---

              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, September 19, 2025, Vol. 27, No. 188

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: Aguilar et al. PFAS Suit Removed to N.D. Ala.
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH: Customer Sue Over Hollister Fake Discounts
ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Louisiana Workers Class Certified in Hamm Suit
AIR FRANCE: Allison and Soofiani Sue Over Private Data Breach
AMP LTD: Agrees to Settle Superannuation Class Suit for $120-Mil.

AMPLITUDE INC: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Atkins Suit Granted
CARDCONNECT CORP: Partly Wins Bid to Enforce Prior Deal in ASA Suit
CITIGROUP GLOBAL: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Loomis Suit
CLEO AI: Court Dismisses Franklin Suit Over Cash Advance Dispute
CROSS COUNTY: Carattini Suit Alleges Labor Law Breaches

EARTHGRAINS DISTRIBUTION: Must Respect Tax Return Privilege
FLY-E GROUP: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due November 7
FLYING S WINGS: Court Grants Summary Judgments in Tip Credit Case
HAWX SERVICES: Court Dismisses Bell's First Amended Complaint
HEALTHCARE SERVICES: Crews Sues Over Alleged Private Data Breach

KEOLIS TRANSIT AMERICA: Pace Suit Removed to C.D. California
KOIO COLLECTIVE: Bishop Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
LANTHEUS HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Nov. 10
LASHERSHIP INC: Faces Bowlin Suit Over Unprotected Private Info
LTF CLUB: $1.25MM Settlement in Turner Wage Suit Has Prelim. Nod

MDL 2873: Bateman Sues Over Undisclosed Chemical Hazards
MDL 2873: Chipman Sues Over PFAS Contamination of AFFF Products
MDL 2873: Lassiter Sues Over Unsafe, Hazardous AFFF Products
MDL 2873: Scott Seeks Damages Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals
MDL 3035: Symetra Must Pay Fees & Expenses for Discovery Violations

OOMA INC: Bachhuber Sues Over Unwanted Text Messages
ROBERTA PLACE: COVID Outbreak Class Suit to Proceed, Court Rules
SGMS INC: Must Face Newman's Claims Over Do Not Call Registry
SMARTE INC: Benasutti Sues For Unlawful Collection of Personal Info
SMITH AUTOMOTIVE GROUP: Jackson Files TCPA Suit in N.D. Georgia

TESLA INC: Faces Suit for Favouring Foreign Workers on H-1B Visas
TRANSUNION LLC: Cornwell Sues Over Data Security Failures
TRANSUNION LLC: Garcia Sues Over Inadequate Data Security Measures
UNITED STATES: 5th Cir. Issues Preliminary Injunction in WMM Suit
VOZZCOM INC: Wilson Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida

WARRIOR WASTE: Jackson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
WASHINGTON GASTROENTEROLOGY: Miller Sues Over Recent Cyberattack
WEST VIRGINIA: Loses Bid for Legal Fees in Sheppheard Inmate Suit

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Avondale Wins Summary Judgment in Shipyard Case


                            *********

3M COMPANY: Aguilar et al. PFAS Suit Removed to N.D. Ala.
---------------------------------------------------------
The case styled JAVIER AGUILAR ET AL., Plaintiffs v. 3M COMPANY ET
AL., Defendants, Case No. Case No. 01-CV-2025-903113.00, was
removed from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
on September 3, 2025.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of Alabama assigned
Case No. 2:25-cv-01489-MHH to the proceeding.

The case arises from Defendants' manufacturing and sale of aqueous
film-forming foam (AFFF) products that contain harmful per- and
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The Plaintiffs were allegedly
exposed to these substances through drinking water, which in turn
caused them to develop various injuries.

Headquartered in Tyco Fire Products LP manufactures fire
suppression and protection products. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

         Gregory M. Taube, Esq.
         NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP
         201 17th Street, NW, Suite 1700
         Atlanta, GA 30363
         Telephone: (404) 322-6000
         Facsimile: (404) 322-6050
         E-mail: greg.taube@nelsonmullins.com

ABERCROMBIE & FITCH: Customer Sue Over Hollister Fake Discounts
---------------------------------------------------------------
Top Class Actions reports that plaintiff Rebeka Rodriguez filed a
class action lawsuit against Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., doing
business as Hollister.

Why: Rodriguez claims Hollister advertises fictitious regular
prices and corresponding phantom discounts on products sold through
its website.

Where: The Hollister class action was filed in California state
court.

A new class action lawsuit claims Hollister advertises fictitious
regular prices and corresponding phantom discounts on products sold
through its website.

Plaintiff Rebeka Rodriguez filed the class action complaint against
Hollister in California state court, alleging violations of state
consumer laws.

The class action lawsuit alleges that Hollister's website,
www.hollister.com, uses fake reference prices to create the
illusion of discounts, a practice that is allegedly illegal under
California law.

Rodriguez claims she purchased a short-sleeve crew baby tee from
Hollister's website on March 4, 2025, for what she believed was a
discounted price of $6.99. The website compared this price to a
"strike-through" reference price of $14.95, suggesting a
significant discount, the Hollister class action states.

Hollister allegedly misleads customers into thinking they are
getting a bargain
The Hollister class action lawsuit claims the reference price was
not the "prevailing market price" in the 90 days preceding her
purchase, and the advertisement did not clearly state when the
reference price was the prevailing market price.

The lawsuit claims Hollister's pricing and advertising practices
are intended to mislead customers into believing they are getting a
bargain by buying products on sale and at a substantial discount.

The reference price is therefore an artificially inflated price,
making the advertised discounts nothing more than phantom
markdowns, the Hollister class action lawsuit alleges.

Rodriguez claims Hollister knows that the prices for its products
are fake and intentionally uses them in its pricing scheme to
increase sales and profits by misleading consumers to believe they
are buying products at a substantial discount.

The lawsuit cites longstanding scholarly research that supports the
effectiveness of such deceitful pricing schemes.

Rodriguez seeks to represent a class of all individuals who
purchased a product from Hollister's website while in California at
a purported discount from a higher reference price. The lawsuit
asserts claims for violations of California's False Advertising Law
and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

Rodriguez is demanding a jury trial and requesting damages,
restitution and injunctive relief to prevent Hollister from
continuing its alleged deceptive pricing practices.

In July, Premium Brands OpCo LLC, which operates Ann Taylor Factory
and Loft Outlet stores, agreed to a class action settlement to
resolve claims it advertised false discounts.

What do you think of the claims in this Hollister class action
lawsuit? Join the discussion in the comments.

Rodriguez is represented by Scott J. Ferrell and Victoria C.
Knowles of Pacific Trial Attorneys APC.

The Hollister class action lawsuit is Rodriguez v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Trading Co., Case No. 3:25-cv-01890-JES-DEB, in the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of San Diego. [GN]

ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Louisiana Workers Class Certified in Hamm Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Amy Hamm, et al., Plaintiffs v. Acadia
Healthcare Co., Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-1515 (E.D.
La.), Judge Susie Morgan of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification to pursue causes of action for unjust enrichment and
conversion under Louisiana law.

The Court certified a class defined as: All current and former
hourly, non-exempt Mental Health Technicians, Behavioral Health
Associates, nurses, non-exempt therapists, and intake coordinators
employed by any Defendants at the River Place Behavioral Health
Hospital at any time until the date of the Court's order granting
certification.

Plaintiff Amy Hamm worked as a nurse at Red River Hospital in
Wichita Falls, Texas, from February 2015 to December 2019, and then
at River Place Behavioral Health in LaPlace, Louisiana, from
December 2019 to September 2020. Plaintiff Joye Wilson worked as a
mental health technician at River Place from 2018 to January 2020.

The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting four claims
against the Defendants, as parent companies of River Place,
alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Louisiana
state law by failing to properly compensate their employees for
work performed. The Plaintiffs assert Louisiana law causes of
action for conversion and unjust enrichment, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, as a Rule 23 class
action, but only to the extent the claims do not overlap with or
duplicate the FLSA damages alleged.

Plaintiffs maintain that they are owed compensation for all their
breaks, not just the ones that were factually interrupted.
Plaintiffs claim damages for unpaid gap time wages under Louisiana
causes of action for conversion and unjust enrichment.

On September 13, 2024, the Court issued an order and reasons
finding Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) but deferring determination of Plaintiffs'
Motion to Certify pending further briefing.

The Court found that Plaintiffs met the numerosity requirement
because, although only 67 individuals opted into the FLSA
collective action, fear of retaliation and the relatively small
value of individual damages artificially underestimates the size of
the membership. The Court found that Plaintiffs satisfied the
commonality requirement because Plaintiffs' conversion and unjust
enrichment causes of action depend on common issues of fact and law
related to several of Defendants' policies and practices. The Court
found Plaintiffs proved typicality because the named Plaintiffs and
proposed class members advance the same legal and remedial
theories. The Court found Plaintiffs met the adequacy of
representation requirement because of Hamm's continued, active
participation in this litigation and Plaintiffs' counsel's
competency and zealousness.

Defendants admitted their meal break policy applies to its hourly,
non-exempt patient care workers. The policy provides that Employees
are encouraged to remain at the facility during meal breaks. The
policy further provides every effort should be made to provide an
unpaid meal break for employees, and they should be paid when that
break is unavoidably missed or interrupted.

The meal break policy states if it becomes necessary for employees
to remain on duty during their meal breaks or if they are called
back to work, employees will be paid for the entire meal break if
less than 30 minutes or, if possible, another meal break will be
scheduled during the shift." The policy further states a meal break
may be interrupted by management when it is necessary for employees
to return to work. If a meal break is interrupted, it becomes time
worked and will be paid unless another 30 minute meal break is
given during the work shift.

The Court found that if the class is certified, determination of
the causes of action will present common questions of fact and law:
what is the Defendants' policy and practice with respect to
requiring employees to be on call during meal breaks; are there
ethical and legal obligations that require employees to be on call
during meal breaks; whether employees are effectively on call
during meal breaks and are entitled to pay for their meal breaks
regardless of whether or not their break actually was interrupted;
and alternatively, whether employees are effectively on call and
are entitled to be paid for their meal breaks only if the meal
break actually was interrupted.

For unjust enrichment claims, the Court analyzed the five required
elements: (1) enrichment; (2) impoverishment; (3) connection
between the enrichment and impoverishment; (4) absence of
justification or cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and
(5) no other remedy at law available.

The Court found whether Defendants were enriched without cause
through withholding wages from the putative class members for meal
breaks is determinable on a class-wide basis and is a common issue
predominating over individualized inquiries. Whether Defendants'
alleged conduct impoverished the putative class members is
determinable on a class-wide basis and predominates over individual
issues. The existence of connection between alleged enrichment and
impoverishment is determinable on a class-wide basis and
predominates over individualized issues. The absence of
justification or cause for Defendants' withholding of wages may be
determined on a class-wide basis and predominates over
individualized issues.

For conversion claims, Plaintiffs must prove (1) ownership over the
wages; (2) Defendants' possession of the wages was inconsistent
with the putative class's ownership over the wages; and (3)
Defendants' possession is a wrongful withholding of the wages.

The Court found whether the putative class members own the wages
that Defendants did not pay them for work done during unpaid meal
periods may be determined on a class-wide basis and predominates
over individual issues. Whether Defendants possessed the unpaid
wages in a manner inconsistent with the putative class's ownership
may be decided on a class-wide basis and predominates over
individual issues. The crux of the wrongful withholding inquiry is
whether the putative class is entitled to wages for unpaid meal
periods, which may be decided on a class-wide basis and presents a
predominant common issue.

The Court found that although putative class members have differing
experiences with meal break interruptions, this does not affect
whether the putative class members are on call and entitled to pay.
Because variables relate to how many interruptions each individual
experienced and the duration of those interruptions, rather than to
whether or not the individual experienced an interruption, these
variables are relevant to damages, not to Defendants' liability.

The Court relied on Chavez v. Plan Benefit Services, Inc., noting
that the necessity for individual damages calculations does not
preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). The Court found
common issues of law or fact predominate over individualized issues
because each putative class member is challenging Defendants'
conduct and treatment of the putative class as a whole.

The Court found several factors weigh in Plaintiffs' favor on
superiority. There is no other pending litigation concerning this
controversy and, most importantly, there is a high probability that
litigation of individual claims of the putative class members would
lead to a collection of negative value suits.

Defendants' arguments on superiority focused on manageability
concerns, attacking Plaintiffs' plan to rely on representative
evidence and statistical data because of each putative class
member's unique factual circumstances. The Court explained that the
differences between the putative class members will impact the
amount of damages rather than liability.

The Court found there is no inherent problem with Plaintiffs' plan
to use representative and statistical evidence, citing Tyson Foods,
Inc. v. Bouaphakeo: "A representative or statistical sample, like
all evidence, is a means to establish or defend against liability.
Its permissibility turns not on the form a proceeding takes but on
the degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or
disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action.

The Court concluded this is exactly the type of case in which
representative evidence and statistical data is needed to fill an
evidentiary gap created by the employer's failure to keep adequate
records, since Defendants' records will not show time worked or
interruptions that occurred during unpaid meal periods.

Having determined the putative class meets Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance and superiority requirements, the Court addressed
potential manageability concerns under Rules 23(c)(4) and (c)(5).
The Court concluded the best method for managing this class action
is bifurcation of the trial.

During phase one of trial, the jury will determine Defendants'
liability to the putative class members for conversion and unjust
enrichment and will answer the common questions of fact and law
identified. If the jury finds Defendants liable, the trial will
proceed to phase two. During phase two of trial, the jury will
assess damages.

The Court found that proceeding in this way achieves economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promotes uniformity of decisions as
to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness, thereby satisfying Rule 23(b)(3).

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a
class action to pursue causes of action for unjust enrichment and
conversion under Louisiana law is granted.

The Court further ordered that this trial be bifurcated and that
the issues of liability and damages will be tried separately.
Schneider Wallace Cottrell Kim LLP is named class counsel.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=6pGWaj from PacerMonitor.com.


AIR FRANCE: Allison and Soofiani Sue Over Private Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
ETHAN ALLISON and ARYA SOOFIANI on behalf of themselves
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. AIR FRANCE, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-04873
(E.D.N.Y., September 3, 2025), arises from Defendant's failure to
adequately train its employees on cybersecurity, failure to
adequately monitor its agents, contractors, vendors, and suppliers
in handling and securing the personally identifiable information of
Plaintiffs, and failure to maintain reasonable security safeguards
or protocols to protect the Class's PII.

On or around July 2025, Air France discovered it had lost control
over its computer network and the highly sensitive personal
information stored on its computer network in a data breach
perpetrated by cybercriminals. The data breach has impacted several
thousands of current and former customers. However, Defendant has
not yet begun official notice of the breach to its victims.
Moreover, the Defendant's failure to timely report the data breach
makes the victims vulnerable to identity theft without any warnings
to monitor their financial accounts or credit reports to prevent
unauthorized use of their PII, says the suit.

Headquartered in New York, NY, Air France offers airline services.
The company operates in the passenger, cargo and maintenance
businesses. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

         Linda H. Joseph, Esq.
         SCHRODER, JOSEPH & ASSOCIATES, LLP
         394 Franklin Street, 2nd Floor
         Buffalo, NY 14202
         Telephone: (716) 861-1398
         Facsimile: (716) 881-4909
         E-mail: ljoseph@sjalegal.com

                 - and -

         Raina Borrelli, Esq.
         Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
         STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC
         980 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1610
         Chicago, IL 60611
         Telephone: (872) 263-1100
         Facsimile: (872) 263-1109
         E-mail: sam@straussborrelli.com
                 raina@straussborrelli.com

AMP LTD: Agrees to Settle Superannuation Class Suit for $120-Mil.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Capital Brief reports that AMP has settled a class action brought
on behalf of superannuation customers against its subsidiaries on
the claim that AMP had charged excessive fees and delivered low
interest rates on cash-only options.

The numbers: A total $120 million settlement has been reached,
subject to finalisation and execution of a deed of settlement by
the Federal Court. Of this figure, about $75 million will be paid
by AMP while the remaining will be paid by insurance.

The context: AMP has made no admission of liability in reaching the
settlement.  

The class action was brought against NM Superannuation Proprietary,
AMP Superannuation and AMP Services on behalf of some
superannuation clients and their beneficiaries over the period July
2008 and May 2020. It was jointly led by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
and Slater and Gordon.

Separately, AMP said it had reached a settlement agreement with
regards to legal proceedings the bank had brought by AMP against
insurers. The proceedings related to recovery amounts sought
relating to costs "incurred in historical remediation programs
which concluded in 2022".

So far ANZ has received $44 million in proceeds, with AMP
continuing in discussions with insurers following a hearing in
August 2025.

What they said: "The settlement of this class action is another
important step forward for AMP, which means we can put this legacy
matter behind us," AMP chief executive Alexis George said. [GN]

AMPLITUDE INC: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Atkins Suit Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Kyle Atkins, et al., Plaintiffs v.
Amplitude, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 24-cv-04913-RFL (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Rita F. Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants the motion to compel arbitration and
denied as moot the motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Kyle Atkins and Michael Luo brought this class action
against Defendant Amplitude, Inc., alleging that Amplitude embedded
its software development kits (SDKs) in various apps to
surreptitiously track consumers' sensitive locations and capture
their in-app activities, in violation of (1) The Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. Section 2510, (2) The California Invasion of Privacy Act,
Cal. Penal Code Section 638.51, (3) The California Comprehensive
Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code Section 502,
and (4) The California Wiretap Act, Cal. Penal Code Section 631.

Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Amplitude contracted with
DoorDash to provide its SDK to be embedded in the DoorDash food
delivery app, and that Plaintiffs' information was collected
through their use of the DoorDash app as a result. Amplitude moved
to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs' claims based on arbitration
agreements executed between Plaintiffs and DoorDash, seeking to
enforce the agreements as a non-party.

The Court first addressed Amplitude's motion to dismiss for lack of
Article III standing. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that they
suffered a concrete privacy harm to establish Article III standing.
The Court noted that violations of the right to privacy have long
been actionable at common law. Plaintiffs alleged that their
private information including timestamped geolocation information,
device IDs, device fingerprint data, information about other apps
they were using on their device, search terms input to the app,
products placed in their cart, and other restaurants and products
they viewed was collected and disseminated.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs alleged that the collection of this data
may reveal, for instance, a consumer's religious affiliation,
sexual orientation, medical condition, and even whether the
consumer is part of an at-risk population. The Court found that
disclosure of facts that allegedly reveal this highly sensitive
information is sufficient to allege a concrete privacy harm
analogous to those actionable under common law privacy torts.

The Court found that Amplitude is entitled to enforce the
arbitration agreement against Plaintiffs under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. Under California law, the doctrine applies in
two circumstances: first, when a signatory must rely on the terms
of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the
nonsignatory or the claims are intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract, and second, when the
signatory alleges substantially interdependent and concerted
misconduct by the nonsignatory and another signatory.

The Court determined that both circumstances applied. Plaintiffs'
theory of liability is that DoorDash's SDK transmitted their
personal information to Amplitude without Plaintiffs' consent.
Because consent is an element of each claim, and DoorDash's Privacy
Policy expressly discusses the manner by which DoorDash may provide
or disclose Personal Information to third-parties, the Court found
this critical to the issue of consent.

The case also involves allegations of interdependent and concerted
misconduct by Amplitude and DoorDash. Plaintiffs alleged that
Amplitude, contracted with DoorDash to provide its SDK to be
embedded in the DoorDash food delivery app, and that Amplitude
designed the SDK so that Amplitude could collective sensitive
consumer data from consumers, including DoorDash users, despite
Amplitude not having their consent to collect such data.

Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable.
The Court applied the sliding scale test requiring both procedural
and substantive unconscionability. The Court found minimal
procedural unconscionability, noting that although the agreement
carries hallmarks of a contract of adhesion, users are provided
with the opportunity to opt out of the arbitration agreement.

Regarding substantive unconscionability, the Court found the
agreement does not have a high degree of substantive
unconscionability. The Court distinguished the batch arbitration
provision from the problematic provision in Heckman v. Live Nation
Entertainment, Inc., noting that DoorDash's provision facilitates
the efficient coordination of cases so that they may be heard
together while ensuring that each party still has an opportunity to
be heard.

The Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to
demonstrate that the delegation provision of the arbitration
agreement is unenforceable as unconscionable. Accordingly, any
other disputes about the agreement's enforceability are validly
delegated to the arbitrator.

The motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing was denied,
and the remainder of that motion was denied without prejudice
pending arbitration. The motion to compel arbitration was granted,
and the case was stayed pending arbitration. The parties were
ordered to file a joint status report every 120 days until the
arbitration is resolved, and within 14 days of the proceeding's
completion.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ZpcXwU from PacerMonitor.com.


CARDCONNECT CORP: Partly Wins Bid to Enforce Prior Deal in ASA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Richard E. Obringer PAC, A Professional
Corporation, d/b/a Advanced Surgical Associates, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CardConnect
Corp., Defendant, Case No. 24-3034 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Gerald J.
Pappert of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's
motion to enforce a prior class action settlement agreement.

The Court granted the motion as to Counts I and IV and denied it as
to Counts II and III. Judge Pappert ruled that a previous class
action settlement agreement between CardConnect and merchants in
the Kao case bars some but not all of Advanced Surgical Associates'
current claims over payment processing fees.

Advanced Surgical Associates provides physician assistant services
to surgical practices. Richard Obringer, a licensed physician
assistant and the principal owner, signed an agreement with
CardConnect on behalf of the company on April 17, 2018. After
CardConnect charged various allegedly unauthorized fees, Advanced
Surgical Associates filed suit in 2024.

The current lawsuit stems from a dispute over CardConnect's payment
processing services. Like the earlier Kao case, Advanced Surgical
Associates alleges that merchants sign a Merchant Agreement that
identifies certain fees, only to be charged junk fees pursuant to
the Program Guide. According to the Plaintiff, CardConnect does not
sign the Merchant Agreement, and most merchants, including Advanced
Surgical Associates, have never been given the Program Guide.

The case builds upon a prior class action lawsuit filed in 2016 by
Teh Shou Kao and his company against CardConnect. In that earlier
case, Kao alleged that neither CardConnect nor the relevant bank
ever countersigned the agreement that merchants signed. The Court
determined there was no express binding contract between the
parties and established that under the terms of their implied
contract, CardConnect was limited to charging the fees expressly
listed in the agreement merchants signed and could not unilaterally
add fees or increase rates.

The Kao case resulted in a class action settlement in 2021. The
settlement class consisted of all CardConnect merchants that paid
at least one of the subject fees from November 1, 2012 through July
7, 2020. CardConnect agreed to pay up to $7.65 million to settle
the suit. Advanced Surgical Associates was a member of this Kao
settlement class.

The settlement agreement contained a broad release provision
covering all claims that result from, arise out of, are based upon,
or relate in any way to the allegations in the action, the
assessment of any fees or charges for the processing of credit or
debit cards, and any fees or charges imposed by CardConnect from
the beginning of the class period through preliminary approval on
July 7, 2020.

However, the settlement agreement also included Section 10.6, which
states that nothing in the agreement will release or otherwise
affect any right of the releasing parties to contest for any reason
any statement sent by CardConnect after preliminary approval on
July 7, 2020.

The Court found this provision to be unambiguous and emphasized
that it expressly preserves for class members all rights to contest
statements sent after preliminary approval on any basis, including
a basis that the Section 10.1 would have otherwise precluded. Judge
Pappert stated that to conclude otherwise would defy the plain
meaning of the provision and turn nothing into something.

Regarding Advanced Surgical Associates' specific claims, the Court
ruled on each count separately. For Counts II and III, which
involve claims for unjust enrichment and breach of contract, the
Court determined these fall within Section 10.6 and are not barred
by the settlement agreement. The Plaintiff alleges that CardConnect
charged unauthorized fees in statements from January, February and
March of 2024, and the proposed class period begins on July 8,
2020.

According to the Court, Advanced Surgical Associates contests and
seeks restitution or damages for only statements that CardConnect
sent after preliminary approval was granted in Kao. The fact that
proving these claims may require relitigating matters disputed in
the prior action does not place the claims outside of Section 10.6,
which permits contesting post-preliminary statements for any
reason.

For Count IV, which alleges a violation of the Nevada Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, the Court ruled differently. The Court found
that proving a violation requires showing that Defendant's act of
consumer fraud caused damage to the Plaintiff. While post-Kao
statements might be used to prove damages, that does not make the
claim a challenge to the statement, rather than the earlier,
allegedly deceptive conduct.

The Court explained that in claims for unjust enrichment or breach
of contract, the post-Kao statement charging an allegedly
unauthorized fee is itself the alleged unjust enrichment or breach.
However, in a claim under the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
the statement is not per se objectionable, and sending the
statement was not the type of deceptive conduct the law forbids.

The Court determined that Advanced Surgical Associates' Nevada
Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims are based upon events that
occurred around the time the company signed the Merchant Agreement
in 2018. Accordingly, these claims in Count IV are barred by the
settlement agreement because they fall within the broad release
provision covering claims based upon facts relating to the
acquisition of payment card processing services.

For Count I, which seeks a declaration that there is no express
contract between CardConnect and the Plaintiff or class members,
and that the Program Guide is not a binding contract enforceable
against them, the Court ruled this claim is also barred. The Court
noted that similar relief could have been obtained in the Kao case,
and a declaratory judgment claim founded on the absence of a
contract because of the same contractual flaws alleged in Kao is
the sort of potential claim inextricably related to matters covered
by the broad release provision.

The Court emphasized that settlement agreements can release claims
that were not brought in the action, and even those that could not
have been brought, so long as the factual predicate for future
claims is identical to the factual predicate underlying the
settlement agreement. The bounds of preclusion after a settlement
are determined by the express terms of the settlement agreement.

Judge Pappert concluded that while the judicial economy that would
be achieved by a more comprehensive settlement is important, it
does not override the principle that the terms of the agreement
control the bounds of preclusion. The Court stated it will not
assume that the parties were careless or ignorant when crafting the
language of Section 10.6, which unambiguously reserved rights with
no exception to the reasons for which a post-Kao settlement can be
contested.

Therefore, the Court granted CardConnect's motion to enforce the
settlement agreement as to Counts I and IV, dismissing these claims
as barred by the broad release provision. However, the Court denied
the motion as to Counts II and III, allowing these claims to
proceed because they fall within the exception preserved by Section
10.6 for contesting statements sent after the preliminary approval
date.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=zyaObq from PacerMonitor.com.


CITIGROUP GLOBAL: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Loomis Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Loomis Sayles Trust Co., LLC, Plaintiff v.
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 22 Civ. 6706
(LGS) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Lorna G. Schofield of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York denies the Plaintiff's
motion to certify class.

The Court denied the Plaintiff's motion to certify a class of
investors under Rule 23(b)(3) and denied the request for
appointment of itself as class representative and its counsel as
class counsel under Rule 23(g).

This action by Plaintiff Loomis Sayles Trust Co., LLC against
Defendant Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. asserts a claim of breach
of contract related to Defendant's execution of two securities
trades on behalf of LSTC and its affiliated investment advisory
firm, Loomis, Sayles & Company, L.P. on March 18, 2022. LSTC and
Loomis provide investment management and advisory services and
decide which securities to buy and sell on behalf of their clients.
On numerous occasions, LSTC and Loomis have engaged Citigroup as a
broker to execute trades on their behalf for their clients.

On March 18, 2022, Plaintiff engaged Defendant as a broker to
execute several large buy and sell orders on Plaintiff's behalf.
Among them were trades in the two stocks at issue here, Shopify,
Inc. and Colgate-Palmolive Company. Defendant placed these orders
into the closing auction as market-on-close orders, which must
trade regardless of price, resulting in losses of approximately $70
million to Plaintiff and its investment clients.

Plaintiff sought to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), consisting
of: The owners of the 232 identified accounts managed by Loomis or
by LTSC, plus the owners of more than 3,000 subaccounts to wrap fee
program omnibus accounts managed by Loomis, each of which was
allocated shares of Shopify, Inc. and/or Colgate-Palmolive Company
as purchased and sold by Defendant Citigroup Global Markets Inc. on
their behalf on March 18, 2022, and which suffered damage as a
result. In general terms, the class members -- apart from Plaintiff
-- are investment advisory clients whose shares in SHOP and CL
Citigroup traded for Plaintiff on March 18, 2022.

The Court denied the motion because Plaintiff cannot adequately
represent the putative class and because Plaintiff's claims are not
typical of those of the putative class.

Judge Schofield finds the Plaintiff is not an adequate
representative because Plaintiff has a conflict of interest with
the other putative class members. The adequacy inquiry under Rule
23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named
parties and the class they seek to represent. The adequacy
requirement has two components: the proposed class representative
must have an interest in vigorously pursuing the claims of the
class, and must have no interests antagonistic to the interests of
other class members.

Judge Schofield also finds the Plaintiff does not satisfy the
adequacy requirement because Plaintiff is fundamentally different
from the rest of the putative class in a way that conflicts with
its interests. Plaintiff is the investment advisor that placed the
other putative class members' trades at issue, with Plaintiff's own
duties to its investor clients. While Plaintiff will vigorously
pursue claims against Defendant, Plaintiff will do so only in a way
that minimizes its own responsibility for the losses and will not
pursue any claims against itself. A different class representative
might have sued both Citigroup and LSTC in a single action, on the
theory that any misconduct that led to the losses must have been
committed by one of the two entities responsible for the trades at
issue.
The central factual issues involve the instructions provided by
LSTC to Citigroup about how and when to execute the challenged
trades. Questions could arise about the timing and clarity of
LSTC's instructions, as well as LSTC's responsiveness shortly
before the close of the market to clarify or reaffirm the
instructions in light of market conditions. The divergence between
Plaintiff's interests in shielding itself from liability and the
other class members' interest in recouping the maximum recovery is
fundamental and goes to the very heart of the litigation.

Judge Schofield opines that the class cannot be certified for a
second reason: Plaintiff's claims are atypical of those of the
other class members. Typicality is satisfied when each member's
claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member
makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability.

Plaintiff's claims are atypical because Plaintiff occupies a unique
position in relation to the class members by acting as their
investment advisor, Judge Schofield opines. Plaintiff's claims are
unlike those of the other class members who potentially have claims
against both Plaintiff and Citigroup, not just the latter.

Judge Schofield points out that the Plaintiff's claims are atypical
for the additional reason that Plaintiff uniquely has a direct
contractual relationship with Citigroup. The class consists of two
groups: The owners of the 232 identified accounts managed by Loomis
or by LTSC, plus the owners of more than 3,000 subaccounts to wrap
fee program omnibus accounts managed by Loomis. The second group
invested in wrap fee programs sponsored by five other large
financial institutions, which then retained Loomis as an investment
advisor, which in turn retained Citigroup as a broker. This second
group, which makes up more than 90% of the class, is thus two steps
removed from any direct contractual relationship with Citibank.

Judge Schofield notes that the summary judgment motion illustrates
how Plaintiff's atypical position makes it ill-suited to represent
the interests of this second group. At issue were Plaintiff's two
claims, for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.
Citigroup argued that the fiduciary duty claim was duplicative of
the breach of contract claim. LTSC opposed, but did not argue that
the claim should be preserved for the absent putative class
members, none of whom had a direct contractual relationship with
Citibank. Summary judgment was granted to Defendant on the
fiduciary duty claim because it did not identify any additional
duties, misconduct or damages from those identified in the contract
claim. Plaintiff's summary judgment briefing never considered the
class members.

The Court concluded that the class is disserved by Plaintiff's
misguided effort to represent the class, which might be certified
if it had different class representatives whose interests were
similar to, and directly aligned with, those of the other class
members. Class certification is denied because Plaintiff, the
proposed class representative, does not satisfy the requirements of
adequacy and typicality. The issue of class counsel is not
addressed because the proposed class is not certified.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to certify a class,
appoint itself as class representative and appoint its counsel as
class counsel is denied.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=gHOru8 from PacerMonitor.com.


CLEO AI: Court Dismisses Franklin Suit Over Cash Advance Dispute
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Shamira Franklin, et al., Plaintiffs v.
Cleo AI Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:24-cv-00146-JMC (D. Md.), Judge
J. Mark Coulson of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland dismisses the Amended Complaint without prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court also denies the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend and
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as moot.

Plaintiffs Shamira Franklin and Devon Chapman are Baltimore County,
Maryland residents who obtained cash advances through Defendant's
mobile app called Cleo. The Court noted that Plaintiffs filed the
present lawsuit individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated on January 16, 2024, against Cleo AI Inc. Plaintiffs then
amended their Complaint on June 5, 2025, after submissions
regarding a discovery dispute between the parties, dropping their
federal claims.

According to the Court, Plaintiffs solely alleged violations of the
Maryland Consumer Loan Law, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law Section 12-301,
et seq. (Count I); the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code
Ann., Com. Law Section 13-101, et seq. (Count II); and the Maryland
Consumer Debt Collection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law Section
14-201, et seq. (Count III).

The Court found that Defendant operates the Cleo App by advancing
up to $250.00 of a person's paycheck per pay period after users
have signed up for a membership. Defendant offers two different
memberships: a Cleo Plus plan, which charges users $5.99 per month
or a Cleo Builder plan, which charges users $14.99 per month. The
Court noted that Defendant requires borrowers to repay their cash
advances on payday.

The Court determined that under the Amended Complaint, the sole
basis for Plaintiffs asserting subject matter jurisdiction arose
from the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d). The Court explained that Congress enacted the Class Action
Fairness Act, which creates a basis for subject matter jurisdiction
over class action lawsuits, if (1) The parties are minimally
diverse in citizenship; (2) The number of proposed class members is
100 or more; and (3) The aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5
million.

The Court found that Plaintiffs agreed that the Amended Complaint
does not include allegations concerning the amount in controversy
under the Class Action Fairness Act. The Court stated that facts
showing subject matter jurisdiction must be affirmatively alleged
in the complaint and that the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.

According to the Court, Plaintiffs, with Defendant's consent,
sought leave to amend the complaint to include the following
allegation: There are tens of thousands of members of the class,
and these persons obtained over five million dollars in cash
advances from Defendant, and paid millions of dollars in fees to
Defendant on those advances, at a time when the Defendant was not
licensed under the MCLL.

The Court analyzed whether this proposed amendment would cure the
jurisdictional defect. The Court reasoned that for purposes of
satisfying the CAFA's amount in controversy requirement, a court
must begin by multiplying the number of potential class members by
the average damages each class member sustained.

The Court determined that the amount in controversy allegations in
the instant case failed to specify necessary details that would
enable the Court to multiply the purported tens of thousands of
class members by the average damages each class member sustained.
The Court explained that it could not plausibly infer either how
many plaintiffs there may be or the average damages each class
member suffered.

Upon detailed review, the Court found that to calculate the average
damages, it must be able to plausibly infer the advanced-cash value
and the monthly fee value. The Court stated that it must be able to
plausibly infer facts like: (1) how many plaintiffs are part of the
class; (2) the average advance-cash value per class member; (3) the
average number of class members who paid the express fee; (4) the
average number of transactions each class member made; (5) the
average duration of each class member's subscription; and (6) the
average subscription choice, whether that be $5.99 per month or
$14.99 per month (to calculate how much each plaintiff paid in
monthly fees).

The Court noted that neither the Amended Complaint nor the proposed
additional amendment alleged specific facts to infer the necessary
inferences. For example, the Court observed that Plaintiffs alleged
that Plaintiff Franklin paid a $5.99 monthly fee and a $3.99
express fee to obtain a $40.00 cash advance, but they did not
allege how long Plaintiff Franklin kept her subscription, how many
advancements she sought, or how many times she paid the express
fee.

The Court applied guidance from Skipper v. CareFirst BlueChoice,
Inc., which provided analysis on analogous facts. The Court
explained that in Skipper, this Court dismissed a case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction when plaintiffs failed to provide
sufficient allegations to determine the amount in controversy
exceeded $5 million.

According to the Court's analysis, the allegations here were even
more ambiguous and contained more variables than those in Denson v.
Capital Jazz Inc., where this Court considered the sufficiency of
an amount in controversy allegation under CAFA and dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court considered whether leave to amend would be proper under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). The Court explained that
while the court should freely grant leave as justice so requires,
amendments are not necessary when they would be futile.

The Court determined that Plaintiffs' proposed allegation was a
conclusory invocation of the CAFA that failed to make specific
factual allegations necessary for Plaintiffs to carry their burden.
The Court reasoned that simply adding a conclusory allegation that
the putative class paid an excess of $5 million to an already
fact-deficient complaint does not create subject matter
jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Court found that leave to amend was futile because
the proposed allegation did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

For the reasons stated, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to amend and dismissed Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court ordered that Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend is
denied, and Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=NmtE0p from PacerMonitor.com.


CROSS COUNTY: Carattini Suit Alleges Labor Law Breaches
-------------------------------------------------------
GRISEL CARATTINI, Plaintiff v. CROSS COUNTY CAR WASH & GAS, INC.,
ANTHONY PATONE, JOYCE PATONE, and ANTHONY PATONE JR., individually,
Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-07320 (S.D.N.Y., September 3, 2025) is
a class action arising out of Defendants' alleged violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, as recently
amended by the Wage Theft Prevention Act, and related provisions
from Title 12 of New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations.

The Plaintiff was employed primarily as a cashier, but later on, he
was in charge of cleaning the entire store. Throughout his
employment, Plaintiff was not compensated with proper overtime pay.
Among other things, the Defendant failed to maintain accurate
record keeping as mandated by the FLSA and the NYLL, says the
suit.

Cross County Car Wash & Gas, Inc. operates a full service car wash
and food mart in Yonkers, NY. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lina Stillman, Esq.
          STILLMAN LEGAL, P.C.
          42 Broadway, 12t Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 203-2417
          Website: www.StillmanLegalPC.com

EARTHGRAINS DISTRIBUTION: Must Respect Tax Return Privilege
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Tlaloc Munoz, Miguel Ruiz, Edgar Corona,
and Steven Snavely, individually and on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Earthgrains
Distribution, LLC and Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., Defendants, Case
No. 3:22-cv-01269-AJB-AHG (S.D. Cal.), Judge Allison H. Goddard of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
denies the Defendants' motion to compel production of tax returns
from Plaintiff Steven Snavely.

The case centers on allegations that Defendants misclassified
Plaintiffs as independent contractors rather than employees. On May
2, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their operative amended complaint
alleging that they were misclassified as independent contractors
and that Defendants failed to pay overtime, failed to provide meal
and rest breaks, failed to provide compliant wage statements,
deducted certain amounts from wages, and failed to reimburse
necessary business expenses.

All claims arise under California law, including violations of
California Labor Code sections 221-23, 226, 226.7, 510, and 2802,
California's Industrial Wage Commission Wage Order 1 sections 3,
7-9, 11-12, California Business and Professions Code section 17200
et seq., and California Private Attorneys General Act.

Defendant Earthgrains Distribution served its first set of Requests
for Production on Plaintiffs on May 12, 2025. The disputed requests
included RFP No. 11, seeking all documents that evidence or
reference all expenses incurred by Plaintiff during the time that
Plaintiff contracted with Defendant, including insurance policies
and costs, maintenance records, and expenses for gas, parking,
employee expenses, home office expenses, accountant expenses, and
tolls. RFP No. 19 sought Plaintiff's and his businesses' financial
records and statements such as balance sheets, income statements,
or any records of sales and expenses during the time that Plaintiff
contracted with Defendant. RFP No. 20 sought Plaintiff's and his
businesses' tax returns and related schedules during the time that
Plaintiff contracted with Defendant.

The Court first addressed whether the documents sought by
Defendants were relevant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b). The Court agreed that the financial information sought was
relevant to the question of misclassification, explaining that the
information was relevant to whether Plaintiffs could control the
profits and losses of their businesses and the investments they
made in their businesses, and to the merits and damages for their
underlying Labor Code violation claims, such as the amounts and
types of expenses they incurred in running their businesses, and
the amounts earned, which is necessary to calculate overtime.

However, the Court noted that Defendants did not address whether
the information sought was proportional to the needs of the case.
The Court emphasized that relevancy alone is no longer sufficient
to obtain discovery, as the discovery requested must also be
proportional to the needs of the case. The Court observed that
Plaintiff Snavely is a current Distributor, while the other
plaintiffs no longer work for or with Defendants, so the burden to
Plaintiff Snavely is greater than the other plaintiffs.

Regarding privilege, the Court determined that California law
governs assertions of privilege in this matter since all claims
arise under California law and Defendants removed the case to
federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, alleging
diversity of citizenship. California courts recognize a statutory
privilege against disclosing tax returns, which applies to tax
returns and records submitted with the tax returns, such as W-2 and
1099 forms.

The Court explained that although California law affords a very
strong privilege from discovery for tax returns, the tax return
privilege is not absolute. The privilege will not be upheld when
circumstances indicate an intentional waiver of the privilege, the
gravamen of the lawsuit is inconsistent with the privilege, or a
public policy greater than that of the confidentiality of tax
returns is involved. The requesting party bears the burden of
demonstrating that an exception to the tax privilege applies.

Defendants argued that the tax return privilege should not shield
Plaintiff Snavely's production because the gravamen of the lawsuit
is inconsistent with the privilege. They contended that Plaintiff
Snavely's tax returns provide what is likely the only clear picture
of the nature of his business and the harms stemming from the
allegations of misconduct he has lodged at Defendants.

The Court found that Defendants had not met their burden of
demonstrating that an exception to the tax privilege applies. The
Court determined that the gravamen of the instant lawsuit - the
substantial point or essence of a claim concerning alleged
misclassification of workers as independent contractors - was not
inconsistent with the tax return privilege. The Court explained
that tax records bear little if any relationship to determining
Plaintiffs' and Defendants' employment relationship because while
evidence of the sources of class members' income, as well as the
costs, investments and expenses incurred in their businesses, may
be relevant to a determination of whether they were misclassified,
tax treatment is not a strong factor in that determination and such
source of income information could have been obtained through means
other than their tax return.

The Court noted that Defendants had numerous ways to seek
information from Plaintiff Snavely, including written
interrogatories, RFPs, and a deposition. Plaintiff Snavely
committed to produce all documents in his possession, custody, and
control, and explained that he will produce all responsive
documents that he plans to rely on to prove his expense
reimbursement claim in this case. Plaintiff Snavely produced 521
pages in his first production and 292 pages in his second
production, with evidence of a substantial third production raising
his total pages produced to at least 1,369. Additionally, Plaintiff
Snavely was questioned by Defendants regarding those invoices and
receipts during his August 27, 2025, deposition, so Defendants had
ample opportunity to question him under oath regarding his business
activities.

The Court also declined to compel Plaintiff Snavely to supplement
other responses to various RFPs and Interrogatories, finding that
his supplemental responses were adequate and that his tax returns
remained privileged.

Accordingly, the Court denied Defendants' motion to compel in its
entirety, finding that no exception to the tax return privilege
applied and that Plaintiff Snavely's production of over 1,369 pages
of business documents and his deposition testimony provided
adequate discovery alternatives to the privileged tax returns.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=7DANXQ from PacerMonitor.com.


FLY-E GROUP: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due November 7
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action securities lawsuit was filed against Fly-E Group,
Inc. that seeks to recover losses of shareholders who were
adversely affected by alleged securities fraud between July 15,
2025 and August 14, 2025.

CASE DETAILS: According to the filed complaint, defendants made
false statements and/or concealed that: defendants created the
false impression that they possessed reliable information
pertaining to the Company's projected revenue outlook and
anticipated sales. In truth, Fly-E's optimistic revenue goals and
demand for its EV products and services fell short of reality; the
defendants continually praised Fly-E's brand reputation in the
industry, cost reductions and favorable pricing from suppliers as a
key component for Fly-E's ability to grow its sales network, while
simultaneously minimizing risks associated with its lithium
battery, supply chain changes and the regulatory environment and
possible demand fluctuations for its E-Bikes and E-Scooters.

WHAT'S NEXT? If you suffered a loss in Fly-E Group, Inc. stock
during the relevant time frame - even if you still hold your shares
- go to
https://zlk.com/pslra-1/fly-e-group-inc-lawsuit-submission-form?prid=167023&wire=1&utm_campaign=30
to learn about your rights to seek a recovery. There is no cost or
obligation to participate.

WHY LEVI & KORSINSKY: Over the past 20 years, Levi & Korsinsky LLP
has established itself as a nationally-recognized securities
litigation firm that has secured hundreds of millions of dollars
for aggrieved shareholders and built a track record of winning
high-stakes cases. The firm has extensive expertise representing
investors in complex securities litigation and a team of over 70
employees to serve our clients. For seven years in a row, Levi &
Korsinsky has ranked in ISS Securities Class Action Services' Top
50 Report as one of the top securities litigation firms in the
United States. Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee
similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

    Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
    Ed Korsinsky, Esq.
    Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
    33 Whitehall Street, 17th Floor
    New York, NY 10004
    jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
    Tel: (212) 363-7500
    Fax: (212) 363-7171
    https://zlk.com/ [GN]

FLYING S WINGS: Court Grants Summary Judgments in Tip Credit Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Kayla Pender, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Flying S. Wings,
Inc. et al., d/b/a Buffalo Wild Wings, Defendants, Case No:
2:21-cv-04292 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Algenon L. Marbley of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio grants in part and
denies in part both the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The court ruled that this collective action may proceed as a class
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, rejecting Defendants'
motion to decertify. The court granted partial summary judgment in
favor of Plaintiffs on liability for dual jobs violations related
to janitorial and maintenance work performed during shift changes
and closing duties.

The matter arises from the payment of servers and bartenders who
are tipped employees at four restaurants doing business as Buffalo
Wild Wings in Ohio and West Virginia. Plaintiff Kayla Pender
brought this collective action against Defendants Flying S. Wings,
Inc., Flying Buffalo Inc., Chase & Green Corp., Scott Lloyd, and
Stephon Green. The court previously granted conditional
certification on March 13, 2023, defining the putative FLSA
collective members as all individuals who worked as servers at any
one or more of Defendants' Buffalo Wild Wings restaurants in Ohio
and West Virginia at any time during the three year period
preceding the filing of this lawsuit and were paid a direct cash
wage of less than the federal minimum wage.

The putative Ohio Wage Act collective members include "All servers
and bartenders who worked at any one or more of Defendants' Buffalo
Wild Wings restaurants located in Ohio at any time during the three
year period preceding the filing of this lawsuit and were paid a
direct cash wage of less than the Ohio minimum wage set for that
year."

From October 2019 until June 15, 2021, Kayla Pender was employed by
Defendants at the Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant located at 50725
Ohio Valley Place Access Road, Saint Clairsville, Ohio 43950.
During her employment, Defendants compensated her with a subminimum
hourly wage, supplemented by customer tips. Defendants similarly
employed other individuals as servers and bartenders at their
Buffalo Wild Wings locations in Ohio and West Virginia, relying on
customer gratuities to bridge the gap between the subminimum wage
paid and the applicable minimum wage.

Pender, along with other servers and bartenders, recorded their
working hours using the restaurant's Point of Sale system. The POS
system allowed employees to clock in under different job
classifications, including bartender, cashier, meeting, and server.
Generally, employees understood that if they arrived before
opening, they were expected to clock in under the meeting code.
Some tipped employees were trained or otherwise knew that they were
to clock in under meeting, and clock out of meeting and into server
once they began serving tables.

Tipped employees performed various types of work that the parties
call side work. This includes opening work, shift change work, outs
work, and closing work. Opening work involved preparing the
restaurant and was paid at a full minimum wage. Defendants
implemented the Server Opening Duties checklist and the BWW
Learning Hub-Opening Shift policy. Based on these policies, a
server's opening duties included: clean and sanitize all tables
tops, chairs, booth, including table and chair and legs; spot sweep
dining rooms if needed; fill all ice bins at server stations; set
up soap and sanitizer buckets; brew iced tea; cut lemons and day
dot; set up dirty silverware bins; daily cleaning; sweep parking
lot and pick up cigarette butts; set up soda station and stock
paper products.

When servers changed shifts, there were specific tasks to be
completed as the server finishes a shift while the restaurant is
still open. These duties included: clean and sanitize all tables
tops, chairs, booths; clean and restock table caddies; roll all
flatware; make sure dishes and cups washed and put away; wipe down
counter tops and cabinet doors; clean and restock all soda and
server stations; fill all ice bins; make sure fresh iced tea at all
station; sweep; empty all trash.

Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to comply with the tip
credit requirements under the FLSA by failing to inform Plaintiffs
of the tip credit provisions as required by section 203(m) of the
FLSA. Generally, FLSA mandates that employers compensate employees
no less than the federal minimum wage. For tipped employees,
however, employers may claim a tip credit against payment of the
full minimum wage, using a portion of an employee's tips to satisfy
the employer's minimum wage obligations to the employee.

In order to claim the tip credit and pay employees the tip wage,
the employer must inform tipped employees of its use of the tip
credit. The FLSA requires that the tipped employee be informed by
the employer of the provisions of this subsection. The Department
of Labor issued regulations, 29 C.F.R. Section 531.59(b), requiring
employees to be informed of the following: (1) the amount of the
employee's cash wage, (2) the amount of the tip credit claimed by
the employer, (3) that the amount claimed may not exceed the value
of the tips actually received, (4) that all tips received must be
retained by the employee, except that the pooling of tips among
employees who customarily and regularly receive tips is permitted,
and (5) that the tip credit shall not apply to any employee who has
not been informed of all of these requirements.

Defendants relied on purported written and oral notices, including
a notification form, a poster, and oral communications. Turning
first to the notification form, which Defendants implemented in
November 2021, after this case was filed. The form outlines the tip
credit and included a line for the tipped employee to sign.
Plaintiffs do not dispute the existence of the notification form
but argue that the form is insufficient to provide the requisite
notice.

By itself, this notification form does not establish that
Plaintiffs received adequate notice during the relevant time
period. No evidence shows that these notification forms were given
to all Plaintiffs. While a signed notification form may suffice to
satisfy notice requirements for claims arising after November 2021,
the record viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs is
insufficient to show if and when all Plaintiffs in this case
received the form. Accordingly, if any Plaintiff signed this
notification form, their notice claims end on the date they signed
the form.

As to the posters, Defendants argued that the restaurants had
prominently displayed posters approved by the DOL in their
restaurants throughout Plaintiffs' employment and contain the
required information. The posters measuring at approximately 3 feet
by 2 1/2 feet included information about the cash wage for tipped
employees. As a threshold matter, there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the posters were prominently
displayed throughout the relevant period of this case. While some
Plaintiffs admitted seeing tip credit posters on employee bulletin
boards, others deny ever seeing a poster or being directed to
review the poster.

Whether non-tipped work may be paid at a tipped wage is a common
issue arising when the employee spends part of their time
performing tip-producing work, and other time on non-tipped tasks.
This issue was addressed in 1967, under 29 C.F.R. Section
531.56(e), in the Dual Jobs Regulation. The regulation explains
that when an employee has a dual job, the employee essentially has
two occupations and no tip credit can be taken for the employee's
hours of employment in the non-tipped work.

Over time, the DOL issued guidance interpreting the Dual Jobs
Regulation. This includes the 1988 guidance in its Field Operations
Handbook where the DOL explained: First, an employer may not claim
a tip credit for time an employee spent on duties that were
unrelated to the tipped occupation. Second, an employer may claim a
tip credit for time an employee spent performing duties related to
the tipped occupation so long as those duties were not performed by
that employee for more than twenty percent of her working hours.

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment, arguing that Defendants
required them to perform work unrelated to their roles as tipped
employees including maintenance work, janitorial tasks, kitchen
work as expos, and dishwashing while paying subminimum wages. Under
the Dual Jobs Regulation, a court's analysis hinges upon whether an
employee's untipped duties are related to their tipped occupation,
as well as the frequency with which those duties are performed.

With respect to Plaintiffs' assigned opening, shift change, and
closing duties, the tasks alleged by the Plaintiffs closely
resemble those examined in other cases where the Court categorized
the work as unrelated to a tipped occupation. Here, Plaintiffs have
established that during opening shift, Defendants' policies
required the tipped employees to clean and sanitize all tables,
chairs, and booths including the table and chair legs; sweep the
parking lot; pick up cigarette buds around the building; remove
trash; clean blinds, door handles, and door glass; and roll out
welcome mats.

As in other similar cases, these tasks were unrelated to tipped
work and formed part of a routine, systemic practice rather than
isolated or incidental assignments. This supports a finding that
the unrelated tasks exceeded the occasional request and was instead
part of a continuous practice that occurred each shift.

Defendants also moved for summary judgment on claims against the
individual defendants, Scott Lloyd and Stephon Green, contending
that neither had significant operational control over the
day-to-functions of the restaurants where Plaintiffs worked so as
to qualify as an employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Under FLSA, an employer is defined as any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee. A corporate officer who has operational control of the
corporation's covered enterprise is an employer under FLSA, along
with the corporation itself. Plaintiffs assert that Lloyd and Green
exercised such operational control, pointing to their involvement
in hiring upper-level management and other decision-making
responsibilities.

Both Lloyd and Green had ownership interests in the restaurants at
issue. Both individuals devoted a meaningful portion of their time
approximately 20% (Lloyd) and 33% (Green) to business operations
from 2018 to 2023. They also are both involved in making decisions
about promoting high-level managers and general managers at the
store level. Moreover, Lloyd began serving as the human resources
consultant in 2023.

Defendants also moved for decertification of the conditionally
certified class. Defendants argued that even if this action
survives summary judgment, the collective action aspects of the
case should be decertified because Defendants' policies do not show
any basis for FLSA violations and the difference in their working
situations precludes resolution through representative testimony.

The FLSA authorizes collective actions by any one or more employees
for and on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated. To participate in FLSA collective actions, all
plaintiffs must signal in writing their affirmative consent to
participate in the action. Only similarly situated persons may
opt-in to such actions.

Here, the Named Plaintiff and the opt-in's Plaintiffs' raise claims
that involve common questions of law and fact, including whether
Defendants maintained an FLSA-violating policy with respect to tip
credit notice requirements and the assignment of non-tipped duties
to tipped employees. Each Plaintiff was subject to the same
timekeeping system, the POS system, which required them to clock in
under specific job classifications associated with different wage
rates. Moreover, Plaintiffs' duties were consistent across
locations, as servers were expected to complete similar opening,
shift-change, and closing tasks at each restaurant.

For these reasons, this Court finds that Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. The
motion is granted as to liability on Plaintiffs' dual jobs claim.
Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages is granted and
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and
denied in part. Specifically, the motion is granted as to: (1) any
claim that Plaintiffs were not paid appropriately for work
performed during their opening shifts; and (2) notice-related
claims after November 2021 for Plaintiffs who signed the
notification form, starting on the date the form was signed.
Defendants' duplicative motion for summary judgment is denied as
moot. Further, Defendants' Motion for Decertification of Collective
Action is denied.

Accordingly, because the claims arise from common policies and are
unified by shared legal theories despite some factual differences,
the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that they are similarly situated.
This case may proceed as a collective action.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=pshDNf from Pacermonitor.com.


HAWX SERVICES: Court Dismisses Bell's First Amended Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Frank Bell, Plaintiff v. Hawx Services,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:24-cv-00825-DC-DMC (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Dena Coggins of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California grants in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
first amended complaint with leave to amend.

The court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) claim for failure to
adequately allege telephone solicitations, while denying the motion
regarding Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. The ruling
allows Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint within 14
days.

According to the court's findings, Plaintiff registered his cell
phone number on the National Do Not Call registry on November 7,
2014. The cell phone number is not associated with a business but
is used for residential purposes to communicate with friends and
family.

On December 4, 2023, at 8:10 a.m., Plaintiff received a call from
telephone number (801) 689-3100. When he answered, the caller
stated that he was with Defendant and attempted to solicit
Plaintiff to purchase Hawx's pest control services. Plaintiff
advised the caller that he was not interested in Defendant's
services and not to call again.

Approximately one hour later, on December 4, 2023, at 9:11 a.m.,
Defendant called Plaintiff from the same telephone number. When
Plaintiff answered, the caller again attempted to solicit him to
purchase pest control services. Plaintiff again advised the caller
that he was not interested and asked why Defendant had called him
after he had requested not to be contacted. In response, the caller
advised Plaintiff that he could not control the calling because he
was using an autodialer. Plaintiff alleges he is at risk of
receiving future calls from Defendant because Defendant uses an
automated dialing system, and it does not "scrub" its call/lead
lists against the DNC registry before making calls.

The court explained that to state a claim under 47 U.S.C. Section
227(c)(5) and 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(c)(2), a plaintiff must
allege: (1) he is a residential telephone subscriber with a number
that is registered on the DNC registry, (2) that he received more
than one telephonic solicitation, (3) on or behalf of the same
entity, (4) during a 12-month period.

Defendant argued that Plaintiff's allegations that a caller
attempted to solicit him to purchase Hawx's pest control services
were insufficient because he alleges virtually no content of the
alleged violative calls in his first amended complaint, such that
the court could reasonably determine whether they were actually
telephone solicitations as required by the TCPA.

The court found that Plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded that he
received a telephone solicitation within the meaning of the TCPA.
The court stated: "Although Plaintiff argues in his opposition that
he has sufficiently pled facts to allege that telephone
solicitations in violation of the TCPA occurred, Plaintiff provides
no details in his first amended complaint regarding the content of
the two calls he received on December 4, 2023.

The court noted that while Plaintiff is not required to provide a
line-by-line transcript of the telephone calls in question, he is
still required to provide more than a conclusory statement that
Defendant attempted to solicit him.

Regarding Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, the court
addressed Defendant's contention that Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing because he had not pleaded plausible facts suggesting an
imminent possible future injury to himself. Defendant argued that
Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief must be dismissed because
he had not alleged receiving a single additional call from
Defendant since December 4, 2023.

The court found that Plaintiff did not solely rely on the December
4, 2023 calls to allege standing. Instead, Plaintiff contended he
had sufficiently alleged a risk of future harm that Defendant may
call him again, due to Defendant's scrubbing policies (which appear
nonexistent) and usage of automated dialing systems it cannot
control.

The court determined that because Defendant still purportedly
retains Plaintiff's phone number, Plaintiff had adequately alleged
that there is a sufficient likelihood that Defendant could call him
again. The court stated: "Like Campbell, there is no indication
that Defendant has ceased the challenged conduct, and Defendant has
made no representation that they have taken any action to prevent
that challenged conduct."

Defendant contended that Plaintiff's first amended complaint should
be dismissed without leave to amend because he already had an
opportunity to amend his original complaint, and his first amended
complaint still contained the same fatal defects as the original
complaint.

The court determined that although Plaintiff had already amended
his complaint, it was not convinced that his TCPA claim could not
possibly be cured by pleading additional facts. Therefore, the
court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.

The court concluded by ordering that: (1) Defendant's motion to
dismiss is granted, in part; (2) Plaintiff's first amended
complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; (3) Within 14 days from
the date of entry of this order, Plaintiff shall file a second
amended complaint, or alternatively, a notice of his intent to not
file a second amended complaint; and (4) Plaintiff is cautioned
that his failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal
of this action due to Plaintiff's failure to prosecute and comply
with a court order.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=cCwBCw from PacerMonitor.com.


HEALTHCARE SERVICES: Crews Sues Over Alleged Private Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
JACE CREWS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 2:25-cv-05045-JDW (E.D. Pa., September 3, 2025) arises
from Defendant's failure to properly secure and safeguard
Plaintiff's and other similarly situated individuals' personally
identifiable information including names, Social Security numbers,
dates of birth, financial account information, driver's license
numbers, and state identification numbers from hackers.

According to the complaint, the Defendant detected unusual activity
on some of its computer systems on October 7, 2024. In response,
the company conducted an investigation which revealed that an
unauthorized party had access to certain company files between
September 27 and October 3, 2024. Yet, the Defendant waited ten
months to notify the public that they were at risk. On or about
August 25, 2025, Defendant sent out data breach notice letters to
individuals whose information was compromised as a result of the
hacking incident.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff now seeks redress for Defendant's
unlawful conduct and asserts claims for negligence, negligence per
se, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, unjust
enrichment, and for declaratory judgment.

Based in Pennsylvania, Healthcare Services Group, Inc. provides
environmental, dining, and nutritional support services to
healthcare facilities across the country. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas Sandercock, Esq.
          Tyler J. Bean, Esq.
          SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP
          745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 500
          New York, NY 10151
          Telephone: (212) 532-1091
          E-mail: nsandercock@sirillp.com
                  tbean@sirillp.com

KEOLIS TRANSIT AMERICA: Pace Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Diamond Erica Pace, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Keolis Transit America,
Inc., DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Case No. CIVSB2400435 was
removed from the San Bernardino County Superior Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on Sept. 5,
2025.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:25-cv-02324 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Jobs Civil Rights for Employment
Discrimination.

Keolis -- https://www.keolisna.com/ -- is a leading provider of
passenger transportation services throughout the US and
Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

KOIO COLLECTIVE: Bishop Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
------------------------------------------------------------
CEDRIC BISHOP, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KOIO COLLECTIVE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:25-cv-07297 (S.D.N.Y., September 3, 2025) arises from the
Defendant's failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
interactive website, https://www.koio.co, to be fully accessible to
and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons.

According to the complaint, the Defendant failed to make its
website available in a manner compatible with computer screen
reader programs, depriving blind and visually-impaired individuals
the benefits of its online goods, content, and services.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff now seeks redress for Defendant's
discriminatory conduct and asserts claims for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights
Law, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York State
General Business Law.

Koio Collective, Inc. owns and operates the website which offers
footwear for sale and provides information about goods, pricing,
locations and hours of operation of its physical stores. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
         Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
         Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
         GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES PLLC
         150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
         New York, NY 10003
         Telephone: (212) 228-9795
         Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
         E-mail: Jeffrey@Gottlieb.legal
                 Dana@Gottlieb.legal
                 Michael@Gottlieb.legal

LANTHEUS HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Nov. 10
------------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP (www.ktmc.com)
informs investors that a securities class action lawsuit has been
filed against Lantheus Holdings, Inc. ("Lantheus") (NASDAQ: LNTH)
on behalf of those who purchased or otherwise acquired Lantheus
securities between February 26, 2025, and August 5, 2025, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). The lead plaintiff deadline is November 10,
2025.

CONTACT KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP:

If you suffered Lantheus losses, you may visit the link:
https://www.ktmc.com/new-cases/lantheus-holdings-inc?utm_source=NewMediaWire&mktm=PR
  

DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED MISCONDUCT:

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Lantheus provided investors with misleading statements
concerning the true state of PYLARIFY's competitive position,
notably, that Lantheus was not equipped to properly assess the
pricing and competitive dynamics for PYLARIFY; (2) Lantheus failed
to properly disclose that its early 2025 price increase, issued
despite price erosion the year prior, created an opportunity for
competitive pricing to flourish, risking PYLARIFY's price point,
revenue, and overall growth potential; and (3) as a result,
Defendants' public statements were materially false and misleading
at all relevant times.

THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROCESS:

Lantheus investors may, no later than November 10, 2025, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP or other counsel, or may choose
to do nothing and remain an absent class member. A lead plaintiff
is a representative party who acts on behalf of all class members
in directing the litigation. The lead plaintiff is usually the
investor or small group of investors who have the largest financial
interest and who are also adequate and typical of the proposed
class of investors. The lead plaintiff selects counsel to represent
the lead plaintiff and the class and these attorneys, if approved
by the court, are lead or class counsel. Your ability to share in
any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not to
serve as a lead plaintiff.

ABOUT KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP:

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP prosecutes class actions in
state and federal courts throughout the country and around the
world. The firm has developed a global reputation for excellence
and has recovered billions of dollars for victims of fraud and
other corporate misconduct. All of our work is driven by a common
goal: to protect investors, consumers, employees and others from
fraud, abuse, misconduct and negligence by businesses and
fiduciaries. The complaint in this action was not filed by Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. For more information about Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP please visit www.ktmc.com.

CONTACT:

     Jonathan Naji, Esq.
     Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
     280 King of Prussia Road
     Radnor, PA 19087
     Tel: (484) 270-1453
     info@ktmc.com [GN]

LASHERSHIP INC: Faces Bowlin Suit Over Unprotected Private Info
---------------------------------------------------------------
ASHLEY BOWLIN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LASERSHIP, INC. d/b/a ONTRAC FINAL MILE, and
DOES 1 through 20, Defendants, Case No. 3:25-cv-00694 (E.D. Va.,
September 3, 2025) arises out of the data breach that occurred
between April 13 and April 15, 2025.

During the said period, there was unauthorized access to a number
of Defendant's files and systems, including the data that contained
Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, medical
information, and health insurance information of impacted
individuals, among other sensitive information. However, the
Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff and Class Members with timely
and adequate notice, waiting until August 27, 2025 to send notice
letters to Plaintiff and Class Members. Accordingly, the Plaintiff
now seeks redress for Defendant's unlawful conduct and asserts
claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, unjust
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and invasion of privacy.

Lasership, Inc. is an e-commerce delivery company based in
Chantilly, VA. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Ramon Rodriguez, III, Esq.
         SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP
         745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 500
         New York, NY 10151
         Telephone: (212) 532-1091
         E-mail: rrodriguez@sirillp.com

                 - and -

         Jason M. Wucetich, Esq.
         WUCETICH & KOROVILAS LLP
         222 North Sepulveda Boulevard, Suite 2000
         El Segundo, CA 90245
         Telephone: (310) 335-2001
         Facsimile: (310) 364-5201
         E-mail: jason@wukolaw.com

LTF CLUB: $1.25MM Settlement in Turner Wage Suit Has Prelim. Nod
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Samuel Turner, Plaintiff v. LTF Club
Management Co, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:20-cv-00046-DAD-JDP (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California grants the
Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of class action
settlement.

Judge Drozd granted the motion for preliminary approval of the
$1,250,000 class action settlement involving wage and hour
violations at health and athletic clubs. The court found that the
settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed,
non-collusive negotiations and falls within the range of possible
approval.

The court certified for settlement purposes a class defined as all
current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked
for any of the Defendants within the State of California at any
time during the Class Period, extending from November 21, 2015
through the Preliminary Approval Date. The Plaintiff estimated the
class comprises approximately 7,518 individuals.

The court appointed Samuel Turner as class representative and Edwin
Aiwazian, Arby Aiwazian, and Joanna Ghosh of Lawyers for Justice,
PC, and LippSmith LLP as class counsel for settlement purposes. The
court also approved Simpluris, Inc. as the Settlement
Administrator.

Under the Settlement Agreement, defendants will pay a maximum
settlement amount of $1,250,000.00 allocated as follows: (1) up to
$437,500 for attorneys' fees and up to $97,000 for plaintiff's
counsel's documented litigation costs; (2) a $10,000 incentive
award for the named plaintiff; (3) $187,500 in civil PAGA
penalties, with $140,625 of the penalties payable to the California
Labor and Workforce Development Agency; and (4) up to $45,300 for
settlement administration costs.

The settlement is projected to pay each Class Member an average of
$62.88, less employee taxes. The court noted that approximately
$519,575.00 in a net settlement amount will be available for
distribution to Class Members who do not submit a timely and valid
request to be excluded from the settlement.

The court applied Rule 23 requirements for class certification and
found that all prerequisites were satisfied. The court determined
that numerosity was satisfied with approximately 7,518 estimated
class members, noting that joinder of all members is impracticable.
Regarding commonality, the court found that questions of law or
fact common to the class existed, specifically whether defendants
uniformly failed to pay all Class Members all compensation due to
them during the Class Period.

The court concluded that typicality was satisfied because
plaintiff's claims and those of the putative Class Members involve
the same allegations, facts, supporting evidence, and applicable
law. For adequacy of representation, the court found that plaintiff
has no conflict with the class and that counsel are experienced in
class action litigation.

For adequacy of representation, the court found that plaintiff has
no conflict with the class and would "vigorously prosecute the
action on behalf of the class." The court determined that both
plaintiff's interests align with those of the proposed Class
Members and that counsel are experienced in class action
litigation, noting that counsel "have collectively recovered
hundreds of millions of dollars in complex cases brought against
the largest companies in the world.

Under Rule 23(b)(3), the court found that predominance was met
because common issues of whether Class Members were paid for hours
worked and received legally compliant meal and rest breaks
predominate in this case. The court determined that superiority was
satisfied because prosecution of separate actions by individual
Class Members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying
adjudications, meaning that a class action is superior means for
the fair adjudication of the case.

The court analyzed the Private Attorney General Act component and
found that the $187,500.00 allocated towards civil penalties
represents 15% of the $1,250,000.00 maximum settlement amount. The
court noted this proportion is higher than other PAGA settlements
approved by this court and higher than ranges generally approved by
courts. However, the court preliminarily concluded that the
settlement of plaintiff's PAGA claims is fair, reasonable, and
adequate in light of PAGA's public policy goals.

The court addressed the proposed attorneys' fees of $437,500.00,
equivalent to 35% of the maximum settlement amount. While
acknowledging this exceeds the Ninth Circuit's 25% benchmark, the
court accepted a measured departure from the benchmark percentage
at this preliminary approval stage. The court noted that
plaintiff's counsel "have litigated this matter for over five
years" and engaged in significant formal and informal discovery as
well as numerous party and third-party depositions.

The court found that the process by which the parties arrived at
their settlement was truly the product of arm's length bargaining
and not collusion or fraud. The parties engaged in significant
settlement negotiations and participated in a formal mediation
session with Paul Grossman prior to reaching the proposed
settlement.

The court approved the proposed Class Notice and found that it
meets the requirements of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
The notice adequately informs Class Members of the nature of the
litigation, essential terms of the settlement, how to object to the
settlement, and how to request exclusion from the settlement.

The court set the final approval hearing for March 2, 2026 at 1:30
p.m. The court established specific deadlines including: defendants
must provide Simpluris with Class Member contact information within
30 days after entry of this order; Simpluris must mail Class
Notices within 30 days after receiving information; and Class
Members have 60 days after mailing to challenge weeks worked
information, file objections, or request exclusion.

The court granted plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of
class action settlement and certified the proposed Class for
settlement purposes. The court appointed the named representatives
and counsel, approved the Settlement Administrator, and
preliminarily approved the proposed settlement as fair and
adequate. The court adopted the settlement implementation schedule
and directed parties to comply with established deadlines.

A copy of the Court's order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=FydkP7 from PacerMonitor.com.


MDL 2873: Bateman Sues Over Undisclosed Chemical Hazards
--------------------------------------------------------
JOHN W. BATEMAN, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY ET AL., Defendants, Case
No. 2:25-cv-12043-RMG (D.S.C., September 3, 2025) is a class action
seeking to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of
the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result
of exposure to Defendants' aqueous film-forming foams products at
various locations during the course of Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Defendants breached their duty of care to individuals,
including Plaintiff, in the design, manufacturing, labeling,
warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and
distribution of their AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing
chemicals used in AFFF production.

The Bateman case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, IN RE:
AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING FOAMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

Headquartered in St. Paul, MN, the 3M Company is a multinational
conglomerate that operates in several markets including
electronics, telecommunications, industrial, consumer and office,
health care, and safety. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Scott M. Hendler, Esq.
         HENDLER FLORES LAW, PLLC
         901 S. MoPac Expressway
         Bldg. 1, STE 300
         Austin, TX 78746
         Telephone: (512) 439-3202
         Facsimile: (512) 439-3201
         E-mail: shendler@hendlerlaw.com

MDL 2873: Chipman Sues Over PFAS Contamination of AFFF Products
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHARON E. CHIPMAN, as Representative for the Estate of Charles
Chipman, Deceased, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY ET AL., Defendants, Case
No. 2:25-cv-11987-RMG (D.S.C., September 3, 2025) is a class action
seeking to recover damages for personal injury resulting from
exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) and firefighter
turnout gear (TOG) containing per and polyfluoroalkyl substances
(PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants allegedly concealed
and/or withheld information from their customers, governmental
entities, and the public that would have properly and fully alerted
Plaintiffs to the legal, toxicological, medical, or other
significance and/or risk from having any PFAS material in
Plaintiffs' blood. As a result, the Plaintiffs' consumption,
inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF
or TOG products caused Plaintiffs to develop serious medical
conditions and complications, says the suit.

The Chipman case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, IN RE:
AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING FOAMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

Headquartered in St. Paul, MN, the 3M Company is a multinational
conglomerate that operates electronics, telecommunications,
industrial, consumer and office, health care, and safety markets.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

        James C. Ferrell, Esq.
        FERRELL LAW GROUP, PC
        6226 Washington Avenue, Suite 200
        Houston, TX 77007
        Telephone: (713) 337-3855
        Facsimile: (713) 337-3856
        E-mail: Jferrell@jamesferrell-law.com

MDL 2873: Lassiter Sues Over Unsafe, Hazardous AFFF Products
------------------------------------------------------------
KEVIN LASSITER, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY, Case No. 2:25-cv-12036-RMG
(D.S.C., September 3, 2025) is a class action seeking to recover
for damages and for personal injury resulting from exposure to
aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals
collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of
humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long
periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS
accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. However,
the Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the
Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants'
instructions as to the proper handling of the products. As a
result, the Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal
absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff
to develop serious medical conditions and complications, says the
suit.

The Lassiter case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, IN RE:
AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING FOAMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

Headquartered in St. Paul, MN, the 3M Company is a multinational
conglomerate that operates electronics, telecommunications,
industrial, consumer and office, health care, and safety markets.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

        Scott M. Hendler, Esq.
        HENDLER FLORES LAW, PLLC
        901 S. MoPac Expressway
        Bldg. 1, STE 300
        Austin, TX 78746
        Telephone: (512) 439-3202
        Facsimile: (512) 439-3201
        E-mail: shendler@hendlerlaw.com

MDL 2873: Scott Seeks Damages Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN K. SCOTT, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY ET AL., Defendants, Case
No. 2:25-cv-12042-RMG (D.S.C., September 3, 2025), is a class
action seeking for damages for personal injury resulting from
exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF).

The Defendants breached their duty of care to individuals,
including Plaintiff, in the design, manufacturing, labeling,
warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and
distribution of their AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing
chemicals used in AFFF production.

The Scott case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, IN RE:
AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING FOAMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

Headquartered in St. Paul, MN, the 3M Company is a multinational
conglomerate that operates in several markets including
electronics, telecommunications, industrial, consumer and office,
health care, and safety. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Scott M. Hendler, Esq.
         HENDLER FLORES LAW, PLLC
         901 S. MoPac Expressway, Bldg. 1, STE 300
         Austin, TX 78746
         Telephone: (512) 439-3202
         Facsimile: (512) 439-3201
         E-mail: shendler@hendlerlaw.com

MDL 3035: Symetra Must Pay Fees & Expenses for Discovery Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Pearce Ewing, et al., Plaintiffs v.
Symetra Life Insurance Company, et al., Defendants, Lead Case No.
1:22-md-03035-STA-jay (W.D. Tenn.), Judge S. Thomas Anderson of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee grants in
part and denies in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions
arising from discovery violations.

The court struck a key certificate from evidence after finding
Defendant Symetra Life Insurance Company violated discovery rules
by failing to timely disclose the document.

This multidistrict litigation concerns losses to a non-ERISA
retirement plan established by the African Methodist Episcopal
Church (AMEC) for its clergy and employees. Plaintiffs are current
or retired clergy of the church and allege a number of claims under
state law against the denomination, church officials, third-party
service providers to the plan, and other alleged tortfeasors.

As part of their Second Consolidated Amended Complaint-Class
Action, Plaintiffs allege their claims individually, derivatively
on behalf of the Plan, and on behalf of the Class of similarly
situated plan participants and beneficiaries. Symetra moved to
dismiss the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims
Plaintiffs alleged individually and the class action claims alleged
on behalf of the plan participants, arguing that it owed no direct
duty of care to individual participants or beneficiaries of the
plan.

On June 6, 2025, Symetra filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
derivative claims based on real party-in-interest and capacity
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. As part of
its Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Symetra included an unauthenticated
exhibit titled Certificate of Incumbency and Authority of Executive
Director of the AME Church Department of Retirement Services and
Trustee of the AME Church Retirement Plan (the Blackwell
Certificate).

The Certificate bears the letterhead of the AMEC Department of
Retirement Services and purports to contain attestations and
certifications made by Bishop Marvin C. Zanders, the chairman of
the AMEC Commission on Retirement Services. Bishop Zanders
certified that Rev. Brian K. Blackwell was elected as the Executive
Director of the AMEC Department of Retirement Services on August
26, 2024. According to Bishop Zanders, Rev. Blackwell in his
capacity as the newly elected Executive Director is a Trustee of
the AME Church Retirement Plan and is therefore authorized to
receive information from and provide written instructions to
Symetra concerning the Church's group variable annuity account.

The court found that Symetra failed to comply with its duty to
supplement its discovery responses in a timely manner for purposes
of Rule 26(e). Symetra came into possession of the Blackwell
Certificate in September 2024, at a time when fact discovery was
still ongoing. The court extended the fact discovery deadline at
the October 2024 status conference, in large part to allow the
parties more time to complete depositions.

Symetra had obtained the Blackwell Certificate in September 2024
and deposed Rev. Blackwell about it at a deposition in October 2024
during the course of the arbitration proceedings. Plaintiffs took
the deposition of Symetra's Rule 30(b)(6) representative Kelli
Fiechtner in the MDL on November 6, 2024. Yet Symetra did not
supplement its discovery responses to produce the Blackwell
Certificate to Plaintiffs in time for Fiechtner's Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition.

According to Plaintiffs, Symetra was responsible for procuring the
Certificate from church officials in September 2024. Plaintiffs
argue the Certificate was discoverable and responsive to discovery
requests made by Plaintiffs as far back as September 2022. Symetra
never supplemented its discovery responses to produce the
Certificate.

The court analyzed whether Symetra's failure to supplement was
substantially justified or harmless under the five-factor test
established in Howe v. City of Akron. The court found:

1. Surprise to Plaintiffs: There is really no dispute Plaintiffs
had not seen the Certificate prior to April 2025 and up until that
time the Certificate was in the exclusive possession of the parties
to the arbitration, AMEC and Symetra. The court found that
Plaintiffs have carried their burden to show that the existence of
such evidence came as a surprise to them.

2. Ability to Cure Surprise: The court noted that reopening
discovery would clearly prejudice Plaintiffs, yet Plaintiffs have
not requested a reopening of discovery or cited any additional
evidence they would need to cure the surprise caused by Symetra's
violation of Rule 26(e).

3. Trial Disruption: The court found it is not clear that allowing
Symetra to introduce the Blackwell Certificate in support of its
motion to dismiss would disrupt the trial, as trial is set to begin
eight months from now in April 2026.

4. Importance of Evidence: The Certificate has obvious significance
for the capacity issue, one of the long-running questions in the
MDL. However, the court noted the Blackwell Certificate is by no
means the only evidence to show who acts as the trustee of the
plan.

5. Defendant's Explanation: The final factor weighed strongly in
favor of exclusion. Symetra argued that it had no duty to
supplement its discovery responses with documents created after
October 2023, but the court found this explanation unsupported and
unconvincing.

The court held that upon consideration of the Howe factors,
Symetra's failure to supplement was not substantially justified or
harmless. Therefore, the court ruled that it will not allow Symetra
to use the Blackwell Certificate to supply evidence on a motion, at
a hearing, or at a trial.

The court struck the Blackwell Certificate as Exhibit A to
Symetra's motion to dismiss. Symetra is prohibited from using the
Blackwell Certificate for any evidentiary purpose in the MDL,
either as an exhibit to a motion or by introducing the Certificate
at a hearing or at trial.

Plaintiffs also requested that the court strike Symetra's motion to
dismiss in its entirety as well as striking the affirmative
defenses related to capacity alleged in Symetra's responsive
pleading. The court declined these greater sanctions, finding that
having already determined to strike the Certificate as an exhibit
to the motion to dismiss, the court can deal with the motion to
dismiss without striking the motion as a discovery sanction.

Plaintiffs requested the opportunity to depose Jeff Bailey, the
Symetra employee who requested the Certificate from Rev. Blackwell
in 2024. The court denied this request, finding that deposing
Bailey will not necessarily allow Plaintiffs to discover anything
new about the claims found in the Certificate, and that the court
has decided to strike the Certificate and prohibit Symetra from
offering it into evidence.

The court granted Plaintiffs' request for their reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by Symetra's failure to
make a timely disclosure of the Certificate. Rule 37(c)(1) allows a
court to order payment of the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, caused by the failure to meet a discovery
obligation. Counsel for Plaintiffs was ordered to prepare a fee
petition along with a memorandum in support and submit their
request to the court within 14 days of the entry of this order.

The court found that Symetra did not meet its Rule 26(e) obligation
to supplement its discovery responses in a timely manner and that
its failure to do so was not harmless or substantially justified.
The court struck the Certificate and ordered Symetra to pay
Plaintiffs' reasonable expenses and attorney's fees. Plaintiffs'
request for additional sanctions against Symetra was denied.

A copy of the Order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=XKSSL0
from PacerMonitor.com.


OOMA INC: Bachhuber Sues Over Unwanted Text Messages
----------------------------------------------------
KEVIN BACHHUBER, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. OOMA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:25-cv-07394-NC (N.D. Cal., September 3, 2025) accuses the
Defendant of violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant routinely violates TCPA by
delivering, or causing to be delivered, more than one advertisement
or marketing text message to residential or cellular telephone
numbers registered with the National Do-Not-Call Registry without
prior express invitation or permission required by the TCPA.
Allegedly, the Defendant's telemarketing solicitations continued
for approximately 22 months after Plaintiff had stopped paying for
Defendant's communication services, says the suit.

Ooma, Inc. is a telecommunications company headquartered in
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

        Carly M. Roman, Esq.
        Andrew Gunem, Esq.
        Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
        STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC
        One Magnificent Mile
        980 N Michigan Avenue, Suite 1610
        Chicago IL, 60611
        Telephone: (872) 263-1100
        Facsimile: (872) 263-1109

ROBERTA PLACE: COVID Outbreak Class Suit to Proceed, Court Rules
----------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Robinson, writing for Midland Today, reports that a judge in
Barrie has granted a motion for a class-action lawsuit stemming
from the deadly COVID outbreak at Roberta Place in 2021 to go
ahead.

According to court filings, 73 residents, 71 of whom had tested
positive for COVID, died at Roberta Place on Essa Road over a
roughly six-week period that straddled January and February 2021.

In the same court documents, it said a total of 129 residents were
infected, as well as 105 Roberta Place staff members.

Reached by phone, Robert Durante, a partner at Oatley Vigmond law
firm in Barrie, confirmed the development earlier this week.
Durante said that the class action represents roughly 900
plaintiffs.

There are two named plaintiffs in the filing, George Head, who is
represented by his legal guardian Marcella Lambie, and the estate
of Janet Martin, who is represented by her son, Scott.

The decision was handed down last month and the five defendants
listed in the filing, one of which is Roberta Place, have 30 days
to appeal.

Gaetana Campisi, a lawyer representing Roberta Place and its
co-defendants, said on Thursday, September 11, that she has been
instructed by her client to appeal Healey's decision. Otherwise,
citing the ongoing litigation, Campisi declined comment.

The other listed defendants are Barrie Long Term Care Centre Inc.,
Jarlette Holdings, Jarlette Ltd., and a numbered company.

The case was heard in May and Justice Susan Healey's decision was
released on Aug. 21. Its sole purpose was to decide whether the
plaintiffs have met the requirements to proceed as a class action.

Though Healey's decision did not pass judgment regarding fault or
negligence, the 29-page decision did offer some indication of how
both sides intend to argue their case.

The plaintiffs allege "gross systemic negligence" on the part of
Roberta Place and its staff to properly prepare and respond led to
the virus spreading rapidly throughout the facility. The result was
"widespread pain, suffering and death."

The defendants are arguing that "no amount of preparation could
have prevented the outbreak," according to Healey's written
ruling.

Roberta Place, located near Harvie Road in the city's south end,
now has about 140 beds and is still in operation. According to
media reports at the time of the outbreak, Roberta Place had 128
residents at the time of the outbreak, all but one of whom tested
positive for COVID.

Roberta Place has been in operation in Barrie since 2007.

The outbreak that occurred there and the devastation wrought made
national and international headlines as one of the worst specific
outcomes of the pandemic, particularly as it related to elderly and
vulnerable people.

Orillia Soldiers' Memorial Hospital, with assistance from Royal
Victoria Regional Health Centre and Red Cross, took over operations
at Roberta Place about 10 days after the outbreak was declared.

Local medical officer of health Dr. Charles Gardner, who will
retire at the end of September, told media during the Roberta Place
outbreak that the facility "no longer (operates) like a long-term
care facility and it is more like an acute care and palliative care
facility, in terms of the needs of the residents who are present."

The facilities residents became infected with the highly contagious
"U.K. variant" of the virus. An outbreak was declared on Jan. 8,
2021, and lasted until Feb. 18, 2021. Most fatal outcomes occurred
in the first three weeks of the 41-day outbreak.

The unfortunate timing of the U.K. variant was a factor, coming as
it did just before mass vaccinations could be rolled out,
particularly on vulnerable people. About 10 months later, another
variant, called omnicron, emerged but proved much milder, in part
because large swaths of the population had been vaccinated by then.
[GN]

SGMS INC: Must Face Newman's Claims Over Do Not Call Registry
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Wesley Newman, Plaintiff v. SGMS, Inc. and
DeMayo Law Offices, LLP, Defendants, Case No. 3:25-CV-00042-KDB-SCR
(W.D.N.C.), Judge KDB of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina denies the Defendants' partial Motion to
Dismiss.

The Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II and III of
Newman's putative class action complaint alleging violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The Court found that
Newman sufficiently stated claims under 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)(5)
and corresponding federal regulations regarding unwanted telephone
solicitation calls.

Newman maintains a cell phone number that he uses solely for
personal, residential, and household needs, and not for
professional or business reasons. Despite having registered his
cell number on the National Do Not Call Registry years ago, Newman
began receiving calls in November 2022 from Legal Conversion Center
sent on behalf of and to generate leads for Camp Lejeune legal
representation claims by Defendant DeMayo.

Newman received at least 12 calls from Legal Conversion Center,
some containing prerecorded messages and beginning with a robot.
During a call on November 8, 2022, Newman told the robot to stop
calling him and to place him on the do not call list. However, the
calls persisted, and during a call on November 17, 2022, he engaged
the robot long enough to be transferred to a human. Newman provided
fictitious information during or after this call, and subsequent
calls from both Legal Conversion Center and DeMayo repeated that
information when engaging with him.

Between November 19 and 29, 2022, Newman visited DeMayo's website
and used its web-based chat functionality. In both the chat and a
subsequent communication with a DeMayo attorney, he inquired how
the company had obtained his contact information. Despite twice
contacting DeMayo, Newman received no response, and the calls using
the same fictitious information continued through May 2023.

On January 21, 2025, Newman filed this putative class action
against DeMayo and Legal Conversion Center, alleging violations of
the TCPA, including 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b) and 47 U.S.C. Section
227(c)(5) and 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(c)-(d). Defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III, which Newman opposed.

Defendants moved to dismiss Counts II and III on the grounds that
Section 227(c) does not apply to Newman. In Defendants' view,
Newman invited the calls that came after November 17, 2022, because
he provided information to the callers as well as his VOIP number
under the guise of seeking legal advice on behalf of his father.

The Court rejected this argument, stating that taking the facts in
the Complaint as true at this early stage of the litigation, Newman
alleged that he received unwanted calls on both November 8, 2022,
and November 17, 2022. The Court found it irrelevant for purposes
of the Motion to Dismiss that during the November 17 call Newman
provided fictitious information, which arguably invited Defendants
to continue calling him, because he did so only after receiving the
second unwanted call. Therefore, Newman plausibly alleged that he
received more than one unwanted and uninvited call within a
12-month period to his cell number.

Defendants next alleged that Newman fails to qualify as a
residential telephone subscriber because neither his cell number
nor his internet-based VOIP line are landlines. The Fourth Circuit
has not addressed whether cell phone or VOIP owners are considered
residential telephone subscribers under 47 U.S.C. Section
227(c)(5).

The Court noted that recent district court decisions in the Fourth
Circuit generally assume that the TCPA extends to wireless
telephone numbers. Finding this recent majority persuasive, the
Court assumed, only for the purpose of this motion, that Newman's
cell number is residential under the facts alleged.

The Court rules that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.
This case will proceed toward trial on the merits in the absence of
a voluntary resolution of the dispute among the parties.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Uum0zz from PacerMonitor.com.


SMARTE INC: Benasutti Sues For Unlawful Collection of Personal Info
-------------------------------------------------------------------
PAIGE BENASUTTI, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SMARTE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:25-cv-07456 (N.D. Cal., September 3, 2025) asserts violations of
Colorado's Prevention of Telemarketing Fraud Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant operates a website that
functions as a data aggregator, which is openly collecting and
listing personal information -- including cell phone numbers, job
history, and email addresses -- without explicit consent. This
data, sourced from various public records and third-party data
brokers, is made readily available to anyone with internet access.
The website monetizes this personal data, including the cell phone
numbers of Colorado residents, through its publicly accessible
directory, thereby profiting from the unauthorized disclosure of
private information. Accordingly, the Plaintiff now seeks redress
for Defendant's pervasive practice of compiling and commercially
disseminating the cellular telephone numbers of Colorado residents
without their explicit, affirmative consent.

Headquartered in Sunnyvale, CA, Smarte, Inc. operates as a data
broker for business-to-business sales. The company owns and
operates the website smarte.pro, which functions as a public
directory. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Zachary M. Crosner, Esq.
           Michael T. Houchin, Esq.
           Adam C. York, Esq.
           9440 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 301
           Beverly Hills, CA 90210
           Telephone: (866) 276-7637
           Facsimile: (310) 510-6429
           E-mail: zach@crosnerlegal.com
                   mhouchin@crosnerlegal.com
                   adam@crosnerlegal.com

SMITH AUTOMOTIVE GROUP: Jackson Files TCPA Suit in N.D. Georgia
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Smith Automotive
Group, LLC. The case is styled as Dontavius Jackson, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Smith Automotive
Group, LLC doing business as: Nissan of Lithia Springs, Case No.
1:25-cv-05035-ELR (N.D. Ga., Sept. 5, 2025).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Smith Automotive Group, LLC doing business as Nissan of Lithia
Springs -- https://www.nissanoflithiasprings.com/ -- is a car
dealership situated in Lithia Springs, Georgia, offering a
selection of new and pre-owned Nissan vehicles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE PA
          26 Grand Georgian Ct.
          Cartersville, GA 30121
          Phone: (305) 479-2299
          Fax: (786) 623-0915
          Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

TESLA INC: Faces Suit for Favouring Foreign Workers on H-1B Visas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Samriddhi Srivastava, writing for People Matters, reports that
Tesla is facing a proposed class-action lawsuit in California
accusing the electric carmaker of favouring foreign workers on H-1B
visas over U.S. citizens in hiring and layoffs, a practice the
plaintiffs say breaches federal civil rights law.

The complaint, filed on Friday, September 12, in San Francisco
federal court, alleges a "systematic preference" by Tesla for visa
holders, enabling the company to suppress wages while cutting U.S.
workers at higher rates. The lawsuit was reported by Reuters.

Hiring data questioned

The case points to 2024 as evidence of a pattern. Tesla is alleged
to have hired about 1,355 H-1B workers that year while laying off
more than 6,000 employees domestically, "the vast majority"
believed to be U.S. citizens.

The lawsuit was brought by software engineer Scott Taub and human
resources specialist Sofia Brander. Both claim they were denied
interviews after Tesla determined they did not require visa
sponsorship. Taub said he was told one role was "H-1B only," while
Brander, a two-time contractor at Tesla, said she was rejected for
interviews despite relevant experience.

Allegations of wage suppression

"While visa workers make up just a fraction of the United States
labour market, Tesla prefers to hire these candidates over U.S.
citizens, as it can pay visa-dependent employees less than American
employees performing the same work," the complaint stated. The
filing described the practice as "wage theft."

Tesla, headquartered in Austin, Texas, did not respond to media
requests for comment on the allegations.

Musk's own history with visas

Elon Musk, Tesla's chief executive, has previously defended the
H-1B programme, citing his own history as a visa holder. In
December 2024 he wrote on X that "so many critical people who built
SpaceX, Tesla and hundreds of other companies that made America
strong" had arrived in the country on H-1B visas.

Plaintiffs argue Tesla has taken that reliance too far, effectively
disadvantaging U.S. citizens by using the programme as a
cost-saving tool.

Legal and political implications

The case, Taub et al v Tesla Inc (No. 25-07785), has been filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. It
seeks damages for all U.S. citizens who applied for Tesla roles but
were not hired, or who were dismissed while visa workers were
retained.

Employment lawyers say the plaintiffs will face challenges proving
systemic discrimination, but the claims could expose Tesla to both
financial liability and political scrutiny. U.S. visa policy and
domestic hiring practices have become flashpoints in an election
year where immigration and jobs are central themes.

Industry backdrop

Technology and automotive companies have long relied on H-1B visas
to fill specialist roles. Critics argue the programme is frequently
misused to depress wages, while supporters say it is essential to
address skill shortages.

Tesla, which has cut costs aggressively while investing in new
vehicle programmes and artificial intelligence, has already shed
thousands of jobs this year. The lawsuit ties those layoffs
directly to a preference for cheaper foreign labour -- an
allegation that, if substantiated, could sharpen debate over how
employers balance innovation with obligations to domestic workers.

For Tesla, the case adds another layer of legal risk as it
navigates slowing demand in some markets, intensifying competition,
and scrutiny of Musk's management. For U.S. policymakers, the
lawsuit highlights the unresolved tension between attracting global
talent and protecting American workers' rights.

Whether the class action gains traction remains to be seen, but its
claims cut to the heart of how America's most prominent electric
carmaker manages its workforce -- and how the benefits of
immigration are weighed against the costs to domestic employment.
[GN]

TRANSUNION LLC: Cornwell Sues Over Data Security Failures
---------------------------------------------------------
NATHAN CORNWELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TRANSUNION, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:25-cv-10573 (N.D. Ill., September 3, 2025) arises from
Defendant's failure to properly secure and safeguard private
information that was entrusted to it.

On July 30, 2025, the Defendant became aware of unauthorized
activity on its IT network  Defendant's investigation confirmed an
unauthorized individual accessed data within its IT network. It
also determined that the private information compromised in the
data breach included individuals' full name, date of birth,
addresses, and Social Security number. However, it was only on
August 26, 2025 that the Defendant made a public disclosure about
the data breach, and began sending out notice letters to
individuals impacted. Moreover, the Defendant failed to take
precautions designed to keep individuals' private information
secure.

The Plaintiff now seeks redress for Defendant's unlawful conduct
and asserts claims for negligence; negligence per se; unjust
enrichment, breach of implied contract, and breach of confidence.

Transunion LLC is a consumer credit reporting agency headquartered
in Chicago, IL. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

        Andrew Shamis, Esq.
        Leanna A. Loginov, Esq.
        Shamis & Gentile, P.A.
        14 NE 1st Ave, Suite 705
        Miami, FL 33132
        Telephone: (305) 475-2299
        E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                lloginov@shamisgentile.com

TRANSUNION LLC: Garcia Sues Over Inadequate Data Security Measures
------------------------------------------------------------------
GINO ADONIS GARCIA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TRANSUNION, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:25-cv-10577 (N.D. Ill., September 3, 2025) arises from
Defendant's inadequate data security measures that resulted in the
private information of Plaintiff and 4.4 million others to be
exposed to unauthorized third parties.

The actual data breach occurred on July 28, 2025 but TransUnion
discovered the data breach on July 30. Exacerbating the injuries to
Plaintiff and Class Members, TransUnion failed to provide timely
notice to Plaintiff and Class Members, depriving them of the chance
to take speedy measures to protect themselves and mitigate harm.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff now brings this action against
TransUnion and asserts claims for negligence, negligence per se,
breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary
duty, and declaratory/injunctive relief.

Headquartered in Chicago, IL, TransUnion, LLC provides consumer
credit services to customers across the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

        Shannon M. McNulty, Esq.
        CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES
        120 N. LaSalle Street
        Chicago, IL 60602
        Telephone: (312) 899-9090
        E-mail: ssm@CliffordLaw.com

                - and -

        John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
        Ronald Podolny, Esq.
        Antonio Arzola, Jr., Esq.
        MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
        201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
        Tampa, FL 33602
        Telephone: (813) 275-5272
        Facsimile: (813) 222-4736
        E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
                ronald.podolny@forthepeople.com
                ararzola@forthepeople.com

UNITED STATES: 5th Cir. Issues Preliminary Injunction in WMM Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as W.M.M., on their own behalf and on behalf
of others similarly situated; F.G.M., on their own behalf and on
behalf of others similarly situated; A.R.P., on their own behalf
and on behalf of others similarly situated, Petitioners-Appellants
v. Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the
United States; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States,
in her official capacity; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United
States Department of Homeland Security, in her official capacity;
United States Department of Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, Acting
Director of the Director of United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, in his official capacity; United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, in his
official capacity; United States State Department; Josh Johnson, in
his official capacity as acting Dallas Field Office Director for
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Marcello
Villegas, in his official capacity as the Facility Administrator of
the Bluebonnet Detention Center; Phillip Valdez, in his official
capacity as Facility Administrator of the Eden Detention Center;
Jimmy Johnson, in his/her official capacity as Facility
Administrator of the Prairieland Detention Center; Judith Bennett,
in her official capacity as Warden of the Rolling Plains Detention
Center, Respondents-Appellees, Case No. 25-10534 (5th Cir.), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit grants a
preliminary injunction.

Circuit Judges Leslie H. Southwick, Irma Carrillo Ramirez, and
Andrew S. Oldham issued the decision on the appeal from an order
issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, USDC No. 1:25-CV-59.

The Court of Appeals granted a preliminary injunction to prevent
removal of the petitioners under the Alien Enemies Act and remanded
for further proceedings. The court declared that its injunction
solely applies to the use of the war-related federal statute and
does not impede use of any other statutory authority for removing
foreign terrorists.

The litigation began after two of the petitioners, who are natives
of Venezuela, were detained by immigration officials on the basis
that they were members of a Venezuelan terrorist organization, Tren
de Aragua (TdA). The petitioners filed for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court, alleging they were about to be removed to El
Salvador under the terms of a March 2025 Presidential Proclamation
issued under the authority of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798.

The Supreme Court had previously construed the petitioners'
application as a petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the Fifth
Circuit's decision dismissing the appeal, and remanded for further
proceedings. The Supreme Court instructed the Court of Appeals to
address all the normal preliminary injunction factors, including
likelihood of success on the merits, as to the named petitioners'
underlying habeas claims that the AEA does not authorize their
removal pursuant to the President's Proclamation, and the issue of
what notice is due, as to the putative class's due process claims
against summary removal.

Regarding the preliminary injunction, the court analyzed the four
factors: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm,
balance of equities, and the public interest. On the first factor,
the court concluded the petitioners are likely to prove that the
AEA was improperly invoked. The court found the President's
Proclamation did not identify an invasion or predatory incursion as
required by the statute. The court interpreted the AEA's terms,
concluding an invasion requires military action by a foreign nation
and a predatory incursion describes armed forces of some size and
cohesion directed by a foreign government. The court accepted the
President's factual findings but held the labels applied to those
findings did not support that an invasion or a predatory incursion
had occurred.

On the second factor, the court found the petitioners demonstrated
they are likely to suffer irreparable harm if improperly removed,
as the Government had represented it was unable to provide for the
return of an individual deported in error to a prison in El
Salvador.

On the third and fourth factors, which merge in cases against the
Government, the court found the public interest in preventing
aliens from being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries
where they are likely to face substantial harm, weighed in favor of
an injunction. The court concluded all four factors favored relief
for both the named petitioners and the putative class members.

Concerning the adequacy of the notice, the court examined the
Government's updated notice procedure, which provides detainees
with notice in a language they understand, information about how to
challenge detention, and seven days to file a habeas petition
before removal. The court declined to require more than the
Government's updated notice procedure at this early stage, leaving
it in place but noting a more developed record may demonstrate an
actual success on the merits regarding the sufficiency of the
timeframe.

Circuit Judge Irma Carrillo Ramirez concurred in part and dissented
in part. Judge Ramirez agreed that the petitioners showed a
likelihood of success on the merits regarding the Proclamation but
respectfully dissented on the notice issue, arguing that seven days
was not sufficient time to reasonably be able to contact counsel,
file a petition, and pursue appropriate relief, and that at least
21 days' notice was required.

Circuit Judge Andrew S. Oldham dissented emphatically, arguing that
for over 200 years, courts have never countermanded the President's
determination that an invasion or similar hostility is being
perpetrated or threatened, and that the President's judgment call
is conclusive. Judge Oldham would have held that the President's
invocation of the AEA was beyond judicial review and that the
petitioners failed to show irreparable injury or that the balance
of equities and public interest favored an injunction.

The court's decision grants the preliminary injunction, blocks
removal under the AEA, leaves the updated notice in place, and
remands the case for further proceedings. The Government is not
enjoined from removing the named petitioners and putative class
members under other lawful authorities. The issue of class
certification for the putative class remains open before the
district court.

A copy of the decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=yzitCW from PacerMonitor.com.


VOZZCOM INC: Wilson Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vozzcom, Inc. The
case is styled as Chet Michael Wilson, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Vozzcom, Inc., Case No.
0:25-cv-61793-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Sept. 5, 2025).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Vozzcom, Inc. -- https://vozzcom.net/ -- provides wireline
telecommunication services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Avi Robert Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          31 Samana Drive
          Miami, FL 33133
          Phone: (305) 469-5881
          Email: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

WARRIOR WASTE: Jackson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Andre Jackson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. WARRIOR WASTE SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 7:25-cv-01515-RDP
(N.D. Ala., Sept. 5, 2025), is brought to recover unpaid overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA").

Although Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Members have
routinely worked (and continue to work) in excess of 40 hours per
workweek, Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Members were not
paid overtime of at least one and one-half their regular rates for
all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.

The Defendant knowingly and deliberately failed to compensate
Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Members for the proper amount
of overtime on a routine and regular basis. Specifically, The
Defendant's regular practice--including during weeks when Plaintiff
and the Putative Collective Members worked and recorded hours in
excess of 40 (not even counting hours worked "off-the-clock")--was
(and is) to deduct a 30-minute meal-period from Plaintiff' and the
Putative Collective Members' daily work time even though they
regularly performed (and continue to perform) compensable work "off
the clock" through their respective meal-period breaks.

The Defendant knowingly and deliberately failed to compensate
Plaintiff and the Putative Collective Members for the proper amount
of overtime on a routine and regular basis during the relevant
statute(s) of limitations under the FLSA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by Warrior Waste in Tuscaloosa.

Warrior Waste is a full-service solid waste company providing waste
collection, recycling, and disposal services to commercial,
industrial, and residential customers throughout Tuscaloosa and
West Alabama.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Hughes, Esq.
          HARDIN HUGHES, LLP
          1490 Northbank Parkway, Suite 234
          Tuscaloosa, AL 35406
          Phone: (205) 523-0463
          Email: dhughes@hardinhughes.com

               - and -

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin Anderson, Esq.
          Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER PLLC
          101 N. Shoreline Blvd., Suite 610
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Phone: 361-452-1279
          Fax: 361-452-1284
          Email: clif@a2xlaw.com
                 austin@a2xlaw.com
                 carter@a2xlaw.com

WASHINGTON GASTROENTEROLOGY: Miller Sues Over Recent Cyberattack
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kim Miller, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. WASHINGTON GASTROENTEROLOGY, PLLC, Case No.
3:25-cv-05795 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 5, 2025), is brought arising out
of a recent cyberattack and data breach (the "Data Breach")
resulting from WAGI's failure to implement reasonable and
industry-standard data security practices to protect its patients'
personal identifying information, including Private Information.

In providing such services to patients located across the country,
WAGI collects a significant amount of data--including patients'
personally identifiable information ("PII"), such as names, Social
Security numbers, as well as health information, including medical
information (the "PHI" or, collectively, the "Private
Information"). WAGI collects, uses, and derives a benefit from its
patients' extremely sensitive Private Information--and it assumes a
significant duty to protect that information.

The Data Breach compromised and exposed patients' Private
Information such as names, Social Security numbers, and medical
information. WAGI failed to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members'
PII/PHI. Because of
WAGI's failures, Plaintiff's and Class Members have been exposed to
actual harm consistent with the litany of injuries that data
breaches cause, including: (a) loss of value of PII and PHI, (b)
loss of time spent dealing with the Data Breach, (c) imminent
threat of, and actual theft of, PII and PHI by cybercriminals (d)
financial loss, such as purchasing protective measures including
credit monitoring, credit freezes, credit reports, and other means
of detecting and mitigating identity theft and (e) any other types
of quantifiable harm that stem from the breach, including
out-of-pocket losses, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff relied on Defendant to keep their PII and PHI
confidential.

WAGI touts itself as "the largest, most comprehensive private GI
practice in Washington state."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Kaleigh N. Boyd, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1200 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Phone: 206.682.5600
          Fax: 206.682.2992
          Email: jdennett@tousley.com
                 kboyd@tousley.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Goldenberg, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, LPA
          4445 Lake Forest Drive, Suite 490
          Cincinnati, OH 45242
          Phone: (513) 345-8291
          Email: jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com

               - and -

          Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN LLP
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Phone: (215) 592-1500
          Email: cschaffer@lfsblaw.com

               - and -

          Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Phone: (516) 873-9550
          Email: bcohen@leedsbrownlaw.com

WEST VIRGINIA: Loses Bid for Legal Fees in Sheppheard Inmate Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Thomas Sheppheard, Tyler Randall, and Adam
Perry, next friend and guardian of minor plaintiff J.P., Plaintiffs
v. Patrick J. Morrisey, in his official capacity as Governor of the
State of West Virginia, et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:23-cv-00530
(S.D. W. Va.), Judge Irene C. Berger of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia denies the Defendants'
motions for attorney fees and costs.

The plaintiffs initiated this class action with a complaint filed
on August 8, 2023, suing on behalf of all currently incarcerated
persons housed in West Virginia state prisons, jails, and juvenile
centers. At all relevant times, Mr. Sheppheard was incarcerated in
the Mount Olive Correctional Complex, Mr. Randall was incarcerated
in the Southwestern Regional Jail, and plaintiff J.P. was housed in
the Donald R. Kuhn Juvenile Center.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to alleviate
pervasive conditions of overcrowding, understaffing, and deferred
maintenance at all such facilities for over a decade. As a result,
they alleged that West Virginia inmates have suffered inhumane
conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to their
health and safety in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The complaint contained one cause of action for Eighth Amendment
violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for conditions of
confinement. The plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin and
compel the defendants to spend approximately 330 million dollars of
the state budget surplus on deferred maintenance repairs in state
correctional facilities and hire the requisite number of
correctional staff needed to appropriately serve the facilities.

The court dismissed the action against the defendants, finding that
the plaintiffs were unable to establish a causal connection between
the defendants' official conduct and their alleged injuries, and
that it would be merely speculative that a favorable decision
against the defendants would redress the plaintiffs' injuries.
Thus, the plaintiffs did not have standing against the defendants.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal, and the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that appellants have failed to
make sufficient factual allegations to support the traceability and
redressability elements of Article III standing. Prior to the
appeal, the defendants separately moved for attorney fees under 42
U.S.C. Section 1988 and have since supplemented their motion for
fees now that the appeal has concluded.

The Governor argued that taxpayers are entitled to a reimbursement
of attorney fees under Section 1988 because the plaintiffs' lawsuit
was unreasonable and groundless on its face. He contended that the
lawsuit was devoid of any attempt to establish standing and
subjected him to voluminous and improper discovery requests. As
such, he concluded he is entitled to Section 1988 fees because the
lawsuit was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.

The Secretary also argued that the complaint was frivolous,
unreasonable, and groundless on its face. He stated that the
plaintiffs were aware when they filed their lawsuit that he was an
improper defendant, he does not have the power to appropriate money
or pass legislation, his general supervisory role does not permit
suit against him, and he was forced to engage and respond to the
plaintiffs' onerous and unduly burdensome discovery requests.

In response, the plaintiffs argued that the dismissal of their
case, by itself, cannot form a basis to award attorney fees. They
stated that a claim is not groundless when the allegations asserted
receive careful consideration by both a district court and an
appellate court. The plaintiffs pointed to several instances where
incarcerated people have been harmed in West Virginia correctional
facilities to demonstrate that the harms set forth in the complaint
are not just allegations but represent real risks of harm.

The defendants further argued that they are entitled to fees under
28 U.S.C. Section 1927 because the plaintiffs' attorney
unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied these proceedings in bad
faith, particularly because of the alleged political aims in
pursuing the case.

The court found that an award of attorney fees to the defendants
under Section 1988 is not appropriate in this case. Although the
action was dismissed in the defendants' favor, and affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit, the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed based on a
lack of standing rather than on the merits. The plaintiffs alleged
specific injuries and constitutional violations in correctional
facilities across West Virginia, and their claims were not so
lacking in merit to deem the action frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation.

The court determined that the plaintiffs' claims were based on more
than "conjecture and speculation." The plaintiffs' case was not
dismissed for presenting claims that relied merely on conjecture
and speculation, but for failing to establish standing as to the
named defendants. A fee award to prevailing defendants is intended
to prevent abuse of the judicial process. If losing plaintiffs were
regularly assessed attorney fees in civil rights cases, a chilling
effect would follow.Such an effect would be contrary to Congress's
intent to encourage plaintiffs to bring civil rights cases while
also protecting defendants from overly burdensome litigation.

Regarding Section 1927 fees, the court found that a finding of bad
faith is a necessary precondition to imposition of fees pursuant to
Section 1927. The court found that no evidence establishes that the
case and efforts to conduct discovery were in bad faith. Given the
claims asserted, the basis of the court's dismissal and the
parties' arguments, an award of attorney fees under Section 1927 is
simply unwarranted.

Therefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, the
court ordered that the Governor's Motion for Attorney Fees and
Costs, Defendant Mark Sorsaia's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs,
and Defendants' Joint Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees and
Costs be denied.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=XdqTli from PacerMonitor.com.


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Avondale Wins Summary Judgment in Shipyard Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Asbestoscasetracker.com reports that On September 12, 2023,
plaintiffs Monica Kelly-Lewis, Gia Lewis-Grows, and Levar Lewis,
successors to the estate of decedent Brouney Lewis, filed an
asbestos action in the Louisiana State Trial Court in the Parish of
Orleans. (Brouney Lewis, et al., v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc., No.
2:23-cv-6764, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165321 E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2025)

Plaintiffs allege decedent developed the lung cancer from which he
died because of his exposure to asbestos while employed at Avondale
Shipyards from 1966 to 2012 as a painter and welder. Plaintiffs
filed an amended operative complaint asserting claims including
products liability, negligence, and wrongful death against
defendants, alleged to be manufacturers and suppliers of
asbestos-containing products, and their insurers.

On November 11, 2023, Avondale removed this action to federal court
and filed a claim against cross-defendants and third-party
defendants for having mined, manufactured, sold, distributed,
supplied, installed, and/or used the asbestos-containing products
to which the decedent was allegedly exposed; or for having insured
those who did.

On April 17, 2024, the district court set its scheduling order in
the original asbestos action. Plaintiffs were ordered to identify
expert testimony and submit written expert reports by December 26,
2024. They failed to do so and to date have not identified any
experts or expert testimony, nor provided good cause for not having
done so. On the other hand, Avondale timely produced an expert
report attributing decedent's lung cancer to his smoking and not
asbestos exposure.

Based on plaintiffs' inability to establish specific medical
causation by timely expert production, multiple defendants moved
for summary judgment. Plaintiffs did not challenge this argument,
only arguing to postpone the court's decision for the discovery of
decedent's living co-worker, a potential lay witness. Plaintiffs
claimed they discovered said witness on January 17, a month after
their expert report deadline. On February 14, plaintiffs
accordingly moved to postpone "all remaining deadlines, as well as
the trial date" in the court's scheduling order. The court granted
extension in its March 30 updated-scheduling order, but only as to
the non-elapsed deadlines (i.e., excluding the elapsed expert
disclosure deadline).

Summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once movant demonstrates
absence of genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to establish an issue of fact warranting a trial. Here,
plaintiffs' failure to identify any expert witness testimony was
fatal to their claims. Applying relevant Louisiana state law to
this case, for asbestos exposure, plaintiffs must show (1)
exposure, i.e., significant exposure to the product complained of,
and (2) causation, i.e., that the exposure was a substantial factor
in bringing about injury. Importantly, plaintiffs must rely on
expert testimony with scientific knowledge to prove causation in
asbestos cases. See Seaman v. Seacor Marine L.L.C., 326 F. App'x
721, 723 (5th Cir. 2009); Schindler v. Dravo Basic Materials Co.,
Inc., 790 F. App'x 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2019).

Such expert testimony and reports must be timely identified in an
expert disclosure, including all the facts or data relied upon, and
in the sequence ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
Plaintiffs have not done so, and conversely, there is expert
testimony to support that decedent's injury was caused by his
smoking, not by asbestos exposure. Plaintiffs have not supported
the foundational causation element of the asbestos exposure claim,
and the court must accept Avondale's uncontroverted expert
testimony as true. As such, plaintiffs cannot create a genuine
dispute of material fact as to causation and are incapable of
proving causation at trial.

The court's order to extend the non-elapsed deadlines did not
relieve plaintiffs of their Rule 26 expert disclosure obligations,
nor did its extension of deadlines implicate the blown expert
deadline. Nor did the new discovery of the lay witness constitute
good cause to excuse plaintiffs' failure to timely identify expert
testimony.

Summary judgment was therefore granted for the defendants, and
Avondale's cross claims and third-party claims were dismissed as
moot.


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2025. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***