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250521.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Wednesday, May 21, 2025, Vol. 27, No. 101 Headlines ABBOTT LAB: Legrand Must Oppose Bid to Exclude by May 29 ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Bid to Dismiss Schavrien Suit Denied as Moot ADAPTHEALTH CORP: Continues to Defend Allegheny County Class Suit AL PIEMONTE NISSAN: Arman Files TCPA Suit in N.D. Illinois ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA: Young Suit Tossed; 1st Amended Suit Due June 6 ALISHA TAFOYA: Court Tosses Ortiz, et al. Civil Rights Suit AMAZON.COM INC: Class Cert Bid Filing Extended to Sept. 15 AMAZON.COM INC: Loses Bid to Claw Back Documents in Antitrust Suits AMAZON.COM INC: Must Oppose Class Cert Bid by August 14 AMERICAN HONDA: Sivakova's Objection to Dismissal Bid Due June 9 BITFARMS LTD: Faces Olympio Suit Over 6.07% Stock Price Drop BOYS' CLUB: Mendoza Sues Over Workers' Unsafe Living Conditions CARIBOU BIOSCIENCES: Saylor Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed CDK GLOBAL: Settlement in Loop Suit Obtains Preliminary Court OK CENTRAL COAST: Aguilar Auto Class Settlement to be Heard on May 20 CENTURY ALUMINUM: Settlement in McDaniel Suit Gets Prelim. Court OK CINTAS CORP: Court OKs $14.85MM Attorneys' Fees in Laurel Suit CINTAS CORP: Settlement in City of Laurel Suit Gets Final Court Nod DAILY HARVEST: HIPPA Qualified Protective Order OK'd in Peni Suit EISNER ADVISORY: Court Consolidates Four Data Breach Lawsuits ESL INVESTMENTS: Loses Bid to Certify Appeal of Remedy Opinion FNU WILKANS: Court Tosses Olivas, et al. Prisoner Civil Rights Suit FNU WILKENS: Court Tosses Saavedra, et al. Civil Rights Suit GIGA WATT: Wins Bid to Dismiss Appeal in Sharp Lawsuit HIGHMARK INC: W.D. Pennsylvania Narrows Claims in Zimmerman Suit HOMELAND SECURITY: Appeals Stay Order in CHNV Parole Program Case HOMELAND SECURITY: Court Halts Third-Country Removal Practices HONDA DEVELOPMENT: Albert Seeks More Time to File Class Response HP HOOD: Court Issues Scheduling Order in Rubio Class Action IN RE CALIFORNIA: Court Grants Service Awards in Antitrust Lawsuit INTERCON CONSTRUCTION: Schult Data Breach Suit Remanded to State Co INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL: Court Tosses Pena, et al. Class Action Suit JOURNAL SENTINEL: Wage Deduction Claim Class Certification Affirmed JR CAPITAL: Newell's Time to Oppose Dismissal Extended to May 19 KELSIER: June 23 Lead Plaintiff Deadline Set in Securities Suit KNIGHT-SWIFT: Court Tosses Sievert, et al. ERISA Lawsuit KRISTI NOEM: Class Certification Granted in Border Patrol Lawsuit LAUNDRESS LLC: Court Tosses Murphy's Claims in Ostenfeld Suit MANHATTAN COLLEGE: 2nd Cir. Reserves Decision on Beck Suit Appeal MAXEON SOLAR: N.D. California Dismisses Menon Securities Suit MDL 3010: Google Must Seal Class Docs by May 23 MONRO INC: Class Settlement in Wise Suit Has Preliminary Approval NCAA: Court Preliminary Approves $49MM Settlement in Coaches' Suit NEBRASKA BOOK: Court Certifies Class in Degroot, et al. WARN Suit NEWELL BRANDS: Judge Remands Barrales Case to State Court ON Q FINANCIAL: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Feathers Suit on June 25 PHILIPS NORTH: Loses Bid to Certify Appeal in Miller Consumer Suit PLUM PBC: Court Affirms Summary Judgment in Gulkaov, et al. Suit RAUL LABRADOR: TRO, Class Certification Granted in IORC Lawsuit RAZVAN POP: Loses Summary Judgment Bid in Uselmann, et al. Suit REDFIN CORP: Morano Class Suit Balks at Rocket Merger Deal SEA THAI: Ortega Class Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL SOMNIA INC: S.D. New York Grants $1MM Attys.' Fees in Chabak Suit ST. CATHERINE: Settlement in Felix, et al. Suit Gets Final Court OK TD BANK: Court Finally Approves Class Settlement in Mansaray Suit TRACY LOGISTICS: Court Tosses Picou Wage-and-Hour Lawsuit TWITTER INC: 9th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Morgan Class Action UPGRADE INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Dieffenbach, et al. Suit ********* ABBOTT LAB: Legrand Must Oppose Bid to Exclude by May 29 -------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as CONDALISA LEGRAND on behalf of herself, those similarly situated and the general public, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, Case No. 3:22-cv-05815-TSH (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Thomas S. Hixon entered an order granting stipulation to extend briefing schedule on the Defendant's motion to exclude portions of declarations of Steven Gaskin And Colin Weir and the Plaintiff's motion for class certification: The schedule relating to Defendant's Motion to Exclude is as follows: 1. The Plaintiff's opposition to the Defendant's motion to exclude shall be due on May 29, 2025. 2. The Defendant's reply in support of its motion to exclude shall be due on June 20, 2025. 3. The Plaintiff's reply in support of her motion for class certification shall be due on June 20, 2025. 4. The hearing on the Defendant's motion to exclude and Plaintiff's motion for class certification shall remain the same, to be heard on July 17, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. Abbott is an American multinational medical devices and health care company. A copy of the Court's order dated May 7, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=3HUZln at no extra charge.[CC] ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Bid to Dismiss Schavrien Suit Denied as Moot ----------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Rita F. Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division denies as moot the Defendant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit captioned MAX ULRICH and RYAN SCHAVRIEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, Defendant, Case No. 3:24-cv-09452-RFL (N.D. Cal.). Plaintiffs Max Ulrich and Ryan Schavrien are California residents, who purport to sue on behalf of a putative nationwide class and a California subclass of Similac Go & Grow and PediaSure purchasers. Abbott is an Illinois-based healthcare company that manufactures, markets, and distributes a variety of medical devices, nutrition supplements, and other products. Among those is Similac Go & Grow, a milk-based toddler drink intended for children 12–36 months old. Similac Go & Grow's ingredients and benefits are expressly set out on its label. This product labeling case involves two distinct Abbott products. The first is Similac Go & Grow, a toddler drink intended for children aged 1–3. The second is PediaSure, a nutritional supplement primarily intended for children aged 2–13. The Plaintiffs allege that both products' labels include certain statements that are false or misleading. The Court denies as moot the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, in light of the Plaintiffs' filing of its First Amended Class Action Complaint. The Defendant has 30 days from the date of filing the amended complaint to file a response. A full-text copy of the Court's Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/247wvm9t from PacerMonitor.com. ADAPTHEALTH CORP: Continues to Defend Allegheny County Class Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- AdaptHealth Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2025 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 6, 2025, that the Company continues to defend itself from Allegheny County Employees' Retirement System class suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On October 24, 2023, Allegheny County Employees' Retirement System, a purported shareholder of the Company, filed a purported class action complaint against the Company and certain of its current and former officers, and certain underwriters in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On January 23, 2024, the court entered an order appointing Allegheny County Employees' Retirement System, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 793, Members Pension Benefit Trust of Ontario, and City of Tallahassee Pension Plan as Lead Plaintiffs. On May 14, 2024, Allegheny Lead Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint against the Company and certain of its current and former officers and directors, and certain underwriters, on behalf of shareholders that purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's stock between August 4, 2020 and November 7, 2023 (as to the complaint the "Allegheny County Consolidated Complaint"; as to the action, the "Allegheny County Consolidated Class Action"). The Allegheny County Consolidated Complaint alleges, among other things, that the defendants violated federal securities laws by making allegedly false and misleading statements and/or failing to disclose material information regarding (i) the Company's billing practices with respect to its diabetes product category, and (ii) the Company's compliance programs and integration with respect to acquired companies. The Allegheny County Consolidated Complaint seeks unspecified damages. On July 23, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Allegheny County Consolidated Complaint. The Allegheny Lead Plaintiffs filed their opposition brief on October 1, 2024, and defendants filed their reply brief on November 15, 2024. The Company intends to vigorously defend against the allegations contained in the Allegheny County Complaint, but there can be no assurance that the defense will be successful. AdaptHealth Corp. and subsidiaries provides home medical equipment, medical supplies and related services. AL PIEMONTE NISSAN: Arman Files TCPA Suit in N.D. Illinois ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Al Piemonte Nissan, Inc. The case is styled as Hazem Arman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Al Piemonte Nissan, Inc., Case No. 1:25-cv-05181 (N.D. Ill., May 9, 2025). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone Equipment. Al Piemonte Ford -- https://www.apnissan.com/ -- is a premier Illinois Ford Dealer located in Melrose Park, Illinois and offer Award Winning Sales and Service with Great Pricing and specials.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Andrew John Shamis, Esq. SHAMIS & GENTILE, PA 14 NE 1st Ave., Ste. 1205 Miami, FL 33132 Phone: (305) 479-2299 Fax: (786) 623-0915 Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA: Young Suit Tossed; 1st Amended Suit Due June 6 ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the lawsuit styled WALTER LEE YOUNG, Plaintiff v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:24-cv-03914-PCP (N.D. Cal.), Judge P. Casey Pitts of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order dismissing complaint, with leave to amend in part. Plaintiff Walter Young, an inmate at Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, California, filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. A class action was filed before United States Magistrate Judge Nathanael Cousins, accusing Santa Rita Jail of mistreating inmates with mental health diagnoses (Babu v. Ahern, 18-cv-07677-NC (N.D. Cal.). A consent decree was entered in that action (Babu v. Ahern, 18-cv-07677-NC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2022)). After that consent decree was entered, Mr. Young filed several declarations in the class action and referred to himself as a member of the class. Magistrate Judge Cousins reviewed those declarations and informed Mr. Young that, to the extent he raised grievances regarding the Defendants' compliance with the Consent Decree, he must work with class counsel to follow the Consent Decree's procedures for dispute resolution. In the instant action, Mr. Young asks the Court to review documents provided in support of his claims. Judge Pitts says he complains that he was "sexually assaulted several times," but provides no facts regarding the assaults. The grievances attached to the Complaint do not mention any sexual assaults. He provides copies of a claim made to Alameda County that he had been sexually assaulted at Santa Rita Jail but none of his filings provide facts regarding the alleged sexual assault. Mr. Young complains that his privileges were taken away. He filed multiple declarations and exhibits regarding this loss of privileges. These documents discuss privileges that Mr. Young believes he was denied because of his mental health diagnosis, which overlaps with the claims raised by his membership in the Babu class. Indeed, Judge Pitts notes, several of Mr. Young's failings are copies of the declarations that he filed in the Babu class action. His filings repeatedly state that he lost privileges "in full violation of the Consent Decree" entered in the Babu v. Ahern class action. One document mentions that he complained of an illegal strip search on April 18, 2023, but does not provide any facts regarding this search. This strip search was not mentioned in the Complaint. Mr. Young states on the face of the Complaint that he did not appeal his grievance(s) to the highest level at Santa Rita Jail, but also asks the Court to review the grievances attached to the Complaint. As Defendants, Mr. Young names the County of Alameda; Gregory Ahern, the Sheriff for Alameda County; and felly inmate "Ishmal." At this time, Judge Pitts holds Mr. Young has not stated any cognizable claim. Mr. Young's claims regarding sexual assault and a strip search are dismissed with leave to amend. Judge Pitts holds that he must provide facts to support his claims; must explain whether he exhausted or, if he failed to exhaust, why the exhaustion requirement must be excused; and must identify proper defendants. Rather than providing facts to support his claims, Mr. Young asks the Court to "please obtain information." Judge Pitts points out that this is not the Court's role. Instead, Mr. Young must provide the Court with the facts necessary to show he has cognizable claims. Judge Pitts opines that Mr. Young must identify who harmed him, when that harm occurred, and the general nature of and circumstances surrounding the harm. He also must explain whether he is a convicted inmate or a pretrial detainee. If he is a convicted inmate, claims regarding a sexual assault and/or strip search are likely to be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. If he is a pretrial detainee, the same events will be analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the face of the Complaint, Mr. Young states that he did not appeal his grievances to the highest administrative level possible. He also asks the Court to review the grievances attached to his Complaint. The Court reviewed these documents and did not find any jail grievance regarding a sexual assault. It, therefore, appears that Mr. Young did not exhaust this claim, Judge Pitts says. Mr. Young's later-filed exhibits mention a strip search, but that was not raised in the Complaint and it is not clear whether Mr. Young pursued this grievance to the highest administrative level possible, Judge Pitts notes. Here, the apparent failure to exhaust is another reason why Mr. Young's claims must be dismissed, Judge Pitts explains. If Mr. Young believes he has exhausted his sexual assault and strip search claims, and if wishes to pursue those claims in an amended complaint, he must explain whether he pursued those claims to the highest level of administrative appeal available, or why exhaustion should not be required of him. Judge Pitts also finds that Mr. Young has not identified any policy or practice which caused the alleged sexual assault or strip search. If he chooses to amend these claims against Alameda County, he must identify such a policy or practice. Judge Pitts adds that Mr. Young's claims against Sheriff Ahern fail because he did not identify any way in which that individual wronged him. Judge Pitts notes that it is unclear why Mr. Young sued a fellow inmate. It seems unlikely that Inmate Ishmal was acting under color of state law when he caused an unspecified injury to Mr. Young. The Court will allow Mr. Young to amend his claims as to Inmate Ishmal if Mr. Young specifies exactly how Inmate Ishmal harmed him and how Inmate Ishmal was acting under state law at the time of the harm. Mr. Young's claims regarding privileges denied by Santa Rita Jail are dismissed without leave to amend, Judge Pitts holds. Mr. Young makes clear that he believes he has been denied privileges guaranteed by the Consent Decree entered in the Babu class action. As Magistrate Judge Cousins has already informed Mr. Young, these claims must be raised "through class counsel using the procedures in the Consent Decree." Mr. Young's claims regarding jail privileges, thus, are dismissed without leave to amend, Judge Pitts holds. Dismissal is without prejudice to pursuing these claims as required by the Consent Decree entered in the Babu class action. Accordingly, the Court rules as follows. The Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend as to the sexual assault and strip search claims, but without leave to amend as to the claims for violations of the Consent Decree entered in the Babu class action. Mr. Young may file a first amended complaint by June 6, 2025. The first amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (CV 24-3914-PCP (PR)) and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. If Mr. Young files a first amended complaint, he must allege facts that demonstrate he is entitled to relief oneach claim. An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint within the allotted time and in accordance with this order will result in a finding that further leave to amend would be futile, and this action will be dismissed. If Mr. Young needs an extension of time to amend his complaint, the extension must be requested before the deadline to amend has passed. The Court points out that it is Mr. Young's responsibility to prosecute this case. Mr. Young must keep the Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed "Notice of Change of Address," and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). A full-text copy of the Court's Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/rdpsjjxk from PacerMonitor.com. ALISHA TAFOYA: Court Tosses Ortiz, et al. Civil Rights Suit ----------------------------------------------------------- Judge Margaret Strickland of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed without prejudice all the claims in the case captioned as ISAAC J. ORTIZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALISHA TAFOYA, et al., Defendants, Case No. 24-cv-0376-MIS-JHR (D.N.M.). The pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis denied as moot. This matter is before the Court on the Prisoner Civil Rights Complaints and supplemental filings in this case, which were submitted by eight inmate-plaintiffs: Isaac J. Ortiz; Lawrence P. Rivas; Angelo Tinoco; Clyde Vigil; James Woodward; Fabian Garcia; Luciano M. Saavedra; and Paul D. Jaramillo. The pleadings purport to raise class action 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims challenging the inmates' conditions of confinement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 governs the joinder of multiple plaintiffs. The Court, in its discretion, may permit joinder where all claims arise from the same transaction/occurrence and share at least one question of law or fact. Even where these requirements are met, the Court may disallow joinder based on the inherent impracticalities associated with pro se prisoner litigation. According to the Court, in this case, some pleadings list all or most of inmate-plaintiffs while others were filed by individual inmate-plaintiffs, making it difficult to discern the scope of the joined claims. At least four inmate-plaintiffs have severed contact with the Court. Moreover, the opening pleading indicates the inmate-plaintiffs wish to proceed as a class. It is well settled that class representatives may not appear pro se, the Court notes. For these reasons, the Court finds joinder is impractical in this case. There is no primary filer in this case. At least three inmate-plaintiffs submitted their own pleadings after signing the original complaint. Moreover, the Court emphasizes that dismissing the claims and requiring each inmate-plaintiff to file their own case will not result in any prejudice. The claims arose in 2023 or 2024 and do not appear time-barred. The Court will therefore dismiss this case and each pleading without prejudice. Each inmate-plaintiff may file a new case limited to their own claims, if they wish to continue litigating. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=XOAA5B from PacerMonitor.com. AMAZON.COM INC: Class Cert Bid Filing Extended to Sept. 15 ---------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTOPHER BROWN, et al., v. AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation, Case No. 2:22-cv-00965-JHC (W.D. Wash.), the Hon. Judge John H. Chun entered an order regarding class certification briefing schedule: 1. The deadline for Plaintiffs to file their class certification motion is extended to Sept. 15, 2025. 2. The deadline for Amazon to respond to the Plaintiffs' motion is Dec. 15, 2025. 3. The deadline for Plaintiffs' reply brief is Feb. 16, 2026. Amazon.com is engaged in e-commerce, cloud computing, online advertising, digital streaming, and artificial intelligence. A copy of the Court's order dated May 7, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=lpEzJu at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Steve W. Berman, Esq. Barbara A. Mahoney, Esq. Anne F. Johnson, Esq. HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP 1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: (206) 623-7292 Facsimile: (206) 623-0594 E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com barbaram@hbsslaw.com annej@hbsslaw.com - and - Zina G. Bash, Esq. Jessica Beringer, Esq. Shane Kelly, Esq. Alex Dravillas, Esq. Roseann Romano, Esq. KELLER POSTMAN LLC 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 500 Austin, TX, 78701 Telephone: (512) 690-0990 E-mail: zina.bash@kellerpostman.com Jessica.Beringer@kellerpostman.com shane.kelly@kellerpostman.com ajd@kellerpostman.com roseann.romano@kellerpostman.com - and - Alicia Cobb, Esq. Steig D. Olson, Esq. David D. LeRay, Esq. Nic V. Siebert, Esq. Maxwell P. Deabler-Meadows, Esq. Adam B. Wolfson, Esq. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 1109 First Avenue, Suite 210 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: (206) 905-7000 E-mail: aliciacobb@quinnemanuel.com steigolson@quinnemanuel.com davidleray@quinnemanuel.com nicolassiebert@quinnemanuel.com maxmeadows@quinnemanuel.com adamwolfson@quinnemanuel.com The Defendant is represented by: John A. Goldmark, Esq. MaryAnn Almeida, Esq. DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 920 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300 Seattle, WA 98104-1610 Telephone: (206) 622-3150 Facsimile: (206) 757-7700 E-mail: SteveRummage@dwt.com JohnGoldmark@dwt.com MaryAnnAlmeida@dwt.com - and - Karen L. Dunn, Esq. William A. Isaacson, Esq. Amy J. Mauser, Esq. Meredith Dearborn, Esq. Yotam Barkai, Esq. Kyle Smith, Esq. PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 2001 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-1047 Telephone: (202) 223-7300 Facsimile: (202) 223-7420 E-mail: kdunn@paulweiss.com wisaacson@paulweiss.com amauser@paulweiss.com ksmith@paulweiss.com mgoodman@paulweiss.com mdearborn@paulweiss.com ybarkai@paulweiss.com AMAZON.COM INC: Loses Bid to Claw Back Documents in Antitrust Suits ------------------------------------------------------------------- Judge John H. Chun of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the motion of Amazon.com Inc. to claw back privileged material and strike references thereto from plaintiffs' class certification motion in the following cases: 1. ELIZABETH DE COSTER et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, CASE NO. 2:21-cv-00693-JHC; 2. DEBORAH FRAME-WILSON, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, CASE NO. 2:20-cv-00424-JHC; and 3. CHRISTOPHER BROWN, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00965-JHC. Plaintiffs brought antitrust class action lawsuits against Amazon claiming various violations of the Sherman Act. On Feb. 20, 2025, Plaintiffs in Frame-Wilson filed their Motion for Class Certification. Amazon says that within a week of receiving Plaintiffs' motion, it emailed Plaintiffs to claw back Exhibit 68 (CAAGLit-AMZ_10780239), Exhibit 69 (CAAGLit-AMZ_03029869), and Exhibit 94 (CAAGLit-AMZ_10631781). It asked Plaintiffs to destroy all copies of these documents, delete them from any and all litigation support or other databases in their possession, and expunge them from any work product reflecting the contents of the documents. It also requested that Plaintiffs remove any reference to the documents from their class certification papers and re-file a new version that contains no reference to the three documents. Plaintiffs responded that they believed the company had waived privileged over these documents. Amazon contends that the Electronically Stored Information Protocol governs this dispute, and that the parties did not intend to override the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d). But the company says that even if the parties' Protective Order (instead of the ESI protocol) governs this dispute, the Court is compelled to reach the same result. In the alternative, Amazon argues that even if Rule 502(d) does not control the treatment of these documents, its handling of the documents satisfies the Rule 502(b) requirements. The three documents at issue were produced during Amazon's months-long privilege re-review. The Court said that no reasonable reading of the Amended Protective Order supports Amazon's contention that it allows a party to claw back a document under any circumstances. Thus, the Court applies the Rule 502(b) waiver standard to Amazon's clawback requests. Amazon contends that the disclosure was inadvertent given that its privilege re-review was enormous and exceedingly difficult. According to the Court, Amazon's production of the documents at issue was intentional. It downgraded the documents during this comprehensive re-review of its privilege logs. And Amazon does not explain how the production of these documents was a mistake. The Court does not conclude that the production of Exhibit 68 (and the six duplicate copies), Exhibit 69, and Exhibit 94 was inadvertent. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=W8J9bh from PacerMonitor.com. AMAZON.COM INC: Must Oppose Class Cert Bid by August 14 ------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVEN FLOYD, JOLENE FURDEK, and JONATHAN RYAN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation, and APPLE INC., a California corporation, Case No. 2:22-cv-01599-KKE (W.D. Wash.), the Hon. Judge Kymberly K. Evanson entered an order regarding sealing of class certification briefing: -- Motion for class certification and May 14, 2025 supporting expert reports: -- Filing of public versions of class June 11, 2025 certification papers and corresponding motion(s) to seal: -- Opposition to motion for class Aug. 14, 2025 certification and supporting expert reports: -- Filing of public versions of Sept. 11, 2025 opposition to class certification and corresponding motion(s) to seal: -- Reply in support of motion for Nov. 14, 2025 class certification and reply expert reports: -- Filing of public versions of class Dec. 12, 2025 certification papers and corresponding motion(s) to seal: Amazon.com is engaged in e-commerce, cloud computing, online advertising, digital streaming, and artificial intelligence. A copy of the Court's order dated May 7, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=TgTqJk at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Steve W. Berman, Esq. Theodore Wojcik, Esq. Meredith Simons, Esq. Ben Harrington, Esq. Benjamin Siegel, Esq. HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP 1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: (206) 623-7292 Facsimile: (206) 623-0594 E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com barbaram@hbsslaw.com benh@hbsslaw.com bens@hbsslaw.com tedw@hbsslaw.com merediths@hbsslaw.com The Defendants are represented by: John Goldmark, Esq. MaryAnn Almeida, Esq. DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 920 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300 Seattle, WA, 98104 Telephone: (206) 622-3150 Facsimile: (206) 757-7700 E-mail: johngoldmark@dwt.com maryannalmeida@dwt.com - and - Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Esq. Benjamin M. Mundel, Esq. Jon Dugan, Esq. SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 Telephone: (202) 736-8000 Facsimile: (202) 736-8711 E-mail: jnuechterlein@sidley.com jdugan@sidley.com bmundel@sidley.com - and - Mark S. Parris, Esq. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 401 Union Street, Suite 3300 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: (206) 839-4300 Facsimile: (206) 839-4301 E-mail: mparris@orrick.com - and - Mark A. Perry, Esq. Brian G. Liegel, Esq. Eric S. Hochstadt, Esq. WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP 2001 M. Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 682-7000 E-mail: mark.perry@weil.com brian.liegel@weil.com morgan.macbride@weil.com eric.hochstadt@weil.com AMERICAN HONDA: Sivakova's Objection to Dismissal Bid Due June 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the lawsuit captioned ANDREA SIVAKOVA, et al., Plaintiffs v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:24-cv-03354-MWF-MAA (C.D. Cal.), Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California rules that the Plaintiffs' opposition to the Defendant's motion to dismiss is due on June 9, 2025. The Court has considered the parties' Stipulation for an Order (1) Setting a Briefing Schedule and Hearing Date re: Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Class Action Complaint; and (2) Enlarging Word Limits for Briefs. For good cause shown, the Court grants the parties' requests and orders as follows. Defendant American Honda Motor Company, Inc.'s ("AHM") deadline to file its Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (the "MTD") was April 28, 2025. The MTD will be noticed for hearing on July 14, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. The Plaintiffs' Opposition to AHM's MTD will be filed no later than June 9, 2025. AHM's Reply in support of its MTD will be filed no later than June 30, 2025. AHM's MTD and the Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto may contain up to no more than 8,000 words. A full-text copy of the Court's Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yck82upk from PacerMonitor.com. BITFARMS LTD: Faces Olympio Suit Over 6.07% Stock Price Drop ------------------------------------------------------------ BONITO OLYMPIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BITFARMS LTD., L. GEOFFREY MORPHY, BENJAMIN GAGNON, and JEFFREY LUCAS, Case No. 1:25-cv-02630 (E.D.N.Y., May 9, 2025) is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than Defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired Bitfarms securities between March 21, 2023 and December 9, 2024, both dates inclusive, seeking to recover damages caused by the Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Bitfarms primarily owns and operates data centers housing computers (miners) designed for the purpose of validating transactions on the Bitcoin Blockchain (mining). Once BTC are mined, Bitfarms keeps them as digital assets or exchanges them for U.S. dollars through established cryptocurrency trading platforms. According to the Company, Bitfarms' financing strategy involves, among other things, strategically selling its BTC assets. When Bitfarms sells its digital assets, the Company is required to account for the proceeds it receives from those sales on its cash flow statement, which provides an accounting of the cash used in operations, including working capital, financing, and investing. In March 2024, the Company identified a material weakness in its internal control over financial reporting with respect to the Company’s classification of the 2021 Warrants. Specifically, the Company acknowledged that "the control over accounting for complex financing transactions did not operate effectively in 2021 as the warrants issued in 2021 should have been classified as a financial liability and accounted for at fair value through profit and loss, and not as equity instruments." On December 9, 2024, Bitfarms issued a press release announcing that its consolidated financial statements for the fiscal years 2022 and 2023 contained a material error related to the classification of proceeds from digital asset sales and would need to be restated. Additionally, Bitfarms stated that it was also restating its financials "to adjust for an error in the accounting for the redemption of warrants in 2023.” On this news, Bitfarms' stock price fell $0.13 per share, or 6.07%, to close at $2.01 per share on December 10, 2024. 9. Then, on April 1, 2025, Bitfarms filed its Annual Report on Form 40-F with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the year ended December 31, 2024. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company’s securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses and damages, says the suit. The Plaintiff acquired Bitfarms securities at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period and was damaged upon the revelation of the alleged corrective disclosures. Bitfarms Ltd. operates integrated Bitcoin data centers in Canada, the U.S., Paraguay, and Argentina. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq. J. Alexander Hood II, Esq. Thomas H. Przybylowski, Esq. POMERANTZ LLP 600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor New York, New York 10016 Telephone: (212) 661-1100 Facsimile: (917) 463-1044 E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com ahood@pomlaw.com tprzybylowski@pomlaw.com BOYS' CLUB: Mendoza Sues Over Workers' Unsafe Living Conditions --------------------------------------------------------------- MANUEL MENDOZA, on behalf of himself, and other similarly situated employees v. THE BOYS' CLUB OF NEW YORK and YARITZA CORTES, Case No. 7:25-cv-03900 (S.D.N.Y., May 9, 2025) alleges that Boys' Club operates at the expense of hard-working employees and children who attend their "sleep away" camps, who were forced to eat, sleep and work in squalor (such as a rodent infestation). Accordingly, supervisor Donnaree Williamson’s response regarding the hazardous and unsafe living conditions was "deal with it." The Boy's Club claims to operate a network of programs for underprivileged children with the purpose of providing enriching, family-friendly experiences to empower boys and young men starting as young as seven years old. Unfortunately, behind this facade, this "non-profit" placed greed over the safety and welfare of both employees and children alike. To add in insult to injury, TBCNY's employees were not compensated for all hours worked and not paid overtime. The Plaintiff was paid for just 35 hours of work per week but was forced to do up to 60 hours per week or more without proper compensation, says the suit. Plaintiff Mendoza is an adult resident of Westchester County, in the State of New York. The Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an "Adventure Specialist," from June 2024 through the wrongful termination of his employment on July 26, 2024, and worked at Defendants' Harriman "Basecamp" located at 533 Arden Valley Rd, Southfields, New York.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph Jeziorkowski, Esq. VALIANT LAW 2 Westchester Park Dr, Suite 205 White Plains, New York 10604 Telephone: (914) 730-2422 E-mail: jjj@valiantlaw.com CARIBOU BIOSCIENCES: Saylor Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed -------------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Vince Chhabria of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California approved the voluntary dismissal of the putative class action captioned as JACOB SAYLOR, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CARIBOU BIOSCIENCES, INC., RACHEL E. HAURWITZ, and JASON V. O'BYRNE, Defendants, Case No. 3:24-cv-09413-VC (N.D. Cal.) without prejudice. Before the Court is Lead Plaintiffs Robert Barnetzke and Pamela Barnetzke request that the Court approve their voluntary dismissal of this putative class action without prejudice. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=WtqWll from PacerMonitor.com. CDK GLOBAL: Settlement in Loop Suit Obtains Preliminary Court OK ---------------------------------------------------------------- Judge James D. Peterson of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted preliminary approval of the class action settlement in the case captioned as LOOP LLC d/b/a AUTOLOOP, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CDK GLOBAL, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 24-cv-00571-jdp (W.D. Wis.). In this certified class action, plaintiff Loop LLC contends that defendant CDK Global, LLC violated antitrust law by conspiring with its competitor The Reynolds and Reynolds Company to unreasonably restrain trade in the market for data-integration services, leading to higher prices. Two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement. The parties now move for preliminary approval of their settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(b). Terms of Settlement Agreement The settlement agreement provides that CDK will pay a total of $630 million, which will be divided up as follows: -- $20 million for class counsel's legal expenses -- $350,000 for the administrator's expenses -- $250,000 for Loop's service award -- One-third of the remaining amount, or $203,133,133, for attorney fees. -- Two-thirds of the remaining amount, or $406,266,667, to be distributed to the 243 class members The settlement will be paid in four installments, over three years. The first payment of $450 million will be made shortly after the settlement is finally approved. Taxes, legal expenses, administrative expenses, the named plaintiff's service award, and attorney fees will be paid first, and the remainder will be paid to the class. CDK will make additional payments of $60 million each year for three years. Any amount that goes unpaid to a class member will be redistributed to other class members in accordance with their pro-rata share; no portion of the settlement fund will revert to CDK. Class counsel seek more than $200 million in fees. This represents one-third of the total settlement after expenses are subtracted, and approximately five times what Loop represents its lodestar is. Class counsel seek $20 million in expenses. Class counsel say that award is proportionate to the expenses requested in this case. Class counsel seek $350,000 for administrative expenses. Class counsel ask the court to approve a $250,000 service award for Loop. The Court does have concerns on several issues: (1) the request for attorney fees; (2) the request for litigation expenses; (3) the request for administrative expenses; (4) the service award; (5) the structure of the settlement; and (6) the claims process. The Court will grant preliminary approval of the settlement. All of the class members in this case are businesses, and the average recovery for each class member is approximately $2 million. More than a dozen class members' shares are calculated at more than $10 million. It is reasonable to infer that many class members are sophisticated businesses that have the incentive and resources to carefully review the settlement and raise objections to any portion of it that they believe is unfair. So the Court is willing to withhold judgment at the preliminary stage and allow the class members to weigh in before determining whether final settlement approval is appropriate. But the Court has laid out its concerns to flag them for both the parties and the class members. In light of the concerns, the Court will provide guidance on what it expects the parties to include in their motion for final approval. As for attorney fees, class counsel must explain why such a large percentage of recovery and a large lodestar multiplier is reasonable under the circumstances of this case, taking care to address each of the points the court has raised in this opinion about the fee request. If class counsel cannot make a persuasive argument, they should reduce their fee request. As for expenses, class counsel must provide records of their litigation expenses, along with an explanation of why the expenses are reasonable. As for the $250,000 service award, class counsel must provide additional support. The evidence submitted should include a declaration from a Loop representative or class counsel, describing in reasonable detail the assistance Loop provided in the lawsuit and providing any other information that is relevant to assessing the reasonableness of the service award. As for the structure of the settlement, the parties must explain how they believe the case should proceed if the settlement is finally approved, addressing the following issues: (1) whether they want the court to keep the case open until the final payment is made, and, if so, why it is necessary and appropriate to do that; (2) whether they want the court to enter judgment after finally approving the settlement, and, if so, whether that is consistent with the parties' request for the court to retain jurisdiction. The parties must submit a proposed order with the motion for final approval, along with any proposed judgment they want the court to enter. As for the claims process, the parties must identify more specifically how class members will verify their identities and provide payment instructions and how disputes about identity, payment, or tax forms will be resolved. The parties may have until June 10, 2025, to file a motion for final approval of the settlement. The parties may have until July 29, 2025, to file a reply to any objections. The court will hold a settlement approval hearing on Aug. 29, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 260. The deadline for class members to object to the settlement is July 15, 2025. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=K3icCH from PacerMonitor.com. CENTRAL COAST: Aguilar Auto Class Settlement to be Heard on May 20 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Magistrate Judge Lisa J. Cisneros modified the the start time for the May 20, 2025, final approval hearing of the class action settlement in the case captioned as AGUILAR AUTO REPAIR, INC., and CENTRAL COAST TOBACCO CO., LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Defendants, Case No. 23-cv-06265-LJC (N.D. Cal.) to 2:30 p.m. The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees is also scheduled on that same date and time. The Court also finds good cause to grant Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A's request to appear remotely. Defense counsel John W. Peterson will appear remotely via Zoom at the May 20, 2025 hearing at 2:30 p.m. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Azul8D from PacerMonitor.com. CENTURY ALUMINUM: Settlement in McDaniel Suit Gets Prelim. Court OK ------------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Richard M. Gergel of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement and for certification of a proposed settlement class, appointment of a class representative and class counsel, and approval of class notice and proposed timeline for settlement approval in the case captioned as Katie Leigh McDaniel, on behalf of herself and a class of all others similarly situated, Myrna S. Seibel, Robert B. Deaver, Amber Brown, and Catherine B. Burns, Plaintiffs, v. Century Aluminum Company and Century Aluminum of South Carolina, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:23-cv-5766-RMG (D.S.C.). In this putative class action, Plaintiffs, a class of persons who owned single-family homes in the Class Area as of Sept. 1, 2023, seek property damages from Defendants stemming from repeated emissions of aluminum oxide particulates, also known as alumina, from Defendants' Mount Holly aluminum smelter in September 2023 into the air that Plaintiffs allege damaged their properties. They bring claims of trespass, nuisance, negligence and gross negligence and negligence per se against Defendants. Certain plaintiffs also seek damages for personal injury claims that are not the subject of the present settlement. The Parties move this Court to certify a settlement class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The "Settlement Class" is composed of "all persons who, as of Sept. 1, 2023, owned a single-family home located in the Class Area as reflected by the Berkeley County public records." The Court finds numerosity is satisfied. In this case, the class comprises 726 single-family homes, making joinder of all class members impracticable. The Court finds commonality is satisfied. In this case, the class property owners' claims depend on the resolution of shared questions of law and fact. The Court finds that typicality is satisfied. The typicality requirement is satisfied where Plaintiff McDaniel's claims are typical of the class as a whole, in light of the fact that she is an individual residential property owner who resided within the Class Area during the relevant time period, her property claims arise out of the same course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members, and her request for recovery is based on the same legal theory. Plaintiff and its counsel are adequate representatives of the Settlement Class. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff McDaniel and Class Counsel— James L. Ward, Jr. of McGowan, Hood, Felder & Phillips, LLC and F. Elliotte Quinn IV, Michael J. Jordan, and William S. Jackson IV of The Steinberg Law Firm, LLC— are adequate representatives of the conditional Settlement Class under Rule 23(a)(4). In this case, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3). A class action must satisfy two factors under Rule 23(b)(3): predominance and superiority. The Court is satisfied that predominance is met. The Court also finds that the proposed class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy raised by the action. In sum, for the sole purpose of determining: (i) whether this Court should preliminarily approve the Proposed Settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate; and (ii) whether the Court should dismiss this litigation as against Defendants as detailed in the Settlement Agreement, the Court certifies a conditional settlement class as follows: Settlement Class: All Persons who, as of Sept. 1, 2023, owned a single-family home located in the Class Area as reflected by the Berkley County public records. Excluded from the Settlement Class: (1) Defendants; (2) any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest; (3) any Person with ownership interest in Defendants; (4) any current or former officer or director of Defendants; (5) the legal representatives, successors, or assigns of Defendants. The following attorneys are designated Class Counsel under Rule 23(g)(1): James L. Ward, Jr. of McGowan, Hood, Felder & Phillips, LLC and F. Elliotte Quinn IV, Michael J. Jordan, and William S. Jackson IV of The Steinberg Law Firm, LLC. Plaintiff Katie Leigh McDaniel is appointed Class Representative. The Court finds that the settlement reached in this case was the result of a fair process. Defendants have vigorously disputed Plaintiffs' claims throughout this litigation. Plaintiffs have amended their complaint three times as a result of refining their claims throughout the course of factual discovery. While denying liability, Defendants have agreed to pay a total settlement amount of $944,000.00 to settle Plaintiffs' property damage claims. The Court considers that the likelihood of substantial future costs weighed against the uncertainty of further litigation favors approving the proposed settlement. The Court adopts the Parties' proposed timeline for implementing the class action settlement as follows: May 2, 2025: Settlement website launched May 9, 2025: Class notice mailed June 9, 2025: Fee petition due June 23, 2025: Opt-out and objection deadline July 7, 2025: Final approval motion due July 23, 2025 at 10:00 A.M.: Final approval hearing A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=wFDMft from PacerMonitor.com. CINTAS CORP: Court OKs $14.85MM Attorneys' Fees in Laurel Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Anne R. Traum of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted the plaintiff's motion for approval of the attorneys' fees, litigation costs and expenses, and service award under the settlement agreement in the class action lawsuit captioned as CITY OF LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 2, Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-00124-ART-CL (D. Nev.). Plaintiff City of Laurel, Mississippi filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint and subsequently entered into an Agreement with Cintas Corporation No. 2 that, if approved, would settle the Action. Plaintiff has moved, under to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, for an order awarding 33% of the common fund in attorneys' fees, reimbursement of $230,211.64 for costs incurred, and a service award of $10,000 to the Class Representative. The Court finds and orders as follows: Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees of 33% of the $45,000,000 Cash Settlement Amount, or $14,850,000. The Court finds that Class Counsel's requested fee award is fair and reasonable under the common fund doctrine and percentage-of-the-recovery method. Class Counsel is awarded reimbursement of their litigation costs and expenses in the amount of $230,211.64. The Court finds that these costs and expenses were reasonably incurred in the ordinary course of prosecuting this case and were necessary given the complex nature and nationwide scope of the case. The Class Representative is awarded a service award in the amount of $10,000. The Court finds that the requested service award is fair and reasonable in light of the Class Representative's efforts on behalf of the litigation. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=gCIYMz from PacerMonitor.com. CINTAS CORP: Settlement in City of Laurel Suit Gets Final Court Nod ------------------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Anne R. Traum of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted final approval of the class action settlement in the case captioned as CITY OF LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 2, Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-00124-ART-CLB (D. Nev.). Plaintiff City of Laurel, Mississippi filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint and subsequently entered into an Agreement with Cintas Corporation No. 2 that, if approved, would settle the Action. The Court granted preliminary approval of the Class Action Settlement on Dec. 31, 2024. Plaintiff has moved, under to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, for final approval of the Class Action Settlement. The Court finds and orders as follows: Under Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and solely for the purposes of judgment on the proposed Settlement Agreement, the Court certifies the following Settlement Class: any Participating Public Agency, including state and local governments, school boards, institutions of higher education, and non-profit organizations, that entered into Local Agreements with Cintas for products or services that "piggybacked" onto the Harford County Master Agreement or the Prince William County Master Agreement during the Class Period [April 1, 2012 through December 31, 2024, the date that the Court entered the Preliminary Approval Order] The Settlement Class, which will be bound by this Order and Judgment, shall include all members of the Settlement Class who did not submit a timely and valid request for exclusion. The Court finds that the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) are satisfied for the following reasons: (1) the Settlement Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law and fact common to members of the Settlement Class that predominate over questions affecting only individual members; (3) Plaintiff's claims are typical of the Settlement Class; (4) Plaintiff and its counsel have and will continue to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Settlement Class; and (5) a settlement class action is a superior method of fairly and efficiently adjudicating this Action. Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court approves the Settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members. Having considered the terms of the Settlement and the record before it, including that there were no objections to the Settlement and only nine requests for exclusion, the Court finds that the Class Representative and Class Counsel have adequately represented the interests of the Settlement Class Members; the settlement consideration provided under the Settlement Agreement constitutes fair value given in exchange for the release of the Released Claims against the Released Parties; the Settlement is the result of arm's-length negotiations by experienced, well-qualified counsel that included a settlement conference conducted by Honorable Robert A. McQuaid, Jr.; the Settlement provides meaningful monetary and non-monetary benefits to Settlement Class Members and such benefits are not disproportionate to the attorneys' fees and expenses sought by Class Counsel; the benefits provided treat Settlement Class Members equitably; and the Settlement is reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this Action. The Court further finds that these facts demonstrate that there was no collusion present in the reaching of the Settlement Agreement, implicit or otherwise. The Court reaffirms its appointment of Angeion Group LLC to perform the functions and duties of the Settlement Administrator set forth in the Settlement -- including providing notice to the Settlement Class, processing Claim Forms, and administering distributions from the Cash Settlement Amount -- and to provide such other administration services as are reasonably necessary to facilitate the completion of the Settlement. The Court approves the Settlement in all respects and orders that the Settlement Agreement shall be consummated and implemented in accordance with its terms and conditions. The Action is dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=i1WEYw from PacerMonitor.com. DAILY HARVEST: HIPPA Qualified Protective Order OK'd in Peni Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Denise Cote of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the the Settlement Administrator's unopposed report and recommendation for entry of a Qualified Protective Order in the case captioned as Breeanne Buckley Peni, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. DAILY HARVEST, INC., SECOND BITE FOODS, INC. d/b/a "STONE GATE FOODS", AND MOLINOS ASOCIADOS SAC, Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-05443 (S.D.N.Y.). By Orders dated May 22, 2024, and Oct. 9, 2024, the Court appointed Edgar C. Gentle, III, to serve as the Settlement Administrator for the Daily Harvest Crumbles Settlement and the Smirk's-Molinos Crumbles Settlement. As part of his duties, the Settlement Administrator will resolve Qualified Class Members' health insurance reimbursement claims and/or liens in the Settlements. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreements and the Payment of Settlement Checks, the Parties have appointed the Settlement Administrator to implement and administer the claim and/or lien identification and resolution process for all Qualified Class Members, including those of deceased Qualified Class Members' Estates and/or their heirs. Specifically, the Parties have appointed the Settlement Administrator to perform the following duties and functions in the Settlements: (1) the authority to act as agent for the benefit of all Qualified Class Members for purposes of claim and/or lien resolution; (2) the authority to provide to, receive from, and disclose to/from Payers certain protected health information and personal identifiable information related to Qualified Class Members in the action and Settlements; (3) the authority to resolve any and all potential recovery claims for medical items, services, and/or prescription drugs with Governmental Payers, Medicaid Program sponsors, and/or Other Payers/Providers, including all private health plans whether insured or self-funded associated with the action; and (4) the PHI, PII and potential recovery claims are acceptable in data file formats and other electronic means. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=tmNSWg from PacerMonitor.com. EISNER ADVISORY: Court Consolidates Four Data Breach Lawsuits ------------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Margaret M. Garnett of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate and appoint interim co-lead class action in the following cases pursuant to Rules 42 and 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1. DAVID FALLEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EISNER ADVISORY GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-03044 2. CHRIS OUELLETTE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EISNER ADVISORY GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-03069 3. HANNAH WATZKA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EISNER ADVISORY GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-03081 4. TIMOTHY RUSHING, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EISNER ADVISORY GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:25-cv-03102 Having found that the cases involved some of the same issues of fact and law, grow out of the same alleged data breach involving Eisner Advisory Group, LLC, have many of the same claims, and have proposed class definitions that will encompass the same persons, the Court finds that the cases have sufficient commonality of issues and parties to warrant consolidating the cases. The Court further finds that the benefits of consolidation are not outweighed by any risk of prejudice or jury confusion. The effect of such consolidation will be judicial economy and preserving the Parties’ resources, as well as avoiding disparate rulings in separate actions. Accordingly, because the Court finds that the Related Actions have sufficient commonality of law and fact and consolidation does not increase the risk of an unfair outcome, the motion is granted. The Court further ordered as follows: l. David Fallen v. Eisner Advisory Group, LLC, Case No. 1:25-cv-03044 (S.D.N.Y); Chris Ouellette v. Eisner Advisory Group, LLC, Case No. 1:25-cv-03068 (S.D.N.Y); Hannah Watzka v. Eisner Advisory Group, LLC, Case No. 1:25-cv-03081 (S.D.N.Y); Timothy Rushing v. Eisner Advisory Group, LLC, Case No. 1:25-cv-03102 (S.D.N.Y); and all other actions (now and in the future) naming Eisner as a defendant in connection with the Data Breach that occurred in September of 2023 shall be consolidated pursuant to under case number of the first-filed case 1:25-cv-03044. 2. All papers filed in the Consolidated Action shall be filed under Case No. 1:25-cv-03044 and shall bear the following caption: Jn re Eisner Advisory Group, LLC Data Breach Litigation. Any action subsequently filed, transferred, or removed to the Court that arises out of the same or simular operative facts as the Consolidated Action will be consolidated with it for pre-trial, discovery, and trial purposes. 3. The Court appoints William B. Federman of Federman & Sherwood and Raina C. Borrelli of Strauss Borrelli PLLC, as Interim Co-Lead Counsel to act on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the putative Class. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=qn6opP from PacerMonitor.com. ESL INVESTMENTS: Loses Bid to Certify Appeal of Remedy Opinion -------------------------------------------------------------- In the appealed case captioned as EDWARD S. LAMPERT, ESL INVESTMENTS, INC. ESL PARTNERS, LP, RBS PARTNERS, LP, TRANSFORM HOLDCO LLC, and HOMETOWN MIDCO LLC, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. CANNON SQUARE, LLC, Intervenor Below, Appellee, No. 111, 2025 (Del.), Justices Abigail M. LeGrow, Gary F. Traynor and N. Christopher Griffiths of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the decision of the Chancery Court of the State of Delaware denying the defendant-appellants' application for certification of an interlocutory appeal of the Remedy Opinion issued on Feb. 27, 2025. Edward S. Lampert controlled Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. (the "Company") and Sears Holdings Corporation ("Holdings") through his control of a group of investment funds known as the "ESL Funds." In 2019, the Company merged with an acquisition subsidiary of Holdings, with the Company surviving. Each share of the Company was converted into the right to receive $3.21. A wholly owned subsidiary of the successor to Holdings supplied the cash to pay the Merger Consideration. The Company emerged as a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent. Stockholders of the Company filed putative class actions challenging the merger. After closing, the stockholders' claims were consolidated into a single putative class action in which the stockholders alleged that Lampert, his affiliates, and certain Company directors breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in a squeeze-out transaction at an unfair price. Cannon Square, LLC demanded appraisal of its Company stock and initiated an appraisal proceeding. In 2020, the Court of Chancery consolidated the Plenary Action and the appraisal proceeding for purposes of discovery and trial. In 2021, it certified a class in the Plenary Action. In 2024, the Court of Chancery issued a post-trial decision finding that the merger was not entirely fair and that the fair price would have been $4.99 per share. By that time, Lampert was the only remaining defendant. Lampert moved for reargument, and the Court of Chancery reduced the fair price determination to $4.06 per share. Subtracting the $3.21 per share merger price from the $4.06 per share fair value, it awarded damages amounting to $0.85 per share. Cannon Square then asserted that it was entitled to recover $4.06 per share from Lampert because it had not received the merger consideration. The Court of Chancery allowed Cannon Square to intervene in the Plenary Action to make that claim. Thereafter, the plaintiffs in the Plenary Action settled with Lampert for $10 million. If that amount were distributed pro rata to all shares in the class, each stockholder -- including Cannon Square -- would receive $0.95 per share. As a result, Cannon Square would have received a total of $0.95 per share, while the other stockholders would have received a total of $4.16 per share -- $3.21 as merger consideration plus $0.95 per share from the pro rata distribution of $10 million. But Cannon Square argued that it should receive $3.21 per share off the top, and then the remaining proceeds -- $0.87 per share -- should be distributed pro rata. Under that approach, each stockholder would have received a total of $4.08 per share. The Court of Chancery agreed with Cannon Square. On Feb. 13, 2025, it issued an opinion holding that Cannon Square is entitled to recover $4.06 per share (the "Remedy Opinion"). It declined to certify, finding that the application was untimely and the defendant-appellants had failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse their untimely filing. It also held that the Remedy Opinion did not resolve a substantial issue of material importance as required by Supreme Court Rule 42(b)(i) and did not satisfy the Rule 42(b)(iii) criteria. Finally, it concluded that the case "is on the verge of a final judgment that will support an appeal as of right" and that an interlocutory appeal therefore is not warranted. The Delaware Supreme Court Justices, in the exercise of their discretion and giving great weight to the trial court's view, conclude that the interlocutory appeal should be refused. The application for certification was untimely because it was filed more than ten days after the Court of Chancery issued the Remedy Opinion on Feb. 13, 2025, and the appellants did not establish good cause to excuse their untimely application. They add, it appears that the proceedings in the Court of Chancery are nearing conclusion. Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of the Remedy Opinion do not exist in this case, and the potential benefits of interlocutory review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by an interlocutory appeal. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=AwQhzf FNU WILKANS: Court Tosses Olivas, et al. Prisoner Civil Rights Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Kea Riggs of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed without prejudice all claims in the case captioned as OBED OLIVAS, et al, Plaintiffs, v. FNU WILKANS, et al, Defendants, Case No. 24-cv-0502-KWR-GJF (D.N.M.). This matter is before the Court on the Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint and supplemental filing in this case, which were submitted by four inmate-plaintiffs: Obed Olivas; Daniel Strew; Aaron Reese; and Craig Reimer. The pleadings purport to raise class action 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims challenging the inmates' conditions of confinement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 governs the joinder of multiple plaintiffs. The Court, in its discretion, may permit a joinder where all claims arise from the same transaction/occurrence and share at least one question of law or fact. Even where these requirements are met, the Court may disallow a joinder based on the inherent impracticalities associated with pro se prisoner litigation. The opening pleading lists all four inmate-plaintiffs, while another complaint was filed by Plaintiff Aaron Reese. According to the Court, it is therefore not possible to discern the scope of the joined claims. At least two inmate-plaintiffs have severed contact with the Court, including Reese. Moreover, the opening pleading indicates the inmate-plaintiffs wish to proceed as a class. It is well settled that class representatives may not appear pro se. For these reasons, the Court finds joinder is impractical in this case. The primary filer in this case, Aaron Reese, is no longer incarcerated at the Guadalupe County Correctional Facility and has severed contact with the Court. Moreover, the Court says dismissing the claims and requiring each plaintiff to file separately would not cause prejudice. The claims arose in 2024 and are not time-barred. The Court will therefore dismiss this case and each pleading without prejudice. Each inmate-plaintiff may file a new case limited to their own claims, if they wish to continue litigating. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=RzNyln from PacerMonitor.com. FNU WILKENS: Court Tosses Saavedra, et al. Civil Rights Suit ------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Margaret Strickland of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed without prejudice all the claims in in the case captioned as ADAM SAAVEDRA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FNU WILKENS, et al., Defendants, Case No. 24-cv-0406-MIS-KK (D.N.M.). The pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied as moot. This matter is before the Court on the Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint and supplemental filings in this case, which were submitted by four inmate-plaintiffs: Adam Saavedra; Quirino Villanueva; Chauncey Johnson; and Terrence Robins. The pleadings purport to raise class action 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims challenging the inmates' conditions of confinement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 governs the joinder of multiple plaintiffs. The Court, in its discretion, may permit joinder where all claims arise from the same transaction/occurrence and share at least one question of law or fact. Even where these requirements are met, the Court may disallow joinder based on the inherent impracticalities associated with pro se prisoner litigation. The opening pleading lists all four inmate-plaintiffs, while another complaint was filed by Plaintiff Adam Saavedra. According to the Court, it is therefore not possible to discern the scope of the joined claims. At least two inmate-plaintiffs have severed contact with the Court. Moreover, the the opening pleading indicates the inmate-plaintiffs wish to proceed as a class. It is well settled that class representatives may not appear pro se, the Court notes. For these reasons, the Court finds joinder is impractical in this case. The primary filer in this case, Adam Saavedra, is no longer incarcerated at the Guadalupe County Correctional Facility and has severed contact with the Court. Moreover, dismissing the claims and requiring each plaintiff to file separately would not cause prejudice. The claims arose in 2024 and are not time-barred. The Court will therefore dismiss this case and each pleading without prejudice. Each inmate-plaintiff may file a new case limited to their own claims, if they wish to continue litigating. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=nW5btV from PacerMonitor.com. GIGA WATT: Wins Bid to Dismiss Appeal in Sharp Lawsuit ------------------------------------------------------ Chief Judge Stanley A. Bastian of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the appeal styled as ANDREA SHARP, Appellant, v. GIGA WATT INC.; MARK D. WALDRON, Trustee, Appellees, Case No. 2:25-cv-00078-SAB (E.D. Wash.) for lack of jurisdiction and standing. The Giga Watt Project was formed to build and run a large-scale cryptocurrency mining operation. As part of the project, Giga Watt sold so-called "WTT Tokens" that entitled a token purchaser to use electricity generated by the Giga Watt facility to mine and generate cryptocurrency. The sales proceeds from the WTT Tokens totaled more than $22 million, which was held by Perkins Coie LLP in an escrow account. After the initial sale of tokens was complete, Perkins provided refunds to some purchasers, paying them from the escrow fund. Perkins subsequently transferred $21.6 million to Giga Watt entities, and by February 22, 2018, the escrow account was depleted. Giga Watt filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Nov. 19, 2018, in the Eastern District of Washington. Appellee Mark D. Waldron was appointed as the Chapter 11 Trustee on Jan. 24, 2019. On Nov. 30, 2020, Trustee Waldron commenced an adversary proceeding against Perkins alleging that its disbursement of the escrow funds violated a fiduciary duty that resulted in Giga Watt's collapse. On Dec. 15, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order approving the employment of Potomac Law Group as special litigation counsel in the Adversary Proceeding. On Dec. 16, 2020, a class action lawsuit was filed in this Court. The class members consisted of individuals who had purchased WTT Tokens, including Appellant. PLG ultimately reached an agreement to settle both the Adversary Proceeding and the Class Action Suit, wherein Perkins agreed to pay $3 million to the bankruptcy estate and $4.5 million to the class members. On Oct. 4, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court approved the Settlement Agreement. On Feb. 2, 2024, this Court entered a preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement. The class members were allowed to object or opt-out, but none did, and this Court then entered final approval of the Settlement Agreement on May 23, 2024. On Oct. 2, 2024, Trustee Waldron filed three omnibus objections to 283 claims that had been made against the bankruptcy estate, arguing that the claims should be disallowed and expunged from the Bankruptcy Court's claims register because they had been released under the Settlement Agreement. On Jan. 30, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court granted Trustee Waldron's omnibus objections. The bankruptcy court may extend the deadline to file an appeal if the appellant" (1) files a motion to extend the deadline within 35 days of the order and (2) demonstrates excusable neglect. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(d). The Court finds the appeal is untimely under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 8002(a)(1). There is nothing in the record to indicate the bankruptcy court extended the deadlines. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Sm17Ay from PacerMonitor.com. HIGHMARK INC: W.D. Pennsylvania Narrows Claims in Zimmerman Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit titled CHANELLE ZIMMERMAN, BARBARA STEETLE, ROBERT WARUSZEWSKI, WENDY MARSHALL, ANGELA HOLLANDSWORTH, and KEVIN HARRISON individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. HIGHMARK, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:23-cv-00250-NR (W.D. Pa.). Judge Ranjan notes that these days, a single, inadvertent click on an email can spawn a multitude of class-action lawsuits. That's what happened here. In December 2022, a Highmark employee was sent an email with a link. That employee clicked on the link. Unbeknownst to that person, the email had been sent by a malicious actor, "phishing" for prey. The link opened a virtual door for the bad actor to obtain access to a treasure trove of Highmark customers' sensitive information. Names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, social security numbers, medical treatment information, and financial information--all compromised. Much of it very valuable. Some of it could be sold for profit on the so-called "dark web." Data breaches, especially in the health-care industry, are becoming very common, Judge Ranjan says. So too the class-action litigation that follows. After the Highmark data breach, the Plaintiffs here filed suit against Highmark. In the operative first amended complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that Highmark failed to safeguard the Plaintiffs' and class members' personally identifiable information ("PII") and protected health information ("PHI"), leading to a data breach that violated the Plaintiffs' and class members' privacy rights. The Plaintiffs seek damages for negligence (Count I), negligence per se (Count II), breach of fiduciary duty (Count III), breach of confidence (Count IV), breach of implied contract (Count V), and unjust enrichment (Count VI), and also seek a declaratory judgment that Highmark owed a duty to secure the class members' data and that Highmark breached that duty (Count VII). The Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief mandating that Highmark employ adequate security protocols. Highmark now moves the Court to dismiss the case. Highmark claims that the Plaintiffs do not have standing and that they have failed to state any viable claims. After consideration, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs do, in fact, have standing to bring their claims. Judge Ranjan says the main sticking point for standing in data-breach cases is the injury-in-fact requirement. Judge Ranjan finds the Plaintiffs here have sufficiently pled an injury in fact, by pleading an intentional breach, misuse of the data, and the sensitive nature of the data at issue. As to the merits of the claims, Judge Ranjan finds the Plaintiffs properly state claims for Counts I, V, VI, and VII; but Highmark is right that the Plaintiffs' claims for Counts II, III, and IV fail, at least as pled, as a matter of law. So the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. Judge Ranjan finds the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for negligence per se (Count II). Because the Court has found that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their negligence claim, the Court will grant Highmark's motion to dismiss Count II. This is without prejudice to the Plaintiffs to advance this theory of liability as part of Count I. The Plaintiffs fail to state a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim (Count III), Judge Ranjan holds. Here, the Plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite confidential relationship. The amended complaint alleges an insurer-insured relationship. That's not enough, Judge Ranjan points out. While the Court will dismiss this claim, it will do so without prejudice and with leave to amend, in the event the Plaintiffs can plead additional facts to support the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Judge Ranjan also finds that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for breach of confidence (Count IV). Here, the Plaintiffs have not alleged that Highmark affirmatively disclosed their information. Instead, the theory of the case is that Highmark failed to implement reasonable data security measures to protect their information and ultimately allowed nefarious third-party hackers to access their information. The Court will grant Highmark's motion to dismiss Count IV. Judge Ranjan further finds the Plaintiffs properly state a claim for breach of implied contract (Count V), for unjust enrichment (Count VI), and for declaratory judgment (Count VII). The Court, therefore, denies Highmark's motion to dismiss these claims. Therefore, after careful consideration, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxmbvsdk from PacerMonitor.com. HOMELAND SECURITY: Appeals Stay Order in CHNV Parole Program Case ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Department of Homeland Security is taking an appeal before the First Circuit Court of Appeals from the district court decisions: 1. staying the DHS's Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans; and 2. granting a class consisting of: "All individuals who have received a grant of parole that is subject to the Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025), rescinding individual grants of parole on a categorical and en masse basis, except: (1) those individuals who voluntarily left, and remain outside, the United States prior to the issuance of that Notice; and (2) those individuals who choose to opt out of the class in order to seek relief in separate litigation." In the case, Doe et al v. Noem et al., Case No. 1:25-cv-10495 (D. Mass.), Judge Indira Talwani of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted emergency relief in favor of the plaintiffs led by Svitlana Doe, et al., staying the Department of Homeland Security's en masse termination of parole processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, pending further court order insofar as it revokes, without case-by-case review, the previously granted parole and work authorization issued to noncitizens paroled into the United States pursuant to parole programs for noncitizens from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela prior to the noncitizen's originally stated parole end date. The district court held that all individualized notices sent to noncitizens from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela via their USCIS online account notifying them that their parole is being revoked without case-by-case review pursuant to the Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 Fed. Reg. 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025), are also stayed pending further court order. The lawsuit names as defendants Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Pete R. Flores, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Kika Scott, in her official capacity as Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; and Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States as defendants.. On October 19, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security announced an effort to address the increasing number of Venezuelan nationals arriving at the southern border of the United States by "coupling a meaningful incentive to seek a lawful, safe and orderly means of traveling to the United States with the imposition of consequences for those who seek to enter irregularly." Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 Fed. Reg. 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022). Under the program, individuals who passed a national security and public safety vetting and who had a supporter in the United States who agreed to provide housing and other support could receive an advanced authorization to travel to the United States for the purposes of seeking, on a case-by-case basis, a discretionary grant of parole at an internal port of entry. The program specified that discretionary grants of parole would be for a temporary period of up to two years, during which time individuals could seek humanitarian relief or other benefits and receive work authorization. The program specified further that those who are not granted asylum or other immigration benefits would need to leave the United States at the expiration of their authorized period of parole or would generally be placed in removal proceedings after the period of parole expires. The process was capped at 24,000 beneficiaries. Individuals who had been ordered removed from the United States in the past five years, or who crossed into the United States between ports of entry or entered Mexico or Panama without authorization after October 19, 2022, were barred from the program. On January 20, 2025, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Benjamin C. Huffman issued a memorandum stating that "it is evident that many current DHS policies and practices governing parole are inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(d)(5)." The Huffman memorandum ordered that within 60 days, the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) were to compile and review all policies pertaining to parole to determine "which are not strictly in accord with" 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(d)(5), and to thereafter formulate a plan for phasing out any such policies. It further ordered that pending such review, DHS Components would have discretion to pause, modify, or terminate any parole program described above to the extent that: (1) the policy was not promulgated pursuant to the procedural requirements of the APA; (2) DHS could take such action while protecting legitimate reliance interests; and (3) taking such action was otherwise consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, and court orders. On February 14, 2025, Andrew Davidson, the Acting Deputy Director of USCIS, issued a memorandum authorizing an immediate agency-wide administrative hold on all pending status readjustment and benefit requests filed by individuals paroled into the United States under the CHNV programs, pending the completion of additional vetting flags in ELIS to identify any fraud, public safety, or national security concerns. On March 25, 2025, DHS published a Federal Register Notice (FRN) announcing that, effective immediately, DHS "is terminating the categorical parole programs for inadmissible aliens from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela." The FRN announced further that the temporary parole period of aliens in the United States under the CHNV parole programs and whose parole has not already expired by April 24, 2025, will terminate on that date unless the Secretary makes an individual determination to the contrary. It directed further that parolees without a lawful basis to remain in the United States following this termination of the CHNV parole programs must depart the United States before their parole termination date. Defendants argue that the decision whether to terminate parole is within the Secretary’s discretion under 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(d)(5)(A) and is therefore precluded from review by Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The plaintiffs challenged the federal government’s abrupt termination of parole and work authorization for noncitizens from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (the CHNV parole programs). The court evaluated the balance of equities and public interest, which merge when the Government is a party, and found these factors favored the plaintiffs. The court emphasized that the relief granted would not admit anyone currently outside the United States, nor would it extend existing parole, but would instead require the government to consider individual reliance interests before terminating parole on a case-by-case basis. Defendants argued that the Federal Register Notice’s broad termination of CHNV parole should be treated the same as individual parole revocations for purposes of the jurisdiction-stripping provision in 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of certain discretionary immigration decisions. However, the district court found that distinction to be significant. While Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) limits review of individualized discretionary decisions made under statutory authority, the FRN involves a categorical termination of parole programs -- a broader agency action not shielded by the same statutory discretion. The court noted that immigration statutes are generally presumed to be reviewable unless Congress clearly states otherwise, and that this presumption can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent. In this case, because the CHNV parole programs were discretionary programs created by agency guidance rather than by statute, Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar judicial review of their termination. The district court rejected the government's argument that the relief would undermine immigration enforcement, noting that summary termination of parole without individualized review harms law-abiding parolees and destabilizes communities. The court further concluded that forcing compliance without process is not in the public interest and undermines the rule of law. The court declined to require the plaintiffs to post a bond, citing the lack of monetary harm to the government and the burden such a requirement would place on individuals seeking to protect their rights. The court also denied the government's request for a stay pending appeal, finding no likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the court granted emergency relief, staying the challenged termination. HOMELAND SECURITY: Court Halts Third-Country Removal Practices -------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Brian E. Murphy of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and granted in part the motion for a preliminary injunction in the case captioned as D.V.D., et al., v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al., Case No. 25-10676-BEM (D. Mass.). Before the Court now are Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, through which Plaintiffs seek: (1) to prevent Defendants from removing certain of the named Plaintiffs to a "third" country without notice and an opportunity to assert fear of persecution or torture; (2) to prevent Defendants from removing any class member to a "third" country without notice and an opportunity to assert fear of torture; and (3) an order directing Defendants to facilitate the immediate return of O.C.G., one of the plaintiffs, to the United States. According to Judge Murphy, the case presents a simple question: "before the United States forcibly sends someone to a country other than their country of origin, must that person be told where they are going and be given a chance to tell the United States that they might be killed if sent there?" Defendants argue that the United States may send a deportable alien to a country not of their origin, not where an immigration judge has ordered, where they may be immediately tortured and killed, without providing that person any opportunity to tell the deporting authorities that they face grave danger or death because of such a deportation. "All nine sitting justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Assistant Solicitor General of the United States, Congress, common sense, basic decency, and this Court all disagree," according to Judge Murphy. When the Government wants to remove an individual, the normal path is through removal proceedings, requiring an evidentiary hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ). Removal proceedings determine not only whether an individual may be removed from the United States but also to where he may be removed. Meanwhile, the alien is also entitled to seek various protections, including asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protections. Alternatively, DHS may reinstate a prior order of removal for an alien it finds has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal. While in both processes aliens are barred from pursuing nearly all avenues of relief from removal, aliens may still seek protection through withholding of removal and CAT. Because the removal proceedings happen on one track, while withholding and CAT proceedings happen on another track, a situation may arise where the Government has an order of removal but no country that an IJ has authorized for that removal. In certain circumstances, where the Government may not remove an alien to any country covered by that alien's order of removal, the Government may still remove the alien to any country whose government will accept the alien into that country. These are called third-country removals. On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 14165, entitled "Securing our Borders." On or about February 18, 2025, DHS issued a directive to the Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The February Directive instructs ERO officers to review the cases of aliens granted withholding of removal or protection under CAT to determine the viability of removal to a third country and accordingly whether the alien should be re-detained. Plaintiffs are individuals subject to final orders of removal, allegedly at imminent risk of deportation to countries other than those authorized by their respective orders. Plaintiffs challenge Defendants' policy or practice of failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to removal to a country that was not designated in their removal orders, which Plaintiffs allege violates the INA, FARRA, regulations implementing the two statutes, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. According to the Court, several subsections of 8 U.S.C. section 1252 limit judicial review of claims and questions that relate to removal proceedings or existing orders of removal. Defendants argue that sections 1252(a), (b), and (g) strip this Court of jurisdiction. The Court concludes that neither section 1252(a) nor section 1252(b) bars this Court's jurisdiction. The Court also finds that section 1252(g) does not bar review of the lawfulness of a removal-related action because such claims are collateral to the discretionary decisions immunized by section 1252(g). Plaintiffs seek to certify a class defined as: "All individuals who have a final removal order issued in proceedings under Section 240, 241(a)(5), or 238(b) of the INA (including withholding-only proceedings) whom DHS has deported or will deport on or after February 18, 2025, to a country (a) not previously designated as the country or alternative country of removal, and (b) not identified in writing in the prior proceedings as a country to which the individual would be removed." The Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) and grants the motion for class certification. According to the Court, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. In this case, the Court continues, Plaintiffs have established that they are likely to succeed in showing that Defendants have a policy or practice of executing third-country removals without providing notice and a meaningful opportunity to present fear-based claims, and that such policy or practice constitutes a deprivation of procedural due process. The Court rejects Defendants' argument that aliens have already received, during their initial removal proceedings, all the process to which they are entitled, so as to justify providing no additional process prior to third-country removal. The Court finds it likely that Defendants have applied and will continue to apply the alleged policy of removing aliens to third countries without notice and an opportunity to be heard on fear-based claims -- in other words, without due process. The irreparable harm factor likewise weighs in Plaintiffs' favor. Here, the threatened harm is clear and simple: persecution, torture, and death. It is hard to imagine harm more irreparable, the Court adds. The Court considers the balance of the equities and the public interest. In cases implicating removal, there is a public interest in preventing aliens from being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm. However, there is also a public interest in prompt execution of removal orders. The Court finds that these circumstances countervail the public's normal and meaningful interest in prompt execution. The Court circumscribes its remedy and orders that, prior to removing any alien to a third country, Defendants must: (1) provide written notice to the alien -- and the alien's immigration counsel, if any -- of the third country to which the alien may be removed, in a language the alien can understand; (2) provide meaningful opportunity for the alien to raise a fear of return for eligibility for CAT protections; (3) move to reopen the proceedings if the alien demonstrates reasonable fear; and (4) if the alien is not found to have demonstrated reasonable fear, provide meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of 15 days, for that alien to seek to move to reopen immigration proceedings to challenge the potential third-country removal. With respect to the return of Plaintiff O.C.G., the Court will not order his return at this time but allows Plaintiffs to renew their motion after discovery. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=LmArzd HONDA DEVELOPMENT: Albert Seeks More Time to File Class Response ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL ALBERT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. HONDA DEVELOPMENT & MANUFACTURING OF AMERICA, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-00694-EAS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order extending their response deadline for their reply in support of the Plaintiff's motion for class certification, appointment of class counsel and class representative, and issuance of notice to Ohio Class Members, filed on March 19, 2025. The Plaintiff's reply is due May 7, 2025. However, the Plaintiff's counsel are facing a press of other matters, including meet and conferrals and discovery in this case, the issues set forth in the Defendants' response to the Plaintiff's motion are substantive and require a thorough response, and the Defendants' counsel was previously accorded a courtesy by the Plaintiffs to extend the Defendants' time to file their response. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request until May 21, 2025, to file the reply brief. The purpose of this Motion for Extension is not for delay. By email, the Defendant's counsel has courteously agreed not to oppose this motion for extension. Honda manufactures motor vehicles and parts. A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated May 5, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=oEt8OS at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph F. Scott, Esq. Ryan A. Winters, Esq. Kevin M. McDermott II, Esq. SCOTT & WINTERS LAW FIRM, LLC 11925 Pearl Rd., Suite 308 Strongsville, OH 44136 Telephone: (216) 912-2221 Facsimile: (440) 846-1625 E-mail: jscott@ohiowagelayers.com rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com - and - Seth R. Lesser, Esq. Christopher M. Timmel, Esq. KLAFTER LESSER LLP Two International Drive, Suite 350 Rye Brook, NY 10573 Telephone: (914) 934-9200 E-mail: seth@klafterlesser.com christopher.timmel@klafterlesser.com - and - Matthew S. Parmet, Esq. PARMET PC 2 Greenway Plaza, Ste. 250 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: (713) 999-5200 E-mail: matt@parmet.law - and - C. Ryan Morgan, Esq. Angeli Murthy, Esq. MORGAN & MORGAN,P.A. 20 N. Orange Ave., Suite 1600 Orlando, FL 32801 Telephone: (407) 418-2069 E-mail: rmorgan@forthepeople.com amurthy@forthepeople.com HP HOOD: Court Issues Scheduling Order in Rubio Class Action ------------------------------------------------------------ Magistrate Judge Allison Claire of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a scheduling order in the putative class action captioned as BENJAMIN RUBIO, Plaintiff, v. HP HOOD, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:24-cv-03621-AC (E.D. Cal.). CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION The parties agree that prior to setting a full discovery schedule and pretrial deadlines, the matter of class certification should be determined. The parties have proposed a briefing schedule which the Court substantively adopts as follows: 1. Plaintiff's motion for Class Certification and plaintiff's Designation of Class Certification Expert(s), Production of Expert Report(s), and Production of Supporting Declarations, shall be filed by Jan. 22, 2026; 2. Defendant's Opposition to the Motion for Class Certification shall be filed by March 23, 2026; 3. Plaintiff's Reply to the Motion for Class Certification shall be filed by May 22, 2026; 4. The Motion for Class Certification shall be heard on June 10, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 26 before Magistrate Judge Allison Claire. DISCOVERY Initial disclosures shall be exchanged by May 12, 2025. Other deadlines will be set as necessary, following a determination on class certification. EXPERT DISCLOSURE Expert deadlines will be set as necessary, following a determination on class certification. The parties shall comply with the information disclosure provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) for any expert, who is in whole or in part designated as a Rule 26 expert. FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE A final pretrial conference will be set as necessary, following a determination on class certification. TRIAL SETTING A trial date will be set as necessary, following a determination on class certification. SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE The parties do not request a settlement conference at this time. The parties may request a settlement conference at any time. The Court summarizes the scheduling order as follows: 1. Initial disclosures shall be exchanged by May 12, 2025; 2. Plaintiff's motion for Class Certification shall be filed by Jan. 22, 2026; 3. Plaintiff's Designation of Class Certification Expert(s), Production of Expert Report(s), and Production of Supporting Declarations shall be filed by Jan. 22, 2026; 4. Defendant's Opposition to the Motion for Class Certification shall be filed by March 23, 2026; A copy of the Court's Order is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ny4ABp from PacerMonitor.com. IN RE CALIFORNIA: Court Grants Service Awards in Antitrust Lawsuit ------------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the plaintiffs' renewed motion for service awards in the case In Re California Gasoline Spot Market Antitrust Litigation. On March 14, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the class action settlement and granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards for the representative Plaintiffs. The Court denied Plaintiffs' request for service awards because Plaintiffs failed to justify the requested awards with any evidence demonstrating the quantity or quality of the Settlement Class Representatives' service. Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for leave to file a renewed motion for service awards and renewed motion for service awards is now pending before the Court. Plaintiffs seek incentive awards of $5,000 each for the three Settlement Class Representatives: Fricke-Parks Press, Inc., Bogard Construction, Inc., and Ritual Coffee Roasters, Inc. Plaintiffs contend the awards are warranted because they: (1) assumed reputational and financial risk by publicly associating their businesses with litigation challenging major players in the California gasoline market; and (2) spent dozens of hours over nearly five years responding to discovery, sitting for depositions, and coordinating with counsel through class certification and ultimately a successful mediation. The Court is satisfied the Settlement Class Representatives' individual contributions to this case warrant an incentive award. Further, the requested $5,000 incentive award is reasonable and does not undermine the adequacy of the class representatives. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion and awards the three Settlement Class Representatives Fricke-Parks Press, Inc., Bogard Construction, Inc., and Ritual Coffee Roasters, $5,000 each. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=lbmcBT from PacerMonitor.com. INTERCON CONSTRUCTION: Schult Data Breach Suit Remanded to State Co ------------------------------------------------------------------- Judge James D. Peterson of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin remanded the case captioned as TODD SCHULT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. INTERCON CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant, Case No. 25-cv-00262-jdp (W.D. Wis.) to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This is a proposed class action under state law for harm caused by a data breach. Plaintiff Todd Schult filed the lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Richland County, Wisconsin, but defendant Intercon Construction, Inc. removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(d). One of the requirements of Sec. 1332(d) is that at least one potential class member must be a citizen of a different state from the defendant. This is called minimal diversity. In its notice of removal, Interncon admitted that it and Schult are both Wisconsin citizens. But Intercon stated that it met the minimal diversity requirement because the Plaintiff seeks to represent a national class. That was insufficient under circuit precedent, which holds that the proponent of jurisdiction must identify a specific, diverse class member. In its amended notice of removal, Intercon attempts to show minimal diversity. The District Court finds none of the information that Intercon included with its amended notice of removal adequately pleads minimal diversity. In this case, Intercon alleges that some class members are "residents" of other states. But Intercon neither provides evidence nor even alleges that any class member is a citizen of a state other than Wisconsin. So Intercon's amended notice of removal still fails to show that the District Court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Intercon's own records suggest that more than 2,600 of fewer than 7,000 potential class members live in Wisconsin. If Intercon is correct in its assumption that the class members are citizens of the same states as their mailing addresses, it would mean that more than one-third of the class is a citizen of Wisconsin. Under Sec. 1332(d)(3), the District Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction when more than a one-third of a class is a citizen of the same state and other factors favor sending the case back to state court. According to the District Court, in this case, many of the factors do not favor retaining jurisdiction. For example, Intercon is a Wisconsin citizen, twice as many class members live in Wisconsin than any other state according to Intercon's records, and Intercon has not identified any other class actions that are raising the same claims. So it seems likely that Sec. 1332(d)(3) is applicable and remand would be inevitable after discovery, the District Court concludes. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=H6FBOR from PacerMonitor.com. INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL: Court Tosses Pena, et al. Class Action Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ The Honorable Judge Anne Hwang of the United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted in the third amended complaint in the class action lawsuit captioned as EDWARD PENA and BRANDON MILLER, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL DEVICES, INC., MENOVA INTERNATIONAL, INC., GESIVA MEDICAL, LLC, JAMES J. ELIST, M.D., a Medical Corporation, and DR. JAMES ELIST, Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03391-AH-RAO (C.D. Cal.) as to the individual claims of plaintiffs and without cost. The claims of the putative class members are dismissed without prejudice. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=53AVYK from PacerMonitor.com. Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Michael A. Caddell, Esq. CADDELL & CHAPMAN 628 East 9th Street Houston, TX 77007 Phone: (713) 751-0400 Counsel for the Defendants: Jennifer M. Stevenson, Esq. Amir M. Nassihi, Esq. Michael L. Mallow, Esq. Jennifer M. Stevenson, Esq. SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLC 2555 Grand Blvd. Kansas City, MO 64108 Phone: (816) 474-6550 E-mail: jstevenson@shb.com anassihi@shb.com mmallow@shb.com JOURNAL SENTINEL: Wage Deduction Claim Class Certification Affirmed ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the appeal styled as MICHAEL STEHBERGER, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT-CROSS-APPELLANT, V. JOURNAL SENTINEL, INC. AND GANNETT PUBLISHING SERVICES, LLC, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS, Appeal No. 2023AP1712 (Wis. Ct. App.), Judges Maxine A. White, M. Joseph Donald and Pedro A. Colon of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's order granting class certification on the wage deduction claim and denying class certification on the unlawful penalty claim. In June 2019, Stehberger filed a class action suit against the Journal. The complaint alleged that the Journal was making unlawful wage deductions for service error complaints from the carriers' wages and had breached the Agreements. In October 2020, Stehberger filed an amended complaint, which added an allegation that the Agreements included an unlawful penalty provision. In November 2020, Stehberger filed a motion for class certification of the unlawful wage deduction claim and the unlawful penalty claim. The Journal opposed class certification. Following briefing and a hearing, the circuit court issued a written order that granted class certification for Stehberger's first claim and denied class certification for his second claim. The Journal appealed the grant of class certification on the first claim. Stehberger cross-appealed the denial of class certification on the second claim. The circuit court issued a twenty-two page decision, which granted certification on the first claim and denied certification on the second claim. The Journal now appeals, and Stehberger cross-appeals. In granting class certification on the first claim, the circuit court observed that Stehberger described the class as individuals that: for a time period starting six years before the start of this lawsuit was filed for the 17 class members who did not release their claims by participating in a litigation settlement between Randal Broughton and the Journal Sentinel Inc; and starting Sept. 18, 2018 for remaining class members who released their earlier claims were both signatory to contracts with the Journal to deliver publications, and suffered deductions to compensation because of service error complaints for days when they delivered publications. The circuit court found that the proposed class was sufficiently numerous, Stehberger and the proposed class had two common questions of fact and law, Stehberger is typical of the class, Stehberger and his counsel are an adequate representation of the proposed class, the common questions of fact and law predominate over individual issues, and a class action is superior to other means of adjudication. In challenging the circuit court's grant of certification, the Journal contends that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard. The Journal also contends the common evidence does not support that the carriers were employees as opposed to independent contractors. In addition, the Journal contends that Stehberger did not establish common evidence that the deductions for service error complaints were made in a manner that did not comport with WIS. STAT. Sec. 103.455 The Appellate Judges explain that even if they were to assume that individual determinations were necessary regarding whether each carrier authorized a deduction in writing, this still leaves the question of whether making a Journal manager the decisionmaker, rather than DWD, violated WIS. STAT. Sec. 103.455. The Journal does not make any argument that the answer to this question will be different for each class member. Therefore, they are not persuaded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion or failed to conduct a 'rigorous analysis' of the evidence with respect to Stehberger's first claim. With respect to the second claim, the circuit court observed that Stehberger described the class as individuals that for a time period starting six years before the start of this lawsuit was filed for the 17 class members who did not release their claims by participating in a litigation settlement between Randal Broughton and the Journal Sentinel Inc; and starting Sept. 18, 2018 for remaining class members who released their earlier claims were both signatory to contracts with Defendants to deliver publications and suffered $2 deductions to compensation because of service error complaints. The circuit court, however, found that commonality was not satisfied on Stehberger's other proposed question, which asked the court to uniformly determine the maximum permissible ratio between the current $2 charge and the actual cost related to redelivery or credit before the $2 charge becomes an unenforceable penalty. In addition, the court found that Stehberger's proposed common questions did not predominate over individual issues. Stehberger contends that the circuit court erred when determining that the predominance standard was not satisfied. The Appellate Judges disagree with Stehberger and conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in finding that individual issues predominate on Stehberger's second claim. According to them, assessing the reasonableness of the liquidated damages clause cannot be ascertained on a class-wide basis. Determining whether a liquidated damages clause is an unlawful penalty is a highly individualized inquiry and not suited to class-wide treatment. Accordingly, the Appellate Judges are not persuaded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying class certification on Stehberger's second claim. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=6I0eoi JR CAPITAL: Newell's Time to Oppose Dismissal Extended to May 19 ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the lawsuit titled JOUREY NEWELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JR CAPITAL, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:25-cv-01419-GAM (E.D. Pa.), Judge Gerald Austin McHugh of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania extends the Plaintiff's deadline to oppose to the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Before the Court is the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to oppose Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint. Plaintiff Jourey Newell is an individual residing in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Defendant JR Capital, LLC, is an Arizona-based company that sells various sorts of equipment, like trucks, vans, and trailers throughout Pennsylvania and across the United States. The Plaintiff brings this action to enforce the consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") alleging that JR Capital violated the TCPA by making telemarketing calls to the Plaintiff and other putative class members listed on the National Do Not Call Registry without their written consent, by making telemarketing calls without the accurate provision of Caller ID Name (CNAM), as well as calling people, who had previously asked to no longer receive calls. The Court grants the Plaintiff's motion. The Plaintiff will have until May 19, 2025, in order to oppose the Defendant's Motion. A full-text copy of the Court's Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mr3yvpyv from PacerMonitor.com. KELSIER: June 23 Lead Plaintiff Deadline Set in Securities Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Jennifer L. Rochon of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered members of the purported class in the case captioned as JONATHAN CLARKE and RODRIGO FERREIRA DA CRUZ VOGT, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, -against- BENJAMIN CHOW, METEORA, HAYDENDAVIS, GIDEON DAVIS, CHARLES THOMAS DAVIS, and KELSIER LABS, LLC d/b/a KELSIER VENTURES, Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-03268-JLR (S.D.N.Y.) to file a motion for appointment of lead plaintiff no later than June 23, 2025. On April 19, 2025, Plaintiffs initiated a putative class action on behalf of all investors that purchased $M3M3 Tokens between Dec. 4, 2024, and April 19, 2025. The Complaint, filed on April 21, 2025, alleges violations of Sections 5, 12(a)(1), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Opposition to any motion for appointment of lead plaintiff must be served and filed by July 7, 2025. A conference will be held on July 17, 2025, at 12:00 p.m. in Courtroom 20B of the United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007 to consider any motions for appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel and for consolidation. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=bmO6Lx from PacerMonitor.com. KNIGHT-SWIFT: Court Tosses Sievert, et al. ERISA Lawsuit -------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Steven P. Logan of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the case captioned as Jason Sievert, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Knight-Swift Transportation Holdings, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 24-cv-02443 (D. Ariz.). The case s dismissed with prejudice. This action is brought by Plaintiffs Jason Sievert, Tracy Petway, and Vivian Bernard against KnightSwift for breach of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 et seq. All three Plaintiffs are current or former participants in Defendant's defined contribution retirement plan. They allege that Defendant's decisions regarding the Plan's forfeited assets constituted a breach of the fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty, a prohibited transaction, were contrary to ERISA's anti-inurement provision, and demonstrate that Defendant failed to monitor Plan fiduciaries. In this case, Defendant is the sponsor and named fiduciary of the Plan and is therefore responsible for all settlor functions, including the design and drafting of the Plan, determining contribution rates, who receives benefits, and the amount of those benefits. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Knight-Swift was obligated to use forfeited Plan assets to pay administrative Plan expenses. Defendant contends that it was not ever obligated to do so. Defendant cites the language of the Plan itself, which grants it broad discretion to choose whether to use forfeitures to offset employer contributions or to pay Plan expenses. Plaintiff s argue that although Defendant had discretion to choose whether to use forfeitures to pay Plan expenses or offset employer contributions, once Defendant decided and -- under penalty of perjury by filing the Form 5500 -- represented to participants that forfeitures would be used to pay Plan expenses, it violated ERISA by ultimately using those forfeitures for a different purpose. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert five causes of action against Defendant: (1) breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(A); (2) breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B); (3) breach of ERISA's anti-inurement provision, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1103(c)(1); (4) an ERISA prohibited transaction in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(a)(1); and (5) failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1102(a) and 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1002(16)(A)(i). According to the Court, Plaintiffs simply have not shown that the Form 5500s created any binding legal obligation for Knight-Swift to use forfeitures to pay administrative expenses. As Defendant points out, the Form 5500 reports appear to contain contradicting, or at the very least ambiguous, terms regarding the use of forfeited assets. The Court finds that a plan sponsor's decision to allocate forfeitures toward reducing its own employer contributions, without more, is not sufficient to state a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty or prudence under ERISA. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=FJ2aLa from PacerMonitor.com. KRISTI NOEM: Class Certification Granted in Border Patrol Lawsuit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the plaintiffs' motion for provisional class certification and motion for a preliminary injunction in the case captioned as UNITED FARM WORKERS, OSCAR MORALES CISNEROS, WILDER MUNGUIA ESQUIVEL, YOLANDA AGUILERA MARTINEZ, JUAN VARGAS MENDEZ, and MARIA GUADALUPE HERNANDEZ ESPINOSA, Plaintiffs, v. KRISTI NOEM, as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; PETE R. FLORES, as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Border Patrol; MICHAEL W. BANKS, as Chief of U.S. Border Patrol; and GREGORY K. BOVINO, as Chief Patrol Agent for El Centro Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol, Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-00246-JLT-CDB (E.D. Cal.). United Farm Workers, Oscar Morales Cisneros, Wilder Munguia Esquivel, Yolanda Aguilera Martinez, Juan Vargas Mendez, and Maria Guadalupe Hernandez filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief related to detentive stops and arrests by Border Patrol. Plaintiffs state claims against the defendants -- including Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Pete R. Flores, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Border Patrol; Michael W. Banks, in his official capacity as Chief of U.S. Border Patrol; and Gregory Bovino, in his official capacity as Chief Patrol Agent for the El Centro Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol -- for violations of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357(a)(2), 8 C.F.R. Sec. 287.8(c)(2)(ii), the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. Oscar Morales Cisneros, Wilder Munguia Esquivel, and Yolanda Aguilera Martinez seek provisional class certification. Plaintiffs also seek a preliminary injunction, preliminarily enjoining Defendants from continuing their practices of: (1) detentive stops without regard to reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is in the country unlawfully, and (2) warrantless arrests without regard to probable cause that the person arrested is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. Defendants oppose both motions. Motion for Provisional Class Certification Plaintiffs seek provisional certification of two classes to challenge the actions of Border Patrol as a discriminatory and unlawful campaign against people of color in Kern County. Plaintiffs defined the provisional classes as: 1. Suspicionless Stop Class: All persons who, since Jan. 6, 2025, have been or will be subjected to a detentive stop by Border Patrol in this district pursuant to a practice of conducting stops without warrants and without an individualized assessment of reasonable suspicion whether the person (1) is engaged in an offense against the United States or (2) is a noncitizen unlawfully in the United States. 2. Warrantless Arrest Class: All persons whom Border Patrol, since Jan. 6, 2025, has arrested or will arrest without a warrant in this district. Defendants contend these two class definitions are fatally flawed. According to Defendants, the proposed classes cannot be certified because they are impermissibly defined as fail-safe classes and the Warrantless Arrest Class is impermissibly overbroad. Plaintiffs dispute these assertions but propose modifying the Warrantless Arrest Class if the Court agrees the original definition is overbroad. The Court finds the two proposed Suspicionless Stop and Warrantless Arrest Classes are not fail-safe classes. The Court also finds it is necessary to modify the definitions, both for clarity and to ensure the scope of the classes are sufficiently narrowed to the theories of liability raised in the complaint. For purposes of the pending motion for provisional class certification, the Court considers the following definitions: Suspicionless Stop Class: All persons since January 6, 2025, who have been or will be subjected to a detentive stop by Border Patrol in this district without a pre-stop, individualized assessment of reasonable suspicion whether the person (1) is engaged in an offense against the United States or (2) is a noncitizen unlawfully in the United States. Warrantless Arrest Class: All persons since January 6, 2025, who have been arrested or will be arrested in this district by Border Patrol without a warrant and without a pre-arrest, individualized assessment of probable cause that the person poses a flight risk. These modified definitions do not create fail-safe classes, because Plaintiffs retain the burden to prove that Border Patrol had (1) a pattern or practice of performing detentive stops without warrants and without reasonable suspicion assessments, and (2) a pattern or practice of placing individuals under arrest without a warrant, without first performing a flight risk assessment to find probable cause. Plaintiffs contend the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) are satisfied for the provisional Suspicionless Stop and Warrantless Arrest Classes. Defendants argue the Court should deny certification because the Proposed Classes are not sufficiently numerous, encompass dissimilarly situated individuals whose claims are not common, whose injuries are not typical, and who differ in their ability to challenge their claims through the administrative process. The Court finds Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that joinder of all members is impracticable, and both the Suspicionless Stop and Warrantless Arrest Classes satisfy the numerosity requirement. Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that putative class members "suffered the same injury" imposed by Border Patrol, which engaged in a practice of performing detentive stops without individualized assessments of reasonable suspicion during "Operation Return to Sender." The Court finds Plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality requirement for the Suspicionless Stop Class. Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing that the class members suffered "the same injury" from the alleged Border Patrol practice. Whether this practice was unlawful or violated the class members' rights may be answered at one time. Therefore, the commonality requirement is satisfied for the Warrantless Arrest Class, the Court concludes. The evidence shows the proposed class representatives were subjected to the same practices of Border Patrol as the putative class members and suffered the same injuries: detentive stops without reasonable suspicion and arrests without the agents performing individual assessments of flight risk to find probable cause to find they were likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained. Because the class representatives were subject to the same practices, their claims are typical of the putative class members. Therefore, Plaintiffs have met their burden of satisfying the typicality requirement for both the Suspicionless Stop and Warrantless Arrest Classes. There is no evidence that Morales Cisneros, Munguia Esquivel, or Aguilera Martinez have any conflict of interests with the two proposed classes. To the contrary, their interests are aligned with those of putative class members: to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief. Morales Cisneros, Munguia Esquivel, and Aguilera Martinez all attest to their understanding that as class representatives, they "represent the interests of everyone in the class," not only themselves. Plaintiffs carry the burden to show the proposed class representatives satisfy the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs have met the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Suspicionless Stop and Warrantless Arrest Classes satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, class certification is appropriate, and the motion for provisional class certification is granted. Morales Cisneros, Munguia Esquivel and Aguilera Martinez are appointed as class representatives for both the Suspicionless Stop and Warrantless Arrest Classes. Bree Bernwanger, Michelle (Minju) Y. Cho, Lauren Davis, and Shilpi Agarwal, Mayra Joachin, Eva Bitran, and Oliver Ma, Brisa Velazquez Oatis, Ajay S. Krishnan, Franco Muzzio, Zainab O. Ramahi, and Julia L. Greenberg are appointed as Class Counsel for the provisional classes. The Court finds the identified attorneys satisfy the adequacy requirement. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 231, seeking an order to ensure that Border Patrol agents comply with the Fourth Amendment and their statutory obligations when performing operations within the Eastern District. The evidence of the practices employed by Border Patrol agents during "Operation Return to Sender"— -- including detentive stops on foot patrols and vehicular stops without reasonable suspicion -- the plans of Border Patrol to perform additional, similar operations in this District and the seeming position of the government that Border patrol agents are not currently trained on their obligations under the Fourth Amendment, demonstrates imminent, irreparable harm to the Suspicionless Stop Class. Plaintiffs have also shown imminent, irreparable harm to the Warrantless Arrest Class. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is granted as follows: a. Border Patrol is enjoined from conducting detentive stops in this District unless, pre-stop, the detaining agent has reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is a noncitizen who is present within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law, as required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. b. Border Patrol is enjoined from effecting warrantless arrests in this District unless, pre-arrest, the arresting agent has probable cause to believe that the noncitizen being arrested is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained, as required by 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357(a)(2). c. Any Border Patrol agent who conducts a detentive stop in this District shall, as soon as practicable, document the facts and circumstances surrounding the stop in a narrative form. This documentation shall include the specific, particularized facts that supported the agent's reasonable suspicion, which was formed in advance of the stop, that: (i) for vehicle stops, the vehicle contained a noncitizen present within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law; and (ii) for stops on foot, the person stopped was a noncitizen within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law. The documentation shall include the date and time that the agent completed the detentive stop and the date and time the agent completed the documentation. d. Any Border Patrol agent who conducts a warrantless arrest in this District shall comply with all requirements set forth in DHS's "Broadcast Statement of Policy" on compliance with 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357(a)(2), including but not limited to the requirement that as soon as practicable after an arrest, agents shall document in writing "the facts and circumstances surrounding the warrantless arrest" and the "specific, particularized facts supporting the conclusion that the individual was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained." Within 60 days and every 60 days thereafter until this litigation is terminated or the Court rules otherwise, Border Patrol shall release to Plaintiffs' counsel the documentation describing Border Patrol's detentive stops and warrantless arrests within this District, or if requested by Plaintiffs' counsel concerning specific individual detentive stops or warrantless arrests, no later than seven days after the request. e. Within 60 days of this order, Defendants shall serve to Plaintiffs' counsel a directive setting forth the guidance given to Border Patrol agents concerning how they should determine whether "reasonable suspicion" exists when conducting detentive stops, including vehicle stops, in this District. This guidance shall include, among other things, that refusal to answer questions does not, without more, constitute a basis for reasonable suspicion to justify a detentive stop. f. Within 90 days of this order and every 30 days thereafter until all agents associated with the El Centro Sector and those who are charged with making detentive stops and warrantless arrests in this District have been trained, Defendants shall serve to Plaintiffs' counsel documentation showing that they have trained the Border Patrol agents who have performed, or will perform, operations in this District on the requirements articulated above. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=igCZZq from PacerMonitor.com. LAUNDRESS LLC: Court Tosses Murphy's Claims in Ostenfeld Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Jesse M. Furman of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff Margaret Murphy's remaining claims for failure to prosecute in the class action lawsuit captioned as Ostenfeld et al. v. The Laundress, LLC, Case No. 22-cv-10667-JMF (S.D.N.Y.) On March 20, 2025, the Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Murphy's class claims and ordered Murphy to submit a letter to the Court, no later than April 18, 2025, if she intends to pursue her individual claims. To date, no letter has been filed. In light of Murphy's lack of intent to proceed with her individual claims, dismissal of those claims is warranted. However, the Court finds that dismissal without prejudice is more appropriate than dismissal with prejudice. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=4Nm9Ax from PacerMonitor.com. MANHATTAN COLLEGE: 2nd Cir. Reserves Decision on Beck Suit Appeal ----------------------------------------------------------------- Judges Richard J. Sullivan, Alison J. Nathan and Maria Araujo Kahn of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reserve decision on the appeal styled CZIGANY BECK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANHATTAN COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee, No. 23-1049 (2nd Cir.). On April 23, 2020, Beck brought this putative class action suit alleging that Manhattan College breached its implied contract with her or, in the alternative, was unjustly enriched when it refused to refund a portion of her tuition and fees after the College shut down its campus and transitioned to remote learning. In a May 7, 2021 order, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Manhattan College's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Beck's primary claims for breach of implied contract as to her payment of tuition and fees. With respect to tuition, the district court concluded that the statements and representations Beck identified in her complaint were not specific enough to constitute a promise for in-person classes or access to specific on-campus facilities or services. Having found that a valid, enforceable contract provision governed Beck's claim for a refund of her fees, the district court further concluded that Beck was barred from proceeding on an unjust enrichment theory as to fees. But the district court found that no contract term governed Beck's unjust enrichment claim for tuition and thus denied that part of Manhattan College's motion for judgment on the pleadings. After discovery, Manhattan College moved for summary judgment on Beck's remaining unjust enrichment claim as to tuition, and the district court granted that motion. Specifically, the district court concluded that there was nothing unjust about the College retaining Beck's tuition payment even though it provided only online instruction. The district court emphasized that the switch to online instruction was reasonable given the exigencies of the global pandemic. It also noted that Beck still was able to earn credits towards her degree. Accordingly, it concluded that there is no genuine issue of material fact and Manhattan College is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Beck's claim for unjust enrichment as to tuition. Having dismissed all of Beck's claims, the district court entered final judgment on June 29, 2023. This appeal followed. The central question on appeal is whether Beck pleaded facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the parties' contract required Manhattan College to provide an in-person education. Beck argues that Second Circuit's decision in Rynasko v. New York University, 63 F.4th 186 (2d Cir. 2023), requires that the district court's judgment be reversed. Manhattan College argues that subsequent decisions from the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, Second Department in Croce v. St. Joseph's College of New York, 195 N.Y.S.3d 210 (2d Dep't 2023), and the Fourth Department in McCudden v. Canisius College, No. 23-1865, 2025 WL 814588 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 14, 2025), require that the district court's judgment be affirmed. Because the parties have identified a split between how federal and state courts are applying New York contract-law principles, which implicates significant state policy interests, the Circuit Judges reserve decision on this appeal in order to certify the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether New York law requires a specific promise to provide exclusively in-person learning as a prerequisite to the formation of an implied contract between a university and its students with respect to tuition payments. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=0zCQUd MAXEON SOLAR: N.D. California Dismisses Menon Securities Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California grants, with leave to amend, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the lawsuit captioned JEYAKUMAR VS MENON, Plaintiff v. MAXEON SOLAR TECHNOLOGIES, LTD., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:24-cv-03869-EMC (N.D. Cal.). The case at bar is a securities fraud class action. The Defendants are (1) the company Maxeon Solar Technologies, Ltd., and (2) two individuals, William Mulligan and Kai Strohbecke, who were, respectively, Maxeon's CEO and CFO during the relevant period. As alleged in the operative amended class action complaint ("CAC"), Maxeon is a solar power energy company. It designs, manufactures, and sells a comprehensive portfolio of photovoltaic solar panels and related components worldwide. Initially, Maxeon was a division of a public company: SunPower. However, in 2020, there was a strategic spinoff, which resulted in Maxeon becoming its own separate entity. Maxeon's business has two main components: the Distributed Generation ("DG") business and the Utility-Scale business. The DG business provides solar panels and energy solutions for smaller and decentralized power generation applications, such as residential, community and commercial applications. The Utility-Scale business provides support for large solar power plants that produce electricity for the utility grid. After Maxeon was spun off from SunPower, the two companies still maintained close ties. The companies entered into agreements with one another. This included the December 2022 New Master Supply Agreement ("MSA") which was significant for Maxeon's DG business. Under the MSA, Maxeon "agreed to supply its Maxeon 6 Modules to SunPower for use in residential installations in the United States and Canada." The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class consisting of all those who purchased Maxeon common stock during the period Nov. 15, 2023, through May 29, 2024, inclusive. According to the Plaintiff, the price of the company's stock dropped significantly after Maxeon made various disclosures on May 30, 2024, including the disclosure that, because of serious cash flow challenges, Maxeon had had to get additional capital to support continuing operations and thus had negotiated commitments for significant liquidity support from its largest shareholder, TZE (even though this would result in share dilution and could endanger getting a loan from the federal government for a new manufacturing facility in New Mexico). According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants made seven different misrepresentations, which took place in November 2023 and April 2024. The seven alleged misrepresentations can be essentially be put into one of two categories: (1) the Defendants misrepresented that, without SunPower, Maxeon could successfully implement a direct-to-dealer sales strategy when, in truth, Maxeon knew that its ability to ramp up sales without SunPower was extremely limited because its prior attempts to contact dealers had already led to a loss of business; and (2) the Defendants misrepresented its profitability, cash flow, and/or liquidity -- e.g., by not disclosing that no more cash would be coming in from the Utility-Scale prepayments; by not disclosing that, as early as summer 2023 and as late as September 2023, lenders had expressed concern about Maxeon's ability to continue as a going concern; and by not disclosing that two major Utility-Scale customers were experiencing project delays. Based on this narrative and, inter alia, the allegations, the Plaintiff has asserted two causes of action: (1) violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 (against all Defendants); and (2) violations of Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act (against Mr. Mulligan and Mr. Strohbecke only, i.e., the individual defendants). Now pending before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Having considered the parties' briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as the oral argument of counsel, the Court grants the Defendants' motion. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' securities fraud claims are deficient because the Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that any of the statements at issue were false or misleading. For each of the statements, the Defendants make one or more of the following arguments: (1) the statement was forward looking in nature and is protected by the safe harbor provision in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"); (2) the statement was simply one of corporate optimism (puffery) and, thus, is not actionable; (3) the statement is an inactionable statement of opinion; and (4) the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the statement was false or misleading. The Plaintiff protests that dismissal would be inappropriate because he has alleged corroborating details for the confidential witnesses' ("CWs") testimonies --- to wit, SunPower's allegation that Maxeon had violated the MSA's non-circumvention provision. But whether Maxeon had actually violated the non-circumvention provision in the MSA is beside the point; the Plaintiff is claiming falsity on the basis that Maxeon's alleged efforts to sell directly to SunPower's installers were not successful, not whether it had previously violated the non-circumvention provision, Judge Chen opines. The Court, therefore, dismisses the claims based on Statement No. 1 but with leave to amend. Statement No. 1 was made during the earnings call on Nov. 15, 2023 (the first day of the class period) Like Statement No. 1, Statement No. 2 was made during the Nov. 15, 2023, earnings call and relates to Maxeon working with SunPower's installers or dealers. According to the Plaintiff, this was a misrepresentation because it omitted the fact that Maxeon had tried to do business with SunPower dealers and installers before the non-circumvention clause expired but this had been largely unsuccessful. The Defendants contend, among other things, that any claim based on Statement No. 2 should be dismissed because the Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that Maxeon tried to do business with SunPower dealers before the expiration of the non-circumvention clause but was unsuccessful. For the reasons stated, the Court agrees (e.g., CW-1's testimony is not reliable and does not establish that sale efforts post-non-circumvention provision were doomed to fail). Hence, the Court dismisses the claims based on Statement No. 2 and the other statements but with leave to amend. As discussed in this Order, Judge Chen rules that the claims based on all seven statements identified by the Plaintiff are dismissed, but with leave to amend. Dismissal is based on failure to sufficiently plead falsity. The Court does not address the Defendants' arguments that the Plaintiff has also failed to allege scienter. Whether or not there are sufficient allegations to support scienter may turn on what the Plaintiff pleads with respect to falsity. The Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within four weeks of the date of this order. If no amended complaint is filed, then the dismissal will be deemed with prejudice at that point and the case will be closed. If an amended complaint is filed, the Defendants will have four weeks thereafter to file a response, whether an answer or a motion to dismiss. This order disposes of Docket No. 70. A full-text copy of the Court's Order iis available at https://tinyurl.com/jmvz375p from PacerMonitor.com. MDL 3010: Google Must Seal Class Docs by May 23 ----------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 1:21-md-03010 (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon Judge Kevin Castel entered an order setting May 23, 2025, as deadline for Google to move to seal material contained in the class certification motions and associated filings. On May 2, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed memoranda of law in support of their motions for class certification, accompanied by declarations in support under seal. Those filings include and quote from numerous materials designated by Google as Confidential or Highly Confidential, including documents produced by Google, expert reports, and deposition transcripts. In the MDL, the Plaintiffs allege that Google has monopolized or suppressed competition in digital display advertising. Moreover, Rumble alleges many of the same business practices as the MDL plaintiffs in support of its claim that Google has violated federal antitrust law – for example, unlawful tying of its ad exchange to its ad server for publishers and an unlawful agreement to undermine the alleged "header bidding" threat to Google's ad exchange. Google is an American multinational corporation and technology company focusing on online advertising, search engine technology, cloud computing, computer software, quantum computing, e-commerce, consumer electronics, and artificial intelligence. Google is an American multinational corporation and technology company focusing on online advertising, search engine technology, cloud computing, computer software, quantum computing, e-commerce, consumer electronics, and artificial intelligence. A copy of the Court's order dated May 6, 2025, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ULSgXN at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Philip C. Korologos, Esq. BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001 Telephone: (212) 446-2390 E-mail: pkorologos@bsfllp.com MONRO INC: Class Settlement in Wise Suit Has Preliminary Approval ----------------------------------------------------------------- Chief District Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York approves the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement in the lawsuit entitled KYLE WISE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MONRO, INC., Defendant, Case No. 6:23-cv-06476-EAW-CDH (W.D.N.Y.). Plaintiff Kyle Wise commenced this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated against Defendant Monro, Inc., alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act ("OMFWSA"). Presently before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion for entry of an order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) that: (1) designates him as the Class Representative; (2) provisionally certifies a proposed settlement collective and class; (3) preliminarily approves his request for a Class Representative compensation award; (4) designates his counsel as Class Counsel; (5) preliminarily approves Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses; (6) designates and approves Analytics Consulting, LLC, as the settlement administrator; (7) approves the Class Notice and 45-day notice period and directs distribution of the proposed notice of class action settlement to the Settlement Class Members as outlined in the parties' Settlement Agreement and Release (the "Agreement"); and (8) schedules a final approval hearing to take place after preliminary approval of the parties' class action settlement. The Defendant does not oppose the Plaintiffs' motion. On Aug. 18, 2023, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit alleging that the policies and practices of the Defendant violated the FLSA and the OMFWSA, Ohio R.C. Chapter 4111, by failing to properly compensate certain employees for time worked, specifically missed or interrupted meal breaks, and further violated Ohio R.C. 4113.15(A) by failing to pay all wages on a semimonthly basis. On Oct. 12, 2023, the Defendant filed an answer denying any wrongdoing. The Defendant continues to deny liability and all material allegations asserted by the Plaintiffs, and has raised several affirmative defenses. On Feb. 24, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a stipulated amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), asserting state common law and/or statutory claims on behalf of assistant store managers, who are or were employed in Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia, and excluding the Defendant's technicians. The Settlement Class identified in the Agreement is defined as the 5,782 current and former assistant store managers, who are or were employed by the Defendant in Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, Wisconsin, and West Virginia and assigned to job codes AST1, MASTH, SERV, and TSM between Aug. 18, 2020, and June 18, 2024, and who are eligible for a settlement payment pursuant to the Agreement. To avoid the burden, expense, risks and uncertainty of litigation, the parties agreed to engage in good faith, arm's length settlement discussions, including mediation before a third party neutral. The Agreement resolves the individual and class claims of the Plaintiff and Settlement Class Members. The Agreement is subject to approval by the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The issues in this case were contested. The Court is satisfied by the parties' representations that the Agreement was achieved after arm's length and good faith negotiations between the parties and their counsel, who have extensive experience litigating collective and class wage and hour claims, while also facilitated by a mediator. The Agreement is preliminarily approved as to the Settlement Class Members' claims as provided in the Agreement, for notice purposes as appearing on its face to be fair, reasonable, and adequate, and as being the product of serious, informed, and extensive arm's length negotiations between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, plus mediation before a third-party neutral. As to the Named Plaintiff and the Class he represents, the Court finds that the proposed settlement class qualifies for provisional certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The proposed settlement class satisfies Rule 23(a)'s requirements of commonality, numerosity, typicality, and adequacy of representation, as well as Rule 23(b)'s requirements of predominance and superiority. The Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because he is a member of the Class, and he possesses the same interests and suffered the same alleged injuries as other Class Members. The Court finds there is sufficient basis to conclude preliminarily that the parties' proposed Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate as to the Class. Therefore, the Court provisionally certifies the Class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). The Court approves Kyle Wise as the Class Representative, and appoints as Class Counsel, Hans A. Nilges and Robi J. Baishnab of Nilges Draher LLC. The Court provisionally approves the Class Representative Compensation Award for the Plaintiff in recognition of his services in this Action. The Court provisionally approves the payment of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses to Class Counsel as provided in the Agreement. The Court approves the proposed Settlement Notice as to substance, form, and manner of distribution, and orders that it be distributed to Settlement Class Members in the manner described in the Agreement. The Court directs that the Settlement Class Members be given notice of the pendency of this Action, the proposed Agreement, and the date of a hearing ("Final Approval Hearing") at which final approval of the proposed Agreement will be considered. The Court designates and approves Analytics Consulting, LLC as the settlement administrator responsible for the issuance of the notice of class action settlement to the Settlement Class Members. The Fairness Hearing will be held on Aug. 26, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. Class Members objecting to the Agreement must timely file objections in the time and the manner set forth in the Class Action Settlement Notice. The Plaintiff will file an unopposed motion in support of Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement no later than 14 days prior to the Fairness Hearing. Along with the motion, Class Counsel will file with the Court a declaration verifying that the Class Action Settlement Notice was distributed to the Settlement Class Members in the form and manner approved here. The Court orders that, pending Final Approval, Settlement Class Members are preliminarily enjoined from commencing, prosecuting, or maintaining in any court other than this Court any claim, action or other proceeding that challenges or seeks review of or relief from any order, judgment, act, decision or ruling of this Court in connection with the Agreement. A full-text copy of the Court's Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yevbb6v3 from PacerMonitor.com. NCAA: Court Preliminary Approves $49MM Settlement in Coaches' Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ Judge William B. Shubb of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted Taylor Smart and Michael Hacker's motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement in the case captioned as TAYLOR SMART, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-02125 WBS CSK (E.D. Cal.). Judge Shubb will hold a fairness hearing on September 15, 2025, to consider final approval of the settlement. On November 29, 2018, the NCAA enforced Bylaw 11.7.6, known as the Volunteer Coach Bylaw, which prohibited volunteer baseball coaches at NCAA Division I schools from receiving compensation for their services. This bylaw remained in effect until July 1, 2023, creating a defined class period of approximately four and a half years during which volunteer coaches were prohibited from receiving payment for their coaching services at NCAA Division I institutions. In 2022, Plaintiffs Taylor Smart and Michael Hacker, representing a putative class of approximately 1,000 volunteer baseball coaches who had served at NCAA Division I institutions, filed a class action against the NCAA, alleging that the NCAA violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and California's Unfair Competition Law by enforcing the bylaw that prohibited payment to volunteer coaches. The complaint specifically alleged that the NCAA's restriction constituted an unlawful restraint of trade by artificially suppressing compensation in the relevant labor market. Following extensive discovery, motion practice, and multiple mediation attempts, the parties negotiated a $49,250,000 settlement, with $32,794,850 allocated directly to class members. The settlement also included provisions for attorney's fees (up to 33.33% of the gross settlement amount), litigation costs, settlement administration expenses, and $7,500 incentive awards for each named plaintiff. The settlement represents approximately 65.87% of the estimated maximum damages that could have been recovered had the case proceeded through trial, a figure the California Courts have noted was particularly favorable given the inherent risks of continued litigation. The Court conducted a thorough analysis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and provisionally certified the class, finding it satisfied all prerequisites for class certification. First, the numerosity requirement was met with approximately 1,000 class members, making joinder impracticable. Second, the commonality requirement was satisfied as the central question -- whether the NCAA's Volunteer Coach Bylaw violated antitrust laws -- was common to all class members and capable of classwide resolution. Third, the typicality requirement was met because the named plaintiffs' claims arose from the same course of conduct and legal theory as those of absent class members, as all were subject to the same bylaw and alleged similar injuries. Fourth, the adequacy requirement was satisfied, with the Court finding that both the named plaintiffs and their counsel, Korein Tillery LLC, had demonstrated vigorous prosecution of the case and an absence of conflicts of interest with other class members. The Court additionally found that the proposed class met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). The predominance requirement was satisfied because questions common to the class predominated over individual questions, as antitrust liability turned primarily on the NCAA's conduct rather than individual circumstances of class members. The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Daniel Rascher, provided a common damages model that could calculate damages on a classwide basis. The superiority requirement was also met, as the Court determined that a class action was superior to individual suits due to the complexity and expense of antitrust litigation and the relatively modest individual recoveries that would likely make individual suits economically unfeasible. Regarding notice requirements, the Court approved the proposed notice plan, which included direct mail, email communications, and a dedicated settlement website. Kroll Settlement Administration LLC was appointed as the Settlement Administrator, charged with ensuring class members received the "best notice practicable" under Rule 23(c)(2). The notice was designed to inform class members of their rights and options under the settlement, including the right to opt out or object to the settlement terms. In preliminarily approving the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e), the Court considered several factors. First, the Court noted that the settlement resulted from arm's-length negotiations between experienced counsel after significant factual investigation and legal analysis. Second, the Court found the recovery amount substantial, with the $32.8 million payout to class members representing nearly two-thirds of the estimated maximum recoverable damages. Third, while deferring final evaluation of the attorney's fee request, the Court indicated it would scrutinize the fee request under the lodestar method at the final approval stage to ensure reasonableness. The Court addressed potential obstacles that might have faced the plaintiffs had the litigation continued, including the NCAA's defenses regarding the procompetitive justifications for the Volunteer Coach Bylaw and challenges to class certification. These litigation risks were deemed to justify the compromise reflected in the settlement agreement. The Court's order included several key directives: 1. It provisionally certified the class defined as all volunteer baseball coaches subject to Bylaw 11.7.6 from November 29, 2018, to July 1, 2023. 2. It directed the Settlement Administrator to mail and email notices to all identifiable class members within 14 days of the order, establishing a 60-day period for class members to opt out of the settlement or file objections. 3. It scheduled a final fairness hearing for September 15, 2025, to evaluate the settlement's fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, as well as the requested attorney's fees and incentive awards. 4. It imposed a preliminary injunction barring class members from filing or prosecuting related claims pending the Court's final decision on the settlement. In granting preliminary approval, Judge Shubb concluded that the settlement within the "range of possible approval" and setting the stage for final review. The Court highlighted the settlement's proportionality to the class's alleged damages and the absence of any glaring deficiencies or preferential treatment of certain class members, while reserving heightened scrutiny for the final approval hearing. The Court emphasized that its preliminary approval was not a final determination of the settlement's fairness but rather an initial assessment that the settlement was sufficiently fair to warrant notice to the class and a final approval hearing. NEBRASKA BOOK: Court Certifies Class in Degroot, et al. WARN Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Magistrate Judge John M. Gerrard of the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify class, appoint class representatives and appoint class counsel in the case captioned as CHRISTOPHER DEGROOT, and STEVEN SHOWALTER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NEBRASKA BOOK COMPANY, INC.; NEBRASKA BOOK HOLDINGS, INC.; CONCISE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LP; AB LENDING SPV I, LLC d/b/a MOUNTAIN RIDGE CAPITAL, Defendants, Case No. 4:23-cv-3041-JMG-MDN (D. Neb.). A class is certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 defined as follows: "Former employees whose employment site was 4700 S. 19th Street, Lincoln, NE 68512, who were terminated as the result of a mass layoff or plant closing (as those terms are defined in the WARN Act) between Feb. 27, 2023 and April 28, 2023, and who did not receive 60 days' notice." The WARN Class asserts that that one or more Defendants, allegedly acting as a single entity or joint employer, violated the class members' rights under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 2101-2109, by terminating their employment as the result of a mass layoff or plant closing without providing them 60 days' notice. Defendants assert all defenses and affirmative defenses available to them under the WARN Act and any other applicable law. Without limiting the foregoing, Defendants Concise Capital Management, LP and AB Lending SPV I, LLC d/b/a Mountain Ridge Capital each asserts that it was not the "employer" of any class member as that term is construed in the WARN Act and applicable case law. A second class is certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 defined as follows: "Former employees, who were terminated on or after Feb. 27, 2023, and who were not paid their accrued but unused paid time off as wages upon termination." The NWPCA Class asserts that one or more Defendants, allegedly acting as a single entity or joint employer, violated the class members' rights under the Nebraska Wage and Payment Collection Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. Secs. 48-1228-34, by terminating their employment without paying them their accrued but unused paid time off as wages upon termination. Defendants assert all defenses and affirmative defenses available to them under the NWPCA and any other applicable law. Without limiting the foregoing, Defendants Concise Capital Management, LP and AB Lending SPV I, LLC d/b/a Mountain Ridge Capital each asserts that it was not the "employer" of any class member as that term is construed in the NWPCA and applicable case law. The Court finds that each class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The Court finds that there are questions of law or fact common to each class. The Court appoints Plaintiffs Christopher DeGroot and Steven Showalter as the class representatives of each class and finds that their claims are typical of the claims of each class. The Court finds that Plaintiffs DeGroot and Showalter will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of each class. The Court finds that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The Court appoints the following law firms as class counsel: (a) Friedman Law Offices, PC; (b) Stranch, Jennings, & Garvey, PLLC; (c) Strauss Borrelli, LLP; and (d) CohenMalad, LLP. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=aZj5vD from PacerMonitor.com. NEWELL BRANDS: Judge Remands Barrales Case to State Court --------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Percy Anderson of the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the plaintiff's motion to remand the case captioned as Tinamarie Barrales v. Newell Brands, Inc., Case No. 25-cv-01882-PA (C.D. Cal.), to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Plaintiff argues the District Court lacks federal equitable jurisdiction over her claims for restitution and disgorgement because she does not allege that she lacks an adequate remedy at law. She further contends that state court is the appropriate venue for her equitable claims. Defendant argues that the District Court should deny the Motion and retain jurisdiction over this matter to avoid "a colossal end run around CAFA." It also argues that the District Court should not remand this action due to its lack of equitable jurisdiction because there is no "substantive difference" between monetary damages and restitution in this case. The District Court disagrees. Judge Anderson explains, "Here Plaintiff has chosen her form of requested relief—she seeks the equitable remedies of restitution and disgorgement, and there is no dispute that she has not alleged the lack of -- nor could she so allege -- an adequate remedy at law. Therefore, this Court does not have equitable jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's claims." The FAC also seeks injunctive relief. Plaintiff asserts that she lacks Article III standing to seek this relief because she has not alleged risk of imminent harm, and, as a result, the District Court does not have jurisdiction over her claim for injunctive relief. Defendant does not dispute the lack of standing but asserts that Plaintiff's lack of standing to seek injunctive relief is a "red herring. In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged any intention to make future purchases of the Products, the District Court finds. Plaintiff has thus not shown a sufficient likelihood that she would be wronged again in a similar way and lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. The District Court concludes that it lacks equitable jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims for restitution and that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to seek injunctive relief. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=hcNxFp from PacerMonitor.com. ON Q FINANCIAL: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Feathers Suit on June 25 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Susan M. Brnovich of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona sets oral argument for June 25, 2025, as to the motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' consolidated class action complaint filed in the lawsuit entitled Jack Feathers; Barbara Squier; Brian Eitemiller; and Isaiah Castellaw on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. On Q Financial, LLC and ConnectWise, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2:24-cv-00811-SMB (D. Ariz.). The case arises from a data security incident experienced by Defendant On Q Financial, LLC, a mortgage lender. On Q Financial collects and maintains certain personally identifiable information ("PII") of its customers. ConnectWise is an Information Technology ("IT") management software and technology provider that offers a remote access software program called ScreenConnect, which On Q Financial uses. Upon learning that a vulnerability existed in the ScreenConnect software, ConnectWise developed a patch and, subsequently, notified On Q Financial of the vulnerability and the availability of a patch. Thereafter, On Q Financial, which was responsible for patching its instance of ScreenConnect, experienced a data security incident wherein unknown individuals allegedly used the ScreenConnect vulnerability to gain access to On Q Financial's computer network and exfiltrated data stored within On Q Financial's network, including allegedly the Plaintiffs' full names and Social Security numbers. In response, the Plaintiffs brought this litigation against On Q Financial and ConnectWise, Inc. The Plaintiffs do not allege any relationship with ConnectWise or that ConnectWise collected, possessed, maintained, stored, used, or controlled the Plaintiffs' PII. Judge Brnovich sets oral argument as to the Motion to Dismiss Case Plaintiffs' Consolidated Class Action Complaint; Memorandum in Support of Motion filed by Connectwise Incorporated. The Motion Hearing is set for June 25, 2025. A full-text copy of the Court's Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yj3xr8x8 from PacerMonitor.com. PHILIPS NORTH: Loses Bid to Certify Appeal in Miller Consumer Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Rita F. Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denies the Defendant's Motion to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal in the lawsuit titled TULIISA MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs v. PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC, Defendant, Case No. 3:24-cv-03781-RFL (N.D. Cal.). Plaintiffs Tuliisa Miller, Adrianna Cortez, and Brian Magadan brought this class action lawsuit against Philips North America LLC, alleging that the Defendant misleadingly markets and advertises its products--baby and infant bottles and cups--to maximize profits and gain an unfair advantage over its competitors. In relevant part, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant failed to disclose that its products leach toxic microplastics when used as directed, which implies to customers that the products contain no harmful plastic byproducts. On Feb. 20, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Now, the Defendant moves for certification for interlocutory appeal. For the reasons stated in this Order, the Court denies the motion. The Defendant argues that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists on the following question as to warrant certification for interlocutory appeal: "Is a plaintiff asserting a claim under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA for a material omission based on the alleged presence of unsafe contaminants in a product required to plead with specificity both the amount of a contaminant the challenged product contains and the level at which exposure to that contaminant would create an unreasonable safety hazard?" However, Judge Lin opines, the cases cited by the Defendant do not support the notion that, in all circumstances, a plaintiff must allege such facts in order to state a claim. For example, Judge Lin explains, in its motion for certification for interlocutory appeal, the Defendant cites Barton v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 24-cv-01332, 2025 WL 486180 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025), for the proposition that to establish a harmful substance claim, a plaintiff must "allege facts that testing disclosed [the] presence of such substances in the accused product purchased." But Barton does not hold that to state a plausible claim, a plaintiff must test the specific product at issue, Judge Lin says. To the contrary, Barton states that "to the extent that Plaintiffs have failed to test the light and regular [tampon] Products purchased by the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are required to either test these Products or explain why extrapolation of the super Pearl and Radiant [tampon test] results is appropriate." Here, by contrast, Judge Lin finds the Plaintiffs plausibly established that studies that measure microplastic release rates of similar polypropylene products provides sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer that similar rates of release occur during the course of use of the Defendant's Products because polypropylene is a standard material that possesses standard chemical properties--meaning that testing results for other similar products may be plausibly extrapolated to apply to the products at issue in the case. Therefore, the principles applied in the motion to dismiss order do not substantially depart from the conclusions articulated by other courts on this issue. Additionally, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs must plead with specificity the particular level at which exposure to the contaminant would create an unreasonable safety hazard. Yet no case the Defendant cites imposes that specific requirement, Judge Lin points out, among other things. For the reasons stated, Judge Lin holds that interlocutory appeal is not appropriate, nor would it materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. Hence, the motion for certification for interlocutory appeal is denied. A full-text copy of the Court's Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2tz9ytwn from PacerMonitor.com. PLUM PBC: Court Affirms Summary Judgment in Gulkaov, et al. Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the appeal styled as LUDMILA GULKAROV; JANINE TORRENCE; KELLY MCKEON; JOSH CRAWFORD; VANESSA MATHIESEN; AUTUMN ELLISON; JESSICA DAVID; SARAH BROWN; TOMMY NURRE; CHRISTINA GONZALEZ, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. PLUM, PBC, a Delaware corporation, Defendant - Appellee, No. 24-2766 (9th Cir.), Judges Andrew D. Hurwitz, Lucy H. Koh and Anthony D. Johnstone of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granting summary judgment in favor of Plum. In this putative class action, Plaintiffs allege that Plum, PBC, which manufactures and sells baby foods, violated California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act and Unfair Competition Law by failing to disclose on its products' labels that the products may contain heavy metals and perchlorate. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plum. Plaintiffs argue that Plum's products pose an unreasonable safety hazard because they contain detectable amounts of heavy metals and perchlorate, and bioaccumulation of these substances over time can cause adverse health effects. The Ninth Circuit finds there is insufficient evidence to establish that Plum's products pose an unreasonable safety hazard. Plaintiffs allege that Plum had exclusive knowledge about the risk of heavy metals and perchlorate in its products and that it actively concealed the risk of heavy metals and perchlorate in its products. Plaintiffs argue that it is uncertain what legal standard applies to claims of deception by omission under the CLRA and UCL, and the Ninth Circuit should therefore certify this question to the California Supreme Court. However, the Ninth Circuit declines to do so. The California Supreme Court may answer a question certified by the Ninth Circuit only if the issue is outcome determinative and there is no controlling precedent. The Ninth Circuit concludes under any plausible legal standard advanced by the parties, Plum is entitled to summary judgment. The Circuit Judges are convinced that the California Supreme Court is aware of this issue and it 'remains free to resolve the legal issue in a future published decision.' For these reasons, they deny Plaintiffs' motion to certify." A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=QXYW8h RAUL LABRADOR: TRO, Class Certification Granted in IORC Lawsuit --------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Amanda K. Brailsford of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted the plaintiffs' emergency motion for temporary restraining order, provisional class certification, and preliminary injunction in the case captioned as IDAHO ORGANIZATION OF RESOURCE COUNCILS; THE ALLIANCE OF IDAHO; A.M.R.; L.M.C.; M.S.; W.G.C.; and J.R.B.M., Plaintiffs, v. RAUL LABRADOR, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Idaho, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:25-cv-00178-AKB (D. Idaho). Plaintiffs, the Idaho Organization of Resource Councils; the Alliance of Idaho; and A.M.R., L.M.C., M.S., W.G.C., and J.R.B.M. seek injunctive relief against Defendants' enforcement of certain provisions of House Bill No. 83 also known as the Idaho ICE Act, Idaho Code Secs. 18-9001 – 9013. Defendants, who include the Attorney General of the State of Idaho and the elected prosecuting attorneys for every county in Idaho, oppose the motion. The Idaho ICE Act went into effect on March 27, 2025. The Act creates two new state law criminal offenses which Plaintiffs challenge: "illegal entry from foreign nation" and "illegal reentry by certain aliens". Under the Act, an alien commits the offense of Illegal Entry if the alien "enters or attempts to enter this state at any location other than a lawful port of entry or through another manner of lawful entry." Meanwhile, an alien commits a violation of Illegal Reentry if the alien "enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in this state after the person: (a) has been denied admission to or excluded, deported, or removed from the United States; or (b) has departed from the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding." The enforcement of both Illegal Entry and Illegal Reentry are limited by an independent crime requirement. Immediately upon the Act becoming effective on March 27, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants and a motion for a temporary restraining order, provisional class certification, and a preliminary injunction to preclude the enforcement of the Act. The Individual Plaintiffs include five aliens, who allegedly travel between Idaho and other states; the IORC, an organization whose members include alien, seasonal migrant workers who travel between Idaho and other states; and the Alliance, an organization which provides legal services, including to clients who it alleges would be subject to prosecution under the Act. Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that the challenged offenses are unconstitutional because Illegal Reentry violates the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause and because Illegal Entry likewise violates these Clauses as well as the Due Process Clause. Defendants challenge the standing of all Plaintiffs -- the Individual Plaintiffs, the IORC, and the Alliance. Plaintiffs argue the Individual Plaintiffs and IORC's members will suffer irreparable harm by being placed at risk of arrest, prosecution, and detention for the preempted, challenged offenses. Defendants argue this alleged harm is inadequate to establish irreparable harm, and they reassert their arguments that Plaintiffs lack standing. Namely, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' harm is speculative because of the independent crime requirement, which limits the enforcement of the challenged offenses to instances when an alien is detained or investigated for the suspected commission of another crime. Defendants argue the Court must assume that Plaintiffs will follow the law and, thus, will not be investigated, detained, or arrested for the challenged offenses. The Court rejected Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' lack standing. It rejects Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' alleged irreparable harm is speculative. Because Plaintiffs are at risk of being subject to criminal penalties allegedly preempted by federal law, the Court finds that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury and that this factor weighs in favor of granting injunctive relief. The Court concludes Plaintiffs have established standing at this stage of the litigation, grants their request for a preliminary injunction, and provisionally certifies two classes of Plaintiffs for this purpose. It also appoints Plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel and concludes no bond is required. The Court certifies the following provisional classes: i. The Entry Class includes all aliens, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101, who may be subject to I.C. Sec. 18-9003; and ii. The Reentry Class includes all aliens, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101, who may be subject to I.C. Sec. 18-9004. The Court now preliminarily enjoins all Defendants from enforcing the challenged offenses of Illegal Entry and Illegal Reentry. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=TU3Pmx from PacerMonitor.com. RAZVAN POP: Loses Summary Judgment Bid in Uselmann, et al. Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Gershwin A. Drain of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment in the case captioned as MIRELA USELMANN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RAZVAN POP, et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-13652 (E.D. Mich.). The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted. This is a class action civil RICO case. Plaintiffs are truck drivers and owner-operators, and Defendant RSP is an over-the-road freight company owned and operated by Defendants Razvan Pop and Maria Pop. Plaintiffs contracted with RSP to transport freight on RSP's behalf to various locations across the country. Some of this freight originated in or was delivered to Mexico or Canada. Plaintiffs transported this freight within the United States, while third-party carriers were responsible for transporting it to and from these international endpoints. RSP's business relationship with Plaintiffs was governed by a written agreement between RSP and each individual class member. Section Two of the Agreement provides that "Carrier shall pay to Contractor a sum equal to 80 (%) percent of the gross revenues (after allowable deductions as provided herein) received by Carrier from Carrier's customers for the transportation of any freight by Contractor." RSP is the "Carrier," and each class member is a "Contractor." The Agreement also contains an integration clause. In their First Amended Class Action Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged two civil RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1964(c) (Counts I and II), breach of contract (Count III), unjust enrichment/quantum meruit (Count IV), promissory estoppel (Count V), and conversion (Count VI). On March 18, 2022, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The Court granted the motion with respect to Count II but denied it as to the remaining counts. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on Count I, which the Court granted. The parties then voluntarily dismissed Counts III, IV, V, and VI with prejudice and without costs or attorneys' fees to any of the parties, as well as waived their right to a jury trial. The sole triable issue remaining in this case is a determination of the damages owed to Plaintiffs for Count I. The parties have indicated to the Court that they are largely in agreement on this issue. However, they dispute whether the Agreement entitles Plaintiffs to 80 percent of the gross revenues RSP received for freight that originated in or was delivered to Mexico or Canada, and whether RSP may deduct international transport costs from those revenues. Plaintiffs argue the Agreement unambiguously entitles them to 80 percent of the gross revenues for all freight they transported, irrespective of whether the freight was ultimately transported to or from Mexico or Canada by a third-party carrier. They further claim the Agreement does not permit RSP to deduct the costs associated with transporting this freight to and from these international endpoints from the gross revenues. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that because third-party carriers ultimately transported the freight to and from Mexico or Canada, this freight was not delivered "by Contractor," as required under the Agreement for Plaintiffs to receive 80 percent of the gross revenues. The Court concludes that there is no dispute of material fact as to the damages Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for freight that originated in or was ultimately delivered to Mexico or Canada. Judge Drain holds, "The Agreement unambiguously entitles Plaintiffs to 80 percent of the gross revenues Defendants received for such loads, less any expressly authorized deductions. The Agreement does not permit deductions for international transport costs or costs to third-party carriers that may have played a role in transporting the freight. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted." A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=3atldZ from PacerMonitor.com. REDFIN CORP: Morano Class Suit Balks at Rocket Merger Deal ---------------------------------------------------------- JASON MORANO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. REDFIN CORPORATION, ROCKET COMPANIES, INC., DAVID H. LISSY, GLENN KELMAN, ROBERT BASS, JULIE BORNSTEIN, KERRY D. CHANDLER, AUSTIN LIGON, BRAD SINGER, JAMES SLAVET, and SELINA TOBACCOWALA, Case No. 2:25-cv-00883 (W.D. Wash., May 9, 2025) is a securities class action for Defendants' violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Plaintiff's federal and state claims arise in connection with the proposed merger between Redfin and Rocket Companies, Inc. On March 9, 2025, Redfin entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the Merger Agreement), pursuant to which Redfin will merge with Rocket, and Redfin shareholders will receive 0.7926 shares of Rocket Class A common stock for each share of Redfin common stock that they currently own. On May 5, 2025, to persuade Redfin stockholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Merger at a special meeting to be held on June 4, 2025. The Defendants authorized the filing of a materially incomplete and misleading definitive proxy statement on Schedule 14A with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in violation of Section 14(a)/Rule 14a-9, and in breach of their fiduciary duties under Delaware law. The Proxy suffers from two material disclosure violations ("Disclosure Violations"). The Proxy contains materially omissive and misleading information concerning a conflict faced by Redfin's financial advisor, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, as a result of a concurrent lending relationship between Goldman Sachs Bank USA and Rocket The Stockholder Vote is presently scheduled for June 4, 2025. In order to allow Redfin stockholders to cast fully informed votes with respect to the Proposed Merger, it is imperative that the Board cure the Disclosure Violations described above no later than five (5) days prior to the Stockholder Vote. Accordingly, the Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin the Special Meeting and the Stockholder Vote until the Board causes the filing of supplemental disclosures with the SEC at least five (5) days in advance of the Stockholder Vote curing the Disclosure Violations. Alternatively, if the Disclosure Violations are not cured, and the Proposed Merger is consummated, Plaintiff reserves the right to recover damages suffered by himself and similarly-situated investors as a result of such Disclosure Violations. Redfin is a residential real estate technology company that provides brokerage and mortgage origination services. Rocket is a financial technology company with a platform of mortgage, real estate, and personal finance businesses, including Rocket Mortgage, Rocket Homes, Rocket Close, Rocket Money and Rocket Loans.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Juan E. Monteverde, Esq. Jonathan T. Lerner, Esq. MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC The Empire State Building 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4740 New York, NY 10118 Telephone: (212) 971-1341 E-mail: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com jlerner@monteverdelaw.com - and - Roger M. Townsend, Esq. TOWNSEND LEGAL CORP. Roger M. Townsend 380 Winslow Way, Suite 200 Bainbridge Island, WA 98110 Telephone: (206) 761-2480 E-mail: Roger@townsendlegal.com - and - Joshua E. Fruchter, Esq. WOHL & FRUCHTER LLP 25 Robert Pitt Drive, Suite 209G Monsey, NY 10952 Telephone: (845) 290-6818 E-mail: jfruchter@wohlfruchter.com SEA THAI: Ortega Class Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL --------------------------------------------------------------- ABEL ORTEGA and MARIA GOMEZ, on behalf of themselves, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class v. SEA THAI HOSPITALITY INC. d/b/a SEA THAI BROOKLYN, SPICE CITY, INC. d/b/a SEA THAI BROOKLYN, SPICEWB INC. d/b/a SPICE, 357 HOSPITALITY INC. d/b/a SPICE, 975 AMSTERDAM INC, d/b/a SPICE, KL 747 INC d/b/a SPICE, SPICE 39 INC d/b/a SPICE, SPICE ON PARK SLOPE, INC d/b/a SPICE, THAMMA INC, d/b/a THE SABIENG THAI, SPICE CORNER 236 INC., d/b/a SPICE, and YONGYUT LIMLEARTVATE, Case No. 1:25-cv-03893 (S.D.N.Y., May 9, 2025) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. The Plaintiffs bring additional claims, on behalf of themselves and a subclass of employees, pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York (NYCHRL), due to the deprivation of their statutory rights due to the Defendants' discrimination based on their race, and national origin, and seek to recover economic damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Individual Defendant operates each of the above nine (9) restaurants through the nine corporate entities named in this Complaint.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: C.K. Lee, Esq. Anne Seelig, Esq. LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC 148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10011 Telephone: (212) 465-1188 Facsimile: (212) 465-1181 SOMNIA INC: S.D. New York Grants $1MM Attys.' Fees in Chabak Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Philip M. Halpern of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York grants attorneys' fees to Class Counsel in the amount of $1 million in the lawsuit styled IRENE CHABAK, ARMANDO CARRASCO, RANDY POLK, KELLY WILSON, THOMAS BOOTH HARRIS, SCOTT WEISCOPE, LAVINA HENDERSON, JEREMY HENDERSON, and RAYCINE SOMMERS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SOMNIA INC., ANESTHESIA SERVICES OF SAN JOAQUIN P.C., PALM SPRINGS ANESTHESIA SERVICES P.C., RESOURCE ANESTHESIOLOGY ASSOCIATES OF IL P.C., RESOURCE ANESTHESIOLOGY ASSOCIATION OF NM INC., and ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES OF EL PASO, P.A., Defendants, Case No. 7:22-cv-09341-PMH (S.D.N.Y.). The matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs' and Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees, expenses, and service awards. The Court finds that Class Counsel are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, and that the percentage of the fund method of determining reasonable attorneys' fees is appropriate here, where the settlement creates a common fund. Class Counsel's fee request of $1 million is 31.5% of the value of the Settlement Fund. The Court finds that this fee is appropriate, given the circumstances of the case. The Court concludes that the requested fee award is reasonable, and grants attorneys' fees to Class Counsel in the amount of $1,000,000. Class Counsel are also entitled to reimbursement of reasonable out-of-pocket costs advanced for the Class. The Court finds that the expenses incurred in this litigation were reasonable and necessary to the effective representation of the Class. Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' request for reimbursement of litigation expenses in the amount of $50,294.92. The Court also finds that the requested service award of $1,000 to each Plaintiff is reasonable and appropriate. Judge Halpern also opines that the service award is reasonable in comparison to the average recovery of class members. The Court, therefore, grants the requested service award of $1,000 to Plaintiffs Irene Chabak, Armando Carrasco, Randy Polk, Kelly Wilson, Thomas Booth Harris, Scott Weiscope, Lavina Henderson, Jeremy Henderson, and Raycine Sommers. A full-text copy of the Court's Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3xu686y7 from PacerMonitor.com. ST. CATHERINE: Settlement in Felix, et al. Suit Gets Final Court OK ------------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Nusrat J. Choudhury of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted final approval of the class action settlement in the case captioned as Herve Felix and Karla Jerabek, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, -v- St. Catherine of Siena Medical Center and Catholic Health Services of Long Island, Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-03220-NJC-SIL (E.D.N.Y.). Plaintiff Herve Felix commenced this action against Defendants St. Catherine of Siena Medical Center and Catholic Health Services of Long Island on June 7, 2021, by service and filing of a Complaint on behalf of current and former hourly paid and non-exempt employees who worked at St. Catherine of Siena Hospital. Felix generally alleged that Defendants owed him and other members of the putative Classes unpaid straight and overtime compensation for: (a) improperly penalizing Plaintiff Felix and members of the Classes by configuring the time clocks in Defendants' facilities to round down and artificially reduce the amount of time members of the putative Classes are credited with performing work, as well as compensating members of the putative Classes based only upon their scheduled hours rather than the actual time they worked for Defendants; and (b) automatically deducting time for meal breaks when members of the putative Classes are performing work during that time. On Dec. 6, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their motion for collective certification pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b). On Feb.3, 2023, Defendants opposed the motion. On Aug. 14, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion and conditionally certified a collective consisting of all current and former non-exempt employees who were employed by Defendants between Dec. 16, 2019 and Dec. 16, 2022, and directed that notice be distributed to the members of the conditionally certified collective to provide them an opportunity to opt-in to the action. After the Conditional Certification Decision, but prior to dissemination of the collective notice, Class Counsel and Defendants' counsel began exploring the possibility of settlement. On or about Jan. 12, 2024, the Parties agreed on the material terms of the settlement. On March 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement. On Aug. 13, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion, preliminarily approved the Settlement, conditionally certified the proposed Class, appointed McLaughlin & Stern, LLP as Class Counsel, approved the proposed Notice, directed that the Notice be sent to members of both Classes, and set a date for the final fairness hearing. On Jan. 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for an Order granting final approval of the Settlement, which would, among other things: (i) certify the Classes for settlement purposes; (ii) approve the Settlement and Agreement as final, fair, reasonable, and adequate; and (iii) enter judgment in accordance with the Agreement. The same day, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for an Order: (i) granting Class Counsel's application for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses; and (2) granting service awards to Jerabek, Frisby, and Massi. The Court held a final fairness hearing on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motions on Jan. 21, 2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule 23 and the Fair Labor Standards Act Sec. 216(b), the Court grants final certification of: (1) the FLSA Class, consisting of current and former non-exempt hourly paid employees who worked at St. Catherine of Siena Hospital during the period from June 7, 2018 through the date of the Preliminary Approval Order; and (2) the Rule 23 Class, consisting of current and former non-exempt hourly paid employees who worked at St. Catherine of Siena Hospital during the period from June 7, 2015 through the date of the Preliminary Approval Order. Specifically, under Federal Rule 23, a class action may be maintained if all the prongs of Rule 23(a), as well as one of the prongs of Rule 23(b), are met. Rule 23(a) requires that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to find that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Each of the foregoing requirements are met. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Classes meet all of the requirements of Federal Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) and grants final certification of the Classes for settlement purposes only. Additionally, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b), the Court grants final collective certification for settlement purposes, as Plaintiffs and members of the FLSA Class are sufficiently similarly situated to one another as they were all allegedly victims of a common policy or plan that purportedly violated the law, i.e., Defendants' alleged failure to compensate them for all hours worked. The Court finds the Settlement is procedurally and substantively fair, reasonable, and adequate in all respects and, pursuant to Federal Rule 23(e). Thus, the Court grants final approval of the Settlement. The Gross Settlement Amount of $2.75 million would yield a Net Settlement Amount of around $1,721,919 after the payment of attorney fees ($916,666.67), expenses ($31,414.76), service awards to Class Representatives ($40,000), and the claims administrator's fee ($45,000). The Court grants Class Counsel attorneys' fees of $916,666.67 or one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, which it finds to be fair and reasonable. The Court approves Class Counsel's request for reimbursement of $31,414.76 in litigation expenses, which expenses it finds were necessarily and reasonably incurred by Class Counsel in prosecuting this case. The Court approves and awards costs and fees to Arden Claims Services LLC in the amount of $45,000 to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance with the Agreement. The Court finds that the requested administration fee is reasonable in light of the tasks completed by Arden and the tasks to be completed in the distribution of funds to members of the Classes. The Court approves a service award of $20,000 for Karla Jerabek, $10,000 for Rachael Massi, and $10,000 for Christian Frisby, based upon the time, effort, and commitment they expended in prosecuting the case on behalf of the Classes. According to the Court, the requested service awards are reasonable and appropriate to compensate Jerabek, Frisby, and Massi for the work they performed and the risks they undertook in this litigation and helping achieve a successful resolution. The Complaint filed in this Litigation and all claims contained therein are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice as to all members of the Classes and without attorneys' fees or costs, except as described herein. By operation of the entry of this Order and the Final Judgment, all Released Claims are fully, finally and forever released, relinquished and discharged pursuant to the terms of the release set forth in Sections 1.27 and 1.28 (as modified) and Section 4.1(A) and (C) of the Agreement as to all members of the Classes other than those who have opted-out of the Settlement. This Final Judgment is a final judgment in the Litigation as to all claims among the Plaintiffs, members of the Classes who have not opted out, and Defendants. The Court finds, for purposes of Federal Rule 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs entry of Judgment as set forth herein. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Ch80BB from PacerMonitor.com. TD BANK: Court Finally Approves Class Settlement in Mansaray Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Anita B. Brody of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the lawsuit entitled AMINATA MANSARAY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TD BANK, N.A., Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-05039-AB (E.D. Pa.). The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement with Defendant TD Bank, N.A. The Court granted preliminary approval to the settlement by Order of Oct. 31, 2024. On April 28, 2025, the Court held a final approval hearing, at which time the parties were afforded the opportunity to be heard in support of or in opposition to the settlement. The Court received no objections to the parties' Settlement Agreement and Release ("Agreement"). Notice to the Settlement Class required by Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been provided in accordance with the Court's Order Preliminarily Approving Class Settlement and Directing Notice to Settlement Class Members. Judge Brody finds that the notice was given in an adequate and sufficient manner; constitutes the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including the dissemination of individual notice to all members, who can be identified through reasonable effort; and satisfies Rule 23(e) and due process. The Defendant has timely filed notification of this settlement with the appropriate officials pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"). The terms of the parties' settlement agreement are incorporated fully into this Order by reference. The Court finds that the terms of the settlement are fair, reasonable, and adequate in light of the complexity, expense and duration of litigation and the risks involved in establishing liability, damages, and in maintaining the class action through trial and appeal. The Court has considered the factors enumerated in Rule 23(e)(2) and finds they counsel in favor of final approval. The Court finds that the relief provided under the settlement constitutes fair value given in exchange for the release of claims. The parties and each class member have irrevocably submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court for any suit, action, proceeding, or dispute arising out of the settlement agreement. The Court finds that it is in the best interests of the parties and the Settlement Class and consistent with principles of judicial economy that any dispute between any class member (including any dispute as to whether any person is a class member) and any released party which, in any way, relates to the applicability or scope of the settlement agreement or this Order should be presented exclusively to this Court for resolution by this Court. Therefore, Judge Brody holds that this action is a class action against the Defendant on behalf of the following class: All persons with a residential mortgage loan with TD Bank, N.A., in the calendar years 2020 or 2021, (a) to whom, at any time from October 2020 through June 2021, TD Bank mailed a mortgage statement fewer than seven (7) calendar days prior to the due date of their residential mortgage loan payment; (b) who, at any time from October 2020 through July 2021, TD Bank furnished to one or more Consumer Reporting Agencies as having made a late mortgage loan payment; and (c) who submitted a dispute to a Consumer Reporting Agency regarding a mortgage loan payment on their TD residential mortgage loan having been incorrectly furnished as late, which dispute the Consumer Reporting Agency sent to TD Bank. Excluded from the Settlement Class are TD Bank and any judge to whom this Action is or has been assigned. The settlement agreement submitted by the parties for the class is finally approved pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the best interests of the class. As agreed by the parties in the settlement agreement, upon the Effective Date, the Released Parties will be released and discharged in accordance with the settlement agreement. As agreed by the parties in the Settlement Agreement, upon the Effective Date, each Participating Settlement Class Member is enjoined and permanently barred from instituting, maintaining, or prosecuting, either directly or indirectly, any lawsuit that asserts Released Claims. Upon consideration of Class Counsel's application for fees and costs and other expenses, the Court awards $135,000 as reasonable attorneys' fees and reimbursement for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, which will be paid from the Settlement Fund. Plaintiff Aminata Mansaray is awarded the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), to be paid from the Settlement Fund, for the services they have performed for and on behalf of the Class. Neither this Order nor the Agreement will be construed or used as an admission or concession by or against the Defendant or any of the Released Parties of any fault, omission, liability, or wrongdoing, or the validity of any of the Released Claims. The action is dismissed on the merits, in its entirety, with prejudice and without costs. A full-text copy of the Court's Final Approval Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mry3tcaf from PacerMonitor.com. TRACY LOGISTICS: Court Tosses Picou Wage-and-Hour Lawsuit --------------------------------------------------------- Judge Dena Coggins of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the motion of Tracy Logistics LLC to dismiss the plaintiff's first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) DONTE PICOU, Plaintiff, v. TRACY LOGISTICS LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:24-cv-00526-DC-JDP (E.D. Cal.). The first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. In this class action lawsuit, Plaintiff Donte Picou is suing his former employer, Defendant Tracy Logistics LLC, for violating California wage-and-hour and unfair competition laws. On Nov. 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against Defendant in San Joaquin County Superior Court. Plaintiff filed the operative first amended class action complaint in San Joaquin County Superior Court on Jan. 17, 2024. Defendant filed its notice of removal of the action to this court on Feb. 20, 2024. In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges Defendant conducts business throughout California and operates offices and facilities in San Joaquin, California. Plaintiff also alleges he was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt hourly employee at its office and facilities. In its notice of removal, Defendant alleges it entered into a collective bargaining agreement with General Teamsters Local #439 that applied to work performed by covered employees from June 1, 2021, through May 31, 2028. Plaintiff's allegations in the FAC do not reference the 2021 CBA, nor are his claims expressly predicated on terms of the 2021 CBA. Plaintiff brings the following thirteen causes of action in the FAC: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay wages and overtime pursuant to Labor Code section 510; (3) recovery of reporting time pay; (4) meal-period liability pursuant to Labor Code section 226.7; (5) rest-break liability pursuant to Labor Code section 226.7; (6) failure to pay vacation wages; (7) failure to provide paid sick time and failure to compute the amount due for paid sick time in violation of Labor Code sections 245 and 246; (8) failure to provide accurate itemized statements in violation of Labor Code section 226(a); (9) failure to keep required payroll records pursuant to Labor Code sections 1174 and 1174.5; (10) failure to pay all wages due and certain upon separation of employment pursuant to Labor Code section 203; (11) failure to reimburse for necessary business expenses pursuant to Labor Code section 2802; (12) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. ("UCL"); and (13) penalties pursuant to California's Private Attorneys General Act, ("PAGA") pursuant to Labor Code section 2699, et seq. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of "all individuals employed by Defendant[], at any time within four (4) years of the filing of this lawsuit, as non-exempt, hourly employees within the State of California." Further, Plaintiff seeks to represent twelve subclasses, corresponding with each of Plaintiff's first twelve claims. On July 11, 2024, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss and/or strike Plaintiff's FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and/or 12(f). Defendant asserts Plaintiff's claims for overtime, paid sick leave, meal and rest break and vacation pay should be dismissed because they are predicated on rights created by the 2021 CBA and/or require interpretation or analysis of the 2021 CBA and are therefore preempted by Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1945, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, et seq. Defendant also argues dismissal of Plaintiff's claims is warranted because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support cognizable legal claims for relief. In its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support his off-the-clock theory of liability for his minimum wage and overtime claims. Defendant asserts Plaintiff failed to allege facts to show that there was at least one week in which he was eligible for but was denied minimum or overtime wages. In his opposition, Plaintiff argues he is not required to identify an exact work shift in which he and/or the proposed class incurred unpaid hours in order to sufficiently state a claim for non-payment of wages. The Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a minimum and/or overtime wage claim. Plaintiff's FAC fails to identify any specific workweek in which Defendant's alleged practices required him to work without appropriate compensation. According to the Court, Plaintiff has also not alleged any facts regarding his typical work schedule beyond a general allegation that employees regularly worked over eight hours on a given day without receiving compensation. While Plaintiff identifies uncompensated tasks he and the alleged class engaged in while off-the-clock, Plaintiff does not provide an estimate of the amount of time he spent on said tasks or how often those tasks were undertaken. For these reasons, Plaintiffs allegations fall short of stating cognizable claims for minimum and overtime wages, the Court concludes. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a meal and/or rest break claim. While Plaintiff alleges daily work demands and pressure forced him to miss meal and rest breaks, he does not allege a single instance in which he was required to forgo meal and rest breaks without compensation. Plaintiff also does not estimate how frequently his breaks were interrupted. Given the lack of factual allegations identifying a week in which Plaintiff suffered a break period violation or sufficient facts to create a plausible inference his breaks were interrupted, Plaintiff's meal and rest break claims suffer the same deficiencies as his minimum and overtime wage claims. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's meal and rest break claims with leave to amend. The Court finds Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that he was entitled to sick leave and thus Plaintiff fails to adequately plead his paid sick leave claim. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's sick leave claim with leave to amend Plaintiff alleges no facts in the FAC that Defendant failed to pay vacation wages at the final rate of pay and Plaintiff cannot cure this deficiency through arguments asserted in his opposition, the Court finds. Accordingly, the court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's vacation wages claim with leave to amend. In this case, Plaintiff tethers his UCL claim to Defendant's alleged Labor Code and wage order violations. Because the Court finds Plaintiff's FAC fails to state a claim for violations of the California Labor Code and applicable wage orders, Plaintiff's UCL claim also fails. Plaintiff's PAGA claim is derivative of his other causes of action. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's UCL and PAGA claims with leave to amend. As for its motion to strike, Defendant asserts Plaintiff's proposed class definitions should be dismissed and/or stricken because they are improper "fail-safe" class definitions. However, striking Plaintiff's proposed class definitions would be premature and procedurally improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Defendant has not articulated any of the bases under Rule 12(f) to strike Plaintiff's class definitions. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's proposed class definitions. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=ul5Wtx from PacerMonitor.com. TWITTER INC: 9th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Morgan Class Action ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the appealed case styled as GLEN MORGAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. TWITTER, INC., Defendant - Appellee, No. 23-3764 (9th Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denying Glen Morgan's motions for remand, motion for leave to amend the complaint, and dismissal of his complaint. Glen Morgan brought a putative class action against Twitter, alleging that Twitter violated Washington's statute, RCW 9.26A.140, prohibiting the deceptive procurement and sale of telephone records. The Ninth Circuit finds the district court properly denied Morgan's first motion for remand based on untimeliness. It also finds the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a second amended complaint. According to the Ninth Circuit, even if the district court had granted Morgan leave to file a second amended complaint, the remaining allegations provided Article III standing, so the district court correctly rejected Morgan's second remand motion. The district court provided four independent reasons for dismissing Morgan's complaint for failure to state a claim, each of which was sufficient to support the dismissal. First, RCW 9.26A.140(1)(b) prohibits the fraudulent collection of telephone records, not numbers. Second, the statute only covers a telephone record that is falsely obtained from a telecommunications company, not an individual. Third, Morgan's claim sounded in fraud, yet he did not meet the higher pleading standards required. Fourth, Morgan's failure to identify a specific misleading statement additionally failed the basic pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit concludes Morgan's complaint was properly dismissed. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Gu1LVb UPGRADE INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Dieffenbach, et al. Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Julia K. Munley of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted Upgrade Inc.'s motion to dismiss and to compel individual arbitration in the case captioned as KEN DIEFFENBACH and JENNIFER GAMMAGE, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UPGRADE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:23-cv-01427 (M.D. Pa.). Defendant Upgrade, Inc. is a non-bank corporation which routinely issues loans to Pennsylvania consumers which exceed Pennsylvania's 6% cap on interest and fees. Upgrade pays another entity, Cross River Bank, to identify itself as the lender for these loans. Cross River Bank has no actual involvement in the Upgrade-issued loans aside from renting its name to Upgrade. Per the complaint, Upgrade has overcharged thousands of Pennsylvania residents millions of dollars in interest and fees above the 6% statutory cap. Plaintiffs Ken Dieffenbach and Jennifer Gammage are Pennsylvania citizens who allege that Upgrade overcharged them. They both obtained Upgrade branded loans by visiting www.upgrade.com. Dieffenbach's loan was in the amount of $1,785.60, and Gammage's was in the amount of $1,300.00. Both plaintiffs repaid their loans, Dieffenbach at an Annual Percentage Rate of 37% and Gammage at an APR of 33%. Plaintiffs each paid hundreds of dollars more in interest beyond the statutory cap. Plaintiffs thus instituted the instant class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the thousands of other Pennsylvanians who were charged interest by Defendant in excess of that allowed by Pennsylvania law. The complaint contains the following three counts: 1) Violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA. STAT. Secs. 201 et seq.; 2) Violation of the Loan Interest and Protection Law, 41 PA. STAT. Secs. 101, et seq.; and 3) Violation of the Consumer Discount Company Act, 7 PA. STAT. Secs. 6201, et seq. Plaintiffs complaint seeks the following relief: restitution in the amount of any interest, fees, or other charges Defendant Upgrade charged, collected, contracted for, or received in excess of 6%; attorneys’ fees and costs; and all other relief that is necessary and proper. Defendant Upgrade has filed a motion to dismiss and to compel individual arbitration. It argues that the loan agreements at issue require any claims to be resolved individually through arbitration. Defendant argues that in the Borrower Agreement and corresponding Loan Agreement and Promissory Note, Plaintiffs both voluntarily agreed to arbitrate their claims on an individual basis when they applied for and obtained their personal loans. Defendant alleges that the substantive law of New Jersey applies, and plaintiff argues that Pennsylvania law applies. It argues that the Borrower and Loan Agreements contain a choice-of-law provision requiring the application of New Jersey law, except for the arbitration provisions which fail under the Federal Arbitration Act. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the agreements contain the choice-of-law provision, however, they argue that under Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules, Pennsylvania law applies to the underlying dispute, not New Jersey law. Defendant alleges that this case has a strong relationship to New Jersey because Cross River Bank provided/funded the loans at issue in this case and it is headquartered in New Jersey. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that Cross River Bank is not a party and was simply a vendor who the defendant paid for the use of its name on their loan documents. Defendant counters that Plaintiffs cannot avoid arbitration through artful pleading. Cross River Bank was the lender in this case and its role was central to the transactions at issue, and thus, New Jersey has a substantial relationship with the parties and transactions per the defendant. Plaintiffs, however, reside in Pennsylvania, and they seek to enforce Pennsylvania usury law. Defendant Upgrade is a corporation headquartered in California. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that New Jersey does not have a substantial relationship to this action. The complaint sets forth a "Rent-A-Bank" scheme that online lenders allegedly use to disguise usury. The complaint further alleges that the nerve center of the loan transaction is a non-bank, therefore, the "rent-a-bank" loans are non-bank loans because the bank has no real involvement in the transaction. The complaint avers that Defendant engaged in a "rent-a-bank" scheme with the New Jersey bank. The bank had no real involvement in the actions giving rise to the instant lawsuit. Accordingly, the state chosen by the parties in the choice of law provision, New Jersey, has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice exists. The choice of law provision found in the loan documents will not be enforced by the court. Taking the allegations as true, Cross River Bank, the entity which would justify applying New Jersey law, does not have a substantial relation to the parties or the transaction. The law of Pennsylvania will therefore apply. The principle dispute between the parties is whether a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement exists. The only issue raised by Plaintiffs with regard to whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists is that the arbitration agreement is invalid under Pennsylvania law. The arbitration provisions in the Borrower Agreements and Loan Agreements waive a constitutional right, that is, the right to a jury trial. Plaintiffs argue that when a party seeks to prove the waiver of a constitutional right under Pennsylvania law, a heightened standard must be met to establish that the parties assented to the agreement. The Court finds that the arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable. The only other issue is whether the dispute falls within the arbitration clauses. According to the Court, Plaintiffs' causes of action regarding whether the agreements charge an excess amount of interest and/or fees falls within the broad language of the agreements and the Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Thus, the dispute falls within the arbitration agreement. As the Court has concluded that valid arbitration agreements exist and the dispute falls within those clauses, then the clauses are enforceable and Defendant's motion to compel arbitration will be granted. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of individuals. Thus, the question of the scope of the arbitration is present. The Court may not order such arbitration on a class-wide basis if the agreement is silent or if the agreement excludes class-wide arbitration. In this case, the arbitration agreements indicate that arbitration shall not proceed on a class or collective basis. Accordingly, the Court is without authority to order classwide arbitration. Thus, the arbitration shall be compelled to the individually named plaintiffs. A copy of the Court's decision is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=uk9GJh from PacerMonitor.com. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2025. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. 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