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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, June 13, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 115

                            Headlines



G E R M A N Y

ADAM OPEL: Dismisses Rumors on Possible Sale
KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Rates EUR300MM Sr. Secured Notes at 'BB-'


I R E L A N D

BANK OF IRELAND: State Stake May Rise if Rights Issue is Shunned
CORIOLANUS LTD: S&P Lowers Rating on Notes Series 27 to 'CC'
IRISH LIFE: Finance Minister Gets Court Order to Speed Up Sale
SYRACUSE FUNDING: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa3'


I T A L Y

GCL HOLDINGS: Moody's Assigns 'Caa1' Rating to EUR200MM Sr. Bonds


R U S S I A

AK BARS BANK: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable
RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'


S P A I N

ZARAGOZA: Files for Creditor Protection; Has US$146-Mil. Debt


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Production Halted; Delays to Continue
SEB AG: Moody's Raises Junior Subordinated Rating to 'Baa2'


U K R A I N E

FORUM BANK: Moody's Downgrades Long-Term Deposit Rating to 'B1'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

COMET: Circulates List of 22 Stores for Sale
EARLSTOWN TECHNOLOGY: Goes Into Administration Following SFO Probe
HALDANES STORES: Goes Into Administration, 600 Jobs at Risk
JOHNSON STEVENS: In Administration on Iran Sanctions
LIFE & STYLE: Falls Into Administration, SKG Capital May Buy Firm

ODEON & UCI: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to Multicurrency Notes
SOUTHERN CROSS: Plans to Surrender Control of 132 Care Homes
SOUTHERN CROSS: Landlords Unimpressed by 30% Rent Cut Proposal
SOUTHERN CROSS: To Axe 3,000 Jobs Amid Efforts to Avert Bankruptcy
THPA FINANCE: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'BB-'


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 6 to June 10, 2011


                            *********


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G E R M A N Y
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ADAM OPEL: Dismisses Rumors on Possible Sale
--------------------------------------------
John Reed and Bernard Simon at The Financial Times report that
Opel on Thursday dismissed two reports that General Motors, its
owner, was considering a sale of its lossmaking German-
headquartered European operation.

According to the FT, Karl-Friedrich Stracke, the unit's chief
executive, and Klaus Franz, head of Opel's works council, both
said the report that GM was considering a sale, published on
Thursday in the online version of Germany's Der Spiegel magazine,
was "pure speculation."

Der Spiegel on Thursday said that GM was "again ready" to sell
Opel because of losses at the brand and its sister UK marque
Vauxhall, the FT relates.  The magazine cited as possible buyers
Chinese automakers and Volkswagen, Germany's largest carmaker, the
FT states.

Germany's Auto Bild also reported that GM was considering selling
Opel, adding that GM's Chevrolet value brand had the same ability
to engineer small and compact cars for its US parent, the FT
notes.

GM in 2009 put Opel up for sale as it prepared to file for
bankruptcy protection in the U.S. because terms of its government
bail-out prohibited it from funding unprofitable overseas
businesses, the FT discloses.  GM held talks to sell Opel to a
Canadian-Russian consortium, but later shelved the sale after an
improvement in its own finances and Opel/Vauxhall's sales and amid
concerns over possible leaks of Opel's technology to Russia, where
local automaker Gaz was poised to build cars based on GM designs,
the FT recounts.

                         About Adam Opel

Adam Opel GmbH -- http://www.opel.com/-- is General Motors
Corp.'s German wholly owned subsidiary.  Opel started making cars
in 1899.  Opel makes passenger cars (including the Astra, Corsa,
and Vectra) and light commercial vehicles (Combo and Movano).  Its
high-performance VXR range includes souped-up versions of Opel
models like the Meriva minivan, the Corsa hatchback, and the Astra
sports compact.  Opel is GM's largest subsidiary outside North
America.


KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Rates EUR300MM Sr. Secured Notes at 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' issue rating
to the proposed EUR300 million senior secured notes due 2018 to be
issued by Kabel Deutschland Vertrieb und Service GmbH & Co. KG
(KDVS), a subsidiary of German cable operator Kabel Deutschland
GmbH (KDG). "The recovery rating on the proposed notes is '3',
indicating our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default," S&P stated.

"The issue and recovery ratings on the proposed senior secured
notes are based on preliminary information and are subject to the
successful issuance of this instrument and our satisfactory review
of the final documentation. In the event of any changes to the
amount, terms, or conditions of the issue, the issue and recovery
ratings might be subject to further review," S&P continued.

"We understand that KDG intends to use the proceeds from the
proposed notes and new bank debt, together totaling at least
EUR750 million, to repay its outstanding payment-in-kind loan due
2014, as well as drawings under its revolving credit facilities
(RCFs). We anticipate that any additional amounts raised would be
used to pay down other senior secured debt, and we therefore
assume that the group's overall gross debt will be broadly
unchanged as a result of this transaction," S&P noted.

                        Recovery Analysis

S&P said, "We understand that the proposed EUR300 million senior
secured notes will benefit from the same security and guarantees
as KDG's existing senior secured bank debt, and that the two
pieces of debt will rank pari passu in right and order of payment
by way of an intercreditor agreement. The security consists of
pledges over shares, bank accounts, and KDG's digital network
equipment and moveable assets. KDG will also provide a guarantee
to the issuer, KDVS. Following the anticipated merger of KDVS into
KDG, we believe that KDG's parent company, Kabel Deutschland
Holding AG (KD Holding AG), will provide to the issuer a pledge of
all shares held or to be held by KD Holding AG in KDG."

The proposed notes' documentation includes some restrictions on,
among other things, KDG's ability to incur additional
indebtedness, create liens (other than an additional permitted
basket of EUR80 million), and make payments and dividends. The
documentation contains one incurrence covenant that limits
senior secured debt leverage to 4.5x, with certain caveats
allowing, among other things, the securitization of receivables.

KDG's existing bank facilities benefit from some maintenance
covenants. These limit senior net debt to EBITDA to 4.25x as of
June 30, 2011, with gradual step-downs to 3.50x by Dec. 31, 2012.

"In order to determine recoveries, we simulate a payment default.
Under our hypothetical scenario, we envisage, among other things,
a decline in KDG's operating performance. This is due to a
combination of increased competition -- resulting in meaningful
churn rates for cable TV subscribers -- and increased subscriber
acquisition and retention costs for broadband Internet
and telephony subscribers. We assume that the operating
underperformance would result in a refinancing trigger of bank
debt ahead of the maturity of the proposed notes in 2018. Our
assumptions include that KDG's current senior secured debt is
refinanced in full on maturity and that the group's RCFs are
fully drawn at default," S&P related.

"At the hypothetical point of default, we assume that EBITDA will
have declined to about EUR417 million, and we calculate a stressed
enterprise value of EUR2.4 billion using a market-multiple
approach," S&P noted.

"From this stressed enterprise value, we deduct priority
liabilities of about EUR190 million, primarily comprising
enforcement costs, with the remainder made up of finance leases
and liabilities related to pensions. This leaves sufficient value
for meaningful (50%-70%) recovery for the pari passu senior
secured debt, which we estimate to be about EUR3.2 billion at
default (at the high end of the range, including six months of
prepetition interest). This supports our recovery rating of '3' on
the proposed senior secured notes," S&P added.

Ratings List

New Rating

Kabel Deutschland Vertrieb und Service GmbH & Co. KG
Senior Secured Debt (Proposed)*
  EUR300 mil nts due 2018               BB-
  Recovery Rating                       3

*Guaranteed by Kabel Deutschland GmbH (KDG).


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I R E L A N D
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BANK OF IRELAND: State Stake May Rise if Rights Issue is Shunned
----------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that Bank of Ireland has
painted a worst-case scenario where the State's stake would rise
to 87% if no bondholders accept its debt for cash or shares
proposals and investors shun a subsequent rights issue.

The Irish Times relates that the Bank of Ireland said it planned
to issue shares at between 11.3 cent and 11.8 cent a share to
subordinated bondholders taking up a debt-for-equity swap before
July 7.

Publishing further details of the cash and shares offer to
bondholders, the bank said the final equity conversion price would
be set on June 23, The Irish Times notes.

Shares will be issued to bondholders on the basis that they will
not be able to participate in a subsequent right issue of new
shares, The Irish Times discloses.

It emerged on Wednesday that a group of investors holding more
than US$1 billion of BoI's subordinated bonds have hired law firm
White and Case in London to challenge the bank's plans to raise
EUR4.2 billion in cash, according to The Irish Times.

The bank's debt offer is "fatally flawed because it fails to
respect the fundamental principle that creditors must be paid
ahead of shareholders," White and Case, as cited by The Irish
Times, said.  Rather than engaging investors in a "market-based"
solution, the bank, supported by the Minister for Finance, has
"defaulted to a different path -- yet another taxpayer funded
bailout that is regrettably premised on the improper impairment of
creditor rights," White and Case noted, the report cites.

BoI, which is 36% State-owned, is attempting to avoid government
control, making it the last of the banks to avoid majority public
ownership, The Irish Times notes.

BoI's offer is open to subordinated bondholders holding EUR2.6
billion of debt, The Irish Times discloses.  The State will buy
any shares not taken up by investors at a price of 10 cent a share
in the rights issue up to EUR2.2 billion following the debt deal
with bondholders, The Irish Times states.

BoI is seeking to inflict losses of up to 90 cent in the euro as
part of the Government's plans to pass a significant share of bank
losses onto the bondholders, The Irish Times notes.

According to The Irish Times, bondholders who don't accept the
offer will be virtually wiped out -- receiving 1 cent for every
EUR1,000 of debt held.  The bank warned that the Government would
take "severe measures" to ensure burden-sharing is achieved, The
Irish Times states.

Bank of Ireland was ordered to raise EUR4.2 billion in cash and a
further EUR1 billion in contingent capital by the Central Bank
following the bank stress tests last March, The Irish Times
discloses.

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland --
http://www.bankofireland.com/-- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor, trustee,
life assurance and pension and investment fund management, fund
administration and custodial services and financial advisory
services, including mergers and acquisitions and underwriting.
The Company organizes its businesses into Retail Republic of
Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital Markets, UK Financial
Services and Group Centre.  It has operations throughout Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 8,
2011, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the dated subordinated
debt of Bank of Ireland (BoI), EBS Building Society (EBS) and
Irish Life & Permanent (IL&P) one further notch to C from Ca. In
addition, the undated subordinated debt EMTN programme rating of
IL&P, and the undated subordinated debt and tier 1 instruments of
Bank of Ireland were downgraded to C (hyb) from Ca (hyb).  This
follows the announcement of offers from EBS and IL&P, and details
of an offer to be made shortly by BoI, to buy back the junior
securities of the banks for cash at very high discounts to
the par value. BoI will also offer an equity conversion option.

EBS and IL&P are rated Ba2/N-P for bank deposits, Ba3/N-P for
senior debt and have D- standalone bank financial strength ratings
(mapping to Ba3 on the long-term scale).  The outlook is negative.
BoI is rated Ba1/N-P for bank deposits, Ba2/N-P for senior debt
and has a D standalone bank financial strength rating (mapping to
Ba2 on the long-term scale).  The outlook is negative.


CORIOLANUS LTD: S&P Lowers Rating on Notes Series 27 to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
17 European synthetic collateralized debt obligation tranches.

Specifically, S&P has:

    * Placed its ratings on five tranches on CreditWatch negative,

    * Lowered and kept on CreditWatch negative its ratings on six
      tranches,

    * Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
      three tranches,

    * Placed its ratings on two tranches on CreditWatch positive,
      and

    * Withdrawn its rating on one tranche.

"The rating actions follow our recent rating actions on the
underlying collateral, reference obligation, or guarantor.
According to the transaction documents, the ratings on these
tranches are weak-linked to the rating on the underlying
collateral, reference obligation, or guarantor. Under our criteria
applicable to transactions such as these, we would generally
reflect changes to the rating on the collateral in our rating on
the tranche," S&P stated.

Ratings List

Class                 Rating
           To                           From

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Negative

*Argon Capital PLC
EUR11 Million Limited-Recourse
Secured Fixed-Rate Credit-Linked
Notes Series 110

           A (sf)/Watch Neg             A (sf)

*Corsair (Jersey) No. 4 Ltd.
US$30 Million Secured First To
Default Credit-Linked
Floating-Rate Notes Series 8

           A (sf)/Watch Neg             A (sf)

*DCC - Dexia Crediop Per La
  Cartolarizzazione S.r.l.
EUR1.132 Billion Floating-Rate
Notes Series 2004-1

           A- (sf)/Watch Neg            A- (sf)

*DCC - Dexia Crediop Per La
  Cartolarizzazione S.r.l.
EUR1.009 Billion Floating-Rate
Notes Series 2005-1

           A- (sf)/Watch Neg            A- (sf)

*DCC - Dexia Crediop Per La
  Cartolarizzazione S.r.l.
EUR2.346 Billion Floating-Rate
Notes Series 2008-1

           A- (sf)/Watch Neg            A- (sf)

Ratings Lowered and Kept on Creditwatch Negative

*Aeolos S.A.
EUR355 Million Floating-Rate
Asset-Backed Notes

           B (sf)/Watch Neg             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

*Ariadne S.A.
EUR650 Million Floating-Rate
Asset-Backed Notes

           B (sf)/Watch Neg             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

*New Economy Development Fund S.A.
EUR105 Million Floating-Rate
Participation Notes

           B (sf)/Watch Neg             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

*Signum Finance II PLC
EUR200 Million Danish Inflation-Linked
Notes Series 2005-15

           B (sf)/Watch Neg             BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

*Willow No.2 (Ireland) PLC
EUR7.2 Million Secured Limited-Recourse
Floating-Rate Notes Series 31

           A+/Watch Neg                 AA+/Watch Neg

*Willow No.2 (Ireland) PLC
EUR6.2 Million Secured Limited-Recourse
Notes Series 32

           A+ (sf)/Watch Neg            AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

*Coriolanus Ltd.
EUR6 Million Pass-Through
Floating-Rate Secured
Notes Series 27

           CC (sf)                      B- (sf)/Watch Neg

*Feco II Ltd.
EUR8.65 Million Deco 17- Pan Europe 7
Limited Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes Series 2009-7

           A                            AAA/Watch Neg

*Lunar Funding V PLC
EUR6.97 Million Limited-Recourse
Secured Asset-Backed Notes Series
2010-74

           A+                           AA+/Watch Neg

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Positive

*Edam Funding One Ltd.
EUR15 Million Limited-Recourse
Floating-Rate Credit-Linked Notes
Series 05-03

           CCC-/Watch Pos               CCC-

*Edam Funding One Ltd.
EUR20 Million Limited-Recourse
Floating-Rate Credit-Linked
Notes Series 2007-1

           CCC-/Watch Pos               CCC-

Rating Withdrawn

*ELM B.V.
EUR10 Million Class Jss Secured
Credit-Linked Notes Series 81
(Morro Bay Notes)

           NR                           BBB+ (sf)

NR--Not rated.


IRISH LIFE: Finance Minister Gets Court Order to Speed Up Sale
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan and Simon Carswell at The Irish Times report that
Ireland's Minister for Finance has secured a court order directing
Irish Life & Permanent to take steps to achieve the speedy and
orderly sale of Irish Life as part of efforts to recapitalize the
company by EUR4 billion.

The Irish Times relates that the president of the High Court, Mr.
Justice Nicholas Kearns, on Thursday granted the Minister's
application, made under emergency banking legislation, the Credit
Institutions Stabilization Act, for the direction order.

The decision to seek the order was linked to concerns that senior
bondholders could characterize the sale of Irish Life -- which
represents about two-thirds of the business -- as an event of
default, The Irish Times notes.

The High Court order safeguards the company's plans to sell Irish
Life, which is estimated to raise EUR1.5 billion towards the
recapitalization, The Irish Times discloses.

According to The Irish Times, a senior Department of Finance
official said in an affidavit that the Minister had considered the
direction order was necessary to protect the company in
circumstances where lawyers in the UK had advised there was a real
risk bondholders could argue the preparatory steps required to
implement the Irish Life sale may trigger events of default under
senior bonds issued by IL&P.

IL&P has about EUR1 billion outstanding under senior bonds
guaranteed by the Minister under a particular scheme, The Irish
Times discloses.

IL&P had consented to the direction order being made, David
Barniville SC, as cited by The Irish Times, said for the Minister.

The order requires IL&P to take steps as soon as practicable, and
no later than October 2011, to offer Irish Life for sale either
through an initial public offering or a private sale, according to
The Irish Times.

The Irish Times notes that Mr. Barniville said the background to
the application was the "precarious" financial position of IL&P,
which was reliant on support from the State and the European
Central Bank.

Headquartered in Dublin, Irish Life & Permanent plc --
http://www.irishlifepermanent.ie/-- is a provider of personal
financial services to the Irish market.  Its business segments
include banking, which provides retail banking services; insurance
and investment, which includes individual and group life assurance
and investment contracts, pensions and annuity business written in
Irish Life Assurance plc and Irish Life International, and the
investment management business written in Irish Life Investment
Managers Limited; general insurance, which includes property and
casualty insurance carried out through its associate, Allianz-
Irish Life Holdings plc, and other, which includes a number of
small business units.  On June 30, 2008, it acquired the rest of
the 50% interest in Joint Mortgage Holdings No. 1 Limited (the
parent of Springboard Mortgages Limited), resulting in Springboard
Mortgages becoming a wholly owned subsidiary.  On December 23,
2008, it acquired an additional 23% of Cornmarket Group Financial
Services Ltd, bringing its interest to 98%.


SYRACUSE FUNDING: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of one class
of notes issued by Syracuse Funding Euro Limited. The notes
affected by the rating action are:

Issuer: Syracuse Funding EUR Limited

   -- EUR6.438M Class D Floating Rate Notes due 2018, Downgraded
      to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2009 Confirmed at Caa1
      (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions result primarily from the very high likelihood
of an ultimate payment default and Moody's recovery expectations
on this tranche.

As of May 3, 2011, the remaining principal of Class D notes was
EUR1.47 Million. The portfolio currently comprises only two assets
and Moody's expects that the proceeds generated by these assets
would lead to losses in line with a Caa3 rating as per "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009.

The principal methodology used in the rating was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Collateralized Funds of Hedge Funds Obligations"
published in July 2003. This approach deviates from the model used
at the inception of the transaction which simulates the net asset
value evolution based on the covenanted characteristics of the
portfolio. No model was used in the current credit assessment.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


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I T A L Y
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GCL HOLDINGS: Moody's Assigns 'Caa1' Rating to EUR200MM Sr. Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Caa1 rating to
the EUR200 million worth of senior unsecured bond issued by GCL
Holdings SCA, holding company of Guala Closures S.p.A. The outlook
on the ratings is stable.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating assignment on the debt obligation is in
line with the provisional rating assigned on April 13, 2011.
Moody's rating rationale was set out in a press release issued on
that date. The final terms of the notes are in line with the
drafts reviewed for the provisional ratings assignments.

The B2 corporate family rating assigned to Guala reflects its
relatively small size overall in relation to its much larger and
consolidated customer base, as well as its weak credit metrics,
which are nevertheless mitigated by Moody's expectation that the
group will gradually de-leverage and maintain a conservative
financial profile. More positively, the B2 rating also reflects:
(i) the sound business profile of the group thanks to its market-
leading position in safety closures for the spirits industry; (ii)
the growing potential offered by the increasing penetration of
safety closures in emerging markets; and (iii) the group's
relatively stable operating performances despite its exposure to
raw material prices.

All in all, Moody's sees Guala's rating as strongly positioned in
its rating category and a track record of sustained profitability
and positive free cash flow that had to lead to a gradual
reduction in financial leverage might result in positive pressure
on the rating over time. Moody's would expect, however, Guala's
key credit metrics to remain in line with a mid single-B rating
over the short to medium term. In particular, as at FYE December
(including the mezzanine debt at holding company level) 2010
Guala's financial leverage, measured as debt/EBITDA (adjusted for
operating leases), stood at 5.2x and EBIT interest coverage at
1.5x.

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that Guala will continue to grow while maintaining a conservative
financial policy and will gradually improve its key credit
metrics, benefitting from the growing penetration of safety
closures and wine caps. Upward pressure on the rating could result
from the company's success in improving operating profitability
leading to a financial leverage well below 5x together with an
EBIT interest cover above 2x. Conversely, a rating downgrade could
result from deteriorating operating profitability preventing the
company from improving key credit metrics, that would result in
financial leverage increasing towards 6x or negative free cash
flow would result in a rating downgrade. The rating does not
assume any large debt financed acquisition.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating GCL Holdings S.C.A. was
the Global Packaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic
Containers Industry Methodology, published June 2009. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative
Grade Issuers in the US, Canada, and EMEA, published June 2009.

Guala is a one of the world largest producers of closures for the
spirits and wine industries, with market-leading positions in the
safety closures and wine screw-cap segments. The company generated
revenues of around EUR371 million and EBITDA of EUR82 million (22%
margin) in FYE December 2010. Located in Italy, Guala generates a
significant proportion of its revenues in Western European markets
(41% of 2010 revenues by production facility).


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R U S S I A
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AK BARS BANK: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ak Bars Bank's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook.

Ak Bars' ratings reflect the potential for support from the
government of the Republic of Tatarstan (RT; 'BBB-'/Stable).
Fitch's view of the high propensity to provide support is based on
the republic's direct and indirect shareholder control, its strong
board representation, the track record of liquidity and capital
injections and the systemic importance of the bank to the region.

The audited financial statements from previous years report that
the government directly and indirectly controls a 96% stake in the
bank. Fitch estimates that at the end of 2010, the republic's
'direct' control (shares owned by a government ministry and by
entities solely owned by the ministry) was 43%. The remaining 53%,
which the bank reports as being indirectly controlled by the
government, is ultimately owned by private individuals. This
complex ownership structure is a risk factor, in Fitch's view,
although the agency notes there is a long track record of a stable
and supportive relationship between the government and the bank.

The 'D/E' Individual Rating reflects moderate internal capital
generation, high concentrations, the significant proportion of
impaired loans, sizable non-core assets and heightened market
risk. At the same time, it factors in Ak Bars' large franchise in
the republic and moderate wholesale refinancing needs.

Ak Bars' rather weak performance is influenced by its dual role as
a commercial bank and a financial vehicle of the republic's
government. Ak Bars' net interest margin has been narrower than
its peers. Profitability is likely to improve slightly in 2011
through asset quality normalization and credit portfolio growth.

Problem loans have continued to mount. Impaired loans under IFRS,
which include all loans with expectations of even a minor loss,
stood at 29.9% of gross lending at end-2010 compared with 20.7% at
end-2009. Loans overdue by 90 days or more stood broadly the same
in absolute terms during 2010 and made up 7.1% of gross loans at
end-2010. However, non-core assets, represented by investment
properties, almost tripled in 2010 and equaled RUB22.9 billion at
year-end (78% of bank's equity). Heightened market risk results
from a sizeable, and increased proprietary equity position (equal
to 42% of the bank's equity at end-2010).

Wholesale refinancing risk is manageable. The bank has two local
bonds with outstanding amounts of RUB5.3 billion (2.3% of end-2010
assets). Foreign debt, apart from trade finance facilities, is
represented by two Eurobond issues: US$300 million (4.0%) maturing
in late June of this year and US$280 million (3.7%) due in
December 2012. Cash and liquid securities (15% of assets at end-
2010) fully covered these obligations, and US$300 million bonds
are to be repaid by deposits currently placed in the central bank.

Both Basel and regulatory capital ratios are significantly above
minimum levels (end-2010 Basel I ratios: Tier I -- 13.1%, Total --
16.1%, regulatory -- 15.3% at end-April 2011). At the same time,
sizable non-core assets and equity holdings undermine the quality
of capital, and make capital adequacy highly dependent on the
success of these investments. That said, in case of need, the
republic would be likely, in Fitch's view, to contribute fresh
equity, as it has done in the past.

The rating actions are:

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

   -- National Long-term rating affirmed at 'AA-(rus)'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Individual Rating affirmed at 'D/E'

   -- Support Rating affirmed at '3'

   -- Senior unsecured debt long-term rating affirmed at 'BB'

   -- Senior unsecured debt National rating affirmed at 'AA-
      (rus)', Outlook Stable


RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Agricultural Bank's (RusAg)
ratings, including its Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'BBB' with a Stable Outlook.

The bank's IDRs continue to be underpinned by Fitch's view of the
high probability of support from the Russian authorities
(sovereign Long-term IDRs: 'BBB'/Positive), if needed. This view
is based on the bank's full state ownership; its policy role in
agribusiness lending; the close association between the government
and the bank, based on strong board representation and supportive
policy statements; and the track record of providing fresh capital
to the bank during the crisis.

The Stable Outlook continues to reflect Fitch's expectation that
the bank's Long-term IDRs (in common with those of other Russian
state-owned banks) are unlikely to change if the Russian
Federation's Long-term IDRs are upgraded to 'BBB+'. This in turn
reflects Fitch's usual practice of notching the ratings of state-
owned banks down from their respective sovereigns, particularly at
higher rating levels. It also reflects the agency's view that if
there was a deep financial crisis in Russia, there is some risk
that the sovereign would cease to provide full and timely support
to state-owned banks and other quasi-sovereigns, including
allowing them to make all payments to bondholders, before it
defaulted on its own obligations.

RusAg's foreign public debt was US$6 billion at end-2010, which
represented approximately 22% of its liabilities. In addition, 11%
of non-equity funding was attracted on the domestic debt market.
In Fitch's view, this represents a significant dependence on
wholesale funding. However, the agency acknowledges that these
amounts, taken in isolation, are still small relative to the
capacity of the Russian sovereign to provide support, in
particular as measured by the country's foreign exchange reserves
of US$520 billion.

RusAg's 'D' Individual Rating factors in the risks of rapid asset
growth and a highly unseasoned loan book of uncertain quality; the
bank's single sector risk concentration and the recent reported
increase in non-performing loans. However, it also takes into
account RusAg's manageable near-term refinancing risk and
government support measures to the agricultural sector.

Non-performing loans by Fitch's definition (those overdue by 90
days or more) reached 9.2% of gross loans at end-2010. This is
slightly higher than the 7.6% NPL ratio reported by the bank,
which excludes loans 90 days overdue not classified as impaired.
Contrary to the broader banking sector, asset quality has
continued to weaken in recent quarters. Combined with the pace at
which the loan portfolio has grown, the long-term maturity of
loans and the initially moderate burden on borrowers due to
interest rate subsidies, this trend suggests to Fitch that there
is a significant risk of further asset quality deterioration in
the future. Reserve coverage of loans over 90 days overdue,
according to Fitch estimates, was 83% at end-2010.

During 2009-2010, the bank channelled practically all pre-
impairment operating profit into provisions. Fitch expects
impairment charges to be high in 2011.

There is a track record of capital injections by the state both
before and during the crisis, which have supported growth and
provide some buffer to absorb a further increase in NPLs. At end-
April 2011, the bank could have increased the maximum
reserves/loans ratio in its statutory accounts to 15.5% (from the
actual level of 7.6%) before the regulatory capital ratio (17.3%
at end-April 2011) would have fallen to the minimum 10% level.
Basel Tier I and total ratios were 13.3% and 18.7%, respectively,
at end-2010. However, the adequacy of the bank's capitalization is
difficult to assess given the unseasoned loan book and uncertainty
of future asset quality trends.

RusAg is the fourth-largest Russian bank by assets and the second-
largest by regional branch network, specializing in agribusiness
lending. It is 100% owned by the state. The privatization of up to
a 25% stake is possible in the period up to 2015; although there
are no concrete privatization plans at present.

The rating actions are:

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'F3'

   -- National Long-term rating affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Individual Rating affirmed at 'D'

   -- Support Rating affirmed at '2'

   -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BBB'

   -- Senior unsecured debt long-term rating affirmed at 'BBB'

   -- Senior unsecured debt short-term rating affirmed at 'F3'

   -- Senior unsecured debt National rating affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'

   -- Subordinated notes affirmed at 'BBB-'

Fitch has also assigned RusAg's subordinated US$800 million bonds
a final Long-term foreign currency rating of 'BBB-'. The bonds
have a final maturity of 10 years and pay a 6% coupon up to a call
option in five years. The notes have been issued under the US$10
billion LPN program, which allows for issuance of both senior
unsecured and subordinated debt.


=========
S P A I N
=========


ZARAGOZA: Files for Creditor Protection; Has US$146-Mil. Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that the soccer club Zaragoza is
filing for protection from creditors under Spanish bankruptcy law.

According to AP, the club on Wednesday said it was in danger of a
"cash flow" problem due to a debt of US$146.57 million.

AP relates that the club said its financial difficulties stemmed
from its "relegation three seasons ago, and the economic effort
made to return to the first division just one season later."

The club, as cited by AP, said it had "been able to stabilize its
debt by the end of the 2009-10 season, but it had been impossible
to reduce it."

Zaragoza is a first division Spanish soccer club.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Production Halted; Delays to Continue
------------------------------------------------------
Christina Zander and Maarten van Tartwijk at Dow Jones Newswires
report that production at Saab Automobile was halted for a third
consecutive day Thursday and owner Spyker Cars NV warned of
continued delays as it works out new contracts with suppliers,
raising fresh fears about the future of the Swedish car maker.

Saab Auto's output was suspended for two months after Spyker ran
out of money to pay suppliers, but production restarted at the end
of May when Chinese car distributor Pang Da Automobile Trade Co.
Ltd. bought 1,300 Saab cars for cash, Dow Jones recounts.  Spyker
had warned that the production restart would be disrupted because
its supply chain is complicated and international, but some
suppliers said Thursday the latest shutdown raises new concerns
over Saab's financial future, Dow Jones notes.

Dow Jones relates that Svenake Berglie, head of the Swedish
suppliers organization FKG, said he had expected initial
disruption to the production restart because Saab's plants were
idle for seven weeks, but the latest shutdown signaled that Saab
didn't have sufficient funds to settle its debts with suppliers
and renegotiate new deliveries.

In a statement, Spyker admitted that Saab's supply chain still
wasn't fully functional as some suppliers continued to withhold
deliveries due to unpaid bills, the FT discloses.

Saab spokeswoman Gunilla Gustavs declined to provide details of
Saab's current financial position, saying negotiations with
suppliers were complicated, the FT states.

"It's important that we continue to strengthen our financial
position," Ms. Gustavs, as cited by Dow Jones, said, adding that
the company is still looking at several different financial
solutions and hopes to present a solution to its plan to sell and
lease back Saab property to secure new funds within a few days.

"We have a few thousand suppliers world-wide, with each of whom we
have to reach acceptable terms and conditions to resume production
of parts and subsequent deliveries," Dow Jones Newswires quotes
Spyker Chief Executive Victor Muller as saying in a statement.
"Many suppliers are located outside Europe and restocking
inevitably takes time."

According to Dow Jones Newswires, Mr. Muller warned there would be
"production hiccups in the near future until the supply chain is
fully back to normal."

Thursday's decision to shut down production in Trollhattan was
made early in the day, Dow Jones recounts.  The news source notes
that Ms. Gustavs said Saab couldn't say how long production would
remain halted.

With an annual production of up to 126,000 cars, Saab's current
models include the 9-3 (available as a convertible or sport
sedan), the luxury 9-5 sedan (also available in a sport wagon),
and the seven-passenger 9-7X SUV.  As it prepared to separate from
General Motors, Saab filed for bankruptcy protection in February
2009.  A year later, in February 2010, GM sold Saab to Dutch
sports car maker Spyker Cars for about US$400 million in cash and
stock.


SEB AG: Moody's Raises Junior Subordinated Rating to 'Baa2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the junior subordinated and
Tier 1 instrument ratings of SEB to Baa2 (hyb) and Ba1 (hyb), from
Baa3 (hyb) and Ba2 (hyb), respectively. The upgrade of these
junior debt instruments follows an improvement in the bank's
standalone credit strength to Baa1 from Baa2, which is mapped from
the bank's C- bank financial strength rating. The bank financial
strength rating, A1 long-term debt and the A2 subordinated debt
ratings have been affirmed with a stable outlook. The ratings of
SEB's German subsidiary SEB AG (Baa1/P-2/D+) are unaffected by the
rating action.

Ratings Rationale

Upgrade of Junior Subordinated and Tier 1 Instrument Ratings

The upgrade in SEB's junior subordinated and Tier 1 instrument
ratings of SEB to Baa2 (hyb) and Ba1 (hyb) follows an affirmation
of the C- BFSR and upward revision in the bank's standalone credit
strength to Baa1 from Baa2 given the stabilization of asset
quality and recovering profitability in the bank's Baltic
operations. As of Q1 2011, the Baltic region accounted almost 70%
of the group's total loan impairments, but only 7% of its credit
exposures.

During the financial crisis, asset quality in SEB's Baltic
operations deteriorated rapidly, putting pressure on the group's
overall profitability. Non-performing loans (defined as gross
impaired loans subject to individual impairment plus loans more
than 60 days overdue) as a percentage of gross loans increased to
13.9% at H1 2010 from 3.2% YE2008. In line with other Nordic banks
that have Baltic operations, SEB responded by significantly
reducing its exposure to the Baltic countries, achieving a 38%
decrease in its Baltic credit exposures since Q4 2008. During the
second half of 2010, Baltic asset quality started to improve and
for the first time since Q3 2008, the Baltic operations returned
to profitability in Q3 2010.

Moreover, the improvement in SEB's financial strength further
reflects the bank's good capitalization. The bank's Tier 1 capital
ratio, in accordance with Basel II transitional rules, have
improved to 13.2% as at the end of March 2011 from 8.4% at year-
end 2008, largely as a result of a SEK15 billion rights issue in
2009.

Following the rating action the baseline credit assessment now
tracks to the higher end of the C- bank financial strength rating
range.

Affirmation of Debt and Deposit Ratings Reflects Gradual Removal
of Extraordinary Systemic Support

The affirmation of SEB AB's long and short-term ratings at A1/P-1
-- despite the upgrade in the stand alone credit strength to Baa1
from Baa2 -- reflects the gradual reduction of Moody's assumption
of the unusual systemic support granted to Swedish banks during
the financial crisis. During the crisis, despite weakening stand-
alone credit fundamentals, Moody's globally maintained a number of
banks' long-term ratings at or near pre-crisis levels, reflecting
the support provided by governments at that time. Moody's is
gradually reducing such unusual support uplift as such support
mechanisms are phased out, as banks' stand-alone profiles improve,
and as regulators globally consider implementing bank resolution
regimes. As a result, SEB's long-term ratings now benefit from
three notches of uplift from the level of the standalone bank
financial strength rating, compared with four previously.

A sustainable improvement in asset quality, earnings and continued
improvement in funding profile could exert upward pressure on the
ratings. The rating agency notes that an upgrade of the standalone
bank financial strength rating will not necessarily lead to an
upgrade of the long-term debt and deposit ratings as the level of
systemic support will continue to be reassessed, especially in
light of the evolving EU regulatory framework concerning support
for banking systems.

Downward pressure on the ratings could result from a material
deterioration in SEB's profitability, capitalization or the bank's
asset quality beyond levels currently expected by Moody's. In
addition, a material erosion of the bank's funding profile and/or
franchise in its core markets could put pressure on the bank's
current rating levels.

The principal methodologies used in the rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden, SEB reported total
consolidated assets of SEK2,118 billion (EUR237 billion) at the
end of March 2011.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


FORUM BANK: Moody's Downgrades Long-Term Deposit Rating to 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Forum Bank's long-term
local currency bank deposit rating to B1 from Ba1. The standalone
bank financial strength rating of E+ has been affirmed, but the
bank's BFSR now maps to B3 on the long-term scale. The bank's
National Scale Rating has been downgraded to Aa3.ua from Aa1.ua.

Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed Forum Bank's other ratings as
follows: B3 long-term foreign currency bank deposit rating and Not
Prime short-term local and foreign currency deposit rating. The
BFSR and global local currency deposit rating carry a negative
outlook, while global foreign currency deposit rating carry a
stable outlook, whilst the NSR carries no specific outlook.

The rating actions follow Moody's assessment of Forum Bank's
audited financial statements for 2010, prepared under IFRS.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action is driven by Moody's continued concerns over
Forum Bank's profitability and asset quality as well as by
deterioration of the bank's franchisee. The bank has been loss
making for three consecutive years, and reported a net loss under
IFRS of UAH3.1 billion (US$396 million) for 2010. Moody's expects
Forum Bank's return to profitability to take time, as the bank's
revenue generation capacity has been significantly eroded by the
shrinking business volumes, and profitability was further
pressured by the rapidly growing cost of risk and. The bank is
expected to return to profitability on a pre-provision basis in
2011, and to break-even on a post-provision basis in 2012. Gradual
improvement in overall operating conditions in Ukraine and
resumption of lending are also expected to support the bank's
recovery.

"The deterioration of Forum Bank's financial profile stems
primarily from the ongoing impairment of the loan book," says
Elena Redko, a Moody's Assistant Vice-President and lead analyst
for the bank. At YE2010, Forum Bank's problem loans amounted to
69.4% of its gross loan book while loan loss reserves amounted to
32.7%. Moody's notes that the bank has a limited volume of
restructured loans, and thus the rating agency believes that the
reported level of impaired loans fairly represents the bank's
asset quality.

Forum Bank's high level of foreign currency lending represents
another critical challenge to the rating -- 75% of total loans
were foreign-currency-denominated as at YE2010. Many borrowers in
the corporate sector, particularly in the real estate and
construction sectors, are unhedged with regard to the currency
risk on their loans. Although the Ukrainian hryvnia has been
rather stable after its devaluation in late 2008/early 2009,
Moody's notes that the event risks stemming from the foreign
currency exposures will remain for several years, given the long-
dated maturity of the existing mortgage portfolio.

Moody's decision to affirm Forum Bank's E+ BFSR was supported by
the bank's current capitalization levels. Based on the IFRS report
for YE2010, the bank's Tier 1 ratio and total capital adequacy
ratio stood at a comfortable 17.5% and 26.2%, respectively. Forum
Bank remains adequately capitalized both under Moody's anticipated
and stress scenario; however, the bank would need to raise capital
in order to face a worse-than-stress scenario -- thereby
increasing expectations of final losses from loan book
deterioration to over 40%. Furthermore, the bank currently does
not generate sufficient earnings to cover potential capital needs,
and would therefore require fresh capital from its majority
shareholder.

Moody's adds that Forum Bank's franchise has deteriorated in past
two years as the bank was focused on maintenance of asset quality
rather than on business development. The bank therefore lost
almost 1% market share in total assets from YE2008 to Q1 2011. The
rating agency notes that franchise recovery will be a challenging
exercise given intense competition among Ukrainian banks.

Forum Bank's B1 deposit rating now receives a two-notch rating
uplift from the bank's revised standalone B1 on the long-term
scale, due to parental support considerations. "Moody's assesses
the probability of parental support from the bank's owner --
Commerzbank (CoBa, rated A2/Prime-2/C-, stable (m) outlook) -- in
the event of a stress situation as "moderate", based on CoBa's
94.5% ownership of Forum Bank, and the shareholder's track record
of capital support during the global financial crisis," Mrs.Redko
explains. In 2010, CoBa increased its stake in the bank from 63%
to 94.5%, and injected around UAH3.7 billion of Tier 1 capital.
However, the rating agency notes, that CoBa's willingness to
support its non-EU subsidiary, which has limited strategic fit
with the parent, could be questioned in terms of still challenging
credit conditions in EU.

Moody's National Scale Ratings are intended as relative measures
of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within a
country, enabling market participants to better differentiate
relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in
that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of
Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt
issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated by
a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as in
".mx" for Mexico. For further information on Moody's approach to
national scale ratings, please refer to Moody's Rating
Implementation Guidance published in August 2010 entitled "Mapping
Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale Ratings."

Previous Rating Actions and Principal Methodologies

The principal methodologies used in the rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Kiev, Ukraine, Forum Bank reported total
consolidated assets UAH13.8 billion (US$1.7 billion) in accordance
with IFRS, at YE2010. The bank reported a net loss of UAH3.1
billion or US$396 million.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


COMET: Circulates List of 22 Stores for Sale
----------------------- --------------------
Claer Barrett at The Financial Times reports that troubled
electrical retailer Comet is circulating a confidential list of 22
stores that it wishes to sell, representing some of its best
stores in the UK.

Lossmaking Comet, which has had the weakest like-for-like sales
this year of any UK electrical retailer, is viewed by retail
analysts and investors as a drag on owner Kesa Electrical plc's
profitable French business Darty, the FT says.  Selling the
stores, analysts have suggested, could be a precursor to Kesa's
selling the entire business, the FT states.

The FT relates that last week, Comet began circulating to other
retailers a list of 22 leasehold stores on prime retail parks,
including Manchester's Trafford Park and Reading's Forbury Road.
If it is successful in reassigning the leases on these properties,
it will wipe nearly GBP5 million (US$8.9 million) off Comet's
annual rent bill, the FT notes.  There are 250 Comet-branded
stores in the UK, the FT discloses.

Many of the stores on the list are believed to be the most
expensive in its portfolio, the FT says, citing people familiar
with the situation.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 24,
2011, Bloomberg News, citing analysts, said Kesa may need a
specialist restructuring firm to buy its U.K. Comet chain or to
discard more of the unprofitable unit's stores to placate activist
investor Knight Vinke Asset Management LLC.  An "accelerated
restructuring" in which Kesa closed the worst-performing Comet
stores and kept the chain would be "the most benign solution,"
Simon Irwin, an analyst at Liberum Research in London, as cited by
Bloomberg, said.  Bloomberg disclosed that one person familiar
with the matter said other options include placing the whole U.K.
unit under a so-called company voluntary arrangement, or CVA,
where creditors such as landlords are offered compensation in
return for ending leases, though this isn't being considered.

Comet is a unit of Kesa Electricals Plc is Europe's third largest
electronics retailer.


EARLSTOWN TECHNOLOGY: Goes Into Administration Following SFO Probe
------------------------------------------------------------------
broadbandwatcher.co.uk relates that I3 Group Limited has now
officially entered administration as of May 24, 2011.

The administration proceeding comes after the Serious Fraud Office
(SFO) started to investigate the company's funds and finances,
which were supposed to help roll out fibre broadband in
Bournemouth and Dundee as a part of the Fibrecity project,
according to broadbandwatcher.co.uk.

broadbandwatcher.co.uk, citing public documents, relates that
Earlstown Technology had GBP1,429,794 in its bank account
throughout 2010 compared to the GBP933,658 it had in 2008.

The firm is also no stranger to frequent name changes from H2O
Group Ltd to H2O Networks Group Limited to I3 Group Limited.

"Following on from residual creditor pressure from within i3
Group, Earlstown Technology was placed into administration on May
24.  It's the latest of a number of dominos as a result of the
funding issues with Total Asset Finance.  A number of the other
trading businesses in the i3 Group were sold prior to our
appointment," the report quoted Matt Dunham, who is responsible
for deciding how to sell off the company, as saying.

"i3 International Limited and Fibre Associates Limited, the
trading businesses previously owned by Earlestown Technology
Limited, are unaffected by the appointment of an administrator to
this company.  They continue to operate under new owner, Mochdre
Limited, and aim to grow the i3 brand across the international
markets in which it has always operated.  All companies in the new
organization will be rebranded to emphasize their links to the i3
brand," Mr. Dunham added.


HALDANES STORES: Goes Into Administration, 600 Jobs at Risk
-----------------------------------------------------------
Retail Gazette reports that Haldanes Stores Chief Executive
Officer Arthur Harris confirmed that the retailer is to go into
administration.

The jobs of Haldanes Stores's 600 staff members are now in
jeopardy due to the move.  The retailer, however, said it will
work hard to secure the future of its 26 outlets, according to
Retail Gazette.

Retail Gazette adds that Haldanes has officially started legal
proceedings against The Co-operative Group over the purchase of
stores following the mutual's takeover of Somerfield in 2008.  The
dispute over the dispute has been been named as the major factor
behind the fall into administration, as Haldanes claims that Co-op
breached the terms of their agreement by misrepresenting the
trading levels of the outlets it took on, according to the report.

The convenience stores owned by Haldanes trading under the UGO and
Haldanes Express Limited brands will continue to operate as usual
and are unaffected by the recent development, Mr. Harris
explained, Retail Gazette says.

This may be small comfort to the group, however, as it seems UGO
has been struggling since it was launched earlier this year,
Retail Gazette cites.

Grocery store group Haldanes Stores has 26 outlets in United
Kingdom.


JOHNSON STEVENS: In Administration on Iran Sanctions
----------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Johnson Stevens Agencies Ltd administrator
said the company has entered into administration due to the loss
of business caused by western sanctions imposed on the company's
Iranian shipping client, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines (IRISL).

PKF has been named as administrators of Johnson Stevens.

In recent months, IRISL has faced sanctions-related pressure from
both the European Union and the United States, which have alleged
that the firm has engaged in illicit arms shipments, according to
Reuters.  IRISL has insisted sanctions could not paralyze its
operations.

Reuters relates that PKF said that after U.S. and EU sanctions
were imposed on IRISL, Johnson Stevens' banking facilities were
withdrawn, which caused cash flow difficulties.  PKF said with the
loss of the IRISL contract, Johnson Stevens' directors sought to
replace it with alternative contracts and were hopeful of
attracting a major new line, Reuters notes.

"However, in May 2011, the directors realized that the new line
would not start within the immediate future.  It then became clear
to the directors that the company could not continue to trade due
to the historic issues with IRISL," PKF added.

Kestrel Liner Agencies has acquired most of the interests of
Johnson Stevens.

"The IRISL situation was dreadful for them.  It was a huge
principal, and they were earning a lot of money out of that
agency," Andy Thorne, Kestrel's owner told Reuters.  "They were
told overnight to find a new bank . . . anything that was tarred
with IRISL and the sanctions everyone became very concerned with,"
he added.

Johnson Stevens Agencies Ltd is United Kingdom's leading ship
liner agent.


LIFE & STYLE: Falls Into Administration, SKG Capital May Buy Firm
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PropertyWeek.com reports that Life & Style has collapsed into
administration.

RSM Tenon directors Simon Bonney, Peter Hughes-Holland, and Tom
MacLennan have been appointed as administrators, according to
propertyWeek.com

"Life & Style has been brought to this situation through poor
trading.  We are currently looking at all aspects of the business,
but with the exception of closures that the business had planned
before it was put into administration, stores will remain open for
the immediate future," PropertyWeek.com quotes joint administrator
Simon Bonney, as saying.

Private equity firm SKG Capital is reportedly interested in buying
Life & Style out of administration, according to PropertyWeek.com.

Life & Style is a fashion and homewares retailer company.


ODEON & UCI: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to Multicurrency Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive B3 rating to the
multicurrency notes (GBP475 million equivalent due 2018) issued by
Odeon & UCI Finco plc and a definitive Ba2 rating to the GBP90
million super senior revolving credit facility available to Odeon
& UCI Bond Midco Limited, the holding company of the Odeon & UCI
cinema group. The corporate family rating assigned to Odeon
remains unchanged at B2. The outlook on the ratings is negative.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating assignments on the debt obligations are
in line with the provisional ratings assigned on May 11, 2011.
Moody's rating rationale was set out in a press release issued on
that date. The final terms of the notes are in line with the
drafts reviewed for the provisional ratings assignments.

The B2 CFR assigned to Odeon is based on Moody's view of: (i) the
high financial leverage of the group, (ii) its limited organic
revenue growth potential and (iii) event and execution risks
associated with the current strategy of the group; which are
compensated by (i) the solid business profile of the group; (ii)
its market leadership position across Europe; and (iii) the
historically relatively stable nature of the cinema industry. The
rating also reflects the good track record of the group and
Moody's expectation that the company will be free cash flow-
positive and maintain a sound liquidity profile going forward.
Nonetheless, the rating also reflects risks from the acquisitive
appetite of the group and the uncertainties surrounding potential
changes in ownership.

The group issued a multicurrency GBP475 million worth of senior
secured notes due in 2018 with the aim to repay existing bank debt
and finance future acquisitions. The B3 rating assigned to the
notes, which is one notch lower than the CFR, mainly reflects the
fact that the notes will be subordinated to a new GBP90 million
senior priority revolving credit line. The notes, issued by Odeon
Finco plc, will be secured by a first-ranking lien over shares of
the issuer and the guarantors and charges in certain bank accounts
of the Issuer and the guarantors. The debt rating reflects the
relatively low value assigned by the rating agency to the pledge
on shares in case of distress. The notes will be also subordinated
to trade claims and other financial debt at non-guarantors,
although Moody's would expect these to be limited. Guarantors
represented approximately 80% of consolidated EBITDA and assets as
at FYE December 2010. The new GBP90 million bank facility will
benefit from the same security and guarantee package as the bond
although will rank ahead in terms of payment priority, hence the
rating of Ba2.

Moody's notes the covenant-lite structure of the recapitalization
as the revolving credit facility will not contain any maintenance
covenants. Furthermore, in Moody's view, the limitation on
additional indebtedness in the indenture provides the company with
a degree of flexibility given the relaxed incurrence test. To this
extent, Moody's will monitor the utilization of the proceeds of
the bond issue and any potential future distribution to
shareholders (potentially from proceeds earmarked at closing for
acquisitions). Although the absence of financial maintenance
covenants in the bank facility makes the structure covenant-lite
and in that way similar to an all-bond deal, a recovery rate of
50% at family level has been assumed resulting in a probability of
default rating (PDR) aligned with the CFR.

Following the issuance of the bond, together with the contribution
of additional acquisitions, Moody's would expect the group to
achieve a financial leverage, measured as Debt to EBITDA, adjusted
for leases, of c. 6.5x and a retained cash flow over debt of
slightly below 10%. These metrics are somewhat weak at the B2
rating level, although compensated for by the strength of the
group's business profile and the expectation that positive free
cash flow generation will result in gradual improvements of key
ratios over time.

Odeon & UCI Bond Midco Limited and Odeon & UCI Finco plc's ratings
were assigned by evaluating factors that Moody's considers
relevant to the credit profile of the issuer, such as the
company's (i) business risk and competitive position compared with
others within the industry; (ii) capital structure and financial
risk; (iii) projected performance over the near to intermediate
term; and (iv) management's track record and tolerance for risk.
Moody's compared these attributes against other issuers both
within and outside Odeon & UCI Bond Midco Limited and Odeon & UCI
Finco plc's core industry and believes Odeon & UCI Bond Midco
Limited and Odeon & UCI Finco plc's ratings are comparable to
those of other issuers with similar credit risk. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative
Grade Issuers in the US, Canada, and EMEA, published June 2009.

Headquartered in London, United Kingdom, Odeon group is the
largest European cinema operator with 1,884 screens as at
December 2010. During the FYE December 2010, the company reported
revenues of GBP650 million and EBITDA of GBP82.4 million. Pro-
forma for the acquisitions already completed or for which the
company entered into an agreement to acquire and including small
cost savings, EBITDA as at December 2010 would be GBP97.5 million.


SOUTHERN CROSS: Plans to Surrender Control of 132 Care Homes
------------------------------------------------------------
Ed Hammond, Simon Mundy and Daniel Thomas at The Financial Times
report that Southern Cross Healthcare plans to surrender control
of 132 care homes as part of a financial restructuring package
aimed at saving the group.

In documents distributed to landlords and seen by the FT, Southern
Cross outlined a two-pronged exit strategy from almost 20% of its
752 care homes.

According to the FT, the documents identified 47 homes that
Southern Cross "does not wish to retain due to demographic and/or
financial reasons" and intends to hand back to landlords by
September 30.  It plans to pull out of a further 85 homes by 2016,
the FT discloses.

All the homes Southern Cross plans to withdraw from are referred
to in the documents as "Limited Life" homes, the FT notes.

The FT relates that Southern Cross also told 80 landlords that it
was "keen to work with landlords to enable the orderly transition
to an alternative operator of [their] choice."

The documents explained the impact that the proposed restructuring
would have on each landlord's rental payments, the FT states.  The
documents also set out a proposal to reduce Southern Cross's
annual rent bill from GBP202.3 million to GBP137.5 million,
according to the FT.

Landlords with profitable homes have said they would ask for the
homes back if Southern Cross failed to pay the rent, and find
other operators for them, the FT notes.

Southern Cross Healthcare provides residential and nursing care to
more than 31,000 residents cared for by 45,000 staff in 750
locations.  It also operates homes that specialize in treating
people with dementia, mental health problems and learning
disabilities.


SOUTHERN CROSS: Landlords Unimpressed by 30% Rent Cut Proposal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Mundy, Ed Hammond and Daniel Thomas at The Financial Times
report that landlords were unimpressed by Southern Cross
Healthcare's proposed 30% cut, and have grown increasingly
frustrated with their tenant's refusal to set out a long-term
plan, which is acceptable to them.

At a meeting on June 6, Four Seasons and Bondcare -- which own 85
of Southern Cross's 752 homes between them -- circulated a
document that set out a plan to put the company into
administration by the end of the month, the FT relates.

"If we can demonstrate that there is a way to maintain continuity
of care, while limiting the financial costs, home closures and
redundancies then we expect we can gather government
support for a quick and orderly administration process," said the
landlords' document, which the FT has seen.

According to the FT, the administration proposal urged the
landlords present to commit to issuing winding-up petitions
against Southern Cross, "if required."  However, the FT notes,
many of the landlords have cooled on the idea of administration.
Only one such petition was submitted from an address registered to
a subsidiary of landlord Vector Property Group, but was withdrawn
on Thursday, the FT relates.

"We've changed our minds," the FT quotes another landlord as
saying.  "Avoiding administration is preferable in terms of
publicity.  Also to a certain extent, you lose control when it's
in the administrators' hands."

Southern Cross Healthcare provides residential and nursing care to
more than 31,000 residents cared for by 45,000 staff in 750
locations.  It also operates homes that specialize in treating
people with dementia, mental health problems and learning
disabilities.


SOUTHERN CROSS: To Axe 3,000 Jobs Amid Efforts to Avert Bankruptcy
------------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Southern Cross Healthcare has announced
proposals to cut 3,000 jobs out of its workforce of 44,000 staff.

According to BBC, the company said home managers, deputy managers,
relief managers, activity coordinators and administrators would
not be directly affected.

BBC relates that Southern Cross said it expected the cuts to be
completed by October, after a period of consultation with unions.

Unions called for the government to step in with financial
support, BBC discloses.

Southern Cross has already deferred 30% of its rent to landlords
of its 750 homes as it tries to avoid bankruptcy, BBC notes.

The company, as cited by BBC, said the job reductions were part of
an ongoing program of change, instigated by its senior management
team 18 months ago.

It said the cuts would not jeopardize the quality of care provided
to its 31,000 residents, but this was disputed by unions, BBC
notes.

Southern Cross Healthcare provides residential and nursing care to
more than 31,000 residents cared for by 45,000 staff in 750
locations.  It also operates homes that specialize in treating
people with dementia, mental health problems and learning
disabilities.


THPA FINANCE: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed THPA Finance Limited's notes and
revised the Outlooks to Positive:

   -- GBP145m class A2 secured 7.127% fixed-rate notes due 2024:
      affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook revised to Positive from Stable

   -- GBP70m class B secured 8.241% fixed-rate notes due 2028:
      affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook revised to Positive from Stable

   -- GBP30m class C secured floating-rate notes due 2031:
      affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook revised to Positive from Stable

The affirmations reflect the stabilization of the transaction's
performance in a post-recessionary environment where the negative
effects of the economic crisis on port traffic are fading away.
Fitch has revised the Outlook on the notes to Positive from Stable
as the agency expects that the transaction will benefit from steel
production resuming at the mothballed Redcar steel plant located
at Teesport. In March 2011, Tata Steel UK Limited sold the plant
to Sahaviriya Steel Industries and the agency understands that the
company plans to resume production as soon as possible. This
development is considered a credit positive as the imports of iron
ore and the steel slab exports will be returning to the port. In
the past, the plant provided the transaction with a significant
amount of traffic and EBITDA contribution. Fitch will continue to
monitor SSI's willingness to operate the plant in the long term
given its relatively higher associated operating costs and general
dependence on importing raw materials.

In the financial year ended December 2010, the transaction's
EBITDA before exceptional items increased by 1.1% to GBP37.4
million. While port operations experienced a decline in the
capacity of P&O's ferry services to Rotterdam and Zeebrugge and a
steep fall in steel slab exports from the mothballed Redcar steel
plant, the EBITDA contribution from port operations remained
static. The negative impact has been mitigated by ongoing robust
growth in container volumes (mainly anchored by port-centric
customers like ASDA and Tesco), the take-or-pay slab handling
agreement with Tata Steel and higher car imports due to the
government scrappage scheme. Conservancy revenue derived from
ships using the river Tees benefited from a recovery of the
chemical sector and coupled with higher contribution from rental
income offsetting the reduction in crude oil export volumes
following a maintenance shutdown at the ConocoPhillips plant.

Fitch notes that the current debt service consists only of
interest payments on the class A2, B and C notes following the
early redemption of class A1 notes in 2004. THPA's reported EBITDA
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) stood at 1.88x, as of end
December 2010, ahead of its 1.25x default covenant. However, the
debt service requirements will markedly increase in September this
year when principal amortization commences for the A2 tranche.
Consequently, this is expected to feed through to the reported
EBITDA DSCR metrics resulting in a decline to a more moderate
level in the range of 1.35x-1.45x. Nevertheless, this is above
Fitch's expectations of 1.30x-1.40x at the time of the last review
in December 2009. Furthermore Fitch's analysis also considers the
annuity-based net cash flow DSCR metrics, which at the class C
level stands at the current 1.23x compared to 1.20x in December
2009.

THPA is a securitization of the assets held, and earnings
generated, by the PD Ports group, which owns the port of Tees &
Hartlepool on the northeast coast of England. Teesport is the
fourth-largest port in the UK per annual tonnage handled and
serves mainly the steel, petrochemical, chemical, manufacturing
and retail industries.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 6 to June 10, 2011
----------------------------------------------------

Issuer               Coupon     Maturity Currency     Price
------               ------     -------- --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES       8.750   10/27/2014    EUR       32.34
IMMOFINANZ             4.250     3/8/2018    EUR        4.11
OESTER VOLKSBK         5.270     2/8/2027    EUR       73.01
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.900    8/18/2025    EUR       61.75
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.810    7/29/2025    EUR       58.50
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.750    4/30/2021    EUR       71.40
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.350   11/16/2018    EUR       74.25
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.160    5/20/2025    EUR       71.36
RAIFF LB OBEROST       4.620    9/17/2030    EUR       68.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        4.500    9/28/2035    EUR       77.56
ECONOCOM GROUP         4.000     6/1/2016    EUR       20.71

BULGARIA
--------
PETROL AD-SOFIA        8.375   10/26/2011    EUR       79.19

CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
SAZKA                  9.000    7/12/2021    EUR       64.76

DENMARK
-------
KOMMUNEKREDIT          0.500   12/14/2020    ZAR       46.42
KOMMUNEKREDIT          0.500     2/3/2016    TRY       70.02
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500     2/9/2016    ZAR       70.12
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    4/27/2018    ZAR       57.97
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    9/24/2020    CAD       70.16
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   11/25/2020    ZAR       44.21
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    4/26/2016    ZAR       69.19
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.250    6/28/2040    CAD       22.16
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000   10/30/2017    AUD       73.46
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000    2/27/2018    AUD       72.11
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    3/17/2025    CAD       54.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000    6/30/2017    ZAR       64.39

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM         4.970     4/1/2015    EUR       13.86
ALCATEL-LUCENT         5.000     1/1/2015    EUR        4.39
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG       6.720     1/1/2015    EUR        6.04
ATOS ORIGIN SA         2.500     1/1/2016    EUR       52.07
CALYON                 6.000    6/18/2047    EUR       11.20
CAP GEMINI SOGET       1.000     1/1/2012    EUR       43.33
CAP GEMINI SOGET       3.500     1/1/2014    EUR       43.08
CGG VERITAS            1.750     1/1/2016    EUR       31.53
CIE FIN FONCIER        3.250   12/30/2044    EUR       73.49
CLUB MEDITERRANE       6.110    11/1/2015    EUR       20.35
CLUB MEDITERRANE       5.000     6/8/2012    EUR       16.02
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY       1.000   12/23/2024    EUR       62.33
EURAZEO                6.250    6/10/2014    EUR       58.18
FAURECIA               4.500     1/1/2015    EUR       29.82
GROUPE VIAL            2.500     1/1/2014    EUR       27.16
INGENICO               2.750     1/1/2017    EUR       43.70
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125    7/31/2014    EUR       20.89
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125    7/31/2015    EUR       20.24
NEXANS SA              4.000     1/1/2016    EUR       69.98
NOVASEP HLDG           9.625   12/15/2016    EUR       49.75
NOVASEP HLDG           9.625   12/15/2016    EUR       57.00
NOVASEP HLDG           9.750   12/15/2016    USD       54.75
NOVASEP HLDG           9.750   12/15/2016    USD       54.75
ORPEA                  3.875     1/1/2016    EUR       47.28
PEUGEOT SA             4.450     1/1/2016    EUR       33.42
PUBLICIS GROUPE        1.000    1/18/2018    EUR       48.99
PUBLICIS GROUPE        3.125    7/30/2014    EUR       38.87
RHODIA SA              0.500     1/1/2014    EUR       51.83
SOC AIR FRANCE         2.750     4/1/2020    EUR       20.68
SOITEC                 6.250     9/9/2014    EUR       11.01
TEM                    4.250     1/1/2015    EUR       56.82
THEOLIA                2.700     1/1/2041    EUR       11.90

GERMANY
-------
DEUTSCHE BK LOND       2.250    9/20/2020    EUR       78.77
EUROHYPO AG            6.490    7/17/2017    EUR        6.75
EUROHYPO AG            3.830    9/21/2020    EUR       69.63
HSH NORDBANK AG        4.375    2/14/2017    EUR       72.50
IKB DEUT INDUSTR       6.500    3/31/2012    EUR       17.76
IKB DEUT INDUSTR       5.625    3/31/2017    EUR       15.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR       6.550    3/31/2012    EUR       17.71
L-BANK FOERDERBK       0.500    5/10/2027    CAD       48.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT        5.250   10/20/2015    EUR       28.89
LB BADEN-WUERTT        2.500    1/30/2034    EUR       58.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT        2.800    2/23/2037    JPY       70.86
Q-CELLS                6.750   10/21/2015    EUR        3.09
QIMONDA FINANCE        6.750    3/22/2013    USD        2.75
SOLON AG SOLAR         1.375    12/6/2012    EUR       39.54
TAG IMMO AG            6.500   12/10/2015    EUR        7.87
TUI AG                 2.750    3/24/2016    EUR       53.00
WESTLB AG              3.350   10/19/2026    EUR       72.42

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.851    9/19/2016    EUR       54.42
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.057    3/26/2013    EUR       72.12
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.301    8/12/2014    EUR       61.08
ATHENS URBAN TRN       5.008    7/18/2017    EUR       53.32
HELLENIC RAILWAY       7.350     3/3/2015    JPY       62.96
HELLENIC RAILWAY       5.460    1/30/2014    EUR       60.27
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.300    7/25/2030    EUR       40.70
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.900    7/25/2025    EUR       41.62
HELLENIC REPUB         5.200    7/17/2034    EUR       58.92
HELLENIC REPUB         6.140    4/14/2028    EUR       55.95
HELLENIC REPUB         5.000    3/11/2019    EUR       52.77
HELLENIC REPUB         5.250     2/1/2016    JPY       47.58
HELLENIC REPUB         5.800    7/14/2015    JPY       60.32
HELLENIC REPUB         2.125     7/5/2013    CHF       72.22
HELLENIC REPUB         4.590     4/8/2016    EUR       58.75
HELLENIC REPUB         5.000    8/22/2016    JPY       44.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.506    3/31/2013    EUR       73.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    5/20/2013    EUR       71.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.900     7/3/2013    EUR       69.97
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.427    7/31/2013    EUR       69.32
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.000    8/20/2013    EUR       67.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.520    9/30/2013    EUR       67.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500    1/11/2014    EUR       65.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500    5/20/2014    EUR       60.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500     7/1/2014    EUR       62.84
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.985    7/25/2014    EUR       58.78
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.500    8/20/2014    EUR       59.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.113    9/30/2014    EUR       58.67
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700    7/20/2015    EUR       55.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.100    8/20/2015    EUR       59.30
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.702    9/30/2015    EUR       55.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700   11/10/2015    EUR       53.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.600    7/20/2016    EUR       54.78
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.020    9/13/2016    EUR       55.94
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.225     3/1/2017    EUR       54.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900    4/20/2017    EUR       55.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.300    7/20/2017    EUR       51.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.675    10/9/2017    EUR       53.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.590     4/3/2018    EUR       50.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.014    2/27/2019    EUR       49.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.959     3/4/2019    EUR       53.26
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.000    7/19/2019    EUR       52.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.161    9/17/2019    EUR       49.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500   10/22/2019    EUR       54.44
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.250    6/19/2020    EUR       52.83
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900   10/22/2022    EUR       50.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.700    3/20/2024    EUR       46.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.300    3/20/2026    EUR       46.65
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500    9/20/2037    EUR       42.61
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    9/20/2040    EUR       42.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600    7/20/2018    EUR       51.05
NATIONAL BK GREE       3.875    10/7/2016    EUR       66.95

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000     3/1/2030    EUR       50.96
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.580    4/28/2028    EUR       57.03
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000    2/12/2030    EUR       50.99
ALLIED IRISH BKS       4.000    3/19/2015    EUR       73.98
ALLIED IRISH BKS      10.750    3/29/2017    EUR       22.13
ALLIED IRISH BKS      10.750    3/29/2017    USD       21.96
ALLIED IRISH BKS      12.500    6/25/2019    EUR       24.62
ALLIED IRISH BKS       7.875     7/5/2023    GBP       24.79
ALLIED IRISH BKS      12.500    6/25/2019    GBP       24.61
ALLIED IRISH BKS       5.625   11/12/2014    EUR       74.66
ALLIED IRISH BKS      11.500    3/29/2022    GBP       21.89
ANGLO IRISH BANK       4.000    4/15/2015    EUR       74.34
BANK OF IRELAND        3.780     4/1/2015    EUR       73.85
BANK OF IRELAND        3.585    4/21/2015    EUR       72.79
BANK OF IRELAND        4.875    1/22/2018    GBP       37.00
BANK OF IRELAND        9.250     9/7/2020    GBP       43.01
BANK OF IRELAND       10.000    2/12/2020    EUR       42.00
BANK OF IRELAND       10.000    2/12/2020    GBP       41.78
BANK OF IRELAND        4.625    2/27/2019    EUR       37.00
BANK OF IRELAND       10.750    6/22/2018    GBP       45.01
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.760     9/7/2029    EUR       53.78
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.450     3/1/2030    EUR       50.90
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.360   10/12/2029    EUR       50.72
DEPFA ACS BANK         5.125    3/16/2037    USD       71.73
DEPFA ACS BANK         5.125    3/16/2037    USD       71.73
DEPFA ACS BANK         4.900    8/24/2035    CAD       63.47
DEPFA ACS BANK         0.500     3/3/2025    CAD       36.88
EBS BLDG SOCIETY       4.000    2/25/2015    EUR       74.66
EBS BLDG SOCIETY       4.992    3/19/2015    EUR       69.37
IRISH GOVT             5.000   10/18/2020    EUR       65.54
IRISH GOVT             4.500    4/18/2020    EUR       64.98
IRISH GOVT             5.900   10/18/2019    EUR       69.36
IRISH GOVT             4.400    6/18/2019    EUR       66.45
IRISH GOVT             4.500   10/18/2018    EUR       67.71
IRISH GOVT             5.400    3/13/2025    EUR       64.45
IRISH LIFE PERM        4.000    3/10/2015    EUR       74.00
IRISH LIFE PERM        4.820    3/22/2015    EUR       68.26
IRISH NATIONWIDE       6.250    6/26/2012    GBP       84.85
IRISH PERM PLC         5.832    2/15/2035    EUR       55.50

ITALY
-----
CO BRAONE              4.567    6/30/2037    EUR       73.62
COMUNE DI MILANO       4.019    6/29/2035    EUR       66.33
INTESA SANPAOLO        1.750    1/19/2026    EUR        3.06
REP OF ITALY           2.000    9/15/2062    EUR       71.94
REP OF ITALY           1.850    9/15/2057    EUR       70.81
TELECOM ITALIA         5.250    3/17/2055    EUR       74.91

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL          7.250     4/1/2014    EUR       28.43
ESPIRITO SANTO F       6.875   10/21/2019    EUR       66.54
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000    4/30/2014    EUR       38.22
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000    4/30/2014    EUR       38.13

NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE      11.750    10/1/2005    USD        0.03
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    4/27/2016    TRY       69.11
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    3/17/2016    TRY       69.59
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    5/25/2016    TRY       69.34
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    6/22/2016    TRY       68.43
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500     3/3/2021    NZD       61.76
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    3/29/2021    USD       71.59
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    3/29/2021    NZD       61.38
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    5/12/2021    ZAR       44.18
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    6/22/2021    ZAR       47.35
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    2/24/2025    CAD       55.33
BRIT INSURANCE         6.625    12/9/2030    GBP       65.04
DGS INTL FIN BV       10.000     6/1/2007    USD        0.01
ELEC DE CAR FIN        8.500    4/10/2018    USD       59.50
FRIESLAND BANK         4.210   12/29/2025    EUR       70.36
KPNQWEST BV            8.125     6/1/2009    USD        0.05
NATL INVESTER BK      25.983     5/7/2029    EUR       19.84
NED WATERSCHAPBK       0.500    3/11/2025    CAD       56.38
NIB CAPITAL BANK       4.510   12/16/2035    EUR       66.40
PORTUGAL TEL FIN       4.500    6/16/2025    EUR       71.00
Q-CELLS INTERNAT       5.750    5/26/2014    EUR       68.75
RBS NV EX-ABN NV       2.910    6/21/2036    JPY       69.22
SIDETUR FINANCE       10.000    4/20/2016    USD       74.60
TJIWI KIMIA FIN       13.250     8/1/2001    USD        0.01

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS          0.500     5/9/2030    CAD       40.43
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500   12/18/2015    ZAR       74.32
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    5/25/2018    ZAR       61.83
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    5/25/2016    ZAR       71.92
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    3/24/2016    ZAR       72.93
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500     3/1/2016    ZAR       73.28
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    1/27/2016    ZAR       73.76
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125   10/15/2033    USD       70.13
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125   10/15/2033    USD       70.13
SPAREBANKEN RGLD       4.170    12/7/2035    EUR       75.30

PORTUGAL
--------
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.455    8/20/2017    EUR       72.39
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.400    10/8/2019    EUR       64.26
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.750    2/14/2016    EUR       69.63
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.380    10/1/2038    EUR       58.90
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.320     8/5/2021    EUR       64.36
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.980     3/3/2028    EUR       70.75
CAIXA GERAL DEPO       4.250    1/27/2020    EUR       73.42
COMBOIOS DE PORT       5.700     2/5/2030    EUR       69.25
COMBOIOS DE PORT       4.170   10/16/2019    EUR       64.01
METRO DE LISBOA        4.061    12/4/2026    EUR       56.09
METRO DE LISBOA        4.799    12/7/2027    EUR       60.54
MONTEPIO GERAL         5.000     2/8/2017    EUR       57.63
PARPUBLICA             4.191   10/15/2014    EUR       74.19
PARPUBLICA             4.200   11/16/2026    EUR       67.50
PARPUBLICA             3.567    9/22/2020    EUR       64.40
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.350   10/16/2017    EUR       70.01
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.200   10/15/2016    EUR       73.77
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.450    6/15/2018    EUR       68.46
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.750    6/14/2019    EUR       67.49
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.800    6/15/2020    EUR       65.79
PORTUGUESE OT'S        3.850    4/15/2021    EUR       60.74
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.950   10/25/2023    EUR       63.31
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.100    4/15/2037    EUR       58.13
REFER                  4.047   11/16/2026    EUR       56.43
REFER                  4.675   10/16/2024    EUR       55.19
REFER                  4.250   12/13/2021    EUR       52.32
REFER                  5.875    2/18/2019    EUR       69.28
REFER                  4.000    3/16/2015    EUR       65.16

RUSSIA
------
A-ENGINEERING          8.500   10/30/2014    RUB       99.00
APK ARKADA            17.500    5/23/2012    RUB        0.38
ARIZK                  3.000   12/20/2030    RUB       52.72
BALTINVESTBANK         9.000    9/10/2015    RUB       99.84
BARENTSEV FINANS      20.000     7/4/2011    RUB        1.10
CREDIT EUROPE BK      11.500    6/28/2011    RUB      101.83
DIPOS                  6.000    6/19/2012    RUB       94.00
DVTG-FINANS           17.000    8/29/2013    RUB        1.02
EESK                   8.740     4/5/2012    RUB      100.00
EXPERTGROUP           12.000   12/17/2012    RUB       95.62
FINANCEBUSINESSG      12.500    6/22/2011    RUB      100.00
FINANCEBUSINESSG      10.000     7/1/2013    RUB      100.00
INVESTTORGBANK         9.500    10/8/2012    RUB      100.00
IZHAVTO               18.000     6/9/2011    RUB       11.31
KARUSEL FINANS        12.000    9/12/2013    RUB      100.00
KOMOS GROUP           13.500    7/21/2011    RUB      100.01
KPM FINANS            11.750   12/23/2014    RUB      100.00
LEASING TECH           8.500   10/24/2014    RUB       99.00
M-INDUSTRIYA          12.250    8/16/2011    RUB       22.53
MIG-FINANS             0.100     9/6/2011    RUB        1.00
MIRAX                 14.990    5/17/2011    RUB       22.41
MIRAX                 17.000    9/17/2012    RUB       17.00
MOSMART FINANS         0.010    4/12/2012    RUB        1.81
MOSOBLGAZ             12.000    5/17/2011    RUB       72.50
NAUKA-SVYAZ           12.500    6/27/2013    RUB      109.00
NOK                   10.000    9/22/2011    RUB        0.04
NOK                   12.500    8/26/2014    RUB        0.04
PEB LEASING           14.000    9/12/2014    RUB       99.99
PENOPLEX-FINANS       14.000   11/21/2014    RUB       75.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA       1.000   12/17/2012    RUB       90.00
PROTON-FINANCE         9.000    6/12/2012    RUB       65.00
RAIFFEISENBANK         7.500   11/27/2013    RUB      101.50
REGIONENERGO           8.500    5/30/2016    RUB       99.00
RMK PARK PLAZA        10.000     1/8/2013    RUB      102.00
ROSSELKHOZBANK         7.800     2/9/2018    RUB      102.00
RVK-FINANS             9.500    7/21/2011    RUB      109.97
SAHO                  10.000    5/21/2012    RUB        0.03
SENATOR               10.000    5/18/2012    RUB       96.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS       10.500    3/27/2012    RUB        3.40
SIBUR                  7.300    3/13/2015    RUB      100.60
SISTEMA-HALS           8.500     4/8/2014    RUB       90.00
SISTEMA-HALS           8.500    4/15/2014    RUB       90.00
SPETSSTROYFINANC       8.500    5/30/2016    RUB       99.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL         0.100    5/24/2011    RUB       70.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA      13.000    9/25/2013    RUB      100.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA      13.000    9/19/2013    RUB      100.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA      13.500     3/7/2012    RUB      101.20
TECHNONICOL-FINA      13.500    9/11/2013    RUB       75.00
TEKHNOPROMPROEKT       8.500    9/28/2016    RUB       99.00
TERNA-FINANS           1.000    11/4/2011    RUB        0.01
TRANSFIN-M             8.400   11/29/2013    RUB      100.00
TRANSFIN-M             9.750    8/13/2013    RUB      100.00
TRANSFIN-M             8.400   11/29/2013    RUB      100.00
TRANSFIN-M            14.000    7/10/2014    RUB      100.00
TRANSFIN-M            11.000    12/3/2014    RUB      100.00
TRANSFIN-M            11.000    12/3/2014    RUB      100.00
TRANSFIN-M            11.000    12/3/2014    RUB      100.00
TRANSFIN-M            11.000    12/3/2014    RUB      100.00
TRANSGAZSERVICE        7.750   11/26/2014    RUB      100.44
TRUDOVE               12.000   11/22/2019    RUB      100.00
UNITAIL               12.000    6/22/2011    RUB      100.00
VNESHPROMBANK          9.000   11/14/2012    RUB      100.00
VTB NAT MTGE AGE      10.500    2/26/2039    RUB      100.00
ZAO EUROPLAN          10.000    8/11/2011    RUB      100.00
ZHILSOTSIPOTEKA-       9.000    7/26/2011    RUB      100.00

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.750    5/25/2027    EUR       73.11
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.250   10/25/2023    EUR       74.68
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750   12/14/2022    EUR       71.07
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750    6/30/2025    EUR       65.56
AYUNTAM DE MADRD       4.550    6/16/2036    EUR       68.52
BANCAJA                1.500    5/22/2018    EUR       64.96
BANCO PASTOR           4.550    7/31/2020    EUR       73.37
CAJA CASTIL-MAN        1.500    6/23/2021    EUR       62.87
CAJA MADRID            5.755    2/26/2028    EUR       72.40
CAJA MADRID            4.125    3/24/2036    EUR       67.03
CAJA MADRID            4.000     2/3/2025    EUR       74.48
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO       4.250    4/10/2031    EUR       62.43
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO       3.875    5/23/2025    EUR       66.84
CEDULAS TDA A-5        4.250    3/28/2027    EUR       67.59
COMUN AUTO CANAR       3.900   11/30/2035    EUR       55.91
COMUN AUTO CANAR       4.200   10/25/2036    EUR       58.81
COMUNIDAD ARAGON       4.646    7/11/2036    EUR       70.43
COMUNIDAD BALEAR       4.063   11/23/2035    EUR       65.46
COMUNIDAD MADRID       4.300    9/15/2026    EUR       69.67
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.220    4/26/2035    EUR       67.22
GEN DE CATALUNYA       5.219    9/10/2029    EUR       74.79
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.690   10/28/2034    EUR       71.91
INSTITUT CATALA        4.250    6/15/2024    EUR       72.57
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        5.150    5/24/2034    EUR       72.40
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        4.250   10/31/2036    EUR       60.13
JUNTA LA MANCHA        3.875    1/31/2036    EUR       55.63
XUNTA DE GALICIA       4.025   11/28/2035    EUR       61.22

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.000    8/12/2011    USD       10.26
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.000    8/28/2011    USD       10.58
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000   10/21/2011    USD       10.00
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000    11/4/2011    USD        6.76
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.000    12/7/2011    USD        9.95
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.130    1/10/2012    USD        9.89
SWEDISH EXP CRED       6.500    1/27/2012    USD        9.38
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000    1/27/2012    USD        8.87
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.500    2/28/2012    USD        9.25
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.000     3/9/2012    USD        9.69
SWEDISH EXP CRED       7.000     3/9/2012    USD        9.84
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.750    3/23/2012    USD        9.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.250    4/27/2012    USD        9.66
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   12/21/2015    ZAR       72.25
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500     3/3/2016    ZAR       70.87
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    6/14/2016    ZAR       71.44
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    6/29/2016    TRY       68.64
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   12/17/2027    USD       50.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    1/25/2028    USD       50.32
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500     3/5/2018    AUD       70.41

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BQ CANTN VAUDOIS       4.000    9/26/2011    CHF      101.00
UBS AG                13.300    5/23/2012    USD        4.01
UBS AG                10.580    6/29/2011    USD       39.02
UBS AG                13.700    5/23/2012    USD       13.09
UBS AG                 9.640   11/14/2011    USD       14.14
UBS AG                10.530    1/23/2012    USD       40.30
UBS AG                 8.720    3/20/2012    USD       32.30
UBS AG                 9.250    3/20/2012    USD       14.58
UBS AG                10.070    3/23/2012    USD       36.44
UBS AG JERSEY         10.280    8/19/2011    USD       35.25
UBS AG JERSEY         13.000    6/16/2011    USD       49.96
UBS AG JERSEY         10.500    6/16/2011    USD       71.69
UBS AG JERSEY          3.220    7/31/2012    EUR       47.56
UBS AG JERSEY          9.230   12/30/2011    USD       13.85
UBS AG JERSEY         10.140   12/30/2011    USD       15.22
UBS AG JERSEY          9.450    9/21/2011    USD       49.91
UBS AG JERSEY         11.150    8/31/2011    USD       39.02

UKRAINE
-------
LVIV CITY              9.950   12/19/2012    UAH       94.79

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
BANK OF SCOTLAND       5.772     2/7/2035    EUR       72.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC        7.500    9/22/2011    USD       17.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.800    9/22/2011    USD       16.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.250    1/31/2012    USD        9.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.650    1/31/2012    USD       45.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC       12.950    4/20/2012    USD       23.75
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.800    7/31/2012    USD       27.52
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.400    7/31/2012    USD       11.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.500    8/31/2012    USD       29.72
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.250    8/31/2012    USD       35.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.750    9/22/2011    USD       73.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC       10.600    7/21/2011    USD       39.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC        2.500    5/24/2017    USD       10.47
BRADFORD&BIN BLD       5.500    1/15/2018    GBP       48.50
BRADFORD&BIN BLD       5.750   12/12/2022    GBP       43.98
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.875    3/28/2033    GBP       71.54
DISCOVERY EDUCAT       1.948    3/31/2037    GBP       70.05
EFG HELLAS PLC         5.400    11/2/2047    EUR       29.63
EFG HELLAS PLC         6.010     1/9/2036    EUR       31.50
ESPRIT TELECOM        10.875    6/15/2008    USD        0.01
F&C ASSET MNGMT        6.750   12/20/2026    GBP       74.48
HBOS PLC               4.500    3/18/2030    EUR       73.85
HEALTHCARE SUPP        2.067    2/19/2043    GBP       72.72
MAX PETROLEUM          6.750     9/8/2013    USD       52.19
NOMURA BANK INTL       0.800   12/21/2020    EUR       65.49
NORTHERN ROCK          5.750    2/28/2017    GBP       74.00
PUNCH TAVERNS          7.567    4/15/2026    GBP       64.84
PUNCH TAVERNS          6.468    4/15/2033    GBP       55.00
PUNCH TAVERNS          8.374    7/15/2029    GBP       63.07
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       4.692     6/9/2025    EUR       71.90
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       6.316    6/29/2030    EUR       60.02
RSL COMM PLC          12.000    11/1/2008    USD        1.88
SKIPTON BUILDING       6.750    5/30/2022    GBP       71.00
SKIPTON BUILDING       5.625    1/18/2018    GBP       77.02
UNIQUE PUB FIN         6.464    3/30/2032    GBP       64.00
WESSEX WATER FIN       1.369    7/31/2057    GBP       31.02


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline
S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *