---

              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, June 14, 2023, Vol. 25, No. 119

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: Busani Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Foams and Chemicals
3M COMPANY: Johnson Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals
3M COMPANY: Kepler Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams
3M COMPANY: Pauldo Sues Over Exposure to Film-Forming Foams
3M COMPANY: Powell Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Foams and Chemicals

ADAPTHEALTH CORP: Plaintiffs Seek to File Docs Under Seal Reply
ADT PIZZA: Court Junks Bid to Certify Class in Mirzai Suit
ADVANCED MARKETING: Filing for Class Certification Bid Extended
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS: Court Continues Hearing for Summary Judgment
ALLEGIANCE ADMINISTRATORS: Plaintiffs File Class Certification Bid

ATX LOGISTICS: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Leonard Claims
BENEFICIENT CO: Horton, Moore Sue Over Misleading Statements
BRIGHT SOLAR: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Bales Suit
CLEVELAND, OH: Conner's Revised Proposed Class Notice Approved
FINICITY CORP: Lawrence Sues Over Illegal Data Collection Practices

GENERAL MOTORS: Riley Suit Seeks Rule 23 Class Certification
GENERAL MOTORS: Seeks Reconsideration May 5 Order
GOLDEN STATE: Trevino's Class Cert. Bid Pushed for Partial Grant
GOOD OL BOYS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Kennedy Suit Says
GOOGLE LLC: Class Cert Bid Filing Vacated in Consumer Privacy Suit

GOOGLE LLC: Class Certification Bid Filing Extended to Sept. 21
GOSHEN HEALTH: Lamarr Sues Over Unlawful Disclosure of Private Info
GUARDIAN LIFE: Faces Kamali Suit Over Breach of Contract
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES: Court Extends Class Cert-Related Deadlines
HENKEL CORP: Waller Voluntarily Dropped Mislabeling Class Suit

JOSH STEIN: ACLUNC Withdraws Class Cert. Bid
KONING ASSOCIATES: Wins Summary Judgment v. Willis
MDL 2573: Court Dismisses American Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
MDL 2573: Court Dismisses Barrett Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
MDL 2573: Court Dismisses Depaoli Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit

MDL 2573: Court Dismisses Hughes Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
MDL 2573: Court Dismisses Tran Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
NATIONSBENEFITS HOLDINGS: A.T. Files Suit in D. Kansas
NAVIENT CORP: Bid for Summary Judgment in Minner Class Suit Granted
NEXTERA ENERGY: Jastram Sues Over False Statements in SEC Filings

NORTH COAST: Court Certifies Bryant FLSA Collective Action
OPOPOP INC: Class Cert Fact Discovery Completion Due Sept. 19
POLARIS INDUSTRIES: Court Redacts Class Cert Documents in Berlanga
PRIMO GOLF LLC: Young Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
R & B CORPORATION: Powers Files Suit in E.D. Virginia

R&B CORPORATION: Monson Files Suit in E.D. Virginia
REALPAGE INC: Goldman Suit Removed to M.D. Tennessee
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE: Fails to Protect Patients' Info, Suit Says
RHYMESAYERS ENTERTAINMENT: Cruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RUST-OLEUM CORPORATION: Seeks to Stay Class Certification Briefing

SHOPIFY INC: My Choice Suit Removed to N.D. California
SKYWEST AIRLINES: Court Partly OK's Horowitz Class Cert Bid
SOLGEN POWER: Faces Class Suit Over Noncompetition Agreements
STATE FARM: July 28 Extension to File Class Cert Sought in Ellis
SUJA LIFE: Bid to Dismiss OK'd; Lumbra Suit Tossed With Prejudice

TMX FINANCE: Trottier Seeks to Suspend Class Cert Deadline
TRACY GUERIN: Wins Summary Judgment v. Fowler
UNITED DEBT: Miller Seeks to Certify Class and Subclasses
VERTEX ENERGY: Levson Sues Over Misleading Statements
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Leggett Claims


                            *********

3M COMPANY: Busani Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Foams and Chemicals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Marlenne Busani, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS
INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S., INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCK
EYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN
PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY
FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC. DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.;)
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDIE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDIE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as Successor-in-interest to the Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.); and ABC CORPORATIONS (1-50), Case No.
2:23-cv-02361-RMG (D.S.C., May 31, 2023), is brought for damages
for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is
not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane
sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that
degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the
serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants'
AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's
training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks
injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his career and was
diagnosed with kidney cancer and/or other medical conditions as a
result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr., Esq.
          John E. Keefe, Jr., Esq.
          WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER P.A.
          125 Half Mile Road, Suite 100
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Phone: 732-855-6060
          Facsimile: 732-726-4860


3M COMPANY: Johnson Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals
---------------------------------------------------------
Robert Johnson and Julie Johnson, his wife, and other similarly
situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA
U.S., INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCK EYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER
GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.;
CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD;
CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC. DEEPWATER CHEMICALS INC.; DU PONT DE
NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.;) DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU
PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDIE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDIE PLC;
NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS
COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as Successor-in-interest to the
Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY
AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.); and ABC
CORPORATIONS (1-50), Case No. 2:23-cv-02363-RMG (D.S.C., May 31,
2023), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from
exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the
toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl
substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to,
perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid
("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA
and/or PFOS.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the
serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants'
AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's
training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks
injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Robert Johnson regularly used, and was thereby
directly exposed to, AFFF in training and to extinguish fires
during his working career, and was diagnosed with thyroid disease,
Parkinson's Disease and/or other medical conditions as a result of
exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr., Esq.
          John E. Keefe, Jr., Esq.
          WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER P.A.
          125 Half Mile Road, Suite 100
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Phone: 732-855-6060
          Facsimile: 732-726-4860


3M COMPANY: Kepler Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams
------------------------------------------------------------
Harry Kepler, individually and as Personal
Representative/Administrator/ Executor of the Estate of Deborah
Kepler, deceased, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS
INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S., INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCK
EYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN
PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY
FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC. DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.;)
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDIE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDIE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as Successor-in-interest to the Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.); and ABC CORPORATIONS (1-50), Case No.
2:23-cv-02365-RMG (D.S.C., May 31, 2023), is brought for damages
for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is
not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane
sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that
degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the
serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants'
AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's
training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks
injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Harry Kepler is the personal
representative/administrator/executor of the Estate of Deborah
Kepler, who regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
PFAS-contaminated drinking water at Fairchild Air Force Base,
Washington and was diagnosed with leukemia as a result of exposure
to Defendants' AFFF products and/or PFAS-contaminated drinking
water.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr., Esq.
          John E. Keefe, Jr., Esq.
          WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER P.A.
          125 Half Mile Road, Suite 100
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Phone: 732-855-6060
          Facsimile: 732-726-4860


3M COMPANY: Pauldo Sues Over Exposure to Film-Forming Foams
-----------------------------------------------------------
Marian Pauldo, individually and as Personal
Representative/Administrator/ Executor of the Estate of Bobby Fred
Pauldo, deceased, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS
INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S., INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCK
EYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN
PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY
FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC. DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.;)
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDIE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDIE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as Successor-in-interest to the Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.); and ABC CORPORATIONS (1-50), Case No.
2:23-cv-02366-RMG (D.S.C., May 31, 2023), is brought for damages
for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is
not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane
sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that
degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the
serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants'
AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's
training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks
injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Marian Pauldo is the personal
representative/administrator/executor of the Estate of Bobby Fred
Pauldo, who regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career
as a firefighter and was diagnosed with liver cancer as a result of
exposure to Defendants' AFFF products.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr., Esq.
          John E. Keefe, Jr., Esq.
          WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER P.A.
          125 Half Mile Road, Suite 100
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Phone: 732-855-6060
          Facsimile: 732-726-4860


3M COMPANY: Powell Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Foams and Chemicals
------------------------------------------------------------------
Frederick O. Powell, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY
(f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS
AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S., INC.; ARKEMA,
INC.; BUCK EYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION;
CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.;
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA,
INC. DEEPWATER CHEMICALS INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a
DOWDUPONT INC.;) DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY; KIDDIE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDIE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL
COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS LP, as Successor-in-interest to the Ansul Company; UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION,
INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.); and ABC CORPORATIONS (1-50), Case
No. 2:23-cv-02364-RMG (D.S.C., May 31, 2023), is brought for
damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals
collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS").
PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid
("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related
chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the
serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants'
AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's
training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks
injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his career and was
diagnosed with prostate cancer and/or other medical conditions as a
result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr., Esq.
          John E. Keefe, Jr., Esq.
          WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER P.A.
          125 Half Mile Road, Suite 100
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Phone: 732-855-6060
          Facsimile: 732-726-4860


ADAPTHEALTH CORP: Plaintiffs Seek to File Docs Under Seal Reply
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DELAWARE COUNTY EMPLOYEES
RETIREMENT SYSTEM and BUCKS COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
ADAPTHEALTH CORP. f/k/a DFB HEALTHCARE ACQUISITIONS CORP., LUKE
MCGEE, STEPHEN P. GRIGGS, JASON CLEMENS, FRANK J. MULLEN, RICHARD
BARASCH, JOSHUA PARNES, ALAN QUASHA, TERENCE CONNORS, DR. SUSAN
WEAVER, DALE WOLF, BRADLEY COPPENS, and DAVID S. WILLIAMS III, Case
No. 2:21-cv-03382-HB (E.D. Pa.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order granting their motion to file under seal their Reply
in Further Support of Lead Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class and
certain exhibits.

Lead Plaintiffs have already filed redacted versions of the Reply
and, where possible, certain Exhibits on the public docket. Lead
Plaintiffs make this motion because the Reply refers to information
that has been designated as "Confidential" pursuant to the
Protective Order. In accordance with the Protective Order's
procedures for filing documents designated as "Confidential" by
another party, the parties will meet and confer within seven days
of this motion in an effort to narrow or eliminate the materials or
information conditionally filed under seal, and within fourteen
days, the designating party will file a motion to seal, specifying
the materials or information to be sealed and why sealing is
appropriate.

Adapthealth provides patient-centered, healthcare-at-home
solutions.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated May 22, 2023, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/45LWWh7 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Douglas r. Britton, Esq.
          Kevin a. Lavelle, Esq.
          Joseph j. Tull, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
          & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: dougb@rgrdlaw.com
                  klavelle@rgrdlaw.com
                  jtull@rgrdlaw.com

                - and –

          Andrew L. Zivitz, Esq.
          Helen J. Bass, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER
          & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610)667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: azivitz@ktmc.com
                  hbass@ktmc.com

ADT PIZZA: Court Junks Bid to Certify Class in Mirzai Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Mirzai, et al v. ADT Pizza
LLC, et al., Case No. 3:23-cv-00124 (D. Conn., Filed Jan. 31,
2023), the Hon. Judge Robert N. Chatigny entered an order:

  -- denying motion to stay;

  -- denying motion to dismiss;

  -- denying motion to certify class.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

ADT Pizza is a franchisee of Pizza Hut located in 9 states.[CC]


ADVANCED MARKETING: Filing for Class Certification Bid Extended
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRITTANY LAMBERTH, v.
ADVANCED MARKETING & PROCESSING, INC., Case No.
8:22-cv-02167-CEH-CPT (M.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Charlene Edwards
Honeywell entered an order:

   1. The Plaintiff Brittany Lamberth's Motion to Continue and/or
Deny
      the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule

      56(d) is granted.

   2. The Defendant Advanced Marketing & Processing, Inc.'s Motion
for
      Summary Judgment is denied without prejudice as premature.

   3. The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion

      for Class Certification is granted.

   4. The Plaintiff’s deadline to move for class certification is

      extended to July 19, 2023.

In this putative class action, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant Advanced Marketing & Processing, Inc. violated the WARN
Act by conducting a plant closing or mass layoff. The Defendant has
filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that AMP did not
terminate enough employees without cause to constitute a mass
layoff or plant closing as defined by the WARN Act.

In her motion, the Plaintiff argues that she cannot respond in
opposition to summary judgment because she has not received
relevant discovery that she requested. She seeks relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), which permits the court to
defer consideration of a motion for summary judgment when a
nonmovant demonstrates it cannot present facts essential to
opposing it.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff has identified specific material that
the Defendant has not produced that bears on the motion for summary
judgment. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to receive this
material, or to compel the Defendant to produce it, is a separate
question that is not before the Court.

The Plaintiff must act diligently and promptly in pursuing the
discovery she believes she needs, with the involvement of the Court
if necessary. At this stage, however, the Plaintiff has adequately

alleged her attempts to obtain the requested materials, which the
Defendant's response in opposition makes clear it has chosen not to
produce.

Advanced Marketing & Processing Inc is a company that operates in
the Information Technology and Services industry.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/4614BbF at no extra charge.[CC]

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS: Court Continues Hearing for Summary Judgment
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Casa Libre Freedom House
et al v. Alejandro Mayorkas et al, Case No. 2:22-cv-01510-ODW-JPR
(C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Otis D. Wright II entered an order
continuing hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment.

The Court continues the hearing on the parties' Cross-motions for
summary judgment to July 24, 2023. Briefing deadlines are
correspondingly continued.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3WQYPFa at no extra charge.[CC]

ALLEGIANCE ADMINISTRATORS: Plaintiffs File Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHMUEL COHEN, YEHUDA
FISCHER, ELIEZER ROSENBERGER and MAYER TANNENBAUM on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, v. ALLEGIANCE
ADMINISTRATORS, LLC d/b/a PERFORMANCE FIRST and AUTOGUARD ADVANTAGE
CORPORATION, Case No. 2:20-cv-03411-JLG-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order appointing them as class
representatives and certifying the following class:

   "Each person who entered into an Excess Wear & Tear Protection
   Waiver with the Defendants to provide coverage for a leased
vehicle
   and who --

     (a) submitted at least one eligible claim for coverage
         under the Waiver Agreement and

     (b) was denied coverage for a stated reason set forth in the
         Defendants' claims report (or other substantively similar

         document) that is not a grounds for non-coverage under the

         terms and conditions set forth in the Waiver Agreement."

The Plaintiffs also move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1) for
an order appointing Daniel A. Schlanger and Evan S. Rothfarb as
class counsel for the above certified class.

The Plaintiffs bring this suit to challenge an overt predatory
scheme in which the Defendants Allegiance Administrators, LLC and
Autoguard Advantage Corporation receive fix sums from consumers
around the country who have leased vehicles and seek protection
against unanticipated wear and tear charges at the end of their
leases.

The Plaintiffs and putative Class Members have meritorious claims
under for breach of contract against the Defendants for identical
misconduct. Under written contracts known as Performance First
Excess Wear & Tear Protection Waivers, the Defendants agree to
reimburse consumers for excess wear and tear charges "subject only
to the terms and conditions set forth" in the documents.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated May 22, 2023, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oNPMZ6 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Evan S. Rothfarb, Esq.
          Daniel S. Schlanger, Esq.
          SCHLANGER LAW GROUP, LLP
          80 Broad Street, Suite 3103
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 500-6114
          Facsimile: (646) 612-7996
          E-mail: erothfarb@consumerprotection.net
                  dschlanger@consumerprotection.net

                - and –

          Eliahu Sarfaty, Esq.
          SARFATY & ASSOCIATES, PC
          1 North Sherri Lane
          Wesley Hills, NY 10977
          Telephone: (845) 377-5845
          Facsimile: (212-401-4720
          E-mail: eli@sarfatylaw.com

                - and –

          Mathew R. Wilson, Esq.
          Michael J. Boyle, Jr., Esq.
          MEYER WILSON CO., LPA
          305 W. Nationwide Blvd.
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614)224-6000
          Facsimile: (614) 224-6066
          E-mail: mwilson@meyerwilson.com
                  mboyle@meyerwilson.com

ATX LOGISTICS: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Leonard Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, LADARIUS HILL, KAYLIN GOLDEN, and DIA’QUANE
HENRY, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly-situated who
consent to representation, Plaintiffs v. YEON HAN and ATX
LOGISTICS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:23-cv-00085-TCB (N.D. Ga.,
May 26, 2023) arises out of the Defendants' violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Leonard was employed by Defendants as a yard jockey from
approximately August 20, 2022 through March 29, 2023. He was
transporting trailers on the private property at the Kia plant
located in Troup County, Georgia. Throughout their employment,
Plaintiffs worked approximately 45 to 65 hours per week. However,
the Defendants have adopted a pay policy of not paying overtime
wages to yard jockeys and/or employees performing duties similar to
yard jockeys, says the suit.

ATX is an Alabama limited liability company doing business within
the State of Georgia. The company provides transportation services
to Kia on the private property at which Kia operates its automobile
manufacturing plant. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          K. Prabhaker Reddy, Esq.
          THE REDDY LAW FIRM, P.C.
          1325 Satellite Boulevard Suite 1506
          Suwanee, GA 30024
          Telephone: (678) 629-3246
          Facsimile: (678) 629-3247
          E-mail: kpr@reddylaw.net

BENEFICIENT CO: Horton, Moore Sue Over Misleading Statements
------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS HORTON AND FRANK MOORE, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. BRAD K. HEPPNER, PETER T.
CANGANY, JR., THOMAS O. HICKS, DENNIS P. LOCKHART, BRUCE W.
SCHNITZER, THE BENEFICIENT COMPANY GROUP, L.P. AND WHITLEY PENN
LLP, Defendants, Case No. 3:23-CV-01230-X (N.D. Tex., May 26, 2023)
arises out of the Defendants' violations of the Securities Act of
1933.

The Plaintiffs acquired "L Bonds" issued by GWG Holdings, Inc.
pursuant to a June 2020 registration statement. They seek relief
under sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. The
Defendants are the Directors who signed the registration statement,
GWG's independent auditor, and a company affiliated with GWG known
as Beneficient Company Group, L.P (Ben), sued as a controlling
person. Allegedly, the registration statement misrepresented Ben's
business by representing that Ben was generating revenue through
lending and indicating that Ben had begun implementing a successful
lending-based business model, and that its business prospects were
materially more favorable than justified by its actual financial
performance. In reality, although undisclosed by the registration
statement, Ben's investments in the alternative assets were
unsecured and had declined in value. The Registration Statement
also contained material misstatements and omissions in several
other areas, including GWG's financial reporting of goodwill
attributable to Ben; the use of L Bond proceeds that GWG invested
in Ben to personally enrich Heppner; and the resignations of
several Directors. Furthermore, the corrected, significantly
reduced revenue and increased net loss disclosed in the Restatement
show that GWG's prior disclosures in the Registration Statement
were materially false and inaccurate, say the Plaintiffs.

The Beneficient Company Group, L.P. is a Delaware limited
partnership formed on or about September 16, 2003, and
headquartered in Dallas, Texas. It is founded and controlled by
Defendant Brad Heppner. The company aimed to provide "liquidity
solutions" to wealthy individuals and entities holding illiquid
assets. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Warren T. Burns, Esq.
          Spencer Cox, Esq.
          BURNS CHAREST LLP
          900 Jackson Street, Suite 500
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (469) 904-4550
          Facsimile: (469) 444-5002
          E-mail: wburns@burnscharest.com
                  scox@burnscharest.com

BRIGHT SOLAR: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Bales Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FLOYD STEVE BALES, Plaintiff v. BRIGHT SOLAR MARKETING
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 5:21-cv-496-MMH-PRL (M.D. Fla.), Judge
Marcia Morales Howard of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Ocala Division, grants the Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

The cause is before the Court on Bright Solar's Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed Feb. 21, 2023. Bales timely filed a response on
March 14, 2023.

Bright Solar runs call centers that only make phone calls to set
appointments for representatives of independent authorized dealers
to sell solar systems. It gets leads for its calls from a marketing
company that relies on internet advertising.

In the Fall of 2020, Bales responded to an internet advertisement
about solar panels and filled out a questionnaire. The
questionnaire asked various screening questions to determine
whether Bales would qualify for solar products or services. In
large print, the questionnaire asked for a phone number to receive
a text with results. Bales entered his cell phone number and
clicked the large blue "Next" button. Directly below the Next
button was a paragraph of text in a smaller size. Bales did not
read the "tiny stuff" below the Next button.

After Bales responded to the advertisement, an agent of Bright
Solar called him on Oct. 30, 2020, and scheduled a phone
appointment for Nov. 22, 2020. Sometime later, Bales called Bright
Solar to cancel the appointment but could not connect with a live
person and did not want to wait on hold. On Nov. 23, 2020, a Bright
Solar agent called Bales who advised that he was no longer
interested in solar panels. Another representative of Bright Solar
called Bales on Dec. 1, 2020, to reschedule the missed phone
appointment. Bales repeated that he was not interested in solar
panels. During the relevant timeframe, Bright Solar made calls
through a company named Xencall. Including the calls when Bales did
not answer, Xencall's records show a total of seven connected calls
between Bales and Bright Solar in 2020.

Bright Solar used another company, Bright Pattern, as a dialing
service from April 2021 until July or August 2021. Its records show
six connected calls between Bales and Bright Solar in 2021.
According to Bright Pattern's records, Bright Solar called Bales on
June 10, 2021, and Bales called back on July 1, 2021. Then Bright
Solar called Bales on July 2 and July 7, 2021.

On July 19, 2021, Bales called Bright Solar to ask why the company
was calling him. He told the Bright Solar agent that he would
"appreciate you not ever calling me." The agent set the call
disposition as "DNC," meaning that the number should not be called.
Once a phone number is placed on Bright Pattern or Xencall's
internal DNC list, the dialing technology will prevent the number
from being called.

At his deposition, Bales testified that he received a silent call
on July 20, 2021, at 7:14 a.m. from the same number that he had
called the previous day. In contrast, Bright Pattern's records show
a call of one second from Bales to Bright Solar on July 20.

Bright Solar's records from Xencall and Bright Pattern do not show
any calls between Bales and Bright Solar after July 20, 2021.
However, Bales stated that he received a call from Bright Solar
with a voicemail message "sometime after" the call on July 20. At
his deposition, Bales did not know what time of day that call was
or where he was at the time. He stated later that he does not
remember whether he received any calls from Bright Solar after July
20, 2021.

Bales initiated the action on Aug. 26, 2021, by filing a
three-count Class Action Complaint in the Circuit Court of the
Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for Marion County, Florida. In the
Complaint, he maintains that Bright Solar called him on three
specific occasions. First, Bales asserts that Bright Solar called
him "in early July 29, 2021," and left him a prerecorded voicemail
message. Second, he alleges that Bright Solar called him at 6:11
p.m. on July 19, 2021. According to him, he answered this call and
asked the agent to stop calling him. Third, Bales asserts that
Bright Solar called him on July 20, 2021, at 7:14 a.m. He alleges
that, when he answered the call, he discovered it was a silent call
with no one on the other end.

Based on these and other allegations, Bales asserts three claims on
behalf of himself and putative class members. In Count I, he
alleges that Bright Solar violated the Florida Telephone
Solicitation Act (FTSA), Florida Statute section 501.059, by
calling him using an automated system for the selection or dialing
of telephone numbers without his prior express written consent. In
Count II, he asserts that Bright Solar violated the FTSA by making
unsolicited telephonic sales calls to him even though his number
was listed on Florida's do-not-call list. In Count III, Bales
alleges that Bright Solar violated the Florida Telemarketing Act
(FTMA), Florida Statute section 501.616, by making a commercial
telephone solicitation call to him before 8:00 a.m. or after 8:00
p.m. in his time zone.

On Oct. 1, 2021, Bright Solar removed the case to this Court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d). It moved for full and final summary judgment on Feb. 21,
2023.

In the Motion, Bright Solar argues that the Court should grant
summary judgment because Bales provided express written consent to
receive all of the calls from Bright Solar. It also contends that
Bales has not pointed to evidence that Bright Solar called him from
an "automated system" as that term is used in the FTSA. Next,
Bright Solar maintains that Bales cannot recover for the July 19
and July 20 calls because Bales made those calls to Bright Solar.
Moreover, it argues that Bales has no evidence that the "silent"
call on July 20 was a telephonic sales call. Finally, it asserts
that Bales has produced no evidence, other than his own unsupported
assertion, that Bright Solar called him after July 20, 2021.

In his Response, Bales contends that genuine disputes of material
facts prevent summary judgment. First, he asserts that there is a
disputed issue of fact as to whether he gave express written
consent to Bright Solar. In addition, he argues that there is a
genuine dispute about whether Bright Solar used an automated system
for selecting and dialing telephone numbers. Finally, Bales
maintains that there is a dispute about the number of calls that
Bright Solar made to him. Based on the supplemental declaration of
Aaron Woolfson, Bales asserts that Bright Solar made 19 sales calls
to him between July 1, 2021, and the present.

Judge Howard concludes that Bright Solar's Motion is due to be
granted. She finds that by now seeking to recover for 19 calls,
Bales is attempting to substantively change the nature of his
claims. At least three courts in this district have rejected
similar attempts to assert new calls at the summary judgment stage.
Judge Howard similarly concludes that Bales's argument that Bright
Solar violated the FTSA by calling him nineteen times is an
improper attempt to amend the Complaint at summary judgment. As
such, the 19 alleged calls are not properly before the Court, and
Bales is precluded from seeking relief on this basis.

Even if Judge Howard were to consider the alleged 19 calls, the
evidence in the record is insufficient to create a triable issue of
fact. Woolfson's statement that Bright Solar made 19 calls to Bales
is too conclusory to create a genuine issue of fact about how many
calls Bales received or whether those calls violated the FTSA.

Therefore, Judge Howard turns her consideration to the three calls
identified in the Complaint. She holds that uncontested objective
records establish that no calls from Bright Solar connected to
Bales' phone after July 20, 2021. Bales' vague, conclusory
testimony to the contrary is a mere scintilla of evidence that does
not create a genuine issue of fact about whether Bright Solar
called Bales on July 29, or on any other date after July 20, 2021.

Because the record establishes that Bright Solar did not initiate
any of the three calls alleged in the Complaint, none of the calls
can be a "telephonic sales call," under Florida Statute section
501.059(1)(j), or a "commercial telephone solicitation" phone call,
under Florida Statute section 501.603(1)(a). Therefore, Bales
cannot succeed on his claim in Count I that Bright Solar made a
telephonic sales call using an automated system for the selection
or dialing of telephone numbers, his claim in Count II that Bright
Solar made a telephonic sales call to him while he was listed on
Florida's do-not-call list, or his claim in Count III that Bright
Solar made a commercial telephone solicitation phone call before
8:00 a.m. or after 8:00 p.m. in his time zone. As such, summary
judgment is due to be granted in favor of Bright Solar.

In sum, Judge Howard concludes that Bales may not amend his
Complaint through argument in his Response to Bright Solar's
Motion. And Bales has not pointed to evidence that creates a
genuine issue of fact about whether Bright Solar called him on the
occasions alleged in the Complaint.

Thus, Bright Solar's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The
Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Bright
Solar and against Bales. The Clerk of the Court is further directed
to terminate any remaining pending motions and deadlines as moot
and close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 26, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ye25s93v from Leagle.com.


CLEVELAND, OH: Conner's Revised Proposed Class Notice Approved
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SARAH B. CONNER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
CLEVELAND COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA, also known as Cleveland County
Emergency Medical Services, Case No. 1:18-cv-00002-MR-WCM
(W.D.N.C.), the Hon. Judge Martin Reidinger entered an order
sustaining the Defendant's Objections to the Plaintiff's proposed
notice to the extent they have been incorporated into the revised
proposed notice.

  -- The Plaintiff's revised proposed notice is approved.

  -- The following procedures are set out for the facilitation of
     distribution of the notice.

  -- Within seven days of the entry of this Order, the Defendant
will
     produce the above-defined Employee Information in a
     computer-readable file.

On April 24, 2023, the Court entered an Order conditionally
certifying a collective action for the Plaintiff’s FLSA claim
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b). The Court also certified a
class action for the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim pursuant
to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In that Order, the Court directed the Defendant to file objections
to the Plaintiff's proposed notice to putative collective action
and class members within 14 days of the entry of the Court's Order.


The Defendant timely filed Objections to the proposed notice on May
8, 2023. On May 9, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a Response to the
Defendant's Objections stating that she did not seek to challenge
any of the Defendant's proposed changes to the notice. [Doc. 86].
The Plaintiff’s Response included a revised proposed notice
incorporating the Defendant's proposed changes.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff's revised proposed notice is
appropriate and will authorize distribution of the notice. See
Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172 (1989) (a
district court has discretion to authorize distribution of a notice
it concludes is "timely, accurate, and informative").

Cleveland County is a county located in the foothills of the Blue
Ridge Mountains and the western Piedmont.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/45Quevq at no extra charge.[CC]

FINICITY CORP: Lawrence Sues Over Illegal Data Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------------
KAITLYN LAWRENCE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FINICITY CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 2:23-at-00498 (E.D. Cal., May 26, 2023) alleges claims for
unjust enrichment and violations of the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, the
California Anti-Phishing Act.

Allegedly, Finicity intentionally misappropriates bank trademarks
and URLs to lure consumers into believing they are interacting with
the actual banks themselves. Using these counterfeit marks and
cyber-pirated URLs, Finicity is able to trick FinTech app users to
turn over their incredibly sensitive bank account credentials.
Worse yet, Finicity never discloses this surreptitious data
collection to consumers. The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Finicity
Technologies from its deceptive data collection practices, and
seeks to obtain actual and statutory damages, restitution,
injunctive relief, and reasonable attorneys' costs and fees.

Finicity Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Murray, Utah. It is a software-as-a-service
company that is hired by FinTech companies to link users' bank
accounts to their proprietary apps and websites. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Stefan Bogdanovich, Esq.
           Brittany S. Scott, Esq.
           BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
           1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
           Walnut Creek, CA 94596
           Telephone: (925) 300-4455
           Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
           E-mail: sbogdanovich@bursor.com
                   bscott@bursor.com

GENERAL MOTORS: Riley Suit Seeks Rule 23 Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Mark Riley, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, v. General Motors LLC,
Case No. 2:21-cv-00924-ALM-EPD (S.D. Ohio), the the Plaintiff asks
the Court to enter an order certifying, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3), an Ohio Class of:

   "Initial purchasers and lessees of new 2017-2019 GMC Acadia,
2019
   Chevrolet Blazer, 2016-2019 Chevrolet Malibu, 2018-2019
Chevrolet
   Traverse, and 2016-2019 Chevrolet Volt vehicles (Class
Vehicles),
   who purchased or leased their vehicles in Ohio.

In the alternative, the Plaintiff seeks certification of the
following "Ohio Alternative Tailored Class" definition which limits
the definition itself to those persons who sought but did not
receive certain repairs during the
warranty period:

   "All persons or entities who (1) bought or leased a 2017-2019
GMC
   Acadia, 2019 Chevrolet Blazer, 2016-2019 Chevrolet Malibu,
2018-
   2019 Chevrolet Traverse, or 2016-2019 Chevrolet Volt vehicle
(Class
   Vehicles) in Ohio; (2) sought a repair from a GM dealer
regarding
   the "Shift to Park" condition (instances where the driver puts a

   Class Vehicle in the Park position however a 'Shift to Park'
   message appears) during GM's 36 month/30,000 mile warranty
period;
   and (3) during the 36 month/30,000 mile warranty period did not

   receive a silicon-free replacement part.

The Plaintiff requests that the Court appoint the Plaintiff as the
class representative and appoint Lemberg Law, LLC and the Chandra
Law Firm as class counsel.

General Motors is an American multinational automotive
manufacturing company.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated May 19, 2023 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/428GunX at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          Joshua Markovits, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, LLC
          43 Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424

                - and -

          Donald P. Screen, Esq.
          Subodh Chandra, Esq.
          THE CHANDRA LAW FIRM LLC
          The Chandra Law Building
          1265 W. 6th St., Suite 400
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 578-1700
          Facsimile: (216) 578-1800
          E-mail: Donald.Screen@ChandraLaw.com
                  Subodh.Chandra@ChandraLaw.com

GENERAL MOTORS: Seeks Reconsideration May 5 Order
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROY WHITE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. GENERAL MOTORS
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-00410-CNS-MEH (D. Colo.), the Defendant asks
the Court to enter an order reconsidering its May 5, 2023, Order
granting the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

GM contends that the Class Certification Order fails to address
GM's pending motions to exclude plaintiff's expert opinions as
unreliable and inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

The Class Certification Order also fails to consider the many
deficiencies in plaintiff's damages model itself. It does not
address whether plaintiff's proposed damages figure is adequate, or
how the one-size-fits-all damages model will work on a classwide
basis when the certified class includes both current and former
owners (i.e., multiple owners of the same vehicle) who obtained
their vehicles in different conditions from different sources, and
who may have even recouped or mitigated any alleged overpayment
upon resale.

In addition, the Class Certification Order overlooks plaintiff's
failure to submit a trial plan that accounts for the multitude of
individual fact-specific issues affecting the Colorado class
members, such as statutes of limitations, and other affirmative
defenses, and instead, fails to consider the many problems created
by proceeding with a class of "all purchasers and lessees" of
Colorado Class Vehicles, the Defendant adds.

On May 5, 2023, the Court issued an order certifying a class of all
purchasers and lessees of Colorado Class Vehicles.

The Plaintiff initially sought to certify a class of all purchasers
and lessees of Colorado Class Vehicles on claims for breach of
express warranty and breach of implied warranty of merchantability.


In its opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certification, GM
focused on the individualized issues and fact-specific evidence
that differs for each purchaser and lessee, which under settled law
should preclude certification of these claims under Rule 23.

On May 5, 2023, the Court issued its Class Certification Order
granting plaintiff's motion to certify a class of "all purchasers
and lessees of a [Class Vehicle] in the State of Colorado" on a
claim for breach of implied warranty, and designating plaintiff
White as the class representative.

General Motors Company is an American multinational automotive
manufacturing company.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated May 19, 2023 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/43u8B26 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          April N. Ross, Esq.
          Rachel P. Raphael, Esq.
          CROWELL & MORING LLP
          1001 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 624-2500
          Facsimile: (202) 628-5611
          E-mail: ksooy@crowell.com
                  aross@crowell.com
                  rraphael@crowell.com

                - and -

          Mike Gallagher, Esq.
          DAVIS GRAHAM & STUBBS LLP
          1550 17th Street, Suite 500
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 892-9400
          E-mail: mike.gallagher@dgs.law.com

GOLDEN STATE: Trevino's Class Cert. Bid Pushed for Partial Grant
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUAN TREVINO, CHRISTOPHER WARD, LINDA QUINTEROS, ROMEO
PALMA, BRITTANY HAGMAN, ALBERTO GIANINI, and JUAN C. AVALOS, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. GOLDEN STATE FC LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company;
AMAZON.COM INC., a Delaware Corporation, AMAZON FULFILLMENT
SERVICES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, Lead Case No.
1:18-cv-00120-ADA-BAM, Member Case No. 1:18-cv-00121-ADA-BAM.,
1:18-cv-00567-ADA-BAM, 1:18-cv-001176-ADA-BAM,
1:17-cv-01300-ADA-BAM (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Barbara A.
McAuliffe of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California recommends that:

    (i) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification be granted
        in part and denied in part; and

   (ii) Amazon's motion to exclude the testimony and opinions of
        Dr. Brian Kriegler be denied as moot.

The Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, bring this consolidated class action against Defendants
Golden State FC, LLC (now known as Amazon.com Services LLC),
Amazon.com, Inc., and Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc. (now known
as Amazon.com Services LLC) (collectively, "Amazon"). The
Plaintiffs moved for class certification pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The motion was referred to
Judge McAuliffe for issuance of findings and recommendations in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). Amazon
relatedly moved to exclude the testimony and opinions of the
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Kriegler, which the Plaintiffs had
submitted in support of their motion for class certification.
Amazon's motion was heard in conjunction with the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.

On June 8, 2021, Judge McAuliffe issued findings and
recommendations, recommending that the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification be granted in part and denied in part and that
Amazon's motion to exclude the Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Kriegler be
denied as having been rendered moot. The Plaintiffs filed
objections on June 22, 2021, and Amazon filed a response to those
objections on July 2, 2021.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of supplemental
authority on Aug. 9, 2021, in which they pointed out that on Aug.
3, 2021, the Ninth Circuit vacated its original decision in Olean
Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 993
F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2021) (Olean I) and granted a rehearing en banc.
The Plaintiffs contended that the findings and recommendations
relied extensively on the now vacated decision in Olean I, which
had vacated and remanded the district court's granting of motions
for class certification, in recommending the denial of
certification as to certain classes in this case.

On Aug. 27, 2021, the district judge issued an order staying the
action pending the final decision from the Ninth Circuit in Olean.
On April 8, 2022, the Ninth Circuit issued the en banc opinion
Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC
(No. 19-56514) (Olean II). As a result of the potential changed
circumstances stemming from the Olean II decision, the district
court declined to adopt the findings and recommendations, and
instead referred the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and
the Defendants' motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Kriegler
back to Judge McAuliffe for the issuance of amended findings and
recommendations in light of the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in
Olean II.

On June 2, 2022, the Plaintiffs submitted supplemental briefing on
the effect of Olean II on their motion for class certification. The
Defendants responded on June 16, 2022 and the Plaintiffs replied on
June 23, 2022. On June 28, 2022, the Defendants requested leave to
file a one-paragraph surreply, which was unopposed. In the absence
of any opposition, and given its limited scope, the Defendants'
request is granted.

On Aug. 6, 2022, the Court issued a Minute Order noting that a
petition for certiorari of the en banc decision in Olean II was
filed with the United States Supreme Court. It indicated that it
would not address the referral of the motion for class
certification until the petition for certiorari was denied or the
Supreme Court decided the merits of the case. The parties did not
object to waiting for a decision pending the Supreme Court's ruling
on the petition for certiorari. Certiorari was denied on Nov. 14,
2022.

The matter is a consolidated action comprised of five wage and hour
lawsuits originally filed in the Central and Eastern Districts of
California. On March 28, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint") seeking to
bring wage and hour claims on behalf of all current and former
non-exempt hourly workers employed by Amazon in California for the
period of four years prior to July 12, 2017 to the present.

Amazon.com, Inc. ("Amazon.com") is one of the world's largest and
well-known on-line retailers. It fills customer orders and ships
them based out of a network of fulfillment, sorting, distribution,
and shipping centers. According to the allegations in the
Complaint, Amazon operates at least nine different fulfillment
centers for Amazon.com in California, which are located in San
Bernardino, Rialto, Eastvale, Tracy, Moreno Valley, Redlands, and
Patterson City. They are in San Bernardino, Riverside, San Joaquin,
Stanislaus, and Riverside counties.

The Plaintiffs forward claims for the following wage and hour
violations: (1) failure to pay wages for all hours worked,
including overtime, (2) meal period violations, (3) rest period
violations, (4) wage statement violations, (5) failure to pay wages
under California Labor Code Section 203, (6) unfair business
practices, and (7) violations of the California Business and
Professions Code (Private Attorneys General Act claim).

As indicated, the Plaintiffs seek certification of 11 classes. They
are as follows:

     Class 1. Unpaid Wages Class (Hours Worked Claim Based on
Control of Employees through Mandatory Exit Security Procedures):
All non-exempt employees employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc. or
Amazon.com, Inc. at any of Defendants' facilities in California at
any time during the period from July 12, 2014 and ending on the
date of certification or as otherwise determined by the Court who
were required to go through a metal detector security process to
exit the facility.

     Class 2. Unpaid Wages Class (Controlled Meal Periods): All
non-exempt employees employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc. or
Amazon.com, Inc. at any of Defendants' facilities in California at
any time during the period from July 12, 2014 and ending on the
date of certification or as otherwise determined by the Court who
took a meal period and who were required to go through a metal
detector security process to leave the facility during such meal
period and were not paid for the time of such meal period.

     Class 3. Meal Period Violations for Controlled Meal Periods:
All non-exempt employees employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc. or
Amazon.com, Inc. at any of Defendants' facilities in California at
any time during the period from July 12, 2014 and ending on the
date of certification or as otherwise determined by the Court who
worked a shift longer than six hours and who were required to go
through a metal detector security process to leave the facility
during such meal periods and were not paid a meal period premium
for such shifts.

     Class 4. Rest Periods Violations for Controlled Rest Periods:
All non-exempt employees employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc. or
Amazon.com, Inc. at any of Defendants' facilities in California at
any time during the period from July 12, 2014 and ending on the
date of certification or as otherwise determined by the Court who
worked a shift longer than three and one-half hours and were
subject to a policy that leaving company premises without
permission during assigned work hours was a serious infraction that
subjected them to termination or who were required to go through a
metal detector security process to leave the facility during the
rest period and were not paid a rest period premium for all such
shifts.

     Class 5. Improper Rounding Class: All non-exempt employees
employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc. or Amazon.com, Inc. at any of
Defendants' facilities in California at any time during the period
from July 12, 2014 and ending on the date of certification or as
otherwise determined by the Court who were subject to a rounding
practice that resulted in them being paid less than they would have
received had no such rounding practice been utilized for such
employees.

     Class 6. Invalid Second Meal Period Waiver Class: All
non-exempt employees employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc. or
Amazon.com, Inc. at any of Defendants' facilities in California at
any time during the period from July 12, 2014 and ending on the
date of certification or as otherwise determined by the Court who
signed any meal period waiver in the forms attached as Exhibit 12
to the Declaration of Peter R. Dion-Kindem in Support of Motion for
Class Certification and worked more than 10 hours in a day, did not
receive a second 30 minute meal period, and did not receive one
hour of pay at the class member's regular rate of compensation for
such day.

     Class 7. Third Rest Period Class: All non-exempt employees
employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc. or Amazon.com, Inc. at any of
Defendants' facilities in California at any time during the period
from July 12, 2014 and ending on the date of certification or as
otherwise determined by the Court who were scheduled to work a
10-hour shift and worked more than 10 hours and who were not
authorized or permitted to take a third uninterrupted, duty-free,
and control-free 10-minute rest period and did not receive one hour
of pay at the class member's regular rate of compensation for such
day.

     Class 8. Direct Violation of Section 226(a)(2) Wage Statement
Class: All non-exempt employees employed by Amazon.com Services,
Inc. or Amazon.com, Inc. in California at any time during the
period from July 12, 2016 and ending on the date of certification
or as otherwise determined by the Court who did not receive an
itemized statement in writing accurately showing the total hours
worked by the employee where the wage statements reflect a line
item for regular hours worked and at least one other line item for
other types of hours worked other than regular overtime or double
time, such as shift differential hours worked.

     Class 9. Derivative Wage Statement Class: All members of any
of Classes 1 through 7 who, during the period from July 12, 2016
and ending on the date of certification or as otherwise determined
by the Court, were not provided with accurate itemized wage
statements with all the information required by Labor Code Section
226(a)(1), (2), (5) and (9).

     Class 10. Section 203 Subclass: All members of any of Classes
1 through 7 who, during the period from July 12, 2014 and ending on
the date of certification or as otherwise determined by the Court,
were either voluntarily or involuntarily separated from their
employment and did not timely receive all wages owing pursuant to
Labor Code Section 201 or 202.

     Class 11. UCL Class: All non-exempt employees employed by
Amazon.com Services, Inc. or Amazon.com, Inc. at any of Defendants'
facilities in California at any time during the period from July
12, 2013 and ending on the date of certification or as otherwise
determined by the Court who are owed restitution as a result of
Defendants' business acts and practices that are found to be
unlawful, deceptive, and/or unfair.

Many of the challenged policies overlap within and among the
various classes. Judge McAuliffe provides a summary of the policies
along with a reference to the particular class or classes.

     a. Payment of Lawful Wages:

        1. Exit Security Procedures (Classes 1-4): The Plaintiffs
contend that Amazon implemented uniform exit security procedures at
all the facilities where Plaintiffs and putative class members
worked, which required all of the putative class members to pass
through metal detectors and undergo security procedures to exit the
facilities at the end of their shifts, for their meal periods or to
exit for any other reason.

        2. Rounding Policy (Classes 5 and 7): The Plaintiffs claim
that Amazon underpaid putative class members in the aggregate due
to rounding.

     b. Meal and Rest Periods (Classes 3-7): The Plaintiffs contend
that by requiring mandatory security screening exit procedures to
leave the facilities, Amazon failed to relinquish all control over
employees' activities during meal and rest periods, including
control over where such breaks are taken.

     c. Wage Statements (Class 8): The Plaintiffs' claims regarding
Amazon's failure to provide accurate wage statements derive both
from the face of the wage statements and from the Plaintiffs'
substantive claims.

     d. Payment of Timely Wages and UCL Claims (Classes 9-11): The
Plaintiffs' claims for failure to pay timely wages under Labor Code
Section 203 at the termination of employment and their claims under
the UCL are derivative and based on Amazon's alleged substantive
violations.

As a preliminary matter, the parties do not dispute the numerosity,
typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a). As to Rule
23(a) Commonality and Rule 23(b)(3) Commonality - Predominance, the
Plaintiffs present four sets of common questions -- one set
concerning their exit screening classes (classes 1-4), one set
concerning their rounding classes (classes 5 and 7), one set
concerning their meal period waiver class (class 6), and one set
concerning their wage statement class (class 8).

Having conducted a rigorous analysis of the evidence, Judge
McAuliffe finds that individualized inquiries about the injury
status of Class 1 members passing through the metal detectors would
predominate over common questions. Amazon's evidence alone suggests
that nearly all of purported class members experienced no delay --
as if walking through a doorway -- making it clear that
individualized inquiries would be required to identify the injury
status of class members, including at different times and different
facilities. Judge McAuliffe finds that such inquiries would
overwhelm any common question concerning exit security screening.

As to Class 2, Judge McAuliffe then finds that the Plaintiffs have
not met their burden of demonstrating common questions predominate
for controlled meal period claims premised on exit security
screening. Amazon's policy is facially compliant, Amazon authorizes
30 minutes for meal breaks, there is no indication that the
proffered 3-minute grace period would not account for any "exit
screening," and it is not evident that associates were required to
remain on the premises during their meal period. The Court finds
that individualized inquiries would be required to determine which
employees (associates) were not provided with compliant meal
periods and that such individualized inquiries would predominate
over any common questions.

For the reasons discussed with respect to Class 1 and Class 2,
Judge McAuliffe finds that Class 3 cannot be certified.

With respect to Class 4, in the absence of evidence that Amazon
uniformly enforced any policy requiring permission to leave the
facility during rest breaks, Judge McAuliffe holds that there does
not appear to be a question that requires common resolution by the
Court. She says the mere existence of a facially defective written
policy -- without any evidence that it was implemented in an
unlawful manner -- does not constitute significant proof that a
class of employees was subject to an unlawful practice. Any
suggestion that requiring employees to pass through metal detectors
equates with requiring employees to obtain permission before
leaving the premises is not persuasive.

Regarding Class 5 and Class 7, Judge McAuliffe holds that the
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating common
questions predominate for claims premised rounding. Amazon has
demonstrated that individualized inquiries would be required to
determine whether its employees were actually working during those
times when they clocked-in early or clocked-out late. Additionally,
record evidence undermines assertions that employees who clocked-in
early were in fact working. Lastly, determination of the
employer-control question is not readily capable of class wide
resolution and would instead require individualized inquiries.

As to Class 6, Judge McAuliffe says the limited question of facial
validity does not depend upon an individualized assessment of each
employee's understanding of the waiver form and any individualized
inquiries would pertain primarily to damages. The issue of whether
these specific meal break waiver forms are facially valid presents
a common question capable of class-wide resolution.

With respect to Class 8, Judge McAuliffe agrees and finds that the
alleged inaccuracies described by Trevino are limited to a certain
subset of wage statements and, at a minimum, do not include wage
statements issued beginning January 1, 2019, as those statements
displayed a total hours worked line. Thus, the proposed class
definition would need to be modified to capture wage statements
listing shift pay differentials, but not listing a separate line
item for "total hours worked," and also limiting the class period
through December 31, 2018.

For purposes of derivative Classes 9 and 10, Judge McAuliffe has
found class certification appropriate only for Class 6 (Meal Period
Waiver). For purposes of derivative Class 11, she has found class
certification appropriate only for Class 6 (Meal Period Waiver)
and, as modified, Class 8 (Wage Statements).

Turning to the second part of certification under Rule 23(b)(3) --
superiority -- Judge McAuliffe finds that class wide litigation
will promote efficiency by addressing potential defenses to
liability for the two non-derivative classes -- Class 6 (Meal
Period Waiver) and Class 8 (Wage Statement). Amazon has asserted
defenses to the merits of these claims, arguing that the meal
period waivers are valid and that associates could use simple
arithmetic to determine the total hours worked on their wage
statements. Resolution of such issues may streamline the litigation
and potentially resolve the entirety of the class action, including
the derivative claims.

Finally, Amazon moves to exclude the testimony and opinions of the
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Kriegler, submitted in support of their
motion for class certification. For the majority of proposed
classes, Judge McAuliffe recommends denial of class certification.
In reaching that recommendation, she did not substantively rely on
Dr. Kriegler's testimony to assess whether the Plaintiffs' claims
were susceptible to class-wide resolution or whether individual
questions predominated. Therefore, it is unnecessary to address
substantial portions of Amazon's motion seeking to exclude Dr.
Kriegler's report, particularly with respect to Classes 1 through 5
and Class 7.

As to the remaining classes, Classes 6 (Meal Period Waiver) and 8
(Wage Statement) (and the derivative Classes 9 through 11), Judge
McAuliffe holds that it also was unnecessary for her to rely on Dr.
Kriegler's report for a determination as to whether these classes
are susceptible to class wide resolution. Class 6 is premised on
the facial validity of specific meal break waiver forms, a legal
question that does not require expert testimony. Class 8 is
likewise premised on a legal question susceptible to resolution
without expert testimony; that is, whether certain wage statements
violated Labor Code Section 226(a). Accordingly, she recommends
that Amazon's motion to exclude the Plaintiffs' expert be denied as
moot.

Based on the foregoing, Judge McAuliffe recommends that the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification be granted in part and
denied in part as follows:

     a. The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification be denied as
to the following classes: Class 1 Unpaid Wages Class (Hours Worked
Claim Based on Control of Employees through Mandatory Exit Security
Procedures); Class 2 Unpaid Wages Class (Controlled Meal Periods);
Class 3 Meal Period Violations for Controlled Meal Periods; Class 4
Rest Periods Violations for Controlled Rest Periods; Class 5
Improper Rounding Class; and Class 7 (Third Rest Period Class);
and

      b. The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification be granted
as to the following classes:

          Class 6 (Invalid Second Meal Period Waiver Class) defined
as: All non-exempt employees employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc.
or Amazon.com, Inc. at any of Defendants' facilities in California
at any time during the period from July 12, 2014 and ending on the
date of certification or as otherwise determined by the Court who
signed any meal period waiver in the forms attached as Exhibit 12
to the Declaration of Peter R. Dion-Kindem in Support of Motion for
Class Certification and worked more than 10 hours in a day, did not
receive a second 30 minute meal period, and did not receive one
hour of pay at the class member's regular rate of compensation for
such day.

          Class 8. Direct Violation of Section 226(a)(2) Wage
Statement Class defined as: All non-exempt employees employed by
Amazon.com Services, Inc. or Amazon.com, Inc. in California at any
time during the period from July 12, 2016 and December 31, 2018 who
did not receive an itemized statement in writing accurately showing
the total hours worked by the employee where the wage statements
reflect a line item for regular hours worked and at least one other
line item for other types of hours worked other than regular
overtime or double time, such as shift differential hours worked.

          Class 9. Derivative Wage Statement Class defined as: All
members of Class 6 who, during the period from July 12, 2016 and
ending on the date of certification or as otherwise determined by
the Court, were not provided with accurate itemized wage statements
with all the information required by Labor Code Section 226(a)(1),
(2), (5) and (9).

          Class 10. Section 203 Subclass defined as: All members of
Class 6 who, during the period from July 12, 2014 and ending on the
date of certification or as otherwise determined by the Court, were
either voluntarily or involuntarily separated from their employment
and did not timely receive all wages owing pursuant to Labor Code
Section 201 or 202.

          Class 11. UCL Class defined as: All non-exempt employees
employed by Amazon.com Services, Inc. or Amazon.com, Inc. at any of
Defendants' facilities in California at any time during the period
from July 12, 2013 and ending on the date of certification or as
otherwise determined by the Court who are owed restitution as a
result of Defendants' business acts and practices that are found to
be unlawful, deceptive, and/or unfair.

Judge McAuliffe further recommends that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Dr. Brian Kriegler be denied as moot.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United
States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the
provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(l). Within 14 days
after being served with these findings and recommendations, the
parties may file written objections with the Court. Such a document
should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and
Recommendations." The parties are advised that failure to file
objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of
rights on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 26, 2023 Amended Findings &
Recommendations is available at https://tinyurl.com/5n723jjz from
Leagle.com.


GOOD OL BOYS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Kennedy Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------
Larry Kennedy, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Good Ol Boys Ohio LLC d/b/a 1 800 Radiator
and A/C, Delivery Drivers, Inc., National Driver Solutions
Corporation, and National Driver Solutions LLC, Defendants, Case
No. 1:23-cv-00327-JPH (S.D. Ohio, May 26, 2023) arises out of the
Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a delivery driver from
approximately April 2020 through approximately July 2021 in
Defendants' Florence, Kentucky area location, frequently travelling
into Hamilton County, Ohio among other places, to make deliveries.
The Plaintiff, in his work for Defendants, typically worked between
50 and 60 hours or more per week. Rather than classify Plaintiff as
an employee, the Defendants classified him as an independent
contractor. As a result of Defendants' common misclassification
policy, Defendants have not paid overtime pay to Plaintiff and
others similarly situated, says the Plaintiff.

Good Ol Boys Ohio LLC is an Ohio corporation licensed to transact
business in the State of Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clifford P. Bendau, II, Esq.
          BENDAU & BENDAU PLLC
          P.O. Box 97066
          Phoenix, AZ 85060
          Telephone: (480) 382-5176
          Email: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com

                 - and -

          James L. Simon, Esq.
          SIMON LAW CO.
          5000 Rockside Road, Suite 520
          Independence, OH 44131
          Telephone: (216) 816-8696
          E-mail: james@simonsayspay.com

GOOGLE LLC: Class Cert Bid Filing Vacated in Consumer Privacy Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit re: Google RTB Consumer Privacy
Litigation, Case No. 4:21-cv-02155-YGR (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers entered an order that:

   1. The Plaintiffs' pending administrative motion is denied as
moot.

   2. The deadline for plaintiffs to file their motion for class
      certification is vacated.

   3. The parties shall jointly submit a new proposed pretrial case

      schedule by May 25, 2023, that maintains the time intervals
      proposed in ECF No. 492, with plaintiffs' class certification

      motion due seven weeks after the completion of Google's
document
      productions.

   4. If the parties have a dispute about whether any discovery
      limitations should be imposed in connection with the new
      pretrial case schedule, they shall be addressed by the
parties
      in a joint submission not to exceed 3 pages per side that
      accompanies the new proposed case schedule.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 19, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/42eafDO at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Esq.
          Jonathan K. Levine, Esq.
          Bethany Caracuzzo, Esq.
          PRITZKER LEVINE LLP
          1900 Powell Street, Suite 450
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 692-0772
          Facsimile: (415) 366-6110
          E-mail: ecp@pritzkerlevine.com
                  jkl@pritzkerlevine.com
                  bc@pritzkerlevine.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Whitty Somvichian, Esq.
          Michael G. Rhodes, Esq.
          Aarti G. Reddy, Esq.
          Robby L.R. Saldana, Esq.
          Kelsey R. Spector, Esq.
          Reece Trevor, Esq.
          Anupam Dhillon, Esq.
          Khary J. Anderson, Esq.
          COOLEY LLP
          3 Embarcadero Center, 20th Fl.
          San Francisco, CA 94111-4004
          Telephone: (415) 693-2000
          Facsimile: (415) 693-2222
          E-mail: rhodesmg@cooley.com
                  wsomvichian@cooley.com
                  areddy@cooley.com
                  rsaldana@cooley.com
                  kspector@cooley.com
                  rtrevor@cooley.com
                  adhillon@cooley.com
                  kjanderson@cooley.com

GOOGLE LLC: Class Certification Bid Filing Extended to Sept. 21
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as J.C., through their father
and legal guardian CLINTON FARWELL, and M.W., through their mother
and legal guardian ELIZABETH WHITEHEAD, individually and on behalf
of
all others similarly situated, v. GOOGLE LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-01122-SLD-JEH (C.D. Ill.), the Parties submit a joint
motion to extend non-dispositive deadlines and request that the
Court enter an Order extending all deadlines in the May 4, 2022,
Text Order by 90 days.

   1. On May 4, 2022, the Court issued a Text Order setting forth
the
      following schedule for the case through class certification:


      -- Disclosure of the Plaintiffs' experts and expert reports
by
         June 23, 2023.

      -- Disclosure of the Defendant's experts and expert reports
due
         Aug. 25, 2023.

      -- Motion for Class Certification due June 23, 2023.

      -- Response due Aug. 25, 2023.

      -- Reply due Oct. 27, 2023.

   2. To that end, the Parties request a ninety (90) day extension
of
      all remaining deadlines to the following:

      -- Close of fact discovery on Aug. 17, 2023.

      -- Disclosure of the Plaintiffs experts and expert reports by

         Sept. 21, 2023.

      -- Disclosure of the Defendant's experts and expert reports
due
         Dec. 7, 2023.

      -- Motion for Class Certification due Sept. 21, 2023.

      -- Response due Dec. 7, 2023.

      -- Reply due Feb. 8, 2024.

Google is an American multinational technology company focusing on
artificial intelligence, online advertising, search engine
technology, cloud computing, computer software, quantum computing,
e-commerce, and consumer electronics.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ITsaZV at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joseph I. Marchese, Esq.
          Joshua D. Arisohn, Esq.
          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER.
          1330 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: jmarchese@bursor.com
                  jarisohn@bursor.com
                  pfraietta@bursor.com

                - and -

          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Theodore Maya, Esq.
          Bradley K. King, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          2600 West Olive Ave., Suite 500
          Burbank, CA 91505
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
          E-mail: radhoot@ahdootwolfson.com
                  twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                  tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com
                  bking@ahdootwolfson.com

                - and -

          Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
          David W. Hall, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1140
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 357-2107
          Facsimile: (305) 200-8801
          E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com
                  dhall@hedinhall.com

                - and -

          John C. Carey, Esq.
          CAREY RODRIGUEZ LLP
          1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 700
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 372-7474
          Facsimile: (305) 372-7475
          E-mail: jcarey@careyrodriguez.com

                - and -

          Andrew John Stuckart, Esq.
          BOUGHER, KRISHER & ASSOCIATES
          202 N Lafayette Street
          Macomb, IL 61455
          Telephone: (309) 833-1702
          Facsimile: (309) 833-1701
          E-mail: andrew@bougherlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Nicola C. Menaldo, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          1201 3rd Ave
          Suite 4800
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 359-8000
          E-mail: nmenaldo@perkinscoie.com
 


GOSHEN HEALTH: Lamarr Sues Over Unlawful Disclosure of Private Info
-------------------------------------------------------------------
KAITLIN LAMARR, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GOSHEN HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. D/B/A GOSHEN
HEALTH, Defendant, Case No. 49D01-2305-PL-021530 (Ind. Super.,
Marion Cty., May 26, 2023) seeks to address the Defendant"s
outrageous, illegal, and widespread practice of disclosing the
confidential personally identifying information and/or protected
health information of Plaintiff and proposed class members to third
parties, including Meta Platforms, Inc. d/b/a Meta, Google LLC,
Crazy Egg Inc., StackAdapt, Inc., Trade Desk, CallTrackingMetrics,
LLC, Simplifi Holdings, LLC, and possibly others.

Among other things, Plaintiff Lamarr alleges claims for negligence,
invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment,
breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the Indiana Deceptive
Consumer Sales Act and the Indiana Wiretapping Act. Operating as
designed and as implemented by Defendant, the Meta Pixel allowed
Defendant to unlawfully disclose Plaintiff and Class Members'
private health information alongside identifying details to
Facebook. By installing the Meta Pixel on its Website, Defendant
effectively planted a bug on Plaintiff's and Class Members' web
browsers and compelled them to disclose Private Information and
confidential communications to Facebook, without Plaintiff's and
Class Members' authorization or knowledge. In addition to its use
of the Meta Pixel to spy on and transmit Plaintiff's and Class
Members' Private Information, Facebook encourages and recommends
use of its Conversions Application Programming Interface (CAPI).
Unlike the Meta Pixel, which co-opts a website user's browser and
forces it to transmit information to Facebook in addition to the
website owner, CAPI does not cause the user's browser to transmit
information directly to Facebook. Instead, CAPI tracks the user's
website interaction, including Private Information, records and
stores that information on the website owner's servers, and then
transmits the data to Facebook from the website owner's servers,
says the suit.

Goshen Health is an Indiana-based, regional healthcare with a
110-year history. It is a major healthcare provider, operating
nearly healthcare clinics across four counties (Elkhart, Kosciusko,
LaGrange, and Noble), as well as the Goshen Hospital and the Goshen
physician network of family medicine and specialty providers. It
prides itself on its reputation nationally recognized,
award-winning leader in innovative cancer treatment and describes
its vision for itself as a trust partner for care. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
           Amina A. Thomas, Esq.
           Mary Kate Dugan, Esq.
           COHEN & MALAD, LLP
           One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
           Indianapolis, IN 46204
           Telephone: (317) 636-6481
           E-mail: ltoops@cohenandmalad.com
                   athomas@cohenandmalad.com
                   mdugan@cohenandmalad.com

                   - and -

           J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
           Andrew E. Mize, Esq.
           STRANCH, JENNINGS & GARVEY, PLLC
           The Freedom Center
           223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
           Nashville, TN 37203
           Telephone: (615) 254-8801
           Facsimile: (615) 255-5419
           E-mail: gstranch@stranchlaw.com
                   amize@stranchlaw.com

GUARDIAN LIFE: Faces Kamali Suit Over Breach of Contract
--------------------------------------------------------
HENRY KAMALI, M.D., individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, individual and Representative Plaintiff v. GUARDIAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA and DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
5:23-cv-02627-NC (N.D. Cal., May 24, 2023) alleges claims for
breach of contract, violations of the California Civil Code and the
California Business and Professions Code, and breach of contract.

Plaintiff Kamali asserts that Guardian Life Insurance Company of
America has repeatedly violated these rights by imposing a policy
definition of Total Disability that fundamentally and flagrantly
fails to meet California's minimum coverage requirements. Instead
of looking at the claimants' capacity to work in their own
occupation, Defendant has required claimants to be unemployed to
qualify for disability benefits. The Defendant's conduct violates
well-established California law and public policy objectives that
seek to promote greater inclusion of individuals with disabilities
in the work force. As a result of Defendant's no-work requirement,
many individuals who are "Totally Disabled" under California law
have been wrongfully denied and underpaid benefits or deterred from
entering the work force for fear of losing their benefits, says the
Plaintiff.

Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, is an insurance company
licensed to do business and doing business in California selling
long-term disability insurance. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew Bourhis, Esq.
          Ritsa Gountoumas, Esq.
          BOURHIS LAW GROUP, PC
          1808 Wedemeyer Street
          San Francisco, CA 94129
          Telephone: (415) 392-4660
          Facsimile: (415) 421-0259
          E-mail: matthew.bourhis@bourhislaw.com
                  ritsa.gountoumas@bourhislaw.com

                  - and -

          Robert B. Carey, Esq.
          John M. DeStefano, Esq.
          E. Tory Beardsley, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          11 West Jefferson Street, Suite 1000
          Phoenix, AZ 85003
          Telephone: (602) 840-5900
          Facsimile: (602) 840-3012
          E-mail: rob@hbsslaw.com
                  johnd@hbsslaw.com
                  toryb@hbsslaw.com

HAWAIIAN AIRLINES: Court Extends Class Cert-Related Deadlines
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RIKI O'HAILPIN, NINA
ARIZUMI, ROBERT ESPINOSA, ERWIN YOUNG, PUANANI BADIANG, SABRINA
FRANKS, RONALD LUM, DAN SAIKI, and BRANDEE AUKAI, on their own
behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. HAWAIIAN
AIRLINES, INC. and HAWAIIAN HOLDINGS, INC., Case No.
1:22-cv-00532-JAO-RT (D. Haw.), the Hon. Judge Rom A. Trader
entered an order granting the Parties' stipulation for extension of
class certification deadlines as follows:

             Event                   Old Deadline      New
Deadline

  Deadline to complete class        June 30, 2023      June 13,
2023
  certification-related
  discovery

  The Plaintiffs' motion due        June 30, 2023      July 14,
2023

  The Defendants’ response due      July 31, 2023      Aug. 14,
2023

  The Plaintiffs’ reply due         Aug. 14, 2023      Aug. 28,
2023

Hawaiian Airlines is the operator of commercial flights to and from
the U.S. state of Hawaii.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 19, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3N3hk68 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James Hochberg, Esq.
          John C. Sullivan, Esq.
          Austin R. Nimocks, Esq.
          Walker Moller, Esq.
          Laura Carroll, Esq.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Paul Alston, Esq.
          Nickolas A. Kacprowski, Esq.
          John Rhee, Esq.
          Christine Belcaid, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          1001 Bishop Street, Suite 1800
          Honolulu, Hawaii 96813-3689
          Telephone: (808) 524-1800
          Facsimile: (808) 524-4591
          E-mail: paul.alston@dentons.com
                  nickolas.kacprowski@dentons.com
                  john.rhee@dentons.com
                  christine.belcaid@dentons.com

HENKEL CORP: Waller Voluntarily Dropped Mislabeling Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
John Woolley of Bloomberg Law reports that a Missouri woman
voluntarily dropped her warranty and implied contract claims
against Henkel Corp. after she lost her bid to remand the case to
state court.

Valerie Waller alleged the chemical company engaged in deceptive
trade practices by selling "All"-branded liquid laundry detergent
in containers whose labels claim to provide detergent for "58
loads." She says the product doesn't, in fact, provide enough
detergent for 58 loads.

Henkel moved to dismiss her lawsuit last month after removing the
case from state court to the US District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri. [GN]


JOSH STEIN: ACLUNC Withdraws Class Cert. Bid
--------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF NORTH CAROLINA, v. JOSH STEIN, et al., Case No.
1:23-cv-00302-LCB-JLW (M.D.N.C.), the Plaintiff withdraws its
motion for Certification of a Defendant Class and supporting brief.


The Plaintiff is withdrawing its motion upon being informed that
Special Deputy Attorney General Elizabeth Curran O’Brien from the
North Carolina Department of Justice has replaced Special Deputy
Attorney General Kathryn H. Shields as counsel for the Defendants
Deberry, Crump, and Freeman.

The Plaintiff will file an Amended Motion for Certification of a
the Defendant Class and supporting brief consistent with these
changes, seeking Ms. O'Brien's appointment as class counsel
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g).

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated May 19, 2023, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oC7gYk at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel J. Davis, Esq.
          Kristi L. Graunke, Esq.
          ACLU OF NORTH CAROLINA
          LEGAL FOUNDATION
          Raleigh, NC 27611
          Telephone: (919) 354-5071
          E-mail: sdavis@acluofnc.org
                  kgraunke@acluofnc.org

KONING ASSOCIATES: Wins Summary Judgment v. Willis
---------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TROY WILLIS, v. KONING
ASSOCIATES, et al., Case No. 5:21-cv-00819-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Beth Labson Freeman entered an order granting the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining PAGA claim, which is dismissed without prejudice to
refiling in state court.

The Court has determined that the Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on the meal and rest break, overtime, and
reimbursement claims.

The Plaintiff cannot show that the wage statements were inaccurate
on any of these bases. The Defendants' motion for summary judgment
on Claim 5 is granted.

The Court has determined that the Plaintiff was properly classified
as exempt. Therefore, the Court decided that he was not entitled to
overtime or meal or rest breaks and that he received adequate
reimbursement. Therefore, the Plaintiff was not entitled to
additional wages upon quitting on any of these bases.

The Plaintiff Troy Willis filed this employment case against the
Defendants Koning & Associates and Chris Koning, alleging
violations of federal and state statutes.

Mr. Willis is a former employee of Koning & Associates, where he
worked as a general insurance adjuster. He brought suit against the
Defendants, alleging that they failed to compensate insurance
adjusters for all the time they worked.

Koning is an insurance company that provides general liability and
commercial property solutions.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 19, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ONzWbC at no extra charge.[CC]


MDL 2573: Court Dismisses American Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as American Precious Metals
Ltd., et al., v. The London Silver Market Fixing, Ltd. et al., Case
No. 1:14-cv-08869 (S.D.N.Y., Filed Nov. 7, 2014), the Hon. Judge
Valerie E. Caproni entered an order granting motion for judgment on
the pleadings involving Plaintiffs' allegation that the Fixing
Banks violated the Sherman Act and the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)
by manipulating the Fix and trading on their foreknowledge of the
Fix Price.

  -- As this resolves all remaining claims raised in the Third
     Amended Complaint (TAC), the case is dismissed with
prejudice.

  -- The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the open
motion
     at docket entry 604 and to close this case and all related and

     member cases.

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying
facts and procedural posture of this case. To briefly recap the
facts most relevant to this motion, TAC, which is the operative
complaint, alleges that the Fixing Banks conspired to episodically
depress the Silver Fix, which set the benchmark price for London
"Good Delivery" silver bars and influenced the price of silver and
silver derivatives worldwide.

The Plaintiffs also allege that the Fixing Banks improperly traded
silver derivates on their advance knowledge of the Fix Price. The
Fix occurs at noon London time, well before U.S. markets open.

After nearly five years of litigation, only claims regarding
Fix-related manipulation against two Fixing Banks, Scotiabank and
HSBC, remain.

In relevant part, the TAC analyzes publicly available data to
provide a factual basis from which the Court could infer that the
Defendants conspired to suppress periodically the Fix price of
silver.

According to the Plaintiffs, this is all circumstantial evidence of
improper trading by the Fixing Banks to profit from their advance
knowledge of the Fix Price to the detriment of others who were
trading silver derivatives at that time.

The Court has previously decided two motions to dismiss directed at
the second and third amended complaints. In Silver I, the Court
held that the Plaintiffs' Fixing-related allegations contained in
the Second Amended Complaint, which alleged substantially similar
facts to those presently at issue, adequately, albeit barely,
stated claims for violations of the Sherman Act and the CEA.

In Silver II, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against a
group of banks that were not involved in the Fix, noting that the
Plaintiffs were indirect, "umbrella" purchasers who did not
directly transact with the non-Fixing Banks.

Following recent developments in Second Circuit caselaw, the
efendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their CEA or antitrust
claims and, even if they do, the Plaintiffs' CEA claims are
impermissibly extraterritorial.

The Court has not previously decided these questions with respect
to the Plaintiffs' claims against the Fixing Banks in the Third
Amended Complaint but has extensively discussed these issues with
respect to the Plaintiffs' claims generally.

Second Circuit Decisions Post-Silver II

   Through a series of decisions following Silver II -- primarily,
but
   not exclusively, in other commodities benchmark cases -- the
Second
   Circuit has clarified the requirements for private Plaintiffs
   seeking to bring antitrust or CEA claims: they must allege facts

   from which the court can reasonably infer that their alleged
injury
   was directly connected to the challenged conduct, and any claims
of
   unlawful manipulation of a commodities market must include
   manipulation in the United States to fall within the  scope of
the
   CEA.

The Plaintiffs Lack Antitrust Standing

   Accordingly, a private plaintiff only has standing to bring a
   Sherman Act claim if he "shows:

   (1) antitrust injury, which is injury of the type the antitrust

       laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which

       makes defendants' acts unlawful, and

   (2) that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four efficient
       enforcer factors." If plaintiffs fail to make the requisite

       showing, the Court must dismiss the case because "antitrust

       standing is a threshold, pleading-stage inquiry."

   In sum, the TAC does not allege sufficient facts to allow the
Court
   to infer that it is plausible, as opposed to merely possible,
that
   the artificial pricing conditions caused by the Defendants'
   episodic conduct persisted long enough to affect the
Plaintiffs’
   trades, regardless of how long after the Defendants’
manipulative
   conduct the Plaintiffs' trades occurred. As noted in Silver II,
the
   TAC alleges only that the effect of the manipulation of the Fix

   abated gradually over time.

The Plaintiffs Are Not Efficient Enforcers

   Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs have suffered an antitrust

   injury, the Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing because they are
not
   efficient enforcers. "The key principle underlying the efficient

   enforcer test is proximate cause": a plaintiff must allege a
   "direct connection between the harm and the alleged antitrust
   violation."

Commodity Exchange Act Claims

   The Plaintiffs' CEA claims are premised on the same alleged
Fix-
   related manipulation as their Sherman Act claim. To bring a
   manipulation claim under the CEA, the Plaintiffs must allege
that
   the Defendants engaged in conduct that violated the CEA; to have

   CEA standing, the Plaintiffs must allege that conduct caused
them
   to suffer "actual damages."

   The Plaintiffs must also plausibly allege that the Defendants'
   alleged conduct was sufficiently domestic to bring that conduct

   within the scope of the CEA. The Plaintiffs have done neither.

Extraterritoriality

   Even if the Plaintiffs had adequately alleged CEA standing, they

   have failed to establish that the Defendants' actionable conduct

   was sufficiently domestic to fall within the scope of the CEA.

   The Plaintiffs argue that the alleged manipulative conduct is
   sufficiently domestic because the Defendants, frequent traders
in
   U.S. markets, must have traded in the United States to profit
from
   their manipulation of the Fix.

   The Plaintiffs point to a spike in trading activity in COMEX
silver
   futures in the lead-up to the Fix and quantitative analysis
   demonstrating the Defendants' financial incentive to trade on
their
   foreknowledge of the Fixing price.

The American Precious Metals suit is consolidated in LONDON SILVER
FIXING, LTD., ANTITRUST LITIGATION (MDL 2573).

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/43vB0VW at no extra charge.[CC]

MDL 2573: Court Dismisses Barrett Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Barrett, et al., v. Bank
of Nova Scotia, et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-09112 (S.D.N.Y., Filed
Nov. 4, 2014), the Hon. Judge Valerie E. Caproni entered an order
granting motion for judgment on the pleadings involving Plaintiffs'
allegation that the Fixing Banks violated the Sherman Act and the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) by manipulating the Fix and trading on
their foreknowledge of the Fix Price.

  -- As this resolves all remaining claims raised in the Third
     Amended Complaint (TAC), the case is dismissed with
prejudice.

  -- The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the open
motion
     at docket entry 604 and to close this case and all related and

     member cases.

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying
facts and procedural posture of this case. To briefly recap the
facts most relevant to this motion, TAC, which is the operative
complaint, alleges that the Fixing Banks conspired to episodically
depress the Silver Fix, which set the benchmark price for London
"Good Delivery" silver bars and influenced the price of silver and
silver derivatives worldwide.

The Plaintiffs also allege that the Fixing Banks improperly traded
silver derivates on their advance knowledge of the Fix Price. The
Fix occurs at noon London time, well before U.S. markets open.

After nearly five years of litigation, only claims regarding
Fix-related manipulation against two Fixing Banks, Scotiabank
and HSBC, remain.

In relevant part, the TAC analyzes publicly available data to
provide a factual basis from which the Court could infer that the
Defendants conspired to suppress periodically the Fix price of
silver.

According to the Plaintiffs, this is all circumstantial evidence of
improper trading by the Fixing Banks to profit from their advance
knowledge of the Fix Price to the detriment of others who were
trading silver derivatives at that time.

The Court has previously decided two motions to dismiss directed at
the second and third amended complaints. In Silver I, the Court
held that the Plaintiffs' Fixing-related allegations contained in
the Second Amended Complaint, which alleged substantially similar
facts to those presently at issue, adequately, albeit barely,
stated claims for violations of the Sherman Act and the CEA.

In Silver II, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against a
group of banks that were not involved in the Fix, noting that the
Plaintiffs were indirect, "umbrella" purchasers who did not
directly transact with the non-Fixing Banks.

Following recent developments in Second Circuit caselaw, the
efendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their CEA or antitrust
claims and, even if they do, the Plaintiffs' CEA claims are
impermissibly extraterritorial.

The Court has not previously decided these questions with respect
to the Plaintiffs' claims against the Fixing Banks in the Third
Amended Complaint but has extensively discussed these issues with
respect to the Plaintiffs' claims generally.

Second Circuit Decisions Post-Silver II

   Through a series of decisions following Silver II -- primarily,
but
   not exclusively, in other commodities benchmark cases -- the
Second
   Circuit has clarified the requirements for private Plaintiffs
   seeking to bring antitrust or CEA claims: they must allege facts

   from which the court can reasonably infer that their alleged
injury
   was directly connected to the challenged conduct, and any claims
of
   unlawful manipulation of a commodities market must include
   manipulation in the United States to fall within the  scope of
the
   CEA.

The Plaintiffs Lack Antitrust Standing

   Accordingly, a private plaintiff only has standing to bring a
   Sherman Act claim if he "shows:

   (1) antitrust injury, which is injury of the type the antitrust

       laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which

       makes defendants' acts unlawful, and

   (2) that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four efficient
       enforcer factors." If plaintiffs fail to make the requisite

       showing, the Court must dismiss the case because "antitrust

       standing is a threshold, pleading-stage inquiry."

   In sum, the TAC does not allege sufficient facts to allow the
Court
   to infer that it is plausible, as opposed to merely possible,
that
   the artificial pricing conditions caused by the Defendants'
   episodic conduct persisted long enough to affect the
Plaintiffs’
   trades, regardless of how long after the Defendants’
manipulative
   conduct the Plaintiffs' trades occurred. As noted in Silver II,
the
   TAC alleges only that the effect of the manipulation of the Fix

   abated gradually over time.

The Plaintiffs Are Not Efficient Enforcers

   Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs have suffered an antitrust

   injury, the Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing because they are
not
   efficient enforcers. "The key principle underlying the efficient

   enforcer test is proximate cause": a plaintiff must allege a
   "direct connection between the harm and the alleged antitrust
   violation."

Commodity Exchange Act Claims

   The Plaintiffs' CEA claims are premised on the same alleged
Fix-
   related manipulation as their Sherman Act claim. To bring a
   manipulation claim under the CEA, the Plaintiffs must allege
that
   the Defendants engaged in conduct that violated the CEA; to have

   CEA standing, the Plaintiffs must allege that conduct caused
them
   to suffer "actual damages."

   The Plaintiffs must also plausibly allege that the Defendants'
   alleged conduct was sufficiently domestic to bring that conduct

   within the scope of the CEA. The Plaintiffs have done neither.

Extraterritoriality

   Even if the Plaintiffs had adequately alleged CEA standing, they

   have failed to establish that the Defendants' actionable conduct

   was sufficiently domestic to fall within the scope of the CEA.

   The Plaintiffs argue that the alleged manipulative conduct is
   sufficiently domestic because the Defendants, frequent traders
in
   U.S. markets, must have traded in the United States to profit
from
   their manipulation of the Fix.

   The Plaintiffs point to a spike in trading activity in COMEX
silver
   futures in the lead-up to the Fix and quantitative analysis
   demonstrating the Defendants' financial incentive to trade on
their
   foreknowledge of the Fixing price.

The Barrett suit is consolidated in LONDON SILVER FIXING, LTD.,
ANTITRUST LITIGATION (MDL 2573).

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/42x8yll at no extra charge.[CC]

MDL 2573: Court Dismisses Depaoli Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Depaoli, et al., v. The
London Silver Market Fixing, Ltd. et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-09068
(S.D.N.Y., Filed Nov. 13, 2014), the Hon. Judge Valerie E. Caproni
entered an order granting motion for judgment on the pleadings
involving Plaintiffs' allegation that the Fixing Banks violated the
Sherman Act and the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) by manipulating
the Fix and trading on their foreknowledge of the Fix Price.

  -- As this resolves all remaining claims raised in the Third
     Amended Complaint (TAC), the case is dismissed with
prejudice.

  -- The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the open
motion
     at docket entry 604 and to close this case and all related and

     member cases.

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying
facts and procedural posture of this case. To briefly recap the
facts most relevant to this motion, TAC, which is the operative
complaint, alleges that the Fixing Banks conspired to episodically
depress the Silver Fix, which set the benchmark price for London
"Good Delivery" silver bars and influenced the price of silver and
silver derivatives worldwide.

The Plaintiffs also allege that the Fixing Banks improperly traded
silver derivates on their advance knowledge of the Fix Price. The
Fix occurs at noon London time, well before U.S. markets open.

After nearly five years of litigation, only claims regarding
Fix-related manipulation against two Fixing Banks, Scotiabank
and HSBC, remain.

In relevant part, the TAC analyzes publicly available data to
provide a factual basis from which the Court could infer that the
Defendants conspired to suppress periodically the Fix price of
silver.

According to the Plaintiffs, this is all circumstantial evidence of
improper trading by the Fixing Banks to profit from their advance
knowledge of the Fix Price to the detriment of others who were
trading silver derivatives at that time.

The Court has previously decided two motions to dismiss directed at
the second and third amended complaints. In Silver I, the Court
held that the Plaintiffs' Fixing-related allegations contained in
the Second Amended Complaint, which alleged substantially similar
facts to those presently at issue, adequately, albeit barely,
stated claims for violations of the Sherman Act and the CEA.

In Silver II, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against a
group of banks that were not involved in the Fix, noting that the
Plaintiffs were indirect, "umbrella" purchasers who did not
directly transact with the non-Fixing Banks.

Following recent developments in Second Circuit caselaw, the
efendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their CEA or antitrust
claims and, even if they do, the Plaintiffs' CEA claims are
impermissibly extraterritorial.

The Court has not previously decided these questions with respect
to the Plaintiffs' claims against the Fixing Banks in the Third
Amended Complaint but has extensively discussed these issues with
respect to the Plaintiffs' claims generally.

Second Circuit Decisions Post-Silver II

   Through a series of decisions following Silver II -- primarily,
but
   not exclusively, in other commodities benchmark cases -- the
Second
   Circuit has clarified the requirements for private Plaintiffs
   seeking to bring antitrust or CEA claims: they must allege facts

   from which the court can reasonably infer that their alleged
injury
   was directly connected to the challenged conduct, and any claims
of
   unlawful manipulation of a commodities market must include
   manipulation in the United States to fall within the  scope of
the
   CEA.

The Plaintiffs Lack Antitrust Standing

   Accordingly, a private plaintiff only has standing to bring a
   Sherman Act claim if he "shows:

   (1) antitrust injury, which is injury of the type the antitrust

       laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which

       makes defendants' acts unlawful, and

   (2) that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four efficient
       enforcer factors." If plaintiffs fail to make the requisite

       showing, the Court must dismiss the case because "antitrust

       standing is a threshold, pleading-stage inquiry."

   In sum, the TAC does not allege sufficient facts to allow the
Court
   to infer that it is plausible, as opposed to merely possible,
that
   the artificial pricing conditions caused by the Defendants'
   episodic conduct persisted long enough to affect the
Plaintiffs’
   trades, regardless of how long after the Defendants’
manipulative
   conduct the Plaintiffs' trades occurred. As noted in Silver II,
the
   TAC alleges only that the effect of the manipulation of the Fix

   abated gradually over time.

The Plaintiffs Are Not Efficient Enforcers

   Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs have suffered an antitrust

   injury, the Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing because they are
not
   efficient enforcers. "The key principle underlying the efficient

   enforcer test is proximate cause": a plaintiff must allege a
   "direct connection between the harm and the alleged antitrust
   violation."

Commodity Exchange Act Claims

   The Plaintiffs' CEA claims are premised on the same alleged
Fix-
   related manipulation as their Sherman Act claim. To bring a
   manipulation claim under the CEA, the Plaintiffs must allege
that
   the Defendants engaged in conduct that violated the CEA; to have

   CEA standing, the Plaintiffs must allege that conduct caused
them
   to suffer "actual damages."

   The Plaintiffs must also plausibly allege that the Defendants'
   alleged conduct was sufficiently domestic to bring that conduct

   within the scope of the CEA. The Plaintiffs have done neither.

Extraterritoriality

   Even if the Plaintiffs had adequately alleged CEA standing, they

   have failed to establish that the Defendants' actionable conduct

   was sufficiently domestic to fall within the scope of the CEA.

   The Plaintiffs argue that the alleged manipulative conduct is
   sufficiently domestic because the Defendants, frequent traders
in
   U.S. markets, must have traded in the United States to profit
from
   their manipulation of the Fix.

   The Plaintiffs point to a spike in trading activity in COMEX
silver
   futures in the lead-up to the Fix and quantitative analysis
   demonstrating the Defendants' financial incentive to trade on
their
   foreknowledge of the Fixing price.

The Depaoli suit is consolidated in LONDON SILVER FIXING, LTD.,
ANTITRUST LITIGATION (MDL 2573).

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at bit.ly/42sovcq at no extra charge.[CC]

MDL 2573: Court Dismisses Hughes Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Hughes v. Duetsche Bank
AG, et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-07357 (S.D.N.Y., Filed Sept. 11,
2014), the Hon. Judge Valerie E. Caproni entered an order granting
motion for judgment on the pleadings involving Plaintiffs'
allegation that the Fixing Banks violated the Sherman Act and the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) by manipulating the Fix and trading on
their foreknowledge of the Fix Price.

  -- As this resolves all remaining claims raised in the Third
     Amended Complaint (TAC), the case is dismissed with
prejudice.

  -- The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the open
motion
     at docket entry 604 and to close this case and all related and

     member cases.

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying
facts and procedural posture of this case. To briefly recap the
facts most relevant to this motion, TAC, which is the operative
complaint, alleges that the Fixing Banks conspired to episodically
depress the Silver Fix, which set the benchmark price for London
"Good Delivery" silver bars and influenced the price of silver and
silver derivatives worldwide.

The Plaintiffs also allege that the Fixing Banks improperly traded
silver derivates on their advance knowledge of the Fix Price. The
Fix occurs at noon London time, well before U.S. markets open.

After nearly five years of litigation, only claims regarding
Fix-related manipulation against two Fixing Banks, Scotiabank
and HSBC, remain.

In relevant part, the TAC analyzes publicly available data to
provide a factual basis from which the Court could infer that the
Defendants conspired to suppress periodically the Fix price of
silver.

According to the Plaintiffs, this is all circumstantial evidence of
improper trading by the Fixing Banks to profit from their advance
knowledge of the Fix Price to the detriment of others who were
trading silver derivatives at that time.

The Court has previously decided two motions to dismiss directed at
the second and third amended complaints. In Silver I, the Court
held that the Plaintiffs' Fixing-related allegations contained in
the Second Amended Complaint, which alleged substantially similar
facts to those presently at issue, adequately, albeit barely,
stated claims for violations of the Sherman Act and the CEA.

In Silver II, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against a
group of banks that were not involved in the Fix, noting that the
Plaintiffs were indirect, "umbrella" purchasers who did not
directly transact with the non-Fixing Banks.

Following recent developments in Second Circuit caselaw, the
efendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their CEA or antitrust
claims and, even if they do, the Plaintiffs' CEA claims are
impermissibly extraterritorial.

The Court has not previously decided these questions with respect
to the Plaintiffs' claims against the Fixing Banks in the Third
Amended Complaint but has extensively discussed these issues with
respect to the Plaintiffs' claims generally.

Second Circuit Decisions Post-Silver II

   Through a series of decisions following Silver II -- primarily,
but
   not exclusively, in other commodities benchmark cases -- the
Second
   Circuit has clarified the requirements for private Plaintiffs
   seeking to bring antitrust or CEA claims: they must allege facts

   from which the court can reasonably infer that their alleged
injury
   was directly connected to the challenged conduct, and any claims
of
   unlawful manipulation of a commodities market must include
   manipulation in the United States to fall within the  scope of
the
   CEA.

The Plaintiffs Lack Antitrust Standing

   Accordingly, a private plaintiff only has standing to bring a
   Sherman Act claim if he "shows:

   (1) antitrust injury, which is injury of the type the antitrust

       laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which

       makes defendants' acts unlawful, and

   (2) that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four efficient
       enforcer factors." If plaintiffs fail to make the requisite

       showing, the Court must dismiss the case because "antitrust

       standing is a threshold, pleading-stage inquiry."

   In sum, the TAC does not allege sufficient facts to allow the
Court
   to infer that it is plausible, as opposed to merely possible,
that
   the artificial pricing conditions caused by the Defendants'
   episodic conduct persisted long enough to affect the
Plaintiffs’
   trades, regardless of how long after the Defendants’
manipulative
   conduct the Plaintiffs' trades occurred. As noted in Silver II,
the
   TAC alleges only that the effect of the manipulation of the Fix

   abated gradually over time.

The Plaintiffs Are Not Efficient Enforcers

   Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs have suffered an antitrust

   injury, the Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing because they are
not
   efficient enforcers. "The key principle underlying the efficient

   enforcer test is proximate cause": a plaintiff must allege a
   "direct connection between the harm and the alleged antitrust
   violation."

Commodity Exchange Act Claims

   The Plaintiffs' CEA claims are premised on the same alleged
Fix-
   related manipulation as their Sherman Act claim. To bring a
   manipulation claim under the CEA, the Plaintiffs must allege
that
   the Defendants engaged in conduct that violated the CEA; to have

   CEA standing, the Plaintiffs must allege that conduct caused
them
   to suffer "actual damages."

   The Plaintiffs must also plausibly allege that the Defendants'
   alleged conduct was sufficiently domestic to bring that conduct

   within the scope of the CEA. The Plaintiffs have done neither.

Extraterritoriality

   Even if the Plaintiffs had adequately alleged CEA standing, they

   have failed to establish that the Defendants' actionable conduct

   was sufficiently domestic to fall within the scope of the CEA.

   The Plaintiffs argue that the alleged manipulative conduct is
   sufficiently domestic because the Defendants, frequent traders
in
   U.S. markets, must have traded in the United States to profit
from
   their manipulation of the Fix.

   The Plaintiffs point to a spike in trading activity in COMEX
silver
   futures in the lead-up to the Fix and quantitative analysis
   demonstrating the Defendants' financial incentive to trade on
their
   foreknowledge of the Fixing price.

The Hughes suit is consolidated in LONDON SILVER FIXING, LTD.,
ANTITRUST LITIGATION (MDL 2573).

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3J3kp3C at no extra charge.[CC]

MDL 2573: Court Dismisses Tran Silver Fix Price Antitrust Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Tran v. The Bank of Nova
Scotia, et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-07004 (S.D.N.Y., Filed Aug.27,
2014), the Hon. Judge Valerie E. Caproni entered an order granting
motion for judgment on the pleadings involving Plaintiffs'
allegation that the Fixing Banks violated the Sherman Act and the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) by manipulating the Fix and trading on
their foreknowledge of the Fix Price.

  -- As this resolves all remaining claims raised in the Third
     Amended Complaint (TAC), the case is dismissed with
prejudice.

  -- The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the open
motion
     at docket entry 604 and to close this case and all related and

     member cases.

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying
facts and procedural posture of this case. To briefly recap the
facts most relevant to this motion, TAC, which is the operative
complaint, alleges that the Fixing Banks conspired to episodically
depress the Silver Fix, which set the benchmark price for London
"Good Delivery" silver bars and influenced the price of silver and
silver derivatives worldwide.

The Plaintiffs also allege that the Fixing Banks improperly traded
silver derivates on their advance knowledge of the Fix Price. The
Fix occurs at noon London time, well before U.S. markets open.

After nearly five years of litigation, only claims regarding
Fix-related manipulation against two Fixing Banks, Scotiabank
and HSBC, remain.

In relevant part, the TAC analyzes publicly available data to
provide a factual basis from which the Court could infer that the
Defendants conspired to suppress periodically the Fix price of
silver.

According to the Plaintiffs, this is all circumstantial evidence of
improper trading by the Fixing Banks to profit from their advance
knowledge of the Fix Price to the detriment of others who were
trading silver derivatives at that time.

The Court has previously decided two motions to dismiss directed at
the second and third amended complaints. In Silver I, the Court
held that the Plaintiffs' Fixing-related allegations contained in
the Second Amended Complaint, which alleged substantially similar
facts to those presently at issue, adequately, albeit barely,
stated claims for violations of the Sherman Act and the CEA.

In Silver II, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against a
group of banks that were not involved in the Fix, noting that the
Plaintiffs were indirect, "umbrella" purchasers who did not
directly transact with the non-Fixing Banks.

Following recent developments in Second Circuit caselaw, the
efendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their CEA or antitrust
claims and, even if they do, the Plaintiffs' CEA claims are
impermissibly extraterritorial.

The Court has not previously decided these questions with respect
to the Plaintiffs' claims against the Fixing Banks in the Third
Amended Complaint but has extensively discussed these issues with
respect to the Plaintiffs' claims generally.

Second Circuit Decisions Post-Silver II

   Through a series of decisions following Silver II -- primarily,
but
   not exclusively, in other commodities benchmark cases -- the
Second
   Circuit has clarified the requirements for private Plaintiffs
   seeking to bring antitrust or CEA claims: they must allege facts

   from which the court can reasonably infer that their alleged
injury
   was directly connected to the challenged conduct, and any claims
of
   unlawful manipulation of a commodities market must include
   manipulation in the United States to fall within the  scope of
the
   CEA.

The Plaintiffs Lack Antitrust Standing

   Accordingly, a private plaintiff only has standing to bring a
   Sherman Act claim if he "shows:

   (1) antitrust injury, which is injury of the type the antitrust

       laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which

       makes defendants' acts unlawful, and

   (2) that he is a proper plaintiff in light of four efficient
       enforcer factors." If plaintiffs fail to make the requisite

       showing, the Court must dismiss the case because "antitrust

       standing is a threshold, pleading-stage inquiry."

   In sum, the TAC does not allege sufficient facts to allow the
Court
   to infer that it is plausible, as opposed to merely possible,
that
   the artificial pricing conditions caused by the Defendants'
   episodic conduct persisted long enough to affect the
Plaintiffs’
   trades, regardless of how long after the Defendants’
manipulative
   conduct the Plaintiffs' trades occurred. As noted in Silver II,
the
   TAC alleges only that the effect of the manipulation of the Fix

   abated gradually over time.

The Plaintiffs Are Not Efficient Enforcers

   Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs have suffered an antitrust

   injury, the Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing because they are
not
   efficient enforcers. "The key principle underlying the efficient

   enforcer test is proximate cause": a plaintiff must allege a
   "direct connection between the harm and the alleged antitrust
   violation."

Commodity Exchange Act Claims

   The Plaintiffs' CEA claims are premised on the same alleged
Fix-
   related manipulation as their Sherman Act claim. To bring a
   manipulation claim under the CEA, the Plaintiffs must allege
that
   the Defendants engaged in conduct that violated the CEA; to have

   CEA standing, the Plaintiffs must allege that conduct caused
them
   to suffer "actual damages."

   The Plaintiffs must also plausibly allege that the Defendants'
   alleged conduct was sufficiently domestic to bring that conduct

   within the scope of the CEA. The Plaintiffs have done neither.

Extraterritoriality

   Even if the Plaintiffs had adequately alleged CEA standing, they

   have failed to establish that the Defendants' actionable conduct

   was sufficiently domestic to fall within the scope of the CEA.

   The Plaintiffs argue that the alleged manipulative conduct is
   sufficiently domestic because the Defendants, frequent traders
in
   U.S. markets, must have traded in the United States to profit
from
   their manipulation of the Fix.

   The Plaintiffs point to a spike in trading activity in COMEX
silver
   futures in the lead-up to the Fix and quantitative analysis
   demonstrating the Defendants' financial incentive to trade on
their
   foreknowledge of the Fixing price.

The Tran suit is consolidated in LONDON SILVER FIXING, LTD.,
ANTITRUST LITIGATION (MDL 2573).

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/43vxR8A at no extra charge.[CC]

NATIONSBENEFITS HOLDINGS: A.T. Files Suit in D. Kansas
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against NationsBenefits
Holdings, LLC, et al. The case is styled as A.T., individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. NationsBenefits
Holdings, LLC, NationsBenefits LLC, AETNA Resources, LLC, AETNA
Corporate Services LLC, AETNA Health Inc, AETNA Health Management
Inc., AETNA Inc., AETNA International LLC, Case No.
6:23-cv-01112-KHV-GEB (D. Kan., June 1, 2023).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Personal Injury.

NationsBenefits -- https://www.nationsbenefits.com/ -- is a
supplemental benefits company that provides managed care
organizations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lucy McShane, Esq.
          Maureen M. Brady, Esq.
          MCSHANE & BRADY, LLC
          1656 Washington Street, Suite 120
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Phone: (816) 888-8010
          Email: lmcshane@mcshanebradylaw.com
                 mbrady@mcshanebradylaw.com


NAVIENT CORP: Bid for Summary Judgment in Minner Class Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES L. MINNER, Plaintiff v. NAVIENT CORPORATION and
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1086S
(W.D.N.Y.), Judge William M. Skretny of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of New York grants the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and dismisses the Third Amended Complaint.

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's class action alleging
Defendants violated New York General Business Law Section 349, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681s-2, and breached
a contract in the servicing of his (and similarly situated
person's) student loans. The Defendants moved to dismiss the
initial version of the Complaint and Minner cross-moved for leave
to amend. The Court granted leave to amend while denying the Motion
to Dismiss, Minner v. Navient Corporation, No. 18CV1086, 2020 WL
906628 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020).

Presently before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment dismissing the TAC. Prior to moving for summary judgment,
Defendants Navient Solutions, LLC (or "NSL") and Navient Corp.
moved to strikethe Plaintiff's expert report and testimony from
Diane Sovereign. The Court granted the Motion to Strike and now
addresses the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Minner is a federal student loan borrower with nine loans from the
United States Department of Education ("DOE") serviced first by
Defendants' predecessor, Sallie Mae, and later by the Defendants.
He alleges a class of similarly situated "direct student loan
borrowers from the federal government who had at least one federal
loan serviced by Defendants and/or any of their predecessors
between Jan. 1, 2010 and the present that were reported to any
credit reporting agency (or 'CRA') as delinquent or in default
within 30 days after a forbearance.

Navient Corp. and NSL succeeded Sallie Mae as the federal student
loan servicers. As loan servicers, Minner alleges that the
Defendants are responsible for "managing borrower's accounts,
processing monthly payments, assisting borrowers to learn about,
enroll in, and remain in alternative repayment plans.

After taking out these student loans, Minner experienced long-term
financial problems. The Defendants offered options for relief
including income-driven repayment plans (or "IDR") and forbearance.
Minner contends that the Defendants inappropriately placed his
loans in forbearance rather than IDR. Forbearance caused two major
problems for Minner. First, he incurred additional costs with his
loans. Second, Minner believed his credit reports contained errors
about the status of these loans.

Upon learning of these reports, Minner complained to the CRAs. He
alleges the CRAs informed Defendants that Minner disputed their
reports. The Defendants failed to correct the reports stating that
Minner had defaulted on his loans.

The First Cause of Action in the TAC alleges for Minner and a
subclass of New York borrowers that the Defendants violated New
York General Business Law Section 349. Minner claims that he and
the proposed New York subclass reasonably relied upon the
Defendants' assistance but the Defendants steered them to
forbearance against subclass members' best interest. He contends
that the Defendants failed to perform "their core duties in
servicing" his loans by steering him (and those similarly situated)
inappropriately into forbearance.

The Second Cause of Action alleges the Defendants knowingly and
willfully introduced false information in violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681s-2, against the
proposed class by misrepresenting the status of their loans while
in forbearance.

The Third Cause of Action alleges the Defendants breached the
Master Promissory Notes Minner and class members entered with the
DOE. The Defendants breached the promissory notes and breach their
duty of good faith by steering Minner and class members to
forbearance and not to IDR plans and falsely reporting student loan
delinquency to CRAs.

Minner seeks compensatory and punitive damages, a declaration that
the Defendants had a contractual responsibility to provide
borrowers such as Minner and the proposed class with assistance in
understanding and choosing appropriate repayment plans, and an
Order compelling the Defendants to rescind their reports of default
to the credit reporting agencies.

The Defendants answered the TAC. They then moved for summary
judgment.

The Defendants argue that Minner was advised of the option of IDR
in 2013 but waited until five years later to seek relief. They
conclude that Minner's argument that they steered Minner to
forbearance lacks merit. The Defendants next deny proof of a
contract existing between Minner and Defendants for a breach of
contract claim. Next, they contend that NSL was entitled to summary
judgment dismissing the General Business Law Section 349 violations
(id. at 9-10) as well as Fair Credit Reporting Act violations (id.
at 10-12), claiming that there is no evidence that NSL received a
credit dispute from a CRA. The Defendants next argue that Minner
lacks standing for declaratory relief. Alternatively, they assert
Minner has not established an issue of fact precluding summary
judgment to them.

Minner now argues that certain issues of fact exist but he did not
submit a response to the Defendants' Statement. Furthermore, he
only submitted his affidavit to contradict the Defendants'
assertions where their Statement cites to declarations, exhibits,
and Minner's deposition testimony as evidence for the assertions.
Minner's affidavit discusses June 2018 credit reports and his
dispute.

Accepting the Defendants' uncontested facts, Judge Skretney finds
that Minner did not offer counterstatement of facts and failed to
proffer sufficient evidence to show a material issue of fact to
preclude summary judgment. Next, Minner abandoned his steering to
forbearance claims and his Fair Credit Reporting Act claims alleged
in the First and Second Causes of Action. Alternatively, Minner was
delinquent on his student loans and Defendants accurately reported
this to credit reporting agencies, despite entering forbearance on
those loans. Furthermore, had Minner not abandoned this claim,
without notice from a credit reporting agency of a dispute, there
is no Fair Credit Reporting Act claim.

As for Minner's Third Cause of Action, Judge Skretney finds that
there also is no breach of contract or breach of the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing because the information reported by
Defendants to credit reporting agencies -- that Minner was
delinquent on his student loans -- was accurate when given in
May-June 2018. NSL then placed Minner's loan on administrative
forbearance which had no effect on NSL's earlier credit reporting.

For these reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 26, 2023 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3ej5a3j4 from Leagle.com.


NEXTERA ENERGY: Jastram Sues Over False Statements in SEC Filings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MAHA JASTRAM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NEXTERA ENERGY, INC., JAMES ROBO, ERIC
SILAGY and DAVID P. REUTER, Defendants, Case No. 9:23-cv-80833
(S.D. Fla., May 26, 2023) alleges that the Defendants violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

On January 25, 2023, FPL President and CEO Eric Silagy abruptly
resigned and Nextera Energy, Inc. (NEE) filed a Form 8-K with the
SEC which specifically acknowledged that Florida Power and Light
Co. (FPL) faced legal and reputational risks because of the
allegations that FPL executives had orchestrated political
misconduct. On this news, NEE’s stock dropped $7.31 per share, or
about 8.7%, representing a loss of approximately $15 billion in
market capitalization on unusually high trading volume.

Plaintiff Jastram seeks to represent on behalf of the class of
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired NEE
securities between December 2, 2021, and February 1, 2023. She
claims that the Defendants misled investors by failing to disclose
that surreptitious orchestration of political misconduct exposed
NEE to substantial legal and reputational risk and that their
positive statements about the NEE's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

NEE is a Florida corporation headquartered in Juno Beach, FL and
one of the largest power and utility holding companies in North
America. NEE's primary subsidiary is FPL, the largest vertically
integrated regulated utility in Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris Gold, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (786) 673-2405
          E-mail: chris@edelsberglaw.com

                  - and -

          Jeffrey C. Block, Esq.
          Jacob Walker, Esq.
          Brendan Jarboe, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          260 Franklin Street, Suite 1860
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 398-5600
          E-mail: jeff@blockleviton.com

NORTH COAST: Court Certifies Bryant FLSA Collective Action
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TENITA BRYANT, et al., v.
NORTH COAST NATURAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-01075-CAB (N.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge Christopher A. Boyko
entered an order granting the motion of the Plaintiffs to certify
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action.

The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendants on an hourly basis from
April 1, 2019, to May 10, 2019. They were never paid for any hours
worked, the Plaintiffs contend.

In addition, the Plaintiffs have filed the executed Consent Forms
for 63 hourly workers who were employed by the Defendants but did
not receive minimum wages for all hours worked.

The operative Complaint is the Second Amended Complaint filed on
March 26, 2020. the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated
the FLSA by virtue of their practices and policies of failing to
pay minimum wages for any hours worked. On September 14, 2021, the
Court conditionally certified these collective classes:

   -- FLSA Salaried Class

      All current and former employees of the Defendants who were
      classified as salaried employees for the Collinwood Hemp
Venture
      Employers as executive-level employees in Ohio in any
workweek
      in the past three years;"

   -- FLSA Hourly Class

      All current and former employees of the Defendants who were
      classified as hourly employees for the Collinwood Hemp
Venture
      Employers as manufacturing workers (or an equivalent
position)
      in Ohio in any workweek in the past three years;"

The Plaintiffs now move for final certification of the Collective
Class consisting of the Defendants' hourly employees. The
Defendants are in default, have not opposed the Collective Class
Certification Motion and have not filed a motion to decertify the
class.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 19, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3OKFmDW at no extra charge.[CC]

OPOPOP INC: Class Cert Fact Discovery Completion Due Sept. 19
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RAFAEL CORDERO,
Individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
OPOPOP, INC., Case No.  1:23-cv-00904-JPO (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon.
Judge J. Paul Oetken entered an order:

  -- All fact discovery shall be completed          Sept. 19, 2023
     no later than:

  -- Initial requests for production of             June 21, 2023
     documents shall be served by:

  -- All expert discovery, including expert         Nov. 3, 2023
     Depositions, shall be completed no
     later than:

Opopop is a company that manufactures and processes popcorn
products.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 19, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3IJHxnq at no extra charge.[CC]


POLARIS INDUSTRIES: Court Redacts Class Cert Documents in Berlanga
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Francisco Berlanga, et
al., v. Polaris Industries, Inc., et al., Case No.
2:21-cv-00949-KJM-DMC (E.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Kimberly J.
Mueller entered an order granting the Parties' renewed request to
redact, in part, two documents related to plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.

The Plaintiffs are directed to file the redacted documents on the
public docket at the time they file the motion for class
certification, the Court says.

Polaris is an American automotive manufacturer.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 19, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/43eIzA6 at no extra charge.[CC]


PRIMO GOLF LLC: Young Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Primo Golf LLC. The
case is styled as Leshawn Young, on behalf of herself and all other
persons similarly situated v. Primo Golf LLC, Case No.
1:23-cv-04584-JPC (S.D.N.Y., May 31, 2023).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Primo Golf -- https://primogolfapparel.com/ -- sells golf apparel
for the athletic golfer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: nyjg@aol.com
                 danalgottlieb@aol.com


R & B CORPORATION: Powers Files Suit in E.D. Virginia
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against R & B Corporation of
Virginia. The case is styled as Jason Powers, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. R & B Corporation of Virginia
doing business as: Credit Control Corporation, Case No.
4:23-cv-00068-JKW-RJK (E.D. Va., May 31, 2023).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

R & B Corporation of Virginia is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Matthew Sheldon, Esq.
          Lee Adair Floyd, Esq.
          BREIT BINIAZAN, PC
          2100 East Cary Street, Suite 310
          Richmond, VA 23223
          Phone: (757) 622-6000
          Fax: (757) 670-3939
          Email: justin@bbtrial.coms
                 lee@bbtrial.com

               - and -

          David Lietz, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          5335 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 440
          Washington, DC 20015
          Phone: (866) 252-0878
          Fax: (202) 744-1795
          Email: dlietz@milberg.com


R&B CORPORATION: Monson Files Suit in E.D. Virginia
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against R&B Corporation of
Virginia. The case is styled as Douglas Monson, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. R&B Corporation of
Virginia doing business as: Credit Control Corporation, Case No.
4:23-cv-00069-EWH-RJK (E.D. Va., June 1, 2023).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

R & B Corporation of Virginia is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Matthew Sheldon, Esq.
          Lee Adair Floyd, Esq.
          BREIT BINIAZAN, PC
          2100 East Cary Street, Suite 310
          Richmond, VA 23223
          Phone: (757) 622-6000
          Fax: (757) 670-3939
          Email: justin@bbtrial.coms
                 lee@bbtrial.com

               - and -

          Amanda Brooke Murphy, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW FIRM
          4116 Will Rogers Pkwy, Suite 700
          Oklahoma City, OK 73108
          Phone: (405) 389-4989
          Email: abm@murphylegalfirm.com


REALPAGE INC: Goldman Suit Removed to M.D. Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Jason Goldman, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. RealPage, Inc., BH Management
Services, LLC, Cortland Partners, LLC, Pinnacle Property Management
Services, LLC, Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC, Highmark
Residential, LLC, Independence Realty Trust, Inc., Lincoln Property
Co., Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc., Morgan Properties
Management Company, LLC, was removed to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Arizona on June 1 2023.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:23-cv-00552 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Anti-Trust.

RealPage -- https://www.realpage.com/ -- provides data analytics,
property management software, and services to efficiently manage
rental properties and real estate.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tricia R. Herzfeld, Esq.
          Anthony A. Orlandi, Esq.
          HERZFELD SUETHOLZ GASTEL LENISKI AND WALL, PLLC
          223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 300
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Phone: (615) 800-6225
          Email: tricia@hsglawgroup.com
                 tony@hsglawgroup.com

               - and -

          David R. Scott, Esq.
          Amanda Lawrence, Esq.
          Patrick McGahan, Esq.
          Michael Srodoski, Esq.
          G. Dustin Foster, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          156 South Main Street
          P.O. Box 192
          Colchester, CT 06145
          Phone: (860) 537-5537
          Facsimile: (860) 537-4432
          Email: david.scott@scott-scott.com
                 alawrence@scott-scott.com
                 pmcgahan@scott-scott.com
                 msrodoski@scott-scott.com
                 gfoster@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Patrick J. Coughlin, Esq.
          Carmen A. Medici, Esq.
          Fatima Brizuela, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 West Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 798-5325
          Facsimile: (619) 233-0508
          Email: pcoughlin@scott-scott.com
                 cmedici@scott-scott.com
                 fbrizuela@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Kristen Anderson, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          The Helmsley Building
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: (212) 223-6444
          Email: kanderson@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Thomas J. Undlin, Esq.
          Stacey Slaughter, Esq.
          Geoffrey H. Kozen, Esq.
          J. Austin Hurt, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2800
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Phone: (612) 349-8500
          Facsimile: (612) 339-4181
          Email: tundlin@robinskaplan.com
                 sslaughter@robinskaplan.com
                 gkozen@robinskaplan.com
                 ahurt@robinskaplan.com

               - and -

          Christian P. Levis, Esq.
          Vincent Briganti, Esq.
          Peter Demato, Esq.
          Radhika Gupta, Esq.
          LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
          44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Phone: (914) 997-0500
          Fax: (914) 997-0035
          Email: vbriganti@lowey.com
                 clevis@lowey.com
                 pdemato@lowey.com
                 rgupta@lowey.com

               - and -

          Christopher M. Burke, Esq.
          Walter W. Noss, Esq.
          Yifan (Kate) Lv, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY P.C.
          707 Broadway, Suite 1410
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 625-5621
          Fax: (314) 241-3525
          Email: cburke@koreintillery.com
                 wnoss@koreintillery.com
                 klv@koreintillery.com

               - and -

          Joseph R. Saveri, Esq.
          Steven N. Williams, Esq.
          Cadio Zirpoli, Esq.
          Kevin E. Rayhill, Esq.
          JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, LLP
          601 California Street, Suite 1000
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Phone: (415) 500-6800
          Email: jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com
                 swilliams@saverilawfirm.com
                 czirpoli@saverilawfirm.com
                 krayhill@saverilawfirm.com

               - and -

          Benjamin J. Widlanski, Esq.
          Javier A. Lopez, Esq.
          KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON LLP
          2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., 9th Floor
          Coral Gables, Florida 33134
          Phone: (305) 372-1800
          Email: bwidlanski@kttlaw.com
                 jal@kttlaw.com

               - and -

          Jennifer W. Sprengel, Esq.
          Daniel O. Herrera, Esq.
          Alexander Sweatman, Esq.
          CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL LLP
          135 S. LaSalle, Suite 3210
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Phone: 312-782-4880
          Fax: 312-782-4485
          Email: jsprengel@caffertyclobes.com
                 dherrera@caffertyclobes.com
                 asweatman@caffertyclobes.com


REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE: Fails to Protect Patients' Info, Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JANE DOE, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE ASSOCIATES OF
PHILADELPHIA, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 230502846 (Pa. Com. Pl.,
Philadelphia Cty., May 26, 2023) alleges claims for negligence,
invasion of privacy--intrusion upon seclusion, breach of implied
contract, unjust enrichment; breach of fiduciary duty, and
violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law and the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Control Act.

Despite willfully and intentionally incorporating tracking
technology, including the Meta Pixel and other tracking technology,
into its Website and servers. Reproductive Medicine Associates of
Philadelphia, P.C. (RMA) has never disclosed to Plaintiff or Class
Members that it shared their sensitive and confidential
communications and Private Information with third parties including
Facebook, and possibly Google, Microsoft, AppNexus, Hotjar,
Arttrk.com, Trade Desk, and others.

Allegedly, the Defendant breached its statutory and common law
obligations to Plaintiff and Class Members by, inter alia,: (i)
failing to adequately review its marketing programs and web based
technology to ensure the hospital Website was safe and secure; (ii)
failing to remove or disengage technology that was known and
designed to share web-users' information; (iii) aiding, agreeing,
and conspiring with third parties to intercept communications sent
and received by Plaintiff and Class Members; (iv) failing to obtain
the written consent of Plaintiff and Class Members to disclose
their Private Information to Facebook and others; (v) failing to
protect Private Information and take steps to block the
transmission of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information
through the use of Meta Pixel and other tracking technology; (vi)
failing to warn Plaintiff and Class Members; and (vii) otherwise
failing to design and monitor its Website to maintain the
confidentiality and integrity of patient Private Information.

RMA is a professional corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a principal place of
business at 625 Clark Avenue, Suite 17b, King of Prussia,
Pennsylvania 19406 in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and which
conducts business in Philadelphia County. RMA renders reproductive
medical care services throughout Pennsylvania, including in the
Philadelphia area, in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, Langhorne, and
in Abington, Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

            Elizabeth A. Bailey, Esq.
            SALTZ MONGELUZZI & BENDESKY P.C.
            52nd Floor 1650 Market Street
            Philadelphia, PA 19103
            Telephone: (215) 496-8282
            E-mail: ebailey@smbb.com

                        - and -

            Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
            Mary Kate Dugan, Esq.
            COHEN&MALAD, LLP
            One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
            Indianapolis, IN 46204
            Telephone: (317) 636-6481
            E-mail: ltoops@cohenandmalad.com
                         mdugan@cohenandmalad.com

                        - and -

              J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
              Andrew E. Mize, Esq.
              STRANCH, JENNINGS&GARVEY, PLLC
              The Freedom Center
              223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
              Nashville, TN 37203
              Telephone: (615) 254-8801
              Facsimile: (615) 255-5419
              E-mail: gstranch@stranchlaw.com
                            amize@stranchlaw.com

                        - and -

              Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
              Raina C. Borelli, Esq.
              TURKE & STRAUSS, LLP
              613 Williamson St., Suite 201
              Madison, WI 53703
              Telephone: (608) 237-1775
              Facsimile: (608) 509-4423
              E-mail: sam@turkestrauss.com
                            raina@turkestrauss.com

RHYMESAYERS ENTERTAINMENT: Cruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rhymesayers
Entertainment LLC. The case is styled as Alison Michele Cruz, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Rhymesayers
Entertainment LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-04606-JGK (S.D.N.Y., June 1,
2023).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Rhymesayers Entertainment -- http://www.rhymesayers.com/-- is an
American independent hip-hop record label based in
Minneapolis.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


RUST-OLEUM CORPORATION: Seeks to Stay Class Certification Briefing
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANTHONY BUSH, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. RUST-OLEUM
CORPORATION, Case No. 3:20-cv-03268-LB (N.D. Cal.), Rust-Oleum move
the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(A)
for an Order staying briefing and resolution of the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification pending resolution of its motion for
summary judgment as to the individual claims alleged by the
Plaintiff Bush, in his First Amended Complaint.


On May 12, 2023, Rust-Oleum filed its Motion for Summary Judgment,
seeking summary judgment on Bush's individual claims. By this
Motion, Rust-Oleum asserts that it is entitled to judgment on the
UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims because the undisputed facts demonstrate
that Bush’s definition of the terms "Non-Toxic" and "Earth
Friendly" is atypical and without evidentiary support, especially
given the qualifying language included on the same label conveying
those terms. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that Bush has no
evidence demonstrating how a reasonable consumer interprets the
terms "Non-Toxic" and "Earth Friendly, " Bush cannot demonstrate
that a reasonable consumer would
interpret the terms like him. Rust-Oleum is separately entitled to
judgment on each claim Bush's alleges in his First Amended
Complaint premised on the term "Earth Friendly" because the term
constitutes non-actionable puffery, as a matter of law, and Bush's
own definition of the term is inconsistent with his theory of
deception when viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable
consumer.

Rust-Oleum is a manufacturer of protective paints and coatings for
home and industrial use.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated May 22, 2023, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/42jIYQA at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Karen M. Sullivan, Esq.
          MANNING GROSS + MASSENBUEG LLP
          400 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 1450
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 892-4700
          Facsimile: (949) 892-4701
          E-mail: ksullivan@mgmlaw.com

                - and -

          Anthony J. Monaco, Esq.
          P. Stephen Fardy, Esq.
          William D. Patterson, Esq.
          Bryan E. Rogers, Esq.
          Madison C. Shepley, Esq.
          SWANSON, MARTIN & BELL, LLP
          330 N. Wabash, Suite 3300
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Telephone: (312) 321-9100
          Facsimile: (312) 321-0990
          E-mail: amonaco@smbtrials.com
                  sfardy@smbtrials.com
                  wpatterson@smbtrials.com
                  berogers@smbtrials.com
                  mshepley@smbtrials.com

SHOPIFY INC: My Choice Suit Removed to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as My Choice Software, LLC, a California limited
liability company, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. SHOPIFY, INC., a Canadian Corporation;
SHOPIFY (USA) INC., a Delaware Corporation; TASKUS, INC. a Delaware
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
CGC-22-601842 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California, San Francisco County, to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California on May 31, 2023, and
assigned Case No. 4:23-cv-02687-DMR.

The Complaint alleges claims for: negligence; breach of contract;
breach of implied contract; breach of confidence; unfair and
unlawful business practices; violation of the California Consumers
Legal Remedies Act; deceit by concealment; and violation of the
California Consumer Records Act.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Moez M. Kaba, Esq.
          Allison L. Libeu, Esq.
          Sourabh Mishra, Esq.
          HUESTON HENNIGAN LLP
          523 West 6th Street, Suite 400
          Los Angeles, CA 90014
          Phone: (213) 788-4340
          Facsimile: (888) 775-0898
          Email: mkaba@hueston.com
                 alibeu@hueston.com
                 smishra@hueston.com


SKYWEST AIRLINES: Court Partly OK's Horowitz Class Cert Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GREGORY HOROWITZ, v.
SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., Case No. 3:21-cv-04674-MMC (N.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Maxine M. Chesney entered an order denying motion for
class certification as to the following six claims:

  -- "Failure to Pay Minimum Wages" (Third Cause of Action);

  -- "Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods" (Fourth Cause of
      Action);

  -- "Failure to Reimburse Expenses" (Fifth Cause of Action);

  -- "Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements" (Sixth Cause of

      Action);

  -- "Failure to Timely Pay Wages Due at Separation" (Seventh Cause
of
     Action); and

  -- "Violation of the Unfair Competition Law" (Eighth Cause of
     Action).

The Court granted in part and denied in part SkyWest's Motion for
Summary Adjudication and, in so ruling, has granted judgment in
favor of SkyWest on the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action,
as well as on the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action,
except to the extent said last three claims were based on the First
Cause of Action, namely, "Failure to Pay Minimum Wages," as to
which Horowitz has not sought to proceed on behalf of a class.

SkyWest Airlines is an American regional airline headquartered in
St. George, Utah.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3OZb14Y at no extra charge.[CC]

SOLGEN POWER: Faces Class Suit Over Noncompetition Agreements
-------------------------------------------------------------
Laurence A. Shapero, Adam T. Pankratz, Zachary V. Zagger in
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. of The National Law
Review report that a putative class action recently filed in
Seattle, Washington, against a solar energy equipment company could
be the first lawsuit to test the bounds of the state's relatively
new restrictions on noncompetition agreements for lower-wage
employees.

The lawsuit, filed on May 19, 2023, in King County Superior Court,
alleged the company violated the law by requiring employees to sign
agreements that prohibited them from taking a second job or working
for a competitor after leaving the company. But the suit not only
seeks to stop the enforceability of the agreements but statutory
damages as well, meaning the result could have major implications
for employers in the state.

Quick Hits

A recently filed putative class action could be the first to test
Washington's 2020 noncompte agreement restrictions.

The suit highlights concerns for employers regarding potentially
overly broad noncompetition agreements.

Saraceno-Oliveri v. Solgen Power LLC

The putative class action against Solgen Power LLC alleges that
Solgen required one of its employees, Ethan Saraceno-Oliveri, and
other employees to sign noncompete agreements even though they were
paid substantially less than the minimum thresholds under
Washington's 2020 noncompete law.

According to the allegations in the complaint, the company's
noncompetition agreements prevented employees from working for
competing companies for two years following their discharge. The
agreements also prevented employees from seeking outside
employment, or moonlighting, even though they earned less than the
income thresholds for such an agreement under state law.

The complaint alleged that the "noncompetition covenants
unreasonably restrict[ed]" class members' "ability to work," and
were required as a condition of employment and without independent
consideration. The lawsuit seeks a declaration that the agreements
violate state law and are void and unenforceable, a permanent
injunction blocking the employer from enforcing such agreements,
and an award of "actual damages and/or statutory penalties" in
addition to attorneys' fees and costs.

Noncompetes in Washington

Prior to 2020, Washington noncompetition agreements were generally
enforceable under Washington law if they were "no broader than
necessary to protect an employer's legitimate protectable
interests." That language was generally understood by Washington
courts to mean noncompetition covenants are enforceable if
necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition, for
example, in connection with potential theft of trade secrets or
employer/customer relationships that were developed or expanded by
the employee for the benefit of the employer.

However, under a Washington law passed in 2019, which took effect
on January 1, 2020, noncompetition agreements can be enforced only
against employees who earn $100,000 or more based on an employee's
income reported in Box 1 of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form W-2
and independent contractors earning more than $250,000 as reported
on a Form 1099. Each minimum compensation threshold is adjusted
annually for inflation. (The current thresholds for 2023 are
$116,593.18 for employees and $291,482.95 for independent
contractors.)

Notably, an employer may violate Washington law for any attempt to
enforce a pre-2020 covenant or any attempt to require the employee
to enter into an improper noncompetition provision after January 1,
2020. An employer may be considered to have violated the law even
if the employee refuses to sign, or if the employer declines to
enforce the agreement, a violation would take place when the
employer improperly asks the employee to enter into the agreement.

Further, distinct from the noncompetition aspects of the 2020 law,
the law prohibits employers from restricting employees who earn
less than twice the applicable state minimum wage from seeking
outside employment unless the employer can show that the outside
employer raises safety concerns or interferes with reasonable
scheduling expectations. The law further is not meant to alter the
common law duty of loyalty to an employer.

Next Steps

The new putative class action is one of the first to test
Washington's relatively new restrictions on class actions, which
could have major implications for employers. It remains to be seen
whether the fact or legal allegations in the complaint will
withstand scrutiny, but the fact of the filing serves to highlight
the risk faced by employers in Washington. Notably, the noncompete
law opens the door to potential damages of effectively a minimum of
$5,000 per person who is asked to sign or who does sign an
unenforceable agreement, plus attorneys' fees and costs.

Still, the Washington law does not ban such agreements in all
contexts, and properly drafted and applied agreements may still be
enforceable. Further, the limits do not apply to other common
employment agreements, including confidentiality agreements,
agreements prohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets, and certain
narrow types of nonsolicitation agreements.

Employers in Washington may want to review their use of
noncompetition agreements and the types of covenants they include
in employment agreements to ensure that they are enforceable and do
not open them up to potential liability including potential class
action litigation.

Ogletree Deakins will continue to monitor developments will provide
updates on the Washington and Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets
blogs as additional information becomes available. Important
information for employers is also available via the firm's webinar
and podcast programs. [GN]

STATE FARM: July 28 Extension to File Class Cert Sought in Ellis
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANDREA ELLIS, individually
and on Behalf of all those similarly situated, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Case No.
6:22-cv-01005-RBD-DCI (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order granting unopposed motion for extension of time to
file motion for class certification.

  -- The Plaintiff requests until and including July 28, 2023, to
file
     her motion for class certification.

Counsel for both parties conferred on May 23, 2023, and the
Defendant is unopposed to the relief requested in this Motion and
has cooperatively agreed to the date proposed.

However, to finish the necessary discovery and document production,
the Parties need a modest extension of the class certification
deadlines. As such, the Parties request a 60-day extension on the
deadlines for class certification briefing, which would make July
28, 2023, the new deadline for filing a motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiff, Andrea Ellis, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(b)(4), respectfully requests an extension of time to
file her Motion for Class Certification.

On February 22, 2022, the Court entered an Amended Case Management
and Scheduling Order, setting the class certification deadline for
May 29, 2023, and a trial term beginning on October 7, 2024. the
Plaintiff requests an extension of time for the class certification
deadline, up to and including July 28, 2023.

State Farm offers vehicle, auto, accident, homeowners, condo
owners, renters, life and annuities, fire and casualty, health,
disability, flood, and business.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 23, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/43Luxpu at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jacob L. Phillips, Esq.
          Edmund A. Normand, Esq.
          Amy L. Judkins, Esq.
          Joshua R. Jacobson, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          Orlando, FL 32814-0036
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: ed@ednormand.com
                  jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com
                  amy.judkins@normandpllc.com
                  jjacobson@normandpllc.com
                  ean@normandpllc.com

                - and -

          Hank Bates, III, Esq.
          Lee Lowther, Esq.
          CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC
          519 W. 7th St.
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 312-8500
          Facsimile: (501) 312-8505
          E-mail: hbates@cbplaw.com
                  llowther@cbplaw.com

SUJA LIFE: Bid to Dismiss OK'd; Lumbra Suit Tossed With Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RACHEL LUMBRA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SUJA LIFE, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:22-CV-893 (MAD/DJS) (N.D.N.Y.), Judge Mae A. D'Agostino
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
grants the Defendant's motion seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff's
complaint.

On Aug. 28, 2022, Lumbra commenced the putative class action
against the Defendant asserting violations of state and federal
consumer protection laws. The Plaintiff brings claims under New
York General Business Law Sections 349 and 350, the Magnuson Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 2301, et seq., and several
unspecified consumer fraud statutes of the states of Nevada,
Wyoming, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alaska, Montana, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and West Virginia. The Plaintiff also asserts claims for
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment under New
York common law.

On Jan. 24, 2023, following a pre-motion conference, the Defendant
filed the instant motion seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff's
complaint. The Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendant has filed
a reply.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is a limited liability
company incorporated in the State of Delaware with a principal
place of business in San Diego, California. It is an award-winning
seller and manufacturer of organic fruit and vegetable beverages,
including apple and beet blends under its "Suja" brand. These juice
beverages are represented as "Cold Pressed," which refers to a
process of extracting juice from fruits and vegetables.

Importantly, after the Suja juice is "cold-pressed," it is
subjected to "cold pressure," also described as "high pressure
processing" ("HPP") -- a non-thermal treatment method used to
preserve juice for up to 60 days. The Defendant's product contains
a small "High Pressure Certified" seal on the front label at the
bottom of the bottle. The small front seal purportedly references
the HPP treatment. On the back of the bottle, there is a label
containing a brief description about this "cold pressure"
treatment, followed by a website address with more information.

Aside from the small front seal and the back label description,
there is no explanation as to what HPP or "cold pressure"
processing means. The Defendant's product is "often sold in produce
aisles where groceries are sold, in proximity to juices made at
those stores, which have not been subject to any treatment beyond
being cold-pressed. The product is sold at a premium price,
approximately no less than $3.99 per 12 FL OZ, excluding tax and
sales, which is higher than similar products.

The Plaintiff is a New York resident who has purchased the
Defendant's Suja cold-pressed juices at stores in Albany and
Colonie, New York. She believed that the Defendant's juice was not
processed after being cold-pressed. Her complaint contains the
following allegation: "Where juice has not been subject to
treatment beyond being extracted, terms used include 'fresh
squeezed,' 'fresh pressed,' and 'cold-pressed.'" She asserts that,
without any prominent or clear disclaimers of additional processing
steps, consumers expect products described as "Cold-Pressed" to be
"fresh," but that the Defendant's product is not fresh and has more
in common with juices sold in standard refrigerator cases because
it is highly processed after being cold-pressed.

The Plaintiff alleges that the small High Pressure Certified seal
is "vague" and located at the bottom of the bottle, where consumers
are unlikely to notice it and have no idea what it refers to. She
contends that given that all juices are made by applying pressure,
even if consumers notice this seal, they will believe it refers to
the cold-pressing. She alleges that juice subjected to non-thermal
HPP processing is no longer fresh, and it is misleading to describe
such a juice as 'cold-pressed' without an equivalent and
conspicuous disclosure of this processing step.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims fail because she
has not pleaded a material misrepresentation. It requests that the
Court takes judicial notice of the United States Food and Drug
Administration's ("FDA") public service announcement ("PSA")
regarding juice safety, which generally informs consumers about
risks associated with untreated or unprocessed juice and about
juice treatments, including pasteurization and non-thermal
processes. The Defendant asserts that courts both in New York and
across the country have resoundingly rejected the exact theory that
the Plaintiff advances.

In opposition, the Plaintiff argues that under Sections 349 and 350
"technically true statements are actionable" where they have the
capacity to mislead reasonable consumers. She argues further that
the Defendant's reliance on past rulings disregards that reasonable
consumers should not be expected to look beyond misleading
representations on the front of the box to discover the truth.

Judge D'Agostino finds that the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
allege that the Defendant's product is materially misleading. As an
initial matter, it is notable that the parties do not dispute that
the Defendant's juices are "cold pressed" -- a factually accurate
statement. Thus, the Plaintiff's claim hinges on context, the
objective reasonableness of a consumer in circumstances alleged in
the complaint, and common sense.

The Plaintiff's allegation that "all juices are made by applying
pressure" is plainly inconsistent with common sense. Contrary to
the Plaintiff's assertion, the front seal and the back label
explanation also inform consumers that the Defendant's juice
underwent subsequent processing.

Judge D'Agostino takes judicial notice of the FDA's juice safety
PSA, as is permissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), to
the extent that it contains facts that are not subject to
reasonable dispute. She says most germane to the case is the fact
that most of the juice sold in the United States is either
pasteurized (heat-treated) to kill bacteria or treated by non-heat
processes for the same purpose. Additionally, it is widely known
that unprocessed juices sold in grocery stores are required to
contain warning labels informing consumers of harmful bacteria
risks.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible cause of
action under N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. Sections 349 and 350.

Turning to the breach of warranty (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act),
Judge D'Agostino finds that the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
allege either an express or an implied breach of warranty claim.
First, the Plaintiff's express warranty claim fails because she
failed to provide the Defendant timely notice prior to commencing
suit. Second, the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege an
implied breach of warranty claim because there is no allegation
that Defendant's juice beverage was unfit for the ordinary purposes
(i.e., human consumption). Because the Plaintiff's warranty claims
are insufficiently pleaded under state law, there can be no
plausible claim under the MMWA.

With respect to the Plaintiff's fraud claim, Judge D'Agostino finds
that the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a reasonable
reliance, a materially false representation, or an intention to
defraud. As discussed previously, there are no plausible
allegations of a materially false representation relative to the
Defendant's product; it follows that the Plaintiff has failed to
plausibly allege reasonable reliance. As such, the Plaintiff has
failed to plausibly allege a claim for fraud.

The Plaintiff has also failed to state a plausible claim for unjust
enrichment. Judge D'Agostino finds that in reference to the unjust
enrichment claim, the complaint alleges only that the Defendant
obtained benefits and monies because the Product was not as
represented and expected, to the detriment and impoverishment of
the Plaintiff and the class members, who seek restitution and
disgorgement of inequitably obtained profits. In her opposition,
the Plaintiff acknowledges that this claim may be 'duplicative' of
the GBL claims. Because this claim is based on the same allegations
as the Plaintiff's common law and statutory claims, it is indeed
duplicative, and thus cannot be maintained.

Finally, the Plaintiff's complaint contains vague references to
"Consumer Fraud Acts of the States in the Consumer Fraud
Multi-State Class." The Plaintiff provides virtually no substantive
opposition to the Defendant's motion in this regard other than
stating that she has standing to bring this proposed class action,
making it appropriate to defer consideration of standing until the
class certification stage. Because there are no viable claims
otherwise alleged, Judge D'Agostino holds that the Plaintiff cannot
be an appropriate class representative, and thus the complaint must
be dismissed in this regard.

For the stated reasons, Judge D'Agostino grants the Defendant's
motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaint with prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court will enter judgment in the Defendant's
favor, close the case, and serve a copy of the Memorandum-Decision
and Order upon all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 26, 2023 Memorandum-Decision &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdh4btzc from
Leagle.com.

SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C., SPENCER SHEEHAN, ESQ. --
spencer@spencersheehan.com -- ANGELE AARON, ESQ., KATHERINE LALOR,
ESQ., Great Neck, New York, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs.

AMIN TALATI WASSERMAN, LLP, MATTHEW R. ORR, ESQ. --
matt@amintalati.com -- WILLIAM P. COLE, ESQ. --
william@amintalati.com -- Los Angeles, California, Attorneys for
the Defendant.

COLLINS GANN McCLOSKEY & BARRY PLLC, RICHARD D. COLLINS, ESQ.,
Mineola, New York, Attorneys for the Defendant.


TMX FINANCE: Trottier Seeks to Suspend Class Cert Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPH TROTTIER, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, v. TMX FINANCE
CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., Case No. 4:23-cv-00083-RSB-CLR (S.D.
Ga.), the Plaintiff moves the Court to suspend or toll the deadline
for filing a motion for class certification.

The Plaintiff filed this Class Action Complaint on April 5, 2023.
Pursuant to Local Rule 23.2 for the Southern District of Georgia,
the Plaintiff is required to file his Motion for Class
Certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 no later
than "90 days after the filing of a complaint in a class action. "
Here, the current deadline is Tuesday, July 4, 2023. The parties
have moved to consolidate 21 related actions filed as recently as
May 22, 2023.

Additionally, for the Plaintiff to properly advance a motion for
class certification and comply with the legal requirements of Rule
23 and relevant case law, the Plaintiff needs additional time to
propound, receive, and review discovery responses and documents
from the Defendants, conduct depositions, and prepare motions and
memoranda, including expert reports.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 22, 2023, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3MJKyoY at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Tate, Esq.
          Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR
          KANE CONWAY & WISE, LLP
          235 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 400
          Atlanta, GA 30303
          Telephone: (404) 282-4806
          E-mail: atate@peifferwolf.com
                  bwise@peifferwolf.com

TRACY GUERIN: Wins Summary Judgment v. Fowler
----------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICKEY FOWLER, et al., v.
TRACY GUERIN, Director of the Washington State Department of
Retirement Systems, Case No. 3:15-cv-05367-BHS (W.D. Wash.), the
Hon. Judge Benjamin h. Settle entered an order that the granting
Director's motion for summary judgment on her limitations period
defense:

  -- The case is dismissed with prejudice.

  -- The motion to vacate the Court's prior rulings is denied.

  -- Fowler's motion for summary judgment on the Director's
     limitations period affirmative defense is denied.

  -- The Clerk shall enter a judgment and close the case.

The Director’s arguments to the state courts were not false
assurances and, even if they were, they could not, and did not,
dissuade or otherwise hinder Fowler from timely asserting here a
Fifth Amendment per se takings claim based on an event that by
definition occurred before January 2002. Fowler has not established
that the limitations
period should be equitably tolled, and his claim in this Court is
not timely, the Court says.

The dispute involves a class of Washington State teachers asserting
that the DRS unlawfully failed to pay them daily interest on their
retirement account balances when they transferred from TRS Plan 22
to TRS Plan 3, prior to January 20, 2002. Fowler contends that most
class members transferred in 1996–1997.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 19, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/43ygqnC at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED DEBT: Miller Seeks to Certify Class and Subclasses
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Angel Miller, and Steven
Vanness, et al. v. United Debt Settlement, LLC, et al., Case No.
2:22-cv-02210-SDM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order certifying the class for class action treatment in
accordance with Civ.R. 23 and applicable case law:

   "Ohio citizens on the prescreened lists the Defendants obtained,
either directly or through and agent, and/or used from May 1, 2017,
to the present for marketing debt relief services."

The Plaintiffs also identify the following sub-classes:

   a. Ohio Citizens who received the mailer with the template
attached
      as Exhibit A from May 1, 2017, to the present, and who, after

      responding to the mailer by calling the telephone number on
the
      mailer, were bait and switched from a loan offer to a debt
      settlement program sales pitch.

   b. Ohio Citizens who received the mailer template attached as
      Exhibit A or B from May 1, 2017, to the present, and who,
after
      responding to the mailer by calling the telephone number on
the
      mailer, were then convinced under false pretense to authorize
a
      credit inquiry by United, only to have their consumer report

      accessed for a "Credit Transaction" by Elite Restaurant.

   c. Ohio Citizens who received the mailer template attached as
      Exhibit A or B from May 2, 2017, to the present, and who then

      called United in response to the mailer because they were
      deceived by the false and deceptive representations on the
face
      of the mailers.

On November 17, 2022, the Plaintiffs obtained Default Judgment
against the Defendants. On January 17, 2023, the Plaintiffs
obtained Default Judgment against the Defendant Gorelik pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The Plaintiffs have not yet filed a Motion
for Default Judgment against UDS, Everything and Gorelik because a
Class must be Certified before moving for Default Judgment against
the Defendants on behalf of the entire Class.

The case involves the illegal use of and access to the private
financial data in the consumer reports of likely tens of thousands
of financially distressed consumers. The information was accessed
for the illegal purpose of marketing debt settlement and/or
consolidation services. The Defendants obtained lists of consumer
data, lists referred to as "pre-screened lists, " including the
Plaintiffs'. The Defendants used the lists to market debt
settlement services. The pre-screened lists at issue are compiled
by a consumer reporting agency using filters including a base level
of unsecured debt balances, a minimum level of unsecured trade
lines, and various other filters bearing on a consumer's credit
worthiness. The pre-screened lists constitute consumer reports that
may only be accessed and used for a permissible purpose.

All named Defendants engaged in a scheme to obtain and use
protected consumer reporting data to market debt settlement and
credit repair services via mailers directed to Plaintiff Miller
Vanness in the State of Ohio. To that end, United, through an
authorized agent, compiled or direct an agent to compile a
"pre-screened list" containing the names and addresses of consumers
in financial distress.

United Debt offers debt relief services.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated May 22, 2023, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3IUmSgE at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brian M. Garvine, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF BRIAN M. GARVINE, LLC
          5 East Long Street, Suite 1100
          Columbus, OH 43215
          E-mail: brian@garvinelaw.com

                - and -

          Jeremiah E. Heck, Esq.
          LUFTMAN HECK & ASSOCIATES, LLP
          6253 Riverside Drive, Suite 200
          Dublin, OH 43017
          E-mail: jheck@lawLH.com

VERTEX ENERGY: Levson Sues Over Misleading Statements
-----------------------------------------------------
PHIL LEVSON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. VERTEX ENERGY, INC., BENJAMIN P. COWART, and
CHRIS CARLSON, Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-00197-KD-M (S.D. Ala.,
May 26, 2023) arises out of the Defendants' violations of the
federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.

This is a federal securities class action on behalf of all persons
who purchased or otherwise acquired Vertex securities between April
1, 2022 and August 8, 2022, inclusive (class period), seeking to
recover damages caused by Defendants' violations. Throughout the
Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading
statements regarding the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that, among other things,
prior to the acquisition of the Mobile refinery, Defendants had
entered into inventory and crack spread hedging derivatives that
significantly capped the profit margins on 50% of the Mobile
refinery's expected output over the period April 1, 2022 to
September 30, 2022, affecting over 6.5 million barrels of refined
fuel output. These hedges severely limited Vertex's ability to
capitalize on the record-high crack spreads that existed at the
time of the acquisition and resulted in over $90 million in losses
in the second quarter of fiscal year 2022, says the suit.

Vertex is an energy company focused on the production and
distribution of conventional and alternative fuels. Its primary
operations are located in Mobile, Alabama, where it owns and
operates a 91,000 barrel-per-day refinery, and engages in the
supply, marketing, and trading of feedstocks and products to
support the Company's operations. Its common stock trades in an
efficient market on the NASDAQ Stock Market under ticker symbol
VTNR.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           James B. Eubank, Esq.
           Wilson Daniel "Dee" Miles, III, Esq.
           218 Commerce Street
           Montgomery, AL 36104
           Telephone: 334-269-2343
           E-mail: James.Eubank@BeasleyAllen.com
                   Dee.Miles@BeasleyAllen.com

                   - and -

           Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
           J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
           POMERANTZ LLP
           600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
           New York, NY 10016
           Telephone: (212) 661-1100
           Facsimile: (917) 463-1044
           E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                   ahood@pomlaw.com

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Leggett Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA LEGGETT, individually and for others similarly situated v.
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CORPORATION, 2:23-cv-00882-MJH
(W.D. Pa., May 26, 2023) arises out of the Defendant's violations
of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act and the Pennsylvania Wage
Payment and Collection Law.

Plaintiff Leggett has worked for WVUM as a financial access
registration associate at West Virginia University Medical (WUVM)
Corporation's facility in Uniontown, PA since approximately July
2022. Throughout his employment, WVUM classified Leggett as
non-exempt and paid him on an hourly basis. He is also subjected
WUVM's common practice of automatically deducting 30 minutes a day
from his recorded work time for so-called "meal breaks." Moreover,
Leggett claims that WVUM's auto-deduction policy violates PMWA and
WPCL by depriving him of wages, including overtime pay, for all
hours worked, including those worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek. In addition, he also claims that WVUM failed include
shift differentials and bonuses in calculating his regular rates of
pay for overtime purposes.

WVUM bills itself as West Virginia's largest health system and
largest private employer. It is comprised of 20 hospitals across
West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Maryland. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

             Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
             Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
             JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP
             11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
             Houston, TX 77046
             Telephone: (713) 352-1100
             Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
             E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                     adunlap@mybackwages.com

                     - and -
             
             Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
             BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
             11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
             Houston, TX 77046
             Telephone: (713) 877-8788
             E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

                     - and -

             William C. (Clif) Alexander, Esq.
             Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
             ANDERSON ALEXANDER PLLC
             101 N. Shoreline Blvd., Suite 610
             Corpus Christi, TX 78401
             Telephone: (361) 452-1279
             Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
             E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                     austin@a2xlaw.com

                     - and -

             Joshua P. Geist, Esq.
             GOODRICH & GEIST PC
             3634 California Ave.
             Pittsburgh, PA 15212
             Telephone: (412) 766-1455
             Facsmile: (412) 766-0300
             E-mail: josh@goodrichandgeist.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2023. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***