/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/221024.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, October 24, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 206

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: Hall Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams
3M COMPANY: James Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams
3M COMPANY: Reyes Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams
3M COMPANY: Vasquez Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
51 FRESH BAKERY: Cornejo Sues Over Unpaid Minimum Wages

AMERIGAL CONSTRUCTION: Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Claims
ASPIRUS NETWORK: Monopolizes Health Care Services, Suit Contends
ASSURANCE IQ: Smith Files TCPA Suit in D. Arizona
AT&T INC: Parties Seek to Continue Class Cert Hearing
ATLARGE INC: August Sues Over Failure to Pay Hours Worked

AWP INC: Kasiotis Appeals FLSA Class Suit Dismissal to 6th Cir.
BHP GROUP: Australia High Court Ruling in Shareholders' Suit Cited
BLOCK INC: Esposito Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
BLUE SHIELD: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Claims in Saloojas Suit
BLUECREW LLC: Dela Cruz Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

BNSF RAILWAY: Squire Patton Attorneys Discuss Ruling in BIPA Suit
BNSF RAILWAY: Truck Drivers Won $228-M Judgment in BIPA Suit
BP RETIREMENT: 5th Cir. Affirms Press Intervention in Guenther Suit
BRISTOL WEST INSURANCE: Dey Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Debt
CALIFORNIA: Bid for Temporary Stay of Ashker v. Pfeiffer Denied

CANE BAY: Manago Appeals Case Dismissal to 4th Cir.
CARNIVAL CORP: Class Action Trial Over COVID-19 Outbreak Kicked Off
CHCA BAYSHORE: Farner Sues Over Denied Payment for Hours Worked
CHERRY CREEK: Mcknight Suit Moved from State Court to D. Colorado
CITIC CAPITAL: Tang Class Suit Moved to District Court of Delaware

CITYGATE HOSPITALITY: Loyola Sues Over BIPA Violation
COLORADO CORING: Morowski Sues Over Denial of Overtime Pay
COSTCO WHOLESALE: De Benning Suit Settlement for Court Approval
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Faces Cappadora and Sancho Labor Suit
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Faces Gonzalez Labor Suit in Los Angeles Court

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Rough Suit Stayed
CROW VOTE: Court Junks Ward Bid for Class Certification
DIRECTV LLC: Appeals Class Certification Ruling in Vance TCPA Suit
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Cameron Appeals Suit Dismissal to D.C. Cir.
DOUBLE M EXPRESS: MC Logistics Files Suit in N.D. Illinois

ELASTOS FOUNDATION: Seeks Denial of Owen Class Certification Bid
ELI LILLY: Probst Files Suit in S.D. Indiana
ELON MUSK: Pampena Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Violations
EMPRESS AMBULANCE: Cardwell Sues Over Failure to Secure e-PHI
EMPRESS AMBULANCE: Egan Sues Over Failure to Properly Secure PII

ENCORE CAPITAL: Williams Appeals Summary Judgment in FDCPA Suit
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Myers Files 7th Cir. Appeal in FCRA Suit
ERNEST GARCIA: Appeals Denial of Bid to Dismiss Franchi Class Suit
ESSENTIA HEALTH: Filing of Class Cert Bid Due June 15, 2023
EVERGREEN HELICOPTERS: Dismissal of Claims Relating to Deal Upheld

FIRST DATA: Class Settlement Floyd Suit Gets Final Approval
FIRSTENERGY CORP: Class Counsel Defends Atty.'s Fees Request
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Trivedi Balks at Transfer of Suit to D. Mass.
GENEVA FINANCIAL: Barron Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Hours
GEORGIA-PACIFIC: Revised Case Management Schedule Entered

GOBRANDS INC: Beer Sues Over Automatic Renewal of Subscriptions
GRAPEVINE OF NORTH CAROLINA: Class Conditional Status Sought
HARVARD UNIVERSITY: Senior Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
HCI LLC: Yauney Sues Over WARN Act Violation
HEALTHSOURCE GLOBAL: Claims in Louis Suit Sent to Arbitration

HEALTHSOURCE GLOBAL: Court Won't Remand Louis Suit to State Court
HOLLYWOOD TOYS: Lawal Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
INDIANA: Amended Complaint in Smith v. Newman Due on Oct. 28
JUUL LABS: Leon County Schools Join E-cigarette Class Action
LAS VEGAS, NV: Coyne's State Law Claims Remanded to State Court

LOTTERY.COM INC: Faces McDonald Class Suit Over Securities Fraud
MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: Luckey Appeals Suit Dismissal to 9th Cir.
MDL 2573: Gilead Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in HIV Antitrust Suit
MDL 2830: Oklahoma Firefighters Appeals Suit Dismissal to 2nd Cir.
MULTIPLAN CORP: Bid to Compel Reply to Interrogatories Denied

NEW YORK, NY: Gorga Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
NEW YORK: Nursing Mothers File Class Action Over FLSA Violations
OLO INC: Faces Class Action in New York Over Securities Violations
PORTLAND, OR: Wants ADA Class Suit to Include Other Gov't Agencies
RAINBOW REALTY: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Fair Housing Suit

RLX TECH: New York Judge Dismisses Securities Class Action
SAN DIEGO GAS: Radcliff Appeals Arbitration Bid Ruling to 9th Cir.
SCHMITT INDUSTRIES: Steinberg Sues Over 17% Drop in Share Price
SESCO CEMENT: Fails to Pay Construction Workers' OT, Vazquez Says
SIPALA LANDSCAPE: Meza Seeks OT Wages for Laborers Under FLSA

STARBUCKS CORP: Myers Appeals Ruling Dismissing Mars, Quaker Oats
STATE FARM: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Whitman Suit to 9th Cir.
SYNIVERSE CORP: Florida Court Dismisses Baron Data Breach Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Liu Appeals Dismissal of Discrimination Suit
UNITED STATES: Clayton Appeals Suit Dismissal to D.C. Circuit

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Bid to Stay Discovery in Adamson Suit Granted
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Rodriguez Appeals Class Cert. Bid Denial

                            *********

3M COMPANY: Hall Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jerry Hall, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Co.), AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS,
INC., AMEREX CORPORATION, ARCHROMA U.S., INC., ARKEMA, INC.;
BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO., CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION, CHEMDESIGN
PRODUCTS, INC., CHEMGUARD, INC., CHEMICALS, INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY
FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CLARIANT CORPORATION, CORTEVA, INC.,
DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC., DU PONT DE NEMOURS, INC. (f/k/a
DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION, E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS &
COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC, NATION FORD CHEMICAL
COMPANY, NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, and UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS
CORPORATION (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:22-cv-03511-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 11, 2022), is brought for damages for personal injury
resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF")
containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and
polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not
limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane
sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that
degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the
serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants'
AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's
training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks
injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career
as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was diagnosed bladder
cancer as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Phone: 631-600-0000
          Facsimile: 631-543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Phone: 205-328-9200
          Facsimile: 205-328-9456


3M COMPANY: James Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams
----------------------------------------------------------------
Larry James, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Co.), AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS,
INC., AMEREX CORPORATION, ARCHROMA U.S., INC., ARKEMA, INC.;
BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO., CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION, CHEMDESIGN
PRODUCTS, INC., CHEMGUARD, INC., CHEMICALS, INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY
FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CLARIANT CORPORATION, CORTEVA, INC.,
DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC., DU PONT DE NEMOURS, INC. (f/k/a
DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION, E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS &
COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC, NATION FORD CHEMICAL
COMPANY, NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, and UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS
CORPORATION (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:22-cv-03512-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 11, 2022), is brought for damages for personal injury
resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF")
containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and
polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not
limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane
sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that
degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the
serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants'
AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's
training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks
injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career
as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was colorectal cancer
as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Phone: 631-600-0000
          Facsimile: 631-543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Phone: 205-328-9200
          Facsimile: 205-328-9456


3M COMPANY: Reyes Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams
----------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Reyes, Jr., and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY
(f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Co.), AGC CHEMICALS
AMERICAS, INC., AMEREX CORPORATION, ARCHROMA U.S., INC., ARKEMA,
INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO., CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION,
CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC., CHEMGUARD, INC., CHEMICALS, INC.,
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CLARIANT CORPORATION,
CORTEVA, INC., DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC., DU PONT DE NEMOURS, INC.
(f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION, E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS &
COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC, NATION FORD CHEMICAL
COMPANY, NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, and UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS
CORPORATION (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:22-cv-03513-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 11, 2022), is brought for damages for personal injury
resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF")
containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and
polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not
limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane
sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that
degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.

The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the
serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to the Defendants'
AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's
training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks
injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his working career
as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was testicular cancer
as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Phone: 631-600-0000
          Facsimile: 631-543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Phone: 205-328-9200
          Facsimile: 205-328-9456


3M COMPANY: Vasquez Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tonya Vasquez, on behalf of Wayne Vasquez, and other similarly
situated v. 3M COMPANY fka MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO.;
BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CORTEVA, INC.; DUPONT
DE NEMOURS, INC.; DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.;
KIDDE-FENWALL, INC.; KIDDE FIRE FIGHTING, INC.; KIDDE PLC, INC.;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS CO.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY FC,
LLC; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS, LP; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICA'S, INC;
and DOES 1 to 100, INCLUSIVE; Case No. 2:22-cv-03505-RMG (D.S.C.,
Oct. 11, 2022), is brought involving highly toxic chemicals which
have earned the designation "the forever chemicals" because they do
not breakdown and their insidious nature allows them to travel
through soil and into groundwater while maintaining their deadly
nature for decades.

This action deals with Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF") that
were designed, manufactured and sold as firefighting compounds.
AFFF compounding includes Perfluoro octane Sulfonate (commonly
known as "PFOS"), PerfluorooctanoicAcid (commonly known as "PFOA"),
and/or other Per-and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (together, with
PFOS and PFOA, commonly known as "PFAS") which are manmade
organofluorine compounds (in this case commonly referred to as
fluorinated surfactants/fluorocarbon surfactants). The compounds
are designed to lower the surface tension of water so as to create
a firefighting foam to quell/smother (cutting off oxygen), for
example, jet fuel fires.

AFFF is created by mixing fluorine-free hydrocarbon foaming
substances (chemical agents designed for a particular purpose) with
fluorinated surfactants and mixing that with water which creates an
aqueous film, i.e.: Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF"). The
manufacturing processes involved in this action are asserted to
have used fluorocarbon surfactants which are believed to include
PFOS and PFOA (and/or other per fluorinated compounds known as
"PFC" are also believed to be in the mix. PFC's are posited to
break down in PFOS and PFOA).

The Plaintiff Wayne Vasquez joined the Navy and was subsequently
assigned to NAS Miramar, CA (1980-1986). At all times relevant,
Plaintiff lived/worked on Base at NAS Miramar using and drinking
the water. On information and belief, NAS Miramar has elevated PFAS
environmental contamination levels. The levels have not been
publicly disclosed to Plaintiff's present knowledge. In 1992,
Vasquez was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis and thereafter kidney
cancer and commenced on-going medical treatment inclusive of
medical monitoring and hospice care. As known by Defendants,
ulcerative colitis and kidney cancer are diseases linked to PFAS
contamination. See, for example, C8 Science Panel Report. Vasquez
did not discover that PFAS was a cause of the harm until
approximately Fall 2020, when he saw internet information, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff Tonya Vasquez on behalf of her spouse Wayne Vasquez
is a resident of New Mexico, and formerly a resident of San Diego
County, California. Wayne Vasquez was a member of the U.S. Navy,
who during his service was stationed at NAS Miramar, a military
installation identified as being contaminated through use of the
toxic chemicals which are the subject of this action.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy C. Shafer, Esq.
          VETERAN LEGAL GROUP
          700 12th Street N.W., Suite 700
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Phone: (888) 215-7834
          Email: jshafer@bannerlegal.com

               - and -

          S. James Boumil, Esq.
          BOUMIL LAW OFFICES
          120 Fairmount Street
          Lowell, MA, 01852
          Phone: (978) 458-0507
          Email: sjboumil@boumil-law.com

               - and -

          Konstantine Kyros, Esq.
          KYROS LAW
          17 Miles Rd.
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (800) 934-2921
          Email: kon@kyroslaw.com


51 FRESH BAKERY: Cornejo Sues Over Unpaid Minimum Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Claudia Cornejo, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. 51 FRESH BAKERY INC. (D/B/A TALAVERA CAFE), MARIO
ESPINOZA, and VICENTE ROMERO, Case No. 1:22-cv-06104 (S.D.N.Y.,
Oct. 11, 2022), is brought for unpaid minimum wages pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and for violations of the N.Y.
Labor Law, including applicable liquidated damages, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants without appropriate minimum
wage compensation for the hours that she worked. Rather, the
Defendants failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours
worked and failed to pay the Plaintiff appropriately for any hours
worked, either at the straight rate of pay. Regardless, at all
relevant times, the Defendants paid the Plaintiff at a rate that
was lower than the required tip-credit rate. The Defendants
maintained a policy and practice of requiring the Plaintiff and
other employees to work without providing the minimum wage
compensation required by federal and state law and regulations,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants at Talavera Cafe from
April 2017 until on or about August 2022.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a bakery, located in
Woodside, New York under the name "Talavera Cafe."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Catalina Sojo, Esq.
          CSM LEGAL, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Phone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


AMERIGAL CONSTRUCTION: Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSUE BARRIENTOS, ENRIQUE
GARCIA, FIDEL HERNANDEZ, and OSCAR NOE MARTINEZ, individually and
on behalf of all similarly situated, v. AMERIGAL CONSTRUCTION CO.
INC., LUIS EZEQUIEL, and CAPITOL PAVING OF D.C. INC., Case No.
1:22-cv-02618-TSC (D.D.C.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter
an order:

   1. certifying their claims with collective action status
      under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) with respect to a
      class composed of:

      "all similarly situated non-exempt current and former
      employees of Amerigal who performed work on water mains or
      other public-works projects in the District of Columbia
      and Maryland from August 2019 until the present;"

   2. authorizing them to give notice of this lawsuit to all
      current and former employees of Defendant Amerigal from
      August 2019 until the date of final judgment; and

   3. requiring the Defendants to promptly provide them with the
      names, last known addresses, telephone numbers, and dates
      of employment of all current and former similarly-situated
      persons, to post the Notice at Defendants’ office at the
      at 7001 Glenn Dale Road, Glenn Dale, Maryland 20769 and in
      company vehicles, and to include the Notice in the
      paycheck envelopes and/or pay statement envelopes of all
      current employees of Amerigal.

This is a collective action brought by construction workers who
performed work on water mains and other public-works projects in
the District of Columbia and Maryland from August 2019 through the
present.

The workers sue their employers on those projects, alleging that
the defendant-employers maintained various unlawful common policies
through which they cheated workers out of their duly earned wages.


The Plaintiffs assert claims arising under FLSA, District of
Columbia wage laws, and Maryland wage laws. This motion, however,
concerns only Plaintiffs' federal and D.C. claims, for which they
seek collective action certification by this Court.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Oct. 11,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CEUkDX
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Nicolas Mendoza, Esq.
          Mark Hanna, Esq.
          Arlus Stephens, Esq.
          Nicolas Mendoza, Esq.
          MURPHY ANDERSON PLLC
          1401 K Street NW, Suite 300
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 223-2620
          Facsimile: (202) 296-9600
          E-mail: mhanna@murphypllc.com
                  astephens@murphypllc.com
                  nmendoza@murphypllc.com

ASPIRUS NETWORK: Monopolizes Health Care Services, Suit Contends
----------------------------------------------------------------
TEAM SCHIERL COMPANIES and HEARTLAND FARMS, INC., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. ASPIRUS, INC., and
ASPIRUS NETWORK, INC., Case: 3:22-cv-00580 (W.D. Wisc., Oct. 11,
2022) is a class action for unlawful monopolization, restraint of
trade, and price fixing against Aspirus, and its subsidiary
clinical network, ANI.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' health plans pay Aspirus for health
care, and the Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive and equitable
relief under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Aspirus
has engaged in a continuing scheme to suppress competition and
artificially inflate prices for health care services provided by
Aspirus and ANI, the Plaintiff claims.

The Plaintiffs further contend that Aspirus uses various means,
including exclusionary contracts and other coercive and collusive
conduct, to foreclose the ability of rival providers to contract
with payers -- commercial health plans and self-insured employers
-- and thus to prevent those payers from assembling networks that
can compete against Aspirus on price and quality. The result is
that Aspirus has maintained monopoly power while continuing to
charge supracompetitive prices.

The Defendants allegedly injured the Plaintiffs and the Class
through a continuing anticompetitive scheme involving the illegal
maintenance and enhancement of Aspirus's monopoly power in two
health care services markets in North-Central Wisconsin.

The Plaintiffs are two Wisconsin family businesses, each offering a
self-funded health plan for employees and their families.

Aspirus is a health care provider in Northern and Central
Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Timothy W. Burns, Esq.
          Leakhena Au, Esq.
          BURNS BOWEN BAIR
          LLP 10 E. Doty Street Suite 600
          Madison, WI 53703
          Telephone: (608) 286-2808
          E-mail: tburns@bbblawllp.com
               lau@bbblawllp.com


              - and -

          Daniel J. Walker, Esq.
          Robert E. Litan, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          2001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 300
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 559-9745
          E-mail: dwalker@bm.net
                  rlitan@bm.net

              - and -

          Eric L. Cramer, Esq.
          Shanon J. Carson, Esq.
          Abigail J. Gertner, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          1818 Market Street Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-3000
          E-mail: ecramer@bm.net
                  scarson@bm.net
                  agertner@bm.net

              - and -

          Jamie Crooks, Esq.
          FAIRMARK PARTNERS LLP
          1499 Massachusetts Avenue
          NW Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone: (619) 507-4182
          E-mail: jamie@fairmarklaw.com

ASSURANCE IQ: Smith Files TCPA Suit in D. Arizona
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Assurance IQ LLC. The
case is styled as Jonathan Smith, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. Assurance IQ LLC doing business as:
Mortgage.net, Case No. 2:22-cv-01732-GMS (D. Ariz., Oct. 11,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Assurance IQ -- http://www.assurance.com/-- is a licensed
representative of Medicare Advantage HMO, PPO and PPFS
organizations and prescription drug plans with a Medicare
contract.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC - AUSTIN, TX
          401 Congress Ave., Ste. 1540
          Austin, TX 78701
          Phone: (512) 803-1578
          Fax: (561) 961-5684
          Email: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com

               - and -

          James Lee Davidson, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Rd., Ste. 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Phone: (561) 826-5477
          Fax: (561) 961-5684
          Email: jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com

AT&T INC: Parties Seek to Continue Class Cert Hearing
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Timothy Scott, Patricia
Gilchrist, Karen Fisher, Helen Maldonado-Valtierra, John Griffin,
Kenneth Rhodes, Judy Dougherty, John Kelly, Richard Walshon, and
Dan Koval, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. AT&T Inc., AT&T Services, Inc. and the AT&T Pension
Benefit Plan, Case No. 3:20-cv-07094-JD (N.D. Cal.), the Parties
ask the Court to enter an order continuing the hearing on
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the Defendants'
motion to exclude Ian Altman's Expert Opinion and the deadline for
dispositive and Daubert motions as follows:

   -- Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion           Jan. 26, 2023
      for Class Certification and
      Defendants' Motion to Exclude
      Ian Altman’s Expert Opinions
      and Testimony:

   -- Deadline to file dispositive            Feb. 16, 2023
      and Daubert motions:


   -- Deadline to file opposition             March 16, 2023
      to dispositive and Daubert
      motions:

   -- Deadline to file replies in             April 13, 2023
      support of dispositive and
      Daubert motions:

   -- Hearing on dispositive and              May 3, 2023
      Daubert motions:

AT&T Inc is an American multinational telecommunications holding
company headquartered at Whitacre Tower in Downtown Dallas, Texas.


A copy of the Parties' motion dated Oct. 10, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3yIV8Xs at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by

          Mary Bortscheller, Esq.
          Michelle C. Yau, Esq.
          Kai H. Richter, Esq.
          Daniel R. Sutter, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Ave, NW, Fifth Floor
          Washington DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699

               - and -

          Todd Jackson, Esq.
          Nina Wasow, Esq.
          FEINBERG, JACKSON, WORTHMAN & WASOW, LLP
          2030 Addison St., Suite 500
          Berkeley, CA 94704
          Telephone: (510) 269-7998
          Facsimile: (510) 269-7994

               - and -

          Peter K. Stris, Esq.
          Rachana A. Pathak, Esq.
          Victor O'Connell, Esq.
          John Stokes, Esq.
          Colleen R. Smith, Esq.
          Shaun P. Martin, Esq.
          STRIS & MAHER LLP
          777 S. Figueroa St., Suite 3850
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 995-6800
          Facsimile: (213) 261-0299

The Defendants are represented by

          Abigail M. Bartine, Esq.
          Nancy G. Ross, Esq.
          Abigail M. Bartine, Esq.
          Megan E. Troy, Esq.
          Reginald Goeke, Esq.
          Robert C. Double III, Esq.
          MAYER BROWN LLP
          71 South Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 782-0600
          Facsimile: (312) 701-7711

ATLARGE INC: August Sues Over Failure to Pay Hours Worked
---------------------------------------------------------
Lydia August, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. ATLARGE, INC., INVISIBLE VENTURES LLC, and ANAND
PALLEGAR, Individually, Case No. 8:22-cv-02325-CEH-TGW (M.D. Fla.,
Oct. 11, 2022), is brought against the Defendants willful violation
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") by failing and refusing to
pay the Plaintiff for the hours worked.

Throughout her employment with the Defendants, the Plaintiff worked
in excess of 40 hours per week, for which she was not compensated
at the overtime rate. The Plaintiff is entitled to be paid overtime
compensation for all overtime hours worked for the Defendants. The
Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff overtime at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work
performed in excess of 40 hours in a work week, violates the FLSA.
The Defendants failed and refused to pay the Plaintiff for the
hours worked and her unpaid accrued vacation. The Plaintiff has
repeatedly requested her earned wages from the Defendants and to
date he has not been compensated, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from August 2021 to
January 20, 2022 as a full time Community Engagement Manager.

ATLARGE, is a Florida profit corporation authorized and doing
business in this Judicial District.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Wolfgang M. Florin, Esq.
          Christopher D. Gray, Esq.
          FLORIN GRAY BOUZAS OWENS, LLC
          16524 Pointe Village Drive, Suite 100
          Lutz, FL 33558
          Phone (727) 220-4000
          Facsimile (727) 483-7942
          Email: wflorin@fgbolaw.com
                 cgray@fgbolaw.com


AWP INC: Kasiotis Appeals FLSA Class Suit Dismissal to 6th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
JACK KASIOTIS, et al. are taking an appeal from a court order
dismissing their lawsuit styled Jack Kasiotis, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AWP,
Inc., d/b/a Area Wide Protective, Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-00648, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action suit, which was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio, alleges that the Defendant failed to
compensate the Plaintiffs and similarly situated traffic control
specialists for all hours worked, including overtime wages, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

On April 18, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' complaint.

On January 24, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC"), adding Mary Ware as Plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs' SAC is brought on behalf of traffic control
specialists employed by the Defendant. According to the Plaintiffs,
the Defendant failed to pay them for all hours worked, resulting in
unpaid earned wages, including overtime compensation at the rate of
one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all of the
hours they worked over 40 hours each workweek, in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Sections 201-219.

The Plaintiffs also assert a class action claim for unpaid wages in
violation of New York wage and hour laws, in particular 12 NYCRR
Section 142-2.1 et seq. ("New York Wage Law") pursuant to NY CLS
Labor Section 198; violations of the Indiana Wage Payment Statute
I.C. 22-2-5 et seq. ("IWPS"); and violations of Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act of 1968, 43 P.S. Sections 333.101, et seq.

The Plaintiffs contend the Defendant provides temporary work zone
traffic control and flagging throughout the United States. They
were employed as traffic control specialists and were paid at an
hourly rate. They performed various duties, including standing and
controlling traffic through temporary work zones, as well as
transporting equipment, tools, and other traffic control
specialists to the Defendant's worksites.

The Defendant contends its arguments are amenable to resolution on
a motion for judgment on the pleadings as there is no factual
dispute on the nature of the work performed. As none of the
Plaintiffs' alleged compensable job duties are integral and
indispensable to their principal activities, the Defendant asserts
they are barred by the Portal to Portal Act ("PPA") and the
Employee Commuting Flexibility Act ("ECFA") and the Plaintiffs' SAC
must be dismissed. The Defendant further argues that the
Plaintiffs' state law claims fail as a matter of law because New
York, Pennsylvania and Indiana state wage laws are identical to the
FLSA and therefore, for the same reasons the Plaintiffs' FLSA claim
fails, their state law claims fail as well. Moreover, the Defendant
asserts that the Indiana state statute the Plaintiffs bring their
state law claim under only permits recovery for late payment of
wages, not non-payment of wages.

The Defendant moved for judgment on Plaintiff Mary Ware's
Pennsylvania state law claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because her employment is governed by a collective
bargaining agreement and her claim is preempted by Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Her claim further fails
because the CBA expressly requires the Plaintiffs grieve any
disputes over wages under the FLSA or any state wage statute.

On September 16, 2022, based on the allegations in the SAC, the
relevant statues, legislative history and caselaw, Judge
Christopher A. Boyko dismissed the Plaintiff's FLSA claim. Judge
Boyko opined that there does not appear to be any serious dispute,
that mere commute time to and from the flagger-passengers pick up
site is not compensable. At issue is the time spent by
flagger-drivers from a flagger-passenger pick up site to a
designated worksite and the time spent driving from the worksite to
the flagger-passengers drop off site.

Judge Boyko agreed with the Defendant that pre- and post-trip
vehicle inspections and the transportation of tools are not
compensable as these are incidental to the Plaintiffs' principal
activities under the ECFA. Neither is the time spent fueling a
vehicle compensable under the ECFA, and its legislative history as
it is incidental to the commute.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Judge Boyko granted in part
the Defendant's motion and dismissed the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims.
He declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' state law claims and ruled that these are dismissed
without prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned as Jack Kasiotis, et al. v. AWP,
Inc., Case No. 22-3858, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, filed on October 11, 2022. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants JACK KASIOTIS, et al., on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, are represented by:

            Hans Andrew Nilges, Esq.
            NILGES DRAHER
            7034 Braucher Street, N.W., Suite B
            North Canton, OH 44720
            Telephone: (330) 470-4428

Defendant-Appellee AWP, INC., dba Area Wide Protective, is
represented by:

            Carl H. Gluek, Esq.
            FRANTZ WARD
            200 Public Square, Suite 3000
            Cleveland, OH 44114
            Telephone: (216) 515-1660

BHP GROUP: Australia High Court Ruling in Shareholders' Suit Cited
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ross McInnes, Esq., James Walker, Esq., and Aaron Moss, Esq., of
Clayton Utz, disclosed that the ruling by the High Court allowing
foreign resident group members in a shareholder class action raises
strategic and practical challenges for potential respondents sued
under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
(BHP Group Limited v Impiombato [2022] HCA 33).

The class action against BHP
BHP Group Limited (BHP) is the respondent in a class action
relating to the failure of the Fundao Dam in Brazil in 2015. The
group members include persons who owned shares in BHP entities
listed in Australia, the UK and South Africa; share prices declined
significantly following the Dam's collapse. Group members allege
they suffered losses resulting from BHP's failure to disclose
information about problems with the Dam, which they say amounts to
misleading or deceptive conduct and contraventions of the listed
entities' continuous disclosure obligations.

Evidence considered by the primary judge indicated that the class
action may include a substantial number of foreign residents as
group members in the Australian class action proceedings.

The High Court's decision: foreign resident group members are in
BHP argued that foreign residents should be excluded from the
Australian class action proceedings relying on a presumption, which
exists under the common law and statute, that Australian laws do
not have extraterritorial effect. This argument was rejected both
by the primary judge and the Full Federal Court. BHP was granted
special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which also
rejected it.

Chief Justice Kiefel and Justice Gageler rejected BHP's argument
because:

   * BHP accepted that a foreign resident could be a representative
party in a class action and failed to overcome the "immediate
logical hurdle" this created for its argument about group members;

   * BHP's argument impermissibly involved the making of
implications or imposing limitations not found in the words used in
Part IVA; and

   * the Federal Court otherwise had jurisdiction to hear the
claims raised in the class action. Their Honours stated that "Part
IVA as a whole is concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Federal Court. That is the bottom line".

Justices Gordon, Edelman and Steward rejected BHP's argument for
similar reasons to Chief Justice Kiefel and Justice Gageler, and in
addition said:

   * "Part IVA is a procedural mechanism that allows for the
grouping of existing claims" and there was no dispute that the
Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear the claims raised in the
class action;

   * Part IVA was enacted on the understanding that the Federal
Court's jurisdiction was "dependent on the amenability of the
respondent [ie. BHP] to the jurisdiction, not the presence in the
territory of persons on whose behalf the proceeding is being
advanced";

   * Parliament did not exclude foreign residents from the Federal
Court's jurisdiction when enacting Part IVA and instead included
opt out provisions "as the statutory mechanism to ensure that
persons are not made subject to the Court's jurisdiction (or bound
by a judgment given in a representative proceeding) if they are
unwilling to participate"; and

   * BHP's argument was contrary to the text, history and purpose
of Part IVA.

Practical consequences for class action respondents
The High Court's decision is consistent with the law as propounded
by the Courts below. While clear in its operation, the decision
raises difficult practical questions for respondents to class
action proceedings, including how to:

   * assess class action risk in relation to matters that may
include foreign resident group members;

   * ascertain the number and identity of foreign resident group
members, such as when preparing for mediation or settlement; and

   * communicate with foreign resident group members, such as when
conducting an opt-out procedure.

As the High Court's ruling relies on the specific statutory
jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Court, it remains to be seen
whether the ruling will be interpreted to permit the inclusion of
foreign resident group members in class actions commenced under
State and Territory class action legislation modelled on Part IVA.
This will likely depend on the claims being considered by State and
Territory Courts and the interpretation of their empowering
legislation, risking inconsistent approaches between jurisdictions.
[GN]

BLOCK INC: Esposito Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
-------------------------------------------------------------
Donna Esposito, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. BLOCK, INC., JACK DORSEY, and AMRITA AHUJA, Case No.
1:22-cv-08636 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 11, 2022), is brought on behalf of
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Block
securities between November 4, 2021 and April 4, 2022, inclusive
(the "Class Period"), pursuing claims against the Defendants under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as a result of the Defendants'
materially false and/or misleading statements.

On April 4, 2022, Block announced that a former employee had
improperly downloaded certain reports of the Company's subsidiary,
Cash App Investing, on December 10, 2021. The information in the
reports included full customer names and brokerage account numbers,
as well as brokerage portfolio value, brokerage portfolio holdings
and/or stock trading activity. As many as 8.2 million Cash App
Investing customers were affected. Prior to April 4, 2022, the
company had not disclosed this information to shareholders. On this
news, the Company's stock fell $9.27, or 6.4%, to close at $135.92
per share on April 5, 2022, thereby injuring investors.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: that the
Company lacked adequate protocols restricting access to customer
sensitive information; that, as a result, a former employee was
able to download certain reports of the Company's subsidiary, Cash
App Investing, containing full customer names and brokerage account
numbers, as well as brokerage portfolio value, brokerage portfolio
holdings and/or stock trading activity; that, as a result, the
Company was reasonably likely to suffer significant damage,
including reputational harm; and that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendant's positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased Block securities during the Class Period.

Block, formerly known as Square Inc., is a technology company that
creates financial service tools.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory B. Linkh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Ave., Suite 358
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          Email: glinkh@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160

               - and -

          Howard G. Smith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD G. SMITH
          3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112
          Bensalem PA 19020
          Phone: (215) 638-4847
          Facsimile: (215) 638-4867


BLUE SHIELD: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Claims in Saloojas Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's claims in the lawsuit titled SALOOJAS INC., Plaintiff
v. BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-03267-MMC (N.D. Cal.).

Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Original Class Action Complaint, filed Aug. 5, 2022. In the Motion,
the Defendant seeks, inter alia, an order dismissing each of the
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.

By its complaint, Saloojas brings six claims for relief, each
identified by a Roman numeral. The Court addresses the claims in
the sequence alleged.

Claim I, titled "Violation of the FFCRA and the CARES Act," is
subject to dismissal, for the reason that, as the overwhelming
majority of district courts to have addressed the issue have found,
neither Section 6001 of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act
("FFCRA"), nor Section 3202 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act ("CARES Act") creates a private right of
action, Judge Chesney holds.

Claim II, titled "Violation of Section 501(a)(1)(B) of ERISA," is
subject to dismissal because Saloojas lacks standing to state a
claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Judge
Chesney finds.

Claim III, titled "Violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c)," is
subject to dismissal because Saloojas fails to allege facts
sufficient to support a finding that Blue Shield engaged in
racketeering activity, Judge Chesney holds. To the extent the claim
is predicated on mail and/or wire fraud allegations, Judge Chesney
finds Saloojas fails to state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake.

Claim IV, titled "Promissory Estoppel (Non-ERISA)," is subject to
dismissal because Saloojas fails to plead facts identifying any
promise by Blue Shield, let alone a "clear and unambiguous" promise
to reimburse it for the full amount of Covid-19 testing prices,
Judge Chesney holds, adding it cites no authority supporting its
contention that past payment can be construed as a promise of
future payment.

Claim V, titled "Injunctive Relief (Non-ERISA)," is, as pleaded,
derivative of Claim I through Claim IV and, consequently, is, for
the reasons stated, subject to dismissal. Judge Chesney adds that
injunctive relief is not an independent cause of action, but,
rather, a remedy.

Claim VI, titled "Unlawful, Unfair and Fraudulent Business Acts and
Practices" and brought under Section 17200 of the California
Business & Professions Code, is, as pleaded, derivative of Claim I
through Claim IV and, consequently, is, for the reasons stated,
subject to dismissal, Judge Chesney holds.

The Court will afford Saloojas leave to amend Claims III, IV, and
VI, to cure, if it can do so, the deficiencies identified.

For the reasons stated, Blue Shield's motion to dismiss is granted,
with leave to amend Claims III, IV, and VI. Saloojas's amended
complaint, if any, will be filed no later than Oct. 25, 2022.
Saloojas may not, however, add any new claims or defendants without
obtaining leave of court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 3, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ynfnamvw from Leagle.com.


BLUECREW LLC: Dela Cruz Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bluecrew, LLC, et al.
The case is styled as Michael Dela Cruz, an individual, on behalf
of, himself and on behalf of all persons similarly situated v.
Bluecrew, LLC, Bluecrew Staffing, Inc., Does 1 through 50,
Inclusive, Case No. CGC22602240 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco
Cty., Oct. 11, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Non-Exempt Complaints."

BlueCrew -- https://www.bluecrewjobs.com/ -- is an on-demand
platform exclusively for flexible W-2 work.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas James Blouw, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037-3107
          Phone: 858-952-0354
          Fax: 858-551-1232
          Email: DeBlouw@bamlawca.com


BNSF RAILWAY: Squire Patton Attorneys Discuss Ruling in BIPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kristin L. Bryan, Esq. and David J. Oberly, Esq., of Squire Patton
Boggs (US) LLP, in an article for The National Law Review, report
that in January 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court opened the
floodgates to class action litigation pursued under the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA") when the state's highest
court held in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186,
129 N.E.3d 1197 (Ill. 2019), that plaintiffs do not have to allege
any actual injury or damages to pursue claims under the state's
biometric privacy statute; instead, mere technical violations of
the law are sufficient. Today, the world of biometric privacy
litigation experienced a development noteworthy enough to put it on
equal footing with Rosenbach, with a jury finding in favor of a
class of Illinois truck drivers in the first BIPA class action to
be tried to verdict.

In that case, Rogers v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 19 CV 3083 (N.D. Ill.),
Richard Rogers ("Rogers") alleged that his former employer, BNSF
Railway Co. ("BNSF"), violated BIPA's privacy policy, data
retention/destruction, notice, and consent requirements when it
collected and stored his and other truck drivers' biometric data
without obtaining their consent or informing them of the company's
data retention policies. Importantly, however, BNSF itself was not
involved in any activities associated with the collection or use of
biometric data. Instead, the company contracted with a third-party
vendor, Remprex, to operate the equipment that collected Rogers'
fingerprints, which purportedly failed to follow the requirements
of Section 15(b).

On the eve of trial, BNSF filed a motion in limine, moving to
exclude evidence, testimony, or argument suggesting that it was or
could be held liable under BIPA for the acts of any third parties,
including Remprex. The court disagreed, finding that vicarious
liability could be asserted in the context of BIPA disputes—and
allowing the case to proceed to trial. After closing arguments, the
jury needed less than an hour to return its verdict in favor of the
class of truck drivers. The jury only decided the issue of
liability and was not tasked with calculating damages, which will
be assessed by the court at a later date. With that said, using
back-of-the-envelope calculations -- and assuming that the court
applies BIPA's lower $1,000 negligent violation statutory damages
amount and awards damages only for the initial finger scan of each
class member that ran afoul of the law (as opposed to every scan
under a continuing violation theory), damages still amounts to a
staggering $44 million.

The potential implications of Rogers cannot be overstated. For
starters, the fact that a jury needed under an hour to reach its
verdict indicates that it was not even a close call in the jurors'
eyes as to whether the conduct at issue violated BIPA. In addition,
the fact that the jury found against the defendant -- despite the
fact that the railroad did not itself actively collect, use, or
possess any biometric data -- provides further support for the
critical but unsettled issue of vicarious liability in BIPA class
action disputes. Ultimately, the likely impact of the Rogers
verdict will be an immediate uptick in the volume of BIPA class
action filings moving forward. At the same time, the ruling will
also almost certainly be used by plaintiff's attorneys during
settlement negotiations in future class actions to drive up the
already-inflated value of BIPA claims.

Furthermore -- beyond Rogers -- consumers, employees, businesses,
and their counsel are all anxiously awaiting the Illinois Supreme
Court's much-anticipated opinion in Cothron v. White Castle Sys.,
No. 128004 (Ill Sup. Ct.), which will definitively resolve the
currently unsettled issue of claim accrual in BIPA litigation.
Depending on how the court answers the question of whether every
discrete failure to comply with BIPA's requirements amounts to a
separate, independent violation of the statute, the scope of
liability exposure and damages underlying BIPA class actions may
further increase once again for those companies that leverage the
benefits of biometrics in their day-to-day operations.

Combined, companies that have put off evaluating their biometric
data collection and processing practices should do so immediately
with the assistance of experienced biometric privacy counsel to
assess their level of compliance with BIPA and similar laws and
remediate any gaps as soon as practicable. [GN]

BNSF RAILWAY: Truck Drivers Won $228-M Judgment in BIPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Skye Witley, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that a class of
more than 45,000 truck drivers won a $228 million judgment in the
first biometrics privacy class action to go to trial in Illinois,
after a jury found that BNSF Railway Co. violated state law by
collecting employee fingerprints without proper consent.

Jon Loevy, the lead trial attorney for the plaintiffs, confirmed
the verdict to Bloomberg Law. BNSF's loss marks the first look at
how jury trials might play out in similar Biometric Information
Privacy Act class actions.

"The verdict confirms that people care about privacy and they care
when those rights are violated," Loevy said.

BNSF spokesperson Lena Kent said the company plans to appeal.

"We disagree with and are disappointed by the jury's verdict and
think the decision reflects a misunderstanding of key issues," Kent
said.

The lawsuit was filed by truck driver Richard Rogers, who alleged
that he was required to scan his fingerprint to confirm his
identity and access BNSF facilities. The company failed to disclose
the purpose of collecting fingerprints and did not publish a data
retention or destruction policy as required by law, Rogers
alleged.

BNSF argued in subsequent filings that it should not be held liable
for biometric data collection conducted on its behalf by a
third-party contractor, Remprex LLC., an argument Judge Matthew
Kennelly of the US District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois rejected in September.

After a five-day trial, the jury found that BNSF had recklessly or
intentionally violated BIPA 45,600 times, one violation per class
action member. The decision subjects BNSF to the maximum BIPA
penalty of $5,000 per violation.

BIPA, enacted in 2008, is the first state law addressing biometric
privacy, turning Illinois into a legal battleground for companies
accused of improperly collecting fingerprints, eye scans, and other
biological data from consumers or workers. A pending case in the
Illinois Supreme Court will determine whether companies are liable
for just the first violation of an individual's BIPA-protected
rights, or for all subsequent violations.

McGuire Law PC and Loevy & Loevy represent Rogers. Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP and Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP represent BNSF.

The case is Rogers v. BNSF Ry. Co., N.D. Ill., No. 19-cv-03083,
verdict 10/12/22. [GN]

BP RETIREMENT: 5th Cir. Affirms Press Intervention in Guenther Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FREDRIC A. GUENTHER; WALTON FUJIMOTO, LES OWEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. BP RETIREMENT ACCUMULATION PLAN; BP
CORPORATION NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Defendants-Appellees v.
MICHAEL PRESS, Movant-Appellant, Case No. 21-20617 (5th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirms the order
granting the Appellant's motion to intervene.

The Appellees have been adversaries in a protracted class action
for over six years, based on disputed events occurring more than
thirty years ago. After almost five years of litigation, and on the
eve of class certification, the Appellant, who has separately been
engaged in an action against the Defendants-Appellees, moved to
intervene. Despite their differences, the Appellees agreed that
this motion should be denied. The district court subsequently
denied Appellant's motion, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the
Appellees continue to jointly oppose the Appellant's intervention.

In 1987, a subsidiary of British Petroleum, now known as BP Corp.
North America Inc. ("BP America," a Defendant-Appellee in this
action), acquired Standard Oil of Ohio ("Sohio"). Prior to the
acquisition, Sohio employees were members of a Sohio sponsored
defined benefit retirement plan, which calculated its pension
distributions using a formula based on an employee's earnings
history, tenure of service, and age. Therefore, once employees
contributed to the Sohio Plan, Sohio bore the entirety of the
investment risk as distribution amounts were based on a
predetermined formula that did not account for market performance.

At the time of the acquisition, Sohio's employees became employees
of BP America (the "Sohio Legacy Employees"). On Jan. 1, 1988, BP
America converted the Sohio Plan, along with several other defined
benefit plans, into a new plan called the BP America Retirement
Plan (the "ARP"). Notably, the ARP was also a defined benefit plan
that retained the formula used by the Sohio Plan to calculate its
members' pension distributions. One year later, however, BP America
converted the ARP into the BP Retirement Accumulation Plan (the
"RAP"), the other Defendant-Appellee in this action. Unlike its
predecessor plans, the RAP was a cash balance plan, which
calculated distributions, in part, based on fluctuating interest
rates. Thus, under the RAP, employees bore some additional risk
because distributions were now based, in part, on market
performance.

On April 13, 2016, the Plaintiffs-Appellees, two Sohio Legacy
Employees, Fredric A. Guenther and Walton Fujimoto, (the "Guenther
Plaintiffs") filed a class action complaint against the RAP and BP
America (collectively, "BP") in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas alleging that BP violated numerous
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")
by causing Sohio Legacy Employees to forfeit benefits that they had
already accrued and failing to properly disclose this change in
their benefits when BP initiated the Conversion.

Specifically, the Guenther Plaintiffs alleged that BP should have
credited the Sohio Legacy Employees' new RAP opening account
balances with the value of their ARP ending account balances as of
the Conversion Date, Jan. 1, 1989. But according to them, BP
instead calculated the Sohio Legacy Employees' ARP ending account
balances as of a date earlier than the Conversion Date. BP then
calculated the present value for those ARP ending account balances
as of the Conversion Date using an interest rate of 8%, which they
claimed was unreasonably high, and thus, perpetually undervalued
the Sohio Legacy Employees' accrued benefits as reflected in their
RAP account balances. The complaint also alleged that BP
misrepresented to Sohio Legacy Employees that their benefits under
the RAP would be "as good or better" than those that they had
received under the ARP.

Accordingly, the Guenther Plaintiffs sought reformation of the RAP
so that those Sohio Legacy Employees whose retirement benefits were
negatively affected would be in as good a financial position as
they would have been had they remained members of the ARP.

After the Guenther Plaintiffs amended their complaint (while
maintaining the core of their allegations, claims, and the relief
they sought in their original complaint), BP moved to dismiss. On
March 13, 2019, the district court granted BP's motion in part,
dismissing all but one count: the count seeking reformation of the
RAP; however, the court ordered the Guenther Plaintiffs to replead
that count "in a manner that specifically states a recognized cause
of action."

On April 5, 2019, the Guenther Plaintiffs filed a second amended
complaint with a single count claiming that BP breached its
fiduciary duties relating to the Conversion in violation of ERISA
Section 404(a). The complaint seeks "all equitable relief to
redress BP's breach of fiduciary duty, including reformation" under
Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. Alternatively, they assert that they
are entitled to the remedies of surcharge or equitable estoppel as
well as "all equitable relief to redress BP's breach of fiduciary
duty."

Following over a year of extensive discovery, the Guenther
Plaintiffs moved to certify their class under both Rules 23(b)(2)
and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; this motion was
subsequently referred by the district court to a magistrate judge.
BP opposed the motion and moved for summary judgment. On March 12,
2021, the magistrate judge issued a recommendation that both a
general class and subclass should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2)
but declined to make a recommendation as to either the general
class's or subclass's viability under Rule 23(b)(3).

The magistrate judge recommended that the general class should
consist of: All persons under age 50 as of Jan. 1, 1989 who were
active participants in the RAP as of Jan. 1, 1989, and whose
retirement benefit under the ARP exceeds the retirement benefit
offered (or that will be offered) by the RAP, as amended on the
benefit commencement date, and the beneficiaries and estates of
such persons and alternate payees under a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order.

The magistrate judge also recommended that the subclass should
consist of all members of the general class who "signed a release
upon separation of employment."

Meanwhile, on Sept. 14, 2020, over four years after the Guenther
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, Movant-Appellant Michael
Press, along with 276 other individuals (the "Press Plaintiffs"),
filed a two-count complaint in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio against BP America and its parent
company BP p.l.c., the successor in interest to British Petroleum.
The Press Plaintiffs, all of whom are Sohio Legacy Employees,
similarly claimed that BP America had breached its fiduciary duties
regarding its disclosures concerning the Conversion in violation of
Section 404(a). They also sought equitable relief under Section
502(a)(3) through either reformation of the RAP, surcharge, or
equitable estoppel.

In its second count, the complaint alleges that BP p.l.c.
"knowingly participated" in BP America's alleged breach of
fiduciary duty and was consequently unjustly enriched. Accordingly,
the Press Plaintiffs sought "restitution and/or disgorgement of
profits in the amount of BP p.l.c.'s unjust enrichment."

BP America subsequently moved to transfer the Press Action to the
Southern District of Texas or alternatively stay that suit pending
the resolution of the Guenther Action. On Dec. 23, 2020, the
district court granted BP America's motion and ordered that the
Press Action be transferred to the Southern District of Texas under
the first-to-file rule, reasoning that the parties and claims in
both cases were "nearly identical" and noting the relatively
advanced stage of the litigation in the Guenther Action. The Press
Action was then stayed upon its transfer to the Texas district
court pending resolution of the class certification motion in the
Guenther Action.

On March 26, 2021, after the magistrate judge had issued his
recommendation for class certification, the Press Plaintiffs moved
to intervene in the Guenther Action "for the purpose of objecting"
to the magistrate judge's recommendation. In their motion, the
Press Plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to intervene as
of right but that the court should allow for permissive
intervention if it found the former theory unpersuasive. On March
31, 2021, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's
recommendation in its entirety without addressing the Press
Plaintiffs' pending motion. The Press Plaintiffs filed their reply
brief on their motion after the district court had adopted the
magistrate judge's recommendation. Acknowledging this development,
they now sought to intervene so that they could opt out of the
newly certified class, or alternatively, enter the Guenther Action
as named plaintiffs.

On Dec. 7, 2021, the district court denied the Press Plaintiffs'
motion to intervene. It first addressed the motion concerning
intervention as of right, which is adjudicated using a four-factor
test. Assuming that the first three factors of this test had been
met, the court devoted its analysis to the fourth factor: whether
the Press Plaintiffs' interests were adequately represented by the
existing parties.

The court determined that both the Guenther and Press Plaintiffs
had the same ultimate objective -- "to remedy a pension shortfall
allegedly caused by breaches of fiduciary duty and violations of
ERISA" -- and thus, there was a presumption of adequate
representation. Accordingly, it denied the motion to the extent the
Press Plaintiffs sought to intervene as of right. Turning next to
the request for permissive intervention, the court concluded that
allowing the Press Plaintiffs to intervene would unduly delay the
resolution of the Guenther Action and that the action's certified
class would adequately represent their interests. Consequently, it
denied the remaining portion of the motion as well.

On appeal, the Press Plaintiffs only challenge the district court's
decision to deny their intervention as of right. They contend that
the certified class in the Guenther Action inadequately represents
their interests, and therefore, they have a right to intervene.

In denying the Press Plaintiffs' motion to intervene as of right,
the district court held that they failed to overcome the
presumption that they shared the same ultimate objective with the
Guenther Plaintiffs. On appeal, the Press Plaintiffs dispute that
holding, arguing that their interests are considerably distinct
from those of the Guenther Plaintiffs, pointing to a slew of
negligible or spurious differences between the two actions.

The Fifth Circuit holds that whether the operative complaint in the
Guenther Action includes the relevant portion of the pension
shortfall theory is a function of litigation strategy -- it does
not reflect the scope of the Guenther Plaintiffs' interests. It
says similar factual allegations underpin the claims in both
actions.

Both groups of plaintiffs allege the same primary harm -- that the
respective defendants made insufficient disclosures regarding the
Conversion -- based on violations of the same provision in ERISA.
Most importantly, both the Guenther and Press Plaintiffs share the
same ultimate objective: they all seek for their retirement plans
to be made whole due to these alleged inaccurate disclosures.

The Fifth Circuit states it is unnecessary for a complaint to
allege every fact or theory that is conceivably relevant so that a
plaintiff may ultimately obtain relief. A complaint opens the door
to litigation; it is not the final word on the matter. The
Plaintiffs are given many opportunities to amend their pleadings
throughout the course of an action, including stages later than
where the Guenther Action currently stands. "If disagreement with
an existing party over trial strategy qualified as inadequate
representation, the requirement of Rule 24 would have no meaning."

The remainder of the Press Plaintiffs' arguments are also
unavailing, all for the same reason: they lack a distinct interest
that is at risk of being adversely represented in the Guenther
Action. First, nowhere in the magistrate judge's recommendation (or
in the district court's order adopting the recommendation) is there
any language precluding the Guenther Plaintiffs from maintaining
their alternate pleadings. Nor do the Press Plaintiffs cite any
authority that such a limitation should be presumed. Second, the
Guenther Plaintiffs' decision to exclude BP p.l.c. from their
action amounts to no more than a strategic decision as well.

Third, the Press Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate how the Guenther
Plaintiffs' chosen defense strategy is uniquely favorable to their
own interests while placing those of them in jeopardy. Fourth,
because the Press Plaintiffs cannot identify a unique interest of
their own, they are unable to specify how a determination in the
Guenther Action could have a future detrimental preclusive effect.

For the reasons, the Fifth Circuit concludes that the Press
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that their interests diverge from
those of the Guenther Plaintiffs in any meaningful way. It is thus
satisfied that the Press Plaintiffs will be adequately represented
despite their absence from the Guenther Action. Therefore, it
affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/dyxv5wu5 from Leagle.com.


BRISTOL WEST INSURANCE: Dey Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Dey, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated v. BRISTOL WEST INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. OF FLORIDA, Case
No. CACE-22-015099 (Fla. 17th Judicial Cir. Ct., Broward Cty., Oct.
10, 2022), is brought against the Defendant for violation of the
Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, which prohibits persons
from communicating with a debtor between the hours of 9:00 PM and
8:00 AM in the debtor's time zone without the prior consent of the
debtor.

On a date better known by the Defendant, the Defendant began
attempting to collect a debt from the Plaintiff. The Consumer Debt
is an obligation allegedly had by the Plaintiff to pay money
arising from a transaction between the creditor of the Consumer
Debt, the Defendant and the Plaintiff. (the "Subject Service"). The
Subject Service was primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes.

On October 9, 2022, the Defendant sent an electronic mail
communication to the Plaintiff. (The "Communication"). The
Communication was a communication in connection with the collection
of the consumer debt. The Communication was sent from
feedback@bristolwest.com and delivered to the Plaintiff's personal
email address. The Communication was sent to the Plaintiff at 6:44
AM in the Plaintiff's time zone. The communication was received by
the Plaintiff from the Defendant at 6:44 AM in the Plaintiff's time
zone. The Defendant did not have the consent of the Plaintiff to
communicate with the Plaintiff between the hours of 9:00 PM and
8:00 AM. As such by and through the communication the Defendant
violated the FCCPA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person, and a citizen of the State of
Florida, residing in Broward County, Florida.

The Defendant is a Florida corporation with its principal place of
business located in sunrise, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          Jennifer G. Simil, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: 954-907-1136
          Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
                 jen@jibraellaw.com

CALIFORNIA: Bid for Temporary Stay of Ashker v. Pfeiffer Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California denies the Plaintiff's motion to
temporarily stay the lawsuit styled TODD ASHKER, Plaintiff v. C.
PFEIFFER, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-00423-ADA-EPG (PC)
(E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff is a state inmate proceeding pro se in this civil
rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Before the
Court is the Plaintiff's motion to temporarily stay this case
pending resolution of related claim(s) in Ashker v. Newsom ("Ashker
I"), N.D. CA, Case No. 4:09-05796.

The Plaintiff argues that the case should be stayed because the
resolution of the related claim(s) in the class action case may
have a clear and substantial impact on a key part of the case at
bar; thereby, simplifying many parts of the case at bar relating
to: appointment of counsel, discovery, dispositive motions,
settlement, and trial. He adds that absent a stay, he faces the
real threat of serious harm to both the class action pending
anti-retaliation ruling, and related claim(s) in this case.

The Plaintiff alleges that this action is proceeding on claims that
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR")
defendants violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by subjecting him to retaliation in response to his role in
Ashker I, as well as the related prisoner hunger strike actions. He
alleges that after he was released from solitary confinement, he
arrived at Kern Valley State Prison and was placed in General
Population. However, in 2017 he was placed and retained in
Administrative Segregation.

Mr. Ashker further alleges that a core part of this case involves
his placement in Administrative Segregation from May 2017 through
the present. This same issue has been the subject of a
five-and-a-half-year legal challenge by his legal team in Ashker I
as a violation of the settlement agreement's anti-retaliation
clause. They are also waiting for a ruling on their challenge to
the over-redactions of thousands of pages evidence, many of which
are key evidence supporting the Plaintiff's anti-retaliation clause
motion and related claims in this case.

The Plaintiff does not want to proceed with discovery in this case,
where he does not have the assistance of counsel, prior to the
resolution of the same issues in Ashker I. If this case is not
stayed, there may be conflicting rulings regarding key points of
facts and law, the Plaintiff will not have the ability to obtain
and review key evidence supporting his claims due to the
Defendants' claims of confidentiality, and the Defendants may
attempt to seek a tactical advantage due to him not having counsel
in this action. He also argues that the resolution of the issues in
the class action will potentially provide strong support for the
appointment of counsel in this case.

On Sept. 19, 2022, the Defendants filed what is titled a statement
of non-opposition. However, the Defendants' request relief that is
beyond the scope of the stay and, thus, they do not agree to the
relief as requested by the Plaintiff. Instead, the Defendants
assert that the Plaintiff's motion in Ashker I has been denied.

Thus, the Defendants argue that the stay will likely not be short,
and they ask that the Plaintiff be precluded from seeking damages
for the, perhaps lengthy, period of time the stay is in place.

Judge Grosjean states that it appears that the motions the
Plaintiff identified as a reason to stay this case have already
been resolved. Moreover, the Plaintiff does not ask that this case
be stayed pending resolution of motion(s) for reconsideration and
potential appeal(s). Thus, the Plaintiff's motion is moot.

Applying the relevant factors to this case, the Court finds that
the Plaintiff's motion should be denied. Based on the evidence
presented by the Plaintiff, Judge Grosjean opines that it does not
appear that the Plaintiff will suffer a serious hardship if this
case is allowed to proceed at this time. Additionally, the
Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that a stay will help with the
orderly course of justice, and the Court sees no benefit in staying
the case at this time.

The Court also notes that if the Plaintiff does not want to
prosecute this case at this time, he may enter into a stipulation
with the Defendants to voluntarily dismiss this action or file a
motion to voluntarily dismiss this action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 3, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/753ahrnz from Leagle.com.


CANE BAY: Manago Appeals Case Dismissal to 4th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------
GLENDORA MANAGO, et al. are taking an appeal from a court order
dismissing their first amended complaint in the lawsuit styled
Glendora Manago, et al., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Cane Bay Partners VI, LLLP, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-00945-LKG, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Glendora
Manago filed a class action suit against the Defendants alleging
that the Defendants are involved in a scheme to make online
short-term loans that carry triple-digit interest rates, often
exceeding 800%, and that are illegal in many states.

According to the complaint, non-tribe members David Johnson and
Kirk Chewning and their company Cane Bay Partners VI, LLLP, ran the
lender Makes Cents, Inc. d/b/a MaxLend, a purportedly tribal entity
in North Dakota that makes usurious loans to persons located
throughout the United States. Johnson and Chewning and their
company Cane Bay have been running lending schemes for years. These
schemes have been highly lucrative, says the complaint. The
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages and penalties under state and
federal law for the usurious interest and fees obtained by the
Defendants.

On December 15, 2020, Glendora Manago and similarly situated
individuals filed an amended complaint against the Defendants.

In the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants
have engaged in a scheme to provide short-term, usurious loans, in
violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Sections 1961-68; the Maryland Consumer Loan
Law ("MCLL"), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law Sections 12-301-12-307,
11-201-11-223; the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), Md.
Code Ann., Com. Law Sections 13-101-13-501d; and other state laws.
The Plaintiffs assert 21 counts against the Defendants and seek,
among other things, to recover monetary damages from the Cane Bay
Defendants and to receive prospective injunctive and declaratory
relief from the Tribal Defendants.

On February 4, 2022, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' amended complaint, which Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby
granted through an order entered on September 2, 2022.

The Court determined that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged
civil RICO and RICO conspiracy claims in the amended complaint,
because the amended complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations
to demonstrate the existence of a RICO enterprise. In the absence
of a viable federal RICO claim, the Out-of-State Plaintiffs cannot
establish pendant jurisdiction to pursue their state law claims. A
careful reading of the amended complaint also showed that Plaintiff
Manago's MCLL, MCPA, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy claims
are not plausible, and that without these state law claims, there
is no legal basis for her requests for declaratory and injunctive
relief.

The appellate case is captioned Glendora Manago v. Cane Bay
Partners VI, LLLP, Case No. 22-2044, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed on October 4, 2022. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants GLENDORA MANAGO, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

            John G. Albanese, Esq.
            BERGER MONTAGUE PC
            1229 Tyler Street, NE
            Minneapolis, MN 55413
            Telephone: (612) 594-5997

                   - and -

            Eleanor Michelle Drake, Esq.
            BERGER MONTAGUE PC
            1229 Tyler Street, NE
            Minneapolis, MN 55413
            Telephone: (612) 594-5933

                   - and -

            Sophia Marie Rios, Esq.
            BERGER MONTAGUE PC
            401 B. Street
            San Diego, CA 92101
            Telephone: (619) 489-0300

                   - and -

            Martin Eugene Wolf, Esq.
            GORDON & WOLF, CHTD
            100 West Pennsylvania Avenue
            Towson, MD 21204
            Telephone: (410) 825-2300

Defendants-Appellees CANE BAY PARTNERS VI, LLLP, et al., are
represented by:

            David Neal Anthony, Esq.
            TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
            P.O. Box 1122
            Richmond, VA 23218-1122
            Telephone: (804) 697-5410

                   - and -

            Ashley Vinson Crawford, Esq.
            Danielle C. Ginty, Esq.
            AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD
            580 California Street
            San Francisco, CA 94104
            Telephone: (415) 765-9500

                   - and -

            Mary Zinsner, Esq.
            TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
            401 9th Street, NW
            Washington, DC 20004
            Telephone: (202) 274-1932

                   - and -

            Nicole Ducheneaux, Esq.
            BIG FIRE LAW & POLICY GROUP LLP
            1905 Harney Street
            Omaha, NE 68102
            Telephone: (531) 466-8725

                   - and -

            Tony S. Lee, Esq.
            FLETCHER, HEALD & HILDRETH, PLC
            1300 North 17th Street
            Arlington, VA 22209
            Telephone: (703) 812-0442

                   - and -

            Peter J. Breuer, Esq.
            FREDERICKS LAW FIRM
            10541 Racine Street
            Commerce City, CO 80022
            Telephone: (720) 883-8580

                   - and -

            Friend Gansler, Esq.
            CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP
            700 6th Street, NW
            Washington, DC 20001
            Telephone: (202) 862-2300

                   - and -

            Leonika Rose Charging-Davison, Esq.
            BIG FIRE LAW & POLICY GROUP LLP
            1404 Fort Crook Road South
            Bellevue, NE 68005
            Telephone: (531) 466-8725

CARNIVAL CORP: Class Action Trial Over COVID-19 Outbreak Kicked Off
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Lauren Croft, writing for LawyersWeekly, reports that the class
action trial against Carnival and Princess Cruise Lines has kicked
off in the Federal Court, predicted to last at least four weeks.

The class action was first launched by Shine Lawyers in July 2020,
following a massive COVID-19 outbreak on board the Ruby Princess,
resulting in the deaths of 28 passengers and an extensive spread of
the virus.

Shine Lawyers alleged that the defendants broke Australian consumer
laws by breaching consumer guarantees when they engaged in conduct
that was misleading and deceptive. The firm also alleges that the
operators of the cruise ship were negligent and failed a duty of
care to provide passengers with a safe environment.

Of the 1679 Australians onboard the ship, 663 are believed to have
contracted COVID-19. The ship eventually turned around and docked
back in Sydney on 19 March as passengers left the ship -- some
still ill -- to catch buses, trains and even flights to get home.

In his opening submissions for the lead plaintiff Susan Karpik, Ian
Pike SC said that those who fell sick on board, as well as their
families, suffered "loss and damage" as a result of mismanagement
by the operator -- and said the ship "never should have sailed".

Mr Pike submitted that the company was well aware there could be a
COVID outbreak on board -- by the departure date, there had been
over 100,000 COVID cases globally in over 90 countries. Two other
ships in the Princess Cruises fleet had also had outbreaks,
including seven deaths and 700 cases onboard the Diamond Princess,
which sailed out of Japan.

He said that Carnival should have taken "reasonable precautions" to
stop the spread of COVID-19 and should have exercised a better duty
of care for their passengers.

"What occurred was not an accident; it was something very likely to
have occurred," he said.

Ms Karpik boarded the Ruby Princess with her husband Henry, and
subsequently contracted COVID. However, Mr Karpik suffered
extensively as a result, spending four weeks in a medically induced
coma and now requiring constant care.

Speaking outside the Federal Court on (12 October) ahead of the
trial, Shine Lawyers class actions practice leader and lead
solicitor on the case Vicky Antzoulatos said she looked forward to
the weeks ahead.

"The Ruby Princess sailed two and a half years ago on its fateful
journey in the early days of the pandemic. We're here today to seek
justice for the thousands of passengers who were on board the
ship," she said.

"To seek justice for the people who lost their lives to the
outbreak. And the families whose lives were torn apart as a result.
I'd like to take this opportunity to thank our clients who have put
their trust in us to run this case. We look forward to fighting on
their behalf in the weeks ahead."

In the last two years, an inquiry was held and a report was
released on the Ruby Princess COVID-19 disaster. In August 2020,
then-NSW premier Gladys Berejiklian said the tragedy "should and
never will happen again" in the state.

The 2,700 passengers who travelled on the Ruby Princess at the time
of the outbreak are eligible to join the class action, as are the
relatives who suffered psychiatric injuries.

The trial is scheduled to last the next four weeks but could
potentially last until early 2023. [GN]

CHCA BAYSHORE: Farner Sues Over Denied Payment for Hours Worked
---------------------------------------------------------------
Katherine Farner, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. CHCA BAYSHORE, L.P. d/b/a HCA HOUSTON
HEALTHCARE SOUTHEAST and HEALTHTRUST WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS, LLC, Case
No. 3:22-cv-00369 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 10, 2022), is brought under the
Fair Labor Standards Act on behalf of similarly situated nurses who
have been denied payment for all hours worked, including overtime,
were subject to improper deductions from wages, and were denied
bona fide meal periods; and to implicate the longstanding policy of
the Defendants, which fail to properly compensate non-exempt
employees for work during meal periods and for work performed while
"off-the-clock."

Employers are not required to pay employees for meal periods if the
employer can satisfy its burden of demonstrating the employee
received a bona fide meal period which primarily benefits the
employee. The Defendants do not provide bona fide meal periods for
its nurses who are responsible for direct patient care. Nurses who
work for the Defendants are required to remain responsible for
patient care throughout their shift and are expected to perform
duties while "off-the-clock."

Rather than making nurses clock out for their meal periods then
clock back in at the end of a meal period, the Defendants assume
nurses are able to find a 30-minute block of time to enjoy a bona
fide meal period. In fact, this does not typically occur. The
Defendants even go so far as to pressure nurses to falsely state at
the end of their shifts that they received a meal break when the
nurses did not receive a meal break during which they are fully
relieved of all duties. Nonetheless, the Defendants deduct 30
minutes from nurses' shifts for a meal period, when in fact nurses
remain on duty and are continuously subject to interruption during
that time. The Defendants instituted policies and practices that
result in nurses being responsible for patient care throughout
their shift, even when they attempt to have a bite to eat, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed as a registered nurse by the Defendants
at Bayshore Medical Center from June 2021 through February 2022,
and from September 2022 through the present.

CHCA Bayshore, L.P. owns, operates, and/or manages numerous
hospitals in the greater Houston area.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Don J. Foty, Esq.
          William M. Hogg, Esq.
          HODGES & FOTY, LLP
          4409 Montrose Boulevard, Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: (713) 523-0001
          Fax: (713) 523-1116
          Email: dfoty@hftrialfirm.com
                 whogg@hftrialfirm.com


CHERRY CREEK: Mcknight Suit Moved from State Court to D. Colorado
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as GLENN MCKNIGHT and CARLTON A.
SMITH II, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CHERRY CREEK MORTGAGE, LLC, a Delaware company d/b/a
"Blue Spot Home Loans," and STEVEN NAKASH, individually, Case No.
2022CV31756 (Filed Sept. 15, 2022) was removed from Colorado State
Court, County of Arapahoe, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado on  Oct. 11, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the District of Colorado assigned Case No.
1:22-cv-02660 to the proceeding.

The suit alleges that the Defendants failed to pay overtime
compensation in violation of Colorado Wage and Hour laws and the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Cherry Creek Mortgage is a full service mortgage banking company
that embodies the best of the big and small lenders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam M. Harrison, Esq.
          Jesse K. Fishman, Esq.
          HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP
          730 17th Street, Suite 750
          Denver, CO 80202
          E-mail: jfishman@hkm.com
                  aharrison@hkm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Bronwyn H. Pepple, Esq.
          Elizabeth A. Austin, Esq.
          WILLIAMS WEESE PEPPLE & FERGUSON PC
          1801 California St., Suite 3400
          Denver, Colorado 80202
          Telephone: (303) 861-2828
          E-mail: bpepple@williamsweese.com
                  eaustin@williamsweese.com

CITIC CAPITAL: Tang Class Suit Moved to District Court of Delaware
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN YONG TANG and FARIS AL KOOHEJI, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CITIC
CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
21-17008-JXN-AME (D.N.J.), Magistrate Judge Andre M. Espinosa of
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey grants the
Defendants' joint motion to transfer the action to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware or, alternatively, to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.

The matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' joint motion
to transfer the action to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware or, alternatively, to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Delaware. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The
Honorable Julien X. Neals, U.S.D.J., referred the motion to
transfer to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(a).

The civil action arises out of an alleged conspiracy to deprive
certain shareholders of their equity in GNC Holdings, Inc. for the
Defendants' financial gain. GNC is a formerly publicly-traded
Delaware corporation, which maintained a principal place of
business in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania at the time relevant to this
suit. It was engaged in the business of selling nutritional
supplements and marketing other wellness products and services.

According to the operative Second Amended Complaint, the scheme
involved the deliberate mismanagement of GNC to engineer a
situation in which it was purportedly unable to pay its debts and
thus forced to file for bankruptcy, all with the aim of enriching
GNC executives and facilitating the acquisition of GNC's assets by
its majority shareholder Harbin Pharmaceutical Group, allegedly
controlled by defendant CITIC Capital Holdings Ltd.

The Complaint alleges the coordinated activities of the various
Defendants formed an unlawful enterprise, within the meaning the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization ("RICO") statute,
18 U.S.C. Section 1961, which "functioned for the purpose of
allowing CITIC to acquire GNC in its entirety through unlawful
activities and enrich CITIC, its CEO Zhang, along with GNC
Management individual defendants, by working together to avoid
refinancing measures which would have benefitted all shareholders,
while maximizing their financial benefit."

Plaintiffs John Yong Tang, a citizen of New Jersey, and Faris al
Kooheji, a citizen of Bahrain, were each minority shareholders of
GNC Class A common stock. The Defendants are entities and
individuals involved in the alleged conspiracy.

For purposes of this motion, the Defendants can generally be
identified by three groupings: CITIC; the GNC directors and
executives ("GNC Management"); and Evercore, Inc. According to the
Complaint, CITIC is a state-owned Chinese investment company that
controls Harbin. GNC Management consists of the various company
executives who perpetrated the alleged scheme. Evercore advised GNC
on matters of debt restructuring and bankruptcy.

According to the Complaint, CITIC's efforts to acquire GNC date
back to 2017 but were met with resistance from GNC Management. The
Complaint alleges that, although CITIC had been able to purchase an
approximately 40% stake in GNC, through Harbin, it was unsuccessful
in its alleged goal of acquiring the company in its entirety. It
also alleges that "CITIC and its CEO Zhang devised and implemented
an unlawful scheme, aiming at acquiring GNC at the expense of the
Plaintiffs and other minor shareholders through a sequence of
deceiving strategic moves."

The "strategic moves" taken by the Defendants between approximately
2018 and 2021, prior to the bankruptcy filing, are detailed in the
Complaint, over many enumerated paragraphs. Briefly stated, they
consisted of increasing CITIC's control over GNC's board, reducing
GNC's liquidity and overall financial health, driving away
potential investors, and narrowing GNC's options for restructuring
its sizable debt.

According to the Complaint, these actions orchestrated a situation
in which GNC would falsely claim it had no choice but to file for
bankruptcy to manage its financial liabilities. Indeed, according
to the Plaintiffs, "GNC Management had been planning for bankruptcy
for a long time, waiting for an opportunity to implement the
bankruptcy plan to hand the Company to the secured lender in
exchange for a monetary benefit for themselves, with the full
knowledge such acts would cause direct damage to the Plaintiffs and
other minority shareholders."

The Complaint states that, in the beginning of 2020, GNC
Management, CITIC and Evercore "started working to implement the
Chapter 11 filing." It alleges the Defendants used the accelerated
debt obligation of one of GNC's loans as an opportunity to carry
out their ultimate plan of selling GNC's assets to CITIC through
the bankruptcy process.

Under the "Springing Maturity Covenant" of GNC's "Tranche B-2"
loan, the Complaint states, the loan became due on May 16, 2020, if
certain conditions were not satisfied. The Plaintiffs allege that
rather than work to avoid the springing maturity, GNC Management
allowed the acceleration covenant to be triggered, resulting in an
obligation of approximately $109.1 million, which GNC claimed it
lacked the cash to pay.

According to the Complaint, alternatives to bankruptcy were
possible but were left unexplored by GNC Management, which together
with the other Defendants, had "conspired to file for the sham
bankruptcy" to realize the "most monetary benefits" for themselves.
The Complaint alleges that beginning in about April 2020, the
Plaintiffs made concerted efforts to protect the minority
shareholders' interests and prevent the bankruptcy filing. They
communicated repeatedly with GNC Management and Evercore,
presenting alternatives for dealing with GNC's liquidity issues and
urging it not to file for bankruptcy. The Complaint further alleges
the Plaintiffs received false assurances in response.

In May 2020, GNC issued a communication stating it was exploring
options "to address its capital structure -- which has been
exacerbated by the current pandemic" and advising those options
included "filing for voluntary protection under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code." GNC Management negotiated a short extension
of the Tranche B-2 loan's springing maturity date, to June 30,
2020, but according to the Complaint, did so only to create the
impression it was working on a solution to address its debt
obligations.

The alleged scheme to facilitate CITIC's acquisition of GNC assets
culminated with GNC's bankruptcy case, which Plaintiffs assert
"would completely wipe out the GNC shareholder" but "greatly
benefit Defendant ABC Company, GNC Management and Evercore that
collect significant amount of fees."

On June 23, 2020, GNC filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, docketed as In
re GNC Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 20-11662 (KBO). The Plaintiffs
allege the Defendants' unlawful scheme continued throughout the GNC
Bankruptcy Case and involved not only mail and wire fraud in
communications with shareholders and potential investors but also
misuse of the Chapter 11 proceedings and fraud on the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court.

In order to ensure that Defendant CITIC group, or Defendant GNC
Management and secured lenders, who had agreed to split the new GNC
10/90, obtain the GNC, Defendants Zhang, CITIC, CITIC group, GNC
Management, Evercore and Berube to provide manipulated financial
data projecting the disappointing GNC's financial performance in
the future in order to deter the potential bidders.

From July 2020 to September 2020, under the direction of Defendants
CITIC, Zhang, Martindale and Tolivar, Defendants Evercore and
Berube have repeatedly sent emails to potential bidders that
contained fabricated false financial data and access to the virtual
data room (the VDR), which was filled with manipulated GNC
financial information to purposefully deter the potential bidder
from participating in the public auction. Thus, the Plaintiffs
contend the Defendants induced the Delaware Bankruptcy Court,
through deceit, to ultimately approve the sale as a good faith,
non-collusive transaction.

On Sept. 18, 2020, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court entered an order
approving the sale of substantially all of GNC's assets to Harbin
(the "Sale Order"). As recited in the Sale Order, the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court concluded that GNC had "demonstrated good,
sufficient, and sound business purposes and justifications for, and
compelling circumstances to promptly consummate, the Sale prior to
and outside of a plan of reorganization" and further concluded that
among the sound business reasons given, GNC would use the sale
proceeds to pay debts consistent with its Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization. Similarly, referring to the sale transaction
documents, the Sale Order stated that none of the parties to those
documents "are consummating the Transaction with any fraudulent or
otherwise improper purpose."

Noting that, prior to its entry, an opportunity for filing
objections had been provided, the Sale Order denied any objection
not previously withdrawn or resolved. By its terms, the Sale Order
is binding on, among others, "all holders of equity interests in
the Debtors," that is, on GNC and its related subsidiaries as
identified in the Sale Order. TThe Delaware Bankruptcy Court
retained jurisdiction to "interpret, implement, and enforce" the
Sale Order's terms and provisions.

On Oct. 14, 2020, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court confirmed GNC's
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization. The Plan permitted GNC to wind
down its estate following the consummation of the asset sale to
Harbin, pursuant to the Sale Order. Article IX of the Plan sets
forth releases, injunctions, and exculpatory provisions, which were
approved and incorporated by reference in the Oct. 14, 2020
Confirmation Order. After confirmation of the Plan, the GNC
Bankruptcy Case was closed as to various non-lead debtors but, to
date, remains open for administration of the Plan as to certain
liquidating debtors, including GNC (now known as "Vitamin OldCo.
Holdings, Inc.").

The Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit on Sept.
15, 2021, in the District of New Jersey, individually and on behalf
of "all similarly situated GNC minority shareholders of record of
GNC Class A Common Stock as of April 21, 2020 when Plaintiffs
announced the investigation into the GNC matter." According to the
Complaint, the GNC Bankruptcy Case was a means to accomplish the
Defendants' unlawful objectives. It states: "Defendants' unlawful
schemes converged at the fabrication and completion of the sham
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing on June 23, 2020."

The Plaintiffs allege that, by means of the "racketeering activity"
in which the Defendants engaged from "February 2018 through October
7, 2020" -- the date they contend the sale of GNC's assets was
completed -- the Defendants accomplished their goal of allowing
CITIC to seize GNC's assets and collecting significant fees and
other financial gain for the benefit of GNC Management and
Evercore, at the expense of wiping out the minority shareholders'
equity interests. The Complaint states: "The RICO Defendants' goal
was to preserve, not to destroy, the Company assets for themselves
through a sham bankruptcy filing. The RICO Defendants have targeted
the Plaintiffs and other minority shareholders of GNC. The
Plaintiffs have incurred injury to their property (including, but
not limited to their interests in GNC) by reason of the Defendants
violations of 18 U.S. Code Section 1962."

The Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of their racketeering and
other unlawful activities, the Defendants have caused injury to the
Plaintiffs, including the loss of their equity interests in GNC.
The 10-count Complaint asserts claims for violation of the federal
RICO statute, violation of the New Jersey RICO statute, common law
fraud, conspiracy to defraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion,
negligence, and "aiding and abetting a conspiracy." The Plaintiffs'
prayer for relief seeks, among other things, an order directing the
Defendants to divest themselves of any interest in the enterprise.

The threshold question on this motion concerns which transfer
statute governs it.

Judge Espinosa opines that the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs
are inextricably intertwined with the GNC Bankruptcy Case. He
concludes a transfer under Section 1412 is appropriate and
warranted.

Regarding the question of whether the action is transferred to
Delaware District Court or, instead, directly to the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court, Section 1412 authorizes transfer "to a district
court for another district." Judge Espinosa appreciates the
efficiency of a direct transfer to the Delaware Bankruptcy Court
and acknowledges that some district courts have construed Section
1412 to authorize direct transfer to another district's bankruptcy
court. However, others, consistent with the plain language of the
statute, have ordered transfer to another district court, to be
referred to bankruptcy court in that transferee district.

The Third Circuit has described the proper procedure, albeit in a
slightly different litigation posture, for effecting transfers
pursuant to Section 1412 as follows: Where a civil proceeding
already pending in one district court becomes related to a chapter
13 case subsequently filed in another district court, the proper
method for transferring the related proceeding to the bankruptcy
court hearing the chapter 13 case is to seek a change of venue in
the nonbankruptcy forum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1412 and
Bankruptcy Rule 7087. After the related proceeding is transferred
to the district court wherein the chapter 13 case is pending, then
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 157(a), the related proceeding may be
referred to the bankruptcy court actually hearing the chapter 13
case.

In light of the Third Circuit's guidance, and in the absence of any
decisional law construing Section 1412's language to authorize
transfers directly to a bankruptcy court, Judge Espinosa transfers
the action to Delaware District Court, where the parties may seek
referral to the Bankruptcy Court. An appropriate order will be
filed with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 7, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4tvus89r from Leagle.com.


CITYGATE HOSPITALITY: Loyola Sues Over BIPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
Juan Loyola, individually and on behalf of other persons similarly
situated v. CITYGATE HOSPITALITY, LLC and CITYGATE CENTRE HOTEL,
LLC, Case No. 2022LA000894 (Ill. 18th Judicial Cir. Ct., DuPage
Cty., Oct. 11, 2022), is brought to obtain statutory damages and
other equitable relief under the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA).

As past and present employees of the Defendants, the Plaintiff and
class members were required to provide them with their personalized
biometric indicators and the biometric information derived
therefrom ("biometric data"). Specifically, the Defendants collect
and store employees' fingerprints and require employees to clock-in
and clock out by scanning their fingerprints into a
fingerprint-scanning machine. Following the capture of their
employees' biometric data, Defendants use this data to compare the
future scans of their employees' fingerprints into a punch-clock
device. The punch- clock device scans each fingerprint and confirms
that the employee punching in to work is who they claim to be. The
collection of the punch-clock fingerprint entries is then used to
confirm employees' presence.

The Plaintiff and class members have not been notified where their
fingerprints are being stored, for how long the Defendants will
keep the fingerprints, and what might happen to this valuable
information. If the Defendants insist on collecting and storing
their employees' fingerprints, the Defendants must comply with the
BIPA. This includes
notifying employees the practice is taking place; informing
employees of how the practice is implemented; obtaining written
consent from the employees to collect and store their biometric
data; maintaining their employees' biometric data in a sufficiently
secure manner; and maintaining a publicly available disclosure of
how the biometric data will be handled and destroyed. Unfortunately
for the Plaintiff and class members, none of these directives were
followed. Accordingly, the Plaintiff bring this action individually
and on behalf of class members pursuant to obtain statutory damages
and injunctive relief for violations of the BIPA, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is an individual subject to the same
fingerprint-storing practices as other of the Defendants'
employees.

The Defendants are for-profit corporations registered to and doing
business in the state of Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
          William H. Beaumont, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          107 W. Van Buren, Suite 209
          Chicago, IL 60605
          Phone: (773) 831-8000
          Email: rlc@beaumontcostales.com
                 whb@beaumontcostales.com


COLORADO CORING: Morowski Sues Over Denial of Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------------------------
Mark Morowski, on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, known and unknown v. COLORADO CORING & CUTTING,
INC. AND JOHN SARNOWSKI, INDIVIDUALLY, Case No. 1:22-cv-02643 (D.
Colo., Oct. 7, 2022), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), the Colorado Minimum and Pay Standards Order #38
("COMPS") and the Colorado Wage Act as a result of the Defendant's
denial of overtime pay.

The Plaintiff consistently worked over 40 hours per week without
compensation at a rate of one and one-half his regular rate of pay.
Defendants compensated the Plaintiff, and members of the Plaintiff
Class, on an hourly basis but failed to pay one-and one-half times
the employees' regular hourly rates of pay. The Plaintiff, and
members of the Plaintiff Class, only received their regular,
straight time hourly rates of pay for all hours worked, including
overtime-eligible hours in excess of 40 in a work week in violation
of the state and federal laws. As a result of the common policies,
the Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class were denied
overtime pay for work in excess of 40 hours in a work week, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a former construction employee of the Defendants
who performed a variety of concrete construction services for CCC's
customers at their locations as assigned by the Defendants.

The Defendant is a Colorado corporation that owned and operated a
concrete construction business that performs a variety of
construction services, including concrete construction, demolition,
coring and cutting for residential and commercial clients in
Colorado.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel D. Engelson, Esq.
          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          7900 E. Union Ave., Suite 1100
          Denver, CO 80237
          Phone: (720)-386-9006

               - and -

          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 1137
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Phone: (312)-853-1450


COSTCO WHOLESALE: De Benning Suit Settlement for Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-K Annual Report for
the fiscal year ended August 28, 2022 filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on October 4, 2022, that the Company is facing
labor suit captioned De Benning v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No.
34-2021-00309030-CU-OE-GDS; Sacramento Superior Court) alleging
California Labor Code violations.

In September 2021, an employee filed a class action against the
Company alleging violations of the California Labor Code regarding
the alleged failure to provide sick pay, failure to timely pay
wages due at separation from employment, and for violations of
California's unfair competition law. De Benning v. Costco Wholesale
Corp. (Case No. 34-2021-00309030-CU-OE-GDS; Sacramento Superior
Court). The Company answered the complaint in January 2022, denying
its material allegations.

In April 2022, a settlement for an immaterial amount was agreed
upon, subject to court approval.

Costco Wholesale Corporation -- https://www.costco.com/ -- is an
American multinational corporation which operates a chain of
membership-only big-box retail stores.[BN]

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Faces Cappadora and Sancho Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-K Annual Report for
the fiscal year ended August 28, 2022 filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on October 4, 2022, that the company faces
labor suit captioned Cappadora and Sancho v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
(Index No. 604757/2022; Nassau County Supreme Court).

In April 2022, Cappadora and a second plaintiff filed an action
against the Company in New York state court asserting the same
class claims asserted in the federal action under the New York
Labor Law and seeking preliminary approval of the class settlement.
Cappadora and Sancho v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Index No.
604757/2022; Nassau County Supreme Court).

Costco Wholesale Corporation -- https://www.costco.com/ -- is an
American multinational corporation which operates a chain of
membership-only big-box retail stores.[BN]

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Faces Gonzalez Labor Suit in Los Angeles Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-K Annual Report for
the fiscal year ended August 28, 2022 filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on October 4, 2022, that the Company is facing
a labor suit captioned Gonzalez v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No.
22AHCV00255; Los Angeles Superior Court).

In May 2022, an employee filed a PAGA-only representative action
against the Company alleging claims under the California Labor Code
regarding the payment of wages, meal and rest periods, the
timeliness of wages and final wages, wage statements, accurate
records and business expenses. Gonzalez v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
(Case No. 22AHCV00255; Los Angeles Superior Court).

Costco Wholesale Corporation -- https://www.costco.com/ -- is an
American multinational corporation which operates a chain of
membership-only big-box retail stores.[BN]

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Rough Suit Stayed
-----------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-K Annual Report for
the fiscal year ended August 28, 2022 filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on October 4, 2022, that the labor class action
captioned Rough v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No. FCS053454;
Sonoma County Superior Court) has been stayed at the California
state court pending federal action resolution.

In August 2019, the plaintiff filed a companion case in state court
seeking penalties under PAGA. Rough v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case
No. FCS053454; Sonoma County Superior Court). Relief is sought
under the California Labor Code, including civil penalties and
attorneys' fees.

The state court action has been stayed pending resolution of the
federal action.

Costco Wholesale Corporation -- https://www.costco.com/ -- is an
American multinational corporation which operates a chain of
membership-only big-box retail stores.[BN]

CROW VOTE: Court Junks Ward Bid for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Bridget Ward, et al., v.
Crow Vote LLC, et al., Case No. 8:21-cv-01110-FWS-DFM (C.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Fred W. Slaughter entered an order denying the
motion for class certification.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and California's
Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a "Main Class" and a "California
Subclass" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).

On June 29, 2022, Defendants opposed the Motion. On July 13, 2022,
the Plaintiffs filed a Reply.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 7, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CZQx5t at no extra charge.[CC]




DIRECTV LLC: Appeals Class Certification Ruling in Vance TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
DIRECTV, LLC filed on October 4, 2022, a petition to appeal a class
certification ruling in the lawsuit entitled David Vance, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. DirecTV, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
5:17-cv-00179-JPB-JPM, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia.

The Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, allege that the Defendant retained AC1 Communications to
sell the Defendant's services. Further, the Plaintiffs assert AC1
purchased a list of leads and phone numbers from a third party and
used that list to make telemarketing calls but failed to scrub the
list for numbers on the national do-not-call list and called those
numbers in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The
Plaintiffs do not claim the Defendant itself placed the calls in
question. Rather, the Plaintiffs argue DirecTV is vicariously
liable for AC1's actions.

On April 11, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the
following class: All persons within the United States (a) whose
telephone numbers were listed on the Do Not Call Registry, and (b)
who received more than one telemarketing call within any
twelve-month period at any time from AC1, (c) to promote the sale
of DirecTV.

On August 1, 2022, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification through an Order entered by Judge Preston
Bailey. The Court determined that class action litigation is the
overwhelmingly superior method to handle these claims.

The appellate case is captioned as David Vance v. DIRECTV, LLC,
Case No. 22-2041, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, filed on October 4, 2022. [BN]

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Cameron Appeals Suit Dismissal to D.C. Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDER CAMERON, et al. are taking an appeal from a court order
dismissing their lawsuit entitled Alexander Cameron, et al., on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. District of Columbia, Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-02908-APM, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The Plaintiffs bring this action to remedy the harms that they, and
the proposed classes that they seek to represent, have suffered as
a result of the Defendant's unlawful conduct.

The Plaintiffs were among dozens of people who were "kettled"
(corralled into a confined area), detained, and arrested at a march
calling for police reform and racial justice in the Adams Morgan
neighborhood of Washington, D.C., in the late-night hours of August
13, 2020, and early morning hours of August 14, 2020.

According to the complaint, District of Columbia's Metropolitan
Police Department ("MPD") routinely and unlawfully holds cell
phones seized from individuals who have been arrested -- many of
whom are never charged with a crime -- for months or even years
past the point when the government might have any continuing
legitimate interest in retaining the cell phones, while providing
no process to challenge that retention. This policy, pattern,
practice, or custom engaged in by Defendant violates the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and constitutes
an unlawful conversion of property.

On November 5, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify
class. The Plaintiffs asked the Court to certify an Injunctive
Class defined as: "All individuals who were kettled and arrested at
or near the intersection of 18th and Willard Streets, N.W., during
the late-night hours of August 13, 2020, and early morning hours of
August 14, 2020, who were subsequently released without being
charged with a crime, and whose cell phones and other property the
Metropolitan Police Department continues to hold."

On December 17, 2021, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, which the Court granted through an Order entered by
Judge Amit P. Mehta on August 29, 2022. The Court ruled that the
Plaintiffs have failed to state claims under 40 U.S.C. Section 1983
and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' conversion claim. The Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification was denied as moot.

The appellate case is captioned Alexander Cameron, et al. v. D.C.,
Case No. 22-7130, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, filed on September 30, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant docketing statement is due on November 2, 2022;

   -- Appellant certificate as to parties is due on November 2,
2022;

   -- Appellant statement of issues is due on November 2, 2022;

   -- Appellant underlying decision is due on November 2, 2022;

   -- Appellant deferred appendix statement is due on November 2,
2022;

   -- Appellant entry of appearance is due on November 2, 2022;

   -- Appellant transcript status report is due on November 2,
2022;

   -- Appellant procedural motions are due on November 2, 2022;

   -- Appellant dispositive motions are due on November 17, 2022;

   -- Appellee certificate as to parties is due on November 2,
2022.

   -- Appellee entry of appearance is due on November 2, 2022;

   -- Appellee procedural motions are due on November 2, 2022; and

   -- Appellee dispositive motions are due on November 17, 2022.
[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ALEXANDER CAMERON, et al., individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

            Jeffrey Louis Light, Esq.
            LAW OFFICE OF JEFFREY L. LIGHT
            1629 K. Street, N.W., Suite 300
            Washington, DC 20006

                   - and -

            Kristin Leigh McGough, Esq.
            LAW OFFICE OF KRISTIN L. MCGOUGH
            717 D. Street, N.W., Suite 400
            Washington, DC 20004
            Telephone: (202) 681-6410

                   - and -

            Scott Matthew Michelman, Esq.
            Arthur B. Spitzer, Esq.
            ACLU FOUNDATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
            915 15th Street N.W.
            Washington, DC 20005
            Telephone: (202) 457-0800

                   - and -

            Tara L. Reinhart, Esq.
            SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
            1440 New York Avenue, N.W.
            Washington, DC 20005
            Telephone: (202) 371-7000

Defendant-Appellee DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA is represented by:

            Caroline S. Van Zile, Esq.
            OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
            District of Columbia
            400 6th Street, N.W., Suite 8100
            Washington, DC 20001
            Telephone: (202) 727-3400

DOUBLE M EXPRESS: MC Logistics Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Double M Express Inc.
The case is styled as MC Logistics, Inc., Samiullah Khobiagul,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Double M
Express Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05564 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 11, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions.

Double M Express -- https://doublemexpressinc.com/ -- is a freight
and load delivery company that caters across 48 of all United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Emily Rees Brown, Esq.
          Christopher J. Wilmes, Esq.
          HUGHES SOCOL PIERS RESNICK DYM , LTD.
          70 West Madison, Ste. 4000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: (312) 604-2706
          Email: ebrown@hsplegal.com
                 cwilmes@hsplegal.com

ELASTOS FOUNDATION: Seeks Denial of Owen Class Certification Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARK OWEN and JAMES
WANDLING, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, v. ELASTOS FOUNDATION, FENG HAN, and RONG CHEN, Case No.
1:19-cv-05462-GHW-BCM (S.D.N.Y.),

Defendants Elastos Foundation, Feng Han, and Rong Chen will move
the Court for an order denying class certification and granting
such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Elastos is a non-profit organization developing open-source web
services for a decentralized, blockchain-powered internet.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Oct. 11, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3EKfvqL at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by

          Kenneth P. Herzinger, Esq.
          Carl P. Hudson, Esq.
          Erin Zatlin, Esq.
          PAUL HASTINGS LLP
          101 California Street
          Forty-Eighth Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: 1(415) 856-7000
          E-mail: kennethherzinger@paulhastings.com
                  carlhudson@paulhastings.com
                  erinzatlin@paulhastings.com

ELI LILLY: Probst Files Suit in S.D. Indiana
--------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Eli Lilly and
Company. The case is styled as Jennifer M. Probst, individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated v. Eli Lilly and Company,
Case No. 1:22-cv-01986-SEB-DLP (S.D. Ind., Oct. 10, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor.

Eli Lilly and Company -- https://www.lilly.com/ -- is an American
pharmaceutical company headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert Peter Kondras, Jr., Esq.
          HASSLER KONDRAS MILLER LLP
          100 Cherry Street
          Terre Haute, IN 47807
          Phone: (812) 232-9691
          Fax: (812) 234-2881
          Email: kondras@hkmlawfirm.com


ELON MUSK: Pampena Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Violations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Giuseppe Pampena, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. ELON MUSK, Case No. 3:22-cv-05937 (N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 10, 2022), is brought on behalf of all persons and entities
who sold the
publicly traded securities of Twitter, Inc. between May 13, 2022
and October 4, 2022, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period") and
seeking to recover damages caused by Defendant's violations of the
federal securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On April 25, 2022, Twitter, Inc. announced that it had agreed to
sell itself to Elon Musk for $54.20 per share, or approximately $44
billion (the "Buyout" or "Merger"). Musk negotiated the Twitter
Buyout over the weekend of April 23-24, 2022 without carrying out
any due diligence. The Buyout was only conditioned on the approval
of Twitter's shareholders at a shareholder meeting, regulatory
approval, and closing of the Buyout by October 24, 2022. A joint
press release announcing the Merger contained a quote from Musk
promising to "make Twitter better" by "defeating the spam bots."

Musk presumably believed he was obtaining Twitter at a sale price,
since Twitter's stock price had decreased significantly in the
months before he made his offer, declining from $71.69 on July 23,
2021 to just $32.42 on March 7, 2022. But after Musk agreed to buy
Twitter for $54.20, the stock market experienced a further decline.
The market decline, however, did not affect Twitter's stock price
due to the signed Merger agreement. After the announcement of the
Buyout, Twitter's stock consistently traded close to the Buyout
price, and around $50 per share. The small delta between its
trading price and the $54.20 buyout price was typical of the
trading prices of companies who have agreed to be acquired,
characterized by a small discount for the time value of money and a
relatively small risk that the deal will not go through.

Musk had a unique and multi-billion-dollar problem, however, Musk
pledged his Tesla stock as collateral for a $12.5 billion loan to
finance the buyout of Twitter, and Tesla's shares had declined by
over 37% after the announcement of the Buyout. Because Tesla's
stock was worth much less than when Musk agreed to buy Twitter,
Musk was at risk of a margin call or a requirement to put up more
cash. Musk quickly acted to attempt to mitigate these personal
risks to himself by engaging in unlawful conduct that moved the
price of Twitter's stock down. Musk proceeded to make statements,
send tweets, and engage in conduct designed to create doubt about
the deal and drive Twitter's stock down substantially in order to
create leverage that Musk hoped to use to either back out of the
purchase or re-negotiate the buyout price by as much as 25% which,
if accomplished, would result in an $11 billion reduction in the
Buyout consideration. As detailed herein, Musk's conduct was
fraudulent and illegal.

Musk's market manipulation worked – Twitter lost $8 billion in
valuation after the Buyout was announced. As subsequently
disclosed, Musk first started purchasing Twitter shares on January
31, 2022. Musk thereafter exceeded the 5% threshold, requiring him
to file a Form 13G with the SEC. Musk did not timely file the Form
13G; failing to do so benefitted Musk because he was able to
continue to buy Twitter shares at depressed prices. When Musk
belatedly filed the Form 13G, Twitter's shares increased
substantially, rising 27% after he filed the 13G. Musk benefitted
himself by approximately $156 million by failing to timely file a
Form 13G By delaying his disclosure of his stake in Twitter, Musk
engaged in market manipulation and bought Twitter stock at an
artificially low price, in violation of the law.

When Musk eventually filed his Form 13G on April 4, 2022, it was
materially misleading. He did not disclose his intent to join the
Twitter Board and he failed to disclose that he was contemplating
buying Twitter. Both disclosures would have caused Twitter's stock
to increase more than it did when his filing was made. Musk was
later forced to file an amended Form 13G to comply with the law. As
Tesla shares cratered by almost 30% in April and May 2022, Musk
began to make disparaging comments about Twitter in an effort to
drive its stock price down further.

On May 13, 2022, at 5:44 a.m. (i.e., before the stock market
opened), Musk issued a tweet which stated that the buyout was
"temporarily on hold:" Musk's tweet (and public statement) was
misleading and constituted an effort to manipulate the market for
Twitter shares, since he already knew all about the fake accounts.
The statement was false because the buyout was not, in fact,
"temporarily on hold." There is nothing in the buyout contract that
allows Musk to put the deal "temporarily on hold." Moreover, Musk's
statement was misleading because it stated or implied that Musk's
obligation to consummate the buyout was conditioned on his
satisfaction with due diligence to determine whether "spam/fake
accounts do indeed represent less than 5% of users." This was false
because Musk had specifically waived detailed due diligence as a
condition precedent to his obligations under the buyout contract.
Thus, Musk had and has no right to cancel the buyout based on any
results from due diligence concerning the number of spam/fake
accounts at Twitter. Musk then continued issuing false and
disparaging tweets about Twitter in an effort to drive its stock
price down further.

The Defendant made materially false and misleading statements and
omissions, and engaged in a scheme to deceive the market. This
artificially depressed the price of Twitter securities and operated
a fraud or deceit on the Class. Later, when Defendant's prior
misrepresentations and fraudulent conduct were disclosed to the
market, the price of Twitter securities increased precipitously,
with the common stock increasing 22% in one day alone, as the prior
artificial deflation came out of the price. As a result of their
sale of Twitter common stock during the Class Period, Plaintiff and
other members of the Class suffered economic loss, i.e., damages,
under the federal securities law, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff sold Twitter's securities during the Class Period and
was damaged thereby.

Elon Musk is an individual and the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO")
of Tesla, Inc. and the founder of SpaceX and other businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph W. Cotchett, Esq.
          Mark C. Molumphy, Esq.
          Tyson C. Redenbarger, Esq.
          Julia Q. Peng, Esq.
          COTCHETT, PITRE & MCCARTHY, LLP
          San Francisco Airport Office Center
          840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Phone: (650) 697-6000
          Email: jcotchett@cpmlegal.com
                 mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com
                 tredenbarger@cpmlegal.com
                 jpeng@cpmlegal.com

               - and -

          Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Esq.
          Albert Y. Chang, Esq.
          Yury A. Kolesnikov, Esq.
          BOTTINI & BOTTINI, INC.
          7817 Ivanhoe Avenue, Suite 102
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Phone: (858) 914-2001
          Facsimile: (858) 914-2002
          Email: fbottini@bottinilaw.com
                 achang@bottinilaw.com
                 ykolesnikov@bottinilaw.com


EMPRESS AMBULANCE: Cardwell Sues Over Failure to Secure e-PHI
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jack Cardwell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. EMPRESS AMBULANCE SERVICE, LLC d/b/a EMPRESS EMERGENCY
MEDICAL SERVICES f/k/a EMPRESS AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., Case No.
7:22-cv-08603-UA (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 10, 2022), is brought arising from
the Defendant's failure to properly secure and safeguard the highly
sensitive Electronic Protected Health Information of Plaintiff and
Class Members, which included names, Social Security numbers, dates
of service, and insurance information (collectively together,
"e-PHI").

The Plaintiff received a notice letter from Empress EMS dated
September 9, 2022 (the "Notice Letter"), indicating that on July
14, 2022, Empress EMS "identified a network incident resulting in
the encryption of some of their systems" (the "Data Breach"). The
Notice Letter went onto say that Empress EMS's "investigation
determined that an unauthorized party first gained access to
certain systems on our network on May 26, 2022, and then copied a
small subset of files on July 13, 2022."

However, contemporaneous news reporting by the technology industry
website, DataBreaches have indicated that Empress EMS in its public
statements dramatically underestimated the scope of the Data
Breach, including that the Data Breach was a ransomware attack
initiated by the "Hive" ransomware hacking group and that other
categories of sensitive personally identifiable information were
exfiltrated. The Hive ransomware group started their ransomware
attacks against organizations in June 2021 and quickly drew the
attention of law enforcement due to a wide range of target
industries, most notably healthcare. Hive ransomware uses the
'Ransomware-as-a-Service' model and double extortion method. If a
victim fails to pay the ransom, Hive operators release the
exfiltrated data on Hive's data leak sites on the dark web.

The Data Breach was a direct and proximate result of Defendant's
flawed IT systems which was left susceptible to attack by
cybercriminals. The Plaintiff's and Class Members' e-PHI,
compromised by cybercriminals in the Data Breach, is highly
valuable because it is readily useable to commit fraud and identity
theft. Consequently, the Plaintiff and Class Members have devoted
significant time to protecting themselves as a result of
Defendant's actions and Plaintiff and Class Members will need to
spend additional time and money in the future to that same end. The
Plaintiff brings claims for negligence, negligence per se, breach
of implied contract, New York General Business Law, and injunctive
relief claims, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was treated and transported to the hospital by
Empress EMS by the Defendant on June 9, 2018.

Empress EMS is one of the New York's largest emergency and
non-emergency response providers in Westchester, Rockland, Ulster,
Dutchess, Putnam, Orange Counties, and the Bronx, including
providing services with hospitals, correctional institutions, and
private care facilities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christian Levis, Esq.
          Amanda G. Fiorilla, Esq.
          LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
          44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Phone: (914) 997-0500
          Email: clevis@lowey.com
                 afiorilla@lowey.com

               - and -

          Anthony M. Christina, Esq.
          LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
          One Tower Bridge
          100 Front Street, Suite 520
          West Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Phone: (215) 399-4770
          Email: achristina@lowey.com


EMPRESS AMBULANCE: Egan Sues Over Failure to Properly Secure PII
----------------------------------------------------------------
Taylor Egan, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. EMPRESS AMBULANCE SERVICE LLC, Case No. 7:22-cv-08584
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2022), is brought against the Defendant for its
failure to properly secure and safeguard the Plaintiff's and Class
Members' protected health information and personally identifiable
information stored within the Defendant's information network,
including, without limitation, full names, Social Security numbers,
dates of service, and insurer names (these types of information,
inter alia, being thereafter referred to, collectively, as
"protected health information" or "PHI and "personally identifiable
information" or "PII").

The Plaintiff seek to hold the Defendant responsible for the harms
it caused and will continue to cause the Plaintiff and, at least,
318,5583 others similarly situated persons in the massive and
preventable cyberattack purportedly discovered by the Defendant on
July 14, 2022, by which cybercriminals infiltrated the Defendant's
inadequately protected network servers and accessed highly
sensitive PHI/PII and financial information belonging to both
adults and children, which was being kept unprotected (the "Data
Breach"). The Plaintiff further seek to hold Defendant responsible
for not ensuring that the PHI/PII was maintained in a manner
consistent with industry, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPPA") Privacy Rule (45 CFR, Part 160
and Parts A and E of Part 164), the HIPPA Security Rule (45 CFR
Part 160 and Subparts A and C of Part 164), and other relevant
standards.

While the Defendant claims to have discovered the breach as early
as July 14, 2022, the Defendant did not begin informing victims of
the Data Breach until September 2022 and failed to inform victims
when or for how long the Data Breach occurred. Indeed, the
Plaintiff and Class Members were wholly unaware of the Data Breach
until they received letters from the Defendant informing them of
it. The notice received by the Plaintiff was dated on September 9,
2022. The Defendant acquired, collected and stored the Plaintiff's
and Class Members' PHI/PII and/or financial information. Therefore,
the Defendant knew, or should have known, that the Plaintiff and
Class Members would use Defendant's services to store and/or share
sensitive data, including highly confidential PHI/PII.

The Defendant disregarded the rights of the Plaintiff and Class
Members by intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently
failing to take and implement adequate and reasonable measures to
ensure that the Plaintiff's and Class Members' PHI/PII was
safeguarded, failing to take available steps to prevent an
unauthorized disclosure of data, and failing to follow applicable,
required and appropriate protocols, policies and procedures
regarding the encryption of data, even for internal use. As a
result, the PHI/PII of the Plaintiff and Class Members was
compromised through disclosure to an unknown and unauthorized third
party—an undoubtedly nefarious third party that seeks to profit
off this disclosure by defrauding the Plaintiff and Class Members
in the future. the Plaintiff and Class Members have a continuing
interest in ensuring that their information is and remains safe,
and they are entitled to injunctive and other equitable relief,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a victim of the Data Breach.

The Defendant provides emergency and non-emergency medical
transport services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel H. Robinson, Esq.
          ROBINSON & YABLON, P.C.
          232 Madison Ave.RM 909
          New York, NY 10016
          Phone: (212) 725-8566

               - and -

          Laura Van Note, Esq.
          COLE & VAN NOTE
          555 12th Street, Suite 1725
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Phone: (510) 891-9800
          Facsimile: (510) 891-7030
          Email: lvn@colevannote.com

ENCORE CAPITAL: Williams Appeals Summary Judgment in FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
LLOYD WILLIAMS is taking an appeal from a court order denying his
motion for reconsideration in the lawsuit entitled Lloyd Williams,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. Encore Capital Group, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2-19-cv-05252,
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
filed a class action suit against the Defendants for alleged
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff obtained a credit card
from Comenity Capital Bank. This credit card charged an interest
rate that would ordinarily be considered usurious and unlawful in
Pennsylvania, which is where the Plaintiff resides. But Comenity is
a state-chartered, federally insured bank within the purview of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act and could, therefore, charge the
Plaintiff interest exceeding the limits imposed by Pennsylvania
law. Comenity issued a credit card to the Plaintiff, and this
credit card charged between 24.99% and 25.99% annual interest. Over
time, the Plaintiff fell behind on his credit card payments.
Comenity closed the Plaintiff's account, charged it off, and sold
the account to the Defendants.

After acquiring the Plaintiff's account, the Defendants made
various efforts to collect on the Plaintiff's debt. Unlike
Comenity, the Defendants are not state-chartered, federally insured
banks.

In response to Defendants' efforts to collect on his debt, the
Plaintiff filed the lawsuit in federal court claiming that the
Defendants lack authority to collect a portion of his debt and that
the Defendants' efforts to collect that portion violate
Pennsylvania and federal law. The Plaintiff brought this lawsuit as
a putative class action on behalf of himself and other Pennsylvania
residents from whom the Defendants have attempted to collect debt.

On May 23, 2022, Judge John M. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. The Court found the Defendants' motion
dispositive of all the Plaintiff's claims. The Court said it will
not proceed to address the Plaintiff's motions for partial summary
judgment or class certification.

On May 24, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Court denied on August 29, 2022. The Court ruled that the
Plaintiff has not identified any reason for the Court to reconsider
its summary judgment decision.

The appellate case is captioned Lloyd Williams v. Encore Capital
Group Inc., et al., Case No. 22-2811, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on September 28, 2022. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant LLOYD WILLIAMS, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Stephen A. Fogdall, Esq.
            SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS
            1600 Market Street, Suite 3600
            Philadelphia, PA 19103
            Telephone: (215) 751-2581

Defendants-Appellees ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP INC., et al., are
represented by:

            Lauren M. Burnette, Esq.
            MESSER STRICKLER BURNETTE
            12276 San Jose Boulevard, Suite 718
            Jacksonville, FL 32223
            Telephone: (904) 527-1172

EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Myers Files 7th Cir. Appeal in FCRA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN D. MYERS is taking an appeal from a court order in the lawsuit
styled John D. Myers, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Equifax Information Services,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-00392-JMS-DLP, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.

Plaintiff Myers initiated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA")
lawsuit on Jan. 13, 2020, in Rush County Superior Court against
credit reporting agency ("CRA") Defendants Equifax, Experian, and
Trans Union. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are falsely
reporting a reaffirmed loan account as discharged in bankruptcy.
The inaccurate reporting, the Plaintiff contends, is a violation of
Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA and warrants actual, statutory, and
punitive damages for his injuries.

Trans Union removed the case to the Indiana District Court on Feb.
4, 2020. The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint in May 2020. His proposed amended complaint includes a
more detailed factual background regarding the reaffirmation of the
Plaintiff's loan account and notification to the Defendants and
adds class action lawsuit allegations.

Defendant Trans Union filed a response in opposition, arguing that
the Court should deny the Plaintiff's proposed amendment because it
is futile and does not cure the deficiencies in the original
Complaint. Defendants Equifax and Experian did not file responses.

The Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint in a
July 28, 2020, Order by the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana.

The appellate case is captioned as John Myers v. Equifax
Information Services, LLC, et al., Case No. 22-2787, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, filed on October
7, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Transcript information sheet was due October 21, 2022; and

   -- Appellant's brief is due on or before November 16, 2022.
[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JOHN D. MYERS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

            William M. Sweetnam, Esq.
            KEOGH LAW, LTD
            55 W. Monroe Street
            Chicago, IL 60603
            Telephone: (312) 726-1092

Defendants-Appellees EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, et al., are
represented by:

            Misty L. Peterson, Esq.
            KING & SPALDING LLP
            1180 Peachtree Street
            Atlanta, GA 30309
            Telephone: (404) 572-4939

                   - and -

            Adam William Wiers, Esq.
            JONES DAY
            110 N. Wacker Drive
            Chicago, IL 60606
            Telephone: (312) 782-3939

                   - and -

            Albert E. Hartmann, Esq.
            REED SMITH LLP
            Ten S. Wacker Drive
            Chicago, IL 60606
            Telephone: (312) 368-2142

ERNEST GARCIA: Appeals Denial of Bid to Dismiss Franchi Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ernest Garcia II has lodged a petition with the Delaware Supreme
Court to file an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware denying his motion to dismiss the
case captioned Anthony Franchi, et al., Plaintiffs vs. Ernest
Garcia II, Defendant, and Carvana Co., Nominal Defendant, Case No.
2020-0415.

The interlocutory order for which review is sought was entered by
the trial court on August 31, 2022.

The Defendant filed an Application for Certification of
Interlocutory Appeal with the Court of Chancery on September 12,
2022.

On September 22, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed their Response in
Opposition to the Defendant's Application. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees ANTHONY FRANCHI, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

            Ned Weinberger, Esq.
            LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
            222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1510
            Wilmington, DE 19801
            Telephone: (302) 573-2540
            Facsimile: (302) 573-2529

                   - and -

            Kimberly A. Evans, Esq.
            BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
            3801 Kennett Pike, Suite C-305
            Wilmington, DE 19807
            Telephone: (617) 398-5600
            Facsimile: (617) 507-6020

                   - and -

            Mae Oberste, Esq.
            BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP
            500 Delaware Avenue, Suite 901
            Wilmington, DE 19801
            Telephone: (212) 554-1408
            Facsimile: (212) 554-1444

                   - and -

            Christine M. Mackintosh, Esq.
            Rebecca A. Musarra, Esq.
            Michael J. Barry, Esq.
            GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.
            123 Justison Street, 7th Floor
            Wilmington, DE 19801
            Telephone: (302) 622-7000
            Facsimile: (302) 622-7100

                   - and -

            Corinne Elise Amato, Esq.
            Kevin Davenport, Esq.
            Samuel L. Closic, Esq.
            Mary S. Thomas, Esq.
            PRICKETT JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A.
            1310 North King Street, P.O. Box 1328
            Wilmington, DE 19899
            Telephone: (302) 888-6500
            Facsimile: (302) 658-8111

                   - and -

            David E. Ross, Esq.
            Adam D. Gold, Esq.
            R. Garrett Rice, Esq.
            ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP
            1313 North Market Street, Suite 1001
            Wilmington, DE 19801
            Telephone: (302) 528-1199
            Facsimile: (302) 576-1100

Defendant-Appellant ERNEST GARCIA II is represented by:

            John L. Reed, Esq.
            Ronald N. Brown, III, Esq.
            Peter H. Kyle, Esq.
            Kelly L. Freund, Esq.
            Daniel P. Klusman, Esq.
            DLA PIPER LLP (US)
            1201 North Market Street, Suite 2100
            Wilmington, DE 19801
            Telephone: (302) 468-5700
            Facsimile: (302) 394-2341

ESSENTIA HEALTH: Filing of Class Cert Bid Due June 15, 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Kraft, et al., v. Essentia
Health, et al. Case No. 3:20-cv-00121 (D.N.D.), the Hon. Judge
Peter D. Welte entered an order on motion to amend/correct class
certification:

  -- The Plaintiffs' Class Certification        June 13, 2023
     Expert Disclosures and Reports due by:

  -- The Defendants' Class Certification        July 31, 2023
     Expert Disclosures and Reports due by:

  -- The Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Class             Sept. 5, 2023
     Certification Expert Reports due by:

  -- The Plaintiffs' Motion for Class           June 15, 2023
     Certification due by:

  -- The Defendants' Response due by:           July 31, 2023

  -- The Plaintiffs' Reply due by:              Sept. 5, 2023

The nature of suit states Contract -- Contract Product Liability.

Essentia Health is an integrated healthcare system with facilities
in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and North Dakota.[CC]


EVERGREEN HELICOPTERS: Dismissal of Claims Relating to Deal Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN THE MATTER OF: EVERGREEN HELICOPTERS INTERNATIONAL
INCORPORATED Debtor. ROBERT E. OGLE, SOLELY IN HIS CAPACITY AS
LITIGATION TRUSTEE FOR THE ERICKSON LITIGATION TRUST, Appellant v.
QUINN MORGAN; KENNETH LAU; UDO RIEDER; CENTRE LANE PARTNERS,
L.L.C.; 10TH LANE FINANCE COMPANY, L.L.C.; 10TH LANE PARTNERS,
L.P.; ZM PRIVATE EQUITY FUND I, L.P.; ZM PRIVATE EQUITY FUND II,
L.P.; ZM EAC, L.L.C., Appellees, Case No. 20-10908 (5th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirms the district
court's dismissal of the claims relating to the settlement releases
and reverses in part the dismissal of the payments relating to the
Evergreen Transaction itself.

Mr. Ogle, in his capacity as Litigation Trustee for the Erickson
Litigation Trust, appeals dismissal of his avoidance and recovery
claims under the bankruptcy laws. In broad terms, these claims seek
avoidance of settlement releases approved in Delaware state court,
as well as two payments related to Erickson Air-Crane, Inc.'s
acquisition of Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. (EHI) (the "Evergreen
Transaction").

Mr. Ogle's avoidance claims turn on two factual events: The
Evergreen Transaction and a subsequent settlement agreement
resolving direct and derivative claims brought by shareholders
related to that transaction.

In May 2013, Erickson purchased EHI from Evergreen International
Aviation, Inc. for $250 million. The purchase price included a
sizeable cash component of $185 million, along with a $17.5 million
unsecured promissory note, and convertible preferred stock valued
at $47.5 million. The complaint alleges Erickson was "cash poor"
with less than $1.5 million in "cash and cash equivalents." Thus,
Erickson obtained "crippling debt financing" to purchase EHI that
set it "on an inevitable path to financial ruin." Further -- and of
particular importance to this appeal -- in addition to using this
debt financing as consideration for the purchase of EHI, Erickson
used it to provide "early payment" on $27.5 million of "unsecured
obligations" to ZM Entities.

The complaint alleges at length that Erickson's decision to
purchase EHI was the result of deceptive conduct by two conflicted
board members, Quinn Morgan and Kenneth Lau, along with Erickson's
CEO Udo Rieder. It is replete with allegations that they "breached
their fiduciary duties in causing Erickson to acquire EHI at an
inflated price and to incur crippling debt to do so." The alleged
scheme involved a tangled web of interrelated entities. First, ZM
Entities owned a controlling 61% share of Erickson around the
relevant time period. Second, Morgan and Lau "controlled" a
"private equity firm" called Centre Lane Partners that was
"affiliated with" ZM Entities. Third, Morgan and Lau possessed "de
facto control" of ZM Entities and used it to install themselves and
Rieder on Erickson's board of directors.

In short, Ogle's complaint alleges: (1) the Evergreen Transaction
was a bad deal for Erickson; (2) it was pushed forward by
conflicted board members and Center Lane, who "misled" Erickson's
"independent Board of Directors"; (3) the debt incurred to
facilitate the acquisition "set Erickson on an inevitable path to
financial ruin" that the Defendants "knew or should have known
posed a substantial risk of bankruptcy for Erickson"; and (4) the
Defendants attempted to leave other creditors as "bag holders" of
Erickson debt by obtaining early payment on their debt and
attempting to unload their position in Erickson.

In 2013, shareholders brought a class action and derivative suit --
alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties and unjust
enrichment -- in Delaware state court. The suit implicated the same
basic facts described, and the Defendants in the present case were
also defendants in the Delaware suit.

In January 2016, the parties, with the assistance of an experienced
mediator, reached an agreement in principle to settle. Erickson's
board and its counsel certified that the settlement was "fair,
reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of Erickson and its
stockholders." The court approved the settlement and concluded that
the terms were "fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best
interests of Plaintiff, the Class and Erickson." In September 2016,
the court entered an order approving the settlement.

Two aspects of the settlement are particularly important for
present purposes. First, the financial component provided for a
total payment of $18.5 million consisting of (a) $2,833,747 to
Erickson (20% after fees and expenses) and (b) $11,334,989 to the
Erickson stockholder class (80% after fees and expenses). Second,
the settlement required a full release of claims against the
Defendants.

The complaint criticizes both components. It contends the 80/20
division was inappropriate because the "value of Erickson's claims
against the Defendants greatly exceeded the $2.8 million the
company received for settling those claims." And it alleges that
the releases were "part of a nefarious, unspoken quid pro quo
through which: (a) the Defendants were able to obtain releases in
exchange for (b) giving Erickson's shareholders a windfall that
they would not have received if Erickson had filed for
bankruptcy."

In November 2016, Erickson filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The
filing occurred about three and a half years after the Evergreen
transaction and only two months after the derivative action
settlement. A litigation trust was created pursuant to the
reorganization plan, which transferred to the trustee, Ogle, the
right to assert these claims. Ogle's suit asserted 12 counts for
avoidance and recovery of various payments and releases on behalf
of Erickson creditors.
Specifically, the 12 counts fall into three categories:

      1. Avoidance and recovery of the shareholder derivative
releases to Morgan, Lau, Rieder, and Center Lane as actual or
constructive fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. Sections 544,
548, and 550 (Counts 6-11).

      2. Avoidance and recovery, under Sections 544(b) and 550, of
payments made in connection with the Evergreen Transaction:
Erickson's $27.5 million payment to ZM Entities (Counts 1 and 4);
and $2.5 million transaction fee to Center Lane vis-à-vis 10th
Lane Part-ners, LP (Counts 2, 3 and 5).

      3. Objection to claims of the ZM Entities in Erickson's
Chapter 11 case under Section 502(d) (Count 12).

The bankruptcy court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
suit. Regarding the claims attacking the settlement releases
(Counts 6-11), the court concluded that the constructive fraud
claims ran afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they
amounted to an attack on the state court judgment. Alternatively,
it concluded principles of preclusion or this court's decisions in
Besing and Erlewine supported dismissal on the merits. As for the
actual fraud claims attacking the releases, it concluded that the
complaint failed to satisfy a heightened pleading standard for
fraud.

Finally, regarding the claims challenging payments that were part
of the Evergreen Transaction itself (Counts 1-5), the bankruptcy
court concluded that Ogle could not assert these claims because the
Delaware judgment "enjoined Erickson's successors and assignees
from prosecuting any causes of action relating to the Evergreen
transaction."

The district court affirmed on each count for the reasons stated in
the bankruptcy court's order and oral ruling. Additionally, it
fleshed out Besing's applicability and concluded that precedent
barred the "constructive fraudulent transfer claims related to the
Delaware Judgment." Ogle timely appealed.

The claims the Fifth Circuit must review are the first two sets
identified: Those attacking releases in the Delaware settlement and
others seeking avoidance of two payments related to the Evergreen
Transaction.

The Fifth Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the
constructive fraud (Counts 7 and 9) and actual fraud (Counts 6 and
8) claims related to the Delaware settlement. It finds that the
Delaware judgment approving the settlement established reasonably
equivalent value for the releases as a matter of law. Nor was there
any indication whatsoever of collusion, sandbagging, or other
irregularity in the proceedings before the Delaware court. Ogle has
not alleged irregularities or special circumstances that would
require reconsidering a heavily negotiated and judicially
scrutinized settlement agreement that is quintessentially economic
in nature. There was reasonable equivalence as a matter of law. The
Delaware settlement should not be unwound by the federal courts
merely because of its unequal division of settlement proceeds.

Mr. Ogle's attempt to attack the Delaware releases as actually
fraudulent transfers also fails. The Fifth Circuit sees no error in
the lower courts' conclusion that Ogle failed to adequately plead
actual fraud, and his arguments on appeal do not convince us
otherwise. The complaint crucially omits any facts alleging fraud
on the Delaware court to obtain its approval of the settlement. Had
such facts been alleged, they might be considered "independent
claims over which the federal district court had jurisdiction"
because they do "not seek to overturn the state-court judgment" and
the injuries did not "arise from the judgment."

The reasonable equivalence argument is little more than an attempt
to re-argue the constructive fraud issue in the guise of an actual
fraud claim. And the allegation that insiders benefited fails to
account for the fact that the substance of the settlement was
approved by non-insiders including Erickson's independent directors
and legal counsel, the third-party mediator, and the Delaware
court. That leaves the allegation of Erickson's insolvency at the
time the release was given. Standing alone, the Fifth Circuit holds
that this is nothing like the kind of irregularity needed to allege
an "independent claim" involving a state court judgment.

However, the Fifth Circuit holds that the lower courts erroneously
concluded that Ogle was enjoined by a provision of the Delaware
judgment from asserting avoidance and recovery claims challenging
Erickson's $2.5 million payment to Centre Lane and $27.5 million
payment to ZM Entities relating to the Evergreen Transaction. These
claims are asserted by Ogle in his capacity as trustee of the
post-confirmation litigation trust and assignee of the claims in
question. It also rejects the Defendants' alternative theory that
claim preclusion bars these claims. The pleading is sufficient for
Ogle to proceed on the $27.5 million payment, but Ogle fails to
allege a plausible claim of actual or constructive fraud with
respect to the $2.5 million payment to Centre Lane.

For the foregoing reasons, the Fifth Circuit affirms the dismissal
of Counts 6-9 seeking avoidance of and recovery for the releases in
the Delaware settlement as actually and constructively fraudulent
transfers (and Counts 10-12 as dependent on 6-9). It also affirms
dismissal of Counts 2, 3, and 5 relating to the $2.5 million
payment to Center Lane for its work on the Evergreen Transaction.
It reverses the dismissal of Counts 1 and 4 to the extent they
allege an actually fraudulent scheme to obtain early payment on
debt at the expense of other creditors in light of Erickson's
imminent bankruptcy.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2zhd2kh4 from Leagle.com.


FIRST DATA: Class Settlement Floyd Suit Gets Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LOUIS FLOYD, et al., v.
FIRST DATA MERCHANT SERVICES LLC, et al., Case No.
5:20-cv-02162-EJD (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Edward J. Davila
entered an order granting motion for final approval of class action
settlement, and granting motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and
service awards.

The Class Counsel is awarded $533,280.00 in attorneys' fees and
$43,671.02 in litigation costs. The Plaintiffs Floyd and Fabricant
are granted an incentive award of $5,000 each.

The Settlement Agreement defines the class as:

   "All persons in the United States to whom a) one or more
   calls (including text messages) were made; b) to a cellular
   telephone number; c) that could have promoted First Data or
   Sam's Club Merchant Services' goods or services; d) using a
   dialing system the same as or similar to that used to call
   any of Plaintiffs and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice;
   e) from March 30, 2016 to the date of preliminary approval."

   The following are excluded from the Settlement Class:

   (1) any trial judge and other judicial officers that may
       preside over this case;

   (2) the Mediator;

   (3) Defendants, as well as any parent, subsidiary, affiliate
       or control person of Defendants, and the officers,
       directors, agents, servants or employees of Defendants;

   (4) any of the Released Parties;

   (5) any Settlement Class Member who has timely submitted a
       Request for Exclusion by the Opt-Out Deadline;

   (6) any person who has previously given a valid release of
       the claims asserted in the Action;

   (7) Plaintiffs' Counsel; and

   (8) persons for whom Defendants have a record demonstrating
       "prior express written consent" as defined by the
       Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 7, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3D0FI38 at no extra charge.[CC]

FIRSTENERGY CORP: Class Counsel Defends Atty.'s Fees Request
------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that a disputed
request for attorneys' fees in a $49 million class action
settlement involving the scandal-tainted utility FirstEnergy Corp
raises some provocative questions about how to allocate credit when
private lawyers and government regulators target the same alleged
misconduct.

Here's the background. In July 2020, the U.S. Attorney in Columbus,
Ohio, announced racketeering charges against a prominent state
politician, Ohio House Speaker Larry Householder, who allegedly
received $60 million in bribes in exchange for supporting a
billion-dollar bailout of two failing Ohio nuclear plants.
(Householder has pleaded not guilty and is facing a trial next
January.) The original announcement did not name the corporation
that paid the bribes, but it was no trick to figure out
FirstEnergy's identity. Within a week of the U.S. Attorneys' press
release, private lawyers had begun filing civil lawsuits against
the company, including racketeering class actions in state and
federal court for ratepayers who claimed that they bore the cost of
the tainted bailout.

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost also got in on the action. He filed
his own civil racketeering complaint about two months after charges
were filed against Householder. The AG subsequently sued to block
the bailout law from taking effect and to bar FirstEnergy from
imposing higher rates on its customers under a provision of the law
that set a minimum yearly revenue for the company based on an
unusually high benchmark. FirstEnergy soon thereafter settled with
Yost and agreed not to capitalize on the provision.

The Ohio legislature eventually repealed the bailout law.
FirstEnergy entered a $230 million deferred prosecution deal with
the Justice Department in July 2021. And in June 2022, after losing
a bid to dismiss ratepayers' RICO claims, the company and a related
defendant agreed to settle the rateholders' class action in federal
court in Columbus for $49 million. U.S. District Judge Edmund
Sargus granted preliminary approval to the settlement on June 22.

Then things got messy.

Class counsel from Murray & Murray, Miller Law and McGowan, Hood,
Felder & Phillips moved for a fee award of one-third of the
settlement fund. They told Sargus that a 33.3% contingency fee is
well within the standard bounds in a complex class action that
asserted novel claims and faced significant defenses, including
arguments that the alleged ratepayer overcharges were not related
to the bribery scheme. Class counsel also said that the 2.55
multiplier on their lodestar billings of $6.4 million was
reasonable.

The Ohio AG disagreed. On Oct. 4, three state entities represented
by the Attorney General's office -- the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources, the Ohio Department of Public Safety and the University
of Akron -- filed an objection to the fee request. (Kent State
University joined the objection the next day.) The state entities
argued that class counsel are entitled to no more than $4.9
million, or 10% of the settlement.

State AGs, as you know, have a right under the Class Action
Fairness Act to opine on proposed class action settlements. In
recent years, they've begun exercising that right fairly regularly,
often in order to express views on the propriety of fees for class
counsel.

But the Ohio AG's objection in the FirstEnergy case is different.
For one thing, he represents class members objecting to a proposed
deal. And for another, his brief for the objectors is based on
personal knowledge of the case: The brief argues that class counsel
merely piggy-backed on Yost's own work, as well as on the efforts
of the Columbus U.S. Attorney's office.

Contingency fees, the objectors argued, are meant to reward
plaintiffs' lawyers for taking risks. But there was little risk in
this class action, the AG said, in light of the piles of evidence
developed by federal prosecutors who filed intricately detailed
criminal charges before class counsel ever got involved. The brief,
moreover, argued that plaintiffs' lawyers spent most of the case
litigating against a chastened and diminished defendant that had
removed top officials, including its CEO and general counsel, and
had entered a deferred prosecution deal.

Yost's press release announcing the objection was
characteristically feisty: "The settlement table was set by my
office and the U.S. Attorney [and] now these greedy attorneys are
sitting down to dine," the announcement said. "First Energy already
shook down Ohio ratepayers. Let's not let plaintiff attorneys do
the same." (The actual court filing is much more measured than the
press release.)

Class counsel responded on Oct. 11, arguing that their initial
complaints in state and federal court stoked the public outrage
that forced FirstEnergy into concessions. They also insisted that
they originated the theories that Yost adopted weeks later in his
own suits on behalf of ratepayers.

"Class plaintiffs' litigation," the response said, "provided the
AG's office with a roadmap."

Plaintiffs' lawyers cooperated with the AG to maximize the pressure
on FirstEnergy, they said, yet now Yost wants to slash their fees
by citing the results he obtained. It would be perverse, they
argued, to punish private lawyers who "never acted in any
territorial way" and sought only to benefit Ohio ratepayers.

"The Attorney General did not and could not achieve the results
that the private litigants achieved," class counsel asserted. "If
the Attorney General's perspective expressed here (at least) about
fees awarded were to prevail, the public interest would not be
vindicated."

Class counsel also said the AG underestimated the novelty of their
legal theories and insisted that their fee request would reward
them only for the results they obtained. That's the whole point,
the said, of awarding a fee based on a percentage of the class
recovery.

A spokesperson for Yost did not respond to my email query on class
counsel's filing. Plaintiffs' lawyers from Murray & Murray also did
not respond.

I'll be interested to see how Sargus handles the dispute.
Plaintiffs' lawyers, after all, frequently make use of facts and
evidence developed by prosecutors and state AGs, but I can't think
of any other case in which a top state lawyer has asked a court to
award class counsel less money for that reason. [GN]

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Trivedi Balks at Transfer of Suit to D. Mass.
---------------------------------------------------------------
MADHURI TRIVEDI filed a motion for reconsideration following a
court order to transfer his lawsuit styled Madhuri Trivedi, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
General Electric Company, et al., Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-08453, from the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York to the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.

The Plaintiff filed this complaint against the Defendants on
October 3, 2022, alleging various claims including violation of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Whistleblower Retaliation under
Dodd-Frank Act; violations of whistleblower protections under
Sarbanes-Oxley Act; disparate treatment, intentional discrimination
and retaliation in violation of Title VII, violations of Civil
Rights Act of 1991, violations of Civil Rights Act of 1866;
wrongful termination in violation of public policy; breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty; violation of the Federal Tort
Claims Act; aiding & abetting fraud, conspiracy; Foley & Mansfield,
Fragomen related malpractice claims; violation of the
Administrative Procedures Act; and claims for violations of
constitutional rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

On October 5, 2022, the Court ordered the transfer of this case to
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner MADHURI TRIVEDI, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, appears pro se.

GENEVA FINANCIAL: Barron Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Hours
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jamie Barron, an individual, on behalf of all aggrieved employees,
and the State of California as a Private Attorneys General v.
GENEVA FINANCIAL LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, and
DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No. 22STCV33032 (Cal. Super. Ct., Oct.
7, 2022), is brought against the Defendant who failed to comply
with California Labor Code requirements due to erroneous, willful
and intentional employment practices and policies.

The Defendant has had a consistent policy and/or practice of
misclassifying employees as exempt employees when the nature and
scope of their work is consistent only with classification as
non-exempt, hourly employees. As a result, the Plaintiff and
aggrieved employees were deprived of the protections of the
California Labor Code wage and hour laws applicable to hourly,
non-exempt employees, including required overtime, meal and rest
breaks, reimbursement for business expenses, and other
protections.

Concerning these misclassified employees, the Defendant has
policies and practices that result in: failing to pay for all hours
worked, including overtime hours worked; failing to pay wages due
upon termination; failing to provide rest breaks; failing to
provide uninterrupted meal breaks and second meal breaks; failing
to reimburse for required business expenses; and failing to provide
accurate wage statements and maintain accurate payroll records.
Defendant is therefore liable for civil penalties under the Cal.
Labor Code, including the Private Attorney General Act, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of California and is a
former employee of the Defendant, who worked for the Defendant
until November 24, 2021.

The Defendant is a financial services company formed in Arizona and
registered to do business in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nazo Koulloukian, Esq.
          KOUL LAW FIRM
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Phone: (213) 761-5484
          Facsimile: (818) 561-3938
          Email: nazo@koullaw.com


GEORGIA-PACIFIC: Revised Case Management Schedule Entered
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAVID DIAZ, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC
CORRUGATED LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-02151-DMG-AFM (C.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Dolly M. Gee entered an order approving stipulation and
request to continue case management schedule in light of scheduled
mediation.


   Class Certification Dates   Court Order    Revised Deadlines
                                [Doc. 44]

   -- Deadline to File a      Oct. 10, 2022     July 10, 2023
      Motion for Class
      Certification:

   -- Deadline to file an     Oct. 31, 2022     July 31, 2023
      Opposition to the
      Motion for Class
      Certification:

   -- Deadline to File a      Aug. 22, 2023     Nov. 21, 2022
      Reply:

   -- Hearing Date on         Dec. 5, 2022      Sept. 8, 2023
      Motion for Class
      Certification:

   Discovery Dates             Court Order   Revised Deadlines
                               [Doc. 44]

   -- Non-Expert Discovery    Dec. 14, 2022     Sept. 14, 2023
      Cut-Off:

   -- Expert Disclosure       Nov. 15, 2022     Aug. 15, 2023
      (Initial)

   -- Expert Disclosure       Dec. 14, 2022     Sept. 14, 2023
      (Rebuttal)

   -- Expert Discovery        Jan. 16, 2023    Oct. 16, 2023
      Cut-Off:

   Other Pre-Trial Dates       Court Order   Revised Deadlines
                               [Doc. 44]

   -- Motion Cut-Off          Feb. 13, 2023    Nov. 13, 2023
      (Filing Deadline):

   -- Last Hearing Date       March 13, 2023   Dec. 15, 2023
      for Dispositive
      Motions:

   -- Joint Status Report     Feb. 13, 2023    Nov. 13, 2023
      re Settlement:

   -- Motions in Limine       March 13, 2023   Dec. 13, 2023
      Filing Deadline:

   -- Opposition to Motion    April 6, 2023    Jan. 6, 2024
      in Limine Filing
      Deadline:

   -- Proposed Pretrial       April 13, 2023   Jan. 13, 2024
      Conference Order:

   -- Contentions of          April 27, 2023   Jan. 27, 2024
      Fact/Law:

   -- Pretrial Exhibit        May 4, 2023      Feb. 6, 2024
      Stipulation

   -- Joint Exhibit List      May 8, 2023      Feb. 13, 2024

   -- Witness Lists &         April 27, 2023   Jan. 27, 2024
      Joint Trial Witness
      Time Estimate Form

   -- Agreed Statement of     April 27, 2023   Jan. 27, 2024
      the Case:

   -- Proposed Voir Dire      April 27, 2023   Jan. 27, 2024
      Questions

   -- Joint Statement of      April 27, 2023     Jan. 27, 2024
      Jury Instructions &
      Joint Statement of
      Disputed Instructions

   -- Verdict Forms           April 27, 2023     Jan. 27, 2024

   Trial-Related Dates        Court Order   Revised Deadlines
                              [Doc. 44]

   -- Final Pretrial          May 18, 2023     Feb. 20, 2024
      Conference (FPTC)

   -- Jury Trial              June 15, 2023    March 19, 2024

Georgia Pacific Corrugated LLC manufactures corrugated packaging.
The company's products include paper cups, plates, dishes, and
utensils.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 7, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3s2NAL2 at no extra charge.[CC]

GOBRANDS INC: Beer Sues Over Automatic Renewal of Subscriptions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Beer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. GOBRANDS, INC. doing business as GOPUFF, Case No.
2:22-cv-07386 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 11, 2022), is brought against the
Defendant also violates the Automatic Renewal Law (the ARL) by
charging the Plaintiff and class members for automatic renewals or
continuous service without first obtaining the consumer's
affirmative consent to the agreement containing the automatic
renewal offer terms or continuous offer terms.

In recent years, companies that sell goods or services online have
sought to boost sales by enrolling their customers in automatically
renewing subscriptions. One sales practice is to offer a free trial
and then, at the end of the trial, automatically enroll consumers
in a paid subscription program. Some companies fail to make clear
to consumers that they are being signed up for automatic charges.
To protect Californians from these practices, California passed the
Automatic Renewal Law (the ARL). The ARL requires companies who
sign consumers up for automatically renewing purchases to provide
"clear and conspicuous" disclosures about the autorenewal plan and
obtain "affirmative consent" to enroll consumers.

The Gopuff Fam Subscription Program ("Fam") is a subscription plan
where consumers pay $5.95/month for grocery delivery. This fee is
for the delivery service only; the cost of groceries is on top. Fam
plans automatically renew. For example, when the monthly plan ends,
consumers are automatically renewed and charged $5.95 for another
month. To enroll more consumers in Fam, Defendant offers a free
trial offer. At the end of the trial, consumers are automatically
enrolled in a monthly subscription, at $5.95/month. And that
subscription automatically renews each month at that price. But
Gopuff does not provide clear and conspicuous disclosures or obtain
affirmative consent before enrolling consumers in this autorenewal
plan. Consumers like Plaintiff are being enrolled in this
subscription plan in violation of California consumer protection
laws.

In sum, via both the app and its website, Gopuff is violating the
ARL in multiple ways. It violates the ARL by failing to present the
terms of its automatic renewal or continuous service offer in a
clear and conspicuous manner before fulfilling the subscription and
in visual proximity to the request for consent to the offer. The
Defendant also violates the ARL by charging Plaintiff and class
members for automatic renewals or continuous service without first
obtaining the consumer's affirmative consent to the agreement
containing the automatic renewal offer terms or continuous offer
terms. The Defendant also violates the ARL by failing to include a
clear and conspicuous explanation of the price that will be charged
after the trial ends or the manner in which the subscription or
purchasing agreement pricing will change upon conclusion of the
trial, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff signed up for a 14-day free trial of Fam, through the
Gopuff app, on February 21, 2022.

GoBrands, Inc. doing business as Gopuff is an online grocery
shopping and delivery service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christin Cho, Esq.
          DOVEL & LUNER, LLP
          201 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 600
          Santa Monica, CA 90401
          Phone: (310) 656-7066
          Facsimile: (310) 656-7069
          Email: christin@dovel.com


GRAPEVINE OF NORTH CAROLINA: Class Conditional Status Sought
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BAKARI H. GLYMPH-DOZIER
and SOLOMON HILL, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly
situated persons, v. GRAPEVINE OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC. d/b/a
GRAPEVINE DISTRIBUTORS OF THE CAROLINAS, and SCOTT A. COHEN, Case
No. 1:21-cv-00748-CCE-JEP (M.D.N.C.), the Parties ask the Court to
enter an order granting conditional certification of a class action
under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (NCHWA) and completely
overlapping Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action, a
second separate class action under South Carolina Payment of Wages
Act (SCPWA) pursuant Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and conditionally certifying a partially overlapping
collective action under the FLSA, for South Carolina Grapevine
employees, for purposes of settlement of the class action and FLSA
collective action claims between the two Plaintiffs, Class and
Collective Action Members, and Defendants.

In particular, the parties move the Court, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
section 216(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), to
certify a NCWHA class and to conditionally certify a FLSA
collective action for those workers employed by Grapevine in North
Carolina that is, with the exception of the consent requirement of
29 U.S.C. section 216(b), materially identical to the NCWHA class
that the Plaintiffs seek to represent and is defined as follows:

   "All employees of Defendant Grapevine who performed hours
   worked of more than 40 hours in the same workweek in North
   Carolina (i) when that work included work as a delivery
   driver, transfer driver, driver's helper, loader, and/or
   mechanic as defined in 29 C.F.R. Part 782 in Grapevine's
   mixed vehicle fleet for any workweek ending in the two
   chronological years preceding September 25, 2021 or (ii) who
   were employed by Grapevine during that same time period and
   are listed in Exhibit A to the Class Notice and/or employees
   during that same time frame who experienced unauthorized wage
   deductions for employer-required company uniforms or alleged
   breakage of wine products.

Second, the parties move the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), to certify a SCPWA class represented by
Plaintiff Solomon Hill for those workers employed by Grapevine in
South Carolina that is defined as follows:

   "All employees of Defendant Grapevine who performed hours
   worked of more than 40 hours in the same workweek in South
   Carolina (i) when that work included work as a delivery
   driver, transfer driver, driver's helper, loader, and/or
   mechanic as defined in 29 C.F.R. Part 782 in Grapevine's
   mixed vehicle fleet for any workweek ending in the three
   chronological years preceding September 25, 2021 or (ii) who
   were employed by Grapevine during that same time period and
   are listed in Exhibit A to the Class Notice.

Third, the parties also move the Court, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
section 216(b), to conditionally certify a proposed partially
overlapping two-year FLSA collective action for those employees who
were employed by Grapevine in South Carolina as follows:

   "All employees of Defendant Grapevine who performed hours
   worked of more than forty (40) hours in the same workweek in
   South Carolina (i) when that work included work as a delivery
   driver, transfer driver, driver's helper, loader, and/or
   mechanic as defined in 29 C.F.R. Part 782 in Grapevine's
   mixed vehicle fleet for any workweek that occurred in whole
   or in part in the time period starting with September 25,
   2019 and ending with September 25, 2021 or (ii) who were
   employed by Grapevine during that same time period and are
   listed in Exhibit A to the Class Notice."

Grapevine of North Carolina operates as a distributor of alcoholic
beverages.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Oct. 11, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3s28MkA at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

         Robert J. Willis, Esq.
         LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT J. WILLIS, P.A.
         Pittsboro, NC 27312
         Telephone: (919) 821-9031
         Facsimile: (919) 821-1763
         E-mail: rwillis@rjwillis-law.com

              - and -

         Chris W. Haaf, Esq.
         CHRIS HAAF LAW PLLC
         2806 Reynolda Road No. 123
         Winston-Salem, NC 27106
         Telephone: (336) 354-7643
         E-mail: chris@haaflegal.com

The Defendants are represented by

         J. Alexander S. Barrett, Esq.
         Kurt A. Seeber, Esq.
         HAGAN BARRETT PLLC
         300 N. Greene Street, Suite 200
         Greensboro, NC 27401
         Telephone: (336) 232-0650
         Facsimile: (336) 232-0651
         E-mail: abarrett@haganbarrett.com
                 kseeber@haganbarrett.com

HARVARD UNIVERSITY: Senior Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
---------------------------------------------------------------
Milagros Senior, on behalf of herself and all other persons
similarly situated v. HARVARD UNIVERSITY, Case No. 1:22-cv-08576
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2022), is brought against the Defendant for its
failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its website to
be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and
other blind or visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby, is a
violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA")
prohibiting discrimination against the blind. Because the
Defendant's interactive website, https://www.harvard.edu/,
including all portions thereof or accessed thereon, including, but
not limited to, https://gocrimson.com/, is not equally accessible
to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it violates the ADA and
the RA. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that the Defendant's website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using his
computer.

The Defendant operates the Harvard online retail store as well as
the Harvard interactive website and advertises, markets, and
operates in the State of New York and throughout the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          MARS KHAIMOV LAW, PLLC
          108-26 64th avenue, Second Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (929) 324-0717
          Fax: (929) 333-7774
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


HCI LLC: Yauney Sues Over WARN Act Violation
--------------------------------------------
Doug Yauney, individually on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. HCI, LLC, Case No. 5:22-cv-01769 (C.D. Cal.,
Oct. 7, 2022), is brought under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act and/or the California Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act, against Defendant their employer
for WARN Act and California WARN Act purposes.

On August 9, 2022 the Defendant made a mass layoff and/or plant
closing by unilaterally and without notice shutting down the
Defendant with no notice to employees. The Defendant failed to
provide 60 days advance written notice as required by the WARN Act,
and the California WARN Act to the affected employees. On August 9,
2022, the Defendant informed the affected employees that their
services would no longer be required and that they were being
terminated. Because of the August 9, 2022 terminations, the
Defendant's reduction in force constituted a mass layoff or plant
closing which became effective on August 9, 2022. As such, the
Plaintiff should have received the full protection afforded by the
WARN Act and the California WARN Act, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States and resident of San
Bernadino County, California and was employed by HCI, LLC.

HCI, LLC is a company that provides telecommunications
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eve H. Cervantez, Esq.
          Danielle E. Leonard, Esq.
          ALTSHULER BERZON LLP
          177 Post Street, Suite 300
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Phone: (415) 421-7151
          Facsimile: (415) 362-8064
          Email: ecervantez@altshulerberzon.com
                 dleonard@alshulerberzon.com

               - and -

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Dalia R. Khalili, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Phone: (310) 531-1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
          Email: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
                 dkhalili@maternlawgroup.com

               - and -

          J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
          223 Rosa Parks Ave. Suite 200
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Phone: 615/254-8801
          Facsimile: 615/255-5419
          Email: gerards@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          Alyson Steele Beridon, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
          425 Walnut St., Suite 2315
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Phone (513) 381-2224
          Facsimile: 615/255-5419
          Email: alysonb@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
          COHEN & MALAD, LLP
          One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Phone: (317) 636-6481
          Email: ltoops@cohenandmalad.com

               - and -

          Samuel Strauss, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS, LLP
          613 Williamson Street, Suite 201
          Madison, WI 53703
          Phone: 608-237-1775
          Email: Sam@turkestrauss.com


HEALTHSOURCE GLOBAL: Claims in Louis Suit Sent to Arbitration
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California refers to arbitration the claims in the
lawsuit entitled PATRICIA LOUIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. HEALTHSOURCE
GLOBAL STAFFING, INC., Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-02436-JD (N.D.
Cal.).

Named Plaintiffs Patricia Louis and Morgan Murray, on behalf of a
putative class of "strikebreakers" hired to work on short-term
assignments during labor disputes, have sued Healthsource Global
Staffing, Inc., for a variety of wage and hour claims under
California law. They filed this action in the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Alameda in December 2021, and
filed an amended complaint on March 15, 2022 (FAC).

On April 19, 2022, Healthsource removed the case to federal court
under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).

Healthsource asks for an order compelling the individual claims of
the Named Plaintiffs to arbitration pursuant to the parties'
arbitration agreements and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
Healthsource filed a motion to compel arbitration on Aug. 15, 2022.
Under Civil Local Rule 7-3(a), the Plaintiffs' opposition was due
on Aug. 29, 2022. On Sept. 6, 2022, Healthsource filed a notice
that the Plaintiffs had not filed or served a response to the
motion. To date, the Plaintiffs have not filed a response, or
otherwise opposed the arbitration demand.

"Why this is so is not clear, especially since plaintiffs briefed a
motion to remand and have actively engaged with this case in other
respects," Judge Donato asks. The record demonstrates that the
Plaintiffs had notice of the arbitration demand.

The parties submitted a joint case management statement on July 14,
2022, stating that the Defendant claims that the Plaintiffs signed
arbitration agreements as part of their work with HSG and the
Plaintiffs plan to conduct discovery on the arbitrability of their
claims, and that Healthsource anticipates filing a Motion to Compel
Arbitration intended to be heard on Aug. 25, 2022, on the basis
that the Plaintiffs entered into a written agreement to arbitrate
all claims arising out of their employment with HSG.

Healthsource says it sent the Plaintiffs' counsel the applicable
arbitration agreements on May 23, 2022, and the parties met and
conferred regarding individual arbitration on June 28, 2022, but
the Plaintiffs declined to stipulate to arbitration.

Judge Donato holds that the Plaintiffs' failure to oppose the
demand is enough in itself to compel arbitration. Even so, the
Court independently reviewed the arbitration demand, and concludes
that the claims are arbitrable. Consequently, the case is ordered
to arbitration.

There is no question that a valid and enforceable arbitration
agreement exists between Healthsource and the Named Plaintiffs,
Judge Donato notes. The arbitration agreement the Plaintiffs signed
was clear and straightforward. By signing the agreement, Judge
Donato holds that each Plaintiff acknowledged that they read the
agreement, understood its terms, and entered into the agreement
voluntarily.

Judge Donato finds the arbitration agreement covers all 11 claims
in the complaint. The Plaintiffs' wage and hour claims, meal and
rest break claims, and derivative unfair business practices claims
are all are rooted in their employment relationship with
Healthsource and consequently subject to arbitration.

With respect to specific questions about the scope of the
arbitration, such as whether the parties waived class or
representative actions, the arbitration agreement incorporates the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules for employment cases.

Consequently, the parties have agreed to delegate such issues to
the arbitrator for decision. The Court reaches no conclusions about
these issues here.

Judge Donato holds that the claims in the complaint are referred to
arbitration. Healthsource asked to dismiss, or in the alternative,
to stay the action pending arbitration.

Judge Donato rules that the case is dismissed without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 3, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/57wtdcs8 from Leagle.com.


HEALTHSOURCE GLOBAL: Court Won't Remand Louis Suit to State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denies the Plaintiffs' motion to remand the
lawsuit styled PATRICIA LOUIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. HEALTHSOURCE
GLOBAL STAFFING, INC., Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-02436-JD (N.D.
Cal.), to the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of Alameda.

Named Plaintiffs Patricia Louis and Morgan Murray, on behalf of a
putative class of "strikebreakers" hired to work on short-term
assignments during labor disputes, have sued Healthsource Global
Staffing, Inc., for a variety of wage and hour claims under
California law. They filed this action in the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Alameda in December 2021, and
filed an amended complaint on March 15, 2022 (FAC).

On April 19, 2022, Healthsource removed the case to federal court
under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). The Plaintiffs
filed a motion to remand on the grounds that Healthsource has not
plausibly established the $5 million amount in controversy required
for CAFA jurisdiction and that removal was not timely.

The Plaintiffs' lead argument is that Healthsource "was legally
required to provide evidence in support of its estimated amount in
controversy at that time of removal." The law says otherwise, Judge
Donato holds. Healthsource bore the burden of establishing the
amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence only after
the Plaintiffs factually attacked its estimates.

Judge Donato finds Healthsource has met this evidentiary burden
because it has established that the claim under California Labor
Code Section 203 alone puts more than $18 million in controversy.

The Plaintiffs' suggestion that removal was untimely under 28
U.S.C. Section 1446(b) is not well taken, Judge Donato points out.
He explains that Sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) of the removal
statute require that a notice of removal be filed within thirty
days of receipt from the plaintiff of an initial pleading or other
document from which it is ascertainable that the case is
removable.

Neither the initial complaint nor the FAC affirmatively disclosed
the potential size of the putative class or the amount in
controversy, and the Plaintiffs do not point to any other pleading
or document that would have triggered the question of removal,
Judge Donato holds. He opines that Healthsource could not have made
those calculations without reviewing its own business records to
establish the likely number of putative class members, the number
of assignments worked, and the average daily pay. The thirty-day
limits in Section 1446(b) are consequently inapplicable, and it was
proper for Healthsource to remove "at any time."

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 3, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2ek68x5n from Leagle.com.


HOLLYWOOD TOYS: Lawal Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hollywood Toys and
Costumes, Inc. The case is styled as Rafia Lawal, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Hollywood Toys and
Costumes, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-08627 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 11, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Hollywood Toys and Costumes, Inc. --
https://hollywoodtoysandcostumes.com/ -- is a long-time retailer
boasts a diverse selection of costumes for all ages, makeup, wigs &
collectibles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


INDIANA: Amended Complaint in Smith v. Newman Due on Oct. 28
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned DEBORAH SMITH, Plaintiff v. ROBERT B.
NEWMAN, and LISA T. MEEKS, Defendants, Case No.
4:22-cv-00117-TWP-DML (S.D. Ind.), Chief District Judge Tanya
Walton Pratt of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana, New Albany Division, grants the Plaintiff leave to file
an amended complaint by Oct. 28, 2022.

Having screened the Complaint, the Court finds it is subject to
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. If no amended complaint is
filed by Oct. 28, Judge Pratt says the action will be dismissed.

On Sept. 8, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Deborah Smith initiated this
civil action by filing her fill-in-the-blank Complaint for a Civil
Action against the Defendants.

On her Complaint, the Plaintiff checked the box for "Federal
question" as the basis for federal court jurisdiction. She alleges
that she is a citizen of the State of Ohio, and she also alleges
that the Defendants are citizens of the State of Ohio. She then
alleges that she was represented by the Defendants in a civil
lawsuit arising from events that occurred around January 2005.

While the Defendants were representing the Plaintiff, they made her
believe that her personal claim needed to be part of a class action
lawsuit. The lawsuit eventually ended with an award of $321,000.
The Plaintiff's written agreement with the Defendants called for
her to receive one-third of any award. She alleges that she was
supposed to receive $101,000 of the class settlement, yet she was
only awarded $51,500, and the Defendants have failed to give her
the remaining amount. The Plaintiff asks that she be awarded
$153,500 in this lawsuit.

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it does
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the Plaintiff's claims.

Judge Pratt notes that it appears from the Complaint that the
Plaintiff is bringing a state law claim for breach of contract or
possibly fraud or legal malpractice. She has not pled any facts to
allege a violation of federal law to give rise to federal question
jurisdiction in the Court. While her Complaint appears to assert a
state law claim, the Plaintiff also has alleged that the state
citizenship of all the parties is Ohio, which would not support
diversity jurisdiction.

Because the parties are citizens of the same state, the Complaint
is subject to dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
Judge Pratt holds. State law claims between citizens of the same
state are properly brought in state court rather than federal
court.

The Plaintiff will have through Friday, Oct. 28, 2022, by which to
show cause why judgment consistent with this Entry should not
issue.

If the Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, Judge Pratt
points out that  she should conform to the following guidelines:
(a) the amended complaint will comply with the requirement of Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) the amended
complaint must include a demand for the relief sought; (c) the
amended complaint must identify what legal injury the Plaintiff
claims to have suffered and what persons are responsible for each
such legal injury; and (d) the amended complaint must include the
case number referenced in the caption of this Entry.

The amended complaint also should demonstrate that jurisdiction is
proper in this Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 3, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/37c5szrf from Leagle.com.


JUUL LABS: Leon County Schools Join E-cigarette Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Ana Goñi-Lessan, writing for Tallahassee Democrat, reports that
Leon County Schools will join more than a thousand other school
districts in the fight against one of the most popular
e-cigarette makers.

The school board on Oct. 11 evening voted to join a class action
lawsuit with approximately 1,400 other school districts against
Juul, alleging the e-cigarette manufacturer used unfair marketing
practices to make youth addicted to vaping products.

"This is important for us to make a stand to our community that we
are against this, and that we don't appreciate these companies
seducing our children with banana-flavored nicotine," said school
board member Rosanne Wood. "If this lawsuit prevails, and we get an
award, we'll be able to educate our students."

As of early September, 14 other school districts in Florida had
joined the lawsuit.

Leon County Schools will be represented by Kirton McConkie PC, a
law firm based out of Salt Lake City, Utah.

According to the contract, the district will owe 25% of the
settlement and 25% of any non-monetary settlement to attorneys if
the case closes by June 1, 2023. If the case closes after, that
payment increases to 30% each.

Superintendent Rocky Hanna supported joining the lawsuit and said
he's spoken to students about vaping during his sit-down lunches at
middle and high schools.

"After visiting with our kids, there's there's no doubt we're doing
the right thing," Hanna said.

Juul recently agreed to pay nearly $440 million to 34 states and
territories to settle an investigation into the company's vaping
products.

The investigation found that Juul marketed its e-cigarettes to
underage teens with launch parties, giveaways and ads and social
media posts using youthful models, according to a statement from
the Connecticut's Attorney General William Tong.

Connecticut will receive a minimum of $16.2 million through the
settlement. [GN]

LAS VEGAS, NV: Coyne's State Law Claims Remanded to State Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled DANIEL COYNE, et al., Plaintiffs v. LAS VEGAS
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant, Case No.
2:22-cv-00475-APG-VCF (D. Nev.), Judge Andrew P. Gordon of the U.S.
District Court for the District Nevada remands the Plaintiffs'
state law claims to state court.

Plaintiffs Daniel Coyne, David Denton, and Sean Bollig filed this
lawsuit in state court under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
and Nevada law on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
peace officers employed by Defendant Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department (LVMPD). LVMPD removed the case to this Court.

The Plaintiffs allege that LVMPD has failed to pay overtime for
pre- and post-shift activities for scheduled overtime shifts, such
as reporting to their assigned area command to collect equipment
and inspect the department's vehicle, refueling the vehicle, and
returning the equipment and vehicle. They bring a putative
collective action under the FLSA for failure to pay overtime (count
one).

The Plaintiffs also bring a putative class action under Nevada law
for (1) failure to pay for all hours worked under Nevada Revised
Statutes (NRS) (count two); (2) failure to pay minimum wage under
Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada Constitution and NRS (count
three); (3) failure to pay wages due and owing upon termination
under NRS Section 608.020-608.050 and Senate Bill 245 (count four);
and (4) declaratory relief that their pre- and post-shift tasks are
compensable work under the FLSA and Nevada law (count five).

Judge Gordon previously denied LVMPD's motion to dismiss the FLSA
claim. He advised the parties that he was inclined to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and
intended to remand them to state court, but he gave the parties the
opportunity to brief their positions first. The parties filed
supplemental briefs. The Plaintiffs favor remand of the state law
claims. LVMPD opposes it.

Judge Gordon says LVMPD's arguments do not persuade him to retain
jurisdiction over the state law claims. First, LVMPD argues that
FLSA opt-in claims and state law opt-out class actions are not
necessarily incompatible. As noted in prior order, Judge Gordon
agrees. But managing both types of claims in the same lawsuit can
create administrative burdens and complexities that Judge Gordon
says he has factored into his analysis.

Next, LVMPD argues that remand would cause duplicative litigation
and extensive discovery. But it does not explain why the parties
cannot coordinate discovery to reduce any burdens created by
litigating in two forums, Judge Gordon notes. LVMPD also suggests
there may be inconsistent results, but it offers no law or argument
that what constitutes compensable time is the same under state and
federal law. That there might be different results under different
governing laws does not weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction,
Judge Gordon opines. And if the law is the same, then the parties
may invoke issue preclusion to avoid inconsistent results.

LVMPD contends that state law issues do not predominate, but the
parties' briefing at dismissal suggests otherwise. The parties'
briefs raised numerous novel state law issues. Certifying state law
questions to the Supreme Court of Nevada would delay resolution of
the federal claim while the court and parties await answers on the
state law claims.

For all these reasons and those set forth in prior order, Judge
Gordon declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims. Judge Gordon, therefore, severs and remands
them.

Judge Gordon declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the Plaintiffs' state law claims. Those claims are severed and
remanded to the state court. The federal claim under the Fair Labor
Standards Act remains pending in this Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 3, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mrxjp2vk from Leagle.com.


LOTTERY.COM INC: Faces McDonald Class Suit Over Securities Fraud
----------------------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW K. McDONALD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. LOTTERY.COM, INC. f/k/a TRIDENT ACQUISITIONS
CORP., ANTHONY DiMATTEO, RYAN DICKINSON, MATTHEW CLEMENSON, VADIM
KOMISSAROV, MARAT ROSENBERG, ILYA PONOMAREV, THOMAS GALLAGHER, and
GENNADII BUTKEVYCH, Case 1:22-cv-01025 (W.D. Tex., Oct. 11, 2022)
is a securities fraud class action on behalf of all persons or
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Lottery.com publicly
traded securities between November 19, 2020 and July 29, 2022
seeking to pursue remedies against the Company and certain of the
Company's officers and directors under Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in
reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially
inflated prices for Lottery.com securities, they claim. The
Plaintiff and the Class added that they would not have purchased
Lottery.com securities at the prices they paid, or at all, had they
been aware that the market prices were artificially and falsely
inflated by defendants' misleading statement.

On October 21, 2021 only one week prior to the special
stockholders' meeting to approve the Business Combination - TDAC
and Lottery.com jointly issued a press release claiming that
Lottery.com had achieved "Strong Preliminary Third Quarter 2021
Revenues" in the range of $22 million to $24 million. The release
stated that "[t]his represents sequential revenue growth of greater
than 135% compared to $9.3 million in the second quarter of 2021."

On October 27, 2021, TDAC issued a press release stating that
"stockholders holding 5,765,400 shares, or 99.6% of Trident's
outstanding shares, elected to retain their common stock. As a
result, Lottery.com expects to receive over $63 million in gross
proceeds at the closing of the Business Combination."

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants allegedly violated the
federal securities laws by disseminating materially false and
misleading statements to the investing public and/or failing to
disclose adverse facts pertaining to the Company's business,
operations, and prospects. Specifically, the defendants concealed
material information and/or failed to disclose that the Company was
not in compliance with state and federal laws governing the sale of
lottery tickets.

After the truth was revealed in a series of partial disclosures,
the price of Lottery.com securities plummeted, causing investors to
suffer significant losses and economic damages under the federal
securities laws. By the end of the Class Period, the price of
Lottery.com stock had fallen to less than $1 per share and
Lottery.com warrants were virtually worthless, says the suit.

Mr. McDonald purchased Lottery.com securities during the Class
Period and was damaged thereby.

Lottery.com is a provider of domestic and international lottery
products and services that enable consumers and businesses to
purchase purportedly legally sanctioned lottery tickets in the
United States and abroad online through its proprietary
business-to-consumer platform.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joe Kendall, Esq.
          JOE KENDALL
          3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1450
          Dallas, TX 75219
          Telephone: (214) 744-3000
          Facsimile: (214) 744-3015
          E-mail: jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com

               - and -

          Brian E. Cochran, Esq.
          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          Richard W. Gonnello, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101-8498
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423

MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: Luckey Appeals Suit Dismissal to 9th Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------------
SAMUEL LUCKEY, et al. are taking an appeal from a court order
dismissing their lawsuit styled Samuel Luckey, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Rachel
Mitchell, in her official capacity as County Attorney for Maricopa
County, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01168-GMS, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Arizona.

The Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Defendant alleging
that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office (MCAO) has a policy of
warning those charged with crimes in the County's Early Disposition
Courts (EDCs) that if they reject an initial plea offer or exercise
their right to a preliminary hearing, the next offer will be
"presumptively harsher" or even "substantially harsher," thereby
punishing people who simply choose to exercise their rights. The
Plaintiffs claim they are being coerced into accepting pleas that
require giving up their right to preliminary hearings, which harms
them because they must accept the terms offered without any
examination of witnesses or a probable cause determination by a
judge or grand jury and without being given the benefit of any
discovery beyond a police report.

The Plaintiffs bring three class-wide claims. In Count One, they
claim Defendant "maintains and executes an official, blanket
policy, practice, or custom of making plea offers in the EDCs
"substantially harsher" in response to people exercising their
right to a preliminary hearing and/or trial" in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. They allege that this
"Retaliation Policy" is vindictive and punishes people for
exercising their statutory, procedural, or constitutional rights.
In Count Two, they claim the "Retaliation Policy" excessively
burdens the right to trial, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. In
Count Three, they claim the "Retaliation Policy" deprives EDC
defendants of a state-created liberty interest to a preliminary
hearing, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

On September 8, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify
class.

On September 22, 2021, the Defendant filed a motion for judicial
notice. On September 23, 2021, the Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint.

On September 7, 2022, the Court Judge G. Murray Snow entered an
order granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice for
the Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim. The Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification and the Defendant's motion for judicial
notice were denied as moot.

The appellate case is captioned as Samuel Luckey, et al v. Rachel
Mitchell, Case No. 22-16556, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, filed on October 11, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellants Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Aaron
Dromiack and Samuel Luckey Mediation Questionnaire were due on
October 18, 2022;

   -- Appellants Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Aaron
Dromiack and Samuel Luckey opening brief is due on December 12,
2022;

   -- Appellee Rachel H. Mitchell answering brief is due on January
12, 2023; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants SAMUEL LUCKEY, et al., on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, are represented by:

            Jared G. Keenan, Esq.
            ACLU of Arizona
            3707 N. 7th Street, Suite 235
            Phoenix, AZ 85014
            Telephone: (602) 650-1854

                   - and -

            Victoria Lopez, Esq.
            3707 N. 7th Street
            Phoenix, AZ 85014
            Telephone: (602) 773-6011

Defendant-Appellee RACHEL H. MITCHELL, in her official capacity as
County Attorney for Maricopa County, is represented by:

            Charles E. Trullinger, Esq.
            Joseph Isaac Vigil, Esq.
            Maricopa County Attorney's Office
            225 W. Madison Street
            Phoenix, AZ 85003
            Telephone: (602) 506-8541

MDL 2573: Gilead Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in HIV Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., et al. are taking an appeal from a court
order granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs' motion
to certify class in the multi-district litigation captioned In re:
HIV Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 3:19-cv-02573-EMC, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

The Plaintiffs have filed suit against companies that are the new
drug application holders for, or otherwise manufacture, sell,
and/or distribute, those HIV medications, namely: (1) Gilead; (2)
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS); (3) Japan Tobacco; and (4) Janssen.

The operative complaint is the corrected consolidated class action
complaint ("CAC"). The bulk of the Plaintiffs' claims against the
Defendants are antitrust claims, both federal and state (Counts 1-6
and 8-13). The Plaintiffs have also asserted a claim based on
violation of state consumer protection laws (Count 7).

The Plaintiffs have asserted the following causes of action: (1)
conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act (against all the Defendants and implicating all three
categories of anticompetitive conduct); (2) conspiracy to
monopolize in violation of state antitrust laws (against all the
Defendants and implicating all three categories of anticompetitive
conduct); (3) monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act (against Gilead only and implicating all three
categories of anticompetitive conduct); (4) monopolization in
violation of state antitrust laws (against Gilead only and
implicating all three categories of anticompetitive conduct); (5)
attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act (against Gilead only and implicating all three categories of
anticompetitive conduct); (6) attempted monopolization in violation
of state antitrust laws (against Gilead only and implicating all
three categories of anticompetitive conduct); (7) violation of
state consumer protection laws (against all the Defendants and
implicating all three categories of anticompetitive conduct); (8)
conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (against
Gilead and Janssen only and implicating the No-Generics Restraints
only); (9) conspiracy in violation of state antitrust laws (against
Gilead and Janssen only and implicating the No-Generics Restraints
only); (10) conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
(against Gilead and Japan Tobacco only and implicating the
No-Generics Restraints only); (11) conspiracy in violation of state
antitrust laws (against Gilead and Japan Tobacco only and
implicating the No-Generics Restraints only); (12) conspiracy in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (against Gilead and BMS
only and implicating the No-Generics Restraints only); and (13)
conspiracy in violation of state antitrust laws (against Gilead and
BMS only and implicating the No-Generics Restraints only).

The anticompetitive conduct identified in the Plaintiffs' CAC falls
into the following three categories: (1) agreements between Gilead
and one of the other defendants that contain No-Generics
Restraints; (2) patent settlement agreements between Gilead and a
generic manufacturer, Teva, under which Teva agreed to delay entry
into the market in exchange for certain benefits; and (3) Gilead's
commercialization of one of its drugs known as TAF.

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which Judge
Edward M. Chen granted in part and denied in part on September 27,
2022.

The appellate case is captioned In re: HIV Antitrust Litigation,
Case No. 22-80116, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, filed on October 11, 2022. [BN]

Defendants-Petitioners GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., et al., are
represented by:

            Heather M. Burke, Esq.
            WHITE & CASE LLP
            3000 El Camino Real
            2 Palo Alto Square, Suite 900
            Palo Alto, CA 94306
            Telephone: (650) 213-0300
            Facsimile: (650) 213-8158
            E-mail: hburke@whitecase.com

                   - and -

            Steve D. Shadowen, Esq.
            HILLIARD & SHADOWEN LLP
            1135 W. 6th Street, Suite 125
            Austin, TX 78703
            Telephone: (855) 344-3298
            E-mail: steve@hilliardshadowenlaw.com

                   - and -

            Daralyn J. Durie, Esq.
            DURIE TANGRI LLP
            217 Leidesdorff Street
            San Francisco, CA 94111
            Telephone: (415) 362-6666
            E-mail: ddurie@durietangri.com

                   - and -

            Steve W. Berman, Esq.
            HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
            1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
            Seattle, WA 98101
            Telephone: (206) 623-7292
            E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com

                   - and -

            Dianne M. Nast, Esq.
            NASTLAW LLC
            1101 Market Street, Suite 2801
            Philadelphia, PA 19107
            Telephone: (215) 923-9300
            E-mail: dnast@nastlaw.com

                   - and -

            William F. Murphy, Esq.
            DILLINGHAM & MURPHY
            601 Montgomery Street, Suite 1900
            San Francisco, CA 94111
            Telephone: (415) 397-2700
            E-mail: wfm@dillinghammurphy.com

                   - and -

            Francis O. Scarpulla, Esq.
            LAW OFFICES OF FRANCIS O. SCARPULLA
            3708 Clay Street
            San Francisco, CA 94118
            Telephone: (415) 751-4193
            E-mail: fos@scarpullalaw.com

                   - and -

            Michael L. Roberts, Esq.
            ROBERTS LAW FIRM
            1920 McKinney Avenue, Suite 700
            Dallas, TX 75204
            Telephone: (501) 952-8558
            E-mail: mikeroberts@robertslawfirm.us

                   - and -

            Anna T. Neill, Esq.
            KENNY NACHWALTER, P.A.
            Four Seasons Tower, Suite 1100
            1441 Brickell Avenue
            Miami, FL 33131
            Telephone: (305) 373-1000
            E-mail: aneill@knpa.com

                   - and -

            Daniel A. Sasse, Esq.
            CROWELL & MORING LLP
            3 Park Plaza, 20th Floor
            Irvine, CA 92614
            Telephone: (949) 263-8400
            E-mail: DSasse@crowell.com

                   - and -

            Barry L. Refsin, Esq.
            HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN & SCHILLER
            One Logan Square, 27th Floor
            Philadelphia, PA 19103
            Telephone: (215) 568-6200
            E-mail: brefsin@hangley.com

                   - and -

            Joshua Courtney Stokes, Esq.
            BERRY SILBERBERG STOKES PC
            6080 Center Drive, Sixth Floor
            Los Angeles, CA 90045
            Telephone: (213) 986-2690
            E-mail: jstokes@berrysilberberg.com

                   - and -

            Hamish P.M. Hume, Esq.
            BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
            1401 New York Avenue, NW
            Washington, DC 20005
            Telephone: (202) 237-2727
            E-mail: hhume@bsfllp.com

                   - and -

            Judith A. Zahid, Esq.
            ZELLE LLP
            555 12th Street, Suite 1230
            Oakland, CA 94607
            Telephone: (415) 693-0700
            E-mail: jzahid@zelle.com

MDL 2830: Oklahoma Firefighters Appeals Suit Dismissal to 2nd Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION & RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al. are
taking an appeal from a court order dismissing their action in the
multi-district litigation captioned In re: Mexican Government Bonds
Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 1:18-cv-02830-JPO, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, bring this class action suit against the Defendants for
alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton
Antitrust Act.

A Mexican government bond ("MGB") is a debt security (like a U.S.
Treasury bond) that is issued by the Mexican government during
regularly scheduled auctions. The Mexican government uses MGBs to
raise capital, fund budget deficits, and control Mexico's monetary
supply.

The Defendants are horizontal competitors in the MGB market. They
are also the exclusive Mexican government-approved market makers
for MGBs. The Defendants' U.S. Dealer-Subsidiaries sold MGBs in the
United States as agents for their Corporate Parents.

The Plaintiffs allege that this privilege allowed the Defendants to
dominate the MGB market. In exchange for market maker status, the
Bank of Mexico ("Banxico") requires the Defendants to collectively
bid for at least 100% of the MGBs offered in each auction. The
Defendants, thus, control the supply of MGBs in the
over-the-counter market, where they sell the bonds purchased at
auction to their customers, the Plaintiffs assert.

The Defendants used this dominant position as the exclusive
government approved market markets in the MGB market to unlawfully
increase the profitability of their MGB businesses, the Plaintiffs
argue. The Plaintiffs add that the Defendants' agreement to
restrain trade in the MGB market is part of a broader pattern of
collusion and price-fixing by these same Defendants during the
Class Period.

On May 21, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(B) after the Court granted
a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction
from a subset of the Defendants on November 30, 2020.

On March 29, 2022, the Court ordered the consolidation of other
similar cases filed against same Defendants under Case No.
1:18-cv-02830-JPO.

On March 30, 2022, Judge J. Paul Oetken denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration as untimely. Local Rule 6.3 directs a
party to file a notice of motion for reconsideration within 14 days
after the entry of the Court's determination of the original
motion. The Plaintiffs did not do so, nor did they ask for an
extension, ruled the Court.

On August 17, 2022, the Court granted a request for entry of final
judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court ordered the case to be closed stating that it
has dismissed all of the served Defendants, and only unserved
Defendants remain, so there is no reason to preclude the immediate
and automatic entry of a final judgment.

The appellate case is captioned In Re Mexican Government Bonds
Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 22-2039, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, filed on September 15, 2022.
[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION & RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

            Vincent Briganti, Esq.
            Margaret C. MacLean, Esq.
            LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
            44 South Broadway
            White Plains, NY 10601
            Telephone: (914) 997-0500

Defendants-Appellees BANCO SANTANDER, S.A., et al., are represented
by:

            Alan E. Schoenfeld, Esq.
            WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
            7 World Trade Center
            250 Greenwich Street
            New York, NY 10007

                    - and -

            Paul S. Mishkin, Esq.
            DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP
            450 Lexington Avenue
            New York, NY 10017
            Telephone: (212) 450-4292

                    - and -

            Robert D. Wick, Esq.
            COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
            1 CityCenter, 850 10th Street, NW
            Washington, DC 20001
            Telephone: (202) 662-6000

                    - and -

            Boris Bershteyn, Esq.
            SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
            One Manhattan West
            New York, NY 10001
            Telephone: (212) 735-3834

                    - and -

            Matthew J. Porpora, Esq.
            SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
            125 Broad Street
            New York, NY 10004
            Telephone: (212) 558-4028

                    - and -

            Lev L. Dassin, Esq.
            CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP
            One Liberty Plaza
            New York, NY 10006
            Telephone: (212) 225-2000

                    - and -

            Adam Selim Hakki, Esq.
            SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
            599 Lexington Avenue
            New York, NY 10022
            Telephone: (212) 848-4924

                    - and -

            John Francis Terzaken, III, Esq.
            SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP
            900 G. Street, NW
            Washington, DC 20001
            Telephone: (202) 636-5858

                    - and -

            David G. Januszewski, Esq.
            CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
            32 Old Slip
            New York, NY 10005
            Telephone: (212) 701-3352

                    - and -

            Robert O'Loughlin, Esq.
            PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
            1285 Avenue of the Americas
            New York, NY 10019
            Telephone: (212) 373-3000

MULTIPLAN CORP: Bid to Compel Reply to Interrogatories Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RE: In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders Litigation,
C.A. No. 2021-0300-LWW (Del. Ch.), Judge Lori W. Will of the Court
of Chancery of Delaware enters an Order:

   a. granting the Defendants' Motion for Extension of Deadline
      to Respond to Interrogatories; and

   b. denying the Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion to Compel and Strike.

The allegations at issue are described in the court's Jan. 3, 2022
Opinion. In that Opinion, the Court denied the Defendants' motions
to dismiss claims against the former directors of, sponsor of, and
financial advisor to a special purpose acquisition company. On
February 17, the Defendants filed their Answer to the Verified
Class Action Complaint. Discovery (and a series of discovery
disputes) ensued.

On August 31, the Plaintiffs served their second set of
interrogatories on the 10 Defendants -- seven individuals and three
business entities. The next day, they served an additional set of
interrogatories on Defendant The Klein Group, LLC. These
interrogatories collectively seek responses to 86 questions (well
over 100 counting subparts). By rule, the Defendants' responses
were due on September 30 and October 3, respectively.

By the week of September 26, it became clear to the Defendants that
they would be unable to meet the response deadlines. They asked the
Plaintiffs for a three-week extension until October 21. The
Plaintiffs countered with an offer of a 10-day extension. Because
work remained to be done, the Defendants again asked for an
extension until October 21. No agreement was reached. The Motion
for Extension followed.

In opposing the Motion for Extension, the Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion
to Compel seeks an order compelling the Defendants to respond to
the interrogatories within three days of the Ccourt's ruling on
that motion. They also assert that the Defendants' "failure to
respond" to certain interrogatives concerning the factual bases for
the allegations and affirmative defenses in the Answer is
"particularly troubling" given their representations that the
Answer had legal and evidentiary support. The Plaintiffs ask that
the affirmative defenses advanced in the Answer be stricken.

Judge Will holds that the Defendants have demonstrated good cause
for a modification. She finds that the interrogatories at issue --
the second round served on the Defendants -- are extensive. Many of
the interrogatories seek substantive narratives. The Plaintiffs
also opted to serve the sort of interrogatories that require
significant efforts to answer.

Judge Will rules that providing the Defendants a reasonable
extension to complete them will not cause the Plaintiffs prejudice.
The October 21 deadline sought in the Motion for Extension
coincides with the cutoff for the substantial completion of
document discovery. It leaves ample time for depositions given that
the fact discovery deadline is three months from now. The extension
(which now amounts to nine days) will not delay this non-expedited
case.

Accordingly, the Motion for Extension is granted. The Cross-Motion
to Compel, however, is denied. The Defendants have not refused to
provide responses to the interrogatories; they have asked for more
time. Nor will the Defendants' affirmative defenses be stricken.
The so-called "Answer Interrogatories" were served more than six
months after the Defendants' Answer was filed. Though not ideal,
Judge Will says a brief extension in view of that timing hardly
warrants sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 12, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/kyhm2spe from Leagle.com.


NEW YORK, NY: Gorga Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
----------------------------------------------------------
Michael Gorga, Demetrius Mcfadden, Kevin Ryan, and those similarly
situated v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Case No. 1:22-cv-08638 (S.D.N.Y.,
Oct. 11, 2022), is brought against the Defendant as a collective
action in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
because of the Defendant's unlawful deprivation of the Plaintiffs'
right to overtime compensation in accordance with the FLSA.

As a result of these and other of Defendant's uniform workplace
policies and practices, Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated
routinely work in excess of their regularly scheduled shifts, such
that they necessarily work overtime in excess of their regularly
scheduled 40 hour workweeks. However, Defendant fails to compensate
Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated for all hours worked
in excess of 40 in a workweek at a rate of one and one-half times
their regular rate of pay. Specifically, Defendant fails to
compensate Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated
High-Pressure Plant Tenders ("HPPT") for hours worked before the
start of their scheduled shifts and after the end of their
scheduled shifts, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs are current and former employees of the Defendant,
City of New York, who work or have worked in the position of HPPT
in the Department of Citywide Administrative Services ("DCAS").

City of New York is a public agency and "employer" within the
meaning of the FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Molly Elkin, Esq.
          Sarah M. Block, Esq.
          McGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP
          1101 Vermont Ave., N.W., Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20005
          Phone: (202) 833-8855
          Email: mae@mselaborlaw.com
                 smb@mselaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Hope Pordy, Esq.
          Elizabeth Sprotzer, Esq.
          SPIVAK LIPTON, LLP
          1040 Avenue of the Americas, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10018
          Phone: (212) 765-2100
          Email: hpordy@spivaklipton.com
                 esprotzer@spivaklipton.com


NEW YORK: Nursing Mothers File Class Action Over FLSA Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
McKenna Saady, writing for Parents Together, reports that federal
investigators are looking into the conditions for nursing mothers
working in New York state and city agencies after a growing list of
lawsuits have been filed against institutions such as the New York
Police Department, the Fire Department of New York, and the state
Department of Education.

In the most recent lawsuit, State Trooper Schashuna Whyte in the
Bronx alleges she was forced to pump breast milk in her patrol car,
shared locker rooms, storage rooms, and bathrooms while at work.
These conditions are a violation of both state and federal law.

What are your rights to pump in the workplace?
The right to pump breast milk while at work is covered by the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and is a federal law. There may also be
local and state laws in place in your area that protect a
breastfeeding person's right to express milk in the workplace.

The law is known as Break Time for Nursing Mothers, and requires
employers that are non-exempt from the FLSA to provide basic
accommodations for breastfeeding and pumping milk for one year
after an employee welcomes a new baby. Those accommodations must
include a place other than a bathroom that is private and free from
intrusion.

Breastfeeding workers also have the right to reasonable breaks in
order to have sufficient time to pump while at work. The law does
not require those breaks to be paid unless paid breaks are provided
to all employees -- then those breaks must continue to be paid if
nursing parents use them to pump at work.

You can find out from your supervisor or human resources department
whether your workplace is covered under the FLSA. If you have
experienced or witnessed a violation of the right to pump milk at
work, you can file a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor.
[GN]

OLO INC: Faces Class Action in New York Over Securities Violations
------------------------------------------------------------------
Marian Johns, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that the Pompano
Beach Police and Firefighters' Retirement System alleges a
restaurant online ordering/delivery software company misled it and
other investors.  

Pompano Beach Police and Firefighters' Retirement System,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed
a complaint Sept. 26 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York against Olo Inc., Noah Glass and Peter J.
Benevides alleging fraud, violation of the Securities Exchange Act
and other claims.

According to the plaintiff's class action, New York-based Online
Ordering (Olo), provides online ordering and food delivery software
to restaurants and in February of 2020, announced its partnership
with Subway restaurants.

It alleges that in August of 2021, Olo reported its "active
locations" to demonstrate its business growth as having
approximately 15,000 Subway locations, which caused its stock price
to "soar" above $45 per share. The plaintiffs claim Olo misled
investors and omitted material facts about the company's success by
citing Subway locations that were set to end their relationship
with Olo.

They further claim that Olo's misleading of the investing public
led to the inflated price of the company's stock and that Olo
"engaged in a scheme to deceive the market." The plaintiff alleges
Olo's actions caused it to purchase Olo stock at artificially
inflated prices since the stock price fell to $12.99 per share on
Aug. 11 and fell to $8.26 per share on Aug. 12.  

The plaintiffs seek monetary relief, interest, trial by jury and
all other just relief. They are represented by Steven Singer and
Rachel Avan of Saxena White PA in White Plains, Maya Saxena and
Lester Hooker of Saxena White PA in Boca Raton.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York case
number 1:22-CV-08228-JSR [GN]

PORTLAND, OR: Wants ADA Class Suit to Include Other Gov't Agencies
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sophie Peel, writing for Willamette Week, reports that the city of
Portland is asking that a class action lawsuit filed last month
against the city by a group of Portlanders with disabilities over
street tent camping include three other parties in the lawsuit:
Multnomah County, Metro and the state of Oregon.

Portland City Attorney Robert Taylor wrote to one of the
plaintiffs' lawyers Sept. 12 that the lawsuit should widen its
scope of defendants.

"If your clients' goals are to pursue a broader solution to
houseless sidewalk camping, I would invite you to consider joining
in your lawsuit the other government entities with responsibility
for addressing houselessness in our community," Taylor wrote to
John DiLorenzo, one of the attorneys from Davis Wright Tremaine
representing the plaintiffs. "As your lawsuit is currently
presented, I believe it fails to recognize the important role and
responsibility played by these other government entities, in
addition to the City, in addressing this complex problem."

At issue is a lawsuit filed against the city last month by 10
Portlanders with disabilities who argue that the city is failing to
uphold disability access under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The lawsuit asks that a judge mandate the city sweep all tents from
sidewalks and provide their occupants alternative shelter.

It appears in Taylor's email that the city may be preparing for a
worst-case scenario: that a judge rules the defendant must build
the shelter capacity to accommodate for every houseless
Portlander.

If the lawsuit names other defendants also responsible for shelter
across Portland, the city could shoulder less of the monetary
burden.

"I encourage you to consider whether the broad and enduring scope
of relief sought by plaintiffs in your case," Taylor wrote to
DiLorenzo, "can be practically achieved if these other government
entities are not also asked to share in the responsibility to
‘construct, purchase, or otherwise provide for emergency shelters
in which to house the unsheltered persons affected by the Court's
judgment.'"

DiLorenzo provided Taylor's email to local reporters on Oct. 12,
adding that on Oct. 11 he issued subpoenas to the county and the
Joint Office of Homeless Services (an office shared between the
city and county) in an attempt to learn one thing: whether tents
and tarps the Joint Office handed out in 2021 are some of the same
tents and tarps that the city is now being sued over.

County budget documents cited by DiLorenzo show that the Joint
Office distributed 6,550 tents and 27,000 tarps across the county
during 2021 from COVID-19 supply centers.

DiLorenzo says he's made no decisions yet to add other defendants
to the lawsuit, but told Taylor in an email that he would consider
it.

"I strongly suspect that the County has been passing out new tents
only to have the City sweep them," DiLorenzo wrote. [GN]

RAINBOW REALTY: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Fair Housing Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF CENTRAL INDIANA, INC., MORY
KAMANO, NORMA TEJEDA, CORDELL SPENCER, MARIA GASPAR, and FRANKLIN
PAZ, Plaintiffs v. RAINBOW REALTY GROUP, INC., EMPIRE HOLDING
CORP., JAMES R. HOTKA, SUNSHINE TRUST, REDSKINS TRUST, SPORTING
TRUST, ALLEY CAT TRUST, SHORE WATERS DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and
SUNFLOWER TRUST, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-01782-JMS-TAB (S.D.
Ind.), Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, enters an
order:

   a. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs' Motion
      to Correct Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify the Court's
      Summary Judgment Order;

   b. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs' Motion
      to Reconsider the Court's Order on the Parties'
      Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment;

   c. vacating in part the portions of the Court's Aug. 12, 2022
      Order denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment;

   d. granting the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment;
      and

   e. granting the Plaintiffs' Motion Requesting Oral Argument.

The Plaintiffs have asserted various claims against Defendants
Rainbow, Empire, Shore Waters, James Hotka, Sunshine Trust,
Redskins Trust, Sporting Trust, and Alley related to agreements
they entered into with Rainbow and other non-party entities to rent
to buy properties in Indianapolis, Indiana ("the RTB Agreements").
Specifically, the Plaintiffs have asserted various claims under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1691, et seq.
("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3601, et seq.
("FHA"), the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1639 ("TILA"),
and Indiana statutes.

The parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, and, after
wading through 180 pages of briefs and over 1,000 pages of
exhibits, the Court issued an Order on Aug. 12, 2022 denying the
Plaintiffs' Motion and granting the Defendants' Cross-Motion. The
Plaintiffs have now filed a Motion to Clarify, a Motion to
Reconsider, and a Motion Requesting Oral Argument. The United
States, also a non-party, has filed a Statement of Interest in
support of the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider.

The Plaintiffs raise eight issues in connection with the Court's
Order on the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, arguing that the
Court:

     (1) did not address the ECOA claims of class members whose RTB
Agreements were not terminated within the first two years "but
either never signed a Conditional Sales Contract with one of the
Individual Land Trusts at all or entered into a Conditional Sales
Contract with one of the Individual Land Trusts more than two years
after entering into their RTB Agreements";

     (2) should have identified the Plaintiffs' class claims for
disparate treatment under the FHA seeking compensatory and punitive
damages as claims that remain for trial;

     (3) erroneously concluded that TILA and the ECOA do not apply
to agreements considered leases for real property under state law;

     (4) erroneously concluded that the Plaintiffs do not have
standing, even if TILA or the ECOA apply to the RTB Agreements,
because they have not sued the proper Defendants;

     (5) applied the wrong standard in analyzing whether the
Plaintiffs set forth a prima facie case of disparate impact under
the FHA;

     (6) improperly resolved a factual dispute regarding whether
the Plaintiffs had met the robust causation requirement for their
FHA disparate impact claim;

     (7) incorrectly assumed that the Defendants could articulate a
valid business justification for targeting low-value homes in
connection with the Plaintiffs' FHA disparate impact claim; and

     (8) erroneously relied on the Defendants' supposed business
justification in connection with the FHA disparate impact claim
without assessing, or providing the Plaintiffs the opportunity to
present, evidence regarding alternative, less discriminatory means
to achieve Defendants' business interests.

First, Judge Magnus-Stinson addresses the Government's Statement of
Interest, filed in support of the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
as it relates to the ECOA claims. The Government filed its
Statement of Interest on the heels of the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider, setting forth several arguments that the Plaintiffs
make for the first time on reconsideration, and the Defendants'
filed a response.

Judge Magnus-Stinson finds that the Government's Statement of
Interest -- filed more than four months after briefing on the
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment concluded and only after the
Court issued its decision on the Cross-Motions -- is untimely and
either raises arguments already raised by the Plaintiffs and
rejected by the Court, or raises arguments the Plaintiffs did not
raise on summary judgment but could have. For those reasons, she
declines to consider the Government's Statement of Interest.

Second, Judge Magnus-Stinson examines the identification of
remaining claims. The Plaintiffs take issue with the Court's
finding that the only class claims for disparate treatment under
the FHA that the Court has identified as remaining for resolution
are for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that they "have
never abandoned their pursuit of compensatory and punitive damages
and the Court has never ruled that these damages are unavailable."
They assert that "the class members' damages claims may require
separate individual proceedings after a liability finding at trial,
but these claims should nonetheless proceed because they have never
been dismissed or abandoned."

The Defendants argue in their response that the class claims for
compensatory and punitive damages were not certified for class
treatment, that having individual proceedings for class members
after trial has never been discussed and is not warranted, and that
any class claims for compensatory and punitive damages under the
FHA have been abandoned because Plaintiffs did not set forth those
claims in their Statement of Claims. They also argue that the
Plaintiffs' class claims under the FHA for declaratory and
injunctive relief are moot because Defendants terminated the RTB
program in September 2019.

Judge Magnus-Stinson clarifies a typographical error in Judge
Miller's March 27, 2020 Order on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification. She finds that at various points during the
litigation, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants have agreed that
there is a typographical error in the March 27, 2020 Order --
specifically, that the reference to the FHA in item (5) on page 16
of the Order was a typographical error, and that Judge Miller meant
to reference TILA instead.

She agrees with the parties, and clarifies Judge Miller's March 27,
2020 Order on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by
changing item (5) on page 16 of his Order to: "(5) Whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to an award of statutory class damages
under the Truth in Lending Act.

The Plaintiffs raise for the first time in their reply brief in
support of their Motion to Clarify the argument that Judge Miller
held in his March 27, 2020 Order that the claims of putative class
members for disparate treatment under the FHA seeking actual,
compensatory, and consequential damages will be resolved through
individual proceedings (and as a part of this case) after liability
is determined at trial.

Judge Magnus-Stinson says this is another example of the Plaintiffs
failing to raise an issue in an original filing, and she is puzzled
as to why they did not raise this argument in their initial brief
in support of their Motion to Clarify. In any event, she does not
read Judge Miller's holding in that way.

Instead, Judge Miller specifically noted that class members "can
bring those claims in individual proceedings," which Judge
Magnus-Stinson reads to mean proceedings other than this lawsuit.
While she acknowledges that the procedure of certifying declaratory
and injunctive claims to establish liability on a class-wide basis
and then determining putative class member's damages through
individual proceedings as part of the same lawsuit is permitted
under Seventh Circuit law, it is not one that the Court will
follow. She finds that if Judge Miller had intended to reserve
those claims for individual damages determinations in this case, he
would have explicitly said so.

To the extent the Plaintiffs believe that this course of action is
implied by Judge Miller's discussion of cases in which the courts
took that approach, Judge Magnus-Stinson grants Plaintiffs' Motion
to Clarify to the extent that it clarifies that it will not
consider the individual claims of class members for compensatory
and punitive damages for disparate treatment under the FHA as those
claims were not certified for class treatment. Those class members
may bring individual claims for damages in individual lawsuits
should they choose to do so and should a declaratory judgment
imposing liability be issued.

Third, Judge Magnus-Stinson considers the TILA and ECOA Claims. At
the outset, she agrees with the Plaintiffs that the effect of the
Court's Order on the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment was to
split potential TILA and ECOA plaintiffs into three categories: (1)
those individuals who did not make payments past the first two
years of their RTB Agreements; (2) those individuals who made
payments past the first two years of their RTB Agreements and
signed a Conditional Sales Contract; and (3) those individuals who
made payments past the first two years of their RTB Agreements and
did not sign a Conditional Sales Contract.

Judge Magnus-Stinson addresses the Plaintiffs' arguments regarding
whether each category of plaintiff has a valid TILA or ECOA claim;
if so, whether Rainbow is a creditor; and, if not, whether that
category of plaintiff has standing. Initially, Judge Magnus-Stinson
denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider to the extent that it
finds that it properly looked to directly applicable state law
(Carter), in light of the arguments they set forth on summary
judgment, in finding that the RTB Agreements are leases for the
first two years and that TILA and the ECOA do not apply to the RTB
Agreements during that time-frame.

Because she has found that the RTB Agreements are not subject to
TILA or the ECOA during the first two years, Judge Magnus-Stinson
need not consider the finding that Rainbow is not a creditor during
that time period and denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider as
it relates to that issue.

Because she has found that TILA and the ECOA do not apply during
the first two years of the RTB Agreements, Judge Magnus-Stinson
also need not reconsider the finding that the Plaintiffs who did
not pay past the initial two years do not have standing to assert
TILA and ECOA claims and denies their Motion to Reconsider as it
relates to that issue.

Next, to the extent the Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of any
decisions related to individuals who paid past the first two years
of the RTB Agreement but signed a Conditional Sales Contract, Judge
Magnus-Stinson denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider as such
individuals are beyond the scope of the action, according to the
representations by counsel to the Court noted. Accordingly she
limits her consideration of additional claims to those who paid
past two years and did not sign a Conditional Sales Contract.

Last, Judge Magnus-Stinson considers whether TILA or the ECOA Apply
to the transactions of individuals who paid past the initial two
years of the RTB Agreements and did not sign a Conditional Sales
Contract. As to those class members, the Court stated in a footnote
in its Order on the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment that if Mr.
Kamano and Mr. Spencer did not sign Conditional Sales Contracts,
this "would provide an additional reason why Mr. Kamano's and Mr.
Spencer's ECOA claims fail as a matter of law -- since there would
be no contract underlying the alleged extension of credit." Upon
reconsideration of the parties' original briefs, Judge
Magnus-Stinson notes that the parties did not address this issue on
summary judgment, so she vacates footnote 6 in the Court's Aug. 12,
2022 Order.

The parties did not address in their summary judgment briefing
whether the ECOA would apply to payments after the initial two
years of the RTB Agreements, but not pursuant to a Conditional
Sales Contract. They should be prepared to address this issue, and
the issue of whether any Named Defendants are creditors under the
ECOA during this time period, at a hearing the Court sets for.,
along with additional issues.

Fourth, Judge Magnus-Stinson discusses standing. She is perplexed
by the Plaintiffs' reluctance to deal with the issue of whether
they have named the correct parties as defendants head-on -- an
issue that the Defendants have raised multiple times and that was
discussed as long ago as the Dec. 16, 2021 final pretrial
conference. To the extent that the Plaintiffs plan to argue that
the Individual Land Trusts can be considered creditors under the
ECOA, she says now is the time to establish that the Named
Defendants are somehow responsible for the actions of the
Individual Land Trusts.

And further, as with numerous other aspects of the case, Judge
Magnus-Stinson finds it not clear which Named Plaintiffs -- if any
-- paid past the first two years of the RTB Agreement but did not
sign a Conditional Sales Contract. She says this information is
critical to the Court determining whether any Named Plaintiff could
have viable ECOA claims. The Plaintiffs must be prepared to present
admissible evidence regarding the status of Ms. Gaspar, Mr. Paz,
and Mr. Kamano at the hearing. In addition, they must be able to
identify the number of class members who paid pursuant to an RTB
Agreement beyond the first two years but who didn't sign a
conditional sales contract.

Fifth, as to piercing the corporate veil/joint venture, the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider its finding that they did
not present sufficient evidence from which it could determine the
appropriateness of piercing the corporate veil to hold the Named
Defendants liable for the actions of the Individual Land Trusts,
because no party moved for summary judgment on that issue. They
also argue that the Court did not resolve their Motion for Summary
Judgment on the issue of whether the Named Defendants can be held
collectively liable through piercing the corporate veil and did not
resolve the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment relating to
whether there is a joint venture among the Defendants. In response,
the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have provided absolutely
no evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil aside from mere
conjuncture and speculation, both of which are insufficient to
survive summary judgment.

Upon further review of the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment,
Judge Magnus-Stinson acknowledges that neither the Plaintiffs nor
the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether
the corporate veil should be pierced to hold the Named Defendants
liable for the actions of the Individual Land Trusts. Now that the
Plaintiffs have clarified that they merely sought to pierce the
corporate veil among the Named Defendants "to simplify the
presentation of evidence at trial," she grants the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider to the extent that she vacates the finding
that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their TILA or
ECOA claims because they did not present sufficient evidence to
justify piercing the corporate veil to hold the Named Defendants
liable for the actions of the Individual Land Trusts.

As to whether the corporate veil should be pierced to hold all
Named Defendants liable for each other's actions, Judge
Magnus-Stinson agrees that the Court did not decide that issue on
summary judgment. However, the Plaintiffs only sought to pierce the
corporate veil for purposes of their TILA claims. Because no viable
TILA claims remain, she denies the Motion to Reconsider to the
extent it asks the Court to determine whether it will pierce the
corporate veil to hold all Defendants liable for any TILA
violations.

To recap, upon reconsideration, Judge Magnus-Stinson grants summary
judgment, and holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish a
joint venture either among the Named Defendants or among the Named
Defendants and the Individual Land Trusts. The Court will decide
whether the corporate veil should be pierced for any remaining
claims and for any particular entities or individuals at the
upcoming hearing. The parties should be prepared to present their
evidence on the corporate veil issue, in full, at the hearing.

Sixth, in their FHA Claims, the Plaintiffs raise four manifest
errors of law in connection with the Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants on the Plaintiffs' disparate
impact claims: (1) that the Court applied the wrong standard for
assessing whether the Plaintiffs adduced sufficient facts for a
trier of fact to find a prima facie case of disparate impact under
the FHA; (2) that the Court "improperly resolved a factual dispute
regarding the Plaintiffs' ability to prove a robust causation
between Defendants' policy and the observed disproportionate
effect"; (3) that the Court "incorrectly assumed, based on no
evidentiary support, that Defendants could articulate a valid
business justification for targeting low-value homes"; and (4) that
the Court "erroneously relied on the Defendants' supposed business
justifications to find against the Plaintiffs without assessing, or
ever providing the Plaintiffs the opportunity to present evidence
regarding, available alternative less discriminatory means to
achieve their business interest."

At the outset, Judge Magnus-Stinson finds that the Court erred in
considering whether the Defendants had produced evidence sufficient
to overcome a prima facie case of disparate impact by establishing
that the RTB Program was justified by a valid business purpose. She
therefore vacates the portion of its Aug. 12, 2022 Order on the
parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment finding that even if
the Plaintiffs had set forth a prima facie case of disparate
impact, the Defendants had shown that the RTB program accomplished
a valid, non-discriminatory business goal.

Judge Magnus-Stinson then considers whether the Court applied the
wrong standard in finding that the Plaintiffs had not set forth a
prima facie case of disparate impact. To the extent that the
Plaintiffs rely in their Motion to Reconsider on statistics related
to the location of the homes upon which Defendants made offers, she
finds that those statistics also do not reliably establish a
disparate impact because Dr. Parnell did not include offers made in
the four additional counties in his original analysis.

Judge Magnus-Stinson grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider to
the extent that she vacates the portion of its Aug. 12, 2022 Order
finding that even if the Plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case
of disparate impact under the FHA, the Defendants had presented a
valid, nondiscriminatory business goal to overcome the prima facie
case.

Judge Magnus-Stinson denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider to
the extent that it reiterates its finding that the statistical
disparity upon which the Plaintiffs rely -- that homes that are
part of the RTB Program are disproportionately located in minority
neighborhoods -- is not sufficient to make a prima facie showing of
disparate impact under the FHA.

Finally, as to further proceedings, Judge Magnus-Stinson finds that
after the second round of summary judgment motions and Plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Clarify, there are still several
outstanding issues that she finds require clarification before a
jury trial on the remaining claims takes place.

To that end, at the hearing, she orders the following:

     a. The parties will be required to present argument regarding
whether those who paid past the first two years of the RTB
Agreements and did not sign a Conditional Sales Contract engaged in
transactions covered by the ECOA and, if so, what entities or
individuals, if any, are creditors under the ECOA;

     b. Those Plaintiffs who were still paying under the RTB
Agreements after the initial two-year period and did not sign a
Conditional Sales Contract will be required to show cause why they
have standing to pursue ECOA claims -- that is, show they have sued
appropriate parties from whom they can seek redress. The Plaintiffs
will be required to provide evidence showing that Ms. Gaspar, Mr.
Paz, and/or Mr. Kamano paid beyond two years without signing a
Conditional Sales Contract. The Court will hear argument and
evidence, if necessary;

     c. The parties will be required to present evidence and
argument regarding the issue of piercing the corporate veil to hold
all Named Defendants responsible for the conduct of any Named
Defendant or non-party;

     d. The parties will be required to present argument regarding
whether the Plaintiffs' FHA disparate treatment claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief are moot; and

     e. The parties will be required to raise any other issues the
determination of which they believe would streamline a jury trial
in this matter.

Judge Magnus-Stinson grants the Plaintiffs' Motion Requesting Oral
Argument to the extent that it will discuss those issues at the
hearing. The Court will not consider any further filings related to
these issues.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Magnus-Stinson:

     a. grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Correct Plaintiffs' Motion
to Clarify the Court's Summary Judgment Order to the extent that
she will not consider the sentence omitted in the corrected version
of the Motion to Clarify;

     b. grants in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify to the
extent that it: clarifies Judge Miller's March 27, 2020 Order to
certify the question of whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to an
award of statutory class damages under TILA, rather than the FHA;
clarifies that any claims of class members for disparate treatment
under the FHA seeking compensatory or punitive damages will not be
determined as a part of this case; and acknowledges that it did not
determine the issue of whether the Plaintiffs or class members who
were still paying under an RTB Agreement after the initial two
years and did not sign a Conditional Sales Contract have a valid
ECOA claim;

     c. denies in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify in all
other respects including with respect to any additional issues that
the Court has failed to discern as being raised in the Motion to
Clarify;

     d. grants in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider to the
extent that she: vacates the portions of the Court's Aug. 12, 2022
Order, finding that: TILA and the ECOA do not apply to the
Plaintiffs who paid past the initial two years of the RTB
Agreements and did not sign a Conditional Sales Contract; the
Plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to justify piercing
the corporate veil to hold the Named Defendants liable for the
actions of the Individual Land Trusts; and even if the Plaintiffs
have set forth a prima facie case of disparate impact under the
FHA, the Defendants have set forth a valid, non-discriminatory
business interest to rebut that prima facie case;

     e. grants the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on
the issue of joint venture both as to a joint venture among the
Named Defendants and as to a joint venture between the Named
Defendants and the Individual Land Trusts;

     f. denies in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider in all
other respects including on any additional issues that the Court
has failed to discern as being raised in the Motion to Reconsider;

     g. declines to consider the Government's Statement of
Interest; and

     h. grants the Plaintiffs' Motion Requesting Oral Argument to
the extent that at the hearing, the parties will be required to
address the issues the Court has set forth.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2dd9f627 from Leagle.com.


RLX TECH: New York Judge Dismisses Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP disclosed that on September 30, 2022, Judge
Paul A. Engelmayer of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed with prejudice a putative
class action asserting claims under the Securities Act of 1933
against an e-cigarette manufacturer, certain of its officers and
directors, and the underwriters of the company's initial public
offering in the United States. Garnett v. RLX Tech., Inc., No.
21-cv-5125, 2022 WL 4632323 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022). Plaintiffs
alleged that the China-based company failed to disclose the
likelihood of increased e-cigarette regulations in China that would
harm the company's financial prospects. The Court held that
plaintiffs failed to adequately allege any actionable
misrepresentation.

The Court first explained that the disclosures in the offering
documents, "taken together and in context," did not misrepresent
any facts relating to the likelihood of increased regulation. Id.
at *18. The Court emphasized that the offering materials contained
extensive disclosures regarding existing regulations in China
relating to e-cigarettes, the prospect that additional regulatory
measures could be adopted -- including potentially a total
prohibition on e-cigarettes -- and the risks to investors from such
measures. Id. at *19. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
the company should have disclosed that it was "inevitable" that
authorities in China would subject e-cigarettes to regulatory
scrutiny similar to traditional tobacco products, as regulators
ultimately proposed two months after the IPO. To the contrary, the
Court determined that plaintiffs' allegations were conclusory and
that prior to the IPO Chinese regulators had indicated uncertainty
as to future regulations. Id.

The Court further held that the challenged statements were not
actionable because the information allegedly omitted was "already
in the mix of public information" at the time of the IPO and the
company's cautionary statements were protected under the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine. Id. at *22. While the Court emphasized that
"[c]ontext matters" in evaluating whether publicly available
information might nevertheless need to be disclosed, the Court
rejected plaintiffs' argument that regulatory efforts in China were
inherently difficult for investors in the United States to uncover.
The Court observed that English-language articles in the New York
Times and Wall Street Journal prior to the IPO had "revealed, to
varying degrees, the state of e-cigarette regulations in China" and
"put a member of the public with an interest in investing in [the
company] on clear notice that tightened regulations were under
active consideration and worth investigating before investing." Id.
at *23. Moreover, the Court concluded that the IPO offering
materials "repeatedly warn[ed] of the specific contingency that
lies at the heart of the alleged misrepresentation" -- the
likelihood of future regulation of e‑cigarettes in China -- and
therefore the challenged forward-looking statements were protected
under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine even if, as plaintiffs
asserted, they lacked certain details. Id. at *24.

The Court separately rejected plaintiffs' allegations that the
company presented financial information that was "inaccurate" and
"not indicative of [the company's] future financial performance"
because it did not capture the financial impact of regulations that
Chinese regulators were "actively preparing" at the time of the
IPO. Id. at *24. The Court concluded that these financial-related
allegations were "derivative" of plaintiffs' primary argument that
the regulations ultimately adopted were a "foregone conclusion" and
failed for the same reason. Id. at *25. The Court further noted
that a company's "presenting an unduly optimistic view of its
financial outlook" is typically mere puffery and not actionable,
and the Court emphasized that the IPO offering documents here did
not contain any actionable misstatement or omission, particularly
in light of their extensive risk disclosures. Id.

The Court similarly rejected as "redundant" plaintiffs' argument
that the company had an independent duty to disclose material
information under Item 105 of SEC Regulation S-K and a duty to
disclose known trends and uncertainties under Item 5(D) of Form
20-F. The Court explained that Item 105 and Item 5(D) "required
nothing further" than the risk disclosures contained in the
company's offering materials. Id. at *26.

Finally, the Court evaluated "[i]n the interest of completeness"
defendants' arguments regarding plaintiffs' standing to bring a
claim under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. The Court
concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to do so because their
certifications showed that none of them purchased their shares at
the IPO price and two had purchased after the IPO, and therefore
they did not buy their shares directly in the IPO. Id. at *28.
However, the Court rejected the argument that certain defendants
— the company's designated U.S. representative and its employee
— were not "statutory sellers" for purposes of Section 12;
rather, the Court determined that there were sufficient allegations
at the pleading stage that they solicited the purchase of
securities in the IPO and did not "merely sign a registration
statement." Id.

The Court dismissed the action with prejudice because plaintiffs
had already amended their complaint twice, plaintiffs had not
requested further leave to amend, and it did not appear that the
deficiencies identified by the Court could be remedied. Id. at *29.
[GN]

SAN DIEGO GAS: Radcliff Appeals Arbitration Bid Ruling to 9th Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID RADCLIFF is taking an appeal from a court order granting the
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and motion to strike in
the lawsuit styled David Radcliff, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. San Diego Gas & Electric
Company, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-01555-H-MSB, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.

On Feb. 27, 2020, Radcliff filed a proposed class action complaint
against Defendants San Diego Gas & Electric Company and Sempra
Energy alleging various wage-and-hour violations. On Sept. 25,
2020, the Defendants moved to compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's
wage-and-hour claims. The Court granted this motion. As a result,
the only claims still before the Court are the Plaintiff's claims
for penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act
("PAGA").

On Jan. 13, 2022, the parties jointly moved to stay the Court's
consideration of the PAGA claims pending a forthcoming decision by
the United States Supreme Court in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v.
Moriana, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (2022). The Court granted the parties'
motion for a stay. The Supreme Court issued its decision in Moriana
on June 15, 2022.

On Aug. 16, 2022, the Defendants moved to compel arbitration of the
Plaintiff's individual PAGA claim and to strike the Plaintiff's
representative PAGA claim. The Court held a case status hearing on
Aug. 22, 2022. The Plaintiff subsequently filed his opposition to
the motion on Aug. 30, 2022. The Defendants filed their reply in
support of their motion on Sept. 7, 2022.

On Sept. 12, 2022, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to
compel arbitration and motion to strike through an Order entered by
Judge Marilyn L. Huff. The Court ruled that the Defendants in this
case are entitled to arbitrate the Plaintiff's individual PAGA
claim because it is subject to the parties' valid, enforceable
arbitration agreement.

The appellate case is captioned as David Radcliff v. San Diego Gas
& Electric Company, et al., Case No. 22-55940, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on October 11, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant David Radcliff Mediation Questionnaire was due on
October 18, 2022;

   -- Transcript is due on December 12, 2022;

   -- Appellant David Radcliff opening brief is due on January 18,
2023;

   -- Appellees Does, San Diego Gas & Electric Company and Sempra
Energy answering brief is due on February 21, 2023; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant DAVID RADCLIFF, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Joshua D. Boxer, Esq.
            MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
            1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
            Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
            Telephone: (310) 531-1900

                   - and -

            Sara B. Tosdal, Esq.
            MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
            1330 Broadway, Suite 436
            Oakland, CA 94612
            Telephone: (510) 227-3998

Defendants-Appellees SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., are
represented by:

            Richard Azada, Esq.
            SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, LLP
            333 S. Hope Street, 43rd Floor
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 617-4137

                   - and -

            Daniel J. McQueen, Esq.
            SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, LLP
            333 S. Hope Street, 43rd Floor
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 620-1780

SCHMITT INDUSTRIES: Steinberg Sues Over 17% Drop in Share Price
---------------------------------------------------------------
LLOYD STEINBERG, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. SCHMITT INDUSTRIES, INC., MICHAEL R. ZAPATA, PHILIP
BOSCO, and JAMIE SCHMID, Case 3:22-cv-01533-YY (D. Or., Oct. 11,
2022) is a class action on behalf of persons or entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded Schmitt Industries
securities between September 1, 2020 and September 20, 2022.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Specifically, the Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that:

  -- Schmitt Industries continuously downplayed its serious
     issues with internal controls;

  -- Schmitt Industries' financial statements from August 31,
     2021 to the ' present included "certain errors";

  -- as a result, Schmitt Industries would need to restate its
     previously filed financial statements for certain periods;
     and

  -- as a result, Defendants' statements about its business,
     operations, and prospects, were materially false and
     misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant
     times.

On September 20, 2022, after market hours, the Company announced
that it would restate its financial statements from August 31, 2021
to the present and expected to report at least one material
weakness, stating the following, in pertinent part, in its current
report filed with the SEC on Form 8-K.

    "The Company has determined that it made certain errors due
    to the ineffective application of cut-off procedures
    resulting primarily in the exclusion of certain general and
    administrative expenses from the statement of operations in
    the Company's financial statements during the fiscal year
    ended May 31, 2022."

On this news, Schmitt Industries' stock fell 17% to close at $3.12
per share on September 21, 2022, on unusually heavy trading volume,
damaging investors.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's common
shares, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the suit.

Schmitt designs, manufactures and sells high precision test and
measurement products, solutions, and services through its Acuity
and Xact product lines. Acuity provides laser and white light
sensor distance measurement and dimensional sizing products, and
their Xact line provides ultrasonic-based remote tank monitoring
products and related monitoring revenues for markets in the
Internet of Things environment. The individual Defendants are
senior officers and/or directors of the company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey. S. Ratliff, Esq.
          RANSOM, GILBERTSON, MARTTN & RATLIF, LLP
          544 S. Macadam Avenue, Suite 30 l
          Portland, OR 97239
          Telephone: (503)-226-3664

              - and -

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                 lrosen@rosenlegal.com

SESCO CEMENT: Fails to Pay Construction Workers' OT, Vazquez Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GABRIEL VAZQUEZ, individually and for others similarly situated v.
SESCO CEMENT, CORP., Case 4:22-cv-03507 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 11, 2022)
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for Sesco as an inspector and provided welding
inspection services from August 2020 until October 2020.

Mr. Vazquez and the Putative Class Members regularly worked more
than 40 hours a week but never received overtime pay for any hours
they worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. Instead,
Sesco paid them the same hourly rate for all hours worked,
including those in excess of 40 in a workweek, says the suit.

Sesco is a cement manufacturer and construction project company
with projects in Texas and the surrounding states.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Taylor S. Montgomery, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  tmontgomery@mybackwages.com

              - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

SIPALA LANDSCAPE: Meza Seeks OT Wages for Laborers Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS MEZA, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated v. SIPALA LANDSCAPE SERVICES, INC. and MICHAEL SIPALA,
Case 2:22-cv-06110 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 11, 2022) seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages and prevailing wages and benefits for work
they performed on various Public Works Projects under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and to recover damages for violations of the
New York Labor Law, and the supporting New York State Department of
Labor Regulations.

The Plaintiff, who was employed as a landscaper and laborer from
March 2013 to June 2022, regularly worked more than 40 hours per
week. The Defendants paid the Plaintiff at his regular
"straight-time" rate for hours worked beyond 40 hours in a single
workweek, the Plaintiff claims.

Sipala Landscape is a company that provides services from landscape
construction to landscape maintenance and irrigation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Farnworth, Esq.
          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          MATTHEW J. FARNWORTH
          490 Wheeler Road, Suite 250
          Hauppauge, New York 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257-5588
          E-mail: mfarnworth@romerolawny.com

STARBUCKS CORP: Myers Appeals Ruling Dismissing Mars, Quaker Oats
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LORI MYERS is taking an appeal from a court order granting
Defendants Mars Wrigley Confectionery US, LLC and The Quaker Oats
Company's motions to dismiss the lawsuit styled Lori Myers,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Starbucks Corporation, et al., Defendants, Case No.
5:20-cv-00335-JWH-SHK, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California.

On February 19, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against Mars,
Quaker Oats, and Starbucks. On May 7, 2020, Myers filed a First
Amended Complaint against all Defendants.

On July 29, 2020, the Court dismissed Myers' First Amended
Complaint with leave to amend.

On August 12, 2020, Myers filed the Second Amended Complaint,
asserting two claims, each against all Defendants: (1) Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices in violation of the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); and (2) violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"). All three Defendants
moved to dismiss on September 4, 2020. Myers opposed all three
motions on September 28, 2020.

On May 5, 2021, the Court granted Defendants Mars and Quaker Oats'
motions to dismiss with prejudice. However, the Court denied
Defendant Starbucks' motion and directed Starbucks to file its
answer to Myers' Second Amended Complaint.

The appellate case is captioned Lori Myers v. Starbucks
Corporation, et al., Case No. 22-55930, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on October 6, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Lori Myers Mediation Questionnaire was due on
October 13, 2022;

   -- Transcript is due on December 5, 2022;

   -- Appellant Lori Myers opening brief is due on January 13,
2023;

   -- Appellees Mars Wrigley Confectionery US, LLC and The Quaker
Oats Company answering brief is due on February 13, 2023; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant LORI MYERS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Aya Dardari, Esq.
     Joshua Adam Fields, Esq.
            Helen I. Zeldes, Esq.
            SCHONBRUN SEPLOW HARRIS HOFFMAN & ZELDES, LLP
            501 W. Broadway, Suite 800
            San Diego, CA 92101
            Telephone: (619) 400-4990

                   - and -

            Paul L. Hoffman, Esq.
            SCHONBRUN SEPLOW HARRIS HOFFMAN & ZELDES, LLP
            200 Pier Avenue, Suite 226
            Hermosa Beach, CA 90254
            Telephone: (310) 717-7373

                   - and -

            Catherine Sweetser, Esq.
            SCHONBRUN SEPLOW HARRIS HOFFMAN & ZELDES LLP
            9415 Culver Boulevard, Suite 115
            Culver City, CA 90232
            Telephone: (310) 396-0731

                   - and -

            John Clay Washington, Esq.
            SCHONBRUN SEPLOW HARRIS HOFFMAN & ZELDES LLP
            11543 W. Olympic Boulevard
            Los Angeles, CA 90064
            Telephone: (310) 396-0731

Defendants-Appellees STARBUCKS CORPORATION, et al., are represented
by:

            John K. Rubiner, Esq.
            FREEMAN MATHIS & GARY, LLP
            550 S. Hope Street, 22nd Floor
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 615-7060

                   - and -

            Perlette Michele Jura, Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            333 S. Grand Avenue
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 229-7121

STATE FARM: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Whitman Suit to 9th Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY has filed a cross appeal from a
court order granting the Plaintiff's motion to certify class in the
lawsuit entitled William Whitman, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. State Farm Life Insurance
Company, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-06025-BJR, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals who purchased life insurance from State Farm
Life Insurance Company, brought this class action suit against the
Defendant alleging claims for breach of contract, conversion,
violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), and
for declaratory judgment.

Plaintiff Whitman challenges State Farm's interpretation and
implementation of its form universal life insurance policy -- "Form
94030."

State Farm's Form 94030 life insurance policy is a "universal" life
insurance contract. Unlike standard "term" life insurance,
universal life insurance is designed to provide a lifetime death
benefit to the insured plus an investment feature or savings
component, called the "Account Value," which allows policy owners
to earn interest on their accumulated premiums over time.

On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff Whitman filed a motion for class
certification. The Plaintiff asked the Court to certify a class of:
"all persons who own or owned a universal life insurance policy
issued by State Farm on Form 94030 in the State of Washington whose
policy was in-force on or after January 1, 2002, and who was
subject to at least one monthly deduction."

On September 21, 2021, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to
certify class through an Order entered by Judge Barbara J.
Rothstein.

The appellate case is captioned as William Whitman v. State Farm
Life Insurance Company, Case No. 22-35787, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on October 7, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant State Farm Life Insurance Company Mediation
Questionnaire was due on October 14, 2022;

   -- Appellee William Whitman first cross appeal brief is due on
November 25, 2022;

   -- Appellant State Farm Life Insurance Company second brief on
cross appeal is due on December 27, 2022;

   -- Appellee William Whitman third brief on cross appeal is due
on January 27, 2023; and

   -- Appellant State Farm Life Insurance Company optional cross
appeal reply brief is due within 21 days of service of third brief
on cross appeal. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee WILLIAM T. WHITMAN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Stephen R. Basser, Esq.
            BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
            600 West Broadway
            San Diego, CA 92101
            Telephone: (619) 230-0800

                   - and -

            Ethan M. Lange, Esq.
            Lindsay Todd Perkins, Esq.
            Norman Siegel, Esq.
            STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
            460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
            Kansas City, MO 64112
            Telephone: (816) 714-7100

                   - and -

            John J. Schirger, Esq.
            MILLER SCHIRGER, LLC
            4520 Main Street, Suite 1570
            Kansas City, MO 64111
            Telephone: (816) 561-6500

                   - and -

            Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
            TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, PLLC
            1200 5th Avenue, Suite 1700
            Seattle, WA 98101
            Telephone: (206) 682-5600

Defendant-Appellant STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, is
represented by:

            Daniel R. Adler, Esq.
            Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            333 S. Grand Avenue
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 229-7634

                   - and -

            Cari Katrice Dawson, Esq.
            ALSTON & BIRD, LLP
            1201 W. Peachtree Street
            Atlanta, GA 30309
            Telephone: (404) 881-7000

                   - and -

            Matt Aidan Getz, Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            333 S. Grand Avenue
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 229-7754

                   - and -

            Bradley Joseph Hamburger, Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            333 S. Grand Avenue
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 229-7658

                   - and -

            Kristin Andrea Linsley, Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            555 Mission Street, Suite 3000
            San Francisco, CA 94105
            Telephone: (415) 393-8395

                   - and -

            Todd Noteboom, Esq.
            STINSON, LLP
            50 S. 6th Street, Suite 2600
            Minneapolis, MN 55402
            Telephone: (612) 335-1500

                   - and -

            Jeremy Root, Esq.
            STINSON LEONARD
            230 W. McCarty
            Jefferson City, MO 65101
            Telephone: (573) 636-6263

                   - and -

            Deborah L. Stein, Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            333 S. Grand Avenue
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 229-7164

                   - and -

            David Ray Venderbush, Esq.
            ALSTON & BIRD LLP
            90 Park Avenue
            New York, NY 10016
            Telephone: (212) 210-9532

SYNIVERSE CORP: Florida Court Dismisses Baron Data Breach Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Susan C. Bucklew of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Tampa Division, grants the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the lawsuit styled MELISSA BARON, et al., Plaintiffs v.
SYNIVERSE CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 8:21-cv-2349-SCB-SPF
(M.D. Fla.).

Before the Court is the Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Consolidated Complaint. The
Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition, to which the
Defendant has filed a reply.

The case is about a cyberattack and data breach that allegedly
exposed mobile phone users' "private communications."

Syniverse is a global telecommunications company whose customers
include approximately 800 carriers, including AT&T, T-Mobile, and
Verizon. It provides network services, outsources carrier
solutions, and messaging solutions to its carrier customers, which
in turn allows the mobile carriers to "provide their customers with
secure global connectivity and messaging." It processes and routes
billions of text messages each year between different carriers and
connects billions of devices to the mobile ecosystem. Its messaging
gateways translate mobile carriers' different protocols to handle
incompatibility and route messages across carriers so that
end-users can exchange person-to-person ("P2P") messages between
any network or service.

The Plaintiffs and the Class Members they seek to represent are
mobile phone users who sent and received text messages during the
times relevant to the data breach. Additionally, they seek to
represent were customers of Syniverse's customers, namely, AT&T,
T-Mobile, and Verizon, during the times relevant to the data
breach.

In May 2021, Syniverse discovered that an unknown individual or
organization had gained unauthorized access to its operational and
information technology systems beginning in May 2016. It conducted
an internal investigation, notified law enforcement, commenced
remedial actions, and hired specialized counsel.

On Sept. 27, 2021, Syniverse disclosed the Data Breach to the SEC
in connection with a merger. Specifically, it reported to the SEC
that: Syniverse's investigation revealed that the individual or
organization gained unauthorized access to databases within its
network on several occasions, and that login information allowing
access to or from its Electronic Data Transfer (EDT) environment
was compromised for approximately 235 of its customers. All EDT
customers have been notified and have had their credentials reset
or inactivated, even if their credentials were not impacted by the
incident. All customers whose credentials were impacted have been
notified of that circumstance.

Syniverse has notified all affected customers of this unauthorized
access where contractually required, and it has concluded that no
additional action, including any customer notification, is required
at this time.

One week later, on Oct. 5, 2021, Plaintiffs Melissa Baron, Olivia
Enloe, Marco Lerra, and John Pels filed the instant action. Two
days later, Plaintiffs Alexis Mullen, Nicholas Yeomelakis, and
Thomas Macnish filed a nearly identical action -- Mullen, et al. v.
Syniverse Corporation, No. 8:21-cv-2363-SCB-SPF.

The Plaintiffs in both cases brought claims for negligence, breach
of contract, invasion of privacy, and breach of confidence,
alleging that Syniverse failed to properly secure and safeguard
their "private and personally identifiable information" ("PII"). It
is alleged in both cases that their PII included, "without
limitation, call records and message data, such as call length and
cost, callers' and receivers' numbers, the location of the parties
in the call, as well as the actual content of SMS text messages."

On Nov. 23, 2021, the Plaintiffs in this action filed an unopposed
motion to consolidate the cases. The Court granted the motion and
directed the Plaintiffs to file a single amended complaint in this
case (the lead case).

On Dec. 3, 2021, Plaintiffs Baron, Enloe, Lerra, Pels, Mullen,
Yeomelakis, and Macnish filed a six-count consolidated class action
complaint. They asserted claims for negligence/negligence per se,
third-party beneficiary of contracts, breach of implied contract,
unjust enrichment, violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), and violations of California's
Consumer Privacy Act.

The Plaintiffs alleged a variety of injuries due to Defendant's
conduct, including expenses associated with identity theft, tax
fraud, and unauthorized use of their PII; continued and increased
risk to their PII; anxiety and emotional distress; and loss of
privacy. They sought actual, consequential, and nominal damages, as
well as injunctive relief.

On Jan. 18, 2022, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state claims upon
which relief could be granted. Among other things, it argued that
the Plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege any
actual or imminent concrete injury and causation.

On March 2, 2022, in response to the Defendant's motion to dismiss,
the Plaintiffs filed an eight-count Amended Consolidated Class
Action Complaint ("Amended Complaint" or "Operative Complaint").
The bring this actiony on behalf of all persons whose "private
communications were accessed" during the Data Breach as a result of
Syniverse's alleged failure to, among other things, "adequately
protect the private communications of Plaintiffs and Class
Members."

As with their prior allegations of PII, the Plaintiffs allege "upon
information and belief" that their "private communications" were
stored on and/or processed through Syniverse's EDT environment, and
include, "without limitation, call records and message data, such
as call length and cost, caller and receiver's numbers, the
location of the parties in the call, as well as private
communications sent via SMS text messages." In support of their
allegations, they quote heavily from a 2021 article published on
VICE.com, which itself quotes several sources when discussing
Syniverse's data breach.

Based on this, the Plaintiffs assert claims for: negligence and
negligence per se (Count I); third-party beneficiary of contracts
(Count II); breach of implied contract (Count III); unjust
enrichment (Count IV); violations of the FDUTPA (Count V); invasion
of privacy (Count VI); violations of the California Unfair
Competition Law (Unlawful Business Practices) (Count VII); and
violations of the California Unfair Competition Law (Unfair
Business Practices) (Count VIII).

The Plaintiffs allege they "have suffered and will suffer injury,"
including the following harms: (1) the continued risk to their
private communications (Counts I-III, V-VI);7 (2) anxiety and
emotional distress (Counts I-II); (3) loss of privacy (Counts
I-II); (4) "other economic and non-economic losses" (Counts I-II);
(5) the loss of money and property (Counts VII-VIII); and (6) the
loss of the legally protected interest in the confidentiality and
privacy of their private communications (Counts VII-VIII).
Plaintiffs seek actual, consequential, and nominal damages (Counts
I-III, VI); restitution and/or disgorgement (Count IV, VII-VII);
and injunctive and/or declaratory relief (Counts III, V-VIII).

The Defendant seeks dismissal on two grounds. First, it seeks
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing.
Second, and in the alternative, it seeks dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to plead plausible claims for relief.

The Defendant asserts a facial attack to subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that the Plaintiffs lack standing because
their injury in fact and causation allegations are facially
insufficient. It also asserts a factual attack to subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that the evidence shows that the Plaintiffs
lack standing because they cannot establish any actual injury. It
further argues that to the extent the Court reaches the substance
of the Plaintiffs' claims, dismissal is warranted because they fail
to allege plausible claims.

Judge Bucklew finds that the Defendant's facial challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction has merit. Given this finding, she does
not reach its factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, and
the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the Defendant's alternative
Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.

As to facial challenge to injury in fact, at issue in the case are
whether the injuries alleged are "concrete" and "actual or
imminent."

First, with respect to concrete and actual injury, the Defendant
contends that the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege an injury in
fact because their alleged injuries are not "concrete" and "actual
or imminent." Judge Bucklew agrees. She holds that none of the
Plaintiffs' alleged harms satisfy the injury in fact requirement of
Article III standing.

Judge Bucklew finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations as to the
unauthorized disclosure of their text messages and call records due
to the data breach do not bear a sufficiently close relationship to
the type of harm protected by the tort of public disclosure of
private information. As such, they fail to satisfy the concreteness
requirement.

Judge Bucklew also finds that the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly
allege a concrete harm by virtue of their alleged anxiety and
emotional distress. Absent a showing that the unauthorized
disclosure of their text messages and call information is an
intangible harm sufficiently concrete to confer standing, she says
their allegation of emotional harm resulting from the same also
fails to confer standing.

The Plaintiffs also fail to plausibly allege an injury in fact (and
causation) under California's UCL. Judge Bucklew holds that their
allegations fail to adequately allege a loss of money or property
due to Syniverse's alleged UCL violations. Their allegations are
too vague, unsupported, and conclusory to state a plausible injury
or causation under the UCL. Further, the Plaintiffs' allegation of
the loss of their legally protected interest in the confidentiality
and privacy of their private communications is not an economic
injury for purposes of the UCL.

Second, with respect to concrete, imminent future injury, Judge
Bucklew holds that the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege a
concrete, imminent future injury. She says their allegation of
possible future harm is dependent on a speculative chain of
possibilities and, thus, is insufficient to confer standing. Their
allegation of possible future harm is also conclusory and supported
only by Syniverse's alleged acknowledgement that the risk is
"possible" and statements by anonymous individuals and one
researcher that the Data Breach could result in identity theft or
fraud.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs' failure to identify any misuse of
their personal private communications or data weighs against
finding a substantial risk of imminent injury. Although actual
identity theft or misuse of their data is not required, Judge
Bucklew finds that the Plaintiffs' failure to allege either renders
their allegation of possible future harm less plausible.

For the reasons, the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege an
imminent future injury sufficient to confer Article III standing.

As to facial challenge to causation, given her findings, Judge
Bucklew says she need not address the causation or traceability
requirement. However, even if the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a
concrete actual or imminent injury, she says their allegation that
Syniverse's substandard security allowed the data to be accessed by
unauthorized third parties does not satisfy the causation or
traceability requirement. Any harm that could occur arguably was
caused by a third-party not before the Court and, therefore, is not
traceable to Syniverse's alleged conduct. Alternatively, the
traceability between Syniverse's conduct and the injury is too
attenuated.

In accordance with the foregoing, Judge Bucklew grants the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. She dismisses the Plaintiffs'
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint without prejudice for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs may have 30 days to file an amended complaint that
alleges an injury in fact and causation, if they are able to do so.
Failure to file an amended complaint within 30 days will result in
the case being closed without further notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 7, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/dpx634bz from Leagle.com.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Liu Appeals Dismissal of Discrimination Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS LIU is taking an appeal from a court order dismissing his
lawsuit entitled Thomas Liu, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:20-cv-07499-VC, in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
filed a class action suit against the Defendant under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has discriminated against
minority drivers using its star rating system to terminate them.
Under the rating system, Uber passengers are asked to evaluate
drivers on a one to five scale after each ride, and Uber used the
customer feedback to determine which drivers get terminated. The
Defendant continued to use the rating system despite its awareness
that passengers frequently discriminate against minority drivers.
Thus, the Defendant's reliance on customer evaluation to determine
driver terminations is racially discriminatory.

On December 9, 2020, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and
strike the Plaintiff's class allegations, which Judge Vince
Chhabria granted in part and denied in part through an order
entered on March 3, 2021.

On March 24, 2021, the Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint
and the Defendant moved to dismiss on April 23, 2021.

On July 30, 2021, the Court granted the motion to dismiss with
leave to amend.

On November 26, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a second amended class
action and the Defendant again moved to dismiss on January 7,
2022.

On May 23, 2022, the Court granted the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.

On June 20, 2022, the Plaintiff filed its third amended class
action complaint. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on July
5, 2022.

On September 28, 2022, the Court granted the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.

The appellate case is captioned Thomas Liu v. Uber Technologies,
Inc., Case No. 22-16507, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, filed on October 3, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Thomas Liu Mediation Questionnaire was due on
October 11, 2022;

   -- Transcript is due on November 28, 2022;

   -- Appellant Thomas Liu opening brief is due on January 9,
2023;

   -- Appellee Uber Technologies, Inc. answering brief is due on
February 8, 2023; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant THOMAS LIU, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
            LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
            729 Boylston Street
            Boston, MA 02116
            Telephone: (617) 994-5800

Defendant-Appellee UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. is represented by:

            Sophia Collins, Esq.
            LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
            333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
            San Francisco, CA 94104
            Telephone: (415) 433-1940

                   - and -

            Andrew Michael Spurchise, Esq.
            LITTLER MENDELSON, PC
            900 3rd Avenue, 8th Floor
            New York, NY 10022
            Telephone: (212) 583-2684

UNITED STATES: Clayton Appeals Suit Dismissal to D.C. Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR CLAYTON is taking an appeal from a court order dismissing
his lawsuit entitled Victor Clayton, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. United States
Department of Justice, et al., Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-01631-UNA, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.

The Plaintiff is an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who has been charged with violating the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The Plaintiff filed a
complaint against the Defendants invoking the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and seeking an injunction requiring the
Defendants to comply with the TVPA.

On July 5, 2022, the Court dismissed the case for the Plaintiff's
failure to state a claim through an Order entered by Judge Dabney
L. Friedrich.

The appellate case is captioned Victor Clayton v. DOJ, et al., Case
No. 22-5250, in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, filed on September 28, 2022. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant VICTOR CLAYTON, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, appears pro se.

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Bid to Stay Discovery in Adamson Suit Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled PORTIA ADAMSON, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF
AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey corporation d/b/a AUDI OF AMERICA,
INC., and AUDI COLORADO SPRINGS, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-00740-CMA-MDB (D.
Colo.), Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado:

   (1) grants Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.'s Motion to Stay
       Discovery;

   (2) stays discovery in this matter, pending a ruling on the
       outstanding motion to dismiss; and

   (3) directs the parties to file a joint status report within
       ten days of a final ruling on the outstanding motion to
       dismiss, if any portion of the case remains, to advise
       whether a proposed scheduling order deadline should be
       set.

The lawsuit is a putative class action lawsuit centering on federal
antitrust claims that lessees of Audi vehicles assert against
independent, authorized Audi dealers. The sole named Plaintiff
alleges, specifically, that the two named Defendants "have acted in
concert to restrict the entry of off-lease Audi automobiles into
the free, open used car market," by refusing to provide "payoff
figures" to Audi lessees, and by refusing to allow Audi lessees to
use "third-party funds" to exercise the early lease buyout option
set forth in their Audi lease agreements.

The Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, filed on March 25, 2022,
asserts that the Defendants' alleged actions violated Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.

On June 17, 2022, Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. d/b/a
Audi of America, Inc. ("AOA") responded to the Plaintiff's
allegations by filing a motion to dismiss this case, in its
entirety, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6), while Defendant Audi Colorado Springs ("ACS") filed a
joinder in support of Defendant AOA's motion to dismiss.

In the motion to dismiss, AOA argues, among other things, that the
Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring this case, and that
she also lacks antitrust standing under the federal statute. In the
joinder, ACS incorporates all of AOA's arguments for dismissal of
the case, and states that "the same legal analysis" forming the
basis of AOA's motion to dismiss applies to the Plaintiff's claims
against it.

That same day, AOA filed a motion to stay discovery pending
resolution of its motion to dismiss, and ACS filed a joinder in
full support of that motion, as well. AOA argues that a discovery
stay is warranted here, because its motion to dismiss seeks
dismissal of the entire case "on multiple independent grounds,"
including jurisdictional grounds. The Defendants contend that AOA
and other parties should not be faced with the extraordinary burden
of discovery in a putative plaintiff and defendant antitrust class
action where the Plaintiff's Complaint is fundamentally deficient
and fails as a matter of law.

On June 30, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a response to AOA's motion to
stay, asserting that the underlying motion to dismiss is
"meritless," and contending that the Defendants' concerns as to the
burdens of discovery in this case are "baseless."

In ruling on a motion to stay discovery, Judge Braswell notes that
five factors are generally considered: (1) the plaintiff's
interests in proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and the
potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on
the defendants; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests
of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public
interest.

As to the first factor, although the Plaintiff inarguably possesses
an interest to proceed expeditiously with her case, the Court does
not find that a temporary stay of the proceedings will
significantly affect that interest. Accordingly, Judge Braswell
finds that the first factor weighs only slightly against the
imposition of a stay.

As to the second factor, Judge Braswell stresses that a stay is not
warranted merely by virtue of a defendant's filing of a purportedly
dispositive motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court agrees with the
Defendants that discovery in this case will likely be complex, as
well as costly. Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor
of a stay, Judge Braswell holds.

Judge Braswell also finds that the third "court convenience" factor
weighs in favor of stay, and that the fourth factor also supports
the imposition of a stay, given that the parties' briefing
identifies at least two anticipated third-party deponents.

As to the fifth factor, the general public's primary interest in
this case is an efficient and just resolution, Judge Braswell
notes. Hence, the Judge points out that avoiding wasteful efforts
by the Court and the litigants serves that purpose.

Having weighed the appropriate factors, the Court finds that a stay
of discovery is appropriate in this case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 3, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/msffpn6a from Leagle.com.


WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Rodriguez Appeals Class Cert. Bid Denial
-------------------------------------------------------------
CECILIA RODRIGUEZ, et al. are taking an appeal from a court order
denying their motion for class certification in the lawsuit
entitled Cecilia Rodriguez, et al., on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Wal-Mart Associates,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-07045-AB-KK, in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action suit, which was removed from the Superior Court of the State
of California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, alleges that Walmart
"had a consistent and uniform policy, practice and procedure of
willfully failing to pay the earned wages of [its] former
employees."

The Plaintiffs were employed as hourly associates. Cecelia
Rodriguez was employed from March 11, 2014, to October 24, 2019, at
the Walmart location in San Jacinto, California. Breana Stewart was
employed from September 28, 2019, to December 19, 2019, at the
Walmart location in Lancaster, California.

On March 28, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class.
The Plaintiffs asked the Court to certify the following Off Premise
Rest Class: "All California based hourly-paid nonexempt employees
employed by the Defendant (excluding Defendant's Distribution
Centers, Fulfillment Centers and Warehouses) during the time period
from July 29, 2016, to June 8, 2020 to whom the Defendant did not
provide an off-premise rest period (or a one-hour payment for any
violations)."

On September 16, 2022, Judge Andre Birotte Jr. denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Court determined
that class certification is inappropriate because the Plaintiffs
have not established numerosity nor commonality as required by Rule
23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Similarly, class
certification is inappropriate because the Plaintiff has not
established the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3), adds
the Court.

The appellate case is captioned Cecilia Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart
Associates, Inc., Case No. 22-80111, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on September 30, 2022. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners CECILIA RODRIGUEZ, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

            Kevin Barnes, Esq.
            LAW OFFICES OF KEVIN T. BARNES
            1635 Pontius Avenue, Second Floor
            Los Angeles, CA 90025
            Telephone: (323) 549-9100

Defendant-Respondent WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC. is represented by:

            Carmen Aguado, Esq.
            Jennifer L. Katz, Esq.
            OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
            400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 239-9800

                   - and -

            Paloma Peracchio, Esq.
            OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
            400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 438-1293

                   - and -

            Mitchell Aaron Wrosch, Esq.
            OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
            695 Town Center Drive
            Costa Mesa, CA 92626
            Telephone: (714) 800-7900


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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