/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/230215.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, February 15, 2023, Vol. 25, No. 34

                            Headlines

2192 NIAGARA: Responses on Bid to Certify Class Due Feb. 16
ACUITY BRANDS: Fails to Secure Employees' Info, Smith Suit Says
ALLIED WASTE: Cross Must File Class Certification Bid by Feb. 17
APPLE INC: Faces Abad Suit for Invasion of Customers' Privacy
APPLE INC: Robinson Sues Over Illegal Tracking of Personal Data

ASTORIA44 LLC: Fails to Pay Construction Workers' OT Under FLSA
ASTRAZENECA UK: Sciannella Suit Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duty
AUDIBLE INC: Seeks Leave to File Certain Exhibits Under Seal
BED BATH: Faces Bowser Suit Over Failure to Timely Pay Wages
BLEACHER REPORT: Discloses Subscribers' Info to FB, Sellers Alleges

BLOOMBERG LP: 2nd Cir. Certifies State Law Question in Syeed Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in Herbert Suit Granted
BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in St. Ann Suit Granted
BP EXPLORATION: Bid to Exclude Testimony of Johnson's Expert OK'd
BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Gomes Suit

BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Mann Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in McCray Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Stallworth Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Testimony of Edwards' Expert
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Testimony of Stewart's Expert

BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Testimony of Williams' Expert
BREADBERRY INC: Calderon Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
CLUB 360: Amended Bid for Class Cert. Denied w/o Prejudice
COMMUNITY CARE: Beh Bid for Class Status Granted in Part
DOTDASH MEREDITH: Discloses Info to Facebook, Harris-Shields Says

DOUGLASTON GRIMALDI: Faces De Gante Arce Wage-and-Hour Suit in N.Y.
DUMBO MOVING: Brkic Appeals Arbitration Ruling to 2nd Circuit
EIGER BIOPHARMACEUTICAL: Case Mgmt. Conference Cont'd to Feb. 16
ENVIVA INC: Fanucchi Named Lead Plaintiff in Fagen Securities Suit
ENVOLVE CLIENT: Partial Bid to Dismiss Alvarado FLSA Suit Denied

ESSEX COUNTY, MA: Bid to Certify Class in Lucero v. ECCF Denied
ESSEX COUNTY, NJ: Greene Seeks Correctional Officers' Unpaid OT
FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Extension of Class Cert. Deadlines Sought
GITHUB INC: Seeks Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint
GREATBANC TRUST: Court Refuses to Dismiss Laidig ERISA Class Suit

GRIDSUM HOLDING: Barth Seeks Extension of Briefing Schedule
GVG CAPITAL: Bid to Strike Eagle Class Claims Denied W/o Prejudice
GVG CAPITAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Eagle TCPA Class Suit
HADCO METAL: Perkins Labor and FCRA Suit Removed to N.D. Cal.
HELLA BITTER: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

HI.Q INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Quiles Suit; Proceedings Stayed
HOLIDAY DIVER: Garcia Sues Over Unsolicited Text Message Ads
HORNELL BREWING: Bid to Remand Brunts Suit to State Court Denied
INTEGRATIVE PSYCHIATRY: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JEFFERSON CAPITAL: Hernandez Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Kentucky

JETBLUE AIRWAYS: Buehler Sues Over Anticompetitive Arrangement
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Carroll Sues Over Secret Reporting of Data
JOHNSON HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss Prince Complaint Granted in Part
KEY BANK: Bozin Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
KINDER MORGAN: Oates Seeks OT Pay for Day Rate Inspectors

KNOX COLLEGE INCORPORATED: Mosley Files Suit in C.D. Illinois
KW CALIFORNIA: Hernandez Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
L BRANDS: $2.75MM Class Settlement in Allison Wins Final Approval
LA DOWNTOWN BROOKLYN: Blackman Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
LG ENERGY: Court Dismisses Charlton's First Amended Complaint

LIGHTOPIA LLC: Jackson Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LOCUST AVENUE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Blanco Suit Claims
LUNYA COMPANY: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MARLBORO DIAMOND: Lopez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MARS INC: Dark Chocolate Contains Lead & Cadmium, Cooper Alleges

MATTERPORT INC: Court Won't Allow Lynch to File 2nd Amended Suit
MDL 3056: Three Customer Data Security Suits Transferred to N.D. Ga
MINGLES EXPRESS: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages Under FLSA
MUTHANA INC: Fails to Pay Cooks' OT Wages, Maldonado Suit Says
NEW YORK: Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Heidel v. Governor

NISSAN NORTH: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Hagenbaugh Suit Granted
NNJ RESTAURANT: Fails to Pay Tipped Workers' OT Wages, Mendez Says
OLIPHANT FINANCIAL: Denial of Arbitration in Fleming Suit Affirmed
OUR HOUSE HOSPITALITY: Borwn Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
P3 PROJECTS: Faces Alvarez Suit Over Carpenters' Unpaid Wages

PARK 100: Fails to Provide Proper Overtime Wages, Barber Claims
RAINBOW CHILD: Ramnarine Awarded $153K in Attys.' Fees and Costs
RYVYL INC: Cullen Sues Over Misleading Registration Statements
SAFE BOX: Gilmore's Bid for Responses and Doc Production Denied
SHARP HEALTHCARE: Court Consolidates Cousin and Camus Class Suits

SHELL LAKE: $155K Class Settlement in Coetzee Suit Wins Prelim. Nod
ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL: Court Grants Hudson Leave to Amend Complaint
STATE FARM: Interim Class Co-Counsel Appointed in Schwartz Suit
STAVATTI AEROSPACE: Dimitrov Files Suit in D. Arizona
TIKTOK INC: Bogard Sues Over Harmful Contents on Video Platforms

UCOR LLC: Speer, et al., File Bid for Class Certification
UMASS MEMORIAL: Brooks Discrimination Suit Removed to D. Mass.
UNITED RENTALS: Standridge Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
UNITED STATES: $185M Attys.' Fees Award in Health Republic Vacated
VERYABLE LLC: Fails to Pay Employees' OT Wages, Slater Suit Says

WAKEMED: 4th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Elrod's Amended Class Suit
WATERWIPES USA: Vences Sues Over Deceptive Biodegradable Wipes
WHELE LLC: Faces Nelson Suit Over Defective Electric Heating Pads
Y-MABS THERAPEUTICS: Court Sets April 18 Hearing in Corwin Suit

                            *********

2192 NIAGARA: Responses on Bid to Certify Class Due Feb. 16
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Davis, et al,. v. 2192
Niagara Street, LLC, et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00429 (W.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge Leslie G. Foschio entered an order on motion to certify
class.

   -- Responses due by Feb. 16, 2023.

   -- Replies due by Feb. 27, 2023.

   -- Sur-replies, if any, due by March 6, 2023.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.[CC]


ACUITY BRANDS: Fails to Secure Employees' Info, Smith Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREW SMITH and MACKENZIE FAIRFIELD, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. ACUITY BRANDS, INC., Case No.
1:23-cv-00392-MHC (N.D. Ga., Jan. 25, 2023) alleges that the
Defendant failed to properly secure and safeguard the personally
identifiable information (PII) that it collected and maintained as
part of its regular business practices, including, names, Social
Security numbers, driver's license numbers, financial account
numbers, and information related to employees' healthcare
benefits.

On December 7, 2021, the Defendant became aware of suspicious
activity on its networks. Defendant proceeded to investigate and
subsequently concluded that "an unauthorized person obtained access
to some of Acuity's systems on December 7 and December 8, 2021,
and copied a subset of files out of its network during that time.
As a further result of investigation into the Data Breach detected
on December 7, 2021, Acuity also uncovered "an unrelated incident
of unauthorized access that occurred on October 6 and October 7,
2020, which included an attempt to copy certain files out of its
network."

The Defendant's investigation concluded that the PII compromised in
the Data Breach included the Plaintiffs' and approximately 37,000
other individuals' information. After learning of the Data Breach,
the Defendant waited nearly an entire year (from December 7, 2021,
to December 5, 2022) to notify the Plaintiffs and Class Members of
the Data Breach and/or inform them that their PII was compromised,
says the suit.

Accordingly, current and former Acuity employees are required to
entrust the Defendant with sensitive, non-public PII in order to
obtain employment or certain employment benefits at the Defendant.
The Defendant retains this information for at least many years and
even after the employee-employer relationship has ended, the sui
asserts.

Mr. Smith and Ms. Fairfield provided their PIIs to Defendant on the
condition that it be maintained as confidential and with the
understanding that the Defendant would employ reasonable safeguards
to protect their PIIs.

Acuity Brands is an industrial lighting and building management
solutions provider.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          MaryBeth V. Gibson, Esq.
          N. Nickolas Jackson, Esq.
          THE FINLEY FIRM, P.C.
          3535 Piedmont Road
          Building 14, Suite 230
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Telephone: (404) 320-9979
          Facsimile: (404) 320-9978
          E-mail: mgibson@thefinleyfirm.com
                  njackson@thefinleyfirm.com

                - and -

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          David K. Lietz, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC
          227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (866) 252-0878
          E-mail: gklinger@milberg.com
                  dlietz@milberg.com

ALLIED WASTE: Cross Must File Class Certification Bid by Feb. 17
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KEILA CROSS, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. ALLIED WASTE SERVICES
OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, D/B/A REPUBLIC SERVICES, Case No.
9:21-cv-00145-SEH (D. Mont.), the Hon. Judge Sam E. Haddon entered
an order:

   1. If Cross seeks class certification, she shall file an
      appropriate motion for class certification and a support
      brief on or before Feb. 17, 2023.

   2. Republic shall have to and including March 3, 2023, in
      which to file a response brief in opposition to the Cross
      will be due on or before March 10, 2023.

Allied Waste provides non-hazardous solid waste management
services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan 26, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JPQDAH at no extra charge.[CC]


APPLE INC: Faces Abad Suit for Invasion of Customers' Privacy
-------------------------------------------------------------
MARIO ABAD, TREVOR ADKINS, JARELL BROWN, SHELBY COOPER, CAMILLE
HUDSON, and DAMANY BROWNE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. APPLE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:23-cv-00505 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 2, 2023) is a class action against
the Defendant for breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy,
unjust enrichment, and violations of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the California
Invasion of Privacy Act, the California Unfair Competition Law, the
Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, the New York
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act and the N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law.

This case is a proposed class action brought against Apple over its
long-standing and ongoing invasion of the privacy of consumers,
including Plaintiffs, who use Apple mobile devices, despite leading
such consumers utilizing its mobile devices and related proprietary
applications - including the App Store, Apple Music, Apple TV,
Books, and Stocks - to believe that their privacy was and is
protected once they chose to indicate through the mobile device
settings that they do not want their data and information tracked
by Apple or consequently shared with third parties. Apple
aggressively collects, transmits, exploits, and uses for its
financial gain, details about mobile device consumers' usage,
browsing, communications, personal information, and even
information relating to the mobile device itself, without the
consent or authorization of mobile device consumers, says the
suit.

Apple's tracking and hoarding of the user data of Plaintiffs and
all other Class Members, and collecting and monetizing their
information without their consent, is a violation of Apple's
promises and a violation of the law for which it is liable, the
suit asserts.

Apple Inc. is an American multinational technology company
headquartered in Cupertino, California, United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stephen R. Basser, Esq.
          Samuel M. Ward, Esq.
          BARRACK RODOS & BACINE
          One America Plaza
          600 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0800
          Facsimile: (619) 230-1874
          E-mail: sbasser@barrack.com
                  sward@barrack.com
   
               - and -

          Andrew J. Heo, Esq.
          BARRACK RODOS & BACINE
          3300 Two Commerce Square
          2001 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 9663-0600
          Facsimile: (215) 963-0838

               - and -

          John G. Emerson, Esq.
          EMERSON FIRM, PLLC
          2500 Wilcrest Drive, Suite 300
          Houston, TX 77042
          Telephone: (800) 551-8649
          Facsimile: (501) 286-4659    
          E-mail: jemerson@emersonfirm.com

               - and -

          Matthew Smith, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          201 Spear St., Ste 1100
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          E-mail: msmith@classlawdc.com

               - and -

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          Tyler Bean, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street NE
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                  jrathod@classlawdc.com
                  tbean@classlawdc.com

APPLE INC: Robinson Sues Over Illegal Tracking of Personal Data
---------------------------------------------------------------
BARRY ROBINSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. APPLE INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:23-cv-00877 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 2, 2023) is a class action against
the Defendant for invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract,
unjust enrichment, and violations of New York General Business
Law.

The Plaintiff brings this case against Apple on behalf of himself
and other similarly situated consumers for Apple's deceptive use of
personal data from iPhones as well as additional personal Apple
devices including iPads, and Apple personal computers that utilize
the App Store, etc.

The Plaintiff asserts that for all of Apple's promises regarding
privacy and its consumers' choice to keep their personal data
private, Apple still tracks such information even when it leads
consumers to believe they are not being tracked. Until recently,
consumers had no idea Apple was tracking their personal data to
profit even when they specifically asked Apple not to, says the
Plaintiff.

Apple Inc. is an American multinational technology company
headquartered in Cupertino, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
          Daniel Markowitz, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP P.C.
          85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 200
          Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
          Telephone: (845) 483-7100  
          Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
          E-mail: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com
                  markowitzd@thesultzerlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
          David C. Magagna Jr., Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          E-mail: cschaffer@lfsblaw.com
                  dmagagna@lfsblaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          1 Old Country Rd., Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516) 873-9550
          E-mail: jbrown@leedsbrownlaw.com

ASTORIA44 LLC: Fails to Pay Construction Workers' OT Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ronald S. Restrepo, Jose M. Ruiz, and other similarly situated
individuals v. Astoria44, LLC, Orlando Martinez, And Arlene
Martinez, individually, Case No. 6:23-cv-00160-CEM-EJK (M.D. Fla.,
Jan. 30, 2023) seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, retaliatory
damages, liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees
under the provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, on behalf of the
Plaintiff and all other current and former employees similarly
situated to the Plaintiff and who worked more than 40 hours during
one or more weeks on or after November 2021.

While employed by the Defendants, Plaintiffs Jose M. Ruiz and
Ronald S. Restrepo worked a tremendous amount of overtime hours,
but they were allegedly not paid for overtime hours, at any rate,
not even at the minimum wage rate as required by law.

Accordingly, the Defendants allegedly fired Plaintiffs Jose M. Ruiz
and Ronald S. Restrepo on December 26, 2022, after they complained
about unpaid overtime wages.

Mr. Ruiz and Mr. Restrepo were employed by the Defendant as
construction workers from November 01, 2021, to December 26, 2022
and from June 01, 2022, to December 26, 2022, respectively.

Astoria44 is a construction company doing business in Orange
County.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com

ASTRAZENECA UK: Sciannella Suit Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duty
----------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHEN M. SCIANNELLA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ASTRAZENECA UK LIMITED,
ASTRAZENECA PLC, TYRELL RIVERS, PH.D., PASCAL SORIOT, ZHENGBIN YAO,
PH.D., EDWARD HU, YANLING CAO, ANDREAS WICKI, CHRIS NOLET, and
RACHELLE JACQUES, Defendants, Case No. 2023-0125-PAF (Del. Ch.,
Feb. 2, 2023) is a verified stockholder class action complaint
brought by the Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated former stockholders of Viela Bio, Inc., against
the Defendants for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with
their actions to bring about the unfair sale of Viela to affiliates
of Horizon Therapeutics PLC for the inadequate price of $53 per
share in cash.

The complaint alleges that the Non-AstraZeneca directors had a duty
to provide full, fair, and complete disclosures to Viela
stockholders who were faced with the decision of whether to accept
the consideration paid in the acquisition. However, the
Non-AstraZeneca directors acted in bad faith when they issued a
misleading solicitation/recommendation statement on Schedule 14D-9
that failed to disclose material information known by each of these
fiduciaries. Each of the Non-AstraZeneca directors were aware of
certain alleged material non-disclosures and misrepresentations in
the 14D-9, asserts the complaint.

According to the complaint, the Defendants breached their duty of
loyalty by intentionally disclosing false information and
concealing material information, all of which they were fully
aware, including information regarding: (i) AstraZeneca's
communications to the Board concerning AstraZeneca's planned
abandonment and exit, including AstraZeneca's ensuing threats to
the Board; (ii) Viela's false representations attached to the 14D-9
regarding the Company's "Material Contracts"; (iii) the existence
of reliable standalone projections, which Viela management, at
Viela CEO Yao's direction, prepared in the ordinary course of
business, resulting in a value of the Company materially above the
acquisition price; and (iv) Yao's unsupervised retention and
compensation-related discussions with Horizon.

Astrazeneca UK Limited focuses on the discovery, development,
manufacturing, and commercialization of medications.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kimberly A. Evans, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          3801 Kennett Pike, Suite C-305
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Telephone: (302) 499-3600

               - and -

          Randall J. Baron, Esq.
          David A. Knotts, Esq.
          Teo Doremus, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423  

               - and -

          Christopher H. Lyons, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-2203
          Facsimile: (615) 252-3798

               - and -

          Bret M. Middleton, Esq.
          JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
          501 West Broadway, Suite 800
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0063  
          Facsimile: (619) 255-1856

AUDIBLE INC: Seeks Leave to File Certain Exhibits Under Seal
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Golden Unicorn
Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Audible, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-07059-JMF (S.D.N.Y.), Audible seeks leave to file certain
exhibits from their Opposition under seal or in redacted form.

Further, pursuant to the parties' procedure that this Court
approved for sealing or redacting documents related to Audible's
Opposition, Audible seeks to seal its Opposition and all exhibits,
pending Plaintiffs' review and potential motion to seal or redact.


As discussed in Audible's letter‐motion to seal materials from
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, although there is a
presumption of public access, a court must balance "countervailing
factors," including privacy interests as well as confidential and
proprietary business information.

As with the documents Audible moved to seal or redact from
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, here, Audible seeks to
file under seal or redact two types of confidential information:

   (1) documents or information that contain sensitive business
       information, or information that could cause competitive
       harm; and

   (2) personal information of non‐parties that does not bear on
       Plaintiffs' class certification motion.

Audible seeks narrow redactions from the reports of Plaintiffs'
proposed experts. The redactions contain highly sensitive
information from Audible's documents and depositions of Audible
witnesses and are the same Audible sought in relation to
Plaintiffs' class certification motion.

Audible's proposed redactions include the number of ACX creators,
discussions about internal strategy and analysis, confidential
information about publishers that are not parties to this lawsuit,
and internal information about Audible's royalties' calculations.

Audible's proposed redactions are limited to confidential
information about Audible's internal financial systems, processes,
and calculations, including information about royalty earners that
are not parties to this litigation. These are the same redactions
Audible sought when this report was filed in support of Plaintiffs'
class certification motion.

Audible is an American online audiobook and podcast service that
allows users to purchase and stream audiobooks and other forms of
spoken word content.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan 26, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/40HVcDc at no extra charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Brian D. Buckley, Esq.
          FENWICK & WEST LLP
          1191 Second Avenue, 10th Floor
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 389-4510
          E-mail: BBuckley@fenwick.com

BED BATH: Faces Bowser Suit Over Failure to Timely Pay Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
VANESSA BOWSER, DONALD HESS, ELIZABETH PADILLA, JUDITH HOLLAND,
TIKA JONES, HARRY LICHTMAN, DAWN MESA, ALEXANDRIA SMITH and EMILY
VAHUE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. BED BATH & BEYOND, INC., STEVEN H. TEMARES, ARTHUR
STARK, EUGENE A. CASTAGNA, SUSAN E. LATTMAN, SARAH GREGORY, PAULA
M. BARONE, HOWARD SHYMAN, TINA SUOJANEN, BRIAN SNELL and JOHN AND
JANE DOES 1-20, jointly and severally, Defendants, Case No.
601860/2023 (N.Y. Sup., Nassau Cty., February 1, 2023) is an action
brought pursuant to New York Labor Law to recover monies owed to
the named Plaintiffs and similarly situated workers due to
Defendants' practice of making delinquent wage payments.

According to the complaint, throughout the Plaintiffs' employment
with Defendants, they worked in non-exempt, hourly positions where
they would perform physical tasks for more than of 25% of their
typical workdays, including but not limited to by stocking shelves,
moving inventory, receiving, unpacking, organizing, storing,
packaging, and labeling merchandise, and generally standing
throughout the entirety of the workday. The Plaintiffs were
compensated every other week, rather than weekly, by Defendants
throughout the entirety of their respective employment, says the
suit.

Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. is an American chain of domestic
merchandise retail stores.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Steven John Moser, Esq.
          MOSER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          5 East Main Street
          Huntington, NY 11743
          Telephone: (631) 824-0200
    
               - and -

          Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516) 873-9550

BLEACHER REPORT: Discloses Subscribers' Info to FB, Sellers Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JABARI SELLERS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. BLEACHER REPORT, INC., Case No. 3:23-cv-00368 (N.D.
Cal., Jan. 25, 2023) is a consumer digital privacy class action
complaint against the Defendant for violation of the federal Video
Privacy Protection Act by disclosing to a third party, Meta
Platforms, Inc. (Facebook), data containing its digital
subscribers' personally identifiable information or Facebook ID
(FID) and the computer file containing video and its corresponding
URL viewed.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant uses the Personal Viewing
Information to build more targeted advertising on its website.
Thus, without obtaining consent from its digital subscribers, the
Defendant profits from its unauthorized disclosure of its digital
subscribers' Personal Viewing Information to Facebook. The
Defendant reaps these secret profits at the expense of its digital
subscribers' privacy and their statutory rights under VPPA. The
Plaintiff never gave Defendant express written consent to disclose
his Personal Viewing Information, says the Plaintiff.

Because Defendant does not clearly and conspicuously inform
Bleacherreport.com digital subscribers about this dissemination of
their Personal Viewing Information -- indeed, the process is
automatic and invisible -- they cannot  exercise reasonable
judgment to defend themselves against the highly personal ways
Bleacherreport.com has used and continues to make money by using
their personal data. The Defendant allegedly chose to disregard the
Plaintiff's and hundreds of thousands of other Bleacherreport.com
digital subscribers' statutorily protected privacy rights by
releasing their sensitive personal data to Facebook, the suit
asserts.

The Plaintiff began his digital subscription to Bleacherreport.com
around 2007 and continues to maintain the subscription to this
day.

Bleacher Report is an American media company focused on sport and
sports culture with its headquarters in San Francisco, California.
It develops, owns, and operates the Bleacherreport.com website,
which includes a broad selection of video content posted along with
their stories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 1700
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  adam@edelsberglaw.com

                - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Edwin E. Elliott, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  edwine@shamisgentile.com

BLOOMBERG LP: 2nd Cir. Certifies State Law Question in Syeed Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned NAFEESA SYEED, Plaintiff-Appellant v.
BLOOMBERG L.P., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 22-1251 (2d Cir.), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reserves its
decision and certifies this question to the New York Court of
Appeals:

     Whether a nonresident plaintiff not yet employed in New York
     City or State satisfies the impact requirement of the New
     York City Human Rights Law (the "NYCHRL") or the New York
     State Human Rights Law (the "NYSHRL") if the plaintiff
     pleads and later proves that an employer deprived the
     plaintiff of a New York City- or State-based job opportunity
     on discriminatory grounds?

Bloomberg L.P. is a privately held company that operates Bloomberg
Media, a news organization that employs approximately 2,700
reporters, producers, and editors across over 120 news bureaus
worldwide. Bloomberg Media's employment decisions are controlled by
its Editorial Management Committee, which operates from Bloomberg's
New York City headquarters.

In October 2014, Nafeesa Syeed, a South Asian-American woman, began
working for Bloomberg's Dubai news bureau as a Persian Gulf economy
and government reporter. A year later, Syeed informed Bloomberg
that she wished to transfer to its New York or Washington, D.C.
bureaus because of her husband's job location. After applying for
multiple positions, Syeed ultimately obtained a position in the
Washington, D.C. bureau reporting on cybersecurity. By mid-2018,
Syeed realized that there was no career path for her at that
bureau, and she applied for several reporting jobs with Bloomberg
in New York City. In particular, Syeed repeatedly told her team
leader that she was interested in filling a U.N.-reporter position.
That vacancy, however, was ultimately filled by a man.

When Syeed subsequently asked why she had not been considered for
the U.N. position, her team leader responded that Syeed had never
said that she wanted to cover foreign policy; he also advised her
that she had to advocate for herself if she wanted to advance at
Bloomberg. Another editor told Syeed that one of the reasons she
was not considered for the U.N. position was that the position had
not been designated as a "diversity slot."

In June 2018, Syeed met with the Head of Human Resources for the
Washington, D.C. bureau and complained that Bloomberg had a racist
and sexist culture. The Head of Human Resources instructed Syeed to
report her concerns to a senior executive editor for diversity,
talent, standards, and training at Bloomberg Media. Two days later,
Syeed informed her team leader and managing editor that she could
not continue to work at Bloomberg because of the discrimination
that she faced.

On behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals,
Syeed -- now a resident of California -- filed a class-action
lawsuit in New York state court against Bloomberg and several of
its employees on Aug. 9, 2020; shortly thereafter, she amended her
complaint. Prior to any further proceedings in state court, the
Defendants removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act and moved to dismiss the amended complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Rather than oppose the motion, Syeed again amended her complaint,
dropping all of the individual employee defendants. In her second
amended complaint, Syeed alleged class claims under NYSHRL for
disparate treatment and disparate impact on the basis of sex, as
well as individual claims for constructive discharge and, under
NYSHRL and NYCHRL, for discrimination on the basis of race and sex
in denying her promotions, setting her compensation, and creating a
hostile work environment.

Thereafter, Bloomberg again moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Upon that motion, the district court (Woods, J.) dismissed all of
Syeed's claims against Bloomberg, including her NYCHRL and NYSHRL
claims based on Bloomberg's failure to promote her to positions in
New York (Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 568 F.Supp.3d 314, 321, 329-34
(S.D.N.Y. 2021)).

More specifically, the district court concluded that Syeed's
failure-to-promote claims must be dismissed because, at all
relevant times, Syeed was a nonresident of New York City and State,
who worked in Washington, D.C., and thus did not and could not
adequately plead that she had felt the impact of Bloomberg's
discrimination in New York City or State. The district court
entered a final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) on Syeed's claims, and Syeed timely appealed.

Ms. Syeed's appeal raises a single legal question: Whether a
nonresident plaintiff not yet employed in New York City or State
satisfies the NYCHRL or NYSHRL impact requirement if the plaintiff
pleads and later proves that an employer deprived the plaintiff of
a New York City- or State-based job opportunity on discriminatory
grounds. The Court of Appeals finds that this core question is an
unsettled issue of New York law that merits certification to the
New York Court of Appeals.

Circuit Judge Richard J. Sullivan, writing for the Panel, notes
that the discretion to certify is principally guided by three
factors: (1) the absence of authoritative state court decisions;
(2) the importance of the issue to the state; and (3) the capacity
of certification to resolve the litigation, citing O'Mara v. Town
of Wappinger, 485 F.3d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 2007).

Judge Sullivan holds that each of these factors weighs in favor of
certification.

For the reasons stated in its Opinion, the Court of Appeals
reserves decision and certifies the following question to the New
York Court of Appeals:

     Whether a nonresident plaintiff not yet employed in New York
     City or State satisfies the impact requirement of the New
     York City Human Rights Law or the New York State Human
     Rights Law if the plaintiff pleads and later proves that an
     employer deprived the plaintiff of a New York City- or
     State-based job opportunity on discriminatory grounds.

Judge Sullivan directs the Clerk of the Court to transmit to the
Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals a certificate, together with
a copy of this opinion and a complete set of briefs, appendices,
and the record filed by the parties in this Court. The Panel will
retain jurisdiction to decide the case once it has had the benefit
of the views of the New York Court of Appeals or once that court
declines to accept certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Jan. 23, 2023, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc7jh4f6 from Leagle.com.

NIALL MACGIOLLABHUI, Law Office of Niall MacGiollabhui, in New York
City, for Plaintiff-Appellant Nafeesa Syeed.

ELISE M. BLOOM -- ebloom@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, in
New York City (Allison L. Martin -- amartin@proskauer.com --
Proskauer Rose LLP, in New York City, Mark W. Batten --
mbatten@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, in Boston,
Massachusetts, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Bloomberg
L.P.


BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in Herbert Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in the lawsuit captioned SEBASTIAN HERBERT v. BP
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET. AL. SECTION: D(2), Case No.
17-4355 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff
Sebastian Herbert opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3
plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on April 30, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately eight months in 2010 and
2011, the Plaintiff worked as a beach cleanup worker, tasked with
cleaning up oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal
areas near Gulfport, Biloxi, Pascagoula, Petit Bois Island, and
Ship Island, Mississippi.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' negligence and
recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently
failing to properly design and implement a clean-up response caused
him to suffer myriad injuries including dermal issues, rash, skin
irritation, itching, neurological issues, memory loss, chronic
headaches, hypertension (exacerbation), cardiomyopathy, congestive
heart failure, heart attack, chest pain, blood issues, low white
blood cell count, GI issues, burning abdominal pains, stomach gas,
nausea, respiratory issues, SOB, cough, chronic bronchitis,
chemically induced asthma, ocular issues, blurred vision, and
watery eyes.

Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages,
personal injury damages--including damages for past and future
medical expenses and for pain and suffering--punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 3, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that he alleges to have been exposed to.
Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the Defendants
argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as
the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation through
expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit
precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in which he argues that Dr.
Cook's Report and general causation opinions should be deemed
reliable and admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because of BP's
alleged failure to collect exposure data on oil spill cleanup
workers. The Plaintiff argues that BP had an obligation to preserve
evidence that it reasonably anticipated may have been relevant to
future litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed said evidence
in bad faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that he cannot demonstrate spoliation of
evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the first
place. The Defendants also contend that the issue of biological
monitoring of cleanup workers is irrelevant to the reliability and
admissibility of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the Defendants argue
that the remedy sought by the Plaintiff--admission of Dr. Cook's
Report--is inappropriate and without basis.

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response, Judge Vitter notes. To prove
causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in his
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of his
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. He argues that BP intentionally failed to
conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil spill
cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason why
Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. He contends that the Defendants should not be
allowed to benefit from their behavior and that excluding Dr.
Cook's Report and granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment would only benefit that behavior. Accordingly, the remedy
the Plaintiff seeks for the Defendants' alleged spoliation of
evidence is the admission of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

Judge Vitter opines that the chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument
is that he does not point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled
by the Defendants. Unsurprisingly, every court to have considered
the Plaintiff's argument has rejected it. The Court concurs and
finds no merit to the Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if he could prove
spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter holds. The Court
finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter holds that the Plaintiff lacks
expert testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony,
which is required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus,
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Judge Vitter, therefore, grants the Defendants' Daubert Motion to
Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of Plaintiffs' Expert
Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

Judge Vitter also ordered that the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted. The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants
are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/33m4yfkh from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in St. Ann Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in the lawsuit entitled JOHN ST. ANN v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., SECTION: D (1), Case No. 17-4257 (E.D.
La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook, filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. Plaintiff John St. Ann opposes both Motions. The
Defendants have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the
Plaintiff has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's
Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs'
Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff John
St. Ann opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against Defendants on
April 28, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately two months in 2010, the
Plaintiff worked as an offshore cleanup worker, tasked with
cleaning up oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal
areas near Bay Jimmy and Myrtle Grove, Louisiana. The Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants' negligence and recklessness in both
causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently failing to properly
design and implement a clean-up response caused him to suffer
myriad injuries, including nasal congestion, nasal discharge,
decreased sense of smell, throat irritation, nausea, diarrhea,
vomiting, abdominal cramps and pain, boils, skin inflammation,
itching, peeling, scaling, welts, dermatitis, eye burning,
irritation, visual disturbances, pneumonia, shortness of breath,
cough, wheezing, breathing problems, headaches, dizziness,
fainting, memory loss, high blood sugar, hyperglycemia, urinary
retention, acute kidney injury, chronic kidney disease stage 3,
microcytic hypochromic anemia, abnormal weight loss, heart attack,
coronary artery disease, chest pain, essential hypertension, and
hypertension emergency.

Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages,
personal injury damages--including damages for past and future
medical expenses and for pain and suffering--punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 3, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that the Plaintiff alleges to have been
exposed to. Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying,
the Defendants argue, the Court should grant their Motion for
Summary Judgment as the Plaintiff is unable to establish general
causation through expert testimony, a necessary requirement under
controlling Circuit precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in which the Plaintiff argues
that Dr. Cook's Report and general causation opinions should be
deemed reliable and admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because of
BP's alleged failure to collect exposure data on oil spill cleanup
workers. The Plaintiff argues that BP had an obligation to preserve
evidence that it reasonably anticipated may have been relevant to
future litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed said evidence
in bad faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that he cannot demonstrate spoliation of
evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the first
place. The Defendants also contend that the issue of biological
monitoring of cleanup workers is irrelevant to the reliability and
admissibility of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the Defendants argue
that the remedy sought by the Plaintiff--admission of Dr. Cook's
Report--is inappropriate and without basis.

Judge Vitter notes that the burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs
to prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the response. To
prove causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in his
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of his
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. He argues that BP intentionally failed to
conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil spill
cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason why
Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants
should not be allowed to benefit from their behavior and that
excluding Dr. Cook's Report and granting the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment would only benefit that behavior. Accordingly, the
remedy the Plaintiff seeks for the Defendants' alleged spoliation
of evidence is the admission of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

The chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument is that he does not
point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled by the Defendants,
Judge Vitter opines. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if he could prove
spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter holds. The Court
finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter finds that the Plaintiff lacks
expert testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony,
which is required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus,
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Hence, Judge Vitter rules that the Defendants' Daubert Motion to
Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

Judge Vitter further ordered that the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted. The Plaintiff's claims against the
Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/mtchfycp from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Bid to Exclude Testimony of Johnson's Expert OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' motion to exclude the
causation testimony of the Plaintiff's expert in the lawsuit
captioned LISA JOHNSON v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL.
SECTION: D (2), Case No. 17-4372 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff Lisa
Johnson opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on April 30, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately two months in 2010, the
Plaintiff worked as a beach cleanup worker, tasked with cleaning up
oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal areas near
Gulfport, Long Beach, and Biloxi, Mississippi. She alleges that the
Defendants' negligence and recklessness in both causing the Gulf
oil spill and subsequently failing to properly design and implement
a clean-up response caused her to suffer myriad injuries including
watery, burning eyes, eye irritation, blurred vision, rashes,
dermal irritation, irritation, and infection, hypertension,
dizziness, frequent headache, depression, anxiety, fatigue,
insomnia, esophagitis, sinus pain, nasal congestion, abdominal
pain, GERD, nausea, vomiting, constipation, gastritis,
pyelonephritis, leftsided hydronephrosis, and chronic kidney
disease.

Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages,
personal injury damages--including damages for past and future
medical expenses and for pain and suffering--punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support her claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused her particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 17, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that she alleges to have been exposed
to. Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the
Defendants argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary
Judgment as the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation
through expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling
Circuit precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that Dr. Cook's Report satisfies
the Daubert standards for reliability and relevancy and, therefore,
that summary judgment is inappropriate. She also filed a Motion for
Admission of Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants'
Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in which she argues
that Dr. Cook's Report and general causation opinions should be
deemed reliable and admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because of
BP's alleged failure to collect exposure data on oil spill cleanup
workers. She argues that BP had an obligation to preserve evidence
that it reasonably anticipated may have been relevant to future
litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed said evidence in bad
faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that she cannot demonstrate spoliation
of evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the
first place. The Defendants also contend that the issue of
biological monitoring of cleanup workers is irrelevant to the
reliability and admissibility of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the
Defendants argue that the remedy sought by the Plaintiff--admission
of Dr. Cook's Report--is inappropriate and without basis.

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response, Judge Vitter notes. To prove
causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in her
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of her
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. The Plaintiff argues that BP intentionally
failed to conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil
spill cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason
why Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. She contends that the Defendants should not be
allowed to benefit from their behavior and that excluding Dr.
Cook's Report and granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment would only benefit that behavior. Accordingly, the remedy
the Plaintiff seeks for the Defendants' alleged spoliation of
evidence is the admission of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

The chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument is that she does not
point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled by the Defendants,
Judge Vitter holds. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if she could
prove spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter points out.
The Court finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide
any support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter holds the Plaintiff lacks expert
testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony, which is
required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her claims
that her injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus, the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to Plaintiff's failure
to establish general causation.

Accordingly, Judge Vitter grants the Defendants' Daubert Motion to
Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of Plaintiffs' Expert
Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/42xwn5zr from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Gomes Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in the lawsuit titled TEVON GOMES v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., SECTION: D (1), Case No. 17-4332 (E.D.
La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff Tevon
Gomes opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on April 29, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately three months in 2010,
the Plaintiff worked as a beach and offshore cleanup worker, tasked
with cleaning up oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and
coastal areas near Mobile and Dauphin Island, Alabama.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' negligence and
recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently
failing to properly design and implement a clean-up response caused
him to suffer myriad injuries including body pains, kidney pains,
heart pain, back pain, headaches, stress, skin irritation, rash,
skin itching, eye irritation, burning and tearing, blurriness,
constipation, and trouble eating. Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks
to recover economic damages, personal injury damages--including
damages for past and future medical expenses and for pain and
suffering--punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 3, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that he alleges to have been exposed to.
Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the Defendants
argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as
Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation through expert
testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit
precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' [sic] Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants'
Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in which Plaintiff
argues that Dr. Cook's Report and general causation opinions should
be deemed reliable and admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because
of BP's alleged failure to collect exposure data on oil spill
cleanup workers. He argues that BP had an obligation to preserve
evidence that it reasonably anticipated may have been relevant to
future litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed said evidence
in bad faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that he cannot demonstrate spoliation of
evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the first
place. They also contend that the issue of biological monitoring of
cleanup workers is irrelevant to the reliability and admissibility
of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the Defendants argue that the remedy
sought by the Plaintiff--admission of Dr. Cook's Report--is
inappropriate and without basis.

Judge Vitter notes that the burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs
to prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the response. To
prove causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in his
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of his
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. He argues that BP intentionally failed to
conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil spill
cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason why
Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. He contends that the Defendants should not be
allowed to benefit from their behavior and that excluding Dr.
Cook's Report and granting their Motion for Summary Judgment would
only benefit that behavior. Accordingly, the remedy the Plaintiff
seeks for the Defendants' alleged spoliation of evidence is the
admission of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

The chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument is that he does not
point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled by the Defendants,
Judge Vitter says. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if he could prove
spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter holds. The Court
finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter finds the Plaintiff lacks expert
testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony, which is
required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his claims
that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus, the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Hence, Judge Vitter rules that the Defendants' Daubert Motion to
Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2vmbvx9v from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Mann Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in the lawsuit entitled MAXIE MANN v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL. SECTION: D (2), Case No. 17-4421 (E.D.
La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff Maxie
Mann opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on May 1, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately five months in 2010, the
Plaintiff worked as an offshore cleanup worker, tasked with
cleaning up oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal
areas near Slidell, Louisiana and surrounding Gulf waters.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' negligence and
recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently
failing to properly design and implement a clean-up response caused
him to suffer myriad injuries including abdominal cramps, abdominal
pain, headaches, dizziness, fainting, bronchitis, asthma, reactive
airway disease, wheezing, sinusitis, allergic rhinitis, decreased
sense of smell, rashes, psoriasis, acute kidney injury,
bradycardia, syncope, and shortness of breath. Specifically, the
Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages, personal injury
damages--including damages for past and future medical expenses and
for pain and suffering--punitive damages, and attorneys' fees,
costs, and expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 17, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that he alleges to have been exposed to.
Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the Defendants
argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as
the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation through
expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit
precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that Dr. Cook's Report satisfies
the Daubert standards for reliability and relevancy and, therefore,
that summary judgment is inappropriate. The Plaintiff also filed a
Motion for Admission of Plaintiffs' [sic] Expert Opinions Because
of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure,
in which he argues that Dr. Cook's Report and general causation
opinions should be deemed reliable and admissible under Fed. R.
Evid. 702 because of BP's alleged failure to collect exposure data
on oil spill cleanup workers. He argues that BP had an obligation
to preserve evidence that it reasonably anticipated may have been
relevant to future litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed
said evidence in bad faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that he cannot demonstrate spoliation of
evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the first
place. They also contend that the issue of biological monitoring of
cleanup workers is irrelevant to the reliability and admissibility
of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the Defendants argue that the remedy
sought by the Plaintiff--admission of Dr. Cook's Report--is
inappropriate and without basis.

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response, Judge Vitter notes. To prove
causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in his
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of his
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. He argues that BP intentionally failed to
conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil spill
cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason why
Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. He contends that the Defendants should not be
allowed to benefit from their behavior and that excluding Dr.
Cook's Report and granting their Motion for Summary Judgment would
only benefit that behavior. Accordingly, the remedy the Plaintiff
seeks for the Defendants' alleged spoliation of evidence is the
admission of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

Judge Vitter holds that the chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument
is that he does not point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled
by the Defendants. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if he could prove
spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter says. The Court
finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter finds the Plaintiff lacks expert
testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony, which is
required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his claims
that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus, the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Accordingly, Judge Vitter rules that the Defendants' Daubert Motion
to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr.
Jerald Cook is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5kme6pnk from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in McCray Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment in the lawsuit entitled ANTHONY McCRAY v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., SECTION: D (1), Case No. 17-3552 (E.D.
La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff
Anthony McCray opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3
plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on April 18, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately seven months in 2012,
the Plaintiff worked as a beach cleanup worker, tasked with
cleaning up oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal
areas near Biloxi, Mississippi. He alleges that the Defendants'
negligence and recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and
subsequently failing to properly design and implement a clean-up
response caused him to suffer myriad injuries, including rash,
dermatitis, acne, blistering, dryness, flaking, inflammation,
redness or swelling, itching, lesions, peeling, scaling, welts of
the skin, fatigue, malaise, nasal mucositis, runny nose, acute
sinusitis, allergic rhinitis, difficulty hearing, nosebleeds, sore
throat, chronic rhinitis, throat irritation, headaches, dizziness,
loss of appetite, weight loss, abdominal cramps and pain, diarrhea,
nausea, eye burning and irritation, shortness of breath, and
wheezing.

Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages,
personal injury damages--including damages for past and future
medical expenses and for pain and suffering--punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 17, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that he alleges to have been exposed to.
Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the Defendants
argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as
the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation through
expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit
precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that Dr. Cook's Report satisfies
the Daubert standards for reliability and relevancy and, therefore,
that summary judgment is inappropriate. The Plaintiff also filed a
Motion for Admission of Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in
which he argues that Dr. Cook's Report and general causation
opinions should be deemed reliable and admissible under Fed. R.
Evid. 702 because of BP's alleged failure to collect exposure data
on oil spill cleanup workers. He argues that BP had an obligation
to preserve evidence that it reasonably anticipated may have been
relevant to future litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed
said evidence in bad faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that he cannot demonstrate spoliation of
evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the first
place. The Defendants also contend that the issue of biological
monitoring of cleanup workers is irrelevant to the reliability and
admissibility of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the Defendants argue
that the remedy sought by Plaintiff--admission of Dr. Cook's
Report--is inappropriate and without basis.

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response, Judge Vitter notes. To prove
causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in his
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of his
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. The Plaintiff argues that BP intentionally
failed to conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil
spill cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason
why Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. Accordingly, the remedy the Plaintiff seeks for
the Defendants' alleged spoliation of evidence is the admission of
Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

The chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument is that he does not
point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled by the Defendants,
Judge Vitter holds. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if he could prove
spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter says. The Court
finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter finds that the Plaintiff lacks
expert testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony,
which is required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus,
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Hence, Judge Vitter ordered that the Defendants' Daubert Motion to
Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

Judge Vitter further ordered that the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted. The Plaintiff's claims against the
Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3jt43nr5 from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Stallworth Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in the lawsuit titled BEN STALLWORTH, III v. BP
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., SECTION: D (1), Case No.
17-3612 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff Ben
Stallworth, III, opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3
plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on April 18, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately one month in 2010, the
Plaintiff worked as a beach cleanup worker, tasked with cleaning up
oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal areas near
Gulf Shores, Orange Beach, Laguna Beach, Little Lagoon, and Dauphin
Island, Alabama.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' negligence and
recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently
failing to properly design and implement a clean-up response caused
him to suffer myriad injuries including dehydration, dizziness,
headaches, shortness of breath, depression, panic attacks, chronic
anxiety, nasal congestion/discharge, decreased sense of smell,
abdominal cramps/pain, diarrhea, skin inflammation, redness, and
swelling. Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic
damages, personal injury damages--including damages for past and
future medical expenses and for pain and suffering--punitive
damages, and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 17, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that he alleges to have been exposed to.
Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the Defendants
argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as
the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation through
expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit
precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that Dr. Cook's Report satisfies
the Daubert standards for reliability and relevancy and, therefore,
that summary judgment is inappropriate. He also filed a Motion for
Admission of Plaintiffs' [sic] Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in
which he argues that Dr. Cook's Report and general causation
opinions should be deemed reliable and admissible under Fed. R.
Evid. 702 because of BP's alleged failure to collect exposure data
on oil spill cleanup workers. He argues that BP had an obligation
to preserve evidence that it reasonably anticipated may have been
relevant to future litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed
said evidence in bad faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that he cannot demonstrate spoliation of
evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the first
place. The Defendants also contend that the issue of biological
monitoring of cleanup workers is irrelevant to the reliability and
admissibility of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the Defendants argue
that the remedy sought by the Plaintiff--admission of Dr. Cook's
Report--is inappropriate and without basis.

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response, Judge Vitter notes. To prove
causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in his
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of his
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. He argues that BP intentionally failed to
conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil spill
cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason why
Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. He contends that the Defendants should not be
allowed to benefit from their behavior and that excluding Dr.
Cook's Report and granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment would only benefit that behavior. Accordingly, the remedy
the Plaintiff seeks for the Defendants' alleged spoliation of
evidence is the admission of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

The chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument is that he does not
point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled by the Defendants,
Judge Vitter says. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if he could prove
spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter holds. The Court
finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter finds the Plaintiff lacks expert
testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony, which is
required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his claims
that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus, the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Therefore, Judge Vitter rules that the Defendants' Daubert Motion
to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr.
Jerald Cook is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3v4uk345 from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Testimony of Edwards' Expert
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' motion to exclude the
causation testimony of the Plaintiffs' expert in the lawsuit titled
AL EDWARDS v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., SECTION: D
(4), Case No. 17-4324 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff Al
Edwards opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on April 29, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately six months in 2010, the
Plaintiff worked as an offshore cleanup worker, tasked with
cleaning up oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal
areas near Biloxi, Cat Island, Deer Island, and Ship Island,
Mississippi. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' negligence
and recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and
subsequently failing to properly design and implement a clean-up
response caused him to suffer myriad injuries, including
neurological issues, migraines, photophobia, nausea, back pain, GI
issues, abdominal pain, stomach problems, vomiting, and diarrhea.
Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages,
personal injury damages--including damages for past and future
medical expenses and for pain and suffering--punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 3, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that he alleges to have been exposed to.
Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the Defendants
argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as
the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation through
expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit
precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' [sic] Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants'
Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in which Plaintiff
argues that Dr. Cook's Report and general causation opinions should
be deemed reliable and admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because
of BP's alleged failure to collect exposure data on oil spill
cleanup workers. He argues that BP had an obligation to preserve
evidence that it reasonably anticipated may have been relevant to
future litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed said evidence
in bad faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that he cannot demonstrate spoliation of
evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the first
place. They also contend that the issue of biological monitoring of
cleanup workers is irrelevant to the reliability and admissibility
of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the Defendants argue that the remedy
sought by the Plaintiff--admission of Dr. Cook's Report--is
inappropriate and without basis.

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response, Judge Vitter notes. To prove
causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in his
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of his
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. He argues that BP intentionally failed to
conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil spill
cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason why
Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. He contends that the Defendants should not be
allowed to benefit from their behavior and that excluding Dr.
Cook's Report and granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment would only benefit that behavior. Accordingly, the remedy
the Plaintiff seeks for the Defendants' alleged spoliation of
evidence is the admission of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

The chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument is that he does not
point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled by the Defendants,
Judge Vitter opines. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if he could prove
spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter holds. The Court
finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter finds that the Plaintiff lacks
expert testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony,
which is required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus,
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Accordingly, Judge Vitter rules that the Defendants' Daubert Motion
to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr.
Jerald Cook is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5742j7a8 from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Testimony of Stewart's Expert
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' motion to exclude the
causation testimony of the Plaintiff's expert in the lawsuit styled
ELIZABETH STEWART v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL.,
SECTION: D (4), Case No. 17-4299 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff
Elizabeth Stewart opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3
plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on April 29, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately four months in 2010, the
Plaintiff worked as a beach cleanup worker, tasked with cleaning up
oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal areas near
Pascagoula, Mississippi. She alleges that the Defendants'
negligence and recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and
subsequently failing to properly design and implement a clean-up
response caused her to suffer myriad injuries including sinus
issues, nasal congestion, nose bleeds, nasal discharge, decreased
sense of smell, epistaxis, upper respiratory infection,
cardiovascular issues, edema, fatigue, high blood pressure, dermal
issues, skin flaking, chronic anemia, headaches, mental issues,
memory loss, neurological issues, burning and numbness in back and
legs, and hyperparasthesia.

Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages,
personal injury damages--including damages for past and future
medical expenses and for pain and suffering--punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support her claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused her particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 3, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that she alleges to have been exposed
to. Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the
Defendants argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary
Judgment as the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation
through expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling
Circuit precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in which she argues that Dr.
Cook's Report and general causation opinions should be deemed
reliable and admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because of BP's
alleged failure to collect exposure data on oil spill cleanup
workers. The Plaintiff argues that BP had an obligation to preserve
evidence that it reasonably anticipated may have been relevant to
future litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed said evidence
in bad faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that she cannot demonstrate spoliation
of evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate in the
first place. The Defendants also contend that the issue of
biological monitoring of cleanup workers is irrelevant to the
reliability and admissibility of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the
Defendants argue that the remedy sought by the Plaintiff--admission
of Dr. Cook's Report—is inappropriate and without basis.

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response, Judge Vitter notes. To prove
causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in her
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of her
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. Accordingly, the remedy the Plaintiff seeks
for the Defendants' alleged spoliation of evidence is the admission
of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

Judge Vitter notes that the chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument
is that she does not point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled
by the Defendants. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if she could
prove spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter says. The
Court finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to her Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion for
Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants'
Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter finds that the Plaintiff lacks
expert testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony,
which is required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
her claims that her injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus,
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Judge Vitter, therefore, ordered that the Defendants' Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

Judge Vitter further ordered that the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted. The Plaintiff's claims against the
Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3rdd6vwu from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Testimony of Williams' Expert
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' motion to exclude the
causation testimony of the Plaintiff's expert in the lawsuit styled
GREGORY WILLIAMS v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL.,
SECTION: D (5), Case No. 17-4306 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is BP's Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c., as well as the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") have joined in
both motions. The Plaintiff opposes both Motions. The Defendants
have filed Replies in support of their Motions and the Plaintiff
has filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to BP's Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook.

Also before the Court is a Motion for Admission of the Plaintiffs'
Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of
Plaintiff's Exposure, filed by the Plaintiff. The Defendants oppose
this Motion.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, United States District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA. Plaintiff
Gregory Williams opted out of the MSA and, accordingly, is a B3
plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed this individual action against the Defendants
on April 29, 2017, to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately nine months in 2010 and
2011, the Plaintiff worked as a beach cleanup worker, tasked with
cleaning up oil and oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal
areas near Pilot Town, Venice, Elmer's Isle, and Grand Isle,
Louisiana.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' negligence and
recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently
failing to properly design and implement a clean-up response caused
him to suffer myriad injuries including dermal issues, rashes,
blistering, crusting, flaking, inflammation, itching, scaling,
lesions, dermatitis, diabetes mellitus, wheezing, sinus issues,
throat irritation, chronic rhinitis, GI issues, diarrhea, nausea,
abdominal pain, and unexplained weight loss of 30 lbs.
Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic damages,
personal injury damages--including damages for past and future
medical expenses and for pain and suffering--punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. Dr.
Cook's Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims;
rather, Dr. Cook's generic causation Report has been utilized by
numerous B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before
this Court, as well as in other cases before other sections of this
Court. Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general
causation and not to specific causation.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion in limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment on Oct. 3, 2022. In their Motion in limine, the
Defendants contend that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying
due to, inter alia, Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful
level of exposure capable of causing the Plaintiff's particular
injuries for each chemical that he alleges to have been exposed to.
Because Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying, the Defendants
argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as
the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation through
expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit
precedent.

In response, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' [sic] Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants'
Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure, in which he argues
that Dr. Cook's Report and general causation opinions should be
deemed reliable and admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because of
BP's alleged failure to collect exposure data on oil spill cleanup
workers. He argues that BP had an obligation to preserve evidence
that it reasonably anticipated may have been relevant to future
litigation and that BP intentionally destroyed said evidence in bad
faith.

The Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiff's
spoliation Motion, arguing that the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate
spoliation of evidence because there never was evidence to spoliate
in the first place. The Defendants also contend that the issue of
biological monitoring of cleanup workers is irrelevant to the
reliability and admissibility of Dr. Cook's Report. Finally, the
Defendants argue that the remedy sought by the
Plaintiff---admission of Dr. Cook's Report---is inappropriate and
without basis.

The burden of proof is on the B3 plaintiffs to prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response, Judge Vitter notes. To prove
causation, the B3 plaintiffs are required to provide reliable
expert testimony.

The Court has previously considered the June 21, 2022 version of
Dr. Cook's Report offered here by the Plaintiff, finding that the
Report fails to meet the Daubert standards for reliability and
helpfulness to the trier of fact, citing Kaoui v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
Inc., No. CV 17-3313, R. Doc. 68 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vitter,
J.). For the same reasons set forth in detail in that Order and
Reasons, the Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed in his
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of his
expert's report and finds it appropriate to grant the Defendants'
Motion in limine to exclude Dr. Cook's Report.

The Plaintiff has filed a motion arguing that the Court should find
Dr. Cook's opinions admissible because of the Defendants' alleged
spoliation of evidence. He argues that BP intentionally failed to
conduct dermal and biological monitoring of the Gulf oil spill
cleanup workers and that such failure to do so is the reason why
Dr. Cook is unable to provide the requisite dose-response
relationship data. He contends that the Defendants should not be
allowed to benefit from their behavior and that excluding Dr.
Cook's Report and granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment would only benefit that behavior. Accordingly, the remedy
the Plaintiff seeks for the Defendants' alleged spoliation of
evidence is the admission of Dr. Cook's Report.

To properly assert a spoliation claim, Judge Vitter says the
Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the Defendants controlled the
evidence and were obliged to preserve it at the time of
destruction; (2) the Defendants intentionally destroyed the
evidence; and (3) the Defendants acted in bad faith. The Plaintiff
fails to make this showing, Judge Vitter holds.

Judge Vitter notes that the chief flaw in the Plaintiff's argument
is that he does not point to any actual evidence allegedly spoiled
by the Defendants. The Court concurs and finds no merit to the
Plaintiff's argument.

Finally, the remedy sought by the Plaintiff, even if he could prove
spoliation, is wholly inappropriate, Judge Vitter holds. The Court
finds no basis--and the Plaintiff has failed to provide any
support--for the theory that an unreliable, unhelpful, and
otherwise inadmissible expert opinion may nevertheless be admitted
due to one party's alleged spoliation. Because the Court finds no
merit to the Plaintiff's Motion, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
Motion for Admission of Plaintiff's Expert Opinions Because of BP
Defendants' Spoliation of Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure.

For these reasons, Judge Vitter finds that the Plaintiff lacks
expert testimony on general causation. Without expert testimony,
which is required to prove general causation, the Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to oil. Thus,
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's
failure to establish general causation.

Judge Vitter, therefore, ordered that the Defendants' Daubert
Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert,
Dr. Jerald Cook is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of
Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Because of BP Defendants' Spoliation of
Evidence of Plaintiff's Exposure is denied.

Judge Vitter further ordered that the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted. The Plaintiff's claims against the
Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4j7et2b from
Leagle.com.


BREADBERRY INC: Calderon Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA CALDERON and PATRICIA CALDERON, on behalf of themselves and
the Class, Plaintiffs v. BREADBERRY INC. d/b/a BREADBERRY, and
SAMUEL GLUCK, Defendants, Case No. 503456/2023 (N.Y. Sup., Kings
Cty., February 1, 2023) is brought by the Plaintiffs pursuant to
New York Labor Law to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime
premiums, unpaid wages due to timeshaving, unpaid spread of hours
premiums, statutory penalties, liquidated damages, and attorneys'
fees and costs.

Plaintiff Sandra Calderon was hired by the Defendants to work in
their Deli Department from June 2017 until November 2018.

Plaintiff Patricia Calderon was hired by the Defendants and/or
their predecessors to work as a salad and sandwich preparer from
July 2016 to June 2019.

Breadberry Inc. is a kosher grocery store with a principal place of
business in Brooklyn, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

CLUB 360: Amended Bid for Class Cert. Denied w/o Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Edwin Bazarganfard, et
al., v. Club 360 LLC, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-02272-CBM-PLA (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Consuelo B. Marshall entered an order denying
without prejudice the amended motion for class certification as
premature because the pleadings have not been resolved in the
action.

  -- No motion for class certification shall be filed until an
     answer to the operative complaint has been filed.

  -- To the extent a further motion for class certification is
     subsequently filed after the pleadings have been resolved,
     the motion, opposition, and reply shall not reference prior
     briefs or evidence filed in connection with the original or
     amended motion for class certification.

Club 360 offers personal training, fitness classes, boxing,
physiotherapy and sports massage.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan 26, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3XfG2Cb at no extra charge.[CC]

COMMUNITY CARE: Beh Bid for Class Status Granted in Part
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ORETHA BEH, RUBY CASON,
BRIANA KINCANNON, and KIMBERLY BALKUM, individually and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, v. COMMUNITY CARE COMPANIONS
INC., ALEXANDER J. CARO, MARK GATIEN, INTERIM HEALTHCARE OF
ROCHESTER, INC., JAMES WATSON, Case No. 1:19-cv-01417-JLS-MJR
(W.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge John L. Sinatra, Jr. entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs motion
      for class certification and appointment of class counsel;

   2. granting the Plaintiffs' motion as to Subclass VI, but
      denying the motion as Subclasses I, II, III, IV, and V;

   3. dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims for violations of New
      York Labor Law without leave to amend;

   4. denying without prejudice to renewal the Plaintiffs motion
      for entry of final judgments and motions for attorneys'
      fees; and

   5. referring the case back to Judge Roemet, consistent with
      the referral order for further proceedings.

The Plaintiffs commenced this putative class and collective action
on October 22, 2019, alleging claims for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law (NYLL).

The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Janu. 3, 2020, and a
second amended complaint on Feb. 3, 2019.

The Plaintiffs' claims stem from their employment as home-care
workers beginning in early 2013 and continuing through the filing
of the Second Amended Complaint.

Community Care is a non-medical that provides healthcare and
homecare services to seniors.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan 26, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Ycrpk1 at no extra charge.[CC]

DOTDASH MEREDITH: Discloses Info to Facebook, Harris-Shields Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHELLE HARRIS-SHIELDS, individually and on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DOTDASH MEREDITH, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:23-cv-00851 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 1, 2023) is a
class action brought against the Defendant for alleged violation of
the federal Video Privacy Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff's claims arise from the
Defendant's practice of knowingly disclosing to a third party, Meta
Platforms, Inc. or Facebook, data containing its digital
subscribers' (i) personally identifiable information or Facebook ID
and (ii) the computer file containing video and its corresponding
URL viewed. The Plaintiff's allegations are made on personal
knowledge as to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's own acts and upon
information and belief as to all other matters.

Moreover, the Defendant uses the personal viewing information to
build more targeted advertising on its website which, in turn,
generates greater revenue. Thus, without obtaining consent from its
digital subscribers, Defendant profits from its unauthorized
disclosure of its digital subscribers' personal viewing information
to Facebook. The Defendant reaps these secret profits at the
expense of its digital subscribers' privacy and their statutory
rights under VPPA, alleges the suit.

DotDash Meredith, Inc. is an American media company headquartered
in New York, New York. The Company develops, owns, and operates the
EW.com website, which includes a selection of video content posted
along with their stories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Edwin E. Elliott, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  edwine@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Esq.
          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Avenue  
          Aventura, FL 33180  
          E-mail: adam@edelsberglaw.com
                  scott@edelsberglaw.com

DOUGLASTON GRIMALDI: Faces De Gante Arce Wage-and-Hour Suit in N.Y.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
MARTINIANO DE GANTE ARCE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DOUGLASTON GRIMALDI INC. d/b/a
GRIMALDI’S PIZZERIA, FRANK SANTORA and ANTHONY PISCINA, as
individuals, Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-00794 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 2,
2023) seeks to recover damages for Defendants' egregious violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law arising
from the Plaintiff's employment with the Defendants.

The Plaintiff alleges the Defendants' failure to pay minimum wages
and overtime compensation, failure to pay spread of hours
compensation, failure to provide wage statements, and failure to
furnish written wage notice.

The Plaintiff was employed by Douglaston Grimaldi as a cook and
pizza maker while performing related miscellaneous duties for the
Defendants, from February 2021 until December 2022.

Douglaston Grimaldi Inc., d/b/a Grimaldi's Pizzeria, is a pizza
restaurant company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.  
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591

DUMBO MOVING: Brkic Appeals Arbitration Ruling to 2nd Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
MILIJA BRKIC is taking an appeal from a court order granting the
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration in the lawsuit entitled
Milija Brkic, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Dumbo Moving and Storage, Inc., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-07029, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York.

The Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendants alleging
hostile work environment and work-and-hour violations under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

On Oct. 20, 2022, the Defendants moved to compel the Plaintiff to
arbitrate his claims pursuant to the arbitration agreement he
entered into with the Defendants and to dismiss or stay further
judicial proceedings.

On Jan. 9, 2023, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration through an Order entered by Judge Colleen McMahon. The
Court held that the Plaintiff is a party to the arbitration
agreement since he signed the agreement in his capacity as sales
representative. The Plaintiff is bound by the agreement, and he
must arbitrate all arbitrable disputes, ruled the Court.

The appellate case is captioned Brkic v. Dumbo Moving and Storage,
Inc., Case No. 23-0125, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, filed on January 30, 2023. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MILIJA BRKIC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Paul Andrew Bartels, Esq.
            BELL LAW GROUP, PLLC
            100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard
            Garden City, NY 11530
            Telephone: (516) 280-3008

Defendant-Appellee DUMBO MOVING AND STORAGE, INC., et al. are
represented by:

            William H. Ng, Esq.
            LITTLER MENDELSON, PC
            290 Broadhollow Road
            Melville, NY 11747
            Telephone: (631) 247-4707

EIGER BIOPHARMACEUTICAL: Case Mgmt. Conference Cont'd to Feb. 16
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled RONALD A. SCHOEN, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated Plaintiff v. EIGER
BIOPHARMACEUTICALS, INC., DAVID A. CORY, and SRIRAM RYALI,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-06985-RS (N.D. Cal.), Chief District
Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco, approved the parties
Stipulated Request and Order regarding the Defendants' time to
respond to the complaint and case management conference.

Among other things, the stipulation provides that Initial Case
Management Conference set for Feb. 9, 2023, is continued to Feb.
16, 2023, at 10:00 a.m.

On Nov. 8, 2022, Schoen, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against
Defendants Eiger BioPharmaceuticals, Inc., David A. Cory, and
Sriram Ryali alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. On Nov. 8, the Court
entered an Order Setting Initial Case Management Conference and ADR
Deadlines (the "Case Management Order").

Pursuant to the Case Management Order, Jan. 19, 2023, was the last
day for the parties to meet and confer regarding initial
disclosures, early settlement, ADR process selection, and a
discovery plan, and to file ADR Certification; Feb. 2, 2023, was
the last day for the parties to file Rule 26(f) Reports and file
case management statements; and the Initial Case Management
Conference was scheduled for Feb. 9, 2023, at 10:00 a.m.

The Defendants have not yet responded to the Complaint. Each of the
Defendants has waived service of the summons and Complaint.

The parties agree that this action is subject to the provisions of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15
U.S.C. Section 78u-4, et seq., which, inter alia, requires the
Court to appoint a lead plaintiff, who will oversee the litigation,
and to approve the lead plaintiff's selection of lead counsel.

The parties anticipate that the Court-appointed lead plaintiff will
file an amended complaint that will supersede the existing
Complaint and any later-filed complaint(s).

In order to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources
or effort by the parties prior to the appointment of a lead
plaintiff and lead counsel and the filing of the anticipated
amended complaint, the parties have agreed to an extension of time
for the Defendants to respond to the current Complaint.

For the same reasons, the parties request that the Court order that
the Initial Case Management conference be continued, and all
deadlines set forth in the Case Management Order be continued
therewith.

The parties stipulated and agreed, and the Court ordered, that the
Defendants will not be required to respond to the Complaint until
after the appointment of a lead plaintiff, and after the filing by
such lead plaintiff of an amended complaint or the designation of
an operative complaint.

Within fourteen (14) days following the appointment of a lead
plaintiff, the Defendants will meet and confer with the
court-appointed lead plaintiff and submit a schedule for the filing
of an amended complaint or designation of an operative complaint
and the filing of the Defendants' response thereto.

The Initial Case Management Conference set for Feb. 9, 2023, is
continued to Feb. 16, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. Pursuant to the Case
Management Order, the deadline for the parties to meet and confer
regarding initial disclosures, early settlement, ADR process
selection, and discovery plan, and to file ADR Certification, is
continued to 21 days in advance of the new Initial Case Management
Conference date, and the deadline for the parties to file Rule
26(f) reports and Case Management Statements is continued to 7 days
in advance of the new Initial Case Management Conference date.

A full-text copy of the Court's Stipulated Request and Order dated
Jan. 23, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4e8rt43j from
Leagle.com.

POMERANTZ LLP, Jennifer Pafiti -- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Attorneys
for Plaintiff Ronald A. Schoen.

Sara B. Brody -- SBRODY@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, in San
Francisco, California; Matthew J. Dolan -- MDOLAN@SIDLEY.COM --
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, in Palo Alto, California, Attorneys for
Defendants Eiger BioPharmaceuticals, Inc., David A. Cory, and
Sriram Ryali.


ENVIVA INC: Fanucchi Named Lead Plaintiff in Fagen Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID FAGEN v. ENVIVA INC., et al., Civil Action No.
DKC 22-2844 (D. Md.), Judge Deborah K. Chasanow of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland grants Dustin
Fanucchi's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and approval as
lead counsel.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this securities class
action is a motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and approval
of selection of counsel, filed by Mr. Fanucchi. The Court held a
recorded telephone conference on Jan. 31, 2023, to discuss the
pending motion.

On Nov. 3, 2022, Mr. Fagen filed a securities class action
complaint on behalf of himself and others who purchased or
otherwise acquired securities of Enviva between Feb. 21, 2019, and
Oct. 11, 2022. The action is subject to the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (the "PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4.
Pursuant to PSLRA requirements, Mr. Fagen caused a notice to be
published on Nov. 3, 2022. Accordingly, investors had 60 days to
file a motion to be appointed as lead plaintiff. Only one such
motion was filed, by Mr. Fanucchi, on Jan. 3, 2023. No competing
motions and no objections have been filed.

Judge Chasanow explains that the statute provides three factors for
a court to consider in making this determination: It creates a
rebuttable presumption that the "most adequate plaintiff" is the
person that (aa) has either filed the complaint or made a motion in
response to a notice under subparagraph (A)(i); (bb) in the
determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in
the relief sought by the class; and (cc) otherwise satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although there is only one movant seeking lead plaintiff status and
no objections have been filed, Judge Chasanow must examine the
record to determine whether he meets the requirements. She finds
that Mr. Fanucchi satisfies the first prong because he made a
motion in response to the notice filed by Mr. Fagen, which
satisfied the requirements of the PSLRA.

As for the second prong, while Mr. Fanucchi's approximated loss is
relatively modest, as the only movant, he necessarily has the
largest financial interest.

The third prong requires an analysis of the requirements of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Courts have narrowed this
inquiry for the purposes of the FSLRA to only the typicality and
adequacy requirements under Rule 23(a).

Judge Chasanow holds that Mr. Fanucchi satisfies these
requirements. His claims and the claims of the other class members
are the same: He alleges, as do all class members, that Defendants
made false or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
material facts in violation of the Exchange Act, he purchased
securities of Defendant Enviva Inc. during the class period, and he
claims to have sustained damages due to the drop in Enviva's share
price upon the disclosure of those misrepresentations and/or
omissions. There has been no suggestion of conflict of interest
with other class members.

Moreover, Judge Chasanow is satisfied that Mr. Fanucchi has made a
prima facie showing of adequacy. Accordingly, Mr. Fanucchi is
entitled to a presumption that he is the most adequate plaintiff.
Because no evidence has been presented rebutting that presumption,
he will be appointed as the Lead Plaintiff in the action.

As the lead plaintiff, Mr. Fanucchi may select lead counsel,
"subject to the approval of the court." He has selected the law
firm Pomerantz LLP as Lead Counsel and Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll PLLC as Liaison Counsel to represent the class in the action.
During the Jan. 31, 2023, recorded telephone conference, counsel
clarified that Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC's role as liaison
counsel would be akin to that of local counsel. The exhibits
submitted in support of these selections amply demonstrate both law
firms' experience in prosecuting cases of this nature. Accordingly,
Pomerantz LLP will be approved as the Lead Counsel, and Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC will be approved as the Liaison
(Local) Counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chasanow grants the motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff and approval as lead counsel. A
separate order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y4j9t2cd from Leagle.com.


ENVOLVE CLIENT: Partial Bid to Dismiss Alvarado FLSA Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALMA ALVARADO, Individually and for others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ENVOLVE CLIENT SERVICES GROUP, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. EP-22-CV-00292-FM (W.D. Tex.), Judge Frank
Montalvo of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas, El Paso Division:

   a. denies the Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack
      of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2); and

   b. grants in part and denies in part Alvarado's Opposed Motion
      to Transfer or Alternative Motion to Dismiss.

Alvarado was an hourly accountant for Envolve, "a real estate and
property management company" headquartered in Tennessee. She worked
for Envolve from approximately December 2019 until March 2022,
during which time she worked close to 60 hours per week. Envolve
required Alvarado to work through her lunch period, even as it also
required her to clock out for lunch. Envolve frequently failed to
pay Alvarado for work she did outside her scheduled start and end
times or for overtime compensation when she worked in excess of 40
hours in a week.

The Plaintiff filed a complaint in August 2022, alleging violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and seeking to represent a
collective of all similarly situated accountants who have worked
for the Defendant. The Defendant, who does not reside in Texas,
moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's collective action to the extent it
seeks to include claims against the Defendant by putative
nonresident collective action members where those claims are not
based on its forum-related contacts.

In response, the Plaintiff moved to transfer the action to the
Western District of Tennessee -- where the Defendant is subject to
general jurisdiction -- pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631 or,
alternatively, to dismiss without prejudice under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41 so that she may refile in Tennessee.

First, both parties agree the Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over FLSA claims by collective action members when those claims do
not arise from a defendant's contacts with the forum state. But the
law is not settled on this point: circuit courts disagree, and the
Fifth Circuit has not weighed in. Regardless, Judge Montalvo finds
the issue is not ripe for decision since a collective action has
not been conditionally certified.

Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion is premature. The same is true
for the Plaintiff's Motion, to the extent it seeks to transfer the
cause under Section 1631 as there is no "want of jurisdiction" in
this federal question case: only the Plaintiff and the Defendant
are currently before the Court, and the Defendant concedes the
Court has jurisdiction over it concerning the Plaintiff's personal
claim.

In the alternative to transfer, the Plaintiff moves to dismiss the
above-captioned cause without prejudice so that she may refile in
the Western District of Tennessee. Because the Defendant 1) filed
an answer and 2) opposes the Plaintiff's motion to dismiss without
prejudice, the Plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss only by Court
order, on terms that the Court considers proper. Dismissal by Court
order is without prejudice unless stated otherwise.

The Defendant argues voluntary dismissal is inappropriate because
it will suffer legal prejudice.

Judge Montalvo finds that the Plaintiff filed her complaint in late
August 2022, roughly five months ago. The Defendant filed an answer
as well as a short motion to dismiss in October. In response, the
Plaintiff filed a motion to transfer or voluntarily dismiss.

A schedule has not been set and there have been no hearings or
discovery. The Plaintiff is therefore not seeking to dismiss "at a
late stage of pretrial proceedings" nor have the parties expended
"significant" amounts of time and energy litigating. As such, the
Defendant will not suffer plain legal prejudice by an unconditional
grant of the Plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss. Neither is
there evidence of abuse by the Plaintiff. Hence, Judge Montalvo
holds that the Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal should be
freely granted.

Accordingly, Judge Montalvo denies the Defendant's Partial Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2) as premature. He denies Alvarado's Opposed Motion to
Transfer or Alternative Motion to Dismiss to the extent it seeks to
transfer the cause pursuant to Section 1631 and grants to the
extent it seeks to voluntarily dismiss the cause.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/w4vemkyy from Leagle.com.


ESSEX COUNTY, MA: Bid to Certify Class in Lucero v. ECCF Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MANUEL LUCERO, et al., Plaintiffs v. KEVIN
COPPINGER, et al., Defendants, Case No. 23-10088-LTS (D. Mass.),
Judge Leo T. Sorokin of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts issued a Memorandum and Order:

   (a) denying Plaintiff Manuel Lucero's motion to certify class;
       and

   (b) denying without prejudice Lucero's emergency motion for
       temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Judge Sorokin says if the Plaintiffs wish to proceed with this
action, on or before March 1, 2023, they either must pay the $402
filing fee or each Plaintiff must file an Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Costs or Fees and a copy of his
prison account statement.

On Jan. 13, 2023, Manuel Lucero, now in custody at the Essex County
Correctional Facility ("ECCF"), filed a motion to certify class and
an emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. At the same time, Lucero filed a complaint that is
signed by Lucero and 14 other inmates in custody at ECCF. The
Defendants named in the complaint are Kevin Coppinger, the Essex
County Sheriff; George Glynos, an ECCF grievance officer; "John
Doe" Udom, the ECCF medical director and facility physician; and
John Doe, the ECCF assistant superintendent. The Plaintiffs'
complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000cc. They contend that their statutory and
constitutional rights are being violated due to actions and
inactions surrounding COVID-19 policies.

No filing fee has been paid in connection with the filing of the
complaint and none of the 15 Plaintiffs have filed motions for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Mr. Lucero and the other 14 inmates, who signed the complaint, are
proceeding pro se. Although each of the Plaintiffs may bring a
claim or claims on his own behalf, none may represent another
inmate, Judge Sorokin says. For that reason, a pro se inmate may
not represent other inmates in a class action, Judge Sorokin points
out.

Because Lucero and the other plaintiffs are appearing pro se, and
they are not alleged to be attorneys admitted to the bar, Judge
Sorokin holds that they may not represent other inmates in a class
action. Without counsel, Judge Sorokin explains, Lucero cannot act
as a class representative nor can he represent any other
individually named plaintiff. Because Lucero cannot adequately
represent the interests of the class he has identified, the motion
to certify class is denied.

In the emergency motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, Lucero seeks to have the Court enjoin the
Defendants from depriving Covid-negative inmates from access to the
law library and religious services and enjoin any retaliation
against the Plaintiffs because of their participation in this
litigation.

The Court says it will not enter an injunction without first
providing the Defendants an opportunity to respond or be heard.
Here, Judge Sorokin says, there is no certification in writing of
any effort made to provide at least informal notice to the
Defendants and no details as to the reasons why such notice should
not be required. Thus, Judge Sorokin finds that Lucero has not
satisfied the requirements of either Rule 65(a)(1) or Rule
65(b)(1)(B).

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court orders that the motion
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is
denied without prejudice. The motion to certify class is denied.

If one or more of the Plaintiffs wish to proceed on a
self-represented basis, on or before March 1, 2023, they either
must pay the $402 filing fee or each Plaintiff must file an
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Costs or
Fees and a copy of his prison account statement for the 6-month
period preceding Jan. 13, 2023. Failure of any Plaintiff to comply
with these directives may result in the dismissal of that Plaintiff
from this action without prejudice.

The Clerk will provide each Plaintiff with a copy of the standard
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or
Costs and will send a copy of this Order to the Treasurer's Office
at the Essex County Correctional Facility in order to facilitate
any request by the Plaintiffs for copies of their certified prison
account statements.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Jan. 23,
2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4535j6zz from
Leagle.com.


ESSEX COUNTY, NJ: Greene Seeks Correctional Officers' Unpaid OT
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT GREENE and RYAN CONNELL, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF ESSEX,
Defendant, Case No. 2:23-cv-00572 (D.N.J., February 1, 2023) arises
from the Defendant's common policy and practices that have violated
Plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act by willfully
denying them overtime pay for the hours the employees spent in
mandatory training and working as instructors at Essex County
Police Academy.

Plaintiff Greene was employed by the County of Essex, as an Essex
County Correctional Police Officer while Plaintiff Connell was
employed by the County of Essex, as an Essex County Correctional
Police Superior Officer, with the rank of Lieutenant.

County of Essex is a governmental entity organized under the laws
of the State of New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Valerie Palma DeLuisi, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF NICHOLAS J. PALMA, ESQ., P.C.
          1425 Broad Street, Second Floor
          Clifton, NJ 07013
          Telephone: (973) 471-1121
          Facsimile: (973) 472-0032
          E-mail: VPD@PalmaLawFirm.com

               - and -

          Catherine M. Elston, Esq.
          C. ELSTON & ASSOCIATES, LLC
          309 Morris Ave., Suite E
          Spring Lake, NJ 07762
          Telephone: (732) 280-6911
          Facsimile: (732) 280-6955
          E-mail: CME@ElstonLaw.com

FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Extension of Class Cert. Deadlines Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RAFFI P. DERAVAKIAN, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, v. FIRSTSOURCE
ADVANTAGE, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-23428-CMA (S.D. Fla.), the Parties
ask the Court to enter an order granting a 60-day extensions of
class certification-related deadlines.

n this putative class action under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA"), the Court established a pre-trial schedule
requiring that class certification discovery be completed by
February 3, 2023 and for Plaintiff to file his motion for class
certification no later than February 13, 2023.

Having already conducted some class certification-related
discovery, the parties are actively engaged in class settlement
discussions and wish to concentrate their efforts on potential
resolution.

First Source Advantage provides business process management
solutions.

A copy of the Court's order dated Jan 26, 2023 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jJpULu at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James L. Davidson, Esq.
          Jesse S. Johnson, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          E-mail: jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com
                  jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com

                - and -

          Matisyahu H. Abarbanel, Esq.
          Matthew Bavaro, Esq.
          LOAN LAWYERS
          3201 Griffin Road, Suite 100
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33312
          Telephone: (954) 523-4357
          E-mail: Matis@Fight13.com
                  Matthew@Fight13.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Armando P. Rubio, Esq.
          John P. Golden, Esq.
          FIELDS HOWELL LLP
          9155 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1012
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (786) 870-5613
          Facsimile: (855) 802-5821
          E-mail: arubio@fieldshowell.com
                  jgolden@fieldshowell.com

GITHUB INC: Seeks Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as J. DOE 1 and J. DOE 2,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
GITHUB, INC., a Delaware corporation; MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a
Washington corporation; OPENAI, INC., a Delaware nonprofit
corporation; OPENAI, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership; OPENAI
GP, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company; OPENAI STARTUP
FUND GP I, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company; OPENAI
STARTUP FUND I, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership; OPENAI
STARTUP FUND MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Case No. 4:22-cv-06823-JST (N.D. Cal.), the Defendants ask the
Court to enter an order dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaint.

The Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state any claim against the
OpenAI Entities. The complaint should be dismissed in its entirety,
the Defendants contend.

The Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim fails because this is not an
independent cause of action. The Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim
should be dismissed on this ground alone. Separately, the
conspiracy claim fails because the complaint does not identify the
role of each Defendant in the formation and operation of the
alleged conspiracy, the wrongful acts done by each Defendant, or
anything else about the alleged conspiracy, other than four
paragraphs of boilerplate allegations, the Defendants add.

This case is about an emerging field of artificial intelligence
known as "Generative AI." Generative AI systems learn concepts and
relationships from large bodies of existing knowledge, and use what
they learn to help people create new works. Plaintiffs' lawsuit
challenges two generative AI tools that help people write computer
programming code -- GitHub Copilot and OpenAI Codex. But Plaintiffs
attempt to plead causes of action that don't actually apply to
these tools, rendering the complaint subject to dismissal on
multiple grounds.

OpenAI is the creator of Codex and a pioneer in the field of AI. It
is an independent company whose mission is to ensure that
artificial intelligence, including generative AI systems,
benefit all of humanity.

GitHub, Inc. is an Internet hosting service for software
development and version control using Git.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Jan 26, 2023 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HGd20x at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Michael A. Jacobs, Esq.
          Joseph C. Gratz, Esq.
          Tiffany Cheung, Esq.
          Rose S. Lee, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          425 Market Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105-2482
          Telephone: (415) 268-7000
          Facsimile: (415) 268-7522
          E-mail: MJacobs@mofo.com
                  JGratz@mofo.com
                  TCheung@mofo.com
                  RoseLee@mofo.com

GREATBANC TRUST: Court Refuses to Dismiss Laidig ERISA Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Paul Laidig, et al., Plaintiffs v. GreatBanc Trust
Company, et al., Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-1296 (N.D. Ill.), Judge
Mary M. Rowland of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division:

   a. denies GreatBanc's motion to dismiss;

   b. denies in large part the Brunner Defendants' motion to
      dismiss; and

   c. denies Berkshire Fund VI, LP's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Paul Laidig, Peter Lewis, and Michael Robbins are or
were employees of Vi-Jon, a manufacturer of personal care products
including hand sanitizer, and are participants in Vi-Jon's employee
stock ownership plan. They bring a putative class action complaint
alleging that, in 2020, Defendants GreatBanc Trust Co., Berkshire
Fund VI, LP, John Brunner, and the John G. Brunner Revocable Trust
violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by
causing and/or knowingly participating in the transaction leaving
Vi-Jon 100% employee-owned.

Non-party Vi-Jon established the Plan with an effective date of
Jan. 1, 2020. According to the Plaintiffs, the Plan constitutes an
"employee pension benefit plan" under 29 U.S.C. Section 1002(2)(A)
and an "employee stock ownership plan" (ESOP) under 29 U.S.C.
Section 1007(d)(6).

In August 2020, in a series of related transactions (the ESOP
Transaction), Berkshire and the Brunner Defendants sold Vi-Jon to
the Plan making Vi-Jon a 100% employee-owned company as the Plan's
participants are Vi-Jon's employees.

Through the ESOP Transaction, the Plan acquired 1,203,711 shares of
Vi-Jon stock, representing 100% of the issued shares, for a total
of $398,512,583. The Plan did not possess capital prior to the ESOP
Transaction and therefore borrowed 100% of the purchase price; as a
result, the Plan became indebted to the company for the outstanding
principal and interest, to be paid over 49 years. The Plan releases
shares of stock to participant accounts in proportion to the amount
of the total debt paid each year. The ESOP Transaction closed on
Aug. 20, 2020.

As of Dec. 31, 2020, 1,031 individuals participated in the Plan
with shares allocated to their individual accounts. Under the Plan
and ERISA, participants may receive a retirement benefit based on
the value of the shares allocated to their accounts upon
retirement.

In January 2020, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Vi-Jon
ramped up hand sanitizer production to meet and anticipate demand
for such products. It did well as the pandemic escalated in the
first half of 2020. The sharp increase in profits was, however,
temporary; by June 2020, many new competitors entered the space and
widely reported studies should have put Defendants on notice that
demand would decrease by August 2020. The Plaintiffs assert
Berkshire and the Brunner Defendants pushed the deal through and
determined the valuation with their advisors, latching on to
pandemic-driven sales figures notwithstanding the temporary nature
of the underlying market conditions. They allege that the
Defendants knew that ERISA's provisions prohibited the ESOP
Transaction.

As a result of the ESOP Transaction -- where the purchase price was
inflated, and debt load unsustainable -- employee participants in
the new Plan are the "losers as they suffer harm from the inflated
sale price.

The Plaintiffs bring the derivative action on behalf of the Plan.
Additionally and alternatively, they seek to represent a putative
class defined as follows: All participants and beneficiaries of the
Vi-Jon Employee Stock Ownership Plan at any time since its
inception, excluding Defendants, any fiduciary of the Plan, the
directors of Vi-Jon or of any entity in which a Defendant has a
controlling interest, and legal representatives, successors, and
assigns of any such excluded person.

The Plaintiffs assert two causes of action under ERISA: (1) Count I
alleges that GreatBanc caused a prohibited transaction in
contravention of 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a); and (2) Count II seeks
equitable relief under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3) against
Berkshire and the Brunner Defendants.

The Defendants have all moved to dismiss the complaint. GreatBanc
moves to dismiss Count I under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to
adequately allege Article III standing and under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to plead a remediable loss. The Brunner Defendants move to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the Plaintiffs have not
adequately alleged facts to support a claim for appropriate
equitable relief under ERISA. Berkshire moves to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1) for failure to plausibly allege standing and under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Judge Rowland addresses the parties' Article III standing argument
first. He opines that the Plaintiffs have adequately stated a
concrete Article III injury. He says (i) he cannot find the absence
of a concrete injury, where the Plaintiffs expressly plead
pecuniary harm resulting from the overvaluation of the company;
(ii) the Plaintiffs' allegations support the Plaintiffs' theory
that Vi-Jon's stock was overvalued, and ultimately caused their
concrete harm; (iii) ESOP transactions like the one at issue are
more susceptible to overvaluation and manipulation, resulting in
harm to Plan participants.

In sum, Judge Rowland finds the Plaintiffs have adequately stated a
concrete Article III injury. Judge Rowland accordingly rejects the
Defendants' motions as they relate to lack of standing.

Judge Rowland now turns to the merits. In Count I, the Plaintiffs
allege that GreatBanc, a Plan fiduciary, caused the Plan to engage
in a prohibited transaction -- namely, a direct or indirect sale or
exchange of any property with parties in interest -- in violation
of 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a)(1)(A). In moving to dismiss, GreatBanc
advances a single argument -- that the Plaintiffs speculate that
the company was overvalued but do not state a cognizable loss
redressable under Section 409.

Judge Rowland opines that this argument is essentially a
repackaging of its standing arguments and has no merit. She says
the Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the Plan overpaid by not only
pointing to the valuation immediately following the transaction,
but by alleging facts about how the company failed to sell at
similar prices for the decade leading up to the ESOP Transaction
and how the Defendants' valuation failed to account for the
prospect of declining profitability after the initial boom from the
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. These allegations raise an
inference that the company was overvalued and that GreatBanc, as
the Plan fiduciary, is liable for any losses as a result.

In Count II, the Plaintiffs attempt to hold Berkshire and the
Brunner Defendants liable under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3).
Berkshire argues that Count II should be dismissed in the event
Count I is dismissed, because liability for non-fiduciaries is
derivative of a fiduciary's liability.

Judge Rowland opines that Berkshire correctly recognizes that its
liability is derivative of GreatBanc's. However, she says the
Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded loss, and the Court has declined to
dismiss Count I. Because the Plaintiffs' claim against GreatBanc
stands, Berkshire's also remains viable, unless subject to
dismissal for other reasons.

Berkshire and the Brunner Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs fail
to plead its knowing participation of an ERISA violation, arguing
that it is insufficient for the Plaintiffs to allege merely that
the ESOP Transaction took place. But the Plaintiffs here plead more
than mere knowledge of the transaction against both sets of the
Defendants.

Berkshire next contends that the Plaintiffs fail to adequately
allege entitlement to equitable relief. Based on the allegation and
the Plaintiffs' representations in their brief, Judge Rowland is
satisfied that the Plaintiffs appropriately seek an equitable
remedy against non-fiduciaries Berkshire and the Brunner
Defendants.

Berkshire and the Brunner Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs
have not, as they must, adequately alleged that any ESOP property
can be traced to any particular fund or account within their
control. Judge Rowland disagrees. She says the Plaintiffs clearly
allege that the Defendants received ill-gotten gains from the ESOP
Transaction, thus raising the inference that those gains are
currently kept in the Defendants' accounts.

The Brunner Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' request for
declaratory arguing that such relief generally is unavailable for
past acts like the ESOP Transaction. The Plaintiffs ask the Court
to declare that: (1) GreatBanc caused the Plan to engage in
prohibited transactions; (2) such prohibited transactions did not
satisfy requirements for exemption under ERISA; and (3) Berkshire
and Brunner Defendants knowingly participated in prohibited
transactions in violation of ERISA.

These are requests for the Court to declare violations of a
transaction that already occurred, which is not appropriate, Judge
Rowland holds. Indeed, courts typically decline to grant
declaratory relief when plaintiffs are merely seeking a declaration
of liability, which plaintiffs appear to do." Thus, she strikes the
Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief.

The Brunner Defendants next move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' request
for rescission of the ESOP Transaction, which they request in the
alternative to equitable relief. On the contrary, as the Plaintiffs
explain in their opposition brief, they request rescission to
return the parties to their pre-ESOP Transaction positions:
returning the company shares to the original shareholders in
exchange for the employee compensation used in the prohibited
transactions. This, according to Judge Rowland, is an appropriate
request for relief under ERISA.

Finally, the Brunner Defendants also move to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' request for "other appropriate relief" because it is
vague and non-specific as to the form of relief sought. Because the
Plaintiffs do not substantively address this argument, Judge
Rowland deems their silence a waiver. She therefore strikes the
Plaintiffs' vague request for "other appropriate relief."

For the reasons she explained, Judge Rowland denies GreatBanc's
motion to dismiss, denies in large part the Brunner Defendants'
motion to dismiss, and denies Berkshire's motion to dismiss. As a
result of her rulings, the Plaintiffs' requests for declaratory
relief and for "other appropriate relief" are stricken from the
complaint's prayer for relief. The complaint otherwise stands as
pled. The Defendants are directed to answer the complaint by Feb.
21, 2023.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p87vsp5 from
Leagle.com.


GRIDSUM HOLDING: Barth Seeks Extension of Briefing Schedule
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Xu v. Gridsum Holding Inc.
et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-03655-GHW (S.D.N.Y.), the Lead Plaintiff
William Barth asks the Court to enter an order extending the
briefing schedule for the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiffs request a two-week extension of time to file their
motions for class certification due to counsel's unforseen
scheduling conflicts. If granted, the Plaintiffs motion for class
certification would be due on Feb. 17, 2023, the Defendants
opposition (if any) would de due on April 21, 2023, and Plaintiffs'
reply (if any) would be due on May 22, 2023.

Gridsum is a leading provider of sophisticated data analysis
software for multinational and domestic enterprises and government
agencies in China.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Jan 26, 2023 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Ypnhx0 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lawrence P. Eagel, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
          810 Seventh Avenue, Suite 620
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 308-5888
          Facsimile: (212) 214-0506

GVG CAPITAL: Bid to Strike Eagle Class Claims Denied W/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH EAGLE, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GVG CAPITAL, LLC, d/b/a
WeBuyHomes4Cash.org, Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-00638-SRB (W.D.
Mo.), Judge Stephen R. Bough of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, Western Division, denies the
Defendant's Motion to Strike Class Allegations without prejudice.

In a companion Order, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The companion Order set forth
the applicable facts and law.

The Plaintiff asserts three causes of action against the Defendant
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"). She asserts
these claims on behalf of herself, and also seeks to represent
three classes of similarly situated individuals.

The proposed classes are as follows:

     Federal Do-Not-Call Registry Class: All persons throughout the
United States (1) to whom GVG Capital, LLC delivered, or caused to
be delivered, more than one text message within a 12-month period,
promoting GVG Capital, LLC's or its business partners' goods or
services, (2) where the person's residential telephone number had
been registered with the National Do Not Call Registry for at least
thirty days before GVG Capital, LLC delivered, or caused to be
delivered, at least two of the text messages within the 12-month
period, (3) within four years preceding the date of this complaint
through the date of class certification.

     Revocation Class: All persons and entities throughout the
United States (1) to whom GVG Capital, LLC delivered, or caused to
be delivered, more than one text message within a 12-month period,
promoting GVG Capital, LLC's or its business partners' goods or
services, (2) after the texted party informed GVG Capital, LLC that
he or she did not wish to receive text messages, or after the
texted party instructed GVG Capital, LLC to stop delivering text
messages to the telephone number, (3) within four years preceding
the date of this complaint through the date of class
certification.

     Sender Identification Class: All persons and entities
throughout the United States (1) to whom GVG Capital, LLC
delivered, or caused to be delivered, more than one text message
within a 12-month period, promoting GVG Capital, LLC's or its
business partners' goods or services, (2) where the subject text
messages did not state the name of the individual caller, the name
of GVG Capital, LLC, and a telephone number or address at which GVG
Capital, LLC may be contacted, (3) within four years preceding the
date of this complaint through the date of class certification.

The Defendant now moves to strike the Plaintiff's proposed class
allegations and definitions. It argues in part that the Plaintiff's
proposed class definitions include a huge number of people who lack
Article III standing to pursue a claim, and Plaintiff also cannot
represent individuals who received telephone solicitations or
telemarketing text messages. The Plaintiff opposes the motion and
argues that her claims are eminently suitable for class treatment.

First, the Defendant moves to strike the class allegations because
the Plaintiff and the proposed class members lack standing. To
establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact,
(2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.

Based on this authority and the Plaintiff's allegations, Judge
Bough rejects the Defendant's standing arguments. He finds that the
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant sent her and all proposed
class members unwanted text messages in violation of the TCPA. She
alleges that she suffered actual harm as a result of the text
messages at issue in that she suffered an invasion of privacy, an
intrusion into her life, and a private nuisance. The Plaintiff
further alleges that she suffered the same injuries as members of
the classes. At this early stage of litigation, Judge Bough finds
that the Plaintiff and the putative class members have standing.

Second, the Defendant raises arguments presented in its motion to
dismiss, including that the Plaintiff is not a member of any of the
proposed class because she never received a solicitation. It
similarly argues that she is not a member of the Seller
Identification Class because 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d) applies
only to phone calls, not text messages. Judge Bough rejects these
arguments for the reasons stated in the companion Order denying the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.

Third, the Defendant moves to strike the proposed classes because
the proposed classes are overly broad and lack commonality. The
Plaintiff disagrees, and further argues that the Court should allow
her a reasonable opportunity to conduct class discovery before
addressing whether she ultimately will satisfy the elements of Rule
23.

Upon review, Judge Bough finds the Defendant's arguments premature.
The case is in its early stages and discovery has not yet
commenced. Consequently, prior to any class discovery or a motion
for class certification, the Court cannot determine whether
individualized matters will predominate over common issues. The
Plaintiffs have set forth plausible claims for relief. For these
reasons, the Defendant's motion to strike is denied as premature.

Accordingly, Judge Bough denies the Defendant's Motion to Strike
Class Allegations without prejudice. He denies the Defendant's
request for oral argument as unnecessary and as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4y38thuy from Leagle.com.


GVG CAPITAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Eagle TCPA Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH EAGLE, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GVG CAPITAL, LLC, d/b/a
WeBuyHomes4Cash.org, Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-00638-SRB (W.D.
Mo.), Judge Stephen R. Bough of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, Western Division, denies the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Kansas City, Missouri, and has a
cellular telephone number. She uses her cellular telephone as her
personal residential telephone number. On Aug. 22, 2012, the
Plaintiff registered her cellular telephone number with the
National Do-Not-Call Registry ("DNC Registry"). The Defendant is a
marketing and lead generation company located in Texas.

In May 2022, the Plaintiff began receiving text messages on her
cellular telephone from a series of different telephone numbers. In
general, the text messages asked her whether she was interested in
selling her home.

The text messages directed the Plaintiff to the website
WeBuyHomes4Cash.org, which is a real estate website that purports
to buy homes and/or provides home selling services. The Plaintiff
believes that the Defendant also collects and sells consumer data
to other individuals/entities as "motivated home seller" leads. She
alleges that the Defendant either (1) solicited Plaintiff to sell
her home to it at a discount in order for it to resell her home at
a profit, or (2) solicited her to submit her information to the
Defendant's lead generation service and use its lead generation
services, which it would then sell to other businesses for a
profit.

The Plaintiff did not recognize the sender of the text messages,
did not request any quotes for her home, and was not interested in
the Defendant's services or marketing. On several occasions, she
responded to the text messages with "STOP" or similar instructions.
Nonetheless, she received dozens of text messages from the
Defendant. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant knew, or should
have known, that she registered her cellular telephone number with
the DNC Registry. She further alleges that because the Defendant
repeatedly failed to heed her instructions to stop delivering text
messages to her telephone number, it did not maintain or adhere to
any internal or external do-not call lists.

On Oct. 7, 2022, the Plaintiff filed the lawsuit against the
Defendant on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated. She alleges that the Defendant's text messages
violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") and
accompanying regulations.

The Plaintiff asserts the following claims: Count I - Violation of
47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)(5) On Behalf of the Federal Do-Not-Call
Registry Class; Count II - Violation of 47 U.S.C. Section
227(c)(5) On Behalf of the Revocation Class; and Count III -
Violation of 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)(5) On Behalf of the Sender
Identification Class.

The Defendant now moves to dismiss each claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It argues that the Complaint does not
adequately allege a violation of the TCPA. The Plaintiff opposes
the motion.

In Count I, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated the
TCPA by delivering, or causing to be delivered, to her and the
members of the Federal Do-Not-Call Registry Class, more than one
solicitation call or text message in a 12-month period. The
Defendant moves to dismiss Count I because the Plaintiff fails to
allege a telephone solicitation and fails to allege the texts were
sent within a 12-month period.

Judge Bough holds that at the motion to dismiss stage, the
Plaintiff has adequately pled factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. The Complaint also adequately alleges more
than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf
of the same entity. For all these reasons, the Defendant's motion
to dismiss Count I is denied.

In Count II, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 47
C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d)(6) because on multiple occasions she
responded to its text messages with variations of the instruction
to 'stop.' She alleges that because the Defendant repeatedly failed
to heed her instructions to stop delivering text messages, it did
not maintain or adhere to any internal do not call lists. The
Defendant argues this claim should be dismissed because the
Complaint does not adequately allege that it lacks an internal DNC
Policy.

Upon review, Judge Bough rejects the Defendant's arguments. He says
at the motion to dismiss stage, it is reasonable to infer that the
Defendant did not have internal procedures regarding do not call
requests as required by 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d). Additionally,
the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant sent her text messages
between May 2022 and October 2022. These allegations support an
inference that the Defendant did not honor the Plaintiff's requests
within a reasonable time from the date such requests were made.
Hence, the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count II is denied.

Count III asserts a claim under 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)(5) and 47
C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d)(4). The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant's text messages failed to provide the required contact
information and disclosures. The Defendant argues Count III should
be dismissed because this regulation applies "only to calls, not
text messages."

Judge Bough finds that Count III is adequately pled. The FCC has
recognized that the TCPA and implementing regulations apply to both
voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for
example, short message service calls. At the motion to dismiss
stage, the Defendant has failed to show that Section 64.1200(d)(4)
should be treated differently than other provisions of Section
64.1200(d). Sections 64.1200(d), (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4),
(d)(5), and (d)(6) all refer to "call," "calls," or "do-not-call"
lists. Consequently, the Defendant's text messages fall under 47
C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d)(4). However, the Defendant may reassert
this argument at the summary judgment stage.

For the foregoing reasons, and for the additional reasons stated by
the Plaintiff, Judge Bough denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim. He denies its request for oral
argument as unnecessary and as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p9fxbkh from Leagle.com.


HADCO METAL: Perkins Labor and FCRA Suit Removed to N.D. Cal.
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled QUINCY GRIFFIN PERKINS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HADCO METAL TRADING
SANTA FE SPRINGS CA dba RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS INC.; an DOES
1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 22CV021674, was removed from
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of
Alameda to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California on February 2, 2023.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:23-cv-00502 to the proceeding.

The Complaint is a purported class action alleging the following
causes of action: (1) failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to
provide meal periods; (3) failure to provide rest periods; (4)
failure to pay timely wages at end of employment; (5) failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) failure to indemnify
necessary business expenses; (7) violations of unfair competition
law; (8) improper use of consumer credit report; (9) violation of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act for failure to make proper
disclosures; (10) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act for
failure to obtain proper authorization; (11) failure to make proper
disclosure and obtain proper authorization; and (12) failure to
make proper disclosures.

Hadco Metal Trading Santa Fe Springs CA, dba Ryder Integrated
Logistics Inc., provides transportation services.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Mara D. Curtis, Esq.
          Rafael N. Tumanyan, Esq.
          Tanner J. Hendershot, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2900
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1514
          Telephone: (213) 457-8000
          Facsimile: (213) 457-8080
          E-mail: mcurtis@reedsmith.com
                  rtumanyan@reedsmith.com
                  thendershot@reedsmith.com

HELLA BITTER: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hella Bitter, LLC.
The case is styled as Joyce Carrico, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Hella Bitter, LLC, Case No.
1:23-cv-00925 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 3, 2023).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Hella Bitter doing business as Hella Cocktail Co. --
https://hellacocktail.co/ -- is a mixology company crafted with
integrity and rooted in discovery for everyone who wants to taste
more and know more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          225 Broadway, Ste. 39th Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


HI.Q INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Quiles Suit; Proceedings Stayed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KARYSSA QUILES, on behalf of herself and on behalf of
all others similarly situated Plaintiff v. HI.Q, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 5:22-cv-669-PGB-PRL (M.D. Fla.), Magistrate Judge Philip
R. Lammens of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Ocala Division, grants the Defendant's unopposed motion to
compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration.

Upon referral, the case, brought under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 2101, is before the
Court for consideration of the Defendant's unopposed motion to
compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration.

The Defendant's motion recites that, under the relevant terms of
the Plaintiff's employment, the Plaintiff's claims are subject to
"Arbitration and Class Action, Collective Action, and
Representative Action Waiver provisions" contained in the parties'
"Proprietary Information & Inventions Assignment and Arbitration
Agreement." The Arbitration Agreement explicitly requires
arbitration of "any statutory claims under local, state, or federal
law, including, but not limited to, claims under the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act."

The Defendant has attached a copy of the relevant documents,
including the Arbitration Agreement. It recites that the Plaintiff
consents to the motion, and there appears to be no dispute that the
Arbitration Agreement is enforceable and covers the Plaintiff's
claims brought.

Accordingly, Judge Lammens grants the Defendant's unopposed motion
to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration. She stays further proceedings in the action pending
completion of arbitration. The case is referred to arbitration
pursuant to the parties' Arbitration Agreement and the Federal
Arbitration Act. The Clerk is directed to administratively close
the file with the right of either party to move to reopen the file
after arbitration or for other good cause shown.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yckwzw8z from Leagle.com.


HOLIDAY DIVER: Garcia Sues Over Unsolicited Text Message Ads
------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN GARCIA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HOLIDAY DIVER, INC., doing business as
DIVERS DIRECT, Defendant, Case No. CACE-23-001361 (Fla. Cir., 17th
Judicial, Broward Cty., February 1, 2023) is a putative class
action brought by the Plaintiff pursuant to the Florida Telephone
Solicitation Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant sent text message
advertisements that promoted Divers Direct's services and products
without transmitting to the recipients' caller identification
service a telephone number that was capable of receiving telephone
calls and that connected to either the telephone solicitor or the
Defendant. These Divers Direct text message advertisements are part
of an elaborate text marketing campaign by Defendant that uses
various approaches to attempt to drive business to its online
store, says the suit.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a class of persons
similarly situated, further seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's unlawful conduct, and any other available legal or
equitable remedies.

Plaintiff, John Garcia, is the regular user of a cellular telephone
number that receives Defendant's telephonic sales calls.

Holiday Diver, Inc., doing business as Divers Direct, retails a
wide variety of scuba equipment and services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua A. Glickman, Esq.
          Shawn A. Heller, Esq.
          SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW COLLECTIVE, PL
          974 Howard Ave.
          Dunedin, FL 34698
          Telephone: (202) 709-5744
          Facsimile: (866) 893-0416
          E-mail: josh@sjlawcollective.com
                  shawn@sjlawcollective.com

HORNELL BREWING: Bid to Remand Brunts Suit to State Court Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned NICHOLAS BRUNTS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HORNELL
BREWING CO., INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:22CV648 HEA (E.D.
Mo.), Judge Henry Edward Autrey of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denies the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Case to State Court.

On April 8, 2022, Brunts filed the putative class action proceeding
against the Defendants in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County,
Missouri, alleging breach of warranty, breach of implied contract,
unjust enrichment, and violations of the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act ("MMPA"). The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants
sold a variety of AriZona beverages, falsely labeling that the
products were "All Natural" when the beverages contained added
coloring.

The Plaintiff's claims concern the labels of the following AriZona
beverages: Kiwi Strawberry Fruit Juice Cocktail; Lemonade Fruit
Juice Cocktail; Mucho Mango Fruit Juice Cocktail; Fruit Punch Fruit
Juice Cocktail; Orangeade; Grapeade; Lemonade Drink Mix; Golden
Bear Strawberry Lemonade; Watermelon Fruit Juice Cocktail and Rx
Energy Herbal Tonic (collectively, the "AriZona Beverages").

The Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, restitution, attorney's
fees, rescission, and such further relief as the Court deems just,
including injunctive relief, and all profits, benefits, and other
compensation obtained by the Defendant through the inequitable
conduct, on behalf of a putative class of Missouri citizens, who
purchased the AriZona Beverages over a five-year period in
Missouri.

Defendant Hornell Brewing timely removed the matter to the federal
court, invoking this Court's diversity jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d). In
turn, the Plaintiff filed its motion, requesting this case be
remanded to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri.

In support of his motion to remand, the Plaintiff argues that the
minimum amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional
threshold of $5 million necessary to establish jurisdiction under
CAFA.

The Plaintiff argues that his precertification stipulation of
damages in his Petition that disclaims any recovery exceeding $5
million on behalf of himself and the "purported class" prevents
removal pursuant to CAFA, incorrectly relying on Rolwing v. Nestle
Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
damages stipulation could preclude removal under CAFA).

The Plaintiff contends that his stipulation addresses the concerns
in Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 595 (2013),
regarding a precertification stipulation for damages because his
counsel, who singularly chooses the individual to present to the
Court as a putative class representative, stipulates, as a
condition of bringing and presenting this action, that any such
representative must also stipulate to limit recoverable damages.

Judge Autrey opines that the Plaintiff's argument to overcome
Standard Fire and its progeny by this type of precertification
stipulation has been rejected not only by this Court, but at least
four other Courts in this district, citing Muller v.
Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare Holdings (US) LLC et al.,
4:22CV670 HEA, 2022 WL 17718628, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2022).

The Court agrees with Muller. Judge Autrey explains that CAFA
jurisdiction is not defeated by the Plaintiff's precertification
stipulation of damages because he cannot legally bind members of
the proposed class before the class is certified.

Next, the Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hornell Brewing has not
demonstrated, with specific facts or evidence, that there is at
least $5 million in controversy to meet its burden for removal
purposes.

In its Removal Notice, Defendant Hornell Brewing attached a
declaration of Don Vultaggio, who is the Chairman of both Defendant
Hornell Brewing and Arizona Beverages USA, LLC, (ABU), and is
familiar with the AriZona Beverages at issue here. Vultaggio's
declaration states, under oath, that from January 2018 through the
end of 2021, ABU's sales of the AriZona Beverages in Missouri
exceed $7 million.

Further, the Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney's fees. When
considering the total estimated sales together with the Plaintiff's
request for attorney's fees, the Court finds Defendant Hornell
Brewing has carried its burden to show that CAFA's amount in
controversy is met.

After the party seeking to remove has shown CAFA's jurisdictional
minimum by a preponderance of the evidence, remand is only
appropriate if the plaintiff can establish to a legal certainty
that the claim is for less than the requisite amount, Judge Autrey
notes. The Plaintiff attempts to meet this burden by his proposed
recovery, set forth in his Petition, that would be "a percentage of
the price paid for the Product."

Judge Autrey opines that the Plaintiff makes no attempt to identify
the actual percentage he will seek to recover, but asserts that
hypothetically, the percentage could be 25% or lower. The Plaintiff
ignores his allegations in his Petition where he seeks to recover a
full refund and disgorgement for all profits, benefits, and other
compensation obtained by the Defendant through this inequitable
conduct. Judge Autrey holds that the Plaintiff fails to show that
it is legally impossible for his and the putative class to recover
more than $5 million.

Judge Autrey finds that Defendant Hornell Brewing showed by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is
met, and the Plaintiff did not establish to a legal certainty that
the claim is for less than the requisite amount. Therefore, the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d), and the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand will be denied.

Accordingly, Judge Autrey denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
Case to State Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion, Memorandum and Order dated
Jan. 23, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/dmrtb94w from
Leagle.com.


INTEGRATIVE PSYCHIATRY: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Integrative
Psychiatry, Inc. The case is styled as Andrew Toro, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Integrative
Psychiatry, Inc., Case No. 1:23-cv-00870 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 2, 2023).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Integrative Psychiatry -- https://www.integrativepsychiatry.net/ --
is dedicated to bringing experience-based personal care, informed
by data, and backed by science, to help costumers stay
healthy.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


JEFFERSON CAPITAL: Hernandez Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Kentucky
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jefferson Capital
Systems, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Tina Hernandez,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC, ABC Legal Services, Inc., Case No.
2:23-cv-00017-DLB-EBA (E.D. Ky., Feb. 2, 2023).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Jefferson Capital -- https://www.jcap.com/ -- is a leading
purchaser and solutions provider in the consumer finance
industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert Yusko, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Suite 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500


JETBLUE AIRWAYS: Buehler Sues Over Anticompetitive Arrangement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dianne Buehler, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION and AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP
INC., Case No. 1:23-cv-10281 (D. Mass., Feb. 2, 2023), is brought
against the Defendants' anticompetitive arrangement and
anticompetitive conduct that has raised the prices of airfare, not
just for their own customers, but for all air travelers nationwide,
in violation of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.

The Northeast Alliance is a series of agreements between American
and JetBlue in which American and JetBlue promised to collude, not
compete. The agreements bind the companies to coordinate their
flight offerings and jointly decide which company would fly which
route, using which plane, at what time—in other words, to
allocate the supply of flight offerings between them, artificially
limiting the capacity available to purchasers. They agreed not to
sell or lease any of their assets (slots or gates) to other
competitors, and to rearrange who controlled which slots to
maximize their collective ability to coordinate their schedules to
support price increases. To cement the collaboration contemplated
by the Northeast Alliance, American and JetBlue agreed to pool and
split their excess revenue from the Alliance--which disincentivized
competition between the two airlines, and incentivized them to
raise prices, and allow their former competitor to raise theirs, so
that both would benefit.

American and JetBlue have reaped rich rewards since the companies
began implementing the Northeast Alliance in January or February
2021. American is free to raise prices in the Northeast without
fear of competition from its now-collaborator, JetBlue. JetBlue is
free to raise prices without fear of competition from one of the
most powerful market participants, American. Under the Northeast
Alliance, the companies restricted the available ticket offerings
and charged more than they could if they had to compete with one
another. The Northeast Alliance is a win-win for JetBlue and
American.

But purchasers have lost. The Northeast Alliance has caused
passengers and purchasers to bear increased costs for the same, or
worse, service, that was more affordable before American and
JetBlue agreed to collude. Purchaser savings from the JetBlue
Effect, which JetBlue had estimated to exceed $10 billion
(including $3 billion at Boston Logan alone) since its founding,
vanished. And the fare-increasing effects of American and JetBlue's
Northeast Alliance have trickled through the industry, raising
fares on all airlines.

This sort of horizontal market allocation, where two competitors
agree not to compete for customers in order to preserve or enhance
their own profits, is precisely the sort of anticompetitive
arrangement that is condemned as per se illegal. The United States
Department of Justice (DOJ), the United States Department of
Transportation (DOT), and several states' attorneys general have
all recognized that the defendants' conduct was illegal.

As a result of this illegal arrangement, purchasers have been
forced to pay more for scheduled commercial air service into,
through, or out of the Northeast than they would have paid if
American and JetBlue had not formed the Northeast Alliance. These
increased fares represent a classic form of antitrust injury:
overcharges.

This lawsuit seeks monetary relief for victims of American and
JetBlue's misconduct. It seeks to hold American and JetBlue liable
for violating the federal antitrust laws. The Northeast Alliance
represents a contract, combination, and conspiracy to acquire,
maintain, and leverage unearned market power in the market for
scheduled commercial air passenger service in the Northeast. And
after acquiring that power, American and JetBlue restricted supply
by splitting the market between themselves, and raised prices. As a
result, purchasers have been overcharged for commercial air
passenger service since the Northeast Alliance's inception.

American and JetBlue should not be allowed to retain their
ill-gotten gains. The DOJ and state attorneys general have sought
to end the the Defendants' anticompetitive practices; the time to
remedy the harm already wrought on purchasers is now, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff resides in Massachusetts and purchased airfare from
JetBlue in 2022.

JetBlue Airways Corporation, is an airline incorporated in Delaware
and headquartered in Long Island City, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kathleen M. Donovan-Maher, Esq.
          Steven L. Groopman, Esq.
          Kristie A. LaSalle, Esq.
          Christina L. Gregg, Esq.
          BERMAN TABACCO
          One Liberty Square
          Boston, MA 02109
          Phone: (617) 542-8300
          Facsimile: (617) 542-1194
          Email: kdonovanmaher@bermantabacco.com
                 sgroopman@bermantabacco.com
                 klasalle@bermantabacco.com
                 cgregg@bermantabacco.com

               - and -

          Todd A. Seaver, Esq.
          Matthew D. Pearson, Esq.
          BERMAN TABACCO
          One California Street, Suite 900
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Phone: (415) 433-3200
          Facsimile: (415) 433-6382
          Email: tseaver@bermandetabacco.com
                 mpearson@bermantabacco.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Carroll Sues Over Secret Reporting of Data
-------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Carroll, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC., a Nevada corporation
d/b/a TYLENOL.COM; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No.
23STCV02483 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Feb. 3, 2023), is
brought against the Defendant for violations of the Video Privacy
Protection Act as a result of the Defendant who secretly report all
the details of the visitors' personally identifiable information
("PII"), the titles watched, and more.

Whenever someone watches a video on www.tylenol.com (the
"Website"), Defendants secretly report all the details to Facebook:
the visitor's personally identifiable information ("PII"), the
titles watched, and more. When Plaintiff watched videos on the
Website, the Defendants disclosed event data, which recorded and
disclosed the video's title, description, and URL, to Facebook.
Alongside this event data, Defendants also disclosed identifiers
for the Plaintiff, including the c_user and fr cookies. In other
words, Defendants did exactly what the VPPA prohibits: they
disclosed Plaintiff's video viewing habits to a third party.
Visitors would be shocked and appalled to know that Defendants
secretly disclose to Facebook all of the key data regarding a
visitor's viewing habits.

The Defendants' conduct is illegal, offensive, and contrary to
visitor expectations: indeed, a recent study conducted by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, a respected thought leader
regarding digital privacy, found that: nearly 9 in 10 adults are
"very concerned" about data privacy, and 75% of adults are unaware
of the extent to which companies gather, store, and exploit their
personal data. By disclosing Plaintiff's event data and identifiers
to Facebook, Defendant knowingly disclosed Plaintiff's PII to a
third party, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff watched a video on the Website.

The Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls the Website,
www.tylenol.com.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott J. Ferrell, Esq.
          PACIFIC TRIAL ATTORNEYS
          A Professional Corporation
          4100 Newport Place Drive, Ste. 800
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Phone: (949) 706-6464
          Fax: (949) 706-6469
          Email: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com


JOHNSON HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss Prince Complaint Granted in Part
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WENDY PRINCE, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JOHNSON HEALTH TECH
TRADING, Inc., JOHNSON HEALTH TECH RETAIL, Inc., and JOHNSON HEALTH
TECH, Inc., Defendants, Civil Action No. 5:22-cv-00035 (W.D. Va.),
Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, Harrisonburg Division, grants in part
and denies in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

The lawsuit is a putative class action brought by Prince, on behalf
of herself and similarly situated purchasers of Horizon Fitness
treadmills. Defendants Johnson Health Tech Trading, Inc., Johnson
Health Tech Retail, Inc., and Johnson Health Tech, Inc.
(collectively referred to as Johnson Health or Horizon), move to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court held a hearing on this motion on Dec. 15,
2022.

The amended class action complaint alleges that the subject
treadmills are incapable of reaching and maintaining Horizon's
continuous horsepower (CHP) representations during normal designed
household exercise use. Treadmill horsepower rating is a prevalent
and recognized specification used by consumers when purchasing a
treadmill. Horizon misled consumers into believing that the
treadmills generate and maintain the represented CHP, even though
the represented horsepower can never be obtained during actual
household use by plaintiff and the class and subclass members.

Horizon marketed and sold the treadmills as maintaining a certain
"continuous horsepower" or "continuous duty horsepower." CHP is a
measurement of the motor's ability to maintain and continuously
produce power over an extended period of time without exceeding the
current rating of the motor. Horizon's treadmills are only capable
of producing a fraction of the misrepresented CHP due to the
treadmill's onboard electrical circuit breaker, as well as the
electrical limits commonly found in households throughout the
United States.

The Plaintiff purchased a Horizon 7.8 AT Treadmill online directly
from Horizon's website on or about Nov. 9, 2020, for the purpose of
using the treadmill at her home located in Shenandoah, Virginia.
Horizon's website noted that the 7.8 AT Treadmill delivered 4.0
CHP, but the Plaintiff has not received the CHP that Horizon
represented. She paid $1,999 for the treadmill. She would not have
purchased her treadmill, or would have paid considerably less, if
she had known its true horsepower capabilities.

The Plaintiff brings the action on behalf of herself and a
nationwide class defined as follows: All persons in the United
States who purchased a Horizon treadmill, during the maximum period
of time permitted by law, for personal, family, or household
purposes, and not for resale.

The Plaintiff also brings the action on behalf of a
Virginia-state-wide class (Virginia subclass) defined as follows:
All persons in the State of Virginia who purchased a Horizon
treadmill, during the maximum period of time permitted by law, for
personal, family, or household purposes, and not for resale.

The Plaintiff brings claims for (1) breach of express warranty
(nationwide class); (2) breach of express warranty—Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act (MMWA); (3) breach of express warranty (Va. Code
Section 8.2-313) (Virginia subclass); (4) breach of implied
warranty (nationwide class or alternatively, Virginia subclass
pursuant to Va. Code Section 8.2-314); (5) breach of implied
warranty -- Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA); (6) constructive
fraud (Virginia subclass); and (7) Virginia Consumer Protection Act
(VCPA) (Va. Code Section 59.1-198, -200) (Virginia subclass).

Initially, Judge Dillon examines the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction. She says when a motion is filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that subject matter jurisdiction exists.

Johnson Health argues that the Plaintiff does not have standing to
assert claims related to treadmills she did not purchase.

Judge Dillon finds that the Plaintiff has standing to assert claims
related to treadmills she did not purchase because the treadmill
she purchased is substantially similar to all Horizon treadmills
and her claims are substantially similar to those of the other
class members. In addition, she finds that Congress' purpose in
enacting CAFA was to expand subject matter jurisdiction in the
federal courts. So, once CAFA's requirements have been satisfied,
MMWA's additional jurisdictional requirements need not also be
satisfied. Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction under CAFA.

Next, Judge Dillon considers the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must
contain facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.

First, the Defendants argue that Johnson Health Tech, Inc., should
be dismissed as a defendant because it does not exist. The
Plaintiff argues that there is an issue of fact as to whether this
is an entity that may be subject to liability in this action.
Plaintiff attaches two press releases that reference Johnson Health
Tech, Inc.

Judge Dillon does not consider the exhibits because the motion to
dismiss Johnson Health Tech, Inc. is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and
she must confine herself to the pleadings. However, at this stage,
she can only conclude that the Plaintiff has stated a claim against
an entity called Johnson Health Tech, Inc. that may or may not be
an existing legal entity. The status of Johnson Health Tech, Inc.
as a viable defendant must be resolved through the discovery
process.

Second, the Plaintiff maintains that she has adequately pled the
existence of a warranty that the product will meet a specified
level of performance over a specified period of time. The
Defendants argue that the representation of "lifetime" performance
does not create a written warranty because it is an inherently
imprecise measurement and therefore not a "specified period of
time" under the MMWA.

Judge Dillon holds that because the Plaintiff's allegations of
duration are inherently imprecise, she grants the Defendants'
motion to dismiss this claim, with leave to amend. She finds that
not every workout will be the same amount of time, and even if that
were somehow true, the Plaintiff has not specified what that amount
of time would be.

Third, the Plaintiff argues that there is no case holding that she
must plead the exact date she discovered her treadmill's inability
to reach and maintain the warranted CHP to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. Judge Dillon opines that the Plaintiff has adequately pled
notice simply by alleging that she provided pre-suit notice within
a reasonable time of discovering the defect. Therefore, she denies
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's state-law
warranty claims.

Fourth, the Plaintiff's misrepresentation theory relies on the
allegation that the CHP rating achieved during lab testing
conditions cannot be achieved in home use due to limitations in
home electricity amperage. The Defendants argue that these claims
must be dismissed because plaintiff does not allege that Johnson
Health specifically qualified its CHP rating as applicable to home
use or that it could be achieved in home use. Judge Dillon holds
that the allegation is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule
9.

Finally, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's constructive
fraud claim is barred by the economic loss rule. However, Judge
Dillon finds that the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim that
may not be barred by the economic loss rule. Economic loss rule
does not bar a constructive fraud claim which goes beyond mere
disappointed economic expectations assumed only by agreement.
Therefore, the Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Dillon issues an order granting in
part and denying in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bdek3dr8 from Leagle.com.


KEY BANK: Bozin Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Daniel Bozin, James McNichol, Kristi Burk,
Patricia Burk, Jessica McNichol, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Key Bank, N.A., Overby-Seawell Co.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-01536 was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio, to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia on Feb. 2, 2023.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:23-cv-00506-SDG to the
proceeding.

The nature suit is stated as Other Contract for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty.

KeyBank -- https://www.key.com/personal/index.html -- is one of the
largest banks in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Flick, Esq.
          DANN LAW FIRM
          15000 Madison Avenue
          Lakewood, OH 44107
          Phone: (216) 373-0539
          Fax: (216) 373-0536
          Email: notices@dannlaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          THOMAS A. ZIMMERMAN, JR. ATTORNEY AT LAW
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: (312) 440-0020
          Email: tom@attorneyzim.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Lisa M. Ghannoum
          BAKER & HOSTETLER-CLEVELAND
          1900 East Ninth Street
          3200 National City Center
          Cleveland, OH 44114-3485
          Phone: (216) 861-7872


KINDER MORGAN: Oates Seeks OT Pay for Day Rate Inspectors
---------------------------------------------------------
DAVID M. OATES, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. KINDER MORGAN ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P., Case No.
5:23-cv-00081-SLP (W.D. Okla., Jan. 25, 2023) alleges that the
Defendant does not pay its day rate inspectors overtime as required
by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, Kinder Morgan's day rate inspectors
often worked 12 hour shifts for 6-7 days per week. Kinder Morgan
allegedly paid all their day rate inspectors pursuant to their day
rate pay plan with no additional compensation for overtime hours
regardless of the number of hours worked that workweek.

Kinder Morgan's day rate pay plan violates the FLSA because the day
rate inspectors are owed overtime for hours worked in excess of 40
in a week at the rate of one-and-one-half times their regular
rates, the suit claims.

Mr. Oates worked for Kinder Morgan as an inspector from May 2017 to
July 2018 including time spent working in Sayre, Beckham County,
Oklahoma.

Kinder Morgan is an energy infrastructure company in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Taylor A. Jones, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  tjones@mybackwages.com

                - and -

          Richard J. (Rex), Esq.
          Michael K. Burke, Esq.
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com
                  mburke@brucknerburch.com

KNOX COLLEGE INCORPORATED: Mosley Files Suit in C.D. Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Knox College
Incorporated. The case is styled as Le'Andra Mosley, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Knox College
Incorporated, Case No. 4:23-cv-04023-SLD-JEH (C.D. Ill., Feb. 3,
2023).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Breach of Contract.

Knox College -- https://www.knox.edu/ -- is a nationally ranked
liberal arts college in Galesburg, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          227 W Monroe St., Ste. 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (866) 252-0878
          Email: gklinger@milberg.com


KW CALIFORNIA: Hernandez Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KW California, et al.
The case is styled as Martin Hernandez, an individual and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. KW California, KW Plastics of
California, Case No. BCV-23-100346 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty.,
Feb. 3, 2023).

The case type of suit is stated as "Other Employment – Civil
Unlimited."

KW Plastics -- https://www.kwplastics.com/ -- is the world's
largest plastics recycler offering quality materials at competitive
prices.[BN]

L BRANDS: $2.75MM Class Settlement in Allison Wins Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DONNA ALLISON, Individually and as a representative of
a class of similarly situated persons, on behalf of the L BRANDS,
INC. 401(K) SAVINGS AND RETIREMENT PLAN, Plaintiff v. L BRANDS,
INC., L BRAND SERVICE COMPANY LLC, THE RETIREMENT PLAN COMMITTEE OF
THE L BRANDS, INC. 401(K) SAVINGS AND RETIREMENT PLAN, and Does No.
1-10, Whose Names Are Currently Unknown, Defendants, Civil Action
No. 2:20-CV-06018-EAS-CMV (S.D. Ohio), Judge Edmund A. Sargus of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division, grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Action Settlement
and their Motion for Attorney Fees.

The class action came before the Court for hearing on Jan. 25,
2023, to determine the fairness of the proposed Settlement
presented to the Court and the subject of the Court's Order
Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement,
Preliminarily Certifying a Class for Settlement Purposes, Approving
Form and Manner of Settlement Notice, and Setting Date for a
Fairness Hearing.

For the sole purpose of settling and resolving the Action, Judge
Sargus certifies the Action as a class action pursuant to Rules
23(a) and (b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Settlement Class is defined as: All participants and beneficiaries
of the Plan, at any time during the Class Period, including any
beneficiary of a deceased person who was a participant in the Plan
at any time during the Class Period, and any Alternate Payees, in
the case of a person subject to a QDRO who was a participant in the
Plan at any time during the Class Period.

Judge Sargus appoints Donna Allison as the Class Representative and
Miller Shah LLP as the Class Counsel for the Settlement Class.

Judge Sargus approves the Settlement and orders that the Settlement
will be consummated and implemented in accordance with its terms
and conditions. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), he finds that
the Settlement embodied in the Settlement Agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate to the Plan and the Settlement Class. The
amount of the Settlement -- $2.75 million -- is fair, reasonable,
and adequate, taking into account the costs, risks, and delay of
trial and appeal.

The Plan of Allocation is finally approved as fair, reasonable, and
adequate. The Settlement Administrator will distribute the Net
Settlement Amount in accordance with the Plan of Allocation and the
Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Administrator will have final
authority to determine the share of the Net Settlement Amount to be
allocated to each Class Member in accordance with the Plan of
Allocation approved by the Court.

The releases and covenants not to sue set forth in the Settlement
Agreement, including but not limited to Section V of the Settlement
Agreement, together with the definitions contained in the
Settlement Agreement relating thereto, are expressly incorporated
herein in all respects. The releases are effective as of the date
of the Order. Accordingly, Judge Sargus orders that, as of the date
of his Order, the Class Representative, the Class Members, and the
Plan settle, release, relinquish, waive, and discharge any and all
rights or benefits they may now have, or in the future may have,
under any law relating to the releases of Unknown Claims.

The Class Representative, the Class Members, and the Plan, acting
individually or together, or in combination with others, are
permanently and finally barred and enjoined from suing the
Defendant Released Parties in any action or proceeding alleging any
of the Released Claims. Each Class Member releases the Defendant
Released Parties, the Defense Counsel, the Class Counsel, and the
Plan for any claims, liabilities, and attorneys' fees and expenses
arising from the allocation of the Settlement Fund or Net
Settlement Amount and for all tax liability and associated
penalties and interest as well as related attorneys' fees and
expenses.

The Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of
one-third of the Settlement Fund, plus any applicable interest,
such amounts to be paid out of the Settlement Fund within 30
calendar days of the Effective Date of the Settlement.

The Plaintiff is awarded $8,750 as a compensatory award for
reasonable costs and expenses directly relating to the
representation of the Class, such amount to be paid from the
Settlement Fund within 30 calendar days of the Effective Date of
the Settlement.

The operative complaint in the Action and all claims asserted
therein are dismissed with prejudice and without costs to any of
the Parties and the Defendant Released Parties other than as
provided for in the Settlement Agreement.

The Court will retain exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any
disputes or challenges that may arise as to the performance of the
Settlement Agreement or any challenges as to the performance,
validity, interpretation, administration, enforcement, or
enforceability of the Settlement Notice, the Plan of Allocation,
the Final Approval Order, the Settlement Agreement, or the
termination of the Settlement Agreement.

With respect to any matters that arise concerning the
implementation of distributions to the Class Members who have an
Active Account (after allocation decisions have been made by the
Settlement Administrator in its sole discretion), all questions not
resolved by the Settlement Agreement will be resolved by the Plan
administrator or other fiduciaries of the Plan, in accordance with
applicable law and the governing terms of the Plan.

Within 10 calendar days following the issuance of all settlement
payments to the Class Members as provided by the Plan of Allocation
approved by the Court, the Settlement Administrator will prepare
and provide to the Class Counsel and the Defense Counsel a list of
each person who received a settlement payment or contribution from
the Settlement Fund and the amount of such payment or contribution,
and any other information as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.

Upon entry of the Final Approval Order, all Parties, the Settlement
Class, and the Plan will be bound by the Settlement Agreement and
this Final Approval Order.

For the reasons set forth and on the record at the Fairness
Hearing, Judge Sargus grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Action Settlement and the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees. The
Settlement is approved as fair, reasonable and adequate to the Plan
and the Class, and the Parties are directed to take the necessary
steps to effectuate the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Judge Sargus enters judgment on all claims, counts, and causes of
action alleged in the Action. Notwithstanding the reservation of
jurisdiction described in the Final Approval Order, it is a final
and appealable judgment that ends the litigation of the Action. The
Clerk is directed to enter judgment in accordance with the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Final Approval Order
& Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/322fzfyw from
Leagle.com.


LA DOWNTOWN BROOKLYN: Blackman Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Loriah Blackman, on behalf of Plaintiff and similarly situated
individuals v. LA DOWNTOWN BROOKLYN, LLC and LA-YARDLEY, LLC, Case
No. 1:23-cv-00851 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 3, 2023), is brought pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law
("NYLL"), to recover from the Defendant(s): unpaid wages; unpaid
wages at the overtime wage rate; statutory penalties; liquidated
damages; prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and attorneys'
fees and costs.

The Plaintiff worked 9.5 hours per day that week for a total of
47.5 hours that week—exclusive of travel time. Further, the
Defendant(s) had the Plaintiff say in a hotel for the week and
would drive the Plaintiff from the hotel and back. The Plaintiff
was not compensated for this time either. The Plaintiff was not
correctly compensated wages at the overtime wage rate for all hours
worked over 40 in a workweek. The Defendant(s) knowingly and
willfully operated business with a policy of not paying the
Plaintiff wages for hours worked over 40 hours in a week at the
overtime wage rate in violation of the FLSA and NYLL and the
supporting Federal and New York State Department of Labor
Regulations, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs was employed by the Defendant(s) until November, 11,
2021.

LA DOWNTOWN BROOKLYN, LLC, is a domestic business corporation,
organized and existing under the laws of the State of New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq.
          AIDALA, BERTUNA & KAMINS, P.C.
          546 5th Avenue
          New York, NY 10036
          Phone: (212) 486-0011
          Email: ls@aidalalaw.com


LG ENERGY: Court Dismisses Charlton's First Amended Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHEN J. CHARLTON, PhD, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LG ENERGY SOLUTION
MICHIGAN, INC., and DOES 1-50, Defendant, Case No.
3:21-cv-02142-RBM-JLB (S.D. Cal.), Judge Ruth Bermudez Montenegro
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
grants LG's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Stephen J. Charlton's First
Amended Complaint.

On Nov. 12, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint
against the Defendant in the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of San Diego on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated. On Dec. 29, 2021, the Defendant removed
the action to the Court, and the Plaintiff subsequently filed a
First Amended Compliant ("FAC") on Jan. 24, 2022.

The FAC asserts the following causes of action: (1) violation of
California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), and (2)
violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code Sections 17200, et seq. On Feb. 15, 2022, the
Defendant filed the instant Motion requesting the Court dismisses
the Plaintiff's FAC with prejudice and without leave to amend.

The FAC alleges that the Defendant marketed and sold LG Residential
Energy Storage Unit ("RESU") batteries in California to provide
energy storage and backup power for homes. The batteries are
designed to pair with a home solar system and connect directly to a
storage-ready solar inverter for charging and discharging, and the
Defendant advertised that the stored solar energy can be used to
power the home later in the evening, after the sun sets and
electricity rates are at their peak, which substantially lowers
electric bills. The RESU batteries were also marketed by the
Defendants to provide stored energy in the event of a power
failure.

The Plaintiff and the members of the class relied on the
Defendant's representations and purchased RESU batteries which cost
several thousands of dollars each. The FAC claims the Defendant has
admitted that its batteries are defective and offered to replace
some of these batteries. However, based on information and belief,
the Defendant has not done so for a period of approximately one
year.

The Defendant explains that on Dec. 16, 2020 and Aug. 4, 2021, in
conjunction with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
("CPSC"), it announced voluntary recalls of RESU batteries
purchased by consumers in the United States, including consumers
who are residents of California. At the same time, it stopped
selling RESU batteries that incorporated the battery cells within
the scope of the recall program. The Defendant announced the recall
due to the potential for overheating (which occurred in very rare
instances). It presented the recall program to the CPSC under the
agency's Fast Track Recall Program and, after thorough review, the
CPSC approved the Defendant's proposed program and continues to
monitor its progress.

Under the terms of the recall, the Defendant has offered to replace
RESU batteries with new replacement battery units, coupled with a
new 10-year warranty. Moreover, any affected consumers will receive
new batteries, the useful lives of which will extend longer than
existing batteries, and which will be covered by warranties that
will extend for years longer than the warranties on the recalled
batteries. These recalls were publicly announced, widely
disseminated to the Defendant's distributors and customers, and
remain fully disclosed on the websites of ESMI, the CPSC, and in
numerous other sources.

The Defendant asserts that notwithstanding these express public
commitments, on Oct. 6, 2021, the Plaintiff served the Defendant
with a letter in which he provided a demand of requested remedies
and threatened suit for damages. On Nov. 4, 2021, the Defendant
provided a written response advising the Plaintiff of the recall
program and its commitment to provide a remedy through the program,
and on Nov. 12, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the instant action in San
Diego Superior Court.

Thus, the Defendant's Motion argues the FAC should be dismissed
because: (1) in light of its Nov. 4, 2021 response letter and
public recall, the Plaintiff's claims are moot and cannot satisfy
the threshold case and controversy requirements of Article III; (2)
in light of the fact that the CPSC has approved and continues to
closely monitor the recall program, the action should be dismissed
under the doctrine of prudential mootness; (3) the Plaintiff's UCL
claim is devoid of any plausible allegation of unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent conduct; and (4) the Plaintiff's claims for injunctive
relief fail and the Plaintiff cannot allege his legal remedies are
inadequate.

Initially, the Defendant requests the Court takes judicial notice
of four exhibits: (1) a copy of its Dec. 16, 2020 Home Energy
Storage Batteries Recall in Conjunction with the CPSC; (2) a copy
of its Aug. 4, 2021 Home Energy Storage Batteries Recall in
Conjunction with the CPSC; (3) a copy of the Plaintiff's Oct. 6,
2021 Notice Letter to the Defendant; and (4) a copy of its Nov. 4,
2021 Response Letter to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff filed an
objection to the Defendant's request for judicial notice. In
particular, he opposes judicial notice of the Defendant's Response
Letter because he disputes the contents of the letter.

Judge Montenegro takes judicial notice of images of the Defendant's
Dec. 16, 2020 Home Energy Storage Batteries Recall in Conjunction
with the CPSC in Exhibit 1 and its Aug. 4, 2021 Home Energy Storage
Batteries Recall in Conjunction with the CPSC in Exhibit 2. She
also takes judicial notice of the Plaintiff's Oct. 6, 2021 Notice
Letter to the Defendant in Exhibit 3. The Plaintiff's Notice Letter
is referenced several times in the FAC and no party questions its
authenticity.

In addition, Judge Montenegro will consider the Defendant's Nov. 4,
2021 Response Letter to the Plaintiff pursuant to the incorporation
by reference doctrine. The FAC references the Defendant's Response
Letter, and the CLRA provides that no action for damages may be
maintained under Section 1780 if an appropriate correction, repair,
replacement, or other remedy is given, or agreed to be given within
a reasonable time, to the consumer within 30 days after receipt of
the notice. Moreover, it seems the Plaintiff does not question the
existence or authenticity of the Response Letter, but rather the
truth of its contents. However, the Court is not bound to take
judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted therein.

The Defendant then argues that the Plaintiff's CLRA and UCL claims
should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) because there is no live case or controversy as required
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Its recall
program already addresses and remedies the alleged battery defect
(and the alleged harm flowing from the defect) on which the
Plaintiff bases all of his claims, thus eliminating any injury and
rendering the claims moot.

The Plaintiff counters that the Defendant's recall program is
deficient because it does not address hi specific remedy requests
and that whether its recall program is sufficient raises a question
of fact not determinable in a motion to dismiss.

In reviewing the Dec. 16, 2020 and Aug. 4, 2021 recall
announcements the Defendant released in conjunction with the CPSC,
Judge Montenegro finds that the Defendant has made reasonable
efforts to correct the RESU battery defect. Thus, she finds that
the Plaintiff has not adequately pled how Defendant's recall
program is insufficient, and the Plaintiff cannot elect his
preferred remedy.

Moreover, Judge Montenegro agrees with the Defendant that the fact
that it has not yet replaced all of its allegedly defective
batteries is not a bar to dismissing the Plaintiff's claims as
moot. Absent proper allegations that the recall program is somehow
deficient, the Plaintiff's FAC is insufficient to survive the
Defendant's Motion.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Montenegro grants the Defendant's
Motion and dismisses the Plaintiff's FAC. She grants the Plaintiffs
21 days leave from the date of her Order in which to file an
amended complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading
noted. If the Plaintiff chooses not to file an amended complaint by
then, the Clerk of Court will close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3apa2y24 from Leagle.com.


LIGHTOPIA LLC: Jackson Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lightopia, LLC. The
case is styled as Sylinia Jackson, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Lightopia, LLC, Case No.
1:23-cv-00953 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 4, 2023).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Lightopia -- https://www.lightopia.com/ -- is the home for fans of
modern and contemporary lighting who hope to bring design into
their everyday lives.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (917) 796-7437
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: danalgottlieb@aol.com


LOCUST AVENUE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Blanco Suit Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
JESUS BLANCO, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
employees, Plaintiff v. LOCUST AVENUE DELI CORP. (DBA LOCUST AVENUE
DELI) and RUSSELL CATAPANO, Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-00762
(E.D.N.Y., February 1, 2023) arises from the Defendants' failure to
pay proper overtime wages, failure to provide notice at time of
hiring, and failure to provide accurate wage statements in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

Plaintiff Blanco was employed by the Defendants from November 2020
until December 21, 2022 as a cook and delivery.

Locust Avenue Deli Corp., dba Locust Avenue Deli, owns, operates,
and controls a deli located in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lina Stillman, Esq.
          Toneille Raglan, Esq.
          STILLMAN LEGAL PC
          42 Broadway, 12th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 203-2417

LUNYA COMPANY: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lunya Company. The
case is styled as Joyce Carrico, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Lunya Company, Case No. 1:23-cv-00896
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 2, 2023).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Lunya -- https://lunya.co/ -- is a DTC apparel brand that sells
sleepwear and loungewear.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          225 Broadway, Ste. 39th Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


MARLBORO DIAMOND: Lopez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Marlboro Diamond
Castle, LLC. The case is styled as Iliana Lopez, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Marlboro Diamond
Castle, LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-00875 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 2, 2023).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Marlboro Diamond Castle, LLC (trade name Diamond Castle) is in the
Jewelry, Precious Stones and Precious Metals business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Noor Abou-Saab, I, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF NOOR A. SAAB
          380 North Broadway, Suite 300
          Jericho, NY 11753
          Phone: (718) 740-5060
          Email: noorasaablaw@gmail.com


MARS INC: Dark Chocolate Contains Lead & Cadmium, Cooper Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
SHELBY COOPER and SAMANTHA HORTON, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. MARS, INC., Case No. 5:23-cv-00135
(C.D. Cal., Jan. 25, 2023) is a class action lawsuit against the
Defendant regarding the manufacture, distribution, and sale of its
Dove Promises Deeper Dark Chocolate 70% Cacao products which
contain unsafe levels of lead and cadmium.

The Plaintiffs contend that the marketing for and labeling of the
Products are silent as to the presence of elevated levels of Heavy
Metals. The Defendant's advertising and packaging are false,
misleading, and reasonably likely to deceive the public.

Lead is a harmful chemical when consumed and is especially
dangerous to pregnant women and children. Lead poisoning occurs
when lead builds up in the body, over months or years. Cadmium is
also dangerous when consumed. Cadmium is carcinogenic and exposure
to even low levels of cadmium over time may result in a toxic
build-up of cadmium in the kidneys, leading to kidney disease and
bones damage and osteoporosis.

The Plaintiffs and the Class reasonably relied on the marketing,
labeling, and information provided by the Defendant in making
purchasing decisions. By representing that the Affected Products
contain only the ingredients listed on the Affected Products'
labeling, and not disclosing the presence of the Heavy Metals,
Defendant misled reasonable consumers, including the Plaintiffs and
the Class, say the Plaintiffs.

Accordingly, the Defendant's conduct violated and continues to
violate, inter alia, California's Unfair Competition Law;
California's False Advertising Law; California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, and Ohio's Consumer Sales Protection Act. The
Defendant also breached and continues to breach its warranties
regarding the Affected Products and has been and continues to be
unjustly enriched, the suit asserts.

Plaintiff Cooper purchased the Affected Products from a Walmart
retail store located in Riverside, California. The Plaintiff Horton
purchased the Affected Products during the Class Period from a Rite
Aid retail store located in Canton, Ohio.

Mars, Inc. manufactures, advertises, labels, and sells dark
chocolate, including the Affected Products, throughout the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Adam M. Apton, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
          445 South Figueroa Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 985-7290
          Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
          E-mail: aapton@zlk.com

                - and -

          Mark S. Reich, Esq.
          Courtney E. Maccarone, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          55 Broadway, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 363-7500
          Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
          E-mail: mreich@zlk.com
                  cmaccarone@zlk.com

MATTERPORT INC: Court Won't Allow Lynch to File 2nd Amended Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAWN LYNCH, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MATTERPORT, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. C 22-03704 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
denies the Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended
class action complaint.

Matterport markets 3D cameras that create 3D models of real-world
places. It developed the Matterport Service Partner (MSP) program
as a way for individuals who purchased a camera to start their own
businesses selling 3D scans they take using it.

Lynch, who became an MSP, alleges that Matterport's ads made
several material misrepresentations and omissions regarding how the
MSP program could help MSPs build their own businesses. According
to him, after throwing himself into learning to use Matterport's
cameras and starting his own 3D scanning enterprise, he had little
to show for the time and money he spent. What's more, Matterport
purportedly launched another program, Matterport Capture Services,
that competed against MSPs and took away one of Lynch's regular
clients.

Lynch filed suit in the Superior Court of California against
Matterport and seven members of its board of directors, bringing
claims on behalf of himself and three putative classes of
individuals who became MSPs. After Lynch amended his complaint,
Matterport and its individual directors removed the action to
federal court. They then moved to dismiss all of Lynch's claims
against the individual directors, all of Lynch's claims on behalf
of two putative classes, as well as select claims against
Matterport. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Lynch
withdrew his claims asserted on behalf of two putative classes.

The Court then granted in part and denied in part the motion,
dismissing all claims against the individual directors as well as
the Plaintiff's putative class claims against Matterport under
California's Seller-Assisted Marketing Plan (SAMP) Act and Section
17500, et seq., of California's Business and Professions Code a/k/a
False Advertising Law (Section 17500). In so doing, it allowed
Lynch to seek leave to amend the dismissed claims.

The Plaintiff now moves for leave to file a second amended class
action complaint. Judge Alsup's order follows full briefing and
finds the motion suitable for disposition on the papers under Civil
Local Rule 7-1(b). The hearing is vacated.

According to Lynch, the second amended class action complaint
addresses all of the deficiencies set forth in the Court's Order,
incorporating factual allegations regarding each of the individual
Defendants and factual allegations in support of application of the
discovery rule to the claims of class members under the SAMP Act
and the False Advertising Law.

The Court previously dismissed Lynch's claims against the
individual directors because there were no allegations in Lynch's
complaint that the individual directors personally participated in
or authorized any wrongdoings. The first amended class action
complaint merely named each individual director once as someone who
directly or indirectly controls Matterport, never again using the
directors' names or alleging actions they took to perpetuate
misconduct.

According to Lynch, the second amended class action complaint would
address this deficiency because it alleges that Defendants, and
each of them, each had knowledge and information sufficient to them
to have authorized, ratified, and directed the acts of one another
as their conduct relates to the Defendants' uniform practices and
treatment of the proposed Class members. In his reply brief, Lynch
withdraws the amended claims he sought to bring against the
individual directors for violation of the SAMP Act and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Thus, Judge Alsup considers only the remaining amended claims Lynch
seeks to bring against the individual directors: those for
violation of Section 17500 and Section 17200, et seq., of
California's Business and Professions Code a/k/a Unfair Competition
Law. He finds that Lynch still does not meaningfully differentiate
the activities of each director such that it can be said for each
director that their individual participation was the guiding spirit
behind the wrongful conduct. Moreover, the individual participation
that Lynch pleads consists of the sort of corporate
responsibilities from which the corporate form was designed to
insulate directors.

Absent assertions of personal involvement in purported wrongdoing
beyond acting in their corporate capacities and authorizing,
ratifying, and directing, Judge Alsup holds that the actions of
Matterport, the allegations as to the individual directors'
liability are conclusory and speculative. As such, he does not
reach arguments regarding alleged mismatch between remedies and
claims.

The Court also dismissed Lynch's putative class claims against
Matterport under the SAMP Act and Section 17500 because they were
presumptively time-barred but allowed Lynch to seek leave to amend
to properly plead discovery tolling arguments first raised in his
opposition to the motion to dismiss. According to Lynch, the second
amended class action complaint would sufficiently plead the
discovery rule because Matterport's announcement of its competitor
program permits delayed accrual for his SAMP Act and Section 17500
putative class claims.

Matterport counters that regardless of when Capture Services
Program ('CSP') went into effect or whether or not the Plaintiff
knew about it is irrelevant to his SAMP Act claims -- the Plaintiff
knew or had reason to suspect that the Defendants are allegedly not
in compliance with the SAMP Act requirements before Spring 2020 and
would have been able to find out whether or not Matterport had
complied with the SAMP Act's requirements with minimal diligence.

Judge Alsup agrees with Matterport. As alleged, Lynch knew or had
reason to suspect that Matterport was not in compliance with the
SAMP Act well before Matterport announced the Matterport Capture
Services program in spring 2020. Moreover, as pleaded, Lynch knew
or had reason to suspect that Matterport violated Section 17500
long before Matterport announced its Matterport Capture Services
program in spring 2020 -- at the latest, within a few months of him
becoming an MSP. Even assuming that it would have taken Lynch six
months to recognize these alleged omissions, permitting delayed
accrual under the discovery rule until November 25, 2018, his
initial complaint would have been filed more than three years later
on March 28, 2022. Lynch's Section 17500 putative class claim is
time-barred on account of its three-year statute of limitations.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Alsup denies the Plaintiff's
motion for leave to file a second amended class action complaint.
The amended claims against the individual directors remain
inadequately individualized, and the amended putative class claims
against Matterport under the SAMP Act and Section 17500 remain
time-barred.

To save the counsel yet another trip to San Francisco, a separate
case management order will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2tv2c2ws from Leagle.com.


MDL 3056: Three Customer Data Security Suits Transferred to N.D. Ga
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Karen K. Caldwel, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, has entered an order on February 1, 2023
transferring six class actions pending in three districts to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and with
the consent of that court, assigned to Honorable Stephen D.
Grimberg for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings in In
re: Overby-Seawell Company Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation, MDL 3056.

Judge Caldwell ordered that the following class actions within and
pending outside the Northern District of Georgia are transferred to
the Northern District of Georgia:

Northern District of Georgia:
SAMSEL v. OVERBY-SEAWELL COMPANY, ET AL., C.A. No. 1:22-03593
MARLOWE v. OVERBY-SEAWELL COMPANY, ET AL., C.A. No. 1:22-03648
ARCHER, ET AL. v. OVERBY-SEAWELL CO., ET AL., C.A. No. 1:22-03780;

Northern District of Ohio:
BOZIN v. KEYBANK, N.A., C.A. No. 1:22-01536
URCIUOLI, ET AL. v. KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ET AL., C.A. No.
1:22-01598; and

Western District of Pennsylvania:
MARTIN, ET AL. v. KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ET AL., C.A. No.
2:22-01346.

These actions -- all of which are putative nationwide class actions
-- share factual issues relating to a July 2022 incident in which
an "unauthorized external party" gained remote access to
Overby-Seawell Company's network and acquired certain personally
identifiable information of OSC's financial institution clients'
customers. All plaintiffs allege that OSC failed to maintain
adequate security measures, and they assert similar claims
including for negligence, negligence per se, and breach of
contract.

Judge Caldwell further ordered that the caption of this litigation
be changed from "In re: KeyBank Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation" to "In re: Overby-Seawell Company Customer Data
Security Breach Litigation." She noted that the litigation should
be renamed to reflect that the entity whose system was breached was
OSC, not KeyBank.

Overby-Seawell Company is a technology services vendor for
financial institutions that provides ongoing verification that the
institutions' residential mortgage customers are maintaining
required property insurance.[BN]

MINGLES EXPRESS: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------
XAVIER RICKETTS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MINGLES EXPRESS LLC d/b/a Mingles Express Grill, FUSION
OF FOODS NY Corp. d/b/a Mingles Ultra Lounge, RACQUEL HAYNES and
ERROL BROWN, Case No. 1:23-cv-00762 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2023) seeks
to recover unpaid minimum wage, unpaid overtime, lost wages for
retaliation, liquidated damages and attorneys' fees and costs,
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

According to the complaint, during Ricketts' stints of employment
with the Defendants, Ricketts was not paid minimum wage, overtime
or spread-of hours pay. The Defendants also failed to provide
Ricketts with a wage notice or wage statements/paystubs with each
payment he received. Lastly, the Defendants retaliated against
Ricketts by terminating his employment following his complaints of
unpaid wages, says the suit.

The Plaintiff bring claims for relief on behalf of all non-exempt
employees of the Defendants, including servers, bartenders,
dishwashers, food prepares and line cooks, employed by the
Defendants at any time from three years prior to the filing of this
action through the entry of judgment in this action.

Ricketts was employed with the Defendants as bartender/server from
August 2018 until the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, and as
as dishwasher from October 26, 2021 to December 11, 2021.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert D. Salaman, Esq.
          AKIN LAW GROUP PLLC
          45 Broadway, Suite 1420
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 825-1400
          E-mail: rob@akinlaws.com

MUTHANA INC: Fails to Pay Cooks' OT Wages, Maldonado Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Maldonado, and other similarly situated individuals v.
Muthana, Inc. d/b/a La Placita Supermarket and Zaben O. Nafal, Case
No. 2:23-cv-14021 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 30, 2023) seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

While employed by the Defendants, the Plaintiff worked seven days
per week. From Monday to Friday, the Plaintiff worked from 4:00 AM
to 2:00 PM. On Saturdays and Sundays, the Plaintiff worked from
4:00 AM to 10:00 PM. The Plaintiff worked a total of 86 hours
weekly. The Plaintiff did not take bonafide lunchtime hours. The
Plaintiff was allegedly paid for all her hours at her regular
minimum wage rate.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant violated the FLSA by
failing to pay the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
individuals the proper compensation for every overtime hour worked
at the rate of time and one-half their regular rate.

Plaintiff Maldonado was employed by the Defendants as a
non-exempted, full-time cook from June 01, 2014, to August 20,
2022.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com

NEW YORK: Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Heidel v. Governor
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW HEIDEL, R. ANDREW HEIDEL INC., DBA The Way
Station, FRANKLIN ORTEGA, PO ITALIANISSIMO INC., JOHN MEROLLA, NYMS
PRODUCTIONS, INC., DBA Murdered by the Mob, individually and on
behalf of classes of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK STATE, in her
official capacity, THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ERIC ADAMS, THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, KATHY HOCHUL, MAYOR OF NEW YORK CITY, in his official
capacity, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-2860-cv (2d Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirms the October
2021 judgment of the District Court dismissing the Plaintiffs'
complaint in its entirety against the State Defendants, Governor of
New York and the State, and City Defendants, the Mayor of the City
of New York and the City.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from the October 2021 judgment of
the District Court dismissing their complaint in its entirety
against the State Defendants and City Defendants. The Plaintiffs
brought their putative class action for money damages against State
Defendants and City Defendants arguing that the Plaintiffs and the
putative class were harmed by the State and City's 2020 COVID-19
executive orders.

In reviewing the District Court's dismissal of the Takings claim
against the State Defendants for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the Second Circuit reviews factual findings for clear
error and legal conclusions de novo. It reviews de novo the
District Court's dismissal of claims against the City Defendants
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It affirms the District
Court's judgment.

First, the Second Circuit holds that the District Court correctly
dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim against the State Defendants --
seeking money damages arising from a categorical regulatory taking
under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause -- because Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity barred the suit. The Plaintiffs
concede on appeal that sovereign immunity may generally require
that Takings claims against the State Defendants must be brought in
state court. Moreover, the procedural steps do not impede the
Plaintiffs' ability to obtain individual relief through New York
procedures.

Because the Second Circuit has previously held that New York State
has a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation, and the Plaintiffs do not argue that state procedures
bar "reasonable, certain and adequate" individual recovery, it
rejects the Plaintiffs' arguments as precluded by its precedent.

Second, in his thorough and well-reasoned Opinion and Order, Judge
Castel dismissed all claims against the City, which arose under the
Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and the New York
Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and the New
York Constitution. The District Court dismissed the Equal
Protection claims and all others on the basis of the Plaintiffs'
failure to state claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal,
the City Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that any city policy caused their alleged injuries.

The Second Circuit holds that the Plaintiffs never connect the dots
between any City policy and their alleged injuries necessary to
show causation. Notably, they fail to address the City Defendants'
causation argument in their reply beyond mere recitation that the
City's actions caused the Plaintiffs' business closures. Because
the Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to adequately plead causation as to
the City Defendants that is necessary for Article III standing, the
Second Circuit affirms the District Court's dismissal of claims
against those defendants.

The Second Circuit has reviewed all of the arguments raised by the
Plaintiffs on appeal and finds them to be without merit. For the
foregoing reasons, it affirms the judgment of the District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Summary Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/myhrkep5 from Leagle.com.

JOHN G. BALESTRIERE -- john.balestriere@balestrierefariello.com --
BALESTRIERE FARIELLO, New York, NY, for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

ELIZABETH A. BRODY (Barbara D. Underwood, Ester Murdukhayeva, on
the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney General, State of New York,
New York, NY, for the Defendants-Appellees.

REBECCA L. VISGAITIS (Richard Dearing, Claude S. Platton, on the
brief), for Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Corporation Counsel of the City
of New York, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for
Defendants-Appellees.


NISSAN NORTH: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Hagenbaugh Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Malachy E. Mannion of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania grants the motion to compel arbitration
and stay litigation in the lawsuit styled DAVID HAGENBAUGH, et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA d/b/a NISSAN USA, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:20-1838 (M.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of those similarly situated, brought this
putative class action against the Defendants in the Luzerne County
Court. Included among the Plaintiffs' putative class are all
individuals located within and/or residents of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, who purchased or leased automobiles at the Defendant
dealerships between Nov. 1, 2016, and Nov. 30, 2018. On Nov. 20,
2020, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with attached
Exhibits. The Plaintiffs are three pairs of individuals (two
married couples and one father and daughter) residing in Luzerne
County, Pennsylvania.

The Defendants are three auto manufacturers incorporated and
headquartered in other states, three limited liability company auto
dealerships incorporated in Pennsylvania, and two remaining
individual dealership owners residing in other states. One of the
dealership owners, Defendant Antonio D. Pierce, was dismissed from
this action with prejudice pursuant to a stipulation. The Defendant
manufacturers are Hyundai Motor America, Kia Motors America, and
Nissan North America, Inc.

In their complaint, the Plaintiffs raise four causes of action and
allege violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") (Count I), breach of contract,
(Count II), unjust enrichment, (Count III), and fraud, (Count IV).
With respect to the Defendant manufacturers, the Plaintiffs allege
that they are liable under agency theories, contract, and fraud for
misrepresenting that they would guarantee the benefits in the Set
for Life Program if the Defendant dealerships failed to honor
them.

The Defendants removed this case on Oct. 7, 2020, averring that
this Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(a) or, alternatively, jurisdiction under Section 1332(d),
i.e., the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"). On Nov. 3,
2020, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand this case back to
state court, which the Plaintiffs ultimately withdrew on June 2,
2022, after the Court had ordered the parties to conduct additional
discovery regarding the citizenship of the Defendant Dealership for
jurisdictional purposes.

According to the amended complaint, the Defendant dealerships, with
approval of the Defendant manufacturers and owners, advertised a
"Set for Life Program," which represented that vehicle purchasers
would receive certain benefits, including engine warranties, oil
and filter changes, car washes, loaner vehicles, and state
inspections, free for the duration of their ownership of the
vehicle.

Amid financial difficulties, the Defendant dealerships sold
numerous vehicles without repaying the financing for those vehicles
to certain manufacturer-affiliated financing entities, while still
advertising the Set for Life Program benefits to purchasers. The
Defendant dealerships went out of business in November of 2018,
about two years after opening. Since the dealership closures, the
Defendant manufacturers have refused customers' demands to provide
them with the Set for Life Program benefits.

Each pair of the Plaintiffs purchased a vehicle from one of the
Defendant dealerships and each either signed an agreement with the
dealership upon purchase specifying the benefits of the Set for
Life Program or was provided a brochure upon purchase specifying
the benefits. After the dealerships closed, the Plaintiffs demanded
that the Defendant manufacturers continue to provide the Set for
Life Program benefits on behalf of the closed dealerships they had
authorized, and the Defendant manufacturers refused.

On Jan. 4, 2021, two Defendants who manufactured some of the
vehicles at issue, HYUNDAI and KIA, filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Also, on
Jan. 4, 2021, NISSAN and HYUNDAI filed a motion to compel
arbitration and stay litigation, pursuant to the Plaintiffs'
written arbitration agreements and the Federal Arbitration Act (the
"FAA"). NISSAN and HYUNDAI attached Exhibits to their motion to
compel. The Defendant manufacturers filed their briefs in support
of both motions on Jan. 15, 2021. The Plaintiffs filed their briefs
in opposition to the Defendant manufacturers' motions on Feb. 8,
2021, with Exhibits attached. On March 4, 2021, the Defendant
manufacturers filed their reply briefs in support of their
motions.

For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum, Judge Mannion rules
that NISSAN and HYUNDAI's motion to compel arbitration and stay
litigation will be granted. The Court will sever the proceedings in
this case as to all claims against NISSAN and HYUNDAI pending
arbitration pursuant to Section 3 of the FAA. This case is not
stayed and will proceed with respect to the claims of the
Plaintiffs, who bought Kia vehicles asserted against Defendant
manufacturer KIA.

In light of the severance, KIA and HYUNDAI's joint motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' amended complaint will be dismissed without
prejudice to filing separate motions and briefs in the appropriate
forum.

In the instant case, the amended complaint and its attachments
show, on their face, that there is the existence of arbitration
agreements with respect to some of the Plaintiffs. Thus, Judge
Mannion opines, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard will
be applied in reviewing NISSAN and HYUNDAI's motion to compel
arbitration and in determining the validity and enforceability of
the agreements without discovery's delay

The arbitration agreements signed by the Hagenbaugh and Lubrecht
Plaintiffs are in writing and indicate that they understood the
terms of the contracts and, had a clear intent to arbitrate all
disputes and claims since the contracts plainly and conspicuously
indicated that they are governed by the FAA, Judge Mannion notes.
As such, the Court finds that the arbitration agreements are
enforceable contracts under Pennsylvania law since (1) an offer was
communicated to the Plaintiffs, (2) the Plaintiffs accepted that
offer, and (3) the Arbitration Agreements are supported by
consideration.

Next, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' claims against NISSAN
and HYUNDAI are within the scope of the arbitration agreements. The
Court also finds that the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims
against NISSAN and HYUNDAI, which rely upon the benefits of the
contracts and the Set for Life program, are "founded in and
intertwined with" the obligations of the sale contracts, which had
the arbitration clauses.

Thus, the Court finds that equitable estoppel allows NISSAN and
HYUNDAI to enforce the arbitration agreements with respect to all
of the Plaintiffs' claims against them.

Since the Court has found that enforceable agreements to arbitrate
exist as to the Defendants, including non-signatory manufacturers
NISSAN and HYUNDAI, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs'
claims against NISSAN and HYUNDAI are within the scope of the
arbitration agreements.

The court finds that the Plaintiffs' claims against NISSAN and
HYUNDAI fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration
agreements.

In short, since the arbitration agreements in the instant case
delegated issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator, the Court finds
that the issue of whether the Plaintiffs must arbitrate their
claims against the two non-signatory Defendants NISSAN and HYUNDAI
must be decided by an arbitrator.

Finally, because valid arbitration agreements exist as to the
Plaintiffs and covers their claims against Defendants NISSAN and
HYUNDAI, the Court has no choice but to grant a motion to compel
arbitration of their claims. The Court also finds it appropriate to
sever the Plaintiffs' claims against NISSAN and HYUNDAI, as opposed
to staying this entire case.

The Court finds that severing and only staying the claims that
Hagenbaugh and Lubrecht Plaintiffs have against Defendants NISSAN
and HYUNDAI is in the interests of justice, judicial economy, and
most fair. The Plaintiffs, who bought Kia vehicles and have claims
against KIA, are not subject to an arbitration agreement and their
claims are not stayed and will proceed.

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant the motion to compel
Hagenbaugh and Lubrecht Plaintiffs to comply with their arbitration
agreements filed by NISSAN and HYUNDAI, and the Court will sever
and stay the litigation only with respect to the claims against
NISSAN and HYUNDAI.

The claims of the Plaintiffs against KIA are not stayed and will
proceed. The joint motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' amended
complaint, filed by HYUNDAI and KIA, will be dismissed without
prejudice with both parties permitted to file a separate motion to
dismiss, if it so chooses, in the appropriate forum.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Jan. 23, 2023, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/275aehej from Leagle.com.


NNJ RESTAURANT: Fails to Pay Tipped Workers' OT Wages, Mendez Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
ARTURO MENDEZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. NNJ RESTAURANT LLC D/B/A SHUKO, NICK KIM, individually
and JIMMY LAU, individually, Case No. 601694/2023 (N.Y. Sup., Jan.
30, 2023) seeks to recover overtime compensation, misappropriated
tips, and other damages for the Plaintiff and his similarly
situated co-workers -- servers, bartenders, bussers, barbacks, food
runners, and other similarly situated tipped employees -- who work
or have worked at Shuko and with respect to whom Shuko took a tip
credit.

The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated current and former tipped workers pursuant to
Civil Practice Law and Rule (CPLR) 901 to remedy violations of the
New York Labor Law, Article 6, and Article 19, and the supporting
New York State Department of Labor Regulations.

During some weeks in this employment, Mendez worked over 40 hours
per week. During his employment, the Defendants applied a tip
credit towards the minimum wage rate paid to Mendez for work
performed as a busboy. The Defendants failed to notify Mendez
either verbally or in writing of the tip credit provisions of the
FLSA, or of their intent to apply a tip credit to his wages, the
suit claims.

The Defendants unlawfully redistributed part of Mendez's tips to
employees who are in positions that are not entitled to tips under
the NYLL and/or the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Defendants
allegedly required the Plaintiff and tipped workers to perform more
than 2 hours and/or 20% of their shift performing non-tip producing
side work, including general cleaning of the restaurant and
stocking and cleaning service areas. As a result, the Defendants
did not satisfy the requirements under the NYLL and the FLSA by
which they could apply a tip credit to the hourly rates paid to
Mendez, and the Defendants failed to compensate Mendez at the
proper minimum wage rate, says the suit.

Mr. Mendez was employed by the Defendants as a busboy -- a tipped
worker -- at Shuko from 2014 through March 2020.

NNJ Restaurant has owned and/or operated Shuko, a Japanese
restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Armando A. Ortiz, Esq.
          Katherine Bonilla, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375
          E-mail: aortiz@fslawfirm.com
                  kbonilla@fslawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          W. Patrick Downes, Esq.
          J. Cody Fitzsimmons, Esq.
          SCHAEFFER VENAGLIA HANDLER & FITZSIMMONS, LLP
          1001 Avenue of the Americas, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 508-9394
          E-mail: downes@svhflaw.com
                  fitzsimmons@svhflaw.com

OLIPHANT FINANCIAL: Denial of Arbitration in Fleming Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRUNO FLEMING, Plaintiff and Respondent v. OLIPHANT
FINANCIAL, LLC, Defendant and Appellant, Case No. A165837 (Cal.
App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the First District,
Division One, affirms the trial court's order denying the petition
to compel arbitration.

Before a trial court may grant a motion to compel arbitration it
must necessarily determine if a valid agreement exists to arbitrate
the dispute. This is a requirement set forth in the Federal
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Section 2 et seq., FAA) and the
California Code of Civil Procedure.

The appeal raises a single issue: Did Oliphant meet its burden in
proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement with Bruno
Fleming, which would then allow the trial court to compel the
arbitration of a financial dispute between these two parties? The
trial court determined that Oliphant did not meet this initial
burden.

On Feb. 13, 2020, Fleming filed a complaint against Oliphant. The
class action complaint included a single cause of action for the
alleged violation by Oliphant of the California Rosenthal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act. Oliphant subsequently filed a petition to
compel arbitration. His petition sought to dismiss Fleming's class
action claims and compel binding arbitration of his individual
claims under the FAA.

The declaration of Michael Crossan, the custodian of records for
Oliphant, supported the petition. According to Crossan's
declaration, Fleming electronically applied for a Barclay Rewards
credit card from Barclays Bank Delaware on Dec. 1, 2013. The
electronic application included no reference to an arbitration
agreement. Fleming received a Barclay Rewards credit card after
Barclays approved his application.

Fleming used his credit card for purchases and made payments on his
account. He received account statements. As with the electronic
application, the account statements did not include any reference
to arbitration. The statements did provide: "Please refer to your
Cardmember Agreement for additional information about the terms of
your Account." All of the account statements submitted to the trial
court for review were from 2017 and 2018.

There is no evidence in the record of any signed agreement between
Barclays and Fleming. Additionally, Oliphant provided no evidence
that it even sent such an agreement to Fleming, along with the
resultant absence of evidence of when or how such an agreement
might have been sent to him. Instead, Oliphant proffered three
separate Cardmember Agreements -- or exemplars -- that were in
effect (1) when Fleming opened his account in December 2013, (2)
when he made his last payment to the account in March 2018, and (3)
when the account was charged-off in May 2018. The language in all
three exemplars regarding the arbitration agreement is the same.

Fleming filed an opposition to the petition. In support of his
opposition, he filed a declaration in which he denied ever agreeing
to settle any disputes through arbitration or ever receiving an
arbitration agreement, much less any of the three exemplars.
Oliphant filed a reply that included a second affidavit from
Crossan. This second affidavit did not materially alter the
substantive aspects of his earlier affidavit, relative to the
arbitration issue. A hearing on the petition took place on March 3,
2021. On April 28, 2021, the trial court issued its order denying
Oliphant's petition to compel arbitration. The appeal followed.

The Court of Appeals' focus is primarily placed on California law
to address the issues surrounding the claimed agreement. When
deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter
(including arbitrability), courts generally should apply ordinary
state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts. More
specifically, it looks to California law regarding contracts. An
arbitration agreement is subject to the same rules of construction
as any other contract. The existence of a contract under California
law requires four essential elements: parties capable of
contracting; their consent; a lawful object; and a sufficient cause
or consideration.

Grasping the nettle of this appeal, the Court of Appeals turns to
one of those elements -- consent -- that creates the sharp dispute
between Oliphant and Fleming. California law provides clarification
that the consent of the parties to a contract must be free, mutual,
and communicated by each to the other. Absent evidence of mutual
assent, the Defendant cannot show that the cardmember agreements
are enforceable arbitration agreements. Oliphant had ultimately
failed to provide the necessary evidence supporting its assertion
that Fleming consented to arbitration. While both the Federal
Arbitration Act and California law favor arbitration, a party is
not required to arbitrate his or her claims absent consent.

A final point remains about the substantive law that applies to the
reputed agreement. Oliphant summarily asserts that the agreement is
governed by Delaware law. A hint of a conundrum inevitably arises
by Oliphant's assertion of the need to apply Delaware law in accord
with the agreement -- where the agreement's very existence is
questionable.

This assertion is ultimately unpersuasive, the Court of Appeals
holds that any analysis under Delaware contractual law on the
issues raised by Oliphant's appeal would appear to be substantially
comparable to that under California contractual law. Since no
agreement exists under either California or Delaware law,
California and federal law provide the proper framework for the
evaluation of the legal issues.

As the trial court correctly concluded, Oliphant's petition to
compel arbitration failed to produce sufficient evidence that
Fleming consented to the agreement that would have compelled
arbitration. The absence of consent unavoidably follows from the
dearth of evidence establishing that Fleming ever received the
agreement. As the trial court emphasized, the Defendant does not
explain how the Plaintiff could have consented to any agreement
that he was not provided. Recognizing this deficiency, Oliphant
again argues that Fleming's use of the credit card bound him to the
arbitration clause. Finally, nothing in the record suggests that
Fleming might have consented to the arbitration provision, the key
issue in this appeal

In sum, after considering all the grounds for relief raised by
Oliphant, the Court of Appeals holds that the trial court's apt
conclusion stemmed from the evaluation of the undisputed evidence
that Oliphant never provided any agreement, let alone one including
a provision for arbitration, to Fleming. This necessarily
foreclosed his ability to consent to arbitration. In the absence of
evidence demonstrating the existence of any agreement, the trial
court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration.

The Court of Appeals concludes that Oliphant failed to meet its
burden demonstrating the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement. Accordingly, it affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mr32vajp from Leagle.com.

Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, Katherine S. Catlos --
kcatlos@kdvlaw.com -- Marcus Dong -- mdong@kdvlaw.com -- for the
Defendant and Appellant.

Consumer Law Center, Fred W. Schwinn -- info@sjconsumerlaw.com --
Raeon R. Roulston, Matthew C. Salmonsen, for the Plaintiff and
Respondent.


OUR HOUSE HOSPITALITY: Borwn Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Our House
Hospitality, Inc. The case is styled as Brianna Borwn, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated, and on behalf of the
general public v. Our House Hospitality, Inc., Case No.
STK-CV-UOE-2023-0000918 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., Feb. 2,
2023).

The case type is stated as "Unlimited Civil Other Employment."

Our House Hospitality develop restaurant brands that can be
successful in multiple locations across the globe by providing best
in class experiences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Otkupman, Esq.
          OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM, ALC
          28632 Roadside Dr, Ste 203
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301-6015
          Phone: (818) 293-5623
          Fax: (888) 850-1310
          Email: roman@OLFLA.com


P3 PROJECTS: Faces Alvarez Suit Over Carpenters' Unpaid Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
NERY ARNULFO RAMIREZ ALVAREZ and JULIO ORLANDO BONILLA RODAS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. P3 PROJECTS HOME IMPROVEMENTS & DESIGNS, LLC THIAGO
PETRI and GULIANA PETRI, as individuals, Defendants, Case No.
1:23-cv-00768 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 2, 2023) arises from the Defendants'
alleged violations of New York Labor Law and the Fair Labor
Standards Act by failing to pay overtime wages, failing to provide
wage statements, and failing to furnish written wage notices.

Plaintiffs ALVAREZ and RODAS were employed by the Defendants as
carpenters from August 2022 until December 2022 and from October
2019 until March 2020, respectively.

P3 Projects Home Improvements & Designs, LLC is a general
contractor based in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591

PARK 100: Fails to Provide Proper Overtime Wages, Barber Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
LABRINA BARBER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PARK 100 FOODS INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:23-cv-00208-JRS-MJD (S.D. Ind., Feb. 2, 2023) arises from the
Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated
employees overtime compensation for all of the hours worked in
excess of 40 each workweek in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff and those similarly situated, who were engaged in the
manufacturing, packaging, and handling of food products, assert
that the Defendant's practice and policy of not paying them for
time spent donning and doffing their sanitary clothing that
protects against the contamination of food, food-contact surfaces,
or food-packaging materials, washing their hands, or for associated
travel and wait time, resulted in Defendant's failure to pay
overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their
regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
workweek.

Park 100 Foods Inc. operates food production facilities in Tipton,
Kokomo, and Morristown, Indiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey J. Moyle, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          1360 East 9th Street, Ste. 808
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 230-2944
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: jmoyle@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7034 Braucher St NW, Suite B
          North Canton, OH 44720
          Telephone: (330) 470-4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

RAINBOW CHILD: Ramnarine Awarded $153K in Attys.' Fees and Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RENA ANNE RAMNARINE, Plaintiff v. RAINBOW CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. DKC-17-2261
(D. Md.), Judge Deborah K. Shaw of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland, Southern Division, awards $153,341.40 in
attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in the unpaid wages case
are the Defendants' objections to Magistrate Judge Quereshi's
Report and Recommendation ("R&R") on the Plaintiff's motion for
attorneys' fees and costs. Ms. Ramnarine also filed a Second
Supplement to Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, requesting
additional fees incurred in connection with responding to the
Defendants' objections to the R&R. The issues are fully briefed,
and the Court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing
being deemed necessary.

Ms. Ramnarine was employed as a preschool teacher by the
Defendants, who failed to pay her wages due for hours worked. Ms.
Ramnarine filed two lawsuits in 2017 against the Defendants: (1) a
putative class action for failure to pay regular and overtime wages
under federal and Maryland state law; and (2) retaliatory discharge
in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.
Sections 215(a)(3).

Summary judgment was granted to the Defendants in the retaliatory
discharge suit in July 2018, and the decision subsequently was
affirmed on Nov. 6, 2019 by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. In this case, summary judgment was granted on
some claims conditional certification was denied, and only one
claim remained to be resolved at a bench trial -- her unpaid wages
claim under the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL"),
Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Sections 3-501-509.

A bench trial was held on June 7-9, 2021, and judgment was entered
in favor of the Plaintiff for $2,389.50, together with reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs. The Plaintiff then filed her motion for
attorney fees and costs, to which the Defendants responded, and she
replied, adding a supplemental filing. The Plaintiff ultimately
requested a total award of $179,947.38, consisting of attorney's
fees of $156,775.83 and costs of $23,171.55. Judge Grimm referred
the motion to Magistrate Judge Quereshi for preparation of a Report
and Recommendation.

Magistrate Judge Quereshi issued his R&R on Nov. 4, 2022. He
recommended that the Plaintiff's counsel be awarded $127,573.63,
which reflected a reduction in the hourly rates of the attorneys
and paralegals as well as the exclusion of some hours related to
the preparation of the fee petition and post-summary judgment
dispositive motions. He further recommended a reduction in
Plaintiff's requested costs of $81.25 for an award of $23,090.30.

The Defendants timely objected, requesting the Court rejects the
R&R, denies the motion for attorney's fees in its entirety or
reduces the requested award by 80% and significantly reduce the
award of costs. The Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the
Defendants' objections, adopt the R&R, and award her the
recommended $150,663.93 in fees, expenses, and costs, and grant her
supplemental motion for $2,677.50 for time expended responding to
the Defendants' objections and drafting the supplement.

Judge Shaw has reviewed the record, the caselaw, and the R&R, and
finds no clear error that would lead her to reject the R&R
wholesale as the Defendants request.

First, the Defendants generally repeat the same objections they
lodged in their response to the Plaintiff's motion for attorney's
fees and costs, namely that the Plaintiff's request for fees is
excessive in light of only prevailing on one of five claims, and
the resulting judgment was less than the amount Defendants
initially paid to the Plaintiff to resolve the dispute without
litigation.

Their specific objections to the R&R include the following: (1) on
pages 2 and 16 of the report, the magistrate judge erred in his
characterization of the Defendants' efforts to settle the case; (2)
on page 19 of the report, the magistrate judge misunderstood the
Defendants' objection to the excessive and duplicative time spent
on trial preparation by Mr. Melehy; (3) on pages 25 and 26, the
magistrate judge erred in accepting the reductions offered by the
Plaintiff, which did not go far enough, in part because the
judgment represented only 1.8% of the recommended attorneys' fees;
and (4) the magistrate judge erred in awarding costs for all the
depositions and printing because the judgment was based solely on
one claim, and the burden of proof was improperly shifted to the
Defendants.

Judge Shaw opines that (i) she finds no factual error and overrules
the Defendants' objection challenging the accuracy of the factual
background; (ii) she agrees with the magistrate judge's analysis
and conclusion on the work performed by Mr. Balashov, the propriety
of attendance at trial by two attorneys, and ultimately the
reduction of the rate for Mr. Balashov's trial time to $180 per
hour; (iii) she finds no error in the reasoning or decision to
accept the Plaintiff's voluntary reductions under the circumstance;
and (iv) the magistrate judge did not shift the burden to the
Defendants to prove that the transcripts were not necessary but
responded to the specific objections they made.

Next, the Plaintiff seeks to recover fees of $2,677.50 for time
spent responding to the Defendants' objections to the R&R and for
drafting the supplemental fee petition. She attached a spreadsheet
of time spent since May 1, 2022, which totals 8.5 hours spent by
Mr. Balashov, Mr. Melehy, and a paralegal.

Judge Shaw holds that the Defendants lodge the same general
objections as discussed regarding the Plaintiff's refusal to settle
the case in light of the limited damages ultimately achieved, but
they make no specific objections to any of the hours expended on
the fee petition. Further, time spent preparing and defending a fee
petition is compensable.

Judge Shaw notes that there may be arithmetical errors in the
calculations, but the corrected calculations total $2,722.50, which
is $45 more than the Plaintiff requested. Accordingly, she grants
the Plaintiff's motion for the requested amount of $2,677.50.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Shaw overrules the Defendants'
objections to the R&R. Upon consideration of the record and having
found no clear error, the findings and conclusions of the
Magistrate Judge's R&R will be adopted.

A separate order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4zc59jzc from Leagle.com.


RYVYL INC: Cullen Sues Over Misleading Registration Statements
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARK CULLEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RYVYL INC. F/K/A GREENBOX POS, BEN ERREZ,
FREDI NISAN, J DREW BYELICK, BENJAMIN CHUNG, EF HUTTON F/K/A
KINGSWOOD CAPITAL MARKETS, A DIVISION OF BENCHMARK INVESTMENTS,
INC., and R.F. LAFFERTY & CO., Defendants, Case No.
3:23-cv-00185-GPC-AGS (S.D. Cal., February 1, 2023) is a class
action on behalf of the Plaintiff and all persons or entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded Ryvyl securities
pursuant and/or traceable to the registration statement and
prospectus issued in connection with the Company's January 29, 2021
public offering; and/or between January 29, 2021 and January 20,
2023, inclusive, seeking to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and violations
of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder.

On January 29, 2021, the Company filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission a registration statement on Form S-1. Defendant
Nisan and Errez signed or authorized the signing of the Company's
registration statement.

According to the complaint, the registration statement was
negligently prepared and, as a result, contained untrue statements
of material facts or omitted to state other facts necessary to make
the statements made not misleading, and was not prepared in
accordance with the rules and regulations governing its
preparation. The registration statement was materially false and/or
misleading because it misrepresented and failed to disclose the
following adverse facts pertaining to the Company's business,
operations and prospects, which were known to Defendants or
recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, the Defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(1) Ryvyl downplayed its serious issues with its internal controls;
(2) Ryvyl's financial statements for December 31, 2021 through and
including interim periods ended September 30, June 30, and March
31, 2022 contained errors resulting in overstatements of revenue,
assets, and stockholders' equity and understatements of losses; (3)
as a result, Ryvyl would need to restate its previously issued
financial statements for those periods; and (4) as a result,
Defendants' statements about its business, operations, and
prospects, were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times, says the suit.

Ryvyl Inc., formerly GreenBox POS, is a financial technology
company. The Company develops, markets, and sells blockchain-based
payment solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785-2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

SAFE BOX: Gilmore's Bid for Responses and Doc Production Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Robert M. Illman of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, Eureka Division, denies the
Plaintiff's request to compel certain interrogatory responses and
document production in the lawsuit entitled JANICE GILMORE,
Plaintiff v. SAFE BOX LOGISTICS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-06917-TLT (RMI) (N.D. Cal.).

Pending before the Court is a discovery dispute letter brief
through which the Plaintiff seeks to compel certain interrogatory
responses and document production. Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds
the matter suitable for disposition without oral argument.

The Plaintiff has filed a putative wage and hour class action
lawsuit against Defendant FedEx Ground ("FedExG") and one of its
many contract service providers, Defendant Safe Box Logistics, Inc.
The essence of the case can be distilled down to the following
disagreement: while FedExG disputes that it ever had an employment
relationship with the Plaintiff or, for that matter, any of the
thousands of service providers' employee drivers comprising the
Plaintiff's putative class, the Plaintiff has alleged that FedExG
is not only a joint employer, but also a 'client employer' as that
term is defined under Labor Code Section 2810.3 along with SafeBox
and FedExG's other contracted service providers, and therefore, the
Plaintiff seeks relevant discovery from FedExG necessary to
prosecute her claims as a class action, including in relevant part
contact information of class members, timekeeping and payroll
records, reports of scanner data generated in support of FedExG's
request for removal, and other documents sent to its contracted
service providers.

The Plaintiff requests the compelled production of information
under four categories. Through the first and second categories, she
requests an order compelling a response (or, perhaps, a different
response) to an interrogatory that sought contact information for
putative class members (SROG1), as well as documents and records
that show the payroll and timekeeping records (including U.S.
Department of Transportation "scanner data" relating to the elapsed
time on duty for all putative class members).

As to the putative class members' contact information, as well as
their payroll and timekeeping records, FedExG submits that the
Plaintiff seeks information that FedEx Ground does not have because
it does not maintain employment records for service provider
drivers and disputes the Plaintiff's joint employment status.
Instead, FedExG submits that the Plaintiff must seek that
information from the entities that possess it -- namely, the
service providers.

Because FedExG represents, and the Plaintiff does not dispute, that
FedExG does not possess (or otherwise control) the information
sought by the Plaintiff, FedExG clearly does not have possession or
control for the purposes of the Plaintiff's request to compel;
therefore, Judge Illman holds that FedExG cannot be compelled to
produce what it does not have. Naturally, therefore, the
Plaintiff's request to compel FedExG to produce information and
documents that it does not possess or otherwise control is denied.

As for the scanner data -- FedExG does possess such data, but it
maintains that it is attended with minimal (if any) probative value
and that its production would represent such effort as to render
the request as unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the needs
of the case. As described by FedExG, this scanner data is not
compensable timekeeping data but, rather hours of service data. In
other words, the scanner data does not reflect break times because
the DOT's regulation for this data category does not permit
exclusion of any break times.

Once again, Judge Illman notes, the Plaintiff's portion of the
letter brief gives this issue short shrift. The Plaintiff simply
states that she wants the scanner data -- neither does she explain
or discuss what probative value may attend this scanner data, nor
does she address FedExG's assertions about the burdensome nature of
this request or its disproportionality to the needs of the case.
For these reasons, Judge Illman denies the Plaintiff's request to
compel the scanner data in question.

As to the third category, the Plaintiff seeks production of all
documents between the Defendant and its ISPs relating to
transporting and delivering packages for putative class members
during the relevant period. While requesting the compelled
production of "all documents" that were exchanged between FedExG
and all of its service providers during the relevant time period
and relating to transporting and delivering packages by putative
class members in California -- a wildly broad phrasing -- the
Plaintiff's justification for this request focuses only on the
agreements governing FedExG's relationship with each of these
service providers.

Initially, as to the Plaintiff's request to compel "all documents"
exchanged between FedExG and every ISP -- that request is
undeveloped and unsupported by argument; accordingly, the Court
deems that portion of this request as abandoned.

As to the component of this request that seeks the compelled
production of all agreements between FedExG and every ISP relating
to all putative class members in California during the relevant
time period, FedExG objects to the effect that this request too is
overly burdensome and disproportionate to the needs of the case as
it would require FedExG to gather and produce thousands of separate
contracts. Instead, FedExG states that it has produced agreements
and other documents concerning its relationship with Safe Box and
that it has also agreed to provide the Plaintiff with exemplars of
the Agreements for each year in the putative class period, which
FedExG submits is more than sufficient to meet the Plaintiff's
needs at the class certification stage.

Once again, Judge Illman says, the Plaintiff does not address these
contentions, or otherwise venture to explain why the Safe Box
documents, and the exemplars offered by FedExG are insufficient for
her purposes at this stage of the case. Consequently, the
Plaintiff's request to compel FedExG to produce its entire
repository of such agreements is denied.

After receiving and reviewing the Safe Box documents, and the
exemplars that FedExG has agreed to provide, if the Plaintiff is
able to articulate reasons why this degree of production (as to the
ISP agreements) is insufficient for her purposes at this stage of
the case, and assuming an impasse continues to persist after
good-faith meet-and-confer efforts, Judge Illman holds that the
Plaintiff is free to cause that dispute to be brought back before
the Court through another jointly-filed letter brief at the
appropriate time.

Regarding the final category of documents sought -- the Plaintiff
seeks documents related to any internal financial analysis prepared
by FedExG related to any decision to contract with ISPs rather than
directly employing its own drivers. The Plaintiff's explanation of
the relevance of this information appears to rely on a great deal
of speculation in that she only contends that this information
could support or refute each party's contentions with respect to
the nature of FedExG's relationship with putative class members.

This effort at establishing relevance is so sweeping and so generic
that -- under this reasoning -- "relevant evidence" would exclude
nearly nothing and would include nearly everything, Judge Illman
holds. Relevance must be established with a concrete logical chain,
as opposed to speculation, guesswork or hopes and wishes as to what
the documents or information might reveal, Judge Illman points
out.

Thus, in addition to FedExG's objection based on the temporal
problems attending this request, Judge Illman holds that the
Plaintiff's request to compel the production of this data is denied
because the Plaintiff has failed to establish its relevance given
the highly speculative and generalized nature of her assertion that
this information could support or refute either party's contentions
with respect to FedExG's relationship with putative class members.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 23, 2023, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3jnsjt85 from Leagle.com.


SHARP HEALTHCARE: Court Consolidates Cousin and Camus Class Suits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California grants the parties' joint motion to
consolidate these two cases: HANNAH COUSIN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SHARP
HEALTHCARE, Defendant; and LINDA CAMUS, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SHARP
HEALTHCARE, Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-2040-MMA (DDL), No.
23-cv-33-MMA (DDL) (S.D. Cal.).

On Dec. 22, 2022, Sharp removed the putative class action filed by
Cousin from the San Diego County Superior Court. On Jan. 6, 2023,
it removed another putative class action, filed by Camus and DeAnna
Franklin-Pittman, to this Court. All parties now jointly move to
consolidate the two cases.

Judge Anello explains that Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that if actions before the court involve a
common question of law or fact, the court may: (2) consolidate the
actions. Rule 42 seeks to provide the Court with broad discretion
to decide how cases on its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the court may be dispatched with expedition and economy
while providing justice to the parties. A motion for consolidation
can be raised by a party or the Court sua sponte. In determining
whether to consolidate cases, the Court should weigh the saving of
time and effort consolidation would produce against any
inconvenience, delay, or expense that it would cause.

Both actions against Sharp include overlapping claims and nearly
identical factual allegations. Additionally, both actions seek to
represent overlapping classes and involve claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, invasion of privacy under California's
Constitution, Art. 1 Section 1, violations of the California
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section
56 et seq., and violations of the California Invasion of Privacy
Act, Cal. Pen. Code Sections 630 et seq.

Judge Anello, therefore, agrees that consolidating these two
actions will save time and effort and thus preserve judicial
resources and avoid inconsistent rulings, while creating little, if
any, potential for delay, confusion, or prejudice. Consequently, he
grants the parties' joint motions, Case No. 22-cv-2040-MMA (DDL),
ECF 10 and Case No. 23-cv-33-MMA (DDL).

The related cases of Hannah Cousin, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Sharp HealthCare, Case No.
3:22-cv-02040-MMA-DDL and Linda Camus and DeAnna Franklin-Pittman
v. Sharp Healthcare, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Case No. 3:23-cv-00033-MMA-DDL are consolidated
for all purposes. The Clerk of Court will promptly take all
reasonable and necessary action to consolidate the cases.

All further proceedings in the consolidated action will be filed
and docketed under Case No. 22-cv-2040-MMA (DDL).

Judge Anello vacates all pending deadlines.

The Plaintiffs must file a Consolidated Complaint on March 3, 2023.
Sharp must then respond to the Consolidated Complaint on April 3,
2023. Should Sharp file a motion, the Plaintiffs must file their
opposition on or before May 3, 2023. Sharp may then file its reply,
if any, no later than May 24, 2023.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ysu5bya4 from Leagle.com.


SHELL LAKE: $155K Class Settlement in Coetzee Suit Wins Prelim. Nod
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COURTNEY COETZEE, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SHELL LAKE HEALTH CARE CENTER LLC
and PREMIER HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT OF SHELL LAKE LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 21-cv-337-wmc (W.D. Wis.), Judge William M. Conley of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin grants
the parties' joint motion for preliminary approval of settlement
agreement.

On behalf of herself and other similarly situated, putative
Plaintiffs, Courtney Coetzee brought suit against Defendants Shell
Lake Health and Premier for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), as well as Wisconsin's wage payment and collection
laws, by preventing workers from leaving the premises during their
unpaid lunch breaks. The parties have now stipulated to certify a
class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and a 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b)
collective and jointly moved for preliminary approval of a
settlement agreement.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify the following Rule 23 class for
settlement purposes: All persons who have been or are currently
employed by Shell Lake Health Care Center LLC and/or Premier
Healthcare Management of Shell Lake LLC in the Shell Lake,
Wisconsin facility and who were not permitted to leave the premises
for unpaid meal breaks and therefore denied regular and/or overtime
wages at any time between March 1, 2020 and Aug. 28, 2021.

The parties have also stipulated to the following 216(b) collective
for settlement purposes: All persons who have been or are currently
employed by Shell Lake Health Care Center LLC and/or Premier
Healthcare Management of Shell Lake LLC in the Shell Lake,
Wisconsin facility who were not permitted to leave the premises for
unpaid meal breaks and therefore denied overtime wages at any time
between March 1, 2020 and Aug. 28, 2021.

Under the proposed settlement, the Defendants will pay a total
amount of $155,000, which includes any attorney fees and costs.
After payment of attorney's fees and Enhancement Payment, provided
they are approved, the class and collective members will, through
the settlement, receive the full value of their unpaid meal periods
between March 1, 2020 and Aug. 28, 2021 at their regular and
overtime rates. FLSA collective members will be given the
opportunity to opt in, while Rule 23 class members will
automatically receive funds unless they exclude themselves. Funds
from Rule 23 class members who exclude themselves will be
redistributed to the participating class members, and any unclaimed
funds will be paid to the University of Wisconsin Law School's
Economic Justice Institute.

Judge Conley states that certification of a class is only
appropriate following a rigorous analysis concerning whether the
proposed class satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The
Plaintiff has the burden to show that a class should be certified.
This analysis encompasses a two-part test: (a) whether the proposed
class meets all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) to establish the
class (numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of
representation); and (b) whether the class can be maintained under
one of the subsections of Rule 23(b).

Judge Conley opines that (i) individually joining members of a
class this size would be impractical; (ii) the putative class
members share common questions of fact, injuries and related
questions of law; (iii) Coetzee's pursuit of her claim would
advance the interests of the entire class; (iv) Coetzee is adequate
to represent the proposed class; and (v) given its breadth of
experience in similar cases, Hawks Quindel, S.C. will serve as
adequate class counsel.

Since all the Rule 23(a) prerequisites are met, Judge Conley turns
to the superiority and predominance requirements under Rule
23(b)(3). He opines that (i) the common issues of fact and law
associated with these claims predominate over any individual
issues; and (ii) a single proceeding to determine whether
defendants engaged in a pattern of undercompensation is far
superior to duplicative, individual adjudication of each class
member's claim.

Since the Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) requirements are readily
satisfied, class certification will be granted, and Coetzee and
Hawks Quindel, S.C. will be appointed as the class representative
and the class counsel, respectively.

Given Judge Conley's findings regarding common questions of law and
fact and Coetzee's typicality, the Plaintiff has made a successful
factual showing in the case. Judge Conley therefore conditionally
certifies the proposed FLSA collective because of the Plaintiff's
similarity to potential members of the collective and the fact that
he has some chance of successfully showing she and other members of
the proposed collective were injured by the Defendants' policy of
denying overtime payments to employees kept on premises during
meals.

Judge Conley then turns to preliminary settlement approval. Because
the preliminary factors overall suggest that the parties' proposal
is fair, reasonable and adequate, he preliminarily approves the
proposed class action settlement and authorizes the mailing of
notice.

Judge Conley next addresses the validity of the named Plaintiff's
incentive award and the counsel's request for attorneys' fees. The
settlement provides Coetzee with a $1,000 incentive award. As to
attorneys' fees, the class counsel requests 30% of the Settlement
Fund in a separate fee petition, which would result in a total fee
award of $46,500.

Judge Conley opines that the proposed incentive award appears
reasonable, as the Court has approved the same and larger incentive
awards for similar lawsuits. As to the attorneys' fees, he opines
that the general request for 30% of the settlement fund also
appears reasonable, especially when the class members are
purportedly recovering the full value of their damages.
Accordingly, he directs the parties to issue notice given that the
settlement was reached through arm's length negotiations, and will
nevertheless further scrutinize the class counsel's application for
attorneys' fees before final approval. In particular, the
Plaintiffs' counsel should submit their hourly billing records and
rates in their fee request.

Finally, Judge Conley authorizes the class counsel to send notice
to members of the class. The proposed notice provides class and
collective members with information regarding the nature and claims
of the action, a definition of the classes and collective, options
to appear through counsel, and the availability and process for
exclusion or objection. Furthermore, the notice details the option
for class members to be excluded and the effect on members of a
class judgment, as well as the opportunity to opt in to the
collective recovery under Section 216(b). The notice is sufficient
as written and may be sent to the class members.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Conley dismisses as moot the
Plaintiff's motion to certify the class and the Defendants' request
to file a sur-reply. He grants the parties' joint motion for
preliminary approval of settlement agreement.

Judge Conley certifies the following Rule 23 classes for settlement
purposes: All persons who have been or are currently employed by
Shell Lake Health Care Center LLC and/or Premier Healthcare
Management of Shell Lake LLC in the Shell Lake, Wisconsin facility
and who were not permitted to leave the premises for unpaid meal
breaks and therefore denied regular and/or overtime wages at any
time between March 1, 2020 and Aug. 28, 2021.

He certifies the following FLSA collectives for settlement
purposes: All persons who have been or are currently employed by
Shell Lake Health Care Center LLC and/or Premier Healthcare
Management of Shell Lake LLC in the Shell Lake, Wisconsin facility
who were not permitted to leave the premises for unpaid meal breaks
and therefore denied overtime wages at any time between March 1,
2020 and Aug. 28, 2021.

The case is conditionally certified as a collective action under 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act for purposes
of discovery and sending notice to the putative plaintiffs as
defined.

Judge Conley appoints Coetzee as the class representative and Hawks
Quindel, S.C. as the class counsel.

The proposed notice attached as Exhibit B to the Settlement
Agreement is approved and the class counsel is authorized to
distribute it as provided in the parties' submissions.

Judge Conley approves the following settlement procedure and
timeline:

     a. no later than March 7, 2023, the Settlement Administrator
will begin mailing the notice to class members consistent with the
Opinion;

     b. the class members will have until 45 days after mailing of
notice to submit a request to be excluded or any objections;

     c. no later than May 2, 2023, the class counsel will file a
petition for attorneys' fees and costs;

     d. no later than May 9, 2023, the class counsel will provide
the list of excluded class members to the Defendants' counsel;

     e. a motion for final approval and any briefing in support, as
well as any objection to the class counsel's fee petition are due
on May 16, 2023; and

     f. the Court will hold a fairness hearing on May 23, 2023, at
1:00 p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/25auumba from Leagle.com.


ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL: Court Grants Hudson Leave to Amend Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled TERISA HUDSON, Plaintiff v. ST. JOSEPH'S
HOSPITAL HEALTH CENTER et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:21-cv-935
(GLS/TWD) (N.D.N.Y.), Senior District Judge Gary L. Sharpe of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York issued a
Memorandum-Decision and Order:

   (a) granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss;

   (b) denying Plaintiff Hudson's cross-motion to amend;

   (c) dismissing Hudson's amended complaint;

   (d) ruling that Hudson may renew her motion for leave to amend
       in full compliance with the Local Rules of Practice,
       within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
       Memorandum-Decision and Order;

   (e) ruling that, if no motion for leave to amend is filed, the
       Clerk will close this case without further order of the
       Court; and

   (f) directing the Clerk to provide a copy of this
       Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.

Plaintiff Terisa Hudson brings the putative class action against
Defendants St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center, Trinity Health
Corp., and Trinity Health, alleging violations of overtime
compensation pursuant to Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New
York Labor Law (NYLL), and failure to provide annual wage notices
pursuant to New York State law.

Ms. Hudson was employed as a Licensed Practical Nurse at St.
Joseph's Hospital Health Center from October 2015 through January
2021. During her employment, Hudson would typically be scheduled to
work four, but sometimes five, days per week between Monday and
Friday, with her shifts varying in duration between eight hours and
twelve hours. She typically worked anywhere from 32 to 60 hours a
week, and she often exceeded 40 hours in a single workweek.
Employees were paid on a biweekly basis and were paid overtime
rates if the employee's hours exceeded 80 hours for the biweekly
period, rather than exceeding 40 hours in one week.

In 2016, Hudson inquired with the Defendants' Human Resources
Office regarding overtime compensation, which confirmed that
overtime was only paid when biweekly hours exceeded 80.

Ms. Hudson filed her complaint in August 2021. The Defendants
thereafter moved to dismiss the complaint. Hudson amended the
complaint as a matter of course and the Defendants again moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

The Defendants seek dismissal of Hudson's claims against Trinity
Health Corporation and Trinity Health (hereinafter the "Trinity
Defendants"), arguing that Hudson has not sufficiently alleged an
employment relationship with the Trinity Defendants. The Defendants
maintain, among other things, that Hudson has not pleaded facts to
support that the Trinity Defendants form a single, integrated
enterprise with St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center.

Ms. Hudson alleges that the Defendants operate as a single
integrated enterprise and/or as joint employers and that the
Defendants share a common business purpose and maintain common
control, oversight, and direction over the operations of the
services performed by her, including employment practice.

The Court is satisfied that, at this stage, Hudson has adequately
pleaded that St. Joseph's and the Trinity Defendants operated as a
single integrated enterprise, and, thus, qualify as a single
statutory employer under the FLSA. Although discovery may support
the Defendants' argument that the Trinity Defendants are not
related to St. Joseph's, Hudson has alleged sufficient facts that
the Defendants form a single integrated enterprise.

Accordingly, the Court rejects the Defendants' argument that Hudson
failed to allege an employment relationship with the Trinity
Defendants, but the Trinity Defendants may renew such arguments at
a later stage.

The Defendants seek dismissal of Hudson's overtime claims, arguing
that she has not sufficiently alleged that she worked overtime for
which she was not compensated. Relying primarily on three cases
from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Defendants contend
that Hudson's allegation that she would "typically" work four to
five shifts per week and her shifts "varied" between eight and
twelve hours is too generalized and imprecise to support a
reasonable inference that Hudson worked more than 40 hours in any
given week.

The Court agrees with the Defendants. Hudson alleges that she
"typically" worked 32 to 60 hours in a single week, "often" working
more than 40 hours in one week, which are, on their own,
insufficient to state a plausible claim, Judge Sharpe opines.
Additionally, Hudson does not allege that she was denied overtime
compensation for every week she worked over 40 hours, rather, she
claims to have been denied overtime in a specific instance--when
she worked over 40 hours in one week but her biweekly hours did not
exceed 80 hours.

Based on the allegations, Judge Sharpe says it is unclear whether
Hudson was ever denied overtime to which she was entitled. Hudson
indicates that she was not compensated at an overtime rate "in
weeks" when she worked 40 hours in one week of the biweekly pay
period but her biweekly hours did not exceed 80, however, there are
no allegations of how frequently this scenario occurred, if ever,
or the length of her uncompensated work during these weeks, nor
does she point to a specific week or biweekly period in which she
did not receive overtime compensation.

While Hudson's allegations make it conceivable that she did not
receive some overtime compensation, absent any specificity as to
the frequency, length, or dates of her unpaid work, her allegations
invite speculation and do not nudge her claims from conceivable to
plausible, Judge Sharpe opines. Accordingly, the Defendants' motion
to dismiss Hudson's FLSA and NYLL overtime claims is granted.

As for Hudson's remaining state law claim for failure to provide
annual wage notices, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.

Ms. Hudson filed a notice of cross-motion to amend, however, she
did not attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading to her
motion papers in accordance with Local Rule 15.1(a). Accordingly,
Judge Sharpe rules that Hudson's cross-motion to amend is denied
for failing to comply with Local Rule 15.1.

Finally, although Hudson's cross-motion to amend is denied for
failure to comply with the Local Rules of Practice, and Hudson has
already amended once, Hudson is granted leave to renew her motion
to amend in full compliance with the Local Rules of Practice within
14 days of this Memorandum-Decision and Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum-Decision and Order dated
Jan. 23, 2023, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p94errw from
Leagle.com.

Gattuso & Ciotoli, PLLC, FRANK S. GATTUSO, ESQ., in Fayetteville,
New York; Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, JAMES E. MURPHY --
jmurphy@vandallp.com -- MICHELE A. MORENO -- mmoreno@vandallp.com
-- in New York City, for the Plaintiff.

Littler, Mendelson Law Firm, JACQUELINE P. POLITO --
jpolito@littler.com -- ERIN TRAIN -- etrain@littler.com -- in
Fairport, New York, for the Defendants.


STATE FARM: Interim Class Co-Counsel Appointed in Schwartz Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kea W. Riggs of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Mexico appoints Dominguez Law Firm, Pizzonia Law, LLC, and the
Law Office of Ryan J. Villa as interim class co-counsel in the
consolidated lawsuit styled DANA SCHWARTZ, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. FREEMAN J. PALMER, and
CHELSEA PALMER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00328-KWR-SCY,
Consolidated with No. 1:19-cv-00301-KWR-SCY (D.N.M.).

The matter comes before the Court upon competing motions to appoint
interim class counsel in this consolidated class action. The
Plaintiffs filed competing putative class actions against the same
insurer, asserting substantially similar claims. Each Plaintiff
seeks the interim appointment of their counsel as class counsel to
the exclusion of the other Plaintiff's counsel.

The Defendant does not object to the interim appointment of class
counsel, or take a position on which group of counsel should be
appointed. Plaintiff Schwartz is represented by the Dominguez Law
Firm, Pizzonia Law, LLC, and the Law Office of Ryan J. Villa. The
Palmer Plaintiffs are represented by Bhasker Law, Corbin
Hildebrandt, P.C., and the Law offices of Geoffrey R. Romero.

Plaintiff Schwartz filed a Motion to Appoint Co-Class Counsel
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) and (g)(1)-(4).

The Palmer Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Appoint Co-class Counsel
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) and (g)(1)-(4).

Judge Riggs states that both sets of counsel clearly satisfy
(g)(1)(A)(1)-(4) and would serve the class well. However, the
Schwartz Plaintiff was the first to file this case against the
State Farm Defendants. The Palmer Plaintiffs filed their case
approximately one year after the Schwartz Plaintiff, after the
Schwartz Plaintiff was already successful on one round of
dispositive motions and fully briefed another round of dispositive
motions.

The Palmer Plaintiffs assert that their counsel developed the legal
theory used in this consolidated action in a separate class action
against different insurers. Although the Palmer counsel began their
theory in Bhasker and have filed several putative class actions
against insurers, the Schwartz case was the second overall class
action, and the Schwartz counsel have prevailed in multiple rounds
of dispositive motions, Judge Riggs says.

The Court finds that the appointment of the Schwartz team best
represents the interests of the putative class in this consolidated
action.

The Palmer Plaintiffs suggest that their putative class definition
is broader or superior. However, these cases have been
consolidated. It is unclear why this consolidated case could not
proceed on the broader class language in Palmer, Judge Riggs points
out.

Therefore, Plaintiff Schwartz's motion to appoint interim counsel
is granted and the Schwartz co-counsel (including the Dominguez Law
Firm, Pizzonia Law, LLC, and the Law Office of Ryan J. Villa) are
appointed as interim co-class counsel of these consolidated cases.
The Palmer Plaintiffs' motion to appoint interim counsel is
denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 23, 2023, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8wp4u6 from Leagle.com.


STAVATTI AEROSPACE: Dimitrov Files Suit in D. Arizona
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stavatti Aerospace
Limited, et al. The case is styled as Valentino Dimitrov,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Stavatti Aerospace Limited, Stavatti Aerospace Limited, Stavatti
Corporation, Stavatti Immobiliare Limited, Stavatti Industries
Limited, Stavatti Niagara Limited, Stavatti Super Fulcrum Limited,
Stavatti Ukraine, a Ukrainian business entity, Stavatti Heavy
Industries Limited, Christopher Beskar, husband, Maja Beskar, wife;
Brian Colvin, husband, Corrina Colvin, wife; John Simon, husband,
Jean Simon, wife; William Mcewen, husband, Patricia Mcewen, wife;
Rudy Chacon, husband, Unknown Chacon named as Jane Doe Chacon,
wife; Unknown Parties named as Does 1-10, inclusive, Case No.
2:23-cv-00226-DJH (D. Ariz., Feb. 3, 2023).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutes: Racketeer/Corrupt
Organization for the Racketeering (RICO) Act.

Stavatti Aerospace Ltd. -- https://www.stavatti.com/ -- is an
aircraft manufacturer focused on the design and production of
military, commercial and general aviation aircraft.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          George Khalil Chebat, Esq.
          Joseph J Toboni, Esq.
          ENARA LAW PLLC
          7631 E Greenway Rd., Ste. B2
          Scottsdale, AZ 85260
          Phone: (602) 687-2010
          Email: info@enaralaw.com
                 joseph@enaralaw.com


TIKTOK INC: Bogard Sues Over Harmful Contents on Video Platforms
----------------------------------------------------------------
BOGARD, MCGRATH, JANE DOE, BECCA SCHMILL FOUNDATION, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
TIKTOK INC., BYTEDANCE INC., ALPHABET INC., XXVI HOLDINGS INC.,
GOOGLE LLC, YOUTUBE LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:23-cv-00012-RLY-MPB
(S.D. Ind., February 1, 2023) is a class action against the
Defendants for strict product liability, negligence, fraudulent
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of
the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, the Wisconsin Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act, and
the California Business and Professional Code.

The Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit after being ignored and
re-victimized by TikTok and YouTube after they had made reports.
The Plaintiffs voluntarily contributed labor and resources to help
TikTok and YouTube's content moderation teams to identify toxic,
fatal, and dangerous content that had taken the lives of their own
children and many others. In response, all they received was a
canned response stating that choking challenge videos, harassing
contents, and child pornography does not violate their community
guidelines. There was no chance for Plaintiffs to appeal or seek
explanations. The Defendants' actions and inactions made plaintiffs
re-experience trauma and grief.

The Plaintiffs in this class action lawsuit bring claims on behalf
of their children, three of whom are deceased. The Plaintiffs seek
to hold accountable the companies that develop and operate TikTok
and YouTube, two of the most popular online video platforms among
teens. Two of these plaintiffs have lost their children due to
harmful and dangerous audio-visual contents allowed, promoted, and
suggested to minor children by Defendants, including content
promoting the "choking challenge," harassing and sexually explicit
material, and unlawful drugs and drug use, says the suit.

Tiktok Inc. operates as a free service and social media application
for creating and sharing short mobile videos.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew Rozynski, Esq.
          Juyoun Han, Esq.
          Eric Baum, Esq.
          EISENBERG & BAUM, LLP
          24 Union Square East, PH
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: (212) 353-8700
          Facsimile: (212) 353-1708

UCOR LLC: Speer, et al., File Bid for Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CARLTON SPEER, MALENA
DENNIS, and ZACHARIAH DUNCAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, v. UCOR LLC, Case No.
3:22-cv-00426-TRM-JEM (E.D. Tenn.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order certifying their proposed class (consisting of two
subclasses) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 as follows:

   "All employees, staff augmentation employees, and
   subcontractors who (i) were subject to UCOR's COVID-19
   vaccine mandate, (ii) who submitted an accommodation/
   exemption request based on their sincerely held religious
   belief opposing the receipt of the vaccine, and (iii) whose
   request for an accommodation/exemption was denied."

   Of these employees," the first subclass consists of those who
   suffered an adverse employment action for refusing to receive
   the vaccine.

   The second subclass consists of those people who after having
   their religious-based accommodation/exemption request denied
   by UCOR, subsequently received the vaccine out of fear of
   losing their livelihood because of UCOR's vaccination-or-
   termination policy.

UCOR is an environmental cleanup contractor.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Jan 26,
2023 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3XtEKDL
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jesse D. Nelson, Esq.
          Clint J. Coleman, Esq.
          NELSON LAW GROUP, PLLC
          10263 Kingston Pike
          Knoxville, TN 37922
          Telephone: (865) 383-1053
          E-mail: jesse@NLGattorneys.com
                  clint@NLGattorneys.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          William S. Rutchow, Esq.
          Darius Walker, Jr., Esq.
          Luci Nelson, Esq.
          OGLETREE DEAKINS
          401 Commerce Street, Suite 1200
          Nashville, TN 37219
          E-mail: William.rutchow@ogletree.com
                  Darius.walker@ogletree.com
                  Luci.nelson@ogletree.com

UMASS MEMORIAL: Brooks Discrimination Suit Removed to D. Mass.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled SHELLY BROOKS, SHANNON DYER, JOVANNA MEROLLA, and
REBECCA THOMAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. UMASS MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2285-CV-01088, was removed from the Superior
Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Worcester County, to
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
on February 2, 2023.

The Clerk of Court for the District of Massachusetts assigned Case
No. 4:23-cv-40011 to the proceeding.

This action arises from the former employment relationship between
Plaintiffs and Defendant. In their Amended Class Action Complaint,
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant discriminated against them on the
basis of their religion under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et
seq., and M.G.L. c. 151B, Section 4.

UMass Memorial Medical Center, Inc. is a health care system in
Central Massachusetts.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Robert L. Kilroy, Esq.
          Amanda M. Baer, Esq.
          Massiel L. Sanchez, Esq.
          Ashlyn E. Dowd, Esq.
          MIRICK, O'CONNELL, DEMALLIE & LOUGEE, LLP
          1800 West Park Drive, Suite 400
          Westborough, MA 01581-3926
          Telephone: (508) 860-1464
          Facsimile: (508) 983-6264
          E-mail: rkilroy@mirickoconnell.com
                  abaer@mirickoconnell.com
                  msanchez@mirickoconnell.com
                  adowd@mirickoconnell.com

UNITED RENTALS: Standridge Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled LARRY GENE STANDRIDGE, individually and on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. UNITED
RENTALS (NORTH AMERICA), INC., a Delaware Corporation, and DOES
1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CV-22-005875, was removed
from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County
of Stanislaus to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California on February 2, 2023.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 1:23-cv-00166-ADA-SAB to the proceeding.

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, 10 total causes of action, nine of which
are for various violations of the California Labor Code and one for
"Unfair Competition" under the California Business & Professions
Code.

United Rentals (North America), Inc. is an equipment rental
company.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Julie M. Capell, Esq.
          Jaime D. Walter, Esq.
          Arielle J. Spinner, Esq.
          DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
          865 South Figueroa Street, 24th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-2566
          Telephone: (213) 633-6800
          Facsimile: (213) 633-6899
          E-mail: juliecapell@dwt.com
                  jaimewalter@dwt.com
                  ariellespinner@dwt.com

UNITED STATES: $185M Attys.' Fees Award in Health Republic Vacated
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee, KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN INC., KAISER
FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF GEORGIA, KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF
THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES, INC., KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN INC.
OF COLO., KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTHPLAN OF THE NW, GROUP HEALTH
COOPERATIVE, HARKEN HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY, HEALTH PLAN OF
NEVADA, INC., OXFORD HEALTH PLANS (NJ), INC., ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION, INCORPORATED, UNITEDHEALTHCARE BENEFITS
PLAN OF CALIFORNIA, UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMUNITY PLAN, INC.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, UNITEDHEALTHCARE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF ALABAMA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF
COLORADO, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF FLORIDA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE
OF GEORGIA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF KENTUCKY, LTD.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF LOUISIANA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF
MISSISSIPPI, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NEW YORK, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF OKLAHOMA, INC.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE
MID-ATLANTIC, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE MIDLANDS, INC.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE MIDWEST, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF UTAH,
INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF WASHINGTON, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF
OHIO, INC., ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE OPTIONS, INC., ALL SAVERS
INSURANCE COMPANY, UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. COMMON GROUND
HEALTHCARE COOPERATIVE, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff-Appellee, KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH
PLAN INC., KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF GEORGIA, KAISER
FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES, INC., KAISER
FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN INC. OF COLO., KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTHPLAN
OF THE NW, GROUP HEALTH COOPERATIVE, HARKEN HEALTH INSURANCE
COMPANY, HEALTH PLAN OF NEVADA, INC., OXFORD HEALTH PLANS (NJ),
INC., ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION, INCORPORATED,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE BENEFITS PLAN OF CALIFORNIA, UNITEDHEALTHCARE
COMMUNITY PLAN, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF
ALABAMA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF COLORADO, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE
OF FLORIDA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF GEORGIA, INC.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF KENTUCKY, LTD., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF LOUISIANA,
INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF MISSISSIPPI, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF
NEW ENGLAND, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NEW YORK, INC.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF
OKLAHOMA, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE MID-ATLANTIC, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE
MID-LANDS, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE MIDWEST, INC.,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF UTAH, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF WASHINGTON,
INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF OHIO, INC., ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE
OPTIONS, INC., ALL SAVERS INSURANCE COMPANY, UNITEDHEALTHCARE
INSURANCE COMPANY INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES,
Defendant, Case Nos. 2022-1018, 2022-1019 (Fed. Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacates the attorney's
fees award and remands for further proceedings consistent with its
Opinion.

These appeals present a challenge to awards of attorney's fees to
the class counsel taken out of the classes' recoveries in
successful class actions against the United States based on the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010)
(collectively, the ACA).

In the ACA, Congress created a three-year Risk Corridors program to
accompany the creation of new health-insurance marketplaces, which
presented uncertain risks for participating health-insurance
companies. To encourage participation, Congress provided, among
other things, that qualified health-plan issuers (QHP issuers) that
offered their products in the new marketplaces would be entitled to
payments from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) if they suffered sufficient losses. When the
government failed to make the payments required by the statute,
many QHP issuers sued the United States in the Court of Federal
Claims (Claims Court) seeking damages under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. Section 1491(a)(1).

Among the suits were two class actions now before the Court, Health
Republic Insurance Co. v. United States and Common Ground
Healthcare Cooperative v. United States, in which the law firm of
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP (Quinn Emanuel) was
appointed the lead counsel for classes of QHP issuers seeking
payment of the past-due amounts. In the opt-in notices sent to
potential class members with court approval, Quinn Emanuel
represented that it would seek attorney's fees to come out of any
recovery, that it would seek no more than 5% of any judgment or
settlement obtained, and that the Claims Court would determine the
exact amount based on, among other things, how many issuers
participated, the amount at issue in the case, and a so-called
"lodestar cross-check" (based on the hours actually worked).

The Health Republic and Common Ground cases were stayed on the
merits pending the resolution of appeals in other cases involving
materially identical claims. During the stay, the Supreme Court, in
other cases, ruled against the government on the central issue in
the various cases, holding that QHP issuers were entitled to
collect ACA-promised Risk Corridors payments through Tucker Act
actions, citing Maine Community Health Options v. United States,
140 S.Ct. 1308, 1331 (2020).

In light of Maine Community, the Claims Court entered money
judgments in favor of the Health Republic and Common Ground
classes, in amounts adding to about $3.7 billion. It then awarded
Quinn Emanuel 5% of each of the common funds recovered in Health
Republic and Common Ground, rejecting various objections of 34
class members (Objectors), the total fee amounting to about $185
million, to be taken out of the class members' recovery.

The Objectors timely appealed on Oct. 1, 2021, contending that the
attorney's fee award (the two awards considered as one) was
unreasonable.

The Federal Circuit reviews an award of attorney's fees for an
abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes a
clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing
its decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual
findings.

The Federal Circuit concludes that the Claims Court abused its
discretion in its fee award for several reasons, mostly but not
exclusively limited to the court's discussion of a lodestar
crosscheck.

First, the Claims Court concluded that it was not necessary to
perform a lodestar cross-check.

That conclusion, the Federal Circuit holds, was legal error. It
says it is a sufficient reason for it to so hold that the
court-approved notices sent to potential class members, for use by
potential members in deciding to whether to opt into the classes,
expressly guaranteed use of a lodestar cross-check by the Claims
Court in determining an attorney's fee award.

Second, the Claims Court did not perform the required lodestar
cross-check. It did note what the implicit multiplier would be for
the $185 million award if the hours and rates asserted by Quinn
Emanuel were accepted, and it stated, citing three judicial
decisions in support, that "even if the Court applied the lodestar
crosscheck, a multiplier of 18-19 would, at least, not be outside
the realm of reasonableness."

That analysis does not suffice even apart from the lack of scrutiny
of the lodestar figure itself, the Federal Court holds. It finds
that (i) the Claims Court did not give required consideration or
weight to pertinent principles and to consensus norms based on
those principles; and (ii) in stating simply that an implicit
multiplier of 18 to 19 was not outside "the realm of
reasonableness," the Claims Court misconceived its task as one in
which the request for fees was presumptively to be granted, subject
only to challengers' demonstration that the request is outside the
range of reasonableness and must be reduced.

For these reasons, the Federal Circuit must vacate the award of
fees and remand for reconsideration. That reconsideration must
include a lodestar cross-check in accordance with its Opinion,
including an assessment of whether there is sufficient
justification for an award with an implicit multiplier outside the
mainstream of relevant multipliers. The Federal Circuit does not
see such justification in what Quinn Emanuel has presented to it.

As part of the lodestar cross-check on remand, the Claims Court
should also readdress the Objectors' contentions that Quinn Emanuel
has not done enough to justify the lodestar itself -- the
approximate number of hours and blended rates used to produce the
18-to-19 implicit multiplier. More relaxed specificity and
documentation standards apply to examination of the lodestar in a
percentage-of-the-fund case compared to the standards applied when
the lodestar method is directly used to set the fee (especially
where paid by the adverse party). But the Claims Court should
provide more explanation than so far presented concerning the
adequacy of Quinn Emanuel's hours and rates in light of the
Objectors' criticisms.

Finally, the Federal Circuit has concluded that the court must
honor the class-notice commitments if, as in the present case, they
remain material to the court's task and that the court in may not
treat the request as presumptively the proper award but must play a
more neutral role, characterized as a fiduciary one, in deciding
what fee is warranted. The Objectors argue that those conclusions
may have a bearing on aspects of the fee analysis beyond the
lodestar cross-check. On remand, the Claims Court should reconsider
any parts of its analysis affected by the conclusions the Federal
Circuit has reached.

For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Circuit vacates the fee
award and remands for further proceedings consistent with its
Opinion. Costs are awarded to the Appellants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3uub2bfw from Leagle.com.

DEREK L. SHAFFER -- derekshaffer@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for
plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented by DAVID COOPER --
davidcooper@quinnemanuel.com -- New York, NY; J. D. HORTON, ADAM
WOLFSON -- adamwolfson@quinnemanuel.com -- Los Angeles, CA; STEPHEN
A. SWEDLOW, Chicago, IL.

MOHAMMAD KESHAVARZI -- mkeshavarzi@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued for
plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by JOHN BURNS --
jburns@sheppardmullin.com -- MATTHEW G. HALGREN --
mhalgren@sheppardmullin.com -- San Diego, CA.


VERYABLE LLC: Fails to Pay Employees' OT Wages, Slater Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANTONIO SLATER, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated current v. VERYABLE, LLC, Case No. 2:23-cv-02040-SHL-tmp
(W.D. Tenn., Jan. 25, 2023) seeks to recover unpaid overtime
compensation and other damages owed to Plaintiff and other
similarly situated current and former full-time "day rate"
employees, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that he and those similarly situated were not
paid one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay for
all hours worked over 40 per week within weekly pay periods during
all times material to this collective action.

Accordingly, the Defendant only pays to the Plaintiff and those
similarly situated "day rate" compensation for all their hours
worked per week rather than by an hourly pay rate or by a salary
wage. The Defendant's "day rate" compensation policy, plan and
policy did not include any compensation for hours worked in excess
of 40 hours per week within weekly pay periods. Thus, the Defendant
failed to pay the Plaintiff and those similarly situated at the
applicable FLSA overtime compensation rates of pay for hours they
performed in excess of 40 hours per week within weekly pay periods
during all times relevant, the suit claims.

As a result, the Plaintiff and others similarly situated are
entitled and hereby seek to recover from Defendant back pay,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, interest, and other cost, fees
and expenses for all such unpaid compensable overtime that is
available to them under the FLSA.

The Plaintiff was employed by and performed work as a staffing
employee of Defendant at the Cartcom, Inc. facility in Memphis,
Tennessee within the last three years.

Veryable LLC is a staffing company with locations in Tennessee and
in several other states.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          JACKSON SHIELDS YEISER HOLT
          OWEN & BRYANT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com

WAKEMED: 4th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Elrod's Amended Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PEGGY ELROD; YVONNE BERTOLO; JANINE PALMER; JUSTIN
PALMER, and all similarly situated persons within the proposed
class, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. WAKEMED; WAKEMED SPECIALTY
PHYSICIANS, LLC, d/b/a WakeMed Physician Practices; WAKEMED
SPECIALISTS GROUP, LLC, d/b/a WakeMed Physician Practices; ARGOS
HEALTH, INC., Defendants-Appellees, and ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 25, Defendants, Case No.
21-2203 (4th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirms the district court's dismissal of the amended
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Peggy Elrod, Yvonne Bertolo, and Janine Palmer on behalf of her
minor son, Justin Palmer (collectively, "Patients"), sued WakeMed
and Argos, alleging that an assignment of benefits ("AOB") that
Patients signed with WakeMed is unenforceable.

Following unrelated car accidents, the Patients sought emergency
medical treatment from WakeMed, an emergency-room ("ER") healthcare
service provider. WakeMed required the Patients to execute a
general consent form ("GCF") to obtain emergency treatment. The GCF
indicated that, by executing the form, the patient consented to the
provision of all medical treatment and other health care that his
or her physician(s) or other caregivers considered necessary, which
may include diagnostic, radiology, and laboratory procedures. In
relevant part, the GCF also included an AOB.

After the Patients were treated, WakeMed worked with Argos to send
invoices for the services provided, plus the signed GCFs, to
Patients' auto insurers, among others. After determining that they
had medpay coverage, Elrod and Bertolo's insurers sent checks to
WakeMed as payment toward their medical bills. The Patients do not
allege that the Palmers' insurers sent their medpay proceeds to
WakeMed.

The Patients assert that WakeMed and Argos took advantage of their
compromised state to force them to sign the GCFs to obtain medpay
benefits to which WakeMed was not otherwise entitled. Patients
claim that they simply had no choice but to sign," even though they
had no intention of assigning their rights under their insurance
policies.

The Patients filed an amended class action complaint in November
2020, bringing five claims against WakeMed, Argos, and various
insurers. They sought a declaratory judgment that the AOB was void
based on unconscionability, lack of mutual assent, lack of
consideration, unilateral mistake, fraud, imposition, and public
policy. They also brought a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against WakeMed and claims for fraud, conversion, and violations of
the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C.
Gen. Stat. Section 75-1 et seq., against WakeMed and Argos.

WakeMed and Argos moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(6),
and the district court granted the motions on 12(b)(6) grounds.

On the declaratory judgment claim, the district court reasoned that
the Patients' signatures manifested their assent to the GCF. It
also found adequate consideration based on the exchange of
healthcare services for the AOB. And in response to the Patients'
argument that WakeMed had a duty under the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1395dd, to
provide emergency services such that there was no additional
consideration for the AOB, the court reasoned that, in the GCF,
WakeMed promised to provide necessary medical services, which was
more than required by EMTALA.

The district court also rejected the Patients' various
contract-enforcement defenses. It found that the Patients failed to
plausibly allege that the AOB was unconscionable where it performed
a function permitted by law and was not harsh or one-sided. On the
Patients' mistake, fraud, undue-influence, and diminished-capacity
arguments, it noted, among other flaws, that the Patients did not
identify any individual who concealed facts from them, did not
allege that any WakeMed employee intended for them to rely on any
purported concealment, and did not allege that they so relied in
executing the GCF.

On the Patients' undue-influence and duress claims, the court
indicated that Patients alleged they were "directed" to sign the
GCF, which did not give rise to a plausible inference of
overpowering influence or a wrongful threat. And on diminished
capacity, it explained that the Patients did not plausibly allege
that they could not make or communicate important decisions about
themselves.

Moreover, the court rejected the Patients' argument that the AOB
was unenforceable under the law governing Medicare. It reasoned
that by contracting to assign benefits payable from a primary
insurer, WakeMed was not engaging in conduct prohibited by
Medicare, but rather conduct that furthers the central purposes of
the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.

Finally, the district court noted that WakeMed sought dismissal of
the Palmers' claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing.
However, it reasoned that the presence of one party with standing
is enough to satisfy Article III and declined dismissal on that
basis as to the Palmers.

On appeal, WakeMed contends that, in addition to dismissing the
amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court should
have dismissed the Palmers under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
standing. The Patients disagree and also argue (1) that the court
should have found the GCF and AOB unenforceable or rescinded them
based on various contract-formation and contract-enforcement
defenses, and (2) that the court should have held that the GCF
violated the law governing Medicare.

Initially, WakeMed argues that the district court erroneously
concluded that because Elrod and Bertolo had standing, the court
could overlook that the Palmers lacked standing.

The Fourth Circuit opines that Elrod and Bertolo plausibly allege
standing: both allege that their insurers sent their medpay
benefits to WakeMed based on the AOB such that their funds were
diverted from them as a result of WakeMed's conduct. However, it
finds that the Patients do not allege that the Palmers' insurers
paid their medpay benefits to WakeMed. Moreover, WakeMed submitted
uncontested evidence that the insurers paid the Palmers' medpay
benefits to another healthcare provider. Therefore, the district
court should have dismissed the Palmers for lack of standing under
Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to trace their injury to WakeMed's
allegedly unlawful conduct.

While this is a separate and independent ground to affirm the
dismissal of the Palmers, the Fourth Circuit also agrees with the
district court's conclusion that the Patients failed to state
claims on which relief can be granted. Consequently, it affirms the
dismissal of Patients' claims -- the Palmers, on 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) grounds, and Elrod and Bertolo, on 12(b)(6) grounds.

Turning to the merits, the Patients argue that the GCF is
unenforceable due to lack of mutual consent and consideration and
that it should be rescinded based on diminished capacity,
unconscionability, duress, undue influence, and fraud.

The Fourth Circuit reviews de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Applying this
standard of review and North Carolina substantive law, it concludes
that the district court properly dismissed the amended complaint.

First, the district court correctly concluded that Patients failed
to allege a lack of mutual assent. The Patients signed the GCFs,
and therefore their argument that they "never made an objective
manifestation of their consent to the terms of the contract" fails

Second, it properly concluded that the Patients failed to allege a
lack of consideration. The GCF clearly provides for the provision
of healthcare services beyond EMTALA's screening and stabilization
requirements.

Third, the district court accurately found that the Patients failed
to plausibly allege that the AOB should be rescinded based on lack
of mental capacity. The Patients' allegations alone are
insufficient to plausibly plead that they did not understand the
nature of the GCF and its effects.

Fourth, it correctly rejected the Patients' unconscionability
argument. The Patients have failed to plausibly plead substantive
unconscionability.

Fifth, the Fourth Circuit agrees with the district court that the
Patients failed to plausibly allege that the GCF should be
rescinded based on duress or undue influence. For the same reasons
that the Patients' duress claim fails, the Patients do not
plausibly allege a result indicating undue influence.

Sixth, the district court did not err in concluding that Patients
failed to plausibly allege fraud. The Fourth Circuit agrees with
the district court that the Patients failed to plausibly allege
that the GCF and AOB lacked consideration, the parties lacked
mutual assent, or that the GCF and AOB should be rescinded.

Finally, the Fourth Circuit turns to the Patients' argument that
the AOB is unenforceable under the law governing Medicare. It
opines that WakeMed did not violate Section 1395a by entering the
AOB with Patients. Instead, WakeMed engaged in conduct that
furthers the central purposes of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.

For the foregoing reasons, the Fourth Circuit affirms the district
court's dismissal of the amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2023 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y7ddjeep from Leagle.com.

ON BRIEF: Arlene L. Velazquez-Colon, Kendra Renee Alleyne --
kendra@colonlaw1.com -- THE LAW OFFICE OF COLON & ASSOCIATES, PLLC,
Wake Forest, North Carolina, for the Appellants.

Matthew Nis Leerberg -- mleerberg@foxrothschild.com -- Troy D.
Shelton -- tshelton@foxrothschild.com -- Jeffrey R. Whitley --
jwhitley@foxrothschild.com -- FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellees Wake Med; WakeMed Specialty Physicians,
LLC; WakeMed Specialists Group, LLC. James C. Thornton --
jthornton@cshlaw.com -- Steven A. Bader -- sbader@cshlaw.com -- R.
Robert El-Jaouhari -- rjaouhari@cshlaw.com -- CRANFILL SUMNER LLP,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee Argos Health, Inc.


WATERWIPES USA: Vences Sues Over Deceptive Biodegradable Wipes
--------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINA VENCES, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WATERWIPES (USA), INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:23-cv-00619 (N.D. Ill., February 1, 2023) is a class
action against the Defendant for unjust enrichment and for
violation of the State Consumer Fraud Acts and the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act.

This is a class action lawsuit regarding Defendant's manufacturing,
distribution, advertising, marketing, labeling, and sale of
"WaterWipes" brand wipes that are sold nationwide and marketed as,
among other things, "100% Biodegradable Wipes," along with the
image of a green leaf. Additionally, since on or around March or
April 2022, the Defendant further misled consumers by claiming on
the back of the product package that the Water Wipes are "Made from
100% plant fibres, biodegrades in 4 weeks," says the suit.

The complaint asserts that because Defendant's false and misleading
representations and deceptive and unfair material omissions dupe
reasonable consumers into believing the products feature premium
attributes, Defendant's representations and omissions thus dupe
reasonable consumers into paying premium prices for the products,
even though they do not actually feature the premium attributes for
which the consumers, including Plaintiff and Class members, pay.

WaterWipes (USA), Inc. formulates, manufactures, markets,
advertises, and sells baby wipes, which are sold across the U.S. in
retailers like Target, Walmart, and Walgreens.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          LAUKAITIS LAW FIRM LLC
          737 Bainbridge Street #155
          Philadelphia, PA 19147
          Telephone: (215) 789-4462
          E-mail: klaukaitis@laukaitislaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Sciolla, Esq.
          SCIOLLA LAW FIRM LLC
          Land Title Building
          100 S. Broad Street, Suite 1910
          Philadelphia, PA 19110
          Telephone: (267) 328-5245
          E-mail: andrew@sciollalawfirm.com

WHELE LLC: Faces Nelson Suit Over Defective Electric Heating Pads
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JORDAN NELSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. WHELE, LLC d/b/a PERCH, Case No. 4:23-cv-00430 (N.D.
Cal., Jan. 30, 2023) sues the Defendant for the manufacture and
sale of its electric heating pads, all of which suffer from an
identical defect in design.

According to the complaint, the products overheat during charging
or use and create the potential for a burn or fire hazard. Such a
design defect is extraordinarily dangerous and has rendered the
Products unsuitable for their principal and intended purpose. Due
to the dangerous nature of the defect, the Defendant initiated a
recall of its electric heating pads. However, the recall is grossly
inadequate, as it does not provide consumers with immediate
monetary relief, and it fails to provide sufficient notice to
consumers, the lawsuit contends.

The product that Ms. Nelson purchased malfunctioned shortly after
she purchased it, causing rashes, and skin irritation. Ms. Nelson
no longer uses the product because of the significant injury risk
and fire hazard posed by the Defect. The Lot No. shown on the
product purchased by Ms. Nelson is 211103 and is included in
Defendant's product recall.

Ms. Nelson brings her claims against the Defendant individually and
on behalf of a class of all other similarly situated purchasers of
the products for:

  (1) violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act;

  (2) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law,

  (3) fraud;

  (4) unjust enrichment;

  (5) breach of implied warranties; and

  (6) violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

In April 2022, Ms. Nelson purchased the Mighty Bliss Blue Electric
Heating Pad, Large (12" x 24") online from Amazon.

WHELE sells electric heating pads and deep-tissue massage
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com

Y-MABS THERAPEUTICS: Court Sets April 18 Hearing in Corwin Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ROBERT CORWIN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Y-MABS THERAPEUTICS,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 23-CV-431 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.),
Judge Jesse M. Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York ordered that a conference will be held on
April 18, 2023, to consider any motions for appointment of lead
plaintiff and lead counsel and for consolidation.

On Jan. 18, 2023, the Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit on
behalf of purchasers of Y-mAbs Therapeutics, Inc. securities
between Oct. 6, 2020, and Oct. 28, 2022. See ECF No. 1. The
Complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") and Rule 10b-5,
promulgated thereunder.

As explained in the Court's Jan. 19, 2023 Order, Section
78u-4(a)(3)(A) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA") requires that within 20 days of the filing of the
complaint, the Plaintiff will cause to be published, in a widely
circulated national business-oriented publication or wire service,
a notice advising members of the purported plaintiff class of the
pendency of the action, the claims asserted therein, and the
purported class period.

The Plaintiff's counsel notified the Court that the required notice
was published on Jan. 18, 2023. Members of the purported class,
therefore, have until March 20, 2023, to move the Court to serve as
lead plaintiffs. It is further ordered that opposition to any
motion for appointment of lead plaintiff will be served and filed
by April 3, 2023. No replies may be filed absent prior leave of
Court.

Finally, Judge Furman ordered that a conference will be held on
April 18, at 3:00 p.m., to consider any motions for appointment of
lead plaintiff and lead counsel and for consolidation. The
conference will be held remotely by telephone.

If an amended complaint or a related case is filed prior to
appointment of a lead plaintiff, the Plaintiff's counsel will,
within one week, submit a letter to the Court identifying any
differences between the allegations in the new complaint(s) and the
allegations in the original complaint (including any differences in
the claims asserted and the relevant class periods) and showing
cause why the Court should not order republication of notice under
the PSLRA and set a new deadline for the filing of motions for
appointment.

Judge Furman directs the Named Plaintiffs to promptly serve a copy
of this Order on each of the Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 23, 2023, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yrfed464 from Leagle.com.



                            *********

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