/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/110321.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, March 21, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 56
Headlines
A L B A N I A
PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
A U S T R I A
S&T SYSTEM: Founder Sells 28% Stake to Three Creditor Banks
B E L A R U S
BELARUS RE: S&P Cuts Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B+'
BELARUSIAN BELAGROPROMBANK: S&P Cuts to 'B' on Sovereign Downgrade
* MINSK, BELARUS: S&P Cuts Rating to 'B' After Sovereign Downgrade
C Z E C H R E P U B L I C
* Czech Republic: Number of Companies in Insolvency Up 6.2%
D E N M A R K
SCANDINOTES V: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ca (sf)'
G E R M A N Y
BELUGA CHARTERING: Files for Insolvency Proceedings
BOWE SYSTEC: PBGC to Cover Pensions for US Unit's Workers
PROVIDE-A 2006-1: S&P Affirms 'BB (sf)' Rating on Class E Notes
I C E L A N D
KAUPTHING BANK: Vincent Tchenguiz Mulls Debt Restructuring
I R E L A N D
BOADILLA PROJECT: S&P Raises 2008-1 E CDO Notes to 'BB+'
L U X E M B O U R G
SUNRISE COMMUNICATIONS: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Corp. Rating
THESEUS EUROPEAN: S&P Hikes Class E Notes to B (sf) From CCC (sf)
M A C E D O N I A
PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
N E T H E R L A N D S
BASED THERMEA: S&P Upholds 'BB-' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
INDIGOLD CARBON: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating; Stable Outlook
OPERA FINANCE: S&P Lowers C & D Notes to 'CCC'; Default Seen
R U S S I A
GLOBEXBANK: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating
MARE BALTIC: Moody's Confirms 'Ca (sf)' Rating on Class B Notes
TROIKA DIALOG: CreditWatch Positive Over Sberbank Deal, S&P Says
* Fitch Says Recent Central Bank Measures Won't Affect Ratings
S P A I N
BBVA EMPRESAS: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class B Notes
METROVACESA SA: To Delay Debt Repayments; Mulls Debt Restructuring
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
COASTA: Goes Into Liquidation; Unable to Pay Rent
GLOBAL GENERAL: U.S. Court Recognizes High Court Proceedings
MOTORWAY SERVICE: S&P Upgrades Rating to 'B' on Refinancing
ODDBINS: Creditors to Recover 21p in the Pound Under CVA
PLYMOUTH ARGYLE: No Pay Yet for Players, Staff Until Buyer Found
X X X X X X X X
* EUROPE: FSA Chair Says Creditors Must Bear Losses in Bank Crisis
* EUROPE: Deadline Set for Emergency Bank Recapitalization Plan
* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 14 to March 18, 2011
*********
==============
A L B A N I A
==============
PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ProCredit Bank (Albania's) and
ProCredit Bank (Macedonia's) ratings.
The IDRs and Support Ratings of both banks reflect Fitch's view of
the potential support available from the bank's owners, in
particular Frankfurt-based ProCredit Holding AG ('BBB-'/Stable)
which at end-11M10 had total assets of EUR5.2 billion. PCH is the
largest shareholder of both banks, with stakes of 80% and 87.5% in
PCBA and PCM, respectively, at end-2010. PCH'S IDRs and Support
Ratings in turn reflect the agency's view of the potential support
available from its institutional shareholders, in particular from
a group of international financial institutions, which are key
voting shareholders.
The potential support for PCBA, and hence its Support Ratings and
foreign currency IDRs, are constrained by Fitch's assessment of
transfer and convertibility risks in Albania. Consequently, its
ratings could be upgraded or downgraded if Fitch's view of these
risks changed.
PCBA's Individual Rating reflects the negative trends in the
bank's asset quality -- although its ratios have remained
reasonably resilient to date -- and the risks associated with the
operating environment. It also reflects the pressure on PCBA's
performance from high loan impairment charges, rising interest
expense and a high cost base. In light of these considerations,
capitalization is only moderate. However, the rating also takes
into account PCBA's well-diversified, largely deposit-funded
funding base, and reasonable liquidity -- as reflected in a high
level of liquid assets and a strong loans/deposits ratio. The
bank's performance also improved in Q410 on the back of strong
loan growth.
PCM's Individual Rating reflects the bank's weak profitability and
the risks associated with the operating environment. Asset
quality has deteriorated but remains reasonable. In light of the
bank's low level of internal capital generation, trends in its
asset quality ratios and operating environment, capitalization is
modest. However, the rating also reflects PCM's satisfactory
liquidity and funding profile, which are supported by a well-
established customer deposit base.
In addition, PCBA and PCM's Individual Ratings are enhanced by
relatively strong management, good corporate governance and robust
risk management systems and practices ensuing from the entities
being part of the ProCredit group of banks.
The rating affirmations are:
PCBA:
-- Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating: 'B+';
Outlook Stable
-- Long-term local currency IDR: 'BB-', Outlook Stable
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'B'
-- Individual Rating 'D/E'
-- Support Rating '4'
PCM:
-- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
-- Long-term local currency IDR: 'BB+', Outlook Stable
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'B'
-- Individual Rating 'D/E'
-- Support Rating '3'
=============
A U S T R I A
=============
S&T SYSTEM: Founder Sells 28% Stake to Three Creditor Banks
-----------------------------------------------------------
Zoe Schneeweiss at Bloomberg News, citing Format magazine, reports
that Thomas Streimelweger, the founder of S&T System Integration &
Technology Distribution AG, has agreed to hand over his 28% stake
in the Austrian IT company to three creditor banks.
Bloomberg relates that the Vienna-based magazine said
Mr. Streimelweger owed EUR16 million (US$22.5 million) to Hypo
Alpe-Adria-Bank International AG, Oesterreichische Volksbanken
AG's Investkredit and Hypo Niederoesterreich.
According to Bloomberg, Format, citing the Austrian Takeover
Commission, said the banks will create a hive-off vehicle for the
stake and combine it with the 29% of S&T that formerly were in the
portfolio of insolvent AvW. The banks will then seek a buyer for
the combined stake of 57%, Bloomberg says, citing the report.
Format, as cited by Bloomberg, said that KDDI Corp. of Japan and
MDS of Lebanon may be interested in S&T.
S&T System Integration & Technology Distribution AG is an Austrian
IT company.
=============
B E L A R U S
=============
BELARUS RE: S&P Cuts Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings on
Belarusian National Reinsurance Organization (Belarus Re) to 'B+'
from 'BB-'. The outlook remains negative.
"The downgrade of Belarus Re follows our downgrade of Belarus, and
reflects our view of the risk of a deterioration in the
sovereign's creditworthiness," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Ekaterina Tolstova.
The ratings on Belarus Re now reflect its stand-alone credit
profile. "In line with our methodology, we have removed the one-
notch uplift we factored into our rating on Belarus Re to signify
government support. This is because the long-term local currency
rating on Belarus is now below 'BB'," S&P said.
Nevertheless, S&P still assesses Belarus Re's role for the
Belarusian economy to be "important", because it enjoys a monopoly
position in the Belarus insurance market as the sole provider of
reinsurance protection. "We assess Belarus Re's link with the
Belarusian government as 'very strong' because the government owns
100% of Belarus Re via the Belarusian Ministry of Finance," S&P
said.
The negative outlook on Belarus Re reflects the outlook on the
Republic of Belarus (foreign currency B/Negative/B; local currency
B+/Negative/B).
"In line with our methodology, we would not normally assign
domestic insurers a rating higher than the local currency rating
on the sovereign in which they are domiciled," S&P said.
"Further rating actions on Belarus Re could result from changes to
the sovereign local currency ratings on Belarus," said
Ms. Tolstova.
S&P said, "Consequently, if we lowered the sovereign local
currency rating on Belarus further, it would likely trigger a
similar rating action on Belarus Re.
"If we were to revise the outlook on the sovereign to stable, it
would likely lead to the revision of the outlook on Belarus Re to
stable, as well."
BELARUSIAN BELAGROPROMBANK: S&P Cuts to 'B' on Sovereign Downgrade
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
counterparty ratings on Belarus-based Belagroprombank JSC and JSC
BPS-Bank (BPS) to 'B' from 'B+'. At the same time, the ratings
firm affirmed the 'B' short-term counterparty credit ratings. The
outlook on both banks remains negative.
"The rating actions follow our downgrade of Belarus, and reflect
our view of the risk of a deterioration in the sovereign's
creditworthiness," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Sergey
Voronenko.
S&P said, "In our opinion, the current situation may have a
negative impact on these banks because of their high operational,
funding, and asset exposures to the predominantly state-owned
Belarusian economy. As a result, the long-term ratings on
Belagroprombank and BPS-Bank now reflect their stand-alone credit
profiles and are capped at the sovereign level. Both banks had
benefited from a one-notch uplift above their stand-alone credit
profiles to reflect the likelihood of parental and state
extraordinary support."
The ratings on Belagroprombank reflect its status as a government-
related entity. "We assess the likelihood of extraordinary
support from the Belarusian government in the event of financial
distress as 'very high'. This is based on our view of the bank's
role for the local economy as 'very important' and its link with
the government as 'very strong', given the state's direct 70%
shareholding through the Cabinet of Ministers of Belarus and a
combined 30% stake held by state-owned insurance companies and
regional administrations," S&P said.
The ratings on BPS-Bank reflect S&P's view that there is a "very
high" likelihood of extraordinary parental support from the
Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (Sberbank; not rated),
which owns a 97.4% stake in BPS-Bank. The ratings firm considers
BPS-Bank to be a strategically important subsidiary of Sberbank,
Russia's largest (and state-owned) bank, and considers the
parent's commitment to BPS-Bank's development as significant.
"We understand that Sberbank is aligning BPS-Bank's local
operations with the group's global strategy, and will support BPS-
Bank through a gradual equity increase and supplementary
financing, S&P said.
The negative outlooks on Belagroprombank and BPS-Bank mirror the
outlook on the Republic of Belarus (foreign currency B/Negative/B;
local currency B+/Negative/B), reflecting the country's low
external liquidity, owing to very high current-account deficits,
which in turn present risks for the predominantly state-controlled
Belarusian banking sector and economy. Moreover, both banks have
rapidly accumulated a high exposure to state-related projects and
entities. In the event that Belarus is unable to refinance its
external liabilities, it could hamper these projects and entities
from servicing their debts with Belagroprombank and BPS-Bank.
Further rating actions on Belagroprombank and BPS-Bank could
result from changes to the sovereign foreign currency ratings on
Belarus or our transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment of
Belarus. However, the ratings on Belarus and those on
Belagroprombank and BPS-Bank would not necessarily move
in tandem.
"If we were to further lower the sovereign foreign currency
ratings and T&C assessment on Belarus, these actions would likely
trigger similar rating actions on Belagroprombank and BPS-Bank,"
said Mr. Voronenko.
S&P said, "Moreover, if we see that the likelihood of timely and
sufficient extraordinary government support for Belagroprombank,
or parental support from Sberbank in the case of BPS-Bank, were
decreasing, it might also lead us to downgrade the respective
bank, if the bank's stand-alone credit profile had not improved."
Ratings upside is low and would be possible only if the stand-
alone credit quality and the external support probability of the
two banks remains unchanged, in addition to S&P's raising the
sovereign foreign currency ratings and T&C assessment on Belarus,
which is unlikely at least within one year.
* MINSK, BELARUS: S&P Cuts Rating to 'B' After Sovereign Downgrade
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on the Belarusian City of Minsk to 'B' from 'B+'.
The outlook is negative.
"Our downgrade of Minsk reflects our downgrade, on March 15, 2011,
of the Republic of Belarus (foreign currency B/Negative/B; local
currency B+/Negative/B)," S&P said.
"We view the institutional framework for Belarusian local and
regional governments as centralized, and because of this we cap
the long-term rating on the city of Minsk at the level of the
long-term sovereign rating on Belarus," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Felix Ejgel.
Under S&P's methodology it assesses the indicative credit level
for Minsk as 'b+'. "We believe that the institutional framework
under which Belarusian regional governments operate is very
centralized and evolving, which limits the predictability and
flexibility of Minsk's financial policy. The central government
defines the types, rates, and bases of most taxes, sets norms of
regional spending through established social standards, limits
regions' budget deficits, and authorizes all borrowings," S&P
said.
Moreover, the central government alters the share of taxes
allocated to regional budgets annually and unilaterally raises
salaries in the public sector, social benefits, and utility
charges. This therefore exerts spending pressure on Minsk's
budget. Furthermore, the central government prescribes annual
limits for deficits of regional governments and authorizes their
borrowings.
The negative outlook reflects that on Belarus as the rating on
Minsk is capped by that on the sovereign.
"We would lower the rating on the city if the sovereign ratings
were lowered," said Mr. Ejgel.
"Even if the sovereign rating remains unchanged, we could lower
the rating on Minsk within the next 12 months in the unlikely
event of a significant weakening of the city's liquidity position.
This could result from a rapid accumulation of short-term foreign
currency debt, either directly or via the municipal companies,
amid worsening borrowing conditions. This could occur if the city
had to enlarge its capital program without adequate cofinancing
from the central government," S&P said.
"We could take a positive rating action on the city, however, if
there is a positive rating action on the sovereign, and at the
same time Minsk's moderate deficit after capital accounts and its
solid cash reserves are maintained, and its debt accumulation
slows, in line with our base-case scenario.
"The rating on the City of Minsk continues to reflect our view of
the city's very limited budget predictability and flexibility,
large infrastructure needs, and high contingent liabilities.
Nevertheless, we consider that the city's status as the country's
largest administrative, financial, and commercial center; its
consistently very strong operating surplus; moderate debt burden;
and good liquidity all support its creditworthiness."
===========================
C Z E C H R E P U B L I C
===========================
* Czech Republic: Number of Companies in Insolvency Up 6.2%
-----------------------------------------------------------
CTK, citing data from Creditreform, reports that the number of
companies in insolvency grew by 6.2 percent year-on-year to 4,852
in the Czech Republic last year owing to the economic crisis,
while the number of insolvencies in Central and Eastern Europe
rose by 11.8 percent to 52,181.
In 2009 the number of businesses in insolvency in the Czech
Republic jumped by 57 percent while the number of insolvencies in
Central and Eastern Europe grew by 40 percent, CTK discloses.
"The impacts of the crisis in 2008 and 2009 are far from being
over. The economic situation in countries in Central and Eastern
Europe has stabilised in recent months, but the drop in corporate
bankruptcies is not in sight yet," Creditreform said, according to
CTK.
CTK relates that Creditreform registered the biggest rise in
insolvencies of companies of 28.1 percent in Lithuania last year.
In contrast, Estonia showed the sharpest drop in the number of
insolvencies of 27.3 percent.
The number of insolvencies in Western Europe dropped by 1.4
percent to fewer than 175,700 last year, while in 2009 their
number grew by 22 percent, CTK notes.
Creditreform, which monitors the insolvency register permanently,
has been publishing its regular analyses on the development of
insolvencies in the Czech Republic and abroad for several years.
=============
D E N M A R K
=============
SCANDINOTES V: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ca (sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took these rating actions on notes
issued by Scandinotes V P.L.C.:
-- DKK218,100,000 Class A Floating Rate Limited Recourse
Secured Senior Notes due 2015, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf);
previously on Feb 18, 2011 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade
-- DKK672,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Guaranteed Limited
Recourse Secured Senior Notes due 2015, Underlying Rating:
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Caa1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
-- DKK417,900,000 Class C 4% Guaranteed Limited Recourse
Secured Mezzanine Notes due 2015, Underlying Rating:
Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Caa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Ratings Rationale
Scandinotes(R) V is a highly non-granular securitization of
subordinated debt issued by Danish banks. All the assets in the
pool have the flexibility to redeem the loans at the five year
call option in November 2012. Should they choose not to redeem,
the underlying assets will be subject to an increase in the
coupons paid.
The driver of the rating actions is the recent announcement by
Financial Stability, the Danish government-backed bank-support
vehicle that, effective Feb. 6, 2011, a newly created subsidiary
of Financial Stability acquired all the assets and part of the
liabilities of Amagerbanken Aktieselskab. The transfer
effectively wipes out the subordinated debt of Amagerbanken that
was included in the Scandinotes(R) V pool.
The rating of class A remains unchanged due to the extremely high
over-collateralization (527% excluding swap termination payments)
benefitting this tranche. Moody's notes as well that three of the
loan issuers were also included in previous Scandinotes
transactions and chose to redeem their loans after five years.
Two of these banks, Spar Nord Bank A/S and Middelfart Sparekasse
redeemed the loans securitized in Mare Baltic 2005 in November
2010, whilst Max Bank A/S, which was securitized in Mare Baltic
PCC Limited (Mare Baltic II), redeemed its loan in 2009.Should
they decide to proceed similarly in the context of this
transaction,the class A would be entirely redeemed.
Following the default of Amagerbanken, and in accordance with the
terms of the swap documentation, Class D has been written down to
zero. Without the guarantee from EIF, class C would have been
written down to DKK308,190,527 from its initial value of
DKK417,900,000. Reflecting this, and incorporating Moody's
expectations of future pool performance, the action on the
underlying rating of Class C is commensurate with the Moody's
expected recoveries for the notes, as outlined in the paper titled
"Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
Default" (November 2009).
The impact on the underlying ratings of classes B and C was
mitigated by the already very low ratings on the tranches and the
high default probability assigned to Amagerbanken at the last
rating action (June 2010).
The majority of the assets in the pool are assessed by credit
estimate. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool
with a stressed weighted average default probability equivalent to
a Caa 2 rating. In addition to the estimates on the underlying
issuers, average portfolio rating reflected the treatment for non
granular pools that rely on credit estimates outlined in the paper
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" (October 2009).
Moody's also considered various additional scenarios, including
the jump to Caa2 scenario described in the above mentioned report.
This scenario had an impact of slightly over half a notch on the
model output of class A.
Because the portfolio references a low number of generally small
Danish banks and the concerns listed above surrounding the Danish
banking industry, Moody's believes the correlation in defaults
between issuers in the pool is likely to be high. Correlation was
assumed to be 50%, though a stress case of 75% was also looked at.
This had a two notch impact on the model results for Class A.
Although the issuers have an economic incentive to repay the loans
at the Optional Redemption Date falling in November 2012, Moody's
also considered the likelihood that some or all of the loans would
not be redeemed at the end of their fifth year due to financing
difficulties of the underlying banks, and found the impact to be
consistent with the revised rating levels.
Recoveries on the subordinated loans in the event of default were
assumed to be zero.
Sources of additional performance uncertainties include:
1) Low portfolio granularity: the performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
large obligors that are rated low non investment grade. This is
especially true in scenarios where these obligors jump to
default.
2) Moody's believes the correlation in defaults between issuers in
the pool will be probably be high, with the consequence that
remaining performance outcomes of the notes are likely to be
binary in nature.
At closing the assets were referenced via an asset swap with HSH
Nordbank AG as the counterparty. Using this mechanism, classes C
and D were issued at discount paying a reduced fixed coupon. The
difference was due to be paid to the noteholders by way of a final
payment from the asset swap that expires in December 2012 at the
same time as the call options on the underlying loans. After
termination of the swap, there remains a floor in place to
mitigate the interest risk between the floating rate assets and
fixed liabilities on Classes C and D. When defaults occur on the
underlying assets, the amount of the fixed notional of the swap
that is written down is determined by the current interest rates
at the time the swap is written down.
Under these methodologies, Moody's relies on a simulation based
framework. Moody's used a bespoke CDOROM and cash model in order
to capture the specific characteristics of the deal, incorporating
the assumptions contained in the above methodologies. As such
default scenarios were generated for each asset in the portfolio
and these were applied in the cash flow model to compute the loss
associated with each tranche in the structure.
Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.
=============
G E R M A N Y
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BELUGA CHARTERING: Files for Insolvency Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
Heavy Lift & Project Forwarding International reports that Beluga
Chartering GmbH filed for insolvency proceedings at the local
court in Bremen, Germany, on March 16, 2011.
The isolated insolvency filing of Chartering follows the discovery
of material irregularities relating to revenues and liquidity,
details of which have been notified to the relevant authorities,
Klaus Becker, interim spokesman, confirmed to HLPFI.
HLPFI relates that Chartering's parent company, Beluga Group GmbH,
and certain other key subsidiary companies continue to operate
outside insolvency.
"Beluga is pleased to confirm that its key stakeholders are
involved in ongoing and constructive dialogue designed to achieve
a common solution for Beluga," the company said in a statement,
according to HLPFI. "Further announcements will be made in due
course as appropriate."
According to HLPFI, an investigation into suspended Beluga
Shipping management, including founder Neils Stolberg, on
suspicion of fraud and incorrect accounting was launched earlier
this month by the Bremen prosecutor's office.
HLPFI adds that Beluga has announced a "comprehensive financial
restructuring" working closely with its largest secured lender US-
based private equity firm Oaktree Capital Management, which
invested approximately EUR100 million in the company last year.
BOWE SYSTEC: PBGC to Cover Pensions for US Unit's Workers
---------------------------------------------------------
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation will cover the retirement
benefits of nearly 800 employees and retirees of Bowe Bell +
Howell Co., a maker of high-speed postal inserting and sorting
systems based in Wheeling, Ill.
The PBGC, which safeguards the pensions of 44 million Americans,
acted because Bowe Bell + Howell's parent company, Bowe Systec AG
of Augsburg, Germany, is selling all its assets in bankruptcy.
Following the sale, the pension plan will be abandoned, leaving
PBGC to pay about US$21 million in unfunded benefits.
By taking action before the sale, the agency can more easily
recover assets from the company and its units to help pay benefits
to members of Bowe Bell + Howell's retirement plan.
In general, PBGC will pay the benefit that a retiree would earn if
they retired at age 65. However, there is a legal maximum,
US$54,000 per year for a 65-year-old, and lower for people who
retire before age 65 or choose survivor benefits. In addition,
certain early-retirement payments and recent benefit increases are
generally not covered.
Further information is available at the PBGC Web site,
www.pbgc.gov, or by calling toll-free 1-800-400-7242. TTY/TDD
users should call the federal relay service toll-free at 1-800-
877-8339 and ask for 800-400-7242.
Bowe Bell + Howell retirees who get their pension from PBGC may be
eligible for the federal Health Coverage Tax Credit. For more
information, see
http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/hctc/hctc-faqs.html
PBGC, which receives no taxpayer funds, will take over the pension
plan assets and use insurance premiums to pay covered benefits.
The company's pension plan has $24.6 million in assets to cover
$45.5 million in benefit liabilities, according to the PBGC. The
agency expects to cover $20.8 million of the $20.9 million
shortfall.
PBGC's action will not have a significant impact on the agency's
financial statements. PBGC included an estimate of Bowe Bell +
Howell's benefit payments in its fiscal year 2010 financial
statements, in keeping with generally accepted accounting
principles.
PROVIDE-A 2006-1: S&P Affirms 'BB (sf)' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
LONDON (Standard & Poor's) March 16, 2011--Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on PROVIDE-A 2006-1
GmbH's class B, C, and D notes. At the same time, it affirmed its
ratings on the class A+, A, and E notes.
The raising of the ratings on the class B, C, and D notes follows
a detailed analysis of the transaction performance. Credit
support is provided by a threshold, above which losses will be
allocated to the notes, in an amount of EUR20.4 million and the
subordinated classes. Synthetic excess spread of approximately
0.03% of the performing balance per quarter provides additional
credit support and increases the creditworthiness of all rated
notes.
"Excess spread was sufficient to cover allocated losses totaling
EUR1,121,826 to date. Therefore, the threshold is fully funded in
the amount of EUR20.4 million. Relatively high recovery rates
further support the good performance of this transaction, in our
view. In recent interest periods, recovery rates for worked-out
credit events, for which a loss was allocated to the transaction,
were between 63.55% and 65.35%," S&P explained.
"Since closing we have observed, what we consider to be, moderate
arrears of 90+ days and credit events. As of the current pool
report for the payment date Feb. 25, 2011, the current level of
90+ day arrears is 0.16% of the current pool balance and credit
events amount to 1.10% of the current pool balance.
"Considering realized losses and delinquencies to date, and taking
into account historical recovery rates in this particular
portfolio, we have assessed the likelihood of future losses for
both the performing and nonperforming parts of the collateral
pool.
"The good performance of the transaction and the current level of
credit enhancement provided to senior classes of notes by excess
spread, the threshold, and subordinated classes have led us to
raise our ratings on the class B, C, and D notes.
"We have affirmed the ratings on the class A+, A, and E notes as,
in our opinion, credit enhancement is commensurate with the
current ratings on these notes."
Amortization has reduced the pool factor in PROVIDE-A 2006-1 to
50%. S&P will continue to monitor the development of credit
events and actual losses in the transaction.
PROVIDE A 2006-1 is a synthetic German residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction using the partially funded KfW
Provide Platform.
RATINGS LIST
Rating
Class To From
PROVIDE A 2006-1
EUR340.2 Million Floating-Rate Credit-Linked Notes
Ratings Raised
B AA+ (sf) AA (sf)
C AA (sf) A (sf)
D A (sf) BBB (sf)
Ratings Affirmed
A+ AAA (sf)
A AAA (sf)
E BB (sf)
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I C E L A N D
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KAUPTHING BANK: Vincent Tchenguiz Mulls Debt Restructuring
----------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Thomas at The Financial Times reports that Vincent
Tchenguiz, the property mogul who was arrested and released
without charge as part of the investigation into Kaupthing Bank
hf., has begun a process to restructure more than GBP2 billion of
debt backing his business.
The FT relates that the entrepreneur last month held a "beauty
pageant" of investment banks to advise on plans to either
restructure or refinance the debt, which was borrowed from banks
including Lloyds, Royal Bank of Scotland, Allied Irish, Bayerische
Landesbank, Citibank, Deutsche Bank and UBS. Lazard was among the
leading names to advise on the process, the FT says.
According to the FT, Mr. Tchenguiz said the banks that backed the
property business had been given reassurances following his
arrest, which could have threatened to derail plans to restructure
the loans. He said the decision by the court on March 16 to allow
him to pursue a civil claim against Kaupthing for more than GBP1
billion in the UK courts had helped limit the reputational damage
caused by the arrest, the FT notes.
There have been defaults elsewhere in debt outstanding to the
business, most recently the GBP125 million loan from Bank of
America Merrill Lynch that pushed Peverel property management into
administration on March 14, the FT discloses. There is also a
GBP100 million loan outstanding to Kaupthing, the bank whose 2008
collapse had prompted the investigation, which will mature within
the month, the FT states.
"Kaupthing is still in there," the FT quotes Mr. Tchenguiz as
saying. "They have GBP100 million of GBP2 billion, so its
disproportionately small but very toxic. The GBP100 million loan
has not been given back. The maturity hasn't finished but it will
in a few weeks."
Mr. Tchenguiz's claim against Kaupthing centers on losses he said
were incurred by the bank, causing the cross-default in the
financial structures behind the businesses used as collateral for
his loan and debt held by his brother, Robert, who was also
arrested and released without charge with seven others, according
to the FT. The FT says collateral included the offshore ownership
of the Peverel operating and ground rents business, as well as an
HBOS-funded ground rents business.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 11,
2011, the SFO, as cited by Bloomberg News, said the agency is
investigating Kaupthing's "decision-making processes, which appear
to have allowed substantial value to be extracted from the bank in
the weeks and days prior to its collapse." In 2008, lending to
Robert Tchenguiz and "related parties" corresponded to more than
25% of Kaupthing's equity, Bloomberg said, citing the Icelandic
parliament-appointed Special Investigative Commission.
Mr. Tchenguiz, Kaupthing's biggest retail borrower, was also a
board member in Exista hf, one of the former owners of the bank,
according to Bloomberg. The SFO is also probing whether Kaupthing
made misrepresentations to attract U.K. investors, particularly
its efforts to attract British investors to a high-yield deposit
account called Kaupthing Edge, Bloomberg noted.
About Kaupthing Bank
Headquartered in Reykjavik, Kaupthing Bank --
http://www.kaupthing.com/-- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups. With operations in
more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of services
including retail banking, corporate finance, asset management,
brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private wealth
management. Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank. In October 2008, the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on Nov. 30,
2008, Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf., filed a
petition under Chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York commencing the Debtor's Chapter 15 case ancillary to the
Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the Icelandic
Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the Bankruptcy
Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.
=============
I R E L A N D
=============
BOADILLA PROJECT: S&P Raises 2008-1 E CDO Notes to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services removed from CreditWatch
negative and withdrew its credit ratings on Boadilla Project
Finance CLO (2008-1) Ltd.'s class A to D notes. It also lowered,
removed from CreditWatch negative, and withdrew the rating on the
class E notes.
According to S&P, "On Jan. 17, we placed our ratings on all
classes of Boadilla Project Finance CLO (2008-1)'s notes on
CreditWatch negative following tariff changes that, in our view,
reduced the overall level of subsidies paid to Spanish solar power
producers. Spanish solar power project finance loans account for
29% of the reference portfolio. We have revised some of our
credit estimates on these solar power project finance loans and
there has been some effect on the ratings on the Boadilla Project
Finance CLO (2008-1) notes.
"In our opinion, there has been no effect on the ratings on the
class A, B, C, and D notes, so we have therefore removed our
ratings on these notes from CreditWatch negative. Note that the
rating on the class A notes was also on CreditWatch negative for
counterparty reasons.
"When our revised counterparty criteria became effective on
Jan. 18, we kept our rating on the class A notes on CreditWatch
negative. Applying the counterparty criteria, we have concluded
that the rating on the class A notes remains appropriate, and we
have therefore removed our rating on the class A notes from
CreditWatch negative for counterparty reasons.
"We have, however, lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative
our rating on the class E notes following our revised assessment
of some of the solar power project finance loans referenced in the
portfolio.
"We have withdrawn the ratings on all of these notes at the
arranger's request.
Boadilla Project Finance CLO (2008-1) is a synthetic
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of project finance loans
originated by Banco Santander S.A. Around 29% of Boadilla Project
Finance CLO (2008-1)'s underlying reference portfolio represents
exposure to the Spanish solar power sector. The transaction
closed in December 2008.
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
Boadilla Project Finance CLO (2008-1) Ltd.
EUR78.25 Million Asset-Backed Credit-Linked Notes
Ratings Removed From CreditWatch Negative and Withdrawn
A AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
NR AA+ (sf)
B A+ (sf) A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
NR A+ (sf)
C A- (sf) A- (sf)/Watch Neg
NR A- (sf)
D BBB- (sf) BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
NR BBB- (sf)
Rating Lowered, Removed From CreditWatch Negative, and Withdrawn
E B+ (sf) BB (sf)/Watch Neg
NR B+ (sf)
NR -- Not rated.
===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================
SUNRISE COMMUNICATIONS: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Corp. Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Luxemburg-based holding company Sunrise Communications Holdings
S.A. (Sunrise) to negative from stable. At the same time, the
'BB-' long-term corporate credit rating on Sunrise was affirmed.
"In addition, we affirmed the 'BB' issue rating on the Swiss franc
(CHF) 500 million senior secured term loan facility A, due 2016,
and CHF 320 million (equivalent) senior secured term loan facility
B, due 2017, issued by Skylight S.a.r.l; and on the CHF300 million
and EUR371 million senior secured bonds issued by Sunrise
Communications International S.A., both due 2017. The recovery
rating on both term loan facilities and the senior secured bonds
is unchanged at '2', indicating our expectation of substantial
(70%-90%) recovery in the event of a payment default," S&P said.
"We also affirmed the 'B' issue rating on Sunrise's EUR561 million
subordinated bonds (including a EUR56 million tap issuance), due
2018. The recovery rating on this instrument is unchanged at '6',
indicating our expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.
The outlook revision follows the announcement on March 15, 2011,
that a financial vehicle of Mobile Challenger Group S.a.r.l, the
parent company of Sunrise, has raised EUR75 million (approximately
CHF98 million) in payment-in-kind (PIK) loans with a 9.5% coupon
maturing in 2018. "We understand that proceeds will be used to
refinance part of the CHF0.9 billion preferred equity certificates
(PECs) that sit at Mobile Challenger Group," S&P said.
"We view these transactions by Sunrise's shareholder as reflective
of a more aggressive financial policy than we had previously
anticipated," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Patrizia
D'Amico. "The launch of the PIK loans represents the second debt
issuance aimed at reducing the equity exposure of private-equity
company CVC Capital Partners since its acquisition of Sunrise
in September 2010.
"The ratings on Sunrise reflect the group's high leverage,
relatively weak competitive position against the dominant Swiss
incumbent telecommunications operator Swisscom AG (A/Stable/--),
and only moderate profitability. Furthermore, the ratings are
constrained by our view that the group's sponsor, CVC, is likely
to continue to pursue an aggressive financial policy in the
near to medium term.
"We see the increasingly aggressive financial policy adopted by
Sunrise's shareholder, CVC, resulting in higher leverage, as
calculated by us, compared with our base-case assessment. This is
only partially offset by the group's solid cash flow generation,
in our view.
"We could lower the ratings if Sunrise's shareholder undertakes
further aggressive actions that could delay the prospect of
deleveraging, such as further reducing the amount of PECS and
CPECs through the incurrence of instruments with more debt-like
characteristics. The ratings could also come under pressure if
Sunrise's credit measures fail to improve from their current
levels -- for example, as a result of a more competitive
environment in Switzerland weighing on mobile revenues growth and
operating margins. In addition, a significant weakening of free
operating cash flow required to serve debt amortization below the
level that we anticipate for 2011 in our base-case assessment
(CHF140 million) could likely put pressure on the rating.
"We could revise the outlook to stable if Sunrise's adjusted
leverage, including PIK loans but excluding PECs and CPECs, were
to approach 4.5x over the next 12 to 18 months supported by an
operating performance that's stronger than we anticipate."
THESEUS EUROPEAN: S&P Hikes Class E Notes to B (sf) From CCC (sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Theseus European CLO S.A.'s class A1, A2B, B, C, D, and E notes.
At the same time, S&P affirmed and removed from CreditWatch
negative its rating on the class A2A notes.
"Since our last review in October 2010, we have observed a general
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
For instance, based on notional amounts, our analysis shows that
assets we consider to be rated in the 'CCC' category have
decreased," S&P recounted.
"At the same time, we have also observed an increase in the
balance of performing assets plus principal cash, which, in our
view, have helped to improve the credit enhancement available to
all classes of notes.
"In our last review, we noted from the trustee report as of
September 2010 that the class C, D, and E par value tests were
failing. Since then, we have noticed a general improvement in the
results of these tests. According to the latest available trustee
report of February 2011, all par value tests were passing, with
any deferred payments on junior classes being paid in full on the
last payment date.
"Based on our analysis, we consider that the increased credit
enhancement available to the class A1, A2B, B, C, D, and E notes
is now consistent with higher ratings than previously assigned,
and we have therefore raised our ratings on these classes.
"We placed the class A2A notes on CreditWatch negative on Jan. 18,
2011 due to the implementation of our updated counterparty
criteria. Our review of the transaction, which included applying
our updated counterparty criteria as well as conducting credit and
cash flow analyses, concluded that the rating on the class A2A
notes remains appropriate. We have therefore affirmed and removed
from CreditWatch negative our rating on the class A2A notes."
Theseus European CLO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-
grade corporate borrowers. The transaction closed in August 2006
and is managed by INVESCO Senior Secured Management.
RATINGS LIST
Rating
Class To From
Theseus European CLO S.A.
EUR331 Million Senior Secured And Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Raised
A1 AA (sf) A+ (sf)
A2B AA (sf) A+ (sf)
B A (sf) BBB+ (sf)
C BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf)
D BB+ (sf) BB- (sf)
E B (sf) CCC (sf)
Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative
A2A AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg
=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================
PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ProCredit Bank (Albania's) and
ProCredit Bank (Macedonia's) ratings.
The IDRs and Support Ratings of both banks reflect Fitch's view of
the potential support available from the bank's owners, in
particular Frankfurt-based ProCredit Holding AG ('BBB-'/Stable)
which at end-11M10 had total assets of EUR5.2 billion. PCH is the
largest shareholder of both banks, with stakes of 80% and 87.5% in
PCBA and PCM, respectively, at end-2010. PCH'S IDRs and Support
Ratings in turn reflect the agency's view of the potential support
available from its institutional shareholders, in particular from
a group of international financial institutions, which are key
voting shareholders.
The potential support for PCBA, and hence its Support Ratings and
foreign currency IDRs, are constrained by Fitch's assessment of
transfer and convertibility risks in Albania. Consequently, its
ratings could be upgraded or downgraded if Fitch's view of these
risks changed.
PCBA's Individual Rating reflects the negative trends in the
bank's asset quality -- although its ratios have remained
reasonably resilient to date -- and the risks associated with the
operating environment. It also reflects the pressure on PCBA's
performance from high loan impairment charges, rising interest
expense and a high cost base. In light of these considerations,
capitalization is only moderate. However, the rating also takes
into account PCBA's well-diversified, largely deposit-funded
funding base, and reasonable liquidity -- as reflected in a high
level of liquid assets and a strong loans/deposits ratio. The
bank's performance also improved in Q410 on the back of strong
loan growth.
PCM's Individual Rating reflects the bank's weak profitability and
the risks associated with the operating environment. Asset
quality has deteriorated but remains reasonable. In light of the
bank's low level of internal capital generation, trends in its
asset quality ratios and operating environment, capitalization is
modest. However, the rating also reflects PCM's satisfactory
liquidity and funding profile, which are supported by a well-
established customer deposit base.
In addition, PCBA and PCM's Individual Ratings are enhanced by
relatively strong management, good corporate governance and robust
risk management systems and practices ensuing from the entities
being part of the ProCredit group of banks.
The rating affirmations are:
PCBA:
-- Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating: 'B+';
Outlook Stable
-- Long-term local currency IDR: 'BB-', Outlook Stable
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'B'
-- Individual Rating 'D/E'
-- Support Rating '4'
PCM:
-- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
-- Long-term local currency IDR: 'BB+', Outlook Stable
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'B'
-- Individual Rating 'D/E'
-- Support Rating '3'
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
BASED THERMEA: S&P Upholds 'BB-' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Netherlands-based heating products
manufacturer BDR Thermea Group B.V. S&P subsequently withdrew the
rating at BDR's request. At the time of the withdrawal, the
outlook was stable.
The rating withdrawal follows the early redemption of the GBP100
million mezzanine notes due 2014 by Heating Finance PLC, an
intermediate holding company that is indirectly owned by BDR.
Heating Finance completed the redemption in January 2011. BDR was
the guarantor of the mezzanine notes.
INDIGOLD CARBON: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating; Stable Outlook
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned a 'BB-' corporate
credit rating to Netherlands-based Indigold Carbon BV. The outlook
is stable. At the same time, we removed all ratings on Columbian
Chemicals Acquisition LLC from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they had been placed on Jan. 31, 2011,
following the announcement that Aditya Birla Group had entered
into a definitive agreement to acquire the company. The
CreditWatch placement reflected the risk that additional debt
associated with the acquisition could weaken financial metrics
without measurable offsetting benefits to the business or
financial risk profiles.
"At the same time, we assigned our 'BB-' issue-level ratings (the
same as the corporate credit rating) to Indigold Carbon USA's $575
million senior secured credit facilities. The recovery ratings
are '3', indicating our expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-
70%) in the event of a payment default," S&P said.
The company proposes to use the proceeds, along with equity from
Aditya Birla Group, to refinance existing debt and fund the
acquisition of Columbian Chemicals from One Equity Partners LLC,
an affiliate of JPMorgan Chase & Co. The senior facilities
consist of a $75 million revolving credit facility due 2016, a
$175 million term loan A due 2016, and a $325 million term loan B
due 2018.
"The ratings on Indigold Carbon reflect the company's aggressive
financial risk profile as well as its fair business risk profile."
"Although Indigold Carbon is the world's third-largest
manufacturer of carbon black, it has a narrow product focus, and
substantial customer and end-market concentration related to sales
to the automotive and tire industries," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Seamus Ryan. "The stable outlook reflects our
expectation that modest improvements in global demand for carbon
black applications should support operating results and credit
quality. We expect the new ownership will be prudent in its
investment plans and we do not expect an increase in debt leverage
from dividends or acquisitions."
OPERA FINANCE: S&P Lowers C & D Notes to 'CCC'; Default Seen
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Opera Finance (Uni-Invest) B.V.'s class A, B, C, and D notes.
"We consider that the notes are likely to experience principal
losses at legal final maturity on Feb. 15, 2012," S&P said.
The single loan that backs the notes matured in February 2010 and
has been in standstill since that date. The loan is in special
servicing, with Eurohypo AG as special servicer. According to a
special notice the servicer issued in February, the borrower has
not complied with the deposit conditions under the standstill
agreement and -- failing compliance at the end of a 10-day grace
period -- the special servicer will have the right to enforce the
loan and sell the properties that secure the loan.
Opera Finance (Uni-Invest) is a single-loan transaction secured by
office, retail, industrial, and residential properties located
throughout The Netherlands. The notes mature in February 2012.
The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 73.1%, based on values calculated
by DTZ in 2009. This LTV ratio is low in comparison with other
loans that secure speculative-grade notes across the European
commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions S&P rate.
There are currently 207 properties securing the loan (down from
318 at closing). "The properties vary in asset and tenant
quality, and we consider most as average or below average. There
is little value concentration in the property pool, with only two
properties accounting for more than EUR20 million in value (these
two assets together account for only 5% of the remaining property
pool)," S&P said.
The notes have amortized by 39% since closing in February 2005, as
a result of asset sales since then. The current portfolio balance
is GBP612.9 million, down from GBP1,008.9 million at closing.
The issuer has applied most of the proceeds of asset sales to date
in this transaction on a pro rata basis to the notes. "Based on
our understanding of the transaction documents, and assuming asset
disposals between now and maturity, we consider that the issuer
would apply sales proceeds on a pro rata basis to the notes, up to
the loan amount allocated to each property (i.e., the 'allocated
loan amount'). Any sales proceeds that exceed the allocated loan
amounts would be applied sequentially, as would all amounts of
excess income (the remaining rental income after payment of loan
interest), S&P said.
The pro rata application would switch to sequential only if:
-- A note event of default (e.g., due to nonpayment of
interest) occurs; or
-- Less than 25% of the initial note balance remains
outstanding.
S&P said, "In order to pay down all of the notes, approximately
70% of the portfolio would have to be sold at or above the current
market value, according to our calculations. We believe the
borrower will be unlikely to achieve the required amount of sales
based on their previous track record and because, in our view, the
following factors are likely to constrain the workout of the loan:
* The size of the loan and asset pool: This is a large pool,
in terms of the secured amount and the number of assets that need
to be sold. In terms of loan size, out of 650 loans backing the
European CMBS transactions we rate (excluding nonperforming loan
transactions, small loan transactions, and commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligations CRE CDOs), this loan is in the top
30.
* Demand for Dutch real estate assets: The Dutch investment
market is currently reported to be about EUR616 million per
quarter, and accordingly it is unlikely in our view that the
market can absorb such a large volume of Dutch asset sales, even
if sold as a portfolio of assets.
* Time to note maturity: Even if the above constraints could
be overcome, we consider that the short time to note maturity will
compound the difficulties facing the special servicer. We believe
the special servicer may be forced to sell assets at or below the
allocated loan amount, to reduce the loan balance to a level that
a lender is willing to lend against the remaining portfolio."
According to S&P, "We have considered a range of scenarios that
are likely for the loan and notes, in our view. These scenarios
are based on our assumptions regarding the amount and price of
asset sales, as well as the amount of other income, such as excess
rent and disposal proceeds exceeding the allocated loan amount.
In all scenarios, the issuer would fail to repay the classes of
notes in full by the maturity date, absent a refinancing."
"We believe that there are scenarios in which noteholders could be
repaid in full. However, in these scenarios, payment would be
made after the current maturity date (Feb. 15, 2012). Even in
such a scenario, we would lower our ratings to 'D (sf)' because
our ratings address the repayment of principal no later than the
note maturity date (in addition to timely payment of interest).
"In view of these factors, absent a refinancing prior to maturity,
we consider that the likelihood that the issuer will not meet its
obligations under the notes at maturity has materially increased.
We have therefore lowered our ratings on all classes of notes in
the transaction," S&P said.
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
Opera Finance (Uni-Invest)
GBP1,008.9 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Lowered
A B (sf) BBB (sf)
B B- (sf) BB (sf)
C CCC (sf) B (sf)
D CCC- (sf) B- (sf)
===========
R U S S I A
===========
GLOBEXBANK: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Counterparty Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
and 'B' short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based
GLOBEXBANK. The outlook is stable. At the same time, the 'ruAA-'
Russia national scale rating was affirmed.
"The rating affirmations reflect our view that the potentially
risky acquisition of National Trade Bank (NTB; not rated) will
have no material impact on our credit ratings on GLOBEXBANK," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Maria Malyukova. "This is
because we regard GLOBEXBANK's financial profile as sound, with
good capitalization and asset quality, and factor in potential
extraordinary support for GLOBEXBANK from Vnesheconombank (VEB;
foreign currency BBB/Stable/A-3; local currency BBB+/Stable/A-2),
its majority shareholder."
On Feb. 22, 2011, GLOBEXBANK finalized the buy-out of a 100% stake
in midsize regional player NTB, based in the Samara region.
GLOBEXBANK acquired 16.6% of NTB from VEB in December 2010 and the
remaining shareholding from individuals in February, 2011, using a
Russian ruble (RUB) 5 billion (about $1.6 billion) 10-year
subordinated loan from VEB. "GLOBEXBANK spent a total of about
RUB3.5 billion to acquire NTB; therefore, we believe GLOBEXBANK's
liquidity position should remain adequate after the acquisition,"
S&P said.
With total assets of RUB32 billion as of Dec. 31, 2010, NTB has an
established franchise in Samara, ranking among the region's top
three banks. "We think the risks arising from NTB's weak
financial profile could offset the potential benefits from the
acquisition," S&P said.
"NTB carries high credit risk, in our opinion, with overdue loans
representing 9% of the portfolio, restructured loans about 11%
before the acquisition, and significant exposure to the real
estate and construction sector. We understand GLOBEXBANK did not
conduct a due-diligence exercise before the acquisition, so the
scale of NTB's problem loans could well be understated.
"Nevertheless, we believe this acquisition shouldn't materially
threaten GLOBEXBANK's financial profile because, in our view,
GLOBEXBANK's asset quality is currently good. Reported
nonperforming loans are less than 1% of the portfolio, and the
ratio of adjusted total equity to adjusted assets was 21% as of
Dec. 31, 2010, showing good capitalization, in our opinion.
"Moreover, the ratings are supported by GLOBEXBANK's strong links
with and support from its 98.9% shareholder, state-owned VEB. The
long-term counterparty credit rating incorporates a two-notch
uplift above our assessment of GLOBEXBANK's stand-alone credit
profile to reflect potential extraordinary support from VEB."
The ratings on GLOBEXBANK remain constrained by the challenging
operating environment in Russia, as well as by the bank's
aggressive growth plans, concentrated and volatile corporate
deposit base, and the burden of integrating the weaker NTB.
"The stable outlook reflects the balance between our expectation
that GLOBEXBANK will sustain its strong links with Vnesheconombank
and our concerns about its weaker financial profile following the
acquisition of NTB," said Ms. Malyukova.
S&P said, "We could consider a positive rating action if the
operating environment in the Russian banking sector recovers
considerably. In conjunction with this, we would need to see a
quick integration of NTB, including improvement of NTB's financial
profile; GLOBEXBANK's business profile become stronger and more
diversified; more sustainable funding; and the maintenance of good
asset quality, liquidity, and capitalization.
"We might lower the ratings if GLOBEXBANK's stand-alone credit
profile were to deteriorate, with asset quality, liquidity, or
capitalization worsening beyond our expectations. A negative
rating action could also result if VEB's control of or support for
GLOBEXBANK were to weaken or if the merger with NTB were to
significantly harm GLOBEXBANK's financial profile," S&P said.
MARE BALTIC: Moody's Confirms 'Ca (sf)' Rating on Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took these rating actions on notes
issued by Mare Baltic The Series 2006-1 Cell of Mare Baltic PCC
Limited ("ScandiNotes(R) IV"):
-- EUR170.011M Class A Floating Rate Limited Recourse Secured
Asset Backed Notes due 2014, Downgraded to B1 (sf);
previously on Feb 18, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade
-- DKK879.571M (currently DKK528.166M) Class B 3% Limited
Recourse Secured Asset Backed Notes due 2014, Confirmed at Ca
(sf); previously on Feb 18, 2011 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Downgrade
Ratings Rationale
Mare Baltic 2006-1 is a highly non-granular securitization of
subordinated debt issued by Danish banks. All the assets in the
pool have the flexibility to redeem the loans at the year five
call option in November 2011. Should they choose not to redeem,
the underlying assets will be subject to an increase in the
coupons paid.
The driver of the rating actions is the recent announcement by
Financial Stability, the Danish government-backed bank-support
vehicle, that, effective 6 February 2011, a newly created
subsidiary of Financial Stability acquired all the assets and part
of the liabilities of Amagerbanken. Aktieselskab. The transfer
effectively wipes out the subordinated debt of Amagerbanken that
was included in the pool.
The impact on the underlying rating of class A was mitigated by
the already low rating on the tranche and the high default
probability assigned to Amagerbanken at the last rating action
(June 2010).
Following the default of Amagerbanken, and in accordance with the
terms of the swap documentation, Class C has been written down to
zero. Class B has been written down to DKK528,166,376 from its
initial value of DKK879,571,000. Reflecting this, the ratings on
Class B remain commensurate with the Moody's expected recoveries
for the notes, as outlined in the paper titled "Moody's Approach
to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default" (November
2009).
The majority of the assets in the pool are assessed by credit
estimate. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool
with a stressed weighted average default probability (DP)
equivalent to a B3 rating. In addition to the estimates on the
underlying issuers, the average portfolio rating reflected the
treatment for non granular pools that rely on credit estimates
outlined in the paper "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions" (October 2009).
Moody's also considered various additional scenarios, including
the jump to Caa2 scenario described in the above mentioned report.
This scenario had an impact of slightly over half a notch on the
model output of class A.
Because the portfolio references a low number of generally small
Danish banks and the concerns listed above surrounding the Danish
banking industry, Moody's believes the correlation in defaults
between issuers in the pool is likely to be high. Correlation was
assumed to be 50%, though a stress case of 75% was also looked at.
This had a two notch impact on the model results for Class A .
Although the issuers have an economic incentive to repay the loans
at the Optional Redemption Date falling in November 2011, Moody's
considered the likelihood that some or all of the loans would not
be redeemed at the end of their fifth year due to financing
difficulties of the underlying banks, and found the impact to be
consistent with the revised rating levels.
Recoveries on the subordinated loans in the event of default were
assumed to be zero.
Sources of additional performance uncertainties include:
1) Low portfolio granularity: the performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
large obligors that are rated low non investment grade. This is
especially true in scenarios where these obligors jump to
default.
2) Moody's believes the correlation in defaults between issuers in
the pool will be probably be high, with the consequence that
remaining performance outcomes of the notes are likely to be
binary in nature.
At closing the assets were referenced via an asset swap with HSH
Nordbank AG as the counterparty. Using this mechanism, classes B
and C were issued at discount paying a reduced fixed coupon. The
difference was due to be paid to the noteholders by way of a final
payment from the asset swap that expires in November 2011 at the
same time as the call options on the underlying loans. After
termination of the swap, there remains a floor in place to
mitigate the interest risk between the floating rate assets and
fixed liabilities on classes B and C. When defaults occur on the
underlying assets, the amount of the fixed notional of the swap
that is written down is determined by the current interest rates
at the time the swap is written down.
Under these methodologies, Moody's relies on a simulation based
framework. Moody's used a bespoke CDOROM and cash model in order
to capture the specific characteristics of the deal, incorporating
the assumptions contained in the above methodologies. As such
default scenarios were generated for each asset in the portfolio
and these were applied in the cash flow model to compute the loss
associated with each tranche in the structure.
Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.
TROIKA DIALOG: CreditWatch Positive Over Sberbank Deal, S&P Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has placed the 'B+' long-term
counterparty credit rating and 'ruA+' long-term Russia national
scale rating on Troika Dialog Group Ltd. on CreditWatch with
positive implications. At the same time, it has affirmed the
short-term 'B' rating on Troika Dialog.
The rating action follows the announcement that Sberbank and
Troika Dialog signed a memorandum of understanding on March 11,
2011, to combine the two entities.
"The ratings on Troika Dialog, the nonoperating holding company
(NOHC) of Russia's Troika Dialog Group (Troika), reflect Standard
& Poor's view of the challenging Russian operating environment and
Troika's dependence on business and capital markets cycles given
the group's significant business and earnings concentrations,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Ekaterina Trofimova.
Positive rating factors include Troika's leading market position
in domestic and international securities sales and brokerage,
high-quality staff, proactive and flexible business strategy, and
good capitalization.
"In accordance with our criteria, we base the ratings on Troika
Dialog on the creditworthiness of the consolidated Troika
companies. These companies form one of Russia's leading brokerage
and investment banking groups, with total equity of about $920
million on Sept. 30, 2010 (see "Analytical Approach To Assessing
Nonoperating Holding Companies," published March 17, 2009).
Troika is 64% owned by a management partnership (led by the CEO
Ruben Vardanian), with another 36% held by Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd. (SBSA; unsolicited public information (pi) rating
'BBBpi')," S&P said.
Sberbank, a state savings bank with a 27% market share of
systemwide banking assets and a 47% share of retail deposits,
dominates the Russian banking industry. Troika's $6 billion in
assets represented only 2% of Sberbank's approximately $300
billion in assets on Dec. 1, 2010. The majority of Sberbank's
shares are owned by the Central Bank of Russia.
Troika's securities brokerage and investment banking businesses in
Russia are strategically attractive to Sberbank, a universal bank
with its roots in retail branch banking throughout the Russian
Federation.
Under the terms of the memorandum of understanding, Troika would
become a wholly owned subsidiary of Sberbank.
"When the terms of the acquisition are final, we likely would
raise the global and national scale ratings on Troika. The amount
of the uplift would depend on our opinion of the importance of
Troika to Sberbank and our opinion on the likelihood that Sberbank
would support Troika if needed," said Ms. Trofimova.
S&P said, "We will resolve the CreditWatch placement after
assessing the terms of the acquisition and the operational plans
for Troika in the Sberbank group."
* Fitch Says Recent Central Bank Measures Won't Affect Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that administrative measures to exclude 'B' and
'B-' rated entities from the list of those eligible for inclusion
in the Lombard List to have their bonds accepted as collateral by
the Central Bank of Russia is unlikely to result in any corporate
rating actions.
Fitch does not base its liquidity analysis or ratings on an
assumption that refinancing short-term debt through the issuance
of long-term bonds will take place. Fitch's evaluation of
corporate liquidity is based on an entity's established debt
maturity profile. Nevertheless, there is a general assumption in
the ordinary course that short-term bank debt will be rolled over.
On Jan. 31, 2011, the Central Bank of Russia announced that from
April 1 it would raise the minimum rating level for bonds to be
eligible as collateral to 'B' from 'B-'. This threshold will be
raised further to 'B+' from 'B' from July 1, 2011. These
revisions reflect measures by the Russian authorities to unwind
anti-crisis measures in the face of rising inflationary pressures
in the economy. As such, while outstanding issuances for 'B-' and
'B' rated entities would remain eligible and on the Lombard List
until maturity (or any subsequent change in the rules of the
scheme), these issuers will have to price any new issues at full
market prices or seek funding from the banks after these dates.
According to the Kommersant Daily newspaper, there are 106
corporate issuers currently approved by the Central Bank of Russia
for Lombard lending. According to the CBR's information of
March 16, 2011, 59 non-financial corporate issuers (i.e.,
excluding banks and leasing companies) have bonds that are
currently approved for Lombard lending. The total value of bonds
in issue that are not compliant with the requirements entering
into force on July 1, 2011 is estimated at RUB162 billion. Of
this amount, RUB22 billion is currently included on the Lombard
list.
Non-financial corporate issuers included or currently eligible to
be included on the Lombard List and rated by Fitch at 'B-' and as
such no longer eligible to have future issues pledged as
collateral with the Central Bank on and after April 1 are
Sitronics JSC and OJSC LSR Group. Entities rated by Fitch at 'B'
and as such no longer eligible to have future issues pledged as
collateral with the Central Bank on and after July 1 are OJSC
TGK-2, OAO Nizhnekamskneftekhim, OAO Polymetal, Alliance Oil
Company Limited, OAO Synergy and OJSC Holding Company United
Confectioners.
=========
S P A I N
=========
BBVA EMPRESAS: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned BBVA EMPRESAS 5, FTA's notes final
ratings:
-- EUR975m Class A notes (ISIN ES0313281000): 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable; Loss Severity Rating of 'LS-1'
-- EUR275m Class B notes (ISIN ES0313281018): 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Stable; Loss Severity Rating of 'LS-3'
The final ratings are based on the quality of the collateral, the
underwriting and servicing of the portfolio loans, the integrity
of the transaction's legal and financial structure, available
credit enhancement and the management company's administrative
capabilities.
The transaction is a cash flow securitization of a mixed static
pool (the collateral) of secured (42% of collateral value) and
unsecured loans originated and serviced by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria (BBVA, 'AA-'/Stable/'F1+').
The agency considers obligor concentration is the primary risk
driver, as Fitch has applied its "Rating Criteria for European
Granular Corporate Balance-Sheet Securitizations". The top 1 risk
group represents 5.4% of collateral value, and there are 36 risk
groups that each represent more than 50bp of the collateral value
for a total of 38.1%. Fitch has downgraded the rating proxy of
these obligors by three notches, and then applied a one-year PD
floor equal to the weighted average PD of the collateral (ie 8%),
to compensate for the lack of a Fitch Credit Opinion on these
large obligors.
Fitch considers the combined exposure to real estate and building
& material sectors to be a significant risk factor as it
represents 29% of the collateral value. Fitch has applied a
minimum one-year PD of 11% to all obligors in these sectors given
the current Spanish economic environment. Otherwise, the
collateral is diversified across industries. Fitch takes comfort
from the transaction documentation and portfolio audit report,
which warrants that no loan in the portfolio has been granted to
finance an ongoing development.
Fitch has assigned a final forward-looking weighted average PD of
9.8% to the portfolio (ie slightly worse than a 'B-' rating
proxy), reflecting its credit view of Spanish SMEs, historically
observed default rates in a year of stress, concentration in RE
and construction, and high obligor concentration.
The ratings address payment of interest on the notes according to
the terms and conditions of the documentation, as well as the
repayment of principal by the legal maturity date in September
2052. The structure allows for temporary interest shortfalls for
the class B notes.
METROVACESA SA: To Delay Debt Repayments; Mulls Debt Restructuring
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sharon Smyth at Bloomberg News, citing Expansion, reports that
Metrovacesa SA reached agreement with 90% of its lenders to delay
debt repayments for five years.
Bloomberg relates that the newspaper said Metrovacesa will pay the
interest on its EUR5.76 billion (US$8.1 billion) worth of loans
but not the principal.
According to Bloomberg, the newspaper said the company will also
present a scheme of arrangement, a court-approved plan between a
company and its lenders, in the U.K. to allow it to reach an
accord with its lenders to restructure debt. Bloomberg notes that
the company is presenting the scheme of arrangement under U.K. law
because it states that companies have to reach an agreement with
at least 75% of creditors, whereas in Spain creditor agreement
must be 100%.
The newspaper added that the company will also stage a EUR1.2
billion capital increase, according to Bloomberg.
Metrovacesa SA -- http://www.metrovacesa.com/-- is a Spain-based
company active in the real estate sector. Its activities include
the acquisition, purchase, promotion and management of properties
primarily for rental purposes. Its portfolio is structured in six
divisions: Offices, comprising more than 500,000 square meters of
leasable surface area; Shopping Centers, including five operating
centers and two in development; Hotels, comprising 14 operating
hotels and three in construction; Homes, providing residential
property construction and development services; Car Parks,
operating 13 parking lots located in Madrid, Valencia, Soria and
Santa Cruz de Tenerife, and Land, which portfolio consists of more
than three million square meters of land. The Company is a parent
of Grupo Metrovacesa, a group which comprises a number of entities
with operations established in the United Kingdom, Germany and
France.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
COASTA: Goes Into Liquidation; Unable to Pay Rent
-------------------------------------------------
Pete Hayman at attractionsmanagement.com reports that the operator
of Treasure Island, a visitor attraction situated on the seafront
in Eastbourne, East Sussex, has gone into liquidation.
The report relates that Eastbourne Borough Council said the
operator of Treasure Island, Coasta, had called in liquidators
following negotiations with the council over outstanding rent.
"Prior to this announcement the council, as landlord of the venue,
had been negotiating the recovery of outstanding rent owed by
Coasta," attractionsmanagement.com cited a council statement.
"It is essential that an appropriate resolution is achieved in a
timely manner and the council will contribute in any way it can to
support this objective," the council said.
GLOBAL GENERAL: U.S. Court Recognizes High Court Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
has granted the request of Simon Brincklow, as duly authorized
foreign representative of GLOBAL General and Reinsurance Company
Limited, for recognition of the foreign main proceedings
respecting the Scheme of Arrangement proposed by GLOBAL under Part
26 of the Companies Act of Great Britain before the High Court of
Justice of England and Wales.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court also ordered that the Scheme, including
any modifications thereto, will be given full force and effect in
the United States, and will be binding on and enforceable against
any person or entity that is a Scheme Creditor, including, without
limitation, against such person or entity in its capacity as a
creditor or a debtor of the Company in the United States.
As reported in the TCR on Feb. 14, 2011, the proposed scheme,
which was sanctioned by the High Court on Jan. 28, "addresses and
resolves all of the Company's existing and future liabilities,"
excluding certain liabilities, such as those
covered in prior schemes.
Global General has ceased underwriting and went into run-off in
October 2002. When insurance or reinsurance companies enter into
run-off, they cease writing new business and seek to determine,
settle and pay all liquidated claims of their insureds either as
they arise, or, if possible, before they arise. Typically, a run-
off of an insurance company will take 20 or more years to
complete.
About GLOBAL General
Headquartered in London, GLOBAL General and Reinsurance Company
Limited is an insurance and reinsurance company formed in
April 16, 1940. Between 1940 and 2002, GLOBAL General wrote a
wide array of reinsurance business in England. The reinsurance
portfolio was underwritten in London, predominantly from the
early 1950's to the early 1980's. The portfolio was mostly
accepted through placements made by London market brokers. The
portfolio consists of facultative and treaty reinsurance, both
proportional and non-proportional, covering various classes
including, but not limited to, marine, non-marine and aviation.
Simon Brincklow filed a chapter 15 petition for GLOBAL General
and Reinsurance Company Limited (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
11-10327) on Jan. 31, 2011.
Two schemes for different lines of General Global's insurance
business already have been recognized under Chapter 15. Thomas
Klaus Freudenstein, as foreign representative of the two Scheme
Companies, filed voluntary Chapter 15 petitions for GLOBAL General
and its wholly owned subsidiary GLOBALE Ruckversicherrungs-AG
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case Nos. 08-14939 and 08-14940) on December
10, 2008, estimating assets and debts of more than US$100 million
in the petition.
Howard Seife, Esq., and Francisco Vazquez, Esq., at Chadbourne &
Parke LLP, represent the foreign representatives in all three
Chapter 15 proceedings.
MOTORWAY SERVICE: S&P Upgrades Rating to 'B' on Refinancing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'B' from 'CCC+' its
long-term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based motorway service
area operator Moto Hospitality Ltd. (Moto). At the same time, we
removed the rating from CreditWatch, where it had been placed with
positive implications on March 8, 2011. The outlook is stable.
"In addition, we affirmed the 'CCC+' issue rating on the GBP176
million notes issued by Moto Finance PLC. The recovery rating on
these notes is unchanged at '6', indicating our expectation of
negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of a payment default,"
the ratings firm said.
"The upgrade follows the successful issuance of GBP176 million
second-lien notes, which, together with GBP400 million of new bank
facilities, were used to refinance Moto's existing debt
maturities," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Olli
Rouhiainen. "In our opinion, the completion of the refinancing
has improved Moto's financial risk profile and liquidity position
by removing short-term refinancing risks. In addition, a modest
equity injection of GBP24 million has lowered overall leverage."
However, the rating on Moto continues to be constrained by its
highly leveraged capital structure. Standard & Poor's-adjusted
total debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be about 7.5x for the financial
year ending Dec. 31, 2011. (S&P's ratios are calculated at the
Moto International Holding Ltd. level, the ultimate parent company
of the Moto group.)
"Furthermore, we anticipate weak adjusted funds from operations
(FFO) to debt and adjusted FFO interest coverage over the next two
years. We believe that FFO to debt is likely to range between
5.0% and 5.5%, and FFO interest coverage between 1.5x and 1.6x.
Moto has no mandatory debt repayments until 2012, when the new
bank facilities start to amortize," S&P said.
"In our view, Moto will sustain positive revenue growth while
maintaining its current level of profitability, despite the
potential negative effect of a decline in the real incomes of U.K.
consumers. We base this view on Moto's track record over the past
two years and on future revenue visibility, especially given the
resilience of traffic on U.K. motorways during the recent
recession. Moreover, we believe that the company is likely to
maintain a financial profile commensurate with the ratings,
supported by positive free operating cash flow (FOCF).
"We would likely take a negative rating action if operating
setbacks were to lead to a failure to maintain the current
operating trend and, as such, to an increase in adjusted debt to
EBITDA to more than 8x or a decline in FFO interest coverage to
less than 1.5x. We could also take a negative rating action if
Moto's ability to generate positive FOCF were diminished, or if
the company's liquidity profile were to deteriorate.
"We think that an improvement in the rating is unlikely at
present, due to Moto's high leverage. A positive rating movement
would depend on the company's debt to EBITDA declining to
comfortably less than 6x on a sustainable basis."
ODDBINS: Creditors to Recover 21p in the Pound Under CVA
--------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Sibun at The Telegraph reports that creditors to Oddbins,
including major champagne houses Pol Roger and Laurent Perrier,
will be paid just 21p in the pound on their debts under plans to
rescue the company.
The Telegraph relates that Oddbins has outlined plans for a
company voluntary agreement (CVA) that would also see landlords of
89 retained shops offered rental payments 30% lower. According to
The Telegraph, landlords of the 39 shops that Oddbins is closing
would be handed five months worth of rent, while creditors would
be paid back over 46 months.
Creditors will vote on the proposals on March 31, with Oddbins
needing 75% approval to see the plan through, The Telegraph says.
The Telegraph notes that Oddbins said the payout could rise
depending on the outcome of a legal battle with the company's
previous owner, French drinks group Castel Freres.
Deloitte, which is handling the restructuring, estimated that
creditors would receive 13.6p in the pound if Oddbins were put
into administration, The Telegraph states.
Oddbins sells wine, spirits and other related products. The Head
Office is in Wimbledon, London and the company has over 227
branches spread across the UK, Ireland and France.
PLYMOUTH ARGYLE: No Pay Yet for Players, Staff Until Buyer Found
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Scott at guardian.co.uk reports that Plymouth Argyle's
players, staff and manager are working without pay until a buyer
can be found for the club.
According to guardian.co.uk, an injection of interim cash from
potential purchasers, which would have enabled the buyer to enter
an exclusive negotiation period, failed to materialize on
Thursday.
Administrators then took the extreme cost-cutting measure of
legally binding employees to an agreement to defer their March and
April wages, guardian.co.uk says.
Guardian.co.uk notes that Brendan Guilfoyle, who is leading the
administration, is trying to reduce the claims by secured
creditors to assist in an orderly exit from administration.
Meanwhile, guardian.co.uk says, Argyle have requested donations of
memorabilia or cash from all football fans towards an auction
attempting to stave off the increasing threat of the club's
liquidation.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 8,
2011, the High Court has placed Plymouth Argyle Football Club has
been placed into administration. Brendan Guilfoyle, Christopher
White and John Russell of The P&A Partnership have been appointed
as administrators.
The TCR-Europe, citing The Guardian, reported on March 3, 2011,
that Plymouth Argyle directors have been warned that the club
needs an injection of around GBP3 million if it is not to be
placed into administration. Peter Ridsdale, who is acting as an
independent adviser to Argyle's board, has told the directors that
the club does not have the money to meet its liabilities and that
they are "in denial" about the seriousness of its problems, The
Guardian related.
The joint administrators said have received a number of offers to
acquire the club and are now pursuing a funding facility linked
with an exclusivity agreement, the TCR-Europe reported on
March 16, citing SkySports.
About Plymouth Argyle
Plymouth Argyle Football Club, commonly known as Argyle, or by
their nickname, The Pilgrims, is an English professional football
club based in Central Park, Plymouth. It plays in Football League
One, the third division of the English football league system.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* EUROPE: FSA Chair Says Creditors Must Bear Losses in Bank Crisis
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Moshinsky at Bloomberg News reports that U.K. Financial
Services Authority Chairman Adair Turner said creditors of crisis-
stricken banks should take losses before taxpayers have to.
Bloomberg relates that Mr. Turner said the most systemically
important lenders should face tougher capital requirements than
smaller banks.
"It is essential that private fund providers to banks can absorb
losses without this triggering" fire sales of assets or a "reduced
credit supply," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Turner as saying.
The European Union is working on rules aimed at averting a repeat
of the financial crisis that followed the 2008 failure of Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. and resulted in European governments
setting aside more than $5 trillion to support banks, Bloomberg
discloses. The plans may require some creditors to accept losses
in the event of a crisis, Bloomberg states.
According to Bloomberg, Mr. Turner said that while the latest
standards from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are a
major step forward, "in an ideal world" equity capital
requirements would be as high as 15% to 20% of risk-weighted
assets.
* EUROPE: Deadline Set for Emergency Bank Recapitalization Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Jenkins at The Financial Times reports that Andrea Enria,
chairman of the European Banking Authority, said European
governments must put in place emergency bank recapitalization
mechanisms within the next three months.
According to the FT, Mr. Enria has told European finance ministers
that he is determined that each country should be in a position to
correct capital shortfalls at any banks that failed impending
stress tests, whose results are due to be announced in late June.
Italy's banks are among the weakest capitalized in Europe and
analysts believe several smaller Italian institutions risk
failing, the FT notes.
The FT relates that Mr. Enria said it would be "sensible" to
impose a deadline on banks that fail stress tests to raise fresh
capital, although he did not specify how long it should be.
Last year, although only seven out of 91 banks failed the test,
there was little follow-through by regulators, the FT recounts.
Some banks that failed have yet to act to plug the capital
weakness the exercise identified, the FT states.
By some measures, the tests are as weak, or weaker, than last
year, although the regulator has been at pains to highlight some
of the scenarios that have been strengthened, according to the FT.
Those include tests for exposure to property for some countries
such as the UK the FT says.
The tests are set to take place next month, with a month-long
period of peer review, the FT discloses.
* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 14 to March 18, 2011
-------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT 5.470 8/28/2013 EUR 55.50
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.11
OESTER VOLKSBK 4.170 7/29/2015 EUR 60.50
OESTER VOLKSBK 4.810 7/29/2025 EUR 68.25
RAIFF ZENTRALBK 4.500 9/28/2035 EUR 77.90
DENMARK
-------
KOMMUNEKREDIT 0.500 2/3/2016 TRY 67.67
FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC 1.000 2/27/2018 AUD 66.45
MUNI FINANCE PLC 0.500 9/24/2020 CAD 70.84
MUNI FINANCE PLC 0.250 6/28/2040 CAD 22.99
MUNI FINANCE PLC 0.500 3/17/2025 CAD 55.66
MUNI FINANCE PLC 0.500 2/9/2016 ZAR 65.14
MUNI FINANCE PLC 1.000 6/30/2017 ZAR 58.28
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 15.04
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 4.39
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.53
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 54.11
BNP PARIBAS 10.050 7/24/2012 USD 59.62
CALYON 6.000 6/18/2047 EUR 26.47
CAP GEMINI SOGET 1.000 1/1/2012 EUR 44.27
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 43.53
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 30.69
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 18.66
CLUB MEDITERRANE 5.000 6/8/2012 EUR 16.03
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 57.37
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 27.25
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 39.04
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 17.69
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 16.02
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 68.30
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 48.39
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 32.24
PUBLICIS GROUPE 3.125 7/30/2014 EUR 38.93
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 48.81
RHODIA SA 0.500 1/1/2014 EUR 49.14
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.46
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 11.50
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 56.58
THEOLIA 2.700 1/1/2041 EUR 11.16
GERMANY
-------
DEUTSCHE BK LOND 3.000 5/18/2012 CHF 65.36
DEUTSCHE BK LOND 0.500 3/9/2018 BRL 48.38
ESCADA AG 7.500 4/1/2012 EUR 16.00
EUROHYPO AG 6.490 7/17/2017 EUR 8.13
HSH NORDBANK AG 4.375 2/14/2017 EUR 67.12
IKB DEUT INDUSTR 5.625 3/31/2017 EUR 13.01
L-BANK FOERDERBK 0.500 5/10/2027 CAD 49.76
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 39.34
GREECE
-------
ATHENS URBAN TRN 4.851 9/19/2016 EUR 64.98
ATHENS URBAN TRN 4.301 8/12/2014 EUR 72.89
ATHENS URBAN TRN 5.008 7/18/2017 EUR 62.95
HELLENIC RAILWAY 7.350 3/3/2015 JPY 74.44
HELLENIC RAILWAY 4.500 12/6/2016 JPY 58.41
HELLENIC REP I/L 2.900 7/25/2025 EUR 51.27
HELLENIC REP I/L 2.300 7/25/2030 EUR 48.20
HELLENIC REPUB 5.200 7/17/2034 EUR 61.49
HELLENIC REPUB 6.140 4/14/2028 EUR 57.67
HELLENIC REPUB 5.000 3/11/2019 EUR 55.56
HELLENIC REPUB 5.000 8/22/2016 JPY 62.83
HELLENIC REPUB 4.590 4/8/2016 EUR 60.49
HELLENIC REPUB 5.800 7/14/2015 JPY 69.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.590 4/3/2018 EUR 61.61
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.500 5/20/2014 EUR 72.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.500 7/1/2014 EUR 72.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI 3.985 7/25/2014 EUR 71.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.500 8/20/2014 EUR 72.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.113 9/30/2014 EUR 71.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI 3.700 7/20/2015 EUR 65.70
HELLENIC REPUBLI 6.100 8/20/2015 EUR 70.98
HELLENIC REPUBLI 3.702 9/30/2015 EUR 66.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI 3.600 7/20/2016 EUR 62.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.020 9/13/2016 EUR 63.85
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.225 3/1/2017 EUR 63.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.900 4/20/2017 EUR 66.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.300 7/20/2017 EUR 62.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.675 10/9/2017 EUR 63.15
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.600 7/20/2018 EUR 62.93
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.014 2/27/2019 EUR 61.84
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.959 3/4/2019 EUR 66.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI 6.000 7/19/2019 EUR 65.48
HELLENIC REPUBLI 6.250 6/19/2020 EUR 67.53
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.700 3/20/2024 EUR 60.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.300 3/20/2026 EUR 61.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.500 9/20/2037 EUR 56.06
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.600 9/20/2040 EUR 56.06
NATIONAL BK GREE 3.875 10/7/2016 EUR 74.00
IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK 5.580 4/28/2028 EUR 66.02
AIB MORTGAGE BNK 5.000 3/1/2030 EUR 60.10
AIB MORTGAGE BNK 5.000 2/12/2030 EUR 60.11
ALLIED IRISH BKS 5.250 3/10/2025 GBP 22.37
ALLIED IRISH BKS 10.750 3/29/2017 USD 27.00
ALLIED IRISH BKS 11.500 3/29/2022 GBP 26.00
ALLIED IRISH BKS 12.500 6/25/2019 GBP 26.06
ALLIED IRISH BKS 12.500 6/25/2019 EUR 26.58
ALLIED IRISH BKS 10.750 3/29/2017 EUR 26.40
BANK OF IRELAND 8.500 9/22/2018 CAD 55.66
BANK OF IRELAND 10.000 2/12/2020 EUR 62.08
BANK OF IRELAND 4.625 2/27/2019 EUR 51.69
BANK OF IRELAND 4.875 1/22/2018 GBP 51.29
BANK OF IRELAND 10.750 6/22/2018 GBP 59.72
BANK OF IRELAND 9.250 9/7/2020 GBP 59.17
BANK OF IRELAND 10.000 2/12/2020 GBP 60.64
BK IRELAND MTGE 5.760 9/7/2029 EUR 71.25
BK IRELAND MTGE 5.400 11/6/2029 EUR 68.10
BK IRELAND MTGE 5.450 3/1/2030 EUR 68.60
DEPFA ACS BANK 5.125 3/16/2037 USD 65.32
DEPFA ACS BANK 5.125 3/16/2037 USD 65.79
DEPFA ACS BANK 4.900 8/24/2035 CAD 61.98
DEPFA ACS BANK 0.500 3/3/2025 CAD 34.13
IRISH GOVT 5.400 3/13/2025 EUR 69.94
IRISH GOVT 4.500 4/18/2020 EUR 70.61
IRISH GOVT 4.400 6/18/2019 EUR 71.94
IRISH LIFE & PER 4.625 5/9/2017 EUR 44.57
IRISH LIFE PERM 4.250 4/9/2015 EUR 73.56
IRISH NATIONWIDE 6.250 6/26/2012 GBP 50.88
IRISH NATIONWIDE 13.000 8/12/2016 GBP 19.67
ITALY
-----
ABRUZZO REGION 4.450 3/1/2037 EUR 72.48
CITY OF TURIN 5.270 6/26/2038 EUR 65.43
CITY OF VENICE 4.265 3/26/2026 EUR 72.15
CITY OF VENICE 4.265 3/26/2026 EUR 72.15
CO BRAONE 4.567 6/30/2037 EUR 68.02
CO CASTELMASSA 3.960 3/31/2026 EUR 69.29
COMUNE DI MILANO 4.019 6/29/2035 EUR 68.47
REGION OF UMBRIA 5.087 6/15/2037 EUR 72.49
TELECOM ITALIA 5.250 3/17/2055 EUR 73.68
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 30.75
CRC BREEZE 5.290 5/8/2026 EUR 65.75
LIGHTHOUSE INTL 8.000 4/30/2014 EUR 31.06
LIGHTHOUSE INTL 8.000 4/30/2014 EUR 30.50
NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE 11.750 10/1/2005 USD 0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN 0.500 3/3/2021 NZD 60.71
BK NED GEMEENTEN 0.500 3/17/2016 TRY 71.40
BK NED GEMEENTEN 0.500 3/29/2021 NZD 60.28
BK NED GEMEENTEN 0.500 3/29/2021 USD 72.12
BK NED GEMEENTEN 0.500 2/24/2025 CAD 53.98
BRIT INSURANCE 6.625 12/9/2030 GBP 65.19
ELEC DE CAR FIN 8.500 4/10/2018 USD 55.01
NATL INVESTER BK 25.983 5/7/2029 EUR 22.11
NED WATERSCHAPBK 0.500 3/11/2025 CAD 54.35
TJIWI KIMIA FIN 13.250 8/1/2001 USD 0.01
NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS 0.500 5/9/2030 CAD 43.08
KOMMUNALBANKEN 0.500 3/1/2016 ZAR 71.30
KOMMUNALBANKEN 0.500 3/24/2016 ZAR 71.03
KOMMUNALBANKEN 0.500 1/27/2016 ZAR 71.84
PORTUGAL
--------
CAIXA GERAL DEPO 5.380 10/1/2038 EUR 69.06
METRO DE LISBOA 4.061 12/4/2026 EUR 61.05
METRO DE LISBOA 4.799 12/7/2027 EUR 68.01
PORTUGUESE OT'S 3.850 4/15/2021 EUR 74.45
PORTUGUESE OT'S 4.100 4/15/2037 EUR 67.43
RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA 17.500 5/23/2012 RUB 0.38
ARKTEL-INVEST 12.000 4/9/2012 RUB 0.05
DVTG-FINANS 17.000 8/29/2013 RUB 5.02
EMALIANS-FINANS 10.970 7/8/2011 RUB 75.00
ENERGOSPETSSNAB 8.500 5/30/2016 RUB 75.00
EUROKOMMERZ 16.000 3/15/2011 RUB 0.01
FORMAT 17.000 12/6/2012 RUB 75.00
IZHAVTO 18.000 6/9/2011 RUB 11.31
KVART-FINANS 12.000 10/5/2011 RUB 75.00
LSR-INVEST 9.250 7/14/2011 RUB 75.00
M-INDUSTRIYA 12.250 8/16/2011 RUB 25.00
MEDVED-FINANS 14.000 8/16/2013 RUB 75.00
MIG-FINANS 0.100 9/6/2011 RUB 1.00
MINPLITA-FINANS 20.000 4/22/2011 RUB 0.02
MIRAX 17.000 9/17/2012 RUB 30.00
MIRAX 14.990 5/17/2011 RUB 40.06
MOSMART FINANS 0.010 4/12/2012 RUB 1.81
MOSOBLGAZ 12.000 5/17/2011 RUB 72.50
MOSOBLTRUSTINVES 20.000 3/26/2011 RUB 6.99
NOK 12.500 8/26/2014 RUB 3.01
NOK 10.000 9/22/2011 RUB 50.00
NOVOROSSIYSK 13.000 12/9/2011 RUB 75.00
NOVYE TORGOVYE S 15.000 4/26/2011 RUB 70.00
PROTON-FINANCE 9.000 6/12/2012 RUB 95.00
SAHO 10.000 5/21/2012 RUB 1.00
SATURN 8.500 6/6/2014 RUB 1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS 10.500 3/27/2012 RUB 3.40
SOUTHERN STOCK C 9.000 4/29/2014 RUB 75.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL 0.100 5/24/2011 RUB 3.01
TALIO-PRINCEPS 16.000 5/17/2012 RUB 75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA 13.500 3/7/2012 RUB 97.10
TECHNOSILA-INVES 7.000 5/26/2011 RUB 1.00
TERNA-FINANS 1.000 11/4/2011 RUB 5.02
VOSTOCHNY EXPRES 7.500 3/7/2013 RUB 85.00
SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA 4.750 5/25/2027 EUR 74.25
AYT CEDULAS CAJA 3.750 6/30/2025 EUR 66.33
AYUNTAM DE MADRD 4.550 6/16/2036 EUR 67.56
BANCAJA 1.500 5/22/2018 EUR 62.68
BANCO GUIPUZCOAN 1.500 4/18/2022 EUR 52.42
CAJA CASTIL-MAN 1.500 6/23/2021 EUR 59.75
CAJA ESPANA 4.150 2/23/2020 EUR 74.87
CAJA ESPANA 3.500 6/29/2020 EUR 74.83
CAJA MADRID 5.755 2/26/2028 EUR 61.25
CAJA MADRID 4.125 3/24/2036 EUR 69.29
CEDULAS TDA 6 3.875 5/23/2025 EUR 67.75
CEDULAS TDA A-5 4.250 3/28/2027 EUR 68.63
CEDULAS TDA A-6 4.250 4/10/2031 EUR 64.81
COMUNIDAD ARAGON 4.646 7/11/2036 EUR 71.31
GEN DE CATALUNYA 5.219 9/10/2029 EUR 72.93
GEN DE CATALUNYA 4.220 4/26/2035 EUR 58.00
GENERAL DE ALQUI 2.750 8/20/2012 EUR 69.33
IM CEDULAS 5 3.500 6/15/2020 EUR 74.63
INSTITUT CATALA 4.250 6/15/2024 EUR 73.98
JUNTA ANDALUCIA 5.150 5/24/2034 EUR 71.52
JUNTA LA MANCHA 3.875 1/31/2036 EUR 54.80
SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED 8.000 11/4/2011 USD 7.90
SWEDISH EXP CRED 9.000 8/28/2011 USD 10.68
SWEDISH EXP CRED 2.130 1/10/2012 USD 9.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED 0.500 3/3/2016 ZAR 64.82
SWEDISH EXP CRED 0.500 3/5/2018 AUD 67.60
SWEDISH EXP CRED 0.500 9/29/2015 BRL 63.21
SWEDISH EXP CRED 7.000 3/9/2012 USD 9.45
SWEDISH EXP CRED 8.000 1/27/2012 USD 10.10
SWEDISH EXP CRED 0.500 1/25/2028 USD 51.85
SWEDISH EXP CRED 2.000 12/7/2011 USD 9.65
SWEDISH EXP CRED 9.000 8/12/2011 USD 10.02
SWITZERLAND
-----------
UBS AG 10.580 6/29/2011 USD 39.56
UBS AG 14.000 5/23/2012 USD 9.70
UBS AG 10.530 1/23/2012 USD 39.05
UBS AG 13.700 5/23/2012 USD 14.05
UBS AG 13.300 5/23/2012 USD 4.18
UBS AG JERSEY 3.220 7/31/2012 EUR 52.29
UBS AG JERSEY 10.990 3/31/2011 USD 30.98
UBS AG JERSEY 9.450 9/21/2011 USD 51.03
UBS AG JERSEY 9.350 9/21/2011 USD 70.88
UBS AG JERSEY 11.150 8/31/2011 USD 39.66
UBS AG JERSEY 10.360 8/19/2011 USD 53.45
UBS AG JERSEY 10.280 8/19/2011 USD 35.25
UBS AG JERSEY 13.000 6/16/2011 USD 50.13
UBS AG JERSEY 10.500 6/16/2011 USD 73.14
UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
BANK NADRA 8.000 6/22/2017 USD 73.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.500 8/31/2012 USD 29.95
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.250 8/31/2012 USD 35.46
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.800 7/31/2012 USD 26.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.400 7/31/2012 USD 11.19
BARCLAYS BK PLC 13.050 4/27/2012 USD 27.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC 12.950 4/20/2012 USD 23.53
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.950 4/20/2012 USD 16.30
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.650 1/31/2012 USD 45.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.250 1/31/2012 USD 9.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.350 1/23/2012 USD 22.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.550 1/23/2012 USD 11.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.800 9/22/2011 USD 16.64
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.750 9/22/2011 USD 73.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC 7.500 9/22/2011 USD 17.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.000 6/30/2011 USD 43.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.510 5/31/2011 USD 13.01
BARCLAYS BK PLC 13.000 5/23/2011 USD 23.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.950 5/23/2011 USD 65.04
BRADFORD&BIN BLD 4.910 2/1/2047 EUR 65.66
CO-OPERATIVE BNK 5.875 3/28/2033 GBP 70.16
DISCOVERY EDUCAT 1.948 3/31/2037 GBP 68.46
EFG HELLAS PLC 6.010 1/9/2036 EUR 24.25
EFG HELLAS PLC 5.400 11/2/2047 EUR 65.50
HBOS PLC 4.500 3/18/2030 EUR 74.03
HBOS PLC 6.000 11/1/2033 USD 72.18
HBOS PLC 6.000 11/1/2033 USD 68.21
HEALTHCARE SUPP 2.067 2/19/2043 GBP 71.15
NORTHERN ROCK 5.750 2/28/2017 GBP 69.83
PRINCIPALITY BLD 5.375 7/8/2016 GBP 75.78
PUNCH TAVERNS 8.374 7/15/2029 GBP 61.12
PUNCH TAVERNS 7.567 4/15/2026 GBP 60.60
UNIQUE PUB FIN 6.464 3/30/2032 GBP 64.42
WESSEX WATER FIN 1.369 7/31/2057 GBP 32.00
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.
Copyright 2011. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.
* * * End of Transmission * * *