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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, September 26, 2025, Vol. 27, No. 193

                            Headlines

AETNA INC: Court Approves $4.6M Settlement in Peters Admin Fee Suit
ANTHROPIC PBC: Calif. Court Grants Initial OK to $1.5-Bil. Deal
APPLE INC: Pinczewski Sues Over Unsecured Apple Gift Cards
BON SECOURS: Faces Jones Suit Over Unprotected Personal Info
CERNER CORP: Fails to Secure Patients' Personal Info, Morgan Says

DISNEY WORLDWIDE: Invades Children's Privacy, Popa Suit Says
FPG LABS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Klosowski Suit W/o Prejudice
INMARKET MEDIA: Must Face Amended Complaint Over Geolocation Data
MICHIGAN: Wins in Part Summary Judgment in Unclaimed Property Suit
NBCUNIVERSAL MEDIA: Court Dismisses Golden Video Privacy Suit

PEACOCK ALLEY: Bowman Seeks Equal Website Access for the Blind
POWDER VITAMIN: Website Inaccessible to Blind Users, Echols Says
PURE FISHING: Faces Cole Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
TRUSKIN PARTNERS: Lopez Seeks Equal Website Access for the Blind
TWIST BIOSCIENCE: Court Refuses to Dismiss Claim Against Leproust

UPONOR INC: Court Denies Bid to Compel Arbitration in Harwood Suit

                        Asbestos Litigation



                            *********

AETNA INC: Court Approves $4.6M Settlement in Peters Admin Fee Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Sandra M. Peters, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Aetna, Inc., Aetna Life
Insurance Company, and OptumHealth Care Solutions, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 1:15-cv-00109-MR (W.D.N.C.), Judge Martin Reidinger of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
grants final approval of a $4.6 million class settlement and
awarded attorneys' fees totaling $3.55 million.

The Court approved a settlement requiring Aetna to pay $4.6 million
for the benefit of the classes, with OptumHealth Care Solutions
paying an additional $200,000. The settlement resolves claims that
the defendants violated ERISA by improperly charging administrative
fees on chiropractic and physical therapy services. The Court found
the proposed settlement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate after
extensive litigation spanning nearly 10 years.

In June 2015, Plaintiff Sandra Peters filed a putative class action
complaint challenging the defendants' imposition of OptumHealth's
administrative fees on her chiropractic health care claims. The
complaint alleged that the defendants violated ERISA by improperly
charging members and plans administrative fees pertaining to
chiropractic and physical therapy services performed by
OptumHealth's network of providers.

The defendants charged these fees by assessing the members' and
plans' financial responsibility using an agreed rate between Aetna
and OptumHealth that exceeded the provider's contracted rate with
OptumHealth for such services. The complaint sought three
objectives: stopping the defendants from imposing the challenged
rate, requiring reimbursement for overpayments, and requiring
separate payment of attorneys' fees.

The defendants each filed motions to dismiss the complaint, which
the Court granted in part and denied in part. The parties then
conducted extensive discovery over several years. The plaintiff
served over sixty document requests and fifteen interrogatories
while responding to thirty-four document requests and twenty-eight
interrogatories. Collectively, the parties produced and reviewed
thousands of documents.

The plaintiff's counsel took ten depositions of Aetna and
OptumHealth witnesses, including corporate designee witnesses and a
defense expert witness. In 2018, the plaintiff moved for class
certification, which the Court denied in March 2019. Each defendant
separately moved for summary judgment in May 2019, which the Court
granted in September 2019.

The plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which in June 2021
vacated the denial of class certification and reversed in part the
grant of summary judgment in Peters v. Aetna, Inc., 2 F.4th 199
(4th Cir. 2021). Following remand and supplemental briefing, the
Court granted the plaintiff's second motion for class certification
in June 2023, certifying two classes: a Plan Claim Class and a
Member Claim Class.

After the Court set a trial date for early 2025, the parties
engaged in arms-length, good faith settlement discussions for
almost one full year while simultaneously preparing for trial. On
December 17, 2024, the parties reached an agreement in principle on
all material terms of settlement and executed a term sheet, and
filed the term sheet under seal with the Court.

Pursuant to the proposed settlement, Aetna agreed to pay $4.6
million for the benefit of the classes, separate and apart from its
payment to class counsel. OptumHealth agreed to pay $200,000 for
the benefit of the classes. Aetna agreed to pay $3.55 million for
attorneys' fees and expenses to class counsel, separate from its
payment to the classes.

On March 19, 2025, the Court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement. Aetna provided records identifying 256,219 class
members. The settlement administrator mailed approved notices
directly to these class members, achieving an overall mailing
success rate of 99.87 percent.

As of the July 10, 2025 deadline for opting out or objecting to the
settlement, only twelve class members had opted out, and only one
objection was received. The single objection did not address the
settlement terms explicitly but rather cited generalized concerns
about misconduct in the healthcare space and irrelevant concerns
about Medicare. The objector did not appear to be a member of
either class.

As required by the Class Action Fairness Act, notices of the
proposed settlement were sent to appropriate state officials, the
Attorney General of the United States, and the United States
Secretary of Labor. No recipient of the CAFA notice raised any
objection to the settlement.

The Court applied the Fourth Circuit's multi-factor test for
determining whether a class action settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate under Rule 23(e)(2). For determining fairness, the
Court considered: (1) the posture of the case at the time
settlement was proposed; (2) the extent of discovery that had been
conducted; (3) the circumstances surrounding the negotiations; and
(4) the experience of counsel in the area of class action
litigation.

The Court found that by the time parties reached settlement, they
had conducted extensive discovery and litigated vigorously up until
the eve of trial. The settlement was the product of arms-length
negotiations conducted in good faith without collusion. The parties
reached agreement after nine and a half years of hard-fought
litigation, including almost a year of contentious negotiations.
The plaintiff and certified classes were represented by counsel
highly experienced in healthcare-related class action litigation.

In assessing adequacy, the Court considered: (1) the relative
strength of the plaintiff's case on the merits; (2) the existence
of difficulties of proof or strong defenses; (3) the anticipated
duration and expense of additional litigation; (4) the solvency of
defendants and likelihood of recovery; and (5) the degree of
opposition to the settlement.

Although the plaintiff believed she had a strong chance of
prevailing at trial and on subsequent appeals, the plaintiff
admitted that the classes potentially faced serious procedural and
substantive obstacles to obtaining final relief through continued
litigation. The defendants would likely have sought to narrow or
decertify the classes based on evidence relating to their
disclosures to plans during the class period.

The plaintiff estimated it would take at least another two years to
obtain a final judgment, during which parties would incur
substantial expenses due to the complexity of issues involved.
Rather than continuing down this uncertain path, the settlement
provided the classes certainty of a favorable outcome and the
benefit of the time value of money.

Class counsel expected that individual class members are likely to
recover all of the challenged rates that they paid for the
2012-2017 period. Plan class members are likely to recover 30-40
percent of their losses, which is significant given the particular
challenges that members of the plan class faced in pursuing their
claims.

The Court found the $3.55 million attorneys' fee award to be
reasonable after applying the twelve-factor test established in
Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc. The Court emphasized that the most
critical factor in determining reasonableness of a fee award is the
degree of success obtained.

The plaintiff achieved significant success by accomplishing all
three main objectives: ending the defendants' practice of charging
the challenged fee, recovering payments of the challenged rates,
and separately recovering attorneys' fees. The challenged
arrangement ended during litigation in April 2023, and Aetna agreed
not to process any new claims subject to that arrangement.

Class counsel's fees and expenses will be paid by Aetna separate
and apart from the defendants' $4.8 million common fund payment to
the classes. The payment of attorneys' fees will not reduce the
classes' recovery. Zuckerman lawyers invested 7,941.2 hours in the
case while Van Winkle lawyers invested 577.3 hours.

As for counsel's hourly rates, the rates claimed by Class Counsel
are well in excess of the prevailing local rates in this District
and would result in a lodestar amount in excess of $8,000,000.
While the Court would be inclined to find counsel's claimed hourly
rates excessive, class counsel requested a fee that would be only
about 39 percent of the claimed lodestar incurred to date. In light
of the reduced fee request, the Court found the overall requested
fee award to be reasonable.

According to the settlement agreement, Sandra Peters as lead
plaintiff may be paid $20,000 from the common fund to reflect her
important contributions to the case. The Court noted that the
plaintiff's willingness to serve as named plaintiff made it
possible to obtain substantial relief for the classes.

During the course of litigation, she dedicated over 200 hours to
the case, closely followed case developments, prepared for and gave
a full-day deposition, met with class counsel to discuss litigation
and trial strategy, and conferred with class counsel at key points
during settlement negotiations. Accordingly, the Court found that a
$20,000 service award was warranted.

The Court ordered that the plaintiff's unopposed motion for final
approval of class settlement is granted, and the class settlement
as set forth in the parties' settlement agreement is approved. The
Court also ordered that the plaintiff's unopposed motion for award
of attorneys' fees and costs and service award for class
representative is granted.

The Court further ordered that the parties shall file a stipulation
of dismissal with respect to all of the plaintiff's claims against
the defendants within 30 days of the entry of this order.

A copy of the settlement order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ltHSKv from PacerMonitor.com.


ANTHROPIC PBC: Calif. Court Grants Initial OK to $1.5-Bil. Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William Alsup on September 25, 2025, granted preliminary
approval to the $1.5 billion settlement in the Anthropic AI
Litigation. "We have some of the best lawyers in America in the
courtroom right now and I think you can do it," Judge Alsup said.

Check out Class Action Updates' "BY THE NUMBERS: Anthropic $1.5
Billion AI Copyright Infringement Settlement" for a breakdown of
the deal. CAU reports that Plaintiffs' Lawyers may get 25% of the
Settlement Fund. See
https://classactionupdates.substack.com/p/anthropics-15-billion-settlement

The landmark settlement requires Anthropic to pay $1.5 billion to
rightsholders whose books were downloaded by Anthropic from the
notorious pirated databases "Library Genesis" ("LibGen") and
"Pirate Library Mirror" ("PiLiMi") -- and who otherwise qualify as
members of the "LibGen & PiLiMi Pirated Books Class" previously
certified by Judge Alsup. Anthropic will pay approximately $3,000
per class work. The case was original filed by authors Andrea
Bartz, Kirk Wallace Johnson, and Charles Graeber.

Believed to be the largest publicly reported recovery in the
history of US copyright litigation, the massive payout sends a
powerful message of accountability to AI developers who torrented
copyrighted works from illegal pirated websites to train AI models.
Anthropic's acquisition and use of books from these websites,
illegal websites that have been repeatedly shut down by law
enforcement and the courts, was made public for the first time as a
result of this action.

This settlement gives hope to creators of every kind including the
writers, musicians, artists, journalists, and others seeking to
enforce creators' rights in dozens of other pending cases.

Co-lead plaintiffs' counsel Justin Nelson of Susman Godfrey LLP
said: "This landmark settlement far surpasses any other known
copyright recovery. It is the first of its kind in the AI era. It
will provide meaningful compensation for each class work and sets a
precedent requiring AI companies to pay copyright owners. This
settlement sends a powerful message to AI companies and creators
alike that taking copyrighted works from these pirate websites is
wrong."

"Piracy harms those who devote their lives to writing and
publishing books that benefit us all, and companies that exploit
piracy and endanger the creative industries must be accountable,"
said Co-lead plaintiffs' Rachel Geman of Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP.

While the exact size of the final settlement class is being
finalized, based on the current record and available information
regarding the works covered by the settlement, several facts are
clear:

     -- Anthropic will pay $1.5 billion plus interest into a
settlement fund, equating to approximately $3,000 for each work
covered by the settlement. We anticipate approximately 500,000
works in the class. To the extent Anthropic adds works that bring
the total list above 500,000, it will pay an additional $3,000 per
work. Depending on the number of claims submitted, the final figure
per work could be higher.

     -- The settlement only releases claims based on past acts –
it does not give Anthropic a license or permission for future AI
training and it does not release any claims that arise after August
25, 2025.

     -- The settlement does not release any claims – past or
future – based on the output of AI models. And Anthropic
certifies in the agreement that it did not use materials from
LibGen or PiLiMi in any commercial models.

     -- The settlement only covers works from the class list.
Authors retain all rights and legal claims regarding any books not
on the settlement works list.

As part of the settlement, Anthropic has agreed to destroy the
original files of works torrented/downloaded from Library Genesis
or Pirate Library Mirror, and any copies that originate from the
torrented copies The resolution was negotiated in consultation with
key stakeholders from the author and publisher communities.

President and CEO of the Association of American Publishers Maria
Pallante said "I believe that settlement as presented is beneficial
to all class members and I am hopeful that the settlement will
receive wide support from copyright owners. Beyond the monetary
terms, the proposed settlement provides enormous value in sending
the message that Artificial Intelligence companies cannot
unlawfully acquire content from shadow libraries or other pirate
sources as the building blocks for their models."

The CEO of the Authors' Guild Mary Rasenberger praised the
agreement as "an excellent result for authors, publishers, and
rightsholders generally, sending a strong message to the AI
industry that there are serious consequences when they pirate
authors' works to train their AI, robbing those least able to
afford it."

Consistent with the Court's rulings in this case, the settlement
class includes legal and beneficial owners of copyrights in books
downloaded by Anthropic from Library Genesis or Pirate Library
Mirror, and whose works were registered within five years of
initial publication and prior to Anthropic's download.

Co-lead class counsel appointed by the court are Justin Nelson,
Susman Godfrey LLP and Rachel Geman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP.

Authors and rightsholders may visit
AnthropicCopyrightSettlement.com, which gives potential class
members an option to provide contact information to Class Counsel.
In the coming weeks, and if the court preliminarily approves the
settlement, the website will provide to find a full and easily
searchable listing of all works covered by the settlement and
information for class members about their options and rights
regarding the settlement.

                         *     *     *

On September 22, 2025, the Anthropic class plaintiffs filed an
extensive package of materials describing "an exhaustive notice
process along with a streamlined, fair, and careful claims process"
they propose to use if the agreement receives preliminary approval
from the Court. The proposal is supported by a wide array of
copyright owners—from various author groups to publishers to the
named class representatives themselves.

The product of round-the-clock efforts over the last several weeks,
the plan as submitted to the Court reflects extensive, hands-on
participation from all three class representatives, working with
Class Counsel in consultation with stakeholders and experts from
across the author, publishing, and claims administration
communities and is supported by 16 separate sworn declarations. It
responds in detail to questions raised by Judge Alsup at the first
hearing on preliminary approval, building on well-established class
action precedents to ensure fairness and due process for all
members of the class.

As the brief states, the "goals in proposing this plan of notice
and distribution were to make a process that (1) will result in a
high claims rate that is efficient for claimants; (2) respects
pre-existing contractual relationships; and (3) is consistent with
due process and this Court's guidance."

All three Class Representative Plaintiffs filed declarations with
the court describing their personal involvement in the crafting and
development of this plan.

Plaintiff Andrea Bartz, the New York Times bestselling author of
five thrillers including We Were Never Here, said: "The works
included in this case represent hundreds of millions of hours of
labor and immeasurable dedication, creativity, vulnerability, and
grit from both authors and publishers. I strongly support this
settlement and, in the coming months, I'm committed to helping
class members, including my fellow authors, understand the
settlement and why it's such a critical step for those of us who
believe that Anthropic violated our copyrights . . .. Together,
authors and publishers are sending a message to AI companies: You
are not above the law, and our intellectual property isn't yours
for the taking."

Plaintiff Charles Graeber, award winning journalist and New York
Times bestselling author of The Good Nurse: A True Story of
Medicine, Madness, and Murder and The Breakthrough: Immunotherapy
and the Race to Cure Cancer, said: "[W]hen I heard about
Anthropic's piracy, I immediately understood the threat that
unchecked piracy posed to those [copyright] protections, and the
harm already done to myself and many thousands of others who depend
on them. I immediately called, offering to join this case. If I
could help, I wanted to. . . . Whatever my previous deadlines,
there was no case but this civil case; my top job now was to
represent all stakeholders in this critical class action to the
best of my ability. This responsibility continues to be an honor,
whatever it takes."

Plaintiff Kirk Wallace Johnson, journalist and author of The
Fishermen and the Dragon: Fear, Greed, and a Fight for Justice on
the Gulf Coast, The Feather Thief: Beauty, Obsession, and the
Natural History Heist of the Century, and To Be A Friend Fatal: The
Fight to Save the Iraqis America Left Behind and founder of The
List Project, a nonprofit that has helped resettle over 2,500 Iraqi
refugees, said: "This settlement marks an important moment for the
legal and moral framework that has bound us to each other since we
started telling each other stories: that it's wrong to steal; that
the system of justice protects us from those that ignore it; and
that we don't have to sacrifice everything we once valued on the
altar of big tech."

A joint declaration of not-for-profit author organizations
including Novelists, Inc., Romance Writers of America, Science
Fiction and Fantasy Writers of America, Sisters in Crime, and The
Authors Guild states that these groups "support the settlement"
including the proposed Notice and Allocation Plan, which they call
"fair, reasonable, and adequate." These experts specifically
identified the importance of a simplified, one-step process
allowing individual authors to file their own claims and the
availability of a non-mandatory default 50/50 split, rooted in
industry norms and practices reflected in most trade and university
authors' contracts.

Maria Pallante, President and CEO of the Association of American
Publishers, filed a declaration supporting the settlement and
describing robust consultation with publishing organizations
including the Association of University Presses, the Independent
Book Publishers Association, a number of international associations
(including the International Publishers Association and the
International Association of Scientific, Technical and Medical
Publishers), and religious publishing groups (including the
Evangelical Christian Publishers Association and Protestant
Church-Owned Publishers Association). Ms. Pallante stated "I
believe that the settlement as presented is beneficial to all class
members . . . Beyond the monetary terms, the proposed settlement
provides enormous value in sending the message that artificial
intelligence companies cannot unlawfully acquire literary works
from shadow libraries or other pirate sources to use as the
building blocks for their businesses."

The filing describes in detail the components of a robust outreach
plan for notice, deploying US email, email, social media,
publication and digital targeting, and trade group/peer to peer
outreach to reach potential members of the class. Author and
publisher groups in the United States as well as Canada and the
United Kingdom also have agreed to distribute notice to their
members.

It also describes a transparent allocation plan that responds to
Judge Alsup's comments about works with multiple claimants and the
need to respect individual contracts by putting in place a default,
non-mandatory allocation offering a fair, industry-standard 50/50
author/publisher split for most works (not including educational
works where there is no sufficiently widespread standard split and
splits will be determined case by case) but also allowing any
claimant to decline the default split and engage in a bespoke
process to allocate payment for their work.

The case is Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC, No. 3:24-cv-05417-WHA
(N.D. Cal.). For more information regarding the settlement
including a full description of the settlement class and claim
requirements, visit AnthropicCopyrightSettlement.com.

APPLE INC: Pinczewski Sues Over Unsecured Apple Gift Cards
----------------------------------------------------------
JESSICA PINCZEWSKI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. APPLE INC., a Delaware
corporation; APPLE VALUE SERVICES, LLC, a Virginia limited
corporation; and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
3:25-cv-02362-TWR-MMP (S.D. Cal., September 11, 2025) is an action
on behalf of the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated
consumers to prevent Defendants' further dissemination of unsecure
Apple Gift Cards, provide truthful disclosures advising consumers
of the vulnerabilities of the Gift Cards, and to obtain redress for
those who have purchased Gift Cards.

For years, Apple has manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold
unsecured Apple Gift Cards. Apple uniformly represented to
unsuspecting purchasers that, in exchange for their money, Apple
would provide them with a secure gift card, the balance of which
could be conveniently redeemed for Apple products and services.

However, throughout the Class Period, the Defendants knew, or
should have known, the Apple Gift Cards were not secure but instead
susceptible to being accessed by unauthorized third parties who,
after obtaining the "secret" Personal Identification Number for an
Apple Gift Card, could drain the balance placed on the card after
it was activated but before an authorized user could use the card.
Unauthorized third parties have implemented this scheme across the
nation, fraudulently draining millions of dollars from Apple Gift
Cards.

The Defendants' actions and omissions caused Plaintiff and other
similarly situated consumers to purchase Apple Gift Cards, which
were not secure and did not perform as represented. The Plaintiff
and the putative class have been damaged in the amount they paid
for the useless gift cards, plus interest, says the suit.

Apple, Inc. is a multinational technology company headquartered in
Cupertino, California, that designs, develops, and sells consumer
electronics, computer software, and online services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darrell P. White, Esq.
          Douglas C. Stastny, Esq.
          KIMURA LONDON & WHITE LLP
          17631 Fitch
          Irvine, CA 92614
          E-mail: dwhite@klw-law.com
                  dstastny@klw-law.com

BON SECOURS: Faces Jones Suit Over Unprotected Personal Info
------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM JONES and SHAWNA WILLIAMS, and CHRISTY POOL individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. BON
SECOURS MERCY HEALTH d/b/a MERCY HEALTH-WESTERN KENTUCKY
ORTHOPEDICS, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-670 (S.D. Ohio, September
11, 2025) arises out of Defendant WKO's failures to properly
secure, safeguard, encrypt, and/or timely and adequately destroy
Plaintiffs' and Class Members' sensitive personal identifiable
information that it had acquired and stored for its business
purposes.

According to the complaint, the Defendant's failure to secure and
monitor its network resulted in a September 2025 data breach of
highly sensitive personally identifiable information and protected
health information stored on the computer network of WKO, an
organization that provides medical treatment and/or employment to
individuals, including Plaintiffs and Class Members.

The Plaintiffs bring this class action lawsuit on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated to address Defendant's
inadequate safeguarding of Class Members' private information that
it collected and maintained, and for failing to provide timely and
adequate notice to Plaintiffs and other Class Members that their
information had been subject to the unauthorized access of an
unknown third party and including in that notice precisely what
specific types of information were accessed and taken by
cybercriminals.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant
seeking redress for its unlawful conduct, and asserting claims for:
(i) negligence, (ii) negligence per se, (iii) breach of implied
contract, (iv) breach of fiduciary duty; and (v) unjust enrichment,
and (vi) declaratory relief.

Bon Secours Mercy Health d/b/a Mercy Health-Western Kentucky
Orthopedics provides orthopedic services including general
orthopedics, specialized medicine, X-rays, MRIs, and various
therapies.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeffrey S. Goldenberg, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, L.P.A.
          4445 Lake Forest Drive, Suite 490
          Cincinnati, OH 45242
          Telephone: (513) 345-8297
          Facsimile: (513) 345-8294
          E-mail: jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          Danielle L. Perry, Esq.
          MASON LLP
          5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 640
          Washington, DC 20015
          Telephone: (202) 429-2290
          E-mail: gmason@masonllp.com
                  dperry@masonllp.com

CERNER CORP: Fails to Secure Patients' Personal Info, Morgan Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KAREN MORGAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CERNER CORPORATION d/b/a ORACLE HEALTH,
INC., ALBANY MED HEALTH SYSTEM and GLENS FALLS HOSPITAL,
Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-01271-AMN-DJS (N.D.N.Y., September 11,
2025) arises from a recent cyberattack resulting in a data breach
of Plaintiff's sensitive information in the possession and custody
and/or control of Defendants.

According to the complaint, the Defendant lost control over its
affiliated entity and client's patients' highly sensitive personal
information, including Glens Falls, as early as January 22, 2025.
Following an internal investigation, the Defendants learned the
Data Breach resulted in unauthorized disclosure, exfiltration, and
theft of current and former patients' personally identifying
information.

The Defendants' failure to timely detect and report the Data Breach
made patients vulnerable to identity theft without any warnings to
monitor their financial accounts or credit reports to prevent
unauthorized use of their sensitive information, says the suit.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a class of
similarly situated individuals, brings this lawsuit seeking
injunctive relief, damages, and restitution, together with costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees, the calculation of which will be
based on information in Defendants' possession.   
    

Cerner Corp. is a healthcare software-as-a-service company offering
electronic health record and business operations systems to
hospitals and healthcare organizations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
          Amina A. Thomas, Esq.
          COHENMALAD, LLP
          One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 636-6481
          Facsimile: (317) 636-2593
          E-mail: ltoops@cohenmalad.com
                  athomas@cohenmalad.com

               - and -

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
            Raina Borrelli, Esq.
          STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC 
          980 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1610 
          Chicago, IL 60611 
          Telephone: (872) 263-1100 
          Facsimile: (872) 263-1109
          E-mail: sam@straussborrelli.com
                  raina@straussborrelli.com

DISNEY WORLDWIDE: Invades Children's Privacy, Popa Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------
ASHLEY POPA, on behalf of her minor children, J.D. and J.D.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. DISNEY WORLDWIDE SERVICES, INC.; DISNEY ENTERTAINMENT
OPERATIONS LLC; and THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, Defendants, Case No.
1:25-cv-07571 (S.D.N.Y., September 11, 2025) is a class action on
behalf of Plaintiff's minor children, J.D. and J.D., individually
and on behalf of all other individuals who had their privacy
invaded by Disney's intrusive and unlawful business practices of
enabling the collection of personal information from millions of
children under the age of 13 in the United States, without
providing notice to parents or obtaining verifiable parental
consent.

According to the complaint, Disney's failure to designate its
videos as "made for kids" has allowed the collection of personal
data from children, including persistent identifiers (like cookies
and device IDs) and sensitive information (such as identity and
location), all without notifying parents or securing verifiable
parental consent. Disney thereby generates substantial advertising
revenue from opening up its audience of millions of children under
the age of 13 to YouTube's targeted advertising algorithm, says the
suit.

Disney's conduct illegally invades the privacy of millions of
children in the United States, and it violates an array of federal
and state statutes protecting children and consumers.

Thus, Minor Plaintiffs bring claims on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated children under the age of 13 injured by
Disney's alleged misconduct.

Disney Worldwide Services, Inc. is a worldwide media conglomerate
that produces and distributes highly popular child-directed
content, including through its official channels on YouTube.

The Walt Disney Company operates as one of the world's largest
media and entertainment conglomerates through numerous
subsidiaries, including Disney Worldwide and Disney
Entertainment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          Nicholas A. Colella, Esq.
          Connor P. Hayes, Esq.
          Patrick D. Donathen, Esq.
          LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP  
          1133 Penn Ave., 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
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          E-mail: gary@lcllp.com
                  nickc@lcllp.com
                  connorh@lcllp.com
                  patrick@lcllp.com

FPG LABS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Klosowski Suit W/o Prejudice
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In the case captioned as Rachel Klosowski, et al., Plaintiffs v.
FPG Labs, LLC d/b/a Ovation Fertility, US Genetic Lab, LLC d/b/a
Ovation Genetics, et al., Defendants, Case No. 24-1210 (MN), Judge
Maryellen Noreika of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware grants, without prejudice, the Defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim due to lack of standing.

The court ruled that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III
standing under the benefit-of-the-bargain theory of injury. Judge
Noreika determined that the complaint lacks adequate allegations
showing that the named plaintiffs personally received defective
products or failed to receive the economic benefit of their
bargain.

The putative class action was initiated by 9 individuals: Rachel
and Adam Klosowski, Janine and Jonathan Carlin, Laura Mendoza,
Michelle Schafer, Dori Shick, Soupharack Vannasing, and Lauren
Teverbaugh. According to the complaint, each named plaintiff
received fertility treatment and purchased preimplantation genetic
testing for aneuploidy, known as PGT-A or PGT-A testing. PGT-A is
an add-on to the IVF process and purports to screen embryos for
chromosomal abnormalities.

Plaintiffs claimed they suffered economic losses after buying PGT-A
testing from Defendants based on false, deceptive, unfair, and
misleading advertising, marketing, and promotion between November
2020 and October 2023. They brought this lawsuit on behalf of
themselves and all persons in the United States who have purchased
PGT-A testing from Defendants, seeking to represent a nationwide
class and five state subclasses from California, Louisiana, Nevada,
North Carolina, and Texas.

Defendants FPG Labs, LLC and US Genetic Lab, LLC are Delaware
limited liability companies headquartered in Brentwood, Tennessee.
According to the complaint, Ovation is a national leading network
of fertility laboratories providing leading-edge treatment.
Defendant US Fertility, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company
headquartered in Rockville, Maryland.

The complaint alleged that each named plaintiff purchased PGT-A
testing from Ovation during the putative Class Period, in reliance
and based upon the false, deceptive, and misleading statements and
material omissions made by Ovation, including that PGT-A is greater
than 98% accurate, increases the chance of pregnancy, decreases the
chance of miscarriage, leads to a higher chance of a healthy
pregnancy, and reduces the time to pregnancy.

Each named plaintiff alleged they paid a certain price for PGT-A,
which they would not have purchased absent the false and misleading
misrepresentations and omissions. As a result, the complaint
stated, plaintiffs suffered direct and ascertainable economic
losses and were harmed by paying for an unproven and unreliable
test. Notably, none of the named plaintiffs alleged that the PGT-A
testing they bought failed to work specifically for them.

The court applied the Third Circuit's recent precedent regarding
benefit-of-the-bargain theory of injury. As the Third Circuit
stated in several recent cases, a plaintiff alleging an economic
injury as a result of a purchasing decision must do more than
simply characterize that purchasing decision as an economic injury.
The plaintiff must instead allege facts that would permit a
factfinder to determine, without relying on mere conjecture, that
the plaintiff failed to receive the economic benefit of her
bargain.

The court emphasized that allegations that a product is flawed as
to others are not relevant to determining whether named plaintiffs
have standing themselves. Instead, once plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged economic injury, the court must still determine whether
they sufficiently alleged that their products were defective.
Otherwise, their claim that they purchased a product worth less
than the product for which they bargained necessarily fails, and
they are not entitled to relief under the benefit-of-the-bargain
theory.

The court found that while the complaint provides studies that
purport to undermine the scientific efficacy of Ovation's PGT-A
testing and the representations that it increases the chance of
pregnancy, decreases the chance of miscarriage, and leads to a
higher chance of a healthy pregnancy, the complaint does not allege
that the named plaintiffs' testing failed to adequately perform any
of these functions.

Judge Noreika noted that other than the short proclamation that in
a specific month and year, each named plaintiff purchased PGT-A for
a certain price, plaintiffs provided no further allegations about
their individual purchases. The court found this fatal for the
standing inquiry.

None of the named plaintiffs alleged, for example, that they failed
to become pregnant, suffered a miscarriage, or experienced a
medically compromised pregnancy - notwithstanding Ovation's alleged
marketing statements that PGT-A mitigates all of those problems.
The court found plaintiffs' conclusory assertions of harm all the
more implausible given that some of these adverse outcomes are
directly in conflict with and mutually exclusive of one another.

The court determined that plaintiffs' theory of recovery is simply
that they suffered an economic injury by purchasing improperly
marketed testing. This was illustrated by the Class Action
Allegations, which purported to bring this lawsuit on behalf of all
persons in the United States who have purchased PGT-A testing from
Defendants, with no mention of harm whatsoever.

Because the complaint lacks any allegation that plaintiffs received
a product that failed to work for its intended purpose or was worth
objectively less than what one could reasonably expect, they have
not demonstrated a concrete injury-in-fact. Accordingly, the court
found that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege Article III
standing and granted the motion to dismiss on that basis.

Plaintiffs initiated this action on October 31, 2024, asserting 13
claims for violations of state consumer protection statutes, common
law fraud, breach of warranty, and unjust enrichment. On January 6,
2025, Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing and failure
to state a claim. The court held oral argument on July 28, 2025.

The court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss the Class Action
Complaint without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to attempt to
replead.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=3jhQ1Zfrom PacerMonitor.com.


INMARKET MEDIA: Must Face Amended Complaint Over Geolocation Data
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In the case captioned as Bernadette Lionetta and Cheryl Wallace,
Plaintiffs v. InMarket Media, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:24-cv-11170-JEK (D. Mass.), Judge Julia E. Kobick of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts denies the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs, Bernadette Lionetta and Cheryl Wallace, allege that
InMarket used its software, embedded on third-party mobile
applications that they had downloaded, to improperly collect and
sell their geolocation data without their informed consent.
Defendant InMarket Media is a data aggregator and digital marketing
company that collects consumers' personal data through either its
own mobile applications or its Software Development Kit (SDK),
which can be embedded in third-party applications.

This data includes information about app users' purchasing history,
demographics, socioeconomic background, and movements over time.
The data also includes precise information about users' locations.
Brands and retailers then buy that data from InMarket to produce
targeted advertisements for those users in an effort to get them to
buy their products.

Since 2017, InMarket's own apps have been downloaded onto more than
30 million unique devices, and InMarket SDK has been incorporated
into more than 300 third-party apps, which have, in turn, been
installed on over 390 million unique devices.

Plaintiffs Lionetta and Wallace are both Massachusetts residents
who downloaded and repeatedly used third-party applications with
InMarket SDK - such as CVS, Stop & Shop, and Dunkin' apps - while
in the Commonwealth. Lionetta and Wallace did not, however, provide
InMarket with their informed consent to share and monetize their
historic and real-time location data it received from those
third-party applications.

The amended complaint asserts two claims: (1) unjust enrichment
(Count I) and (2) a violation of M.G.L. c. 93A, Sections 2 and 9
(Count II). InMarket moved to dismiss the amended complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (6), respectively.

The Court concluded it has specific jurisdiction over InMarket
because it has purposefully availed itself of the Commonwealth's
market by selling data from Massachusetts consumers and then
sending targeted advertisements to those Massachusetts consumers on
behalf of companies in the Massachusetts market; the plaintiffs'
claims arise out of, or relate to, InMarket's contacts with
Massachusetts; and the exercise of jurisdiction over InMarket is
fair and reasonable.

The Court found that the plaintiffs have established that their
claims arise out of, or relate to, InMarket's activities in
Massachusetts. The Court noted that InMarket allegedly determines
which advertisements display in third-party applications embedded
with its SDK and permits advertisers to send push notifications
based on a consumer's geolocation data. For example, a
Massachusetts consumer using an affiliate application with InMarket
SDK may see a targeted advertisement for cold medicine or
toothpaste if they walk within 200 meters of a local pharmacy in
the Commonwealth.

The Court determined that the plaintiffs have established that
InMarket purposefully availed itself of the Massachusetts market.
The plaintiffs allege that InMarket targets consumers in
Massachusetts through affiliate applications with its SDK and
derives substantial revenue by monetizing the geolocation data of
those same consumers. InMarket notably does not dispute this
assertion about its revenue from the Commonwealth.

The record reveals that InMarket is registered to do business in
Massachusetts and has an appointed resident agent for service of
process in the Commonwealth. Chief Accounting Officer Kennedy also
attests that, while InMarket is a Delaware LLC based principally in
Texas, nine of its approximately 345 employees work remotely in
Massachusetts.

The Court found that the exercise of jurisdiction over InMarket
would be fair and reasonable. The factors favor the exercise of
jurisdiction. First, the fact that InMarket is based in Texas and
has no offices in Massachusetts does not mean that it would be
burdened by litigating in the Commonwealth. Second, Massachusetts
has a "manifest interest" in providing its residents with a
convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state
actors. Third, some deference is owed to the plaintiffs' choice of
forum, and it would be most convenient for the plaintiffs to
litigate this matter in Massachusetts, where they both reside.

The Court found that the amended complaint plausibly states a claim
of unjust enrichment. To sustain their unjust enrichment claim, the
plaintiffs must allege that (1) they conferred a measurable benefit
on InMarket, (2) they reasonably expected compensation from
InMarket, and (3) InMarket accepted the benefit with knowledge of
their reasonable expectation.

The plaintiffs plausibly allege that they conferred a measurable
benefit upon InMarket through its collection and sale of their
location data. The relevant question is whether InMarket received a
benefit from the plaintiffs at all, not whether that benefit was
directly received. The involvement of the affiliate applications
does not, therefore, preclude InMarket's liability because InMarket
allegedly received the plaintiffs' geolocation data, albeit
indirectly, and profited from that data.

The plaintiffs also adequately allege that they reasonably expected
InMarket to compensate them for their location data. Specifically,
the amended complaint alleges that their privacy has been invaded,
and that they have unwittingly conferred a benefit upon InMarket
through their valuable personal location information and "received
nothing" in return.

The Court determined that the amended complaint adequately alleges
a claim under Chapter 93A. Section 2 of Chapter 93A prohibits
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. The Supreme
Judicial Court has held that a merchant's unlawful and deceptive
recording of a consumer's zip code was an invasion of the
consumer's personal privacy" that violated section 2 of Chapter
93A.

The plaintiffs similarly allege that InMarket improperly obtained
and sold their geolocation data without their informed consent. The
plaintiffs in this case downloaded third-party mobile applications
embedded with InMarket SDK without knowing about or consenting to
the collection and transmission of their data.

The amended complaint adequately alleges that the plaintiffs were
harmed by InMarket's misappropriation and sale of their location
data without their consent. In this case, the plaintiffs similarly
allege that they were harmed and seek disgorgement. Had they known
that InMarket was selling their data, they would also have
allegedly stopped using the affiliate applications or sought
compensation for their geolocation data.

For these reasons, the Court denies InMarket's motion to dismiss
the amended complaint. The Court has specific jurisdiction over
InMarket because it has purposefully availed itself of the
Commonwealth's market by selling data from Massachusetts consumers
and then sending targeted advertisements to those Massachusetts
consumers on behalf of companies in the Massachusetts market. The
plaintiffs also plausibly allege claims for unjust enrichment and a
violation of M.G.L. c. 93A.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=rfOpEl from PacerMonitor.com.


MICHIGAN: Wins in Part Summary Judgment in Unclaimed Property Suit
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In the case captioned as Dennis O'Connor, and all those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Rachael Eubanks, Terry Stanton, and the
State of Michigan, Defendants, Case No. 21-12837 (E.D. Mich.),
Judge Nancy G. Edmunds of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan grants in part and denies in part the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment or, alternatively,
dismissal.

The putative class action concerns Michigan's Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act and the State's concomitant program for unclaimed
property ("UPP"). Under the Act, all property held in a holder's
business and left unclaimed for more than three years after it
becomes payable is presumed abandoned. If the conditions for the
presumption of abandonment are raised, the State takes custody and
ownership of the property, but the property can be recovered by the
original owner by making a claim as set forth by the Act.

Plaintiff Dr. Dennis O'Connor, on behalf of himself and the class
he seeks to represent, filed a second amended complaint for money
damages against the State of Michigan and Defendants Rachael
Eubanks (administrator of UPP) and Terry Stanton (state
administrative manager of UPP) in their personal capacities.
Plaintiff's second amended complaint includes seven counts.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants committed an unconstitutional taking
of his property and interest earned on it by taking custody of the
principal and withholding interest earned on it while in the
State's custody. Plaintiff also alleges Defendants violated his due
process rights in the manner the property was transferred to State
custody.

The case's procedural history bears mentioning. Defendants moved to
dismiss Plaintiff's first amended complaint. This Court accepted
and adopted the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation and
granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. In
that complaint, Plaintiff raised Fifth Amendment takings claims on
the interest and principal against each defendant and Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims against Defendants Eubanks and
Stanton. The Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims
against the State on sovereign immunity grounds and dismissed with
prejudice his claims against Defendants Eubanks and Stanton on
qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiff appealed.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
the case to this Court for further proceedings. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's taking claims against
Defendants Eubanks and Stanton but held they were not entitled to
qualified immunity on the due process claims, and Plaintiff
plausibly alleged a violation of his right to notice and process
before being deprived of a property right. Of note, the Sixth
Circuit held Plaintiff had a property right in the principal and
any interest the State earned on it while in its custody, stating:
"the parties disagree over whether O'Connor has a right to
interest. Precedent clearly establishes that he does. When the
government takes custody of private property and earns interest on
it, that interest belongs to the owner. The Supreme Court has
reaffirmed this rule time and again." In sum, only Plaintiff's due
process claims against Defendants Eubanks and Stanton remain.

Less than a month later, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued an
opinion relevant to this case. The Appeals Court held the Act
abrogated the common law doctrine that interest follows principal,
and, accordingly, the Act's provisions governing original owners'
entitlement to any interest control. The Appeals Court also held
that property held in the UPP is deemed abandoned and the State
becomes owner and titleholder of property held in the UPP. As a
result, under the Act, individuals whose property was not
interest-bearing at the time the State took custody do not have a
property right under Michigan law in interest earned on the
property while in the State's custody and the State becomes owner
unless the original owner makes a successful claim for its return.

Relying on the Appeals Court's decision, Defendants argue they are
entitled to summary judgment or dismissal of Plaintiff's claims
regarding any interest earned on his property while it was
abandoned because, under Michigan law, he does not have a right to
that interest and the State becomes owner while the property is in
the UPP. Defendants assert the law of the case doctrine should
result in dismissal of Plaintiff's re-alleged takings claims
against the State and Defendants Eubanks and Stanton. Defendants
further argue there was no due process violation because Plaintiff
was not deprived of a property interest where he could always
reestablish ownership of the principal, and, if there was a
deprivation, Plaintiff received sufficient notice and process by
the Act's statutory publication and the UPP's website where
individuals can search for abandoned property.

Plaintiff argues statutory notice is insufficient and he did not
receive the notice required under the Act or adequate process in
general. Plaintiff maintains he has a protected property interest
in both the principal and any interest, and that Defendants
deprived him of those interests when taking custody of his property
through the UPP. Plaintiff also argues Kemerer was wrongly decided,
and he does have a property right in interest earned on his
principal property, citing Kemerer v. State, 21 N.W.3d 201 (Mich.
2025).

This case arises out of Plaintiff discovering that two properties
in the form of money that belonged to him but were previously held
by two third parties had been turned over to the UPP. One property
of $54.50 was held by FMC Corporation and $120.00 was held by
Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Company. Plaintiff claims he
never received notice from either holder that they would transfer
custody of his property to the UPP. The FMC money was reported to
the UPP in 2003 and the MMI money in 2018. Plaintiff filed a claim
for their return shortly after discovering his property was in the
UPP. Between discovering his property was in the UPP and filing his
claim for its return, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court
alleging the constitutional violations discussed above. Plaintiff
received a check for the sum amount of the property at the time the
UPP received custody of it but no more.

Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but they
are created and their dimensions are defined by an independent
source such as state law. Accordingly, Michigan state-law controls
the existence and dimensions of property rights. The law of the
case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law,
that decision should continue to govern the same issues in
subsequent stages in the same case. Although the Sixth Circuit held
Plaintiff has a right to any interest, this court is bound by
decisions of the state's intermediate appellate courts unless
convinced that the Michigan Supreme Court would decide the question
differently. Therefore, the Court must apply the result of Kemerer
in interpreting Michigan law.

Kemerer dictates Plaintiff has no property right to any interest
earned on his principal while it was abandoned and in the UPP.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts that, taken as true,
establish he has a property right to any such interest, his claims
regarding interest are not plausible on their face. Accordingly,
dismissal is appropriate for these claims. Count V of Plaintiff's
second amended complaint for not receiving due process before being
deprived of interest earned on his principal is dismissed with
prejudice.

The Court will apply the law of the case doctrine to Plaintiff's
second amended complaint with the aspects of the Sixth Circuit's
opinion not affected by the Appeals Court's decision. As a result,
counts I-II of Plaintiff's second amended complaint for
unconstitutional takings of interest and the principal against
Defendant State of Michigan are dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff's counts III-IV for unconstitutional takings of interest
and the principal against Defendants Eubanks and Stanton are
dismissed with prejudice. Because the Sixth Circuit held Defendants
Eubanks and Stanton are not entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff's due process claims, their motion for dismissal on this
basis is denied.

Courts in this Circuit undertake a two-step analysis when
considering claims for the violation of due process rights. The
first step determines whether the plaintiff has a property interest
entitled to due process protection. Second, if the plaintiff has
such a protected property interest, this court must then determine
what process is due. The predeprivation process need not always be
elaborate, however; the amount of process required depends, in
part, on the importance of the interests at stake.

The Sixth Circuit found Plaintiff has a property right in the
principal, and Defendants have not offered any state-law basis to
revisit this holding. The Court finds Plaintiff has a protected
property interest in the principal and will turn to Defendants'
claims that he was not deprived of that property interest and was
afforded all process due regardless.

As far as his remaining claims, Plaintiff alleges his right to due
process was violated first when his property was transferred by FMC
and MMI to the UPP, and second when the principal was seized and
used by the State. The first instance appears to allege the
pre-deprivation process was inadequate, and the second alleges the
post-deprivation process was too.

For the pre-deprivation claim, Defendants argue there was no due
process violation and cite to Anderson National Bank v. Luckett for
support. There, the Court considered a Kentucky statute which
required banks to turn where deposits became presumed abandoned
after ten years of inactivity. The statute also required banks to
turn over to the state deposits that were presumed abandoned,
provided administrative and judicial processes to have depositors'
property claims determined, and allowed depositors to make demands
for repayment or return from the state. Anderson National Bank is
distinguishable for several reasons. First, there, the depositors
took affirmative action to deposit money from their custody into a
bank account. Whereas here, Plaintiff appears to have been unaware
in each instance that he had property held by another that would
eventually be transferred to the State. The aggrieved in Anderson
National Bank chose to have their property held by another. Not so
here, and that makes a difference in deciding the due process
implications of transferring custody from a private holder to the
state.

Second, here, the Act deems property presumptively abandoned after
three years of being unclaimed while in the holder's custody, and
the State steps in as owner when the property is transferred to its
custody. The statute at issue in Anderson National Bank allowed
longer inactivity before the property was presumed abandoned and
the state did not immediately step in as owner. Further, here, the
State does not simply substitute itself as holder as Defendants
claim - it does much more. The State is allowed conduct sales of
property in the UPP, deposit it in its general fund, and earn
interest on property in its custody. The statutes' respective
impact on property interests differ, and Anderson National Bank is
not persuasive.

Defendants have not shown that the transfer of Plaintiff's property
to the UPP was not a deprivation of his protected right nor that
statutory notice was sufficient as due process for that event.

For Plaintiff's post-transfer claim, Defendants argue there was no
deprivation of a property interest because he could always
re-establish ownership and receive the same value the State did
when it took custody by filing a successful claim under the Act.
Defendants miss the point. Plaintiff has a protected property
interest in his principal, and he is deprived of the enjoyment of
that interest while the State holds it. The fact the State provides
an avenue for the deprivation to be temporary lessens the severity,
but that does not eliminate the deprivation. Further, the Act does
not just deprive Plaintiff of his right to custody over his
property, it deprives him of ownership too. It cannot be that the
Act gives custody, albeit where the original owner did not have
any, and ownership of property to the State and the former owner
has not been deprived of a protected interest in that property.

Defendants argue the notice was adequate for several reasons,
including that Plaintiff received the forms of notice required by
the Act. As for what notice he received, Plaintiff points to his
declaration statement that he never received notice from either FMC
or MMI or any State official that his property would be presumed
abandoned and transferred to the State. Defendants point to
Defendant Stanton's affidavit statement that both holders indicated
they had complied with the Act's notice requirements in reporting
the property to the State, and that the State has complied with its
obligations to issue notice every six months in a newspaper
circulated statewide and maintain the website discussed above.
Thus, there is a genuine dispute as to what notice Plaintiff
received.

Plaintiff received actual notice in some way as evidenced by him
discovering his property was in the UPP. Defendants argue this
shows the notice designed by the Act is sufficient. Similarly,
Defendants argue Plaintiff received statutory notice of the Act's
operation by its publication, and this satisfies due process.
However, where it took almost twenty years for Plaintiff to find
out he had property in the UPP, the Court cannot conclude on
summary judgment that such evidence shows the Act's notice
requirements satisfy due process. As discussed above, Plaintiff's
rights to not just custody but also ownership of his property are
impacted by the Act. Statutory notice alone is not sufficient under
such circumstances.

Additionally, Defendants argue Plaintiff received due process
because the Act granting a right and process for original owners to
reclaim their property also suffices as the process due to original
owners. As Defendants put it, Michigan's Act provides all the
process that is due. As an initial matter, the Court has warned
against defining the property right by the procedures provided for
its deprivation. For support, Defendants cite to Hall v. State.
There, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a challenge to that
state's unclaimed property law. The statute and challenges in Hall
are similar to those here. However, there are important differences
between Minnesota's law and the Act. The Hall court noted
Minnesota's unclaimed property act and program is not an
escheatment scheme where the state acquires ownership of unclaimed
property. On the record before the Court at this stage, the Court
sees no reason to treat Michigan's Act the same as Minnesota's when
the State tells the Court they are not. The fundamental requirement
of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and
proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the
constitutional protection is invoked. As stated above, the Act
impacts rights to custody and ownership. Defendants have not met
their burden to show they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law that the process Plaintiff received and what is required by the
Act satisfies due process.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court granted in part and denied in
part Defendants' motion for summary judgment or alternatively
dismissal. Plaintiff's claims for unconstitutional takings against
Defendant State of Michigan (counts I-II) are dismissed without
prejudice. Plaintiff's claims for unconstitutional takings of
interest and the principal against Defendants Eubanks and Stanton
(counts III-IV) are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's claim for
not receiving due process before being deprived of interest earned
on his principal (count V) is dismissed with prejudice. Counts VI
and VII, only as they relate to principal property, remain.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=W8hcZq from PacerMonitor.com.


NBCUNIVERSAL MEDIA: Court Dismisses Golden Video Privacy Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Sherhonda Golden, individually and on
behalf of all ohers similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NBCUniversal
Media, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 22 Civ. 9858 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.),
Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York grants the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint with prejudice.

Judge Engelmayer dismissed the putative class action brought by
Plaintiff claiming violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act,
18 U.S.C. Section 2710, and unjust enrichment. Golden claimed that
Defendant knowingly disclosed to Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook)
personally identifiable information about Golden and other digital
visitors to Today.com, along with information about their video
consumption. The information was allegedly transmitted through the
Facebook Pixel, a functional software code that collects users'
data.

The data consisted of (1) a sequence of characters, letters, and
numbers which, when interpreted, would identify the user's video
title and uniform resource locator (URL or web address), and (2)
the user's Facebook identification number (FID or Facebook ID), a
unique sequence of numbers linked to the user's Facebook profile.

The case had a complex procedural history. In November 2022, Golden
filed her first complaint. In August 2023, the Court dismissed her
First Amended Complaint, holding that Golden had not plausibly
alleged her consumer status under the VPPA. The Court granted
Golden leave to amend to add factual allegations as to the
operation of Defendant's mobile app and email newsletter. Golden
eventually filed the Third Amended Complaint, which the Court
dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding
that Golden's receipt of a non-video email newsletter did not make
her a consumer under the VPPA.

While her appeal was pending, the Second Circuit issued Salazar v.
National Basketball Association, 118 F.4th 533 (2d Cir. 2024),
which held that a subscription to a digital newsletter linked to
video content could establish consumer status under the VPPA. The
Court then issued an indicative ruling that, if remanded, it would
deny Defendant's motion to dismiss Golden's VPPA claim on the basis
of the Salazar decision. Golden then moved to dismiss her appeal
and remand to the Court, which the Second Circuit granted.

Golden, thereupon, amended and filed the Fourth Amended Complaint,
the operative complaint. Defendant moved anew to dismiss the Fourth
Amended Complaint on a ground not previously litigated.

Defendant owns and operates Today.com, a website accessible from a
desktop computer or a mobile app. Today.com offers both live and
on-demand video content. The website allows users to sign up for a
daily digital newsletter. Once a user signs up, a daily digital
newsletter is delivered to the email address that the user provided
to Today.com. The newsletters contain hyperlinks to web-hosted
audio visual content, exclusive content, and direct, prominently
featured links to audio visual content on Today.com.
Today.com installed Facebook's tracking pixel (the Pixel) to
transmit certain information about users to Facebook, which
Facebook then uses to target ads for particular users. The Pixel
tracks users' actions on Facebook advertisers' websites and reports
these to Facebook. When a digital newsletter recipient watches
video content, Today.com transmits to Facebook a cookie with the
video content name, the URL of the prerecorded video that was
viewed, and, for visitors with an active and logged in Facebook
account, the viewer's Facebook ID.

In 2022, Golden signed up to receive a Today.com newsletter. She
has since received emails and other communications from Today.com.
Golden has accessed audio-visual content via hyperlinks provided in
the daily digital newsletters. She has also accessed Today.com's
content through its website and mobile app. Golden has had a
Facebook account since approximately 2012. During the relevant
period, she has used her Today.com subscription to view videos
through Today.com or its mobile app while concurrently logged into
her Facebook account. Golden never agreed, authorized, or otherwise
consented to Defendant's disclosure of her personal video viewing
information to Facebook, and has not been given written notice
stating that it is Defendant's practice to do so.

Defendant's current motion to dismiss argued that the Fourth
Amended Complaint did not adequately allege that Defendant
disclosed Golden's personally identifiable information within the
meaning of the VPPA. The Fourth Amended Complaint undisputedly
alleged that Defendant, through the Facebook Pixel, transmitted
Golden's URL, FID, and video-watching history. The complaint's
basis for claiming that Defendant disclosed Golden's personally
identifiable information was that an FID uniquely identifies a
Facebook user.

Defendant, relying on the Second Circuit's recent decision
construing the VPPA in Solomon v. Flipps Media, Inc., 136 F.4th 41
(2d Cir. 2025), countered that the Fourth Amended Complaint did not
allege an actionable disclosure of personally identifiable
information. The Court found that Defendant was correct.

The VPPA was enacted in 1988 after a newspaper profile disclosed
the video rental history of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork.
Under the Act, a video tape service provider who knowingly
discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information
concerning any consumer of such provider shall be liable to the
aggrieved person.

Personally identifiable information, under the VPPA, has three
distinct elements: (1) the consumer's identity, (2) the video
material's identity, and (3) the connection between them.

The courts of appeals have diverged in interpreting personally
identifiable information under the statute. The First Circuit has
adopted a reasonable foreseeability standard. In contrast, the
Third and Ninth Circuits, and now the Second, in Solomon, have
adopted the ordinary person standard. The ordinary person standard
limits personally identifiable information to the kind of
information that would readily permit an ordinary person to
identify a specific individual's video-watching behavior.

In adopting the ordinary person standard in Solomon, the Second
Circuit rejected a materially identical VPPA claim to the one here
- that a Facebook Pixel had disclosed a video user's FID and video
URLs to Facebook. The Circuit held that personally identifiable
information encompasses information that would allow an ordinary
person to identify a consumer's video-watching habits, but not
information that only a sophisticated technology company could use
to do so. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must plausibly allege that the defendant's disclosure of
information would, with little or no extra effort, permit an
ordinary recipient to identify the plaintiff's video-watching
habits.

In Solomon, the complaint reproduced an exemplar screenshot with
several lines of computer code, interspersed with characters,
numbers, and letters, which it contended represented an actionable
disclosure of personally identifiable information. The Circuit
rejected that claim. It found implausible that an ordinary person
would look at that code and understand it to reveal a video title
or the plaintiff's FID, as opposed to just one phrase embedded in
many other lines of code. The Circuit noted that the complaint
lacked any details about how an ordinary person might access the
information on the Pixel's Page View, or any details about how an
ordinary person would use an FID to identify the plaintiff.

The Circuit reiterated the point and reached the same conclusion
just over two months ago, in Hughes v. National Football League,
where it again affirmed the dismissal of a VPPA claim. The
plaintiff there, as in Solomon, had alleged that the defendant's
website transmitted FIDs and video URLs to Facebook through the
Pixel. Rejecting that claim, the Circuit stated that Solomon had
effectively shut the door for Pixel-based VPPA claims.

Like the complaints in Solomon, Hughes, and Nixon, the Fourth
Amended Complaint alleged that Defendant disclosed users'
video-viewing activity to Facebook via the Pixel, specifically by
transmitting URLs, FIDs, and video-watching history without their
knowledge or consent. It included a screenshot of computer code
showing the alleged transmissions to Facebook. It alleged that
because a person with the right tools can use an FID to identify a
specific Facebook user, the data constitutes personally
identifiable information.

Those allegations did not materially differ from those in Solomon,
Hughes, and Nixon. Indeed, the Fourth Amended Complaint tacitly
underscored its inability to satisfy the Second Circuit's ordinary
person standard, in its description of the Pixel's disclosures as
technical, and embedded in HTTP transmissions inaccessible to
ordinary persons, and in its reproduction of the screenshot
consisting of several jumbled lines of code separated by
characters, numbers, and letters unintelligible to ordinary
persons. The Fourth Amended Complaint did not explain how an
ordinary person, with little or no extra effort, could discern that
these strings contained Golden's FID or the titles of videos she
had watched. At most, the Fourth Amended Complaint pleaded that
Facebook, through its proprietary systems, could decode these
technical strings. But disclosures comprehensible only to Facebook
or other sophisticated actors are not personally identifiable
information.

The Court, accordingly, dismissed the VPPA claim.

The Fourth Amended Complaint's unjust enrichment claim was based on
the same allegations as its VPPA claim. Defendant moved to dismiss
it as duplicative, and Golden did not oppose. The Court found
Defendant's motion meritorious.

To allege unjust enrichment under New York law, a plaintiff must
plead that the defendant benefitted at the plaintiff's expense, and
that equity and good conscience require restitution. Unjust
enrichment is not a catchall cause of action to be used when others
fail, and is not available where it simply duplicates, or replaces,
a conventional contract or tort claim.

Golden did not distinguish her unjust enrichment claim from her
VPPA claim. The Fourth Amended Complaint stated that the basis of
the unjust enrichment claim was that Defendant wrongfully shared
users' personally identifiable information without their consent.
That claim effectively replicated the Fourth Amended Complaint's
VPPA allegations, and Golden, by not responding to Defendant's
motion to dismiss, waived any opposition.

The Court, accordingly, dismissed the unjust enrichment claim as
duplicative of the Fourth Amended Complaint's VPPA claim.

Therefore, the Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Fourth Amended Complaint with prejudice. The Clerk of Court was
directed to terminate the motion and to close the case.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=rfOpEl from PacerMonitor.com.


PEACOCK ALLEY: Bowman Seeks Equal Website Access for the Blind
--------------------------------------------------------------
TANISIA BOWMAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Peacock Alley, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:25-cv-10996 (N.D. Ill., September 11, 2025) is a civil rights
action against the Defendant for its failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website, www.peacockalley.com, to be
fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired persons in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.

On July 28, 2025, the Plaintiff was searching for bed sheet sets
and came across Defendant's website. While attempting to navigate
the website, the Plaintiff encountered substantial accessibility
barriers that interfered with her ability to complete a purchase.

According to the complaint, these barriers are pervasive and
include, but are not limited to: incorrectly formatted lists,
ambiguous link texts, changing of content without advance warning,
inaccessible drop-down menus, redundant links where adjacent links
go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions
be performed solely with a mouse.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Peacock Alley's policies, practices, and procedures so that its
website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers. This complaint also seeks compensatory
damages to compensate Class members for having been subjected to
unlawful discrimination.

Peacock Alley, Inc. operates the website that offers bedding and
bath products, such as blankets, sheets, bed pillows, bath towels,
bathrobes, shower curtains, and bundles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David B. Reyes, Esq.
          EQUAL ACCESS LAW GROUP, PLLC
          68-29 Main Street
          Flushing, NY 11367
          Office: (844) 731-3343
          Cellphone: (718) 554-0237
          E-mail: Dreyes@ealg.law

POWDER VITAMIN: Website Inaccessible to Blind Users, Echols Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
TAZINIQUE ECHOLS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Powder Vitamin, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:25-cv-10999 (N.D. Ill., September 11, 2025) is a civil rights
action against the Defendant for its failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website, www.powdervitamin.com, to be
fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired persons in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.

On June 18, 2025, while browsing the internet, the Plaintiff
learned about health and wellness benefits of electrolyte powders.
During her search among popular products, she came across the brand
Powder Vitamins and visited the Defendant's website.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff, while navigating the
website, experienced access barriers that prevent free and full use
by her and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading
software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not
limited to: inaccurate landmark structure, inadequate focus order,
changing of content without advance warning, the denial of keyboard
access for some interactive elements, and the requirement that
transactions be performed solely with a mouse, says the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
PowderVitamin's policies, practices, and procedures so that its
website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers. This complaint also seeks compensatory
damages to compensate Class members for having been subjected to
unlawful discrimination.

PowderVitamin, LLC operates the website that offers a selection of
electrolyte powders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David B. Reyes, Esq.
          EQUAL ACCESS LAW GROUP, PLLC
          68-29 Main Street
          Flushing, NY 11367
          Office: (844) 731-3343
          Cellphone: (718) 554-0237
          E-mail: Dreyes@ealg.law

PURE FISHING: Faces Cole Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
-------------------------------------------------------------
HARON COLE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff v. Pure Fishing, Inc., d/b/a Abu Garcia, Defendant, Case
No. 1:25-cv-10990 (N.D. Ill., September 11, 2025) is a civil rights
action against Pure Fishing for its failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website, www.abugarcia.com, to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind
or visually-impaired persons in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

On June 24, 2025, the Plaintiff searched on Google for online
stores offering fishing gear when he came across the Defendant's
website. While browsing, he decided to purchase a 2-piece spinning
combo that featured a custom integrated reel seat with a molded
polymer comfort grip. However, as he attempted to navigate the
website and complete his purchase, he encountered accessibility
barriers that significantly hindered his ability to proceed.

The Plaintiff asserts that the website contains access barriers
that prevent free and full use by him and blind persons using
keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive
and include, but are not limited to: inadequate focus order,
ambiguous link texts, changing of content without advance warning,
unclear labels for interactive elements, the denial of keyboard
access for some interactive elements, and the requirement that
transactions be performed solely with a mouse.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Pure Fishing's policies, practices, and procedures so that its
website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers. This complaint also seeks compensatory
damages to compensate Class members for having been subjected to
unlawful discrimination.

Pure Fishing, Inc., d/b/a Abu Garcia, operates the website that
offers fishing equipment and related products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David B. Reyes, Esq.
          EQUAL ACCESS LAW GROUP, PLLC
          68-29 Main Street
          Flushing, NY 11367
          Office: (844) 731-3343
          Cellphone: (718) 554-0237
          E-mail: Dreyes@ealg.law

TRUSKIN PARTNERS: Lopez Seeks Equal Website Access for the Blind
----------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TRUSKIN PARTNERS, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:25-cv-07560 (S.D.N.Y., September 11, 2025) is a civil rights
action against the Defendant for its failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its interactive website, https://truskin.com,
to be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and
other blind or visually impaired persons in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights
Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and the New York State
General Business Law.

During Plaintiff's visits to the website, the last occurring on
July 21, 2025, in an attempt to purchase a Vitamin C Serum For Face
from Defendant and to view the information on the website, the
Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied
Plaintiff a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person
and full and equal access to the goods and services offered to the
public and made available to the public. He was unable to locate
pricing and was not able to add the item to the cart due to broken
links, pictures without alternate attributes and other barriers on
Defendant's website, says the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
its website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually
impaired consumers.

Truskin Partners, Inc. operates the website that offers skincare
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES PLLC
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: Jeffrey@Gottlieb.legal
                  Dana@Gottlieb.legal
                  Michael@Gottlieb.legal

TWIST BIOSCIENCE: Court Refuses to Dismiss Claim Against Leproust
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Eumi K. Lee of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants in part and denies in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the securities class action case
captioned as Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Lead
Plaintiff v. Twist Bioscience Corporation, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 22-cv-08168-EKL (N.D. Cal.).

The Court ruled that the motion to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part as to the Section 11 and Section 15 Securities Act
claims, granted as to the Section 10(b) Exchange Act claim against
James Thorburn and denied as to Twist and Emily Leproust, and
denied as to the Section 20(a) Exchange Act claim.

The lawsuit centers on allegations that Twist Bioscience
Corporation and two of its top executives, Emily Leproust and James
Thorburn, misled investors about the company's production
capabilities and financial metrics. Lead Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants stated that Twist had automated its entire workflow,
enabling it to manufacture its products consistently and
efficiently, when in reality Twist faced tremendous production
challenges and received rampant customer complaints. The complaint
further alleges that Defendants failed to disclose that Twist
improperly allocated certain expenses to inflate its gross
margins.

The Court examined two distinct categories of allegedly false
statements: the Court addresses actionability, falsity, and
scienter first for the  Product Statements regarding Twist's
production, manufacturing, and product capabilities, and Financial
Metrics Statements concerning the company's research and
development expenses, cost of revenue, and gross margins. Founded
in 2013, Twist is a biotechnology company that manufactures
synthetic DNA products for various purposes ranging from academic
and medical research to applications for more sustainable crop
production.

Regarding the Product Statements, the Court found that Plaintiff
plausibly alleged falsity as to statements regarding lack of
automation, perfect quality DNA, and excellent customer experience.
Four former Twist employees detailed that the production process
was not fully automated, resulting in human errors, increased
costs, and longer turnaround times. According to the Court, one
former employee explained that there were many human touchpoints in
the production processes, and that it would often take one to two
years before Twist was willing to invest in the software
development needed for automated production.

The Court determined that statements portraying Twist's workflow as
entirely automated create an impression of a state of affairs that
differs in a material way from the one that actually exists. Three
former Twist employees detailed significant customer complaints
regarding the quality of products received, including complaints
about imperfect DNA. These allegations directly contradict
assertions of shipping perfect DNA and the customer experience
being excellent.

However, the Court found that Plaintiff did not plausibly allege
that statements regarding error rates, turnaround times, and
certain customer satisfaction claims were false. The Court noted
that Plaintiff's allegations as to these statements were not
specific enough to necessarily render them false, stating that
because Plaintiff's allegations do not specify when the error rate
was calculated, the Court cannot find that the allegations
contradict Defendants' statements.

Concerning scienter, the Court ruled that Plaintiff adequately
alleged facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as to
Leproust based on facts provided by former employees. The complaint
alleges that one former employee had hundreds of conversations and
meetings with Leproust regarding product failures, quality control
errors, and customer complaints. These concerns were raised in
formal Development Meetings with Leproust and other company
executives until the employee was frozen out because they were the
one to bring up the problems and no one wanted to hear the
problems.

In contrast, the Court found that Plaintiff had not adequately
alleged scienter as to Thorburn. The overwhelming majority of
allegations in the complaint address Leproust's knowledge and
actions, but do not address Thorburn's state of mind with a similar
level of detail. The Court concluded that the allegations are
insufficient to support a strong inference of scienter as to
Thorburn.

Regarding the Financial Metrics Statements, the Court determined
that these statements involve facts known at the time rather than
forward-looking opinions or predictions. The Financial Metrics
Statements involve reporting of research and development expenses
that existed at the time, not projections of future expenses. The
Court found that the complaint plausibly alleges with sufficient
particularity that the Financial Metrics Statements were false or
misleading based on Twist's alleged standing policy of improperly
allocating certain expenses to research and development in
violation of applicable Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

However, the Court concluded that Plaintiff has not alleged
scienter as to any of the Defendants regarding the Financial
Metrics Statements. The Court noted that the mere publication of
inaccurate accounting figures, or a failure to follow Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, without more, does not establish
scienter. The complaint does not allege the role of the Individual
Defendants in preparing the company's accounting statements or what
knowledge they had of accounting principles.

On the issue of loss causation, the Court found that Plaintiff has
plausibly pleaded loss causation through a corrective disclosure.
The Court examined whether a short-seller report published by
Scorpion Capital could serve as a corrective disclosure, noting
that on the day the Report was published, Twist's stock allegedly
lost over 20% of its value. In the three days following, the stock
continued to plummet, closing at a two-year loss representing a
loss in value of almost 35%. The immediate and drastic drop in
value bolsters the inference that the market regarded the
allegations as true.

Concerning the Section 11 Securities Act claim, the Court applied
the same analysis to Product Statements and Financial Metrics
Statements incorporated by reference into the 2020 Registration
Statement. However, the Court granted the motion in part regarding
standing for the February 2022 offering, finding that Plaintiff
does not plausibly allege that it acquired shares during the
February 2022 offering or shares traceable to that offering.

The Court addressed the control person claims under Section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act, noting
that where the plaintiff adequately pleads a primary securities
violation, dismissal at the pleading stage is rarely appropriate
because the question of whether an individual defendant is a
controlling person is an intensely factual question. Given that
Plaintiff has adequately pleaded primary violations and that
Thorburn and Leproust plausibly exercise actual power or control
over Twist, the Court found it would be premature to dismiss these
claims.

Therefore, the Court denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Section 20(a) and Section 15 claims as to both Leproust and
Thorburn, but granted the motion to the extent the Section 15 claim
is based on the February 2022 offering. The Court granted Plaintiff
leave to amend because this is the Court's first ruling on the
legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations, but warned that
failure to cure the deficiencies identified may result in dismissal
of deficient claims with prejudice.

Accordingly, Plaintiff must file its Second Amended Complaint
within 21 days of this Order. Where Plaintiff relies on Product
Statements comprised of multiple sentences or more than one
proposition, Plaintiff is ordered to bold or highlight the portions
of the Product Statement alleged to be false.

The Court strongly encourages Plaintiff to submit a chart
containing their amended allegations which satisfies the dictates
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, specifying each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, stating
with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.

A copy of the order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=fVREog
from PacerMonitor.com.


UPONOR INC: Court Denies Bid to Compel Arbitration in Harwood Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Mark Harwood and Ashley Harwood, husband
and wife, Plaintiffs v. Uponor, Inc. and Uponor North America,
Inc., Defendants, Case No. 25-CV-90-GLJ (E.D. Okla.), United States
Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Jackson of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Oklahoma denies Uponor, Inc.'s Motion to
Compel Arbitration.

In 2016, Mark and Ashley Harwood purchased a home in Coweta,
Oklahoma equipped with a potable water supply system fitted with
PEX flexible tubing. The PEX products were designed, manufactured,
marketed, distributed and sold by Uponor, Inc., and installed in
the plaintiffs' residence on or about February 1, 2012. On or about
November 8, 2022, the PEX tubing in the plaintiffs' home failed
causing water damage to their home. Water leaks occurred on at
least two more occasions and, in 2023, the plaintiffs replaced the
PEX tubing.

In November 2023, Mr. Harwood learned Uponor, Inc. utilized an
online portal whereby customers could submit complaints and created
a project, combining the three incidents of water damage and
submitted a claim to warrantyclaims.us@uponor.com on November 9,
2023, for the expenses they had incurred. Mr. Harwood submitted
samples of his pipes that underwent inspection and testing by
Uponor, Inc. to determine whether they met standard quality.
Uponor, Inc. denied Mr. Harwood's claim and supplied him a copy of
the Uponor Plumbing Systems Limited Warranty on January 15, 2024,
but offered to provide new PEX materials at no cost. The plaintiffs
assert that prior to this date they had not seen or been provided a
copy of the warranty nor agreed to its terms.

The warranty, as in effect on date of installation, provided in
pertinent part: "If You believe Uponor has failed to comply with
its obligations set forth in this limited warranty, You should send
a written complaint detailing the alleged failure(s) to Uponor. You
and Uponor shall in good faith discuss and attempt to resolve such
warranty claim dispute though informal means. If such informal
dispute resolution process proves unsuccessful after  30 days, or
if there is any other claim or dispute between the parties in any
way regarding the design, manufacture, sale, distribution or
condition of any product, whether such claim or dispute is based on
contract, warranty, tort or otherwise, then either party may submit
the dispute to the American Arbitration Association or its
successor for arbitration. The warranty also contained a provision
prohibiting all class action claims and a choice of law provision
requiring all claims be construed under the laws of Minnesota.

The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, and all persons similarly
situated, bring three causes of action against Uponor Inc. and
Uponor North America, Inc.: (i) strict product liability, (ii)
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and (iii) violations
of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. Uponor, Inc. moves to
compel this matter to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause contained in the warranty and Uponor North America, Inc.
moves to dismiss the claims against it for want of personal
jurisdiction and, alternatively, to compel arbitration.

The Court determined that Oklahoma law applies to govern this
matter. Although Defendant Uponor, Inc. invoked Minnesota law due
to a choice of law provision contained in the warranty, the Court
noted that reflexively applying the choice-of-law clause to resolve
the contract formation issue would presume the applicability of a
provision before its adoption by the parties has been established.
The plaintiffs asserted that there is no conflict between Oklahoma
and Minnesota law and Uponor, Inc. did not contest such assertion.
Accordingly, because Uponor, Inc. does not plead and prove that an
actual conflict exists between the two bodies of law, the Court
applies Oklahoma law.

Defendant Uponor North America, Inc. moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs' claims against it pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)
for want of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it did not design,
manufacture, market, advertise, sell, or distribute the PEX tubing,
and is organized under the laws of Delaware with its principal
place in Minnesota. In response to the motion, the plaintiffs
stipulated to the dismissal as requested in the motion.
Accordingly, the Motion of Defendant Uponor North America, Inc. to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is hereby granted in part
to the extent it requests Uponor North America, Inc. be dismissed
from this action. Thus, Defendant Uponor North America, Inc. is
hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Defendant Uponor, Inc. moved to compel this matter to arbitration
based on the arbitration provision contained in the warranty. The
plaintiffs maintained that there is not a valid arbitration
agreement under Oklahoma law. In response, Uponor, Inc. does not
present this Court with a signed agreement nor does it maintain
that the plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate their claims, instead
arguing the plaintiffs are obligated to arbitrate their claims
because they are equitably estopped from claiming the arbitration
provision is not binding since they submitted a warranty claim. The
Court disagreed and found the plaintiffs are not estopped from
challenging the arbitration provision of the warranty.

The Court applied the established two-step inquiry concerning the
arbitrability of the dispute: (1) whether there is a valid
arbitration agreement, and (2) whether the particular dispute falls
within the scope of that agreement. In determining whether a party
has agreed to arbitration, the Court applied ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts.

Defendant Uponor, Inc. did not assert that the plaintiffs agreed to
the terms of the warranty, including the arbitration agreement, but
instead asserted that the plaintiffs are estopped from arguing they
are not bound by the arbitration agreement because they sought to
benefit from the warranty when Mr. Harwood submitted a warranty
claim. The plaintiffs asserted equitable estoppel does not apply
here because they are not seeking to hold Uponor, Inc. liable under
the terms of the express warranty but instead, only submitted a
warranty claim without knowledge of the terms of the warranty,
including the arbitration clause contained therein.

The Court noted that although the plaintiffs did not file a
warranty claim at the bequest of Uponor, Inc., the plaintiffs were
not aware of the terms of the warranty prior to submitting a
warranty claim and did not make false representations or conceal
facts from Uponor, Inc. in their warranty claim. Ultimately,
Uponor, Inc. asked this Court to apply a direct benefits theory of
estoppel arguing that the plaintiffs cannot now avoid arbitration
because they sought to directly benefit through the terms of the
warranty by submitting a warranty claim, but Oklahoma has not
embraced the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel and the
plaintiffs do not seek to enforce the terms of the warranty against
Uponor, Inc. in this action

Based on the available case law from the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
and because Oklahoma has not adopted a direct benefits estoppel
theory, the Court concluded that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
likely find the plaintiffs are not estopped from challenging the
arbitration agreement. The Court therefore found that the
plaintiffs are not equitably estopped from asserting they are not
bound by the arbitration agreement contained in the warranty for
lack of mutual assent.

The plaintiffs contended they did not agree to the arbitration
provision because they did not have knowledge of the terms of the
warranty prior to submitting their warranty claim, and Uponor, Inc.
does not challenge this assertion. The Court noted there is no
evidence the plaintiffs received or had access to a copy of the
warranty prior to submitting their warranty claim. Therefore, the
plaintiffs could not have had actual or constructive knowledge of
the arbitration agreement and could not consent to its terms.

The Court ordered that (i) the Motion of Defendant Uponor North
America, Inc. to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or In
the Alternative, to Compel Arbitration is granted in part to extent
it requests Defendant Uponor North America, Inc. be dismissed from
this action without prejudice and denied in part to the extent it
requests this action be compelled to arbitration, and (ii) the
Motion of Defendant Uponor, Inc. to Compel Arbitration is denied.

A copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=tI8GQZ from PacerMonitor.com.


                        Asbestos Litigation


                            *********

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