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260617.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Wednesday, June 17, 2026, Vol. 28, No. 120 Headlines 12-15 BROADWAY: Denial of Class Certification in Abdelrazek Flipped ALABAMA: Faces Kelly Suit Over Unlawful Employment Practices ALOVA LABS: Ibarra Sues Over Automatic Paid Subscription Renewal BP EXPLORATION: Summary Judgment in Ruffin BELO Suit Affirmed EAST CHICAGO, IN: Firefighters Judgment Reversed for Lack of Notice GAP INC: 2nd Cir. Affirms Smith Securities Class Suit Dismissal GARRISON INVT: Dismissal of Messer for Lack of Jurisdiction Upheld MCMENAMINS INC: Wage Claim Summary Judgment in Patrick Reversed NEW YORK: Reversal of FLSA Judgment in Andersen Class Suit Affirmed PATERSON, NJ: Class Certification in Evans Wage & Hour Suit Upheld SPIRIT AIRLINES: Smidga Dismissal Upheld, Modified to w/o Prejudice STRATEGIC EDUCATION: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Hooks Says STRATEGIC EDUCATION: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Hooks Says TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Class Certification Denial in Guthrie Affirmed TSCHETTER SULZER: Dismissal of Woodruff Suit Reversed on Appeal UNITED STATES: Violates Rehabilitation Act, Panian Suit Alleges ********* 12-15 BROADWAY: Denial of Class Certification in Abdelrazek Flipped ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, Karim Abdelrazek, etc., et al., appellants-respondents, v. 12-15 Broadway Astoria, LLC, respondent-appellant, Case No. 2022-04705, Index No. 701984/21 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, (i) reversed the order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and to approve a proposed notice of class action and (ii) affirmed the denial of the Defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. In a putative class action, inter alia, to recover damages for rent overcharges, the Plaintiffs appeal, and the Defendant cross-appeals, from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered June 13, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and to approve a proposed notice of class action. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, denied the Defendant's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. In 2021, the Plaintiffs, current and former tenants of a residential apartment building in Queens, commenced this putative class action against the Defendant, the owner of the building, inter alia, to recover damages for rent overcharges and violations of the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, including Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 (Administrative Code of City of NY) Section 26-517(a)(4), and the Rent Stabilization Code, including Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) Section 2521.1(g). They alleged that the Defendant failed to register the correct initial legal regulated monthly rent on each apartment in 2013 and 2014, resulting in subsequent rent overcharges for all tenants of the building after that time. The Plaintiffs moved for class certification and to approve a proposed notice of class action. The Defendant opposed the plaintiffs' motion and cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. In an order entered June 13, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the motion and the cross-motion. The Plaintiffs appeal, and the Defendant cross-appeals. The Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court correctly denied the Defendant's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. In opposition to the Defendant's prima facie showing that the alleged overcharges were based on initial legal regulated monthly rents that were registered more than four years before the filing of the complaint, which is not challenged on appeal, the Plaintiffs set forth sufficient indicia of fraud to warrant consideration of the rental history beyond the four-year statutory period. The Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court erred in denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. It found that common questions of law and fact predominated, particularly whether the Defendant engaged in a fraudulent scheme that resulted in rent overcharges in violation of rent stabilization laws. The Court also concluded that the Plaintiffs' claims were typical of the proposed class and that differences in the timing and duration of individual tenancies only affected damages, not liability, and therefore did not defeat certification. Finally, it determined that the Plaintiffs would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court should have granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, but modified the class period to begin on January 26, 2017 rather than June 14, 2015, applying the four-year statute of limitations under CPLR former 213-a for rent overcharge claims. It also remitted the matter for the Supreme Court to consider the proposed class notice, since that issue had not yet been addressed. The remaining arguments were either improperly raised for the first time on appeal or found to be without merit. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/e98J2nyrJ. Newman Ferrara LLP, New York, NY (Lucas A. Ferrara -- lferrara@nfllp.com -- and Roger A. Sachar -- rsachar@nfllp.com -- of counsel), for appellants-respondents. D'Agostino, Levine, Landesman, Lederman, Rivera & Miraglia, LLP, New York, NY (Eric R. Garcia -- egarcia@dlpartnerslaw.com -- of counsel), for respondent-appellant. ALABAMA: Faces Kelly Suit Over Unlawful Employment Practices ------------------------------------------------------------ GREGORY KELLY AND ANNETTE B. KELLY v. ALABAMA STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Case No. 2:26-cv-00439-MHT-JTA (M.D. Ala., June 3, 2026) is a class action brought by the Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, from whom the Defendants at usurped the federal laws with state's laws by requiring state licensing boards to use the state's ambiguous and vague Good Moral Charters and Crime Involving Moral Turpitude when issuing state Professional Boards License due to their race, color, sex, disabilities, and perceived and true religious and political views and beliefs. Since February 14, 2024, the Plaintiffs have accused more than 458 state agencies including more than 45 state of Alabama Licensing Boards of usurping federal law when making decisions about issuing professional board licenses. In the Kelly vs AL Dept of Insurance in the Circuit Court of Montgomery, AL, the Plaintiffs exposed the Defendants violations under military SCRA Act and the NDAAAct and violations under the state's 1939 Merit system laws and the state Ethic laws. The Plaintiffs say state's 1939 Merit system laws mirrors the 1925 Klaus' Manual about directed hostility towards immigrants and Roman Catholics as well as African Americans. Millions of white Protestant Americans joined this hostility including many elected officials and community leaders. Under State's 1939 Merit system and under Alabama Code section 36-25-24, the Defendants subjected the Plaintiffs to retaliation for reporting state ethical law violations such as FCPAAct and Unlawful Compensation, accepting anything of value ( e.g., loans, gifts, travel, or favors) with the intent to influence official actions and violations under federal law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as unended, 42 US.CS 2000e ("Title and Title 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, race and retaliation and to provide appropriate relief to classes of employees who were adversely affected by such practices. 5. Other Defendants include ALABAMA STATE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, ALABAMA ABC BOARD, ALABAMA MEDICAL CANNABIS COMMISSION, ALABAMA BOARD OF REGISTRATION FOR FORESTERS, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & INDUSTRIES (Pesticide Applicator), ALABAMA ATHLETIC COMMISSION, ALABAMA BOARD OF ARCHITECTS, ALABAMA BOARD OF COSMETOLOGY, ALABAMA BOARD OF·COURT REPORTING, ALABAMA BOARD EXAMINERS FOR SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY & AUDIOLOGY, ALABAMA BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN MARIAGE & FAMILY THERAPY, ALABAMA BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, ALABAMA BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTS, ALABAMA BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF NURSING HOME ADMINSTRATORS, ALABAMA BOARD OF FUNERAL SERVICES, ALABAMA BOARD OF GENETIC COUNSELING, ALABAMA BOARD OF HVAC/R CONTRACTORS, ALABAMA BOARD OF HOME MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, ALABAMA BOARD OF LICENSURE FOR PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS & LAND SURVEYORS, ALABAMA BOARD OF LICENSURE FOR PROFESSIONAL GEOLOGISTS, ALABAMA BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS & MEDICAL LICENSURE COMMISSION, ALABAMA BOARD OF NURSING ALABAMA BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, ALABAMA BOARD OF PHYSICAL THERAPY, ALABAMA ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS BOARD, ALABAMA ELECTRONIC SECURITY BOARD OF LICENSURE, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE OFFICE, ALABAMA LICENSING BOARD FOR GENERAL CONTRACTORS, ALABAMA LICENURE BOARD FOR INTERPRETERS & TRANSLATORS, ALABAMA MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMISSION, ALABAMA MASSAGE THERAPY LICENSING, BOARD STATE OF ALABAMA OIL & GAS BOARD, ALABAMA PLUMBERS & GAS FITTERS EXAMINING BOARD, ALABAMA POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS BOARD, ALABAMA PRIVIATE INVESTIGATION BOARD, ALABAMA SECURITIES COMMISSION, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF AUCTIONEERS, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTICS EXAMINERS, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF PODIATRY, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF PROSTHETISTS & ORTHOTISTS, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF RESPIRATORY THERAPY ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF VETERINARY MEDICAL EXAMINERS, ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF SOCIAL WORK EXAMINERS, BOARD OF DENTIAL EXAMINERS OF ALABAMA, STATE OF ALABAMA HOME BUILDERS LICENSURE BOARD, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES (Daycare), ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, and ALABAMA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. The Plaintiffs appear pro se.[BN] ALOVA LABS: Ibarra Sues Over Automatic Paid Subscription Renewal ---------------------------------------------------------------- PEDRO IBARRA v. TALOVA LABS INC., a Delaware corporation, d/b/a WWW.TALOVALABS.COM, Case No. 26STCV17748 (Cal. Super., June 4, 2026) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself and others similarly situated arising after the Plaintiff purchased an automatically renewing paid subscription at website, www.talovalabs.com which caused Plaintiff to incur unlawful charges from Defendant related to an automatic renewal or continuous service. According to the complaint, the Defendant made unlawful automatic renewal and/or continuous service offers to consumers in California in violation of California's Automatic Renewal Law by failing to provide "clear and conspicuous" disclosures mandated by California law and failing to provide an acknowledgment to consumers that includes the automatic renewal or continuous service offer terms, the cancellation policy, and information regarding how to cancel in a manner that is capable of being retained by the consumer. The Defendant is an online retailer that sells products nationwide and in California. Defendant has substantial contacts with and receives substantial benefits and income from and through the state of California.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Scott J. Ferrell, Esq. Victoria C. Knowles, Esq. PACIFIC TRIAL ATTORNEYS 4100 Newport Place Drive, Ste. 800 Newport Beach, CA 92660 Telephone: (949) 706-6464 Facsimile: (949) 706-6469 E-mail: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com vknowles@pacifictrialattorneys.com BP EXPLORATION: Summary Judgment in Ruffin BELO Suit Affirmed ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, FLOYD RUFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 23-30854 (5th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of the expert testimony that Ruffin submitted to prove that his alleged exposure caused his cancer and its associated award of summary judgment to BP. Ruffin worked as a shoreline clean-up worker in Louisiana for five months after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill and was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later. He filed a "Back-End Litigation Option" (BELO) claim against BP under the Deepwater Horizon medical-benefits class action settlement, alleging that exposure to harmful chemicals during the clean-up effort caused his cancer. After discovery, Ruffin designated several experts, including causation expert Dr. Benjamin Rybicki, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist. Dr. Rybicki opined that Ruffin was exposed to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) during the clean-up effort and identified benzo(a)pyrene, a common PAH, as a carcinogen linked to prostate cancer. Relying on animal and occupational studies, he concluded that occupational exposure to PAHs is associated with a modest increase in the risk of developing prostate cancer. During his deposition, Dr. Rybicki acknowledged that he could not identify a specific level of PAH exposure known to cause prostate cancer in humans. He also stated that benzo(a)pyrene is likely the only PAH that is carcinogenic. While he did not specifically opine that Ruffin was exposed to PAHs or benzo(a)pyrene, and limited his testimony to crude oil exposure generally, he maintained that PAHs are present in crude oil and that Ruffin's oil exposure represented his most significant exposure in terms of intensity. BP moved to exclude Dr. Rybicki's causation testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion, finding the testimony unreliable because it failed to identify the level of exposure to PAHs necessary to cause prostate cancer or show that Ruffin was exposed to that level. The court also found a significant analytical gap between the underlying data and Rybicki's conclusions, citing methodological flaws. With the expert testimony excluded, the court held that Ruffin could not establish causation and granted summary judgment in favor of BP. Ruffin then appealed the decision. BP argued that Dr. Rybicki's testimony should be excluded because it is insufficient to establish general causation. To prove general causation, Ruffin must present expert evidence showing that the chemicals he was exposed to are capable of causing prostate cancer in the general population. The Fifth Circuit held that, to establish general causation, an expert must reliably opine that the chemical at issue can cause the disease at exposure levels humans could realistically experience, though a precise numerical dose is not always required. Applying that standard, the court concluded that Rybicki’s testimony was not inadmissible simply because it lacked a quantified exposure level. His opinion that PAHs can cause prostate cancer in humans, if otherwise reliable, could satisfy general causation requirements, meaning the testimony was not categorically irrelevant. The Fifth Circuit declined to adopt BP's proposed requirement of a quantitative dose threshold but still held that Ruffin failed to establish general causation. It explained that under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), expert testimony may be excluded when there is too great an analytical gap between the underlying data and the expert’s conclusions. The Fifth Circuit found that Dr. Rybicki's opinion was unsupported because his conclusion that PAHs cause prostate cancer was not backed by his own analysis. His reliance on studies involving PAHs generally, rather than specifically benzo(a)pyrene, did not show that PAHs cause prostate cancer in the general population. In fact, the only PAH he identified as carcinogenic, benzo(a)pyrene, lacked a strong link to prostate cancer. Therefore, his testimony was properly excluded and could not establish general causation, affirming the district court's ruling. Without Dr. Rybicki's testimony, Ruffin could not establish general causation. The Fifth Circuit noted that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that a failure of proof on an essential element renders other facts irrelevant. Because Ruffin lacked admissible expert evidence on causation, the district court properly granted summary judgment for BP. The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed both the exclusion of Rybicki's testimony and the entry of summary judgment in BP's favor. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/ZtE8H99Xc EAST CHICAGO, IN: Firefighters Judgment Reversed for Lack of Notice ------------------------------------------------------------------- The Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case, East Chicago Professional Firefighters Local 365, and David Mata, Jr., President of the East Chicago Professional Firefighters Local 365, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. City of East Chicago; Anthony Copeland, Mayor of the City of East Chicago; and Damon Carpenter, Chief of the East Chicago Fire Department, Appellees-Defendants, Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-1609 (Ind. App.), holding that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to provide required notice to the Rule 23(B)(3) class before entering final judgment. East Chicago Professional Firefighters Local 365, and David Mata, Jr., President of the East Chicago Professional Firefighters Local 365 (collectively The Firefighters) filed a two-count Class Action Complaint For Declaratory Judgment against the City of East Chicago, a municipal corporation, Mayor of the City of East Chicago Anthony Copeland, and Chief of the East Chicago Fire Department Damon Carpenter (collectively East Chicago). The Firefighters appeal from the court's order resolving issues concerning compensation for time off-duty that The Firefighters alleged was denied them by East Chicago. The dispositive issue presented in this appeal is as follows: whether the trial court's failure to carry out its role in the statutory procedure for the provision of notice to the members of the class of the class action and their options as members of the class amounts to reversible error. On March 7, 2022, the Firefighters filed a two-count complaint against the City of East Chicago seeking declaratory relief. The first count asked the court to interpret Indiana Code Section 36-8-4-9(a), which requires firefighters to receive 24 hours off duty every eight days. The second count sought a declaration regarding Local Ordinance 20-0020 providing firefighters with 144 hours of off-duty time in 2021. The Firefighters sought a declaration that the statute and ordinance required East Chicago to provide the mandated off-duty time and that the City had failed to comply during the relevant periods of December 2019 to April 3, 2022, for the statutory claim, and calendar year 2021 for the ordinance claim. The group consisted of 84 current and former firefighters, who moved for class certification on June 23, 2022. The trial court noted that no separate class certification petition was filed under Indiana Trial Rule 23(A) and (B), and no class representative was identified in the complaint, but it nevertheless set the matter for a hearing under Trial Rule 23(C), which was held on June 23, 2022. In its July 29 order, the trial court held that Trial Rule 23(B)(3) applied and certified two damages classes: (1) firefighters employed by East Chicago from December 7, 2019 to the present, and (2) firefighters employed during the 2021 calendar year. The court also appointed David Mata, Jr. as the class representative. The trial court defined the certified issue as whether East Chicago caused injury to the Firefighters (Classes A and B) through its alleged violations of Indiana Code Section 36-8-4-9 et seq. and City of East Chicago Local Ordinance 20-0020, based on the December 7, 2019 shift schedule change. The court later held a hearing on the Firefighters’ Section 8 Petition seeking compensatory damages based on the prior declaratory judgment for the statutory claim, expressly noting that injunctive relief was not being sought. The Firefighters also submitted damages calculations and requested that the court lift its stay on the ordinance claim, which had been paused due to related litigation that had since been resolved. During the Section 8 hearing, East Chicago proposed that the court craft an equitable remedy for firefighters who were still employed, while the Firefighters argued that monetary damages were the proper legal remedy. In its May 23, 2025 order, the court addressed both claims. For the ordinance claim, it held that for 2021 the Firefighters were entitled to six reduction days totaling 144 hours. On the statutory claim, the court found the Firefighters proved injury through loss of time off but concluded that treating the loss solely as wages did not capture broader harms such as missed family, work, and personal obligations. It ultimately found the Section 8 petition insufficient as presented. Noting the absence of a statutory penalty provision, the court instead fashioned an equitable remedy, declared its order final, and retained jurisdiction to resolve disputes over amounts owed and enforce relief. It also denied prejudgment interest under the Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute. The Firefighters filed a motion to correct error, arguing for the first time that the trial court entered final judgment affecting a Rule 23(B)(3) class without providing the required notice and opt-out procedures under Trial Rule 23(C)(2). The trial court denied the motion without addressing the notice issue, and the Firefighters appealed seeking vacatur of the judgment on that basis. On appeal, the City did not dispute that formal class notice was not given, but argued the issue was waived because it was not properly raised earlier, that notice was discretionary because no separate class certification petition was filed, and that the class was otherwise adequately represented and effectively present at hearings. The Court of Appeals held that the Firefighters did not waive the class notice issue by raising it in a Trial Rule 59 motion to correct error. It concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to provide the required notice to identifiable members of the Rule 23(B)(3) class. The Court of Appeals explained that notice was mandatory under the rule and should have been directed to class members who could be identified through reasonable effort. It also noted the Firefighters raised the issue at the first practical opportunity after the final judgment was entered without a trial or evidentiary hearing. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings and declined to address the remaining issues. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Decision is available at https://lnk.ua/WgBgIa9Zv. Roy P. Amatore -- roy@amatorebushing.com -- Shaun R. Bushing -- shaun@amatorebushing.com -- Amatore & Bushing, Chicago, Illinois, R. Alex Mendoza, Alex Mendoza Law, LLC -- info@alexmendozalaw.com -- Hammond, Indiana, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS. Michael E. Tolbert -- mtolbert@tolbertlegal.com -- Shelice R. Tolbert -- stolbert@tolbertlegal.com -- Samuel E. Brown -- sbrown@tolbertlegal.com -- Anindita K. Guha -- aguha@tolbertlegal.com -- Tolbert & Tolbert, LLC, Gary, Indiana, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES. GAP INC: 2nd Cir. Affirms Smith Securities Class Suit Dismissal --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MICHAEL SMITH, JEFFREY WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE GAP, INC., SONIA SYNGAL, KATRINA O'CONNELL, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 25-1130 (2d Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety. Gap, which operates the Old Navy brand with more than 1,200 stores worldwide, launched its BODEQUALITY initiative in August 2021 to expand plus-size clothing options in stores. The company later overestimated demand, leading to excess inventory that had to be sold at steep discounts. In early 2022, Gap scaled back its in-store plus-size offerings, and in May 2022 it disclosed that its first-quarter financial results had been negatively affected by missteps related to the BODEQUALITY rollout. On December 5, 2022, plaintiffs filed a putative securities class action on behalf of investors who purchased Gap stock between November 24, 2021, and July 11, 2022. They alleged violations of Section 10(b) and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, claiming that Gap and two senior executives made false or misleading statements about the company’s BODEQUALITY initiative. Specifically, they asserted that defendants failed to disclose known issues with the initiative in risk disclosures, earnings calls, and press releases issued between November 2021 and March 2022. On March 31, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint in its entirety under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead any false or misleading statements or scienter. Because the complaint did not allege a primary securities violation, the court also dismissed the remaining Section 20(a) control person claim. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the Plaintiffs failed to plead any actionable false or misleading statements and did not adequately allege scienter. It found that Gap's risk disclosures were too general to be misleading and did not suggest specific issues with BODEQUALITY in a way that would deceive a reasonable investor. It also held that statements describing demand as "strong" and expressing optimism were non-actionable puffery and consistent with available data at the time. The Second Circuit further concluded that Gap had no duty to disclose additional details about inventory issues when speaking about other aspects of its business, and that the Plaintiffs' Item 303 claim could not proceed because omissions are only actionable when they render existing statements misleading. The "core operations" theory also failed to establish scienter, as the Plaintiffs did not plausibly link BODEQUALITY to Gap's core business in a meaningful way. Because no primary securities violation was adequately pleaded, the Section 20(a) claim was also properly dismissed. For these, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/uBoJgFKZh. JONATHAN STERN -- jstern@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., New York, NY (Jacob A. Goldberg -- jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Jenkintown, PA, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. PAUL ALESSIO MEZZINA -- pmezzina@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC (Samantha J. Kavanaugh -- skavanaugh@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, Miami, FL; Israel Dahan -- idahan@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, New York, NY, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees. GARRISON INVT: Dismissal of Messer for Lack of Jurisdiction Upheld ------------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Stephanie Thacker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, TONY A. MESSER; KEVIN N. MUMPOWER; JANICE L. BOOHER; PATRICIA C. EADS; PHILIP E. BARBROW; BENJIE G. HICKS; KENDALL W. LUTTRELL; DARRELL G. MURRAY; DAVID A. STOVALL; DENNIS J. STILTNER; TIMOTHY M. WAMPLER; MICHAEL L. PARKER; CHARLES E. VESTAL; JIMMY AMBERGEY; DAVE S. BOOHER; LARRY RICHARDS, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GARRISON INVESTMENT GROUP, LP; JOSEPH B. TANSEY; STEVEN SCOTT STUART; GIG GP LLC; JTSS BORROWER LLC; JOSHUA BRANDT; JULIAN WELDON; BRIAN STEVEN CHASE; GARRISON SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES GP LLC; GARRISON COMMERCIAL FUNDING VIII LLC; GARRISON FINANCIAL ASSETS MM LLC; GARRISON SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES HOLDINGS GP LLC; BCPI ACQUISITIONS, INC; GARRISON BRISTOL LLC; GARRISON BRISTOL HOLDINGS LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 25-1657 (4th Cir.), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Appellants were employees at Bristol Compressors International, LLC's manufacturing facility in Bristol, Virginia. On July 1, 2018, BCI announced it would shut down operations by around August 31, 2018, with layoffs beginning immediately. The first terminations occurred between July 31 and August 2, 2018, and additional layoffs continued through September and November, with the facility ultimately closing around November 16, 2018. On October 19, 2018, the Appellants filed a class action lawsuit against BCI and Garrison, alleged successor and alter ego of BCI, in federal court ("Messer I"). The Appellants alleged that BCI violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 ("the Warn Act") by failing to provide adequate notice before closing the plant and that it improperly terminated an employee severance plan in violation of Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). They also named Garrison as a defendant, claiming it was jointly liable as BCI’s alter ego and successor. According to the complaint, Garrison acquired an interest in BCI and was involved in directing or participating in the plant closure and employee terminations. On that basis, the Appellants asserted that BCI and Garrison should be treated as a single employer under the WARN Act, with both entities responsible for the decisions and actions leading to the shutdown. The district court certified three subclasses of former BCI employees. After discovery, Garrison moved for summary judgment on the Appellants' WARN Act "single employer" theory, arguing it could not be held vicariously liable for BCI's actions. BCI and Garrison also filed additional summary judgment motions, including challenges to the ERISA severance claim based on alleged proper plan termination, to claims by employees who signed Stay Bonus Letter Agreements releasing employment-related claims, and to WARN Act claims by employees who received 60 days’ notice. The Appellants did not oppose Garrison's motion for summary judgment on the single employer theory. Instead, they moved to voluntarily dismiss Garrison without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), stating the dismissal would conserve resources while litigation continued against BCI and focused on WARN Act liability. Garrison opposed the Appellants' motion to dismiss it without prejudice. The district court nevertheless granted the motion, finding Garrison would not suffer sufficient legal prejudice to warrant denial. In the same order, the court addressed several summary judgment issues raised by BCI. It held that BCI's severance plan qualified as an ERISA-governed employee welfare plan but concluded there was no ERISA violation and granted BCI partial summary judgment on that claim. The court also granted summary judgment to BCI on the claims of employees who signed Stay Bonus Letter Agreements, and on WARN Act claims brought by employees who received the required 60 days' notice of the plant closure. After Garrison was dismissed and BCI's partial summary judgment motions were granted, the district court conducted a bench trial on the remaining WARN Act claims. BCI did not appear, and the court found it liable for violating the WARN Act, entering judgment for $1,392,915.40. The Appellants appealed the adverse portions of the summary judgment rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, upholding summary judgment on claims released through Stay Bonus Letter Agreements but vacating rulings on the ERISA severance plan and remaining WARN Act issues. It held the severance plan was governed by ERISA and that BCI failed to properly terminate it under its own procedures. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the Appellants on the ERISA and WARN Act claims after BCI again failed to respond. It awarded an additional $2,407,471.90 in damages plus $277,717.81 in attorneys' fees and costs, bringing the total judgment against BCI to $4,078,105.11. Because they have been unable to collect on the judgment against the now-insolvent and dissolved BCI, the Appellants filed a new action in August 2024 seeking to hold Garrison and 14 additional individuals and entities liable for the Messer I judgment under alter ego and veil-piercing theories. They characterize the suit as a continuation of Messer I for judgment enforcement, alleging the Appellees exercised control over BCI's liquidation and improperly failed to satisfy WARN Act and ERISA obligations. They assert federal jurisdiction under ERISA and the WARN Act and seek to recover the full prior judgment of $4,078,105.11, plus interest, fees, and additional relief, including WARN Act backpay and related obligations. The Appellants contend that federal common law and veil-piercing doctrines permit imposing derivative liability on the Appellees for BCI's obligations. The Appellees moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) and also argued the claims were time-barred under ERISA and the WARN Act. The district court granted the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, explaining that although the Appellants relied on the WARN Act and ERISA, the suit effectively sought to impose liability on Garrison for a prior judgment against BCI, despite Garrison never being found liable in Messer I. Relying on Peacock v. Thomas, the court held that federal courts lack ancillary jurisdiction over a new action seeking to hold a non-liable party responsible for an existing money judgment. The court also noted that even if jurisdiction existed, the claims would be untimely under the applicable statutes of limitations. The Appellants appealed both rulings. Judge Thacker opined that the district court was correct to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, she affirmed. She explained that there are two relevant avenues that could provide federal jurisdiction over this lawsuit. The first is 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 which provides federal question jurisdiction. And the second is federal common law ancillary jurisdiction. She said both avenues failed to establish jurisdiction. On federal question jurisdiction, Judge Thacker found no independent ERISA basis because the Appellants were not alleging new ERISA violations and ERISA does not create a standalone cause of action for piercing the corporate veil. As to the WARN Act, she concluded the Appellants also alleged no new statutory violations and were instead attempting to enforce the Messer I judgment against Garrison through veil-piercing theories, which would improperly expand WARN Act liability beyond established limits. She further clarified that the case was not about new ERISA or WARN Act claims, but an effort to impose liability for the prior judgment against BCI, which does not confer federal question jurisdiction. On the issue of ancillary jurisdiction, Judge Thacker held that the Fourth Circuit could not exercise jurisdiction over the case. She explained that where there are no independent ERISA or WARN Act violations supporting federal question jurisdiction, the court must consider whether ancillary jurisdiction can apply, and concluded it cannot. She emphasized that jurisdiction from the original Messer I case does not extend to a new, separate action, even if the goal is to enforce that prior federal judgment. Because BCI was the only party found liable in the original case, and Garrison was not, the court lacked jurisdiction to impose liability on Garrison through ancillary jurisdiction. In sum, because the Appellants' suit is based exclusively on veil piercing and does not allege any new or additional ERISA or WARN Act violations, and because their voluntary dismissal of Garrison from Messer I resulted in a judgment against BCI only, the district court correctly held that it lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction in this action. As the Appellees' counsel aptly stated at oral argument, this is not a case of Garrison not being willing to face the music. It's a case of the Plaintiffs not doing their job. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Thacker affirmed the judgment of the district court. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/UhOhtwq57. Mary Lynn Tate -- mltate@tatelaw.com -- TATE LAW P.C., Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellants. Mark Hunter Churchill -- Mark.Churchill@hklaw.com -- HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, Tysons, Virginia, for Appellees MCMENAMINS INC: Wage Claim Summary Judgment in Patrick Reversed --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, John PATRICK, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. McMENAMINS, INC., a domestic corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. A182444 (Or. App.), the Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment for the Plaintiff and denying summary judgment for the Defendant on the minimum-wage claim. The Plaintiff worked as a server at McMenamins Edgefield. He was an at-will employee with an agreed rate of pay of $16.00 per hour. On March 17, 2020, the Defendant temporarily closed most of its properties due to the COVID-19pandemic. Its employees' next regular payday was Friday, March 27, 2020. The Defendant lacked adequate funds to cover its payroll obligations and, on March 26, informed employees that their paychecks would be delayed until the following week. On Wednesday, April 1, 2020, after receiving cash from its owners, defendant paid its employees, including plaintiff, all their wages earned in the prior pay period. Plaintiff subsequently brought this class action against the Defendant, asserting two wage claims in the alternative. Only the second claim is at issue on appeal. In that claim, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant violated the minimum-wage law, ORS 653.025, by not paying its employees their earned wages on their regular payday, March 27, 2020, and instead paying them five calendar days later on April 1, 2020. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Based on its construction of the relevant statutes, the trial court granted summary judgment for the Plaintiff on the minimum-wage claim, denied summary judgment for the Defendant on that claim, and awarded penalty wages. The Defendant appeals. It assigns error to the trial court's summary judgment rulings on the minimum-wage claim, arguing that the court misconstrued the applicable statutes in concluding that the late payment of wages in March 2020 constituted a minimum-wage violation. The Plaintiff maintains that the trial court correctly construed the statutes. The Court of Appeals concludes that the Defendant did not "employ or agree to employ" the Plaintiff at wages computed at a rate lower than the minimum wage, and therefore did not violate the minimum-wage statute as a matter of law. The Defendant employed the Plaintiff to work for $16.00 per hour, and at no point were his wages computed at a rate lower than that. The legislature intended the minimum-wage law to serve a different purpose from the laws relating to timing of wage payment, and it drafted ORS 653.025 accordingly. Any remedy for late payment of wages computed at a rate above the minimum wage lies in the statutes addressing the timing of wage payment, not the minimum-wage statute. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in the Defendant's favor on the Plaintiff's second claim. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/vGVXiwkJE. Misha Isaak -- misha.isaak@stoel.com -- argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs were John B. Dudrey -- john.dudrey@stoel.com -- J. Alexander Bish -- alexander.bish@stoel.com -- and Stoel Rives LLP. Nadia H. Dahab -- nadia@sugermandahab.com -- argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Stephanie J. Brown -- sbrown@wageclaim.org -- Karen Moore -- kmoore@wageclaim.org -- and Shuck Law, LLC, Washington. NEW YORK: Reversal of FLSA Judgment in Andersen Class Suit Affirmed ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, In the Matter of Danny Andersen, et al., & c., Appellants, v. Michael P. Hein, & c., Respondent, et al., Respondents, Case No. 42 (N.Y. App.), Judge Anthony Cannataro of the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the order of the Appellate Division unanimously reversing the Supreme Court's grant of judgment to the Petitioners on their Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim. Congress allows states to provide interim public assistance to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applicants while they wait for eligibility determinations and to later seek reimbursement from retroactive federal SSI benefits under 42 U.S.C. Section 1383(g). In this case, the Petitioners received New York interim assistance that was tied to required work activities and paid at the minimum wage level. The issue is whether New York's practice of seeking federal reimbursement for that assistance violates the FLSA by effectively reducing the value of the workers' labor. While their SSI applications were pending, the Petitioners received New York Safety Net Assistance (SNA) as interim support and were required to participate in Work Experience Programs (WEPs). After their SSI applications were approved, the Social Security Administration issued retroactive benefits to the county agencies, which used those funds to reimburse New York for the assistance previously provided and distributed any remaining amounts to the Petitioners. After an unsuccessful administrative challenge, the Petitioners commenced a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and putative class action, arguing that New York's practice of recouping Safety Net Assistance from retroactive SSI benefits unlawfully deprived Work Experience Program participants of wages in violation of the FLSA and Matter of Carver v State of New York, 26 NY3d 272, 275-276 [2015]. The State countered that federal law expressly permits reimbursement for interim assistance and that allowing the Petitioners to retain both benefits would result in a windfall. The Supreme Court granted judgment to the Petitioners on their FLSA claim, holding that the interim assistance reimbursement process must account for the value of WEP labor. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, finding that the Petitioners received and retained the equivalent of minimum wage through interim assistance and that reimbursement merely reduced their retroactive SSI awards to prevent duplicate recovery for the same period. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. On appeal, the Respondents argued solely that the FLSA was inapplicable because WEP participants do not qualify as "employees" under the statute, and therefore Carver did not control. The question presented is whether New York's practice of obtaining federal reimbursement for interim assistance under 42 U.S.C. Section 1383(g) violates the FLSA by effectively depriving WEP participants of the value of their labor. Judge Cannataro answered the question in the negative. He opined that the funds in dispute were included in the Petitioners' retroactive federal benefits award with the understanding that they would ultimately be paid to the State as compensation for its interim assistance. Because they received both the minimum wage for their work and all other amounts they are entitled to under federal law to satisfy their basic needs, reimbursement did not result in any cognizable loss to them. Applying the economic reality test, Judge Cannataro agreed with the Appellate Division that Carver was an employee under the FLSA and entitled to minimum wage for his labor. Because the Respondents offered no other basis to overturn the prior ruling, he affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. He also noted that although the Court of Appeals in Carver referenced the broader issue of whether the State could recoup funds in a way that reduced the practical value of wages, it did not directly decide the legality of the reimbursement practice. Accordingly, the Appellate Division's order was affirmed without costs. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/EUnCmqZcC. Saima Akhtar -- akhtar@nclej.org -- for appellants. Kate H. Nepveu -- Kate.Nepveu@ag.ny.gov -- for respondent Michael P. Hein. The Legal Aid Society et al., amici curiae. PATERSON, NJ: Class Certification in Evans Wage & Hour Suit Upheld ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, ADRIAN EVANS and KENNETH HICKS, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. CITY OF PATERSON, PATERSON FIRE DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellant, Docket No. A-1218-25 (N.J. Super. App. Div.), the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the class certification order and the order denying the City's motion for reconsideration. The City appealed from a Law Division order certifying a class of firefighters under Rule 4:32-1 in a wage and hour dispute brought by firefighters on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees. The City also challenged the trial court’s denial of its motion for reconsideration. The Plaintiffs were City firefighters assigned to the Paterson Fire Division and members of the Paterson Firefighters Association, which negotiated collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") with the City covering employment terms for the periods July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2019, and July 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023. On July 17, 2023, the Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that provisions of the collective bargaining agreement violated their rights under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("NJWHL"), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1 to -56a41. They argued the agreement allowed the City to pay overtime in a manner that did not comply with statutory requirements, and that firefighters regularly worked more than forty hours per week without receiving the required overtime compensation. The putative class was defined as "all individuals employed by the City whose primary responsibility was to perform firefighting duties, including those with titles 'firefighter, captain and battalion chief' from July 2017 through the present." On September 26, 2023, the City of Paterson moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to compel arbitration under the CBA, as well as for failure to state a claim under the NJWHL. The Plaintiffs opposed, citing Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 441 (2014), and argued that the CBA expressly stated it did not waive any statutory rights or benefits. They also contended their NJWHL claims raised legal issues that needed to be decided by the court, not an arbitrator. The trial court granted the City's motion and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded, finding the Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. After remand, the City filed its answer and asserted affirmative defenses on February 27, 2025. In August 2025, the Plaintiffs moved for class certification and the City opposed. Following oral argument, the trial court granted the Plaintiffs' motion and defined the class as follows: "All individuals employed by Defendant, City of Paterson, whose primary responsibility was to perform firefighting duties, including all individuals with the title firefighter, captain and battalion chief, from July 2017 through to the present." The trial court appointed Evans and Hicks as the class representatives and granted class certification under Rule 4:32-1(a), finding the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy satisfied. It relied in part on the City's failure to respond to requests for admissions and on shared employment conditions among firefighters. The court later denied the City's motion for reconsideration, reaffirming its ruling and declining to consider arguments raised for the first time in the City's reply brief. On appeal, the City argued that class certification was premature, the class was improperly defined, and the Plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of Rule 4:32-1(a), as well as predominance and superiority under Rule 4:32-1(b). The Superior Court rejected the City's arguments and affirmed the class certification order. It held that the Firefighters' NJWHL claims arising under the CBA were sufficient on their face to satisfy Rule 4:32-1, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in defining the class based on the pleadings and record. The Court further found that numerosity was met with approximately 40 firefighters, and that commonality, typicality, and adequacy were properly established given the shared employment conditions and alleged overtime violations. It also held that the requirements of Rule 4:32-1(b), including predominance and superiority, were supported by the record. Any remaining arguments raised by the City were deemed without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/n27ldRqpt. Taylor Law Group LLC, attorneys for appellant (Christopher J. Buggy -- cbuggy@taylorlawgroupllc.com -- and Jeremy C. Washington -- jwashington@taylorlawgroupllc.com -- on the briefs). Sattiraju & Tharney, LLP, attorneys for respondents (Ravi Sattiraju -- rsattiraju@s-tlawfirm.com -- of counsel and on the brief; Brendan P. McCarthy -- bmccarthy@s-tlawfirm.com -- on the brief). SPIRIT AIRLINES: Smidga Dismissal Upheld, Modified to w/o Prejudice ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MALINDA A. SMIDGA, KAYLA MANDENG, FRANCES CURD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC., Case No. 24-1757 (3d Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order granting Spirit's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but modified the order to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice. The Appellants filed a putative class action against Spirit Airlines alleging that the company used third-party Session Replay Code (SRC) on its website to secretly record and intercept users' online activity. The named Plaintiffs, from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and California, visited Spirit's website to search for flights, and Mandeng also purchased tickets and entered personal information for herself and her children. They alleged in their First Consolidated Amended Complaint that Spirit's SRC tracked user interactions in real time without disclosure, including keystrokes, mouse movements, and geolocation data. They brought claims for (i) violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act; (ii) invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion in violation of Pennsylvania law; (iii) violation of the Maryland Wiretap Act; (iv) invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion in violation of Maryland law; (v) violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act; (vi) violation of California's statutory larceny provision; (vii) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law; (viii) trespass to chattels; and (ix) conversion of chattels. Spirit moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing lack of standing. It submitted a declaration from its Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer disputing the allegations, stating that Spirit had never enabled the software features capable of collecting personal data and that any data collected could not be linked to individual users. The district court dismissed the complaint with leave to seek jurisdictional discovery and amend the complaint, but the Appellants did not do so. The court then dismissed the case with prejudice, leading to this appeal. The Third Circuit held that its decision in Cook v. GameStop, Inc. controlled the case and defeated the Appellants' standing argument. In that case, it found that the use of Session Replay Code to collect website interaction data did not amount to a concrete injury. Here, the Third Circuit concluded the Appellants failed to show a concrete injury required for Article III standing. It found that the alleged harms did not closely match traditional privacy torts like disclosure of private information or intrusion upon seclusion, and the pleadings did not show any unauthorized disclosure of personal data. The Court also noted that any alleged privacy invasion was undermined where websites do not expressly promise not to collect user data. The Third Circuit further held that the Appellants did not seek jurisdictional discovery after Spirit submitted evidence challenging their allegations, and the district court properly relied on Spirit’s declaration in finding a lack of standing. However, because dismissals for lack of Article III standing must generally be without prejudice, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal but modified it to be without prejudice. For the foregoing reasons, the Third Circuit affirmed as modified the District Court's dismissal of the First Amended Consolidated Complaint. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/Db6Fx0muQ STRATEGIC EDUCATION: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Hooks Says -------------------------------------------------------------- TAMESHIA HOOKS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. STRATEGIC EDUCATION, INC., Case No. 1:26-cv-01550-AJT-WEF (E.D. Va., June 4, 2026) arises from the Defendant's failure to protect highly sensitive data. According to the complaint, the Defendant stores a litany of highly sensitive personal identifiable information (PII) about its current and former students. But Defendant lost control over that data 1Our Offerings when cybercriminals infiltrated its insufficiently protected computer systems in a data breach. On or around May 29, 2026, the Defendant began notifying state government officials about the Data Breach and sending breach notices to the victims affected. The Defendant had no effective means to prevent, detect, stop, or mitigate breaches of its systems -- thereby allowing cybercriminals unrestricted access to its current and former students' PII, says the suit. The Plaintiff is a Data Breach victim, and she brings this class action on behalf of herself, and all others harmed by Defendant's misconduct. The Defendant is a private education company that owns and operates several schools and education platforms including Strayer University and Capella University.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ramon Rodriguez, III, Esq. SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP 11 South 12th Street Richmond, VA 23219 Telephone: (509) 822-2463 E-mail: rrodriguez@sirillp.com - and - Tyler J. Bean, Esq. Kennedy M. Brian, Esq. SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP 101 Park Avenue Suite 1300 - No. 16982799 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 Telephone: (212) 532-1091 E-mail: tbean@sirillp.com kbrian@sirillp.com - and - Leanna A. Loginov, Esq. SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A. 14 NE 1st Ave, Suite 705 Miami, FL 33132 Telephone: (305) 475-2299 E-mail: lloginov@shamisgentile.com STRATEGIC EDUCATION: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Hooks Says -------------------------------------------------------------- TAMESHIA HOOKS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. STRATEGIC EDUCATION, INC., Case No. 1:26-cv-01550-AJT-WEF (E.D. Va., June 4, 2026) arises from the Defendant's failure to protect highly sensitive data. According to the complaint, the Defendant stores a litany of highly sensitive personal identifiable information (PII) about its current and former students. But Defendant lost control over that data 1Our Offerings when cybercriminals infiltrated its insufficiently protected computer systems in a data breach. On or around May 29, 2026, the Defendant began notifying state government officials about the Data Breach and sending breach notices to the victims affected. The Defendant had no effective means to prevent, detect, stop, or mitigate breaches of its systems -- thereby allowing cybercriminals unrestricted access to its current and former students' PII. The Plaintiff is a Data Breach victim, and she brings this class action on behalf of herself, and all others harmed by Defendant's misconduct. The Defendant is a private education company that owns and operates several schools and education platforms including Strayer University and Capella University.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ramon Rodriguez, III, Esq. SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP 11 South 12th Street Richmond, VA 23219 Telephone: (509) 822-2463 E-mail: rrodriguez@sirillp.com - and - Tyler J. Bean, Esq. Kennedy M. Brian, Esq. SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP 101 Park Avenue Suite 1300 - No. 16982799 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 Telephone: (212) 532-1091 E-mail: tbean@sirillp.com kbrian@sirillp.com - and - Leanna A. Loginov, Esq. SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A. 14 NE 1st Ave, Suite 705 Miami, FL 33132 Telephone: (305) 475-2299 E-mail: lloginov@shamisgentile.com TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Class Certification Denial in Guthrie Affirmed ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, BRIAN GUTHRIE, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. A171526 (Cal. App.), the U.S. Court of Appeals of California for the First District, Division One, affirmed the order denying the Appellants' motion for class certification of certain claims in their action against Transamerica. In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege Transamerica violated all three prongs of the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 17200 et seq. (UCL))—unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practices—in connection with its sale of a life insurance product referred to as "Trendsetter LB." They sought class certification of claims based solely on common language in the policy. On appeal, the Plaintiffs complain the trial court relied on improper criteria and erroneous legal assumptions in denying certification. Transamerica later introduced a second product in its Trendsetter series, Trendsetter LB, beginning in 2012. Like Trendsetter Super, it provides a fixed death benefit and an accelerated death benefit for terminal illness, but it also adds accelerated benefits for qualifying chronic and critical illnesses. These additional benefits are bundled into the policy through one endorsement and two riders. Trendsetter LB is sold at a single premium rate, with only potential administrative fees if accelerated benefits are used. Policyholders may also purchase optional add-on riders for additional cost, though the Plaintiffs declined these options. Each policy includes customized "policy data pages" at the start of the contract for individual owners. The Plaintiffs filed a class action in May 2021 on behalf of California policyholders who purchased Transamerica's Trendsetter LB policies. They later filed a first amended complaint, which is the operative pleading. They allege that Transamerica improperly bundled the cost of the Trendsetter LB policy's accelerated death benefit riders into a single premium without disclosing their separate cost or informing consumers that a lower-priced Trendsetter Super policy with fewer benefits was available. They contend this omission violated the Insurance Code, undermined California's 30-day free-look statute, and constituted unlawful, unfair, and deceptive conduct under the UCL. As relief, they seek restitution based on either the portion of the premium attributable to the riders or the difference between the Trendsetter LB premium and the cost of a comparable Trendsetter Super policy. In essence, their damages theory treats the added benefits in Trendsetter LB as if they were free, arguing consumers were misled into believing they were paying the same price as a lower-coverage policy while receiving additional coverage at no extra cost. The Plaintiffs moved for class certification, seeking to represent "all persons in the state of California who, from May 11, 2017 through the date the Class is certified, paid for, were issued, and did not cancel within 30 days after receipt a Transamerica Trendsetter LB individual term life insurance policy." In opposition to the motion for class certification, Transamerica argued that the Plaintiffs' claims were not appropriate for class treatment because they would require individualized inquiries into what information Transamerica and its agents or brokers provided to each policyholder. It also maintained that the policy language at issue was accurate and not misleading. The trial court found the proposed class sufficiently numerous and ascertainable based on Transamerica's records but largely denied class certification. It concluded that the Plaintiffs' UCL claims based on alleged concealment, misrepresentation, and violations of Insurance Code sections 330–332 would require individualized inquiries into the information each policyholder received, including marketing materials and communications from agents, defeating predominance. Although the court initially certified claims under Insurance Code section 10127.9 concerning the required free-look notice, it later withdrew that certification after the Plaintiffs acknowledged they did not intend to pursue such a claim, resulting in a complete denial of class certification. The following month, the Plaintiffs filed an ex parte request seeking clarification that their certified UCL claims under Insurance Code section 10127.9 also included allegations that misrepresentations in the Trendsetter LB policy language prevented policyholders from understanding the true terms of their coverage, thereby violating the purpose and intent of the free look statute. Transamerica opposed the request, arguing that the trial court had already made clear it declined to certify any claims based on alleged concealment or misrepresentation regarding how the Trendsetter LB policies were priced. The trial court clarified that its certification of the Plaintiffs' UCL claims under Insurance Code section 10127.9 was limited to whether Transamerica had a policy or practice of failing to provide the required statutory notice. The Plaintiffs then filed a second ex parte request seeking to amend the order to deny class certification entirely, stating that the only certified claim—failure to provide the required notice—was not one they had pleaded in good faith. The court granted the request and amended its ruling, ultimately denying class certification in full based on its prior orders and the Plaintiffs' representation that they did not intend to pursue a claim for failure to provide the statutory notice. On appeal, the Plaintiffs complained the trial court relied on improper criteria and erroneous legal assumptions in denying certification. The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the denial of class certification. It explained that, when considered in the context of the Trendsetter LB policy as a whole, the data page language on which the Plaintiffs relied was facially ambiguous. Because resolving the Plaintiffs' claims would require consideration of evidence beyond the policy language itself, the trial court reasonably concluded that individualized issues would predominate. The Third Circuit added that, even if it did not directly address the Plaintiffs' contention that the language was unambiguous, it would still conclude that the denial of class certification was proper. The Third Circuit also rejected the Plaintiffs' argument that the policy's integration and modification clauses barred consideration of extrinsic evidence. It explained that an integration clause does not prevent a court from considering outside evidence to interpret contract terms. Nor would reviewing communications with policyholders to evaluate alleged misrepresentations or omissions under the UCL alter the terms of the policy. Accordingly, the court concluded that the integration and modification provisions did not support class certification. Hence, the judgment is affirmed. Transamerica is entitled to its costs on appeal. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/MyoGiCwm4 TSCHETTER SULZER: Dismissal of Woodruff Suit Reversed on Appeal --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, Courtney Woodruff, Gheri Smith, Cristobal Zambrano, Casey Hodges, Joshua Shipley, Wesley Morgan, and Shannon Copeland, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Tschetter Sulzer, P.C.; Cornerstone Apartment Services, Inc.; RedPeak Properties, LLC; Echelon Property Group, LLC; Colorado Apartment Association, Inc.; and Asset Living, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Court of Appeals No. 24CA1323 (), the Court of Appeals of Colorado, Division I, reversed the district court's judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Plaintiffs (collectively, the tenants), appeal the district court's C.R.C.P. 56(h) order and subsequent judgment dismissing their claims against landlords Cornerstone, RedPeak, Echelon and Asset Living, as well as the law firm representing the landlords, Tschetter Sulzer, and the Colorado Apartment Association, Inc. (CAA) (collectively with the landlords, the Defendants). A tenant unlawfully detains property when they remain in possession without the landlord's permission after defaulting on rent and receiving proper written notice demanding either payment or surrender of the premises. If the tenant does not cure the default within ten days of that demand, the landlord may file a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action seeking recovery of past and future rent, damages, costs, and any other relief allowed by law. In 2021, the General Assembly expanded the cure period for tenants who fall behind on rent by allowing them to bring their account current even after a FED action is filed, as long as they do so before the court enters a judgment for possession in the landlord's favor. This appeal focuses on what financial requirements, if any, a landlord may impose on a tenant who attempts to cure the default during the period between the filing of the FED action and the entry of judgment. The tenants argue that, based on a statutory ban on one-way fee-shifting provisions in residential leases, landlords were prohibited from requiring payment of attorney’s fees incurred in a FED action as a condition of curing a rent default during the 2021–2023 period. The Defendants counter that nothing in the governing statutes during that time barred landlords from recovering those attorney's fees as part of a tenant's cure of the default in an FED proceeding. Before August 7, 2023, each tenant entered into a residential lease containing a "Statutory Right to Cure" provision drafted using a standard form. That provision required tenants to pay the landlord's attorney fees if they defaulted on rent, an FED action was filed, and the tenant later exercised the statutory right to cure. The leases did not include any reciprocal obligation for landlords to pay the tenant's attorney fees during the cure process. When the tenants later fell behind on rent, they received statutory notices giving them ten days to pay or vacate, and the notices also stated that attorney's fees and court costs would be added if an eviction lawsuit was filed, with estimated fees between $300 and $500. None of the tenants cured within the notice period, and the landlords filed FED actions. The cases were later resolved either by cure or stipulation, but in each instance the landlords added attorney’s fees from the FED filings to the tenants' accounts, leaving some tenants still in arrears unless those fees were also paid. The tenants filed a putative class action alleging that the defendants unlawfully collected attorney's fees in multiple ways: by charging fees without a court order, by relying on notices served through posting rather than personal service, by assessing fees even after tenants cured their defaults, and by collecting fees when cases were resolved through stipulation agreements. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and also asserted claims for civil theft, deceptive trade practices, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. Before discovery or class certification, the district court addressed the core legal issue: whether Colorado law permitted landlords, prior to August 2023, to collect attorney's fees incurred in filing a FED action when tenants agreed in their leases to pay those fees as part of curing a default. The court held that the landlords' practice was lawful under the statutes in effect at the time the leases were executed. It reasoned that statutory provisions barring one-way fee-shifting clauses and limiting attorney's fees in FED actions did not apply where there was no prevailing party because the cases were resolved without trial. It also relied on the cure statute, which requires tenants to pay "all amounts due according to the notice" before judgment, interpreting that language to include attorney's fees listed in the notice as part of the cure amount. The tenants sought reconsideration of the district court's ruling and filed a second amended complaint, but the court denied reconsideration and dismissed the entire action, reaffirming its conclusion that the landlords' attorney-fee practices were lawful under the applicable statutes. The tenants appealed, and the Court of Appeals noted that the only issues it needed to decide were whether the district court correctly determined the practices were legal and whether dismissal of the complaint was proper based on that determination. The district court interpreted sections 38-12-801(3)(a)(II), 13-40-123, and 13-40-115(4) together to mean that, between 2021 and 2023, landlords could recover attorney's fees incurred in filing an FED action when tenants had agreed in their leases to pay those fees as part of curing a default. The Court of Appeals rejected the district court’s interpretation of the governing statutes. It held that the lease "fees provision" violated section 38-12-801(3)(a)(II) because it appeared in a rental agreement and improperly shifted landlords' attorney's fees to tenants without any reciprocal obligation, rendering the provision unenforceable. As a result, there was no valid contractual basis for attorney’s fees, and the landlords could not recover them under section 13-40-123. The Court of Appeals further held that section 13-40-115(4) did not authorize landlords to collect attorney's fees simply because they were included in the notice accompanying the FED process. It also addressed the litigation privilege, concluding that while some of the law firm's alleged conduct may be protected, the issue could not be resolved as a matter of law on the existing record and required further factual development. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for proceedings. After the district court entered and affirmed a Rule 56(h) order, Tschetter Sulzer moved for judgment on the pleadings and the remaining defendants sought dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). The district court relied on its earlier ruling that the landlords’ practices were lawful and dismissed the tenants' claims. The Court of Appeals rejected that legal conclusion reversed the judgment of dismissal as to all Defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its Opinion. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://lnk.ua/CFQkE2YC3. Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C., Ty Gee -- tgee@hmflaw.com -- Jacob McMahon -- jmcmahon@hmflaw.com -- Denver, Colorado; Carol Kennedy -- carol.kennedy@wilsonelser.com -- Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, John M. Palmeri -- jpalmeri@grsm.com -- John R. Mann -- jmann@grsm.com -- Tamara A. Seelman -- tseelman@grsm.com -- Rose Zetzman -- rzetzman@grsm.com -- Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Tschetter Sulzer, P.C. Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Frederick J. Baumann -- Fred.Baumann@wbd-us.com -- Angela M. Vichick -- Angela.Vichick@wbd-us.com -- Joseph Hykan -- Joe.Hykan@wbd-us.com -- Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Cornerstone Apartment Services, Inc. Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Timothy M. Reynolds -- timothy.reynolds@bclplaw.com -- Marcia M. Levitan-Haffar -- marcia.levitanhaffar@bclplaw.com -- Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee RedPeak Properties, LLC. Clark Hill PLC, Stefanie Mann Chadha -- smann@clarkhill.com -- Claire E. Wells Hanson -- chanson@clarkhill.com -- Darren B. Kaplan -- dkaplan@clarkhill.com -- Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Echelon Property Group, LLC, and Asset Living, LLC Greenberg Traurig LLP, Naomi Beer -- beern@gtlaw.com -- H. Camille Papini-Chapla -- papinichaplac@gtlaw.com -- Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellee Colorado Apartment Association, Inc. Spencer R. Bailey -- spencer.bailey@cedproject.org -- Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae CED Law. UNITED STATES: Violates Rehabilitation Act, Panian Suit Alleges --------------------------------------------------------------- KIMBERLY PANIAN and HOI YEE BAXTER v. TODD W. BLANCHE, in his official capacity as Acting Attorney General of the United States, Case No. 1:26-cv-01537-PTG-WEF (E.D. Va., June 3, 2026) is a class action brought by the Plaintiffs and those similarly situated seeking to enjoin unlawful Policy and Practice and to vindicate the Plaintiffs' rights under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act to continue to serve their country without jeopardizing their health or their lives. Accordingly, these policies and practices ensured that federal employees like Plaintiffs Kimberly Panian and Hoi Yee Baxter -- both employees of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) --could serve their country and support themselves and their families. Ms. Panian has worked for EOIR since 2018 and is currently an Attorney Advisor at the Otay Mesa Immigration Court in San Diego, California, which operates under EOIR's Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ). OCIJ oversees the administration of immigration courts nationwide and exercises administrative supervision over Immigration Judges. Ms. Panian has Type I diabetes that causes severe and rapid swings between hyper- and hypoglycemia. She also experiences severe migraines with aura that can present as strokes and cause excruciating pain, severe nausea and vomiting, sudden loss of vision and feeling in her fingers, and disorientation with slurred speech. Ms. Baxter has worked for EOIR since 2018 and is currently an Attorney Advisor for the Legal Education and Research Services Division within EOIR's Office of Policy. LERS develops and coordinates legal training and professional development for Immigration Judges, attorneys, and others within EOIR. Ms. Baxter has Stage IV lung cancer, for which she is receiving treatment, and is therefore an individual with a disability as defined in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Todd Blanche is the Acting Attorney General of the United States and is responsible for overseeing and running the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Catherine M.A. Carroll, Esq. Anashua Dutta, Esq. Louis Katz, Esq. Elena Goldstein, Esq. DEMOCRACY FORWARD FOUNDATION P.O. Box 34553 Washington, DC 20043 Telephone: (202) 448-9090 Facsimile: (202) 921-4875 E-mail: ccarroll@democracyforward.org adutta@democracyforward.org lkatz@democracyforward.org egoldstein@democracyforward.org - and - Heidi Burakiewicz, Esq. Sophia Serrao, Esq. BURAKIEWICZ & DEPRIEST 1120 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 856-7500 Facsimile: (202) 217-2599 E-mail: hburakiewicz@bdlawdc.com sserrao@bdlawdc.com ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2026. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. 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