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260707.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Tuesday, July 7, 2026, Vol. 28, No. 134 Headlines ABBVIE INC: Garcia Files Suit Over Juverderm-Linked Granulomas ANHEUSER-BUSCH LLC: Class Certification in Overby Vacated on Appeal APPLE INC: Simpson Files Suit Over Privacy Breach BNY MELLON: Bid to Certify Interlocutory Appeal in "Walden" OK'd COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Wins Partial Dismissal of Claims in "Brower" DAIMLER TRUCK: Faces Suit Over Trucks' Engine Calibration Defects MARYLAND: Wins Partial Discovery Extension in "Tribue" Suit OPTIMUM FIRST: Fails to Secure Private Info, Adams Alleges UTZ QUALITY: Lumbra Sues Over Salmonella Contaminated Products ********* ABBVIE INC: Garcia Files Suit Over Juverderm-Linked Granulomas -------------------------------------------------------------- CHRISTINA GARCIA, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ABBVIE INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:26-cv-07542 (N.D. Ill., June 27, 2026) is a class action seeking economic damages over her purchases of Juvederm filler injections (hyaluronic acid filler, or "HA") and suffered severe medical consequences due to a product defect as well as Defendant's failure to warn of the risk of substantial, material incidence rate of bodily harm caused by granulomas at Juvederm injection sites. Defendant Abbvie, Inc. is a North Chicago, Illinois-based corporation which produces cosmetic products distributed throughout the United States – including the products at issue, Juvederm injectables. The Defendant designed, manufactured, tested, marketed, labeled, packaged, handled, distributed, stored, and/or sold the Juvederm Products. In 2023, Plaintiff Garcia received numerous Juvederm injections in her face and paid thousands of dollars for each injection. Because insurance does not cover the cost of Juvederm injections, Plaintiff Garcia paid out of pocket for each injection. In June of 2026, three years later, Plaintiff Garcia became extremely ill as a result of delayed onset granuloma which occurred due to Juvederm. Plaintiff Garcia was hospitalized and had to receive numerous medical procedures to address the harm caused by Juvederm granulomas. Had Defendant marketed their Juvederm accurately and refrained from making these vital omissions regarding the risk of granuloma and delayed onset granuloma, Plaintiff Garcia would have been aware of this and would not have purchased Juvederm injections or would have paid substantially less for them, asserts the complaint. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff Garcia and Class members were harmed by paying a price premium for the Juvederm products which they otherwise would not have paid for due to the risk of granuloma. They seek actual consequential damages to remediate the harm caused by Defendant's failure to warn of Juvederm granulomas and the defective Juvederm products sold into commerce, says the suit. Plaintiff Garcia and Class members seek actual damages, statutory damages, restitution, disgorgement of profit into a constructive trust, pre- and post-judgment interest, and reasonable costs and attorneys fees. Plaintiff Christina Garcia is a licensed pharmacist residing in Solano County, California.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Blake Hunter Yagman, Esq. YAGMAN PLLC RXR Plaza 626 RexCorp Plaza Uniondale, NY 11556 Telephone: (929)709-1493 E-mail: blake.yagman@yagmanpllc.com - and - Michael R. Reese, Esq. REESE LLP 5544 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33707 Telephone: (917) 596-3283 E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com - and - Carlos F. Ramirez, Esq. REESE LLP 1000 W. 93rd Street, 16th Floor New York, NY 10025 Telephone: (212) 643-0500 E-mail: cramirez@reesellp.com ANHEUSER-BUSCH LLC: Class Certification in Overby Vacated on Appeal ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, THOMAS E. OVERBY, JR., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; ABBY GEARHART, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH, LLC, Defendant-Appellant. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus Supporting Appellant. NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; NORTH CAROLINA ADVOCATES FOR JUSTICE; NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE CENTER; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT; IMPACT FUND, Amici Supporting Appellee, Case No. 25-1520 (4th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's class-certification order. The Defendant, a prominent brewing company, challenged the certification of a class action concerning its alleged failure to compensate employees for a host of pre- and post-shift work activities. Defendant-Appellant Anheuser-Busch produces several well-known beer brands, including Budweiser, Bud Light, and Michelob. This appeal arises from claims involving its Williamsburg, Virginia brewery, where the company employs about 400 hourly workers. All of the claims in the case concern employment practices at that facility. Hourly employees at Anheuser-Busch's Williamsburg brewery work across five departments and access the facility by swiping badges, though the company generally pays them based on scheduled shifts rather than badge-swipe data. Employees are expected to be at their workstations at the start of each shift and must obtain approval for work performed outside scheduled hours. While the company states it pays for all hours worked, employees allege they were not consistently compensated for pre- and post-shift work. Named Plaintiffs Overby and Gearhart sued Anheuser-Busch under the Virginia Wage Payment Act ("VWPA"), the Virginia Overtime Wage Act ("VOWA"), and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). They alleged the company maintained a policy of failing to pay employees for required pre- and post-shift work. The Plaintiffs sought unpaid wages and related damages for those specific work activities, but did not seek compensation for all time spent at the brewery outside their scheduled shifts, such as using the gym or socializing. The Plaintiffs' claims rest on three assertions: first, that Anheuser-Busch required employees to perform various pre- and post-shift tasks, including donning and doffing PPE, complying with COVID-19 protocols, attending shift handoff meetings, and handling tools; second, that these activities necessarily occurred outside scheduled shift hours because employees were expected to be at their workstations for the entire shift; and third, that employees were not automatically paid for this additional work. However, the record showed that not all employees performed the same pre- and post-shift tasks beyond PPE and COVID-19 protocols. For example, some employees did not consistently attend shift handoff meetings, and the proposed class included workers hired after the brewery had ended its COVID-19 safety measures. Anheuser-Busch agreed to conditional certification of an FLSA collective action, and 71 brewery employees opted in. The named plaintiffs later sought certification of their VWPA and VOWA claims as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, while Anheuser-Busch opposed certification and moved to decertify the FLSA collective. After the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in Stafford v. Bojangles' Restaurants, Inc., 123 F.4th 671 (4th Cir. 2024), both sides submitted supplemental briefing addressing its impact. The district court ultimately found that the Plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), including the requirements of numerosity, commonality, predominance, superiority, typicality, and adequacy, and certified the proposed class. The district court defined the class as follows: All individuals who are currently, or were formerly, employed at Anheuser-Busch's Williamsburg brewery as non-exempt employees subject to Anheuser-Busch's LTM timekeeping system at any time from July 1, 2020, through the date of final disposition of the action. In certifying the class, the district court found commonality based on broad questions of whether Anheuser-Busch failed to compensate employees for required pre- and post-shift work, including compliance with COVID-19 protocols, and whether that practice violated Virginia law. It also concluded that these common issues predominated because the central dispute concerned the company's alleged policy of paying employees only for scheduled shift hours despite requiring additional work. Applying the same reasoning, the court denied Anheuser-Busch's motion to decertify the FLSA collective action. Anheuser-Busch then sought and obtained permission from the Fourth Circuit to appeal the class certification order under Rule 23(f). The Fourth Circuit explained that at its core, this case is about the requisite specificity district courts must employ in Rule 23 predominance and commonality analyses. In Bojangles, it held that relying solely on overly generalized company policies will typically defeat class-action certification because these formulations too often disguise the dissimilarity of prospective class members. The present case epitomizes this exact trap. In defining the common question at too high a level, the district court failed to observe the myriad variations in employees' circumstances. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in certifying the proposed class because it failed to properly apply the commonality and predominance requirements of Rule 23 in light of the binding Bojangles decision. The proposed class encompassed employees who performed different types of pre- and post-shift work, creating significant individualized issues that would require numerous mini-trials. The Fourth Circuit also found the class definition overly broad. It explained that the district court may consider whether narrower subclasses or a valid class-wide damages methodology could satisfy Rule 23, or instead deny class certification altogether. Because the Fourth Circuit found substantial variation in the pre- and post-shift tasks employees performed, when and where those tasks occurred, and the legal standards governing their claims, it held that the proposed class did not satisfy Rule 23's commonality and predominance requirements. It therefore vacated the class certification order and remanded for further proceedings. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/wyA1bLfvu. ARGUED: James Edward Tysse -- jtysse@akingump.com -- AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Robert Wesley Thayer Tucci -- rtucci@zagfirm.com -- ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Robert G. Lian, Jr. -- blian@akingump.com -- Margaret O. Rusconi -- mrusconi@akingump.com -- Katherine I. Heise -- kheise@akingump.com -- AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Craig J. Curwood -- craig@butlercurwood.com -- Zev H. Antell -- zev@butlercurwood.com -- Samantha R. Galina -- samantha@butlercurwood.com -- BUTLER CURWOOD, PLC, Richmond, Virginia; Gregg C. Greenberg -- ggreenberg@zagfirm.com -- Thomas J. Eiler -- teiler@zagfirm.com -- ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellees. Jennifer B. Dickey -- dickey@uschamber.com -- UNITED STATES CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, Washington, D.C.; Brian D. Boone -- brian.boone@alston.com -- ALSTON & BIRD LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Amicus Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. Michael J. Scimone -- mscimone@outtengolden.com -- OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP, New York, New York, for Amici National Employment Lawyers Association and Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers. Carol L. Brooke -- carol@ncjustice.org -- NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE CENTER, Raleigh, North Carolina; Marcus Samuel McGee -- sam@wilderlawgroup.com -- WILDER PANTAZIS LAW GROUP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Amici North Carolina Advocates for Justice, North Carolina Justice Center, National Employment Law Project and Impact Fund. APPLE INC: Simpson Files Suit Over Privacy Breach ------------------------------------------------- SARAH SIMPSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. APPLE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:26-cv-06307 (N.D. Cal., June 24, 2026) is a class action against the Defendant for allowing third parties to track users of its proprietary web browser, Safari, despite Apple's express representations of user privacy. The company relates that Apple heavily markets Safari's purported anti-tracking features, detailing the ways in which Safari protects users from being identified and monitored at length on its website. Recently, Apple launched an ad campaign centered on Safari's privacy features. Despite Apple promising that Safari's advanced privacy features protect individual users from being tracked, Safari transmits large amounts of identifying information from its users to third parties, asserts the complaint. Third parties utilize this information to track users through what is called "fingerprinting." Users are fingerprinted even if they have expressly taken measures to prevent data sharing, such as disabling cookies. Apple represents that Safari effectively prevents fingerprinting through the many anti-tracking features it contains by default, but this is not the case. The Plaintiff and Class members reasonably relied on Apple's representations of the security and privacy of Safari. However, Apple's practices disregard their consumers' privacy preferences and expectations. These practices infringe upon consumers' privacy; intentionally deceive consumers; give third parties power to learn intimate details about individuals' lives, interests, and web browser usage; and allow third parties to use consumers' browsing data for their own benefit. Through false advertisements, Apple represents to consumers that Safari prevents tracking while allowing third parties to track individual users, says the suit. The Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals alleging Apple's conduct: (1) breaches express contracts; (2) breaches implied contracts; (3) breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) violates California's Unfair Competition Law; (5) violates California's False Advertising Law; and (6) violates California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act. Plaintiff Sarah Simpson is a resident of California. Plaintiff uses Apple's proprietary web browser, Safari, to access the internet. Plaintiff uses Safari for its privacy features, including protection from fingerprinting. Defendant Apple, Inc. is a multinational technology company incorporated and headquartered in Cupertino, California.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: (Eddie) Jae K. Kim, Esq. Tiffine E. Malamphy, Esq. LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP 9171 Towne Centre Dr, Ste 180 San Diego, CA 92122 Telephone: (619) 762-1910 Facsimile: (858) 313-1850 E-mail: ekim@lcllp.com tiffine@lcllp.com - and - Gary F. Lynch, Esq. Kelly K. Iverson, Esq. Jamisen A. Etzel, Esq. Nicholas A. Colella, Esq. LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP 1133 Penn Ave, 5th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Telephone: (412) 322-9243 Facsimile: (412) 231-0246 E-mail: gary@lcllp.com kelly@lcllp.com jamisen@lcllp.com nickc@lcllp.com BNY MELLON: Bid to Certify Interlocutory Appeal in "Walden" OK'd ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Stephen Walden and Leslie Walden, Plaintiffs, v. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and BNY Mellon, N.A., Defendant, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-01972-CBB (W.D. Pa.), Magistrate Judge Christopher B. Brown of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted Plaintiff's motion for certification of interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b). Plaintiff initiated this action on December 21, 2020, seeking to maintain a class action against Defendant for breach of contract and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Plaintiff alleged Defendant, acting as fiduciary under investment management agreements, failed to disclose conflicts of interest when it invested Plaintiff's funds in Defendant-affiliated mutual funds. The Court had earlier rejected Defendant's argument that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) barred these claims, finding the allegations sounded in breach of contract and fiduciary duty rather than securities misrepresentation. Following discovery, the Court partially granted summary judgment for Defendant on claims Plaintiff had abandoned, while allowing the remaining claim regarding undisclosed conflicts of interest to proceed. At a subsequent hearing, Plaintiff narrowed the claim to focus solely on Defendant's alleged fiduciary duty and failure to disclose conflicts tied to affiliated fund purchases. Defendant renewed its SLUSA argument, and the Court agreed, finding the narrowed claim involved a misrepresentation or omission connected to the purchase of a covered security. The Court dismissed the class claims as preempted and denied class certification as moot, while noting a separate cash sweep account theory was not properly before it since it had not been pleaded. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to add class claims based on the cash sweep account theory; the Court denied that motion. Plaintiff then sought certification for interlocutory appeal of the question whether SLUSA deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims tied to Defendant's alleged non-disclosure. The Court first addressed whether an interlocutory order existed to certify, rejecting Defendant's position that final judgment should be entered because Plaintiff had abandoned individual claims by seeking leave to amend. The Court found Plaintiff's individual claims remained viable, noting that denial of class certification or leave to amend does not preclude a plaintiff from pursuing individual claims, and that SLUSA bars only class-action treatment, not individual state law claims. Applying the three-factor test under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b), the Court found each factor satisfied. First, the SLUSA preemption question is a controlling question of law because it implicates the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Second, substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist because the Third Circuit has not addressed the specific SLUSA disclosure issue, and Plaintiff cited several cases suggesting SLUSA may not apply where an investor cedes investment authority to a to the investment company and the company acts accordingly – in other words, because the plaintiff does not make the decisions regarding specific securities transactions . Third, immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation's termination, since proceeding to trial on individual claims and appealing afterward risks the case being remanded to the class certification stage and requiring a second trial in this six-year-old case. The Court also rejected Defendant's timeliness objection, noting Plaintiff filed the motion after the Court denied leave to amend and met the Court's deadline. Accordingly, the Court granted certification for interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b). A Copy of the Court's decision is available at https://www.pacermonitor.com/view/UNBTAXY/WALDEN_et_al_v_THE_BANK_OF_NEW_YORK_MELLON_CORPORATION__pawdce-20-01972__0215.0.pdf?mcid=tGE4TAMA from PacerMonitor.com COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Wins Partial Dismissal of Claims in "Brower" --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Rebecca Brower, et al., individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, Defendant, Civil Action No. 25-CV-3348 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint in an Opinion and Order. Eleven named Plaintiffs sued Colgate over allegations that its toothpaste products contained or risked containing heavy metals, including lead and mercury, despite marketing claims that the products promoted whole mouth health, protected gums, and were responsibly made. Plaintiffs asserted thirteen claims, including violations of consumer protection statutes in New York, Minnesota, Illinois, Arizona, New Jersey, and California, along with common law fraud by omission and unjust enrichment. The court held that Plaintiffs' affirmative misrepresentation claims were not preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because they paralleled the federal prohibition on false or misleading labeling. However, the court found that Plaintiffs' omission-based theory was expressly preempted, reasoning that federal law imposes no obligation to disclose heavy metal contaminants, so a state law claim premised on that omission would add requirements beyond the federal framework. The court distinguished the case from Canale v. Colgate-Palmolive, which addressed only an affirmative misrepresentation claim, and declined to follow Clinger v. Edgewell Personal Care Brands to the extent it collapsed the FDCA's two preemption prongs into one. On standing, the court found that Plaintiffs Rashed, Vinezeano, and Scott lacked standing because their sole product allegation, Total Active Prevention Whitening Toothpaste, was not linked to any testing of their specific purchases, and they were dismissed from the action. Plaintiff Boyd's long-term purchase history of Total Whitening Toothpaste likewise did not establish standing absent product-specific testing. Plaintiffs Brower, Peralta, and Alqadri were found to lack standing for mercury-based claims because their testing results showed only trace, non-actionable levels of mercury. The court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that one named plaintiff's standing could confer standing on all class members, citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. The court sustained Plaintiffs' claims under New York General Business Law Sections 349 and 350, California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act and Unfair Competition Law, and the consumer fraud statutes of Illinois, Arizona, and New Jersey, finding that statements such as "Whole Mouth Health" and Responsibly Made could plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer regarding the presence of heavy metals. The court also allowed three of Plaintiffs' four Minnesota statutory claims to proceed, finding the public benefit requirement satisfied, though it dismissed the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim for failure to adequately plead a threat of future harm. The court dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud by omission claim as preempted and dismissed the unjust enrichment claim as duplicative of Plaintiffs' other causes of action. The court declined to dismiss any claims as time-barred at the pleading stage, finding that Colgate had not established an ironclad limitations defense from the face of the complaint. Because the motion was granted only in part, the court denied Plaintiffs' conditional request for leave to amend. Colgate was ordered to answer the remaining claims within 14 days of the Opinion and Order. A Copy of the Court's decision dated June 25, 2026 is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=UzSIYB from PacerMonitor.com DAIMLER TRUCK: Faces Suit Over Trucks' Engine Calibration Defects ----------------------------------------------------------------- FIRE CHIEF TRANSPORT LLC; HAPPYCAT TRANSPORT LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. DAIMLER TRUCK NORTH AMERICA LLC; DETROIT DIESEL CORPORATION; and WESTERN STAR TRUCKS SALES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:26-cv-1314 (D. Or., June 26, 2026) is a class action concerning an engine calibration defect in nearly 200,000 heavy-duty diesel trucks equipped with Gen5 DD15 engines ("Class Trucks"), designed and manufactured by Defendants. The complaint relates that the defective engine calibration in the Class Trucks reduces engine performance, which progressively and prematurely damages the aftertreatment system components that are designed to limit the production of particulate matter and harmful emissions. At a high level, the defective engine calibration causes the Class Trucks to generate excessive soot. Soot or particulate matter is a tar-like substance composed of fine carbon particles that form during incomplete fuel burning in internal combustion engines. That soot accumulates in the diesel particulate filter ("DPF"), a component of the truck's emissions-control system designed to capture particulate matter before it is released into the atmosphere. As soot accumulates, the DPF must undergo more frequent regeneration cycles, during which exhaust temperatures are significantly increased to burn the accumulated soot from the filter. Although regeneration is a normal feature of diesel emissions-control systems, the excessive soot generated by the defective engine calibration causes regeneration to occur far more frequently than is necessary, subjecting the DPF, the downstream selective catalytic reduction ("SCR") catalyst, and related aftertreatment components to excessive heat and thermal stress that accelerate their degradation. These excessively frequent regeneration events also create safety hazards by increasing the risk of fires during parked regeneration and, in severe cases, engine fires caused by excessively clogged DPFs, asserts the complaint. The defective engine calibration has also caused and will continue to cause economic harm to owners of the Class Trucks. Their economic losses include frequent and costly DPF cleanings and replacements, increased downtime, and reduced vehicle reliability, accelerated aging of the DPFs, SCRs, and related aftertreatment components, and out-of-pocket repair expenses for damaged aftertreatment components, it notes. Recognizing there was a problem with the engine calibration, on July 22, 2025, DTNA initiated Field Service Campaign D25M3 (the "Campaign"), which applies to nearly 200,000 Class Trucks. Through the Campaign, Defendants admitted that the DPF failures in Class Trucks were caused by unexpected, accelerated particulate matter buildup within the DPFs and excessively frequent high-temperature regeneration cycles. The Campaign attempts to address the defective engine calibration through reprogramming (a "reflash") of the Motor Control Module ("MCM"), including modifications to engine fuel maps intended to reduce the rate of soot accumulation and regeneration-related thermal stresses imposed on the aftertreatment system. However, Defendants' proposed remedy ails to address the cumulative degradation and premature aging already suffered by the DPFs, SCRs, and related aftertreatment components before implementation of the MCM reflash and does not compensate Plaintiffs for excessively frequent and costly cleanings of the DPFs, the complaint alleges. Critically, the Campaign does not require dealers to replace the DPFs or even to inspect them for thermal fatigue, degradation of the DPFs' filter element ("substrate"), or filter cracking that may already have occurred after prolonged operation under the defective engine calibration, notes the complaint. Additionally, Defendants' proposed remedy fails to address accelerated aging of and degradation to the DPFs, SCRs, and related aftertreatment components resulting from excessively frequent regeneration cycles over several years of vehicle operation. Defendants failed to disclose any of the operational and economic tradeoffs associated with the reflash, and provide no compensation for any resulting increase in fuel costs. Defendants could and should have identified the defective engine calibration and the resulting harm to the aftertreatment system years before acknowledging elevated DPF failure rates through the Campaign. Using standard engineering validation processes, including modeling and simulation tools, engine and aftertreatment dynamometer testing, and reliability, durability and road validation testing, would have revealed that excessive soot generation was resulting in excessively frequent regeneration cycles that imposed stresses on the DPFs, SCRs, and related aftertreatment components, says the suit. The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated to recover damages caused by Defendants' defective Gen5 DD15 engines in Class Trucks and inadequate remedy, and to obtain injunctive relief compelling Defendants to fully remedy the Defect. Plaintiff Fire Chief Transport LLC owns a 2024 Western Star 57X Chassis Truck-Tractor purchased from Premier Truck Group of Dallas. Plaintiff Happycat Transport LLC owns a 2022 Western Star 5700 Truck-Tractor purchased from TAG Truck Center of Memphis. Defendant Daimler Truck North America LLC ("DTNA") is one of the largest manufacturers of commercial vehicles in North America and is engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling heavy-duty trucks throughout the United States. Defendant Detroit Diesel Corporation is a subsidiary of DTNA and designs, develops, manufactures, and sells diesel engines for use in commercial trucks, including the Gen5 DD15 engines (model 472.912) at issue in this action. Defendant Western Star Trucks Sales, Inc. is engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling heavy-duty trucks throughout the United States.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Noah Rich, Esq. BARON & BUDD, P.C. 2600 Virginia Ave. NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20037 Telephone: 202-333-4562 E-mail: nrich@baronbudd.com - and - Roland Tellis, Esq. David Fernandes, Esq. Adam Tamburelli, Esq. Michael Dobbs, Esq. BARON & BUDD, P.C. 15910 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1600 Encino, CA 91436 Telephone: 818-839-2333 Facsimile: 818-986-9698 E-mail: rtellis@baronbudd.com dfernandes@baronbudd.com atamburelli@baronbudd.com mdobbs@baronbudd.com - and - Kevin Budner, Esq. Phong-Chau G. Nguyen, Esq. LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 275 Battery Street, 29th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: 415-956-1000 Facsimile: 415-956-1008 E-mail: ecabraser@lchb.com kbudner@lchb.com pgnguyen@lchb.com - and - David Stellings, Esq. Katherine McBride, Esq. LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10013 Telephone: 212-355-9500 Facsimile: 212-355-9592 E-mail: dstellings@lchb.com kmcbride@lchb.com - and - Bill Robins, Esq. ROBINS CLOUD LLP 808 Wilshire, Suite 450 Santa Monica, CA 90401 Telephone: 310-929-4200 E-mail: robins@robinscloud.com MARYLAND: Wins Partial Discovery Extension in "Tribue" Suit ----------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Byron Tribue, Matin Dunlap, and Analisse Diaz, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. State of Maryland, Colonel Roland L. Butler, Jr., Colonel William M. Pallozzi, James E. Hock, Jr., and Colonel Woodrow W. Jones III, Defendants, Judge Brendan A. Hurson of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion to modify the scheduling order, and denies Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint except as construed to permit intervention by a proposed plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this putative class action on October 24, 2022, alleging race-based employment discrimination against Defendant State of Maryland and several individual officials. Claims against the individual defendants were previously dismissed without prejudice for insufficient allegations of supervisory liability. Discovery, ongoing for more than a year, has produced five unresolved disputes referred to a magistrate judge. Defendant sought to extend the discovery deadline to December 31, 2026, citing continued custodian document review, delayed medical authorizations from Plaintiff, and an overbroad deposition notice. Plaintiff called the proposal excessive and argued it rewarded Defendant's own delay, proposing instead that discovery run 90 days past a class certification ruling. The court finds Defendant demonstrated good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) but declines to leave the discovery closing date open-ended. It adopts a revised schedule, closing discovery on November 30, 2026, setting the class certification motion deadline for December 14, 2026, and the dispositive motions deadline for January 11, 2027. Turning to the motion to amend, Plaintiff sought to add former officers Analisse Diaz and Wing "Eric" Tong as named plaintiffs and to revive Section 1983 claims against the individual defendants. Because the original pleading amendment deadline of November 21, 2024, had lapsed, the court applies the two-step test under Rules 16(b)(4) and 15(a)(2), which first requires a showing of diligence. The court finds Plaintiff's counsel had represented Diaz and Tong individually since 2022 and possessed their allegations well before the amendment deadline, yet waited until February 2026 to seek amendment after learning by mid-2025 of a potential adequacy problem with the existing named plaintiffs. Similarly, the proposed Section 1983 allegations against the individual defendants relied largely on information already available to Plaintiff rather than newly discovered evidence. The court concludes Plaintiff failed to act diligently and denies the motion to amend on both grounds. As an alternative, Plaintiff requested that Diaz and Tong be permitted to intervene. The court rules that Diaz, already a former party whose claims were dismissed, cannot use intervention to revisit that ruling. As to Tong, a nonparty putative class member, the court evaluates timeliness under Rule 24, weighing the case's procedural stage, potential prejudice, and the reason for delay. Because discovery remains ongoing and depositions have not begun, the court finds no substantial prejudice to Defendant and permits Tong to intervene as a named plaintiff. Tong must file a separate intervenor complaint within 30 days, which may not include the claims the court has already declined to revive. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to modify the scheduling order is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff's motion to amend is denied except insofar as construed as a motion for Tong's intervention. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=l4cZ0V from PacerMonitor.com OPTIMUM FIRST: Fails to Secure Private Info, Adams Alleges ---------------------------------------------------------- DIANE ADAMS on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. OPTIMUM FIRST INC., D/B/A OPTIMUM FIRST MORTGAGE, Defendant, Case No. 8:26-cv-1661 (C.D. Cal., June 28, 2026) arises from Defendant's failure to secure the personally identifiable information ("PII") of Plaintiff and the members of the proposed Class. The complaint relates that the Plaintiff and Class members trusted that Optimum First, as a condition of receiving their private information, would use their data only for business purposes in a manner that was safe and secure. On June 15, 2026, Optimum First experienced a data security incident in which an unauthorized actor gained access to its computer systems and exfiltrated certain files containing the sensitive personal data of Plaintiff and other current and former Optimum First customers and loan applicants. On June 19, 2026, a threat actor identifying itself as "PEAR" publicly claimed responsibility for the attack and asserted that it had exfiltrated approximately 9.3 terabytes of Optimum First's data. The PII intruders accessed and infiltrated from Defendant's systems included but were not necessarily limited to, customers' and applicants' names, contact information, Social Security numbers, loan application details, financial and income documentation, and mortgage account and application data. As a direct and proximate result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered actual and present injuries, including but not limited to: (a) present, certainly impending, and continuing threats of identity theft crimes, fraud, scams, and other misuses of their Private Information; (b) diminution of value of their Private Information; (c) loss of benefit of the bargain (price premium damages); (d) loss of value of privacy and confidentiality of the stolen Private Information; (e) illegal sales of the compromised Private Information; (f) mitigation expenses and time spent responding to and remedying the effects of the Data Breach; (g) identity theft insurance costs; (h) "out of pocket" costs incurred due to actual identity theft; (i) credit freezes/unfreezes; (j) expense and time spent on initiating fraud alerts and contacting third parties; (k) decreased credit scores; (l) lost work time; and (m) anxiety, annoyance, and nuisance; (n) continued risk to their Private Information, which remains in Defendant's possession and is subject to further breaches so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information. Through this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant responsible for the injuries they inflicted on Plaintiff and Class Members due to their impermissibly inadequate data security measures, and to seek injunctive relief to ensure the implementation of security measures to protect the Private Information that remains in Defendant's possession. Plaintiff Diane Adams is a resident and citizen of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Defendant Optimum First Inc., d/b/a Optimum First Mortgage is a residential mortgage lender headquartered in Huntington Beach, California.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Daniel Srourian, Esq. SROURIAN LAW FIRM, P.C. 468 N. Camden Dr. Suite 200 Beverly Hills, CA 90210 Telephone: (213) 474-3800 Facsimile: (213) 471-4160 E-mail: daniel@slfla.com UTZ QUALITY: Lumbra Sues Over Salmonella Contaminated Products -------------------------------------------------------------- Rachel Lumbra, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Utz Quality Foods LLC d/b/a Zapp's and Dirty Potato Chips, Defendant, Case No. 1:26-cv-1291 (AMN/DJS) (N.D.N.Y., June 24, 2026) is a class action seeking to remedy the deceptive and misleading business practices of the Defendant with respect to the manufacturing, marketing, and sale of Defendant's Zapp's and Dirty potato chips products throughout the state of New York. Defendant Utz Quality Foods LLC d/b/a Zapp's and Dirty Potato Chips manufactures, markets, advertises, and distributes the products throughout the United States. Plaintiff Rachel Lumbra purchased and used Defendant's Products that contained Salmonella, including Products that were subject to a recall. More specifically, during the class period Plaintiff purchased Big Cheezy, as well as the Sour Cream and Onion products. The complaint relates that the Defendant has improperly, deceptively, and misleadingly labeled and marketed its Products to reasonable consumers, like Plaintiff, by omitting and not disclosing to consumers on its packaging that consumption of the Products may increase the risk of contracting Salmonella. The Defendant's advertising and marketing campaign is false, deceptive, and misleading because the Products do contain, or risk containing, Salmonella, which is dangerous to one's health and well-being. The Plaintiff and Class Members relied on Defendant's misrepresentations and omissions of the safety of the Products and what is in the Products when they purchased them. Consequently, Plaintiff and Class Members lost the entire benefit of their bargain when what they received was a food product contaminated with a known bacterium that is harmful to consumers' health. Given that Plaintiff and Class Members paid a premium for the Products, Plaintiff and Class Members suffered an injury in the amount of the premium paid, says the suit.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Russell M. Busch, Esq. BRYSON HARRIS SUCIU & DEMAY PLLC 11 Park Place, 3rd Floor New York, NY 10007 Telephone: (919) 926-7948 E-mail: rbusch@brysonpllc.com - and - Nick Suciu III, Esq. BRYSON HARRIS SUCIU & DEMAY PLLC 6905 Telegraph Rd., Suite 115 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301 Telephone: (616) 678-3180 E-mail: nsuciu@brysconpllc.com - and - Jason P. Sultzer, Esq. SULTZER & LIPARI, PLLC 85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 200 Poughkeepsie, NY 12601 Telephone: (845) 483-7100 Facsimile: (888) 749-7747 E-mail: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2026. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. *** End of Transmission ***