/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/221007.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, October 7, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 195

                            Headlines

10/10 PIZZA: Camp Seeks Unreimbursed Expenses for Delivery Drivers
450 NORTH RIVER: Collado Sues Over Improper Distribution of Tips
ACASTI PHARMA: Court Dismisses Bisel's 2nd Amended Class Complaint
ACKERCAMPS.COM LLC: Faces Suit Over Illegal Biometric Collection
ACOSTA SALES: Frederick Labor Suit Removed to W.D. Pennsylvania

AFTER HOURS: Franklin Sues Over Unpaid OT for Dental Assistants
AGRANA FRUIT: Conditional Class Certification Granted in Miller
ALBEE BABY: Raslavich FTSA Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
ALBERTA: Class Action Over Timely Bail Hearings Can Proceed
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA: Faces Class Action Over Probation Detainers

AMAZON.COM INC: Court Consolidates Pecznick & Griffith Class Suits
AMERICA'S FINEST: Underpays Deli Workers, Gonzalez Says
AMERICAN GENERAL: Court Denies Moriarty's Bid to Certify Class
APPLE INC: Agrees to Settle Class Action Over iPhone 4S Performance
ARC AUTOMOTIVE: Hudson Sues Over Automobiles' Inflator Defect

ARCADIS US: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime, Byrkett Suit Alleges
ARCHULETA COUNTY, CO: Brown Sues Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation
ASTRAZENECA PLC: Judge Dismisses Securities Class Action
AT&T INC: Settles Class Action Over Hidden Fees for $14 Million
AUSSIE HOME: Promotes Flawed Insurance, Class Action Claims

BEYOND MEAT: Faces Borovoy Suit Over Mislabeled Meat Products
BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in Colbert Suit Granted
BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in Harris Suit Granted
BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in Villere Suit Granted
BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook's Expert Opinion in Tebbs Suit

BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook's Testimony in Cambre Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook's Testimony in Moorere Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Abdelfattah Suit
BRAINSHARK INC: Illinois Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Wilk BIPA Suit
BRICE, OH: Appeal From Denial of Judgment in Weldele Suit Dismissed

BROOKLYN SUYA: Faces Gaskin Suit Over Wage-and-Hour Violations
BT'S ON THE RIVER: Cabrera Alleges Unpaid Wages, Illegal Tip Credit
BUILDING TESTING: Hernandez Seeks Unpaid Construction Workers' OT
BURGER KING: 11th Circuit Reinstates No-Hire Antitrust Claims
CARVANA CO: Pretrial Conference in Unfair Trade Set November 23

CDM SMITH: Faces Craig Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime Pay
CERTAINTEED LLC: Settles Suit Over Defective Fiberglass Shingles
CHICAGO, IL: Court Dismisses Davis' Class Complaint With Prejudice
CITIZENS DISABILITY: Appeals Class Certification Order in Thrower
COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY: N.J. Court Grants Bids to Dismiss FCPA Suit

COLUMBUS ELECTRIC: Court Refuses to Approve Walsh Suit Settlement
CYRACOM INTERNATIONAL: Heid Sues Over Interpreters' Unpaid Wages
DISCOVERY INC: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due November 22
E-TELEQUOTE INSURANCE: Costa Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
EXECU|SEARCH GROUP: Brain Sues Over Recruiters' Unpaid Overtime

F&B ASSOCIATES: Adams et al. File Suit Over Illegal Tip Pooling
FARADAY FUTURE: Howard Sues Over Merger's Impact on Stockholders
FERGUSON ENTERPRISES: Mismanages Retirement Plans, Bozzini Alleges
FERGUSON, MO: Bid to Exclude Testimonies of Vail and Wilkes Denied
FOUNDATIONS HEALTH: Underpays Practical Nurses, Durbin Suit Says

GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Bovberg Alleges
GRANTS PASS, OR: Permanent Injunction in Johnson Suit Affirmed
GREATBANC TRUST: Beville Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
GROUP HEALTH: Midthun-Hensen May File Amended Counsel Declaration
GUARDIAN OF GEORGIA: Bean Alleges WARN Act Breach Over Mass Layoff

GUIDANT GLOBAL: Smith Suit Transferred to W.D. Pa.
HEALTH MANAGEMENT: Higgs Sues Over Discrimination, Retaliation
INNOFOODS USA: Falsely Advertised Keto Snack Foods, Class Suit Says
JETSUITEX INC: McKeehan Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
JIANPU TECHNOLOGY: Court Dismisses Africa's Amended Class Complaint

JIAYIN GROUP: Hearing of $2M Deal in Securities Suit Set on Dec. 2
KROGER COMPANY: Barnett Sues Over Baby Food's Heavy Metal Content
LENDERFI INC: Underpays Mortgage Loan Officers, Assi Suit Alleges
LOANDEPOT.COM LLC: Fails to Give Fund Transfer Copy, Jweinat Says
MCDONALD'S USA: Kim Suit Dismissed for Lack of Article III Standing

MISSION POINT: Faces Brewster Wage-and-Hour Suit in E.D. Mich.
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN: Faces TCPA Class Action in Alabama
NESTLE HEALTHCARE: Benzin Sues Over Mislabeled Powdered Drink Mix
NEW YORK CITY: Class Suits Over Summer 2020 Protests Consolidated
NEXA MORTGAGE: Umeres Suit Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court

NONNI'S FOODS: Goldstein Sues Over Biscotti Cookies' Lemon Labels
NORFOLK, VA: Albert L. Roper Appeals Suit Dismissal to 4th Cir.
OHIO: 6th Cir. Affirms Claims' Dismissal in T.M. v. DeWine & ODJFS
PENNSYLVANIA: Court Approves Voluntary Dismissal of Graham v. DOC
PLANNED LIFESTYLE: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Baxter Suit Says

POCLAIN HYDRAULICS: Arrobeullo Suit Seeks Assemblers' Unpaid Wages
PROTECTIVE LIFE: Advance Trust Appeals Judgment to 11th Cir.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Faces Class Action Over Privacy Violations
SAN ANTONIO, TX: Court Vacates Class Certification in Blair Suit
SARA LEE: Settlement Fairness Hearing in Mislabeling Suit Set Nov.

SCOUT ENERGY: Underpays Gas Royalties, Cooper-Clark Suit Alleges
SENTINEL INSURANCE: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Buffalo Suit
SG PIZZA: Aragon Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Restaurant Staff
SHIMMICK CONSTRUCTION: Faces Bulger Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
SOUTH BY SOUTHWEST: Insurers Not Required to Cover Suit Costs

STARNET INSURANCE: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Alltru Suit
SUBARU OF AMERICA: Agrees to Settle Class Suit Over Battery Defect
TRULIEVE INC: Bittlingmeyer Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
VIDHI HOSPITALITY: Fails to Properly Pay Hotel Staff, Head Claims
VISA INC: Faces Class Action Over Corporate Card Interchange Fees

WALMART STORES: Faces Class Action Over Great Value Veggie Straws
WEALTHSIMPLE INC: Faces Class Suit Over Hidden Crypto Trading Fees
WESTERN HEALTH: Agrees to Settle Privacy Breach Class Action

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: CIRCOR Still Faces Product Liability Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: H.B. Fuller Defends Personal Injury Lawsuits


                            *********

10/10 PIZZA: Camp Seeks Unreimbursed Expenses for Delivery Drivers
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THOMAS CAMP, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 10/10 PIZZA, INC., and LANCE A. VOSBURGH,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-02201 (S.D. Ill., September 21, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendants for failure to properly
reimburse the Plaintiff and similarly situated delivery drivers for
their automobile expenses in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Mr. Camp worked for the Defendants as a delivery driver at Domino's
store located in Salem, Illinois from approximately August 2019 to
March 2022.

10/10 Pizza, Inc. is an operator of Domino's franchise stores in
Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Katherine Serrano, Esq.
         FORESTER HAYNIE, PLLC
         400 N. St. Paul Street, Suite 700
         Dallas, TX 75201
         Telephone: (214) 210-7493
         Facsimile: (469) 399-1070
         E-mail: kserrano@foresterhaynie.com

450 NORTH RIVER: Collado Sues Over Improper Distribution of Tips
----------------------------------------------------------------
OCTAVIO COLLADO, for himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. 450 NORTH RIVER DRIVE, LLC, d/b/a KIKI ON THE RIVER,
RJ RIVER, LLC, and ROMAN JONES, Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-23074-XXXX (S.D. Fla., September 23, 2022) brings this
complaint as a collective action against the Defendant for their
alleged unlawful companywide practices that intentionally and
willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants as a server from
approximately August 7, 2017 to January 2, 2022.

The Plaintiff asserts claim that the Defendant failed to properly
pay/distribute the overtips, which are discretionary amounts that
the Defendants' patrons would leave for the tipped employees above
and beyond the mandatory service charge. The FLSA always precluded
employers like the Defendants to retain any portion of the tips (or
overtips) and from distributing any tips (or overtips) to
traditionally non-tipped employees.

On behalf of himself and all other similarly situated tipped
employees, the Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages,
(including tips which are improperly withheld/distributed), an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages, pre- and
post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and
other relief that the Court deems appropriate.

450 North River Drive, LLC d/b/a Kiki on the River, and RJ River,
LLC sell food and alcoholic beverages. Roman Jones is the owner of
the Corporate Defendants. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian H. Pollock, Esq.
          FAIRLAW FIRM
          135 San Lorenzo Ave., Suite 770
          Coral Gables, FL 33146
          Tel: (305) 230-4884
          E-mail: brian@fairlawattorney.com

ACASTI PHARMA: Court Dismisses Bisel's 2nd Amended Class Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAUDEN BISEL, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. ACASTI PHARMA, INC., RODERICK
CARTER, JAN D'ALVISE, JOHN CANAN, and DONALD OLDS, Defendants, Case
No. 21 Civ. 6051 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Katherine Polk Failla of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint in full.

Lead Plaintiff Michael Castaldo brings the putative class action
against Acasti and four members of its Board of Directors: Roderick
Carter, Jan D'Alvise, John Canan, and Donald Olds. In brief,
Castaldo alleges that the Defendants violated Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder, in connection with the
merger (the "Merger") of Acasti and Grace Therapeutics Inc.
Specifically, Castaldo alleges that the Defendants omitted
financial projections prepared by Grace and the adjustments Acasti
made to those projections from the proxy statement Acasti issued in
conjunction with the proposed Merger. As such, Castaldo contends
that certain statements relying on the projections were misleading,
and that Acasti shareholders approved an unfair merger. Defendants
have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ( the "PSLRA").

Acasti is a biopharmaceutical company that focuses on "the
research, development, and commercialization of" prescription drugs
made with omega-3 fatty acids. In September 2020, it began
exploring "potential strategic transactions" with other businesses.
The Acasti Board engaged Oppenheimer, a financial advisor, to
assist in this process. It also determined that a reverse merger
was the most realistic strategic transaction. By the end of the
September 2020 to January 2021 period, 18 companies had signed
confidentiality agreements with Acasti.

On Jan. 12, 2021, Grace submitted an initial indication of interest
to Oppenheimer. The Plaintiff notes that it is unclear from the
Proxy whether Grace was included in Oppenheimer's initial outreach.
Prior to the Merger, Grace was a privately-held rare and orphan
disease specialty pharmaceutical company "focused on developing and
commercializing products using novel drug delivery technologies."
Specifically, Grace had three "clinical stage assets": GTX-101,
GTX-102, and GTX-104, all intended to treat orphan diseases.

The Acasti Board met on Jan. 28 and 30, 2021, and further narrowed
the review process to Grace, Company B, and Company C. Companies D
and E were ruled out at this point for different reasons, including
their relatively low valuation of Acasti. Acasti's share price
continued to rise, and by Feb. 10, 2021, the company had a market
capitalization of $230 million.As a result, the finalist companies
-- Companies B, C, and Grace -- renegotiated the transaction from a
reverse merger to an Acasti acquisition, whereby Acasti
shareholders would hold more than 50% ownership of the merged
entity. At this point, the Board directed Oppenheimer to "present
non-binding acquisition proposals" to the finalists.

Grace was the only company willing to accept "substantially all of
the key material terms" of Acasti's new proposals. On Feb. 19,
2021, Acasti proposed to Grace that Acasti shareholders retain 55%
ownership of the merged entity. The companies then entered into an
exclusivity period from the end of February 2021 to May 6, 2021. On
May 7, 2021, Acasti and Grace entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger, whereby Acasti Pharma U.S. Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Acasti, would be merged into Grace.

The  Plaintiff summarizes his core allegation as follows: Simply
stated, the Defendants allowed the Proxy to incompletely and
misleadingly refer to the adjustments made to the Grace Management
Projections while omitting the fact that the adjustment was a
meaningful upward adjustment, and then allowed the Proxy to
summarize Oppenheimer's valuation analyses predicated on the
unreasonably upward Adjusted Grace Projections, which misled Acasti
shareholders about Grace's true value and the fairness of the
Merger. The summary of Oppenheimer's Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
Analysis on page 111 of the Proxy was materially incomplete and
misleading because it failed to disclose the key facts and metrics
that were necessary for shareholders to fully recognize: [i] the
illegitimacy of the analyses, i.e., that the Grace Management
Projections had been meaningfully and unjustifiably upward adjusted
by Acasti; and [ii] how off-base the misleading resulting implied
equity value was.

The Acasti shareholder vote on the Merger took place on Aug. 26,
2021. At the vote, 79,679,548 Acasti shares were present,
satisfying the company's requirement that a quorum of one-third of
the outstanding Acasti shares be present for the vote. 21,915,935
were cast in favor of the Merger. The Plaintiff notes that this
means that, of the total 208,375,549 outstanding shares eligible to
vote on the Merger, only 10.5% were cast in favor of the Merger.
Following this affirmative vote, Acasti announced the close of the
Merger on the next day, Aug. 27, 2021.

Following the Merger, Grace emerged as the surviving corporate
entity, now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Acasti. Acasti's
pre-Merger shareholders owned approximately 58.8% of the merged
entity Grace shareholders, on the other hand, owned the remaining
41.2%. The Plaintiff alleges that Acasti's value represented "as
much as 74% of the combined company's equity value," under a
selected public company analysis, and "as much as 67% of the
combined company equity value" under a selected transactions
analysis. Following consummation of the Merger, Acasti's stock
price declined from $3.76 per share to $1.12 as of Feb. 3, 2022.
The Plaintiff claims that shareholders have thus lost $2.64 per
share as a result of the omissions and misleading statements in the
Proxy.

Plaintiff Bisel initiated this action by filing a complaint on July
14, 2021. On Aug. 10, 2021, the case was reassigned from the
Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein to this Court. That same day, the
Defendants filed a pre-motion letter, discussing a contemplated
motion to dismiss the complaint and requesting consolidation of
this case with Castaldo v. Acasti Pharma, Inc., No. 21 Civ. 6567
(KPF). On Aug. 13, 2021, Bisel filed a pre-motion letter responding
to the substance of the Defendants' letter and noting that the
Plaintiffs in the separate actions consented to consolidation of
the two cases. On Aug 16, 2021, the Court entered an Order
consolidating this case with Castaldo. In this Order, the Court did
not administratively close the Castaldo case, but all relevant
filings for the consolidated cases have been docketed in Bisel.

Following consolidation, the Court granted the Defendants' request
for a pre-motion conference on Aug. 17, 2021. This conference was
held on Sept. 1, 2021. Bisel then filed an amended class action
complaint on Oct. 1, 2021. Because Bisel had filed a class action
complaint, the Court ordered, pursuant to the PSLRA, that he inform
the Court in writing of the date and manner in which he had
published the required notice advising members of the putative
class of the pendency of the action. Bisel filed proof of the
requisite notice on Oct. 7, 2021, and the next day the Court
ordered members of the purported class to move the Court to serve
as lead plaintiffs by Dec. 6, 2021. In this Order, the Court set
Dec. 21, 2021, as the deadline for oppositions to any motions for
appointment of lead plaintiff, and scheduled a hearing regarding
appointment of a lead plaintiff for Jan. 5, 2022.

On Dec. 6, 2021, Plaintiffs Bisel and Castaldo (the "BC Group")
filed a motion for appointment as lead plaintiffs and supporting
papers. In their motion, two firms -- Monteverde & Associates PC
and Kahn Swich & Foti, LLC -- requested approval as co-lead
counsel. On Dec. 22, 2021, the BC Group filed a notice that no
competing lead plaintiffs had filed motions, and that there was no
opposition to their appointment. This notice requested adjournment
of the previously-scheduled Jan. 5, 2022 hearing. The Court
endorsed this notice on Dec. 29, 2021, but declined to adjourn the
Jan. 5, 2022 hearing. That same day, the Defendants filed another
pre-motion letter, renewing the arguments for dismissal they raised
previously and noting that they did not oppose appointment of the
BC Group as lead plaintiffs.

On Jan. 5, 2022, the Court held the aforementioned conference to
discuss appointment of lead plaintiffs and lead counsel. At that
conference, it appointed Castaldo to serve as the lead plaintiff,
and Monteverde & Associates PC to serve as the lead counsel. It
also set Feb. 4, 2022, as the date for the Plaintiff to file a
second amended complaint, and set forth a briefing schedule for the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the forthcoming second amended
complaint. In line with this schedule, the Plaintiff filed the
Second Amended Complaint -- the operative complaint in the
consolidated class action -- on Feb. 4, 2022. The Defendants filed
their motion to dismiss and supporting papers on Feb. 25, 2022.

On March 24, 2022, Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff requested an
extension of time to file his opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The Court then set a revised scheduling order in line with this
request on March 25, 2022. The Plaintiff filed a second request for
an extension on April 28, 2022, so Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiff "could confer with Second Amended Complaint Defendants
regarding factual arguments raised in their Motion to Dismiss." The
Court again entered a revised scheduling order based on this
request.

On May 27, 2022, Monteverde & Associates PC and Kahn Swich & Foti,
LLC, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Second Amended
Complaint Plaintiff and supporting papers. In the Declaration of
Juan E. Monteverde in support of this motion, the Plaintiff's
counsel noted that, following an exchange of information between
the Defendants and the Plaintiff's counsel, the counsel no longer
believe that they can reasonably oppose the Motion to Dismiss while
conforming to their duties as officers of the Court because the
documents shared with the Plaintiff's counsel contradict the
allegations and theory of the case and in particular paragraph 4 in
the complaint.

This paragraph of the SAC relates to the Plaintiff's core
allegation that the Defendants withheld from shareholders the
Projections and the upward adjustments allegedly made to them by
Acasti. Also in this Declaration, the counsel represented that he
had attempted to communicate with the Plaintiff regarding the
factual misunderstanding, but that the Plaintiff had not
meaningfully engaged with counsel and instead only noted that he
(Plaintiff) wanted more time to review the information. The
Plaintiff similarly did not respond to the counsel's notice that
they intended to withdraw from the case. The Defendants responded
to the motion to withdraw by noting that they did not oppose
withdrawal, and consented to a 30-day extension of the Plaintiff's
response deadline.

On May 31, 2022, the Court entered an Order permitting the
Plaintiff's counsel to withdraw from the case. In the Order, it
provided the Plaintiff 30 days to secure new representation, and
set Aug. 1, 2022, as the date for him to submit an opposition, and
Aug. 15, 2022, as the date for the Defendants to file a reply.
Following this Order, the Plaintiff filed applications to proceed
in forma pauperis ("IFP") and for the Court to appoint pro bono
counsel on June 13, 2022. On June 21, 2022, the Court entered an
Order granting the Plaintiff's request to proceed IFP, and denying
the Plaintiff's request for appointment of pro bono counsel. The
Plaintiff did not file an opposition brief by Aug. 1, 2022. On Aug.
15, 2022, the Defendants filed a reply memorandum of law in support
of their motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiff's Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 claim alleges that the
Defendants "knew or were negligent in not knowing that the Proxy is
materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary
to render it not misleading." In effect, he alleges that the
Defendants were required to disclose the Projections and any
adjustments made to them, and that Acasti's adjustments to the
Projections rendered later statements based on the Projections
false or misleading.

Judge Failla opines that the Plaintiff does not allege that any
relevant SEC regulations mandate disclosure of the Projections or
adjustments made to the Projections. Accordingly, she considers
whether he has adequately identified a statement that is misleading
or made misleading due to a material omission. The Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants' alleged upward adjustment to the
Projections "is a material omission that renders multiple
statements in the Proxy misleading." He essentially claims that the
Defendants either negligently directed the use of the wrong inputs
for various analyses that informed the fairness opinion, like the
DCF, or that they manipulated the Projections, which manipulation
then led to misleading representations in the valuations of Grace,
the fairness opinion, and other analyses.

The Plaintiff identifies a variety of information included in the
Proxy that, he argues, was rendered false or misleading through
omission of the adjusted Projections. These include: the Board's
recommendation to approve the Merger, Oppenheimer's fairness
opinion of the Merger and the summary of that fairness opinion, and
certain analyses included in the fairness opinion, like the DCF.

Judge Failla does not find that omission of the Projections
rendered statements in the Proxy false or misleading. First and as
a threshold matter, without more, she says the Court need not
credit a barebones assertion that Defendants did, in fact, adjust
the Projections upwards. The Plaintiff does not identify any facts
to support his allegation that the Projections were adjusted
upward. Even if the Court credits his conclusion that the
Projections were adjusted upwards, the Plaintiff does not explain
why any potential upward adjustments to the Projections would be
fraudulent, nor how any opinions rendered based on them would be
fraudulent. The Plaintiff makes no specific allegations about who
created the allegedly upward-adjusted Projections, nor when they
were made.

Second, even moving past the Plaintiff's apparent fraud theory and
focusing solely on negligence, Judge Failla holds that disclosure
of an item of information is not required simply because it may be
relevant or of interest to a reasonable investor. Courts within
this Circuit routinely find that the omission of underlying inputs,
assumptions, and financial metrics for the aforementioned types of
analyses and opinions, or omission of alternate projections, do not
render proxies misleading when there is a fair summary of the
underlying bases for the analyses or opinions, even where there are
allegations that other projections or inputs could have been used.
The Plaintiff cannot merely deem that omission of the Projections,
or the adjustments made to them, renders other statements in the
Proxy misleading. His allegation that "Grace's value differed from
the best estimates of Grace's own management" is plainly
unsupported by statements in the Proxy.

Third, the representations, analyses, and opinions that the
Plaintiff identifies as allegedly tainted by the adjusted
Projections made clear that they were uncertain and rested on
disclosed assumptions.

As to the Projections and the adjustments, Judge Failla opines that
the Plaintiff fails to show that the disclosure of the Projections
or adjustments made to them would meaningfully alter the total mix
of information available to investors. A review of the SAC
discloses facts that contradict a finding that omission of the
Projections was material or that such omission altered the total
mix of information available to an investor. Even if the Court were
to credit the allegation that the upwardly-adjusted Projections
existed, the Plaintiff himself explains in the SAC where in the
Proxy one could find the information that may have informed any
adjustments. Thus, the SAC itself, citing to the Proxy, reveals
bases for possible adjustments made to the Projections and other
information regarding future plans for the business, and
accordingly fails to show a material omission. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff fails to show that omission of the Projections was
material.

The Plaintiff identifies Oppenheimer's fairness opinion (of which
the DCF formed one part), representations regarding Oppenheimer's
analyses (citing Proxy at 109)), and the Board's recommendation for
the Merger as statements rendered false or misleading by omission
of the adjusted Projections.

Judge Failla finds that the Plaintiff fails to plead "with
particularity provable facts" that any statements of opinion or
recommendations premised on the Projections or adjusted Projections
were objectively or subjectively false. These statements say
nothing about the current valuation of Grace or its potential
future value. Nor do they reveal any facts regarding the
Projections or the adjustments made to them. Absent such showing,
the Court cannot conclude that statements relying on the adjusted
Projections are objectively false. Further, yjr Plaintiff alleges
no facts to suggest that Defendants believed their Merger
recommendation, Oppenheimer's analyses and fairness opinion, or any
other statement to be false. Even if he showed that there were
"upward" adjustments made to the Projections that rendered
statements of opinion regarding the merger false, he only cites to
sections of the Proxy that would confirm the Defendants' belief in
the validity of their statements and opinions. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff's Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 claims similarly fail to
meet the standards required to show objectively and subjectively
false statements of opinion.

The Plaintiff's second claim alleges that Defendants Roderick
Carter, Jan D'Alvise, John Canan, and Donald Olds (collectively,
the "Individual Defendants") violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act. Specifically, he alleges that the Individual Defendants acted
as "controlling persons of Acasti," and are thus liable for the
"primary violation" committed by Acasti, namely, the violation of
Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. However, if a plaintiff has not
adequately alleged a primary violation, i.e., a viable claim under
another provision of the Exchange Act, then the Section 20(a)
claims must be dismissed. Because she does not find that the
Plaintiff has alleged a primary violation, Judge Failla will also
dismiss the Plaintiff's Section 20(a) claim.

Finally, although she remains skeptical of the Plaintiff's
assertion that the Projections were wrongly adjusted upwards after
a careful review of the Proxy, and in any event has found that the
Plaintiff's claims under the Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 fail,
Judge Failla finds that the Plaintiff did not misquote sections of
the Proxy or lie to make his case. To be clear, the Plaintiff took
wide latitude interpreting sections of the Proxy in order to bring
his claims, given the vast amount of information contained therein.
But the Proxy does disclose that adjustments were made to the
Projections, even if his theory that they were erroneously adjusted
upwards does not make a Section 14(a) or Rule 14a-9 case.
Accordingly, Judge Failla does not find that Rule 11 sanctions are
warranted.

For the reasons she discussed in her Opinion, Judge Failla grants
the Defendants' motion to dismiss in full. Further, because the
Plaintiff has already amended his pleadings twice, and because he
has given no indication that he can amend them further to plead
viable claims -- indeed his former counsel represented to the Court
that they could "no longer reasonably oppose the Motion to Dismiss"
she does not grant leave to amend.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions,
adjourn all remaining dates, and close the case. The Clerk of Court
is further directed to terminate all pending motions, adjourn all
remaining dates, and close Castaldo v. Acasti Pharma, Inc., No. 21
Civ. 6567 (KPF), which was previously consolidated with this case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 28, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/6t4d8cfc from Leagle.com.


ACKERCAMPS.COM LLC: Faces Suit Over Illegal Biometric Collection
----------------------------------------------------------------
Corrado Rizzi, writing for ClassAction.org, reports that the
company who operates summer camp photo and video gallery Bunk1.com
faces a proposed class action that alleges it has unlawfully
collected, stored, used and disclosed the sensitive biometric
information of some Illinois residents.

The 21-page lawsuit against AckerCamps.com LLC claims the company,
whose Bunk1 website partners with summer camps across the United
States and Canada to "offer families a simple way of staying
connected with their campers," has violated the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act (BIPA), a state law that governs private
entities who deal with biometric information such as facial scans,
fingerprints and voiceprints.

Bunk1.com is advertised by AckerCamps.com LLC as equipped with
facial recognition software that sends a notification whenever a
photo of a specific person is posted. For the defendant's system to
work, the case says, users must upload a high-resolution, close-up
profile photo of a specific person, so the website's facial
recognition software can identify their facial geometry and detect
possible matches within its online photo galleries.

Bunk1.com's online photo galleries function, at least in part, by
scanning, collecting, storing and using consumers' facial
biometrics, including those of counselors, staff, siblings, parents
and other people aside from campers who appear in uploaded photos,
the suit states.

According to the complaint, "[t]his exposes Defendant's customers,
potential customers, as well as any person in the camp's photos,
including Plaintiffs, to serious and irreversible privacy risks."

"For example, if a biometric database is hacked, breached, or
otherwise exposed -- such as in the recent Equifax data breach --
consumers have no means by which to prevent identity theft,
unauthorized tracking, and other improper or unlawful use of this
information."

The BIPA mandates that companies such as AckerCamps.com LLC obtain
a written release from an individual prior to capturing, collecting
and/or storing their biometric information, the lawsuit stresses.

"Burying a vague reference to biometric information in an online
privacy policy is not sufficient to comply with [the] BIPA's
requirements," the case states.

The law also obligates the defendant to inform potential customers
in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is
being collected or captured, as well as how long it will store
their biometric data and any purposes for which it is being
captured, the complaint relays. Lastly, the defendant by law must
make available a written policy disclosing when it will permanently
destroy the biometric information it has collected, the suit says.


"BIPA makes all of these requirements a precondition to the
collection or recording of face geometry scans, or other associated
biometric information. Under the Act, no biometric identifiers or
biometric information may be captured, collected, purchased, or
otherwise obtained if these pre-capture, pre-collection,
pre-storage, or pre-obtainment requirements are not met."

AckerCamps.com LLC has captured, collected or otherwise obtained
the biometric identifiers of Illinois consumers without properly
obtaining a written executed release, and without making the
required disclosures concerning collection, storage, use, and
destruction, the lawsuit alleges. The company also lacks retention
schedules and guidelines for permanently destroying the data, and
"has not and will not destroy" the information as required by the
BIPA, the suit claims.

The case looks to cover all persons who had their biometric
identifiers, facial geometry, faceprints or facial data captured,
collected, or received by AckerCamps.com LLC while residing in
Illinois within the last five years and until a class is certified
in the lawsuit. [GN]

ACOSTA SALES: Frederick Labor Suit Removed to W.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled LEROY FREDERICK, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. ACOSTA SALES CO., INC. and MOSAIC
SALES SOLUTIONS US OPERATING CO., Case No. GD-22-005681, was
removed from the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, to the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania on September 21, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01350-CCW to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged failure to pay
overtime wages and failure to reimburse business expenses in
violation of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law.

Acosta Sales Co., Inc. is a sales, marketing and service company,
with its principal place of business in Florida.

Mosaic Sales Solutions US Operating Co. is a marketing company,
with its principal place of business in Texas. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Marla N. Presley, Esq.
         JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
         1001 Liberty Avenue, Suite 1000
         Pittsburgh, PA 15222
         Telephone: (412) 232-0404
         Facsimile: (412) 232-3441
         E-mail: Marla.Presley@jacksonlewis.com

                 - and -

         Robert William Gignilliat, IV, Esq.
         JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
         Rob.Gignilliat@jacksonlewis.com
         15 South Main Street, Suite 700
         Greenville, SC 29601
         Telephone: (864) 232-7000

AFTER HOURS: Franklin Sues Over Unpaid OT for Dental Assistants
---------------------------------------------------------------
TASHA FRANKLIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AFTER HOURS DENTISTRY PLLC, Defendant, Case
No. 4:22-cv-00809 (E.D. Tex., September 21, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for its failure to compensate the Plaintiff
and similarly situated dental assistants overtime pay for all hours
worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Ms. Franklin was employed by the Defendant as a dental assistant
from July 2020 to August 13, 2022.

After Hours Dentistry PLLC is provider of preventative dental care,
restorative dentistry, sedation dentistry, orthodontics, and other
related services, headquartered in Plano, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Barry S. Hersh, Esq.
         HERSH LAW FIRM, PC
         3626 N. Hall St., Suite 800
         Dallas, TX 75219-5133
         Telephone: (214) 303-1022
         Facsimile: (214) 550-8170
         E-mail: barry@hersh-law.com

AGRANA FRUIT: Conditional Class Certification Granted in Miller
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARY MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs v. AGRANA FRUIT US,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-01919 (N.D. Ohio), Judge Bridget
Meehan Brennan of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, Eastern Division, grants Plaintiffs Gary Miller and
Donovan Richardson's Motion for Conditional Certification and
Court-Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs.

Agrana owns and operates fruit processing plants in Ohio, New York,
Tennessee, and Texas. Miller worked at Agrana's facility located in
Botkins, Ohio as a "fruit prep lead" from 2003 to 2020. His role
consisted of "various tasks related to getting fruit ready to put
in a cooker including unboxing the fruit and dumping the fruit into
a bin." Richardson worked at Agrana's Lysander, New York facility
from September 2020 until March 2021. His role consisted of
shipping and production functions.

Because their jobs demanded close contact with food, Agrana
required the Plaintiffs to follow certain sanitary and
sterilization protocols before starting work -- including washing
hands and feet and putting on sanitary uniforms, sanitary boots,
sanitary glasses, sanitary gloves, and hair and beard nets. The
Plaintiffs were required to perform these tasks at the facility
before they clocked in. Similarly, after they clocked out of work,
they had to change out of the protective clothes.

The Plaintiffs seek to conditionally certify a class to recover
unpaid overtime stemming from Agrana's food and sterilization
policies under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs proposed class definition is as follows: "All
current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of Agrana Fruit US,
Inc. whose job duties involved contact with food, food-contact
surfaces, or food packaging materials, and were required to change
at work into sanitary clothing and equipment (e.g., sanitary
uniform, sanitary boots, sanitary glasses, sanitary gloves, and
hair net), and worked at least 40 hours in at least one workweek,
from October 11, 2018, to present."

In support of litigating the case collectively, the Plaintiffs
attached their declarations to their motion, along with the
declarations of six other employees of Agrana facilities located in
Ohio, Tennessee, New York, and Texas.

Taken together, these declarations provide that throughout Agrana's
facilities: Agrana employees (i) whose job demanded close contact
with food were required to don similar types of sanitary clothing
and equipment at the facility before clocking in for work; (ii)
were not paid any amount for time spent donning said sanitary
clothing and equipment; (iii) whose job demanded close contact with
food were required to doff similar types of clothing and equipment
after they clocked out of work; and (iv) were not paid any amount
for the time spent doffing said sanitary clothing and equipment.

First, Judge Brennan holds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied their
"modest" burden for conditional certification. He opines that (i)
the Plaintiffs' claims are unified by common theories of the
Defendants' statutory violations; (ii) courts do not consider a
defendant's de minimis defense at the conditional class
certification stage; and (iii) the fact that the class members will
have individualized damages does not defeat class certification
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, let alone under the comparatively lenient
FLSA conditional class certification standard.

Accordingly, she grants the Plaintiff's motion as it relates to
conditionally certifying the following class: All current and
former hourly, non-exempt employees of Agrana Fruit US, Inc. whose
job duties involved contact with food, food-contact surfaces, or
food packaging materials, and were required to change at work into
sanitary clothing and equipment (e.g., sanitary uniform, sanitary
boots, sanitary glasses, sanitary gloves, and hair net), and worked
at least 40 hours in at least one workweek, from Oct. 11, 2018, to
present.

The Plaintiffs also move for approval of their proposed opt-in
procedures. Judge Brennan orders the Plaintiffs and the Defendant
to meet and confer to determine a mutually agreeable opt-in
procedure. She orders them to report to the Court within 21 days
with jointly approved forms or a document specifying for the Court
any areas of disagreement regarding the proposed notice, consent
form, or cover email.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Brennan grants in part the
Plaintiff's motion for conditional class certification. She
conditionally certifies the Plaintiff's proposed class and will
finalize the opt-in procedure after reviewing the parties' joint
filing pursuant to the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2ypm3jbc from
Leagle.com.


ALBEE BABY: Raslavich FTSA Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of ANNA RASLAVICH, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. ALBEE BABY CARRIAGE CO.,
INC., filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Circuit Court
of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County,
Florida, Case No. 22-CA-006674, to the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida on September 23, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Middle District of Florida assigned Case
No. 8:2-cv-02207 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges the violation of the Defendant of the Florida
Telephone Solicitation Act.

Albee Baby Carriage Co., Inc. retails baby products such as baby
carriage. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Maria K. Vigilante, Esq.
          BLANK ROME LLP
          500 East Broward Blvd., Suite 2100
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394
          Tel: (954) 512-1809
          Fax: (813) 433-5564
          E-mail: Maria.Vigilante@BlankRome.com

ALBERTA: Class Action Over Timely Bail Hearings Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ian Burns, writing for The Lawyer's Daily, reports that an Alberta
judge has given the go-ahead to a class action alleging the lack of
access to timely bail hearings has led to thousands of Charter
violations in the province.

Court of King's Bench Associate Chief Justice John Rooke certified
the class in a decision issued Sept. 26 (Reilly v. Alberta 2022
ABKB 612), writing that the "abuse -- in this case, delay -- is so
manifest that a broad procedural remedy must be found."

The class covers all persons who were arrested in Alberta between
May 2, 2016, and the date of certification, and who did not receive
a bail hearing within 24 hours of their arrest, in violation of s.
503 of the Criminal Code.

According to plaintiff counsel Margaret Waddell, the class will be
"well in excess" of 17,000 people.

"The language in the Criminal Code is an absolute obligation and a
protected Charter right which falls into the category of habeas
corpus, because people are not to be unreasonably detained," said
Waddell, who practises with Waddell Phillips in Toronto. "And this
is a consistent problem across Canada, and is fundamentally a
reflection of the failure of the government to properly resource
the criminal justice system."

In 2016, Alberta changed its old system for bail hearings, where
police would present the case in court, to one where Crown counsel
did.

Waddell said this led to a bottleneck system characterized by these
"overholds" beyond the 24-hour period.

"The situation was so bad that it really was screaming out for a
class action to bring access to justice for these folks," she said.
"Once you are arrested by the police you are chucked into one of
these holding cells which are gross, to put it mildly -- there are
steel benches, concrete walls and the lights are on 24/7. They
aren't meant to be places where people are held for any length of
time."

For its part, Alberta argued that the Minister of Justice has no
authority to micromanage the police, whose obligation is to get an
accused a bail hearing within 24 hours, and the challenge does not
address the cause of the delay.

But Justice Rooke wrote that it is "the fact of delay beyond 24
hours, not the individual causes or who caused the delay that is
relevant to certification."

The individual who originally brought the action, Ryan Reilly, is a
name that may be familiar to legal observers in Alberta. He
received a stay on assault and unlawful confinement charges due to
bail hearing delay in 2018, a move which was later overturned by
the Alberta Court of Appeal but reinstated by the Supreme Court of
Canada.

However, a person identified only as "MS" will be the
representative plaintiff in the case, as Reilly will not be a class
member because he has received a constitutional remedy in his
criminal proceedings.

A representative for Alberta's Ministry of Justice said in an
e-mail it would be inappropriate to comment on the case while it
remains before the courts. [GN]

ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA: Faces Class Action Over Probation Detainers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pittsburgh's Action News 4 reports that a new class-action lawsuit
alleges hundreds of people are illegally held at Allegheny County
Jail every day.

The lawsuit claims judges and other court officials have used
"probation detainers" to keep people in jail for prolonged periods
of time. The orders stop the person's release from jail if they
allegedly violated their probation.

The plaintiffs in the case claim those orders come without fair
hearings to determine if they should be held in jail at all.

The lawsuit says at any given time, about a third of those housed
at the county jail have these "probation detainers" lodged against
them.

Pittsburgh's Action News 4 spoke with the lead attorney on the
case. She says it's nearly impossible for people to get out of jail
after these orders come down.

"The result of these policies is really catastrophic," Sumayya
Saleh said. "They're separating families, they're ruining lives and
it's done with such disregard for the human toll that this is
taking on people's lives."

The suit demands that these practices be changed and monetary
damages for every day the plaintiffs are in jail. [GN]

AMAZON.COM INC: Court Consolidates Pecznick & Griffith Class Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, JOY PECZNICK and GIL KAUFMAN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AMAZON.COM,
INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, DENA GRIFFITH,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
Case Nos. 2:22-cv-00743-TL, 2:22-cv-00783-TL (W.D. Wash.), Judge
Tana Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, enters an order:

   a. granting Griffith's Motion to Consolidate and for
      Appointment of Interim Class Counsel;

   b. granting Amazon's Motion to Consolidate;

   c. denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss or Stay Griffith;
      and

   d. appointing the law firms representing Griffith (BORDE LAW
      PLLC, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, and the Law Offices of
      Ronald A. Marron, APLC) as the interim class counsel.

On May 31, 2022, Pecznick and Kaufman filed a putative class action
(Pecznick) in the Western District of Washington against Amazon,
alleging that the company had changed Amazon Prime members'
contractual benefits without compensation by "unilaterally
rescinding" a benefit of their annual subscription.

At the time the fee was introduced in 2021, customers had been
paying $119 per year for their Amazon Prime subscriptions, which
had -- in many locations across the United States -- included free
grocery delivery from Whole Foods Markets for orders over $35. With
the policy change, Amazon added a $9.95 "service fee" to any
delivery from Whole Foods.

The Pecznick Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of "all Amazon
Prime members residing in the United States who ordered Amazon's
Whole Foods free delivery and were annual members when the $9.95
fee was introduced on Oct. 25, 2021." The suit brings four causes
of action: violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act
(Wash. Rev. Code Section 19.86.020), breach of contract, breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The
case was assigned to the Hon. Tana Lin.

On June 7, 2022, Plaintiff Griffith filed a putative class action
in the same district against Amazon, alleging false and misleading
advertising and "bait-and-switch" advertising in connection with
"FREE" delivery from Whole Foods Markets. She alleges that the
Defendant engaged in deceptive practices by continuing to advertise
that it offered "free delivery" from Whole Foods to Prime members
after instituting the new fee and that it used "drip-pricing"
tactics to sneakily add that fee to Whole Foods orders placed by
Prime members on Amazon.com, while not applying any fee to
customers picking up items from a Whole Foods store.

The Plaintiff Griffith proposes certification of a nationwide class
as well as a California sub-class. The nationwide class would
include: "All U.S. citizens who were Amazon Prime members that were
charged a service fee in connection with an online delivery from
Whole Foods Market from Aug. 1, 2021, until the date notice is
disseminated to the class, excluding Defendant and Defendant's
officers, directors, employees, agents and affiliates, and the
Court and its staff."

The California sub-class would include: "All California residents
who were Amazon Prime members that were charged a service fee in
connection with an online delivery from Whole Foods Market from
Aug. 1, 2021, until the date notice is disseminated to the class,
excluding Defendant and Defendant's officers, directors, employees,
agents and affiliates, and the Court and its staff."

The complaint brings eight causes of action: (1) the Washington
Consumer Protection Act (Wash. Rev. Code Sections 19.86.010 et
seq.); (2) the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code
Sections 1750 et seq.); (3) the False Advertising Law (Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code Sections 17500 et seq.); (4) the Unfair Competition Law
(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200 et seq.); (5) unjust
enrichment/quasi contract; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7)
concealment/non-disclosure; and (8) fraud.

On the day she filed her complaint, Griffith also filed a notice of
related case, alerting the Court that there were now two "putative
class actions for claims arising out of a service fee charged by
Amazon in connection with its grocery delivery service from Whole
Foods Market." For this reason, the Griffith case was also assigned
to the Hon. Tana Lin.

On June 23, 2022, Griffith and Amazon each filed their respective
motions to consolidate. In her motion, Griffith also requested that
the Court appoints her counsel team as the interim class counsel.
The Plaintiffs in the Pecznick action opposed both motions, and
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss or stay the Griffith case
under the first-filed rule, or alternatively (in case of
consolidation) to have their counsel appointed as the interim lead
counsel.

Judge Lin states that the first-to-file rule is a generally
recognized doctrine of federal comity which permits a district
court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint
involving the same parties and issues has already been filed in
another district. In order for the first-to-file rule to apply, (1)
the relevant action must have been filed prior to the one the Court
is being asked to decline jurisdiction over; (2) the same or
substantially similar parties must be involved; and (3) the issues
raised in the suits must be the same or substantially similar.

Given these two cases are in the same district before the same
judge and consolidation is an option, Judge Lin denies the Pecznik
Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss. She believes a more equitable
outcome than dismissing or staying the Griffith action would be to
consolidate the two cases. Indeed, consolidation of these cases
would obviate the need to apply the first-to-file rule.

District courts may consolidate actions that "involve a common
question of law or fact." A court has "broad discretion" under this
rule to consolidate actions pending within one judicial district.
Factors relevant to the analysis include "judicial economy, whether
consolidation would expedite resolution of the case, whether
separate cases may yield inconsistent results, and the potential
prejudice to a party opposing consolidation."

Judge Lin finds that though the Pecznick Plaintiffs insist that
their complaint differs significantly from the complaint in the
Griffith case, both cases are against the same defendant, have
similar plaintiffs, center around the same core fact (the Defendant
charging Amazon Prime customers a fee for deliveries from Whole
Foods Market), and assert causes of action under the Washington
Consumer Protection Act on behalf of overlapping classes. And as
the drafters of their complaint, Pecznick Plaintiffs cannot now
assert that both cases do not involve a common factual question
regarding the propriety of Amazon's fee for deliveries from Whole
Foods Market for Amazon Prime customers and some similar legal
theories related to the fee.

Given the similarities between the cases, Judge Lin finds it would
further judicial economy to consolidate the cases and expedite
their resolution by avoiding duplicative discovery. As the cases
are before the same judge, the risk of inconsistent results is low.
With regard to prejudice, the Pecznick Plaintiffs fear that their
breach of contract claim will be deprioritized and fundamentally
misunderstood by Plaintiff Griffith's counsel, but they have not
established that consolidation is likely to prejudice their
claims.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Lin believes the factors weigh in
favor of consolidation. Therefore, she will consolidate the
Pecznick and Griffith cases. All future filings will bear the
following case caption and be filed in Case No. 2:22-cv-00743-TL:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT
SEATTLE IN RE: AMAZON SERVICE FEE CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00743-TL
LITIGATION (CONSOLIDATED CASE)

Finally, the rivalry between the counsel groups representing the
Plaintiffs and their disagreement over the scope of the proposed
class(es) counsel in favor of appointing one counsel group as
interim class counsel. Having reviewed the competing counsel
groups' respective submissions and all of the briefing related to
this matter, Judge Lin appoints the counsel team for the Griffith
action (BORDE LAW PLLC, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, and the Law
Offices of Ronald A. Marron, APLC) as the interim class counsel.

Both counsel groups have demonstrated work done in investigating
the potential claims, relevant experience and knowledge, and
adequate resources to represent the class.However, the Griffith
team has shown more care and attention in this early stage of
litigation than their competitor. The Griffith complaint is found
to be more thorough, and its class definition more comprehensive.
Moreover, the Pecznick Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Court's
Standing Order, which requires parties to confer before filing most
motions.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Lin:

     (1) grants the motions to consolidate and consolidates
Plaintiffs Joy Pecznick and Gil Kaufman v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case
No. 2:22-cv-00743-TL, and Dena Griffith v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case
No. 2:22-cv-00783-TL, under 2:22-cv-00743-TL for all purposes,
including trial;

     (2) denies the motion to stay or dismiss the Griffith case;

     (3) designates Pecznick, et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No.
2:22-cv-00743-TL the lead case in the consolidated action. The case
will thereinafter be captioned as In Re Amazon Service Fee
Litigation;

     (4) directs all counsel to file all further documents only
under the lead case, Case No. 2:22-cv-00743-TL;

     (5) directs the Clerk to file this order in Case No.
2:22-cv-00743-TL and Case No. 2:22-cv-00783-TL;

     (6) instructs the Clerk to leave open the member case, Case
No. 2:22-cv-00783-TL;

     (7) appoints BORDE LAW PLLC, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, and
the Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, APLC, as the interim class
counsel; and

     (8) orders the interim class counsel to file a consolidated
amended complaint that faithfully represents every claim from both
actions within 30 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3dkrwhwh from Leagle.com.


AMERICA'S FINEST: Underpays Deli Workers, Gonzalez Says
-------------------------------------------------------
GERARDO CORDOVA GONZALEZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AMERICA'S FINEST DELI, CORP.
(D/B/A AMERICA'S FINEST DELI) and TAHER NAMER, Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-08212 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 26, 2022) is a class action for
unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and
for violations of the New York Labor Law and the "spread of hours"
and overtime wage orders of the New York Commissioner of Labor,
including applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees
and costs.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants at America's Finest
Deli from approximately August 2018 until March 2020, and then from
approximately August 2020 until March 2021, and from approximately
November 2021 until July 19, 2022.

America's Finest Deli, Corp. owns an American deli located in New
York under the name "America's Finest Deli."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Catalina Sojo, Esq.
          CSM LEGAL, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

AMERICAN GENERAL: Court Denies Moriarty's Bid to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHELLE L. MORIARTY, as Successor-In-Interest to
Heron D. WVG Moriarty, Decedent, on Behalf of the Estate of Heron
D. Moriarty, and on Behalf of the Class, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN
GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-1709-BTM-WVG (S.D. Cal.), Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denies
the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

In 2012, the Plaintiff's husband, Heron D. Moriarty, took out a
term life insurance policy with American General. On March 24,
2016, American General was unable to process Mr. Moriarty's
automatic monthly payment because the associated bank account was
closed. On May 22, 2016, American General terminated the policy as
of the date of the lapsed payment: March 20, 2016.

Mr. Moriarty passed away on May 31, 2016. On June 22, 2016, the
Plaintiff submitted a claim on Mr. Moriarty's life insurance
policy. On July 6, 2016, American General denied the claim because
the policy had allegedly terminated as of March 20, 2016, which was
prior to Mr. Moriarty's death.

On Oct. 19, 2017, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on
behalf of herself and a purported class of similarly situated
individuals, asserting claims for (1) declaratory and injunctive
relief; (2) breach of contract: (3) bad faith; (4) negligence; and
(5) violation of the California Business & Professions Code
(CB&PC).

The Plaintiff's primary argument is that American General failed to
comply with sections of the California Insurance Code (which went
into effect on Jan. 1, 2013) requiring insurers to (1) give policy
holders a sixty-day grace period before canceling a policy, (2)
inform policy holders of their right to designate at least one
person to receive notice of the insurer's intent to terminate
coverage due to nonpayment, and (3) provide written notice to the
policy holder and any named designee at least 30 days before a
scheduled termination date. Because American General failed to
comply with those sections, the Plaintiff argues, American
General's termination of the policy was invalid and Plaintiff's
right to benefits enforceable.

The Court has already made several pertinent rulings in the matter.
Among other decisions, the Court ruled that American General
complied with the statutory 60-day grace period; that American
General failed to provide Mr. Moriarty with the statutory notice of
his right to designate someone to receive a notice of termination;
that American General failed to provide proper notice of its intent
to terminate the policy; that summary judgment was not warranted
for the Plaintiff's breach-of-contract claims; and that American
General was entitled to summary judgment on her declaratory
judgment claim.

While this suit was pending, the California Supreme Court decided
whether the statutory provisions at issue apply to insurance
policies issued before the provisions went into effect. In McHugh
v. Protective Life Ins. Co., the California Supreme Court held that
sections 10113.71 and 10113.72 of the California Insurance Code
"apply to all policies in effect as of the sections' effective
date," that is, Jan. 1, 2013.

The Plaintiff's main argument for class certification is simple. In
her view, the answer to two questions -- whether the statutory
provisions apply to policies issued before Jan. 1, 2013 and, if so,
whether the failure to comply with those provisions voids the
termination of a policy -- will drive this litigation and
essentially resolve her claims and those of the class members. If
the failure to comply with those provisions is sufficient to prove
breach of contract, the argument goes, then the resolution of that
legal question will essentially resolve every claim a class member
has. As such, the Plaintiff argues, the Court should certify a
class to resolve those questions.

The Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class: All
owners, or beneficiaries upon a death of the insured, of
Defendant's individual life insurance policies that were renewed,
issued, or delivered by Defendant in California, and in force on
Jan. 1, 2013, and which underwent or will undergo lapse or
termination for the non-payment of premium without Defendant first
providing all of the notices, grace periods, and offers of
designation required by Insurance Code Sections 10113.71 and
10113.72.

In turn, American General argues (among other things) that
individual questions -- driven by idiosyncratic policies and
questions regarding breach and causation -- will predominate over
any common question; that California law will not apply to various
class members; that the class is overbroad and includes policy
holders who do not yet have breach-of-contract claims; that the
Plaintiff's case is atypical compared to the proposed class; and
thus that a class action is an inefficient mechanism to resolve the
action.

Judge Moskowitz holds that the certifying the Plaintiff's proposed
class would be inconsistent with Rule 23. He finds that the
Plaintiff cannot represent a class comprised primarily of policy
holders seeking equitable relief because she has no equitable claim
to pursue. She is seeking damages, but most class members would not
be. In any case, the proposed class raises too many individual
questions because it is too broad. The Plaintiff failed to satisfy
Rule 23. Class certification is not a superior mechanism for the
fair, efficient resolution of this controversy.

The Court could theoretically modify the Plaintiff's proposed class
definition to include only those policy holders or beneficiaries
who have damage claims, but it is not required to do so. Judge
Moskowitz declines to do so without briefing on the question. He
has substantial concerns as to whether the issues of the individual
claims such as actual damages and causation would predominate. He
recognizes that the Plaintiff sees the issue as a simple one of
failure to comply with the Statutes results in the policy not
lapsing and upon death, the benefit is payable. He respectfully
disagrees, and since this issue is fairly debatable, it may
ultimately have to be resolved on appeal.

For the reasons stated, the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification is denied without prejudice. The counsel will appear
at a status conference on Oct. 12, 2022, at 4 PM to set a trial
date in January 2023.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5abzs6ek from Leagle.com.


APPLE INC: Agrees to Settle Class Action Over iPhone 4S Performance
-------------------------------------------------------------------
OWPIT reports that more than 6 years have passed since the
beginning of a class action related to the iPhone 4s against Apple,
with the company that has finally decided to close everything.

With the debut in 2011 of the iPhone 4s, particularly well-known
devices obviously now abandoned by the giant as regards updates, a
real class action was also born against the Cupertino company. We
are talking specifically about an alleged problem that arose
following the update to iOS 9 arrived in 2015, and which as
officially confirmed and taken up by MacRumors led the company to
pay $ 15 to some owners.

During the month of December there was talk of how the company
would have inflated the announcement of the new OS also talking
about better performance for some devices, including the iPhone 4s.
After more than 6 years in which the situation has persisted, the
giant has finally decided to "accept" the accusations that saw the
new update slow down the systems. Find below the declaration of the
class action.

The plaintiffs collectively file the operational complaint in this
class action, claiming that consumers were harmed by downloading
iOS 9 to their iPhone 4s due to Apple misrepresenting the new
operating system. According to the plaintiffs, Apple misrepresented
the fact that iOS 9 would arrive on the iPhone 4S with the fact
that it would improve performance for customers who downloaded the
update. Instead, the plaintiffs stated that iOS 9 significantly
slowed the performance of the iPhone 4S.

In total, a total of $ 20 million was provided for some New York
and New Jersey owners who had problems with the devices and who
received $ 15 by signing a specific statement on the whole, with a
specific official site having permission to register with their
data in order to obtain a refund. [GN]

ARC AUTOMOTIVE: Hudson Sues Over Automobiles' Inflator Defect
-------------------------------------------------------------
ROSALIND HUDSON-BATTIE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ARC AUTOMOTIVE, INC., GENERAL
MOTORS LLC, HYUNDAI MOTOR GROUP, HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, and HYUNDAI
MOTOR AMERICA, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-03809-LMM (N.D. Ga.,
September 21, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
fraudulent concealment, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust
enrichment.

The case arises from the design, manufacturing, and marketing of
automobile vehicles with defective inflators. The inflators in the
Class vehicles suffer from a design defect wherein it fails to
account for the excess, asymmetrical weld flash which is a
byproduct of the friction welding process that is required to
manufacture these inflators according to ARC's design. As a result
of a defective design and defective manufacturing process, instead
of protecting vehicle occupants from bodily injury during
accidents, the defective airbag modules too often violently explode
and rupture, expelling metal debris and shrapnel at vehicle
occupants. The Plaintiffs and the Class did not receive the benefit
of their bargain; rather, they purchased and leased vehicles that
are of a lesser standard, grade, and quality than represented, and
they did not receive vehicles that met ordinary and reasonable
consumer expectations regarding safe and reliable operation, says
the suit.

ARC Automotive, Inc. is a manufacturer of automobile components
based in Delaware.

General Motors LLC is an automobile manufacturer based in
Michigan.

Hyundai Motor Group is a general partnership firm based in South
Korea.

Hyundai Motor Company is an automotive manufacturer headquartered
in South Korea.

Hyundai Motor America is a subsidiary of Hyundai Motor Company
based in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Kevin R. Dean, Esq.
         John D. O'Neill, Esq.
         MOTLEY RICE LLC
         28 Bridgeside Blvd.
         Mount Pleasant, SC
         Telephone: (843) 216-9000
         E-mail: kdean@motleyrice.com
                 jdoneill@motleyrice.com

ARCADIS US: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime, Byrkett Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY BYRKETT, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated employees, Plaintiff v. ARCADIS US, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:22-cv-05376 (N.D., Il., Oct. 30, 2022) is an action against
the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

Plaintiff Byrkett was employed by the Defendant as field
inspector.

ARCADIS US INC. provides design, engineering, consulting, and
management services. The Company offers alternative project
delivery, geographic information systems, land resources, value
management, water and environment management, renewable energy
solutions, commissioning, and project and program control services.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 W. Washington, Ste 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008
          Email: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                 msalas@flsalaw.com
                 sarendt@flsalaw.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Ste 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                 rschreiber@mybackwages.com

ARCHULETA COUNTY, CO: Brown Sues Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation
---------------------------------------------------------------
LACY BROWN, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. ARCHULETA COUNTY, BOARD OF COUNTY COMISSIONERS, WARREN
BROWN, individually, RONNIE MAEZ, individually, Defendants, Case
No. 1:22-cv-02502-PAB-NRN (D. Colo., Sept. 26, 2022) is a class
action against Defendant Archuleta County, Board of County
Commissioners for damages and other relief relating to violations
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Colorado
Wage Claim Act, the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, and
the Emergency Family Medical Leave Act.

This action has two components. The first consists of Ms. Brown's
individual claims against the County and Defendants for engaging in
protected activity of reporting sexual harassment to the County and
for complaining about the unlawful requirements to earn a bonus.
The second is a collective and class action instituted by Plaintiff
because of Defendants' policy and practice of not paying certain
county employees a $2,000 bonus, including Plaintiff, who took
leave during the COVID pandemic that was mandated by County policy
and protected by federal law.

Plaintiff, Lacy Brown, is an adult woman who was employed by the
County from November 2011 until October 24, 2021. Her final job
position with the County was as a Caseworker Supervisor in the
Department of Human Services.

Archuleta County is a local Colorado government entity.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David T. Albrechta, Esq.
          Eleni K. Albrechta, Esq.
          ALBRECHTA & ALBRECHTA, LLC
          530 Main Avenue, Suite D03
          Durango, CO 81301
          Telephone: (970) 422-3288
          E-mail: david@albrechtalaw.com
                  eleni@albrechtalaw.com

               - and -

          Tod J. Thompson, Esq.
          810 Sycamore Street
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 322-4348
          E-mail: tod@thompsonlaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph F. Albrechta, Esq.
          ALBRECHTA & COBLE, LTD.
          2228 Hayes Avenue, Suite A
          Fremont, OH 43420
          Telephone: (419) 332-9999
          E-mail: jalbrechta@lawyer-ac.com
                  jcoble@lawyer-ac.com

ASTRAZENECA PLC: Judge Dismisses Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Mondaq, reports that on
September 12, 2022, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed with
prejudice a putative class action asserting claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against a pharmaceutical company
and certain of its executives. In re AstraZeneca plc Sec. Litig.,
2022 WL 4133258 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2022). Plaintiffs alleged that
the company made misstatements and omissions with respect to
clinical trials of its COVID-19 vaccine. The Court held that
plaintiffs failed to identify any misleading statements and failed
to adequately allege scienter.

As a general matter, the Court held that plaintiffs failed to meet
the heightened pleading standard under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") to "'demonstrate with specificity
why and how' each statement is materially false or misleading." Id.
at *6. Rather, the Court observed that plaintiffs presented in
"boilerplate fashion" various statements from the class period and
then, "after each one, repeat[ed] a copy-and-pasted list of
omissions" as to allegedly adverse information regarding the
clinical trials. Id. This, the Court explained, was insufficient
because it did not "specify what understanding each statement left
investors, and how that understanding was inconsistent with alleged
omissions." Id.

With respect to plaintiffs' allegations that information was
omitted regarding the dosages used in the trials, the Court
determined that plaintiffs failed to identify "any inaccurate,
misleading, or incomplete statement" relating to vaccine dosage,
but rather "identified only accurate statements describing the
launch and historical progression of the . . . clinical trials."
Id. at *7. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that any
statements "created the misleading impression" that there were "no
significant setbacks or unusual issues;" rather, the Court
explained that there is "no generalized duty to 'disclose negative
facts.'" Id. Moreover, while plaintiffs argued that the company had
a duty to "tell the whole truth" after it chose to speak on the
issue of the clinical trials, the Court concluded that the
challenged statements were "at such a high level of generality, and
the alleged omitted facts so granular, that there is no violation
of that principle here." Id.

Further, the Court rejected plaintiffs' allegations with respect to
the alleged omission that the number of trial participants over the
age of 55 was purportedly insufficient. Id. at *8. The Court
determined that no challenged statement was rendered misleading by
this alleged omission. For instance, while plaintiffs pointed to a
statement that the clinical trials would measure immune responses
"in different age ranges," the Court noted that there was no
dispute that the trials indeed did so. Id. The Court also rejected
plaintiffs' argument that defendants "created the misleading
impression that the number of 55+ subjects was sufficient to be
studied," which the Court noted amounted to "little more than a
dispute about the proper interpretation of data," which was
insufficient to establish an actionable misrepresentation. Id.

In addition, the Court held that various general statements were
non-actionable puffery, including statements that the company was
"moving quickly but without cutting corners," that the clinical
trial was "on track," and that the company would "follow the
science" and "put patients first." Id. at *8-9. The Court
determined that no reasonable investor would rely on such general
statements.

The Court also determined that plaintiffs' allegation that the
company failed to disclose that the vaccine was unlikely to receive
regulatory approval in the near term was not actionable under the
safe-harbor provision of the PSLRA for forward-looking statements
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language. Id. at *9. The Court
emphasized that statements regarding regulatory approval are
"classically forward-looking," and the challenged statements were
all accompanied by meaningful cautionary language. Id.

The Court further concluded that plaintiffs failed to adequately
allege scienter. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
scienter should be inferred on a theory of "motive and
opportunity." Id. The Court explained that plaintiffs failed to
establish the required "concrete and personal benefit" from the
alleged misrepresentations, as the only motives identified—such
as increasing the stock price to facilitate the acquisition of
another company—were insufficient and were "common to most
corporate officers." Id.

The Court also rejected plaintiffs' argument for scienter based on
a theory of "strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness," which the Court explained required
behavior that was "highly unreasonable" and "an extreme departure
from the standards of ordinary care." Id. While plaintiffs argued
that defendants had access to "contrary facts" conflicting with the
challenged statements, the Court determined that plaintiffs failed
to specifically identify the information any defendant had access
to. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that the alleged omitted facts
were, in fact, disclosed to the FDA, and that there was "room for
disagreement" as to whether this information undermined the trial
results, further undermining any inference of fraudulent intent.
Id. at *10.

Finally, the Court declined to grant leave to amend, concluding
that further amendment would be futile, given that plaintiffs had
previously amended their complaint and failed to explain how
further amendment would remedy the deficiencies identified by the
Court. Id.

In re AstraZeneca plc Sec. Litig. [GN]

AT&T INC: Settles Class Action Over Hidden Fees for $14 Million
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Avery, writing for CNET, reports that AT&T will pay some of its
customers a combined total of $14 million to settle a class action
lawsuit claiming that the telecommunications company illegally
charged wireless subscribers undisclosed fees for several years.
The company agreed to the settlement amount in June, and the
deadline for filing a claim is a little more than three weeks
away.

Plaintiffs in the suit, filed in the US District Court for the
Northern District of California, argue AT&T failed to inform
postpaid wireless customers they were being charged a monthly $1.99
administrative fee for each line. (Unlike prepaid subscribers,
postpaid customers are billed after the fact based on usage.)

In an email to CNET, AT&T denied the allegations, adding that it
"clearly and prominently" discloses all fees. The carrier agreed to
the settlement, it said, "to avoid lengthy, expensive litigation."

Here's what you need to know about the AT&T case, including who's
eligible for a payment, when the deadline to file is and how much
you could get.

Want to find out about more class-action settlements? See if you
qualify for payouts from T-Mobile's $350 million data-breach deal
or Roundup weed killer's $45 million settlement.

What is AT&T accused of in the class-action lawsuit?

AT&T began charging postpaid customers a monthly administrative fee
for each wireless line in May 2013.

In the suit, Vianu v. AT&T Mobility, plaintiffs Ian Vianu,
Elizabeth Blum and Dominic Gutierrez allege the fee is really a way
for AT&T to increase its basic rate "without having to advertise
the higher prices."

The fee has been regularly raised -- it more than doubled in 2018
to $1.99 a month -- even though AT&T financial records allegedly
show the company's administrative costs have actually been
decreasing.

According to the complaint, mention of the fee is intentionally
buried in bill statements "to [make] it likely customers will not
notice it." It's also phrased to suggest that it's akin to a tax or
regulatory fee, the suit reads, "when in fact it is simply a way
for AT&T to advertise and promise lower rates than it actually
charges."

Calling the practice a "bait-and-switch scheme," the plaintiffs
maintain AT&T has "unfairly and improperly extracted hundreds of
millions of dollars in ill-gotten gains from California
consumers."

Their complaint accuses the carrier of violating several California
statutes regarding unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business
practices, as well as "the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."

Who is eligible for money from the AT&T settlement?
While all postpaid customers were charged the fees, only California
residents have recourse due to the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, which protects against "false advertising, fraud, and
other unfair business practices."

AT&T customers in California who were charged administrative fees
on their postpaid wireless service plans between June 20, 2015, and
June 16, 2022, can file a claim for a one-time cash payment.

It's not clear how many subscribers AT&T has in California, though
it is the third-largest mobile carrier in the US, with more than 80
million postpaid customers across the country.

How much will eligible customers receive in the settlement?
Class members who successfully file a claim will receive an equal
share of the net settlement, estimated to be $20. The final amount
may be higher or lower depending on the number of claimants, as
well as attorneys' fees.

Current AT&T subscribers would receive their refund via an
automatic credit to their account, while former customers would get
a check mailed to them.

The payments won't be a full reimbursement: According to AT&T
records, the average customer has paid $180 in fees since 2015, The
Verge reported, two years after the practice began.

How do I file a claim for payment from the AT&T settlement?
If you believe you're eligible for a portion of the settlement, you
can submit a claim on this website or print out a physical form to
mail in.

You'll be asked for your name, mailing and email addresses and AT&T
Wireless phone number or account number. Claims must be submitted
by Oct. 29, 2022.

Some class members received emails or postcards notifying them of
the potential settlement with a Notice ID and Confirmation Code. If
you received a notification, include the ID and code provided when
you file. If you didn't receive a postcard or email -- or do not
know where it is -- you can still file without them.

The deadline to opt out of the settlement and retain the right to
pursue your own lawsuit was Sept. 29, 2022.

When will class members receive payment from the AT&T settlement?
Any compensation will be disbursed after the final approval hearing
for the deal, scheduled for Nov. 3. [GN]

AUSSIE HOME: Promotes Flawed Insurance, Class Action Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pippa Bradshaw, writing for 9Now, reports that a home loan
brokerage has been accused of exploiting Aussie customers by
promoting flawed insurance.

Aussie Home Loans is one of the country's largest mortgage brokers
but now there's a potential class action against them looming.

"I have paid for three and a half years for this policy," customer
Gary*, who wished to remain anonymous, told A Current Affair.

Gary used Aussie Home Loans in 2017 to organise finance for a new
property, which is when he said the extra Mortgage Protection Plan
was pushed.

"They pressed in a way that, 'Oh, what if you lose your job down
the track, if you have a family', you know, and that was kind of
the trigger point for me," he said.

The plan promised $7500 to cover three months of repayments if Gary
was to lose his job, along with a death and terminal illness
benefit.

"I'm thinking, 'Oh ok, if I do lose my job, at least I have $7500',
what they advertise, which is $2500 per month," he said.

Gary was paying $67 a month but the premium kept increasing and by
2020, Gary was in financial trouble.

"I called them, actually, to cancel the policy and they said, 'Oh,
instead of cancelling it, how about you reduce your cover?'" he
recalled.

Gary said he was persuaded by the insurance helpline not to cancel,
which was a relief when he lost his job in 2020.

But when he went to claim the $7500, he hit a brick wall.

"Then they said, 'Oh no, no, no, that's not how this works, you
have to be unemployed for 60 days before you can put your claim,'"
Gary said.

Gary was forced to jump through hoops, which included proving he
was applying for jobs, just to get the policy paid out.

"That was a very stressful time for me, first not having a job,
then having to deal with insurance giving me the claim money," he
said.

Rebecca Jancauskas from Shine Lawyers is now investigating a
possible class action against Aussie Home Loans.

Shine Lawyers believes the Mortgage Protection Plan presented to
customers offered limited or low value.

"The insurance is very expensive when you stack it up against the
alternatives and it offers, in most cases, much poorer cover than
the superannuation cover most people already have," Jancauskas
said.

Jancauskas said Shine is now trying to understand whether the
broker has been acting in the best interest of its clients when
selling its policies.

Canstar editor Effie Zahos said for those who've been sold a credit
card, taken out a home loan, or had finance to buy a car, the
"chances are you have been sold junk insurance".

She explained that most people would already have the type of cover
Aussie Home Loans was selling in its Mortgage Protection Plan.

"These are the features that are probably in your super fund," she
explained.

"Most of us do have a default insurance through our super fund."

Zahos said there is a four-day cooling off period brokers must
abide by and recommends taking the time to ask questions.

"If you are sold this type of insurance, you need to ask them,
'What is the total cost? Are you adding this onto the loan? Will
the cost inflate?/'" she said.

*Name has been changed.

Statement by an Aussie Home Loan spokesperson:
Aussie brokers have access to thousands of products via our
approved panel of lenders and partners, but we do not issue or
administer insurance. Aussie has not received any legal
correspondence relating to these claims.

Statement by a spokesperson for the insurer ALI:
ALI has protected over 225,000 policyholders through our authorised
brokers. During that time, only 42 policyholders (0.02%) made a
complaint to the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA).
Of those 42 complaints, 40 were found in ALI's favour. [GN]

BEYOND MEAT: Faces Borovoy Suit Over Mislabeled Meat Products
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINE BOROVOY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BEYOND MEAT, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 2022LA000862 (Ill. Cir., Dupage Cty., Oct. 1, 2022) is a civil
class action lawsuit brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of all
consumers who purchased the Defendant's Beyond Meat products that
are allegedly falsely marketed.

The Defendant's Meat products include but not limited to: Beyond
Meat Sausage Plant-Based Dinner Links Hot Italian 14 oz, Beyond
Meat Beyond Sausage Plant-Based Dinner Sausage Links Brat Original
14 oz, Beyond Meat Beyond Beef Plant-Based 16oz Patties, Beyond
Meat Beyond Beef Plant-Based Ground Beef, Beyond Meat Beyond
Breakfast Sausage Plant-Based Breakfast Patties Classic 7.4 oz,
Beyond Meat Beyond Breakfast Sausage Plant-Based Breakfast Patties
Spicy 7.4 oz, Beyond Meat Beyond Chicken Plant-Based Breaded
Tenders Classic 8 oz, Beyond Meat Beyond Meatballs Italian Style
Plant-Based Meatballs 12 ct Classic 10 oz, Beyond Meat Beyond
Breakfast Sausage Plant-Based Breakfast Links Classic 8.3 oz.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant's related
marketing claims of the Products are false and misleading because
the Defendant: (1) miscalculates and overstates the Products'
protein content, which is measured in grams per serving determined
by nitrogen testing; (2) miscalculates and overstates the quality
of the protein found in its products, which is represented as a
percentage of daily value and calculated by the Protein
Digestibility Amino Acid Corrected Score method ("PDCAAS"); and (3)
misleads consumers into believing that the Products provide
equivalent nutritional benefits to that found in traditional
meat-based products.

By advertising protein content on the Beyond Meat Products' front
label, Defendant misleads consumers into believing that they stand
to benefit from the Products' stated protein content, says the
suit.

Beyond Meat, Inc. develops plant based protein food products. The
Company offers burgers, sausage, crumbles, strips, and other
related products. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          Russell Busch, Esq.
          Milberg Coleman Bryson, Esq.
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (866) 252-0878
          Email: gklinger@milberg.com
                 rbusch@milberg.com

               - and -

          Nick Suciu III, Esq.
          Milberg Coleman Bryson, Esq.
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          6905 Telegraph Rd., Suite 115
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301
          Telephone: (313) 303-3472
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          Email: nsuciu@milberg.com

               - and -

          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          J. Hunter Bryson, Esq.
          Milberg Coleman Bryson, Esq.
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC, 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919)600-5035
          Email: dbryson@milberg.com
                 hbryson@milberg.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          SHUB LAW FIRM LLC
          134 Kings Hwy E, Fl-2
          Haddonfield, NJ 08033
          Telephone: (856) 772-7200
          Facsimile: (856) 210-9088
          Email: jshub@shublawyers.com
                 klaukaitis@shublawyers.com

BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in Colbert Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled EDWARD COLBERT v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC. ET AL., SECTION: H, Case No. 17-3647 (E.D. La.),
Judge Jane Triche Milazzo of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana grants:

   (1) the Motion in Limine to Exclude the Opinions of Plaintiff's
       Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   (2) the Motion for Summary Judgment Due to Plaintiff's
Inability
       to Prove Medical Causation, both filed by Defendants BP
       Exploration & Production, Inc.; BP America Production
       Company; BP p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; Transocean
       Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling,
       Inc.; and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

The case is one among the "B3 bundle" of cases arising out of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, In Re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, No.
10-md-02179, R. Doc. 26924 at 1 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2021). This
bundle comprises claims for personal injury and wrongful death due
to exposure to oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill
response (e.g., dispersant). These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Eastern District of
Louisiana before Judge Carl Barbier.

During this MDL, Judge Barbier approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement, but the B3
plaintiffs either opted out of this agreement or were excluded from
its class definition. Subsequently, Judge Barbier severed the B3
cases from the MDL to be reallocated among the judges of the Court.
This case was reassigned to Section H.

Plaintiff Colbert alleges exposure to oil and dispersants during
his time as a cleanup worker cleaning oily rocks and jetties and
picking up tar balls. He claims to suffer from a host of medical
conditions caused by the exposure, including "itchy rash, change in
hair/skin, acne, blistering, crusting, dryness/flaking, scaling,
welts, blurred vision, eye burning, irritation, difficulty
swallowing, hoarseness, sore throat, cough, chronic rhinitis,
facial pain, sinus pain, nasal congestion, nasal discharge, ringing
in ears, chest pain, wheezing, exacerbation of pre-existing asthma,
shortness of breath, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, joint pain,
difficulty walking, weakness, headache, night sweats, and
dizziness." He asserts claims under the general maritime law of
negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence with respect to
the spill and its cleanup.

In the Motion in Limine, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's
expert on medical causation, Dr. Jerald Cook, fails to satisfy the
Fifth Circuit requirements for admissible general and specific
causation opinions in toxic tort cases and should therefore be
excluded as unreliable. In the Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Defendants argue that assuming their Motion in Limine is granted,
the Plaintiff lacks expert testimony on causation and, therefore,
fails to present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his
injuries were caused by exposure to oil and dispersants. The
Plaintiff opposes.

Judge Milazzo notes that B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response. The plaintiff's burden with
respect to causation in a toxic tort case involves proof of both
general causation and specific causation. Because the Court finds
Dr. Cook's opinion on general causation to be unreliable, it need
not consider specific causation.

General causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a
particular injury or condition in the general population, while
specific causation is whether a substance caused a particular
individual's injury.

Here, Dr. Cook is listed as the Plaintiff's only expert witness on
causation. On this topic, Dr. Cook produced a report dated November
23, 2021. Dr. Cook's report in this case is substantially similar
to a report previously examined and rejected by Judge Africk in
Murphy v. BP Exploration & Production Inc. In Murphy, Judge Africk
held that Dr. Cook's opinion on general causation was unreliable
because he (1) failed to verify the plaintiff's illness; (2) did
not follow a sequential process for his analysis; (3) failed to
establish the relevancy of studies that he consulted; and (4)
failed to identify a harmful dose.

Further, five other sections of the Eastern District of Louisiana
have excluded Dr. Cook based on a later, more detailed report for
similar reasons. After carefully and thoroughly reviewing those
decisions, and for the same reasons articulated by Judges Africk,
Ashe, Vance, Barbier, Morgan, and Zainey, the Court grants the
Defendants' Motion in Limine. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot
prove general causation, and the Court also grants the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

For these reasons, the Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment are granted.

Judge Milazzo ordered that all of the Plaintiff's claims are
dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated Sept. 15,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/dmtxb4wr from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in Harris Suit Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CHARLES HARRIS v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., SECTION: H, Case No. 17-3265 (E.D. La.),
Judge Jane Triche Milazzo of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana grants:

   (1) Motion in Limine to Exclude the General Causation
       Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   (2) Motion for Summary Judgment Due to Plaintiff's
       Inability to Prove Medical Causation, both filed by
       Defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc.; BP America
       Production Company; BP p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, LLC;
       Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Offshore Deepwater
       Drilling, Inc.; and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

The case is one among the "B3 bundle" of cases arising out of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, In Re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, No.
10-md-02179, R. Doc. 26924 at 1 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2021). This
bundle comprises "claims for personal injury and wrongful death due
to exposure to oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill
response (e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Eastern District of
Louisiana before Judge Carl Barbier.

During this MDL, Judge Barbier approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement, but the B3
plaintiffs either opted out of this agreement or were excluded from
its class definition. Subsequently, Judge Barbier severed the B3
cases from the MDL to be reallocated among the judges of this
Court. This case was reassigned to Section H.

Plaintiff Charles Harris alleges continuous exposure to oil and
dispersants while decontaminating boats and booms following the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The Plaintiff claims to suffer from a
host of medical conditions because of the exposure, including
abdominal cramps and pain, nausea, vomiting, headaches,
dehydration, skin issues including rashes, irritation, and itching,
chest pain, anxiety, decreased appetite, sleep disorders, decreased
concentration, lethargy, depression, and GI bleed. The Plaintiff
asserts claims under the general maritime law of negligence,
negligence per se, and gross negligence with respect to the spill
and its cleanup.

In the Motion in Limine, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's
expert on medical causation, Dr. Jerald Cook, fails to satisfy the
Fifth Circuit's requirements for an admissible general causation
opinion in toxic tort cases and should therefore be excluded as
unreliable. In the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants
argue that assuming their Motion in Limine is granted, the
Plaintiff lacks expert testimony on general causation and,
therefore, fails to present a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether his injuries were caused by exposure to oil and
dispersants. The Plaintiff opposes.

Judge Milazzo notes that B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response. The plaintiff's burden with
respect to causation in a toxic tort case involves proof of both
general causation and specific causation. General causation is
whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or
condition in the general population, while specific causation is
whether a substance caused a particular individual's injury.

Here, Dr. Cook is listed as the Plaintiff's only expert witness on
causation. On this topic, Dr. Cook produced a report dated June 21,
2022, and entitled "Health Effects Among Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill Response and Cleanup Workers: A Cause and Effect Analysis."
This report is not unique to this case; another judge of this Court
has described it as "an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs."

Seven sections of the Eastern District of Louisiana, including this
one, excluded an earlier version of Dr. Cook's report dated March
14, 2022. Judge Milazzo finds that Dr. Cook's June report does not
appear to make any changes that disturb the reasons for excluding
the March version. Indeed, at least two sections have already
excluded the June 21, 2022 report as well.

Accordingly, for the same reasons articulated by Judges Africk,
Ashe, Vance, Barbier, Morgan, and Zainey, the Court grants the
Defendants' Motion in Limine. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot
prove general causation, and the Court also grants the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

For these reasons, the Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment are granted.

Judge Milazzo ordered that all of the Plaintiff's claims are
dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated Sept. 15,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3ymych5d from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Bid for Summary Judgment in Villere Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANE VILLERE v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET
AL., SECTION: D (4), Civil Action No. 17-4217 (E.D. La.), Judge
Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana grants the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America Production
Co., and BP p.l.c. and joined in by Defendants Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.,
Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Deepwater, Inc.

The case arises from the Plaintiff's alleged exposure to harmful
chemicals following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that occurred
on April 20, 2010. On Jan. 11, 2013, U.S. District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA").
However, certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs,
either opted out of or were excluded from the MSA.

Ms. Villere filed an individual Complaint on April 28, 2017 against
the Defendants. She alleges that after the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, she was injured as a result of exposure to oil and/or
dispersing chemicals and/or decontaminants in Pensacola, Florida
and Waveland and Gulfport, Mississippi. She alleges that her
symptoms include, inter alia, burning of the eye, eye irritation,
and breathing problems. She alleges that she sustained damages "as
a result of the Defendants' negligence; strict liability; gross
negligence; willful and wanton conduct; and violations of
applicable safety, construction, or operation regulations and/or
statutes." Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to recover economic
damages, personal injury damages -- including damages for past and
future medical expenses and for pain and suffering -- punitive
damages, and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion on Aug. 22, 2022, asserting
that they are entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiff
has not produced an expert report or any expert testimony in
support of her health complaints and, thus, cannot prove that her
alleged medical conditions were caused by her exposure to
substances related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. They claim
that the Fifth Circuit and at least eleven Sections of this Court
have issued numerous opinions addressing the obligation of a B3
plaintiff to prove legal causation. According to them, this
requirement derives from the fundamental principles governing proof
of causation in toxic tort cases decided under general maritime
law. The claim that B3 plaintiffs, who were originally part of the
multidistrict litigation stemming from the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, must satisfy the same legal cause standard as BELO
plaintiffs.

The Defendants further assert that due to the technical nature of
the proof, courts have uniformly concluded that toxic tort
plaintiffs need expert testimony to meet their burden of proving
causation. Accordingly, they claim that courts have repeatedly
granted summary judgment dismissing claims of plaintiffs who
alleged injuries from exposure to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
but failed to produce expert support for their claims. They argue
that, for these reasons, the Plaintiff's claims lack the expert
support required to carry her burden of proof on causation and,
thus, that the Court should grant their Motion and dismiss the
Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

As the Defendants correctly point out, Judge Barbier previously
described the BELO and B3 cases in similar terms, explaining that:
"BELO cases and the B3 cases are similar in several important
respects. Both allege personal injuries or wrongful death due to
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the oil spill
response. Furthermore, both BELO plaintiffs and B3 plaintiffs must
prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the response. In a
separate matter, this Court has explained that the Fifth Circuit
and nearly every Section of this Court have uniformly held that,
with regard to B3 plaintiffs, "absent expert testimony, a B3
plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof on causation." The Court
finds that because Plaintiff failed to identify a causation expert
in this case by the Court's Aug. 25, 2022 deadline and did not move
for an extension of that deadline, or for an extension of her
deadline to respond to the instant Motion, she cannot meet her
burden of proof on causation. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law."

For the foregoing reasons, BP's Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted, and the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants are
dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/nhf789ud from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook's Expert Opinion in Tebbs Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHEILA GOREE TEBBS v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
INC., ET AL., SECTION D (4), Civil Action No. 17-4606 (E.D. La.),
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the following two motions:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

The motions were filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production
Inc., BP America Production Co., BP p.l.c., Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., and Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, U.S. District Judge Carl J. Barbier, who
presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out of the
Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical
Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA"). However,
certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs, either opted
out of or were excluded from the MSA. Tebbs opted out of the MSA
and, accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.

Ms. Tebbs filed this individual action against the Defendants on
May 3, 2017 to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a result
of the oil spill. For approximately five months in 2010, she worked
as a recovery technician, tasked with cleaning up oil and
oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal areas in Gulfport,
Biloxi, Pass Christian, and Pascagoula, Mississippi.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' negligence and
recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently
failing to properly design and implement a clean-up response caused
her to suffer myriad injuries including coughing, congestion,
headaches, rashes, recurrent sinus symptoms, vision loss, and
fatigue. Specifically, she seeks to recover economic damages,
personal injury damages -- including damages for past and future
medical expenses and for pain and suffering -- punitive damages,
and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support her claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused her particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. His
Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims; rather,
Dr. Cook's generic causation report has been utilized by numerous
B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before the Court
as well as in other cases before other sections of the Court.
Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general causation
and not to specific causation.

The Defendant filed the instant Motions on May 31, 2022. In their
Daubert Motion in Limine, they contend that Dr. Cook's report
should be excluded as it is both unreliable and unhelpful to the
trier of fact. They primarily point to the opinions of other
sections of the Court which have excluded this very same Report on
grounds of unreliability to suggest that the Court should likewise
exclude the Report. Further, the Defendants contend that Dr. Cook's
specific methodology is unreliable and that he failed to establish
the harmful level of exposure to the chemicals the Plaintiff
allegedly was exposed to at which harmful health effects occur.
Next, because Dr. Cook should be excluded to testify, the
Defendants argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary
Judgment as the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation
through expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling
Circuit precedent.

The Plaintiff disputes the Defendants' characterization of Dr.
Cook's Report. She argues that Dr. Cook utilized a proper
methodology in conducting his general causation analysis and that
he thoroughly explained his methods. Further, she argues that the
Report does provide adequate harmful exposure level data for each
health condition exhibited by her and that to the extent that Dr.
Cook is unable to provide more specific exposure-level data, it is
the fault of the Defendants for improperly restricting access to
scientific research teams to gather such data. Finally, she
contends that expert testimony is not necessary for a transient
symptom case.

Judge Vitter concurs with the other sections of the Court that have
addressed this issue and found Dr. Cook's failure to address the
level of harmful dosage of each relevant chemical to be ultimately
fatal to his report. At no point in his report does Dr. Cook
adequately identify what level of exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil is capable of producing the harmful health effects
alleged by the Plaintiff. Indeed, as numerous Sections of the Court
have pointed out, Dr. Cook does not even specify the exact
chemicals that the Plaintiff was allegedly exposed to, let alone
provide evidence regarding the level of exposure at which the
Plaintiff's symptoms might manifest.

Because Judge Vitter finds that Dr. Cook's Report fails to
demonstrate the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the Plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case," i.e., the harmful exposure level, she
does not find it necessary to address the Defendant's other
arguments as to why the Report should be excluded. Accordingly, she
finds that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying as an expert
on general causation in the matter.

Dr. Cook's Report is the Plaintiff's sole expert opinion on general
causation. Because Judge Vitter finds it appropriate to exclude the
Report for failure to comport with the Daubert standards for
reliability, the Plaintiff accordingly lacks expert testimony on
general causation. Without expert testimony, which is required to
prove general causation, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a
genuine dispute of material fact as to her claims that her injuries
were caused by exposure to oil. Thus, the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment must be granted as the Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's failure to
establish causation.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Daubert Motion to Exclude and their
Motion for Summary Judgment are granted. The Plaintiff's claims
against the Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2p8snjwr from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook's Testimony in Cambre Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDOCHE CAMBRE v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC.,
ET AL., SECTION D (5), Civil Action No. 17-3643 (E.D. La.), Judge
Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana grants the following two motions:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

The motions were filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production
Inc., BP America Production Co., BP p.l.c., Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., and Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, U.S. District Judge Carl J. Barbier, who
presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out of the
Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical
Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA"). However,
certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs, either opted
out of or were excluded from the MSA. Cambre opted out of the MSA
and, accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.

Mr. Cambre filed this individual action against the Defendants on
April 18, 2017 to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a
result of the oil spill. For approximately three months in 2010, he
worked as a beach cleanup worker, tasked with cleaning up oil and
oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal areas in Gulfport
and Biloxi, Mississippi. He alleges that the Defendants' negligence
and recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and
subsequently failing to properly design and implement a clean-up
response caused him to suffer myriad injuries including shortness
of breath, headaches, rashes, boils, and sinus problems.
Specifically, he seeks to recover economic damages, personal injury
damages -- including damages for past and future medical expenses
and for pain and suffering -- punitive damages, and attorneys'
fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support his claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused his particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. His
Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims; rather,
Dr. Cook's generic causation report has been utilized by numerous
B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before the Court
as well as in other cases before other sections of the Court.
Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general causation
and not to specific causation.

The Defendant filed the instant Motions on June 13, 2022. In their
Daubert Motion in Limine, the Defendants contend that Dr. Cook's
report should be excluded as it is both unreliable and unhelpful to
the trier of fact. They primarily point to the opinions of other
sections of this court which have excluded this very same Report on
grounds of unreliability to suggest that the Court should likewise
exclude the Report. Further, they contend that Dr. Cook's specific
methodology is unreliable and that he failed to establish the
harmful level of exposure to the chemicals the Plaintiff allegedly
was exposed to at which harmful health effects occur. Next, because
Dr. Cook should be excluded to testify, the Defendants argue, the
Court should grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as the
Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation through expert
testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling Circuit
precedent.

The Plaintiff disputes the Defendants' characterization of Dr.
Cook's Report. He argues that Dr. Cook utilized a proper
methodology in conducting his general causation analysis and that
he thoroughly explained his methods. Further, he argues that the
Report does provide adequate harmful exposure level data for each
health condition exhibited by him and that to the extent that Dr.
Cook is unable to provide more specific exposure-level data, it is
the fault of the Defendants for improperly restricting access to
scientific research teams to gather such data. Finally, the
Plaintiff contends that expert testimony is not necessary for a
transient symptom case.

Judge Vitter concurs with the other sections of the Court that have
addressed this issue and found Dr. Cook's failure to address the
level of harmful dosage of each relevant chemical to be ultimately
fatal to his report. At no point in his report does Dr. Cook
adequately identify what level of exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil is capable of producing the harmful health effects
alleged by the Plaintiff. Indeed, as numerous Sections of the Court
have pointed out, Dr. Cook does not even specify the exact
chemicals that the Plaintiff was allegedly exposed to, let alone
provide evidence regarding the level of exposure at which the
Plaintiff's symptoms might manifest.

Because she finds that Dr. Cook's Report fails to demonstrate the
"minimal facts necessary to sustain the Plaintiff's burden in a
toxic tort case," i.e., the harmful exposure level, Judge Vitter
does not find it necessary to address the Defendant's other
arguments as to why the Report should be excluded. Accordingly, she
finds that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying as an expert
on general causation in the matter.

Dr. Cook's Report is the Plaintiff's sole expert opinion on general
causation. Because Judge Vitter finds it appropriate to exclude the
Report for failure to comport with the Daubert standards for
reliability, the Plaintiff accordingly lacks expert testimony on
general causation. Without expert testimony, which is required to
prove general causation, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a
genuine dispute of material fact as to his claims that his injuries
were caused by exposure to oil. Thus, the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment must be granted as the Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's failure to
establish causation.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Daubert Motion to Exclude and Motion
for Summary Judgment are granted. The Plaintiff's claims against
the Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5d4mvaua from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook's Testimony in Moorere Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HOLLY MOORERE v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET
AL., SECTION D (4), Civil Action No. 17-4461 (E.D. La.), Judge
Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana grants these two motions:

    (i) Daubert Motion to Exclude the Causation Testimony of
        Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   (ii) Motion for Summary Judgment.

The motions were filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production
Inc., BP America Production Co., BP p.l.c., Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., and Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.

The case arises from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 and the subsequent cleanup efforts of the Gulf
Coast. On Jan. 11, 2013, U.S. District Judge Carl J. Barbier, who
presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out of the
Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical
Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA"). However,
certain individuals, referred to as "B3" plaintiffs, either opted
out of or were excluded from the MSA. Moorere opted out of the MSA
and, accordingly, is a B3 plaintiff.

Ms. Moorere filed this individual action against the Defendants on
May 1, 2017 to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a result
of the oil spill. For approximately four months in 2010, she worked
as a beach cleanup worker, tasked with cleaning up oil and
oil-covered debris from the beaches and coastal areas in Gulf
Shores, Alabama.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' negligence and
recklessness in both causing the Gulf oil spill and subsequently
failing to properly design and implement a clean-up response caused
her to suffer myriad injuries including shortness of breath,
headaches, coughing, burning eyes, bronchitis, hair falling out,
and sinus problems. Specifically, she seeks to recover economic
damages, personal injury damages -- including damages for past and
future medical expenses and for pain and suffering -- punitive
damages, and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

To help support her claims that exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil spilled by the Defendants caused her particular health
symptoms, the Plaintiff offers the report and testimony of Dr.
Jerald Cook. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with expertise
specifically as an occupational and environmental physician. His
Report is not tailored directly to the Plaintiff's claims; rather,
Dr. Cook's generic causation report has been utilized by numerous
B3 plaintiffs, including many plaintiffs currently before this
Court as well as in other cases before other sections of the Court.
Accordingly, Dr. Cook's Report pertains only to general causation
and not to specific causation.

The Defendant filed the instant Motions on June 13, 2022. In their
Daubert Motion in Limine, the Defendants contend that Dr. Cook's
report should be excluded as it is both unreliable and unhelpful to
the trier of fact. They primarily point to the opinions of other
sections of the Court which have excluded this very same Report on
grounds of unreliability to suggest that this Court should likewise
exclude the Report. Further, the Defendants contend that Dr. Cook's
specific methodology is unreliable and that Dr. Cook failed to
establish the harmful level of exposure to the chemicals the
Plaintiff allegedly was exposed to at which harmful health effects
occur. Next, because Dr. Cook should be excluded to testify, the
Defendants argue, the Court should grant their Motion for Summary
Judgment as the Plaintiff is unable to establish general causation
through expert testimony, a necessary requirement under controlling
Circuit precedent.

The Plaintiff disputes the Defendants' characterization of Dr.
Cook's Report. She argues that Dr. Cook utilized a proper
methodology in conducting his general causation analysis and that
he thoroughly explained his methods. Further, she argues that the
Report does provide adequate harmful exposure level data for each
health condition exhibited by her and that to the extent that Dr.
Cook is unable to provide more specific exposure-level data, it is
the fault of the Defendants for improperly restricting access to
scientific research teams to gather such data. Finally, the
Plaintiff contends that expert testimony is not necessary for a
transient symptom case.

Judge Vitter concurs with the other sections of the Court that have
addressed this issue and found Dr. Cook's failure to address the
level of harmful dosage of each relevant chemical to be ultimately
fatal to his report. At no point in his report does Dr. Cook
adequately identify what level of exposure to the chemicals present
in the oil is capable of producing the harmful health effects
alleged by the Plaintiff. Indeed, as numerous Sections of the Court
have pointed out, Dr. Cook does not even specify the exact
chemicals that the Plaintiff was allegedly exposed to, let alone
provide evidence regarding the level of exposure at which her
symptoms might manifest.

Because she finds that Dr. Cook's Report fails to demonstrate the
"minimal facts necessary to sustain the Plaintiff's burden in a
toxic tort case," i.e., the harmful exposure level, Judge Vitter
does not find it necessary to address the Defendant's other
arguments as to why the Report should be excluded. Accordingly, she
finds that Dr. Cook should be excluded from testifying as an expert
on general causation in the matter.

Dr. Cook's Report is the Plaintiff's sole expert opinion on general
causation. Because Judge Vitter finds it appropriate to exclude the
Report for failure to comport with the Daubert standards for
reliability, the Plaintiff accordingly lacks expert testimony on
general causation. Without expert testimony, which is required to
prove general causation, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a
genuine dispute of material fact as to her claims that her injuries
were caused by exposure to oil. Thus, the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment must be granted as the Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law due to the Plaintiff's failure to
establish causation.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Daubert Motion to Exclude and Motion
for Summary Judgment are granted. The Plaintiff's claims against
the Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4568eftu from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Abdelfattah Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled KHALED ABDELFATTAH v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC. ET AL., SECTION: H, Case No. 17-3443 (E.D. La.),
Judge Jane Triche Milazzo of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana grants:

   (1) the Motion in Limine to Exclude the General Causation
       Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   (2) the Motion for Summary Judgment Due to Plaintiff's
       Inability to Prove Medical Causation, both filed by
       Defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc.; BP America
       Production Company; BP p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, LLC;
       Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Offshore Deepwater
       Drilling, Inc.; and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

The case is one among the "B3 bundle" of cases arising out of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, In Re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, No.
10-md-02179, R. Doc. 26924 at 1 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2021). This
bundle comprises "claims for personal injury and wrongful death due
to exposure to oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill
response (e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Eastern District of
Louisiana before Judge Carl Barbier.

During this MDL, Judge Barbier approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement, but the B3
plaintiffs either opted out of this agreement or were excluded from
its class definition. Subsequently, Judge Barbier severed the B3
cases from the MDL to be reallocated among the judges of this
Court. This case was reassigned to Section H.

Plaintiff Khaled Abdelfattah alleges continuous exposure to oil and
dispersants while decontaminating and handling equipment following
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The Plaintiff claims to suffer
from a host of medical conditions because of the exposure,
including coughing, itchy rashes, headache, irritated stomach,
severe back aches that interfere with breathing, acid reflux,
irritated itchy and watery eyes. The Plaintiff asserts claims under
the general maritime law of negligence, negligence per se, and
gross negligence with respect to the spill and its cleanup.

In the Motion in Limine, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's
expert on medical causation, Dr. Jerald Cook, fails to satisfy the
Fifth Circuit's requirements for an admissible general causation
opinion in toxic tort cases and should, therefore, be excluded as
unreliable. In the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants
argue that assuming their Motion in Limine is granted, the
Plaintiff lacks expert testimony on general causation and therefore
fails to present a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his
injuries were caused by exposure to oil and dispersants. The
Plaintiff opposes.

B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury
or illness is exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the
response, Judge Milazzo notes. The plaintiff's burden with respect
to causation in a toxic tort case involves proof of both general
causation and specific causation. General causation is whether a
substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in
the general population, while specific causation is whether a
substance caused a particular individual's injury.

Here, Dr. Cook is listed as the Plaintiff's only expert witness on
causation. On this topic, Dr. Cook produced a report dated June 21,
2022, and entitled "Health Effects Among Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill Response and Cleanup Workers: A Cause and Effect Analysis."
This report is not unique to this case; another judge of this Court
has described it as "an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs."

Seven sections of the Eastern District of Louisiana, including this
one, excluded an earlier version of Dr. Cook's report dated March
14, 2022. Dr. Cook's June report does not appear to make any
changes that disturb the reasons for excluding the March version,
Judge Milazzo says. Indeed, at least two sections have already
excluded the June 21, 2022 report, as well.

Accordingly, for the same reasons articulated by Judges Africk,
Ashe, Vance, Barbier, Morgan, and Zainey, the Court grants the
Defendants' Motion in Limine. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot
prove general causation, and the Court also grants the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

For these reasons, the Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion for
Summary Judgment are granted.

Judge Milazzo ordered that all of the Plaintiff's claims are
dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated Sept. 15,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/29jyn8tn from
Leagle.com.


BRAINSHARK INC: Illinois Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Wilk BIPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORI WILK, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BRAINSHARK, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1-21-cv-4794 (N.D. Ill.), Judge John Robert Blakey of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, denies Brainshark's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In this putative class action, Wilk sues Brainshark for violating
sections 15(a) and 15(b) of the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act ("BIPA"), 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/1 et seq, by
impermissibly collecting or obtaining her biometric data from a
video that she uploaded to Brainshark at her employer's request.
The Plaintiff sues on behalf of herself and a putative class of
other Illinois residents whose biometric data Brainshark
collected.

The Plaintiff resides in Naperville, Illinois, and previously
worked for RQI Partners, LLC. Brainshark, a Massachusetts company,
provides AI-powered technology that takes sales professionals'
videos and applies facial-mapping technology to identify their
emotions and other performance indicators. To do this, the
technology scans individuals' facial geometry and analyzes each
second of the video for the seller's emotions. Brainshark performs
this service for over 1,000 companies, including RQI.

While the Plaintiff worked for RQI, RQI contracted with Brainshark
to use its AI-technology to provide RQI with a better understanding
of its employees' sales acumen. Between November 2020 and mid-2021,
at RQI's request, the Plaintiff recorded videos of her sales
presentations and uploaded them to Brainshark. It then analyzed her
facial geometry in the videos using its technology and shared with
RQI the analysis results.

Brainshark did not inform the Plaintiff that it planned to collect
scans of her facial geometry or how it planned to retain and manage
such data. It also did not have a publicly available policy
detailing its data collection and management, nor did it provide
Plaintiff with a copy of any such policy. Brainshark also did not
obtain the Plaintiff's informed written consent to collect her
biometric data from the videos she sent at RQI's request.

The Plaintiff alleges that Brainshark is a "private entity" under
BIPA 740 ILCS 14/10.She contends that the scans of facial geometry
(from the uploaded videos) qualify as "biometric identifiers" as
defined by BIPA and Brainshark's collection and use of her
biometric information violated sections 15(a) and 15(b) of BIPA.

Brainshark asserts four arguments in favor of dismissal. First, it
argues that the Plaintiff's claims fail pursuant to Illinois'
Extraterritorial Doctrine. Second, it argues that the Complaint
does not plausibly allege that Brainshark violated sections 15(a)
or (b) of BIPA. Third, Brainshark argues that the Complaint fails
because it does not allege the requisite state of mind for monetary
damages. Fourth, and finally, it argues that BIPA violates the
First Amendment because it constitutes an unconstitutional
restraint on commercial speech.

Brainshark begins by arguing that the Complaint fails under
Illinois' Extraterritorial Doctrine because BIPA does not apply to
purely out-of-state conduct and the Complaint fails to allege that
Brainshark allegedly took any action in Illinois.

Overall, Judge Blakey opines that, at this stage, Brainshark has
not shown that the Plaintiff's claims run afoul of the
extraterritoriality doctrine. The Complaint's allegations suffice
to plausibly suggest the conduct occurred "primarily and
substantially" in Illinois.

While the Complaint does not allege where Brainshark analyzed the
Plaintiff's biometric data, it alleges that Brainshark contracted
with Illinois entities. The Plaintiff also alleges that Brainshark
sent back to her and her employer (both of whom are in Illinois)
analyses of its geometric scans, thereby taking specific actions
toward the Plaintiff directed at Illinois. Further, the Plaintiff
alleges that Brainshark engaged in other misconduct when it failed
to provide her with its policies, obtain her consent, or explain
how it planned to use and store her biometric data. As to these
allegations, discovery may reveal relevant facts such as where
Brainshark creates its service policies, how often it communicated
with the Plaintiff or RQI, and where it stored Plaintiff's data
after it evaluated it.

Next, Brainshark argues that the Complaint does not allege a
Section 15(b) violation because it only collected videos not
biometric information. The Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that
Brainshark obtained face geometry scans from these videos and
Section 15(b) applies to face geometry scans.

Judge Blakey opines that the Plaintiff adequately alleges that
Brainshark violated Section 15(b) when it did not seek her prior
written consent before it captured and analyzed her face from the
videos that she uploaded. Under a plain reading of the text, it
does not matter how one collects information, but merely whether
the information one collects qualifies as a "biometric identifier."
Brainshark fails to explain how the term "scan of face geometry" is
unclear or how what it collected from Plaintiff's videos does not
qualify.

Next, Brainshark argues that the Plaintiff's claim based on BIPA's
Section 15(a) fails because she only alleges that it captured or
collected her biometric data, not that it possessed it.
Specifically, it argues that possession requires "dominion or
control" over the biometric data, which the Complaint fails to
allege.

Judge Blakey disagrees. He finds that the Complaint plausibly
alleges that Brainshark, in fact, exercised dominion and control
over the Plaintiff's biometric data. Namely, it alleges that
Brainshark obtained access to the Plaintiff's uploaded video
containing her biometric data; used its technology to scan her
facial geometry from those videos and analyze those scans; and then
developed reports for her employer. These allegations more than
suffice to infer Brainshark had dominion or control over the
Plaintiff's biometric data.

Brainshark also argues that the Plaintiff's BIPA claims fail
because monetary damages require evidence of negligent,
intentional, or reckless conduct and the Complaint fails to make
such allegations. In response, the Plaintiff argues that she does
not need to allege facts to establish Brainshark's state of mind
and, regardless, she sufficiently alleges facts to plausibly infer
that Brainshark acted negligently, intentionally, or recklessly.

In addition to monetary damages, Judge Blakey finds that the
Plaintiff also seeks an injunction against Brainshark, reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs, and other relief deemed appropriate.
Thus, he says, even if the Plaintiff failed to adequately allege a
basis for monetary damages for negligent, intentional, or reckless
conduct, that does not warrant dismissal of her BIPA claims.

Finally, because Brainshark's non-constitutional arguments fail,
Judge Blakey turns to Brainshark's arguments that BIPA violates the
First Amendment because its use of facial geometry scans
constitutes commercial speech and BIPA constitutes a content-based
restriction of this commercial speech that is subject to, and
cannot withstand, strict scrutiny. In response, the Plaintiff
argues that BIPA only restricts how one may collect biometric
information and the Seventh Circuit has held that restricting the
collection or possession of such information does not restrict
speech. In the alternative, she also argues that, even if does,
BIPA is not a content-based restriction requiring strict scrutiny;
rather, at most, it remains subject to intermediate scrutiny, which
it withstands.

Judge Blakey finds that BIPA Sections 15(a) and (b) do not restrict
Brainshark's speech and therefore do not implicate the First
Amendment. Accordingly, he need not analyze whether these
provisions pass constitutional muster (either through strict or
intermediate scrutiny) and, in fact, it should not proceed further
since a court must avoid making unnecessary constitutional
decisions.

For the reasons he explained, Judge Blakey denies Brainshark's
motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2s4y64nb from
Leagle.com.


BRICE, OH: Appeal From Denial of Judgment in Weldele Suit Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County,
dismisses the appeal in the lawsuit captioned Philip M. Weldele, et
al., Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Village of Brice, Defendant-Appellant,
Case No. 21AP-248 (Ohio App.).

Defendant-Appellant Village of Brice appeals from a judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying, in part, the
Village's motion for summary judgment.

In 2015, the Village enacted an ordinance creating a Civil
Violations Bureau ("CVB"), authorizing the Chief of Police to
ticket motorists for speeding violations within Village limits, and
authorizing a Village administrative hearing officer to hear and
determine the motorist's civil liability administratively. On July
21, 2015, the Chief of Police ticketed Philip Weldele for speeding
after having observed Weldele driving in excess of the posted speed
limit. Weldele paid the $125 fine assessed on the notice of
violation form without requesting an administrative hearing.

On Dec. 10, 2015, the Appellees filed a class action complaint in
the court of common pleas asserting claims for fraud, unjust
enrichment and at least as construed by the trial court declaratory
relief. In the complaint, the Appellees allege the ordinance
establishing the Appellant's CVB is an unconstitutional exercise of
the Appellant's police powers under Ohio Constitution, Article
XVIII, Section 3 and Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 7,
because it is in conflict with the specific provisions of the Ohio
Revised Code pertaining to the same subject matter.

The Appellees' complaint seeks a declaration that the ordinance is
unconstitutional, restitution to Weldele and the class members, a
determination Weldele and the class members' constitutional rights
were violated by the Village, and an award of damages.

On Oct. 31, 2017, the trial court issued an "Ordered Directive on
Briefing Schedule" requiring the parties to brief numerous issues,
including whether Weldele failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, and whether Weldele had standing to file the instant
action. On Dec. 11, 2019, the trial court issued a "Decision and
Entry on Ordered Directive" in the Appellees' favor as to each of
the issues briefed.

On Feb. 19, 2020, the trial court issued a journal entry directing
the Village to file a motion for summary judgment concerning the
issues identified in the Oct. 31, 2017, ordered directive on
briefing schedule, and decided in the Dec. 11, 2019 decision and
entry on ordered directive.

On June 30, 2020, the Village filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking judgment as to liability only. In the motion, the Village
claimed that the ordinance creating the CVB represented a
constitutional exercise of the Village's home rule authority, the
administrative hearing procedures complied with due process, and
the CVB did not usurp the jurisdiction of the Franklin County
Municipal Court. The Village argued that fraud and unjust
enrichment claims failed as a matter of law, and that the Village
was entitled to immunity from liability to Appellees in any event.
The Appellees filed a memorandum in opposition to the Village's
motion for summary judgment, but did not file a cross-motion for
summary judgment.

On March 1, 2021, the trial court issued a "Decision and Entry
Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" wherein
the trial court determined: 1) the Village ordinance is an exercise
of the Appellant's police power, rather than of local
self-government; 2) the relevant state statute, R.C. 4511.21, is a
general law; and 3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.

Accordingly, the trial court suggested that the ordinance
represents an unconstitutional exercise of police powers by the
Village, which is preempted by state statutory law. The trial court
reasoned that the ordinance is in conflict with state law because
there is a significant discrepancy between the punishments imposed
for the same behavior.

Specifically, the trial court found that the ordinance
decriminalizes traffic violations, does not require assessment of
points on a license, and imposes no duty on the Village to notify
the Bureau of Motor Vehicles of the violation.

Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment
as to the claims for unjust enrichment and declaratory relief. The
trial court did not enter judgment in the Appellees' favor on
either the unjust enrichment claim or the prayer for declaratory
relief as no cross-motion for summary judgment had been filed. The
issue of class certification also remains pending in the trial
court.

On April 14, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment entry
incorporating the March 3, 2021 decision and entry, and making a
finding of no just cause for delay. The Village appealed to this
Court from the April 14, 2021 judgment entry.

The Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:

   (1) The Trial Court erred when it determined the Plaintiff did
       not have to exhaust his administrative remedies;

   (2) The Trial Court erred when it determined the Plaintiff's
       admission of liability, when he paid his civil penalty
       before filing the instant action, did not bar the
       Plaintiff's claims; and

   (3) The Trial Court erred when it (seemed to) determined the
       Village of Brice's Ordinance is unconstitutional.

Judge Terri Jamison, writing for the Panel, states that the trial
court's March 1, 2021 decision and entry granting in part, the
Village's motion for summary judgment clearly disposed of the
Appellees' claim for fraud in favor of the Village. However, the
March 1, 2021 decision and entry merely denied the Appellant's
motion for summary judgment as to the claim for unjust enrichment
and the prayer for declaratory relief.

Accordingly, even though the March 1, 2021 decision and entry was
issued in the context of a special proceeding, as the trial court
saw it, Judge Jamison finds the judgment did not affect a
substantial right because no "order" was issued in the Appellees'
favor. Thus, there was no final order in the Appellees' favor for
the Village to appeal.

Though the March 1, 2021 decision and entry expresses a future
intent on the part of the trial court to declare the ordinance
unconstitutional, nothing in the March 1, 2021 decision and entry
prevents the Village from obtaining a meaningful review by way of a
later appeal, Judge Jamison holds. The March 1, 2021 decision and
entry fails to declare the rights and obligations of the parties,
and makes no award.

Judge Jamison notes that it is true that the trial court's April
14, 2021 judgment entry includes a finding of no just reason for
delay, pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B). That finding, however, did not
convert the non-final order denying summary judgment into a final
order in favor of Appellees with respect to the claims for
declaratory relief and unjust enrichment, Judge Jamison points out.
Those claims remain pending in the trial court for a final ruling.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals finds that the Village's
appeal does not present a final appealable order for the Court's
consideration. Lacking jurisdiction to consider anything less than
a final appealable order, the Court of Appeals is compelled to
dismiss the appeal.

Having concluded that the order appealed from was not a final
appealable order, the Court of Appeals dismisses the appeal for the
lack of jurisdiction.

Appeal Dismissed.

DORRIAN and NELSON, JJ., concur.

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision dated Sept. 15, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4awzh3me from Leagle.com.

On brief: David A. Goldstein Co., LPA, and David A. Goldstein --
dgoldstein@dgoldsteinlaw.com -- for the Appellees.

On brief: Isaac Wiles & Burkholder, LLC, and Brian M. Zets --
bzets@isaacwiles.com -- for the Appellant. Argued: Brian M. Zets.


BROOKLYN SUYA: Faces Gaskin Suit Over Wage-and-Hour Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
LAMARR GASKIN and EMPERESS MCDOWELL, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. BROOKLYN SUYA CORP.,
Defendant, Case No. 7:22-cv-08081 (E.D.N.Y., September 21, 2022) is
a class action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law including failure to
pay overtime wages, unlawful tip pooling, failure to provide a wage
notice, and failure to provide wage statements.

Plaintiffs Gaskin and McDowell worked for the Defendant from March
1, 2022 until June 10, 2022 and February 14, 2022 until June 16,
2022, respectively.

Brooklyn Suya Corp. is a restaurant company in Brooklyn, New York.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq.
         AIDALA, BERTUNA & KAMINS, P.C.
         546 5th Avenue
         New York, NY 10036
         Telephone: (212) 486-0011
         E-mail: ls@aidalalaw.com

BT'S ON THE RIVER: Cabrera Alleges Unpaid Wages, Illegal Tip Credit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JANIUSRY CABRERA, DAYANA AGUIAR, ALEXA PIERRE-LOUIS, GRACIELA
CUEVAS, ANNYCHRISTINA DOWNS, MARLIZ NEVAREZ, JESSICA THOMAS,
TEQUILLA RAMEY, YITSEL VEGA, ANGELETE WILLIAMS, KRISTINA
WOODMANSEE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. BT'S ON THE RIVER, LLC dba BOOBY TRAP ON
THE RIVER, a Florida Limited Liability Company; BTS NORTH, INC. dba
BOOBY TRAP DORAL AREA, a Florida Corporation; BOOBY TRAP, INC., dba
BOOBY TRAP POMPANO BEACH a Florida Corporation; PHILIP GORI, an
individual; P.T.G. ENTERTAINMENT, INC. dba BOOBY TRAP, a Florida
Corporation; GREGG BERGER, an individual; B&G OPA LAND HOLDINGS,
LLC dba BOOBY TRAP, a Florida Limited Liability Company; THE GORI
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP dba BOOBY TRAP, a Florida Limited
Partnership; PG INVESTMENTS, INC., a Florida Corporation; PG
INVESTMENTS II, INC., a Florida Corporation; MIKE BRUSO, an
individual; MIKE ARZA, an individual, Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-23111 (S.D. Fla., Sept. 26, 2022) is a class action for
damages over Defendants' evasion of the mandatory minimum wage and
other provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and illegally
absconding with Plaintiffs' tips.

The Plaintiffs and FLSA Class Members are all current and/or former
exotic dancers who worked for the Defendants' strip clubs.

The Defendants own and operate strip clubs named Booby Trap on The
River, Booby Trap South Miami, Booby Trap Pompano and Booby Trap
Doral.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Raymond R. Dieppa, Esq.
          FLORIDA LEGAL, LLC
          12550 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 405
          North Miami, FL 33181-2536
          Telephone: (305) 901-2209
          Facsimile: (786) 870-4030
          E-mail: ray.dieppa@floridalegal.law

               - and -

          Frank M. Mihalic, Esq.
          CARPENTER & ZUCKERMAN
          8827 West Olympic Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 273-1230
          E-mail: fmihalic@cz.law

BUILDING TESTING: Hernandez Seeks Unpaid Construction Workers' OT
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANGEL HERNANDEZ, and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff v. BUILDING TESTING SERVICES LLC a/k/a BUILDING TESTING
SERVICES WORLDWIDE LLC, and MICHAEL CURIALE, Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-23081-XXXX (S.D. Fla., September 23, 2022) seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages as a result of the Defendants' unlawful pay
practices and policies that violated the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants as a construction
worker from approximately October 28, 2021 to September 3, 2022.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay her and
other similarly situated construction workers lawfully earned
overtime compensation. Despite working approximately an average of
76-84 hours per week, the Defendants did not pay them at the rate
of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours
worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff brings this complaint on behalf of herself and all
other similarly situated construction workers to recover unpaid
overtime wages accumulated from the date of hire and/or from 3
years back from the date of the filing of this complaint. The
Plaintiff also seeks an equal amount in double damages/liquidated
damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs, and other
relief as the Court deems equitable and just.

Building Testing Services LLC a/k/a Building Testing Services
Worldwide LLC is a construction company owned by Michael Curiale.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Julisse Jimenez, Esq.
          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Tel: (305) 503-5131
          Fax: (888) 270-5549
          E-mail: julisse@saenzanderson.com
                  msaenz@saenzanderson.com

BURGER KING: 11th Circuit Reinstates No-Hire Antitrust Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
James Bogan III, Esq., of Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, in an
article for JDSupra, reports that restrictive covenants have
generated a lot of controversy lately, especially with the
Department of Justice's continued focus on illegal no-poach hiring
agreements between Silicon Valley companies and other firms.
Recently, an Eleventh Circuit panel reinstated Sherman Act claims
against Burger King based on the "No-Hire Agreement" in Burger
King's standard franchise agreements. Arrington v. Burger King
Worldwide, Inc., --- F.4th ----, No. 20-13561, 2022 WL 3931471
(11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2022). In so ruling, the panel rejected a
district court's ruling "that Burger King and its franchisees
constituted a single economic enterprise and were not capable of
the concerted action that a Section 1 violation requires." 2022 WL
3931471, at *2.

In Arrington, a line cook, crew member, and general manager for
Burger King restaurants in Illinois filed a putative class action
against Burger King, alleging Section 1 Sherman Act antitrust
claims based on the No-Hire Agreement in the Burger King franchise
agreements, alleging further that "the No-Hire Agreement prevented
them from being able to obtain employment at other Burger King
franchise restaurants and, as a result, caused them to be paid
artificially depressed wages, suffer decreased benefits, and be
deprived of job mobility." Id. at *3.

Burger King moved to dismiss the antitrust claims and the district
court granted the motion, on the ground that (as noted above)
Burger King and its franchisees constituted "a single economic
enterprise" incapable of conspiring under the Sherman Act.

With a shout-out to the Miami Dolphins, Judge Robin Rosenbaum based
the panel's decision on the Supreme Court's opinion in American
Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). That
case involved National Football League Properties ("Properties"),
an entity formed by the National Football League ("NFL") and its 32
member football clubs, which had granted an exclusive license to
Reebok to sell all 32 teams' intellectual property. While
recognizing that the NFL and its football teams had interests in
common, the Supreme Court observed that the 32 football teams
competed against each other for players, fans, and even with
respect to sales of team merchandise. Accordingly, the
exclusive-licensing decision made by the 32 teams and Properties
constituted "concerted action," thereby satisfying the essential
element of antitrust conspiracy for a Section 1 Sherman Act an
antitrust claim.

According to the panel, the Supreme Court's reasoning in American
Needle required the reversal of the district court's dismissal. The
Burger King restaurants were independently owned franchises.
Indeed, Burger King's Franchise Disclosure Document not only made
it clear that each restaurant did not possess any sort of exclusive
territory, the disclosure advised (among other things) that
"[o]ther BURGER KING Restaurants may compete with your Restaurant
or may affect customer trading patterns. Because you will not
receive an exclusive territory, you may face competition from other
franchisees, from outlets that we own, or from other channels of
distribution or competitive brands that [Restaurant Brands]
control[s]." Id. at *3.

The panel concluded: "Burger King and its franchisees, though they
certainly have some economic interests in common, each separately
pursue their own economic interests when hiring employees." Id. at
*6. It therefore reversed the district court's "concerted action"
ruling and remanded for further proceedings. [GN]

CARVANA CO: Pretrial Conference in Unfair Trade Set November 23
---------------------------------------------------------------
Barry Simms, writing for WBALTV11, reports that there is a new
development in the lawsuit against Carvana, the 11 News I-Team has
learned.

Hundreds of car buyers from Maryland and nearby states are part of
the class-action lawsuit against Carvana. The company wanted a
federal judge to toss it out, but the judge didn't.

When the I-Team last visited Jo Riedel, of Aberdeen, walking had
become his main mode of transportation -- that was after a tow
truck repossessed his 2017 Mitsubishi Outlander.

Riedel had stopped paying on the car. He decided to let it happen
after receiving only temporary tags that kept expiring and getting
stopped twice by police. He told the I-Team he just wanted to end
the frustration.

"It's been a full year of just needless headache and feeling of
being ripped off and extra stress on our family that we don't
need," Riedel said.

He couldn't legally drive the SUV because he couldn't properly
register it in Maryland. His complaint is similar to others in a
class-action lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania, alleging violations
under the state's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Carvana denies any and all liability. The company attempted to get
the case thrown out, claiming it was without merit. The company
filed a motion to compel or force arbitration and dismiss the case
but a federal judge denied it.

Attorney Phillip Robinson is one of the attorneys representing
Carvana customers in the lawsuit.

When asked what the judge's ruling means, Robinson said: "It means
the case gets to go forward. Their effort to have it dismissed,
saying we haven't pled legal claims is denied."

Robinson said hundreds of people across the country have been
impacted.

"No one buys a car to sit in the driveway. People buy a car to get
to work or school or to go see family members. It's troubling to us
the cavalier approach to selling a car that you can't provide title
to," he said.

In an emailed statement, a spokesperson for Carvana told the
I-Team: "A handful of historical registration delays are not
reflective of our outstanding customer experiences." Carvana does
not agree with the judge's decision and said: "This is just a
procedural ruling; it does not change that the legal theory of this
case is wrong."

The spokesperson wrote: "We look forward to winning this case in
court and view this as nothing more than a predictable attempt by
class-action attorneys to try and profit off of minor-alleged
paperwork issues during the COVID-19 pandemic."

"COVID is not an excuse for the continuing problems," Robinson
said. "Respectfully, I think most of these people I talked to who
can't drive their cars legally, they didn't get the benefit of the
bargain."

The judge ordered Carvana to file an answer to the complaint. A
pretrial conference is set for Nov. 23. [GN]

CDM SMITH: Faces Craig Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------------------
The case, ARVRA CRAIG, JR., individually and for others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CDM SMITH, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-11620-PBS (D. Mass., September 23, 2022) arises from the
Defendant's alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a costs estimator or
project specialist.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant applied unlawful pay
practices that violated her and other similarly situated employees'
statutory rights. The Defendant allegedly compensated them a flat
hourly rate for every approved hour worked, whether they worked
under 40 hours or more than 40 hours in a week. As a result,
although routinely working 42-45 or more hours each week, the
Defendant denied them of overtime compensation at the rate of one
and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked
in excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime and an equal amount
as liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, judgment
interest, and other relief as may be necessary and appropriate.

CDM Smith, Inc. provides workers to the energy and construction
industry. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip J. Gordon, Esq.
          Kristen M. Hurley, Esq.
          GORDON LAW GROUP, LLP
          585 Boylston St.
          Boston, MA 02116
          Tel: (617) 536-1800
          Fax: (617) 536-1802
          E-mail: pgordon@gordonllp.com
                  khurley@gordonllp.com

                - and –

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 352-1100
          Fax: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com

CERTAINTEED LLC: Settles Suit Over Defective Fiberglass Shingles
----------------------------------------------------------------
CertainTeed and Counsel for the Plaintiffs in Segebarth v.
CertainTeed LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-05500-PD (E.D. Pa.), have entered
into an agreement to settle this class action litigation. The
Plaintiffs alleged that CertainTeed's Fiberglass Horizon Shingles
were defective and that they have suffered economic loss damage as
a result of purchasing defective Fiberglass Horizon Shingles and
property damage due to the alleged failure of the Shingles to
adequately perform in conformance with CertainTeed's
representations and warranty. CertainTeed denies that its
Fiberglass Horizon Shingles were defective and the additional
allegations of the Plaintiffs but has agreed to the settlement to
avoid the expense, inconvenience, and distraction of further
protracted litigation and to fully resolve this matter.

The roofing shingles at issue were CertainTeed's Fiberglass Horizon
Shingles. No other CertainTeed roofing product was involved in the
litigation.

The settlement agreement provides a more substantial remedy for
Fiberglass Horizon Shingles with Qualifying Damage than is
available to property owners under CertainTeed's limited warranty.
The remedy available to a class member depends on a number of
factors such as (1) the proportion of the roof with Qualifying
Damage; (2) the length of time the Fiberglass Horizon Shingles have
been installed; and (3) whether the Qualifying Damage was caused by
a third-party or was sustained during installation.

The settlement agreement must be approved by a judge - in this
case, by United States District Court Judge Paul S. Diamond - after
a hearing which is expected to take place on December 22, 2022, in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the hearing, Judge Diamond is
expected to consider, among other things, the fairness of the
settlement and whether members of the class were adequately
represented by Counsel for the Plaintiffs.

People who own buildings in the United States with CertainTeed
Fiberglass Horizon Shingles and believe they may qualify for a
remedy under this settlement can obtain additional information
about the settlement by reviewing the settlement website at
www.FiberglassHorizonSettlement.com or by calling 1-844-423-3336.

For Further Information:

For CertainTeed:

OR

Robert L. Hickok
Charles J. LaDuca
Leah G. Katz
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP
Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP
4725 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Suite 200
3000 Two Logan Square
Washington, DC 20016
Philadelphia, PA 19103
www.cuneolaw.com
215.981.4547
charles@cuneolaw.com
Robert.hickok@troutman.com
Leah.katz@Troutman.com

For Counsel for the Plaintiffs:

OR

Charles E. Schaffer
Michael A. McShane
Levin Sedran & Berman, LLP
Audet & Partners, LLP
510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
711 Van Ness Ave., Suite 500
Philadelphia, PA 19106
San Francisco, CA 94102
www.lfsblaw.com
www.Audetlaw.com
cschaffer@lfsblaw.com
mmcshane@audetlaw.com [GN]

CHICAGO, IL: Court Dismisses Davis' Class Complaint With Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHANIQUA DAVIS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-04984 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Andrea R. Wood
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss and
dismisses the complaint with prejudice.

Ms. Davis lives in Chicago. She alleges that she left the country
for nine days in December 2016, and that the City caused her car to
be towed, impounded, and scrapped for unpaid traffic ticket debt
during that time.

In this putative class action, Davis asserts claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the City violated her Fifth
Amendment right against takings for public use without just
compensation (Count I) and failed to provide her with proper notice
of the seizure and sale of her car in violation of her Fifth
Amendment due process rights (Count II). She further claims that
the City violated a vehicle disposal notice provision of the
Illinois Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5/4-208 (Count III), and a similar
local notice provision, Section 9-100-120 of the Municipal Code of
Chicago (Count IV). Finally, Davis asserts a federal claim for a
declaratory judgment (Count V), a state-law claim for unjust
enrichment (Count VI), and a state-law claim for trover and
conversion of personal property (Count VII).

The City has moved to dismiss Davis' Complaint.

As alleged, the City tows and impounds tens of thousands of
vehicles every year, often because the owner has multiple unpaid
traffic citations. An owner cannot reclaim an impounded vehicle
without paying all outstanding traffic citations, impoundment fees,
late penalties, and collection fees. When an owner fails to pay the
full amount owed within eighteen days, the City sells the vehicle
for a fraction of its value but does not apply the proceeds of the
sale against the owner's outstanding debt. In 2017, the City
received about $4.6 million from selling unclaimed vehicles.

In December 2016, Davis' vehicle was towed for unpaid ticket debt
pursuant to the City's impoundment program. She received no notice
of this action. She eventually spoke with a City employee who
informed her that her car had been towed and that she would need to
pay $1,200 -- the balance of her outstanding tickets and
immobilization, towing, and storage fees -- to retrieve it. Davis
could not afford to pay that cost; shortly thereafter, when she
called the City again, she learned that her car had been sold and
she could no longer recover it. She was also told that the sale
proceeds would not be applied against her debt and that she could
not retrieve her personal possessions from the car. Her car was
sold for scrap value (around $200), which was far less than it was
worth.

The City contends that Counts I through IV and Count VII are
time-barred by their applicable statutes of limitations and must
therefore be dismissed.

Judge Wood holds that the statute of limitations for Davis' Section
1983 claims (Counts I and II), which is determined by reference to
Illinois state law, is two years. The state-law claims at issue
here (Counts III, IV, and VII), because they are brought under
Illinois state law against an Illinois municipality, have a statute
of limitations of one year. Under Illinois state law, a claim
accrues when a plaintiff learns that she has been injured, even if
she does not know who caused her injury. Davis filed her Complaint
on Aug. 24, 2020; thus, the statute of limitations for her federal
claims reaches back to Aug. 24, 2018, and the statute of
limitations for her state-law claims reaches back to Aug. 24,
2019.

Ms. Davis notes that the one-year statute of limitations for her
state-law claims does not apply to any claim demanding "relief
other than damages." But her argument fails because Counts III, IV,
and VII explicitly seek damages and do not seek injunctive relief.
Thus, they are not claims seeking relief other than damages.
Ultimately, Davis's allegations "unambiguously establish all the
elements" of a statute of limitations defense and dismissal is,
therefore, appropriate. For this reason, Judge Wood does not reach
the merits of the parties' other arguments on these counts.

Counts I, II, III, IV, and VII are dismissed with prejudice.

Ms. Davis' remaining claims do not stand on their own. Count VI
asserts a claim for unjust enrichment under Illinois state law.
Because Davis' other state-law claims are dismissed as time-barred,
the unjust enrichment claim in Count VI must be dismissed as well.
Similarly, the parties agree that Count V, which seeks a
declaratory judgment, is dependent on Davis' other claims. Because
Davis' other claims have been dismissed, Count V must be dismissed
too.

For these reasons, the City's motion to dismiss is granted. Davis'
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/mr3pyaz3 from Leagle.com.


CITIZENS DISABILITY: Appeals Class Certification Order in Thrower
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CITIZENS DISABILITY, LLC is taking an appeal from a court order
granting the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the
lawsuit entitled Gene Thrower, et al., individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Citizens Disability,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-10285-GAO, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts.

The Plaintiffs brought this class action suit against the
Defendants for alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act by sending automated telemarketing text messages to
the Plaintiffs and similarly situated consumers without prior
express written consent.

On April 12, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class.
The Plaintiffs asked the Court to enter an order certifying a class
of: "All persons in the United States who (1) received a text
message call or telephone call by or on behalf of the Defendant,
(2) on his, her, or its cellular telephone, (3) from the last four
years through the date notice is sent to the Class, (4) for the
same purpose as the Defendant (or its agent) placed the text
message or telephone call to the Plaintiffs, (5) using the same
equipment that was used to call or text the Plaintiffs, and (6) for
who the Defendant claims it obtained express consent to place the
text message or telephone call in the same manner that Defendant
contends it obtained express consent to call or text the
Plaintiffs."

On August 30, 2022, Judge George A. O'Toole, Jr. granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Court ruled that
the Plaintiffs have demonstrated superiority and carried their
burden of compliance with Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The merits of their claims shall be decided on a
class-wide basis, ruled the Court.

The appellate case is captioned as Gene Thrower, et al. v. Citizens
Disability, LLC, Case No. 22-8020, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, filed on September 14, 2022. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents GENE THROWER, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

            J. Steven Foley, Esq.
            11 Pleasant St.
            Worcester, MA 01609-0000
            Telephone: (508) 754-1042

                   - and -

            Stephen A. Klein, Esq.
            WOODROW & PELUSO LLC
            3900 East Mexico Ave., Ste. 300
            Denver, CO 80210
            Telephone: (720) 907-4654

                   - and -

            Anthony Paronich, Esq.
            PARONICH LAW PC
            350 Lincoln St., Ste. 2400
            Hingham, MA 02043
            Telephone: (617) 485-0018

                   - and -

            Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
            WOODROW & PELUSO LLC
            3900 East Mexico Ave., Ste. 300
            Denver, CO 80210
            Telephone: (720) 213-0676

Defendant-Petitioner CITIZENS DISABILITY, LLC, is represented by:

            Liam C. Floyd, Esq.
            Richard E. Levine, Esq.
            STANZER LEVINIE, LLC
            37 Walnut St., Suite 2400
            Wellesley, MA 02481
            Telephone: (617) 482-3198

                   - and -

            Jeffrey Mark Rosin, Esq.
            O'HAGAN MEYER
            111 Huntington Ave., Ste. 719
            Boston, MA 02199
            Telephone: (617) 843-6801

                   - and -

            Andrew M. Schneiderman, Esq.
            O'HAGAN MEYER
            111 Huntington Ave., Ste. 719
            Boston, MA 02199
            Telephone: (617) 843-6808

COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY: N.J. Court Grants Bids to Dismiss FCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS CORPORATION
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION. This Document Relates To ALL ACTIONS, Civ.
No. 17-01248 (KM) (CLW) (D.N.J.), Judge Kevin McNulty of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey grants the motions to
dismiss on the basis of an unexcused failure to make a demand on
Cognizant's Board of Directors.

In this consolidated case, shareholders of Cognizant have filed a
derivative action against certain current and former members of the
Board, as well as several current and former executive officers of
the company, for breach of fiduciary duties, corporate waste,
unjust enrichment, and contribution and indemnification.

The Plaintiffs are all Cognizant shareholders. Among the Defendants
are 11 individuals who were members of the Board at the time the
action was commenced, and five individuals who were current or
former executive officers at that time. The Defendant Board members
at the time the action was initiated are Francisco D'Souza, John E.
Klein, Zein Abdalla, Maureen Breakiron-Evans, Jonathan Chadwick,
John N. Fox, Leo S. Mackay, Michael Patsalos-Fox, Robert E.
Weissman, Thomas M. Wendel, and Lakshmi Narayanan (collectively,
the "Director Defendants." The "Officer Defendants", as I refer to
them, are Gordon J. Coburn, Cognizant's president from 2012 to
2016; Steven E. Schwartz, chief legal officer of Cognizant from
2013 to 2016; Karen McLoughlin, chief financial officer since 2012;
Ramakrishnan Chandrasekaran, a vice president since 2013; and
Rajeev Mehta, president from 2016 to 2019, and head of information
technology before that.

Because it operates outside the United States, Cognizant is subject
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("FCPA"), as amended,
15 U.S.C. Sections 78dd-1, et seq. The FCPA prohibits covered
companies from making improper payments such as bribes or kickbacks
to foreign officials to obtain or retain business. It also requires
issuers of U.S. registered securities, like Cognizant, to maintain
internal controls and accounting systems aimed at detecting and
deterring any improper payments made in the issuer's name.

Over the course of several months in late 2016 and early 2017,
Cognizant publicly revealed that a number of its employees,
including members of senior management, had been engaged in a
bribery scheme in India that likely stretched from 2010 to 2015.
The company admitted that approximately $6 million in improper
payments had been made to Indian officials for the purpose of
securing construction-related permits and operating licenses. It
also announced that its then-president, Gordon Coburn, and
then-chief legal officer, Steven Schwartz, had resigned.

In addition to conducting an internal investigation into the
bribery scheme, Cognizant notified the Department of Justice and
also the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which
initiated an investigation into Cognizant's compliance with the
FCPA. In 2019, after having spent over $60 million in investigative
costs, Cognizant was ordered by the SEC to pay $25 million in fines
for violating the FCPA.

Cognizant also was named as a primary defendant in a class-action
lawsuit for violations of the federal securities laws. Separately,
Coburn and Schwartz have been charged with various federal offenses
relating to their participation in the bribery scheme.

The complaint alleges that, in the years leading up to the public
revelation of the bribery scheme, the Board was made aware of
several red flags regarding Cognizant's FCPA compliance. At a
September 2014 meeting of the Board audit committee, director
defendants Klein, Breakiron-Evans, Mackay, and Wendel learned that
a "'weakness' was uncovered in Cognizant's global sub-contracting
management process for hiring individual contract workers in
India." They were further told that "'there is potential to
reevaluate anti-corruption/bribery controls in compliance with FCPA
and UK Bribery Acts.'"

The Plaintiffs allege that despite the Board's knowledge of the
compliance problems, the Defendants failed to timely improve
Cognizant's compliance controls and procedures, or notify
shareholders of the compliance deficiencies. Beyond that, they
assert that "Defendants caused Cognizant to publicly release and
widely disseminate materially false and misleading annual
Sustainability Reports," in which they assured shareholders that
audits of anti-corruption compliance had been conducted and had not
uncovered evidence of corruption.

The 2015 Sustainability Report, published in August 2016, similarly
stated that "there were no incidents of corruption reported in
2015." According to the complaint, the director defendants reviewed
both the 2014 and 2015 Sustainability Reports and approved them for
public release to the shareholders.

In June 2017, the Court consolidated three related shareholder
derivative actions brought on behalf of Cognizant arising out of
the India bribery scheme. In May 2019, it consolidated a fourth
related shareholder derivative action with the prior three. The
result is the above-captioned consolidated case. The Plaintiffs
filed their first amended consolidated complaint in July 2020. None
of the Plaintiffs made a demand on the Board prior to the filing of
the complaint(s).

In February 2020, the Director Defendants, joined by Officer
Defendants McLoughlin, Chandrasekaran, and Mehta, filed a motion to
dismiss the consolidated complaint. On the same day, Officer
Defendants Coburn and Schwartz filed a separate motion to dismiss.

Judge McNulty explains that the Delaware Supreme Court recently
adopted a "refined" three-part test, called the Zuckerberg test,
for courts to apply in analyzing demand futility. Under the
Zuckerberg test, courts should ask the following three questions on
a director-by-director basis when evaluating allegations of demand
futility: (i) whether the director received a material personal
benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the
litigation demand; (ii) whether the director faces a substantial
likelihood of liability on any of the claims that would be the
subject of the litigation demand; and (iii) whether the director
lacks independence from someone who received a material personal
benefit from the alleged misconduct that would be the subject of
the litigation demand or who would face a substantial likelihood of
liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the
litigation demand." "If the answer to any of the questions is `yes'
for at least half of the members of the demand board, then demand
is excused as futile.

Regarding the Plaintiffs' allegations of demand futility, beginning
with the second prong, the complaint appears to focus exclusively
on Count I, which alleges breach of fiduciary duties. The
Plaintiffs argue that the Director Defendants face a substantial
likelihood of liability on this claim. Turning to the third prong,
they argue that three of the Director Defendants lack independence.
They maintain that Director Defendants D'Souza and Weissman cannot
impartially consider a demand to sue Coburn, because they "have
significant business and longtime friendships" with him.

In their opposition to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, however,
the Plaintiffs argue that the facts also excuse a pre-suit demand
on the unjust enrichment, corporate waste, and contribution claims,
as the Director Defendants face a substantial likelihood of
liability on those claims as well.

Judge McNulty considers first the claim for breach of fiduciary
duties. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties of "candor, good faith, and loyalty" but do not
label their theories in any greater detail. However, it appears
from the factual allegations of the complaint, supplemented by the
arguments in the briefs, that the Plaintiffs are pursuing a claim
based on the Board's failure to monitor the company's affairs,
otherwise known as a Caremark claim, as well as a claim based on
bad faith.

Judge McNulty holds that the complaint therefore fails to allege
that demand is excused as to Count I based on the Director
Defendants' substantial likelihood of liability under Caremark.
While the complaint asserts that the Director Defendants "failed to
timely improve Cognizant's compliance controls and procedures,"
such a lapse is not equivalent to completely ignoring known
compliance risks in defiance of one's fiduciary duty. Instead, it
appears that the directors made a "good faith effort to implement
an oversight system and then monitor it," in satisfaction of their
Caremark obligations.

Judge McNulty turns to the Plaintiffs' allegations that the
Director Defendants face a substantial likelihood of liability for
acting in bad faith. The complaint falls short as well, he says.
The complaint fails to plead that the directors face a substantial
likelihood of liability on Count I, as neither a Caremark nor a bad
faith claim has been sufficiently alleged. Demand is therefore not
excused as to Count I.

The Plaintiffs' assertions that demand is excused because the
Director Defendants face a substantial likelihood of liability on
Counts II, III, and IV are likewise rejected. Judge McNulty holds
that the complaint does not plead sufficient facts to support its
allegation of "no consideration," therefore not excused as to Count
II. Next, because he has concluded already that the Director
Defendants do not face a substantial likelihood of liability for
breach of fiduciary duties, Judge McNulty concludes the same with
regard to the claim for unjust enrichment, so demand is therefore
not excused as to Count III. Last, the Plaintiffs bring Counts IV
and V, claims for contribution under state and federal law, only
against defendants Coburn and Schwartz, who are officers. It
follows that the Director Defendants face no possibility of
liability on Counts IV and V, which are not asserted against them.

Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that three of the Director
Defendants lack independence, and that demand is therefore excused
under Zuckerberg's third prong. Assuming arguendo that the
complaint contains particularized facts demonstrating those
directors' lack of independence, a demand on the Board would still
be required. Demand is excused under Zuckerberg only where it is
shown that at least half of the members of the board cannot
impartially consider a request to bring litigation. The board of
Cognizant comprised 11 directors, so a majority would be six.
Hence, even assuming for the sake of argument that three of the
directors were not impartial, Zuckerberg's demand-futility test
would still not be met.

For these reasons, Judge McNulty grants the motions to dismiss all
claims in the complaint, as the complaint fails to plead
particularized facts that establish demand futility, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. A separate order will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4uv6r6et from Leagle.com.


COLUMBUS ELECTRIC: Court Refuses to Approve Walsh Suit Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael H. Watson of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, denies the parties' motion for
preliminary approval of settlement in the lawsuit titled Kevin
Walsh, et al., Plaintiffs v. Columbus, Electric, Inc., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-2857 (S.D. Ohio).

The Plaintiffs assert claims under both the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") and Ohio law for, primarily, unpaid overtime. The
parties move for preliminary approval of settlement.

Judge Watson notes that the settlement appears to be structured
such that any Rule 23(b)(3) class member, who does not opt-out of
the Rule 23(b)(3) class, releases both their FLSA and state-law
claims. Although there appears to be a difference of opinion on the
subject, Judge Watson finds such a settlement antithetical to the
purposes behind FLSA collective actions, which require a plaintiff
to affirmatively opt into the lawsuit by filing a consent to join
form with the Court.

The Court, therefore, denies the parties' motion for approval. The
parties will notify the Court within 14 days whether they wish to
pursue litigation or whether they wish to attempt to negotiate a
settlement that resolves the FLSA claims of only those class
members, who opt into the settlement by filing consent to join
notices with the Court.

Moreover, any future motion for settlement approval will indicate
the total amount of damages the Plaintiffs forecasted based on
discovery and the percentage of recovery that the gross settlement
amount represents. The Court is unable to determine, with the
current information provided, whether the gross $183,680.73
settlement is fair for the Plaintiffs unless it can compare that
recovery to some sort of benchmark.

Finally, the parties will limit any redefined classes to those
employees, who worked over 40 hours in any given workweek, or
explain why such limitation is unnecessary for the claims
asserted.

The Clerk will terminate ECF No. 44.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Sept. 15,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/54n69yz9 from
Leagle.com.


CYRACOM INTERNATIONAL: Heid Sues Over Interpreters' Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Helaine Heid and Ingrid Leeman, individually, and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CyraCom
International, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-01445-MMA-AGS (S.D. Cal.,
Sept. 26, 2022) is brought as a collective action and class action
against the Defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
California Labor Code, and the California Business & Profession
Code.

The suit arises from CyraCom's failure to pay Plaintiffs and other
similarly-situated employees all earned minimum and overtime wages,
failure to provide compliant meal-and-rest periods, failure to pay
all vested vacation, failure to furnish accurate wage statements,
failure to reimburse reasonable and necessary business expenses,
and failure to pay all earned wages due upon separation.

Plaintiff Heid is a full-time employee of CyraCom, who works as an
interpreter from approximately July 15, 2009 through the present.

Plaintiff Leeman was a both a part-time and full-time employee of
CyraCom, who worked as an interpreter from approximately January 1,
2013 through approximately March 12, 2020.

CyraCom International, Inc. provides remote translation and
interpretation services to its clients worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brian S. Kabateck, Esq.
          Shant Karnikian, Esq.
          Jerusalem F. Beligan, Esq.
          KABATECK LLP
          633 W. Fifth Street, Suite 3200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071  
          Telephone: (213) 217-5000
          E-mail: bsk@kbklawyers.com
                  sk@kbklawyers.com
                  jfb@kbklawyers.com  

               - and -

          James L. Simon, Esq.
          SIMON LAW CO.
          5000 Rockside Road Liberty Plaza Suite 520
          Independence, OH 44131
          Telephone: (216) 816-8696
          E-mail: james@simonsayspay.com

               - and -

          Michael L. Fradin, Esq.
          8401 Crawford Ave., Ste. 104
          Skokie, IL 60076
          Telephone: (847) 986-5889
          E-mail: mike@fradinlaw.com

DISCOVERY INC: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due November 22
------------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP on Oct. 3 disclosed that
a federal securities class action lawsuit has been filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against Discovery, Inc. ("Discovery") and Warner Bros. Discovery,
Inc. (NASDAQ: WBD) ("Warner Bros.") and certain of the Company's
senior executives (collectively, "Defendants") on behalf of
investors who:

exchanged Discovery common stock for Warner Bros. common stock
pursuant to Discovery's February 4, 2022 Registration Statement on
Form S-4 and Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 10, 2022, or
purchased shares of Warner Bros. common stock on the open market
traceable to the Prospectus through the date of the filing of the
complaint (the "Class Period"). All investors who purchased the
shares and incurred losses are advised to contact the firm
immediately at classmember@whafh.com or (800) 575-0735 or (212)
545-4774. You may obtain additional information concerning the
action or join the case on our website, www.whafh.com.

If you have incurred losses you may, no later than November 22,
2022, request that the Court appoint you lead plaintiff of the
proposed class. Please contact Wolf Haldenstein to learn more about
your rights.

The filed complaint alleges the Defendants made materially false
and misleading statements and omitted material facts in the
Registration Statement and Prospectus for Warner Bros. common
stock. The complaint's allegations related to the merger between
Discovery and the WarnerMedia business of AT&T (the "Merger"). The
Merger was announced on May 17, 2021 and closed on April 8, 2022.
Pursuant to the Merger, Discovery combined its business with
WarnerMedia to form Warner Bros.

At the time of filing the Registration Statement and Prospectus,
Defendants either knew or had access to adverse information
concerning operations of the WarnerMedia business. Among other
things, as subsequently disclosed by Defendants after the Merger:

   -- WarnerMedia's HBO Max streaming business had a high churn
rate that made the business not "viable" unless the churn rate was
reversed,
    -- AT&T was overinvesting in WarnerMedia entertainment content
for streaming, without sufficient concern for return on
investments,
    -- WarnerMedia had a business model to grow the number of
subscribers to its streaming service without regard to cost or
profitability,
   -- WarnerMedia was improvidently concentrating its investments
in streaming and ignoring its other business lines, and
   -- WarnerMedia had overstated the number of subscribers to HBO
Max by as many as 10 million subscribers, by including as
subscribers AT&T customers who had received bundled access to HBO
Max, but had not signed onto the service. That adverse information
was not disclosed to Discovery shareholders in the Registration
Statement or Prospectus or otherwise prior to the effective date of
the Merger.

From April 11, 2022, the first trading day after completion of the
Merger, to the date prior to filing of the operative complaint,
Warner Bros. market price has declined by 52.4%, to $11.79 per
share.

Wolf Haldenstein has extensive experience in the prosecution of
securities class actions and derivative litigation in state and
federal trial and appellate courts across the country. The firm has
attorneys in various practice areas; and offices in New York,
Chicago and San Diego. The reputation and expertise of this firm in
shareholder and other class litigation has been repeatedly
recognized by the courts, which have appointed it to major
positions in complex securities multi-district and consolidated
litigation.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this case, please immediately contact
Wolf Haldenstein by telephone at (800) 575-0735 or via e-mail at
classmember@whafh.com

Contact:

Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
Patrick Donovan, Esq.
Gregory Stone, Director of Case and Financial Analysis
Email: gstone@whafh.com, donovan@whafh.com or
classmember@whafh.com
Tel: (800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774 [GN]

E-TELEQUOTE INSURANCE: Costa Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
------------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL COSTA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. E-TELEQUOTE INSURANCE, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 8:22-cv-02222-VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla., Sept. 26, 2022) seeks to
secure redress for Defendant's alleged violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant places prerecorded
telephone calls to consumers to tout the benefits of its Medicare
health insurance offerings. However, many consumers, like
Plaintiff, did not provide Defendant with the requisite consent to
receive such calls, which is in violation of the TCPA by Defendant,
says the suit.

Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of
privacy, annoyance and disruption of the daily life of thousands of
individuals nationwide. The Plaintiff also seek statutory damages
on behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies.

E-Telequote Insurance, Inc. is an online insurance agency that
sells Medicare insurance across the U.S.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mohammad Kazerouni, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Ave., Suite D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626  
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: mike@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Ryan L. McBride, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          301 E. Bethany Home Road, Suite C-195
          Phoenix, AZ 85012
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ryan@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Jason A. Ibey, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          321 N. Mall Drive, Suite R108
          St. George, UT 84790
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: jason@kazlg.com

EXECU|SEARCH GROUP: Brain Sues Over Recruiters' Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------------------
KATIE BRAIN, individually and for others similarly situated, v. THE
EXECU|SEARCH GROUP, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-08219 (S.D.N.Y., Sept.
26, 2022) seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages
from the Defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant improperly classified her
and other similarly situated workers as exempt employees and paid
them a salary with no overtime compensation. Ms. Brain and the
workers like her were paid a fixed salary and did not receive
overtime pay for hours that they worked over 40 hours in a workweek
in accordance with the FLSA, asserts the complaint.

Ms. Brain worked for the Defendant as a recruiter from
approximately March 2019 until July 2021.

The Execu|Search Group, LLC provides employment and staffing
solutions for the medical industry throughout the United States,
including in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph A. Fitapelli, Esq.
          Dana M. Cimera, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

F&B ASSOCIATES: Adams et al. File Suit Over Illegal Tip Pooling
---------------------------------------------------------------
EBONY ADAMS, MICHAEL FAGIOLI D MORELLI, JOHN RESH, BRANDON
SHOCKLEY, on behalf of themselves individually and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. F&B ASSOCIATES, INC. dba BEST
BEVERAGE CATERING, SPEEDWAY MOTORSPORTS, LLC dba DOVER
INTERNATIONAL SPEEDWAY, ALL ACES PROMOTION STAFFING, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-01262-UNA (D. Delaware, September 23,
2022) is a collective action complaint brought against the
Defendants for their alleged practice of tip stealing in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as bartenders during
the Fire Fly Music Festivals from September 23-September 26, 2021.

The Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Firefly bartenders, who
worked for the Defendants as customarily tipped employees, claim
that the Defendants forced them to share their tips with managers
and other non-tipped employees. Throughout their employment with
the Defendant, they were not compensated for all the hours they
have worked. In addition, the Defendants failed to keep accurate
records of the tips and revenues at each bar station.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of other
similarly situated bartenders, seek judgment against the Defendants
and request compensation for unpaid wages, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees and costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and
other relief as the Court deems fair and equitable.

The Corporate Defendants operate bars to sell alcoholic beverages
during the Firefly Music Festival from 2019 to the present. F&B
Associates, Inc. dba Best Beverage Catering is in charge of the
hiring, management, and payment of the Plaintiffs during their
employment as bartenders at the Firefly Music Festival. Dover
International Speedway worked with BBC in the hiring, management,
payment of the Plaintiffs. All Aces Promotion Staffing, Inc. is a
nationwide event staffing agency which coordinated employment for
Dover International Speedway and BBC to supply bartenders to the
Firefly Music Festival at all relevant times. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ronald G. Poliquin, Esq.
          THE POLIQUIN FIRM, LLC
          1475 S. Governors Ave.
          Dover, DE 19904
          Tel: (302) 702-5001

FARADAY FUTURE: Howard Sues Over Merger's Impact on Stockholders
----------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM HOWARD CLEVELAND, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FARADAY FUTURE INTELLIGENT
ELECTRIC INC. f/k/a PROPERTY SOLUTIONS ACQUISITION CORP.; PROPERTY
SOLUTIONS ACQUISITION SPONSOR, LLC, JORDAN VOGEL, AARON FELDMAN,
DAVID AMSTERDAM, AVI SAVAR, EDUARDO ABUSH, RIVERSIDE MANAGEMENT
GROUP, LLC, DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., LATHAM & WATKINS LLP,
and FF TOP HOLDING LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2022-0845-LWW (Del.
Ch., September 21, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants
for breach of Article Sixth of PSAC's Certificate of Incorporation,
breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, and civil
conspiracy.

The case arises from the merger of Property Solutions Acquisition
Corp. (PSAC), now known as Faraday Future Intelligent Electric Inc.
(FFIE), with FF Intelligent Mobility Global Holdings Ltd., which
allegedly violated and breached Article Sixth of PSAC's Certificate
of Incorporation. The Plaintiff and similarly situated PSAC
stockholders assert a violation of their right under Article Sixth
because the fair market value of the interest of PSAC's public
stockholders in FFIE after the business combination was less than
80 percent of the funds in PSAC's Trust Account. The complaint also
alleges a breach of fiduciary duty by Property Solutions
Acquisition Sponsor, LLC and directors of PSAC, aided and abetted
by PSAC's acquisition partner and advisor, Riverside Management
Group, LLC and other PSAC advisors and FF Top Holding LLC, which
became FFIE's largest stockholder by means of the business
combination.

Faraday Future Intelligent Electric Inc., formerly known as
Property Solutions Acquisition Corp., is a start-up technology
company, headquartered in Los Angeles, California.

Property Solutions Acquisition Sponsor, LLC is a limited liability
company based in New York.

Riverside Management Group, LLC is a capital market company based
in Massachusetts.

Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. is a financial services firm in New
York, New York.

Latham & Watkins LLP is a law firm, headquartered in Los Angeles,
California.

FF Top Holding LLC is a holding company based in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Michael Hanrahan, Esq.
         Corinne Elise Amato, Esq.
         Kevin H. Davenport, Esq.
         Eric J. Juray, Esq.
         PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A.
         1310 N. King Street
         Wilmington, DE 19801
         Telephone: (302) 888-6500

                 - and -

         Eric L. Zagar, Esq.
         Kevin E.T. Cunningham, Jr., Esq.
         Karen Kam, Esq.
         KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
         280 King of Prussia Road
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: (610) 667-7706

FERGUSON ENTERPRISES: Mismanages Retirement Plans, Bozzini Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
TERA BOZZINI; and ADRIAN GONZALES, individually and on behalf of
the FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, LLC, 401(K) RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN f/k/a
FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, INC, 401(K) RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN,
Plaintiffs v. FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, LLC, f/k/a FERGUSON
ENTERPRISES, INC.; RETIREMENT PLAN COMMITTEE OF FERGUSON
ENTERPRISES, LLC 401(K) RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN; WILLIAM BRUNDAGE;
RICHARD WINCKLER; CAPFINANCIAL PARTNERS, LLC, d/b/a CAPTRUST
FINANCIAL ADVISORS; AND DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No. Case
3:22-cv-05667 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 30, 2022) alleges violation of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the Defendants made a
large plan filling of 401(k) plan with expensive funds when
identical, cheaper funds were available, and overpaying covered
service providers, when the Plan had more than sufficient
bargaining power to demand low-cost investment management services
and well-performing investment funds.

The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties of prudence and
loyalty to the Plan by: a. offering and maintaining higher cost
share classes when identical lower cost class shares were available
and could have been offered to participants; b. overpaying for
covered service providers by paying variable direct compensation
fees through the trust, which exceeded costs incurred by plans of
similar size with similar services; c. imprudently choosing and
retaining expensive mutual funds while less expensive index funds
were available and could have been offered to participants; d.
other breaches of fiduciary duties, says the suit.

The Plaintiffs were injured by the Defendants' lack of loyalty,
imprudent skill and flawed processes in breach of their fiduciary
duties. As a result of the Defendants' actions, participants paid
additional unnecessary operating expenses with no value to the
participants and resulting in a loss of compounded returns, the
suit added.

FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, LLC wholesales and distributes plumbing
equipment. The Company provides waterworks and fire protection
products, industrial pipes, valves, and fitting products. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James A. Clark, Esq.
          Renee P. Ortega, Esq.
          TOWER LEGAL GROUP, P.C.
          11335 Gold Express Drive, Ste. 105
          Gold River, CA 95670
          Telephone: (916) 361-6009
          Facsimile: (916) 361-6019
          Email: james.clark@towerlegalgroup.com
                 renee.ortega@towerlegalgroup.com

               - and -

          Paul Sharman, Esq.
          THE SHARMAN LAW FIRM
          11175 Cicero Drive, Suite 100
          Alpharetta, GA 30022
          Telephone: (678) 242-5297
          Facsimile: (678) 802-2129
          Email: paul@sharman-law.com

FERGUSON, MO: Bid to Exclude Testimonies of Vail and Wilkes Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs v. CITY OF FERGUSON,
MISSOURI, Defendant, Case No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF (E.D. Mo.), Judge
Audrey G. Fleissig of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, enters a Memorandum and
Order ruling on the parties' motions to exclude from evidence at
trial the opinions, testimony, and reports of the other's experts.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class-action complaint under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that their federal constitutional
rights were violated by the City policies and practices of jailing
individuals in inhumane conditions when these individuals could not
pay bonds or other fines or fees, without inquiring into their
ability to pay or considering alternatives to detention, without a
neutral determination of probable cause to justify their continued
confinement (in the case of warrantless arrests) or a first
appearance before a judge (in the case of arrests on warrants), and
without affording them counsel. The Court has certified five
damages classes and one class seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.

Both sides seek to present expert opinion testimony regarding
liability and damages as they relate to the Plaintiffs' classwide
claims. And both sides have now moved to exclude from evidence at
trial the opinions, testimony, and reports of the other's experts.

Stephen Demuth is a professor of sociology whose research has
focused primarily on quantitative data analysis related to the
influences of race, gender, and social class on decisions and
outcomes at the pretrial and sentencing stages of the criminal
justice process. He was retained by the Plaintiffs' counsel to
analyze arrest records produced by the City in order to opine
regarding the number and length of detention of arrestees in each
proposed class.

In its motion to exclude Demuth's opinions, the City argues that
Demuth is unqualified to render his opinions because he admittedly
has never served as a damages expert or prepared a damages
methodology. The City further asserts that Demuth's opinions should
be excluded because they rely in part on Excel spreadsheets created
with the assistance of the Plaintiffs' counsel. Next, the City
asserts that Demuth's rebuttal report goes beyond merely responding
to Beach's report and instead improperly expands Demuth's initial
opinions. Finally, the City argues that Demuth's opinions should be
excluded to the extent they comment on the race of class members,
as race is irrelevant to any issue in the case.

The Plaintiffs have also retained Eldon Vail, a former correctional
administrator, to opine on whether the City's policies and
practices conform to national correctional standards and whether
they created a substantial risk of harm to detainees. Vail based
his opinions on his review of discovery, including the transcripts
of depositions of the named Plaintiffs and jail employees; a March
4, 2015 Department of Justice ("DOJ") report investigating the
City's police department; and his extensive experience in
corrections.

Vail specifically opined regarding the City's policies and
practices as they relate to sanitation, hygiene, food service,
medical care, and use of force, comparing these to specific
standards set forth by the American Correctional Association
("ACA") and other national and state correctional standards. He
concluded that the City's policies and practices as they relate to
each of the above-noted areas failed to comply with national
standards and otherwise subjected detainees to risk of significant
harm.

In its motion to exclude Vail's opinions, the City argues that
Vail's opinions lack sufficient evidentiary support because Vail
did not consider the testimony of all of the City's witnesses, Vail
did not visit the City's jail, and the evidence that Vail did rely
upon did not support his opinions. The City further argues that
Vail's opinions are unhelpful, as the jury is capable of
determining what jail conditions existed during the relevant time.
Next, the City argues that Vail is not qualified to offer opinions
on the substantial risk of harm to detainees. Finally, the City
argues that Vail improperly attempts to equate industry standards
with constitutionality and that Vail's rebuttal report cannot cure
the above-noted deficiencies in his original report.

Colin Gordon is a professor of history with extensive education and
experience in public policy, political economy, and economic
development. He was retained by Plaintiffs to opine regarding the
economic, racial, and social history of the St. Louis region and
the City in particular, in order to assess and explain the economic
circumstances leading the City to implement (according to Gordon
and Plaintiffs) the revenue-generating policies that resulted in
the jailing of class members.

The City moves to exclude Gordon's opinions on the grounds that
they are irrelevant, unhelpful, unreliable, and would confuse the
jury. It further argues that Gordon attempts to opine on its
officials' intent and on the credibility of its witnesses, which
are not proper subjects of expert testimony. Finally, the City
argues that Gordon's opinions are unreliable because his report
cites articles written by the Plaintiffs' counsel, ArchCity
Defenders; relies on only portions of the discovery cherry picked
by the Plaintiffs; and otherwise fails to find support in the
sources cited.

Justin Marlowe is a professor of public policy with a research
focus on local government financial management. He was retained by
the Plaintiffs to evaluate the City's fiscal policies in place from
2008 to 2018, including how those policies compare to other
similarly sized municipalities in the state; whether the City
engaged in a policy of maximizing revenues; how police enforcement
and collection of fines and fees affected the City's financial
policies; and the City's incentive to continue a policy of revenue
maximization after that policy began.

The City's motion to exclude Marlowe's opinions largely mirrors its
motion to exclude Gordon's opinions. Specifically, the City argues
that Marlowe's opinions impermissibly purport to speak to the
intent or motive of the City to use its municipal court to increase
revenue. Next, the City argues that Marlowe's opinions are
unreliable because his chosen methodology to select municipalities
for comparison to the City is based solely on population size
rather than other relevant factors. Further, it argues that
Marlowe's supplemental report, which addressed the later-taken
deposition testimony of the City's former finance director, suffers
from the same deficiencies as Marlowe's original report. Finally,
the City contends that Marlowe's report includes irrelevant
references to race.

Douglas Beach is a retired circuit court judge of the 21st Judicial
Circuit, which covers St. Louis County, and a former city attorney
for the city of Chesterfield, Missouri. From Jan. 1, 2017 to Sept.
20, 2018, Beach served as the presiding judge for the 21st Judicial
Circuit, and in that role, he helped implement the new Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 37.04, which gave him and other presiding judges
of the Missouri circuit courts a more active role in supervising
the municipal divisions of the circuit courts, including the
Ferguson Municipal Court.

The City retained Beach to provide historical perspective regarding
the Missouri municipal court system, particularly with respect to
municipal court reform that has taken place since mid-2015 as a
result of changes to state statutes and court rules. Beach opined
that the Ferguson Municipal Court is a division of the state court
system and a separate entity than the City; that the City has no
authority over the municipal court; and that the municipal court's
practices over the relevant period were governed by and complied
with then-existing state law.

The Plaintiffs move to exclude Beach's opinions as irrelevant and
unreliable because the opinions concern state law rather than
federal law and are in any event factually incorrect. Further, they
argue that Beach's opinions are unsupported by the facts because
they are based solely on the testimony of the former judge of the
Ferguson Municipal Court, which testimony (according to Plaintiffs)
did not support Beach's conclusions. Relatedly, they argue that by
relying solely on the former municipal court judge's testimony,
Beach implicitly opined on the credibility of a defense witness,
which Plaintiffs assert is not the proper subject of expert
testimony. Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that Beach failed to apply
reliable methodologies because he attempted to opine on matters of
(state) law without the support of legal research and that such
legal conclusions are in any event not the proper subject of expert
testimony.

The City has also retained Tony Wilkes, a former correctional
administrator and ACA training consultant, to opine regarding
whether ACA standards in fact applied to the City's jail during the
relevant time period; and whether the City's policies and practices
with respect to sanitation, hygiene, food service, medical care,
and use of force complied with accepted corrections industry
practice.

In their motion to exclude Wilkes's opinions, the Plaintiffs argue
that Wilkes is unqualified to render his opinions because his
experience in corrections is limited to a single correctional
system that is not the system at issue in this and because he has
never served as an expert witness. Next, they argue that Wilkes's
opinions are unhelpful because they do not have a sufficient
factual basis and are based on cherrypicked portions of the
discovery. Likewise, the Plaintiffs contend that Wilkes failed to
reliably or consistently apply any applicable set of industry
standards. Finally, they argue that Wilkes's opinions should be
excluded to the extent that they constitute conclusions of law or
opine on the credibility of witnesses.

Judge Fleissig denied the City's motion to exclude Demuth based on
the counsel's involvement in creation of the underlying Excel
spreadsheets. However, to the extent that Demuth seeks to opine
regarding the racial characteristics of arrestees, she agrees with
the City that such opinions are irrelevant to the Plaintiffs'
claims, which do not allege any cause of action dependent upon
race. Therefore, she grants the City's motion to exclude Demuth's
opinions in part, solely to the extent that his opinions relate to
the race of arrestees.

Judge Fleissig has carefully reviewed Vail's report and deposition
testimony, in which Vail makes clear that he is not opining on
whether constitutional (as opposed to industry) standards were
violated. She concludes that Vail does not in fact opine regarding
the City's compliance with constitutional standards and does not
attempt to equate industry standards with constitutional standards,
as the City argues. Therefore, Vail's opinions are not subject to
exclusion on this ground. Finally, she concludes that Vail's
rebuttal report is appropriately limited to rebutting the opinions
of the City's jail conditions expert, Wilkes, and does not
improperly expand Vail's original opinions. For these reasons, she
denies the City's motion to exclude Vail's testimony.

Next, Judge Fleissig agrees with the City that much of Gordon's
report and testimony would be unhelpful to the jury. Specifically,
Gordon's extensive discussion of the history of racial segregation
and racial discrimination in the greater St. Louis area is, as
noted above, marginally, if at all, relevant to any issue in the
case. She concludes that the historical context will help put into
perspective the Plaintiffs' other evidence and arguments that the
City had a policy and practice of using its municipal court and
jail as a significant source of revenue, which is the basis for
Plaintiffs' assertion of municipal liability under Section 1983.

The Court draws a similar line with respect to Marlowe's testimony.
Marlowe's report is primarily limited to describing the City's
finances and fiscal policies. Judge Fleissig concludes that much of
Marlowe's opinions will help the jury synthesize the voluminous
financial data in the case and help put into perspective the
Plaintiffs' other evidence and arguments that the City had a policy
and practice of using its municipal court and jail as a significant
source of revenue. She further concludes that Marlowe is well
qualified to offer such testimony by virtue of his education and
experience. For these reasons, the City's motion to exclude Marlowe
is denied except to the extent noted.

Judge Fleissig concludes that Beach is well qualified to provide
such a historical context and that his testimony would help
synthesize and put into context the City's other evidence and
arguments that it was not the moving force behind the
constitutional violations at issue. She agrees with the Plaintiffs
that Beach's opinions regarding the Ferguson Municipal Court's
compliance with state law are irrelevant, which alleges only
federal constitutional violations. Even if such opinions were
marginally relevant, the Court would exclude them under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 because the probative value of such opinions
is substantially outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues.

Wilkes is also well qualified to offer these opinions not only
because of his experience in corrections but also because of his
specific involvement in the ACA itself, including as an ACA
training consultant, which experience bears a close relationship
with his opinions. Finally, Judge Fleissig has carefully reviewed
Wilkes's report and concludes that Wilkes has not attempted to
opine as to whether constitutional or legal (as opposed to
industry) standards were violated; and has not attempted to draw
legal conclusions or opine on any witness's credibility. For these
reasons, she denies the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Wilkes's
testimony.

For the reasons set forth, the Defendant's motion to disqualify and
exclude the report and testimony of Demuth is granted in part and
denied in part as set forth. Demuth's report and testimony will be
excluded only to the extent that they relate to the race of
arrestees.

The Defendant's motion to disqualify and exclude the report and
testimony of Vail is denied.

The Defendant's motion to disqualify and exclude the report and
testimony of Gordon is granted in part and denied in part, as set
forth above. Gordon's report and testimony will be excluded except
to the extent that they provide fact-based historical context
regarding the City's alleged fiscal crisis, subject to
reconsideration if drawing this distinction proves to be
impracticable.

The Defendant's motion to disqualify and exclude the report and
testimony of Marlowe is granted in part and denied in part.
Marlowe's report and testimony will be excluded only to the extent
that they extend beyond fact-based testimony in order to opine
whether the City's fiscal policies actually motivated its municipal
court practices, subject to reconsideration if drawing this
distinction proves to be impracticable.

The Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify and exclude the testimony of
Beach is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth. Beach's
report and testimony will be excluded except to the extent that
they provide fact-based historical context as to the overall
structure of the Missouri municipal court system, the entity or
entities with general administrative authority over that court
system, and the changes to the Ferguson Municipal Court practices
over time, subject to reconsideration if these topics become
irrelevant due to pretrial rulings.

The Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify and exclude the testimony of
Tony Wilkes is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc3jah87 from Leagle.com.


FOUNDATIONS HEALTH: Underpays Practical Nurses, Durbin Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
HELEN DURBIN, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. FOUNDATIONS HEALTH SOLUTIONS, LLC and FOUNDATIONS
HEALTH, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-01719-JG (N.D. Ohio,
Sept. 26, 2022) is a class action for Defendants' collective
failure to pay employees overtime wages, seeking all available
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio Wage Act, and
the Ohio Prompt Pay Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the FLSA by failing
to compensate her and class members at one-and-one-half times their
regular rates of pay for all hours worked over 40 hours in a
workweek. She further asserts that Defendants also violated the
FLSA by failing to maintain and preserve payroll or other records
containing, among other things, the hours worked each workday and
the total hours worked each workweek.

Named Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from approximately
2016 until approximately April 2022 as a licensed practical nurse.

Foundations Health Solutions, LLC is a long-term care company
specialized in physical therapy, skilled nursing and hospice care
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          Adam C. Gedling, Esq.
          Kelsie N. Hendren, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd Suite #126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  agedling@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  khendren@mcoffmanlegal.com

GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Bovberg Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
KENNETH BOVBERG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT SECURITY; BEN BARBOSA;
and DOES 1-50 inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 22STCV32022 (Cal.
Super., Los Angeles Cty, Oct. 1, 2022) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation,
authorize and permit meal and rest periods, and provide accurate
wage statements.

Plaintiff Bovberg was employed by the Defendant as security guard.

GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT SECURITY is a security and investigations
company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David G. Spivak, Esq.
          Caroline Tahmassian, Esq.
          Christina Prejean, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          8605 Santa Monica Blvd., PMB 42554
          West Hollywood, CA 90069
          Telephone: (213) 725-9094
          Facsimile: (213) 634-2485
          Email: david@spivaklaw.com
                 caroline@spivaklaw.com
                 christina@spivaklaw.com

GRANTS PASS, OR: Permanent Injunction in Johnson Suit Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GLORIA JOHNSON; JOHN LOGAN, individuals, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees
v. CITY OF GRANTS PASS, Defendant-Appellant, Case Nos. 20-35752,
20-35881 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirms in part and vacates in part the permanent
injunction issued by the district court prohibiting enforcement
against the class members of some City ordinances, at certain
times, in certain places.

The City of Grants Pass in southern Oregon has a population of
approximately 38,000. At least 50, and perhaps as many as 600,
homeless persons live in the City. And the number of homeless
persons outnumber the available shelter beds. In other words,
homeless persons have nowhere to shelter and sleep in the City
other than on the streets or in parks. Nonetheless, City ordinances
preclude homeless persons from using a blanket, a pillow, or a
cardboard box for protection from the elements while sleeping
within the City's limits. The ordinances result in civil fines up
to several hundred dollars per violation and persons found to
violate ordinances multiple times can be barred from all City
property. And if a homeless person is found on City property after
receiving an exclusion order, they are subject to criminal
prosecution for trespass.

In September 2018, a three-judge panel issued Martin v. City of
Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), holding "the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting,
sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless
individuals who cannot obtain shelter." Approximately six weeks
after the initial Martin panel opinion, three homeless individuals
filed a putative class action complaint against the City arguing a
number of City ordinances were unconstitutional.

In October 2018, approximately six weeks after the Martin opinion,
Debra Blake filed her putative class action complaint against the
City. The complaint alleged enforcement of the City's anti-sleeping
and anti-camping ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint was amended to include
additional named plaintiffs and to allege a claim that the fines
imposed under the ordinances violated the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.

On Jan. 2, 2019, a few months after the initial complaint was
filed, and before the Plaintiffs filed their class certification
motion, the City amended its anti-camping ordinance in an attempt
to come into compliance with Martin. Prior to this change, the
anti-camping ordinance was worded such that "'sleeping' in parks
automatically constituted 'camping.'" According to the City, "in
direct response to Martin v. Boise, the City amended the
anti-camping ordinance to make it clear that the act of 'sleeping'
was to be distinguished from the prohibited conduct of 'camping.'"
The City meant to "make it clear that those without shelter could
engage in the involuntary acts of sleeping or resting in the City's
parks."

Shortly after the City removed "sleeping" from the "camping"
definition, the Plaintiffs moved to certify a class. They requested
certification of a class defined as "All involuntarily homeless
individuals living in Grants Pass, Oregon, including homeless
individuals who sometimes sleep outside city limits to avoid
harassment and punishment by the City as addressed in this
lawsuit."

The Plaintiffs' class certification motion was accompanied by a
declaration from the Chief Operating Officer and Director of
Housing and Homeless Services for United Community Action Network
("UCAN"), a non-profit organization that serves homeless people in
Josephine County, the county where the City is located. UCAN had
recently conducted a "point-in-time count of homeless individuals
in Josephine County." Based on that count, the Chief Operating
Officer's declaration stated "hundreds of homeless people live in
Grants Pass," and "almost all of the homeless people in Grants Pass
are involuntarily homeless. There is simply no place in Grants Pass
for them to find affordable housing or shelter. They are not
choosing to live on the street or in the woods."

The City opposed class certification, arguing the Plaintiffs had
not provided sufficient evidence to meet any of the requirements
for certifying a class. The district court disagreed and certified
the class proposed by the Plaintiffs. The parties proceeded with
discovery and filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

At the time the parties filed their summary judgment motions, there
were only four locations in the City that temporarily housed
homeless persons, which proved inadequate. One location was run by
the Gospel Rescue Mission, an explicitly religious organization
devoted to helping the poor. The Gospel Rescue Mission operated a
facility for single men without children, and another facility for
women, including women with children. These two facilities required
residents to work at the mission six hours a day, six days a week
in exchange for a bunk for 30 days. Residents were required to
attend an approved place of worship each Sunday and that place of
worship had to espouse "traditional Christian teachings such as the
Apostles Creed." Disabled persons with chronic medical or mental
health issues that prevented them from complying with the Mission's
rules were prohibited.

In addition to the Gospel Rescue Mission, the City itself operated
a "sobering center" where law enforcement could transport
intoxicated or impaired persons. That facility consisted of 12
locked rooms with toilets where intoxicated individuals could sober
up. The rooms did not have beds. The City also provided financial
support to the Hearts with a Mission Youth Shelter, an 18-bed
facility where unaccompanied minors aged 10 to 17 could stay for up
to 72 hours, and could stay even longer if they had parental
consent.

Finally, on nights when the temperature was below 30 degrees (or
below 32 degrees with snow), UCAN operated a "warming center"
capable of holding up to 40 individuals. That center did not
provide beds. The center reached capacity on every night it
operated except the first night it opened, Feb. 3, 2020. Between
February 3 and March 19, 2020, the warming center was open for 16
nights. The center did not open at all during the winter of
2020-2021.

Presented with evidence of the number of homeless persons and the
shelter spaces available, the district court concluded "the record
is undisputed that Grants Pass has far more homeless individuals
than it has practically available shelter beds." It then held that,
based on the unavailability of shelter beds, the City's enforcement
of its anti-camping and anti-sleeping ordinances violated the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause. The fact that Martin involved
criminal violations while the present case involved initial civil
violations that matured into criminal violations made "no
difference for Eight Amendment purposes." Next, the court held the
system of fines violated the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause. Finally, it held the appeals process for park exclusions
violated procedural due process under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

In reaching its decision the district court was careful to point
out that, consistent with Martin, the scope of its decision was
limited. The court's order made clear that the City was not
required to provide shelter for homeless persons and the City could
still limit camping or sleeping at certain times and in certain
places. The district court also noted the City may still "ban the
use of tents in public parks," "limiy the amount of bedding type
materials allowed per individual," and pursue other options "to
prevent the erection of encampments that cause public health and
safety concerns."

Approximately one month after the summary judgment order, the
district court issued a judgment which included a permanent
injunction that provided a complicated mix of relief. First, the
district court declared the ordinance regarding the appeals of park
exclusions failed to provide "adequate procedural due process," but
that ordinance was not permanently enjoined. Instead, the district
court enjoined only the enforcement of the underlying park
exclusion ordinance. Next, it declared enforcement of the
anti-sleeping and anti-camping ordinances against class members
"violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment" and "violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against excessive fines."

Without explanation, however, the district court did not enjoin
those ordinances in their entirety. Rather, the district court
entered no injunctive relief regarding the anti-sleeping ordinance.
But it permanently enjoined enforcement of the anti-camping
ordinances, as well as an ordinance regarding "criminal trespassing
on city property related to parks," in all City parks at night
except for one park where the parties agreed the injunction need
not apply. It also permanently enjoined enforcement of the
anti-camping ordinances during daytime hours unless an initial
warning was given "at least 24 hours before enforcement."
Accordingly, under the permanent injunction, the anti-camping
ordinances may be enforced under some circumstances during the day,
but never at night.

The City appealed and sought initial en banc review to clarify the
scope of Martin. The petition for initial hearing en banc was
denied.

The City now appeals, arguing the case is moot, the class should
not have been certified, the claims fail on the merits, and the
Plaintiffs did not adequately plead one of their theories. On the
material aspects of the case, the district court was right.  
The core issue involving enforcement of the anti-camping ordinances
is governed in large part by Martin. While there are some
differences between Martin and the present case, the City has not
identified a persuasive way to differentiate its anti-camping
ordinances from the questioned ordinances in Martin. Therefore, the
district court's ruling that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause bars enforcement of the anti-camping ordinances will be
mostly affirmed. The Ninth Circuit need not address the potential
excessiveness of the fines issue or whether the Plaintiffs
adequately pled their due process challenge.

The Ninth Circuit's analysis proceeds in five parts. First, it
rejects the City's argument that the district court lacked
jurisdiction. It holds that the surviving class representatives at
a minimum have standing to challenge every ordinance except the
anti-sleeping ordinance. As to the anti-sleeping ordinance, it
vacates summary judgment and remands for the district court to
consider in the first instance whether an adequate class
representative, such as class member Dolores Nevin, exists who may
be substituted.

Second, the Ninth Circuit finds no abuse of discretion in the
district court's certification of a class of involuntarily homeless
persons. The City does not present any other arguments regarding
class certification, such as the propriety of certifying the class
as an injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2). The Ninth Circuit does
not make arguments for parties and the arguments raised by the City
regarding class certification fail.

Third, the Ninth Circuit agrees with the district court that at
least portions of the anti-camping ordinance violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment clause under Martin. Its holding that the City's
interpretation of the anti-camping ordinances is counter to Martin
is not to be interpreted to hold that the anti-camping ordinances
were properly enjoined in their entirety. Beyond prohibiting
bedding, the ordinances also prohibit the use of stoves or fires,
as well as the erection of any structures. The record has not
established the fire, stove, and structure prohibitions deprive
homeless persons of sleep or "the most rudimentary precautions"
against the elements. Moreover, the record does not explain the
City's interest in these prohibitions. Consistent with Martin,
these prohibitions may or may not be permissible. On remand, the
district court will be required to craft a narrower injunction
recognizing the Plaintiffs' limited right to protection against the
elements, as well as limitations when a shelter bed is available.

Fourth, the Ninth Circuit concludes there is no need to resolve
whether the fines violate the Excessive Fines clause. The City
presents no meaningful argument on appeal regarding the excessive
fines issue. As for the Plaintiffs, they argue the fines at issue
were properly deemed excessive because they were imposed for
"engaging in involuntary, unavoidable life sustaining acts." The
permanent injunction will result in no class member being fined for
engaging in such protected activity. Because no fines will be
imposed for protected activity, there is no need for the Ninth
Circuit to address whether hypothetical fines would be excessive.

Fifth, the Ninth Circuit holds it is unnecessary to decide the
Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim. The final issue is
whether the Plaintiffs properly pled their challenge to the park
exclusion appeals ordinance. That ordinance provided a mechanism
whereby an individual who received an exclusion order could appeal
to the City Council. Subsequent to the district court's order, the
City amended its park exclusion appeals ordinance. Therefore, the
district court's determination the previous ordinance violated the
Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights has no prospective
relevance. Because of this, the Ninth Circuit need not decide if
the Plaintiffs adequately pled their challenge to the previous
ordinance.

In light of the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit affirms the district
court's ruling that the City of Grants Pass cannot, consistent with
the Eighth Amendment, enforce its anti-camping ordinances against
homeless persons for the mere act of sleeping outside with
rudimentary protection from the elements, or for sleeping in their
car at night, when there is no other place in the City for them to
go. On remand, however, the district court must narrow its
injunction to enjoin only those portions of the anti-camping
ordinances that prohibit conduct protected by Martin and the Ninth
Circuit's opinion. In particular, the district court should narrow
its injunction to the anti-camping ordinances and enjoin
enforcement of those ordinances only against involuntarily homeless
person for engaging in conduct necessary to protect themselves from
the elements when there is no shelter space available. Finally, the
district court on remand should consider whether there is an
adequate representative who may be substituted for Debra Blake.

The Ninth Circuit is careful to note that, as in Martin, its
decision is narrow. As in Martin, it holds simply that it is
"unconstitutional to punish simply sleeping somewhere in public if
one has nowhere else to do so." Its decision reaches beyond Martin
slightly. It holds, where Martin did not, that class certification
is not categorically impermissible in cases such as this, that
"sleeping" in the context of Martin includes sleeping with
rudimentary forms of protection from the elements, and that Martin
applies to civil citations where, as here, the civil and criminal
punishments are closely intertwined. Its decision does not address
a regime of purely civil infractions, nor does it prohibit the City
from attempting other solutions to the homelessness issue.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirms in part, vacates in part and
remands.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 28, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ye82ph7r from Leagle.com.

Aaron P. Hisel (argued), Law Offices of Montoya Hisel and
Associates, Salem, Oregon; Gerald L. Warren, Law Office of Gerald
L. Warren, Salem, Oregon, for the Defendant-Appellant.

Edward Johnson (argued) and Walter Fonseca, Oregon Law Center,
Portland, Oregon, for the Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Eric S. Tars, National Homelessness Law Center, Washington, D.C.;
Tamar Ezer, Acting Director; David Berris, Joe Candelaria, and Lily
Fontenot, Legal Interns; David Stuzin, Student Fellow; University
of Miami School of Law, Human Rights Clinic, Coral Gables, Florida;
Leilani Farha, Former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Adequate Housing and Global Director, The Shift
#Right2Housing, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada; for Amici Curiae
University of Miami School of Law, Human Rights Clinic and National
Homelessness Law Center.

Kelsi B. Corkran and Seth Wayne, Institute for Constitutional
Advocacy & Protection, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Fines
and Fees Justice Center.

John He, Leslie Bailey, and Brian Hardingham, Public Justice,
Oakland, California; John Thomas H. Do, ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, San Francisco, California; for Amici Curiae Public
Justice, ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of Southern California,
ACLU of Oregon, Institute for Justice, National Center for Law and
Economic Justice, and Rutherford Institute.

Nicolle Jacoby -- nicolle.jacoby@dechert.com -- Dechert LLP, New
York, New York; Tristia M. Bauman -- info@homelesslaw.org --
National Homelessness Law Center, Washington, D.C.; for Amici
Curiae National Homelessness Law Center, Homeless Rights Advocacy
Project at the Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at Seattle
University School of Law, and National Coalition for the Homeless.


GREATBANC TRUST: Beville Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
------------------------------------------------------------
LAWRENCE BEVILLE, Aryne Randall, and Scott Kuhn, on behalf of the
Wells Fargo & Company 401(k) Plan and a class of similarly situated
participants of the Plan, Plaintiffs v. GREATBANC TRUST COMPANY,
Wells Fargo & Co., Timothy J. Sloan, and the Employee Benefit
Review Committee, and its members during the proposed class period,
including Hope Hardison, Justin Thornton, and Jane and John Does
1–20, Defendants, Case No. 0:22-cv-02354 (D. Minn., Sept. 26,
2022) is a class action against the Defendants for breach of
fiduciary duties and prohibited transactions under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

The suit is about corporate self-dealing at the expense of the
retirement savings of company employees including Plaintiffs. All
Defendants are fiduciaries of the Wells Fargo & Company 401(k)
Plan, required by ERISA to act prudently and solely in the interest
of the Plan's participants.

According to the complaint, over the course of many years,
Defendants caused the Plan to pay more than fair market value when
acquiring Wells Fargo preferred stock for the employee stock
ownership plan portion of the Plan. Each year, going back to at
least 2007, up to and including 2018, the Plan acquired Preferred
Stock financed by a loan from Wells Fargo. For example, in 2018 the
Plan acquired 1,100,000 shares of Preferred Stock with a stated
value of $1,039.00 a share, for a total value of $1,142,900,000.
The Defendants knew Wells Fargo was diverting dividend income from
the Plan and therefore caused the Plan to pay more than fair market
value each time it acquired Preferred Stock because the fair market
value agreed to by GreatBanc, Wells Fargo, and Sloan included a
future stream of dividend payments which they knew would not be
received by the Plan or used for the benefit of the participants
and beneficiaries, but instead would be diverted to defray Well
Fargo's obligation to make matching contributions to the Plan, says
the suit.

Wells Fargo, with the knowledge and consent of the other
Defendants, converted Plan assets for its own use in blatant
violation of ERISA's prohibited transaction provisions. This was
theft of participants' retirement savings, an important part of
their compensation package, the suit asserts.

Greatbanc Trust Company acts as a discretionary trustee to the Plan
with respect to the ESOP components of the Plan, including the
Plan's purchase or sale of Preferred Stock.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Paul J. Lukas, Esq.
          Steven Andrew Smith, Esq.
          Brock J. Specht, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          80 South 8th St., Suite 4700
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          Facsimile: (612) 338-4878
          E-mail: lukas@nka.com
                  smith@nka.com
                  bspecht@nka.com

               - and -

          Gregory Y. Porter, Esq.
          Mark G. Boyko, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          1054 31st Street, NW, Suite 230
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 463-2101
          Facsimile: (202) 463-2103
          E-mail: gporter@baileyglasser.com
                  mboyko@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Nina Wasow, Esq.
          Daniel Feinberg, Esq.
          Todd Jackson, Esq.
          FEINBERG, JACKSON, WORTHMAN & WASOW LLP
          2030 Addison St., Suite 500
          Berkeley, CA 94704
          Telephone: (510) 269-7998
          Facsimile: (510) 269-7994
          E-mail: nina@feinbergjackson.com
                  dan@feinbergjackson.com
                  todd@feinbergjackson.com

GROUP HEALTH: Midthun-Hensen May File Amended Counsel Declaration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANGELA MIDTHUN-HENSEN and TONY HENSEN, as
representatives of their minor Daughter, K.H., and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. GROUP HEALTH COOPERATIVE
OF SOUTH CENTRAL WISCONSIN, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-608-slc
(W.D. Wis.), Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin grants the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended declaration from
counsel and denies their motion to stay summary judgment.

In this putative class action, Midthun-Hensen and Hensen contend
that their health insurer, GHC, violated the Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equality Act ("Parity Act"), 29 U.S.C. Section 1185a,
and certain provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Sections 1001, when it failed to approve
their requests for speech and occupational therapy treatment for
their daughter's autism. GHC's stated reason for the denials was
that the treatments were not evidence-based treatments for autism
in children aged 10 and over, and therefore were excluded under the
plan's exclusion for experimental and investigational treatment.

In their amended complaint, the Plaintiffs plead both facial and
as-applied violations of the Parity Act. They allege, generally,
that GHC applies coverage limitations requiring treatment to be
"evidence-based" and not experimental or investigatory more
restrictively to mental health treatment -- specifically, to
occupational and speech therapy for the treatment of autism in
children aged 10 or older-than it does to comparable medical or
surgical treatment.

The amended complaint contains broad allegations to this effect, as
well as more specific allegations that purport to identify
comparable medical analogues, specifically: (1) clinical trials for
the treatment of cancer, cardiovascular disease or muscular
skeletal disorders of the spine, hip or knees; (2) chiropractic
services; and (3) speech, physical and occupational therapy when
requested to treat medical conditions.

In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, GHC
rebuts each of these claims. In support, it relies on the language
of the Plan Certificates and Policy 121, both of which are part of
the administrative record. However, GHC does adduce some
extra-record evidence, namely Policy 117, which it represents is a
policy document prepared by GHC to aid it in evaluating whether
chiropractic treatments were evidence-based and not
experimental/investigational.

According to GHC, Policy 117 shows that GHC's process for
determining which chiropractic services were evidence-based is the
same process it used in determining which treatments for autism
were evidence-based: GHC reviewed the medical research and prepared
summary guidance that discussed which treatments were supported by
research and which were not.

The Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion, accompanied by a
request under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) that the Court allows them to
take discovery on the Parity Act claims before ruling on GHC's
motion. They ask the Court to stay summary judgment until they can
take discovery on their "as applied" Parity Act claims.

Judge Crocker agrees with the Plaintiffs' contention that
information concerning the processes, strategies or other factors
utilized by a plan administrator in applying a particular treatment
limitation to an analogous medical/surgical treatment will
typically be in the possession of the plan administrator. He
disagrees with their suggestion that Parity Act plaintiffs may
unlock the door to essentially unfettered discovery simply by
parroting in their complaint the language of the Parity Act and
alleging generally that the plan administrator does not apply the
relevant treatment limitation as restrictively to "medical/surgical
benefits" as it does to "mental health benefits." Indeed, even the
cases cited by the Plaintiffs require a Parity Act plaintiff to
allege "that the mental health or substance use disorder benefit
being limited is in the same classification as the medical/surgical
benefit to which it is being compared."

Under the Parity Act, the question is not how GHC "covers
medical/surgical care compared to mental health care" in general,
as the Plaintiffs assert, sbut rather whether there is a disparity
in the way GHC applied the relevant treatment limitation to the
mental health benefits sought by the Plaintiff as compared to
limitations that GHC would apply to a covered medical/surgical
analog.

Turning to this more specific question, plaintiffs' motion for a
stay discusses two covered medical benefits that they say are
analogous: (1) chiropractic treatment; and (2) complementary
medicine, which encompasses various forms of therapy such as
acupuncture, homeopathy, energy work and "various types of eastern
practices." But as GHC points out, the Plaintiffs' amended
complaint says nothing about complementary medicine. Rather, this
appears to be yet another new theory in their ever-evolving Parity
Act claim. The Plaintiffs offer no reason why complementary
medicine is not mentioned in the amended complaint except to argue
generally that their amended complaint was not meant to present an
exhaustive list. If the Court limits discovery only to those
analogs identified in the amended complaint, argue the Plaintiffs,
then it should allow them to amend their complaint yet again to
list "the known other outpatient in-network treatments
medical/surgical treatments which did not have the same treatment
limitations as the mental health treatments."

Judge Crocker denies the Plaintiffs' off-hand request for
permission to amend their complaint yet again. He says, their own
case citations establish that identifying a medical/surgical
analogue is an element of a Parity Act claim. With the case law and
the plan documents in hand, the Plaintiffs should have been able to
articulate all of their bases for a Parity Act claim long ago. This
leaves the question whether they have shown a need for discovery
with respect to chiropractic care, which is the only other analog
discussed in their Rule 56(d) submissions.

Although he agrees with the Plaintiffs that Rule 56(d) does not
require the nonmovant to present the Court with the specific
discovery requests that it seeks from the moving party, Judge
Crocker opines that it does require the nonmovant to present
"specified reasons" why it cannot present "essential" facts without
discovery. The Plaintiffs have not proffered what types of
documents they would request, what sort of interrogatories they
would ask, or what, if any, depositions are necessary for them to
obtain the information they think they need, much less why this
information is essential to opposing GHC's summary judgment
motion.

As GHC points out, Policy 117 includes a list of sources GHC
utilized in determining that certain chiropractic treatments were
evidence-based; therefore, the Plaintiffs are able, at this time,
to compare and contrast these sources with those located by the
counsel that he claims state otherwise. The counsel's affidavit in
support of the motion to stay, even as amended, does not present
specific reasons why this does not suffice to respond to GHC's
summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' motion is
denied.

In light of this ruling, Judge Crocker allows the Plaintiffs to
supplement their opposition to GHC's summary judgment motion solely
on their Parity Act claim. He grants the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to file an amended declaration from counsel and denies their
motion to stay summary judgment. They may have until Oct. 18, 2022,
to supplement their opposition to the Defendant's motion for
summary judgment on their Parity Act Claim, with the Defendant's
reply in support of its entire motion due Nov. 8, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/28hcc9h4 from Leagle.com.


GUARDIAN OF GEORGIA: Bean Alleges WARN Act Breach Over Mass Layoff
------------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER BEAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GUARDIAN OF GEORGIA, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 22-05140-sms (N.D. Ga., Sept. 26, 2022) is a class action for
the recovery by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees of
the Defendant of damages worth 60 days' pay and ERISA benefits by
reason of Defendant's violation of the Plaintiff' rights under the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was an employee of the
Defendant and was terminated as part of, or as a result of mass
layoffs and/or plant closings ordered by the Defendant. The
Plaintiff and each of the other members of the Class were
discharged by the Defendant without cause on his or her part as
part of or as the reasonably foreseeable result of the mass layoff
and/or plant closure ordered by the Defendant at its facility
located in Norcross, Georgia.

The complaint further states that at the time Mr. Bean was
terminated, Defendant ordered the termination of other similarly
situated employees who worked at or reported to the facility. On
September 16, 2022, Defendant filed with the Court a voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code, Case No. 22-57392.

Guardian of Georgia provides security services. The Company offers
monitoring and maintaining security systems devices such as burglar
and fire alarms. Guardian operates in the State of Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Leon S. Jones, Esq.
          JONES & WALDEN LLC
          699 Piedmont Avenue NE
          Atlanta, GA 30308
          Telephone: (404) 564-9300

               - and -

          Stuart J. Miller, Esq.
          Johnathan Miller, Esq.
          LANKENAU & MILLER, LLP  
          100 Church Street 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 581-5005

               - and -

          Mary E. Olsen, Esq.
          M. Vance McCrary, Esq.
          THE GARDNER FIRM, PC
          182 St. Francis Street Suite 103
          Mobile, Alabama 36602
          Telephone: (251) 433-8100
          Facsimile: (251) 433-8181

               - and -

          Chad Johnson, Esq.
          STRINDBERG SCHOLNICK BIRCH HALLAM HARSTAD THORNE
          675 East 2100 South, Suite 350
          Salt Lake City, UT 84106
          Telephone: (801) 359-4169
          Facsimile: (801) 359-4313
          E-mail: chad@idahojobjustice.com

GUIDANT GLOBAL: Smith Suit Transferred to W.D. Pa.
--------------------------------------------------
The case styled CHADWICK SMITH, individually and for others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GUIDANT GLOBAL, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-12318, was transferred from the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on Sept. 26. 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01364-MJH to the proceeding.

In this complaint, the Plaintiff alleges the failure of the
Defendant to pay him and other workers proper overtime as required
by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Guidant Global, Inc. provides global workforce management
solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Lindsay Itkin Reimer, Esq.
          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  litkin@mybackwages.com
                  mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard Burch, Esq.
          11 Greenway Plaza Ste 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Taylor A. Jones, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY LLP
          3700 Buffalo Speedway Suite 960
          Houston, TX 77098
          Telephone: (713) 338-2563
          Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
          E-mail: tajones@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          Jennifer Lossia McManus, Esq.
          FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C.
          25892 Woodward Ave.
          Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910
          Telephone: (248) 542-6300
          Facsimile: (248) 542-6301
          E-mail: jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Gregory N. Blasé, Esq.
          K&L GATES LLP
          State Street Financial Center
          One Lincoln Street
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 261-3100
          E-mail: gregory.blase@klgates.com

               - and -

          Keith James, Esq.
          KEITH JAMES PLLC
          26677 W. Twelve Mile Road
          Southfield, MI 48034
          Telephone: (248) 871-7728
          E-mail: James@KeithJamesPLLC.Com

               - and -

          Michael A. Pavlick, Esq.
          K&L GATES LLP
          210 Sixth Avenue
          K&L Gates Center
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222-2312
          Telephone: (412) 355-6275
          Facsimile: (412) 355-6501
          E-mail: michael.pavlick@klgates.com

HEALTH MANAGEMENT: Higgs Sues Over Discrimination, Retaliation
--------------------------------------------------------------
LIA HIGGS, and other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff v.
HEALTH MANAGEMENT CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant, Case No.
0:22-cv-61812 (S.D. Fla., Sept. 26, 2022) is an action against the
Defendant for racial discrimination, unpaid overtime wages and
retaliation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of herself and those
similarly situated to recover from the Defendant proper overtime
compensation at the rate of time-and-one-half for all hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per workweek. She asserts that during the
course of her employment with Defendant, she has been subjected to
a discriminatory, hostile and offensive work environment because of
her race. She further alleges that the Defendant engaged in illegal
retaliatory practices after she made a complaint seeking the
payment of overtime wages from the Defendant.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a receptionist from
June 22, 2022, through her wrongful termination on August 17, 2022.


Health Management Corporation of America is a diagnostic imaging
management services company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Julisse Jimenez, Esq.
          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 503-5131
          Facsimile: (888) 270-5549  
          E-mail: julisse@saenzanderson.com
                  msaenz@saenzanderson.com

INNOFOODS USA: Falsely Advertised Keto Snack Foods, Class Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Shaak, writing for ClassAction.org, reports that a proposed
class action alleges Innofoods USA and Costco Wholesale Corporation
have falsely advertised their "keto" snack foods in that the
sugar-laden, high-carb products are not appropriate for a ketogenic
diet.

According to the 30-page case, people who follow the ketogenic diet
are advised to avoid foods that are high in sugar and
carbohydrates. Nevertheless, the products at issue, including the
Keto Coconut Cluster and Dark Chocolate Keto Nuggets snacks, are
labeled as "keto" or "keto-friendly," even though they contain cane
sugar and are high in carbohydrates, the lawsuit alleges.

"The use of these terms and natural imagery is designed to, and
does, induce consumers, such as Plaintiff and the members of the
putative classes, into believing that the snacks comport with a
ketogenic diet," the complaint contends, claiming that consumers
would not have purchased the Keto snacks, or would have paid less
for them, had they known the truth about the products'
ingredients.

The lawsuit explains that the ketogenic diet was originally
designed to help people who suffered from seizures but has more
recently been practiced by people who are looking to lose weight.
Per the suit, the "keto" diet, which is high in fat, moderate in
protein and low in carbs, aims to force the body into ketosis, a
process whereby the body uses as fuel ketone bodies produced from
fat by the liver instead of sugar.

The case claims Innofoods and Costco have attempted to capitalize
on the keto diet trend, in particular consumers' search for
high-protein plant-based or vegan foods, by falsely advertising
their snack food products, which include a blend of plant-based
ingredients like almonds, pecans and pumpkin seeds, as "keto" or
"keto-friendly." Per the suit, these "buzzword" representations
trick consumers into believing the snacks are compatible with the
keto diet when they are, in reality, high in sugar and carbs, two
ingredients those who follow the keto diet are instructed to
avoid.

For example, the Coconut Keto Clusters product contains cane sugar
and brown rice syrup, and is roughly 14 percent sugar by weight,
the lawsuit says. The Innofoods Dark Chocolate Keto Nuggets product
likewise contains cane sugar, according to the complaint.

The lawsuit argues that discovering the true nature of the
ingredients in the Innofoods products requires "investigation
beyond the grocery store and knowledge of food chemistry as well as
internal manufacturing habits beyond that of the average consumer."
Thus, reasonable consumers relied to their detriment on the snacks'
front label representations, the lawsuit alleges.

The case looks to represent anyone in the U.S. who purchased the
Innofoods Keto products for personal or household use, and not for
resale, at any time from August 25, 2018 until the date of judgment
in this action. [GN]

JETSUITEX INC: McKeehan Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled JACOB McKEEHAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JETSUITEX, INC.; and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 22STCV24435, was
removed from the Superior Court of California for the County of Los
Angeles to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on Sept. 26, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:22-cv-06955 to the proceeding.

The complaint asserts the following claim on a class-wide basis:
(1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime
wages; (3) failure to provide lawful meal periods; (4) failure to
authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay wages
during employment; (6) failure to timely pay wages upon separation
of employment; (7) knowing and intentional failure to comply with
itemized wage statement provisions; and (8) violation of the unfair
competition law.

JetSuiteX, Inc. is an independent air carrier in the United
States.[BN]

Defendant JetSuiteX, Inc. is represented by:

          Spencer C. Skeen, Esq.
          Tim L. Johnson, Esq.
          Andrew J. Deddeh, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          4660 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92122
          Telephone: (858) 652-3100
          Facsimile: (858) 652-3101
          E-mail: spencer.skeen@ogletree.com
                  tim.johnson@ogletree.com
                  andrew.deddeh@ogletree.com

JIANPU TECHNOLOGY: Court Dismisses Africa's Amended Class Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ENRIQUE AFRICA, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JIANPU TECHNOLOGY INC. et
al., Defendant, Case No. 21-CV-1419 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Jesse
M. Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.

In this putative class action, Lead Plaintiff Africa brings
securities fraud claims against Jianpu and two of Jianpu's
executives, David Ye and Yilu (Oscar) Chen (the "Individual
Defendants). The operative Amended Complaint alleges that, between
May 29, 2018, and Feb. 16, 2021, the Defendants made material
misstatements and omissions regarding all three of the Company's
business segments, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Sections 78j(b), 78t(a),
and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
Section 240.10b-5.

Jianpu is a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands with its
principal executive offices in China; its American Depositary
Shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange. It operates an online
platform, Rong360, that connects consumers with financial service
providers in China. Rong360 offers three types of services: (1)
loan recommendation services (the "Loan Segment"), (2) credit card
recommendation services (the "Credit Card Segment"), and (3)
advertising and marketing services (the "Advertising
Segment").Africa alleges securities violations with respect to each
segment of the Company.

Jianpu's Loan Segment connects borrowers with financial service
providers and facilitates loan applications. One method of lending
on the Loan Segment is peer-to-peer ("P2P") lending; it connects
borrowers directly to lenders without the need for a bank or other
middleman. Jianpu screens all financial service providers,
including P2P lenders, before listing their products on Rong360,
but the Company has acknowledged that it has only "limited control
over the quality of the financial products and the services
provided by financial service providers."

Mr. Africa brings claims based on several statements the Individual
Defendants made about the Loan Segment to investors during earnings
calls. In addition to these statements about the regulatory
framework and Jianpu's compliance with it, the Company is alleged
to have made several relevant statements about the Loan Segment's
growth and overall revenues.

On March 15, 2019, China Central Television ("CCTV") aired a
program exposing improper and illegal business practices in the
consumer loan industry. The segment included a Rong360 employee,
who stated that customers on the Company's platform were sometimes
required "to make a purchase before a loan would be released
because Rong360 receives a higher commission after the customer
makes such a purchase." The Amended Complaint, however, does not
identify consumers who found such loans on the Rong360 platform or
lenders who offered them there.

After the CCTV program aired, Jianpu's stock fell 12.86%; the next
day, it declined another 3.64%. In response, Jianpu suspended
further downloads of its mobile application and issue a press
release stating that, despite its stringent screening standards, it
could not "rule out the possibility that the quality of the
financial products and the services provided by financial service
providers are not in full compliance with applicable laws and
regulations at all times."

Jianpu's Credit Card Segment recommends credit cards to consumers.
On earnings calls each quarter beginning with the first quarter of
2018, the Individual Defendants described the growth of their
Credit Card Segment. In several earnings statements, the Company
noted that the revenues it received from credit card recommendation
services increased "due to the increase in both credit card volume
and average fee per credit card," and that it was continuing to see
"very sharp growth momentum" in its Credit Card Segment, "with 25
credit card banks" on the Rong360 platform.

Jianpu announced that it would restate its 2018 financials and that
"investors must exercise caution" with respect to its 2019
financial statements. Following this announcement, share prices
fell 13%. On April 30, 2021, Jianpu finally filed its 2019 Form
20-F, which disclosed certain material weaknesses related to the
Credit Card Segment. The restated revenue for the Credit Card
Segment in 2018 was RMB 61.1 million less than the Company had
previously disclosed; the restated revenue for 2019 was RMB 163.7
million less.

In June 2018, the Company acquired a 65% stake in Databook
Technology Ltd. -- a company that provided products to assist
"financial service providers enhance their risk management
capabilities" -- and its subsidiaries as part of its Advertising
Segment. Jianpu recorded the total asset value of Databook as RMB
268.6 million.

On Dec. 9, 2019, in its announcement of third quarter 2019
earnings, Jianpu disclosed an impairment of RMB 250.3 million and
did not record revenue for Databook during the third or fourth
quarter of 2019. That day, Jianpu's share price fell 5.2%.

On Sept. 10, 2020, the Chinese government filed criminal charges
against Hangzhou Scorpion. A few months later, on Jan. 14, 2021, a
court entered judgment against the company, imposed a fine of RMB
30 million, and ordered disgorgement of RMB 30 million in illegal
proceeds. No other entities owned by Jianpu, and no directors of
officers of Jianpu, were charged in connection with the conduct. In
its 2019 Form 20-F, released on April 30, 2021, Jianpu disclosed
the criminal investigation of -- and judgment against -- the
Databook subsidiary. It further explained the accounting
methodology it applied to recording the relevant revenues and
impairment; specifically, the Company noted that it was applying
Accounting Study Guide ("ASC") 855, reversed RMB 30 million in
revenues from advertising, and recorded RMB 30 million as
penalties.

The Defendants now move, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

Africa brings securities fraud claims under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. To state a claim that
Defendants made material misrepresentations or omissions in
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege
"(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation." To state a control-person claim under Section 20(a), a
plaintiff must, at a minimum, plead a plausible "primary violation"
of Section 10(b).

Applying the foregoing standards, Judge Furman concludes that
Africa's Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims fail for at least two
independent reasons. First, with two possible exceptions, he does
not adequately plead a material misrepresentation or omission. And
second, he does not adequately allege scienter.

Judge Furman examines Africa's allegations of misrepresentations or
omissions with respect to each of the Company's three business
segments.

Mr. Africa alleges two types of misrepresentations with respect to
Jianpu's Loan Segment: those related to the Company's regulatory
compliance and those related to the Segment's revenue. But Africa
fails to establish that these statements were false or material.

First, Africa fails to allege that the Individual Defendants'
statements that the Company improved its processes for onboarding
and monitoring lenders on its platform were actually false. With no
showing of falsity, Africa's claim for securities fraud on the
basis of these statements must fail. The other allegedly misleading
statements Africa identifies with respect to the Loan Segment's
regulatory compliance fail to state a claim for securities fraud
because they are either inactionable puffery or forward-looking
statements that fall within the PSLRA's safe harbor. Africa
identifies no material misstatement regarding the Company's
regulatory compliance. In short, Africa does not plausibly allege
that the Company or the Individual Defendants had a duty to
disclose any alleged improper behavior by third parties using
Jianpu's platform.

Mr. Africa alleges that Jianpu and the Individual Defendants
misrepresented the factors driving the Credit Card Segment's
growth. As an initial matter, the mere fact that Jianpu did not
disclose related-party transactions does not demonstrate falsity.
Africa does not allege at all, let alone with particularity, which
individuals or entities were involved in the related-party
transactions, when they occurred, or how much money the
transactions entailed. Without these key facts, Africa fails to
plead that the non-disclosure of the related-party transactions was
material and, thus, an actionable omission. But, even assuming that
the financial restatement is a material misstatement, Africa fails
to show that the Company misstated its financials with the
requisite scienter, thus defeating its securities-fraud claims
based on these misstatements.

Finally, Africa alleges several types of material misstatements or
omissions with respect to the Advertising Segment. The main focus
of his allegations is the Company's failure to disclose that its
subsidiary's subsidiary -- Hangzhou Scorpion -- was under criminal
investigation. The problem with this argument, according to Judge
Furman, is that Africa fails to establish that the Company had a
duty to disclose any uncharged wrongdoing in 2019. He makes no
allegation that Hangzhou Scorpion's conduct "was the secret behind
[the Company's success," which would have triggered a duty to
disclose the uncharged criminal conduct. Put differently, because
Jianpu informed investors about the financial impairment, the
uncharged criminal conduct of its subsidiary's subsidiary would not
have provided new, material information to investors. In short,
Jianpu had no duty to disclose the investigation in December 2019,
and thus its failure to do so is not actionable.

With respect to scienter, Judge Furman opines that all of Africa's
claims are subject to dismissal for a second, independent reason:
failure to adequately plead scienter. Because Africa fails to
allege that Defendants received a "concrete and personal" benefit
from the alleged scheme, he fails to demonstrate a cognizable
motive. Africa's arguments with respect to the
conscious-misbehavior-and-recklessness prong of the scienter test
require more detailed discussion, but they too ultimately fall
short.

Mr. Africa's bare allegation of scienter with respect to the Loan
Segment can be easily dismissed. He makes no claim, conclusory or
otherwise, that any Defendant knew about the unlawful practices of
certain third-party financial services providers on its platform.
Accordingly, he fails to plausibly allege scienter with respect to
any alleged misstatements about the Loan Segment.

Mr. Africa's scienter arguments with respect to the Credit Card
Segment are more detailed but ultimately unavailing as well, Judge
Furman finds. First, he fails to plausibly allege that any
Defendant actually knew about the undisclosed related-party
transactions, which resulted in the Company restating its 2018 and
2019 financial. Second, general allegations about the
responsibilities of an audit committee, and what its members might
have learned, are, at bottom, speculative and, thus, insufficient
to show scienter. So too, Africa's argument that Jianpu's imperfect
internal controls raise the inference of scienter fails. Africa
proffers no allegations that any Defendant had access to nonpublic
information, or recklessly disregarded such information, about the
related-party transactions prior to disclosing them. As a result,
the Amended Complaint permits no inference that any Defendant knew
or should have known that the 2018 and 2019 financials were false
at the time -- and thus, no strong inference of scienter.

Mr. Africa also fails to raise a strong inference of scienter with
respect to its Advertising Segment claims. First, he makes no
non-conclusory allegations that Jianpu knew the financial figures
it reported in 2018 and 2019 -- both the valuation of Databook and
the revenue numbers -- were false at the time. Additionally, he
does not allege that any Defendant acted with the requisite
scienter when failing to disclose the existence of the Chinese
government investigation into Hangzhou Scorpion in 2019. In sum,
Africa does not adequately plead scienter and his claims must be
dismissed.

Finally, given the absence of a "primary violation," Judge Furman
finds that Africa's Section 20(a) "control person" claims against
the Individual Defendants fail as a matter of law as well. In
addition, although the Defendants do not explicitly raise the issue
in their motion, Africa's underdeveloped claim for scheme liability
fails because the Amended Complaint alleges misstatements and
omissions, not "inherently deceptive conduct." Accordingly,
Africa's scheme liability claim must be and is dismissed.

For the reasons Judge Furman stated, Africa's claims under the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 are dismissed. That leaves only the
question of whether Africa should be granted leave to amend his
complaint. Notably, Africa already had one opportunity to amend
(following the Defendants' initial motion to dismiss), and although
he has requested leave to amend again, he does not identify any
facts he would add. Moreover, there is good reason to doubt that
Africa would be able to remedy the substantive issues identified
above, especially with respect to his claims relating to the Loan
and Advertising Segments. That said, mindful that leave to amend a
complaint should be freely given "when justice so requires," and
that "complaints dismissed under Rule 9(b) are almost always
dismissed with leave to amend," Judge Furman grants Africa one
final chance to amend. Africa will file any Second Amended
Complaint within 30 days of the date of his Opinion and Order.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate ECF No. 47.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 28, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3dmwfbj4 from Leagle.com.


JIAYIN GROUP: Hearing of $2M Deal in Securities Suit Set on Dec. 2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on Oct. 3 disclosed that the Supreme Court of the
State of New York County of New York: Commercial Division has
approved the following announcement of a proposed securities class
action settlement that would benefit purchasers of Jiayin Group,
Inc. American Depository Shares (NASDAQ: JFIN):

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION

TO: ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED AMERICAN
DEPOSITORY SHARES ("ADS") OF JIAYIN GROUP, INC. ("JIAYIN" OR THE
"COMPANY") BETWEEN MAY 10, 2019 AND SEPTEMBER 2, 2020, INCLUSIVE,
PURSUANT AND/OR TRACEABLE TO JIAYIN'S INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING
("IPO") ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPANY'S MAY 10, 2019 IPO

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, County of New York, that a hearing will
be held on December 2, 2022, at 11:30 a.m. before the Honorable
Andrew Borrok, J.S.C., 60 Centre Street, Room 238, New York, New
York 10007, for the purpose of determining: (1) whether the
proposed Settlement1 of the claims in the above-captioned Action
for consideration including the sum of $2,000,000 should be
approved by the Court as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (2)
whether the proposed plan to distribute the Settlement proceeds is
fair, reasonable, and adequate; (3) whether the application of
Class Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees of up to thirty three
percent of the Settlement Amount ($660,000) plus interest,
reimbursement of expenses of not more than $150,000, and a
Compensatory Award to Plaintiff of no more than $5,000, should be
approved; and (4) whether this Action should be dismissed with
prejudice as set forth in the Stipulation.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired American Depository Shares
("ADSs") of Jiayin Group, Inc. ("Jiayin" or the "Company") between
May 10, 2019 and September 2, 2020, inclusive, pursuant and/or
traceable to Jiayin's initial public offering ("IPO") issued in
connection with the Company's May 10, 2019 IPO, your rights may be
affected by this Settlement, including the release and
extinguishment of claims you may possess relating to your ownership
interest in Jiayin ADSs. If you have not received a detailed Notice
Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action ("Notice") and a copy of the
Proof of Claim and Release Form, you may obtain copies by visiting
www.strategicclaims.net/Jiayin/ or by contacting the Claims
Administrator toll-free at (866) 274-4004 or at
info@strategicclaims.net. If you are a member of the Settlement
Class, in order to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund, you must fill out and submit a properly completed Proof of
Claim by 11:59 p.m. on December 9, 2022 to the Claims Administrator
at www.strategicclaims.net/Jiayin/, establishing that you are
entitled to recovery. If you are unable to fill out and submit a
Proof of Claim electronically, you may mail a Proof of Claim at
your own expense to the address listed in the detailed Notice
postmarked no later than December 9, 2022 to the Claims
Administrator, or email it to info@strategicclaims.net,
establishing that you are entitled to recovery. Unless you submit a
written exclusion request, you will be bound by any judgment
rendered in the Action whether or not you make a claim.

If you desire to be excluded from the Settlement Class, you must
submit to the Claims Administrator a request for exclusion so that
it is postmarked no later than November 11, 2022, in the manner and
form explained in the Notice. All members of the Settlement Class
who have not requested exclusion from the Settlement Class will be
bound by any judgment entered in the Action pursuant to the
Settlement Stipulation.

Any objection to the Settlement, Plan of Allocation, or Class
Counsel's request for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement
of expenses and award to Plaintiff must be in the manner and form
explained in the detailed Notice and postmarked no later than
November 11, 2022, to each of the following:

Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court, NY County
60 Centre Street
New York, NY 10007

Lead Counsel
Jeremy A. Lieberman
Tamar A. Weinrib
POMERANTZ LLP
600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
New York, NY 10016

Counsel For Defendants
Matthew Solum
Matthew Tharp
Kirkland & Ellis LLP
601 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022

If you have any questions about the Settlement, you may visit
www.strategicclaims.net/Jiayin/ or write to Class Counsel at the
above address. PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S
OFFICE REGARDING THIS NOTICE.

Dated: August 15, 2022

BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT,
NEW YORK COUNTY

1 Unless otherwise defined, all capitalized terms used herein have
the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement,
dated July 27, 2022 ("Stipulation"). [GN]

KROGER COMPANY: Barnett Sues Over Baby Food's Heavy Metal Content
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TASHEBA BARNETT, ADELE HOFFMAN, and CHADAELA LOVINCEY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE
KROGER COMPANY d/b/a Simple Truth Organic, HARRIS TEETER, LLC,
HARRIS TEETER SUPERMARKETS, INC., and FRED MEYER INC., Defendants,
Case No. 1:22-cv-00544-DRC (S.D. Ohio, September 21, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for common law breach of
implied warranty, breach of implied warranty, unjust
enrichment/restitution, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, the Indiana Deceptive
Consumer Sales Act, and the Washington Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants are engaged in false,
deceptive, and misleading advertising, labeling, and marketing of
Simple Truth Organic Rice Rusks Baby Teething Wafers, a baby food
product. The Defendants advertised the product as safe for infants'
consumption but failed to inform consumers that it contains
elevated levels of toxic heavy metals. As a result of the
Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions, the Plaintiffs and
similarly situated consumers paid premium price for the product,
says the suit.

The Kroger Company, doing business as Simple Truth Organic, is a
manufacturer of consumer products, with its principal place of
business in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Harris Teeter LLC is a distributor of baby food products, with its
principal office in Matthews, North Carolina.

Harris Teeter Supermarkets, Inc. is a supermarket company, with its
principal office in Matthews, North Carolina.

Fred Meyer Inc. is a subsidiary of The Kroger Company, with its
principal place of business in Portland, Oregon. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                
      
         Terence R. Coates, Esq.
         Dylan J. Gould, Esq.
         MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC
         119 E. Court Street, Suite 530
         Cincinnati, OH 45202
         Telephone: (513) 651-3700
         Facsimile: (513) 665-0219
         E-mail: tcoates@msdlegal.com
                 dgould@msdlegal.com

                 - and -

         Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
         Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
         Mark D. Patronella, Esq.
         MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
         412 H Street NE, Suite 302
         Washington, DC 20002
         Telephone: (202) 470-3520
         E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                 jrathod@classlawdc.com
                 mpatronella@classlawdc.com

                 - and –

         Gary Graifman, Esq.
         Melissa R. Emert, Esq.
         KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, P.C.
         135 Chestnut Ridge Road, Suite 200
         Montvale, NJ 07645
         Telephone: (845) 356-2570
         Facsimile: (845) 356-4335
         E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com
                 memert@kgglaw.com

LENDERFI INC: Underpays Mortgage Loan Officers, Assi Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY ASSI and MICHAEL URNECLI, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LENDERFI, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 2:22-cv-06786 (C.D. Cal., September 21, 2022) is a class
action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the California Labor Code, and the California's
Business & Professions Code including failure to pay overtime
wages, failure to pay final wages, failure to provide meal and rest
breaks, and unfair business practices.

The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendant as mortgage loan officers
in California.

Lenderfi, Inc. is a mortgage lender in California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                
      
         Arthur Petrousian, Esq.
         MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
         633 West Fifth Street, Suite 2652
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 787-8590
         E-mail: apetrousian@forthepeople.com

                  - and -

         Gregory R. Schmitz, Esq.
         Ryan D. Naso, Esq.
         MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
         20 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1600
         Orlando, FL 32801
         Telephone: (407) 204-2170
         Facsimile: (407) 563-9986
         E-mail: gschmitz@forthepeople.com
                 rnaso@forthepeople.com
                 mbarreiro@forthepeople.com

LOANDEPOT.COM LLC: Fails to Give Fund Transfer Copy, Jweinat Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JAMIE JWEINAT and RICHARD LECHLEITNER, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC;
and DOES 1-10 inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 3:22-cv-05387 (N.D.
Cal., September 21, 2022) is a class action against the Defendant
for violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and the
California's Business and Professions Code.

The case arises from the Defendant's failure to provide the
Plaintiffs and similarly situated consumers a copy of written
preauthorized electronic fund transfers when made. As a result, the
Plaintiffs did not have a record of the withdrawals that were
agreed to take place and were thereafter charged unowed fees,
interest, and defamed by the Defendant who reported the Plaintiffs
as delinquent on their mortgage when it failed to process the
payments. Thus, the Plaintiffs suffered actual harm from the
Defendant's practice of failing to provide copies of written
preauthorized electronic fund transfers, says the suit.

Loandepot.com, LLC is a mortgage loan servicing company based in
California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                
      
         Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
         Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
         Meghan E. George, Esq.
         Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
         LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
         21031 Ventura Blvd., Suite 340
         Woodland Hills, CA 91364
         Telephone: (323) 306-4234
         Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
         E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                 abacon@toddflaw.com
                 mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                 twheeler@toddflaw.com

MCDONALD'S USA: Kim Suit Dismissed for Lack of Article III Standing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEONG-SU KIM, HUE-SOUNG JUN, and JONG MIN LEE on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. McDONALD'S USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and
McDONALD'S CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case
No. 21-cv-05287 (N.D. Ill.), Judge John Robert Blakey of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, grants McDonald's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
three-count complaint in its entirety for lack of Article III
standing.

In this putative class action, the Plaintiffs assert claims against
Defendants McDonald's USA, LLC and McDonald's Corp. for violating
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act ("ICFA"), 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.,
the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("IDTPA"), 815 ILCS
510/1 et seq., and the Republic of Korea's Personal Information
Protection Act ("PIPA"), alleging that the Defendants' negligence
and misrepresentation that their personal information would be
encrypted led to the theft of their names, email addresses, and
street addresses from a database maintained by the Defendants.

McDonald's USA, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of McDonald's
Corp., which is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal
place of business in Illinois. The Plaintiffs, all of whom are
residents of the Republic of Korea, used their personal information
to register for an account ("McDelivery") with the Defendants that
would allow them to place delivery orders through their mobile app
and website.

To register for delivery orders on McDelivery, the Plaintiffs were
required to provide their addresses, email addresses, and cell
phone numbers. As part of the registration process, the Defendants
required users to agree to their terms and conditions, including
their privacy policies. To cater to both Koreans and non-Koreans
living in Korea, the registration process for McDelivery is
available in both Korean and English. The Korean language version
of the privacy policy notifies users that their personal
information -- names, phone numbers, passwords, and email and
delivery addresses -- would be encrypted and secured when it is
transmitted to the Defendants in Illinois as well as to Amazon Web
Services. Additionally, the privacy policy represents to its users
that their personal information would be destroyed after one year
of non-use.

On April 15, 2021, unknown third-party hackers stole McDelivery
users' delivery addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses. The
Defendants delayed nearly two months in notifying their customers
of the data breach. On June 13, 2021, they published a notice on
their webpage stating that unauthorized individuals obtained a file
containing the email addresses, phone numbers, and physical
addresses of their McDelivery customers. In the notice, the
Defendants stated that they had inspected their vulnerable servers
and implemented security measures after learning of the data breach
but advised the public to be cautious of phishing attempts and
email solicitations from entities impersonating them. The notice
reminded the public that the Defendants do not request credit card
and other financial information through phone or email and informed
the public of a website where customers could confirm whether the
data breach had compromised their personal information

On June 19, 2021, the Defendants distributed an email to individual
customers affected by the data breach containing the same
information in the public notice, as well as an apology for their
delay in identifying and notifying the individual customers of the
data breach. The customers affected by the McDelivery data breach
included not just Korean citizens but also U.S. citizens and
individuals who were living in or visiting the Republic of Korea,
the Republic of China, South Africa, and Russia.

The Plaintiffs allege that, due to the Defendants' failure to
adequately safeguard and protect the "file" containing their
personal information, cybercriminals accessed, obtained, and used
their personal information without authorization and invaded their
privacy. Further, they contend that, as a direct and proximate
cause of the data breach, hackers may use that information to
conduct phishing schemes against them, which are prevalent in Korea
where they reside. Since the data breach, the Defendants have not
offered the Plaintiffs any compensation or direct personal
protection from the data breach (such as the means to prevent
phishing scams and identity theft insurance).

On Oct. 5, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed suit in the Court asserting
claims against the Defendants for violations of Illinois' Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/et seq.,
Illinois' Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 510/et
seq., and the Republic of Korea's Personal Information Privacy Act.
They allege that, as a result the Defendants' failure to safeguard
their personal information, third parties accessed their personal
information without consent and are able to use Plaintiffs' email
addresses to register for website subscriptions exposing them to
countless spam and other unwanted emails. In addition, they remain
at risk of phishing scams because their phone numbers are tied to
their names and addresses.

As a result, Plaintiffs have lost time and incurred expenses and
mental aggravation monitoring their email accounts for phishing
scams, removing spam emails, removing accounts registered on
unwanted and unfamiliar websites, and communicating with McDonald's
regarding their personal information stolen in the data breach, all
of which has caused the Plaintiffs anxiety, emotional distress, and
loss of privacy. The Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all
individuals who registered for McDelivery while in Korea, seek
equitable relief, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.

The Defendants now move to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint in its
entirety under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to
allege an injury-in-fact necessary for Article III standing. In the
alternative, they move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Judge Blakey begins with the Defendants' challenge to the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction. The Defendants argue that the
Plaintiffs fail to allege an injury-in-fact and thus lack
standing.

In response to the Defendants' challenge, the Plaintiffs argue that
they pled concrete and particularized injuries when they alleged
that: (1) they face an increased risk of identity theft and
phishing scams as a result of Defendants' negligence; (2) they
suffer from anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and
continue to spend time and efforts monitoring, reporting, and
removing unwanted phishing scam emails; (3) the disclosure of their
personal information has resulted in a loss of privacy; and (4)
Defendants unlawfully retained Plaintiff Jun's personal information
in violation of PIPA.

With respect to potential future harms, Judge Blakey opines that
the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that the harm they fear --
identity theft and being victimized by a phishing scam -- is
impending. The type of data stolen in the data breach consisted of
non-sensitive email addresses, phone numbers, and delivery
addresses.

The harm the Plaintiffs claim remains too attenuated and
speculative given the non-sensitive nature of the information
stolen in the data breach. The claimed future harm would require a
"highly attenuated chain of possibilities" to materialize and
finding such harm would "require guesswork as to how independent
decisionmakers will exercise their judgment." As for the
Plaintiffs' fears of falling victim to phishing scams, only Lee
alleges that he was the victim of a phishing attempt.

In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that they spent time
monitoring for and removing unwanted spam and phishing emails,
spent time contacting the Defendants about the data breach, and, in
the case of Jun, spent time filing a proactive police report.

Judge Blakey opines that as the complaint contains no allegation
indicating that the Plaintiffs' feared harms are certainly
impending, they cannot rely on their time and money spent in
response to fears that are too speculative to support standing
under Article III. Similarly, their allegations that they
experienced mental aggravation, anxiety, and emotional distress
from the data breach, also remain insufficient to provide standing
under Article III, as such emotional injuries constitute
"quintessential abstract harms that are beyond" the Court's power
to remedy.

The Plaintiffs also argue that the theft of their personal
information -- email addresses, phone numbers, and delivery
addresses -- suffices to confer standing under Article III.

As an initial matter, Judge Blakey finds that the Plaintiffs do not
allege in their complaint that they had a property or privacy
interest in their email addresses, phone numbers, and delivery
addresses. The Plaintiffs do not allege that they considered their
email addresses, phone numbers, and delivery addresses to be
private or otherwise sensitive or confidential. And the disclosure
of the type of information at issue -- by its very nature -- would
not be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Thus the mere
disclosure of the type of information at issue here does not confer
standing under Article III. Nor have the Plaintiffs identified any
federal statute conferring a right of privacy or any other interest
in their email addresses, phone numbers, or delivery addresses.

Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants' retention of
Jun's data, which continued after Jun had ceased using the
McDelivery app, violated the Republic of Korea's Personal
Information Privacy Act. They allege that this violation "works a
concrete and particularized Article III injury."

Judge Blakey finds that the complaint contains no allegation
explaining how the Defendants' retention of Jun's data caused him
any concrete injury. The case is not about biometric data. And
without some allegation that Jun suffered a concrete injury from
the Defendants' wrongful retention of his personal information, Jun
has just the bare procedural violation of PIPA, which will not
suffice to confer standing under Article III.

For the reasons he explained, Judge Blakey finds that the
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue their claims. Having
so found, he need not consider whether the Plaintiffs' complaint
would also fail under Rule 12(b)(6). He grants the Defendants'
motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaint without prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction. To the extent the Plaintiffs can, consistent
with their obligations under Rule 11, amend the complaint to allege
Article III standing, they may file an amended complaint by Oct.
24, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2yy3tfe8 from
Leagle.com.


MISSION POINT: Faces Brewster Wage-and-Hour Suit in E.D. Mich.
--------------------------------------------------------------
DESHANTA BREWSTER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MISSION POINT MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-12220-MFL-KGA (E.D. Mich.,
September 21, 2022) is a class action against the Defendant for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Michigan
Workforce Opportunity Wage Act including failure to timely pay
wages, misclassification, and retaliation.

The Plaintiff was employed as an Admissions Director at the
Defendant's facilities in Clawson, Michigan from June of 2021 until
July of 2022.

Mission Point Management Services, LLC is a health care services
and management company based in Bingham Farms, Michigan. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Josh Sanford, Esq.
         SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
         Kirkpatrick Plaza
         10800 Financial Centre Pkwy., Suite 510
         Little Rock, AR 72211
         Telephone: (501) 221-0088
         Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
         E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN: Faces TCPA Class Action in Alabama
-------------------------------------------------------
Tori Guidry, writing for TCPAWorld, reports that a class action
TCPA Lawsuit has been filed in Alabama which alone might be
noteworthy in and of itself. However, this one is particularly
interesting as Katherine Dorr (Dorr) has filed against a political
group -- a republican political organization at that, the National
Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC). This organization raises
money for Republican Senatorial candidates all over the United
States. The class per the complaint could include thousands of
people.

NRSC allegedly attempted to solicit donations from the wrong
person, Dorr. The lawsuit specifically mentions this one sent in
January of 2022 but claims this has been happening since summer of
2021.

The lawsuit claims that this was accomplished by using an ATDS
without prior express consent. Dorr states she has never so much as
even donated to a Republican candidate to warrant this type of
solicitation.

With 1976 being the last time Alabama went blue for a presidential
election and with 2/2 current US senators being Republicans, I do
not think the alleged texts were worth the risk here. [GN]

NESTLE HEALTHCARE: Benzin Sues Over Mislabeled Powdered Drink Mix
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANNA BENZIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NESTLE HEALTHCARE NUTRITION, INC.,
Defendant, Case 1:22-cv-00747 (W.D.N.Y., Oct. 1, 2022) alleges that
the Defendant mislabeled its powdered drink mix represented as
containing 13g of protein under the Carnation Breakfast Essentials
brand.

According to the complaint, Carnation Breakfast Essentials
Nutritional Powder Drink Mix appeals to these consumers by
promoting "13g Protein" on the front label. However, the much
smaller print in the right corner reveals "13g Protein" is
available "Per Prepared Serving," above the smaller and all lower
case statement of "just add milk." The apparent instruction to
"just add milk" is inconsistent with the information in the purple
call-out which states "3x vitamin D vs. milk." Consumers will not
think they need to add milk given that the Product is comparing
itself to milk. Only if consumers scrutinize the back of the
package will they see the Product they bought has 5g of protein or
38% of the 13g promoted on the front label, revealed on the last
line of the main box of the Nutrition Facts, says the suit.

This is shown by the two columns representing "Powder" and "As
Prepared." However, no preparation instructions are provided on the
back of the package so that consumers can obtain 13g of protein.
This includes no instructions about how much milk to add, i.e., 4
oz, 6 oz, or 8 oz. Nor are there instructions about what kind of
milk to add, such as nonfat, 2%, whole milk, almond milk, soy milk,
or oat milk. The Defendant sold more of the Product and at higher
prices than it would have in the absence of this misconduct,
resulting in additional profits at the expense of consumers. As a
result of the false and misleading representations, the Product is
sold at a premium price, approximately no less than $7.99 for a
12.6 oz. box containing 10 individual packets, excluding tax and
sales, higher than similar products, represented in a
non-misleading way, and higher than it would be sold for absent the
misleading representations and omissions, the suit added.

NESTLE HEALTHCARE NUTRITION, INC. provides nutritional solutions
for people with specific dietary needs related to illnesses,
diseases, and, age. The Company offers its products to infant,
health care, and performance nutrition, and weight management.
Nestle HealthCare Nutrition serves customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd Ste 412
          Great Neck NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com

               - and -

          James Chung, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JAMES CHUNG
          43-22 216th St
          Bayside NY 11361
          Telephone: (718) 461-8808
          Email: jchung_77@msn.com

NEW YORK CITY: Class Suits Over Summer 2020 Protests Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Colleen McMahon of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York grants the Plaintiffs' motion for permission
to file a consolidated and amended class action complaint in the
lawsuits entitled In Re: New York City Policing During Summer 2020
Demonstrations. This filing is related to: Payne v. De Blasio, et
al. Wood v. City of New York, et al. Sierra v. City of New York, et
al., Case Nos. 20-cv-8924 (CM)(GWG), 20-cv-10541 (CM)(GWG),
20-cv-10291 (CM)(GWG) (S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs in these two class actions have filed a motion for
permission to file a consolidated and amended class action
complaint. The proposed pleading would consolidate these two
overlapping class action lawsuits; dismiss certain Defendants;
remove the request for declaratory relief, which would make money
damages the only form of relief sought; and add several new
Defendants on the federal (but not the state law) claims.

The Plaintiffs do not intend to assert state law claims against any
newly-added Defendants and do not seek to assert any state law
claims against the proposed new Defendants. They have represented
to the Court that they require no additional discovery if the new
pleading is allowed.

The Defendants consent to the consolidation of the cases, the
dismissal of certain Defendants and the removal of a request for
declaratory relief. They take no position on the addition of
additional Defendants on the federal claims, as to which the
statute of limitations has not expired.

Judge McMahon rules that the motion is granted in all respects. The
Clerk of Court is directed to remove the motion at Docket #686 from
the Court's list of open motions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Sept. 15, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/33c4sx64 from Leagle.com.


NEXA MORTGAGE: Umeres Suit Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California remands the lawsuit titled CIRO
UMERES, Plaintiff v. NEXA MORTGAGE, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:22-cv-05658-SB-AGR (C.D. Cal.), to the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Los Angeles.

Plaintiff Umeres filed this putative class action in state court
against his former employer, Defendant NEXA, alleging that it
violated California law by, among other things, failing to pay
minimum wages and overtime wages and failing to provide rest
periods. After Umeres amended his pleading to add a cause of action
under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), NEXA
removed the case based on diversity jurisdiction. Umeres now moves
to remand, contending that the amount in controversy does not
exceed $75,000.

NEXA briefly suggests that the motion to remand should be denied
because Umeres filed it only six days after the parties' first of
two meet-and-confers, in violation of Local Rule 7-3. Although
Umeres should have paid closer attention to the Court's rules, the
parties' two meetings served the basic purposes of Rule 7-3, and
NEXA does not suggest that waiting another day to file the remand
motion would have made any difference.

More importantly, Judge Blumenfeld points out, striking the motion
would have no practical effect, since the Court must remand the
case sua sponte if subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking.

Judge Blumenfeld notes that it is undisputed that Umeres is a
citizen of California and NEXA and its members are citizens of
Arizona. Thus, the parties are completely diverse. Their dispute
focuses on whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Umeres expressly alleges that the aggregate amount in controversy
for the class is less than $5 million, and NEXA does not contend
that removal is warranted under the Class Action Fairness Act.
Thus, the only question before the Court is whether the amount in
controversy as to Umeres's claims exceeds $75,000.

Umeres's amended complaint alleges that "the matter in controversy,
exclusive of interest, exceeds $25,000." In its notice of removal,
NEXA contends that "the cumulative impact of the multiple
violations alleged," together with the inclusion of the PAGA claim,
"renders it a reasonable certainty" that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.

The notice of removal notes, however, that the pleadings do not
"provide any information as to the frequency of the alleged
violations and/or the number of hours worked in any weeks," such
that NEXA has "not been able to calculate with certainty the number
of damages claimed." NEXA asserts without explanation that the
Plaintiff seeks statutory damages that cumulatively amount to
nearly $7,000 per month, exclusive of actual damages, punitive
damages, and attorney's fees, and that because the Plaintiff worked
for NEXA for approximately one year, it is apparent that the
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint seeks damages exceeding
$75,000.

After Mr. Umeres challenged the basis for NEXA's calculations, NEXA
in its opposition provided a somewhat more specific breakdown of
its jurisdictional assertion. Assuming without explanation that 26
pay periods are at issue for Umeres's individual claims and 19 pay
periods are at issue for his PAGA claim, NEXA calculates that
Umeres seeks penalties of $38,750 for individual violations of the
California Labor Code and $39,600 in PAGA statutory penalties, for
a total of $78,350. NEXA also contends that an estimated 25% for
attorney's fees brings the amount in controversy to $97,938.

Mr. Umeres raises numerous challenges to NEXA's calculations and
contends that the total penalties he seeks amount to only $15,325.
Among other things, Umeres argues that NEXA has used improperly
high penalty amounts, incorrectly double-counted penalties, and
made assumptions about the relevant pay periods and the rates of
violations that are speculative and unsupported by evidence.
Moreover, NEXA counts the entire $39,600 it calculates for PAGA
penalties toward the amount in controversy, but "the weight of
opinion is that only 25% of the civil penalties sought in a PAGA
action, the amount that accrues to employees rather than the LWDA,
should be counted toward the amount in controversy."

Even if the Court were to adopt the minority approach and count all
PAGA civil penalties toward the amount in controversy, the Court is
unpersuaded that NEXA has met its burden here. Umeres raises
serious questions about NEXA's calculations and assumptions, which
NEXA has not adequately addressed. NEXA, on the other hand,
provides no evidence to support its use of 26 pay periods to
calculate Umeres's individual damages. Nor has NEXA produced
evidence to support its other assertions and assumptions, Judge
Blumenfeld points out.

NEXA contends that even if the Court discounts the PAGA penalties,
the Plaintiff's actual damages could bring the amount in
controversy over $75,000, assuming 10 hours per week for 51 weeks
of work with a $13 minimum wage and one week of overtime. But
NEXA's calculations are wholly speculative, apparently based on how
much actual damages would be required to bring the amount in
controversy above $75,000 rather than on any evidence of Umeres's
actual damages, Judge Blumenfeld holds.

On this record, and in light of the rule that any doubts about the
propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand, the Court
finds that NEXA has not met its burden to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the requirements of Section 1332 are
satisfied. Umeres's motion to remand is, therefore, granted, and
this case is remanded to the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Los Angeles.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Sept. 15, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/25dku8ce from Leagle.com.


NONNI'S FOODS: Goldstein Sues Over Biscotti Cookies' Lemon Labels
-----------------------------------------------------------------
NANCY GOLDSTEIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NONNI'S FOODS LLC, Defendant, Case No.
9:22-cv-81462-AMC (S.D. Fla., September 21, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for false and misleading advertising,
negligent misrepresentation, fraud, unjust enrichment, breaches of
express warranty, implied warranty of merchantability/fitness for a
particular purpose and Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, and violations
of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act and State
Consumer Fraud Acts.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in false,
deceptive, and misleading advertising, labeling, and marketing of
biscotti cookies under the Nonni's brand. The Defendant represented
the product to contain an appreciable amount of lemon ingredients
but in reality, it contains a de minimis amount of lemon. The
product's ingredients do not list any separately identified lemon
ingredient and instead includes natural flavor(s). The Defendant
sold more of the product and at higher prices than it would have in
the absence of this misconduct, resulting in additional profits at
the expense of consumers, says the suit.

Nonni's Foods LLC is a food company, with its principal place of
business in Tulsa, Oklahoma. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Will Wright, Esq.
         THE WRIGHT LAW OFFICE, P.A.
         515 N. Flagler Dr., Ste. P-300
         West Palm Beach, FL 33401
         Telephone: (561) 514-0904
         E-mail: willwright@wrightlawoffice.com

                 - and -

         Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
         SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 Cuttermill Rd., Ste. 412
         Great Neck, NY 11021
         Telephone: (516) 268-7080
         E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

NORFOLK, VA: Albert L. Roper Appeals Suit Dismissal to 4th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
ALBERT L. ROPER II REVOCABLE TRUST, et al. are taking an appeal
from a court order dismissing their lawsuit entitled Albert L.
Roper II Revocable Trust, et al., individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. City of Norfolk, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-00596-RAJ-RJK, in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

The Plaintiffs brought this class action suit against the
Defendants for federal inverse condemnation, state inverse
condemnation, and gross negligence by failing to notify the
Plaintiffs of a right to appeal the City's decision to approve the
demolishment of Grandy House, a property located at 355 W.
Freemason Street in Norfolk, Virginia. They allege further that the
City's actions constituted a taking without just compensation and
gross negligence.

On January 24, 2022, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, which the Court granted through an order
entered by Judge Raymond A. Jackson. The Court dismissed the case
with prejudice saying the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the
inverse condemnation claims and the gross negligence claim because
they do not have a property interest in Grandy House.

The appellate case is captioned as Albert L. Roper II Revocable
Trust v. City of Norfolk, Case No. 22-1968, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed on September 14,
2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Opening Brief and Appendix are due on October 24, 2022; and

   -- Response Brief is due on November 23, 2022. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ALBERT L. ROPER II REVOCABLE TRUST, et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

            Joseph V. Sherman, Esq.
            JOSEPH V. SHERMAN, P.C.
            324 West Freemason Street
            Norfolk, VA 23510
            Telephone: (757) 350-8308

Defendants-Appellees CITY OF NORFOLK, et al., are represented by:

            Kristopher Richard McClellan, Esq.
            CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
            810 Union Street
            Norfolk, VA 23510
            Telephone: (757) 664-4529

                   - and -

            Adam Daniel Melita, Esq.
            CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
            810 Union Street
            Norfolk, VA 23510
            Telephone: (757) 664-4366

OHIO: 6th Cir. Affirms Claims' Dismissal in T.M. v. DeWine & ODJFS
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, T.M., Next Friend on behalf of H.C. and Y.C., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. RICHARD MICHAEL DEWINE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-3752 (6th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms the district court's
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims.

Child foster care systems in this country are administered by the
various state governments. The federal government, however, will
reimburse states, like Ohio, for "foster care maintenance payments"
that the state makes to certified foster caregivers who meet
federal-eligibility requirements. In Ohio, there are also foster
caregivers whom the state does not certify as meeting those federal
requirements. So Ohio withholds payments for those caregivers.
Instead, Ohio provides these non-certified caregivers with less
generous payments through a separate state program.

The Plaintiffs are a group of foster caregivers whom Ohio has
considered ineligible to receive the higher foster care maintenance
payments but who argue that they meet the federal requirements and
are thus entitled to those payments. So they have sued Ohio
Governor Mike DeWine and the Director of the Ohio Department of Job
and Family Services ("ODJFS").

By enacting the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
("CWA"), Congress used its Spending Clause powers to create Title
IV-E of the Social Security Act and set up a statutory scheme for
states to administer foster care systems. Title IV-E lays out
requirements for states that receive federal funds, such as having
a state plan approved by the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS"). Ohio receives Title IV-E funds and has
a state plan approved by the HHS.

Like other Spending Clause legislation, Title IV-E's federal money
has strings attached. Along with Ohio's state plan conforming with
the other requirements set out in 42 U.S.C. Section 671(a), Ohio
must provide foster care maintenance payments ("FCMPs") to eligible
children and their caregivers.

Like other states, Ohio claims reimbursements under Title IV-E for
FCMPs made to eligible recipients. Congress set out eligibility
requirements in Title IV-E, and HHS has offered regulatory
guidance. Relevant in the case, for a child to be eligible to
receive FCMP's, the child must be "placed in a foster family home."
Importantly, the state plan sets forth the specific criteria that
the state is going to apply in order to determine FCMP eligibility.
This set of criteria is then approved by HHS as part of the
state-plan approval and future reviews.

Ohio has two foster care systems. One is Ohio's Title IV-E program,
operated in accordance with Ohio's state plan approved by the HHS
Secretary. See generally Ohio Rev. Code Section 5101; Ohio Admin.
Code 5101:2-47. Caregivers eligible for this program become
"certified" by the state, which means they are "licensed"
caregivers under Title IV-E. Ohio Rev. Code Section 5103.03(B)(2).
The other program is a separate, state-run foster-care system for
non-certified foster caregivers who are deemed ineligible to
participate in Title IV-E.

The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS" or
"Department") administers both systems. For Title IV-E purposes,
the Department regulates the licensing of foster care homes and
issues "certificates" to foster homes that it concludes meet Title
IV-E's requirements. Not every caregiver's home meets those
requirements.

The Department promulgates rules to administer the state system.
Before December 2020, all non-certified caregivers were eligible
for financial assistance from Ohio Works First (the financial
assistance portion of Ohio's Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families program) or from other public-benefits programs.

During this litigation, the Ohio legislature passed, and Governor
Mike DeWine signed into law, Amended Substitute Senate Bill 310.
The bill, which went into effect the same day, created the Kinship
Support Program ("KSP"). The KSP provides financial assistance to
non-certified relative caregivers who receive temporary or
permanent custody of children in the foster care system but are not
certified by the state as foster care homes under Title IV-E.

Under the KSP, non-certified caregivers are subject to different
standards than certified caregivers eligible for FCMPs. In turn,
these non-certified caregivers in the state system receive a per
diem less than the amount licensed caregivers receive from FCMPs.
But Ohio encourages non-certified caregivers to get certified as a
licensed foster family home. If a caregiver fails to obtain
certification within six or nine months, the payments end.
Likewise, if a caregiver receives a certificate, KSP payments also
cease and FCMPs begin.

The Plaintiffs are four foster children and four of their relative
foster caregivers. The caregivers brought a putative class action
against Governor DeWine and the then-director of ODJFS, in their
official capacities. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants,
acting under color of state law, are depriving them of their
statutory rights to FCMPs under 42 U.S.C. Section 672(a), in
violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. They sought declaratory and
injunctive relief.

The Plaintiffs moved to certify their classes and for a preliminary
injunction. Ohio opposed the motions and moved to dismiss the case.
The district court granted the motions to dismiss and denied as
moot the motions for class certification and a preliminary
injunction. It determined that Governor DeWine was immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment, a ruling the Plaintiffs don't
challenge on appeal. But the district court ruled that the ODJFS
Director was not entitled to sovereign immunity because the suit
fell within the Ex parte Young exception. On the merits, it
concluded that there is a single set of federal eligibility
requirements under Title IV-E for caregivers in Ohio to qualify for
FCMPs. And because the Plaintiffs did not meet the same
federally-approved standards that Ohio has for licensed caregivers,
they are not "approved" foster family homes under Title IV-E and
are ineligible for FCMPs. The Plaintiffs timely appealed

Initially, since the Plaintiffs do not challenge the district
court's finding that Governor DeWine was entitled to sovereign
immunity, the Sixth Circuit reviews only the district court's
ruling as to Director Damschroder. And it reviews de novo whether a
state official is entitled to sovereign immunity.

By and large, the Eleventh Amendment protects States from private
civil suits, both from their own citizens and citizens of other
States. To determine whether the Ex parte Young exception applies,
the Sixth Circuit "need only conduct a 'straightforward inquiry
into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'"
Retroactive relief for past unlawful conduct will not do.

The Plaintiffs want to enjoin Ohio officials from withholding FCMPs
in an alleged ongoing violation of federal law. The injunction's
effect would be that Ohio officials would issue FCMPs to these
Plaintiffs and others like them going forward. Although this relief
would have "a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury,"
the Sixth Circuit has held that similar relief falls within the Ex
parte Young exception. In suits concerning a state's payment of
public benefits under federal law, a federal court may enjoin the
state's officers to comply with federal law by awarding those
benefits in a certain way going forward -- even if the court may
not order those officers to pay out public benefits wrongly
withheld in the past. That is the kind of relief that the
Plaintiffs seek. Their suit seeks prospective relief to end an
allegedly ongoing violation of federal law, and thus falls within
the Ex parte Young exception.

Turning now to the merits, the Plaintiffs argue that the district
court erred in concluding that because the Plaintiff caregivers are
not "approved" under Section 672, they are not "licensed or
approved" "foster care homes" under Title IV-E and thus not
eligible for FCMPs. The Sixth Circuit reviews the district court's
dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo and it reviews
questions of statutory interpretation de novo as well.

The case boils down to whether the district court properly
interpreted the meaning of "foster family home" under Section
672(c)(1)(A). Section 672 sets out the eligibility requirements for
FCMPs. Among other things, states like Ohio with approved plans
must make FCMPs to children "placed in a foster family home." Title
IV-E, in turn, defines a foster family home as one "that is
licensed or approved by the State that meets the standards
established for the licensing or approval." The Plaintiffs contend
that they are "approved" though not "licensed" by Ohio under the
separate state program and that this "approval" satisfies Title
IV-E.

The Sixth Circuit disagrees. Congress made clear that the same
standards apply to every foster family home; it did not create two
separate standards (i.e., one set of licensing standards and one
set of approval standards) that would both be sufficient for FCMP
eligibility. The particular standards that Congress set out and
that the states implement -- safety, admission policies,
sanitation, and protection of civil rights -- will be applied by
the State to any foster family home receiving funds.

So once HHS approves the standards that the state develops for its
FCMP licensing program, these standards apply to all foster family
homes, whether they are deemed "licensed or approved." Reading that
statutory language together, then, the district court was correct
in finding that "an 'approved' relative caregiver is not eligible
for FCMPs under Title IV-E unless the state 'approval' standards
are the same standards that the state uses for licensing foster
caregivers."

There is no dispute that Ohio has different standards for certified
caregivers and for approved caregivers. The district court
comprehensively spelled out the differences between the two. So by
having different standards, Ohio's system creates a group of
caregivers eligible for FCMPs and an ineligible group. The district
court was thus correct that the Plaintiffs, who are not "foster
family homes" under Title IV-E, are ineligible for FCMPS and failed
to state a claim.

Hence, the Plaintiffs were not held to Ohio's certification
standards and thus are ineligible for FCMPs. So although the text
is clear and the Sixth Circuit need not defer to HHS, their
interpretation reinforces what its interpretative tools tell it.

The Plaintiffs also argue that the Sixth Circuit's decision in D.O.
v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 382 (6th Cir. 2017) means that Ohio is
withholding FCMPs to relative caregivers solely because they are
relatives.

That would, of course, violate federal law, the Sixth Circuit
points out. But, it says, that is both a misreading of Glisson and
a mischaracterization of Ohio's foster-care system. In Glisson, the
plaintiff was an aunt caring for relative children. Kentucky denied
her FCMPs even though she had met Kentucky's safety standards,
including a background check and home evaluation. But after
acknowledging that states may waive non-safety standards, the Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the caregiver had met those standards. So it
concluded that "if Kentucky was denying benefits because the aunt
is related to the children, it is violating federal law." It then
remanded so the district court could determine other eligibility
requirements. In sum, Glisson did not hold that states may not
operate two foster-care systems with different standards, just that
states cannot determine Title IV-E eligibility on relation alone.

Ohio does not withhold FCMPs because a caregiver is related to a
child. Recognizing "Congress's preference for care of dependent
children by relatives," Ohio's foster system is structured to
initially place children with non-certified relatives, while
contemplating that those relative caregivers could become eligible
for FCMPs later. Non-certified relative caregivers can apply for
certification in Ohio and Ohio encourages them to do so. Ohio's
bifurcated system is set up with the understanding that many
relatives are not immediately ready to be certified under ODJFS'
standards when duty calls. But the KSP aims to keep children with
relatives by providing temporary funding to relative caregivers and
then encouraging them to become certified.

The Sixth Circuit opines that the district court properly
interpreted Section 672 in finding that caregivers like the
Plaintiffs, who are subject to different standards than "licensed"
caregivers are not "foster family homes," are ineligible to receive
FCMPs. Because Title IV-E of the Social Security Act requires that
all foster family homes eligible for payments under federal law
meet the same licensing standards, the Sixth Circuit agrees with
the district court that the Plaintiffs are not eligible to receive
the foster care maintenance payments. It affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 28, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ur6hrtwk from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Paul B. Lewis -- paul.lewis@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LLP
(US), Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellants. Mathura J. Sridharan,
OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for the
Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Paul B. Lewis, DLA PIPER LLP (US), Boston, Massachusetts,
Julie A. Gryce -- julie.gryce@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LLP (US),
San Diego, California, Daniel Turinsky --
daniel.turinsky@dlapiper.com -- Jonathan M. Kinney --
jonathan.kinney@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER LLP (US), New York, New
York.

Jay R. Langenbahn , Lindhorst & Dreidame, CO., L.P.A., Cincinnati,
Ohio,

Eric Thompson Ira Lustbader, Stephanie Persson, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS,
New York, New York, Richard F. Dawahare, RICHARD F. DAWAHARE, ESQ.,
Lexington, Kentucky, for the Appellants.

Mathura J. Sridharan, Benjamin M. Flowers, OFFICE OF THE OHIO
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for the Appellees.

Guenther Karl Fanter -- kfanter@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER & HOSTETLER
LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, Susan Baker Manning --
susan.manning@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.


PENNSYLVANIA: Court Approves Voluntary Dismissal of Graham v. DOC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Arthur J. Schwab of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Voluntarily Dismiss the lawsuit styled ZACHARY R. GRAHAM, KEVIN R.
SHAY, Plaintiffs v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Case No. 21cv0148 (W.D. Pa.).

Pro se Plaintiffs brought this case on Feb. 1, 2021, with the
filing of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Both Plaintiffs
are and were incarcerated in a State Correctional Institution in
Waynesburg, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Geene").

Although it is difficult to discern, it appears to the Court that
the Plaintiffs attempted to file a class action lawsuit contending
their rights as transgender and cis-gender inmates had been
violated under "Defendants' policy" (which was never explained or
defined).

What is clear, Judge Schwab says, is that many different Defendants
were served, many motions were filed in an attempt to get to the
heart of the claims being raised by the Plaintiffs, and the
Plaintiffs amended their complaint on numerous occasions.

United States Magistrate Judge Maureen Kelly held a telephonic
conference with Plaintiff Graham and Defense Counsel in October of
2021, and consistent with the discussions held during that
conference, Magistrate Judge Kelly denied the Plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction and TRO and dismissed their motion for
certification of class action.

Thereafter, on March 21, 2022, Magistrate Judge Kelly issued a
Report and Recommendation granting in part and denying in part the
Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim in the instant case.
After careful consideration of the matter, the Court issued an
Order on July 21, 2022, adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation.

Through the Report and Recommendation and subsequent Court Order,
the Plaintiffs were permitted to file a third amended complaint by
Aug. 11, 2022. In the meantime, the remaining Defendants filed
their Answer to the remaining claims averred by the Plaintiffs in
the Second Amended Complaint. The Defendants also requested that
the Court issue an Order to take the Plaintiffs' depositions.

Shortly thereafter, on Sept. 6, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice
of Voluntary Dismissal, which the Court has construed a Motion to
Voluntarily Dismiss the instant matter in accordance with Rule
41(a)(2).

The Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss of
the instant matter. The Clerk is ordered to mark this docket
closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Order of Court dated
Sept. 15, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4uujpm7k from
Leagle.com.


PLANNED LIFESTYLE: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Baxter Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
JULIUS BAXTER and ABDUL YAKUB, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. PLANNED LIFESTYLE
SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-08222 (S.D.N.Y., Sept.
26, 2022) asserts underpayment from the Defendant caused by
untimely wage payments, and seeks to recover damages for Plaintiffs
and similarly situated manual positions in violation of the New
York Labor Law.

Plaintiffs Baxter and Yakub were employed by the Defendant as
manual workers such as doorpersons and concierges from November
2017 through approximately March 2021, and from November 2021
through approximately March 2022 in Manhattan, New York City.

Planned Lifestyle Services, Inc. is a janitorial service company in
Parsippany-Troy Hills, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brian S. Schaffer, Esq.
          Dana M. Cimera, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375

POCLAIN HYDRAULICS: Arrobeullo Suit Seeks Assemblers' Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
JESSE ARROBEULLO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. POCLAIN HYDRAULICS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-01096 (E.D. Wis., September 21, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendant for failure to pay regular
wages and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws.

The Plaintiff worked as an assembler at the Defendant's Sturtevant,
Wisconsin location from January 2022 until September 2022.

Poclain Hydraulics, Inc. is a manufacturer of hydraulic pumps,
parts, and motors, with its principal place of business at 1300
Grandview Parkway, Sturtevant, Wisconsin. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         James A. Walcheske, Esq.
         Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
         David M. Potteiger, Esq.
         WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
         235 N. Executive Drive, Suite 240
         Brookfield, WI 53005
         Telephone: (262) 780-1953
         Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
         E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                 sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                 dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com

PROTECTIVE LIFE: Advance Trust Appeals Judgment to 11th Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------
ADVANCE TRUST & LIFE ESCROW SERVICES, LTA is taking an appeal from
a court order granting judgment in favor of defendants in the
lawsuit styled Advance Trust & Life Escrow Services, LTA, as
securities intermediary for Life Partners Position Holder Trust,
and Worth Johnson, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Protective Life Insurance Company,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01290-MHH, in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, this class
action is brought by the Plaintiff on behalf of similarly situated
owners of life insurance policies issued by the Defendant who have
been forced to pay unlawful and excessive cost of insurance
charges. The Plaintiff seeks damages against the Defendant for
breach of contract.

The Defendant filed its first motion for judgment and asked the
Court to enter judgment in its favor based on the Plaintiff's
factual allegations. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff's
claims were time barred, either by Alabama's applicable statute of
limitations or its common-law rule of repose.

Judge Karon O. Bowdre, however, denied the Defendant's first motion
for judgment.

Less than two months later, Protective Life filed its second motion
for judgment on the pleadings. On August 20, 2021, Judge Bowdre
recused, and the case was reassigned to Judge Madeline Hughes
Haikala.

In her ruling, Judge Haikala agreed with Protective Life that the
"based on" statement on its policies does not connote exclusivity
and that Protective Life may rely on factors other than
expectations of future mortality experience in setting cost of
insurance (COI) rates. Contrary to the Plaintiff's arguments, the
Court found no language in the COI rate provisions in the policies
at issue that obligates Protective Life to reassess COI rates
monthly. For these reasons, the Court granted Protective Life's
second motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The appellate case is captioned as Advance Trust & Life Escrow
Services, LTA v. Protective Life Insurance Company, Case No.
22-12991, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, filed on September 6, 2022.

Plaintiff-Appellant ADVANCE TRUST & LIFE ESCROW SERVICES, LTA, as
securities intermediary for Life Partners Position Holder Trust,
and Worth Johnson, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, is represented by:

            Seth D. Ard, Esq.
            Ravi Bhalla, Esq.
            SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
            1301 Avenue of the Americas, Fl. 32
            New York, NY 10019
            Telephone: (212) 336-8330

                   - and -

            Glenn C. Bridgman, Esq.
            Steven G. Sklaver, Esq.
            SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
            1900 Avenue of The Stars, Ste. 1400
            Los Angeles, CA 90067
            Telephone: (310) 789-3104

                   - and -

            Ryan C. Kirkpatrick, Esq.
            DEWEY & LEBOEUF, LLP
            1301 Avenue of The Americas
            New York, NY 10019-6092
            Telephone: (212) 259-8000

                   - and -

            Barry Alan Ragsdale, Esq.
            DOMINICK FELD HYDE, PC
            1130 22nd St., S. Ste. 4000
            Birmingham, AL 35205
            Telephone: (205) 536-8888

                   - and -

            Alejandra Salinas, Esq.
            SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
            1000 Louisiana St., Ste. 5100
            Houston, TX 77002
            Telephone: (713) 653-7801

Defendant-Appellee PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY is represented
by:

            Lee Edmundson Bains, Jr., Esq.
            Thomas Julian Butler, Esq.
            Katharine Anne Weber, Esq.
            Mary Caroline Wynn, Esq.
            MAYNARD COOPER & GALE, PC
            1901 6th Ave., N Ste. 1700
            Birmingham, AL 35203
            Telephone: (205) 254-1000

                   - and -

            Rachel Hampton, Esq.
            Eric S. Mattson, Esq.
            SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP
            1 S. Dearborn St.
            Chicago, IL 60603
            Telephone: (312) 853-7000

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Faces Class Action Over Privacy Violations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Adrianne Appel, writing for Compliance Week, reports that Samsung
collected too much personal data from customers and failed to
adequately secure it, leading to two data breaches this year and
potentially millions of harmed individuals, a class-action lawsuit
filed in September alleges.

The complaint, filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, claims Samsung violated the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) by failing to protect the personally
identifiable information (PII) of California residents. The
lawsuit's two plaintiffs, on behalf of the class, question whether
Samsung "implemented and maintained reasonable security procedures
and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to
protect the PII under the CCPA."

The lawsuit also alleges violations of the Michigan Identify Theft
Protection Act for Samsung failing to timely disclose the second of
the two breaches it suffered this year. [GN]


SAN ANTONIO, TX: Court Vacates Class Certification in Blair Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Michael SHANNON, Director of Development Services
Department, City of San Antonio, Texas; and City of San Antonio,
Texas, Appellants v. Arlene W. BLAIR and Plaintiff Class
Petitioners, Appellees, Case No. 04-21-00257-CV (Tex. App.), the
Court of Appeals of Texas for the Fourth District, San Antonio,
reverses the trial court's denial of the Appellants' plea to the
jurisdiction, vacates the trial court's grant of the motion for
class certification, and renders judgment for the City dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction.

The dispute concerns the City's enforcement of certain ordinances
requiring owners to keep their properties and abutting alleys free
of garbage and overgrown brush. Blair and a putative class of San
Antonio property owners in the Dellcrest and Eastwood Village
subdivisions own properties abutting alleys. They sued the City
seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the City
owned the alleys, and therefore Blair and the putative class were
not required to maintain the alleys.

After filing suit, Blair and the putative class moved to certify
the class. The City followed that motion by filing a plea to the
jurisdiction, arguing Blair did not have standing and the claims
were barred by governmental immunity. After a hearing on the
motions and additional filings by the parties, the trial court
signed an order denying the plea to the jurisdiction and granting
the class certification motion.

The appeal followed. The City challenges Blair's pleadings and
jurisdictional facts, arguing Blair does not have standing because
she has not alleged anything more than a speculative injury no
different from the public, and has shown no evidence of injury.
Blair argues she has standing because injunctive and declaratory
relief are required to stop the threat of the City's enforcement of
ordinances requiring her to maintain alleys she does not own.

To maintain standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact
that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that the injury is fairly
traceable to the defendant's challenged action; and (3) that it is
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.

First, the City argues the trial court erred in permitting Blair to
amend her pleading after the hearing on the two motions because she
cannot correct chronic jurisdictional defects to maintain
jurisdiction in the case. The crux of the City's contention is
Blair filed additional evidence after the hearing. However, its
objection to the trial court's consideration of such evidence is
without merit.

The Court of Appeals carefully considers the allegations in the
original petition, along with any relevant evidence, in determining
whether Blair has standing. Reviewing the pleadings in Blair's
favor, taking as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovants, and
indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in
the nonmovant's favor, it opines that the City has failed to
conclusively demonstrate there is no genuine issue of fact as to
whether Blair has standing. As Blair has alleged, and as the
evidence shows, the City has issued notices to residences to keep
the alleys clean and unobstructed at all times to remain in
compliance with the ordinances, and Blair provides a list of
residences receiving the notices which include residents in her
neighborhood and on her block. Blair's petition provides she has
been forced to maintain the alley under the threat of having the
ordinances enforced against her. And the City has presented no
relevant evidence to contradict Blair.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, cannot conclude the trial court
erred when it denied the plea to the jurisdiction on standing
grounds.

The City also argues Blair's first declaratory judgment claim is
unripe. Issues affecting subject-matter jurisdiction, like
ripeness, may be raised for the first time on appeal, including
interlocutory appeal. Ripeness is a component of subject matter
jurisdiction that focuses on a lawsuit's timing" and is subject to
de novo review.

Reviewing the pleadings in Blair's favor, taking as true all
evidence favorable to the nonmovants, and indulging every
reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's
favor, the Court of Appeals finds that the City has not established
by undisputed evidence Blair's claim is unripe. Even if Blair has
not been fined, the City has served notices on residents stating
they must ensure the alleys remain clean and there is a dispute
over whether the residents are required to keep the alleys clean.
And Blair states she has been forced to maintain the alleys behind
her house even though she does not own the alleys. Such a dispute
is not merely academic or theoretical. And the controversy would be
resolved by a declaration stating the residents were under no
obligation to maintain the alleys. Like the issue of standing, the
City has presented no relevant evidence to contradict Blair.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, cannot conclude Blair's claim is
unripe.

The City also argues governmental immunity applies to Blair's suit
because Blair is not challenging the ordinances' validity or
constitutionality and only seeks a declaration construing her
rights under the ordinance. Blair admits she is not challenging the
ordinances' validity but argues governmental immunity does not
apply because she is suing Shannon under the ultra vires exception
to immunity for his imminent enforcement of the ordinances against
Blair and the putative class.

The City argues Blair has failed to plead a claim within the ultra
vires exception to immunity because Blair has failed to plead any
facts indicating Shannon acted without legal authority or outside
the scope of his duties as the Director of Development Services and
Head Enforcement Officer for San Antonio. She argues she seeks a
declaratory judgment that Shannon is acting outside his legal
authority -- i.e., ultra vires -- if he enforces the alley
ordinances against her and the putative class members as owners
because the City owns the alleys.

To fall within the ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain
of a government officer's exercise of discretion, but rather must
allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal
authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. A
government officer acts without legal authority if the officer's
exercise of judgment or limited discretion is "without reference to
or in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing the
official to act." If the law authorizing the government officer to
act grants the officer "absolute discretion -- free decision-making
without any constraints" -- a challenge to the exercise of
discretion under such a law is barred by governmental immunity.

Ms. Blair contends the ultra vires act in the first declaratory
judgment claim is "the attempted application of the maintenance
responsibility to 'owners' under ordinance sections 14-61 and
14-64, when the Plaintiffs are not true 'owners.'" Shannon is
therefore acting without authority and not in compliance with the
ordinances.

The Court of Appeals holds that to decide whether governmental
immunity bars the first declaratory judgment claim, it must
determine the grant of authority to Shannon under the ordinances at
issue. Because the enforcement of the ordinance is within the
City's authority and Blair only challenges the ordinance's
application, not its validity or constitutionality, governmental
immunity bars Blair's claim. Assuming for the sake of argument
governmental immunity does not bar the claims because Blair and the
putative class challenge only the application of the ordinance,
section 14-64 establishes the City's enforcement of the ordinance
is discretionary. In other words, the City decides when to enforce
the ordinance. Such broad discretion in enforcement is protected by
governmental immunity and falls outside the ultra vires exception.

Because Blair's first declaratory judgment claim does not fall
within the ultra vires exception of governmental immunity, the
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.

Turning to Blair's second declaratory judgment claim, Blair and the
putative class seek a declaration that actual and threatened
enforcement of the ordinances requiring the landowners to provide
maintenance to the alleys is an unconstitutional taking under
article 1, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. In opposition to
Blair's claim, the City urges Blair simply attempts to recast a
takings claim as a declaratory judgment claim and did not plead any
actual payments made in connection with a violation of the
ordinance. Blair responds she is not pursuing a takings claim, but
is instead seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for a "threat
of constitutional taking of her money as property." Blair argues,
at the same time, she has properly pleaded a takings claim.

The Court of Appeals notes that the real substance of Blair's
petition and evidence is to posit the City owns the alleys, and it
cannot enforce the public nuisance and alley maintenance ordinances
against Blair and the class because they are not the owners. This
is supported by Blair's request for relief in the petition: a
declaratory judgment that she and the putative class have no
obligation to maintain dedicated alleys abutting their property
because they are not the "owners" under the ordinances. In other
words, Blair's second claim is just a restatement of her first
claim, and the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear it.

Even if Blair's claim was actually a takings claim for money
damages, the Court of Appeals points out that Blair's claim is
brought as an ultra vires claim against appellant Shannon in his
official capacity. Ultra vires claimants are only entitled to
prospective relief, like declaratory relief, not retrospective
relief like money damages for takings. Nothing in the record shows
Blair sought administrative relief, and the trial court therefore
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Blair's second claim.

Because both of Blair's declaratory judgment claims fall outside
the ultra vires exception, the claims are barred by governmental
immunity, and the trial court erred in denying the plea to the
jurisdiction.

The question then becomes whether Blair and the putative class are
entitled to an opportunity to amend. Texas courts allow parties to
replead unless their pleadings demonstrate incurable defects. Texas
law does not favor striking defective pleadings without providing
plaintiffs an opportunity to replead. Thus, so long as petitioners'
pleading does not affirmatively demonstrate the absence of
jurisdiction, they should be given an opportunity to amend.

In the case, the petition alleges Shannon's enforcement of the
ordinances is outside his legal authority because Blair and the
putative class are not "owners" under the ordinances. However, the
plain language of the ordinances show it is the City's authority,
not Shannon's, to enforce the ordinances, and the City's immunity
is not waived. Because the allegations affirmatively negate a
waiver of immunity, the petition demonstrates an incurable defect.
Blair and the putative class are therefore not entitled to an
opportunity to replead and are not granted one. For these reasons,
the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's denial of the plea
to the jurisdiction and dismisses the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Finally, because the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the Court of Appeals vacates the portion of the trial court's order
granting class certification.

In sum, the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's June 29,
2021 order denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction, it vacates
the portion of that order granting class certification, and it
renders judgment granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and
dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 28, 2022 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/2w84a8pc from Leagle.com.


SARA LEE: Settlement Fairness Hearing in Mislabeling Suit Set Nov.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Attention All United States Purchasers of Sara Lee All Butter Pound
Cake Between April 27, 2017, and July 29, 2022

A proposed Settlement has been reached in a class action lawsuit
("lawsuit") called Grayer v. Sara Lee Frozen Bakery, LLC, Case No.
2022LA000002, filed in the Third Judicial Circuit of Madison
County, Illinois.

The lawsuit contends that the Sara Lee Products were
inappropriately marketed as being "All Butter Pound Cake." Sara Lee
Frozen Bakery, LLC ("Defendant") denies any wrongdoing and denies
all of the allegations made in the lawsuit. Defendant contends that
the Products have always been truthfully marketed and labeled.
Defendant has settled this case to avoid further litigation and
distraction of resources from its business.

You are included in the Settlement if you meet all the following
criteria:

Purchased Sara Lee Products that contain the labeling "All Butter
Pound Cake";
Purchased between April 27, 2017, and July 29, 2022;
Purchased in the United States; and
Purchased for personal use and not resale.
To settle the case, Defendant has agreed to:
Change its labeling practices; and
Provide a Settlement Benefit of:
$1.00 per Product purchased, up to 5 Products or $5.00 per
Household, to Claimants who file a valid Claim Form and do not have
Proof of Purchase.
$1.00 per Product up to 20 Products or $20.00 per Household, to
Claimants who file a valid Claim Form and have a Proof of Purchase.


For avoidance of doubt, a Settlement Class Member may file a single
Claim Form and only one valid claim per Household is eligible for a
Settlement Benefit. "Household" is defined as indicia that
Settlement Class Members reside in the same residence (i.e., they
share the same mailing address, same payment account, or other
evidence of sharing a residence). The minimum payment for any valid
Claim Form shall be $3.00 per Household, regardless of whether
Proof of Purchase is filed along with the Claim Form.

The total combined Settlement Benefits for all Settlement Class
Members is limited to $1,000,000.00. If the total amount of valid
claims exceeds $1,000,000.00, then the distribution to Settlement
Class Members will be reduced on a pro rata basis.

The lawyers who brought the lawsuit will ask the Court for up to
$400,000.00 to be paid by Defendants as attorneys' fees and
expenses for investigating the facts, litigating the case, and
negotiating the Settlement. They will also ask for $2,500.00 for
the Plaintiff who brought this lawsuit. That payment is called the
"Class Representative Service Award."

Your legal rights are affected whether you act or don't act. Read
the Notice carefully.

The Notice summarizes the proposed Settlement. For the precise
terms and conditions of the Settlement, please see the Settlement
Agreement available here, or contact the Settlement Administrator.

PLEASE DO NOT TELEPHONE THE COURT OR THE COURT CLERK'S OFFICE TO
INQUIRE ABOUT THIS SETTLEMENT OR THE CLAIM PROCESS.

YOUR RIGHTS AND OPTIONS IN THIS SETTLEMENT
Submit a Claim Form
The only way to receive payment under the Settlement for your
purchases.
DEADLINE
October 11, 2022

Opt-Out Get out of the lawsuit and the Settlement. This is the only
option that allows you to ever bring or join another lawsuit
raising the same legal claims against the Defendant. You will
receive no payment from this Settlement. (If you want to opt-out of
the Settlement, you must submit a written Request for:

Exclusion that includes the requirements under the Settlement
Agreement and must do so by the Opt-Out/Exclusion Deadline.)

File Objection Write to the Court about any aspect of the
Settlement you don't like or you don't think is fair, adequate, or
reasonable. Any Objection must also be served on the Parties.

Go to a Hearing Speak in Court about the Settlement. (If you object
to any aspect of the Settlement, you must submit a written
Objection by the Objection Deadline noted above and complete other
requirements under the Settlement Agreement.)
November 17, 2022 at 9 a.m. CT

These rights and options—and the deadlines to exercise them—are
explained in the Notice.

The Court in charge of this case still has to decide whether to
approve the Settlement. Settlement Benefit payments will be made to
Settlement Class Members only if the Court approves the Settlement.
If there are appeals, payments will not be made until the appeals
are resolved and the Settlement becomes effective. Please be
patient.

Final Approval Hearing

On November 17, 2022 at 9 a.m. CT, the Court will hold a hearing to
determine: (1) whether the proposed Settlement should be approved
as fair, reasonable, and adequate and should receive final
approval; (2) the Released Claims of the Settlement Class against
the Released Parties should be dismissed with prejudice; (3)
whether Class Counsel's Fee Application for a Fee Award should be
granted; and (4) whether the application for the Class
Representative Service Award payment should be granted. The hearing
will be held in the Third Judicial Circuit of Madison County,
Illinois, 155 N. Main Street Edwardsville, IL 62025. The hearing
will be held in the courtroom of the Honorable Judge Smith. This
hearing date may change without further notice to you. Consult this
Settlement Website, or the Court docket in this case available
through the Court's website (www.co.madison.il.us), for updated
information on the hearing date and time.

This website is authorized by the Court, supervised by Counsel and
controlled by Kroll Settlement Administration LLC, the Settlement
Administrator approved by the Court. This is the only authorized
website for this case.

Call(833) 620-3581
Emailinfo@buttercakesettlement.com
MailGrayer v. Sara Lee Frozen Bakery, LLC
Kroll Settlement Administration LLC
P.O. Box 5324
New York, NY 10150-5324 [GN]

SCOUT ENERGY: Underpays Gas Royalties, Cooper-Clark Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
THE COOPER-CLARK FOUNDATION, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SCOUT ENERGY MANAGEMENT,
LLC; SCOUT ENERGY GROUP III, LP; SCOUT ENERGY PARTNERS III-A, LP;
SCOUT ENERGY PARTNERS III-B, LP; SCOUT ENERGY GROUP V, LP; SCOUT
ENERGY PARTNERS CO-INVEST V-A, LP; and SCOUT ENERGY PARTNERS V-A,
LP, Defendants, Case No. 5:22-cv-04048-KHV-ADM (D. Kan., September
21, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for breach of
lease.

The case arises from the Defendants' practice of underpaying
royalties owed to the Plaintiff and similarly situated royalty
owners. Under their lease agreement, the Defendants are required to
pay royalties on gas. The Defendants concealed the systematic
underpayment of royalty from the Plaintiff and Class members by
falsely representing on the check stubs provided monthly to the
Plaintiff and the Class that the Defendants were paying royalty on
the full volume and value of production from their wells, when in
fact, they were not. As a result of the Defendants' breaches, the
Plaintiff and Class members have been damaged through underpayment
of the actual royalty amounts due under the leases, says the suit.

The Cooper-Clark Foundation is a not-for-profit corporation, with
its principal place of business in Liberal, Kansas.

Scout Energy Management, LLC is an oil and gas production company,
with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas.

Scout Energy Group III, LP is an oil and gas production company,
with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas.

Scout Energy Partners III-A, LP is an oil and gas production
company, with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas.

Scout Energy Partners III-B, LP is an oil and gas production
company, with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas.

Scout Energy Group V, LP is an oil and gas production company, with
its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas.

Scout Energy Partners Co-Invest V-A, LP is an oil and gas
production company, with its principal place of business in Dallas,
Texas.

Scout Energy Partners V-A, LP is an oil and gas production company,
with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Scott B. Goodger, Esq.
         Larkin E. Walsh, Esq.
         Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
         SHARP LAW, LLP
         4820 W. 75th St.
         Prairie Village, KS 66208
         Telephone: (913) 901- 0505
         Facsimile: (913) 901-0419
         E-mail: rsharp@midwest-law.com
                 lwalsh@midwest-law.com
                 sgoodger@midwest-law.com

SENTINEL INSURANCE: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Buffalo Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirms
the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint in the
lawsuit styled BUFFALO XEROGRAPHIX, INC., SHATKIN F.I.R.S.T. LLC,
and TODD E. SHATKIN DDS PLLC, for themselves and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated policyholders, Plaintiffs-Appellants v.
SENTINEL INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST, THE HARTFORD
INSURANCE GROUP a.k.a. THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees, HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD
ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY OF
ILLINOIS, HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, NEW ENGLAND
INSURANCE COMPANY, NEW ENGLAND REINSURANCE CORPORATION, PACIFIC
INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
OF HARTFORD, TRUMBULL INSURANCE COMPANY, and TWIN CITY FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 21-1502 (2nd Cir.).

The Plaintiffs-Appellants are New York businesses representing a
putative class of similarly situated businesses affected by
Governor Andrew Cuomo's order of business closures in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. The businesses appeal the district court's
dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of a putative class action
complaint against various insurers, who denied coverage for losses
that resulted from those closures. In the proceedings before the
district court, the businesses claimed to be entitled to insurance
coverage because the closures in response to COVID-19 were "direct
physical losses" under the insurers' policies. The businesses
sought relief for breach of contract and for violation of New
York's General Business Law Section 349.

The district court dismissed the complaint in two separate orders.
First, the district court held that the Hartford Insurance Group
("HIG") was not responsible for insurance policies that its
subsidiaries issued to the businesses. The district court,
therefore, granted the Hartford Insurance Group's motion to
dismiss, Buffalo Xerographix, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 540
F.Supp.3d 382, 392-93 (W.D.N.Y. 2021). Second, the district court
held that the businesses failed to state a claim against the
subsidiary insurers because the state-mandated closures did not
qualify as a "direct physical loss" eligible for insurance
coverage.

The Court of Appeals affirms the judgment of the district court. It
opines that HIG cannot be held liable for the insurance policies
issued by its subsidiaries because it was not a signatory to those
policies, and it neither authorized its subsidiaries to act as its
agents in issuing the policies nor created appearances of authority
in the subsidiaries to issue policies for it. The businesses also
cannot state a claim against the subsidiary insurers because the
closures due to COVID-19 do not qualify as a direct physical loss
under the policies.

                                I

The businesses argue that HIG evinced an intent to be bound by the
insurance policies of its subsidiaries because each of the
insurance policies displayed the HIG logo and corporate officers of
HIG signed the policies and are referenced throughout the contract.
As the district court observed, however, the use of a parent
company's logo is not enough to make the parent company a signatory
to a contract. The insurance policies define the counterparty as
"the Company providing this insurance," namely the subsidiary
insurers, and the policy language does not contradict that
definition.

The businesses also argue that HIG may be liable for the policies
under an agency theory. A principal may be bound by the
representations of its agent if the principal's words or conduct
addressed to the agent sustain a reasonable express or implied
inference "that the principal has consented to the agent's
performance of a particular act" or if the principal creates
appearances that reasonably cause a third person to believe that
the principal consents to have an act done on his behalf by the
person purporting to act for him, the Court of Appeals opines,
citing Minskoff v. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co., 98 F.3d 703,
708 (2d Cir. 1996).

As the district court correctly noted, a reasonable observer would
not infer that HIG intended to be bound by the insurance policies
issued by its subsidiaries, according to the Court of Appeals. The
policies clearly indicate that each contract was between the
insured party and the subsidiary insurer. Each subsidiary insurer
maintained its own pool of risk, for which the other subsidiaries
and affiliates were not responsible. HIG did not, either expressly
or impliedly, authorize its subsidiary insurers to issue policies
on its behalf, and it did not create appearances that would
reasonably lead third persons to believe that the subsidiaries were
so authorized.

                               II

The businesses argue that the losses associated with the closure of
businesses due to COVID-19 qualify as "direct physical loss" under
the insurance policies and, therefore, should be covered by the
subsidiary insurers. The businesses point to a Virus Exclusion
Clause and a Virus Limitation Clause that the subsidiary insurers
have included in other policies but did not include the policies at
issue here. Those clauses, introduced in response to the SARS
epidemic of 2006, limit or exclude coverage for direct physical
loss or damage "caused by" a virus. The businesses argue that these
clauses indicate that "direct physical loss" may be caused by a
virus and that the closures due to COVID-19 are such a direct
physical loss.

The Court of Appeals says it need not decide whether direct
physical loss may be caused by viruses in other circumstances. It
has already held that closures of businesses due to the presence of
COVID-19 do not qualify as a "direct physical loss," citing 10012
Holdings v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 21 F.4th 216, 220-21 (2d Cir.
2021).

The Court of Appeals opines that neither the availability of a
Virus Exclusion or Limitation Clause nor the businesses' allegation
that COVID-19 was present at their properties leads to a different
conclusion in this case. Even if there are circumstances in which a
virus might cause the actual physical loss of or damage to
property, the presence of COVID-19 on surfaces at a retail store or
office would not cause the store or office to be physically lost or
damaged. Accordingly, the businesses cannot state a claim, and the
Court affirms the judgment of the district court.

                              * * *

The Court of Appeals has considered the Appellants' remaining
arguments, which it concludes are without merit. For these reasons,
the Court of Appeals affirms the judgment of the district court.

PRESENT: Pierre N. Leval, Barrington D. Parker, Steven J. Menashi

A full-text copy of the Court's Summary Order dated Sept. 15, 2022,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/2uy4hub5 from Leagle.com.

CHRISTOPHER M. BERLOTH -- cberloth@dhpglaw.com -- (Charles C.
Ritter, Jr. -- critter@dhpglaw.com -- Steven W. Klutkowski --
sklutkowski@dhpglaw.com -- and Thomas D. Lyons --
tlyons@dhpglaw.com -- on the brief), Duke Holzman Photiadis &
Gresens LLP, in Buffalo, New York, for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

ANJALI S. DALAL -- adalal@wiggin.com -- Wiggin & Dana LLP, in New
York City (Jonathan M. Freiman -- jfreiman@wiggin.com -- Wiggin &
Dana LLP, in New Haven, Connecticut, and Charles A. Michael --
cmichael@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, in New York City, on
the brief), for the Defendants-Appellees.


SG PIZZA: Aragon Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Restaurant Staff
------------------------------------------------------------
BAUDELIO ARAGON and JOAN ANAYA, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SG PIZZA, INC. d/b/a ZESTY
PIZZERIA, SALVATORE GRIMALDI, and STEPHANO GRIMALDI, Defendants,
Case No. 1:22-cv-08072 (S.D.N.Y., September 21, 2022) is a class
action against the Defendants for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and unpaid wages in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

Plaintiffs Aragon and Anaya worked at Zesty Pizzeria as cooks, food
preparers, and dishwashers from June 2015 until May 2022 and June
2022, respectively.

SG Pizza, Inc. is an owner and operator of a restaurant under the
name Zesty Pizzeria, located at 1670 3rd Avenue, New York, New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                
      
         C.K. Lee, Esq.
         Anne Seelig, Esq.
         LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
         148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
         New York, NY 10011
         Telephone: (212) 465-1180
         Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

SHIMMICK CONSTRUCTION: Faces Bulger Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
STEFFAN BULGER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SHIMMICK CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. and DOES
#1 through #10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 8:22-cv-01756 (C.D.
Cal., Sept. 26, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New Jersey
State Wage and Hour Law, and the New Jersey Wage Payment Law by
failing to pay Plaintiff proper overtime compensation.

Plaintiff Bulger works for Defendant Shimmick Construction as a
rail traffic controller and assistant train master since July 1,
2020. Bulger asserts that throughout his employment with Shimmick,
he has been paid the same hourly rate for all hours worked
including those in excess of 40 in a workweek.

Shimmick Construction Company, Inc. operates as an independent
company with commitment to water, transportation, and transit
projects.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew S. Parmet, Esq.
          PARMET PC
          340 S. Lemon Ave., #1228
          Walnut, CA 91789
          Telephone: (310) 928-1277  
          E-mail: matt@parmet.law

SOUTH BY SOUTHWEST: Insurers Not Required to Cover Suit Costs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Cooke, writing for Complete Music Update, reports that a US
judge concluded that the insurers of South By Southwest are not
required to cover the costs that the festival incurred when dealing
with a class action lawsuit in relation to its COVID-caused
cancellation in 2020.

District judge Robert Pitman basically accepted the recommendations
that magistrate judge Susan Hightower made earlier this year in
relation to the dispute between SXSW and Federal Insurance Co.

The SXSW music conference and showcase festival was one of the
first major music events to cancel as the COVID pandemic first
started to spike in the US back in 2020. Ticket holders were told
that they could defer their tickets to either the 2021, 2022 or
2023 editions of the festival.

However, some ticket holders reckoned that they should have been
given the option of a cash refund, and they filed a class action
lawsuit accusing the festival of, among other things, breach of
contract.

That lawsuit was ultimately settled. But the whole thing prompted a
second lawsuit, after Federal declined to cover SXSW's legal costs
in relation to the class action. Because it's alway fun when
lawsuits result in lawsuits.

Federal said that SXSW's insurance policy had a professional
services exclusion and that applied in this case. For its part,
SXSW said that the insurer was employing an "overboard
interpretation" of that particular exclusion. However, in a ruling
in May, Hightower sided with the insurance firm.

It was for then for Pitman to decide whether to take Hightower's
recommendation. SXSW urged him not too, arguing that the magistrate
judge -- like the insurer -- had also interpreted the exclusion
clause in the insurance policy too widely. But those latest
arguments in the case were not successful.

Pitman's ruling states simply: "On this date, the court adopted US
magistrate judge Susan Hightower's report and recommendation
concerning plaintiff SXSW LLC's motion for partial summary judgment
and defendant Federal Insurance Company's motion for summary
judgment".

That means "the court's order denied SXSW's partial motion for
summary judgment, and granted Federal's motion for summary
judgment. The court dismissed SXSW's claims". [GN]

STARNET INSURANCE: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Alltru Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALLTRU FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, f/k/a 1st FINANCIAL
CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff v. STARNET INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. 4:21-CV-01334-JAR (E.D. Mo.), Judge John A. Ross of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, grants in part and denies in part Starnet's motion to
dismiss.

The lawsuit is an action seeking insurance coverage and related
damages. Alltru seeks to enforce its insurer's alleged coverage
obligations for damages incurred litigating and settling a consumer
class action lawsuit filed against it in state court. Starnet moves
to dismiss, arguing there was no potential for coverage under its
policy and therefore no duty to defend Alltru from the underlying
claims or to indemnify it against the resulting damages.

During the relevant time period, Alltru, a federally chartered
credit union, was insured by StarNet under Management Liability
Insurance Policy number MLP 6014300-11. The Policy insured it
against loss resulting from, among other things, a "lending act"
through coverage labeled "Company Lender Liability" (Insuring
Agreement E) with a policy limit of $250,000; loss resulting from a
"third-party harassment act" through coverage labeled "Third Party
Harassment Liability" (Insuring Agreement I) with a policy limit of
$1 million; and loss resulting from an "electronic publishing act"
through coverage labeled "Electronic Publishing" (Insuring
Agreement K) with a policy limit of $1 million.

In July 2019, a consumer class action lawsuit was filed against
Alltru in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City, Missouri (the
"Underlying Lawsuit") alleging that Alltru failed to issue
UCC-compliant notices pertaining to repossessed collateral for
consumer loans. The class members further alleged that Alltru
reported false and derogatory credit information related to the
repossessions to consumer credit reporting agencies. The class
members alleged that they suffered property damages from the loss
of use of tangible property, as well as personal injury damages in
the form of defamation and harm to credit worthiness.

Alltru notified Starnet of the Underlying Lawsuit and made demand
on Starnet to defend and indemnify Alltru for the resulting
damages. In response, Starnet issued an initial reservation of
rights letter agreeing to defend Alltru but reserving its rights to
deny coverage. On March 11, 2020, Starnet acknowledged coverage
under Insuring Agreement E, but declined coverage under Insuring
Agreements I and K.

Alltru ultimately settled the Underlying Lawsuit with a cash fund
of $4.75 million and then filed this action against Starnet in the
Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Missouri. Alltru alleges
claims for breach of contract (Count I); bad faith refusal to
defend and indemnify (Count II); and vexatious refusal to pay
(Count III). Starnet removed the case to this Court on Nov. 10,
2021 based upon diversity of citizenship and then moved to
dismiss.

The issue for the Court's determination is whether Alltru has
stated sufficient factual allegations to plausibly show a potential
for coverage under the Policy. Starnet argues that the Underlying
Lawsuit alleges only "lending acts," i.e., an "error, misstatement,
misleading statement, act, omission, neglect, or breach of duty" by
the company or company personnel "in connection with or relating to
(d) the restructure, termination, transfer, repossession or
foreclosure of a loan, lease or extension of credit." Therefore,
there is no possibility of coverage under the Policy other than
what it has already provided under Insuring Agreement E.

In response, Alltru contends that the Underlying Lawsuit pleads
defamation and invasion of privacy claims that are within the scope
of coverage afforded by Insuring Agreements I and K. Alternatively,
it argues that a justiciable controversy exists regarding Starnet's
coverage obligations.

Judge Ross concludes there was no possibility of coverage under
Insuring Agreement I because the damages claimed in the Underlying
Lawsuit were not caused by a "third party harassment act." Thus,
Starnet had no duty to defend or indemnify Alltru under Insuring
Agreement I. Judge Ross cannot conclude, however, that there was no
possibility of coverage under Insuring Agreement K based on the
allegations in the Underlying Lawsuit. Questions of fact exist as
to whether the damages claimed were caused by an "electronic
publishing act."

Accordingly, Judge Ross grants Starnet's motion to dismiss as to
Insuring Agreement I and denies as to Insuring Agreement K.
Starnet's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part
in accordance with the rulings herein.

A scheduling conference will be set by separate order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/4k9as988 from Leagle.com.


SUBARU OF AMERICA: Agrees to Settle Class Suit Over Battery Defect
------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Huffman, writing for ConsumerAffairs, reports that Subaru
owners who have noticed their batteries run down faster than normal
may be entitled to compensation. The automaker has agreed to a
settlement of a class action lawsuit, according to Top Class
Actions, a publication that covers legal matters.

The report said the settlement will cover current and former owners
and lessees of the Outback, Forester, Legacy, and WRX from the
2015-2020 model years. The settlement also covers the 2019-2020
Ascent, except for consumers living in Alaska or Hawaii.

The suit claimed the batteries in these vehicles had insufficient
capacity to support vehicle components when the vehicle is not
running. As a result, the plaintiffs alleged the battery ran down
prematurely.

Inderjit, or Saratoga, Calif., said he has owned three Subaru
Outbacks and only the third one has given him trouble -
specifically, a battery that lost power.

"I guess it was a lemon and took it to dealer and they did not
perform any diagnostic check on why it died and simply recharged
the battery," Inderjit wrote in a ConsumerAffairs review. "At the
new Subaru dealer, my car was kept for almost a day, findings were
battery was weak and they recharged it. I tried to contact the
Customer Advocacy dept again but did not get a response. I'm now
nervous on when and where my battery will be dead again. A brand
new car owner should not have such experiences."

Suit claims company knew about the problem
The lawsuit argues that Subaru executives were aware there were
problems with the batteries in certain models but took no action.

"Subaru had a duty to disclose the true quality and reliability of
the Class Vehicles because the knowledge of the Defect and its
details were known and/or accessible only to Subaru; Subaru had
superior knowledge and access to the relevant facts; and Subaru
knew the facts were not known to, or reasonably discoverable by,
Plaintiff and Class Members," the plaintiffs wrote.

In agreeing to settle the case, Subaru does not admit to any
wrongdoing. While affected consumers are expected to receive
compensation, court documents did not reveal the financial details
of the settlement. [GN]

TRULIEVE INC: Bittlingmeyer Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
---------------------------------------------------------------
CARLY BITTLINGMEYER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TRULIEVE, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 0:22-cv-61804-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Sept. 26, 2022) is a putative
class action brought against the Defendant pursuant to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Florida Telephone
Solicitation Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant engages in unsolicited
text messaging to promote its cannabis products and dispensaries to
individuals who have registered their telephone numbers on the
National Do-Not-Call Registry, to those who have not provided
Defendant with their prior express written consent as required by
the FTSA, and to consumers who have requested for the messages to
stop, including Plaintiff.

The Defendant also engages in telemarketing without the requisite
policies and procedures and training required under the TCPA and
its implementing regulations. The Defendant's telephonic sales
calls have caused Plaintiff and the Class members harm, including
violations of their statutory rights, statutory damages, annoyance,
nuisance, and invasion of their privacy, says the suit.

Trulieve, Inc. is a medical and recreational cannabis and
cannabidiol products provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.  
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713  
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street Suite 1744
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

VIDHI HOSPITALITY: Fails to Properly Pay Hotel Staff, Head Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
AMANDA HEAD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. VIDHI HOSPITALITY, INC. and HITESHBHAI
PATEL, Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-00539 (W.D. Wis., September 21,
2022) is a class action against the Defendants for failure to pay
appropriate minimum wages and overtime wages in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Ms. Head worked for the Defendants as a hotel employee.

Vidhi Hospitality, Inc. is a hotel operator in Wisconsin. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Douglas B. Welmaker, Esq.
         WELMAKER LAW, PLLC
         409 N. Fredonia, Suite 118
         Longview, TX 75601
         Telephone: (512) 799-2048
         E-mail: doug@welmakerlaw.com

VISA INC: Faces Class Action Over Corporate Card Interchange Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Finextra reports that Visa and Mastercard are facing a class action
lawsuit in the UK seeking compensation for businesses charged
Multilateral Interchange Fees (MIFs) for accepting payments using
corporate credit cards.

Commercial litigation law firm Harcus Parker has brought the claim
at the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), the UK's specialist
judicial body for hearing competition cases.

The suit claims that Visa and Mastercard have forced banks to agree
to a level of MIFs set by the two giants, which are
"anti-competitive and unlawful".

Since 2015, EU law capped MIFs at 0.3% on consumer credit card
transactions, and 0.2% for consumer debit cards. However, this cap
did not apply to corporate credit and debit cards or for
inter-regional transactions.

These sales have continued to attract fees of up to 1.8% per
transaction, says Harcus Parker, which argues that they should be
zero per cent.

Jeremy Robinson, competition litigation partner, Harcus Parker,
says: "We are making a stand against unlawful interchange fees,
which should be abolished.

"Both the Court of Justice of the EU and the United Kingdom Supreme
Court have condemned this practice for consumer credit and debit
cards. The UK courts should now clamp down on commercial card and
inter-regional fees."

Businesses with an annual pre-Covid turnover of under £100 million
will be automatically included in the claim unless they choose to
opt out. Firms with a higher turnover are invited to opt in.

Mastercard is already facing a multi-billion pound class action
suit on behalf of tens of millions of Brits, while the Payment
Systems Regulator is carrying out two market reviews into it and
Visa for their scheme fees and cross-border interchange charges.
[GN]

WALMART STORES: Faces Class Action Over Great Value Veggie Straws
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Anne Bucher, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that Walmart
falsely advertises its Great Value Veggie Straws as containing no
artificial flavors or preservatives, according to a class action
lawsuit filed Oct. 2 in Florida federal court.

Plaintiff Devin Lara alleges the label on the Great Value Veggie
Straws product prominently states "No Artificial Flavors or
Preservatives."

Despite these representations, the Walmart class action lawsuit
says the product contains malic acid, an artificial flavor
enhancer, and citric acid, a chemical preservative.

Walmart class action says FDA requires product labels to declare
artificial flavors, preservatives

Lara points to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's definition
of a chemical preservative as a substance that "tends" to prevent
or slow the deterioration of foods. The citric acid in the Great
Value Veggie Straws functions as a synthetic preservative, the
Walmart class action lawsuit explains.

Additionally, the Great Value Veggie Straws contain malic acid,
which "imparts and contributes to the tangy, sweet and sour ranch
flavor," the lawsuit alleges.

Lara claims the malic acid used in the Great Value Veggie Straws is
manufactured in petrochemical plants from benzene or butane through
"a series of chemical reactions involving highly toxic chemical
precursors and byproducts."

Although malic acid can be used as a pH control agent, the presence
of malic acid in the Great Value Veggie Straws affects the flavor
of the product and therefore acts as an artificial flavor, the
Walmart class action explains.

FDA regulations require product labels to declare whether a food
contains artificial flavoring that resembles or reinforces the
characterizing flavor, the Walmart class action lawsuit says.
Because the malic acid contained in the Great Value Veggie Straws
reinforces the "zesty ranch" flavor, Walmart should have indicated
on the product label that it contains artificial flavors, Lara
argues.

Lara says he relied on the claim on the Great Value Veggie Straws
package that it contained "No Artificial Flavors or Preservatives"
and has been damaged by the allegedly false and misleading claims,
according to the Walmart class action lawsuit.

He seeks to represent a proposed class of consumers in the United
States and/or Florida who purchased Great Value Veggie Straws
containing citric acid or malic acid ingredients in the last four
years.

In related Walmart news, an Illinois federal judge recently revived
a Walmart class action lawsuit alleging Great Value Fudge Mint
Cookies misled consumers about the product's fudge and mint
content.

Lara is represented by Alexander J. Korolinsky of AJK Legal and
Spencer Sheehan of Sheehan & Associates PC.

The Walmart Great Value Veggie Straws class action lawsuit is Devin
Lara v. Walmart Stores Inc., Case No. 5:22-cv-00437, in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida. [GN]

WEALTHSIMPLE INC: Faces Class Suit Over Hidden Crypto Trading Fees
------------------------------------------------------------------
Charlie Alcaraz, writing for betakit, reports that Canadian FinTech
startups Wealthsimple and Shakepay are facing a class action
lawsuit that claims the two cryptocurrency platform providers
allegedly mislead users about hidden fees.

The lawsuit, which was filed on September 29 in the Superior Court
of Québec, is seeking punitive damages of $10 million each from
Wealthsimple and Shakepay for misrepresenting the true costs of
their cryptocurrency services. The proposed class action suit is
currently pending a hearing and has not yet been authorized by the
Québec court.

The plaintiff, represented by LPC Avocat, alleges that the
companies "bait customers" by advertising their services as
"commission-free," giving the general impression that there are no
out-of-pocket costs for buying or selling crypto on either of
Wealthsimple and Shakepay's platforms.

When reached for comment, a Wealthsimple spokesperson provided a
statement response to BetaKit.

"We have always been transparent about what we charge for our
services -- that's our commitment to our clients," the statement
reads. "This legal action has no merit and we will defend our
company against it."

A Shakepay spokesperson also provided a statement response to
BetaKit: "We have always put transparency at the forefront of
everything we do. That's a commitment we've made to ourselves and
our customers. This legal action has no merit and we will fight it
before the courts."

Initially starting out as a stocks and exchange-traded funds (ETFs)
trading platform, Wealthsimple expanded its services to offer
crypto trading in 2020. At the time of publication, Wealthsimple's
website states that it charges a 1.5 to 2 percent fee per
transaction for its crypto trading accounts. If a user places an
order to buy $100 worth of Bitcoin for example, and the trading fee
is 1.5 percent, they will be charged $1.50 for the transaction.
Wealthsimple told BetaKit that these fees have been in effect since
its crypto offering launched.

The class action lawsuit alleges that "expressing a range of fees
and charging a price that exceeds the lowest of those expressed" is
prohibited by both the Competition Act and Québec's Consumer
Protection Act.

According to the suit, Shakepay and Wealthsimple keep the spreads
(the difference between the current market price for the asset and
the price you buy or sell that asset for) of the cryptocurrencies
offered on their platforms "intentionally large" to collect a
hidden commission or fee from its users. Further, the suit alleges
that the prices displayed by the defendants on their platforms are
not determined by the market, but by the "voluntary decision of
[Wealthsimple and Shakepay] as to how much money they want to make
on a transaction."

Founded in 2015 by Amiouny and CTO Roy Breidi, Shakepay began as a
Bitcoin-loadable Visa card that users could spend in physical
retail stores. In 2018, Shakepay executed a "major pivot" and
turned into a crypto exchange.

In a blog post created by Shakepay, which was updated over a week
ago, Shakepay describes itself as a commission-free service.
Shakepay's homepage also displays "commission-free" as one of the
perks of using its platform. When the plaintiff purchased $200 CAD
worth of bitcoin from Shakepay however, they allege they were
charged a fee of 1.2 percent.

The filing notes a number of Canadian cryptocurrency exchanges that
indicate their commissions and fees structure, naming the likes of
Bitbuy, Coinbase, Coinsmart, Binance, and Kraken.

By failing to disclose the precise cost of their services to their
users and charging a higher price than what was advertised, the
filing alleges that Wealthsimple and Shakepay have violated section
12 and section 224 of Quebec's Consumer Protection Act.

The class action lawsuit is led by Joey Zukran of LPC Avocat, a
Québec-based class action law firm that specializes in consumer
rights. In addition to this lawsuit against Wealthsimple and
Shakepay, LPC Avocat's cases have also involved the nation-wide
Rogers outage in July.

Over the past year, LPC Avocat has also led cases against ecommerce
SaaS provider Lightspeed and payments tech company Nuvei for
allegedly issuing materially misleading information to investors.

In Lightspeed's case, which was re-amended in June and is currently
pending for authorization hearing, two investors cite a report
published by Spruce Point Capital Management that claims Lightspeed
had been concealing its "massive organic decline," failed to make
required goodwill impairments, and played with the reporting of its
revenues and earnings.

Another report by Spruce Point also spurred a class action lawsuit
against Nuvei. In this report, Spruce Point alleged that Nuvei has
covered up a "pattern of business failures, lack of organic growth,
and a web of relationships with individuals connected to major
Ponzi Schemes and alleged fraudulent activities." [GN]

WESTERN HEALTH: Agrees to Settle Privacy Breach Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Diane Crocker, writing for Saltwire, reports that after 10 years of
court appearances, compiling disclosure material, interviews and
discoveries, a settlement has been reached in a class-action
lawsuit involving a privacy breach at Western Health.

The matter had been set for a two-week trial in Newfoundland and
Labrador Supreme Court in Corner Brook, but at the start of the
trial on Monday, Oct. 3, Justice Peter Brown was informed the
parties had reached a settlement late Friday, Sept. 30.

The privacy breach at the centre of the class action was announced
by Western Health in August 2012. At the time, the health authority
revealed that a former clerk had inappropriately accessed the files
of 1,043 patients from June 2011 to May 2012.

The class action was launched on Aug. 17, 2012, with Barbara Hynes
listed as the representative plaintiff. Valerie Dyke was later
added as another representative plaintiff.

Western Health and the former employee, Donna Colbourne, were
originally named as defendants, but Colbourne, who pleaded guilty
to a charge under the Personal Health Information Act and was fined
$5,000 in provincial court in September 2014, was later removed.

The trial had been set for last year, but had to be postponed
because of the cyberattack on the province's health authorities.

Hynes' lawyer, Bob Buckingham, said it probably should not have
taken as long as it did to reach a settlement. He said the two
sides did engage in mediation, but were far apart on the issue.

"Perhaps it should have happened earlier, but sometimes these
matters only settle on the courthouse steps," said Buckingham.

"Maybe they were prepared to come to the table last year, but
things got set aside because of the cyberattack."

Discussions started again and culminated in the settlement.

Details of the settlement, including the amount of restitution for
class members, cannot yet be provided.

Buckingham said it will include a fund of money so each member of
the class receives a certain amount of money.

In addition, there will be a fee set aside for legal fees and money
set aside to cover disbursements in terms of the costs and expenses
the plaintiffs had to incur to run the class action.

Buckingham said the costs have been tremendous to both his firm,
Bob Buckingham Law, and Brothers and Associates in Corner Brook.

"And that doesn't include the stress and the strain, the cost on
the lead plaintiffs in this, which has been very difficult on them.
The personal and emotional costs. They were the lead people on
this, and they have found it very difficult," he said.

Buckingham said Hynes was committed to proceeding with the matter
and had been gearing up the last couple of weeks preparing for the
trial.

"She's found it very stressful and very difficult, but was ready to
go to court, was ready to face this matter, but at the same time,
now that we have reached a resolution, she's happy with that.

"And I think this is a good settlement for the whole class."

The next step in the matter will see an application filed with the
court to have the settlement and settlement process approved and to
get that information out to the 912 class members. Then it will be
back to court to get final court approval.

No date has been set for the court to hear the application.
Buckingham said the lawyers involved met after court on Oct. 3 to
set out the basic parameters of what has to be done next, and the
application should be filed in a week or so.

Buckingham said the issue of Western Health accepting
responsibility for the breach will be part of the settlement
proposal that is put forward.

The Western Health privacy breach is not the only one before the
courts.

Two others allegedly affecting 35-40 people in Central Health and
120 people in Eastern Heath had been put on hold pending the
resolution of the Western Health matter.

A statement of claim has also been filed in a fourth case from two
years ago in Central Health. A staff person there looked at the
obstetric and gynecological information of various people, and some
other records of other people. The class in that case involves 240
people. [GN]

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: CIRCOR Still Faces Product Liability Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Asbestos-related product liability claims continue to be filed
against two of CIRCOR International, Inc.'s subsidiaries: CIRCOR
Instrumentation Technologies, Inc. (f/k/a Hoke, Inc.), the stock of
which the Company acquired in 1998, and Spence Engineering Company,
Inc., the stock of which the Company acquired in 1984, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "The Hoke subsidiary was divested in January
2020 through the sale of the I&S business. However, the Company has
indemnified the buyer for asbestos-related claims that are made
against Hoke. Due to the nature of the products supplied by these
entities, the markets they serve and the Company's historical
experience in resolving these claims, the Company does not expect
that these asbestos-related claims will have a material adverse
effect on the financial condition, results of operations or
liquidity of the Company.

"During the second quarter of 2021, the Company was notified of a
contract termination by one of its Industrial segment customers.
The basis for termination is under dispute and the ultimate outcome
of this matter is uncertain. During the fourth quarter of 2021 the
Company recorded a full allowance against the outstanding
receivables resulting in a charge of $6.3 million. The Company also
has outstanding guarantees of its performance under the contract in
the aggregate amount of $3.4 million. Further, the Company is
exposed to claims from sub-contractors for contract termination.
The Company has received claims from sub-contractors and has
accrued an additional $1.6 million in charges during the fourth
quarter of 2021 as its best estimate of probable loss. Should the
negotiations or settlement process be unfavorable for the Company,
the Company may be unable to collect the outstanding receivables,
be exposed to risk of loss on the outstanding performance
guarantees, additional claims from sub-contractors, losses in
excess of amounts accrued on claims from subs-contractors and
potential future claims should any be asserted."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3T0QyeP

ASBESTOS UPDATE: H.B. Fuller Defends Personal Injury Lawsuits
-------------------------------------------------------------
H.B. Fuller Company been named as a defendant in lawsuits in which
plaintiffs have alleged injury due to products containing asbestos
manufactured more than 35 years ago, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "The plaintiffs generally bring these lawsuits
against multiple defendants and seek damages (both actual and
punitive) in very large amounts. In many cases, plaintiffs are
unable to demonstrate that they have suffered any compensable
injuries or that the injuries suffered were the result of exposure
to products manufactured by us. We are typically dismissed as a
defendant in such cases without payment. If the plaintiff presents
evidence indicating that compensable injury occurred as a result of
exposure to our products, the case is generally settled for an
amount that reflects the seriousness of the injury, the length,
intensity and character of exposure to products containing
asbestos, the number and solvency of other defendants in the case,
and the jurisdiction in which the case has been brought.

"A significant portion of the defense costs and settlements in
asbestos-related litigation is paid by third parties, including
indemnification pursuant to the provisions of a 1976 agreement
under which we acquired a business from a third party. Currently,
this third party is defending and paying settlement amounts, under
a reservation of rights, in most of the asbestos cases tendered to
the third party.

"In addition to the indemnification arrangements with third
parties, we have insurance policies that generally provide coverage
for asbestos liabilities, including defense costs. Historically,
insurers have paid a significant portion of our defense costs and
settlements in asbestos-related litigation. However, certain of our
insurers are insolvent. We have entered into cost-sharing
agreements with our insurers that provide for the allocation of
defense costs and settlements and judgments in asbestos-related
lawsuits. These agreements require, among other things, that we
fund a share of defense costs, settlements and judgments allocable
to years in which the responsible insurer is insolvent."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3EhzNYw




                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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