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251006.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Monday, October 6, 2025, Vol. 27, No. 199 Headlines AIMBRIDGE HOSPITALITY: Westbrook Sues Over FCRA Breach ALIBABA.COM US: Faces Rossi Suit Over TCPA Breach ARG ME19PCK001: Stanley Balks at Property's Architectural Barriers AYVAZ PIZZA: Tafoya Suit Seeks Proper Wages for Delivery Drivers BARRETT-JACKSON: "Cain" Fails to Establish CAFA Jurisdiction CLEANSPARK INC: Court Certifies "Hasthantra" Securities Suit CONNECTICUT COLLEGE: Breach of Contract Claims in "Murray" Allowed CORNWELL QUALITY: Fails to Protect Personal Info, Schwartz Says CORNWELL QUALITY: Fails to Secure Private Info, Visnofsky Says CYTOKINETICS INC: Faces Seidman Securities Class Suit FREEDOM DEBT: Salaiz Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages HAMSKEA ARCHERY: Preston Sues Over Archery Products Price-Fixing HILTON RESORTS: Spio-Garbrah Balks at Unpaid Wages, Retaliation ILLUMINA INC: Court Dismisses Securities Fraud Suit MEMORIAL HOSPITAL: Wins Partial Dismissal of Meta Pixel Claims NISSAN NORTH: Wilson Sues Over Prerecorded Telephone Calls NORMANS CAY: Faces Rodriguez Wage-and-Hour Suit in S.D.N.Y. PLYMOUTH RESTAURANT: Faces Rios Suit Over Workers' Unpaid Wages RICHLAND COUNTY: Wins Partial Dismissal of Detainee Suit RUFF GREENS: Martinez Seeks Equal Website Access for the Blind SLEEP OUTFITTERS: Website Inaccessible to the Blind, Bennett Says SOL-TI INC: Martinez Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website STATE OF WISCONSIN: Court Dismisses Federal Takings Claim SUPERMERCADOS GISELLE: Rodriguez Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages TEA LIVING: Website Inaccessible to Blind Users, Bennett Says TRANSUNION LLC: Faces Roberts Suit Over Unprotected Personal Info TRANSUNION LLC: Revelle Balks at Inadequate Data Security Practices TWIN CITIES: Timmerman Balks at Unprotected Personal, Health Info UNITED STATES: Wins Partial Dismissal of Portland Protest Suit VENETIAN LAS VEGAS: Vasquez Balks at Third Parties' Tracking Apps WESTERN REFINING: Wins Bid to Stay of "Peoples" WEYERHAEUSER CO: Court Permits Amicus Support in ERISA Case ********* AIMBRIDGE HOSPITALITY: Westbrook Sues Over FCRA Breach ------------------------------------------------------ MELISSA WESTBROOK on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AIMBRIDGE HOSPITALITY, LLC d/b/a/ EXTENDED STAY AMERICA, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-681 (S.D. Ohio, September 16, 2025) is a class action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. According to the complaint, the Defendant obtained information concerning Plaintiff from a consumer reporting agency named Sterling. The Defendant paid a fee for the information it obtained concerning Plaintiff. The Defendant relied on information in a consumer report to make decisions regarding Plaintiff, and on information and belief, Defendant relies on similar information from consumer reports to make decisions regarding other prospective or current employees, including, in whole or in part, as a basis for adverse employment action; such as a refusal to hire and/or termination, alleges the suit. In taking the adverse action without first providing a copy of the Consumer Report, Defendant violated the FCRA. Thus, the Plaintiff seeks statutory damages, punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees, and all other relief available pursuant to the FCRA. Aimbridge Hospitality, LLC is an American third-party hotel management company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Christopher Wiest, Esq. CHRIS WIEST, ATTY AT LAW, PLLC 50 E. Rivercenter Blvd, Ste. 1280 Covington, KY 41011 Telephone: (513) 257-1895 Facsimile: (859) 495-0803 E-mail: chris@cwiestlaw.com ALIBABA.COM US: Faces Rossi Suit Over TCPA Breach ------------------------------------------------- ASHTON ROSSI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALIBABA.COM U.S. LLC, a Delaware company, Defendant, Case No. 5:25-cv-07927 (N.D. Cal., September 17, 2025) seeks to stop the Defendant from violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by making pre-recorded calls to cellular telephone numbers without consent. The complaint alleges that Defendant Alibaba uses pre-recorded calls to reach businesses and consumers en masse to find businesses who are willing to sell products on Defendant's online platforms including Alibaba.com and AliExpress.com. Neither Plaintiff nor the members of the proposed class ever consented to receive the telephone calls at issue, says the suit. Alibaba.com U.S. LLC operates an online retail platform through which companies sell products to consumers and businesses throughout the world.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Rachel E. Kaufman, Esq. KAUFMAN P.A. 237 S Dixie Hwy, Floor 4 Coral Gables, FL 33133 Telephone: (305) 469-5881 E-mail: Rachel@kaufmanpa.com ARG ME19PCK001: Stanley Balks at Property's Architectural Barriers ------------------------------------------------------------------ SOLOMON STANLEY, individually, Plaintiff v. ARG ME19PCK001, LLC A Foreign Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-05324-SDG (N.D. Ga., September 17, 2025) is a class action seeking injunctive relief, and attorney's fees, litigation expenses, costs and damages pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the complaint, the Plaintiff, upon visiting the Defendant's Exxon Gas Station property, personally suffered discrimination because of his disability. There are several elements and spaces that Plaintiff personally encountered and which discriminated against him based upon him disability, such as inaccessible parking areas, ramps, routes throughout the gas station, and public restrooms. Plaintiff Stanley suffers from mobility issues, utilizes prescribed knee braces, must ambulate with a cane, is only able to ambulate short distances, and is an individual with a disability within the meaning of ADA. ARG ME19PCK001, LLC owns and operates Exxon Gas Station.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Pete M. Monismith, Esq. 1000 Main Street, Suite 2016 Pittsburgh, PA 15215 Telephone: (724) 610-1881 E-mail: pete@monismithlaw.com AYVAZ PIZZA: Tafoya Suit Seeks Proper Wages for Delivery Drivers ---------------------------------------------------------------- Jacob Tafoya, Chandler Shamburg, Debralyn Duke, Crystal Sandle, Nolan Wright, Mario Shivers, and Marvin Alexander, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Ayvaz Pizza, LLC; Ayvaz Holdings, LLC, Dhanani Group of Companies, Inc.; Shoukat Dhanani; Usman Dhanani; Doe Corporation 1-10; John Doe 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 4:25-cv-04421 (S.D. Tex., September 17, 2025) seeks appropriate monetary, declaratory, and equitable relief based on Defendants' willful failure to compensate Plaintiffs and similarly-situated individuals under the Fair Labor Standards Act and in accordance with the state wage and common laws of Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia. The Plaintiffs seek to represent the delivery drivers who have worked at the Defendants' Ayvaz Pizza Hut Franchise Stores. According to the complaint, because Defendants paid their drivers a gross hourly wage at precisely, or at least very close to, the applicable minimum wage, and because the delivery drivers incurred unreimbursed automobile expenses, the delivery drivers "kicked back" to Defendants an amount sufficient to cause minimum wage violations. The Defendants have willfully failed to pay federal and state minimum wage to Plaintiffs and similarly situated delivery drivers at the Ayvaz Pizza Hut Franchise Stores and have been unjustly enriched by the delivery drivers' incurring automobile expenses for their benefit, says the suit. Ayvaz Pizza, LLC is one of the entities that has entered into a franchise agreement with Pizza Hut to operate the Ayvaz Pizza Hut Franchise Stores.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: William S. Hommel, Jr., Esq. HOMMEL LAW FIRM PC 5620 Old Bullard Road, Suite 115 Tyler, TX 75703 Telephone: (903) 596-7100 E-mail: bhommel@hommelfirm.com - and - Andrew Biller, Esq. Andrew Kimble, Esq. Laura Farmwald, Esq. BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC 8044 Montgomery Rd, Suite 515 Cincinnati, OH 45236 Telephone: (513) 202-0710 E-mail: abiller@billerkimble.com akimble@billerkimble.com lfarmwald@billerkimble.com BARRETT-JACKSON: "Cain" Fails to Establish CAFA Jurisdiction ------------------------------------------------------------ In the case captioned as Dylan Cain, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Barrett-Jackson Holdings LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. CV-25-03017-PHX-MTL (D. Ariz.), Judge Michael T. Liburdi of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona issued an Order directing the Plaintifss to file a supplement to the complaint fully and properly pleading subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed this action by invoking jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, but the allegations were insufficient to establish jurisdiction under CAFA. The Court noted that Under CAFA, federal jurisdiction exists where there is minimal diversity, an aggregate amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000, and at least 100 putative class members. Section 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B). Minimal diversity is satisfied when any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.Id.Section 1332(d)(2)(A). According to the Court, "For a limited liability company ("LLC"), citizenship is determined by the citizenship of every one of its members, not by its state of organisation or principal place of business." Upon careful examination, the Court stated, the present allegations do not identify the members of Barrett-Jackson Holdings, LLC or their citizenships, and therefore do not allow the Court to assess minimal diversity or potential CAFA exception. Accordingly, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a supplement to the complaint fully and properly pleading subject-matter jurisdiction, and ordered Defendant to file a disclosure statement as required by Rule 7.1. The Court warned, failure to comply will result in dismissal of this action without prejudice. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=oqXxA1 from PacerMonitor.com CLEANSPARK INC: Court Certifies "Hasthantra" Securities Suit ------------------------------------------------------------ In the case captioned as Darshan Hasthantra, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CleanSpark, Inc., et al., Defendants, No. 21-CV-511 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y.), Senior United States District Judge Loretta A. Preska of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Plaintiff's motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lead Plaintiff Darshan Hasthantra brought this putative class action against Defendants CleanSpark, Inc., Zachary Bradford, and S. Matthew Schultz pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5, promulgated thereunder; and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78t(a). Defendants opposed the Motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion was granted. This action arose out of Plaintiff's claim that Defendants shifted CleanSpark's business model from alternative energy and software to mining Bitcoin and in so doing, fraudulently omitted material information and misled investors in three ways during a December 10, 2020 press release and subsequent investor call. First, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants misled investors about CleanSpark's acquisition of ATL Data Centers, Inc., a Bitcoin mining company, by failing to disclose that another Bitcoin mining company, Marathon Patent Group, had announced its intent to purchase ATL, before withdrawing the offer because it discovered adverse information about ATL during the due diligence process. Second, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants omitted the material fact that ATL was effectively the rebranded assets of a company called Virtual Citadel, Inc., which had gone bankrupt. Finally, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants misrepresented the timeline for completion of a project to expand the ATL facility's power capacity. According to Plaintiff, Defendants' fraud was revealed by a series of corrective disclosures, including: (1) the January 14, 2021 Culper Research Report, which disclosed Marathon's failed acquisition of ATL and that ATL was the assets of Virtual Citadel, which had gone bankrupt; (2) a January 15, 2021 Tweet from Culper Research following up on its report; (3) Defendants' February 12, 2021 adjustment of the timeline for completion of the Expansion Project; and (4) Defendants' August 17, 2021 adjustment of the Expansion Project timeline. A district court may only certify a class after it is satisfied based on a rigorous analysis that the proposed class meets Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)'s prerequisites. Those prerequisites require showing that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law and fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of those of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The district court also must ensure that certification is appropriate under one of the three bases for certification set forth by Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(3) allows for certification if both (1) questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and (2) a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Defendants argued that Plaintiff Hasthantra lacked standing because he had not demonstrated that he sold his shares at a loss or provided evidence of any other financial harm. Plaintiff Hasthantra purchased CleanSpark securities between December 31, 2020 and January 12, 2021 and had not sold any of his CleanSpark shares. The Court held that Plaintiff Hasthantra's failure to sell his shares was no bar to his representation of the class because Article III does not impose a sell-to-sue requirement for standing. The Court explained that Plaintiff Hasthantra need not have sold his shares to demonstrate he had suffered an injury-in-fact. Next, Defendants argued that Plaintiff's proposed class of investors included individuals who lacked standing. The Court exercised its authority to modify the proposed class definition to exclude investors who suffered no compensable losses from the class, in accordance with the proposal Plaintiff outlined in reply. Defendants did not dispute that Plaintiff had met the Rule 23(a) numerosity, commonality, and adequacy requirements or the Rule 23(b) superiority requirement. With respect to numerosity, CleanSpark common stock was traded on the Nasdaq with an average of 30.3 million shares outstanding. Approximately 93 percent of the Company's common stock was held and freely tradeable by outside investors. Because there were presumably thousands of class members, the numerosity requirement was satisfied. Commonality requires that there be "questions of law or fact common to the class," FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), and is a "low bar, especially in securities-fraud actions." Regarding commonality, Plaintiff's claims raised numerous questions common to the class, for example whether Defendants made misleading statements or concealed material facts about CleanSpark's business. Typicality Defendants argued that Plaintiff Hasthantra was subject to unique defenses that destroyed typicality. First, Defendants claimed Plaintiff was vulnerable to an argument that he did not rely on the market because he continued to purchase CleanSpark securities after the Culper Report was issued and this lawsuit was initiated. The Court held that Plaintiff Hasthantra's post-disclosure purchases did not render him an atypical representative of the class. There was no suggestion that Plaintiff Hasthantra had any insider information. In addition, Plaintiff's post-disclosure purchases of CleanSpark shares constituted a small portion of his overall amount of purchases. The overwhelming majority of Plaintiff Hasthantra's purchases were made between December 31, 2020 and January 12, 2021 before any alleged fraud was revealed by the Culper Report on January 14, 2021. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff Hasthantra was subject to a separate unique defense—that he could not show he relied on any of the alleged misstatements that occurred after his last purchase of CleanSpark stock on March 5, 2021. The Court held that it is well established that where a plaintiff alleges that his losses were the result of a sustained course of conduct that propped up defendant's stock price throughout the class period, the class may be represented by an individual who purchased his shares prior to the close of the class period. The alleged misstatements Defendants made after March 5, 2021 concerned the same course of conduct as their earlier misstatements, namely CleanSpark's shift of its business model from alternative energy and software to mining Bitcoin, including the delayed timeline for the Expansion Project. Defendants claimed that Plaintiff did not meet the predominance requirement because he failed to demonstrate a common method of reliance that applied class wide. Plaintiff sought to satisfy the reliance element of his claim via the fraud-on-the-market presumption under Basic and the presumption of reliance applicable to omission claims under Affiliated Ute. Defendants argued that neither the Basic presumption nor the Affiliated Ute presumption applied to investors who purchased their CleanSpark stock after this lawsuit was filed on January 20, 2021. The Court rejected this argument, noting that a significant aspect of the alleged fraud -- the timeline for completion of the Expansion Project -- was not revealed until the corrective disclosures in February and August 2021. Finally, Defendants asserted that Plaintiff could not show predominance because he had not provided a model capable of calculating damages on a class-wide basis that was consistent with his liability theory. The Court held that Defendants' argument failed for two reasons. First, Dr. Bozanic's event study was not prepared to demonstrate price impact, but, rather, market efficiency. Second, it is Defendants' burden, rather than Plaintiff's, to demonstrate the absence of price impact. Considering Defendants had failed to present any evidence demonstrating a lack of price impact to rebut the presumption of reliance, Plaintiff was entitled to the presumption of reliance and had satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Plaintiff explained that there was no indication any members of the proposed class would prefer to prosecute individually and there did not appear to be any existing cases already pursued by class members. The cost of pursuing individual litigation may not be feasible given the members of the class were geographically dispersed, which counseled in favor of concentrating the litigation in one forum. Finally, there was no suggestion of any management issues. Plaintiff had demonstrated that a class action was the superior method to adjudicate his claims. The Court certified this action as a class action. Darshan Hasthantra was appointed as Class Representative. Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP was appointed as Class Counsel. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=pLSaAX from PacerMonitor.com CONNECTICUT COLLEGE: Breach of Contract Claims in "Murray" Allowed ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case captioned as James MT Murray, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Connecticut College, Defendant, No. 3:24-cv-01099-MPS, Judge Michael P. Shea of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss a putative class action complaint. The Court dismissed the negligence claim but allowed the breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment claims to proceed. Connecticut College is a private liberal arts college located in New London, Connecticut. Murray and the putative class are members of the CTC community, and CTC required them to submit their non-public personal identifying information and personal health information to receive CTC's services. CTC stored this information on its computer systems. When CTC collects this sensitive information, it promises to use reasonable measures to safeguard the PII and PHI from theft and misuse. It also represented in written contracts, marketing materials, and otherwise that it would properly protect all PII and PHI it obtained. On February 7, 2024, CTC sent notice letters to Murray and other Class Members, informing them that a security incident had resulted in the exfiltration of their PII and PHI. Specifically, CTC informed recipients that an unauthorized party had accessed and acquired certain files maintained on its computer systems, and that one or more of the files accessed by the unauthorized party contained the recipient's full name, Social Security number, and potentially one or more of the following elements of the recipient's information: student identification number, education records information, financial aid information, taxpayer identification number, driver's license number, government-issued identification numbers, financial account information and/or access code, health benefits/enrollment information, and medical record number and/or treatment information provided by the recipient to its Student Health Services. Although this Data Breach began prior to March 2023, and was detected on or about March 3, 2023, it was not until February 2024 that CTC notified Murray and Class Members of the Data Breach. As a consequence of the breach, Murray and Class Members are now subject to the present and continuing risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse of their PII and PHI. CTC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of Article III standing, arguing that Murray has entirely failed to allege an injury-in-fact that is connected to conduct by CTC sufficient to establish Article III standing. The Court disagreed. To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, that the injury was caused by the defendant, and that the injury would likely be redressed by the requested judicial relief. The Court applied the framework established in McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Associates, LLC, which held that a plaintiff may establish standing based on an increased risk of identity theft or fraud following the unauthorized disclosure of his or her data. The McMorris court identified three factors: whether the data at issue has been compromised as the result of a targeted attack intended to obtain the data; whether the plaintiffs can show that at least some part of the compromised dataset has been misused; and whether the type of data is more or less likely to subject plaintiffs to a perpetual risk of identity theft or fraud once it has been exposed. The Court found that Murray satisfied the first McMorris factor because his complaint alleges that the unauthorized third-party cybercriminals gained access to his PII and PHI with the intent of engaging in misuse of the PII and PHI, including marketing and selling his PII and PHI. The Court rejected CTC's argument regarding ransomware attacks, finding that Murray's complaint alleged only that Murray remains in the dark regarding what particular data was stolen, the particular ransomware used, and what steps are being taken, if any, to secure his PII and PHI going forward. The Court found that Murray did not satisfy the second McMorris factor because the complaint contains no allegations that Murray's data, or the data of others affected by the breach, has been misused. However, the Court found that Murray satisfied the third McMorris factor because he alleges that the breach involved his full name and Social Security number, as well as financial aid information, taxpayer identification numbers, driver's license numbers, government-issued identification numbers, financial account information, health benefits/enrollment information, and medical record numbers. Because Murray satisfied two of the three McMorris factors, the Court found that he has plausibly alleged an imminent injury. The Court also found that Murray's injury is concrete under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez because the core injury, exposure of Murray's private PII to unauthorized third parties, bears some relationship to a well-established common-law analog: public disclosure of private facts. The Court followed the Second Circuit's decision in Bohnak v. Marsh, which held that the disclosure of one's PII bears a relationship to an injury with a close historical or common-law analogue. The Court granted CTC's motion to dismiss the negligence claim. A cause of action in negligence is comprised of four elements: duty, breach of that duty, causation, and actual injury. CTC argued that Murray has failed to adequately plead duty. The Court agreed, noting that duty is a function of two variables: foreseeability and public policy. Murray argued that he has adequately pled duty, yet in the three pages of his brief devoted to the topic, he does not cite a single Connecticut case. Instead, he cites out-of-circuit cases and two cases from federal district courts in New York, none of which apply Connecticut law. He has failed to provide any analysis of the duty question under the framework used by Connecticut courts. Because Murray has failed to offer any relevant analysis and because the existence of a duty is a matter of judicial policy best left to Connecticut courts to determine in the first instance, the Court dismissed Murray's negligence claim. The Court denied CTC's motion to dismiss the breach of implied contract claim. The elements of a breach of contract are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages. CTC denied the formation of any agreement, arguing that Murray does not identify from where CTC's alleged promises that form the basis of this purported implicit agreement arose. The Court disagreed, finding that the complaint pleads sufficient facts to suggest the formation of a contract. The key ingredients of the exchange, as alleged, are as follows: CTC required Murray to pay money and relinquish his private information as a condition of his enrollment at CTC. In return, CTC promised to provide educational and other services, to protect Murray's health information and other PII and PHI from unauthorized disclosure, and to comply with HIPAA standards. Under this mutual exchange of promises, both Murray and CTC enjoyed the benefit of the bargain. Moreover, from the complaint's allegation that Murray was enrolled, the Court drew the reasonable inference that Murray was a student, and in Connecticut, courts have recognized a contractual relationship between students and educational institutions. The Court also denied CTC's motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim. Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove that the defendants were benefited, that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment. Murray alleges that he conferred a monetary benefit on CTC, by paying money for education and other services, a portion of which funds was intended to be used by CTC for data security measures. He then alleges that CTC enriched itself by saving the costs it reasonably should have expended on data security measures to secure Murray's PII and PHI. For the reasons above, the Court granted in part and denied in part CTC's motion to dismiss. Murray's negligence claim is dismissed. He may proceed on the remainder of his claims, including breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=uNBzJk from PacerMonitor.com CORNWELL QUALITY: Fails to Protect Personal Info, Schwartz Says --------------------------------------------------------------- BRYAN SCHWARTZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CORNWELL QUALITY TOOLS COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-02929-SBP (D. Colo., September 17, 2025) is a class action against Defendant for its failure to properly secure and safeguard the protected health information and other personally identifiable information including, but not limited to: first and last names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, financial account information. In a data breach letter sent to the Maine Attorney General's office on September 4, 2025, counsel for the Defendant advised that a third-party hacking occurred on December 12, 2024. Omitted from the data breach notice letter were the details of the root cause of the Data Breach, the vulnerabilities exploited, and the remedial measures undertaken to ensure such a breach does not occur again. To date, these omitted details have not been explained or clarified to Plaintiff, who retains a vested interest in ensuring that her PHI/PII remains protected, says the suit. The Data Breach was a direct result of Defendant's failure to implement reasonable safeguards to protect PHI/PII from a foreseeable and preventable risk of unauthorized disclosure. Had Defendant implemented administrative, technical, and physical controls consistent with industry standards and best practices, it could have prevented the Data Breach, the suit alleges. The Plaintiff is a customer of Cornwell Quality Tools residing in Colorado. Cornwell Quality Tools Company is an American privately held company manufacturing tools for the automotive and aviation industries.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Paul J. Doolittle, Esq. POULIN | WILLEY | ANASTOPOULO, LLC 32 Ann Street Charleston, SC 29403 Telephone: (803) 222-2222 Facsimile: (843) 494-5536 E-mail: paul.doolittle@poulinwilley.com CORNWELL QUALITY: Fails to Secure Private Info, Visnofsky Says -------------------------------------------------------------- ANDREW VISNOFSKY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE CORNWELL QUALITY TOOLS COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-01970-SO (N.D. Ohio, September 16, 2025) is a class action lawsuit individually and on behalf of the Plaintiff and all persons who entrusted Defendant with sensitive personally identifiable information and protected health information who were impacted in a data breach Defendant experienced on or around December 20, 2024. On December 20, 2024, the Defendant became aware of unusual activity within its computer network. Upon detection, the Defendant launched an investigation and engaged third-party cybersecurity experts to determine the nature and scope of the incident. The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all persons whose private information was compromised as a result of Defendant's failure to: (i) adequately protect the private information of Plaintiff and Class Members; (ii) warn Plaintiff and Class Members of Defendant's inadequate information security practices; (iii) effectively secure hardware containing protected private information using reasonable and adequate security procedures free of vulnerabilities and incidents; and (iv) timely notify Plaintiff and Class Members of the Data Breach. The Plaintiff further brings this action individually and on behalf of a Class of similarly situated individuals against Defendant for: negligence; negligence per se; unjust enrichment; breach of implied contract; and breach of confidence. The Cornwell Quality Tools Company is a commercial tools manufacturer that specializes in designing, manufacturing, and distributing professional-grade tools for mechanics and technicians across the United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Andrew J. Shamis, Esq. SHAMIS & GENTILE P.A. 14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705 Miami, FL 33132 Telephone: (305) 479-2299 E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com - and - Mark S. Reich, Esq. Melissa G. Meyer, Esq. LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP 33 Whitehall Street, 27th Floor New York, NY 10004 Telephone: (212) 363-7500 Facsimile: (212) 363-7171 E-mail: mreich@zlk.com mmeyer@zlk.com CYTOKINETICS INC: Faces Seidman Securities Class Suit ----------------------------------------------------- JUDAH SEIDMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CYTOKINETICS, INCORPORATED and ROBERT I. BLUM, Defendants, Case No. 3:25-cv-07923 (N.D. Cal., September 17, 2025) is a federal securities class action on behalf of the Plaintiff and all investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Cytokinetics common stock between December 27, 2023 and May 6, 2025, inclusive, seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the Securities Exchange Act. Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants allegedly made materially false and misleading statements regarding the timeline for the New Drug Application submission and approval process for aficamten. Specifically, the Defendants represented that the Company expected approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for its NDA for aficamten in the second half of 2025, based on a September 26, 2025 PDUFA date, and failed to disclose material risks related to the Company's failure to submit a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy that could delay the regulatory process. The truth began to emerge on March 10, 2025, when Cytokinetics disclosed in a Form 8-K filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission that the FDA had decided not to convene an advisory committee meeting to review the Company's NDA for aficamten. Then, on May 1, 2025, Cytokinetics announced that the FDA had extended the Prescription Drug User Fee Act action date for aficamten's NDA from September 26, 2025 to December 26, 2025 to review a REMS submitted at the FDA's request after the initial NDA filing, says the suit. As a result of Defendants' false and misleading statements, the Plaintiff and other Class members purchased Cytokinetics' common stock at artificially inflated prices and suffered significant losses when the truth was revealed, the suit alleges. Cytokinetics, Incorporated is a biopharmaceutical company based in South San Francisco, California.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Adam M. Apton, Esq. LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP 1160 Battery Street East, Suite 100 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 373-1671 E-mail: aapton@zlk.com FREEDOM DEBT: Salaiz Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages -------------------------------------------------------- ERIK SALAIZ, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FREEDOM DEBT RELIEF, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant, Case No. 3:25-cv-00396 (W.D. Tex., September 17, 2025) seeks to stop Defendant's illegal practice of sending telemarketing text messages and to obtain redress for all persons injured by their conduct, including Plaintiff, under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. As part of its marketing, the Defendant sends text messages to Plaintiff and thousands of consumers' phone numbers whose phone numbers were registered on the Federal Do Not Call registry. The Plaintiff was harmed by the text and was temporarily deprived of legitimate use of his phone, the text injured Plaintiff because it was frustrating, obnoxious, annoying, and a nuisance, and depleted Plaintiff's cell phone battery, and used cellular data, says the suit. Freedom Debt Relief, LLC is a debt consolidation company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mark L. Javitch, Esq. JAVITCH LAW OFFICE 3 East 3rd Ave. Ste. 200 San Mateo, CA 94401 Telephone: (650) 781-8000 Facsimile: (650) 648-0705 HAMSKEA ARCHERY: Preston Sues Over Archery Products Price-Fixing ---------------------------------------------------------------- LYNELL PRESTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HAMSKEA ARCHERY SOLUTIONS LLC; ARCHERY TRADE ASSOCIATION, INC.; BOWTECH, INC.; BPS DIRECT LLC d/b/a BASS PRO SHOPS; CABELA'S LLC; DICK'S SPORTING GOODS, INC.; HOYT ARCHERY, INC.; JAY'S SPORTS, INC. d/b/a JAY'S SPORTING GOODS; KINSEY'S OUTDOORS, INC.; LANCASTER ARCHERY SUPPLY, INC.; MATHEWS ARCHERY, INC.; NEUINTEL LLC d/b/a PRICESPIDER f/k/a ORIS INTELLIGENCE; PRECISION SHOOTING EQUIPMENT, INC.; TRACKSTREET, INC.; HUNTER'S MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. d/b/a TENPOINT CROSSBOW TECHNOLOGIES, Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-02924 (D. Colo., September 17, 2025) arises from the Defendants' conspiracy to fix, raise, maintain, and/or stabilize the price of archery products which includes bows, broadhead arrows, arrowpoints, targets, and accessories in violation of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. According to the complaint, the Defendants implemented their conspiracy through their common membership in the Archery Trade Association. Since 2014, the ATA, a professional association which includes the most prominent and influential Archery Product manufacturers, distributors, and retailers across the United States, has worked with Defendants and their co-conspirators to artificially increase prices for Archery Products at the retail level through the widespread adoption, implementation, and enforcement of minimum advertised price policies. The Defendants and their co-conspirators executed this conspiracy to eliminate horizontal price competition for Archery Products at the retail level by agreeing to adopt, implement, and enforce MAP policies which served to fix, raise, stabilize, or otherwise maintain the price of Archery Products at supracompetitive levels, says the suit. The Plaintiff purchased one or more Archery Products that were manufactured or distributed by an Archery Trade Association member within the Class period. Hamskea Archery Solutions LLC is a manufacturer of archery products with primary place of business in Frederick, Colorado.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Seth A. Katz, Esq. Sarah H. Boelts, Esq. BURG SIMPSON ELDREDGE HERSH & JARDINE, P.C. 40 Inverness Drive East Englewood, CO 80112 Telephone: (303) 792-5595 E-mail: skatz@burgsimpson.com sboelts@burgsimpson.com - and - Jonathan S. Crevier, Esq. DICELLO LEVITT LLP 6645 S Cherry Way Centennial, CO 80121 Telephone: (646) 933-1000 E-mail: jcrevier@dicellolevitt.com - and - Gregory S. Asciolla, Esq. Alexander E. Barnett, Esq. Theodore J. Salem-Mackall, Esq. DICELLO LEVITT LLP 485 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1001 New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (646) 933-1000 E-mail: gasciolla@dicellolevitt.com abarnett@dicellolevitt.com tsalemmackall@dicellolevitt.com HILTON RESORTS: Spio-Garbrah Balks at Unpaid Wages, Retaliation --------------------------------------------------------------- PAPAA SPIO-GARBRAH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HILTON RESORTS CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 7:25-cv-07701 (S.D.N.Y., September 16, 2025) arises from Defendant Hilton Resorts Corporation's systematic and unlawful practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and other Lead Generation Agents for all commissions they earned, and its illegal retaliation against those who complained. According to the complaint, Plaintiff Spio-Garbrah was subjected to a recurring pattern of underpayment. When he escalated his complaints about unpaid commissions to Human Resources, Hilton responded not by correcting its errors, but by terminating his employment less than two months later. The Plaintiff brings claims for unpaid wages in violation of New York Labor Law, retaliation for a wage complaint in violation of NYLL, and breach of contract arising from Defendant's failure to pay Spio-Garbrah and other similarly situated employees the commissions they earned pursuant to their Compensation Plan. Hilton Resorts Corporation is a global hospitality company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Alex Rissmiller, Esq. Jazly Liriano, Esq. RISSMILLER PLLC 5 Pennsylvania Plaza, 19th Floor New York, NY 10001 Telephone: (646) 664-1412 E-mail: arissmiller@rissmiller.com jliriano@rissmiller.com ILLUMINA INC: Court Dismisses Securities Fraud Suit --------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as In Re Illumina, Inc. Securities Litigation, Case No. 23cv2082-LL-DTF (S.D. Cal.), Judge Linda Lopez of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted Defendants' motions to dismiss a putative securities class action complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs Universal-Investment-Gesellschaft mbH, UI BVK Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, and ACATIS Investment Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH sued Defendants Illumina, Inc. and GRAIL, LLC, including their executives, for allegedly deceiving them and other investors during an acquisition. The Court consolidated several related actions into this one federal securities putative class action. The putative Class Period covers all persons or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Illumina common stock between September 21, 2020, and November 9, 2023. Illumina, a public biotechnology company that trades on the NASDAQ, is based in San Diego, California. The company makes and sells DNA sequencing platforms that are used in numerous medical applications, controlling over 80 percent of this gene sequencing market. In September 2015, Illumina formed GRAIL as a subsidiary. GRAIL developed a multi-cancer-early-detection test, later called Galleri, that aimed to identify multiple cancer types from a single blood draw. As others invested into GRAIL, Illumina's share was eventually reduced to just under 20 percent. After additional fundraising rounds brought GRAIL to a rumored market value of $4 billion, it began to pursue an IPO. On September 21, 2020, the first day of Plaintiffs' Class Period, Illumina announced that it would reacquire GRAIL for over $8 billion. During this time, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made several false and misleading statements designed to assure investors that acquiring GRAIL was a good investment, including with regards to (1) GRAIL's financial projections; (2) Illumina's ability to accelerate Galleri's FDA approval and commercialization; and (3) the clinical evidence purportedly supporting Galleri's proven technology and ability to save lives. Illumina security price nearly doubled from September 2020 to August 2021. Despite a standstill imposed by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and European Commission, Illumina closed the deal on August 18, 2021, which shocked investors and set off a string of eight more surprising disclosures. The result: Illumina stock plummeted about 80 percent through November 9, 2023, the end of Plaintiffs' Class Period. Plaintiffs allege that these disclosures and accompanying stock drops were proximately caused by Defendants' false and misleading statements. But for such prior statements artificially inflating Illumina stock, which Plaintiffs purchased, they wouldn't have lost so much money during the post-acquisition disclosure period and stock drops. The complaint includes causes of action for alleged violations under: (1) Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b) against all Defendants; (2) Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) against all Defendants; and (3) Section 20(a) against all executives. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rules 8, 9, 12(b)(6), and the PSLRA for failure to state a claim. Defendants argue that dismissal is warranted because Plaintiffs have not adequately pled (1) a material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, and (3) loss causation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b), each independent dismissal grounds. The Court began its analysis with loss causation. Loss causation is simply a variant of proximate cause, meaning the ultimate issue is whether the defendant's misstatement, as opposed to some other fact, foreseeably caused the plaintiff's loss. Plaintiffs alleged nine corrective disclosures between August 2021 and November 2023. Plaintiffs allege that there was a causal connection between the alleged fraud and these stock price declines, essentially arguing a fraud-on-the-market theory. The Court found that nowhere in the table or elsewhere in the Loss Causation section do Plaintiffs specify which misrepresentations the nine disclosures supposedly correct, leaving it to Defendants and this Court to guestimate the connections. This is inappropriate; precisely the kind of connect-the-dots exercise that should not be required of courts and defense counsel. Indeed, such failure to plead with particularity and distinguish among the various misstatements and revelations that allegedly caused that decrease in the market is grounds for dismissal. In opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint, Plaintiffs stressed that it needn't plead a fraud-on-the-market theory to prove loss causation in lieu of some other way. The Court acknowledged that loss causation is a context-dependent inquiry, but noted that when plaintiffs plead a causation theory based on market revelation of the fraud, the court naturally evaluates whether plaintiffs have pleaded the facts relevant to their theory. Because the only plausible reading of this complaint is that Plaintiffs must rely on a fraud-on-the-market theory to establish loss causation, they must trace the loss back to the very facts about which the defendant lied with sufficient particularity. Since Plaintiffs have failed to do the same here, the Court dismissed their first claim on this stand-alone ground. For Plaintiffs' scheme liability claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), the Court found that this scheme consists entirely of the allegations underlying Plaintiffs' first claim under Rule 10b-5(b), so it fails for the same reasons. The Court dismissed claim two. Regarding Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claim against the executives, the Court found that since Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled a primary violation of federal securities law, this claim is dismissed as well. To establish a cause of action under this provision, a plaintiff must first prove a primary violation of underlying federal securities laws, such as Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, and then show that the defendant exercised actual power over the primary violator. Accordingly, the Court granted the Motions to Dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, but with leave to amend. By October 27, 2025, Plaintiffs must file any amended complaint. If Plaintiffs fail to do so by that date, the Court may enter a final order dismissing this case, based both on failure to state a claim and failure to prosecute. A copy of the order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=P9bJL1 from PacerMonitor.com MEMORIAL HOSPITAL: Wins Partial Dismissal of Meta Pixel Claims -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Lacey Gittings-Barrera, Plaintiff, v. Memorial Hospital Association, Defendant, Case No. 4:24-cv-04167-SLD-RLH (C.D. Ill.), Chief United States District Judge Sara Darrow of the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Plaintiff brought this putative class action alleging that Memorial Hospital Association encoded tracking devices into its website. These tracking devices, like the Facebook Pixel, designed by Meta, track information about a website user's device and the URLs and domains she visits, as well as a visitor's search terms, button clicks, and form submissions." The Plaintiff alleged that Memorial knowingly and intentionally installed the Meta Pixel and other tracking technologies on its website which then sent information to Facebook, Google, and other technology companies. Most relevant to this suit, Memorial shared the parameters of website users' physician and location searches, as well as their traffic to web pages relevant only to patients, such as a page about financial assistance. Memorial did not disclose to website users the use of tracking technologies or the sharing of their Private Information with third parties. The Plaintiff began using Memorial's website and online platforms in 2009. Without consent or disclosure, Memorial disclosed to Facebook through use of its Meta Pixel information including the Plaintiff's identity, status as a patient of Memorial, seeking of medical treatment from Memorial, health conditions, and location. Since using Memorial's website, she received online advertisements related to depression and anxiety medication and services. The Plaintiff sought to represent a nationwide class defined as all patients of Defendant whose Private Information was disclosed by Defendant to third parties through the Meta Pixel and related technology without authorization, as well as an Illinois Subclass. The Plaintiff asserted eleven counts against Memorial: (I) negligence, (II) negligence per se, (III) breach of express contract, (IV) breach of implied contract, (V) unjust enrichment, (VI) bailment, (VII) violation of the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute, (VIII-IX) two violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, (X) violation of the Stored Communications Act, and (XI) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Memorial contended that the negligence claims were precluded by the economic loss rule, commonly known in Illinois as the Moorman doctrine. The Court found that Moorman did not operate to bar the Plaintiff's negligence claims for two reasons. First, she pleaded non-economic damages in her negligence claim. "Although Moorman bars recovery for purely economic harm under tort law when the relationship between the parties is governed by contract, Gittings-Barrera's alleged emotional distress and loss of privacy are plainly non-economic." Second, the economic loss doctrine does not bar recovery in tort for the breach of a duty that exists independently of a contract. Memorial's Moorman argument failed because the duties alleged in the complaint to protect confidential information do not arise purely out of contract. Memorial argued that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim because Memorial owes no common law duty to protect personal information. The Court found this argument unpersuasive because the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act was amended in 2017, creating a duty to "implement and maintain reasonable security measures to protect those records from unauthorized access, acquisition, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure." The Court stated that Illinois court does not recognize a common law duty to protect information" was based on old law. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count I for negligence was denied. Similarly, the Court denied the motion to dismiss Count II for negligence per se. The Court found that considering that Count II is based on alleged statutory violations, Memorial's request to dismiss Count II for lack of a common law duty can be dismissed outright. The Court granted Memorial's motion to dismiss Counts III and IV for breach of express and implied contracts. "Under the basic theory of damages for breach of contract, the claimant must establish an actual loss or measurable damages resulting from the breach in order to recover." The Court examined five categories of alleged injuries: (1) increased revenue for Memorial, (2) loss of privacy, (3) overpayment and lost benefit of the bargain, (4) diminished value of personal information, and (5) emotional damages. The Court found that none of these constituted sufficient injury to support a claim for breach of express or implied contract. Regarding overpayment, the Court stated that overpayment has been found a cognizable injury in product-liability cases because only in such cases do plaintiffs allege a defect in the purchased good. The Plaintiff nowhere alleged that the medical services were "defective or dangerous." Regarding emotional distress, the Court found that these allegations are no more than conclusory statements of the elements of her cause of action and that the Plaintiff pleaded no facts suggesting Memorial knew or had reason to know the disclosure would cause mental suffering. The Court denied Memorial's motion to dismiss Count V for unjust enrichment. The Court found that the Plaintiff's payment of money to Memorial for medical services could not constitute a benefit for an unjust enrichment claim. However, benefit provided in the form of personal information given while using the publicly accessible website could plausibly support an unjust enrichment claim. The Court accepted the Plaintiff's allegations that the information given to Memorial through use of the website is valuable. Memorial failed to identify any legal authority showing that provision of Private Information cannot be a benefit for the purposes of unjust enrichment. The Court granted Memorial's motion to dismiss Count VI for bailment. The Court found that it is difficult to imagine what it means to return this allegedly bailed property and that it is similarly unclear how it is possible for Memorial to take 'exclusive possession' of Gittings-Barrera's name or search history, as is typically required of a bailment. The Court concluded that the law of bailment in Illinois does not map onto the circumstances of this case, as no one can have 'exclusive possession' of another person's personal information. The Court granted Memorial's motion to dismiss Count VII for violation of the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute. The Court found that Section (a)(2) applies only to the transmission or recording of private conversations, which the statute defines as any oral communication between 2 or more persons. Since the Plaintiff made no allegation of an oral communication, this section did not apply. The Plaintiff also could not proceed on a Section (a)(3) claim because that section prohibits interception of communications to which he or she is not a party, and the facts alleged contradicted this requirement. Memorial's sole ground for dismissing all three ECPA counts was that the Plaintiff failed to plead economic injury. The Court denied the motion to dismiss Counts VIII and IX for violations of the Wiretap Act. The Court found that the Wiretap Act expressly permits statutory damages in the alternative of actual damages and therefore it cannot reasonably be read, as Memorial suggests, to require a showing of economic damages. Regarding Count X for violation of the Stored Communications Act, the Court found that while the SCA requires actual damages, it does not necessarily follow that Gittings-Barrera's claim can only proceed upon a pleading of economic damages. The Court noted that the language of the SCA, 'actual damage,' does not on its face appear limited to only economic injury. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Count X was denied. The Court granted Memorial's motion to dismiss Count XI for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The Court found that the Plaintiff pleaded no actionable damage or loss. The statute defines 'damage' as any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information. The Plaintiff alleged only misuse of her information, not harm to her devices or electronic files. Additionally, the Court found that the Plaintiff failed to allege that Memorial exceeded its authorized access because the Plaintiff voluntarily visited, utilized, and input information into Memorial's website and therefore Memorial was authorized to access Gittings-Barrera's data. The Court concluded that Counts I and II (negligence and negligence per se), Count V (unjust enrichment), and Counts VIII through X (Electronic Communications Privacy Act claims) were allowed to proceed. Counts III and IV (breach of express and implied contracts), Count VI (bailment), Count VII (Illinois Eavesdropping Statute), and Count XI (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) were dismissed. The Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint within fourteen days of entry of the Order. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=9JsAEc NISSAN NORTH: Wilson Sues Over Prerecorded Telephone Calls ---------------------------------------------------------- CHET MICHAEL WILSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. Defendant, Case No. 3:25-cv-01042 (M.D. Tenn., September 16, 2025) is a class action against the Defendant under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. According to the complaint, the Defendant routinely violates the law by using an artificial or prerecorded voice in connection with non-emergency calls it places to telephone numbers assigned to a cellular telephone service, without prior express consent. More specifically, upon information and good faith belief, the Defendant routinely uses an artificial or prerecorded voice in connection with non-emergency calls it places to wrong or reassigned cellular telephone numbers, says the suit. Nissan North America, Inc. is the North American headquarters, and a wholly owned subsidiary of Nissan Motor Corporation of Japan.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Susan S. Lafferty, Esq. 1321 Murfreesboro Pike, Suite 521 Nashville, TN 37217 Telephone: (615) 878-1926 E-mail: ssl@laffertylawtn.com NORMANS CAY: Faces Rodriguez Wage-and-Hour Suit in S.D.N.Y. ----------------------------------------------------------- HERMINIO RODRIGUEZ (a.k.a. ANGEL), individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NORMANS CAY GROUP LLC (d/b/a LAS'LAP), SCOTT ROBERT WILLIAMS, VINCENT BRYANT, and NICHOLAS SEMKIW, Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-07694 (S.D.N.Y., September 16, 2025) arises from the Defendants' alleged unlawful labor practices in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. According to the complaint, the Defendants violated the federal and state laws by failing to pay Plaintiff applicable minimum hourly rate and overtime compensation; failing to pay one additional hour's pay at the basic minimum wage rate before allowances for each day Plaintiff's spread of hours exceeded 10 hours; failing pay Plaintiff with a written wage notice, in English and in Spanish; and failing to provide an accurate wage statement. Plaintiff Rodriguez was employed by Defendants at Las'lap as a barback from approximately July 2022 until January 20, 2025. Normans Cay Group LLC owns, operates, and controls a Jamaican restaurant/bar in New York under the name "Las'lap."[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael Faillace, Esq. MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510 New York, NY 10165 Telephone: (212) 317-1200 Facsimile: (212) 317-1620 PLYMOUTH RESTAURANT: Faces Rios Suit Over Workers' Unpaid Wages --------------------------------------------------------------- BENITO RIOS and MARIA JOSE AYUI, on behalf of themselves and all other laborers similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiffs v. PLYMOUTH RESTAURANT, INC., d/b/a Pancho's Rooftop Cantina, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-11207 (N.D. Ill., September 16, 2025) arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, and the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance. The complaint alleges the Defendant's: 1) failure to pay its employees at time and a half their mandated regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 per week; 2) failure to pay its employees the Illinois and Chicago-mandated minimum wage for all time worked; and 3) practice of making unlawful deductions from its employees. Plaintiff Rios has been employed by Defendant as a cook since approximately 2013 through the present. Plymouth Restaurant, Inc. operates a rooftop restaurant in downtown Chicago, Illinois doing business as Pancho's Rooftop Cantina.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Alvar Ayala, Esq. FARMWORKER AND LANDSCAPER ADVOCACY PROJECT 77 West Washington, Suite 1100 Chicago, IL 60402 Telephone: (224) 522-3178 E-mail: aayala@flapillinois.org - and - Christopher J. Williams, Esq. WORKERS' LAW OFFICE 1341 W. Fullerton Ave, Suite 147 Chicago, IL 60614 Telephone: (312) 945-8737 E-mail: cwilliams@workers-law-office.com RICHLAND COUNTY: Wins Partial Dismissal of Detainee Suit -------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Disability Rights South Carolina, individually, and C.D., J.O., J.H., W.M., T.D., L.D., A.S., F.J., T.J., T.F., and K.B., as Class Representatives on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Richland County, Defendant, Civil Action No. 8:22-1358-MGL (D.S.C.), Judge Mary Geiger Lewis of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment, denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for class certification Plaintiffs Disability Rights South Carolina individually and C.D., J.O., J.H., W.M., T.D., L.D., A.S., F.J., T.J., T.F., and K.B., as Class Representatives on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated filed this civil action against Defendant Richland County. Class Representatives are former and current pretrial detainees with serious mental illnesses who were or are confined at Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Richland County, South Carolina. ASGDC is owned, managed, operated, staffed, and overseen by the County. Plaintiffs allege dangerous, inhumane, and unconstitutional conditions, policies, and practices exist and have existed for an extended period of time at ASGDC because of the County's failure to provide adequate mental health care and safe and sanitary conditions of confinement to SMI Detainees in custody at ASGDC. Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief. They assert a discrimination claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq., as well as Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.[1] The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In the first Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Court grant the County's motion as to Plaintiffs' discrimination claim, deny the parties cross-motions as to Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims, and grant the County's motion as to Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims. For ease of reference, the Court will categorize the Fourteenth Amendment claims as claims for failure to protect, inadequate mental health treatment, and conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification. In the second Report, the Magistrate Judge suggests the Court grant the motion, certify the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), and appoint class counsel. The parties objected to Report I only. The parties filed replies, and Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply. Plaintiffs first contest the Magistrate Judge's suggestion the Court grant the County's motion for summary judgment as to their discrimination claim. Title II of the ADA allows plaintiffs to pursue three distinct grounds for relief: (1) intentional discrimination or disparate treatment; (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make reasonable accommodations. Plaintiffs maintain two practices, ASGDC's restrictive housing policy and use of force, have a harsher, disparate impact on SMI Detainees. But, Plaintiffs neglect to offer any substantive argument in support of their restrictive housing allegation and instead focus solely on ASGDC's purported use of force. The County asserts Plaintiffs are unable to argue discriminatory use of force, as the operative complaint advances discrimination based only on ASGDC's restrictive housing policy. In the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege ASGDC discriminates against SMI Detainees on the basis of their mental illnesses by confining them, upon information and belief, at materially greater rates and for materially longer periods than non-disabled detainees are subjected to such confinement. Absent from the complaint, though, and as the County notes, is any contention ASGDC engages in discriminatory use of force. The Court is unable to agree with Plaintiffs' contention the Magistrate Judge erred in suggesting the Court grant the County's motion for summary judgment as to their discrimination claim. Failure to Protect Claim The parties object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation the Court deny their cross-motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' failure-to-protect claim. The County first argues the Magistrate Judge improperly applied the objective standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593 (4th Cir. 2023). In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the Supreme Court explained pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all. Hence, the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim is solely an objective one. More than eight years later, the Fourth Circuit in Short determined Kingsley rendered prior precedent applying a subjective deliberate indifference standard to Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims untenable.[1] The County proposes the Court adopt the test enunciated in Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). The Court agrees with the County and thus concludes the Castro test is the proper standard under which to assess Plaintiffs' failure-to-protect claim. The Ninth Circuit held the four elements of a pretrial detainee's failure-to-protect claim are: (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. The County next posits the Magistrate Judge disregarded its argument the Supreme Court's analyses in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), apply in the Court's consideration of Plaintiffs' failure-to-protect claim. The Court is unable to conclude Short rendered Farmer and Helling wholly inapplicable in this case. The prospective relief sought by the plaintiffs in Farmer and Helling is the same relief sought by Plaintiffs here.[1] Plaintiffs maintain the evidence reveals chronic staffing shortages have caused a collapse of ASGDC's direct supervision management system and, in turn, have exposed vulnerably and mentally disordered detainees to a substantial risk of serious harm. The County, however, asserts Plaintiffs present a recitation of their previous arguments focusing on largely anecdotal evidence and incomplete, misleading, and essentially cherry-picked statistical evidence. On the one hand, Plaintiffs have presented competent evidence indicating the County continues to act with deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm to SMI Detainees. On the other hand, the County has presented evidence of post-litigation improvements in the very practices underlying Plaintiffs' failure-to-protect claim. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge the parties present conflicting evidence as to whether Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief based on ASGDC's failure to protect SMI Detainees Accordingly, the Court will overrule Plaintiffs' objections relative to their failure-to-protect claim. The Court rejects the parties' contentions the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending the Court deny their cross-motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' failure-to-protect claim. The parties also object to the Magistrate Judge's suggestion the Court deny their cross-motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' inadequate mental health treatment claim. The Fourth Circuit has explained a prison inmate is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial. Once a pretrial detainee demonstrates he or she is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment under Bowring, the inquiry shifts to the constitutional adequacy of such treatment. In Ruiz v. Estelle,. The court identified the following six minimum components of a constitutional mental health treatment program: First, there must be a systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates in order to identify those who require mental health treatment. Second, treatment must entail more than segregation and close supervision of the inmate patients. Third, treatment requires the participation of trained mental health professionals, who must be employed in sufficient numbers to identify and treat in an individualized manner those treatable inmates suffering from serious mental disorders. Fourth, accurate, complete, and confidential records of the mental health treatment process must be maintained. Fifth, prescription and administration of behavior-altering medications in dangerous amounts, by dangerous methods, or without appropriate supervision and periodic evaluation, is an unacceptable method of treatment. Sixth, a basic program for the identification, treatment, and supervision of inmates with suicidal tendencies is a necessary component of any mental health treatment program. The County challenges the Magistrate Judge's determination on several grounds. First, the County maintains the Magistrate Judge disregarded the key holding from Bowring that a local detention facility must provide what is medically necessary and not what may be medically desirable. Having fully reviewed Report I, the Court is unable to discern any manner in which the Magistrate Judge implied SMI Detainees are entitled to unqualified or unlimited access to mental health care. Third, the County posits the Magistrate Judge failed to draw the necessary distinctions between a long-term facility housing convicts with respect to its requirements for health care including mental health care and the availability of resources as compared to a local detention facility where convicts serve sentences of ninety days or less and pre-trial detainees are typically short-term. The due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to the convicted prisoner. Accordingly, a mental health treatment program that is constitutionally inadequate under the Eighth Amendment is necessarily inadequate under the Fourteenth Amendment, too. The Court concludes Plaintiffs have neglected to submit any evidence establishing Disability Rights, J.O., J.H., W.M., T.D., L.D., A.S., F.J., T.J., T.F., and K.B. are entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment under Bowring. The parties have, however, presented conflicting evidence as to whether C.D. is entitled to such treatment and, if so, whether the mental health treatment program at ASGDC is constitutionally adequate under Ruiz.[1] Plaintiffs present medical records for J.O., J.H., W.M., T.D., L.D., F.J., T.J., T.F., and K.B. But, medical records alone fail to establish these detainees are entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment. The Court concludes a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether C.D. is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment under Bowring. But, because Plaintiffs have neglected to set forth any evidence indicating Disability Rights, J.O., J.H., W.M., T.D., L.D., A.S., F.J., T.J., T.F., and K.B. are entitled to such treatment, the Court holds the County is entitled to summary judgment on this claim as to these Plaintiffs. As for the constitutional adequacy of ASGDC's mental health treatment program under Ruiz, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge the parties have offered conflicting evidence. Considering the foregoing evidence, much of which directly conflicts, the Court concludes genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether C.D. is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment under Bowring and, if so, whether the mental health treatment program at ASGDC satisfies the constitutional minima under Ruiz. The Court observes the issue of medical necessity under Bowring depends upon the individual characteristics of each particular defendant. As such, the Court determines the class action requirement of commonality is unsatisfied as to C.D.'s inadequate mental health treatment claim. The Court will therefore deny Plaintiffs' motion for class certification as to this claim. The Court overrules in part and sustains in part the parties' objections. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Reports to the extent they are consistent with this Order and incorporates them herein. It is therefore the judgment of the Court Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied, and the County's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. More specifically, the County's motion is granted as to Plaintiffs' discrimination claim; as to the inadequate mental health treatment claims brought by Disability Rights, J.O., J.H., W.M., T.D., L.D., A.S., F.J., T.J., T.F., and K.B; and as to Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims, which are all dismissed with prejudice. The motion is denied as to Plaintiffs' remaining claims. Further, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted in part and denied in part. Namely, the motion is granted as to Plaintiffs' failure-to-protect and conditions of confinement claims and denied as to C.D.'s inadequate mental health treatment claim. Relative to the class claims, the Court appoints Plaintiffs C.D., J.O., J.H., W.M., T.D., L.D., A.S., F.J., T.J., T.F., and K.B. as class representatives. The Court also appoints the attorneys of Burnette Shutt and McDaniel PA, who have already appeared in this action, as class counsel. The Court defines the class as all individuals: 1) Who were, are, or will be detained at ASDGC on or after April 28, 2022; and 2) Who were, are, or will be before their discharge from ASGDC: a) Assigned to a mental health housing unit at ASGDC; b) Diagnosed by a psychiatrist or other licensed clinical mental health professional with any of the following mental illnesses: i) Cognitive disorders; ii) Schizophrenia; iii) Schizoaffective Disorder; iv) Paranoid Disorder; v) Major Depressive Disorder; vi) Bipolar Disorder; vii) Other Psychotic or Mood Disorders; c) Diagnosed by a psychiatrist or other licensed clinical mental health professional with another mental disorder that is not listed above but that has resulted in significant functional impairment, defined as: i) The inability to attend and effectively perform the usual or necessary activities of daily living; ii) An extreme impairment of coping skills, rendering the patient exceptionally vulnerable to unintentional or intentional victimization and possible mismanagement; or iii) Behaviors that are bizarre and/or dangerous to self or others; or d) Admitted to a licensed behavioral health or psychiatric hospital. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=fApNYG from PacerMonitor.com RUFF GREENS: Martinez Seeks Equal Website Access for the Blind -------------------------------------------------------------- JUDITH ADELA FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RUFF GREENS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-07705 (S.D.N.Y., September 17, 2025) is a civil rights action against the Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its interactive website, https://ruffgreens.com, to be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired persons in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and the New York State General Business Law. During Plaintiff's visits to the Website, the last occurring on September 12, 2025, in an attempt to purchase Dog Food from Defendant and to view the information on the Website, the Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied her a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person and full and equal access to the goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public. She was not able to add the item to the cart due to broken links, pictures without alternate attributes and other barriers on Defendant's Website, the Plaintiff asserts. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that its Website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers. Ruff Greens, Inc. operates the website that offers dog and cat nutritional supplements.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael A. LaBollita, Esq. Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq. Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq. GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES PLLC 150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR New York, NY 10003 Telephone: (212) 228-9795 Facsimile: (212) 982-6284 E-mail: Jeffrey@Gottlieb.legal Dana@Gottlieb.legal Michael@Gottlieb.legal SLEEP OUTFITTERS: Website Inaccessible to the Blind, Bennett Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- LIVINGSTON BENNETT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sleep Outfitters, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-11264 (N.D. Ill., September 17, 2025) is a civil rights action against the Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its interactive website, https://sleepoutfitters.com, to be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired persons in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. On August 21, 2025, the Plaintiff has made an attempt to complete a purchase on Sleepoutfitters.com. However, as he tried to navigate the website and complete his purchase, he encountered significant accessibility issues that severely hindered his ability to proceed. According to the complaint, the website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to inaccurate landmark structure, inadequate focus order, changing of content without advance warning, the lack of navigation links, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in Sleep Outfitters' policies, practices, and procedures so that its website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers. This complaint also seeks compensatory damages to compensate Class members for having been subjected to unlawful discrimination. Sleep Outfitters, LLC operates the website that offers a variety of mattresses, pillows, protectors, bedding sheets and accessories.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David B. Reyes, Esq. EQUAL ACCESS LAW GROUP, PLLC 68-29 Main Street Flushing, NY 11367 Telephone: (718) 554-0237 E-mail: Dreyes@ealg.law SOL-TI INC: Martinez Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website --------------------------------------------------------- JUDITH ADELA FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SOL-TI, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-07708 (S.D.N.Y., September 17, 2025) is a civil rights action against the Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its interactive website, https://solti.com, to be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired persons in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and the New York State General Business Law. During Plaintiff's visits to the Website, the last occurring on September 12, 2025, in an attempt to purchase a Ginger SuperShot beverage from Defendant and to view the information on the Website, the Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied her a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person and full and equal access to the goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public. She was not able to add the item to the cart due to broken links, pictures without alternate attributes and other barriers on Defendant's Website, says the suit. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that its Website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers. Sol-Ti, Inc. operates the website that offers nutritional beverages.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael A. LaBollita, Esq. Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq. Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq. GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES PLLC 150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR New York, NY 10003 Telephone: (212) 228-9795 Facsimile: (212) 982-6284 E-mail: Jeffrey@Gottlieb.legal Dana@Gottlieb.legal Michael@Gottlieb.legal STATE OF WISCONSIN: Court Dismisses Federal Takings Claim --------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as John Elliot, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. State of Wisconsin, Adams County, Ashland County, Barron County, Bayfield County, Brown County, Buffalo County, Burnett County, Calumet County, Chippewa County, Clark County, Columbia County, Crawford County, Dane County, Dodge County, Door County, Douglas County, Dunn County, Eau Claire County, Florence County, Fond Du Lac County, Forest County, Grant County, Green County, Green Lake County, Iowa County, Iron County, Jackson County, Jefferson County, Juneau County, Kenosha County, Kewaunee County, La Crosse County, Lafayette County, Langlade County, Lincoln County, Manitowoc County, Marathon County, Marinette County, Marquette County, Menominee County, Milwaukee County, Monroe County, Oconto County, Oneida County, Outagamie County, Ozaukee County, Pepin County, Pierce County, Polk County, Portage County, Price County, Racine County, Richland County, Rock County, Rusk County, Sauk County, Sawyer County, Shawano County, Sheboygan County, St. Croix County, Taylor County, Trempealeau County, Vernon County, Vilas County, Walworth County, Washburn County, Washington County, Waukesha County, Waupaca County, Waushara County, Winnebago County, Wood County, and City of Milwaukee, Defendants, Case No. 25-CV-421-SCD (E.D. Wis.), United States Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Dries of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss a class action complaint, dismissing the federal takings claim as time-barred while remanding state law claims to state court. John and Darlene Elliot, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, challenge the practice whereby local or county governments retain surplus proceeds from property tax foreclosures. Under Wisconsin's previous statute, when a government foreclosed on a property for delinquent taxes, it retained any surplus after the property tax debt had been paid. Wisconsin amended this statute in April 2022 to require that any surplus be returned to the prior property owner. Then, the Supreme Court held in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023), that when a government entity keeps surplus proceeds from property tax foreclosures, that constitutes a taking of private property requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In February 2025, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in state court alleging that the State of Wisconsin, all Wisconsin counties, and the city of Milwaukee violated the takings clauses of the Wisconsin and U.S. constitutions, and the excessive fines clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. The Defendant removed the case to federal court, and the Plaintiff moved to remand to state court and filed an amended complaint. The Defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of owners who: (1) had their properties foreclosed on to satisfy a tax debt; (2) where the property was sold for more than the debt; (3) and one of the Defendant retained the surplus; (4) between January 1, 1989 and April 2, 2022. The Defendant consists of Wisconsin counties, the city of Milwaukee (classified as a county under Wis. Stat. Section 75.06), and the State of Wisconsin. On May 9, 2025, the Plaintiff filed an amended class-action complaint. Count 1 alleges that the Defendant violated Wisconsin's takings clause, article 1 section 13. Count 2 alleges that the Defendant violated Wisconsin's excessive fines clause, article 1 section 6. Count 3 alleges that the Defendant violated the U.S. Constitution's takings clause in the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court addressed whether there is a direct cause of action under the Takings Clause. Although the law has been unsettled, current guidance suggests that there is not a direct cause of action under the Takings Clause in this case. Section 1983 provides a procedural vehicle to challenge alleged takings. The Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of action arising directly under the Constitution in a case where Section 1983 was available as a remedy. When the legislature provided a cause of action to remedy a constitutional violation, that cause of action should be pursued in lieu of resolving whether a direct cause of action exists. In Devillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285 (2024), the Court held that Constitutional rights do not typically come with a built-in cause of action to allow for private enforcement in courts. Our precedents do not cleanly answer the question whether a plaintiff has a cause of action arising directly under the Takings Clause. At the very least, when a procedural vehicle is available to bring a constitutional claim, then the direct cause of action question need not be addressed. The Seventh Circuit agreed, stating Neither we nor the Supreme Court have ever recognized a direct cause of action for compensation under the Takings Clause. The Court found that in pleadings, substance is more important than form. The allegations' substance, not its proposed label, controls the applicable law and procedure. Even though the Plaintiff labels the claim as a direct cause of action under the Fifth Amendment, Congress provided the Plaintiff with a remedy in Section 1983 to pursue the claims. That statute and its attendant limitations control here. Upon careful examination of the statute of limitations, the Court concluded that a three-year statute of limitations bars the Plaintiff's federal claim. Section 1983 borrows a statute of limitations from the forum state's personal injury law. In Wisconsin, an action to recover damages for an injury to the character or rights of another, not arising on contract, shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues, except where a different period is expressly prescribed, or be barred. The residual or general personal injury statute of limitations applies to 42 USC 1983 actions. The named plaintiff whose property sold most recently is Carl Geib. Walworth County acquired Mr. Geib's property on June 10, 2021, and sold it on October 25, 2021. If the accrual date is the date of the property's sale, then the limitations period would end on October 25, 2024, four months before the Plaintiff's complaint was filed in state court. Even under the latest accrual date, the statute of limitations categorically bars the Plaintiff's claims. The Court rejected the Plaintiff's arguments for equitable relief. A constitutional claim can become time-barred just as any other claim can. Constitutional claims generally, and takings claims specifically, are not immune from procedure, so long as the procedure provides just compensation. The Court found that new case law does not toll claims. Equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if, despite the exercise of all due diligence, he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim. According to the Court, the failure to file a timely complaint was not due to circumstances outside the Plaintiff's control, nor despite due diligence. A Section 1983 takings claim based on the retention of a taxpayer's surplus equity was already viable before the Supreme Court decided Tyler. The Supreme Court's decision in Tyler appears to have strengthened the force of the Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims, but it did not create them out of whole cloth. Neither Tyler nor the statutory amendment actively prevented the Plaintiff from filing earlier. The Court noted that principles articulated by new case law apply retroactively to pending cases, but do not revive already expired claims. Lastly, equitable estoppel does not apply here. The doctrine of equitable estoppel comes into play if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time. The alleged misconduct by Wisconsin courts in deciding Ritter and Jensen were not committed by the entities whose alleged violation of the constitution gave rise to this suit. The Defendant reasonably relied on Wisconsin courts' understanding of takings law, and the statute at that time, alongside the Plaintiff. Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions bars count 3. Regarding the state claims, the Court determined that with count 3 dismissed, counts 1 and 2 should be remanded to state court. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Declining supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate because only state claims remain after dismissing count 3. Counts 1 and 2 raise novel issues of state law best addressed in state court. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has not yet considered Tyler and retroactivity under article 1, section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ebQLdu from PacerMonitor.com SUPERMERCADOS GISELLE: Rodriguez Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages -------------------------------------------------------------- LUCIA RODRIGUEZ and LIZETH SANCHEZ on behalf of themselves and all other laborers similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiffs v. SUPERMERCADOS GISELLE, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-11245 (N.D. Ill., September 17, 2025) is a class action against the Defendant for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. The complaint alleges the Defendant's failure to pay its employees at time and a half their mandated regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 per week; and b) Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff Lizeth Sanchez Illinois-mandated minimum wages for all time worked. Plaintiff Rodriguez was employed by Defendant primarily as a cashier, but performing a range of other duties at Defendant's store including stocking, and cutting fruit from approximately May 2021 through approximately the end of August 2025. Plaintiff Sanchez was been employed by Defendant performing a range of duties including stocking and handling phone order between approximately mid-June, 2025 and the end of August. Supermercados Giselle, LLC operates a grocery store in Mundelein, Illinois.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Alvar Ayala, Esq. FARMWORKER AND LANDSCAPER ADVOCACY PROJECT 77 W. Washington St., Suite 1100 Chicago, IL 60602 Telephone: (224) 522-3178 TEA LIVING: Website Inaccessible to Blind Users, Bennett Says ------------------------------------------------------------- LIVINGSTON BENNETT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Tea Living, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-11266 (N.D. Ill., September 17, 2025) is a civil rights action against the Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its interactive website, www.teacollection.com, to be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired persons in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the complaint, the website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: inaccurate landmark structure, inaccurate heading hierarchy, changing of content without advance warning, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the denial of keyboard access for some interactive elements, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in Tea Living's policies, practices, and procedures so that its website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers. This complaint also seeks compensatory damages to compensate Class members for having been subjected to unlawful discrimination. Tea Living, Inc. operates the website that offers kids' apparel, including swimwear, dresses, leggings, tees and tops, shorts, rompers and jumpsuits, and pants.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David B. Reyes, Esq. EQUAL ACCESS LAW GROUP, PLLC 68-29 Main Street Flushing, NY 11367 Telephone: (718) 554-0237 E-mail: Dreyes@ealg.law TRANSUNION LLC: Faces Roberts Suit Over Unprotected Personal Info ----------------------------------------------------------------- Danielle Roberts, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TransUnion LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-11248 (N.D. Ill., September 17, 2025) is a class action complaint against TransUnion seeking recompense for its acts and omissions, which led to a breach of TransUnion's consumer support-operations application in July 2025, culminating in the theft of Plaintiff and the Class' sensitive information by cybercriminals. On July 28, 2025, an unauthorized third party accessed a cloud-based customer relationship management system database used by TransUnion to store customer information. The value of the type of sensitive information stolen in the Data Breach is well recognized in the modern data economy, including to cybercriminals on the dark web who use it for fraud and identity theft. As such, the foreseeable risk to individuals as a result of a criminal hacking event is well known and recognized by technology companies and others who gather and store data, including Defendant, the suit asserts. Had Plaintiff and Class Members known TransUnion maintained inadequate data security protocols, Plaintiff and Class Members would not have provided their Sensitive Information to TransUnion. Due to TransUnion's inadequate data security and the resulting Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class Members now face a present, immediate, and ongoing risk of fraud and identity theft and must deal with that threat forever, says the suit. Plaintiff Roberts signed up for a TransUnion account years ago and paid TransUnion for its credit monitoring services until sometime in November 2021. TransUnion LLC is a major credit reporting agency in the United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David M. Cialkowski, Esq. Brian C. Gudmundson, Esq. Madison M. DeMaris, Esq. ZIMMERMAN REED LLP 1100 IDS Center, 80 South 8th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 Telephone: (612) 341-0400 Facsimile: (612) 341-0844 E-mail: david.cialkowski@zimmreed.com brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com madison.demaris@zimmreed.com TRANSUNION LLC: Revelle Balks at Inadequate Data Security Practices ------------------------------------------------------------------- ANDREW REVELLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TRANSUNION LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-11268 (N.D. Ill., September 17, 2025) arises from the Defendant's failure to implement and follow basic, standard data security procedures that resulted in the compromise of the personal identifying information of approximately 4.4 million customers, including Plaintiff. On August 26, 2025, TransUnion began notifying consumers that Defendant had suffered a cybersecurity incident which impacted personal data on a third-party application used by TransUnion. The Plaintiff and Class Members are now at a significantly increased and certainly impending risk of fraud, identity theft, and similar forms of criminal mischief—risks which may last for the rest of their lives. Consequently, the Plaintiff and Class Members must devote substantially more time, money, and energy to protect themselves, to the extent possible, from these crimes, says the suit. The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, brings claims for negligence, negligence per se, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, and declaratory judgment, seeking damages, with attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, and appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief. TransUnion LLC is a major credit reporting agency in the United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Maureen Kane Berg, Esq. Karen H. Riebel, Esq. Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, Esq. Emma Ritter Gordon, Esq. Jacob E. Lanthier, Esq. LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN PLLP 100 Washington Ave. S., Suite 2200 Minneapolis, MN 55401 Telephone: (612) 596-4097 Facsimile: (612) 596-4037 E-mail: khriebel@locklaw.com kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com mkberg@locklaw.com erittergordon@locklaw.com jelanthier@locklaw.com TWIN CITIES: Timmerman Balks at Unprotected Personal, Health Info ----------------------------------------------------------------- ELIZABETH TIMMERMAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TWIN CITIES PAIN CLINIC, Defendant, Case No. 27-CV-25-17086 (Minn. Dist., Hennepin Cty., 4th Judicial, September 16, 2025) arises from the Defendant's failure to properly secure and safeguard Plaintiff's and other similarly situated patients' personally identifiable information and protected health information. On July 9, 2025, the Defendant discovered suspicious activity in a TCPC employee's email account. Following the discovery, the Defendant conducted an internal investigation and determined that an unauthorized cyber actor was able to access its files on July 9. Despite learning of the Data Breach Incident in July 2025, the Defendant waited until September 4, 2025, to begin notifying Plaintiff and Class Members. The Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit to address Defendant's inadequate safeguarding of Class Members' private information that it collected and maintained, and its failure to provide timely and adequate notice to Plaintiff and Class Members of the types of information that were accessed, and that such information was subject to unauthorized access by cybercriminals. Accordingly, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and Class Members, assert claims for negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of confidence. Twin Cities Pain Clinic is a pain management center that treats its patients for bodily injuries and chronic pain.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Philip J. Krzeski, Esq. Bryan L. Bleichner, Esq. Christopher P. Renz, Esq. CHESTNUT CAMBRONNE PA 100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 1700 Minneapolis, MN 55401 Telephone: (612) 339-7300 E-mail: pkrzeski@chestnutcambronne.com bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com crenz@chestnutcambronne.com - and - Mariya Weekes, Esq. MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC 333 SE 2nd Avenue, Suite 2000 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (866) 252-0878 E-mail: mweekes@milberg.com UNITED STATES: Wins Partial Dismissal of Portland Protest Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Ellen Urbani, Nathaniel West, and Rowan Maher, each individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. United States of America, Defendant, Case No. 3:23-cv-01920-AN (D. Or.), Judge Adrienne Nelson of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss a putative class action complaint alleging negligence and battery arising from the use of tear gas, munitions, and other crowd-control methods during the July 2020 protests in Portland, Oregon. The Court dismissed the negligent training claim with leave to amend, dismissed portions of the negligence claim based on intentional conduct, but allowed the battery claim and most negligence claims to proceed. The Plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 19, 2023, alleging claims for negligence and battery arising from the July 2020 protests in Portland, Oregon. The Plaintiffs alleged that they participated, alongside putative class members, in protesting against police violence outside the Hatfield Courthouse in Portland, Oregon in July 2020. On July 1, 2020, federal law enforcement officers and agents were deployed in Portland, where they allegedly "engaged in crowd-dispersal operations, deploying tear gas and impact munitions well beyond the immediate surroundings of federal property and with the apparent purpose of quelling lawful protests in support of Black lives rather than protecting federal property," under direction of then-Acting Department of Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf and then-Senior Official Performing the Duties of the DHS Deputy Secretary Kenneth Cuccinelli. The Plaintiffs alleged that federal agents repeatedly failed to employ de-escalation strategies or tactics to mitigate violence and instead escalated violence on a nightly basis by pursuing protesters, observers, and journalists through the streets blocks beyond federal property while simultaneously firing pepper-spray balls, rubber bullets, and other munitions and concealing the pathways for protestors to safely disperse with tear gas and flashbang devices. Federal agents discharged tear gas, less-lethal munitions, and sonic grenades directed at plaintiffs and other protestors, who were exposed to teargas, shot with sonic grenades and impact munitions, and beaten and arrested. The Plaintiffs defined the putative class as consisting of people who, between July 1 and July 30, 2020, lawfully gathered in an area bounded by SW Taylor St. on the north, SW 2nd Ave. on the east, SW Madison St. on the south, and SW 4th Ave. on the west (also referred to herein as 'the protest zone') to protest police violence, who were exposed to teargas or other impact munitions, and who, within two years of the date of injury filed a Form 95 with the United States. The Plaintiffs believe that the class includes at least 162 people. Plaintiff Urbani attended the protests on July 24, 2020, and alleged that she was exposed to tear gas which caused "pain, discomfort, mental distress, respiratory distress, temporary blindness, and temporary loss of mobility." She was also struck in the left foot by impact munitions while standing in the protest zone, which broke her big toe. She was additionally struck by pepper-spray balls in the head and face causing pain and discomfort. Plaintiff West attended the protests on July 21, 22, 24, and 25, 2020. He was exposed to tear gas which caused pain, discomfort, mental distress, respiratory distress, temporary blindness, and temporary loss of mobility. On July 25, 2020, one or more of Defendant's agents allegedly fired stun grenades close to West, which detonated close to him, causing hearing loss, pain, and disorientation. Plaintiff Maher attended the protests on July 21 through 26 and 29 through 30, 2020. She was exposed to tear gas which caused her to suffer "pain, discomfort, mental distress, respiratory distress, temporary blindness, and temporary loss of mobility." On July 22, 2020, around approximately 12:30 to 1:00 a.m., she was beaten with a baton by "a federal agent wearing military camouflage fatigues" while walking away from Lownsdale Square. That same night, between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., she was allegedly struck in the head by a pepper-spray ball munition while standing on SW Main Street between 5th and 6th Avenue. The Court addressed Defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Regarding the negligent training claim, the Court found that sovereign immunity compelled dismissal. The Court applied the two-part test to determine whether the discretionary function exception bars a claim. The Court noted that without allegations describing a statute, regulation, or policy that prescribes a specific course of action that was not subject to discretion and that defendant did not take, plaintiffs have not stated a claim over which the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the claim for negligent training was dismissed, with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies. Regarding the negligent arrest and pepper spray claims, the Court found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated standing at this stage. The Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's class certification approach, explaining that if there is a disjuncture between the injuries suffered by named and unnamed plaintiffs, the court first addresses whether the named plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim, and then later, at the class certification stage, addresses whether they are adequate representatives. The Court concluded that because the unnamed putative class members have similar, but not identical, interests, this matter is premature and is appropriately raised at the class certification stage. Regarding the battery claim, the Court found that it was not barred by sovereign immunity. The Court explained that while the Federal Tort Claims Act typically preserves immunity for intentional torts, Congress has carved out an exception for certain claims that arise out of the wrongful conduct of law enforcement officers. This exception, called the law enforcement proviso, allows suits for claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, [or] abuse of process by investigative or law enforcement officers. The Court found that Plaintiffs' battery claim was cognizable under the FTCA because it was covered by the law enforcement proviso. The Court addressed Defendant's argument that the negligence claim must be dismissed because it was premised on intentional conduct. The Court noted that under Oregon law, intentional conduct cannot support a claim for negligence. The Court found that striking someone with a baton, fist, or other weapon is intentional conduct that does not give rise to a negligence claim. Similarly, arresting and handcuffing a person is intentional conduct that cannot support a claim for negligence. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' negligence claim was dismissed to the extent it was premised on beatings and arrests. However, the Court found that the allegations of negligence regarding the use of tear gas, pepper-spray balls, pepper spray, grenades, and generally using force during the protests survive defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court explained that Plaintiffs were permitted to plead in the alternative and may allege claims for both negligence and battery. The Court found it plausible that the listed items were used for crowd control purposes, and not with the intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, and also plausible that they were used with the intent to cause harmful contact. Regarding the failure to warn claim, the Court found that Plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a negligence claim based on failure to warn. The Court stated that taking into consideration the totality of the complaint, and drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiffs, plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for negligence under a failure to warn theory. The Court found that Plaintiffs alleged that the federal agents should have issued crowd-dispersal orders but failed to do so. The Court concluded that it is foreseeable that firing munitions, tear gas, or other crowd-control devices into a peaceful protest that has not been directed to disperse or warned about the potential use of such tools could lead to the kinds of injuries alleged by plaintiffs. Regarding the battery claim, the Court found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded their battery claim. The Court noted that under Oregon law, a battery is a voluntary act that is intended to cause the resulting harmful or offensive contact. The Court found that drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiffs, it is plausible that the federal agents intentionally fired munitions, tear gas, and pepper-spray balls at plaintiffs with the intent to cause harmful or offensive contact. Accordingly, the Court declined to dismiss the battery claim. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ksE636 from PacerMonitor.com VENETIAN LAS VEGAS: Vasquez Balks at Third Parties' Tracking Apps ----------------------------------------------------------------- MAX VASQUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VENETIAN LAS VEGAS GAMING, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 5:25-cv-07934-VKD (N.D. Cal., September 17, 2025) arises from the Defendant's alleged violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act. According to the complaint, the Defendant owns and operates the website, VenetianLasVegas.com. The Defendant has purposefully installed various tracking application programming interfaces into the code of its website to aid, employ, agree with, or otherwise enable several third parties -- Heap Inc., Google LLC, and Meta Platforms, Inc. -- to eavesdrop on communications sent and received by Plaintiff and Class Members. As a result, whenever Plaintiff and other consumers book rooms to the Venetian through the website, these third-parties discovery who exactly stayed at which hotel, which suites they stayed in, on which dates they came and on which dates they left, along with how many adults and children they had with them, says the suit. Because Defendant failed to obtain consumers' consent before enabling the Third Parties to intercept their confidential hotel booking communications, the Defendant violated the state law, the suit alleges. Venetian Las Vegas Gaming, LLC is a casino resort with principal place of business in Nevada.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Philip L. Fraietta, Esq. BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 50 Main Street, Suite 475 White Plains, NY 10106 Telephone: (914) 874-0708 Facsimile: (914) 206-3656 E-mail: pfraietta@bursor.com - and - Stefan Bogdanovich, Esq. BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 1990 North California Blvd., 9th Floor Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Telephone: (925) 300-4455 Facsimile: (925) 407-2700 E-mail: sbogdanovich@bursor.com WESTERN REFINING: Wins Bid to Stay of "Peoples" ----------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Johnathon Peoples, individually, and on behalf of members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Western Refining Retail, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-00480-JLT-CDB (E.D. Cal.), United States Magistrate Judge granted Defendant Western Refining Retail, LLC's motion to stay the action on September 26, 2025. The Court stayed this action pending resolution of an earlier-filed putative class action, Gaston v. Western Refining Retail, LLC. On March 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against Defendants Western Refining Retail, LLC, Speedway LLC and 5245 Western Refining Retail, LLC in the Kern County Superior Court. Western Refining filed an answer in the state court action; no other Defendant answered or appeared. On April 25, 2025, Western Refining removed the action to this Court. On July 21, 2025, Western Refining filed a notice of related cases in which counsel represented this case is related to seven other cases pending in state and federal court. On August 21, 2025, Speedway answered the complaint. In the complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 on behalf of himself and a putative class of others similarly situated based on alleged violations of the California Labor Code, seeking to recover among other claims, unpaid wages, overtime wages, lawful meal periods, lawful rest periods, accurate wage statements, timely payment of wages, and failure to indemnify (reimburse). The proposed class to be certified is defined as: all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants within the State of California at any time during the period from four years preceding the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint to final judgment and who reside in California. Prior to the commencement of this action, on December 26, 2024, a plaintiff initiated a similar wage and hour class action against Defendant in the Superior Court for the County of Tehama; that action was removed by Defendant to the Sacramento Division of this Court on January 31, 2025. The class action complaint in Gaston named as defendants Western Refining, Western Refining Southwest, Inc., Western Refining Company, LLC, and Western Refining Wholesale, LLC. In the complaint, plaintiff John David Gaston sought to represent a similar putative class of workers as Plaintiff here seeks to represent and asserted virtually identical wage and hour claims as are at issue in this action. The proposed class sought to be certified in Gaston is defined as: all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants within the State of California at any time commencing four years preceding the filing of Plaintiff's complaint through what the Complaint anticipates is a notice to the class. Defendant contended that its motion to stay should be granted because Plaintiff's putative class action claims here, premised on alleged violations of the California Labor Code, are virtually duplicative of those presented in Gaston, which seeks to represent a class that includes Plaintiff and is likely to completely subsume the putative class action in the present action. Defendant contended that under the first-to-file rule or the Court's inherent discretionary stay power, the Court is permitted to stay the instant, later-filed action to avoid facing wasteful and duplicative litigation until final resolution of the Gaston putative class action. Plaintiff contended Defendant's motion to stay should be denied because Defendant cannot satisfy the requirements under the first-to-file rule as Defendant failed to demonstrate how the parties between the instant case and the Gaston case or the putative class action Barden v. Western Refining Retail, LLC are substantially similar and how the hardship of continuing the instant case outweighs the significant prejudice to Plaintiff if the proposed stay is granted. The Court noted that the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. In considering whether to grant a stay, this Court must weigh several factors, including the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay. The Court addressed whether the first-to-file rule applies when cases are filed in the same district. Here, the earlier-filed Gaston putative class action is filed in the same district as the instant case, albeit before a different judge than the undersigned. The undersigned concluded the first-to-file rule may be applicable here in considering Defendant's motion to stay. However, because the rule is discretionary, given the uncertainty of the rule's applicability where two cases are filed in the same district without further clarification from the Ninth Circuit, the undersigned proceeded to consider whether a stay of this action is appropriate under the Court's inherent authority. Under the first factor, the Court found no basis to assess that a stay of proceedings here, in light of the scheduling and procedural posture of Gaston, would be anything other than reasonably finite. The Court found the first factor weighs in favor of a stay. Under the second factor, the Court found that, in the absence of a stay, the parties may be required to unnecessarily litigate this action in parallel to the Gaston action, which likely would result in duplicative, wasted effort of the parties. The Court's resolution of the earlier-filed Gaston putative class action will have a direct impact on the instant case as to whether the proposed putative class there may be certified, thereby impacting Plaintiff's putative class claims here. Accordingly, the Court found the second factor favors a stay, as there is a tangible risk of inconsistent judgments and duplicative efforts if the action proceeds. Under the third factor, the Court found that staying the case is in the interest of judicial economy pending the Court's resolution of the earlier-filed Gaston putative class action, which includes a proposed class to be certified that would include Plaintiff as a class member and therefore bears upon the instant case. The Court found that consideration of the third factor weighs heavily in favor of staying this action. After balancing the potential harm and prejudice implicated by staying this action against the competing equities of hardship imposed and judicial economy, the Court found good cause to grant Defendant's motion to stay pending resolution of the earlier-filed putative class action in Gaston. The Court ordered that 1. Defendant Western Refining Retail, LLC’s motion to stay (Doc. 18) is GRANTED; 2. This action is HEREBY STAYED pending resolution of the earlier-filed Gaston putative class action; 3. The parties SHALL FILE a joint report addressing the status of the Gaston putative class action 120 days from the entry of this order, and thereafter, every 120 days; 4. The parties SHALL FILE a joint report within 14 days of the resolution of the Gaston putative class action, setting forth the parties’ positions as to the impact of the resolved case on the instant litigation, whether the stay in this case should be lifted, and the parties’ respective positions concerning further scheduling of this case, as necessary; and 5. All other case management dates, conferences, and filing requirements are VACATED A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=s7s4p3 from PacerMonitor.com WEYERHAEUSER CO: Court Permits Amicus Support in ERISA Case ----------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Gregory Maneman, Annette Williams, Cassandra Wright, James Hollins, and Pierre Donaby, Plaintiffs, v. Weyerhaeuser Company, Weyerhaeuser Company Annuity Committee, Weyerhaeuser Company Administrative Committee, State Street Global Advisors Trust Company, and Does 1-5, Defendants, Case No. C24-2050-KKE (W.D. Wash.), Judge Kymberly K. Evanson of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle granted Pension Rights Center's motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss. On May 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action against Defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C Section 1001 et seq. The alleged bad acts arose from Defendants' January 2019 transfer of certain pension obligations to a highly risky private equity-controlled insurance company with a complex and opaque structure. On July 31, 2025, Defendants filed two motions to dismiss arguing Plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On September 19, 2025, Pension Rights Center moved to submit an amicus curiae brief stating that its proposed brief is relevant to this case by exploring the history of pension plan risk transfers to insurance companies and the relevant policy concerns. The Court found that the proposed brief is of assistance in considering significant differences in regulatory structures and benefit security concerns between ERISA-regulated pension plans and state regulated insurance contracts. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=g3X37K from PacerMonitor.com ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2025. 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