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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, September 5, 2025, Vol. 27, No. 178

                            Headlines

056 DELI & GROCERY: Faces Gonzales Wage-and-Hour Suit in S.D.N.Y.
ALBERTSONS COMPANIES: Court Dismisses First Amended Arroyo Suit
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL: Court Allows Arbitration in Mehlman Suit
AMMO INCORPORATED: Co-Lead Plaintiffs Named in Securities Suit
ANNE ARUNDEL: Court Consolidates 21 Class Suits Over Data Breach

ARCHERY TRADE: Controls Archery Equipment Prices, Eichman Claims
ASC BRANDS: Echols Sues Over Blind's Equal Access to Online Store
BOOKSAMILLION.COM INC: Dalton Sues Over Website's Access Barriers
CH2M HILL: Settlement in Ponce Employment Suit Has Final Approval
COMMONWEALTH FEDERAL: Aids 3rd Party to Access Customers' Info

CPAP MEDICAL: Crist Sues Over Failure to Secure Clients' Info
DARREN INDYKE: Court Allows New Plaintiff in Epstein Abuse Suit
DELAVAL INC: Court OKs Discovery Bids in Defective Products Suit
DMC GLOBAL INC: Laurent Securities Suit Ongoing in Colorado Court
DOW INC: Faces Class Action Lawsuit for Misleading Investors

ENPHASE ENERGY: Kessler Topaz Is Lead Counsel in Securities Case
EPOCH EVERLASTING: Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Certification
EQT CORPORATION: Class Certification in Glover Suit Upheld in Part
FCA US: Court Rejects 3rd Bid to Amend Class Definition
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP: Faces Consolidated Consumer Suit in Ohio

FISHER & PAYKEL: Blind Users Can't Access Website, Knowles Alleges
FLORIDA: Faces Suit Over Illegal Detention in Big Cypress Facility
FOUNDATION BUILDING: Houston Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
GOOGLE LLC: Agrees to Settle Face Recognition Suit for $6.02-Mil.
HSBC BANK: Court Rejects Bid to Decertify Class in Cheng Lawsuit

INDEPENDENT LIVING: $14MM Breach Suit Final OK Hearing Set Nov. 17
INTERACTIVE MEMORIES: Dumm Sues Over False Product Discount Ads
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS: Settlement Deal for Court OK
JOSEPH CAMMARATA: 3rd Circuit Affirms Fraud Convictions
LANDS' END: 9th Circuit Affirms Denial of Arbitration Motion

LANGERS CONCORD: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Food Labeling
LUNG INSTITUTE: Insurer's Declaratory Action to Proceed, Court Says
MEAT MARKET: Fails to Properly Pay Restaurant Servers, Horn Claims
MITSUBISHI CHEMICAL: Must Face Humphries-Mowry ERISA Case
MOUNTAIN VALLEY: Faces Class Suit Over Carcinogen Contamination

MYBOOKIE INC: Faces Class Action Suit Over Promotional Texts
NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT: $1.7MM Settlement Gets Initial Court Approval
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Affirms in Part Dismissal of Claims Against DOH
NISSAN MOTORS: Faces Class Suit Over Defective Compression Engines
NOVO NORDISK: Court Tosses Most Claims Against 401(k) Fiduciaries

NV WOODWORK: Garcia Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages for Carpenters
OE FEDERAL: Court Narrows Claims in Jimenez Cyber Attack Case
PACESETTER PERSONNEL: Dismissal of Villarino Suit Vacated in Part
PALO ALTO NETWORKS: N.D. California Dismisses Securities Class Suit
PARAMOUNT MANAGEMENT: Managers Face $700MM Suit Over Ponzi Scheme

PERRY ONAH: Court Narrows Claims in Vazquez's Suit
PHH MORTGAGE: Continues to Defend Jones Securities Suit
PHH MORTGAGE: Continues to Defend Knapp Securities Suit
PNC BANK: Gurevich Suit Moved From New Jersey to W.D. Pennsylvania
PUMP.FUN: Executes $62MM Token Buyback as Class-Action Suit Looms

RECKITT BENCKISER: NYHTCHA Fund Named as Lead in Securities Suit
RTX CORP: Fails to Properly Manage Savings Plan, Jacob Says
SARAH D. CULBERTSON: Court Narrows Claims in Privacy Suit
SEMLER SCIENTIFIC: Faces Suit Over Misleading Company Statements
SONOS INC: Court Names Interim Counsel in App Redesign Class Suit

SPORT SQUAD: Class Settlement in Matus Suit Has Prelim. Approval
STRATEGY INC: Investors Drop Bitcoin Class Action Lawsuit
VISA INC: Loses Bid to Enforce Settlement Against New Lawsuit
WALGREENS CO: Federal Court Keeps McGill Labor Case
WASHINGTON: Lenay Sues Over Residents' Transfer to DOC Custody

WOOPLA INC: Davis Suit Seeks Recovery of Illegal Gambling Losses

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Coty Inc. Defends Product Liability Cases
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Insurers Take Pyrotek to Court Over Suit Coverage
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judge Approves Presperse $50MM Bankruptcy Plan


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056 DELI & GROCERY: Faces Gonzales Wage-and-Hour Suit in S.D.N.Y.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TEODORO GONZALES, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 056 DELI & GROCERY CORP, SANDRA
PICHARDO and YOMAIRA PICHARDO, individually, Defendants, Case No.
1:25-cv-06965 (S.D.N.Y., August 22, 2025) is a class action against
the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law including failure to pay minimum wages,
failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide wage notice at
time of hiring, and failure to provide wage statements.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants in Bronx, New York
from approximately July 2023 until August 7, 2025.

056 Deli & Grocery Corp. is a deli and grocery owner and operator
located in Bronx, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Lina Stillman, Esq.
       STILLMAN LEGAL, PC
       42 Broadway, 12th Floor
       New York, NY 10004
       Telephone: (212) 203-2417

ALBERTSONS COMPANIES: Court Dismisses First Amended Arroyo Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as David Ferrer Arroyo, Plaintiff v.
Albertsons Companies, Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:24-cv-08935-ODW (Ex) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II, of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the First Amended
Complaint with leave to amend.

The case is a putative class action brought by Plaintiff on behalf
of himself and all other similarly situated consumers who purchased
a gift card from an Albertsons owned store, for a specified
monetary amount, and who were not able to access the total monetary
amount of gift card value purchased, because the total monetary
amount was not available on the gift card after purchase.

On October 4, 2023, Ferrer Arroyo purchased four Vanilla-branded
gift cards, each for an amount of $400 with a $5.95 purchase
charge, at an Albertsons grocery store in San Dimas, California. In
total, Arroyo paid $1,623.80 for the gift cards. Several months
later, in January 2024, Ferrer Arroyo gifted one of the $400 gift
cards to another individual. After attempting to access the funds
on the gift card, the recipient informed Ferrer Arroyo that the
gift card contained no monetary value. Ferrer Arroyo then opened
another gift card and discovered that it also contained no monetary
value.

Following this discovery, Ferrer Arroyo returned to the San Dimas
Albertsons and informed the Store Manager about this issue. While
at the store, the Store Manager and Ferrer Arroyo opened the
remaining two gift cards and found that they were also valueless.
At the Store Manager's instruction, Ferrer Arroyo filed a complaint
with Albertsons' customer service department and received a ticket
number related to the complaint. After receiving no response from
Albertsons, Ferrer Arroyo returned to the San Dimas Albertsons and
the Store Manager informed him that he would call customer service
on Ferrer Arroyo's behalf. Ferrer Arroyo never received a response
from Albertsons.

Based on these facts, Ferrer Arroyo alleges that Albertsons knew
the gift cards are subject to fraud and has been aware of the issue
of worthless gift cards sold to consumers at its locations for many
years. He further alleges that despite knowing their gift cards are
subject to fraud, Albertsons sold the gift cards to Ferrer Arroyo
without any such disclosures. Ferrer Arroyo also alleges that
Albertsons did not take adequate preventative measures to avoid the
sale of valueless gift cards.

Ferrer Arroyo asserts one cause of action for violation of the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), California Civil Code Section
1750, et seq. He contends that Albertsons violated CLRA Section
1770(a)4-5, 9, and 14 by using deceptive representations or
designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or
services, representing that goods or services have quantities that
they do not have, advertising goods or services with intent not to
sell them as advertised, and representing that a transaction
confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations that it does
not have.

The Court found that Albertsons first argues that Ferrer Arroyo
does not establish any misrepresentation by Albertsons of the gift
cards' features. In the First Amended Complaint, Ferrer Arroyo
pleads only one statement—that the Vanilla-branded gift card
packaging stated gift cards could be purchased in any amount
between '$20-$500' with a '5.95 Purchase Charge.' To adequately
plead a misrepresentation under Rule 9(b), Ferrer Arroyo must show
how this statement is misleading. Ferrer Arroyo does not explain in
the First Amended Complaint how this statement is misleading—for
instance, that consumers could not purchase the gift cards for the
amounts indicated.

Regarding omission claims, the Court determined that to plead an
actionable omission under the CLRA, the omission must be contrary
to a representation actually made by the defendant, or an omission
of a fact that defendant was obliged to disclose. Here, Ferrer
Arroyo alleges that Albertsons (1) Knew the Vanilla-branded gift
cards are subject to fraud which can render them worthless, yet it
sold them without any such disclosures, and (2) Did not adequately
warn gift card purchasers that they might not be able to access the
monetary value they paid for the gift card after purchase and that
the gift card might actually be worthless.

The Court found that first, Ferrer Arroyo fails to show that the
alleged omissions are contrary to a representation made by
Albertsons. Second, Ferrer Arroyo fails to allege a duty to
disclose. Under California law, an obligation to disclose may arise
in four circumstances if the defendant: (1) Is in a fiduciary
relationship with the plaintiff; (2) Had exclusive knowledge of
material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) Actively conceals a
material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) Makes partial
representations but also suppresses some material facts.

The Court noted that Albertsons presents copies of the gift card
packaging showing that this risk was disclosed on the packaging,
with the following disclosure: IF TAMPER EVIDENT, DO NOT PURCHASE
and for security purposes, please check that the underlined portion
of this number matches the number below. Thus, if the material
omission is based on Albertsons' knowledge of the activation code
scam, Ferrer Arroyo fails to sufficiently plead that he did not
know this fact or that Albertsons actively concealed it.

Additionally, the Court opines that Ferrer Arroyo fails to explain
how a disclosure would have caused a reasonable consumer to behave
differently. It is unclear--and Ferrer Arroyo does not allege--how
a reasonable consumer would attach importance to the proposed
disclosure and alter their behavior.

Based on the foregoing, Ferrer Arroyo does not meet the threshold
requirement of pleading a misrepresentation or omission and the
Court need not reach Albertsons' additional arguments for
dismissal. Accordingly, the Court granted the Motion. For the
reasons discussed, the Court granted Albertsons' Motion to Dismiss
and dismissed the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. If
Ferrer Arroyo chooses to amend, he must file his Second Amended
Complaint no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this
order. If Ferrer Arroyo does not timely amend, this dismissal shall
be deemed a dismissal with prejudice.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=MRzFbH from PacerMonitor.com.


AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL: Court Allows Arbitration in Mehlman Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Susanne Mehlman, Joy Hultman, Mindy
Bender, Robert Sullivan, and Frank R. Tripson, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Ameriprise
Financial, Inc.; American Enterprise Investment Services, Inc.; and
Ameriprise Financial Services, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 24-3018
(JRT/DLM) (D. Minn.), Judge John R. Tunheim of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota grants the motion to compel
arbitration and grants in part and denies in part the motion to
dismiss.

Plaintiffs are clients who held a variety of accounts with
Ameriprise, including Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA),
investment advisory accounts, and traditional brokerage accounts,
since July 29, 2018. Defendant Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (AFI)
provides financial planning, advice, and brokerage services, which
include cash management and banking products like cash sweep
programs. Defendants Ameriprise Financial Services, LLC (AFS) and
American Enterprise Investment Services, Inc. (AEIS) are wholly
owned subsidiaries of AFI.

Plaintiffs bring claims for breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs allege that
Ameriprise established unreasonably low interest rates on their
cash sweep balances, which violated its alleged contractual,
implied, and fiduciary duties and unjustly enriched Ameriprise at
its clients' expense.

Ameriprise clients have the option to participate in Bank Sweep
Programs, which sweep uninvested cash daily from clients'
individual accounts to interest-bearing accounts insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Ameriprise offers two
primary Bank Sweep Programs: the Ameriprise Insured Money Market
Account (AIMMA) and the Ameriprise Bank Insured Sweep Account
(ABISA). The average client balance in Ameriprise Bank Sweep
Programs ranges from $6,000 to $8,000. The aggregate total of
Ameriprise cash sweep balances at Ameriprise Bank as of June 2024
was $21.5 billion.

The Court granted Ameriprise's motion to compel arbitration.
Because the arbitration clause in the investment advisory
agreements is valid and Plaintiffs' claims with respect to
investment advisory services fall within its scope, the Court will
grant the motion to compel arbitration. The Advisory Agreements
contain an arbitration clause providing that "any controversy or
claim arising out of the investment advisory services offered or
delivered pursuant to this Agreement shall be resolved solely by
arbitration on an individual basis.

The Court found that the Advisory Agreements' arbitration clause is
broad. Considering the broadness of the arbitration clause, the
Court finds that some of Plaintiffs' claims fall within its scope.
The Court cannot say with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute." Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs bring
claims with respect to Ameriprise's investment advisory services,
such claims fall within the scope of the Advisory Agreements'
arbitration clause and must be submitted to arbitration.

The Court denied Ameriprise's motion to dismiss the claims against
AFI. These allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege vicarious
liability against AFI. There are fact questions regarding whether
AFI controlled or had the right to control AFS and AEIS, such that
dismissal would be inappropriate at this stage.

The Court denied Ameriprise's motion to dismiss the breach of
contract claims. For Count 1, the Brokerage Contract provides that
interest rates on the Deposit Accounts will be tiered and will vary
based upon prevailing economic and business conditions. Based on
this contractual language, it is plausible that Ameriprise was
contractually obligated to secure for and pay clients interest
rates that took prevailing economic and business conditions into
consideration.

For Count 2, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Ameriprise had
a duty to secure reasonable interest rates for clients in the Bank
Sweep Programs. Moreover, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that
Ameriprise's interest rates were unreasonable. The Court finds that
all of the alleged comparisons, taken together, are sufficient to
plausibly allege unreasonableness. Count 2 plausibly alleges a
breach of contract.

The Court denied Ameriprise's motion to dismiss the claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
Court finds that Plaintiffs are not using the covenant to expand
the scope of the contracts. These documents plausibly suggest that
Ameriprise was obligated to not deprive clients of the fruits of
their bargain in the Bank Sweep Programs. The Court finds that
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Ameriprise abused its power
over the Bank Sweep Programs by seeking financial gain for itself
at its clients' expense.

The Court granted Ameriprise's motion to dismiss the claim for
breach of fiduciary duty. The Court finds that the parties' mere
broker-dealer relationship is insufficient to establish a fiduciary
relationship. Courts have found that an ordinary broker-dealer
relationship is insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship.
Plaintiffs do not adequately allege any particular special
relationship authorizing Ameriprise to act as a fiduciary above and
beyond the typical broker-customer relationship.

The Court denied Ameriprise's motion to dismiss the unjust
enrichment claim. The Court finds that Plaintiffs plausibly alleged
that Ameriprise was unjustly enriched at their expense. The
allegations plausibly suggest that Ameriprise took advantage of its
clients' swept cash by ignoring its obligations to secure
reasonable interest rates based on prevailing market and economic
conditions in order to pad its own pockets.

Based on the foregoing, the Court ordered that the Defendants'
Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted. Plaintiffs are granted
leave to amend the Amended Complaint to remove facts and claims
arising out of Defendants' investment advisory services.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in
part as follows: (a) The Motion is granted with prejudice as to
Count 4; and (b) The Motion is denied as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=jwdunb from PacerMonitor.com.


AMMO INCORPORATED: Co-Lead Plaintiffs Named in Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Diane J. Humetewa of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Arizona grants the motion by Dmitry Cherches and Irene Zvagelsky
to be appointed as co-lead plaintiffs in the securities class
action lawsuit captioned as Arias Larmay, Plaintiff v. AMMO
Incorporated, et al., Defendants, Case No. CV-24-02619-PHX-DJH (D.
Ariz.).

On November 29, 2024, four separate parties filed motions seeking
appointment as lead plaintiff: Shelly Barrile, Samuel Scarborough,
Cary Sommerville, and the duo of Dmitry Cherches and Irene
Zvagelsky. The defendants did not take a position on the dispute.
After full briefing by the competing plaintiffs, the court referred
the matter to United States Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett for
a report and recommendation.

Judge Willett issued her report and recommendation on May 8, 2025,
recommending that the court grant Cherches and Zvagelsky's motion
and deny the other three motions. She further recommended approving
Pomerantz LLP and Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC as co-lead
counsel, and Keller Rohrback L.L.P. as liaison counsel for the
class.

Samuel Scarborough timely filed an objection to the magistrate
judge's recommendation, arguing that he should be declared lead
plaintiff instead of Cherches and Zvagelsky. Scarborough contended
that Judge Willett erred in her analysis of the third step because
she failed to apply the Supreme Court's directive under Dura, which
precludes recovery for losses on shares that were purchased during
the class period, but sold before the corrective disclosure at the
end of the class period.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 governs the
appointment of lead plaintiff in securities class actions. The
PSLRA dictates a three-step process: (1) Notice must be posted so
class members can move for lead plaintiff appointment; (2) The
court must determine which movant is the most adequate plaintiff"
with the largest financial interest who satisfies Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 requirements; and (3) This presumption may be
rebutted only upon proof that the party will not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class or is subject to
unique defenses.

The court addressed Scarborough's argument that Judge Willett was
required to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo at step three of the PSLRA
analysis. Judge Humetewa found that Judge Willett did not err in
finding that applying Dura principles, i.e., excluding losses from
stock trades that occurred prior to a defendant's disclosure of
fraud, is premature at the lead plaintiff appointment stage.

The court noted that no law requires that the Court apply Dura to
adjust a prospective plaintiff's alleged loss prior to the
dismissal stage of a lawsuit. The court explained that an expansive
view of damages benefits members of the putative class and prevents
a rift between class members who may seek or assert entitlement to
a greater amount of damages than those sought by the lead
plaintiff.

Scarborough also argued that Cherches and Zvagelsky should be
disqualified because they are net gainers since the proceeds they
received from selling options contracts during the class period
swamp their potentially recoverable stock losses. Judge Willett
rejected this argument, finding that Cherches and Zvagelsky's stock
losses of $2,100,266 (calculated using the LIFO methodology) exceed
their options profits of $631,464 (calculated using the LIFO
methodology), which undermines claims that Cherches and Zvagelsky
are net gainers.

The court affirmed this finding, stating that speculation is
insufficient to rebut the lead plaintiff presumption. The court
noted that Cherches and Zvagelsky are net purchasers because they
bought more stock during the putative class period than they sold
and their losses exceed any profits from their options; therefore,
it was speculative that they would face a unique defense that they
are net gainers since they are net losers under the LIFO method.

Using the last-in, first-out (LIFO) methodology, Judge Willett
determined that Cherches and Zvagelsky had the largest net loss
among the competing movants. Cherches and Zvagelsky collectively
purchased 787,409 shares of AMMO common stock, 52 shares of AMMO
Preferred Stock, and 14,031 AMMO options contracts, expending
$3,918,833.00 on these transactions. They retained 166,000 shares
of AMMO common stock and 1,660 open AMMO options contracts,
incurring losses of approximately $1,468,882.00.

The court overruled Scarborough's objection and accepted the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Judge Humetewa
ordered that: Barrile's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff
and approval of lead counsel is denied; Scarborough's motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of lead counsel is
denied; Sommerville's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and
approval of lead counsel is denied; and Cherches and Zvagelsky's
motion for appointment as co-lead plaintiffs and approval of their
selection of counsel is granted.

The court approved the selection of Pomerantz LLP and Bronstein,
Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC as co-lead counsel and Keller Rohrback
L.L.P. as liaison counsel for the class.

The court ordered that by September 2, 2025, the co-lead plaintiffs
shall file any amended complaint or affirm that they will stand on
the original complaint. The defendants have thirty days thereafter
to answer or otherwise respond to the operative complaint.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=cr1XaU from PacerMonitor.com.


ANNE ARUNDEL: Court Consolidates 21 Class Suits Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Natalia Correa, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Anne Arundel
Dermatology, P.A., Defendant, Case No. 25-2341 (D. Md.), Chief
District Judge George L. Russell, III, of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maryland grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Actions and Appoint Leadership
and Executive Committee.

On July 14, 2025, Defendant Anne Arundel Dermatology, P.A.,
allegedly issued a notice to Plaintiff Natalia Correa and others,
informing them that an unauthorized third-party may have gained
access to certain parts of its IT system between February 14, 2025
and May 13, 2025. The unauthorized third-party likely acquired
personally identifiable information and protected health
information about Anne Arundel Dermatology's patients including
name, date of birth, medical record number/identification, health
history, financial information, insurance information, and
appointment history.

Correa alleged that Anne Arundel Dermatology obfuscated the nature
of the breach and the threat it posed because it refused to inform
patients how the breach happened, whether Defendant paid a ransom,
or why it took so long for Anne Arundel Dermatology to notify
victims. The Plaintiff contended that Anne Arundel Dermatology
should have known that each victim of the Data Breach deserved
prompt and efficient notice of the Data Breach and assistance in
mitigating its effects, and that failure to timely report the Data
Breach made the victims vulnerable to identity theft without any
warning.

On July 14, 2025, Correa filed a Class Action Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial against Anne Arundel Dermatology, P.A., individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, for five counts:
negligence (Count I); negligence per se (Count II); breach of
implied contract (Count III); unjust enrichment (Count IV);
invasion of privacy (Count V). On behalf of the class, Correa
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, attorneys' fees
and costs.

The Court granted the request to consolidate all related actions.
To date, 21 class actions have been filed in this Court against
Anne Arundel Dermatology, P.A. The actions share common questions
of law and fact as they all arise out the same Data Breach that
affected Anne Arundel Dermatology, P.A. Plaintiffs alleged similar
injuries, including invasion of privacy, financial costs associated
with mitigating risk of identity theft, loss of time and loss of
productivity to detection and prevention of identity theft, and
failure to receive the benefit of the bargain, among other things.

According to the Court, many of the claims and relief sought in the
complaints overlap and that the risks of prejudice and possible
confusion are low because the cases in their early stages.
Moreover, no putative class members opposed consolidation or
asserted any burdens or expenses caused by consolidating.
Accordingly, the Court found that combining the cases serves the
purposes of Rule 42(a) and consolidated all related class actions
into a single action.

The Court granted the request to appoint Gary Klinger of Milberg
Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC and Tyler Bean of Siri &
Glimstad, LLP as interim co-lead class counsel, and Gary E. Mason
of Mason LLP as liaison class counsel. The Court found that all
four Rule 23(g)(1) factors supported the appointments.

The first factor supported appointing the proposed counsel because
immediately after the public announcement of the Data Breach,
proposed counsel investigated potential legal claims and remedies
for the victims of the breach, including "researching and
discovering the facts surrounding the breach;" interviewing many of
those affected; drafting initial pleadings; and organizing
plaintiffs for unified proceedings.

The second and third factors--experience and knowledge of the
applicable law--also weighed in favor of appointing proposed
interim co-lead and liaison counsel. Proposed counsel and their
firms have extensive experience leading complex class actions,
including data breach cases. Specifically, proposed counsel Klinger
has settled more than 100 class actions involving privacy
violations as lead or co-lead counsel; proposed counsel Bean has
successfully litigated dozens of data breach and privacy class
actions from inception through settlement; and proposed counsel
Mason was the first attorney to successfully settle a privacy case
on a class-wide basis against Google, serving as the
court-appointed lead counsel.

The Court denied the request to appoint an Executive Committee. The
Court stated that at this stage of the litigation, the Court is not
persuaded that it is necessary or appropriate to appoint an
Executive Committee. The Court noted that committees of counsel are
most commonly needed when group members' interests and positions
are sufficiently dissimilar to justify giving them representation
in decision making, but they often compete against considerations
of efficiency and economy and can lead to substantially increased
costs and unnecessary duplication of efforts.

The Court found that this action arises from one data breach and is
comprised of lawsuits with nearly identical common law claims.
Plaintiffs do not argue that it involves numerous complex issues.
Rather, Plaintiffs alleged the same or substantially similar harm,
and do not allege different interests requiring separate
representation. Moreover, Correa had not specified any roles or
tasks that warrant appointment of the proposed executive
committee.

The Court ordered the consolidation of all 21 related cases into
the lead case, 1:25-cv-02274-GLR, with all filings to bear the case
caption: In re Anne Arundel Data Breach Litigation. The Court
appointed Gary Klinger and Tyler Bean as interim co-lead class
counsel, and Gary E. Mason as interim liaison class counsel. The
Court ordered that Plaintiffs shall file an amended, consolidated
Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, and
that Defendant Anne Arundel Dermatology, P.A. shall answer the
Amended Complaint as required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court.

A copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=pw9jH7 from PacerMonitor.com.


ARCHERY TRADE: Controls Archery Equipment Prices, Eichman Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
DON EICHMAN and JOE KRAMER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ARCHERY TRADE ASSOCIATION,
INC.; BOWTECH INC.; HOYT ARCHERY, INC.; MATHEWS ARCHERY, INC.;
PRECISION SHOOTING EQUIPMENT, INC.; BPS DIRECT, LLC d/b/a BASS PRO
SHOPS; CABELA'S LLC; DICK'S SPORTING GOODS, INC.; JAY'S SPORTS INC.
d/b/a JAY'S SPORTING GOODS; KINSEY'S OUTDOORS, INC.; LANCASTER
ARCHERY SUPPLY, INC.; TRACKSTREET, INC.; and NEUINTEL LLC d/b/a
PRICESPIDER f/k/a ORIS INTELLIGENCE, Defendants, Case No.
1:25-cv-02644-GPG-CYC (D. Colo., August 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendants for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' unlawful agreement to raise,
fix, maintain, and/or stabilize the prices of archery products,
purchased from one or more of the Manufacturer Defendants and/or
Retailer Defendants from January 1, 2014, through the present.
According to the complaint, the Defendants exchanged competitively
sensitive, non-public information concerning, inter alia, seasonal
sales numbers, prices, output, percentages of sales by product
type, capacity, demand, sales volume, and future sales strategies
to carry out their price-fixing conspiracy. As a result of the
Defendants' anticompetitive conduct, the Plaintiffs and Class
members have sustained antitrust injury and damages.

Archery Trade Association, Inc. is a trade group focused on the
sports of archery and bowhunting with its primary place of business
in New Ulm, Minnesota.

Bowtech, Inc. is an archery equipment company with its primary
place of business in Eugene, Oregon.

Hoyt Archery, Inc. is an archery equipment company with its primary
place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Mathews Archery, Inc. is an archery equipment company with its
primary place of business in Sparta, Wisconsin.

Precision Shooting Equipment, Inc. is an archery equipment company
with its primary place of business in Tucson, Arizona.

BPS Direct, LLC, doing business as Bass Pro Shops, is a retail
company with its primary place of business in Springfield,
Missouri.

Cabela's LLC is a retail company with its primary place of business
in Sidney, Nebraska.

DICK'S Sporting Goods, Inc. is a retail company with its primary
place of business in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania.

Jay's Sports, Inc., doing business as Jay's Sporting Goods, is a
retail company with its primary place of business in Clare,
Michigan.

Kinsey's Outdoors, Inc. is a retail company with its primary place
of business in Mount Joy, Pennsylvania.

Lancaster Archery Supply, Inc. is an archery distributor with its
primary place of business in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

TrackStreet, Inc. is a software provider with its primary place of
business in Las Vegas, Nevada.

NeuIntel, LLC, doing business as PriceSpider, formerly known as
Oris Intelligence, is a software provider with its primary place of
business in Irvine, California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                
      
       Eric Olson, Esq.
       Sean Grimsley, Esq.
       Kenzo Kawanabe, Esq.
       OLSON GRIMSLEY KAWANABE HINCHCLIFF & MURRAY LLC
       700 17th Street, Suite 1600
       Denver, CO 80202
       Telephone: (303) 535-9151
       Email: eolson@olsongrimsley.com
              sgrimsley@olsongrimsley.com
              kkawanabe@olsongrimsley.com

                - and -

       Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
       FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
       923 Fayette Street
       Conshohocken, PA 19428
       Telephone: (610) 234-6486
       Email: kjustice@fklmlaw.com

                - and -

       Matthew W. Ruan, Esq.
       Douglas A. Millen, Esq.
       Samantha M. Gupta, Esq.
       FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
       100 Tri-State International, Suite 128
       Lincolnshire, IL 60069
       Telephone: (224) 632-4500
       Email: mruan@fklmlaw.com
              dmillen@fklmlaw.com
              sgupta@fklmlaw.com

ASC BRANDS: Echols Sues Over Blind's Equal Access to Online Store
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TAZINIQUE ECHOLS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ASC BRANDS, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:25-cv-10051 (N.D. Ill., August 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for violation of Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, declaratory relief, and negligent infliction
of emotional distress.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually impaired persons. The Defendant's website,
https://www.lakeside.com, contains access barriers which hinder the
Plaintiff and Class members to enjoy the benefits of their online
goods, content, and services offered to the public through the
website.

The Plaintiff and Class members seek permanent injunction to cause
a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually impaired individuals.

ASC Brands, LLC is a company that sells online goods and services
in Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       David B. Reyes, Esq.
       EQUAL ACCESS LAW GROUP, PLLC
       68-29 Main Street
       Flushing, NY 11367
       Telephone: (844) 731-3343
       Facsimile: (630) 478-0856
       Email: Dreyes@ealg.law

BOOKSAMILLION.COM INC: Dalton Sues Over Website's Access Barriers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIE DALTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BOOKSAMILLION.COM, INC., Defendant, Case No.
0:25-cv-03341-NEB-DTS (D. Minn., August 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually impaired persons. The Defendant's website,
www.booksamillion.com, contains access barriers which hinder the
Plaintiff and Class members to enjoy the benefits of their online
goods, content, and services offered to the public through the
website.

The Plaintiff and Class members seek permanent injunction to cause
a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually impaired individuals.

Booksamillion.com, Inc. is a company that sells online goods and
services in Minnesota. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Patrick W. Michenfelder, Esq.
       Chad A. Throndset, Esq.
       Jason Gustafson, Esq.
       THRONDSET MICHENFELDER, LLC
       80 S. 8th Street, Suite 900
       Minneapolis, MN 55402
       Telephone: (763) 515-6110
       Email: pat@throndsetlaw.com
              chad@throndsetlaw.com
              jason@throndsetlaw.com

CH2M HILL: Settlement in Ponce Employment Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Celine Ponce, an individual, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CH2M Hill
Engineers, Inc., etc., et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:23-cv-10797-DSF-BFM (C.D. Cal.), Judge Dale S. Fischer of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California grants
the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA
Settlement.

The Court found that the Settlement was made and entered into in
good faith and approves the Settlement as fair, reasonable, and
adequate to all Class Members." Judge Fischer noted that No
objections, timely or otherwise, have been submitted and determined
that any Class Members who have not timely and validly requested
exclusion from the Class are bound by this Judgment.

The Court confirmed the class action status by finding that the
Settlement Class meets the requirements for certification under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3) and finally certifies the
following Settlement Class for settlement purposes only. The
certified class includes All of Defendants' current and former
non-exempt hourly-paid employees employed by Defendants in the
State of California who worked for Defendants during the Class
Period.

The Class Period spans from October 13, 2019 through January 29,
2025, while the PAGA Period covers August 9, 2022 through January
29, 2025. The Court also approved the definition of an "Aggrieved
Employee" as "A non-exempt hourly-paid employee employed by
Defendants in the State of California who worked for Defendants
during the PAGA Period."

The Court established jurisdiction over all claims asserted in the
action, Plaintiff, the Class Members, and Defendants CH2M Hill
Engineers, Inc., Jacobs Engineering Group Inc., Jacobs Solutions
Inc., and Jacobs Project Management Co. (JPMCo).

Judge Fischer determined that Notice to Class Members has been
completed in conformity with the terms of the Settlement Agreement
and Preliminary Approval Order as to all Class Members who could be
identified through reasonable effort. The Court found that the
notice plan was the best notice practicable under the circumstances
and that The Class Notice and the method for providing notice to
the Class Members satisfied the requirements of due process.

The Court noted that no objections to the Settlement were submitted
by Class Members in accordance with the requirements set forth in
the Settlement Agreement and the Class Notice. Additionally, the
Court found that no Class Members have submitted a valid and timely
Request for Exclusion.

The Court ordered that Defendants shall fully fund the Gross
Settlement Amount by transmitting the funds to the Administrator no
later than 25 days after the Effective Date. The Effective Date
requires multiple conditions including court approval, notice
completion, fairness hearing, final order entry, and the passage of
appeal periods.

Upon funding, "the Participating Class Members, on behalf of
themselves and their respective former and present representatives,
agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns,
release the Released Parties from the Released Class Claims as
defined in the Settlement Agreement and any individual or entity
which could be liable for any of the Released Claims, and
Defendants' counsel of record in the Action."

According to the Court "the Released Parties include Defendants and
all their present and former parent companies, including Jacobs
Solutions, Inc., Jacobs Solutions, Inc.'s direct and indirect
subsidiaries, members, joint ventures, owners, principals, agents,
divisions, and their respective related or affiliated companies,
shareholders, officers, directors, employees, agents, attorneys,
insurers, successors and assigns."

The Released Class Claims encompass "All claims during the Class
Period alleged, or that reasonably could be alleged based on the
facts asserted, in the Operative Complaint in the Action, including
without limitation claims for violation of California Labor Code
sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 204b, 210, 218.6, 226, 226.3, 226.7,
500, 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197,
1197.1, 1198, 2802, California Industrial Commission Wage Order No.
4-2001, and Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq."

The claims include alleged failure to provide meal periods, failure
to provide rest periods, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to
pay minimum wages, failure to pay all wages due to discharged and
quitting employees, failure to furnish accurate itemized wage
statements, failure to indemnify employees for necessary
expenditures incurred in discharge of duties, and unfair and
unlawful business practices.

The Court found that PAGA Penalties in the amount of $250,000 are
fair, reasonable, and adequate and consistent with PAGA's purposes
to remediate present labor law violations, to deter future
violations, and to benefit the public through enforcement of state
labor laws." The Court directed "the Administrator to pay
$187,500.00 from the Gross Settlement Amount to the California
Labor and Workforce Development Agency for penalties under PAGA and
to distribute the remaining $62,500.00 to Aggrieved Employees as
Individual PAGA Payments in accordance with terms of the
Settlement.

The Court approved the payment of the requested Administration
Expenses Payment in the amount of $13,000.00 to CPT Group, Inc. and
found this amount to be fair and reasonable and sufficiently
supported.

For uncashed payments, the Court ordered that If any Individual
Class Payment or Individual PAGA Payment checks remain uncashed
after 180 days from mailing, the checks will be voided and the
Administrator shall transmit the funds from those checks to a cy
pres recipient, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles.

The Court ordered that the case shall be dismissed with prejudice,
provided, however, that the Court reserves exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction over the Action, Plaintiff, the Class Members, and
Defendants for purposes of supervising the implementation,
enforcement, construction, administration and interpretation of the
Settlement Agreement and this Judgment.

Judge Fischer entered judgment for Plaintiff and the Class Members
in accordance with the terms of the Settlement and this Judgment is
final and appealable. The Court also provided that If the
Settlement does not become final and effective in accordance with
its terms, this Judgment shall be rendered null and void and shall
be vacated.

A copy of the Court's Order and Judgment is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=okxjRXfrom PacerMonitor.com.


COMMONWEALTH FEDERAL: Aids 3rd Party to Access Customers' Info
--------------------------------------------------------------
JARED JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. COMMONWEALTH FEDERAL CREDIT UNION a/k/a
COMMONWEALTH CREDIT UNION, Defendant, Case No. 3:25-cv-00042-GFVT
(E.D. Ky., August 22, 2025) is a class action against the Defendant
for negligence, negligence per se, invasion of privacy, intrusion
upon seclusion, breach of express and implied contract, unjust
enrichment, bailment, and violations of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the Kentucky Wiretap Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant aids, employs, agrees,
and conspires with third parties, including Google, LLC to
intercept customers' communications as they seek financial services
on its website, www.ccuky.org, without prior consent. The Defendant
secretly installed tracking technologies on its website which serve
to track and disclose its customers' personal and financial
information to Google, suit says. As a result of the Defendant's
misconduct, the Plaintiff and the Class suffered damages, says the
suit.

Commonwealth Federal Credit Union, also known as Commonwealth
Credit Union, is a financial institution, with its headquarters in
Frankfort, Kentucky. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Andrew E. Mize, Esq.
         J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
         Emily E. Schiller, Esq.
         STRANCH, JENNINGS & GARVEY, PLLC
         223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
         Nashville, TN 37203
         Telephone: (615) 254-8801
         Facsimile: (615) 255-5419
         Email: amize@stranchlaw.com
                gstranch@stranchlaw.com
                eschiller@stranchlaw.com

                 - and -
       
         Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
         COHEN & MALAD, LLP
         One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
         Indianapolis, IN 46204
         Telephone: (317) 636-6481
         Email: ltoops@cohenandmalad.com

                 - and -
       
         Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
         Raina C. Borrelli, Esq.
         STRAUSS BORRELLI, PLLC
         980 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1610
         Chicago, IL 60611
         Telephone: (872) 263-1100
         Facsimile: (872) 263-1109
         Email: sam@straussborrelli.com
                raina@straussborrelli.com

CPAP MEDICAL: Crist Sues Over Failure to Secure Clients' Info
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN CRIST, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CPAP MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:25-cv-00966 (M.D. Fla., August 22, 2025) is a
class action against the Defendant for negligence, negligence per
se, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, and
injunctive/declaratory relief.

The case arises from the Defendant's failure to properly secure and
safeguard the personally identifiable information and protected
health information of the Plaintiff and similarly situated
individuals stored within its network systems following a data
breach between December 13, 2024, and December 21, 2024. The
Defendant also failed to timely notify the Plaintiff and similarly
situated individuals about the data breach. As a result, the
private information of the Plaintiff and Class members was
compromised and damaged through access by and disclosure to unknown
and unauthorized third parties.

CPAP Medical Supplies And Services, Inc. is a provider of sleep
therapy treatment based in Jacksonville, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Nicholas A. Colella, Esq.
         Gerald D. Wells, III, Esq.
         LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
         1133 Penn Ave., 5th Floor
         Pittsburgh, PA 15222
         Telephone: (412) 322-9243
         Email: nickc@lcllp.com
                jerry@lcllp.com

                 - and -

         Amber L. Schubert, Esq.
         SCHUBERT JONCKHEER & KOLBE LLP
         2001 Union St., Ste. 200
         San Francisco, CA 94123
         Telephone: (415) 788-4220
         Facsimile: (415) 788-0161
         Email: aschubert@sjk.law

DARREN INDYKE: Court Allows New Plaintiff in Epstein Abuse Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Jane Doe 3, individually on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Darren K. Indyke and
Richard D. Kahn, Defendants, Case No. 24-cv-1204 (AS) (S.D.N.Y.),
Judge Arun Subramanian of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York grants the Plaintiff's motion to amend the
complaint to add Allyson Ward as an additional named plaintiff.

The court determined that Jane Doe 3 demonstrated good cause to
amend the complaint under the unique circumstances of this putative
class action. The plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable for
Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse. When Doe filed this case, she and
Danielle Bensky were the named plaintiffs. The court granted Doe's
motion to proceed anonymously while reserving the right to modify
it as the case progressed.

The court dismissed Bensky's claims as barred by a release she
signed in exchange for payment from the Epstein Victims'
Compensation Program. Defendants then moved for public disclosure
of Doe's identity. The court denied the motion but explained that
it agreed with defendants that Doe cannot anonymously represent a
certified class." The court cautioned that Doe should anticipate
that if she succeeds on her motion for class certification, she may
very well have to reveal her identity so that others can make
informed decisions about whether she can represent their
interests."

According to Doe's counsel, Allyson Ward informed them on October
8, 2024, that she would be willing to serve publicly as a class
representative, thirteen days after the court issued its September
pseudonym order. That same day, Doe raised the issue of amendment
at a telephonic discovery conference. Doe filed her motion for
leave to amend ten days later. On October 28, 2024, discovery
closed, and on November 4, 2024, defendants moved for summary
judgment.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend
shall be freely given when justice so requires. The court has
discretion to deny leave for good reason, including futility, bad
faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.

The court found that Doe demonstrated good cause to amend. Although
the Court ultimately agreed with defendants that Doe cannot
anonymously represent a certified class in this case, that was not
clear until September 26, 2024. When Doe initiated this lawsuit, it
was on the heels of two class actions against JPMorgan and Deutsche
Bank in which an anonymous Epstein victim served as class
representative. Doe may reasonably have expected that she would be
permitted to represent the class without revealing her identity
based on this precedent.

Defendants argued that Rule 16(b) bars the proposed amendment
because Doe lacks good cause for missing the amendment deadline,
which was May 20, 2024. They contended that Doe's counsel knew or
should have known when this suit was filed in February 2024 that
neither of their named plaintiffs could viably proceed as class
representatives. However, the court noted it wasn't until the
court's order on September 26, 2024, that Doe and her lawyers knew
that Doe's anonymity would be a problem. Less than two weeks later,
Doe raised the issue of amendment after Ward came forward and was
willing to serve as a class representative.

Defendants argued that amendment would be highly prejudicial
because it would require them to restart discovery and motions
practice with Ward. However, the court disagreed that this suffices
to deny leave to amend. The court explained that the adverse
party's burden of undertaking discovery, standing alone, does not
suffice to warrant denial of a motion to amend a pleading."

Doe argued that any prejudice is mitigated by the fact that if
amendment is denied, Ward will file a new class suit. The court
noted that defendants "fail to explain how denying leave to amend
would be any more prejudicial than their having to engage in
precisely the same course of action if Ward filed a new lawsuit, as
she surely would if the court denied leave to amend."

Defendants countered that if Doe's motion to amend is denied and
the court declines to certify the class, then Ward's class claims
would be time barred. They cited the Supreme Court's decision in
China Agritech v. Resh, which clarified the scope of the tolling
rule stated in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah. However,
the court agreed that Ward's individual claims are not clearly time
barred, noting that Doe argues Ward has "independent tolling
arguments."

Defendants argued that the court should deny leave to amend because
amendment is futile. They claimed that Ward's claims could not
survive a motion to dismiss and that class certification is
improper regardless of who represents the class.

The court disagreed on both points. First, the court noted that it
already found that the allegations in the Complaint were sufficient
to establish Doe's state tort and TVPA claims. Ward joins in those
same allegations and further explains that she met Ghislaine
Maxwell in late 1994 or early 1995, was recruited by Maxwell to
work as a massage therapist for Epstein, required to provide
Epstein with massages on a repeated basis, and "During many of the
massages Epstein sexually abused or assaulted her." Ward alleges
that her "contact with Epstein ended in approximately 2015.

The allegations in the proposed amended complaint plausibly suggest
that Ward was abused for approximately twenty years by Epstein,
between 1995 and 2015. The court found that while it isn't
prejudging the issue, plaintiffs' bid for class certification is
not so baseless that it warrants denial of amendment.

Defendants argued that regardless of who is representing the class,
the putative class cannot meet the numerosity requirement of Rule
23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the predominance
and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b). Additionally,
defendants argued that the class is not ascertainable.

On ascertainability, the court noted that this is not a demanding
standard and is designed only to prevent the certification of a
class whose membership is truly indeterminable. The court explained
that the only requirement for ascertainability is that a class be
defined by objective criteria that establish a membership with
definite boundaries.

For numerosity, this requirement is presumptively met when the
class contains at least 40 members. Doe argued that numerosity is
met here because Epstein trafficked or abused hundreds of girls and
women during the class period. Doe's counsel claims to have
ascertained a class of over 40 women who have not signed releases
with the Estate through discovery, conversations with victims, and
counsel's preexisting relationships with Epstein's victims.

The court granted Doe's motion to amend the complaint. Given that
defendants will need to conduct additional discovery, and both
parties will need to revise their briefs accordingly, Doe's motion
to certify the class and defendants' motion for summary judgment on
the class claims are denied without prejudice, as is defendants'
motion to exclude expert testimony on class-wide damages.

The parties must propose a joint schedule for additional discovery
and briefing. The court does not anticipate that plaintiffs will be
taking any further discovery. In terms of the pending motions, they
need not be rebriefed; a consolidated opening brief from
defendants, response by plaintiffs, and reply by plaintiffs
addressing arguments unique to Ward will suffice.

A copy of the Opinion and Order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=cHgBoh from PacerMonitor.com.


DELAVAL INC: Court OKs Discovery Bids in Defective Products Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Triple S Farms LLC, Green Acres Dairy,
LLC, Charles Fry and Emily Snyder, Rocky Point Farms, Inc., and
Northcrest Dairy, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. DeLaval Inc., West Agro,
Inc., DeLaval Int'l AB, DeLaval Holding BV, DeLaval Holding AB, and
Tetra Laval Int'l SA, Defendants, Civil Action No. 22-cv-1924
(KMM/SGE) (D. Minn.), United States Magistrate Judge Shannon G.
Elkins of the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions
to compel discovery in this putative class action concerning
defective robotic cow-milking machines.

The Plaintiffs are dairy farms that purchased DeLaval's VMS V300
robotic milking systems. Triple S Farms LLC, located in Belgrade,
Minnesota, purchased the V300 system in 2018 and made substantial
barn modifications to accommodate the robotic system. The
Plaintiffs alleged that DeLaval misrepresented the capabilities of
the V300, that the robot is defective and fails to operate as
promised, and that other issues have caused Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated putative class members to incur substantial
damages.

The matter involved two competing motions to compel discovery.
Plaintiffs served their Third Request for Production of Documents
on March 14, 2025, seeking documentation of DeLaval's revenue for
the V300 and its components, documents related to work on a new
V300 version, and documents related to Project Thunderbird. DeLaval
responded with various objections on April 18, 2025, more than 30
days after the requests were served.

On May 14, 2025, DeLaval produced a 55-page Project Green Report
addressing dairy farmers' experience using the V300. The report
comprised anonymized comprehensive interviews of V300 owners
surveying their overall experience with using the V300. DeLaval
produced this report one day before the deposition of its
president, Fernando Cuccioli. According to Campbell, the Project
Green Report was part of a litigation prevention effort that began
after this suit was filed.

The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion regarding documents related to
the Project Green Report, finding that the creation and existence
of the Project Green Report is relevant, and discovery of documents
related to the same is proportional to this dispute. The Court
ordered DeLaval to produce documents from Campbell, Derek Zepp,
Chris Horton, and Fernando Cuccioli that are relevant to creating
the Project Green Report, including documents collected and created
up until March 14, 2025.

DeLaval created and produced the Persson Spreadsheet, which
purports to identify 95 instances where the V300 achieved or
exceeded a certain level of milk production. The Court found that
all underlying data from the Persson Report is relevant and must be
produced. The Court noted that the Persson Report was created after
this litigation began and contradicts some of Plaintiffs' critical
allegations and seems almost certain that Defendants will attempt
to use the Persson Report at trial, making it highly relevant to
this case.

The Court ordered DeLaval to produce all of the underlying MyFarm
data and noted that the parties can avail themselves of the
controlling protective order in this matter to ensure that
confidential information remains protected.

Regarding financial documents, the Court granted most of
Plaintiffs' requests for documents showing revenue, cost, and
profits related to the V300 and its component parts and
consumables. The Court noted that DeLaval failed to formally object
to these document requests within the time allotted by the Federal
Rules. The Court ordered DeLaval to produce documents sufficient to
determine the number of V300s operating each year, which
after-market products were used only with V300s, which after-market
products are used with V300s and other products, and how much of
the after-market products were used by the V300s.

However, the Court denied requests for documents related to
DeLaval's expected profits as opposed to actual profits and profit
margins on devices other than the V300.

The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion compelling DeLaval to apply
the search term Project Thunderbird through previously collected
custodial documents. The Court found that Project Thunderbird is
highly relevant to a crucial issue in this case, namely, whether
there was a feasible alternative design that DeLaval could have
employed. The Court noted that DeLaval knew that it was using
Project Thunderbird for the next generation of machines and neither
informed Plaintiffs of its use nor updated the search terms to
include the term in its searches until very late in discovery."

The Court denied DeLaval's request for Plaintiffs' remote access
codes to their Dairy Herd Information systems. The Court explained:
Just as the Court would not give defendant the ability to come into
plaintiff's home or peruse her computer to search for possible
relevant information, the Court will not allow defendant to review
social media content to determine what is relevant.

The Court granted DeLaval's motion for Plaintiffs' DelPro BAK
files, finding that the cost of obtaining and restoring the DelPro
BAK files would not impose an undue burden on Plaintiffs.

The Court granted DeLaval's request for two additional depositions
beyond the 10 fact depositions allowed under the scheduling order.
The Court found good cause existed because Plaintiffs have been
granted leave to amend the complaint and add a new named plaintiff,
Rocky Farm and the addition of an entirely new named plaintiff
sufficiently increases the underlying facts of this case.

The Court ordered that Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is granted in
part and denied in part and Defendants' Motion to Compel is granted
in part and denied in part. The Court ordered that each party shall
bear its own costs and fees and that all prior, consistent orders
remain in full force and effect.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=X03NhW from PacerMonitor.com.

DMC GLOBAL INC: Laurent Securities Suit Ongoing in Colorado Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DMC Global Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2023, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 5, 2025, that on January 27, 2025, a
securities class action lawsuit was filed in the District Court by
Alessandro Laurent, individually and of behalf of a putative class,
asserting violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b5-1 promulgated thereunder on behalf of a putative
class of all persons who purchased the company's securities between
May 3, 2024 and November 4, 2024.

Complaint sought certification of a class of purchasers of the
company's securities during the respective class periods and an
award of damages, interest, costs and expenses (including
attorney's fees) to the respective plaintiffs and class members.

On February 5, 2025, the District Court ordered this consolidated
with another lawsuit and on June 23, 2025, the lead plaintiff in
the consolidated case filed an amended complaint adding additional
allegations within the class period.

DMC Global Inc. owns and operates manufacturing businesses and
engineered solutions in the construction, energy, industrial
processing and transportation markets. It is headquartered in
Broomfield, Colorado.


DOW INC: Faces Class Action Lawsuit for Misleading Investors
------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Dow Inc. ("Dow" or the "Company") (NYSE:DOW) and certain
officers. The class action, filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Northern Division, and
docketed under 25-cv-12744, is on behalf of a class consisting of
all persons and entities other than Defendants that purchased or
otherwise acquired Dow securities between January 30, 2025 and July
23, 2025, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to
recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
officials.

If you are an investor who purchased or otherwise acquired Dow
securities during the Class Period, you have until October 28,
2025, to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the
class. A copy of the Complaint can be obtained at
www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this action, contact Danielle
Peyton at newaction@pomlaw.com or 646-581-9980 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Dow is an American materials science company, serving customers in
the packaging, infrastructure, mobility, and consumer applications
industries. Dow conducts its worldwide operations through six
global businesses organized into three operating segments: (i)
Packaging & Specialty Plastics, (ii) Industrial Intermediates &
Infrastructure, and (iii) Performance Materials & Coatings.

Historically, Dow has touted its "industry-leading dividend," which
is of particular importance to investors. On conference calls with
investors and analysts, Dow's Chief Executive Officer, Defendant
Jim Fitterling ("Fitterling"), has variously stated that the
Company's "dividend is a key element of our investment thesis," and
that "north of 65% of our owners count on that dividend."

Notwithstanding an ongoing slump in the materials science industry,
as well as the recent onset of tariff-related market uncertainties,
at all relevant times, Defendants represented that Dow was well
positioned to weather macroeconomic and tariff-related headwinds
while maintaining sufficient levels of financial flexibility to
support the Company's lucrative dividend. Specifically, Defendants
cited various purported strengths and advantages unique to Dow in
its industry, including, inter alia, the Company's purported
"differentiated portfolio," "cost-advantaged footprint," and
"industry-leading flexibility to navigate global trade dynamics."

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding Dow's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Dow's ability to
mitigate macroeconomic and tariff-related headwinds, as well as to
maintain the financial flexibility needed to support its lucrative
dividend, was overstated; (ii) the true scope and severity of the
foregoing headwinds' negative impacts on Dow's business and
financial condition was understated, particularly with respect to
competitive and pricing pressures, softening global sales and
demand for the Company's products, and an oversupply of products in
the Company's global markets; and (iii) as a result, Defendants'
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

On June 23, 2025, BMO Capital downgraded its recommendation on Dow
to "Underperform" from "Market Perform" while also cutting its
price target on the Company's stock to $22.00 per share from $29.00
per share, citing sustained weakness across key end markets and
mounting pressure on the Company's dividend.

On this news, Dow's stock price fell $0.89 per share, or 3.21%, to
close at $26.87 per share on June 23, 2025.

Then, on July 24, 2025, Dow issued a press release reporting its
financial results for the second quarter of 2025. Therein, Dow
reported a non-GAAP loss per share of $0.42, significantly larger
than the approximate $0.17 to $0.18 per share loss expected by
analysts. Dow also reported net sales of $10.1 billion,
representing a 7.3% year-over-year decline and missing consensus
estimates by $130 million, "reflecting declines in all operating
segments." The Company further reported, inter alia, that
"sequentially, net sales were down 3%, as seasonally higher demand
in Performance Materials & Coatings was more than offset by
declines across the other operating segments." Defendant Fitterling
blamed these disappointing results on "the lower-for-longer
earnings environment that our industry is facing, amplified by
recent trade and tariff uncertainties," while providing a dour
outlook marked by "signs of oversupply from newer market entrants
who are exporting to various regions at anti-competitive
economics."

In a separate press release issued the same day, Dow revealed that
it was cutting its dividend in half, from $0.70 per share to only
$0.35 per share, citing the need for "financial flexibility amidst
a persistently challenging macroeconomic environment."

Following these disclosures, Dow's stock price fell $5.30 per
share, or 17.45%, to close at $25.07 per share on July 24, 2025.

Pomerantz LLP, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
London, Paris, and Tel Aviv, is acknowledged as one of the premier
firms in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, Pomerantz pioneered the field of
securities class actions. Today, more than 85 years later,
Pomerantz continues in the tradition he established, fighting for
the rights of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of
fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered
billions of dollars in damages awards on behalf of class members.
See www.pomlaw.com. [GN]

ENPHASE ENERGY: Kessler Topaz Is Lead Counsel in Securities Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Trustees of the Welfare and Pension Funds
of Local 464A Pension Fund, Plaintiff, v. Enphase Energy, Inc., et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 24-cv-09038-JST (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Jon S. Tigar of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California appointed HANSAINVEST as Lead
Plaintiff and Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP as Lead Counsel.

This is a federal securities class action on behalf of persons and
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Defendant Enphase
Energy, Inc.'s common stock between April 25, 2023 and October 22,
2024. The complaint alleges that Enphase underrepresented the
competitive challenges it faced in European markets, leading to
declines in the price of Enphase's stock when it failed to gain
market share in Europe.

Before the Court were two competing motions to appoint lead
plaintiffs and lead counsel, filed by:

     -- Plaintiff HANSAINVEST Hanseatische Investment-GmbH, and
     -- Plaintiffs Cheshire Pension Fund and the Rhondda Cynon Taf
Pension Fund.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act instructs district
courts to select as lead plaintiff the one "most capable of
adequately representing the interests of class members. The
presumptive lead plaintiff... is the movant with the largest
financial interest and who has made a prima facie showing of
adequacy and typicality."

HANSAINVEST and the UK Pension Funds both claimed the largest
financial interest. HANSAINVEST, calculating its losses using a
last in, first out (LIFO) analysis, represented that it suffered
total losses of at least $2.8 million. The UK Pension Funds
estimated their losses on a LIFO basis to be around $2.5 million.

The UK Pension Funds argued in opposition that HANSAINVEST's losses
should be calculated using a unified approach, since HANSAINVEST
manages several different funds that bought and sold Enphase
securities at various times and prices. Under such an approach,
HANSAINVEST's losses would total only $1.6 million.

HANSAINVEST objected to use of the unified approach on the ground
that its funds are legally separate and economically independent.
The UK Pension Funds cited no cases accepting a unified method of
calculating an investment fund manager's losses. HANSAINVEST
identified eight cases in the past year in which courts appointed
investment managers as lead plaintiffs based on separate losses
suffered by multiple funds.

The Court was persuaded that calculating the losses for each of
HANSAINVEST's unique investment funds is a better representation of
reality. Each of these investment funds "has separate prospectuses,
separate assets, separate investment strategies, separate
portfolios, separate investors" and "they are legally separate from
one another and from HANSAINVEST." The Court thus accepted
HANSAINVEST's calculation of its losses at $2.8 million.

District courts within the Ninth Circuit generally consider the
four Lax factors to determine which plaintiff has the greatest
financial interest:

     (1) The number of shares purchased during the class period;
     (2) The number of net shares purchased during the class
period;
     (3) Total net funds expended during the class period; and
     (4) The approximate losses suffered during the class period.

The prevailing approach in the Ninth Circuit is to assign the most
weight to the amount of loss. Approximate losses in the subject
securities is the preferred measure for how to calculate the
largest financial interest. By that measure, HANSAINVEST suffered
the largest loss. The Court therefore found HANSAINVEST has the
largest financial interest and is thus the presumptive lead
plaintiff.

HANSAINVEST made a sufficient prima facie showing of its typicality
by representing that it, just like all other class members, seeks
recovery of losses on its investments in Enphase common stock that
it incurred as a result of Defendants' misrepresentations and
omissions. It made a sufficient prima facie case for adequacy by
representing that its interest in vigorously pursuing the claims
against Defendants—given its substantial financial losses—are
aligned with the interests of the members of the class and that
there are no potential conflicts between HANSAINVEST's interests
and those of the other members of the class.

The UK Pension Funds objected that appointing HANSAINVEST as lead
plaintiff would raise concerns about "an unwelcome sideshow,"
namely, HANSAINVEST's Article III standing and the peculiarities of
German law upon which it may ultimately rely to support it. The UK
Pension Funds warned that defendants might well do so at a later
stage in the litigation.

The Court found such speculation is insufficient to defeat the
presumptive lead plaintiff's prima facie showing of adequacy. The
Court noted that courts have routinely found asset managers like
HANSAINVEST to have standing to represent their investment funds
under the prudential exception to Article III standing.

If the lead plaintiff has made a reasonable choice of counsel, the
district court should generally defer to that choice. The Court
found that HANSAINVEST's choice of counsel in Kessler Topaz Meltzer
& Check, LLP is reasonable in light of that firm's significant
experience obtaining favorable results as lead counsel in
shareholder derivative litigation. Accordingly, the Court appointed
Kessler Topaz as Lead Counsel.

The Court denied the UK Pension Funds' motion, Plymouth County
Retirement Association's motion, and Jeffrey Schumacher and
Haridarshan Singh's motion.

The Court ordered Lead Plaintiff to serve and file a consolidated
complaint or designate a previously filed complaint as the
operative complaint within 60 days of this Order.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=tAeOtU

EPOCH EVERLASTING: Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Williene Jackson-Jones,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Epoch Everlasting Play, LLC and Amazon.com
Services, LLC, Defendants-Appellants, No. 24-7157 (9th Cir.),
Circuit Judges Nguyen, Forrest, and VanDyke of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
order granting class certification and remanded for further
proceedings.

The Plaintiff brought a putative class action against Amazon.com
Services LLC and Epoch Everlasting Play, LLC after purchasing
Calico Critters, a series of flocked toys created by Epoch
Everlasting Play and sold by Amazon. The Plaintiff argued that
Calico Critters are unlawfully sold as they contain small parts
that pose choking hazards. She brought claims under California's
Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code
Section 17200 et seq. The district court certified a class that
sought injunctive relief and restitution in the form of a full
refund.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the decision to certify a class and
any particular underlying Rule 23 determination involving a
discretionary determination for an abuse of discretion. The Court
reviewed de novo the district court's determination of underlying
legal questions, such as standing, and reviewed for clear error its
determination of underlying factual questions.

The Court found that Jackson-Jones lacks Article III standing to
seek injunctive relief on behalf of the putative class. To seek
injunctive relief, she must have suffered an injury in fact, that
is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical. Because she seeks prospective relief,
she must also show a sufficient likelihood of similar imminent
harm.

The Court of Appeals determined that the record does not support
that Jackson-Jones is sufficiently likely to be injured by Calico
Critters in the future. The Court of Appeals distinguished her case
from Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., where a consumer bought
wipes falsely advertised as flushable from the defendants. In
Davidson, the consumer's amended complaint alleged that she
continued to seek -- and would buy -- truly flushable wipes from
defendants.

In contrast, the Court of Appeals noted that Jackson-Jones does not
allege her intention to repurchase the product at issue. The Court
found that at most, her testimony points to some possible future
intention to repurchase the product, without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be," which is too speculative to show actual or imminent
injury.

A copy of the Court of Appeals decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=RivAsp


EQT CORPORATION: Class Certification in Glover Suit Upheld in Part
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as William D. Glover; Linda K. Glover, his
wife; Richard A. Glover; Christy L. Glover, his wife; Goshorn
Ridge, LLC, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. EQT Corporation, a Pennsylvania
corporation; EQT Production Company, a Pennsylvania corporation;
EQT Energy, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 23-2204 (4th Cir.), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirms in part and
reverses in part the district court's class certification order.

Circuit Judge DeAndrea Gist Benjamin, joined by Circuit Judge
Berner, wrote the majority opinion. Circuit Judge Niemeyer joined
as to Part IV only and wrote a dissenting opinion regarding Part
III.

The Court of Appeals confirmed this case as a certified class
action involving "All royalty owners who were paid royalties by EQT
between January 1, 2012 and February 28, 2021 pursuant to leases
for wells located in West Virginia in Marshall County, Wetzel
County, Tyler County, Doddridge County, or Ritchie County." The
class encompasses approximately 3,843 individual leases with
royalty owners who lease oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquid
interests to EQT.

The Plaintiffs own and lease oil, natural gas, and natural gas
liquid interests to EQT. The Plaintiffs' wells are located across
five counties in West Virginia. From January 1, 2012, to February
28, 2021 (the "Class Period"), EQT produced wet gas from all class
members' wells. "Wet gas" means gas containing hydrocarbon
constituents and natural gas liquids ("NGLs") entrained within the
gas. NGLs include commercially valuable hydrocarbons like propane,
butane, and pentane.

During the Class Period, EQT sold Plaintiffs' wet gas at the
wellhead to EQT Production Company and EQT Energy. Despite textual
variations in the Class Leases, EQT paid all Plaintiffs royalties
based on the British thermal unit ("BTU") content of their wet
gas.

EQT next separated the wet gas into "residue gas," composed
primarily of methane, and NGLs. EQT then fractionated the NGLs into
separate purity products like butane, propane, pentane, and
isobutane. EQT sold these purity products to unaffiliated third
parties. During the Class Period, EQT did not pay royalties to
Plaintiffs for the sales of NGLs or their purity products.

In March 2021, EQT sent a letter to all royalty owners stating that
historically it had calculated royalties based on the BTU value of
natural gas when it is produced. EQT declared, however, that it was
shifting its practice to calculating royalties based on the method
of separately valuing the NGLs and the residue gas.

The district court first granted Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment regarding EQT's alter egos. The district court
found that from January 1, 2012, to September 6, 2017 EQT
Corporation was the alter ego of the EQT Production Company and EQT
Energy and several other subsidiaries. It also found that from
September 7, 2017, to February 28, 2021 EQT Corporation was and is
the alter ego of EQT Production and EQT Energy.

The Plaintiffs filed this putative class action against EQT and
brought claims for breach of contract, statutory interest, and
fraudulent concealment. According to Plaintiffs, under the Class
Leases, and irrespective of any textual variations, EQT should have
paid royalties on its arms-length sales of fractionated NGLs to
third parties. Instead, EQT paid royalties on its sale of
Plaintiffs' wet gas to EQT Production Company and EQT
Energy—entities which were EQT's alter egos.

The district court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification as to both breach of contract and fraudulent
concealment claims. The district court subsequently modified its
class certification order to create three subclasses. The first
subclass consisted of class members whose leases did not provide
for postproduction deductions. The second subclass consisted of
class members whose leases did provide for such deductions but did
not meet Tawney's requirements for imposing such costs. The final
subclass consisted of class members whose leases provided for
payment based on dekatherms.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's certification of
the breach of contract claim. Circuit Judge Benjamin found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying this
claim. The Court stated: "Based on evidence Plaintiffs put forth,
the district court had ample reason to conclude that, given EQT's
uniform conduct toward all lessors, the variations in the Class
Leases EQT dwelled on did not prevent class certification."

The Court of Appeals noted that EQT's expert admitted that no Class
Lease permitted payment for NGLs on a BTU basis. The Court found:
"In other words, the district court had reason to find EQT arguably
violated all Class Leases uniformly. The district court therefore
did not abuse its discretion in finding there were common questions
of fact and law and that said questions predominated.

The Court of Appeals rejected EQT's argument that the proposed
class was not ascertainable. The Court found: "The district court
correctly noted that objective data and criteria exist from which
Plaintiffs can connect royalty payments to Class Leases and
lessors. The class-wide data EQT must provide Plaintiffs obviates
any concern on this score.

The Court explained that because EQT made all royalty payments to
royalty owners over time pursuant to the Class Leases, EQT
possesses the information and ability to reconstruct a Class Lease
accounting connecting all royalty payments to owners to Class
Leases over time.

The Court of Appeals noted that after oral argument, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued Romeo v. Antero Resources
Corp., which vindicated the district court's interpretation of West
Virginia law. The Court stated: "West Virginia is a 'marketable
product rule' state, meaning that unless the lease provides
otherwise, royalties may not be calculated based on the value of
the oil and gas at a stage where it has not yet been marketed,
i.e., sold to a third-party purchaser in an arms-length
transaction."

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's certification of
the fraudulent concealment claims. Circuit Judge Benjamin found:
The district court abused its discretion in certifying Plaintiffs'
fraudulent concealment claims, as questions affecting only
individual class members will predominate over common questions of
law or fact.

The Court explained that West Virginia law requires proof of
reliance on the defendant's alleged fraudulent acts and considers
the individual circumstances under which a plaintiff received and
reacted to said acts. The Court noted that "proof of reasonable
reliance depends upon a fact-intensive inquiry into what
information each [lessor] actually had," defeating Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance requirement.

Circuit Judge Niemeyer dissented from Part III and concurred in
Part IV. Judge Niemeyer argued: "The majority fails to demand the
rigorous analysis that the district court was required to conduct
before finding that there are questions of law or fact common to
the class and that the representative parties' claims are typical
of those of the class, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)(2) and (3). The majority also fails to require a
rigorous analysis into whether common questions of law or fact
predominate such that the class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy, as required by Rule 23(b)(3)."

Judge Niemeyer concluded that because the record shows that there
is no one lease form or type of royalty provision common to the
plaintiffs' claims, I conclude that under no rational analysis
could the proper royalties for each lease be determined on a class
basis.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's certification
order as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim but reversed as to
Plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment claim.

ARGUED for Appellants:  Elbert Lin, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH, LLP,
Richmond, Virginia. BABST, CALLAND, CLEMENTS AND ZOMNIR, P.C.,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants.

Argued for Appellees: Marvin Wayne Masters, MASTERS LAW FIRM, LC,
Charleston, West Virginia.  ON BRIEF:  David R. Dehoney, New York,
New York, Lauren W. Varnado, MICHELMAN & ROBINSON, LLP, Houston,
Texas; Jennifer J. Hicks, Robert P. Fitzsimmons, Mark A.
Colantonio, Clayton J. Fitzsimmons, Robert J. Fitzsimmons,
Christine Pill Fisher, FITZSIMMONS LAW FIRM PLLC, Wheeling, West
Virginia; April D. Ferrebee, MASTERS LAW FIRM, LC, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellees

A copy of the Court of Appeals decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Wcxy5Pfrom PacerMonitor.com.


FCA US: Court Rejects 3rd Bid to Amend Class Definition
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Janella Mack and John Lynd, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US
LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 24-CV-02990-SJB-SIL (E.D.N.Y.),
Judge Sanket J. Bulsara of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend
class definition, granted Defendant's motion for sanctions, and
granted in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment in a
products liability class action concerning allegedly faulty
gearshifters.

This case involves a certified class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) for three limited issues:

     (1) whether the monostable gear shift has a design defect that
renders the class vehicles unsuitable for ordinary use,

     (2) whether the defendant knew about the defect and concealed
its knowledge from buyers, and

     (3) whether information about the defect that was concealed
would be material to a reasonable buyer.

The Issues Class includes all persons or entities who currently own
or lease a class vehicle, which means a 2012-2014 Dodge Charger,
2012-2014 Chrysler 300, or 2014-2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee equipped
with the monostable shifter, where the vehicle was purchased in
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah,
Washington, or Wyoming.

The products liability class action brought by Plaintiffs Janella
Mack and John Lynd concerns an allegedly faulty gear shifter
manufactured by Defendant FCA US LLC and used in certain Dodge,
Chrysler, and Jeep vehicles. The case originated in 2016 in the
Eastern District of New York but was transferred to the Eastern
District of Michigan and consolidated into multidistrict
litigation. After multiple rounds of class certification practice
and a trial on alleged design defects, the case was remanded back
to the Eastern District of New York for final resolution.

The Court noted that the MDL Court certified a class of individuals
from 21 different states who had purchased or leased a vehicle with
a gearshifter but the claims of New York residents were excluded
from the trial itself. Following the trial, which was largely
resolved in favor of FCA US, the MDL Court rejected the defendant's
attempt to use the favorable verdict against the New York class
members and remanded the New York case back to this Court for final
resolution.

Plaintiffs now seek to amend the certified class. Their proposal
differs from the class certified by the MDL Court in two ways:
first, their class is now limited to those who purchased or leased
a vehicle before a 2016 Chrysler recall, whereas the certified
class lacked such a time limitation; and second, their proposal
attempts to change the type of class that was certified.

This is the third time Plaintiffs have made such a request to amend
the temporal scope of the class. The MDL Court previously twice
rejected the same request. Similarly, it is also the third time
Plaintiffs have sought to certify a broader class that resolves all
claims, having failed twice before.

The Court applied the law of the case doctrine, explaining that
litigants once battled for the court's decision should neither be
required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it
again. The doctrine counsels a court against revisiting its prior
rulings in subsequent stages of the same case absent cogent and
compelling reasons, including the need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.

The Court noted that the doctrine is particularly applicable in
multidistrict litigation where the claims of numerous diverse
parties might otherwise result in continuous relitigation of the
same issues. Therefore, orders issued by a federal transferee court
remain binding if the case is sent back to the transferor court.

Regarding the temporal limitations, the Court found that two weeks
after the MDL Court certified the Issues Class on December 9, 2019,
the MDL Plaintiffs sought to alter the class definition. However,
on the eve of the September 2022 trial, Plaintiffs sought to alter
the class definition again by continuing to press the point of a
cutoff date to limit it temporally to pre-recall vehicles. The MDL
Court denied this motion, finding the tardy attempt to redefine the
scope of the class woefully untimely and procedurally improper.

The Court explained that with respect to the substantive scope of
the Issues Class, the MDL Court already twice denied what
Plaintiffs seek now: certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class that
permits the whole case to proceed on a class basis. The first
motion in January 2019 was denied, with the MDL Court choosing
instead to certify the Issues Class. After the Issues Trial, the
MDL Plaintiffs moved again for certification, but the MDL Court
found the motion essentially asks for a do-over and struck the
motion.

Having already been denied in their attempt to modify the certified
class either in terms of temporal scope or to transform it into a
Rule 23(b)(3) class, the Court held that Plaintiffs' motion is
barred by law of the case. Therefore, Plaintiffs' third motion for
certification is denied.

FCA US moved for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927, which
provides that an attorney who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

The Court found that what Plaintiffs have done goes well beyond
good-faith litigation conduct. They have filed the same motion
every few years, hoping for a different result. The Court noted
that they filed a 2019 motion to certify a New York subclass under
Rule 23(b)(3); that is exactly what they filed in 2022 in the MDL
Court; and they have filed that same motion now in this Court.
Additionally, the Court criticized Plaintiffs' conduct for omitting
to mention the prior denials and the prior history of this very
same motion in the MDL Court and giving the misleading impression
that this Court was deciding certification on a blank slate. The
Court characterized this as the height of chicanery and bad faith
misconduct that attempts to deceive this Court.

Therefore, Chrysler's motion for sanctions is granted and
Plaintiffs are directed to pay Chrysler attorney's fees and costs
incurred in responding to the motion to amend or alter as well as
in support of its motion to strike and for sanctions.

FCA US argued that the Seventh Amendment and issue preclusion
principles required dismissal of the New York class members' claims
based on the Issues Trial verdict. However, the Court found these
arguments were already made and rejected by the MDL Court.

The Court noted that FCA US was judicially estopped from making
this argument because it had initially argued that the Seventh
Amendment precluded resolution of New York claims in the Issues
Trial, but then took the opposite position after the trial.

The Court explained that the prior Issues Trial at Chrysler's
urging did not include the claims of New York class members and
therefore the plaintiffs and absent class members from New York
have not had their day in court. This lack of opportunity to
litigate is the sine qua non of issue preclusion.

The Court granted summary judgment on several claims after
Plaintiffs conceded they were no longer pursuing any claims other
than the GBL claims. Therefore, summary judgment is granted, and
the claims for fraudulent concealment, express warranty, unjust
enrichment, and MMWA are dismissed with prejudice.

For the surviving GBL Section 349 claim, the Court explained that
to make out a prima facie case under Section 349, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that:

     (1) The defendant's deceptive acts were directed at consumers,


     (2) The acts are misleading in a material way, and

     (3) The plaintiff has been injured as a result.

The Court found that Plaintiffs' omission theory could proceed
based on undisputed facts that FCA US conducted multiple studies
into the usability of the monostable gearshifter; tested shifting
mistake rates and compared it to alternative shifters; and found
generally that the gearshifter had lower rates of successful
shifting attempts, including attempts to shift into Park." Despite
this knowledge, it went ahead with installing the gearshifter in
the Class Vehicles while only FCA US had access to this information
when Plaintiffs purchased their vehicles.

Regarding damages, the Court noted that FCA US's challenges to Dr.
Justine Hastings's damages methodology were barred by law of the
case doctrine because the MDL Court already twice determined that
Dr. Hastings's methodology is a sound and reliable method of
calculating damages in cases such as this.

The Court granted summary judgment on the GBL Section 350 claim,
explaining that while the absence of a reliance element does not
obviate the need for a plaintiff to identify the misleading
advertisement. The Court found that none of Plaintiffs' briefs, nor
their Rule 56.1 statements, challenge or identify any specific
advertisement, brochure, or commercial. Therefore, no GBL Section
350 claim can survive in such a posture.

The Court concluded: Plaintiffs' motion to amend or alter the class
definition is denied. Chrysler's motion to strike is denied, but
its motion for sanctions is granted. Chrysler's motion for summary
judgment is granted as to the claims for GBL Section 350,
fraudulent concealment, express warranty, unjust enrichment, and
violation of the MMWA, which are dismissed with prejudice, and
denied as to the claim for GBL Section 349.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=rGbV2U

FIFTH THIRD BANCORP: Faces Consolidated Consumer Suit in Ohio
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fifth Third Bancorp disclosed in its Form 10-Q for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2025, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 25, 2025, that it is facing a consolidated
lawsuit captioned "In re: Fifth Third Early Access Cash Advance
Litigation (Case No. 1:12-CV-851) in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio.

In 2013, four putative class action lawsuits were filed against
Fifth Third Bank in federal courts throughout the country (Lori and
Danielle Laskaris v. Fifth Third Bank, Janet Fyock v. Fifth Third
Bank, Jesse McQuillen v. Fifth Third Bank, and Brian Harrison v.
Fifth Third Bank). Those four lawsuits were transferred to the
Southern District of Ohio and consolidated.

On behalf of a putative class, the plaintiffs sought unspecified
monetary and statutory damages, injunctive relief, punitive
damages, attorneys' fees, and pre- and post-judgment interest. On
March 30, 2015, the court dismissed all claims alleged in the
consolidated lawsuit except a claim under the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA). On May 28, 2019, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and
remanded for further proceedings.

The plaintiffs' claimed damages for the alleged breach of contract
claim exceed $440 million, plus prejudgment interest. On March 26,
2021, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

On March 29, 2023, the trial court issued an order granting summary
judgement on plaintiffs' TILA claim, with statutory damages capped
at $2 million plus costs and attorney fees. Plaintiffs’ claim for
breach of contract proceeded to trial beginning on April 17, 2023.
On April 27, 2023, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Bank, finding a breach of contract, but that the voluntary payment
doctrine is a complete defense to the breach of contract claim. On
September 30, 2024, the trial court issued a decision denying
post-trial motions related to the jury verdict.

On October 30, 2024, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, and on
November 7, 2024, Fifth Third filed a notice of cross appeal.

Fifth Third Bancorp is a diversified financial services company
headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio with 1,072 full-service banking
centers and 2,114 ATMs in eleven states throughout the Midwestern
and Southeastern regions of the U.S. The Bancorp reports on three
business segments: Commercial Banking, Consumer and Small Business
Banking and Wealth and Asset Management.


FISHER & PAYKEL: Blind Users Can't Access Website, Knowles Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
CARLTON KNOWLES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FISHER & PAYKEL APPLIANCES, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:25-cv-06945 (S.D.N.Y., August 22, 2025) is a class
action against the Defendant for violations of Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights
Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and the New York General
Business Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually impaired persons. The Defendant's website,
https://www.fisherpaykel.com/us/, contains access barriers which
hinder the Plaintiff and Class members to enjoy the benefits of
their online goods, content, and services offered to the public
through the website. The accessibility issues on the website
include but not limited to: lack of alternative text (alt-text),
empty links that contain no text, redundant links, and linked
images missing alt-text.

The Plaintiff and Class members seek permanent injunction to cause
a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually impaired individuals.

Fisher & Paykel Appliances, Inc. is a company that sells online
goods and services in New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
       Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
       Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
       GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES PLLC
       150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
       New York, NY 10003
       Telephone: (212) 228-9795
       Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
       Email: Jeffrey@Gottlieb.legal
              Dana@Gottlieb.legal
              Michael@Gottlieb.legal

FLORIDA: Faces Suit Over Illegal Detention in Big Cypress Facility
------------------------------------------------------------------
M.A., on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff v. KEVIN GUTHRIE, Executive Director of the
Florida Division of Emergency Management, in his official capacity;
RICKY D. DICKSON, Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections, in his official capacity; DAVID M. KERNER, Director of
the Florida Highway Patrol, in his official capacity; MARK GLASS,
Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, in his
official capacity; JOHN D. HAAS, Adjutant General of the Florida
National Guard, in his official capacity; MARK THIEME, Executive
Director of the Florida State Guard, in his official capacity;
JEROME WORLEY, Division Director of the Florida Department of
Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages
and Tobacco, in his official capacity; JIMMY PATRONIS, Chief
Financial Officer of the Florida Department of Financial Services,
in his official capacity; RODNEY BARRETO, Chairman of the Florida
Wildlife Conservation Commission, in his official capacity; ALEXIS
A. LAMBERT, Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, in her official capacity; JOHN F. DAVIS, Secretary of
the Florida Lottery, in his official capacity; and MATTHEW MORDANT,
Warden of "Alligator Alcatraz," in his official capacity,
Defendants, Case No. 2:25-cv-00765 (M.D. Fla., August 22, 2025) is
a class action against the Defendants for violation of 8 U.S.C.
Section 1357(g) and ultra vires.

The class action complaint seeks to issue a writ of habeas corpus
and permanent injunction barring the Defendants from detaining
class members at Alligator Alcatraz, a detention facility inside
the Big Cypress National Preserve in Florida. Furthermore, the
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the Defendants lack
authority under federal law to detain civil immigration detainees
at the facility. According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and
hundreds of others are detained at the facility in violation of
federal law, by state employees and contractors who lack statutory
authority to hold them for civil immigration violations. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Amy Godshall, Esq.
         Daniel Tilley, Esq.
         AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA
         4343 West Flagler Street, Suite 400
         Miami, FL 33134
         Telephone: (786) 363-2714
         Email: agodshall@aclufl.org
                dtilley@aclufl.org

                 - and -

         Miriam Haskell, Esq.
         Alana Greer, Esq.
         COMMUNITY JUSTICE PROJECT, INC.
         3000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 106
         Miami, FL 33137
         Telephone: (305) 907-7697
         Email: miriam@communityjusticeproject.com
                alana@communityjusticeproject.com

                 - and -

         Mark Fleming, Esq.
         Mark Feldman, Esq.
         NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER
         111 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 800
         Chicago, IL 60604
         Telephone: (312) 660-1628
         Email: mfleming@immigrantjustice.org
                mfeldman@immigrantjustice.org

                 - and -

         Spencer Amdur, Esq.
         Michael K.T. Tan, Esq.
         Cody Wofsy, Esq.
         Hannah Steinberg, Esq.
         Corene Kendrick, Esq.
         Kyle Virgien, Esq.
         AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
         425 California Street, Suite 700
         San Francisco, CA 94104
         Telephone: (415) 343-0770
         Email: samdur@aclu.org
                m.tan@aclu.org
                cwofsy@aclu.org
                hsteinberg@aclu.org
                ckendrick@aclu.org
                kvirgien@aclu.org

                 - and -

         Omar Jadwat, Esq.
         AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
         125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
         New York, NY 10004
         Telephone: (212) 549-2660
         Email: ojadwat@aclu.org

                 - and -

         Eunice H. Cho, Esq.
         AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
         915 15th St. N.W., 7th Floor
         Washington, DC 20005
         Telephone: (202) 548-6616
         Email: echo@aclu.org

FOUNDATION BUILDING: Houston Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
DARNELL HOUSTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FOUNDATION BUILDING MATERIALS, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 8:25-cv-01863 (C.D. Cal., August 22, 2025) is a
class action against the Defendant for failure to pay overtime
wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant as a non-exempt, hourly
employee from approximately September 2011 until the present.

Foundation Building Materials, LLC is a building materials and
construction products distribution company in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
       SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
       402 West Broadway, Suite 1760
       San Diego, CA 92101
       Telephone: (619) 762-2125
       Facsimile: (619) 762-2127
       Email: kstoops@sommerspc.com

GOOGLE LLC: Agrees to Settle Face Recognition Suit for $6.02-Mil.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Chloe Gocher of ClassAction.org reports that an over $6.02 million
settlement will resolve a class action lawsuit that alleged YouTube
and Google violated an Illinois privacy law by collecting biometric
information through YouTube's Face Blur tool without users'
consent.

The YouTube class action settlement received preliminary approval
from the court on July 25, 2025 and covers the approximately 16,500
Illinois residents who uploaded a video to YouTube on which the
Face Blur program was run.

The court-approved website for the YouTube settlement can be found
at YouTubeFaceBlurBIPASettlement.com.

YouTube settlement class members who submit a timely, valid claim
form will be able to receive a share of the $6,022,500 settlement
fund, which the settlement website estimates will be approximately
$200 per person.

To submit a claim form, class members must visit this page of the
settlement website and enter the email address associated with
their YouTube account to either submit the form online or receive a
PDF form to print, fill out and mail back to the address listed
here.

All claim forms must be submitted by November 30, 2025.

A hearing is set for December 30, 2025 to determine whether the
settlement will receive final court approval. Payments will begin
to be distributed to class members only after final approval has
been granted and any appeals have been resolved.

The YouTube class action lawsuit claimed that the companies
violated the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act by capturing and
storing users' biometric information, including facial geometries,
through YouTube's Face Blur without first obtaining the subjects'
written consent and providing required disclosures. [GN]

HSBC BANK: Court Rejects Bid to Decertify Class in Cheng Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Ji Dong Cheng, Plaintiff, v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., Defendant, Civil Action No. 20-cv-1551 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y.),
Judge Brian M. Cogan of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York denied the Defendant's motion to
decertify a class action but granted its alternative motion to
amend the class definition.

The case centers on a class action complaint filed by Plaintiff Ji
Dong Cheng on March 25, 2020, against HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
Representing certain other holders of HSBC savings accounts, Cheng
brought several claims premised on roughly the same theory: that
the terms and conditions governing the savings accounts indicated
that interest should accrue on noncash deposits the moment a
transfer is initiated, yet HSBC credited interest only after it
received a deposit.

In September 2023, the court initially denied Cheng's motion to
certify a class on his two remaining claims -- a breach of contract
claim and a claim under New York General Business Law Section 349.
However, over a year later, the Second Circuit summarily reversed
that decision in November 2024. On remand, the court certified a
class on the contractual claim but denied certification on the
Section 349 claim.

The certified contract class was defined as: All persons in the
United States who opened a Direct Savings Account with HSBC between
March 25, 2014, through the date of certification and who made
noncash deposits into the account using HSBC's online portal on a
Business Day for which HSBC did not begin to apply interest on the
same Business Day the deposits were initiated on the portal or on
the first Business Day after a deposit initiated on a Saturday,
Sunday, or Federal holiday.

Following the class certification, HSBC filed the instant motion
seeking to decertify the class. The Defendant primarily seeks to
decertify the class on a theory that the one-year contractual
limitations period expired on the absent class members' claims
while the certification order was before the Second Circuit.
Alternatively, HSBC sought to amend the class definition to replace
"March 25, 2014" with "March 25, 2019" and clarify that the class
contains only accountholders who made noncash deposits into the
account on or before February 20, 2021.

The court addressed HSBC's decertification argument, which invoked
the limits of the American Pipe tolling doctrine. Under American
Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), the
commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have
been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class
action.

HSBC's argument proceeded in six steps:

     (1) the statute of limitations on the absent class members'
claims began to run in September 2023, when the court denied the
first motion for class certification;

     (2) the limitations period expired a year later, while the
case was still on appeal;

     (3) the absent class members' claims were time-barred when the
court certified the contract class on remand;

     (4) those absent class members should have been excluded from
the class;

     (5) Cheng's proposed contract class includes only him; and

     (6) therefore, the class lacks numerosity and should be
decertified.

These arguments culminated in the assertion that the class lacks
numerosity and should be decertified. However, the court found that
the fourth premise crumbles upon closer scrutiny. Namely, whether
the class members would now be barred from bringing a separate
individual suit, or from intervening in the current suit, does not
affect their ability to participate as absent members in Cheng's
timely filed class action.

The court explained that statutes of limitations are time-to-file
rules. Since Cheng filed his complaint on March 25, 2020, and it
asserts a contract claim on behalf of the absent class members, the
one-year limitations period does not bar the absent members from
participating in the action.

The court emphasized that every court of appeals presented with the
question at issue here has ruled that when an appellate court
overturns a district court's denial of class certification, the
date of original filing, rather than the date of eventual
certification, is used to determine whether the claims of potential
class members are time-barred.

The court rejected HSBC's reliance on district court cases stating
that a class action cannot proceed on behalf of class members whose
claims are time-barred, explaining that those cases refer to
putative class members whose claims were time-barred at the time
the lead plaintiff filed the complaint.

The court noted that HSBC's proposed rule would require arguing
that a class representative does not make or file the claims of the
absent members until the district court grants class certification.
However, this contradicts the very theory undergirding the modern
incarnation of Rule 23. By filing a class action claim, a class
representative asserts prospective members' claims on their
behalf.

Furthermore, the court found that HSBC's proposed rule frustrates
two core objectives of Rule 23 class actions: procedural fairness
and efficiency. The rule would force absent class members to either
take an active role in the litigation or forfeit recovery on the
claims and would require courts to adjudicate each claim
separately, clogging its docket with near-identical individual
claims.

Regarding the motion to amend the class definition, the court
granted HSBC's request for certain modifications. The parties
disagreed on whether the class should include individuals who
opened accounts before HSBC revised its terms and conditions on
February 20, 2021, but who did not make a noncash deposit until
after the revision.

The court concluded that the class definition should include only
those accountholders who made noncash deposits before the terms and
conditions were updated. The court reasoned that it is highly
unlikely that other accountholders could make out a
breach-of-contract claim against HSBC; the new terms and conditions
removed the very phrase that Cheng claims created a contractual
obligation to apply interest upon transfer.

The court ordered that the class definition be modified to reflect
these limitations while maintaining the class action status of the
case.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=dz7Ha2 from PacerMonitor.com.

INDEPENDENT LIVING: $14MM Breach Suit Final OK Hearing Set Nov. 17
------------------------------------------------------------------
Top Class Actions reports that Independent Living Systems (ILS)
agreed to a $14 million class action lawsuit settlement to resolve
claims it failed to prevent a 2022 data breach that compromised
sensitive consumer information.

The settlement benefits consumers whose sensitive information was
exposed or potentially accessed in the Independent Living Systems
data breach in June and July 2022.

Independent Living Systems is a health care management company that
provides services to health plans, providers and other
organizations. The company's services include care management,
pharmacy services, technology solutions and more.

In June and July 2022, Independent Living Systems was the target of
a data breach that compromised sensitive consumer information.
According to the company, the breach was the result of a phishing
attack and affected around 3.9 million people.

Affected consumers quickly took legal action against Independent
Living Systems, arguing the company could have prevented the breach
through reasonable cybersecurity measures. Plaintiffs in the case
say they now face an increased risk of identity theft and fraud as
a result of the breach.

Independent Living Systems has not admitted any wrongdoing but
agreed to pay $14 million to resolve the allegations.

Under the terms of the Independent Living Systems settlement, class
members can receive reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses and
cash payments.

Class members can receive up to $5,000 for documented, unreimbursed
losses resulting from the data breach. This compensation covers
expenses, such as credit monitoring, bank fees, fraudulent charges,
credit freezes and more.

In addition to out-of-pocket loss reimbursement, class members can
receive a cash payment from the settlement. These payments will
vary depending on whether class members lived in California at the
time of the data breach.

Class members who lived in California at the time of the data
breach can receive two pro rata shares of the net settlement fund.
Class members who did not live in California at the time of the
data breach can receive one pro rata share of the net settlement
fund. Exact payment amounts will vary depending on the number of
claims filed with the settlement.

The deadline for exclusion and objection is Oct. 6, 2025.

The final approval hearing for the Independent Living Systems
settlement is scheduled for Nov. 17, 2025.

To receive settlement benefits, class members must submit a valid
claim form by Nov. 4, 2025.

Who's Eligible

U.S. residents who received a notice of a data security incident
stating that their sensitive information was potentially
compromised through the June/July 2022 data security incident of
Independent Living Systems LLC's computer systems or who have a
good faith reason to believe their sensitive information was
compromised through that data security incident.

Potential Award
Up to $5,000 in out-of-pocket losses plus a pro rata share of the
remaining settlement fund.

Proof of Purchase
Documentation of out-of-pocket expenses, such as bank statements,
credit card statements, invoices, receipts, bills or other
documents. "Self-prepared" documents are not sufficient to support
a claim.

Claim Form

NOTE: If you do not qualify for this settlement do NOT file a
claim.

Remember: you are submitting your claim under penalty of perjury.
You are also harming other eligible Class Members by submitting a
fraudulent claim. If you're unsure if you qualify, please read the
FAQ section of the Settlement Administrator's website to ensure you
meet all standards (Top Class Actions is not a Settlement
Administrator). If you don't qualify for this settlement, check out
our database of other open class action settlements you may be
eligible for.

Claim Form Deadline
11/04/2025

Case Name
In re: Independent Living Systems Data Breach Litigation, Case No.
1:23-cv-21060-Williams, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida

Final Hearing
11/17/2025

Settlement Website
ILSDataBreachSettlement.com

Claims Administrator

    ILS Settlement Administrator
    c/o Kroll Settlement Administration LLC
    P.O. Box 5324
    New York, NY 10150-5324
    info@ILSDataBreachSettlement.com
    (833) 420-3957

Class Counsel

    Stuart A. Davidson
    ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP

    Alexandra M. Honeycutt
    MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC

    John A. Yanchunis
    MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP

Defense Counsel

    Gregory T. Parks
    MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP [GN]

INTERACTIVE MEMORIES: Dumm Sues Over False Product Discount Ads
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINE DUMM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. INTERACTIVE MEMORIES, INC., D/B/A MIXBOOK,
Defendant, Case No. 3:25-cv-07142 (N.D. Cal., August 22, 2025) is a
class action against the Defendant for violations of California's
False Advertising Law, California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act,
and California's Unfair Competition Law, breach of contract, breach
of express warranty, quasi-contract/unjust enrichment, negligent
misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation.

The case arises from the Defendant's false, misleading and
deceptive price and purported discount advertising. On its website,
the Defendant advertises discounts on everything or "almost
everything" it sells. The Defendant lists purported regular prices
and purported limited-time sales offering steep discounts from
those listed regular prices. However, the list prices the Defendant
advertises are not actually its regular prices, or the prevailing
market value of its products, because its products are always
available for less than that. As a result, the Plaintiff and
similarly situated consumers suffered damages.

Interactive Memories, Inc., doing business as Mixbook, is a company
that sells and markets personalized photo books, calendars, cards,
and home decor online, with its principal place of business in
Redwood City, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Simon Franzini, Esq.
       Vivek Kothari, Esq.
       DOVEL & LUNER, LLP
       201 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 600
       Santa Monica, CA 90401
       Telephone: (310) 656-7066
       Facsimile: (310) 656-7069
       Email: simon@dovel.com
              vivek@dovel.com

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS: Settlement Deal for Court OK
---------------------------------------------------
International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. (IFF) disclosed in its Form
10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2025, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 25, 2025, that in the
second quarter of 2025, the parties in a securities class action
was filed in the Tel Aviv District Court, Israel, in August 2019,
finalized a settlement agreement and submitted it to the court for
approval. The settlement payment, fees and expenses totals 24.0
million New Israel Shekel (approximately $6.8 million).

The Class action alleges, among other things, false and misleading
statements largely in connection with IFF's acquisition of Frutarom
and improper payments made by Frutarom businesses operating
principally in Russia and Ukraine to representatives of customers.
The motion asserted claims under the Israeli Securities Act-1968
against IFF, its former Chairman and CEO, and its former CFO, and
against Frutarom and certain former Frutarom officers and
directors, as well as claims under the Israeli Companies Act-1999
against certain former Frutarom officers and directors.

On July 14, 2022, the court approved the parties' motion to mediate
the dispute, which postponed all case deadlines until after the
mediation. The parties held mediation meetings on September 13,
2022, November 22, 2022, March 1, 2023, November 2023, March 3,
2024 and April 1, 2024. In November 2024, the court granted
extensions to the parties' joint filings of the responses to the
Oman motion and for the evidential hearings, for the parties to
exhaust the mediation proceeding.

International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. and its subsidiaries is a
creator and manufacturer of food, beverage, health & biosciences,
scent and pharma solutions and complementary adjacent products,
including cosmetic active and natural health ingredients, which are
used in a wide variety of consumer products.


JOSEPH CAMMARATA: 3rd Circuit Affirms Fraud Convictions
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as United States of America v. Joseph
Cammarata*, No. 23-2110 (3d Cir.), Circuit Judge D. Brooks Smith of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the defendant's convictions for conspiracy, wire fraud, and money
laundering; and upheld the restitution order, but vacated and
remanded the forfeiture order regarding a specific property for
further proceedings.  

The Appeal presents issues arising out of a unique intersection of
federal sentencing principles and class action settlement practice.
Joseph Cammarata and two confederates developed an elaborate
scheme by which they submitted fraudulent claims to administrators
of securities class action settlement funds.  None of the three
were class members, yet their efforts yielded them over $40
million.  Two of the men entered guilty pleas pursuant to
agreements.  Cammarata, though, proceeded to trial and was found
guilty by a jury of all charges filed against him.

Defendants Joseph Cammarata and his business partners, Eric Cohen
and David Punturieri, joined forces to create Alpha Plus Recovery,
LLC in 2014.  Alpha Plus was a "claims aggregator" that submitted
hundreds of claims to administrators who were overseeing nearly 400
securities class action settlements filed in both federal and state
courts from 2014 to 2021.  Alpha Plus did so primarily on behalf of
three clients: Nimello Holding LLC, Quartis Trade and Investment
LLC, and Inversiones Invergasa SAS.  Nimello, Quartis, and
Invergasa were not hedge funds - they were defunct foreign shell
companies acquired by the Defendants.

The 3rd Circuit detailed that the Defendants created and submitted
further fabricated reports which listed fictitious transactions,
often using altered data from SpeedRoute, a legitimate
broker-dealer founded by Cammarata in 2010. The court stated, "All
told, claims administrators paid Alpha Plus approximately $40
million for claims made on behalf of Nimello, Quartis, and
Invergasa from 2014 to 2021."

The 3rd Circuit outlined that on October 28, 2021, a grand jury
sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a
single-count indictment charging the Defendants with conspiracy to
commit mail and wire fraud.

A superseding indictment in September 2022 charged Cammarata with
conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit
money laundering.  The court noted that Cammarata's co-Defendants,
Punturieri and Cohen, pled guilty, while Cammarata proceeded to
trial on the remaining counts a week later.

Cammarata argued that the trial evidence and the Government's
closing argument constructively amended the superseding indictment,
that evidentiary rulings violated Federal Rules of Evidence, that
the loss calculation was erroneous, that the restitution order
violated the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), and that the
forfeiture of his vacation home was improper.

Upon careful examination, the Circuit Court rejected Cammarata's
constructive amendment claim, stating, Cammarata has failed to
direct its attention to any constructive amendment of the
superseding indictment during trial.

The Circuit found that the testimony of the two witnesses was
consistent with the Government's theory of guilt and the means by
which class action settlements were to be administered.  Regarding
evidentiary challenges, the Circuit held that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in overruling defense counsel's Rule
403 objection to evidence of Cammarata's private island purchase,
as no prejudice could reasonably have resulted from admission of
the private island evidence.   Similarly, the Circuit found no
error in the use of Cammarata's tax returns, noting that the
failure by Cammarata to report the transfers of settlement funds
from Alpha Plus to PB Trade as income on his tax returns supported
a reasonable inference that he knew the funds were unlawfully
obtained.

On the loss calculation, the Circuit affirmed that "the District
Court's $40,862,748.30 actual loss determination was consistent
with the Guidelines," as "the trial testimony showed that the
Defendants' fraudulent scheme directly reduced the balance
available from every settlement fund for payment to legitimate
class claimants."  For restitution, the Circuit Court concluded
that "the defrauded classes easily meet the MVRA's definition of
'victim,'" but noted that "the District Court abused its discretion
by ordering restitution in an amount that did not fully compensate
the victims."  However, due to the Government's failure to
cross-appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed the restitution order,
stating, "Greenlaw's mandate that 'the sentence [a defendant]
received should not' be increased without a government
cross-appeal, therefore, necessarily encompasses restitution under
the MVRA.

Regarding forfeiture, the Circuit Court found that the Government
provided sufficient notice" and "did not waive its right to seek
forfeiture of the Poconos property."  However, the court identified
a procedural error, stating, "Cammarata was deprived of the jury
right afforded to him by Rule 32.2(b)(5)(A)."  The court determined
this error was harmless but vacated the forfeiture order in part,
remanding "for the limited purpose of allowing the Government to
move to amend the forfeiture order under Rule 32.2(e) to reflect
that the Poconos property is forfeitable as a substitute asset.

Therefore, the Circuit Court affirmed Cammarata's convictions,
stating, "we will affirm Cammarata's conspiracy, wire fraud, and
money laundering convictions."  The Circuit Court also affirmed the
restitution order, despite its under inclusiveness, due to the lack
of a government cross-appeal. However, the Circuit vacated the
forfeiture order concerning the Poconos property and remanded for
further proceedings, ordering that the Government should move to
amend the forfeiture order to reflect that the Poconos property is
forfeitable as 'other property' under 21 U.S.C. Section 853(p).

A copy of the Third Circuit's Opinion is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=n4Vj6P

Appellant Joseph Cammarata is represented by:

     Peter Goldberger [Argued]
     Law Office of Peter Goldberger
     P.O. Box 645
     Ardmore, PA 19003

Appellee United States of America is represented by:

     David J. Ignall
     Paul G. Shapiro
     Office of United States Attorney
     615 Chestnut Street
     Suite 1250
     Philadelphia, PA 19106
  

LANDS' END: 9th Circuit Affirms Denial of Arbitration Motion
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Juan Plata, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lands' End,
Inc., Defendant-Appellant, No. 25-328 (9th Cir.), Circuit Judges
Nguyen, Forrest, and VanDyke of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling that denied
Lands' End's motion to compel arbitration in Plaintiff's class
action suit alleging various California consumer law violations.
Lands' End contended that Plaintiff's suit was barred by its Terms
of Use, which were hyperlinked on the check-out page from which
Plaintiff purchased merchandise.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's denial of a
motion to compel arbitration de novo and any underlying findings of
fact for clear error. In determining whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate a particular dispute, federal courts apply state-law
principles of contract formation. Under California law, a sign-in
wrap agreement may be an enforceable contract if the website
provides reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to which the
consumer will be bound and the consumer takes some action that
unambiguously manifests assent to those terms.

According to the Court of Appeals, "The district court did not
clearly err in finding that the hyperlink to the Terms of Use was
broken at the time of Plaintiff's purchase. Lands' End conceded
that the link misdirected to the website's Help Center, and that it
could not prove that the link was operational in the way it was
intended at the time of purchase. Defendant further conceded,
consistent with the record, that there were no changes to the
hyperlink between the time of purchase and the time it was
confirmed to be broken.

California law is unclear whether a broken link should be evaluated
under the first or second step of the internet contract formation
test. The first step of reasonable conspicuousness has two aspects:
the visual design of the webpages and the context of the
transaction. The second step requires an action taken by the
internet user that unambiguously manifested assent to proposed
contractual terms consistent with an explicit advisement that the
said action would constitute assent.

The Court of Appeals determined it need not decide whether a broken
link implicates conspicuousness or explicit advisement, or both. In
light of the district court's finding that the link was inoperable,
under California law, no mutual assent occurred, and the parties
did not form a contract.

Because no contract was formed between Plaintiff and Defendant, the
Court did not reach the parties' unconscionability claims.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the
motion to compel arbitration.

A copy of the Court of Appeals' decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=CiL9jr

LANGERS CONCORD: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Food Labeling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chloe Gocher of ClassAction.org reports that a proposed class
action lawsuit claims that Langers Concord Grape Juice contains
synthetic ingredients, contrary to its claims of being "100%
Juice."

According to the 19-page lawsuit, Langers grape juice contains
citric acid and ascorbic acid, two synthetically produced food
additives whose presence, the suit says, renders the product's
"100% Juice" and "100% Concord Grape Juice from Concentrate" claims
false and misleading to reasonable consumers.

Per the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the complaint
says, a food product is misbranded "[i]f it bears or contains any
artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical
preservative, unless it bears labeling stating that fact[.]"
Additionally, food labeling regulations require that if a drink
contains 100 percent juice and other ingredients, the product's
"100 percent juice" representations "must be accompanied by the
phrase 'with added [ingredients, preservatives or sweeteners],'"
even if the names of the ingredients are stated elsewhere on the
label, the filing says.

As such, the complaint claims that Langers Concord Grape 100% Juice
is misbranded according to both federal regulations and California
state law and cannot be legally sold.

The lawsuit alleges that the Langers Concord Grape Juice's label
representations are intended to confuse and sway consumers who seek
"clean" and "natural" food products, which they perceive to be
those that do not contain additives or artificial preservatives,
flavors or colors. By emphasizing the drink's 100 percent juice
claims while failing to disclose the presence of citric and
ascorbic acid, Langers Juice Company makes its product seem
healthier and more "natural" than it is and profits from an
increasingly health-conscious consumer base, the case claims.

The Langers Juice Company class action lawsuit seeks to represent
anyone in the U.S. who purchased Langers Concord Grape 100% Juice
primarily for consumption within the applicable statute of
limitations period. [GN]

LUNG INSTITUTE: Insurer's Declaratory Action to Proceed, Court Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Capitol Speciality Insurance Corporation,
Plaintiff, v. Tammy Rivero, et al., Defendants, Case No.
8:24-cv-2119-SDM-LSG (M.D. Fla.), Judge Steven D. Merryday of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint seeking
declaratory judgment on insurance coverage for a class action
judgment.

In 2016, Tammy Rivero and Marylan Mazza sued Lung Institute, LLC,
in Florida's Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, alleging the company
marketed ineffective and fraudulent stem-cell therapy through
convoluted, deceptive marketing, advertising and targeted sales
calls to prospective elderly clients. Each plaintiff paid
out-of-pocket for and received the stem-cell therapy but realized
no improvement. The complaint included class representation
allegations, which purported to bring suit on behalf of all persons
who have received Lung Institute's stem-cell therapy for the four
years prior to the filing of the first complaint.

Upon the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, a state-court
order certified a class comprised of Plaintiffs and all other
persons similarly situated who underwent venous, adipose and/or
bone marrow stem cell therapy, and/or supplemental therapies, for
the four years prior to filing of the initial complaint at the Lung
Institute. A jury found that Lung Institute engaged in a deceptive
or unfair act or a deceptive or unfair practice. The final judgment
identifies each member of the class, which comprises 1,075
members.

Capitol Specialty Insurance Corporation insures Lung Institute.
Capitol sued Lung Institute and requested a declaration that the
insurance policy provides no coverage for the judgment against Lung
Institute. The complaint names as defendants Tammy Rivero and
Marilyn Mazza in their capacity as representatives of the class
certified in the state-court class action and in lieu of naming
every class member as a nominal defendant. An April 2, 2025 order
substituted Larry Hyman (Lung Institute's receiver) for Lung
Institute under Rule 25(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Rivero and Mazza moved to dismiss the complaint, and Hyman joined
their motion, which argued:

     (1) That the complaint fails to name several indispensable
parties -- the remaining members of the class -- and
     (2) That inclusion of four class members will destroy
diversity jurisdiction.

Capitol responded and argued that, although the issue raised in
each defendant's motion is not often before any federal court, the
weight of authority requires only the insured and the named class
representatives to be parties to the declaratory action. Capitol
affirmed no intent for this to be a class action and affirmed no
attempt to plead it as a class action.

The court noted that the parties agreed that under Ranger Insurance
Company v. United Housing of New Mexico, 488 F.2d 682, 683 (5th
Cir. 1974), a tort claimant is an indispensable party to a
declaratory judgment action between the tortfeasor and the
tortfeasor's insurer. The defendants argued that, because the
resolution of this case will affect the Class Members' ability to
recover the damages allocated to them under the Judgment, the
remaining class members must join this action.

The court explained that a class member upon joining the class
forfeits any individual claim. This forfeiture means that no class
member has a claim, and therefore no class member is a claimant.
Although the parties agreed that any tort claimant must join this
action, the parties failed to show that any class member is a
claimant.

The court emphasized that Rule 19 developed to directly combat
thoughtless labelling based on legal relationship rather than on ad
hoc analysis of relevant factors and the underlying policy. The
defendants' urge to apply Ranger exhibits a failure to understand
that indispensable is a label placed on the absentee after
completing an analytical process and concluding that the pending
action must be dismissed.

The court determined that a pragmatic analysis under Rule 19
militates decidedly against compulsory joinder of each class
member. The state court certified a class and appointed two class
representatives, who must fairly and adequately protect and
represent the interests of each member in the class. The
state-court judgment binds each absent class member through
representation by Rivero and Mazza.

Because Rivero and Mazza, on behalf of the class, must enforce,
collect, and distribute to the class the proceeds of the
state-court judgment, this declaratory action affects only the
judgment debtor, the judgment debtor's insurer, and Rivero and
Mazza, as the duly certified class representatives. Although not
individually named in the complaint and individually served
process, each class member is present in this action through their
lawfully certified class representatives.

The court concluded that the judgment will afford complete relief,
and both the law and the ends of justice require the joinder of
only the class representatives. Accordingly, each motion was
denied.

A copy of the Court's Order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=CA6lhx from PacerMonitor.com.

MEAT MARKET: Fails to Properly Pay Restaurant Servers, Horn Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL HORN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MEAT MARKET BOCA RATON, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 9:25-cv-81050-MD (S.D. Fla., August 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for failure to provide the required and
sufficient notice of the tip credit in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Florida Minimum Wage Act, and Art. X, Sec. 24 of
the Florida Constitution.

The Plaintiff was employed as a server by the Defendant at its
restaurant, located in Boca Raton, Florida from August 2023 to June
2025.

Meat Market Boca Raton, LLC is a restaurant owner and operator in
Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Michael V. Miller, Esq.
         Jordan Richards, Esq.
         USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS-JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
         1800 SE 10th Ave., Suite 205
         Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
         Telephone: (954) 871-0050
         Email: Michael@usaemploymentlawyers.com
                Jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com

MITSUBISHI CHEMICAL: Must Face Humphries-Mowry ERISA Case
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Robert Humphries and Dennis Mowry,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Mitsubishi Chemical America, Inc., Mitsubishi
Chemical America Employees' Savings Plan Administrative Committee,
and Jane and/or John Does 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-06214
(JLR) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Jennifer L. Rochon of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in
part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss an Amended
Class Action Complaint under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.

The case involves the Mitsubishi Chemical America Employees'
Savings Plan, a defined-contribution retirement plan established in
1994. During the Class Period -- defined as July 19, 2017, to July
19, 2023 -- the Plan had between 2,873 and 4,656 participants, and
between $376,728,654 and $700,368,614 in assets. Plaintiffs alleged
that Defendants violated their fiduciary obligations by failing to
monitor share class discounts and administrative fees and
expenses.

Plaintiffs brought two primary claims:

     A. Breach of fiduciary duty for failing to offer the
lowest-cost share classes of mutual-fund investments, and

     B. Breach of fiduciary duty for paying excessive
administrative fees.

The court addressed the threshold issue of standing first.
Defendants challenged Plaintiffs' standing to bring claims
regarding mutual funds they did not personally invest in. The court
found that Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded class standing under
the Second Circuit's class standing jurisprudence.

To assert class standing, the Second Circuit requires a plaintiff
to show:

     -- Actual injury as a result of the defendant's conduct, and

     -- That the conduct implicates the 'same set of concerns' as
those of the rest of the putative class.

The court determined both prongs were satisfied because similar
inquiries and proof and the 'same set of concerns' are implicated
across each of the challenged mutual funds.

The court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss the share class
claims. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants offered seven mutual
funds where cheaper, identical share classes were available:

     1. MFS Value Fund: Defendants invested in share class 'A'
(MEIAX), which, in 2017, had an expense ratio of 0.86%. That year,
other share classes, such as share class 'R6,' had an expense ratio
of 0.49%.

     2. Prudential Jennison Mid-Cap Growth Fund: Defendants
invested in share class 'Z' (PEGZX), which, in 2017, had an expense
ratio of 0.76%. That year, share class 'Q' had an expense ratio of
0.58%.

     3. Pioneer Fundamental Growth Fund: Defendants invested in
share class 'Y' (FUNYX), which, in 2017, had an expense ratio of
0.79%. That year, share class 'K' had an expense ratio of 0.67%.

     4. Goldman Sachs Small Cap Value Fund: Defendants invested in
share class 'I' (GSSIX), which, in 2017, had an expense ratio of
1.01%. That year, share class 'R6' had an expense ratio of 0.94%.

     5. Janus Henderson Flexible Bond Fund: Defendants invested in
share class 'I' (JFLEX), which, in 2017, had an expense ratio of
0.56%. Share class 'N' had an expense ratio of 0.44% in 2016 and
0.45% in 2017.

     6. Virtus Duff & Phelps Real Estate Securities Fund:
Defendants invested in share class 'I' (PHRIX), which, in 2017, had
an expense ratio of 1.13%. That year, share class 'R6' had an
expense ratio of 0.96%.

     7. Pioneer Bond Fund: Defendants invested in share class 'Y'
(PICYX), which had an expense ratio of 0.59% in 2017 and 2018,
0.47% in 2019, and 0.46% in 2020. Share class 'K' had an expense
ratio of 0.47% in 2017, 0.35% in 2018, and 0.34% in 2019 and 2020.

The court found these allegations adequately state a claim for
breach of the duty of prudence. The court explained that Plaintiffs
have alleged that a superior alternative investment was readily
apparent such that an adequate investigation -- simply reviewing
the prospectus of the fund under consideration -- would have
uncovered that alternative.

Regarding Defendants' revenue sharing defense, the court noted that
while revenue sharing may have factored into Defendants' decision
making, this argument goes to the merits and is misplaced at this
early stage. The court stated that ERISA does not require them, at
the pleading stage, to rule out every possible lawful explanation
for the conduct they challenge.

The court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the excessive
recordkeeping fees claim. Plaintiffs alleged that Plan participants
were paying excess fees in the range of $84 to $211 from 2017 to
2021, comparing the Plan's fees to allegedly similar plans.

However, the court found these allegations insufficient under
recent Second Circuit precedent. The court noted that Plaintiffs'
reasoning contravenes this Court's prior opinion and is squarely
foreclosed by the Second Circuit's recent decisions in Singh v.
Deloitte LLP, 123 F.4th 88, and Boyette v. Montefiore Medical
Center.

The court explained that excessive recordkeeping fee claims must
provide a certain level of specificity as to the type and quality
of services provided by the Plan and its comparators. The court
found that Plaintiffs allege next to nothing about the
recordkeeping services provided by the Plan or the six other large
plans that the Complaint cites as allegedly lower-priced
comparators.

The court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that recordkeeping services
are fungible across providers, noting that the variation in fees
among Plaintiffs' own comparator plans contradict their assertion
that such services are standardized.

     Mitsubishi Chemical America: The court denied the motion to
dismiss Mitsubishi Chemical as a defendant. Plaintiffs allege that,
according to the company's Form 5500s, Mitsubishi Chemical was
listed as Plan Administrator and is therefore a named fiduciary.
The court found these allegations suffice to plausibly establish
that Mitsubishi Chemical was a fiduciary with respect to the Plan's
administration.

     Board of Directors: The court granted the motion to dismiss
the Board of Directors. The court found that Plaintiffs have not
adequately pleaded that the individual Board members are
fiduciaries to the Plan for purposes of the conduct alleged. The
court explained that The Board of Directors' fiduciary
responsibility with respect to the Plan is a limited one. The only
power the Board had under the Plan was to appoint, retain, or
remove members of the Committee.

The court also found insufficient allegations for failure to
monitor or co-fiduciary liability claims against the Board of
Directors, noting that the Amended Complaint makes only the
conclusory assertion, relying on group pleading without specific
factual allegations.

For the reasons set forth, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied
in part and granted in part. Plaintiffs' excessive fees claim is
dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs' claims as to the Board of
Directors are dismissed with prejudice. However, Defendants' motion
to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs' share class
claim.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=fHPRlF from PacerMonitor.com.

MOUNTAIN VALLEY: Faces Class Suit Over Carcinogen Contamination
---------------------------------------------------------------
Chloe Gocher of ClassAction.org reports that a proposed class
action lawsuit alleges that Mountain Valley Spring Water contains
multiple carcinogens despite claims of exceptional purity and
healthfulness.

The 47-page lawsuit claims that despite being advertised as "the
very best bottled water you can drink," "purely sourced,"
"exceptionally healthful" and "free of pollutants," Mountain Valley
Spring Water was found to contain uranium, arsenic and bromoform --
none of which are safe for human consumption in any concentration
or amount, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Independent lab testing also allegedly found cadmium in the water
at a concentration that, while within federal EPA benchmarks, is
twice the limit set forth in California's stricter Public Health
Goal.

These chemicals, the complaint says citing the EPA and the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, have been linked to
various health effects and conditions, which, depending on the
specific substance, may include:

  -- An increased risk of bladder, skin and lung cancers;
  -- Adverse pregnancy outcomes such as neurodevelopmental effects
and low birth weight;
  -- Cardiovascular disease;
  -- Kidney damage;
  -- Liver damage; and
  -- Bone demineralization.

The complaint claims that the presence of bromoform, in particular,
may indicate the use of chemical filtration and processing methods,
as bromoform is a byproduct of the chlorination of organic
materials. A chlorine-based treatment, the suit says, would
directly contradict Mountain Valley's claims of "3,500-year natural
filtration" and lack of additives and chemicals.

The lawsuit also contends that Mountain Valley may have actively
attempted to obscure knowledge of its alleged water contamination
and chemical processing methods in the past, such as when they
claimed a major supply shortage at the same time certain posts and
videos went viral on various social media platforms, including
TikTok, about independent testing revealing Mountain Valley Spring
Water was contaminated.

"The suspicious timing suggests Defendants may have voluntarily
restricted distribution to manage the crisis while maintaining
their premium pricing and 'purely sourced' marketing claims --
choosing to deceive remaining customers rather than admit the truth
about their water."

The case cites several potential sources of contamination,
including mining operations that may disturb geological formations
containing arsenic and uranium, waste management facilities, and
several industrial facilities such as power plants and nuclear
facilities that are relatively nearby the Mountain Valley source.

Additionally, the filing writes, Mountain Valley "may have
manipulated their public disclosures or strategically decided to
stop releasing lab reports to conceal the contamination they knew
about," including by not reporting any of the at-issue contaminants
in its 2023 water quality report, which was the last one
published.

"Meanwhile, independent analysis by the Oasis Health App in 2025,
which ranks tests from over 600 bottled waters, ranks Mountain
Valley at 55/100 -- in the bottom 25% of all brands tested," the
suit adds. "Remarkably, Defendants' own budget brand, Primo Spring
Water, scores 68/100, proving Defendants can produce cleaner water
but choose not to for their 'premium' product."

Ultimately, the case argues that Mountain Valley knew or should
have known that its bottled water was contaminated and that
consumers would not have purchased the spring water—or at least
would not have paid a premium price—had they known about the
alleged presence of carcinogens.

The Mountain Valley class action lawsuit, filed against Primo Water
Corporation, Primo Water North America, Inc., and Mountain Valley
Spring Company, LLC, seeks to represent anyone in the U.S. who
purchased glass bottles of Mountain Valley Spring Water from a
retail store for personal, household or family use between June 7,
2023 and the date of class certification. [GN]

MYBOOKIE INC: Faces Class Action Suit Over Promotional Texts
------------------------------------------------------------
Top Class Actions reports that plaintiff Cody Connolly has filed a
class action lawsuit against MyBookie Inc.

Why: Connolly claims MyBookie ignored opt-out requests from
consumers who received text messages from the sports betting
company.

Where: The MyBookie class action lawsuit was filed in California
federal court.

A new class action lawsuit alleges MyBookie ignored opt-out
requests from consumers who received text messages from the sports
betting company.

Plaintiff Cody Connolly claims MyBookie sent the text messages to
promote its online sports betting platform, mybookie.ag, and
continued to send them even after consumers opted out.

Connolly argues MyBookie's alleged actions violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which prohibits companies from
sending unsolicited text messages without obtaining prior express
consent from the recipient.

"The TCPA affords special protection for people who request to be
placed on a company's internal do not call list," the MyBookie
class action states. "Specifically, the TCPA provides that each
person who receives more than one call on their cell phone after
requesting to be placed on the company's internal do not call list
is entitled to recover a penalty of $500 per call, and up to $1,500
per call if the TCPA is willfully or knowingly violated," it
added.

MyBookie sent plaintiff 10 text messages after he opted out, class
action alleges

Connolly claims he received at least 10 marketing text messages
from MyBookie after he opted out of receiving them by replying
"STOP" to a text message he received from the company on Sept. 7,
2023.

"Defendant entirely ignored Plaintiff's request; it never stopped
bombarding Plaintiff with texts as recently as March and June
2025," the MyBookie class action states.

Connolly wants to represent a nationwide class of consumers who
received two or more text messages from MyBookie within a 12-month
period after they had already opted out.

He demands a jury trial and requests declaratory and injunctive
relief and an award of statutory and punitive damages for himself
and all class members.

In related news, two class action lawsuits allege a group of online
gaming companies are illegally operating internet casinos under the
guise of "free-to-play sweepstakes."

The plaintiff is represented by L. Timothy Fisher, Julia K.
Venditti and Joshua B. Glatt of Bursor & Fisher P.A.

The MyBookie class action lawsuit is Connolly v. MyBookie Inc.,
Case No. 4:25-cv-06688, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California. [GN]

NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT: $1.7MM Settlement Gets Initial Court Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Jeffrey Stephenson and Billy Smith II,
individually, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Navy Federal Credit Union, Defendant, Case
No. 3:23-CV-01851-WQH-KSC (S.D. Cal.), Judge William Q. Hayes of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted the unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement and Provisional Class Certification.

The Court ordered that the Motion is granted after considering the
Class Action Settlement Agreement and all supporting documents
filed by the Plaintiffs on July 22, 2025.

The Court preliminarily certified two settlement classes under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3).

     -- The Written Explanation Settlement Class includes all
Accountholders whose claims of unauthorized electronic fund
transfers were denied by Navy Federal Credit Union between October
10, 2022, and the date the Court grants preliminary approval of the
Settlement.

     -- The Document Request Settlement Subclass covers all
Accountholders in the Written Explanation Settlement Class who
requested documents Navy Federal relied on in making its
determination and who did not receive them.

The Settlement achieved by the Parties through experienced counsel
-- reached via arm's-length negotiations with the assistance of a
respected mediator -- guarantees substantial benefit for the
Settlement Class Members. In exchange for a release of certain
claims against Navy Federal, the Parties agree that Navy Federal
will:

     -- provide $1,700,000 to Settlement Class Members to fund (a)
payments or Account credits to Settlement Class Members who file a
valid and timely Claim Form; and (b) any award of attorneys' fees,
costs, and expenses. Settlement Class Members will receive a pro
rata share of the Net Settlement Fund (with the opportunity for a
second pro rata share for Settlement Class Members who also are
members of the Document Request Settlement Subclass);

     -- separately pay $5,000 to each Plaintiff to settle their
individual claims for actual damages and $5,000 Service Awards to
Plaintiffs for serving as Class Representatives; and

     -- Settlement Administration Costs paid to the Settlement
Administrator, to be reimbursed in whole or in part if there are
uncashed checks after payments to Settlement Class Members.

Navy Federal promised to implement changes to its policies and
procedures for handling account-holders' claims for unauthorized
transfers promotes Electronic Fund Transfer Act-compliance and adds
meaningful Settlement value. The Settlement does not release
Settlement Class Members' actual-damages claims based on Navy
Federal's purported improper denial of a claim of unauthorized
transfers. Instead, Settlement Class Members release claims of
statutory damages only, which are capped under the EFTA. 15 U.S.C.
sec. 1693m(a)(2)(B).

On December 11, 2024, the Parties participated in an Early Neutral
Evaluation with Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford, which did not
result in settlement. Then, on February 26, 2025, the Parties
requested, and the Court granted a stay of the case to allow the
Parties to participation in a mediation to see if they could
resolve the case without further litigation.

On June 4, 2025, the Parties attended a full-day in-person
mediation before Judge Diane M. Welsh (Ret.), which resulted in an
agreement to the material terms of this Settlement. On June 6,
2025, the Parties notified the Court that they had reached an
agreement to settle in principle on a class-wide basis and
stipulated to stay the case. The Parties then negotiated the
Agreement now pending preliminary approval.

Judge Hayes found that the settlement classes satisfy Rule 23
requirements, noting that the number of Settlement Class Members is
so numerous that joinder is impracticable and there are questions
of law and fact common to the Settlement Class members. The Court
determined that the claims of the Class Representatives are typical
of the claims of the Settlement Class members and the Class
Representatives are adequate representatives for the Settlement
Class.

The Court found that it will likely be able to approve the
Settlement as set forth in the Agreement as fair, reasonable, and
adequate under Rule 23(e). The judge determined that the settlement
substantially fulfills the purposes and objectives of the class
action and provides beneficial relief to the Settlement Classes,
considering the risks and delay of continued litigation and all
other relevant factors.

The Court noted that the settlement is the result of arm's-length
negotiations involving experienced counsel, with the assistance of
a neutral mediator and preliminarily meets all applicable
requirements of law, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1715,
for settlement purposes only.

The Court appointed Plaintiffs Jeffrey Stephenson and Billy Smith
II as Class Representatives for the Settlement Classes. Class
Counsel appointments include Scott Edelsberg and Adam Schwartzbaum
of Edelsberg Law, P.A.; Edwin E. Elliott of Shamis & Gentile, P.A.;
and Sophia Gold and Jeffrey D. Kaliel of Kaliel Gold PLLC.

The judge approved Kroll Settlement Administration LLC as the
Settlement Administrator and directed the company to perform the
functions and duties of the Settlement Administrator set forth in
the Settlement—including providing notice to the Settlement
Classes and effectuating the Notice Program.

The Court ordered the Settlement Administrator to send the
agreed-upon Notices to the Settlement Class within 60 calendar days
following the entry of this Order and will carry out all
requirements of the Notice Program set out in Section Four of the
Agreement.

The Court established that Settlement Class Members who wish to be
excluded must send a written request for exclusion to the
Settlement Administrator. The request must be postmarked on or
before 45 days after the Notice Date and include specific
information including the case name and a statement indicating the
Settlement Class member's desire to be excluded from the Settlement
Class, the Settlement Class member's name, current address, and
signature.

For objections, the Court ordered that any Settlement Class Member
who objects must file with the Court a written statement (along
with any supporting papers), postmarked or filed on or before 45
days after the Notice Date. The Court warned that any Settlement
Class Member who does not make an objection to the Settlement in
the manner provided herein shall be deemed to have waived and
forfeited any and all rights he or she may have to object, appear,
present witness testimony, and/or submit evidence; shall be
precluded from seeking review of the Settlement by appeal or other
means; and shall be bound by all terms of the Settlement and by all
proceedings, orders, and judgments in the Action.

The judge scheduled the Final Approval Hearing for February 4,
2026, at 10:30 a.m. at the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, James M. Carter and Judith N. Keep
United States Courthouse, 333 West Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101.
The hearing will address whether the Settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and should be granted final approval by
the Court and consider the application for an award of attorneys'
fees and litigation expenses of Class Counsel.

The Court enjoined all members of the Settlement Classes, and
anyone who acts or purports to act on their behalf, from pursuing
or continuing to pursue all other proceedings in any state or
federal court related to the claims covered by the settlement. The
judge emphasized that the Settlement does not constitute an
admission, concession, or indication by the Parties of the validity
of any claims or defenses in the Action or of any liability, fault,
or wrongdoing of any kind by Defendant.

The Court retained jurisdiction to consider all further matters
arising out of or connected with the Settlement and noted that it
may approve the Settlement, with such modifications as may be
agreed to by the Parties, if appropriate, without further notice to
the Settlement Classes.

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          1925 Century Park E #1700
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: Scott@edelsberglaw.com  
                  Adam@edelsberglaw.com

                - and -

          Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
          Sophia G. Gold, Esq.
          KALIELGOLD PLLC
          1100 15th Street NW, 4th Floor
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 350-4783
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
                  sgold@kalielgold.com

                - and -

          Edwin E. Elliot, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: edwine@shamisgentile.com

Defendant Navy Federal Credit Union is represented by:

          Nancy R. Thomas, Esq.
          John D. Freed, Esq.
          Fred B. Burnside, Esq.
          Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
          Tel: 213-655-9689
               415-276-6500
               206-757-8016
          E-mail: nancythomas@dwt.com
                  jakefreed@dwt.com
                  fredburnside@dwt.com

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ZAXR2Y from PacerMonitor.com.

NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Affirms in Part Dismissal of Claims Against DOH
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as A.H., by her next friend E.H., R.D., by
her next friend M.D., J.D., by his next friend D.D., H.L., A.B.,
J.S., J.C.M., L.P., by her next friend C.P., and Disability Rights
New York, Plaintiffs v. New York State Department of Health, James
V. McDonald, New York State Office for People with Developmental
Disabilities, Willow Baer, Defendants, Case Nos. 24-725-cv(L),
24-728-cv(CON) (2d Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands
the district court's dismissal of claims and denial of intervention
in a lawsuit alleging delays in moving individuals with
developmental disabilities to community-based settings.

Circuit Judge Joseph F. Bianco wrote the Panel's opinion. Circuit
Judge Myrna Perez dissented in part, disagreeing with the dismissal
of DRNY's claims.

According to the Court, Plaintiffs in this case are an organization
called Disability Rights New York ('DRNY') and eight individuals
with developmental disabilities ('Individual Plaintiffs') who
allege long delays in moving from restrictive institutional
facilities to community-based residential settings.

The New York State Office for People with Developmental
Disabilities (OPWDD) administers Medicaid's Home and Community
Based Services (HCBS) Waiver Program. The Individual Plaintiffs,
eligible for community-based settings, allege that they remained
institutionalized for nine months to six years, causing physical
and psychological regression. DRNY, a Protection and Advocacy
System, is authorized to "pursue legal, administrative, and other
appropriate remedies or approaches to ensure the protection of, and
advocacy for, the rights of individuals with developmental
disabilities."

Upon careful examination, the Plaintiffs sued the Defendant under
the Medicaid Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation
Act, and Fourteenth Amendment, seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief for themselves and a purported class. The Defendant moved to
dismiss DRNY's claims for lack of standing, arguing it suffered no
injury in fact. In a pre-motion letter, the Defendant claimed the
Individual Plaintiffs' claims were moot as they had been placed in
community residences. The Plaintiffs argued DRNY had
"congressionally authorized representational standing" under
federal statutes. They also contested mootness, citing "inherently
transitory" claims which are capable of repetition, yet evading
review." Eight additional individuals moved to intervene as
plaintiffs.

The Court found that the district court correctly dismissed DRNY's
claims for lack of standing because DRNY suffered no injury in
fact, and we reject its theory of 'congressionally authorized
representational standing.'" It stated, "Congress cannot erase
Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the
right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing."
Circuit Judge Perez dissented, arguing that "Congress authorized
DRNY to bring lawsuits on behalf of its constituents" and that "the
majority opinion's misreading of Supreme Court precedent" wrongly
limits Congress's power to shape standing. The Court held that "the
district court erred in dismissing the Individual Plaintiffs'
claims as moot based solely on pre-motion letters," as "it is not
unmistakably clear that the court lacks jurisdiction." The Court
also determined that "the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the motion to intervene" due to its
untimeliness.

Therefore, the Court affirmed the dismissal of DRNY's claims and
the denial of intervention. It vacated the dismissal of the
Individual Plaintiffs' claims as moot and remanded for further
proceedings. Accordingly, the case was partially upheld and
partially returned for review. Circuit Judge Perez dissented from
the standing ruling but concurred in the mootness and intervention
rulings.

A copy of the Opinion is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=FrXxuI from PacerMonitor.com.


NISSAN MOTORS: Faces Class Suit Over Defective Compression Engines
------------------------------------------------------------------
Emmet White of Road Track reports that Nissan's innovative variable
compression engines were a fascinating innovation when they were
first revealed, but the jury is still out on whether or not the
combustion technology will stick around. A June 2025 recall filed
with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration explained
that Nissan's three- and four-cylinder variable compressions
engines were prone to dramatic rod bearing failure, and now a group
of unsatisfied customers are suing the Japanese automaker.

A complaint against Nissan was filed in a federal district court in
Delaware in late July on behalf of multiple plaintiffs, covering
2019-2022 Infiniti QX50, 2022 Infiniti QX55, 2021-2024 Nissan
Rogue, and 2019-2020 Nissan Altima owners. Both the 1.5-liter
KR15DDT three-cylinder and 2.0-liter KR20DDET four-cylinder engines
are included in the 450,000 unit recall and lawsuit filings.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that Nissan's innovative engine
technology was known to be faulty from the start, and that the
automaker should have taken steps to warn owners of the potential
for failure.

"Defendants' knowledge of the Engine Defect comes from, among other
things, pre-production testing, numerous consumer complaints,
warranty data, dealership repair orders, and internal analyses of
complaint and production issues," the complaint reads. "Despite
knowing of the Engine Defect, Defendants regularly deny its
existence until after the expiration of the five year/60,000 mile
Nissan New Vehicle Limited Warranty Powertrain Coverage. . ."

While the lawsuit alleges that Nissan is holding out on paying
certain affected owners, the complaint also includes plaintiffs who
allegedly didn't even get to 1000 miles before experiencing a
complete engine failure. A Florida man driving a 2023 Nissan Rogue
claims that his engine failed dramatically at 157 miles, completely
shutting down and forcing the plaintiff to coast to a stop on the
side of the road. One plaintiff in New York even claims that a full
engine replacement on her Nissan Altima did not remedy the issue.

The actual mechanics of the variable compression engine are
fascinating. The engine can switch between high compressions
settings under high loads or degrade its compressions ratio for
improved efficiency under mild loads. A pair of connecting rods is
responsible for this new-age movement on each piston. The second
connecting rod can adjust the "multi-link" shaft and thereby alter
the position of the piston. Unfortunately, this kind of movement
could have made the bearings on both the adjustment mechanism and
the crankshaft worse for wear.

"Nissan has identified bearing failures in certain vehicles
equipped with the subject 3-cylinder 1.5L or 4- cylinder 2.0L
variable compression turbo engine (VC-Turbo) engines. A potential
manufacturing defect in specific engine bearings (main, A-, C-, and
L-link) or supporting engine components may cause engine damage and
potentially lead to engine failure," the June recall filed with
NHTSA reads.

The class-action lawsuit seeks multiple remedies from Nissan, and
it specifically focuses on Nissan expanding its recall notice to
additional model years of previous recalled models. Notably, the
Japanese automaker still sells the VC-series engines in multiple
models, though the initial recall filing with NHTSA claims that
only 1.2 percent of the nearly 450,000 units would experience such
an engine failure. The plaintiffs are also seeking restitution in
the form of damages paid by Nissan, though the exact amount has yet
to be disclosed. [GN]

NOVO NORDISK: Court Tosses Most Claims Against 401(k) Fiduciaries
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as John Fumich, Laura Mischley, Raphael
Hinton, Ronnie McLean, and Thomas Chaffin, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Novo Nordisk
Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No. 24-9158 (ZNQ) (JBD), Judge Zahid
N. Quraishi of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey grants the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

The Court dismissed Counts One through Four without prejudice and
in part as requested by Defendants, while allowing limited portions
of two counts to proceed.

Plaintiffs filed their class action Complaint on September 13, 2024
pursuant to Sections 409 and 502 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Sections 1109 and 1132,
against the fiduciaries of Novo Nordisk Inc.'s 401(k) Savings Plan.
During the class period, the Plan was alleged to have at least $1.2
billion in assets under management. As a result, as one of the
largest plans in the United States, the Plan had substantial
bargaining power to obtain the most cost efficient investments.

The Plan's total assets under management for all funds as of
December 31, 2023 was $2,303,296,181. Under the Plan, several
investment options were available to participants each year. Since
2018, the assets included the Schwab Managed Retirement Target Date
Funds in the V and VI share classes. The Schwab Funds are
tax-exempt collective investment trusts, as opposed to mutual
funds.

Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants did not exercise appropriate
judgment in scrutinizing each investment option, initially and on
an ongoing basis. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties owed to the Plan and Plaintiffs by failing to
objectively and adequately review the Plan's investment portfolio
to ensure that each investment was prudent.

At the start of the Class Period, the Plan held more than $268
million in the Schwab Funds. That number grew to $538 million in
2023. As a result, Plaintiffs alleged that multiple investment
firms and banks, including American Funds, Callan GlidePath Funds,
MFS Lifetime Funds, and T. Rower Price, offered alternative funds.
However, under the Plan, participants who want to invest in a
target date strategy have no choice other than the Schwab Funds,
which significantly underperformed.

Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants failed to control the
Plan's Recordkeeping and Administrative costs and failed to defray
reasonable expenses of administering the Plan, by using Plan
participant funds to reduce company contributions instead of using
the funds to reduce amounts charged to participants.

Plaintiffs asserted claims for breach of the fiduciary duty of
prudence (Count One), breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty
(Count Two), breach of ERISA's Anti-Inurement Provision (Count
Three), and failure to monitor fiduciaries (Count Four).

The court found that Plaintiffs' allegations were conclusory and
speculative and failed to make out a claim that the Retirement
Committee breached the fiduciary duty of prudence. Although
Plaintiffs alleged that the Schwab Funds significantly
underperformed, they failed to plead allegations pertaining to the
Retirement Committee's process in arriving at its decision to use
the Schwab Funds and to continue using them.

The court noted that a court assesses a fiduciary's performance by
looking at process rather than results, focusing on a fiduciary's
conduct in arriving at a decision and asking whether a fiduciary
employed the appropriate methods to investigate and determine the
merits of a particular investment. There were no allegations
challenging how the Retirement Committee arrived at the decision to
choose the Schwab Funds and to continue using them.

The court emphasized that allegations of underperformance, without
more, do not suffice. The court found that the charts presented by
Plaintiffs demonstrated that the Schwab Funds' underperformance was
only slight in comparison to other funds, militating against an
inference that Defendants acted imprudently.

Count Two asserted a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty against all Defendants for using forfeited funds in the
Plan for Novo Nordisk's benefit instead of the Plan participants
and beneficiaries. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants acted
disloyally by using forfeited funds to offset contributions instead
of using the funds to pay for recordkeeping and administrative
costs and fees, which Plaintiffs and Plan participants had to pay.

The court found that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a
breach of the duty of loyalty. The Plan expressly stated that All
forfeited amounts may be used to reduce the applicable Employer's
future contributions, restore forfeited Accounts, or pay certain
Plan expenses. The text of the Plan was therefore fatal to
Plaintiffs' allegations.

The court explained that requiring Defendants to use the
forfeitures to pay administrative costs would use the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and prudence to create a new benefit to
participants that is not provided in the plan document itself.

Count Three asserted a claim for breach of ERISA's Anti-Inurement
Provision by Novo Nordisk and the Board. Plaintiffs alleged that
they were liable to restore to the Plan all losses caused by their
breaches of ERISA's anti-inurement provision, and also to restore
any profits resulting from such breaches.

The court found that Plaintiffs' anti-inurement claim failed
because ERISA does not create a duty for a plan sponsor to maximize
pecuniary benefit, only to ensure that participants have received
the benefits promised to them. Most fatal to the claim was that
Plaintiffs did not allege that any of the forfeited assets left the
Plan.

The court agreed with Defendants that allegations that fiduciaries
received incidental or indirect benefits does not satisfy a claim
for breach of ERISA's anti-inurement provision.

Plaintiffs asserted a claim for the failure to monitor other
fiduciaries, alleging that Novo Nordisk and the Board had a duty to
monitor the Retirement Committee to ensure that they were
adequately performing their fiduciary obligations, and to take
prompt and effective action to protect the Plan in the event that
the Retirement Committee were not fulfilling those duties.

The court noted that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for breach
of the duty to monitor absent an underlying breach of the duties
imposed under ERISA." Because the Complaint failed to adequately
plead breaches of the underlying duties, the portions of
Plaintiffs' corresponding claim for failure to monitor were also
dismissed.

For these reasons, the Court granted the Motion. Counts One through
Four were dismissed without prejudice and in part as requested by
Defendants. The claims were dismissed to the extent they were
premised on the decision to include the Schwab Funds as Plan
investments or to use forfeitures to offset contributions instead
of paying recordkeeping fees.

However, the following portions of two counts were permitted to
proceed: (1) the portion of Count One alleging that the Retirement
Committee breached its duty of prudence by permitting the Plan to
pay excessive recordkeeping fees; and (2) the portion of Count Four
alleging that Novo Nordisk and the Board breached their duty to
monitor the Retirement Committee regarding that issue.

A copy of the court's decision can be found at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=0ZHcEdfrom PacerMonitor.com.


NV WOODWORK: Garcia Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages for Carpenters
----------------------------------------------------------
JOSE LUIS GARCIA REYES and ROMAN GERONIMO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NV WOODWORK
CORP., (d/b/a NV WOODWORK), and NICOLAS VEGAS, Defendants, Case No.
1:25-cv-04679 (E.D.N.Y., August 22, 2025) is a class action against
the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law including failure to pay minimum wages,
failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide wage notice,
failure to provide wage statements, and failure to pay wages on a
regular weekly basis.

The Plaintiffs worked at the Defendants' custom-made, handcrafted
woodworking shop, located in Brooklyn, New York, where their sole
duties consisted of doing carpentry work.

NV Woodwork Corp., doing business as NV Woodwork, is a custom-made,
handcrafted woodworking company, headquartered in Brooklyn, New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                
      
       Michael A. Faillace, Esq.
       MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, PC
       60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
       New York, NY 10165
       Telephone: (212) 317-1200
       Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

OE FEDERAL: Court Narrows Claims in Jimenez Cyber Attack Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants in part and denies in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the case captioned as Daniel Jimenez
Jr., Mark Hendren, Erica Jaramillo, and the class members they seek
to represent, Plaintiffs v. OE Federal Credit Union, Defendant,
Case No. 24-cv-02746-JST (N.D. Cal.).

The matter is a class action lawsuit involving an alleged
ransomware attack and data breach.

The Court found that between approximately August 19, 2023 and
October 29, 2023, OEFCU suffered a targeted data breach impacting
certain categories of PII/PHI. The breach involved personally
identifiable information and protected health information including
full names; Social Security numbers; dates of birth; bank and/or
financial account information; Taxpayer Identification Numbers;
driver's license numbers; usernames and passwords; passport
numbers; medical procedure information; clinical or treatment
information; medical provider names; and health insurance
information.

The credit union sent impacted individuals of the data breach a
notice letter on April 30, 2024, informing them of the breach.
Third-party reports confirmed that the perpetrators of the
cyber-attack were from the cybercriminal group 'No Escape.

The Court found that Plaintiffs adequately pleaded all elements of
negligence. Regarding duty, the Court stated that OEFCU had a duty
to store Plaintiffs' PII/PHI with care. For breach, Plaintiffs
specifically allege that OEFCU failed to meet the minimum standards
of cybersecurity frameworks including "the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework Version 1.1" and the Center for Internet Security's
Critical Security Controls. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs
have alleged plausible damages to support their negligence claim
including time spent monitoring accounts and emotional distress.

The Court denied the motion for Jimenez and Hendren, finding they
adequately alleged a claim of implied breach of contract because
they alleged that they were required to submit their PII to OEFCU
as a condition of receiving services. However, because Jaramillo
does not allege that she was a customer of OEFCU, her claim was
dismissed with leave to amend.

The Court refused to dismiss the invasion of privacy claims, noting
that courts are generally hesitant to decide claims of this nature
at the pleading stage. The Court emphasized that disclosure of such
information is more likely to constitute an 'egregious breach of
the social norms' that is 'highly offensive'" when medical
information is involved.

The Court rejected Defendant's argument that the unjust enrichment
claim was barred by the existence of an implied contract claim,
distinguishing this case from others involving express contracts.
The Court noted that the doctrine of implied contracts has its
foundation in the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

The Court dismissed the UCL claims for lack of statutory standing,
finding that Plaintiffs failed to allege actual monetary losses.
The Court stated that courts generally view lost time alone as a
non-economic injury that is insufficient to confer statutory
standing under the UCL. The Court noted that nowhere do Plaintiffs
allege that they paid any actual sums to OEFCU to receive any
services.

The Court found that OEFCU qualified as a business under the CCPA
rather than a mere service provider. The Court determined that
Plaintiffs specifically allege that OEFCU collected Plaintiffs' PII
and PHI as a condition of providing its services and therefore
plausibly allege that OEFCU is a business under the CCPA.

The Court denied the motion for Jimenez and Hendren, finding they
adequately alleged that delayed notification caused incremental
harm. However, Jaramillo's CCRA claim was dismissed because she
does not allege to be a customer of OEFCU.

The Court dismissed the declaratory relief claim, finding it was
duplicative of the negligence claim and would neither serve a
useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in
issue nor terminate the proceedings. The Court also noted that
declaratory relief is a remedy and not a standalone cause of
action.

Accordingly, the Court grants OEFCU's motion to dismiss in part:
the breach-of-implied-contract claim and the CCRA claim brought by
Erica Jaramillo are dismissed with leave to amend; Plaintiffs' UCL
claims are dismissed with leave to amend; and Plaintiffs' claim for
declaratory relief is dismissed with prejudice. The Court denies
the remainder of OEFCU's motion.

The Court ordered that Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint
within 28 days of this order solely to address the deficiencies
identified in the order. Failure to timely file an amended
complaint will result in dismissal of the relevant claims with
prejudice.


PACESETTER PERSONNEL: Dismissal of Villarino Suit Vacated in Part
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Shane Villarino, an individual, Laura J.
Johnson, an individual, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Walter Strong v. Kenneth Joekel, an individual,
Marc Plotkin, an individual, Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc.,
Pacesetter Personnel Service of Florida, Inc., Florida Staffing
Service, Inc., Tampa Service Company, Inc., Case No. 24-11124 (11th
Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part the district
court's dismissal of the amended complaint.

The matter is before Circuit Judges Rosenbaum, Lagoa, and Abudu.

The plaintiffs are daily unskilled laborers who were employed by
Pacesetter, a temporary staffing agency, at its labor hall located
on East Commercial Boulevard in Fort Lauderdale from January 29,
2016, until the location's closure in February 2021. The plaintiffs
alleged that Pacesetter failed to provide restroom facilities and
drinking water for workers at the Labor Hall, in violation of the
Florida Labor Pool Act, Florida Statute Section 448.24.

In January 2020, plaintiffs Villarino and Johnson, along with two
other individuals, sued Pacesetter in federal court in the Southern
District of Florida under case number 0:20-cv-60192. The case was
assigned to United States District Judge Raag Singhal. In a
four-count amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged minimum and
overtime wage violations under federal and Florida law and
violations of the Florida Labor Pool Act for charging unauthorized
or excessive fees and failing to provide workers with restroom
facilities and drinking water at the Labor Hall.

As litigation progressed, the district court limited the proposed
classes to individuals who had been employed at the Labor Hall, not
just employed by Pacesetter. In May 2022, the court granted
conditional certification for a class covering the potential
water-and-bathroom violations at the Labor Hall from January 29,
2016, until the location's closure in February 2021.

In January 2023, the district court granted Pacesetter summary
judgment on all claims but Count IV, finding a genuine dispute as
to whether Pacesetter provided restrooms and drinking water at the
Labor Hall. However, in February 2023, the district court entered
an order decertifying the Labor Hall class, finding that it would
be impossible to establish Article III standing on a class-wide
basis. The court explained that although the jury can determine in
one fell swoop whether Pacesetter supplied restrooms or water on a
given day, determining whether a particular worker suffered a
concrete injury would require individualized trials.

The district court subsequently declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the Florida Labor Pool Act claims, reasoning that
federalism concerns of federal courts of limited jurisdiction
weighing in on state law tip the factors in favor of dismissing the
remaining state-law claim. Accordingly, the district court ordered
that Count IV was "dismissed without prejudice."

In March 2023, plaintiffs Villarino and Johnson refiled the Florida
Labor Pool Act claims in Florida state court, adding two
individuals as defendants, Kenneth Joekel and Marc Plotkin, who
were citizens of Texas and who allegedly owned and operated the
Labor Hall.

Two months later, Pacesetter removed the action to the Southern
District of Florida, invoking federal diversity jurisdiction under
the Class Action Fairness Act. The case was assigned to United
States District Judge K. Michael Moore under case number
0:23-cv-61003.

Pacesetter's notice of removal asserted that the amount in
controversy exceeded $5,000,000, given allegations that the class
exceeded 3,800 individuals and that each violation resulted in
consequential damages or penalties of $1,000, whichever was
greater, combined with the possibility of multiple violations.

In June 2023, Villarino and Johnson moved to remand the action for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Pacesetter could
not establish that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million,
citing Judge Singhal's prior finding that the class claims could
not be maintained in federal court for reasons of Article III
standing.

In October 2023, the district court granted the defendants' motions
to dismiss, finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking over
Joekel and Plotkin and reasoning that the action was otherwise due
to be dismissed for improper claim splitting. The court dismissed
the complaint without prejudice, but with leave to amend.

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming Strong as a class
representative along with Villarino and Johnson and expanding on
the allegations against the individual defendants. According to the
pleading, Joekel, as sole owner of Pacesetter, and Plotkin, as the
"senior operations employee," jointly ran day-to-day operations for
Pacesetter entities. Plotkin visited Florida on Pacesetter business
four or five times per year, including multiple visits to the Labor
Hall.

According to the Court of Appeals, the district court again granted
the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court reasoned that the
amended complaint still failed to plead grounds for exercising
personal jurisdiction over Joekel and Plotkin, finding that they
acted only in their corporate capacities and finding no exception
applicable. The district court further concluded that the
amendments did not save the amended complaint from dismissal for
improper claim splitting.

The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred by failing
to resolve its subject-matter jurisdiction before dismissing the
plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The court noted that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a court first must
determine whether it has original jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
claims before it may proceed to the merits of the case.

Because the plaintiffs disputed the notice of removal's allegation
regarding the amount in controversy, the court explained that it
then fell to the district court to discern whether the amount in
controversy had been established. However, the court found that the
court did not make any findings that the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeded $5 million at the time of removal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the individual
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that
the district court properly applied the corporate-shield doctrine,
explaining that "under the corporate shield doctrine, the actions
of a corporate employee in a representative capacity do not form
the basis for jurisdiction over the corporate employee in their
individual capacity.

The court noted that apart from vague and conclusory assertions,
the amended complaint failed to establish that the individual
defendants took any action on their own account in the state, as
opposed to engaging in business as representatives of the
corporation. The court found that their liability was based on
their strictly corporate acts as agents or owners of Pacesetter,
which is insufficient for personal jurisdiction over nonresident
individuals.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal with
prejudice of the plaintiffs' amended complaint against Pacesetter
and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the
dismissal of the individual defendants, Joekel and Plotkin, for
lack of personal jurisdiction.

A copy of the Court of Appeals decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=IN0iPO from Pacermonitor.com.


PALO ALTO NETWORKS: N.D. California Dismisses Securities Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the securities class action case captioned as In re Palo Alto
Networks, Inc. Securities Litigation, Lead Case No. 24-cv-01156-CRB
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California grants the Defendants' motion
to dismiss with prejudice.

Judge Breyer found that Plaintiffs have brought this purported
class action against Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (or PANW) alleging
that the company and its executive officers violated the Securities
Exchange Act by making misleading statements to investors about its
financials. The Court determined that Defendants successfully moved
to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended complaint, and Plaintiffs
subsequently filed their operative second amended complaint, which
Defendants also moved to dismiss.

The Court concluded that the core failure of Plaintiffs' first
amended complaint is that Plaintiffs did not allege particular
facts that would establish that Defendants' statements were
misleading when they were made. Specifically, the Court found that
Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege facts to support their
assertions that (1) General demand was declining in August and
November 2023, (2) That demand for platform products was declining
in August and November 2023, (3) That demand for platform products
was low relative to demand for other products in August and
November 2023, or (4) That PANW had already decided to give away
free products in August and November 2023.

The Court determined that Plaintiffs' second amended complaint
fails to remedy these flaws in their first amended complaint. Judge
Breyer noted that Plaintiffs continued to rely heavily on PANW's
CEO's February 2024 statements that PANW had been quietly working
to develop programs that would ease customers' concerns about
platformization, but found that those statements do not prove that
PANW's August and November 2023 statements were false when made.

The Court emphasized that later, sobering revelations do not by
themselves make earlier, cheerier statement a falsehood, citing In
re Cloudera, Inc., 121 F.4th 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2024). Therefore,
the Court ruled that Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendants' 2023
statements were false when they were made are conclusory and fail
to state a claim.

The Court also addressed an independent ground for dismissal,
finding that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged scienter because
PANW's CEO's stock sales were not so suspicious as to give rise to
an inference of scienter. Despite Plaintiffs adding various
allegations about the history and purpose of SEC Rule 10b5-1, the
Court determined that nothing in this new material creates the
strong inference of scienter that is required to establish an
Exchange Act violation.

Additionally, Plaintiffs attempted to bring a new scheme liability
claim, but the Court ruled this fails for the same reasons as their
other claims fail. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs cannot
remedy their failure to plead falsity or scienter by repackaging
their claims as scheme liability claims under SEC Rules 10b-5(a)
and (c).

The Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Breyer
determined that Plaintiffs' failure to allege any new facts in
their third attempt at a complaint indicates that leave to amend
would be futile, so this dismissal is with prejudice.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=AqrMWu from PacerMonitor.com.


PARAMOUNT MANAGEMENT: Managers Face $700MM Suit Over Ponzi Scheme
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Chad Umble, writing for witf, reports that four of Lancaster County
businessman Daryl Heller's partners in his ATM investment network
are named as defendants in a class-action lawsuit filed Wednesday,
August 27, on behalf of 2,700 investors.

Batman Investments LLC claims in the suit that the men -- Jerry
Hostetter, Randall Leaman, Dave Zook and Mir Jafer Ali "Buck"
Joffrey -- helped carry out a $700 million Ponzi scheme by using
cash infusions from new investors to pay previous investors.

While Heller is not named as a defendant, the suit said Paramount
Management Group, which managed the ATMs, and the Prestige Funds
that recruited investors "were riddled with conflicts of interest
stemming from common ownership and control by Defendants and by
non-party Daryl Heller, who collectively grossly mismanaged the
Prestige Funds and misappropriated investor monies for
themselves."

Here's what we know about the four investment managers named in the
suit.

Jerry Hostetter

Jerry Hostetter partnered with Daryl Heller in 2011 to form
Prestige Investment Group, a company that solicited investments in
ATMs managed by Heller's Paramount Management Group.

Previously, Hostetter was the founder and owner of Hostetter
Management Co., a Lititz area hog management business he began in
1991 and then sold in 2004 to Hatfield Quality Meats. From 2008
until 2011, Hostetter was vice president of fund development at
Ephrata Community Hospital.

An avid golfer, Hostetter was instrumental in bringing the U.S.
Women's Open to Lancaster County Club, where it held its
championship in 2015 and 2024. Hostetter was the general chairman
for both events.

Hostetter, who lives in Manheim Township, graduated from Lancaster
Mennonite High School in 1979, the same year as William K. Poole,
another fund manager. Poole was an usher at Hostetter's wedding in
1981 and Hostetter was the best man at Poole's wedding in 1982.
Heller is also a graduate of Lancaster Mennonite High School, class
of 1988.

Randall Leaman

Leaman served as Paramount Management Group's chief executive
officer from 2022 to 2024, and as president for 11 years before
that.

A Millersville University graduate whose LinkedIn profile includes
note of MBA courses at Lebanon Valley College, Leaman previously
worked as a partner and chief financial officer at Tonya's Gluten
Free Kitchen in Newmanstown from 2010 to 2022. Leaman majored in
English and journalism while at Millersville.

Before that, he was CFO and vice president of finance at LamTech
Inc. in Ephrata and had served as vice president of operations for
Jemcor, the then-parent company of LamTech, Marblux and Jemson
Cabinetry. Jemson, at the time, was the county's largest
full-service kitchen and bath distributor, and Leaman served as
general manager before his promotion to vice president.

Leaman was working closely with Heller up until the end of 2024,
according to exhibits in filings submitted in the bankruptcy
litigation.

Dave Zook

Dave Zook was born in an Old Order Amish family near Atglen. In
2000, Zook became a partner in Stoltzfus Structures, his family's
shed building business. In addition to helping run the family
business, Zook began investing in real estate by pooling money from
investors.

In 2012, Zook made an ATM investment with Heller and soon became a
chief syndicator for the ATM business, recruiting investors to
contribute money.

In 2015, Zook founded Real Asset Investor, which promoted the ATM
investment along with investments in real estate, car washes and
self-storage facilities. Zook lives near Atglen.

Buck Joffrey

Buck Joffrey is a former surgeon who in 2008 completed a residency
in plastic surgery at the University of California, San Francisco.
After working in medicine, Joffrey began investing in real estate
as a syndicator. He began investing in ATMs with Daryl Heller
around 2021.

Joffrey, who lives in Santa Barbara, California, hosts the weekly
"Wealth Formula Podcast," which he began in 2013. He is the author
of the book, "7 Secrets of Eternal Wealth," and is a frequent
speaker and commentator on finances and investing. [GN]


PERRY ONAH: Court Narrows Claims in Vazquez's Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Angie Vazquez, Plaintiff, v. Perry Onah
Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Sec-Curity, J. Anthony Enterprises, Inc,
CAC Industries, Inc., Tully Construction Co., Inc, and ABC Bonding
Companies, Defendants, Index No. 152084/2023 (N.Y. Supreme Court,
New York County), Judge Gerald Lebovits granted in part and denied
in part multiple motions to dismiss.

Plaintiff Angie Vazquez worked as a construction flagger on
publicly financed construction projects in New York for defendant
general contractors J. Anthony, Tully, and CAC from 2018 to
December 2022. She was employed by Sec-Curity, which served as the
general contractors' subcontractor. New York City agencies hired
defendants to perform and/or manage construction work to be
performed at the Public Works Projects.

Plaintiff contends that a schedule of prevailing rates of wages and
supplemental benefits to be paid to all workers furnishing labor on
the site of the Public Works Projects was annexed to and formed a
part of the contracts between defendants and the City agencies. She
alleges that defendants paid her and other members of the putative
class less than the prevailing rates of wages and supplements to
which she and the other members of the putative class were entitled
to.

Plaintiff asserted five causes of action:

     (i) Breach of the public works contracts (against general
contractors),
    (ii) Breach of the public works contracts or subcontracts
(against Sec-Curity),
   (iii) Unpaid wages (against Sec-Curity),
    (iv) Overtime compensation (against Sec-Curity), and
     (v) Suretyship (against ABC Bonding).

The Court granted Tully's motion to dismiss the first cause of
action. Plaintiff claimed that Sec-Curity breached its subcontract
with Tully and sought to hold Tully jointly and severally liable
under Labor Law Section 198-e(5). However, plaintiff failed to
establish she was a third-party beneficiary of the subcontract
between Tully and Sec-Curity.

To state a third-party-beneficiary claim, plaintiff must plead:

     (1) The existence of a valid and binding contract between
other parties,
     (2) That the contract was intended for its benefit, and
     (3) That the benefit to it "is sufficiently immediate . . . to
indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to
compensate it if the benefit is lost."

The Court found that plaintiff has not provided facts or evidence
to support that she was hired to work Tully's public work
projects." The time sheets plaintiff submitted reflected her work
for CAC alone, not Tully.

The Court granted in part and denied in part Sec-Curity's motion to
dismiss the second cause of action. Regarding Sec-Curity's contract
with Tully, the Court noted that section 6.52CG.S.3. provides that
if any worker performing services under crossing guard is also
assigned the task of directing construction equipment . . . or any
laborer tasks, then such worker shall be deemed to be subject to
the provisions of Labor Law Section 220 Prevailing Wage Schedule.
However, since plaintiff failed to allege she worked on Tully's
projects, this claim was dismissed.

Regarding Sec-Curity's subcontracts with J. Anthony and CAC, those
agreements did not include express provisions about prevailing
wages. However, the Court found that plaintiff may rest a
third-party beneficiary claim on a contractual provision that
impliedly incorporates prevailing-wage requirements through
mandating compliance with all applicable laws.

The Court found that the subcontracts with J. Anthony and CAC
incorporated Labor Law Section 220 through their compliance
clauses. However, plaintiff only provided evidence of working on
CAC's projects through timesheets showing "CAC signed off on her
employee sign-in log. She neither alleges, nor provides evidence,
that she worked on J. Anthony's projects."

The Court granted Sec-Curity's motion to dismiss the third cause of
action. Plaintiff claimed that Sec-Curity violated Labor Law
Section 191 by failing to pay prevailing wages and overtime
payments. The Court found that a claim for nonpayment of wages,
rather than late payment of wages, does not fall within the scope
of Labor Law Section 191 (frequency of payments).

Additionally, the Court determined that plaintiff's claim was
duplicative of her causes of action for breach of contract and
overtime.

The Court denied Sec-Curity's motion to dismiss the fourth cause of
action. Plaintiff claimed that Sec-Curity violated 12 NYCRR 142-2.2
by failing to pay overtime at one-and-one-half times her regular
rate.

The Court found plaintiff sufficiently alleged the required
elements:

     (1) An employee of the defendant,
     (2) She worked more than 40 hours per week, and
     (3) Defendant failed to pay her certain overtime compensation
to which she was entitled. Plaintiff alleged she normally worked
from approximately 7:00am to 3:30pm five days per week, with an
unpaid one-half hour for lunch. Occasionally, she was required to
work until 4:00p.m. or 5:00p.m. as well as night shifts.

The Court ordered that:

     -- Tully's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first cause of action
is granted;
     -- Sec-Curity's motion to dismiss the second cause of action
premised on subcontracts with Tully and J. Anthony is granted;
     -- Sec-Curity's motion to dismiss the second cause of action
premised on its subcontract with CAC is denied;
     -- Sec-Curity's motion to dismiss the third cause of action is
granted;
     -- Sec-Curity's motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action
is denied;
     -- The balance of the claims in this action are severed and
shall continue; and
     -- The parties must appear for a telephonic preliminary
conference on September 15, 2025.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=WUyofX

PHH MORTGAGE: Continues to Defend Jones Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Onity Group Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2025, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 25, 2025, that its primary operating
subsidiary is currently defending a class action lawsuit
challenging, under state and federal law, its practice of charging
borrowers a fee to use certain optional payment methods, in "Jones
v. PHH Mortg. Corp., et al." (D. NJ), which the company moved to
dismiss.

In July 2024, the court granted the motion in part, dismissing the
majority of the claims. Onity filed an answer to the surviving
claims in August 2024.

In April 2025, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and a
recommendation that the court deny the company's motion; in May,
Onity filed objections to the recommendation and sought a de novo
review.

On July 17, 2025, following oral argument before the court, the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its case.

Onity Group Inc. is a non-bank mortgage servicer and originator
providing solutions to homeowners, clients, investors and others
through its primary operating subsidiary, PHH Mortgage Corporation
(PHH).


PHH MORTGAGE: Continues to Defend Knapp Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Onity Group Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2025, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 25, 2025, that its primary operating
subsidiary is currently defending a class action lawsuit
challenging, under state and federal law, its practice of charging
borrowers a fee to use certain optional payment methods, "Knapp v.
PHH Mortg. Corp., et al." (D. OR) was filed in state court in
Oregon in October 2024. Onity removed the matter to federal court
in Oregon in November 2024 and filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint in December 2024.

Onity Group Inc. is a non-bank mortgage servicer and originator
providing solutions to homeowners, clients, investors and others
through its primary operating subsidiary, PHH Mortgage Corporation
(PHH).


PNC BANK: Gurevich Suit Moved From New Jersey to W.D. Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Alla Gurevich, individually, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PNC Bank,
Defendant, Case No. 24-11376 (D.N.J.), Judge Jamel K. Semper of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey grants the
Defendant's Letter Motion requesting the transfer of this case to
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The Court ordered that this action shall be transferred to the
Western District of Pennsylvania, to be coordinated or consolidated
with Acampora v. PNC Bank, Civil Action No. 24-01296, in the
discretion of the transferee court. Plaintiff consented to the
Defendant's request to transfer.

This action arises from Plaintiff Alla Gurevich's December 20, 2024
Class Action Complaint against the Defendant for alleged violations
of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and the New Jersey Wage Payment
Law. Gurevich, a former PNC mortgage loan officer, specifically
alleges that she and similarly situated PNC mortgage loan officers
in New Jersey were not compensated for their overtime work, and
that the Defendant had a common policy and practice of discouraging
the recording of all hours worked in order to avoid paying mortgage
loan officers overtime wages.

On September 11, 2024, a former PNC mortgage loan officer, Anthony
Acampora, commenced a proposed class action suit in the Western
District of Pennsylvania on behalf of himself and similarly
situated mortgage loan officers, alleging that the Defendant
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. That
action, captioned Anthony Acampora v. PNC Bank, Civil Action No.
24-01296, is currently pending in the Western District of
Pennsylvania. In that action, Acampora, like Gurevich here, alleges
that the Defendant failed to pay overtime wages to mortgage loan
officers, and maintained a common policy, practice and custom of
discouraging mortgage loan officers from accurately recording their
hours worked.

The Court found that the first-filed rule applies. According to the
Court, the first-filed rule ordinarily counsels deference to the
suit that was filed first, when two lawsuits involving the same
issues and parties are pending in separate federal district courts.
The Court determined that the Acampora Action commenced on
September 11, 2024, whereas Gurevich's action commenced on December
20, 2024. As such, the Acampora Action was filed first.

The Court found that the same issues requirement is met. Both the
Acampora Action and Gurevich's Complaint allege that the Defendant
failed to pay mortgage loan officers overtime wages and maintained
and engaged in a pattern and practice of discouraging mortgage loan
officers from accurately logging their overtime hours. Although the
Acampora Action involves Fair Labor Standards Act and New York
Labor Law claims, and the Gurevich Complaint involves New Jersey
Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage Payment Law claims, identical
claims are not required to meet this prong.

The Court determined that the Acampora Action and instant action
involve the same parties. When the first-filed rule is applied to
two putative class actions against the same defendant, "classes,
and not the class representatives, are compared. The Acampora
Action and instant action involve the same defendant and the
classes in each action overlap. Thus, although there are different
named plaintiffs in the Acampora Action and the instant action, the
same parties' requirement is met.

The Court agreed that transfer to the Western District of
Pennsylvania is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).
Section 1404(a) provides that for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought or to any district or division to which
all parties have consented.

The Court found that Gurevich could have brought this action in the
Western District of Pennsylvania. The Western District of
Pennsylvania will have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant
since the Defendant is headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
The Western District of Pennsylvania also would have personal
jurisdiction over Plaintiff because Plaintiff has consented to
personal jurisdiction there. Venue would also be proper in the
Western District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1391(b)(1) since the Defendant is headquartered in Pittsburgh.

The Court determined that the convenience of the parties, interest
of justice, and public and private interest factors warrant
transfer to the Western District of Pennsylvania. The parties have
agreed that transfer to the Western District of Pennsylvania is
appropriate; Defendant is headquartered in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; and transfer would allow Gurevich and her proposed
class of New Jersey mortgage loan officer plaintiffs to coordinate
and consolidate their claims with Acampora and the proposed
nationwide class of mortgage loan officer plaintiffs in the
Acampora Action.

Judge Semper opines that transfer to the Western District of
Pennsylvania would also allow the Defendant to defend itself in a
single combined action, while still allowing the Plaintiffs to
pursue their common claims. Additionally, transfer would be
consistent with the first-filed rule and would promote judicial
economy.

A copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=1a4K0h from PacerMonitor.com.


PUMP.FUN: Executes $62MM Token Buyback as Class-Action Suit Looms
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Abdelaziz Fathi of Finance Feeds reports that Pump.fun, the
Solana-based memecoin launchpad, has repurchased more than $62.6
million worth of its native token PUMP, according to onchain data,
in a bid to reduce selling pressure and stabilize its market.

Data from Dune Analytics shows the buyback program has absorbed
over 16.5 billion tokens at an average price of $0.003785. Daily
repurchases, funded by platform revenue, have ranged between $1.3
million and $2.3 million over the third week of August. Pump.fun's
revenue comes largely from fees paid by users to launch new
memecoins.

The platform charges roughly 0.5 SOL (about $90) in listing fees
per token launch, in addition to taking a percentage of trading
activity once the new coin is live. Analysts estimate Pump.fun has
facilitated the creation of more than 1.2 million tokens since its
debut in January 2023, making it one of the most active launchpads
on Solana.

The platform generated more than $775 million in revenue since
launch, according to DefiLlama, though income briefly slumped in
late July, when weekly revenue fell to $1.72 million -- its lowest
level since March 2024. At its peak in May, weekly revenue topped
$56 million, coinciding with a surge of Solana memecoins that
briefly pushed SOL itself above $200, its highest level since late
2021.

Market Impact and User Growth

The buybacks appear to be lifting sentiment. PUMP has gained 12% in
July and 9% in the third week of August, trading at $0.003522 -- up
54% from an August low of $0.002282. The number of unique PUMP
holders has climbed to more than 70,800, with smaller accounts
holding under 10,000 tokens now making up nearly half of
distribution, pointing to stronger retail participation. Blockchain
explorer Solscan shows wallet activity on Pump.fun has nearly
doubled since May, with daily active users averaging 48,000
compared with 25,000 earlier in the year.

Competition has recently challenged Pump.fun's dominance. In July,
Solana newcomer LetsBonk briefly overtook the platform in 24-hour
revenue and market share. But data from aggregator Jupiter shows
Pump.fun has since regained ground, capturing 73% market share and
handling $4.5 billion in trading volume, compared with LetsBonk's
$543 million and 9% share.

Pump.fun's largest rival outside Solana remains Ethereum's Uniswap
ecosystem, which has seen more than $12 billion in weekly volume
across meme-token pairs, though its higher fees and slower
transaction speeds have pushed many retail traders to Solana.

Despite its market recovery, Pump.fun faces escalating legal
pressure. A class-action lawsuit filed in January accuses the
platform of using aggressive marketing to push volatile tokens,
alleging investor losses of $5.5 billion. An amended filing in July
described Pump.fun as an "unlicensed casino" and likened its
mechanics to a "rigged slot machine," claiming that early adopters
profited at the expense of later participants.

The case, filed in the Southern District of New York, names both
Pump.fun and several affiliated wallets as defendants. Plaintiffs
are seeking damages as well as potential restrictions on token
launches, which could force Pump.fun to register under US
securities law if the court sides with regulators. The lawsuit
echoes previous cases against BitConnect and SafeMoon, both of
which ended in heavy penalties and settlements. [GN]

RECKITT BENCKISER: NYHTCHA Fund Named as Lead in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Elevator Constructors Union Local No. 1
Annuity & 401(k) Fund, Plaintiff v. Reckitt Benckiser Group plc, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-04708 (JPC) (SDA) (S.D.N.Y.),
United States Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York grants the New
York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Association of New York City,
Inc. Pension Fund's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and
denied the Elevator Constructors Union Local No. 1 Annuity & 401(K)
Fund's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff.

The action is a securities fraud class action lawsuit against
Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC and certain of its officers and
directors. On June 5, 2025, this action was commenced asserting
claims against Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC and certain of its
officers and directors under Section 10(b) (and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder) and Section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, on behalf of all persons other than
Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired Reckitt American
Depositary Shares between January 13, 2021, and July 28, 2024,
inclusive, and were damaged thereby.

Pending before the Court are a motion by New York Hotel Trades
Council & Hotel Association of New York City, Inc. Pension Fund for
appointment as lead plaintiff and a motion by Elevator Constructors
Union Local No. 1 Annuity & 401(K) Fund for appointment as lead
plaintiff. On June 5, 2025, the same day this action was filed, a
notice of pendency of the action was published on Business Wire, a
national newswire service, setting a deadline of August 4, 2025 for
members of the Class to apply to be lead plaintiff.

On August 4, 2025, the NYHTCHA Fund and the ECU Fund both timely
applied to be lead plaintiff. In its moving memorandum, the NYHTCHA
Fund stated that to the best of its counsel's knowledge, there are
no other plaintiffs with a larger financial interest than the
NYHTCHA Fund. In its moving memorandum, the ECU Fund stated that to
its knowledge, the Fund is the Lead Plaintiff movant with the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the Class.

On August 5, 2025, this Court entered an Order directing that each
of the NYHTCHA Fund and the ECU Fund file a submission, no later
than August 18, 2025, addressing which of the two has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the Class, as well as
whether the requirements of Rule 23 are otherwise satisfied as to
each. On August 18, 2025, the NYHTCHA Fund timely filed its
response to the Court's Order, stating (with numerical support)
that it possesses a larger financial interest than the ECU Fund. On
August 18, 2025, the ECU Fund also timely submitted its response,
stating that it appears that it has not asserted the largest
financial interest.

The Court analyzed the requirements under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The PSLRA directs the Court to
appoint the most adequate plaintiff to serve as lead plaintiff.
Under the PSLRA, the court must adopt a presumption that the most
adequate plaintiff is the person or group of persons that: (A) Has
either filed the complaint or made a timely motion to be appointed
as lead plaintiff; (B) In the determination of the court, has the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class; and
(C) Otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Regarding timeliness, the NYHTCHA Fund timely filed its motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff on August 4, 2025, within 60 days
thereafter. Accordingly, it has satisfied the first requirement to
become the presumptive lead plaintiff.

The Court also finds that the NYHTCHA Fund is the movant asserting
the largest financial interest.

The Court applied a four factor test considering: (1) The total
number of shares purchased during the class period; (2) The net
shares purchased during the class period; (3) The net funds
expended during the class period; and (4) The approximate losses
suffered. Of these factors, courts have consistently held the
fourth, the magnitude of the loss suffered, most significant.

The NYHTHCA Fund purchased a total of 585,730 shares, its net
shares purchased were 125,439, its net funds expended were
$2,763,451 and its claimed loss is $1,289,231. The only other
movant for lead plaintiff, i.e., the ECU Fund, concedes that it has
not asserted a larger financial interest. Accordingly, the second
requirement for the NYHTHCA Fund to become presumptive lead
plaintiff also has been met.

Finally, the NYHTHCA Fund has made a preliminary showing that it
otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In the present case, the NYHTHCA Fund's
claims are typical of those of the class because, like other
members of the Class, it purchased Reckitt ADSs during the Class
Period, was negatively affected by Defendants' alleged false and
misleading statements and omissions, and suffered damages
therefrom. The NYHTHCA Fund is adequate because its interests in
the action are aligned with the interests of the other Class
members.

Given the lack of opposition to the NYHTHCA Fund's motion, no proof
has been offered rebutting this presumption. The Court therefore
finds that the NYHTHCA Fund is the most adequate plaintiff and
appoints it to serve as lead plaintiff.

Regarding lead counsel selection, The NYHTHCA Fund has selected
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP as lead counsel. Robbins Geller
has substantial experience in the prosecution of securities fraud
class actions, and is qualified to prosecute this securities action
on behalf of the Class. Accordingly, the Court approves the
selection of Robbins Geller as counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, the NYHTHCA Fund's motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of lead plaintiff's
counsel is granted. The ECU Fund's motion for the same is denied.
The NYHTHCA Fund is appointed lead plaintiff, and Robbins Geller is
appointed lead counsel.

A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=IwEum5 from PacerMonitor.com.


RTX CORP: Fails to Properly Manage Savings Plan, Jacob Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
MELISSA JACOB and THOMAS MILLER, individually, and as
representatives of a Class of Participants and Beneficiaries of the
RTX 401(k) Plan, Plaintiff v. RTX CORPORATION and THE PENSION
ADMINISTRATION AND INVESTMENT COMMITTEES OF THE RTX SAVINGS PLAN,
RTX CORPORATION SAVINGS PLAN, and UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
EMPLOYEE SAVINGS PLAN, Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-01389 (E.D.
Va., August 22, 2025) is a class action against the Defendants for
violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' failure to act in the best
interests of the RTX Savings Plan, its participants, and
beneficiaries by failing to act in accordance with the plan
documents, breaching their fiduciary duties of loyalty and
prudence, using plan assets for the benefit of the employers,
dealing with the assets of the plan in their own interest, and
causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions. Furthermore,
the Defendants failed to monitor the Pension Administration and
Investment Committees of the RTX Savings Plan, RTX Corporation
Savings Plan, and UTC Employee Savings Plans (the "Committee") to
ensure that they were performing their delegated fiduciary
obligations.

As a result of the Defendants' fiduciary breaches, the Plan's
assets were decreased, and its participants and their beneficiaries
incurred avoidable expense deductions to their individual accounts,
says the suit.

RTX Corporation is an aerospace and defense conglomerate, with its
headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                
      
       Steven T. Webster, Esq.
       WEBSTER BOOK LLP
       2300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 728
       Arlington, VA 22201
       Telephone: (888) 987-9991
       Email: stw@websterbook.com

               - and -
       
       Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
       Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
       Elijah G. Savage, Esq.
       DICELLO LEVITT LLP
       Ten North Dearborn Street, Sixth Floor
       Chicago, IL 60602
       Telephone: (312) 214-7900
       Email: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
              dferri@dicellolevitt.com
              esavage@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -
       
       Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
       THE MILLER LAW FIRM
       950 West University Drive, Suite 300
       Rochester, MI 48307
       Telephone: (248) 841-2200
       Email: ssa@millerlawpc.com

SARAH D. CULBERTSON: Court Narrows Claims in Privacy Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Alana Hannant, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Sarah D. Culbertson
Memorial Hospital, Defendant, Case No. 4:24-cv-04164-SLD-RLH (C.D.
Ill.), Chief United States District Judge Sara Darrow of the United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted
in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss an Amended
Class Action Complaint. The Court dismissed 10 of 12 counts but
allowed two negligence claims to proceed.

Plaintiff Alana Hannant, a citizen of Illinois, alleges that
Defendant Sarah D. Culbertson Memorial Hospital, a non-profit
corporation headquartered in Illinois, wrongfully embedded
third-party tracking technology on its website as well as its
web-based tools and services. The hospital allegedly used Meta
Pixel tracking technology that tracks information about a website
user's device and the URLs and domains they visit and can be
configured to track more information, including a visitor's search
terms, button clicks, and form submissions.

Plaintiff alleges that by installing the Meta Pixel on its Website,
Defendant effectively planted a bug on Plaintiff's and Class
Members' web browsers and compelled them to disclose Private
Information and confidential communications to Facebook, without
their authorization or knowledge. She personally used Defendant's
Online Platforms to find a specific physician, to research
treatments, including information related to an MRI test, to search
for treatment information; to find out how to obtain medical
records; to use the patient portal. After doing so, advertisements
for MRI tests and advertisements for doctors treating back problems
began appearing in her Facebook feed.

     Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Counts IX-X)

The Court dismissed Count IX, finding that Plaintiff failed to
adequately invoke the crime-tort exception under HIPAA. The Court
stated that invoke the crime-tort exception, the specificity is
replaced by vague generalities and that she does not allege that
she actually contacted any specific physician, that she actually
obtained any of her medical records, nor even that she logged into
the patient portal.

For Count X, the Court found that Defendant is not an electronic
communication service provider, stating that simply operating a
website is not enough and that companies that merely purchase or
use electronic communications services in the conduct of their
ordinary business are not themselves electronic communications
services.

     Stored Communications Act (Count XI)

The Court also dismissed this claim for the same reasons as Count
X, as it also required Defendant to be an electronic communication
service provider.

     Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (Count XII)

The Court dismissed this claim, finding that Plaintiff's
allegations concern downstream information misuse rather than
unauthorized access. The Court noted that such allegations of
downstream information misuse do not support a CFAA claim in the
wake of Van Buren."

     Plaintiff's Lost Benefit of the Bargain

The Court dismissed this claim for failure to allege actual
damages. The Court found that Plaintiff's lost benefit of the
bargain is insufficient to maintain an ICFA claim and that her
other categories of damages, including diminished value of personal
information and harm to privacy interests, are also insufficient.

     Illinois Eavesdropping Statute (Count VIII)

Dismissed because the Court found that Plaintiff failed to
adequately allege violations under the specific subsections
invoked. The Court stated that Plaintiff does not plausibly allege
that Defendant surreptitiously recorded any private conversations
as defined by the IES.

     Negligence and Negligence Per Se (Counts I-II)

These claims survived the motion to dismiss. The Court found that
Plaintiff's allegations of emotional distress due to Defendant's
mishandling of her private information are sufficient to withstand
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court stated that under a proper
understanding of the longstanding principle of Illinois law
identified by Defendant, Plaintiff's alleged emotional damages may
be sufficient to maintain a cause of action for negligence.

     Invasion of Privacy (Count III)

The Court dismissed this claim because Plaintiff's allegations
concern a subsequent disclosure of information, not a wrongful
initial acquisition of information.

     Breach of Implied Contract (Count IV)

The Court dismissed this claim for failure to allege actual
monetary damages, as these intangible harms are not the sort of
actual or measurable damages which can support an implied contract
claim.

     Unjust Enrichment (Count V)

The Court dismissed this claim because Plaintiff's claim for unjust
enrichment must also be dismissed given the dismissal of related
claims based on the same conduct. According to the Court "Plaintiff
allegations that Defendant’s conduct in disclosing her Private
Information for its own financial gain was wrongful are also the
subject of either her now-dismissed IFCA claim or breach-of-implied
contract claim."

     Breach of Implied Duty of Confidentiality (Count VI)

The Court dismissed this claim because the Court found it is
unlikely that Illinois would recognize the breach of
confidentiality tort.

The Court granted Defendant's Motion to Reply and granted in part
and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. All counts except
Counts I and II, construed as negligence claims, were dismissed.
The Court gave Plaintiff until September 10, 2025, to seek the
Court's leave to file another amended complaint.

Judge Darrow noted that while discovery would likely be necessary
to understand the exact mechanism of Defendant's alleged practices,
Plaintiff has access to her end of the equation, such as whether
she used Defendant's website to book an appointment or log into a
patient portal. The Court found that the complaint's allegations
about Plaintiff's personal experiences lacked sufficient
specificity compared to those regarding potential class members.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=q49Ggp

SEMLER SCIENTIFIC: Faces Suit Over Misleading Company Statements
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces it has
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Semler Scientific, Inc. (NASDAQ: SMLR) between March
10, 2021 and April 15, 2025, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Semler
Scientific investors under the federal securities laws.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Semler Scientific did not disclose a material
investigation by the United States Department of Justice (the
"DOJ") into violations of the False Claims Act, while discussing
possible violations of the False Claims (and aggressive DOJ
enforcement thereof) in hypothetical terms; and (2) as a result,
defendants public statements were materially false and/or
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October
28, 2025. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://rosenlegal.com/submit-form/?case_id=39889 or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at case@rosenlegal.com.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR’S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 4 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm achieved the largest
ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese Company
at the time. Rosen Law Firm’s attorneys are ranked and recognized
by numerous independent and respected sources. Rosen Law Firm has
secured hundreds of millions of dollars for investors.

Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome.

Contacts:

     Laurence Rosen, Esq.
     Phillip Kim, Esq.
     The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
     275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Tel: (212) 686-1060
     Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
     Fax: (212) 202-3827
     E-mail: case@rosenlegal.com
             www.rosenlegal.com [GN]

SONOS INC: Court Names Interim Counsel in App Redesign Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Robert Bornemann, et al., Plaintiffs v.
Sonos, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:25-cv-04656-MEMF-KS (C.D. Cal.),
Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California grants in part and denies in
part the Stipulated Request to Appoint Interim Co-Lead Counsel.

The Court appointed Pomerantz LLP and Tina Wolfson of Ahdoot
Wolfson, PC, as Interim Co-Lead Counsel to represent the putative
class in this consolidated consumer protection litigation against
Sonos.

Plaintiffs in these consolidated putative class actions allege that
Defendant Sonos released a materially degraded version of its
software application for its home and audio products. On May 7,
2024, Sonos released an app redesign software which plaintiffs
allege substantially degraded the functionality of Sonos products.
Users were forced to install the redesign as access to the legacy
app was cut off without adequate warning.

Sonos's release of the redesign software violated various consumer
protection statutes, breached express and implied warranties, and
constituted deceptive and unfair business practices. Furthermore,
Sonos materially altered or omitted certain facts, commercially
harming purchasers deprived of the features and performance for
which they paid.

Plaintiffs Robert Bornemann, John Bird, and Thomas Flores initiated
this action on May 22, 2025. Four additional actions were filed in
the Central District of California over the following six weeks on
behalf of putative classes of Sonos device users. On July 2, 2025,
the parties stipulated to consolidate the five actions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).

On July 3, 2025, the Bornemann Plaintiffs filed a motion to appoint
Pomerantz LLP as Interim Lead Counsel and create an executive
committee on which the Rosen Law Firm and Portnoy Law Firm would
serve. That same day, Plaintiffs Scott Blair, Ryan Bolanowski, and
John Welch filed a competing motion to appoint Tina Wolfson of
Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC as sole Interim Lead Counsel.

On July 17, 2025, both the Bornemann and Blair Plaintiffs filed
oppositions. Sonos took no position on the issue. On July 24, 2025,
both the Bornemann Plaintiffs and the Blair Plaintiffs filed the
Stipulation, agreeing to appoint Pomerantz LLP and Tina Wolfson of
Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC as Interim Co-Lead Counsel.

The Court analyzed the appointment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(g) factors, which require consideration of: (i) The
work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential
claims; (ii) Counsel's experience in handling class actions, other
complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;
(iii) Counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the
resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.

The Court found that both Proposed Interim Counsel have undertaken
substantial and meaningful efforts to identify and investigate
potential claims. Pomerantz conducted a thorough factual and legal
investigation before initiating the suit and filed the first
complaint and initiated communication with other firms to
consolidate efforts. Pomerantz sent formal statutory notice letters
to Sonos under Georgia and Texas law contemporaneously with filing.
Pomerantz also extended effort beyond their own case, initiating
cross-firm collaboration to coordinate filings, discussing
consolidation with defense counsel, and proposing the structure for
a leadership slate including other plaintiff firms.

Wolfson's firm retained and consulted an expert prior to filing,
investigated aspects of the complaint such as the impact of the
software redesign, drafted a consumer-oriented complaint, and
collaborated extensively with other counsel. Wolfson coordinated
consolidation and employed a collaborative approach to leadership
after contacting counsel in the three other related cases.

Wolfson brings nearly 30 years of experience representing consumers
in complex class actions. She has served as lead counsel in
numerous high-profile cases, including the Apple Inc. Device
Performance Litigation, which resulted in a $500 million settlement
regarding device degradation caused by manufacturer-issued software
updates, factual issues that are somewhat analogous to those in
this action. Her firm has also successfully litigated major
consumer protection matters involving arbitration clauses, privacy
violations, and false advertising in the technology sector.

Pomerantz has extensive experience in securities and shareholder
litigation, including multimillion-dollar recoveries in derivative
suits and financial fraud matters. Pomerantz attorneys have
thorough experience successfully litigating class actions and
securing billions of dollars for defrauded investors. Pomerantz
represented users in a class action against Apple where they were
materially harmed due to a defective software update.

Both Proposed Interim Counsel demonstrate familiarity and
competence with the applicable law. Wolfson exhibits a nuanced and
targeted understanding of advanced consumer protection theories
under state statutes, including specific doctrines of unfair
competition, false advertising, and contract law. Wolfson's
extensive background of successful litigation in analogous class
action cases is sufficient to show that she has a robust knowledge
of the applicable law.

Pomerantz demonstrates a broad familiarity with technology-based
consumer deception matters and the surrounding statutory
frameworks. Pomerantz's broader legal knowledge is advantageous in
unpredictable and multifaceted litigation. While Pomerantz focuses
more extensively on broader liability theories and relief
structures, and Wolfson shows a narrow tailoring to the instant
subject matter, both appear sufficient to show a requisite
knowledge of the applicable law.

Wolfson contends that she fully understands the financial and human
resources this case will require and is willing to expend them.
Wolfson's law firm has never relied upon third-party funding for
any matter and has never failed to pay assessments. Wolfson claims
her team is comprised of talented, experienced class action
litigators that are well funded and ready to fully invest
themselves in the case.

Pomerantz has consistently demonstrated efficacy in devoting
necessary resources to complex litigation while advancing all
litigation costs. Pomerantz has committed to addressing any
situation that can arise in any stage of litigation, and will
allocate the necessary staff, resources, and diversity of skills at
its disposal to effectively prosecute this litigation.

The Court denied Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Stipulation as exceeding
the scope of an interim appointment under Rule 23(g)(3). Paragraph
5 provided that the order shall apply to any subsequently
consolidated action and any actions filed in, transferred to,
removed to, or otherwise sent to this Court relating to the facts
underlying this litigation. This provision effectively grants
Interim Co-Lead Counsel de facto class counsel status, as they
would have continued control over all related present and future
cases with no defined end point, and without regard for the Court's
later ability to select class counsel after certification.

Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation grants Interim Co-Lead Counsel sole
authority to communicate with the defendant's counsel and the
Court, while also binding its agreement on all other plaintiffs'
counsel. These powers are characteristic of class counsel and
appear to exceed the scope of the temporary and managerial role
ascribed to interim counsel outlined in Rule 23(g)(3).

The Court granted in part and denied in part the Stipulation. The
Court appointed Pomerantz LLP and Tina Wolfson of Ahdoot Wolfson,
PC, as Interim Co-Lead Counsel to act on behalf of the plaintiffs
and the class members in the Related Cases.

Interim Co-Lead Counsel shall have responsibilities including:
determining and presenting to the Court and opposing parties the
position of the plaintiffs and the putative classes on all matters
arising during pretrial proceedings; coordinating the initiation
and conduct of discovery; convening meetings among counsel;
conducting settlement negotiations; delegating specific tasks to
other plaintiffs' counsel; negotiating stipulations with opposing
counsel; monitoring activities of all counsel; serving as the
primary contact for communications between the Court and other
plaintiffs' counsel; ensuring proper distribution of notices and
orders; communicating with defense counsel; and allocating
attorneys' fees.

The Court clarified that Interim Co-Lead Counsel's authority shall
be limited to any precertification activities deemed necessary to
protect the interests of the putative class, and limited in tenure
until certification occurs, and this Court decides to appoint class
counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g)(1).

The parties are ordered to file a stipulation addressing the
consolidation of the Siena case within one week of the date of this
Order. The deadline for filing a consolidated complaint will run 30
days from the date of any order consolidating the Siena case, or 45
days from the date of this Order if no stipulation regarding the
Siena case is timely filed.

A copy of the court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=M4XDMc from PacerMonitor.com.


SPORT SQUAD: Class Settlement in Matus Suit Has Prelim. Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Greg Matus, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sport Squad, Inc. d/b/a
JOOLA, Defendant, Case No. 0:24-cv-60954-LEIBOWITZ/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
(S.D. Fla.), Judge David S. Leibowitz of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida grants the Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Provisional
Certification of Proposed Settlement Class.

The Court considered the Report and Recommendation filed on August
11, 2025, which recommended that the Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Provisional Certification of
Proposed Settlement Class be granted. The undersigned previously
referred the Motion to United States Magistrate Judge
Augustin-Birch for a report and recommendation, consistent with 28
U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72,
and Rule 1(d) of the Local Magistrate Judge Rules.

Having reviewed the Motion, the record, the Report and
Recommendation, the governing law and finding no error, the Court
ordered and adjudged that the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation is affirmed and adopted.

The Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement and
Provisional Certification of Proposed Settlement Class is granted.

Consistent with 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(d) of the Local Magistrate Judge
Rules, the Court referred any further motions and proceedings
concerning this class action settlement to Judge Augustin Birch.
Judge Augustin-Birch may schedule and conduct any hearings as
necessary.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=M51qLs from PacerMonitor.com.


STRATEGY INC: Investors Drop Bitcoin Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Maxwell Mutuma of BLOCKONOMI reports that investors in Strategy
Inc. have decided to end their class action lawsuit against the
company voluntarily. The dispute centered on the company's Bitcoin
accounting practices, specifically how it disclosed the impact of
changes in cryptocurrency accounting rules. The lead plaintiffs and
initiating shareholder dismissed their claims "with prejudice,"
meaning the case cannot be brought again by those investors.
However, other shareholders may still have the option to file
future claims.

Dismissal of Claims with Prejudice

The dismissal of the class action lawsuit marks a significant
moment for Strategy. The case began earlier this year after the
company announced changes in cryptocurrency accounting standards.
Investors claimed that the company misled the market by not
properly disclosing how the changes would affect its Bitcoin
holdings. The plaintiffs argued that this lack of transparency
distorted the true risks tied to the company's Bitcoin assets.

This ruling removes the immediate threat of a prolonged trial for
Strategy. Despite this, the company remains under scrutiny, as
other shareholders may pursue legal action. The case's resolution
with prejudice ensures that the plaintiffs cannot refile similar
claims in the future. However, it does not eliminate the
possibility of new lawsuits from other investors.

Implications of the Case for Strategy's Bitcoin Accounting

The controversy surrounding Strategy's Bitcoin accounting is not
over. The company's large Bitcoin holdings have been at the core of
its business model since it rebranded from MicroStrategy. As the
largest publicly traded holder of Bitcoin, Strategy's approach to
accounting for digital assets continues to attract attention from
both investors and regulators. Investors will continue to closely
monitor how the company handles its Bitcoin holdings on the balance
sheet.

While the dismissal provides immediate relief, analysts agree that
accounting rules for digital assets remain unclear. Under previous
accounting standards, companies had to report losses if Bitcoin's
value dropped but could not record gains unless the assets were
sold. The new standards offer more flexibility by allowing
companies to report both gains and losses at market value. This
change may ease some of the concerns, but questions over
transparency and accurate reporting remain.

Despite the lawsuit's dismissal, investor sensitivity around
Strategy's Bitcoin accounting disclosures is high. The company's
stock price, symbolized by MSTR, has shown volatility in response
to changes in its accounting practices. A notable example occurred
when Michael Saylor, the company's executive chairman, made a
significant change to its Minimum Net Asset Value (MNAV) policy,
causing the stock price to drop sharply. This highlights how vital
accurate and transparent reporting is for maintaining investor
confidence in the company's future.

Continued Scrutiny Over Digital Asset Reporting

While the legal battle may be over for now, Strategy's Bitcoin
accounting practices will continue to be scrutinized. Investors
will expect the company to adhere to evolving rules on how digital
assets are reported. The legal landscape surrounding cryptocurrency
accounting remains in flux, and companies with significant Bitcoin
holdings must remain vigilant. Future regulatory changes could
further impact Strategy's reporting practices, requiring the
company to adapt its approach.

Strategy's legal and financial standing depends on its ability to
navigate these complex accounting rules. As the company continues
its aggressive Bitcoin acquisition strategy, the eyes of both
investors and regulators will remain fixed on its disclosures. [GN]

VISA INC: Loses Bid to Enforce Settlement Against New Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Visa Inc. is taking an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit from the Memorandum and Order entered by
Judge Margo K. Brodie of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York denying its Motion to Enforce the Rule
23(b)(3) Class Settlement Agreement and Final Judgment -- in In re
Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust
Litigation, Case No. 05-MD-1720 (E.D.N.Y.) -- by Compelling Rule
23(b)(3) Class Members to Dismiss Released Claims.

Judge Brodie denied Visa's motion seeking an order compelling
members of the Rule 23(b)(3) Settlement Class to dismiss related
claims in a separate action entitled In re Visa Debit Card
Antitrust Litigation, No. 24-CV-7435 (S.D.N.Y.). The Court
concluded that Visa Debit Plaintiffs are not bound by the 2019 Rule
23(b)(3) Class Settlement's Release and therefore denies
Defendant's motion to enforce the settlement agreement.

This case involves multiple certified class actions. In November of
2016, the Court appointed counsel to two putative classes under
Rule 23(b)(2) -- Equitable Relief Class -- and Rule 23(b)(3) --
Damages Class. The Settlement Agreement defines the Settlement
Class as all persons, businesses, and other entities that have
accepted any Visa-Branded Cards and/or Mastercard-Branded Cards in
the United States at any time from January 1, 2004 to the
Settlement Preliminary Approval Date of January 24, 2019.

The litigation has extensive procedural history spanning nearly two
decades. In October of 2005, several complaints asserting similar
antitrust claims against Visa, Mastercard, and various issuing
banks were consolidated for pretrial purposes and transferred to
the Eastern District of New York. In December of 2019, the Court
granted final approval to a settlement agreement between Defendants
and the Damages Class. In March of 2023, the Second Circuit
affirmed in all material respects the Court's decision certifying
the Settlement Class and approving the Settlement Agreement.

In November 2024, Judge John G. Koeltl consolidated several cases
asserting similar antitrust claims against Visa in the Southern
District of New York. The consolidated complaint alleges that Visa
has unlawfully entrenched its monopoly in the debit network by
using a multi-faceted exclusionary strategy to stifle competition
and innovation in the United States debit market, resulting in
enormous financial harms to merchants and cardholders.

The Court first determined whether the Visa Debit Plaintiffs were
members of the Settlement Class. The Court found that the Visa
Debit Plaintiffs 'accepted' payment cards within the meaning of the
Settlement Agreement, noting that Plaintiff Yabla, Inc. accepted
debit payments routed on Visa's network starting in 2005 and
Plaintiff R&N Productions LLC d/b/a SewRobQnE accepted debit
payments routed on Visa's network starting in 2013.

Therefore, the Court finds that Visa Debit Plaintiffs are members
of the Settlement Class.

Release Provisions Analysis

The Court's central analysis focused on whether the Visa Debit
Plaintiffs' claims were subject to the Release provisions. The
Court applied the identical factual predicate test, explaining that
a settled class action may release claims "not presented directly
in the class action complaint" if the subsequent claims are "based
on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in
the settled class action."

Defendant argued that the claims in In re Visa Debit litigation
arise from the "same factual predicate as that underlying the
settled litigation" -- i.e., that Visa, in fact, exercised market
power to impose supra competitive interchange and network fees
regarding the same debit transactions. Defendant contended that
given that the two complaints allege the same damages from
interchange fees and network fees based on the same transactions
arising from the same conduct, the identical factual predicate test
is met regardless of any differences in the legal theories  on
which the complaints rely.

Visa Debit Plaintiffs argued that their claims were not released by
the Settlement Agreement. They contended that In re Visa Debit
depends upon a different legal theory and will require "proof of
further facts," and therefore In re Visa Debit and In re Payment
Card do not have identical factual predicates. They argued that
their claims seek to prove that Visa, acting alone, used agreements
or partnerships with potential competitors to restrain trade and
prevent them from introducing products that would disintermediate
Visa and encroach on its monopoly or attempted monopoly of the
debit network services market, while the In re Payment Card claims
depended on proving that Visa, working with Mastercard and their
member banks, both fixed prices as to the interchange fees and
imposed various anticompetitive rules that made it impossible for
merchants to escape those anticompetitive charges.

The Court found fundamental differences between the two cases. Visa
Debit Plaintiffs do not allege the same facts as the Rule 23(b)(3)
Class. They allege Visa wielded and protected its monopoly power in
the debit network by (1) requiring merchants to enter into loyalty
contracts or face high network fees and other penalties; (2)
stifling competition by offering incentives to Apple, PayPal, and
Square not to compete with Visa; and (3) attempting to acquire
potential debit network competitors such as Plaid.

In contrast, the Rule 23(b)(3) Class alleged that Visa and
Mastercard conspired to impose supracompetitive interchange fees on
merchants and that Visa and Mastercard leveraged their dominance in
the credit card network to become the dominant debit card
networks.

The Court distinguished the core allegations: The allegations in In
re Visa Debit center on "Visa's anticompetitive conduct" leveraging
'its monopoly power in non-contestable debit transactions to
foreclose entry and competition in contestable debit transactions
through, among other things, its volume commitment agreements with
acquiring banks. Meanwhile, The In re Payment Card allegations
center on "the fees [America's largest banks have] imposed on
merchants for transactions processed over the dominant Visa and
MasterCard Networks."

The Court examined Visa's agreement with Apple as a key
differentiator. The Court noted that Visa offered "incentives,
sometimes worth hundreds of millions of dollars" to Apple "not to
compete" with Visa. While this agreement was briefly acknowledged
in In re Payment Card, the Court did not assess Visa's agreement
with Apple in In re Payment Card because that agreement and others
like it were not core to the Rule 23(b)(3) Class's allegations.
However, Visa's agreement with Apple was tangentially related to
the allegations in In re Payment Card, but forms the core of the
allegations in In re Visa Debit.

The Court rejected Defendant's argument that the cases involved
merely different legal theories based on the same facts. Visa Debit
Plaintiffs do not only or primarily allege that they are harmed by
Defendant's imposition of supracompetitive interchange fees, but
allege harm based on Visa's "contractual penalties and punitively
high network fees," and "reduced choice and innovation in the
market," all resulting from Visa's "multi-faceted exclusionary
strategy" to "unlawfully entrench[] its monopoly."

Court's Conclusion on Identical Factual Predicate

The Court concluded that the facts Visa Debit Plaintiffs allege are
materially different from the facts alleged by the Rule 23(b)(3)
Class. Although the facts in both cases overlap to some extent, the
facts Visa Debit Plaintiffs allege are materially different from
the facts alleged by the Rule 23(b)(3) Class. Therefore, the two
cases therefore do not arise out of an "identical factual
predicate."

Based on its analysis, the Court determined that Visa Debit
Plaintiffs' claims were not released by the Settlement Agreement
because they do not satisfy the "identical factual predicate" test.
The Court emphasized that Visa Debit Plaintiffs therefore rely on
facts related to Visa's market power, "disintermediation" strategy,
and agreements with companies like Apple, PayPal, and Square, none
of which were "presented directly" in In re Payment Card.

The Court concluded that Visa Debit Plaintiffs' claims are not only
based on a different legal theory but also on a different set of
core facts that were not subject to the Release. Accordingly, the
Court found that Visa Debit Plaintiffs are not bound by the 2019
Rule 23(b)(3) Class Settlement's Release and denies Defendant's
motion to enforce the settlement agreement.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Tnek60 from PacerMonitor.com.

Counsel for Defendant Visa Inc.:

Matthew A. Eisenstein, Esq.
Robert J. Vizas, Esq.
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
Three Embarcadero Center, 10th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111-4024
Tel: (415) 471-3100
E-mail: robert.vizas@arnoldporter.com

     - and -

Anne P. Davis, Esq.
Matthew A. Eisenstein, Esq.
Rosemary Szanyi, Esq.
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
601 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-3743
Tel: (202) 942-5000
E-mail: anne.davis@arnoldporter.com
        matthew.eisenstein@arnoldporter.com
        rosemary.szanyi@arnoldporter.com

     - and -

Michael S. Shuster, Esq.
Demian A. Ordway, Esq.
Blair E. Kaminsky, Esq.
HOLWELL SHUSTER & GOLDBERG LLP
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017
Tel: (646) 837-5151
E-mail: mshuster@hsgllp.com
        dordway@hsgllp.com
        bkaminsky@hsgllp.com


WALGREENS CO: Federal Court Keeps McGill Labor Case
---------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Mark Anthony McGill v. Walgreens Co. et
al., Civil Action No. EDCV 25-1422-KK-SP (C.D. Cal.), Judge Kenly
Kiya Kato of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California denied Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, saying
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims.

On April 8, 2025, plaintiff Mark A. McGill filed the operative
First Amended Class Action Complaint in the Riverside County
Superior Court against defendants Walgreens Co., Walgreens Boots
Alliance, Inc., James Titus, and Does 1 through 100, alleging
various California labor law violations. On June 6, 2025, Walgreens
Defendants removed the action to this Court, invoking original
diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.
On July 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand.

The First Amended Class Action Complaint raises the following
alleged violations of state law:

     (1) Failure to pay all wages;
     (2) Failure to provide meal periods;
     (3) Failure to provide rest periods;
     (4) Failure to provide recovery periods;
     (5) Failure to implement heat prevention and maintain legal
temperature controls;
     (6) Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements;
     (7) Failure to pay waiting time penalties;
     (8) Failure to reimburse for necessary business expenditures;

     (9) Violation of California's quota laws;
    (10) Unfair business practices in violation of Business and
Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.; and
    (11) Enforcement of the Private Attorney General Act.

Plaintiff brings the instant action on behalf of all current and
former non-exempt employees employed by Defendants in the State of
California within four years prior to the filing of this action to
the date of class certification.

The Class Action Fairness Act vests federal courts with original
diversity jurisdiction over class actions where: (1) there are at
least 100 class members; (2) any class member is a citizen of a
state different from any defendant; and (3) the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeds $5,000,000. The parties only disputed whether
the amount in controversy is satisfied.

In support of their Opposition, Walgreens Defendants provided the
declaration of their data analytics manager, Maxime Joly, which
provides that during the Class Period, non-exempt Walgreens
employees: (1) worked "at least 851,215 shifts exceeding five
hours," (2) worked "at least 882,678 shifts of at least 3.5 hours
in length," and (3) earned an "average final base rate of
approximately $20.04." Based on this data and an assumed 20%
violation rate, Walgreens Defendants estimate Plaintiff's meal and
rest break violation claims place at least $6,949,443.14 in
controversy.

Plaintiff argued that Walgreens Defendants' assumption of a 20%
violation rate is unreasonable based on the Complaint's language.
The Court found Walgreens Defendants' assumption of a 20% violation
rate to be reasonable based on the allegations in the Complaint.
Walgreens Defendants specifically pointed to the phrase at times in
support of its assumption of a 20% violation rate.

Courts in this district have found that assuming a 20% violation
rate from the phrase at times is a reasonable interpretation of the
complaint. Plaintiff's argument that it would be just as consistent
with the complaint to assume a frequency of once-per month, or
possibly once-per-quarter, has been squarely rejected by the Ninth
Circuit.

Plaintiff contended this Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over
his UCL claim, which seeks equitable relief in the form of
restitution and does not plead lack of an adequate legal remedy.
Plaintiff thus requested remand of just the UCL claim or,
alternatively, the entire case under 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).

However, according to the Court, the plain language of Section
1447(c) does not contemplate remanding a case for lack of equitable
jurisdiction. Equitable jurisdiction is creature of federal common
law, and thus cannot constitute a defect, which the Ninth Circuit
has limited to failures to comply with the statutory requirements
for removal provided in Sections 1441-1453.

Based on Walgreens Defendants' data and assumed 20% violation rate,
the amount in controversy exceeds the $5,000,000 jurisdictional
threshold. Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand.

A copy of the court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=SltHWF from PacerMonitor.com.

WASHINGTON: Lenay Sues Over Residents' Transfer to DOC Custody
--------------------------------------------------------------
CAYA LENAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ROSS HUNTER and JASON ALDANA, Defendants,
Case No. 3:25-cv-05743 (W.D. Wash., August 22, 2025) is a class
action against the Defendants for civil rights violations.

The case arises from the Defendants' transfer of 43 Green Hill
School residents under the age of 25 to Department of Corrections'
(DOC) custody without a review board hearing, where they were
subjected to emotional and physical abuse. The Defendants knew, or
should have known, that Green Hill School residents had a statutory
right to remain at Green Hill School pursuant to Revised Code of
Washington (RCW) 72.01.410 and RCW 13.40.280, but they ignored the
transferees' statutory rights, suit says.

As a result of the Defendants' conduct, the Plaintiffs suffered
economic and non-economic damages.

Ross Hunter is sued in her capacity as former Washington Department
of Children, Youth, and Families Secretary.

Jason Aldana is sued in his capacity as former Green Hill
Superintendent. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
       Darrell L. Cochran, Esq.
       Patrick A. Brown, Esq.
       PFAU, COCHRAN, VERTETIS & AMALA, PLLC
       909 A. Street, Suite 700
       Tacoma, WA 98402
       Telephone: (253) 777-0799
       Email: darrell@pcvalaw.com
              pbrown@pcvalaw.com

WOOPLA INC: Davis Suit Seeks Recovery of Illegal Gambling Losses
----------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WOOPLA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:25-cv-00619-MRB (S.D. Ohio, August 22, 2025) is a class action
against the Defendant for declaratory action, declaratory judgment,
individual losses, third party losses, violation of the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act, and unjust enrichment.

The class action seeks recovery of illegal gambling losses by Ohio
residents, including the Plaintiff, who played Woopla's illegal
online gambling games. The Plaintiff, on his own behalf and on
behalf of all similarly situated Ohio residents, seeks declaratory
judgment that Woopla's games violate federal law, and that Woopla's
online terms of service set out the terms and conditions under
which the illegal gambling is conducted are therefore unenforceable
in a federal court. Moreover, they ask a declaratory judgment that
the online terms of service and the arbitration provision contained
in the terms of service are each void as violative of Ohio law.

Woopla, Inc. is a game developer, with its principal place of
business in Sydney, Nova Scotia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Joshua D. Rockwell, Esq.
         ROCKWELL LLC
         47 East Wilson Bridge Road
         Worthington, OH 43085
         Telephone: (614) 315-1970
         Email: jrockwell@lawrockwell.com

                 - and -

         Wesley W. Barnett, Esq.
         DAVIS & NORRIS, LLP
         2154 Highland Avenue South
         Birmingham, AL 35205
         Telephone: (205) 930-9900
         Facsimile: (205) 930-9989
         Email: wbarnett@davisnorris.com

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Coty Inc. Defends Product Liability Cases
----------------------------------------------------------
Coty Inc. has been named as a defendant in numerous civil actions
alleging that certain cosmetic talcum powder products they sold
were contaminated with asbestos leading to bodily injury, according
to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Most of these actions involve a number of
co-defendants and, to date, many such actions have been resolved by
settlement or other resolution acceptable to the Company. In each
of the previous fiscal years the value of settlements, both
individually and in the aggregate, has not been material but, due
to the rising number of filed and pending cases against the
Company, as well as the evolving litigation landscape, settlement
values and other costs associated with these cases have increased
and are likely to increase in the future. The Company believes that
a limited portion of its costs incurred in defending and resolving
certain of these claims will be covered by insurance policies
issued by several insurance carriers, subject to deductibles,
exclusions, retentions and policy limits and, in some cases, there
may be indemnity obligations of third parties. While the Company
and its legal counsel intend to continue to defend these cases
vigorously, there can be no assurances regarding the ultimate
resolution of these matters, individually or collectively. The
Company has accrued for such litigation when the likelihood of loss
is probable and a reasonable estimate of such loss can be made, and
such accruals are not material to the Company's consolidated
financial statements. However, the range of reasonably possible
losses in excess of accrued liabilities currently cannot be
reasonably estimated."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ieMdJJ

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Insurers Take Pyrotek to Court Over Suit Coverage
------------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Sellers, writing for insurancebusinessmag.com, reports that
major insurers are squaring off with Pyrotek, Inc. in a
Pennsylvania federal court, seeking clarity on whether they have to
pick up the tab for a wave of asbestos lawsuits targeting the
manufacturer.

On August 4, 2025, ACE Property & Casualty Insurance Company,
Federal Insurance Company, Great Northern Insurance Company, and
Oakwood Insurance Company filed suit in the US District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Their goal: a definitive
answer on whether their policies require them to defend and
indemnify Pyrotek, a company with a long history in industrial
materials, now facing a steady stream of asbestos-related claims.

Pyrotek, which once operated under the name Fibrous Glass Products,
Inc., is no stranger to litigation. The company has been named in a
series of lawsuits - some from individuals who say they were harmed
by asbestos in Pyrotek's products, others from former employees who
allege exposure at work. The complaint highlights two categories:
"Products Lawsuits," brought by those exposed to
asbestos-containing products, and "Employee Lawsuits," brought by
workers who claim they were exposed on the job. One such case,
Barnhart Jr. v. 3M Company, et al., is currently pending in
Pennsylvania state court and centers on alleged exposure at
Pyrotek's Carlisle facility.

The insurers, for their part, insist their policies don't cover
these employee lawsuits. They cite specific language in their
contracts. ACE's policy, originally issued by Aetna Insurance
Company, includes general liability coverage but expressly excludes
"bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in
the course of his employment by the insured." It also carves out
any obligation covered by workers' compensation or similar laws.

Federal Insurance Company's umbrella policy and Great Northern's
general liability policy echo these exclusions. Federal's policy
says it does not apply to "any obligation for which the Insured or
any company as its insurer may be held liable under any Workmen's
Compensation, Unemployment Compensation, Disability Benefits Law,
or under any similar law." Great Northern's policy similarly
excludes employee injuries that occur in the course of employment,
unless the liability was assumed under a written contract or
agreement. Oakwood Insurance Company's umbrella policy contains a
general endorsement that limits coverage for employer liability,
except as provided in the underlying insurance.

Beyond the question of coverage, the insurers are also asking the
court to set clear boundaries on their potential liability. If the
court finds any duty to defend in the employee lawsuits, the
insurers want all asbestos exposure claims within a policy period
to be treated as a single occurrence - effectively capping their
payout at the per-occurrence limit. For product lawsuits, they
argue that all claims within a policy period should be subject to
the aggregate limit.

The complaint also ropes in United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company, Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., St.
Paul Mercury Insurance Company, and Travelers Property Casualty
Company of America. The plaintiffs are seeking a judicial
declaration of everyone’s rights and obligations under the
various insurance policies Pyrotek has amassed over the years.

It's worth underscoring that these are the insurers' claims, not
established facts. Pyrotek and the other defendants will have their
chance to respond, and the court will ultimately decide where the
chips fall.

For those in the insurance industry, this case is a fresh reminder
of the complexities that come with legacy asbestos claims and the
fine print that governs liability coverage. The outcome could shape
how insurers draft exclusions and limits in the future, especially
for manufacturers with a history of asbestos use.

For now, there's no decision - just a newly filed complaint and a
host of questions about who will foot the bill. But for anyone in
commercial insurance, it's a case that demands attention.

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judge Approves Presperse $50MM Bankruptcy Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Travis Rodgers, writing for Asbestos.com, reports that Hundreds of
asbestos exposure injury claims are set to be resolved after a
federal judge approved a bankruptcy plan for cosmetics supplier
Presperse and its parent company Sumitomo Corporation.

The company, which has battled asbestos-related lawsuits since
2015, faced a recent wave of litigation from people who claimed
they were exposed to asbestos through its talc-based products and
later developed asbestos-related illnesses, including mesothelioma.
Presperse supplies raw materials to the cosmetics and personal-care
industry.

The plan includes a $50 million trust to settle current lawsuits
and future claims and was approved by U.S. District Judge Robert
Kirsch and Judge Michael B. Kaplan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of New Jersey. Presperse filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy
in September 2024 after litigation costs threatened the company's
ability to continue operating.

Presperse is owned by Tokyo-based Sumitomo Corporation, which also
owns U.S.-based Sumitomo Corporation of Americas.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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