/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/990316.MBX              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, March 16, 1999, Vol. 1, No. 28


EASTMAN KODAK: Class Action Repair Parts Litigation Concluded
GENERAL MOTORS: Waiting for Decision on Dismissal of EDS Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Continuing to Defend Defective Brake Pin Suits
GENERAL MOTORS: Awaits Decision on Motion to Dismiss Hughes Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Louisiana Court Rekindles Fuel Tank Litigation

GENERAL MOTORS: Defending Defective Door Latch Litigation
GENERAL MOTORS: 8th Cir. Appeal Pending in Anti-Lock Brake Suits
GENERAL MOTORS: Motion to Dismiss Front Seat Air Bag Suit Pending
GENERAL MOTORS: Four Defective Paint CasesPend; No Classes Yet
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS: Austrian Banks Will Pay $40MM & Release Papers

INDIAN TRUST: Interior Officials End Indian Talks
ISLE OF CAPRI: Subsidiary Named in Gaming Industry RICO Complaint
LASER TECHNOLOGY: Has Not Fully Reviewed Shareholder Complaints
MESA AIR: Substantial Payment Made on Shareholder Settlement
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES: Continues Defense of Carpet Antitrust Suits

NEW YORK: Civil Liberties Group Sues over Drunken-Driving Policy
PEGASUS COMMUNICATIONS: Evaluating Response to Late Fee Complaint
PLM INTERNATIONAL: ESOP Complaint Goes to Trial in September
PLM INTERNATIONAL: March Hearing on Fund Class Certification
SEARS, ROEBUCK: Credit Card Customers Receive, on Average, $23.80

TELXON CORPORATION: Counts 26 Shareholder Suits; SEC Inquiring
TOWNE BANCORP: Vows to Defend Suits; Cooperating with SEC Inquiry


EASTMAN KODAK: Class Action Repair Parts Litigation Concluded
In April 1987, Eastman Kodak Co. was sued in federal district
court in San Francisco by a number of independent service
organizations who alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act and of various state statutes in the sale by the
Company of repair parts for its copier and micrographics
equipment (Image Technical Service, Inc. et al v. Eastman
Kodak Company, "ITS").  The complaint sought unspecified
compensatory and punitive damages.  Trial began on June 19, 1995
and concluded on September 18, 1995 with a jury verdict for
plaintiffs of $23,948,300 ($71,844,900 after trebling).  The
Company appealed the jury's verdict, and on August 26, 1997 the
9th Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming
in part, reversing in part, and reversing and remanding on the
issue of used equipment damages.  The court affirmed the
jury's liability rulings, but reduced damages (after trebling)
from $71,844,900 to $35,818,200, and narrowed the scope of the
injunction under which the Company is required to make parts
available.  On April 27, 1998, the Supreme Court denied the
Company's petition for Supreme Court review, effectively
concluding all aspects of the case except plaintiffs' used
equipment claim.  The Company took a third quarter 1997 pre-tax
charge of $46,000,000.

Two cases that raise essentially the same antitrust issues as ITS
are Nationwide, et al v. Eastman Kodak Company, filed March 10,
1995, and A-1 Copy Center, et al v. Eastman Kodak Company, filed
December 13, 1993.  Both cases were filed in federal district
court in San Francisco.  A-1 is a consolidated class action.  The
complaints in both cases seek unspecified compensatory and
punitive damages.  On September 16, 1998, the Company and
plaintiffs in ITS, Nationwide, and A-1 engaged in a successful
mediation, effectively concluding these cases.  Under the terms
of the mediated settlement, the Company will make payments to
plaintiffs in return for plaintiffs' discontinuance of the
litigation, with prejudice.

A fourth repair parts case, Broward Microfilm, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Company, a purported national class action which was filed
February 27, 1996 in federal district court in Miami, was
dismissed without prejudice on May 13, 1998.

GENERAL MOTORS: Waiting for Decision on Dismissal of EDS Suit
Two suits,  Stephen A. Solomon v. General Motors Corporation, et
al. and TRV Holding Company v. General Motors Corporation, et  
al., (collectively "Solomon/TRV"), were filed in Delaware
Chancery Court on May 13 and 18, 1994, respectively, challenging
GM's split-off of Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS).  
Such actions have been consolidated and a consolidated amended
complaint was filed on April 2, 1996.  In addition, on May 10,
1996, a second  amended and supplemental  consolidated complaint
(the "Second Amended Complaint") was filed by plaintiffs in this
action.  Another lawsuit, Ward et al., as Trustees for the
Eisenberg Children's Irrevocable Trust II v. General Motors
Corporation, et al. (Ward), was filed in Delaware Chancery  Court
on November 15, 1995. On May 17, 1996, Solomon/TRV and Ward
(collectively, "Solomon/TRV/Ward") were consolidated and  the  
Second Amended Complaint was adopted as the complaint for the
consolidated action.
Solomon/TRV/Ward  purports to be a class  action  brought on
behalf of former holders of Class E common stock,  $0.10 par
value per share (the "Class E Common Stock"), of General  Motors  
against  certain  present and former directors of General Motors,  
as well as a double  derivative action brought on behalf of EDS
against certain present and former directors of General  Motors
and certain former  directors of EDS (all of whom are also  
directors or officers of General Motors).  EDS is named in the
complaint only as a nominal defendant with respect to the double  
derivative  action.  The Second  Amended  Complaint  alleges that
defendants have breached and are continuing to breach their
fiduciary  duties in connection with their conduct with respect
to EDS and the proposed  split-off of EDS from General Motors
(the "Split-Off").  In particular, the complaint alleges that  
the  process  of  establishing  terms  for the  Split-Off,  
including  the consideration of alternatives to such transaction
and the negotiating process in connection  therewith,  was
unfairly  dominated and controlled by General Motors and that the
resulting terms unfairly  benefit General Motors and its  
continuing shareholders,  including the holders of common stock,
$1-2/3 par value per share (the "$1-2/3 Common Stock"),  and the
Class H common stock,  $0.10 par value per share (the "Class H
Common Stock"),  of General Motors,  to the detriment of EDS
and the former holders of Class E Common Stock.  The complaint
also alleges that the split-off  would  unfairly  effect a
disposition of EDS because it would not provide for a  
recapitalization  of the Class E Common Stock into $1-2/3  Common
Stock at a 120%  exchange  ratio,  as had been  provided in the  
General  Motors Certificate   of   Incorporation   upon  a  
disposition  by  General  Motors  of substantially  all of the
business of EDS.  Furthermore,  the complaint  alleges that the
solicitation of consents by General Motors with respect to the
proposed split-off is wrongfully  coercive and the  solicitation  
statement being used in connection therewith is materially
deficient. The Second Amended Complaint seeks monetary damages
from the defendants,  as well as an injunction  against further
action in connection  with the split-off.  In addition,  the
complaint  seeks an order appointing independent representatives
to act on behalf of and protect the interests of EDS and the
former  holders of Class E Common Stock.  The complaint also
seeks an order  requiring the  defendants  to  disseminate  
completely  all material information to the former holders of
Class E Common Stock in connection with the split-off.

On May 10, 1996, the plaintiffs in the consolidated action filed
a motion for expedited  proceedings,  including a request for a
hearing on their  application for a preliminary  injunction  
against  further  action in  connection  with the split-off.  As
a  result  of such  application,  a  hearing  on the  plaintiffs'
application for a preliminary injunction had been scheduled for
May 30, 1996.  On May 23, 1996,  after limited  discovery,  the
plaintiffs'  counsel  informed the court that  plaintiffs had
concluded  that adequate  relief could be afforded to the  
plaintiff  class  members  after the  split-off  was  consummated  
and were withdrawing their application for expedited  proceedings
including a preliminary injunction hearing. Thus, plaintiffs
abandoned their pursuit of an injunction to prevent consummation
of the split-off.  On June 7, 1996, having received consent
of a majority of the holders of each class of its common stock,  
General  Motors split-off EDS to former General Motors Class E
stockholders.  (See Tabulation of consents  at Item 4, page 36 of
the Form 10-Q  filed by  General  Motors for the Quarter Ended
June 30, 1996).
On  December 1, 1997,  plaintiffs  served a Third  Amended  and  
Supplemental Consolidated  Complaint  which makes  essentially  
the same  allegations  as the Second  Amended  Complaint.  The
complaint seeks monetary damages, including recissory damages,  
and an  accounting  for any  special  benefits  obtained by
defendants.  On  December  11,  1997,  defendants  filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint. The parties continue to await a
decision by the Court.

GENERAL MOTORS: Continuing to Defend Defective Brake Pin Suits
On April 26 and 27,  1996,  two  purported  class  actions,  
Keith  McGill v. General Motors  Corporation and Richard Dolowich
v. General Motors  Corporation, were filed against General Motors
in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Counties of Bronx
and Suffolk,  alleging  defective rear disc brake caliper pins
in the "GM W-Body car".  These  actions have been  consolidated  
in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Bronx.
The Dolowich suit is brought on behalf of all persons and  
entities in the United  States who  currently  own or lease or
previously owned or leased a 1988-1993 Buick Regal,  Oldsmobile
Cutlass Supreme,  Pontiac Grand Prix or Chevrolet  Lumina.  The
McGill suit includes the same model year  vehicles,  but is  
brought  on behalf of persons  and  entities residing  in the
State of New York who  purchased  or leased such  vehicles  and
still own them. Three additional purported nationwide class
actions,  brought on behalf of current and previous  owners of
the same vehicles,  have been filed in federal courts in New
Jersey,  Garcia v. General Motors, and Pennsylvania,  Neff
v. General Motors and Marcel v. General Motors.  

Two additional  purported class actions involving the same
vehicles were filed, one in the Superior Court of New Jersey for
Burlington  County,  Bishop v. General Motors Corporation and
another in the United States  District Court for the Eastern  
District of   Pennsylvania, Cohen v. General Motors Corporation.  
Together,  the complaints allege violation of state consumer  
protection  laws,  fraud,  negligent  misrepresentation,  and
breach of express and implied warranty, and seek unspecified
amounts of economic damages, punitive damages not less than $20
million,  attorneys' fees and costs, and injunctive relief. The
Neff, Marcel and Cohen actions have been consolidated in  
Pennsylvania   State  Court.   The  Garcia  and  Bishop  actions  
have  been consolidated  in New Jersey  State Court.  On November
11, 1996,  the New Jersey state  court  rendered a  decision  
certifying  a class of all past and  present owners  of 1988  
through  1993  model  year  Buick  Regals,  Chevrolet  Luminas,
Oldsmobile  Cutlass  Supremes and Pontiac Grand Prix.  The New
Jersey  Appellate Division denied GM's motion for leave to
appeal,  but noted that the trial court is required to monitor  
compliance with the requirements to maintain a class.  GM intends
to vigorously defend this matter.

GENERAL MOTORS: Awaits Decision on Motion to Dismiss Hughes Suit
Nine lawsuits  were filed in the Delaware  Court of Chancery
during the first quarter of 1997: Jules Levine v. General Motors
Corporation, et al., on February 6, 1997; Steven Verkouteren v.
General Motors  Corporation,  et al., on February 6, 1997;  
Malcolm Rosenwald v. General Motors  Corporation,  et al., on
February 7, 1997; Richard Strauss v. General Motors Corporation,
et al., on February 7, 1997; Jeanette Whited, et al. v. General
Motors  Corporation,  et al.,  on  February  26,  1997;   Andrew  
Carlucci,   I.R.A.  v.  General  Motors Corporation,  et al., on
March 3, 1997;  Dr.  Joseph  Mantel v.  General  Motors
Corporation,  et al., on March 5, 1997; John  P.McCarthy  Profit
Sharing Plan v. General  Motors  Corporation,  et al., on March
6, 1997; and Patinkin v. General Motors  Corporation,  et al., on
March 31, 1997.  Each suit was denominated as a class action and
was  purportedly  brought on behalf of specified  holders of GM
Class H common stock against the  defendants,  General Motors and
its directors.  The  complaints  made  essentially  the  same  
allegations,   namely,  that  the defendants  have  breached  and
are  continuing  to breach their  fiduciary  and alleged  
contractual  duties to specified  holders of GM Class H common  
stock in connection  with the  Hughes  transactions.  All of  
these  lawsuits  have  been consolidated  under the  caption,  In
Re  General  Motors  Class H  Shareholders Litigation.  Following
a hearing on November  24, 1997,  the  Delaware  Court of
Chancery  denied  plaintiffs'  request  for  expedited  discovery  
and  for  the scheduling of a hearing on a motion for a
preliminary injunction.    

On December 1, 1997, plaintiffs filed a Second Consolidated
Amended Complaint which asserts three claims against  General
Motors and its directors.  The first claim alleges that General  
Motors is breaching  contractual  obligations  to GM Class  H  
common   stockholders  by  effecting  a  disposition  of  the  
defense electronics   business   of  Hughes   Electronics   
without   providing   for  a recapitalization  of the GM Class H
common  stock into $1-2/3  common stock at a 120% exchange ratio,
as currently  provided for under certain  circumstances  in the
GM Certificate of  Incorporation.  Plaintiffs  contend that any
amendment of the GM Certificate of Incorporation as part of the
Hughes  transactions would be invalid  because  stockholders  are
being coerced into  approving such a change.  Plaintiffs'  second  
claim  alleges  that GM's  directors  have  breached  their
fiduciary  duties (1) by failing to act in an informed manner and
(2) by failing to act  independently  to protect  the  interests  
of both  classes of GM common stockholders.  In particular, this
claim alleges that no processes were employed to ensure that the
interests of GM Class H common  stockholders  were adequately
represented in connection with the various  aspects of the Hughes  
transactions.  Plaintiffs'  third  claim is that GM's  directors  
have  breached  their duty of candor by using false and
misleading  solicitation  materials to obtain approval of the
Hughes  transactions.  This claim alleges,  among other things,  
that the Solicitation  Statement  fails to  disclose  the  
consideration  that GM Class H common  stockholders  would have  
received in the event the Hughes  transactions triggered   the  
provision  in  the  GM   Certificate   of   Incorporation   for
nondiscretionary  recapitalization  of GM Class H common  stock  
into GM  $1-2/3 common  stock at a 120%  exchange  ratio;  
misstates  that there is  substantial uncertainty regarding  
application  of  this  provision  to  the  Hughes  transactions;  
and misleadingly portrays the Hughes transactions as being fair
to GM Class H common stockholders. The complaint alleges that GM
Class H common stockholders would be irreparably  damaged  if the  
Hughes  transactions  were  to be  consummated  as structured  
because they would lose their alleged right to receive a 20%
premium in the event of a disposition of Hughes Aircraft.
Plaintiffs sought, among other things, an injunction  against the
consummation of the Hughes  transactions,  an order requiring  
defendants to implement certain procedures  designed to protect
the  interests  of GM  Class  H  common  stockholders,  or,  in  
the  event  the transaction closes (it has now closed),  
rescission and/or compensatory  damages against the defendants.
On December 17, 1997, having received consent of a majority of
the holders of each class of its common stock, the Hughes  
transactions were consummated.  (See Tabulation  of  consents  at
Item 4, page I-13 of the Form 10-K filed by General Motors for
the Year Ended  December  31,  1997).  Also,  on December  17,  
1997, defendants  filed a motion to dismiss the  complaint.  The  
parties  continue to await a decision by the Court.

GENERAL MOTORS: Louisiana Court Rekindles Fuel Tank Litigation
Thirty-nine  class  actions have been filed in state,  federal,  
and Canadian courts against the Corporation,  claiming that 1973-
1987 model Chevrolet and GMC full-size pickup trucks are
defective because their fuel tanks are mounted below the cab and
outside the frame rails.  Twenty-four  federal  court class  
actions were transferred to the federal  court in  Philadelphia,  
Pennsylvania  by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
In these actions, plaintiffs claimed that the fuel tank  
locations  make the  vehicles  unreasonably  susceptible  to
fuel-fed fires following  side-impact  collisions.  Plaintiffs
alleged breach of contract and warranty,  negligence,  fraud and
negligent  misrepresentation,  as well as violation of various
state consumer  protection  laws. The lawsuits seek compensatory  
and punitive  damages and injunctions  requiring notice to
owners, repairs, retrofitting and "disgorgement" of revenues.
An agreement  for a nationwide  settlement  of the class  actions  
pending in federal and state courts  received final court
approval on December 19, 1996, by a state court in  Louisiana.  
The  settlement,  which is not  expected to have a material  
effect on the  consolidated  financial  statements of General  
Motors, provides for owners of 1973 to 1991 full-size pickup
trucks and cab chassis with outside-the-frame  fuel tanks, as of
July 3, 1996, to receive  certificates  for $1,000  toward the  
purchase of any new General  Motors  passenger  car or light
truck,  except Saturns.  The certificates can be used for the
first 15 months at $1,000 or transferred  one time,  whereupon
the transferee  would be able to use the  certificate for $500
($250 if used with a General Motors rebate) toward the purchase
of an eligible vehicle until  expiration of the 15-month period.  
After the first 15 months, original recipients of the
certificates may use them for an additional 18 months at $500 or
transfer them, whereupon the transferee would be able to use the  
certificates  for $250  towards  the  purchase  of an  eligible
vehicle.  For fleets and governmental  entities,  after the first
15 months, the certificates  are  reduced  to $250 for an  
additional  35  months,  but are not transferable,  except to
other  departments or agencies of the same governmental
The  settlement  also  provides for $4.1  million to fund motor  
vehicle fire safety  research.  Research  funds will be used to
benefit motor vehicle  safety generally, and research will not be
done on the pickup trucks. The court ordered General Motors to
pay  plaintiffs'  attorneys'  fees and costs totaling  $27.875

The  Louisiana  Court of Appeals  reversed  on the ground  that
the  findings required to certify a class had not been made and
remanded the case to the trial court for the required  findings.  
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.  On January 20, 1999,
the trial court made  supplemental  findings, recertified the
settlement  class,  and reaffirmed its approval of the
settlement.  Certificates will not be issued  until any  appeals  
are  concluded  and the  approval of the settlement is final.
There are also  pending  individual  product  liability  claims
and  lawsuits involving  allegations  of defects in the design of
such  vehicles  resulting in fuel-fed  fires  following  side-
impact  collisions.  GM intends to defend these cases vigorously.

GENERAL MOTORS: Defending Defective Door Latch Litigation
On December 2, 1996, a purported  class action,  Alma Rosa
Rangel,  et al. v. General Motors  Corporation,  was filed in
District Court,  Webb County,  Texas, claiming that the Type III
door latches used in approximately 40 million 1978 to 1986 model
GM passenger cars and light trucks are defective.  Plaintiffs  
allege breaches of express and implied warranties, negligence and
gross negligence, and seek compensatory and punitive damages and
attorneys' fees. No determination has been made that the case can
proceed as a class  action.  GM has removed the case to the  
United  States  District  Court,  Southern  District  of  Texas,  
Laredo Division,  and intends to oppose certification of a class.

On February 27, 1998, Johnny McLain v. General Motors Corporation
was filed in Circuit Court,  Walker County,  Alabama  alleging
that Type III door latches used in 1979 to 1986 model GM vehicles
are  defective.  GM removed the case to the United States
District Court, Northern District of Alabama, and moved to
dismiss that case.  GM intends to vigorously defend these cases.

GENERAL MOTORS: 8th Cir. Appeal Pending in Anti-Lock Brake Suits
Eleven purported class actions alleging that certain antilock
braking systems on 1989 to 1996  light-duty GM trucks are  
defective  were  consolidated  by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation for coordinated pretrial proceedings
as In Re General Motors  Anti-Lock Brake Products  Liability  
Litigation,  USDC, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division.  On June 11, 1997, GM's motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint was granted.  Plaintiffs have appealed to
the federal court of appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

GENERAL MOTORS: Motion to Dismiss Front Seat Air Bag Suit Pending
On April 25, 1997, a purported  nationwide class action was filed
against General Motors Corporation  and certain  other  vehicle  
manufacturers  in the Circuit Court of Coosa County,  Alabama,  
Ellen Smith, et al v. General Motors Corporation,  Ford Motor
Company, Chrysler Motors Corporation, Sylacauga Auto Plex, et al,
claiming that the  front  seat air bags  installed  in 1993 to
1997  model  vehicles  are defective  because,  when  deployed,  
they are  likely to injure  small-statured adults and  children.  
The complaint  seeks  compensatory  damages,  the cost of
repair or replacement of the allegedly defective air bags, plus
attorneys' fees.  No  determination  has been made that the
matter may proceed as a class  action.  The  defendants  have
filed a motion to  dismiss  the  complaint  which is under
consideration by the Court.  GM intends to vigorously defend this

Two previously reported matters which purported to be class
actions asserting claims similar to those in Ellen Smith v.
General Motors, et al, have been dismissed with prejudice.  

GENERAL MOTORS: Four Defective Paint Cases Pend; No Classes Yet
Seven separate putative class actions have been filed alleging  
defects in vehicle paint.  Three of those cases have been
dismissed.  No determination has been made as to whether any of
the four  pending  cases may  proceed as a class action:

   * On March 24, 1995, a purported  nationwide class action
     (Christian Amedee and Louis  Fuxan v.  General  Motors  
     Corporation,  et al),  was  filed in the Civil District
     Court for the Parish of New Orleans,  State of Louisiana,   
     alleging the paint or paint  application  process  used by
     GM at  several  unspecified  North American  assembly  
     plants was  defective due to the omission of a surface layer    
     primer, allegedly causing the paint to prematurely
     delaminate,  deteriorate, and peel.  Plaintiffs  seek  
     unspecified  compensatory  damages,  equitable  relief,
     interest, costs, and attorneys' fees.
   * On April 8, 1998, the Corporation was served with a putative
     nationwide class action filed in the Circuit Court of Cook
     County,  Illinois,  Chancery  Division (Craig   Friedman,   
     Robert  Bengston  and  Debra  Bengston  v.  General  Motors
     Corporation).  The named plaintiffs  purport to represent a
     class of all persons who now or formerly  owned or leased a
     1986  through  1997 model year GM vehicle which was  painted  
     without  a primer  surfacer  layer  and  which  subsequently
     experienced  paint  delamination,  and  asserts  claims for
     breach of  contract, breach of warranty  and  violation of
     the Michigan  Consumer  Protection  Act on behalf of that
     class.  The Complaint  also  identifies a similar  putative
     class limited to Illinois  residents  for the  purpose of  
     asserting a claim  under the Illinois Deceptive Trade
     Practices Act.  Plaintiffs allege that vehicles painted
     using a "high build  electrocoat"  instead of both a "bottom  
     layer  electrocoat applied  directly to the sheet metal" and
     "a spray  primer" are subject to paint delamination  
     (peeling) and well as  "softening,  chipping,  and other  
     damage."  Plaintiffs seek unquantified compensatory   
     damages, punitive damages, pre-judgment interest,  
     costs and attorneys' fees. The case has been removed to the
     Federal District Court for the Northern District of

   * On or about July 6, 1998,  the  Corporation  was served with
     a putative class action  complaint  filed in the  Superior  
     Court for the City and  County of San Francisco,  California  
     (Eddie  Glorioso v. General Motors  Corporation).  On or
     about July 23, 1998,  the  Corporation  was served with
     another  putative  class action  complaint  filed  in the  
     Superior  Court  for the  County  of  Almeida, California
     (Scott Arnold v. General Motors Corporation).  The two
     Complaints are virtually identical.  In each, the named
     plaintiff purports to represent a class of all persons or
     entities  resident in California  which then or formerly
     owned or leased a 1985 through 1997 model year GM vehicle
     which was painted  without a primer surfacer layer and which  
     subsequently  exhibited  pealing or chipping of the paint.  

Each  complaint  asserts  claims  for  breach of  express  
warranty, violation  of  California's  Song  Beverly  Consumer  
Warranty  Act,  and unfair competition  and/or  fraudulent  
business  practices.  Each  Complaint  requests restitution  of
all  amounts  paid  by  class  members  for GM  vehicles  and/or
disgorgement of related profits or revenues,  equitable relief,  
actual damages, prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys' fees.

HOLOCAUST VICTIMS: Austrian Banks Will Pay $40MM & Release Papers
A large Austrian bank has agreed to pay $40 million and provide
reams of ocuments to settle a major class- action suit that
charged the bank with aiding the Nazi war machine and profiting
by selling Jewish assets during World War II, according to an
article appearing in the Jerusalem Post.  The agreement, while
not on the scale of $1.25 billion settlement with Swiss banks
last year, is considered significant, according to attorneys and
Jewish leaders, because the documents will give them considerable  
ammunition in major cases pending against German banks.

Creditanstalt, and its parent company Bank Austria, were sued in
the same cases as two leading German banks, Deutsche Bank and
Dresdner Bank.  

A unique aspect of the settlement is that it gives the plaintiffs
the right to any claims that the Austrian bank might have against
the German banks for assets that were forcibly transferred to the
German banks after Germany annexed Austria in March 1938.
Deutsche Bank formally took control of Creditanstalt after the

"The significance of the settlement is not in the amount being
paid, but in the documents being produced and the claims being
assigned," said attorney Robert A. Swift of Philadelphia, one of
the lead lawyers for the plaintiffs. "This settlement will lead
to far larger compensation for Holocaust survivors."

Charles Moerdler, a New York attorney who was the lead lawyer for
the Austrian banks, declined to return calls from reporters
seeking comment.  The settlement specifically provides that the
Austrian banks admit no liability by signing the settlement.   
The 37-page settlement resolves three cases filed in the past
year against Creditanstalt and Bank Austria.

The suits alleged that the bank aggressively participated in a
scheme to profit from the slave labor inflicted by the Nazi
regime and its allies.  The plaintiffs also asserted that the
bank obtained, concealed, and profited from assets looted or
"Aryanized" by the Nazi regime.  

Within months after the suits were filed, Austrian officials
indicated that they wanted to expeditiously resolve the cases.  
The settlement provides that the Austrian banks will provide $30
million for a humanitarian fund, some of which will go to
survivors, and another $10 million for an administrative fund and
interim claim fund.

INDIAN TRUST: Interior Officials End Indian Talks
Philip Brasher, writing for the Associated Press, reports that
Interior Department officials upset by congressional criticism
have broken off talks with Indian leaders on settling claims on  
billions in Indian trust funds.  Senate Indian Affairs Committee
Chairman Ben Nighthorse Campbell, R-Colo., said last week the
department's action "sends a dangerous message to witnesses  
that exercising their right to free speech could result in
reprisals from the federal government."

As previously reported (CAR 25-Feb-1999), Interior Secretary
Bruce Babbitt and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin were found in
contempt of court last month in connection with a lawsuit over
the government's handling of the funds.  

On March 3, Mr. Brasher relates, Interior officials canceled a
meeting with tribal leaders a few hours after the hearing by two
Senate committees, including Campbell's.  Interior's assistant
secretary for Indian affairs, Kevin Gover, said he did not like
the tone of the tribal representatives' testimony.  "You can't
call me a liar in the morning and that afternoon ask me to trust  
you," said Gover, himself an Indian. "We're not sure there is
enough trust between the two parties to continue to negotiate
without some kind of congressional involvement."  Tribal leaders
say his response was childish.

"I came 1,400 miles to give the testimony and meet with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.  They told us their feelings were hurt
and they didn't want to meet," said Charles Tillman, chief of
Oklahoma's Osage Nation.

A spokeswoman for Babbitt said he had nothing to do with
canceling the negotiations.  "We're hopeful that a process can be
set up for productive meetings in the future," Stephanie Hanna

The Department of the Interior manages $2.5 billion belonging to
tribes and another $500 million owned by individual Indians.  The
money includes lease revenue, royalties and court settlements.
The funds were mismanaged for decades, and lawyers for the
Indians say the government could be liable for billions of
dollars in claims.

Tillman is on the board of a group that has been negotiating with
the department on a way to settle claims on the tribal accounts.
The accounts belonging to individual Indians are the subject of a
class-action lawsuit.

The biggest single account, worth $500 million, is the proceeds
of a court judgment won by the Sioux tribes as compensation for
their loss of the Black Hills.  The federal judge handling that
litigation said he was tired of lies and bureaucratic foot-
dragging and found Babbitt and Rubin in contempt of court  
over their delay in turning over account records.

ISLE OF CAPRI: Subsidiary Named in Gaming Industry RICO Complaint
In its latest quarterly report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC., indicates that
a subsidiary has been named, along with numerous manufacturers,
distributors and gaming operators, including many of the
country's largest gaming operators (the "Gaming Industry
Defendants"), in a consolidated class action lawsuit pending in
Las Vegas, Nevada.  The suit alleges that the Gaming Industry
Defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act by engaging in a course of fraudulent and
misleading conduct intended to induce people to play their gaming
machines based upon a false belief concerning how those gaming
machines actually operate, as well as the extent to which there
is actually an opportunity to win on any given play. The suit
seeks unspecified compensatory and punitive damages. The actions
are in the discovery and preliminary motion stages. The Company
is unable at this time to determine what effect, if any, the suit
would have on its financial position or results of operations.
However, the Gaming Industry Defendants are committed to
vigorously defend all claims asserted in the consolidated action.

LASER TECHNOLOGY: Has Not Fully Reviewed Shareholder Complaints
On February 10, 1999, a securities class action entitled Moshe
Rosenfeld, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, vs. Laser Technology, Inc., David Williams, Pamela
Sevy, Dan N. Grothe and H. DeWorth Williams, was filed in the
United States District Court, District of Colorado (Case no. 99-
Z-266). The Complaint alleges that the Company and certain of its
officers and directors violated federal securities laws,
particularly Sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended (the "1934 Act").  Specifically, the
complaint alleges that the Company's financial statements
were false and misleading during the "class period" (February 12,
1996 to December 23, 1998) and that the Company made certain
false or misleading statements regarding the Company's financial
statement during this period.  The individual named defendants
are directors and/or executive officers of the Company.

The action appears to have followed and be premised on the
resignation of the Company's independent accountant, BDO Seidman,
LLP ("BDO"), on December 21, 1998, and the resignation of three
members of the Audit Committee of the Board of the Board of
Directors. The resigning members of the Audit Committee were
members of the Special Audit Committee (the "Special Committee"),
who also resigned from the Board of Directors on January 7, 1999
as a result of disagreements between management and the Special
Committee.  BDO also withdrew its opinions on the previously
issued certified financial statements for the fiscal years 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.  At the time of BDO's resignation, the
Special Committee was conducting an independent investigation
into the Company's accounting records and alleged irregularities
relating to the Company's accounting records. Following the
announcement of the resignation of BDO and withdrawal of five
years of audited financial statements, the American Stock
Exchange suspended trading in the Company's shares on December
23, 1998.

On January 7, 1999, a Special Meeting of the Board of Directors
(the "Special Meeting") was held for the purpose of receiving the
report and recommendations from the Special Committee.  At the
Special Meeting, the Special Committee made several proposals
including, but not limited to, asking for the resignation of the
Company's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer.
Following the presentation by the Special Committee of its
findings and proposed actions, those directors not serving on the
Special Committee made a counter proposal. Without responding to
the counter-proposal, the individuals on the Special Committee
then informed the Board of Directors of their intent to resign
from the Special Committee and from the Board of Directors.

In its complaint, the plaintiff contends that the resignation of
BDO and the three directors is due to the Company's alleged
unreliable and misleading financial statements.  Plaintiff's
complaint further alleges violations of Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  The action specified
the period from February 12, 1996 through December 23, 1998
as the "class period."

The Company has not had ample time to fully review the complaint
nor to determine the extent of any possible liability or material
damage to the Company.  The Company further believes that the
allegations set forth in the complaint are groundless and without
merit and it intends to vigorously defend against the action.

The Company is aware of at least five additional class action
suits that have been filed recently against the Company. As of
the date hereof, the Company has received two of the complaints
in the five actions, and the Company believes that the actions
parallel the one described above.  The Company intends to
vigorously defend against all of the actions.

MESA AIR: Substantial Payment Made on Shareholder Settlement
During 1994, seven shareholder class action complaints were filed
in the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico against MESA AIR GROUP, INC., certain of its present and
former corporate officers and directors, its independent auditor,
and certain underwriters who participated in Mesa's June 1993
public offering of Common Stock. During October 1995, the Court
certified a class consisting of persons who purchased Mesa stock
between January 28, 1993 and August 5, 1994. These complaints
were consolidated by court order, and in May, 1996, the court
granted, in part, a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, a third
amended consolidated complaint was filed alleging that during the
class period the defendants caused or permitted Mesa to issue
publicly misleading financial statements and other misleading
statements in the registration statement for the June 1993 public
offering, annual and quarterly reports to shareholders, press
releases and interviews with securities analysts. In May 1998,
Mesa entered into a memorandum of understanding with the
plaintiffs to settle the litigation. While Mesa and its corporate
officers and directors believe they have substantial and
meritorious defenses against the plaintiff's allegations and have
defended their position vigorously, they have agreed to a
settlement to avoid ongoing litigation and associated costs. The
memorandum of understanding provides for a total of $8 million to
be paid to the class plaintiffs on behalf of the defendants. Mesa
paid a substantial portion of the settlement. Mesa accrued an
additional $2.5 million as of September 30, 1998 and on December
1, 1998, the settlement was approved by the Court and the cases
were dismissed.  "A substantial portion of the ultimate
settlement was provided by Mesa's previous accrual to vigorously
defend this litigation," the Company says in its latest annual
report on Form 10-K.

MOHAWK INDUSTRIES: Continues Defense of Carpet Antitrust Suits
In December 1995, MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC., and four other carpet
manufacturers were added as defendants in a purported class
action lawsuit, In re Carpet Antitrust Litigation, pending in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, Rome Division. The amended complaint alleges price
fixing regarding polypropylene products in violation of Section
One of the Sherman Act.  In September 1997, the Court determined
that the plaintiffs met their burden of establishing the
requirements for class certification and granted the plaintiffs'
motion to certify the class.

MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC., is a party to two consolidated lawsuits
captioned Gaehwiler v. Sunrise Carpet Industries, Inc. et. al.
and Patco Enterprises, Inc. v. Sunrise Carpet Industries, Inc.
et. al.; both of which were filed in the Superior Court of the
State of California, City and County of San Francisco in 1996.
Both complaints were brought on behalf of a purported class of
indirect purchasers of carpet in the State of California and
seek damages for alleged violations of California antitrust and
unfair competition laws.  The complaints filed do not specify any
amount of damages but do request for any unlawful conduct to be
enjoined and treble damages plus reimbursement for fees and
costs.  In October 1998, two plaintiffs, on behalf of an alleged
class of purchasers of nylon carpet products, filed a complaint
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia against the Company and two of its subsidiaries as well
as a competitor and one of its subsidiaries.  The complaint
alleges that the Company acted in concert with other carpet
manufacturers to restrain competition in the sale of certain
nylon carpet products.  The Company has filed an answer and
denied the allegations in the complaint and set forth its

In February 1999, a similar complaint was filed in the Superior
Court of the State of California, City and County of San
Francisco, on behalf of a purported class based on indirect
purchases of nylon carpet in the State of California and alleges
violations of California antitrust and unfair competition laws.
The complaints described above do not specify any specific amount
of damages but do request injunctive relief and treble damages
plus reimbursement for fees and costs.  The Company believes it
has meritorious defenses and intends to vigorously defend against
these actions.

NEW YORK: Civil Liberties Group Sues over Drunken-Driving Policy
The New York Civil Liberties Union sued the city of New York last
week over a new policy to seize the cars of people accused of
drunken driving.  Norman Siegel, the organization's executive
director, called the policy "unfair, excessive and un-American."   
A class-action lawsuit by the group was filed on behalf of 72
people who lost their cars because of the policy that went into
effect Feb. 22.  Under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's policy, suspects
with a blood-alcohol level exceeding New York state's legal limit
of .10 will lose their cars as the "instrumentalities of a
crime," and the vehicles might not be returned.

PEGASUS COMMUNICATIONS: Evaluating Response to Late Fee Complaint
In November 1998 PEGASUS COMMUNICATIONS CORP. was sued in Indiana
for allegedly charging DBS subscribers excessive fees for late
payments.  The plaintiffs, who claim to represent a class
consisting of residential DIRECTV customers in Indiana, seek
unspecified damages for the purported class and modification of
our late-fee policy.  "We are in the process of evaluating our
response and are unable to estimate the amount involved or to
determine whether this suit is material to us.  Similar suits
have been brought against DIRECTV and various cable operators
in other parts of the United States," the Company indicates in
its latest annual report filed on Form 10-K.

PLM INTERNATIONAL: ESOP Complaint Goes to Trial in September
In November  1995,  a former  employee of PLM  International,
Inc., filed and served a first amended  complaint (the complaint)
in the United States District Court for the  Northern  District  
of  California  (Case No.  C-95-2957  MMC)  against the Company,  
the PLM International,  Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP), the ESOP's trustee, and certain individual employees,
officers, and directors of the Company. The complaint contains
claims for relief alleging breaches of fiduciary duties and
various violations of the Employee  Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974  (ERISA)  arising  principally  from  purported  
defects in the  structure, financing,  and termination of the
ESOP, and for defendants'  allegedly engaging in prohibited  
transactions and interfering with plaintiff's rights under ERISA.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, rescission of the preferred
stock transactions with the ESOP and/or  restitution of ESOP
assets,  and attorneys' fees and costs under ERISA. In January
1996, the Company and other defendants filed a motion to dismiss  
the  complaint  for lack of subject  matter  jurisdiction,  
arguing the plaintiff  lacked standing under ERISA.  The motion
was granted and in May 1996, the district  court  entered a
judgment  dismissing  the  complaint  for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit  seeking a reversal of the district  court's  
dismissal of his ERISA  claims,  and in an  opinion  filed in  
October  1997,  the Ninth  Circuit reversed  the  decision  of
the  district  court  and  remanded  the case to the district  
court for  further  proceedings.  The  Company  filed a  petition  
for rehearing,  which was denied in November  1997.  The Ninth  
Circuit  mandate was filed in the district court in December

In February 1998, plaintiff was permitted by the district court
to file a second amended  complaint  in order to bring the
fourth,  fifth,  and sixth  claims for relief as a class action
on behalf of himself and all similarly situated people.  These
claims  allege that the Company and the other  defendants  
breached  their fiduciary duties and entered into prohibited
transactions in connection with the termination  of the  ESOP  
and by  causing  the  ESOP to sell  or  exchange  the preferred  
shares  held for the benefit of the ESOP  participants  for less
than their fair market value. Also in February 1998, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the fourth,  fifth,  and
sixth claims relating to the termination of the ESOP, and the
seventh claim relating to defendants'  alleged  interference  
with plaintiff's  rights under ERISA, all for failure to state
claims for relief. The district  court,  in an order  dated  July
14,  1998,  granted  this  motion and dismissed the fourth
through seventh claims for relief.

In June 1998,  the  defendants  filed a motion for  summary  
judgment  seeking a ruling that the first two claims for relief,  
which allege breaches  arising out of the  purchase and sale of
stock at the  inception of the ESOP,  are barred by the  
applicable  statute of  limitations.  In an order dated July 14,
1998,  the district  court  granted in part and  denied in part
this  motion and ruled that these claims for relief are barred by
the statute of  limitations  to the extent that they rely on a
theory that the automatic conversion feature and other terms and
conditions of the purchase and sale of the preferred  stock
violated  ERISA, but are not so barred to the extent that they
rely on a theory that the purchase and sale of the  preferred  
stock at the inception of the ESOP was for more than adequate

On September 30, 1998,  plaintiff filed a motion to certify as
final,  and enter judgment  on, the two July 14, 1998 orders.  
This motion was denied.  Defendants filed their  answer to the
second  amended  complaint  on  September  18,  1998, denying the  
allegations  contained in the first,  second,  and third claims
for relief.  The trial  regarding  these  remaining  claims is
set for September 27, 1999.  The Company believes it has
meritorious defenses to these claims and plans to continue to
defend this matter vigorously.

PLM INTERNATIONAL: March Hearing on Fund Class Certification
PLM International, Inc., and various of its  affiliates  are
named as defendants in a lawsuit filed as a purported  class  
action on January 22, 1997 in the Circuit  Court of Mobile  
County,   Mobile,   Alabama,  Case  No.  CV-97-251  (the  Koch  
action).  Plaintiffs,  who  filed  the  complaint  on their own
and on behalf of all class members  similarly  situated,  are  
six  individuals  who  invested  in  certain California  limited  
partnerships  (the  Partnerships)  for which the  Company's
wholly-owned subsidiary, PLM Financial Services, Inc. (FSI), acts
as the general partner,  including PLM Equipment  Growth Funds
IV, V, and VI, and PLM Equipment Growth & Income Fund VII (Fund  
VII).  The state  court ex parte  certified  the action as a
class action (i.e.,  solely upon plaintiffs' request and without
the Company being given the opportunity to file an opposition).  
The complaint asserts eight causes of action  against all  
defendants,  as follows:  fraud and deceit, suppression,
negligent misrepresentation and suppression, intentional breach
of fiduciary duty, negligent breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, conversion,  and conspiracy.  Additionally,
plaintiffs allege a cause of action against PLM Securities Corp.
for breach of third party beneficiary  contracts in violation  of
the  National  Association  of  Securities  Dealers  rules of
fair practice.  Plaintiffs  allege that each defendant owed  
plaintiffs and the class certain duties due to their status as
fiduciaries,  financial advisors,  agents, and control persons.
Based on these duties,  plaintiffs assert liability against
defendants  for improper  sales and marketing  practices,  
mismanagement  of the Partnerships,   and  concealing  such   
mismanagement   from  investors  in  the Partnerships. Plaintiffs
seek unspecified compensatory and recissory damages, as well as
punitive damages,  and have offered to tender their limited  
partnership units back to the defendants.

In March 1997,  the  defendants  removed the Koch action from the
state court to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama,  Southern Division (Civil Action No. 97-
0177-BH-C) based on the district court's diversity jurisdiction,  
following which plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the action to
the state court. Removal of the action to federal court
automatically nullified the state court's ex parte  certification  
of the class.  In September 1997, the district court denied
plaintiffs' motion to remand the action to state court and
dismissed without  prejudice the individual claims of the
California  plaintiff, reasoning that he had been fraudulently
joined as a plaintiff.  In October 1997, defendants filed a
motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' claims,  based on
an agreement to arbitrate contained in the limited partnership
agreement of each Partnership,  and to  stay  further  
proceedings  pending  the  outcome  of such arbitration.  
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' opposition, the district court
granted defendants' motion in December 1997.

Following  various  unsuccessful  requests that the district
court  reverse,  or otherwise certify for appeal, its order
denying plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court and
dismissing the California plaintiff's claims, plaintiffs
filed with the U.S.  Court of Appeals for the Eleventh  Circuit a
petition for a writ of mandamus  seeking to reverse the district  
court's  order.  The Eleventh Circuit  denied  plaintiffs'  
petition in  November  1997,  and  further  denied plaintiffs  
subsequent  motion in the  Eleventh  Circuit for a rehearing on
this issue.  Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's order
granting defendants' motion  to compel  arbitration,  but in June
1998  voluntarily  dismissed their appeal pending settlement of
the Koch action, as discussed below.

On June 5, 1997, the Company and the  affiliates who are also  
defendants in the Koch action were named as defendants in another  
purported class action filed in the San Francisco  Superior
Court,  San Francisco,  California, Case No. 987062 (the Romei
action). The plaintiff is an investor in PLM Equipment Growth
Fund V, and filed the  complaint  on her own behalf  and on
behalf of all class  members similarly situated who invested in
certain  California limited  partnerships for which FSI acts as
the general partner, including the Partnerships. The complaint
alleges the same facts and the same nine causes of action as in
the Koch action, plus five additional causes of action against
all of the defendants, as follows: violations of California  
Business and Professions  Code Sections 17200, et seq. for  
alleged  unfair  and  deceptive   practices,   constructive  
fraud,  unjust enrichment, violations of California Corporations
Code Section 1507, and a claim for treble damages under
California Civil Code Section 3345.

On July 31,  1997,  defendants  filed with the  district  court
for the Northern District of California  (Case No. C-97-2847 WHO)
a petition (the petition) under the Federal  Arbitration Act
seeking to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims and for an
order staying the state court proceedings  pending the outcome of
the arbitration.  In connection with this motion,  plaintiff
agreed to a stay of the state court  action  pending the  
district  court's  decision on the petition to compel  
arbitration.  In October 1997,  the district  court denied the
Company's petition  to  compel  arbitration,  but in  November  
1997,  agreed  to hear the Company's motion for  reconsideration  
of this order. The hearing on this motion has been taken off
calendar and the district  court has  dismissed  the petition
pending  settlement of the Romei  action,  as discussed  below.  
The state court action  continues to be stayed pending such  
resolution.  In connection with her opposition  to the petition
to compel  arbitration,  plaintiff  filed an amended complaint
with the state court in August 1997, alleging two new causes of
action for violations of the California Securities Law of 1968
(California Corporations Code  Sections  25400 and  25500) and
for  violation  of  California Civil Code Sections 1709 and 1710.  
Plaintiff  also served  certain  discovery  requests on
defendants.  Because of the stay, no response to the amended
complaint or to the discovery is currently required.

In May 1998, all parties to the Koch and Romei actions entered
into a memorandum of understanding  (MOU) related to the
settlement of those actions (the monetary settlement).  The  
monetary  settlement  contemplated  by the MOU  provides  for
stipulating to a class for settlement purposes,  and a settlement
and release of all claims  against  defendants  and third party
brokers in exchange for payment for the benefit of the class of
up to $6.0 million.  The final settlement amount will  depend on
the  number  of claims  filed by  authorized  claimants  who are
members  of the  class,  the  amount of the  administrative  
costs  incurred  in connection with the settlement, and the
amount of attorneys' fees awarded by the Alabama  district court.
The Company will pay up to $0.3 million of the monetary
settlement, with the remainder being funded by an insurance

The  parties to the  monetary  settlement  have also agreed in  
principal to an equitable settlement (the equitable  settlement),  
which provides,  among other things:  

(a) for the extension of the operating lives of Funds V, VI,
     and VII by judicial amendment to each of their partnership  
     agreements,  such that FSI, the general  partner of each
     such  partnership,  will be permitted to reinvest  cash
     flow, surplus  partnership  funds, or retained proceeds in
     additional  equipment into the year 2004, and will liquidate
     the partnerships'  equipment in 2006;

(b) that FSI is entitled to earn front-end  fees  (including  
     acquisition  and lease negotiation  fees) in excess of the       
     compensatory  limitations  set forth in the NASAA Statement
     of Policy by judicial  amendment to the  partnership  
     agreements for Funds V, VI,  and VII;  

(c) for a  one-time  redemption  of up to 10% of the outstanding
     units of Funds V, VI, and VII at 80% of such partnership's
     net asset value;  and

(d) for the  deferral  of a portion of FSI's  management  fees.  
The equitable settlement also provides for payment of the
equitable class attorneys' fees from partnership funds in the
event that distributions paid to investors in Funds V, VI, and
VII during the extension  period reach a certain  internal rate
of return.

Defendants will continue to deny each of the claims and
contentions and admit no liability in connection with the
proposed  settlements.  The monetary settlement remains  subject
to  numerous  conditions,  including  but not  limited  to:

(a) agreement and execution by the parties of a settlement
     agreement (the settlement agreement),  

(b) notice to and  certification of the monetary class for
     purposes of the  monetary  settlement,  and

(c) preliminary  and final  approval  of the monetary  
     settlement by the Alabama  district  court.  

The equitable  settlement remains  subject to  numerous  
conditions,  including  but not  limited  to:

(a) agreement and execution by the parties of the settlement  

(b) notice to the current  unitholders  in Funds V, VI, and VII
     (the  equitable  class) and certification  of the equitable
     class for purposes of the equitable  settlement,

(c) preparation,  review by the Securities and Exchange  
     Commission  (SEC), and dissemination  to the members of the
     equitable class of solicitation  statements regarding the
     proposed  extensions,

(d) disapproval by less than 50% of the limited partners in
     Funds V, VI, and VII of the proposed amendments to the
     limited partnership agreements,

(e) judicial approval of the proposed amendments to the limited
     partnership agreements, and

(f) preliminary and final approval of the equitable settlement
     by the Alabama district court.  

The parties submitted the settlement agreement to the Alabama
district court on February 12, 1999, and the preliminary class
certification hearing is scheduled for March 24, 1999. If the
district court grants preliminary approval, notices to the
monetary class and equitable class will be sent following review
by the SEC of the solicitation statements to be prepared in  
connection with the equitable  settlement.  The monetary  
settlement, if approved, will go forward  regardless  of whether
the equitable settlement is approved or not. The Company  
continues to believe that the allegations of the Koch and Romei
actions are completely without merit and intends to continue to
defend this matter vigorously if the monetary settlement is not

SEARS, ROEBUCK: Credit Card Customers Receive, on Average, $23.80
As reported last week, Sears, Roebuck and Co. has agreed to
settle a class-action lawsuit by paying millions of dollars in
cash and coupons to 11 million credit card holders.  When credit
card balances were transferred to a subsidiary, Sears National
Bank, the new bank increased the credit card's annual percentage
rate.  Under the settlement, which still must be approved in U.S.
District Court, Sears will pay $72 million in cash and coupons to
about 3 million customers -- about $23.80 each.

TELXON CORPORATION: Counts 26 Shareholder Suits; SEC Inquiring
In December 1998 and January and February 1999, a total of 26
class actions were filed in the United States District Court,
Northern District of Ohio, by certain alleged stockholders of
Telxon Corp. on behalf of themselves and purported classes
consisting of Telxon stockholders, other than the defendants and
their affiliates, who purchased stock during the period May 8,
1998 and January 27, 1999 or various portions thereof. The named
defendants are the Company, President and Chief Executive Officer
Frank E. Brick, and Senior Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer Kenneth W. Haver.  On February 9, 1999, the plaintiffs
filed a Motion to Consolidate all of the actions.  The complaints
allege claims for "fraud on the market" arising from alleged
misrepresentations and omissions with respect to the Company's
financial performance and prospects and an alleged violation of
generally accepted accounting principles by improperly
recognizing revenues. Each complaint seeks certification of its
purported class, unspecified compensatory damages, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs.  The defendants believe that these
claims lack merit and they intend to vigorously defend these
actions. Defendants anticipate filing a Motion to Dismiss.

By letter dated December 18, 1998, the Staff of the Division of
Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission advised the
Company that it was conducting a preliminary, informal inquiry
into trading of the securities of the Company at or about the
time of the Company's December 11, 1998 press release announcing
that the Company would be restating the revenues for its second
fiscal quarter ended September 30, 1998. In cooperation with the
informal inquiry, the Company has voluntarily provided certain
responsive information to the Staff. On January 20, 1999, the
Commission issued a formal Order Directing Private Investigation
And Designating Officers To Take Testimony with respect to the
referenced trading and specified accounting matters, pursuant to
which a subpoena duces tecum was served on the Company on
February 11, 1999 requiring the production of specified
documents. The Company has delivered documents to, and intends to
continue cooperating fully with, the Staff.

On May 8, 1998, two class action suits were filed in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware, in and for the County of New
Castle, by certain alleged stockholders of Telxon on behalf of
themselves and purported classes consisting of Telxon
stockholders, other than defendants and their affiliates,
relating to an alleged offer by Symbol Technologies, Inc.
("Symbol") to acquire the Company.  The named defendants are
Telxon and its Directors at the time, namely, Frank E. Brick,
Robert A. Goodman, Dr. Raj Reddy, John H. Cribb, Richard J.
Bogomolny, and Norton W. Rose.  The plaintiffs allege that on
April 21, 1998, Symbol made an offer to purchase Telxon for
$38.00 per share in cash and that on May 8, 1998, Telxon rejected
Symbol's proposal. Plaintiffs further allege that Telxon has
certain anti-takeover devices in place purportedly designed to
thwart hostile bids for the Company. Plaintiffs charge the
Director defendants with breach of fiduciary duty and claim that
they are entrenching themselves in office. The plaintiffs seek
certification of the purported class, unspecified compensatory
damages, equitable and/or injunctive relief requiring the
defendants to act in specified manners consistent with the
defendant Directors' fiduciary duties, and payment of attorney's
fees and costs. The parties have stipulated that the plaintiffs
will file an Amended Complaint and that the defendants will
answer only the Amended Complaint.  On June 2, 1998, the Court
ordered consolidation of the above-captioned cases. This action
is in its early stages, with no scheduling order having been
issued by the Court; discovery has not yet commenced. The
defendants believe that these claims lack merit and intend to
vigorously defend the consolidated action.

TOWNE BANCORP: Vows to Defend Suits; Cooperating with SEC Inquiry
In the third quarter of 1998, two class action lawsuits were
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Western Division, against TOWNE BANCORP, INC., its
directors, its corporate stock transfer agent, and (in one suit)
its Directors' and Officers' insurer.  The suits allege violation
of various Federal and State laws in connection with the
Company's offering of common stock.  The suits request
unspecified damages and costs.

The Company has agreed to indemnify its directors and officers
for costs assumed by them in connection with such lawsuits.  The
Company intends to vigorously defend itself in connection with
these lawsuits.

The Company has received an informal inquiry from the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Midwest Regional Office, Division of
Enforcement regarding the initial public offering of the
Company's common shares.  In connection with the informal
inquiry, the Division of Enforcement has requested that the
Company furnish certain documents relating to the offering.  The
Company intends to fully cooperate with the informal inquiry.  

The Company cautions investors that, in the event the Division of
Enforcement determines that there is a basis for an enforcement
action and elects to pursue such an action against the Company,
its officers or directors, the defense costs associated with, and
any resulting judgments from any enforcement action will have a
material adverse affect on the Company.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N   

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Princeton, NJ, and Beard
Group, Inc., Washington, DC.  Peter A. Chapman, Editor.

Copyright 1999.  All rights reserved.  ISSN XXXX-XXXX.

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