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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, April 25, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 80

                            Headlines



G E R M A N Y

ENTRY FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ca'
IKB DEUTSCHE: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2'


I R E L A N D

CAPEL DEVELOPMENTS: NAMA Appoints Receiver; Firm Owes EUR100 Mil.
DIRECTROUTE LIMERICK: Moody's Cuts Rating on Secured Loans to Ba2
RMF EURO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class V Notes to 'B3 (sf)'


N E T H E R L A N D S

ODEON ABS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'BB+'


R U S S I A

COMMERCIAL BANK: S&P Upgrades Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B'
SOTSGORBANK: S&P Downgrades Counterparty Credit Rating to 'D/D'
* YAROSLAVL REGION: Fitch Assigns 'BB-(exp)' Rating to RUB3BB Bond


S L O V A K   R E P U B L I C

TIPOS: Fails to Get Creditor Protection; Restructuring Rejected


S P A I N

BBVA RMBS 2: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR100MM C Certificate to 'B3'
BBVA RMBS 4: Moody's Reviews 'Caa1 (sf)' Rating on C Certificate
CAJA DE AHORROS: Moody's Lowers Senior Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'


T U R K E Y

EXPORT CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'BB' LT Foreign Currency Credit Rating
TURKISH METROPOLITAN: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-' Currency Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALBURN REAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'Csf'
BRISTOL CARS: Bought Out of Administration
KAYE PESTEIGNE: To Close Next Month; More Than 100 Jobs Affected
PENSHER SECURITY: Goes Into Administration; 56 Jobs Affected
SILENTNIGHT HOLDINGS: Applies for Company Voluntary Arrangement

VON ESSEN: Holding Company Goes Into Administration
WREXHAM FC: Owners Unable to Inject More Funding


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 18 to April 22, 2011


                            *********


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


ENTRY FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ca'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of three
classes of notes issued by Entry Funding I No.1 plc.

Issuer: Entry Funding No.1 plc

   -- EUR358.5M (original issuance amount) Class A Notes,
      Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010 Confirmed
      at Baa3 (sf)

   -- EUR8M (original issuance amount) Class B Notes, Downgraded
      to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010 Confirmed at Caa1
      (sf)

   -- EUR8M (original issuance amount) Class C Notes, Downgraded
      to Ca (sf); previously on Aug 26, 2010 Confirmed at Caa3
      (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

Entry Funding I is a cash flow CDO exposed to a static pool of
senior unsecured loans issued by German SME borrowers.  95.6% of
the loans are bullet and the maturity profile of the pool is
concentrated with 54% of the loans maturing in the next 3 months,
and the remaining 46% maturing by September 2011.  The current
portfolio is comprised of 183 loans issued by 161 borrowers (244
borrowers at closing) for an outstanding notional of EUR163.5
million (EUR400 million at closing).

According to Moody's, the downgrade actions are primarily driven
by a reduction in the overcollateralization levels of the notes.
This reduction results from an increase in the number of defaults
in the underlying pool.  Since the last rating action in August
2009, a further 26 loans have increased the accumulated Principal
Deficiency Ledger by EUR7.3 million.  Including the excess spread
captured in the transaction to date, the current remaining PDL has
increased from EUR31.4 million in June 2009 to EUR33.9 million in
March 2011.  With only two additional payment periods remaining
before the scheduled maturity of the transaction in September
2011, it is unlikely that the excess spread diverted then will be
able to fully cure the remaining PDL balance.

The credit indicators assigned to the borrowers by the originator
Landesbank Baden-Wrttemberg are used by Moody's to assess the
credit quality of the pool.  Indicators provided by LBBW indicate
a credit deterioration across the portfolio which is reflected in
a substantial increase in the Weighted Average Rating of the
portfolio.  According to the Investor Report dated March 2011,
EUR18.1 million of assets have a credit quality consistent with a
Moody's rating of B3 and below.

Due to low OC ratios on the notes Moody's analysis includes a loss
given default analysis with various default and recovery
scenarios.  Class A notes outstanding amount of EUR155.4 million
is currently covered by a total performing portfolio amount of
EUR163.5 million, which is equivalent to an overcollateralization
ratio of 105.21%.  Among other scenarios, if the two lowest rated
largest obligors in the pool default with recovery rates less than
20%, Class A will suffer a loss.  Similarly, if all the loans with
a credit quality consistent with a Moody's rating of B3 and below
default with recovery rates below 55%, Class A will suffer a loss.
Reflecting this, the rating on Class A Notes remains commensurate
with the Moody's expected recoveries for the notes, as outlined in
the paper "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" (November 2009).

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing in the next 6 months, which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance.  Specific sources of
additional performance uncertainties for Entry Funding No.1 plc
include

1) Limited portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
   depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
   large obligors that are rated non investment grade: the ten
   largest obligors account for EUR5 million exposures each.  Due
   to the pool's limited granularity, Moody's supplements its base
   case scenario with individual scenario analysis.

2) Potential for refinancing difficulties, particularly among loan
   obligors with weaker credit quality.

3) Recoveries: although the complete work out process may not be
   terminated for all of them, the observed recovery rate levels
   achieved to date on the 45 defaulted loans in the transaction
   since closing are below initial assumptions.  They range
   between 16% and 20%.

The principal methodologies used in rating the notes are "Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default"
published in November 2009, "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in August 2009 and
"Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe" published in
February 2007.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


IKB DEUTSCHE: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by two notches the long-
term debt and deposit ratings of IKB Deutsche Industriebank (IKB)
to Ba2 from Baa3 and changed the Prime-3 short-term rating to non-
prime.

The rating actions follow Moody's review of its assumptions of
future government support for IKB, due to Moody's view that the
possibility of future government support for IKB is weakening.
The rating action also reflects the slow recovery of IKB's weak
financial profile and limited financial flexibility.  The outlook
on the Ba2 senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings therefore
remains negative.  Moody's has also affirmed with a stable outlook
IKB's E bank financial strength rating (BFSR), mapping to Caa1 on
the long-term rating scale.

All IKB's other ratings remain unaffected by today's rating
actions, including (i) the Caa2 rating for senior subordinated
debt; (ii) the C(hyb) rating for the upper Tier 2 junior
subordinated instruments issued by IKB and its vehicle ProPart
Funding Ltd.; (iii) the Ca(hyb) ratings for the Tier 1 instruments
issued by IKB Funding Trust I & II and Capital Raising GmbH; and
(iv) the Aaa rated bonds guaranteed by the Financial Market
Stabilisation Agency.

Any subsequent short-term debt, long-term senior unsecured debt,
and senior subordinated debt issued by IKB will be rated non-
prime, Ba2 and Caa2 respectively.

                         Ratings Rationale

Moody's decision to downgrade IKB's senior unsecured debt and
deposit ratings to Ba2 and to change the short-term rating to non-
prime was triggered by the agency's concerns that the probability
of future government support for IKB is weakening.  This view
reflects (i) the German government's stated intention to have bond
investors (rather than taxpayers) take a share in losses, if banks
encounter financial distress; (ii) Moody's view that IKB's
systemic relevance is lessening; and (iii) the government's
scheduled exit from supporting IKB with liquidity, with more than
half of the FMSA-guaranteed bonds currently outstanding maturing
in 2012.

One additional consideration that is of increasing importance in
Moody's assessment of future support, is whether the European
Commission would be likely to approve of the renewal of state aid.
For IKB, this appears questionable, given the weaknesses of its
franchise as a standalone entity and the fact that it has so far
not been able to prove that it can generate appropriate returns.

The downgrade also reflects the slow recovery of IKB's weak
financial profile and limited financial flexibility, given that it
remains structurally loss-making.  For Moody's standalone rating,
this weakness continues to override the progress that IKB has made
in various other areas, chiefly in substantially de-risking its
balance sheet and securing sound regulatory capitalization (the
Tier 1 ratio for the group was a satisfactory 10.8% as of December
2010).  In addition, IKB has sufficient liquidity for around six
quarters without raising any new funds or deposits.  However, it
still has very limited access to external funding and this could
raise IKB's liquidity risk during 2012.  As a result of its
assessment, Moody's therefore takes the view that the recent
developments do not yet allow for upward pressure on the E
standalone financial strength rating.

"The lower Ba2 rating level still includes relatively high
assumptions of future support, which is reflected in the five-
notch rating uplift from the Caa1 stand-alone level," says
Katharina Barten, a Vice President and Senior Credit Officer in
Moody's banking team in Frankfurt.  "However, with the
introduction of the new resolution regime for German banks in
January 2011, the legal framework has changed, particularly
affecting smaller banks.  The resulting risk for IKB, which
currently continues to downsize the balance sheet, is better
reflected in the Ba2 sub-investment grade rating level."
Ms. Barten explains.

Following the scheduled repayment of FMSA-guaranteed debt in Q1
2012 -- for which IKB currently maintains sufficient liquidity
levels -- the government will thereafter cease to be IKB's primary
risk taker, leaving the Deposit Protection Fund of the Association
of German Banks the party most exposed to risk associated with any
renewed distress that IKB may encounter.  This fund, however,
insures deposits only, and not senior bonds.

                       Key Rating Drivers

Moody's stresses that, notwithstanding the negative outlook on the
Ba2 long-term debt ratings, these ratings could be subject to
upward pressure, in particular if the current owners manage to
successfully sell IKB.  If the eventual buyer is a financially
robust player in the banking market with a clear intention to
support IKB, the ratings may be subject to a potentially multi-
notch upgrade.

That said, the negative outlook is an indicator that the Ba2
ratings could be subject to a further downgrade in the next 12 to
18 months, if (i) the bank continues to operate as a standalone
bank without a beneficial change of its ownership; and (ii) if IKB
fails to quickly restore profitability and obtain access to market
(or other) funding.

                      Moody's Methodologies

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007, and Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.

Headquartered in Duesseldorf, Germany, IKB reported total assets
of EUR34.2 billion at the end of December 2010 and a group net
loss of EUR132.2 million for the nine months to December 2010.


=============
I R E L A N D
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CAPEL DEVELOPMENTS: NAMA Appoints Receiver; Firm Owes EUR100 Mil.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
John Mulligan at Irish Independent reports that The National Asset
Management Agency appointed a receiver to Capel Developments on
Wednesday.

Irish Independent relates that Simon Coyle of Mazars had been
appointed by the agency to the firm, which is weighed under by
more than EUR100 million in debts.

Capel Developments has been strike-off listed by the Companies
Registration Office since April 10, Irish Independent relates.  It
hasn't filed accounts since April 2009, Irish Independent notes.
The last filing of the company's accounts for the financial year
through the end of February 2008 shows it made a EUR43.6 million
loss that year and had a revenue reserves deficit of EUR36
million, Irish Independent points out.

Capel Developments is a Dublin-based property company.  It was
controlled by directors Liam Kelly, John O'Connor and Edward
Keegan and has been involved in a number of high-profile projects.


DIRECTROUTE LIMERICK: Moody's Cuts Rating on Secured Loans to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3 the
underlying rating for the EUR143.5 million guaranteed secured loan
due 2040 from Landale Asset Purchasing Company No 3 Limited
(including a EUR3 million standby loan), and the EUR97.6 million
guaranteed secured loan from the European Investment Bank both
raised by DirectRoute (Limerick) Finance Limited.  Moody's has
changed the outlook on the ratings to negative from positive.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action follows Moody's recent downgrade of the
Government of Ireland to Baa3 from Baa1.  The underlying rating of
the Loans is underpinned by the credit strength of the National
Roads Authority, as payer under the Concession Agreement.

The Issuer is a financing conduit that on-lends the proceeds of
the Loans to DirectRoute (Limerick) Limited, which is responsible
for financing, procuring, operating and maintaining the Limerick
Tunnel PPP Scheme.

The NRA provides a minimum traffic guarantee under the Concession
Agreement, and the actual Average Daily Traffic has to date been
less than the minimum traffic guarantee level.  As a result,
payments are made under the minimum traffic guarantee and Moody's
is applying a two-notch differential between the rating of the
Loans and that of the Irish Government.  This differential is
consistent with Moody's approach for availability-based projects,
as outlined in Moody's methodology for Operating Risk in
Privately-Financed Public Infrastructure (PFI/PPP/P3) Projects,
published in December 2007.

The Project's negative outlook reflects the negative outlook of
Ireland's Government bond rating as Moody's expects the rating of
the Loans to move with the Government bond rating.  The previous
positive outlook had reflected the satisfactory construction
completion and early steps towards steady state operation, for
which Baa3 would normally be an unusually low rating.  Ireland's
rating would not necessarily have acted as an absolute cap on the
rating if toll revenues had been sufficient to make the minimum
revenue guarantee a contingent rather than essential support.
However the lower than expected actual revenues now make the
Project reliant on the minimum traffic guarantee payments (which
have already started to flow), and in this scenario it is more
appropriate to impose the usual two-notch gap between offtaker
rating and project rating as outlined by the Operating Risk in
Privately-Financed Public Infrastructure (PFI/PPP/P3) Projects
methodology.

The Loans benefit from an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee
of scheduled principal and interest under a financial guarantee
insurance policy issued by MBIA UK Insurance Limited (MBIA; rated
B3, negative outlook).  However, as MBIA's rating is lower than
the underlying rating, the rating of the Loans is determined by
the underlying rating.

The Project involves a 10km. tolled dual carriageway bypass,
located to the southwest of the City of Limerick (situated in the
southwest of Ireland on the River Shannon).  The Project consists
of a 675 meter immersed tube tunnel under the River Shannon and
other significant structures including bridges, underpasses and
culverts.  The Project was opened to traffic on July 27, 2010.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Operational
Toll Roads published in December 2006, and Operating Risk in
Privately-Financed Public Infrastructure (PFI/PPP/P3) Projects
published in December 2007.

DirectRoute (Limerick) Limited is ultimately owned by Strabag
(20%), John Sisk & Sons (10%), Lagan Holdings Limited (10%),
Roadbridge Limited (10%), Allied Irish Banks PLC (25%) and
Meridiam Infrastructure Finance S.a.r.l (25%).


RMF EURO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class V Notes to 'B3 (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five classes
of notes and withdrawn four combination notes issued by RMF Euro
CDO IV PLC.  The notes affected by the rating action are:

Issuer: RMF Euro CDO IV PLC

   -- EUR39.3M Class II Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
      2022, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 26, 2009
      Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- EUR15.3M Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
      due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
      Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR21.6M Class IV-A Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
      Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 23,
      2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR3.5M Class IV-B Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
      due 2022, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
      B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR12.6M Class V Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
      due 2022, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR6M Class R Combination Notes, due 2022, Withdrawn (sf);
      previously on Dec 23, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR6M Class S Combination Notes, due 2022, Withdrawn (sf);
      previously on Dec 23, 2010 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR4M Class Q Combination Notes, due 2022, Withdrawn (sf);
      previously on Dec 23, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10M Class P-a Combination Notes, due 2022, Withdrawn
      (sf); previously on May 24, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings assigned to Classes Pa, Q, R and
S Combination Notes.  These notes were split back into their
original components and thus are no longer outstanding.

                         Ratings Rationale

RMF Euro CDO IV PLC is a managed-cash CLO with exposure to
predominantly European senior secured loans that remains in its
reinvestment period.

According to Moody's, the upgrade rating actions taken on the
notes is a result primarily of the improved credit quality of the
underlying portfolio and increased overcollateralization cushions
since the last rating action.  Since the last rating action in
November 2009, the reported class I/II, class III, class IV and
class V overcollateralization ('OC') ratios have increased by
7.59%, 7.12%, 6.45% and 6.16% respectively. All OC tests are in
compliance. In addition, the weighted average rating factor
("WARF") has increased from 2728 in September 2009 to 2883 in
March 2011.  This increase incorporates the technical transition
related to rating factors of European corporate credit estimates,
as announced in the press release published by Moody's on 1
September 2010.  Hence effectively, the WARF of this portfolio has
remained stable since last rating action.  Further, the proportion
of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below has decreased from
14.2% (at last rating action) to approximately 11.13%.  These
measures were taken from the recent trustee report dated 1 March
2011.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with an adjusted WARF of 3740 (compared to an adjusted WARF of
4264 at last rating action), a diversity score of 41 and a
weighted average recovery rate of 57.96%.

In order to assess the sensitivity of the notes to changes in
credit quality of the portfolio, Moody's ran sensitivity analyses
on key parameters.  For example, Moody's ran cases with a plus 10%
change in the base case WARF and an absolute change of minus 10%
in the WARR.  In all cases, the impact on the notes was less than
2 notches from the base case model outputs.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) Other collateral
quality metrics: The deal is allowed to reinvest (on a non-
discretionary basis) and the manager has the ability to
deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels.  Moody's analyzed the impact of
assuming lower of reported and covenanted values for weighted
average rating factor, weighted average spread, recovery rates and
diversity score, and found that the impact was within one notch of
the base case model outputs.

CDO notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's
CDOEdge(TM) software.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

Under the principal methodology, Moody's used its Binomial
Expansion Technique, whereby the pool is represented by
independent identical assets, the number of which being determined
by the diversity score of the portfolio.  The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
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ODEON ABS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A-1 Notes to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
the class X, A-1, A-2, A-3, and B notes in Odeon ABS 2007-1 B.V.
"At the same time, we removed the rating from CreditWatch
negative on the class X notes," S&P said.

Odeon ABS 2007-1 is a hybrid collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
of asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction that closed in July
2007.  At closing, the issuer entered into a credit default swap
(CDS) selling protection on a reference portfolio of primarily
European corporate CDOs, and commercial and prime residential
mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  It invested the issuance
proceeds of the class X to C (Sub) notes in collateral bonds held
by the custodian.

At the same time, the issuer entered into a total return swap
whereby the market-value risk on the collateral bonds is borne by
the total return swap (TRS) counterparty.  Following the
notification of a credit event under the CDS, the issuer funds any
protection payments by selling a required portion of the
collateral bonds at its face value to the TRS counterparty,
thereby reducing the available collateral for the repayment of the
notes.

Ratings Detail
                           Notional
                              as of  Current CS as of Current
         Rtg      Rtg      Feb 2010 notional Feb 2010      CS
Class    from     to      (mil. EUR)(mil. EUR)    (%)     (%)

Unfunded NR       NR         613.72   518.55     8.90   10.03
X        AA(sf)WN A+(sf)       1.75     0.98     8.64    9.86
A-1      A(sf)    BB+(sf)     15.00    15.00     6.42    7.26
A-2      BBB(sf)  B(sf)       21.00    21.00     3.30    3.62
A-3      BB(sf)   CCC-(sf)    13.72    13.99     1.26    1.19
B        CCC(sf)  CC(sf)      13.84    14.32     0.00    0.00
Sub      NR       NR           9.50     9.50      N/A     N/A

NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.
WN--Watch Neg.
CS--Credit support = (total performing synthetic exposure +
expected recovery on defaulted reference obligations - notional of
pari passu and senior tranches with) / (total performing synthetic
exposure + expected recovery on defaulted reference obligations).

"We estimate that 32% of the portfolio is currently exposed to
corporate credit risk through tranches of CDOs, which we have
assessed using our updated criteria for corporate CDOs," S&P
noted.

"Since our review in February 2010, we have observed that the
transaction's credit profile has continued to deteriorate.  The
notional of assets considered as defaulted in our analysis
currently stands at EUR14.9 million, compared with none in
February 2010," according to S&P.

Ratings Distribution (% of total synthetic exposure)

               As of
Rating      Feb 2010   Current
AAA            21.06      4.14
AA+ to AA-     14.89     15.20
A+ to A-       18.59     27.64
BBB+ to BBB-   18.30     17.92
BB+ to BB-     19.50     21.34
B+ to B-        7.18      5.90
CCC+ to CCC-    0.48      7.68
D                  -      0.18

Transaction Key Metrics
                                                 As of
                                              Feb 2010   Current
Total performing synthetic exposure (mil. EUR)    673.7    571.9
Obligations considered defaulted (mil. EUR)         0.0     14.9
Funded collateral (mil. EUR)                       70.2     71.3
Weighted average spread (bps)                      58         56
AAA weighted-average recovery rate (%)             47         45
AA weighted-average recovery rate (%)              52         49
A weighted-average recovery rate (%)               58         55
BBB weighted-average recovery rate (%)             62         60
BB weighted-average recovery rate (%)              67         66
B weighted-average recovery rate (%)               69         68
CCC weighted-average recovery rate (%)             72         71
Class A-2 overcollateralization (%)             93.88      86.95
Class A-3 overcollateralization (%)             91.97      84.88

S&P continued, "As a result of these developments, the ratings on
the class A-1, A-2, and A-3 notes are, in our view, no longer
commensurate with the available credit enhancement.  We have
therefore lowered our ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and
A-3 notes.  We believe that full repayment of principal and
interest on the class B notes is highly unlikely.  Therefore, we
have lowered our rating on the class B notes to CC (sf)."

"In our opinion, HSBC Bank PLC (AA/Stable/A-1+) currently provides
limited direct support to the rated notes in its role as account
bank and custodian.  As CDS and TRS counterparty, we consider that
Natixis S.A. (A+/Stable/A-1) provides substantial direct support
to the rated notes.  Our analysis indicates that none of the
ratings on the notes, except potentially the class X notes,
are currently constrained by our updated counterparty criteria,"
S&P related.

"In the case of the class X notes, given Odeon ABS 2007-1's
corporate CDO exposure, we have applied the supplemental tests
that form part of our corporate CDO criteria.  Applying the
supplemental tests, the class X rating is constrained to the 'A+'
level and we have therefore lowered to 'A+ (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative our rating on these notes," S&P added.

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                  From

Odeon ABS 2007-1 B.V.
EIUR75.5 Million Floating-Rate and Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A-1         BB+ (sf)            A (sf)
A-2         B (sf)              BBB (sf)
A-3         CCC- (sf)           BB (sf)
B           CC (sf)             CCC (sf)

Rating Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

X           A+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg


===========
R U S S I A
===========


COMMERCIAL BANK: S&P Upgrades Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it raised its long-term
counterparty credit rating on Russia-based Commercial Bank
Renaissance Capital (CBRC) to 'B' from 'B-'.  The 'C'
short-term rating was affirmed.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, the national scale rating was raised to 'ruBBB+'
from 'ruBBB'.

"The rating actions reflect our view that the bank's funding
profile has improved and asset quality has stabilized," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Irina Velieva.  "Other positive
rating factors include wide margins on key products and adequate
capitalization."

The ratings are constrained by the challenging operating
environment in Russia, high credit risk stemming from CBRC's focus
on consumer lending, and CBRC's weaker market position relative to
its closest competitors.

"The ratings reflect our assessment of CBRC's stand-alone
creditworthiness and do not include additional notches of external
support, either from the shareholders or the government, given our
view of the bank's low systemic importance.  Indirectly, CBRC is
ultimately controlled by the shareholders of Renaissance Holdings
Management Ltd. (not rated)," S&P related.

S&P continued, "With total assets of Russian ruble (RUB)40.7
billion (about US$1.3 billion) as of Dec. 31, 2010, CBRC is a
small bank specialized in consumer finance.  We note that CBRC is
one of the most active players in this segment in Russia.
However, in our opinion, CBRC has a weaker market position than
its closest
competitors."

CRBC managed to improve the quality of its loan portfolio in 2010,
with the share of loans more than 90 days overdue declining from
20% of the total portfolio to 6% by the end of the year.
"However, we are mindful that CBRC's policy is to automatically
write off loans that are overdue by more than 365 days.  In our
opinion, credit risk is high because of the bank's focus on
unsecured consumer lending.  Given current provisioning ratios and
future portfolio growth, we think that new provisioning needs may
arise in 2011," S&P noted.

According to S&P, "In our view, the most important recent change
in CBRC's business model is a shift toward funding
diversification, which makes the bank more resilient to
negative trends in the operating environment.  During 2010, the
share of retail deposits increased to 51% of liabilities from 8%,
and the proportion of wholesale funding decreased to 34% from 70%
(of which 42% comprised loans from the central bank).  We
understand CBRC has repaid its loans from the Central Bank of
Russia," S&P related.

CBRC reported a RUB1.6 billion (about US$51.5 million) net profit
for 2010, which compares favorably with a loss of RUB4.2 billion
(about US$141 million) in 2009.  Despite rising funding costs, the
net interest margin remained wide at 12.8% for 2010 (after
adjustments for fees and penalties).  "We view CBRC's
capitalization as adequate.  Standard & Poor's risk-adjusted
capital ratio was 11.1% before adjustments and 8.9% after
adjustments as of Dec. 31, 2010.  Although we understand
management is planning considerable business expansion, we do not
expect CBRC's capitalization to decline further, given the current
profitability ratios," according to S&P.

"The outlook is stable because we believe that CBRC is likely to
keep its existing business model and focus on consumer lending,
reasonable funding diversification, adequate capitalization, and
gradually improving operational efficiency," said Ms. Velieva.

"We could lower the ratings if CBRC's business expansion were to
materially hamper asset quality indicators, profitability, or
capital, or if CBRC's liquidity position were to deteriorate,
which is not our base-case expectation, however," S&P related.

"We could consider a positive rating action if the operating
environment were to improve significantly or if CBRC were to
strengthen its competitive position, improving overall business
diversification and efficiency," S&P added.


SOTSGORBANK: S&P Downgrades Counterparty Credit Rating to 'D/D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its counterparty credit
ratings on Russia-based SOTSGORBANK to 'D/D' from 'CCC/C'.  "We
also lowered our Russia national scale rating on the bank to
'D' from 'ruB-'.  The ratings were subsequently withdrawn," S&P
said.

The rating actions follow the Central Bank of Russia's revocation
of SOTSGORBANK's banking license on April 18, 2011, and its
introduction of a temporary management team at SOTSGORBANK.  "We
understand the central bank's action was based on SOTSGORBANK's
failure to abide with laws regulating banking activity, which also
highlights our view of insufficient reliable accounting data from
SOTSGORBANK.  The downgrade also stems from our concerns
regarding the bank's corporate governance and deteriorated
financial risk profile, as well as the quality of information
provided to us," S&P noted.

"We understand that all payments are frozen as a result of the
regulator's intervention and that, as a result, the bank is
currently unable to fulfill its obligations according to the terms
agreed with customers.  We have therefore also withdrawn our
counterparty credit ratings, owing to our view that we have
insufficient reliable information to maintain the ratings on
SOTSGORBANK," S&P continued.

"Because SOTSGORBANK is a member of the Deposit Insurance Agency
(DIA), we understand that the DIA will repay retail deposit
liabilities, subject to statutory limits.  We expect that the new
management will soon start discussions with SOTSGORBANK's other
creditors on potential terms of recovery," S&P noted.

With total assets of RUR10.6 billion (about US$350 million) as of
April 1, 2011, SOTSGORBANK is based in Moscow.  In October 2010,
five Russian private investors acquired 89.8% of the bank from its
previous owners.  A new board of directors was subsequently
appointed and some significant changes within top and middle
management were also made.


* YAROSLAVL REGION: Fitch Assigns 'BB-(exp)' Rating to RUB3BB Bond
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Yaroslavl Region's upcoming RUB3bn
domestic bond, due April 15, 2014 an expected Long-term local
currency rating of 'BB-(exp)' and an expected National Long-term
rating of 'A+(rus)(exp)'.  The region is rated Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency 'BB-', respectively with Positive Outlook,
Short-Term Foreign Currency 'B', and National Long-term 'A+(rus)'
with a Positive Outlook.

The bond has a fixed step-down coupon between 8% and 7.25% per
annum.  The initial placement price of the bond will be set at an
auction on April 19, 2011.  The principal will be amortized by 35%
of the initial bond issue value on July 16, 2013 and the remaining
65% of the initial value will be redeemed on April 15, 2014.  The
proceeds from the new bond will be used to finance the region's
budget deficit.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final documents
conforming to information already received.

Yaroslavl Region is part of the Central Federal District and lies
in the northern part of Russia.  The region accounted for 0.9% of
the national population (1.31 million residents) and 0.6% of
national GDP in 2008.


=============================
S L O V A K   R E P U B L I C
=============================


TIPOS: Fails to Get Creditor Protection; Restructuring Rejected
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tipos failed to get creditor protection after a court in
Bratislava rejected its petition for restructuring owing to a
formal shortcoming in the proposal, CTK reports, citing the
court's spokesman Pavol Adamciak.

The verdict cannot be appealed, CTK cites.

According to CTK, Tipos turned to the court owing to a lost
dispute with Cyprus-based company Lemikon to which it should pay
over EUR14 million (more than CZK337 million) for illegal use of
trademarks of several games.

Tipos is a Slovak lottery company.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BBVA RMBS 2: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR100MM C Certificate to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took these rating actions on notes
issued by BBVA RMBS 2, FTA a Spanish RMBS securitization deal
closed in March 2007, following an internal review after the
discovery of an input error in the cash flow model:

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

   -- EUR112.5M B Certificate, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously
      on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR100M C Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
      Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has placed on review direction uncertain
the ratings of all notes issued by BBVA RMBS 4, FTA in relation to
the discovery of the same input error in the cash flow model.

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

   -- EUR2740M A1 Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Aa3 (sf)

   -- EUR960M A2 Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Aa3 (sf)

   -- EUR1050.5M A3 Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Aa3 (sf)

   -- EUR41.7M B Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Baa3 (sf)

   -- EUR107.8M C Certificate, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Caa1 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating actions conclude the rating review that was prompted by
Moody's discovery that the Principal Deficiencies (PDL) were
incorrectly set in the cash flow models used at the latest rating
review of BBVA RMBS 2 and BBVA RMBS 4, concluded on Oct. 13, 2010,
when full amount of PDL was not modeled for the transactions.

BBVA RMBS 2

PDL currently represents EUR6.76 million for BBVA RMBS 2.  After
correctly modeling PDL and considering the current level of credit
enhancement under each Class, Moody's concluded that the
correction of PDL modeling has no impact on Classes A2, A3 and A4
Aa1(sf) rating and an impact of 1 notch for classes B and C.

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, as well as the transaction
structure and cash flow analysis.  The expected loss and the MILAN
Aaa CE are the two key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its
loss distribution curve, used in the cash-flow model to rate
European RMBS transactions.

Moody's is not revising the 2.27% of original balance expected
loss assumption for BBVA RMBS 2 given performance is still in line
with expectations as of rating review time.  Milan Aaa CE remains
at 9.5%.

BBVA RMBS 4

PDL currently represents EUR36.18 million for BBVA RMBS 4.
Moody's Investors Services is not taking immediate action on the
notes but placing them under review direction uncertain in
consideration of the restructuring process currently in progress
with the intention to increase credit enhancement in the
transaction.  The review will be concluded upon detailed analysis
of the restructuring proposal and evidence of its implementation.

Moody's ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by
the legal final maturity of the notes.  Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transaction.  Other
risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's
Updated Methodology for Rating Spanish RMBS published in July
2008, Revising Default/Loss Assumptions Over the Life of an
ABS/RMBS Transaction published in December 2008 and Cash Flow
Analysis in EMEA RMBS: Testing Structural Features with the MARCO
Model (Moody's Analyser of Residential Cash Flows) published in
January 2006.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


BBVA RMBS 4: Moody's Reviews 'Caa1 (sf)' Rating on C Certificate
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took these rating actions on notes
issued by BBVA RMBS 2, FTA a Spanish RMBS securitization deal
closed in March 2007, following an internal review after the
discovery of an input error in the cash flow model:

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

   -- EUR112.5M B Certificate, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously
      on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR100M C Certificate, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
      Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has placed on review direction uncertain
the ratings of all notes issued by BBVA RMBS 4, FTA in relation to
the discovery of the same input error in the cash flow model.

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

   -- EUR2740M A1 Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Aa3 (sf)

   -- EUR960M A2 Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Aa3 (sf)

   -- EUR1050.5M A3 Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Aa3 (sf)

   -- EUR41.7M B Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Baa3 (sf)

   -- EUR107.8M C Certificate, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
      Direction Uncertain; previously on Oct 13, 2010 Downgraded
      to Caa1 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating actions conclude the rating review that was prompted by
Moody's discovery that the Principal Deficiencies (PDL) were
incorrectly set in the cash flow models used at the latest rating
review of BBVA RMBS 2 and BBVA RMBS 4, concluded on Oct. 13, 2010,
when full amount of PDL was not modeled for the transactions.

BBVA RMBS 2

PDL currently represents EUR6.76 million for BBVA RMBS 2.  After
correctly modeling PDL and considering the current level of credit
enhancement under each Class, Moody's concluded that the
correction of PDL modeling has no impact on Classes A2, A3 and A4
Aa1(sf) rating and an impact of 1 notch for classes B and C.

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, as well as the transaction
structure and cash flow analysis.  The expected loss and the MILAN
Aaa CE are the two key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its
loss distribution curve, used in the cash-flow model to rate
European RMBS transactions.

Moody's is not revising the 2.27% of original balance expected
loss assumption for BBVA RMBS 2 given performance is still in line
with expectations as of rating review time.  Milan Aaa CE remains
at 9.5%.

BBVA RMBS 4

PDL currently represents EUR36.18 million for BBVA RMBS 4.
Moody's Investors Services is not taking immediate action on the
notes but placing them under review direction uncertain in
consideration of the restructuring process currently in progress
with the intention to increase credit enhancement in the
transaction.  The review will be concluded upon detailed analysis
of the restructuring proposal and evidence of its implementation.

Moody's ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by
the legal final maturity of the notes.  Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transaction.  Other
risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.

The principal methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's
Updated Methodology for Rating Spanish RMBS published in July
2008, Revising Default/Loss Assumptions Over the Life of an
ABS/RMBS Transaction published in December 2008 and Cash Flow
Analysis in EMEA RMBS: Testing Structural Features with the MARCO
Model (Moody's Analyser of Residential Cash Flows) published in
January 2006.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


CAJA DE AHORROS: Moody's Lowers Senior Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the senior debt and
deposits ratings of Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (CAM) by two
notches to Ba1 from Baa2 and upgraded CAM's standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) to D from D-.  The D standalone
BSFR maps to Ba2 on the long-term scale.  At the same time,
Moody's lowered CAM's dated subordinated debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3 and the short-term rating to Not Prime from Prime-2.  All of
CAM's ratings have a negative outlook.

These rating actions conclude Moody's rating review initiated on
March 24, 2011, when it downgraded by two notches CAM's senior
debt and deposit ratings as part of Moody's multiple rating
actions on Spanish banks.  CAM's long and short-term ratings were
kept on review for possible downgrade, pending the review of the
newly formed Banco Base (unrated), in which CAM was integrated by
that time and which was to incorporate the activities of three
more Spanish savings banks.  However, on March 30, 2011, the
Assemblies of Cajastur (Baa2 on review for downgrade, D+/Baa3
negative), Caja Cantabria (Baa2 on review for downgrade, D-/Ba3
negative) and Caja Extremadura (unrated), decided to reject the
segregation of their financial business to Banco Base.  As a
result, the SIP of Banco Base was dissolved and the four cajas
participating in the group (including CAM) started to operate
independently.  CAM was subsequently forced to find an alternative
solution outside Banco Base to comply with minimum regulatory
capital requirements.  It thus presented a recapitalization plan
to Bank of Spain on April 11, 2011, including a request of
EUR2.8 billion from the FROB (the Spanish government sponsored
Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking System), which
will enable CAM to achieve a core capital ratio of 10%.

                        Ratings Rationale

    Upgrade of Cam's Standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating

Moody's decision to upgrade CAM's standalone BFSR is driven by the
rating agency's view that the recapitalisation plan -- which has
been approved by the FROB on April 15, 2011 - will improve CAM's
financial strength because (i) the FROB's capital injection will
strengthen CAM's solvency ratios, as core capital is expected to
increase to 10.04% from the 4.24% reported at year-end 2010; (ii)
the FROB's participation in the capital of CAM will imply the
transformation of the savings bank into a commercial bank; it
should also result in improvements in corporate governance,
especially in terms of more stringent risk-management procedures.
Moody's understands that the FROB's capital injection will be
accompanied by a restructuring plan that the Bank of Spain will
monitor.

Despite the clear benefits of the capital injection and the
restructuring plan, Moody's believes that CAM continues to face
challenges especially in view of its risk-absorption capacity
which Moody's considers to remain weak.  According to Moody's
views, the FROB's funds may not be sufficient to fully cover all
the expected losses embedded in CAM's balance sheet, as envisaged
under Moody's own scenario analysis. In other words, given Spain's
uncertain economic outlook and the uncertainties within the real-
estate sector, the rating agency believes that the FROB's
recapitalization may not sufficiently protect CAM against a more
conservative loss scenario.  Furthermore, Moody's expects that
internal capital generation from recurrent sources may be limited
by the very challenging domestic operating environment of subdued
growth, downward margin pressures -- which arise from the high
level of non-earning assets and increased funding costs -- and
ongoing provision requirements.

Moody's assigns a negative outlook to CAM's BFSR, reflecting the
negative pressures on its standalone creditworthiness stemming
from the very weak operating environment in Spain, which raises
CAM's vulnerability to further deterioration in asset quality,
funding metrics and/or profitability.

     Downgrade of Cam's Senior Debt and Deposit Ratings,
                   and Subordinated Debt

In downgrading CAM's senior debt and deposit ratings to Ba1 from
Baa2, Moody's has taken into account these considerations:

  (i) A moderate probability of systemic support for CAM that
      results in a one-notch uplift from its standalone credit
      strength

(ii) The upgrade of the standalone BFSR by one notch to D
      (mapping to Ba2 on the long-term scale)

Moody's considers that CAM has a moderate systemic relevance based
on its deposit and loan market shares across Spain.  However,
Moody's also takes into consideration the likely restructuring
impact which may result in a loss of some market share, and also
notes that the current ratings already incorporate a significant
capital injection by the FROB.  With any further potential FROB
utilization, the pressure to share some of that burden with
creditor groups may increase in Moody's view, which is also
reflected in the "moderate" support assumption only.

The downgrade of CAM's dated subordinated debt instruments to Ba2
from Baa3 is driven by the same factors considered in Moody's
downgrade of the senior unsecured debt.  These dated subordinated
debt instruments continue to be rated one notch lower than the
senior debt instruments, based on subordination in the case of
liquidation.

The outlook on the senior debt and deposit ratings and dated
subordinated debt is negative, reflecting the negative outlook on
the Kingdom of Spain's Aa2 bond rating and the negative outlook on
CAM's standalone credit profile, given the challenging operating
environment in Spain.

            Potential Triggers for a Downgrade/Upgrade

Downward pressure would be exerted on CAM's standalone credit
strength because of (i) greater-than-expected deterioration in its
risk-absorption capacity, beyond the estimations assumed in
Moody's stress tests; and/or (ii) deterioration of CAM's current
liquidity position.

CAM's senior debt and deposit ratings benefit from systemic
support.  These ratings are therefore linked to the
creditworthiness of the Spanish government and exposed to any
further reduction of Moody's current systemic support assumption.
A downgrade of the Spanish government could also exert downward
pressure on CAM's debt and deposit ratings.

An improvement in CAM's standalone BFSR could exert upward rating
pressure on its debt and deposit ratings.  This could be driven by
the longer-term benefits of the planned restructuring that should
lead to (i) stronger corporate governance; (ii) more efficient
cost structures; (iii) an in-depth revision of risk management
practices; and (iv) better access to capital.  An improvement in
the economic and overall operating environment could also
positively affect CAM's BFSR and its senior debt and deposit
ratings.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology", published in
February 2007, "Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology", published in March
2007, and "Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities
and Subordinated Debt", published in November 2009.

Headquartered in Alicante, Spain, CAM reported total consolidated
assets of EUR72 billion as of Sept. 30, 2010.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


EXPORT CREDIT: S&P Affirms 'BB' LT Foreign Currency Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long-term foreign
currency credit rating on Export Credit Bank of Turkey (Turk
Eximbank) at 'BB', mirroring the rating on the Republic of Turkey.
Turk Eximbank's short-term rating is 'B'.  The outlook is
positive.

The ratings on Turk Eximbank reflect those on its sole owner, the
Republic of Turkey.  "In our opinion, Turk Eximbank's link to the
government is integral, implying an almost certain probability of
extraordinary support.  As the government remains committed to an
export-driven growth strategy, Turk Eximbank plays a critical role
in providing credit and political-risk insurance to support
exports," S&P stated.

The positive outlook on Turk Eximbank's ratings mirrors that on
the ratings on the Republic of Turkey.  As long as the state
continues to provide support, any change in the ratings on Turkey
will result in a similar rating action on Turk Eximbank.
"Conversely, any change in our assessment of Turk Eximbank's
critical role for, and integral link with, the government could
lead to downward pressure on the ratings," S&P noted.


TURKISH METROPOLITAN: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-' Currency Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the Turkish Metropolitan Municipality
of Eskisehir's (Eskisehir) ratings.

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings as Eskisehir has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process.  Therefore, Fitch will no
longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings.
Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical
coverage for Eskisehir.

Prior to the withdrawal, Eskisehir's Long-term foreign and local
currency ratings were 'BB-' and its National Long-term rating was
'A(tur), all with Stable Outlooks.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALBURN REAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'Csf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Alburn Real Estate Capital Limited's
commercial mortgage-backed notes due in October 2016:

   -- GBP121.8m class A (XS0285749833): downgraded to 'BBsf' from
      'Asf'; Outlook Stable

   -- GBP19.8m class B (XS0285751904): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
      'BBsf'; assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'

   -- GBP18.5m class C (XS0285753272): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
      assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR5'

   -- GBP18.5m class D (XS0285753942): downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6'

   -- GBP5.4m class E (XS0285755053): downgraded to 'Csf' from
      'CCsf'; assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR6'

The downgrades reflect the persistence of weak market conditions
for the secondary and tertiary segments of the UK property market,
which are eroding the transaction's creditworthiness.

The property portfolio is a granular mix of low-tier secondary or
tertiary units spread around the UK.  A significant part of the
portfolio's office component is located outside established
markets, while the largest retail property, a secondary quality
shopping centre in Doncaster, is under-performing.  Fitch believes
that portfolio collateral value will continue to be constrained by
the yield gap that has emerged between prime and non-prime quality
assets.

Portfolio net operating income has declined by approximately 11%
since closing in February 2007, of which 4% was lost in the past
12 months.  While this fall is not extraordinary, the occupational
markets concerned are unlikely to support a reversal of fortunes
in the short to medium term.  The reported forward-looking
interest coverage ratio (ICR) stands at 1.73x versus a covenant
set at 1.30x.  However, the extent of interest coverage is
overstated, and if the GBP4.8 million of cash collateral held in
the property account was not treated as income in the calculation,
the covenant would be breached.

The collateral was revalued at GBP129.6 million in April 2011,
reflecting a market value decline of approximately 48% since
closing (3% since the time of the last revaluation, conducted in
October 2010).  On this basis, the underlying loan reports a
current senior loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 142%, and a whole-loan
LTV of 151%.

The LTV covenant, previously waived until April 2011 as part of
the September 2009 loan restructuring, is in breach.  The borrower
has 20 business days in which to cure the resulting loan event of
default.  Fitch understands that the borrower has submitted three
restructuring proposals for consideration, which are in the
process of being assessed by the servicer and its advisors.

In the agency's view, given the severe impairment of the loan, the
scope for performance improvement following loan restructuring is
limited.  However, the operational and capital complexity of the
portfolio limits the range of options available to the servicer,
with any action that could threaten the sponsor's ongoing
cooperation likely viewed as a last resort.  This complexity may
lead to higher costs than in other workouts.

The prospects of further weakening in sentiment and substantial
workout costs means that further sharp declines in value cannot be
ruled out from Fitch's rating analysis, which explains the extent
of the negative rating action taken at this time.

Alburn Real Estate Capital Limited is a securitization of the A-
note of a single commercial mortgage loan arranged by N M
Rothschild & Sons ('A-'/Stable/'F1').  The loan is secured by
first-ranking mortgages over 45 commercial properties located
across the UK, comprising 29 offices, 13 industrial properties,
two retail properties and one shopping centre.


BRISTOL CARS: Bought Out of Administration
------------------------------------------
Autocar.co.uk reports that Bristol Cars has been bought from
administration by Swiss firm Kamkorp Autokraft, part of the
Frazer-Nash group.

The company was originally placed into administration at the
beginning of March with Tom MacLennan and Trevor Binyon from RSM
Tenon appointed as administrators for the firm, Autocar.co.uk
recounts.

According to Autocar.co.uk, in the coming months, plans for the
car maker and Frazer-Nash will be revealed, and will include the
use of "cutting-edge electric and range extended powertrains."

Bristol Cars is a British sports car brand.  It was formed from
the aircraft industry in 1946 and has maintained a constant,
eclectic presence through a single showroom on Kensington High
Street in west London.


KAYE PESTEIGNE: To Close Next Month; More Than 100 Jobs Affected
----------------------------------------------------------------
County Times reports that Dennis Bell, a major shareholder at Kaye
Presteigne, has confirmed that more than 100 jobs will be lost at
the company when it closes at the end of the month.

"The company has been struggling for some time and is due to close
at the end of this month.  We have not got a specific date as we
are trying to continue manufacturing for our customers," County
Times quotes Mr. Bell as saying.

Mr. Bell explained that one of the company's biggest customers
defected to another company in Hungary a few months ago, County
Times relates.

According to County Times, Mr. Bell has vented his anger at the
Welsh Assembly Government, claiming that half the redundancies
could have been avoided with some help, which they had asked for.

"If we had been given support from the Welsh Assembly Government
we would have been able to downsize to 50 people, and we could
have continued," Mr. Bell, as cited by County Times, said.  "But
the redundancy costs were over GBP1 million.  We wanted help and
support for half the redundancies, and we could have kept the
other half working."

County Times notes that Mr. Bell said the Welsh Assembly
Government rejected Kaye Presteigne's request because they never
help with redundancies, and that if they did in this case, then it
would set a precedent for the future and the funds are not
available.

Kaye Presteigne is a car parts manufacturer based in Presteigne.


PENSHER SECURITY: Goes Into Administration; 56 Jobs Affected
------------------------------------------------------------
Owen McAteer at The Northern Echo reports that Pensher Security
Doors has gone into administration.

According to The Northern Echo, delays in commencement of orders
secured in recent months were blamed for the problems at the
company, which employed 60.

The Northern Echo relates that administrators PwC said that due to
the financial circumstances of the company, 56 employees were made
redundant on Wednesday.

"Trading has suffered in recent months as a result of delays in
recent orders and the administration is clearly disappointing news
for all of the stakeholders, and employees in particular," The
Northern Echo quotes administrator Nick Reed as saying.

"The administrators are working closely with employees affected by
the closure of the business to ensure they receive the support
they need during this difficult time to assist with their claims
for redundancy and other compensatory payments.

"We are looking to secure the rapid sale of the business and
assets of PSDL and consequently we are very keen to speak to
anyone who might have an interest in acquiring the business and
assets of the company, including the order book and contracts."

Based in Gateshead, Pensher Security Doors manufactures security
doors.


SILENTNIGHT HOLDINGS: Applies for Company Voluntary Arrangement
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Simpson at Bloomberg News reports that the London-based
Times, citing Chief Executive Officer Neal Mernock, said
Silentnight Holdings Plc,, a U.K. furniture maker, asked its
pension fund and suppliers to take less money than they are owed
as the company applies for a company voluntary arrangement.

Silentnight Holdings Plc is a furniture maker based in the United
Kingdom.


VON ESSEN: Holding Company Goes Into Administration
---------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the holding company of the von Essen hotel
chain has appointed accountants Ernst & Young as administrators.

The firm owns 28 luxury hotels in the UK and France, BBC
discloses.

According to BBC, E&Y said in a statement that the hotels
themselves are not in administration and are operating normally.

"It is business as normal for the hotels and customers of von
Essen Hotels can continue to enjoy their stay," BBC quotes Angela
Swarbrick, one of the joint administrators, as saying.


WREXHAM FC: Owners Unable to Inject More Funding
------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the owners of Wrexham FC say they are unable
to put any more money into the club, which faces a GBP200,000
winding up order.

According to BBC, a club statement said Ian Roberts and Geoff Moss
had already invested millions and were "unable to continue".

Wrexham FC was issued a winding-up order by Her Majesty's Revenue
and Customs (HMRC), BBC recounts.

BBC relates that the club said it was concerned it may be barred
from the Conference play offs if the tax bill was not settled.

The club, as cited by BBC, said various attempts to sell the club
had been made, with some still ongoing, but no potential investors
had yet been willing or able to commit to a deal.

"While the team is on the verge of a potential promotion [to the
Football League], it is unfortunate that the funding seems to have
now reached an end," BBC quotes the club saying.

"We are concerned that the Football Conference may prevent Wrexham
Football Club from participating in the play-offs, should the HMRC
debt not be paid in advance (that is by May 6, 2011).

"Obviously, should the company be wound up or go into
administration, it could lose its current league status and any
phoenix club may be unable to apply to enter the English football
hierarchy."

BBC notes that the statement said the only other alternative was
to sell the Racecourse Ground, with some parties "already showing
an interest."

Wrexham Football Club is a professional football team based in
Wrexham, north-east Wales, who plays in the English football
pyramid.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 18 to April 22, 2011
-------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                Coupon    Maturity  Currency   Price
------                ------    --------  --------   -----

AUSTRIA
-------
IMMOFINANZ              4.250    3/8/2018      EUR     4.25
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.900   8/18/2025      EUR    63.25
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.810   7/29/2025      EUR    56.63
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.750   4/30/2021      EUR    68.31
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500   9/28/2035      EUR    75.47
SAZKA                   9.000   7/12/2021      EUR    73.75

DENMARK
-------
KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500    2/3/2016      TRY    69.27

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   4/27/2018      ZAR    60.48
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250   6/28/2040      CAD    20.98
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    2/9/2016      ZAR    70.81
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   3/17/2025      CAD    51.05
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   9/24/2020      CAD    67.09
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   4/26/2016      ZAR    70.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   6/30/2017      ZAR    65.17
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   2/27/2018      AUD    69.89

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970    4/1/2015      EUR    14.51
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000    1/1/2015      EUR     4.84
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720    1/1/2015      EUR     5.94
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500    1/1/2016      EUR    55.29
BNP PARIBAS            10.050   7/24/2012      USD    59.62
BPCE                    3.455   9/16/2025      EUR    72.86
CALYON                  6.000   6/18/2047      EUR    34.52
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500    1/1/2014      EUR    45.73
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000    1/1/2012      EUR    45.41
CGG VERITAS             1.750    1/1/2016      EUR    30.82
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110   11/1/2015      EUR    19.19
CLUB MEDITERRANE        5.000    6/8/2012      EUR    16.50
EURAZEO                 6.250   6/10/2014      EUR    59.73
INGENICO                2.750    1/1/2017      EUR    44.41
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2015      EUR    17.63
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2014      EUR    19.14
NEXANS SA               4.000    1/1/2016      EUR    74.09
ORPEA                   3.875    1/1/2016      EUR    48.67
PEUGEOT SA              4.450    1/1/2016      EUR    33.51
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125   7/30/2014      EUR    39.35
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000   1/18/2018      EUR    48.86
RHODIA SA               0.500    1/1/2014      EUR    51.43
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750    4/1/2020      EUR    21.02
SOITEC                  6.250    9/9/2014      EUR    12.09
TEM                     4.250    1/1/2015      EUR    57.77
THEOLIA                 2.700    1/1/2041      EUR    11.70

GERMANY
-------
EUROHYPO AG             3.830   9/21/2020      EUR    70.00
EUROHYPO AG             6.490   7/17/2017      EUR     7.50
HSH NORDBANK AG         4.375   2/14/2017      EUR    73.49
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        6.550   3/31/2012      EUR    15.38
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        6.500   3/31/2012      EUR    17.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        5.625   3/31/2017      EUR    14.75
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500   5/10/2027      CAD    46.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.500   1/30/2034      EUR    64.19
SOLON AG SOLAR          1.375   12/6/2012      EUR    67.15
TUI AG                  2.750   3/24/2016      EUR    56.69

GREECE
-------
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.301   8/12/2014      EUR    63.74
ATHENS URBAN TRN        5.008   7/18/2017      EUR    56.37
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.851   9/19/2016      EUR    57.35
HELLENIC RAILWAY        4.500   12/6/2016      JPY    50.67
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900   7/25/2025      EUR    47.61
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300   7/25/2030      EUR    46.29
HELLENIC REPUB          2.125    7/5/2013      CHF    72.77
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000   3/11/2019      EUR    52.05
HELLENIC REPUB          4.590    4/8/2016      EUR    62.02
HELLENIC REPUB          6.140   4/14/2028      EUR    61.26
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000   8/22/2016      JPY    57.18
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200   7/17/2034      EUR    58.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.250   6/19/2020      EUR    58.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700   3/20/2024      EUR    53.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300   3/20/2026      EUR    54.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   9/20/2040      EUR    50.48
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   7/20/2018      EUR    56.19
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.014   2/27/2019      EUR    55.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.959    3/4/2019      EUR    59.44
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.000   7/19/2019      EUR    56.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.161   9/17/2019      EUR    55.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   9/20/2037      EUR    50.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   5/20/2013      EUR    73.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.900    7/3/2013      EUR    72.41
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.427   7/31/2013      EUR    73.41
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.000   8/20/2013      EUR    69.32
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.520   9/30/2013      EUR    69.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500   1/11/2014      EUR    69.20
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   5/20/2014      EUR    63.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    7/1/2014      EUR    68.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.985   7/25/2014      EUR    64.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.500   8/20/2014      EUR    63.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.113   9/30/2014      EUR    64.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700   7/20/2015      EUR    57.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.100   8/20/2015      EUR    61.70
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.702   9/30/2015      EUR    60.53
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.600   7/20/2016      EUR    56.62
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.020   9/13/2016      EUR    59.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.225    3/1/2017      EUR    57.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900   4/20/2017      EUR    58.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300   7/20/2017      EUR    56.47
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.675   10/9/2017      EUR    57.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.590    4/3/2018      EUR    55.77
NATIONAL BK GREE        3.875   10/7/2016      EUR    70.05

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.580   4/28/2028      EUR    70.43
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000    3/1/2030      EUR    63.81
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000   2/12/2030      EUR    63.86
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500   6/25/2019      EUR    28.23
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750   3/29/2017      EUR    24.31
ALLIED IRISH BKS        7.875    7/5/2023      GBP    22.00
ALLIED IRISH BKS       11.500   3/29/2022      GBP    24.25
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500   6/25/2019      GBP    27.99
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750   3/29/2017      USD    24.40
BANK OF IRELAND        10.750   6/22/2018      GBP    63.98
BANK OF IRELAND         4.875   1/22/2018      GBP    54.50
BANK OF IRELAND         4.625   2/27/2019      EUR    57.19
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020      EUR    64.30
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020      GBP    63.70
BANK OF IRELAND         9.250    9/7/2020      GBP    61.98
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.450    3/1/2030      EUR    72.02
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400   11/6/2029      EUR    70.23
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.760    9/7/2029      EUR    73.54
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125   3/16/2037      USD    65.71
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125   3/16/2037      USD    67.11
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500    3/3/2025      CAD    34.22
EBS BLDG SOCIETY        4.992   3/19/2015      EUR    72.22
HYPO PUBLIC FIN         5.400   3/26/2024      EUR    20.50
IRISH GOVT              4.400   6/18/2019      EUR    69.09
IRISH GOVT              5.400   3/13/2025      EUR    68.37
IRISH GOVT              4.500   4/18/2020      EUR    68.28
IRISH LIFE & PER        4.625    5/9/2017      EUR    25.01
IRISH LIFE PERM         2.000    4/9/2015      EUR    66.62
IRISH LIFE PERM         4.820   3/22/2015      EUR    71.59
IRISH NATIONWIDE        6.250   6/26/2012      GBP    70.00
IRISH PERM PLC          5.832   2/15/2035      EUR    52.27

ITALY
-----
ABRUZZO REGION          4.450    3/1/2037      EUR    72.78
CITY OF TURIN           5.270   6/26/2038      EUR    66.20
CO BRAONE               4.567   6/30/2037      EUR    66.06
COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019   6/29/2035      EUR    62.52
REGION OF UMBRIA        5.087   6/15/2037      EUR    73.87
TELECOM ITALIA          5.250   3/17/2055      EUR    74.79

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL           7.250    4/1/2014      EUR    30.48
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014      EUR    40.59
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014      EUR    40.82

NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE       11.750   10/1/2005      USD     0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   4/27/2016      TRY    70.42
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    3/3/2021      NZD    58.93
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/17/2016      TRY    68.72
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/29/2021      NZD    58.54
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/29/2021      USD    67.97
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   2/24/2025      CAD    52.20
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625   12/9/2030      GBP    65.45
DGS INTL FIN BV        10.000    6/1/2007      USD     0.01
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500   4/10/2018      USD    59.50
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983    5/7/2029      EUR    26.92
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500   3/11/2025      CAD    53.45
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000   4/20/2016      USD    74.25
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.250    8/1/2001      USD     0.01

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS           0.500    5/9/2030      CAD    38.10
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   1/27/2016      ZAR    72.10
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   3/24/2016      ZAR    71.27
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    3/1/2016      ZAR    71.63
TRICO SHIPPING         13.875   11/1/2014      USD    73.00

PORTUGAL
--------
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.380   10/1/2038      EUR    59.04
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.980    3/3/2028      EUR    72.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.250   1/27/2020      EUR    73.28
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.400   10/8/2019      EUR    69.57
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.750   2/14/2016      EUR    72.30
COMBOIOS DE PORT        5.700    2/5/2030      EUR    74.25
METRO DE LISBOA         4.799   12/7/2027      EUR    62.69
METRO DE LISBOA         4.061   12/4/2026      EUR    59.16
PARPUBLICA              3.567   9/22/2020      EUR    58.49
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.450   6/15/2018      EUR    71.17
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.750   6/14/2019      EUR    71.99
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.850   4/15/2021      EUR    65.47
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100   4/15/2037      EUR    60.97
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.800   6/15/2020      EUR    72.27
REFER                   4.000   3/16/2015      EUR    66.99

RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA             17.500   5/23/2012      RUB     0.38
ATOMSTROYEXPORT-        7.750   5/24/2011      RUB    75.00
BALTINVESTBANK          9.000   9/10/2015      RUB    75.00
BANK SOYUZ              7.750    5/2/2011      RUB    75.00
BARENTSEV FINANS       20.000    7/4/2011      RUB     1.10
CREDIT EUROPE BK       11.500   6/28/2011      RUB    75.00
DIPOS                   6.000   6/19/2012      RUB    75.00
DVTG-FINANS            17.000   8/29/2013      RUB     1.00
EMALIANS-FINANS        10.970    7/8/2011      RUB    75.00
ENERGOSPETSSNAB         8.500   5/30/2016      RUB    75.00
ENERGOSTROY-FINA       12.000   5/20/2011      RUB    75.00
FINANCEBUSINESSG       10.000    7/1/2013      RUB    75.00
FINANCEBUSINESSG       12.500   6/22/2011      RUB    75.00
FORMAT                 17.000   12/6/2012      RUB    75.00
GLOBEX BANK             8.300   2/16/2013      RUB   100.00
INTERGRAD               9.100    7/9/2014      RUB    75.00
IZHAVTO                18.000    6/9/2011      RUB    11.31
KRAYINVESTBANK          8.500    8/5/2011      RUB    75.00
LADYA FINANS           13.750   9/13/2012      RUB    75.00
LLC VICTORIA FIN        8.000   2/12/2013      RUB    75.00
M-INDUSTRIYA           12.250   8/16/2011      RUB    24.01
MAIN ROAD OJSC         10.200    6/3/2011      RUB    75.00
MEDVED-FINANS          14.000   8/16/2013      RUB    75.00
MIG-FINANS              0.100    9/6/2011      RUB     1.00
MIRAX                  17.000   9/17/2012      RUB    15.50
MIRAX                  14.990   5/17/2011      RUB    22.00
MOSMART FINANS          0.010   4/12/2012      RUB     1.81
MOSOBLGAZ              12.000   5/17/2011      RUB    72.50
NATIONAL CAPITAL       12.500   5/20/2011      RUB    75.00
NATIONAL CAPITAL       13.000   9/25/2012      RUB    75.00
NAUKA-SVYAZ            12.500   6/27/2013      RUB    75.00
NOK                    10.000   9/22/2011      RUB     0.10
NOK                    12.500   8/26/2014      RUB     0.04
NOVOROSSIYSK           13.000   12/9/2011      RUB    75.00
OBYEDINEONNYE KO       10.750   5/16/2012      RUB    75.00
PEB LEASING            14.000   9/12/2014      RUB    75.00
PROMNESTESERVICE        7.750   12/5/2014      RUB    75.00
RAILTRANSAUTO          11.750   2/10/2016      RUB    75.00
REGIONENERGO            8.500   5/30/2016      RUB    75.00
RFA-INVEST             10.000   11/4/2011      RUB    75.00
RMK PARK PLAZA         10.000    1/8/2013      RUB    75.00
RUSSIAN SEA            10.000   6/14/2012      RUB    75.00
SAHO                   10.000   5/21/2012      RUB     0.03
SATURN                  8.500    6/6/2014      RUB    96.00
SENATOR                14.000   5/18/2012      RUB    75.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500   3/27/2012      RUB     3.40
SIBUR                   8.000   3/13/2015      RUB    75.00
SIBUR                  13.500   3/13/2015      RUB    75.00
SIBUR                   9.250   3/13/2015      RUB    75.00
SIBUR                   7.300   3/13/2015      RUB    75.00
SIBUR                  10.470   11/1/2012      RUB    75.00
SISTEMA-HALS            8.500   4/15/2014      RUB    75.00
SISTEMA-HALS            8.500    4/8/2014      RUB    75.00
SOUTHERN STOCK C        9.000   4/29/2014      RUB    75.00
SPETSSTROYFINANC        8.500   5/30/2016      RUB    75.00
SPURT                  11.250   5/31/2012      RUB    75.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL          0.100   5/24/2011      RUB     1.00
TALIO-PRINCEPS         16.000   5/17/2012      RUB    75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.000   9/25/2013      RUB    75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.000   9/19/2013      RUB    75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.500   9/11/2013      RUB    75.00
TECHNOSILA-INVES        7.000   5/26/2011      RUB     0.01
TEKHNOPROMPROEKT        8.500   9/28/2016      RUB    75.00
TERNA-FINANS            1.000   11/4/2011      RUB     4.99
TGK-4                   8.000   5/31/2012      RUB    75.00
TGK-6-INVEST            7.500   2/21/2012      RUB    75.00
TRANSCREDITFACTO       12.000   6/11/2012      RUB    75.00
TRANSCREDITFACTO       12.000   11/1/2012      RUB    75.00
TRANSFIN-M              9.750   8/13/2013      RUB    75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2014      RUB    75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2015      RUB    75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2014      RUB    75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2015      RUB    75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2015      RUB    75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2015      RUB    75.00
UNITAIL                12.000   6/22/2011      RUB    75.00
URALELEKTROMED          8.250   2/28/2012      RUB    75.22
VKM-LEASING FINA        1.000   5/18/2011      RUB     0.02
VTB 24                  6.900   2/20/2014      RUB    75.00
VTB 24                  4.500    2/5/2013      RUB    75.00
VTB-LEASING FINA        6.650    8/2/2017      RUB   100.00
ZAO EUROPLAN           10.000   8/11/2011      RUB    75.00
ZHILSOTSIPOTEKA-        9.000   7/26/2011      RUB    75.00

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750   6/30/2025      EUR    65.66
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.750   5/25/2027      EUR    72.70
AYUNTAM DE MADRD        4.550   6/16/2036      EUR    65.37
BANCAJA                 1.500   5/22/2018      EUR    64.79
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500   6/23/2021      EUR    63.17
CAJA MADRID             4.000    2/3/2025      EUR    76.17
CAJA MADRID             4.125   3/24/2036      EUR    66.67
CAJA MADRID             5.755   2/26/2028      EUR    70.09
CEDULAS TDA 6           3.875   5/23/2025      EUR    66.84
CEDULAS TDA A-5         4.250   3/28/2027      EUR    68.06
CEDULAS TDA A-6         4.250   4/10/2031      EUR    64.37
COMUNIDAD ARAGON        4.646   7/11/2036      EUR    67.46
COMUNIDAD MADRID        4.300   9/15/2026      EUR    67.64
GEN DE CATALUNYA        5.400   5/13/2030      EUR    73.13
GEN DE CATALUNYA        5.325   10/5/2028      EUR    73.81
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.220   4/26/2035      EUR    63.99
GEN DE CATALUNYA        5.219   9/10/2029      EUR    71.71
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750   8/20/2012      EUR    71.83
INSTITUT CATALA         4.250   6/15/2024      EUR    71.00
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         5.150   5/24/2034      EUR    69.72
JUNTA LA MANCHA         3.875   1/31/2036      EUR    53.13

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.000   12/7/2011      USD    10.12
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.130   1/10/2012      USD     9.50
SWEDISH EXP CRED        6.500   1/27/2012      USD     9.53
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   1/27/2012      USD     9.55
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000    3/9/2012      USD    10.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000    3/9/2012      USD     9.73
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.750   3/23/2012      USD    10.13
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    3/3/2016      ZAR    67.20
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    3/5/2018      AUD    68.05
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   1/25/2028      USD    47.51
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000   8/28/2011      USD    10.49
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   11/4/2011      USD     8.28
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000   8/12/2011      USD    10.17

SWITZERLAND
-----------

UBS AG                 10.580   6/29/2011      USD    39.59
UBS AG                 10.530   1/23/2012      USD    39.05
UBS AG                  8.720   3/20/2012      USD    32.30
UBS AG                  9.250   3/20/2012      USD    14.49
UBS AG                 10.070   3/23/2012      USD    36.00
UBS AG                 13.300   5/23/2012      USD     4.23
UBS AG JERSEY          10.500   6/16/2011      USD    71.69
UBS AG JERSEY          10.360   8/19/2011      USD    53.45
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220   7/31/2012      EUR    51.19
UBS AG JERSEY          10.280   8/19/2011      USD    35.25
UBS AG JERSEY          13.000   6/16/2011      USD    49.96
UBS AG JERSEY          11.150   8/31/2011      USD    39.48

UKRAINE
-------
GOVT OF UKRAINE        10.970   1/29/2014      UAH   101.77

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
BANK NADRA              8.000   6/22/2017      USD    72.76
BANK OF SCOTLAND        5.772    2/7/2035      EUR    73.36
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   8/31/2012      USD    35.46
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.500   8/31/2012      USD    29.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC         2.500   5/24/2017      USD    10.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.950   5/23/2011      USD    64.38
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.000   5/23/2011      USD    23.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.500   9/22/2011      USD    17.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.800   9/22/2011      USD    16.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550   1/23/2012      USD    11.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000   6/30/2011      USD    43.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.510   5/31/2011      USD    12.92
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350   1/23/2012      USD    22.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   1/31/2012      USD     9.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650   1/31/2012      USD    45.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC        12.950   4/20/2012      USD    23.72
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400   7/31/2012      USD    11.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800   7/31/2012      USD    27.11
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.750   9/22/2011      USD    73.22
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.600   7/21/2011      USD    39.76
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.875   3/28/2033      GBP    72.04
DISCOVERY EDUCAT        1.948   3/31/2037      GBP    68.26
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010    1/9/2036      EUR    30.88
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400   11/2/2047      EUR    33.88
HEALTHCARE SUPP         2.067   2/19/2043      GBP    70.86
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750   2/28/2017      GBP    74.97
PUNCH TAVERNS           7.567   4/15/2026      GBP    61.46
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        6.316   6/29/2030      EUR    66.57
SKIPTON BUILDING        5.625   1/18/2018      GBP    76.08
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.464   3/30/2032      GBP    64.48
WESSEX WATER FIN        1.369   7/31/2057      GBP    31.07


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *