/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/230707.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Friday, July 7, 2023, Vol. 25, No. 136 Headlines 3M COMPANY: Davis' Personal Injury Suit Removed to N.D. Alabama 3M COMPANY: Duhon Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams 3M COMPANY: Farrow Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams 3M COMPANY: Garrett Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals & Foams 3M COMPANY: Glover Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams 3M COMPANY: Green Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals 450 NORTH RIVER: Bids to Dismiss & to Strike in Collado Suit Denied 51st St. & 8TH AVE: Solis Suit Removed to C.D. California ALBANY ENT & ALLERGY: Blackmore Files Suit in S.D. New York ANDREW M. JORDAN: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Brumble Suit ANTHONYS INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York BATH & BODY: Herrera Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website BILLY REID INC: Black Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York BP EXPLORATION: Discovery Deadlines Order in Byrd & 14 Suits Upheld BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Brown B3 Case CAMBRIDGE REAL: Can Compel Arbitration in Cortez Suit, Court Says CAPITAL ONE: S.D. California Denies Bid to Strike in Marquez Suit CARPET CULTURE & RUGS: Vachnine Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York CHARLES SCHWAB: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Barbiero Class Suit CMG CIT: $900K Class Settlement in Erguera Suit Has Final Approval COOL AIR MECHANICAL: Howard Sues Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation CULTURAL CARE: FLSA Collective Certified in Posada Class Suit DUNKIN' BRANDS: Kelledy Class Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice FACEBOOK INC: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of 3rd Amended Vargas Suit HFZ KIK 30TH: Court Denies Pavarini's Bid to Allow Class Action HI Q INC: Miller Ordered to Appear for Deposition in Hoy Suit HY'S LIVERY: Conn. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Belgada Suit IMPERIAL PACIFIC: Loses Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended Genc Class Suit KOCH FARMS: Loses Partial Bid for Summary Judgment in Leo Suit LOWE'S COS: Counts I & II in Downing Suit Dismissed With Prejudice MDL 2262: Fact Discovery in Adams v. BoA Due April 4, 2024 MDL 2262: Fact Discovery in Axiom v. BoA Due April 4, 2024 MDL 2323: Stallworth, Langfitt to Get Same Fees in NFL Players Suit MDL 2873: Ahwee Suit Alleges Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams MDL 2873: Barros Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Bennett Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Castillo Suit Alleges Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams MDL 2873: Duffy Suit Alleges Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams MDL 2873: Emery Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Exposure to Toxic Chemicals Led to Death, Taylor Says MDL 2873: Faces Job Suit Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Faces Ross Suit Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Belzer Says MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Cutlip Says MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Duncan Says MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Gusch Claims MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Hamilton Says MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Williams Says MDL 2873: Hailey Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Mayfield Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: McBride Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: McDonough Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Moscatelli Alleges Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Rogers Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Soriano Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams MDL 2873: Walter Suit Alleges Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams MDL 2913: N.D. California Suggests Remand of Breathe Suit to D.D.C. META PLATFORMS: Meaning of Web-Property in Healthcare Suit Resolved META PLATFORMS: Time Period for Discovery in Healthcare Suit Solved NEGRIL ATL: Faces Gooding Suit Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation NEVADA: Bid for Writ of Mandamus in El Capitan v. Dist. Court Nixed NEW RESIDENTIAL: Ross Sues Over Unlawful Mortgage Services NEW YORK: Electronic Discovery in C.K. v. Bassett Compelled in Part NJ GREAT WALL: Court Approves $11.5K Class Settlement in Zheng Suit NORTH CAROLINA: District Court Dismisses in Part Wheeler Suit PAYSTAND INC: Waller Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. PBI RESEARCH SERVICES: Landi Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. PIXI INC: Missimer Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY: Maine Court Narrows Claims in Thurston Suit RAISE MARKETPLACE: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ROADMASTER DRIVERS: Court Narrows Claims in Amended Meehan Suit SAFECO INSURANCE: Can File Amended Answer to Cogent Brain Complaint SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA: Rodriguez Can't Intervene in Dunsmore Suit SERVALL BIOMETRICS: Norman Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois SHARED IMAGING: Court Allows Ranger to File 3rd Amended Complaint SLEEPY'S LLC: 3rd Cir. Affirms Class Certification in Hargrove Suit SMALLHOLD INC: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York SOBEL WESTEX: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York SOUTHEASTERN INDIANA: Elkins Suit Removed to S.D. Indiana STATE FARM: Clippinger Must Respond to Bid in Limine by July 7 STERIS CORPORATION: Radic Suit Removed to S.D. California SUSAN ALEXANDRA: Crosson Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York SUTER COMPANY: Harris Seeks to Recover Losses Under ERISA T-MOBILE US: Ferrendino Sues Over Failure to Protect Personal Info TA OPERATING: Siaosi Suit Removed to C.D. California TAELOR INC: Martinez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York TESLA INC: Lambrix Has Until July 17 to Consolidate and Amend Suit TESLA INC: Ragone Has Until July 17 to Consolidate and Amend Suit THISTLE HEALTH: Reid Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York TWIGS & HONEY: Alexandria Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York UNITED NATURAL FOODS: Mosley Suit Removed to C.D. California UNITED STATES: 5th Cir. Flips Class Certifications in Braidwood VAIL RESORTS: Quint Suit Stayed Until Hamilton Class Deal Is Final VF OUTDOOR LLC: Leary Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. VITAL PLAN INC: Morgan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York VITALIZE LABS: Morgan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York WHALECO INC: Eakins Suit Removed to W.D. Oklahoma WHALECO INC: Smith Suit Removed to W.D. Oklahoma WILLAMETTE VALLEY: Rougeux Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. ZIGNEGO CO: Class of Non-Office Workers Certified in Cardenas Suit Asbestos Litigation ASBESTOS UPDATE: Georgia-Pacific Avoid Lawsuits After Unit's Ch. 11 ASBESTOS UPDATE: GMS Inc. Faces 1,054 PI Lawsuits As of April 30 ********* 3M COMPANY: Davis' Personal Injury Suit Removed to N.D. Alabama --------------------------------------------------------------- The class action styled JEREL LAMAR DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. 3M COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 01-CV-2023-901655.00 was removed from the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Jefferson County, Alabama, to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on June 14, 2023. The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of Alabama assigned Case No. 2:23-cv-00783-ACA to the proceeding. The Plaintiffs seek to hold 3M and certain other Defendants liable based on their alleged conduct in designing, manufacturing, and/or selling aqueous film-forming foams and/or firefighter turnout gear that Plaintiffs allege were used in firefighting activities, thereby causing injury to Plaintiffs. Following removal, 3M intends to designate this action for transfer to the MDL. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] Defendant 3M Company is represented by: M. Christian King, Esq. Harlan I. Prater, IV, Esq. W. Larkin Radney, IV, Esq. Wesley B. Gilchrist, Esq. LIGHTFOOT, FRANKLIN & WHITE, L.L.C. The Clark Building 400 North 20th Street Birmingham, AL 35203-3200 Telephone: (205) 581-0700 E-mail: cking@lightfootlaw.com hprater@lightfootlaw.com lradney@lightfootlaw.com wgilchrist@lightfootlaw.com 3M COMPANY: Duhon Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ---------------------------------------------------------------- Aaron Frank Duhon, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTSLP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:23-cv-02796-RMG (D.S.C., June 19, 2023), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during the Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian and was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Phone: (850) 202-1010 Email: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com 3M COMPANY: Farrow Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ----------------------------------------------------------------- Jack D. Farrow, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTSLP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:23-cv-02674-RMG (D.S.C., June 14, 2023), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to, AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was prostate cancer as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Phone: (850) 202-1010 Email: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com 3M COMPANY: Garrett Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals & Foams ----------------------------------------------------------------- Don Garrett, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:23-cv-02278-RMG (D.S.C., May 26, 2023), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to, AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was diagnosed with vocal cord cancer as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq. Steven D. Gacovino, Esq. GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 270 West Main Street Sayville, NY 11782 Phone: 631-600-0000 Facsimile: 631-543-5450 - and - Gregory A. Cade, Esq. Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Kevin B. McKie, Esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C. 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Phone: 205-328-9200 Facsimile: 205-328-9456 3M COMPANY: Glover Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ----------------------------------------------------------------- Kwane M. Glover, as Surviving son of Daniel Robertson, deceased, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTSLP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:23-cv-02808-RMG (D.S.C., June 19, 2023), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff Kwane M. Glover is the surviving son of Daniel Robertson, who regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to, AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career as a military and/or civilian and was diagnosed with thyroid cancer as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Phone: (850) 202-1010 Email: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com 3M COMPANY: Green Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals ------------------------------------------------------- Nathaniel Green, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTSLP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:23-cv-02708-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to, AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was prostate cancer as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Phone: (850) 202-1010 Email: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com 450 NORTH RIVER: Bids to Dismiss & to Strike in Collado Suit Denied ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, OCTAVIO COLLADO, for himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 450 NORTH RIVER DRIVE, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-23074-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes (S.D. Fla.), Judge Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denies the Defendants' Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss. The cause is before the Court upon the Motion to Strike and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants 450 North River Drive, LLC, d/b/a Kiki on the River, Roman Jones, and RJ River, LLC. Plaintiff Collado filed a Response in opposition to the Motion to Strike and a separate Response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The Defendants filed a Reply in support of the Motion to Strike and a separate Reply in support of the Motion to Dismiss. Judge Bloom has carefully reviewed the Motions, the Responses, the Replies, the record in the case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. The lawsuit is a putative class action brought against the Defendants for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") (Count I), the Florida Minimum Wage Act ("FMWA") (Count II), and Florida common law (Count III). The Plaintiff claims that he was denied payment owed to him while working at Defendants' restaurant, Kiki on the River. On April 27, 2023, the Defendants filed their Motion to Strike. Therein, they argue that seven allegations within Count II of the Third Amended Complaint must be stricken because those allegations seek to hold them liable for all tips that they withheld from the Plaintiff. They argue that the FMWA does not authorize such recovery. On the same day they filed the Motion to Strike, the Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss. Therein, they seek dismissal of Count II and Count III of the Third Amended Complaint. In its Responses, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is procedurally improper because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g) prohibits a defendant from filing multiple Rule 12 motions in response to a complaint. He additionally argues that the Motions should be denied on the merits. Judge Bloom first addresses the propriety of the Defendants' simultaneous filing of a Motion to Strike and a Motion to Dismiss directed against the same Complaint. She agrees with the Plaintiff that the Defendants' second Rule 12 motion -- the Motion to Dismiss -- must be denied as being improperly filed. The Plaintiff persuasively argues that the Defendants were required to combine their Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss into one filing, and their failure to do so warrants denial of the Motion to Dismiss. Judge Bloom now turns to consider the merits of the Motion to Strike. In their Motion to Strike, the Defendants move to strike the following allegations within the Third Amended Complaint: 82, 85(b)(x), 104, 113, 125, 128, and subparagraph (d) of Count II's "Wherefore" clause. Each of those allegations relate to "tips/overtips" that the Defendants unlawfully retained in violation of the FMWA. The Defendants argue that the FMWA, unlike the FLSA, does not create a cause of action for tip retention apart from a minimum wage or tip credit violation. The Plaintiff responds that the cases cited by the Defendants provide no support for their legal position. Even assuming the Defendants are correct that, under the FMWA, employees may recover only up to the tip credit and not the actual tips, Judge Bloom holds that the Defendants have failed to show that any of the provisions at issue are "redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous," so there is no cause to strike them. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss are denied. The Defendants will file an Answer to the Third Amended Complaint. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4mknrp3m from Leagle.com. 51st St. & 8TH AVE: Solis Suit Removed to C.D. California --------------------------------------------------------- The case captioned as Rosa Solis, an individual, on behalf of herself, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated v. 51st St. & 8TH AVE. CORP., a New York corporation; LOEWS CORONADO HOTEL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; LOEW'S HOTELS, INC., a New York corporation; and DOES 1-50, Inclusive, Case No. 37-2023-00021359-CU-OE-CTL was removed from the Superior Court for the State of California, County of San Diego, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California on June 22, 2023, and assigned Case No. 3:23-cv-01161-JES-AHG. In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts 8 causes of action arising out of her employment with Defendant: violations of California Business & Professions Code; failure to pay the minimum wages; failure to pay overtime compensation; failure to provide required meal periods; failure to provide required rest periods; failure to pay wages when due; failure to provide accurate itemized wage statement; and (8) failure to reimburse for all necessary business-related expenses.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Ellen M. Bronchetti, Esq. GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 101 Second Street, Suite 2200 San Francisco, CA 94105 Phone: 415.655.1300 Facsimile: 415.707.2010 Email: Ellen.bronchetti@gtlaw.com ALBANY ENT & ALLERGY: Blackmore Files Suit in S.D. New York ----------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Albany ENT & Allergy Services P.C. The case is styled as Andre Blackmore, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Albany ENT & Allergy Services P.C., Case No. 1:23-cv-00757-BKS-CFH (S.D.N.Y., June 22, 2023). The nature of suit is stated as Other Personal Property for Personal Injury. Albany ENT & Allergy Services -- https://albanyentandallergy.com/ -- offers care for adults and children with disorders of the ear, nose, throat, head and neck.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Elmer R. Keach, III, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III, P.C. One Pine West Plaza-Suite 109 Albany, NY 12205 Phone: (518) 434-1718 Fax: (518) 770-1558 Email: bobkeach@keachlawfirm.com ANDREW M. JORDAN: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Brumble Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, KERWYN BRUMBLE, Plaintiff v. ANDREW M. JORDAN, INC., Defendant, Case No. 23-cv-01336-RS (N.D. Cal.), Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California: a. denies Brumble's motion to remand the action; b. grants Jordan's motion for summary judgment as to the preempted claims; and c. remands the remaining state law claims to state court, without prejudice to any determination the state court may subsequently make as to whether arbitration of those claims should be compelled. The lawsuit is a putative class action asserting wage and hour claims on behalf of non-exempt employees of the Defendant, a construction company that provides a full array of construction and civil engineering services in Northern California. Named Plaintiff Brumble began working for Jordan in 2019 under the job title "laborer." Brumble's complaint, filed originally in Alameda County Superior Court, asserts eight claims for relief: failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime, failure to provide meal breaks, failure to provide rest breaks, failure to provide sick time compensation, wage statement violations, waiting penalties, and unfair competition. Jordan removed the action here, contending jurisdiction exists by virtue of the preemptive effect of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185 ("LMRA"), because Brumble's employment is subject to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Jordan now moves for summary judgment as to the claims for relief it contends are preempted, and to compel arbitration as to the remaining claims, over which it contends the Court has supplemental jurisdiction. Brumble, in turn, moves to remand the entire action to state court, arguing the complaint did not support removal jurisdiction. Because Brumble's motion to remand challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, Judge Seeborg addresses it first. He says Jordan's notice of removal asserts jurisdiction is proper based on claims in the complaint that give rise to a federal question. On their face, all of the claims for relief are stated exclusively under California state law. Jordan, however, contends certain of the claims are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. The flaw in Brumble's argument is that he fails to address the directly applicable holding of Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019). Curtis concludes that by its terms, the default definition of overtime and overtime rates in section 510 does not apply to an employee who is subject to a qualifying CBA. Because of that, as long as the employment is governed by a CBA that satisfies Labor Code section 514, the right to overtime "exists solely as a result of the CBA," and therefore is preempted under Section 301. Jordan has submitted admissible and adequate evidence that Brumble's employment was governed by a qualifying CBA. Although unnecessary to give rise to the right to remove, the same basic analysis applies to the claim for meal period violations (CBA gives rise to exemption under Labor Code section 512 (e)), the claim for rest period violations (exemption under Labor Code section 227(e) and Wage Order 16), and the claim for sick time pay (exemption under Labor Code section 245.5). Finally, the portion of the unfair competition claim that is based on these underlying alleged violations is likewise preempted and also supports removal. Hence, Brumble's motion to remand is denied. Jordan seeks summary judgment in its favor on the overtime, meal period, rest period, and sick time claims, as well as the portion of the unfair competition claim arising from those claims, on grounds that Jordan's employment was exempt from the state law provisions he contends were violated. Brumble's opposition to summary judgment is two-fold. First, it argues that Jordan has not adequately established that his employment was in fact subject to the CBA Jordan submitted with its motion papers. Second, Brumble contends the CBA does not fully meet the requirements of Wage Order 16 to make his employment exempt from the statutory meal period and rest break rules. The issues to which Brumble points, however, do not obviate the effect of the CBA. Judge Seeborg holds that Brumble's employment was not subject to the California statutory requirements that govern overtime, rest period, meal periods, and sick time in the absence of a qualifying CBA. His claims under those statutes fail as a matter of law, and Jordan's motion for summary judgment is granted. Jordan moves to compel Brumble to arbitrate those claims pursuant to an arbitration provision of the CBA. Brumble opposes, arguing that Jordan waived the right to compel arbitration by seeking a court adjudication of some of the claims in this action via its summary judgment motion. Judge Seeborg holds that the question of whether the remaining state law claims are subject to arbitration is more appropriately addressed by the state courts. By seeking summary judgment on the preempted claims and arbitration of the remaining claims, however, Jordan has already precluded that. Additionally, the determination that certain claims are preempted has not required substantive analysis of the underlying facts or remaining claims such that there would be any judicial efficiencies in exercising supplemental jurisdiction were arbitration not ordered. A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Discretion counsels such a result in this case. For these reasons, Judge Seeborg denies Brumble's motion to remand the action for lack of jurisdiction. He grants Jordan's motion for summary judgment in its favor as to Brumble's overtime, meal period, rest period, and sick time claims, as well as the portion of the unfair competition claim arising from those claims. He denies Jordan's motion to compel arbitration of the remaining claims without prejudice to its refiling in state court following remand. The action is remanded to the Alameda County Superior Court. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mt9kee4h from Leagle.com. ANTHONYS INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York -------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Anthonys, Inc. The case is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Anthonys, Inc., Case No. 1:23-cv-05311-MKV (S.D.N.Y., June 22, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Anthony's Inc. sells and distributes apparel for women. The Company offers casual wear, swimsuits, ankle pants, and resort wear peices.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com BATH & BODY: Herrera Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website --------------------------------------------------------- CARLOS HERRERA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BATH & BODY WORKS, INC., Defendant, Case No. HUD-L-002136-23 (N.J. Super., Hudson Cty., June 16, 2023) is a civil rights action brought by the Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, seeking redress for Defendant's actions which violate the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Plaintiff, like approximately 2 million other people in the United States, is visually impaired and legally blind. He asserts that upon visiting Defendant's website, https://www.bathandbodyworks.com/, he quickly became aware of Defendant's failure to maintain and operate its website in a way to make it fully accessible for himself and for other blind or visually-impaired people. He contends that Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and therefore denial of its goods and services offered thereby, is a violation of his rights under the ADA. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers. Bath & Body Works, Inc. is an American retail store chain that sells soaps, lotions, fragrances, and candles.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Daniel Zemel, Esq. ZEMEL LAW LLC 660 Broadway Paterson, NJ 07514 Telephone: (862) 227-3106 E-mail: dz@zemellawllc.com BILLY REID INC: Black Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York ----------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Billy Reid, Inc. The case is styled as Jahron Black, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Billy Reid, Inc., Case No. 1:23-cv-04647 (E.D.N.Y., June 22, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Billy Reid, Inc. -- https://www.billyreid.com/ -- is a modern designer of men's clothing and women's clothing, shoes and accessories.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 14749 71st Ave. Flushing, NY 11367 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com BP EXPLORATION: Discovery Deadlines Order in Byrd & 14 Suits Upheld ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the cases, George Arron Byrd, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, P.L.C.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Rebecca Yarbrough, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Jennifer Danielle Byrd, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Joy Lashawn Beverly, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Lucy Ann Dailey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Sharitye Seay, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, George Leonard Coon, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Dennis Edward Bosarge; Lorinda Ruth Bosarge, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Reynard Lenderis Brown, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, John D. Naples, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP America Production Company; BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP, p.l.c., Defendants-Appellees, Gary Joseph Terrebonne, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, John Earl Fountain, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Royce Lamar Fairley, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Alexis White, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, Terry Hye, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated; BP America Production Company; BP, p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, L.L.C.; Transocean Deepwater, Incorporated; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Halliburton Energy Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees, No. 22-30654, Summary Calendar, Consolidated with Nos. 22-30657, 22-30661, 22-30665, 22-30666, 22-30667, 22-30668, 22-30669, 22-30671, 22-30694, 22-30724, 22-30725, 22-30726, 22-30728, 22-30731 (5th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirms the district court's order declining to extend discovery deadlines and granting BP's motion for summary judgment. These 15 cases are yet another chapter in the Deepwater Horizon saga. The Fifth Circuit is asked whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to extend discovery deadlines and instead ruling on BP's motion for summary judgment. The Appellants are workers hired by BP (through sub-contractors) to clean up the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Because they allege that this work caused them acute, chronic medical conditions, they declined to participate in BP's previous class action settlement and chose to proceed individually. For this collection of cases, the district court gave the workers over a year to submit expert reports concerning causation. The workers relied on Dr. Jerald Cook as their general causation expert. Dr. Cook concluded that several categories of injury can result from exposure to crude oil or dispersants, including harm to lungs, skin, and eyes. Meanwhile, the workers tried to depose Dr. David Dutton, BP's main fact witness regarding the health and safety of clean-up workers. Aside from a short deposition that the workers found unsatisfactory, they were unable to do so. This, says the workers, kept them from presenting evidence on BP's decision-making regarding dermal testing and biomonitoring of clean-up crews. Despite that discovery issue, the district court excluded Dr. Cook's report and granted summary judgment to BP. It first found that Dr. Cook did not identify the harmful level of exposure to a chemical at issue, a baseline requirement of general causation in these sorts of cases. Then, because the workers provided no other evidence of general causation, the district court awarded summary judgment to BP. It explained that even if the workers were correct that BP willfully declined to collect dermal testing and biomonitoring data, such a failure was irrelevant to general causation. The workers now appeal. Before diving into the merits, the Fifth Circuit notes that the Appellants do not challenge the exclusion of Dr. Cook's report. Instead, they argue only that the district court erred in granting summary judgment before they had a chance to depose a BP executive with regards to dermal testing and biomonitoring. In denying the workers' Rule 56(d) motions, the district court explained that the evidence the workers sought (on whether BP failed to conduct dermal testing and biomonitoring) was irrelevant to the general causation inquiry. And even if the court were to consider any such evidence, the reasoning went, that evidence would not cure the lack of 'fit' between Dr. Cook's general causation report and the facts of the Plaintiffs' case[s]. As such, it concluded that any stay of discovery deadlines was unwarranted, and that summary judgment was proper. The Appellants deem that denial an abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit disagrees. It's repeatedly held that plaintiffs alleging injury due to exposure to toxic substances must prove both general and specific causation. In these toxic-tort cases, the Fifth Circuit demands scientific -- i.e., expert -- knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical as a minimal fact necessary to sustain the plaintiffs' burden. As the district court rightly explained, even assuming that BP had an affirmative duty to conduct dermal testing or biomonitoring after the oil spill, the lack of this information is not what renders Dr. Cook's expert report unreliable, unhelpful, and inadmissible. Because the Appellants do not explain how the evidence they seek would allow them to prove general causation and because they do not otherwise challenge the exclusion of Dr. Cook's report, the Fifth Circuit cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion. Hence, the district court is affirmed. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2k7vctum from Leagle.com. BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Brown B3 Case -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, SHAH MUNEER AKBAR BROWN v. BP EXPLORATION & PROD., INC., ET AL., SECTION A(2), Civil Action No. 17-3641 (E.D. La.), Judge Jay C. Zainey of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' motion in limine and their motion for summary judgment. The case is a B3 lawsuit that was allotted to this section from Judge Barbier's MDL 2179 pertaining to the Deepwater Horizon disaster that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. The B3 pleading bundle includes personal injury claims due to oil or chemical exposure during the disaster response -- In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6055613, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the Medical Settlement or were not members of the settlement class. The Plaintiff was employed in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response effort and claims that exposure to crude oil and chemical dispersants (the former being released by the oil spill itself and the latter being used in the cleanup process) caused various personal injuries, some temporary and some long-term. From the inception of the severed B3 cases, it has been understood that to prevail "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the response." Because causation had proved to be the critical element in the BELO cases, it was predicted to be the "make-or-break" issue for many B3 cases as well. A B3 plaintiff must prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the oil spill response. The issue of causation will require an individualized inquiry. The Plaintiff's burden with respect to causation in a toxic tort case involves proof of both general causation and specific causation. General causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population. Specific causation is whether a substance caused a particular individual's injury, i.e., the plaintiff's injury. If the Plaintiff's case fails at the first-step of producing admissible evidence as to general causation, then the issue of specific causation is rendered moot. In each of the hundreds of B3 cases that were reassigned from MDL 2179 to the judges of this district, the Plaintiff attempted to prove both general and specific causation by relying on expert medical doctor, Jerald Cook, M.D. Dr. Cook's expert report, of which there have been several versions, has been described by another judge as an omnibus, non-case specific general causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs. Unfortunately, no version of Dr. Cook's report has been accepted in this district. The motion in limine pertains to the Plaintiff's use of Dr. Cook's report, and the testimony that would derive from it at trial, as evidence of both general and specific causation. The Movants seek to exclude Dr. Cook's opinions on various grounds including the principles espoused in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Again, Dr. Cook's report has been rejected under Daubert by the judges of this district. If Dr. Cook's opinions are excluded from trial, then the Defendants argue that their motion for summary judgment must be granted because the Plaintiff will have no expert medical causation evidence, which would constitute a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the case. Judge Zainey has carefully studied and considered the numerous decisions issued by the other judges of this district who have determined that Dr. Cook's opinions should be excluded. For the same reasons given by Judges Vance, Barbier, Morgan, Milazzo, and Ashe when they granted the Defendants' motions in limine directed at the same or even "improved" versions of Dr. Cook's report, he grants the Defendants' motion in limine. Consequently, he likewise grants the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Judge Zainey notes that the Plaintiff has filed a spoliation motion in this matter but the judges of this district, including this Court, have rejected in numerous other cases the arguments raised in that motion. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3jdsdf87 from Leagle.com. CAMBRIDGE REAL: Can Compel Arbitration in Cortez Suit, Court Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ALBERTO C. CORTEZ, Plaintiff v. CAMBRIDGE REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-07332-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California grants Cambridge's motion to compel arbitration. The Plaintiff brought the putative class action against Cambridge, alleging 10 causes of action related to Cortez's employment with Cambridge, including both individual and class claims. Cambridge moves to compel Cortez to arbitrate his claims as required by an arbitration agreement. On April 1, 2019, Cambridge, a property management service business, hired Cortez. On the same day, the Plaintiff signed the Agreement, in which he agreed to submit "any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes, lawsuits or controversies arising out of or relating to his or her application or candidacy for employment, his or her employment, or the cessation of his or her employment to binding arbitration before a neutral and unbiased arbitrator." Under the Agreement, "the term 'any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes, lawsuits or controversies' includes, but is no limited to, any and all claims, actions, or executive orders, or under the common law of any jurisdiction." Cortez's last date of employment with Cambridge was Oct. 18, 2021. On Oct. 7, 2022, Cortez originally brought the Complaint against the Defendant in Butte County Superior Court alleging ten causes of action related to Cortez's employment with Cambridge: (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages and for All Hours Worked; (2) Failure to Pay Wages and Overtime; (3) Meal Period Liability; (4) Rest Break Liability; (5) Violation of Labor Code Section 226(a); (6) Violation of Labor Code Section 221; (7) Violation of Labor Code Section 204; (8) Violation of Labor Code Section 203; (9) Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses; and (10) Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200. On Nov. 18, 2022, Cambridge removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). Cambridge moves to compel Cortez to arbitrate his individual claims based on the Agreement, and to dismiss Cortez's class claims. Judge Gilliam agrees that the Agreement is enforceable and that the class claims must be dismissed. First, he finds that a valid arbitration covering the claims in the lawsuit exists. The declaration of Angela Cooper adequately authenticates the Agreement. Cooper, the Human Resources Consultant for Cambridge Real Estate, attests to having personal knowledge of the date of Cortez's hiring and affirms that the Plaintiff signed the Agreement on April 1, 2019. Significantly, Cortez does not challenge the authenticity of his own handwritten signature on the Agreement. Moreover, the signed agreement is attached to the declaration of Cooper and the Plaintiff does not actually deny that the handwritten signature is his. Accordingly, Judge Gilliam grants Cambridge's motion to compel arbitration with respect to the individual claims. However, the putative class claims may not be arbitrated. Judge Gilliam finds the clause ambiguous because the language in the agreement may be reasonably interpreted to extend only to individual claims or also to class claims. The ambiguity present in the Agreement provides that "any and all claims, actions, or lawsuits" must be submitted "to binding arbitration before a neutral and unbiased arbitrator." Even the Plaintiff admits that the Agreement is silent as to class claims. In light of his findings that the class claims may not be arbitrated and that the Plaintiff's individual claims are compelled to arbitration, Judge Gilliam finds that he must dismiss the putative class claims. He says because the Plaintiff cannot serve as class representative given the Court's dismissal of the individual claims, there is no class representative who can pursue the class claims, and those claims are dismissed. Finally, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a notice of removal to be filed within 30 days after the receipt of notice by the Defendant and the Defendant met this deadline, Judge Gilliam holds that the removal was proper. The Plaintiff also argues that if the class claims are dismissed, the individual claims should be remanded to state court, where the Plaintiff has initiated a separate PAGA case. Because he has granted the motion to compel arbitration with respect to the individual claims, Judge Gilliam says there are no individual claims to remand. For these reasons, Cambridge's motion to compel arbitration is granted and Cortez's putative class claims are dismissed. The remainder of the case is stayed pending completion of arbitration. The parties are directed to file a joint status report regarding the status of the arbitration proceeding 120 days from the date of this order and every 120 days thereafter unless otherwise ordered. The Clerk is directed to administratively close the case. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4axf6b42 from Leagle.com. CAPITAL ONE: S.D. California Denies Bid to Strike in Marquez Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the lawsuit entitled AILEEN MARQUEZ, MARIA DIANA DE LA ROSA, and JORGE A. RODRIGUEZ, for themselves and all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CAPITAL ONE BANK, USA N.A.; CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION; and CAPITAL ONE, N.A., Defendants, Case No. 22-CV-1591-GPC-KSC (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denies without prejudice the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike. Before the Court is Defendants Capital One Bank, USA N.A.'s; Capital One Financial Corporation's; and Capital One N.A.'s Motion to Stay under the first-to-file rule. Plaintiffs Aileen Marquez, Maria Diana De La Rosa, and Jorge A. Rodriguez ("Plaintiffs" or "Marquez, et al.") have filed an opposition, and the Defendants filed a reply. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d), the Court found the matter was appropriate for decision on the papers and vacated the hearing previously scheduled for June 9, 2023. In July 2021, Aileen Marquez filed a Complaint ("Original Complaint") in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego against the Defendants. The Original Complaint was not a class action and was filed only on behalf of Marquez. It alleged that the Defendants violated the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA") when Marquez, represented by counsel, sent the Defendants a cease and desist letter and yet the Defendants allegedly continued to directly contact Marquez about collecting a debt. In August 2021, Sergio D. Fiorarancio filed a Class Action Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, Fiorarancio v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 3:12-cv-15775-GC-RLS ("the New Jersey Action"). In the New Jersey Action, Fiorarancio alleged that Capital One Bank violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") when it contacted Fiorarancio and class members on their cellular telephones using an artificial or prerecorded voice without their prior express consent, or after they revoked consent. Fiorarancio seeks injunctive relief, actual and statutory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. In September 2022, despite opposition from the Defendants, the California Superior Court granted Marquez Leave to file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). It found that an eight-month delay between filings did not warrant denying the amendments, and reasoned that although the amendments may require additional investigation or a delay in trial date, there did not appear to be any significant prejudice to Defendants since the claims are based on the same general set of facts, discovery is ongoing, there is no impending issue with the statute of limitations, and Marquez would be entitled to refile her claims as a new lawsuit. The FAC added two new causes of action pursuant to the TCPA, and added class action allegations. The TCPA causes of action allege that Marquez's cease and desist letter revoked any alleged consent for the Defendants or their agents or representatives to call her on her cellular telephone with an artificial or prerecorded voice. In October 2022, the Defendants removed the Superior Court Action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331, 1332, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. In April 2023, the Court granted the parties' Joint Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). Maria Diana De La Rosa and Jorge A. Rodriguez were added as named plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated the RFDCPA and the TCPA by contacting the Plaintiffs and class members via their cellular telephones for debt collection purposes using an artificial and/or recorded voice. The Plaintiffs seek to represent a national class for their TCPA claim and a California sub-Class for their RFDCPA claim. They seek injunctive relief, actual and statutory damages, and attorneys' fees. As of May 2023, both the New Jersey Action and this instant action have conducted some discovery--the full extent of which is unclear--and neither of these actions have obtained class certification. The Defendants move to stay the proceedings before the Court in light of the New Jersey Action under the first-to-file rule. Although Fiorarancio filed the New Jersey Action a month after Marquez's original individual lawsuit, Fiorarancio's class action claim still predated Marquez's class action claim by 13 months, Judge Curiel notes. The Plaintiffs argue that because their SAC relates back to their Original Complaint under the relation-back doctrine, this instant action was filed first. However, Judge Curiel finds that the Plaintiffs do not direct the Court's attention to any cases holding that an amended class action relates back to the original individual complaint. Furthermore, the Court finds that the relation back doctrine is inapplicable to the first-to-file issue in this case. Judge Curiel explains that the purpose of the relation back doctrine is to provide maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural technicalities, citing ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2014). Because staying an action under the first-to-file rule does not deprive the Plaintiffs of the maximum opportunity to decide their claims on the merits, Judge Curiel holds that the relation-back doctrine is not implicated here. Moreover, even if the SAC relates back to the Original Complaint, the Court finds that the date of when the Original Complaint was filed adds little value to the Court's litigation economy analysis. By asserting his class claim 13 months before the Plaintiffs in this action did, Judge Curiel opines that Fiorarancio provided the New Jersey court and parties with a 13-month head start to conduct class discovery and determine if class certification would be appropriate. Efficiency and comity favors deferring to the New Jersey Action, and staying the proceedings, Judge Curiel points out. Fiorarancio and Marquez, et al., both seek to represent a class, who "within four years prior" to their respective litigation, received calls on their "cellular telephone" from or on behalf of Capital One, utilizing "an artificial or prerecorded" voice. The class in the New Jersey Action is further limited to those "for whom Capital One cannot demonstrate that it had written, prior express consent for such calls and/or where the called person had previously revoked consent." Marquez, et al., define their California RFDCPA sub-class to include persons who provided Defendants written notice withdrawing consent for such calls. Accordingly, Judge Curiel says, even though Marquez, et al.'s California RFDCPA Class likely would not be represented in the New Jersey Action, the common questions of law and fact will be so overwhelmingly similar between the two actions such that these two factors also favor staying the Marquez, et al., proceedings. For these reasons, Judge Curiel grants the Defendant's Motion to Stay. The parties are directed to file a joint status report every 120 days. Because the matter has been stayed, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike is denied without prejudice. The hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, previously scheduled for July 7, 2023, is vacated. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 12, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/557e7s5x from Leagle.com. CARPET CULTURE & RUGS: Vachnine Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York --------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Carpet Culture & Rugs Inc. The case is styled as Ness-Lee Vachnine, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. The Rug Company, Ltd., Case No. 1:23-cv-05277 (S.D.N.Y., June 22, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Carpet Culture -- https://www.carpet-culture.com/ -- is a unique rug store in Soho New York, offering an exceptional selection of new and antique rugs from around the world.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Gabriel Levy, Esq. GABRIEL A. LEVY, P.C. 1129 Northern Blvd, Suite 404 Manhasset, NY 11030 Phone: (516) 287-3458 Email: glevy@glpcfirm.com CHARLES SCHWAB: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Barbiero Class Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, LAUREN MARIE BARBIERO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CHARLES SCHWAB INVESTMENT ADVISORY, INC.; THE CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 22-15932 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' putative class action complaint. Barbiero and other named Plaintiffs appeal the district court's dismissal of their putative class action complaint against Charles Schwab Investment Advisory, Inc. and Charles Schwab Corporation (collectively, "Schwab") as precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"). Reviewing de novo, the Ninth Circuit affirms. The Plaintiffs' state law claims involve Schwab's handling of the Plaintiffs' assets in their Schwab Intelligent Portfolios ("SIP") accounts. They contend that by over-concentrating clients' assets in cash, Schwab imposed an "undeclared fee" and contravened clients' investment objectives. Thus, even though misrepresentation is not an element of all of the Plaintiffs' causes of action, the gravamen of the claims is a deceptive practice actionable under federal securities law. The Plaintiffs argue that any misrepresentations and omissions were not, however, material to a decision by one or more individuals (other than the fraudster) to buy or sell a 'covered security,' taking the case out of SLUSA's class action bar. However, the Plaintiffs allege that the deceptive conduct here directly affected the "trading strategies" in their SIP accounts, not just their decision to keep those accounts open or their relationship with Schwab. The fact that Schwab, rather than the Plaintiffs themselves, did the actual buying and selling of securities is inapposite because the complaint makes plain that plaintiffs had control over Schwab's decision to buy and sell securities on the Plaintiffs' behalf. The Ninth Circuit thus agrees with the district court that SLUSA precludes the Plaintiffs' claims. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant leave to amend. It is clear on de novo review that the Plaintiffs' complaint could not be saved by amendment. No amendment would change the conclusion that deceptive statements or conduct form the gravamen or essence of the claim. Thus, the Ninth Circuit cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/pe3wr4j4 from Leagle.com. CMG CIT: $900K Class Settlement in Erguera Suit Has Final Approval ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, MARGARITA ERGUERA, an individual on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CMG CIT ACQUISITION, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-1744 JLT CDB (E.D. Cal.), Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California grants the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of a class settlement and the Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs from the settlement fund, expenses for settlement administration, and a service payment for the class representative. Erguera asserts CMG and Circharo Acquisition LLC violated California wage and hour laws by (1) failing to include all remuneration in the regular rate of pay when calculating overtime wages, and (2) failing to timely pay all wages owing at termination of employment. The Plaintiff seeks final approval of a class settlement reached in this action. In addition, she seeks attorneys' fees and costs from the settlement fund, expenses for settlement administration, and a service payment for the class representative. The Defendants do not oppose these requests, and no class member submitted objections to the settlement terms. Judge Thurston found the matters suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and the hearing for final approval was vacated. The Defendants operate a healthcare staffing company that employs hourly health care professionals for short-term travel assignments at health care providers throughout California and elsewhere. For each work assignment, they execute an assignment contract specifying the employee's compensation and expected work hours. Employees receive both an hourly wage and a weekly per diem allowance, the latter of which varies depending upon the extent to which the employee satisfies her contracted hours for that week. An employees' weekly per diem allowance is prorated on a sliding scale to the extent the employee fails to satisfy her weekly contracted hours. The Plaintiff asserts that as employees of the Defendants, she and others performed assignments for more than eight hours per week. When this would occur, she alleges that the Defendants did not include the value of the weekly per diem allowance in their regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating their overtime and double time wages. On Dec. 8, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the instant class complaint. She identifies the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay overtime wages pursuant to Cal. Labor Code Sections 510, 1194; (2) unlawful and unfair conduct in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200, et seq.; (3) waiting time penalties pursuant to Cal. Labor Code Sections 201, 203; and (4) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 201, et seq. The Plaintiff asserts the claims are brought on behalf of herself and the California class composed of "all non-exempt hourly health care professionals employed by the Defendants in California who, at any time since four years before the filing of this action, worked overtime and received a per diem allowance." The Defendants filed their answer on Feb. 8, 2021. The Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the settlement, which was granted on Nov. 8, 2022. The Court appointed the Plaintiff as the Class Representative and authorized her request for an incentive payment up to $5,000 subject to a petition and review. In addition, it appointed the firm of Hayes Pawlenko LLP as the Class Counsel. The Court preliminarily granted the Class Counsel's request for fees not to exceed 25% of the gross settlement amount and costs up to $10,000, noting the requests were also subject to review at the final approval stage. Finally, the Court appointed Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the Settlement Administrator, and authorized costs up to $15,000 for the administration. The Court approved the Class Notice that conveyed this information for Class Members on Nov. 18, 2022. On Jan. 18, 2023, the Settlement Administrator mailed the Class Notice to all 784 Class Members. Jarrod Salinas, a case manager for the Settlement Administrator, reports that 41 Notices returned from the Post Office without a forwarding address and only two Notice Packets were undeliverable. No Class Member disputed the number of overtime hours identified in their Notice Packets for purposes of calculating each settlement share. Further, no requests for exclusion or objections to the agreement terms were received by either the Settlement Administrator or the Court. On Feb. 9, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, a service award for the Plaintiff as the Class Representative, and settlement administration expenses. On March 2, 2023, she filed a motion for final approval of the settlement. The Defendants did not oppose either of the pending motions. Pursuant to the proposed "Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, the parties agree to a gross settlement amount of $900,000 for a class including: All non-exempt hourly healthcare professionals employed by Defendant in California who, at any time from Dec. 8, 2016 through Sept. 30, 2022, worked overtime and received a per diem allowance. In the event the number of class members exceeds 800, the Gross Settlement Fund will be increased pro-rata for each additional class member. The settlement funds are non-reversionary and the Defendants will also pay employer-side payroll taxes separately from the Gross Settlement Fund. The parties agree the Gross Settlement Fund will cover payments to class members, including (1) a service award to the Plaintiff as the Class Representative, not to exceed $5,000; (2) payment to the Class Counsel for attorneys' fees and costs, not to exceed $10,000; and (3) administration fees to the Settlement Administrator, not to exceed $15,000. After these payments, the remaining balance of the Gross Settlement Fund would be distributed to class members who did not opt-out. Settlement shares will be calculated on a pro rata basis to class members based on the number of overtime hours the Defendants' pay records credit each member with having worked during the class period. The appointed Settlement Administrator will distribute payment by mailing checks to all class members. Checks must be cashed within 180 days of the mailing. If any check remains uncashed after the 180-day period, the money does not revert to the Defendants. Rather, the amount will be deposited with the State of California Controller's Office of Unclaimed Funds in the name of the individual to whom the settlement check had been addressed. The Settlement provides that the Plaintiff and the class members, other than those who elect not to participate in the Settlement, will release Defendants from claims. The release for the Plaintiff encompasses more claims than those identified for class members, because she agreed to release any claims known and unknown against the Defendants, not just those claims constrained to the facts alleged in this action. Thus, claims released by the Plaintiff -- but not the Settlement Class -- include any claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The parties agree the class members would not be required to take any action to receive their settlement shares. However, any class member who wishes may file objections, elect not to participate in the Settlement, or dispute the number of Qualifying Overtime Hours allocated to him or her. The proposed notice for class members explains the procedures to object to the terms, request exclusion from the Settlement, and dispute overtime calculations. Salinas reports the Notice was mailed to 784 Class Members on January 18, 2023. He reports that no Class Member disputed the number of overtime hours identified in the Notice, which was given for purposes of calculating each settlement share. Salinas also reports the Settlement Administrator did not receive any requests for exclusion or objections from the Class Members. Likewise, the Court did not receive any objections to the Settlement. Judge Thurston finds that the Plaintiff meets the burden to demonstrate certification of the Settlement Class is appropriate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Class Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. The factors set forth under Rule 23 and Ninth Circuit precedent weigh in favor of final approval of the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, she grants the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the Settlement. She grants certification of the Settlement Class. The Class is defined as follows: All non-exempt hourly healthcare professionals employed by Defendant in California who, at any time from Dec. 8, 2016 through Sept. 30, 2022, worked overtime and received a per diem allowance. Judge Thurston grants (1) the request for a Class Representative service payment to the Plaintiff in the amount of $5,000; (2) the Class Counsel's motion for fees in the amount of 25% of the gross settlement fund -- in the total amount of $225,000; (3) the Class Counsel's request for costs in the amount of $9,305.85; and (4) the Settlement Administration expenses in the amount of $10,000, to be paid from the Gross Settlement Fund. The action is dismissed with prejudice, with each side to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees except as otherwise provided by the Settlement and ordered by the Court. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the action. The Court retains jurisdiction to consider any further applications arising out of or in connection with the Settlement. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ytjc2dvb from Leagle.com. COOL AIR MECHANICAL: Howard Sues Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation --------------------------------------------------------------- JUSTIN HOWARD, CHRIS TAYLOR, BILLY MAYVILLE, SEAN BOWLING, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. COOL AIR MECHANICAL, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:23-cv-02725-SCJ (N.D. Ga., June 17, 2023) arises from Defendant's willful violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and for breach of contract as well as individual claims for retaliation under the FLSA. The putative Class is comprised of all persons who are or were employed by the Defendant as hourly service technicians at any time within the past four years. Allegedly, the Defendant acted willfully or with reckless disregard as to their obligation to pay workers a minimum hourly wage and proper overtime, and, accordingly, Defendant's violations were willful for purposes of the FLSA. By not paying service technicians within the proposed Class the agreed upon hourly wage for the time Defendant recorded but chose to exclude from employees' compensable time, Defendant systematically breached its contracts with these Plaintiffs and Class members. Further, the Defendants have willfully and deliberately discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiffs Howard and Taylor for asserting their FLSA minimum wage and overtime rights, says the suit. Cool Air Mechanical LLC provides residential and commercial cooling, heating and plumbing service, repair, maintenance and installations throughout metro Atlanta, Georgia.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Dane Steffenson, Esq. DANE LAW LLC 3575 Piedmont Rd. Suite L120 Atlanta, GA 30305 Telephone: (404) 919-9719 E-mail: Dane@TheDaneLawFirm.com CULTURAL CARE: FLSA Collective Certified in Posada Class Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, KAREN MORALES POSADA, AMANDA SARMENTO FERREIRA GUIMARES, WILLIANA ROCHA and SARA BARRIENTOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CULTURAL CARE, INC., a Massachusetts Corporation, Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-11862-IT (D. Mass.), Judge Indira Talwani of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts: 1. denies Cultural Care's Motion to Strike Pre-Certification Consents; and 2. grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Collective Action Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) and Issue Notice to the Proposed Collective. The Plaintiffs allege that Cultural Care has violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq., by failing to pay minimum wages and overtime pay and by failing to provide certain disclosures. In their Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert these claims on their own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated individuals "who were sponsored by Cultural Care and worked as J-1 visa au pairs during any portion of the period commencing three years prior to the filing of this action through the entry of final judgment in this action." Pending before the court is Cultural Care's Motion to Strike Pre-Certification Consents. Cultural Care asks the Court (1) to strike the consents without prejudice to refiling if and when the court conditionally certifies a FLSA collective and approves notice and consent forms to join such collective, and (2) to order the Plaintiffs' counsel to cease soliciting opt-in consent to sue forms and to do so only in accordance with any notice requirements approved by the court if a collective is conditionally certified. Also pending is the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Collective Action which asks the Court to certify a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq., and to approve notice to potential opt-in FLSA plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Oct. 15, 2020 and filed their Second Amended Complaint on Feb. 19, 2021. As of June 15, 2023, 1904 individuals, including the four named Plaintiffs, have filed (and not withdrawn) consents to join the FLSA collective action. While the motions at issue were pending, the Court granted in part and denied in part Cultural Care's Motion to Dismiss, and Cultural Care appealed. Cultural Care also sought a stay of proceedings, which the Plaintiffs joined after Cultural Care agreed to toll the FLSA statute of limitations. On Nov. 4, 2021, the court granted the Joint Motion, stayed the action pending resolution of Cultural Care's appeal, and as agreed upon by the parties, tolled the action from Nov. 4, 2021 (the date of the Court's Order) until the elapse of two weeks from the date that the First Circuit resolves the Defendant's appeal or the stay is lifted, whichever is shorter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected Cultural Care's contention that it was immune from suit (albeit for reasons distinct from the Court's reasons). The appellate court declined to exercise its discretion under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the remaining portions of Cultural Care's appeal. On June 9, 2023, mandate issued, returning the matter to this Court. On June 20, 2023, the Court lifted the stay. Tolling of the statute of limitations ends two weeks from the date of mandate, or June 23, 2023. Judge Talwani examines Cultural Care's Motion to Strike Consents. First, Cultural Care argues that consents gathered prior to court-approved notice were prematurely solicited, that they omitted material information routinely required in court-ordered FLSA collective action notices, and that they should be stricken. Judge Talwani finds no grounds to make conditional certification in an FLSA action a prerequisite to filing of consents to sue. She holds that the statutory scheme requires the Plaintiffs to file consents to proceed with an action, with the statute of limitations running until a consent is filed, the Supreme Court has identified the process as one of "joinder" rather than "class certification." The Defendants may seek to moot a collective action by making offers of judgment to the named Plaintiffs. Second, Cultural Care contends that the Plaintiffs' counsel's website concerning the case, which provides links to allow potential plaintiffs to opt-in, is misleading and that the consents filed to date should therefore be stricken. Judge Talwani finds that the Plaintiffs' counsel's website as presented is appropriate and not misleading. Further, Cultural Care's demands would improperly intrude on the Plaintiffs' attorneys' First Amendment rights. The Plaintiffs' counsel's website may not have included Cultural Care's position and defenses or its counsel's contact information, but those omissions are not misleading. Nor is the description of the case misleading. As a final matter, Cultural Care reports that it inspected the code underlying the website and noted that the Plaintiffs' counsel appears to be using a Facebook ad tracker on its website. As Cultural Care concedes, without more this does not establish that the Plaintiffs' counsel is actively advertising on Facebook or any other platform. Nor is there any basis from this limited report to find that any misleading or otherwise improper solicitation has occurred. Judge Talwani now turns to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify FLSA Collective Action and Give Notice. To facilitate the opt-in process, the Plaintiffs seek certification of a collective action and court approval to give notice to "All individuals who were sponsored by Cultural Care and worked as J-1 visa au pairs during any portion of the period commencing three years prior to the filing of this action through the entry of final judgment in this action." Judge Talwani finds that (1) the Plaintiffs have adequately supported the allegation that Cultural Care has a uniform policy of not compensating au pairs for training time where the named Plaintiffs and all of the 49 additional declarants state that they attended but were not compensated for a training conducted by Cultural Care; (2) the Plaintiffs assert claims that arise after the effective date of the settlement in Beltran v. Interexchange, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-03074-CMA-KMT, 2017 WL 4418684 (D. Colo. Apr. 28, 2017); and (3) the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Cultural Care's actions were willful. For these reasons, Judge Talwani conditionally certifies a class consisting of "all individuals who were sponsored by Cultural Care and worked as J-1 visa au pairs during any portion of the period commencing three years prior to the filing of this action through the entry of final judgment in this action." In addition, Judge Talwani finds that (1) there is no purpose in giving notice beyond three years (plus 19 months and 19 days to account for the tolling period) from the date of her Order for those individuals who have not yet filed consents; (2) she allows the use of social media to reach eligible individuals; (3) she approves Cultural Care's addition of the following language be added to the notice: "Cultural Care disputes that it 'employs' au pairs and argues that, contrary to employment, it supports au pairs during their exchange year and oversees host family compliance with Department of State minimum stipend requirements," in the interest of judicial neutrality; and (4) a 90-day opt-in period and 45e-day reminder notice is reasonable. For the forgoing reasons, Judge Talwani denies Cultural Care's Motion to Strike Pre-Certification Consents and grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify a Collective Action subject to the conditions she described. The Defendant is ordered to produce, within 14 days of the Order, a list of all au pairs that Cultural Care sponsored at any time during the three years (plus 19 months and 19 days) preceding the Order, including each au pair's email addresses, cell phone numbers, and dates and locations of employment. The Plaintiffs' counsel may distribute notice via email, text message, or social media, to all individuals on the list produced by Cultural Care. Consents to join the action will be accepted for 90-days following the distribution of the notice (the 90-day opt-in period) and the Plaintiffs may distribute a reminder notice 45 days into the 90-day period. Judge Talwani approves the Plaintiffs' proposed form of notice, subject to the following modifications: 1. The following text must be added: Individuals who consent to join this action may be required to submit documents and testify under oath at a deposition, hearing, or trial. 2. The following text must be added: Cultural Care disputes that it 'employs' au pairs and argues that, contrary to employment, it supports au pairs during their exchange year and oversees host family compliance with Department of State minimum stipend requirements. If the Plaintiffs' counsel elects to keep its current website running, it is ordered to make the following changes to the website: 1. The following text must be added: Individuals who consent to join the FLSA collective action may be required to submit documents and testify under oath at a deposition, hearing, or trial. 2. The website must make clear that any individual has the right to hire their own attorney. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Memorandum & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3byknf2f from Leagle.com. DUNKIN' BRANDS: Kelledy Class Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MARTIN KELLEDY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. DUNKIN' BRANDS, INC., and DUNKIN' BRANDS GROUP INC., Civil Action No. 23-10626-RGS (D. Mass.), Judge Richard G. Stearns of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismisses the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The lawsuit comes before the Court after the American Arbitration Association (AAA) twice declined to arbitrate the parties' dispute. Among other claims, Kelledy asserts that Defendants Dunkin' Brands, Inc., and Dunkin' Brands Group Inc. (collectively, Dunkin') violated the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, by charging users of its Mobile Application undisclosed fees on remote purchases. Dunkin' moves to (1) dismiss the case and compel arbitration of Kelledy's claims, or (2) strike all class-action allegations from the Complaint. Judge Stearns declines to take either action and dismisses the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction instead. Kelledy asserts jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d), which provides district courts with jurisdiction over class actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million and at least one class member is a citizen of a State different from the Defendant. The latter requirement, minimal diversity, forms the basis of Judge Stearns' decision. Kelledy pleads that minimal diversity exists because there are members of the Classes who are citizens of states of which the Defendants are not citizens. Precedent is clear, however, that when a class action is filed, it includes only the claims of the named plaintiff or plaintiffs. The claims of unnamed class members are added to the action later, when the action is certified as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Kelledy, the only plaintiff named in the Complaint, is a resident of Dorchester, Massachusetts. Dunkin's principal place of business is in Canton, Massachusetts. Because both parties are citizens of Massachusetts, the Complaint fails to meet the minimal diversity requirement. Judge Stearns accordingly lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the Complaint must be dismissed. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Memorandum & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/37s6tr2r from Leagle.com. FACEBOOK INC: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of 3rd Amended Vargas Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ROSEMARIE VARGAS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, and NEUHTAH OPIOTENNIONE; JESSICA TSAI, Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-16499 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reverses the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Class Action Complaint and remands for further proceedings. Plaintiffs Rosemarie Vargas, Jazmine Spencer, Kisha Skipper, Deillo Richards, and Jenny Lin appeal from the dismissal of their Third Amended Class Action complaint against Facebook. The Ninth Circuit holds that the district court erred by dismissing the operative complaint for failure to allege a concrete injury sufficient to confer Article III standing. The operative complaint alleges that Facebook's targeting methods provide tools to exclude women of color, single parents, persons with disabilities and other protected attributes, so that the Plaintiffs were prevented from having the same opportunity to view ads for housing that Facebook users who are not in a protected class received. The district court faulted the complaint for not identifying specific ads that Vargas did not see. But the Plaintiffs' very claim is that Facebook's practices concealed information from housing-seekers in protected classes. And nothing in the case law requires that a plaintiff identify specific ads that she could not see when she alleges that an ad-delivery algorithm restricted her access to housing ads in the first place. Vargas alleges a concrete and particularized injury -- deprivation of truthful information and housing opportunities -- whether she can establish all the elements of her claims later in the litigation. The Ninth Circuit further holds that the district court also erred by holding that Facebook is immune from liability pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c)(1). It agrees with the Plaintiffs that, taking the allegations in the complaint as true, the Plaintiffs' claims challenge Facebook's conduct as a co-developer of content and not merely as a publisher of information provided by another information content provider. As the website's actions did in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), Facebook's own actions contributed materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct. Facebook created the categories, used its own methodologies to assign users to the categories, and provided simple drop-down menus and toggle buttons to allow housing advertisers to exclude protected categories of persons. Facebook points to three primary aspects of the case that arguably differ from the facts in Roommates.com, but none affects the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Plaintiffs' claims challenge Facebook's own actions. First, Facebook is more of a developer than the website in Roommates.com in one respect because, even if a user did not intend to reveal a particular characteristic, Facebook's algorithms nevertheless ascertained that information from the user's online activities and allowed advertisers to target ads depending on the characteristic. Second, the manner of discrimination offered by Facebook may be less direct in some respects, but as in Roommates.com, Facebook identified persons in protected categories and offered tools that directly and easily allowed advertisers to exclude all persons of a protected category (or several protected categories). Finally, Facebook urges the Ninth Circuit to conclude that the tools at issue are "neutral" because they are offered to all advertisers, not just housing advertisers, and the use of the tools in some contexts is legal. The Ninth Circuit is unpersuaded that the distinction leads to a different ultimate result in the case. According to the complaint, Facebook promotes the effectiveness of its advertising tools specifically to housing advertisers. A patently discriminatory tool offered specifically and knowingly to housing advertisers does not become "neutral" within the meaning of this doctrine simply because the tool is also offered to others. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/2mmujc9d from Leagle.com. HFZ KIK 30TH: Court Denies Pavarini's Bid to Allow Class Action --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, PAVARINI McGOVERN, LLC, Plaintiff v. HFZ KIK 30TH STREET OWNER, LLC, HFZ KIK 30TH STREET, LLC, OTERA CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IX, INC., EMPIRE STATE LAYOUT INC.,BSI SERVICES AND SOLUTIONS (NYC) INC., ZIEL FELDMAN, NIR MEIR, JOHN SHANNON, ANTHONY MORRONE, JOHN DOE, RICHARD ROE, XYZ CORP. 1 THROUGH XYZ CORP. 10, BETONS PREFABRIQUES DU LAC INC., 9229-0188 QUEBEC INC., ACHESON DOYLE PARTNERS, ARCHITECTS, P.C., B.I.G. ARCHITECTURE D.P.C., CODE CONSULTANTS PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, P.C., DESIMONE CONSULTING ENGINEERING, D.P.C., FABBRICA LLC, GILLMAN CONSULTING INC., KRYPTON ENGINEERING, PLLC, LANGAN ENGINEERING, ENVIRONMENTAL, SURVEYING, LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE AND GEOLOGY, D.P.C., LINDEGRIFFITH CONSTRUCTION CO., MG ENGINEERING D.P.C., MGE UNIFIED TECHNOLOGIES CORP., TILLOTSON DESIGN ASSOCIATES, INC., ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE MINIMIZATION, INC., ROSCHMANNN STEEL & GLASS CONSTRUCTIONS INC., HOWARD I. SHAPIRO & ASSOCIATES CONSULTING ENGINEERS, P.C., DELTA TESTING, INC., SALTUS LLC, TOP HAT EXTERMI NATING CORP., PSI AGENCY INC., VBGO COLLEGIATE TOWER LLC, Defendants, Index No. 160556/2020, Motion Seq. No. 004 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Lisa S. Headley of the Supreme Court, New York County, denies the Plaintiff's motion for an order allowing a class action and motion for an order to enforce a trust. Plaintiff Pavarini filed the motion pursuant to Section 902 of the New York Consolidated Laws, Civil Practice Law and Rules, for an Order to permit a class action and pursuant to Lien Law Section 77(1), for an Order to enforce a trust. Defendant HFZ KIK 30th Street Owner, LLC ("KIK Owner") filed opposition and the Plaintiff filed a reply. In this action, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendants, HFZ KIK 30th Street Owner LLC and HFZ KIK 30th Street LLC, failed to pay for construction work the Plaintiff performed at the construction and development project located at 11 West 29th Street, 9 West 29th Street and 3 West 29th Street in New York, New York (Block 831, Lots 28, 29 and 30). In support of the motion, the Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that pursuant to Lien Law Section 70(2), all funds received by an owner and contractor on a public or private improvement in New York constitute assets of a statutory trust for which said owner and contractor are designated as statutory trustees. In addition, it seeks to enforce statutory rights to pursue a class action under Article 3-A of the Lien Law. In the fifteenth and sixteenth causes of action in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the money received by defendant, KIK Owner, be declared trust funds, and the Plaintiff seeks an injunction enjoining KIK Owner from making any further diversions of the sums disbursed or advanced to them, along with damages in the amount of $14,172,093.23. The Plaintiff argues there are questions of law and fact common to the class that warrant an Order permitting the Article 3-A claims to proceed as a class action because the questions of fact, which are common to all parties include the 1) identification and accounting for all trust funds; 2) determination of to whom and for what purposes such trust funds were disbursed; and 3) identification of the companies or individuals who controlled or participated in disbursing or received such funds. Thus, it contends that pursuant to CPLR Section 902, the Court should consider determining whether this action should proceed as a class action. In opposition, KIK Owner argues, inter alia, the Plaintiff's motion for class certification is untimely because CPLR Section 902 requires the Plaintiff to move for class certification within 60 days after the time to serve a responsive pleading has expired for all persons named as defendants. It further argues that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that class certification is warranted because its motion for class certification does not meet the perquisites pursuant to CPLR Section 90. Judge Headley explains that Lien Law Section 77(1) permits any party with a trust claim to bring an action to enforce the claim on behalf of all beneficiaries; it requires, however, compliance with the procedural requirements of a class action. A motion for class certification is governed by Section 902. Pursuant to CPLR Section 902, a motion for class certification must be made within 60 days after the time to serve a responsive pleading has expired. Although the parties may stipulate to extend the Plaintiffs' time to move for class certification and the court may order such an extension, in the absence of an extension, the "deadline set forth is mandatory." Judge Headley finds that Pavarini failed to comply with the 60-day requirement pursuant to CPLR Section 902, because the deadline for all named Defendants to respond to the Amended Complaint was July 21, 2021, when Pavarini in fact filed the instant motion for class certification on June 3, 2022, which is 317 days beyond the required period. There is no indication that the parties stipulated to extend the Plaintiff's time to move for class certification since there are no stipulations mentioned or uploaded to the motion papers. Additionally, based on the arguments presented, Judge Headley finds that Pavarini did not comply with the requisites pursuant to Lien Law Section 77(1) to enforce a trust. As such, the Plaintiff motion for an Order allowing class action pursuant to CPLR Section 902, and for an Order to enforce a trust pursuant to Lien Law Section 77(1) is denied. Accordingly, Judge Headley denies Pavarini's motion for an order allowing a class action pursuant to CPLR Section 902 and motion for an order to enforce a trust pursuant to Lien Law Section 77(1). Any requested relief sought not expressly addressed has nonetheless been considered. Within 30 days of entry, Pavarini will serve a copy of the decision/order upon the parties with notice of entry. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Decision + Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/48scyvcp from Leagle.com. HI Q INC: Miller Ordered to Appear for Deposition in Hoy Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, HI Q, INC. d/b/a HEALTH IQ, Petitioner v. ZEETOGROUP, LLC, Respondent, Case No. 22-cv-1440-LL-DDL (S.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge David D. Leshner of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California grants the TCPA Plaintiffs' motion to compel, and denies Carley Miller's motion for a protective order. Judge Leshner orders Miller, an employee of Zeeto, to appear for deposition within 14 days of the date of the Order. The TCPA Plaintiffs -- Toby Hoy and Constance Kennedy -- represent a putative class of consumers in an action currently pending in the Northern District of California against Hi Q for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. In the class action, Hi Q asserts as a defense that TCPA Plaintiffs consented to be contacted. Zeeto is not a party to the class action, but allegedly collected telephone numbers from consumers and provided them to Hi Q. In January 2022, Hoy subpoenaed Zeeto for documents and testimony in the class action to obtain discovery as to whether it was disclosed to consumers that Hi-Q was an affiliated partner of Zeeto's, such that consent to be contacted by Zeeto constituted consent to be contacted by Hi Q. When Zeeto refused to comply, Hoy sought the Court's assistance in enforcing the subpoena. However, upon Hoy's representation that Zeeto had agreed to produce information in satisfaction of the subpoena, the Honorable Mitchell D. Dembin (the magistrate judge assigned to the case) denied Hoy's motion as moot. Zeeto did not produce the promised information, leading to Hi Q issuing its own subpoena to Zeeto, which largely sought the same information as Hoy's subpoena. Hi Q later moved in this District to enforce compliance with its subpoena. The matter was again assigned to Judge Dembin. On Nov. 29, 2022, Judge Dembin ordered Zeeto to comply with Hi Q's subpoena, including by producing a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to testify. Zeeto's designee, Shayne Cardwell, appeared for deposition on Jan. 19, 2023. It is undisputed Cardwell could not answer certain questions and identified Miller as the individual at Zeeto likely to have relevant information on those issues. Following Cardwell's deposition, therefore, the parties began discussing a deposition of Miller. On Jan. 31, 2023, Anthony Paronich, counsel for the TCPA Plaintiffs, emailed Jacob Gillick, counsel for Zeeto, stating that they intend to issue a deposition subpoena for Miller and asks if Gillick would be able to accept service. Gillick confirmed three days later he would accept service. A little more than a week later, Paronich again emailed Gillick, asking if Miller had preferred dates for her deposition or if Paronich should suggest possible dates. Gillick responded on Feb. 21, 2023, stating to send them the subpoena and they will get going. On Feb. 24, 2023, Paronich responded to Gillick's email, attaching a subpoena to Miller. He requested they discuss dates and stated, "We're not requesting any documents at this time because all of the documents that Miller could have would be documents that we should have already received from Zeeto." Attached to the TCPA Plaintiffs' motion to compel is a "Subpoena to Testify at a Deposition in a Civil Action" to Miller dated March 28, 2023 and signed by Paronich. It commands Miller to appear for a deposition by remote means on April 20, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. and refers to a "Schedule A" which purportedly identifies the matters for examination, although there is no Schedule A attached. The Subpoena also requires Miller to bring documents to the deposition. On April 17, 2023, Miller served a document titled "Objections to Subpoena to Produce Documents, Information or Objects or to Permit Inspection of Premises in a Civil Action" on the TCPA Plaintiffs and Hi Q. The Objections were signed by Gillick and his law firm as "attorneys for the deponent." Miller objected that the Subpoena required production of documents more than 100 miles from where the custodian was located, that the request for "all documents responsive to previously served subpoenas" was insufficiently specific and overbroad, and that the Subpoena called for the production of confidential and private information "unrelated to the instant lawsuit." There is no other correspondence coincident with the service of the Objections in the record, but the transcript of Miller's nonappearance indicates Paronich informed Gillick about his intent to "go on the record," and his "position that the time for objections had passed." On April 20, 2023, the date identified in the Subpoena for Miller's deposition, Paronich and Paul Rosenthal, counsel for Hi Q, appeared via videoconference for Miller's deposition at the appointed time. Neither Miller nor her counsel appeared. The Court reporter recorded the nonappearance and Paronich entered the Subpoena as an exhibit. Paronich also related the history of his communications with Gillick regarding the Subpoena on the record. Miller did not move for a protective order, nor did she move to quash or modify the Subpoena, at any time before April 20, 2023. On May 8, 2023, counsel met and conferred regarding Miller's failure to appear. Paronich summed up the parties' meet and confer as follows: "(a) we all agree that Ms. Miller has relevant information (b) we agree that your [sic] accepted her deposition subpoena with a specified date and time that you provided and (c) you did not appear for that deposition because we did not limit the topics of testimony, which you've provided no legal support or case law for." The instant Motions followed. As a threshold matter, Judge Leshner finds that Miller's testimony is relevant to the class action. He says the TCPA Plaintiffs relate that Zeeto's Rule 30(b)(6) witness identified Miller as having further information regarding the topics on which he had been designated to testify. Miller, in turn, acknowledges her "name came up" during the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and that she has information relevant to "specific issues" in the case. Attached to Miller's motion for protective order are several excerpts of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition in which the witness deferred to Miller as being more capable of answering counsel's questions. Thus, notwithstanding Miller's protestation that her deposition will not produce any relevant information, Judge Leshner finds her testimony is well within the broad scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Leshner grants the TCPA Plaintiffs' motion to compel and denies Miller's motion for a protective order. He orders Miller to appear for deposition within 14 days of the date of the Order, on a date and time mutually agreed to by all parties. For the avoidance of doubt, Miller is not obligated to produce any documents before or at the deposition. The deposition may proceed by remote means upon the agreement of all parties. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/5t4h3nym from Leagle.com. HY'S LIVERY: Conn. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Belgada Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MEHDI BELGADA, ET AL. v. HY'S LIVERY SERVICE, INC., ET AL., AC 44659 (Conn. App.), the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirms the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The Plaintiffs, a group of chauffeurs who brought the class action complaint seeking unpaid wages, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of Defendants Hy's; Robert L. Levine, Hy's president; and Mathew Levine, Hy's vice president. On appeal, Plaintiffs Mehdi Belgada, Hormoz Akhundzadeh and Daniel Dziekan, as representatives of the class, set forth three arguments in support of their claim that the court improperly resolved the legal issue, namely, whether the Plaintiffs' meal breaks were not compensable time and, consequently, improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants. Hy's is a limousine service provider owned and operated by the Levines. Its employs chauffeurs, including the Plaintiffs, to transport its clients to and from destinations, oftentimes airports, in Connecticut and the New York area. Hy's also employs accounting personnel to track the chauffeurs' hours and calculate their pay, as well as dispatchers who act as liaisons for the chauffeurs while they are on duty. Between March 2015 and March 2016, the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor investigated Hy's in response to employee complaints surrounding uncompensated preshift hours and the automatic deducting of a one hour meal break. While this investigation was ongoing, Hy's chauffeur manager, Steven Zubrinsky, sent an email to the Plaintiffs on Dec. 30, 2015, and notified them of a new meal break policy that would soon take effect. The new policy stated: "As of the pay period beginning January 3, 2016, all chauffeurs will be given a one hour, unpaid meal break every day, while on the road, at a time decided by dispatch pursuant to the United States Department of Labor, Code of Federal Regulations, regulation 29 U.S.C. Section 785.19 [2016]. You may take that break anywhere within a radius of two miles from your next pick up. If for any reason, due to scheduling or length of shift, you did not get that break, and it was deducted, please let me know and it will be adjusted. Also, if you have any questions, please come and see me." Following the implementation of the new policy, Hy's accounting department would review the Plaintiffs' schedules to determine if they had sufficient time for an hour-long meal break during each shift that exceeded seven and one-half hours, and, if they did, then, in the absence of any notification that the Plaintiffs had to work during that time, the accounting department was directed to record a meal break. The accounting department would arbitrarily choose one of the lag time hours to designate as the meal break. If the Plaintiffs were unable to take a meal break but saw the meal break deduction on their time sheets, then, pursuant to the meal break policy, they were to notify management so that it could be corrected. Beginning in August, 2017, Hy's permitted the Plaintiffs to self-record their meal breaks on their time sheets using the Livery Coach app. The Plaintiffs first filed suit in 2018 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut and alleged that Hy's had violated state and federal law by, inter alia, depriving its chauffeurs of bona fide meal breaks, yet automatically deducting one hour per day from their work time. While the case was pending, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in which it held that limousine drivers fall within the taxicab exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq. Consequently, the Plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal of the FLSA claims with prejudice and dismissal of the state law claims without prejudice, which the District Court granted on Feb. 14, 2019. Because Connecticut law has a narrower taxicab exemption than federal law that has not been applied to chauffeurs, the Plaintiffs filed the present action in the Superior Court on April 2, 2019, claiming only a violation of state law. Specifically, they alleged that Hy's had violated General Statutes Section 31-58 et seq., the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act (minimum wage act), by improperly deducting the plaintiffs' pay for their meal breaks. Following one year of discovery, they filed a motion for class certification, which was granted by the court, Ozalis, J., on April 20, 2020. On Sept. 24, 2020, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to summary judgment because, based on the undisputed facts, the Plaintiffs did not perform compensable work during their meal breaks. The Plaintiffs objected to the Defendants' motion and moved for partial summary judgment based on their "contract theory" of liability, pursuant to which Hy's policy as to meal breaks was an enforceable contract that the Defendants had breached. On April 13, 2021, the court, Moukawsher, J., granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. After considering the parties' arguments, it concluded that the Plaintiffs' meal breaks did not constitute compensable time. This appeal followed. On appeal, the Plaintiffs set forth three arguments in support of their claim that their meal breaks were compensable time, and, therefore, the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. First, they assert their "contract theory," that is, that Hy's meal break policy created an enforceable contract that required the defendants to abide by 29 C.F.R. Section 785.19, which they posit invokes the completely relieved from duty test. Second, they claim that they were "working" during their meal breaks pursuant to the plain language of General Statutes Section 31-76b (2) (A), and the court erred by applying the predominant benefit test to its analysis under the statute. Finally, they argue that, even if it was proper for the court to apply the predominant benefit test, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the meal breaks were for the predominant benefit of Hy's. The Appellate Court disagrees. It concludes that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Plaintiffs' meal breaks were predominantly for their own benefit, and, therefore, the Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. For these reasons, the Appellate Court affirms the judgment of the court. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yt42jbkm from Leagle.com. Michael T. Petela, with whom was Richard E. Hayber -- rhayber@hayberlawfirm.com -- for the Appellants (Named Plaintiff, et al.). Adam J. Lyke -- alyke@zcclawfirm.com -- with whom was Glenn A. Duhl -- gduhl@zcclawfirm.com -- for the Appellees (Defendants). IMPERIAL PACIFIC: Loses Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended Genc Class Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, OZCAN GENC, HASAN GOKCE, and SULEYMAN KOS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. IMPERIAL PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL (CNMI), LLC and IMPERIAL PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD., Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00002 (D.N. Mar. I.), Judge Romana V. Manglona of the U.S. District Court for the District of Northern Mariana Islands denies IPI's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint with prejudice. Previously, the Court granted IPI's motions to dismiss the original complaint and the first amended complaint, but granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend both times. Plaintiffs Ozcan Genc, Hasan Gokce, and Suleyman Kos subsequently filed their SAC. Before the Court is IPI's motion to dismiss the SAC with prejudice. The Plaintiffs filed an opposition, to which IPI filed a reply. The matter came on for a hearing, at which time the Court took the matter under submission. Judge Manglona now issues her Decision and Order denying the motion to dismiss the SAC and memorializes her reasoning as follows. The Plaintiffs are three individuals with Turkish national origin and who were, at all relevant times, employees of IPI admitted to the United States under the H-2B temporary foreign worker program as construction workers to build the Imperial Palace casino/hotel resort in Garapan. Genc started working for IPI in January 2020 as a foreman and leader of the welding and drywall team -- with an employment certificate title of "Construction Carpenter." Gokce started working for IPI in January 2020 as a plumber, plumbing foreman, and master of pipe installation -- with an employment certificate title of "Plumber. Kos started working for IPI in January 2020 as an electrician -- with an employment certificate title of "Electrician" -- and was later promoted to foreman in June 2020. Towards the end of June 2020, when H-2B workers were negotiating with IPI to extend their contracts for another six months, one Taiwanese worker showed the Plaintiffs his paycheck, which is when the Plaintiffs learned that the Taiwanese were being paid $23 an hour, nearly three times what IPI was paying them for the same work. They further learned that the Italians were being paid $30 an hour, also for the same work that the Plaintiffs were doing. IPI then started to miss paydays around the same time in June 2020, and the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit with this Court in November 2020 pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Plaintiffs were subsequently terminated on Dec. 16, 2020. Around the same time in December 2020, Plaintiffs each individually filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging discrimination based on both national origin and retaliation. After receiving their respective right to sue letters from the EEOC, the Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit on Jan. 20, 2022 against IPI and IPI's parent company Imperial Pacific International Holdings Ltd. Having received leave to amend their FAC after the Court granted IPI's motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs timely filed their SAC, alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e et. seq., and asserting the Court's original jurisdiction under Title VII. The Plaintiffs claim that IPI engaged in a company-wide practice of employment discrimination, both intentional and systemic, on the basis of national origin, against them and a class of similarly situated Turkish employees/former employees as alleged in this Complaint. Even though the Turkish, Italian, and Taiwanese teams were each assigned floors that were based on the same plan and the same productions, the Plaintiffs assert that those Taiwanese and Italian workers were paid by IPI at a wage rate significantly higher -- as much as three times higher -- than the Plaintiffs and members of the class. A former Turkish employee observed that while Taiwanese and Italian workers doing the same job as he worked fewer hours (no overtime) each week, they were paid substantially more. Additionally, the Plaintiffs contend that within each ethnic national team, all the construction workers were paid at the same rate, all foremen were paid at the same rate, and all supervisors were paid at the same rate. IPI employed those Taiwanese and Italian workers to perform the same types of work that the Plaintiffs and mthe embers of the class performed and those Taiwanese and Italian workers had the same or similar level of skills, qualifications, and experience as them. Fiden T. Hamo, a U.S. citizen that worked in general construction at IPI's construction site, observed the Turkish, Italian, and Taiwanese construction workers. He states that there was no difference that he could see in the work that Turkish construction workers doing welding, masonry, carpentry, and electrical work were doing, as opposed to work that welders, mason, carpenters, and electricians from other nations were doing. Glenn Bell, project manager for a team of Italian construction workers, attests that while the nature and quality of work that the Turks did was comparable to the nature and quality of the work the Italians did the Turks were paid approximately one-third the hourly rate as the Italians. Further, the Plaintiffs provide wage rates for the H-2B program from the Department of Labor (DOL). They list the wage range the DOL authorized for various construction worker positions such as plumbers and welders. The Plaintiffs assert that because IPI paid Turkish employees minimum wage, they were paid below the range that the DOL had approved IPI to pay its H-2B employees. The Plaintiffs bring their Title VII claim on behalf on themselves and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), seeking to represent an estimated class of 107 persons of Turkish national origin who were employed by IPI under the H-2B visa program during 2020 and 2021. In addition to suing IPI, the Plaintiffs also sue Imperial Pacific International Holdings Ltd. under an alter ego theory. As relief, they seek for the case to be expedited pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(f)(5); class certification; compensatory and punitive damages; costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k); and any other such relief that is just. Judge Manglona finds that the Plaintiffs plausibly allege a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination. The differences that IPI cites are immaterial. Additionally, she says the SAC alleges plausible facts to show that each named Plaintiff was discriminated against. Judge Manglona further finds the DOL statistics anecdotally supportive of the claim of Title VII discrimination. The facts alleging systemic discrimination also support the claim of discrimination. In reaching these findings, Judge Manglona holds that the Plaintiffs plausibly allege a claim for Title VII employment discrimination because they demonstrate other circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Although yjr Plaintiffs use the vague term "workers," it can apply to the context of the foremen. These drawn inferences along with the prior findings that IPI discriminated against the Turkish construction workers and supervisors supports finding that the SAC raises an inference that IPI discriminated against the Turkish foremen. Each of the three named Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged individual claims of Title VII discrimination. The SAC plausibly states that individual Plaintiffs Genc, Gokce, and Kos were each discriminated against. And, any differences IPI alleges are immaterial because the SAC plausibly alleges that IPI discriminated against the Turkish construction workers, foremen, and supervisors. Moreover, the statistics by the DOL establish circumstantial and anecdotal evidence that the Plaintiffs suffered Title VII discrimination. This additional information supports the finding of plausibility of discrimination as it is strong circumstantial and anecdotal evidence of how IPI paid the Turkish H-2B workers substantially less than H-2B workers recruited from Italy and Taiwan. Finally, the facts alleging systemic discrimination establish circumstantial and anecdotal evidence that the Plaintiffs suffered Title VII discrimination. The SAC plausibly asserts that it was IPI's standard operating procedure maintained through systematic intentional discrimination to pay the Plaintiffs and the proposed class members less than their Italian and Taiwanese counterparts. Based on the foregoing, Judge Manglona denies IPI's motion to dismiss the SAC with prejudice because the Plaintiffs' SAC alleges sufficient facts to plausibly show that IPI discriminated against them and the proposed class of 107 Turkish H-2B workers. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Decision & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4u8633m9 from Leagle.com. KOCH FARMS: Loses Partial Bid for Summary Judgment in Leo Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Annemarie Carney Axon of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division, denies the Defendants' partial motion for summary judgment without prejudice in the lawsuit captioned ROCCO J. LEO, as Trustee of Bankruptcy Estate of Christy Grigsby and Anthony Grigsby and Grigsby Farm, Plaintiff v. KOCH FARMS OF GADSDEN, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:20-cv-01997-ACA (N.D. Ala.). Defendants Koch Farms of Gadsden, LLC, and Koch Foods, Inc. (collectively "Koch") have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff Rocco J. Leo's Packers and Stockyards Act ("PSA") claim. Koch contends that a class action settlement agreement in In re: Broiler Chicken Grower Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 6:20-md-02977-RJS-CMR (E.D. Okla.) ("Broiler Grower Litigation"), precludes the claim. Mr. Leo has filed a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment entered against him in Broiler Grower Litigation and requests that the Court here decline to address Koch's motion for summary judgment while Mr. Leo's 60(b) motion is pending. Koch is one of the largest poultry dealers in the United States. It provides chickens to independent contractor farmers, who "grow" the chickens until they are ready for Koch to slaughter and sell them. Grigsby Farm, owned and operated by Anthony Grigsby and Christy Grigsby, was a farmer for Koch. Grigsby Farm grew chickens for Koch from 2008 until January 2019, when Koch allegedly stopped providing chickens to Grigsby Farm. The Grigsbys and Grigsby Farm filed for bankruptcy because their relationship with Koch broke. Mr. Leo, as Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Christy Grigsby, Anthony Grigsby, and Grigsby Farms, is the real party in interest in this lawsuit. Mr. Leo brought this lawsuit alleging Koch's actions violated the PSA, as well as other state law causes of action. His PSA claim asserts that Koch positioned growers against each other through a competitive compensation structure in which Koch determined the top producing growers to receive additional payment by partially arbitrary standards. Following the filing of multiple analogous class action complaints against Koch and other poultry processing defendants nationwide, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the complaints and transferred the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The consolidated class action complaint alleged the poultry processing defendants created an anticompetitive market scheme to suppress the compensation of the contract broiler growers. The class members sought damages in violation of the PSA and the Sherman Antitrust Act. In June 2022, the Eastern District of Oklahoma issued: (1) an order preliminarily approving a settlement with Koch and certifying the settlement class; and (2) an order approving the notice plan and authorizing the issuance of notice to the Koch settlement class. The notice authorization gave class members until September 2022 to opt-out of the class. The approved settlement agreement contained a release, which states that the release will be nationwide in scope and release all claims (including any Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, and/or federal, state, or common law unfair competition or anticompetitive conduct claims) any member of the Settlement Class ever had, now has, or hereinafter . . . (the Released Claims). The court ordered the approval of final settlement with Koch and entered final judgment in October 2022. The order of final judgment included a list of the growers excluded from the settlement. Neither Mr. and Ms. Grigsby nor Mr. Leo are listed. In the Fall of 2021, Mr. and Ms. Grigsby received a mailed settlement notice at their home that advised them of a settlement in Broiler Grower Litigation and their right to opt-out of it. The Grigsbys mailed the opt-out form back via certified mail. In November 2022, they received a mailed Notice of Class Settlement of Broiler Grower claims against Koch Foods--two months after the opt-out period closed. Mr. Leo did not receive notice about a settlement agreement in Broiler Grower Litigation. He recently filed a motion to set aside judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in the Broiler Grower Litigation due to Koch's failure to provide him with notice of the proceedings and settlement agreement in the case. Koch argues that summary judgment should be granted because neither the Grigsbys nor Mr. Leo opted out of the Koch settlement class and, thus, Mr. Leo's PSA claim is barred by res judicata. Koch also contends it did not have the duty to provide notice of the class settlement to Mr. Leo because proper notice was the duty of the Broiler Grower Litigation Plaintiff's class counsel. The court appoints Angeion Group LLC as the Settlement Administrator to assist Class Counsel in effectuating and administering the Notice Program and the exclusion process for Class members that wish to be excluded from the Settlement Class, and in effectuating and administering the plan of allocation. Mr. Leo asserts a material question of fact exists as to whether the failure to provide notice violated his due process rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). He argues that Koch had personal knowledge of his status as the party in interest to a claim against Koch because of this lawsuit, where Koch is represented by the same counsel as in Broiler Grower Litigation. As such, Mr. Leo maintains that Koch's failure to provide him with notice of Broiler Grower Litigation was not "the best notice practicable under the circumstances" because he could have been "easily be identified through reasonable effort." Judge Axon notes that the purpose of MDLs is to consolidate proceedings for the convenience of parties and to "promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C. Section 1407(a). The outcome of the instant motion relies on whether Mr. Leo is a class member in the Broiler Grower Litigation, and if so, whether he received proper notice of the Koch Settlement Agreement and Notice Plan. Both Mr. Leo and Koch acknowledge that the Eastern District of Oklahoma is in the best position to address whether the settlement notice complied with Rule 23. He requests that the court stay any ruling on the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment until the determination is made by the Oklahoma court on his Rule 60(b) Motion. In reply, Koch asked the court decline to address the merits of the Trustee's attack on the adequacy of the Broiler Grower Litigation Notice Plan and requests that this Court either dismiss the Trustee's PSA claim and decide whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims or stay Koch's Motion pending the Oklahoma court's ruling. Judge Axon opines that two rulings on the sufficiency of the notice of settlement in Broiler Growers Litigation would not promote an efficient resolution of the parties' dispute. And as the approving court of the settlement agreement and notice plan, the Eastern District of Oklahoma is the appropriate court to determine whether Mr. Leo received proper notice. Accordingly, until the Eastern District of Oklahoma rules on Mr. Leo's Rule 60(b) motion, this Court will not determine whether res judicata bars Mr. Leo's PSA claim. In respect of judicial efficiency and consistency, the Court denies Koch's partial motion for summary judgment without prejudice with leave to refile pending a ruling on Mr. Leo's 60(b) motion in Broiler Grower Litigation. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated June 12, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2e49hwxj from Leagle.com. LOWE'S COS: Counts I & II in Downing Suit Dismissed With Prejudice ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, Justin Downing, Plaintiff v. Lowe's Companies Incorporated, et al., Defendants, Case No. CV-22-08159-PCT-SPL (D. Ariz.), Judge Steven P. Logan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona grants Lowe's' Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II of Downing's Amended Complaint. In February 2022, the Plaintiff applied for a job with Lowe's. As part of the hiring process, the Plaintiff was provided with several acknowledgments of company disclosure, including the disclosure regarding a background report. On Feb. 26, 2022, the Plaintiff indicated his acknowledgment of the Disclosure by signing it. Thereafter, Lowe's contracted with Defendant First Advantage Corp. -- a consumer reporting agency ("CRA") that provides, among other things, "background screening services to employers nationwide"—to compile and furnish the background report. Between February 26 and March 2, 2022, First Advantage commenced a search for the Plaintiff's past criminal history to be included in his consumer report. On March 2, 2022, First Advantage provided a completed background report to Lowe's. On March 10, 2022, Lowe's denied the Plaintiff employment based in whole or in part on information contained within his consumer report. The Plaintiff alleges that the background report inaccurately included three past criminal convictions with the disposition stated as "guilty." Although he admits to pleading guilty to three criminal charges between 2006 and 2009, he contends that it is not accurate to state that the disposition of those cases is 'guilty' because, on Nov. 24, 2020, the three judgments of guilt were set aside by the Navajo County Superior Court, pursuant to A.R.S. Section 13-905. On Sept. 8, 2022, the Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Lowe's and First Advantage. He filed it as a class action suit, asserting his claims on behalf of himself and all those similarly situated. The Amended Complaint defines two separate classes -- the "Lowe's Class" and the "First Advantage Class." The Lowe's Class is defined as: All persons in the United States who (1) from a date two years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action to the date notice is sent to the Class; (2) applied for employment with Lowe's; (3) about whom Lowe's procured a consumer report; and (4) who were provided the same form FCRA disclosure and authorization as the disclosure and authorization form Lowe's provided to Plaintiff. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' actions -- relating to the disclosure, procurement, compiling, and furnishing of the background report upon which his denial of employment was based -- violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 1681, et seq. In Count I, the Plaintiff and the Lowe's Class assert a claim against Lowe's for violation of the FCRA's "standalone" disclosure requirement, which is found in Section 1681b(b)(2)(A). In Count II, the Plaintiff and the Lowe's Class assert a claim against Lowe's for violation of the FCRA's "clear and conspicuous" disclosure requirement, which is also found in Section 1681b(b)(2) On Nov. 10, 2022, Lowe's filed the present Motion seeking dismissal with prejudice of Counts I and II. The Plaintiff later filed a Response. The Defendant has since filed a Reply brief, along with two separate Notices of Supplemental Authority. The Court has fully considered the parties' briefing, the Defendant's Notices of Supplemental Authority, and the entire record in this matter. Judge Logan finds that the Disclosure in the case lacked any extraneous information in violation of the standalone requirement, and that it was reasonably understandable such that it did not violate the clear-and-conspicuous requirement. As a matter of law, the Disclosure did not violate Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) of the FCRA. Hence, Counts I and II must be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, Judge Logan grants Lowe's' Motion to Dismiss and dismisses Counts I and II with prejudice. Lowe's is dismissed from this action. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3vrvmptf from Leagle.com. MDL 2262: Fact Discovery in Adams v. BoA Due April 4, 2024 ---------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as Adams, et al., v. Bank of America Corporation et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-07461 (S.D.N.Y., Filed Oct. 4, 2012), the Hon. Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald entered a scheduling order as follows: -- Deadline for substantial completion Sept. 7, 2023 of Defendants rolling production of all document discovery relating to the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Close of fact discovery (including April 4, 2024 depositions) concerning the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Close of expert discovery (including Sept. 13, 2024 depositions) concerning the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Deadline to file summary judgment motions Oct. 4, 2024 on the Upstream Issues, Deadline for Plaintiffs to file motion to certify the OTC class with respect to the Foreign Defendants, Deadline to file motions to exclude experts concerning the Upstream Issues and OTC class certification: -- Deadline for service of privilege logs, Oct. 10, 2023 if any, concerning the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Deadline to serve Hague requests to obtain Oct. 23, 2023 testimony abroad concerning the Upstream Issues or class certification in the OTC Action: -- Deadline for parties to propound Jan. 19, 2024 interrogatories and RFAs concerning the Upstream Issues or class certification in The OTC action: -- Deadline to notice fact depositions Feb. 2, 2024 concerning the Upstream Issues or class certification in the OTC action: -- Close of fact discovery (including Feb. 4, 2024 depositions) concerning the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Deadline for parties to serve April 19, 2024 opening expert reports concerning the Upstream Issues and OTC class certification: -- Deadline for parties to serve rebuttal June 18, 2024 Expert reports concerning the Upstream Issues and OTC class certification: The suit alleges violation of the Securities Exchange Act and Racketeering (RICO) Act. The Adams case is consolidated in Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation MDL No. 2262. The Plaintiffs argue that their actions involve a primarily local transaction between an Ohio business and its local bank, and that the action does not involve any antitrust claims. These arguments are unconvincing. A review of the Cicchini Enterprises complaint demonstrates that the action shares multiple issues with actions already in the MDL concerning alleged manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), the Court says. The Bank of America Corporation is an American multinational investment bank and financial services holding company headquartered at the Bank of America Corporate Center in Charlotte, North Carolina, with investment banking and auxiliary headquarters in Manhattan. A copy of the Court's order dated June 21, 2023 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3r9NzrL at no extra charge.[CC] MDL 2262: Fact Discovery in Axiom v. BoA Due April 4, 2024 ---------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as Axiom Investment Advisors, LLC, et al., v. Bank of America Corporation et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-02973 (S.D.N.Y., Filed April 16, 2015), the Hon. Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald entered a scheduling order as follows: -- Deadline for substantial completion Sept. 7, 2023 of Defendants rolling production of all document discovery relating to the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Close of fact discovery (including April 4, 2024 depositions) concerning the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Close of expert discovery (including Sept. 13, 2024 depositions) concerning the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Deadline to file summary judgment motions Oct. 4, 2024 on the Upstream Issues, Deadline for Plaintiffs to file motion to certify the OTC class with respect to the Foreign Defendants, Deadline to file motions to exclude experts concerning the Upstream Issues and OTC class certification: -- Deadline for service of privilege logs, Oct. 10, 2023 if any, concerning the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Deadline to serve Hague requests to obtain Oct. 23, 2023 testimony abroad concerning the Upstream Issues or class certification in the OTC Action: -- Deadline for parties to propound Jan. 19, 2024 interrogatories and RFAs concerning the Upstream Issues or class certification in The OTC action: -- Deadline to notice fact depositions Feb. 2, 2024 concerning the Upstream Issues or class certification in the OTC action: -- Close of fact discovery (including Feb. 4, 2024 depositions) concerning the Upstream Issues and class certification in the OTC action: -- Deadline for parties to serve April 19, 2024 opening expert reports concerning the Upstream Issues and OTC class certification: -- Deadline for parties to serve rebuttal June 18, 2024 Expert reports concerning the Upstream Issues and OTC class certification: The suit alleges violation of the Securities Exchange Act and Racketeering (RICO) Act. The Axiom case is consolidated in Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation MDL No. 2262. The Plaintiffs argue that their actions involve a primarily local transaction between an Ohio business and its local bank, and that the action does not involve any antitrust claims. These arguments are unconvincing. A review of the Cicchini Enterprises complaint demonstrates that the action shares multiple issues with actions already in the MDL concerning alleged manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), the Court says. The Bank of America Corporation is an American multinational investment bank and financial services holding company headquartered at the Bank of America Corporate Center in Charlotte, North Carolina, with investment banking and auxiliary headquarters in Manhattan. A copy of the Court's order dated June 21, 2023 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/44oiRta at no extra charge.[CC] MDL 2323: Stallworth, Langfitt to Get Same Fees in NFL Players Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS' CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION. Kevin Turner and Shawn Wooden, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. National Football League and NFL Properties, LLC, successor-in-interest to NFL Properties, Inc., Defendants. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO Smith & Stallworth, P.A. v. SPID 260001304 (J.W.) Attorney Lien Dispute (Lien Disp. No. 01780), Case No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa.), Judge David R. Strawbridge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania orders that Smith & Stallworth, P.A.'s reasonable fee should be equal to that awarded to Langfitt PLLC but that the aggregate individually-retained player's attorney's fee should be less than 22% of the Player's Monetary Award. Presently before the Court in the National Football League Player's Concussion Injury Litigation is the assertion of an Attorney Lien by Stallworth against the Award granted to its former client, Settlement Class Member ("SCM") SPID 260001304, J.W. ("Player"), in the litigation that became this class action, In re: National Football League Players' Concussion Injury Litigation, No. 12-md-2323 (E.D. Pa.). By its lien, the firm sought payment of attorneys' fees of 22% of the Award issued to the Player pursuant to the contingency fee agreement ("CFA") that he entered into with Stallworth on May 17, 2021. The Player, now represented by Langfitt PLLC, challenges the lien. As the Court set out in a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") filed on Jan. 7, 2019, its evaluation of these positions involves a consideration of the CFA between the Player and his former counsel and an assessment of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of the five factors enumerated by the Third Circuit in McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1985) ("McKenzie I") and McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 823 F.2d 43, 45 (3d Cir. 1987) ("McKenzie II"). This approach will require the Court to scrutinize the reasonableness of the CFA at the time of the signing of the contracts and then determine if the circumstances compel a different evaluation of the CFA at the time Stallworth, as lienholder, seeks to enforce it. It will then examine the results obtained, the quality of the representation provided by Stallworth, and whether the efforts of Stallworth substantially contributed to the result. This necessarily also involves a consideration of the role of Langfitt and other circumstances that led Player to achieve his award. The Player retained the law firm of Gibbs & Parnell to represent him for a possible claim in this litigation. That firm, acting through Neurocognitive Football Lawyers, PLLC, registered him in the settlement program on Feb. 10, 2017. Gibbs submitted a claim on Player's behalf on June 23, 2017, which was subsequently denied. Thereafter, and while still represented by Gibbs, the Player took the free BAP exam that is available to retired players under the Settlement Agreement. His exam was conducted by neurologist Hera Stephens, M.D., with testing conducted by Heather Belanger, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist. The June 8, 2019 report provided by Dr. Stephens did not qualify the Player for any other benefits of the Settlement Agreement, such as the non-monetary benefits associated with a diagnosis of Level 1.0 Neurocognitive Impairment nor the monetary award associated with a diagnosis of Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment. The record does not indicate when or why the Player terminated his engagement of Gibbs. On May 17, 2021, after an initial contact a few weeks earlier, Player entered into a retention and contingent fee agreement to have Stallworth represent him in connection with his NFL case. Under the terms of the agreement, if recovery were made for these injuries, Stallworth was entitled to a fee in the amount of 22% of the net recovery. The agreement also provided that if the Player discharged Stallworth "without cause," he agreed to pay Stallworth 22% of his future settlement award. Stallworth gathered from the Player details of his medical treatment and obtained pertinent medical records, through his Settlement Claims Portal and otherwise. It requested records from a neuropsychologist with whom Player had been treating beginning in late 2020, Dr. Richard Hoffman. It also worked with the office of Dr. Ahmed Sadek, a then-MAF approved neurologist at the Orlando Epilepsy Center, to have Player seen for a new MAF examination. The firm also provided Dr. Sadek's office with Player's prior medical evaluations. Although the appointment was scheduled for Oct. 15, 2021, the office delayed all of the appointments it had scheduled for Stallworth clients and at one point suggested that another doctor would perform the evaluations. Stallworth later learned that Dr. Sadek had been excluded from the Settlement Program following an audit, which would seem to account for the scheduling difficulties around this time. As the scheduling of the MAF examination appeared to have been falling apart, the Player looked for new counsel. He entered into a CFA with Langfitt on Sept. 24, 2021, and gave notice to Stallworth on Sept. 28, 2021 that he was terminating his engagement of the firm. Shortly thereafter, Stallworth gave notice to the Claims Administrator that it would assert a lien, and it filed its lien on the MDL docket in March 2022 seeking its fee from any Monetary Award that the Player were to receive. When Langfitt took over the representation, it too sought to schedule the Player for an appointment with an MAF neurologist. Like Stallworth before it, Langfitt reviewed the past medical records, the Player's medical history, and the neuropsychology examination report from the BAP provider who examined the Player in June 2019. The Player attended an MAF examination with Dr. Daniel Jacobs, for which Langfitt advanced the cost in November 2021. Before Langfitt submitted any MAF claim based on its development of an updated examination, the Court approved modifications to the Settlement Program relating to the evaluation of the qualifying diagnoses of various levels of "Neurocognitive Impairments," which was the condition for which Player sought an award. As a result of that class-wide modification, which was approved on March 4, 2022, the Player's 2019 neuropsychological testing through the BAP became eligible for re-calculation under new standards. Under those standards, the Player was found to have a qualifying diagnosis of Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment as of the June 6, 2019 examination date, and with the submission of a claim to the MAF, that finding resulted in the issuance of a Notice of Monetary Award Claim Determination on July 22, 2022. Leading up to the notice of the award, the Claims Administrator advised Langfitt of Stallworth's lien. The two firms engaged in some communications about resolving the lien but were unable to reach an agreement. On Dec. 7, 2022, the Claims Administrator issued a Schedule of Document Submissions concerning the contested lien on the award. Stallworth and Langfitt submitted their respective Statements of Dispute to the Claims Administrator in accordance with the briefing schedule on Jan. 9, 2023. They submitted response memoranda as well on Jan. 27, 2023. Gibbs never filed a lien on the docket and has not been involved in this lien dispute. In light of the unresolved lien based upon Stallworth's contingency fee agreement, the Claims Administrator withheld from the Player's award funds for payment of attorneys' fees in an amount equal to 22% of his Award. This figure represents the presumptive fee cap for individually-retained player's counsel in this litigation. Of that attorney fee withholding, a portion reflecting 5% of the Player's Award was separately deposited into the Attorneys' Fees Qualified Settlement Fund pursuant to the Court's June 27, 2018 Order Regarding Withholdings for Common Benefit Fund counsel. Those funds may be distributed at a later date upon further order(s) of Judge Brody. This leaves the Court to determine the appropriate distribution for the attorneys' fees currently available for disbursement (representing 17% of Player's Award) and the allocation of those funds that are currently held in the Attorneys' Fees Qualified Settlement Fund (representing 5% of Player's Award), if those funds, or a portion thereof, are distributed by the Court at a future date. Pursuant to Lien Rule 17, the Record of Dispute was transferred to the Court. Neither party requested that it holds an evidentiary hearing, nor does it find that one is necessary for its resolution of this dispute. Judge Strawbridge finds that the circumstances did not change significantly from the time of the Player's initial contracting with Stallworth to the time that Stallworth sought to enforce its contract inasmuch as it was already clear that the Player would proceed by way of a settlement claim and not a lawsuit against the NFL. What changed in that time, however, was some of the criteria for the evaluation of claims, which turned out to be more favorable to claimants such as the Player. Based upon its evaluation of the remaining three prongs of the McKenzie test, however, Judge Strawbridge is satisfied that Stallworth provided quality representation and was working to achieve for the Player the benefit that ultimately occurred on Langfitt's watch. He therefore approves Stallworth's fee request in part, authorizes the release of an equal portion of the remaining withheld fees to Langfitt as current counsel for the Player, and returns a portion of the withheld fees to the Player in recognition of the fact that neither party to this lien dispute played a substantial role in bringing about the current award. Langfitt seeks reimbursement for the costs of medical examinations that it has been expending to have the Player re-evaluated for a claim under the Settlement and in the Player's attempt to secure benefits under the "88" disability plan. These costs are reimbursable to Langfitt under the terms of its CFA. Judge Strawbridge awards these costs to Langfitt. An appropriate order follows. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2knkxsnd from Leagle.com. MDL 2873: Ahwee Suit Alleges Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams ------------------------------------------------------------ JASON AHWEE, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02756-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to Defendants’ AFFF products, the suit asserts. The Ahwee case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Barros Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams --------------------------------------------------------------- ALEXANDER BARROS, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02731-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism, and Graves disease as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit alleges. The Barros case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Bennett Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ---------------------------------------------------------------- CARY V. BENNETT, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02732-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with kidney cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Bennett case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Castillo Suit Alleges Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams --------------------------------------------------------------- ALBERT CASTILLO, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02711-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer and thyroid cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants’ AFFF products, the suit asserts. The Castillo case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Duffy Suit Alleges Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams ------------------------------------------------------------ FRANCIS DUFFY, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02733-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to Defendants’ AFFF products, the suit asserts. The Duffy case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Emery Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams -------------------------------------------------------------- CHRISTOPHER ADAM EMERY, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02734-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Emery case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Exposure to Toxic Chemicals Led to Death, Taylor Says --------------------------------------------------------------- BRENDA TAYLOR, as surviving spouse of RICHARD DAVID TAYLOR, deceased, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02687-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff for damages for personal injury and death resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances. According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of Richard David Taylor. Richard David Taylor ("Decedent") was, at the time of death, an adult resident and citizen of Delta, Ohio. The Decedent regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Decedent's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. Prior to death, the Decedent was diagnosed with testicular cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products. The Decedent's alleged diagnosis caused and/or contributed to his death. The Decedent passed away on approximately July 18, 2020. The Taylor case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Faces Job Suit Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ------------------------------------------------------------------ JAMES R. JOB, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02718-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Job case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Faces Ross Suit Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ------------------------------------------------------------------- CHRISTIAN N. ROSS, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02763-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Ross case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Belzer Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- DONALD LEE BELZER, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02764-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism and thyroid cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Belzer case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Cutlip Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- DALE L. CUTLIP, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02714-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with kidney cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Cutlip case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Duncan Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- HARVEY L. DUNCAN, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02703-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Duncan case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Gusch Claims ------------------------------------------------------------------ JAMES N. GUSCH, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02706-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Gusch case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Hamilton Says ------------------------------------------------------------------- BRYAN HAMILTON, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02759-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism and Hashimoto's disease as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Hamilton case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Film-Forming Foams Contain Toxic Chemicals, Williams Says ------------------------------------------------------------------- GUY E. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02710-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Williams case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Hailey Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams --------------------------------------------------------------- TERRY W. HAILEY, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02736-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Hailey case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Mayfield Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ----------------------------------------------------------------- DENNIS CRAIG MAYFIELD, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02723-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with kidney cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Mayfield case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: McBride Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ---------------------------------------------------------------- BRIAN R. MCBRIDE, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02725-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with kidney cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The McBride case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: McDonough Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ------------------------------------------------------------------ FLOYD W. MCDONOUGH, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02707-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The McDonough case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Moscatelli Alleges Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ----------------------------------------------------------------- ANTONIO MICHELE MOSCATELLI, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02762-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with testicular and kidney cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Moscatelli case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Rogers Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams --------------------------------------------------------------- JOHNNY ROGERS, SR., Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02709-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with kidney cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit alleges. The Rogers case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Soriano Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ---------------------------------------------------------------- GREGORY MISAEL SORIANO, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02728-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with hypothyroidism as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit claims. The Soriano case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2873: Walter Suit Alleges Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams ------------------------------------------------------------- JOHN E. WALTER, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:23-cv-02685-RMG (D.S.C., June 15, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). According to the complaint, AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. The Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff's blood and/or body, says the suit. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian. He was diagnosed with bladder cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products, the suit asserts. The Walter case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglass A. Kreis, Esq. Bryan F. Aylstock, Esq. Justin G. Witkin, Esq. AYLSTOCK, WITKIN, KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC 17 East Main Street, Suite 200 Pensacola, FL 32502 Telephone: (850) 202-1010 E-mail: dkreis@awkolaw.com baylstock@awkolaw.com jwitkin@awkolaw.com MDL 2913: N.D. California Suggests Remand of Breathe Suit to D.D.C. ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the lawsuit styled IN RE JUUL LABS, INC., MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Document Relates only to: Case No. 20-cv-03717. BREATHE D.C., Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS INC., Defendant, Case Nos. 19-md-2913-WHO, 20-cv-03717-WHO (N.D. Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California grants the Plaintiff's motion and suggests remand of the lawsuit to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Judge Orrick construed Plaintiff Breathe D.C.'s pending motion as a motion for an Order of Suggestion of Remand to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML"). In January 2020, Breathe filed this case in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defendant JUUL Labs, Inc. ("JLI"), removed the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia and filed with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation a notice of a potential tag-along action to the In re JUUL Labs, Inc. Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation MDL, 19-md-02913-WHO ("In re JUUL MDL" or "MDL"). While the case was pending in the District of Columbia, Breathe filed a motion to remand. The D.C. District Court held that motion in abeyance, pending final the determination by the JPML on whether to transfer this case to this MDL. Over Breathe's objections, the JPML issued a final order transferring the case to the In re JUUL MDL. On Jan. 29, 2021, Breathe moved to "retransfer" this case back to D.C. District Court. Judge Orrick denied that motion explaining that given the early stage of the MDL and by operation of his Pretrial Order #1, all pending motions to remand and other substantive motions were stayed. Judge Orrick found that Breathe had not shown a "sufficiently compelling reason" for its motion to be addressed at that early juncture, but noted the "ambitious schedule" he had set for resolution of the common issues and questions before him in the thousands of underlying cases and indicated that Breathe's motion would be considered on the merits once it became effective and efficient to do so. On Jan. 18, 2023, Breathe filed the pending motion requesting to lift the stay on its pending motion to remand to D.C. Superior Court and its motion to "retransfer" this case "to D.C. Federal Court." Judge Orrick heard oral argument on that motion on Feb. 17, 2023. Having reviewed the arguments of Breathe D.C., as well as the objections of JLI, Judge Orrick finds it appropriate to send this case back to the JPML now with a suggestion of remand. Judge Orrick does not reach the merits of whether there was or is jurisdiction over Breathe D.C.'s sole claim (asserted under the District of Columbia's Consumer Protection Procedures Act, "CPPA"). Judge Orrick only determines that given the state of related proceedings in this MDL -- in particular the settlement structures into which JLI and Co-Lead Plaintiffs' Counsel have entered to resolve participating personal injury, school district and local government entities, and Native American tribal entities' claims, as well as the preliminary approval of the settlement of the consumer class action claims asserted against JLI -- Judge Orrick sees no benefit from this case remaining in the MDL. There are no further actions that he can or should take to facilitate the pre-trial preparation or resolution of this specific, distinct case. Therefore, Judge Orrick suggests to the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation that this case, 20-cv-03717-WHO Breathe DC v. Juul Labs, Inc., be remanded to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 12, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybt7z4wx from Leagle.com. META PLATFORMS: Meaning of Web-Property in Healthcare Suit Resolved ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, IN RE META PIXEL HEALTHCARE LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: All Actions, Case No. 22-cv-03580-WHO (VKD) (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California holds that "Web-Property" should be understood to mean healthcare providers' websites and web pages; it does not include "applications." The Plaintiffs and Meta ask the Court to resolve their dispute regarding the scope of the Plaintiffs' discovery relating to healthcare providers' use of Meta tracking tools. The Court held a hearing on this matter on May 23, 2023. In this putative class action, the Plaintiffs allege that Meta improperly acquires their confidential health information in violation of state and federal law and in contravention of Meta's own policies regarding use and collection of Facebook users' data, principally by means of a tracking tool called the "Pixel." Each of the Plaintiffs' healthcare providers allegedly installed the Meta Pixel on their patient portals and in other places on their websites. The Plaintiffs claim that when they logged into the patient portal or engaged in other activity on their healthcare providers' websites, the Pixel transmitted certain information to Meta. The Plaintiffs have served document requests ("RFPs") and interrogatories on Meta. Those discovery requests define the term "Web-Property" as "a point of presence on the web, including websites." The Plaintiffs say that "Web-Property" should be understood to encompass webpages and applications of healthcare providers, i.e., HIPPA or CMIA covered entities. Meta says that "Web Property" should be limited to medical providers' webpages that contain a patient portal or similar features that transmit patient status. Although the Plaintiffs' consolidated complaint includes allegations that the Meta acquired confidential health information by tracking users' activities on healthcare provider web pages other than patient portals, Meta argues that certain web pages maintained by healthcare providers do not implicate protected health information as a matter of law and should be outside the scope of relevant discovery. It also argues the Judge Orrick has already held that Meta's tracking of users' behavior on web pages other than "portal-type" web pages is "legally irrelevant." The Plaintiffs counter that Judge Orrick did not decide precisely what information is "protected" when he denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and that Smith also does not resolve the parties' dispute. Judge DeMarchi agrees with the Plaintiffs that neither the Smith decision nor the preliminary injunction order decides whether information acquired by Meta using the Pixel or other tracking tools on web pages that are not "portal-like" is protected health information. She also agrees with the Plaintiffs that their allegations are not limited to acquisition of information on "portal-like" web pages. Thus, for purposes of the Plaintiffs' discovery requests, the term "Web-Property" should be understood as a healthcare provider's "point of presence on the web, including websites." The definition does not include "applications," nor are any particular applications described or identified in the consolidated complaint or its Appendix. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/57x6zawm from Leagle.com. META PLATFORMS: Time Period for Discovery in Healthcare Suit Solved ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, IN RE META PIXEL HEALTHCARE LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: All Actions, Case No. 22-cv-03580-WHO (VKD) (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California resolves discovery dispute on the time period for discovery. The Plaintiffs and Meta ask the Court to resolve their dispute regarding the appropriate time period for Meta's responses to the Plaintiffs' document requests and interrogatories. The Court held a hearing on this matter on May 23, 2023. The Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action against Meta on June 17, 2022. The operative complaint is the Consolidated Class Action Complaint, filed on Feb. 21, 2023. The Plaintiffs allege that Meta improperly acquires their confidential health information in violation of state and federal law and in contravention of its own policies regarding use and collection of Facebook users' data, principally by means of a tracking tool called the "Pixel." Each of the Plaintiffs' healthcare providers allegedly installed the Meta Pixel on their patient portals and in other places on their websites. The Plaintiffs claim that when they logged into the patient portal or engaged in other activity on their healthcare providers' websites, the Pixel transmitted certain information to Meta. The Plaintiffs have served document requests ("RFPs") and interrogatories on Meta. Those discovery requests define "the relevant time period." The parties agree that Meta launched the Pixel around Oct. 14, 2015. They also agree that Meta added new functionality to the Pixel's capabilities, including the "SubscribedButtonClick" event transmission, in May 2017. Meta has Terms of Service, a Data Policy, and a Cookies Policy that form the basis for the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. The Plaintiffs argue that Meta should be required to produce documents created or modified on or after April 14, 2014 through April 28, 2023, and should be required to respond to interrogatories based on information from April 14, 2014 through April 28, 2023, subject to later supplementation, if appropriate. Meta argues that it should not have to produce documents or information for any time period before April 1, 2018 or after Feb. 21, 2023 (with one exception). It explains that the consolidated complaint contains no allegations of any misconduct occurring before April 2018, and that the longest limitations period for any of the Plaintiffs' claims is four years, which would encompass conduct no earlier than June 2018. Meta further explains that its proposed end of the discovery period, Feb. 21, 2023, is the date the Plaintiffs filed the consolidated complaint and that it is a reasonable cut off for custodial discovery. However, it proposes to produce non-custodial "event data" received from web developers via the Pixel though April 1, 2023. Judge DeMarchi has reviewed the entire consolidated complaint. That complaint asserts claims on behalf of a putative class of "all Facebook users whose health information was obtained by Meta from their healthcare provider or covered entity." She says the consolidated complaint is conspicuously silent about when the named Plaintiffs visited their healthcare providers' websites with a Meta Pixel installed, or when they first discovered the facts that form the basis for their claims. Thus, discovery relating solely to Meta's alleged breach of an express contract arguably could be limited to the period of time the alleged contract was in effect, but there is no reason that limitation should automatically apply to discovery relating to the Plaintiffs' other claims. Judge DeMarchi is unable to resolve the parties' dispute about whether the Plaintiffs are or are not entitled to toll the statutes of limitations. For purposes of this dispute, then, she accepts that the consolidated complaint includes claims on behalf of "all Facebook users whose health information was obtained by Meta from their healthcare provider or covered entity." As a general matter, the earliest date for discovery relating to the Plaintiffs' claims is Oct. 14, 2015 -- the date the Pixel was first launched. For discovery requests that are limited to functionality first introduced in May 2017, Judge DeMarchi sees no reason why discovery should extend earlier than the date the functionality was made available. For discovery requests that are directed to information about Meta's knowledge and intent it may be reasonable for the Plaintiffs to obtain discovery of documents and information before Oct. 14, 2015. However, the Plaintiffs proposed date of April 14, 2014 appears to be an arbitrarily earlier date. The relevant start date for such discovery will depend on the specific requests and the timing of the activities they implicate, which is information that may be known only to Meta. For discovery requests that are directed to the Plaintiffs' breach of express contract claim, Judge DeMarchi sees no reason why discovery should extend earlier than the date of the alleged contract, which is similar to Meta's proposed start date of April 1, 2018. The Court has recently set an interim discovery schedule that includes a date for the substantial completion of document discovery. In order to facilitate the orderly production of documents, including ESI, Judge DeMarchi sets the discovery end date for all discovery requests at April 28, 2023, the date the Plaintiffs propose, subject to modification as the needs of the case require. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/554ysamw from Leagle.com. NEGRIL ATL: Faces Gooding Suit Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation ------------------------------------------------------------- INDIRA GOODING, and JAIDA BELTON, Plaintiffs v. NEGRIL ATL, LLC, d/b/a NEGRIL ATL and PETER BEST, Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-02724-AT (N.D. Ga., June 16, 2023) is brought by the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, for unpaid wage violations. This case arises from Defendants' violations of the FLSA tip credit and subsequent underpayment of its employees at the federally mandated minimum wage rate and for Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiffs and all similarly situated workers their earned minimum wages. On July 2, 2022, both Plaintiffs were terminated by the Defendants within hours of complaining about not being paid appropriately. Their terminations violated the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA, says the suit. Plaintiff Gooding worked as a waitress for Defendants from approximately September 26, 2020, to July 2, 2022, while Plaintiff Belton worked as a bartender from approximately September 7, 2021, to July 2, 2022. Negril ATL, LLC, d/b/a Negril ATL, operates a restaurant chain in Atlanta, Georgia as well as in Brooklyn, New York.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Arnold J. Lizana, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF ARNOLD J. LIZANA III 1175 Peachtree Street NE, 10th Floor Atlanta, GA 30361 Telephone: (470) 207-1559 Facsimile: (470) 231-0672 E-mail: alizana@attorneylizana.com - and - Tia T. Brown, Esq. THE LAW OFFICE OF THORNTON BROWN, LLC 235 Peachtree Street, Suite 400 Atlanta, GA 30303 Telephone: (404) 946-8702 Facsimile: (229) 337-5459 E-mail: tjbrown@thorntonbrown.com NEVADA: Bid for Writ of Mandamus in El Capitan v. Dist. Court Nixed ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, EL CAPITAN RANCH LANDSCAPE MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION, A NEVADA CORPORATION; AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT GROUP, A NEVADA CORPORATION, Petitioners v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. WILLIAMS, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and PATRICK McKNIGHT, Real Party in Interest, Case No. 86441 (Nev.), Judge Lidia S. Stiglich of the Supreme Court of Nevada denies the petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The original petition for a writ of a mandamus or prohibition challenges a district court order denying a motion for summary judgment in a putative class action. Having considered the petition and supporting documentation, Judge Stiglich is not persuaded that writ relief is warranted. Judge Stiglich holds that mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary remedies and whether to consider a petition seeking such relief is within the Court's sole discretion. They generally decline to exercise that discretion as to petitions challenging orders denying motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and she is not convinced that any of the exceptions for doing so apply in the case. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3dmj24rh from Leagle.com. NEW RESIDENTIAL: Ross Sues Over Unlawful Mortgage Services ---------------------------------------------------------- Michael Ross, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. NEW RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE, LLC, NEWREZ, LLC, and PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Case No. 2:23-cv-00255-LEW (D. Maine, June 23, 2023), is brought against all the Defendants as a result of mortgage servicer duty of good faith violations. Maine requires that mortgage servicers act in good faith toward Maine consumers when servicing mortgage loans. The Defendants have not acted in good faith toward Mr. Ross in offering to modify his loan. Their initial offer contained a poison pill that Mr. Ross had to free the property of a junior lien, serviced by the Defendants and which did not have a practical impact on the Defendants or the 2nd Plaintiff's rights. The only function the demand that the mortgage be discharged served was to make it impossible for Mr. Ross to comply with the terms of the offer. Once Mr. Ross got the second mortgage discharged, the Defendants changed their tune. Mr. Ross's financial situation was essentially unchanged, but the Defendants suddenly had new financial concerns and requirements that, they said, meant they could not extend him the previous offer. The new reasons provided were false and violated existing federal law and regulations about the handling of loss mitigation applications, including requirements that servicers provid specific reasons for any loan modification denials as further discussed, says the complaint. The Plaintiff is the owner of residential real property, located at and commonly known as 90 Southside Road, York, ME 03909-5117 (the "Home"). H Mortgage Corporation ("PHH") is a corporation with a headquarters in Mount Laurel, New Jersey and is a "servicer."[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: John Z. Steed, Esq. ISLAND JUSTICE P.O. Box 711 // 43 School Street Stonington, ME 04681 Phone: (207) 200-7077 Email: john@islandjusticelaw.com NEW YORK: Electronic Discovery in C.K. v. Bassett Compelled in Part ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, C.K. through his next friend P.K.; C.W. through her next friend P.W.; C.X., through her next friend P.X.; C.Y. through his next friend P.Y., for themselves and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Mary T. Bassett, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health; and Ann Marie T. Sullivan, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health, Defendants, Case No. 22-CV-1791 (BMC) (JMW) (E.D.N.Y.), Magistrate Judge James M. Wicks of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York grants in part and denies in part: a. the Plaintiffs' motion to compel electronic discovery; b. the Defendants' cross-motion for a protective order; c. the Plaintiffs' motion to compel depositions; and d. Defendants' cross-motion for a protective order. The Plaintiffs commenced the putative class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and asserting various causes of action against Defendants related to New York State's alleged failure to provide mental health services to Medicaid-eligible children. They allege that the Defendants have violated the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment Services provisions of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 U.S.C Section 1396a(a)(43); 42 U.S.C. Section 1396d(a)(4)(B); 42 U.S.C Section 1396d(r), Reasonable Promptness provision of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(8), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12132, et seq., Section 504, 29 U.S.C. Section 794, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Plaintiffs are four minors proceeding under pseudonyms and each through their "next friend." The Defendants are Mary T. Bassett, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, and Ann Marie T. Sullivan, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health. The Plaintiffs challenge the scope and nature of services provided by the State of New York, specifically the intensive home and community-based mental health services provided to Medicaid-eligible children (e.g., Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment), and the Plaintiffs highlight, inter alia, the alleged issues around the access to, and availability of, these services within the state. Before the Court are two joint motions regarding the parties' discovery disputes), which the Court construes as the Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery and the Defendants' motion for a protective order. At bottom, the parties are at an impasse regarding the keyword search terms that Defendants should use to locate, review, and produce responsive documents. The genesis of the dispute stems from the differing volume of documents -- the document review population -- that would result from the application of either party's proposed search terms. Relatedly, the parties disagree on how to proceed with depositions considering the ongoing dispute regarding search terms. District Judge Brian M. Cogan referred the motion to Judge Wicks for determination and a recommendation to him for any adjustments to the current case schedule necessitated because of that determination. The initial complaint was filed on March 31, 2022. The amended complaint was filed on Oct. 31, 2022. The Defendants filed their answer on Nov. 21, 2022. Judge Cogan adopted a discovery schedule on May 20, 2022 and pursuant to that schedule discovery was set to end by June 30, 2023. The Defendants subsequently requested that the Sept. 13, 2023 deadline by which they must (i) serve their written responses to the Plaintiffs' initial document production requests and interrogatories, and (ii) begin producing documents, be extended to Oct. 20, 2022. The Plaintiffs filed a response with their own conditions. The Court heard the parties' arguments on Nov. 2, 2022 and adopted a revised discovery schedule on Nov. 3, 2022. The parties are still in the paper discovery phase. The Plaintiffs served their First Set of Requests for the Production of Documents (Exhibit 1) on July 28, 2022, and their Second Set of Requests for the Production of Documents (Exhibit 2) on Dec. 20, 2022. As of April 17, 2022, when this dispute first arose, the Defendants had already produced 14 gigabytes of Microsoft Excel spreadsheets containing responsive data. As for non-data documents, the Plaintiffs noted that there were documents outstanding as to both sets of Plaintiffs document demands. They served a Third Set of Requests for the Production of Documents on March 21, 2023. Since Sept. 7, 2022, the parties have exchanged various iterations of keyword search term proposals for the review of the Defendants custodians' electronic mailboxes to begin the document review and production process. However, they were unable to resolve the issue amongst themselves and filed a joint motion regarding their dispute on April 17, 2023. Judge Cogan referred this motion to Judge Wicks for determination and a recommendation to him for any adjustments to the current case schedule necessitated because of that determination. On April 26, 2023, the parties appeared before Judge Wicks for a motion hearing to discuss the discovery issues. They were adamant that their respective proposals were the best path forward. Following discussion with counsel, the Court directed the Defendants to conduct and complete a sample review of the 8,000 documents identified by the parties by May 12, 2023 and report the results of that sampling to Plaintiffs by that date. The parties were further directed to meet and confer in a good faith effort to reach a compromise regarding the search parameters and terms that would lead to a document review population substantially below the 1.6 million document review proposed by the Plaintiffs and substantially above the 166,156 proposed by the Defendants. Moreover, the parties were directed to file a joint status report by May 19, 2023 as to the status of their meet and confer regarding search terms, including the production status of certain outstanding responsive non-email documents discussed and addressed in the parties' joint motion. Additionally, they were directed to proceed with the three 30(b)(6) witness depositions that were already scheduled for early May. The Court reserved decision on motion, which it construed as a motion to compel, and a cross-motion for a protective order. On May 19, 2023, the parties filed their anticipated status report. The Defendants reported that they had searched for and produced all non-email documents requested except any that may be attached to emails that are the subject of the parties' keyword search proposal dispute. Thus, that dispute was resolved. As to the keyword search terms, however, the Defendants completed the sampling as directed, and the parties subsequently met and conferred. Yet, disputes remained, and thus, each side provided further search term proposals for the Court's consideration. The Plaintiffs revised terms pointed to an approximately 25% reduction from their original proposal, with a document review population of around 1.2 million. The Defendants' revised terms pointed to an approximately 65% increase from their original proposal, with a document review population of around 463,932.8. In connection with their proposed terms, the Plaintiffs urged that a three-to-four-month extension of time would be appropriate for Defendants to produce the 1.2 million documents. The Defendants in turn asked for an eight-month extension of all deadlines based on their proposed terms and stated that a review population of 1.2 million or anything close to that would require substantially more time. The Plaintiffs also noted that they had already conducted two 30(b)(6) depositions with a third scheduled for May 24, 2023. They further requested that they continue to be able to take substantive depositions of Defendants' employees without prejudice to their ability to conclude those depositions after substantial production of the email documents. The Court allowed, and encouraged, depositions to continue. On May 24, 2023, the parties appeared before Judge Wicks once again for a status conference to discuss their revised search term proposals including the scope and timing of production and other deadlines. There was extensive discussion regarding various options that could help further refine the document review population and assist the Defendants in efficiently reviewing and producing the large volume of electronically stored information at issue. The parties were subsequently directed to meet and confer to attempt to further narrow the scope of responsive documents based on that discussion. Subsequently, the parties filed their respective letters. Thereafter, they also filed a second joint motion raising a dispute as to the procedure for conducting depositions given the pending document review. The parties' primary dispute revolves around the collection and production of electronically stored information ("ESI") from the electronic mailboxes of 24 custodians that the parties have agreed on. More specifically, the parties disagree about the proposed keyword search terms that the Defendants should use to locate responsive documents, and the appropriate time that Defendants should be afforded to review and produce those documents. Their secondary dispute relates to the procedure for depositions in light of the pending electronic discovery dispute. First, Judge Wicks finds that the Plaintiff's proposed keyword search terms are appropriate and proportionate. Given the undisputed importance of the issues at stake, the relevance of the documents, the high responsive rates, the wide variety of terms used in the documents for the same or similar concepts, and the likelihood that highly relevant documents would escape review if Defendants proposed search terms were applied, he finds the Plaintiffs proposed search terms (DE 46-1) are appropriate. Accordingly, the Defendants are directed to utilize and apply the Plaintiffs' most recent keyword search term proposal to the documents of the 24 custodians to create the document review population. Second, having reviewed the parties' proffered authority, and considered the parties' arguments and briefing, Judge Wicks recommends to Judge Cogan that the discovery schedule be adjusted as follows: a. Joint Status Report filed by Oct. 1, 2023; b. Fact depositions substantially completed by Oct. 12, 2023; c. Initial expert reports served by Nov. 16, 2023; d. Class certification motion served by Nov. 16, 2023; e. Joint Status Report filed by Nov. 29, 2023; f. Defendants to complete ESI production by Dec. 29, 2023; g. Opposing expert reports served by Dec. 29, 2023; h. Opposition to class certification to be served by Dec. 29, 2023; i. Joint Status Report filed by Jan. 16, 2024; j. Reply expert reports served by Feb. 16, 2024; k. Reply in support of class certification served by Feb. 16, 2024; and l. Conclusion of discovery (including completion of limited depositions as necessary based on documents produced after initial depositions were taken): March 8, 2024. Third, Judge Wicks holds that the Defendants should reconsider whether the use of TAR may in fact expedite the review considering the volume of documents to now be reviewed. Though he is not inclined to direct the parties to enter into such a claw-back agreement, the Defendants are nevertheless free to consider this option and weigh its utility in helping them meet their production obligations. Judge Wicks also finds that are myriad of options available to the parties to ensure the review and production of the subject documents occurs within a reasonable timeframe. He leaves it to the parties to confer and work out mutually desirable methods of achieving their presumably common goal of completing document discovery. Finally Judge Wicks holds that accessibility is indisputably not an issue. The relevant documents from the 24 custodians have already been gathered, the only issue that remains is what terms will be applied to the collected documents to create the document review population. Thus, although the undersigned raised the issue of cost-shifting and invited briefing, upon consideration, cost-shifting is not warranted under these circumstances. For the reasons he stated, Judge Wicks grants in part and denies the Plaintiffs' motion to compel electronic discovery, the Defendants' cross-motion for a protective order, the Plaintiffs' motion to compel depositions, and the Defendants' cross-motion for a protective order. The Defendants are directed to utilize and apply the Plaintiffs' most recent keyword search term proposal (DE 46-1) to the documents of the 24 custodians to create the document review population. The parties are directed to continue with depositions and the Defendants will prioritize reviewing the documents of custodians noticed for deposition. Further, Judge Wicks respectfully recommends that the discovery schedule be amended as noted. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Memorandum & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ykfe4cfj from Leagle.com. Claire Renee Glasspiegel, Esq., Children's Rights, Jersey City, NJ, Attorney for the Plaintiffs. Valerie Achille, Esq., Children's Rights, Baldwin, NY, Attorney for the Plaintiffs. Daniele Gerard, Esq., Harry Frischer, Esq., Children's Rights, New York, NY, Attorneys for Plaintiffs C.K. and C.W.. Brandy Tomlinson, Esq. -- intake@drny.org -- Disability Rights New York, Rochester, NY, Attorneys for Plaintiffs C.K. and C.W.. Kimberly Lewis, Esq. -- lewis@healthlaw.org -- Martha Jane Perkins, Esq., National Health Law Program, Los Angeles, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiffs C.K. and C.W.. Shiva Pedram, Esq. -- spedram@proskauer.com -- Jacob Wonn, Esq. -- jwonn@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, NY, Attorneys for Plaintiffs C.K., and C.W.. Steven H. Holinstat, Esq. -- sholinstat@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, NY, Attorney for the Plaintiffs. Benjamin D Liebowitz, Esq., Matthew Joseph Lawson, Esq., Yuval Rubinstein, Esq., Office of New York State Attorney General, New York, NY, Attorneys for the Defendants. Rebecca Durie Katherine Culley, Esq., Office of New York State Attorney General, New York, NY, Attorney for the Defendants. NJ GREAT WALL: Court Approves $11.5K Class Settlement in Zheng Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, YU CEN ZHENG, individually and on behalf of all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NJ GREAT WALL, LLC, and NICKY LIU, Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-16350 (GC) (RLS) (D.N.J.), Judge Georgette Castner of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey grants the parties' renewed joint motion for approval of the proposed settlement agreement and approves the settlement agreement. The comes before the Court upon the renewed joint motion for approval of the proposed settlement agreement submitted by Zheng and the Defendants, which resolves the Plaintiff's wage-and-hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Sections 201, et seq., and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("NJWHL"), N.J. Stat. Ann. Sections 34:11-56a, et seq., for alleged unpaid overtime and minimum wage. The wage-and-hour dispute stems from the Plaintiff's employment as a "fry wok cook and helper" at Great Wall, a restaurant in Neptune City, New Jersey. The Plaintiff was employed at Great Wall from about Oct. 6, 2020, to April 5, 2021, and he alleges that despite working more than 70 hours per week, he did not receive overtime pay and was compensated at a fixed rate of $3,000 per month. On Aug. 31, 2021, the Plaintiff brought suit individually and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated individuals who were employed by the Defendants within a three-year period and who allegedly "failed to receive overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week." The Defendants answered the Complaint and asserted affirmative defenses on Jan. 21, 2022. Following mediation overseen by the Court, the parties reported on Aug. 23, 2022, that they had reached a settlement in principle. Two months later, on Oct. 28, 2022, the parties submitted a joint motion for approval of their proposed settlement, which resolved the Plaintiff's claims individually and no longer purported to be on behalf of other employees at Great Wall. After the Court initially raised concerns with the breadth of the release provision in the proposed settlement and gave the parties time to address the concerns, the parties submitted a revised settlement on May 17, 2023, and renewed their motion for joint approval. The settlement would resolve and dismiss the Plaintiff's claims in exchange for the Defendants making a one-time payment of $11,500, which consists of $7,130.67 payable to the Plaintiff and $4,369.33 payable to his counsel for attorney's fees and costs. The parties jointly maintain that the settlement is a "fair" and "reasonable compromise" of the claims in dispute and that the Court should approve it. In view of what has been presented, Judge Castner is satisfied that the settlement resolves a bona fide dispute between the parties. Despite the disagreements, the parties reached a settlement that avoids the cost and time-consuming nature of litigation. On balance, therefore, he finds that the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable to the Plaintiff. He is also satisfied that the revised settlement does not frustrate the FLSA's purpose and, in fact, furthers its implementation. Finally, the requested attorney's fee amount is reasonable under both the percentage-of-recovery approach and the lodestar formula. The costs also appear to be consistent with what would be expected litigation costs. Accordingly, Judge Castner approves the Plaintiff's counsel's request for fees and costs in the amount of $4,369.33. For the reasons he set forth, Judge Castner grants the parties' joint motion for approval of their revised settlement agreement and approves the settlement. An appropriate Order follows. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/48vpnvjy from Leagle.com. NORTH CAROLINA: District Court Dismisses in Part Wheeler Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- Chief District Judge Richard E. Myers, II, of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Western Division, dismisses in part the lawsuit entitled JUAREZ WHEELER, Plaintiff v. FCC BUTNER, et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:23-CT-3024-M (E.D.N.C.). On Jan. 25, 2023, Juarez Wheeler, a federal inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Wheeler moves to "combine" his action with that of another inmate. When a prisoner seeks relief in a civil action from a governmental entity or officer, a court must review and dismiss the complaint if it is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915A(a), (b)(1). When Wheeler filed this action, he was incarcerated at the federal prison in Butner, North Carolina ("FCI Butner"). The allegations of Wheeler's complaint arose at both FCI Butner and the Federal Correctional Institution in Fairton, West Virginia ("FCI Fairton"). He alleges that in 2019, while he was incarcerated at FCI Fairton, another inmate ("Whiteman") assaulted Wheeler, resulting in serious injuries, while correctional officers did not intervene to stop the assault. He was sent to FCI Butner and a couple years passed. Mr. Wheeler further alleges that in 2022, a different inmate ("Lopez") was transferred to FCI Butner and began to threaten Wheeler, informing Wheeler that he was here to finish the business of Whiteman and Lopez was paid handsomely. Wheeler brought the issue to the attention of unspecified correctional staff, who ignored his concerns and did not initiate separation orders or other protection for Wheeler. Messrs. Wheeler and Lopez got into a fight, which Wheeler characterizes as self defense, and Wheeler was convicted of a disciplinary infraction resulting in a loss of sentence credit. Wheeler was transferred to the special housing unit, and describes the conditions in that unit, including inadequate food, as inhumane and a violation of human rights. Mr. Wheeler names as defendants the inmates, who assaulted him, various iterations of the prisons where the assaults happened, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the wardens and unspecified correctional staff. He seeks millions of dollars in monetary damages and requests appointment of counsel and to proceed as a class action with another inmate. The Court begins with Wheeler's allegations arising at FCI Fairton. The Court dismisses these claims and the Defendants without prejudice to allow Wheeler to refile them in the District of New Jersey, where FCI Fairton is located. As for Wheeler's motions and requests to "combine" his case with that of another inmate, to proceed as a class action, and for appointment of counsel, Judge Myers finds that Wheeler and the other inmate fail to meet the criteria for permissive joinder and cannot proceed as a class action without counsel. Wheeler's request for appointed class counsel does not alter this conclusion, Judge Myers points out. No right to counsel exists in civil cases absent "exceptional circumstances," Judge Myers notes, citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated in part on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296 (1989). The facts of this case and Wheeler's abilities do not present exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the Court denies Wheeler's motions and requests. Mr. Wheeler's allegations that correctional staff at FCI Butner failed to protect him from the assault by Lopez and subjected him to unconstitutional living conditions in his special housing unit cell are not clearly frivolous, Judge Myers notes. However, Wheeler has not named any defendant amenable to suit. To state a Bivens claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a federal actor violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Judge Myers holds, Wheeler cannot name the Bureau of Prisons, a fellow inmate, a federal prison, or unspecified prison staff as a defendant. Therefore, the Court dismisses these Defendants. As for Warden Kelly, Wheeler alleges at most that Kelly acted in a supervisory capacity over the prison staff directly involved in the allegations of Wheeler's complaint. A Bivens claim, however, may not be based on respondeat superior, Judge Myers says. A supervisor may be held responsible for a subordinate's unconstitutional act only if the supervisor was involved personally or participated in the unconstitutional act. Judge Myers finds that Wheeler has not plausibly alleged Kelly's direct involvement sufficient to hold Kelly liable for the acts of others. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Kelly. Judge Myers holds that Wheeler may amend his complaint to name specific defendants in connection with his claims concerning the failure to protect him from the assault by Lopez and the conditions of his cell in the special housing unit and explain their role in the allegations of his complaint. Wheeler will file his response on or before July 7, 2023. The Court warns Wheeler that his response must be limited to naming defendants directly involved in his remaining claims and specifically explaining each defendant's role in the claims. Judge Myers points out that this directive is not an invitation to make new claims. The Court will review Wheeler's response pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B). If Wheeler does not file any response, the Court will dismiss the action without prejudice. In sum, Judge Myers says, Wheeler may proceed with his claims concerning the failure to protect him from the assault by Lopez and the conditions of his cell in the special housing unit, but must file a response to this order on or before July 7, 2023, naming defendants directly involved in his remaining claims and specifically explaining each defendant's role in the claims. The Court denies Wheeler's motions, and dismisses all other claims and all Defendants. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 12, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/34vzx3um from Leagle.com. PAYSTAND INC: Waller Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. -------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Paystand, Inc., et al. The case is styled as David Shane Waller, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Paystand, Inc., Does 1 To 10, Inclusive, Case No. CGC23607267 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., June 26, 2023). The case type is stated as "Other Non-Exempt Complaints." Paystand -- https://www.paystand.com/ -- is on a mission to create a more open financial system, starting with B2B payments.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Kane Moon, Esq. MOON & YANG, APC 1055 W 7th St., Ste. 1880 Los Angeles, CA 90017-2529 Phone: 213-232-3128 Fax: 213-232-3125 Email: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com PBI RESEARCH SERVICES: Landi Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against PBI Research Services, et al. The case is styled as Steve Landi, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons v. PBI Research Services, PBI Research Services/Berwyn Group, Pension Benefit Information, LLC d/b/a PBI Research Services, Progress Software, Does 1 To 50, Inclusive, Case No. CGC23607276 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., June 26, 2023). The case type is stated as "Other Non-Exempt Complaints." PBI Research Services -- https://www.pbinfo.com/ -- is the leading provider of proactive population management including death audit and locate services.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Matthew Righetti, Esq. RIGHETTI GLUGOSKI 220 Halleck St., Ste. 220 San Francisco, CA 94129-1728 Phone: 415-264-9990 Fax: 415-923-9292 Email: matt@righettilaw.com - and - Edward J. Wynne, Esq. WYNNE LAW FIRM 80 E Sir Francis Drake Blvd., Ste. 3G Larkspur, CA 94939-1709 Phone: 415-461-6400 Fax: 415-461-3900 Email: ewynne@wynnelawfirm.com PIXI INC: Missimer Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. ------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pixi, Inc. The case is styled as Laura Missimer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Pixi, Inc., Case No. STK-CV-UF-2023-0006497 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., June 23, 2023). The case type is stated as "Unlimited Civil Fraud." Pixi -- https://www.pixibeauty.com/ -- is an international beauty brand renowned for its natural, skin-loving, youth-enhancing, multi-tasking colour and skincare products, including the iconic and award-winning Glow Tonic..[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Allison Willett, Esq. WILLETT & WILLETT LLP 171 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 500 Beverly Hills, CA 90210-5536 Phone: 424-276-0065 Fax: 424-276-0151 Email: allison@willettlaw.com Website: www.willettlaw.com PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY: Maine Court Narrows Claims in Thurston Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MATTHEW THURSTON, Plaintiff v. PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00375-NT (D. Me.), Judge Nancy Torresen of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Compel Appraisal and Stay the Proceedings. On Jan. 21, 2022, Thurston's vehicle -- a 2012 Volvo XC70 -- was badly damaged in a collision. At the time of the collision, the Plaintiff had auto insurance from Progressive. His insurance policy was underwritten by United Financial Casualty Co. ("UFCC"). The Policy provided that, in the event of a collision, the insurer would pay for sudden, direct, and accidental loss to the Plaintiff's vehicle. The Policy specified that the actual cash value of a vehicle equals its replacement cost at the time the loss occurs, less the value of its physical depreciation as determined by standard business practices. It stated that the insurer could use estimating, appraisal, or injury evaluation systems to assist the insurer in adjusting claims under this policy and to assist it in determining the amount of damages, expenses, or loss payable under this policy. The Policy also laid out a series of steps in the event of a disagreement between the insurer and the insured as to the amount of loss. It further stated that they may not be sued unless there is full compliance with all its terms. The Plaintiff made a claim for the damage to his vehicle stemming from the collision on Jan. 25, 2022. Progressive accepted the claim and declared the Plaintiff's vehicle to be a "total loss." To calculate the settlement amount, Progressive used a vehicle valuation report (the "Valuation Report") prepared by a third-party vendor, Mitchell International, Inc. A "Methodology Explanation" appended at the back of the Valuation Report explained Mitchell's process for vehicle appraisal. First, Mitchell found comparable vehicles in the same market area. Second, Mitchell adjusted the prices of the comparable vehicles based on the "comparable vehicle adjustments": Projected Sold Adjustment (PSA), Vehicle Configuration Adjustment, Mileage Adjustment, and Equipment. Third, Mitchell calculated a "base vehicle value" by averaging the adjusted cost of the comparable vehicles. Fourth, Mitchell calculated the following "loss vehicle adjustments": Condition Adjustment, Prior Damage Adjustment, After Market Part Adjustment, and Refurbishment Adjustment. Finally, Mitchell calculated a "market value" by applying the loss vehicle adjustments to the base value. In its Valuation Report for the Plaintiff's Volvo, Mitchell identified three comparable vehicles for sale in the market area. Mitchell then subtracted $398, $537, and $427, respectively, from each of those vehicles' list prices by applying a PSA. Ultimately, the Defendants offered the Plaintiff $12,824.37 to settle his claim. A letter dated Aug. 10, 2022 from the Defendants' counsel to the Plaintiff's counsel indicates that the Plaintiff sent the Defendants a "demand letter and draft complaint regarding Matthew Thurston's automobile property damage claim" on July 12, 2022. Then, in the fall of 2022, the Plaintiff filed a class action3 complaint (the "Complaint") against Progressive and UFCC. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts that he purchased insurance from the Defendants based on their promise that they would pay him the value of his car if it were damaged in an accident but that when it came time for the Defendants to honor the promises made in the Policy they sold to him, the Defendants failed to pay him the fair value for his car. The Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the application of a PSA in Mitchell's appraisal process. Overall, the Plaintiff states that were it not for the Defendants' deceptive and improper adjustments, he and the other similarly situated consumers in Maine, would have received a greater amount for their total loss vehicles from the Defendants. His Complaint contains three counts against the Defendants: unfair claim settlement practices (Count I); unfair trade practices (Count II); and conversion (Count III). Now, the Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint or, in the alternative, to compel an appraisal and stay the proceedings. First, they argue that the Plaintiff's entire suit is barred by his failure to participate in the appraisal dispute process outlined in the Policy. Second, they assert that Counts I, II, and III should each be dismissed because the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for unfair claim settlement practices, unfair trade practices, or conversion. Third, they seek to dismiss the claims against Progressive on the ground that it is not the proper defendant in the action. Finally, the Defendants argue that, if the Court declines to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint, that it should compel appraisal and stay the proceedings. At the outset, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's lawsuit is barred because, by refusing to participate in the appraisal process invoked by the Defendants after the Plaintiff disagreed with Mitchell's valuation, the Plaintiff failed to satisfy a precondition to his ability to pursue any lawsuit challenging their valuation of his loss. Judge Torresen finds that the Plaintiff's suit is not precluded because the appraisal clause does not apply to the dispute over the Defendants' application of a PSA to the Plaintiff's claim or those of the purported class in general. The Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply with the appraisal clause is therefore denied. For the same reason, she also denies the Defendants' request to stay proceedings and compel appraisal. Even if the Plaintiff's suit is not barred, the Defendants argue that his complaint should still be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Judge Torresen holds that the Plaintiff's Complaint clears the relatively low hurdle required to state a plausible claim pursuant to Section 2436-A(1)(E) of the UCSPA and the Defendants' motion to dismiss that Count I is denied. She finds that the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the Defendants knowingly misrepresented facts related to coverage; the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the Defendants' settlement offer was made "without a reasonable basis" and thus "without just cause"; and the Plaintiff has alleged an injury and the Defendants provide no support for their contention that this does not satisfy the definition of injury under the UCSPA. In Count II of his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' actions constituted "unfair and deceptive trade practices prohibited by" the UTPA. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's UTPA claim should be dismissed because he has failed to sufficiently allege that he suffered a "loss of money or property," that they committed an unfair or deceptive trade practice, and/or that any representation by them was material. Judge Torresen is not convinced. The Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a loss of money or property; the Defendants misrepresented the nature of the insurance coverage they provide; and it is reasonable to infer that customers choose insurance policies based on the extent and value of coverage. She finds that the Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim of unfair and deceptive acts under the UTPA, and the Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II of the Plaintiff's Complaint is therefore denied. Count III of the Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the Defendants converted the property of the Plaintiff and the putative class by denying them the money they were entitled to when they filed claims. In all, Judge Torresen is not persuaded that the Plaintiff's claim is appropriately brought as one for conversion. She holds that the problem for the Plaintiff is that he does not explain how the intangible -- his right to payment under the Policy -- is the type of intangible "customarily merged in or identified with some document," as, for instance, savings bank books. The Plaintiff offers no case law that has applied a conversion action to a claim for payment under an insurance policy, and while the law may be "undergoing a process of expansion," federal courts are not at liberty to blaze new trails in state law. The Defendants' motion to dismiss Count III of the Plaintiff's Complaint is therefore granted. Finally, the Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the claims against Progressive because the sole allegation against Progressive is that it owns the 'Progressive' trademark," and because, as the underwriter of the Policy, UFCC was the plaintiff's insurer and the entity that engaged in the allegedly improper conduct. The Defendants, however, present no support for their argument that UFCC, as the underwriter of the Policy, is therefore the Plaintiff's insurer and the sole proper defendant. Judge Torresen has not been made privy to the corporate structure of the Defendant-companies but the record before her shows that Progressive's name is on the Valuation Report and the Policy, which suggests that Progressive bears some responsibility for those documents. Though discovery may eventually show that UFCC is the only proper defendant in this action, at this stage, she finds that the Plaintiff may proceed on his suit against both Defendants. For these reasons, the Defendants' motion to dismiss Count III of the Plaintiff's Complaint is granted. The motion is denied as to all other claims. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2m3zave4 from Leagle.com. RAISE MARKETPLACE: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York -------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Raise Marketplace, LLC. The case is styled as Linda Slade, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Raise Marketplace, LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-05389 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Raise -- https://www.raise.com/ -- is a digital prepaid and retail payment platform where consumers save money on every purchase at over 4,000 brands and earn rewards with Raise Pay.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C. 14 Harwood Court, Suite 415 Scarsdale, NY 10583 Phone: (917) 373-9128 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com ROADMASTER DRIVERS: Court Narrows Claims in Amended Meehan Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, BRADLEY MEEHAN and CESAR E. CIRVERA SANTAMARIA, on behalf of themselves and those similar situated, Plaintiff v. ROADMASTER DRIVERS SCHOOL, INC., Defendant, Civil No. 2:22-cv-04299-JMG (E.D. Pa.), Judge John M. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs Bradley Meehan and Cesar E. Corvera Santamaria brought the class action against the Defendant alleging claims of a violation of the Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection law, Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment. The Plaintiffs paid to take a Commercial Driver's License ("CDL") course with the Defendant and were promised CDL testing at the conclusion of the course. Soon after they received their CDL licenses through the Defendant, they received notice from state entities that their CDL's were invalid. The Defendant owns, operates, and manages CDL schools in several locations throughout the United States. The Plaintiffs attended the Defendant's location at 4219 Fritch Drive in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The Defendant offered students CDL testing that complied with requirements of various state entities, including the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. On July 15, 2022, individuals who had taken the course and obtained their CDL's through the Defendant received a letter from government entities indicating the CDL exams they took were invalid. Corvera received his letter in July 2022. As a result of the invalid CDL exam his license was revoked, and he has lost income. Meehan received a letter from the New York Department of Transportation and then had to pay money to take another course to receive a valid CDL. Meehan filed a complaint against Roadmaster Drivers School of Pennsylvania, Inc. and Roadmaster Drivers School, Inc. on Oct. 26, 2022, alleging a violation of the Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), and claims of Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment. Both Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on Nov. 16, 2022. On Dec. 7, 2022, Meehan and Corvera filed an Amended Complaint against Roadmaster Drivers School, Inc., alleging the same claims. The Defendant now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint. First, the Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for deceptive conduct under the UTPCPL, making three arguments. First, they argue the Plaintiffs have not identified a deceptive practice. Second, that the Plaintiffs have not plead sufficient facts to show justifiable reliance. And third, that the CDL course and testing provided by the Defendant was not. Ass to the Defendant's first argument, Judge Gallagher that the Plaintiffs have thus pled sufficient facts to show a deceptive practice. As to the Defendant's second argument, he says the Plaintiffs have plead sufficient facts to make a plausible allegation of justifiable reliance. As to the final argument, courts have found the purchase of educational services to qualify as expenses for personal, household or family purposes. At this stage, the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged they purchased a good or service that was "primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Therefore, the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count One is denied. The Defendant next moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract. Accepting the Plaintiffs' factual allegations as true and construing them in a light most favorable to the non-movant, Judge Gallagher holds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for breach of contract. Among other things, the Plaintiffs have alleged they contracted with the Defendant, Defendant breached that contract and they suffered damages as a result, and the Defendant failed to provide the contracted for services and they suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's breach. The Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim alleges that the Defendant voluntarily and accepted a benefit, in this case monies paid for CDL training and testing services, and, they have retained this benefit even though they failed to provide the services that were promised. Judge Gallagher holds that the Plaintiffs have, thus, far pleaded sufficient factual allegations to establish the elements of an unjust enrichment claim. The Plaintiffs conferred a benefit on the Defendant in the form of monies paid for CDL training and resting services. Defendant accepted this benefit by receiving payment. They have alleged it has retained this benefit even though the CDL licenses were determined to be invalid. Moreover, the Plaintiffs are entitled to plead both their breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims at this stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the Defendant's motion to dismiss count three is denied. Next, the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint contains a prayer for punitive damages. However, punitive damages are also not available for a claim of unjust enrichment. As such, the Plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages on their breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. With respect to the Plaintiffs' UTPCPL claim, the Plaintiffs ask this Court to consider their prayer for punitive damages to be a claim for treble damages under the liberal pleading standards of the federal rules. That request is denied. If the Plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint to include a prayer for treble damages under the UTPCPL, they must do so on July 3, 2023. Accordingly, Judge Gallagher grants the Defendant's motion to strike punitive damages without prejudice. The Plaintiffs have also requested prejudgment interest in their prayer for relief. The Defendant argues the Plaintiffs' prayer for prejudgment interest should be stricken, as they are unable to establish their damages with any mathematical precision. But even if the Plaintiffs cannot assert such damages with mathematical precision at this stage, Judge Gallagher finds that they have stated a viable claim for all three counts of the Amended Complaint. And they very well could be able to state their damages with a mathematical precision at a later stage of the litigation. Therefore, the Defendants' motion to strike the prayer for prejudgment interest is denied. The Defendant may reassert this argument at a later stage in the proceedings if warranted by relevant facts and applicable law. The Defendant moves to strike the Plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief on the grounds that they did not include any request for injunctive relief in their Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs did not respond to this issue in their brief. Therefore, Judge Gallagher grants the Defendant's motion to strike the Plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief as unopposed. Finally, the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint contains a prayer for attorney's fees. The Defendant argue that under Pennsylvania law attorney's fees are not recoverable in a claim for breach of contract or unjust enrichment. They further argue that while the UTPCPL does permit recovery of attorney's fees, the Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead a UTPCPL claim, and any recovery would be precluded by the contract between them and Roadmaster. Judge Gallagher declines to strike the Plaintiffs' demand for attorney's fees at this stage of the litigation. The Defendant may reassert their argument at a later stage in the proceedings if warranted by the relevant facts and applicable law. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gallagher grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/3p7ppudb from Leagle.com. SAFECO INSURANCE: Can File Amended Answer to Cogent Brain Complaint ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the cases, COGENT BRAIN, PS, Plaintiff v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC., a Washington corporation, and FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE OF AMERICA, a Washington corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO. and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, foreign insurance companies, Defendants. LAWRENCE A. THOMAS, DC, PS, d/b/a CAPITOL HILL CHIROPRACTIC and CHIROPRACTIC d/b/a Cooper Chiropractic, Plaintiffs v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC., a Washington corporation, and FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE OF AMERICA, a Washington corporation; Defendants, Case Nos. 2:23-cv-00544, 2:23-cv-00545 (W.D. Wash.), Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington grants the Defendants' motion for leave to file an amended answer. The Defendants filed a Rule 15(A)(2) Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer to Class Action Complaint for Violation of Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86, et seq., and a Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycyhne72 from Leagle.com. SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA: Rodriguez Can't Intervene in Dunsmore Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, DARRYL DUNSMORE, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-00406-AJB-DDL (S.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge David D. Leshner of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California recommends that nonparty Pedro Rodriguez's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) Request to Present a Claim be denied. Through this putative class action, the Plaintiffs bring claims "on behalf of all adults who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated in any of the San Diego County Jail facilities" for violations of their civil and other rights. Among the Plaintiffs' claims is that the County's jail facilities are not accessible to disabled incarcerated persons, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"). On April 27, 2023, the District Court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") in part. Pursuant to the District Court's order, many of the Plaintiffs' claims, including those calling for improved compliance with the ADA in the County's jail facilities, will proceed. The Plaintiffs have also moved the District Court for a preliminary injunction and provisional class certification. They seek an order "enjoining the Defendants' ADA violations" and provisional certification of a class of incarcerated persons with disabilities. The District Court has scheduled a hearing on the motion for June 29, 2023. On June 30, 2022, Rodriguez, proceeding without counsel, filed a "Motion to Intervene, Present Claims and Come Into the Action Under F.R.C.P. 23(d)." He represented that he "is a disabled prisoner" who has been detained in the County's Central Jail since 2014. He moved to intervene on the basis that his interests may not be fairly represented in the action. The District Court denied Rodriguez's motion, finding that although Rodriguez had an interest in the action, his interests were fairly represented by other parties in the action and further that his intervention would unnecessarily disrupt the action. In the Request now before the Court, Rodriguez -- again proceeding without counsel -- states he is a disabled prisoner of Module 5C. He further states that on behalf of himself and other disabled inmates, he demanded that Module 5C "be made ADA compliant" but that his complaints have been ignored. Specifically, Rodriguez complains that the bunks in Module 5C are unsafe, that the tables in 5C cannot accommodate inmates in wheelchairs, that the inmates in Module 5C have not had adequate access to showers, and that the lack of call boxes and obscured windows present a safety hazard for inmates "in case of emergency." He asserts that jail personnel "disregard" these "admitted ADA violations" and asks the Court to "notice" the "insufferable conditions." As is relevant to Rodriguez's motion, the Plaintiffs allege in the TAC that the Defendants fail to ensure that incarcerated people with disabilities have equal access to all programs and services offered at the Jail, fail to ensure that people with disabilities are housed in units and are assigned to beds that are accessible and safe, and fail to adequately train staff to house people with disabilities in adequate and safe housing. The Plaintiffs therefore seek: (1) declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the Defendants' systemic and willful discrimination against incarcerated people with disabilities, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations to incarcerated people with disabilities in programs, services and activities; and (2) declaratory and injunctive relief under the United States and Deliberate indifference to their failure to ensure the safety and security of incarcerated people. The Plaintiffs seek this relief "on behalf of a subclass of all qualified individuals with a disability who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated in San Diego County Jail facilities. They assert the members of this subclass are "at risk of harm" from Defendants' failure to provide accessible and safe accommodations. Judge Leshner finds that Rodriguez has not made the required showing that the Plaintiffs' representation has been inadequate. Because the Plaintiffs adequately represent Rodriguez's interests, he may not intervene in the action as a matter of right. He further finds that permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b) is unwarranted. Although Rodriguez's claim for "redress" shares a common legal and factual basis with the Plaintiffs' claims, the identity of interests between Rodriguez and the Plaintiffs is sufficient reason for the District Court to deny Rodriguez's Request. Judge Leshner has also considered whether permitting Rodriguez to intervene would unduly delay or prejudice the original parties and whether judicial economy favors intervention. He finds that Rodriguez's intervention is neither necessary nor beneficial to the resolution of the action. Judge Leshner concludes that Rodriguez is not entitled to intervene as of right, and that permitting him to intervene as a matter of discretion would create delay and unduly prejudice the current parties. He therefore recommends that the District Court denies Rodriguez's renewed motion to intervene. He submits his Report and Recommendation to Judge Anthony J. Battaglia, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 72.3. Judge Leshner requests the Clerk of the Court mail a copy of his Report and Recommendation to: Pedro Rodriguez, No. 14745493 San Diego Central Jail 1173 Front Street, 5C-Cell 8 San Diego, CA 92101 Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Court and served on all parties by July 11, 2023. The document should be titled "Objections to Report and Recommendation." Failure to timely object may result in a waiver of the right to raise objections on appeal. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Report & Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/2cxvh763 from Leagle.com. SERVALL BIOMETRICS: Norman Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois -------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Erica Norman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Servall Biometrics d/b/a Patronscan, Inc., Case No. 2023CH02874 was removed from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on June 23, 2023. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:23-cv-04015 to the proceeding. The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Servall Biometrics is the maker of PatronScan and ID scanning software and mobile apps that are used by restaurants, hotels, nightlife establishments, bars, casinos and law enforcement to validate if IDs are authentic.[BN] The Plaintiff appears pro se. The Defendants is represented by: Harnaik Kahlon, Esq. RILEY, SAFER, HOLMES & CANCILA LLP Three First National Plaza 70 W. Madison St., Suite 2900 Chicago, IL 60602 Phone: (312) 471-8755 Email: nkahlon@rshc-law.com SHARED IMAGING: Court Allows Ranger to File 3rd Amended Complaint ----------------------------------------------------------------- Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California grants the Plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint in the lawsuit titled MONICA RANGER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SHARED IMAGING, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-401-KJN (E.D. Cal.). The Court, having reviewed the parties' stipulation requesting that the Plaintiff be granted leave to file a Third Amended Complaint in the form proposed in their stipulation, finds good cause to allow amendment. Judge Newman grants the Plaintiff leave to file the Third Amended Complaint in the form attached to the parties' stipulation and is directed to file the Third Amended Complaint forthwith. Once filed, the Court will resolve the parties' revised motion for preliminary approval of the class action and PAGA settlement on the submitted briefing without a hearing. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 12, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5x655uf9 from Leagle.com. SLEEPY'S LLC: 3rd Cir. Affirms Class Certification in Hargrove Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the lawsuit captioned SAM HARGROVE; ANDRE HALL; and MARCO EUSEBIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SLEEPY'S LLC, Appellant v. CURVA TRUCKING LLC; EUSEBIO's TRUCKING CORP.; I STEALTH LLC; HC TRUCKING LLC; ALS TRUCKING, INC.; ALS TRUCK DELIVERY LLC; UTILA TRANSPORT, INC.; E-MAK LLC; EMAK TRANSPORT INC.; EMAK TRANSPORT; A&P TRUCKING LLC; DJG TRANSPORT LLC; AL TRANSPORT SERVICES CORP.; A.C. BAUTISTA LLC; FB LOGISTICS CORP.; GD DELIVERY SERVICES LLC; RAAN TRANSPORT LLC; JONATHAN LLC; JONATHAN's LLC; S.O. TRUCKING LLC; SIX STARTS TRUCKING LLC; MSF TRUCKING LLC; RKC DELIVERY LLC; GEORGIAN SHIELD INC.; and WR TRUCKING LLC, Case No. 22-2040 (3d Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirms the District Court's grant of class certification. Sleepy's, a mattress retailer, relied on drivers to deliver its mattresses to customers. More than 100 of those drivers were based at Sleepy's facility in Robbinsville, New Jersey. Sleepy's classified these drivers as independent contractors and required them to sign a contract governing their relationship with Sleepy's. The drivers allege they were employees--not independent contractors--and so Sleepy's violated New Jersey law by making improper deductions from their pay and failing to pay them overtime. In 2018, the Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of "111 individuals who performed deliveries on a full-time basis and who drove one truck for Sleepy's." The District Court denied certification, holding that the class was not "ascertainable based on objective criteria" because Sleepy's records did not identify which drivers worked full time (Hargrove v. Sleepy's LLC, No. 10-cv-1138, 2019 WL 8881823, at *4 (D.N.J. May 9, 2019). The Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Plaintiffs satisfied the ascertainability requirement by identifying a "reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining class membership." On remand, the District Court was again confronted with deciding whether a class of drivers could be certified. The court certified the class. The court certified the class only on the issue of liability, leaving the assessment of damages for future individual proceedings. The Court of Appeals granted Sleepy's request to appeal the class certification decision. In this case, the District Court allowed 111 Sleepy's delivery drivers to sue Sleepy's as a class. The drivers allege that Sleepy's has misclassified them as independent contractors instead of employees, that it has made illegal deductions from their pay, and that it has failed to pay them overtime. The drivers present identical legal claims based on virtually identical facts. Circuit Judge Anthony J. Scirica, writing for the Panel, opines that these claims can be proven with common evidence. Resolving them in a single trial would be fair and efficient. Accordingly, Judge Scirica holds, the District Court did not err in allowing the case to proceed as a class action. The Panel will affirm the District Court's grant of class certification. At the core of this case is the Plaintiffs' allegation that they were not independent contractors but Sleepy's employees. Judge Scirica says to decide whether this is so, the District Court will apply what is commonly known as the "ABC test." The District Court already applied the ABC test to the three Plaintiffs and held that they were Sleepy's employees, Judge Scirica notes. Its decision about Part A--Sleepy's control over the drivers--rested entirely on common evidence. Judge Scirica points out, among other things, that this was sufficient to resolve the issue of employment status, and is likewise sufficient to show that employment status is a common issue. Because the Plaintiffs can prove their case with common evidence, Judge Scirica finds they have satisfied the predominance requirement. The District Court held that a class action was the most fair and effective way of resolving this case. The Court of Appeals agrees. Before certifying the class, the District Court was required to conclude that "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy," Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The District Court balanced, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of alternatives, and concluded that a class action was the superior method of adjudication. The Court of Appeals agrees that adjudicating liability for these claims in a single class action is more efficient than potentially holding 111 trials. Moreover, a single class verdict will be fairer than 111 potentially conflicting individual verdicts about the same legal claims based on very similar sets of facts. In granting certification, the District Court found that the class representatives would "fairly and adequately protect" its interests. The court held that there were no conflicts of interest between the named parties and the class. Sleepy's contends this was error. According to Sleepy's, some class members are joint employers of other Sleepy's "drivers and helpers. Sleepy's therefore worries that a judgment against it could prove disastrous for those class members, who might be sued by their former employees and bankrupted. Judge Scirica holds that the District Court was right to reject this argument. If some class members are liable to their own employees for violating the wage and hour laws, they are so liable regardless of the outcome of this suit. A win for the class would establish only that Sleepy's had failed to pay overtime and illegally deducted money from the drivers' pay--not that the class members had done the same to their employees, Judge Scirica explains. Hence, the Court of Appeals finds that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding they were adequate representatives. Judge Scirica is also confident the District Court will appoint class counsel. Hence, the Court of Appeals affirms the order of the District Court granting class certification, and remands for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated June 12, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdfhtvf3 from Leagle.com. SMALLHOLD INC: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Smallhold, Inc. The case is styled as Linda Slade, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Smallhold, Inc., Case No. 1:23-cv-05390 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Smallhold -- https://smallhold.com/ -- is a growing network of organic mushroom farms with operations in Brooklyn, Austin, Los Angeles, and beyond.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C. 14 Harwood Court, Suite 415 Scarsdale, NY 10583 Phone: (917) 373-9128 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com SOBEL WESTEX: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sobel Westex. The case is styled as Emanuel Delacruz, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated v. Sobel Westex, Case No. 1:23-cv-05434 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Sobel Westex -- https://sobelathome.com/ -- provides furniture products. The Company offers home furniture such as pillows, bedding, bath, blanket, pool, robes, and other related products.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq. Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq. GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES 150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR New York, NY 10003 Phone: (212) 228-9795 Fax: (212) 982-6284 Email: nyjg@aol.com SOUTHEASTERN INDIANA: Elkins Suit Removed to S.D. Indiana --------------------------------------------------------- The case is styled as Brian Elkins, Annie Elkins, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Southeastern Indiana Health Management Inc. d/b/a Columbus Regional Health, Case No. 49D01-2303-PL-020792 was removed from the Marion County Superior Court 1, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on June 26, 2023. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:23-cv-01117-JRS-TAB to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated Personal Injury: Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability. Southeastern Indiana Health Management Inc. doing business as Columbus Regional Health -- https://www.crh.org/ -- is a nationally recognized health system serving a 10-county region in southeastern Indiana.[BN] The Plaintiffs appear pro se. The Defendant is represented by: Peter S. French, Esq. Vivek Randle Hadley, Esq. Matthew Thomas Albaugh, Esq. TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP (Indianapolis) One Indiana Square, Suite 3500 Indianapolis, IN 46204 Phone: (317) 713-3500 Fax: (317) 713-3699 Email: pfrench@taftlaw.com vhadley@taftlaw.com malbaugh@taftlaw.com STATE FARM: Clippinger Must Respond to Bid in Limine by July 7 -------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as Clippinger v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Case No. 2:20-cv-02482 (W.D. Tenn., Filed July 2, 2020), the Hon. Judge Thomas L. Parker entered an order granting Plaintiff's motion for: (1) an extension of time to respond to the Defendant's motion in limine; and (2) for leave to reply in support of her motion for class certification with a combined brief that addresses the arguments of both the Defendants that is fifteen pages long. The Plaintiff has through July 7, 2023, to respond to the Defendant's motion, the Court says. The nature of suit states Diversity-Contract Dispute. State Farm is a group of mutual insurance companies throughout the United States with corporate headquarters in Bloomington, Illinois.[CC] STERIS CORPORATION: Radic Suit Removed to S.D. California --------------------------------------------------------- The case captioned as Dragutin Radic, an individual, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all persons similarly situated v. STERIS CORPORATION, an Ohio Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 37-2023-00008579 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California on June 26, 2023, and assigned Case No. 3:23-cv-01174-AJB-WVG. On March 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed an unverified Class Action Complaint which sets forth the following causes of action: Failure to Pay Straight-Time and Overtime Wages; Failure to Provide Compliant Meal Periods; Failure to Reimburse Required Expenses; Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements; Failure to Pay All Wages Owed Upon Separation; and Violation of the Unfair Competition Law.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: David G. Hoiles, Jr., Esq. Lana B. Nassar, Esq. JACKSON LEWIS P.C. 225 Broadway, Suite 1800 San Diego, CA 92101 Phone: (619) 573-4900 Facsimile: (619) 573-4901 Email: David.hoiles@jacksonlewis.com Lana.nassar@jacksonlewis.com SUSAN ALEXANDRA: Crosson Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York -------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Susan Alexandra, LLC. The case is styled as Aretha Crosson, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Susan Alexandra, LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-04731 (E.D.N.Y., June 26, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Susan Alexandra -- https://www.susanalexandra.com/ -- is dedicated to bringing sparkle and joy to everyday life with all handbags, jewelry, and accessories are made with love in New York City.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C. 14 Harwood Court, Suite 415 Scarsdale, NY 10583 Phone: (917) 373-9128 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com SUTER COMPANY: Harris Seeks to Recover Losses Under ERISA --------------------------------------------------------- NICHOLE HARRIS, on behalf of The Suter Company, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, and on behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MIGUEL PAREDES, PRUDENT FIDUCIARY SERVICES, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company, TIMOTHY P. SUTER, GEORGE B. SUTER, and DANIEL B. SUTER, Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-03831 (N.D. Ill., June 16, 2023) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 for losses suffered by The Suter Company, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan and its participants when Defendants caused the Plan to buy shares of Suter Company for more than fair market value and thereby misused the Plan's money to the benefit of Selling Shareholders, and other plan-wide relief. Suter Company was a privately held company and party in interest to the Plan. Suter Company adopted the Plan effective retroactively as of January 1, 2019. On September 2, 2020, the Plan, through its trust, The Suter Company, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Trust, purchased from party-in[interest Selling Shareholders, directly or indirectly, 100,000 shares of Suter Company common stock for $62,371,709, which was financed by a $62,371,709 term loan agreement with Suter Company, and on November 1, 2020, as a result of a working capital adjustment, the purchase price and note payable to the Company were adjusted to $63,840,499 (the purchase and loan transactions together, referred here as the ESOP Transaction). Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to enforce her rights under ERISA and the Plan, to recover the losses incurred by the Plan and the improper profits realized by Defendants resulting from their causing prohibited transactions and breaches of fiduciary duty, knowingly participating in the prohibited stock transaction and breaches of fiduciary duty, and failing to meet their duties as co-fiduciaries, and equitable relief, including reformation of transaction contracts, rescission of the transaction, and removing Defendants as fiduciaries and enjoining them from acting as fiduciaries for any employee benefit plan that covers or includes any Suter Company employees or members of the Class. The Plaintiff requests that these prohibited transactions be declared void, Defendants be required to restore any losses to the Plan arising from their ERISA violations, Defendants be ordered to disgorge to the Plan any improper profits, and any monies recovered for the Plan to be allocated to the accounts of the Class members. The Plaintiff was employed at Suter Company as an assembler from February 2016 to January 4, 2023. She was vested in shares of Suter Company in her Plan account. The Suter Company is a food manufacturing company manufacturing prepared food products throughout the United States and Canada. Prudent Fiduciary Services touts itself as a provider of professional Independent Fiduciary/ESOP Trustee, ERISA compliance consulting, and expert witness services related to employee benefit plans such as qualified retirement plans and health and welfare plans.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by" Patrick O. Muench, Esq. BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 318 W. Adams Street, Ste. 1512 Chicago, IL 60606 Telephone: (312) 500-8680 Facsimile: (304) 342-1110 E-mail: pmuench@baileyglasser.com - and - Gregory Y. Porter, Esq. Ryan T. Jenny, Esq. BAILEY & GLASSER LLP 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Ste. 540 Washington, DC 20007 Telephone: (202) 463-2101 Facsimile: (202) 463-2103 E-mail: gporter@baileyglasser.com rjenny@baileyglasser.com T-MOBILE US: Ferrendino Sues Over Failure to Protect Personal Info ------------------------------------------------------------------ PETER FERRENDINO and JACOB KILGORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. T-MOBILE US, INC. and T-MOBILE USA, INC., Defendants, Case No. 4:23-cv-00418-FJG (W.D. Mo., June 16, 2023) is brought by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants for negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy - intrusion upon seclusion, and violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs' personally identifiable information was exfiltrated and compromised in the data breach announced by T-Mobile on January 19, 2023. The data breach was a direct result of T-Mobile's failure to implement adequate and reasonable cybersecurity procedures and protocols necessary to protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII. The Plaintiffs seek, among other things, damages and injunctive relief requiring T-Mobile to fully and accurately disclose the PII and other information that has been compromised; to adopt reasonably sufficient security practices and safeguards to protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII from unauthorized disclosures in order to prevent incidents like the data breach from reoccurring in the future, and to safeguard the PII that remains in T-Mobile's custody. T-Mobile US, Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary Defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc. are telecommunications companies that provide wireless, messaging, and data services along with mobile phones and accessories.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Tim E. Dollar, Esq. DOLLAR BURNS BECKER & HERSHEWE, L.C. 1100 Main Street, Suite 2600 Kansas City, MO 64105 Telephone: (816) 876-2600 Facsimile: (816) 221-8763 E-mail: timd@dollar-law.com - and - Ronald A. Marron, Esq. Alexis M. Wood, Esq. Kas L. Gallucci, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON 651 Arroyo Drive San Diego, CA 92103 Telephone: (619) 696-9006 Facsimile: (619) 564-6665 E-mail: ron@consumersadvocates.com alexis@consumersadvocates.com kas@consumersadvocates.com - and - Margaret MacLean, Esq. Christian Levis, Esq. Amanda Fiorilla, Esq. LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C. 44 South Broadway, Suite 1100 White Plains, NY 10601 Telephone: (914) 997-0500 Facsimile: (914) 997-0035 E-mail: mmaclean@lowey.com clevis@lowey.com afiorilla@lowey.com - and - Anthony M. Christina, Esq. LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C. One Tower Bridge 100 Front Street, Suite 520 West Conshohocken, PA 19428 Telephone: (215) 399-4770 Facsimile: (914) 997-0035 E-mail: achristina@lowey.com - and - Ian W. Sloss, Esq. Brett Burgs, Esq. SILVER GOLUB & TEITELL LLP One Landmark Square, Floor 15 Stamford, CT 06901 Telephone: (203) 325-4491 Facsimile: (203) 325-3769 E-mail: isloss@sgtlaw.com bburgs@sglaw.com - and - Timothy J. Peter, Esq. FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP 1617 JFK Boulevard, Suite 1550 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (215) 277-5770 Facsimile: (215) 277-5771 E-mail: tpeter@faruqilaw.com TA OPERATING: Siaosi Suit Removed to C.D. California ---------------------------------------------------- The case captioned as Liva Siaosi, an individual; Perry Vazquez, an individual; Willie Calvin Bryant, an individual; Imran Ayub, an individual; and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. TA OPERATING LLC, a California limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No. CIVSB2301858 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino, to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on June 26, 2023, and assigned Case No. 5:23-cv-01240. On February 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an unverified Class Action Complaint against Defendant which sets forth the following ten causes of action: failure to pay overtime wages; failure to pay minimum wages; failure to provide meal periods; failure to provide rest periods; waiting time penalties; wage statement violations; failure to timely pay wages; to indemnify violations of Labor Code; and unfair competition.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Mia Farber, Esq. Eric J. Gitig, Esq. JACKSON LEWIS P.C. 725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2500 Los Angeles, CA 90017-5408 Phone: (213) 689-0404 Facsimile: (213) 689-0430 Email: Mia.Farber@Jacksonlewis.com Eric.Gitig@jacksonlewis.com - and - Semarnpreet Kaur, Esq. JACKSON LEWIS P.C. 3390 University Dr., Suite 110 Riverside, CA 92501 Phone: (951) 848-7940 Email: Semarnpreet.Kaur@jacksonlewis.com TAELOR INC: Martinez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Taelor, Inc. The case is styled as Pedro Martinez, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Taelor, Inc., Case No. 1:23-cv-04732 (E.D.N.Y., June 26, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Taelor, Inc. -- https://taelor.style/ -- is a monthly menswear clothing subscription that uses personal stylists and AI to help you pick rental outfits for all seasons, first dates, meetings, and more.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C. 14 Harwood Court, Suite 415 Scarsdale, NY 10583 Phone: (917) 373-9128 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com TESLA INC: Lambrix Has Until July 17 to Consolidate and Amend Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as Lambrix v. Tesla, Inc., Case No. 3:23-cv-01145 (N.D. Cal., Filed March 14, 2023), the Hon. Judge Trina L. Thompson entered a case management scheduling order as follows: -- Consolidated Amended Complaint due by: July 17, 2023 -- Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended July 31, 2023 Complaint due by: -- Responses due by: Aug. 14, 2023 -- Replies due by: Aug. 21, 2023 -- Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Sept. 5, 2023 Complaint Hearing set for: -- Close of Fact Discovery is now: Nov. 8, 2024 -- Class Certification Opening Reports May 10, 2024 due by: -- Class Certification Rebuttal June 21, 2024 Reports due by: -- Substantial Completion of Document March 15, 2024 Productions due by: -- Initial Disclosures due by: July 10, 2023 -- Motion to Appoint Interim Class July 25, 2023 Counsel Hearing set for: -- Oppositions due by: July 5, 2023 -- Replies due by: July 12, 2023 The nature of sui states antitrust litigation. Tesla is an American multinational automotive and clean energy company headquartered in Austin, Texas. Tesla designs and manufactures electric vehicles, stationary battery energy storage devices from home to grid-scale, solar panels and solar roof tiles, and related products and services. A copy of the Court's order dated June 21, 2023 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CSvNMa at no extra charge.[CC] TESLA INC: Ragone Has Until July 17 to Consolidate and Amend Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as Ragone v. Tesla, Inc., Case No. 3:23-cv-02352 (N.D. Cal., Filed May 15, 2023), the Hon. Judge Trina L. Thompson entered a case management scheduling order as follows: -- Consolidated Amended Complaint due by: July 17, 2023 -- Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended July 31, 2023 Complaint due by: -- Responses due by: Aug. 14, 2023 -- Replies due by: Aug. 21, 2023 -- Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Sept. 5, 2023 Complaint Hearing set for: -- Close of Fact Discovery is now: Nov. 8, 2024 -- Class Certification Opening Reports May 10, 2024 due by: -- Class Certification Rebuttal June 21, 2024 Reports due by: -- Substantial Completion of Document March 15, 2024 Productions due by: -- Initial Disclosures due by: July 10, 2023 -- Motion to Appoint Interim Class July 25, 2023 Counsel Hearing set for: -- Oppositions due by: July 5, 2023 -- Replies due by: July 12, 2023 The nature of sui states antitrust litigation. Tesla is an American multinational automotive and clean energy company headquartered in Austin, Texas. Tesla designs and manufactures electric vehicles, stationary battery energy storage devices from home to grid-scale, solar panels and solar roof tiles, and related products and services. A copy of the Court's order dated June 21, 2023 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/4489XAr at no extra charge.[CC] THISTLE HEALTH: Reid Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Thistle Health, Inc. The case is styled as Nadreca Reid, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Thistle Health, Inc., Case No. 1:23-cv-05392 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Thistle -- https://www.thistle.co/ -- is a healthy food and juice company that delivers fully-prepared, plant-forward meals to the doorsteps of its customers.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C. 14 Harwood Court, Suite 415 Scarsdale, NY 10583 Phone: (917) 373-9128 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com TWIGS & HONEY: Alexandria Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York --------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Twigs & Honey, LLC. The case is styled as Erika Alexandria, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Twigs & Honey, LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-05366 (S.D.N.Y., June 23, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Twigs & Honey -- https://www.twigsandhoney.com/ -- is a design studio focused on making pieces with an attention to detail and interest in fine craftsmanship.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com UNITED NATURAL FOODS: Mosley Suit Removed to C.D. California ------------------------------------------------------------ The case captioned as Christopher Mosley, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. UNITED NATURAL FOODS, INC., a Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 23STCV09845 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles, to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on June 26, 2023, and assigned Case No. 2:23-cv-05064. The Plaintiff's Complaint alleges 9 causes of action: failure to pay overtime wages; minimum wage violations; violation of Labor Code; meal period violations; rest period violations; waiting time penalties; wage statement violations; unfair competition; and civil penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA").[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Jennifer B. Zargarof, Esq. Anahi Cruz, Esq. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 300 South Grand Avenue Twenty-Second Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071-3132 Phone: +1.213.612.2500 Fax: +1.213.612.2501 Email: jennifer.zargarof@morganlewis.com anahi.cruz@morganlewis.com UNITED STATES: 5th Cir. Flips Class Certifications in Braidwood --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INCORPORATED, on behalf of itself and others similarly situated; BEAR CREEK BIBLE CHURCH, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CHARLOTTE A. BURROWS; JOCELYN SAMUELS; JANET DHILLON; ANDREA R. LUCAS; KEITH E. SONDERLING, in their official capacities as chair, vice-chair, and commissioners of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; MERRICK GARLAND, U.S. Attorney General, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, Case No. 22-10145 (5th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirms in part and reverses in part the district court's order denying the EEOC's motion to dismiss, modifying the classes that the Plaintiffs moved to certify, granting in part and denying in part EEOC's motion for summary judgment, and denying the Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the final judgments. In Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1740-41, 1743 (2020), the Court determined that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers from discriminating against homosexuals and transgender persons, holding that such discrimination is "on the basis of sex." Yet, it punted on how religious liberties would be affected by its ruling and on the practical scope of the Title VII protections afforded by Bostock. Instead, the Court identified three potential avenues of legal recourse for religious and faith-based employers to shield themselves from any potential infringement of their religious rights. The avenues were Title VII's religious exception, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-1(a), the ministerial exception of the First Amendment, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). In expanding discrimination "on the basis of sex" to include sexual orientation and concepts of gender identity such as transgenderism, the Bostock Court gave little guidance on how courts should apply those defenses and exemptions to religious employers. This is a suit by two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. and Bear Creek Bible Church. Braidwood is a management company that employs the workers of Hotze Health & Wellness Center, Hotze Vitamins, and Physicians Preference Pharmacy International LLC. Steven Hotze controls or owns the business entities and is the sole trustee and beneficiary of the trust that owns Braidwood. He is also the sole board member of Braidwood, serving as President, Secretary, and Treasurer. Braidwood has close to 70 employees who work at those entities. Hotze runs his corporations as "Christian" businesses -- to-wit, he does not permit Braidwood to employ individuals who engage in behavior he considers sexually immoral or gender non-conforming, nor does he allow Braidwood to recognize homosexual marriage. To Hotze, that would lend approval to homosexual behavior and make him complicit in sin. He also gives a nonreligious reason for refusing to recognize same-sex marriage: He will not allow Braidwood to recognize same-sex marriage because Texas continues to define marriage in heterosexual terms. Braidwood enforces a sex-specific dress code that disallows gender-non-conforming behavior. Hotze also does not countenance Braidwood employees' using a restroom opposite their biological sex, regardless of any asserted gender identity. There is no record evidence of any job applicant or employee of Braidwood who has claimed he was discriminated against under these policies. Bear Creek is a nondenominational church whose bylaws state that marriage is exclusively the union of one genetic male and one genetic female. Accordingly, it requires its employees to live according to its professed views on Biblical teaching. To that end, Bear Creek will not hire practicing homosexuals, bisexuals, crossdressers, or transgender or gender non-conforming individuals. Bear Creek has over 15 employees, some of whom are non-ministerial, and so is subject to Title VII. Finally, it also asserts that it is compelled to obey civil authorities per Biblical teachings. The church avers that it employed three persons who participated in conduct that it considered immoral and against its religious values, but Bear Creek never fired any of them based on its values. As per their closely held religious beliefs, Braidwood and Bear Creek assert that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC's guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. They have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. And all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by the Plaintiffs already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both Plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals' behavior, not their asserted identity. Although the EEOC has not brought an enforcement action against either party, it has not forsworn or disclaimed its willingness to bring an enforcement action against plaintiffs or other similarly situated members of their proposed classes. The Plaintiffs sued the EEOC and related governmental Defendants (collectively, "the EEOC") in 2018, seeking declaratory judgments. The district court stayed proceedings pending the resolution of Bostock, and post-Bostock, the Plaintiffs amended their complaint to seek a declaratory judgment on the following five statements: 1. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act compels exemptions to Bostock's interpretation of Title VII (RFRA claim); 2. The Free-Exercise Clause compels exemptions to Bostock's interpretation of Title VII (free exercise claim); 3. The First Amendment right of expressive association compels exemptions to Bostock's interpretation of Title VII (expressive association claim); 4. Title VII, as interpreted in Bostock, does not prohibit discrimination against bisexual employees (bisexual orientation claim); and 5. Title VII, as interpreted in Bostock, does not prohibit employers from establishing sex-neutral rules of conduct that exclude practicing homosexuals and transgender people from employment (sex-neutral rules of conduct claim). In addition to bringing claims on behalf of themselves, the Plaintiffs moved to certify two classes: all employers that oppose homosexual or transgender behavior for sincere religious reasons and all employers that oppose homosexual or transgender behavior for religious or nonreligious reasons. All claims are asserted on behalf of the sincere-religious-objector class, but only claims 3 to 5 are asserted on behalf of the nonreligious-objector class. The EEOC moved for summary judgment based on standing, ripeness, and sovereign immunity. It also moved for summary judgment on substantive grounds, averring that it did not violate the Plaintiffs' religious rights and that Bostock prohibits the policies on which the Plaintiffs want declaratory relief. The Plaintiffs similarly sought summary judgment on substantive grounds. The district court, in pertinent part, initially denied the EEOC's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, ruling that plaintiffs had established a "credible fear" of EEOC enforcement, conferring Article III standing. Pt separately held that the Plaintiffs' claims were ripe because the issues presented were purely legal with no need for further factual development. The Court held that waiting and withholding review would force the Plaintiffs between Scylla and Charybdis: Violate either Title VII and EEOC guidance or violate their sincere religious beliefs. Next, the court modified the classes that the Plaintiffs moved to certify. First, it certified a religious-business-type employers' class for all of Braidwood's claims. Then the claims of Bear Creek were separated into a church-type employers' class, which the court held was statutorily exempt from Title VII. The court declined to certify that class and entered judgment against Bear Creek. Finally, it accepted the Plaintiffs' proposed class definition for an "All Opposing Employers Class," defined as "every employer in the United States that opposes homosexual or transgender behavior for religious or nonreligious reasons." That class was certified only for claims 4 and 5. On the merits, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the religious-business-type employer class for claims 1-3: The court ruled that the class was protected under RFRA and the First Amendment. For the RFRA claim, it determined that Title VII substantially burdened the class members. Next, the court decided that the EEOC did not have a compelling interest in failing to provide a religious exemption to all class members. Moreover, the EEOC had not selected the least restrictive means to further any compelling interest. For the free exercise claim, the district court ruled that Title VII is not a generally applicable statute because it has individualized exemptions. Thus, strict scrutiny applies. Next, relying on Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S.Ct. 1868 (2021), and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the court concluded that the EEOC had not shown a compelling interest in light of the exemption system, which undermined the EEOC's contention that all discrimination had to be eliminated under Title VII. Again, in the alternative, Title VII was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Relying on Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), the district court ruled that the members of the religious-business-type-employers class engaged in expressive association and therefore had a right not to associate with persons engaging in homosexual or transgender conduct. Again, the court held that the EEOC had failed to show a compelling interest that would defeat the associational right. Additionally, the court determined, as a matter of law, that the sex-neutral policies of both classes pertaining to sexual conduct, dress codes, and bathrooms did not violate Title VII. Those policies applied equally to both sexes. On the other hand, the court granted summary judgment in the EEOC's favor on the entirety of claim 4 regarding bisexual orientation and employer policies regulating sex-reassignment surgery and hormone treatment for claim 5. The court then separately denied the Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the final judgments in pertinent part. Both Plaintiffs and the EEOC timely appealed. To begin, the Fifth Circuit holds that the Plaintiffs' claims are justiciable. Despite the EEOC's protestations that no one has brought a Title VII enforcement action against these Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have established a credible fear of such an action sufficient to establish standing. The case is ripe because no further facts are required to adjudicate their specific claims and there is a hardship to them in withholding judgment. Finally, the Plaintiffs have a valid cause of action. Next, class certification. Although the district court has wide discretion when defining and modifying classes, the Fifth Circuit holds that the class definitions it provided are too broad and ill-defined to reach the thresholds of class certification. Thus, it reverses the class certifications and proceeds to the merits on only Braidwood's individual claims. The Plaintiffs request that the Fifth Circuit finds that the district court erred in granting judgment against Bear Creek. The Plaintiffs' arguments primarily revolve around semantics and they cite no relevant cases indicating that the court abused its discretion in declining the original motion to amend the final judgment. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirms the decisions. The EEOC fails to carry its burden. It does not show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. Moreover, even if the Fifth Circuit accepted the EEOC's formulation of its compelling interest, refusing to exempt Braidwood, and forcing it to hire and endorse the views of employees with opposing religious and moral views is not the least restrictive means of promoting that interest. Hence, the Fifth Circuit affirms the summary judgment. Finally, Braidwood asks the Fifth Circuit to decide, post-Bostock, what policies are prohibited by Title VII. Specifically, it requests a declaratory judgment that Title VII, as interpreted in Bostock, permits employers to discriminate against bisexuals and to establish sex-neutral codes of conduct that may exclude practicing homosexuals and transgender persons. Although the Plaintiffs have a valid cause of action, the Fifth Circuit declines to answer these open questions for Braidwood's policies because the class certifications have been reversed. Braidwood already has obtained statutory relief and does not represent a class requiring relief. On that ground, the Fifth Circuit vacates the judgments for all of the scope-of-Title-VII claims post-Bostock. For the reasons stated, the district court's conclusion that the Plaintiffs' claims are justiciable is affirmed. The class certifications are reversed. The judgment against Bear Creek is affirmed. The ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption is affirmed. The judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption is vacated. The judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law is vacated. The Fifth Circuit remands the matter. It places no limitation on the matters that the district court may address on remand and it gives no indication of what decisions it should reach. A full-text copy of the Court's June 20, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mrxhfmp5 from Leagle.com. VAIL RESORTS: Quint Suit Stayed Until Hamilton Class Deal Is Final ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, RANDY DEAN QUINT, JOHN LINN, and MARK MOLINA, Individually and On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. VAIL RESORTS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Civil Action No. 20-cv-03569-DDD-NRN (D. Colo.), Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado grants the Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Class Settlement in Parallel Action is Final. The case is before the Court pursuant to an Order referring the subject motion issued by Judge Daniel D. Domenico. Now before the Court is Defendant Vail's Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Class Settlement in Parallel Action is Final. The Court has carefully considered the motion, the Plaintiffs' response, and Vail's reply, and has heard argument from the parties. It has taken judicial notice of its file and has considered the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law. In this wage and hour case, the Plaintiffs, who worked for Vail as Snow Sports Instructors or Ticket Scanners, allege that Vail did not pay them for all hours they worked, including overtime premiums. They assert 22 separate claims pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and various state wage and hour laws. On Nov. 21, 2022, (then-Magistrate, now-District) Judge Gordon P. Gallagher issued a Recommendation on Motion to Certify Class and Order on Motions to Compel and to Strike, in which he, among other things, recommended that the Plaintiffs' state law claims be bifurcated from the FLSA claims and stayed pending a resolution of the FLSA claims, and that a Hoffmann-LaRoche notice be sent only to Instructor employees. That Recommendation has not yet been ruled on. Judge Gallagher briefly addressed Vail's argument that the Hoffmann-LaRoche notice should be further narrowed due to the resolution of a FLSA lawsuit brought against Vail in California state court, Hamilton v. The Vail Corporation, et al., No. SC20210148 (Cal. Sup. Ct.). In Hamilton, the court, over these Plaintiffs' objections, approved a nationwide settlement for all claims of alleged unpaid wages and any other violations of state or federal law. These Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the final judgment in Hamilton was denied and the Plaintiffs' appeal of that order remains pending in the California Court of Appeals. Judge Gallagher rejected Vail's argument that the settlement in Hamilton bars FLSA claims here from any members of the Hamilton settlement class, meaning a Hoffmann-LaRoche notice should be sent only to the 1,603 individuals that expressly opted out of the Hamilton settlement. Vail now asks the Court to stay these proceedings until all appeals have been resolved and the Hamilton settlement is finalized. Vail seeks to stay any further proceedings until the Plaintiffs' appeal of the Hamilton settlement has been resolved. It claims that the resolution of Hamilton will clarify and narrow the claims of this putative class/collective action. They further argue that the String Cheese factors favor a stay. The Plaintiffs oppose any further stay of the proceedings on several grounds. As an initial matter, they argue that String Cheese is inapposite and the Court should apply the legal standard set forth in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Chilcott Portfolio Management, Inc., 713 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1983). Judge Neureiter finds that the Plaintiffs' interests are outweighed by the undue burden Vail will experience with having to produce discovery regarding employees who have already released their claims against it. And even a cursory review of the docket indicates that, should the case proceed, innumerable discovery disputes and motion practice is certain to follow. Further, while the Court typically discourages stays of discovery, Judge Neureiter acknowledges the efficiency and fairness of delaying the proceedings pending a final resolution of Hamilton. As state, courts routinely exercise the discretion to grant stays when a pending nationwide settlement could impact the claims in the case before them. Judge Neureiter then holds that the interests of non-parties, specifically non-party employees of Vail, will be furthered by a stay. He respectfully disagrees with Judge Gallagher and believes that distributing Hoffman-LaRoche notices in this case to thousands of Vail's Instructors nationwide who have already released claims and expect to receive settlement funds will likely sow confusion. Upon resolution of Hamilton, the Court and those who either opted out or did not receive adequate notice of Hamilton can proceed expeditiously here. Finally, Judge Neureiter finds that the public interest does not greatly favor one side or the other. For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Class Settlement in Parallel Action is Final is granted. Discovery is stayed pending the final resolution of all appeals in the Hamilton case. Within five days of such final resolution, the parties will file a Status Report with the Court. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mr423r4n from Leagle.com. VF OUTDOOR LLC: Leary Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against VF OUTDOOR, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Phillip Leary II, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals v. VF Outdoor, LLC, Does 1 To 100, Inclusive, Case No. CGC23607235 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., June 23, 2023). The case type is stated as "Business Tort." VF Corporation -- https://www.vfc.com/ -- is an American global apparel and footwear company founded in 1899 by John Barbey and headquartered in Denver, Colorado.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Scot Bernstein, Esq. LAW OFFICES SCOT D BERNSTEIN APC 101 Parkshore Dr., Ste. 100 Folsom, CA 95630-4726 Phone: 916-447-0100 Fax: 916-933-5533 Website: www.sbernsteinlaw.com - and - Eric Andrew Dgrover, Esq. KELLER GROVER LLP 1965 Market St, San Francisco, CA 94103 Phone: 415-543-1305 Fax: 415-543-7861 Email: eagrover@kellergrover.com Website: www.kellergrover.com VITAL PLAN INC: Morgan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vital Plan, Inc. The case is styled as Paradise Morgan, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Vital Plan, Inc., Case No. 1:23-cv-05397 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Vital Plan -- https://vitalplan.com/ -- provides supplements and lifestyle advice for individuals to live healthier and happier.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C. 14 Harwood Court, Suite 415 Scarsdale, NY 10583 Phone: (917) 373-9128 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com VITALIZE LABS: Morgan Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ----------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vitalize Labs, LLC. The case is styled as Paradise Morgan, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Vitalize Labs, LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-05398 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2023). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Vitalize Labs, LLC doing business as EBOOST -- https://www.eboost.com/ -- provides clean performance products such as daily energy products, pre-workout and recovery - that increase energy, focus, and all-around well-being.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C. 14 Harwood Court, Suite 415 Scarsdale, NY 10583 Phone: (917) 373-9128 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com WHALECO INC: Eakins Suit Removed to W.D. Oklahoma ------------------------------------------------- The case captioned as Valerie Eakins, individual and on behalf of all other similarly situated v. WHALECO INC. d/b/a TEMU, Case No. CJ-2023-21 was removed from the District Court of Washita County, State of Oklahoma, to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on June 26, 2023, and assigned Case No. CIV-23-560-J. The Plaintiff's single-count Petition seeks relief from Defendant, on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly-situated persons, for allegedly "sending automated commercial telephonic sales calls, in the form of text messages, to her cellular telephone and the cellular telephones of numerous other individuals across Oklahoma" in violation of Oklahoma's Telephone Solicitation Act.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: John A. Burkhardt, Esq. SCHAFFER HERRING PLLC 7134 S. Yale, Suite 300 Tulsa, OK 74136 Phone: (918) 550-8105 Facsimile: (918) 550-8106 Email: john.burkhardt@schafferherring.com - and - Robert A. Stines, Esq. SMITH GAMBRELL & RUSSELL LLP 201 North Franklin Street, Suite 3550 Tampa, FL 33602 Phone: (813) 488-2920 Facsimile: (813) 488-2960 Email: rstines@sgrlaw.com WHALECO INC: Smith Suit Removed to W.D. Oklahoma ------------------------------------------------ The case captioned as Heather Smith, individual and on behalf of all other similarly situated v. WHALECO INC. d/b/a TEMU, Case No. CJ-2023-2888 was removed from the District Court of Washita County, State of Oklahoma, to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on June 26, 2023, and assigned Case No. 5:23-cv-00559-D. The Plaintiff's single-count Petition seeks relief from Defendant, on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly-situated persons, for allegedly "sending automated commercial telephonic sales calls, in the form of text messages, to her cellular telephone and the cellular telephones of numerous other individuals across Oklahoma" in violation of Oklahoma's Telephone Solicitation Act.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: John A. Burkhardt, Esq. SCHAFFER HERRING PLLC 7134 S. Yale, Suite 300 Tulsa, OK 74136 Phone: (918) 550-8105 Facsimile: (918) 550-8106 Email: john.burkhardt@schafferherring.com - and - Robert A. Stines, Esq. SMITH GAMBRELL & RUSSELL LLP 201 North Franklin Street, Suite 3550 Tampa, FL 33602 Phone: (813) 488-2920 Facsimile: (813) 488-2960 Email: rstines@sgrlaw.com WILLAMETTE VALLEY: Rougeux Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. -------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Willamette Valley Vineyards Inc., et al. The case is styled as Robert Rougeux, all others similarly situated v. Willamette Valley Vineyards Inc., Does 1-50, Case No. 23CV003675 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., June 23, 2023). The case type is stated as "Other Employment Complaint Case." Willamette Valley Vineyards -- https://www.wvv.com/ -- offers sustainably made classic Oregon Wines including Pinot Noir, Chardonnay any many more.[BN] ZIGNEGO CO: Class of Non-Office Workers Certified in Cardenas Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, MARISOL CARDENAS, Plaintiff v. ZIGNEGO CO., INC., Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-961-pp (E.D. Wis.), Judge Pamela Pepper of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin conditionally certifies the following class under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b): All non-office, hourly employees who worked for Zignego Co. on one or more jobsites on or after Feb. 17, 2020. On Aug. 22, 2022, the Plaintiff filed an individual and proposed collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. On Feb. 17, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a motion for conditional certification, seeking leave to send notice to all current and former hourly paid employees who worked for the Defendant on or after Feb. 17, 2020. The Plaintiff asserts that four of her FLSA claims can be resolved on a collective basis. On March 24, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation for conditional certification of the collective action under 28 U.S.C. Section 216(b). Judge Pepper explains that the FLSA permits collective action against any employer by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. Collective action members are bound under Section 216(b) only if they opt in to the action by providing their written consent. Courts in this circuit generally employ a two-phase inquiry in determining who is similarly situated and, thus, entitled to notice. Phase one is conditional certification. The court will allow notice to be sent if the plaintiff can make a modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law. Second, usually after discovery, the defendant files a motion for decertification and asks the court to determine whether the opt-ins are in fact similarly situated. The parties indicate that they have conferred in good faith and have agreed to an order conditionally certifying the case as a collective action under the FLSA. They stipulate that the Plaintiff's Feb. 17, 2023 motion for conditional certification made the requisite "modest showing" that the Plaintiff may be similarly situated to one or more other Zignego non-office, hourly employees who worked for Zignego on one or more jobsites on or after Feb. 17, 2020 with respect to each of the four alleged common practices for which" the Plaintiff sought conditional certification. The stipulation applies only to the first step of the FLSA collective action process. Judge Pepper approves the parties' stipulation for conditional certification. She conditionally certifies the following class under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b): All non-office, hourly employees who worked for Zignego Co. on one or more jobsites on or after Feb. 17, 2020. She approves the notice of pendency of lawsuit and the consent to opt-in form. Within five days of the Order, the Defendant must provide to the Plaintiff the first name, last name, dates of employment and last known address of all non-office, hourly employees who worked for the defendant on one or more jobsites on or after Feb. 17, 2020. Within 10 days of receiving this information from the Defendant, the Plaintiff must mail the agreed-upon notice and opt-in form to the class members. Signed opt-in forms postmarked within 45 days after the mailing date will be considered timely, unless the Court excuses a late mailing. The Plaintiff agrees to waive her right to seek conditional certification as to all claims that currently are included in the complaint, and for which she has not sought conditional certification in her motion filed on Feb. 17, 2023. By stipulating to conditional certification of the collective action, the Defendant does not agree that it engaged in any unlawful practice, does not waive any defenses to the Plaintiff's claims and does not waive or in any way compromise its right to seek decertification of the conditionally certified class at the close of discovery. A full-text copy of the Court's June 16, 2023 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/5esm6hpb from Leagle.com. Asbestos Litigation ASBESTOS UPDATE: Georgia-Pacific Avoid Lawsuits After Unit's Ch. 11 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Evan Ochsner, writing for news.bloomberglaw.com, reports that Georgia-Pacific LLC can avoid tort lawsuits tied to certain products while its affiliate, Bestwall LLC, seeks to resolve those claims in bankruptcy, the Fourth Circuit ruled. The US Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina, which is overseeing Bestwall's Chapter 11 case, had "related to" jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction to pause asbestos claimants' lawsuits against Georgia-Pacific, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said in a ruling Tuesday. "These bankruptcy procedures promote the equitable, streamlined, and timely resolution of claims in one central place compared to the state tort system, which can and has caused delays in getting payment for legitimate claimants," Judge Steven Agee wrote in the opinion, which affirmed a bankruptcy court and a district court. The decision upholds a key element of the so-called Texas Two-Step, in which a company places legal claims against it in a separate unit and files bankruptcy for that unit. The idea is to obtain bankruptcy benefits without subjecting the entire company to bankruptcy. In 2017, a pulp-and-paper maker called Georgia-Pacific LLC conducted a restructuring by creating two units — one bearing the same name and another called Bestwall. The old Georgia-Pacific's liabilities and assets were divided between the two units, as subsidiaries under Georgia-Pacific Holdings LLC. Bestwall soon filed Chapter 11. Asbestos claimants argued that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to issue the protections for Georgia-Pacific, which didn't file for bankruptcy. But allowing asbestos suits against Georgia-Pacific to proceed would be detrimental to Bestwall's bankruptcy proceedings, the appellate court said. "The possible effect on the Bestwall bankruptcy estate of litigating thousands of identical claims in state court is sufficient to confer 'related to' jurisdiction," the Fourth Circuit said. If Georgia-Pacific were found liable for asbestos claims in state court, "that could reduce the claimants' recovery on those claims in the bankruptcy proceeding," a three-judge panel from the court said in a 2-1 ruling. But in a dissent, Judge Robert King criticized Georgia-Pacific’s Texas Two-Step maneuver. "I would squarely reject Georgia-Pacific's use of its 2017 restructuring — little more than a corporate shell game — to artificially invoke the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and obtain shelter from its substantial asbestos liabilities without ever having to file for bankruptcy," King wrote. ASBESTOS UPDATE: GMS Inc. Faces 1,054 PI Lawsuits As of April 30 ---------------------------------------------------------------- GMS Inc., from time to time, is involved in lawsuits that is brought against the Company in the normal course of business, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Company states, "Since 2002 and as of April 30, 2023, approximately 1,054 asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits have been filed against us and we have vigorously defended and continue to vigorously defend against them. Of these lawsuits, 1,001 have been dismissed without any payment by us, 40 are pending and only 13 have been settled, which settlements have not materially impacted our financial condition or operating results. "As a distributor of building materials, we face an inherent risk of exposure to product liability claims if the use of the products we have distributed in the past or may in the future distribute is alleged to have resulted in economic loss, personal injury or property damage or violated environmental, health or safety or other laws. Such product liability claims have included and may in the future include allegations of defects in manufacturing, defects in design, a failure to warn of dangers inherent in the product, negligence, strict liability or a breach of warranties. Certain of our subsidiaries have been the subject of claims related to alleged exposure to asbestos-containing products they distributed prior to 1979." A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at https://t.ly/Zo0Gx ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2023. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. *** End of Transmission ***