/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/221219.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, December 19, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 246

                            Headlines

1ST CHOICE: Davis Must File Class Cert Bid by February 14, 2023
212 STEAKHOUSE: Suit Seeks to Certify Tipped Employees Class
5.11 INC: Herrera Files ADA Suit in C.D. California
82 COURT STREET: Davis Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
AARON BASHA CORP: Zinnamon Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

ACCEPTANCE NOW: Seeks to Stay McBurnie Case Pending Appeal
ACKERCAMPS.COM LLC: Scheduling and Discovery Order Entered
ACUITY CHS: Arbuthnot Seeks Extension of Class Cert. Deadlines
ADT PIZZA: Stracham Files ADA Suit in W.D. North Carolina
AIR METHODS: Fisher Suit Removed to D. New Jersey

ALFRED DUNNER: Zinnamon Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ALGENIST LLC: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Nguyen Consumer Suit
ALPHA IMPORTS NY: Zinnamon Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ANDERSON, TX: Declaration of Edward Pruette Stricken in Martinez
ANTHONY ANNUCCI: Zielinski Suit Transferred to W.D. New York

ARETE FINANCIAL: Doyle Loses Bid to Reassign or Vacate Dismissal
ARIZONA BEVERAGES: Stipulation Extending Class Certification Filed
ARKADIUM INC: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
ARMCHAIR EXPERT: Luis Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER: Hernandez's Claims Against Pronto Dismissed

ASSAEL INC: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
ASSESSOR OF GREAT NECK: Zar Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
ASSESSOR OF MINEOLA: Lameirao Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
ASSESSOR OF ROCKVILLE CENTRE: Delaney Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
ASTRAL HEALTH & BEAUTY: Galarsa Files Suit in N.D. California

AUTOZONE INC: Iannone's Bid for Class Certification Partly Granted
AUTOZONERS LLC: Scheduling Order Entered in Confusione Suit
AZURE POWER: Serap Lokman Appointed as Lead Plaintiff in Gilbert
B.P. EXPLORATION: Court Issues Summary Judgment Against Campbell
B.P. EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Brumfield Suit

BASSETT HEALTHCARE: Prelim Approval of Class Settlement Sought
BELKIN INTERNATIONAL: Gromov Sues Over Misrepresentation of mAh
BICYCLE HABITAT: Rodriguez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
BITESQUAD.COM LLC: Jenson Suit Removed to D. Minnesota
BLACK CEO: Ulery Seeks Leave to Conduct Class Cert Discovery

BLATT BILLIARD CORP: Rodriguez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
BOST INC: Moses Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages
BRIAN KABOT: Shirley Files Suit in Del. Chancery Ct.
BROADWAY FOOD MART: De La Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
CAL-MAINE FOODS: Magistrate Judge Recommends Dismissal of Bell Suit

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY: Jan. 18, 2023 Status Conference Set
CALIFORNIA: Funds Must Be Disbursed to Class in Vataj v. Johnson
CAPITAL HOME MORTGAGE: Kauffman Files Suit in S.D. California
CARECORE HEALTH: Seeks to Stay Conditional Cert. in Gudger Suit
CEE & CEE: Order on General Pretrial Management Entered in Brown

CHAD WOLF: Court Orders Sealing Defendants' Objection Documents
CHEGG INC: Keller Files Suit in N.D. California
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO: Class Cert Hearing Extended to Jan. 9, 2023
COMPOUND DAO: Houghton Sues Over Selling without Registration
COSAN CONSTRUCTION: Amended Case Mng't Plan Entered in Sanchez

DAVID SHINN: Walton Loses Bid for Class Certification
DON HERRINGTON: Seeks More Time to File Class Cert Response
DST SYSTEMS: 8th Cir. Vacates Confirmation Orders in Hursh Suit
EMORTGAGE FUNDING: Kauffman Sues Over Unlawful Recording
ENERGY TRANSFER: Case Management Order Entered in AERS Suit

FCA US: Scheduling Order Entered in Wilson Class Action
FIRST CONTACT: Nightingale Seeks More Time to File Class Cert. Bid
FIRSTENERGY CORP: Class Cert Hearing Set for March 17, 2023
FLYING S. WINGS: Class Certification Hearing Set for Feb. 24, 2023
GLAXOSMITHKLINE: Ruling to Seal Confidential Docs Sought

GLOBAL RESOURCING: Martinez Seeks to Certify Worker Class
GOLDEN APPLE: Initial Case Mng't Conference Set for Jan. 11, 2023
GOLDEN ENTERTAINMENT: Recommendation Adopted; Houston Suit Tossed
GQ SOLUTIONS: Granting Leave to Ulery to Conduct Discovery Endorsed
GRETCHEN WHITMER: Class Certification Deadlines Extended in Rouse

HARVARD BUSINESS: Case Management Order Entered in McVay Suit
HEALTH INSURANCE: Modified Class Cert. Related Deadlines Sought
HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Moore TCPA Suit
HI.Q INC: Loses Bid for Summary Judgment in Tyner TCPA Class Suit
HY-VEE INC: Scheduling & Trial Setting Order Entered in Rodriguez

HYUNDAI MOTOR: Court Provides Jarrell Leave to Amend Class Suit
IDAHO: Must File Response to Class Certification by Jan. 4, 2023
JOHN HANCOCK: Bid for Class Certification Granted in Kroetz
JSW STEEL: Polen Seeks to Conditionally Certify FLSA Collective
KPS AFFILIATES: Seeks More Time to File Class Cert Response

LIBERTY MUTUAL: Denial of Schiff's Summary Judgment Bid Reversed
LOUISIANA: Court Denies Bid to Supplement Record in Lewis v. Cain
MARRIOTT INT'L: Must Add Briefing on Affirmative Defense in Hall
META PLATFORMS: Summary Judgment in dotStrategy Suit Affirmed
MYLAN NV: Appeals Document Production Ruling in KPH Healthcare Suit

MYLAN NV: Court Grants in Part Bid to Compel Discovery in KPH Suit
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: District Court Dismisses Appeal in Homaidan Suit
NISSAN NORTH: E.D. California Grants Bid to Dismiss Lux Global Suit
PEOPLES BANK: Discovery in Mays Suit Stayed Over Dismissal Ruling
PFIZER INC: Monmouth Suit Stayed Pending Consolidation by JPML

PSC COMMUNITY: 1199SEIU Union Wins Bid to Confirm Premier Award
PSCU INC: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in Brown FLSA Suit
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Final Judgment Entered in Wilson Class Suit
STEADFAST INSURANCE: Partial Summary Judgment for T-Mobile Upheld
TGI FRIDAY'S: N.D. Illinois Narrows Claims in Joseph Consumer Suit

UNCASVILLE, CT: Initial Review Order Entered in Quint Class Suit
UNITED STATES: Carter Wins Bid to Lift Stay; Suit Dismissed
WALDEN UNIVERSITY: Maryland Court Refuses to Dismiss Carroll Suit
WASHINGTON: Grant of Counties' Dismissal Bid in CSP Suit Affirmed
WESTWARD MGMT: Ill. Supreme Court Flips Judgment in Channon Suit


                            *********

1ST CHOICE: Davis Must File Class Cert Bid by February 14, 2023
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BENJAMIN DAVIS,
Individually, and on behalf of other similarly situated, v. 1ST
CHOICE SERVICES, LLC and DARYL DUNGEE, Case No. 3:22-cv-00510-MHL
(E.D. Va.), the Hon. Judge Hannah Lauck entered an order granting
the Plaintiff's motion for bifurcation.

The Court said it will allow discovery regarding class
certification through January 31, 2023. The Court orders Plaintiff
to file motion for class certification no later than February 14,
2023.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3YpgCDZ at no extra charge.[CC]

212 STEAKHOUSE: Suit Seeks to Certify Tipped Employees Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NINO MARTINENKO, on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated, v. 212 STEAKHOUSE, INC.,
and NIKOLAY VOLPER, Case No. 1:22-cv-00518-JLR-RWL (S.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiffs will move the Court to grant the following relief:

   1. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, certifying a Class
      defined as all tipped employees -- servers, runners,
      bussers, and bartenders – who worked for the Defendants at
      any time on or after January 20, 2016 at 212 Steakhouse;

   2. appointing Nino Martineko and Dagmara Huk as Class
      Representatives; appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class
      Counsel;

   3. directing the Defendants to produce to the Plaintiffs a
      Microsoft Excel list, in electronic format, of all Class
      Members’ names, last known address, all known telephone
      numbers, dates of employment, and job titles; and
      authorize the mailing of the proposed Notice to all Class
      Members; or, in the alternative,  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
      P. 15, 20, 21, permit Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to
      join Opt-In Plaintiff Dagmara Huk as a named Plaintiff;

212 Steakhouse is a modern steakhouse with a unique concept: making
true Japanese Kobe beef and other top-notch cuts of beef accessible
to the general public.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Dec. 9,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3VQALkD
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          D. Maimon Kirschenbaum, Esq.
          Denise A. Schulman, Esq.
          Michael DiGiulio, Esq.
          JOSEPH & KIRSCHENBAUM LLP
          32 Broadway, Suite 601
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 688-5640
          Facsimile: (212) 981-9587

5.11 INC: Herrera Files ADA Suit in C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 5.11, Inc., et al.
The case is styled as Juanita Herrera, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. 5.11, Inc. doing business as:
5.11 Tactical, Does 1 to 10, inclusive, Case No.
5:22-cv-02184-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal., Dec. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

5.11, Inc. doing business as 5.11 Tactical --
https://www.511tactical.com/ -- is an American apparel brand of
outdoor clothing, footwear, uniforms and tactical equipment,
primarily targeting the market of military, law enforcement and
public safety personnel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Binyamin I. Manoucheri, Esq.
          Thiago Merlini Coelho, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Boulevard 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Phone: (213) 381-9988
          Fax: (213) 381-9989
          Email: binyamin@wilshirelawfirm.com
                 thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com


82 COURT STREET: Davis Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------
Katrina Davis, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. 82 COURT STREET CORP. d/b/a MCDONALD'S, 420 FULTON
RESTAURANT CORP. d/b/a MCDONALD'S, JOHN DOE RESTAURANTS 1-50, and
RICHARD G. LAROSE, Case No. 1:22-cv-07493 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 9, 2022),
is brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
York Labor Law, that he is entitled to recover from the Defendants:
unpaid wages, including overtime, due to time shaving; statutory
penalties; liquidated damages; and attorneys' fees and costs.

Throughout her employment with the Defendants, the Plaintiff was
scheduled to finish work at 5:00 P.M. the Defendants time shaved
the Plaintiff because they required Plaintiff to stay 1 hour longer
than her shift. Every time the Defendants asked the Plaintiff to
stay past her scheduled time, the Defendants made the Plaintiff
clock-out, and work off-the-clock. As a result, the Plaintiff was
not paid her corresponding overtime compensation for such time. The
Plaintiff was
time shaved a total of 5 hours per week. FLSA Collective Plaintiffs
and Class members were similarly time shaved because they were
required to work off the clock and were not paid overtime
compensation for such time, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants as a cashier at the
Defendants' restaurant.

The Defendants own several McDonald's franchises in New York
State.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Phone: 212-465-1180
          Fax: 212-465-1181


AARON BASHA CORP: Zinnamon Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aaron Basha Corp. The
case is styled as Warren Zinnamon, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Aaron Basha Corp., Case No.
1:22-cv-10409 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Aaron Basha Corp. -- https://www.aaronbasha.com/ -- was founded in
1990. The company's line of business includes the retail sale of
jewelry such as diamonds and other precious stones.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


ACCEPTANCE NOW: Seeks to Stay McBurnie Case Pending Appeal
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHANNON MCBURNIE and APRIL
SPRUELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. ACCEPTANCE NOW, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No. 3:21-cv-01429-JD (N.D.
Cal.), the Defendant RAC East seeks to shorten time for briefing
and hearing its forthcoming motion for a stay pending appeal or, in
the alternative, to stay the deadlines relating to Plaintiffs'
forthcoming motion for class certification until after the Court
rules on the motion for a stay pending appeal.

RAC East is erroneously sued as Acceptance Now, LLC. RAC intends to
file the motion for a stay on or before Monday, December 12, 2022.
RAC requests that the motion be heard as soon as the Court's
schedule permits, and respectfully suggests the following shortened
briefing schedule:

   1. Plaintiffs Shannon McBurnie's         December 15, 2022
      and April Spruell's opposition
      to the motion for a stay
      pending appeal due on or
      before:

   2. RAC's reply due on or before:         December 19, 2022

   3. The hearing be set for:               December 22, 2022

Alternatively, RAC requests that Plaintiffs' deadline to move for
class certification be stayed until 14 days after the Court rules
on RAC's motion for a stay pending appeal.

On November 30, 2022, the Court denied RAC's motion to compel
arbitration, rejecting RAC's argument that the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S.
Ct. 1906 (2022), abrogates California's McGill rule. RAC promptly
filed a notice of appeal two days later, on December 2, 2022.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 9, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FP7st7 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James T. Hannink, Esq.
          Zach P. Dostart, Esq.
          Lisa A. Dozier, Esq.
          Catherine S. Klobucar, Esq.
          DOSTART HANNINK LLP
          4225 Executive Square, Suite 600
          La Jolla, CA 92037-1484
          E-mail: jhannink@sdlaw.com
                  zdostart@sdlaw.com
                  ldozier@sdlaw.com
                  cklobucar@sdlaw.com

                - and -

          Michael Rubin, Esq.
          Connie K. Chan, Esq.
          Christine M. Salazar, Esq.
          ALTSHULER BERZON LLP
          177 Post Street, Suite 300
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          E-mail: mrubin@altber.com
                  cchan@altber.com
                  csalazar@altber.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Matthew G. Ball, Esq.
          Caitlin Blanche, Esq.
          Amy Wong, Esq.
          Ashley Song, Esq.
          K&L GATES LLP
          4 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1200
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 882-8200
          Facsimile: (415) 882-8220
          E-mail: matthew.ball@klgates.com
                  caitlin.blanche@klgates.com
                  amy.wong@klgates.com
                  ashley.song@klgates.com

ACKERCAMPS.COM LLC: Scheduling and Discovery Order Entered
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LYNAE VAHLE, Individually
and as Guardian of K.V., a minor, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, v. ACKERCAMPS.COM LLC,Case No.
3:22-cv-02256-DWD (S.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge David W. Dugan
entered an order adopting joint report and proposed scheduling and
discovery order.

Ackercamps.com, LLC develops specialty software. The Company offers
camp management, administration, and scheduling solutions through
software.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 12, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Yl9Kr1 at no extra charge.[CC]

ACUITY CHS: Arbuthnot Seeks Extension of Class Cert. Deadlines
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHANNON ARBUTHNOT,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
ACUITY -- CHS, LLC f/k/a COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH SERVICES LLC, Case
No. 6:22-cv-00658-PGB-DCI (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court
to enter an order granting an extension of the current, class
certification related deadlines by 60 days.

The Plaintiff contends that the  requested extension is
necessitated by the pendency of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the
impact of a parallel case, and her need for additional time to
pursue class certification related discovery.

On April 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Class Action Complaint.
Following service, and an extension of time to respond to the
Complaint, the Defendant filed its motion to dismiss on May 27,
2022, which raises issues of federal jurisdiction pursuant to
Article III standing.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 12, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uNaOpV at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David K. Lietz, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          5335 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 440
          Washington, D.C. 20015-2052
          Telephone: (866) 252-0878
          Facsimile: (202) 686-2877
          E-mail: dlietz@milberg.com

                - and -

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Patrick A. Barthle II, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 223-5402
          E-mail: jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com
                  pbarthle@ForThePeople.com

ADT PIZZA: Stracham Files ADA Suit in W.D. North Carolina
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ADT Pizza, LLC, et
al. The case is styled as Jesi Stracham, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. ADT Pizza, LLC, ADT Carolina,
LLC, Does 1 to 25., Case No. 3:22-cv-00613-FDW-DCK (W.D.N.C., Nov.
9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

ADT PIZZA, LLC -- https://www.adtpizza.com/ -- is a franchisee of
Pizza Hut located in 9 states.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nancy Stewart Litwak, Esq.
          ROSENWOOD, ROSE & LITWAK, PLLC
          1712 Euclid Ave
          Charlotte, NC 28203
          Phone: (704) 228-8578
          Fax: (704) 371-6400
          Email: nlitwak@rosenwoodrose.com


AIR METHODS: Fisher Suit Removed to D. New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Kevin D. Fisher, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Air Methods Corporation, Rocky
Mountain Holdings, LLC, Rocky Mountain Holdings Limited Liability
Company, Case No. ESX-L-006509-22 was removed from the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Essex County, to the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey on Dec. 8, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-07149-JXN-JRA to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Air Methods Corporation -- http://www.airmethods.com/-- is an
American privately owned helicopter operator.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A Francis, Esq.
          Lauren KW Brennan, Esq.
          FRANCIS MAILMAN SOUMILAS, P.C.
          1600 Market Street, Suite 2510
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 735-8600
          Email: jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com

               - and -

          William Seth Greenberg, Esq.
          GREENBERG MINASIAN, LLC
          80 Main Street
          West Orange, NJ 07052
          Phone: (973) 325-0071
          Fax: (973) 325-7571
          Email: WSGreenberg@GMattorneys.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Bruce Daniel Greenberg, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG & AFANADOR, LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Phone: (973) 623-3000
          Fax: (973) 623-0858
          Email: bgreenberg@litedepalma.com


ALFRED DUNNER: Zinnamon Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alfred Dunner, Inc.
The case is styled as Warren Zinnamon, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Alfred Dunner, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-10416 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Alfred Dunner, Inc. -- https://www.alfreddunner.com/ -- designs,
manufactures, and sells apparel. The Company offers ladies
t-shirts, formal, and casual outfits.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


ALGENIST LLC: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Nguyen Consumer Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Katherine Polk Failla of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York grants the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the lawsuit titled CATHERINE NGUYEN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALGENIST LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 22 Civ. 13 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y.).

Enticed by the promise of age-defying effects, Nguyen purchased a
skincare product from Defendant Algenist LLC. Unhappy with her
results after using the product, the Plaintiff filed this putative
class action against the Defendant for false advertising and
related claims. Her allegations center on one of the product's
ingredients: vegan collagen, a substance designed to mimic a
naturally occurring protein found in skin, hair, and other parts of
the body. According to the Plaintiff, vegan collagen cannot
possibly deliver the results the Defendant advertises.

The Defendant is a Delaware corporation that sells, among other
things, products containing a proprietary vegan collagen. Three of
the Defendant's products are named in this suit: (i) Algenist
Genius Collagen Calming Relief, (ii) Algenist Genius Liquid
Collagen, and (iii) Algenist Genius Sleeping Collagen. The
Products' packaging features Algenist branding and descriptive
phrases.

The Plaintiff alleges that each product's front label features the
words "ADVANCED ANTI-AGING." The name of each product appears
immediately under that phrase. The lower half of the labels feature
the word "ALGENIST," in large letters and, in smaller letters below
that, either "Alguronic Acid + Collagen" or "Alguronic Acid + Vegan
Collagen."

The Plaintiff, who is a New York citizen, purchased Calming Relief
at a TJMaxx store in New York City in April 2021. The Complaint
does not specify how much the Plaintiff paid for the product. In
making her decision to purchase Calming Relief over comparable
products, she relied on the assertions made on the product's label
and packaging. The packaging led her to believe that Calming Relief
contained "collagen" and/or "vegan collagen" that would provide
"advanced anti-aging benefits." Based on these representations, the
Plaintiff paid "a substantial price premium" for the product.

After her purchase, the Plaintiff used Calming Relief as directed.
To her dismay, she did not enjoy any "anti-aging or skin-firming
benefits" as a result. She asserts that the Products cannot
possibly offer those benefits because the molecules in
topically-applied collagen -- vegan or otherwise -- cannot
penetrate the skin's top layer. Vegan collagen has the same issue,
claims the Plaintiff, because it typically mimics the exact
structure of human collagen. In short, the Plaintiff believes that
the Defendant's advertising is "false, misleading, and deceptive"
because "no topical collagen product can stimulate and increase
natural collagen production."

The Plaintiff claims that, had she known that the representations
on Calming Relief's label were untrue, she would not have paid a
price premium for it. Despite her disappointment, she intends to
purchase Calming Relief again in the future if it is truthfully
labeled. She brings this suit on behalf of a putative nationwide
class of purchasers of the Products.

The Plaintiff initiated this action by filing the Complaint on Jan.
3, 2022. On Jan. 25, 2022, the Defendant requested leave to file a
motion to dismiss. The Court held a pre-motion conference on Feb.
18, 2022, at which time (i) the Plaintiff declined an opportunity
to amend her Complaint, and (ii) the Court set a briefing schedule
for the Defendant's contemplated motion.

The Defendant filed its motion to dismiss and supporting papers on
Feb. 25, 2022, portions of which were refiled on March 3, 2022, to
comply with the Court's filing conventions. The Plaintiff filed her
opposition on March 15, 2022. The Court granted the Defendant's
request to extend its reply deadline by a week, and the Defendant
filed its reply on April 18, 2022. Subsequently, the Plaintiff
filed a notice of supplemental authority, to which the Defendant
promptly responded.

The Plaintiff alleges that she would buy Calming Relief again in
the future if truthfully labeled.

Judge Failla holds that this allegation does not suffice to
establish likely future injury. Judge Failla finds that the
Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief, but has
standing to raise a claim for damages.

The Defendant does not contest that the challenged advertising is
consumer-oriented. Its arguments focus instead on the other two
elements of claims under Sections 349 and 350: whether the
Defendant engaged in materially misleading conduct and whether that
conduct injured the Plaintiff. Because the Plaintiff has not
adequately alleged that the Defendants' representations regarding
topical collagen are untrue, she has not carried her burden on the
materially misleading element and, thus, has not stated a claim for
deceptive practices or false advertising under New York law, Judge
Failla holds.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Plaintiff's deceptive business
practice and false advertising claims for failure to state a
claim.

Judge Failla also finds that the Complaint fails to allege that the
collagen in the Products cannot provide anti-aging benefits. Judge
Failla opines that the Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that
vegan collagen is necessarily ineffective, alone or in the context
of the Products' formulas.

The Plaintiff is not required to prove her claims at this stage in
the case, Judge Failla says. But to survive a motion to dismiss,
she must plead facts that, if substantiated, prove her allegations.
Because the Plaintiff's theory that the Products cannot provide
anti-aging benefits is not supported by the allegations in the
Complaint, she has failed to state a claim for false advertising or
deceptive business practices.

Without an allegation of breach, the Plaintiff has not stated a
claim for breach of warranty, Judge Failla notes. Hence, the Court
dismisses the Plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty for failure
to state a claim.

After receiving and responding to a pre-motion letter from the
Defendant that mirrored the claims made in the instant motion, the
Plaintiff declined the Court's invitation to amend her pleadings.
More pointedly, however, the Plaintiff has offered no indication as
to how she could plead a viable claim for deceptive business
practices, false advertising, or breach of warranty with respect to
the Products, and the above analysis suggests to the Court that she
cannot. Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's request for
leave to amend.

Because the Plaintiff has not stated a claim for deceptive
practices, false advertising, or breach of express warranty, the
Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. The Clerk of Court is
directed to terminate all pending motions, adjourn all remaining
dates, and close this case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p87hkzs from
Leagle.com.


ALPHA IMPORTS NY: Zinnamon Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alpha Imports NY,
Inc. The case is styled as Warren Zinnamon, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Alpha Imports NY, Inc., Case
No. 1:22-cv-10425 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Alpha Imports NY -- http://www.alphaimports.com/-- is a diamond
dealer in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


ANDERSON, TX: Declaration of Edward Pruette Stricken in Martinez
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CRISTIAN MARTINEZ,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al.
v. ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Case No. 6:22-cv-00171-JCB-KNM
(E.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge K. Nicole Mitchell entered an order
granting the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to strike declaration of
Edward Pruette.

The declaration was submitted as Exhibit 5 to Plaintiffs' motion to
certify class. After due consideration, The declaration  is
stricken.

Anderson County is a county in the U.S. state of Texas. Located
within East Texas, its county seat is Palestine.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 6, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FzP9rD at no extra charge.[CC]

ANTHONY ANNUCCI: Zielinski Suit Transferred to W.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Jeremy Zielinski, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Anthony Annucci, JPay, LLC, Julie
Wolcott, D. Leonard, Case No. 1:22-cv-10050 was transferred from
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, to
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York on
Dec. 8, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-00954-LJV to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Habeas Corpus (Prison Condition).

Anthony J. Annucci was named the Acting Commissioner of the New
York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision on
May 1, 2013.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

ARETE FINANCIAL: Doyle Loses Bid to Reassign or Vacate Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ROBERT DOYLE, individually, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ARETE FINANCIAL GROUP LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 21-19935 (D.N.J.), Judge John Michael Vazquez
of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denies
the Plaintiff's motion to reassign the case and, alternatively, to
vacate the orders of dismissal.

Doyle brought this putative class action pro se and in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915, alleging violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated. On May 12, 2022, the Court granted the
Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed
the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(e)(2)(B). The Complaint was dismissed because the Plaintiff
failed to establish that he met the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a)(4), which requires that a plaintiff seeking
to represent a class be able to "fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class."

The Court, however, granted the Plaintiff thirty days to file an
amended complaint curing that deficiency, and warned that failure
to do so would result in dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint
with prejudice. The Plaintiff failed to amend the Complaint, and
the Court ordered that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice on
June 30, 2022.

Nearly two months later, the present motion was filed and seeks to
reassign the case and alternatively to vacate the orders of
dismissal.

At the outset, Judge Vazquez notes, the Plaintiff, a licensed
attorney, has failed to follow any appropriate procedure to obtain
relief from the Court's Orders. As noted, the Court dismissed the
Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice on May 12, 2022. The
Plaintiff did not make a timely motion for reconsideration of that
Opinion and Order. He also failed to file an amended pleading,
despite the Court's instructions in its May 12, 2022 Opinion and
Order that he had thirty days to do so.

The Plaintiff provides no explanation for either failure, Judge
Vazquez says. As a result, and with prior notice, the Court
dismissed the matter with prejudice on June 30, 2022--well after
the thirty-day deadline had expired to file an amended pleading. He
did not appeal this dismissal and again offers no explanation for
his inaction.

Thus, Judge Vazquez says it appears that the Plaintiff may only
seek relief from the final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60,
but he has not done so. As a licensed attorney, the Plaintiff is
well aware of the proper procedural options available to him, but
nonetheless failed to pursue them. For these reasons, the present
motion is denied.

Even if the Court were to reach the merits of the Plaintiff's
motion, Judge Vazquez points out that the result would be the same.
The Plaintiff's motion first seeks to randomly reassign this matter
on the ground that Local Civil Rule 40.1(c) is an unconstitutional
violation of his equal protection rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.

The Plaintiff has provided no authority, and the Court is aware of
none, holding that a person's status as a pro se litigant is a
suspect class or otherwise requires that Rule 40.1(c) be subject to
heightened scrutiny. The Court agrees that there is no basis on
which to find that rules which differentiate on the basis of pro se
status must be subjected to heightened scrutiny.

The Plaintiff argues that the law must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny because proceeding pro se is a fundamental right. He has
not provided any authority demonstrating that a similar
constitutional right applies in civil cases, Judge Vazquez finds.
And while access to the courts is a fundamental right, an
administrative rule concerning which judge a litigant's case is
assigned to is not an infringement on that right, Judge Vazquez
points out.

The Court also finds that Rule 40.1(c) passes rational basis
review.

The Plaintiff, without citing to any authority in support of this
argument, also claims that the Orders dismissing the Complaint
should be vacated. He claims that (1) it was inappropriate for the
Court to act sua sponte, and (2) that even acting sua sponte, it
was only appropriate for the Court to dismiss the class
allegations, not the entire Complaint.

First, Judge Vazquez opines, the Court acted sua sponte pursuant to
explicit authority granted by Congress. Thus, the Court's sua
sponte dismissal was appropriate.

As to the Plaintiff's second argument, the Court dismissed the
Complaint without prejudice and afforded him 30 days to cure the
deficiencies noted in its Opinion and Order. He was free to amend
his pleading to remove the class allegations and proceed
individually. In fact, the Court instructed him as such, stating if
the Plaintiff continues pro se, the amended complaint must be
brought on behalf of him individually and not on behalf of a
putative class.

Judge Vazquez says the Plaintiff chose not to amend at all with
full awareness of the consequences--dismissal with prejudice. While
an ordinary pro se litigant might be treated more liberally, the
Plaintiff states that he is a licensed attorney. As noted, the
Plaintiff offers no reason for his failure to amend the Complaint
in a timely manner, and he provides no sufficient basis in law or
fact to vacate the Orders of dismissal.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to reassign the case or to
vacate the orders of dismissal is denied. The Clerk of the Court
will serve a copy of this Opinion and Order upon the Plaintiff by
regular mail and certified mail return receipt.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ns7xwhfx from
Leagle.com.


ARIZONA BEVERAGES: Stipulation Extending Class Certification Filed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KALESHA NILES, JASON
LAHEY, NICOLE LOCKHART, BOBBI O'SULLIVAN AND ALEXIS JADE HUNTER, on
behalf of themselves, the general public, and those similarly
situated, v. ARIZONA BEVERAGES USA LLC, BEVERAGE MARKETING USA,
INC. AND HORNELL BREWING CO., INC, Case No. 2:19-cv-01902-GRB-LGD
(E.D.N.Y.), the Parties file stipulation extending Class
Certification Deadlines as follows:

                   Event            Current        Joint
                                    Deadline       Proposal

-- Plaintiffs' class          Feb. 10, 2023     April 11, 2023
    certification motion:

-- Deposition of the          April 7, 2023     June 6, 2023
    Plaintiffs' class
    certification experts:

-- Defendants' opposition     April 21, 2023    June 20, 2023
    to class certification:

-- Depositions of             May 24, 2023      July 24, 2023
    Defendants' class
    certification experts:

-- Plaintiffs' reply to       June 2, 2023      Aug. 1, 2023
    opposition to class
    certification motion:

Arizona Beverages is an American producer of many flavors of iced
tea, juice cocktails, and energy drinks.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Dec. 12, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3j1Rh2C at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen M. Raab, Esq.
          Rajiv V. Thairani, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          305 Broadway, 7th floor
          New York, NY 10007

The Defendants are represented by:

          Robert P. Donovan, Esq.
          STEVENS & LEE
          669 River Drive, Suite 201
          Elmwood Park, NJ 07407
          Telephone: (201) 857–6778
          Facsimile: (201) 857–6761
          E-mail: Robert.Donovan@StevensLee.com

ARKADIUM INC: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Arkadium, Inc. The
case is styled as Marta Hanyzkiewicz, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Arkadium, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07513
(E.D.N.Y., Dec. 12, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Arkadium -- https://www.arkadium.com/ -- is a founder-led creator
of casual games for adults.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com

ARMCHAIR EXPERT: Luis Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Armchair Expert, LLC.
The case is styled as Kevin Yan Luis, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Armchair Expert, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-10495 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 12, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Armchair Expert LLC -- https://armchairexpertpod.com/ -- is a
company that operates in the Management Consulting industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com



ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER: Hernandez's Claims Against Pronto Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ITXAMAR HERNANDEZ, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER SERVICE
COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; PRONTO AUTO
INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1-50,
Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-01910-H-DEB (S.D. Cal.), Judge Marilyn
L. Huff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California dismisses the Plaintiff's claims, both the individual
claims and the representative claims, against Pronto without
prejudice.

On Oct. 28, 2022, Hernandez filed a putative class action in the
Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego against
Defendants Arthur J. Gallagher and Pronto. On Nov. 15, 2022, the
Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal of Pronto without prejudice
pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.770.

On Dec. 2, 2022, Arthur J. Gallagher filed an answer to Hernandez's
complaint. On Dec. 2, 2022, it also filed a notice of removal,
removing the action from state court to the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections
1441, 1446, on the basis of jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d) ("CAFA").

Based on her review of the record, Judge Huff finds that it appears
that the state court never granted the Plaintiff's request for
dismissal of the Defendant Pronto pursuant to California Rule of
Court 3.770. Nevertheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(1)(a)(i) permits a plaintiff to dismiss a party without a court
order by filing a notice of dismissal so long as that opposing
party has not served an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
Pronto has not served an answer or a motion for summary judgment in
the action.

As such, Judge Huff dismisses the Plaintiff's claims (both the
individual claims and the representative claims) against Pronto
without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(1)(a)(i). The action will proceed on the Plaintiff's putative
class action claims against Arthur J. Gallagher. She orders the
Plaintiff to serve Pronto with a copy of her Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3jjmbda6 from Leagle.com.


ASSAEL INC: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Assael, Inc. The case
is styled as Marta Hanyzkiewicz, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Assael, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07512
(E.D.N.Y., Dec. 12, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Assael -- https://assael.com/ -- has been the premiere purveyor of
cultured pearls, luxury pearl jewelry & responsibly sourced coral
since the 50's.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


ASSESSOR OF GREAT NECK: Zar Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Assessor of the
Village of Great Neck, et al. The case is styled as Navid Zar,
Mechaela Zar, all other similarly situated Petitioners on the
annexed SCHEDULE A, Petitioners v. The Assessor of the Village of
Great Neck, The Board of Assessment Review of the Village of Great
Neck, Respondents, Case No. 617323/2022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau
Cty., Dec. 8, 2022).

The case type is stated as "SP-CPLR Article 78 (Body or Officer)."

Great Neck -- https://www.vgne.com/ -- is a village on the Great
Neck Peninsula in the Town of North Hempstead, in Nassau County, on
the North Shore of Long Island, in New York.[BN]

The Petitioners are represented by:

          MAIDENBAUM & STERNBERG, LLP
          132 Spruce St
          Cedarhurst, NY 11516-1915


ASSESSOR OF MINEOLA: Lameirao Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Assessor of the
Village of Mineola, et al. The case is styled as Valdemar Lameirao,
Idalina Lameirao, all other similarly situated Petitioners on the
annexed SCHEDULE A, Petitioners v. The Assessor of the Village of
Mineola, The Board of Assessment Review of the Village of Mineola,
Respondents, Case No. 617322/2022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., Dec.
8, 2022).

The case type is stated as "SP-CPLR Article 78 (Body or Officer)."

Mineola -- https://www.mineola-ny.gov/ -- is a village in and the
county seat of Nassau County, on Long Island, in New York, United
States.[BN]

The Petitioners are represented by:

          MAIDENBAUM & STERNBERG, LLP
          132 Spruce St
          Cedarhurst, NY 11516-1915


ASSESSOR OF ROCKVILLE CENTRE: Delaney Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Assessor of the
Village of Rockville Centre, et al. The case is styled as Kimberly
Delaney, Timothy Delaney, all other similarly situated Petitioners
on the annexed SCHEDULE A, Petitioners v. The Assessor of the
Village of Rockville Centre, The Board of Assessment Review of the
Village of Rockville Centre, Respondents, Case No. 617324/2022
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., Dec. 8, 2022).

The case type is stated as "SP-CPLR Article 78 (Body or Officer)."

Rockville Centre -- https://www.rvcny.gov/ -- commonly abbreviated
as RVC, is an incorporated village located in the Town of Hempstead
in Nassau County, on the South Shore of Long Island, in New
York.[BN]

The Petitioners are represented by:

          MAIDENBAUM & STERNBERG, LLP
          132 Spruce St
          Cedarhurst, NY 11516-1915

ASTRAL HEALTH & BEAUTY: Galarsa Files Suit in N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Astral Health &
Beauty, Inc. The case is styled as Rachel Galarsa, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Astral Health &
Beauty, Inc. doing business as: PUR Cosmetics, Case No.
4:22-cv-07020-KAW (N.D. Cal., Nov. 9, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Astral Health & Beauty, Inc. -- https://www.astralbrands.com/ --
provides personal care products. The Company offers gel, perfume,
powder, and skin care products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          Sean L. Litteral, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Phone: (925) 300-4455
          Fax: (925) 407-2700
          Email: ltfisher@bursor.com
                 slitteral@bursor.com


AUTOZONE INC: Iannone's Bid for Class Certification Partly Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL J. IANNONE, JR., and NICOLE A. JAMES, as plan
participants, on behalf of the AUTOZONE, INC. 401(k) Plan, and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AUTOZONE, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02779-MSN-tmp (W.D. Tenn.),
Judge Mark S. Norris of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee, Western Division, grants in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

Before the Court is the Chief Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation, issued on Aug. 12, 2022. The Report recommends that
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification be granted in part.
The Defendants filed timely objections to the Report on Aug. 26,
2022. The Plaintiffs timely filed a Response to Defendants'
objections on Sept. 9, 2022.

The litigation involves the Plaintiffs' claims that AutoZone and
others breached their fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Their Amended Complaint
alleges one count of breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 1109. They seek certification of the following class
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1): All persons, other than
Defendants, who were participants as of Nov. 11, 2013 in Plan,
including (i) beneficiaries of deceased participants who, as of
November 11, 2013, were receiving benefit payments or will be
entitled to receive benefit payments in the future, and (ii)
alternate payees under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order who, as
of November 11, 2013, were receiving benefit payments or will be
entitled to receive benefit payments in the future; and (b) all
persons, other than AutoZone, who have been participants or
beneficiaries in either the Plan and had account balances in the
Plan at any time between Nov. 11, 2013 through the date of
judgment.

The Defendants' principal objection is to the scope of the class
recommended in the Report. Specifically, they agree with the
Report's recommendation to narrow the proposed class to only those
Plan participants who invested in the GoalMaker funds, but further
contend that the class cannot include participants in the Plan who
invested in different GoalMaker funds or at different times than
the Plaintiffs. They argue that the Plaintiffs (1) lack
constitutional standing and (2) cannot show that the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites -- specifically commonality, typicality, and adequacy
-- are met as to those five funds and as to periods in which they
were not invested in GoalMaker funds. Since the Report recommended
finding both constitutional standing and the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites satisfied in the matter, the Defendants thus object
to those proposed findings.

First, the Defendants object to all but three of the Chief
Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings of Fact. However, Judge Norris
finds that they provide no specific basis for this blanket
objection save for their general opposition to the Chief Magistrate
Judge citing to allegations in the Plaintiff's Complaint. This kind
of objection does little, if anything, to make clear to the Court
"those issues that are dispositive and contentious. Furthermore,
the Defendants' failure to identify specific concerns with the
Report's Proposed Findings of Fact makes it difficult for the Court
to discern what factual or legal disputes exist on these issues.

Accordingly, and after review of the Report, Judge Norris deems
their blanket objection a general objection and adopts and
incorporates the Report's Proposed Findings of Fact.

Next, the Report recommended that putative class members who did
not invest through the GoalMaker program be excluded from the
class, since "those individuals have not suffered an
injury-in-fact, and therefore lack Article III standing." The
Defendants agree with this limitation, as does the Court. They
nonetheless argue the Plaintiffs have not suffered an
injury-in-fact as to the five funds in which they did not invest,
and therefore lack standing to pursue claims as to those funds.

Judge Norris adopts that recommendation. He says these objections
merely restate the arguments previously presented and addressed by
the magistrate judge, and so do not sufficiently identify alleged
errors in the report and recommendation. He also agrees that the
Plaintiffs' allegations related to excessive fees are of an
imprudent process that allegedly injured all investors in the
GoalMaker funds and that their allegations about rge Defendants'
process for selecting and monitoring the investment menu applies to
all of the challenged funds.

Finally, having agreed that the Plaintiffs have met the
requirements of Rule 23, Judge Norris adopts the Report's
recommendation that the Plaintiffs' ERISA claims are suitable for
class treatment. Judge Norris adopts the proposed finding that the
Plaintiffs have constitutional standing to pursue claims related to
GoalMaker funds in which they were not investors. He finds that the
23(a) requirements to have been met. As the Defendants have not
objected to the portion of the Report recommending that Rule 23(b)
has been satisfied, he has reviewed the Report's basis for this
proposed finding for clear error and finds none.

Having carefully reviewed the Report, as well as the materials and
arguments presented to the Chief Magistrate Judge, the Defendants'
objections, and the Plaintiffs' response, Judge Norris overrules
the Defendants' objections and adopts the Report in full. He
therefore grants in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/52x5sfbc from Leagle.com.


AUTOZONERS LLC: Scheduling Order Entered in Confusione Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Confusione, et al v.
Autozoners, LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-00001 (E.D.N.Y.), the Hon.
Magistrate Judge Anne Y. Shields entered a scheduling order as
follows:

  -- The Plaintiffs shall serve their      January 5, 2024
     motion for class certification by:

  -- The Defendants shall serve their      February 5, 2024
     opposition by:

  -- The Plaintiffs' reply shall be        February 19, 2024
     served, and the fully briefed
     motion filed on ECF by:

  -- Counsel are directed to submit        March 13, 2023,
     a joint status letter on:

  -- A telephone status conference         March 20, 2023
     has been scheduled for:

The nature of suit states Labor -- Other Labor Litigation.[CC]

AZURE POWER: Serap Lokman Appointed as Lead Plaintiff in Gilbert
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CARSON D. GILBERT,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
AZURE POWER GLOBAL LIMITED, RANJIT GUPTA, ALAN ROSLING, HARSH SHAH,
and PAWAN KUMAR AGRAWAL, Case No. 1:22-cv-07432-GHW (S.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge Gregory H. Woods entered an order:

  -- granting Ms. Lokman's motion;

  -- denying the motions filed by Mr. Webb and Mr. James;

  -- appointing Serap Lokman as Lead Plaintiff;

  -- appointing Levi & Corsinsky, LLP as Lead Counsel; and

  -- directing the Clerk of Court to terminate the motions
     pending at Dkt. Nos. 11, 14, and 18.

On October 31, 2022, members of the putative class in this case
filed motions to serve as lead plaintiffs and for approval of their
respective choices of counsel.

The Court ordered that any oppositions to the Motions be filed no
later than November 18, 2022, and that any replies be filed no
later than November 29, 2022.

On November 14, 2022, Yannick Sabourin stated his non-opposition to
the other motions for appointment of lead plaintiff and lead
counsel.

In light of Mr. Sabourin’s nonopposition to the competing
motions, the Court denied Mr. Sabourin’s motion to serve as lead
plaintiff on December 2, 2022.

The three remaining motions were fully briefed as of November 29,
2022, and two members of the putative class filed letters
supplementing the briefing on December 2, 2022.

The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefing with respect to
these three motions, including the supplemental letters. For the
reasons stated below, the motion filed by Serap Lokman is granted,
Serap Lokman is appointed as Lead Plaintiff, and Levi & Korsinsky,
LLP is appointed as Lead Counsel.

Azure Power is an independent power producer, a developer and an
operator of utility and commercial scale solar PV power plants
headquartered in New Delhi, India.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ha4c1X at no extra charge.[CC]

B.P. EXPLORATION: Court Issues Summary Judgment Against Campbell
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment in the lawsuit captioned SHARON ARLETA CAMPBELL v. B.P.
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., Case No. 17-3119 (E.D.
La.).

Before the Court is BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America
Production Company, and BP p.l.c.'s (collectively the "BP parties")
motion to exclude the testimony of the Plaintiff's general
causation expert, Dr. Jerald Cook, and their motion for summary
judgment. The Plaintiff opposes both motions. The Plaintiff also
filed a motion seeking admission of Dr. Cook's testimony as a
sanction for BP's failure to conduct biomonitoring and dermal
monitoring, which Campbell alleges amounted to spoliation. The
Defendants oppose the Plaintiff's spoliation motion.

The case arises from the Plaintiff's alleged exposure to toxic
chemicals following Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico. The Plaintiff alleges that she performed cleanup work after
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill beginning in June of 2010 until
late-July of 2010, as well as August of 2012 until mid-2013. She
asserts that she experienced continuous, personal, direct exposure
to crude oil and dispersants while working the cleanup operation at
Gulfport, Long Beach and Biloxi, MS, during the relevant period.

The Plaintiff also represents that this exposure has resulted in
the following conditions: hypertension, asthma, chest pain,
shortness of breath, wheezing, acne, rash, skin itching,
dermatitis, eczema, blistering, crusting, dryness/flaking,
inflammation, redness, swelling, peeling, scaling, welts, insomnia,
depression, headaches, dizziness, itching eyes, blurred vision, eye
irritation, nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, joint pain, and "weakness."
The Plaintiff's case was originally part of the multidistrict
litigation ("MDL") pending before Judge Carl J. Barbier. Her case
was severed from the MDL as one of the "B3" cases for plaintiffs,
who either opted out of, or were excluded from, the Deepwater
Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (In re
Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on
Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *2, 12 & n.12
(E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021)).

Ms. Campbell is a plaintiff, who opted out of the settlement. After
her case was severed, it was reallocated to this Court. The
Plaintiff asserts claims for general maritime negligence,
negligence per se, and gross negligence against the Defendants as a
result of the oil spill and its cleanup.

To demonstrate that exposure to crude oil, weathered oil, and
dispersants can cause the symptoms the Plaintiff alleges in her
complaint, she offers the testimony of Dr. Jerald Cook, an
occupational and environmental physician. Dr. Cook is her sole
expert offering an opinion on general causation. In his June 21,
2022 report, Dr. Cook utilizes a "general causation approach to
determine if some of the frequently reported health complaints are
indeed from the result of exposures sustained in performing [oil
spill] cleanup work." Dr. Cook concludes that general causation
analysis indicates that the following conditions, among others,
"can occur in individuals exposed to crude oil, including weathered
crude oil": rhinosinusitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
("COPD"), bronchitis, asthma, dermatitis, conjunctivitis, and dry
eye disease.

The BP parties contend that Dr. Cook's expert report should be
excluded on the grounds that that it is unreliable and unhelpful.
The Defendants also move for summary judgment, asserting that if
Dr. Cook's general causation opinion is excluded, the Plaintiff is
unable to carry her burden on causation. She opposes both motions,
and filed a motion seeking admission of Dr. Cook's opinion as a
sanction for BP's alleged spoliation of evidence.

At issue here is whether the Plaintiff has produced admissible
general causation evidence, Judge Vance notes.

The Court finds that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the level of
exposure to a relevant chemical that can cause the conditions
asserted in the Plaintiff's complaint renders his opinion
unreliable, unhelpful, and incapable of establishing general
causation. The closest Dr. Cook's report comes to identifying a
harmful level of exposure that can trigger specific health
conditions is his consideration of the Bradford Hill factor of
"dose-response." But even in the sections of his report that are
dedicated to the dose-response relationship and exposure, Judge
Vance holds Dr. Cook still fails to identify a harmful dose of any
chemical to which the Plaintiff was allegedly exposed.

Given Dr. Cook's failure to determine the relevant harmful level of
exposure to chemicals to which the Plaintiff was exposed for her
specific conditions, the Court finds, among other things, that Dr.
Cook lacks sufficient facts to provide a reliable opinion on
general causation.

Given that Dr. Cook's report is unreliable and fails to provide the
"minimal facts necessary" to establish general causation in this
case, the Court grants the Defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Cook's
testimony.

The Plaintiff also contends that BP's decision not to conduct
monitoring amounts to sanction-worthy spoliation.

Judge Vance holds that the Plaintiff's spoliation motion is fatally
flawed for a number of reasons. First, Judge Vance opines that her
contention that BP's failure to conduct monitoring amounts to
spoliation is based on the faulty premise that BP was obligated to
develop evidence in anticipation of litigation. Furthermore, the
Plaintiff has not established that BP had a duty to conduct
monitoring during the Deepwater Horizon cleanup effort.

Further, Judge Vance finds the Plaintiff lacks any evidence that BP
acted in bad faith--a requirement for the remedy she seeks. Lastly,
the remedy the Plaintiff seeks--admission of Dr. Cook's expert
opinion despite its numerous deficiencies--is wholly unwarranted,
Judge Vance holds. Put simply, Judge Vance says, Dr. Cook's report
is flawed in ways unrelated to BP's decision not to conduct
monitoring.

Even if the Court were persuaded by the Plaintiff's spoliation
assertions, Judge Vance finds Dr. Cook's opinion nonetheless
remains inadmissible. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's spoliation
motion seeking admission of Dr. Cook's opinion as a sanction
against BP is denied.

In their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants contend that
they are entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiff cannot
establish either general or specific causation.

Here, the Court has excluded testimony from the Plaintiff's only
expert offering an opinion on general causation. Although the
Plaintiff has also retained Dr. Rachel Jones as a "general exposure
assessment" expert, she does not provide a general causation
opinion, nor does she provide the information or analysis that Dr.
Cook's report lacks. Specifically, she does not identify a harmful
level of exposure to the chemicals that the Plaintiff was allegedly
exposed to that can cause the conditions the Plaintiff alleges.
And, although Dr. Jones summarizes reports that measured the levels
of a variety of toxic chemicals at different cleanup sites, she
does not address the issue of causation, Judge Vance points out.

Because the Court excludes Dr. Cook's opinion on general causation,
and the Plaintiff has produced no other admissible general
causation evidence in this case, the Court need not reach the
question of specific causation. Accordingly, the Court grants the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

For these reasons, the Court grants the BP parties' motion to
exclude the testimony of Dr. Cook and denies the Plaintiff's motion
seeking admission of Cook's testimony as a sanction for BP's
alleged spoliation.

The Court also grants the BP parties' motion for summary judgment.
The Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc2y6mhx from
Leagle.com.


B.P. EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Brumfield Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment in the lawsuit styled HERBERT LEE BRUMFIELD v. B.P.
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., Case No. 17-3107 (E.D.
La.).

Before the Court is BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America
Production Company, and BP p.l.c.'s (collectively the "BP parties")
motion to exclude the testimony of the Plaintiff's general
causation expert, Dr. Jerald Cook, and their motion for summary
judgment. The Plaintiff opposes both motions. The Plaintiff also
filed a motion seeking admission of Dr. Cook's testimony as a
sanction for BP's failure to conduct biomonitoring and dermal
monitoring, which Brumfield alleges amounted to spoliation. The
Defendants oppose the Plaintiff's spoliation motion.

The case arises from the Plaintiff's alleged exposure to toxic
chemicals following Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico. The Plaintiff alleges that he performed cleanup work after
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill beginning in May of 2010 until
August of 2011, as well as "a few weeks in 2012." He asserts that
he experienced "exposure to crude oil and the Corexit dispersants
used on a constant, continual basis" while he was employed to
assist in the cleanup effort. He also represents that this exposure
has resulted in the following conditions: chest pain, shortness of
breath, skin irritation, rashes, eczema, inflamed seborrheic
keratoses, xerosis cutis, gastroesophageal reflux disease,
gastritis, severe headaches, depression, dizziness, and
"weakness."

The Plaintiff's case was originally part of the multidistrict
litigation ("MDL") pending before Judge Carl J. Barbier. His case
was severed from the MDL as one of the "B3" cases for plaintiffs,
who either opted out of, or were excluded from, the Deepwater
Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (In re
Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on
Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *2, 12 & n.12
(E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021)).

Mr. Brumfield is a plaintiff, who opted out of the settlement.
After his case was severed, it was reallocated to this Court. He
asserts claims for general maritime negligence, negligence per se,
and gross negligence against the Defendants as a result of the oil
spill and its cleanup.

To demonstrate that exposure to crude oil, weathered oil, and
dispersants can cause the symptoms, the Plaintiff alleges in his
complaint, he offers the testimony of Dr. Jerald Cook, an
occupational and environmental physician. Dr. Cook is the
Plaintiff's sole expert offering an opinion on general causation.

In his June 21, 2022 report, Dr. Cook concludes that general
causation analysis indicates that the following conditions, among
others, can occur in individuals exposed to crude oil, including
weathered crude oil: rhinosinusitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, bronchitis, asthma, dermatitis, conjunctivitis, and dry
eye disease.

The BP parties contend that Dr. Cook's expert report should be
excluded on the grounds that that it is unreliable and unhelpful.
The Defendants also move for summary judgment, asserting that if
Dr. Cook's general causation opinion is excluded, the Plaintiff is
unable to carry his burden on causation. The Plaintiff opposes both
motions, and filed a motion seeking admission of Dr. Cook's opinion
as a sanction for BP's alleged spoliation of evidence.

Judge Vance notes that at issue here is whether the Plaintiff has
produced admissible general causation evidence.

Based on Dr. Cook's report, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff
is unable to prove general causation with relevant and reliable
expert testimony. They contend that Dr. Cook's general causation
report is unreliable because he failed to: (1) identify the harmful
dose of exposure of any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed; (2) identify which chemicals can cause which
conditions; (3) verify the Plaintiff's diagnoses; and (4) follow
the accepted methodology for analyzing epidemiology.

The Defendants further argue that even if Dr. Cook's report were
reliable, it is unhelpful because it addresses few of the
Plaintiff's specific medical complaints. The Defendants also note
that the Court and several others have excluded various versions of
Dr. Cook's report for similar reasons, including the version at
issue in this case.

The Plaintiff contends that the latest version of Dr. Cook's
report, version four, is "substantially improved," but it is
undisputed that the only substantive change Dr. Cook made in
version four is a revision to Section 3.4.1 of his report, which he
updated to include tables stating the minimal risk levels of a
handful of chemicals found in crude oil and dispersants on certain
systems of the human body.

The Court finds that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the level of
exposure to a relevant chemical that can cause the conditions
asserted in plaintiff's complaint renders his opinion unreliable,
unhelpful, and incapable of establishing general causation. The
closest Dr. Cook's report comes to identifying a harmful level of
exposure that can trigger specific health conditions is his
consideration of the Bradford Hill factor of "dose-response," Judge
Vance says. But even in the sections of his report that are
dedicated to the dose-response relationship and exposure, Judge
Vance finds that Dr. Cook still fails to identify a harmful dose of
any chemical to which the Plaintiff was allegedly exposed.

Given Dr. Cook's failure to determine the relevant harmful level of
exposure to chemicals to which the Plaintiff was exposed for the
Plaintiff's specific conditions, the Court finds, among other
things, that Dr. Cook lacks sufficient facts to provide a reliable
opinion on general causation. Given the concerns about the accuracy
of this model from both the Plaintiff's expert, as well as the
investigators themselves, the Court does not find that, in this
context, Dr. Cook's conclusions are reliable.

Given that Dr. Cook's report is unreliable and fails to provide the
"minimal facts necessary" to establish general causation in this
case, the Court grants the Defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Cook's
testimony.

The Plaintiff also contends that BP's decision not to conduct
monitoring amounts to sanction-worthy spoliation. The Plaintiff's
spoliation motion is fatally flawed for a number of reasons, Judge
Vance holds. First, the Plaintiff's contention that BP's failure to
conduct monitoring amounts to spoliation is based on the faulty
premise that BP was obligated to develop evidence in anticipation
of litigation.

Moreover, Judge Vance opines, the Plaintiff's assertion that the
allegedly harmful exposures themselves were observable events, and
that BP spoliated that evidence by failing to collect data about
it, simply does not involve existing evidence. Rather, it concerns
evidence that the Plaintiff argues could have been created. This is
not a cognizable theory of spoliation, and it would expand the
definition of spoliation beyond any reasonably administrable
limits, Judge Vance points out.

Furthermore, Judge Vance finds that the Plaintiff has not
established that BP had a duty to conduct monitoring during the
Deepwater Horizon cleanup effort, and the Plaintiff lacks any
evidence that BP acted in bad faith--a requirement for the remedy
he seeks.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's spoliation motion seeking admission of
Dr. Cook's opinion as a sanction against BP is denied.

In their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants contend that
they are entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiff cannot
establish either general or specific causation. Here, the Court has
excluded testimony from the Plaintiff's only expert offering an
opinion on general causation. Although the Plaintiff has also
retained Dr. Rachel Jones as a "general exposure assessment"
expert, she does not provide a general causation opinion, nor does
she provide the information or analysis that Dr. Cook's report
lacks.

Because the Court excludes Dr. Cook's opinion on general causation,
and the Plaintiff has produced no other admissible general
causation evidence in this case, the Court need not reach the
question of specific causation. Accordingly, the Court grants the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

For these reasons, the Court grants the BP parties' motion to
exclude the testimony of Dr. Cook and denies the Plaintiff's motion
seeking admission of Cook's testimony as a sanction for BP's
alleged spoliation.

The Court also grants the BP parties' motion for summary judgment.
The Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yca83e5e from
Leagle.com.


BASSETT HEALTHCARE: Prelim Approval of Class Settlement Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAVID WALRATH and HARLEY
REYNOLDS, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated who were employed by BASSETT HEALTHCARE NETWORK and/or any
other entities affiliated with or controlled by BASSETT HEALTHCARE
NETWORK v. BASSETT HEALTHCARE NETWORK, and any related entities,
Case No. 6:21-cv-01179-DNH-ATB (N.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order preliminary approving the proposed class
action settlement, together with such other and further relief as
the Court may deem just and proper.

Bassett Healthcare is an integrated health care system that
provides care and services in upstate New York.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 12, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3VYWZkc at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Frank S. Gattuso, Esq.
          GATTUSO & CIOTOLI, PLLC
          The White House
          7030 E. Genesee Street
          Fayetteville, NY 13066
          Telephone: (315) 314-8000
          E-mail: fgattuso@gclawoffice.com

BELKIN INTERNATIONAL: Gromov Sues Over Misrepresentation of mAh
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dennis Gromov, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. BELKIN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No. 1:22-cv-06918
(N.D. Ill., Dec. 9, 2022), is brought seeking to redress for
Belkin's unlawful, unjust, unfair, and deceptive practices that
misrepresent the amount of milliampere-hours ("mAh") their portable
electronic devices ("PEDs" or "the Products") can deliver and that,
in doing so, violate state law.

The packaging of Belkin's chargers (commonly referred to as "power
banks") misrepresents the capacity of their power banks. In fact,
the capacity of Belkin's power banks is significantly lower than
represented to consumers. The consumers that buy those power banks
are harmed by receiving products inferior to what they believe they
are buying. A label that represents that a power bank has a certain
amount of mAh conveys to reasonable consumers that the power bank
is capable of delivering that amount of mAh to charge PEDs.
Accordingly, consumers prefer and are willing to pay more for power
banks with a higher mAh rating.

All models of power banks sold by Belkin (collectively, the
"Products") are substantially similar in form and function and all
are sold in substantially similar packages with no material
differences other than their respective purported mAh ratings. All
are designed such that the necessarily deliver less power than
Belkin claims. Thus, the misrepresentations (overstating the amount
of mAh) are substantively identical across all the Products and
mislead consumers in the same way regardless of which Product is
purchased. All of the Products are sold using a prominent and false
representation that they have a certain mAh rating. In fact, all of
the Products deliver less mAh to charge PEDs than is represented on
the Products or their packaging.

For greater profit and a larger market share, Belkin exploits
consumers' preferences for power banks that provide more mAh.
Belkin intentionally deceives consumers by misrepresenting the
amount of power its Products can transfer to PEDs. Belkin
advertises its Products as more capable of providing more mAh than
its Products are able to provide.

The Plaintiff relied on Belkin's misrepresentations when he
purchased one of the Belkin Products, the Pocket Power 10000.
Belkin represents that the Pocket Power 10000 will deliver 10,000
mAh to charge PEDs. However, the Pocket Power 10000 cannot, and
never could, deliver 10,000 mAh. As a result, Mr. Gromov paid a
premium for one of Belkin's Products that did not work as
represented and warranted, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased the Product from a store located within
this judicial district.

Belkin International, Inc. manufactures and sells chargers for
portable electronic devices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William F. Cash III, Esq.
          Matthew D. Schultz, Esq.
          Scott Warrick, Esq.
          LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, RAFFERTY, PROCTOR, BUCHANAN, O'BRIEN,
BARR & MOUGEY, P.A.
          316 South Baylen Street, Suite 600
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Phone: 850-435-7059
          Email: bcash@levinlaw.com
                 mschultz@levinlaw.com
                 swarrick@levinlaw.com

               - and -

          Seyed Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Phone: 800-400-6808
          Email: ak@kazlg.com

               - and -

          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          Bradley F. Silverman, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
          1 North Broadway, Suite 900
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Phone: 914-298-3290
          Email: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                 bsilverman@fbfglaw.com

BICYCLE HABITAT: Rodriguez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Bicycle Habitat,
Inc. The case is styled as Daniel Rodriguez, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. The Bicycle Habitat, Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-07511 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 12, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bicycle Habitat -- https://www.bicyclehabitat.com/ -- are a full
service bike shop offering the top bicycle brands and excellent
service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


BITESQUAD.COM LLC: Jenson Suit Removed to D. Minnesota
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Pat Jenson, Gabriel Willison, and Alison
Ekberg, individually, and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated v. BITESQUAD.COM, LLC, Case No. 27-CV-22-16699 was removed
from the Superior Court of the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District, County of Hennepin, State of Minnesota, to the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on Dec.
8, 2022, and assigned Case No. 0:22-cv-03044.

In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that representations made
regarding Bite Squad's delivery fees violated the Minnesota Uniform
Deceptive Practices Act and Minnesota False Statement in
Advertisement statutes.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          James K. Langdon, Esq.
          Caitlin L.D. Hull, Esq.
          DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
          50 South Sixth Street, Suite 1500
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Phone: (612) 340-2600
          Facsimile: (612) 340-2868
          Email: langdon.jim@dorsey.com
                 hull.caitlin@dorsey.com

BLACK CEO: Ulery Seeks Leave to Conduct Class Cert Discovery
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAVID ULERY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. BLACK CEO, LLC
dba SUCCESSFEST and TREVELYN OTTS, Case No. 1:22-cv-02709-MDB (D.
Colo.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order allowing him
to Leave to Conduct Class Certification and Damages Related
Discovery in support of Class Certification and in furtherance of
an ultimate default judgment against the defaulted Defendant for
its violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

As part of Plaintiff's Motion, Plaintiff seeks the following
relief:

   1. That Leave of Court be granted to conduct Class
      Certification and damages related discovery from BLACK
      CEO, including third-party discovery as necessary, in
      support of Class Certification and final damages judgment;

   2. That the Court reserve jurisdiction on the issue of
      damages against BLACK CEO and to otherwise reserve ruling
      on a final damages determination against BLACK CEO until
      the completion of discovery and a ruling on Class
      Certification; and

   3. That Plaintiff be permitted to seek a final default
      judgment against BLACK CEO, both as to the individual
      Plaintiff and the putative Class, upon completion of Class
      Certification and damages discovery from BLACK CEO and the
      Court's ruling on Class Certification.

The purpose of this motion is to allow Plaintiff sufficient time to
conduct Class Certification and damages related discovery from
BLACK CEO and relevant third parties before Plaintiff moves for
class certification and entry of a final default judgment against
BLACK CEO.

The Plaintiff intends to seek a final default judgment against
BLACK CEO, both as to the individual Plaintiffs and the putative
Class, upon completion of such Class Certification and damages
discovery.

On October 14, 2022, the Plaintiff filed his original Class Action
Complaint against BLACK CEO to start this action. Plaintiff alleges
that BLACK CEO systematically sent unsolicited pre-recorded calls
to Plaintiff and Class members which violate the TCPA.

On December 1, 2022 a Clerk's Default was entered against BLACK
CEO.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 9, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3YjVYoE at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
          EGGNATZ | PASCUCCI
          7450 Griffin Road, Suite 230
          Davie, FL 33314
          Telephone: (954) 889-3359
          E-mail: JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com

                - and  -

          Jordan Richards, Esq.
          JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
          1800 SE 10 th Ave. Suite 205
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone: (954) 871-0050
          E-mail: Jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
                  Jake@jordanrichardspllc.com

BLATT BILLIARD CORP: Rodriguez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blatt Billiard Corp.
The case is styled as Daniel Rodriguez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Blatt Billiard Corp., Case No.
1:22-cv-07509 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 11, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Blatt Billiards -- https://blattbilliards.com/ -- offers
handcrafted customizable pool tables and game tables.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


BOST INC: Moses Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ila Moses and Virgir Surett, each individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. BOST, INC., Case No. 3:22-cv-03071-TLB
(W.D. Ark., Dec. 12, 2022), is brought against the Defendant for
violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wages Act, to seek a declaratory
judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment
interest, and a reasonable attorney's fee and costs as a result of
Defendant's policy and practice of failing to pay proper overtime
wages under the FLSA and the AMWA.

The Plaintiffs regularly worked hours over 40 each week. The
Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiffs a lawful minimum wage for
all hours worked and a lawful overtime premium for all hours work
over 40 each week. The Defendant knew or should have known that
Plaintiffs were working hours off the clock for which they were not
compensated, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed as Residential Habilitation Aides and
Personal Care Assistants.

The Defendant is a foreign for-profit corporation maintaining a
website at https://www.bost.org/.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Laura Edmondson, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Parkway, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Phone: (800) 615-4946
          Fax: (888) 787-2040
          Email: lydia@sanfordlawfirm.com
                 josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

BRIAN KABOT: Shirley Files Suit in Del. Chancery Ct.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brian Kabot, et al.
The case is styled as Patricia Shirley and Christopher Dylan
Spears, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated v. Brian
Kabot, James Hofmockel, Ann Kono, Marc Lehmann, James Norris, Juan
Manuel Quiroga, SRC-NI Holdings, LLC, Edward K. Freedman, Mikhail
Kokorich, Dawn Harms, Fred Kennedy, and John C. Rood, Case No.
2022-1023-PAF (Del. Chancery Ct., Nov. 10, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Civil Action."

Brian Kabot is a member of the Momentus Board of Directors.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kelly L. Tucker, Esq.
          Jason M. Avellino, Esq.
          GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.
          123 Justison Street, 7th Floor
          Wilmington, Delaware 19801
          Phone: (302) 622-7000
          Email: ktucker@gelaw.com
                 javellino@gelaw.com


BROADWAY FOOD MART: De La Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rafael De La Cruz, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. BROADWAY FOOD MART INC., d/b/a DOLLAR JUNCTION, SUTTER
DOLLAR DISCOUNT INC. d/b/a SUTTER DOLLAR DISCOUNT, JOHN DOE
CORPORATIONS 1-100, and BASIT H. MOTIWALA, Case No. 1:22-cv-10403
(S.D.N.Y., Dec. 8, 2022), is brought pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law to recover from the
Defendants: unpaid wages, unpaid wages, including overtime, due to
a fixed salary, unpaid wages, including overtime, due to
off-the-clock work, unpaid spread of hours premiums, statutory
penalties, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Plaintiff worked 10-hour shifts per day, totaling up to 60
hours per week. The Plaintiff regularly worked days exceeding 10
hours in length, but the Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff
with his spread-of hours premium for the workdays that exceeded 10
hours in length. The Plaintiff was compensated at a fixed salary
rate, regardless of the actual amount of hours worked. The
Plaintiff was required to clock out for 30-minute meal breaks. On a
daily basis, the Plaintiff was required by Defendants to work
through his break, despite being already off-the-clock. The
Plaintiff was not paid all of their wages or their overtime
premiums, at a rate of time and one half of the regular hourly
rate, for all hours worked due to time-shaving and improper use of
a fixed salary, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants to work as a stocker for
the Defendants.

The Defendants own and operate a series of discount stores and food
marts throughout New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          CK Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Phone: 212-465-1188
          Fax: 212-465-1181


CAL-MAINE FOODS: Magistrate Judge Recommends Dismissal of Bell Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KENNETH BELL, et al., Plaintiffs v. CAL-MAINE FOODS,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:22-CV-246-RP (W.D. Tex.),
Magistrate Judge Susan Hightower of the U.S. Case District Court
for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, recommends that
the District Court grants the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint and dismisses without prejudice
the Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

Before the Court are Defendant Lucerne Foods, Inc.'s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint, filed June 28, 2022;
Defendants Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., Trillium Farm Holdings, LLC and
Centrum Valley Farms, LLP's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class
Action Complaint, filed Aug. 23, 2022; and the parties' response
and reply briefs. By Text Orders entered Oct. 17, 2022, the
District Court referred the motions to Judge Hightower for a report
and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B),
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of
the Local Rules of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas.

On March 15, 2022, Plaintiffs Kenneth Bell, Sherry Dabbs-Laury,
Charlene Dirks, Wendy Brown, and Tonnie Walker-Beck filed the class
action lawsuit against Defendants Cal-Maine Foods; Trillium Farm
Holdings, LLC; Centrum Valley Farms, L.P.; and Lucerne Foods, Inc.
They allege violations of Section 17.46(b)(27) of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("TDTPA"), which prohibits false,
misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce,

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Texas Governor Greg Abbott
declared a state of emergency on March 13, 2020, and extended it
for an additional 30 days on April 12, May 12, June 11, and July
10, 2020. The Plaintiffs are Texas consumers who purchased eggs
from various Texas retailers during the state of emergency.

The Plaintiffs allege that the eggs were produced or distributed by
the Defendants, some of the largest egg producers in Texas and the
United States. They allege that between the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic and March 30, 2020, the price of eggs nearly tripled in
Texas, from $1 to almost $3 per dozen. They further allege that the
Defendants unjustifiably raised the price of eggs to an "exorbitant
or excessive price" during the declared state of emergency and by
participating in a price spike in the Urner-Barry Index, in
violation of Section 17.46(b)(27) of the TDTPA.

The Plaintiffs seek to permanently enjoin the Defendants from
selling eggs at prices prohibited by the TDTPA, as well as a
declaration that they violated the TDTPA, monetary damages,
attorneys' fees, and an order certifying a class of "all consumers
who purchased eggs in the state of Texas that were sold,
distributed, produced, or handled by any of the defendants, at any
of the retail chains where Plaintiffs purchased their eggs, during
the state of emergency declared by Governor Greg Abbott on March
13, 2020."

The Plaintiffs invoke the Court's diversity jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d),
which requires that the aggregate amount in controversy exceed $5
million and that minimal diversity exits between the parties (i.e.,
at least one plaintiff and one defendant are from different
states).

On April 30, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a virtually identical class
action against Defendants Cal-Maine Foods, Trillium Farm Holdings,
Centrum Valley Farms, and several retailers who sold eggs in Texas
during the state of emergency, but not Lucerne Foods -- Bell v.
Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 1-20-CV-00461-RP (W.D. Tex. April 30,
2020) ("Bell I"). After they voluntarily dismissed the retailer
defendants under Rule 41, the remaining defendants moved to dismiss
under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

The Defendants argued that the Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2) because the
Plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that the damages against
any single defendant would exceed $5 million, or that the damages
should be aggregated against all defendants based on a theory of
joint liability.

The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to show that the the
Defendants acted together to increase the price of eggs in order to
show joint liability. It dismissed Bell I without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and entered a Final Judgment on
Sept. 20, 2021. On Oct. 18, 2021, the Plaintiffs moved to amend the
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, asking the Court
to modify the Final Judgment to allow them to file a second amended
complaint. The Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion via Text Order
on July 12, 2022.

The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on March 15, 2022, while their
motion to amend the judgment in Bell I was pending. All Defendants
now move to dismiss the case under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Defendant Lucerne Foods argues that the Plaintiffs fail to (1)
allege facts to demonstrate that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction under Section 1332(d)(2)(A), and (2) state a plausible
claim for relief under the TDTPA. Defendants Cal-Maine Foods,
Trillium Farm Holdings, and Centrum Valley Farms also argue that
the Plaintiffs fail to (1) allege facts to demonstrate that this
Court has subject matter jurisdiction under Section 1332(d)(2)(A),
and (2) state a plausible claim for relief. The latter three
defendants also contend that this suit is duplicative of Bell I and
barred under the rule against claim-splitting, and that Section
17.46(b)(27) of the TDTPA is unconstitutional.

Judge Hightower addresses the Defendants' jurisdictional arguments.
She finds that the allegations do not show that the Defendants are
related entities, worked together, or conspired to increase the
price of eggs during the state of emergency. The Plaintiffs plead
no facts showing that any Defendant should be liable for the acts
of any other Defendant. Nor have they cited any case supporting
joint liability where defendants acted separately, but similarly,
to cause harm.

As the Magistrate Judge Lane stated in Bell I: Without joint
liability, there is no legal basis to aggregate the Plaintiffs'
damages claims against the Defendants. Without such aggregation,
the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged damages that exceed $5
million against each Defendant. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have
not shown the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over their
claims.

For these reasons, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and
the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter  jurisdiction should be granted. Judge Hightower is
precluded from addressing the merits of the case and need not
address the Defendants' alternative Rule 12(b)(1) arguments.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Hightower recommends that the
District Court grants the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint and dismisses without prejudice
the Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

The Clerk must remove the case from the Magistrate Court's docket
and return it to the docket of the Hon. Robert Pitman.

The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation.
A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings
or recommendations to which objections are being made. A party's
failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations contained in the Report within 14 days after the
party is served with a copy of the Report will bar that party from
de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Report and, except on grounds of plain
error, will bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/a7rwbv5w from
Leagle.com.


CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY: Jan. 18, 2023 Status Conference Set
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Anders, et al., v.
California State University, Fresno, et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-00179
(E.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Barbara A Mcauliffe entered an order
setting status conference for January 18, 2023, at 9:30 AM in
Courtroom 8 (BAM).

The Court is not inclined to reverse its prior determination that
merits discovery is premature while the issue of class
certification remains pending. However, the Plaintiffs are not
precluded from filing a formal noticed motion to open merits
discovery.

The purpose of the conference will be to address the status of
Plaintiffs' request for permission to appeal and, if appropriate,
further scheduling of this action.

The parties shall appear at the conference remotely with each party
appearing either via Zoom video conference or Zoom telephone
number. The parties will be provided with the Zoom ID and password
by the Courtroom Deputy prior to the conference. The Zoom ID number
and password are confidential and are not to be shared. Appropriate
court attire required.

The nature of suit states Civil Rights -- Education.

California State University, Fresno is a public university in
Fresno, California. It is one of 23 campuses in the California
State University system.[CC]


CALIFORNIA: Funds Must Be Disbursed to Class in Vataj v. Johnson
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER VATAJ, Plaintiff v. WILLIAM D. JOHNSON, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-06996-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California grants the motion for disbursement
of funds to the class filed by Co-Lead Plaintiffs Iron Workers and
Robert Allustiarti.

On Nov. 5, 2021, the Court granted the parties' motion for final
approval of the class action settlement. It directed the parties
and the Settlement Administrator, A.B. Data, Ltd., to implement the
terms of the settlement agreement consistent with the Court's
order. Since then, A.B. Data has processed the Claim Forms it
received, and has determined which individuals are Authorized
Claimants under the settlement agreement.

The Plaintiffs now seek an order permitting the settlement
administrator to distribute the Net Settlement Fund to those
Authorized Claimants. Judge Gilliam held a telephonic conference to
discuss the motion with the parties, and requested supplemental
briefing on the claims that A.B. Data rejected. Having reviewed the
Plaintiffs' supplemental filing, he finds that A.B. Data's review
has been thorough and that disbursement of the Net Settlement Fund
is appropriate.

The Net Settlement Fund (less any necessary amounts to be withheld
for payment of potential tax liabilities and related fees and
expenses) will be distributed on a pro rata basis to the Authorized
Claimants identified in Exhibits D and E to the Declaration of Eric
A. Nordskog in Support of Motion for Settlement Class Distribution
Order, at the direction of the Lead Counsel pursuant to the
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, dated March 9, 2021 and
the Plan of Allocation set forth in the Notice that was distributed
pursuant to the Court's prior Order.

Any person asserting any rejected or subsequently filed claims are
finally and forever barred from the date of the Order.

The checks for distribution to Authorized Claimants will bear the
notation "DEPOSIT PROMPTLY; VOID AND SUBJECT TO RE-DISTRIBUTION IF
NOT NEGOTIATED WITHIN 120 DAYS OF DISTRIBUTION." The Lead Counsel
and the Claims Administrator are authorized to locate and/or
contact any Authorized Claimant who has not cashed his, her or its
check within said time.

If any funds remain in the Net Settlement Fund by reason of
uncashed checks or otherwise, then, after the Claims Administrator
has made reasonable and diligent efforts to have Settlement Class
Members who are entitled to participate in the distribution of the
Net Settlement Fund cash their distribution checks, any balance
remaining in the Net Settlement Fund six months after the initial
distribution of such funds will be re-distributed to Settlement
Class Members who have cashed their checks and who would receive at
least $20 from such re-distribution. If any funds will remain in
the Net Settlement Fund six months after such re-distribution, then
such balance will be contributed to the Investor Justice and
Education Clinic at the Howard University School of Law in
Washington D.C.

Following distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, A.B. Data is
ordered to maintain the completed Proofs of Claims on file for
three years after the Effective Date as defined in the
Stipulation.

In light of the large-scale nature of the distribution, Judge
Gilliam awards A.B. Data $84,952.25 in fees and expenses already
incurred and in anticipation of the work that will be performed for
the initial distribution. If the estimate of fees and expenses to
conduct the initial distribution is greater than the actual cost to
conduct the distribution, the excess will be returned to the Net
Settlement Fund.

The Court retains jurisdiction over any further application or
matter which may arise in connections with the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/7zabmvzc from Leagle.com.


CAPITAL HOME MORTGAGE: Kauffman Files Suit in S.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Capital Home
Mortgage, LLC. The case is styled as David Kauffman, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Capital Home
Mortgage, LLC, Case No. 3:22-cv-01940-MMA-DDL (S.D. Cal., Dec. 8,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for the Class Action
Fairness Act.

Capital Home Mortgage -- https://capitalhomemortgage.com/ -- is a
Full-Service Home Mortgage Company offering Great Mortgage Rates on
FHA, VA, USDA Conventional Loans.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 308
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: (619) 222-7429
          Fax: (866) 431-3292
          Email: DanielShay@TCPAFDCPA.com

               - and -

          Joshua Brandon Swigart, Esq.
          SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 308
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: (866) 219-3343
          Fax: (866) 219-8344
          Email: josh@swigartlawgroup.com


CARECORE HEALTH: Seeks to Stay Conditional Cert. in Gudger Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TRE'ANYA GUDGER, on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated, v. CARECORE HEALTH LLC,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00239-MJN-CHG (S.D. Ohio), the Defendant asks the
Court to enter an order staying conditional certification pending
the final disposition of Clark, et al. vs. A&L Home Care and
Training Ctr., et al., Sixth Circuit No. 22-3101, if it does not
deny Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification outright.

The Plaintiffs have filed an Amended Complaint defining a large,
overbroad collective and, by that act alone, seek to obtain a court
order requiring Defendant to inform hundreds of current and former
individuals -- who are employees of separate entities -- of their
right to participate in this case, and to subject Defendant to
expensive and time- consuming collective action discovery.

The Plaintiffs assert that, under the current conditional
certification standard, this is all they need. Notwithstanding that
Plaintiffs are wrong for the reasons in Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification, the
standard upon which they rely is likely to change in the very near
future.

CareCore Health is family owned and operated, and provides
individualized care plans.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 9, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3YmanRk at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Ryan M. Martin, Esq.
          Gretchen M. Treherne, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          201 E. Fifth Street, 26th Floor
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 898-0050
          Facsimile: (513) 898-0051
          E-mail: Ryan.Martin@jacksonlewis.com
                  Gretchen.Treherne@jacksonlewis.com

CEE & CEE: Order on General Pretrial Management Entered in Brown
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALTAUNE BROWN, v. CEE &
CEE DEPARTMENT STORE INC., et al. Case No. 1:22-cv-10452-PGG-BCM
(S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Barbara Moses entered an order regarding
general pretrial management:

  1. Once a discovery schedule has been issued, all discovery
     must be initiated in time to be concluded by the close of
     discovery set by the Court.

  2. Discovery applications, including letter-motions requesting
     discovery conferences, must be made promptly after the need
     for such an application arises and must comply with Local
     Civil Rule 37.2 and section 2(b) of Judge Moses's
     Individual Practices.

  3. For motions other than discovery motions, pre-motion
     conferences are not required, but may be requested where
     counsel believe that an informal conference with the Court
     may obviate the need for a motion or narrow the issues.

  4. Requests to adjourn a court conference or other court
     proceeding (including a telephonic court conference) or to
     extend a deadline must be made in writing and in
     compliance with section 2(a) of Judge Moses's Individual
     Practices.

  5. In accordance with section 1(d) of Judge Moses's Individual
     Practices, letters and letter-motions are limited to four
     pages, exclusive of attachments. Courtesy copies of letters
     and letter-motions filed via ECF are required only if the
     filing contains voluminous attachments.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 12, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BBmAaN at no extra charge.[CC]

CHAD WOLF: Court Orders Sealing Defendants' Objection Documents
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Osny Sorto-Vasquez Kidd et
al. v. Chad T. Wolf, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-03512-ODW-JPR (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Otis D. Wright, II entered an order that
Defendants' three original Objection documents be sealed based on
the reasoning set forth in the Court's December 1, 2022 Minute
order.

The Court notes that, along with its recent sealing order, the
Court should have ordered sealed, but did not order sealed, the
three Objections Defendants originally filed as part of their
opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 6, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3UEITmK at no extra charge.[CC]

CHEGG INC: Keller Files Suit in N.D. California
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chegg, Inc. The case
is styled as Joshua Keller, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Chegg, Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-06986-JD (N.D.
Cal., Nov. 8, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Personal Property for
Property Damage.

Chegg, Inc. -- https://www.chegg.com/ -- is an American education
technology company based in Santa Clara, California. It provides
homework help, digital and physical textbook rentals, textbooks,
online tutoring, and other student services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Robert Reese, Esq.
          Sue Jung Nam
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Phone: (212) 643-0500
          Email: mreese@reesellp.com
                 snam@reesellp.com

               - and -

          Brian Charles Gudmundson
          Michael James Laird
          Rachel Kristine Tack
          ZIMMERMAN REED LLP
          1100 IDS Center
          80 S 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Phone: (612) 341-0400
          Email: brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com
                 Michael.Laird@zimmreed.com
                 rachel.tack@zimmreed.com

               - and -

          Caleb Marker
          ZIMMERMAN REED, LLP
          6420 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1080
          Los Angeles, CA 90048
          Phone: (877) 500-8780
          Email: caleb.marker@zimmreed.com

               - and -

          George Volney Granade
          REESE LLP
          8484 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 515
          Los Angeles, CA 90211
          Phone: (310) 939-0070
          Fax: (212) 253-4272
          Email: ggranade@reesellp.com

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO: Class Cert Hearing Extended to Jan. 9, 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHARON WILLIS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO., Case No. 2:19-cv-08542-JGB-RAO (C.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Jesus G. Bernal entered an order rescheduling
hearing on the Plaintiff's motion for class certification and
defendant's motions to exclude plaintiff's expert witnesses and
evidence.

The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for class certification and
Colgate's motions to exclude Plaintiff's expert witnesses and
evidence shall be continued from December 12, 2022 to January 9,
2023 at 9:00 a.m., the Court says.

Colgate-Palmolive Company is an American multinational consumer
products company headquartered on Park Avenue in Midtown Manhattan,
New York City. The company specializes in the production,
distribution, and provision of household, health care, personal
care, and veterinary products.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3iTaqU5 at no extra charge.[CC]

COMPOUND DAO: Houghton Sues Over Selling without Registration
-------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Houghton, Charles Douglas, and Susan Franklin, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. COMPOUND DAO, a
California general partnership; ROBERT LESHNER; GEOFFREY HAYES; AH
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC; POLYCHAIN ALCHEMY, LLC; BAIN CAPITAL
VENTURES (GP), LLC; GAUNTLET NETWORKS, INC; PARADIGM OPERATIONS LP,
Case No. 3:22-cv-07781 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 8, 2022), is brought
against unlawful selling of COMP to the public and solicit such
sales without registration or qualification.

Compound is a business that allows users to borrow and lend crypto
assets, in much the same way that a traditional bank allows
customers to borrow and lend traditional currencies. Like a
traditional bank, Compound earns money on the spread between the
rate borrowers pay and the rate lenders earn.

Compound was created in 2017 by Compound Labs, Inc., a corporation
headquartered in San Francisco. In May 2020, Compound Labs
transferred control over the Compound business to Defendant
Compound DAO, a California general partnership. Compound DAO is
governed by the holders of a security called COMP. In this respect,
the DAO is analogous to a traditional company governed by its
shareholders, except in crypto terminology, a unit of COMP is
referred as a "token" instead of a "share." More than 50% of COMP
tokens are controlled by fewer than ten people, including
Defendants here. As Compound Labs' general counsel put it when the
company passed control to Compound DAO, these people now "manage"
the Compound business.

Shortly after Compound Labs transferred control of its business to
Compound DAO, the DAO began offering COMP tokens to the public. It
did so through a process known as "yield farming": Users who
borrowed or loaned crypto assets with Compound were provided with
COMP proportional to the amount they borrowed or loaned. COMP
immediately exploded in value, creating a speculative frenzy of
users borrowing and lending assets not because they had a need for
those services, but solely to obtain COMP from the DAO with the
expectation of making a profit by immediately selling it on the
secondary market. The price of COMP skyrocketed--but has since
plummeted.

COMP is a security. Users purchase COMP to gain an ownership share
in the Compound business, expecting to earn profits based on the
efforts of the Partner Defendants and a handful of other people who
together control and manage the business. No registration
statements have been filed with the SEC or have been in effect with
respect to the offering of COMP tokens.

Compound DAO and the Partner Defendants sell COMP directly to
investors through the Compound protocol, in exchange for using the
service and paying fees. Compound DAO and the Partner Defendants
also solicit sales of COMP on the secondary market through their
extensive promotion of COMP, their efforts to facilitate and
encourage a robust secondary market for COMP, and their performance
of other steps necessary to the widespread distribution of COMP to
investors.

Because Compound DAO and the Partner Defendants offer and sell COMP
to the public and solicit such sales without registration or
qualification, Plaintiffs bring this class action for rescission or
rescissory damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs purchased COMP on Coinbase.

Compound DAO is a general partnership headquartered in San
Francisco, California..[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jason Harrow, Esq.
          GERSTEIN HARROW LLP
          3243B S. La Cienega Blvd.
          Los Angeles, CA 90016
          Phone: (323) 744-5293
          Email: jason@gerstein-harrow.com

          James Crooks, Esq.
          Michael Lieberman, Esq.
          FAIRMARK PARTNERS, LLP
          1499 Massachusetts Ave. NW, #113A
          Washington, DC 20005
          Phone: (619) 507-4182
          Email: jamie@fairmarklaw.com

          Charles Gerstein, Esq.
          Emily Gerrick, Esq.
          GERSTEIN HARROW LLP
          810 7th Street NE, Suite 301
          Washington, DC 20002
          Phone: (202) 670-4809
          Email: charlie@gerstein-harrow.com


COSAN CONSTRUCTION: Amended Case Mng't Plan Entered in Sanchez
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LAURO SANCHEZ and JUAN
EUSEBIO SANTIAGO, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. COSAN CONSTRUCTION CORP., AMCG INC., TRADE SOLUTIONS
INC., TERRENCE JAMES FERGUSON, and AARON KING, Case No.
1:21-cv-06744-JLR-SLC (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Sarah L. Cave
entered an order regarding amended case management plan as
follows:

   1. All discovery shall be completed    February 10, 2023
      by:

   2. The parties shall file a joint      February 17, 2023
      letter certifying the completion
      of all discovery by:

   3. The briefing schedule for
      Plaintiffs' anticipated motion
      for class certification under
      Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 is extended
      as follows:

      a. Plaintiffs shall file the        January 13, 2023
         Class Motion in accordance
         with the Individual
         Practices of the
         Honorable Jennifer L.
         Rochon:

      b. Defendants shall file their      February 13, 2023
         opposition to the Class
         Motion by:

      c. The Plaintiff shall file         March 6, 2023,
         their reply, if any:

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 6, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Hhvoq0 at no extra charge.[CC]

DAVID SHINN: Walton Loses Bid for Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Geary Wayne Walton, v.
David Shinn, et al., Case No. CV-22-01277-PHX-DLR-JFM (D. Ariz.),
the Hon. Judge Douglas L. Rayes entered an order that:

  (1) The First Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to
      state a claim. The Plaintiff has 30 days from the date
      this Order is filed to file a second amended complaint in
      compliance with this Order.

  (2) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30
      days, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice,
      enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with
      prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a
      "strike" under 28 U.S.C. section 1915(g) and deny any
      pending unrelated motions as moot.

  (3) The Plaintiff’s combined Motion for Preliminary
      Injunction, Class Certification, and Appointment of
      Counsel is denied.

  (4) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved
      form for filing a civil rights complaint by a prisoner.

The Court says, "To the extent Plaintiff seeks to file a "class
action" on behalf of himself and other Motion for Class
Certification similarly situated inmates, he cannot do so. The
Plaintiff is not an attorney. Although Plaintiff may appear on his
own behalf, he may not appear as an attorney for other persons in a
class action. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification will be denied."

On July 28, 2022, the Plaintiff Geary Wayne Walton, who is confined
in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman, filed a pro se Complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and an Application to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis. Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Supplement, a
Motion to Appoint Counsel, a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and
a Motion to File Supplemental Affidavits, with which he has lodged
several proposed Affidavits.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 6, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uE9qG1 at no extra charge.[CC]

DON HERRINGTON: Seeks More Time to File Class Cert Response
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Helen Roe, a minor, by and
through her parent and next friend Megan Roe; James Poe, a minor,
by and through his parent and next friend Laura Poe; and Carl Voe,
a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, Rachel Voe, v.
Don Herrington, in his official capacity as Interim State Registrar
of Vital Records and Interim Director of the Arizona Department of
Health Services, Case No. 4:20-cv-00484-JAS (D. Ariz.), the
Defendant asks the Court to enter an order extending the time in
which to file his Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.

The Response is currently due on December 12, 2022. This is
Defendant's first request to extend this deadline. Additional time
is needed to complete the Response largely as a matter of
professional courtesy. The 30-day period following the relevant
class-certification depositions included the Thanksgiving holiday
and the bustle, travel, and ailments that come with it.

Unfortunately, undersigned counsel, who is primarily responsible
for preparing the Response, also experienced a death in his family
during this same period, which further set back progress. Finally,
the Defendant did not receive the final transcripts for two of the
three depositions until the night of December 7, 2022, despite
being assured by the court reporter that they would be completed by
November 23, 2022. Those final transcripts are necessary to support
arguments in Defendant's Response.

The Defendant maintains this constitutes "good cause" for an
extension of time. When defense counsel approached Plaintiffs to
see if they would object to an extension of time, Plaintiffs'
California counsel would only agree to an additional two days.

Because Defendant needs more time and anticipates Plaintiffs will
file a formal objection to this request, he will address their
objections here. Plaintiffs' counsel first objected on the grounds
that the Motion for Class Certification has been pending for nearly
16 months.

More importantly, Plaintiffs have not suffered any prejudice by the
length of time their Motion has been pending, nor will they suffer
any prejudice if the Response deadline is briefly extended. Indeed,
the case has moved forward since its inception and Plaintiffs have
engaged in extraordinary merits discovery contemporaneously with
class discovery.

A ruling on class certification is not a condition predicate to the
case's Schedule or any other deadline. Thus, an extension of the
Response deadline will not disrupt the case in any way or extend
its resolution.

The Defendant would like a two-week extension of time, until
December 27, 2022, to allow sufficient flexibility to work around
the issues that come with the December holidays. That is a
reasonable request and seemingly comports with this Court's
directives that "the deadlines in the Scheduling Order are
flexible" and to seek extensions if necessary to ensure that the
parties have "a full and fair opportunity to support or defend
their positions."

But, at a minimum, Defendant requests an extension of at least one
week, until December 19, 2022.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3iQHf4m at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Patricia Cracchiolo LaMagna, Esq.
          Aubrey Joy Corcoran, Esq.
          MARK BRNOVICH
          ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL
          2005 N. Central Avenue
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          Telephone: (602) 542-8854
          Facsimile: (602) 542-8308
          E-mail: EducationHealth@azag.gov

                - and -

          Daniel P. Struck, Esq.
          Nicholas D. Acedo, Esq.
          Dana M. Keene, Esq.
          STRUCK LOVE BOJANOWSKI & ACEDO, PLC
          3100 West Ray Road, Suite 300
          Chandler, AZ 85226
          Telephone: (480) 420-1600
          E-mail: dstruck@strucklove.com
                  nacedo@strucklove.com
                  dkeene@strucklove.com

DST SYSTEMS: 8th Cir. Vacates Confirmation Orders in Hursh Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled Theresa Hursh, Plaintiff-Appellee v. DST
Systems, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 21-3554 (8th Cir.),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacates
the district court's confirmation orders and remands for further
consideration.

The Plaintiffs in these 177 consolidated appeals were participants
in a 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan provided to employees by DST
Systems, Inc., a financial and healthcare services company based in
Kansas City, Missouri. At the time in question, DST was the Plan's
sponsor, administrator, and a designated fiduciary. Ruane Cunniff &
Goldfarb Inc. was a Plan fiduciary involved in managing the Plan's
investments.

When a stock in which the Plan was heavily invested dropped from
$258 per share in 2015 to $15 per share in 2016, the Plan suffered
nearly $400M in losses. Substantial litigation ensued, including
class action lawsuits in the Western District of Missouri and the
Southern District of New York alleging breaches of fiduciary duty
by DST and by Ruane in managing the defined-contribution Plan.

At DST's urging, the Missouri actions resulted in more than 554
individual arbitration proceedings between participants and
defendants under DST's employee Arbitration Agreement. Meanwhile,
in August 2021, the Southern District of New York certified a Rule
23(b)(1) mandatory class that includes the Missouri arbitration
claimants in a parallel action filed in that court by other Plan
participants alleging DST and Ruane breached fiduciary duties to
the Plan (Ferguson v. Ruane Cuniff & Goldfarb Inc., 2021 WL
3667979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 17, 2021)). DST supported the motion
for class certification in Ferguson and ceased participating in
Missouri arbitration proceedings when the class was certified. The
many claimants, who received awards from the arbitration panel,
began filing individual actions to confirm their awards under
Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in the Western
District of Missouri.

On Nov. 18, 2021, the plaintiffs in Ferguson obtained a preliminary
injunction, enjoining all members of the Rule 23(b)(1) class from
"instituting new actions or litigating in arbitration or other
proceedings against the DST Defendants matters arising out of or
relating to the facts or transactions alleged in the Ferguson
amended complaint."

Between October and December 2021, the district court issued seven
largely identical orders confirming the arbitration awards to 177
claimants and granting their requests for substantial costs and
attorneys' fees. The Defendants appealed, raising numerous issues.
The Court of Appeals consolidated the 177 appeals for briefing and
argument.

On March 31, 2022, with briefing not yet completed, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. ___, 142
S.Ct. 1310 (2022), dramatically limiting federal jurisdiction to
confirm or vacate arbitration awards under Sections 9-10 of the
FAA. The Court of Appeals vacates each of the district court's
confirmation orders and remands for further consideration of the
court's subject matter jurisdiction as defined in Badgerow.

The Plaintiffs, sought relief under the DST Arbitration Agreement,
a part of their employment contracts that specifically excludes
claims for "ERISA-related benefits" under a DST-sponsored plan.

Circuit Judge James B. Loken, writing for the Panel, notes that
this is not state contract law that "relates" to DST's ERISA Plan
as the Supreme Court has applied that statutory term. Although the
arbitration awards at issue were based upon breach of DST's
fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), without a look-through to this underlying ERISA
controversy that is foreclosed by Badgerow, the Plaintiffs' Section
9 applications only concern the contractual rights provided in the
arbitration agreement, generally governed by state law. If that
were enough to establish an "independent basis" for federal
question jurisdiction, the exception under Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing., 545 U.S. 308,
312 (2005), would swallow the Badgerow rule, Judge Loken opines.

With federal question jurisdiction foreclosed by Badgerow, Judge
Loken says the question becomes whether the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction to issue the Section 9 confirmation
orders under the congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction in
28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a)(1).

The Court of Appeals concludes the district court lacks federal
question subject matter jurisdiction under the FAA or 28 U.S.C.
Section 1331 and, in light of these factual uncertainties, the
Court of Appeals remands the consolidated cases for a determination
of whether the court has subject matter diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a) in each case.

Most of the issues in this consolidated appeal the Court of Appeals
cannot and will not address until the district court's subject
matter diversity jurisdiction is established on a case-by-case
basis, Judge Loken states. The Defendants insist that the Southern
District of New York's mandatory class certification and
preliminary injunction in Ferguson precluded the district court
from confirming arbitration awards. Judge Loken finds the
proposition is supported by less-than-conclusive authorities. In
any event, it is not an issue the Court of Appeals can or should
address before jurisdiction has been established.

Among other reasons, Judge Loken explains, the answer may depend on
how many of the 177 awards the district court has subject matter
jurisdiction to confirm. Likewise, the Plaintiffs insist that the
Court of Appeals can and should affirm based on the district
court's alternative judicial estoppel ruling.

But the Plaintiffs simply assume, without even acknowledging the
issue, that a party's judicial estoppel can create subject matter
jurisdiction that is otherwise lacking, Judge Loken observes. And
the Plaintiffs' argument that the Court of Appeals should affirm
the district court's separate awards of attorney's fees
conveniently ignores the question whether claimants whose awards
are held to be beyond the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction can be considered prevailing parties.

There is one additional issue that can be considered even when the
district court's subject matter jurisdiction is in doubt -- whether
the district court erred in denying (or not even addressing) the
Defendants' motion to transfer these cases to the Southern District
of New York, Judge Loken says. In 1982, Congress addressed the
question whether a district court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction may nonetheless transfer an action to a federal court
that has subject matter jurisdiction: Section 1631. Transfer to
cure want of jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. Section 1631).

In Johnson v. Woodcock, 444 F.3d 953, 954 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006), the
Court of Appeals deemed the request for transfer waived when it was
first raised in a petition for rehearing on appeal. But here, the
issue was not viable until the Supreme Court's decision in
Badgerow, so Johnson is not controlling on the issue of waiver,
Judge Loken opines.

In Bernard v. United States Department of the Interior, 674 F.3d
904, 909 (8th Cir. 2012), the Court of Appeals held "that the
requirements for transfer under Section 1631 were not met" because
the plaintiff had abandoned the "action which the district court
could have transferred." Again, Judge Loken explains, that was not
the situation when the Defendants filed their request to transfer
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) in the district court.

Thus, the Court of Appeals concludes that transfer under Section
1631 is an issue that can be addressed before the district court's
subject matter jurisdiction is resolved. The Court of Appeals
declines to consider the issue because Badgerow has changed
underlying circumstances that may affect whether transfer is in the
interest of justice.

Judge Loken opines that Badgerow may deprive the Southern District
of New York of subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the awards as
transferee court. But if so, the ongoing proceedings in Ferguson
may provide the parties a transferee court with subject matter
jurisdiction that can resolve the entire controversy, including the
transferred claims, by settlement or otherwise, in a manner that is
fair and more efficient than keeping some Plaintiffs' claims
pending in the Court of Appeals and leaving the remaining
arbitration claimants to seek confirmation in state court.

These issues can best be determined by the district court on
remand, with input from the parties based on their views of the
post-Badgerow alternatives for resolving this dispute, Judge Loken
points out.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals holds, the judgments of the
district court are vacated, including the awards of attorney's
fees, and the consolidated cases are remanded to the district court
for determination of transfer and subject matter jurisdiction
issues, to the extent necessary, and for other further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion the district court finds
appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Nov. 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3tu57yfd from Leagle.com.


EMORTGAGE FUNDING: Kauffman Sues Over Unlawful Recording
--------------------------------------------------------
David Kauffman, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. EMORTGAGE FUNDING, LLC, Case No. 3:22-cv-01934-DMS-BGS
(S.D. Cal., Dec. 7, 2022), is brought for damages and injunctive
relief against the Defendant and its present, former, or future
direct and indirect parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates,
agents, and related entities for recording conversations with
Plaintiff and Class Members without any notification or warning in
violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act.

On June 30, 2017, the Plaintiff purchased identity theft protection
from Experian. The Plaintiff gave Experian his personal information
so that Experian could monitor his credit and help prevent identity
theft. The Plaintiff's agreement with Experian may have allowed
Experian to share the Plaintiff's information with the Defendant.
On November 15, 2022, the Plaintiff applied for a home equity line
of credit with Comerica Bank and the Plaintiff gave Comerica his
information. Comerica provided the Plaintiff's information to
Experian which Experian used to produce the Plaintiff's credit
report. Experian sent the report to Comerica as requested.

Unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, Experian then sold the Plaintiff's
information to the Defendant for commercial purposes. On November
22, 2022, an agent of Defendant called Plaintiff attempting to sell
Plaintiff a mortgage. The agent did not advise Plaintiff that
Defendant was recording the call or seek Plaintiff's consent to
record. The parties spoke for several minutes while the agent
attempted to persuade Plaintiff to apply for a loan. Plaintiff then
asked the agent if Defendant was recording the call and the agent
responded affirmatively, stating Defendant recorded phone calls for
training purposes.

The Plaintiff was surprised and annoyed that the Defendant recorded
his call without telling him. There was no beeping noise or any
indication of recording. Plaintiff requested Defendant not to call
him again. The Defendant called the Plaintiff several more times
and never warned him the calls were recorded. The Defendant records
all its calls, both inbound and outbound, like the ones it made to
the Plaintiff. The Defendant does not advise anyone that it is
recording, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person and resident of the State of
California, County of San Diego.

The Defendant is a Michigan entity with its headquarters in
Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
          2221 Camino del Rio S, Ste 308
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: 619-222-7429
          Email: DanielShay@TCPAFDCPA.com

               - and -

          Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
          SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
          2221 Camino del Rio S, Ste 308
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: 866-219-3343
          Email: Josh@SwigartLawGroup.com

ENERGY TRANSFER: Case Management Order Entered in AERS Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALLEGHENY COUNTY
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE
CITY OF BATON ROUGE AND PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, DENVER
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT PLAN, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS
AND AEROSPACE WORKERS NATIONAL PENSION FUND, and IOWA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, v. ENERGY TRANSFER LP, KELCY L. WARREN,
THOMAS E. LONG, MARSHALL MCCREA, and MATTHEW S. RAMSEY, Case No.
2:20-cv-00200-GAM (E.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge Gerald Austin McHugh
entered a case management order as follows:

   1. The deadline for the completion      December 16, 2022
      of all non-deposition fact
      discovery shall remain:

   2. The deadline for the completion      May 31, 2023
      of non-expert depositions shall
      be:

   3. The deadline for Parties to          May 31, 2023
      identify the subject areas of
      expert testimony they intend
      to proffer with respect to
      non-class certification issues
      for which they bear the burden
      of proof shall be:

   4. The deadline for Parties to          June 30, 2023
      serve expert reports and all
      other expert disclosures
      required pursuant to FED. R.
      CIV. P. 26 with respect to
      non-class certification issues
      for which they bear the burden
      of proof shall be:

   5. The deadline for Parties             August 31, 2023
      to serve expert reports and
      all other expert disclosures
      required with respect to
      non-class certification
      issues for which they do
      not bear the burden of proof
      shall be:

Energy Transfer is an American company engaged in natural gas and
propane pipeline transport.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 7, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Hm1YH9 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeffrey W. Golan, Esq.
          Robert A. Hoffman, Esq.
          Jeffrey A. Barrack, Esq.
          Chad A. Carder, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          3300 Two Commerce Square
          2001 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 963-0600
          Facsimile: (215) 963-0838
          E-mail: jgolan@barrack.com
                  rhoffman@barrack.com
                  jbarrack@barrack.com

                - and -

          John C. Browne, Esq.
          Adam H. Wierzbowski, Esq.
          Michael M. Mathai, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
          & GROSSMANN LLP
          1251 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 554-1400
          Facsimile: (212) 554-1444
          E-mail: johnb@blbglaw.com
                  adam@blbglaw.com
                  michael.mathai@blbglaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Marc J. Sonnenfeld, Esq.
          Karen Pieslak Pohlman, Esq.
          Laura H. McNally, Esq.
          Amanda F. Lashner, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1701 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921
          Telephone: (215) 963-5000
          Facsimile: (215) 963-5001
          E-mail: marc.sonnenfeld@morganlewis.com
                  karen.pohlmann@morganlewis.com
                  laura.mcnally@morganlewis.com
                  amandalashner@morganlewis.com

                - and -

          Trey Cox, Esq.
          Brian M. Lutz, Esq.
          Colin B. Davis, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          2001 Ross Avenue
          Suite 2100
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 698-3100
          Facsimile: (214) 571-2900
          E-mail: tcox@gibsondunn.com
                  blutz@gibsondunn.com
                  cdavis@gibsondunn.com

FCA US: Scheduling Order Entered in Wilson Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JASON WILSON, ROBERT
KRENEK, AND DONALD ALDRIDGE, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, v. FCA US LLC, ET AL., Case No.
4:22-cv-00447-ALM (E.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge Amos L. Mazzant
entered a scheduling order as follows:

-- Deadlines for motions to transfer:    December 29, 2022

-- Deadline to add parties:              January 6, 2023

-- Deadline for Plaintiffs to            March 21, 2023
    file amended pleadings:

-- Deadline for Defendant to             April 25, 2023
    file amended pleadings:

-- Deadline for Plaintiffs to            June 20, 2023
    disclose the names,
    curriculum vitae and subject
    areas of expected testimony
    for all experts in support
    of motion for class
    certification:

-- Deadline for Defendant to             July 21, 2023
    disclose the names,
    curriculum vitae and subject
    areas of expected testimony
    for all experts in opposition
    to motion for class
    certification:

-- Deadline for Plaintiffs to            August 1, 2023
    disclose the names, curriculum
    vitae, and subject areas of
    expected testimony for all
    experts to rebut Defendant's
    experts (only if necessary):

-- Deadline for Plaintiffs to            August 29, 2023
    file motion for class
    certification:

-- Deadline for response to              October 24, 2023
    motion for class
    certification:

-- Class certification hearing:          February 6, 2024

FCA US designs, engineers, manufactures, and sells vehicles. The
Company offers passenger cars, utility vehicles, mini-vans, trucks
and commercial vans.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 7, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uzpXev at no extra charge.[CC]

FIRST CONTACT: Nightingale Seeks More Time to File Class Cert. Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Robert Nightingale, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. National
Grid USA Service Company, Inc., First Contact LLC, and iQor US
Inc., Case No. 1:19-cv-12341-NMG (D. Mass.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order extending the deadlines to move for class
certification and/or file any Daubert motions by seven days, up to
and including December 16, 2022.

The deadlines for Plaintiff to move to for class certification or
to file Daubert motions is December 9, 2022.

On November 16, 2022, Plaintiff moved to reopen discovery and
adjourn these deadlines which Defendants have opposed.

While that motion is undecided, the deadline to move for class
certification or to file Daubert motions remains. However,
undersigned counsel Stephen Taylor has had family conflicts and
obligations which have arisen this week (specifically, his partner
has begun physical therapy following a broken ankle and there have
been unforeseen childcare issues which have
resulted). Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully needs and requests a
very brief extension of the Daubert and class certification
deadlines.

The requested extension will not unreasonably delay proceedings in
this case and will not impact the upcoming class certification
hearing scheduled for February 15, 2022.

On December 8, 2022, counsel for Plaintiff conferred with counsel
for Defendants, who advise they do not consent to extending any of
the case briefing deadlines.

First Contact is a full service real estate development firm
committed to quality residential and commercial development.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Fhp930 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          Stephen Taylor, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, LLC
          43 Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424

FIRSTENERGY CORP: Class Cert Hearing Set for March 17, 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DIANE OWENS, et al., v.
FIRSTENERGY CORP., et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-04287-ALM-KAJ (S.D.
Ohio), the Hon. Judge Algenon L. Marbley entered an order setting
date for class certification hearing on March 17, 2023 at 1:30 p.m.
in Court Room 1, Room 331 of the U. S. Courthouse located at 85
Marconi Boulevard, Columbus, Ohio.

The Class Certification Hearing in this case may not be continued
by stipulation of the parties or counsel, but only by an order of
the Court on good cause shown. Any request for a continuance should
be made promptly after the reason for seeking the continuance
becomes known.

Counsel should prepare for this hearing with the knowledge that
this Court has already studied the memoranda related to class
certification. Counsel should be prepared to answer questions
raised by the Court.

FirstEnergy is an electric utility headquartered in Akron, Ohio.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3hgiuOw at no extra charge.[CC]

FLYING S. WINGS: Class Certification Hearing Set for Feb. 24, 2023
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KAYLA PENDER, v. FLYING S.
WINGS, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-04292-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), the Hon.
Judge Algenon l. Marbley entered an order setting date for class
certification hearing on February 24, 2023 at 1:00 p.m. in Court
Room 1, Room 331 of the U. S. Courthouse located at 85 Marconi
Boulevard, Columbus, Ohio.

The Class Certification Hearing in this case may not be continued
by stipulation of the parties or counsel, but only by an order of
the Court on good cause shown. Any request for a continuance should
be made promptly after the reason for seeking the continuance
becomes known.

Counsel should prepare for this hearing with the knowledge that
this Court has already studied the memoranda related to class
certification. Counsel should be prepared to answer questions
raised by the Court.

Flying S. Wings is doing business as Buffalo Wild Wings.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FHSbKD at no extra charge.[CC]

GLAXOSMITHKLINE: Ruling to Seal Confidential Docs Sought
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LISA M. MOORE,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
GLAXOSMITHKLINE CONSUMER HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS (US) LLC, and PFIZER,
INC., Case No. 4:20-cv-09077-JSW (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court to enter an order considering whether to seal the
documents provisionally filed under seal that Defendants designated
as "confidential" pursuant to the Protective Order.

Pursuant to the Protective Order, the Defendants designated as
"CONFIDENTIAL" certain documents and/or transcripts regarding its
proprietary ChapStick (TM) brand lip care consumer products that
are the subject of this putative class action.

At issue in the instant motion, the Plaintiff provisionally filed
under seal the following documents in support of Plaintiff's Class
Certification Motion that contain material Defendants designated as
confidential under the terms of Protective Order:

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 7, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3hbZII6 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan J. Clarkson, Esq.
          Katherine A. Bruce, Esq.
          Kelsey J. Elling, Esq.
          CLARKSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
          22525 Pacific Coast Highway
          Malibu, CA 90265
          Telephone: (213) 788-4050
          Facsimile: (213) 788-4070
          E-mail: rclarkson@clarksonlawfirm.com
                  kbruce@clarksonlawfirm.com
                  kelling@clarksonlawfirm.com

                - and -

          Christopher D. Moon, Esq.
          Kevin O. Moon, Esq.
          MOON LAW APC
          228 Hamilton Ave., 3rd Fl
          Palo Alto, CA 94301
          Telephone: (619) 915-9432
          Facsimile: (650) 618-0478
          E-mail: chris@moonlawapc.com
                  kevin@moonlawapc.com

GLOBAL RESOURCING: Martinez Seeks to Certify Worker Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Juan Martinez, an Arizona
resident; v. Global Resourcing, LLC, an Arizona company; Element
Power Group, LLC, an Arizona company; Christopher Rouen, an Arizona
resident; and Elise Rouen, an Arizona resident; Case No.
2:22-cv-01132-SMM (D. Ariz.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter
an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a collective action pursuant to
      Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
      consisting of:

      "All current or former workers; who work[ed] for the
      Defendants Global Resourcing, LLC, Element Power Group,
      LLC, Christopher Rouen, and/or Elise Rouen; who were
      classified as independent contractors; who worked over 40
      hours in any given workweek; and who did not receive time-
      and-a-half for all hours worked over 40 hours are known as
      (the "Collective Members")."

    2. authorizing the Opt-In procedure; and

    3. For any such other relief as this Court deems just and
       proper.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages for himself
and the Collective Members, requiring the proper payment of
overtime wages to workers, under the collective action mechanism of
the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. section 216(b).

The Plaintiff was a full-time employee who worked for Defendants
from March 17, 2017, until April 5, 2022. The Plaintiff was
misclassified as an independent contractor.

Global Resourcing is a security cleared expert provider of
innovative talent and resourcing solutions in support of digital,
data and technology transformation, across the public and
non-profit sectors.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Dec. 8,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3UNSwj9
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason Barrat, Esq.
          ZOLDAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
          5050 N. 40 th St., Suite 260
          Phoenix, AZ 85018
          Telephone: (480) 442-3410
          Facsimile: (480) 442-3410
          E-mail: jbarrat@zoldangroup.com

GOLDEN APPLE: Initial Case Mng't Conference Set for Jan. 11, 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SANJAY SOOKUL, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, v. GOLDEN APPLE
INDUSTRIES, INC., Case No. 1:22-cv-09203-JMF-SLC (S.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge Sarah L. Cave entered an order scheduling initial case
management conference on January 11, 2023 at 12:00 p.m. on the
Court's conference line.

The parties are directed to call: (866) 390-1828; access code:
380-9799, at the scheduled time. At the conference, the parties
must be prepared to discuss the subjects set forth in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16(b) and (c).

The Court further ordered that counsel shall meet and confer in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) no later than 21 days before
the Initial Case Management Conference. No later than one
week before the conference, the parties shall file a Report of Rule
26(f) Meeting and Proposed Case Management Plan, via ECF, signed by
counsel for each party.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Br0vvs at no extra charge.[CC]


GOLDEN ENTERTAINMENT: Recommendation Adopted; Houston Suit Tossed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada dismisses the case, Matthew Travis Houston,
Plaintiff v. Golden Entertainment, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-00499-JAD-DJA (D. Nev.).

Pro se Plaintiff Houston is an inmate at Nevada's High Desert State
Prison and a prolific litigant. He commenced the action in March
2021 as an "objection" to a class-action settlement notice he
received in an action against Golden Entertainment. A year later,
he filed an "Amended Civil Rights Complaint" against more than a
dozen targets unrelated to the Golden Entertainment class action.

Houston did not pay the filing fee, and he seeks to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP). His first three applications were denied as
incomplete or inappropriate, and he was given leave (and further
instructions) for submitting a fourth application or paying the
fee. The magistrate judge cautioned Houston that failure to comply
with this order will result in a recommendation to the District
Judge that this action be dismissed. This will be the Plaintiff's
last opportunity to file a complete application to proceed in forma
pauperis or pay the filing fee. When that fourth application was
still woefully deficient, the magistrate judge denied it, too, and
entered a report and recommendation to dismiss the action.

Although Houston filed a document entitled "Notice of Formal
Objection as Emergency Interpleadings of Factual Merit and Motion
to Compel in Regards to" that recommendation, this document does
not address -- let alone explain or attempt to cure -- the
deficiencies in the IFP application. While the report and
recommendation and Houston's objection remained pending before the
Court, Houston filed a fifth IFP application. The magistrate judge
denied it as unintelligible and rife with delusional answers.

Judge Dorsey explains that a court may dismiss an action based on a
party's failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules.
In determining whether to dismiss an action on this ground, the
court must consider: (1) the public's interest in expeditious
resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its
docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public
policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the
availability of less drastic alternatives.

Judge Dorsey holds that the first two factors weigh in favor of
dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims. The third factor also weighs
in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from
the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. The
fourth factor is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring
dismissal.

The fifth factor requires Judge Dorsey to consider whether less
drastic alternatives can be used to correct the party's failure
that brought about the court's need to consider dismissal. She
finds that because the Court cannot operate without collecting
reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a
plaintiff's compliance with court orders, the only alternative is
to give Houston yet another chance to try again and hope that his
sixth try yields a complete, sensical ifp application. But the
largely unintelligible nature of Houston's filings in the action to
date suggests that this approach will only delay the inevitable and
further squander the Court's finite resources. So the fifth factor
favors dismissal.

Having thoroughly weighed these dismissal factors, Judge Dorsey
finds that they tip heavily in favor of dismissal. Therefore, she
adopts the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in its
entirety. The case is dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to
enter judgment accordingly and close the case. And because the
Order terminates the case, all pending motions are denied without
prejudice and as moot.

If Houston desires to proceed with his claims, and they are not
duplicative of claims he has pending in another action, he must
file a new lawsuit and either pay the filing fee or submit a
complete application to proceed in forma pauperis in that new
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mrfcrt9k from Leagle.com.


GQ SOLUTIONS: Granting Leave to Ulery to Conduct Discovery Endorsed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAVID ULERY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. GQ SOLUTIONS,
LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-01581-PAB-MDB (D. Colo.), the Hon. Judge
Maritza Dominguez recommended that the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave
to Conduct Class Certification and Damages Related Discovery Form
GQ Solutions, LLC be granted.

Within 14 days after service of a copy of the Recommendation, any
party may serve and file written objections to the Magistrate
Judge's proposed findings and recommendations with the Clerk of the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado.

A general objection that does not put the district court on notice
of the basis for the objection will not preserve the objection for
de novo review.

The Plaintiff brings this action against GQ Solutions for alleged
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The
Plaintiff also purports to bring this action on behalf of a
putative class of similarly situated persons.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "systematically sent
unsolicited pre-recorded calls to Plaintiff and Class members which
violate the TCPA." The Plaintiff seeks damages under the TCPA and
declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff contends that the putative class consists of members
who were unlawfully targeted by Defendant's un-solicited
prerecorded calls.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 7, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3UKN14F at no extra charge.[CC]

GRETCHEN WHITMER: Class Certification Deadlines Extended in Rouse
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ARTHUR J. ROUSE, et al.,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v.
Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, et al., in their individual and
official capacities, Case No. 2:20-cv-12308-BAF-DRG (E.D. Mich.),
the Hon. Judge David R. Grand entered an order extending the
deadline for the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and
extending the parties' deadline for filing proposed case management
and discovery plan:

   1. A status conference shall be held on January 5, 2023, at
      1:30 p.m. by Zoom Video, for the parties to update the
      Court on the progress of their negotiations. Counsel will
      receive Zoom link by email.

   2. Plaintiffs shall have until January 12, 2023, to file
      their motion for class certification.

   3. The parties shall have until January 15, 2023, to file
      their proposed case management and discovery plan.

On September 21, 2022, this Court held a scheduling conference to
establish a timeline for the efficient resolution of this case.

The Parties represented to the Court that they were engaged in good
faith settlement discussions and requested time to pursue those
discussions.

To encourage out of court settlement and ensure that this case
moved forward, this Court issued an Order requiring Plaintiffs to
submit their motion for class certification on November 7, 2022,
for the Parties to submit their  proposed case management and
discovery plan by November 10, 2022, and scheduled a scheduling
conference for November 14, 2022.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 6, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Y4vZ4o at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Paul Matouka, Esq.
          OLIVER LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1647 W. Big Beaver Rd.
          Troy, MI 48084
          Telephone: (248) 327-6556
          E-mail: notifications@oliverlawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Zachary Zurek, Esq.
          MDOC DIVISION
          P.O. Box 30217
          Lansing, MI 48909
          Telephone: (517) 335-3055
          E-mail: zurekz1@michigan.gov

HARVARD BUSINESS: Case Management Order Entered in McVay Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TIMOTHY MCVAY, v. HARVARD
BUSINESS PUBLISHING CORPORATION, Case No. 1:22-cv-00802-HYJ-RSK
(W.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge Ray Kent entered a case management
order as follows:

-- Trial Date                                 Oct. 7, 2024

-- Motions to Join Parties or                 Jan. 27,2023
    Amend Pleadings

-- Motion for Class Certification             Aug. 8, 2023

-- Disclose Name, Address, Area of
    Expertise and a short summary of
    expected testimony of Expert Witnesses
    (Rule 26(a)(2)(A))

         Party with the Burden of Proof:       Aug. 11, 2023

         Responding Party:                     Sept.12, 2023

-- Disclosure of Expert Reports
    (Rule 26(a)(2)(B))

         Party with the Burden of Proof:       Sept. 12, 2023

         Responding Party:                     Oct. 11, 2023

-- Completion of Discovery                    Dec. 15, 2023

-- Dispositive Motions                        Jan. 30, 2024

Harvard Business Publishing offers a catalog of business case
studies, articles, books, and simulations to add dynamic, real-life
perspective.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 7, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3PbVUTz at no extra charge.[CC]



HEALTH INSURANCE: Modified Class Cert. Related Deadlines Sought
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as THERESA LOMAS, v. HEALTH
INSURANCE ASSOCIATES LLC, Case No. 6:22-cv-00679-PGB-DCI (M.D.
Fla.), the Parties ask the Court to enter an order granting the
modified class certification related deadlines as follows:

  -- Deadline to disclose expert reports
     regarding class certification

                              Plaintiff:     Mar. 10, 2023

                              Defendant:     Apr. 7, 2023

  -- Discovery cut off for class             Apr. 28, 2023
     certification:

  -- Deadline for moving for class           Mar. 10, 2023
     certification, if applicable:

  -- Deadline for responding to motion       Apr. 7, 2023
     for class certification

  -- Deadline for replying to motion         Apr. 28, 2023
     for class certification

On April 7, 2022, Plaintiff Lomas filed a class action complaint
asserting a single claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act's robocalls provision,

On August 30, 2022, the Plaintiff Taylor filed a class action
complaint asserting two Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
(TCPA) claims: one under the robocalls provision, which overlaps in
total with Plaintiff Lomas's claim, and one under the TCPA's
National Do Not Call Registry provision, which requires different
discovery and expert analysis than the robocalls claim.

On November 22, 2022, the Court consolidated the Lomas and Taylor
actions.

The parties require additional time to complete class discovery and
expert analysis relating to Plaintiff Lomas's National Do Not Call
Registry claim.

Health Insurance, established in 1998, has been a local insurance
agency located in North Haven, Connecticut.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Dec. 6, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FiqkiK at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          Rachel E. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          237 S. Dixie Hwy, 4th Floor
          Coral Gables, FL 33133
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com
                  rachel@kaufmanpa.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Wendy Stein Fulton, Esq.
          MOUND COTTON WOLLAN & GREENGRASS LLP
          110 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 610
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 467-5800
          Facsimile: (954) 467-5880
          E-mail: wsteinfulton@moundcotton.com

HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Moore TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GEORGE MOORE, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS INC. and
PROSPERITY LIFE INSURANCE GROUP LLC, Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-4919 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Steven C. Seeger of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
denies Healthcare Solutions' motion to dismiss the complaint.

On Aug. 13, 2021, Moore received two phone calls to his residential
telephone line from the same phone number. The calls went to a
residential number "used by Mr. Moore only." Moore's caller ID
showed that both phone calls came from the same phone number.

Moore didn't answer the first call. But when he received a second
call from that number, he picked up. Moore soon discovered that
Carol Jandera, an employee of Healthcare Solutions, was on the
other end of the line. And she wanted to sell.

Jandera offered to sell Moore an insurance policy from Prosperity
Life Insurance Group. Jandera then offered to transfer Moore to
Prosperity Life so that he could sign up for an insurance policy.
Moore apparently wasn't interested in buying insurance, so he ended
the call. Sometime later, Moore received an email from Jandera to
confirm Prosperity Life's policy offer. Jandera's email address had
the domain "ourhcs.com," which is a domain owned by Healthcare
Solutions.

That email, like the call, apparently didn't sit well with Moore.
He wrote Healthcare Solutions and requested evidence showing that
it had permission to contact him. He never received a response.

As it turns out, Moore's phone number was listed on the Do Not Call
Registry since July 7, 2017. He didn't expect unwanted calls as
someone with a number on the Do Not Call Registry.

Moore responded with his own form of unsolicited communication. He
filed a class action complaint against Healthcare Solutions and
Prosperity Life, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227, et seq. He seeks statutory
damages of up to $500 for each violation, and treble damages for
any knowing or willful violation.

Prosperity Life filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. After
jurisdictional discovery, the parties agreed to dismiss Moore's
claims against Prosperity Life with prejudice.

Healthcare Solutions, the only remaining defendant, later filed a
motion to dismiss. That motion is now before the Court.

Moore's complaint has a single count. He alleges that Healthcare
Solutions violated the TCPA by calling him more than once within a
12-month period, even though his phone number is on the Do Not Call
Registry.

Healthcare Solutions moves to dismiss on two grounds. It first
argues that the complaint does not allege that Moore received more
than one telephone solicitation. Under the regulation, a caller
cannot be liable for only one call. The regulation adopts a
call-me-twice, shame-on-you approach.

Judge Seeger opines that Moore received two calls from the same
number, on the same day. Given the content of the second call, it
is a reasonable inference that the first call was a telemarketing
call from Healthcare Solutions. The interruption exists without
answering the phone. If the calls don't count under the TCPA unless
the person picks up, telemarketers would escape liability for all
previous interruptions, no matter how annoying or intrusive.
Nothing in the statutory text supports giving callers a pass for
such intrusions.

Healthcare Solutions also makes a second argument, but it does not
get very far. The argument is about whether Moore -- as opposed to
someone else -- personally registered his phone number on the Do
Not Call Registry.

It does not matter who registered the phone number on the Do Not
Call Registry, Judge Seeger opines. But even if it mattered, the
complaint would survive. The complaint alleges that Moore's phone
number is registered, and that Moore is the only person who uses
that number. That's more than enough to support a reasonable
inference that Moore registered his number.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the complaint is
denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/9tbmaxzb from
Leagle.com.


HI.Q INC: Loses Bid for Summary Judgment in Tyner TCPA Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAKI TYNER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. HI.Q, Inc. d/b/a HEALTH IQ, INC.,
Defendant, Judge Stephen P. Friot of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma denies Health IQ's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Tyner, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
brings this putative class action against Health IQ, seeking
injunctive relief and statutory damages for alleged violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C.
Section 227, et seq.

According to the First Amended Class Action Complaint, Health IQ,
in a 12-month period, placed more than one unsolicited
telemarketing call using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the
cellular telephones of Tyner and other members of the putative
class. The telephone numbers to which the telemarketing calls were
placed were for personal use only and were registered on the
national do-not-call registry.

The unsolicited telemarketing calls placed by Health IQ to those
telephone numbers related to insurance and the Complaint alleges
that Tyner and other members of the putative class did not provide
prior express written consent for Health IQ to make the
telemarketing calls. After the calls were received, Tyner and
members of the putative class requested to opt-out of the
telemarketing calls, but the calls continued because the company
did not implement a written policy for maintaining an internal
do-not-call list and did not train its personnel on the existence
and use of the internal do-not-call-list.

The Complaint alleges that Health IQ's conduct violated the TCPA
and the implementing regulations (TCPA regulations or TCPA
regulation), specifically, 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b) and 47 C.F.R.
Section 64.1200(a) (Count I); 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c) and 47
C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d) (Count II); and 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)
and 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(c) (Count III).

Health IQ has moved for summary judgment with respect to Tyner's
individual claims. It contends it is entitled to summary judgment
because (1) Tyner provided TCPA-compliant consent to receiving the
telemarketing calls; (2) the prerecorded voicemail messages
received by Tyner fall outside the scope of the TCPA, but even if
they fall within the statute's scope, they cannot serve as a valid
basis for recovery for Tyner; and (3) Health IQ's established
practices, procedures and training provide the company with a safe
harbor defense against Tyner's do-not-call claims.

Tyner has responded, opposing summary judgment with respect to
Count I and Count III. With leave of Court, Tyner has sur-replied.

Initially, Health IQ contends that Tyner's individual claims are
barred because prior to the telemarketing calls, Tyner gave express
written consent or express invitation or permission to receiving
the calls. It asserts on the last page of the form, Tyner checked a
box consenting to receive phone sales calls from the website or its
marketing partners, on the telephone number provided, even if the
telephone number was on a federal or state do-not-call registry.
Because Tyner had completed the web form, and in the absence of
evidence that he revoked the consent prior to the telemarketing
calls, Health IQ contends that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Tyner's individual TCPA claims.

Judge Friot finds that given that Health IQ has not demonstrated
that it qualified as "CAC" or one of the "Marketing Partners" at
the time the calls were placed to Tyner, it does not fall within
the group of permissible callers and its telemarketing calls were
not of the kind that Tyner agreed to receive. Moreover, Tyner's
consent contained a limitation as to the parties from whom she
consented to receiving sales phone calls. The web form at issue did
not "clearly authorize" Health IQ to deliver or cause to be
delivered to Tyner telemarketing messages using an artificial or
prerecorded voice. The web form also doesn't state that Tyner
agrees to be contacted specifically by Health IQ. This is no mere
technicality.

Because the web form did not clearly authorize Health IQ to deliver
or cause to be delivered telemarketing messages using an artificial
or prerecorded voice and did not state that Tyner agreed to be
contacted by Health IQ, Judge Friott concludes that Health IQ is
not entitled to summary judgment on Tyner's individual claims
alleged in Count I and Count III based on its alleged consent
affirmative defense.

Health IQ posits another reason to grant summary judgment in its
favor as to Tyner's individual claims alleged in Count I.
Specifically, it posits that the prerecorded voicemail messages it
left on Tyner's cellular telephone were not prohibited by the TCPA,
but even if they were, Tyner proffers no injury based on receipt of
those messages.

Upon review, Judge Friot finds that Health IQ is not entitled to
summary judgment on Tyner's Count I claims because it has not
satisfied its initial burden of production on summary judgment or
its ultimate burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the Count I claims. He is satisfied that Tyner,
claiming the receipt of two unsolicited prerecorded voice messages
invaded her privacy or intruded on her seclusion, has standing to
prosecute her claims under Count I of the Complaint.

Lastly, Health IQ contends that it is entitled to summary judgment
on Count III of the Complaint -- the do-not-call registry claims --
based upon its alleged safe harbor affirmative defense. The record,
it, demonstrates that it established and implemented policies,
procedures, training, and recordkeeping procedures to ensure
compliance with the national do-not-call rules, warranting
protection from liability under the TCPA.

Judge Friot disagrees. Health IQ is not entitled to summary
judgment as it has not demonstrated, as a matter of law, all
essential elements of its defense. To the extent that Health IQ
contends that its calls to Tyner were in error because it had a
good faith belief that it had permission, a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether Health IQ had such good faith
belief. Upon review of the record in a light favorable to Tyner,
Judge Friot finds that Health IQ has not established as a matter of
law that the telemarketing calls it made to Tyner were
unintentional. He therefore concludes that Health IQ is not
entitled to summary judgment on Tyner's claims alleged in Count III
of the Complaint.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Friot denies Health IQ's Motion
for Summary Judgment. The matter will be set for a status and
scheduling conference regarding the putative class claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/bde3pd6j from Leagle.com.


HY-VEE INC: Scheduling & Trial Setting Order Entered in Rodriguez
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as THERESA L. RODRIGUEZ,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated;
ZACHARY M. SHANK, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated; MICHAEL P. MANSBERGER, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; HEIDI L. DETRA,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; and
TIM CAMPBELL, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, v. HY-VEE, INC.; BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF HY-VEE, INC.;
HY-VEE AND AFFILIATES 401(K) PLAN INVESTMENT COMMITTEE; and JOHN
DOES, (1-30); Case No. 4:22-cv-00072-SHL-HCA (S.D. Iowa), the Hon.
Judge Helen C. Adams entered a scheduling and trial setting order
as follows

  -- A scheduling conference was        December 8, 2022
     conducted pursuant to
     Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 on:

  -- A Non-Jury Trial shall begin       June 24, 2024
     on:

  -- A Final Pretrial Conference        June 5, 2024
     shall be held on:

  -- Initial Disclosures shall          December 22, 2022
     be made by:

  -- Motions to add parties shall       March 17, 2023
     be filed by:

  -- Motions for leave to amend         March 17, 2023
     pleadings shall be filed by:

  -- The Plaintiffs shall move for      April 14, 2023
     class certification by:

  -- Fact discovery shall be            July 31, 2023
     completed by:
  -- The Plaintiff shall designate      August 31, 2023
     expert witnesses and disclose
     their written reports by:

  -- The Defendant shall designate      October 2, 2023
     expert witnesses and disclose
     their written reports by:

  -- The Plaintiff shall designate      November 2, 2023.
     rebuttal expert witnesses and
     disclose their written reports
     by:

  -- Expert discovery shall be          December 1, 2023
     completed by:

  -- Dispositive motions shall be       December 21, 2023
     filed by:

Hy-Vee is an employee-owned chain of supermarkets in the Midwestern
and Southern United States.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3hbyX6H at no extra charge.[CC]

HYUNDAI MOTOR: Court Provides Jarrell Leave to Amend Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Embry J. Kidd of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, grants the
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint in
the lawsuit entitled KRIS JARRELL, ROBERT BOMER, KATHLEEN FALVO,
ANTHONY JOSEPH, and NATHANIEL SEGURA, Plaintiffs v. HYUNDAI MOTOR
COMPANY, HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA LLC, and HYUNDAI MOTOR
AMERICA, Defendants, Case No. 6:22-cv-990-CEM-EJK (M.D. Fla.).

The lawsuit is a class action where the Plaintiffs seek relief from
the Defendants for their use of allegedly defective seat belts in
their vehicles.

In the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs say they are owners
of various Hyundai vehicles and are residents of Florida,
California, New York and Illinois. In turn, the Defendants filed a
Motion to Compel Arbitration based on a binding arbitration
agreement as it relates to the claims of the California Plaintiff.

Thus, on Nov. 11, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to
request leave to file an amended complaint to "significantly narrow
the claims and issues in this case" and removing the California
Plaintiff as a named Plaintiff.

Here, the deadline for filing amended pleadings was Nov. 14, 2022.
However, the Plaintiffs have shown good cause to amend their
pleading. Specifically, they seek to amend their complaint to
narrow the claims asserted. Judge Kidd recognizes that the amended
complaint necessarily impacts the adjudication of this action, as
the proposed amendment drops claims that may be subject to
arbitration. Thus, Judge Kidd finds that the Plaintiffs have
demonstrated good cause for the amendment.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs assert there was no undue delay, bad
faith, or dilatory motive in moving for leave to amend.
Furthermore, Judge Kidd finds that there are no additional reasons
to deny the amendment--no prejudice to the parties or any adverse
impact on the Court's administration of the case would result if
the amendment were granted.

Accordingly, Judge Kidd grants the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for
Leave to Amend the Complaint. The Clerk is directed to docket the
Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Class Action Complaint.

The Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration of Claims of
California Plaintiff Timothy Cordial is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Nov. 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/nctecxub from Leagle.com.


IDAHO: Must File Response to Class Certification by Jan. 4, 2023
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Dreyer, et al., v. Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-00211
(D. Idaho), the Hon. Judge David C. Nye entered an order pursuant
to informal communications between the Court and Counsel as
follows:

  -- The Defendants' Response to         January 4, 2023
     Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
     Certification is due
     on or before:

  -- The Plaintiffs' Reply               January 27, 2023
     is due on or before:

The suit alleges violation of the Civil Rights Act.[CC]

JOHN HANCOCK: Bid for Class Certification Granted in Kroetz
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SILVINA KROETZ and others
similarly situated, v. JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (U.S.A.)
and DOES 1 t0 50, inclusive, Case No. 2:20-cv-02117-TJH-RAO (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. entered an order
granting application to file under seal plaintiff's notice of
motion and motion for class certification and certain supporting
documents.

John Hancock provides insurance and financial services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 6, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3h6ufXE at no extra charge.[CC]

JSW STEEL: Polen Seeks to Conditionally Certify FLSA Collective
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JASON POLEN, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, v. JSW STEEL USA OHIO, INC.,
Case No. 2:22-cv-00085-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order pursuant to section 216(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"):

   a. Conditionally certifying the case as a collective action
      under the FLSA on behalf of Named Plaintiff and others
      similarly situated;

   b. Directing that notice be sent by United States mail and
      email to the following:

      "All current and former Ohio hourly, non-exempt production
      employees of Defendant who were paid for 40 or more hours
      of work in any workweek beginning March 3, 2019 and
      continuing through the final disposition of this case
      ("Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs");"

   c. Approving the proposed Notice and Consent to Join form;
      and

   d. Directing Defendant JSW Steel USA Ohio, Inc. to provide
      within 14 days an electronic spreadsheet in Microsoft
      Excel or comma-delimited format a roster of all
      individuals that fit the definition above that includes
      their full names, positions, dates of employment, last
      known home addresses, personal email addresses, and phone
      numbers ("Roster").

The case involves the Defendant's unlawful pay to shift policy
and/or practice (as well as Defendant's unlawful regular rate of
pay policy and/or practice). The Plaintiff has submitted
allegations and evidence that under this policy and/or practice,
Defendant requires its production employees to arrive at their
workstations prior to the scheduled start of their shifts in order
to begin the process of relieving employees from the previous
shift.

The Defendant similarly requires its production employees to work
beyond the scheduled ends of their shifts to facilitate the shift
change. Despite working before and after their scheduled shifts,
Defendant's production employees were only compensated based on
their scheduled shift, not their actual time worked ("Pay to Shift
Policy"). This Pay to Shift Policy deprived Defendant's production
employees of their hard-earned overtime pay, the lawsuit says.
JSW Steel provides rolling mills.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3YbkYhK at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          Adam C. Gedling, Esq.
          Kelsie N. Hendren, Esq.
          Tristan T. Akers, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite #126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  agedling@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  khendren@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  takers@mcoffmanlegal.com

KPS AFFILIATES: Seeks More Time to File Class Cert Response
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Monalisa Johnson-Cradle v.
KPS Affiliates Inc., PPB Inc. d/b/a Prime Protective Bureau, and
Terry English, Case No. 1:22-cv-01052-PGG-SLC (S.D.N.Y.), the
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order granting final 30-day
extension  of time to respond to the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Certification from December 7, 2022 to January 9, 2023.


The Plaintiff's counsel indicated to Defense counsel that Plaintiff
"could consent" to this extension if Defendants agreed to toll the
statute of limitations from the date Plaintiff filed the motion.
Accordingly, and accepting Plaintiff's offer, Defendants consent to
tolling the statute of limitations for the claims at issue in this
action from November 10, 2022 until January 9, 2023 in the event
the Court grants Defendants' requested extension.

By way of brief background, on November 10, 2022, the Plaintiff
filed a motion to conditionally certify this action as a class
action. On November 29, 2022, Defendants requested, and received, a
two-day extension of time to respond to Plaintiff's motion.

On November 30, 2022, Defendants filed a letter informing the Court
of the sudden and unexpected announcement of the departure of lead
defense counsel in this matter, Vincent Avery, Esq., from
FordHarrison LLP, and requested a one-week extension so that
replacement counsel can step in to review and complete a response
to Plaintiff's motion.

On December 6, 2022, the undersigned was staffed to assume
representation in this matter.

KPS Affiliates is a security agency that has provided security
services in the New York City and New Jersey area.

A copy of the Defendant's motion

dated Dec. 7, 2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3UKMxLT at no extra charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Richard Bahrenburg, Esq.
          FORDHARRISON LLP
          366 Madison Avenue, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 453-5937
          E-mail: rbahrenburg@fordharrison.com

LIBERTY MUTUAL: Denial of Schiff's Summary Judgment Bid Reversed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled STAN SCHIFF, M.D., Ph.D., on behalf of
himself and a class of similarly situated providers,
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO.
and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, foreign insurance companies,
Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, Case No. 82554-2-I, Consol. with No.
82558-5-I (Wash. App.), the Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division One, reverses the trial court's denial of Stan Schiff's
motion for summary judgment, and affirms the denial of Liberty
Mutual's motion for summary judgment.

Stephen J. Dwyer, writing for the Panel, notes that Washington's
insurance code and regulations prohibit persons engaged in the
business of insurance from engaging in unfair methods of
competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in that
business. In this state's Consumer Protection Act (CPA), the
legislature expressly provided that violations of that prohibition
subject insurers to liability pursuant to the consumer protection
law. In the first party insurance context, this Appellate Court
recently held that an insurer engages in an unfair practice in
violation of the insurance regulations and the CPA by failing to
conduct an individualized assessment of the reasonableness of a
medical provider's bill and, instead, relying solely on a
mechanistic, formulaic approach that compares charges within a
geographic area to determine if the amounts billed are reasonable.

Here, the insurer engaged in the precise conduct that the Appellate
Court had recently determined constitutes an unfair practice.
Because the Plaintiff challenging the lawfulness of the insurer's
conduct has additionally established the other elements of a CPA
claim, the Appellate Court concludes that he is entitled to entry
of summary judgment on that claim.

In addition, the Appellate Court rejects the insurer's assertion
that it is exempt from liability for this conduct pursuant to the
CPA's exemption provision. Such a reading of that provision would
contravene the legislature's clear intent that an insurer is
subject to CPA liability for actions prohibited by the insurance
code and regulations.

Moreover, because there is no "good faith" defense to the claim
presented here, the Appellate Court additionally rejects the
insurer's contention that such a defense shields it from liability.
Accordingly, the Appellate Court concludes that the insurer is
subject to CPA liability for the unfair practice challenged.

Stan Schiff, M.D., Ph.D., is a neurologist, who practices in
Shoreline. Schiff sometimes treats patients insured by Liberty
Mutual personal injury protection (PIP) and "med pay" automobile
insurance policies. Schiff submitted to Liberty Mutual two bills
for treating its insureds, in September 2015 and October 2016, that
the insurer did not pay in full. Instead, Liberty Mutual, pursuant
to the applicable insurance policy language, determined that the
full amount of the charges was not "reasonable." To make this
determination, the insurer relied solely on the FAIR Health
database, a computer database that compares billed charges to the
charges submitted by other medical providers within the same broad
geographical area. Because the charges billed by Schiff exceeded
the 80th percentile of charges in the FAIR Health database for the
same services within the same geographical area, Liberty Mutual
reduced its payment on the bills to the 80th percentile amount (the
80th percentile practice).

In May 2017, Schiff filed a class action lawsuit against Liberty
Mutual, asserting that the insurer's 80th percentile practice
violates provisions of Washington's insurance code and insurance
regulations defining unfair claims settlement practices. Schiff
further asserted that the 80th percentile practice constitutes an
unfair act pursuant to the CPA. In the complaint, he requested
certification of the class, an award of actual damages to be
established at trial, an award of treble damages pursuant to the
CPA, and an award of attorney fees and costs, prejudgment interest,
and reasonable litigation expenses. He subsequently amended his
complaint to additionally request that the trial court enjoin
Liberty Mutual from continuing to reduce the amount paid on medical
providers' bills using the 80th percentile practice.

In January 2020, the trial court ruled that an Oregon class action
settlement agreement and the judgment approving that agreement (the
Froeber settlement) barred Schiff from asserting the class action
and injunctive relief claims pleaded in his complaint; Froeber v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 193 P.3d 999 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Froeber v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 2003 WL 25854983 (Circuit Court of Oregon,
Marion County). However, the trial court ruled that the Froeber
settlement does not bar Schiff from pursuing the individual CPA
claim for monetary damages based on the September 2015 and October
2016 billing incidents. Thus, the trial court dismissed Schiff's
"class action claims and injunctive claims" and denied his motion
for class certification.

Mr. Schiff thereafter filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on CPA liability, asserting that Liberty Mutual's 80th percentile
practice violates the CPA as a matter of law pursuant to this
Appellate Court's decision in Folweiler Chiropractic, PS v. Am.
Fam. Ins. Co., 5 Wn. App. 2d 829, 429 P.3d 813 (2018). In its
response in opposition to Schiff's motion, Liberty Mutual asserted
that, even if the challenged practice violates the CPA, his claim
is barred by so-called "safe harbor" and "good faith" affirmative
defenses.

In February 2020, the trial court ruled that it was undisputed, on
the current record, "that Liberty Mutual did not do the kind of
individualized investigation" required by the Appellate Court's
Folweiler decision. The trial court, nevertheless, denied Schiff's
motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that disputed facts
remained regarding the defenses asserted by Liberty Mutual.

In June 2020, in response to Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss
Schiff's third amended complaint, the trial court again ruled that
the Froeber settlement bars him from asserting CPA class action and
injunctive relief claims. The trial court thus ruled, for a second
time, that he can pursue only his individual CPA claims for
monetary relief allegedly sustained as a result of the September
2015 and October 2016 billing incidents. The trial court denied
Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment regarding Schiff's
individual claims.

The parties, thereafter, filed the cross motions for summary
judgment that are the basis of this discretionary review. In a
hearing on the motions, the trial court ruled that issues of fact
remained regarding Liberty Mutual's asserted affirmative defenses.
Accordingly, on April 8, 2021, the trial court denied the parties'
motions for summary judgment.

Both Mr. Schiff and Liberty Mutual filed motions for discretionary
review of the trial court's April 2021 orders. The Appellate
Court's commissioner granted the parties' motions. The commissioner
ruled that, to the extent the parties disagreed regarding the
appropriate scope of review, they could present such argument in
their merits briefing.

Mr. Schiff asserts that Liberty Mutual's 80th percentile bill
review practice constitutes an unfair practice pursuant to the CPA.
This is so, he contends, because the practice violates provisions
of the insurance code and regulations promulgated by the insurance
commissioner. Liberty Mutual disagrees, asserting that its practice
was approved by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC),
and, thus, that this Court's Folweiler decision is inapplicable. In
addition, Liberty Mutual contends that Schiff has not demonstrated
the injury and causation elements of his CPA claim.

Judge Dwyer finds that Schiff's analysis of the questions presented
is the more compelling. The undisputed and pertinent facts indicate
that Liberty Mutual's 80th percentile practice is indistinguishable
from the practice the Appellate Court held unlawful in the
Folweiler decision. Because the Appellate Court also concludes that
the additional elements of Schiff's individual CPA claim have been
established, Schiff is entitled to summary judgment for liability
on that claim.

Liberty Mutual asserts that, even if the challenged conduct
constitutes an unfair practice, that conduct is exempt from CPA
liability pursuant to the statute's regulated industries exemption,
RCW 19.86.170. According to Liberty Mutual, because insurers are
prohibited from issuing insurance policies prior to obtaining
regulatory approval of those policies, conduct arising therefrom is
"permitted" pursuant to the CPA's exemption provision. Thus, this
argument goes, RCW 19.86.170 exempts any such conduct from CPA
liability.

This argument, however, is contrary to the legislature's clear
mandate--within that very statutory provision--that violations of
the insurance regulations are subject to CPA liability, Judge Dwyer
opines. Liberty Mutual's assertion is also contrary to Washington
decisional authority interpreting the pertinent statutory
provision. Accordingly, the Appellate Court finds Liberty Mutual's
argument unavailing.

Judge Dwyer holds that Schiff has established that Liberty Mutual's
80th percentile practice constitutes an unfair practice pursuant to
the CPA. Schiff has additionally established the other four
elements of his CPA claim. Liberty Mutual is incorrect that it is
shielded from liability for its unlawful conduct based on the CPA's
exemption provision or a purported "good faith" affirmative
defense.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court reverses the trial court's denial
of Schiff's motion for summary judgment, and it affirms the trial
court's denial of Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Nov. 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/46ma5vfx from Leagle.com.

Philip Albert Talmadge -- phil@tal-fitzlaw.com --
Talmadge/Fitzpatrick, 2775 Harbor Ave. SW, Third Floor, Suite C, in
Seattle, Washington 98126-2138; John Michael Silk -- silk@wscd.com
-- Wilson Smith Cochran Dickerson, 1000 Second Ave., Suite 2050, in
Seattle, Washington 98104; James Morsch, Butler Rubin Saltarelli &
Boyd LLP, 70 West Madison Street, Suite 1800, Chicago, Illinois
60602-4257; Marc Fuller, Vinson and Elkins, 2001 Ross Ave., Suite
3700, in Dallas, Texas 75201-2975, Counsel for the
Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

David Elliot Breskin -- dbreskin@bjtlegal.com -- Breskin Johnson &
Townsend PLLC, 1000 2nd Ave., Suite 3670, in Seattle, Washington
98104-1053; Cynthia J. Heidelberg -- cheidelberg@bjtlegal.com --
Breskin, Johnson & Townsend, 1000 2nd Ave., Suite 3670, in Seattle,
Washington 98104-1053, Counsel for the Respondent/Cross-Appellant.


LOUISIANA: Court Denies Bid to Supplement Record in Lewis v. Cain
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH LEWIS, JR., ET AL. v. BURL CAIN, ET AL., Civil
Docket No. 15-318-SDD-RLB (M.D. La.), Judge Shelly D. Dick of the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana denies the
Defendants' Motion to Supplement the Record and Admit Certain
Evidence of Current Conditions.

The lawsuit is a class action case alleging unconstitutional
medical care provided at Louisiana State Penitentiary ("LSP") as
well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") at the prison. The Court
bifurcated the case into separate liability and remedial phases.
Following a trial on liability, it found that aspects of the
medical care at LSP violated the Eighth Amendment and found
violations of the ADA and RA.3 The Court held a remedy phase trial
in the matter from June 6, 2022 through June 17, 2022.

Prior to the remedy trial, the Court set several discovery
deadlines and ultimately ordered that remedial discovery was closed
as of April 1, 2022. Nevertheless, the Defendants moved to
introduce remedial evidence beyond April 1, 2022. Cognizant of its
previous order that it would credit LSP at the remedy phase with
post-liability trial remedial conduct, the Court allowed the
Defendants to offer some evidence of prison changes occurring
beyond the discovery cutoff, but that was only because such
evidence was disclosed to the Plaintiffs ten days prior to trial,
and the Plaintiffs had enough time to prepare for this evidence and
an opportunity to rebut the evidence at trial. The Court did not
reopen discovery, nor did it suggest that the record remained open
or that remedial evidence developed after the parties rested their
respective cases at the remedy trial would be considered.

In support of their motion, the Defendants argue that some of the
Plaintiffs' claims for relief are now moot based on the new
evidence it seek to offer such that there remains no case or
controversy for the Court to decide. They seek to offer evidence
of: (1) LSP's re-accreditation by the American Correctional
Association, (2) LSP's hiring additional medical providers, and (3)
LSP's implementation of electronic healthcare records. They argue
these matters are significant, undisputable, and should be
considered by the Court prior to ruling.

The Plaintiffs oppose the Defendants' motion on several grounds.
Among other things, they note that, in the Court's prior ruling, it
found that the facts of Valentine were distinguished from the facts
of the case. They argue that Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270,
282 (5th Cir. 2021) and Dockery v. Cain are distinguishable from
the case, and following the Defendants' interpretation of these
cases would upend the orderly disposition of the case, render
evidentiary and briefing deadlines meaningless, and empower the
Defendants to indefinitely defer resolution, prolonging the
duration for which class members are forced to suffer
unconstitutional care.

Alternatively, the Plaintiffs urge the Court to deny the
Defendants' motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP") and the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"). They contend
that this new evidence should be inadmissible under FRCP 37(c)
because the Defendants have not complied with FRCP 26(e)(1).
Finally, the Plaintiffs contend most of the Defendants' evidence
should be excluded under FRE 802 as hearsay.

Judge Dick rules that the law is well settled that the Court has
the discretion to manage discovery and litigation. The suggestion
by the Defendants that they may disregard the discovery orders of
this Court and submit any evidence they wish "up to judgment,"
without regard to the Court's wide discretion to manage discovery,
does not comport with the jurisprudence discussed.

Judge Dick also finds that the parties are "lost in the weeds." In
her view, this does not present a discovery issue at all. Evidence
is closed and the matter is submitted. The time for discovery has
long passed. If the record remains open to new evidence until the
ink is dry on the final judgment, then Title V of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is rendered meaningless.

If conditions have changed post-trial but pre-judgment, logic and
order are not simply suspended. Rather, an orderly administration
of controversies seeking prospective relief call for the Court to
rule on the relief requested as of the close of the evidence. If
injunctive relief is ordered and the defendant cures the
deficiencies, in whole or in part, then relief from the injunction
is appropriate.

Finally, Judge Dick says the issue is not just whether Defendants
have taken the post-trial actions they claim but whether those
actions are actually remedial of the constitutional violations. At
this point in the litigation, the Plaintiffs do not have time to
both meet their post-trial briefing deadline and investigate
whether the Defendants' purported changes remedy or moot certain
claims. Thus, she finds that this post-trial evidence is untimely
and inadmissible under FRCP 37 and is more prejudicial than
probative under and FRE 403.

For these reasons, the Defendants' Motion to Supplement is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Ruling is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mtr64zpe from Leagle.com.


MARRIOTT INT'L: Must Add Briefing on Affirmative Defense in Hall
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD HALL, KEVIN BRANCA, and GEORGE ABDELSAYED
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 19cv1715-JO-AHG (S.D. Cal.), Judge Jinsook Ohta
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
requests supplemental briefing regarding Marriott's affirmative
defense.

In this consumer class action brought by Lead Plaintiffs Hall and
Abdelsayed against Marriott, the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment. The Lead Plaintiffs also filed a motion to
certify the class.

To aid the Court in deciding these pending motions, Judge Ohta
requests supplemental briefing regarding Marriott's affirmative
defense that some or all of the putative class agreed to a class
action waiver.

The supplemental briefing will address the following: (1) what
evidence is in the record that Lead Plaintiffs had notice of
Marriott's terms and conditions; (2) what evidence would be
relevant to determining whether putative class members had notice
of Marriott's terms and conditions; (3) what portion of the
putative class would be subject to this affirmative defense; (4)
whether Marriott, if it has waived this affirmative defense with
respect to Lead Plaintiffs, has also waived with respect to the
remainder of the putative class; (5) whether Lead Plaintiffs are
typical and adequate class representatives if they are not subject
to this affirmative defense but other members of the putative class
are.

The parties will submit simultaneous briefing on the above issues
on Dec. 20, 2022. The briefing will be limited to 15 pages per
submission.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/33379nfv from Leagle.com.


META PLATFORMS: Summary Judgment in dotStrategy Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned DOTSTRATEGY CO., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v.
META PLATFORMS, INC., FKA Facebook, Inc., Defendant-Appellee, Case
No. 21-17056 (9th Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirms the summary judgment issued in favor of
Facebook.

The putative class action by dotStrategy Co. claims that Facebook,
Inc. violated the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") through
misleading representations about its advertising charges. Two kinds
of charges are at issue: (1) "click-based" charges, under which
dotStrategy paid a fee for each click on its advertisements, and
(2) "impression-based" charges, under which dotStrategy paid a fee
for each one-thousand occasions that an advertisement was displayed
to a Facebook account.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Facebook--finding "no genuine dispute that Facebook's invalid
clicks statement was anything but true in our case" and that
"Facebook never represented that it would not charge for invalid
impressions."

Reviewing the summary judgment de novo and the district court's
denial of class certification for abuse of discretion, the Court of
Appeals affirms.

dotStrategy ran only two click-based ad campaigns, and the district
court correctly found that there is absolutely nothing in the
record suggesting that Facebook charged the Plaintiff for a click
by a fake account in either of these two campaigns. Thus, the Court
of Appeals holds that there was no evidence that Facebook's
allegedly misleading statement was anything but true, and the
statement did not violate the UCL.

The Court of Appeals finds there was no abuse of discretion here.
The district court reasonably stated that dotStrategy cannot expect
that Facebook's otherwise meritorious motion should be deferred
indefinitely because it is 'plausible' that Facebook will find some
evidence of nominal harm to the Plaintiff. Moreover, dotStrategy
stipulated to forgo any further fact or expert discovery in the
case unless and until the appellate court reverses or vacates the
district court's order denying class certification.

Because the district court properly granted summary judgment on
dotStrategy's claims, it also did not abuse its discretion in
denying class certification for the proposed classes, the Court of
Appeals holds.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Nov. 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2wt8hmwp from Leagle.com.


MYLAN NV: Appeals Document Production Ruling in KPH Healthcare Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
MYLAN N.V., et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in
the lawsuit entitled KPH HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a/k/a KINNEY
DRUGS INC., FWK HOLDINGS LLC, and CESAR CASTILLO, LLC, individually
and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MYLAN,
N.V., MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., MYLAN SPECIALTY L.P., PFIZER,
INC., KING PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and MERIDIAN MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-02065-DDC-TJJ, in
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas-Kansas
City.

The complaint is a class action against the Defendants for
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Plaintiff, seeking
to represent direct purchasers of an epinephrine auto-injector
called EpiPen, filed the Complaint against the Defendants due to
unlawful monopolization in the market for EpiPen, which led to the
purchase of the product at a higher price.

In August 2017, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
created MDL 2785, In re: EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP)
Marketing, Sales Practices and Antitrust Litigation. And, the JPML
assigned that MDL to Judge Daniel D. Crabtree. The MDL involves
cases brought by end-payors of the EpiPen who assert claims of
anticompetitive conduct or unfair methods of competition against
Mylan N.V., Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Mylan Specialty, L.P.,
Mylan Inc., Heather Bresch, Pfizer, Inc., King Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., and Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. arising from their
manufacture, marketing, and sales of the EpiPen.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sep. 6, 2022,
Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James of the District Kansas granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production
of Documents.

On Nov. 25, 2021, following Mylan's production to the Plaintiffs of
the documents the Defendants had produced in the MDL, the
Plaintiffs served their First Set of Document Requests to Mylan. In
conjunction with these requests, they have identified four new
custodians and 18 new search strings, and have asked Mylan to
produce documents created after 2016, which was the cutoff for
Mylan's document production in the MDL. Mylan has declined these
requests. In addition to seeking an order compelling Mylan to
comply with their discovery requests, the Plaintiffs challenge
certain entries on Mylan's MDL privilege log.

Based on the parties' efforts, Judge James found they have complied
with the requirements of D. Kan. R. 37.2. She granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants'
Responses to Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production of Document.
Specifically, the motion was (1) granted insofar as it seeks an
order requiring Mylan to search for and produce relevant and
responsive documents through the present, except for those
categories the Plaintiffs have noted; (2) granted insofar as it
seeks an order requiring Mylan is to collect documents from Joseph
Carrado, Satish Medakkar, Kim Brooks, and Ron Graybill; (3) granted
insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan to apply the search
strings proposed by the Plaintiffs; (4) granted insofar as it seeks
an order requiring Mylan to produce documents shared between Pfizer
and Mylan that were created before July 2013 and appear on its
privilege log; and (5) denied insofar as it seeks an order
requiring Mylan to produce the 1,493 documents on its privilege log
described by the Plaintiffs.

The Defendants seek a review of this order by Judge James.

The appellate case is captioned as Mylan N.V., et al. v. KPH
Healthcare Services, Inc., et al., Case No. 22-604, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, filed on November
28, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that
miscellaneous response is due on December 9, 2022 for Cesar
Castillo, LLC, KPH Healthcare Services, Inc. and FWK Holdings,
LLC.[BN]

Defendants-Petitioners MYLAN N.V., et al., are represented by:

          Justin Bernick, Esq.
          Carolyn Anne DeLone, Esq.
          David M. Foster, Esq.
          Michael D. Gendall, Esq.
          Adam K. Levin, Esq.
          Charles A. Loughlin, Esq.
          Christine A. Sifferman, Esq.
          HOGAN LOVELLS
          555 Thirteenth Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 637-5600

               - and -

          Brian Christopher Fries, Esq.
          LATHROP GPM
          2345 Grand Boulevard, Suite 2200
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 292-2000

Plaintiffs-Respondents KPH HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., AKA Kinney
Drugs, Inc., et al., are represented by:

          Eric David Barton, Esq.
          Thomas P. Cartmell, Esq.
          Tyler W. Hudson, Esq.
          WAGSTAFF & CARTMELL
          4740 Grand Avenue, Suite 300
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 701-1100

               - and -

          Sarah E. DeLoach, Esq.
          Michael L. Roberts, Esq.
          Erich Paul Schork, Esq.
          ROBERTS LAW FIRM
          20 Rahling Circle
          Little Rock, AR 72223
          Telephone: (501) 821-5575

               - and -

          Dianne M. Nast, Esq.
          NASTLAW
          1101 Market Street, Suite 2801
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 923-9300

               - and -

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036

               - and -

          Bradley Wilders, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON
          460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 714-7100

MYLAN NV: Court Grants in Part Bid to Compel Discovery in KPH Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas grants in part and denies in part the Mylan
Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs in the
lawsuit captioned KPH HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a/k/a KINNEY DRUGS
INC., FWK HOLDINGS LLC, and CESAR CASTILLO, LLC, individually and
on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MYLAN,
N.V., MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., MYLAN SPECIALTY L.P., PFIZER,
INC., KING PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and MERIDIAN MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-02065-DDC-TJJ (D.
Kan.).

Mylan seeks an order requiring the Plaintiffs to amend certain of
their responses and produce documents responsive to Mylan's First
Set of Document Requests to All Plaintiffs, and to amend certain of
their responses to Mylan's First Set of Interrogatories to All
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

On April 1, 2022, Mylan served its First Set of Documents Requests
to All Plaintiffs and its First Set of Interrogatories to All
Plaintiffs. Mylan's requests for production ("RFPs") included 57
directed to all Plaintiffs, as well as additional requests directed
to each of the three individual Plaintiffs. Mylan directed 18
Interrogatories to Plaintiff KPH, 17 to Plaintiff FWK, and 15 to
Plaintiff Cesar Castillo, LLC. Each Plaintiff timely responded. The
parties met and conferred several times during the following weeks,
resulting in the Plaintiffs amending and supplementing their
responses to certain Interrogatories.

Although the parties also addressed their differences over certain
RFPs during their conferral process, as of the filing of this
motion, the Plaintiffs had produced no documents responsive to any
RFP.

Mylan recounts the parties' efforts to resolve their differences
through numerous exchanges of written correspondence over several
weeks. Ultimately, the parties reached an impasse and this motion
followed. Based on the parties' efforts, the Court finds they have
complied with the requirements of D. Kan. R. 37.2.

Mylan organizes its motion by discussing the Plaintiffs' common
objections to each of the six general categories of the discovery
at issue. The Plaintiffs' original response included objections
that: (1) Mylan's downstream discovery requests are irrelevant as a
matter of law and unduly burdensome; (2) requests focused on the
typicality of FWK's claims and FWK's adequacy to serve as a class
representative are irrelevant; (3) discovery related to KPH's
status as McKesson's assignee is privileged; (4) requests seeking
documents relating to communications the Plaintiffs have had with
the parties, counsel, or retained experts in In re: EpiPen
(Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing, Sales Practices and
Antitrust Litigation, No. 17-md-2785 (D. Kan.) ("the MDL") or in
another direct purchaser action pending in the District of
Minnesota ("the Minnesota case") regarding EpiPen or any action or
potential claims or defenses in this action, are privileged; and
(5) requests to KPH regarding its assignment from McKesson and to
FWK seeking transcripts of deposition testimony from FWK relating
to another putative class action are confidential.

Mylan retains its challenges to these objections and although the
Plaintiffs have withdrawn certain objections, Mylan asks the Court
to order the Plaintiffs' compliance. Finally, it seeks supplemental
answers to certain interrogatories to which it contends the
Plaintiffs have not fully responded. The Plaintiffs agree to
supplement an interrogatory to FWK, maintain objections to an
interrogatory to Castillo, and argue they have sufficiently
answered interrogatories posed to all Plaintiffs.

Judge James notes that the Plaintiffs' response reflects their
agreement to withdraw certain objections, produce responsive
documents, and provide a privilege log. The following areas of
dispute remain following the parties' efforts to narrow and resolve
their differences:

   A. Downstream Discovery. Mylan served 15 RFPs to all
      Plaintiffs, which it describes as being tailored to the
      goal of discovering evidence relevant to whether the
      Plaintiffs' interests conflict with the interest of other
      putative class members.

      The Court overrules Plaintiffs' Downstream Discovery
      Objection to RFP Nos. 26, 27, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44-51, and
      73. In addition, the Court overrules Plaintiff FWK's
      objection to Interrogatory No. 17 for the same reasons;

   B. RFP No. 54 to all Plaintiffs. This request seeks all
      documents relating to any communications the Plaintiffs
      have had with the parties, counsel, or retained experts in
      the MDL or in the Minnesota case.

      The Court finds the Plaintiffs have not waived the
      work-product objection raised in their initial response to
      this request. But as Mylan appropriately notes, the
      Plaintiffs must include in their privilege log all
      appropriate information for documents they claim are
      protected by the work-product doctrine;

   C. RFP No. 74 to FWK. This request seeks all transcripts of
      deposition testimony by FWK relating to the putative
      class-action it filed in In re Intuniv Antitrust
      Litigation, No. 1:16-CV-12653 (D. Mass.).

      The Court agrees that FWK abandoned its objection based on
      relevance. But even if not abandoned, the Court would
      overrule the objection because the Intuniv court found FWK
      to be an inadequate class representative, citing FWK's
      deposition testimony. Accordingly, the requested deposition
      testimony is relevant to Mylan's assessment of whether FWK
      is an adequate class representative. The Court overrules
      FWK's objections to RFP No. 74;

   D. Interrogatory No. 1 to FWK. This interrogatory directs the
      Plaintiffs to identify all persons with knowledge of the
      events, facts, or circumstances alleged in the Complaint.
      Plaintiff FWK refused to identify anyone with relevant
      knowledge who was previously employed by its assignor,
      Kerr. But in the meet-and-confer process, the Plaintiffs
      agreed they will identify Ralph Young, Kerr's
      pharmaceutical buyer, as an individual with relevant
      knowledge.

      The Court agrees the Plaintiffs' representation is
      ambiguous. Even though FWK abandoned its original response,
      in its supplemental responses to Interrogatory No. 1, it
      will identify all individuals with knowledge of the events,
      fact, or circumstances alleged in the Complaint;

   E. Interrogatory Nos. 10 and 11 to all Plaintiffs. These
      interrogatories address the date on which all the
      Plaintiffs' alleged damages began.

      The Court agrees that the Plaintiffs may defer further
      supplementation of their answer to Interrogatory No. 10,
      but reminds the Plaintiffs of their duty to supplement as
      they learn more responsive information.

      With respect to Interrogatory No. 11, the Court agrees the
      answer to when Teva would have launched its generic EpiPen
      in the but-for-world is in the province of the Plaintiffs'
      expert testimony. The Plaintiffs will answer this
      interrogatory at the completion of discovery;

   F. Interrogatory Nos. 15 and 16 to KPH. These interrogatories
      request information and documents relating to the
      assignment of claims from McKesson to KPH. The Plaintiffs
      have agreed to provide any non-privileged information, to
      the extent there is any, responsive to these
      interrogatories, and to log privileged documents.

      The Court has no reason to believe the Plaintiffs will not
      fully respond, and will not speculate about what
      information is available and within the Plaintiffs'
      knowledge and control; and

   G. Interrogatory No. 15 to Castillo. This interrogatory asks
      Plaintiff Castillo to describe its bases for voluntarily
      dismissing the claims it filed against Mylan in 2017.

      The Court finds the interrogatory seeks information
      relevant to Mylan's statute of limitations defense insofar
      as it reflects Castillo was not diligent in pursuing its
      claims. And the Plaintiffs have provided no basis for
      objections of undue burden or lack of proportionality. The
      Plaintiffs have agreed to supplement Castillo's answer to
      this interrogatory to include additional information. To
      the extent the interrogatory seeks protected work-product
      information, however, the Court will not compel Castillo to
      produce documents but expects the Plaintiffs to properly
      enter the identifying information on its privilege log.

The Plaintiffs have withdrawn their objections to several discovery
requests included in Mylan's motion, thereby, obviating the need
for a ruling. In addition, the Plaintiffs have agreed to prepare a
privilege log for documents they claim are subject to protection.
This includes the following:

   * RFP Nos. 69, 70, and 75-77 to FWK (withdrawing objection to
     relevance);

   * RFP Nos. 58-59 to KPH (withdrawing confidentiality objection
     and will prepare privilege log);

   * RFP Nos. 63-64 to KPH (will prepare privilege log); and

   * RFP Nos. 60-61 to KPH (will prepare privilege log).

Judge James, therefore, ordered that the Mylan Defendants' Motion
to Compel Discovery From Plaintiffs is granted in part and denied
in part. The Plaintiffs will produce responsive documents and a
complete privilege log within thirty (30) days of the date of this
order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/hkjunmae from
Leagle.com.


NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: District Court Dismisses Appeal in Homaidan Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Eric Komitee of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York dismissed Navient's appeal in the lawsuit
styled NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC and NAVIENT CREDIT FINANCE
CORPORATION, Appellants v. HILAL K. HOMAIDAN and REEHAM YOUSSEF, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellees,
HILAL K. HOMAIDAN and REEHAM YOUSSEF, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SALLIE MAE, INC.,
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC, and NAVIENT CREDIT FINANCE CORPORATION,
Defendants, Case No. 22-CV-6316(EK), Adversary Proceeding No.
17-AP-1085(ESS) (E.D.N.Y.).

Navient Solutions, LLC and Navient Credit Finance Corporation
("Navient"), defendants in an adversary proceeding in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York, appeal Judge
Elizabeth Stong's recent decision granting a preliminary injunction
against them. This Court previously denied Navient's request for
leave to appeal a temporary restraining order ("TRO") issued
against them.

Navient services education loans. Congress has made certain kinds
of education loans non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. A "private"
education loan like the ones at issue here -- i.e., a loan that is
not guaranteed by the federal government -- is a non-dischargeable
"qualified education loan" only if it was incurred "solely to pay
qualified higher education expenses," which are defined as the cost
of attendance at an eligible educational institution (with certain
adjustments, such as for scholarships).

When making such loans, Navient did not, apparently, endeavor to
verify that the loan amount did not exceed the cost of attendance;
instead, it obtained -- and allegedly relied on -- the borrowers'
representations to that effect.

Appellees Hilal Homaidan and Reeham Youssef filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy protection in 2008 and 2013, respectively; they each
obtained orders discharging their pre-petition debts. According to
Navient, those orders noted only that "the debtor is granted a
discharge," without specifying which debts (including loans) were
covered. After Navient continued to seek payment of their education
loans, Homaidan and Youssef moved to reopen their Chapter 7
proceedings and commenced an adversary proceeding, on behalf of a
putative class, against Navient, In re Hilal Homaidan, No.
08-48275, (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2017).

In that adversary proceeding -- from which this putative appeal
comes -- the Appellees seek a declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and damages for Navient's alleged violations of the
discharge injunctions. They allege that Navient has continued to
seek to collect private education loan debts, despite knowing that
such debts were discharged. Those private loans fell within the
discharge orders, the Appellees contend, because they were
dischargeable: they either were not made solely for, or they
exceeded, the "cost of attendance" and, therefore, are not
qualified education loans under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(8)(B)
(which are non-dischargeable).

The Appellees initially moved for a preliminary injunction before
the Bankruptcy Court in December 2019. That motion was still
pending when the Appellees moved for a TRO in April 2022. After
briefing and argument, the Bankruptcy Court entered a TRO on July
8, 2022 (TRO, No. 17-AP-1085 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2022)). The
TRO, which went into effect on September 6, restrained Navient
"from taking any acts to collect on Tuition Answer Loans held by
the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members, as the class is
described in the Amended Complaint, that exceed the cost of
attendance as defined by Internal Revenue Code Section 221(d), and
that have an outstanding balance subject to collection." Navient
sought leave to appeal the TRO, which Judge Komitee denied (Navient
Sols., LLC v. Homaidan, No. 22-CV-4398 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2022)).
The Bankruptcy Court extended the TRO, with Navient's consent,
through Oct. 14, 2022.

In the meantime, the Bankruptcy Court called for supplemental
briefing and held argument on the Appellees' motion for a
preliminary injunction. On October 17, Judge Stong entered the
Preliminary Injunction, effective immediately, enjoining Navient on
the same terms specified in the TRO, pending further order of that
court. Navient timely sought leave for this appeal; the Appellees
oppose such leave. Navient also asked the Bankruptcy Court to stay
the Preliminary Injunction pending appeal; Judge Stong denied that
motion on November 2.

The Appellees' motions for class certification and summary judgment
remain pending before the Bankruptcy Court.

The parties disagree (again) whether Navient's appeal comes as a
matter of right or requires leave of the Court. Judge Komitee
concludes that leave to appeal is required under 28 U.S.C. Section
158(a), and for the reasons below, deny such leave.

Navient advances two arguments why its appeal should be heard as of
right: First, Navient asserts, the Preliminary Injunction is
effectively a "final" order that warrants appellate review under
Section 158(a)(1). Alternatively, Navient argues that Section
158(c)(2) directs the Court to follow the rule set out in 28 U.S.C.
Section 1292(a)(1), which establishes appellate jurisdiction as of
right over preliminary injunctions. Neither argument, however,
carries the day, Judge Komitee holds.

The Preliminary Injunction is not a final order under Section
158(a)(1), Judge Komitee holds. The Preliminary Injunction at issue
here does not satisfy even this "more flexible" standard of
finality. The Preliminary Injunction is, thus, a "non-final"
interlocutory order.

Judge Komitee also holds that Section 158(c)(2) does not provide
for appeal as of right under Section 1292(a). For these reasons,
Navient requires leave of the court to bring the instant appeal.

Leave to appeal is not justified, however, because Navient again
fails to demonstrate how an immediate decision would "materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," Judge Komitee
opines, citing 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).

As with their request for leave to appeal the TRO, Navient does not
explain, in any meaningful way, how appellate review here would
substantially accelerate the path to a trial or other disposition,
Judge Komitee states. Even if -- hypothetically speaking -- Judge
Komitee were to determine that bankruptcy courts lack the power to
police the discharge orders issued by other districts, this
litigation would continue apace as to debtors, who received
discharge orders in this district.

For these reasons, Judge Komitee concludes that Navient has failed
to meet its burden of demonstrating that an appeal on the
nationwide injunction question, even if successful, would
materially advance the ultimate termination of the case.

Mandamus review is a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for
really extraordinary causes, Judge Komitee notes. Navient has not
persuasively explained why it is entitled to this extraordinary
remedy, and the Court will not grant it here.

For these reasons, Navient's motion for leave to appeal the
Preliminary Injunction, or alternatively for mandamus review, is
denied. This appeal is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum & Order dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4np9mrnu from
Leagle.com.


NISSAN NORTH: E.D. California Grants Bid to Dismiss Lux Global Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California grants without leave to amend the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the lawsuit entitled LUX GLOBAL AUTO
SALES, a California corporation, and MARIA VELARDE, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NISSAN
NORTH AMERICA, INC., and DOES 1 to 10, Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-02157-JAM-AC (E.D. Cal.).

Lux Global Auto Sales and Maria Velarde filed this lawsuit against
Nissan North America, Inc., and various fictitious persons
(collectively "Defendants") for allegedly violating Section 17200
of California's Business and Professions Code--also known as
California's Unfair Competition Law. Thereafter, Lux Global Auto
Sales voluntarily dismissed its claim against the Defendants
without prejudice. Velarde maintained her claims and the Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss and request for judicial notice.

The Plaintiff filed this suit because of the Defendants' alleged
failures to comply with the California Emissions Warranty. Under
this Warranty, car manufacturers--like the Defendants--must provide
additional coverage for specific components of Super Ultra Low
Emissions Vehicles ("SULEV") if the California Air Resources Board
issued them non-methane organic gases or vehicle equivalent
credits. Such parts are generally covered for eight years or
100,000 miles; high-mileage parts are covered for 112,500 miles
(collectively referred to as "Extended Coverage").

According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants concocted a scheme to
deprive Nissan SULEV owners of these protections by unilaterally
defining and wrongfully limiting the parts that should properly be
identified as parts covered by the Warranty and covered for the
Extended Coverage period. The Plaintiff argues the Defendants'
supposed mischaracterizations enables them to curb the costs of its
warranty-related repairs because most if not all dealerships or
customers will not investigate or understand what components should
actually and correctly be covered under the Warranty.

The Plaintiff asserts the Defendants' supposed scheme is
demonstrated by their refusal to provide Extended Coverage to SULEV
transmissions, pointing to her own experience as evidence. She owns
a 2019 Nissan Sentra--a SULEV vehicle. In 2019, prior to being
driven for 100,000 miles or in use for eight years, the Plaintiff's
vehicle exhibited "classic symptoms" of "transmission slipping" as
it would shake and hesitate upon acceleration.

Because of these issues, the Plaintiff contacted the Defendants and
was informed her transmission was not under warranty. Since the
Defendants denied the Plaintiff assistance, she took her vehicle to
a local repair shop and "paid thousands of dollars out of pocket to
have the transmission repairs performed." She argues the Warranty's
Extended Coverage should have encompassed these repairs because the
transmission's malfunctioning increased the vehicle's emission
output--which the Plaintiff argues triggers such coverage pursuant
to California Code of Regulations' Title 13 Sections 1961(a)(8),
2035, 2037, and 2038.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff initiated this diversity
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2)(A) and filed her
First Amended Complaint ("FAC") consisting of one claim under
Section 17200 of California's Business and Professions Code--also
known as California's Unfair Competition Law.

The Defendants ask the Court take judicial notice of the Order and
Judgment Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and
Settlement Agreement entered in Weckwerth v. Nissan North America,
Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-00588 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 10, 2020). The Court
grants the Defendants' request. The Court's judicial notice,
however, extends only to the existence of these documents and not
to their substance to the extent it is disputed or irrelevant.

The parties dispute whether the doctrine of res judicata (or claim
preclusion) bars the Plaintiff's claim.

Given the caselaw, the Court finds res judicata's elements
satisfied. First, although the legal theory and grounds for
recovery regarding Plaintiff's claim differ from those underlying
the Weckwerth Judgment, the two cases share an "identity of claims"
because they both concern the warranty of the Plaintiff's
transmission. Second, the Weckwerth court gave final approval to
the parties' class action settlement, which meets the 'final on the
merits' element of res judicata" and is as conclusive a bar as a
judgment rendered after trial. In turn, the Weckwerth Judgment has
a preclusive effect on the released claims described--such as the
Plaintiff's. Third, because the Plaintiff is a member of the
Weckwerth class, the parties in this case overlap with those in
Weckwerth and the Plaintiff is bound by the judgment in that class
action.

Because all three elements are met, the Court agrees with the
Defendants that res judicata bars the Plaintiff's claim.
Furthermore, under federal law, any modification or appeal of this
judgment lies with the Weckwerth court.

As a result, the Court declines to address the Plaintiff's
contention that the Weckwerth Judgment contravenes public policy
and is, accordingly, unenforceable. Lastly, because the Court finds
res judicata precludes the Plaintiff's claim, the Court finds the
Defendants' remaining 12(b)(6) arguments moot and need not address
them.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Plaintiff's claim. Dismissal
is with prejudice as amendment would be futile.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Nov. 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/kd43fr9k from Leagle.com.


PEOPLES BANK: Discovery in Mays Suit Stayed Over Dismissal Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PATRICK MAYS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PEOPLES BANK, Defendant, Civil
Action No. 2-22-cv-00418 (S.D.W. Va.), Judge John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Charleston, grants the Defendant's motion to stay
discovery pending resolution of its motion to dismiss.

Pending is the Defendant's motion to stay discovery filed Dec. 2,
2022.

On Oct. 11, 2022, the Court entered an Order and Notice, which gave
the parties until Dec. 2, 2022, to serve their initial rule
26(a)(1) disclosures. On Nov. 16, 2022, the Plaintiff served the
Defendant with his first set of interrogatories and first set of
requests to produce. On Nov. 17, 2022, he filed the parties' rule
26(f) report. The Court on Nov. 21, 2022, entered an order
cancelling the scheduling conference set for Nov. 23, 2022, and
directing that the scheduling conference be continued pending
resolution of the Plaintiff's motion to remand.

Judge Copenhaver explains that pursuant to rule 26(c)(1), a
district court is afforded the discretion to stay discovery pending
the resolution of a dispositive motion. Courts may stay discovery
after considering the following three factors: "1) the interests of
judicial economy, (2) the hardship and equity to the moving party
if the action is not stayed, and (3) the potential prejudice to the
non-moving party.

In this instance, the Defendant requests that discovery be stayed
pending resolution of its motion to dismiss filed Oct. 6, 2022. As
to the first factor, Judge Copenhaver finds judicial economy weighs
in favor of granting the stay. The putative class action lawsuit
likely involves complex factual and legal issues. Moreover, the
motion to dismiss raises potentially dispositive legal issues,
which may obviate the need for discovery. Thus, he agrees with the
Defendant that a discovery stay would promote judicial economy.

As to the second factor, Judge Copenhaver finds the Defendant would
suffer hardship if the action was not stayed, yet, ultimately
dismissed pursuant to its pending motion to dismiss. Because of the
costs associated with responding to the Plaintiff's initial
discovery requests, the second factor weighs in favor of granting
the discovery stay. Finally, the third factor also weighs in favor
of granting the discovery stay. Judge Copenhaver notes that the
Court has already granted the Plaintiff three extensions to file
responsive briefings. It is also early in the litigation process.
Of note, a scheduling order has not yet been entered. Accordingly,
the potential prejudice to the Plaintiff is at best, minimal.

Having considered the applicable factors, Judge Copenhaver grants
the Defendant's motion to stay discovery pending resolution of its
motion to dismiss be. He stays the discovery in the action pending
the further order of the Court.

The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this order to all
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yafmzvf2 from
Leagle.com.


PFIZER INC: Monmouth Suit Stayed Pending Consolidation by JPML
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COUNTY OF MONMOUTH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PFIZER, INC., Defendant,
Civil Action No. 22-2050 (MAS) (DEA) (D.N.J.), Judge Michael A.
Shipp of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
grants the Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Proceedings, pending
consideration by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation of
a motion to consolidate and transfer this and other related cases
for centralized proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.

The Defendant manufactures and sells the smoking cessation
brand-name drug Chantix, which was approved by the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") in May 2006. Until recently, it has
continuously manufactured, marketed, and sold Chantix without any
generic competition due to exclusivity provided by patent
protection. Non-party Apotex, Inc. distributed Chantix in Canada on
Defendant's behalf.

In October 2020, Health Canada -- the FDA analogue for Canada --
informed Apotex, Inc., about the presence of nitrosamines in
Chantix and its generic equivalents -- specifically, a nitrosamine
known as N-nitroso-varenicline, among others. Nitrosamines are
genotoxic compounds and known human carcinogens. The Plaintiff
alleges that the presence of nitrosamine contaminants in Chantix
renders it adulterated and misbranded under federal and analogous
state laws, and therefore economically worthless and illegal to
sell.

Yet despite Health Canada's notice about nitrosamine contamination
as early as October 2020, and having knowledge about the risks
posed by nitrosamines, the Defendant did not institute any recall
of its product in the United States until June 2021. When it did
initially institute a recall, it only recalled certain lots of
Chantix -- however, the Defendant finally instituted a product-wide
recall in September 2022 due to the presence of a nitrosamine.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated third-party payers, filed the present nine-count Class
Action Complaint asserting breach of express warranties; breach of
implied warranties; claims pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warrant
Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301, et seq.; fraud; negligent
misrepresentation and omission; violation of state consumer
protection laws; unjust enrichment; negligence; and negligence per
se.

Pending at the JPML (In Re: Chantix (Varenicline) Mktg., Sales
Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 3050 filed on Aug. 31,
2022)), the Plaintiff seeks an Order (1) transferring to the
District of New Jersey the eight actions and any other tag-along
actions asserting similar or related claims against the Defendant
involving contaminated, defective, or adulterated Chantix (or
varenicline) drug products that contained a carcinogenic substance,
N-nitroso-varenicline, and were adulterated, that may be
subsequently filed in or removed to the federal courts, and (2)
consolidating eight class actions for pretrial discovery and class
certification purposes.

The Plaintiff now seeks to stay this action until the JPML issues a
ruling on the transfer request.

Judge Shipp finds that a stay is appropriate. First, the JPML is
considering eight actions and other tag-along actions against the
Defendant. The existence of related proceedings and the
consideration by the JPML of centralizing the claims weighs in
favor of a stay. Second, balancing the parties' interests weighs in
favor of a stay. Consolidation might ultimately result in a more
streamlined approach to discovery and resolution of the individual
claims asserted against the Defendant, avoiding the risk of
duplication and inconsistent rulings. Third, considerations of
judicial economy favor a stay. It would be a waste of judicial
resources for the Court to consider the merits of the motions in
this action while the JPML is considering whether transfer and
centralization is appropriate.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Shipp grants the Plaintiff's
Motion to Stay Proceedings. An appropriate order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3wzucydy from Leagle.com.


PSC COMMUNITY: 1199SEIU Union Wins Bid to Confirm Premier Award
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John G. Koeltl of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York grants the Union's petition to confirm an Aug.
31, 2022 arbitration award addressing the failure of Respondent
Premier Home Health Services, Inc., to comply with certain terms of
a previous award in the lawsuit entitled 1199SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE
WORKERS EAST, Petitioner v. PSC COMMUNITY SERVICES, ET AL.,
Respondents, Case No. 20-cv-3611 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y.).

The action arises out of arbitration proceedings involving
Petitioner 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (the "Union")
and the Respondents, a group of home care agencies licensed to
provide home care services in New York. The Union previously filed
two petitions for confirmation of arbitration awards pursuant to
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
Section 185, the first seeking to confirm an award addressing
issues of arbitrability and jurisdiction (the "First Award"), and
the second seeking to confirm an award resolving the Union's
grievance against the respondents on the merits (the "Second
Award").

Both Awards were rendered according to procedures set forth in
collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") between the Union and the
various Respondents. This Court confirmed the First Award on Feb.
19, 2021, see 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers E. v. PSC Cmty.
Servs., 520 F.Supp.3d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), and the Second Award on
June 24, 2022, see 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers E. v. PSC
Cmty. Servs., No. 20-cv-3611, 2022 WL 2292736 (S.D.N.Y. June 24,
2022).

The Union now petitions the Court to confirm an Aug. 31, 2022
arbitration award ("Premier Award") addressing the failure of
Respondent Premier Home Health Services, Inc. to comply with
certain terms of the Second Award ("Third Petition"). The Union
also seeks an award of attorneys' fees incurred in connection with
this confirmation proceeding. For the reasons set forth here, the
Third Petition is granted and the Premier Award is confirmed. The
Union's request for attorneys' fees is granted, with the amount to
be determined after the Court has considered additional
submissions.

The Union is a labor union that serves as the sole and exclusive
representative for the Respondents' home health aide employees. At
all relevant times, the Union was a party to CBAs with each of the
Respondents, including licensed home-care agency Premier. In 2015,
the Union and the Respondents executed a memorandum of agreement
(the "2015 MOA") that amended the CBAs to include an alternative
dispute resolution process, through which all claims arising under
certain federal and state wage-and-hours laws (the "Covered
Statutes") must be resolved. As pertinent here, the last step in
that process is a "final and binding arbitration."

In January 2019, the Union filed a class action grievance on behalf
of its former and current members for "violations of the CBAs
regarding wage and hour claims arising under the Covered Statutes."
Pursuant to the 2015 MOA and the CBAs, the Union and the
Respondents proceeded to arbitration.

On April 17, 2020, the arbitrator issued the First Award. The Court
confirmed the First Award on Feb. 19, 2021. Premier actively
participated in the confirmation proceedings and did not assert
objections to the First Award.

On Feb. 25, 2022, the arbitrator issued the Second Award, this time
addressing the merits of the Union's grievance. The arbitrator
determined that all of the Respondents had committed violations of
the relevant wage-and-hours laws, "resulting in underpayment of
required wages" to the Union's former and current members.

To remedy those violations, the arbitrator ordered the Respondents
to contribute to a compensation fund (the "Special Wage Fund" or
the "Fund") for eligible claimants.

On June 24, 2022, the Court issued an Order confirming the Second
Award in full. Premier did not object to confirmation.

Pursuant to the terms of the Second Award, Premier was required to
deposit $5,620,250 into the Special Wage Fund on or before April
26, 2022. That dollar value represents the total amount of $250
payments owed for each of the 22,481 home health aides employed by
Premier between June 16, 2010, and Oct. 31, 2019. On April 25,
2022, the arbitrator granted Premier's request to extend the
deadline for Premier's deposits to Aug. 25, 2022.

Premier then deposited $3,766,250 into the Fund, representing $250
per home health aide employed by Premier between Jan. 1, 2016, and
Oct. 31, 2019. As of the date of the Third Petition, Premier had
failed to pay the remaining $1,854,000, which would cover the
payments for home health aides employed between June 16, 2010, and
Dec. 31, 2015.

In response to Premier's noncompliance with the Second Award, the
Union sought relief from the arbitrator. The Union asked the
arbitrator to impose daily penalties of $10,000, as well as
interest on late payments at a rate of nine percent per year, until
Premier made its remaining contribution.

On Aug. 31, 2022, the arbitrator issued the Premier Award, which
requires that Premier pay penalties, interest, and costs as a
remedy for its failure to comply fully with the terms of the Second
Award. Specifically, the arbitrator ordered as follows:

   1. Premier will pay the sum of $2,500 per day commencing
      Aug. 25, 2022, until it makes full payment of the amount
      owed to the Fund, which is $1,854,000. This payment will be
      deposited in the Fund;

   2. Commencing Aug. 25, 2022, Premier will pay interest on the
      amount owed to the Fund as set forth, at the rate of
      nine (9%) percent per annum. The interest payments will be
      deposited in the Fund; and

   3. The cost of this proceeding, as well as any additional
      costs of administration, occasioned by Premier's refusal to
      adhere to the terms of the Second Award, will be paid by
      Premier.

On Oct. 14, 2022, the Union filed the Third Petition, seeking
confirmation of the Premier Award and other relief.

Premier failed to appear by new counsel within the time allotted by
the Court. Accordingly, on Nov. 9, 2022, the Court reminded Premier
that it was required to appear by new counsel by Nov. 7, 2022, and
also reminded Premier that its response to the most recent petition
was due on Nov. 16, 2022.

To date, Premier has neither appeared by new counsel nor submitted
a response to the Third Petition. The Court, therefore, decides the
merits of the Third Petition based on the relevant papers already
filed on the docket.

Judge Koeltl opines that the Premier Award is a reasonable remedy
to Premier's noncompliance with the Second Award in light of the
facts and circumstances presented to the arbitrator. Moreover, the
Premier Award clearly reflects the arbitrator's efforts to craft a
fair and balanced remedy under the circumstances. Finally, the
Premier Award is a proper exercise of the arbitrator's authority
under the relevant CBA and the previously confirmed Awards.

In short, Judge Koeltl holds, the Union convincingly argues that
the arbitrator had more than a barely colorable justification for
issuing the Premier Award, which sets forth reasonable terms for
addressing Premier's refusal to comply with the Second Award. Thus,
the Third Petition is granted and the Premier Award is confirmed.

The Union also requests an award of attorneys' fees incurred in the
course of this confirmation proceeding.

In this case, Judge Koeltl notes that it is clear that Premier
simply refuses to comply with the Second Award, and thus with the
Court's Order confirming it. Accordingly, Judge Koeltl holds that
the Union is entitled to the attorneys' fees incurred in connection
with the Third Petition. The Union's counsel should submit an
application for attorneys' fees within 60 days of the issuance of
this decision. Premier may respond by counsel 30 days thereafter,
and the Union may reply 15 days thereafter.

The Clerk is directed to close ECF No. 289 and to enter judgment
confirming the Premier Award.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
Nov. 28, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/v48kasay from
Leagle.com.


PSCU INC: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in Brown FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CONNIE BROWN, v. PSCU,
INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-11510-DPH-DRG (E.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge
Denise Page Hood entered an order granting the motion to certify
class.

The Discovery Questionnaire will not be included in the Notice.
Defendant's request for sanctions raised in its response is denied
without prejudice.

Brown admits to not knowing about the local rule, which requires
conferral on every motion in this District. Here, had Brown
contacted PSCU before filing its motion for Conditional Class
Certification, the Parties could have narrowed the issues in
dispute.

This surely would have streamlined the litigation. The Parties also
would have jointly participated in preparing the proposed Order
addressing conditional certification and the Notice and Consent
form, which would have saved Brown and PSCU from drafting their
respective proposals.

However, the Parties did manage to resolve some of the issues after
the filing of the motion. PSCU's requested relief for sanctions is
denied at this time, preserving its right to renew this motion if
the practice continues.

On December 5, 2020, Plaintiff Brown moved for Conditional Class
Certification, pre-discovery, in her complaint against the
Defendant PSCU. In the original complaint, Brown alleged PSCU
violated Sections 7 and 15 of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
by employing individuals longer than 40 hours without compensating
and at rates at least one and one-half times the regular rates.

On December 28, 2020, PSCU filed a Response, in it, it agreed to
class certification, disagreed with the Plaintiff's notice and
dissemination method, requested to include a discovery
questionnaire, and sought sanctions because Brown violated Local
Rule 7.1(a) by failing to confer before moving for Conditional
Class Certification.

Brown and the Putative Class Members are all hourly, non-exempt
individuals who worked for the call center Defendant PSCU in the
state of Michigan for the past three years.

PSCU required its employees to arrive to work early to start up and
log-into their computer systems before their scheduled shift start
times. The time it took for employees to log-into the network and
load up the software was neither counted as time worked nor
compensated.

PSCU applies this policy uniformly and consistently to all its
hourly call-center employees in Michigan. PSCU required Brown and
the Putative Class Members to perform tasks before their scheduled
shift, they are not permitted to clock-in until the exact moment
they are ready for calls.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 8, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Fkkg95 at no extra charge.[CC]

SANTANDER CONSUMER: Final Judgment Entered in Wilson Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRENZETTA WILSON, et al., Plaintiff v. SANTANDER
CONSUMER USA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:20-cv-00152 KGB (E.D.
Ark.), Judge Kristine G. Baker of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division, grants the
Settlement Class Representatives' motion for final approval of
class action settlement.

Before the Court is the motion for final approval of class action
settlement of Plaintiffs Frenzetta Wilson and Ronnie Dickerson of a
Settlement Agreement and Release entered into with Santander
Consumer USA, Inc. ("SC") on April 1, 2022. The Court entered an
Order granting the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of the class action Settlement on April 12, 2022. The
matter came before the Court for hearing on Oct. 13, 2022, pursuant
to the Preliminary Approval Order.

Judge Baker has reviewed all relevant motions and papers that have
been filed in connection with the proposed Settlement, and finds
good cause.

For purposes of the Settlement and this Final Approval Order and
Judgment, the Settlement Class will be defined as follows: all
persons in the U.S. who have a car loan with SC with a Texas choice
of law provision who paid a convenience fee in connection with a
loan payment made online, over the phone, or by interactive voice
recognition (IVR) since Jan. 13, 2016.

Judge Baker confirms the prior appointments of Wilson and Dickerson
to serve as the Class Representatives and Carney Bates & Pulliam,
PLLC as the Class Counsel.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, she approves the
Settlement set forth in the Agreement and finds that the Settlement
is, in all respects, fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the best
interests of the Settlement Class Members.

By operation of the Order, final judgment is entered with respect
to the Released Claims of all Settlement Class Members, and the
Released Claims in the Action are dismissed in their entirety with
prejudice and without costs. All claims in the Action are
dismissed, and the case will be closed pursuant to paragraph 22 of
the Order.

The releases as set forth in Section 10 of the Agreement together
with the definitions in Sections 1.32-1.34 and 1.42 relating
thereto are expressly incorporated herein in all respects and made
effectively by operation of the Order. Judge Baker approves the
release provisions as contained and incorporated in Section 10 of
the Agreement. The Releasors will be deemed to have, and by
operation of the Judgment will have fully, finally, and forever
released, relinquished, and discharged all Released Claims
(including Unknown Claims) against the Releasees.

Judge Baker grants the application and finds that an award of
attorneys' fees in the amount of $240,000 and reimbursement of
litigation expenses in the amount of $10,094.38 are fair and
reasonable. As such, she approves payment of the foregoing fee and
expense amounts to be paid from the Settlement Fund in the manner
and at the times set forth in the Agreement. She further finds that
a service award for each Class Representative in the amount of
$5,000 or $10,000 in total, is fair and reasonable. As such, she
approves the service awards in these amounts to be paid from the
Settlement Fund in the manner and at the time set forth in the
Agreement.

Without affecting the finality of this Final Approval Order and
Judgment in any way, the Court retains continuing jurisdiction over
the administration, consummation, enforcement, and interpretation
of the Agreement, the final judgment, and for any other necessary
purpose, including to ensure compliance with the Protective Order.

The Parties and the Settlement Administrator are authorized to
implement the terms of the Agreement.

Without further order of the Court, the Parties may agree to
reasonable extensions of time to carry out any of the provisions of
the Agreement.

SC has provided notification through the Settlement Administrator
to all appropriate federal and state officials regarding the
Settlement as required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1715.

In accordance with paragraph 7.6 of the Agreement, no later than 30
days after the Effective Date (as defined in the Agreement), the
Settlement Administrator will file with the Court, under seal
pursuant to the Protective Order entered in the litigation (in
order to protect the names, addresses and other personal
information of Class Members), a list of the names and addresses of
all Members of the Class to whom the Class Notice was sent.

There is no just reason for delay in the entry of the Order and
Final Judgment and immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is
directed. As such, the Clerk of the Court is directed to close the
Action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 7, 2022 Final Judgment & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/3vcwp9jv from Leagle.com.


STEADFAST INSURANCE: Partial Summary Judgment for T-Mobile Upheld
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled T-MOBILE USA, INC., Respondent v. STEADFAST
INSURANCE COMPANY; and ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners, Case No. 82704-9-I (Wash. App.), the Court of Appeals
of Washington, Division One, affirms the trial court's order
granting partial summary judgment for T-Mobile.

Zurich and its subsidiary Steadfast (collectively Steadfast)
insured T-Mobile USA Inc. for loss from data privacy breaches.

In September 2015, Experian, a T-Mobile vendor, suffered a data
privacy breach. T-Mobile notified Steadfast of the breach in
October 2015 and tendered a claim for coverage. In the following
months, T-Mobile faced multiple individual and class action
lawsuits. T-Mobile also faced inquiries from the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and state
attorneys general. In total, T-Mobile incurred $17,264,498.20 in
loss (referred to as $17.3 million) in costs and expenses related
to the data privacy breach. T-Mobile sought indemnity from Experian
by filing an arbitration demand to which Experian counterclaimed.
Ultimately, in July 2017, Experian agreed to pay T-Mobile $10.75
million to settle.

Under the policy, T-Mobile self-insured the first $10 million of
any loss from a data privacy breach under a "Self-Insured
Retention" (SIR) provision and Steadfast insured the next $15
million in loss. T-Mobile incurred about $17.3 million in loss
after one of its vendors, Experian Information Solutions Inc.,
suffered a data privacy breach. T-Mobile later recovered $10.75
million from Experian as indemnification for its loss.

Steadfast refused to pay T-Mobile's claim for $17.3 million,
asserting that the policy's definition of "loss" excludes
T-Mobile's recovery from Experian, so T-Mobile did not satisfy the
SIR. T-Mobile sued. Now, on certified question from the trial
court, the Court of Appeals must determine the scope of coverage
under T-Mobile's policy.

The Court of Appeals concludes that Steadfast must provide coverage
under the policy because Mobile incurred $17.3 million in loss as
defined by the policy, a loss exceeding its SIR obligation. The
Court of Appeals affirms and remands to the trial court for further
proceedings.

The record shows T-Mobile incurred $17.3 million in costs and
expenses because of the Experian data breach. A declaration from
T-Mobile's attorney states that those expenses included "costs tied
to responding to government regulatory agencies, defending itself
in numerous underlying lawsuits, defending itself against Experian,
and prosecuting its indemnification claim in the Experian
arbitration" after the data breach.

Because those are all costs T-Mobile had to pay on account of the
data breach, they are a covered loss under the policy, Judge Bill
A. Bowman, writing for the Panel, opines. The Court of Appeals
concludes that the policy does not exclude as a covered loss the
$10.75 million T-Mobile recovered from Experian.

Judge Bowman says he can best characterize Steadfast's effort to
benefit from the $10.75 million payment to T-Mobile as seeking a
"setoff." A "setoff" refers to an insurer's claim to sums a third
party has already paid the insured. But an insurer may not set off
any third-party payment to the insured unless "(1) the policy
itself authorizes it and (2) the insured is fully compensated by
the relevant 'applicable measure of damages.'"

Nothing in T-Mobile's policy authorized Steadfast to set off the
$10.75 million Experian recovery, Judge Bowman holds.

Because T-Mobile incurred a loss of $17.3 million and the policy
does not authorize Steadfast to set off the $10.75 million recovery
from Experian, Judge Bowman holds that the trial court properly
granted partial summary judgment for T-Mobile.

The Court of Appeals affirms and remands to the trial court for
further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Unpublished Opinion dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8fhyre from
Leagle.com.

Howard Mark Goodfriend, Catherine Wright Smith, Smith Goodfriend
PS, 1619 8th Ave. N, in Seattle, Washington 98109-3007, Andrew
Margulis, Attorney at Law, 750 3rd Ave., Room 2500, in New York
City, NY 10017-2708, Counsel for the Petitioner(s).

Michael A. Moore -- mmoore@corrcronin.com -- Kelly H. Sheridan --
ksheridan@corrcronin.com -- Corr Cronin LLP, 1015 Second Avenue,
10th Floor, in Seattle, Washington 98104; Michael Barr King --
king@carneylaw.com -- Carney Badley Spellman PS, 701 5th Ave.,
Suite 3600, in Seattle, Washington 98104-7010, Counsel for the
Respondent(s).


TGI FRIDAY'S: N.D. Illinois Narrows Claims in Joseph Consumer Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denies in part and
grants in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the lawsuit titled
AMY JOSEPH v. TGI FRIDAY'S, INC., and INVENTURE GOODS, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-1340 (N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiff initiated this putative class action against
Defendants TGIF and Inventure on Feb. 5, 2021, and later amended
her complaint on May 7, 2021. She argues that the "TGI Fridays
Mozzarella Stick Snacks" manufactured, marketed, distributed, and
sold by the Defendants were misbranded.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the Product's
label--which prominently states, "Mozzarella Stick Snacks" and
includes an image of the hot appetizer, mozzarella sticks--is
misleading because the Product does not contain actual mozzarella
cheese. She asserts that the Defendants' misleading representations
and omissions give rise to several claims: (1) Count I: a violation
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
("ICFA"); (2) Count II: state-law claims for consumer fraud and
deceptive trade practices in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia; and (3) in the alternative, Count III: a claim for unjust
enrichment.

The Defendants removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2). Before the Court is the
Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

The Defendants move to dismiss TGIF as a defendant and Counts I and
III as failing to state claims. The Defendants move to dismiss TGIF
as a defendant based on two arguments: (1) that the Plaintiff's use
of group pleading fails to meet the requirements of Rules 8 and
9(b), and (2) that TGIF's role as a licensor fails to state a claim
for misleading representations.

The Court agrees with the Plaintiff that the complaint adequately
puts the Defendants on notice of the unlawful acts that she alleges
both committed. As the Defendants do not suffer any apparent
confusion over the Plaintiff's allegations, the Court declines to
dismiss the Plaintiff's allegations against the Defendants for
improper "lumping together."

The Defendants further argue that even if the Plaintiff's pleadings
are adequate, she still fails to state a claim against TGIF, which
she identifies as a licensor. The Defendants argue that TGIF's
participation in the one role the Plaintiff actually ascribes to
it--a mere trademark licensor--does not render it liable for the
alleged improper acts of the Product's manufacturer.

The Court agrees. While the Plaintiff's group pleading sufficiently
put the Defendants on notice of her allegations, TGIF is not liable
as a licensor, as alleged. As such, the Court dismisses TGIF as a
defendant.

The Defendants argue that Count I should be dismissed because a
reasonable consumer would not interpret the Product's packaging to
denote that the Product contains mozzarella cheese. The Court finds
that, at this stage, the Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that a
reasonable consumer could infer from the Product's packaging a
representation that the Product contains mozzarella cheese.

ICFA allows a plaintiff to premise her claim on either deceptive
conduct, unfair conduct, or both. Because the Defendants' argument
centers on the Plaintiff's allegation of deceptive conduct, the
Court similarly focuses on the Plaintiff's allegations of deceptive
conduct.

As the Plaintiff suggests, another reasonable interpretation is
that a product labelled "Mozzarella Stick Snacks" with an image of
mozzarella sticks would bear some resemblance to mozzarella sticks,
which presumably contain some mozzarella cheese. This aligns with
the reasonable consumer standard, which does not require that a
consumer parse every front label or read every back label before
placing groceries in their carts.

The Plaintiff's interpretation of the Product's packaging is a
plausible interpretation, Judge Dow says. If a product does not
contain mozzarella cheese, why market it under the TGIF logo, which
has a strong correlation to the hot appetizer mozzarella sticks,
which presumably contain some quantity of mozzarella cheese?

The Defendants' only argument against this interpretation is that
because the Product is a "shelf-stable, crunchy snack product," it
could not feasibly contain mozzarella cheese. Judge Dow opines that
the Defendants' common sense approach must fail under prevailing
caselaw at this stage of the case. Nevertheless, the Court declines
currently to dismiss the Plaintiff's ICFA claim.

The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff's claim for unjust
enrichment must be dismissed because the Plaintiff fails to
adequately allege an inadequate remedy at law under City of
Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., 360 F.Supp.3d 730 (N.D. Ill.
2019). The Court disagrees with the Defendant's reading of City of
Rockford and finds that the Plaintiff adequately pleads her unjust
enrichment claim.

Judge Dow holds that the Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment is
adequately pled and the Court declines to dismiss on these grounds.
Because the Court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's ICFA claim, the Court accordingly denies the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment
claim, which rests on the same alleged misconduct.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class consisting of
"[a]ll persons in the United States who purchased TGI Friday's
Mozzarella Sticks Snacks" and an Illinois subclass consisting of
"[a]ll persons in Illinois who purchased TGI Friday's Mozzarella
Sticks Snacks." The Plaintiff's nationwide class applies to Counts
II and III in her complaint.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's nationwide class
allegations, which concern the laws of all fifty states and
District of Columbia, should be stricken because her class
definitions are inherently unmanageable.

Although the Court has doubts about whether the Plaintiff's
nationwide class allegations are manageable, the Court agrees that
the Defendant's arguments are, at this stage, premature.

In the present case, the Defendants generally point to the varying
requirements of reliance, notice, statutes of limitations,
standing, scienter, and damages across various states without
identifying how those differences might affect the Plaintiff's
proposed class. Even if the Defendants are correct that the
Plaintiff's nationwide class allegations are inherently
unmanageable, the Court needs additional factual development to
determine whether any of the alleged differences in state law
create a conflict for the Plaintiff and potential class members or
whether the class device may be manageable and otherwise
appropriate to adjudicate one or more non-nationwide classes or
subclasses.

The Court is hard-pressed to state that the Plaintiff's class
action is inherently unmanageable based on variations in state law
at this early stage when it is not clear which state law will
ultimately present an issue or whether similarities in some--though
not all--state laws would justify class treatment.

For instance, Judge Dow says, the Plaintiff could use subclasses to
bypass potential conflicts of state law. Alternatively, the
Plaintiff could certify a common question of fact or an issue
class. While none of these possibilities should be foreclosed at
this early stage of the case, it likewise is by no means clear that
any provides a clear path to certification of any class, much less
the sweeping class contemplated by the Plaintiff. Going forward,
Judge Dow holds that the Plaintiff should take care in defining her
proposed classes and subclasses in her motion for class
certification and to set out clearly which laws she purports to
seek relief under.

For these reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in
part and denied in part. Defendant TGIF is dismissed. The parties
are directed to file a joint status report with an updated
discovery plan by Dec. 19, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
Nov. 28, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4y9n4kfh from
Leagle.com.


UNCASVILLE, CT: Initial Review Order Entered in Quint Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RICHARD R. QUINT, v.
LAMONT, et al., Case No. 3:22-cv-1263-VAB Case No.
3:22-cv-01263-VAB (D. Conn.), the Hon. Judge Victor A. Bolden
entered an INITIAL REVIEW ORDER as follows:

   -- Mr. Quint’s federal law claims in the Amended Complaint
      are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. section
      1915A(b)(1). The Court declines to exercise supplemental
      jurisdiction over Mr. Quint’s state law claims.

   -- Mr. Quint’s Motion for Class Certification  is denied. As
      this action is dismissed, his Motion for Preliminary
      Injunction [ECF No. 14], Motion to Appoint Counsel, and Ex
      Parte Motion for Injunction are denied as moot.

      If Mr. Quint files a second Amended Complaint that
      addresses the deficiencies identified in this order, the
      Court will consider Mr. Quint’s motions for injunctions
      and motion to appoint counsel to be renewed without the
      necessity of filing new motions on the docket.

Mr. Quint, currently confined at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional
Center in Uncasville, Connecticut, has filed an Amended Complaint
pro se under Mr. Quint names five individuals as defendants,
Governor Ned Lamont, Commissioner Angel Quiros, Warden Robert
Martin, Deputy Warden Foote, and Deputy Warden Oles. He also
includes, as a sixth defendant, all correctional officers at
Corrigan. In addition, Mr. Quint has filed four motions: a motion
for preliminary injunction, a motion for class certification, a
motion for appointment of counsel, and an ex parte motion for
injunction. The individual defendants are named in individual and
official capacities. Mr. Quint seeks damages and injunctive
relief.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 6, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FxauBU at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Carter Wins Bid to Lift Stay; Suit Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia grants the Plaintiff's motion to lift stay in the
lawsuit captioned TERESA CARTER, et al., Plaintiffs v. CARLOS DEL
TORO, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Navy, Defendant,
Case No. 1:20-cv-01702-RCL (D.D.C.).

The Court recently issued a memorandum opinion in the class action
Torres v. Del Toro, which involved a challenge to the Navy's
Properly Referred Policy as administered between Sept. 12, 2016,
and June 11, 2018 (No. 1:21-cv-306-RCL, 2022 WL 5167371 (D.D.C.
Oct. 5, 2022)). In that opinion, the Court held that the Department
of the Navy's Properly Referred Policy was unlawful in its effect
on the physical evaluation board decisions rendered for the named
plaintiff in that case, as well as similarly situated class
members.

The Court, therefore, ordered that the physical evaluation board
decisions for each class member be vacated and set aside (Order,
Torres v. Del Toro, No. 1:21-cv-306-RCL, ECF No. 67). The case was
then remanded to the Secretary of the Navy for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's memorandum opinion and relevant law.

In July 2020, the Plaintiffs filed this action challenging, the
same Properly Referred Policy as the one at issue in Torres. In
2021, the Plaintiffs and the government agreed that the Plaintiffs
were "putative class members in the Torres class action." The Court
then granted the government's motion to stay this case to consider
consolidation with Torres. The Plaintiffs moved to lift that stay
in July 2022, and briefing on that motion was ripe when the Court
issued its memorandum opinion in Torres.

Given the resolution of the Torres case, the Court ordered the
parties in this case to supplement their briefing on lifting the
stay and explain whether there is any reason why this case should
not be dismissed, particularly given that the Plaintiffs were
previously described as putative class members in the Torres class
action. Both parties filed such a supplement.

In their supplemental briefing, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
take several actions. First, the Plaintiffs ask that judgment he
entered in their favor. Second, they ask the Court to remand to the
Secretary for a replacement PEB proceeding for each Plaintiff.
Third, they request that the Court retain jurisdiction pending
final resolution of the Plaintiffs' replacement PEB proceeding to
enable the Plaintiffs to return to the Court to file an amended
complaint should the need arise.

The Secretary asks the Court to dismiss this case as moot because
the Plaintiffs no longer have standing. Under the government's
theory, the Plaintiffs have fully received the relief that they
sought in this case due to a favorable decision in Torres and,
thus, their case is moot.

Judge Lamberth holds that the Plaintiffs' lawsuit against the
Secretary is moot because the Court's decision in Torres both (1)
provided all the relief due to the Plaintiffs, and (2) vacated the
Secretary's challenged actions, leaving the Plaintiffs with no
additional avenues for relief.

The Plaintiffs do have one viable remaining request for relief in
the form of attorneys' fees and costs, Judge Lamberth notes.
However, a request for attorneys' fees does not rescue a case that
is otherwise moot, and, therefore, that final avenue of relief
cannot be a basis for the Court to exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction.

There is no additional remedy for the Court to issue beyond what
these Plaintiffs have already received. The relevant actions have
been vacated, set aside, and are now sitting on remand with the
Secretary of the Navy. Because there is nothing more for the Court
to do in aid of the Plaintiffs' civil action, their case is moot,
Judge Lamberth points out.

Based on the reasoning here, Judge Lamberth ordered that the
Plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay in this case is granted. Judge
Lamberth further ordered that this case be dismissed without
prejudice as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Order dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5n9bcrdz from
Leagle.com.


WALDEN UNIVERSITY: Maryland Court Refuses to Dismiss Carroll Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Julie R. Rubin of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss the lawsuit
entitled ALJANAL CARROLL, et al., Plaintiffs v. WALDEN UNIVERSITY,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00051-JRR (D. Md.).

Defendant Walden University, LLC, is a Florida company with its
principal place of business in Baltimore, Maryland. Defendant
Walden e-Learning, LLC, is a Delaware company with its principal
place of business in Baltimore, Maryland. Walden University and
Walden e-Learning jointly own and operate Walden University, a
for-profit university with its academic headquarters in
Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Walden University offers online degrees for various doctoral
programs. In 2008, Walden University offered its Doctor of Business
Administration ("DBA") program as an inaugural professional
doctorate program. Walden University advertised that its DBA
program requires sixty credits and costs about $43,000 to $63,000
depending on the year. This case arises from an alleged multi-part
discriminatory and fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Walden
University.

Plaintiff Carroll is a resident of North Carolina and was a student
in the DBA program from September 2017 to October 2020. Plaintiff
Claudia Provost Charles is a resident of Louisiana and was a
student in the DBA program from July 2017 to May 2021. Plaintiff
Tiffany Fair is a resident of Virginia and was a student in the DBA
program from June 2016 to January 2021.

The DBA program at Walden University involves two phases: the
coursework phase and the capstone phase. The Plaintiffs allege that
the capstone credit requirement is the primary subject of the
Defendants' misrepresentations. The Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants beginning no later than fall semester of 2008, and
continuing through at least January 2018, in order to entice
students to enroll, the Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the
requirements of the DBA program, including the required credits,
the length of time required to complete the program, and the cost
of the degree.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege that beginning no later than
fall semester of 2008 and continuing through the present, the
Defendants purposefully prolonged the capstone requirement, in
order to compel or persuade students to pay for the additional
credits to earn a degree. As a result, the Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendants' capstone process was, and is, designed to extract
additional tuition revenue from students by prolonging the process
without any legitimate academic purpose. Through this predatory
scheme, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants overcharged
members of the proposed classes more than $28.5 million.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants lured students into this
program by advertising a doctoral degree that could be earned at a
reasonable cost and within a reasonable timeframe; however, the
Defendants knew and intended that the degree would cost much more.
The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants used its websites and
enrollment advisors to advertise the DBA program to prospective
students and the public at large. The Plaintiffs further allege
that the Defendants represented the sixty credit program to be
about forty coursework credit hours and about twenty capstone
credit hours. However, between 2008 and 2017, the Defendants did
not allow students to receive a DBA degree until completing
fifty-four capstone credit hours, which is three times the
advertised requirement. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants
specifically targeted the predatory scheme at Black and female
students.

On Jan. 7, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit.
Plaintiffs Carroll, Charles, and Fair bring this action for
damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated individuals against the
Defendants. Plaintiffs Carroll and Charles seek redress for
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI").
Plaintiffs Charles and Fair seek redress for violation of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"). Plaintiffs Carroll, Charles, and
Fair also bring this action individually for violation of the
Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, the Minnesota Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and Minnesota Statute prohibiting
false statements in advertising, and for common law fraudulent
misrepresentation under Minnesota law.

The Complaint sets forth six counts: (I) Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; (II) Equal Credit Opportunity Act; (III)
Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act; (IV) Minnesota Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (V) MINN. STAT. Section 325F.67,
prohibiting false statements in advertising; and (VI) fraudulent
misrepresentation. The prayer for relief seeks (I) declaratory
judgment; (II) an injunction directing the Defendants and their
directors, officers, agents, and employees to take all steps
necessary to remedy the effects of the conduct complained of and to
prevent additional instances of conduct or similar conduct from
occurring in the future; (III) compensatory damages; (IV) punitive
damages; (V) an award of the Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1691e(d), 42 U.S.C. Section
1988(b); (VI) award prejudgment interest; and (VII) any other
relief the court deems just and equitable.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 9(b). They argue
that the Plaintiffs' federal claims--Counts I and II--fail to state
plausible claims and, as a result, the Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the state law claims--Counts III through
VI. They also argue that the Plaintiffs' fraud claims--Counts III
through VI--fail to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' Count I claim fails for
two reasons: (1) the Plaintiffs fail to allege intentional
discrimination on the basis of race; and (2) the Plaintiffs fail to
allege that similarly situated non-Black students were treated
differently. In addition, the Defendants contend that the
Plaintiffs' reverse redlining theory does not apply because there
is no allegation regarding unfavorable loan terms.

Judge Rubin opines that the Defendants correctly assert that in
order to survive a motion for summary judgment the Plaintiffs must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination and generate a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a jury could
conclude that similarly situated individuals did not suffer the
same adverse actions in the same or similar situations. However,
Judge Rubin says, at the motion to dismiss stage, a complaint need
not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Judge Rubin notes that the Plaintiffs are not required to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination; therefore, they are not
required to allege similarly situated individuals did not suffer
the same adverse actions. As stated, the Plaintiffs sufficiently
alleges facts giving rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VI.

The plain language of the ECOA, its broad purpose, as well as other
courts' applications of the statute, satisfy the Court at this
stage of the litigation that ECOA violations are not necessarily
restricted to consideration of the four corners of the paper
bearing a student borrower's signature. In view of the broad,
protective reach of ECOA, Judge Rubin holds the Motion as to Count
II will be denied at this time.

Since Count I is not dismissed, the Court may properly exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state law claims,
Judge Rubin holds. She adds that the fraud claims in Counts III
through VI will not be dismissed for failure to satisfy the
heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).

The Court finds that Minnesota statutes may be applied in this
case. Also, taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs,
the Court finds that they have alleged a public benefit.

The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs' MUDTPA claim fails
for two reasons: 1) because "the sole statutory remedy under the
act is injunctive relief, which cannot issue here" and 2) the
Plaintiffs do not allege irreparable harm or threat of future
harm.

At this stage of the litigation, the Court declines to foreclose an
equitably remedy that may prove to be appropriate. As to the
Defendants' second argument that Plaintiffs do not allege an
irreparable injury or threat of future harm, the Court finds this
lacks merit. Judge Rubin opines that the Plaintiffs allege a risk
of future harm that is sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss.

The Plaintiffs do not allege an issue with the quality of Walden's
DBA program or the education they received. Instead, the Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants engaged in a multi-part discriminatory,
fraudulent, deceptive, and dishonest scheme and that the Defendants
deliberately hid the true cost of the DBA program by knowingly
misrepresenting and understating the number of capstone credits
required to complete the program and obtain a degree. Judge Rubin
holds that the educational malpractice doctrine does not bar any of
the Plaintiffs' claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Nov. 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/36cmjzn8 from
Leagle.com.


WASHINGTON: Grant of Counties' Dismissal Bid in CSP Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled THE CIVIL SURVIVAL PROJECT, individually and
on behalf of its Members and Clients, and Irene Slagle, Christina
Zawaideh, Julia Reardon, Adam Kravitz, Laura Yarbrough, and
Deighton Boyce, individually and on behalf of the Proposed
Plaintiff Class, Appellants v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, individually,
and KING COUNTY and SNOHOMISH COUNTY, individually and on behalf of
the Proposed Defendant Class, Respondents, ADAMS COUNTY, ASOTIN
COUNTY, BENTON COUNTY, CHELAN COUNTY, CLALLAM COUNTY, CLARK COUNTY,
COLUMBIA COUNTY, COWLITZ COUNTY, DOUGLAS COUNTY, FERRY COUNTY,
FRANKLIN COUNTY, GARFIELD COUNTY, GRANT COUNTY, GRAYS HARBOR
COUNTY, ISLAND COUNTY, JEFFERSON COUNTY, KITSAP COUNTY, KITTITAS
COUNTY, KLICKITAT COUNTY, LEWIS COUNTY, LINCOLN COUNTY, MASON
COUNTY, OKANOGAN COUNTY, PACIFIC COUNTY, PEND OREILLE COUNTY,
PIERCE COUNTY, SAN JUAN COUNTY, SKAGIT COUNTY, SKAMANIA COUNTY,
SPOKANE COUNTY, STEVENS COUNTY, THURSTON COUNTY, WAHKIAKUM COUNTY,
WALLA WALLA COUNTY, WHATCOM COUNTY, WHITMAN COUNTY, and YAKIMA
COUNTY, individually and as putative Defendant Class Members,
Defendants, Case No. 84015-1-I (Wash. App.), the Court of Appeals
of Washington, Division One, affirms the superior court's grant of
King and Snohomish Counties' motion to dismiss.

The Civil Survival Project, on behalf of its members, and the named
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, sued
Washington State and King and Snohomish Counties. They sought the
return and cancellation of legal financial obligations arising from
convictions rendered retroactively unconstitutional by State v.
Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). To this end, they
pleaded theories of unjust enrichment and rescission and requested
injunctive relief under Washington's Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act, ch. 7.24 RCW. The trial court dismissed without deciding
whether to certify the class.

Judge Lori K. Smith, writing for the Panel, notes that Williams v.
City of Spokane, 199 Wn.2d 236, 505 P.3d 91 (2022), controls the
resolution of this appeal. It clarifies, first, that Criminal Rule
7.8 and analogous rules provide the exclusive remedy to revisit
judgment and sentences and, second, that no dispute exists under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act sufficient to permit
injunctive relief.

In February 2021, the Washington State Supreme Court created a sea
change in the state criminal law when it issued its decision in
Blake. Blake held unconstitutional Washington's strict liability
drug possession statute, voiding it and vacating Blake's
conviction.

Judge Smith states that the rippling impacts of this decision have
yet to be fully realized, let alone resolved, and will not likely
be for many years. Because of the interaction between the strict
liability drug possession statute and other criminal statutes--such
as crimes that incorporate other crimes as an element or the use of
Blake-related convictions when calculating a defendant's offender
score--it is possible that more than 100,000 individuals were
affected by Washington's decades-long enforcement of the now void
law. Unspooling Blake's practical consequences for all affected
individuals is, as a result, a considerable task by virtue of both
its scale and its complexity, Judge Smith says.

Counties across the State, coordinating with the State itself, have
sought to address Blake by vacating convictions both proactively
and, in response to individual's motions to the court, reactively.
Efforts to ensure that Blake's promise is fulfilled have not,
however, been limited to the executive branch of the government.
This state's Supreme Court has actively promulgated changes to
court rules to enable easier access to counsel to address voided
convictions. And the state legislature has passed multiple bills
that touch on the issues arising in Blake's wake, the first only
two months after issuance of the decision. The most recent
legislative appropriation directs more than $100 million towards
the administrative and other costs of addressing Blake.

Prioritized above all by the various governmental entities
responding to Blake are currently imprisoned individuals for whom
vacation of their Blake conviction would result in immediate
release. However, Judge Smith notes, the return and discharge of
legal financial obligations (LFOs) imposed as a part of Blake
sentences is also of great concern. LFOs comprise the gamut of
fees, fines, and other financial assignments related to a criminal
conviction. They can range from seemingly small amounts to
considerably larger ones, and can be mandatory or discretionary on
the part of the trial court. Collectively, they can constitute a
severe burden on a population that already faces disproportionate
financial struggles; failure to pay has in some counties resulted
in the debtor's incarceration. Increasingly the subject of
scrutiny, the harsh consequences of LFOs were referenced in the
Blake decision itself, though they were not its focus.

This lawsuit was initiated on March 11, 2021, only two weeks after
Blake's issuance. Brought at first by the Civil Survival Project
(CSP)--a statewide nonprofit dedicated to advancing the interests
of formerly incarcerated people--on behalf of its clients and
members, the suit's collection of Plaintiffs was supplemented to
include Irene Slagle, Christina Zawaideh, Julia Reardon, Adam
Kravitz, Laura Yarbrough, and Deighton Boyce, each of whom has
borne Blake LFOs. This group of individuals was meant to be the
named members of a proposed plaintiff class representing all people
affected by Blake LFOs. The lawsuit's original Defendants were the
State of Washington and King and Snohomish Counties. This group,
too, would be expanded, eventually encompassing all Washington
counties.

The Plaintiffs' goal is the return of any money paid towards an LFO
downstream of a Blake conviction and the cancellation of any
outstanding obligation. To this end, they plead several legal
causes of action, all couched within the framework of a putative
class action.

First, the Plaintiffs bring unjust enrichment and rescission claims
as to both paid and unpaid LFOs. Second, they request declaratory
relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA).
Through this avenue they pursue declarations from the Court that:
(1) their class's convictions are "void and vacated"; (2) they are
entitled to recover Blake LFOs collected by the Defendants; (3) the
Defendants must cancel any unpaid LFO debt; (4) the Defendants must
not reallocate Blake-related payments to cover other LFO balances;
and (5) they request any further equitable relief deemed proper.

The case comes to the Appellate Court on appeal from the superior
court's grant of King and Snohomish Counties' motion to dismiss,
which was decided before consideration of the Plaintiffs' request
for class certification. The court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims
of unjust enrichment and rescission after determining that Criminal
Rule (CrR) 7.8 in superior courts--or its equivalent rules in
courts of limited jurisdiction--is the "exclusive mechanism" to
obtain the relief requested through those claims. It dismissed the
request for declaratory relief after determining that CrR 7.8 and
its alternatives are an "adequate alternative remedy" to
declaratory relief. The court concluded that the rules of procedure
do not entitle the Plaintiffs' to their requested relief other than
through individual motions under CrR 7.8 or its alternatives; it
concluded that civil class action is an improper vehicle.

The Plaintiffs appeal.

The Appellate Court is presented with two questions. First, whether
CSP and the individual Plaintiffs are barred from bringing civil
class action claims to address the burden of their Blake LFOs
because CrR 7.8 and its equivalent rules prohibit other avenues of
relief. Second, whether the Plaintiffs are nonetheless entitled to
declaratory judgment.

The Appellate Court concludes that the Washington Supreme Court
definitively resolved these issues earlier this year with its
holding in Williams and, therefore, the Appellate Court affirms the
trial court's dismissal.

Judge Smith agrees with the Defendants that Williams controls and
conclude that CrR 7.8 does not violate due process. The Appellate
Court holds that Williams controls. CrR 7.8 is the exclusive
procedural means by which to seek refund and cancellation of
superior court imposed Blake LFOs, just as CrRLJ 7.8 and CRLJ 60
are the exclusive means in courts of limited jurisdiction.

The Appellate Court also concludes that the public interest would
not be enhanced by reviewing the case and so declines to extend
standing under the public importance doctrine. Unlike other cases
that apply the doctrine, Judge Smith explains, this dispute is not
the sort of policy that lends not lends itself to quick and easy
resolution through a legal ruling. It instead presents complex,
fact-dependent questions of public administration in an area that
has already received significant attention from many aspects of the
state government. To review this case, permitting declaratory
judgment and its unclear consequences, would not enhance the public
interest but instead further complicate an already complicated
problem.

Because the trial court correctly concluded that CrR 7.8 and
similar rules are the exclusive means for the Plaintiffs to address
their claims and because the Plaintiffs are not entitled to
declaratory relief, Judge Smith holds dismissal was appropriate.

The Appellate Court affirms.

HAZELRIGG and MANN, JJ., concurs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Nov. 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4yechdjv from Leagle.com.

Michael Craig Subit -- msubit@frankfreed.com -- Frank Freed Subit &
Thomas LLP, 705 2nd Ave., Suite 1200, in Seattle, Washington
98104-1798; Lisa Daugaard -- lisa.daugaard@defender.org -- Public
Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Pl S, Suite 502, in Seattle,
Washington 98104-2626; Prachi Vipinchandra Dave --
prachi.dave@defender.org -- Public Defender Association, 110
Prefontaine Pl S., Suite 502, in Seattle, Washington 98104-2626;
Adam Klein -- atk@outtengolden.com -- 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor,
in New York City, NY 10017; Christopher Mcnerney --
cmcnerney@outtengolden.com -- 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor, in New
York City, NY 10017; Moire Heiges-Hoepfert -- mhg@outtengolden.com
-- One California Street, 12th Floor, in San Francisco, California
94111; Hannah Cole-Chu -- hcolechu@outtengolden.com -- Outten
Golden, 600 Massachusetts Avenue Nw, Suite 200w, in Washington,
D.C. 20003, Counsel for the Appellant(s).

Paul Michael Crisalli -- paul.crisalli@atg.wa.gov -- Washington
Attorney General's Office, 800 Fifth Ave., Suite 2000, in Seattle,
Washington 98104-3188; David J. Hackett --
david.hackett@kingcounty.gov -- King County PAO Civil Division, 516
3rd Ave., Suite W554, in Seattle, Washington 98104-2362; Timothy
George Leyh -- timl@harriganleyh.com -- Harrigan Leyh Farmer &
Thomsen LLP, 999 3rd Ave., Suite 4400, in Seattle, Washington
98104-4017; Randall Thor Thomsen -- randallt@harriganleyh.com --
Harrigan Leyh Farmer & Thomsen LLP, 999 3rd Ave., Suite 4400, in
Seattle, Washington 98104-4017; Bridget Elizabeth Casey --
bcasey@co.snohomish.wa.us -- Snohomish County Prosecutor's Office,
3000 Rockefeller Ave., in Everett, Washington 98201-4046, Counsel
for the Respondent(s).

John Ballif Midgley -- jmidgley@aclu-wa.org -- ACLU of Washington
Foundation, Po Box 2728, in Seattle, Washington 98111-2728; Nancy
Lynn Talner -- talner@aclu-wa.org -- ACLU-WA, Po Box 2728, in
Seattle, Washington 98111-2728; John Ballif Midgley --
jmidgley@aclu-wa.org -- ACLU of Washington Foundation, Po Box 2728,
in Seattle, Washington 98111-2728, Amicus Curiae on behalf of ACLU
of Washington.

Robert S. Chang -- changro@seattleu.edu -- Seattle University
School of Law, 901 12th Ave., in Seattle, Washington 98122-4411;
Jessica Levin -- levinje@seattleu.edu -- Seattle University School
of Law, 901 12th Ave., Korematsu Center For Law & Equality, in
Seattle, Washington 98122-4411; Melissa R. Lee --
leeme@seattleu.edu -- Seattle University School of Law, 901 12th
Ave., Korematsu Center For Law & Equality, in Seattle, Washington
98122-4411, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Fred T. Korematsu Center for
Law and Equality.

La Rond Baker -- baker@aclu-wa.org -- American Civil Liberties
Union of Washin, Po Box 2728, in Seattle, Washington 98111-2728,
Amicus Curiae on behalf of King County Department of Public
Defense.

Alexandria Marie Hohman, The Washington Defender Association, 110
Prefontaine Pl S, Suite 610, in Seattle, Washington 98104-2626,
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defender Association.

Jonathan Nomamiukor, Jr., Columbia Legal Services, 101 Yesler Way,
Suite 300, in Seattle, Washington 98104-2528, Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.


WESTWARD MGMT: Ill. Supreme Court Flips Judgment in Channon Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned HARRY CHANNON, et al., Appellees v.
WESTWARD MANAGEMENT, INC., Appellant, Case No. 128040 (Ill.), the
Supreme Court of Illinois reverses the appellate court judgment.

Justice Robert L. Carter delivered the judgment of the Court, with
opinion.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court answers the following certified
question:

     Whether section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act
     provides an implied cause of action in favor of a
     condominium unit seller against a property manager, as agent
     of a condominium association or board of directors, based on
     allegations that the property manager charged excessive fees
     for the production of information required to be disclosed
     to a prospective buyer under that statute.

The appellate court answered the question in the affirmative, 2021
IL App (1st) 210176, Paragraph 38.

After applying the test from Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill.2d 30, 36
(2004), the Supreme Court concludes that section 22.1 of the
Condominium Property Act (Act) (765 ILCS 605/22.1 (West 2016)) does
not create an implied private right of action by condominium unit
sellers. Because it answers the certified question in the negative,
the Supreme Court reverses the appellate court judgment and remands
the cause to the circuit court.

The Plaintiffs, Harry and Dawn Channon, decided to sell their
condominium unit in the Kenmore Club Condominium Association.
Section 22.1 of the Act requires condominium unit sellers to obtain
specific disclosure documents from the Association or its agent
prior to a sale and to provide them to potential buyers on request.
After entering into a standard sales contract with a potential
buyer, who requested those disclosures, the Channons obtained them
from the Defendant, Westward Management, Inc. (Westward), a
management agent hired by the Association's board of managers.
Westward charged the Channons $245 for the documents.

The Channons later filed a class-action lawsuit in the Cook County
circuit court, naming Westward as the Defendant. In one count, they
alleged that Westward violated section 22.1 of the Act by charging
unreasonable fees for the statutorily required documents. In a
separate count, their complaint asserted that Westward's conduct
also violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act (Fraud Act).

Westward filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. At Westward's
request, however, the trial court certified a question of law to
the appellate court: "Whether section 22.1 of the Condominium
Property Act provides an implied cause of action in favor of a
condominium unit seller against a property manager, as agent of a
condominium association or board of directors, based on allegations
that the property manager charged excessive fees for the production
of information required to be disclosed to a prospective buyer
under that statute."

In answering the certified question, the appellate court applied
the four-factor test from Metzger, 209 Ill. 2d at 36. The Metzger
test examines whether (1) the Plaintiffs are members of the class
the statute was intended to benefit, (2) the statute was designed
to prevent the Plaintiffs from suffering the injury they incurred,
(3) the statute's purpose is consistent with the creation of a
private right of action, and (4) it is necessary to imply a private
right of action to provide an adequate remedy for the statutory
violation.

After reviewing the first factor, the appellate court determined
that, while the primary purpose of section 22.1 was to protect
potential buyers, it was also intended to protect sellers. Because
sellers typically lack personal access to the mandated disclosure
documents, they must seek them from their condominium associations.
By limiting the fee that could be charged for those documents, that
section benefitted the sellers, who were required to provide them
to potential buyers. The appellate court concluded, therefore, that
the Channons were members of a class that section 22.1 was intended
to benefit, satisfying the first factor in the Metzger test.

In considering the second Metzger factor, the appellate court noted
that section 22.1 permits sellers to be charged a reasonable fee
covering the direct out-of-pocket cost of providing the required
information. Because Westward allegedly charged fees that exceeded
its "direct out-of-pocket costs," the appellate court concluded
that the Channons incurred precisely the type of injury the statute
was intended to prevent.

The appellate court then reviewed the third factor of the Metzger
test. It concluded that implying a private right of action for
sellers required to pay excessive fees to obtain the mandated
disclosure documents was consistent with the legislative intent
expressed in section 22.1 because placing a ceiling on the fees
that could be charged protects sellers.

Addressing the fourth Metzger factor, the appellate court found
that implying a private right of action was necessary to give unit
sellers an adequate remedy for violations of section 22.1. Because
the statute lacked an express enforcement mechanism, the appellate
court believed it would be ineffective if a private right of action
were not implied. Stating that the issue was not part of the
certified question before it and had been insufficiently briefed,
the appellate court declined to address Westward's argument that
here the Fraud Act provides the Channons with an adequate
alternative source of relief.

Judge Carter opines that by answering the certified question in the
affirmative, the appellate court rejected the contrary holdings in
Horist v. Sudler & Co., 941 F.3d 274 (7th Cir. 2019), Ahrendt v.
Condocerts.com, Inc., No. 17-cv-8418, 2018 WL 2193140, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. May 14, 2018), and Murphy v. Foster Premier, Inc., No. 17 CV
8114, 2018 WL 3428084, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2018), because
they construed the legislative purpose underlying section 22.1 too
narrowly. The court also distinguished the decisions in Nikolopulos
v. Balourdos, 245 Ill.App.3d 71 (1993), and D'Attomo v. Baumbeck,
2015 IL App (2d) 140865, finding that they did not address the
question of whether section 22.1 was intended to protect sellers.
Thus, the court effectively upheld the trial court's denial of
Westward's dismissal motion.

The appellate court next considered whether a seller's section 22.1
implied a private right of action could be asserted against a
property manager that was acting as the agent of a condominium
board of managers, such as Westward. Westward contended that
section 19 of the Act obliged only the Association, not its
contractual agent, to provide sellers with the specified
information at its actual cost.

The appellate court rejected that argument and declined to apply
section 19 as an interpretative guide for construing section 22.1,
reasoning that section 19 lacked a clear legislative intent to
impose exclusive liability for section 22.1 violations on
associations and their boards. Because Westward contracted with the
Association to act as its agent for the purpose of fulfilling its
statutory duties under the Act, the appellate court concluded that
Westward could also be liable if it actively participated in
breaching the Association's section 22.1 duty.

Westward filed a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court,
and the Supreme Court allowed that petition.

Because the Channons have failed to establish the first factor by
showing that they are members of the class the Act was intended to
benefit, they cannot prove a "clear need" for an implied private
right of action, Judge Carter holds. Under the facts of this case,
the Supreme Court concludes the legislature did not intend section
22.1 to imply a private right to relief for unit sellers, such as
the Channons.

The standard that must be met for a court to imply a private right
of action in a statute is quite high, Judge Carter notes. The
Supreme Court takes extraordinary step only when it is clearly
needed to advance the statutory purpose and when the statute would
"be ineffective, as a practical matter, unless a private right of
action were implied." That high bar was not overcome here, Judge
Carter points out.

The Supreme Court holds that section 22.1 of the Condominium
Property Act does not create an implied private right of action by
a condominium unit seller against an agent of a condominium
association or its board of managers for allegedly violating the
fee limitations set forth in subsection 22.1(c). Accordingly, the
Supreme Court answers the certified question in the negative and
reverses the judgment of the appellate court, and remands the cause
to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Certified question answered.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice Michael J. Burke, specially concurs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Nov. 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3mp3v6xn from Leagle.com.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***