/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/220916.mbx
C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R
Friday, September 16, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 180
Headlines
1ST CHOICE FAMILY: Court Approves Settlement in Fuller Class Suit
ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Faces Zaidi Shareholder Suit in CA Court
ALLSTATE CORPORATION: Faces Hewitt Suit Over ALIC Sale
AMERICAN MERCHANDISING: Fails to Pay Employees' Wages Under FLSA
AMPLIFY ENERGY: Faces Putative Class Action in California
APEX HUMAN: Court Denies Lincoln's Bid to File 2nd Amended Suit
APPHARVEST INC: Faces Shareholder Suit Over Tomato Production Claim
ASTEC INDUSTRIES: Court of Appeals Reverses Dismissal of Suit
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING: Faces ERISA Suit in New Jersey Court
BENQ CORP: Agrees to Settle Price-Fixing Class Action for $29.7-M
BERRY CORP: Faces Torres Securities Suit in Texas Court
BP EXPLORATION: Keller's Bid to Reconsider Summary Judgment Denied
CONAGRA BRANDS: Faces Class Action Over Mislabeled Sunflower Seeds
CONAGRA BRANDS: Suarez Sues Over Misleading Labeling
COTERRA ENERGY: Texas Court Junks Shareholder Suit
CREDIT SUISSE: Bid to Decertify Class in FX Antitrust Suit Denied
CURADEN AG: $298K in Attys.' Fees & Costs Awarded in Lyngaas Suit
CVS HEALTH: Must Comply With Third-Party Subpoena in Healy Suit
EXECUPHARM INC: Class Action Over Phishing Attack Reinstated
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Williams Files FCRA Suit in E.D. Virginia
FCA US LLC: Do Suit Transferred to E.D. Michigan
FCA US: Court Awards $179K in Costs to Defendants in Flynn Suit
FERROVIAL SERVICES: Wu's Counsel Awarded $50K in Attorneys' Fees
FOUNDATION ENERGY: Ritter Files Suit in E.D. Oklahoma
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Faces Class Action Over Fire Alarm Defect
GOOGLE LLC: Appen's Bid for Order Relief in Kumandan Suit Denied
GOOGLE LLC: Court Extends Stay of Vance Suit Through Feb. 27, 2023
GRANDIZIO WILKINS: Court Dismisses Stamat Suit for Lack of Standing
ICECURE MEDICAL: Challenges Shareholder's Motion for Class Cert.
ICECURE MEDICAL: Class Cert. Bid Over Report Accessibility Pending
JG RESTAURANT: Windheim Suit Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Servers
JUUL LABS: Agrees to Settle Vape Class Action for $438.5 Million
LANDMARK FENCE: Appeals Court Affirms Dismissal of Sahagun Suit
MARDEN-KANE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Suski's 3rd Amended Suit
MICHIGAN: Faces Class Action Over Pandemic Unemployment Benefits
NABORS COMPLETION: $92K in Unpaid Wages Awarded in Ramos Suit
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Flores Asks Judge to Deny Arbitration Bid
NATIONAL UNION: Supreme Court Questions For Denied Coverage
NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR: $12.8M Deal in Sexual Abuse Suit Gets OK
ONETOUCHPOINT INC: Fails to Secure Customers' Info, Young Suit Says
ORGANIGRAM HOLDINGS: $2.3-M Deal in Tainted Cannabis Suit Gets OK
P.A.M. TRANSPORT: Bid for Prelim. OK of Vasquez's Settlement Denied
RED ROBIN: Agrees to Settle Stella Artois Class Suit for $450,000
STERLING JEWELERS: Settles Discrimination Class Action for $175M
THORLEY INDUSTRIES: Suit Alleges Death Over Swing's Dangling Straps
TRUMPET BEHAVIORAL: N.D. California Dismisses Johnson Class Suit
TRUWELLNESSMD: Williams Sues Over Unsolicited Telephonic Calls
UCOR LLC: E.D. Tennessee Dismisses Speer Class Suit W/o Prejudice
UNICO AMERICAN: Anchors & Whales Files Opening Brief in Appeal
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Iuliano Sues Over Unsolicited Sales Calls
USHEALTH ADVISORS: Tiefenthaler Suit Transferred to N.D. Texas
WALKER FINE ART: Senior Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
WALMART INC: Luthe Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Biometric Data
WASHINGTON CTY., AR: Pastor Seeks Suit Dismissal, Joins Class Suit
WEDGE BRANDS: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
XPO LAST MILE: Court Certifies Delivery Drivers Class in Muniz Suit
ZILLOW GROUP: Faces Huber Suit Over Wiretapping of Website Visitors
ZUDY SUPERMARKET: Vega Seeks unpaid OT, Minimum Wages Under FLSA
Asbestos Litigation
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tiger Brands Recalls Baby Powder Due to Asbestos
*********
1ST CHOICE FAMILY: Court Approves Settlement in Fuller Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael H. Watson of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, grants the parties' motion for
approval of their settlement agreement in the lawsuit styled
Monisha Fuller, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 1st Choice Family Services, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 2:21-cv-2771 (S.D. Ohio).
Plaintiff Monisha Fuller sued 1st Choice Family Services, Inc., for
unpaid overtime wages and other relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and analogous state laws. The Plaintiff
alleged that the Defendant failed to properly pay overtime to her
and other similarly situated persons because the Defendant
improperly classified them as independent contractors rather than
employees. The Court granted conditional certification of a
collective action, and approved the parties' joint proposed class
definition, notice, and distribution plan on Nov. 4, 2021. The
opt-in period has closed. The parties have settled the Plaintiff's
claims and now move for approval of their settlement agreement.
After a careful review of the proposed settlement agreement, the
Court finds that the settlement agreement is a fair, reasonable,
and adequate resolution of a bona fide legal dispute between the
parties.
Judge Watson notes that there is a bona fide dispute in this case
as the parties dispute whether the Defendant properly categorized
the Plaintiff and others as independent contractors and, as a
result, whether it properly paid them overtime. There is no
indication that the settlement was reached by anything other than
arms' length negotiations between counsel. The settlement will
avoid expensive litigation for both sides, including any remaining
discovery, dispositive motions, trial, and possible appeals.
Further, the Plaintiff's counsel was able to assess the Defendants'
payroll information and other discovery, and both sides could
evaluate the chances of success.
The parties represent that the gross settlement amount represents
more than 100% of the allegedly unpaid overtime damages, and the
net settlement amount (after attorney's fees and taxes) represents
approximately 88% of the total alleged unpaid overtime wages. The
exact amount of each payment will be calculated on an individual
basis. The Plaintiff will receive a $5,000 service award in
addition to her individual payment. Judge Watson finds both these
payments are reasonable.
Moreover, Judge Watson finds that attorney's fees and costs in the
amount of $119,166.67 represent approximately one-third of the
total settlement amount and are reasonable. Finally, the Plaintiffs
counsel's expenses and costs of $3,706.80 are reasonable and should
be reimbursed from the settlement fund.
Hence, the parties' joint motion is granted, including its request
for attorney's fees and costs, to settle the FLSA claims of any
opt-in plaintiffs. The settlement agreement is approved. The Court
dismisses the case with prejudice but retains jurisdiction to
enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The Clerk is
directed to close the case.
A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Aug. 25,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/58hnbuh6 from
Leagle.com.
ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Faces Zaidi Shareholder Suit in CA Court
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Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2022, that it is
facing a putative class action lawsuit alleging violations of the
federal securities laws filed by Ali Zaidi in December 10, 2019
against its subsidiary Adamas Pharmaceuticals and certain of
Adamas's former directors and officers in federal court in the
Northern District of California (Case No. 4:19-cv-08051).
This lawsuit alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by Adamas and certain of Adamas's former directors and
officers. On October 8, 2021, the presiding judge dismissed the
litigation, and granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
On November 5, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their second amended
class action complaint. On December 10, 2021, Adamas filed a motion
to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs opposed the
motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss remains pending.
Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company
Maryland.
ALLSTATE CORPORATION: Faces Hewitt Suit Over ALIC Sale
------------------------------------------------------
The Allstate Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 2022, that the company is
continuing to defend a putative class action in California federal
court captioned "Holland Hewitt v. Allstate Life Insurance Company
(E.D. Cal., filed May 2020), following the sale of Allstate Life
Insurance Company (ALIC) to private equity investment firm,
Blackstone.
The Allstate Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries,
primarily Allstate Insurance Company, is a property and casualty
insurance company based in Illinois.
AMERICAN MERCHANDISING: Fails to Pay Employees' Wages Under FLSA
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GUS L. SINGLETON IV, individually and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated v. AMERICAN MERCHANDISING SPECIALISTS, INC.,
Case No. 5:22-cv-123 (W.D.N.C., Sept. 7, 2022) alleges that AMS
Retail's failed to pay its salary non-exempt employees all the
wages to which they are entitled, including regular and overtime
wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum
Fair Wage Standards Act.
According to the complaint, AMS Retail administered unlawful
policies requiring non-exempt Field Service Representatives, Field
Marketing Representatives, Product Advisors, Field Technicians and
other similar roles, however titled (Field Representatives), to
perform off-the-clock work while carrying out their job duties,
and, as a result, Field Representatives did not receive overtime
pay for hours regularly worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek.
The Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Field Service
Representative from March 2018 to February 2021.
AMS Retail is a retail support company that delivers a variety of
retail solutions to promote and increase the sales of AMS Retail's
clients' products within retailers nationwide. AMS Retail employs
individuals, such as Plaintiff and those similarly situated, to
travel to retailers, maintain and repair clients' products, audit
and stock product, monitor inventory levels, build product
displays, and update product pricing and signage.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Jeffrey L. Osterwise, Esq.
Camille Fundora Rodriguez, Esq.
Alexandra K. Piazza, Esq.
BERGER MONTAGUE PC
1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: (215) 875-3000
Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
E-mail: josterwise@bm.net
crodriguez@bm.net
apiazza@bm.net
AMPLIFY ENERGY: Faces Putative Class Action in California
----------------------------------------------------------
Amplify Energy Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 2022, that the company and two
subsidiaries have been named as defendants in a consolidated
putative class action in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
Plaintiffs filed a consolidated class action complaint on January
28, 2022 and an amended complaint on March 21, 2022.
Plaintiffs assert claims against the company, Beta Operating
Company, LLC, San Pedro Bay Pipeline Company, MSC Mediterranean
Shipping Company, Dordellas Finance Corp., the MSC Danit
(proceeding in rem), Costamare Shipping Co. S.A., Capetanissa
Maritime Corporation of Liberia, V. Ships Greece Ltd., and the
COSCO Beijing.
The company filed a third-party complaint on February 28, 2022, and
an amended complaint on June 21, 2022. The company sued the same
shipping defendants and has added claims against the Marine
Exchange of Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor, COSCO Shipping Lines Co.
Ltd., COSCO (Cayman) Mercury Co. Ltd., and Mediterranean Shipping
Company S.r.l.
The company has moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint, and the
Marine Exchange of Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor and certain of the
shipping defendants have moved to dismiss the company's complaint.
Amplify Energy Corp. is into acquisition, development, exploitation
and production of oil and natural gas properties based in Texas.
APEX HUMAN: Court Denies Lincoln's Bid to File 2nd Amended Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SECRET LINCOLN v. APEX HUMAN SERVICES LLC, et
al., Case No. 22-341 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Harvey Bartle, III, of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denies
the Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended
collective action and class action complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff Secret Lincoln has sued Defendants Apex and Mohamed
Sesay, the CEO and administrator of Apex, in this collective action
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"). The Plaintiff,
a former employee of Apex, also brings state law claims and a
putative class action pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law ("PWPCL"), and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act
("PMWA").
Apex contracts with registered nurses and licensed practical nurses
to provide home health care and skilled nursing services. The
Plaintiff worked for Apex as a registered nurse beginning in March
2019 pursuant to an "independent contractor agreement" that she
signed with Apex on Jan. 15, 2019. Sesay signed the agreement on
behalf of Apex. In December 2019, Lincoln became a registered nurse
supervisor. She held this position until she left Apex on March 31,
2020.
The Plaintiff filed a complaint on Jan. 27, 2022, claiming unpaid
wages, including overtime and seeking compensatory and liquidated
damages. Sesay filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a claim on March 2, 2022, which Apex joined on
March 8, 2022. The motions were dismissed as moot when the
Plaintiff amended her complaint as of right on March 16, 2022, in
response to the motions to dismiss. On March 30, 2022, Sesay sought
to dismiss the first amended complaint for failure to state a
claim. That same day Apex filed a motion joining the motion of
Sesay to dismiss. This time, the Plaintiff opposed the motions to
dismiss rather than seeking Court approval to file a second amended
complaint.
The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motions to dismiss the first amended complaint. Specifically, the
Court granted the motions as related to the Plaintiff's claim that
the Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. The Court ruled that
the Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claim
that the alleged violations of the FLSA were willful. The
Plaintiff's remaining claims under the FLSA are subject to a
two-year statute of limitations rather than the three years
permitted under the FLSA for willful violations. The Plaintiff's
claims from before Jan. 27, 2020, are, therefore, time-barred. The
Defendants' motions to dismiss the first amended complaint were
otherwise denied.
In the Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint, she includes
additional allegations that the Defendants' violations of the FLSA
were willful. She maintains that they knew or should have known
that their actions, in particular the signing and substance of the
"independent contractor agreement," violated the FLSA. In addition,
she inserts allegations that the Defendants' failure to keep
accurate records constitutes willful disregard for the requirements
under the FLSA.
Judge Bartle notes that allowing the second amended complaint would
give the Plaintiff the benefit of a three-year statute of
limitations under the FLSA.
The Court is mindful that Rule 15 provides that leave to amend
should be freely given "when justice so requires." The Plaintiff,
however, had ample opportunity in both her original complaint and
her first amended complaint to include the proposed allegations of
willfulness but failed to do so, Judge Bartle states. In addition,
she declined to seek to amend the complaint a second time in
response to the Defendants' March 30, 2022 motions to dismiss the
first amended complaint. Instead, she stood by her allegations and
chose to oppose the motions.
Only after losing her arguments on the adequacy of her willfulness
allegations did she seek another bite at the apple by moving to
amend for the second time, Judge Bartle holds.
Furthermore, Judge Bartle observes, there is no indication that the
allegations in the second amended complaint were unknown to the
Plaintiff when she filed the initial complaint or first amended
complaint. In fact, the proposed allegations largely stem from the
"independent contractor agreement," which the Plaintiff already had
in her possession and attached to the first amended complaint. The
Plaintiff has engaged in undue delay, Judge Bartle points out.
Judge Bartle opines that it would be unjust to allow the Plaintiff
a third crack at a claim of willfulness. Hence, the motion of the
Plaintiff for leave to file a second amended complaint will be
denied.
A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Aug. 25, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/58a39crn from Leagle.com.
APPHARVEST INC: Faces Shareholder Suit Over Tomato Production Claim
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AppHarvest, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 2022, that a second amended class
action complaint was filed against the company in July 2022.
On September 24, 2021, the first of two federal securities class
action lawsuits captioned "Ragan v. AppHarvest, Inc." was filed by
a purported stockholder of the Company in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a
proposed class consisting of those who acquired the Company's
securities between May 17, 2021 and August 10, 2021.
On December 13, 2021, the court consolidated the two cases, and
appointed a lead plaintiff. An amended complaint was filed on March
2, 2022. The amended complaint was brought as a purported class
action on behalf of purchasers of the Common Stock between February
1, 2021 to August 10, 2021. The amended complaint names the Company
and certain of its current officers as defendants, and alleges that
the defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, by making materially false and
misleading statements regarding the company's operations at the
Morehead CEA Facility in the first half of 2021.
In particular, plaintiffs allege that defendants' public statements
during the class period were false and misleading because
defendants failed to disclose issues related to the company's
tomato harvest and employee training and retention.
The amended complaint seeks unspecified monetary damages on behalf
of the putative class and an award of costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorneys' fees. On May 2, 2022, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint. On July 25, 2022, the lead
plaintiff filed a second amended complaint.
AppHarvest is a food company based in Kentucky.
ASTEC INDUSTRIES: Court of Appeals Reverses Dismissal of Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Astec Industries, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 2022, that the Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal of a securities suit against the company.
The company and certain of its former executive officers were named
as defendants in a putative shareholder class action lawsuit filed
on February 1, 2019, as amended on August 26, 2019, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.
The action is styled "City of Taylor General Employees Retirement
System v. Astec Industries, Inc., et al.," Case No.
1:19-cv-24-CEA-CHS. The complaint generally alleges that the
defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making
allegedly false and misleading statements and that the individual
defendants were control persons under Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act.
The complaint is filed on behalf of shareholders who purchased
stock of the company between July 26, 2016 and October 22, 2018 and
seeks monetary damages on behalf of the purported class. On October
25, 2019, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. On February 19,
2021, the Motion to Dismiss was granted with prejudice and judgment
was entered for the defendants. On March 19, 2021, plaintiff filed
a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and For Leave to File the
Proposed Amended Complaint, which was denied on May 5, 2021.
Plaintiff appealed the Motion to Dismiss and denial of its Motion
to Alter or Amend the Judgment and For Leave to File the Proposed
Amended Complaint to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. On March 31, 2022, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion reversing the
dismissal of the company and one former executive officer,
affirming the dismissal of certain other former executive officers
and remanding the action.
Astec Industries, Inc. designs, engineers, manufactures and markets
equipment and components used primarily in road building based in
Tennessee.
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING: Faces ERISA Suit in New Jersey Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Automatic Data Processing, Inc. (ADP) disclosed in its Form 10-K
Report for the year ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2022, that in May 2020, two
potential class action complaints were filed against ADP,
TotalSource and related defendants in the U.S. District Court,
District of New Jersey.
The complaints assert violations of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) in connection with the ADP TotalSource
Retirement Savings Plan's fiduciary administrative and investment
decision-making.
Automatic Data Processing, Inc. is a technology company based in
New Jersey.
BENQ CORP: Agrees to Settle Price-Fixing Class Action for $29.7-M
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gary Ng, writing for iPhone in Canada, reports that if you
purchased an optical disc drive (ODD) product in Canada between
2004-2010 in B.C., Ontario and Quebec, you can claim $20 or more as
part of a price-fixing class action lawsuit.
There's a settlement of $29.7 million up for grabs as approved by
B.C. and Quebec Courts from BenQ, Hitachi-LG, NEC, Panasonic,
Phillips, Pioneer, Quanta, Sony, TEAC, and Toshiba Samsung.
Allegations are these companies "conspired to fix the prices for
ODD, with the intention of raising prices for both ODD and ODD
Products sold in Canada."
"ODDs are any device which reads and/or writes data from and to an
optical disc. ODD Products are desktop computers, mobile/laptop
computers, video game consoles, CD players/records, DVD
players/recorders and Blu-Ray disc players/recorders," explains the
class action lawsuit website.
In a nutshell, a $20 claim can be approved without documents, with
no proof of purchase required. To claim over $20, you need to show
your proof of purchase (who has receipts from 2004-2010?!).
"Subject to further court order, approved undocumented claims will
be paid $20 (per claim, not per product) and do not require proof
of purchase. If you wish to be eligible to receive more than $20,
proof of purchase is required. However, even if you provide proof
of purchase, if you purchased a small volume of ODDs and/or ODD
Products you may not receive more than $20. This will depend on the
number and size of claims filed by all class members," explains the
class action website.
You can click here -- https://oddclassaction.com/ -- to get $20 by
submitting your precious info, with payouts soon to arrive via
e-Transfer or cheque (minus a $2 fee of course). [GN]
BERRY CORP: Faces Torres Securities Suit in Texas Court
-------------------------------------------------------
Berry Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 2022, that in November 20, 2020,
Luis Torres, individually and on behalf of a putative class, filed
a securities class action lawsuit (the Torres Lawsuit) in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
against Berry Corp. and certain of its current and former directors
and officers.
The complaint asserts violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, on behalf of a putative class of all persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired common stock pursuant and/or
traceable to the company's 2018 initial public offering or Berry
Corp.'s securities between July 26, 2018 and November 3, 2020.
In particular, the complaint alleges that the Defendants made false
and misleading statements during the Class Period and in the
offering materials for the IPO, concerning the Company's business,
operational efficiency and stability, and compliance policies, that
artificially inflated the Company's stock price, resulting in
injury to the purported class members when the value of Berry
Corp.'s common stock declined following release of its financial
results for the third quarter of 2020 on November 3, 2020.
On January 21, 2021, multiple plaintiffs filed motions in the
Torres Lawsuit seeking to be appointed lead plaintiff and lead
counsel. After briefing and a stipulation between the remaining
movants, the Court appointed Luis Torres and Allia DeAngelis as
co-lead plaintiffs on August 18, 2021.
On November 1, 2021, the co-lead plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint asserting claims on behalf of the same putative class
under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, alleging, among other things,
that the Company and the individual Defendants made false and
misleading statements between July 26, 2018 and November 3, 2020
regarding the Company's permits and permitting processes.
The amended complaint does not quantify the alleged losses but
seeks to recover all damages sustained by the putative class as a
result of these alleged securities violations, as well as
attorneys' fees and costs. The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
on January 24, 2022, for which the Court's ruling is pending.
Berry Corporation is an independent upstream energy company based
in Texas.
BP EXPLORATION: Keller's Bid to Reconsider Summary Judgment Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lance M. Africk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana denies the Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration in the lawsuit entitled BRIAN KELLER v. BP
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., SECTION I, Case No. 13-1018
(E.D. La.).
Before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff Brian Keller for
reconsideration of the Court's order granting the Defendants'
("BP") motion in limine to exclude the Plaintiff's expert witness
and granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The
Plaintiff asserts that the sanctions recently ordered against BP by
a U.S. Magistrate Judge in this District warrant reconsideration
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), citing
Torres-Lugo v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 20-210, R. Doc. 136
(E.D. La. June 3, 2022).
The lawsuit is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve "claims
for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil
and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response (e.g.,
dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at
*9 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021) (Barbier, J.). In the course of the MDL
proceedings, Judge Carl J. Barbier approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement, which included
a Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO") permitting certain class
members to sue the defendants for later-manifested physical
conditions.
The B3 plaintiffs, by contrast, either opted out of the class
action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition. To prevail on their claims, the "B3 plaintiffs must
prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the response."
Mr. Keller was employed in the response to the Deepwater Horizon
("DWH") oil spill. He alleges that exposure to crude oil and
chemical dispersants caused him to develop a multitude of adverse
medical conditions, including "coughing, sore throat, skin rashes
and discoloration, white lines in fingernails and low blood
levels."
Like other B3 plaintiffs, Keller sought to support his claims that
exposure to oil and dispersants caused health problems by
introducing medical causation analysis by Dr. Jerald Cook. BP
responded with a motion in limine arguing that Cook's testimony is
scientifically unreliable and therefore inadmissible pursuant to
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
The Court granted that motion and simultaneously granted BP's
motion for summary judgment.
The Plaintiff now argues that the Court's orders on BP's motion in
limine and motion for summary judgment should be reconsidered in
light of the Torres-Lugo sanctions and the ongoing dispute over
BP's decision not to collect dermal and biometric data from cleanup
workers. In a single sentence, he characterizes "BP's failure to
collect the data" as possible "anticipatory spoliation."
Judge Africk notes that the Plaintiff does not explain which of the
Rule 59(e) criteria he believes is satisfied. Instead, he merely
rehashes arguments previously made and rejected by this Court. He
argues that "summary judgment is not appropriate where it has now
been ruled in the Torres-Lugo case that BP failed to produce a
qualified corporate witness to respond to questions that go to the
heart of the general causation issue."
As the Court has previously stated, the Torres-Lugo sanctions are
irrelevant to the Defendants' motions in limine and for summary
judgment. Sanctions and more discovery on BP's internal
decision-making regarding data collection have no effect on the
data actually available to Cook to prove general causation and, as
another section of this Court has noted, are, therefore, not
outcome determinative of the legal issue of general causation.
As for Keller's anticipatory spoliation allegation, "even assuming
that BP had an affirmative duty to collect biomonitoring and dermal
data from cleanup workers, this lack of information is not what
renders Dr. Cook's expert report" inadmissible, Judge Africk holds,
citing Barkley v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 13-995, R. Doc. No.
58, at 4 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 2022) (Barbier, J.).
Considering this, the Court finds that no circumstance is present
which justifies alteration or amendment pursuant to Rule 59(e).
Reconsideration of the order granting BP's motion in limine and
motion for summary judgment is not necessary to correct manifest
errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based. Keller has
presented no new evidence. Reconsideration would not prevent any
"manifest injustice," because, as explained, the circumstances
relied upon by Keller are irrelevant to the orders he urges the
Court to reconsider. Finally, Keller has pointed to no "intervening
change in controlling law."
Accordingly, Judge Africk denies the Plaintiff's motion.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Aug. 25,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4nkpvs6h from
Leagle.com.
CONAGRA BRANDS: Faces Class Action Over Mislabeled Sunflower Seeds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Wilson Fay, writing for Law Street, reports that on Sept. 4,
Rebecca Suarez filed a class action complaint in the Northern
District of Illinois against Conagra Brands, Inc. alleging consumer
fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
According to the complaint, Conagra Brands is a Delaware
corporation that manufactures, packages, labels, markets and sells
sunflower seeds under the Bigs brand. Further, the complaint states
that Suarez is a Wisconsin citizen who purchased Bigs Chile Limon
Flavor sunflower seeds.
The complaint purports that the Bigs Chile Limon Flavor sunflower
seeds packaging and labeling contains a picture of half a fresh
lime and a red background matching the color of chili peppers. The
plaintiff argues that this labeling indicates to consumers and
causes consumers to expect that the Bigs Chile Limon Flavor
sunflower seeds gets its chili pepper and lime taste only from
chili peppers and limes.
However, the complaint alleges that although the ingredients
included aged red peppers and lime juice solids, it also contains
malic acid and natural flavors. The plaintiff argues that the use
of malic acid in the product's ingredients without disclosing that
the product contains artificial flavoring is false and misleading
to consumers.
The plaintiff states that she is part of the majority of consumers
who avoid artificial flavors based on the belief that foods
containing artificial flavors are less healthy and argues that her
and similar consumers were misled by Bigs Chile Limon Flavor
sunflower seeds labeling. The plaintiff argues that the value of
Bigs Chile Limon Flavor sunflower seeds is less than the value
represented by the defendant causing consumers to pay higher prices
that they would not have in the absence of the defendant's
omissions and misrepresentations.
Accordingly, the plaintiff filed the present suit alleging
violations of Wisconsin and Illinois deceptive trade practice laws,
state consumer fraud acts, breach of express warranty, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff seeks
class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary,
statutory, and punitive damages, attorneys fees and costs. The
plaintiff is represented by Sheehan & Associates, P.C. [GN]
CONAGRA BRANDS: Suarez Sues Over Misleading Labeling
----------------------------------------------------
Rebecca Suarez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Conagra Brands, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04743 (N.D.
Ill., Sept. 4, 2022), seeks damages and an injunction to stop the
Defendant's false and misleading labeling and marketing practices
with regards to its sunflower seeds having a "Chile Limon Flavor"
under the Bigs brand ("Product").
The representation of "Chile Limon Flavor" is false and misleading
because this fails to adequately disclose the source of the
Product's chili pepper and lime taste. The Product's primary or
"characterizing" flavor is "Chile Limon," from chili pepper and
lime, because the label makes "direct representations" about these
fruits through the words, "Chile Limon," picture of a sliced lime,
and the red background matching the color of chili peppers.
By representing the Product as having a "Chile Limon Flavor" with
"Flavor" significantly smaller than "Chile" and "Limon," and in a
different font, consumers will expect all of the taste will come
from the characterizing ingredients of chili peppers and lime.
Though the ingredients include "Aged Red Peppers" and "Lime Juice
Solids," they also include "Malic Acid" and "Natural Flavors."
The Product contains other representations and omissions which are
false and misleading. The value of the Product that the Plaintiff
purchased was materially less than its value as represented by th
Defendant. The Defendant sold more of the Product and at higher
prices than it would have in the absence of this misconduct,
resulting in additional profits at the expense of consumers.
As a result of the false and misleading representations, the
Product is sold at a premium price, approximately no less than
$5.99 for 5.35 oz, excluding tax and sales, higher than similar
products, represented in a non-misleading way, and higher than it
would be sold for absent the misleading representations and
omissions, says the complaint.
The Plaintiff purchased the Product on one or more occasions.
Conagra Brands, Inc. manufactures, packages, labels, markets, and
sells sunflower seeds having a "Chile Limón Flavor" under the Bigs
brand.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
60 Cuttermill Rd., Ste. 409
Great Neck NY 11021-3104
Phone: (516) 268-7080
Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com
COTERRA ENERGY: Texas Court Junks Shareholder Suit
--------------------------------------------------
Coterra Energy Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 2022, that the class action
lawsuit was dismissed and a third amended complaint was filed by
the plaintiffs in May 2022.
On February 25, 2021, the company filed a motion to transfer the
class action lawsuit to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, in Houston, Texas, where its headquarters are
located. On June 11, 2021, the Company filed a motion to dismiss
the class action lawsuit on the basis that the plaintiffs'
allegations do not meet the requirements for pleading a claim under
Section 10(b) or Section 20 of the Exchange Act.
On June 22, 2021, the motion to transfer the class action lawsuit
to the Southern District of Texas was granted. Pursuant to the
prior agreement of the parties, the consolidated derivative case
discussed in the preceding paragraph was also transferred to the
Southern District of Texas on July 12, 2021. Subsequently, an
additional stockholder derivative action styled "Treppel Family
Trust U/A 08/18/18 Lawrence A. Treppel and Geri D. Treppel for the
benefit of Geri D. Treppel and Larry A. Treppel v. Dinges, et al.,"
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division,
asserting substantially similar Delaware common law claims as in
the existing derivative cases, was filed in the Southern District
of Texas and consolidated with the existing consolidated derivative
cases.
On January 12, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas granted the Company's motion to dismiss the class
action lawsuit but allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint. The class action plaintiffs filed their amended
complaint on February 11, 2022. The Company filed a motion to
dismiss the amended class action complaint on March 10, 2022. The
motion to dismiss is fully briefed and is pending for decision.
On April 1, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas granted the company's motion to dismiss the consolidated
derivative case but allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint. The derivative plaintiffs filed their third amended
complaint on May 16, 2022.
Coterra Energy Inc. is into crude petroleum and natural gas based
in Texas.
CREDIT SUISSE: Bid to Decertify Class in FX Antitrust Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARK RATES ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, Case No. 13 Civ. 7789 (LGS), Judge Lorna G. Schofield
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
denies Defendants Credit Suisse Group AG, Credit Suisse AG, and
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC's motion to decertify the issue
class.
The case concerns an alleged conspiracy among banks to fix prices
in the foreign exchange ("FX") market. On Sept. 3, 2019, a
so-called issue class was certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(4) with respect to two issues: (1) the existence of
a conspiracy to widen spreads in the FX spot market and (2)
participation in the conspiracy by Defendants Credit Suisse Group
AG, Credit Suisse AG and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
(collectively, "Credit Suisse").
The Complaint alleges that the Defendants conspired to widen
spreads in the FX spot market. In the FX market, certain
participants called "market makers" or "liquidity providers" make
themselves available both to buy and sell a given currency pair
(such as euro/dollar, a/k/a "EUR/USD"). A liquidity provider quotes
a "bid" price at which it is willing to buy and an "ask" price at
which it is willing to sell. The difference between those prices is
the "bid-ask spread," or simply the "spread." In general, a wider
spread results in greater profit for the liquidity provider, as it
buys lower and sells higher. Defendant banks, including Credit
Suisse, allegedly used chat rooms to fix spreads for certain
currency pairs. Fifteen of the sixteen Defendant banks have settled
for over $2.3 billion, leaving Credit Suisse as the sole
non-settling Defendant.
On March 1, 2019, the Plaintiffs moved to certify two classes. On
Sept. 3, 2019, the Court denied certification of the "Exchange
Class" for all purposes and certified the "OTC Class" for
adjudication of only two issues under Rule 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4).
The "OTC Class" was not certified for all issues because
individualized inquiries were found to be necessary to determine,
for each trade, (1) whether it took place "in the United States"
for purposes of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 6a, (2) whether it was a "resting order" or
"benchmark trade" excluded from the class; and (3) whether a
Defendant provided liquidity. The Plaintiffs argued that the
existence of a conspiracy and its class-wide effect could be
established with common proof, and damages could be calculated with
common formulae. Rule 23(b)(3) certification was denied because
those common issues did not predominate over the above individual
issues.
Two issues were certified for resolution on a class-wide basis: (1)
the existence of a conspiracy to widen spreads and (2)
participation in the conspiracy by Credit Suisse. The Court found
that class-wide resolution of those issues could resolve or
significantly narrow the case for individual claimants. If Credit
Suisse proved it did not join such a conspiracy, all claims against
it would be resolved. If the Plaintiffs proved that Credit Suisse
did conspire, that issue would be resolved efficiently in advance
of individual lawsuits. Common issues were found to predominate
because class-wide adjudication of only the two certified issues
does not require addressing individual issues. An issue class was
found to be superior to requiring future individual claimants to
present the same proof or to persuade courts to apply non-mutual
collateral estoppel.
Credit Suisse now moves to decertify the OTC issue class.
First, Judge Schofield opines that Credit Suisse's motion is an
untimely request for reconsideration, not a timely motion for
decertification. While an intervening event is not required to
decertify a class, Credit Suisse has not pointed to any relevant
changed circumstances that would affect the previous certification.
It cites interrogatories that were not answered and expert opinions
not proffered and relies on legal arguments that have been
available to it for years. Even in the context of class actions,
"interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial
resources" place some limits on motions for reconsideration.
Next, Judge Schofield holds that the OTC Class is ascertainable
because it is "defined using objective criteria that establish a
membership with definite boundaries." The case is easily
distinguished from the cases that Credit Suisse cites that found
class definitions insufficiently objective or definite. In Brecher
v. Republic of Argentina, for example, the class was defined by the
"objective" criterion of beneficial ownership of certain bonds, but
was not limited to any "defined class period," leaving the class
open-ended and literally indefinite. In Bakalar v. Vavra, the
putative defendant class was unascertainable because class was
defined by the objective fact of class members' relationship to
certain works of art, but the set of works was indefinite because
they were "not described by title" and apparently were incapable of
being identified.
Judge Schofield further holds that Article III standing does not
present a barrier to certification because the OTC Class is
"defined in such a way that anyone within it would have standing."
Every class member suffered an injury in fact because the class
includes only customers who conducted FX trades in an affected
currency pair with a Defendant during the period when Defendants
were allegedly conspiring to widen FX spreads. Every class member
suffered the harm of paying more or receiving less than they should
have in those trades.
What the customer paid or was paid is also relevant; if the spread
was widened due to the conspiracy, the quoted bid price would be
lower and the ask price higher than if the spread were narrower.
The customer would have paid too much or received not enough on
account of the alleged conspiracy. The class member would still be
harmed, even if no spread was provided. As for "resting orders" and
benchmark trades, they are expressly excluded from the class. The
class notice states: "Transactions that resulted from resting
orders are not included. Transactions at benchmark rates are not
included."
Judge Schofield also finds that contrary to Credit Suisse's
argument, individual issues that bear on class membership do not
preclude certification of an issue class where those individual
issues are not certified for class treatment. Only two issues are
certified: The existence of a conspiracy, and Credit Suisse's
participation in it. The class is not certified on the issue of
"liability" generally. Rather, the certified issues comprise part
of the first liability element of an antitrust claim: "a violation
of the antitrust laws." Issues relating to the second element --
"injury caused by that violation," -- will not be adjudicated
class-wide, so they are not weighed in the predominance analysis.
Credit Suisse's arguments for disturbing the limited issue
certification are unpersuasive. Liability will not be established
class wide. So individual liability issues do not defeat
predominance.
Finally, Judge Schofield opines that class treatment of the two
common issues certified for class-wide adjudication is superior to
requiring individual claimants repeatedly either to prove Credit
Suisse's role in a conspiracy or to litigate offensive non-mutual
collateral estoppel. Class-wide resolution of the two certified
issues would materially advance the litigation, despite the
existence of some non-certified, individual issues. The "due
process" concerns Credit Suisse raises are speculative and
baseless, and Credit Suisse's reexamination concerns can be
addressed with sound case management.
Credit Suisse suggests that it might defend against later damages
actions by arguing that class members who participated in the
chatrooms at issue acquiesced in the conspiracy. There is no
re-examination of the same factual issue if the first jury decides
Credit Suisse's involvement in the conspiracy, and a later jury
decides a different entity's involvement. Unlike in the comparative
negligence context, the application of Credit Suisse's proffered
defense to a class member would rise and fall solely on that class
member's conduct, not on any comparison with Credit Suisse's
conduct.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to decertify the
issue class is denied. Its motion for oral argument is denied as
moot.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at
Docket Numbers 1678 and 1689.
A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5ypzyu49 from Leagle.com.
CURADEN AG: $298K in Attys.' Fees & Costs Awarded in Lyngaas Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN LYNGAAS, D.D.S., individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff
v. CURADEN AG, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-10910 (E.D.
Mich.), Judge Mark A. Goldsmith of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, grants in part the
Plaintiff's motion for litigation expenses, attorney fees, and a
named plaintiff incentive award out of the total recovery,
modifying his requested relief to award:
(i) $96,490.78 in litigation expenses;
(ii) $3,000 to Lyngaas in his role as class representative,
to be paid from the total amount recovered; and
(iii) $202,002.31 in attorney fees.
Mr. Lyngaas brought the class action based on unsolicited faxes
advertising dental products that Curaden and its parent, Curaden,
allegedly sent to dental offices in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227 (TCPA). Following a
bench trial, the Court found that Curaden (but not its parent) was
liable for violating the TCPA and ordered that a claims
administration process be established so that an award amount could
be fixed and distributed to eligible class members. It subsequently
entered a final judgment in favor of the class against Curaden in
an amount to be determined through the claims administration
process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
this judgment.
Mr. Lyngaas filed a declaration from the administrator of the
claims process stating that 919 class members had claimed receipt
of 1,815 total violative fax transmissions. Because Curaden was
liable for $500 per violative transmission under the TCPA, the
Court found that Curaden was liable to the class for a total of
$907,500.
The Court also allowed Lyngaas to file a renewed motion for
attorney fees, an incentive award, and/or litigation costs. Lyngaas
now moves for litigation expenses, attorney fees, and a named
plaintiff incentive award out of the total recovery of $907,500.
Mr. Lyngaas requests that the Court (i) awards the class counsel
$96,490.78 in litigation expenses; (ii) award the class counsel
one-third of the total recovery of $907,500 -- that is, $302,500;
and (iii) authorize the class counsel to pay an incentive award of
$15,000 to Lyngaas for serving as the class representative, taken
from monies that would otherwise be attorney fees.
As to the litigation expenses, Judge Goldsmith opines that Lyngaas
has adequately demonstrated that these "expenses were reasonable
and necessary to the representation of the Class," and that they
"reflect reasonable and appropriate expenditures associated with
preparing for trial." Accordingly, he grants Lyngaas' request for
litigation expenses. If actual future expenses are less than the
expected future expenses proposed by Lyngaas, then the lower figure
must be used to calculate distributions to class members. If the
actual figure for future expenses is higher, the claims
administrator will remain responsible for completing the claims
process, and no additional amount may be paid to it from the
recovered funds.
Regarding attorneys' fees, Judge Goldsmith reduces Lyngaas'
proposed award of one third of the gross amount of the fund to 25%
of the fund after subtraction of litigation expenses and the class
representative award. He says the Court has already noted the
counsel's lack of professionalism in including unethical terms in
its representation agreement and in failing to timely comply with
the Court orders necessary to secure payment for the class.
Additionally, there were times during trial when the counsel's
performance was simply inept. This level of competence, he says,
supports a reduction to the class counsel's attorney fee. Thus,
Judge Goldsmith awards attorney fees equal to $202,002.31, leaving
$606,006.91 in the fund for the class members and resulting in a
distribution of $333.89 per violative fax transmission.
With respect to incentive award to the Named Plaintiff, Judge
Goldsmith is skeptical of Lyngaas' proposal that his willingness to
be deposed and to testify at trial should result in an award more
than 50 times the amount received by non-named class members. Other
than Lyngaas' very brief testimony at trial, there is no other
action on his part that he says justifies the award of a
significant amount. Judge Goldsmith is further concerned that
Lyngaas' relationship with the class counsel suggests that he may
be seeking an inappropriate "bounty" for bringing suit.
Accordingly, he finds it appropriate to award Lyngaas $3,000, and
to apply the more typical arrangement of awarding this amount out
of the total recovery rather than the award of attorney fees.
For the reasons explained, Judge Goldsmith grants Lyngaas' motion
in part, modifying his requested relief to award (i) $96,490.78 in
litigation expenses; (ii) $3,000 to Lyngaas individually in his
role as class representative, to be paid from the total amount
recovered; and (iii) $202,002.31 in attorney fees, equal to 25% of
the total recovery after the subtraction of attorney fees and the
class representative award.
A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8c89yk from Leagle.com.
CVS HEALTH: Must Comply With Third-Party Subpoena in Healy Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John C. Coughenour of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, grants the Plaintiff's motion to
compel the Defendant's compliance with a third-party subpoena in
the lawsuit titled JAMES HEALY, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Movant v. CVS HEALTH CORPORATION, Respondent,
Case No. MC22-0065-JCC (W.D. Wash.).
The subpoena seeks testimony supporting Mr. Healy's suit in a
certified class action, Healy v. Milliman Inc., Case No.
C20-1473-JCC (W.D. Wash. 2021) ("Certified Suit").
Mr. Healy contends that Milliman, Inc., violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA"), when it (a) sold a report containing Mr.
Healy's erroneous medical and prescription history to an insurer
and (b) then shifted the burden to correct the report to Mr. Healy.
He further contends this experience was not unique. Following
briefing on the issue, the Court granted class certification.
According to Mr. Healy, CVS provided data to Milliman, which it
used to compile his erroneous report. Therefore, in order to
support claims against Milliman, he seeks testimony from CVS
regarding its dealings with Milliman. Upon receipt of his subpoena,
CVS objected on myriad grounds and, since then, has refused to make
a CVS representative available for deposition.
Following unsuccessful e-mail communications and meet and confers,
Mr. Healy moved the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to compel enforcement of the subpoena. That court
transferred the matter to this Court, where Mr. Healy has renewed
his motion.
In opposing, CVS argues that the testimony Mr. Healy seeks is
overly broad and burdensome. CVS also contends the testimony is
irrelevant, given the classes as ultimately certified by the Court.
In addition, according to CVS, at least some of what he seeks is
either propriety or protected health information and cannot be
disclosed. Finally, CVS posits that he could more readily obtain
other information directly from Milliman; therefore, it is improper
to seek this information from a non-party.
The Court does not find CVS's arguments persuasive.
Judge Coughenour states that the party seeking to quash or modify a
subpoena bears the burden of showing that the subpoena should be
quashed or modified, citing Lillywhite v. AECOM, 2020 WL 4501596,
slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (citing Goodman v. United States,
369 F.2d 166, 169 (9th Cir. 1966)). However, a party or attorney,
who issues a Rule 45 subpoena that imposes an undue burden or
expense on the recipient, may be subject to sanctions, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 45(d)(1). And, to the extent that a nonparty's compliance costs
are substantial, the Court may award discovery costs to that
nonparty.
Mr. Healy seeks testimony on the following topics: (1) CVS's
understanding of its contract to supply data to Milliman, (2) the
server CVS's uses to store and transmit data to Milliman, (3) the
process CVS uses to supply data to Milliman, (4) the source of
CVS's data, (5) the process it uses to obtain that data, (6) CVS's
policies and practices regarding FCRA disputes, (7) details
regarding CVS's system, (8) the manner in which CVS's systems
interact with Milliman's, (9) CVS's maintenance of medical data,
and (10) CVS's maintenance of prescription records.
Judge Coughenour finds that this information is relevant to Mr.
Healy's claims, is proportional to the needs of his certified case,
is not overbroad, and does not appear to be within Milliman's
control. Undoubtedly, some of the information sought would be
proprietary. But that is not an appropriate basis to oppose
testimony on the topic. The protective order the Court previously
entered provides a process to designate certain testimony as
confidential. This is more than adequate to protects CVS's
information from unwarranted disclosure, Judge Coughenour points
out.
Finally, the Court does not view the requisite preparation that a
deposition on these topics would require, or the time and expense
required in actually testifying, to be unduly burdensome. If, after
the deposition is complete, CVS feels otherwise, it may move for
fee recovery. But this is not a basis to oppose or quash the
current subpoena.
For these reasons, the Court grants Mr. Healy's motion. CVS is
ordered to produce a representative to be deposed on the topics
described in Mr. Healy's subpoena within 45 days of this Order.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 25, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3822fs2s from Leagle.com.
EXECUPHARM INC: Class Action Over Phishing Attack Reinstated
------------------------------------------------------------
Judy Greenwald, writing for Business Insurance, reports that a
federal appeals court has overturned a lower court and reinstated a
putative class action lawsuit filed by a former pharmaceutical
company employee whose personal information was released on the
dark web following a phishing attack.
Jennifer Clemens, a former employee of ExecuPharm Inc., a unit of
Parexel International Corp., whose U.S. headquarters is in Newton,
Massachusetts, was required as a condition of her employment to
provide sensitive personal and financial information, such as her
Social Security and bank and financial account numbers, according
to the Sept. 2 ruling by the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Philadelphia in Jennifer Clemens v. ExecuPharm Inc.; Parexel Int'l
Corp. The company promised it would take appropriate measures to
protect the information.
In March 2020, a hacking group accessed ExecuPharm's services
through a phishing attack and installed malware to encrypt the data
stored on its servers, the ruling said. Either because ExecuPharm
did not pay ransomware or for other reasons, the company's data was
released on the dark web.
To mitigate potential harm, Ms. Clemens immediately took actions
including moving to a new bank and purchasing credit monitoring
services.
She filed a putative class-action lawsuit against the companies in
U.S. District Court in Philadelphia, on charges including breaches
of contract, fiduciary duty and confidence.
The district court dismissed the case, stating Ms. Clemens had not
yet experienced actual identity theft or fraud. It was overturned
by a unanimous three-judge appeals court panel.
ExecuPharm "expressly contracted" to protect Ms. Clemens'
information in its employment agreement, said the ruling, adding,
"As employment agreements have become routine, information security
provisions" as in this case "have assumed a new prominence.
"Likewise, the failure to uphold those provisions -- particularly
in the digital age -- can yield uniquely drastic consequences," the
ruling said, in reinstating the case and remanding the ruling for
further proceedings.
Plaintiff attorney J. Austin Moore, a partner with Stueve Siegel
Hanson LLP in Kansas City, Missouri, said in a statement, "We
appreciate the panel's thorough and well-reasoned analysis and look
forward to pursuing the merits of these claims before the district
court."
Parexel's attorneys did not respond to a request for comment. [GN]
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Williams Files FCRA Suit in E.D. Virginia
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Experian Information
Solutions, Inc. The case is styled as Freddie L. Williams, on
behalf of himself and all similarly situated individuals v.
Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Case No.
4:22-cv-00092-RBS-LRL (E.D. Va., Sept. 2, 2022).
The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.
Experian Information Solutions, Inc. --
https://www.experian.com/corporate/ -- operates as an information
services company.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Craig Carley Marchiando, Esq.
Leonard Anthony Bennett, Esq.
CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES
763 J Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite 1A
Newport News, VA 23601
Phone: (757) 930-3660
Fax: (757) 930-3662
Email: craig@clalegal.com
lenbennett@clalegal.com
- and -
Drew David Sarrett, Esq.
CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, PC
626 East Broad Street, Suite 300
Richmond, VA 23219
Phone: (804) 905-9900
Fax: (757) 930-3662
Email: drew@clalegal.com
FCA US LLC: Do Suit Transferred to E.D. Michigan
------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Alton Do, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. FCA US LLC, Case No. 3:22-cv-04497 was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for Northern District of
California, to the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of
Michigan on Sept. 2, 2022.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-12064-DML to the
proceeding.
The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.
FCA US LLC designs, engineers, manufactures, and sells vehicles.
The Company offers passenger cars, utility vehicles, mini-vans,
trucks and commercial vans, as well as distributes automotive
service parts and accessories.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Jeremy Nash, Esq.
LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC
570 Broad St., Suite 1201
Newark, NJ 07102
Phone: (973) 623-3000
FCA US: Court Awards $179K in Costs to Defendants in Flynn Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Staci M. Yandle of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois grants in part and denies in part the
Defendants' motions for costs under 28 U.S.C. Section 1919 in the
lawsuit titled BRIAN FLYNN, GEORGE BROWN, KELLY BROWN, MICHAEL
KEITH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. FCA US LLC and HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-855-SMY (S.D. Ill.).
FCA is awarded $86,086.81 in costs and Defendant Harman is awarded
$93,157.96.
Plaintiffs Flynn, Keith, and the Browns filed the putative class
action against FCA and Harman, asserting consumer fraud claims
related to an alleged design defect in the Uconnect system
manufactured by Harman and installed in some of FCA's 2013-2015
model vehicles.
After over four years of litigation, the Court granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and dismissed this case with prejudice. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed on appeal but modified the Judgment to reflect a
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without leave to
amend. Now before the Court are FCA and Harmon's Bill of Costs and
corresponding Motions for Taxation of Costs, which the Plaintiffs
oppose.
The Court has the authority to order the "payment of just costs,"
including attorneys' fees when a suit is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, Judge Yandle notes, citing 28 U.S.C. Section 1919;
Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 926 (7th
Cir. 2000). While the Seventh Circuit has not addressed what
constitutes "just costs" under Section 1919, the Court finds the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Otay Land Co. v. United Enters. Ltd.,
672 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) instructive.
The Otay court articulated a four-factor analysis for determining
what is most fair and equitable based on the totality of
circumstances: (1) the role played by exigent circumstances, such
as hardship, prejudice, or culpable behavior by the parties
(although it is clear that costs may be awarded absent exigent
circumstances); (2) the strength of the plaintiff's jurisdictional
claim; (3) the significance of pending parallel litigation in state
court; and (4) other equitable considerations, as encapsulated by
the question "what is fair here?" As the first and third factors
don't apply here, the Court focuses its analysis on the second and
fourth factors.
Judge Yandle notes that Article III standing has been a point of
contention from the beginning of this litigation. The Plaintiffs'
theory was that although the alleged cybersecurity defect never
manifested again after the controlled Wired hack, they nevertheless
suffered an "overpayment" injury. From the outset, the Defendants
argued that the Plaintiffs lacked standing because the alleged
design flaws had never caused them any legally cognizable
injury-in-fact.
The Plaintiffs' overpayment theory survived several pleading-stage
challenges. But after discovery closed, facing a factual challenge
to standing, the Plaintiffs failed to cite credible evidence
supporting their theory, notwithstanding the amount of discovery
generated, including hundreds of thousands of documents, 31
depositions, and 10 separate expert reports. Simply put, Judge
Yandle says, the Plaintiff's jurisdictional claim was always
tenuous at best.
With respect to the fourth factor -- "what is fair? -- equitable
considerations warrant the imposition of a cost award in this case,
Judge Yandle holds. The Defendants incurred substantial costs and
attorneys' fees in defending against the Plaintiffs' claims,
including persistently challenging their overpayment theory based
on a lack of standing. In light of the totality of circumstances,
Judge Yandle points out that it is fair and equitable to award the
Defendants some measure of costs.
The lion's share of costs sought by the Defendants is for
deposition transcripts and videographer services. FCA seeks
$92,300.54 and Harman seeks $97,000.44 in deposition costs.
Deposition costs, including transcripts, are authorized under
Section 1920(2) as stenographic transcripts.
Harman seeks $9,100.00 for videography costs associated with the
depositions of 19 deponents. FCA seeks $16,752.19 in videography
costs. However, neither Defendant offers a reason why a
video-depositions were necessary for those particular deponents,
Judge Yandle finds. As such, the Court will only award the
Defendants costs associated with the written transcripts; FCA is
awarded $75,548.35 and Harman is awarded $87,900.44 in deposition
costs.
FCA seeks $8,554.91 and Harman seeks $4,462.42 for costs incurred
for printing and copying. These expenses are recoverable if
incurred for copies or printing used in the litigation. Judge
Yandle finds the Defendants' cost breakdown coupled with affidavits
of their legal counsel adequately meets this standard.
FCA seeks $488.55 and Harman seeks $795.10 for costs incurred to
obtain hearing transcripts. The Plaintiffs do not specifically
object to the costs. Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants'
motions as to the hearing transcript costs.
Section 1920(1) permits the Court to assess costs for clerk and
marshal fees, a category that includes costs associated with the
service of subpoenas.
FCA incurred $3,284.07 to serve 23 subpoenas on third parties to
obtain necessary information relating to the Plaintiffs' use and
maintenance of their vehicles. However, it seeks to recover only
$1,495, the equivalent of the Marshal's rates. The Plaintiffs do
not specifically object to these costs. Accordingly, FCA's motion
is granted as to the subpoena costs.
Accordingly, Judge Yandle granted in part and denied in part the
motions for costs under 28 U.S.C. Section 1919 filed by Defendants
FCA US and Harman International Industries Incorporated. Defendant
FCA US is awarded $86,086.81 in costs and Defendant Harman is
awarded $93,157.96.
A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Aug. 25,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3j4v587c from
Leagle.com.
FERROVIAL SERVICES: Wu's Counsel Awarded $50K in Attorneys' Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
awards a total of $50,000 in attorneys' fees in the lawsuit titled
SHU WU, et al., Plaintiffs v. FERROVIAL SERVICES INFRASTRUCTURE
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-09447-WHO (N.D. Cal.).
On Aug. 24, 2022, the Court conducted a hearing on the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and a Class Representative
Incentive Awards.
The Court finds that the requested award of attorneys' fees in the
amount of $50,000, or one-third of the common fund created by the
settlement, is reasonable for a contingency fee in a class action
such as this.
The Plaintiffs' counsel has also provided sufficient evidence to
establish that the award is reasonable in light of a lodestar
cross-check, which the Court finds to be the product of reasonable
billing rates and hours billed to the litigation.
Additionally, evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs' Counsel
demonstrates that the requested costs of $10,787.41 are fair and
reasonable.
The Court, accordingly, awards a total of $50,000 in attorneys'
fees and $10,787.41 in costs to Capstone Law APC.
It also approves incentive awards of $2,500, each, to Plaintiffs
Jason Brunton and Brian Cooley.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 25, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc4yws57 from Leagle.com.
FOUNDATION ENERGY: Ritter Files Suit in E.D. Oklahoma
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Foundation Energy
Management, LLC. The case is styled as Stephen Lane Ritter, and on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Foundation
Energy Management, LLC, Case No. 6:22-cv-00246-GLJ (E.D. Okla.,
Sept. 1, 2022).
The nature of suit is stated Other Contract.
Foundation Energy Management, LLC -- https://foundationenergy.com/
-- is a manager of energy investments for institutional
partners.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Reagan E. Bradford, Esq.
Ryan K. Wilson, Esq.
BRADFORD & WILSON, PLLC
431 W Main St, Ste D
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
Phone: (405) 698-2770
Fax: (405) 234-5506
Email: reagan@bradwil.com
ryan@bradwil.com
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Faces Class Action Over Fire Alarm Defect
-----------------------------------------------------------
Steve Karantzoulidis, writing for Security Sales & Integration,
reports that a class action lawsuit has been filed against General
Electric Company and Carrier for allegedly selling
combination-listed burglar and fire alarm system control units with
defects, dangers and non-conformities.
The units in question were sold under the brand name Interlogix,
and manufactured and sold by GE, UTC, UTC Security and Carrier.
According to the lawsuit, the Interlogix alarm system control unit
was manufactured and sold by GE from 2002 through 2009 under the GE
Security name, and then UTC from 2010 through late 2015 under the
Interlogix brand name and then UTC Security from late 2015 through
early 2020 under the Interlogix brand name
It was then sold by Carrier under the Interlogix brand name after
UTC Security was spun off into Carrier in early 2020.
The lawsuit states, "The serious defects, dangers and
non-conformities which Defendants have known about for years,
and/or were required to know about for years, and long before they
designed, sold, and put their products out into the stream of
commerce can lead to an instantaneous and catastrophic failure of
the alarm system's combination-listed control unit during a fire.
In this dangerously silent and non-functional state, instead of the
alarm system performing its crucial life safety function by audibly
warning all occupants inside the home of the fire emergency and the
central station, the combination listed control unit fails."
These alleged defects are said to render the control units
non-conforming to the minimum standards required by both UL and
NFPA 72 Standards. The lawsuit says before the Defendants submitted
their equipment to be listed by a nationally recognized testing
laboratory such as UL, they were required to verify that their
equipment was conforming.
The defect pointed out in the lawsuit is if the data-bus circuit
wiring is faulted and/or shorted anywhere it is installed
throughout the home by fire, the non-conforming control unit is
instantly rendered non-functional.
If the combination listed control unit was conforming, fire
attacking the single data-bus circuit of the combination listed
control unit or any equipment that is required to connect to the
single data-bus of the combination listed control unit shall not
cause the system to be rendered non-functional, since conforming to
both UL and NFPA 72 Standards specifically prohibits this loss of
functionality from happening, according to the lawsuit.
The lawsuit also claims that GE and Carrier's were aware of the
defects, dangers and non-conformities and concealed them from
consumers and/or failed to disclose the plaintiff and the class,
while at the same time affirmatively representing the high quality
and safety of their control unit systems meeting both UL and NFPA
Standards.
The class action's plaintiff learned of the alleged defects when he
upgraded his Interlogix Concord IV Control Unit to a new wireless
radio alarm transmitter in August 2021.
The class action lawsuit the contains more than 100 members and
seeks in the aggregate more than $5 million, exclusive of costs and
interest. [GN]
GOOGLE LLC: Appen's Bid for Order Relief in Kumandan Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ASIF KUMANDAN, et al., Plaintiffs v. GOOGLE
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-04286-BLF (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, denies without
prejudice Non-Party Appen Butler Hill Inc.'s motion for relief from
nondispositive pretrial order issued by Magistrate Judge Susan van
Keulen.
Before the Court is non-party Appen Butler Hill Inc.'s motion for
relief from Judge van Keulen's order granting in part and denying
in part Appen's motion to quash the Plaintiffs' subpoena of Appen
in this privacy class action against Defendants Google LLC and
Alphabet, Inc. (collectively, "Google"). The Court denies Appen's
motion without prejudice to Appen filing a motion for leave to file
a motion for reconsideration before Judge van Keulen.
On Jan. 6, 2022, the Plaintiffs served Appen with subpoenas that
included document requests and topics for a deposition. The
document requests and deposition topics sought information
regarding Appen's work transcribing audio recordings for Google.
Appen moved to quash the subpoena seeking deposition testimony,
arguing that (1) it was unlimited in time; (2) any relevant
information it sought could be obtained from Google directly; and
(3) it sought privileged information.
Judge van Keulen granted Appen's motion in part and denied it in
part, finding that there are a number of subpoenaed topics that are
clearly within the exclusive knowledge, custody and control of
Appen and for which neither production of documents nor preparation
of a witness would be unduly burdensome. Judge van Keulen further
modified the deposition topics and requests for production, given
that some of the topics are not relevant to the limited third-party
role of Appen in this action. Judge van Keulen ordered that
document production pursuant to the modified subpoena must be
completed by Aug. 19, 2022, and the deposition must take place by
Aug. 31, 2022.
Appen now challenges portions of Judge van Keulen's order, arguing
that it is erroneous and contrary to law because it seeks
information available from Google after the close of fact discovery
and in excess of the ten depositions allowed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 30(a)(2)(A)(i). The Court declined to request an
opposition from the Plaintiffs under Civil Local Rule 72-2(d).
Appen argues that Judge van Keulen's order "of hardly one page and
with no reasoning" is "erroneous and contrary to law." First, Appen
provides a declaration from an employee indicating that Appen has
no documents or information indicating that Appen has accessed
audio obtained with the Google Assistant Software at issue in this
case. Second, it argues that Judge van Keulen's order is erroneous
because it compels Appen to provide information that is available
from Google. It provides evidence that it contracted with Google to
transcribe audio recordings through a proprietary Google tool, so
even the information Judge van Keulen considered to be exclusively
within Appen's knowledge or custody could have been sought from
Google.
Third, Appen argues that Judge van Keulen's order requires Appen to
testify to irrelevant topics, i.e., the locations and number of
Appen personnel that "work for or on behalf of Google." It argues
that these topics are part of the Plaintiffs' fishing expedition to
seek Appen employee deponents. Fourth, it argues that Judge van
Keulen's order requires a deposition in excess of the ten allowed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2).
The Court disagrees with Appen. As a threshold matter, it notes
that Appen mischaracterizes Judge van Keulen's order as consisting
of "hardly one page" and containing "no reasoning." Judge Freeman
points out that Appen completely ignores the six pages Judge van
Keulen provides containing detailed alterations to the Plaintiffs'
document requests and deposition topics served on Appen. Further,
Appen ignores the reasoning in Judge van Keulen's order.
Accordingly, Judge van Keulen's order is far more than "hardly one
page," and it is untrue that it contains "no reasoning," Judge
Freeman holds.
Otherwise, Judge Freeman notes, Appen's motion appears to be based
on mere disagreements with Judge van Keulen's findings that are
insufficient to meet Appen's burden on its motion. Appen's quibbles
regarding the relevance of the information sought by the
Plaintiffs' subpoena as modified by Judge van Keulen fail to show
that Judge van Keulen's order was contrary to law.
Appen contends that the locations and the number of Appen
personnel, who perform work for or on behalf of Google, is relevant
only as the basis for an improper "fishing expedition" to find
Appen employee deponents. But this information also speaks to the
scope of the relationship between Appen and Google, which Judge van
Keulen found "may be addressed in deposition," Judge Freeman says.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Appen's relevance challenges fail
to show that any of Judge van Keulen's findings were contrary to
law.
Appen's argument that the information at issue in Judge van
Keulen's order is equally accessible to Google is also unavailing,
Judge Freeman states. Appen's argument, which pertains to the
burden of the Plaintiffs' document requests and deposition topics,
is based on a challenge to Judge van Keulen's factual finding that
there are a number of subpoenaed topics that are clearly within the
exclusive knowledge, custody and control of Appen.
The Court reviews Judge van Keulen's factual determinations for
clear error. Appen's argument appears to be based merely in a
disagreement as to whether certain information is available to
Google. Appen argued in its motion to quash that certain
information sought from Appen was equally available to Google.
Nonetheless, Judge van Keulen disagreed, finding that certain
deposition topics are "clearly within the exclusive knowledge,
custody and control of Appen."
Judge Freeman finds that Appen fails to show that Judge van
Keulen's disagreement was clear error. For example, Appen fails to
show that information regarding Appen's "policies and
practices"--something clearly in Appen's exclusive knowledge and
custody, regardless of any arrangement with Google--is equally
accessible to Google.
In support of its challenges to Judge van Keulen's relevance and
burden findings, Appen provides new evidence that it did not
present to Judge van Keulen regarding the relationship between
Appen and Google. The Court does not see how it can consider such
evidence on a motion for relief from a nondispositive pretrial
order of Judge van Keulen. Appen appears to be covertly moving for
reconsideration of Judge van Keulen's order based on newly offered
evidence, Judge Freeman observes.
If Appen wishes for Judge van Keulen to reconsider her prior order
based on new evidence, this Order will be without prejudice to
Appen filing a motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration before Judge van Keulen. But the Court will not
take Appen's improper invitation to grant relief from Judge van
Keulen's order based on evidence that was not before her. Moreover,
if Appen does not have responsive documents, it is free to say so
in a properly verified response to the subpoena or at a
deposition.
Appen also argues that any deposition in response to the
Plaintiffs' subpoena will be in excess of the ten depositions the
Plaintiffs are allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(a)(2)--a fact the Plaintiffs "withheld" and "conceal[ed]" from
Appen and Judge van Keulen. Again, Judge Freeman notes, this
appears to be new evidence appropriate to raise in a motion for
reconsideration before Judge van Keulen--not a motion for relief
from Judge van Keulen's nondispositive pretrial order. And it is
not clear why a third party would be harmed by a presumptive limit
intended to protect the litigants.
For these reasons, Judge Freeman rules that Appen's motion is
denied without prejudice to Appen filing a motion for leave to file
a motion for reconsideration, to be presented to Magistrate Judge
van Keulen.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 25, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yvebuujk from Leagle.com.
GOOGLE LLC: Court Extends Stay of Vance Suit Through Feb. 27, 2023
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, extends through Feb. 27, 2023, the stay in the
lawsuit captioned STEVEN VANCE, et al., Plaintiffs v. GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-04696-BLF (N.D. Cal.).
On Aug. 15, 2022, the parties submitted a joint status report in
which Defendant Google LLC requested that the Court extend the stay
in this case pending resolution of an action in the Northern
District of Illinois. The Plaintiffs contest various issues
underlying Google's request and the Court's prior stay orders,
although the Plaintiffs take no position on whether the Court
should extend the stay.
The case is a privacy class action under the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act ("BIPA") based on Google's alleged receipt
of the "Diversity in Faces" dataset from International Business
Machines Corporation ("IBM"). The Plaintiffs first sued IBM in the
Northern District of Illinois on Jan. 24, 2020 (Vance v. Int'l Bus.
Machines Corp., No. 1:20-cv-00577 (N.D. Ill.) (the "IBM Action")).
On July 14, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed this action and actions
against Amazon.com, Inc. and Microsoft Corp. in the Western
District of Washington and against FaceFirst, Inc. in the Central
District of California; Vance v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-1084
(W.D. Wash.) ("Amazon Case"); Vance v. Microsoft Corp., No.
2:20-cv-1082 (W.D. Wash.) ("Microsoft Case"); Vance v. FaceFirst,
Inc., No. 2:20-cv-6244 (C.D. Cal.) ("FaceFirst Case").
On Feb. 21, 2021, the Court stayed this case pending the IBM
Action, since the case "shares significant factual and legal
questions with the IBM action" and the harm to the Plaintiffs from
a stay was not significant enough to outweigh other factors.
Further, it credited the Plaintiffs' concerns regarding an
indefinite stay, so it limited the stay to a year.
On Feb. 14, 2022, the Court extended the stay an additional six
months, finding that it was appropriate to allow the parties to the
IBM Action to "complete discovery and provide them a meaningful
amount of time to resolve some of the issues that overlap with this
case," particularly given that the Plaintiffs "failed to point to
any damage from an extended stay other than a further delay in the
case."
Per the Court's Feb. 14, 2022 order, the parties filed a joint
status report on Aug. 15, 2022. The parties informed the Court that
fact discovery is ongoing in the IBM Action. In the Amazon and
Microsoft Actions, no stay was requested, so the cases have
proceeded and summary judgment motions have been fully briefed. In
the FaceFirst Action, the court recently extended the stay an
additional six months. The parties also included briefing in the
joint status report regarding whether the Court should extend the
stay in the action given the pendency of the IBM Action.
District Judge Beth Labson Freeman notes that district courts have
the "discretionary power to stay proceedings," citing Lockyer v.
Mirant Corp.., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Landis
v. N. Amer. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). In determining whether
to grant or extend a stay, the competing interests, which will be
affected by the granting or refusal to stay must be weighed. Among
these competing interests are [1] the possible damage which may
result from the granting of the stay, [2] the hardship or inequity
which a party must suffer in being required to go forward, and [3]
the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying
or complicating the issues, proof, and questions of law which could
be expected to result from the stay ("Landis factors").
In support of extending the stay in this case, Google argues that
the Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if the stay remains in
effect, because they are actively engaged in the IBM Action and
Google has agreed to take reasonable steps to preserve any relevant
evidence in its possession. Google further argues that a lift of
the stay could bring about duplication of effort and inconsistent
rulings among the various cases brought by the Plaintiffs.
In response, the Plaintiffs do not take a position on whether the
Court should extend the stay in this case. However, the Plaintiffs
do dispute Google's contentions in support of extending the stay.
They argue that since discovery is ongoing in the IBM Action and no
discovery schedule has been set, any extended stay is likely to be
open-ended. Further, they argue that overlap between the cases and
any of their other pending cases is minimal due to factual issues
specific to each case.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue that Google is prejudicing
itself and them, because once any stay ends, "Google and Plaintiffs
will be in the difficult position later of either dragging
third-parties through discovery again or else adopting production
and testimony from discovery in other cases in which Google chose
not to participate."
The Court agrees with Google. As it outlined in its prior orders,
Google has adequately shown that the second and third Landis
factors support staying the case pending the IBM Action. While
there are of course factual differences between the Plaintiffs'
various cases since they involve different parties, the Court has
already found that there is overlap in the facts and law at issue
that are likely to create redundancies or discrepancies if the case
proceeds in parallel with the IBM Action. The Plaintiffs fail to
provide sufficient detail of the factual differences between their
various cases to indicate that the Court should reconsider its
prior finding regarding case overlap.
Further, under the first Landis factor, the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs have again failed to show anything more than minimal
prejudice from an extended stay. The Plaintiffs now point to the
fact that the parties may have to redo discovery in the case if it
is stayed or else fight about whether to import discovery from
their other cases. They contend that discovery could be coordinated
between this case and their other cases if this case were not
stayed.
Judge Freeman holds that the time savings of coordinated discovery
pointed to by the Plaintiffs are minimal, speculative, and
outweighed by the time that will be wasted if overlapping factual
and legal issues are repeatedly litigated across their cases.
Accordingly, she finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that
prejudice from a stay outweighs the other Landis factors, which
support extending the stay.
Based on this reasoning, the Court extends the stay until Feb. 27,
2023. The parties will submit a joint status report to the Court
within 14 days of the resolution of the IBM Action or on Feb. 27,
2023, whichever comes first. The final pretrial conference and
trial dates are vacated. The case schedule will be reset upon
lifting the stay.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 25, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4k8szdtn from Leagle.com.
GRANDIZIO WILKINS: Court Dismisses Stamat Suit for Lack of Standing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SPYRO STAMAT, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GRANDIZIO WILKINS LITTLE &
MATTHEWS, LLP, Defendant, Civil Case No. SAG-22-00747 (D. Md.),
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint.
Mr. Stamat, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
filed the class action against Grandizio seeking monetary,
declaratory, and injunctive relief for the alleged negligent
failure to protect Personal Identifying Information ("PII") from
unauthorized access, and for unjust enrichment. The Plaintiff is a
resident of Delaware. Grandizio, a Maryland corporation, is an
accounting firm that offers tax and business services. It acquires
and stores PII of individuals in connection with its services.
On June 7, 2021, Grandizio discovered unauthorized access into one
of its employee's email accounts. It commissioned an investigation
with cybersecurity experts to determine whether any information had
been compromised. The internal investigation completed on Dec. 17,
2021, but could not conclusively determine whether any data has
been or will be misused by those who gained unauthorized access to
the email account. The following month, on Jan. 14, 2022, Grandizio
informed relevant States' Attorney Generals about the breach of its
email account. At the same time, it sent written notification to
any individuals whose data may have been compromised.
Thereafter, Mr. Stamat received a "Notice of Data Security
Incident" from Grandizio, informing him about the email account
breach and noting that some of the company's files "may have been
accessed by the unauthorized individual" that "may have contained
names, Social Security numbers, Medical Information, Drivers'
License Information, Financial Account Information, or Payment Card
Information." The letter further informed Mr. Stamat that his
personal information "may have been involved." It offered single
bureau credit and identity monitoring services for 12 months, and
suggested Mr. Stamat take measures to protect against possible
identity theft.
Mr. Stamat does not purport to have worked with Grandizio directly;
he alleges that Grandizio acquired his PII through a third-party
intermediary without his knowledge. Beyond the information provided
in the letter, he is unaware to what extent his PII has been
compromised (if at all), what type of his information may have been
compromised, or how the unauthorized email access occurred. He
believes the likely mechanism was an email phishing attack of one
of Grandizio's employees. He "further believes his PII, and that of
Class Members, was subsequently sold on the dark web following the
Data Breach, as that is the modus operandi of cybercriminals that
commit cyber-attacks of this type."
As a result of the potential exposure of his PII, Mr. Stamat spends
"a considerable amount of time" monitoring his accounts and credit
scores and researching how the unauthorized access of the email
account may have impacted him. He further "anticipates spending
considerable time and money on an ongoing basis" to mitigate and
prevent potential misuses of his PII. He has "sustained emotional
distress," specifically, he has "suffered lost time, annoyance,
interference, and inconvenience as a result of the Data Breach and
has anxiety and increased concerns for the loss of his privacy."
In total, Mr. Stamat alleges that the failure to protect PII from
unauthorized access resulted in the following injuries to himself
and other similarly situated individuals: (i) the current and
imminent risk of fraud and identity theft; (ii) lost or diminished
value of PII; (iii) out-of-pocket expenses associated with the
prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, tax fraud,
and/or unauthorized use of their PII; (iv) lost opportunity costs
associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of
the Data Breach, including but not limited to lost time; and (v)
the continued and certainly increased risk to their PII; (vi) the
invasion of privacy; (vii) the compromise, disclosure, theft, and
unauthorized use of Plaintiff's and the Class Members' PII; and
(viii) emotional distress, fear, anxiety, nuisance and annoyance
related to the theft and compromise of their PII.
Mr. Stamat, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
filed the Class Action Complaint in the Court on March 28, 2022. He
purports to represent "all persons Grandizio identified as being
among those individuals impacted by the Data Breach, including all
who were sent a notice of the Data Breach." He, and those he
represents, allege that Grandizio negligently failed to reasonably
secure their PII (Counts I, III) and became unjustly enriched
through use of the PII without implementing adequate safeguards
(Count II).
Grandizio has now filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Its Motion
is based upon two grounds. First, Grandizio argues that the Court
should dismiss Mr. Stamat's Complaint because he has failed to
allege an injury-in-fact and lacks standing. Second, it asserts
that the Court should dismiss Mr. Stamat's claims for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In his Complaint, Mr. Stamat provides a list of alleged harms --
actual and imminent -- resulting from the unauthorized email
access.
Mr. Stamat identifies the "current and imminent risk of fraud and
identity theft" as an injury for standing purposes. He urges the
Court to "follow the growing number of courts that have found the
imminent risk of future harm is a legally cognizable injury."
Grandizio counters that this threat of injury is speculative and
insufficient to establish Article III standing.
Judge Gallagher opines that Mr. Stamat alleges no actual misuse of
his personal data. He does not provide any instance where his
personal information has been fraudulently used to open a credit
card, make fraudulent charges, or used in such a way to lower his
credit score. All potential harms and misuses of his data remain
hypothetical. Even assuming that Grandizio maintains PII
inadequately in the general course, because even the actual data
breach fails to establish injury-in-fact, any continued risk of
another data breach is equally unsatisfactory for Article III
standing purposes.
Mr. Stamat also identifies various actual harms he alleges he has
suffered as a result of Grandizio's failure to adequately protect
his PII from unauthorized access, including the unauthorized access
itself and the resulting "invasion of privacy" and the "lost or
diminished value" of his PII.
Judge Gallgher holds that the fact that an unauthorized third party
accessed the email account of a Grandizio employee, which may have
contained Mr. Stamat's PII, does not on its own provide an
actionable injury or show that his privacy was invaded. Also, the
fact that someone else can profit from having access to his
information does not necessarily lower the value of that
information to Mr. Stamat. Indeed, the misuse of PII can damage its
value and lower Mr. Stamat's credit scores, but until that misuse
occurs, Mr. Stamat has not been concretely harmed.
Judge Gallgher notes that it is not out of the realm of possibility
that other individuals in the proposed class have suffered some
concrete harm as a result of the unauthorized email access, if
there has been actual misuse of their PII. But the Complaint fails
to provide examples of misuse of any other plaintiffs' information,
and for the purposes of determining standing for a class action
complaint, Judge Gallgher reviews Mr. Stamat's alleged injuries as
the named plaintiff. As discussed, he has failed to allege any
concrete harm -- imminent or actual -- to establish injury-in-fact
for Article III standing.
For these reasons, Judge Gallagher grants Grandizio's Motion to
Dismiss for lack of standing. As a result, she finds moot and does
not address Grandizio's alternative arguments to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). A separate Order follows.
A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mr36xr9u from Leagle.com.
ICECURE MEDICAL: Challenges Shareholder's Motion for Class Cert.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Icecure Medical Ltd. disclosed in its Form 20-F/A filing for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 22, 2022, that the Company believes
that the motion filed by a shareholder to certify a claim as a
Class Action in connection with the private placement that was
approved by the general meeting on March 7, 2021, is without merit,
and that the factual description and the data underlying the motion
are incorrect and/or imprecise.
On July 5, 2021, the Company was informed that a Motion
(hereinafter: 'the motion') to certify a claim as a Class Action
was filed against it and the members of the Board of Directors, the
controlling shareholder and the investors who took part in the
private placement that was approved by the general meeting on March
7, 2021 (hereinafter: 'the investors'). The Motion to Certify was
filed with the Tel Aviv District court by a shareholder of the
Company, (hereinafter: the 'Plaintiff').
In the motion, the plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the Company
made a private placement of securities to the controlling
shareholder and the investors at a significant discount on the
share price at that time, in which the share price did not reflect
material information that was allegedly in the Company's possession
and which was also brought to the attention of the investors, and
that there were alleged defects in the manner of approving the
private placement at the meeting of the Company's shareholders.
The plaintiff estimated the amount of his individual claim at a sum
of approximately NIS30,000 (USD9,191), the amount of the class
action, insofar as it will be qualified as such, at a sum of
approximately NIS163,459 (USD50,079) for the class damages that the
plaintiff claims had their shares diluted unlawfully, and at a sum
of approximately NIS234,349 (USD71,798), for damage that was
supposedly caused to the shareholders due to a sale at less than
the full market price.
After a preliminary review of the motion, the Company believes that
the motion is without merit and that the factual description and
the data underlying the motion are incorrect and/or imprecise.
Icecure Medical Ltd. is engaged in the business development,
marketing, clinical management and sale of minimally invasive
medical devices for cryoablation of tumors in the human body using
its proprietary liquid nitrogen Cryoablation technology, as an
alternative to surgical intervention to remove the tumor.
ICECURE MEDICAL: Class Cert. Bid Over Report Accessibility Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Icecure Medical Ltd. disclosed in its Form 20-F/A filing for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 22, 2022, that a motion to certify a
claim as a Class Action over the Company's alleged non-compliance
with applicable report accessibility guidelines is pending.
On July 29, 2021, the Company was informed that a motion to certify
a claim as a Class Action was filed against it claiming that the
Company's reports filed on the TASE electronic filing site, the
MAYA, and on the ISA electronic filing site, the MAGNA, are not in
compliance with applicable accessibility guidelines, and therefore
the Company prevents or reduces the access of people with
disabilities to such reports. The claim is in the amount of
NIS5,000 (USD1,541). As far as the Company is aware, this motion
was filed against many companies that trade on the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange.
On March 6, 2022, following a court hearing, the court determined
that the public companies will submit a joint response within 45
days.
No further updates were provided in the Company's latest Form
20-F/A filing.
Icecure Medical Ltd. is engaged in the business development,
marketing, clinical management and sale of minimally invasive
medical devices for cryoablation of tumors in the human body using
its proprietary liquid nitrogen Cryoablation technology, as an
alternative to surgical intervention to remove the tumor.
JG RESTAURANT: Windheim Suit Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Servers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA WINDHEIM, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. JG RESTAURANT VENTURES LLC d/b/a BIG LOUIE'S
PIZZERIA, a Florida liability company, Case No. 0:22-cv-61673 (S.D.
Fla., Sept. 7, 2022) alleges that Defendant failed to pay federal
minimum wages, Florida minimum wages, and federal overtime wages
for certain hours to Restaurant Servers who worked for the
Defendant in Hollywood, Florida in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
The Plaintiff seeks class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 of
the following class for failure to pay Florida's mandated minimum
wages pursuant to the Florida Minimum Wage Act:
-- Tip Notice Class:
"All Servers who worked for Defendant at Big Louie's
Pizzeria in Hollywood, Florida the five years preceding
this lawsuit, who were not provided the appropriate tip
notice pursuant to Fla. Const. Art. X 24(c) and/or F.S.
section 448.110."
The Defendant is in the business of providing food and drink to the
general public at its pizzeria located in Hollywood, Florida. The
Defendant employed the Plaintiff and the Class Members as "Servers"
at Big Louie's within the past five years. Their job duties
consisted of serving patrons and customers designated areas which
required little to no special or advanced skill.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Jordan Richards, Esq.
USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS
JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
1800 SE 10th Ave. Suite 205
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
E-mail: Jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
Jake@jordanrichardspllc.com
JUUL LABS: Agrees to Settle Vape Class Action for $438.5 Million
----------------------------------------------------------------
Aaron Katersk, writing for ABC News, reports that Juul agreed on
Sept. 6 to pay nearly a half billion dollars as part of a
settlement with 39 states over the way it marketed its vape
products.
The $438.5 million agreement in principle with Juul Labs resolves a
two-year investigation into the e-cigarette manufacturer's
marketing and sales practices. In addition to the financial terms,
the settlement would force JUUL to comply with a series of strict
injunctive terms severely limiting their marketing and sales
practices.
Investigators also sought to examine to what extent Juul marketed
itself has an effective smoking cessation device despite lack of
required U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval.
While traditional cigarette use has plummeted among youth, vaping
is skyrocketing, undermining national progress towards reducing
tobacco use. The National Youth Tobacco Survey conducted by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration and Centers for Disease Control
in 2019 found more than 5 million youth reported having used
e-cigarettes within the past 30 days, up from 3.6 million just one
year prior.
"Juul created a generation of nicotine addicts with its
kid-friendly flavors and targeted marketing," Connecticut Attorney
General William Tong said.
The FDA earlier this year removed Juul products from the U.S.
market.[GN]
LANDMARK FENCE: Appeals Court Affirms Dismissal of Sahagun Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES SAHAGUN, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants v.
LANDMARK FENCE CO., INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents, Case
No. E076919 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
Fourth District, Division Two, affirms the following two April 15,
2021 orders:
(1) the order granting Robert J. Yanik's motion to dismiss the
action based on the Plaintiffs' failure to bring it to
trial within five years of its commencement (Code Civ.
Proc., Sections 583.310, 583.360), and
(2) the order denying the Plaintiffs' motion to "recognize"
their $10,116,533 bankruptcy court judgment against
Landmark and to enter a new, "updated" state court
judgment against Landmark, but not Yanik, based on the
bankruptcy court judgment.
Plaintiffs James Sahagun and others comprise a class of 188 former
employees of Landmark. In 2003, the Plaintiffs filed their original
complaint against Landmark and its sole shareholder, director, and
officer, Robert J. Yanik, alleging that the Defendants had failed
to pay the Plaintiffs prevailing wages on public works projects
since 1999.
Landmark was a construction company that specialized in the
fabrication, construction, installation, repair, and demolition of
chain-link and wrought-iron fencing and gates. Yanik formed
Landmark as a sole proprietorship in 1989 and incorporated Landmark
as a California corporation in 1997. Yanik was Landmark's sole
shareholder, director, and officer, and managed Landmark's
day-to-day operations. As Landmark's nonexempt, full-time
employees, the Plaintiffs worked on public works projects and
private construction projects throughout California.
In 2003, the Plaintiffs filed their original class action complaint
against Landmark and Yanik. The original complaint alleged that,
since 1999, Landmark and Yanik had failed to pay the Plaintiffs
prevailing wage rates and other required compensation on public
works projects.
In 2006, the Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint (FAC),
alleging for the first time that Yanik was Landmark's alter ego and
was personally liable for Landmark's debts to them. The FAC alleged
additional wage-related claims against both Defendants, including
that they had failed to adequately compensate the Plaintiffs for
work performed on private construction contracts. In March 2007,
the superior court certified the Plaintiffs as a class of
approximately 188 former Landmark employees.
In 2009, the superior court ordered the action stayed against both
Defendants after Landmark filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection. On April 7, 2011, the bankruptcy court ruled that the
Plaintiffs were "free to pursue" their alter ego claim against
Yanik outside of the bankruptcy proceedings because the alter ego
claim belonged solely to plaintiffs rather than to the bankruptcy
estate or to Landmark's unsecured creditors as a whole. But at that
time, the Plaintiffs did not pursue any of their claims against
Yanik or ask the superior court to lift the 2009 stay order as to
Yanik.
Instead, through May 2020, the Plaintiffs and Landmark litigated
the Plaintiffs' wage-related claims against Landmark in the
bankruptcy court and on appeal in the federal courts. On May 6,
2020, a bankruptcy court judgment for $10,116,533, in favor of
plaintiffs and against Landmark, was affirmed on appeal in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In a June 23, 2020 status report
filed in this action, the Plaintiffs said they wanted to pursue
their alter ego claim against Yanik and obtain a new, updated state
court judgment against Yanik and Landmark, based on the bankruptcy
court judgment, including post judgment interest.
Thereafter, Yanik and the Plaintiffs filed motions, resulting in
two April 15, 2021 orders that the Plaintiffs now appeal: (1) the
order granting Yanik's motion to dismiss the action based on the
Plaintiffs' failure to bring it to trial within five years of its
commencement (Code Civ. Proc., Sections 583.310, 583.360),2 and (2)
the order denying the Plaintiffs' motion to "recognize" the
Plaintiffs' $10,116,533 bankruptcy court judgment against Landmark
and to enter a new, "updated" state court judgment against
Landmark, but not Yanik, based on the bankruptcy court judgment.
First, the Plaintiffs claim the court erred as a matter of law in
dismissing their entire action against Yanik, including their alter
ego claim, under the five-year dismissal statutes. They argue that
in granting the dismissal motion, the court "ignored or
misapprehended the case law and statutory law pertaining to res
judicata, enforcement of judgments, and timely prosecution of an
alter ego claim."
The Court of Appeals finds no error in the April 15, 2021 dismissal
order. It opines that the Plaintiffs have not cited any authority
prohibiting the superior court from dismissing the action because
the court's own March 15, 2009 stay order was still in effect when
the dismissal motion was heard on March 2, 2021, or when the order
of dismissal was issued on April 15, 2021. The record shows that,
after April 7, 2011, the Plaintiffs could have asked the court to
lift its May 15, 2009 stay order insofar as that order stayed their
pursuit of their alter ego claim against Yanik, but they never did
so.
Next, the superior court denied the Plaintiffs' motion to
"recognize" their May 6, 2020 bankruptcy court judgment against
Landmark and enter a new and "updated" state court judgment against
Landmark based on the bankruptcy court judgment. The court ruled
that it had no authority to grant the motion. The Plaintiffs claim
the motion was erroneously denied because sections 1908, 128,
subdivision (a)(8), and 187 authorized the court to grant it. They
argue: "The res judicata doctrine as set forth in section 1908, and
sections 128 and 187, provided the trial court with the authority
to recognize the bankruptcy court judgment and enter a new, updated
judgment against Landmark."
The Court of Appeals disagrees saying none of the cited statutes,
either alone or in combination, authorizes a California court to
enter a new and additional state court judgment against a party,
based solely on a federal court judgment against that party, even
when the parties to the federal court judgment are parties to the
action before the state court.
As the Defendants also point out, federal court judgments are not
subject to state court enforcement as sister state money judgments;
only state judgments are. Section 1710.10, subdivision (c), defines
a "'sister state judgment'" as "that part of any judgment, decree,
or order of a court of a state of the United States, other than
California, which requires the payment of money." This definition
excludes federal court judgments.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals affirms the April 15, 2021
orders dismissing the Plaintiffs entire action, including their
alter ego claim, against Yanik, and denying the Plaintiff's motion
to "recognize" the May 6, 2020 bankruptcy court judgment in favor
of the Plaintiffs and against Landmark. The parties will bear their
respective costs on appeal.
A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/33s2v3pr from Leagle.com.
Ginez, Steinmetz & Associates and Rudy Ginez, Jr., for the
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Ostergar Lattin Julander, John E. Lattin -- jlattin@ostergar.com --
and Treg A. Julander -- tjulander@ostergar.com -- for the
Defendants and Respondents.
MARDEN-KANE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Suski's 3rd Amended Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID SUSKI, et al., Plaintiffs v. MARDEN-KANE, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-04539-SK (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Sallie Kim of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants in part and denies in part the
motions to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint filed by Defendant
Marden-Kane, Inc., and by Coinbase Global, Inc.
Plaintiffs David Suski, Jaimee Martin, Jonas Calsbeek and Thomas
Maher filed the purported class action on behalf of themselves and
persons who opted into Coinbase's $1.2 million Dogecoin (DOGE)
sweepstakes in June 2021, and who purchased or sold Dogecoin on a
Coinbase exchange for a total of $100 or more between June 3, 2021
and June 10, 2021. Coinbase hired Marden-Kane as the administrator
of the Dogecoin Sweepstakes.
The Plaintiffs are Coinbase users with Coinbase accounts, which
they created before the sweepstakes began. When they created their
Coinbase accounts, each Plaintiff agreed to the Coinbase User
Agreement, each of which contains an arbitration provision. Suski
accepted Coinbase's User Agreement on Jan. 24, 2018; Martin
accepted on Feb. 12, 2021; Calsbeek accepted on May 13, 2021; and
Maher accepted on April 5, 2020.
The Plaintiffs then participated in Coinbase's June 2021
sweepstakes. The "Official Rules" for the Dogecoin Sweepstakes
identifies Coinbase as the sponsor and Marden-Kane as the
administrator.
The Court denied Coinbase's earlier motion to compel arbitration,
which Coinbase then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. It also granted
in part and denied in part Coinbase's alternative motion to
dismiss. It granted the motion as to the Plaintiffs' claim that the
Dogecoin Sweepstakes constituted an illegal lottery under
California Penal Code Section 320 but provided them with leave to
amend. Marden-Kane did not move to compel arbitration or dismiss
any of the Plaintiff's claims at that time. The Plaintiffs filed
their Third Amended Complaint in response.
In their Third Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs bring the
following claims against both Defendants: (1) violations of the
California Unfair Competition Law, California Business and
Professions Code Sections 17200, et seq. ("UCL") based on
California Penal Codes Sections 319 and 320 regarding unlawful
lotteries; (2) violations of UCL based on California Business and
Professions Code Section 17539.15 regarding solicitation materials
for sweepstakes; (3) violation of California Business and
Professions Code Sections 17500, et seq., ("FAL") for false
advertising; (4) violation of UCL for false advertising; (5)
violation of UCL for unfair business practices; (6) violations of
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code Sections
1750, et seq. ("CLRA"); and (7) violations of UCL based on unlawful
acts under the CLRA.
The matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the
Defendants' motions to dismiss. Each Defendant joined in the
other's arguments made in the respective motions. Therefore, Judge
Kim address both motions together. However, in the future, the
parties are required to make the arguments they are on which they
relying and opposing in their own briefs. The Court will not refer
to a separate brief in evaluating a party's argument.
First, in their motion to dismiss, Marden-Kane moves to enforce the
arbitration provision in Coinbase's User Agreement, an agreement
between Coinbase and Plaintiffs as Coinbase users. Coinbase joins
in the motion.
Judge Kim finds that (i) while the Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, the new factual allegations against Coinbase do not
affect the arbitration analysis in any manner. The Court no longer
has jurisdiction over the issue of whether the arbitration clause
of Coinbase's User Agreement applies to Coinbase. Coinbase appealed
the Court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration to the Ninth
Circuit, and that appeal deprives the present Court of jurisdiction
over the issue of arbitration.
Absent an applicable exception, Marden-Kane does not have standing
to enforce an arbitration provision in an agreement to which it is
not a party. The legal theories on which Marden-Kane rely to
support standing -- equitable estoppel and successor in interest --
are inapplicable. And Marden-Kane does not even argue and can point
to no evidence showing that it is a successor-in-interest to
Coinbase, so Marden-Kane cannot enforce the terms of the User
Agreements on that basis.
Therefore, Judge Kim denies both the Defendants' motions with
respect to the issue of arbitration.
Second, three of the four User Agreements between the Plaintiffs
and Coinbase provide: "Formal Complaint Process.** If you have a
dispute with Coinbase (a Complaint), you agree to contact Coinbase
through our support team to attempt to resolve any such dispute
amicably. **If we cannot resolve the dispute through the Coinbase
support team, you and we agree to use the Formal Complaint Process
set forth below.** You agree to use this process before filing any
arbitration claim or small claims action. If you do not follow the
procedures set out in this Section before filing an arbitration
claim or suit in small claims court, we will have the right to ask
the arbitrator or small claims court to dismiss your filing unless
and until you complete the following steps."
Marden-Kane -- but notably not Coinbase -- argues that the Court
must dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims because the Plaintiffs failed
to comply with this process for contacting Coinbase before filing
suit. However, Marden-Kane lacks standing to enforce the User
Agreements between the Plaintiffs and Coinbase. Moreover, even if
the Court could find that Marden-Kane had standing, the provision
in the User Agreements with three of the Plaintiffs is inapplicable
to this lawsuit, according to its terms. The provision explicitly
applies only to claims filed in arbitration or small claims court:
"You agree to use this process before filing any arbitration claim
or small claims action."
The Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court and did not file an
arbitration claim or small claims action, and thus the plain terms
of the User Agreements do not apply. Because Marden-Kane lacks
standing and because this provision is simply inapplicable, Judge
Kim need not address whether it is unconscionable.
Third, as to the class action waiver in the Dogecoin Sweepstakes
Official Rules, the Defendants both argue that the Court should
enforce it. However, where, as in the case, a class action waiver
is not coupled with an arbitration provision, California law on
unconscionability applies. Judge Kim says the Plaintiffs cannot
state a claim under the CLRA as a matter of law. Therefore, they
cannot recover punitive damages. For these reasons, she finds that
their claims predictably involve small amounts of damages and that
the class action waiver is unconscionable.
Fourth, the Court previously rejected the Plaintiffs' contention
that the Dogecoin sweepstakes violates California Penal Code
Section 320. In their Third Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs
include allegations that in addition to their subjective lack of
knowledge of the free method of entry, "the ordinary, reasonable
consumer could not be expected to have known the truth that the
Defendants would privately allow Coinbase users to" enter the
sweepstakes without buying or selling Dogecoin on Coinbase and that
the "truth was reasonably and objectively knowable only to the
Defendants themselves."
Again, Judge Kim finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations center
around the Defendants' alleged misrepresentations and disclosures,
or lack of disclosures. As the Court previously stated "because
California penal statutes are construed strictly and because no
California court has held that being unaware of the free method of
entry is sufficient to demonstrate the required consideration, it
finds that the Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege a violation of
California Penal Code Section 320."
The Plaintiffs have not cited to any authority to alter the Court's
conclusion. Accordingly, Judge Kim grants the Defendants' motions
as to the Plaintiffs' claims to the extent they are premised on
allegations of an illegal lottery. Moreover, because giving leave
to amend would be futile, she dismisses such claims with
prejudice.
Fifth, Marden-Kane argues that the Plaintiffs fail to allege
sufficient allegations against it to support their claims against
Marden-Kane but merely group Marden-Kane together with Coinbase.
The Plaintiffs allege that Coinbase hired Marden-Kane to help plan
and execute the Dogecoin Sweepstakes. They further allege that
Marden-Kane and Coinbase, in collaboration, drafted, structured and
designed the emails and digital ads for the Dogecoin Sweepstakes.
Coinbase and Marden-Kane knew that the advertisements had the
likelihood, tendency and capacity to mislead and confuse consumers.
The Plaintiffs then describe an earlier sweepstakes for which
Coinbase and Marden-Kane had collaborated.
Judge Kim finds that the Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts related
to Marden-Kane to hold Marden-Kane liable for any
misrepresentations in the advertisements for the Dogecoin
Sweepstakes. Accordingly, she denies Marden-Kane's motion to
dismiss on this ground.
Sixth, both Coinbase and Marden-Kane move to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' CLRA claims. THe Plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g), which prohibits successive
motions to dismiss, the Court should not consider Coinbase's
arguments.
Judge Kim finds that judicial economy warrants considering
Coinbase's arguments. She finds that the Plaintiffs' CLRA claims
fail as a matter of law. Her reason for dismissing the claim
against Marden-Kane applies equally to the Plaintiffs' CLRA claims
against Coinbase, so applying that argument only to Marden-Kane and
forcing Coinbase to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings at
a later date is not an efficient way to address this issue. She
grants both Defendants' motions on the Plaintiffs' CLRA claims.
Because granting leave would be futile, she dismisses the
Plaintiffs' CLRA claims with prejudice.
Finally, the Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal of their
request for injunctive relief. Therefore, Judge Kim grants the
Defendants' motion on this ground.
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Kim grants in part and denies in
part Coinbase's and Marden-Kane's motions to dismiss. She grants
with prejudice the motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' requests for
injunctive relief, the Plaintiffs' CLRA claims 6 and 7 against both
Defendants, and the Plaintiffs' claims 1 and 5 to the extent they
are premised on an unlawful lottery. She denies the remainder of
both motions.
A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5dcz72f3 from Leagle.com.
MICHIGAN: Faces Class Action Over Pandemic Unemployment Benefits
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rose White, writing for mlive, reports that Paul Kreps waited for
months to get pandemic unemployment benefits.
But the checks totaling $25,000 never came.
The Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency approved Kreps, 31, for
benefits when COVID-19 restrictions forced him to shutter his
Monroe pest control business in April 2020. But more than two years
later, he still hasn't seen a penny.
"It made me upset," he said. "Because here we are, we're losing
everything we have. They say they are sending me money, but I can't
get it. My kids are hungry, we have no food, we are literally
starving because we have no income."
Kreps is now one of five people suing the Michigan unemployment
agency.
A class-action lawsuit filed in federal court by David Blanchard of
Ann Arbor-based Blanchard & Walker in late August claims the agency
froze payments for thousands of workers during the pandemic while
failing to provide a way for workers to appeal. Blanchard is also
behind another class-action lawsuit alleging the unemployment
agency illegally demanded benefits back.
"This is sticking up for people left behind in this pandemic who
were eligible, otherwise qualified and still can't get paid,"
Blanchard said.
The unemployment agency responded to a request for comment by
highlighting director Julia Dale's recent efforts for "improving
access to jobless benefits for qualified workers who have lost
their jobs through no fault of their own." The agency announced
last month it received $6.8 million equity grant to help
underserved communities.
Payments halted for thousands of workers, lawsuit says
The central claim of the 53-page complaint is that Michigan workers
were denied due process.
It alleges five plaintiffs had a right to unemployment benefits,
but the state agency violated this "well-established right" by
halting benefits or reversing eligibility without providing an
appeals process. Workers then left "without a lifeline" were placed
in "financially dire situations" as Michigan unemployment hit
nearly 23% in April 2020.
"Why are you doing this do people? Poor, out-of-work people in
Michigan are getting treated like this," Blanchard said.
Kreps qualified for $362 a week from the state and additional aid
from the federal Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program. But his
MiWAM account, the online unemployment system, shows each of the 44
weekly payments were frozen by a "Stop Payment Indicator."
"I sent them all my information: my social security card, my birth
certificate, my marriage license. And I didn't hear anymore. I
called them every week and they told me I still need to certify,"
he said.
The lawsuit says the Michigan unemployment agency slapped labels
like "stop payment indicator" or "benefit payment review" on
thousands of eligible claims causing some to wait months while
"many have never been paid at all."
Kreps, unemployed for the first time in his life, lived for nearly
a year without an income or jobless aid.
During that time, he paid the bare minimum on utilities. His
parents took out a second mortgage to keep the family of four from
losing their housing. And the dangling promise of benefits took a
toll on Kreps, his wife of 11 years and their two children.
"We lost pretty much everything we had," he said. "I couldn't get
jobs even though I tried, but nobody was hiring because it was a
pandemic. We literally lost everything. We were lucky enough to
have my parents who took out that second mortgage to help us, but
if it wasn't for them, we would have been homeless."
An October 2020 policy prompted the agency to "arbitrarily freeze
benefit payments" without explaining why, according to the
complaint.
As a result, workers struggled with rent and mortgage payments,
took out high-interest payday loans and borrowed on retirement
accounts — all of which, the lawsuit says, had a "disparate
impact on communities of color, mothers and caregivers and other
disadvantaged populations."
"It's fine if you need to review it, if you have the capacity to
review it," Blanchard said. "But instead, it put people under
review and froze their accounts knowing that the agency doesn't
have the resources to actually review it. Just a recipe for
disaster, just absolute purgatory and financial ruin for people."
An embroider, cooking demonstrator and teen worker
Other than Kreps, four other workers are named in the lawsuit.
It claims they are all Michigan workers who either never got
payments, were cut off from benefits while appealing, did not have
benefits reinstated after a redetermination or were hit with an
overpayment notice that demanded money back.
"It's illegal," Blanchard said. "It's well-established. There's
precedent that you can't arbitrarily cut people off from benefits
without a hearing."
Plaintiff Robin Shipe faced "total confusion" when trying to get
unemployment benefits.
As the owner of a printing and embroidery business, Shipe was found
eligible for aid until the agency froze her account and reversed
its decision. She appealed twice, but the lawsuit claims "the
agency deleted Shipe's appeal" and issued a third redetermination
in May 2022. She then appealed for a third time a month later.
"To date, Shipe has never received pandemic relief benefits," the
lawsuit says.
For Zachary Brazil, whose job is not specified in the lawsuit, and
a teen worker identified as I.F., their benefits were allegedly
frozen.
The lawsuit says Brazil's payments were locked after a few weeks by
a stop payment indicator and "most of the benefits remain frozen"
despite his appeals.
For I.F., who worked part-time for an activity center, the
unemployment agency went back and forth on her claim.
After first being okayed for $160 a week in April 2020, the agency
put I.F.'s account under review in January 2021, deemed her
eligible a month later and then found her retroactively ineligible
for all payments. It didn't get cleared up until July of this year
when the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Commission made a final
decision.
Diana Boudrie was furloughed in April 2020 from a company that
provided cooking demonstrations at Costco stores. After receiving
benefits for 19 weeks, her eligibility was reversed in November
2020.
Even though the lawsuit says Boudrie then filed a timely protest,
the agency still demanded $9,440 be paid back under the threat of
collection activity.
What's next?
Kreps, who secured a job in June 2021 as a truck driver, hopes the
state will eventually pay him the $25,000. The money will straight
toward paying his parents back, and he's also optimistic the
lawsuit spurs change at the unemployment agency.
"My biggest hope is they will look into it and issue all these
people what they deserve," he said. "And for the state to realize
something is wrong here."
The lawsuit is seeking class status, an injunction, monetary
damages for plaintiffs and the creation of a "common fund" to repay
people who "prematurely" paid their benefits back.
If granted, a court order would require the Michigan UIA to pay
benefits quickly, stop freezing benefits without due process,
establish a procedure for collecting overpayments and remove all
stop payment indicators until appeals can be considered.
Blanchard says the lawsuit also spotlights longstanding issues at
the Michigan unemployment agency.
"It's absolutely no secret the system is broken," he said. "The
computer system and the data management system never worked. It's
only fallen apart more in recent years. The agency has never had
the resources it needed throughout this pandemic."
Among other reforms, Dale recently started replacing the agency's
"decade-old computer system," a statement from the Michigan UIA
said.
After being flooded with claims in the early days of the COVID-19
pandemic, the unemployment agency has paid nearly $40 billion to
3.48 million people since March 2020. By their account, 99.8% of
eligible claimants have been paid at least once meaning about 7,000
have not.
Rolling out pandemic unemployment benefits to that many people,
however, has been rife with issues including sudden changes in
agency leadership to billions in fraud and a mistake leading to
nearly 700,000 people being found retroactively ineligible for
aid.
Since filing the first lawsuit in January, Blanchard's law firm has
heard from 6,500 unemployment claimants.
"The response has been overwhelming. People need help and can't get
it," he said. "This is a perfect example of why class actions are
useful and important in our legal system when so many people can be
affected by a violation." [GN]
NABORS COMPLETION: $92K in Unpaid Wages Awarded in Ramos Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled RAYMOND RAMOS, Petitioner v. NABORS
COMPLETION & PRODUCTION SERVICES CO., a Delaware corporation, now
known as C&J Well Services, Inc., Respondent, Case No.
2:22-cv-01632-DDP-JPR (C.D. Cal.), Judge Dean D. Pregerson of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California grants
the Petitioner's petition to confirm final arbitration award, and
awards him $92,208.83 in unpaid wages, among other awards.
On April 2, 2015, two former employees of Respondent NABORS,
Brandyn Ridgeway, and Tim Smith, filed a putative class action
alleging, among other things, claims under Labor Code Section
1194(a) and 1771 for failure to pay the minimum prevailing wage and
overtime, under Labor Code Section 226(e) for failure to provide
accurate itemized wage statements under Labor Code Section 226(a),
and for related interest and penalties, as well as attorneys' fees
and costs, (CACD Case No. 2:15-cv-03436-DDP-VBKx; "Ridgeway class
action").
On June 29, 2015, NABORS brought a motion to compel arbitration of
Ridgeway and Smith's individual claims pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Section
2, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and a written arbitration
agreement that included a class action waiver. On Oct. 13, 2015,
the Court its motion to compel arbitration, finding the arbitration
agreement unenforceable.
NABORS timely appealed the denial of its motion to compel
arbitration.
On Feb. 13, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal issued a
Memorandum, which reversed the Court's order denying the motion and
remanded with instructions.
On March 30, 2018, Petitioner Raymond Ramos, a putative class
member in the Ridgeway class action, commenced an individual
arbitration at JAMS. Ramos' individual claims were adjudicated by
JAMS Arbitrator Hon. Rex Heeseman (Ret.) resulting in an Interim
Award issued Dec. 9, 2021, and a Final Arbitration Award issued
March 8, 2022, in favor of Ramos.
On March 11, 2022, Ramos filed the instant Petition to Confirm
Final Arbitration Award, for Further Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and
to Enter Judgment Against Nabors; Nabors appeared, filed an answer
and filed a crossclaim to vacate the Final Award.
On Aug. 25, 2022, the Court granted Ramos's motion and confirmed
the Final JAMS Arbitration Award issued by Arbitrator Hon. Rex
Heeseman (Ret.) on March 8, 2022, in the Arbitration JAMS Case No.
1220059025 and denied NABORS' request to vacate the award.
Therefore, Judge Pregerson rules that Petitioner RAYMOND RAMOS will
recover against Respondent NABORS COMPLETION & PRODUCTION SERVICES
CO n/k/a C&J WELL SERVICES, INC. ("NABORS") in the following
amounts:
(1) $92,208.83 in unpaid wages, $76,411.15 in statutory
interest thru Oct. 12, 2021, and continuing at $23.04 per
day on the unpaid wages and interest at the rate of 10%
per annum until all wages and interest thereon are paid in
full, $24,512.70 in waiting time penalties, $2,550 for
non-compliant wage statements, $161,325.94 in attorneys'
fees, and $4,637.50 in costs as awarded by the Arbitrator;
and
(2) Additional post-arbitration attorneys' fees in the amount
of $8,588 and for costs in the amount of $402.
A full-text copy of the Court's Judgment dated Aug. 25, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4a3728tw from Leagle.com.
Richard E. Donahoo -- rdonahoo@donahoo.com -- Sarah L. Kokonas --
skokonas@donahoo.com -- R. Chase Donahoo, DONAHOO & ASSOCIATES, in
Tustin, California.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Flores Asks Judge to Deny Arbitration Bid
------------------------------------------------------------
Jessy Edwards and Abraham Jewett, writing for Top Class Actions,
report that former Miami Dolphins coach Brian Flores has asked a
federal judge to deny the NFL's request to compel arbitration for
his complaint alleging the league has a culture of racial
discrimination.
Flores, along with Black NFL coaches Ray Horton and Steve Wilks,
argue arbitration would not be fair since the NFL wants to use its
own commissioner, Roger Goodell, to act as the mediator.
Flores, Horton and Wilks claim Goodell would not be able to be
objective as a mediator.
The coaches also argue that the league knows it cannot
contractually compel arbitration since arbitration clauses in their
contracts did not cover disputes with the league as a whole.
The NFL has argued that wording in the coaches contract ensures
that the complaint has to be arbitrated.
Miami Dolphins coach Brian Flores racism class action overview:
Who: Former Miami Dolphins Head Coach Brian Flores is suing the NFL
and its teams on behalf of Black coaches and general managers in
the league.
Why: Flores, who is Black, alleges a culture of racial
discrimination at the NFL after he was passed over for a head
coaching position in favor of a white coach despite a back-to-back
winning season.
Where: The lawsuit was filed in a Manhattan federal court. (Feb.
02, 2022)
A Black former-Miami Dolphins coach with a winning record is suing
the NFL and its teams, alleging a culture of racism, after he was
passed over before his interview for a head coach role at the New
York Giants in favor of a white man.
Former coach Brian Flores filed the class action complaint against
the National Football League (NFL), the Giants and other teams Feb.
1 in a New York federal court, alleging violations of the Civil
Rights Act.
The lawsuit was filed after Flores, who was considered a leading
candidate for the head coaching position at the Giants due to his
back-to-back winning seasons, was passed over in favor of a white
coach, Brian Daboll.
Flores alleges that he found out that he hadn't got the job three
days before he was set to interview with the Giants through a
mistaken text message sent to him by New England Patriots coach
Bill Belichick.
"I hear from Buffalo & NYG that you are their guy. Hope it works
out if you want it to!!" the text reportedly read. When Flores
responded, confused, Belichick admitted he had made a mistake, the
lawsuit states.
"Sorry - I f****d this up. I double checked & misread the text. I
think they are naming Daboll. I'm sorry about that. BB," Belichick
said.
NFL Tries To Appear To Have Commitment To Racial Quality But Does
Not, Flores Says
Flores says he then went on to have an extensive interview with the
Giants, knowing they had already chosen someone else. He alleges
that the process shows that the NFL is trying to appear to have a
commitment to racial equity when it does not.
"NFL remains rife with racism, particularly when it comes to the
hiring and retention of Black Head Coaches, Coordinators and
General Managers," Flores says. "Over the years, the NFL and its 32
member organizations have been given every chance to do the right
thing. Rules have been implemented, promises made—but nothing has
changed. In fact, the racial discrimination has only been made
worse by the NFL's disingenuous commitment to social equity."
Flores says he has realized the only way to effectuate change is
through the courts. He is suing for discrimination under the Civil
Rights Act and for violations of New York civil rights laws.
Despite 70% Black Player Pool, NFL Only Employs One Black Head
Coach, Lawsuit Notes
The class action lawsuit seeks to represent all Black Head Coaches,
Offensive and Defensive Coordinators, Quarterbacks Coaches and
General Managers, as well as Black candidates for those positions
during the applicable statute of limitations period.
Flores was controversially fired by the Dolphins last month after
three years on the job. He led the Dolphins to a 9-8 record this
season, going 8-1 the final nine games to secure the team's first
back-to-back winning seasons since 2003.
Despite an NFL player pool that is 70% Black, out of 32 teams, only
one employs a Black head coach, only six employ a Black general
manager and none have a Black majority owner, the lawsuit notes.
The news comes days after a group of 75 former NFL players, their
wives and one daughter sent a letter to a federal judge to express
their approval and concerns about a recent settlement made in a
class action lawsuit against the NFL and NFL Properties LLC over
racist concussion protocols.
Flores is represented by Douglas H. Wigdor, Michael J. Willemin and
David E. Gottlieb of Wigdor LLP and John Elefterakis, Nicholas
Elefterakis and Raymond Panek of Elefterakis Elefterakis & Panek.
The NFL Racial Discrimination Class Action Lawsuit is Flores v. The
National Football League et al., Case No. 1:22-cv-00871, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. [GN]
NATIONAL UNION: Supreme Court Questions For Denied Coverage
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joyce E. Cutler, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that California
Supreme Court justices on Sept. 6 questioned an insurance company's
rationale for denying coverage to Yahoo! Inc., as the company fends
off class actions arising from alleged Telephone Consumer
Protection Act violations.
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., declined
coverage, concluding the legacy internet company's policies didn't
cover allegations it had sent unsolicited spam text messages, even
though the parties had negotiated separate coverage for advertising
and for personal injuries.
Yahoo argues National Union's promise and policy to defend claims
alleging personal injury should be read according to their plain
ordinary meaning, and that the website's coverage claims arise from
the contents of the complaints from those who sued it alleging
their right to privacy was violated.
Attorneys for National Union contend the scope of the right of
privacy involves only the right to keep personal information
confidential, also called the right to secrecy, rather than the
right to seclusion, or being free from unwanted intrusions.
"It seems like you have to convince us that the right of privacy
does not include seclusion or you don't prevail on the argument,"
Justice Joshua P. Groban told Steven Fleischman, Horvitz & Levy LLP
partner representing National Union.
Interpretations, Expectations
Justice Marin Jenkins noted the insurer contends the coverage
depends more on the content, rather than the conduct that led to
the lawsuits.
And Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye asked whether interpreting
the contract "also means the reasonable expectations of the insured
at the time of the negotiation of the contract."
While the TCPA exclusion was removed, "there is an even broader
exclusion for anything that violates any state or federal statute
or regulation," Fleischman said.
Moreover, he said, "Yahoo was a sophisticated entity that was
buying coverage that California courts had already held there was
no coverage for TCPA claims," Fleischman said.
If, as National Union contends, the TCPA cases were never covered
in the first place, "why was the exclusion in the standard policy?"
William Um, Jassy Vick Carolan LLP partner arguing for Yahoo,
asked.
Yahoo's position is that the right to privacy isn't defined under
the policy. "So, the court has to determine what right of privacy
was meant in the policy," Um said. There's no dispute among the
parties that the right of privacy could include both the right of
secrecy and the right of seclusion, he said.
'Unreasonable' Intrusion
TCPA violations wouldn't necessarily violate the right to privacy
as secured under common law, Justice Leondra Kruger said, "because
to establish an actionable privacy tort, it has to be an intrusion
that is unreasonable."
The allegations in the underlying actions are direct TCPA
violations, Um said, along with general violation of privacy claims
"that class plaintiffs are alleging their fundamental privacy
rights have been violated as a result of these unsolicited text
messages being sent to them without their permission."
The court is answering a question posed by the US Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit: does a commercial liability policy that
covers "personal injury" -- defined as arising out of oral or
written publication of material violating a person's right of
privacy -- trigger an insurer's duty to defend claims that the
insured violated the TCPA by sending those unsolicited texts, even
if they didn't reveal any private information?
An opinion is due within 90 days.
Horvitz & Levy and Nicolaides Fink Thorpe Michaelides Sullivan LLP
represent National Union Fire. Jassy Vick & Carolan represents
Yahoo.
The case is Yahoo! Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of
Pittsburgh, PA, Cal., No. S253593, oral arguments 9/6/22. [GN]
NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR: $12.8M Deal in Sexual Abuse Suit Gets OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Canadian Press reports that a $12.8-million class-action
settlement has been approved for victims of sexual abuse at youth
facilities operated by the Newfoundland and Labrador government
from 1973 to 1989.
The suit was led by three representative plaintiffs — one woman
and two men — who said they were sexually assaulted by staff at
institutions for young offenders and for youth in provincial care.
Their names are protected by a publication ban.
The institutions involved in the class action include youth
detention centres in the towns of Whitbourne and Torbay and in the
capital city of St. John's. The provincial government is the sole
defendant in the case.
Those eligible to file a claim may have faced abuse including naked
beatings or sexual assault by staff, volunteers and other
residents, according to a decision dated Aug. 31 by associate chief
Justice Rosalie McGrath of the province's Supreme Court.
The settlement McGrath approved includes $12.5 million for
claimants and administration fees, a $10,000 honorarium for each of
the three plaintiffs and $250,000 to publicize the case so that
others may come forward and make abuse claims.
"The representative plaintiffs have taken the brave action of
stepping up to tell their own stories," McGrath wrote in her
reasoning for granting them each a $10,000 honorarium. "While they
are protected by the use of a pseudonym, they still risked public
exposure of the details of their abuse and its aftermath."
The female plaintiff said she was sexually assaulted by three
different staff members from 1979 to 1982 at a girls home,
McGrath's decision said. A male plaintiff accused a priest from the
boys institute in Whitbourne, N.L., of taking him to a cabin,
drugging him and then sexually assaulting him. The other male
alleged he was sexually assaulted "many times" by two guards at the
Whitbourne school in 1974, McGrath wrote.
They filed their statement of claim in 2017, and the class action
was certified two years later.
The Whitbourne facility is also the subject of another lawsuit
against the Newfoundland and Labrador government, filed in November
of 2021 with the province's Supreme Court. In that suit, a male
plaintiff alleges he was sexually and physically abused at the
institution between 2004 and 2008, when he was a teenager. By that
time, the facility was renamed the Newfoundland and Labrador Youth
Centre.
His lawyer, Jennifer Helleur, said in an email on Sept. 6 that the
case is presently in the discovery stage.
This report by The Canadian Press was first published Sept. 6,
2022. [GN]
ONETOUCHPOINT INC: Fails to Secure Customers' Info, Young Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JEFFREY NEIL YOUNG, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. ONETOUCHPOINT, INC., Case No. 2:22-cv-1029 (E.D. Wis.,
Sept. 7, 2022) is a class action brought on behalf of all persons
in the United States whose personally identifying information (PII)
or personal health information (PHI) was compromised in the
OneTouchPoint, Inc. data breach disclosed by the Defendant on July
27, 2022, and on behalf of a subclass of individuals residing in
Maine whose PII and/or PHI was compromised in the Data Breach.
OTP is a provider of mailing and printing services for healthcare
providers, offering print, marketing execution and supply chain
management services to organizations in the healthcare sector. It
provides healthcare organizations with the ability to manage their
brands across departments, clinic locations and hospital
affiliates, create and execute prescriptive marketing campaigns,
and enable on and off-line marking efforts.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
Nicholas A. Colella, Esq.
Hannah Barnett, Esq.
LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
1133 Penn Ave., Fl. 5
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Telephone: (412) 322-9243
Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
E-mail: gary@lcllp.com nickc@lcllp.com
hannah@lcllp.com
- and -
Melissa R. Emert, Esq.
Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER &
GRAIFMAN, P.C.
135 Chestnut Ridge Road, Suite 200
Montvale, NJ 07645
Telephone: (201) 391-7000
Facsimile: (201) 307-1086
E-mail: memert@kgglaw.com
ggraifman@kgglaw.com
- and -
Lynda Grant, Esq.
THEGRANTLAWFIRM, PLLC
521 Fifth Avenue, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10175
Telephone: (212) 292-4441
Facsimile: (212) 292-4442
E-mail: lgrant@grantfirm.com
ORGANIGRAM HOLDINGS: $2.3-M Deal in Tainted Cannabis Suit Gets OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Macdonald, writing for Country94.1, reports that the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia has approved a $2.31-million settlement in a
class action lawsuit against Organigram Holdings Inc. over tainted
cannabis.
Kate Boyle, the partner with Wagners Law Firm who argued the case
before the court, said the settlement is, in essence, a refund of
the amount of money spent on the affected product.
"That is kind of the nature of the consumer claim - that are the
economic damages arising from the breach of contract and the fact
that, basically, class members didn't get the product they
bargained for," Boyle said.
The settlement will cover a large portion of the refunds for the
3,544 members involved in the class action lawsuit against
Organigram, minus any funds they've already received.
In 2016 and 2017, trace amounts of pesticides bifenazate,
myclobutanil, and malathion -- substances that aren't authorized
for use on cannabis plants -- were found in some of Organigram's
medical cannabis products.
Organigram voluntarily recalled 74 batches but the class action
concerns consumers who bought the tainted cannabis before the
company recalled it.
Boyle said Wagners was unable to advance claims of adverse health
consequences against class members.
"We attempted to certify the adverse health consequences claims as
our representative plaintiff and a number of other class members
had complained of a myriad of symptoms they suffered after
consuming marijuana that had myclobutanil and bifenazate," Boyle
said.
Wagners initiated the lawsuit following an initial statement of
claim filed March 3, 2017.
In the lawsuit, class members alleged that they didn't receive the
product they bargained for and should be provided with a return of
the purchase price.
The lawsuit initially focused only on refunds but was later
expanded to include personal injury claims, with class members
complaining of symptoms while consuming the product.
Boyle said the adverse health consequences claim was certified by
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court but Organigram appealed that and the
certification was overturned by the Court of Appeal.
Wagner and Organigram wrangled in court over whether personal
injury claims were valid in a series of appeals.
In the process, Organigram argued that it was impossible to
determine whether it was specifically the pesticides that caused
symptoms, or whether it was cannabis use, in general, that caused
them.
"We sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, so
basically, we exhausted the appeal process with respect to that,
but we were denied leave," said Boyle.
According to documentation from Wagners relating to the lawsuit,
that appeal, sought in June 2020, was dismissed the following
November.
"We were kind of left with the consumer claims because of the other
aspect of the case - it wasn't allowed to go ahead based on the
decision of the court of appeal," Boyle said.
Wagners and Organigram agreed on the settlement in June, and the
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia approved it at an Aug. 31 hearing.
Boyle said the first payments to class members are expected to be
made in late October.
Huddle reached out to Organigram for comment but did not receive a
response before our publication deadline. Organigram, a subsidiary
of Organigram Holdings Inc., operates in New Brunswick, Quebec, and
Manitoba.
At the time of writing, two days after the settlement was approved,
Organigram's shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange were up 2.2
percent.
Sam Macdonald is a reporter with Huddle, an Acadia Broadcasting
content partner. [GN]
P.A.M. TRANSPORT: Bid for Prelim. OK of Vasquez's Settlement Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge P.K. Holmes, III, of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, issued an Opinion and
Order denying with leave to re-file the Plaintiff's motion for
preliminary approval of settlement in the lawsuit entitled LEE
VASQUEZ, Plaintiff v. P.A.M. TRANSPORT, INC. and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 5:21-CV-5143 (W.D. Ark.).
Before the Court are Plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of the collective and class action settlement, a copy of
the executed settlement agreement and settlement notice and
Plaintiff's brief in support. The Court has reviewed these
materials and largely approves of the parties' proposal.
However, the Court has five areas of concern, which currently
prevent it from granting full approval. Therefore, the Plaintiff's
motion for preliminary approval will be denied with leave to
re-file on terms consistent with this Opinion and Order.
First, although the Plaintiff's proposed notice references a
consent form for FLSA opt-in plaintiffs, the Plaintiff has not
provided the Court with a copy of this consent form. The Court will
not approve this settlement without first reviewing and approving
the consent form for FLSA opt-in plaintiffs.
Second, page 4 of the Plaintiff's proposed notice contains
incorrect section numbering. This should be corrected in any
re-filed proposed notice.
Third, section 3.5 of the proposed settlement, entitled
"Non-Monetary Settlement Terms," indicates that the Defendant has
agreed not to reinstitute certain policies within the next five
years. If the parties file a renewed motion for approval, then the
motion should be accompanied by a brief that explains what
enforcement mechanism, if any, is contemplated for these
non-monetary terms. For example, it is presently unclear to the
Court whether the parties intend to ask the Court to retain
jurisdiction of this case to enforce the terms of the settlement
agreement after the case is closed, or perhaps whether the parties
are asking the Court to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2) for the purpose of entering injunctive relief.
Fourth, the settlement agreement and proposed notice state that
eligible settlement class members, who do not opt out, "will waive,
release, and forever discharge" all claims against the Defendant
"under the FLSA," as well as various other federal and state laws.
Counsel for both sides should already be aware the Court does not
approve this language, given their previous participation before
this Court in the case of Estes v. PAM Transport Inc., Case No.
5:13-CV-5199, in which this very issue was thoroughly litigated. In
that case, the Court declined to approve a settlement where Rule 23
class members waived FLSA claims without having opted into the
collective action, and held that "preliminary approval of this
settlement is contingent upon all notice and settlement
documentation being amended to reflect that Rule 23 class members
who have not opted into the FLSA collective action do not waive
FLSA claims for the relevant time period."
The Court's view on this issue has not changed since then. As in
Estes, preliminary approval of the instant settlement is contingent
upon all notice and settlement documentation being amended to
reflect that Rule 23 class members, who have not opted into the
FLSA collective action, do not waive FLSA claims for the relevant
time period.
Relatedly, Judge Holmes holds, any re-filed proposed notice must
clarify that although the FLSA and Rule 23 classes overlap they are
nevertheless legally distinct entities, and that, therefore, opting
out of the Rule 23 class will not prevent one from opting in as an
FLSA plaintiff or vice versa. To that end, the Court specifically
notes that it does not approve the proposed notice's statement that
"You may not opt-in as an FLSA opt-in Plaintiff if you wish to
exclude yourself from the Settlement," because as presently worded
the proposed notice fails to conceptually distinguish between
opting out of the Rule 23 class in particular and excluding oneself
from the settlement more generally.
The Court recognizes, as it did in Estes, "that the practical
effect of these amendments may be slight, as it is unlikely that
the employees will pursue separate FLSA claims or that the claims
will not be barred by the running of the statute of limitations,"
but "the Court nevertheless must make the decision that it finds is
legally appropriate and correct."
Fifth and finally, although the "Legal Rights and Options" table on
the cover page for the Plaintiff's proposed notice includes summary
instructions on how to file a consent form, it does not include any
analogous instructions in the "Exclude Yourself" row on how to opt
out of the Rule 23 class. Judge Holmes says any re-filed proposed
notice should add language to an appropriate row of this table
summarizing the procedure that is subsequently described in the
section of the proposed notice that is currently entitled "How do I
exclude myself (opt-out) from this settlement?" In doing so, the
parties should take care to distinguish between opting out of the
Rule 23 class in particular versus excluding oneself from the
settlement more generally, in keeping with the concerns addressed
by the Court's fourth point.
Judge Holmes, therefore, ordered that the Plaintiff's unopposed
motion for preliminary approval of the collective and class action
settlement is denied with leave to re-file a motion for preliminary
approval on terms consistent with this Opinion and Order.
A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Aug. 25,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5d9vaskr from
Leagle.com.
RED ROBIN: Agrees to Settle Stella Artois Class Suit for $450,000
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Top Class Actions reports that Red Robin agreed to a $450,000
settlement to resolve claims it sold Stella Artois beer in smaller
containers than advertised. No proof of purchase is required in
order for consumers to benefit from this settlement.
The settlement benefits consumers who purchased a "small" size
Stella Artois beer from a Red Robin Gourmet Burger and Brews that
was served in a Stella Artois chalice between June 25, 2017, and
July 21, 2022.
Red Robin is a burger chain with locations around the country.
Customers at Red Robin can enjoy a burger with bottomless fries and
one of the many beers served at the restaurant.
However, according to a class action lawsuit, Red Robin may deny
its customers the entire Stella Artois beer they paid for.
The class action lawsuit claims that "small" Stella Artois may be
served in a Stella Artois chalice by Red Robin. Although this
chalice may add to the drinking experience, plaintiffs in the case
say the chalice doesn't fit the full "small" size of beer. As a
result, customers such as the plaintiffs were allegedly overcharged
for their Stella Artois beers. The plaintiffs sought compensation
for the amount they were "overcharged" by Red Robin.
The Red Robin class action lawsuit includes claims for breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
deadline, violation of state consumer protection laws and unjust
enrichment.
Red Robin hasn't admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to pay $450,000
to resolve the consumer claims. The company maintains its conduct
was legal under state and federal laws.
Under the terms of the settlement, class members can receive a cash
payment based on the number of eligible Stella Artois beers
purchased during the class period.
Class members who wish to claim six or more beers under the
settlement must provide adequate documentation. Class members who
fail to do so will only be paid for up to five beers.
Class members who purchased many "small" Stella Artois beers from
Red Robin will be eligible for a larger share of the net settlement
fund than those who purchased only one beer.
Exact payments will vary, but class members are projected to
receive $3 per purchased beer.
Any funds remaining in the settlement after distribution will
revert to Red Robin.
The deadline for exclusion and objection is Oct. 7, 2022.
The final approval hearing for the Red Robin settlement is
scheduled for Nov. 8, 2022.
In order to receive settlement benefits, class members must submit
a valid claim form by Dec. 23, 2022.
Who's Eligible
The settlement benefits consumers who purchased a "small" size
Stella Artois beer from a Red Robin Gourmet Burger and Brews that
was served in a Stella Artois chalice between June 25, 2017, and
July 21, 2022.
Potential Award
Varies
Proof of Purchase
No proof of purchase is required
Claim Form
CLICK HERE TO FILE A CLAIM »
NOTE: If you do not qualify for this settlement do NOT file a
claim.
Remember: you are submitting your claim under penalty of perjury.
You are also harming other eligible Class Members by submitting a
fraudulent claim. If you're unsure if you qualify, please read the
FAQ section of the Settlement Administrator's website to ensure you
meet all standards (Top Class Actions is not a Settlement
Administrator). If you don't qualify for this settlement, check out
our database of other open class action settlements you may be
eligible for.
Claim Form Deadline
12/23/2022
Case Name
Bruun v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., Case No. A-20-814178-C,
in the District Court for Clark County, Nevada
Final Hearing
11/08/2022
Settlement Website
RedRobinBeerSettlement.com
Claims Administrator
Red Robin Beer Settlement Administrator
1650 Arch Street, Suite 2210
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Info@RedRobinBeerSettlement.com
855-999-9055
Class Counsel
Thomas A Zimmerman
ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES PC
Defense Counsel
Colin Deihl
POLSINELLI PC [GN]
STERLING JEWELERS: Settles Discrimination Class Action for $175M
----------------------------------------------------------------
Top Class Actions reports that Sterling Jewelers agreed to pay over
$175 million to resolve class action lawsuit claims it
discriminated against women working at its stores.
The settlement benefits women employed as part-time sales
associates, full-time sales associates, department managers,
assistant managers, assistant general managers, store managers or
general managers at Belden, Friedlanders, Goodman, Jared, JB
Robinson, Kay, LeRoys, LeVian, Marks & Morgan, Osterman, Rogers,
Shaws, Weisfield or Ultra Diamonds (after being acquired by
Sterling) retail stores.
These class members are part of the Title VII Settlement Class
and/or the EPA Settlement Class.
The Title VII Class includes female workers employed by Sterling
between July 22, 2004, and May 2, 2018.
The EPA Class includes women who worked for Sterling and submitted
forms consenting to join the EPA case in 2016.
Sterling Jewelers is an American company that sells jewelry through
a number of subsidiaries including Kay Jewelers, Zales and more.
The company is owned by Signet Jewelers.
According to a class action lawsuit, women employed at Sterling
Jewelers stores were routinely discriminated against. The company
allegedly paid its female workers less than their male counterparts
and denied them promotions despite the women being qualified.
Plaintiffs in the class action lawsuit claim that these practices
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act.
Sterling Jewelers denies any wrongdoing but agreed to pay $175.37
million to resolve these allegations. Of that amount, $125 million
will be used to fund class member payments.
Under the terms of the Sterling Jewelers lawsuit settlement, class
members can receive a cash payment based on the number of years
they worked for Sterling Jewelers, their position and their class
membership.
Members of the Title VII Class will receive payments based on their
position. Store managers and general managers will receive $2,996
per year they worked for Sterling. Assistant managers and assistant
general managers will receive $1,928 per year. Department managers
will receive $1,196 per year. Full-time sales associates will
receive $672 per year, and part-time sales associates will receive
$270 per year.
Members of the EPA Class will receive similar payments. Store
managers and general managers will receive $2,996 per year they
worked for Sterling. Assistant managers and assistant general
managers will receive $1,361 per year. Department managers will
receive $1,152 per year. Full-time sales associates will receive
$500 per year, and part-time sales associates will receive $150 per
year.
Class members who are part of both classes will receive both types
of payments under the settlement.
Twenty-five percent of each payment will be considered income or
interest and result in a 1099 tax form. The remaining 75% of each
payment will be considered wages and result in a W-2 tax form.
Funds remaining after the first distribution may be used to fund a
second round of checks to consumers who cashed their initial
checks.
Any funds remaining after that distribution will be donated to a
fund promoting diversity, equity and inclusion (25% of remaining
funds) and one or more nonprofits that serve the interests of women
in the workplace (75% of remaining funds).
As part of the Sterling Jewelers class action lawsuit settlement,
the company agreed to retain a third party expert to evaluate its
pay and promotion policies for fairness and, if necessary, help the
company revise these practices. The company will also offer
mentorship programs for women, improve its parental leave policy
and develop its workplace complaint investigation practices.
The deadline for exclusion and objection is Sept. 27, 2022.
The final approval hearing for the Sterling Jewelers lawsuit
settlement is scheduled for Nov. 15, 2022.
Class members may update their address on the settlement website to
ensure they receive payments.
No claim form is required to benefit from the settlement. Class
members who do not exclude themselves will automatically receive a
settlement payment in the mail.
Who's Eligible
The settlement benefits women employed as part-time sales
associates, full-time sales associates, department managers,
assistant managers, assistant general managers, store managers or
general managers at Belden, Friedlanders, Goodman, Jared, JB
Robinson, Kay, LeRoys, LeVian, Marks & Morgan, Osterman, Rogers,
Shaws, Weisfield or Ultra Diamonds (after being acquired by
Sterling) retail stores.
Potential Award
Varies
Proof of Purchase
No proof of purchase applicable
Exclusion and Objection Deadline
09/27/2022
Case Name
Jock, et al. V. Sterling Jewelers Inc., Case No. 08 civ. 2875
(s.D.N.Y.), and Case No. 11-16-00655-08 (aaa), before the American
Arbitration Association
Final Hearing
11/15/2022
Settlement Website
SterlingClassActionArbitration.com
Claims Administrator
Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Settlement Administrator
P.O. Box 6968
Portland, OR 97228-6968
800-231-1918
Class Counsel
Joseph M. Sellers
Kalpana Kotagal
Harini Srinivasan
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
Sam J Smith
Loren B Donnell
BURR & SMITH LLP
Thomas A Warren
THOMAS A WARREN LAW OFFICES PL
Barry Goldstein
Defense Counsel
Michael L Banks
Sarah E Bouchard
W John Lee
MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
Jeffrey S Klein
CLARICK GUERON REISBAUM LLP
Celine Chan
WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES LL
Christina M Janice
BARNES & THORNBURG LLP [GN]
THORLEY INDUSTRIES: Suit Alleges Death Over Swing's Dangling Straps
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Daily Hornet reports that a class action lawsuit has been filed
after two babies strangled on the dangling straps of a now-recalled
4moms MamaRoo Baby Swing.
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 4moms, a manufacturer
who recalled over 2 million MamaRoo Baby Swings and RockaRoo Baby
Rockers after two babies strangled on the dangling straps.
The class action was filed by customers who claimed that 4moms
misrepresented the safety of the now-recalled baby swings.
On August 15, 4moms issued a safety recall for MamaRoo Swings and
RockaRoo Rockers after receiving 2 reports of babies who were
strangled when they crawled under the unoccupied swings, and got
their head and neck tangled up in the straps dangling under the
seat.
Tragically, one 10-month-old baby strangled to death, and another
10-month-old baby nearly died but was rescued by a caregiver just
in time. The baby who survived suffered bruising to his neck.
The lawsuit accuses the manufacturer of continuing to sell the
MamaRoo and RockaRoo for 3 years after the first report of a baby
who strangled on the straps in August 2018.
According to the lawsuit: "4moms was aware of the risk of infant
strangulation of the recalled devices in August of 2018, when the
first injury of this kind was reported to them. . . . Yet,
defendant continued to manufacture and sell the recalled devices."
The class action would apply to U.S.-based consumers who bought
4moms MamaRoo Baby Swings and/or RockaRoo Baby Rockers between
January 2010 and August 2020.
The MamaRoo Class Action Lawsuit was filed against Thorley
Industries, LLC (doing business as 4moms) on August 29, 2022 in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania - Case
Number 2:05-mc-02025. [GN]
TRUMPET BEHAVIORAL: N.D. California Dismisses Johnson Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
dismisses the class action lawsuit styled JASMINE JOHNSON, JADE
KHODAR-FISHER and BRITTNIE BORUFF, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. TRUMPET BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; QUALITY BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 3:21-cv-03221-WHO (N.D. Cal.).
The Court, having reviewed the Stipulation of Dismissal filed by
the Parties, dismisses the entire action without prejudice.
Each party will bear its own attorney's fees and costs. Because no
class has been certified, this stipulation applies only to the
named plaintiffs. The Clerk will close the case.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 25, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yj3fm7c2 from Leagle.com.
TRUWELLNESSMD: Williams Sues Over Unsolicited Telephonic Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
Josie Williams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. TRUWELLNESSMD LLC, Case No. 156707715 (Fla. 13th
Judicial Cir. Ct., Hillsborough Cty., Sept. 2, 2022), is brought
against Defendant's violations the Florida Telephone Solicitation
Act as a result of the Defendant unsolicited telephonic sales
calls.
To promote its goods and services, the Defendant engages in
telephonic sales calls to consumers without having secured prior
express written consent as required by the FTSA. The Defendant's
telephonic sales calls have caused Plaintiff and the Class members
harm, including violations of their statutory rights, statutory
damages, annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of their privacy.
Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks an injunction and
statutory damages on behalf of herself and the Class members, and
any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the
unlawful actions of Defendant, says the complaint.
The Plaintiff is an individual that received the Defendant's
telephonic sales calls.
The Defendant is a cosmetic medical spa that offers various
cosmetic treatment, procedures, and products to consumers.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
SHAMIS & GENTILE P.A.
14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
Miami, FL 33132
Phone: 305-479-2299
Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
gberg@shamisgentile.com
- and -
Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
Christopher Gold, Esq.
EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
Aventura, FL 33180
Office: (786) 289-9471
Direct: (305) 975-3320
Fax: (786) 623-0915
Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com
chris@edelsberglaw.com
UCOR LLC: E.D. Tennessee Dismisses Speer Class Suit W/o Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLTON SPEER, et al., Plaintiffs v. UCOR, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 3:21-cv-368 (E.D. Tenn.), Judge Charles E.
Atchley, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee, Knoxville:
(i) denies the Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction; and
(ii) grants UCOR's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice.
The action arises out of UCOR's requirement that all employees
receive a vaccination against COVID-19 and the Plaintiff employees'
refusal to receive the vaccination on the basis of their
sincerely-held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs Carlton Speer, Malena
Dennis, and Zachariah Duncan are former employees of UCOR, who
bring the action on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated. In support of their request for preliminary injunctive
relief, they also submit the Declaration of Ryan LaRochelle and
Cynthia Ogle, both of whom worked for subcontractors of UCOR, and
Dawn Casselton and David Casselton, who worked for UCOR. Charles
Malarkey, Administrative Services Manager for UCOR, declares that
neither Ms. Ogle nor Mr. LaRochelle were UCOR employees and were
not terminated by UCOR.
UCOR announced a mandatory vaccination program on Aug. 26, 2021,
applicable to all members of the workforce. Employees were required
to receive their first COVID-19 vaccination dose by Oct. 1, 2021.
Requests for religious exemptions to the requirement were due by
Sept. 14, 2021. UCOR received 103 religious exemption request
forms, five of which were withdrawn. It created an Accommodation
Review Committee to evaluate the 98 remaining requests. It contends
that the Committee reviewed each religious exemption request
individually and contacted each employee to discuss possible
accommodations.
After completing the individual interactive process with each UCOR
employee that submitted a religious exemption request, a review
team deliberated over each request. It developed a matrix to
evaluate possible accommodations and determine whether they would
impose an undue hardship, i.e. one that imposed a greater than de
minimis cost/burden on it. It incorporated various possible
accommodations into the matrix, including weekly testing, enhanced
face coverings, limited task reassignment, job reassignment, work
location adjustments such as isolation or distancing, leave of
absence, and telework.
Plaintiffs Speer, Dennis, and Duncan, as well as Mr. and Mrs.
Casselton, were informed that their religious exemption requests
had been denied on Oct. 4, 2021, and they were given an additional
week to obtain the vaccine. They were then given a written warning,
noting they would be subject to termination. On Oct. 18, 2021, the
Plaintiffs were placed on a leave of absence to allow them time to
comply with the vaccine requirement. On Oct. 25, 2021, they were
placed on unpaid suspension through Oct. 31, 2021. Plaintiffs
Speer, Dennis, and Duncan, and declarants Mr. and Mrs. Casselton
declined to comply with the vaccination policy and were terminated
effective Nov. 1, 2021.
On Oct. 28, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their Verified Class Action
Complaint, asserting claims for religious discrimination (Count 1)
and failure to accommodate (Count 2) in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The following day, they filed their
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. After conferring with the
parties, the Court elected to treat the motion as one for a
preliminary injunction and order further briefing. The parties
agreed that there was no need for a hearing and the Court would be
able to rule on the motion based on the filings.
Following briefing on the preliminary injunction, UCOR filed a
Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to file
discrimination charges with the EEOC prior to filing suit. UCOR
shows that the Plaintiffs did not file discrimination charges with
the EEOC until Dec. 2, 2021, over a month after filing suit. The
Plaintiffs do not contend that the administrative process has been
completed.
The Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, filed Oct. 29, 2021, originally sought to enjoin UCOR
from terminating the Plaintiffs on Nov. 1, 2022. After consultation
with the parties and based on the parties' agreement that a hearing
was not necessary, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction
Scheduling Order. The Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of
Preliminary Injunctive Relief likewise recognizes that termination
of their employment already occurred, and they now seek preliminary
injunctive relief. Specifically, the Plaintiffs seek preliminary
injunctive relief to restore their employment, health insurance,
and other employment benefits, and to require the Defendant to
provide individualized assessments for the purpose of reasonably
accommodating each Plaintiff's sincerely-held religious beliefs.
As to the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, Judge Atchley opines that the Plaintiffs have not
carried their burden of showing that injunctive relief is
appropriate. The Plaintiffs have not shown they have a strong
likelihood of success on the merits. While they take issue with the
necessity of these precautions and the accuracy of UCOR's
estimates, they have not presented evidence to rebut UCOR's
showing, nor have they shown what accommodations would be
reasonable. They have not presented any evidence that less costly
accommodations would pose a lesser burden on UCOR. This is in part
because the overall burden on UCOR is not measured simply by
dollars and cents, but by the impact on the efficiency of the
workforce, the burden shifted to other employees, and the increased
risk of transmission of illness.
The Plaintiffs also did not exhaust their administrative remedies
prior to bringing suit. Nothing in the record indicates they have
since completed the administrative process. Their Complaint is thus
subject to dismissal on this basis alone, further indicating they
do not have a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
Finally, Judge Atchley opines that the Plaintiffs do not allege
that they will be unable to obtain replacement insurance or that
they will be denied adequate medical care, so the loss of health
insurance is insufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm. They
present no specific evidence that their former positions are the
only such positions available, that they will lose skills necessary
to obtain other employment, or that they are missing out on
advancement opportunities. They also have not shown they will
suffer a certain and immediate harm that is not fully compensable
by monetary damages and have not shown a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits. And as even they acknowledge, there is also
a strong public interest in reducing the spread of COVID-19.
Having considered each factor in the preliminary injunction
analysis, Judge Atchley finds that the Plaintiffs have not shown
entitlement to the "extraordinary relief" of a preliminary
injunction and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction is denied.
Turning to its Motion to Dismiss, UCOR moves to dismiss due to the
Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies prior
to filing suit. It shows that the Plaintiffs did not file EEOC
charges until after they filed the Complaint, and the Plaintiffs
concede that they did not exhaust their administrative remedies
prior to filing suit. UCOR carried its burden of showing a failure
to exhaust prior to filing, and the Plaintiffs have not rebutted
that showing.
As the undisputed facts show that the Plaintiffs did not exhaust
their administrative remedies prior to filing suit and nothing in
the record indicates they have since completed the administrative
process, Judge Atchley opines that their claims are subject to
dismissal. Accordingly, UCOR's Motion to Dismiss is granted and the
action is dismissed without prejudice.
A separate judgment will enter.
A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/322unc2m from
Leagle.com.
UNICO AMERICAN: Anchors & Whales Files Opening Brief in Appeal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Unico American Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 22, 2022, that Anchors
& Whales LLC has filed its opening brief in its appeal from the
court's dismissal of the putative class action entitled Anchors &
Whales LLC et al. v. Crusader Insurance Company.
On March 23, 2021, ten policyholders sued Crusader in a putative
class action entitled Anchors & Whales LLC et al. v. Crusader
Insurance Company, Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of San Francisco (CGC-21-590999). The action alleges
that Crusader wrongly denied claims for business interruption
coverage made by bars and restaurants related to the COVID-19
pandemic and related government orders that limited or halted
operations of bars and restaurants. The action further alleges that
Crusader acted unreasonably in denying the claims, and it seeks as
damages the amounts allegedly due as contract benefits under the
insurance policies, attorneys' fees and costs, punitive damages,
and other unspecified damages. The lawsuit alleges a putative class
of all bars and restaurants in California that were insured by
Crusader for loss of business income, who made such a claim as a
result of "one or more Governmental Orders and the presence of the
COVID-19 virus on the property," and whose claim was denied by
Crusader.
On October 1, 2021, Crusader was granted its motions on the
pleadings without leave to amend and the lawsuit was dismissed.
On December 15, 2021, Anchors & Whales LLC filed a notice of appeal
with California Court of Appeals, 1st Appellate District, Division
2 (A164412). The opening brief of Anchors & Whales LLC was filed
August 12, 2022, and the Company has 90 days to respond. The
Company cannot predict the actions of the Court of Appeals.
Unico American Corporation is an insurance holding company.
Currently, the Company's subsidiary Crusader Insurance Company
underwrites commercial property and casualty insurance, the
Company's subsidiaries Unifax Insurance Systems, Inc. and American
Insurance Brokers, Inc. (AIB) provide marketing and various
underwriting support services related to property, casualty,
health
and life insurance. The Company's subsidiary American Acceptance
Company (AAC) provides insurance premium financing, and the
Company's subsidiary Insurance Club, Inc., dba AAQHC, an
Administrator, provides membership association services. The
company
is based in Calabasas, California.
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Iuliano Sues Over Unsolicited Sales Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Iuliano, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. UnitedHealth Group Incorporated, Case No.
22-004262-CI (Fla. Sixth Judicial Cir. Ct., Pinellas Cty., Sept. 2,
2022), is brought Defendant's violations of the Florida Telephone
Solicitation Act as a result of the Defendant unsolicited
telephonic sales calls.
To promote its goods and services, the Defendant engages in
telephonic sales calls to consumers without having secured prior
express written consent as required by the FTSA. The Plaintiff and
the Class members have been aggrieved by the Defendant's unlawful
conduct, which adversely affected and infringed upon their legal
rights not to be subjected to the illegal acts at issue, says the
complaint.
The Plaintiff is an individual and a "called party."
The Defendant is a healthcare and insurance provider.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Benjamin W Raslavich, Esq.
KUHN RASLAVICH, P.A.
2110 West Platt Street
Tampa, Florida 33606
Phone: (813) 422 – 7782
Facsimile: (813) 422 – 7783
Email: ben@theKRfirm.com
USHEALTH ADVISORS: Tiefenthaler Suit Transferred to N.D. Texas
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Hans Tiefenthaler, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated v. USHealth Advisors, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-11132 was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
District of Massachusetts, to the U.S. District Court for Northern
District of Texas on Sept. 1, 2022.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:22-cv-00780-P-BJ to
the proceeding.
The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.
USHEALTH Group -- https://www.ushealthgroup.com/ -- is a leading
health coverage provider, offering affordable and personalized
plans for everyone looking for a custom coverage solution.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
PARONICH LAW PC
350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
Hingham, MA 02043
Phone: (617) 485-0018
Fax: (508) 318-8100
Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com
The Defendant is represented by:
Paul M. Kessimian, Esq.
PARTRIDGE SNOW & HAHN LLP
40 Westminster Street, Suite 1100
Providence, RI 02903
Phone: (401) 861-8200
Fax: (401) 861-8210
Email: pk@psh.com
- and -
Jeffrey A Backman, Esq.
GREENSPOON MARDER
200 E Broward Blvd., Suite 1800
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Phone: (954) 761-2957
Fax: (954) 213-0140
Email: jeffrey.backman@gmlaw.com
- and -
Roy Taub, Esq.
GREENSPOON MARDER LLP
200 East Broward Blvd., Suite 1800
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Phone: (954) 491-1120
WALKER FINE ART: Senior Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Walker Fine Art, LTD.
The case is styled as Milagros Senior, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Walker Fine Art, LTD, Case No.
1:22-cv-07526 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 2, 2022).
The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
Walker Fine Art -- https://www.walkerfineart.com/ -- is airy,
loft-style gallery featuring exhibits of contemporary art,
including photography & sculpture.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
New York, NY 10003
Phone: (212) 228-9795
Fax: (212) 982-6284
Email: nyjg@aol.com
michael@gottlieb.legal
WALMART INC: Luthe Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Biometric Data
------------------------------------------------------------------
James Luthe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. WALMART, INC., Case No. 1:22-cv-04701 (N.D. Ill., Sept.
1, 2022), is brought arising out of the Defendant's collection,
storage, and use of Plaintiff's and the Class's biometric
identifiers 1 and biometric information 2 (referred to collectively
as "Biometric Data") without obtaining informed written consent or
providing consumers with data retention and destruction policies.
In direct violation of each of the foregoing provisions of
Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"), as alleged here, the
Defendant is and has been actively collecting, storing, and
using--without providing notice, obtaining informed written
consent, or publishing data retention policies--the Biometric Data
of thousands of Illinois residents who have entered Walmart's
stores. Walmart's stores in Illinois are outfitted with cameras and
advanced video surveillance systems that – unbeknownst to
customers – surreptitiously collect, possess, or otherwise obtain
Biometric Data.
Walmart does not notify customers of this fact prior to store
entry, nor does it obtain consent prior to collecting its
customers' Biometric Data. Further, Walmart does not provide a
publicly available policy establishing a retention schedule and
guidelines for permanently destroying this Biometric Data. In
addition, Walmart uses software provided by Clearview AI, Inc. to
match facial scans taken in its Illinois stores with billions of
facial scans maintained within Clearview's massive facial
recognition database (the "Biometric Database").
Walmart does not notify customers of this fact prior to store
entry, nor does it obtain consent prior to disseminating or
disclosing its customers' Biometric Data through Clearview's
Biometric Database. BIPA confers on Plaintiff and all other
similarly situated Illinois residents a right to know about the
inherent risks of Biometric Data storage, collection, and use, and
a right to know how long such risks will persist.
The Defendant failed to comply with its duties under Illinois law.
Walmart did and does not adequately disclose its Biometric Data
collection practices to its customers, never obtained written
consent from any of its customers regarding its Biometric Data
practices, and never provided any data retention or destruction
policies to any of its customers. Moreover, Walmart invaded
Plaintiff's and the Class's privacy through the unauthorized
collection, retention, and use
of Plaintiff's Biometric Data, says the complaint.
The Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Illinois.
Walmart, Inc. is a corporation with its corporate headquarters
located in Bentonville, Arkansas.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, IL 60606
Phone: 866.252.0878
Email: gklinger@milberg.com
- and -
Blake Hunter Yagman, Esq.
MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
Garden City, NY 11530
Phone: 212-594-5300
Email: byagman@milberg.com
- and -
Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
The Helmsley Building
230 Park Ave., 17th Floor
New York, NY 10169
Phone: (212) 223-6444
Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
Email: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com
WASHINGTON CTY., AR: Pastor Seeks Suit Dismissal, Joins Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Wood, writing for Northwest Arkansas Democrat Gazette, reports
that a preacher who sued two Washington County Quorum Court members
claiming he was improperly removed from meetings, wants to dismiss
his current lawsuit so he can be part of a future class action
lawsuit after the November elections.
Clint Schnekloth sued Justices of the Peace Patrick Deakins and Sam
Duncan in July 2021 claiming he was removed from county government
meetings June 28, 2021 and July 15, 2021 and was deprived of his
"guaranteed rights of speech and participation in democratic
government."
Schnekloth, lead pastor at Good Shepherd Lutheran Church in
Fayetteville, has been vocal about issues ranging from how the
county spends, or does not spend, federal relief money; the
proposed jail expansion; and a pro-life resolution the county
passed.
According to the lawsuit, Duncan ordered a Washington County
sheriff's deputy to remove Schnekloth from the June 28 meeting "for
no apparent reason and without any good cause."
Deakins ordered a deputy to remove Schnekloth from the meeting room
before the July 15 meeting started, according to the lawsuit.
Schnekloth claims the county has no policy governing the removal of
people from a public meeting.
U.S. District Judge Timothy Brooks earlier dismissed parts of the
lawsuit.
Schnekloth moved a few weeks ago to voluntarily dismiss the
lawsuit, saying he no longer believes the lawsuit is worth the time
and expense of trying it. Schnekloth wants the judge to dismiss the
case without prejudice, meaning it could be refiled later.
In response, Deakins and Duncan filed a motion opposing voluntary
dismissal of the lawsuit. They argue they're entitled to qualified
immunity and summary judgment. The two also argued Schnekloth
failed to respond to their earlier motion to dismiss the case with
prejudice, meaning it couldn't be refiled.
Brooks entered an order directing Schnekloth to respond to the
motion by Deakins and Duncan opposing voluntary dismissal. In
addition to addressing the objections to voluntary dismissal,
Brooks said Schnekloth's reply should also say why he failed to
respond to the officials' earlier motion for summary judgment.
In a response, Schnekloth's attorney, Matthew Bender, said his
client has talked with other people who had been removed from
meetings by Deakins and Duncan and preserving his claim for a
potential future class action lawsuit would be a more productive
path to protect free speech at local government meetings and more
efficient than litigating his own claim independently. By allowing
dismissal without prejudice, Schnekloth could pursue that avenue.
"There is also an additional reason for the court to entertain Mr.
Schnekloth's motion to dismiss, which is that the defendants in
this case are engaged in political campaigns, which seem to be
influencing the litigation and behavior of the parties in this
case," according to the response. "Permitting Mr. Schnekloth to
dismiss his claims without prejudice would allow Mr. Schnekloth to,
with new counsel, potentially reopen his case later when litigation
would not blur with parties' political campaigns. Too much of this
case seems to be being litigated on social media, and the case's
implications for the defendants' political campaigns seems to
overshadowing the substantive issues."
In a related issue, Magistrate Judge Christy Comstock denied a
motion by Deakins and Duncan to be excused from an upcoming
settlement conference on the suit.
The phrase "without prejudice" means that a claim, lawsuit, or
proceeding has been brought to a temporary end but that no legal
rights or privileges have been determined, waived, or lost by the
result. This means that the dismissal is no bar to bringing a new
lawsuit in the future. By contrast "with prejudice" means that a
party's legal rights have in fact been determined and lost. [GN]
WEDGE BRANDS: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wedge Brands, LLC.
The case is styled as Ramon Jaquez, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Wedge Brands, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-07530 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 2, 2022).
The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
Wedge Brands -- https://wedgebrands.com/ -- provides CRM, ERP, back
office support and logistics services focused on the outdoor,
snowsport, bike, surf and consumer product industries.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
New York, NY 10281
Phone: (212) 595-6200
Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com
XPO LAST MILE: Court Certifies Delivery Drivers Class in Muniz Suit
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In the case, JUSTIN MUNIZ, MOHAMMED BELAABD, NELSON QUINTANILLA,
JOSE DILONE, and VICTOR AMARO, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. XPO LAST MILE, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 4:18-11905-TSH (D. Mass.), Judge
Timothy S. Hillman of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.
The Plaintiffs bring the action, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, against XPO. The Plaintiffs are delivery
drivers who contracted with XPO, a federally authorized freight
forwarder, to deliver appliances and other large consumers goods
for XPO's retail clients. They allege that XPO misclassified them
as independent contractors and unlawfully deducted wages from their
pay in violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, M. G. L. c. 149,
Sections 148 and 150.
XPO works with retailers on "last mile delivery" of appliances and
other large consumer goods. Typically, when a customer of one of
XPO's retail clients makes a purchase and requests in-home
delivery, the retail client sends the customer's order information
to XPO. XPO then uploads the order information to XPO's proprietary
software and organizes disparate orders into efficient delivery
sequences and routes. For some retail clients, XPO aggregates
retail goods at a centralized location before delivery. For other
retail clients, XPO operates a dedicated warehouse or arranges
deliveries out of the retail client's retail store.
To make deliveries, XPO contracts with motor carriers, whom XPO
refers to as "Delivery Service Providers" or "DSPs." Some DSPs
consist of a single driver operating a single truck; other DSPs
consist of a team of drivers operating a fleet of trucks. XPO
requires all DSPs to form entities before contracting.
The contractual relationship between XPO and DSPs is set forth in a
"Delivery Service Agreement" or "DSA." As far as the class
certification record is concerned, each DSA is substantively the
same. The DSA grants DSPs discretion over how to deliver freight;
it also gives DSPs permission to deliver goods for other companies.
It further provides that it is not intended to create an
employer/employee relationship for any purpose.
During the class period, XPO contracted with approximately 534 DSPs
to make deliveries in Massachusetts. Its data suggest that 349 of
the DSPs worked with secondary drivers, 127 of the DSPs used one
secondary driver per week, and 83 of the DSPs used at least five
secondary drivers per week. Moreover, 264 of the DSPs worked with
more than one XPO client, and 426 of the DSPs made deliveries both
inside and outside Massachusetts.
Plaintiff Muniz commenced the action in July 2018 in Massachusetts
state court. After XPO removed the case to federal court, Muniz
twice amended the complaint to add Belaabd, Quintanilla, Dilone,
and Amora as additional named Plaintiffs. Collectively, the
Plaintiffs allege that XPO misclassified them as independent
contractors and unlawfully deprived them of wages to which they
were entitled under M. G. L. c. 149, Sections 148 and 150. They now
move for class certification, seeking to certify the following
class: All individuals who personally or on behalf of their
business entity, signed a Service Agreement with XPO and who
personally performed deliveries for XPO full-time in Massachusetts
between July 2015 and the present.
The Plaintiffs define "full-time" as "personally making deliveries
at least 80% of the days XPO assigns routes to the contractor for
at least three months and who average performing deliveries for XPO
at least four days per week during that time span." In effect, the
proposed class excludes primary drivers who only occasionally made
deliveries for XPO or recruited secondary drivers to work in their
place. XPO opposes class certification.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class certification.
Rule 23(a) requires that "(1) there be numerosity, (2) there be
common questions of law or fact, (3) the class representative's
claims be typical of the class, and (4) the representative's
representation of the class be adequate." Rule 23(b)(3) requires
that common questions "predominate" over individual questions, and
that a class action be a "superior" method of adjudicating the
controversy. Rule 23 also implicitly requires that putative class
members be "ascertainable" with reference to objective criteria.
Judge Hillman finds that (i) given the number of potential class
members, however, the numerosity threshold plainly is met; (ii) the
answer to the operative question on whether "the worker is capable
of performing the service to anyone wishing to avail themselves of
the services or, conversely, whether the nature of the business
compels the worker to depend on a single employer for the
continuation of the services" depends on evidence common to the
proposed class; (iii) the named Plaintiffs' claims share the same
essential characteristics as the proposed class' claims, so the
typicality requirement is met; and (iv) he named Plaintiffs', but
Quintanilla's, interests align with the interests of the proposed
class.
Judge Hillman further finds that (i) individual issues will not
predominate over common questions, so the predominance requirement
is met; (ii) class adjudication will be "far more efficient and
economical"; and (iii) the proposed class definition renders the
class readily ascertainable based on XPO's records.
For the reasons he stated, Judge Hillman grants the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification. He certifies the following class:
"All individuals who personally or on behalf of their business
entity, signed a Service Agreement with XPO and who personally
performed deliveries for XPO full-time in Massachusetts between
July 2015 and the present."
The term "full-time" means "personally making deliveries at least
80% of the days XPO assigns routes to the contractor for at least
three months and who average performing deliveries for XPO at least
four days a week during that time span."
Judge Hillman appoints Justin Muniz, Mohammed Belaabd, Jose Dilone,
and Victor Amora as the class representatives, and Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C. as the class counsel.
The Class counsel will file a proposed class notice, consistent
with the Order. If XPO objects to the proposed class notice, it
will file its own proposed class notice.
A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Order & Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3m9wussp from Leagle.com.
ZILLOW GROUP: Faces Huber Suit Over Wiretapping of Website Visitors
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JAMIE HUBER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ZILLOW GROUP, INC., Case No. 2:22-cv-03572 (E.D. Pa.,
Sept. 7, 2022) is a class action suit under the Pennsylvania
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act.
The case involves one of the most egregious examples of consumer
tracking and Internet privacy violations. The case stems from
Defendant's unlawful interception of Plaintiff's and Class members'
electronic communications through the use of "session replay"
spyware that allowed Defendant to watch and record Plaintiff's and
the Class members' visits to its website, says the suit.
The Defendant allegedly intercepted the electronic communications
at issue without the knowledge or prior consent of Plaintiff or the
Class members. The Defendant did so for its own financial gain and
in violation of Plaintiff's and the Class members' substantive
legal privacy rights under the WESCA, the suit asserts.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
MARCUS ZELMAN LLC
701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
Asbury Park, NJ 07712
Telephone: (732) 695-3282
Fascimile: (732) 298-6256
E-mail: Ari@marcuszelman.com
ZUDY SUPERMARKET: Vega Seeks unpaid OT, Minimum Wages Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
JESSEN VEGA, and other similarly situated individuals v. ZUDY
SUPERMARKET INCORPORATED d/b/a Food Town Meat Market and JOSE
TEJADA, Case No. 8:22-cv-02062-TPB-MRM (M.D. Fla., Sept. 7, 2022)
is a class action suit for wrongful, retaliatory discharge of an
employee in violation of Section 440.205 of the Florida Statutes
and for recovery of money damages for unpaid overtime and minimum
wages under the the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a butcher from May
of 2021 through his wrongful termination on or about August 10,
2022. He performed his duties as a butcher in a satisfactory manner
and was never written up by the Defendant, the Plaintiff says.
When Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a butcher, he worked
six to seven days per week and, on average, he worked 10 hours per
day. The Plaintiff estimates having worked for the Defendants
approximately 60-70 hours per week on average, added the
Plaintiff.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Julisse Jimenez, Esq.
R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
Aventura, FL 33180
Telephone: (305) 503-5131
Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
E-mail: julisse@saenzanderson.com
msaenz@saenzanderson.com
Asbestos Litigation
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tiger Brands Recalls Baby Powder Due to Asbestos
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Nqobile Dludla of reuters.com, reports that South Africa's biggest
food producer Tiger Brands Ltd (TBSJ.J) is recalling its Purity
Essentials baby powder products as a precautionary measure after
traces of asbestos were detected in test samples, it said on
Wednesday.
By 0932 GMT, shares in Tiger Brands were down 5.4% to 157.80 rand.
Tiger Brands said the test samples were from a batch of
pharmaceutical-grade talc powder used as raw material in the
production of finished powder products. This batch did not meet the
company's strict quality and safety standards, it said.
Products forming part of the recall include the 100g, 200g and 400g
pack sizes of Purity Essentials Baby Powder. Purity Essentials baby
cornstarch powder or any other baby care products under the Purity
brand are not affected by the recall, it added.
"In the best interest of consumers and as a precautionary measure,
the company made the decision to initiate a product recall of the
affected products after consultation with the National Consumer
Commission," the company said.
Tiger Brands said the recall would not have a material impact on
its financial results.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
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