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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, July 17, 2025, Vol. 27, No. 142

                            Headlines

ACTING WARDEN: Suit over First Step Act Can't Proceed as Class
ALTON, IL: Appeals Court Upholds $500 Vehicle Impoundment Fee
ARVATO DIGITAL: Lewis Suit Moved to San Bernardino Superior Court
ASHLYNN MARKETING: Calif., NY Class Claims over Kratom May Proceed
AXT INC: Nowakowski Securities Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend

B.S.D. CAPITAL: Onisko Suit Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court
BROOKLYN CRAFT: Court Dismisses Layne ADA Suit With Prejudice
BYTEDANCE INC: Court Stays Case Pending Completion of Arbitration
COLGATE-PAMOLIVE: Court Narrows Claims in PFAS Contamination Suit
CUSTOMERS BANCORP: Court Refuses to Appoint Chang as Lead Plaintiff

EDWARDSVILLE, IL: Appeals Court Tosses Class Action Over $300 Fee
METRO ONE: Bid to Remand Hager Suit to Superior Court Denied
NEW YORK: Class Claims in Religious Accommodation Suit Resolved
ONE NEVADA: Class Settlement in Castro Suit Gets Final Approval
SYNAGRO WOONSOCKET: Must Defend Against Sewer Odor Case

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Grants Arbitration Bid in Bonhomme Suit

                            *********

ACTING WARDEN: Suit over First Step Act Can't Proceed as Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Keli M. Neary of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed the class complaint in
the case captioned as TYRONE KELLY, Plaintiff, v. ACTING WARDEN, et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 1:25-CV-896 (M.D. Pa.), without
prejudice to Kelly's right to file an amended complaint solely with
respect to his individual claims for relief.

Tyrone Kelly is a prisoner in Schuylkill Federal Correctional
Institution. He filed this case on May 20, 2025, on behalf of
himself and a putative class of other inmates incarcerated in
federal prisons to challenge the Bureau of Prisons' policies
implementing the First Step Act. Kelly has since filed two motions
for leave to amend, the first of which clarifies the injunctive
relief the complaint is seeking, and the second of which clarifies
facts regarding Kelly's individual request for First Step Act time
credit.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act authorizes a district court to
review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is
proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a
governmental employee or entity. The court is required to identify
cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.

In screening claims under Sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B), the
court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This standard requires the court to accept all factual allegations
as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of
the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.

The First Step Act allows eligible inmates who successfully
complete evidence-based recidivism reduction programs or productive
activities to receive earned time credits to be applied toward time
in pre-release custody or supervised release. An inmate may earn 10
days of credit for every 30 days of successful participation.
Eligible inmates who have been assessed at a minimum or low risk of
recidivism who do not increase their risk of recidivism over two
consecutive assessments may earn an additional five days of credit
for every 30 days of successful participation.

Kelly's complaint seeks injunctive relief on behalf of himself and
other similarly situated inmates compelling the Bureau of Prisons
to properly apply the First Step Act.

The court dismissed this class complaint, stating that it is plain
error to permit an imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel
to represent his fellow inmates in a class action. The court does
not construe Kelly’s complaint or other filings as requesting the
appointment of counsel. To the extent he has made such a request,
however, appointment of counsel is not warranted because Kelly has
not made an adequate showing that his claims have merit.

Judge Neary noted that courts must liberally construe complaints
brought by pro se litigants. Pro se complaints, however in artfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.

The court dismissed Kelly's complaint without prejudice to his
right to file an amended complaint that asserts claims solely on
his own behalf. Kelly's motions for leave to amend were denied as
moot.

A copy of the court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=q7oYFY


ALTON, IL: Appeals Court Upholds $500 Vehicle Impoundment Fee
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as MATTHEW E. CARTER, on Behalf of Himself
and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY
OF ALTON, Defendant-Appellee, No. 5-24-0289, Presiding Justice
McHaney of the Illinois Appellate Court Fifth District affirmed the
order of the Madison County circuit court dismissing trial court's
dismissal of the class action complaint challenging the
constitutionality of Alton's impoundment ordinance., and denying
the motion to reconsider that order. The court found that Alton's
impoundment ordinance was rationally related to legitimate
governmental purposes and that the fees charged bore a reasonable
relationship to the actual costs incurred by the city.

In 2010, Alton enacted Ordinance No. 7164, which added provisions
to the Alton City Code regarding the towing and impoundment of
vehicles. The statement of purpose for the ordinance provides that
"certain activities negatively affect the quality of life in Alton
and the health, safety, and welfare of people in the community" and
that "certain crimes require members of the police force to devote
a significant amount of time in processing motor vehicles."

The ordinance established a three-tiered system of fees. Alton
charges a level Level 1 fee of $500 if the vehicle is towed in
connection with an arrest for any felony or specific traffic
offenses, including driving under the influence. Alton charges a
level Level 2 fee of $200 if the vehicle is impounded pursuant to a
custodial arrest for misdemeanors or traffic offenses not included
in the list of level Level 1 traffic offenses. Alton charges a
level Level 3 administrative fee of $100 if the vehicle is towed
and impounded for any other reason -- --—those reasons include
abandoned, disabled, and illegally parked vehicles.

Section 8-8-11(C) of the Alton City Code details that an
administrative fee shall be paid to the City of Alton and shall be
paid at the City of Alton Police Department prior to the release of
the motor vehicle as partial reimbursement to the City of Alton
Police Department in compensation for the time and resources spent
by the Department regarding the seizure, impoundment and release of
said motor vehicles.

On December 6, 2011, Carter filed his complaint against Alton
alleging that he was arrested for DUI, that his car was towed and
impounded pursuant to Alton's ordinance, and that he was required
to pay the mandated administrative fee. He challenged the
administrative fee alleging that the "tow release fees" require
only a minimal amount of time and expense by Alton "requiring only
the Defendant's Police Department employees write a receipt for
payment" of the fees.

On October 25, 2013, the trial court granted Alton's motion to
dismiss. Carter appealed the dismissal to the appellate court,
which reversed and remanded on May 2, 2015, finding that "Alton
failed to allege affirmative matter that would preclude the case
from going forward."

Carter filed the final version of his complaint on November 7,
2022. In December 2022, Alton filed its motion to dismiss and
strike the amended complaint. On September 18, 2023, the trial
court granted the motion to dismiss. Carter filed a motion to
reconsider that the court denied on February 2, 2024.

The appellate court noted that "a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully because an enactment is facially
invalid only if no set of circumstances exist under which it would
be valid." The court must determine if the $500 fee in Alton's
ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose
and is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.

The court found that "a fee is rationally related to the interest
the ordinance is meant to advance if the amount charged bears some
reasonable relationship to the actual costs it is intended to
recoup." The fees established in this ordinance were based upon two
studies commissioned by Alton where the estimated costs incurred
with a DUI arrest ranged between $414.58 and $882.42.

The court concluded that "the fees listed in this ordinance
substantially correlate to the actual costs incurred by Alton" and
that "Alton's ordinance designed to recover costs and expenses
incurred by its police department in handling criminal
investigations that culminate in an arrest, towing, and impoundment
of the suspect's vehicle serves a legitimate purpose and is
valid."

Substantive Due Process

Carter argued that the trial court erred in finding that he failed
to establish a violation of his substantive due process rights,
contending that the ordinance only authorizes Alton to recover
administrative expenses for writing or printing the receipt for the
fees charged.

The court found that "Carter has failed to make a claim of a valid
substantive due process violation" because "Carter's substantive
due process challenge only involves deprivation of a property
interest" and he must establish either that state law remedies are
inadequate or state an independent constitutional violation.

The court explained that "the rule is that in the absence of fraud,
misrepresentation, or mistake of fact, money voluntarily paid under
a claim of right to the payment, with full knowledge of the facts
by the person making the payment, cannot be recovered unless the
payment was made under circumstances amounting to compulsion."

Carter claimed that his payment of the $500 fee was compulsive and
made under duress. However, the court noted that Section 8-8-11(H)
of the Alton City Code "expressly provides an administrative remedy
for contesting and potentially recovering the fee." Therefore, the
court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that "Carter's claim
is barred by the voluntary payment doctrine."

Carter argued that the trial court should not have allowed the
relitigation of previously decided issues pursuant to the law of
the case doctrine. The court rejected this argument, finding that
"the trial court's order denying Alton's earlier motion to dismiss
was interlocutory, and therefore never became the law of the
case."

The appellate court affirmed the order of the Madison County
circuit court dismissing this case and denying the motion to
reconsider that order. The court found that Alton's impoundment
ordinance was rationally related to legitimate governmental
purposes and that the fees charged bore a reasonable relationship
to the actual costs incurred by the city.

A copy of the Appeals Court's Opinion can be found is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=qTYx59


ARVATO DIGITAL: Lewis Suit Moved to San Bernardino Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Andre Birotte, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California grants Plaintiff Markely Lewis's
motion for remand and denies Defendant Arvato Digital Services,
LLC's motion to compel arbitration as moot in the case captioned as
MARKELY LEWIS, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ARVATO DIGITAL SERVICES, LLC; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 5:24-cv-02693-AB-SHK
(C.D. Cal.).

The Court remands the case to the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of San Bernardino after finding that the
Defendant failed to establish the required $5 million amount in
controversy under the Class Action Fairness Act.

Plaintiff Markely Lewis filed this putative class action complaint
on September 18, 2024, in San Bernardino County Superior Court. The
complaint alleged eight causes of action against Defendant Arvato
Digital Services, LLC: (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (2)
Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods;
(4) Failure to Provide Rest Periods; (5) Failure to indemnify
Necessary Business Expenses; (6) Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages
at Termination; (7) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage
Statements; and (8) Unfair Business Practices.

The complaint alleged that "Plaintiff and the putative class
members were not paid all wages and expenses, provided meal and
rest periods, issued accurate wage statements, or timely paid wages
at termination due to Defendant's policy and practice of
noncompliance." On November 20, 2024, Defendant removed the action
to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act. Plaintiff
subsequently filed a motion for remand.

Legal Standards Applied

The court applied established legal standards for removal
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act. The Class Action
Fairness Act gives federal courts jurisdiction over specified class
actions if (1) the parties are minimally diverse; (2) the putative
class has more than 100 members; and (3) the aggregated amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million.

The court noted that "no antiremoval presumption attends cases
invoking CAFA" and that "Congress passed CAFA with the 'overall
intent . . . to strongly favor the exercise of federal diversity
jurisdiction over class actions with interstate ramifications.'"
Regarding the burden of proof, the court stated that "a removing
defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction."
When "a plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant's
allegation" the defendant must "submit evidence to establish the
amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence."

Timeliness of Removal

Plaintiff argued that removal was untimely because Plaintiff
notified Defendant of the complaint by email before executing
formal service. The court rejected this argument, stating that "a
named defendant's time to remove is triggered by simultaneous
service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint,
'through service or otherwise,' after and apart from service of the
summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any
formal service."

The court found that "Defendant executed a written acknowledgment
of receipt of the mailed summons on November 20, 2024" and
therefore "Defendant's deadline to remove the case was 30 days
later: December 20, 2024. Defendant timely removed the lawsuit on
December 20, 2024."

Amount in Controversy Analysis

The central issue in the case concerned whether Defendant could
establish the required $5 million amount in controversy. "In the
Notice of Removal, Defendant alleges that the amount in controversy
is approximately $5,192,500." Defendant relied on "the Declaration
of Sofia Cruz, Senior Human Resource Manager at Arvato in Ontario,
California, to support its calculations."

Based on the Cruz Declaration, "Defendant asserts that 297 class
members worked approximately 32,000 workweeks and earned an average
hourly rate of $22.98, and an average overtime rate of $34.46."
Defendant also asserted that "118 employees separated from the
company between September 18, 2021, and December 18, 2024, and that
Defendant issued more than 4,600 weekly wage statements to 171
Putative Class Members within the one-year statute of
limitations."

Unpaid Minimum Wage Claims

The court found issues with Defendant's calculation methodology for
minimum wage claims. The court stated: "Defendant does not explain
why it uses the 'average hourly rate' to calculate the minimum wage
damages at stake in this claim." The court noted that "in 2020,
California's minimum wage was $13.00 per hour, in 2021 it was
$14.00, in 2022 it was $15.00, in 2023 it was $15.50, and in 2024
it was $16.00—all below Defendant's $22.98."

The Court is unable to find a reasonable factual basis for applying
the $22.98 hourly rate to this claim" and adjusted the calculation.
The court determined that "the average minimum wage (rounded up to
the nearest dollar) over the relevant period is $15.00, which
reasonably places $480,000 in controversy." Accordingly, "the Court
reduces Defendant's calculation of $1,151,360 in controversy for
the minimum wage claim to $960,000 including liquidated damages."

Unpaid Overtime Claims

The court found Defendant's overtime calculations reasonable
despite Plaintiff's arguments about double counting. The court
stated that "it is reasonable to assume Plaintiff is alleging
different instances of unpaid time for the two claims because the
Complaint includes a distinct reason for unpaid overtime
compensation (failure to account for incentives) and does not
specify the nature of the unpaid work."

The court distinguished the case from others where double counting
was problematic, noting that "the instant case is distinct from
that of Vasquez where both the overtime and minimum wage claims
were premised on the same 2.5 hours of unpaid meal breaks."
Accordingly, "Defendant's calculation of $1,100,000 in controversy
for the overtime claim is reasonable."

Meal Period and Rest Break Claims

The court found Defendant's calculations for meal and rest break
premiums unreasonable. "Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's
assumption of one missed meal period per week or one missed rest
break per week for each class member was unreasonable because the
Complaint alleged those violations occurred 'sometimes, but not
always.'"

The court applied the standard from Harris v. KM Industrial, Inc.,
stating that when a plaintiff "contest[s] the truth of the
defendant's factual allegations," the defendant has the "burden of
supporting its jurisdictional allegations with competent proof."
The court found that "Defendant did not directly respond to
Plaintiff's argument or elaborate on its basis for asserting that
all employees would be reasonably implicated by the rest and meal
break claims."

The court noted that "while unpaid wages would not typically be
tracked in company records, information relevant to meal and rest
break claims such as shifts worked, break eligibility, and breaks
taken would be recorded, making sub-classes for these two claims
more readily discernable." Despite having this information
available, "Defendant did not provide any more information or
argument to explain its assumption that all class members would be
subject to the meal and rest break claims following Plaintiff's
factual challenge."

Court's Ultimate Decision

The court concluded that Defendant failed to meet its burden of
establishing the required amount in controversy. The court stated:
"Finding no factual basis in the Complaint or NOR from which to
draw an assumption about how many members of the class were
eligible to take breaks, the Court cannot 'supply further
assumptions of its own.'"

The court emphasized that "where a defendant's assumption is
unreasonable on its face without comparison to a better
alternative, a district court may be justified in simply rejecting
that assumption and concluding that the defendant failed to meet
its burden." The court found that "Defendant's calculation is
unreasonable because Defendant did not establish that it was more
likely than not that 100% of the class members were eligible for
rest breaks or meal breaks every week."

The court concluded that "without a plausible factual basis, the
assertion of 100% percent class participation, or any other
proportion the Court might draw without knowledge of the shifts
worked by the class, would amount to 'speculation' or 'assumptions
... pulled from thin air,' which the Ninth Circuit has prohibited."
Accordingly, "the Court finds Defendant has not met its burden to
show that $735,360 is in controversy under the unpaid rest and meal
break claims."

Therefore, the court granted "Plaintiff's Motion for Remand and
denies Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration as moot." The case
was remanded to San Bernardino County Superior Court for further
proceedings.

A copy of the court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=5WNW0L


ASHLYNN MARKETING: Calif., NY Class Claims over Kratom May Proceed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as J.J., C.D., C.B., and D.F., individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Ashlynn Marketing Group, Inc., Defendant, Civil Action No.
24-cv-00311-GPC-MSB (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo Paul Curiel of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss a Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

The court dismissed the Plaintiffs' nationwide class claims without
leave to amend due to significant variations in state consumer
protection laws but allowed the California and New York class
claims to proceed, finding that the Plaintiffs adequately alleged
fraudulent omissions regarding the addictive nature of the
Defendant's kratom products.

The Plaintiffs initiated this class action against Ashlynn
Marketing Group, Inc., alleging "false, misleading, deceptive, and
negligent sales practices regarding its kratom powder, capsule, and
liquid extract products." Kratom, a plant indigenous to Southeast
Asia, contains active alkaloids that "work on the exact same opioid
receptors in the human brain as morphine and its analogs" and "have
the same risks of addiction, dependency, and painful withdrawal
symptoms". The Defendant, a kratom product manufacturer and
distributor, allegedly failed to disclose kratom's addictiveness,
causing "serious physical, psychological, and financial harm" to
consumers.

The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendant "knew or should have
known that the Products it was selling were highly addictive" but
failed to disclose the addictive potential of kratom on its website
or on its Products' packaging. Each named Plaintiff reported
personal experiences with kratom addiction. Plaintiff J.J. began
purchasing the Defendant's products in 2018, unaware of their
addictive potential, and experienced intense physical and
psychological withdrawal symptoms when attempting to quit.

Plaintiff C.D. started using the products in 2020 and realized
addiction in 2021, unable to quit due to withdrawal symptoms.
Plaintiff C.B., seeking relief from prescription painkiller
dependence, began using kratom in 2021 and faced opioid-like
withdrawals when trying to stop.

Plaintiff D.F. purchased kratom in New York, believing it would
help with pain and anxiety, but suffered "flu-like symptoms,
insomnia, sweating, nausea, diarrhea, and seizures upon quitting.

The Plaintiffs asserted five causes of action:

(1) violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200)

(2) violations of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA)

(3) violations of New York's Consumer Protection from Deceptive
Acts and Practices Act (NYDAPA)

(4) violations of New York False Advertising Act (NYFAA)

(5) common law fraudulent omission.

They alleged that, had they known about kratom's addictiveness,
they "would have never purchased Defendant's Products" or "would
have paid less than they did for them.

The Defendant moved to dismiss the CCAC under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that federal law preempts the
Plaintiffs' state law claims, as disclosing kratom's addictiveness
would constitute an unauthorized "disease claim" under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).

The Defendant also contended that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring claims under laws of states other than California and New
York, claims based on website representations, or claims for
products they did not purchase.

Additionally, the Defendant argued that a nationwide class was
unsustainable due to variations in state laws and that Plaintiff
D.F. and Plaintiff C.B. failed to state claims under New York and
California laws, respectively.

Upon careful examination, the court rejected the Defendant's
preemption argument, finding that "federal law does not preempt
Plaintiffs' state law claims.

The court determined that disclosing kratom's addictive potential
is a permissible structure/function claim under the FDCA, not a
disease claim, and that the Defendant could comply with both state
laws and the FDCA by avoiding "false, misleading, or deceptive
statements or omissions regarding kratom's alleged addictiveness."

According to the court, "the FDCA's requirements would be
consistent with state law requirements" prohibiting deceptive
practices.

The court addressed standing issues, deferring the question of
whether the Plaintiffs could bring claims under laws of states
other than California and New York, as the nationwide class claims
were dismissed on other grounds.

The court denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss claims based on
website representations, as the Plaintiffs clarified they did not
rely on such representations but sought to represent consumers who
purchased similar products.

The court also found that the Plaintiffs had standing to bring
claims for unpurchased products, as they adequately alleged that
all kratom products were "substantially similar" due to their
shared active ingredient and uniform packaging. Regarding the
nationwide class, the court found that "variances in state law
overwhelm common issues and preclude predominance for a single
nationwide class.

The court noted material differences in state consumer protection
laws, including reliance requirements, burdens of proof, statutes
of limitations, and damage . Therefore, the court granted the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the nationwide class claims and
struck the nationwide class allegations without leave to amend, as
the Plaintiffs could not cure the deficiency .For Plaintiff D.F.'s
New York claims, the court denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the NYDAPA and NYFAA claims, finding that Plaintiff D.F.
sufficiently alleged a fraudulent omission.

The court noted that while the Defendant did not have exclusive
knowledge of kratom's addictiveness, Plaintiff D.F. plausibly
alleged that consumers could not reasonably obtain this information
due to its inaccessibility and complexity.

Similarly, the court denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiff D.F.'s
common law fraudulent omission claim, as the allegations supported
that the Defendant had superior knowledge and knew consumers acted
on mistaken knowledge. For Plaintiff C.B.'s California claims, the
court denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the UCL, CLRA, and
fraudulent omission claims.

The court reaffirmed its prior finding that the Defendant had
superior knowledge of kratom's addictiveness, supported by the
Plaintiffs' allegations and the conflicting public information on
kratom).  The court also found that Plaintiff C.B. adequately
alleged a lack of adequate legal remedies for the UCL claim,
seeking public injunctive relief to prevent future harm, which
monetary damages could not address.

The court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
nationwide class claims without leave to amend, and struck his
nationwide class allegations as "Plaintiffs cannot plead around
this shortcoming."

The court denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss on all other
grounds, allowing the California and New York class claims to
proceed. Accordingly, the court ordered that the case move forward
with the remaining claims intact.

A copy of the court's memorandum and order is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=j1ilRi


AXT INC: Nowakowski Securities Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants AXT Inc.'s motion to dismiss the
amended class action complaint in the case captioned as CRAIG
NOWAKOWSKI, et al., Plaintiffs v. AXT INC., et al., Defendants,
Case No. 24-cv-02778-MMC (N.D. Cal.).

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend for failure to
adequately plead falsity under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act.

The case involves a securities fraud class action filed by
plaintiffs Craig Nowakowski and Charles Grubb against defendants
AXT Inc., Morris Young, and Gary L. Fischer. The plaintiffs
"purchased stock in defendant AXT" and allege that AXT, described
as "a materials science company," obtains "almost all of its
revenue" from the operations of Tongmei, its "subsidiary based in
China."

According to the complaint, AXT announced in November 2020 that it
planned "to list Tongmei on China's STAR Market, an exchange
established by the Chinese government." Subsequently, AXT raised
$49.6 million from "private equity firms in China" in exchange for
"a 7.28% non-controlling interest in Tongmei" and granted those
firms the right to redeem their shares if "Tongmei's IPO
application" was "rejected" or Tongmei "withdrew" it.

The plaintiffs further alleged that in December 2021, Tongmei
submitted its IPO application to the Shanghai Stock Exchange, which
entity, in August 2022, "gave preliminary approval and forwarded an
amended version of the IPO application to the CSRC (China
Securities Regulatory Commission)."

The plaintiffs assert that AXT filed reports with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on March 23, 2021, January 10, 2022, March
15, 2022, August 2, 2022, March 16, 2023, and March 14, 2024,
containing "materially false and misleading statements." The
plaintiffs contended that AXT failed to disclose in those reports
that "there were specific, known material risks that Tongmei's IPO
attempt would fail, requiring AXT to refund the $49 million
investment to the pre-IPO Chinese corporate investors and that
AXT's financial condition, and business operations would be
adversely impacted."

The complaint acknowledges that AXT's SEC reports contained "risk
disclosures," including that "the proposed Tongmei IPO on the STAR
market in China could fail to be completed" and that "the terms of
the private equity raised by Tongmei in China grant each investor a
right of redemption if the IPO fails to pass the audit of the
Shanghai Stock Exchange, is not approved by the CSRC or Tongmei
cancels the IPO application, which could result in disgorging the
cash Tongmei raised from the investors."

However, the plaintiffs alleged that the risk disclosures were
"incomplete and materially false and misleading" because AXT did
not disclose that "Tongmei had stolen trade secrets from its
competitors, leading to a criminal investigation and pending
prosecution in China."

The plaintiffs alleged that Tongmei, in 2019, hired a former
employee of a competitor known as Sinocryst who "brought with him
trade secrets" of Sinocryst, and that Tongmei "used" Sinocryst's
trade secrets to "quickly develop" products. The complaint further
alleged that Sinocryst, in 2021, "reported the violation" to the
Yucheng City Public Security Bureau, which agency "obtained
evidence of Tongmei's IP infringement" and "launched a criminal
investigation." According to the plaintiffs, the agency, in 2023,
"completed its investigation and transferred the case records to
the People's Procuratorate, or public prosecutor's office, pending
criminal prosecution."

Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs asserted two causes of
action on their own behalf and on behalf of a putative class:
"Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder"
(Count I) and "Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act"
(Count II).

The Court noted that the elements of a private securities fraud
action under Section 10b, Rule 10b-5, and Section 20(a) are "(1) a
material misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) scienter, (3) a
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) transaction
and loss causation, and (5) economic loss."

The defendants argued that the amended complaint is subject to
dismissal for failure to allege sufficient facts to meet the
"formidable pleading requirements" applicable in "private
securities fraud class actions" under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, particularly facts sufficient to support a
finding of "falsity."

The Court explained that "to plead falsity adequately under the
PSLRA, the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have
been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."
Additionally, "the plaintiff must reveal the sources of his
information."

The Court determined that the plaintiffs failed to expressly allege
"the sources of their information." The Court noted that to the
extent the plaintiffs implicitly alleged the source was a "report"
issued in April 2024 by "J Capital Research," which "revealed the
criminal investigation against Tongmei due to the IP infringement,"
the plaintiffs' reliance was unavailing.

Although courts have found that a plaintiff can "rely on a short
seller report" to "allege falsity at the pleading stage" if the
report contains "indicia of reliability," such as where the report
"relies on publicly filed documents," the Court found that "the
amended complaint does not allege the source or sources on which J
Capital Research relied, much less a source that is of the type on
which a securities fraud claim can be based."

The Court noted that the short seller report was insufficient to
plead falsity because the short seller "did not corroborate its
core conclusions" and cited only to "unverified and unverifiable
information."

Court's Ruling and Order

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the amended complaint for failure
to sufficiently allege falsity. The Court determined that "it
appears plaintiffs may be able to cure the deficiency identified"
and therefore afforded the plaintiffs leave to amend.

The Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed
the Amended Class Action Complaint with leave to amend. The Court
ordered that any Second Amended Class Action Complaint was due on
June 27, 2025.

The Court noted that in any further pleading, "plaintiffs are not
limited to amending their falsity allegations, and may choose to
amend other allegations as well." The Court did not address the
defendants' additional arguments regarding scienter and loss
causation "in light of the Court's findings with respect to
falsity."

A copy of the court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=8c1BNN


B.S.D. CAPITAL: Onisko Suit Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California grants the Plaintiffs' motion to
remand in the case captioned as ONISKO AND SCHOLZ, LLP, et al. v.
B.S.D. CAPITAL, INC., Case No. 2:24-cv-10314-MEMF-SK (C.D. Cal.).

The court ordered the case remanded to Los Angeles County Superior
Court and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss as moot.

Plaintiff Onisko and Scholz, LLP is a limited liability company
located in Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs Paul Scholz and Cindy
Schoelen are natural persons residing in Los Angeles County.

Defendant B.S.D. Capital, doing business as Lendistry, has its
principal place of business in Los Angeles County.

Lendistry entered into a contract on April 25, 2023, with the
Governor's Office to administer the Small Business and Nonprofit
COVID-19 Supplemental Paid Sick Leave Relief Grant Program.

The Governor's Office required Lendistry to follow all applicable
privacy laws during the application process. As part of the
application process, applicants were required to create accounts on
the Lendistry app and verify their bank accounts.

According to the complaint, Lendistry's website allowed a
third-party bank verification partner to intercept communications
between applicants and their financial institutions. This
third-party partner allegedly accessed putative class members' bank
accounts without consent to repeatedly data mine their accounts and
monetize the obtained data in transactions with other third
parties.

Claims and Allegations

Plaintiffs filed suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court on
October 28, 2024, bringing sixteen claims under California law: 1.
Breach of contract; 2. Negligence; 3. Violation of California's
Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud Act; 4. Unlawful obtaining or
use of personal information; 5. Violation of California Penal Code
Section 631; 6. Violation of California Penal Code Section 632; 7.
Violation of California Penal Code Section 632.7; 8. Violation of
California Penal Code Section 638.51; 9. Invasion of privacy:
intrusion upon seclusion; 10. Invasion of privacy: publication of
private information; 11. Invasion of privacy: breach of confidence;
12. Violation of California Constitutional Invasion of Privacy
Civil conspiracy; 13. Violation of California Civil Code Sections
1709-1711; 14. Breach of implied contract; and 15. Violations of
California Unfair Competition Law.

Procedural History

Lendistry removed the action to federal court on November 27, 2024,
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Plaintiffs filed a
motion to remand on December 6, 2024, along with a request for
judicial notice. Lendistry filed opposition on December 20, 2024,
and plaintiffs filed their reply on December 27, 2024.

On January 3, 2025, Lendistry filed a motion to dismiss. On May 30,
2025, the Magistrate Judge granted plaintiffs' motion to compel
jurisdictional discovery subject to a temporary protective order.

On June 6, 2025, plaintiffs filed a supplement to their motion.

Request for Judicial Notice

The court granted plaintiffs' request for judicial notice of
Exhibit D and Appendix A, finding these documents satisfied Federal
Rule of Evidence 201(b) as public documents available through
government agency websites.

The court found that Lendistry properly established the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million. Each plaintiff requests statutory
damages of $5,000 for counts six and seven.

The complaint states the putative class consists of "thousands of
California businesses and California residents." The court
calculated that even with 1,000 putative class members and only two
counts, the amount would reach $10 million ($5,000 statutory
damages × two counts × 1,000 putative class members).

The court found that Lendistry failed to establish minimum
diversity by a preponderance of the evidence. While the class
definition refers to "all persons in California who submitted an
application," the complaint explicitly alleges that "Plaintiffs,
all putative class members, and Defendant itself are citizens of
this state."

The court rejected Lendistry's argument that the class definition
necessarily includes non-Californians, finding this contention not
founded on the complaint's allegations.

The court distinguished this case from Broadway Grill, Inc. v. Visa
Inc., noting that unlike other cases, this complaint affirmatively
alleged the citizenship of all putative class members. After
minimum diversity was challenged, Lendistry bore the burden to
provide supporting facts but failed to do so.

The court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand, finding that
removal under CAFA was improper due to lack of minimum diversity.
The court ordered the case remanded to Los Angeles County Superior
Court and denied Lendistry's motion to dismiss as moot.

The court applied established CAFA principles, requiring: (1)
amount in controversy exceeding $5 million; (2) minimal diversity
between parties; and (3) 100 or more proposed plaintiff class
members.

The removing party bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence. When jurisdictional allegations
are challenged, defendants must provide factual support rather than
rely on speculation or conjecture.

The court emphasized that citizenship determinations must be based
on complaint allegations, and explicit allegations of citizenship
cannot be overcome by mere class definitions that might
theoretically include diverse parties.

For these reasons, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Request for
Judicial Notice and Motion to Remand. The case is remanded to the
Los Angeles County Superior Court forthwith. Lendistry's Motion to
Dismiss is denied as moot.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=bPjSKZ


BROOKLYN CRAFT: Court Dismisses Layne ADA Suit With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Hector Gonzalez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York dismisses with prejudice the putative class
action lawsuit captioned as DALE LAYNE, Plaintiff v. BROOKLYN CRAFT
PRODUCTIONS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 25-CV-00021 (HG) (E.D.N.Y.).

The Court dismisses the lawsuit pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to comply with court
orders. The court found that plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel
repeatedly failed to comply with unambiguous court orders regarding
filing mandatory case management documents.

Plaintiff Dale Layne alleged that he is "visually impaired and
legally blind" and "was unable to purchase products from
Defendant's website, which was incompatible with screen access
programs he needed to use the website." Plaintiff claimed this
"violated, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act."

After plaintiff filed proof of service, the court "ordered the
parties to submit a joint letter describing the case and a
completed civil case management plan by February 20, 2025." The
court specifically ordered that "Plaintiff's counsel was ordered to
notify Defendant's counsel of this scheduling order, in writing, as
soon as reasonably possible." The deadline passed and "the parties
did not file the joint letter or CMP. That was the first missed
deadline."

On February 21, 2025, "the Court sua sponte extended the deadline
to March 21, 2025, warning that if the parties failed to meet the
March 21, 2025, deadline, the Court would enter a discovery
schedule without seeking further input from the parties." Again,
"the parties did not file the joint letter or CMP. That was the
second missed deadline."

On March 24, 2025, the court "ordered Plaintiff to request a
certificate of default from the Clerk of Court on April 7, 2025, if
Defendant had not answered the Complaint by that date." The court
"warned the parties, future failure to comply with unambiguous
court orders may result in sanctions."

On April 7, 2025, "Plaintiff filed a motion to extend the time
until May 15, 2025, for Defendant to respond to the Complaint." The
court "granted Plaintiff's extension request until May 15, 2025"
and "warned the parties that if they failed to comply with the
Court's order, the Court would enter a discovery schedule without
seeking further input from the parties and that failure to comply
with unambiguous court orders may result in sanctions."

On May 15, 2025, "Plaintiff filed a letter purporting to explain
why the parties could not submit a proposed case management plan
and requesting an extension to June 30, 2025."

Plaintiff stated that "the parties are nearing a settlement of the
matter and currently have a tentative date scheduled for mediation
if the parties are unable to reach an agreement."

The court "construed Plaintiff's letter as a motion for an
extension and denied the motion."

The court "entered a discovery schedule as its scheduling order
required by Rule 16(b)" and "ordered the parties to file on the
docket a joint letter describing the case, per the mandatory
requirements in ECF No. 6, by May 23, 2025." For the third time,
the court "warned the parties, future failures to comply with
unambiguous court orders will result in sanctions, including
terminating sanctions pursuant to Rule 41(b) and monetary sanctions
directly on counsel." The court noted that "The parties again
failed to comply. That was the third missed deadline for the same
court-ordered joint letter and CMP."

Court's Analysis of Culpability

The court stated it "predominantly views Plaintiff and Plaintiff's
counsel culpable for the parties' failure to comply." The court
explained that "Plaintiff brought this case and thus it is
Plaintiff's responsibility to move his case forward" and "It is an
attorney's responsibility to press his client's case."

The court noted that "Plaintiff's counsel has steadily developed a
reputation for unabashedly disobeying the authority of the courts,"
citing multiple cases where similar conduct occurred, including
sanctions imposed on the law firm Stein Saks PLLC for filing "a
high volume of virtually identical complaints" that "follow a
familiar pattern" with "mere boilerplate pleadings."

Rule 41(b) Analysis

The court applied the five-factor test from Baptiste v. Sommers for
dismissal under Rule 41(b), analyzing: "(1) the duration of the
plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order, (2) whether
plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in
dismissal, (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced
by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court's
interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in
receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5) whether the judge has
adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal."

Duration Factor

The court found that "Over four months have passed since the
Court's initial scheduling order instructing the parties to file
the joint letter and CMP." The court determined that counsel's
conduct "indicates a willful disregard of Court orders."

Notice Factor

The court concluded that "the Court unambiguously warned the
parties that this case would be dismissed if they fail to file the
joint letter and CMP." Additionally, "Plaintiff's counsel could not
credibly feign surprise, given the numerous warnings and sanctions
courts in this district and the Southern District have imposed on
Mr. Salim and his firm, Stein Saks PLLC, for similar behavior."

Judicial Economy Factor

The court emphasized that "Since the inception of this case, the
Court has been chasing Plaintiff to comply with his procedural
obligations and thus has an interest in eliminating this case from
its docket." The court stated that "it is not this Court's role to
keep this case in a holding pattern merely to increase pressure on
Defendant to settle" and that "Clearing this case from the Court's
calendar will permit the Court to prioritize its criminal docket
and the civil matters of those plaintiffs committed to the vigorous
prosecution of their claims."

Lesser Sanctions Factor

The court determined that "The Court has already imposed a less
drastic sanction: setting discovery deadlines without the parties'
input" and concluded that "there is no reason to believe that a
lesser sanction would be effective."

Court's Ruling

The court concluded that "the balance of factors in this case
supports dismissal" and ordered that "the Court dismisses
Plaintiff's claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant
to Rule 41(b)." The court ordered the Plaintiff's counsel to serve
a copy of this Order on defense counsel and to file an affidavit
confirming his compliance with this Order on or before June 2,
2025.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=McmbhE


BYTEDANCE INC: Court Stays Case Pending Completion of Arbitration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Selena Connell, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Bytedance, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 24-cv-07859-NC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Nathanael M. Cousins of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California granted, in part, and denied,
in part, Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the
case pending arbitration. The Court ordered that all Plaintiffs
except one must proceed to arbitration based on their agreements,
and the case is stayed in its entirety, including the claims of the
Plaintiff who did not agree to arbitrate.

Plaintiffs, 18 current and former sales representatives employed by
Defendant ByteDance, Inc. in Texas, New York, Illinois, or
California, filed a collective action alleging violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for failure to pay overtime.

Plaintiffs largely fall into two subgroups based on the agreements
they signed: the CIAA Plaintiffs and the MAA Plaintiffs. The six
CIAA Plaintiffs -- Alexa Naas, Kevin Leadley, Carlvin Dorvilier,
Adam Schwartz, Kate Van Meter, and Otho Wilbur Jr. -- signed both
an offer letter and a Statement Regarding Employee Confidentiality
and Inventions Assignment Agreement (CIAA). The eleven MAA
Plaintiffs -- Selena Connell, Beau Wengert, Ryan Gregory,
Christopher J. Kawesa, Josh Koo, Samuel Schwaeber, Christine Quach,
James Cashen, Mariel Negrón, Gigi Silver, and Rachel Atkinson --
each signed an offer letter and a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate
(MAA).
Plaintiff Katie Melgar signed an offer letter and CIAA but did not
sign an MAA.

Upon careful examination, the Court applied federal arbitrability
law to resolve the issues presented. The Court found no contract
formation issues that it must decide at the outset, as the parties'
disputes about the scope and completeness of the contracts were
better left for the arbitrator. The Court acknowledged Plaintiffs'
arguments regarding illusoriness and lack of mutuality but treated
them as validity and enforceability challenges suitable for
arbitration.

Regarding the CIAA Plaintiffs, the Court held that the delegation
clauses in their agreements clearly and unmistakably delegated
arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, relying on incorporation
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules and applicable
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.

The delegation clauses stated that any employment-related disputes
would be submitted to binding arbitration under the AAA rules and
the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court rejected Plaintiffs'
argument that incorporation of AAA rules did not constitute clear
delegation, noting that the Ninth Circuit had applied Brennan v.
Opus Bank to hold otherwise.

However, the Court found the delegation clause in Plaintiff Naas's
CIAA unconscionable under California law due to an unequal
carve-out allowing Defendant to seek equitable relief in court
without reciprocal obligations for Plaintiffs. This carve-out
created substantive unconscionability compounded by moderate
procedural unconscionability because the delegation clause was
implied rather than explicit and Plaintiffs were not provided a
copy of the AAA rules, leading to unfair surprise. The Court
severed the offending equitable relief provision, rendering the
remaining delegation clause enforceable

For Plaintiff Wilbur, whose CIAA contained an explicit delegation
clause, the Court found the arbitration clause enforceable under
Texas law, which requires a totality of circumstances analysis. The
Court concluded the clause was neither procedurally nor
substantively unconscionable, and therefore compelled arbitration
for Wilbur.

As to the MAA Plaintiffs, the Court first held their class and
collective action waivers enforceable. The waivers prohibited
collective or class arbitration and required any challenges to
their enforceability to be decided by the Court, consistent with
Supreme Court precedent in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Epic
Systems Corporation v. Lewis, which preclude state laws
invalidating class waivers in FAA-covered arbitration agreements.

The Court concluded that the MAAs formed part of a larger contract
including the offer letters and CIAAs, based on integration clauses
and references in the offer letters to these documents as
attachments. As a result, challenges to illusoriness and mutuality
were validity and enforceability issues for the arbitrator, not
contract formation issues for the Court.

The MAA delegation clauses explicitly granted the arbitrator
exclusive authority to decide issues of validity, enforceability,
and unconscionability, except for challenges to the class and
collective action waivers. The Court found these clauses clear and
unmistakable, relying on Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., which
upheld delegation clauses with similar carve-outs for class waiver
disputes.

Applying New York, Illinois, and Texas law, the Court rejected
Plaintiffs' arguments that the delegation clauses were procedurally
or substantively unconscionable based on adhesion, obscurity, fee
shifting, or lack of mutuality. The delegation clauses were
prominently placed, not hidden in fine print, and any fee-shifting
provisions did not impose prohibitive costs. The equitable relief
carve-outs in the MAAs allowed both parties to seek injunctive
relief in court, unlike the one-sided carve-out in Naas's CIAA,
which weighed against unconscionability.

Under California law, however, the Court found the delegation
clauses in the MAAs unconscionable due to two provisions: (1) a
one-sided equitable relief carve-out allowing Defendant easier
access to injunctive relief without bond or showing irreparable
harm, and (2) a provision requiring Plaintiffs to arbitrate claims
against a broad category of related entities, but binding only
Defendant to arbitrate claims against Plaintiffs. The Court found
these provisions lacked mutuality and reasonable justification,
rendering the delegation clauses unenforceable under California
law.

The Court severed the offending provisions from the California
MAAs, including the one-sided coverage of claims and the equitable
relief carve-out from the CIAA portions incorporated by reference.
Severance preserved the remainder of the delegation clauses and
MAAs for enforcement. Plaintiffs were not precluded from raising
further unconscionability challenges to the arbitration agreements
as a whole before the arbitrator.

Regarding Plaintiff Melgar, who signed an offer letter and CIAA but
no MAA, the Court found no valid agreement to arbitrate. The CIAA
incorporated arbitration terms only as set forth in the MAA, which
Melgar did not sign or receive. Consequently, the Court denied
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration as to Melgar but stayed
her claims pending completion of arbitration by other Plaintiffs.

Finally, the Court stayed the entire case, including Melgar’s
claims, pending arbitration. The Court found that staying the
non-arbitrable claims served judicial economy and avoided
inefficiency, as the factual allegations and claims overlapped
among all Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not show any hardship from the
stay, and proceeding with only Melgar's claims would be
inefficient. The Court ordered the parties to file joint status
reports every six months and allowed motions to lift the stay at
any time.

In conclusion, the Court granted Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration as to all Plaintiffs except Melgar, severing
unconscionable provisions from certain agreements. The class and
collective action waivers were enforceable. The case is stayed in
its entirety pending completion of arbitration.

Summary of decisions by Plaintiff group and applicable state law:

     1. CIAA Plaintiffs Dorvilier, Schwartz, Van Meter, Leadley
(New York or Illinois law): granted motion to compel arbitration
based on delegation clauses.

     2. CIAA Plaintiff Naas (California law): granted motion after
severing unconscionable equitable relief carve-out.

     3. CIAA Plaintiff Wilbur (Texas law): granted motion based on
enforceable arbitration clause.

     4. MAA Plaintiffs Quach, Cashen, Negron (New York law);
Schwaeber (Illinois law); Connell, Silver, Wengert, Atkinson (Texas
law): granted motion based on delegation clauses.

     5. MAA Plaintiffs Gregory, Kawesa, Koo (California law):
granted motion after severing unconscionable provisions.

     6. Plaintiff Melgar (California law): denied motion for lack
of arbitration agreement.

A copy of the Court's opinion is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=6m24q2


COLGATE-PAMOLIVE: Court Narrows Claims in PFAS Contamination Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Abigail Esquibel, Tammy Searle, Jeremy
Wahl, Aimen Halim, Nicholas Salerno, and Jason Zirpoli,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. and Tom's of Maine, Inc.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 23-CV-00742-LTS (S.D.N.Y.), Chief
United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint.

The Court dismissed claims by certain Plaintiffs for lack of
standing, dismissed claims for injunctive relief, and dismissed
specific common law claims, while allowing other claims to
proceed.

The Plaintiffs, residents of California, Illinois, and New York,
purchased Toms Wicked Fresh! Mouthwash, marketed as "natural" by
Defendant Tom's of Maine, Inc., a Maine corporation majority-owned
by Defendant Colgate-Palmolive Co., a Delaware corporation based in
New York. The Plaintiffs alleged that the mouthwash contained per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), harmful "forever chemicals"
that persist in the body. Independent third-party testing in July
2022 and November 2023 detected PFAS in bottles purchased by
Plaintiffs Esquibel, Halim, and Zirpoli, but not by Plaintiffs
Searle, Wahl, or Salerno.

The Plaintiffs brought a proposed class action asserting violations
of California's False Advertising Law (Count I), California's
Unfair Competition Law (Count II), California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (Count III), the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (Count IV), fraud (Count V), constructive
fraud (Count VII), and unjust enrichment (Count VIII). The claims
centered on the Defendants' alleged misrepresentation of the
mouthwash as "natural" despite the presence of PFAS.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, 9(b) for failure to meet the
heightened pleading standard for fraud, and under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. They argued that the Plaintiffs lacked
standing, failed to plead fraud with particularity, and that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had primary jurisdiction over
PFAS safety in cosmetics.

The Plaintiffs countered that they had standing based on a
price-premium injury, met the pleading standards, and that the
issue of misleading labeling was within judicial competence. Upon
careful examination, the Court found that Plaintiffs Esquibel,
Halim, and Zirpoli sufficiently alleged standing by demonstrating
that bottles they purchased contained PFAS, satisfying the
injury-in-fact requirement under a price-premium theory. According
to the Court, Plaintiffs Esquibel, Halim, and Zirpoli have
adequately demonstrated standing by pleading that the November 2023
tests revealed that bottles that they actually purchased were found
to contain detectable levels of PFAS.

However, Plaintiffs Searle, Wahl, and Salerno failed to establish
standing, as their allegations did not support a plausible
inference of systemic contamination in the product line.  The Court
rejected the Defendants' factual challenge to standing, noting that
the Defendants' arguments about the accuracy of test results did
not negate the Plaintiffs' allegations of PFAS presence.

The Court further found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing for
injunctive relief, as they did not demonstrate a real or immediate
threat of future injury, stating, "Plaintiffs' allegations are
insufficient because they do not indicate that they are facing a
threat of future injury."

Regarding Rule 9(b), the Court determined that the Plaintiffs met
the heightened pleading standard for fraud-based claims, finding
that Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were aware of the higher
prices that plaintiffs were willing to pay for natural products as
well as the rising consumer demand for natural products," which
supported a strong inference of fraudulent intent.

The Court also found that the Plaintiffs adequately pleaded that
the use of the word "natural" on the product's packaging was likely
to deceive reasonable consumers. For the state statutory claims,
the Court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I, II,
III, and IV for Plaintiffs Esquibel, Halim, and Zirpoli.

The Court said Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded claims under the
FAL and CLRA, and Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that
Defendants have engaged in business practices that a reasonable
consumer could find deceptive. However, the Court noted that claims
under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) were
preempted, as the FDCA does not provide a private right of action.

On common law claims, the Court allowed the fraud claim (Count V)
to proceed, finding that the Plaintiffs "have alleged sufficient
facts to suggest that a reasonable consumer may be deceived.
However, the constructive fraud claim (Count VII) was dismissed, as
the Plaintiffs failed to allege a fiduciary relationship, with the
Court noting, "Plaintiffs" recitation of duties applicable to drug
manufacturers is also inapposite because mouthwash may only be
classified as a drug for regulatory purposes when it claims
therapeutic effects. The unjust enrichment claim (Count VIII) was
dismissed under New York law for being duplicative but allowed to
proceed under California and Illinois law.

The Court declined to dismiss the case under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, stating, This issue is squarely legal in
nature and lies within the traditional realm of judicial
competence. Regarding claims against Colgate-Palmolive, the Court
found sufficient allegations to hold Colgate liable, noting that
the Plaintiffs alleged Colgate has pervasive control over Tom’s
products. Therefore, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss all claims by Plaintiffs Searle, Wahl, and Salerno for lack
of standing, dismissed the claims for injunctive relief, and
dismissed the constructive fraud and New York unjust enrichment
claims for Plaintiffs Esquibel, Halim, and Zirpoli.

The Court denied the motion with respect to the California and
Illinois statutory claims, the fraud claim, and the California and
Illinois unjust enrichment claims for Plaintiffs Esquibel, Halim,
and Zirpoli. The Court granted leave to amend the constructive
fraud and New York unjust enrichment claims within 21 days,
stating.

A copy of the court's Opinion is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=4EdRAQ

                           *     *     *

Judge Laura Taylor Swain has directed the parties to meet and
confer and complete an updated Proposed Case Management Plan, at
https://nysd.uscourts.gov/hon-valerie-figueredo, and file it on ECF
by Thursday, July 31, 2025. Counsel who disagree about the dates or
other terms of the proposed schedule were directed to submit a
joint letter briefly explaining the dispute. The letter, if any,
must be submitted by July 31, 2025.

On July 11, Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted a Letter Motion for
Extension of Time to Answer re Amended Complaint. Defendants'
response to the Second Amended Complaint is due August 1, 2025.
Should Plaintiffs file a Third Amended Complaint, Defendants'
response will be due 14 days after service of the amended pleading,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3).

CUSTOMERS BANCORP: Court Refuses to Appoint Chang as Lead Plaintiff
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Juan R. Sanchez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denies Plaintiff Chun Yao Chang's motion
for appointment as lead plaintiff in the putative class action
captioned as CHUN YAO CHANG, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. CUSTOMERS BANCORP, INC., et al., Civil
Action No. 24-6416 (E.D. Pa.).

The Court found that Chang has not demonstrated ability and
incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously. The
Court found that Chang failed to make the required prima facie
showing that he would be an adequate class representative.

The lawsuit is a putative class action brought by Plaintiff Chun
Yao Chang against Customers Bancorp, Inc. and two current or former
high-ranking officers of the company, alleging violations of the
federal securities laws.

Chang personally suffered only minimal losses as a result of the
alleged fraud, having purchased only a single share of Customers
Bancorp's stock during the approximately five-month class period,
on which he claims to have lost about $16. Nevertheless, Chang
moved for appointment as lead plaintiff in this case and for
approval of his counsel as lead counsel.

On December 2, 2024, Chang filed a Complaint against Customers
Bancorp; Jay S. Sidhu, the company's Chief Executive Officer; and
Carla A. Leibold, the company's former Chief Financial Officer. The
Complaint alleges that in the company's 2023 annual report filed
after the market closed on February 29, 2024 and in its quarterly
report for the first quarter of 2024 filed after the market closed
on May 9, 2024, Defendants made false and misleading statements and
failed to disclose that: (1) Customers Bancorp had inadequate
anti-money laundering practices; (2) as a result, it was not in
compliance with its legal obligations, which subjected it to
heightened regulatory risk; and (3) as a result, Defendants'
statements about Customers Bancorp's business, operations, and
prospects were materially false and misleading and lacked a
reasonable basis at all times.

The Complaint further alleges that as a result of Defendants'
misstatements and material omissions, the market price of Customers
Bancorp's securities was artificially inflated during the class
period from March 1, 2024 to August 8, 2024.

The market price then fell when information about the deficiencies
in the company's risk management and compliance practices was
disclosed in August 2024, causing those who purchased securities
during the class period to suffer losses. Chang asserts a claim
against all Defendants for violations of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. He also
alleges the individual Defendants are liable as "controlling
persons" under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The same day he filed the Complaint in this case, Chang issued a
press release via Business Wire, announcing the filing of this
action, describing the basis for the suit and the class period, and
advising that anyone wishing to serve as lead plaintiff must file a
motion with this Court no later than January 31, 2025. On January
31, 2025, Chang filed the motion seeking to be appointed lead
plaintiff in this action and to have his counsel at The Rosen Law
Firm appointed as lead counsel for the putative class. Despite the
press release, no other putative class member came forward to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff.

On March 4, 2025, this Court held a teleconference with the parties
regarding Chang's motion. During the call, the Court expressed
concern about Chang's adequacy to serve as lead plaintiff given his
exceedingly small holdings of Customers Bancorp's securities and
loss.

To address the Court's concern, Chang requested the opportunity to
submit examples of cases in which courts have appointed individuals
with similarly small losses as lead plaintiffs. Defendants
requested an opportunity to submit a response. The Court granted
the parties' requests, and both parties submitted letter briefs.

Chang's motion is governed by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA), which established new procedures for the
appointment of lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in securities class
actions. These procedures were designed to increase the likelihood
that institutional investors would serve as lead plaintiffs. The
statute requires a plaintiff filing a securities class action to
provide prompt notice of the action to potential class members.
Within 20 days of filing a complaint, a plaintiff must publish, in
a widely circulated national business-oriented publication or wire
service, a notice advising potential class members of the pendency
of the action, the claims, the class period, and the opportunity to
seek appointment as lead plaintiff.

The Court must appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of
the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most
capable of adequately representing the interests of class members.
The statute creates a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff
is the person or group of persons that: (aa) has either filed the
complaint or made a motion in response to a notice published by the
plaintiff; (bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class; and (cc)
otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because Chang is the only movant in this case, he is also,
necessarily, the movant with the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the class, despite having purchased only a single
Customers Bancorp share during the class period. The Court must
next determine whether Chang otherwise satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23. The relevant Rule 23 requirements are those set forth
in subsection (a)(3), which requires that the claims or defenses of
the representative party be typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and subsection (a)(4), which requires that the
representative party will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

The Court found Chang made the requisite prima facie showing of
typicality. Chang's claims are generally based on the same legal
theory and course of events as those of the other class members,
namely, that Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions caused
Customers Bancorp's share price to be artificially inflated
throughout the class period such that those who purchased shares
during that period were harmed when the share price later dropped
after Defendants' wrongful conduct came to light. However, the
Court was not persuaded Chang made the required showing of
adequacy.

The Court added that in assessing whether a movant has made a prima
facie showing of adequacy, a court should consider whether the
movant has the ability and incentive to represent the claims of the
class vigorously, has obtained adequate counsel, and whether there
is a conflict between the movant's claims and those asserted on
behalf of the class. The court should also inquire whether the
movant has demonstrated a willingness and ability to select
competent class counsel and to negotiate a reasonable retainer
agreement with that counsel.

With a loss of only $16 on the purchase of a single Customers
Bancorp share, Chang has a minimal financial interest in the
outcome of this action. While this small loss, standing alone, is
not disqualifying, Chang's minimal holdings and losses gave the
Court serious pause as to his adequacy to serve as lead plaintiff.
Also lacking was information suggesting Chang has the experience
and sophistication to adequately protect the class's interests. His
motion states only that he has approximately eight years of
investing experience, holds a bachelor's degree, and works as a
software engineer.

In response to the Court's concerns, Chang submitted a declaration
stating that despite his small loss, he is committed to prosecute
this case to seek justice, understands the lead plaintiff's role is
to direct the litigation on behalf of the class, and will fulfill
his responsibilities as lead plaintiff by holding meetings as
needed with his attorneys to receive updates about the case and
provide input concerning the theories of liability and damages.

The declaration provides no additional information regarding
Chang's background or investing experience and gives no indication
he has any experience managing attorneys in litigation or
negotiating retainer agreements.

While Chang has obtained qualified counsel with experience
litigating securities class actions, and his claims do not appear
to conflict with those of the class at this stage, on balance, the
Court was not persuaded Chang made the required prima facie showing
of adequacy. The Court found Chang did not demonstrate that he has
the ability and incentive to represent the claims of the class
vigorously.

Accordingly, the Court denied Chang's motion for appointment as
lead plaintiff. Notwithstanding the Court's ruling, Chang may still
pursue his claims on an individual basis.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=OjWZ25


EDWARDSVILLE, IL: Appeals Court Tosses Class Action Over $300 Fee
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as BAXTER GRACE, on Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
EDWARDSVILLE, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 2025 IL App (5th)
240425, Presiding Justice McHaney of the Appellate Court of
Illinois Fifth District affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
class action complaint challenging the constitutionality of
Edwardsville's vehicle impoundment ordinance.

The plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the defendant,
challenging the constitutionality of Edwardsville's impoundment
ordinance, which requires violators to pay an administrative
processing fee when their vehicle is used in the commission of
certain offenses. The case originated when the plaintiff "was
arrested for DUI, that his car was towed and impounded pursuant to
Edwardsville's ordinance, and that he was required to pay the
mandated administrative fee."

Edwardsville enacted article VII in 2009, adding provisions to the
Edwardsville Code of Ordinances for vehicle impoundment. The
ordinance provided that if an operator uses a motor vehicle and
drives under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs,
intoxicating compounds, in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-501 the motor
vehicle shall be subject to tow and impoundment by the city, and
the owner of record of said vehicle shall be liable to the city for
an administrative processing fee of $300.00 in addition to any
towing and storage fees.

The ordinance established a hearing procedure where "an owner may
secure release of an impounded vehicle pending completion of the
hearings provided for in section 114-414 by posting a bond of cash,
money order, certified check, with the Edwardsville Police
Department in the amount of $300.00 and accrued towing and storing
charges."

The plaintiff filed his complaint against the defendant on December
6, 2011, alleging that the administrative fee violated principles
of substantive due process because the "tow release fees" require
only a minimal amount of time and expense by the defendant
"requiring only the Defendant's Police Department employees write a
receipt for payment" of the fees. He alleged that the fees charged
bore no reasonable relationship to the stated purposes of the
ordinance and thus violated principles of substantive due process

The trial court initially dismissed the complaint on October 25,
2013, but the appeals court reversed and remanded on May 2, 2015,
"finding that Edwardsville failed to allege affirmative matter that
would preclude the case from going forward." The plaintiff then
filed four amended complaints, with the final version filed on
November 7, 2022.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and strike the amended
complaint on December 8, 2022. The trial court granted the motion
to dismiss on March 13, 2024, and the plaintiff appealed.

The appeals court applied the rational basis test for the
plaintiff's substantive due process claim, noting that municipal
ordinances -- just like statutes -- are presumed valid. The appeals
court stated that the ordinance will pass constitutional muster if
it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and
is not arbitrary or discriminatory.

According to the appeals court, the plaintiff's argument that the
$300 fee was solely for collection of the fee and issuance of a
receipt is meritless." The appeals court pointed out the lower
court had outlined extensive costs the defendant could incur,
including "subduing the driver and/or the passengers who are
resisting the officer(s) on the scene and transporting the driver
and/or passengers either to a police station or other locations.
The process also includes the search and inventory of the vehicle.

The appeals court concluded that "the administrative processing fee
listed in this ordinance substantially correlates to the actual
administrative costs incurred by Edwardsville resulting from the
arrest" and that the defendant's ordinance "serves a legitimate
purpose and is valid."

The appeals court determined that the plaintiff failed to make a
claim of a valid substantive due process violation." The court
explained that when a substantive due-process challenge involves
only the deprivation of a property interest, a plaintiff must show
either the inadequacy of state law remedies or an independent
constitutional violation before the court will even engage in this
deferential rational-basis review.

The appeals court found that the plaintiff "has not established a
separate constitutional violation or established that there were no
adequate state remedies available and concluded that dismissal was
proper as a matter of law." The trial court found that dismissal
was warranted pursuant to the voluntary payment doctrine, stating
that the defendant's ordinance contained a method to seek a refund
of the fee, and the plaintiff chose not to utilize the legislative
remedy.

The appeals court explained that the voluntary payment doctrine is
based in common law and that money voluntarily paid to another
under a mistake of the law, but with knowledge of all the facts,
cannot be recovered back." The court noted that if there is a
statutory remedy for a refund, the only mechanism to recover that
fee is compliance with the statute."

The appeals court found that Section 114-414 of the defendant's
ordinance expressly provides an administrative remedy for
contesting and potentially recovering the fee and therefore agreed
that Grace's claim is barred by the voluntary payment doctrine."

The plaintiff argued that the trial court should not have allowed
relitigation of previously decided issues pursuant to the law of
the case doctrine. However, the court found that "the trial court's
order denying Edwardsville's earlier motion to dismiss was
interlocutory, and therefore never became the law of the case."

The appeals court concluded that the trial court's reconsideration
of the previous denial of a motion to dismiss was proper" and
rejected the plaintiff's law of the case argument.

A copy of the appeals court's opinion is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=wbdNFZ


METRO ONE: Bid to Remand Hager Suit to Superior Court Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John H. Chun of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington denies Plaintiff Dennis Hager's Motion to
Remand in the case captioned as DENNIS HAGER, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. METRO ONE LOSS
PREVENTION SERVICES GROUP, INC., a Maryland corporation; METRO ONE
LOSS PREVENTION SERVICES GROUP (WEST COAST), INC., AND METRO ONE
LOSS PREVENTION SERVICES GROUP (GUARDS), INC., Defendants, Case No.
3:25-cv-05164-JHC (W.D. Wash.).

The Court found that Hager has Article III standing to pursue his
claims under Washington's Noncompete Act (NCA) and Silenced No More
Act (SNMA).

Defendants provide security and loss prevention services to
customers across the corporate sector. Hager began working for
Defendants in March 2023 as an Account Manager and was promoted to
Regional Performance Manager in January 2024. Hager alleged that
Defendants required him to sign a "Confidentiality and
Noncompetition Agreement" containing a non-disparagement clause and
a noncompetition covenant as part of his employment.

The non-disparagement clause requires Hager to refrain from
"directly or indirectly, through any agent or surrogate, or in any
way otherwise, orally or in writing, either while employed by the
Company, or at anytime thereafter, disparage or denigrate the
Company." The noncompetition covenant prohibits Hager, for two
years after his employment ends, from within a twenty-five mile
radius of any location at which the Company maintains or conducts
any business, operations or facility: (a) starting, continuing,
advising, assisting, or in any way otherwise participating or
engaging in any competing business; or (b) seeking or accepting any
employment or other affiliation, in any capacity, with any then or
thereafter known competitor of the Company which maintains any
business, operations or facility.

Hager filed this putative class action against Defendants in state
court, alleging that the Agreement violated Washington's Noncompete
Act, RCW 49.62 and Washington's Silenced No More Act, RCW
49.44.211. He asserts that he is entitled to statutory damages and
requests an injunction preventing Defendants from enforcing the
clauses. Defendants removed the case to this Court under the Class
Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).

Hager then filed the present motion requesting that the Court
remand this matter to state court because the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over his claims. Specifically, Hager contends
that he lacks Article III standing because his "injury is not
concrete and particularized."

Standing under Article III of the United States Constitution is a
component of subject matter jurisdiction. Article III standing
requires that a plaintiff (1) "suffered an injury in fact," (2)
that there was a "causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of," and (3) the injury is likely "redressed by
a favorable decision." A plaintiff must have standing for each
claim and form of relief sought.

At issue is the first element, injury-in-fact. An injury-in-fact
must be "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical." The injury must also be "fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant" and "it is
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision."

Generally, Washington's Noncompete Act prohibits employers from
imposing noncompetition covenants on employees who earn less than
$100,000 annually. Under the NCA, a noncompetition covenant
"includes every written or oral covenant, agreement, or contract by
which an employee or independent contractor is prohibited or
restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business
of any kind."

Defendants respond that the NCA "protects the concrete interest of
preventing contracts of adhesion and restraints on employee
mobility, particularly with respect to low-wage employees." They
say that this concrete interest is violated the moment an employee
is bound by an unlawful noncompetition covenant in an employment
contract.

The Court found that Hager has a tangible interest in preventing
the noncompetition covenant from being enforced against him. As a
former employee of Defendants, he alleges that Defendants violated
the NCA by "requiring" him to sign an employment contract
containing a noncompetition covenant. He requests that a court
award statutory damages and enjoin Defendants from enforcing the
noncompetition covenant against him. Based on the terms of the
agreement, his workplace mobility is restricted for two years after
his employment ends.

The Court noted that the Washington Legislature has said that
"workforce mobility is important to economic growth and
development" and the NCA "facilitates workforce mobility and
protects employees." Furthermore, the alleged injury to Hager - the
inclusion of a noncompetition covenant in his employment contract -
implicates contract rights. This is a harm traditionally recognized
as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts.

The SNMA "prohibits nondisclosure and nondisparagement provisions
in agreements concerning conduct that occurs at the workplace, at
work-related events coordinated by or through the employer, between
employees, or between an employer and an employee, whether on or
off the employment premises."

Hager alleges that Defendants unlawfully "required" him to
"execute" an employment contract containing a non-disparagement
clause preventing him from making any "disparaging or denigrating"
remarks about Defendants during and after his employment. Hager
requests that a court award statutory damages and enjoin Defendants
from enforcing the non-disparagement clause against him.

The Court determined that Hager's SNMA claim derives from the
alleged inclusion of an unlawful clause in his employment contract.
The alleged injury to Hager implicates contract rights, which is a
harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in
American courts.

The Court noted that the Washington Legislature in enacting the
SNMA recognized the "strong public policy in favor of disclosure"
and that non-disclosure and non-disparagement agreements have
"become routine and perpetuate illegal conduct." The
non-disparagement clause at issue raises a material risk of harm
because it impairs an employee's ability to speak or write about
Defendants, irrespective of the time that has passed since the
employment ends.

Based on the above analysis, the Court denied the motion to remand
the case to Pierce County Superior Court. The Court also denied
Hager's request for attorney fees and costs.

The Court concluded that Hager has established Article III standing
for both his claims under Washington's Noncompete Act and
Washington's Silenced No More Act, as his injuries are concrete and
particularized, relating to contractual rights traditionally
recognized in American courts.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=5cj4pH


NEW YORK: Class Claims in Religious Accommodation Suit Resolved
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ronnie Abrams of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York entered a stipulation, order, and consent
judgment on May 28, 2025, resolving the class claims in the case
captioned as Brian Sughrim, et al., Plaintiffs v. State of New
York, et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-CV-7977-RA-SDA (S.D.N.Y.).

The Court approved the parties' agreement, granting injunctive
relief to address the defendant's practice of denying religious
accommodations for correctional officers to wear beards based on
their religious beliefs. The judgment resolved the class claims
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), while individual
claims remain pending for trial.

The case arose from a class action lawsuit filed in 2019 by Brian
Sughrim and other correctional officers against the State of New
York, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision (DOCCS), Acting Commissioner Anthony J. Annucci, and
other state officials (collectively, the "State"). The plaintiffs
alleged that the State's practice of denying religious
accommodations for correctional officers to wear beards violated
their rights.

On August 18, 2022, the plaintiffs filed their Fourth Amended Class
Action Complaint, seeking injunctive relief for the class (Dkt.
278). The State filed its answer on September 1, 2022.

On September 5, 2023, the court issued an Opinion & Order granting
the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and partial summary
judgment on their class injunctive claim. The court permanently
enjoined the State "from enforcing their practice of denying
religious accommodations based on their own understanding of the
tenets of the applicant's faith". The court further directed the
parties to propose specific injunctive relief to ensure compliance
with the permanent injunction

The plaintiffs' primary claim was that the State's policy of
evaluating religious accommodation requests based on its own
interpretation of religious tenets was unconstitutional.
Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the State's denial of
requests by correctional officers to wear beards for religious
reasons, arguing that such denials infringed on their sincerely
held religious beliefs. The class sought injunctive relief to
reform the State's policies and practices, as outlined in DOCCS
Directives 2609 and 3083.

Upon careful examination, the court found that the State's prior
practice of denying religious accommodations based on its own
assessment of an applicant's faith was improper. The plaintiffs
argued that the State's verity analysis—questioning the validity
of an officer's religious beliefs—was unlawful and that
accommodations should be evaluated based on the sincerity of the
belief and whether granting the request would impose an undue
hardship. The State, in its briefs submitted on October 6 and
October 27, 2023, acknowledged the need for revised procedures and
proposed modifications to Directives 2609 and 3083 to align with
the court's ruling.

The parties engaged in settlement negotiations, facilitated by
Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel of the Northern District of
New York, starting on July 9, 2024. These negotiations resulted in
an agreement on injunctive relief to implement the court's
permanent injunction, focusing on revised procedures for processing
religious accommodation requests.

According to the court, the State's prior practice constituted an
unconstitutional restriction on religious freedom. The court
emphasized that "the law does not let the Department determine what
the teachings or doctrines of a religion require or don't require"
and that "inquiries into ‘the truth' of an officer's concepts of
their religious faith are not permitted."

The court further clarified that a religious belief is protected if
it is "sincerely held" and concerns "ultimate ideas about life,
purpose, and death," regardless of whether it aligns with
established religious doctrines or is followed by all adherents of
a religion

The Judge found that the sincerity of an officer's belief should
generally be presumed unless there is an objective reason to
question it, such as behavior markedly inconsistent with the
professed belief or a request made shortly after a non-religious
accommodation denial.

The court also noted that an accommodation may be denied if it
imposes an undue hardship, defined as "significant expense or
difficulty" or interference with the safe and efficient operation
of the workplace.

The court entered the stipulation and order on May 28, 2025,
resolving the class claims through a consent judgment under Rule
54(b). The key rulings include:

1. **Injunctive Relief Procedures**: The State agreed to apply
revised Directives 2609 and 3083, ensuring individualized reviews
of religious accommodation requests for correctional officers to
wear beards. The State must document the information considered and
reasons for any denial, including any questions about the sincerity
of an officer's belief (Dkt. 410 at 3-4).

2. **Training Requirements**: The State agreed to provide training
within 60 days of the order's effective date to all DOCCS staff
involved in processing religious accommodation requests. The
training, detailed in Exhibit A, covers proper evaluation of
requests, emphasizing that sincerity is presumed unless objectively
questionable (Dkt. 410 at 4, 10-28).

3. **Reconsideration of Denials**: Within 30 days, the State must
contact current officers denied accommodations between August 1,
2016, and September 30, 2023, offering them 30 days to reapply.
Former officers will be contacted within 60 days, offered
reinstatement (if eligible), and allowed to reapply for
accommodations (Dkt. 410 at 5).

4. **Notice to Class**: The State must notify correctional officers
of the revised directives and the terms of the order through
supervisor announcements and other court-directed methods.

5. **Reporting and Inspection**: For nine months following the
order's effective date, the State must provide monthly reports to
plaintiffs' counsel, detailing pending, granted, and denied
accommodation requests, including reasons for denials. If
plaintiffs identify potential violations, they must submit written
objections, and the parties will attempt informal resolution before
seeking court intervention.

6. **Attorneys' Fees**: The plaintiffs may file a petition for
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs within 60 days of the order
and again within 60 days after the reporting period concludes,
subject to the State's right to oppose (Dkt. 410 at 8-9).

Therefore, the court entered judgment on the class claims,
resolving the injunctive relief issues while preserving the
plaintiffs' individual claims for trial. The State is permanently
enjoined from denying religious accommodations based on its own
interpretation of religious tenets, and the agreed-upon procedures
ensure compliance with this mandate.

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=KBw1OI


ONE NEVADA: Class Settlement in Castro Suit Gets Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Gloria M. Navarro of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nevada grants final approval of the class action settlement in
the case captioned as JORGE HERNANDEZ CASTRO, an individual, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
ONE NEVADA CREDIT UNION, Defendant, Case No: 2:22-cv-01563-GMN-BNW
(D. Nev.).

The court approved the settlement agreement and dismissed all
claims with prejudice.

The court "finally certifies the Action as a class action" under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The settlement
class is defined as "the 38 individuals who, according to
Defendant's records: (i) applied for a financial product from
January 1, 2020 through the date on which the Court grants
preliminary approval; (ii) were residing in any state in the United
States at the time they applied; and (iii) were denied full and
equal consideration for such financial product solely because of
their immigration or citizenship status at the time they applied."

The court found that "class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) is appropriate in that, in the settlement context: (a) the
members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Class
Members in the class action is impracticable; (b) there are
questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over
any individual question; (c) the claims of the Class Representative
are typical of the claims of the Class; (d) the Class
Representative will fairly and adequately represent and protect the
interests of the Class Members."

The court determined that "the Agreement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable, and in the best interest of the Settlement Class." The
court approved "the Settlement set forth in the Agreement and finds
that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable, and
adequate to the Parties." The court further found that "the
Settlement set forth in the Agreement is the result of good faith,
arms-length negotiations between experienced counsel representing
the interests of the Parties."

The court found that "the form and means of disseminating the Class
Notice as provided for in the Order Preliminarily Approving
Settlement constituted the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all Class Members who
could be identified through reasonable effort." The court
determined that "no objections to the Settlement have been filed by
members of the Class and no members of the Class requested
exclusion from the Class."

The court ordered that "Final Judgment is entered with respect to
the Released Claims of all Settlement Class Members, and the
Released Claims in the Action are dismissed in their entirety with
prejudice and without costs. All claims in the Action are
dismissed, and the case shall be closed."

The court approved "the release provisions as contained and
incorporated in Section 13 of the Agreement" and determined that
"the Releasors shall be deemed to have, and by operation of the
Judgment shall have, fully, finally and forever released,
relinquished and discharged all Released Claims (including Unknown
Claims) against the Defendant Releasees."

The court ordered that "the Releasors, including the Class
Representative and all Settlement Class Members, and anyone
claiming through or on behalf of any of them, are forever barred
and enjoined from filing, commencing, prosecuting, intervening in,
or participating in (as class members or otherwise) any action in
any jurisdiction for the Released Claims."

The court granted "an award of $21,229 in attorneys' fees and
costs" finding that this amount "is fair and reasonable." The court
also approved "the service award for Plaintiff Hernandez Castro in
the amount of $5,000" determining this amount to be "fair and
reasonable."

Settlement Administration

The court appointed "RG/2 Claims Administration LLC as the Claims
Administrator under the terms of the Agreement." The court ordered
that "all costs incurred in connection with providing notice and
settlement administration services to the Class Members shall be
paid by Defendant."

The court directed that "within thirty (30) days after filing the
Final Report with this Court the total amount of uncashed checks,
and residual amounts held by the Claims Administrator at the time
of the Final Report, shall be paid by the Claims Administrator to
the designated cy pres recipients, TheDream.US and Immigrants
Rising, in equal parts."

The court ordered that "Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, and the Unopposed Motion for
Attorney Fees, Costs, and Service Award  are granted." The court
retained "continuing jurisdiction over the administration,
consummation, enforcement, and interpretation of the Agreement, the
Final Judgment, and for any other necessary purpose."

The court emphasized that "neither this Order, the fact that a
settlement was reached and filed, the Agreement, nor any related
negotiations, statements or proceedings shall be construed as,
offered as, admitted as, received as, used as, or deemed to be an
admission or concession of liability or wrongdoing whatsoever or
breach of any duty on the part of One Nevada."

A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=sdQKsH


SYNAGRO WOONSOCKET: Must Defend Against Sewer Odor Case
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Maurice Doire and Joshua Hoye, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Synagro Woonsocket, LLC, Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., City of
Woonsocket, a municipality, and by and through Christine
Chamberland, Interim Finance Director, Defendants, Civil Action No.
PC-2024-06059 (R.I. Super. Ct., Providence Cty.), Judge Brian P.
Stern of the Rhode Island Superior Court denied Synagro Woonsocket,
LLC's motion to dismiss and motion to strike class allegations, and
Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.'s motion to dismiss. The court
granted leave to amend the complaint to name CH2M Hill Engineers,
Inc. as the correct defendant, if requested.

Synagro Woonsocket, LLC, a Rhode Island limited liability company,
operates Woonsocket' sewage sludge incinerator at 15 Cumberland
Hill Road. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
manages the Woonsocket Wastewater Treatment Plant at 11 Cumberland
Hill Road. These facilities together form a single sewage treatment
facility for the city's sewer system. The plaintiffs alleged that
this facility releases noxious odors into the surrounding
community, impacting residents within a one-mile radius.

Maurice Doire and Joshua Hoye, representing themselves and others
similarly situated, filed their complaint on November 8, 2024,
seeking damages for private nuisance, public nuisance, and
negligence. They claimed the facility's odors interfere with their
use and enjoyment of their properties, reduce property values, and
violate the public right to clean air. The plaintiffs sought class
certification for all owner-occupants and renters of residential
properties within one mile of the facility, potentially including
thousands of households.

Synagro and Jacobs filed motions to dismiss on January 16, 2025,
arguing that the plaintiffs failed to allege special harm for
public nuisance, lacked control over the nuisance for private
nuisance, and did not demonstrate actual loss for negligence.
Synagro also moved to strike the class allegations, asserting that
varying odor impacts across properties prevented common questions
of law and fact. The plaintiffs countered that they sufficiently
alleged special damages, including loss of property enjoyment and
value, and that dismissing class allegations was premature given
the fact-intensive nature of certification.

The court found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged public
nuisance. The plaintiffs claimed noxious odors from the facility
harm the public right to uncontaminated air and cause special harm
by hindering property use and enjoyment. The court referenced Rhode
Island law, noting that a public nuisance involves interference
with shared resources like air. It distinguished the defendants'
cited cases, finding a federal case, Agudelo v. Sprague Operating
Resources, LLC, 528 F. Supp. 3d 10, 14-15 (D.R.I. 2021), more
relevant due to similar odor-related claims affecting property
enjoyment.

For private nuisance, Judge Stern determined that the plaintiffs
alleged unreasonable injury from the facility's odors, which
interfered with their land use. It rejected Synagro's argument that
compliance with its contract shielded it from liability, noting
that the plaintiffs attributed the odors to Synagro's
non-compliance with contractual obligations.

On negligence, Judge Sterns held that the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged actual losses, including diminished property values and
loss of enjoyment. It clarified that Rhode Island law allows
damages for harm to land, such as reduced property value and loss
of use. The court distinguished the defendants' cited case,
Newstone Development, LLC v. East Pacific, LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 106
(R.I. 2016), where no economic loss was acknowledged, unlike the
ongoing losses the Plaintiffs alleged.

Regarding class certification, the court found that the plaintiffs
adequately pled numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate
representation for a class action. It stated that it was not
obvious from the pleadings that the case could not proceed on a
class-wide basis, declining to strike the class allegations.

Stephen E. Breggia, Esq., at The Breggia Law Firm, represents the
Plaintiffs.

Defendants are represented by Michael J. Lepizzera, Jr., Esq., at
Lepizzera & Laprocina; Michael R. Creta, Esq. --
michael.creta@klgates.com -- at K&L Gates; Andrew R. McConville,
Esq., and Stephen T. Armato, Esq. -- amcconville@cetllp.com and
sarmato@cetllp.com -- at Cetrulo LLP; and Noel Y. Cho-Carr, Esq. --
nycho-carr@sherin.com -- at Sherin and Lodgen
  
A copy of the Court's decision is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=QXma2n


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Grants Arbitration Bid in Bonhomme Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants Uber Technologies, Inc.'s motion to
compel arbitration and stay proceedings in the case captioned as
DESMOND BONHOMME, et al., Plaintiffs v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 24-cv-07998-JST (N.D. Cal.).

The Court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of their Platform Access Agreement and
stayed the putative class action pending arbitration.

Background and Claims

Plaintiffs Desmond Bonhomme and Daniel Tyler brought this putative
class action against Uber for alleged violations of New York City
Administrative Code, Section 20-1501, et seq. The plaintiffs
contended that Uber violated the Code's requirement to "disclose to
[a food delivery] worker . . . the address where the food,
beverage, or other goods must be picked up" by instead offering
drivers only a "zoomed-out map, rather than . . . actual
addresses."

The parties did not dispute that they entered into Uber's Platform
Access Agreement (PAA), which contains an arbitration clause. As
stated in the Court's order, the plaintiffs acknowledged that "they
have an agreement to arbitrate with Defendant." However, the
plaintiffs contended that the arbitration clause was unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable.

Legal Standard and Jurisdiction

The Court established jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." The Court noted that this provision reflects "both a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, and the fundamental
principle that arbitration is a matter of contract."

The Court explained that on a motion to compel arbitration, the
Court's role under the FAA is "limited to determining (1) whether a
valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does (2) whether the
agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." The Court further
stated that "the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of
proving any defense, such as unconscionability."

Delegation Clause Analysis

The PAA contained a delegation clause stating: "This Arbitration
Provision applies to all claims whether brought by you or us,
except as provided below. This Arbitration Provision requires all
such claims to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and
binding individual arbitration and not by way of court of jury
trial. . . . such disputes include without limitation disputes
arising out of or relating to the interpretation, application,
formation, scope, enforceability, waiver, applicability,
revocability, or validity of this Arbitration Provision or any
portion of this Arbitration Provision."

The plaintiffs argued the delegation clause was both procedurally
and substantively unconscionable. They claimed it was presented in
a "contract of adhesion . . . imposed upon the subscribing party
without an opportunity to negotiate the terms" and that Uber's
presentation of the delegation clause, 24 pages into the PAA with
no visual markers, contributed to unfair surprise.

Uber responded that the arbitration clause was not unconscionable
because the PAA provided a procedure to opt out of the arbitration
clause by emailing Uber within 30 days of signing. The PAA stated:
"Agreeing to this Arbitration Provision is not a mandatory
condition of your contractual relationship with us. If you do not
want to be subject to this Arbitration Provision, you may opt out
of this Arbitration Provision."

The Court further stated that "the party opposing arbitration bears
the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability."
Additionally, on a motion to compel arbitration, "courts rely on
the summary judgment standard of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."

Court's Findings on Unconscionability

The Court determined that Uber had the better argument under both
California and New York law. The Court cited the Ninth Circuit
holding that "an arbitration agreement is not adhesive if there is
an opportunity to opt out of it."

The Court also noted that "courts applying New York law have
considered an opt-out provision as an important, if not
dispositive, factor in rejecting challenges of procedural
unconscionability."

The Court found that the plaintiffs did not contend that they opted
out of the arbitration clause, nor did they explain how the
delegation clause could be procedurally unconscionable in spite of
the PAA's opt-out provision. The Court concluded that it "cannot
conclude that the PAA's delegation clause is procedurally
unconscionable."

Class Action Waiver

The PAA stated that the Court was responsible for determining
whether the class action waiver was enforceable: "only a court of
competent jurisdiction, and not an arbitrator, shall have exclusive
authority to resolve any and all disputes arising out of or
relating to the Class Action Waiver and/or Representative Action
Waiver." The PAA's class action waiver provided that "any and all
disputes or claims between the parties shall be resolved only in
individual arbitration, and not on a class, collective,
coordinated, or consolidated basis."

The plaintiffs argued that the class action waiver was
unconscionable under the rule set forth in Discover Bank v.
Superior Court. Uber responded that the opt-out provision rendered
the class action waiver enforceable and that New York law permits
contractual class action waivers.

The Court applied the same reasoning regarding the opt-out
provision, stating that "if the offeree has a meaningful
opportunity to freely opt out of a term after assenting to the
contract, . . . then the contract is not being offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis." Therefore, the Court held that "the
opt-out provision renders the class action waiver enforceable."

Final Order and Stay

Uber requested that the Court stay proceedings during the pendency
of arbitration. The Court granted this request, stating it would
"stay the case consistent with the FAA, 9 U.S.C. Section 3, and the
guidance of the Ninth Circuit."

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Uber's motion to compel
arbitration and stays these proceedings. The Clerk shall
administratively close the file. This order shall not be considered
a dismissal or disposition of the action against any party. If
further proceedings become necessary, any party may initiate them
in the same manner as if this order had not been entered.

A copy of the Court's decision can be found at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=NLwXLs



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