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250812.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Tuesday, August 12, 2025, Vol. 27, No. 160 Headlines 3M COMPANY: Chappell Suit Transferred to D. South Carolina 3M COMPANY: Lamon Suit Transferred to D. South Carolina A1 DEVELOPMENT: Hester Suit Removed from State Court to Alabama ALPHA BAKING: Johnson Suit Removed from State Court to N.D. Ill. AMAZON SERVICES: Court Sends Bahamonde Case to Arbitration CENTRAL NETWORK: Holway Suit Removed from State Court to C.D. Cal. CENTRAL NETWORK: Morse Suit Removed from State Court to N.D. Cal. CHRISTIAN DIOR: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Nguyen Alleges CITRIX SYSTEMS: Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Granted COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Murray Says CORKYS N FEDERAL: Commercial Property Violates ADA, Isaacson Says DOLCE & GABBANA: Court Dismisses Plaintiff's NFT Claims ENTRATA INC: Court Rejects Arbitration Bid in Trimble Case FBI: Court Dismisses Martin Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction HONEYBEE FOODS: Ariza Seeks Website Equal Access for Blind Users KROGER CO: Partial Bid to Dismiss Womick Class Suit Denied LOCKHEED MARTIN: Court Grants Interlocutory Appeal Motion LUV AJ: Website Inaccessible to the Blind Users, Henry Alleges MANAGED CARE: Allowed Leave to File Docs Under Seal MARTORELLO: 4th Cir. Upholds Lower Court's Denial of Motion to Dism MDL 2704: Court Approves $35.5M Attorney Fee Award MID AMERICA: Fails to Secure Personal, Health Info, More Says MONAT GLOBAL: Seeks to Modify Scheduling Order in Monat Suit MW SERVICES: Faces Mayhone Over Alleged Illegal Online Casino NAVIGATORS SPECIALTY: Must Indemnify Averhealth, Court Rules NCAA: Brantmeier Plaintiffs Wins Class Cert Bid NCAA: Court Grants Motions to Dismiss All Claims in Pryor NELNET SERVICING: Court Transfers FCRA Class Action to New Jersey NOW OPTICS: Parties Seek to Modify Class Certification Deadline OHO CARGO: Larios Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA, NYLL ORREFORS KOSTA: Website Inaccessible to the Blind, Henry Alleges PAUL CROFT: Strobel Plaintiffs Seek $239MM Default Judgment POLAR BEVERAGES: Court Dismisses Gradney Suit QUALTEK WIRELESS: Bid to Dismiss or Stay Dodge Class Action Tossed REDLINE SOCIETY: Moreno Seeks Leave to Conduct Class Certification SHEST LTD: Commercial Property Violates ADA, Pardo Suit Alleges SHORE MEDICAL: Mastromarino Breach Suit Removed to D.N.J. SIG SAUER: Glasscock Wins Bid for Rule 23 Class Certification STEADILY INSURANCE: Bid to Dismiss Class Suit Tossed w/o Prejudice SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Class Settlement in White Suit Gets Final Nod TEA DATING: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Jones Suit Says TMC: Court Grants Motion to Dismiss All Fraud Claims TRICOLOR HOLDINGS: Class Cert. Bid Filing in Campos Due Nov. 21 US CONCEPTS: Court Upholds Federal Jurisdiction Over Class Action WOLVERINE WORLD: Oh Suit Removed from State Court to C.D. Cal. ********* 3M COMPANY: Chappell Suit Transferred to D. South Carolina ---------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Terry Chappell, et al., and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. 3M Company, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-01018 was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, to the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina on July 28, 2025. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:25-cv-08659-RMG to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated as Personal Inj. Prod. Liability. 3M -- http://www.3m.com/-- is an American multinational conglomerate operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, healthcare, and consumer goods.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Gregory Cade, Esq. Kevin B McKie, Esq. Yahn Eric Olson, esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP PC 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Phone: (205) 328-9200 Fax: (205) 328-9206 Email: gary@elglaw.com GregC@elglaw.com kmckie@elglaw.com yolson@elglaw.com 3M COMPANY: Lamon Suit Transferred to D. South Carolina ------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Jeffrey Wade Lamon, et al., and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. 3M Company, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-01019 was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, to the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina on July 28, 2025. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:25-cv-08661-RMG to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated as Personal Inj. Prod. Liability. 3M -- http://www.3m.com/-- is an American multinational conglomerate operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, healthcare, and consumer goods.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Gregory Cade, Esq. Kevin B McKie, Esq. Yahn Eric Olson, esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP PC 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Phone: (205) 328-9200 Fax: (205) 328-9206 Email: gary@elglaw.com GregC@elglaw.com kmckie@elglaw.com yolson@elglaw.com A1 DEVELOPMENT: Hester Suit Removed from State Court to Alabama --------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as TAMARA HESTER v. A1 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Case No. 33-CV-2025-900095 (Filed June 26, 2025) was removed from the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Alabama, to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on July 30, 2025. The Northern District of Alabama Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:25-cv-01234-HNJ to the proceedings. The Plaintiff's allegations against A1 Development in this case arise from A1 Development's alleged publication of online games, namely casino-themed social games, which Plaintiff claims are unlawful contests of chance under Alabama law. The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit as a putative class action, seeking refunds of the net losses by all players who made purchases from Alabama for virtual tokens for A1 Development's games "in the period between six months prior to the complaint [December 26, 2024] and the entry of judgment." A1 Development has not filed responsive pleadings in the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Alabama, in advance of removing the case to this Court. The Plaintiff seeks to certify and represent a class defined as follows: "All Alabama residents who spent money purchasing virtual coins on A1's websites [sic] and suffered a net loss on the gambling games within the six months preceding the filing of this complaint and continuing to a date to be set by the Court following certification." All employees of the Court and plaintiff's counsel, and their families, as well as any individual who suffered a net loss of more than $75,000 on A1's games within the six months preceding the filing of this complaint, are excluded. The Defendant is a consultancy firm.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: John C. Neiman, Jr., Esq. William B. Grimes, Esq. MAYNARD NEXSEN PC 1901 Sixth Avenue N., Suite 1700 Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 254-1000 E-mail: jneiman@maynardnexsen.com bgrimes@maynardnexsen.com - and - Walter A. Saurack, Esq. DUANE MORRIS LLP 22 Vanderbilt 335 Madison Ave. 23rd Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: 212-404-9200 E-mail: wasaurack@duanemorris.com - and - William M. Gantz, Esq. 100 High Street, Suite 2400 Boston, MA 02110 Phone: Telephone: (857) 488-4234 E-mail: bgantz@duanemorris.com ALPHA BAKING: Johnson Suit Removed from State Court to N.D. Ill. ---------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as CARL JOHNSON, on behalf of himself individually and all others similarly situated v. ALPHA BAKING CO., INC., Case No. 2025CH06645 (Filed June 24, 2025), was removed from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Chancery Division, to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on July 30, 2025. The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:25-cv-08951 to the proceedings. The Plaintiff asserts claims against Alpha Baking relating to a data security incident that allegedly allowed an unauthorized third party to access the personally identifiable information of the Plaintiff and other individuals. Alpha specializes in the baking and distribution of bread, buns, rolls, and muffins.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Jena M. Valdetero, Esq. Aaron S. Klein, Esq. Christopher S. Dodrill, Esq. GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 5200 Dallas, TX 75201 Telephone: (214) 665-3601 E-mail: Christopher.Dodrill@gtlaw.com Jena.Valdetero@gtlaw.com Aaron.Klein@gtlaw.com AMAZON SERVICES: Court Sends Bahamonde Case to Arbitration ---------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Javier Bahamonde, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Amazon.com Services LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 25-cv-03499-JSC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part Amplio's motion to compel arbitration in this putative class action involving alleged violations of California labor laws. Plaintiff Javier Bahamonde worked for Defendants from approximately April 12, 2023, through approximately April 15, 2023. Plaintiff Dajane Sanders worked for Defendants from approximately November of 2022, through approximately June of 2023. Plaintiffs' job duties included delivering packages, and loading containers with merchandise. Defendants committed several California Labor Code violations against Plaintiffs and putative class members, including failing to pay overtime wages, provide meal and rest breaks, and properly itemize wage statements. Plaintiffs worked as delivery drivers for Amplio, which is based in Antioch and makes local-only deliveries in California for its clients, one of which is Amazon. When Amplio hired Plaintiffs, they both signed arbitration agreements titled "Mutual Agreement to Individually Arbitrate Disputes." The arbitration agreement does not expire upon termination of employment, rather it shall survive the term of Employee's employment. The agreement provides: "The Employee and Company agree that any covered claim, whether based in contract, tort, statute, common law, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal or equitable theory, shall be submitted to individual binding arbitration." The Court determined that Section 1 of the FAA creates an exemption for contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers. At the first step, the class of employees is defined as delivery drivers who make deliveries for Amplio's clients exclusively within California. Amplio's operations manager attests Amplio is a delivery service based in Antioch, California that makes local-only deliveries in California. A class of workers is directly involved in interstate commerce and thus falls under Section 1's exemption if the workers at least play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders. Amplio's delivery drivers are directly involved in interstate commerce. Plaintiffs attest Amplio drivers deliver goods with out-of-state addresses to in-state consumers. Accordingly, Amplio's drivers are what the Rittmann court deemed "last leg" delivery drivers. Under current Ninth Circuit law, Amplio's drivers are exempt under Section 1. Plaintiffs belong to a class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce and Section 1's exemption therefore applies. When the FAA is inapplicable, the analysis is exclusively guided by California law. Plaintiffs assert their claims are exempt from arbitration under California Labor Code Section 229 and California Labor Code Section 432.6. Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate. Section 229 applies only if a cause of action seeks to collect due and unpaid wages pursuant to sections 200 through 244. The Court found that most of Plaintiffs' causes of action do not fall within Section 229's protection. Plaintiffs' fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action seek recovery of penalties, not unpaid wages. Plaintiffs' first, eighth, and tenth causes of action do not arise from California Labor Code Sections 200 through 244. Plaintiffs' third and fourth causes of action under Labor Code Section 226.7 for missed meal periods and rest breaks are not actions seeking unpaid wages as defined by the statute. However, Plaintiffs bring their ninth cause of action for unpaid vacation upon termination under California Labor Code Section 227.3. By its plain language Section 227.3 is about the collection of unpaid wages; it provides that, upon termination, all vested vacation shall be paid to the employee as wages. Since an action under Section 227.3 is an action to enforce the provision of this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages, Plaintiffs' ninth cause of action may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate. Plaintiffs argue the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as unconscionable. Under California law, plaintiffs seeking to invalidate a contractual provision as unconscionable must prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability. The agreement was an employment contract of adhesion, as Plaintiffs attest they were not given the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement and it was presented to them on a take it or leave it basis. A nonnegotiable contract of adhesion in the employment context is procedurally unconscionable. However, where there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, the degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low. The Court found the agreement substantively unconscionable because: (1) the agreement has a broad scope that goes beyond Plaintiffs' employment with Amplio; (2) the agreement applies indefinitely; and (3) the agreement requires arbitration of claims as to third parties without reciprocal benefits. The Court determined that most of the substantive unconscionability can be cured by severing subsection (b) which extends arbitrability to claims unrelated to Plaintiffs' employment with Amplio. Since the Court can sever subsection (b), the substantive unconscionability of the arbitration agreement is low at most. As the degree of procedural unconscionability is also low, the agreement is not unenforceable as unconscionable. The arbitration agreement includes a class action waiver providing that class action, collective action, or consolidated action procedures are hereby waived and shall not be asserted in arbitration or in court. When an agreement with a class waiver is governed by California law rather than the FAA, such waivers may be unenforceable under the Gentry rule. The Court applied four factors: (1) the modest size of the potential individual recovery; (2) the potential for retaliation against members of the class; (3) the fact that absent members of the class may be ill informed about their rights; and (4) other real-world obstacles to the vindication of class members' rights through individual arbitration. The Court found the first three factors were met. Plaintiffs' counsel attests the maximum recovery for Plaintiff Bahamonde is $5,403.50 and for Plaintiff Sanders is $17,311.25. Plaintiff Sanders attests she knows from firsthand experience that none of her coworkers would feel comfortable reporting these policies. Both Plaintiffs attest they were not informed of a formal complaint procedure and that they did not know their rights under California law. In light of the three of the four Gentry factors that are met, a class proceeding would be a significantly more effective way of permitting the employees to enforce their statutory rights so the class waiver is unenforceable under California law. The Court invalidates the class action waiver. The Court granted Amplio's motion to compel as to all of Plaintiffs' causes of action except their ninth cause of action for unpaid vacation upon termination under California Labor Code Section 227.3. The Court stays this matter as to all of the causes of action compelled to arbitration pending completion of arbitration. The parties are ordered to meet and confer and file a joint statement a week in advance of the hearing indicating each parties' position on how to proceed on the ninth cause of action. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=31Idtf CENTRAL NETWORK: Holway Suit Removed from State Court to C.D. Cal. ------------------------------------------------------------------ The class action lawsuit captioned as CHARLENE HOLWAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CENTRAL NETWORK RETAIL GROUP, LLC d/b/a OUTDOOR SUPPLY HARDWARE; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 25CIV0117(Filed Feb. 25, 2025) was removed from the Superior Court of California, County of San Luis Obispo, to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on July 30, 2025. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:25-cv-07046 to the proceedings. The Plaintiff's complaint alleges failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, and failure to pay timely pay wages. The Plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class consisting of "All persons who have been employed by Defendants as Non-Exempt Employees or equivalent positions, however titled, in the state of California within four (4) years from the filing of the Complaint in this action until its resolution." CNRG is a multi-format, multi-brand retailer operating hardware stores, home centers, and lumberyards.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Vincent R. Fisher, Esq. Jose Cruz Zavala-Garcia, Esq. Jacqulynn A. Olivarez, Esq. O'HAGAN MEYER LLP One Embarcadero Center, Suite 2100 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 604-0159 E-mail: VFisher@ohaganmeyer.com CZavala@ohaganmeyer.com JOlivarez@ohaganmeyer.com CENTRAL NETWORK: Morse Suit Removed from State Court to N.D. Cal. ----------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as STEVEN LAWRENCE MORSE and OWEN SMITH JR., individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CENTRAL NETWORK RETAIL GROUP, LLC, a limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No. 24CV097267 (Filed Oct. 25, 2025) was removed from the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, to the United States District Court for Northern District of California on July 30, 2025. The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:25-cv-06411 to the proceedings. Morse's Complaint alleges Failure to Pay Minimum and Straight Time Wages; Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; Failure to Provide Meal Periods; and Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods. CNRG is a multi-format, multi-brand retailer operating 145 hardware stores, home centers, and lumberyards. The Defendant is represented by: Vincent R. Fisher, Esq. Jose Cruz Zavala-Garcia, Esq. Jacqulynn A. Olivarez, Esq. O'HAGAN MEYER LLP One Embarcadero Center, Suite 2100 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 604-0159 E-Mail: VFisher@ohaganmeyer.com CZavala@ohaganmeyer.com JOlivarez@ohaganmeyer.com CHRISTIAN DIOR: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Nguyen Alleges ------------------------------------------------------------- RALPH NGUYEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CHRISTIAN DIOR, INC., Case No. 1:25-cv-06270 (S.D.N.Y., July 30, 2025) alleges that the Defendant failed to properly secure and safeguard personally identifiable information of the Plaintiff and the Class members, including, without limitation: names, dates of birth, home addresses, phone numbers, driver's license number and/or passport numbers. In the course of its operations, the Defendant was entrusted with an extensive amount of Plaintiff's and the Class Private Information. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information, Defendant assumed non-delegable legal and equitable duties to Plaintiff and the Class members, asserts the suit. On May 7, 2025, learned that intruder gained entry to Defendant's network, accessed Plaintiff's and the Class members' Private Information, and exfiltrated information (the "Data Breach Incident"). Accordingly, the Plaintiff's and the Class members' Private Information that was acquired in the Data Breach Incident can be sold on the dark web. Hackers can access and then offer for sale the unencrypted, unredacted Private Information to criminals. The Plaintiff and the Class members face a lifetime risk of identity theft, says the suit. Christian Dior, Inc. was founded in 1946. The Company's line of business includes owning or leasing franchises, patents, and copyrights.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Zane C. Hedaya, Esq. THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI 1515 NE 26th Street Wilton Manors, FL 33305 Telephone: (813) 340-8838 E-mail: zane@jibraellaw.com - and - Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq. HIRALDO P.A. 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Telephone: (954) 400-4713 E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com CITRIX SYSTEMS: Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Granted ---------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Ryan Emmett, individually and on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Citrix Systems, Inc., et al, Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-546 (W.D. Pa.), Judge William S. Stickman IV of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted Plaintiff's motion to remand and denied Defendant's motion to transfer venue. The Plaintiff filed the class action data breach case in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated against Comcast and Citrix. The case involves a certified class action with two defined classes: 49-State Class: "All natural persons residing in the United States excluding California, whose [PII] was compromised as a result of the Data Breach." Cable Act Subclass: "All natural persons residing in the United States, excluding California, whose [PII] was compromised as a result of the Data Breach, and who received Xfinity Residential Services (including Xfinity Cable Television, Xfinity TV, Xfinity Internet, and/or Xfinity Voice)." The lawsuit centers around an alleged data breach that occurred in October 2023 ('the Data Breach') and allegations that Comcast and Citrix failed to properly secure and safeguard the personally identifiable information ('PII') of approximately 36 million Comcast customers. The complaint contains nine counts against the Defendants: Count One: Violations of the Cable Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. Sections 551(a), (c), and (e) against Comcast Count Two: Negligence against Comcast Count Three: Negligence per se against Comcast Count Four: Breach of express contract against Comcast Count Five: Breach of implied contract against Comcast Count Six: Unjust enrichment against Comcast Count Seven: Negligence against Citrix Count Eight: Negligence per se against Citrix Count Nine: Declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against both Defendants Citrix removed the litigation from state court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 and the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). The Plaintiff sought to remand the litigation requesting that the District Court remand the litigation to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, or, in the alternative, order a more definite statement as to subject-matter jurisdiction. Comcast filed a motion to transfer venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Plaintiff argued that judicial estoppel should prevent Citrix from removing the case because of inconsistent positions taken in a related case, Hasson v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, et. al., Case No. 2:23-cv-05039 (E.D. Pa.). In Hasson, "Comcast and Citrix filed motions to dismiss arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the action because the plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing." The Court applied the three-factor test for judicial estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped is asserting a position that is irreconcilably inconsistent with one he or she asserted in a prior proceeding; (2) the party changed his or her position in bad faith, i.e., in a culpable manner threatening to the court's authority or integrity; and (3) the use of judicial estoppel is tailored to address the affront to the court's authority or integrity. Because Citrix's position in the Hasson action has not been accepted by any court and because that litigation is at a more advanced stage, the District Court does not find that Citrix's removal of the action was done in bad faith, or that it presents an affront to the District Court's authority or integrity. Therefore, judicial estoppel does not apply to prevent Citrix from removing this action from state court, the District Court finds. The District Court analyzed whether the Plaintiff had Article III standing using the three-factor test from Clemens v. ExecuPharm Inc.: (1) whether the data breach was intentional; (2) whether the data was misused; and (3) whether the nature of the information accessed through the data breach could subject a plaintiff to a risk of identity theft. The District Court found that the current case is more akin to Reilly v. Ceridian Corporation than Clemens v. ExecuPharm Inc." The Plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating that the cybercriminals in the data breach at issue had the same type of malicious and sophisticated intent that existed in Clemens. The complaint does not plead any other facts supporting a finding that the breach had a high degree of intentionality or sophistication. This factor weighed against finding that Emmett has suffered an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. The District Court found the Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that his PII was misused by unknown cybercriminals. The Plaintiff alleged his information was "potentially compromised" which implies that he is speculating as to whether his information was even involved in the Data Breach. The District Court noted, "While Emmett alleges that multiple sets of Comcast/Xfinity data' was uploaded to 'Fox Store' and 'BlackBet,' Emmett does not allege that his PII was involved in either of these uploads." This factor weighed against standing, the District Court finds. The District Court determined that due to the sensitive nature of the potentially impacted data, particularly social security numbers, names, and dates of birth, the factor of "whether the data was misused" cuts in favor of a finding that Emmett has alleged an injury in fact. After weighing all three factors, the District Court concluded that "Citrix, as the removing party, has not met its burden of establishing that Emmett has the standing required for the Court's Subject-Matter jurisdiction." The District Court held that "Emmett's allegations are more consistent with those in Reilly than in Clemens." The District Court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that time and money expenditures to monitor his financial information established standing, finding that "costs incurred to prevent or monitor a speculative chain of future events based on hypothetical criminal acts are no more 'actual' injuries than the alleged 'increased risk of injury' which form the basis of Emmett's claims. The District Court determined that the bulk of Emmett's alleged injuries are hypothetical and concern only the possibility that he may suffer adverse consequences in the future." The claims relied on the same speculative chain of events that the Third Circuit rejected in Reilly: if the hacker read, copied, and understood the hacked information, and if the hacker attempts to use the information, and if he does so successfully, only then will plaintiff have suffered an injury.'" Since the Court finds that Emmett's claims involve future harms that are merely hypothetical, it finds that Emmett did not allege that he suffered an injury in fact. Thus, he does not have Article III standing, and the District Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the current action. The Court maintained that Citrix failed to meet its burden to establish that removal from state court was proper. Accordingly, Judge Stickman ruled that Emmett's complaint will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Defendants Comcast Cable Communications, LLC and Comcast Corporation's Motion to Transfer Venue was denied as moot, the Judge added. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=eQ7xc6 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Murray Says --------------------------------------------------------------- LIAM MURRAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Case No. 1:25-cv-06283 (S.D.N.Y., July 30, 2025) seeks to hold the Defendant responsible for the injuries Columbia University inflicted on Plaintiff and over 2.5 million others due to Defendant's alleged egregiously inadequate data security, which resulted in the private information of Plaintiff and those similarly situated to be exposed to unauthorized third parties (the Data Breach). The data that Columbia University exposed to the public is unique and highly sensitive. For one, the exposed data included personal identifying information, like admissions records, Social Security numbers, passport scans, citizenship statuses, disciplinary records, financial aid data, and university payroll files. The Plaintiff and Class Members provided this information to Columbia University with the understanding Columbia University would keep that information private in accordance with both state and federal laws. On June 24, 2025, Columbia University suffered a cyberattack, which caused Columbia University's systems to go offline for several hours. As a result of the cyberattack, the cybercriminal stole the Private Information of over 2.5 million individuals, including Plaintiff and Class Members. Columbia University disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by intentionally, willfully, recklessly, and/or negligently failing to implement reasonable measures to safeguard Private Information and by failing to take necessary steps to prevent unauthorized disclosure of that information. Columbia University's woefully inadequate data security measures made the Data Breach a foreseeable, and even likely, consequence of its negligence. Exacerbating the injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members, Columbia University failed to provide timely notice to Plaintiff and Class Members, depriving them of the chance to take speedy measures to protect themselves and mitigate harm. Today, the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members continue to be in jeopardy because of Defendant’s actions and inactions alleged herein. The Plaintiff and Class Members now suffer from a heightened and imminent risk of fraud and identity theft for years to come and now must constantly monitor their financial and other accounts for unauthorized activity, the suit says. Columbia University in the City of New York, commonly referred to as Columbia University, is a private Ivy League research university in New York City.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Paul C. Whalen, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF PAUL C. WHALEN P.C. P.O. Box 111 Haines Falls, NY 12436 Telephone: (516) 426-6870 E-mail: pcwhalen@gmail.com - and - Ronald Podolny, Esq. John A. Yanchunis, Esq. Antonio Arzola, Jr. MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP 201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor Tampa, FL 33602 Telephone: (813) 275-5272 Facsimile: (813) 222-4736 E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com ronald.podolny@forthepeople.com ararzola@forthepeople.com CORKYS N FEDERAL: Commercial Property Violates ADA, Isaacson Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- DENA ISAACSON, by and through her next friend, ITZHAK ISAACSON, Plaintiff v. CORKYS N FEDERAL HIGHWAY, LLC and WGC II, LLC, Case No. 0:25-cv-61530-R (S.D. Fla., July 30, 2025) is brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated disabled persons, asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the ADA's Accessibility Guidelines. The Plaintiff is disabled as defined by the ADA. He is required to traverse in a wheelchair and is substantially limited in performing one or more major life activities, including but not limited to: walking, standing, grabbing, grasping and/or pinching. The Plaintiff, in her individual capacity, visited the Subject Premises accompanied by her next friend and personally encountered physical barriers to access, which compelled her to engage with those barriers, resulting in legal harm and injury. Plaintiff continues to suffer harm due to the existence of these barriers and the Defendants’ failure to comply with ADA regulations. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has visited the Subject Premises and intends to return to utilize the goods, services, and accommodations offered to the public. However, she is deterred from returning while the discriminatory barriers and non-compliant policies described herein persist, says the Plaintiff. The subject property is a restaurant located at 418 N Federal Highway, Pompano Beach, Florida. The Defendant operates restaurant business.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Lauren N. Wassenberg, Esq. LAUREN N. WASSENBERG & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 33 SE 4th St., Ste. 100 Boca Raton, FL 33432 Telephone: (844) 702-8867 E-mail: WassenbergL@gmail.com DOLCE & GABBANA: Court Dismisses Plaintiff's NFT Claims ------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Luke Brown, Plaintiff, v. Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc., UNXD, Inc., Bluebear Italia S.R.L., Defendants, Civil Action No. 24 Civ. 3807 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc.'s motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by the plaintiff on behalf of a putative class. Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to amend his initial complaint, with full knowledge of D&G USA's view of the defects in the pleading but the Court found that the plaintiff "has [] failed to explain how a second amended complaint would be productive." Plaintiff Luke Brown brought the current action against three defendants: Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc., a Delaware corporation; UNXD, Inc., a Dubai corporation; and Bluebear Italia S.R.L., an Italian corporation. The plaintiff, on behalf of a putative class, alleges that defendants advertised, promoted, and sold digital assets, or 'Non-Fungible Tokens' ('NFTs'), but then failed to deliver the benefits they promised. The Complaint contended that the defendants jointly created and marketed the 'DGFamily' - a digital asset project . . . which was used to sell digital assets" or NFTs. The plaintiff alleged that defendants marketed DGFamily Products to purchasers by falsely claiming that, in exchange for transferring cryptocurrency to buy a DGFamily Product, purchasers would later receive benefits, including, among other things, digital rewards, physical products, and exclusive access to events, along with the support of an online ecosystem to use and market DGFamily Products. The Plaintiff contended that "once the purchasers' funds were used to purchase the NFTs, the developers abruptly abandoned the project and failed to deliver the promised benefits all while fraudulently retaining the purchasers' funds." The Complaint stated that in February 2024, Defendants made the business decision to forgo an expensive and time-consuming process to complete the DGFamily project or support it. As a result, the plaintiff allegedly lost $5,800. Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc. (D&G USA), the sole American defendant and the only defendant to be served, moved to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint. The defendant argued that it is incorrectly named in the amended complaint, as it never advertised, promoted, or sold the relevant NFTs." Defendant averred that the plaintiff's allegations refer to its Italian parent company, Dolce & Gabbana S.R.L., "which did enter into a joint venture in relation to the relevant NFTs. Defendant maintained "that it cannot be haled into court for D&G S.R.L.'s alleged conduct." The Court addressed whether the amended complaint adequately alleged Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc.'s direct liability. The defendant "recites the elements of plaintiff's twelve causes of action and argues that the amended complaint fails to tie D&G USA to any specific misconduct." Notably, "Plaintiff's counsel did not respond to this argument." The Court found that Plaintiff has thus abandoned this argument and D&G USA's direct liability cannot serve as a basis for denying D&G USA's motion to dismiss. The Court further noted that plaintiff's concession is required by law. Because plaintiff has pled no facts as to D&G USA's specific conduct . . . the Court cannot 'draw the reasonable inference that the [movant] is liable for the misconduct alleged. The Court examined whether the amended complaint sufficiently established Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc. as the alter ego of Dolce & Gabbana S.R.L. Under New York law, those seeking to pierce a corporate veil . . . bear a heavy burden. To succeed, a party must "make a two-part showing: (i) That the owner exercised complete domination over the corporation with respect to the transaction at issue; and (ii) That such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong that injured the party seeking to pierce the veil. Regarding complete domination, the Court reviewed ten factors and found the plaintiff's allegations insufficient. The Court stated the Plaintiff admits that of 'the 10 factors, the Complaint specifically alleges five,' arguing that 'four of the remaining factors follow naturally from those five' and that the 'one remaining factor (corporate funds used for personal use) is irrelevant.' The Court found that the plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegation about common branding because it does not include 'specific facts or circumstances as to how [D&G USA] disregarded the corporate form in conducting [D&G S.R.L.'s] business.' The Court emphasized that the plaintiff must do more than merely parrot the factors enumerated in the veil-piercing case law. On balance, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that D&G S.R.L. completely dominated D&G USA even if D&G S.R.L. allegedly shared some employees and office space with D&G USA. Regarding the second prong, the Court found that "plaintiff has failed to plead that such domination resulted in a wrong or fraud." The Court explained that alter ego liability requires more than conclusory allegations of control; the party . . . must plead sufficient 'factual allegations to establish that the parent's domination of the alleged alter ego was the means by which a wrong was done to plaintiff. The Court addressed whether the amended complaint complied with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A complaint violates Rule 8 if it "lump[s] all the defendants together in each claim and provid[es] no factual basis to distinguish their conduct." The Court found that "Plaintiff's amended complaint is plainly insufficient to withstand D&G USA's motion to dismiss." The Court explained, "The operative pleading refers to both D&G USA and D&G S.R.L. as 'Dolce & Gabbana' and attributes all misconduct to this shared moniker, without differentiating what each entity did." The Court emphasized that a plaintiff must still specify what conduct [a defendant] is alleged to have performed and, thus, against which allegations it must defend. A copy of the Court's order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=QBD7PO ENTRATA INC: Court Rejects Arbitration Bid in Trimble Case ---------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Kaitlyn Trimble, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Entrata, Inc., Defendant, Civil Action No. RDB-24-3710 (D. Md.), Judge Richard D. Bennett of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration. This putative class action arises from a contract between Plaintiff Kaitlyn Trimble and Defendant Entrata, Inc., which operated an online portal that Trimble utilized to pay her residential rent between 2023 and 2024. On October 29, 2024, Trimble initiated this action against Entrata in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, by filing a six-count Class Action Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment, equitable and injunctive relief, and damages. The Court confirmed that Entrata has met the requirements of Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d), 1453 such that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this putative class action. Entrata provided an affidavit asserting that "approximately 58,760 people paid [Entrata] a convenience fee . . . [and] that these convenience fees totaled to $12,996,719.30." In Reply, Trimble withdrew her Motion to Remand because Entrata's statements under oath establish that federal jurisdiction exists over this case pursuant to CAFA. Entrata operates ResidentPortal, an online payment management portal that landlords and property managers may use to collect residential rent. While residing at Lynn Hill apartments, an apartment complex in Linthicum Heights, Maryland, Trimble utilized ResidentPortal to make six or seven rent payments. Each of these payments consisted of a residential rent charge and a "Convenience Fee" that Entrata collected. Before Trimble could finalize these payments, she had to agree to Entrata's Terms and Conditions by checking a box at the bottom of the screen that stated, "I agree to the fees listed and have read and accept the terms & conditions." The Terms were hyperlinked immediately below the checkbox and statement of agreement. Although users could not click the button to submit or finalize their payments until they had checked the box stating their agreement to the Terms, they were not required to click on, scroll through, or otherwise review the hyperlinked Terms. Specifically, Trimble seeks a declaratory judgment under Maryland law that Entrata violated the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act ("MCALA") (Count I); and alleges violation of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act ("MCDCA") (Count II); violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA") (Count III); an equitable claim for money had and received (Count IV); unjust enrichment (Count V); and negligence (Count VI). The Terms have four provisions of particular relevance to the parties' pending Motions: (1) a provision titled Dispute Resolution ("Arbitration Provision"); (2) a provision titled Changes to the Agreement ("Change Clause"); (3) a provision titled Indemnity, which contains an exculpatory clause ("Exculpatory Clause"); and ( 4) a provision titled "Agreement to Deal Electronically; Electronic Communications and Notices" ("Agreement and Notices Clause"). Under the Arbitration Provision, which appears on page 14 of the Terms, "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the use of the services on this site, the relationship resulting from the use of such services, or a breach of any duties hereunder will be settled by Arbitration. The Change Clause appears on the fourth page of the Terms and provides that the ResidentPortal, users are bound by the version of this Agreement that is in effect on the date of [their] visit. This Agreement may change from time to time, so please review it when you visit ResidentPortal." The Court applied the standard that the party seeking to compel arbitration . . . "bears the burden of establishing the existence of a binding contract to arbitrate." Trimble challenged arbitration on two bases: formation and enforceability. She contended that no valid arbitration agreement was ever formed. She also argued that any arbitration agreement is unenforceable because the Terms' Exculpatory Clause violates the prospective waiver doctrine. The Court determined that formation of an agreement to arbitrate is a threshold issue that must be addressed before evaluating enforceability. Under Maryland law, the formation of a contract requires mutual assent (offer and acceptance), an agreement definite in its terms, and sufficient consideration. According to the Court, Maryland law dictates that an arbitration provision is "a 'severable contract that must be supported by adequate consideration'" beyond the consideration that supports the overall contract. The Court found that "a promise becomes consideration for another promise only when it constitutes a binding obligation." "A promise is illusory and thus cannot act as consideration if it appears to be a promise but does not actually bind or obligate the promisor to do anything," Judge Bennett ruled. The court further noted that "under Maryland law, a promise to arbitrate is illusory . . . if [one party] reserves the right to 'alter, amend, modify, or revoke the Arbitration Policy . . . at any time with or without notice.'" The Fourth Circuit has concluded that providing "notice" by posting an updated version of the relevant agreement on a modifying party's website is not sufficient to preserve consideration because it places no constraint on the modifying party's ability to escape its contractual obligations whenever it sees fit. The Court determined that the Terms' general Change Clause does in fact apply to the Arbitration Provision in this case. "By its plain language, the Change Clause binds users to the version of this Agreement that is in effect on the date of their visit and provides, that this Agreement may change from time to time, so please review it when you visit [ResidentPortal]. Neither the Change Clause nor the Arbitration Provision contain any language that would except the Arbitration Provision from the Change Clause's terms." No part of the Terms required Entrata to give advanced notice before a change became effective. The Change Clause provide no promise of advanced notice. The relevant portion of the Agreement and Notices Clause similarly fails to require advanced notice of changes. The Terms allow the same form of post-hoc "notice" that the Fourth Circuit deemed insufficient to preserve consideration. Entrata argued that its modification right was not unilateral or unfettered because only Trimble could bind the parties to any changes by continuing to use ResidentPortal. The Court rejected this argument, finding that under the Change Clause and Agreement and Notices Clause, when Trimble accessed ResidentPortal after Entrata updated its terms on April 24, 2024, she was bound to the updated version of the Terms the moment she accessed ResidentPortal. Thus, she had no chance to end the contract before the change[s] took effect. The Court also rejected Entrata's argument that at the very least, the Change Clause includes an implied restriction on its ability to modify the agreement. The Court noted that District Court, the Fourth Circuit, and Maryland state courts have determined that the presence of a unilateral clause such as the Change Clause at issue here demonstrates no restriction, implied or express. The Court determined that the Change Clause destroyed the consideration supporting the Arbitration Provision such that no agreement to arbitrate was formed. As the Court explained, severing the Change Clause in this case could make an existing but unenforceable arbitration agreement valid, but it cannot affect an arbitration agreement that was never formed because 'there is nothing to enforce if a contract never existed. Accordingly, the Court found that the parties did not form an agreement to arbitrate, and denied Entrata's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration. The Court ordered that Defendant shall file a responsive pleading. A copy of the Court's Memorandum and Opinion is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Oh109E FBI: Court Dismisses Martin Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction ----------------------------------------------------------- Senior Circuit Judge Rogers of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the appeal captioned as Linda Martin, Appellant v. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Kash Patel, in his Official Capacity as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Appellees, No. 24-5144 (D.C. Cir.), for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that Martin had waived all arguments related to class certification by not challenging the denial of class certification in her appellate briefs and therefore concluded: "So, having waived all arguments relating to class certification, to the extent Martin seeks review of her individual Due Process claim, or on behalf of a non-certified class, no Article III jurisdiction exists for the court to review her moot individual claim or to resolve the merits of the class claim." This case originated as a putative class action complaint filed by Martin on behalf of herself and a nationwide class against the FBI. The district court never certified the class, and the motion for class certification was denied as moot. Therefore, no actual class action was established -- it remained only a proposed or putative class action throughout the proceedings. On March 17, 2021, the FBI obtained search warrants for anonymous safe deposit boxes owned and rented by U.S. Private Vaults in Beverly Hills, California. The warrant directed the FBI to identify their owners in order to notify them so that they can claim their property. On June 10, 2021, the FBI sent Linda Martin a Notice of Seizure of Property and Initiation of Administrative Forfeiture Proceedings for $40,200 from Box 1810. The Notice of Seizure identified the property seized, seizure date and location, legal authority for the seizure, and instructions on filing a petition for remission requesting a pardon within 30 days, a claim contesting the forfeiture by July 15, 2021, and a request for release of property based on hardship. On June 18, 2021, Martin filed a petition for remission with the FBI, stating that she was an "innocent owner" and did not know of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture. After multiple inquiries and document submissions, the FBI determined on May 18, 2023, that the key produced by Martin corresponded to Box 1810 and thereafter discontinued the forfeiture proceedings. On July 10, 2023, the seized funds plus interest were electronically transferred to Martin. On March 7, 2023, two months prior to the return of her seized property, Martin filed a class action complaint against the FBI and its director for declaratory and injunctive relief: Count 1, the individual claim, alleged that the Notice of Seizure violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by failing to provide Martin with specific legal or factual bases for the seizure or forfeiture, thereby denying her the opportunity to offer "an effective and meaningful response to defend her rights." Count 2, the class claim, sought similar relief for a proposed class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b), namely all persons who had received a Notice of Seizure within the past six years or would receive a notice in the future and whose property had not been returned or made subject to a judicial complaint for forfeiture. The FBI filed a motion on June 8, 2023, to dismiss the entire case as moot. The district court dismissed the putative class action asserting a Due Process claim under the Fifth Amendment for failure to exhaust and failure to state a claim. The court ruled Martin's individual claim was moot because the FBI had discontinued the forfeiture proceedings and returned her seized property. The district court made several key rulings: 1. Mootness: The court found Martin's individual claim was moot because the FBI had discontinued the forfeiture proceedings and returned her seized property on July 10, 2023. 2. Inherently Transitory Exception: The court applied the inherently transitory exception to mootness, finding Martin had demonstrated the two essential elements for application of the exception: the absence of evidence that forfeiture proceedings resulting in the return of property ordinarily last at least two years, and the likelihood class member claims would remain live throughout the proceedings. 3. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: The court ruled that an independent basis required dismissal of the putative class action, namely Martin's conceded failure to exhaust her administrative remedies by challenging the constitutionality of the Notice of Seizure before the FBI. 4. Failure to State a Claim: The court ruled Martin had failed to state a plausible Due Process claim in view of her opportunity to force the government to identify the basis for and show the seizure was lawful. By separate order, the district court dismissed the class action complaint as to all claims against all defendants and denied the motion for class certification as moot. On appeal, Martin contended that the district court made two legal errors requiring reversal: first, that she plausibly alleged the FBI violated Due Process by relying on administrative forfeiture notices that did not state the crime supporting the forfeiture; and second, that there were no remedies to exhaust during the 30 days that the Notice of Seizure allowed for response because filing a petition would result in the forfeiture of her property. However, the Court of Appeals focused on jurisdictional issues as dispositive. Senior Circuit Judge Rogers wrote: Because the jurisdictional issues are dispositive, the court begins and ends with the threshold issue of its jurisdiction to consider Martin's challenges to the district court dismissal of the class claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed that Martin's individual claim in Count 1 was moot. The court stated: "It is undisputed that, as the district court found, the FBI discontinued the forfeiture proceedings and that the seized property was returned to Martin on July 10, 2023, shortly after the class action complaint was filed." Therefore, Martin no longer had a personal stake in the litigation sufficient for Article III standing. The court noted that "Class certification here is logically antecedent to the existence of any Article III issues regarding the putative class." Since no class had been certified, the district court's dismissal of the class claims on the merits before any class had been certified was entered without jurisdiction and hence advisory and without legal effect. The court explained that where the named plaintiff's claims have expired and class certification has been denied, the proposed representative retains a personal stake in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that Article III values are not undermined. However, that stake is limited to the appeal of the denial of the class certification motion. The Court of Appeals dismissed Martin's appeal of the class certification judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The district court's dismissal of Martin's individual claim as moot was affirmed. A copy of the Court of Appeals opinion is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Gx95qk HONEYBEE FOODS: Ariza Seeks Website Equal Access for Blind Users ---------------------------------------------------------------- VICTOR ARIZA v. HONEYBEE FOODS CORPORATION, d/b/a JOLLIBEE, a foreign for-profit corporation, Case No. 6:25-cv-01454 (M.D. Fla., July 30, 2025) is brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated seeking for declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses for unlawful disability discrimination in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Plaintiff resides in Miami-Dade County, Florida, he frequently travels to the Orlando, Florida area, where he stays either with friends or in other lodging accommodations. His most recent trip to the Orlando area was in June 2025, and he intends to continue to regularly revisit the area, including making trips as early as September or October 2025. The Plaintiff is and at all relevant times has been blind and visually disabled in that he suffers from optical nerve atrophy, a permanent eye and medical condition that substantially and significantly impairs his vision and limits his ability to see. The Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, either directly or through franchise agreements, a chain of restaurants nationwide selling food and beverage products, including the restaurant that Plaintiff intended to patronize in the near future (as early as September or October 2025) located at 11891 East Colonial Drive, Orlando, Florida. Accordingly, the Defendant was and still is an organization that owns, operates, and/or controls, either directly or through franchise agreements, a chain of restaurants nationwide under the name "Jollibee". Each "Jollibee" restaurant is open to the public. As the owner, operator, and/or controller of these restaurants, Defendant is defined as a place of "public accommodation" within meaning of the ADA because Defendant is a private entity which owns, operates, and/or controls, "a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food and drink." The Defendant also owns, controls, maintains, and/or operates an adjunct website, https://www.jollibeefoods.com. One of the functions of the Website is to provide the public information on the locations of Defendant's physical restaurants. Defendant also sells to the public its food and beverage products through the Website, which acts as a critical point of sale and ordering for Defendant's food and beverage products that are made in and also available for ordering and purchase in, from, and through Defendant's physical restaurants. In addition, the Website allows users to arrange in-restaurant pickup and from-restaurant delivery of Defendant's food and beverage products, purchase electronic gift cards for use online and in the physical restaurants, and sign up for a rewards account to receive exclusive offers, benefits, invitations, and discounts for use online and in the physical restaurants. The Website also services Defendant's physical restaurants by providing information on available food and beverage products, services, tips and advice, editorials, sales campaigns, events, and other information that Defendant is interested in communicating to its customers. Accordingly, the Website does not meet the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0 Level AA or higher versions of web accessibility. The Defendant has not disclosed to the public any intended audits, changes, or lawsuits to correct the inaccessibility of the Website to visually disabled individuals who want the safety and privacy of ordering and purchasing Defendant's food and beverage products offered on the Website and in the physical restaurants from their homes. The Defendant thus has not provided full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations provided by and through the Website and the physical restaurants in contravention of the ADA.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Roderick V. Hannah, Esq. HANNAH LAW 4800 N. Hiatus Road Sunrise, FL 33351 6355 Telephone: (954) 362-3800 Facsimile: (954) 362-3779 E-mail: rhannah@rhannahlaw.com - and - Pelayo M. Duran, Esq. P.A. LAW OFFICE OF PELAYO DURAN, P.A. N.W. 36th Street, Suite 307 Virginia Gardens, FL 33166 Telephone: (305) 266-9780 E-mail:duranandassociates@gmail.com KROGER CO: Partial Bid to Dismiss Womick Class Suit Denied ---------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANTHONY WOMICK, individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, v. THE KROGER CO., Case No. 3:21-cv-00574-NJR (S.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Nancy Rosenstengel entered an order denying the partial motion to dismiss. The Court concludes that Plaintiff Anthony Womick has adequately alleged Article III standing to pursue claims on behalf of the putative class with respect to the products he did not personally purchase insofar as the injuries alleged are substantially similar. The Court further concludes that whether Womick may assert claims on behalf of the putative multi-state class under the consumer protection statutes of states other than Illinois raises class certification questions that are premature at the pleading stage. Womick claims that Kroger engaged in unfair and deceptive business practices in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), and similar consumer protection statutes of other states, by misrepresenting the number of cups of coffee that can be brewed from select Kroger-brand ground coffee products. Womick seeks to represent two putative classes. The first consists of Illinois citizens who purchased one or more of the products at issue during the class period—that is, the time within the applicable statute of limitations through the date of class certification—within the State of Illinois (the "Illinois class"). The second includes citizens of Illinois and 22 other states with "similar consumer fraud laws," who purchased any of the products at issue during the same period (the "multi-state class"). Kroger manufactures, packages, advertises, distributes, and sells various types of ground coffee in canisters under its private-label brand. A copy of the Court's memorandum and order dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=YRlSVs at no extra charge.[CC] LOCKHEED MARTIN: Court Grants Interlocutory Appeal Motion --------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Bruce Konya, Simon Shiff, Stephen Schwarz, Diana Vasquez, individually and as representatives of a class of participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the Lockheed Martin Corporation Salaried Employee Retirement Program and the Lockheed Martin Aerospace Hourly Pension Plan, Plaintiffs, v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, Defendant, Civil Action No. 24-750-BAH (D. Md.), Judge Brendan A. Hurson of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted Defendant's motion to certify for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) and stayed the case pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. The case centers on two PRTs where Lockheed transferred its pension liabilities to annuity provider Athene Annuity & Life Assurance Company of New York. Plaintiffs alleged that the transfer represented a violation of Lockheed's statutory and fiduciary duties because Athene represented a riskier alternative to traditional annuity providers. Judge Hurson noted that Plaintiffs' complaint is best summarized as alleging that Lockheed Martin sacrificed the retirement security of retirees and beneficiaries for corporate profits. Notably, Plaintiffs do not claim that Athene has failed to pay any retirement benefits. Instead, Plaintiffs alleged their harm is an increased and significant risk that they will not receive the benefit payments to which they are entitled and a decrease in value of their pension benefits due to the uncompensated risk. Plaintiffs raised three causes of action related to the pension risk transfers: 1. They alleged a breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1)(A)-(B). 2. They alleged that the PRTs represented prohibited transactions in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a) and (b). 3. Plaintiffs alleged that Lockheed failed to monitor fiduciaries by failing to ensure that the process of selecting Athene as an annuity provider complied with the fiduciary standards set forth in 29 U.S.C. Sections 1104(a)(1)(A) and (B). Plaintiffs sought equitable relief, including disgorgement of the cost savings derived from the alleged improper transactions and the posting of security to assure that Plaintiffs receive their full retirement benefits. The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss On March 28, 2025, holding that Plaintiffs had "eked out sufficient injury-in-fact to establish standing." The Court noted that Thole did not compel dismissal despite Defendant's argument that the mere allegation of plan mismanagement, standing alone, is not enough to confer standing on a defined-benefit retirement plan participant whose payments have not been reduced or suspended. However, on the same day, Judge Loren Ali Khan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a motion to dismiss filed by corporate defendants in a case with facts similar to the case at bar. In Camire v. Alcoa USA Corp., Judge AliKhan determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the case after applying the same Thole analysis. The Court observed that it appears that only the Court and Judge AliKhan have decided the question of whether Thole compels dismissal of claims resting on the theory presented here, creating a circuit split on the viability of such pension risk transfer challenges. The Court explained that 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) provides a mechanism by which litigants can bring an immediate appeal of a non-final order upon the consent of both the district court and the court of appeals. Under this provision, a defendant seeking an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 1292(b) must show: (1) That a controlling question of law exists (2) About which there is a substantial basis for difference of opinion and (3) That an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The Court emphasized that interlocutory appeal is intended to be an extraordinary remedy and all three requirements must be satisfied. The Court determined that the ultimate decision rendered was a legal one, namely whether those facts, if true, represent mismanagement so egregious that it substantially increased the risk that Plaintiffs' retirement plan would fail and be unable to pay the participants' future pension benefits. The Court found this to be primarily a legal question, and one that another district court faced with nearly identical allegations has decided differently. The Court concluded that the question poses a "pure question of law," that is, "an abstract legal issue that the court of appeals can decide quickly and cleanly" and does not require the appellate court to delve beyond the surface of the record in order to determine the facts. Substantial Difference of Opinion The Court found a substantial basis for difference of opinion on the question to be presented for appellate review, noting that "the two district courts to address the issue of whether similar allegations of potential injury establish Article III standing answered the question differently." The Court observed that "more decisions on the same question are undoubtably coming as "the same issue is currently before trial courts in New York, Massachusetts, and Washington. Finally, the Court agreed that resolving the issue related to the application of Thole to the allegations at hand definitively at this stage will lend clarity to possible settlement discussions and pretrial preparation. The Court found that a decision by a higher court on the question of standing for allegations of future harm in the context of PRTs would simplify the trial and make discovery easier and less costly. Defendant argued that given the extraordinary burden of putative class-action litigation, an answer from the Fourth Circuit was necessary to avoid the prospect of spending millions of dollars on years of fact discovery and expert discovery-not to mention motion practice and potential trial. Defendant contended that as of now, plaintiffs have standing to assert these claims in one court but not another one nearby and that the consistent administration of justice, particularly for threshold constitutional issues like Article III standing, militates in favor of Fourth Circuit review now, not later. Plaintiffs argued that the "injury in fact" issue raised by Defendant is clearly factual, as evidenced by Plaintiffs' detailed factual allegations, the Court's robust analysis, which dove deeply into those factual allegations. They contended that Plaintiffs would almost surely be given the opportunity to amend their complaint to allege additional facts to make such a showing if the appeal were unsuccessful. The Court certifies the portion of its order and memorandum opinion addressing whether Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a sufficient injury for purposes of Article III for interlocutory appeal. The Court ordered that the remainder of this case is stayed pending review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The decision to stay proceedings was based on the Court's authority under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b), which provides that such stays may be ordered by the district judge or the Court of Appeals. Judge Hurson concluded that "the requirements for an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) are met on the question posed by Defendant, namely whether Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a sufficient injury for purposes of Article III under the unique scenario presented here. The Court found that given the expanding costly litigation related to pension risk transfers to Athene and the split between district courts, a final answer from the appellate court at this stage would achieve the purpose behind the exception, which is to avoid unnecessary litigation. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=YtGon4 LUV AJ: Website Inaccessible to the Blind Users, Henry Alleges -------------------------------------------------------------- CONSTANCE HENRY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated Plaintiff v. Luv AJ, Inc., Case No. 1:25-cv-08954 (N.D. Ill., July 30, 2025) alleges that the Cedarville failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its interactive website, Luvaj.com, to be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired persons in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibiting discrimination against the blind. Because of the Defendant's denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of the website, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of Defendant's conduct. By failing to make its Website available in a manner compatible with computer screen reader programs, Defendant deprives blind and visually-impaired individuals the benefits of its online goods, content, and services -- all benefits it affords nondisabled individuals -- thereby increasing the sense of isolation and stigma among those persons that Title III was meant to redress, says the suit. Luvaj.com provides to the public a wide array of the goods, services, price specials and other programs offered by Luv AJ.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Alison Chan, Esq. Equal Access Law Group PLLC 68-29 Main Street, Flushing, NY 11367 Telephone: (630) 478-0856 E-mail: achan@ealg.law MANAGED CARE: Allowed Leave to File Docs Under Seal --------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as Crowe v. Managed Care of North America, Inc., Case No. 0:23-cv-61065 (S.D. Fla., Filed June 5, 2023), the Hon. Judge Raag Singhal entered an order granting the Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. The Defendants shall file under seal documents listed in Exhibit A to the Motion, and Defendants shall file under seal an unredacted version of the Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. The nature of suit states Torts -- Personal Property -- Other Personal Property Damage. Managed offers medicare, long term, and commercial plans. [CC] MARTORELLO: 4th Cir. Upholds Lower Court's Denial of Motion to Dism ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Lula Williams, Gloria Turnage, George Hengle, Dowin Coffy, and Marcella P. Singh, Administrator of the Estate of Felix M. Gillison, Jr., on behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Matt Martorello, Defendant-Appellant, and Big Picture Loans, LLC, Ascension Technologies, Inc., Daniel Gravel, James Williams, Jr., Gertrude McGeshick, Susan McGeshick, and Giiwegiizhigookway Martin, Defendants, Case No. 23-2097, Circuit Judge Steven T. Agee of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. The case involved a certified class of approximately 491,018 individuals who obtained payday loans from tribal lending entities operated by Defendant. Defendant Matt Martorello was the architect behind this particular 'Rent-A-Tribe' scheme in which a payday lender partners with a Native American tribe to cloak the lender in the sovereign immunity of the tribe, thereby precluding enforcement of otherwise applicable usury laws that cap interest rates. The Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indians purportedly created businesses under tribal law to make small-dollar, high-interest rate loans to the class of Virginia consumers and to other consumers around the country via the internet. When Defendant and the Tribe began operating in January 2012, loans were made through Red Rock Tribal Lending LLC, but the Tribe eventually restructured that company into Big Picture Loans, LLC, and Ascension Technologies. Throughout the scheme, Defendant continued to keep almost all the profits while retaining substantial control of the lending operation through his companies. In 2017, five Virginia citizens who had obtained payday loans from Red Rock or Big Picture filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Defendant, Big Picture, Ascension, and others, alleging that their enterprise violated federal civil RICO law and seeking damages as relief. The case underwent multiple interlocutory appeals. The first interlocutory appeal in the case involved the claims against the tribal entities, and the Fourth Circuit initially held that the tribal entities "were arms of the Tribe and thus entitled to tribal sovereign immunity" and reversed the district court's contrary holding and remanded with instructions to grant the tribal entities' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Following this decision, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations that resulted in the named plaintiffs entering into a Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release with Big Picture, Ascension, individual Tribe members, and others. Thereafter, Martorello filed a second interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's finding that he had made material misrepresentations, its ruling that the Borrowers had not waived their right to pursue the class-action litigation against him, and its grant of class certification. The Fourth Circuit affirmed as to each of these issues and remanded for further appropriate proceedings. In the current appeal and for the third time, Martorello challenges three rulings made by the district court that led to entry of judgment against him: (a) First, he contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 for failure to join necessary and indispensable parties. (b) Second, he asserts the district court erred in concluding that Virginia, rather than tribal, law applied when determining whether the challenged loans were unlawful. (c) And third, he maintains that the district court erred in rejecting the "mistake of law" defense that he wanted to present to negate what he termed a scienter element of a federal civil RICO claim. Upon deliberation, the Fourth Circuit rejects each of these challenges and affirms the district court's judgment. A copy of the Fourth Circuit's Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/3s573xt5 The Fourth Circuit maintained, "[] the equities in this case are not at all as Martorello portrays them. The Tribe and its entities are not indispensable parties, and the extreme remedy of dismissal for nonjoinder under Rule 19 was not warranted. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martorello's motion [to dismiss under Rule 19]." Moreover, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's contention that the district court erred in relying on Virginia, not tribal, law to assess whether the challenged lending practices involved the collection of unlawful debt. Defendant argued that applying Virginia's usury laws to tribal lending practices violates the Indian Commerce Clause because tribal law is subordinate to only federal, not state, law. Defendant maintained that the district court should have applied the test set out in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), to identify the federal, tribal, and state interests at stake before deciding what usury laws apply to the Tribe's online lending practices. The Fourth Circuit expounded that consistent with Bracker and its framework, however, is the long-held recognition that, "[a]bsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens." The Fourth Circuit determined that the Tribe's online lending activities were broadly marketed online and in direct mailings to consumers. The Borrowers lived off the reservation when they applied for and made payments under the loans. The effect of the challenged conduct was also felt off the reservation through collection and other actions. Thus, the Fourth Circuit rejects Martorello's contention that the loans at issue here constitute on-reservation conduct to which the Bracker analysis applies. The district court therefore did not err in applying Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit finds. Also, the Fourth Circuit agrees with the district court that a mistake-of-law defense would not negate any element of the Borrowers' civil RICO claims. The Fourth Circuit says, "Our understanding begins with the statutory language pertaining to a RICO violation found in 18 U.S.C. Section 1962. . . "Section 1962(c)'s substantive RICO violation requires proof of the 'collection of an unlawful debt,' but this statutory language has no requirement that the defendant knew that the debt being collected was unlawful." The Fourth Circuit avers, "In the end, a civil RICO claim does not hinge on evidence of the defendant's mens rea apart from whatever requirements the predicate acts impose. Here, it is unchallenged that Virginia's usury laws impose no such mens rea requirement. Consequently, the Borrowers did not have to establish that Martorello acted willfully, i.e., that he knew that the loans would be subject to Virginia law or that their terms violated Virginia's usury laws. Evidence relating to a mistake-of-law defense would therefore be irrelevant to establishing the Borrowers' civil RICO claim against Martorello, and the district court did not err in disallowing the defense as part of its summary judgment ruling." MDL 2704: Court Approves $35.5M Attorney Fee Award -------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as In Re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2704, Master Docket No. 16 MD 2704 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Service Awards, awarding attorneys' fees equal to $35,500,000 minus the amount of litigation expenses awarded by Court order. The Court ordered that the fees shall be drawn proportionally from each Settlement Fund, plus interest at the same rate as the earnings in the respective Settlement Funds, accruing from the inception of each of the Settlement Funds. Co-Lead Counsel received authorization to allocate these awards among themselves and with other firms that assisted them in such manner as, in their judgment, reflects the contributions of each firm to the prosecution and settlement of the Action. The Court found that the Credit Suisse Settlement created a fund of $25,000,000 in cash, and the New Settlement created a Fund of $46,000,000 in cash, for a total of $71,000,000 in total cash settlements in the Action. The fee represents only 17% of the Settlement Funds, and a "negative" lodestar "multiplier" of approximately 0.12 (as of the time of Plaintiffs' Motion using historical rates from Co-Lead Counsel). Adequate Notice was disseminated to potential members of the Settlement Classes. The Notice indicates that Co-Lead Counsel would move for fee and expense awards not to exceed 50% of each Settlement Fund, totaling $35,500,000 plus interest thereon. Judge Oetken determined the fee was fair and reasonable after considering multiple factors. The Court noted that numerous members of the Settlement Classes who have submitted valid Proof of Claim and Release Forms will benefit from the Settlements achieved by Plaintiffs and Co-Lead Counsel. Additionally, no Settlement Class Member filed any objection to Co-Lead Counsel's proposed fee or expense awards. According to the Court, Co-Lead Counsel has pursued the litigation and achieved the Settlements with skill, perseverance, and diligent advocacy, as reflected by the positive reception of the Settlement Agreements by the Settlement Classes. The litigation involved complex factual and legal issues and, in the absence of the Settlements, would involve lengthy proceedings whose resolution would be uncertain. The Court determined that Notice of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Service Awards was given to potential members of the Settlement Classes in a reasonable manner and complied with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, due process requirements, and any other applicable law." Members of the settlement classes were given the opportunity to object to the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Service Awards in compliance with Rule 23. However, no objections to the Motion have been made. The Court ordered that the fee award and interest awarded herein shall constitute a final order and shall be payable to Co--Lead Counsel from the Settlement Funds upon entry of the final judgment related to each Settlement. The Court specified that in the event settlements are terminated, this Order shall be rendered null and void to the extent provided in each respective Agreement. Plaintiffs in the case are the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association and the Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago. A copy of the Court's Order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=wuA09x MID AMERICA: Fails to Secure Personal, Health Info, More Says ------------------------------------------------------------- TERESA MORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MID AMERICA PHYSICIAN SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 2:25-cv-02422 (D. Kan., July 30, 2025) alleges that the Defendant failed to properly secure and safeguard the protected health information (PHI) and other personally identifiable information of its patients. The Plaintiff and Class Members are current and former patients of Defendant. In November 2013, four Kansas City-area obstetrics and gynecology practice groups merged to form Mid America Physician Services LLC to create the area's largest independent physician-owned women's health practice. Mid America Physician Services LLC is the provider of women's care in the Kansas City area.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: James J. Rosemergy, Esq. CAREY, DANIS & LOWE 8235 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63105 Telephone: (314) 725-7700 E-mail: : jrosemergy@careydanis.com - and - Paul J. Doolittle, Esq. POULIN | WILLEY | ANASTOPOULO 32 Ann Street Charleston, SC 29403 Telephone: (803) 222-2222 Facsimile: (843) 494-5536 E-mail: paul.doolittle@poulinwilley.com cmad@poulinwilley.com MONAT GLOBAL: Seeks to Modify Scheduling Order in Monat Suit ------------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit RE: MONAT HAIR CARE PRODUCTS MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Case No. 1:18-md-02841-DPG (S.D. Fla.), the Defendants ask the Court to enter an order modifying the Eighth Amened Scheduling Order by: (i) requiring the that Defendants conduct the depositions of 3 additional named Plaintiffs on or before Sept. 19, 2025 (for a total of 6 depositions of named Plaintiffs on or before that date); and (ii) requiring the Defendants' conduct the depositions of the remaining named Plaintiffs on or before April 4, 2026. The Defendants move this Court for an order modifying the Court's current scheduling order to allow Defendants to depose some of the named Plaintiffs after Plaintiffs serve Defendants with their expert reports in support of class certification. The Defendants submit that allowing them to depose half of the named Plaintiffs after being served with Plaintiffs’ expert reports, but prior to the deadline for Plaintiffs to submit their rebuttal reports, is fair and will in no way prejudice Plaintiffs. The class action lawsuits that comprise this MDL were filed in the late winter and early spring of 2018. Since very shortly after the cases were filed, and despite repeated requests from Defendants, Plaintiffs have never explained how the Monat haircare products at issue caused their alleged injuries. Indeed, the Plaintiffs' voluminous medical histories, chronicled in the records obtained by the Defendants via subpoena from the named Plaintiffs' medical providers, as well as the named Plaintiffs’ answers to Defendants’ written discovery requests, make it clear that the named Plaintiffs were experiencing the very symptoms/injuries (e.g. hair loss, skin irritation) that they allege were caused by the Monat products, months or in some cases years before they ever used the Monat products. Accordingly, the modification that Defendants seek would have absolutely no impact on the overall schedule and would in no way disturb any of the other dates in the Eighth Amended Scheduling Order, including the schedule regarding expert discovery and the briefing of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class Monat is a privately-held American multi-level marketing company. A copy of the Defendants' motion dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=MKT7a2 at no extra charge.[CC] The Defendants are represented by: William C. Meyers, Esq. David J. Chizewer, Esq. Joseph L. Hoolihan, Esq. GOLDBERG KOHN LTD. 55 East Monroe Street, Suite 3300 Chicago, IL 60603 Telephone: (312) 201-4000 Facsimile: (312) 332-2196 E-mail: william.meyers@goldbergkohn.com david.chizewer@goldbergkohn.com kristen.jones@goldbergkohn.com joseph.hoolihan@goldbergkohn.com MW SERVICES: Faces Mayhone Over Alleged Illegal Online Casino ------------------------------------------------------------- MILAUNCRE MAYHONE and CATHERINE ROUSSEAU, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MW SERVICES LIMITED; WOW SERVICES LIMITED; WOWCOM SERVICES, INC.; CYBERHORIZON LIMITED; and ARENA ENTERTAINMENT LIMITED, Case No. 1:25-cv-08956 (N.D. Ill., July 30, 2025) seeks to enjoin the Defendant's operation of illegal online casino games and to seek restitution, damages, and other appropriate relief. The action arises from a predatory scheme orchestrated by Defendants through their illegal online casino platform, WOW Vegas. The Defendants lure consumers by falsely marketing WOW Vegas as a harmless "social casino" that only offers free-to-play entertainment. But in reality, WOW Vegas is an illegal gambling operation that profits from players wagering and losing real money on virtual slot machines and other casino-style games. On wowvegas.com, players buy chips, gamble, and cash out their winnings -- just like at a regular casino. But the Defendants knew that openly selling casino chips would expose WOW Vegas as an illegal online casino. To hide the true nature of their gambling operation, the Defendants claim that the only chips they sell to consumers are harmless tokens called "WOW Coins," which can only be used for "casual" gameplay on the platform, have no real-world value, and can never be cashed out. But here's the catch: Defendants bundle every purchase of WOW Coins with a second type of token called "Sweeps Coins" as a supposedly free bonus. Unlike WOW Coins, Sweeps Coins can be wagered on casino games and cashed out for real money at a fixed 1:1 ratio to the U.S. Dollar––exposing Sweeps Coins as a clear vehicle for real-money gambling, asserts the suit. The Defendants' pricing structure confirms that the true purpose of these transactions is to sell Sweeps Coins –– not WOW Coins. Every dollar spent buys players an equivalent amount of Sweeps Coins, plus an enormous quantity of WOW Coins, the suit adds. MW SERVICES LIMITED owns online casino platform, WOW Vegas.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: J. Eli Wade-Scott, Esq. Ari J. Scharg, Esq. Michael Ovca, Esq. Hannah Hilligoss, Esq. EDELSON PC 350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor Chicago, IL 60654 Telephone: (312) 589-6370 E-mail: ewadescott@edelson.com ascharg@edelson.com movca@edelson.com hhilligoss@edelson.com NAVIGATORS SPECIALTY: Must Indemnify Averhealth, Court Rules ------------------------------------------------------------ In the case captioned as Navigators Specialty Insurance Company, Plaintiff, v. Avertest, LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. L24-CV-932 (LMB-AVBP) (E.D. Va.), Judge Leonie M. Brinkema of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment in an insurance coverage dispute. The Court resolved a coverage dispute between two insurance companies over which should defend Avertest, LLC (also known as Averhealth) in a lawsuit involving allegedly false positive drug tests. Judge Brinkema ruled that Navigators Specialty Insurance Company must cover the defense costs, rejecting Navigators' attempts to shift coverage responsibility to Columbia Casualty Company. Averhealth conducts laboratory testing of biological samples, including hair and urine, for illegal drugs like methamphetamine and cocaine. Columbia provided professional liability insurance coverage for Averhealth on a claims-made basis between December 17, 2013 and May 1, 2022. Navigators provided professional liability insurance coverage for Averhealth on a claims-made basis from May 1, 2022 to May 1, 2023. The coverage dispute centers on two separate lawsuits filed against Averhealth. In February 2021, during Columbia's policy period, Justin Gonzalez and Darrell E. Tullock Jr. sued Averhealth in Missouri state court in a case styled as a class action. The Gonzalez complaint alleged that "Averhealth prioritized the speed in which it returned test results to its customers over ensuring that proper testing methods were followed." Columbia paid for Averhealth's defense, and the case was ultimately settled on an individual basis. The Gonzalez action was dismissed on February 23, 2022 without ever being certified as a class action. On August 22, 2022, during Navigators' policy period, eight new plaintiffs represented by the same seven Missouri lawyers who had filed the Gonzalez complaint sued Averhealth in the Eastern District of Missouri in Foulger v. Avertest LLC. The Foulger complaint repeated some allegations from Gonzalez, such as Averhealth prioritized the speed of its results, but included additional claims about collection procedures and different controlled substances than were in the Gonzalez case. Both insurance policies contained related claims provisions treating multiple claims from the same acts or omissions as a single claim. The Columbia Policy defined related acts, errors or omissions as all acts, errors or omissions negligently committed in the rendering of professional services that are logically or causally connected by any common fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, event, advice or decision. The Navigators Policy contained Exclusion Y, which excluded coverage for "any Claim that was reported to, or covered under, another program of insurance prior to this policy." Navigators argued this exclusion applied because Averhealth had notified Columbia of potential new litigation on May 18, 2022. The Court examined whether the Foulger lawsuit constituted the same claim or a related claim to the Gonzalez lawsuit. Judge Brinkema found several similarities between the complaints: both alleged the same general root causes and similar results, were brought by six of the same lawyers, and relied on similar background facts. However, the Court identified substantial differences that prevented the claims from being considered related. According to the Court, the allegations in the Gonzalez and Foulger lawsuits are not sufficiently similar to constitute related claims under the Navigators and Columbia Policies. The factual similarities described general business practices, not the same underlying facts or transactions. The Court noted that each plaintiff's circumstances were different, including different lab facilities, different collection employees, and different circumstances at each facility. Additionally, important legal differences existed between the claims. The statutory claims in Gonzalez were brought under Missouri law, while the statutory claims in Foulger were brought under Arizona, Massachusetts, and Michigan law. The Court concluded: Because of all these factual and legal differences, the Gonzalez and Foulger lawsuits are not the same or related claims, which means that the Foulger litigation qualifies as a claim covered by the Navigators Policy. The Court rejected Navigators' argument that Exclusion Y applied. Since the Court concluded that the Foulger claim was not sufficiently related to the Gonzalez claim, Exclusion Y does not provide a basis for excusing Navigators from its obligation to defend Averhealth against the Foulger lawsuit. Regarding Columbia's potential coverage obligations, the Court found that Columbia had no duty to defend Averhealth because the Foulger complaint was filed nearly four months after the Columbia Policy ended. According to the Court, because the Foulger complaint was filed nearly four months after the Columbia Policy ended, as Columbia correctly argues, by definition the lawsuit did not occur during the coverage relationship, which is a condition precedent to Averhealth receiving coverage under the policy. Judge Brinkema denied Navigators' motion for summary judgment seeking declarations that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Averhealth. The Court granted Columbia's motion for summary judgment, finding Columbia had no duty to reimburse Navigators. The Court also granted Averhealth's motion seeking coverage from either insurance company. The Court emphasized equitable considerations supporting its ruling: Averhealth purchased comprehensive claims-made insurance policies from both defendants, never had a gap in coverage, and promptly reported the Foulger lawsuit to Navigators. When Averhealth applied to Navigators for coverage, it fully disclosed the Gonzalez litigation. Therefore, the Court declared that Navigators has a duty to defend Averhealth in the Foulger litigation and indemnify Averhealth from any judgment resulting therefrom, up to its policy limits. Columbia has no obligation to reimburse Navigators for costs incurred in defending Averhealth A copy of the Court's Memorandum and Opinion is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=qnoROU NCAA: Brantmeier Plaintiffs Wins Class Cert Bid ----------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as REESE BRANTMEIER and MAYA JOINT, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Case No. 1:24-cv-00238-CCE-JEP (M.D.N.C.), the Hon. Judge Catherine C. Eagles entered an order that: 1. The Plaintiffs' motion to exclude certain opinions of Dr. Matthew Backus is denied. 2. The defendant's motion to exclude opinions of Andrew Schwarz is denied. 3. The plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted. 4. The following classes are certified: a. "All persons who, at any time between March 19, 2020, and the date of judgment in this action, (i) competed in NCAA Division I Tennis, or (ii) were ineligible to compete in NCAA Division I Tennis due to the Prize Money Rules." b. "All persons who, at any time between March 19, 2020, and the date of judgment in this matter, have voluntarily forfeited Prize Money earned in a tennis tournament, and (i) have competed in NCAA Division I Tennis, or (ii) have submitted information to the NCAA Eligibility Center." 5. The plaintiffs, Reese Brantmeier and Maya Joint, are appointed as class representatives. 6. The Plaintiffs' Counsel, Arthur Stock, Daniel Bryson, Lucy Inman, Peggy Wedgworth, and Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC and Jason Miller, Robert Rader III, William Plyler, Joel Lulla, and Miller Monroe Holton & Plyler, PLLC are appointed as class counsel. Ms. Brantmeier is a student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a member of the UNC women’s tennis team, a Division I NCAA program. National is a nonprofit organization that regulates student athletics. A copy of the Court's memorandum opinion and order dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=TGvkrs at no extra charge.[CC] NCAA: Court Grants Motions to Dismiss All Claims in Pryor --------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Terrelle Pryor, Plaintiff, v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:24-cv-4019 (S.D. Ohio), Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court granted the Conference Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority. The court denied the Conference Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue Or, In the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings. The court granted the Ohio State University's Motion to Dismiss, Learfield Communications, LLC's Motion to Dismiss, and the Conference Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Terrelle Pryor is a former student-athlete who played football at Ohio State University as the team's starting quarterback from 2008 to 2010. Mr. Pryor brought this putative class action against OSU, Learfield, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), and the Big Ten Conference, Inc. When Mr. Pryor played at OSU, Defendants required him to cede control of his publicity rights to them in perpetuity and also policed the use of his name, image, and likeness -- NIL -- by other parties. The plaintiff was prohibited from endorsing any commercial product, even in the absence of compensation, and from obtaining any monetary benefit from his athletic career. Although Mr. Pryor is no longer a student-athlete, Defendants continue to derive revenue from his NIL. The NCAA hosts videos that depict Mr. Pryor that can only be viewed after watching a commercial advertisement from which the NCAA profits and the Big Ten has a joint venture with another corporation that regularly replays games from the past, generating substantial advertising revenue. Mr. Pryor brought claims for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (Counts I and II) and unjust enrichment (Count III). Mr. Pryor has never been compensated for the past and continuing use of his NIL. The Conference Defendants moved to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the plaintiff's claims overlapped with claims in an earlier filed class action, Chalmers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. However, the Southern District of New York has since dismissed the Chalmers class action. The court determined that there are no longer two duplicative lawsuits pending in two federal courts of equal rank and therefore denied the motion to transfer venue. The Conference Defendants argued the plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring his antitrust claims because he could not establish an injury-in-fact. The court found that Mr. Pryor's alleged harm is the lost compensation that he would have received but for Defendants' unlawful conduct which satisfies Article III's injury-in-fact requirement. The court concluded Mr. Pryor has Article III standing to bring his antitrust claims. OSU argued the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff's claims against it. The court explained that "Eleventh Amendment immunity bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments, by citizens of another state, foreigners or its own citizens." Since "a public university qualifies as an arm of the state, OSU is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment." The plaintiff argued three exceptions: (1) Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to the Lanham Act; (2) OSU lacked immunity because it acted as a commercial participant; and (3) the Ex parte Young exception applied to claims for prospective relief. The court rejected all three arguments, noting the plaintiff did not bring any Lanham Act claims and that OSU has asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity, not state-action immunity. Accordingly, OSU is dismissed. The court found the plaintiff's Sherman Act claims were subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Claims brought under the Sherman Act are subject to a four-year statute of limitations beginning on the date that the cause of action accrued. The plaintiff argued three theories for timeliness: (1) Continuing Violations Doctrine: The plaintiff contended that defendants' alleged unlawful conduct continues to the present. However, the court determined that Defendants' alleged act that caused Mr. Pryor's injury -- requiring him to give them control over his publicity rights -- occurred at the latest in 2010. The court explained that the continued commercial usage of Mr. Pryor's NIL rights is a manifestation of Defendants' past conduct, not a new and independent act that restarts the statute of limitations. (2) Fraudulent Concealment The plaintiff argued the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled by fraudulent concealment. The court found that Mr. Pryor knew at the time he played college sports that Defendants required him to relinquish control of his publicity rights -- the cause of the injury he now complains of. The court noted that other student-athletes have brought lawsuits against the NCAA about substantively the same practices that Mr. Pryor now challenges dating to 2009 -- and he does not claim to have been unaware of those earlier. (3) Injunctive Relief Claims The plaintiff argued that the four-year statute of limitations does not apply to claims for injunctive relief. However, the court found that even assuming (without deciding) that the four-year statute of limitations does not apply to Mr. Pryor's injunctive claims, the doctrine of laches bars them. The court explained that if the plaintiff asserts the claim beyond the statutory period, it is presumed unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendant. Therefore, Mr. Pryor's Sherman Act claims (Counts I and II) are dismissed. The court applied Ohio's six-year statute of limitations for unjust enrichment claims. According to the Court, "An unjust enrichment claim does not accrue until the last point in time that the plaintiff conferred and a defendant unjustly received a benefit. The court found that the plaintiff gave Defendants the benefit (control over his NIL) over a decade ago and that the continual ill effects resulted from this original alleged violation, not from Defendants' later conduct. Accordingly, his unjust enrichment claim is time-barred and Mr. Pryor's unjust enrichment claim (Count III) is dismissed." A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=DM6gEb NELNET SERVICING: Court Transfers FCRA Class Action to New Jersey ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Adriana Walsh, Plaintiff, v. Nelnet Servicing, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 24 Civ. 4325 (DEH) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Dale E. Ho of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and ordered the transfer of the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The Court also held that Defendant's motion to stay discovery became moot because it was contingent on the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Judge Ho examined two competing lawsuits against Nelnet under the Second Circuit's first-to-file rule. The first action, Derrico v. Nelnet Servicing, LLC, pending in the District of New Jersey, is a class action brought by Tami Derrico on behalf of herself and other federal student loan borrowers with loans previously serviced by Nelnet. Adriana Walsh filed her action on June 6, 2025, two days after the Derrico case was filed. Both cases allege violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) based on substantially similar theories. According to the Court, "Both bring a single claim against the same defendant, Nelnet, under the same statute, the FCRA, under what is, broadly speaking, the same theory: Nelnet's alleged failure to correct the inaccurate student loan information it furnished to CRAs." The Court noted that both cases were filed by the same attorney and the complaints are nearly identical. Both cases seek class action status but with different proposed class populations. The Derrico action seeks to certify a class of borrowers who no longer had federal student loan debt, which had been forgiven after their loans were transferred to different servicers. In contrast, putative class members in the Walsh case are borrowers whose loans were transferred but not forgiven. The Court explained the alleged harm in this case: "After transferring these class members' student loans to other servicers, Nelnet would allegedly report to CRAs that borrowers owed it the outstanding balance at the time of transfer. But the new loan servicers would, rightly, also report to CRAs that the borrowers owed a balance on the loans. This made it appear as though the borrowers owed double their loan amounts on their credit reports." The Court applied the first-to-file rule, explaining that it embodies considerations of judicial administration and conservation of resources by avoiding duplicative litigation. Under this rule, when there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should have priority, absent the showing of balance of convenience or special circumstances giving priority to the second. The Court rejected Plaintiff's arguments against application of the first-to-file rule. Plaintiff denies that the parties and claims are sufficiently similar to warrant application of the rule, but the Court found this argument unavailing. The Court emphasized that the first-filed rule does not require identical plaintiffs; it only requires that the plaintiffs be substantially similar. Court considered factors identical to those used in connection with motions to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). These factors include: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) the convenience of any witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the convenience of the parties involved, (5) the locus of operative facts, (6) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, (7) the relative means of the parties, (8) the forum's familiarity with the governing law, and (9) trial efficiency and the interest of justice. The Court found that only the first factor -- plaintiff's choice of forum -- counsels against transfer. The Court noted that it is a nationwide class action; there will be no discernable difference to putative class members or witnesses if this case is heard across the river in the District of New Jersey rather than in this Court. The Court relied on its authority under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), noting that both parties consented to transfer. Section 1404 provides that a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented. Judge Ho applied a two-part test for transfer, examining "whether the case could have been brought in the proposed transferee district" and whether the transfer is in the interest of justice and convenience of the parties and witnesses. Both requirements were satisfied. A copy of the Opinion and Order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=XP9vhV NOW OPTICS: Parties Seek to Modify Class Certification Deadline --------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as RICHARD MAROUS, on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. NOW OPTICS HOLDINGS, LLC d/b/a STANTON OPTICAL, Case No. 9:24-cv-80702-RLR (S.D. Fla.), the Parties ask the Court to enter an order modifying the class certification deadline and permitting the Plaintiff through and including Aug. 18, 2025, within which to file his motion for class certification. The Plaintiff will be unable to obtain the deposition transcript with sufficient time to prepare his motion for class certification by the current deadline of Aug. 11, 2025. Thus, Plaintiff are in need of an extension of the class certification motion deadline through and including Aug. 18, 2025. The Parties both confirm they will not be prejudiced by the requested relief and that they do not seek relief in bad faith but as a result of the nature of the documents requested and Now Optics diligently working to assemble the documentation sought by the Plaintiff. On April 11, 2025, the Court entered its order denying all pending motions without prejudice and order continuing trial. Now Optics is in the eye care industry. A copy of the Parties' motion dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=wLiK5B at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq. HIRALDO P.A. 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: (954) 400-4713 E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com The Defendant is represented by: Frank A. Zacherl, Esq. SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP 200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 4100 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 347-7305 Facsimile: (305) 347-7705 E-mail: FZacherl@shutts.com - and - Beth A. Wilkinson, Esq. James M. Rosenthal, Esq. Matthew Skanchy, Esq. Alysha Bohanon, Esq. Jenna Pavelec, Esq. WILKINSON STEKLOFF LLP 2001 M Street NW, 10th Floor Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 847-4000 Facsimile: (202) 847-4005 E-mail: bwilkinson@wilkinsonstekloff.com jrosenthal@wilkinsonstekloff.com mskanchy@wilkinsonstekloff.com abohanon@wilkinsonstekloff.com jpavelec@wilkinsonstekloff.com - and - Lauren Sachi Wulfe, Esq. ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLC 777 S. Figueroa Street, 44th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 243-4211 Facsimile: (213) 243-4199 E-mail: lauren.wulfe@arnoldporter.com - and - Mark C. Hansen, Esq. Michael J. Guzman, Esq. David L. Schwarz, Esq. KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD, FIGEL & FREDERICK, P.L.L.C. 1615 M Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 326-7900 E-mail: mhansen@kellogghansen.com mguzman@kellogghansen.com dschwarz@kellogghansen.com OHO CARGO: Larios Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA, NYLL ------------------------------------------------------------------ JONATHAN LARIOS v. OHO CARGO DELIVERY INC. (DBA MAGIC PIANO MOVERS) and SHERZOD ABDURAZAKOV, individually, Case No. 1:25-cv-04232 (E.D.N.Y., July 30, 2025) is a class action seeking to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wage compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law. The Plaintiff is a former employee of the Defendant. The Plaintiff was employed primarily to move pianos; he also sometimes drove the van to transport them. He picked up the pianos, moved them, and took them to their destination under the direct supervision and control of the Defendant. The Defendants were required, under relevant New York State law, to compensate Plaintiff with overtime pay at one and one-half the regular rate for work in excess of 40 hours per work week. However, despite such mandatory pay obligations, the Defendants willfully only compensated Plaintiff at a rate of $7.50 per hour and failed to pay the Plaintiff his lawful overtime pay for that period from June 2024 until June 1, 2025, says the suit. OHO CARGO DELIVERY INC. provides residential and commercial moving services. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: STILLMAN LEGAL PC www.StillmanLaw.us 42 BROADWAY, 12th FL NEW YORK NY 10005 Telephone: (212) 832-1000 ORREFORS KOSTA: Website Inaccessible to the Blind, Henry Alleges ---------------------------------------------------------------- CONSTANCE HENRY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated Plaintiff v. Orrefors Kosta Boda, LLC, Case No. 1:25-cv-08943 (N.D. Ill., July 30, 2025) alleges that the Cedarville failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its interactive website, Orrefors.us, to be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired persons in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibiting discrimination against the blind. Because of the Defendant's denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of the website, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of Defendant's conduct. By failing to make its Website available in a manner compatible with computer screen reader programs, Defendant deprives blind and visually-impaired individuals the benefits of its online goods, content, and services -- all benefits it affords nondisabled individuals -- thereby increasing the sense of isolation and stigma among those persons that Title III was meant to redress, says the suit. Orrefors.us provides to the public a wide array of the goods, services, price specials and other programs offered by Orrefors Kosta Boda. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Alison Chan, Esq. Equal Access Law Group PLLC 68-29 Main Street, Flushing, NY 11367 Telephone: (630) 478-0856 E-mail: achan@ealg.law PAUL CROFT: Strobel Plaintiffs Seek $239MM Default Judgment ----------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as STACY STROBL and BRIAN HARDING, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. PAUL CROFT; JONATHAN FROST; RHINO ONWARD INTERNATIONAL, LLC; ROI FUND I, LLC; ROI FUND II, LLC; ROI FUND III, LLC; ROI FUND IV, LLC; BRIAN KAWAMURA; CROFT & FROST, PLLC; THE WELL FUND LLC; SCORPIO REF, LLC; MATTHEW DIRA; THE DIRA GROUP; CHESTNUT HOLDINGS, LLC; STEVEN FROST; LISA FROST; JOSEPH INVESTMENTS, LLC; JANE and JOHN DOES 1-25, Case No. 1:24-cv-00140-CLC-CHS (E.D. Tenn.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order granting motion for default judgment. The Plaintiff's propose the following interest addition to their compensatory damages calculated at .34% per month (4.08%/12 months for monthly interest of .34%). Ms. Strobl under the terms of her investment was due to be paid in July of 2023, entitling her to 24 months of prejudgment interest. As a result, Plaintiffs seek an individual default judgment amount in total of $2,398,053 against the Defaulting Defendants. The Complaint details how the Defaulting Defendants, through false representations and deceptive conduct, solicited funds from the Plaintiffs allegedly to invest and develop a green energy hydrogen project. These representations were false and instead much of the money went to other failed ventures of Jonathan Frost. The Defaulting Defendants have failed to plead or otherwise defend against this action, and default has been duly entered against them by the Clerk of Court. The Plaintiffs now seek entry of a default judgment as to liability and damages under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The Plaintiffs filed this case as a class action seeking to recoup their losses based on the fraudulent representations and alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 ("RICO"). A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=eAfa4u at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Benjamin A. Gastel, Esq. Anthony A. Orlandi, Esq. Alyson S. Beridon, Esq. HERZFELD, SUETHOLZ, GASTEL, LENISKI & WALL, PLLC 1920 Adelicia St., Suite 300 Nashville, TN 37212 Telephone: (615) 800-6225 Facsimile: (615) 994-8625 E-mail: ben@hsglawgroup.com tony@hsglawgroup.com alyson@hsglawgroup.com The Defendants are represented by: David M. Eldridge, Esq. Loretta G Cravens, Esq. ELDRIDGE & CRAVENS, P.C. 400 West Church Avenue, Suite 101 Knoxville, TN 37902 E-mail: deldridge@ecattorneys.law lcravens@ecattorneys.law - and - J. Michael Holloway, Esq. Mark W. Litchford, Esq. Christopher M. Gant, Esq. LITCHFORD, PEARCE & ASSOCIATES Chattanooga, TN 37414 E-mail: michael@lpafirm.com mark@lpafirm.com chris@lpafirm.com - and - Cara J Alday, Esq. Gary R Patrick, Esq. Lance W Pope, Esq. PATRICK, BEARD, SCHULMAN & JACOWAY 537 Market Street, Suite 300 Chattanooga, TN 37402 E-mail: calday@pbsjlaw.com gpatrick@pbsjlaw.com lpope@pbsjlaw.com POLAR BEVERAGES: Court Dismisses Gradney Suit --------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as STACY GRADNEY, et al., v. POLAR BEVERAGES, Case No. 3:25-cv-02149-EMC (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Edward M. Chen entered an order granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss. -- All of the Plaintiffs' claims are deficient because they have not sufficiently alleged what flavors of seltzer water were tested, whether the flavors tested included those purchased by Plaintiffs, whether the flavors tested are representative (suggesting a systemic problem with the product), and, ultimately, which flavors contain which synthetics. The Plaintiffs have also identified at most only one synthetic in the product and not identified which flavors contain that synthetic. The claims seek equitable relief are also problematic to the extent they seek retrospective relief – i.e., restitution. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged why a legal remedy would be inadequate. This problem infects at least the claims for violation of §§ 17200 and 17500 and unjust enrichment -- plus, e.g., the CLRA claim which includes a request for equitable relief. Although Plaintiffs still have a basis to seek prospective equitable relief -- i.e., an injunction – Plaintiffs do not seek injunctive relief for the unjust enrichment claim. The unjust enrichment claim is also a problem to the extent Plaintiffs are basing that claim on California law (applying across the board to a nationwide class). Plaintiffs have not explained how California law can apply if a plaintiff or class member lives outside of California and purchased seltzer outside the state. There is no connection to California justifying application of California law, especially since Polar is allegedly a Massachusetts corporation with a principal place of business in Massachusetts. California law does not apply to purchases made outside of California. The Court agrees with that direct privity is not a requirement for the warranty claim under New York law, but that claims is flawed for independent reasons. The Plaintiffs have waived punitive damages for the New York-based claims. For the California-based claims, the issue of punitive damages is premature to the extent the claims are deficient for the reasons stated above. The Plaintiffs are barred from asserting a nationwide class, even though the Court is permitting amendment. The Plaintiffs may file their amended complaint by Sept. 22, 2025. Although the Court is allowing Plaintiffs to amend, their amendment cannot contravene the Court’s rulings above that prohibit Plaintiffs (1) from seeking retrospective equitable relief in the form of restitution, (2) from asserting a nationwide class for the unjust enrichment and warranty claims, and (3) from seeking punitive damages for the New York-based claims. If Plaintiffs do not amend, then this case shall automatically be dismissed with prejudice. If Plaintiffs do amend, the Court directs the parties to meet and confer to reach a stipulation on a reasonable time for Polar to respond to the amended pleading, whether by answer or motion. This order disposes of Docket No. 17. The Plaintiffs brought a false advertising class action against the Defendant. Polar sells a product, flavored seltzer water, that it labels "100% Natural." The Plaintiffs assert that the "100% Natural" label is false because the product actually contains synthetic ingredients Polar is a company that manufactures, markets, and sells seltzer water. A copy of the Court's order dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=dGWXjh at no extra charge.[CC] QUALTEK WIRELESS: Bid to Dismiss or Stay Dodge Class Action Tossed ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSHUA DODGE, v. QUALTEK WIRELESS LLC, Case No. 2:25-cv-00043-DAD-AC (E.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Dale Drozd entered an order denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss or stay action. The Court says that Because "there exists a substantial doubt as to whether the state court proceeding will resolve all of the disputed issues in [the federal] case, it is unnecessary for [the court] to weigh the other factors included in the Colorado River analysis." The Defendant's motion to stay this action pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine will therefore be denied. The case is a putative Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action arising from the Defendant's alleged failure to pay overtime wages and in which plaintiff also asserts several California Labor Code claims. Qualtek provides business consulting services on a contract and fee basis. A copy of the Court's order dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=HdcOpS at no extra charge.[CC] REDLINE SOCIETY: Moreno Seeks Leave to Conduct Class Certification ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as RUBEN MORENO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. REDLINE SOCIETY, LLC, Case No. 8:25-cv-01455-TPB-AEP (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order granting motion for leave to conduct class certification and damages discovery. The Plaintiff seeks the following relief: 1. That leave of Court be granted to conduct class certification and damages related discovery from the Defendant(s), including third-party discovery as may be necessary, in support of Class Certification and a final damages judgment; 2. That the Court reserve jurisdiction on the issue of damages against the Defendant and to otherwise reserve ruling on a final damages determination against the Defendant until the completion of discovery and a ruling on Class Certification; and 3. That the Plaintiff be permitted to seek a final default judgment against the Defendant, both as to the individual Plaintiff and the putative Class, upon completion of class certification and damages discovery from the Defendants and the Court's ruling on class certification. On June 4, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the Defendant. The Plaintiff asserts one claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) for Defendant's violation of the TCPA's prohibition against making telephone solicitations to an individual who has asked not to be called again (Count I). The Plaintiff also one claim under the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (FTSA) for Defendant's violation of the FTSA's internal DNC rules (Count III). Redline offers vehicle giveaways and merchandise in the industry. A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=VOppTq at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq. EGGNATZ | PASCUCCI 7450 Griffin Road, Suite 230 Davie, FL 33314 Telephone: (954) 889-3359 E-mail: jeggnatz@justiceearned.com - and - Alexander J. Korolinsky, Esq. AJK LEGAL 1580 Sawgrass Corp Pkwy, Suite 130 Sunrise, FL 33323 Telephone: (888) 815-3350 E-mail: korolinsky@ajklegal.com SHEST LTD: Commercial Property Violates ADA, Pardo Suit Alleges --------------------------------------------------------------- NIGEL FRANK DE LA TORRE PARDO v. SHEST, LTD.; MOJITOS CALLE 8, INC.; and JW & HC, INC., Case No. 1:25-cv-23431 (S.D. Fla., July 30, 2025) is a class action seeking injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the complaint, the Defendant owns, operates and/or oversees the commercial property; to include its general parking lot, parking spots, and entrance access and path of travel specific to the tenant business therein and all other common areas open to the public located within the commercial property. The Plaintiff contends that the he found the commercial property and commercial mini mart business located within the commercial property to be rife with ADA violations. He encountered architectural barriers at the commercial property and commercial mini mart business located within the commercial property and wishes to continue his patronage and use of the premises, says the Plaintiff. The Defendant owned and/or operated a commercial property at 7920 SW 8th St. and 8000 SW 8th St., Miami, Florida.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Alfredo Garcia-Menocal,Esq. GARCIA-MENOCAL, P.L. 350 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 200 Coral Gables, FL 33134 Telephone: (305) 553-3464 E-Mail: aquezada@lawgmp.com jacosta@lawgmp.com. - and - Ramon J. Diego, Esq. THE LAW OFFICE OF RAMON J. DIEGO, P.A. 5001 SW 74th Court, Suite 103 Miami, FL, 33155 Telephone: (305) 350-3103 E-Mail: rdiego@lawgmp.com ramon@rjdiegolaw.com SHORE MEDICAL: Mastromarino Breach Suit Removed to D.N.J. --------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as NICOLE MASTROMARINO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SHORE MEDICAL CENTER, Case No. ATL-L-001789-25 (Filed June 13, 2025) was removed from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County, to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District of New Jersey Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:25-cv-13946 to the proceedings. The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit on behalf of herself and a class of persons who "entrusted Defendant with sensitive Personally Identifiable Information and Protected Health Information and that was impacted in a data breach that Defendant publicly disclosed in May 2025." Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that Shore's third-party vendor, Nationwide Recovery Services, notified Shore in or about March 26, 2025, that NRS had been the victim of the Data Incident which impacted Shore's patients. Shore Medical is a full-service acute care community hospital located in Somers Point, New Jersey.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Eric R. Fish, Esq. Casie D. Collignon, Esq. Sarah A. Ballard, Esq. BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP 45 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10111 Telephone: (212) 589-4200 Facsimile: (212) 589-4201 E-mail: efish@bakerlaw.com ccollignon@bakerlaw.com sballard@bakerlaw.com SIG SAUER: Glasscock Wins Bid for Rule 23 Class Certification ------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSHUA GLASSCOCK, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. SIG SAUER, INC., Case No. 6:22-cv-03095-MDH (W.D. Mo.), the Hon. Judge Douglas Harpool entered an order granting the Plaintiff's motion for class certification. The Court certifies the following class in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: "All persons who purchased a Sig Sauer model P320 pistol without an external thumb safety primarily for personal, family or household purposes in the state of Missouri from Sept. 1, 2017, through the present." Excluded from the class are (1) individuals who have filed an individual action against Sig Sauer related to the P320, or (2) individuals who no longer own a P320 pistol without an external thumb safety. The Court finds Mr. Stockton's damage framework is sufficient at this stage of the litigation. The Court finds that a class action is the superior method for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The case is a putative class action arising out of an alleged defect in the Model P320 pistol ("P320") manufactured by the Defendant. The Plaintiff's class action lawsuit alleges a violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act ("MMPA"). Sig is a provider and manufacturer of firearms, electro-optics, ammunition, airguns, suppressors, and remote controlled weapons stations. A copy of the Court's order dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=GHhCwL at no extra charge.[CC] STEADILY INSURANCE: Bid to Dismiss Class Suit Tossed w/o Prejudice ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as 91 S. Main Street, LLC et al v. Steadily Insurance Agency, Inc. et al., Case No. 3:24-cv-01559 (D. Conn., Filed Sept. 27, 2024), the Hon. Judge Victor A. Bolden entered an order denying motion to dismiss without prejudice for renewal in the event that the matter is not otherwise resolved by the parties without further court intervention. The nature of suit states Contract – Insurance. Steadily offers property insurance solutions that cover damages from fire, water, vandalism, and theft, as well as cover legal liability. [CC] SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Class Settlement in White Suit Gets Final Nod --------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as RENALDO WHITE and RANDOLPH NADEAU, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. SYMETRA ASSIGNED BENEFITS SERVICE COMPANY and SYMETRA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 2:20-cv-01866-MJP (W.D. Wash.), the Hon. Judge Marsha J. Pechman entered a final order and judgment: 1. The Court affirms the appointment of Plaintiffs Renaldo White and Randolph Nadeau as Settlement Class representatives ("Named Plaintiffs"). 2. The Court finds that the Notice Plan for disseminating notice to the Class provided for in the Settlement Agreement and previously approved and directed by the Court in its Preliminary Approval Order has been implemented by the Settlement Administrator and the Settling Parties. 3. The Court also grants Settlement Class Counsels' Attorneys' Fee and Expense Application. Specifically, the Court awards Settlement Class Counsel attorneys' fees in the amount of $543,750. The Court also grants Settlement Class Counsel reimbursement of litigation expenses in the amount of $310,257. The Court further awards Named Plaintiffs service awards of $10,000 each. 4. The fee awarded is also reasonable under the lodestar- multiplier approach. Settlement Class Counsel reasonably incurred more than $4,938,280.50 in lodestar (as of February 2024) in investigating, prosecuting, and resolving this litigation over the past four years. A copy of the Court's order dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=a0Jj2g at no extra charge.[CC] TEA DATING: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Jones Suit Says ---------------------------------------------------------- CELESTE JONES, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals v. TEA DATING ADVICE INC., Case No. 4:25-cv-06376-KAW (N.D. Cal., July 30, 2025) is a class action lawsuit against Tea for its failure to protect and safeguard the Plaintiff's and the Class's highly sensitive private information. As a result of Tea's insufficient data security, cybercriminals easily infiltrated Defendant's inadequately protected network and accessed the private information of Plaintiff and the Class (the Data Breach), the Plaintiff contends. Founded in 2023, Tea allows women to anonymously review and share details about the men they have dated. Intended to alert women about potential red or green flags in their vicinity, the app had surged to the top of App Store ratings recently. On July 25, 2025, Tea announced there had been a data breach of a "legacy storage system" holding data for its users. Tea is a dating safety app that allows women to do background checks on men and anonymously share 'red flag' behaviour.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: John J. Nelson, Esq. MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC 280 S. Beverly Drive-Penthouse Suite Beverly Hills, CA 90212 Telephone: (858) 209-6941 E-mail: jnelson@milberg.com TMC: Court Grants Motion to Dismiss All Fraud Claims ---------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Point12 Diversified Fund, LP and Kyle Autry, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TMC The Metals Company, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-CV-5991 (EK)(PK) (E.D.N.Y.), Judge Eric Komitee of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint in its entirety. The Court stated that because the plaintiffs failed to allege a primary violation of the securities laws, the Section 20(a) control person claims against Barron and Leonard also failed and were dismissed. Defendant TMC touted its ability to mine the deep seafloor for the metals used in batteries for electric vehicles and other products. Formerly known as DeepGreen Metals, the company merged with a special purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, and began trading on the NASDAQ under a new name - The Metals Company, ticker symbol TMC - in September 2021. The stock opened at $12.45 on its initial public offering, but declined substantially in the following weeks when the market began questioning, among other things, TMC's cash position and the environmental repercussions of seafloor mining. Lead plaintiffs Point12 Diversified Fund, LP and Kyle Autry brought the action on behalf of a putative class of individuals who purchased, or otherwise acquired, the publicly traded securities of TMC between March 4, 2021 and October 5, 2021. Plaintiffs also sued two individual defendants, Gerard Barron (the CEO of DeepGreen and then TMC) and Scott Leonard (the former CEO of the SPAC with which DeepGreen merged). Plaintiffs contend that TMC and its predecessor violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by, among other things: -- Falsely claiming that certain private funds had "fully committed" to invest $330 million in TMC's public equity (via a private investment in public equity, or "PIPE," transaction), even though only about one-third of that money ultimately materialized; -- Overstating the fair market value of assets on its balance sheet, including a license to prospect a portion of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone ("CCZ"), a region in the central Pacific Ocean; and -- Understating the environmental risks associated with deep seafloor mining. The Court confirmed that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring claims on behalf of the class, satisfying the requirements that they suffered an injury-in-fact fairly traceable to the defendants' conduct and redressable by a favorable decision. The Court also found that the named plaintiffs had class standing, as their claims and evidentiary proofs sufficiently overlapped with those of the absent class members. However, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing under the purchaser-seller rule to challenge three pre-merger statements concerning DeepGreen itself, since plaintiffs purchased TMC stock and not DeepGreen stock. Thus, claims based on statements about DeepGreen prior to the merger could not be maintained . Regarding the substantive allegations, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead falsity. First, statements describing the PIPE financing as "fully committed" were not false because written subscription agreements constituted binding contractual commitments. The fact that some investors later failed to fund did not negate the commitments. Similarly, Barron's statement that TMC was pursuing "all our remedies" to recover missing PIPE funds was not false, as TMC had filed state court lawsuits after voluntarily dismissing federal actions. Barron's projections about TMC's cash sufficiency to fund operations through Q3 2023 and to meet operational milestones were expressions of opinion accompanied by qualifying language such as "expect." These were not rendered false by plaintiffs' allegations that TMC faced a funding shortfall that had already been disclosed in public media before the statements were made. The Court emphasized that plaintiffs failed to allege why the cash on hand was insufficient to meet the stated goals, and the statements were protected by the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements . Second, the challenged environmental statements by Leonard and Barron, that deep-sea mining would significantly reduce the environmental footprint of metal extraction and produce zero tailings and zero waste, were not misleading by omission. These statements were comparative and aspirational, and the plaintiffs failed to identify specific omitted facts inconsistent with them. Additionally, TMC's public filings adequately warned of environmental, regulatory, and operational risks associated with deep-sea mining. Thus, no actionable omission existed. Third, statements regarding the valuation of the Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (TOML) license were opinions based on subjective judgments about asset value. Plaintiffs primarily relied on a short-seller report alleging that DeepGreen overpaid for the license in a conflicted transaction with undisclosed insiders and that the license was overvalued. The Court found these assertions speculative and unsupported by detailed factual allegations. The purported ongoing relationship between DeepGreen and Nautilus Minerals, the prior license holder, was not sufficiently explained to establish a related-party transaction. Further, disagreement over valuation methodology or price did not constitute falsity. Plaintiffs also failed to show that the valuation violated accounting rules or that the defendants did not believe in the valuation at the time . Fourth, the challenge to the reported Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (NORI) exploration expenses failed because differences in accounting standards (IFRS before the merger and U.S. GAAP after) plausibly explained discrepancies between DeepGreen's reported $35 million and International Seabed Authority records showing approximately $15 million. Plaintiffs' attempt to demonstrate a material discrepancy in payments to Maersk based on share payments versus options-based payments was unpersuasive and reflected misunderstandings of accounting classifications. Therefore, the alleged inflation of exploration expenses was not adequately pleaded . Fifth, the claim that the pro forma equity valuation of $2.9 billion was overstated failed because it was a forward-looking opinion statement. Plaintiffs did not allege any accounting violations or facts showing the defendants did not believe in the valuation. Moreover, the press release expressly assumed no redemptions prior to closing and plaintiffs did not allege the defendants’ knowledge of redemptions at the time . Finally, the Court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead scienter with the required particularity. Plaintiffs did not allege specific personal motives to defraud beyond the generalized need to raise capital, which courts have held insufficient. Nor did they allege circumstantial facts showing conscious misbehavior or recklessness. The core operations theory was invoked but found insufficient without more detailed factual allegations. The Court also noted the absence of allegations that the individual defendants had actual knowledge of contrary facts. A copy of Judge Komitee's Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/347w9ppd TRICOLOR HOLDINGS: Class Cert. Bid Filing in Campos Due Nov. 21 --------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSE LUIS CAMPOS, v. TRICOLOR HOLDINGS, LLC et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-05410-SB-RAO (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr. entered an order Pretrial Conference: July 10, 2026 Class Certification Motion for Class Certification: Nov. 21, 2025 Opposition to Motion for Class Certification: Dec. 5, 2025 Reply Brief in Support of Class Certification: Dec. 19, 2025 Motion for Class Certification Hearing: Jan. 9, 2026 Discovery Deadline – Nonexpert: Feb. 27, 2026 Discovery Deadline – Expert: Mar. 27, 2026 Discovery Motion Hearing Deadline: Mar. 27, 2026 Non-Discovery Motion Hearing Deadline: Apr. 10, 2026 Settlement Conference Deadline: Apr. 24, 2026 Tricolor operates as a holding company. A copy of the Court's order dated July 28, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=xhGGv0 at no extra charge.[CC] US CONCEPTS: Court Upholds Federal Jurisdiction Over Class Action ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as Deborah J. Rombaut, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. U.S. Concepts LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 2:25-cv-02802-AB (Ex) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Andre Birotte Jr. of the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. The Court found that Defendant met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the $5 million threshold required under the Class Action Fairness Act. The ruling allows the federal court to retain jurisdiction over this California labor law class action. From February 6, 2021, to February 28, 2025, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt Brand Ambassador. Rombaut seeks to represent a class of individuals who are or were employed by Defendant as non-exempt employees in California during the class period. According to Plaintiff, Defendant violated California labor law by failing to pay minimum wage and compensate for all hours worked, including overtime. The Complaint alleges 10 causes of action: (1) Failure to Pay All Minimum Wages (Cal. Lab. Code Section 1197); (2) Failure to Pay All Overtime Wages (Cal. Lab. Code Sections 204, 510, 1194, and 1198); (3) Failure to Provide Rest Periods and Pay Missed Rest Period Premiums (Cal Lab. Code Section 226.7 and 512); (4) Failure to Provide Meal Periods and Pay Missed Meal Period Premiums (Cal. Lab. Code Section 226.7); (5) Failure to Maintain Employment Records (Cal. Lab. Code Section 1174(d)); (6) Failure to Pay Wages Timely during Employment (Cal. Lab. Code Sections 210 and 218.5); (7) Failure to Pay All Wages Earned and Unpaid at Separation (Cal. Lab. Code Sections 201-3); (8) Failure to Indemnify All Necessary Business Expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code Section 2802, subds. (b), (c)); (9) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements (Cal. Lab. Code Section 226 subds. (a)); and (10) Violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. and Pro. Code Section 17200-10). On March 31, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal, removing the case to federal court pursuant to CAFA. Plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court on the grounds that Defendant had not satisfied the requisite amount in controversy under CAFA, and Defendant failed to timely remove the case. Plaintiff argued that Defendant's Notice of Removal relies on inflated estimates regarding unpaid working hours, non-compliant meal periods and rest periods, waiting time penalties, failure to timely pay wages, wage statements, and attorneys' fees. The Court examined Defendant's estimated amount in controversy of at least $5,958,868, broken down as follows: Unpaid Wages $1,276,673; Overtime Wages $309,585; Rest Breaks $542,312; Meal Periods $351,359; Waiting Time Penalties $1,137,935; Failure to Maintain Accurate Employment Records $144,500; Untimely Pay During Employment $577,300; Unreimbursed Business Expenses $138,780; Inaccurate Wage Statements $288,650; and Attorneys' Fees $1,191,773. The Court applied the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Perez v. Rose Hills Co., which clarified that the assumptions underlying a removing defendant's violation rates do not necessarily need to be supported by evidence if the assumptions are founded on the allegations of the complaint. The district court must determine whether the defendant's violation-rate assumptions are based on a reasonable interpretation of the complaint. The Court found Defendant's assumed violation rate of 20%, equating to one unpaid hour per week, was reasonable. The Court noted that Plaintiff's Complaint offers no guidance as to the frequency of the alleged violations, relying instead on allegations that Defendants did not compensate for all hours worked. The Court concluded that Defendant's proposed violation rate is considered reasonable if it is justified by the allegations in the complaint. Regarding Defendant's 20% violation rate for meal and rest periods, the Court found that Plaintiff's allegations that the violations occurred often and that Defendant had a policy and practice of denying these breaks does not foreclose the possibility that the violation happened at every opportunity that arose, and thus, Defendant's calculations are in line with the described violations. The Court upheld Defendant's 100% violation rate for waiting time penalties. The Court found that Defendant reasonably assumes a 100% violation rate and uses conservative figures to calculate the total estimate. The Court accepted Defendant's calculation using the 25% benchmark that applies to common fund class action settlements, yielding $1,191,773. The Court noted that "District courts, including this one, have used the 25% as a benchmark level to estimate the amount put in controversy by attorneys' fee shifting statutes." The Court addressed Plaintiff's argument that the removal was untimely. The Court found that though Defendant's removal of the case came substantially after the initial 30-day window from when Plaintiff filed her complaint, Plaintiff's Complaint does not affirmatively reveal removability under CAFA. The Court concluded that Defendant properly removed the matter within 30 days of determining that it could do so properly. The Court overruled Plaintiff's evidentiary objections to parts of the Valerie Morales Declaration, finding that Morales, as Director of Payroll, was speaking to her personal knowledge and credentials and that she describes the basis and boundaries of her personal knowledge and personal access to business records maintained in the ordinary course of business operations. The Court concluded that Defendant has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. The Court emphasized that Plaintiff does not offer any evidence that the amount in controversy is below the necessary $5 million. Plaintiff offers no data, affidavits, nor evidence for the Court to consider in the alternative. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=aYoS9f WOLVERINE WORLD: Oh Suit Removed from State Court to C.D. Cal. -------------------------------------------------------------- JUDY OH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v., WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE INC., a Delaware Corporation, d/b/a WWW.WOLVERINE.COM, Case No. 25STCV17621 (Filed June 17, 2025) was removed from the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on July 30, 2025. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. e 2:25-cv-07028 to the proceedings. The Complaint arises out of Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant advertised discounted prices for products sold through Defendant's website at www.wolverine.com (Website) through the use of allegedly misleading "reference prices." Ms. Oh asserts claims based on the California False Advertising Law, Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and common law fraud. The Plaintiff alleges that, on May 3, 2025, she purchased a product, "Women's Torrent Waterproof Insulated Chukka", for an advertised discounted price of $55.00, which was allegedly listed next to a "strike-through" reference price of $134.95. The Plaintiff alleges that the sale price reflected a "phantom discount" which mislead her into believing that she was getting a bargain by buying the Product at a significant bargain. Wolverine is a publicly traded American footwear manufacturer based in Rockford, Michigan.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Michael J. Burns, Esq. SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 560 Mission Street, Suite 3100 San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: (415) 397-2823 Facsimile: (415) 397-8549 E-mail: mburns@seyfarth.com ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. 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