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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, October 7, 2025, Vol. 27, No. 200

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: State of Texas' PFAS Suit Remanded to State Court
ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Oct. 24 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
ALLIANCE SERVICES: Court Grants Final Settlement OK in "Birdsong"
AMARAMEDICAL HEALTH: Wins Partial Dismissal of "Allen" OT Suit
APOLLOMD BUSINESS: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Bruni Says

ASCENSION HEALTH: "Negron" Negligence Claims Survive Dismissal Bid
AUSTRALIA: Faces Suit Over Unfair Community Development Program
AUTODESK INC: Faces Barkasi Securities Suit over SEC Disclosures
BALL METAL BEVERAGE: $4.5MM Settlement in "Westfall" Wins Prelim OK
BEIERSDORF INC: Aquaphor Ointment Contains Allergen, Suit Says

BENWORTH CAPITAL: Love Sues Over Unauthorized Access of Info
BEST BEV: Must Face "Johnson" Wage Payment Class Action Suit
BONIUK INTERESTS: Faces Garcia Over Restaurant Physical Barriers
CALABASAS BEVERAGE: Negrin Sues Over 818 Tequila's Agave Azul Label
CARDINAL GROUP: Hoffman Sues Over Illegal Holdover Fee Collection

CITY OF NEW YORK: Wins Dismissal of "Friedland" Arrest Claims
CONSOLIDATED EDISON: Court OKs Conditional Certification in "Ortiz"
DECIEM USA: Blind Users Can't Access Online Store, McCormick Says
DUKE CAPITAL: Wins Partial Dismissal of "Castillo" FDCPA Case
EXP REALTY: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Hollis" Do-Not-Call Lawsuit

FAMOUS BOURBON: Judge Approves Settlement of "Kikuchi" FLSA Claims
FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE: Faces Suit Over Player Transfer System
FORTINET INC: Faces Oklahoma Suit Over Drop of Common Stock Price
FRESHREALM INC: "Casanares" Wage & Hour Suit Stays in Dist. Court
GERBER PAYROLL SERVICES: Court Strikes Motion to Dismiss "Coghill"

GOOGLE LLC: Wins Dismissal of BlueChew Data Interception Suit
GRIMAL JOYEROS: Underpays Jewelry Store Attendants, Morales Claims
HARVARD COLLEGE: Weick Seeks Unpaid Personal Time Wages
HHLP COCONUT: Ariza Suit Seeks Equal Web Access for Blind Users
HSBC BANK: Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Wages, Discriminatory Practices

IEC GROUP: Black Appeals Amended Suit Dismissal to 9th Circuit
IRA INNOVATIONS: Defeats Sake TN Class Certification Bid
JOE SMITH: Court Dismisses Chaplain's Religious Rights Suit
KENTUCKY: Marcum Appeals Injunction Order to 6th Circuit
LENNY'S SHOE: Bennett Sues Over Blind's Equal Access to Website

LOANDEPOT.COM: Loses Bid to Strike "Hubble" TCPA Class Claims
LULULEMON ATHLETICA: Faces Patel Shareholder Suit in NY Court
MDL 3156: Court Denies Consolidation of 4 Suits in D. Conn.
MDL 3157: False Advertising Suits Transferred to S.D. Ohio
MDL 3157: Seven False Ad Suits Transferred to S.D. Ohio

MDL 3158: 4 Patent Dispute Suits Consolidated in D. Del.
MDL 3159: 12 Athlete Data Breach Suits Consolidated in E.D. Mich.
MONSANTO COMPANY: Faces Kopelman Suit Over Defective Herbicide
MONSANTO COMPANY: Leung Sues Over Roundup's Impact to Human Health
MONSANTO COMPANY: Roundup Herbicide "Defective," Morgan Suit Claims

MONSANTO COMPANY: Sells Hazardous Herbicide, Koeritz Suit Alleges
MONTVALE NAIL: Kim Sues Over Unpaid Wages and Disability Bias
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Breach of Contract Claim Survives Dismissal
NEW MEXICO: Prescription Opioids "Addictive," Kinlaw Suit Alleges
NEW SOUTH WALES: Plaintiff Given $93,000 for Police Strip Searches

NEW YORK, NY: C.S. Appeals Amended Suit Dismissal to 2nd Circuit
NISSAN NORTH: Carper Appeals Suit Dismissal to 6th Circuit
PEACEHEALTH NETWORKS: Aids Google to Access Medical Data, Suit Says
PELHAM COUNTRY: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Lewis" Overtime Lawsuit
PETER PAN: Court OKs Judgment on Pleadings in "Mulani"

PNC FINANCIAL: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Cardinale Says
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN: Court OKs $3.96MM Settlement in "Knight"
RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Must Pay Nominal Damages in "Powers"
RIO TINTO: PNG National Court Dismisses Copper Mine Class Suit
ROMARK UNIVERSAL: Isidoro Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages for Grocery Staff

ROQUETTE AMERICA: Processing Plant Releases Odors, Helenthal Says
RUGSUSA LLC: Must Face Most Claims in "Hong" Pricing Case
SHEHEEN HANCOCK: May Face Class Action Over Alleged Data Breach
SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE: Faces Class Action Suit Over Mortgage Fees
SMITH & WESSON: Sued over Website Privacy Settings

SOUTHERN GRAPHICS: Palmer Sues Over Clients' Compromised Info
SOUTHERN LIVING: Fails to Properly Pay Installers, Harvey Claims
SPRINKLR INC: Faces Boshart Consolidated Securities Suit
TW METALS: Merchant Seeks Unpaid Overtime for Material Handlers
UNITED PARKS: Must Face Limited Fake Sales Claims

UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Indiana Rail Corridor Class Action
UNITED STATES: Obtains Injury Claim Proceeds, Kvirikashvili Says
UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER: Breaches Fiduciary Duties, Green Alleges
VILLE FOOD: Miranda Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages for Pizzeria Workers
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Agrees to Settle Defective Turbochargers' Suit

WIRELESS VISION: Wins Partial Dismissal of "Turenne" Suit

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3M COMPANY: State of Texas' PFAS Suit Remanded to State Court
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In the case captioned as State of Texas, Plaintiff, v. 3M Company;
Corteva, Inc.; DuPont De Nemours, Inc.; and EIDP, Inc. f/k/a E. I.
Du Pont De Nemours and Company, Defendants, Civil Action No.
3:25-CV-122-L (N.D. Tex.), Judge Sam A. Lindsay of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas
Division, granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand, declined to
rule on the DuPont Defendants' motion to dismiss, declined to rule
on 3M's motion to dismiss, and remanded the action to the 18th
Judicial District Court of Johnson County, Texas. The Court denied
the Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs.

On December 11, 2024, the State of Texas, through its Attorney
General, Ken Paxton, filed its Original Petition against 3M,
Corteva, New DuPont, and Old DuPont in the 18th Judicial District
Court of Johnson County, Texas. The Plaintiff alleged that the
Defendants engaged in deceptive trade practices by not disclosing
health and environmental risks associated with their products, and
falsely marketing them as safe, in violation of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Sections 17.41-17.63.

The Plaintiff contended that for decades the Defendants
manufactured, marketed, and sold consumer products containing per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances, including perfluorooctane sulfonic
acid and perfluorooctanoic acid. The State of Texas contended that
these products were marketed for their resistance to heat, oil,
stains, grease, and water, and were used in food packaging,
carpeting, cookware, upholstery, cosmetics, and other consumer
goods under brand names like Teflon and Scotchgard.

The Plaintiff argued that despite profiting from these sales, the
Defendants knew that PFAS posed risks to human health and the
environment. The Plaintiff contended that PFAS are persistent,
bioaccumulative and toxic, and human exposure may be linked to
diseases such as cancer and decreased vaccine response. The State
of Texas argued that PFAS can also accumulate in fish, game,
plants, and drinking water, and have been found in human blood. The
Defendants were allegedly aware of these risks, knew their products
could not contain PFAS, and by the 1970s, knew that PFAS chemistry
was accumulating in the blood of most Americans. The Plaintiff
contended that despite knowing this, the Defendants concealed these
risks from consumers and the State, and for decades, affirmatively
claimed their products were safe.

The State of Texas sought monetary relief of $1,000,000 or more,
including civil penalties, attorney's fees, and costs, as well as
non-monetary injunctive relief. The requested injunctions included
prohibiting the Defendants from misrepresenting the safety or
health risks of their chemicals, failing to disclose human health
risks, selling products known to create health concerns due to
PFAS, causing goods in the stream of commerce to include harmful
PFAS chemicals, and advertising products as safe for household use
if they contain chemicals known to create health risks. The
Plaintiff also sought civil penalties of up to $10,000 per DTPA
violation, prejudgment and postjudgment interest, court costs,
investigation costs, and reasonable attorney's fees.

On January 16, 2025, 3M removed this action to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, under
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d),
and, independently and alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(a), contending that there is diversity of citizenship among
the real parties in interest to this suit. The DuPont Defendants
consented to removal. The Plaintiff disagreed that this action
should not have been removed to federal court. The Plaintiff
contended that there is no diversity of citizenship because the
State is the real party in interest, and this action cannot be
brought pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act because there is
no class.

The Court concluded that the State of Texas is the real party in
interest in this litigation. The Court noted that the DTPA
explicitly grants the Attorney General and the Consumer Protection
Division of the Attorney General's office to bring suits against
persons engaging in any act or practice declared to be unlawful on
behalf of the State of Texas. The Court observed that an entity is
the real party in interest when it is statutorily authorized to
bring suit to enforce a claim.

The Court stated that the Attorney General and the Consumer
Protection Division of the Attorney General's office are the only
entities that may bring suit under this section. If individual
consumers wish to seek relief under the DTPA, they must sue under
Section 17.50 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, not Section
17.47. In its Petition, the Plaintiff cited Section 17.47 as the
basis for jurisdiction. The Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief
and civil penalties, and any civil penalties will, by law, be
transferred to the State treasury.

The Court determined that it is clear based on the Plaintiff's
Petition that it is not a nominal party because it is seeking
redress for the alleged injury, loss, damage, and adverse effects
directly or indirectly affecting people in the State of Texas.
Despite the Plaintiff seeking to ensure compliance with the laws of
the State of Texas, it is not a nominal party because compliance is
not its sole stake in the litigation. That the Plaintiff is seeking
redress for the Defendants' alleged deceptive practices on behalf
of people in Texas does not make the people of Texas the real
parties in interest.

As a result, the Court concluded that it does not have jurisdiction
over this case pursuant to Section 1332. The Court noted that
federal case law makes it unequivocally clear that when a state is
a party to an action, the court has no federal jurisdiction on the
basis of diversity of citizenship because a state is not a citizen
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

The Court also determined that this lawsuit is not a class action
as defined by the Class Action Fairness Act. Title 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(d)(1)(B) defines class action for the purposes of
diversity jurisdiction as any civil action filed under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or similar State statute or
rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1
or more representative persons as a class action.

The Court found that this suit is brought pursuant to Section 17.47
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, not Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 or a similar Texas statute. Section 17.47 of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code does not contain language similar to
Rule 23. The DTPA does not authorize an action to be brought by 1
or more representative persons as a class action.

The Court noted that in its Petition, the Plaintiff does not allege
that it is representing an adequately defined and clearly
ascertainable class of people. Despite 3M's contentions, the cases
it cites do not create an automatic class action suit anytime the
State files a suit under the DTPA. The Court stated that these
individual nonbinding rulings do not transform the DTPA into a
class action.

The Court determined that it is clear that Rule 23 provides only
three ways to bring a class action suit pursuant to the CAFA.
Neither Rule 23 nor Section 14.27 authorizes de facto class action
suits. Taking the Plaintiff's well-pleaded facts in the Petition as
true and viewing them in the light most favorable to it, the Court
determined that this lawsuit is not a class action as defined in
the CAFA statute.

Because the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this
action, it declined to address the merits of the DuPont Defendants'
Motion and 3M's Motion. Accordingly, the Court declined to address
the DuPont Defendants' Motion; and declined to address 3M's
Motion.

The Plaintiff sought attorney's fees and costs incurred for
obtaining a remand of this action to state court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1447(c). Based on the Court's review of the facts
and circumstances, an award of attorney's fees is not warranted.
The law regarding whether actions filed by the State of Texas or
its Attorney General pursuant to Section 17.47 may be removed to
federal court is not settled. The Plaintiff and 3M cite to federal
district courts and intermediate state appellate courts, which are
not binding on this Court.

While this case should not have been removed, the Court, in
exercising its discretion, determined that the interests of justice
are not served by awarding attorney's fees to the Plaintiff under
these circumstances. Accordingly, the Court denied the Plaintiff's
request for attorney's fees and costs.

For the reasons stated, the Court granted the Motion to Remand,
declined to rule on the DuPont Defendants' Motion; declined to rule
on 3M's Motion; and remanded this action to the 18th Judicial
District Court of Johnson County, Texas.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order dated 24th September is
available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=O8YAxh from PacerMonitor.com

ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Oct. 24 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP issued a statement regarding the
Acadia Healthcare Securities Litigation:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

ST. CLAIR COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT  
SYSTEM, Individually and on Behalf of All Others  
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,

vs.

ACADIA HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC., et al.,   
Defendants.

Chief District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Alistair E. Newbern

Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-00988
CLASS ACTION

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF
CLASS ACTION

TO: ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED ACADIA
HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC. COMMON STOCK BETWEEN APRIL 30, 2014 AND
NOVEMBER 15, 2018, INCLUSIVE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee, that the lawsuit that is now
pending in that Court under the caption St. Clair County Employees'
Retirement System v. Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc., Civil Action
No. 3:18-cv-00988 (M.D. Tenn.) (the "Action") against Acadia
Healthcare Company, Inc. ("Acadia") (Nasdaq Ticker ACHC, CUSIP
0404A109), Deborah H. Jacobs, as Executor of the Estate of Joey A.
Jacobs, Brent Turner, and David Duckworth, has been certified as a
class action on behalf of the Class, except for certain persons and
entities that are excluded from the Class by definition as set
forth in the full printed Notice of Pendency of Class Action
("Notice").

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
THIS ACTION. A Notice is currently being mailed or emailed to known
Class Members. If you have not yet received the Notice, you may
contact the Notice Administrator at:

Acadia Healthcare Securities Litigation
c/o Verita Global
P.O. Box 301135
Los Angeles, CA 90030-1135
1-888-777-6014
www.AcadiaHealthcareSecuritiesLitigation.com

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice, may be made to Class
Counsel:

Christopher M. Wood, Esq.
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
& DOWD LLP
200 31st Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37203
1-615-244-2203

If you are a Class Member, you have the right to decide whether to
remain a member of the Class. If you choose to remain a member of
the Class, you do not need to do anything at this time other than
to retain your documentation reflecting your transactions and
holdings in Acadia common stock. You will automatically be included
in the Class. If you are a Class Member and do not exclude yourself
from the Class, you will be bound by the proceedings in this
Action, including all past, present, and future orders and
judgments of the Court, whether favorable or unfavorable. At this
time there has been no monetary recovery, and there is no guarantee
that one will be obtained in the future.

If you ask to be excluded from the Class, you will not be bound by
any order or judgment of this Court, and you will not be eligible
to receive a share of any money which might be recovered for the
benefit of the Class. To exclude yourself from the Class, you must
submit a written request for exclusion postmarked no later than
October 24, 2025, in accordance with the instructions set forth in
the full printed Notice. Please note, if you decide to exclude
yourself from the Class, you may be time-barred from asserting the
claims covered by the Action by a statute of repose. Pursuant to
Rule 23(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is within
the Court's discretion as to whether a second opportunity to
request exclusion from the Class will be allowed if there is a
settlement in the Action.

Further information may be obtained by directing your inquiry in
writing to the Notice Administrator or by visiting
www.AcadiaHealthcareSecuritiesLitigation.com.

Please Do Not Call or Write the Defendants or the Court with
Questions

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee


ALLIANCE SERVICES: Court Grants Final Settlement OK in "Birdsong"
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In the case captioned as Romesha Birdsong, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Alliance Services,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 23-cv-1057-bhl, Judge Brett H. Ludwig of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin granted final approval of a collective and class action
settlement.

On July 9, 2025, the parties filed their Joint Motion for
Preliminary Settlement Approval and their fully executed Settlement
Agreement and Release in this dual Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 class action and Fair Labor Standards Act collective action. On
July 10, 2025, the Court granted preliminary approval in part and
scheduled a final fairness hearing.

On September 17, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a Joint Motion for Final
Settlement Approval, Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Service
Award, and Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees and
Costs.

On September 25, 2025, the Court conducted a Fairness Hearing on
the parties' request for final approval of their Settlement
Agreement.

The Court determined that the settlement in this matter,
Plaintiff's counsel's attorneys' fees and case-related costs and
expenses, and Plaintiff's service award are fair and reasonable.
Based on the parties' submissions and the representations of
counsel, the Court found that the Settlement Agreement is a fair,
reasonable, and adequate resolution pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e). The Court further found that the Settlement Agreement is a
fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute under the
FLSA.

The Court found that Plaintiff Romesha Birdsong's service award in
the amount of $1,500.00 is reasonable. The Court also found that
Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees and case-related costs and
expenses in the amount of $23,125.00 is reasonable.

The Court ordered that the Wisconsin Wage Payment and Collection
Laws Class is certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and the FLSA
Collective is certified pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The Court granted the parties' Joint Motion for Final Settlement
Approval and approved the parties' Settlement Agreement and Release
as fair, reasonable, and adequate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e), and represents a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona
fide dispute under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Court appointed Named Plaintiff Romesha Birdsong as Class
Representative for the WWPCL Class and FLSA Collective. Walcheske &
Luzi, LLC is appointed as counsel for the settlement class. The
Settlement Agreement is binding on Plaintiff, Defendant, and all
settling Plaintiffs.

The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Service Award
and approved Plaintiff Romesha Birdsong's Service Award of
$1,500.00.

The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Attorneys'
Fees and Costs and approved counsel's requested award of attorneys'
fees and case-related costs and expenses in the total amount of
$23,125.00.

The Settlement Class Members' released claims are dismissed with
prejudice.

The wage claims of the putative collective members who did not
timely submit their written consent to join forms are dismissed
without prejudice.

The wage claims of the putative class members who timely and
properly excluded themselves in full accordance with the procedures
set forth in the parties' Settlement Agreement are dismissed
without prejudice.

This matter is dismissed on the merits, with prejudice, and without
further costs to either party.

A copy of the settlement order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=XmBbX7 from PacerMonitor.com

AMARAMEDICAL HEALTH: Wins Partial Dismissal of "Allen" OT Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Christine Allen, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Amaramedical Health
Care Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-225, Judge Susan
J. Dlott of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Western Division, denied in part and granted in
part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint.

Judge Dlott denied in part and granted in part Defendant
Amaramedical Health Care Services, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the
Amended Collective and Class Action Complaint. The Court denied the
motion to dismiss insofar as Plaintiff Christine Allen's FLSA and
Ohio MFWSA claims were not dismissed. The Court granted the motion
to dismiss to the extent that Allen's allegations of willful FLSA
violations were dismissed as insufficient. The Court applied a
two-year statute of limitations to Allen's claims.

Allen is a non-exempt hourly employee at Amaramedical. She and
similarly-situated employees performed home health aide services
for the company. They routinely worked forty hours or more per
week. They were required to travel between patients' homes during
their normal work hours to provide health aide services and other
job-related duties. Amaramedical required employees to clock in at
each patient's home and to clock out upon leaving, even when they
were continuing their shift by traveling to another assigned client
or performing work-related tasks. Allen and the similarly-situated
employees were not paid when traveling to and from different job
sites during the same workday. This unpaid time included (1) the
travel time between clients' homes; (2) time spent at a client's
home when they were unable to clock in because the client was not
home; and (3) time spent on work-related activities such as picking
up prescriptions, groceries, or supplies for clients.
As a result, Amaramedical did not accurately record all hours
worked and did not pay Allen and similarly-situated employees
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty per
workweek.

Allen filed the Amended Complaint asserting claims on behalf of
herself and other similarly-situated employees based on
Amaramedical's failure to pay employees overtime compensation for
hours worked in excess of forty per week under the FLSA and the
Ohio MFWSA. She sought to assert an opt-in FLSA collective action
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) on behalf of all current and
former hourly employees of Defendant, including temporary workers
if applicable, who performed job-to-job travel and who worked 40 or
more hours during any workweek at any time from April 9, 2022,
through final disposition of this matter.

She also sought to certify a class pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 to pursue a claim under Ohio MFWSA on behalf of
all current and former hourly employees of Defendant in Ohio,
including temporary workers if applicable, who performed job-to-job
travel and who worked 40 or more hours during any workweek at any
time from April 9, 2023, through final disposition of this matter.

Amaramedical moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on two bases.
First, Amaramedical contended that the Complaint should be
dismissed because Allen failed to state plausible FLSA and Ohio
MFWSA claims as a matter of law. Second, Amaramedical argued that
Allen failed to plead facts sufficient to establish willful
violations of the FLSA.

Amaramedical primarily contended Allen's FLSA and Ohio MFWSA claims
must be dismissed based on application of the travel provision
Portal-to-Portal Act, which amended the FLSA. The Portal-to-Portal
Act provides that travel to and from the actual place of
performance of the principal activity or activities which occur
either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such
employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular
workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities
is not compensable under the FLSA. Amaramedical argued that the
travel time for which Allen sought compensation was noncompensable
because it occurred prior to or subsequent to the principal
activities of providing health care at clients' homes.

The Court found that Amaramedical's argument failed to persuade at
this pleadings stage. The Court stated it would not dismiss Allen's
claims on the basis of the Portal-to-Portal Act because Allen
explicitly stated in the Amended Complaint that she is not seeking
compensation for ordinary commute time before or after the start
and/or end of the workday. Instead, she sought compensation for
time spent traveling between her clients' separate homes and for
work-related errands during her workday. The FLSA regulations
provide that time spent by an employee in travel as part of his
principal activity, such as travel from job site to job site during
the workday, must be counted as hours worked. The regulations also
state that any work which an employee is required to perform while
traveling must, of course, be counted as hours worked.

The Court concluded that Allen pleaded sufficient facts to make it
plausible that her travel from one client's home to another
client's home and performing job-related errands are part of her
principal activities under these FLSA regulations.

The Court did not agree with Amaramedical's reliance on Forrester
v. American Security and Protection Service LLC, wherein FLSA
claims were dismissed. The Court noted that unlike in Forrester,
Allen alleged specific facts about the time and activities for
which she sought to be paid. She sought compensation for travel
time between clients' homes, time spent at clients' homes when
unable to clock in for the scheduled appointment, and for time
spent on worked-related errands such as picking up prescriptions,
groceries, or supplies for clients. The Court concluded she stated
at least a plausible claim at the pleading stage that such
intra-workday activities should be considered principal activities.
Therefore, the Court declined to dismiss Allen's FLSA or Ohio MFWSA
claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

Amaramedical contended that Allen failed to allege willful
violations of the FLSA in the Amended Complaint. Willful violations
of the FLSA are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, but
non-willful violations are subject to two-year statute of
limitations. An FLSA violation is only willful if the employer knew
or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct
was prohibited by statute.

The Court agreed with Amaramedical that the allegations were not
sufficient to establish willfulness. The Court found that certain
allegations were conclusory and insufficient to state a willful
violation. The Court noted that allegations concerning an employee
named Andrea merely indicated that Andrea reiterated the company
policy to not pay for travel time between clients' homes, the same
policy Amaramedical defended in this suit. The Court stated that
Andrea's statement did not indicate that Amaramedical knew or
should have known that Allen should be paid for that travel time,
or stated differently, that its policy violated the FLSA. The Court
concluded that Allen had not alleged sufficient facts to establish
willfulness for the failure to pay for client-to-client travel
time. The Court applied a two-year statute of limitations to the
travel time allegations.

The Court found that allegations concerning a supervisor named
Yvonne came closer to providing plausibility of the requisite
willfulness. The allegation that Yvonne stated that she would fix
Allen's time-worked records for a given day because Allen was
unable to clock in at a client's home suggested that Yvonne
believed Allen should be paid for her time at the client's home
that one day. However, the Court found the allegations were not
sufficient to plausibly state a claim that Amaramedical knew that
such unpaid time caused her to work more than forty hours such that
she should have received overtime compensation for that pay period,
much less for other pay periods. The Court concluded that Allen had
not sufficiently pleaded willful violations by Amaramedical.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=kSm5jA from PacerMonitor.com

APOLLOMD BUSINESS: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Bruni Says
------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL BRUNI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. APOLLOMD BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC, Case No.
1:25-cv-05467-SEG (N.D. Ga., Sept. 24, 2025) is a class action
lawsuit on behalf of all persons who entrusted the Defendant with
sensitive Personally Identifiable Information and Protected Health
Information that was impacted in a data breach.

The Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendant failure to properly
secure and safeguard private Information that was entrusted to
them, and their accompanying responsibility to store and transfer
that information.

The Defendant is a physician practice management company based in
Georgia that offers multispecialty business and health services to
hospitals and health systems.

Accordingly, between July 21, 2025, and September 11, 2025,
Defendant notified its Clients of a data security incident that may
have resulted in unauthorized access to and acquisition of
information pertaining to some of its Clients patients.

The Defendant first became aware of the incident on May 22, 2025,
after it detected unusual activity in its Information Technology
environment.

The Defendant initiated an investigation to determine the nature
and scope of the Data Breach. The Defendant's investigation
determined that an unauthorized third-party accessed its IT
environment between May 22, 2025, and May 23, 2025. While in the IT
environment, the unauthorized party accessed and/or acquired files
that contain information for patients treated by the Defendant's
Clients, the suit says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue,, Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          Facsimile: (786) 623-0915
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

ASCENSION HEALTH: "Negron" Negligence Claims Survive Dismissal Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Angel Joel Gusman Negron, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Ascension Health, et al., Defendants, Case No.
4:24-CV-00669-JAR (E.D. Mo.), Judge John A. Ross of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs' claims in this putative class action arising
from a healthcare system data breach.

This matter is a putative class action that has not yet been
certified. The proposed nationwide class consists of all United
States residents whose Personal Information was compromised in the
Data Breach discovered by Ascension in May 2024, including all
those individuals who receive notice of the breach. Seven proposed
subclasses consist of residents of Arkansas, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, respectively.

Defendant Ascension Health and two affiliated companies comprise a
Missouri-based Catholic non-profit healthcare system of 140
hospitals serving 19 states. Plaintiffs were Ascension patients on
May 8, 2024, when its technology network suffered a ransomware
attack wherein hackers copied electronic files containing patients'
protected health information (PHI) and personally identifiable
information (PII). The next day, Ascension posted a notice to its
website disclosing a cybersecurity event and describing its
response, involving investigation and remediation with expert
third-party assistance.

On May 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action
asserting claims of negligence, negligence per se, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust
enrichment and seeking various forms of injunctive relief and
monetary damages. In October 2024, Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint asserting seven claims on behalf of a nationwide class
and 11 state law claims specific to seven state subclasses.

The Court addressed whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring their
claims. The Court found that considering the nature of PII
compromised, combined with multiple concrete incidents of
suspicious bank and credit activity and dark web exposure after the
breach, the risk of future injury was sufficiently substantial to
establish standing. The Court stated that given this real risk of
future harm, Plaintiffs' dependent claims regarding time and money
spent on mitigation and monitoring also confer standing.

Regarding present injuries, the Court found that specific instances
of fraudulent bank and credit activity are actual and concrete
injuries. The Court accepted the pleadings as true at this early
stage and found them sufficient to entitle Plaintiffs to discovery
on the issue. The Court also accepted at this stage that
disruptions in medical care are cognizable for purposes of
standing.

However, the Court found that Plaintiffs' alleged injuries in the
form of spam calls, texts, and emails are not fairly traceable to
Ascension. Phone numbers and email addresses were not identified in
the pleadings or public notices as types of PII compromised in the
breach. The Court found the connection to this data breach too
speculative to establish standing entitling Plaintiffs to any form
of relief.

With respect to benefit of bargain theory, the Court accepted
Plaintiffs' pleading that a contract existed and thus they have
standing to claim this injury. The Court stated that a party to a
breached contract has a judicially cognizable interest for standing
purposes, regardless of the merits of the breach alleged.

On invasion of privacy, the Court found that there is no dispute
that Plaintiffs lost the security of highly sensitive personal
information as a result of this data breach. To the extent
Plaintiffs plead emotional harm from this violation, the Court
found this is a long-recognized injury flowing from an invasion of
privacy and that Plaintiffs at least have standing to assert this
claim.

Regarding lost value of PII, the Court found the practical value
significant. The Court explained that the value of the information
is not derived from its worth in an imagined marketplace but rather
in the economic benefit of being able to purchase goods and
services remotely and electronically. The Court found that the lost
value of Plaintiffs' information is a concrete injury in fact for
purposes of standing.

Count I - Negligence: The Court denied Defendant's motion to
dismiss. The Court concluded that the economic loss doctrine would
not bar Plaintiffs' negligence claim even if their contract claims
were viable. The Court found that the level of trust inherent in
the patient-provider relationship and corresponding duty of
confidentiality codified by HIPAA necessarily extends to regulated
providers and warrants fiduciary treatment.

Count II - Negligence Per Se: The Court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The Court found that Plaintiffs have stated a
viable claim for negligence per se based on alleged violations of
HIPAA and applicable regulations but not based on the FTCA or the
FTC Guide for Business. The Missouri Court of Appeals has
recognized that HIPAA creates a statutory duty of confidentiality
that, when violated, gives rise to a common law claim of negligence
per se under Missouri law. However, the Court found that neither
the statutory language of the FTCA nor the FTC publication can be
interpreted to legislate a standard of care for data security.

Count III - Breach of Express Contract: The Court granted the
motion to dismiss. The Court found that Plaintiffs' bare allegation
that the Notice constitutes an agreement is conclusory. The Notice
is merely a notice, informing patients of their rights under HIPAA
and the duties HIPAA imposes on providers. The Court explained that
Plaintiffs do not and could not plead that they understood the
Notice to create a contract for data security funded by their
payment for medical services.

Count IV - Breach of Implied Contract: The Court granted the motion
to dismiss. The Court agreed that the complaint cannot establish
mutual assent and consideration for the same reasons stated with
respect to express contracts. Ascension's obligation to protect
Plaintiffs' information is entirely statutory, not transactional.
The Court stated that the complaint cannot be understood to
demonstrate Ascension's contractual assent or acceptance of any
form of consideration for data security.

Count V - Unjust Enrichment: The Court granted the motion to
dismiss. The Court found that consistent with the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning in SuperValu II, the defendant did not receive a benefit
in exchange for data security because no portion of payment was
attributable to that service.

Count VI - Invasion of Privacy: The Court granted the motion to
dismiss. The Court found that while Plaintiffs have surely suffered
an appropriation of their private information, the legal theories
do not fit the present facts. The Court explained that Ascension
did not commit the intrusion or publication; hackers did. The Court
stated that by imputing the conduct to Ascension due to its
inadequate security, Plaintiffs essentially reprise their
negligence claim.

Count VII - Missouri Merchandising Practices Act: The Court granted
the motion to dismiss. The Court found that absent clear precedent
to the contrary, it must follow the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Kuhns, which concluded that the plaintiffs' MMPA claim was not
viable because the plaintiff purchased brokerage services, not data
security. The Court stated that the alleged misrepresentation and
corresponding loss did not relate to the purchase of information
privacy.

Count VIII - Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act: The Court
denied the motion to dismiss. The Court found that Rule 23
supersedes any conflicting state procedural law, including the
ADTPA's prohibition on class actions. Given the particular nature
of this case, the totality of the pleadings, and the further
details in Ascension's possession, the Court found the pleadings
sufficiently specific to place Ascension on fair notice of
Plaintiffs' claims.

Count IX - Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act: The
Court denied the motion to dismiss. The Court rejected the notion
that the presence of information on Ascension's servers in Missouri
would foreclose the Florida Plaintiffs' home state claims. The
Court found that the Florida resident Plaintiffs were treated at
Ascension facilities in Florida where they received Ascension's
HIPAA Notice and provided their PII/PHI.

Counts X and XI - Illinois Personal Information Protection Act and
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act: The
Court denied the motion to dismiss both counts. The Court found
that Plaintiffs can maintain their IPIPA claim if their ICFA claim
is viable. The Court stated that the Illinois subclass Plaintiffs
were treated at Ascension facilities in Illinois where they
received Ascension's HIPAA Notice, provided their PII/PHI, and
suffered loss from the data breach.

Count XII - Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act: The Court granted the
motion to dismiss. The Court found that the OCPA exemption applies
because Ascension's privacy practices are regulated by HIPAA. The
Court explained that the focus on whether a Section 754 exemption
applies is determined by whether the action or transaction is
regulated and not specifically on whether such regulations also
provide a private right of action.

Counts XIII, XIV, and XV - Wisconsin Statutory Claims: The Court
denied the motion to dismiss Counts XIII and XIV but granted the
motion as to Count XV. For Count XIII (breach of confidentiality),
the Court declined to depart from Wisconsin district court
decisions that rejected the argument that the statute does not
apply when information is stolen rather than released. For Count
XIV (WDTPA), the Court accepted Plaintiffs' pleadings of active
misrepresentation at this early stage. For Count XV (notice of
unauthorized acquisition), the Court dismissed the count as an
independent claim but noted that Plaintiffs may invoke the statute
as relevant to their negligence claims.

Counts XVI and XVII - Michigan Statutory Claims: The Court granted
the motion to dismiss Count XVI but denied the motion as to Count
XVII. The Court found that MITPA Section 445.72 does not create a
private right of action and concluded that the MCPA does not
authorize a plaintiff to bring a claim based upon a violation of
that section. However, the Court found that Plaintiff Willis'
pleadings were sufficient to state an MCPA claim.

Count XVIII - Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act: The Court
denied the motion to dismiss. The Court found that the allegations
satisfy Rule 9(b) standards for an IDCSA claim, noting that
Plaintiffs plead that Ascension misrepresented through its HIPAA
notice that it would maintain adequate security while knowing that
its practices were inadequate.

The Court ordered that Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted
with respect to Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, XII, XV, and XVI and
denied with respect to Counts I, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XIV, XVII,
and XVIII. As to Count II, the motion is granted as to the FTCA and
denied as to HIPAA. As to the claims of Plaintiff Tiffany Farrand,
the motion is granted in its entirety and without prejudice. The
Court also ordered that Defendant's motion to dismiss Ascension
Health Alliance and Ascension Technologies is denied at this time.

A copy of the court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=yNgI57 from PacerMonitor.com

AUSTRALIA: Faces Suit Over Unfair Community Development Program
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Guardian reports that a class action seeking compensation for
about 20,000 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who were
part of a work for the dole scheme that made remote participants
work longer hours under more onerous conditions than people in the
cities has been lodged in the federal court.

The community development program required remote participants to
work up to 50 hours a fortnight, five days a week, 52 weeks a year
as a condition of income support. More than 80% of participants
were Indigenous.

Miranda Nagy, a principal lawyer at Maurice Blackburn, said the
requirements exceeded equivalent programs in cities.

"I would describe the community development program in its design,
in its administration and in its effect, as racially
discriminatory," she said.

The CDP was introduced in 2015 by the former Indigenous affairs
minister Nigel Scullion.

In the subsequent years, Indigenous people were more likely to have
payments withheld for failing to meet their requirements, about
6,000 mostly young people disappeared from the program entirely,
and more than a third of participants said their communities were
worse off.

Wood sculptor Serena Marrkuwatj Bonson, an artist from Arnhem Land
in the Northern Territory whose work has been displayed at the Art
Gallery of South Australia, is the lead plaintiff of the class
action.

She says she was made to paint shells to earn income support under
the CDP.

Bonson was penalised 17 times over about five years, her lawyers
say, cutting off her welfare payments for four weeks. She was
caring for her grandchildren at the time and says she was forced to
ask extended family for money to help feed them.

Her uncle and fellow claimant, Yolngu elder Baru Pascoe, signed up
to the CDP voluntarily despite exceeding the age cap -- only to
find he was unable to opt out after realising its flaws, his
lawyers say.

Pascoe was required to make mud bricks alongside the younger men --
work that was "shameful" and "culturally inappropriate" for the
senior elder, his lawyers say. They say he was financially
penalised five times for breaching his obligations.

Pascoe alleged the CDP caused a lot of harm to his community of
Maningrida.

"It was rolled out and a lot of people suffered or were confused,
stressed, traumatised," he said.

"A lot of people had nightmares, even getting sick. A lot of people
with disabilities were asked to perform work duties in CDP . . .
We saw it like Cyclone Tracy, causing a big storm."

While the scheme was overhauled in 2021, Nagy said its impacts were
still front of mind for those in communities where people were
"begging outside supermarkets because they didn't have enough money
to live".

"We'd like to get compensation for people that recognises the time
that they lost was valuable to them," she said.

"We want to claw back some of the penalties that people paid . . .
we want the commonwealth to apologise, and we want this not to
happen again."

The claim covers people in Queensland, the Northern Territory,
Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales who took
part in the scheme between 2015 and 2021. The federal government in
2021 paid out $2m to settle a class action claim from the
Ngaanyatjarra traditional owners' council in WA's remote Goldfields
region, which claimed the program was racist. The government made
no admission or concession of legal liability in making the
settlement.

The minister for Indigenous Australians, Malarndirri McCarthy, said
the Albanese government was already fulfilling its pledge to
dismantle the CDP.

"We have invested more than $700m into our new Remote Jobs and
Economic Development Program to give First Nations Australians the
dignity of real work, real pay and better conditions," she said.

"Our program is a gamechanger and making a real difference in
people's lives. It is grounded in self-determination and focused on
economic opportunity and community development." [GN]

AUTODESK INC: Faces Barkasi Securities Suit over SEC Disclosures
----------------------------------------------------------------
Autodesk, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended July 31, 2025, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on September 1, 2025, that on April 24, 2024, plaintiff
Michael Barkasi filed a purported federal securities class action
complaint in the Northern District of California against the
company, its Chief Executive Officer, Andrew Anagnost and former
Chief Financial Officer, Deborah L. Clifford.

On July 18, 2025, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
with leave to amend. On August 8, 2025, plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, which purports to assert claims under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act, and
25 Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint was filed on August 29, 2025.

The complaint, which was filed shortly after the company’s
announcement of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors’
internal investigation regarding the company’s free cash flow and
non-GAAP operating margin practices, generally alleges that the
defendants made false and misleading statements in violation of
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The action purports to be brought on behalf of those who purchased
or otherwise acquired the company’s publicly traded securities
between June 1, 2023 and April 16, 2024, and seeks unspecified
damages and other relief. On July 10, 2024, the court appointed a
lead plaintiff in the action, and an amended complaint was due last
September 16, 2024. On July 10, 2024, the court appointed a lead
plaintiff in the action, and an amended complaint was filed on
September 16, 2024. The action purports to be brought on behalf of
those who purchased or otherwise acquired the company's securities
between February 23, 2023 and April 16, 2024, and seeks unspecified
damages and other relief. On November 25, 2024, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint.

Autodesk is a technology/software company based out of San
Francisco, California.


BALL METAL BEVERAGE: $4.5MM Settlement in "Westfall" Wins Prelim OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Robert Westfall, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Ball Metal Beverage Container Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
2:16-cv-02632-DAD-CKD (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of class
action settlement on September 25, 2025. The court found the
proposed $4,500,000 settlement to be the product of serious,
informed, non-collusive negotiations and fell within the range of
possible approval.

The court preliminarily confirmed and appointed plaintiffs Robert
Westfall, David E. Anderson, Lynn Bobby, and David Ellinger, and
Objectors Richard Martin and Andre Bernstein as the Class
Representatives for settlement purposes. The settlement class was
defined as all persons employed by Defendant Ball in a Class
Position at any time during the Class Period from September 7, 2012
through April 20, 2024.

On September 7, 2016, plaintiff Robert Westfall filed his action in
Solano County Superior Court asserting state law claims and seeking
penalties under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).
Defendant subsequently removed the action to federal court. On
April 6, 2017, plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint. On
February 5, 2018, the previously assigned district judge granted
class certification, thereafter amending and expanding that grant
of class certification on January 15, 2019.

On December 11, 2019, plaintiffs and defendant reached a resolution
of this action. On September 16, 2021, the previously assigned
district judge granted preliminary approval of the parties' class
action settlement. Plaintiffs submitted a motion for final approval
of the settlement on April 15, 2022. Richard Martin and Andrew
Bernstein (collectively Objectors or Objectors-Intervenors) filed
objections to the settlement reached by plaintiffs and defendant
before the January 17, 2023 final approval hearing, and final
approval was denied by the undersigned for reasons discussed later
in this order.

In total, the parties attended four mediations spanning the period
from 2017 to 2023. The parties participated in full-day mediations
with Alan Berkowitz on February 7, 2017 and August 1, 2018, with
the Honorable Raul Ramirez (Retired) on December 11, 2019, and with
Jeffrey Ross on August 30, 2023. The final mediation in August 2023
extended well into the evening before reaching a resolution based
upon a mediator's proposal. Plaintiffs represent that the
negotiations were adversarial, though still professional in nature.
The parties also engaged in substantial discovery, including taking
the depositions of approximately 24 class members and exchanging
thousands of pages of documents covering wage and hour policies,
timekeeping and pay data, personnel files, and other documentation
necessary to evaluate both liability and damages.

On May 30, 2024, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint.
On January 21, 2025, plaintiffs, with the support of the prior
Objectors, filed a second motion for preliminary approval of class
action settlement. That same day, the parties uploaded a copy of
the proposed settlement to the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency (LWDA) website.

According to theSettlement Agreement, defendant will pay a gross
settlement amount (GSA) of $4,500,000 allocated as follows: (1) up
to $10,000 for settlement administration costs; (2) $100,000 in
civil PAGA penalties, with $75,000 of the penalties payable to the
LWDA; (3) up to $1,500,000 for attorneys' fees and up to $45,000
for plaintiffs' counsel's documented litigation costs; and (4)
$10,000 incentive awards for each named plaintiff and the
Objectors-Intervenors. The GSA funds are non-reversionary, meaning
no portion will revert to defendant for any reason.

Assuming these allocations are awarded in full, approximately
$2,810,000 in a net settlement amount will be available for
distribution to Class Members who do not submit a timely and valid
request to be excluded from the settlement. The settlement is
projected to pay each Class Member an average of $7,223.65. After
the funds are distributed to the Class Members, they will have
one-eighty  days to cash their checks. Any remaining amounts from
uncashed checks will be paid to a cy pres recipient as agreed upon
by the parties, subject to court approval, or to the California
State Controller Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the
Qualified Claimant.

In exchange for the consideration recited in the Settlement, Named
Plaintiffs, Objectors-Intervenors, and all Eligible Class Members
on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all who claim by or
through them or in their stead, for the period from September 7,
2012 to April 20, 2024 hereby and forever release defendant and
related parties for any and all claims arising from or that could
have reasonably been asserted based on the allegations in the
Complaint for:

(1) Failure to pay wages owed, including claims for the failure to
properly pay all minimum wages, failure to pay all overtime wages,
and the failure to pay vested vacation or sick pay wages;

(2) Failure to provide meal periods;

(3) Failure to authorize and/or permit rest periods;

(4) Failure to pay premiums related to meal and/or rest periods
pursuant to California Labor Code Section 226.7 at the regular rate
of pay;

(5) Failure to furnish accurate, itemized wage statements in
compliance with California Labor Code Section 226(a);

(6) Failure to pay all wages upon separation of employment;

(7) Alleged violation of and/or based on California Labor Code
Sections 200, 201-203, 204, 210, 218, 218.5, 218.6, 221, 223, 226,
226(a), 226.3, 226.7, 227.3, failure to pay sick time, including at
the regular rate of pay, and any claim for PAGA penalties
predicated thereon under Section 246 et seq, 500, 510, 511, 512,
515, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1175, 1182.11, 1182.12, 1185, 1193.6 1194,
1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 3289, 3751, as well as, to the
extent predicated on regulatory violations, general violations, or
repeat violations associated with IC spray practices and
procedures, Labor Code Sections 6300, et seq., and Sections 3, 4,
5, 7, 11, and 12 of the IWC Wage Orders;

(8) Alleged violations of the California Unfair Competition Law
(Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq.); and

(9) Violation of any provision of the California Labor Code that
are subject to penalties pursuant to the California Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 that were or could have been
asserted based on the allegations in the Complaint, as well as PAGA
penalties that were or could have been sought in relation to
violation of such provisions. This includes the Section 6300 PAGA
claims alleged by Objector Martin in the Martin Action.

The court found that the proposed settlement appeared to be the
product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations. The
parties participated in four mediations spanning from 2017 to 2023
that were purportedly adversarial, though professional in nature.
The parties also engaged in substantial discovery. Based on these
representations, the court preliminarily concluded that the
parties' negotiation constituted genuine, informed, and
arm's-length bargaining.

Plaintiffs retained an independent economic data analyst, Nick
Briscoe of Briscoe Economics Group, to assist with creation of
potential damages analyses in anticipation of the fourth and final
mediation. With the help of Mr. Briscoe and based on analysis and
review of relevant documents and information on the class,
plaintiffs' counsel determined that a generous likely total
exposure for the asserted claims in this case, plus related
statutory and civil penalties, without any reduction for risk of
loss or reduction in PAGA penalties is approximately $22,545,996,
not including interest. The gross settlement amount of $4,500,000
represents approximately 19.96% of the estimated likely maximum
recovery. The net settlement amount of $2,810,000 represents
approximately 12.46% of plaintiffs' maximum potential recovery.

The court found this proportion to be in the range of the
percentage recoveries that California district courts, including
this one, have found to be reasonable. The court noted that while a
larger award was theoretically possible, the very essence of a
settlement is compromise, a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning
of highest hopes. The court preliminarily approved the settlement
amount reflected in the parties' proposed settlement as being
adequate.

The settlement provides for $100,000 in civil PAGA penalties.
Pursuant to the PAGA before its recent amendment, 75% of the civil
penalties, or $75,000, will go to the LWDA, and 25%, or $25,000,
will be included in the net settlement amount and payable to
Aggrieved Employees. The $100,000 allocated towards civil penalties
represents 2.2% of the $4,500,000 GSA. The court found the amount
proposed to settle plaintiffs' PAGA claims to be consistent with
other PAGA settlements approved by the court and preliminarily
concluded that the settlement of plaintiffs' PAGA claims is fair,
reasonable, and adequate in light of the PAGA's public policy
goals.

The settlement provides that Class counsel will seek an award of
$1,500,000 equivalent to 33.33% of the GSA. That amount is higher
than the 25% benchmark established in the Ninth Circuit, but the
court noted it is not an uncommon percentage for wage and hour
class actions litigated in the Eastern District of California. The
proposed Settlement Agreement also provides for costs not exceeding
$45,000.

In explaining their proposed departure from the 25% benchmark,
plaintiffs' counsel stated that this case involved complex and
lengthy litigation spanning nearly nine years, with counsel
conducting extensive discovery including 24 class member
depositions, and the matter becoming even more complex when the
Objectors-Intervenors raised additional claims. Moreover, the
combined efforts of Plaintiffs' Counsel and Objectors' Counsel
proved highly effective, while Plaintiffs' Counsel initially
secured a substantial $2.45 million settlement through years of
litigation, the addition of Objectors' Counsel helped nearly double
the gross settlement amount to $4.5 million. Counsel obtained
significant non-monetary benefits through policy changes regarding
both paging systems and hazardous materials procedures that will
help prevent future violations.

Considering the significant relief obtained for Class Members after
nine years of complex litigation on a contingency basis, the court
accepted a measured departure from the benchmark percentage at this
preliminary approval stage of the litigation. However, the court
stated that at the final approval stage, it will carefully
re-examine the award of attorneys' fees and conduct a final
lodestar cross-check. At that point, the court will expect
plaintiffs' counsel to provide the requisite billing records and
calculations for cross check purposes and in justifying the fees
they seek. Additionally, plaintiffs' counsel must provide an
accounting or invoices documenting the requested $45,000 in
litigation expenses at the final approval stage.

The named plaintiffs and objectors-intervenors in this action have
requested incentive payments of $10,000 each. Throughout the
litigation, Plaintiffs' Counsel worked closely with the named
Plaintiffs Robert Westfall, David Anderson, Lynn Bobby and David
Ellinger to gather data about Defendant and its employment
practices, participate in discovery and inform the litigation
strategy. Furthermore, the Objectors' Participation resulted in
nearly doubling the settlement amount. Plaintiff Robert Westfall
participated in four mediations while the other named Plaintiffs
participated in the third mediation, and all were available for the
fourth mediation. Likewise, Objectors Martin and Bernstein also
attended the entire mediation and participated in the litigation.

Under the proposed settlement, the average Class Member will
receive $7,223.65. Thus, proposed incentive awards of $10,000 are
roughly 1.4 times the average amount each putative Class Member
could expect to receive from the proposed settlement. Having
reviewed the proposed $10,000 incentive awards for the named
plaintiffs and objector-intervenors, the court preliminarily
approved the proposed incentive awards.


The court approved ILYM as the Settlement Administrator and found
that the notice and the manner of notice proposed by plaintiffs
meet the requirements of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(2)(B)
and 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) and that the proposed mail delivery is
appropriate under these circumstances. The estimated cost of
administering this settlement is not to exceed $10,000, which will
be deducted from the GSA. The court found this estimate to be
reasonable when compared with administration fees proposed in other
settlements submitted to this court.

Prior Issues

The court noted that the parties previously received preliminary
approval but were denied final approval of their earlier settlement
agreement. The court identified issues with the administration of
that settlement, including that the administrator reported that he
received no requests for opt-outs or objections but the Objectors
presented evidence that they had submitted timely objections that
the administrator received. The administrator also mailed notice
packets that provided for an insufficient number of days to opt out
or object to the settlement, sent Objector Martin's notice packet
to the wrong address despite having Martin's correct address on
file, and did not submit his declaration to the court until four
days before the hearing on the motion for final approval.

Plaintiffs' renewed motion for preliminary approval seeks approval
of a different Settlement Administrator than the one responsible
for many of the issues identified above. The newly proposed
Settlement Administrator is ILYM. Further, following a substantial
increase in the GSA, Objector-Intervenors now agree to the parties'
Settlement Agreement, including the release of claims. Therefore,
the court found that the issues that plagued the parties' prior
settlement agreement are unlikely to arise in the context of the
currently proposed Settlement Agreement.

The parties are directed to specifically inform the court in their
motion for final approval how the parties intend to define the
group of Aggrieved Employees under the PAGA. The parties are
directed to inform the court in their motion for final approval
whether the LWDA has commented on the proposed settlement. The
parties are also directed to inform the court in their motion for
final approval whether and when they provided notice in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. Section 1715(b). The parties are directed to
specifically inform the court in their motion for final approval to
what extent, if any, their requested class certification further
diverges from the court's prior orders and to provide support for
such modified certification. In their motion for final approval,
plaintiffs are directed to specify the proposed cy pres recipient
and explain why the specified recipient should be approved by the
court. The parties are directed to inform the court in their motion
for final approval what portion of the estimated potential damages
are attributable to PAGA penalties. Plaintiffs are directed to
provide information regarding the expected median, minimum, and
maximum awards in their motion for final approval. The parties are
directed to clearly state their intentions as to the release of
claims along with any additional authority supporting the scope of
that release, including the release of unknown claims, in their
motion for final approval.

The court set the hearing for final approval of the proposed
settlement for Monday, May 4, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. before the
undersigned in Courtroom 4, with the motion for final approval of
class action settlement to be filed at least thirty-five days in
advance of the final approval hearing. The court adopted a detailed
implementation schedule requiring defendant to provide ILYM with
Class Member contact information no later than forty-five days
after receiving notice of entry of the preliminary approval order,
and ILYM to mail Class Notices no later than thirty days after
receiving that information. Class Members will have forty-five days
after ILYM mails the Class Notices to challenge weeks worked
information, send objections regarding the settlement, or postmark
requests for exclusion from the settlement.

Accordingly, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
approval of class action settlement and denied plaintiff's request
for status as having been rendered moot by this order. The court
preliminarily confirmed and appointed Timothy B. Del Castillo and
Spencer S. Turpen of Castle Law: California Employment Counsel, PC;
Matthew R. Eason and Erin Scharg of Eason & Tamborini, ALC; Levi
Lesches of Lesches Law; and I. Benjamin Blady of Blady Workforce
Law Group LLP as Class Counsel for settlement purposes. The
proposed Class Notice was approved in accordance with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23. Before sending out the Class Notice, the
court directed the parties or ILYM to fill in all blank or
bracketed placeholders in the Class Notice with the appropriate
information. The proposed settlement detailed herein was approved
on a preliminary basis as fair and adequate.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=t52FEV from PacerMonitor.com

BEIERSDORF INC: Aquaphor Ointment Contains Allergen, Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Top Class Actions reports that a California mother, plaintiff
Esther Hicks, is suing Beiersdorf Inc.

Why: The plaintiff claims the company's Aquaphor healing ointment
contains an allergen despite being marketed as hypoallergenic.

Where: The Aquaphor class action lawsuit was filed in California
federal court.

A new class action lawsuit alleges that Beiersdorf Inc.'s Aquaphor
healing ointment for babies and children contains a common allergen
despite being marketed as hypoallergenic.

Plaintiff Esther Hicks filed the Aquaphor hypoallergenic class
action complaint against Beiersdorf Inc. on Sept. 15 in a
California federal court, alleging violations of state and federal
consumer laws.

Hicks claims in her lawsuit that Aquaphor Baby Healing Ointment and
Aquaphor Children's Healing Ointment both contain lanolin alcohol,
a common allergen among infants and children that studies have
recommended against putting on damaged skin.

The plaintiff notes that lanolin alcohol was named contact allergen
of the year in 2023 by the American Contact Dermatitis Society.

While lanolin is useful for preventative skin care because healthy
skin acts as a barrier to the allergen lanolin alcohol, damaged
skin allows it to penetrate deeply enough to trigger an immune
system response, Hicks said.

Aquaphor labels products as hypoallergenic to take advantage of
market, lawsuit says
According to the class action lawsuit, lanolin is not recommended
for use on infants under age 2 because of the risk of an allergic
reaction, including allergic contact dermatitis.

Hicks alleges that she purchased the products based on the
hypoallergenic label to treat a persistent rash on her infant
daughter for several months but only saw an improvement after she
stopped.

She claims that Beiersdorf labels the products as hypoallergenic to
take advantage of the growing market for products for sensitive
skin and charges a premium compared to other similar products. For
example, the complaint said, the 14-ounce package of Baby Healing
Ointment is available for $18.37 at Walmart, while a 13-ounce
container of Vaseline Baby Healing Petroleum Jelly retails for
$5.48.

Consumers do not have the time or knowledge to scrutinize a
product's label for each ingredient at the point of sale to
determine if there are allergens when the label claims it is
"hypoallergenic," Hicks argued, saying that a reasonable consumer
also would not know that lanolin alcohol is a common allergen.

According to the complaint, it is generally recognized that to be
hypoallergenic, lanolin must contain less than 3% free lanolin
alcohol, and Hicks alleged that the ointments contain more than
that.

Hicks aims to represent a class of all people who bought the
products in California, as well as a multistate breach of warranty
class for claims in states with warranty laws similar to
California's.

A similar class action lawsuit recently alleged "hypoallergenic"
Almay products, including eyeliners, mascaras, concealers and
makeup removers, contain known allergens like corn starch,
salicylic acid and zinc stearate.

What do you think of the allegations made in this Aquaphor class
action lawsuit? Let us know in the comments.

The plaintiff is represented by Jennifer L. MacPherson, Craig W.
Straub and Zachary M. Crosner of Crosner Legal PC.

The Aquaphor class action lawsuit is Esther Hicks v. Beiersdorf
Inc., Case No. 1:25-cv-00822, in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California. [GN]

BENWORTH CAPITAL: Love Sues Over Unauthorized Access of Info
------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN LOVE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BENWORTH CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:25-cv-24334-JB (S.D. Fla., September 22, 2025) is a
class action against the Defendant for negligence, breach of
implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and declaratory judgment.

The case arises from the Defendant's failure to properly secure and
safeguard the personally identifiable information of the Plaintiff
and similarly situated individuals stored within its network
systems following a data breach on or about May 18, 2025. The
Defendant also failed to timely notify the Plaintiff and similarly
situated individuals about the data breach. As a result, the
private information of the Plaintiff and Class members was
compromised and damaged through access by and disclosure to unknown
and unauthorized third parties, says the suit.

Benworth Capital Partners, LLC is a private finance company with
its principal executive office located in Coral Gables, Florida.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Nicholas A. Colella, Esq.
         LYNCH CARPENTER LLP
         1133 Penn Ave., 5th Floor
         Pittsburgh PA, 15222
         Telephone: (412) 322-9243
         Email: nickc@lcllp.com

                 - and -

         Gerald D. Wells, III, Esq.
         Stephen E. Connolly, Esq.
         LYNCH CARPENTER LLP
         1760 Market Street, Suite 600
         Philadelphia, PA 19103
         Telephone: (267) 609-6910
         Facsimile: (267) 609-6955
         Email: jerry@lcllp.com
                steve@lcllp.com

BEST BEV: Must Face "Johnson" Wage Payment Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Shakie Johnson, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Best Bev LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 3:24-CV-1260 (AJB/ML), (N.D.N.Y) Judge Anthony
Brindisi of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York denied Defendant's motion to dismiss a
putative class action complaint alleging violations of the New York
Labor Law.

Judge Brindisi denied Defendant's pre-answer motion to dismiss
under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and denied Defendant's alternative request for a stay of
litigation pending resolution by the New York Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff, an employee of Defendant, filed this putative class
action alleging that Defendant violated various provisions of the
New York Labor Law. More specifically, Plaintiff claimed that
Defendant abridged his and other New York employees' rights by
failing to pay them within one week of when they earn their wages
(Count One), failing to give them complete wage statements with
each paycheck (Count Two), and failing to provide wage notices upon
hiring (Count Three), as required under the NYLL.

Plaintiff lives, works, and is domiciled in New York. Defendant is
a company that batches and cans various kinds of beverages,
including sodas, alcoholic drinks, and more. Defendant is
incorporated in the Virgin Islands, with a principal executive
office in St. Thomas, and is registered to do business in New York.
Since January 5, 2024, Defendant has employed Plaintiff as a
processing tech at its Waverly, New York, facility. More than a
quarter of Plaintiff's work is manual labor, which includes, among
other things, mixing and canning drinks; lifting, packing, and
organizing merchandise; and cleaning cans.

During Plaintiff's employment, he has earned between $21 and $24
per hour, with higher shift differentials. He typically works
thirty-six- or forty-eight-hour weeks. Throughout Plaintiff's
employment, Defendant has paid him every two weeks. Defendant has
consistently distributed his wages more than one week after the
final day of the associated pay period. For example, for the week
beginning on January 7, 2024, and ending on January 13, 2024,
Defendant paid Plaintiff his lawfully earned wages on January 25,
2024, rather than on January 20, 2024, as Plaintiff believes he was
entitled. Defendant's allegedly untimely payments have deprived
Plaintiff of the time-value of money, including by making it
impossible for him to invest, save, or purchase goods utilizing the
wages he earned and was owed but were paid late.

Defendant has also failed to give Plaintiff proper wage statements
with each paycheck. Instead, Defendant's wage statements have
consistently omitted the dates of work covered by that payment of
wages, Plaintiff's actual hours worked, his overtime rate, and his
overtime wages owed. According to Plaintiff, these omissions
deprived Plaintiff of the ability to know exactly how much
compensation he was entitled to for each pay period and, thus,
contributed to the underpayment of wages he now alleges. In
addition to the defective wage statements, Defendant also failed to
provide Plaintiff with any wage notice upon hiring. Plaintiff
claimed that, like the defective wage statements, Defendant's
failure to provide any wage notice, let alone one containing the
required information, deprived him of the ability to know exactly
how much compensation he was entitled to and against whom to bring
his claims, and contributed to the underpayment of wages as
asserted herein.

During Plaintiff's employment, he has seen between 300 and 400
other employees perform manual work at Defendant's Waverly
facility. Plaintiff claimed that, like himself, all of those
individuals have also received inadequate wage notices and wage
statements and untimely paychecks. On October 15, 2024, Plaintiff
filed this putative class action based on diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. On behalf of himself and the other manual workers,
Plaintiff asserted claims for money damages under NYLL Sections 191
(failure to pay timely wages), 195(3) (failure to furnish accurate
wage statements), and 195(a) (failure to furnish accurate wage
notices).

On December 16, 2024, Defendant moved to dismiss this action under
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and, in the alternative, sought a stay pending a
decision from the New York Court of Appeals in Grant v. Global
Aircraft Dispatch, Inc., where the Second Department of the
Appellate Division held that the NYLL's frequency-of-payment
provisions did not establish a private right of action. After
Defendant filed its motion, the case was reassigned from Chief U.S.
District Judge Brenda K. Sannes to this Court. Subsequently,
Plaintiff opposed, and Defendant served a reply.

Regarding Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion, Defendant argued that
Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to assert claims for alleged
technical violations of NYLL Section 195(1) and Section 195(3). In
opposition, Plaintiff responded that he had adequately stated an
injury in fact that satisfied Article III's concreteness
requirements as articulated by the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit. The Court found that Plaintiff's complaint adequately
connected Defendant's alleged conduct to the concrete harms he
experienced. The complaint alleged that Defendant's failure to
provide Plaintiff with a proper wage statement deprived Plaintiff
of the ability to know exactly how much compensation he was
entitled to and contributed to the underpayment of wages as
asserted herein. Additionally, Defendant's failure to provide
Plaintiff with a proper wage notice deprived Plaintiff of the
ability to know exactly how much compensation he was entitled to
and against whom to bring his claims, and contributed to the
underpayment of wages as asserted herein.

The Court distinguished this case from Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing
Inc., 113 F.4th 300 (2d Cir. 2024), where the Second Circuit held
that a plaintiff cannot rely on technical violations of NYLL but
must allege actual injuries suffered as a result of the alleged
wage notice and wage statement violations. Unlike the plaintiff in
Guthrie, who had asserted only that the defendant had failed to
provide the required documents, Plaintiff here had identified a
concrete downstream harm he suffered as a result of the statutory
violations: the alleged underpayments, or the lost time-value of
money. The Court concluded that following Guthrie, district courts
are in agreement that a plaintiff has standing if he plausibly
alleges that, by failing to provide the required wage statements,
the employer was able to hide its violations of wage and hour laws
and thus prevent the employee from determining and seeking payment
for the precise amount of his unpaid wages. At this stage, the
complaint contained sufficient factual allegations to overcome the
hurdles that Spokeo, TransUnion, and Guthrie imposed. Since
Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to make out concrete
injuries, he had standing to assert Counts Two and Three.

Regarding Count One, Defendant contended that NYLL Section 191
provided no private right of action for frequency-of-payment
claims. Defendant did not argue that the statutory text precluded
private suits, but instead pointed to the statutory history and
purpose, urging the Court to adopt the Second Department's
reasoning in Grant, 223 A.D.3d at 712.

Plaintiff responded that the Court should follow the overwhelming
majority of its sister courts, which have been nearly unanimous in
adopting the First Department's contrary conclusion in Vega v. CM &
Associates Construction Management, LLC, 175 A.D.3d 1144 (1st Dept.
2019), which found that Section 191 provided a private right of
action.

The Court found the First Department's decision in Vega more
persuasive, declined to adopt the Second Department's reasoning in
Grant, and predicted the Court of Appeals would do the same. The
Court observed that district courts sitting in this Circuit have
had the opportunity to weigh-in on Grant and address the split in
authority, and all but one have continued to follow Vega as the
predominant authority and predict that the Court of Appeals is more
likely to adopt the First Department's conclusion. After Chief
Judge Sannes's writing in Covington v. Childtime Childcare, Inc.,
2024 WL 2923702 (N.D.N.Y. June 10, 2024), the Southern District of
New York similarly concluded, for the sixth consecutive time since
Grant, that a private right of action is available for
timeliness-of-payment violations. The Court was persuaded by the
reasoning of, and the conclusion reached by, the majority of its
sister courts and saw no reason to depart from such rulings.

As an alternative to dismissal, Defendant asked the Court to stay
these proceedings, pending a Court of Appeals decision regarding
the availability of a private right of action for untimely wage
payments.

Plaintiff countered that a stay was unwarranted, in part because it
was unclear that the Court of Appeals would soon, if ever, act to
resolve the split between Vega and Grant.

The Court declined to exercise its discretion to grant a stay. The
Court found that the lack of any clear idea of when this litigation
may resolve after a stay counseled against granting one.

At this time, nothing suggested the Court of Appeals was close to
issuing a decision that would aid in resolving Defendant's motion.


The Court was reluctant to leave the parties to twist in the wind,
and Defendant's request for a stay was denied.

The Court acknowledged that the Legislature amended the NYLL
earlier this year, including a provision related to liquidated
damages' availability as a remedy for untimely wage payments in
some scenarios. Because the parties did not have occasion to
address the new language in their submissions, and as these
developments did not appear to deprive the Court of its
jurisdiction over this matter, this order did not decide any
questions about the amendment's potential effects on this
litigation. However, the Court invited the parties to submit
further briefing on this narrow issue, if they wished to do so,
within twenty-eight days of entry of this order.

Since the Court found that the Court of Appeals would likely permit
private suits for alleged violations of NYLL Section 191, and
Plaintiff had plausibly alleged concrete injuries stemming from
inadequate wage statements and notices, Plaintiff had adequately
stated claims under NYLL's wage-notice, wage-statement, and
timeliness-of-payment provisions. Therefore, Defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint for want of standing or failure to state a
claim was denied.

Further, because Plaintiff, the court, non-parties, and the public
may incur prejudice from any further delay in awaiting a Court of
Appeals decision, the Court declined to issue a stay. The Court
ordered that Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied and ordered
that, should the parties wish to submit supplemental briefing
concerning only the 2025 amendment to the NYLL, all such
submissions must be submitted within twenty-eight days of the entry
of this order.

A copy of the Court's order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=UmTH4H from PacerMonitor.com

BONIUK INTERESTS: Faces Garcia Over Restaurant Physical Barriers
----------------------------------------------------------------
ERIK GARCIA v. BONIUK INTERESTS, LTD., Case No. 4:25-cv-04522 (S.D.
Tex., Sept. 23, 2025) is a class action lawsuit brought by the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated compelling the Defendant to
remove the physical barriers to access and correct the Americans
with Disabilities Act violations that exist at the "La Pupusa
Rica," a restaurant located in Houston, Texas (Property).

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff's access to La Pupusa
Rica and other businesses at the Property and/or full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, foods, drinks, facilities,
privileges, advantages and/or accommodations offered were denied
because of the physical barriers and ADA violations that exist at
the Property.

The Plaintiff is required to traverse in a wheelchair and is
substantially limited in performing one or more major life
activities, including but not limited to: walking, standing,
grabbing, grasping and/or pinching.

The Defendant is the owner or co-owner of the real property and
improvements that La Pupusa Rica is situated.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas S. Schapiro, Esq.
          THE SCHAPIRO LAW GROUP, P.L.
          7301-A W. Palmetto Park Rd., No. 100A
          Boca Raton, FL 33433
          Telephone: (561) 807-7388
          E-mail: schapiro@schapirolawgroup.com

CALABASAS BEVERAGE: Negrin Sues Over 818 Tequila's Agave Azul Label
-------------------------------------------------------------------
LAUREN NEGRIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CALABASAS BEVERAGE COMPANY, LLC, K & SODA,
INC. D/B/A 818 SPIRITS, a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case
No. 1:25-cv-24360 (S.D. Fla., September 23, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendants for common law negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and violation of Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' false, deceptive, and
misleading advertising, labeling, and marketing of their 818
Tequila brand. According to the complaint, the Defendants represent
the Tequila products as "100% AGAVE AZUL" and claim on their
website that they work closely with local, family-owned farms in
Jalisco, Mexico to bring the smoothest, most natural, and best
tasting tequila possible. However, testing of the products has
uncovered that they contain material amounts of ethanol not derived
from agave plants, and, as such, they were enhanced with ethanol
other than that obtained from tequilana weber blue variety agave.
Had the Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers known the truth,
they would not have purchased the products or would have paid less
for them, says the suit.

Calabasas Beverage Company, LLC is a beverage manufacturer
headquartered in California.

K & Soda, Inc., doing business as 818 Spirits, is a beverage
manufacturer headquartered in Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Daniel S. Maland, Esq.
       Robert M. Stein, Esq.
       Sandra E. Mejia, Esq.
       RENNERT VOGEL MANDLER & RODRIGUEZ, P.A.
       Miami Tower, Suite 2900
       100 S.E. Second Street
       Miami, FL 33131
       Telephone: (305) 577-4177
       Email: dmaland@rvmrlaw.com
              rstein@rvmrlaw.com
              smejia@rvmrlaw.com

CARDINAL GROUP: Hoffman Sues Over Illegal Holdover Fee Collection
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KASEY HOFFMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CARDINAL GROUP MANAGEMENT & ADVISORY, LLC
d/b/a CARDINAL GROUP MANAGEMENT, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-02978
(D. Colo., September 22, 2025) is a class action against the
Defendant for breach of contract and violations of the Florida
Residential Landlord Tenant Act and the Florida Consumer Collection
Practices Act.

The case arises from the Defendant's practice of charging tenants
holdover fees of $100 per hour in breach of its standard form lease
agreement. According to the complaint, the Defendant devised a
scheme to charge its tenants excessive fees by cutting off the last
day of the lease term at noon, even after being paid in full for
the final day, so that it can charge an unlawful and excessive fee
of $100 per hour for every hour or partial hour past the noon
deadline. As a result of the Defendant's unlawful practice, the
Plaintiff and the Class have been harmed, suit says.

Cardinal Group Management & Advisory, LLC, doing business as
Cardinal Group Management, is a student housing and multi-family
landlord based in Denver, Colorado. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       William H. Anderson, Esq.
       HANDLEY FARAH & ANDERSON PLLC
       1454 Spruce Street, Suite 301
       Boulder, CO 80302
       Telephone: (303) 800-9109
       Facsimile: (844) 300-1952
       Email: wanderson@hfajustice.com

                 - and -

       Simon Wiener, Esq.
       33 Irving Place
       New York, NY 10003
       Telephone: (202) 921-4567
       Facsimile: (844) 300-1952
       Email: swiener@hfajustice.com

                 - and -

       Jeffrey L. Newsome, II, Esq.
       Brian W. Warwick, Esq.
       Janet R. Varnell, Esq.
       VARNELL & WARWICK, P.A.
       400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 1900
       Tampa, FL 33602
       Telephone: (352) 753-8600
       Facsimile: (352) 504-3301
       Email: bwarwick@vandwlaw.com
              jvarnell@vandwlaw.com
              jnewsome@vandwlaw.com

                 - and -

       Thomas M. Bonan, Esq.
       SERAPH LEGAL, P.A.
       2124 W. Kennedy Blvd., Suite A
       Tampa, FL 33606
       Telephone: (813) 567-1230
       Facsimile: (855) 500-0705
       Email: TBonan@SeraphLegal.com

CITY OF NEW YORK: Wins Dismissal of "Friedland" Arrest Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Willow Friedland, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
City of New York, et al., Defendants, Case No. 24cv7064 (DLC)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Denise Cote of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint as time barred.

On June 1, 2020, Plaintiffs Willow Friedland, Steven Gonzalez, and
Miriam Sieradzki attended a Black Lives Matter protest in Midtown
Manhattan at approximately 5:00 pm. That same day, the Governor of
New York and the Mayor of the City announced that there would be an
11:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. curfew. Close to 11:30 p.m., while the
Plaintiffs were walking on the sidewalk on 8th Avenue between West
40th and 41st streets, Friedland noticed a group of NYPD officers
harassing and apprehending a group of young Black teenagers. In
response, Plaintiffs stopped walking and began recording the
officers. Around six officers then approached Plaintiffs, became
verbally aggressive, and instructed Plaintiffs to back up and stop
recording. At about 11:30 p.m., the officers threw the Plaintiffs
to the ground and placed them under arrest. Plaintiffs were
transported via police van to NYPD Midtown Precinct South.
Friedland and Sieradzki were released after 2-3 hours and Gonzalez
after 4-5 hours.

Plaintiffs filed this action on September 18, 2024. Plaintiffs
filed a first amended complaint on November 4, 2024. After
Defendants moved to dismiss on April 25, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the
operative Second Amended Complaint on May 15, 2025. Defendants then
renewed their motion to dismiss. The motion became fully submitted
on August 1, 2025.

The Defendants moved to dismiss this action as time barred. Section
1983 claims brought in the State of New York are subject to a
three-year statute of limitations. A plaintiff's Section 1983 claim
accrues when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury
which is the basis of his action.

The Plaintiffs' claims accrued on June 1, 2020. Due to the tolling
period established by COVID-19 Executive Orders in New York,
however, the limitations period was tolled until November 4, 2020.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs had three years, or until November 4,
2023, to file this action. It was not filed, however, until
September 18, 2024.

The Plaintiffs contended that their time to file this action was
further tolled by the American Pipe tolling doctrine and is
therefore timely. In support, they pointed to a proposed class
action in Sow v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-533-CM-GWG (S.D.N.Y.),
which was brought against the City and other municipal defendants.


Sow was filed on January 21, 2021, on behalf of individuals who
were falsely arrested or had suffered physical and emotional harm
during a wave of BLM protests from Summer 2020 through 2021. The
Sow First Amended Complaint was filed on March 6, 2021, and the
Plaintiffs contended that their claims fall within its definition
of the proposed class.

On August 23, 2023, Judge Colleen McMahon preliminarily approved a
settlement agreement in Sow. This settlement agreement defined the
class in narrower terms than proposed in the Sow First Amended
Complaint. The new class definition limited claims to those made by
those arrested during the George Floyd protests at 18 specified
protest sites within certain geographic boundaries on eight days
between May 28 and June 4, 2020. For arrests made in Midtown
Manhattan on June 1, the class was limited to arrests made at the
protest within the area bordered by East 66th Street, Second
Avenue, East and West 23rd Street, Sixth Avenue, Central Park
South, and Fifth Avenue. The class was certified on February 22,
2024. The Plaintiffs agreed that their claims do not fall within
the certified class.

The Court held that the commencement of a class action suspends the
applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the
class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to
continue as a class action. However, Plaintiffs have no substantive
right to bring their claims outside the statute of limitations. The
purpose behind American Pipe tolling is to preserve the rights of
Plaintiffs who reasonably relied on the class representative, who
sued timely, to protect their interests in their individual
claims.

The Court found that the Plaintiffs' reliance on American Pipe
tolling failed. The Plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied on
the Sow First Amended Complaint definition of its class to toll the
statute of limitations period for their claims, and their assertion
that their individual claims were tolled by that class definition
creates unfair surprise for the Defendants.

The Sow First Amended Complaint defined its proposed class as:

(a) all persons who were targeted for their First Amendment
protected activity including being, inter alia, unlawfully detained
and/or arrested without fair warning or ability to disperse,
subjected to excessive force, and/or subjected to unreasonably
lengthy and unsafe custodial arrest processing during the New York
City protest marches in opposition to police misconduct and in
support of police reform from May 28, 2020 through no earlier than
November, 2020;

(b) all persons who have been or will be unlawfully detained and/or
arrested without fair warning or ability to disperse since May 28,
2020, pursuant to the NYPD's policy, practice, and/or custom of,
without legal justification, conducting retaliatory arrests and
detentions of individuals protesting in opposition to police
misconduct and in support of police reform.

The Court determined that the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
failed to allege facts that allowed it to fit within either prong
of the Sow class definition. First, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint did not link the Plaintiffs' arrests to their
participation in any protest. While it mentioned that they attended
a protest that occurred roughly six hours before their arrests, it
did not state that that protest continued past the 11:00 p.m.
curfew into the time of their arrests at around 11:30 p.m. At
bottom, the Second Amended Complaint did not allege facts to
support a finding either that the Plaintiffs could have reasonably
relied on the Sow First Amended Complaint's class definition to
toll the statute of limitations for their individual claims or that
there is no unfair surprise to the Defendants from an assertion
that the time for them to file their claims had been tolled.

The Court further noted that the Second Amended Complaint did not
plausibly allege that the Plaintiffs were engaged in some other
protest at around 11:30 p.m. such that their arrests are
encompassed by the Sow class definition. The Second Amended
Complaint indicated that the Plaintiffs were simply walking on the
sidewalk outside the New York Times building when they saw an
interaction between the police and teenagers and decided to film
it.

The Plaintiffs principally argued that their arrests fit within the
second prong of the Sow class definition. They emphasized that
their arrests occurred after they began recording NYPD officers who
seemed to be harassing and apprehending a group of young Black
teenagers. However, the Court held that these allegations failed to
describe activities that fall within the parameters of the second
prong of the Sow class definition. Their arrests are not described
in the Second Amended Complaint as arrests of individuals who were
protesting in opposition to police misconduct and in support of
police reform. In addition, the Second Amended Complaint did not
describe arrests that occurred without fair warning or an
opportunity to disperse, both of which were elements of the Sow
class definition. Instead, the Second Amended Complaint alleged
that the Plaintiffs were instructed to back up and stop filming. It
did not allege that the Plaintiffs did either.

The Court concluded that taking the allegations in the Second
Amended Complaint as true, they do not provide a basis to find that
the Plaintiffs could have reasonably relied on the Sow class
definition as tolling the statute of limitations for their claims.
Also, these allegations do not provide a basis to find that the
Defendants had fair notice that the Plaintiffs' arrests were
encompassed within the Sow class action.

Finally, the Plaintiffs relied on an argument that their claims
arguably fall within the Sow First Amended Complaint's class
definition, relying on a formulation articulated in DeFries v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 104 F.4th 1091 (9th Cir. 2024). That
argument failed as well.

The Court found DeFries inapposite for several reasons. The parties
in DeFries agreed that the plaintiff qualified as a putative class
member under the class definition in the original complaint but
disputed whether he was included or excluded in the narrowed class
that was later certified. DeFries therefore did not address whether
American Pipe tolling had begun, but instead addressed when it
should end. The Court noted that DeFries expressly acknowledged the
importance of fair notice to the Defendants for any tolling of the
statute of limitations.

The Defendants did not have fair notice that the arrests of the
Plaintiffs would be encompassed by the Sow class definition in its
First Amended Complaint. Simply put, Sow did not toll the statute
of limitations for every arrest that occurred in New York City on
the same day as a BLM protest.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted.

A copy of the Court's decision dated September 25 is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=YzFrcm from PacerMonitor.com

CONSOLIDATED EDISON: Court OKs Conditional Certification in "Ortiz"
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Nashaily Ortiz, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al.,(S.D.N.Y)
Case No.22 Civ. 8957 (JLR) (GS) Defendants, United States
Magistrate Judge Gary Stein of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification of a collective action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and denied Plaintiffs' motion for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations.

The action was commenced on October 20, 2022 and has been the
subject of two motions to dismiss filed by the CESG Defendants and
Con Edison. The Second Amended Complaint's eight Named
Plaintiffs—Nashaily Ortiz, Isaura Lopez, Ruben Lemus Najarro,
Nashemir Ortiz, Adrianna Gamboa, Steven Allicott, Roberto Rosario,
Jr., and Stephanie Bundrick—alleged they worked as flaggers or
spotters at jobsites operated by Con Edison in New York City and
Westchester County. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the FLSA, on
behalf of themselves and a collective of similarly situated
persons, for failure to pay overtime and failure to timely pay all
wages owed.

In addition to the eight Named Plaintiffs, 17 other individuals
filed consent forms opting in to become Plaintiffs in this action:
Osiris Santos, Adonis Espinal, Miguel Sosa, Melvin Baria, Derrick
Omaro, Roberto Rosario, Marvin Rosado, Pavell Rosado, Henri
Paulino, Raymond Watson, Kevin White, Benjamin Franco, Sanju
Philip, Jorge Cervantes, Hector Lopez, Doreen Polanco, and Rafael
De La Cruz. These consent forms were filed between October 26, 2022
and December 20, 2023. Thus, there are now a total of 25 Plaintiffs
in this case.

The Second Amended Complaint alleged that the CESG Defendants
operate a traffic control services company in Brooklyn, New York
that provides Con Edison with Flaggers and Spotters. The CESG
Defendants provide these flaggers and spotters to Con Edison
through various subcontractors, including the Argani Defendants,
the Concord Defendants, the A&M Defendants, 23 West, and MMT. The
Named Plaintiffs worked for Con Edison, the CESG Defendants, and
one or more of the Subcontractors at various times between August
2018 and April 2023. The Second Amended Complaint alleged that
Defendants jointly employ approximately 400 to 500 flaggers and
spotters at any given time.

Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that an action to recover the
liability prescribed under the statute may be maintained against
any employer by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. The
statute further specifies that no employee shall be a party
plaintiff to such an action unless the employee gives his or her
consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed
in the court in which such action is brought.

The Second Circuit employs a two-step process in FLSA cases
involving a proposed collective action. At step one, the district
court permits a notice to be sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs if
the named plaintiffs make a modest factual showing that they and
others together were victims of a common policy or plan that
violated the law. At step two, with the benefit of additional
factual development, the district court determines whether the
collective action may go forward by determining whether the opt-in
plaintiffs are in fact similarly situated to the named plaintiffs.

The Court found that Plaintiffs submitted declarations from seven
of the Named Plaintiffs and two of the Opt-In Plaintiffs in support
of their motion for conditional certification. Plaintiffs'
Declarations explained when and for which Subcontractor each
Plaintiff worked and set forth facts regarding how Con Edison, the
CESG Defendants, and the Subcontractor controlled various aspects
of the Plaintiffs' employment, including assignment of shifts;
direction and supervision of their work; tracking Plaintiffs' hours
through submission and verification of timesheets and rectifying
discrepancies; and control over the hiring, firing, and discipline
of Plaintiffs.

The Court noted that Plaintiffs alleged, both in the Second Amended
Complaint and in their Declarations, that they routinely were not
paid overtime despite working more than 40 hours per week,
providing examples of specific weeks when this was the case.
Plaintiffs also alleged that they routinely were not paid their
wages on time and had to wait up to two weeks after they were
supposed to be paid, again providing specific examples in their
declarations.

The Court stated that Plaintiffs' declarations have considerable
force when taken together. The Court found that the nine declarants
are joined by another sixteen Employees who have elected to be
Plaintiffs in this lawsuit. Thus, dozens of Employees have asserted
that they have been subjected to the same allegedly unlawful
employment practices described in Plaintiffs' pleading. The Court
determined this is more than sufficient to meet Plaintiffs'
step-one burden to demonstrate that they and other similarly
situated flaggers and spotters were victims of a common policy or
plan that violated the law.

The Court rejected the CESG Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs'
Declarations failed to establish that Plaintiffs and other workers
are similarly situated because the Declarations did not
specifically allege for whom the other workers were employed,
whether the other workers had similar job responsibilities, or at
which jobsite they worked. The Court stated that the Declarations
state that the Plaintiffs spoke with other Employees—defined in
the Declarations to mean Flaggers and Spotters—employed by Con
Edison, the CESG Defendants, and the Subcontractor in question.

The Court found that Con Edison relied almost entirely on the same
arguments it made in seeking to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint on the ground that Plaintiffs had failed to adequately
plead that Con Edison was their joint employer. The Court noted it
rejected these arguments in ruling in the Report and Recommendation
that the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleged that Con
Edison was Plaintiffs' joint employer.

The Court determined that only two of the eight Named Plaintiffs
claimed to have worked for the Concord Defendants, but Plaintiffs'
allegations went well beyond the Concord Defendants'
characterization. The Court found that Plaintiffs Lopez and Najarro
asserted in their declarations that, while they did so, the Concord
Defendants controlled various aspects of their employment, failed
to pay overtime when required, and failed to timely pay them their
wages.

Accordingly, the Court found that Plaintiffs have made the modest
factual showing required to justify conditional certification of an
FLSA collective on October 26, 2022. At the same time, however, the
Court found that Plaintiffs' definition of the collective is too
broad. The Court directed the parties to discuss whether any change
in the definition of the collective is warranted as part of the
meet-and-confer process regarding the Notices.

The Court agreed that the Notices should be provided in Georgian
and Spanish, in addition to English, given the predominant
languages spoken by members of the proposed collective. The Court
also agreed that the Notices should be revised to include a
statement to the effect that Defendants deny that they violated the
law, and the Court has not taken any position regarding the merits
of the lawsuit.

The Court found that the Notices should include a statement to the
effect that if you choose to join this case, you may be required to
provide information, appear for a deposition, and testify in court.
The Court determined that the opt-in period should be 60 days
rather than thirty days.

The Court found that text message is an appropriate form of
alternative notice under the circumstances of this case. The Court
noted that Plaintiffs asserted that there is a high rate of
turnover among flaggers and spotters and none of the nine
Plaintiffs who submitted declarations on this motion remains
employed by Defendants. The Court stated that this action has been
pending for nearly three years, and notice will be sent to flaggers
and spotters who worked for Defendants going back another three
years, to October 2019, increasing the likelihood that collective
members have changed their residence or email address in the
interim.

However, the Court reached a different conclusion with respect to
Plaintiffs' request that notice be disseminated via the CESG
Defendants' Smartphone App and the Concord Defendants' Concord App.
The Court stated that Plaintiffs did not explain why the additional
method of notice via the Smartphone App and Concord App is needed
in this case; instead, they justified it on the ground that it will
ensure that as many Employees as possible are made aware of this
action.


The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for categorical equitable
tolling, without prejudice to an application for equitable tolling
by members of the collective who may opt-in to this action. The
Court emphasized that the test for equitable tolling is not
concerned with the diligence of a plaintiff who has already timely
filed a claim, but rather with the diligence of a plaintiff who is
seeking the application of the doctrine. In the case of an FLSA
collective, that means it is the diligence of the potential opt-in
plaintiffs that is relevant.

The Court stated that determining if equitable tolling is warranted
for potential opt-in plaintiffs is a highly factual issue that
depends on what and when a plaintiff knew or should have known—an
inquiry that is simply impossible to conduct when opt-in plaintiffs
and the facts specific to them have not yet been revealed. The
Court found that because the potential future opt-in plaintiffs
were not before it, there was no basis for a ruling at this time
that equitable tolling was warranted because there has been no
showing that they have met the diligence prong of the equitable
tolling doctrine.

The Court noted that since Contrera v. Langer, numerous courts in
this District have likewise concluded that equitable tolling in
FLSA cases generally should be denied as a categorical matter,
without prejudice to the rights of potential opt-in plaintiffs to
make a future application for tolling upon an appropriate showing
of diligence and extraordinary circumstances.

A copy of the Court's decision dated September 24,2025 is available
at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=xkkQ4p from PacerMonitor.com

DECIEM USA: Blind Users Can't Access Online Store, McCormick Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GRACE MCCORMICK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DECIEM USA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:25-cv-07835 (S.D.N.Y., September 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the New York City Human Rights Law, the New
York State Human Rights Law, the New York State Civil Rights, and
declaratory relief.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually impaired persons. The Defendant's website,
www.theordinary.com, contains access barriers which hinder the
Plaintiff and Class members to enjoy the benefits of their online
goods, content, and services offered to the public through the
website. The accessibility issues on the website include but not
limited to: unlabeled form fields and buttons announced only as
"button"; non-descriptive link text that failed to identify product
categories or names; improper heading structure that disrupted page
navigation; dynamic content-including promotional modals and
regimen tools-not announced to screen readers; and keyboard traps
and inaccessible modal dialogs that prevented progression through
checkout and promotional redemption.

The Plaintiff and Class members seek permanent injunction to cause
a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually impaired individuals.

DECIEM USA, Inc. is a beauty and skincare company, doing business
in New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Robert Schonfeld, Esq.
       JOSEPH & NORINSBERG, LLC
       825 Third Avenue, Suite 2100
       New York, NY 10022
       Telephone: (212) 227-5700
       Facsimile: (212) 656-1889
       Email: Rschonfeld@employeejustice.com

DUKE CAPITAL: Wins Partial Dismissal of "Castillo" FDCPA Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Sarah Castillo, Viktoria Svensson, and
Robin Bean, Plaintiffs, v. Duke Capital, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-00229-JNP-JCB (D. Utah), Judge Jill N. Parrish of the
United States District Court for the District of Utah granted in
part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
second amended complaint. The motion was denied as untimely with
respect to Plaintiffs' Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims,
but granted as to common law claims pursuant to Plaintiffs'
stipulation.

In 2019, Duke Capital filed lawsuits in Utah state court against
Plaintiffs to recover debts it had purchased from prior creditors.
Against all three Plaintiffs, it obtained a default judgment. It
then sought to enforce the judgments through garnishment
proceedings. Plaintiffs then initiated this action as a putative
class-action suit in 2020 in a Utah district court. Duke Capital
removed the action to this court.

After removal, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint
raising five claims: (1) violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. Section
1692 et seq.; (2) violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Protection
Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 13-11-1 et seq.; (3) a request for
declaratory judgment that Duke Capital lacked standing to obtain
any judgment in the state courts and that the default judgments on
the debts were therefore void and unenforceable; (4) intrusion upon
seclusion; and (5) unjust enrichment. The UCSPA claim was based on
the allegation that Duke Capital was not registered with the Utah
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and did not have a
bond as required under the Utah Collection Agency Act, Utah Code
Ann. Section 12-1-1 et seq.

Duke Capital moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs'
claims based on four grounds: (1) the UCAA's licensing requirement
did not apply to Duke Capital; (2) all of Plaintiffs' claims were
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion; (3) all of Plaintiffs'
claims were barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion; and (4)
UCAA licensing violations by themselves cannot support a claim
under the UCSPA. Plaintiffs opposed the motion on the merits and
moved to amend their complaint to remove all parts of their claims
which could be interpreted as a collateral attack on the prior
state court judgments. Duke Capital opposed Plaintiffs' motion to
amend on futility grounds. In its briefing, Duke Capital conceded
its first and third arguments.

The court issued a memorandum decision and order ruling on Duke
Capital's remaining arguments for summary judgment and Plaintiffs'
request to amend their complaint. With respect to claim preclusion,
the court denied summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs' claims,
including their FDCPA claims, did not arise out of the same claim
as the earlier debt collection actions under Utah's claim
preclusion doctrine. With respect to Plaintiffs' claims under the
UCSPA and Utah common law, the court granted Duke Capital's motion
for summary judgment, reasoning that a violation of the UCAA was
not sufficient to create a claim under Utah state law. At the same
time, the court granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint
in part. Because it found that Plaintiffs' FDCPA claims were not
barred by claim preclusion, the court granted Plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaint to remove any allegations that could be
interpreted as a collateral attack on the underlying state court
judgment.

Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint. In this operative
complaint, Plaintiffs removed their request for declaratory
judgment regarding state debt collection actions and their claims
under the UCSPA. But otherwise, the second amended complaint
remained largely unchanged, maintaining claims under the FDCPA and
claims for intrusion upon seclusion and unjust enrichment under
Utah common law.

Duke Capital now brought a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's second
amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. It raised three arguments: (1) all of Plaintiffs'
claims are barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion because
they arise out of the same transaction as the underlying debt
collection actions; (2) Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient
to state a FDCPA claim; and (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege facts
sufficient to state common law claims. In response, Plaintiffs
first argued that Duke Capital's motion is procedurally improper.
Namely, they argued that Duke Capital's motion is untimely under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), which requires a party to
raise a 12(b) motion before answering the complaint. Plaintiffs
also responded to Duke Capital's first two arguments on the merits,
arguing that their claims are not barred by claim preclusion and
that the alleged facts do make out an FDCPA claim. Plaintiffs,
however, conceded their common law claims and stipulated to their
dismissal. Duke Capital maintained that its motion is timely and
continued to defend it on the merits.


The court first determined whether the motion should even be
considered. Plaintiffs argued the motion is untimely under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and thus should be denied by the
court. According to the text of Rule 12(b), a party's 12(b) motion
must be made before pleading. This language suggests that Duke
Capital's Rule 12(b) motion, filed over five years after its
answer, is clearly untimely. Duke Capital raised two arguments for
departing from the strict letter of Rule 12(b). The court
ultimately found these arguments unpersuasive. Neither case law nor
broader considerations of justice and judicial efficiency support
departing from Rule 12(b)'s text. For these reasons, Duke Capital's
motion must be denied as procedurally improper.


The Court found that Duke Capital's first argument for departing
from the text of Rule 12(b) was that its motion is based upon case
law that did not exist when Duke answered the initial complaint.
Duke Capital noted that consecutive Rule 12 motions to dismiss are
permitted when new defenses become available that were not
available at the time of the previous complaint(s). More
specifically, Duke Capital argued that it could not have raised its
Rule 12(b) motion before its answer because it rests on Utah Court
of Appeals cases decided after it filed its answer. But even if one
accepts Duke Capital's premise that Rule 12(b) only bars motions
that could have been made before the party's responsive pleading,
the argument fails because it mischaracterizes the case law. None
of the new appellate decisions cited by Duke Capital meaningfully
supports its current Rule 12(b) motion.

The first two cases on which Duke Capital relied are Haskell v.
Wakefield & Assocs. Inc., 500 P.3d 950 (Utah App. Ct. 2021) and
Haskell v. Wakefield & Assocs., Inc., 557 P.3d 245 (Utah App. Ct.
2024). Duke Capital argued that these two decisions show that the
Utah Court of Appeals implicitly supports a Utah district court's
holding regarding the UCAA. But Haskell I and II simply do not
address the UCAA. Duke Capital is thus unpersuasive in arguing that
its motion is supported by Haskell I and II. According to the Court
"While the holding of the first district court may support Duke
Capital's current motion, Haskell I and II do not come close to
affirming the substance of that holding."

Duke Capital also relied on another case decided by the Utah Court
of Appeals after it filed its answer, LeBaron v. Drs. & Merchants
Credit, Inc., 547 P.3d 855 (Utah App. Ct. 2024). Duke Capital
suggested that LeBaron demonstrates the Utah courts' agreement with
McMurray v. Forsythe Fin., LLC, No. 21-4014, 2023 WL 5938580 (10th
Cir. Sept. 12, 2023) when considering whether claims arising from
the filing of a collection lawsuit are precluded in a subsequent
action.

But this overstates the significance of LeBaron. As Duke Capital
conceded, the Utah Court of Appeals did not endorse the reasoning
of McMurray but rather affirmed on different procedural grounds.
Duke Capital's argument that LeBaron supports its motion rests on
the theory of the dog that did not bark. According to Duke Capital,
the failure of the Utah Court of Appeals to correct the lower
court's application of McMurray reflects agreement. But if one
takes the Utah Court of Appeals at its word, the issue simply was
not preserved for appeal and thus not addressed. The court thus
found that the appellate decision in LeBaron does not support Duke
Capital's motion, and Duke Capital had no reason to wait until
LeBaron to bring its motion.

Duke Capital's second argument for departing from the timing
requirement of Rule 12(b) invoked a much broader exception. It
asserted that courts have frequently heard subsequent Rule 12
motions that have not been brought for purposes of delay where
considering such a motion would expedite the resolution of the case
on the merits.

Duke Capital was correct that there are cases using analogous
language when departing from Rule 12's timing requirements.
However, the court noted important differences between the language
of Rule 12(g) and Rule 12(b), which suggest the case law involving
Rule 12(g) may be inapplicable. Rule 12(g)'s restriction on
successive motions is explicitly qualified and only applies to
motions raising a defense or objection that was available to the
party but omitted from its earlier motion. By contrast, Rule
12(b)'s restriction on post-answer motions is unqualified. This
textual difference suggests the need for heightened caution before
departing from Rule 12(b)'s timeliness requirement.

The court was ultimately not persuaded to permit the broad
exception to Rule 12(b)'s timing requirement proposed by Duke
Capital. The Federal Rules should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. Here,
Plaintiffs alleged FDCPA claims when they first filed a complaint
in federal court. Duke Capital chose to answer the complaint on
April 14, 2020. Now, more than five years later, after discovery is
well under way and Duke Capital's motion for summary judgment was
extensively briefed and considered by this court, Duke Capital
wished to circumvent the plain language of Rule 12(b). Under these
circumstances, the interests of justice and judicial efficiency do
not support giving Duke Capital a second bite at the apple for a
motion it could and should have filed five years earlier. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not a mere technicality but
instead are the primary tool with which the court and the parties
can effectively and predictably labor within the civil justice
system and manage the litigation process. Accordingly, the court
rejected Duke Capital's suggestion to circumvent Rule 12(b).

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' stipulation Duke Capital's motion to
dismiss was granted with respect to Plaintiffs' intrusion upon
seclusion and unjust enrichment claims. With respect to Plaintiffs'
remaining claims, Duke Capital's motion to dismiss was denied as
untimely under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=r2phDO from PacerMonitor.com

EXP REALTY: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Hollis" Do-Not-Call Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Daniel Hollis, Plaintiff, v. eXp Realty
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. C25-0822JLR (W.D. Wash.), Judge
James L. Robart of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington at Seattle denied Defendant eXp Realty LLC's
motion to dismiss Plaintiff Daniel Hollis's amended class action
complaint for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff filed his original complaint against eXp Realty and
Defendant Aaron Yoon in King County Superior Court on April 14,
2025. On May 5, 2025, eXp Realty removed the action to federal
court on the basis of federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
On June 2, 2025, eXp Realty moved to dismiss Plaintiff's original
complaint for failure to state a claim. In response, Plaintiff
amended his complaint.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff raised claims, on behalf of
himself and three proposed classes, against eXp Realty and Mr. Yoon
for negligently, knowingly, or willfully violating the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227, et seq., and the
Washington Telephone Solicitation Statute, RCW 80.36.390, et seq.,
by contacting him by phone and text message to promote eXp Realty's
services. On July 7, 2025, eXp Realty moved to dismiss Plaintiff's
amended complaint.

eXp Realty argued that the court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims
because he had not plausibly alleged that eXp Realty was liable,
either directly or vicariously, for calls and text messages made to
Plaintiff by Mr. Yoon.

The TCPA, as pertinent here, prohibits making telemarketing calls
to residential telephone subscribers who have registered their
telephone numbers on the national do-not-call registry. Persons who
have registered their numbers on the do-not-call registry who
receive more than one telemarketing call in a 12-month period by or
on behalf of the same entity have a private right of action. Courts
should defer to the Federal Communications Commission's
interpretation of a term in the TCPA, so long as the term is not
defined by the TCPA and the FCC's interpretation is reasonable.

There are two potential theories of liability under the TCPA: (1)
direct liability and (2) vicarious liability.

Regarding direct liability, the court noted that generally, a
seller is not directly liable for a call by a third-party
telemarketer, such as an independent contractor, because the seller
is not the person or entity that initiates a telemarketing call. A
seller, however, can be directly liable when it initiates a call on
its own behalf or when it acts through a third party but is so
involved in the placing of a specific telephone call as to be
directly liable for initiating it. The latter situation can occur
where, for example, the seller gives the third party specific and
comprehensive instructions as to timing and the manner of the
call.

To allege a seller's direct liability, a plaintiff must provide
more than conclusory allegations that the seller initiated or
physically dialed a call that violated the TCPA. Instead,
plaintiffs must allege facts to support their belief that the
defendant placed the calls at issue, such as how the caller
identified itself, the substance of the calls, or other details
revealing that the defendant actually took steps to place the
calls.

eXp Realty argued that it did not make or initiate the calls and
text messages that Plaintiff received, and it asserted that
Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege eXp Realty's direct
liability under the TCPA. However, Plaintiff alleged that eXp
Realty, along with Mr. Yoon, made multiple calls to his cell phone.
He also alleged that callers told him that they were acting on
behalf of, or were part of, eXp Realty. The caller told Plaintiff
that the call was on behalf of eXp Realty, and the caller
identified himself as Mr. Yoon at eXp Realty.

Furthermore, Plaintiff included supporting allegations that allow
the court to draw the reasonable inference that eXp Realty
controlled the content of the calls he received: he included the
language of the questions asked in his allegations, and he alleged
that the callers read from the same or similar scripts of questions
to promote eXp Realty. The court concluded that by alleging that
eXp Realty made the calls at issue and by including supporting
allegations to explain his belief that eXp Realty made the calls,
Plaintiff included sufficient allegations, if accepted as true, to
allow the court to reasonably infer that eXp Realty is directly
liable for violating the TCPA.

Regarding vicarious liability, a defendant may be held vicariously
liable for TCPA violations where the plaintiff establishes an
agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, between the
defendant and a third-party caller. To state a vicarious liability
claim, a plaintiff cannot rely solely upon allegations that a call
was made simply to aid or benefit the seller if agency principles
would not impose vicarious liability for the call. Instead,
vicarious liability must be based upon at least one of the
following theories: (1) apparent authority, (2) actual authority,
or (3) ratification.

A plaintiff need not separately plead a particular theory of
vicarious TCPA liability to proceed on that theory. Instead, a
plaintiff who asserts a claim for vicarious TCPA liability should
not be required to develop all of the facts surrounding the agency
relationship at the pleadings stage and need only include
sufficient allegations to support the existence of an agency
relationship.

Apparent authority exists when a third party reasonably believes
the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that
belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations. Apparent
authority exists only as to those to whom the principal has
manifested that an agent is authorized.

Plaintiff alleged that eXp Realty is aware of and has authorized or
caused its agent Mr. Yoon's illegal placement of telephone calls to
individuals who registered their numbers on the do-not-call
registry. In support, Plaintiff alleged that eXp Realty advertises
on its website that Mr. Yoon is one of its real estate brokers and
that eXp Realty encourages consumers to Send Mr. Yoon a Message
directly through eXp Realty's main website.

Plaintiff also alleged that, when he called eXp Realty to request
that eXp Realty cease trying to contact him, he spoke with Robin
McCue, an individual who was serving as a Designated Managing
Broker at eXp Realty. Plaintiff alleged that Ms. McCue stated that
she was Mr. Yoon's manager; that Plaintiff's contact information
had been added to eXp Realty's internal do not call list; and that
the calls to Plaintiff's number would stop. Plaintiff also alleged
that, after this conversation with Ms. McCue, Plaintiff continued
to receive calls from eXp Realty, including a call from Mr. Yoon.

Accepting these allegations as true, as the court must, the court
concluded that based upon remarks made by Ms. McCue, in conjunction
with the information posted on eXp Realty's website, Plaintiff had
pled sufficient factual content to allow the court to reasonably
infer that Mr. Yoon had apparent authority to place calls to
Plaintiff for eXp Realty that violated the TCPA. Consequently,
Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that eXp Realty is vicariously
liable under the TCPA under an apparent authority theory, and the
court need not assess Plaintiff's allegations with respect to his
additional theories concerning actual authority and ratification.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=hSmmgy from PacerMonitor.com

FAMOUS BOURBON: Judge Approves Settlement of "Kikuchi" FLSA Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Lauren Kikuchi, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Famous Bourbon Management Group, Inc., et al., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 20-2764, c/w 20-2991 (E.D. La.), Judge Jane Triche
Milazzo of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana granted the parties' Joint Motion for
Approval of Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Action Settlement.

Plaintiffs in these consolidated lawsuits are former exotic dancers
working or performing at certain commonly owned and operated and
interrelated gentlemen's clubs in Louisiana, including Stiletto's
Cabaret, Scores French Quarter, and Scores West. On December 6,
2022, the Court authorized the distribution of class notice
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). There are 78 Plaintiffs in
this collective action, and the opt-in period has closed.

Plaintiffs named the following entities as Defendants: Famous
Bourbon Management Group, Inc.; Manhattan Fashion, LLC d/b/a Scores
West; Silver Bourbon, Inc. d/b/a Scores French Quarter;
Temptations, Inc. d/b/a Stiletto's Cabaret; and N'awlins
Entertainment Group, Inc. Plaintiffs also named the following
individuals as Defendants: Guy Olano, Jr., Joseph Ascani, Scott
Yaffee, and Raymond Palazzolo. Plaintiffs asserted claims on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated against Defendants
alleging misclassification of the dancers as independent
contractors and failure of Defendants to pay wages in compliance
with the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In their Complaints, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants each
qualified as employers or joint employers under the FLSA for
Plaintiffs and all other exotic dancers working or performing in
the Clubs. On summary judgment, the Court found that Plaintiffs
were employees under the FLSA, but had not yet met their burden to
prove which of the Defendants were their employer(s) for the
purpose of imposing liability under the FLSA. At a July 10, 2025
Settlement Conference before Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld,
the parties negotiated this dispute and agreed to settle all
claims.

The parties proposed a settlement agreement that provides recovery
for the 78 Plaintiffs in this case. Because this case arises under
the FLSA, the Court must approve of the fairness of the settlement.
When employees bring a private action for back wages under the
FLSA, and present to the district court a proposed settlement, the
district court may enter a stipulated judgment after scrutinizing
the settlement for fairness. To pass muster, a settlement agreement
must be both the product of a bona fide dispute and fair and
reasonable.

The Court determined whether a bona fide dispute exists by looking
for a genuine dispute as to the defendants' liability under the
FLSA. In these consolidated cases, Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendants misclassified Plaintiffs as independent contractors and
violated the FLSA by failing to pay minimum wage compensation;
unlawfully taking tips and gratuities; and unlawfully taking
deductions, kickbacks, fees, fines, and assignments from wages.
Throughout this litigation, Defendants denied Plaintiffs'
allegations and asserted numerous defenses that may have defeated
the claims in whole or in part. The parties engaged in discovery
and motion practice, revealing numerous issues of fact and law in
this litigation. Particularly, the parties disputed whether
Defendants could be held liable under the FLSA, either individually
or collectively. Accordingly, the Court found that there is a bona
fide dispute between the parties as to whether Defendants have
violated the FLSA and are liable to Plaintiffs.

The Court noted that before the parties' July 10, 2025 Settlement
Conference, litigation had been ongoing for nearly five years, and
the parties were expected to have a seven-day trial starting August
18, 2025. Extensive discovery has been undertaken and completed,
and motion practice has occurred. All parties involved in these
settlement agreements were represented by counsel in extensive
negotiations and have discussed the potential risks associated with
further litigation. Notably, Plaintiffs are aware that their
potential recovery may be limited by the possible insolvency of
certain Defendants.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs' agreed-to
compensation amounts are within the range of possible recovery for
Plaintiffs in this matter. The settlement amounts were carefully
negotiated based in part on the parties' investigation and
extensive discovery. The Settlement Agreement treats all Plaintiffs
uniformly and awards compensation based upon objective factors
considering each Plaintiffs' claims and participation in the
litigation. Further, the Settlement Agreement sets forth a fair and
reasonable plan to administer the settlement. Accordingly, after
considering these factors and conducting an in camera review of the
Settlement Agreement, the Court found that the Settlement Agreement
shows a fair, just, and reasonable resolution of a bona fide
dispute.

Further, the Court noted that Plaintiffs' Counsel does not seek any
attorney's fees as part of the Settlement Agreement, only those
litigation expenses that were incurred in prosecuting the case. The
Court has been involved in this case since its inception and is
aware of the resources expended on this matter. The Court approved
these expenses as well.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ordered that the Joint Motion
for Approval of Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Action
Settlement is granted.

A copy of the court's order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=CLdUAu from PacerMonitor.com

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE: Faces Suit Over Player Transfer System
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Baskaymaz reports that the summer of 2025 may be remembered as a
turning point in the legal scrutiny of FIFA's (Federation
Internationale de Football Association) transfer system within the
European Union. On 4 August 2025, the Dutch foundation Justice for
Players ("JfP") announced the launch of a collective action against
FIFA and a number of European football associations. The case will
be filed before the District Court of Midden-Nederland under the
Dutch Act on the Settlement of Mass Damages in Collective Action.
It is a bold attempt to confront FIFA's transfer rules at their
core, and it arrives less than a year after the Court of Justice of
the European Union ("CJEU") declared parts of those rules
incompatible with European law.

Legal Background: The Diarra Judgment of the CJEU

This JfP action at hand is anchored in the CJEU's Diarra judgment
of October 4, 2024. In that case, the Court held that several core
provisions of FIFA's Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players ("RSTP") were incompatible with fundamental principles of
EU law, in particular the freedom of movement of workers under
Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU") and the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements under
Article 101 TFEU. The judgment thus struck at the heart of the
regulatory framework governing player mobility.

Lassana Diarra (whose professional career included periods at
Chelsea, Arsenal, Portsmouth and Real Madrid) became the central
figure in this legal dispute. In 2013, he signed a four-year
contract with Lokomotiv Moscow. Barely a year later, the employment
relationship deteriorated after the club-imposed wage cuts, a
decision Diarra contested. Lokomotiv Moscow proceeded to terminate
the contract, and the dispute escalated to FIFA's dispute
resolution chamber and ultimately to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport ("CAS"). CAS concluded that Lokomotiv Moscow had terminated
with just cause and ordered Diarra to pay €10.5 million in
compensation, a sum wholly disproportionate to the player's
earnings capacity.

Yet the consequences extended beyond the award itself. Under the
RSTP as then drafted, a player who terminated a contract without
just cause was not only personally liable for compensation but also
exposed any prospective new club to joint and several liability.
Moreover, the issuance of the International Transfer Certificate, a
prerequisite for registration with a new federation, could be
withheld. Faced with such risks, Belgian club Charleroi abandoned
negotiations to sign Diarra. Although he eventually returned to
professional football with Marseille in 2015, the collapse of the
Charleroi transfer left him sidelined for an entire season,
depriving him of income and competitive continuity.

In response, Diarra initiated proceedings before Belgian courts,
seeking €6 million in damages against FIFA and the Belgian
federation. The Belgian courts, recognizing the broader
implications for EU law, referred questions to the CJEU for a
preliminary ruling. The Court used the opportunity to conduct a
structural examination of FIFA's transfer rules. It was found that
the rules in question imposed restrictions that were neither
inherent nor proportionate to the objectives claimed by FIFA. In
particular, the Court emphasized that the possibility of clubs
competing for talent through recruitment is an essential element of
professional football, and that rules which immobilize players or
predetermine their allocation among employers undermine both market
competition and worker mobility. The CJEU went so far as to
characterize the regime as "similar to a no-poach agreement," a
type of arrangement widely recognized in competition law as
anticompetitive because it suppresses competition for labour.

The Diarra judgment thus made clear that FIFA's regulatory
framework cannot stand above EU law. While the Court acknowledged
the specificity of sport, it reaffirmed that the autonomy of
sporting bodies ends where fundamental Treaty principles begin. In
doing so, it provided not only a victory for Diarra but also a
legal foundation for broader challenges, of which the Justice for
Players action is the first and most ambitious.

The comparison with the famous Bosman ruling was inevitable. Just
as Jean-Marc Bosman's struggle in the mid-1990s reshaped European
football by granting players the right to move freely at the end of
their contracts, the Diarra case has opened the door to a new wave
of litigation. FIFPRO (Federation Internationale des Associations
de Footballeurs Professionnels), the international players' union,
hailed the ruling as a major decision on the regulation of the
labour market in football. It saw in it not only vindication for
Diarra but also an opportunity to restore balance to a system that
had long privileged clubs and governing bodies over individual
players.


The Case at Hand: "FIFA, I want my freedom!"

Against this backdrop, JfP was created as the vehicle for
collective redress. The foundation has moved swiftly, supported by
litigation funder Deminor, which ensures that players face no
financial risks in joining the claim. The Dutch boutique Finch
Dispute Resolution leads the proceedings, while Dupont-Hissel, the
firm that represented Diarra and has been involved in some of the
most consequential sports law cases of the last three decades,
provides additional expertise. Jean-Louis Dupont, the lawyer
synonymous with the Bosman ruling, is advising JfP.

The defendants are as prominent as the claimants. Besides FIFA, the
action targets the football associations of Germany, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. United Kingdom's Football
Association has also been notified and may yet be added. All have
been given until September 2025 to respond to the notice of
action]. If a settlement cannot be reached in advance, the case to
get to court in 2029, JFP expects.

The potential consequences for football are significant. Although
FIFA adopted an interim regulatory framework in December 2024
amending the RSTP (including the methodology for compensation and
certain burdens of proof), FIFPRO and other commentators view the
changes as insufficient and not compliant with the Diarra
principles. If successful, the claim could accelerate a structural
shift in the football labour market. Treating players as ordinary
workers for EU-law purposes weakens the normative basis for
fee-based allocation mechanisms, with predictable effects on
contract duration, wage formation and bargaining dynamics.
Distributional impacts are non-trivial: many clubs—particularly
smaller ones—rely on transfer proceeds and on capitalising player
registrations as intangible assets; an abrupt contraction of such
income, coupled with immediate exposure to damages, raises solvency
and restructuring risks.

Beyond substance, the case underscores the limits of regulatory
autonomy for sporting bodies under EU law and the growing role of
collective redress in sports governance. The proceedings are at an
early stage; public reporting suggests a protracted timetable,
while a settlement-driven redesign of the rules remains plausible
in light of FIFA's stated intention to engage in dialogue and
update the framework.

Regardless of its ultimate outcome, the JfP action forces a
fundamental question: should footballers, like other workers in the
European Union, enjoy full mobility and freedom of contract, or is
football's unique ecosystem sufficient to justify restrictions? The
answer will shape not only the careers of players but also the
finances of clubs, the authority of FIFA, and the very identity of
the world's most popular sport. [GN}

FORTINET INC: Faces Oklahoma Suit Over Drop of Common Stock Price
-----------------------------------------------------------------
OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
FORTINET, INC., KEN XIE, MICHAEL XIE, KEITH JENSEN, and CHRISTIANE
OHLGART, Defendants, Case No. 5:25-cv-08037 (N.D. Cal., September
22, 2025) is a class action against the Defendants for violations
of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

According to the complaint, the Defendants made materially false
and misleading statements regarding Fortinet's business,
operations, and prospects in order to trade KBR securities at
artificially inflated prices between November 8, 2024 through
August 6, 2025. Specifically, the Defendants made
misrepresentations regarding the business impact and sustainability
of a purportedly "record" round of unit upgrades consisting of
approximately 650,000 FortiGate firewalls, or roughly one quarter
of the Company's total FortiGate units. During the Class Period,
Fortinet told investors that this "refresh cycle" was "by far the
largest we've seen probably ever," would generate "around $400
million to $450 million in product revenue" in 2025 and 2026, and
would create strong opportunities to cross-sell additional products
and services. In reality, the Defendants knew that the refresh
cycle would never be as lucrative as they represented, nor could
it, because it consisted of old products that were a "small
percentage" of the Company's business.

When the truth emerged, the price of Fortinet common stock fell
over 22 percent, from $96.58 per share on August 6, 2025, to $75.30
per share on August 7, 2025, on unusually high trading volume. As a
result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the company's
securities, the Plaintiff and Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System is a public
pension fund established in 1980 to administer pension benefits for
Oklahoma firefighters.

Fortinet, Inc. is a cyber security company with its corporate
headquarters in Sunnyvale, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Lesley E. Weaver, Esq.
       BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
       1330 Broadway, Suite 630
       Oakland, CA 94612
       Telephone: (415) 445-4003
       Facsimile: (415) 445-4020
       Email: lweaver@bfalaw.com

               - and -

       Javier Bleichmar, Esq.
       BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
       300 Park Avenue, Suite 1301
       New York, NY 10022
       Telephone: (212) 789-1340
       Facsimile: (212) 205-3960
       Email: jbleichmar@bfalaw.com

               - and -

       Nancy A. Kulesa, Esq.
       Ross Shikowitz, Esq.
       BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
       75 Virginia Road
       White Plains, NY 10603
       Telephone: (914) 265-2991
       Facsimile: (212) 205-3960
       Email: nkulesa@bfalaw.com
              rshikowitz@bfalaw.com

FRESHREALM INC: "Casanares" Wage & Hour Suit Stays in Dist. Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Rhonda Casanares, Plaintiff, v.
FreshRealm, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 4:25-cv-04249-KAW (N.D.
Cal.), United States Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied the Plaintiff's motion to remand the putative
class action to state court on September 23, 2025.

Plaintiff Rhonda Casanares was employed by Defendant FreshRealm,
Inc. as a non-exempt employee in Richmond, California from May 2014
until on or around December 4, 2024. During the relevant time
period, April 8, 2021 to present, Defendant employed approximately
775 non-exempt employees in California. At least 339 of those
non-exempt employees remained employed with FreshRealm after April
8, 2024, while 463 non-exempt employees were terminated from April
8, 2021 to present. All non-exempt employees were paid on a weekly
basis and were considered to be full-time employees who were
typically scheduled for eight-hour shifts, five days per workweek.

Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendant
alleging violation of various California Labor Code provisions.
Plaintiff sought to represent a proposed class of all current and
former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to: (1) pay employees for
hours worked, including minimum wages and overtime; (2) provide
meal and rest periods or provide compensation in lieu thereof; (3)
provide accurate, itemized wage statements; and (4) pay all wages
due upon separation of employment.

With respect to failure to pay wages for all hours worked,
Plaintiff alleged that the putative class was routinely required to
work through their second meal breaks. As to the failure to provide
meal periods, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to provide
legally compliant second meal periods, in addition to impeding,
discouraging, dissuading and/or not relieving Plaintiff and the
Plaintiff Class from all work duties during meal periods. Plaintiff
further alleged that Defendant failed to reasonably make available
rest breaks due to understaffing, workload, and demands. Plaintiff
further alleged that when they worked six (6) to eight (8) hours in
a workday, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class often only received one
rest period instead of the two required by law.

On May 16, 2025, Defendant removed this case to federal court under
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), asserting that the amount in
controversy exceeded $5 million. On June 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed
the motion to remand, challenging Defendant's calculations of the
amount in controversy.

The Court examined whether Defendant met its burden to show by a
preponderance of evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded
CAFA's jurisdictional threshold of $5,000,000.

The Court noted that CAFA gives federal district courts original
jurisdiction over class actions in which the class members number
at least 100, at least one plaintiff is diverse in citizenship from
any defendant, and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5
million, exclusive of interest and costs. The Court further noted
that Congress intended CAFA to be interpreted expansively.

Regarding Plaintiff's general allegations of speculation, the Court
found that Defendant did provide sufficient evidence to support the
number of putative class members, which are approximately 775,
based off of personnel records, and a report generated from
timekeeping records and payroll data. Based on the data, Defendant
estimated that employees only worked 90% of those weeks to account
for vacation, sick leave, and other forms of leave, which totaled
30,751 aggregate weeks. The Court found that these assumptions are
not speculative. The Court noted that Plaintiff did not
meaningfully dispute Defendant's calculation of the average hourly
rate, which is $20.35.

Regarding meal and rest breaks, Defendant estimated that the amount
in controversy for the meal break violations is $1,251,566,
assuming a violation rate of 40%. Defendant estimated that the
amount in controversy for the rest break violations is $1,877,349,
applying a 30% violation rate. Plaintiff's primary argument was
that there is nothing to support 40% and 30% violations rates,
because there is no allegation of policy and practice. The Court
found that Plaintiff has alleged a pattern or practice of missed
rest and meal breaks. The Court found that Defendant's assumption
of a twice per week violation rate for missed meal periods is
reasonable, as is the 30% violation rate for missed rest breaks.
Accordingly, the Court found that the rest and meal breaks totaled
$3,128,915.

Regarding unpaid wages and overtime claims, in calculating the
amount in controversy, Defendant estimated that the overtime claim
is worth $939,751, based on an estimated one hour of uncompensated
overtime per week. The Court calculated this amount to total
$938,828.03. The Court found that this claim is derivative of the
meal and rest period claims, which assumed that at least one meal
or rest period was missed during the week. The Court found the
assumption of one hour of overtime pay per week based on these
allegations is reasonable, increasing the amount in controversy to
$4,067,743.03.

Regarding waiting time penalties, Defendant estimated that the
waiting time penalties claim is worth $2,261,292. The Court noted
that courts in this district and others within the Ninth Circuit
have accepted a 100-percent violation rate where the plaintiff has
(1) tied waiting-time penalties to other claims and (2) the
defendant specifically accounts for only terminated employees. The
Court found that Plaintiff's waiting time penalties are based on
the failure to pay minimum wages, overtime wages, and the meal and
rest penalties. The Court found Defendant's $2,261,292 estimate to
be reasonable. Combined with the estimated overtime and rest period
penalties, the Court found the cumulative amount in controversy is
$6,329,035.03, which exceeds the CAFA jurisdictional threshold for
removal.

Regarding noncompliant wage statements under California Labor Code
Section 226(e), Defendant estimated that Plaintiff's claim is worth
$1,356,000 based on the one-year statute of limitations and the
statutory maximum of $4,000. The Court found that based on the
pleadings, Defendant may assume a 100% violation rate due to the
missed meal and rest periods.

Accordingly, the Court found Defendant's estimate of $1,356,000 to
be reasonable. Combined with the prior amounts, the Court found the
cumulative amount in controversy is $7,685,035.03.

The Court found that Defendant has demonstrated that the amount in
controversy exceeds CAFA's jurisdictional threshold of $5,000,000
and denied Plaintiff's motion to remand.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=rIYx7f from PacerMonitor.com

GERBER PAYROLL SERVICES: Court Strikes Motion to Dismiss "Coghill"
------------------------------------------------------------------
In a case captioned as KENNETH COGHILL, et al., vs. GERBER PAYROLL
SERVICES , et al.,Judge S. Kate Vaughan striked the motion to
Dismiss Dkt, 19, as moot.

Acoording to the Court: Plaintiffs timely filed a Second Amended
Class Action Complaint, Dkt. 26, as provided for in the Court's
Order dated August 15, 2025, Dkt. 25.  Because an amended pleading
supersedes an original or prior amended pleading, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 19, targeting the now "non-existent" First
Amended Class Action Complaint, is properly deemed moot.  

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=UiZMAW from PacerMonitor.com

GOOGLE LLC: Wins Dismissal of BlueChew Data Interception Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as M.D., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Google LLC,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 24-cv-06369-AMO (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Araceli Martinez-Olguin of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted Defendants' motions to
dismiss a putative data privacy class action. The court found that
Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege their claims survived the
consent established by BlueChew's updated privacy policy and lacked
factual support connecting the data sharing practices to the period
before consent was obtained.

Non-party Dermacare, LLC, d/b/a BlueChew, operates www.bluechew.com
and provides a technology platform which enables registered users
to connect with physicians and other health care providers for the
diagnosis and treatment of erectile dysfunction. Plaintiff M.D. is
a California citizen who, on December 6, 2022, and January 4, 2023,
was prescribed and ordered erectile dysfunction medication through
the Website. Plaintiff O.F., a Pennsylvania citizen, purchased
erectile dysfunction medication through the Website in January
2022. Plaintiff J.P., a Maryland citizen, purchased erectile
dysfunction medication through the Website in August 2024.

In using the Website, Plaintiffs and class members provided
protected health information to BlueChew for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment, including providing responses to a
medical profile questionnaire to determine whether they qualify for
erectile dysfunction medication. Defendants intercepted Plaintiffs'
sensitive health information conveyed through the Website using the
Facebook Tracking Pixel, Google Analytics tool, and other similar
software. The data transferred by BlueChew to Google and Meta
included a Website user's name, birthday, email address, and a
pseudonymous identifier created and assigned to them by BlueChew.
The data intercepted and collected also included de-anonymized,
prescription erectile dysfunction medications purchased by
Plaintiffs and class members on the Website.

Google intercepted information showing that a BlueChew user
registered on the Website, added a medication to their cart, and
ultimately purchased the medication. Meta accomplished the same
using its technology. Through the Facebook Tracking Pixel,
Defendant Facebook intercepted and recorded AddToCart and
CompleteRegistration events, which detail information about which
prescription the patient was purchasing on the Website. Plaintiffs'
protected health information intercepted by Defendants was
personally identifiable, and Defendants used Plaintiffs' and class
members' intercepted health information for the purpose of targeted
advertising. At some point after Plaintiffs' respective purchases
on BlueChew's website, they received targeted advertisements
relating to erectile dysfunction medications.

Plaintiffs advanced the following claims in the First Amended
Complaint: (1) violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act,
California Penal Code Section 631; (2) violation of CIPA,
California Penal Code Section 632; (3) invasion of privacy under
the California Constitution; (4) Plaintiff O.F.'s claim for a
violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Section 5701 et seq., on behalf of a putative Pennsylvania class;
and (5) Plaintiff J.P.'s claim for a violation of the Maryland
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Section 10-401 et seq. on behalf of a putative Maryland
class.

M.D. seeks to represent a putative California class including all
natural persons in California who, during the class period,
purchased medication on www.bluechew.com. Plaintiff O.F. brings
claims on behalf of himself and an identical class of persons in
Pennsylvania. Plaintiff J.P. brings claims on behalf of himself and
an identical class of persons in Maryland.

Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs
consented to having their information collected on BlueChew's
website and shared with Defendants. Defendants argued that
Plaintiffs consented to BlueChew's transmission of information
about their activity on its website to service providers like Meta
and Google, pointing to BlueChew's sign-up process. Both Defendants
contended that BlueChew's Privacy Policy disclosed throughout the
relevant time period (2022 to 2024) both that BlueChew may collect
and use information about users' activity on its website and that
BlueChew may share that information.

Court's Analysis

The court noted that consent generally defeats privacy claims. On a
motion to dismiss, the burden of proof to show consent rests with
defendants. Under CIPA, WESCA, and MWESA, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege that the complained-of interception occurred
without consent. To state claims under CIPA Sections 631 and 632,
Plaintiff M.D. must plausibly allege, among other things, that he
did not consent to the alleged interception or recording. Like
CIPA, Plaintiff O.F.'s WESCA claim contains an exception to its
prohibition on the interception of electronic communications where
all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such
interception. Plaintiff J.P.'s MWESA claim likewise protects only
those who do not consent to the interception of their private
conversations. All claims thus rely on the absence of Plaintiffs'
consent to the challenged data interception.

The court found that reference to excerpts within the previous
iterations of BlueChew's Privacy Policy does not establish consent
because the Privacy Policy did not explicitly notify Plaintiffs of
the practice at issue. In order for consent to be actual, the
disclosures must explicitly notify users of the practice at issue.
The older versions of BlueChew's Privacy Policy do not establish
consent because they espouse that BlueChew safeguards sensitive
health information and only shares it with certain third parties
for certain purposes that do not include online advertising. In the
very section relied upon by Defendants, the Privacy Policy
explicitly states: we do not share your personal information with
these third parties their own direct marketing purposes. BlueChew
users may have consented to the disclosure of certain information
to Meta and Google by using the BlueChew Website, but they did not
agree to the disclosure of their private health information under
those earlier Privacy Policies.

The court determined that sometime in 2024, BlueChew changed its
Privacy Policy. The version of BlueChew's Privacy Policy that
appeared on August 16, 2024, clearly stated that BlueChew would use
the Meta Pixel to keep track of what users do after they see or
click on a Facebook or Instagram advertisement on BlueChew's
website and keep track of users who access our Website or
advertisements from different devices. The August 2024 Policy
explained that such user data would be processed by Facebook and
Instagram. The August 2024 Policy described how BlueChew employed
Google Analytics to track users' interactions with the website,
providing several links regarding Google's ability to receive and
use data obtained from the website. The August 2024 Policy also
disclosed that BlueChew collects Personal Information consisting of
health information, and that it shares such Personal Information
with third parties, including for advertising and data analysis.
Most notably, the August 2024 Policy omits a key assertion by
BlueChew that appeared in earlier versions. The August 2024 Policy
thus makes clear that BlueChew would share data about users'
activity on BlueChew's site with both Meta and Google and without
any limitation regarding the sharing of personal information as had
been included in the previous iterations of the Privacy Policy. At
the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the August 2024
Policy establishes users' consent to the data collection practices.
Plaintiffs' claims accordingly may only survive for the period
prior to the adoption of the August 2024 Privacy Policy.

The court held that Plaintiffs' claims fail because they have not
averred that the challenged data sharing practices were in place
before Defendants' obtained Plaintiffs' consent to employ them.
Plaintiffs became aware that Defendants intercepted their personal
information in September 2024, following the August 2024 Privacy
Policy's grant of consent for Defendants' conduct. Though they seek
to challenge the interception of data reaching back several years,
the Complaint lacks any allegations that the data sharing practices
to which users consented in August 2024 were previously undertaken.
As presently alleged, Plaintiffs' claims fail for want of factual
support. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not nudged their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible, and their claims,
which all rely on the absence of consent, all must face dismissal.
The court dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint.

Leave to Amend

The court granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. At
this stage, the court cannot determine as a matter of law that
amendment would prove futile. Plaintiffs may still be able to
proffer factual allegations that support their claims of privacy
violations for the period preceding the adoption of the August 2024
Privacy Policy. Plaintiffs may file any amended complaint by no
later than October 24, 2025. No parties or claims may be added
without leave of Court or stipulation of Defendants.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=wj3Afr from PacerMonitor.com

GRIMAL JOYEROS: Underpays Jewelry Store Attendants, Morales Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
JANET MORALES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GRIMAL JOYEROS CORP. and ANGEL GRIMAL,
Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-24383 (S.D. Fla., September 23, 2025)
is a class action against the Defendants for failure to pay
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Ms. Morales was employed by the Defendants as a jewelry store
attendant from April 20, 2021, through January 18, 2024.

Grimal Joyeros Corp. is a jewelry manufacturer with its place of
business in Dade County, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
       ZANDRO E. PALMA, PA
       9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
       Miami, FL 33156
       Telephone: (305) 446-1500
       Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
       Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com

HARVARD COLLEGE: Weick Seeks Unpaid Personal Time Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
ANNA WEICK, on her own behalf and on behalf of all similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE,
Defendant, Case No. 2581-CV-02269 (Mass. Super., Middlesex Cty.,
September 17, 2025) seeks compensation for Plaintiff's unpaid
personal time wages pursuant to the Massachusetts Wage Act;
statutory enhancement of damages for the late payments; attorneys'
fees and costs; and injunctive relief.

When her employment ended on May 16, 2025, Plaintiff Weick had
accrued unused paid personal days. In her last pay check, Ms. Weick
received wages from her unused vacation time, but she did not
receive wages for her unused personal time. Harvard's practice of
refusing to pay for personal time wages at the end of employment
violates the Wage Act. Those personal time wages remain unpaid and
are, accordingly, outstanding late wage payments under the Wage
Act, says the suit.

Plaintiff Weick is a resident of Ashburnham, Massachusetts, who was
employed at Harvard University from August 23, 2021 to June 20,
2025.

The President and Fellows of Harvard College is the governing body
of Harvard University, an institution of higher education located
in Cambridge, Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Francis J. Bingham, Esq.
          Brook Hopkins, Esq.
          BINGHAM HOPKINS LLC
          20 University Road, Suite 500
          Cambridge, MA 02138
          Telephone: (617) 798-2302
          E-mail: Francis.Bingham@binghamhopkins.com
                  Brook.Hopkins@binghamhopkins.com

               - and -

          Raymond Dinsmore, Esq.
          Richard E. Hayber, Esq.
          Ryan B. Guers, Esq.
          HAYBER, MCKENNA, & DINSMORE, LLC
          One Monarch Place, Suite 1340
          Springfield, MA 01144
          Telephone: (413) 785-1400
          E-mail: rdinsmore@hayberlawfirm.com
                  rhayber@hayberlawfirm.com
                  rguers@hayberlawfirm.com

HHLP COCONUT: Ariza Suit Seeks Equal Web Access for Blind Users
---------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR ARIZA v. HHLP COCONUT GROVE RC LESSEE, LLC, d/b/a ISABELLE'S
COCONUT GROVE, a foreign limited liability company, Case No.
1:25-cv-24368 (S.D. Fla., Sept. 23, 2025) is a class action seeking
to remove Defendant's website,
https://www.isabellescoconutgrove.com, access barriers.

The Website services Defendant's physical restaurant by providing
information on available food and beverage products, services, tips
and advice, editorials, sales campaigns, events, and other
information that Defendant is interested in communicating to its
customers. The Plaintiff is inaccessible because of access
barriers, asserts the suit.

The action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney's
fees, costs, and litigation expenses for unlawful disability
discrimination in violation of Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff is and at all relevant times has been blind and
visually disabled in that he suffers from optical nerve atrophy, a
permanent eye and medical condition that substantially and
significantly impairs his vision and limits his ability to see.
Plaintiff thus is substantially limited in performing one or more
major life activities, including, but not limited to, seeing,
accurately visualizing his world, and adequately traversing
obstacles.

The Defendant also owns, controls, maintains, and/or operates the
restaurant Isabelle's Coconut Grove. The restaurant sells food and
beverage products that Plaintiff intended to patronize in the near
future located at 3330 Southwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roderick V. Hannah, Esq.
          RODERICK V. HANNAH, ESQ., P.A.
          4800 N. Hiatus Road
          Sunrise, FL 33351
          Telephone: (954) 362-3800
          Facsimile: (954) 362-3779
          E-mail: rhannah@rhannahlaw.com

              - and -

          Pelayo M. Duran, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PELAYO DURAN, P.A.
          6355 N.W. 36th Street, Suite 307
          Virginia Gardens, FL 33166
          Telephone: (305) 266-9780
          Facsimile: (305) 269-8311
          E-mail: duranandassociates@gmail.com

HSBC BANK: Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Wages, Discriminatory Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALYSSA CRUZ, on behalf of herself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and
the Class v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A., Case No. 1:25-cv-07945 (S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 24, 2025)seeks to recover unpaid wages, including overtime,
due to time shaving; liquidated damages; and attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York
Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant instituted a nationwide
policy of not compensating meal breaks of employees, despite
employees being forced to work through their meals. The Defendant
required Class members to self-report for meal breaks and for their
weekly work hours. As part of this self-reporting, employees were
instructed to record their exact scheduled hours, including
scheduled meal breaks, and not self-report any hours over 40 hours
in a week, unless overtime work was pre-approved by management.

The Defendant was aware that Class members worked through the meal
breaks and implemented a policy that fostered employers to
self-report less time even though its written policy urged
employees to report accurately, asserts the suit.

The Plaintiff alleges, on an individual basis, that she was
deprived of her statutory rights as a result of the Defendant's
unlawful discrimination practices and hostile work environment on
the basis of gender, in violation of New York State Human Rights
Law, New York Executive Law and New York City Human Rights Law,
Administrative Code of the City of New York.

The Plaintiff alleges, on an individual basis, that Defendant
violated the Family and Medical Leave Act, when they would not
allow her time off due her pregnancy.

The Plaintiff further alleges, on an individual basis, that
Defendant violated the New York City Earned Safe and Sick Time Act
when they denied her sick leave with regards to her pregnancy and
resultant complications.

The Plaintiff further alleges, on an individual basis, that
Defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, when they
failed to accommodate her pregnancy-related disabilities.

HSBC Bank is the American subsidiary of the multinational banking
conglomerate HSBC. During all relevant times, the Defendant has
offered banking and financial services across the United States
while operating and setting nationwide policy from its headquarters
located at 452 Fifth Avenue, New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

IEC GROUP: Black Appeals Amended Suit Dismissal to 9th Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
MELISSA BLACK, et al. are taking an appeal from a court order
dismissing the lawsuit entitled Melissa Black, et al., individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. IEC
Group, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:23-cv-00384-AKB, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Idaho.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
filed their initial complaint alleging numerous claims for relief,
including negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, breach
of implied contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment/quasi contract, and violation of Florida statutory law.

On July 30, 2024, Judge Amanda K. Brailsford granted the
Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice.

On Aug. 20, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which
the Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on Oct.
4, 2024.

On Aug. 21, 2025, Judge Brailsford granted the Defendant's motion
to dismiss with prejudice.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring
their claims for damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.
Since the Court previously granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend,
the Court finds dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.

The appellate case is captioned Black, et al. v. IEC Group, Inc.,
Case No. 25-5952, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, filed on September 22, 2025.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant's Mediation Questionnaire was due on September 29,
2025;

   -- Appellant's Opening Brief is due on November 3, 2025; and

   -- Appellee's Answering Brief is due on December 1, 2025. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants MELISSA BLACK, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Bonner C. Walsh, Esq.
          WALSH PLLC
          1561 Long Haul Road
          Grangeville, ID 83530

                 - and -

          Marc E. Dann, Esq.
          DANN LAW FIRM
          15000 Madison Avenue
          Lakewood, OH 44107

                 - and -

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, PC
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602

Defendant-Appellee IEC GROUP, INC. is represented by:

          Nicole C. Hancock, Esq.
          STOEL RIVES, LLP
          101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900
          Boise, ID 83702

                 - and -

          Bradley R. Prowant, Esq.
          STOEL RIVES, LLP
          33 S. 6th Street, Suite 4200
          Minneapolis, MN 55402

IRA INNOVATIONS: Defeats Sake TN Class Certification Bid
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Sake TN, LLC, and Seanache Homes, Inc.,
for themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Patrick Moss, IRA Innovations, LLC, Mary M. Wester, individually
and as Trustee of the Mary M. Wester Revocable Trust, Alycia White,
as Executrix of the Estate of William J. Gulas, Defendants, Case
No. 3:21-cv-00108 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge Aleta A. Trauger of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

Plaintiff Seanache Homes, Inc. initiated this lawsuit in the
Davidson County Chancery Court in October 2020, asserting state law
claims against twenty-four individuals and entities. In February
2021, Seanache, together with Sake TN, LLC, filed a First Amended
Complaint for themselves and all others similarly situated against
the remaining eleven defendants, asserting the same state law
claims and adding federal claims under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act. The defendants collectively removed the
action to federal court. In July 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a
Second Amended Complaint, substituting for Bill Gulas, who had
died, Alycia White, as the executrix of his estate.

The Court granted the motion to dismiss as to defendant Mike Todd
and denied the motion as to IRA Innovations, LLC. In May 2022, the
Court dismissed with prejudice all claims against defendants Trey
Cain; Kali Cain; Cain & Associates, PLLC; Knox Valley Partners,
LLC; Morris Family Holdings, LLC; and Tennessee Title & Escrow
Affiliates, LLC. Four defendants remain: Patrick Moss; IRA
Innovations; Mary M. Wester, individually and as Trustee of the
Mary M. Wester Revocable Trust; and Alycia White.

According to the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff Seanache is a
real estate developer that primarily funds its projects through
loans. The Second Amended Complaint alleges a scheme among the
defendants to charge usurious interest and loan charges prohibited
by Tennessee law. The Plaintiffs claim that the class members are
entitled to recovery under Tennessee Code Annotated Section
47-14-114. The Plaintiffs seek damages for intentional usury under
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-14-117(c)(1).

The alleged scheme began when Seanache's president met Trey Cain,
who offered to find investors to loan Seanache money for
development and construction projects, to provide legal
representation through Cain's law firm, and to perform the closings
on loans through Tennessee Title. Through this alleged scheme, Cain
brought Seanache lenders; his law firm drafted the loan documents,
including promissory notes; his title company performed the
closings; and the lenders benefitted from payments on the unlawful
interest rates, including by charging extra interest disguised as
transaction funding fees.

The Second Amended Complaint seeks relief based on twenty-two
allegedly usurious loans Seanache executed according to the alleged
scheme. Three of the remaining defendants—IRA Innovations,
Wester, and Patrick Moss—are alleged usurious lenders who
executed promissory notes.

The Plaintiffs asked the Court to certify, under Rule 23(b)(3),
three subclasses:

(1) Usury Class: all persons who paid interest and/or loan charges
from July 22, 2016, to Mary M. Wester or IRA Innovations, LLC based
upon a loan governed by Tennessee law which interest rate and/or
loan charges exceeded the maximum legal rate allowed under
Tennessee law.

(2) Breach of Contract Class: all persons who paid interest and/or
loan charges from July 22, 2013, to one or more of the Class
Defendants, pursuant to a loan governed by Tennessee law that
contained a provision requiring the repayment to maker of any
unlawfully excessive interest and/or loan charges.

(3) RICO Class: all persons who qualify under the Usury Class, and
who from July 22, 2015, paid interest and/or loan charges at twice
the maximum legal statutory rate in the State of Tennessee.

Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of questions of law or fact
common to the class. Commonality requires the Plaintiff to
demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury.
The claims must depend upon a common contention whose resolution
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
of the claims in one stroke.

Usury Claims

Under Tennessee law, a claim for usury has four elements: (1) a
loan or forbearance; (2) an understanding between the parties that
the principal shall be repayable absolutely; (3) the exaction of a
greater profit than allowed by law; and (4) an intention to violate
the law.

The Court found that whether the Class Defendants made loans to
proposed class members is not of such a nature that it is capable
of classwide resolution because Class Defendant Wester admits that
it made loans to Seanache, while Class Defendant IRA Innovations
argues that it is a mere passive administrator that executed
non-discretionary buy-orders from its self-directed IRA
accountholders.

Determining whether the Class Defendants executed loans that were
usurious on their face will require a loan-by-loan examination. The
Court would need to check each promissory note's date and interest
rate and then compare that to the maximum rate allowed on that
date. Whether a usury cause of action accrues depends not only on
each borrower's promissory note, but also on their payment history.
Tennessee usury law provides that no person shall be entitled to an
equitable remedy with respect to usury or excess loan charges
unless the person seeking such remedy does equity by paying, or
tendering into court, the principal plus lawful interest and loan
charges then due.

Tennessee imposes a three-year statute of limitations on usury
claims, which runs from the date of last payment or foreclosure or
court action, whichever ensues first. The Court would need to
decide not only whether each class member's usury claim was
time-barred by looking at the date of the last payment, but also
whether each class member's claim for excessive loan charges was
time-barred by determining the date of payment of the loan
charges.

However, the Court found that whether, if the Class Defendants have
collected usurious interest, they acted unconscionably is
susceptible to classwide proof. Tennessee Code Annotated Section
47-14-117 provides that unconscionable conduct includes any
calculated violation of statutory limitations on interest, loan
charges, commitment fees, or brokerage commissions with full
awareness of those limitations. While the Court would need to
conduct an individualized inquiry to determine whether a given
promissory note had terms that were usurious on its face, whether
the Class Defendants engaged in calculated violations of statutory
limitations is susceptible to classwide proof.

Breach of Contract Claims

The Court found that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
Wester employed standardized contracts. The Plaintiffs' original
brief references the promissory note for the only Mary Wester loan
to Seanache for which Plaintiffs have all of the pertinent
information. The Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief does not append any
exhibits relevant to loans Wester executed. Wester's deposition
testimony, as represented by the Plaintiffs, in combination with
one loan document including a usury savings provision, does not
show that Wester employed standardized contracts such that the
interpretation of their usury savings provision is in fact a common
question.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not met their
burden to identify a common question relevant to the Breach of
Contract Class. The Court denied the Motion to Certify as it
pertains to this subclass.

Court's Analysis: Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance criterion is even more demanding than
Rule 23(a). A plaintiff must establish that issues subject to
generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole
predominate over those issues that are subject to only
individualized proof.

The Court disagreed with the Plaintiffs' argument that individual
considerations would be limited to damages calculations. Broadly,
this case requires each class member to prove, through
individualized evidence, that they have paid usurious interest or
charges in excess of those permitted.

First, the Court must make a choice of law determination for each
promissory note because the Plaintiffs have not presented evidence
showing that all of the notes at issue have a Tennessee choice of
law provision. Plaintiffs' counsel stated that most of the notes
had choice of law provisions that explicitly identified Tennessee
law as applicable, but in some cases, the notes had no choice of
law provisions. For those promissory notes without a choice of law
provision, the Court would need to determine the state in which the
loan was executed.

Second, determining whether a particular loan was usurious under
Tennessee law is a complex, individual inquiry. The Plaintiffs
concede that determination of the interest rate for each note will
require minor individualized review of each applicable note. The
Court would need to look at each note to determine its interest
rate and check the maximum allowable rate at the time to determine
whether the note was usurious on its face.

Third, for each class member, the Court would need to determine
whether a cause of action for usury had accrued. Fourth, for each
class member, the Court would need to determine whether their claim
is time-barred.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that questions common to
Usury Class members do not predominate over questions affecting
individual members.

The RICO Class consists of a subset of the Usury Class: those Usury
Class members who paid interest or loan charges at twice the
maximum legal statutory rate in the State of Tennessee. The
Plaintiffs' RICO claim depends on their state usury claim. The
addition of this one factor does not persuade the Court that the
questions common to the RICO Class members predominate over
questions affecting individual members, which are otherwise
identical to those affecting Usury Class members.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Class Certification is
denied. The Plaintiffs are on notice that the Court will dismiss
defendant White for failure to effect timely service of process.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=8jEYT8 from PacerMonitor.com

JOE SMITH: Court Dismisses Chaplain's Religious Rights Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Nathan E. Brooks, Plaintiff, v. Joe Smith,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:24-cv-378, Judge Charles E. Atchley,
Jr. of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee overruled the Plaintiff's objection to a magistrate
judge's report and dismissed the case without prejudice for failure
to state a claim.

The Plaintiff, an Anglican priest, alleged he served as a volunteer
chaplain at the Hamilton County Jail from 2009 through 2020. In
this role, the Plaintiff participated in Holy Communion and
Anointment for Healing and Deliverance with prisoners. In 2020, the
Hamilton County Jail moved to a new location, Silverdale. After
this occurred, the Plaintiff reached out to Administrative Chaplain
John Waters to ask for instructions regarding how he could conduct
the aforementioned sacraments at Silverdale.

In response, Waters allegedly told the Plaintiff there was no place
for him at Silverdale given that the facility did not have a
chapel. The Plaintiff further alleged that several prisoners were
denied Holy Communion and that he was prohibited from administering
the bread of Holy Communion to prisoners through their cell bars
when they were unable to attend the service with a group of
prisoners.

The Plaintiff also alleged he was prevented from engaging in
ministry during the COVID-19 pandemic. After the pandemic subsided
and the Plaintiff completed treatment for a personal medical
condition, he wrote the Hamilton County Sheriff, Defendant Austin
Garrett, to express his desire to return to the Jail to celebrate
Holy Communion with the prisoners. When his letters to Sheriff
Garrett were met with no response, the Plaintiff reached out to
Defendant Joe Smith who performed prison ministry at Silverdale.
Smith allegedly told the Plaintiff that he could begin ministering
to prisoners again but that the Plaintiff would be unable to
conduct Holy Communion or participate in Anointment. The Plaintiff
then called Defendant Chaplain Jones to state that he and the
prisoners were guaranteed the right to celebrate Holy Communion in
the Jail. In response, Jones told the Plaintiff that she had no
place for him and hung up the phone. The Plaintiff appeared to
believe this, as well as his other difficulties in ministering to
prisoners, was part of a broader conspiracy on the Defendants' part
to deny him and the prisoners their First Amendment rights.

Through his pro se lawsuit, the Plaintiff purported to bring claims
under the Free Exercise Clause through 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and 18 U.S.C.
Section 242. He also asked the Court to certify a class action for
all prisoners who have been denied Holy Communion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Plaintiff recognized that
he could not represent this class, and he asked the Court to
appoint a representative for it.

Because the Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis alongside his Complaint, 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)
obligated the Court to screen this action and dismiss any portion
thereof which is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. United States Magistrate
Judge Christopher H. Steger performed the Section 1915 screening
and concluded that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim for which
relief can be granted.

Specifically, Magistrate Judge Steger recommended the Court:

(1) Dismiss the prisoners' Free Exercise claims based on the
Plaintiff's lack of standing to bring them;

(2) Dismiss the Plaintiff's Free Exercise claim on the ground that
he does not have a constitutional right to administer religious
services in prisons;

(3) Dismiss the Plaintiff's Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act claim based on the Plaintiff's
failure to allege that his religious exercise was burdened by a
land use regulation; and (4) dismiss the Plaintiff's 18 U.S.C.
Section 242 claim on the ground that 18 U.S.C. Section 242 is a
criminal statute which does not provide a private right of action.

The Plaintiff timely objected to the Report and Recommendation. In
his Objection, the Plaintiff did not contest the recommended
dismissal of either his Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act claim or his 18 U.S.C. Section 242 claim. Instead, he
focused his efforts solely on his and the prisoners' Free Exercise
claims relating to alleged prohibition on celebrating Holy
Communion at Silverdale. Specifically, he argued that the gravamen
of this cause of action is not whether plaintiff has standing to
act as next friend of a class of prisoners, nor is it whether
plaintiff has an inherent right to act as a chaplain.

Instead, the Plaintiff contended, the Court should focus on the
attack upon the celebration of the most precious body and blood of
Jesus that amounts to religious discrimination in violation of the
rights of the prisoners to free exercise of religion and the
plaintiff's First Amendment right to free exercise.

Regarding the prisoners' Free Exercise claims, the Court found that
Magistrate Judge Steger correctly recommended their dismissal on
the ground that the Plaintiff lacked standing to sue on the
prisoners' behalf. A party generally must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties.

Third-party standing is limited to cases where the party asserting
the right has a close relationship with the person who possesses
the right and there is a hindrance to the possessor's ability to
protect his own interests. The Court determined that the Plaintiff
had not alleged anything suggesting the prisoners he sought to
certify as a class could not effectively pursue their own Free
Exercise claims. Thus, even assuming that the Plaintiff was
sufficiently close to the prisoners to satisfy the first
requirement of third-party standing, he still could not bring
claims on their behalf, whether individually or as a class action.
Threshold individual standing is a prerequisite for all actions,
including class actions. Accordingly, the Court found the
Plaintiff's objection to this portion of the Report and
Recommendation was without merit.

Turning to the Plaintiff's personal Free Exercise claim, the Court
found that Magistrate Judge Steger correctly recommended it be
dismissed because the Plaintiff does not have a constitutional
right to administer religious services in prisons. The Plaintiff
undoubtedly has a constitutional right to practice his faith, to
minister to others, and to celebrate Holy Communion. But this right
is not without limits. Importantly, courts have consistently held
that clerics do not have an unfettered right to enter correctional
institutions to perform religious services. The Court cited
O'Malley v. Brierley, which held there is no principle in the law
granting to clerics an absolute right to enter a prison.
Accordingly, the Court determined that the Defendants did not
violate the Plaintiff's Free Exercise rights by prohibiting him
from celebrating Holy Communion with the prisoners. Therefore, the
Court found the Plaintiff's objection to this portion of the Report
and Recommendation was without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court overruled the Plaintiff's
Objection. The Court accepted and adopted the findings of fact and
conclusions of law set forth in the Report and Recommendation. This
action was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. All pending motions were denied as moot.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=RlIJuQ from PacerMonitor.com

KENTUCKY: Marcum Appeals Injunction Order to 6th Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------
MADDILYN MARCUM is taking an appeal from a court order in the
lawsuit entitled Maddilyn Marcum, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Cookie Crews, in her
official capacity, et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:25-cv-00238, in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

The Plaintiff in this matter is an inmate in state court requesting
that this Court find Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Sec.
197.280(2) and (3) (the "Public Funds Ban") unconstitutional in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The Plaintiff filed an emergency motion for an injunction pending
appeal.

On Sept. 19, 2025, Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove entered an Order
denying the Plaintiff's emergency motion for an injunction pending
appeal.

This Court issued a decision finding that the Plaintiff did not
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits sufficient to
entitle the Plaintiff to a preliminary injunction. The Commonwealth
of Kentucky has filed a Notice of its intention to respond to the
Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal but not
until September 25, 2025. However, the Plaintiff has not raised any
additional arguments beyond those that were raised in the
Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, and the Court is
well acquainted with the Commonwealth's response to these
arguments. Furthermore, given the nature of relief requested, the
Court finds that the need for a prompt decision weighs in favor of
issuing a decision rather than waiting for the Commonwealth's
response. For the reasons stated here, the Plaintiff has failed to
show why the Court should depart from its previous decision.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's emergency motion for an injunction
pending appeal is denied.

The appellate case is entitled Maddilyn Marcum v. Cookie Crews, et
al., Case No. 25-5840, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, filed on September 22, 2025. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MADDILYN MARCUM, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

         William E. Sharp, Esq.
         ACLU of Kentucky
         325 W. Main Street, Suite 2210
         Louisville, KY 40202
         Telephone: (502) 581-9746

Defendants-Appellees COMMISSIONER COOKIE CREWS, in her official
capacity, et al. are represented by:

         Jennifer Horan, Esq.
         JACKSON KELLY
         100 W. Main Street, Suite 700
         P.O. Box 2150
         Lexington, KY 40588
         Telephone: (859) 255-9500

LENNY'S SHOE: Bennett Sues Over Blind's Equal Access to Website
---------------------------------------------------------------
LIVINGSTON BENNETT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LENNY'S SHOE & APPAREL, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-11424 (N.D. Ill., September 22, 2025)
is a class action against the Defendant for violations of Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act and declaratory relief.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually impaired persons. The Defendant's website,
https://lennyshoe.com, contains access barriers which hinder the
Plaintiff and Class members to enjoy the benefits of their online
goods, content, and services offered to the public through the
website. The accessibility issues on the website include but not
limited to: inaccurate landmark structure, changing of content
without advance warning, lack of alt-text on graphics, redundant
links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the
requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse.

The Plaintiff and Class members seek permanent injunction to cause
a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually impaired individuals.

Lenny's Shoe & Apparel, Inc. is a company that sells online goods
and services, with its headquarters in Barre, Vermont. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       David B. Reyes, Esq.
       EQUAL ACCESS LAW GROUP, PLLC
       68-29 Main Street,
       Flushing, NY 11367
       Telephone: (844) 731-3343
       Facsimile: (718) 554-0237
       Email: Dreyes@ealg.law

LOANDEPOT.COM: Loses Bid to Strike "Hubble" TCPA Class Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Robert Hubble, Plaintiff, v.
loanDepot.com, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:24-cv-11173 (E.D. Mich.),
Judge Thomas L. Ludington of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan, Northern Division, denied the
Defendant's pre-discovery motion to strike class allegations.

In early January 2024, Defendant loanDepot.com began making live
and prerecorded sales calls to Plaintiff Robert Hubble. The
Defendant's calls telemarketed its mortgage and loan products to
the Plaintiff. When the Plaintiff received one of these calls from
a live representative, he would explain that he was not interested
and did not need any mortgage services or loan products. The
Plaintiff would ask the Defendant to cease calling him.

But the Defendant persisted. To stop the sales calls, the Plaintiff
called the Defendant. When he called, a message greeted the
Plaintiff stating, "Thank you for calling loanDepot. To opt-out of
further calls, press one." So the Plaintiff pressed one. Yet the
Defendant's calls continued. Eventually, the Plaintiff located a
live representative of the Defendant. The Plaintiff again requested
that the calls cease. Still, the Defendant's calls continued,
occasionally leaving the Plaintiff prerecorded voicemails. All in
all, the Plaintiff alleges that after he asked the Defendant to
stop calling, the Defendant called him approximately 48 times in
less than a month.

On May 2, 2024, the Plaintiff filed this putative class action
against the Defendant. The Plaintiff's class allegations list two
classes: (1) the Prerecorded Class; and (2) the Pre-recorded Stop
Class. The Plaintiff defines the Prerecorded Class as "Plaintiff
and all persons within the United States who from four years prior
to the filing of this action through class certification Defendant
called using an artificial or prerecorded voice message for the
same purpose Plaintiff was called." By contrast, the Plaintiff
defines the Prerecorded Stop Class as "All persons in the United
States who from four years prior to the filing of this action
through class certification (1) Defendant called (2) using an
artificial or prerecorded voice (3) despite previously requesting
to no longer be contacted."

The Plaintiff asserts two claims under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section 227, one for each class.
First, on behalf of the Prerecorded Class, the Plaintiff asserts
that the Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b) by placing
nonemergent prerecorded telephone calls to the Plaintiff and others
without prior consent. Second, on behalf of the Prerecorded Stop
Class, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant violated 47 U.S.C.
Section 227(b) by making telemarketing calls to the Plaintiff and
others after receiving "do not call" requests.

Shortly after the Plaintiff sued, the Defendant moved to strike the
Plaintiff's class allegations. The Defendant alleges the
Plaintiff's class definitions are vague and overbroad, rendering
them uncertifiable.

Under Civil Rule 12(f), a court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter. Moreover, Civil Rule 23(c)(1)(A) requires a
court to determine whether to certify the action as a class action
at an early practicable time in the case. Based on these two rules,
a defendant may file a motion to strike class allegations before
the plaintiffs move for class certification. The Sixth Circuit
permits motions to strike class allegations before discovery.

However, pre-discovery motions to strike class allegations are
disfavored. Such motions are granted only in the narrow
circumstance where it is impossible to certify the defined class,
regardless of what facts might emerge in discovery. Outside of such
circumstances, the more prudent course is to defer ruling on
certification until discovery provides an adequate record for
resolving the issues.

The Defendant's argument for why the class allegations should be
stricken is two-fold. First, the Defendant argues that the
Plaintiff's class definitions are vague and are thus uncertifiable
for lack of ascertainability because they are defined based on
persons the Defendant "called." Second, the Defendant argues that
the class definitions are overbroad because they could include
calls placed by the Defendant with consent.

Regarding the vagueness argument, the Defendant argues that the
classes are vague because they are defined based on persons the
Defendant "called." The Defendant argues that this indefiniteness
warrants striking the class allegations because "called" could
refer to three categories of people: (i) the person the Defendant
was trying to reach; (ii) the person who answered the phone; (iii)
or the person subscribing to the line. The Defendant contends that
this uncertainty makes it impossible to ascertain the individuals
who fit within the proposed classes. And in the Defendant's view, a
proper TCPA class should be defined based upon ownership of the
cell phone numbers.

The Court acknowledged that ordinarily, TCPA classes are defined
more precisely than just those that a defendant chose to call.
Indeed, for clarity, TCPA classes are usually defined based on
ownership of the cell phone or fax number. But courts have
certified similar class definitions to the Plaintiff's. That is,
courts have certified classes with definitions that feature no
distinction between the three possible categories of people the
Defendant identifies. And in any event, to the extent the
definition needs a little more clarity, such fine-tuning of the
class definition is best left for the class certification stage.
After all, district courts have broad discretion to modify class
definitions. As a result, striking the class definition for
vagueness is not warranted at the pleading stage.

Regarding the overbreadth arguments, the Defendant argues that the
class definitions, as written, could include those who consented to
receive calls from the Defendant. And, according to the Defendant,
because Section 227(b)(1)(A) of the TCPA does not prohibit making
prerecorded calls for emergency purposes or with prior express
consent of the called party, people who consented to the
Defendant's calls lack standing, rendering the classes
uncertifiable in that they could include people without standing.
The Defendant also contends that this overbreadth renders the
classes uncertifiable for lack of commonality.

The Court found these arguments fall short at this stage of the
case. The court noted that  for starters, it is not impossible to
certify a TCPA class with a definition that does not expressly
exclude telecommunication recipients who solicited or consented to
receiving the challenged communications. Indeed, discovery could
reveal a class-wide absence of consent, which would ultimately moot
the Defendant's consent concerns. In other words, further factual
development could alter the certification analysis, which counsels
heavily against striking the Plaintiff's class allegations at the
pleading stage.

Not to mention, the Defendant seemingly faults the Plaintiff for
not pleading a failsafe class. To that end, TCPA class definitions
that are defined in terms of consent render the class a failsafe
class. These classes are failsafe classes because the lack of
consent is a component of liability for TCPA claims. In this way,
TCPA classes that exclude those who consented to the challenged
prerecorded telecommunications consist solely of persons who can
establish that defendant violated the TCPA. In the end, it appears
striking the Plaintiff's allegations based on the Defendant's
consent critique would create a catch-22 for Plaintiffs at the
pleading stage: define your TCPA class in terms of consent and have
your class allegations stricken before discovery under failsafe
principles; don't define it in terms of consent and have it
stricken on other grounds.

The Court concluded that the Defendant's attempt at a first-round
knockout misses the mark: striking the Plaintiff's class
allegations before discovery is not warranted on either ground that
it raises.

A copy of the Opinion and order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=fUgzc1 PacerMonitor.com

LULULEMON ATHLETICA: Faces Patel Shareholder Suit in NY Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lululemon Athletica Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2025, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on September 4, 2025, that on August 8,
2024, the company and certain of its officers were named as
defendants in a purported securities class action captioned "Patel
v. Lululemon Athletica Inc., et al.," No. 1:24-cv-06033) in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.

The complaint asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 based on allegedly false and
misleading public statements and omissions by Defendants during the
period December 7, 2023 to July 24, 2024 relating to lululemon's
business, product offerings, and inventory allocation that
Plaintiff alleges artificially inflated the Company’s stock
price. The complaint currently seeks unspecified monetary damages.

On March 10, 2025, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, asserting
claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 based on allegedly false and misleading public
statements and omissions by defendants during the period December
8, 2023 to July 24, 2024 relating to lululemon's business, product
offerings, and inventory allocation that plaintiffs allege
artificially inflated the company's stock price. The amended
complaint currently seeks unspecified monetary damages. On May 19,
2025, defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint.

Lululemon Athletica Inc., a Delaware corporation, is engaged in the
design, distribution, and retail of technical athletic apparel,
footwear, and accessories with 721 and 711 company-operated stores
as of July 28, 2024 and January 28, 2024, respectively.


MDL 3156: Court Denies Consolidation of 4 Suits in D. Conn.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Karen K. Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation denied the motion filed by Samantha S.
Kumaran to centralize four actions -- two actions from the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut and two actions from
the Southern District of New York -- in the District of Connecticut
under the multi-district action captioned "In re: Samantha S.
Kumaran Litigation," MDL No. 3156.

Ms. Kumaran (a plaintiff in three of the actions) alleges
defendants induced her to open accounts, outsourced discretionary
authority, failed to disclose agreements among them, exchanged
non-public information, and imposed excessive fees. These three
actions involve common factual questions regarding a fraudulent
scheme in which plaintiffs allege that all defendants played a
role. Moreover, in three other actions, the parties are litigating
over confirmation or vacatur of an arbitration award issued in 2023
in defendants' favor. While defendants have sought to confirm the
award, plaintiffs argue the arbitration was biased and the award
must be vacated.

On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing session held, the
panel concluded that centralization will not serve the convenience
of the parties and witnesses or further the just and efficient
conduct of the litigation.  There are just four cases pending
before two judges, and the District of Connecticut judge has stayed
his ruling on overlapping issues in deference to the Southern
District of New York judge. Informal coordination of any
overlapping issues by the involved courts, parties, and counsel
seems practicable and preferable to centralization.

"Given the limited number of parties and courts and significant
overlap among the parties, we are of the view that informal
cooperation and coordination are adequate alternatives to
centralization that should work to minimize any duplication in
pretrial proceedings," rules the panel.

A full-text copy of the court's August 8, 2025 order is available
at
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-3156-Order_Denying_Transfer-7-25.pdf


MDL 3157: False Advertising Suits Transferred to S.D. Ohio
----------------------------------------------------------
In case "In re: Procter & Gamble Company 'Protect, Grow and
Restore' Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation," Judge Karen K.
Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation transfers two cases in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York and one each from the Northern
District of California, Northern District of Illinois, District of
Minnesota and the Western District of Washington, all to the
Southern District of Ohio, with the consent of that court, assigned
them to Judge Douglas R. Cole for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings.

Plaintiffs are individuals who purchased Charmin toilet paper or
Puffs tissues alleging that P&G, which owns the Charmin and Puffs
brands, made false or misleading environmental sustainability
claims about its paper products while sourcing wood pulp derived
from allegedly destructive logging practices in Canada's boreal
forest. They further allege that P&G improperly used Rainforest
Alliance's environmental certification logos to mislead or deceive
consumers into believing that P&G's products are environmentally
friendly. The actions raise common questions of fact, such as
whether P&G overstated the environmental benefits of its products,
whether a reasonable consumer would find P&G's use of Rainforest
Alliance's certifications misleading or deceptive, and whether
plaintiffs overpaid for their P&G paper products.

The Southern District of Ohio is an appropriate transferee district
for this litigation as defendant P&G has its headquarters in this
district, and common witnesses and other evidence likely will be
found in or near this district.

A full-text copy of the court's August 11, 2025 transfer order is
available at
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-3158-Transfer_Order-7-25.pdf


MDL 3157: Seven False Ad Suits Transferred to S.D. Ohio
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Karen K. Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transfers two cases from the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York and one each from the
Northern District of California, Northern District of Illinois,
District of Massachusetts, District of Minnesota, and the Western
District of Washington, all to the Southern District of Ohio, with
the consent of that court, assigned to Judge Douglas R. Cole for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings in the
multi-district action captioned "In re: Procter & Gamble Company
'Protect, Grow and Restore' Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation," MDL No. 3157.

Plaintiffs are individuals who purchased Charmin toilet paper or
Puffs tissues. They allege that P&G, which owns the Charmin and
Puffs brands, made false or misleading environmental sustainability
claims about its paper products while sourcing wood pulp derived
from allegedly destructive logging practices in Canada's boreal
forest. They further allege that P&G improperly used Rainforest
Alliance's environmental certification logos to mislead or deceive
consumers into believing that P&G's products are environmentally
friendly. The actions raise common questions of fact, such as
whether P&G overstated the environmental benefits of its products,
whether a reasonable consumer would find P&G's use of Rainforest
Alliance's certifications misleading or deceptive, and whether
plaintiffs overpaid for their P&G paper products.

The Southern District of Ohio is an appropriate transferee district
for this litigation as defendant P&G has its headquarters in this
district, and common witnesses and other evidence likely will be
found in or near this district, rules the panel.

A full-text copy of the court's August 7, 2025 transfer order is
available at
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-3158-Transfer_Order-7-25.pdf


MDL 3158: 4 Patent Dispute Suits Consolidated in D. Del.
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Karen K. Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transfers two cases from the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois and one each from the
District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, all
to District of Delaware and, with the consent of that court,
assigned to Judge Maryellen Noreika for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings in the multi-district action captioned "In re:
SAP SE, et al., Patent Litigation," MDL No. 3158.

The four actions share factual questions arising from allegations
that defendants, all of which are related companies, infringed one
or more of eight patents concerning data processing, access, and
transfer techniques used by defendants as part of their trading and
market analytics platforms. Defendants in these patent infringement
actions moved to centralize this litigation in the District of
Delaware or, alternatively, the Northern District of Illinois or
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

In opposing centralization, patentholder plaintiffs argue that no
patent is common to all actions, each case involves a unique
defendant and unique allegedly infringing products, and the patents
are not sufficiently related to warrant centralization. However,
the panel does not find these arguments persuasive saying that
while no patent is common to all actions, four of the eight patents
are involved in three of the four actions. Defendants are separate
companies, but they are related, sharing the same parent company.
The two Northern District of Illinois actions, which together
involve seven of the eight patents, have been consolidated.

"This suggests that there are enough similarities among the patents
that centralization of all of the actions in the various districts
may offer important efficiencies," opines the panel.

A full-text copy of the court's August 11, 2025 transfer order is
available at
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-3158-Transfer_Order-7-25.pdf


MDL 3159: 12 Athlete Data Breach Suits Consolidated in E.D. Mich.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Karen K. Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidates eight cases from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and one each
from the Northern District of Illinois, the District of
Massachusetts, the Middle District of North Carolina, and the
Northern District of Ohio all to the Eastern District of Michigan
and, with the consent of that court, assigned them to Judge Mark A.
Goldsmith for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings in
the multi-district action captioned "In re: Keffer Development
Services, LLC, Data Security Breach Litigation," MDL No. 3159.

Defendant Keffer Development Services, LLC moved to centralize this
litigation in the Eastern District of Michigan, while all
responding plaintiffs and defendants opposed the motion. Several of
the opposing parties alternatively supported the Eastern District
of Michigan as the transferee forum.

The panel finds that the 12 actions share factual questions arising
from an alleged breach of Keffer's Athletic Trainer System by
Matthew Weiss, a former assistant football coach at the University
of Michigan. The Athletic Trainer System allegedly is used by
numerous university athletic departments across the country to
maintain medical records for student athletes. Mr. Weiss allegedly
accessed the personal identifying and health information of over
150,000 athletes and then used this information to gain access to
the social media, email, and cloud storage accounts of
approximately 3,300 student-athletes, from which he obtained
private photos and videos without consent.

Plaintiffs in each action are student-athletes who allege that
their private information was compromised by the Weiss data breach.
Plaintiffs in eleven of the twelve actions seek to represent
similar putative nationwide classes of individuals whose
information, images, data, social media, or videos were accessed by
Weiss without authorization.

The opposing parties argue that the common questions regarding
Weiss and Keffer are secondary to the unique questions regarding
each university's liability. However, the panel says this argument
is not persuasive. While the claims against the universities may
involve case-specific questions regarding each university's
relationship with Keffer and its use of the Athletic Trainer
System, the core of the alleged misconduct at the heart of each
case centers on Weiss and Keffer.

"Discovery concerning how Weiss accessed the Athletic Trainer
System and Keffer's database of student information, how and when
the breach was identified, what security measures were in place to
protect students' personal information, and what steps Keffer took
after discovering the breach likely will be common to all actions,"
rules the panel.

Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery as to Weiss and
Keffer; streamline proceedings on class-related
issues; prevent inconsistent rulings on class certification,
particularly with respect to class certification; and conserve the
resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary, adds
the panel.

A full-text copy of the court's August 8, 2025 transfer order is
available at
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-3159-Transfer_Order-7-25.pdf


MONSANTO COMPANY: Faces Kopelman Suit Over Defective Herbicide
--------------------------------------------------------------
JAY KOPELMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
4:25-cv-01424 (E.D. Mo., September 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for negligence, strict products
liability-design defect, strict products liability-failure to warn,
and breach of implied warranties.

The case arises from the personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers as a result of their
exposure to the Defendant's herbicide Roundup, which contains the
active ingredient glyphosate. According to the complaint, Roundup
is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The Plaintiff
and the Class seek compensatory damages as a result of the actions
and inactions of the Defendant.

Monsanto Company is an American agrochemical and agricultural
biotechnology corporation with a principal place of business in St.
Louis, Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Madison Donaldson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF LAW FIRM
         940 North Lincoln Street
         Denver, CO 80203
         Telephone: (303) 376-6360
         Facsimile: (888) 875-2889
         Email: Mdonaldson@wagstafflawfirm.com

                 - and -

         Ken Moll, Esq.
         MOLL LAW GROUP
         180 N. Stetson Ave., 35th Floor
         Chicago, IL 60601
         Telephone: (312) 462-1700
         Facsimile: (312) 756-0045
         Email: kmoll@molllawgroup.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Leung Sues Over Roundup's Impact to Human Health
------------------------------------------------------------------
OLIVIA LEUNG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
4:25-cv-01425 (E.D. Mo., September 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for negligence, strict products
liability-design defect, strict products liability-failure to warn,
and breach of implied warranties.

The case arises from the personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers as a result of their
exposure to the Defendant's herbicide Roundup, which contains the
active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated
tallow amine (POEA). According to the complaint, Roundup is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The Plaintiff
and the Class seek compensatory damages as a result of the actions
and inactions of the Defendant.

Monsanto Company is an American agrochemical and agricultural
biotechnology corporation with a principal place of business in St.
Louis, Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Madison Donaldson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF LAW FIRM
         940 North Lincoln Street
         Denver, CO 80203
         Telephone: (303) 376-6360
         Facsimile: (888) 875-2889
         Email: Mdonaldson@wagstafflawfirm.com

                 - and -

         Ken Moll, Esq.
         MOLL LAW GROUP
         180 N. Stetson Ave., 35th Floor
         Chicago, IL 60601
         Telephone: (312) 462-1700
         Facsimile: (312) 756-0045
         Email: kmoll@molllawgroup.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Roundup Herbicide "Defective," Morgan Suit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM MORGAN, JR., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case
No. 4:25-cv-01428 (E.D. Mo., September 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for negligence, strict products
liability-design defect, strict products liability-failure to warn,
and breach of implied warranties.

The case arises from the personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers as a result of their
exposure to the Defendant's herbicide Roundup, which contains the
active ingredient glyphosate. According to the complaint, Roundup
is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The Plaintiff
and the Class seek compensatory damages as a result of the actions
and inactions of the Defendant.

Monsanto Company is an American agrochemical and agricultural
biotechnology corporation with a principal place of business in St.
Louis, Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Madison Donaldson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF LAW FIRM
         940 North Lincoln Street
         Denver, CO 80203
         Telephone: (303) 376-6360
         Facsimile: (888) 875-2889
         Email: Mdonaldson@wagstafflawfirm.com

                 - and -

         Ken Moll, Esq.
         MOLL LAW GROUP
         180 N. Stetson Ave., 35th Floor
         Chicago, IL 60601
         Telephone: (312) 462-1700
         Facsimile: (312) 756-0045
         Email: kmoll@molllawgroup.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Sells Hazardous Herbicide, Koeritz Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EDWARD KOERITZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
4:25-cv-01423 (E.D. Mo., September 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for negligence, strict products
liability-design defect, strict products liability-failure to warn,
and breach of implied warranties.

The case arises from the personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers as a result of their
exposure to the Defendant's herbicide Roundup, which contains the
active ingredient glyphosate. According to the complaint, Roundup
is defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The Plaintiff
and the Class seek compensatory damages as a result of the actions
and inactions of the Defendant.

Monsanto Company is an American agrochemical and agricultural
biotechnology corporation with a principal place of business in St.
Louis, Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Madison Donaldson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF LAW FIRM
         940 North Lincoln Street
         Denver, CO 80203
         Telephone: (303) 376-6360
         Facsimile: (888) 875-2889
         Email: Mdonaldson@wagstafflawfirm.com

                 - and -

         Ken Moll, Esq.
         MOLL LAW GROUP
         180 N. Stetson Ave., 35th Floor
         Chicago, IL 60601
         Telephone: (312) 462-1700
         Facsimile: (312) 756-0045
         Email: kmoll@molllawgroup.com

MONTVALE NAIL: Kim Sues Over Unpaid Wages and Disability Bias
-------------------------------------------------------------
EUN JUNG KIM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MONTVALE NAIL AND SPA INC., LUCY HE and TAO
WANG, Defendants, Case No. 2:25-cv-15843 (D.N.J., September 22,
2025) is a class action against the Defendants for failure to pay
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, and the New Jersey Wage Payment Law,
and discrimination based on the disability and retaliation in
violation of the American Disability Act and the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a nail technician
at Montvale Nails & Spa from in or around July 2023 to May 2024.

Montvale Nails & Spa, Inc. is a nail salon owner and operator with
its principal place of business in Montvale, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Ryan J. Kim, Esq.
         RYAN KIM LAW, PC
         222 Bruce Reynolds Blvd., Suite 490
         Fort Lee, NJ 07024
         Email: ryan@RyanKimLaw.com

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Breach of Contract Claim Survives Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Mary Washington, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC., Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-1392 (N.D.
Ohio), Judge Charles E. Fleming of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio granted in part and denied in
part Defendant's partial motion to dismiss the second amended class
action complaint. The Court dismissed with prejudice the
Plaintiffs' RESPA, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,
money had and received, overcharges, and constructive trust claims,
while allowing the breach of contract claim and a 36-jurisdiction
putative class to proceed.

On August 21, 2023, the Court issued a memorandum opinion and order
granting Defendant's partial motion to dismiss and allowing
Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint by September
18, 2023. On August 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their second amended
class action complaint. On September 21, 2023, Defendant filed a
partial motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs opposed that motion on
October 15, 2023. Defendant replied in support of the motion on
November 13, 2023.

After the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to file a sur-reply,
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's August
21, 2023 order and a motion to amend their complaint, even though
Plaintiffs were provided the opportunity to amend after the August
21, 2023 order was issued. Defendant opposed both of Plaintiffs'
motions. Plaintiffs replied in support of their motions. Plaintiffs
then filed a motion for leave to point out certain mortgage
language, and to provide two case cites and quote, in opposition to
motion to dismiss and in support of motion for reconsideration. On
May 13, 2024, Plaintiffs supplemented their motion for
reconsideration. Plaintiffs filed additional supplements on January
28, 2025 and March 13, 2025.

In Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, they asserted a general
class not limited to federally-related mortgage loans that raised a
36 state class and a RESPA Subclass (same as above except limited
to federally-related mortgage loans). Plaintiffs alleged a general
class that is not limited to federally related mortgage loans of
everyone who was charged by Nationstar Mortgage LLC or Mr. Cooper
(or any predecessor, successor, nominee, or agent of either) any
Third Party Reconveyance Preparation Fee, Third Party
Reconveyance/Release Preparation Fee, or similar fee, in relation
to any mortgage or mortgages recorded within any of the following
36 jurisdictions (jurisdictions that require lenders to release
satisfied mortgages and do not provide for the charging of other
than actual government fees). The class definition then lists 36
states and territories, including the state of Ohio.

Defendant argued that Plaintiffs' amended pleadings failed to
address the pleading deficiencies the Court identified in its prior
order. Specifically, Defendant noted that Plaintiffs merely stated
that their mortgages are federally related rather than allege facts
that establish how or under what section of 12 U.S.C. Section
2602(1). Defendant contended that Plaintiffs also continued to
argue that the burden is on Defendant to show the fees were
permitted rather than the burden being on Plaintiffs to establish
what the alleged overcharges are and how they fall outside the
scope of the charges allowed in the agreement.

Plaintiffs asserted that they are not required to identify any
provision of law that Nationstar violated or point to any specific
prohibition. They claimed that their RESPA claim can rely on
Defendant not identifying what applicable law expressly authorized
the fees. In Plaintiffs' final filing of supplemental authority,
they attached a case out of the Superior Court of Massachusetts
that interpreted the same provision related to third party
reconveyance preparation fees at issue in this case. The Court was
not persuaded to change its prior interpretation of the phrase
permitted under Applicable Law.

The Court found that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded a
claim under Regulation X and 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(g) of RESPA.
Plaintiffs' RESPA subclass and individual RESPA claims were
dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiffs requested that the Court follow Johnson v. FCA US LLC,
555 F. Supp. 3d 488, 495 (E.D. Mich. 2021), which concluded that
whether it is proper for a class to include out-of-state class
members with claims subject to different state laws is a question
properly resolved at the stage of class certification under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 rather than at the pleading and motion
to dismiss stage. That court noted that two federal appeals courts
have addressed the issue and reached that conclusion. Subsequently,
consensus on this issue in the Courts of Appeals has grown.

In an abundance of caution given this fluctuating area of the law,
the Court allowed the asserted 36-jurisdiction class for breach of
contract to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. The Court
will assess the propriety of that class at the class certification
stage. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied as to the
36-jurisdiction putative class.

Defendant moved for dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, arguing that Plaintiffs still have not alleged
facts to support the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
Plaintiffs argued that Defendant was their servicer and escrow
agent, which created a fiduciary-like duty. In the proposed third
amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant maintained
escrow accounts for them and Defendant acted as a fiduciary when
the money it handled is not its own or for its own benefit.
However, the amended complaint stated that Plaintiffs do not know
if they had a mortgagor-mortgagee relationship with Defendant but
believe Defendant improperly collected these fees as a servicer and
not as a beneficial owner of the mortgage debts.

The Court noted that in Cairns v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 672 N.E. 2d 1058,
1062 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1996), the Ohio Eighth District Court
of Appeals found that the role of mortgage servicing agent did not
give rise to a fiduciary relationship. Plaintiffs' proposed
pleadings in the third amended complaint were not sufficient to
establish a special relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant
required to allege a fiduciary relationship. Defendant's motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim was granted.
Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim was dismissed with
prejudice.

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim
with prejudice. Plaintiffs asserted that the dismissal was wrong
because neither this Court nor Nationstar ever said Plaintiffs have
a remedy under contract or tort. Plaintiffs argued that they should
be allowed to plead unjust enrichment in the alternative and that
the claim should not be dismissed at this stage in proceedings. The
Court found that it did not err in its prior decision and
Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the dismissal of this claim with
prejudice was denied.

Plaintiffs' second amended class action complaint added charges for
money had and received, overcharges, and constructive trust.
Defendant characterized these claims as a recasting of their unjust
enrichment claim, which the Court previously dismissed with
prejudice. The common law claim for money had and received is a
quasi-contractual claim akin to unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs'
second amended complaint explicitly stated that overcharges is
another way of alleging money-had-and received.

A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on
the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted
to retain it. Plaintiffs' claims for money had and received,
overcharges, and constructive trust were dismissed with prejudice.

The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to
dismiss. Plaintiffs' RESPA, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, money had and received, overcharges, and constructive
trust claims were dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration was denied. Plaintiff's motion to amend complaint
was granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs shall file a
third amended complaint solely with regard to the remaining claim
(breach of contract) and putative class by October 15, 2025.
Defendant shall file its answer to the third amended complaint by
November 5, 2025. Plaintiffs' motion requesting leave to point out
certain mortgage language was denied as moot.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=qz6gAF

NEW MEXICO: Prescription Opioids "Addictive," Kinlaw Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KNOX KINLAW, M.D., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RICHARD S. SACKLER; RICHARD S.
SACKLER and DAVID A. SACKLER, as co-executors of the estate of
Beverly Sackler; DAVID A. SACKLER; ILENE SACKLER LEFCOURT; GARRETT
LYNAM, as executor of the estate of Jonathan d. Sackler; KATHE
SACKLER; MORTIMER D. A. SACKLER; RICHARD SACKLER and DAVID SACKLER,
as co-executors of the estate of Raymond Sackler, and THERESA
SACKLER, Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-00918-SCY-JMR (D.N.M.,
September 23, 2025) is a class action against the Defendants for
violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' unfair, deceptive, and
negligent marketing of prescription opioids as safe and
non-addictive through their closely held companies. By their
conduct, the Defendants knowingly exacerbated an opioid epidemic
that affects entire communities, municipalities, towns, and states,
including the Plaintiff's and Class Members' communities, suit
says. As a result, the Plaintiff and the Class lost millions of
dollars each year in providing emergency room health care services
to patients who were opioid addicted, had opioid misuse issues.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Paul S. Rothstein, Esq.
         PAUL S. ROTHSTEIN, P.A.
         626 N.E. 1st Street
         Gainesville, FL 32601
         Telephone: (352) 376-7650
         Facsimile: (352) 374-7133
         Email: psr@rothsteinforjustice.com

NEW SOUTH WALES: Plaintiff Given $93,000 for Police Strip Searches
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Guardian reports that a woman who was illegally strip-searched
by New South Wales police has been awarded $93,000 in a landmark
class action that lawyers believe will "render thousands of
strip-searches" at music festivals unlawful.

Justice Dina Yehia handed down her findings in the NSW supreme
court on Tuesday, September 30, in a class action brought by Slater
and Gordon Lawyers and the Redfern Legal Centre against the state
of NSW over the allegedly unlawful strip-searches conducted by
police at music festivals between 2018 and 2022.

Yehia said there had been a "flagrant" disregard for the rights of
the lead plaintiff, Raya Meredith, and also that the instructions
by police to lift her breasts and remove her tampon during the
search were "egregious".

Meredith was awarded $93,0000 in damages, which included $43,000 in
compensation and $50,000 in aggravated damages. She was also
entitled to exemplary damages, but this figure had not yet been
determined.

Meredith was at Splendour in the Grass when a drug dog sniffed in
her direction but then walked on in 2018. The 27-year-old, who was
postpartum at the time, was then taken into a makeshift tarpaulin
tent, where a female police officer asked her to take all her
clothes off, bend over and bare her bottom, drop her breasts and
remove her tampon. At one point, a male officer walked in
unannounced.

The search found no drugs and nothing else illegal.

"It was a horrible thing to go through," Meredith had said in
emotional testimony on the first day of the class action in May.

But so too, Meredith told the court, was the "gaslighting" she
endured for years by the police force who denied her version of
events, leaving her feeling "violated, yet again".

Days before the class action hearing began, police admitted in
court documents that its strip-search of Meredith was unlawful and
unjustified, and ignored laws protecting her rights.

The state then withdrew the 22 witnesses, mostly police officers,
who were set to contest the lead plaintiff's version of events in
the hearing which took place in May.

Three thousand people have signed on to the class action, but the
affected cohort could be twice as large.

It is yet to be determined what the lead plaintiff's win will mean
for the rest of the group members, but lawyers for group members
said the state could be forced to pay "potentially millions".

"The egregious experience of the plaintiff was not an outlier,"
William Zerno, a senior associate at Slater and Gordon Lawyers,
told reporters outside court.

"[It] was experienced by thousands like it. Minors were
strip-searched. Some people were subjected to cavity searches, and
people were strip-searched in public view and were asked by NSW
police, in some instances, to remove tampons," Zerno said.

Under NSW laws which govern police powers, an officer can only
conduct a strip-search if it is deemed necessary, and there are
serious or urgent circumstances that require it.

In her judgment, Yehia highlighted that there were no records in
the police database that identified how these requirements were met
for all 143 strip-searches officers carried out the day Meredith
was also searched.

She said that "it's not enough" for police to merely rely on their
general experience that patrons at music festivals sometimes
conceal drugs on their body.

Yehia also pointed out that an indication from a drug dog does not
meet the threshold either, with this method only leading to drugs
being found in 30% of cases.

She also deemed that "prior use or possession of cannabis" on its
own cannot meet the strip-search requirements of serious or urgent
because there was no evidence that marijuana causes overdose or
death.

Seventy-four of the people who were searched at the 2018 Splendour
in the Grass had admitted to prior use of marijuana before entering
the festival.

Yehia said the powers that govern strip-searches do not provide
police an express power to direct or force and individual to move
their body parts to facilitate a search. She also pointed out that
cavity searches were prohibited.

"[The instruction for Meredith to] lift her breasts, and the
direction to remove her tampon were beyond the police's powers,"
Yehia said.

Zerno said it was the largest class action against any police force
in history.

"The evidence that was led in this proceeding that the NSW police
undertook searches on industrial level at festivals, and with
little or no regard to the legislative requirements or safeguards
which are intended to check these powers," he said. "This has
significant and far-reaching indications, and we believe that this
will render thousands of strip-searches in this setting unlawful."

Samantha Lee, a senior solicitor at Redfern Legal Centre, said:
"This has been powered by the courage of young people and children.
It is their courage that has brought this case before the court."
[GN]

NEW YORK, NY: C.S. Appeals Amended Suit Dismissal to 2nd Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
C.S., by her parent, K.S., et al. are taking an appeal from a court
order dismissing their lawsuit entitled C.S., by her parent, K.S.,
et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. New York City Public Schools, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 1:24-cv-07600, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought to challenge the Defendants' systematic failure to provide
equal access to education for students with disabilities who are
chronically absent or otherwise suffering from school avoidance
("School Avoidance"), in violation of rights guaranteed by the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"), the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act ("Section 504"), the New York State
Constitution, and New York City's Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL").

On Jan. 8, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which
the Defendants moved to dismiss on Feb. 14, 2025.

On Sept. 4, 2025, Judge John G. Koeltl entered an Order granting
the Defendants' motion to dismiss. To the extent not specifically
addressed, the Court finds that the arguments are either moot or
without merit. Accordingly, the case is dismissed without
prejudice.

The appellate case is entitled C.S., by her parent, K.S. v. New
York City Public Schools, Case No. 25-2286, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, filed on September 22,
2025. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants C.S., by her parent, K.S., et al., on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented
by:

         Susan Joy Horwitz, Esq.
         THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
         2090 ACP Jr. Blvd., 3rd Floor
         New York, NY 10027

Defendants-Appellees NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.
are represented by:

         Barbara D. Underwood, Esq.
         NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
         28 Liberty Street
         New York, NY 10005

NISSAN NORTH: Carper Appeals Suit Dismissal to 6th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------
MELODY CARPER is taking an appeal from a court order dismissing her
lawsuit entitled Melody Carper, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Nissan North America,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 3:23-cv-01293, in the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the suit is
brought to obtain relief from the Defendant regarding the serious
defect in its vehicles' paint.

On Mar. 29, 2024, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss complaint
for failure to state a claim or alternatively to strike national
class allegations and a motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings.

On Aug. 21, 2025, Judge Eli J. Richardson entered an Order granting
the Defendant's motion to dismiss and denying as moot the
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

The appellate case is entitled Melody Carper v. Nissan North
America, Inc., Case No. 25-5850, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, filed on September 23, 2025. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MELODY CARPER, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

         John S. Sawin, Esq.
         SAWIN LAW LTD.
         55 W. Wacker Drive, Suite 900
         Chicago, IL 60601
         Telephone: (312) 853-2490

                 - and -

         Edwin E. Wallis, III, Esq.
         GLASSMAN, WYATT, TUTTLE & COX
         26 N. Second Street
         Memphis, TN 38103
         Telephone: (901) 527-4673

Defendant-Appellee NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. is represented by:

         Brigid M. Carpenter, Esq.
         John Spaulding Hicks, Esq.
         BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ
         1600 West End Avenue, Suite 2000
         Nashville, TN 37203
         Telephone: (615) 726-7341
                    (615) 356-7279

PEACEHEALTH NETWORKS: Aids Google to Access Medical Data, Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
LAURA NICHOLS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PEACEHEALTH NETWORKS ON DEMAND, LLC d/b/a
ZOOMCARE, Defendant, Case No. 2:25-cv-01831 (W.D. Wash., September
22, 2025) is a class action against the Defendant for violation of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant aids, employs, agrees,
and conspires with Google LLC to intercept patients' communications
as they seek medical services and book medical appointments on its
website, https://www.zoomcare.com/, without prior consent. The
Defendant secretly installed tracking technologies on its website
which serve to track and disclose its patients' activity, in real
time, including their protected health information and personally
identifiable information, to Google, suit says. In doing so, the
Defendant undermined the importance of safeguarding the identities
and personal medical information of individuals seeking mental
services and breached its patients' trust, violating state and
federal law, says the suit.

PeaceHealth Networks on Demand, LLC, doing business as ZoomCare, is
a medical provider offering telehealth appointments with its
principal place of business in Vancouver, Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Wright A. Noel, Esq.
         CARSON NOEL PLLC
         20 Sixth Avenue NE
         Issaquah, WA 98027
         Telephone: (425) 837-4717
         Facsimile: (425) 837-5396
         Email: wright@carsonnoel.com

                 - and -

         Alec M. Leslie, Esq.
         BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
         1330 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
         New York, NY 10019
         Telephone: (646) 837-7150
         Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
         Email: aleslie@bursor.com

PELHAM COUNTRY: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Lewis" Overtime Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Kameika Lewis, Ann Pearlina Brown, Adrian
Williams, and Myana Brown, individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Pelham Country Club,
Defendant, No. 23-CV-6500 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2025), Judge
Kenneth M. Karas of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs brought this putative Collective and Class Action
against the Defendant pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq., and the New York Labor Law,
Section 190 et seq. The Second Amended Complaint alleged that the
Defendant failed to pay minimum and overtime wages to the
Plaintiffs, who worked at the Club as golf caddies.

The Defendant is a private golf club in Pelham Manor, New York. The
Club's approximately 250 members must pay a one-time initiation
fee, as well as annual dues. The Plaintiffs each worked at the Club
as golf caddies. Depending on the weather, they would work from May
to October each year. Lewis worked as a caddie at the Club for each
golf season between 2015 and 2020. Williams held that position for
each golf season between 2018 and 2020. Both A. Brown and M. Brown
worked as caddies at the Club for each golf season between 2015 and
2019. The Plaintiffs did not work as caddies anywhere else during
their respective tenures at the Club.

The Defendant employs about 30 caddies at any one time, and those
caddies often work exclusively at the Club for multiple years. Most
of the golfers at the Club use its caddies. In terms of attire, the
Club's caddies are required to wear a blue shirt, khaki pants, and
a Club-provided bib with the Club's insignia.

When caddies start working at the Club, they receive training from
other Club caddies. The caddies' duties include carrying the golf
bag for one or two golfers, which is referred to as doing a loop;
finding, identifying and retrieving golfers' golf balls; cleaning
the golfers' clubs and golf balls; correcting divots on the golf
course; raking sand traps after use; removing the flag from the
hole on the putting green; and providing the golfers with
suggestions on what club to use and information on the course when
asked. At the Club, a round of golf usually lasts around four to
four and a half hours. In a given day, caddies work one or two
rounds.

In addition to its caddies, the Defendant also employed a Caddie
Master whose responsibilities include pairing caddies with golfers;
supervising caddies; interviewing, hiring, and firing caddies;
scheduling caddies' hours and deciding the number of rounds they
work on a given day; disciplining caddies; and discussing any
member complaints about caddies with them.

In general, caddies arriving at the Club for work are required to
check in with the Caddie Master by signing a sign-in book, so that
the Caddie Master knows the caddies are available to be assigned to
a golfer. Typically, caddies arrive for work by around 6:30 a.m.,
and depending on when the sun goes down, caddies generally stop
working between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. Most of the Club's caddies work
six days per week from Tuesday to Sunday, though some caddies also
work on Mondays if there is an outing scheduled. As alleged,
caddies therefore tend to work between forty and fifty-four hours a
week.

With respect to the Plaintiffs themselves, both Lewis and Williams
worked sixty-six hours per week at the Club during the years they
worked there. For their part, A. Brown and M. Brown worked
fifty-seven hours per week during their respective tenures at the
Club.

The Plaintiffs aver that the Club does not pay its caddies any
compensation at all. Instead, caddies like the Plaintiffs receive
payment from golfers directly in the form of so-called Bag Fees.
More specifically, golfers pay caddies a sixty-dollar fee, as
determined by the Club, for each golf bag that they carry during a
round. Caddies are not able to change the Bag Fee or negotiate a
higher Bag Fee, though they do get to keep the entire Fee they are
paid. Further, caddies are under no obligation to share any of the
Bag Fees they receive with the Club.

In addition to Bag Fees, golfers may, at their discretion, tip
their caddies. However, golfers do not always tip caddies in
addition to paying the Bag Fee. The Bag Fees and any additional
tips constitute the sole compensation for caddies at the Club.

The Plaintiffs allege that no agreement existed between the Club
and its caddies that the bag fees or any additional tips from
golfers would count towards the Club's wage payment obligations. In
addition, as alleged, the Club did not keep records of or otherwise
track the Bag Fees paid to caddies; invoice golfers for the Bag
Fees they paid; collect and distribute the Bag Fees to its caddies
on golfers' behalf; take steps to ensure that golfers paid Bag Fees
to golfers; or include caddies' bag fees in its gross receipts.

The Club does not pay caddies any compensation for the time they
spend waiting for the Caddy Master to assign them a golfer. Lewis
heard numerous caddies complain to the Caddy Master about the Club
not paying caddies anything when they were at the Club all day and
did not go out on a loop. In response to these protests, the Caddy
Master would routinely threaten not to assign the complaining
caddie to a golfer. Orlando, who was a caddie with the Club from
2014 to 2023, regularly complained to the Caddy Master about not
getting paid anything when he was at the Club all day but was not
assigned a loop. However, the Club did not change its policies in
response to such complaints.

The Plaintiffs initiated this Action on July 27, 2023. On September
24, 2024, the Court issued an Opinion granting the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, and granting the Plaintiffs leave to file a
second amended complaint. On October 22, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed
the SAC. The Defendant filed the instant Motion on February 7,
2025. On March 7, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed their Opposition. On
March 26, 2025, the Defendant filed its Reply.

In its Motion, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs' claims
should be dismissed because they are untimely, as the Plaintiffs
cannot establish that any FLSA violations were willful, and the
Court should also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claims.

The FLSA statute of limitations is two years for non-willful
violations and three years for willful violations. Here, the
Plaintiffs filed the instant Action on July 27, 2023. Thus, under
the typical two-year statute of limitations, any alleged FLSA
violation must have occurred no earlier than July 27, 2021, and
under the three-year statute of limitations for willful violations
of the FLSA, any alleged violations must have occurred no earlier
than July 27, 2020. However, neither Lewis nor Williams is alleged
to have been employed by the Club after 2020. Thus, to establish
that their claims are timely, the Plaintiffs must show that the
alleged FLSA violations against Lewis and Williams were willful.

An employer willfully violates the FLSA when it either knew or
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by that statute. Therefore, a plaintiff must show more
than that defendant should have known it was violating the law.
Should have known implies negligence or reasonable person standard.
Reckless disregard, in contrast, involves actual knowledge of a
legal requirement and deliberate disregard of the risk that one is
in violation. Put another way, if an employer acts unreasonably,
but not recklessly, in determining its legal obligation under the
FLSA, its action should not be considered willful. The burden is on
the employee to show willfulness.

In the 2024 Opinion, the Court rejected the Plaintiffs' allegations
of willfulness as too conclusory to demonstrate that the three-year
statute of limitations applied. In the SAC, the Plaintiffs amend
their allegations to include two new categories of facts, which
they argue go to willfulness. First, the Plaintiffs allege that
having operated since 1921, the Club is aware of its FLSA
requirements to pay its employees the minimum wage and overtime,
including when they are waiting around for work. Second, the
Plaintiffs allege that the Club received a series of complaints
from caddies about not getting paid anything during the time that
they were required to be at the Club, but not assigned to a loop.

The Court concluded that allegations that the Defendant has been in
operation since 1921 and has managed a number of employees over
that time fail to plausibly allege a willful violation of the FLSA.
These allegations amount to nothing more than evidence that the
Club knew that the FLSA was in the picture, which the Supreme Court
has made clear is insufficient to demonstrate willfulness.

However, as to the second group of the Plaintiffs' allegations that
several caddies complained about the Club's practices, the Court
concluded that the Plaintiffs have plausibly, though barely, pled
sufficient facts to establish willfulness. Courts in the Second
Circuit have held that complaints from employees can put employers
on notice that they are in violation of the FLSA. Here, the
Plaintiffs allege that caddies made repeated complaints about being
required to be in the Club without being paid. The Plaintiffs also
point to allegations that the Caddy Master reacted to these
complaints by threatening to withhold payment opportunities as
evidence that the Club was aware its policy violated the FLSA.

While these allegations are thin, the Plaintiffs' burden at this
stage is merely to allege sufficient facts that render willfulness
plausible. The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged that the Defendant acted willfully, and therefore that the
three-year statute of limitations applies to the FLSA allegations.

In its Motion, the Defendant argued that because the Plaintiffs'
federal law claims fail, the Court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state law claims. Because the
Court rejected the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs'
federal law claims, it retains jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs'
state law claims.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=SYfBBz from PacerMonitor.com

PETER PAN: Court OKs Judgment on Pleadings in "Mulani"
------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Dinesh Mulani and Wesley Batson, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., Defendant, Civil Action No. 24-12277-MGM
(D. Mass.), Judge Mark G. Mastroianni of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings and denied Plaintiff's motion for
leave to amend on September 23, 2025.

This proposed class action alleged Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc.
unlawfully subjects customers to the payment of junk fees.
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, a proposed national class of
all others similarly situated, and a proposed subclass of similarly
situated New York residents, initiated this action, alleging
Defendant's conduct constitutes unjust enrichment (Count I), is in
breach of a contract (Count II), breaches the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing (Count III), violates Mass. Gen. Law
ch. 93A (Count IV), and violates New York Gen. Bus. Law Section 349
and Section 350 (Counts V and VI).

Plaintiffs now admit that Mulani did not purchase a ticket through
Defendant's website. Mulani is therefore dismissed, and the Court
refers to Wesley Batson as Plaintiff.

Operating from its headquarters in Springfield, Massachusetts,
Defendant provides bus services between many major metropolitan
areas throughout the northeast United States. To facilitate ticket
sales, Defendant operates an interactive website that includes a
search feature. The complaint alleges Defendant's website lists one
price before a prospective customer hits the book now button, then
adds several extra fees that only become visible immediately before
the customer checks out. These fees include fuel surcharges,
transaction fees, and departure fees. According to Plaintiff, these
added fees are an example of drip pricing, as they are additional
fees tacked on to a low advertised base price and disclosed later
in the checkout process.

On February 9, 2024, Plaintiff went to Defendant's website with the
intention of buying two tickets to take him from New York City to
Philadelphia. His first search of the website told him each ticket
would cost $11.00, for a total price of $22.00. Plaintiff proceeded
with checkout and, immediately before paying, he noticed he was
also being charged $14.00 in transaction fees. Had he known of
these extra fees before checkout, Plaintiff indicates he would have
taken his business elsewhere.

As to unjust enrichment (Count I), breach of contract (Count II),
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
(Count III) claims, the Court applied Massachusetts law, as there
is an implicit agreement among the parties that Massachusetts law
applies to these specific issues. Plaintiff demonstrated this
agreement by citing Massachusetts law in relation to these claims
in both the operative complaint and briefing. Defendant, while
citing both Massachusetts and New York law when discussing these
claims, also notes the laws are not in conflict on these issues.
Based on its independent analysis, the Court is similarly satisfied
there is no conflict on these counts.

However, as to the consumer protection claims, the Court agreed
with Defendant's argument that there is a true conflict between the
laws of Massachusetts and New York. Chapter 93A, for example,
allows for treble damages without an upper limit, while Gen. Bus.
Law Section 349 caps treble damage awards at $1,000.

Another difference between New York and Massachusetts laws can be
seen with liability. Under Section 349, a person or entity may be
liable if they make a representation or omission likely to mislead
a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. By
contrast, Chapter 93A applies not only to conduct that tends to
mislead consumers, it also prohibits conduct that is (1) within the
penumbra of a common law, statutory, or other established concept
of unfairness; (2) immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
or (3) causes substantial injury to consumers, competitors or other
business people. Given these differences in the scope of liability
and damages under the two provisions, the Court concluded there is
a true conflict between Chapter 93A and Section 349.

The Court applied Massachusetts choice of law rules to determine
which consumer protection law to apply. Massachusetts relies on a
functional choice-of-law approach that responds to the interests of
the parties, the States involved, and the interstate system as a
whole. The Court looked to the relevant portion of the Restatement
governing consumer fraud claims—Section 148(2). Here, Defendant
is headquartered in Massachusetts. Defendant also arguably made the
alleged misrepresentations in Massachusetts, although the Court
accords this factor relatively little weight in the context of
internet advertising. The remaining factors, moreover, counsel
against applying Massachusetts law, as Plaintiff acted in reliance
upon Defendant's alleged representation in New York; Plaintiff
received the representation in New York; the bus ride was to leave
from New York; and Plaintiff was presumably paying Defendant in New
York. Accordingly, the Court joined an unbroken string of opinions
declining to extend Chapter 93A to multi-state classes or a
Plaintiff seeking to establish such a class as it is well
established that under the Restatement, the laws of the home states
of the consumers govern. Count IV is dismissed on choice of law
grounds.

The Court found that even drawing all inferences in favor of
Plaintiff, the complaint is insufficient to plead a breach of
contract claim. The complaint clearly indicates Plaintiff went to
Defendant's website, saw an initial price, clicked through to check
out, saw additional fees, and then proceeded to pay valuable
consideration for the bus ticket after learning of the additional
fees. In other words, the contract formed expressly included the
fees whose inclusion Plaintiff now claims constituted a breach.

There is no plausible allegation Plaintiff failed to get what he
bargained for—a bus trip to Philadelphia for the price he
paid—meaning the complaint fails to allege either breach or
damages. Plaintiff could have walked away from the transaction
after learning of the fees but before paying. Count II is therefore
dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Similarly, Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible violation of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the complaint
does not identify any conduct violating the spirit of the parties'
agreement. To the extent Plaintiff claims Defendant violated its
duty to refrain from withholding material information and making
misleading representations to consumers, this allegation is
contradicted by the rest of the complaint. Plaintiff was clearly
informed of the fees before he paid, meaning this allegation
amounts to a gripe about when he should have been informed.
Accordingly, Count III is dismissed.

Finally, Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is foreclosed because,
a party with an adequate remedy at law cannot claim unjust
enrichment. It is the availability of a remedy at law, not the
viability of that remedy, that prohibits a claim for unjust
enrichment. Accordingly, Count I is dismissed.

According to the Court "To state a claim under either N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law Section 349 or Section 350, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege: (1) an act or practice that was consumer oriented; (2) the
act or practice was misleading in a material respect; and (3) the
plaintiff was injured by the act or practice. Defendant challenged
the sufficiency of the injury element."

The complaint does not contain any factual allegations supporting a
price premium theory of injury. There are no factual allegations
that Defendant's bus tickets were marketed as having a special
quality. Because this allegation is lacking, Plaintiff cannot
allege he paid a premium because of a special attribute, only to
later discover the ticket lacked the special quality. Rather, it is
apparent from the allegations that the complaint's only asserted
injury is a generalized disagreement with when Defendant's website
notifies consumers about the fees. This generalized, nonpecuniary
grievance is not sufficient to establish injury under New York's
consumer protection laws. Accordingly, Counts V and VI are
dismissed.

On December 19, 2024, the Court entered a scheduling order
requiring that any motion to amend the pleadings be filed by
February 12, 2025. In response to Defendant's motion for judgment
on the pleadings, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend on February
24, 2025. Because this motion was filed in violation of the
scheduling order's requirements, the good cause standard of Rule
16(b) applies.

After careful review, the Court found Plaintiff has not established
good cause for amendment. All the additional information that
Plaintiff seeks to add to the complaint could and should have been
included in either the initial complaint or the first amended
complaint. Moreover, defendants routinely attack consumer
protection actions for failing to meet the jurisdictional elements
of state statutes. Therefore, Plaintiff should not have been
surprised that, at minimum, the complaint in this case would need
to establish the jurisdictional applicability of the cited consumer
protection laws. Accordingly, the motion to amend is denied.

For the foregoing reasons,the court granted the Defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings and denied Plaintiff's motion to
amend and closed the case.

A copy of the court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ptLhz5 from PacerMonitor.com

PNC FINANCIAL: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Cardinale Says
------------------------------------------------------------
AMY SUE CARDINALE, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., Case
No. 2:25-cv-01473-RJC (W.D. Pa., Sept. 24, 2025) alleges is a class
action against PNC Financial for its failure to properly secure and
safeguard Representative Plaintiff's and/or Class Members'
protected health information and personally identifiable
information stored within Defendant's information network,
including, without limitation, names, addresses, account numbers
and Social Security numbers.

The Plaintiff seeks to hold the Defendant responsible for the harms
it caused and will continue to cause Representative Plaintiff and
other similarly situated sons in the massive and preventable
cyberattack purportedly discovered by Defendant on Sept. 7, 2025,
by which cybercriminals infiltrated the  Defendant's inadequately
protected network and accessed the Private Information which was
being kept under-protected (the Data Breach).

While the Defendant claims to have discovered the breach as early
as Sept. 7, 2025, the Defendant did not begin informing victims of
the Data Breach until Sept. 10, 2025, and failed to inform victims
when or for how long the Data Breach occurred, the suit says.

Accordingly, the Defendant disregarded the rights of Representative
Plaintiff and Class Members by intentionally, willfully, recklessly
and/or negligently failing to take and implement adequate and
reasonable measures to ensure that Representative Plaintiff's and
Class Members' Private Information was safeguarded, failing to take
available steps to prevent an unauthorized disclosure of data, and
failing to follow applicable, required and appropriate protocols,
policies and procedures regarding the encryption of data, even for
internal use.

The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. is an American bank holding
company and financial services firm based in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
          COLE & VAN NOTE
          555 12th Street, Suite 2100
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (510) 891-9800
          E-mail: sec@colevannote.com

PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN: Court OKs $3.96MM Settlement in "Knight"
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Erik Knight and Jung Kim, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company, Progressive Direct
Insurance Company, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company,
Progressive Specialty Insurance, and Progressive Classic Insurance
Company, Case No. 3:22-cv-00203-JM (E.D. Ark.), Judge James M.
Moody Jr. of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas granted final approval of the class action
settlement and granted the motion for attorneys' fees, litigation
expenses, and service awards.

The Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action
and personal jurisdiction over the Parties and the Settlement Class
Members. The Court previously certified the Settlement Classes in
its Preliminary Approval Order. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court confirmed as final its
certification of the Settlement Classes for settlement purposes
based on its findings in the Preliminary Approval Order and in the
absence of any objections from Class Members to such certification.
The Court confirmed the appointments of Erik Knight and Jung Kim as
Settlement Class Representatives for the Settlement Classes. The
Court confirmed the appointments of Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC,
Jacobson Phillips PLLC, Normand PLLC, Edelsberg Law, P.A., and
Shamis & Gentile as Class Counsel.

Pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court finally approved and confirmed the Settlement embodied in the
Settlement Agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the
best interests of the Settlement Class Members. The Court
specifically considered all factors relevant to class settlement
approval, including the factors set forth in Rule 23(e)(2) and In
re Wireless, 396 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2005).

The Court found that the Class Representatives and Class Counsel
adequately represented the interests of Settlement Class Members,
the settlement consideration provided under the Settlement
constituted fair value given in exchange for the release of the
Released Claims against the Released Parties, and the Settlement
was the result of arm's-length negotiations by experienced,
well-qualified counsel that included a day-long mediation conducted
by a neutral mediator.

The Court found that the notice program as set forth in the
Settlement Agreement and effectuated pursuant to the Preliminary
Approval Order satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 and due process and constituted the best notice
practicable under the circumstances. The Court found that the
Settlement Class Members' reaction to the Settlement was positive,
noting that not one Settlement Class Member objected to the
Settlement, and only two Class Members opted out at this settlement
stage. Two others opted out earlier in response to the notice of
class certification. The four individuals identified in the
Supplemental Declaration of Cameron Azari on Implementation and
Adequacy of Settlement Notice Plan as having timely and validly
requested exclusion from this action and the Settlement Classes
were therefore excluded.

According to the Settlement: "Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(h), the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for
Attorneys' Fees in the amount of $3,963,531.00 because the amount
was fair and reasonable and consistent with fee awards in the
Eighth Circuit and beyond. The attorneys' fee requested was also
supported by this Court's consideration of the factors set forth in
Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),
including the results obtained, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, the skill, experience, and expertise of the
attorneys, the time and labor expended, the customary fee, awards
in similar cases, and the contingent nature of the fee. The Court
approved costs of $112,000.00 incurred by Class Counsel in the
prosecution and settlement of this action. The Court found the
service awards requested were reasonable and warranted, and
approved service awards to each Plaintiff in the amounts of
$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Knight and $5,000 to Plaintiff Kim."

The action was dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear
its own costs.

Upon the Effective Date and by operation of this Order and Final
Judgment, the Settlement Class Members who did not timely exclude
themselves from this action or the Settlement Classes were deemed
to have fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished, and
discharged all Released Claims against the Released Parties.

A copy of the court's settlement is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=8bSwJm from PacerMonitor.com

RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Must Pay Nominal Damages in "Powers"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Stephanie Powers, Plaintiff, v.
Receivables Performance Management, LLC, Defendant, Civil No.
4:21-cv-12125-MRG (D. Mass.), Judge Margaret R. Guzman of the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion for
summary judgment and granted in part the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification. The Court ruled that Powers established a
cognizable claim under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A but
limited her recovery to nominal damages of $25. The Court certified
a class of Massachusetts residents who received excessive debt
collection calls but restricted the class to those not seeking to
prove actual damages.

The Court certified the following class: All persons residing in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who, (1) between September 18,
2014 and September 18, 2018, Defendant initiated in-excess of two
telephone communications within a seven-day period regarding a debt
which was more than 30 days past due to their residence, cellular
telephone, or other provided telephone number; and who (2) do not
seek to prove actual damages.

Receivables Performance Management LLC is a third-party debt
collector located in Washington. The company does not own the debts
it attempts to collect; it is hired by creditors to collect those
debts on their behalf. RPM primarily works with telecommunications
companies to collect debt from past due accounts using a complex
collection management system.

Stephanie Powers, residing in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, alleged
that RPM communicated with her by telephone more than twice in a
seven-day period on multiple occasions while collecting debt.
Powers alleged injuries of invasion of privacy and emotional
distress, claiming RPM's excessive calls were frustrating and
annoying, and caused her fear, anger, anxiety and wasted her time.
The only evidence Powers asserted for her injuries was her own
deposition testimony.

During discovery, RPM produced call data containing the name and
address of debtors called, including the date, time, and result for
each call. A subset identified Massachusetts debtors whose debts
were more than thirty days past due and who were called more than
twice in a seven-day period between September 18, 2014 and
September 18, 2018.

Chapter 93A prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce. The Massachusetts Attorney General stipulated that a debt
collector commits an unfair and deceptive practice by initiating a
communication with any debtor via telephone, either in person or
via text messaging or recorded audio message, in excess of two such
communications in each seven-day period to either the debtor's
residence, cellular telephone, or other telephone number provided
by the debtor as his or her personal telephone number. See 940 CMR
Section 7.04(1)(f).

To succeed on a Chapter 93A claim, a plaintiff must show (1) a
deceptive act or practice on the part of the seller; (2) an injury
or loss suffered by the consumer; and (3) a causal connection
between the seller's deceptive act or practice and the consumer's
injury. The plaintiff must allege a distinct injury or harm, either
economic or non-economic, that arises from the claimed unfair or
deceptive act itself.

The Court examined the First Circuit's decision in Nightingale v.
National Grid USA Service Co., 107 F.4th 1, which involved similar
facts. The First Circuit held that a debt collector violates
Section 2 of Chapter 93A when it initiates the call, even if that
call goes unanswered and regardless of whether the caller leaves a
message. The Nightingale court held that mere receipt of unwanted
communications causes a cognizable privacy-related injury under
section 9 and that emotional injury is cognizable under chapter 93A
even if it is not easily quantified or corroborated by evidence
other than the plaintiff's testimony." The court noted, the
provision for nominal damages of $25 recognizes that Chapter 93A
damages will often be small and hard to measure.

RPM conceded that Nightingale may preclude this Court from entering
summary judgment in RPM's favor on Plaintiff's emotional distress
and invasion of privacy claims, but asserted that Powers should be
limited to nominal damages. The Court agreed.

Powers established all elements of her Chapter 93A claim: RPM
violated Section 2 by initiating excessive communications;
Nightingale established that her alleged injuries were cognizable;
and Powers satisfied causation because her emotional distress
occurred after receiving excessive calls from RPM.

However, Powers failed to demonstrate entitlement to more than
nominal damages. Nightingale held that where evidence of invasion
of privacy or emotional distress is minimal or difficult to
measure, statutory nominal damages of $25 are appropriate. The
Court stated that an emotional injury must be measurable before a
plaintiff can receive actual damages, rather than a statutory
nominal damages award of $25.

According to the Court It was undisputed that Powers did not
possess any documents evidencing emotional distress and had never
spoken with a health care provider regarding RPM causing her
distress. Powers did not suffer any economic or monetary harm as a
result of RPM's alleged conduct. Powers had preexisting mental
health challenges including PTSD, anxiety, and depression dating
back to 2000.

The Court concluded that Powers merely alleged injuries worth more
than a penny that satisfied an award for nominal damages as opposed
to actual damages. As Powers had not shown actual damages, she was
not entitled to treble damages. Plaintiff was entitled to a single
award of $25, not $25 per excessive call. Additionally, each class
member would be eligible for an award of $25. As a prevailing
party, Powers would be eligible for reasonable attorney's fees and
costs.

Accordingly, the Court granted in part and denied in part RPM's
motion for summary judgment. The motion was denied as to the merits
of Plaintiff's Chapter 93A claim but granted as to its request to
limit damages to $25.

The Court addressed whether Powers satisfied Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23's requirements: (1) numerosity, (2) common questions
of law or fact, (3) typicality, and (4) adequate representation.
Additionally, plaintiff must demonstrate that common questions
predominate over individual questions and that class action is the
superior method of adjudicating the controversy.

The Court amended Powers' class definition to include only those
not seeking to prove actual damages. This avoided complicated
adjudication of individual actual damages and matched the class
membership to the claims Powers actually represented. The Court
stated that in limiting Powers' recovery to nominal damages, RPM's
arguments that her damages may differ from other class members no
longer carried weight.

Ascertainability

Before addressing Rule 23 requirements, the Court determined
whether the class was ascertainable. Ascertainability requires that
a class be administratively feasible to determine whether a
particular individual is a member using stable and objective
factors.

RPM argued its call data was unreliable and determining which
consumers lived in Massachusetts, which calls were inbound, or
which phone numbers were linked only to businesses would require
individualized investigation and analysis.

The Court sided with Powers, finding that RPM's call data was
complete enough to identify class members falling within the debt
collection regulation's criteria. The Call Data contained fixed
data points including consumer addresses, debt status, number of
calls placed, timing of calls, and call results. The Court stated
that a plaintiff need not identify every class member prior to
certification, instead, the Court must be able to discern whether
class members are included or excluded from the class by reference
to objective criteria. The data provided this "objective
criteria."

The Court distinguished this case from Nightingale on remand, where
the District Court declined to certify a class because the
defendant's data required intensive, manual, individualized review.
The Call Data here was not plagued by the same deficiencies. In
Nightingale, the call data was not limited to Massachusetts
addresses, did not include debt status, and included inbound calls
that could not be sorted out.

The Court declined to reward RPM for keeping flawed data, stating
that a defendant's failure to maintain adequate records is not a
legitimate basis for denying certification. The Court noted that
denying certification based on defendant's data issues would create
an incentive for a person to violate consumer protection
regulations on a mass scale and keep no records of its activity,
knowing that it could avoid legal responsibility for the full scope
of its illegal conduct.

Numerosity, Commonality, Typicality, and Adequacy

Plaintiff easily met numerosity due to the large number of
potential class members derived from the Call Data. For
commonality, Powers raised whether Defendant violated Chapter 93A
and 940 CMR Section 7.04(1)(f) by placing in excess of two debt
collection calls per debt per seven-day period. This common
question was directly on point to the case allegations. Powers met
typicality because she and proposed class members shared the same
baseline injury: RPM initiated excess communications regarding
debts more than 30 days past due. Powers satisfied adequacy because
her interests were exactly aligned with the proposed class limited
to nominal damages, and her attorney was qualified and experienced
in consumer rights litigation.

Predominance and Superiority

Common issues predominated because liability as to each class
member depended on: (1) whether the debtor was a natural person;
(2) whether the individual owed a debt more than thirty days past
due; (3) whether RPM initiated calls more than twice within seven
days; (4) whether the individual's address on file was a
Massachusetts address; and (5) whether calls were made within the
limitations period. These questions can be addressed either on a
class-wide basis, or in an individualized manner that is neither
inefficient nor unfair. The majority could be answered using RPM's
Call Data.

Powers argued class resolution was superior to individual
adjudication because claims involved a low statutory penalty making
it neither economically feasible nor judicially efficient for
thousands of class members to pursue claims individually. The Court
agreed, noting this action presented exactly the type of claim
suited for class resolution because it permitted the plaintiffs to
pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.
The First Circuit stated, the core purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) is to
vindicate the claims of consumers and other groups of people whose
individual claims would be too small to warrant litigation.

The Court granted in part and denied in part RPM's motion for
summary judgment. The motion was denied as to the merits of
Plaintiff's Chapter 93A claim but granted as to its request to
limit damages to nominal damages of $25. The Court granted in part
Powers' motion to certify class with amendments to the class
definition.

A copy of the court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=CKeJ40 from PacerMonitor.com

RIO TINTO: PNG National Court Dismisses Copper Mine Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Muflih Hidayat, writing for Discovery Alert, reports that The Papua
New Guinea National Court has dismissed a multi-billion-dollar
class action lawsuit against Rio Tinto and its former subsidiary
over alleged damages from the historic Panguna copper mine in
Bougainville. This landmark ruling, announced in September 2025,
marks the end of a significant legal battle that involved over
5,000 claimants seeking compensation for environmental and social
harms allegedly caused by mining operations that ceased over three
decades ago.

Background of the Legal Challenge

The dismissed lawsuit sought billions in reparations for
environmental degradation and social disruption allegedly resulting
from the mine's operations. Filed on behalf of thousands of local
residents, the legal action represented one of the most significant
mineral resources class action cases in the Pacific region's
history. The court ordered a complete dismissal of the proceedings,
though detailed reasoning for the decision has not yet been made
public.

Market Response to the Dismissal

Following the court's decision, Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL),
the current owner of the Panguna project, saw its shares surge by
more than 18% on the Australian Stock Exchange. This immediate
market reaction highlights the financial significance of the ruling
for stakeholders involved in the dormant mining asset.

The Troubled History of Panguna Mine

From Copper Giant to Abandoned Site

The Panguna mine was once among the world's largest copper
operations before its closure in 1989. Its history is deeply
intertwined with both economic development and conflict in the
region:

  -- Operated as a major copper producer until operations ceased in
1989
  -- Closure triggered by a local uprising against the project
  -- Led to a devastating civil war lasting approximately a decade
  -- Resulted in an estimated 20,000 casualties during the
conflict
  -- Site has remained largely abandoned for over 30 years

Ownership Transitions and Current Status

Rio Tinto maintained majority ownership of the Panguna project
until 2016, when it divested its interests. The mining giant has
declined to comment on the recent court ruling, maintaining its
distance from the controversial asset. BCL, which now holds the
rights to the project, has faced significant challenges accessing
the site in recent years despite holding legal title.

Environmental Legacy and Ongoing Concerns

Independent Assessment Findings

An independent environmental study released in 2024 revealed
serious ongoing issues at the abandoned mine site, including:

  -- Significant contamination of the Jaba-Kawerong river system
  -- Unstable tailings dam presenting potential failure risks
  -- Elevated landslide risks in surrounding areas
  -- Continuing threats to human health and safety in nearby
communities

Remediation Challenges

The environmental remediation needs at Panguna present substantial
challenges that will require comprehensive mine reclamation
insights and expertise:

   Remediation Challenge   Estimated Impact

   River system contamination   Multiple waterways affected
                                  Across extensive area

   Tailings dam instability       Potential catastrophic failure
                                  risks to downstream communities

   Landslide-prone areas          Multiple high-risk zones
                                  requiring stabilization

   Community safety threats       Thousands of residents
                                  potentially affected

What Does the Dismissal Mean for Stakeholders?

Implications for Rio Tinto

For Rio Tinto, the court's dismissal removes a significant legal
liability that could have resulted in substantial financial
penalties. The company had previously faced criticism for its
handling of the Panguna situation, including allegations that it
abandoned environmental responsibilities when it divested from the
project in 2016.

Impact on Bougainville Copper Limited

The ruling represents a major victory for BCL, as evidenced by the
immediate share price surge. The company has struggled to advance
plans for the site while legal challenges remained unresolved. With
this legal hurdle cleared, BCL may now face fewer obstacles in its
efforts to potentially redevelop the mine.

Consequences for Claimants

For the thousands of claimants involved in the class action, the
dismissal represents a significant setback in their quest for
compensation and environmental remediation. The ruling effectively
ends their current legal pathway to secure reparations for alleged
damages suffered over decades, as reported by PNG court sources.

Future Prospects for the Panguna Site

Economic Potential Amid Rising Copper Prices

The dismissal comes at a time when rising copper prices have
reached record levels, exceeding $11,000 per ton in 2024. This
price environment potentially enhances the economic viability of
reopening the mine, despite the substantial challenges involved:

  -- Estimates from industry analysts suggest reopening would
require:

     --7-8 years of development work
     --$5-6 billion in capital investment
     --Extensive environmental remediation
     --Community consent and participation

Balancing Economic Opportunity and Environmental Responsibility

Any future development at Panguna would need to address the
significant environmental and social legacy issues while
establishing a framework for sustainable operation. This balancing
act represents one of the most complex mining redevelopment
scenarios globally.

How Does the Ruling Affect Regional Mining Governance?

Precedent for Mining Liability Cases

The dismissal potentially establishes a significant legal precedent
for mining liability cases in Papua New Guinea and potentially
across the Pacific region. The ruling may influence how future
claims against mining companies are structured and pursued in
similar jurisdictions.

Implications for Corporate Responsibility Standards
The case highlights ongoing tensions between:

  -- Historical corporate practices in resource extraction
  -- Modern expectations for environmental stewardship
  -- Indigenous rights and community consent
  -- Post-mining remediation responsibilities
  -- Regulatory Framework Evolution

The Panguna mine class action dismissal may accelerate discussions
about strengthening mining regulations in Papua New Guinea to
better protect communities and environments from similar situations
in the future.

What Happens Next for Bougainville?

Community Response and Potential Appeals
While lawyers for the plaintiffs have not yet publicly commented on
the ruling, affected communities may explore alternative legal
strategies or appeal options, according to local media reports. The
dismissal is unlikely to resolve the underlying grievances that
prompted the lawsuit initially.

Regional Autonomy and Resource Control

The Panguna mine remains symbolically and economically significant
to Bougainville's autonomy aspirations. How the region navigates
this ruling will likely influence its broader relationship with
Papua New Guinea and its path toward potential independence.

What was the Panguna mine known for before its closure?

The Panguna mine was one of the world's largest copper operations,
significantly contributing to Papua New Guinea's economy before
civil unrest forced its closure in 1989. The mine was known for its
substantial copper and gold production capacity.

Why did the original conflict over the mine occur?

The conflict stemmed from local grievances over environmental
damage, inadequate compensation, unequal distribution of economic
benefits, and cultural impacts of the mining operation. These
tensions escalated into an armed uprising that eventually led to a
decade-long civil war.

What environmental issues remain at the Panguna site?
Current environmental concerns include river system contamination,
unstable tailings storage facilities, potential for catastrophic
dam failures, landslide risks, and ongoing threats to community
health and safety in surrounding areas.

Could the mine reopen despite its troubled history?

While technically possible, reopening would require addressing
substantial challenges including environmental remediation,
securing community consent, establishing appropriate
benefit-sharing arrangements, and investing billions in
reconstruction. Recent industry innovation trends could potentially
help address some of these challenges.

What options remain for the claimants after the dismissal?

Claimants may explore appeal options within the Papua New Guinea
legal system, pursue alternative legal strategies, seek political
solutions through government intervention, or advocate for
voluntary remediation programs from the companies involved.

Conclusion: A Complex Legacy Continues

The dismissal of the Panguna mine class action represents a
significant legal development but does not resolve the complex
legacy issues surrounding one of the Pacific's most controversial
mining operations. While the court's decision removes a major legal
obstacle for Rio Tinto and BCL, it leaves important questions
unanswered about environmental remediation, community compensation,
and the future of the resource-rich site.

As copper prices remain at historic highs, economic interest in the
dormant mine will likely continue. However, any path forward must
navigate the challenging intersection of economic opportunity,
environmental responsibility, and social justice that has defined
Panguna's troubled history for decades. This case also highlights
broader industry consolidation trends as mining companies reassess
their global portfolios and legacy assets.

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ROMARK UNIVERSAL: Isidoro Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages for Grocery Staff
-------------------------------------------------------------------
BENITO TAPIA ISIDORO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ROMARK UNIVERSAL FOOD LLC and
MARKEL KANDKHOROV, EMANUIL KANDKHOROV and BARUH KANDKHOROV,
Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-05304 (E.D.N.Y., September 22, 2025)
is a class action against the Defendants for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law including failure to
pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay
spread-of-hours compensation, failure to provide wage notice, and
failure to provide accurate wage statements.

The Plaintiff has been employed by the Defendants as an organizer,
stocker and cleaner while performing related miscellaneous duties,
from in or around August 2014 until present.

Romark Universal Food LLC is a grocery store owner and operator,
with a principal executive office in Rego Park, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
       HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, PC
       80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
       Kew Gardens, NY 11415
       Telephone: (718) 263-9591
       Facsimile: (718) 263-9598

ROQUETTE AMERICA: Processing Plant Releases Odors, Helenthal Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANNE-MARIE HELENTHAL and DEBRA HUNTER, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. ROQUETTE AMERICA, INC., Case No.
3:25-cv-00104-SMR-HCA (S.D. Iowa, Sept. 23, 2025) is a class action
against Roquette relating to its ownership and operation of its
corn processing plant located at 1003 S. 5th St., City of Keokuk,
County of Lee, Iowa.

Through Defendant's operation and maintenance of the corn
processing facility, it wrongfully has released substantial and
unreasonable noxious odors that invade the Plaintiffs' and the
proposed Class's properties, causing damages through private and
public nuisance and negligence, asserts the suit.

The Plaintiff Anne-Marie Helenthal has resided at 2003 Des Moines
St., Keokuk, Iowa.

The Defendant owns and operates a corn processing facility.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James H. Cook, Esq.
          JSC LEGAL
          1205 Technology Parkway
          Cedar Falls, IA 50613
          Telephone: (319) 260-4471
          Facsimile: (319) 260-4499
          E-mail: jcook@jsclegal.com

               - and -

          Steven D. Liddle, Esq.
          Laura L. Sheets, Esq.
          Reed Solt, Esq.
          LIDDLE SHEETS P.C.
          975 E. Jefferson Avenue
          Detroit, MH 48207-3101
          Telephone: (313) 392-0015
          Facsimile: (313)(313) 392-0025
          E-mail: SLiddle@lsclassaction.com

RUGSUSA LLC: Must Face Most Claims in "Hong" Pricing Case
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Anna Hong, Plaintiff, v. RugsUSA, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 24-cv-08799-AMO, Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss and motion to strike a putative consumer class
action complaint.

This putative consumer class action involves allegations of fake
price discounts on Defendant RugsUSA's website. The Court heard
RugsUSA's motion to dismiss and/or strike the operative Complaint
on July 10, 2025. Having read the papers filed by the parties and
carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal
authority, the Court granted in part and denied in part RugsUSA's
motion.

RugsUSA sells rugs and home accessory products on its website,
www.rugsusa.com. On its website, RugsUSA advertises purported
time-limited, site-wide sales on its products. RugsUSA's
advertisements represent that consumers will receive discounts off
of regular prices, and that these discounts are time-limited.
RugsUSA's advertisements convey that, through the advertised
promotion, consumers will get a special discount off of regular
prices, a discount that is not usually available. Consumers rely on
RugsUSA's representations and are led to believe that the regular
prices listed on RugsUSA products are the prices that consumers
usually and regularly have to pay to buy RugsUSA products. Based on
this, consumers buy quickly, believing that this will get them a
special deal on a product worth more than what they are paying.

In truth, Defendant almost always offers discounts off the
purportedly regular prices it advertises. Randomly selected
screenshots from the period beginning October 13, 2023, through
November 22, 2024, found that one-thirty eight out of
one-hundered-fifty of those screenshots displayed a purportedly
time-limited sitewide sale. As a result, everything about
Defendant's price and purported discount advertising is false.
Defendant's Products are constantly available for less than the
regular price, and customers did not have to formerly pay that
amount to get those items. The purported discounts Defendant
advertises are not the true discount the customer is receiving, and
are often not a discount at all. Such purported discounts are thus
not time-limited, quite the opposite, they are almost always
available.

RugsUSA's false pricing conduct harms consumers by inducing them to
make purchases based on the false information conveyed by RugsUSA's
advertisements. RugsUSA's advertisements also artificially increase
consumer demand for its products, enabling RugsUSA to charge a
price premium that it would not be able to charge absent its
misrepresentations. As a result, consumers pay more for RugsUSA's
products than they otherwise would have.

Plaintiff Anna Hong is a California resident who purchased a
RugsUSA Chaya Persian Medallion Rug from RugsUSA on September 2,
2024. When Mrs. Hong made her purchase, Defendant's website
represented that the RugsUSA Chaya Persian Medallion Rug had a
regular price of $83.99, but was discounted $20.99 for a sale price
of $63. In an email order confirmation that RugsUSA sent to Hong
after she made her purchase, RugsUSA represented that the Products
had a certain regular price and that Hong was receiving a
substantial discount for the rug that she purchased. Hong read and
relied on RugsUSA's representations on the website, specifically
that the Products were being offered at a discount for a limited
time and had the regular prices listed above. She relied on the
representations that the sale was time-limited, she understood this
regular price was the market value of the Products that she was
buying, and she would not have made the purchase if she had known
that the Products were not discounted as advertised, and that she
was not receiving the advertised discount. Further, RugsUSA's
products are almost always available at a discounted price off of
the purported regular prices and Defendant did not regularly sell
the Products Mrs. Hong purchased at the purported regular prices.

Hong initiated this lawsuit by Complaint filed on December 6, 2024.
Hong asserts causes of action for (1) violation of California's
False Advertising Law (the FAL, Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17500 &
17501 et. seq.); (2) violation of California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (the CLRA); (3) violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law (the UCL, Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200) (all
three prongs); (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of express
warranty; (6) quasi-contract/unjust enrichment (as an alternative
to the breach of contract claim); (7) negligent misrepresentation;
and (8) intentional misrepresentation.

Under the consumer protection laws of California, claims based on
deceptive or misleading marketing must demonstrate that a
reasonable consumer is likely to be misled by the representation.
Under the reasonable consumer standard, plaintiffs must show that
members of the public are likely to be deceived. The California
Supreme Court has recognized that these laws prohibit not only
advertising which is false, but also advertising which, although
true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity,
likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.

Regarding allegations about Plaintiff's purchase, RugsUSA argued
that the Complaint fails to plead facts regarding Plaintiff's
purchase or the discount she allegedly received. The Court found
that the Complaint contains facts about Hong's purchase and
purported discount. The Court found that Hong sufficiently alleges
facts regarding her purchase and the discount she received and
declined to dismiss the California consumer protection claims on
this basis.

Regarding allegations of reliance on Defendant's representations,
RugsUSA contended that the Complaint contains no facts whatsoever
regarding any specific representation(s) Plaintiff saw and/or
relied upon in relation to her decision to purchase the specific
RugsUSA product that she purchased. The Court found that the
Complaint includes allegations that Hong read and relied on these
representations, specifically that the Products were being offered
at a discount for a limited time and had the regular prices
described in Defendant's statements. The Court found these
allegations sufficient to demonstrate reliance on the pricing
representations.

Regarding pre-suit investigation, RugsUSA argued that Hong fails to
plead an adequate pre-suit investigation into the product Plaintiff
purchased. The Court found that courts have found that plaintiffs
are not required to plead that they had conducted a pre-suit
investigation or include the results of such investigations in
every case, particularly where the information is not within the
personal knowledge of the pleader. The Court found Hong's
allegations regarding her pre-suit investigation are sufficient to
survive at this stage.

Regarding regular prices versus prevailing market prices, RugsUSA
argued that Hong does not adequately plead that the advertised
regular price is not, in fact, representative of the rug's market
value. California Business & Professions Code Section 17501
prohibits advertising a former price for a product unless the
alleged former price was the prevailing market price within three
months next immediately preceding the publication of the
advertisement or unless the date when the alleged former price did
prevail is clearly, exactly and conspicuously stated in the
advertisement. The Court found that Hong's allegations fall short
of establishing a violation of Section 17501, and granted the
motion to dismiss the first cause of action with leave to amend.
However, the Court found that no such allegations are required for
Hong's other claims. The Court found that Section 17500 reaches
more broadly than Section 17501 and prohibits untrue or misleading
advertisements generally, not just former price comparisons where
the former price is out of line with prevailing market prices
specifically. The Court denied the motion as to the remaining
statutory causes of actions.

RugsUSA argued that Hong's breach of contract claim must fail
because Hong has not alleged the terms of the contract she entered
with Defendant. The Court found that Hong alleges that a contract
was formed when she placed an order on the website. The Court found
that the advertised price reductions challenged by Hong were
material to the agreement she entered in purchasing the rug and
thus support a claim for breach of contract based on allegations
that Hong did not receive benefit of the bargain. In light of the
volume of authority supporting the sufficiency of the allegations,
the Court found Hong's breach of contract claim sufficiently
pleaded. The Court therefore denied the motion to dismiss the
breach of contract claim.

An express warranty is a term of the parties' contract. To state a
claim for breach of express warranty under California law, a
plaintiff must allege (1) the exact terms of the warranty; (2)
reasonable reliance thereon; and (3) a breach of warranty which
proximately caused plaintiff's injury. Under California law, an
express warranty is any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods. The Court found
that RugsUSA's representation that the advertised regular price was
the prevailing market value was an affirmation of fact about the
Products. The Court found this constitutes an explicit
representation about a fact relating to the product, its value. The
Court therefore denied the motion to dismiss the claim for breach
of express warranty.


According to the Court "In California, there is not a standalone
cause of action for unjust enrichment. Rather, unjust enrichment
and restitution can serve as the theory underlying a claim that a
defendant has been unjustly conferred a benefit through mistake,
fraud, coercion, or request, the return of which is the remedy
typically sought in a quasi-contract cause of action. To plead a
claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege a receipt of a
benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of
another. The Court found that Hong's allegations regarding the
creation of a price premium through the use of price discounts
require unreasonable logical leaps about the value of the purchased
rug, leaps that the Court need not accept." The Court therefore
granted the motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim.

In general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted
purely economic losses, meaning financial harm unaccompanied by
physical or property damage. The rule functions to bar claims in
negligence for pure economic losses in deference to a contract
between litigating parties. When one party commits a fraud during
the contract formation or performance, the injured party may
recover in contract and tort. The Court found that Hong's negligent
and intentional misrepresentation claims relate to RugsUSA's
representations about the price of the product, particularly the
falsity of those representations. The Court found that Hong's
negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims stem from the
alleged falsity of the pricing representations instead of the
contract formed in the course of her online purchase. Because the
negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims sound in fraud,
they do not trigger the economic loss rule. Therefore, the economic
loss rule does not apply to displace Hong's negligent and
intentional misrepresentation claims, those claims need not be
dismissed as pleaded, and RugsUSA's motion to dismiss them is
denied.

RugsUSA moved to strike Hong's class claims on the basis that the
proposed class definition is overbroad. The Court noted that the
function of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is to avoid the
expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating
spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.
However, motions to strike class allegations are disfavored because
a motion for class certification is a more appropriate vehicle for
arguments pertaining to the class allegations. The Court found that
questions about ascertainability of the class are best decided at
the class certification stage with the benefit of more complete
briefing and development of the record. Accordingly, the Court
denied the motion to strike the class allegations at the pleading
stage.

The Court granted in part and denied in part RugsUSA's motion to
dismiss. The Court dismissed the first cause of action for
violation of the FAL and the sixth cause of action for unjust
enrichment, both with leave to amend. The Court denied the motion
to strike class allegations. Hong may file an amended complaint
within 28 days from the date of this Order. No additional parties
or claims may be added without leave of Court or stipulation of
Defendant.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=m5vA8S from PacerMonitor.com

SHEHEEN HANCOCK: May Face Class Action Over Alleged Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys working with ClassAction.org are looking into whether a
class action lawsuit can be filed in light of the Sheheen, Hancock
& Godwin data breach.

As part of their investigation, they need to hear from individuals
who received a notice stating they were impacted.

Sheheen, Hancock & Godwin Security Incident: What Happened?

Sheheen, Hancock & Godwin, LLP, which provides tax, audit and
accounting services, has reported that it experienced a
cybersecurity incident. On May 19, 2025, an investigation of
unusual network activity determined that certain files and folders
had been accessed by an unauthorized third party on April 8, 2025.

On September 3, 2025, a review of the affected files found that the
incident may have exposed names, Social Security numbers,
government ID numbers, passport numbers, taxpayer ID numbers,
financial account information, dates of birth, medical data and
health insurance details.

According to a report submitted to the Texas Attorney General's
office, the Sheheen, Hancock & Godwin data breach may have also
compromised individuals' addresses and driver's license numbers.

The Camden, South Carolina-based CPA firm has issued notices to
potentially impacted individuals.

What You Can Do After the Sheheen, Hancock & Godwin Data Breach

If your information was exposed in the data breach, attorneys want
to hear from you. You may be able to start a class action lawsuit
to recover compensation for loss of privacy, time spent dealing
with the breach, out-of-pocket costs, and more.

A successful case could also force Sheheen, Hancock & Godwin to
ensure it takes proper steps to protect the information it was
entrusted with. [GN]

SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE: Faces Class Action Suit Over Mortgage Fees
---------------------------------------------------------------
KBA Attorneys reports that homeowners across Maryland are facing
new revelations about unlawful mortgage fees charged by Shellpoint
Mortgage Servicing, formerly known as NewRez LLC. A recent federal
class action, Yates v. NewRez LLC, combined with enforcement
actions from state regulators and the CFPB, highlights a troubling
pattern: Shellpoint has repeatedly put profits above borrower
protections.

For Maryland families, this case is more than just legal news. It
could mean hundreds or even thousands of dollars in refunds, and it
raises urgent questions about whether Shellpoint is abusing its
position as a mortgage servicer.

The Yates Class Action: Illegal Inspection Fees

The most recent lawsuit, Yates v. NewRez LLC, was filed in Maryland
federal court. Homeowner Irene Yates alleged that Shellpoint
illegally charged "property inspection fees" on her residential
mortgage -- charges that are expressly prohibited under Maryland
law.

According to Maryland's usury law (Md. Code Section 12-121(b)),
mortgage lenders and servicers are not allowed to impose inspection
fees on residential loans, except in rare circumstances that did
not apply here.

Despite this, Shellpoint allegedly added these fees to Yates'
mortgage account and to the accounts of over 1,500 Maryland
homeowners. Court records show that these inspection fees added up
to more than $270,000 collected from borrowers statewide.

In August 2023, the court certified the case as a class action,
meaning every affected Maryland borrower may be entitled to
compensation if the plaintiffs succeed.

A Pattern of Misconduct

The Yates case is only one example of a much larger pattern. Over
the past several years, Shellpoint has been repeatedly accused --
and fined -- for deceptive mortgage practices:

  -- Illegal Fees in Maryland (2023): The Maryland Commissioner of
Financial Regulation found that Shellpoint had illegally charged
more than $270,000 in inspection fees to state borrowers.

  -- CFPB Fine (2022): The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
fined Shellpoint $2.8 million for misrepresenting the terms of a
loan modification program. Many borrowers were led to believe they
were entering affordable repayment plans, only to face different
terms later.

  -- Unauthorized Forbearance (Shapiro v. Shellpoint, 2022): A
borrower alleged that Shellpoint placed their loan into forbearance
without consent, causing a default and a steep drop in credit
score.

  -- Property Preservation Fee Lawsuit (2023): In another class
action settlement, Shellpoint and MTGLQ Investors agreed to resolve
claims that they charged illegal "property preservation" fees to
struggling homeowners.

These cases show that Shellpoint's problems are not isolated
mistakes -- they are systemic practices that have harmed borrowers
nationwide.

Why Illegal Fees Matter

At first glance, a $10 or $20 "inspection fee" might not seem
significant. But these charges add up quickly -- especially when
they are imposed month after month on homeowners already struggling
to make payments.

For many families, these illegal fees:

  -- Inflate monthly balances, making it harder to catch up on
payments

  -- Increase the risk of foreclosure when accounts show unpaid
charges

  -- Damage credit reports if borrowers refuse to pay unlawful
fees

  -- Mask the true cost of their loan

This creates a cycle of debt and confusion, often at the expense of
the most vulnerable borrowers.

What This Means for Maryland Homeowners

If you live in Maryland and your loan was serviced by Shellpoint,
you may have been affected by these unlawful practices. Borrowers
should:

  1. Review Mortgage Statements Carefully -- Look for "inspection
fees," "property preservation fees," or other unusual charges.

  2. Check Past Statements -- These fees may have been charged
months or even years ago.

  3. Request a Full Accounting -- You have the right to ask your
servicer for a complete payment history.

  4. Seek Legal Advice -- A qualified attorney can determine
whether you may be part of the class action or entitled to an
individual claim.

The certification of the Yates case means that Maryland homeowners
may soon have an opportunity for recovery. But you don't need to
wait to act.

Oversight Is Needed

Mortgage servicers like Shellpoint hold enormous power over
homeowners' lives. They decide how payments are applied, whether
fees are added, and how accounts are reported to credit agencies.
When that power is abused, families risk foreclosure, damaged
credit, and financial ruin.

The repeated lawsuits and regulatory fines against Shellpoint show
that strong oversight is essential. Without legal accountability,
servicers may continue to exploit borrowers with hidden fees and
misleading practices.

Our Commitment to Homeowners

At KBD Attorneys, we represent borrowers who have been harmed by
illegal mortgage fees, deceptive loan servicing, and unfair debt
collection practices. We are closely monitoring the Shellpoint
litigation and working to protect Maryland families from abuse.

No homeowner should be charged unlawful fees or misled about their
mortgage terms. If your loan has been serviced by Shellpoint -- or
if you suspect you have been charged improper fees -- we encourage
you to take action.

Call to Action

If you live in Maryland and were charged suspicious fees on your
mortgage by Shellpoint (formerly NewRez), you may have legal
rights.

Contact today for a free consultation. We can review your mortgage
statements, explain your options, and help you fight back against
unlawful practices.

You don't have to face powerful mortgage companies alone. If you
have had extra fees charged, especially inspection fees, we are
here to protect your home, your rights, and your family's future.
[GN]


SMITH & WESSON: Sued over Website Privacy Settings
--------------------------------------------------
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q report for
the quarterly period ended July 31, 2025, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on September 4, 2025, that it was named in
a putative class action lawsuit filed on April 4, 2025 in the U.S.
District for the Northern District of California.

The complaint alleges violation of the California Invasion of
Privacy Act, the California Privacy Act, invasion of privacy,
intrusion upon seclusion, fraud/deceit/misrepresentation, breach of
contract, breach of implied contract and fair dealing, trespass to
chattels, and unjust enrichment. On May 30, 2025, the company filed
a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. On July 11, 2025,
plaintiffs filed an opposition brief to the motion to dismiss. On
August 1, 2025, it filed a reply to plaintiffs' opposition brief.

Plaintiffs allege that after they clicked on the "reject all"
cookies button, its website enabled third parties to place cookies
and similar tracking technologies on their browsers and devices
and/or to transmit their user data to third parties for their
financial gain and other purposes. Plaintiffs seek compensatory
damages (including statutory damages), punitive damages, nominal
damages, restitution, disgorgement of revenues and profits,
injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.

Smith & Wesson Brands is a manufacturer and designer of handguns
(including revolvers and pistols), long guns (including modern
sporting rifles), handcuffs, firearm suppressors, and other
firearm-related products for sale.


SOUTHERN GRAPHICS: Palmer Sues Over Clients' Compromised Info
-------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES PALMER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SOUTHERN GRAPHICS, INC. d/b/a SGS & CO.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:25-cv-00613-DJH (W.D. Ky., September 22,
2025) is a class action against the Defendant for negligence,
negligence per se, breach of implied contract, and unjust
enrichment.

The case arises from the Defendant's failure to properly secure and
safeguard the personally identifiable information and protected
health information of the Plaintiff and similarly situated
individuals stored within its network systems following a data
breach on November 18, 2024. The Defendant also failed to timely
notify the Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals about the
data breach. As a result, the private information of the Plaintiff
and Class members was compromised and damaged through access by and
disclosure to unknown and unauthorized third parties, says the
suit.

Southern Graphics, Inc., doing business as SGS & Co., is a brand
consulting agency, with its principal place of business in
Louisville, Kentucky. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Andrew E. Mize, Esq.
         J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
         Grayson Wells, Esq.
         STRANCH, JENNINGS & GARVEY, PLLC
         The Freedom Center
         223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
         Nashville, TN 37203
         Telephone: (615) 254-8801
         Email: amize@stranchlaw.com
                gstranch@stranchlaw.com
                gwells@stranchlaw.com

                 - and -

         Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
         KOPELOWITZ OSTROW
         1 W Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
         Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
         Telephone: (954) 525-4100
         Email: ostrow@kolawyers.com

SOUTHERN LIVING: Fails to Properly Pay Installers, Harvey Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JACOB HARVEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SOUTHERN LIVING CONTRACTORS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:25-cv-00845 (M.D. Fla., September 22, 2025)
is a class action against the Defendant for unpaid overtime wages
in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a nonexempt installer
from November 2021 through August 12, 2025.

Southern Living Contractors, Inc. is a home remodeling company with
its principal place of business in Fort Myers, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Corey L. Seldin, Esq.
       MORGAN & MORGAN, PA
       8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
       Plantation, FL 33324
       Telephone: (954) 807-7765
       Facsimile: (954) 807-7768
       Email: cseldin@forthepeople.com

SPRINKLR INC: Faces Boshart Consolidated Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Sprinklr, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K report for the quarterly
period ended July 31, 2025, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on September 4, 2025, that on August 13, 2024, a
putative securities class action was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, captioned "Boshart v.
Sprinklr, Inc., et al.," Case No. 1:24-cv-06132, naming the company
and certain of its officers as defendants. On November 22, 2024,
the court appointed a lead plaintiff for the putative class and
changed the case title to "In re Sprinklr, Inc. Securities
Litigation."

On January 24, 2025, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint
asserting claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, on behalf of a putative class comprised of those who
purchased or otherwise acquired the company's securities between
March 29, 2023 and June 5, 2024. The amended complaint alleges that
the defendants misled investors during the putative class Period,
including by failing to disclose risks associated with Sprinklr
Service, one of its product suites, and that the company was
focusing resources on Sprinklr Service rather than other product
suites, and primarily seeks compensatory damages for all affected
members of the putative class.

On March 17, 2025, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint. Briefing on the motion to dismiss was completed on June
2, 2025 and the motion is currently pending before the court.

Sprinklr is an enterprise software company that operates "Unified
Customer Experience Management" (Unified-CXM) for customer service,
marketing using a unified AI-based platform.


TW METALS: Merchant Seeks Unpaid Overtime for Material Handlers
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER MERCHANT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TW METALS, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 2:25-cv-05467 (E.D. Pa., September 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for unpaid overtime wages in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as material handler in
Toledo, Ohio from approximately May 2020 through March 2023.

TW Metals, LLC is a manufacturer of metal products based in Exton,
Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Rachel McElroy, Esq.
       MCELROY LAW FIRM
       960 Penn Ave, #1001
       Pittsburgh, PA 15222
       Telephone: (412) 620-8735
       Facsimile: (412) 281-8481
       Email: rachel@mcelroylawfirm.com

                 - and -

       Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
       Matthew S. Grimsley, Esq.
       THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
       The Heritage Building, Suite 250
       34555 Chagrin Boulevard
       Moreland Hills, OH 44022
       Telephone: (216) 696-5000
       Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
       Email: lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
              matthew@lazzarolawfirm.com

UNITED PARKS: Must Face Limited Fake Sales Claims
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael M. Anello of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California granted in part and denied in part
Defendant United Parks & Resorts, Inc.'s motion to dismiss in the
case captioned as David Marks, et al., Plaintiffs, v. United Parks
& Resorts, Inc., Defendant. The Court dismissed the nationwide
class allegations, the entire Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim,
and most of Plaintiff Tagui Galstian's individual claims, while
allowing Plaintiff David Marks to proceed on limited theories under
California law.

Defendant United Parks & Resorts, Inc is a theme park company that
sells tickets to theme parks in California including SeaWorld and
Sesame Place. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant utilizes fake sales
to entice consumers into purchasing tickets. They contended that
Defendant advertises "Limited-Time" discounts from regular ticket
prices, using countdown clocks and language such as HURRY, OFFER
ENDS SOON! to represent that its sales are on the verge of ending.
According to Plaintiffs, these discounts are always available.
Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant uses hidden fees when
selling tickets. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant utilized drip
pricing when a company advertises only part of a product's total
price to lure in customers, and fails to mention other mandatory
charges until late in the buying process until about July 1, 2024,
hiding the true price of tickets until the purchase was nearly
complete.

On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff Marks purchased two SeaWorld
single-day tickets, three Dine with Orcas tickets, and one parking
ticket through Defendant's website. On the date of Plaintiff Marks'
purchase, Defendant represented on its website that SeaWorld
single-day tickets had a regular price of $114.99 but were on sale
at a discounted price of $89.99. Plaintiff alleged that the tickets
were always sold at the purported discounted price and therefore
were never discounted as advertised. Moreover, during the checkout
process, Defendant represented that the total of Plaintiff Marks'
tickets would cost $312.96. But at the end of the checkout,
Defendant added a Service Fee of $22.49, making the actual ticket
price $341.65 (including $6.20 in tax), not $312.97, as Defendant
had previously represented.

Similarly, Plaintiff Galstian purchased five Sesame Place
single-day tickets through Defendant's website on July 29, 2023. On
the date of her purchase, Defendant represented that single-day
tickets to Sesame Place were on sale for a discounted price of
$67.00. However, Plaintiff alleged that these tickets are always
available at a discounted price. Further, during the checkout
process, Defendant represented that the total of Plaintiff
Glastian's tickets would cost $339.95. But at the end of the
checkout, Defendant added a "Service Fee" of $16.99, making the
actual ticket price $356.94, not $339.95, as Defendant had
previously represented.

Plaintiffs asserted nine claims against Defendant: (1) violation of
California's False Advertising Law, Bus. & Prof. Code Sections
17500 et seq.; (2) violation of California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1770; (3-4) violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section
17200 et seq.; (5) breach of contract; (6) breach of express
warranty; (7) quasi-contract; (8) negligent misrepresentation; and
(9) intentional misrepresentation.

The Court addressed Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs lack
standing to represent a nationwide class of consumers. Plaintiffs
sought to represent five classes: a Nationwide Class and four
California-specific subclasses. Plaintiffs pressed their breach of
contract and quasi-contract claims on behalf of themselves and the
Nationwide Class.

The Court noted that following the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Easter v. Am. W. Fin., district courts in California frequently
address the issue of Article III standing at the pleading stage and
dismiss claims asserted under the laws of states in which no
plaintiff resides or has purchased products. The Court stated that
the named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show
that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been
suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they
belong and which they purport to represent. The Court further
explained that standing is not dispensed in gross and is
claim-specific and a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each
claim he seeks to press.

The Court found that Plaintiffs had not even identified which state
laws govern their two nationwide class claims, which is alone
grounds for dismissal. By pressing their breach of contract and
quasi-contract claims on behalf of a nationwide class, the Court
noted that Plaintiffs were attempting to assert fifty breach of
contract claims and fifty quasi-contract claims one of each claim
for each state on behalf of fifty separate state-specific classes,
when they only have standing under one: California.

The Court granted Defendant's motion on this basis and dismissed
Plaintiffs' nationwide class allegations and claims.

Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Consumer Legal Remedies Act,
Unfair Competition Law, and False Advertising Law claims to the
extent they are based upon the "fake sales" for failure to satisfy
Rule 9(b). The parties agreed that these three claims sound in
fraud and are therefore subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading
requirement.

The Court found that Plaintiff Marks' allegations just narrowly
satisfied the who, what, where, when, and how of the asserted
fraud. The Court stated that to the extent the advertisements
represented that the tickets were regularly priced at $114.99, this
representation was false or misleading because Defendants did not
regularly sell the tickets Plaintiff Marks purchased at this price.
To this limited extent, the Court found that Plaintiff Marks'
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, False Advertising Law, and Unfair
Competition Law claims survive dismissal. Otherwise, the Court
granted Defendant's motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, Unfair Competition Law, and False Advertising Law
claims.

Defendant separately moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Consumer Legal
Remedies Act claim, arguing that the sale of amusement park tickets
is not encompassed by the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The Consumer
Legal Remedies Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.
Plaintiffs pleaded that Defendant violated subsections (a)(5),
(a)(9), and (a)(13) of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

The Court found that Plaintiffs did not plead facts plausibly
supporting their claims that Defendant violated subsections (a)(5)
or (a)(9). Plaintiffs failed to identify any representation by
Defendant concerning the tickets' "sponsorship, approval,
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities" or
that Defendant represents it has "a sponsorship, approval, status,
affiliation, or connection" that it does not have. There were also
no allegations that Defendant did not intend to sell the tickets in
question as advertised.

The Court noted that this district has consistently rejected a
broad interpretation and found that the sale of SeaWorld tickets is
not encompassed by the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The Court
stated that "to hold that the tickets, or more specifically the
admission to the parks that the tickets provide, constitute a
service requires a strained and unnatural construction of the
term." The Court explained that "services" means "work, labor, and
services for other than a commercial or business use, including
services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods."
That language focuses on work or labor performed for the consumer,
not on the sale of a ticket that confers permission to be
somewhere.

The Court found that an amusement-park ticket, a revocable license
granting admission and access to attractions, does not itself fall
within the statute's "work or labor" provided to a consumer. The
Court stated that "any shows, exhibits, or performances occur
regardless of whether a specific consumer purchases a ticket; the
ticket is merely proof of access to those offerings not as the sale
of work or labor itself." Accordingly, independent of the pleading
defects, Plaintiffs' Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim failed as a
matter of law because the tickets alleged in the First Amended
Complaint are neither "goods" nor "services" under the Consumer
Legal Remedies Act. The Court also dismissed the Unfair Competition
Law claim to the extent it was premised on alleged violations of
the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.


Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim on
the grounds that (1) the claim sounds in fraud and fails Rule 9(b),
and (2) even under Rule 8, Plaintiffs still failed to give
Defendant fair notice of the factual basis for their breach of
contract claim.

Evaluated under Rule 9(b), the Court found that Plaintiff Marks
pleaded the "who, what, when, where, and how" with sufficient
particularity: identifying the who as United Parks &
Resorts/SeaWorld, the what as a "Spring Spectacular Sale"
advertising SeaWorld San Diego single-day tickets at $89.99 reduced
from a listed regular price of $114.99 with limited-time language,
the when as April 19, 2024, the where as the Defendant's website at
www.seaworld.com, and the how as the allegation that the listed
regular price did not reflect the Defendant's prevailing price and
that the purported limited-time discount was part of an ongoing
practice. By contrast, Plaintiff Galstian alleged a $67.00
"on-sale" Sesame Place ticket purchased July 29, 2023, but did not
identify the specific former price tied to her transaction or
comparable temporal particulars about the sale representation she
relied on. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Plaintiff Galstian
had not met Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement.

The Court noted that courts addressing materially similar
"fake-discount" theories under California law have treated disputes
about the contract's terms and about valuation as factual issues
not resolvable on a motion to dismiss. The Court found that
Plaintiff Marks plausibly alleged that the strike-through "regular"
price and the advertised discount were terms of the bargain, that
Defendant promised tickets with a market value equal to the listed
regular price and the discount equals the regular price minus the
price paid. Whether the site representations reasonably created
such contract terms, and whether the listed regular prices
reflected prevailing market value, are factual questions not suited
to resolution on the pleadings. Accordingly, Defendant's motion was
denied as to Plaintiff Marks's breach of contract claim. The motion
was granted as to Plaintiff Galstian's breach of contract claim for
failure to satisfy Rule 9(b).

Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' express warranty claim on
the grounds that it sounds in fraud and must meet Rule 9(b), that
Plaintiffs fail to identify any actionable "affirmation of fact or
promise," and that alleged statements about "value" are
nonactionable opinions.

Measured against Rule 9(b), the Court found that Plaintiff Marks
pleaded the "who, what, when, where, and how" with adequate
particularity in regard to his breach of express warranty theory.
Plaintiffs alleged that on April 19, 2024, Plaintiff Marks
purchased two tickets in reliance on Defendant's advertisement of a
"Spring Spectacular Sale" on SeaWorld San Diego single-day,
date-specific tickets, listing a regular price of $114.99 and a
sale price of $89.99, and representing the sale as time-limited
through April 21. Plaintiffs further alleged that the strikethrough
regular price communicated the tickets' prevailing market value and
that the discount equaled the difference between the regular and
sale prices. Plaintiffs alleged this was part of the basis of the
bargain and was false because Defendant did not "regularly sell"
the tickets purchased by Plaintiff Marks at $114.99. Accepting the
allegations as true, Plaintiff Marks plausibly alleged breach of an
express warranty and resulting harm. Accordingly, the motion was
denied as to Plaintiff Marks' express warranty claim.

By contrast, Plaintiff Galstian alleged that on July 29, 2023,
Defendant advertised Sesame Place single-day tickets at a
discounted price of $67.00 and that tickets are "always available
at a discounted price," but she did not identify any corresponding
"regular" or strikethrough price for her purchase, any time-limited
representation, or other specific expression of prevailing market
value tied to her transaction. Without facts specifying the
warranty's terms to which she was actually exposed, the Court could
not determine the "what" of the alleged express warranty with the
precision Rule 9(b) demands. Accordingly, Defendant's motion was
granted as to Plaintiff Galstian's express warranty claim.

Negligent and Intentional Misrepresentation Claims

Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' negligent and intentional
misrepresentation claims on the ground that they are not pleaded
with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Because
misrepresentation claims "sound in fraud," Rule 9(b) applies.

Measured against Rule 9(b), the Court found that the affirmative
misrepresentation theory was sufficiently particularized as to the
website strike-through pricing that Plaintiff Marks encountered.
The First Amended Complaint identified the who, what, when, where,
and how with sufficient particularity. On this record, as to
Plaintiff Marks, the affirmative misrepresentation theory satisfied
Rule 9(b) because the First Amended Complaint tied the challenged
pricing statements to identified ticket webpages and a dated
purchase and also alleged exposure and reliance. As to Plaintiff
Galstian, the allegations were pleaded with less specificity. The
First Amended Complaint alleged Plaintiff Galstian's July 29, 2023
purchase but did not quote the precise promotional language or
identify a specific strikethrough "regular" price she saw. On this
record, Plaintiff Galstian's affirmative misrepresentation theory
did not meet Rule 9(b) pleading standard as it was not anchored to
the "who, what, when, where, and how" of what she actually saw and
relied on before purchase.

The omissions theory tracked the same divide. For Plaintiff Marks,
the First Amended Complaint identified the omitted facts, that the
displayed "regular" price was not the prevailing market value and
the "sale" price was not time-limited; where the information should
have appeared, on the same ticket webpages alongside the
strikethrough and "sale" prices; and why a duty arose, partial
representations. As for Plaintiff Galstian's omission allegations,
they failed for the same pleading gaps as the affirmative
misrepresentation theory. Accordingly, Defendant's motion was
granted with respect to Plaintiff Galstian's negligent and
intentional misrepresentation claims. However, Defendant's motion
was denied as to Plaintiff Marks' negligent and intentional
misrepresentation claims, which satisfied Rule 9(b).

Defendant also separately moved to dismiss the negligent
misrepresentation claim as being barred by the economic loss
doctrine, arguing that Plaintiffs seek purely economic damages
premised on the same facts as their contract and warranty claims.
The Court noted that the California Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
have not squarely resolved this question for negligent
misrepresentation.

The Court found that the First Amended Complaint alleged pre-sale
pricing representations, regular or strikethrough prices and
limited-time discounts, that were allegedly false or misleading
because the tickets were perpetually on sale, and Plaintiff Marks
relied on those representations in purchasing and suffered monetary
loss. Those allegations framed a fraudulent inducement theory
grounded in marketing statements made before any contract was
formed, not a failure to honor a bargained-for term or warranty
after the sale.

The Court stated that Plaintiff Marks' negligent misrepresentation
count targeted alleged front-end pricing statements and discount
representations in the advertisements. The allegations did not
simply mirror contract or warranty obligations but instead asserted
a non-contractual duty sounding in deceit. Thus, at the pleadings
stage, the economic loss doctrine did not bar Plaintiff Marks'
negligent misrepresentation claim as alleged. The First Amended
Complaint framed a pre-contract, advertising-based inducement
theory, false pricing statements that allegedly led plaintiffs to
purchase, rather than a mere failure-to-perform or warranty
dispute. Accordingly, the Court denied the motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Marks' negligent misrepresentation claim as barred by the
economic loss doctrine.

The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to
dismiss. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' nationwide class
allegations and claims; dismissed the Consumer Legal Remedies Act
claim in its entirety; dismissed the Unfair Competition Law claim
to the extent it is predicated on the Consumer Legal Remedies Act;
and dismissed Plaintiff Galstian's breach of contract, express
warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional
misrepresentation claims for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b). The
motion was otherwise denied. Should Plaintiffs wish to file an
amended complaint, they must do so on or before October 31, 2025.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=TewQJm from PacerMonitor.com

UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Indiana Rail Corridor Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Greg Andres and Paula Andres, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated parties, Plaintiffs, v.
United States of America, Defendant, No. 4:24-cv-00038-SEB-KMB
(S.D. Ind.), Judge Sarah Evans Barker of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification. The Plaintiffs brought this
putative class action lawsuit against the Defendant seeking just
compensation for the alleged Fifth Amendment taking of their
private property for public use under the National Trails Act
System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. Section 1241 et seq.

The Plaintiffs and putative class members own fee simple interests
in land underlying and/or adjacent to a 62.3-mile segment of rail
line that runs from Bedford to New Albany, Indiana, crossing
through Clark, Floyd, Lawrence, Orange, and Washington Counties.
The Corridor was constructed in the mid-1850s by the New Albany &
Salem Railroad. In September 1987, CSX Transportation, a railroad
operator, acquired the Corridor as well as an easement across the
Plaintiffs' real property for railroad purposes. In 2009, CSX
Transportation petitioned the Surface Transportation Board to
discontinue service over the Corridor. On April 7, 2010, the Board
granted CSX Transportation's request, and, after 160 years, service
ceased on May 12, 2010.

On December 18, 2017, CSX Transportation petitioned the Board for
authorization to abandon its railway operations along the Corridor.
On February 28, 2018, the Board granted CSX Transportation's
request and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment,
pursuant to Section 8(d) of the Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. Section
1247(d), which permitted CSX Transportation to negotiate a trail
use agreement with the Indiana Trails Fund and the City of New
Albany. In October 2022, the Board issued a second Notice of
Interim Trail Use or Abandonment that authorized CSX Transportation
to negotiate new trail use agreements with the City and Radius
Indiana, another prospective trail sponsor. In February 2023, CSX
Transportation sold and fully transferred its property rights in
the Corridor to the City and Radius.

On February 23, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed this putative class
action lawsuit, seeking just compensation under the Fifth Amendment
for the alleged taking of their property along the Corridor. They
assert that, but for the 2018 Notice of Interim Trail Use or
Abandonment issued pursuant to Section 8(d) the Trails Act, CSX
Transportation's abandonment of the Corridor would have
extinguished the railroad's easements, thereby restoring the
Plaintiffs' unencumbered property interests. Section 8(d), however,
thwarted the reversion of the Plaintiffs' exclusive possession and
use of their property, resulting in an uncompensated taking by the
Government. In accordance with the Little Tucker Act's
jurisdictional limitations, the individual monetary damages sought
by the Plaintiffs do not exceed $10,000. 28 U.S.C. Section
1346(a)(2).

On February 27, 2024, shortly after filing their class action
complaint, the Plaintiffs moved for class certification, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. As the Plaintiffs' class
certification motion pended, the Court discovered that, on February
22, 2024, the Plaintiffs' counsel had filed and sought class
certification in a nearly identical putative class action lawsuit
in the Court of Federal Claims. Following a September 20, 2024,
telephonic status conference, the Court stayed any ruling on the
Plaintiffs' pending class certification motion prior to the Court
of Federal Claims's decision in Bauer. On April 9, 2025, the Court
of Federal Claims denied the landowner plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

On July 14, 2025, the Court issued an Order Directing Further
Proceedings, wherein it detailed the evidentiary deficiencies
precluding a final disposition of the Plaintiffs' class
certification motion, allowed the Plaintiffs an opportunity to
supplement the record, and granted the Plaintiffs' request for oral
argument. The Court specifically directed the parties to prepare to
discuss the Government's objections to class certification based on
ascertainability, the Little Tucker Act, and the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

The Plaintiffs timely submitted supplemental evidence, including a
chart enumerating 292 affected parcels, their owners, the original
conveyance source, location, and parcel size; a copy of the North
Albany & Salem Charter, the original railroad conveyance; a
sampling of joint title stipulations filed in seven prior lawsuits
involving the Corridor, wherein the Government agreed that the
railroad obtained an easement for railroad purposes; approximately
two dozen deeds showcasing that putative class plaintiffs own fee
simple interests in property located along the Corridor;
photographic snapshots of each putative plaintiff's property; and
named Plaintiffs Mr. & Mrs. Andres's ownership deeds, photographic
snapshots of their property, and related tax records. The
Government opted not to submit rebuttal evidence.

On September 5, 2025, both parties appeared through counsel for
oral argument, after which the matter was taken under advisement.
The Court addressed the Government's objections concerning
ascertainability and fail-safe classes. The Government asserted
that the Plaintiffs' proposed definition creates a fail-safe class
by incorporating the essential elements of a takings claim such
that class membership turns on the merits of putative plaintiffs'
claims. The Court acknowledged that the Government's fail-safe
argument is well taken insofar as the Plaintiffs' proposed class
definition presupposes putative class members satisfying the
essential elements of their claims and thus presumes the
Government's liability. However, rather than flatly denying class
certification on this basis, the Court revised the class definition
to resolve the fail-safe dilemma by focusing on the common factual
circumstances contributing to putative plaintiffs' alleged Fifth
Amendment injury.

Regarding the Little Tucker Act, the Government contended that the
Court's Little Tucker Act jurisdiction cannot encompass the
Plaintiffs' proposed class because the named Plaintiffs cannot bind
absent class members to a waiver of damages in excess of $10,000.
The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs' proposed class, as
modified, complies with the Little Tucker Act and ensures that
putative class claims fall within the Court's jurisdiction by
excluding landowners who would be entitled to an award greater than
$10,000, unless they waive such recovery.

The Court then addressed the requirements of Rule 23. Under Rule
23, a proposed class must satisfy the prerequisites of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. The Court
concluded that the Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of
establishing, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the class
is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. The putative class is
comprised of approximately 239 individuals, who own a total of
approximately 292 parcels located along the Corridor.

The Court found that the Plaintiffs have met their burden of
establishing commonality. The dispositive legal issue, whether the
2018 Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment effected a taking,
is capable of classwide resolution, as it depends on the uniform
application of a single federal statute. The issuance of the 2018
Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment was a single act that
affected all putative class members, thus operating as the
wellspring of all the putative class members' claims.

The Court determined that Mr. and Mrs. Andres, as putative class
representatives, have demonstrated that their claims are typical of
the class. Mr. and Mrs. Andres, like the putative class plaintiffs,
aver that they own real property that was previously encumbered by
CSX Transportation's railroad easement and that the 2018 Notice of
Interim Trail Use or Abandonment effected a taking. The Court
concluded that the Plaintiffs have satisfactorily demonstrated that
the putative class is adequately represented. At this juncture,
there are no known conflicts of interest between the named
Plaintiffs and the putative class members.

Because the Plaintiffs seek monetary damages against the
Government, they must also satisfy the conditions set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which requires that
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The Court found that the
common questions presented in this case support a finding of
predominance. Each putative plaintiff's claim arises from a single
government act, the issuance of the 2018 Notice of Interim Trail
Use or Abandonment, and requires the application of Indiana
property law to determine the nature and scope of CSX
Transportation's property interests.

The Court rejected the Government's contention that the need for
individualized proof to assess damages for each putative class
member precludes the Plaintiffs from establishing the predominance
of common questions. The Court stated that it would drive a stake
through the heart of the class action device, in cases in which
damages were sought, to require that every member of the class have
identical damages. The Court found that the Plaintiffs have
adequately demonstrated that a class proceeding is the superior
means of litigation because a significant number of putative class
members have small claims and otherwise lack the incentive to
pursue their claims independently.

Accordingly, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification. The Court certified the following class: All persons
or entities who, as of February 28, 2018, owned an interest in real
property valued in the amount of $10,000 or less that underlies
and/or is contiguous to the railroad corridor on which CSX
Transportation had the right to operate a railroad, and which
corridor was authorized for trail use by the City of New Albany and
Radius Indiana through a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment
issued on February 28, 2018 (as amended on October 12, 2022) by the
Surface Transportation Board, pursuant to the National Trails
Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. Section 1247(d). Excluded from this class
are all persons or entities who have joined a separate lawsuit
against the United States seeking compensation for the same
above-described property interests; and/or whose property values
exceed $10,000, unless such persons or entities waive their right
to recover any amount greater than $10,000.

Additionally, the Court appointed attorneys Lindsay Brinton, Meghan
S. Largent, Michael Armstrong, and Thomas Hunter Brown as class
counsel.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=DrmA7t from PacerMonitor.com

UNITED STATES: Obtains Injury Claim Proceeds, Kvirikashvili Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
KOBA KVIRIKASHVILI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY; BLUE STAR CLAIMS, LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:25-cv-05474 (E.D. Pa., September 23, 2025)
is a class action against the Defendants for declaratory judgment
action, breach of contract, conversion, and bad faith.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged practice of unlawfully
obtaining proceeds of personal injury claims throughout the United
States under the guise of subrogation. The Plaintiff and similarly
situated individuals brought this complaint to stop the Defendants
from continuing their conduct and to require disgorgement of their
unlawful gains.

United States Fire Insurance Company is an insurance firm, with its
principal place of business in Eatontown, New Jersey.

Blue Star Claims, LLC, formerly known as Blue Star Claims
Management, LLC, is an insurance company, with its principal place
of business in Phoenix, Arizona. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Lawrence Kalikhman, Esq.
       KALIKHMAN & RAYZ, LLC
       1051 County Line Road, Suite "A"
       Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006
       Telephone: (215) 364-5030
       Facsimile: (215) 364-5029
       Email: lkalikhman@kalraylaw.com

                 - and -

       Gerald D. Wells, III, Esq.
       Robert J. Gray, Esq.
       LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
       1760 Market Street, Suite 600
       Philadelphia, PA 19103
       Telephone: (267) 609-6910
       Facsimile: (267) 609-6955
       Email: jerry@lcllp.com
              rob@lcllp.com

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER: Breaches Fiduciary Duties, Green Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Nia Green, Lauren Szymula, and Ariana King, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, and on
behalf of the Health Care Plans for Faculty & Staff of the
University of Rochester v. University of Rochester, University of
Rochester Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer, and
Does 1-20, Case No. 6:25-cv-06499 (W.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2025)
alleges that the Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties
under Employee Retirement Income Security Act by:

   (1) failing to prudently select and monitor the Plan's
       preferred provider organization ("PPO") medical insurance
       options, allowing the low-deductible option to be
       financially dominated by the high-deductible option; and

   (2) failing to disclose this material information to the Plan's
       participants.

Accordingly, to purportedly accommodate the varying needs of their
employees, the Defendants offer a high deductible ("YOUR
HSA-Eligible") and a low deductible ("YOUR PPO") option. These
options vary in features such as monthly premiums, deductibles,
coinsurance, and out-of-pocket maximums. The YOUR PPO option is
accompanied by higher premiums in exchange for a lower annual
deductible, while the YOUR HSA-Eligible option offers lower
premiums but higher annual deductibles.

The Defendants' decision to offer the financially dominated YOUR
PPO option and the failure to disclose its dominated nature to
participants has resulted in the Plan and its participants paying
wholly excessive and unnecessary healthcare expenses in the form of
lost wages due to excessive premiums unaccompanied by any reduced
out-of-pocket, asserts the suit.

The Plaintiffs bring this action to recover these losses, prevent
further similar conduct, and obtain equitable and other relief as
provided by ERISA.

The Plaintiffs participated in the Health Care Plans for Faculty &
Staff of the University of Rochester. They were enrolled in the
YOUR PPO health plan at the individual coverage level.

University of Rochester is a private research university located in
Rochester, New York. The University is the "plan sponsor."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brock J. Specht, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4700 IDS Center
          80 S 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          Facsimile: (612) 338-4878
          E-mail: bspecht@nka.com
                  bbauer@nka.com

               - and -

          DON BIVENS, PLLC
          Don Bivens, Esq.
          15169 N. Scottsdale Road, Suite 205
          Scottsdale, AZ 85254
          Telephone: (602) 762-2661

VILLE FOOD: Miranda Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages for Pizzeria Workers
----------------------------------------------------------------
OMAR JONATHAN MIRANDA MORENO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VILLE FOOD CORP. (D/B/A
CENTRO PIZZERIA), 852 FOOD CORP. (D/B/A ROMA PIZZA), and EUSEBIO
ECHEVARRIA, Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-07885 (S.D.N.Y., September
23, 2025) is a class action against the Defendants for violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law
including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime
wages, failure to provide accurate wage notice, failure to provide
accurate wage statements, failure to pay spread-of-hours
compensation, and failure to reimburse business expenses.

Plaintiff Miranda worked as a food preparer and as a delivery
worker at Centro Pizzeria and Roma Pizza in New York approximately
May 2024 until on or about September 2025.

Ville Food Corp., doing business as Centro Pizzeria, is a pizzeria
owner and operator located at 1469 Second Avenue, New York, New
York.

852 Food Corp., doing business as Roma Pizza, is a pizzeria owner
and operator located at 852 8th Avenue, New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Michael A. Faillace, Esq.
       MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
       60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
       New York, NY 10165
       Telephone: (212) 317-1200
       Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
       Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Agrees to Settle Defective Turbochargers' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Top Class Actions reports that Volkswagen agreed to a class action
lawsuit settlement to resolve claims that certain Volkswagen and
Audi vehicles were equipped with defective turbochargers.

The settlement benefits current and former owners and lessees of
certain Volkswagen and Audi vehicles equipped with a Generation 1,
2 or 3 EA888 engine. A full list of covered vehicles can be found
on the settlement website.

The class action lawsuit claims that vehicles were equipped with
defective turbochargers that were prone to premature failure,
allegedly caused by corrosion in the turbocharger wastegate. As a
result, owners and lessees of these vehicles allegedly had to pay
out of pocket for expensive repairs.

Audi is a luxury vehicle brand owned by Volkswagen, which also
sells vehicles under several other brands worldwide, including in
the United States.

Volkswagen has not admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to an
undisclosed amount to settle allegations in the turbocharger class
action lawsuit.

Under the terms of the Volkswagen settlement, class members can
receive a partial reimbursement for out-of-pocket turbocharger
repairs.

Class members who paid for a turbocharger repair or replacement
within 8.5 years or 85,000 miles of their vehicle's in-service date
can receive 40% to 50% reimbursement for one turbocharger repair.
Reimbursement rates depend on the generation of the vehicle and are
capped at $3,850 for repairs performed by non-Volkswagen dealers.

Class members can also receive a warranty extension for their
vehicle. Generation 3 vehicles will have their new vehicle limited
warranties extended to 8.5 years or 85,000 miles. This extension
will cover 50% of the cost of a turbocharger repair if the failure
is caused by corrosion.

The deadline for exclusion and objection is Oct. 15, 2025.

The final approval hearing for the Volkswagen and Audi turbocharger
class action lawsuit settlement is scheduled for Dec. 4, 2025.

To receive settlement benefits, class members must submit a valid
claim form by Nov. 29, 2025.

Who's Eligible
Consumers who purchased or leased certain 2008–2024 Audi A3, Q3,
A4, A5, A6, Q5 and TT vehicles, as well as certain Volkswagen
vehicles equipped with a Generation 1, 2 or 3 EA888 engine, are
eligible for benefits under the settlement.

Potential Award
Individual payments capped at $3,850

Proof of Purchase
Consumers must submit a repair invoice that includes their name;
the make, model and VIN of the vehicle; the name and address of the
Audi or Volkswagen dealer or service center; the date of repair;
the vehicle's mileage at the time of repair; a description of the
work performed; a breakdown of parts and labor costs; the amount
charged; and proof of payment.

If the repair was not performed by an authorized dealer and the
only proof is an invoice marked “Paid,” consumers must also
provide a declaration from the repair facility, signed under
penalty of perjury, confirming payment.

Claim Form
CLICK HERE TO FILE A CLAIM »
NOTE: If you do not qualify for this settlement do NOT file a
claim.

Remember: you are submitting your claim under penalty of perjury.
You are also harming other eligible Class Members by submitting a
fraudulent claim. If you're unsure if you qualify, please read the
FAQ section of the Settlement Administrator's website to ensure you
meet all standards (Top Class Actions is not a Settlement
Administrator). If you don't qualify for this settlement, check out
our database of other open class action settlements you may be
eligible for.

Claim Form Deadline
11/29/2025

Case Name
Kimball v. Volkswagen Group of America Inc., et al., Case No.
2:22-cv-04163-MAH, in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey

Final Hearing
12/04/2025

Settlement Website
TurboclassSettlement.com

Claims Administrator

     Turbocharger Class Settlement
     c/o JND Legal Administration
     P.O. Box 91184
     Seattle, WA 98111
     (855) 779-6685

Class Counsel

     Gary Graifman
     KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN P.C.

Defense Counsel

     Michael B. Gallub
     SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP [GN]

WIRELESS VISION: Wins Partial Dismissal of "Turenne" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Jephthe Turenne, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Wireless Vision
Holdings, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 23-CV-3651 (EK)(JAM), Judge Eric
Komitee of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss a putative class action complaint.

Plaintiff Jephthe Turenne brought this putative class action under
the New York Labor Law against his former employer, Wireless Vision
Holdings, LLC. The Defendant operates T-Mobile retail stores across
New York State, including the Brooklyn locations where Turenne was
employed. Turenne asserted claims for failure to pay timely wages,
failure to provide wage notices, and failure to reimburse his
uniform maintenance costs. The Court had jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d). The Defendant
moved to dismiss Turenne's pay-frequency and wage-notice claims,
arguing that Turenne lacked Article III standing and a right of
action to bring the former claim, and that the latter claim was
untimely.

Turenne worked at the Defendant's Flatbush and Bedford-Stuyvesant
locations from February 2016 until November 2018. He worked between
five and six days each week, often for more than forty hours per
week. In addition to customer-service duties, Turenne spent more
than twenty-five percent of his time on physical tasks like
cleaning the store, receiving deliveries, unboxing and stocking
merchandise, and shoveling snow off the sidewalk in the winter
months.

Turenne was paid at or near minimum wage on a bi-weekly basis
during his employment. However, the Defendant paid him late on more
than one occasion. Turenne also alleged that the Defendant failed
to supply him with wage notices required under Section 195 of the
New York Labor Law. He brought his claims on behalf of himself and
a putative class of all exempt, hourly employees of the Defendant
in the State of New York between the date six years preceding the
filing of the complaint and the date a class is certified in this
action. He sought over $5,000,000 in damages.

The Court concluded it had jurisdiction over this action under the
Class Action Fairness Act. Turenne alleged that there were more
than 400 putative class members, and that the aggregate
amount-in-controversy exceeded $5 million. Furthermore, minimal
diversity existed because Turenne was a citizen of New York, while
the Defendant was an LLC formed under Delaware law and
headquartered in Michigan.

Regarding the pay-frequency claim, New York employers must pay
manual workers weekly and not later than seven calendar days after
the end of the week in which the wages are earned under New York
Labor Law Section 191(1)(a). The Defendant did not dispute that,
because Turenne alleged that he spent more than twenty-five percent
of his time on physical tasks such as cleaning the store, he was
plausibly a manual worker under New York law. Instead, the
Defendant argued that he could not bring a pay-frequency claim
because he lacked standing and the right of action necessary to do
so.

The Court rejected the Defendant's argument that Turenne lacked
Article III standing. The Court found that the late payment of
wages is a concrete harm that constitutes an injury-in-fact under
Article III. The Court stated that it is a basic principle of
economics and accounting that a dollar today is worth more than a
dollar tomorrow. Thus, by temporarily depriving Turenne of his
wages, the Defendant plausibly deprived him of the time value of
those wages. That minimal monetary injury was sufficient to allege
Article III standing.

The Court also rejected the Defendant's argument that Section 191
only provided a private right of action for wage underpayments,
rather than wage payment delays. The Court analyzed the split
between New York appellate departments on this issue. In Vega v. CM
& Associates Construction Management, LLC, the First Department
held that Section 198(1-a) expressly provides a private right of
action for a violation of Labor Law Section 191, reasoning that the
term underpayment encompasses the instances where an employer
violates the frequency requirements of Section 191(1) even where it
pays all wages due. The moment that an employer fails to pay wages
in compliance with Section 191(1)(a), the employer pays less than
what is required.

However, in Grant v. Global Aircraft Dispatch, Inc., the Second
Department declined to follow Vega, reasoning that the plain
language of Section 198(1-a) supports the conclusion that this
statute is addressed to nonpayment and underpayment of wages, as
distinct from the frequency of payment. Since the Grant-Vega split,
district courts in this circuit have overwhelmingly sided with
Vega.

The Court found Vega persuasive, noting that there is little
principled distinction between a payment that is too little and one
that is too late. Because of the time-value of money, an employee
is underpaid within the meaning of Section 198 each time her
employer is required, under Section 191, to pay her for one week of
wages and instead pays her nothing on that date. The payment, when
the employee eventually receives it, is worth less than it would
have been worth had the employee been paid on time. Therefore, an
employee that has been paid late has necessarily been underpaid.
The Court was persuaded that the New York Court of Appeals would
agree with Vega that late payments in violation of Section 191 are
underpayments within the meaning of Section 198, and that those
late payments are privately actionable.

Regarding the wage-notice claim, Turenne asserted that the
Defendant willfully failed to supply him the wage notices required
by New York Labor Law Section 195(1). The Court found that Turenne
had not plausibly alleged Article III standing to bring this claim.
When a law authorizes statutory damages for an informational
injury, a plaintiff must identify downstream consequences from
failing to receive the required information to allege Article III
standing. Here, Turenne alleged an informational injury—that he
did not receive wage notices. He alleged no downstream injury that
resulted from this non-receipt, and sought only statutory damages.
An informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot
satisfy Article III.

The Court noted that district courts in this circuit have
consistently dismissed similar claims on standing grounds.
Accordingly, Turenne lacked standing to bring his wage-notice
claim, and that claim was dismissed without prejudice.

For these reasons, the Court granted the Defendant's motion to
dismiss as to Turenne's wage-notice claim and denied as to his
pay-frequency claim.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=sKaqeX from PacerMonitor.com


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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