/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/220906.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, September 6, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 172

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: Exposed Firefighters to PFAS, Spencer Suit Claims
3M COMPANY: Kimble Suit Alleges Complications From AFFF Products
3M COMPANY: Maloun Sues Over Side Effects of Using AFFF Products
3M COMPANY: Mattera Sues Over Injury Sustained From AFFF Products
3M COMPANY: Peeples Suit Alleges PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products

3M COMPANY: York Suit Claims Toxic Exposure From AFFF Products
A. DUDA & SONS: Massengill Files Suit in M.D. Florida
ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Suit
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Chaudhry MMWA Suit Goes to W.D. Pennsylvania
AMF BOWLING: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Dicks Suit Says

ARAPAHOE COUNTY DHS: Jurinsky Suit Removed to D. Colorado
ARC AUTOMOTIVE: Long Files Suit in N.D. Alabama
ARIJIT SENGUPTA: Cal. App. Flips Order Sustaining Demurrer in Xian
ARTELEXIA INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ASSESSOR OF FLORAL PARK: Ficarotto Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.

ASSET RECOVERY: Ragsdale Files FDCPA Suit in D. Utah
AZURE POWER: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Action Suit
BECKETT SPRINGS: Yisrael Files Suit Over Unpaid Minimum Wages
BED BATH & BEYOND: Faces Si Suit Over Alleged Drop in Share Price
BELLE & BLUSH: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

BEST BUY CO: Karim Suit Removed to N.D. California
BLOOMBERG LP: Faces Unpaid OT Suit Despite Prior Class Settlement
BLUESCOPE BUILDINGS: Verdugo Labor Suit Goes to E.D. California
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Davis Class Suit
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Refuses to Dismiss Gujral Class Suit

BOEING CO: Bid to Dismiss Aircraft Securities Suit Granted in Part
BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook Testimony From Moore B3 Suit
BUFFALO WILD WINGS: Pittman Suit Removed to D. Maryland
CALIFORNIA: Dismissal of Claims in Martinez v. Newsom Partly Upheld
CANADA: Hackers Stole CERB Benefits, Alleges Class Action Lawsuit

CARECORE HEALTH: Gudger Sues Over Failure to Properly Pay OT Wages
CARGILL MEAT: Villa PMWA Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania
CATALINA STRUCTURED: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Anderson TCPA Suit
CENTRAL BUCKS: Cartee-Haring's Bid for Final Certification Granted
CHIEF FIRE: Atty. Resila Withdraws as Class Counsel in Brown Suit

CHRISTMAS TREE HILL: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
COMMUNITY HEALTH: White Sues to Recover Compensation and Benefits
CONDOR LLC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CONSTELATION CLEARSIGHT: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Haldeman Says
CREDIT CONSULTING: Summary Judgment Order in Scott Suit Reversed

DANIA ENTERTAINMENT: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Moore Claims
DEL MONTE FOODS: Stewart Sues Over Failure to Pay Wages Owed
DEVA CONCEPTS: Liability Suit Counsel to Answer Settlement Concerns
DEVON ENERGY: Underpays Oilfield Workers, Stoddart Suit Claims
DINGDONG LTD: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Oct. 24

EHEALTHINSURANCE SERVICES: Salaiz Sues Over Unwanted Robocalls
ELEMENTS PRODUCTION: Raus to Amend Complaint to Invoke Jurisdiction
ENERGY TRANSFER: Allegheny County ERS Wins Bid to Certify Class
EQUIFAX INC: Thompson Files FCRA Suit in N.D. Georgia
EXPLORE SCIENTIFIC: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

EXPRESS SERVICES: Storm Suit Removed to C.D. California
FIRST AMERICAN: Cal. App. Flips Dismissal of Sjobring & Kaufman
FIVE ELEMENTS INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FLOSPORTS INC: Young Sues Over Illegal Automatic Renewal Scheme
G & A OUTSOURCING: Petrol Logic Files Suit in D. Colorado

G.A.S. GLOBAL: Faces Herring Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
GAME GOBLINS: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GEORGIA: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Crisp's Civil Complaint
GONSALVES & SANTUCCI: Rodriguez Suit Remanded to Superior Court
GOOGLE LLC: $118M Settlement Proposed in Work Discrimination Suit

GOOGLE LLC: Faces Biometric Privacy Class Suit Over Face Blur Tool
H&R FOODS INC: Serna Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
HARDER MECHANICAL: $1.5MM Settlement in Ellis Suit Wins Prelim. Nod
HEART OF IOWA MARKET: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
HOMEAGLOW INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Costley Suit Alleges

INDIANAPOLIS NEUROSURGICAL: Gill Files Suit in S.D. Indiana
INSPIRED DESIGN: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
IRBSEARCH LLC: Parker FCRA Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
IT GUYZ SOLUTIONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Marshall Alleges
JK MOSS ENTERPRISES: Jones Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

KAISER FOUNDATION: Getubig Labor Suit Goes to N.D. California
KARAN REALTY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Perez Suit Alleges
KROGER CO: Coffee Creamer Does Not Contain Real Cream, Suit Says
LATCH INC: Federman & Sherwood Discloses Securities Class Action
MAINLINE PRIVATE: Misclassifies Security Guards, Dennis Claims

MAKING IT BIG: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MAMAN GROUP: Underpays Restaurant Employees, Torres Suit Alleges
MDL 2913: Causes Youth E-Cigarette Crisis, Mammoth-San Suit Says
MDL 2913: Entices Youth to Use E-Cigarette, Fast Forward Alleges
MDL 2913: Faces Bridge Creek Suit Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Ads

MDL 2913: Faces Okarche Public Suit Over Youth E-Cigarette Crisis
MILWAUKEE, WI: Class Settlement in Kraai Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
MIRAMED REVENUE: Mitchell Sues Over Illegal Biometric Collection
MISSOURI: Court Denies Pate's Bid to Intervene in Parton v. White
MJC ACQUISITION: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

MONA LISA PIZZERIA: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Gomez Claims
MULTICARE HEALTH: Wash. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in M.N. Suit
MYLAN N.V.: Partially Compelled to Reply to KPH's FRPs of Documents
NES GLOBAL: Fails to Pay Overtime Pay, Amin Suit Alleges
NEW JERSEY: Amended Carmona Suit v. NJDOE Dismissed W/o Prejudice

NEWVIEW OKLAHOMA: Steward Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
NIO INC: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Action Lawsuit
NOVANT HEALTH: Allen Files Suit in M.D. North Carolina
OTGS LLC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PECONIC LANDING: Santa Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages

PELOTON INTERACTIVE: Suit Over Sales Tax Claims Sent to Arbitration
PLEXUS CORP: Court Dismisses Amended O'Driscoll Suit With Prejudice
POLLACK & ROSEN: Benjamin Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida
PRACTICEMAX INC: Knox Files Suit in D. Arizona
PREMIER HR: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Estrada Suit Alleges

PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Oyenuga Says
PREVEA CLINIC: Court Narrows Claims in Nohara's 2nd Amended Suit
PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Court Certifies Class in Buffington Suit
QUICKZIP SHEET: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RAY MOLES: Sept. 27 Scheduling Conference in Colores Suit Vacated

REALPAGE INC: Denial of Subclass Certification in Kelly Vacated
RENOWN HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Nevett's 2nd Amended Suit
RINGS END: Hwang Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
RON'S TOWING: Garrett Sues Over Unpaid Tow Truck Operators' OT
RUSH CAR: Viera Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Drivers and Car Cleaners

SCRIPPS HEALTH: Must File Response in Franklin Suit by Sept. 9
SERVICELINK NLS: Rinsch Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
TARGET CORP: Conditional Certification in Babbitt Suit Affirmed
TCA LOGISTICS: Faces Zambrano Wage-and-Hour Suit in E.D.N.Y.
TELADOC HEALTH: Labaton Named Lead Counsel in Securities Suit

TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Blue Cross Sues Over Copaxone Drug Monopoly
TEXAS: Attorney General Sued Over Strict Anti Abortion Laws
THEDACARE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Glick ERISA Class Suit
TRINITY PACKAGING: Prelim. Approval of Robertson Class Deal Denied
TUSIMPLE HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Nov. 1

UNCOMMON GROUNDS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Amended Aguilar Suit
VICTORIA: Police Uses Capsicum Spray Against Protesters, Suit Says
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Court Certifies Class in Nelson FLSA Suit
WEDRIVEU INC: Chatman Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to N.D. California
WINCO HOLDINGS: Court Dismisses Putman Suit With Leave to Amend

WINCO HOLDINGS: Court Narrows Claims in Castanon's 2nd Amended Suit
WINCO HOLDINGS: E.D. California Dismisses Phoung's 1st Amended Suit
ZIGNEGO CO: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Cardenas Suit Alleges
[*] Kyle Roche to Withdraw as Counsel in Crypto Class Action Suits

                            *********

3M COMPANY: Exposed Firefighters to PFAS, Spencer Suit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
CARL SPENCER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02820-RMG
(D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants
for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict
liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied
warranties, and wantonness.

The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous
film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The
Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the
design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training,
selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF
products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian
firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would
foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of
and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human
health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to
toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with prostate cancer, the suit
alleges.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul.
Minnesota.

ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products
based in Exton, Pennsylvania.

Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based
in Trussville, Alabama.

Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North
America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld
and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates &
hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of
business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina.

Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.

Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company
based in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty
chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located
at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in
Baytown, Texas.

Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium
technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in
Wilmington, Delaware.

Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection
systems based in United Kingdom.

Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina.

Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company
based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic
iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma.

Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical
company based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production
of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York.

E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and
specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market
Street, Wilmington, Delaware.

Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems
based in Ashland, Massachusetts.

Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in
Mebane, North Carolina.

Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic
chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina.

National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam
proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting
equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East
Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania.

The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals
with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington,
Delaware.

Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul
Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system
components and ancillary building construction products, including
Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street,
Marinette, Wisconsin.

United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational
conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged
with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon
Technologies.

UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE
Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control
systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
         Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
         GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         270 West Main Street
         Sayville, NY 11782
         Telephone: (631) 600-0000
         Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

                  - and –

         Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
         Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
         Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
         ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
         2160 Highland Avenue South
         Birmingham, AL 35205
         Telephone: (205) 328-9200
         Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Kimble Suit Alleges Complications From AFFF Products
----------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM KIMBLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02827-RMG
(D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants
for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict
liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied
warranties, and wantonness.

The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous
film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The
Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the
design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training,
selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF
products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian
firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would
foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of
and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human
health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to
toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with testicular cancer, the suit
alleges.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul.
Minnesota.

ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products
based in Exton, Pennsylvania.

Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based
in Trussville, Alabama.

Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North
America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld
and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates &
hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of
business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina.

Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.

Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company
based in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty
chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located
at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in
Baytown, Texas.

Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium
technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in
Wilmington, Delaware.

Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection
systems based in United Kingdom.

Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina.

Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company
based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic
iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma.

Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical
company based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production
of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York.

E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and
specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market
Street, Wilmington, Delaware.

Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems
based in Ashland, Massachusetts.

Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in
Mebane, North Carolina.

Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic
chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina.

National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam
proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting
equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East
Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania.

The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals
with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington,
Delaware.

Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul
Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system
components and ancillary building construction products, including
Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street,
Marinette, Wisconsin.

United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational
conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged
with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon
Technologies.

UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE
Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control
systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
         Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
         GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         270 West Main Street
         Sayville, NY 11782
         Telephone: (631) 600-0000
         Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

                  - and –

         Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
         Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
         Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
         ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
         2160 Highland Avenue South
         Birmingham, AL 35205
         Telephone: (205) 328-9200
         Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Maloun Sues Over Side Effects of Using AFFF Products
----------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT MALOUN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02826-RMG
(D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants
for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict
liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied
warranties, and wantonness.

The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous
film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The
Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the
design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training,
selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF
products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian
firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would
foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of
and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human
health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to
toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with prostate cancer, the suit
alleges.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul.
Minnesota.

ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products
based in Exton, Pennsylvania.

Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based
in Trussville, Alabama.

Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North
America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld
and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates &
hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of
business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina.

Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.

Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company
based in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty
chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located
at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in
Baytown, Texas.

Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium
technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in
Wilmington, Delaware.

Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection
systems based in United Kingdom.

Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina.

Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company
based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic
iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma.

Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical
company based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production
of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York.

E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and
specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market
Street, Wilmington, Delaware.

Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems
based in Ashland, Massachusetts.

Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in
Mebane, North Carolina.

Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic
chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina.

National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam
proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting
equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East
Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania.

The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals
with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington,
Delaware.

Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul
Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system
components and ancillary building construction products, including
Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street,
Marinette, Wisconsin.

United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational
conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged
with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon
Technologies.

UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE
Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control
systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
         Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
         GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         270 West Main Street
         Sayville, NY 11782
         Telephone: (631) 600-0000
         Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

                  - and –

         Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
         Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
         Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
         ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
         2160 Highland Avenue South
         Birmingham, AL 35205
         Telephone: (205) 328-9200
         Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Mattera Sues Over Injury Sustained From AFFF Products
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL MATTERA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02830-RMG
(D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants
for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict
liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied
warranties, and wantonness.

The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous
film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The
Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the
design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training,
selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF
products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian
firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would
foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of
and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human
health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to
toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says the
suit.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul.
Minnesota.

ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products
based in Exton, Pennsylvania.

Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based
in Trussville, Alabama.

Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North
America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld
and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates &
hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of
business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina.

Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.

Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company
based in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty
chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located
at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in
Baytown, Texas.

Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium
technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in
Wilmington, Delaware.

Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection
systems based in United Kingdom.

Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina.

Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company
based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic
iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma.

Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical
company based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production
of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York.

E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and
specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market
Street, Wilmington, Delaware.

Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems
based in Ashland, Massachusetts.

Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in
Mebane, North Carolina.

Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic
chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina.

National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam
proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting
equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East
Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania.

The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals
with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington,
Delaware.

Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul
Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system
components and ancillary building construction products, including
Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street,
Marinette, Wisconsin.

United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational
conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged
with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon
Technologies.

UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE
Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control
systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
         Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
         GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         270 West Main Street
         Sayville, NY 11782
         Telephone: (631) 600-0000
         Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

                  - and –

         Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
         Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
         Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
         ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
         2160 Highland Avenue South
         Birmingham, AL 35205
         Telephone: (205) 328-9200
         Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Peeples Suit Alleges PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN PEEPLES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02817-RMG
(D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants
for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict
liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied
warranties, and wantonness.

The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous
film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The
Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the
design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training,
selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF
products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian
firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would
foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of
and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human
health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to
toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says the
suit.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul.
Minnesota.

ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products
based in Exton, Pennsylvania.

Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based
in Trussville, Alabama.

Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North
America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld
and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates &
hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of
business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina.

Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.

Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company
based in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty
chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located
at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in
Baytown, Texas.

Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium
technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in
Wilmington, Delaware.

Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection
systems based in United Kingdom.

Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina.

Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company
based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic
iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma.

Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical
company based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production
of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York.

E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and
specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market
Street, Wilmington, Delaware.

Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems
based in Ashland, Massachusetts.

Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in
Mebane, North Carolina.

Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic
chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina.

National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam
proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting
equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East
Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania.

The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals
with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington,
Delaware.

Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul
Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system
components and ancillary building construction products, including
Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street,
Marinette, Wisconsin.

United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational
conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged
with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon
Technologies.

UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE
Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control
systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
         Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
         GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         270 West Main Street
         Sayville, NY 11782
         Telephone: (631) 600-0000
         Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

                  - and –

         Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
         Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
         Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
         ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
         2160 Highland Avenue South
         Birmingham, AL 35205
         Telephone: (205) 328-9200
         Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: York Suit Claims Toxic Exposure From AFFF Products
--------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT YORK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02828-RMG
(D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants
for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict
liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied
warranties, and wantonness.

The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the
Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous
film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per-
and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The
Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the
design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training,
selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF
products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian
firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would
foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of
and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human
health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to
toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with kidney cancer, the suit
alleges.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul.
Minnesota.

ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products
based in Exton, Pennsylvania.

Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based
in Trussville, Alabama.

Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North
America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld
and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates &
hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of
business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina.

Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.

Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company
based in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty
chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located
at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in
Baytown, Texas.

Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium
technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in
Wilmington, Delaware.

Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection
systems based in United Kingdom.

Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina.

Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company
based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic
iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma.

Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical
company based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production
of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York.

E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and
specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market
Street, Wilmington, Delaware.

Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems
based in Ashland, Massachusetts.

Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in
Mebane, North Carolina.

Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic
chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina.

National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam
proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting
equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East
Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania.

The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals
with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington,
Delaware.

Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul
Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system
components and ancillary building construction products, including
Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street,
Marinette, Wisconsin.

United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational
conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged
with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon
Technologies.

UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE
Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control
systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
         Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
         GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         270 West Main Street
         Sayville, NY 11782
         Telephone: (631) 600-0000
         Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

                  - and –

         Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
         Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
         Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
         ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
         2160 Highland Avenue South
         Birmingham, AL 35205
         Telephone: (205) 328-9200
         Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

A. DUDA & SONS: Massengill Files Suit in M.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed A. Duda & Sons Inc. The case
is styled as James Massengill, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. A. Duda & Sons Inc., Case No.
6:22-cv-01549 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 29, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Federal Trade
Commission Act.

A. Duda & Sons, Inc. -- https://www.duda.com/ -- is a diversified
land company that specializes in agricultural and real estate
operations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, PA
          14 NE 1st Ave Ste 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone: (305) 479-2299
          Fax: (786) 623-0915
          Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Portnoy Law Firm advises Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott" or the
"Company") (NYSE: ABT) investors that a class action has been filed
on behalf of investors. Abbott investors that lost money on their
investment are encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy, Esq.   

Investors are encouraged to contact attorney Lesley F. Portnoy, by
phone 844-767-8529 or email: lesley@portnoylaw.com, to discuss
their legal rights, or click here to join the case via
www.portnoylaw.com. The Portnoy Law Firm can provide a
complimentary case evaluation and discuss investors’ options for
pursuing claims to recover their losses.

Abbott is a medical device and health care company that provides a
broad line of products, including various forms of infant formula
sold under the brand names Similac, Alimentum, and EleCare. By
early 2022, Abbott was responsible for producing 40 percent of the
United States' infant formula. Of that amount, nearly half was
produced in the Company's manufacturing facility in Sturgis,
Michigan ("Sturgis"), meaning that Abbott's Sturgis facility fed
roughly one in six formula-fed babies in the United States.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made numerous materially false and misleading statements and
omissions concerning what the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") called "egregiously unsanitary" conditions at the Company's
Sturgis facility. Specifically, Defendants repeatedly touted to
investors the safety and salability of Abbott's infant formula
brands and their contribution to the Company's sales and revenue
growth.

In truth, Abbott's Sturgis facility was in flagrant violation of
multiple federal and state health and safety regulations. Those
violations, which Defendants willfully or recklessly concealed from
investors, put Abbott’s infant formula business in dire jeopardy
and left the Company exposed to a risk of severe regulatory action,
including the recall of its products and closure of the Sturgis
facility. By no later than February 2021 and continuing throughout
the Class Period, Abbott and Defendants received direct warnings,
communications, FDA inspection reports, and consumer complaints
identifying in detail the safety and regulatory violations that
were rampant at the Sturgis facility. As a result of Defendants’
misrepresentations and omissions, Abbott common stock traded at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.

The truth began to emerge on February 17, 2022, when the FDA
publicly announced that it was investigating four consumer
complaints of infant illness related to powdered infant formula
produced by Abbott in Sturgis. The FDA stated that it had initiated
an onsite inspection at the facility, and to date had found several
positive contamination results from environmental samples for a
bacteria, Cronobacter sakazakii ("Cronobacter"), linked to infant
illnesses and death. The FDA also revealed that its review of
Abbott’s internal records indicated "environmental contamination
with Cronobacter and the firm’s destruction of product due to the
presence of Cronobacter." As a result of these disclosures, the
price of Abbott stock declined $3.79 per share, or 3.14%. In the
following days, Abbott was forced to close the Sturgis plant due to
the severe safety problems, shuttering one of the major sources of
infant formula for the entire United States, as well as certain
Canadian and foreign markets.

Approximately one month later, on March 22, 2022, the FDA released
reports from its three inspections of the Sturgis facility
conducted from 2019 through 2022. Those reports indicated that (a)
Abbott failed to establish process controls "designed to ensure
that infant formula does not become adulterated due to the presence
of microorganisms in the formula or in the processing environment"
and (b) Abbott failed to "ensure that all surfaces that contacted
infant formula were maintained to protect infant formula from being
contaminated by any source." On the news of these damaging
inspection reports, the price of Abbott stock declined $4.97 per
share, or 4%.

As the FDA investigation continued, a redacted copy of a
whistleblower complaint sent to the FDA in October 2021 was made
public on April 22, 2022. Among other things, the whistleblower
complaint revealed that the issues disclosed in February and March
2022 were actually known to Abbott’s management far earlier. Upon
release of the whistleblower complaint, the price of Abbott stock
declined $4.51 per share, or 3.8%. Then, on June 8, 2022, investors
learned that, contrary to the Company’s repeated denials, Abbott
was aware of the whistleblower’s formal allegations in early
2021, when it was reported that the FDA whistleblower had filed a
complaint in February 2021 with the U.S. Labor Department’s
Occupational Safety & Health Administration ("OSHA"), and that OSHA
delivered that complaint to Abbott and the FDA during the same
month. In response, the price of Abbott stock declined $4.17 per
share, or 3.5%.

Please visit our website to review more information and submit your
transaction information.

The Portnoy Law Firm represents investors in pursuing claims
against caused by corporate wrongdoing. The Firm’s founding
partner has recovered over $5.5 billion for aggrieved investors.
Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar
outcomes. [GN]

AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Chaudhry MMWA Suit Goes to W.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled AMBER CHAUDHRY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, Case No.
GD-22-009302, was removed from the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania on August 24, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01221-WSH to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to provide
consumers with access to written warranties in violation of the
Magnuson Moss Warranty Act.

Amazon.com Services LLC is electronic commerce company based in
Seattle, Washington. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Michael S. Nelson, Esq.
         Laura K. Veith, Esq.
         K&L Gates LLP
         210 Sixth Avenue
         Pittsburgh, PA 15222
         Telephone: (412) 355-6500
         Facsimile: (412) 355-6501
         E-mail: michael.nelson@klgates.com
                 laura.veith@klgates.com

                 - and –

         Kathryn E. Cahoy, Esq.
         COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
         3000 El Camino Real, 10th Floor
         5 Palo Alto Square
         Palo Alto, CA 94306
         Telephone: (650) 632-4700
         Facsimile: (650) 632-4800
         E-mail: kcahoy@cov.com

AMF BOWLING: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Dicks Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
VICTORIA DICKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. AMF BOWLING WORLDWIDE, INC. d/b/a Bowlero
Corp., Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-07154 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 22, 2022)
alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant's Web
site, https://www.bowlmor.com, is not fully or equally accessible
to blind and visually-impaired consumers, including the Plaintiff,
in violation of the ADA.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
the Defendant's Web site will become and remain accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers.

AMF BOWLING WORLDWIDE INC. owns and operates bowling centers. The
Company offers competitive and casual bowling, birthday party
space, club, league, gift cards, and rewards. AMF Bowling Worldwide
serves customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          MARS KHAIMOV LAW, PLLC
          108-26 64th avenue, Second Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Telephone: (929) 324-0717
          Facsimile: (929) 333-7774
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com

ARAPAHOE COUNTY DHS: Jurinsky Suit Removed to D. Colorado
---------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Danielle Jurinsky, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Arapahoe County Department of
Human Services Division of Child & Adult Protection Services; Robin
Niceta, in her official capacity as an employee of Arapahoe County
Department of Human Services; Michelle Dossey, in her official
capacity as Division Manager of the Arapahoe County Department of
Human Services, Division of Child & Adult Protection Services;
Arapahoe County Board of County Commissioners; Case No. 2022CV31612
was removed from the Arapahoe County District Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado on Aug. 26, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-02201-PAB-MEH to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services --
https://www.arapahoegov.com/388/Human-Services -- provides
financial assistance and protective services to children, families
and elderly and disabled adults in the community.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Rebecca McClain Taylor, Esq.
          Writer Mott, Esq.
          ARAPAHOE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE-LITTLETON
          5334 South Prince Street
          Littleton, CO 80120-1136
          Phone: (303) 795-4639
          Email: rtaylor@arapahoegov.com
                 wmott@arapahoegov.com


ARC AUTOMOTIVE: Long Files Suit in N.D. Alabama
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ARC Automotive, Inc.,
et al. The case is styled as Preshawn Long, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. ARC Automotive, Inc.,
FCA US, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-01098-NAD (N.D. Ala., Aug. 29,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Motor Vehicle Prod. Liability.

ARC Automotive, Inc. -- http://www.arcautomotive.com/-- is a
global manufacturer that produces a full complement of inflators
for automotive airbag applications.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeanie Snipes Sleadd, Esq.
          Taylor C. Bartlett, Esq.
          W. Lewis Garrison, Jr., Esq.
          HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS
          2224 1st Avenue North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Phone: (205) 326-3336
          Fax: (205) 380-8084
          Email: jsleadd@hgdlawfirm.com
                 taylor@hgdlawfirm.com
                 wlgarrison@hgdlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Kevin R Dean, Esq.
          Lance V Oliver, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          28 Bridgeside Blvd.
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
          Phone: (843) 216-9152
          Fax: (843) 216-9450
          Email: kdean@motleyrice.com
                 loliver@motleyrice.com


ARIJIT SENGUPTA: Cal. App. Flips Order Sustaining Demurrer in Xian
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BENNY XIAN, Plaintiff and Appellant v. ARIJIT
SENGUPTA, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. A162175 (Cal. App.),
the Court of Appeals of California for the First District, Division
One, reverses the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend.

Mr. Xian was a cofounder and an early investor of BeyondCore, Inc.
After his employment was terminated, he recovered investments he
had made in the company as cash payments with 5% interest rather
than obtaining shares of BeyondCore stock under convertible
promissory notes and a warrant. Several years later, BeyondCore was
purchased by Salesforce, Inc.

The Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Arijit Sengupta,
the founder of BeyondCore, and other defendants, alleging various
causes of action related to the Salesforce acquisition, including a
fraud claim alleging that Sengupta misrepresented and concealed
material facts about the early capitalization of the company. He
alleges that had he known those facts, he would have accepted
shares in BeyondCore rather than a cash payout, and would have
realized more than $7 million in profits after the Salesforce
acquisition.

Mr. Xian filed a class action complaint on Oct. 8, 2019, followed
by a first amended complaint. After the trial court sustained
demurrers to the first amended complaint with leave to amend, Xian
filed the SAC. In his SAC, Xian included allegations specifically
addressing his discovery of fraud after the Salesforce
acquisition.

Sengupta demurred to the SAC, arguing among other things, that
Xian's fraud claim was barred by the three-year statute of
limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338. The trial
court sustained the demurrer, finding that most of Xian's claims
were barred by the settlement agreement he entered with BeyondCore
in September 2010 and the statute of limitations. However, it
allowed Xian leave to amend his causes of action for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty to address "alleged fraudulent omissions
that occurred after Sept. 3, 2010 regarding the sale of the note
and the warrant, and only as alleged in Paragraphs 218, 219, and
220 of the Second Amended Complaint." The trial court specifically
directed him to "plead with specificity delayed discovery and
justifiable reliance" as to those two causes of action.

Mr. Xian filed a third amended complaint (TAC), alleging only two
causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. With
respect to delayed discovery of his claims, the TAC alleged that
"in early September 2016," Xian received e-mails from several
friends regarding the Salesforce acquisition of BeyondCore. He
searched and found online a press release about the prospective
transaction. On Sept. 8, 2016, Xian "contacted and engaged an
attorney (not current counsel) to aid him in evaluating his
situation vis a vis BeyondCore and Salesforce. The attorney advised
Xian to compile relevant documents he had from his BeyondCore
tenure and to send them to him for review."

Mr. Xian alleged he and his wife moved from Silicon Valley to
Pasadena in September 2016, and he was not able to access his
BeyondCore documentation for several weeks, but that "after getting
moved into his Pasadena residence," he started compiling BeyondCore
documents he had stored and forwarded them to his attorney "in
November and December 2016." Xian's attorney spent "two months
on-and-off" assisting Xian with potential claims, buthe alleged
that the "documents compiled by him from his own sources were
insufficient to uncover anything about BeyondCore's financial
situation" after he left BeyondCore in 2010 and he "was not yet
aware of the substantial investments made in BeyondCore from
September 2010 onward." Xian "was also unable to determine
financial details about BeyondCore other than what was disclosed in
publicly filed documents concerning the Salesforce Acquisition."

Mr. Xian alleged he was advised by new counsel in November 2017 to
obtain Delaware corporate filings for BeyondCore, which led to a
discovery that Sengupta had improperly issued himself shares of
BeyondCore." Throughout 2018 and through August 2019, Xian sought
additional documents on BeyondCore." Xian alleged that "while
researching online during at dealroom.co circa Aug. 26, 2019, he
discovered a listing in a schedule referring to a Series A
investment of $9 million in February 2014 from Menlo Ventures,
venture capital firm."

Mr. Xian further alleged that in July 2019, he "met with a prior
investor" in BeyondCore. Xian had "attempted to meet with the
investor a year earlier, but was unsuccessful because the investor
was reluctant to discuss BeyondCore or provide any disclosure about
it until their own dealings were concluded with BeyondCore." The
investor provided Xian with BeyondCore's "capitalization table
listing all investments made in BeyondCore through December 2012."
Xian attached the capitalization table to the TAC, and alleged
"this was the first time he was able to discover the existence and
extent of investments" made in BeyondCore after he left.

Finally, Xian alleged he "was unable to discover the occurrence and
nature of the causes of action alleged herein until the period of
November 2017-August 2019 due to the non-public nature of the 2012
Cap Table and the Menlo Ventures Series A investment. The statute
of limitations period for the fraud-based causes of action alleged
herein did not start until his discoveries in July-August 2019 that
tipped him off to the fraudulent concealment and
misrepresentations" by Sengupta and BeyondCore.

Sengupta demurred to the TAC. He argued that Xian had failed to
allege delayed discovery of his fraud claim because the allegations
of the TAC did not show reasonable diligence. In particular, he
focused on the fact that the TAC omitted allegations contained in
the verified SAC regarding "anomalies in the press release" that
Xian had noticed when reading in September 2016 about the
Salesforce acquisition of BeyondCore. Because "Xian was on inquiry
notice as of September 2016" and "had publicly available documents
accessible to him the entire time," Sengupta argued he failed to
demonstrate reasonable diligence and his claims should be
dismissed. Xian opposed the demurrer, arguing he had adequately
alleged delayed discovery and the fact that he had publicly
available documents was irrelevant because the basis of the fraud
cause of action was discovered only once he received the nonpublic
capitalization table in July 2019.

Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend. It concluded Xian had "not
sufficiently pled delayed discovery to postpone accrual of the
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action to 2019 when he
obtained a copy of the BeyondCore 2012 Year-End Capitalization
Table." It concluded Xian had not sufficiently pled delayed
discovery because his allegations in the TAC "contradicted" his
allegations in the SAC, and he had not sufficiently pled around the
prior allegations.

In sum, the trial court ruled that the three-year statute of
limitations barred Xian's fraud claim, because the allegations of
his third amended complaint contradicted earlier allegations in his
pleadings and Xian failed to sufficiently plead delayed discovery
to postpone accrual of his claim to 2019. Concluding Xian had
failed to allege delayed discovery and consequently that his claims
were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, the trial
court sustained the demurer without leave to amend.

The appeal followed.

Xian contends the trial court erred in determining his fraud claim
is barred by the three-year statute of limitations under section
338, subdivision (d). Sengupta disagrees, and asserts Xian's cause
of action accrued at the latest in September 2016, when Xian
learned of the Salesforce acquisition and hired a lawyer to explore
his claims vis-à-vis BeyondCore and Sengupta.

The Court of Appeals opines that whether the allegations are true
or whether a reasonable investigation would have earlier revealed a
factual basis for his fraud claim are questions, it cannot
determine at the pleading stage. Nor do the allegations of the TAC
"contradict" the allegations of the SAC so as to bar Xian's claim.
Also, Sengupta's attack on Xian's delayed discovery allegations do
not persuade the Court of Appeals that they are insufficient as a
matter of law.

In the demurrer to the TAC, Sengupta raised several additional
arguments regarding Xian's inability to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, none of which the trial court addressed,
and none of which Sengupta reasserts on appeal. Sengupta argued in
the trial court that he owed no duty to disclose the allegedly
concealed financial information to Xian because he owed him no
fiduciary duty. But a duty of disclosure can arise in transactional
relationships even where there is no fiduciary or confidential
relationship between the parties.

Sengupta also asserted in his demurrer that Xian had not adequately
pled concealment because the e-mail sent by Xian's lawyer asking
for an update on "'fundraising efforts, etc.'" was a clearly a
request regarding current efforts to raise future funds as opposed
to past fundraising results, and Sengupta's response fully answered
the questions that were asked.

But the Court of Appeals does not think the meaning of the question
is so clear. Nor can it say Sengupta's response forecloses a cause
of action for fraudulent concealment. Simply put, this argument
raises questions of fact not amenable to resolution on demurrer.

Finally, Sengupta argued that the TAC did not adequately allege
justifiable reliance because (1) Sengupta and Xian were in an
adversarial position in 2012, when the alleged concealment took
place; (2) Xian could not have relied on Sengupta's statements
because he asked for his investment back in cash soon after
receiving Sengupta's e-mail; and (3) Xian's counsel wrote in an
e-mail rejecting the conversion option that Xian had "'other
projects that he is much closer to and he'd like to allocate those
funds to those projects.'"

While all of these arguments suggest inferences that can be drawn
from the allegations of the complaint, and while further discovery
may reveal additional support for them, the Court of Appeals cannot
determine as a matter of law that Xian's reliance was unreasonable
at this stage of the litigation.

In sum, the Court of Appeals concludes Xian has adequately pled
delayed discovery so as to survive demurrer. Because it cannot
determine as a matter of law that Xian's claim is barred by the
statute of limitations, and none of Sengupta's other arguments
raised in the trial court defeat Xian's fraud cause of action, the
demurrer should have been overruled.

For these reasons, the judgment is reversed and the action is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
the Court of Appeals' opinion. Xian is to recover costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/mtefu7jd from Leagle.com.


ARTELEXIA INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Artelexia, Inc. The
case is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. Artelexia, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07359
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Artelexia -- https://artelexia.com/ -- is a vibrant retail shop and
event space specializing in THE BEST Mexican gifts, art, home
decor, and gourmet foods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


ASSESSOR OF FLORAL PARK: Ficarotto Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Assessor of the
Village of Floral Park, et al. The case is styled as Carmela
Ficarotto, all other similarly situated Petitioners on the annexed
SCHEDULE A, Petitioners v. The Assessor of the Village of Floral
Park, The Board of Assessment Review of the Village of Floral Park,
Respondents, Case No. 611393/2022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., Aug.
26, 2022).

The case type is stated as "SP-CPLR Article 78 (Body or Officer)."

Floral Park -- https://fpvillage.org/ -- is an incorporated village
in Nassau County, New York, United States, on Long Island.[BN]

The Petitioner is represented by:

          MAIDENBAUM & STERNBERG, LLP
          132 Spruce St
          Cedarhurst, NY 11516-1915


ASSET RECOVERY: Ragsdale Files FDCPA Suit in D. Utah
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Asset Recovery
Solutions. The case is styled as Angela Ragsdale, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Asset Recovery
Solutions, Case No. 2:22-cv-00547-DBP (D. Utah, Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC --
https://assetrecoverysolutions.com/ -- is one of the leading
companies in the US for the effective recovery of assets along with
contingency servicing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brett D. Cragun, Esq.
          CRAGUN & CRAGUN
          PO Box 160234
          Clearfield, UT 84016
          Phone: (801) 450-3267
          Email: brett@brettcragun.com


AZURE POWER: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Action Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Portnoy Law Firm advises Azure Power Global Limited ("Azure" or
the "Company") (NASDAQ: AZRE) investors that a class action has
been filed on behalf of investors. Azure investors that lost money
on their investment are encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy, Esq.
   

Investors are encouraged to contact attorney Lesley F. Portnoy, by
phone 844-767-8529 or email: lesley@portnoylaw.com, to discuss
their legal rights, or click here to join the case via
www.portnoylaw.com. The Portnoy Law Firm can provide a
complimentary case evaluation and discuss investors' options for
pursuing claims to recover their losses.

On August 29, 2022, Azure announced the resignation of its Chief
Executive Officer, less than two months after his appointment. The
Company also disclosed that it had "received a whistleblower
complaint in May 2022 alleging potential procedural irregularities
and misconduct by certain employees at a plant belonging to one of
its subsidiaries." During the Company's review of these
allegations, Azure "discovered deviations from safety and quality
norms" and "also identified evidence of manipulation of project
data and information by certain employees." On this news, the price
of Azure shares declined by $4.61 per share, or approximately
44.07%, from $10.46 per share to close at $5.85 on August 29,
2022.

The lawsuit alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) there were procedural irregularities, including
deviations from safety and quality standards, at one of Azure's
plants; (2) certain project data was manipulated; (3) as a result
of the foregoing, the Company's internal controls and procedures
were not effective; (4) Azure had received a credible whistleblower
report alleging such misconduct; and (5) as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Please visit our website to review more information and submit your
transaction information.

The Portnoy Law Firm represents investors in pursuing claims
against caused by corporate wrongdoing. The Firm's founding partner
has recovered over $5.5 billion for aggrieved investors. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]

BECKETT SPRINGS: Yisrael Files Suit Over Unpaid Minimum Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
TSIPPORAH YISRAEL, Plaintiff v. BECKETT SPRINGS, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:22-cv-00491-SJD (S.D. Ohio, August 22, 2022) brings this
complaint as a collective action on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated to recover unpaid minimum wages against
the Defendant as a result of its unlawful pay policies and
practices that violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio
Rev. Code Section 4111.01.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a licensed therapist
from October 28, 2021 to July 22, 2022. Accordingly, the Plaintiff
was compensated at a salary of $58,000 per year or approximately
$1,208.33 per week.

According to the complaint, the parties specifically agreed that
the Plaintiff  would receive a "Sign On Bonus." However, the
Defendant has employed a policy of deducting a prorated balance of
a signing bonus against the last paycheck of employment. As a
result of the deductions, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees' minimum wage were reduced below the statutory
minimum wage. In addition, the Defendant has failed to issue and/or
remit a final paycheck to the Plaintiff, claiming that it was being
withheld in its entirety to satisfy some of the amount it claims it
is owed on her sign-on bonus, says the suit.

Beckett Springs, LLC provides compassionate, trusted programs for
those facing mental health & addiction challenges. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew S. Okiishi, Esq.
          FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC
          4270 Ivy Pointe Blvd., Suite 225
          Cincinnati, OH 45245
          Tel: (513) 943-6659
          Fax: (513) 943-6669
          E-mail: matt@finneylawfirm.com

BED BATH & BEYOND: Faces Si Suit Over Alleged Drop in Share Price
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PENGCHENG SI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BED BATH & BEYOND; JP MORGAN SECURITIES LLC;
RC VENTURES LLC; RYAN COHEN; ARNAL GUSTAVO, Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-02541 (D.C., Aug. 23, 2022) is a federal securities class
action brought on behalf of a class other that the Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired BBBY common stock from March 25,
2022 to August 18, 2022, inclusive, (the "Class Period"), seeking
to recover compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that as a result of
materially false statements regarding the financial condition and
holding situation of BBBY during the Class Period, the stock price
of BBBY was artificially inflated. The Defendants, knowing that the
information they disclosed was false, took advantage of the
inflated stock price and used fraudulent and misleading SEC filings
to sell all their BBBY shares and options at artificially inflated
prices to unsuspecting and innocent public investors and then
retained control of the profits.

Despite knowing or having information which would cause one to know
that Cohen and Gustavo was engaged in illegal insider trading and
fraudulent SEC reporting, JPM actively aided and abetted Cohen and
Gutavo's activities by enabling Cohen to use JPM's accounts to
effectuate such transactions and otherwise launder the proceeds of
their criminal conduct, says the suit.

On August 18, 2022, the Defendants Cohen and Gustavo, respectively,
filed Form 4 with the SEC reporting that they had sold all their
BBBY shares on August 16, 2022. In reaction to this news, BBBY
Stock dives to $16.16, or over 45%, on unusually heavy trading
volume.

BBBY's stock price continued to decline over the next two trading
days, falling an additional 16.23%, to close at $9.24 per share on
August 22, 2022, and falling another 4.98% to close at $8.78 on
August 23, 2022, dropping over 70% from August 17's highest price
of $30 per share in five trading days after Defendants dumped their
shares.

The Defendants' wrongful conduct, as alleged herein, directly and
proximately caused the economic loss suffered by Plaintiff and his
family and other Class members, alleges the suit.

BED BATH & BEYOND INC. operates a nationwide chain of retail
stores. The Company, through its retail stores, sells a wide
assortment of merchandise principally including domestic
merchandise and home furnishings, as well as food, giftware, health
and beauty care items, and infant and toddler merchandise. [BN]

The Plaintiff, of Falls Church, Virginia, appears pro se.

BELLE & BLUSH: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Belle & Blush, LLC.
The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Belle & Blush, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-07371 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Belle & Blush -- https://www.belleandblush.com/ -- is a girl's
candy land full of makeup, skincare, gifts, stationery, and jewelry
with makeup artists and estheticians on staff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


BEST BUY CO: Karim Suit Removed to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Alee Karim, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Best Buy Co., Inc., Case No. 22-CV-014203 was
removed from the Alameda County Superior Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on Aug. 26,
2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-04909-KAW to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Best Buy Co. Inc. -- https://www.bestbuy.com/ -- is an American
multinational consumer electronics retailer headquartered in
Richfield, Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Christine Marie Reilly, Esq.
          MANATT PHELPS & PHILLIPS LLP
          2049 Century Park East, Suite 1700
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 312-4237
          Fax: (310) 312-4224
          Email: creilly@manatt.com


BLOOMBERG LP: Faces Unpaid OT Suit Despite Prior Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jessy Edwards at topclassactions.com reports that a former human
resources employee at Bloomberg is suing the company, saying she
and others were often required to work unpaid overtime, despite
Bloomberg settling a similar lawsuit on its pay practices several
years ago.

Plaintiff Heidi Diaz filed the class action complaint against
Bloomberg LP Aug. 25 in a New York federal court, alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

According to Diaz, she and other employees were often required to
work through meal breaks, as well as before and after scheduled
shifts. They were not paid overtime for the additional work, she
said, in violation of the law.

The alleged violations happened several years after Bloomberg
agreed to pay $3 million to a group of New York call center workers
who claimed that the company pressured them to work through their
meal breaks and past the end of their shifts but did not pay them
overtime.

That lawsuit came after Bloomberh settled a similar lawsuit for
$54.5 million in 2018. In that case, the lawsuit was filed by three
Bloomberg analytic employees in April 2014 who alleged they and
other employees were wrongfully misclassified as exempt from
overtime pay.

Diaz alleges Bloomberg continued its illegal wage practices despite
both settlements.

After settlement, workers continued to work overtime unpaid,
lawsuit alleges
Diaz says she was paid as a salaried worker with a set schedule,
but was asked regularly to work overtime for which she was not
compensated. She was only paid for her scheduled shifts, she said.


She alleges that in one pay period she worked up to one hour after
her scheduled shift at least four different times, and worked
through her one-hour uncompensated meal break six times.

She says that amounted to her working about five to seven hours of
overtime unpaid.

Diaz alleges that Bloomberg knows exactly how many hours she and
other workers do because they are required to swipe their security
badges to enter and exit the building. She adds that her manager
saw she was working overtime.

The company's "illegal and improper wage practices. . . have
deprived employees of millions of dollars in wages and overtime
compensation," Diaz alleges.

Diaz is looking to represent all current and former salaried and
hourly employees Bloomberg employed from Feb. 4, 2020 who say they
were not paid or properly compensated for overtime.

She's seeking certification of the class action, damages, unpaid
wages, fees, costs and a jury trial.

What do you think about the Bloomberg wage theft class action
claims? Let us know your thoughts in the comments!

Diaz is represented by Lee S. Shalov, Brett R. Gallaway and Jason
S. Giaimo of McLaughlin & Stern LLP.

The Bloomberg class action lawsuit is Diaz v. Bloomberg LP, Case
No. 1:22-cv-07251, in the U.S District Court for the Southern
District of New York.[GN]

BLUESCOPE BUILDINGS: Verdugo Labor Suit Goes to E.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled NATHAN VERDUGO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. BLUESCOPE BUILDINGS NORTH AMERICA,
INC.; BLUESCOPE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; BLUESCOPE STEEL AMERICAS LLC;
BLUESCOPE STEEL NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION; ASC PROFILES LLC;
STEELSCAPE LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No.
VCU292562, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Tulare, to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California on August 23, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 1:22-at-00644 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including unpaid overtime, unpaid minimum wages, failure to
provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods,
non-compliant wage statements and failure to maintain payroll
records, wages not timely paid upon termination, failure to timely
pay wages during employment, unreimbursed business expenses, and
unlawful and unfair business practices.

BlueScope Buildings North America, Inc. is a manufacturer of
engineered building solutions, headquartered in Kansas City,
Missouri.

BlueScope Construction, Inc. is a construction engineering company,
headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri.

BlueScope Steel Americas LLC is a construction engineering company,
doing business in California.

BlueScope Steel North America Corporation. is a construction
engineering company, headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri.

ASC Profiles LLC is a manufacturer of building products in
California.

Steelscape LLC is a supplier of metallic-coated and pre-painted
steel, headquartered in Kalama, Washington. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Todd L. Nunn, Esq.
         K&L GATES LLP
         4 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1200
         San Francisco, CA 94111-5994
         Telephone: (415) 882-8200
         Facsimile: (415) 882-8220
         E-mail: todd.nunn@klgates.com

                 - and –

         Ashley Song, Esq.
         K&L GATES LLP
         1 Park Plaza Twelfth Floor Irvine, California 92614
         Telephone: (949) 253-0900
         Facsimile: (949) 253-0902
         E-mail: Ashley.Song@klgates.com

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Davis Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT DAVIS and DR. BRUCE BARTON, on behalf of
themselves and the Putative Class, Plaintiffs v. BMW OF NORTH
AMERICA, LLC and BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 19-cv-19650 (D.N.J.), Judge Claire C.
Cecchi of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
denies BMW's motion to dismiss Barton's first amended putative
class-action complaint.

The Plaintiffs bring the instant putative class action on behalf of
purchasers of certain BMW or Mini Cooper vehicles that purportedly
are susceptible to catching fire as a result of an allegedly
defective electric auxiliary coolant pump. The Fire Defect
allegedly causes "engine control unit-driven electric auxiliary
water pumps" to overheat in high-temperature environments, which
purportedly increases the likelihood of engine fires.

The Plaintiffs claim that these fires occur without warning and
result in extreme safety risk to the Class Vehicles, their owners,
and any surrounding property. They assert that the Defendant knew
or should have known about the Fire Defect prior to selling the
Class Vehicles, and moreover, that it concealed this risk to the
Plaintiffs and failed take appropriate remedial action while they
owned and operated the Class Vehicles. Instead, the Plaintiffs aver
that the Defendant sold and serviced the Class Vehicles without
warning to them despite its "exclusive knowledge" that the vehicles
contained the Fire Defect.

The Plaintiffs argue that had they known about the Fire Defect,
they would not have purchased or leased the Class Vehicles (or
would have paid substantially less for them due to the increased
fire risk). Accordingly, the action arises out of the Defendant's
allegedly defective design, manufacture, and warranting of the
Class Vehicles, as well as their allegedly misleading promotion of
the Class Vehicles' purported safety and dependability.

Mr. Barton, a Kentucky resident, allegedly purchased his certified
pre-owned 2012 Class Vehicle on Aug. 19, 2017, relying on the
Defendant's marketing materials touting its high quality and
outstanding safety record. He claims that the Defendant did not
disclose to Barton that his vehicle contained the Fire Defect prior
to purchase.

In June 2018, Barton purportedly first learned via notice that his
vehicle was subject to recall for a defective electric auxiliary
coolant pump. He alleges to have contacted his BMW dealer to
schedule the mandated repair but asserts that BMW was not able to
apply the remedy in either June or August 2018. In the meantime, he
alleges that the Defendant recommended to park the Class Vehicles
outdoors until the recall remedy had been performed.

On Jan. 10, 2019, Barton's vehicle allegedly suffered a
catastrophic engine fire while parked in his driveway. His insurer
purportedly declared the vehicle a total loss and determined upon
inspection that the damage was allegedly caused by the Fire Defect.
Davis, a Georgia resident, purchased his Class Vehicle on Aug. 24,
2015, purportedly relying on the Defendant's advertising of its
reliability, high quality, and outstanding safety record. On Jan.
9, 2017, when the vehicle had 92,000 miles, Davis claims to have
experienced a loss of power in the vehicle while driving to work. A
few hours later, Davis discovered a small fire in the engine
compartment of the vehicle. Davis' insurance company and the
Defendant allegedly conducted a joint examination of the vehicle
and concluded that an unspecified failure in the electric water
pump caused the fire. Davis allegedly continued driving the vehicle
and never received a recall notice for his purportedly defective
coolant pump.

The Plaintiffs aver that the Defendant had knowledge of the Fire
Defect as early as 2009 yet failed to remedy the defective
equipment, necessitating several rounds of recalls for an allegedly
similar issue. Moreover, they claim that the recalls did not
sufficiently benefit class members because the parts required to
remedy the Fire Defect were unavailable at the time of recall, and
vehicle owners, including Barton, suffered catastrophic vehicle
fires in the interim.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Oct. 31, 2019 and filed
their FAC on Nov. 18, 2019. The FAC primarily asserts that the
Defendant breached warranties, defrauded consumers by failing to
disclose the Fire Defect, and misleading the Plaintiffs as to the
safety of their Class Vehicles. The FAC alleges: violations of the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. Section 56:8-2, et seq.
("NJCFA") (Counts 1 and 2); breaches of express warranty (Counts 3,
7); breaches of implied warranty (Counts 4, 8, 11); breach of
written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 2301 ("MMWA") (Count 5); violation of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act, KRS Section 367.110 ("KCPA") (Count 6); violation
of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act, Ga. Code
Section 10-1-370 et seq. ("GUDTPA") (Count 10); violation of the
Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, Ga. Code. Section 10-1-390 et
seq. ("GFBPA") (Count 12); and unjust enrichment (Count 9).

On Jan. 10, 2020, the Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's putative class-action first amended complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Plaintiffs filed an opposition on
Feb. 10, 2020, to which the Defendant replied on Feb. 24, 2020.

The Defendants first move to dismiss on grounds that the Court
should defer to the primary jurisdiction of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), a government agency with
federal authority to investigate and remediate motor-vehicle safety
defects. Judge Cecchi finds that the NHTSA does not maintain
primary jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' instant pleading. Given
the seemingly ongoing status of the NHTSA's recall process, the
NHTSA does not have a mechanism by which the Plaintiff could be
awarded damages. Accordingly, Judge Cecchi declines to invoke the
primary jurisdiction doctrine and will not refer the matter to the
NHTSA.

The Defendant asserts that the Court should dismiss Davis' claims
in light of its purported recall of his Class Vehicle, which it
argues provides full relief and renders the claims prudentially
moot. Davis asserts various legal claims for damages beyond the
injunctive relief provided by a recall. He alleges sufficient facts
to support his claims for diminution in value and reimbursement for
out-of-pocket expenses including smoke damage in his garage.
Accordingly, Davis' claims are not prudentially moot.

Judge Cecchi need not decide whether New Jersey consumer fraud law
applies to the Plaintiffs or a proposed nationwide class at the
motion to dismiss stage. While New Jersey's choice of law
principles apply since federal courts with diversity jurisdiction
must apply the choice of law principles of the forum state, Judge
Cecchi need not address the choice of law arguments at this
juncture. She requires a more developed factual record to make a
choice of law conclusion, and thus declines to determine whether
the Plaintiffs or a nationwide class can pursue claims under the
NJCFA.

Similarly, the Defendant's motion to strike class certification is
premature, Judge Cecchi opines. Courts throughout the Third Circuit
have routinely declined to hear premature arguments regarding class
certification in similar circumstances. Accordingly, because the
issue of whether the Plaintiffs can satisfy the class certification
requirements is a fact-intensive question, Judge Cecchi declines to
strike the Plaintiffs' allegations at this stage.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' breach of express
warranty claims must fail because the warranties at issue do not
extend to the type of design defect alleged in their FAC. In
opposition, the Plaintiffs contend that they have sufficiently
alleged potential manufacturing defects covered by the applicable
warranties.

Construing these claims in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, Judge Cecchi will not dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims
for breach of express warranty for failure to plead a valid
manufacturing defect. The Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that
the Defendant knew about the Fire Defect as early as 2009 and
misleadingly concealed the defect from the Plaintiffs. Further,
they have sufficiently alleged "a gross disparity in bargaining
power" and "no meaningful choice" in the warranty negotiation.
Accordingly, Judge Cecchi will not dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims
for breach of express warranty.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant breached its implied
warranties by concealing knowledge of the Fire Defect and
continuing to sell and service the Class Vehicles to consumers in
an allegedly unmerchantable condition.

Judge Cecchi finds that according to the pleading, the Fire Defect
allegedly caused the Class Vehicles to suddenly stop running or
catch fire without warning, resulting in an extreme safety risk.
Thus, the Plaintiffs' allegations effectively give rise to a
plausible inference that the Fire Defect poses a safety risk
sufficient to violate an implied warranty. Moreover, whether the
Fire Defect "posed enough of a safety risk to actually hamper the
Class Vehicles' ability to provide safe, reliable transportation is
ultimately a question of fact to be resolved at summary judgment or
by a jury." Accordingly, Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the breach of implied warranty claims.

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant breached express
warranties in violation of the MMWA, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 et seq.
The MMWA creates a federal cause of action for state law express
and implied warranty claims. The Plaintiffs base their MMWA claims
on the underlying state law claims for breach of express warranty.
As she has determined the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' express
warranty claims at the pleading stage, Judge Cecchi holds that the
dismissal of this MMWA claim is not warranted.

The Defendant argues Barton's KCPA claim is time-barred under the
KCPA's two-year statute of limitations period, which it asserts
began running when Plaintiff allegedly purchased the vehicle on
Aug. 19, 2017. In opposition, the Plaintiffs contend that the
statute of limitations did not accrue until June 2018 when the
Defendant allegedly made false promises about the recall notice and
availability of requisite repairs.

Judge Cecchi holds that whether Barton's cause of action accrued
when he purchased his vehicle in 2017 or when he was denied his
repairs in 2018 is an issue of fact inappropriate for disposition
on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, construing the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, she will
not dismiss Barton's complaint as time-barred.

The Defendant moves to dismiss Davis' GUDTPA claim on grounds that
the Plaintiffs are limited to injunctive relief under the GUDTPA,
and Davis is barred from that injunctive relief for failure to
allege a "future" harm as required by statute. Judge Cecchi,
however, agrees with the Plaintiffs in finding that the FAC
plausibly alleges that the Defendant's refusal to acknowledge or
remedy the Fire Defect in Davis' vehicle may represent a deceptive
trade practice under the GUDTPA. Because Davis purports to have
suffered from the Defendant's deceptive trade practices, his
allegations support a future harm and a viable basis for injunctive
relief.

The Defendant asserts that Davis' GFBPA claim must be dismissed
because the GFBPA expressly precludes class-action claims and,
alternatively, because Davis does not adequately plead reliance.
Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss Davis' GFBPA
claim. First, federal courts have permitted class actions to
proceed under the GFBPA when they are pursued under Rule 23, as is
the situation. Next, she concludes that Davis adequately pleads
reliance under the GFBPA.

Lastly, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claims should be dismissed for lack of privity under New Jersey
law, and for inability to plead unjust enrichment when a valid
contract exists under Georgia and Kentucky laws.

Its arguments are without merit, Judge Cecchi finds. Courts in this
District have held that a manufacturer that advertises its products
directly to consumers, as alleged, may be liable for unjust
enrichment even if the consumer purchases the product from an
intermediate retailer. Furthermore, courts in Georgia and Kentucky
have recognized that at the motion to dismiss stage, unjust
enrichment may be pleaded in the alternative, as it is here, even
where an allegedly valid contract exists. The Plaintiffs
sufficiently allege in the alternative that the Defendant benefited
financially from its alleged breach of warranty,
misrepresentations, and fraud. Thus, the Plaintiffs have adequately
pleaded an unjust enrichment claim.

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's
motion to dismiss. An appropriate Order accompanies the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yd2tt2j7 from Leagle.com.


BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Refuses to Dismiss Gujral Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RANBIR GUJRAL and DANIELLE EMERSON, on behalf of
themselves and the Putative Class, Plaintiffs v. BMW OF NORTH
AMERICA, LLC and BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 19-cv-20581 (D.N.J.), Judge Claire C.
Cecchi of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
denies BMW's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' putative
class-action complaint.

The Plaintiffs bring the instant putative class action on behalf of
purchasers of certain BMW vehicles that purportedly are susceptible
to catching fire as a result of an allegedly defective battery
cable. They claim that these fires occur without warning and result
in extreme safety risk to the Class Vehicles, their owners, and any
surrounding property.

The Plaintiffs assert that Defendants knew or should have known
about the Fire Defect prior to selling the Class Vehicles, and
moreover, that the Defendants concealed this risk to the Plaintiffs
and failed take appropriate remedial action while they owned and
operated the Class Vehicles. Instead, the Plaintiffs aver that BMW
sold and serviced the Class Vehicles without warning to Plaintiffs
despite Defendant's "exclusive knowledge" that the vehicles
contained the Fire Defect.

The Plaintiffs argue that had they known about the Fire Defect,
they would not have purchased or leased the Class Vehicles (or
would have paid substantially less for them due to the increased
fire risk). Accordingly, this action arises out of the Defendant's
allegedly defective design, manufacture, and warranting of the
Class Vehicles, as well as their allegedly misleading promotion of
the Class Vehicles' purported safety and dependability.

Plaintiff Gujral, a Connecticut resident, purchased his Class
Vehicle in September or October of 2013, purportedly relying on
Defendant's promotion of the vehicle's high quality and outstanding
safety record. The Defendant allegedly did not disclose the Fire
Defect to Gujral prior to his purchase, nor did Gujral receive a
recall notice for his purportedly defective battery cable. On April
12, 2017, one week after his warranty expired, Gujral's Class
Vehicle allegedly suffered a catastrophic fire.

Plaintiff Emerson, a North Carolina resident, allegedly purchased
her certified pre-owned Class Vehicle in February 2015, relying on
Defendant's advertisements regarding the safety, reliability, and
high performance of its cars. Five months later, Emerson's vehicle
allegedly experienced a catastrophic fire as a result of a "thermal
event." Emerson claims that she never received a recall notice for
her vehicle, although she learned after the incident that other BMW
models had been recalled for battery cable defects resulting in
unexpected fires.

The Plaintiffs aver that the Defendant had knowledge of the Fire
Defect as early as 2006, yet repeatedly declined to include the
Class Vehicles in any of its prior recalls despite purportedly
near-identical defects.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Nov. 21, 2019, primarily
asserting that Defendant breached warranties, defrauded consumers
by failing to disclose the Fire Defect, and misleading the
Plaintiffs as to the safety of their Class Vehicles. The Complaint
alleges: violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A.
Section 56:8-2, et seq. ("NJCFA") (Counts 1 and 2); breaches of
express warranty (Counts 3, 7); breaches of implied warranty
(Counts 4, 8, 9); breach of written warranty under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 ("MMWA") (Count
5); violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.
Gen. Stat. Section 42-110b(a) ("CUTPA") (Count 6); violation of the
North Carolina Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. Section 75-1.1, et seq. ("NCUDTPA") (Count 10); and unjust
enrichment (Count 11).

On Jan. 24, 2020, the Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's putative class-action complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). The Plaintiffs filed an opposition on Feb. 10, 2020, to
which the Defendant replied on March 13, 2020.

The Defendants first move to dismiss on grounds that the Court
should defer to the primary jurisdiction of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), a government agency with
federal authority to investigate and remediate motor-vehicle safety
defects. Judge Cecchi opines that given the seemingly ongoing
status of the NHTSA's recall process, the NHTSA does not have a
mechanism by which the Plaintiff could be awarded damages.
Accordingly, she declines to invoke the primary jurisdiction
doctrine and will not refer this matter to the NHTSA.

Judge Cecchi need not decide whether New Jersey consumer fraud law
applies to the Plaintiffs or a proposed nationwide class at the
motion to dismiss stage. While New Jersey's choice of law
principles apply since federal courts with diversity jurisdiction
must apply the choice of law principles of the forum state, she
need not address the choice of law arguments at this juncture.
Applying the factors necessary to determine choice of la is a very
fact-intensive inquiry. She requires a more developed factual
record to make a choice of law conclusion, and thus declines to
determine whether the Plaintiffs or a nationwide class can pursue
claims under the NJCFA.

Similarly, the Defendant's motion to strike class certification is
premature, Judge Cecchi finds. Courts throughout the Third Circuit
have routinely declined to hear premature arguments regarding class
certification in similar circumstances. Accordingly, because the
issue of whether the Plaintiffs can satisfy the class certification
requirements is a fact-intensive question, she declines to strike
the Plaintiffs' allegations.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' breach of express
warranty claims must fail because the warranties at issue cover
only manufacturing defects and do not extend to the type of design
defect alleged in their Complaint. In opposition, the Plaintiffs
contend that they have sufficiently alleged potential manufacturing
defects covered by the applicable warranties.

At present, construing the claims in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiffs, Judge Cecchi refuses to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
claims for breach of express warranty for failure to plead a valid
manufacturing defect. The Plaintiffs have also adequately pleaded
that the Defendant knew about the Fire Defect as early as 2006 and
misleadingly concealed the defect from them. Accordingly, Judge
Cecchi does not dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of
express warranty.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant breached its implied
warranty by concealing knowledge of the Fire Defect and continuing
to sell and service the Class Vehicles to consumers in an allegedly
unmerchantable condition. Both Gujral and Emerson specifically
assert that their Class Vehicles unexpectedly suffered a
"catastrophic fire."

Judge Cecchi holds that the Plaintiffs' allegations effectively
give rise to a plausible inference that the Fire Defect poses a
safety risk sufficient to violate an implied warranty. Moreover,
whether the Fire Defect "posed enough of a safety risk to actually
hamper the Class Vehicles' ability to provide safe, reliable
transportation is ultimately a question of fact to be resolved at
summary judgment or by a jury." Accordingly, the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the breach of implied warranty claims is denied.

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant breached express
warranties in violation of the MMWA, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 et seq.
The MMWA creates a federal cause of action for state law express
and implied warranty claims. Here, Plaintiffs base their MMWA
claims on the underlying state law claims for breach of express
warranty. As she has determined the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs'
express warranty claims at the pleading stage, Judge Cecchi opines
that dismissal of this MMWA claim is not warranted.

The Defendant argues Gujral's CUTPA claim is time-barred under the
CUTPA's three-year statute of limitations period, which it asserts
began running when the vehicle was sold in 2013. The Plaintiffs,
however, allege that Connecticut courts recognize the continuing
violation doctrine, which functions to toll the CUTPA's three-year
statute of limitations in situations in which a plaintiff alleges a
"continuing course" of deceptive conduct by the Defendant.

Because the Plaintiffs' Complaint sufficiently alleges that the
statute of limitations may be tolled under the continuing violation
doctrine, Judge Cecchi concludes that it is premature to decide
whether the CUTPA claim is time-barred on this motion to dismiss.

The Defendant argues Emerson's claim is time-barred under the
NCUDTPA's four-year statute of limitations, which it asserts began
to accrue when Emerson purchased her vehicle in February 2015.
Judge Cecchi agrees with the Plaintiffs, however, in holding that
it is premature to dismiss Emerson's claim because the Complaint
sufficiently alleges that the limitations period may be tolled.
Construing the factual allegations supporting tolling in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs, she will not dismiss Emerson's
complaint as time-barred.

Lastly, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claims should be dismissed for lack of privity under New Jersey
law, and for inability to plead unjust enrichment when a valid
contract exists under Connecticut and North Carolina laws. Its
arguments are without merit, Judge Cecchi opines. Courts in this
District have held that a manufacturer that advertises its products
directly to consumers, as alleged, may be liable for unjust
enrichment even if the consumer purchases the product from an
intermediate retailer. Furthermore, Courts in Connecticut and North
Carolina have recognized that at the motion to dismiss stage,
unjust enrichment may be pleaded in the alternative, as it is in
the present case, even where a valid contract exists. The
Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the Defendant benefited
financially from its alleged breach of warranty,
misrepresentations, and fraud. Thus, they have adequately pleaded
an unjust enrichment claim.

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's
motion to dismiss. An appropriate Order accompanies her Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2kbnkty9 from Leagle.com.


BOEING CO: Bid to Dismiss Aircraft Securities Suit Granted in Part
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE THE BOEING COMPANY AIRCRAFT SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Case No. 19-cv-02394 (N.D. Ill.), Judge John J. Tharp,
Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, grants in part and denies in part the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi (MPERS), as
lead plaintiff, brings securities fraud claims on behalf of a
putative class of shareholders against Boeing, its former CEO
Dennis Muilenburg, and its former CFO Gregory Smith. The Plaintiffs
contend that Boeing made misleading statements as it responded to
the October 2018 and March 2019 crashes of two 737 MAX airplanes
designed and manufactured by Boeing.

Boeing launched the 737 MAX program in August 2011 in response to
competition from Airbus's A320neo. The threat from Airbus prompted
Boeing to scuttle plans to develop an entirely new airplane,
deciding instead to improve upon its existing 737 model by adding
new engines that would vastly improve fuel efficiency.

To approve the airplane for commercial use, Boeing's safety
regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), would have to
make two distinct determinations, each of which is made by a
separate group within the FAA. One group (otherwise unidentified in
the complaint) determines whether airplanes meet federal
airworthiness standards; another, known as the Aircraft Evaluation
Group (FAA AEG) determines the minimum level of pilot training
required. The FAA AEG compares the new version of an aircraft with
the old and evaluates the differences between the two. Then the
office mandates the level of "differences training" required for
pilots to operate the new version of the plane. The FAA AEG can
assign one of five different levels of training, ranging from Level
A, the least intensive, to Level E, the most intensive. The FAA AEG
publishes its recommendation for the appropriate training level in
the Flight Standardization Board Report (FSB report). Among
Boeing's goals in designing the 737 MAX was ensuring that it
received a Level B, computer-training-only, designation in that
report.

But Boeing's plan for a seamless transition to the 737 MAX with
minimal pilot training encountered turbulence early in the
airplane's development. In 2012, it tests showed that the new
fuel-efficient engines, which were much larger than the engines
used on the older 737 models, created additional lift and a
tendency for the airplane to pitch up abnormally in flight. Rather
than redesign the entire airplane to address this problem, Boeing
decided to make changes to the aircraft's automated flight control
systems by adding a new software component, the Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).

MCAS was designed to automatically swivel the horizontal stabilizer
on the aircraft's tail if the plane's nose pitched too far upward,
leveling the plane and preventing a potential stall. MCAS was
activated by a signal from an angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor. There
were two such sensors on the MAX, but MCAS drew data from only one
of them, creating a situation in which a single malfunctioning
sensor could erroneously trigger MCAS into trying to pitch the nose
of the aircraft down when no correction was actually needed. By
creating this "single point of failure," the complaint alleges,
Boeing violated fundamental engineering standards and its own
safety design criteria.

In 2014, Boeing Chief Test Pilot Ray Craig and engineer Curtis
Ewbank recognized the risk that a faulty angle-of attack sensor
could cause MCAS to activate when its operation was neither
necessary nor desirable. Senior Boeing executives, including
then-737 MAX program director Michael Teal, rejected a proposed
remedial measure because it might increase the pilot training
requirements for the MAX. Furthermore, the complaint alleges,
Boeing played fast and loose with a Hazard Analysis of MCAS that
was required for certification of the new design, downplaying the
risk posed by MCAS by making "unwarranted assumptions" that pilots
would be able to recognize and respond to an MCAS failure within a
matter of seconds.

Boeing Chief Technical Pilot Mark Forkner led a team of Technical
Pilots responsible for interfacing with FAA AEG. A series of 2016
messages between Forkner and a technical pilot on his team, Patrick
Gustavsson, as well as other internal messages, show Boeing
employees grappling with the implications of MCAS and its effect on
FAA AEG's assessment of the additional training required to safely
fly the MAX. FAA AEG issued a provisional Level B
differences-training determination for the 737 MAX on Aug. 16,
2016.

Boeing later changed MCAS' parameters so that it could activate
between Mach 0.2 and Mach 0.8, encompassing "nearly the entire
speed range for the 737 MAX." Instead of updating FAA AEG regarding
these changes, however, Forkner concealed MCAS's expanded
activation parameters and its aberrant behavior in the flight
simulator. He succeeded, in his words, by "jedi-mind tricking
regulators" that simulator training was not necessary. MCAS was not
mentioned in the FSB report; this omission ensured that it was not
mentioned in the flight manual, and pilots were unaware of its
existence. As a result, the training materials provided to pilots
were "materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete."

Because of this deception, the Plaintiffs allege, Boeing secured
its desired Level B training designation for the 737 MAX, which
meant that pilots would not require expensive simulator training.

On Oct. 29, 2018, Lion Air flight JT 610 crashed shortly after
takeoff from Jakarta, killing all 189 people aboard. Boeing quickly
convened a group of experts who concluded that "MCAS activation
could have been a scenario" that led to the crash. As data from
various sources revealed, a single faulty angle of attack sensor on
the Lion Air airplane fed erroneous data to MCAS, causing the
software to activate over 20 times and pitch the plane downward as
the pilots struggled to maintain control. Boeing quickly met with
the FAA to explain the details of MCAS.

The Plaintiffs allege that, among other problems, the Lion Air
pilots were deprived of critical information because their 737 MAX
did not have a working AOA Disagree Alert. Had they been installed
on every MAX, the AoA Disagree Alerts might have warned pilots
about a malfunctioning AoA sensor before takeoff, allowing for
crews to address the problem before flight.

On Nov. 6, 2018, Boeing issued a bulletin to pilots informing them
of a problem with the MAX's "pitch trim system" in which erroneous
data from an AoA sensor could cause repeated "nose down stabilizer
trim movement." The bulletin directed pilots to an "existing
procedure" for responding to an errant flight control system. The
Plaintiffs allege that because of the differences between MCAS and
older pitch-trim systems, this procedure could not reliably counter
an MCAS malfunction.

In an Emergency Airworthiness Directive issued the following day,
the FAA warned that this problem presented an "unsafe condition"
that was "likely to exist or develop in other products of the same
type design." It further directed pilots to use the Runaway
Stabilizer Non-Normal Checklist, consistent with Boeing's bulletin
issued the day before, in the event of a MCAS malfunction.

Boeing began working on a software fix for the 737 MAX and, in the
months before the second MAX crash, continually struck a confident
tone in press releases, interviews, and other public communications
as to the aircraft's fundamental safety and its "superior value
proposition" to customers and investors. Sometime in February 2019,
Muilenburg learned about the text messages and emails written by
Forkner and other employees between 2016 and 2017 regarding the
expanded operation of the MCAS system and efforts to "jedi-mind
trick" regulators.

On March 10, 2019, another 737 MAX, operated by Ethiopian Airlines,
crashed soon after takeoff from Addis Ababa, killing everyone on
board. By March 13, the FAA and other regulators around the globe
had grounded the airplane. In the weeks following the Ethiopian
Airlines disaster, the Defendants continued to affirm their
confidence in the aircraft's fundamental safety and in the
integrity of the FAA approval process and represented that Boeing
could quickly overcome the grounding order and return the MAX to
operation.

At the Paris Airshow in June 2019, Boeing CEO Muilenburg met with
then-Acting FAA Director Daniel Elwell, who told Muilenburg to
"slow down" his talk of a quick return to service for the MAX so
that the FAA could have "space to exercise scrutiny." He continued
to represent to investors that he anticipated the MAX would soon be
recertified and back in flight.

In October 2019, the Forkner messages were released to the public.
The messages angered the FAA, which only then learned that Boeing
had actively worked to remove mention of MCAS from the flight
manual. The FAA Administrator also publicly expressed his
frustration that the messages had been concealed from the FAA until
their public release.

In response to Muilenburg's further predictions of a speedy
recertification, FAA Administrator Dickson held a private meeting
with Muilenburg on Dec. 12, 2019, rebuking him for pressuring the
agency to move more quickly. The same day, Dickson sent a note to
Congress asserting that "some of Boeing's statements have been
designed to force the FAA into taking quicker action." On December
16, Boeing announced a production halt for the 737 MAX. Boeing's
Board fired Muilenburg as CEO on Dec. 22, 2019, and appointed
defendant Gregory Smith as interim CEO. David Calhoun became
Boeing's CEO in January 2020.

Richard Seeks filed the action on April 19, 2019. A related action,
Bush v. Boeing, 19-cv-03548, was consolidated with this one on June
21, 2019. Five plaintiffs' groups vied for appointment as lead
plaintiff, and on Nov. 15, 2019, the Court appointed the Public
Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi (MPERS) as lead
plaintiff. On Feb. 14, 2020, MPERS filed its consolidated class
action complaint. The Defendants then moved to dismiss that
complaint.

The Plaintiffs claim that 49 statements made by the Defendants
during the putative class period were fraudulent; the Defendants
maintain that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege with requisite
particularity that any of those statements are false or misleading,
or that they were made with scienter.

In Judge Tharp's view, the Plaintiffs have alleged two events that
can support a strong inference of scienter as to certain false
statements by Muilenburg (and therefore to Boeing): Muilenburg's
receipt of the Forkner messages in February 2019, and his
conversations with various leaders of the FAA in the latter half of
2019. By contrast, they have not adequately pleaded that any of the
allegedly false or misleading statements made before these events
were made with an intent to deceive. As for Smith, there are no
particularized allegations regarding any deceptive intent on his
part, so he is dismissed from the suit. While it may be plausible
to infer that a CEO would keep the CFO apprised of important
developments in a brewing crisis, the PSLRA does not permit
scienter to be imputed among individual defendants.

Judge Tharp first addresses the Defendants' statements from the
early part of the class period, from November and December 2018.
Some of these statements were inaccurate, but they all nevertheless
fall short of stating a claim for securities fraud because the
plaintiffs did not adequately allege they were made with scienter.
Second, he considers statements made from January to February 2019
regarding Boeing's financial and operational performance. These
statements are either not false (insofar as they merely report the
company's performance) or they are predictions that fall within the
PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements. Next, Judge Tharp
addresses Boeing's assurances to the public in the wake of the
Ethiopian Airlines crash and the grounding order that soon
followed. Given Muilenburg's knowledge of the Forkner messages and
their content, he says, several of these statements have been
adequately pled as securities fraud claims. Finally, he weighs the
allegations that Boeing misled investors regarding the 737 MAX's
return to service and finds most of those statements actionable.

In broad terms, Judge Tharp finds that the Plaintiffs have not
alleged that the Defendants intended to deceive investors with
their statements responding to the October 2018 Lion Air crash.
Those claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice. Nor have
the Plaintiffs advanced any plausible allegations that Smith
knowingly or recklessly misled investors; he is accordingly
dismissed from the suit (also without prejudice). The Plaintiffs
have, however, plausibly alleged that Muilenburg (and therefore
Boeing) made several materially misleading statements following the
Ethiopian Airlines crash in March 2019. Specifically, their claims
that Muilenburg misrepresented and omitted material information
regarding Boeing's interactions with the FAA adequately state
claims for securities fraud.

For these reasons, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted in
part and denied in part. The Plaintiffs may elect to proceed on
their 10(b)(5) claims against Boeing and Muilenburg as to
statements 22, 23, 24, 28, 34, 39, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48.
Alternatively, they are granted leave to file an amended complaint
by Oct. 10, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc99rct3 from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook Testimony From Moore B3 Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, APRIL MOORE v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET
AL., Civil Action No. 17-4456 (E.D. La.), Judge Sarah S. Vance of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
grants the motion to exclude the testimony of the Plaintiff's
general causation expert, Dr. Jerald Cook, and motions for summary
judgment filed by BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America
Production Co., and BP p.l.c.

The case arises from the Plaintiff's alleged exposure to toxic
chemicals following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico. She alleges that she performed cleanup work after the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill beginning in May of 2010. She asserts
that, as part of this work, she was exposed to crude oil or
dispersants. She also represents that this exposure has resulted in
the following conditions: headache, nausea, abdominal cramps,
vomiting, diarrhea, loss of appetite, mild inflammatory changes of
the paranasal sinuses, cough, dizziness, memory loss, fatigue,
itching, and rashes.

The Plaintiff's case was originally part of the multidistrict
litigation ("MDL") pending before Judge Carl J. Barbier. Her case
was severed from the MDL as one of the "B3" cases for plaintiffs
who either opted out of, or were excluded from, the Deepwater
Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement. Moore
is a plaintiff who opted out of the settlement. After her case was
severed, it was reallocated to the Court. She asserts claims for
general maritime negligence, negligence per se, and gross
negligence against the Defendants as a result of the oil spill and
its cleanup.

To demonstrate that exposure to crude oil, weathered oil, and
dispersants can cause the symptoms the Plaintiff allegedly
experiences, she offers the testimony of Dr. Jerald Cook, an
occupational and environmental physician. Dr. Cook is her sole
expert offering an opinion on general causation.

In his June 21, 2022 report, Dr. Cook utilizes a "general causation
approach to determine if some of the frequently reported health
complaints are indeed from the result of exposures sustained in
performing oil spill cleanup work." He concludes that "general
causation analysis indicates" that the following conditions, among
others, "can occur in individuals exposed to crude oil, including
weathered crude oil": rhinosinusitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, bronchitis, asthma, dermatitis, conjunctivitis, and dry
eye disease.

The BP parties contend that Dr. Cook's expert report should be
excluded on the grounds that that it is unreliable and unhelpful.
The Defendants also move for summary judgment, asserting that if
Dr. Cook's general causation opinion is excluded, the Plaintiff is
unable to carry her burden on causation. The Plaintiff opposes both
motions.

At issue here is whether the Plaintiff has produced admissible
general causation evidence.

Judge Vance finds that Dr. Cook's opinion is unhelpful because of
his inability to link any specific chemical that Moore was
allegedly exposed to, at the level at which she was exposed, to the
conditions that she allegedly experiences. Specifically, hi
conclusion that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between
the respiratory, ocular, and dermal conditions he analyzed and
"exposure to crude oil, including weathered crude oil," is
unhelpful without identifying the specific chemicals and exposure
levels capable of causing specific conditions alleged by the
Plaintiff.

In sum, Judge Vance holds that the Plaintiff, as the party offering
the testimony of Dr. Cook, has failed to meet her burden of
establishing the reliability and relevance of Dr. Cook's report.
Given that Dr. Cook's report is unreliable and fails to provide the
"minimal facts necessary" to establish general causation in the
case, she grants the Defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Cook's
testimony.

Because she excludes Dr. Cook's opinion on general causation, and
the Plaintiff has produced no other admissible general causation
evidence, Judge Vance need not reach the question of specific
causation. Given that the Plaintiff cannot prove a necessary
element of her claims against the Defendants, her claims must be
dismissed. Accordingly, Judge Vance grants the Defendants' motion
for summary judgment and dismisses the Plaintiff's claims with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2ju7jt9k from Leagle.com.


BUFFALO WILD WINGS: Pittman Suit Removed to D. Maryland
-------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Divane Pittman, on her own behalf and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Buffalo Wild Wings
International, Inc.. Inspire Brands, Inc., Case No. 22STCV24110 was
removed from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland on Aug. 26, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-02173-SAG to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Buffalo Wild Wings -- https://www.buffalowildwings.com/ -- is an
American casual dining restaurant and sports bar franchise.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendant is represented by:

          Ellen Elizabeth Dew, Esq.
          DLA PIPER LLP (US)
          6225 Smith Ave.
          Baltimore, MD 21209
          Phone: (410) 580-4127
          Fax: (410) 580-3127
          Email: ellen.dew@dlapiper.com


CALIFORNIA: Dismissal of Claims in Martinez v. Newsom Partly Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Danielle Howard Martinez; D. P., a minor, by his
Guardian ad Litem Erica Wedlow; K. P., a minor, by his Guardian ad
Litem Brittany Williams; T. W., a minor by his Guardian ad Litem
Dahl Johnson; P. C., a minor by her Guardian ad Litem Raven
Campbell; LASHONDA HUBBARD; AMBER WOOD, Plaintiffs-Appellants v.
GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
20-56404 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirms in part and vacates in part the order of the
district court dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims against all the
Defendants for failure to exhaust, denying the Plaintiffs leave to
amend, and dismissing the case.

A group of students and parents allege that every school district
in California failed to adequately accommodate special needs
students after California public schools transitioned to remote
instruction in March 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Plaintiffs are four students enrolled in the Etiwanda and
Chaffey Joint Union High School Districts as well as their parents.
They allege that when California public schools transitioned to
remote instruction in March 2020, every school district in the
state failed to determine "what changes needed to be made to
special needs students' individualized education programs ('IEP')
to account for the differences in distance learning compared to
in-person instruction." They allege that their IEPs were not
updated to account for remote instruction, they were not offered
sufficient accommodations after the transition, and they were
denied a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) during the
time they were receiving remote instruction.

The Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit on behalf of
"all special needs students and their parents in California." They
sued hundreds of defendants, including, but not limited to: (1) the
California Department of Education (CDE); (2) California
Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond; (3) every
school district in the state of California; and (4) the California
School for the Deaf, the California School for the Blind, and the
Diagnostic Centers of California (the State Special Schools).

Their claims against the school districts are straightforward: they
allege that the districts failed to adequately accommodate special
needs students after the transition to remote instruction, thereby
denying them—and every other special needs student in the state
-- a FAPE. Their claims against the CDE and Superintendent Thurmond
are more complicated. During the transition to remote instruction,
the CDE issued guidance that encouraged the school districts to
"work with each family to determine what a FAPE looks like  during
COVID-19," "ensure children with disabilities are included in all
offerings of school education models by using the IEP process," and
"use the annual IEP to plan for a traditional school year and while
not required, it is suggested LEAs include distance learning plans
or addendums to address distance learning needs during immediate or
future school site closures."

The Plaintiffs allege that because this guidance "encouraged, but
did not require, the state's school districts" to take these
measures, the CDE and Superintendent Thurmond either dissuaded or
prohibited school districts from updating special needs students'
IEPs and from offering adequate accommodations. At oral argument,
they characterized this guidance as "a policy of inaction" and "a
blanket decision not to act."

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et
seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment, and seek declaratory and
injunctive relief. Specifically, they request (1) a declaration
that Defendants violated the IDEA, (2) an injunction requiring them
"to immediately reassess special needs students assigned to engage
in distance learning" or return them to in-person instruction, and
(3) an injunction ordering them to provide special needs students
with various educational services "until such time as appropriate
accommodations are made or they are returned to in-person
instruction." They also request "compensatory education" from the
school districts to make up "for special needs students' loss of a
basic minimum education."

After some Defendants moved to dismiss, the district court
dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against all the Defendants for
failure to exhaust, denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend, and
dismissed the case. The Plaintiffs timely appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo whether the IDEA requires
exhaustion in these circumstances. To address the Appellants'
claims, the Ninth Circuit examines whether the Plaintiffs were
required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to IDEA before
filing their lawsuit. It holds that exhaustion was required.

Initially, the Ninth Circuit opines that the Plaintiffs do not
allege that the districts in which they are not enrolled or the
State Special Schools, which they do not attend, have injured them
personally. Therefore, they lack standing to sue those defendants
in federal court. Their claims against the State Special Schools
and the school districts in which they are not enrolled do not fall
within the juridical link doctrine, and the Plaintiffs lack
standing to pursue their claims against these Defendants in federal
court even if the juridical link doctrine were to exempt them from
ordinary principles of Article III standing.

The Ninth Circuit now addresses whether any of the Plaintiffs'
claims are moot. The Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in August 2020,
when most California public schools were holding classes remotely
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, the California public
schools have returned to in-person instruction. Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit next addresses how the return to in-person
instruction affects the Plaintiffs' claims.

The Ninth Circuit agrees that the Plaintiffs' request for
compensatory education means that some of their claims are not
moot. If they were to prevail on the claims for which they
requested compensatory education, the district court could award
this relief despite the return to in-person instruction. But the
Plaintiffs requested compensatory education only from the school
districts. They did not request compensatory education from the CDE
and Superintendent Thurmond. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit next
considers whether the Plaintiffs' claims against the CDE and
Superintendent Thurmond are moot.

The Ninth Circuit holds that the Plaintiffs' claims against the CDE
and Superintendent Thurmond are moot, as are the Plaintiffs' claims
against the other defendants seeking injunctions requiring a return
to in-person instruction or reassessment and services until
students return to in-person instruction. Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs' claims against the school districts in which they are
enrolled seeking compensatory education, a declaratory judgment,
and attorneys' fees and costs survive.

The Ninth Circuit now turns to the Plaintiffs' only remaining
claims: Those against the Etiwanda and Chaffey Joint Union High
School Districts. The Plaintiffs admit in their complaint that they
did not exhaust this administrative process before filing the
lawsuit. They argue that they were not required to do so because
their claims fall within an exception to the exhaustion
requirement. We have held that IDEA plaintiffs are not required to
exhaust administrative remedies in three circumstances: (1) when
they seek systemic or structural relief, (2) when "it is improbable
that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative
remedies (e.g., the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant
the relief sought)," and (3) when exhaustion would be futile. They
argue that all three exceptions apply.

The Ninth Circuit opines that that to conclude that to fall within
the systemic exception, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, identify an
"agency decision, regulation, or other binding policy" that caused
his or her injury. Because the Plaintiffs do not satisfy this
requirement, their claims do not fall within the systemic
exception. Their attempts to reframe this claim as a policy or
practice of not complying with the IDEA does not allow them to
evade the exhaustion requirement.

Next, because the Plaintiffs seek relief for the denial of a FAPE,
they are required to exhaust administrative remedies, even though
some of their claims are based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The
mere fact the complaint is structured as a class action seeking
injunctive relief, without more, does not excuse exhaustion. The
Plaintiffs' fears about 800,000 students overwhelming the
administrative process are unfounded because unnamed class members
need not exhaust.

As to the Plaintiffs' argument that they are not required to
exhaust because one of the named plaintiffs is entitled to services
from the Etiwanda School District pursuant to a settlement
agreement, and the plaintiffs seeking to enforce IDEA settlement
agreements are not required to exhaust because these claims are
simply breach of contract claims, the Ninth Circuit opines that it
need not address this issue because the Plaintiffs did not include
a claim for a breach of this settlement agreement in their
complaint. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs did not assert a claim based
on an alleged breach of a settlement agreement, and the Ninth
Circuit declines to issue an advisory opinion regarding whether
such a claim must be exhausted.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to resolve the Plaintiffs' claims against the school
districts in which they are not enrolled and the State Special
Schools, which they do not attend. It therefore vacates the
district court's judgment dismissing those claims on the merits and
remand with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Further, in light of the California public schools'
return to in-person instruction, the Plaintiffs' claims against the
CDE and Superintendent Thurmond are moot. The Ninth Circuit
therefore vacates the district court's judgment and remands with
instructions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against those
defendants. Finally, it affirms the district court's dismissal of
the Plaintiffs' claims against the Etiwanda and Chaffey Joint Union
High School Districts for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

The other Defendants-Appellees are STATE OF CALIFORNIA; CALIFORNIA
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH;
CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; SANDRA SHEWRY, State Public
Health Officer and Department of Public Health Director; CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; TONY THURMOND, State Superintendent of
Public Education; CALIFORNIA SCHOOL THE DEAF, Fremont and
Riverside; CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FOR THE BLIND DIAGNOSTIC CENTER,
Northern California, Central California Southern California;
FREMONT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
MT. DIABLO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN RAMON VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; CUPERTINO
UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT; HAYWARD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; JUAN
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SBE LATITUDE 37.8 HIGH SCHOOL; LONG BEACH
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SANTA ANA UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; RIVERSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; CHAFFEY JOINT UNION
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT; MILPITAS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; GARDEN
GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; IRVINE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
CORONA-NORCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; MORENO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; ETIWANDA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN BERNARDINO CITY
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
and SBC-HIGH TECH HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2v9fed9m from Leagle.com.

Maxwell V. Pritt -- mpritt@bsfllp.com -- (argued) and Erica
Nyborg-Burch -- enyborg-burch@bsfllp.com --  (argued), Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP, San Francisco, California; Diana Renteria ,
Law Offices of Sheila C. Bayne, Newport Beach, California, for the
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Len Garfinkel (argued), Deputy General Counsel; Amy Bisson
Holloway, General Counsel; California Department of Education,
Sacramento, California; for Defendants-Appellees California
Department of Education, Tony Thurmond, California School for the
Deaf, and California School for the Blind Diagnostic Center. S.
Daniel Harbottle (argued), Sydney J. Blaauw, and Tracy Petznick
Johnson, Harbottle Law Group, Irvine, California, for
Defendants-Appellees Corona-Norco Unified School District, Garden
Grove Unified School District, Irvine Unified School District, and
Moreno Valley Unified School District.

Marlon C. Wadlington -- mwadlington@aalrr.com -- (argued), Scott D.
Danforth -- sdanforth@aalrr.com -- and Kristin M. Meyers --
kmyers@aalrr.com -- Atkinson Andelson Loya Ruud & Roma, Cerritos,
California, for Defendants-Appellees Chaffey Joint Union High
School District, Capistrano Unified School District, Long Beach
Unified School District, Riverside Unified School District, Santa
Ana Unified School District, South Pasadena Unified School
District, and Milpitas Unified School District.

Kirin K. Gill, Deputy Attorney General, Rob Bonta, Attorney
General; Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California;
for Defendants-Appellees Gavin Newsom, State of California,
California State Board of Education, California Department of
Public Health, California Health and Human Services, and Sandra
Shewry.

Seth Gordon -- sgordon@leonealberts.com -- and Louis Leone --
lleone@leonealberts.com --  Leone Alberts & Duus APC, Concord,
California, for Defendants-Appellants Fremont Unified School
District, Oakland Unified School District, Mt. Diablo Unified
School District, San Ramon Valley Unified School District, West
Contra Costa Unified School District, and Cupertino Union School
District.

Lynn A. Garcia and Domenic D. Spinelli, Spinelli Donald & Nott,
Sacramento, California, for Defendants-Appellees Hayward Unified
School District and San Juan Unified School District.

Katherine C. Den Bleyker --
iconKatherine.DenBleyker@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Los Angeles, California, for SBE Latitude
37.8 High School.

Edward Kang and Thomas Madruga -- tmadruga@omlolaw.com -- Olivarez
Madruga Law Organization LLP, Los Angeles, California, for
Defendants-Appellees Etiwanda Elementary School District and San
Bernardino City Unified School District.

Mark Saul Posard -- mposard@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees LLP, San
Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellee San Francisco Unified
School District.

Sue Ann Evans -- sevans@DWKesq.com -- Managing Senior Counsel,
Dannis Woliver Kelley, Long Beach, California, for
Defendants-Appellees Los Angeles Unified School District and San
Jose Unified School District

Kevin S. Wattles --  kwattles@slfesq.com -- Soltman Levitt Flaherty
& Wattles LLP, Thousand Oaks, California, for Defendant-Appellee
SBC — High Tech High School District.


CANADA: Hackers Stole CERB Benefits, Alleges Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Stefan Labbe at delta-optimist.com reports that a class action
against the Canadian government for alleged negligence in the
hacking of thousands of Canadians' financial information will
proceed after a federal court certified the lawsuit.

Todd Sweet, a retired police officer living in Creston, B.C., took
the Government of Canada to court as a representative plaintiff in
the class action after hackers are said to have changed the direct
deposit information of at least 12,700 Canadians. The suit claims
hackers redirected pandemic relief payments to third-party bank
accounts.

Sweet alleges that in the summer of 2020, he logged on to his
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) online account to discover an
unauthorized individual had applied for the Canada Emergency
Response Benefit (CERB) -- the federal government's flagship
pandemic financial assistance program to help out of work Canadians
through the COVID-19 pandemic.

The class action states Sweet is one of likely thousands of
Canadians who were vulnerable to hackers from June to August 2020.


The failure, alleges the judge-certified court filing, stems from a
Government of Canada Branded Credential Service Key, or GCKey.

Built by 2Keys Corporation, the GCKey controls access to 100
enabled services across 30 government departments, including Parks
Canada, the RCMP, and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada.

The CRA -- which is named in the case with Employment and Social
Development Canada -- does not use GCKey and relies on another
two-step authentication process.

But by using the My Service Canada Accounts as a back door to a
user's online CRA account, hackers could avoid answering security
questions in what's known as a "credential stuffing attack,"
alleges the class action.

Justice Richard F. Southcott, who certified the class action
lawsuit, noted in his ruling that such tactics often make use of
stolen credentials sold on the Dark Web and are carried out by bot
systems automatically filling in log-in details on multiple
accounts at once.

Once a hacker was inside the CRA account, the plaintiffs say they
were able to steal a person's identity and apply for CERB
benefits.

Southcott said the CRA became aware of several such attacks in the
summer of 2020 after it was tipped off by law enforcement that
noticed the Dark Web sales. By Aug. 5, 2020, 2Keys told the
government it had determined several login anomalies were a
large-scale attack on the GCKey service.

The tax agency fixed the security flaw around Aug. 10, 2020, but
not before at least 48,110 My Accounts were accessed by a "threat
actor." Of those, the hackers changed the taxpayers' direct deposit
banking details and applied for CERB benefits.

The hackers are alleged to have gained access to "Social Insurance
Numbers, direct deposit banking information, tax information, dates
of birth, records of employment, information regarding employment
insurance, and other benefits information," states the lawsuit.

On the way to having the class action lawsuit certified, Murphy
Battista LLP suffered its own data breach, potentially comprising
their clients' information a second time.

Sixteen months later, Vancouver attorney Rice Harbut Elliott LLP
took on the case, and the class action was eventually certified in
a Vancouver federal court.

In court documents, Sweet claims he and other members of the class
action have:

had money withdrawn from their bank accounts;
had loans applied for in their names;
faced credit card fraud;
had their credit reputation damaged;
not been able to access benefits they were entitled to;
faced out-of-pocket expenses;
and suffered mental distress as they communicated with credit and
federal agencies to address the data breaches.
In certifying the class action, Justice Southcott assessed the
admissibility of a body of evidence, including expert reports and
several news stories about taxpayers dealing with CERB fraud.

The class action claims the federal government of systematic
negligence and breach of confidence, among other failings.

It states that the online application for pandemic relief programs
-- while "an admiral goal," according to Sweet -- was "implemented
hastily and recklessly without taking necessary precautions" and
that the government "ought to have known that its databases and
online systems were vulnerable to unauthorized breaches."

Having certified the class action, the defendants' next step is to
sign up more of the thousands of potential members to the suit.

Southcott ruled that anyone with a Canadian government Online
Account who had their financial information disclosed to a third
party between March 1 and Dec. 1, 2020, may join the suit.

The justice excluded all the people who contacted the original law
firm from joining in the upcoming litigation. [GN]

CARECORE HEALTH: Gudger Sues Over Failure to Properly Pay OT Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
TRE'ANYA GUDGER, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CARECORE HEALTH LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:22-cv-00239-MJN-CHG (S.D. Ohio, August 22, 2022) brings this
collective and class action complaint against the Defendant for its
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio
Prompt Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant as an hourly-paid and
non-exempt employee in the medical records department from
approximately February 2022 to August 2022.

The Plaintiff claims that she and other similarly situated
employees were schedule by the Defendant to work more than 40 hours
in one or more workweek. However, the Defendant did not fully and
properly pay for all their overtime wages because the Defendant
required a 30-minute meal break deduction to their compensable
hours worked even though they were not able to take a full and
uninterrupted 30-minute meal break. As a result, the Plaintiff and
other similarly situated employees were denied by the Defendant of
their lawfully earned overtime compensation at the rate of one and
one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages against the
Defendant, for herself and all other similarly situated employees,
including liquidated damages, costs, disbursements, reasonable
allowances for fees of counsel and experts as well as reimbursement
of expenses, and any other relief as the Court deems just and
proper.

CareCore Health LLC provides individualized care plans and
long-term care communities, operating 8 life plan communities
throughout the State of Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          Adam C. Gedling, Esq.
          Kelsie N. Hendren, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Tel: (614) 949-1181
          Fax: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  agedling@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  khendren@mcoffmanlegal.com

CARGILL MEAT: Villa PMWA Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled JENNIFER VILLA and SUSAN DAVIDSON, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CARGILL MEAT
SOLUTIONS CORPORATION, Case No. 21101004, was removed from the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 23, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-01321-RDM to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to pay
production workers for the COVID-19 screening time and
walking/waiting time in violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage
Act.

Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation is a processor and distributor
of fresh beef, pork, turkey, and cooked and marinated meats, with
its principal place of business in Kansas. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Elizabeth A. Malloy, Esq.
         Jason A. Cabrera, Esq.
         COZEN O'CONNOR
         1650 Market Street, Suite 2800
         Philadelphia, PA 19103
         Telephone: (215) 665-4792
         E-mail: emalloy@cozen.com
                 jcabrera@cozen.com

                 - and –

         Jeremy J. Glenn, Esq.
         COZEN O'CONNOR
         123 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1800
         Chicago, IL 60606
         Telephone: (312) 474-7981
         E-mail: jglenn@cozen.com

CATALINA STRUCTURED: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Anderson TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BEVERLY ANDERSON, Plaintiff v. CATALINA STRUCTURED
FUNDING, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-197 (W.D. Mich.), Judge
Jane M. Beckering of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan, Southern Division, denies the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

Ms. Anderson filed a putative class action complaint against
Defendant Catalina, alleging that it violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section 227. The
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was referred to the
Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation (R&R), recommending that the Court denies the
motion.

The matter is presently before the Court on the Defendant's
objections to the R&R. The Plaintiff filed a response to the
objections. Having considered the parties' submissions, Judge
Beckering concludes that oral argument is unnecessary to resolve
the issues presented. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3), she has performed de novo
consideration of those portions of the R&R to which objections have
been made. She denies the objections and issues her Opinion and
Order.

At issue is whether the Defendant's calls to the Plaintiff were a
telephone solicitation within the meaning of the TCPA. More
specifically, the question is whether the Defendant called the
Plaintiff to encourage her to "purchase, rent, or invest in
Catalina's property, goods or services." After thoroughly setting
forth the factual background, legal context and existing case law,
the Magistrate Judge determined that "where the Plaintiff has
expressed no interest in selling, and the Defendant is in the
business of offering liquidity to structured settlement holders,
the Defendant may be offering to make a purchase, but it is also
marketing a service;" therefore, the Magistrate Judge concluded
that the Plaintiff stated a plausible claim under the TCPA.

According to the Defendant, the Magistrate Judge made two errors in
her analysis. First, it argues that the Magistrate Judge
erroneously distinguishes between business calls that are, and
calls that are not, prompted by the recipient's indication of
interest to sell. According to the Defendant, the Magistrate Judge
"arbitrarily" created a "bright-line rule that a call is a
telephone solicitation unless the called party first expresses
interest in selling her property."

Judge Beckering opines that the Defendant's argument lacks merit.
She says, the Magistrate Judge did not create a bright-line rule
but described decisions holding that calls made in response to
advertisements were not solicitations. The Magistrate Judge
properly analyzed whether Plaintiff stated a claim for relief under
the TCPA that is plausible on its face. While the Defendant
disagrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, its first
objection fails to demonstrate any factual or legal error by the
Magistrate Judge.

Second, the Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge erroneously
concluded that "the question of whether the payee pays the fees for
services separately from an itemized list or as part of a reduced
lump sum payment is irrelevant to the question of whether the payee
pays fees as part of the transaction." According to it, the "tasks"
it performs instead "simply amount to Catalina's cost of doing
business if Catalina wants to complete its purchase of the
structured settlement."

Again, the Defendant's objection fails to demonstrate any error by
the Magistrate Judge but merely a disagreement with her
recommendation, Judge Beckering finds. The Magistrate Judge
acknowledged both interpretations of the transaction and properly
concluded that the transaction, as viewed from Plaintiff's
perspective, states a plausible claim under the TCPA.

Accordingly, Judge Beckering adopts the Magistrate Judge's R&R as
the Opinion of the Court. To the extent the Defendant requests that
the Court also identifies which discovery will assist the Court,
the Defendant's request is misplaced. Discovery will be addressed
at a scheduling conference.

Therefore, Judge Beckering denies the Objections, and approves and
adopts the R&R as the Opinion of the Court. She denies the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for the reasons stated in the R&R.

The Defendant will, within 14 days of the date of entry of the
Opinion and Order, file its answer to the Plaintiff's First Amended
Class Action Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/z3nx95t8 from Leagle.com.


CENTRAL BUCKS: Cartee-Haring's Bid for Final Certification Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, REBECCA CARTEE-HARING v. CENTRAL BUCKS SCHOOL
DISTRICT. DAWN MARINELLO, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated female employees v. CENTRAL BUCKS SCHOOL DISTRICT, Civil
Action Nos. 20-1995, 21-2587 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Michael M. Baylson
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania:

   (i) grants Marinello's Motion for Final Certification of her
       Equal Pay Act claim to proceed as a collective action; and

  (ii) denies as moot Marinello's Motion, in the alternative, for
       conditional certification of the same claim.

Ms. Marinello, in her individual capacity and on behalf of
similarly situated female teachers, seeks final certification of
her Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 206(d)(1), claim against the
District, so she may proceed with the claim as a collective action.
Because Marinello's Equal Pay Act ("EPA") claim has yet to be
conditionally certified, she alternatively seeks conditional
certification.

Since 2000, the District has used Salary Schedules to calculate the
salaries of its full-time faculty members for each school year.
Fulltime teachers were to be paid the salary in the box located
where the "step" placement and "educational level" obtained
intersect.

Since August 2016, the District has employed Marinello as a
full-time English teacher. Before Marinello accepted the District's
offer of employment, the District informed her that the Salary
Schedules, and only the factors contained therein, dictated the
annual salaries of fulltime teachers employed by the District.

Prior to her employment with the District, Marinello had earned a
bachelor's degree, a master's degree, and maintained Instructional
I and Instructional II teaching certifications both issued by
Pennsylvania. At the time she began working for the District, she
had 14 years of prior teaching experience in Pennsylvania public
schools. Therefore, Marinello's "step" placement should have been
Step 15, as she was to begin her fifteenth year of teaching when
the 2016-2017 school year began. Placement on the Salary Schedule
at Step 15 with an educational level of a master's degree would
have yielded a $98,379 annual salary. However, Marinello alleges
the District placed her at Step 1; at Step 1 with a master's degree
Marinello was paid an annual salary of $51,157. Several witnesses,
including Amy Wittman and Rebecca Cartee-Haring, testified live at
an evidentiary hearing held on June 28, 2022 regarding the Motion.

The Plaintiff defines its putative collective class as "All women
teachers employed by the District from 2000 through the present who
have been subject to compensation under the District's applicable
Salary Schedules who were treated less favorably than male teachers
employed by the District from 2000 through the present with respect
to compensation under the applicable Salary Schedules.

The Plaintiff argues final certification of this collective is
proper because the two-step analysis courts traditionally apply to
collective certification is not actually required, and she argues
she established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a putative
class of similarly situated female teachers were also subjected to
the District's practice of underpaying female educators by
assigning them inaccurate placements on the District's Salary
Schedules.

The District counters the Plaintiff's putative class cannot be
certified, conditionally or with finality, because: (i) the
putative class of opt-in plaintiffs are subject to different
statutes of limitations dependent upon their respective dates of
employment with the District; (ii) some putative class members had
no prior working experience, so their placement at Step 1 was
accurate; (iii) the putative opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly
situated because they teach different subjects and at different
grade levels; (iv) since 2000, the District has utilized different
procedures directing its Salary Schedule placements, so the
putative opt-in plaintiffs cannot be said to have been subjected to
a "common" District policy or practice; and (v) the Plaintiff's
putative class of opt-in plaintiffs is nothing more than a
fail-safe class.

As to final certification, Judge Baylson held an evidentiary
hearing on June 28, 2022 to ascertain the similarities between the
Plaintiff's proposed plaintiffs. Eight female educators testified
at the hearing to the following: each witness was a female; each
witness was a teacher employed by the District for some period of
time between 2000 and the present; each witness earned either
greater educational credentials than what her placement on the
District's Salary Schedules reflected or possessed more years of
prior teaching experience in Pennsylvania public school districts
than her placement reflected; and each witness's inaccurate
placement on the Salary Schedule(s) resulted in her receiving an
annual salary lower than the annual salary her credentials actually
entitled her to.

The testimony given at the evidentiary record made clear that the
Plaintiff established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
several women were similarly situated to the Plaintiff in that they
were also female educators, employed by the District, who were
subjected to the same District Salary Schedules, and who all
received inaccurate placements on their respective school year's
Salary Schedule which resulted in their underpayment. When compared
to the twenty-six male educators who were also inaccurately placed
on the Salary Schedules, but whose placements yielded overpayment
not underpayment, Judge Baylson finds the Plaintiff sufficiently
established her burden such that final certification of their
putative class is proper.

The Plaintiff seeks final certification of a collective class of
female teachers employed by the District at any time between 2000
through the present. The Defendant argues this proposed collective
cannot be certified because the potential claims of most teachers
employed by the District during that 22 time span will be barred,
in whole or in part, by the EPA's two-year statute of limitations.
The Plaintiff argues the applicable statute of limitations did not
begin to run as of the date the teachers were paid unequally,
rather it began to run once Marinello and the putative class
discovered they were being compensated unequally in 2020. She
relies on doctrines of "the discovery rule" and equitable tolling
but the Defendant argues both are inapplicable.

Judge Baylson holds that the Plaintiff set forth evidence of the
District's unequal payment to female teachers beginning in 2000 and
continuing through the present. She also established the female
teachers did not know they were being compensated less than their
male counterparts before 202019, and on several occasions the
District misstated how it utilized its Salary Schedules to
calculate the female teachers' annual salaries. This pattern
constitutes a continuing violation, so "the statute of limitations
begins to run on the date of the last occurrence of discrimination,
rather than the first." Because the Plaintiff established members
of the collective continue to be compensated unequally currently,
the statute of limitations applicable to the collective will begin
to run on the date of the last unequal payment made to a female
District teacher.

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Baylson grants the Plaintiff's
Motion for Final Certification of her Equal Pay Act claim to
proceed as a collective action. He denies as moot her Motion, in
the alternative, for conditional certification of the same claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3kekt5n3 from Leagle.com.


CHIEF FIRE: Atty. Resila Withdraws as Class Counsel in Brown Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RORY BROWN, ROSHANE POWELL, ROMARIO POWELL, ANDREW
MORGAN, MICKEL KELLY, REYNARD MORRIS, GAREY MILLS, GARRICK
ROBINSON, MARIO TEAPE, and CRAIG LYNCH, on behalf of themselves,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly-situated,
Plaintiffs v. CHIEF FIRE PREVENTION & MECHANICAL CORP., and FRANK
MITAROTONDA, individually, Defendants, Case No. 22 CV 3359 (VB)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York issued an order relating to
the Plaintiffs' counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel of record.

On Aug. 22, 2022, the Plaintiffs' counsel, James A. Resila, Esq.,
of the law firm Schwab & Gasparani, PLLC, moved to withdraw as
counsel of record. According to Mr. Resila, the reason for his
requested withdrawal is a failure of his clients to communicate
with him and to provide him discovery materials. He attaches an
affirmation of service stating that the motion to withdraw was
served on the Plaintiffs individually via U.S. Mail on Aug. 22,
2022.

Accordingly, by no later than Sept. 13, 2022, the Plaintiffs will
advise the Court by letter whether they consent to the withdrawal.
In the event they do not consent, the Plaintiffs will also explain
in their letter the basis for their unwillingness to consent.

Mr. Resila will serve a copy of the Order on the Plaintiffs and
file proof of service of same on the ECF docket.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mpumcu67 from Leagle.com.


CHRISTMAS TREE HILL: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Christmas Tree Hill,
Inc. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Christmas Tree Hill,
Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07300 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Christmas Tree Hill -- https://www.christmastreehill.com/ -- offers
thousands of unique gifts, brands, fashions, home decor, seasonal
decor, collectibles, functional gifts, and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


COMMUNITY HEALTH: White Sues to Recover Compensation and Benefits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Callie White, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., VENICE HMA,
LLC, d/b/a SHOREPOINT HEALTH VENICE, Case No. 8:22-cv-01989-CEH-AEP
(M.D. Fla., Aug. 29, 2022), is brought against the Defendants for
violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act, seeking to recover damages in the amount of 60 days'
compensation and benefits for each of them by reason of the
Defendants' violation of their rights under the WARN Act.

The Defendants violated the WARN Act by terminating the Plaintiffs
and the putative class members without providing sufficient advance
written notice as required by the WARN Act. In this case, WARN Act
liability is imputed to both Defendants via a "single employer"
test/theory. The Defendants failed to provide Named Plaintiffs and
the Putative Class Members with the 60 days advance written notice
that is required by the WARN Act, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was an employee of the Defendants and was terminated
from her employment.

CHS is (or recently was) "the largest provider of general hospital
healthcare services in the United States in terms of number of
acute care facilities."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          Amanda E. Heystek, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Main No: 813-224-0431
          Direct No: 813-379-2565
          Facsimile: 813-229-8712
          Email: bhill@wfclaw.com
                 lcabassa@wfclaw.com
                 aheystek@wfclaw.com
                 gnichols@wfclaw.com



CONDOR LLC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Condor, LLC. The case
is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. Condor, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07362
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Condor, LLC -- https://www.llccondor.com/home -- is a building
construction Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


CONSTELATION CLEARSIGHT: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Haldeman Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DAKOTA HALDEMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiff v. CONSTELATION CLEARSIGHT, LLC f/k/a EXELON
CLEARSIGHT, LLC; EXELON BUSINESS SERVICES COMPANY, LLC; and EXELON
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03367-TJS (E.D. Pa., Aug.
23, 2022) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Haldeman was employed by the Defendants as drone pilot
and pole inspector.

CONSTELATION CLEARSIGHT, LLC f/k/a EXELON CLEARSIGHT, LLC provides
inspections using drones, robots and AI. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter C. Wood, Jr., Esq.
          Matthew Mobilio, Esq.
          MOBILIO WOOD
          900 Rutter Ave., Box 24
          Forty Fort, PA 18704
          Telephone: (570) 234-0442
          Facsimile: (570) 266-5402
          Email: peter@mobiliowood.com
                 matt@mobiliowood.com

               - and -

          Alex Pisarevsky, Esq.
          Erika R. Piccirillo, Esq.
          COHN LIFLAND PEARLMAN
          HERRMANN & KNOPF LLP
          Park 80 West-Plaza One
          250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 401
          Saddle Brook, NJ 07663
          Telephone: (201) 845-9600
          Facsimile: (201) 845-9423
          Email: ap@njlawfirm.com
                 ep@njlawfirm.com

CREDIT CONSULTING: Summary Judgment Order in Scott Suit Reversed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLIFTON JAMES SCOTT, Cross-complainant and Appellant
v. CREDIT CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., Cross-defendant and
Respondent, Case No. H049063 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of
California for the Sixth District reverses the trial court's order
granting summary judgment in CCS' favor.

After filing a debt collection lawsuit against Scott, Credit
Consulting Services (CCS) stapled a typewritten note to the
court-provided summons and, through a process server, served Scott
with the note, summons, and complaint. Nothing in the assembled
documents disclosed that CCS, not the court, had affixed the note
to the summons. Scott alleged that CCS violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(9),
(11))1 and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civil
Code Sections 1788.16-1788.17) by sending a written communication
that gave a false impression as to its source, authorization, or
approval, because CCS failed to disclose that the note was a
communication from a debt collector and not the court.

In February 2016, Scott received medical treatment from Hazel
Hawkins Memorial Hospital. As a result, he incurred unpaid medical
debts. Hazel Hawkins referred those debts to CCS for collection.

CCS sent Scott eight letters between July 27, 2016 and Sept. 11,
2018. By 2017 at the latest, Scott was aware Hazel Hawkins had
assigned the debt to a debt collector and had received at least one
collections letter. Scott did not pay the debt.

On Oct. 30, 2018, CCS initiated the present action by filing a
collection complaint against Scott seeking recovery of the debt.
The court issued a summons the same day. CCS stapled "a small
yellow note to the summons at a 90-degree angle." The attachment
read: "If you have any questions regarding this matter, please
contact: Credit Consulting Services, Inc., 201 John Street, Suite
E, Salinas, CA 93901, 831-424-0606; outside 831 area code
1-800-679-6888." CCS then had the assembled attachment, summons,
and complaint served on Scott by substituted service.

Mr. Scott retained counsel and answered CCS' complaint. He also
filed a cross-complaint against CCS alleging two class action
causes of action, one pursuant to the FDCPA and one pursuant to the
Rosenthal Act. In support of each cause of action, he alleged that
it was unlawful for CCS to send the attachment with the summons and
the complaint because the attachment appeared to be a message from
the court and did not contain language disclosing that it was sent
by a debt collector.

On Jan. 9, 2020, the court certified a class defined to include:
"All persons with addresses in California to whom CCS sent, or
caused to be sent, a collection notice stapled to a Summons in the
form of Exhibit '1' to Scott's cross-complaint in an attempt to
collect a defaulted consumer debt, during the period Oct. 30, 2017,
through Nov. 14, 2019."

With the basic facts undisputed, the parties filed competing
summary judgment motions. The trial court determined that the
attachment, though a communication covered by the FDCPA and
Rosenthal Act, was lawful. Accordingly, it entered judgment in CCS'
favor on Scott's cross-complaint and denied Scott's cross-request
for summary judgment. Scott thereafter appealed.

Mr. Scott's two causes of action, one for violation of the FDCPA
and one for violation of the Rosenthal Act, are predicated on the
same overlapping theories of liability: (1) the attachment appeared
to be authorized, issued, or approved by the court in violation of
section 1692e(9) and Civil Code sections 1788.16 and 1788.17; and
(2) the attachment did not have a proper disclosure in violation of
section 1692e(11) and Civil Code section 1788.17. We review de novo
the trial court's determination that CCS was entitled to judgment
on Scott's cross-complaint, and that Scott was not, as a matter of
law.

Under the well-settled standard for reviewing the admissible
evidence before the trial court, the Court of Appeals liberally
construes the evidence in favor of the opposing party and resolves
all doubts in favor of that party.

CCS concedes that: CCS is a "debt collector" as defined in both
statutes; Scott is a "consumer" as defined in the FDCPA; and the
money Scott owed to Hazel Hawkins constituted a "debt" and
"consumer debt," as defined in the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act,5
respectively. The parties dispute: (1) whether the attachment is
(a) a communication (b) in connection with the collection of any
debt; and (2) whether the attachment constitutes a substantive
violation of the relevant statutes.

CCS disputes that the attachment was a "communication" and that it
was "in connection with the collection of any debt." Underlying its
arguments is the premise that the Court of Appeals must examine the
yellow attachment in isolation, divorced from the summons and
complaint to which CCS literally attached it. It reject this
premise and concludes that CCS sent the attachment in connection
with debt collection.

The Court of Appeals holds that the attachment is a "communication"
as defined in section 1692a(2). The attachment, by its own
reference to the "matter" defined in the accompanying documents, by
its provision of contact information, and by its invitation to
contact CCS with "any questions" about the lawsuit, refers to the
extant debt and solicits further contact regarding a debt.

The Court of Appeals further holds that CCS sent the attachment to
Scott in connection with the collection of a debt. The obvious
function of the attachment was to prompt Scott to contact CCS, his
litigation adversary, about the debt prompting the lawsuit. The
Court of Appeals fails to conceive of any subject other than debt
collection CCS might think the communication was in connection
with. The message in the attachment refers to the existence of a
debt, conveys information regarding the debt, and serves the
purpose of debt collection by enticing the recipient to contact the
debt collector.

Mr. Scott argues that, to the least sophisticated consumer, the
attachment would appear to have come from the court because it was
both stapled to the official summons and lacked the mandatory
disclosure language. CCS concedes the omission of the mandatory
disclosure language in the attachment but asserts that disclosure
is not required for an "innocuous note" and that even the least
sophisticated consumer would understand that the attachment came
from CCS, a debt collector.

The Court of Appeals concludes on this record that the omission of
the mandatory disclosures in this attachment to an official court
summons violated both section 1692e(11) and 1692e(9). It agrees
with CCS that an "innocuous note" may be included with a summons
and complaint. But, like the judge who denied CCS' special motion
to strike based, in part, on Scott's likelihood of success on the
merits, it does not agree that the attachment is innocuous. The
problem is that the attachment is provided in a context that is
likely to mislead the least reasonable consumer as to the identity
-- and authority -- of the entity sending the communication. Of
course, CCS could have placed the matter beyond doubt by disclosing
that it added the attachment on the face of the document, but it
failed to do so.

As to materiality, the Court of Appeals concludes that the false
official imprimatur, in the eyes of the least sophisticated
consumer, is capable of influencing them. CCS' cases do not involve
similar facts. Intentional or not, the function of the attachment
is to encourage the consumer to direct questions to CCS rather than
to file an answer in an adversarial proceeding. Accordingly,
Scott's "subjective reaction is neither here nor there."

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals concludes that the court's
entry of summary judgment in CCS' favor was error.

Through his cross-motion for summary judgment, Scott sought, among
other things, judgment in his, and the certified class', favor on
both causes of action in his cross-complaint; individual awards of
statutory damages under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act; and a service
award. CCS raised both procedural and substantive arguments in
opposition. Having granted CCS's motion, the trial court
"necessarily" denied Scott's motion. Scott now asks the Court of
Appeals to direct the trial court to enter judgment in his favor.
It declines to do so.

The Court of Appeals agrees that the trial court's denial of
Scott's motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary
adjudication of issues is within the scope of his appeal. And the
issues presented by Scott's cross-motion substantially overlap with
the issues presented by CCS' motion. They are not, however,
coterminous. Resolution of Scott's cross-motion would turn on
adjudication of substantive issues not yet addressed by the trial
court.

In these circumstances, the Court of Appeals deems it prudent to
direct the trial court to vacate its order denying Scott's motion
for summary judgment and to remand for further proceedings
consistent with its determination, as a matter of law on the facts
presented by CCS' summary judgment motion, that CCS's attachment to
the summons, served with CCS' complaint, constitutes a "false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with
the collection of any debt" within the meaning of FDCPA section
1692e, and that the misleading character of the representation or
means is material under Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc. (9th Cir.
2010) 592 F.3d 1027, 1030, Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC (9th
Cir. 2007) 499 F.3d 926, 934, and Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships LLC
(7th Cir. 2009) 557 F.3d 755, 758.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's
entry of judgment in favor of CCS and remands for further
proceedings on Scott's cross-complaint, with directions to vacate
the order granting CCS' motion for summary judgment and denying
Scott's motion for summary judgment. Scott will recover his costs
on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/9efep232 from Leagle.com.


DANIA ENTERTAINMENT: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Moore Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
KOWLESSAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DANIA ENTERTAINMENTY CENTER LLC, Defendants,
Case No. CACE-22-012428 (Fla. Cir., Broward Cty., Aug. 22, 2022)
seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited
calls.

DANIA ENTERTAINMENT CENTER LLC operates as a holding company. The
Company holds or owns securities of companies other than banks.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Shamis, Esq.
          Garett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                 gberg@ shamisgentile.com

               -and-

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Christopher Gold, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (786) 289-9471
          Facsimile: (305) 975-3320
          Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                 chris@edelsberglaw.com

DEL MONTE FOODS: Stewart Sues Over Failure to Pay Wages Owed
------------------------------------------------------------
Derek Stewart, an individual, Javonte Williams, an individual, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. DEL MONTE
FOODS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 3:22-cv-04919 (N.D.
Cal., Aug. 29, 2022), is brought arising from the Defendants'
violations of the California Labor Code, the Fair Labor Standards
Act, including for failure to provide meal and rest periods,
reimburse business expenses, pay all wages owed, provide accurate
wage statements, and other violations of the California Labor
Code.

The Defendant failed to timely pay minimum, regular and overtime
wages to its California non-exempt employees in violation of
California Labor Code; failed to provide timely and uninterrupted
meal and rest periods to its California non-exempt employees in
violation of California Labor Code, and the applicable Industrial
Wage Order; failed to pay its employees one hour of pay at the
regular rate of compensation for each instance that Defendant
failed to provide statutorily mandated rest periods and timely
off-duty meal periods; failed to furnish timely and accurate wage
statements, including by failing to distinguish between meal and
rest break premiums on its wage statements; failed to pay all wages
due upon termination; failed to reimburse its California non-exempt
employees for necessary business expenses incurred, such as boots
and safety equipment, among other expenses, in violation of
California Labor Code; and, is in violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law and the Private Attorney General Act of 2004, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant.

The Defendant manufactures and distributes packaged food products.
The Company provides canned fruits and vegetables, as well as a
wide range of snacks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David R. Markham, Esq.
          Maggie Realin, Esq.
          Lisa Brevard, Esq.
          THE MARKHAM LAW FIRM
          888 Prospect Street, Ste. 200
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Phone: (619) 399-3995
          Fax: (619) 615-2067
          Email: dmarkham@markham-law.com
                 mrealin@markham-law.com
                 lbrevard@markham-law.com

               - and -

          Walter Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
          5500 Bolsa Avenue, Suite 203
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Phone: 888.474.7242
          Fax: 562.256.1006
          Email: whaines@uelglaw.com


DEVA CONCEPTS: Liability Suit Counsel to Answer Settlement Concerns
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DEVA CONCEPTS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION,
Master file 1:20-cv-01234-GHW (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Gregory H. Woods of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
directs the class counsel to file a response regarding the concerns
articulated in Exhibit 1 attached to the Order.

On Aug. 23, 2022, the Court received electronic correspondence from
one of the class members involved in the Deva Concepts Products
Liability Litigation Class Action settlement. According to the
correspondence received by the Court, this class member, among
others, has not received an update regarding the settlement and
scheduling of payments despite numerous attempts to contact the
class counsel and the Settlement Administrator.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3xnpe3e9 from Leagle.com.


DEVON ENERGY: Underpays Oilfield Workers, Stoddart Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
BEAU STODDART, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION COMPANY, L.P.,
Defendant, Case No. 5:22-cv-00725-SLP (W.D. Okla., August 22, 2022)
is a collective action complaint brought against the Defendant to
recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant as a Completions
Inspector from May 2014 until July 2020.

The Plaintiff claims that throughout his employment with the
Defendant, he and other similarly situated oilfield workers were
paid a flat sum for each day worked regardless of the number of
hours worked that workweek. Despite working more than 40 hours per
week, the Defendant did not pay them overtime compensation at the
rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all
hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff.

On behalf of himself and all other similarly situated oilfield
workers, the Plaintiff seeks judgment for unpaid overtime and an
equal amount of liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees and
litigation costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and other relief
as may be necessary and appropriate.

Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. is an independent oil and
natural gas exploration and production company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
          Taylor S. Montgomery, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 352-1100
          Fax: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  tmontgomery@mybackwages.com

                - and –

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 877-8788
          Fax: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

DINGDONG LTD: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Oct. 24
-------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Kuznicki Law PLLC issues this
alert to shareholders of Dingdong (Cayman) Limited (NYSE: DDL), if
they purchased or acquired the Company's American Depository Shares
("ADS") pursuant and/or traceable to the Company’s June 2021
initial public offering (the "IPO"). Shareholders have until
October 24, 2022 to file lead plaintiff applications in the
securities class action lawsuit.

Shareholders are encouraged to contact us at
https://kclasslaw.com/cases/securities/nyse-ddl/, by calling
toll-free at 1-833-835-1495 or by email (dk@kclasslaw.com).

Kuznicki Law PLLC is committed to ensuring that companies adhere to
responsible business practices and engage in good corporate
citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who
incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the
omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial
inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]

EHEALTHINSURANCE SERVICES: Salaiz Sues Over Unwanted Robocalls
--------------------------------------------------------------
ERIK SALAIZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. EHEALTHINSURANCE SERVICES, INC. and JOHN
DOE, an unknown business entity, Defendants, Case No.
5:22-cv-04835-NC (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act and Unlawful Prong of California Unfair Competition
Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants placed telephone calls
to the Plaintiff's and Class members' cellular and/or residential
telephones without prior express written consent. The calls were
made for the express purpose of soliciting customers for E-Health's
Medicare insurance. As a result of the Defendants' unlawful
conduct, the Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages,
including invasion of their personal privacy, says the suit.

eHealthInsurance Services, Inc. is a company that sells Medicare
insurance services, headquartered in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Mark L. Javitch, Esq.
         JAVITCH LAW OFFICE
         3 East 3rd Ave., Ste. 200
         San Mateo, CA 94401
         Telephone: (650) 781-8000
         Facsimile: (650) 648-0705
         E-mail: mark@javitchlawoffice.com

ELEMENTS PRODUCTION: Raus to Amend Complaint to Invoke Jurisdiction
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID RAUS, et al., Plaintiffs v. ELEMENTS PRODUCTION,
LCC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 21cv10431 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York orders the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint no later
than Sept. 9, 2022, if they wish to invoke the Court's diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2).

The complaint invokes the Court's diversity jurisdiction. Diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2) is available in a
class action in which "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a
citizen of a State different from any defendant." Judge Cote holds
that the complaint does not adequate allege the citizenships of the
Defendants.

Accordingly, if the Plaintiffs wish to invoke the Court's diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2), they will amend
their complaint no later than Sept. 9, 2022 to include allegations
sufficient to satisfy Section 1332(d)'s requirements, so long as
they can do so in good faith and consistent with the requirements
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. No other amendments to the complaint will be
included with the amendments made pursuant to the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2nhuacea from Leagle.com.


ENERGY TRANSFER: Allegheny County ERS Wins Bid to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALLEGHENY COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al.,
v. ENERGY TRANSFER LP, et al., Civil Action No. 20-200 (E.D. Pa.),
Judge Gerald Austin McHugh of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania grants the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.

Plaintiffs retirement systems and pension plans brought the action
for themselves and on behalf of a class of shareholders in Energy
Transfer LP against Energy Transfer, its subsidiary, and certain
executives. The Plaintiffs' allegations center around a series of
allegedly false or misleading statements and omissions made in
reference to the Defendants' construction of three natural gas
pipelines related to the Mariner East system across Pennsylvania:
the ME2, the ME2x, and the Revolution Pipeline. These statements
related to the anticipated timeline of the pipeline's construction;
pipeline capacity; the safety of the pipeline and its compliance
with various government orders related to safety; the Defendants'
adherence to a code of ethics; and the Defendants' general
compliance with the law.

After the Defendants moved to dismiss, Judge McHugh issued a
memorandum and order that reviewed in detail the various
misrepresentations and omissions alleged by the Plaintiffs in order
to determine whether they were actionable. He dismissed statements
from 22 paragraphs of the Complaint for various reasons, finding
that the remaining statements were actionable. In denying the
motion to dismiss, he rejected the Defendants' arguments that the
corrective disclosures regarding the project timeline, the pipeline
capacity, and government investigations were legally insufficient
to establish loss causation for the misrepresentations alleged.

Having survived a motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs now seek class
certification of their claims against the Defendants for publicly
making statements that omitted material information and made
material misrepresentations in violation of the Exchange Act. The
parties have submitted extensive briefing on the motion, and a
hearing was held where both parties vigorously advocated their
positions before the Court.

For a class to be certified, the plaintiff must satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(a), along with the requirements for a
particular type of class set forth in Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a)
requires that (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class (typicality); and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class (adequacy).

The Plaintiff seeks certification under subsection (b)(3), which
further requires that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members (predominance), and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy (superiority). Class certification requires that the
Court make factual determinations and resolve factual disputes. It
is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous
analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met."

The core dispute in the motion is over the predominance element of
Rule 23(b)(3) in the context of securities litigation. The
Plaintiffs have established that they are entitled to a presumption
of reliance under Basic v. Levinson such that presumptive class
members can be presumed to have relied on material public
misrepresentations made by Defendants by means of a
market-efficient share price of the security. After this
presumption is established, the burden shifts to the Defendants to
prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged
misrepresentations did not in fact have an impact on the price of
the security. The Defendants attempt to argue controlling legal
principles in a way that would narrow the scope of relevant
evidence and thereby erode the presumption established by Basic,
but their arguments are unconvincing.

In sum, Judge McHugh concludes that the Plaintiffs have proven that
class certification is appropriate. They have established all the
Rule 23(a) elements, as well as the necessary elements of Rule
23(b)(3). Following consideration of all the relevant evidence --
quantitative and qualitative alike -- he finds holds that the
Defendants fail to meet their burden to rebut the presumption of
market impact, with the result that the Plaintiffs can show
predominance.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
granted. An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8mb2xx from Leagle.com.


EQUIFAX INC: Thompson Files FCRA Suit in N.D. Georgia
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax, Inc. The
case is styled as John Thompson, Megan Govea Thompson, individually
and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v.
Equifax, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-03469-LMM-CCB (N.D. Ga., Aug. 26,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

Equifax Inc. -- http://www.equifax.com/-- is an American
multinational consumer credit reporting agency headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alison D Hawthorne, Esq.
          Paul W. Evans, Esq.
          Rachel Boyd Minder, Esq.
          W. Daniel Miles, III, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES-AL
          PO Box 4160
          Montgomery, AL 36104-36013
          Phone: (334) 269-2343
          Fax: (334) 954-7555
          Email: alison.hawthorne@beasleyallen.com
                 paul.evans@beasleyallen.com
                 rachel.minder@beasleyallen.com
                 Dee.Miles@BeasleyAllen.com

               - and -

          Brian E. Johnson, Esq.
          Victoria S. Nugent, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC-DC
          1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005-3964
          Phone: (417) 343-5956
          Fax: (202) 408-4699
          Email: bejohnson@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          H. Clay Barnett, III, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN
          Suite 400
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Phone: (334) 269-2343
          Fax: (334) 954-7555
          Email: clay.barnett@beasleyallen.com


EXPLORE SCIENTIFIC: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Explore Scientific,
LLC. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Explore Scientific,
LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07370 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Explore Scientific -- https://explorescientificusa.com/ -- is a
company founded by former Meade Instruments Vice President of Brand
Community Scott W. Roberts in 2008.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


EXPRESS SERVICES: Storm Suit Removed to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Eve Storm, individually and on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. Express Services, Inc.,
OReilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Case
No. CVRI2202748 was removed from the Riverside County Superior
Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on Aug. 26, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:22-cv-01510 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor.

Express Services, Inc. -- https://www.expresspros.com/ -- provides
human resource services. The Company offers candidate recruitment
process, workforce management, turnover calculator, and
professional staffing services.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Derek W. Paradis, Esq.
          HIGGS FLETCHER AND MACK LLP
          401 West A Street Suite 2600
          San Diego, CA 92101-7913
          Phone: (619) 236-1551
          Fax: (619) 696-1410
          Email: paradisd@higgslaw.com


FIRST AMERICAN: Cal. App. Flips Dismissal of Sjobring & Kaufman
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEFFREY ALBERT SJOBRING, et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants v. FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents, Case No. B293732 (Cal. App.), the Court
of Appeals of California for the Second District, Division Three,
reverses the trial court's order granting the Defendants' motions
for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing both the Sjobring and
the Kaufman lawsuits.

The Insurance Code requires title insurers and title companies to
file a schedule of their rates with the Insurance Commissioner
before charging those rates to the public. The Insurance Code also
prohibits title insurers and title companies from charging rates
for policies and services except in accordance with their filed
rates.

These consolidated appeals concern two class action lawsuits
brought against Defendants and Respondents First American Title
Insurance Co. and First American Title Co. One lawsuit was filed by
Plaintiff and Appellant Sjobring. The other lawsuit was filed by
Plaintiff and Appellant Kaufman. Both Plaintiffs obtained policies
from defendants to insure the title on a recently purchased home:
an owner's policy to cover their own interest in the title, and a
loan policy to cover the mortgage-lender's interest. Because title
insurance policies like these insure the same property, they are
usually less expensive when purchased together. How much less
expensive depends on the range of defects they insure against --
that is, whether the policies are classified as "standard coverage"
or "extended coverage."

The Plaintiffs allege they were overcharged for their title
insurance policies. Specifically, Sjobring asserts that the
Defendants' filed rate for an extended coverage loan policy when
sold together with an extended coverage owner's policy was $125,
not the $563 that he was charged. Alternatively, he asserts that
even if his policy is considered a standard coverage policy, he
should have been charged defendants' filed rate of $290. For her
part, Kaufman alleges that under the Defendants' filed rates, there
was no charge for a loan policy that was sold concurrently with a
standard coverage owner's policy. Thus, Kaufman should have only
paid $125, not the $710 that she was charged.

Mr. Sjobring filed his operative fourth amended class action
complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BC329482 on Nov.
15, 2010.

The court certified two classes for the fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and unfair competition claims. As to class one,
the court certified the following class: "All persons who paid all
or part of the premium in a transaction occurring from Jan. 1, 2003
through Oct. 8, 2006, in which the premium paid was more than $125
for any First American concurrent loan policy issued with an Eagle
Owner's Policy issued without regional exceptions insuring property
in California, where the aggregate liability of the loan policies
issued did not exceed the aggregate liability of the owner's
policy." It found a common question existed as to "whether the
Eagle Owner's Policy is an extended or standard coverage policy."

As to class two, the court certified the following class: "All
persons who paid all or part of the premium in a transaction
occurring from Jan. 1, 2003 through Oct. 8, 2007, in which the
premium paid was more than 20 percent of 'Base Rate A' for a First
American first concurrent loan policy insuring property in
California, where the aggregate liability under the loan policies
did not exceed the liability under the owner's policy, excepting
those persons who are members of any class that may be certified in
Kaufman Class Two may only seek to claim that the rate applied to
the lender's policy, as issued, was improper and should have been
charged at the lower C-5 rate."

Ms. Kaufman filed her operative second amended class action
complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BC382826 on Nov.
15, 2010.

In September 2017, a class was certified for the causes of action
for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law as
to: "All persons who paid for a first Eagle loan title policy in a
residential real estate sales transaction in California that was
issued concurrently with an owner's policy during the period Oct.
2, 2006 to Oct. 2, 2007, where the aggregate liability of the loan
policies did not exceed the liability of the owner's policy."

The Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings in both cases.

The trial court granted the Defendants' motions for judgment on the
pleadings and dismissed both lawsuits. It concluded that
plaintiffs' allegations amounted to an improper challenge to the
"use" of a rate and implicates "ratemaking." Accordingly,
defendants were shielded from liability under section 12414.26,
which bars suits under noninsurance laws for any "act done, action
taken, or agreement made pursuant to the authority conferred" by
the rate-filing statutes.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs contend that immunity under section
12414.26 is limited to conduct authorized by articles 5.5 and 5.7
of the Insurance Code. Those articles do not authorize title
insurers to charge more than their filed rates. To the contrary,
such conduct is expressly prohibited by section 12414.27. Whether
the Defendants charged more than the filed rates depends, in turn,
on whether the Plaintiffs' policies provided standard or extended
coverage and courts routinely interpret insurance policies. Because
those classifications are not clear from the face of the pleadings
and judicially noticed documents, it is a question of fact that
cannot be resolved by motions for judgment on the pleadings. The
Plaintiffs also contend that administrative proceedings before the
Insurance Commissioner are not a consumer's exclusive remedy for
the charging of an unauthorized rate.

The Defendants contend they are immune from suit under section
12414.26 because the lawsuits challenge acts done pursuant to
authority conferred by article 5.5 -- namely, rate setting and the
classification of title insurance policies. And Villanueva doesn't
assist the Plaintiffs because that case dealt with a title insurer
that charged rates without filing them with the Insurance
Commissioner. They also argue that article 6.7's administrative
process is the sole remedy for claims that fall within section
12414.26's immunity provision.

The Court of Appeals finds that the Plaintiffs contend their claims
are not barred by section 12414.26 because the lawsuits do not
challenge the Defendants' ratemaking. Nor do they challenge the
amount of any filed rate or coverage classification. Instead, the
issue is whether the Defendants unlawfully collected more than the
filed rates. Accordingly, whether the Plaintiffs' policies are
standard or extended coverage policies is not a question about rate
setting. It is a question about the nature of the policies, which
in turn determines what the Plaintiffs should have been charged.
This is a question of fact. And because the answer to that question
is not clear from the face of the pleadings and judicially noticed
documents, it cannot be resolved in a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.

In a recent opinion, the California Supreme Court held that "the
statutory immunity for acts done pursuant to the authority
conferred' (Section 12414.26) by the rate-filing statutes does not
shield title insurers from suit for charging unauthorized rates,
and the Insurance Commissioner does not have exclusive jurisdiction
over such claims," citing Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 104, 110-111. In conformity with Villanueva, the
Court of Appeals concludes that the Plaintiffs do not challenge the
Defendants' filed rates or coverage classifications and, therefore,
section 12414.26 does not shield them from suit for charging
unauthorized rates for further proceedings.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reverses the judgments and
remands the matter for further proceedings consistent with the
views expressed in its Opinion. Sjobring and Kaufman will recover
their costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5f266ahr from Leagle.com.

The Bernheim Law Firm, Steven J. Bernheim --
B@thebernheimlawfirm.com -- Nazo S. Semerjian --
N.Semerdjian@TheBernheimLawFirm.com; Shernoff Bidart Echeverria,
Michael J. Bidart, Steven M. Schuetze; Friedman Rubin, Richard H.
Friedman; The Kick Law Firm and Taras Kick for the Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Dentons US, Ronald D. Kent -- ronald.kent@dentons.com --  Joel D.
Siegel -- joel.siegel@dentons.com -- Susan M. Walker, Paul M.
Kakuske -- paul.kakuske@dentons.com --  for the Defendants and
Respondents.


FIVE ELEMENTS INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed Five Elements Inc. The case
is styled as Andrew Toro, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Five Elements Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07351
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Five Elements -- http://www.5elementshr.com/-- is an online skill
assessment platform that offers HR solutions to hire, train, and
measure talent.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


FLOSPORTS INC: Young Sues Over Illegal Automatic Renewal Scheme
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lucas Young, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. FLOSPORTS, INC., Case No. 3:22-cv-04920-TSH
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 29, 2022), is brought against Defendant for
engaging in an illegal "automatic renewal" scheme with respect to
its subscription sports broadcasting and streaming services across
its network sites (the "FS Subscriptions,") through its website,
https://www.flosports.tv/ (the "FloSports Website").

The Plaintiff's allegations, when customers sign up for an FS
Subscription in order to gain access to a live stream through the
FloSports Website, the Defendant enrolls customers in a program
that automatically renews customers' FS Subscription on a yearly
basis and results in yearly charges to customer's credit card,
debit card, or third-party payment account (collectively, "Payment
Method"). In doing so, the Defendant fails to provide the requisite
disclosures and authorizations required to be made to and obtained
from California consumers under California's Automatic Renewal Law
("ARL").

Specifically, the Defendant systematically violates the ARL by:
failing to present the automatic renewal offer terms in a clear and
conspicuous manner and in visual proximity to the request for
consent to the offer before the subscription or purchasing
agreement is fulfilled; charging consumers' Payment Method without
first obtaining their affirmative consent to the agreement
containing the automatic renewal offer terms; and failing to
provide an acknowledgment that includes the automatic renewal offer
terms, cancellation policy, and information regarding how to cancel
in a manner that is capable of being retained by the consumer. As a
result, the access to the sports broadcasting, or streaming
services granted to Plaintiff and the Class under the automatic
renewal of continuous service agreements are deemed to be
"unconditional gifts" under the ARL, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased a yearly FS Subscription ("FloGrappling")
from the Defendant's Website while in California.

The Defendant is a Texas-based subscription sports broadcaster and
streaming service that, among other activities, streams live
sporting events to audiences around the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Phone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          Email: ltfisher@bursor.com

               - and -

          Joseph I. Marchese, Esq.
          Alec M. Leslie, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          New York, NY 10019
          Phone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          Email: jmarchese@bursor.com
                 aleslie@bursor.com

               - and -

          Adrian Gucovschi, Esq.
          GUCOVSCHI ROZENSHTEYN, PLLC.
          630 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
          New York, NY 10111
          Phone: (212) 884-4230
          Facsimile: (212) 884-4230
          Email: adrian@gr-firm.com


G & A OUTSOURCING: Petrol Logic Files Suit in D. Colorado
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against G&A Outsourcing LLC.
The case is styled as Petrol Logic LLC, Ruby Canyon Dental Group
PC, DC Dental PLLC doing business as: Fruita Family Dental, Crested
Oak Dentistry PLLC, individually on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. G&A Outsourcing LLC
doing business as: G&A Partners, Case No. 1:22-cv-02219-PAB (D.
Colo., Aug. 29, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated Other Contract for Breach of
Contract.

G&A Outsourcing, Inc. -- https://www.gnapartners.com/ -- provides
human resources outsourcing and administrative services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Patrick H Peluso, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Avenue, Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Phone: (720) 213-0676
          Fax: (303) 927-0898
          Email: ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com


G.A.S. GLOBAL: Faces Herring Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
STUART HERRING, individually and for others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. G.A.S. GLOBAL SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
4:22-cv-02841 (S.D. Tex., August 22, 2022) alleges the Defendant of
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, who is a Mechanical Commissioning Supervisor,
asserts that he regularly worked 60 or more hours per week.
However, rather receiving an overtime compensation at the rate of
one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all hours worked
in excess of 40 per workweek, the Defendant paid him straight time
rate, says the Plaintiff.

According to the complaint, there are numerous employees, who were
also paid straight time for overtime while working for the
Defendant. Thus, the Plaintiff brings this complaint as a
collective action against the Defendant to recover all unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and
costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and all other relief to
which he and other similarly situated employees may show themselves
to be justly entitled.

G.A.S. Global Services, LLC provides the energy industry with
staffing solutions. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 352-1100
          Fax: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com

                - and –

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 877-8788
          Fax: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

GAME GOBLINS: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Game Goblins, LLC.
The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Game Goblins, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-07367 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Game Goblins -- https://gamegoblins.com/ -- is Central Arkansas's
premier retailer of Magic the Gathering, Pokémon, Warhammer 40K,
Dungeons & Dragons, board games, card games, RPGs, dice, miniatures
& hobby accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


GEORGIA: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Crisp's Civil Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SERGEANT NATHAN D. CRISP, Plaintiff-Appellant v. THE
STATE OF GEORGIA, GWINNETT COUNTY, MS. TOOLE, Gwinnett County
Assistant District Attorney, TUWANDA RUSH WILLIAMS, Gwinnett County
Law Office, WARREN DAVIS, Gwinnett County Superior Court Judge, et
al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-14190 (11th Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirms the district
court's dismissal of Crisp's complaint.

Mr. Crisp, proceeding pro se, appeals following the dismissal of
his civil complaint, which brought claims arising out of his arrest
for impersonating a public officer or employee in violation of Ga.
Code Ann. Section 16-10-23. On appeal, Crisp challenges: (1) the
district court's dismissal of his action against Gwinnett County
and the State of Georgia on sovereign immunity and Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds; and (2) the district court's dismissal
of his action as to four remaining defendants for failing to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, in part, based on Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

In 2017, Crisp was arrested by Gwinnett County, Georgia police
officers for impersonating a public officer or employee and charged
with violating Ga. Code Ann. Section 16-10-23. In 2018, a Gwinnett
County grand jury indicted him for the same. The charges were
brought by Daniel J. Porter, the former Gwinnett County District
Attorney, and Assistant District Attorney Ramona Toole prosecuted
the case. Crisp's case was assigned to Gwinnett County Superior
Court Judge Warren Davis.

While his criminal case was pending, Crisp sued Porter, Gwinnett
County, and the officers who arrested him in federal court. The
civil lawsuit, which alleged several constitutional violations, was
assigned to United States District Court Judge Eleanor Ross, who
stayed the civil case pending the outcome of Crisp's state court
criminal case under the Younger abstention doctrine.

Mr. Crisp later sought mandamus relief from the Supreme Court of
Georgia, invoking the original jurisdiction of that Court.
Assistant Attorney General Brittanie Browning from the Georgia
Attorney General's Office represented Judge Davis before the
Georgia Supreme Court. In this capacity, Browning wrote the Clerk
of the Supreme Court of Georgia and notified the Court of this
representation and argued that the petition should be dismissed.
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed and dismissed Crisp's petition for
mandamus relief shortly thereafter.

Mr. Crisp eventually entered into a negotiated guilty plea to the
felony charge of impersonating an officer. Judge Laura Tate, who
was sitting by designation for Judge Davis on the state trial
court, sentenced Crisp under Georgia's First Offender Statute to
three years of probation.

After pleading guilty, Crisp brought the present pro se "Class
Action" complaint in federal court, against 13 defendants: the
State of Georgia; Gwinnett County; Judge Davis; Gwinnett County
Assistant District Attorney Toole; Georgia Assistant Attorney
General Browning; Porter, the former Gwinnett County District
Attorney; Judge Ross; Tuwanda Rush Williams and David D. Pritchett
of the Gwinnett County Law Office; Gwinnett County Magistrate Judge
Kenneth A. Parker; Clerk of Gwinnett County Superior Court Richard
Alexander; Judge Tate; and a Gwinnett County Magistrate Judge Keith
Miles.

The district court dismissed all of Crisp's claims. Relevant now,
the district court dismissed his claims against the State of
Georgia and Gwinnett County on the basis of sovereign immunity and
Eleventh Amendment immunity. As for four other defendants --Georgia
Assistant Attorney General Browning, former Gwinnett County
District Attorney Porter, Officer Williams and Judge Davis -- the
district court dismissed his claims for failing to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, in part, because Heck v. Humphrey
and various immunities barred his action.

The timely appeal follows.

First, the Eleventh Circuit holds that the district court did not
err in dismissing Crisp's claims against the State of Georgia and
Gwinnett County on the basis of sovereign immunity and Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits by
private individuals against a state in federal court unless the
state has consented to be sued, has waived its immunity, or
Congress has abrogated the state's immunity. The State of Georgia
is afforded sovereign immunity from suit, which "can only be waived
by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that
sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such
waiver." This sovereign immunity also applies to Georgia's
counties.

Nor did the district court err in dismissing Crisp's remaining
claims against Defendants Browning, Williams, Davis or Porter for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A judge
enjoys immunity for judicial acts even if she made a mistake, acted
maliciously, or exceeded her authority. Prosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability for damages for activities that are
intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process. Government officials performing discretionary functions
are generally shielded from liability for civil damages in Section
1983 actions "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."

To the extent that any claims survive these immunities, the
state-law claims against these Defendants were also barred by
official immunity because Crisp did not plausibly allege that any
of them acted with malice or an intent to injure him.

Finally, the district court correctly concluded that any remaining
federal claims were barred by qualified immunity. Crisp's complaint
describes a relatively straightforward criminal prosecution, which,
even if done with malice, does not violate clearly established law.
Crisp does not, and could not, show that "it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that this conduct was unlawful in this
situation."

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concludes that the district court
properly dismissed Crisp's complaint in its entirety, and it
affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/muchbvxz from Leagle.com.


GONSALVES & SANTUCCI: Rodriguez Suit Remanded to Superior Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, remands
the case, ELMER N. RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff v. GONSALVES & SANTUCCI,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-07874-LB (N.D. Cal.), to the
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Contra
Costa.

In this putative class action, the Plaintiff -- a construction
worker -- sued his former employer in state court, claiming that
employees routinely were not compensated for tasks that they had to
complete before clocking in at the beginning of the day and after
clocking out at the end of the day. This meant that the Plaintiffs
were not paid the minimum wage, did not receive accurate wage
statements, and were not paid all wages due on termination.

In the initial complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that class members
worked overtime hours because the Defendant made them work off the
clock "by, among other things, failing to accurately track and/or
pay for all minutes actually worked; engaging, suffering, or
permitting employees to work off the clock, including, without
limitation, by requiring employees: to make phone calls or drive
off the clock; detrimental rounding of employee time entries, and
editing and/or manipulation of time entries to show less minutes
than actually worked." They also claimed an inability to take their
meal and rest breaks.

As a result, the Defendant did not pay employees the full wages due
them on termination (including overtime and minimum wages and
vacation pay), and their wage statements were inaccurate. The
employer did not reimburse costs that employees incurred in (1)
buying mandatory work uniforms, safety equipment, and tools, (2)
laundering mandatory uniforms, and (3) using personal cell phones
for work. The Defendant also had a policy of not paying employees
with compensation at their final rate of pay for unused vested
vacation pay.

The complaint had the following claims: (1) failure to pay overtime
pay (claim one); (2) failure to pay minimum wages (claim two); (3)
failure to provide meal and rest breaks (claims three and four);
(4) failure to pay all wages on termination (claim five); (5)
failure to provide accurate wage statements (claim six); (6)
failure to reimburse employees for necessary expenditures in
violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 2802 (claim seven); (7)
failure to pay vested vacation pay in violation of Cal. Labor Code
Section 227.3 (claim eight); and (8) a violation of California's
Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Labor Code Section 17200,
predicated on the underlying Labor Code violations (claim nine).
The complaint did not mention the CBA or whether the Plaintiff
invoked the dispute-resolution process.

In the amended complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant
caused class members to work off the clock by "failing to
accurately track and/or pay for all minutes actually worked;
engaging, suffering, or permitting the class members to work off
the clock, including, without limitation, by requiring them: to
come early to work and leave late from work without being able to
clock in for all that time, to complete pre-shift tasks before
clocking in and post-shift tasks after clocking out, to don and
doff unforms and safety equipment off the clock, and/or go through
temperature checks off the clock; detrimental rounding of time
entries; and editing and/or manipulation of time entries to show
less hours than actually worked." This resulted in "occasional pay
periods where employees were not paid for all time worked." As a
result, the Defendant did not pay class members the full wages due
them on termination, and their wage statements were inaccurate.

The FAC had the following claims: (1) failure to pay minimum wages
in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 1197; (2) failure to
provide accurate wage statements in violation of Cal. Labor Code
Section 226(a); (3) failure to pay all wages on termination in
violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 201-02; and (4) unfair
competition in violation of the UCL. The complaint again did not
mention the CBA or whether the Plaintiff invoked the
dispute-resolution process.

The SAC adds new allegations to support the position that the
claims arise under state law and do not depend on the CBA. It
reiterates that the Plaintiff's minimum-wage claims "depend
entirely on whether the time at issue constitutes compensable hours
worked under the applicable state law," "do not arise in any manner
from any CBA-based obligations," and "are based on a failure to
compensate at all for certain hours worked by the Plaintiff and
Class Members." The SAC defines the off-the-clock work exactly as
the FAC defined it.

The SAC has the following claims: (1) failure to pay minimum wages
in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 1197 and applicable Wage
Orders; (2) failure to provide accurate wage statements in
violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 226(a); (3) failure to pay all
wages due on termination in violation of Cal. Labor Code Sections
201-02; and (4) unfair competition in violation of the UCL.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant on construction projects
from February 2020 to December 2020 and was a member of a CBA
governing ironworkers' employment. The 2017 CBA covered July 1,
2017, to June 30, 2020, and the 2020 CBA covered July 1, 2020, to
Dec. 31, 2024.

The Defendant removed the case to federal court, asserting
federal-question jurisdiction on the ground that Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempts the claims. The
Court previously dismissed two earlier complaints on the ground
that the claims were preempted because they either (1) involved
rights conferred directly by the parties' collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) or (2) substantially depended on the analysis and
interpretation of the CBA.

The Plaintiffs then filed the SAC, and the Defendant moved to
dismiss it, again based on LMRA preemption. It moved to dismiss the
SAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds
that (1) the claims are preempted by the LMRA, and (2) the
Plaintiff was required to submit to the CBA's grievance
procedures.

First, Judge Beeler holds that there is no need to apply the CBA to
resolve the claims because the Court can look only to state law.
The minimum-wage claim thus is not preempted. To the extent that
the defendant argued at the hearing that the CBA governs the entire
employment relationship, including what work is compensable, that
argument does not change the result. State law also governs what
work is compensable, and that analysis does not depend on
interpretation of the CBA.

And, although a CBA can provide for different pay arrangements, id.
(citing Cal. Labor Code Sections 201-04), the final-wages claim is
predicated on a failure to pay minimum wages. Also, and as the
Plaintiff contends, unlike the overtime and break claims,
resolution of final-wages claims predicated on a failure to pay
minimum wages does not depend on an analysis of the CBA.

Next, the Defendant also contends that the Plaintiff did not
exhaust the CBA's grievance procedures. The Plaintiff counters that
the claims do not rely on the CBA and thus he does not need to
raise the claims under the CBA's grievance procedures.

Looking at the CBA's grievance procedures, and considering the
briefing on the issue, nothing suggests a waiver of the employees'
rights to a judicial forum as a prerequisite to seeking judicial
relief. The waiver provisions in the CBA apply only to disputes
arising out of the "meaning and enforcement" of the CBA. There is
no waiver precluding the claims.

Finally, because the LMRA does not preempt the remaining claims in
the slimmed-down complaint, there is no subject-matter
jurisdiction.

Judge Beeler concludes that because the application of California
law for the remaining claims does not depend on an analysis or
interpretation of the CBA, the LMRA does not preempt the claims.
She remands the case to the Contra Costa County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2rnu3xt4 from Leagle.com.


GOOGLE LLC: $118M Settlement Proposed in Work Discrimination Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
topclassactions.com reports that Google agreed to pay $118 million
to resolve claims it engaged in discrimination against female
employees by paying them less than their male counterparts.

The settlement benefits several California classes:

The Equal Pay Act Class includes women who were hired into covered
positions by Google in California between Sept. 14, 2013, and July
25, 2022
The FEHA Class includes women who were hired into covered positions
by Google in California between Sept. 14, 2013, and Aug. 28, 2017,
excluding college hires
The PAGA Class includes women who were hired into covered positions
by Google in California between June 14, 2021, and July 25, 2022.

Google is a massive tech company responsible for the Google search
engine and other ventures, such as YouTube. Employees at the
company receive benefits such as insurance, wellness programs,
retirement savings, time off and more.

However, according to class action lawsuit allegations, Google may
have discriminated against its female workers by paying them less
than their male counterparts.

Women hired by the company in California say they were paid less
than the men they worked with despite having "comparable experience
and education." There was allegedly no basis for this pay
difference except gender.

In addition, Google allegedly denied women the same opportunities
for corporate advancement by giving them less-important projects to
work on.

"Google has known or should have known of this pay disparity
between its female employees in Covered Positions and male
employees performing substantially equal or substantially similar
work, yet Google has taken no action to equalize its male and
female employees' pay for substantially equal or substantially
similar work," the Google discrimination class action lawsuit
contends.

Plaintiffs in the Google class action lawsuit claim these actions
violated the California Equal Pay Act, Unfair and Unlawful Business
Practices Act and Fair Employment and Housing Act. The class action
also includes claims under California's Private Attorneys General
Act (PAGA).

Google hasn't admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to resolve the
class action lawsuit with a $118 million settlement. The company
also agreed to settle individual plaintiff claims with a $200,000
settlement.

Of the settlement, $1 million will be used to pay penalties to the
California Labor Workforce Development Agency under PAGA. After
these and other deductions, around $86 million is projected to be
leftover to fund settlement payments.

Payments to each class member will vary depending on their hire
date, wages, time worked, class member status and other factors.

Minimum payments of $250 will be allocated to class members hired
after Jan. 1, 2022.

For class members hired on or before Dec. 31, 2021, minimum
payments are $500 for those who worked more than six months and
$250 for those who worked less than six months. Additional
compensation will vary.

The deadline for exclusion and objection is Oct. 11, 2022.

The final approval hearing for the Google pay discrimination
settlement is scheduled for Oct. 24, 2022.

No claim form is required to benefit from the settlement. Class
Members who do not exclude themselves will automatically receive a
settlement payment in the mail.

Who's Eligible
The settlement benefits several California classes:

The Equal Pay Act Class includes women who were hired into covered
positions by Google in California between Sept. 14, 2013, and July
25, 2022
The FEHA Class includes women who were hired into covered positions
by Google in California between Sept. 14, 2013, and Aug. 28, 2017,
excluding college hires
The PAGA Class includes women who were hired into covered positions
by Google in California between June 14, 2021, and July 25, 2022.

Potential Award
Varies

Proof of Purchase
No proof of purchase applicable

Exclusion and Objection Deadline
10/11/2022

Case Name
Ellis V. Google, LLC, Case No. CGC-17-561299, the Superior Court of
the State of California, County of San Francisco

Final Hearing
10/24/2022

Settlement Website
GoogleCAPaySettlement.com

Claims Administrator
Google CA Pay Settlement
c/o JND Legal Administration
PO BOX 91343
Seattle, WA 98111
Info@GoogleCAPaySettlement.com
888-681-2480

Class Counsel
Kelly Dermody
Anne Shaver
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP

James Finberg
Eve Cervantez
ALTSHULER BERZON LLP

Defense Counsel
PAUL HASTINGS LLP[GN]

GOOGLE LLC: Faces Biometric Privacy Class Suit Over Face Blur Tool
------------------------------------------------------------------
lawstreetmedia.com reports that a YouTuber sued YouTube and parent
company Google (together, YouTube), alleging that it
surreptitiously collects, uses, and stores millions of Illinois
residents' faces through use of its "Face Blur" tool. According to
the complaint, 2012-launched Face Blur allows video uploaders to
select faces in a video and blur them, making those faces
unrecognizable to viewers.

The filing claims that "[u]nbeknownst to the average consumer,
Defendants' "Face Blur" tool relies on state-of-the-art facial
recognition technology to scan videos, locate human faces, and
create and store scans of face geometry." The complaint, using
screenshots of the YouTube website, explains that YouTube
permanently stores scans of facial geometry or biometric
information so that YouTube users do not need to re-use the tool.

In addition, the lawsuit points to YouTube's Thumbnail Generator,
which creates thumbnail photographs of various points within a
particular video to create a preview, mostly to generate views and
in turn, revenue for YouTube. The plaintiffs claim it is evidence
that YouTube has “a software program that has been trained to
detect faces. . . [and] it is likely that the software is
continually being optimized by gathering more facial geometry data
from YouTube videos.”

Consequently, the suit asserts that the Face Blur tool violates
their privacy rights because YouTube fails to disclose its
collection and storage of biometric information, and even if it
did, "it would still be a legally insufficient disclosure to the
individual whose image was captured and stored within the video."

The suit states two claims for relief under the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act (BIPA) and seeks statutory damages on
behalf of the Illinois resident class. The plaintiff and putative
class are represented by Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman
PLLC and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP. [GN]

H&R FOODS INC: Serna Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against H&R Foods Inc., et
al. The case is styled as Rachel Monique Serna, all others
similarly situated, and the general public v. H&R Foods Inc.,
Hardeep Singh, Does 1-50Case No. 34-2022-00325937-CU-OE-GDS (Cal.
Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., Aug. 29, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

H&R Foods -- https://www.handrfoods.com/ -- has consistently
provided high quality Beef, Pork and Poultry. Family owned, H&R
foods services nearly 200 independent food companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David G. Spivak, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Blvd, Ste. 203
          Encino, CA 91436-4535
          Phone: 818-582-3086
          Fax: 818-582-2561
          Email: david@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Walter L Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
          5500 Bolsa Ave., Ste. 203
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649-1102
          Phone: 562-256-1047
          Fax: 562-256-1006
          Email: whaines@uelglaw.com


HARDER MECHANICAL: $1.5MM Settlement in Ellis Suit Wins Prelim. Nod
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARY ELLIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. HARDER MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00844-JSW (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Jeffrey S. White of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of class action settlement.

The Plaintiffs bring the class action on behalf of current and
former hourly-paid California employees of the Defendant. The first
amended complaint alleges class claims based on allegations that
the Defendant's wage policies and practices violated California
Labor Code sections 201-203 and 1194. At mediation, the parties
reached an agreement to resolve the action, and now the Plaintiffs
seek preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement.

The Settlement Agreement defines "Class Members" as "all current
and former hourly employees who worked for Defendant in California
during the Class Period." The Class Period is May 1, 2016 through
June 2, 2022. "Settlement Class Members" ("SCMs") are defined as
"all Class Members who do not submit a valid Request for
Exclusion." There are an estimated 2,200 Class Members.

The Maximum Settlement Amount ("MSA") is $1.5 million plus the
Defendant's share of payroll taxes. After subtracting fees and
costs, the Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be $1,079,000.
SCMs will receive individual settlement payments in an amount to be
calculated by dividing the number of Qualified Shifts for each
individual SCM by the total number of Qualified Shifts for all
SCMs. The payment ratio for each SCM will then be multiplied by the
Net Settlement Amount to calculate the SCM's share of the Net
Settlement Amount. No gross individual settlement payment will be
less than $25, and each SCM is expected to receive an average
individual payment of $490.45. The Defendant has no reversionary
interest in the MSA. Unclaimed funds will be sent to the State
Controller's Office, Unclaimed Property Division.

The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement explains the terms
of the Settlement, describes how Class Members can opt out or
object, and gives the deadlines to do so. It will be individualized
to provide each Class Member's number of Qualified Shifts and
calculation of their estimated Individual Settlement Payment. It
informs Class Members that they have 45 calendar days from the date
the Notices are mailed to request exclusion from or object to the
Settlement. The Notice explains the process to dispute the number
of Qualified Shifts stated on their individualized Notice.

Judge White concludes that preliminary certification of the class
for settlement purposes is proper. Based on the record, he finds
that the Settlement appears to the product of serious, informed,
non-collusive negotiations. He further finds that that proposed
settlement falls within the range of possible final approval, has
no obvious deficiencies, and does not improperly grant preferential
treatment to class representatives or segments of the class.
Lastly, he finds the proposed manner of class notice satisfies the
requirements of due process, and complies with applicable law,
including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge White grants the Plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary approval.

The action is provisionally certified as a class action, for
settlement purposes only, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. The settlement Class is defined as follows: "All
current and former hourly employees who worked for Defendant in
California during the Class Period." The Class Period is defined as
May 1, 2016 through June 2, 2022, inclusive.

Judge White preliminarily approves the proposed settlement as set
forth in the Settlement Agreement as within the range of possible
final approval. He preliminarily appoints (i) Keller Grover LLP and
the Law Offices of Scot D. Bernstein, A Professional Corporation,
as the Class Counsel; (ii) Jeff Shipe as the Class Representative
for the settlement Class; and (iiii) Phoenix Settlement
Administrators to serve as the Settlement Administrator and directs
them to carry out all duties and responsibilities of the Settlement
Administrator specified in the Settlement Agreement.

No later than 28 calendar days after the Order is entered by the
Court, and only after the Defendant receives sufficient and
reasonable assurance that the Settlement Administrator will
maintain the confidentiality of the Class Data, the Defendant will
provide the Settlement Administrator with the Class Data. The Class
Data will be formatted as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and will
include all of the following information: (i) each Class Member's
full name; (ii) each Class Member's last-known address; (iii) each
Class Member's Social Security and Employee ID numbers; and (iv)
the number of shifts worked by each Class Member during the Class
Period.

The Settlement Administrator will be obligated to keep the Class
Data confidential and will take reasonable and necessary
precautions to maintain the confidentiality of the data. It will
not distribute or use the Class Data or any information contained
therein for any purpose other than to administer this settlement.

Within 14 calendar days after receiving the Class Data, the
Settlement Administrator will send Class Members, by first-class
mail to their last known addresses, the Court-approved Notice. It
will perform address updates and verifications as necessary prior
to the first mailing.

If any Notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement
Administrator will perform skip-traces on returned mail and will
re-mail the Notices to updated addresses (if any) as soon as
possible upon return of the undeliverable Notices.

Class Members who wish to receive a settlement payment are not
required to submit a claim form. Any Class Member who seeks
exclusion from the Class must send a signed, written request to be
excluded from the settlement via mail to the address specified in
the Notice that must be postmarked no later than 45 calendar days
after the date the Notice is first mailed by the Settlement
Administrator.

Any Class Member who seeks to object to the settlement must send a
written statement of objection to the address specified in the
Notice which must be postmarked no later than the Response
Deadline.

The Plaintiff will file the motion for final approval and motion
applying for awards of attorneys' fees and costs, the Class
Representative Incentive Awards and settlement administration costs
no later than 35 days prior to the Response Deadline.

The Final Approval Hearing will be held on Jan. 6, 2023, at 9:00
a.m., at 1301 Clay Street, Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, in Oakland,
California 94612.

Pending the final determination of whether the settlement should be
approved, all proceedings in the action, except as necessary to
implement the settlement or comply with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement or the Order, are stayed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5ayd3hzr from Leagle.com.


HEART OF IOWA MARKET: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Heart of Iowa Market
Place, LLC. The case is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Heart of Iowa Market
Place, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07364 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Heart of Iowa Market Place -- https://heartofiowamarketplace.com/
-- specialize in locally crafted and Iowa themed foods and
gifts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


HOMEAGLOW INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Costley Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY COSTLEY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HOMEAGLOW INC., Defendant, Case
No. 22STCV27159 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., Aug. 22, 2022)
seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime
compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Costley was employed by the Defendant as housekeeper.

HOMEAGLOW INC. offers residential cleaning services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jean-Claude Lapuyade, Esq.
          Eduardo Garcia, Esq.
          Sydney Castillo Johnson, Esq.
          JCS LAW FIRM, APC
          5440 Morehouse Drive, Suite 3600
          San Diego, CA 92121
          Telephone: (619) 599-8292
          Facsimile: (619) 5998291
          Email: jlapuyade@jcl-lawfirm.com
                 egarcia@jcl-lawfirm.com
                 scastillo@jcl-lawfirm.com

INDIANAPOLIS NEUROSURGICAL: Gill Files Suit in S.D. Indiana
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Indianapolis
Neurosurgical Group, P.C. The case is styled as Dylan Gill,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Indianapolis Neurosurgical Group, P.C. d/b/a Goodman Campbell Brain
and Spine, Case No. 1:22-cv-01704-TWP-DLP (S.D. Ind., Aug. 26,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated Other P.I. for Tort/Non-Motor
Vehicle.

Indianapolis Neurosurgical Group, P.C. doing business as Goodman
Campbell Brain and Spine -- https://www.goodmancampbell.com/ -- is
one of North America's largest and most progressive neurosurgical
practices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Cody Alexander Bolce, Esq.
          555 12th Street, Suit # 1725
          Ste Suit # 1725
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Phone: (510) 891-9800
          Fax: (510) 891-7030
          Email: cab@colevannote.com


INSPIRED DESIGN: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Inspired Design, LLC.
The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Inspired Design, LLC d/b/a The
Polish Pottery Outlet, Case No. 1:22-cv-07302 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 26,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Inspired Design, LLC doing business as The Polish Pottery Outlet --
https://polishpotteryoutlet.com/ -- is a strip-center showroom
featuring a variety of signature & traditional patterns of Polish
pottery.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


IRBSEARCH LLC: Parker FCRA Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Tabitha Parker, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. IRBSearch, LLC, Case No.
22-CA-004980 was removed from the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit, to the U.S. District Court for Middle District of
Florida on Aug. 29, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:22-cv-01988 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

IRBsearch -- https://www.irbsearch.com/ -- allows investigative
professionals to search billions of records including: criminal
records, bankruptcies, property, businesses, reverse phone lookup,
employment, and many more.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kathryn Lopez, Esq.
          COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE
          4301 W. Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 400
          Tampa, FL 33607
          Phone: (813) 509-2621
          Email: kathryn.lopez@csklegal.com


IT GUYZ SOLUTIONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Marshall Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
EDDIE MARSHALL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. IT GUYZ SOLUTIONS, LLC; EDGEWATER
INVESTMENTS, LLC; JOSEPH CHRISTOPHER RILEY; and KEITH OLINGER,
Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00493-MWM (S.D. Ohio., Aug. 23, 2022)
is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

Plaintiff Marshall was employed by the Defendants as technician.

IT GUYZ SOLUTIONS, LLC is a computer service provider. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew S. Okiishi, Esq.
          Stephen E. Imm, Esq.
          FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC
          4270 Ivy Pointe Blvd., Suite 225
          Cincinnati, OH 45245
          Telephone: (513) 943-6659
          Facsimile: (513) 943-6669
          Email:  stephen@finneylawfirm.com
                  matt@finneylawfirm.com

JK MOSS ENTERPRISES: Jones Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against JK Moss Enterprises,
LLC. The case is styled as Damon Jones, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. JK Moss Enterprises, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-07356 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

JK Moss Enterprises, LLC doing business as Pickle Barrel Trading
Post -- https://picklebarreltradingpost.com/ -- is a native
american goods store in Globe, Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


KAISER FOUNDATION: Getubig Labor Suit Goes to N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled FAYE GETUBIG, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC.
and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No. 22CV015742, was removed from the
Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, to
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on
August 23, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:22-cv-04834-SK to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violation of the
California's Unfair Competition Law due to its failure to comply
with federal law concerning COVID-19 testing requirements.

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. is a non-profit health care
organization, headquartered in California. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         John T. Brooks, Esq.
         Samuel Duimovich, Esq.
         SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
         501 W. Broadway, 19th Floor
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 338-6500
         Facsimile: (213) 620-1398
         E-mail: jbrooks@sheppardmullin.com
                 sduimovich@sheppardmullin.com

KARAN REALTY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Perez Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
NELSON PEREZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly-situated, Plaintiff v. KARAN REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC; and
WALTER BLACK, Defendants, Case No. 51637FBD-FAD7-4D76-9B22-704612
(E.D.N.Y., Aug. 23, 2022) is an action against the Defendant for
failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, provide meals
and rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements.

Plaintiff Perez was employed by the Defendants as janitor.

KARAN REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC owns, operates, manages, and controls
a multi-unit residential building located at Richmond Hill, New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nolan K. Klein, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF NOLAN KLEIN
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (954) 745-0588
          Email: klein@nklegal.com
                 amy@nklegal.com
                 melanie@nklegal.com

KROGER CO: Coffee Creamer Does Not Contain Real Cream, Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Nghiem at madisonrecord.com reports that an Illinois woman
filed a class action lawsuit against Kroger, claiming the company's
"coffee creamer" products don't contain any actual cream.

Plaintiff Stacy Sumner filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois against The
Kroger Co. citing violations of the state's Consumer Fraud Acts.
The suit was filed through Spencer Sheehan of Sheehan & Associates
PC in Great Neck, N.Y.

The lawsuit alleges Kroger sells various products misleadingly
labeled as "coffee creamer," which allegedly contain no actual
dairy ingredients. She claims Kroger goes even further and puts the
words "Ultra Pasteurized" on the label, which could lead consumers
to expect that the products contain dairy ingredients. The
plaintiff states that the list of ingredients on these products
shows that they contain no actual dairy products and less than 1
percent of the milk derivative sodium caseinate. She adds that
nowhere on the product is it labeled "non-dairy."

Sumner claims she bought the product, believing it to contain
actual dairy products. She claims she paid a higher price than she
would have for similar products that are correctly labeled as
"non-dairy coffee whiteners."

According to the lawsuit, Kroger deceptively and fraudulently
misrepresented the products in violation of the state's Consumer
Fraud Acts.

Sumner is demanding a jury trial to seek damages for herself and
everyone in her class action lawsuit plus court costs, plus
attorney fees and any other relief the court deems proper. She is
also seeking injunctive action to order Kroger to cease from
further misrepresentation of its products.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois case
number 3:22-CV-01950 [GN]

LATCH INC: Federman & Sherwood Discloses Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood discloses that on August 31, 2022, a class
action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York against Latch, Inc. f/k/a TS
Innovation Acquisitions Corp. (NASDAQ: LTCH). The complaint alleges
violations of federal securities laws, Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, including
allegations of issuing a series of material or false
misrepresentations to the market which had the effect of
artificially inflating the market price during the Class Period,
which is May 13, 2021 through August 25, 2022.

To learn how to participate in this action, please visit:

https://www.federmanlaw.com/blog/federman-sherwood-announces-filing-of-securities-class-action-lawsuit-against-latch-inc

The lawsuit seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Latch, Inc.
shareholders who purchased common stock during the Class Period.
You may move the Court no later than October 31, 2022, to serve as
a lead plaintiff on behalf of the Class.

If you wish to join this action or obtain further information,
please contact: Lacrista A. Bagley at lab@federmanlaw.com or visit
the firm's website at www.federmanlaw.com. [GN]

MAINLINE PRIVATE: Misclassifies Security Guards, Dennis Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL DENNIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MAINLINE PRIVATE SECURITY, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:22-cv-03339 (E.D. Penn., August 22, 2022) is a
collective and class action complaint brought against the Defendant
for its alleged failure to pay overtime compensation in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage
Act.

The Plaintiff began his employment with the Defendant in October
2018 as a Security Guard until his most recent assignment ended on
or May 8, 2022.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated security guards were misclassified by the Defendant as
independent contractors. Despite regularly working more than 40
hours per week, the Defendant paid them only straight-time
compensation without overtime pay. The Defendant allegedly failed
to pay them overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half
times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of
40 per workweek, says the suit.

As a result of the Defendant's alleged unlawful practice, the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated Security Guards have
suffered damages. Thus, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated Security Guards, the Plaintiff seeks unpaid
overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and
all costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and other relief as the
Court may deem proper.

Mainline Private Security, LLC provides security services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Murphy, Esq.
          Michael Groh, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC
          Eight Penn Center, Suite 2000
          1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Tel: (267) 273-1054
          Fax: (215) 525-0210
          E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  mgroh@phillyemploymentlawyer.com

MAKING IT BIG: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Making It Big, Inc.
The case is styled as Veronica Maddy, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Making It Big, Inc. d/b/a On The Plus
Side, Case No. 1:22-cv-07369 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Making It Big, Inc. doing business as On The Plus Side --
https://www.ontheplusside.com/ -- designs and sells plus size
clothing for women worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


MAMAN GROUP: Underpays Restaurant Employees, Torres Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALEJANDRO TORRES, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MAMAN GROUP NEW YORK CORP., MAMAN
TRIBECA, LLC, and "JOHN DOES I-V", Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-05029 (E.D.N.Y., August 24, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law including failure to pay minimum wages,
failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide wage notices,
failure to provide accurate wage statements, and failure to pay
spread-of-hours pay.

The Plaintiff was employed as a general manager and waiter at the
Defendants' cafe known as Maman, located at 211 West Broadway, New
York, New York from on or around March 2022 through and including
July 2022.

Maman Group New York Corp. is a restaurant owner and operator, with
its principal place of business at 211 West Broadway, New York, New
York.

Maman Tribeca, LLC is a restaurant owner and operator, with its
principal place of business at 211 West Broadway, New York, New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
         Jason Mizrahi, Esq.
         LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 792-0046
         E-mail: Joshua@levinepstein.com

MDL 2913: Causes Youth E-Cigarette Crisis, Mammoth-San Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
MAMMOTH-SAN MANUEL UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA
GROUP, INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC,
ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN,
NICHOLAS PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case
No. 3:22-cv-04821 (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and
violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Mammoth-San Manuel Unified School District case has been
consolidated in MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING,
SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge William H. Orrick.

Mammoth-San Manuel Unified School District is a unified school
district with its offices located at 711 McNab Parkway in San
Manuel, Arizona.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

MDL 2913: Entices Youth to Use E-Cigarette, Fast Forward Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
FAST FORWARD CHARTER HIGH SCHOOL, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA
GROUP, INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC,
ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN,
NICHOLAS PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case
No. 3:22-cv-04820 (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and
violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Fast Forward Charter High School case has been consolidated in MDL
No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge William H. Orrick.

Fast Forward Charter High School is a charter high school with its
offices located at 875 W. 1400 N. in Logan, Utah.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

MDL 2913: Faces Bridge Creek Suit Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Ads
----------------------------------------------------------------
BRIDGE CREEK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA GROUP,
INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC, ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN, NICHOLAS
PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case No.
3:22-cv-04819 (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and
violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis.

Bridge Creek Public Schools case has been consolidated in MDL No.
2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge William H. Orrick.

Bridge Creek Public Schools is a unified school district with its
offices located at 2209 East Spooner Road in Blanchard, Oklahoma.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

MDL 2913: Faces Okarche Public Suit Over Youth E-Cigarette Crisis
-----------------------------------------------------------------
OKARCHE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA GROUP,
INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC, ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN, NICHOLAS
PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case No.
3:22-cv-04818 (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and
violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Okarche Public Schools case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2913,
IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
William H. Orrick.

Okarche Public Schools is a unified school district with its
offices located at 632 West Oklahoma Ave in Okarche, Oklahoma.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

MILWAUKEE, WI: Class Settlement in Kraai Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KARL H. KRAAI, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Defendant, Case
No. 20-CV-909 (E.D. Wis.), Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
grants the parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement, Certification of a Rule 23 Class, and
Certification of a Collective Action.

Preliminary approval of the parties' Settlement Agreement and
Release of Claims is granted as the Court finds that the settlement
terms negotiated by the Parties and described in the Settlement
Agreement are a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide
dispute between the Defendant and all affected employees and other
persons who performed production work for it during the relevant
timeframes at the relevant facilities.

The Plaintiff's Rule 23 class is certified for settlement purposes
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The class is defined as follows: "All persons who are or have been
employed by the City of Milwaukee as non-FLSA-exempt employees of
the Milwaukee Fire Department engaged in fire protection
activities, within two (2) years prior to May 8, 2020, and who
allege they have not been fully compensated for all hours worked in
excess of two hundred four (204) hours per twenty-seven (27) day
work period based upon an undercalculation of the regular rate."

Karl Kraai will serve as the representative and the law firm of
MacGillis Wiemer, LLC is appointed as the class counsel for the
certified Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class.

Judge Duffin certifies the case as a collective action pursuant to
29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) with respect to the following collective:
"All persons who are or have been employed by the City of Milwaukee
as non-FLSA-exempt employees of the Milwaukee Fire Department
engaged in fire protection activities, within three (3) years prior
to May 8, 2020, and who allege they have not been fully compensated
for all hours worked in excess of two hundred four (204) hours per
twenty-seven (27) day work period based upon an undercalculation of
the regular rate."

Judge Duffin approves the Notice of Class Action and Collective
Action Settlement and Consent and Claim Form. Such notice will be
mailed within 10 days of the date of the Order.

Each potential Class Member who wishes to be excluded from the
Settlement Class must opt-out per the instructions set forth in the
Notice, and any such responses must be received within 60 days of
the mailing of the Notice. Any Class Member who has not properly
and timely requested exclusion from the Settlement Class will be
bound in the event the Court issues a final order approving the
Settlement Agreement.

The Court will conduct a Fairness Hearing on Dec. 20, 2022, at
10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 242, United States Courthouse, 517 E.
Wisconsin Avenue, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

The Class Counsel will file a Petition for Approval of Attorneys'
Fees and Costs at least 21) days prior to the Fairness Hearing,
which will not exceed $400,000. Any supplemental brief in support
of final approval of the Settlement Agreement or in response to any
objections to the application for attorneys' fees is to be filed at
least seven days before the Fairness Hearing. The Court will
determine at the Fairness Hearing in what amount attorneys' fees
and reimbursement of costs and expenses should be awarded to the
Class Counsel.

Any Class Member who wishes to object in any way to the proposed
Settlement Agreement must file and serve such written objections
per the instructions set forth in the Notice no later than 60 days
after the mailing of the Notice, together with copies of all papers
in support of his or her position. The Court will not consider
objections of any Class Member who has not properly served copies
of his or her objections on a timely basis.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p4sxtuj from Leagle.com.


MIRAMED REVENUE: Mitchell Sues Over Illegal Biometric Collection
----------------------------------------------------------------
CALISHA MITCHELL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MIRAMED REVENUE GROUP, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2022LA000760 (Cir., DuPage Cty., Il., Aug. 23,
2022) alleges violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant has not
properly informed employees in writing that a biometric identifier
or biometric information is being captured, obtained, collected or
stored; informed employees in writing of the specific purpose and
length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric
information is being collected, stored, and used; obtained
employees' proper written consent to the capture, collection,
obtainment or storage of their biometric identifier and biometric
information derived from it; or obtained employees' executed
written release as a condition of employment in violation of BIPA.

MIRAMED REVENUE GROUP, LLC was founded in 2008. The company's line
of business includes home health care services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
          Paul A. Lesko, Esq.
          Adam Florek, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR KANE
          CONWAY & WISE, LLP
          818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 218
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Telephone: (314) 833-4825
          Email: bwise@peifferwolf.com
                 plesko@peifferwolf.com
                 aflorek@peifferwolf.com

MISSOURI: Court Denies Pate's Bid to Intervene in Parton v. White
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL PARTON, et al., Plaintiffs v. CARL WHITE, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:81-cv-19-DDN (E.D. Mo.), Magistrate
Judge David D. Noce of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Northern Division, issued an order:

   a. denying Movant Jermaine Cortez Pate's motions to intervene;
      to reopen and enforce the consent decree entered on Dec. 8,
      1983; for injunctive relief; and for the appointment of
      counsel; and

   b. denying as moot the Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack
      of standing.

The case was originally filed on May 11, 1981, by three inmates at
what was then called the Missouri Training Center for Men, now
named the Moberly Correctional Center. The Plaintiffs alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, largely related to
overcrowding. The action was then conditionally maintained as a
class action, and an amended complaint was filed on April 15, 1983.
On Dec, 8, 1983, the parties entered into a consent decree, which
was approved by the Court on Dec. 30, 1983. Though the case was
administratively closed with the approval of the consent decree,
the Court actively monitored the conditions at the prison through
January 1998, occasionally sustaining the Defendants' motions for
modification of the decree while requiring them to file periodic
compliance reports. Prior to the motions presently before the
Court, the case had been inactive since May 2001.

On Feb. 18, 2022, the Movant filed a motion to intervene and to
enforce the consent decree, stating that the original plaintiffs
are "no longer available." He alleged unconstitutional conditions
of confinement, including food service violations; an unsafe work
environment; inadequate health care; and inadequate living
conditions. From March 15 to May 20, 2022, he filed additional
motions to reopen the consent decree proceedings; to enforce the
consent decree and for sanctions for breach of the decree; for an
injunction to prevent his transfer to another institution; for
modification of the consent decree and injunctive relief; and to
appoint counsel. The Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on
June 3, 2022.

The Movant has also filed in the Court a separate complaint
regarding the same issues, which the Court construed as an attempt
to litigate the consent decree in the case -- Pate v. White, No.
2:22-CV-006 RLW, 2022 WL 2802308 at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2022).
The Court dismissed that action without prejudice.

Judge Noce first considers the Plaintiff's motions to intervene and
reopen the consent decree. In their motion to dismiss, the
Defendants argue that the Movant, as a non-party, lacks standing to
enforce the consent decree. They also argue that the Plaintiff's
motion for an injunction preventing his transfer should be denied,
as it fails under the Dataphase factors.

As to standing, Judge Noce concludes that the Movant does not have
standing to intervene and reopen the consent decree. Because his
complaint in Pate v. White, No. 2:22-CV-006 RLW, was dismissed
without prejudice, he may file a separate action to challenge
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Moberly
Correctional Center.

The Movant seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent
his transfer to another prison, contending that the Defendants plan
to transfer him in retaliation for his efforts to reopen the
consent decree. He additionally seeks injunctive relief for the
remediation of allegedly inadequate living conditions.

In Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th
Cir. 1981), in determining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, the Court must consider four factors: "(1) the threat
of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between
this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict
on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will
succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest."

Judge Noce finds that none of the four factors is determinative,
and each must be examined "in the context of the relative injuries
to the parties and the public." However, "the absence of a
likelihood of success on the merits strongly suggests that
preliminary injunctive relief should be denied." A request for
injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with caution
because "judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing
with the complex and intractable problems of prison
administration."

In his "verified petition for preliminary and permanent
injunction," the Movant states that he recently received a conduct
violation report due to an unauthorized relationship with staff. He
alleges that the "conduct violation is due to him reopening the
consent decree" and that the Defendants intend to use the conduct
violation report to transfer him to another facility as pretext for
retaliation.

Judge Noce construes the request for injunctive relief as a claim
of retaliatory transfer. Though an inmate may be transferred from
one prison to another for a constitutionally permissible reason or
no reason at all, prison officials may not punish an inmate because
he exercises his constitutional right of access to the courts.

The Movant's request for injunctive relief provides few details
beyond his conclusory assertions. He does not state when the
transfer will occur, nor does he provide information about the
conduct violation report. It is also unclear from the motion
whether his conduct violation was a product of the present
litigation or whether the violation report was prepared as
retaliation. The Movant has failed to carry his substantial burden
to prove that the motivating factor for his possible transfer is
retaliation. He is therefore unlikely to succeed on the merits of a
retaliatory transfer claim.

Transfer in retaliation for challenging the conditions of his
confinement would constitute irreparable harm to movant, as his
transfer to another facility would render his claims moot. However,
the remaining factors, the balance of harms and the public
interest, weigh in favor of the Defendants. The Movant is unlikely
to succeed on the merits, so there is no public interest in
enjoining his transfer. Moreover, injunctive relief would harm
defendants, as it would interfere with the complex task of prison
administration.

The Movant seeks an injunction requiring defendants to remediate
"inadequate living conditions," including asbestos, poor air and
water quality, food handling violations, vermin, lead-based paint
hazards, and structural damage. Judge Noce construes the Movant's
allegations as challenges to his conditions of confinement under
the Eighth Amendment. He says, all of the Dataphase factors weigh
in favor of denying the motion for injunctive relief. The Movant
does not have standing to litigate the consent decree, so he cannot
succeed on the merits in the action. Additionally, the Court is
without sufficient information to determine whether the conditions
alleged by movant constitute irreparable harm to him. While it is
in the public interest to protect his constitutional rights, he
cannot succeed on the merits, so there is no public interest in
granting injunctive relief. Finally, injunctive relief would harm
defendants in that it would interfere with prison administration.

Because the Movant has failed to carry his burden, Judge Noce
denies his motions for injunctive relief without prejudice to their
refiling in a separate action.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Noce denies with prejudice the
motions of Pate to intervene and to reopen the proceedings. He
denies without prejudice Pate's motions for injunctive relief. He
denies as moot Pate's motions to enforce the consent decree, to
modify the consent decree, and for appointment of counsel.

Judge Noce denies as moot the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

An appropriate Judgment Order is issued therewith.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/7habrc9r from Leagle.com.


MJC ACQUISITION: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MJC Acquisition, LLC.
The case is styled as Andrew Toro, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. MJC Acquisition, LLC d/b/a Matilda
Jane Clothing, Case No. 1:22-cv-07354 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

MJC Acquisition LLC doing business as Matilda Jane Clothing --
https://www.matildajaneclothing.com/ -- provides online clothing
distribution services. The Company offers dresses, tops, bottoms,
skirts, and other accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


MONA LISA PIZZERIA: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Gomez Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case, JUAN CARLOS GOMEZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MONA LISA PIZZERIA, INC., a New
Jersey corporation, and CHRISTOPHER COCCHI, an individual,
Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-05146 (D.N.J., August 22, 2022) arises
from the Defendants' alleged willful and intentional violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, and
the New Jersey Wage Payment Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from approximately
March 2020 through November 2020 as a general assistant, whose job
included cleaning, washing dishes, preparing ingredients, and any
other task or job that he was assigned at any given time.

Throughout his employment with the Defendants, the Plaintiff was
paid at the rate of $12.00 per hour for each hour worked and in
cash, but with no pay stubs provided. The Plaintiff was never any
raises during the term of his employment. Despite working more than
40 hours per week, the Defendants failed to pay him any overtime
premium at the rate of one and one-half times his regular rates of
pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the
Plaintiff.

As a result of the Defendants' alleged unlawful practice, the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were harmed and
damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Thus, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated employees, the Plaintiff
brings this complaint as a collective action seeking to recover
unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, post-judgment interest,
litigation costs together with reasonable attorneys' fees, and
other relief as the Court deems necessary and proper.

Mona Lisa Pizzeria, Inc. operates a restaurant. Christopher Cocchi
is the owner of the Corporate Defendant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Erik M. Bashian, Esq.
          BASHIAN & PAPANTONIOU, P.C.
          500 Old Country Road, Suite 302
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Tel: (516) 279-1554
          Fax: (516) 213-0339
          E-mail: eb@bashpaplaw.com

                - and –

          Nolan Klein, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF NOLAN KLEIN, P.A.
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Tel: (954) 745-0588
          E-mail: klein@nklegal.com
                  amy@nklegal.com
                  melanie@nklegal.com

MULTICARE HEALTH: Wash. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in M.N. Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, M.N. and G.T., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Appellants, A.B. and W.N., individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs Below v.
MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., a Washington corporation,
Respondents, Case No. 55288-4-II (Wash. App.), the Court of Appeals
of Washington, Division Two, affirms the superior court's order
granting summary judgment for MultiCare and dismissing the General
Treatment Class' negligence claims.

In 2018, an investigation was conducted relating to two patients
who were diagnosed with Hepatitis C infections despite having no
risk factors for the infection. The investigation revealed that a
nurse, Cora Weberg, was diverting drugs from the emergency
department for her own use. Weberg's drug diversion caused the
Hepatitis C infections.

MultiCare identified a total of 2,985 patients who were treated
with certain drugs in the emergency department while Weberg was
working. Weberg treated 208 of the identified patients. The
remaining 2,554 patients had no record of being treated by Weberg.

MultiCare notified 2,762 patients who were treated in the emergency
department while Weberg was working that they may be at risk of
infection and instructed the patients to get tested for Hepatitis
B, Hepatitis C, and the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV). The
notification letter stated that an employee "may have exposed at
least two patients to Hepatitis C." It offered free testing and any
related follow-up for Hepatitis and HIV for all patients who were
treated with injections in the emergency department while Weberg
was working.

After receiving MultiCare's notification letter, patients "who were
subject to both actual and potential Hepatitis C exposure" filed a
class action lawsuit against MultiCare, alleging a violation of
chapter 7.70 RCW and corporate negligence. The complaint alleged
that MultiCare negligently hired, trained, and supervised Weberg;
failed to investigate Weberg and the misuse of drugs; and failed to
implement or follow policies and procedures regarding proper
medication management.

The complaint asserted that, as a result of MultiCare's negligence,
the class members incurred the need for necessary medical care,
treatment, and services received as of the filing of this action
and with reasonable probability to be required in the future; have
incurred inconvenience and loss of time associated with such
medical care, treatment, and services; suffered serious emotional
distress, including but not limited to living with the knowledge
that they could have or potentially will contract a bloodborne
pathogen disease, such as Hepatitis C.

The superior court granted class certification and certified two
classes. The "'Weberg Treatment Class'" included the patients who
received treatment from Weberg. The "'General Treatment Class"
included the patients who were in the emergency department and
received MultiCare's notification letter but did not receive any
treatment from Weberg. M.N. and G.T. were appointed class
representatives for the General Treatment Class. The court created
two classes to eliminate "any concern that patients not directly
treated by Nurse Weberg may not be entitled to relief under the
same cause of action" as those patients directly treated by
Weberg.

MultiCare moved for summary judgment for all claims asserted by the
General Treatment Class. It argued that that the injuries alleged
by the General Treatment Class were not proximately caused by the
alleged negligent acts because the class members suffered no actual
exposure.

In opposing summary judgment, the General Treatment Class argued
that it was owed a duty under chapter 7.70 RCW and corporate
negligence. Further, the General Treatment Class argued that they
were not required to show actual exposure to Hepatitis C in order
to establish its claims.

The superior court granted MultiCare's motion for summary judgment
and dismissed the claims alleged by the General Treatment Class
against MultiCare. M.N. and G.T. moved for reconsideration of the
superior court's order granting summary judgment to MultiCare,
which the superior court denied.

M.N. and G.T. appeal.

M.N. and G.T. argue that MultiCare's negligence was the proximate
cause of the General Treatment Class's injuries. MultiCare argues
that the General Treatment Class has failed to establish legal
causation and, therefore, failed to establish proximate cause.

The Court of Appeals finds that there appears to be no bright-line
rule regarding the requirement of actual exposure to establish
proximate cause. Rather, proximate cause for claims based on
damages resulting from the risk of contracting an infectious
disease, which is the basis of the General Treatment Class' claims,
appears to be resolved based on a determination of legal causation
-- where to draw a line regarding liability based on policy
considerations.

M.N. and G.T. also argue that the General Treatment Class has
established legal causation because, as a matter of policy,
MultiCare should be held accountable for its actions. Specifically,
they assert that "forcing the innocent members of the General
Treatment Class to bear the burden for the emotional distress,
inconvenience, and physical harm from invasive testing caused by
MultiCare's negligence would run afoul of the basic and guiding
principle of the law of torts: To afford compensation for injuries
sustained by one person as a result of the tortious conduct of
another." MultiCare asserts that M.N. and G.T. have failed to
establish legal causation because any damages from Weberg's conduct
are too attenuated and policy considerations do not support
extending liability for the direct consequences of the notification
letter to the General Treatment Class.

In weighing the policy considerations, the Court of Appeals is
persuaded that the policy of encouraging medical institutions to be
open, transparent, and overinclusive outweighs the General
Treatment Class' fear of contracting a communicable disease caused
by MultiCare's notification letter. Accordingly, it holds that the
General Treatment Class has failed to establish legal causation.

Because the General Treatment Class has failed to establish
proximate cause as a matter of law, the superior court properly
granted summary judgment and dismissed their claims. The Court of
Appeals affirms the superior court's order granting summary
judgment.

A majority of the panel having determined that the Opinion will not
be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed
for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, the Court of
Appeals so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/489umd4p from Leagle.com.

Cari Campen Laufenberg -- claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., 1201 3rd Ave Ste 3200, Seattle, WA, 98101-3052,
Jeff Nicholas Comstock, Attorney at Law, 8018 Linden Ave N,
Seattle, WA, 98103-4340, Counsel for the Appellant(s).

Joseph Vickers Gardner, Attorney at Law, 701 5th Ave Ste 4750,
Seattle, WA, 98104-7089, Michele Christine Forrar Atkins --
michele@favros.com -- Fain Anderson Et Al, 701 5th Ave Ste 4750,
Seattle, WA, 98104-7089, Todd Wesley Reichert --
todd@favros.com -- Fain Anderson, Et Al, 701 5th Ave Ste 4750,
Seattle, WA, 98104-7089, Amanda Kathleen Thorsvig --
amanda@favros.com -- Fain Anderson, Et Al, 1301 A St Ste 900,
Tacoma, WA, 98402-4299, Counsel for the Respondent(s).


MYLAN N.V.: Partially Compelled to Reply to KPH's FRPs of Documents
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KPH HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a/k/a KINNEY DRUGS
INC., FWK HOLDINGS LLC, and CESAR CASTILLO, LLC, individually and
on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MYLAN,
N.V., MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., MYLAN SPECIALTY L.P., PFIZER,
INC., KING PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and MERIDIAN MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-02065-DDC-TJJ (D.
Kan.), Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James of the U.S. District Court
for the District Kansas grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs'
First Requests for Production of Documents.

On Nov. 25, 2021, following Mylan's production to the Plaintiffs of
the documents the Defendants had produced in the MDL, the
Plaintiffs served their First Set of Document Requests to Mylan. In
conjunction with these requests, they have identified four new
custodians and 18 new search strings, and have asked Mylan to
produce documents created after 2016, which was the cutoff for
Mylan's document production in the MDL. Mylan has declined these
requests. In addition to seeking an order compelling Mylan to
comply with their discovery requests, the Plaintiffs challenge
certain entries on Mylan's MDL privilege log.

The Plaintiffs recount the parties' efforts to resolve their
differences through numerous meetings and exchanges of letters over
several weeks. Mylan's response also refers to the parties'
communications. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs were not satisfied with
Mylan's responses and this motion followed.

The Plaintiffs contend that Mylan has agreed to search for and
produce only a narrow subset of the 12 categories of documents
Plaintiffs have requested. Mylan objected to any further production
on grounds of duplicity, burdensomeness, and proportionality. After
conferring, the Plaintiffs requested Mylan add four new records
custodians and apply search terms to capture and produce documents
created after Aug. 23, 2016. Mylan rejected the request on the
basis that requiring searches of these individuals' files would not
yield unique results and would be burdensome and disproportional to
the needs of the case.

The Plaintiffs also asked Mylan to apply certain MDL search terms
and 18 new search strings to existing and newly collected documents
that they contend are relevant to the claims or issues in the case.
Mylan rejected the proposal, asserting the Plaintiffs had not tied
those search terms to the pending discovery requests. It also
declined to agree to produce documents created after 2016,
asserting it has produced relevant responsive documents and the
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a justifiable basis for the
request. The Plaintiffs deny Mylan has provided information
regarding the size, scope, or actual burden associated with
complying with Plaintiffs' requests.

The Plaintiffs also challenge certain entries on Mylan's privilege
log which it first produced in the MDL and has provided to them.
They contend Mylan has not met its burden to show that
communications between Mylan and Pfizer before July 2013 satisfy
the "common interest doctrine" as it relates to the Teva patent and
other patent litigations. Mylan disagrees, asserting it and Pfizer
have substantially identical legal interests in protecting the
validity and enforceability of the EpiPen patents. In addition, the
Plaintiffs allege Mylan's privilege log makes an insufficient
showing that certain communications were made for the purpose of
seeking or giving legal advice. Mylan disagrees.

There is no dispute that Mylan has produced to the Plaintiffs its
entire MDL production. But that production, while unquestionably
extensive, was never intended to supplant original discovery.
Accordingly, after the Plaintiffs reviewed the MDL production, they
served a first set of requests for production of documents on
Mylan. The following areas of dispute remain following the parties'
efforts to narrow and resolve their differences.

First, as to whether the Defendants must produce documents through
the present, Judge James holds that seeking documents to the
present does not make these requests overly broad, nor are they
disproportionate to the needs of the case. She grants the
Plaintiffs' motion insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan to
search for and produce relevant and responsive documents through
the present, except for those categories they have noted.

Next, as to whether Mylan's ESI search will include new custodians
and search terms. The Plaintiffs have asked Mylan to expand its ESI
search by adding four custodians and applying search terms not used
in the MDL production.

Judge James finds that (i) the Plaintiffs logically assert that
just because some communications involving Ms. Brooks appear in
custodial files of other Mylan witnesses does not mean she has no
relevant communications; (ii) Joseph Carrado, the former Vice
President, Clinical and Regulatory Affairs and voting member of the
Joint Commercial Committee designed to streamline distribution of
EpiPen products, should also be added as a custodian; (iii) Ron
Graybill, former Vice President of Managed Markets and member of
Mylan's EpiPen pricing committee, is a proper custodian; and (iv)
Satish Medakkar, former Vice President, Head of Global Commercial
Analytics & Insight, is also a proper custodian.

She further finds that (i) she overrules Mylan's objection that the
search terms are overbroad or duplicative of prior MDL requests and
productions; (ii) she denies the motion on the basis that four of
the proposed search strings are not tethered to the Plaintiffs'
RFPs; and (iii) she overrules Mylan's claim of undue burden.

Lastly, as to whether Mylan has waived privilege over certain
documents, the Plaintiffs raise two challenges to Mylan's privilege
log. The first is whether Mylan waived privilege by sharing
attorney-client communications with Pfizer, and the second is
whether Mylan adequately supported its asserted privilege in
certain entries.

Judge James finds Mylan must produce the Mylan-Pfizer
communications and documents dated or exchanged before July 1,
2013, and previously withheld on grounds of attorney-client
privilege and the common interest doctrine. And as Mylan points
out, the privilege log was the end product of painstaking document
reviews and negotiations among the MDL parties with much court
supervision. Without further discussion, Judge James denies the
Plaintiffs' motion with respect to its claim that Mylan has waived
privilege objections for the 1,493 documents at issue.

Based on the parties' efforts, Judge James finds they have complied
with the requirements of D. Kan. R. 37.2. She grants in part and
denies in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants'
Responses to Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production of Document.
Specifically, the motion is (1) granted insofar as it seeks an
order requiring Mylan to search for and produce relevant and
responsive documents through the present, except for those
categories the Plaintiffs have noted; (2) granted insofar as it
seeks an order requiring Mylan is to collect documents from Joseph
Carrado, Satish Medakkar, Kim Brooks, and Ron Graybill; (3) granted
insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan to apply the search
strings proposed by the Plaintiffs; (4) granted insofar as it seeks
an order requiring Mylan to produce documents shared between Pfizer
and Mylan that were created before July 2013 and appear on its
privilege log; and (5) denied insofar as it seeks an order
requiring Mylan to produce the 1,493 documents on its privilege log
described by the Plaintiffs.

Mylan will produce responsive documents within 30 days of the date
of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4664nvbz from Leagle.com.


NES GLOBAL: Fails to Pay Overtime Pay, Amin Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------
SACHIN AMIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NES GLOBAL, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
4:22-cv-02845 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 22, 2022) is an action brought under
the California Labor Code and the California's Unfair Competition
Law against the Defendant for its failure to pay the Plaintiff and
the class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40
hours per week.

Plaintiff Amin was employed by the Defendant as instrument
designer.

NES GLOBAL TALENT FINANCE US LLC provides professional services.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Carl A. Fitz, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                 adunlap@mybackwages.com
                 cfitz@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com

NEW JERSEY: Amended Carmona Suit v. NJDOE Dismissed W/o Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNICA CARMONA, et al., Plaintiffs v. NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
21-18746 (D.N.J.), Judge John Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey grants the Defendants' motions
to dismiss the Amended Complaint and denies their motion for
sanctions.

The Plaintiffs, parents of 15 special needs children, initiated the
putative class action against the New Jersey Department of
Education ("NJDOE"), multiple public-school districts throughout
New Jersey, and the New Jersey Commissioner of Education as well as
the Superintendents of the school districts. The Plaintiffs assert
claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Section 1983, the New Jersey
Administrative Code ("NJAC"), the New Jersey Special Education
Statute ("NJSA"), the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA"), the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD," and together with
the NJAC, NJSA, and NJCRA, the "New Jersey Statutes"), and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").

The Plaintiffs brought suit individually and on-behalf of 15
school-aged children, who are students in different school
districts throughout New Jersey. All have special needs and, all
but one, B.A., had an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") for the
2019-20 and/or the 2020-21 school years. An IEP is the "primary
mechanism" to ensure that every disabled child receives a free
appropriate public education ("FAPE"), as required by the IDEA. An
IEP is a written document that sets forth the special education and
related services that must be provided to the child, to enable a
FAPE. Through their IEPs, all the named children in this matter,
except B.A., received some type of specialized support or
modifications at school during the 2019-20 and 2020-21 school
years.

On March 16, 2020, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, all public
and private preschools, elementary schools, and secondary schools
in New Jersey were ordered to close indefinitely. As a result, all
New Jersey schools that had not already done so, including some of
the School District Defendants, ceased in-person learning and began
virtual instruction. The Plaintiffs received virtual instruction
and services for the remainder of the 2019-20 school year. Virtual
instruction continued until various points in the 2020-21 school
year, when the School District Defendants began providing hybrid
learning or in-person instruction.

On Oct. 18, 2021, the Plaintiffs commenced the present action
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. On Feb. 5, 2022, the
Plaintiffs filed the AC, which contains nine counts. Count One
alleges violations of the IDEA; Count Two violations of the
Rehabilitation Act; and Count Three violations of the ADA. Counts
Four and Five assert Section 1983 claims for deprivation of the
Plaintiffs' equal protection and substantive due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Six alleges violations of the
NJAC and NJSA; Count Seven violations of the NJCRA; and Count Eight
violations of the NJLAD. Finally, Count Nine alleges RICO
violations against the individual Defendants.

The Court previously denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, finding that the Plaintiffs failed to
establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits on
their RICO claims and that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to an
automatic injunction under the stay put provision of the IDEA.

Presently before the Court are the Defendants' motions to dismiss
the AC. Additionally, the Court addresses the motion for sanctions
filed by four Defendants. It reviewed all the submissions in
support and in opposition and considered the motions without oral
argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and
Local Civil Rule 78.1(b).

First, the Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims relating to the denial of
FAPEs because the Plaintiffs have not exhausted their
administrative remedies under the IDEA. The Plaintiffs admit that
they have not exhausted their administrative remedies. However,
they argue that they need not exhaust their administrative remedies
because they were not given full notice of their procedural rights
under the IDEA.

Judge Vazquez opines that it is clear that the claims stated in
Counts Two through Eight of the AC seek relief also available under
the IDEA. The claims all arise out of the cessation of in-person
instruction and services in March 2020, which allegedly resulted in
Plaintiffs suffering discrimination and deprivation of their equal
protection rights, substantive due process rights, and procedural
safeguards. Because these factual allegations are intertwined with
the Plaintiffs' complaints about the schools' failure to
accommodate their educational needs and because such allegations
could not be brought by a nonstudent or outside the school
setting," these claims seek relief available under the IDEA and are
thus subject to exhaustion.

As the Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies
or shown that any exception to the exhaustion requirement applies,
their claims are not properly before the Court. Therefore, Counts
One through Eight are dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

Next, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated RICO by
way of their involvement in a scheme to deprive them of IDEA Part B
funds by making false representations to the USDOE about their
compliance with the IDEA during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Judge Vazquez opines that the Plaintiffs' reliance on Second
Circuit decisions for the proposition that RICO does provide a
private right of action for injunctive relief is insufficient to
overcome the weight of authority in this district. Even assuming
arguendo that RICO provides a private right of action for equitable
relief, the Plaintiffs' RICO claims fail for numerous additional
reasons, including that they lack standing to sue under the RICO
statute and they lack standing to bring their RICO claims because
they allege injuries derivative of harm suffered by a more
immediate victim of the RICO activity.

The Plaintiffs also fail to plausibly plead the existence of an
enterprise. The AC does not contain any allegations supporting an
inference that the members of each enterprise shared a common
purpose. In short, the Plaintiffs have not adequately plead the
existence of an enterprise, but rather, "at best, the conclusory
naming of a string of entities coupled with legal conclusions."

The Plaintiffs further fail to plausibly allege predicate acts of
racketeering activity. Not only do they lack standing to bring
their RICO claims, but they additionally fail to plausibly allege
the required elements of a RICO violation. Accordingly, Count Nine
is dismissed.

Defendants Audubon, Lower Cape May, Dr. Andrew P. Davis, and Joseph
Castellucci move for sanctions. But Judge Vazquez declines to
impose sanctions. However, he cautions the Plaintiffs to ensure
that any future claims have both factual and legal support (or
present a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or establishing new law). Shouldthe
Plaintiffs fail to heed the Court's warning, and should the Court
be presented with a motion for sanctions in the face of similar
circumstances in the future, it will impose sanctions if
appropriate and require the Plaintiffs to pay opposing counsels'
fees and costs.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Vazquez grants the Defendants'
motions to dismiss and denies the motion for sanctions. The
dismissal is without prejudice and the Plaintiff will have 30 days
to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies noted. If
she does not file an amended complaint within that time, the matter
will be closed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An
appropriate Order accompanies the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ycxpyz5t from Leagle.com.


NEWVIEW OKLAHOMA: Steward Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled SHENELL STEWARD, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. NEWVIEW OKLAHOMA, INC. and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. FCS058441, was removed from the
Superior Court of the State of California, County of Solano, to the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on
August 24, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 2:22-cv-01498-JDP to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay meal
period premium, failure to pay rest period premium, failure to pay
minimum wages, failure to timely pay final wages, failure to timely
pay wages owed during employment, failure to furnish accurate
itemized wage statements, failure to reimburse necessary expenses,
failure to pay sick pay at regular rate, and unfair business
practices.

NewView Oklahoma, Inc. is a not-for-profit organization, with its
principal place of business in Oklahoma. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Michael E. Wilbur, Esq.
         Africa E. Davidson, Esq.
         APEX EMPLOYMENT LAW, LLP
         505 14th Street, Suite 900
         Oakland, CA 94612
         Telephone: (510) 588-1310
         E-mail: mwilbur@apexemploymentlaw.com

NIO INC: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Portnoy Law Firm advises NIO, Inc. ("NIO") (NYSE: NIO)
investors that a class action has been filed on behalf of
investors. NIO investors that lost money on their investment are
encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy, Esq.

Investors are encouraged to contact attorney Lesley F. Portnoy, by
phone 844-767-8529 or email: lesley@portnoylaw.com, to discuss
their legal rights, or click here to join the case via
www.portnoylaw.com. The Portnoy Law Firm can provide a
complimentary case evaluation and discuss investors' options for
pursuing claims to recover their losses.

The securities class action alleges that electric car manufacturer,
NIO, misrepresented and failed to disclose that it improperly
overstated its net income by selling batteries for its vehicles to
an unconsolidated related party. NIO, an electric car manufacturer,
gave customers the option to lease batteries for their vehicles
from a third party through a subscription program.

On June 28, 2022, Grizzly Research LLC ("Grizzly Research")
published a report claiming that NIO inflated its net income by
approximately 95% by selling batteries to an unconsolidated related
party and recognizing revenues immediately, rather than over the
lifetime of the subscription. On this news, the price of NIO ADSs
fell $0.59, or 2.57%, from a closing price of $22.95 per ADS on
June 27, 2022, to close at $22.36 per ADS on June 29, 2022, on
elevated trading volume.

On July 11, 2022, NIO announced that it had appointed a special
committee of independent directors to oversee an investigation into
the allegations in the Grizzly Research report. On this news, the
price of NIO ADSs fell $2.03, or 8.98%, from a closing price of
$22.60 per ADS on July 10, 2022, to close at $20.57 per ADS on July
11, 2022, on elevated trading volume.

Please visit our website to review more information and submit your
transaction information.

The Portnoy Law Firm represents investors in pursuing claims
against caused by corporate wrongdoing. The Firm's founding partner
has recovered over $5.5 billion for aggrieved investors. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.[GN]

NOVANT HEALTH: Allen Files Suit in M.D. North Carolina
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Novant Health, Inc.
The case is styled as Keith Van Allen, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Novant Health, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-00709 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

Novant Health -- https://www.novanthealth.org/ -- is a leading
healthcare provider with 15 hospitals & more than 350 physician
practices offering advanced medical treatment in North
Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott C Harris, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Phone: (919) 600-5000
          Fax: (919) 600-5035
          Email: sharris@milberg.com


OTGS LLC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against OTGS, LLC. The case
is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. OTGS, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07366 (S.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

OTG Management, LLC owns and operates restaurants in airports. The
Company offers food and beverages, designs airport terminals, and
provides information services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


PECONIC LANDING: Santa Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
MIA SANTA CRUZ, Plaintiff v. PECONIC LANDING AT SOUTHHOLD, INC.,
DIANE RADIGAN, and PATRICIA LUTZKY, Defendants, Case No.
0:22-cv-04940 (E.D.N.Y., August 22, 2022) brings this complaint as
a collective action on behalf of herself and other similarly
situated against the Defendants for their alleged willful and
intentional violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New
York Labor Law, and the New York Theft Prevention Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a communication
specialist from before August of 2016 to approximately May 5,
2022.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to properly and
timely pay her wages at the statutory minimum wage for all hours
worked. Despite consistently working more than 40 hours per week,
the Defendants paid her a fixed salary on a bi-weekly basis by
check or direct deposit. The Defendants allegedly denied her of her
lawfully earned overtime compensation at the rate of one and
one-half times her regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff also asserts these claims:

     -- The Defendants failed to monitor her work hours regularly
and accurately, thereby failing to maintain accurate and sufficient
time records;

     -- The Defendants failed to provide her with lawful wage
notices upon hiring; and

     -- The Defendants failed to provide her with wage statement
with each wage payment.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime
wages, and spread-of-hours pay, as well as statutory damages,
liquidated damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs, and other relief as the Court deems just
and proper.

Peconic Landing at Southhold, Inc. is a 144-acre campus which
houses more than approximately 400 members in a retirement
community. Diane Radigan has been Member Services Director at
Peconic Landing since approximately 2014. Patricia Lutzky is a
member of the management team. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clifford Tucker, Esq.
          SACCO & FILLAS LLP
          3119 Newtown Ave., 7th Floor
          Astoria, NY 11104
          Tel: (718) 269-2243
          E-mail: CTucker@SaccoFillas.com

PELOTON INTERACTIVE: Suit Over Sales Tax Claims Sent to Arbitration
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Anna Bradley-Smith and Jessy Edwards at topclassactions.com report
that Peloton breached contract and consumer protection laws by
charging members in New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia unlawful
sales tax on their subscriptions, a new class action lawsuit
alleges.

The class action lawsuit was filed in New York on August 12 by lead
Plaintiffs Brannon Skillern and Ryan Corken. They claim the company
charged Peloton members sales tax on their memberships despite the
tax-exempt status of the digital goods they were purchasing -- a
violation of state law.

The company's practice is willfully and knowingly unlawful,
deceptive, and fraudulent, the Peloton members allege. Claims of
unlawful sales tax charges add to the legal woes that have besieged
the company, including class action lawsuits alleging the defective
Tread+ put kids and pets at risk, as well as complaints about
defective pedals and shrinking class lists.

Peloton members complain of 'unlawful' sales tax
According to the class action lawsuit, Skillern and Corken
purchased Peloton Bikes and subscribed to Peloton's All-Access
Membership subscription for $39 per month in 2019.

Peloton went on to charge the members both a more than 6 percent
"sales tax" on their subscriptions every month through December
2020 even though no such tax was actually owed under state law,
resulting in substantial overcharges in violation of Peloton's
Membership Terms and state law, the claim states.

With a $39 per month All-Access Membership subscription, users can
access Peloton's full catalogue of classes along with real-time
performance metric tracking when used with the company's bike or
treadmill. Subscription to Peloton's All Access Membership is
required with the purchase of the Peloton Bike and Peloton Tread.

By purchasing or using a Peloton Membership, subscribers agree to
Peloton's Membership Terms, where they "agree to pay the monthly
fee specified" at purchase "plus any applicable taxes and other
charges," the class action lawsuit states.

Peloton members also provide a payment method that is saved and
charged on a recurring, monthly basis at the beginning of the
monthly membership cycle, which is also authorized "to pay any
amounts described [in the Membership Terms] without requiring a
signed receipt."

Peloton used that payment method to charge consumers sales tax on
its digital goods, such as Peloton Memberships, which are not
taxable under the laws of several US states including in
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, collecting millions of
dollars in overcharges, the class action lawsuit explains.

"Furthermore, Peloton willfully and knowingly overcharged its
subscribers a false and unlawful sales tax on their Peloton
Memberships. When customers complained or inquired about the
impermissible tax charge, Peloton assured them that its business
practices comply with state and local tax requirements," the class
action lawsuit reads.

"Worse, Peloton admittedly has not remitted the unlawfully
collected 'sales tax' to state authorities, recouping these
overcharges in an effort to maximize profits at their subscribers'
expense and under the guise of a state-imposed tax."

Although Peloton has changed its taxation practices, it has not
reimbursed members who were overcharged, the class action lawsuit
states.

Skillern and Corken are suing the company on behalf of anyone
living in Massachusetts, New York, or Virginia who paid tax on a
Peloton Membership through December 31, 2020.

They are suing for breach of contract and violation of state
consumer protection and business laws. They seek certification of
the Class, damages, interest, legal fees and costs, and a jury
trial. [GN]

PLEXUS CORP: Court Dismisses Amended O'Driscoll Suit With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHANIE O'DRISCOLL, individually and as
representative of a class of participants and beneficiaries on
behalf of the Plexus Corp. 401(k) Retirement Plan, Plaintiff v.
PLEXUS CORP., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-C-1065 (E.D. Wis.),
Judge William C. Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin grants the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's amended complaint.

Ms. O'Driscoll, a participant in the Plexus Corp. 401(k) Retirement
Plan (the Plan), brings the case as a proposed class action under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2), against Defendants Plexus, its Board of
Directors, and John Does 1-30.

In approximately November 2019, the Plaintiff commenced employment
with Plexus as a paralegal. Her employment with Plexus ended
approximately eight months later on July 2, 2020. Plexus is the
plan sponsor and plan administrator of the Plexus Corp. 401(k) and
Retirement Plan. It acted through its officers, including the Board
Defendants, and their members to perform plan-related fiduciary
functions in the course and scope of their business. The Plan is a
"defined contribution" pension plan under 29 U.S.C. Section
1102(2)(A). A defined contribution plan allows employees to make
pre-tax elective deferrals through payroll deductions to an
individual account under a plan. The Plan has about $419 million in
assets and 4,487 participants.

The Plaintiff alleges that, at all relevant times, the Plan's fees
were excessive when compared with other comparable 401(k) Plans
offered by other sponsors that had similar numbers of plan
participants, and similar amounts of money under management. She
alleges that the excessive fees led to lower net returns than
returns participants in comparable 401(k) Plans enjoyed.

The Plaintiff claims that, during the putative Class Period, which
is defined as July 15, 2014, through the date of judgment,
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to the Plan, to
her, and to other plan participants by (1) failing to objectively
and adequately review the Plan's investment portfolio with due care
to ensure that each investment option was prudent, in terms of
cost; (2) maintaining certain funds in the Plan despite the
availability of identical or similar investment options with lower
costs and/or better performance histories; and (3) failing to
monitor the recordkeeping and administration fees paid by the Plan
to ensure that they were reasonable and, as a result, authorizing
the Plan to pay objectively unreasonable and excessive
recordkeeping and administration fees, relative to the
recordkeeping and administration services received.

The Defendants' recordkeepers during the Class Period were Mass
Mutual Retirement Services from 2014 through 2018 and T. Rowe Price
RPS Inc. from 2018 to 2020. Mass Mutual and T. Rowe Price are
"well-known providers" of recordkeeping and administration
services.

The Plaintiff alleges that (i) the Defendants failed to regularly
monitor the Plan's recordkeeping and administration fees paid to
covered service providers, including Mass Mutual and T. Rowe Price;
(ii) the Defendants failed to regularly solicit quotes and/or
competitive bids from covered service providers, including Mass
Mutual and T. Rowe Price, to avoid paying unreasonable fees for
recordkeeping and administration services and failed to ensure that
the Plan paid no more than a competitive reasonable fee for
recordkeeping and administration services.; and (iii) from the
years 2014 through 2018, the Plan had, on average, 4,244
participants and paid an average effective annual recordkeeping and
administration fee of at least approximately $453,478, which
equates to an average of at least approximately $107 per
participant.

In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that (i) during the Class
Period, the Defendants did not use share classes that provided the
greatest benefit to plan participants and in some cases even
switched from one share class to a different share class that
charged a higher "net investment expense to retirement plans"; (ii)
the investment options selected by the plan fiduciaries were 438%
more expensive than prudent alternative and less expensive options
covering the same asset category; and (iii) during the Class
Period, she had no knowledge of the Defendants' process for
selecting and regularly monitoring investments to ensure that the
investments remained prudent selections, the recordkeeping and
administration fee structure, or the revenue sharing rates
associated with the investments selected by the Defendants.

The Plaintiff also claims that (i) both the expense ratios and the
"net investment expense to retirement plans" of the Plan's
investment options between the years 2014 and 2020 were more
expensive by significant multiples of comparable passively managed
and actively managed alternative funds in the same investment
style; (ii) the Defendants failed to properly disclose fees charged
to participants in the Plan in their quarterly statements and
participant fee disclosure documents. She asserts that, as a
result, the plan participants were prevented from making informed
decisions with regard to the management of their individual
accounts.

The Plaintiff asserts four claims for relief: breaches of duties of
loyalty and prudence regarding recordkeeping and administration
fees (Count I); breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence
regarding investment management fees (Count II); failure to
adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding recordkeeping and
administration fees (Count III); and failure to adequately monitor
other fiduciaries regarding investment management fees (Count IV).

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended
complaint on Oct. 30, 2020. On Sept. 30, 2021, the Court stayed and
administratively closed the case pending the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Hughes v. Northwestern University, No. 19-1401.
The Supreme Court issued a decision in Hughes on Jan. 24, 2022. 142
S.Ct. 737 (2022). That same day, the Court lifted the stay and
invited the parties to submit simultaneous supplemental briefing in
light of the Supreme Court's decision. The parties submitted
supplemental briefs on Feb. 7, 2022.

First, Judge Griesbach finds that the Plaintiff has neither shown
that she suffered a loss nor alleged that the investment option was
otherwise unreasonable. Because the complaint contains no
allegations that she was harmed by the Defendants' investment
decisions and the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was
injured, she lacks standing to pursue her share class claim.

Next, the Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that the
Defendants failed to disclose revenue sharing information to plan
participants. She asserts that, as a result, plan participants were
prevented from making informed decisions with regard to the
management of their individual accounts. But the Seventh Circuit
has recognized that fiduciaries are not required to disclose
"information about the revenue-sharing arrangement," citing Hecker
v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009). In short, Judge
Griesbach holds that the Defendants are not required to disclose
fees charged or credited to the Plan investments with the level of
detail sought by the Plaintiff.

Lastly, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants breached ERISA's
duty of loyalty, which requires fiduciaries to act solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries. Her breach of the
duty of loyalty claim is based on the same allegations as the
breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Judge Griesbach holds that she must do more than recast allegations
of purported breaches of fiduciary duty as disloyal acts. The
Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations beyond those
pertaining to an alleged breach of fiduciary duty; therefore, the
Plaintiff's breach of the duty of loyalty claims must be
dismissed.

The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants breached their duty
to monitor. Her breach of the duty to monitor claim is derivative
of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Because the Plaintiff has
failed to state a breach of fiduciary duty claim, she has also
failed to state a breach of the duty to monitor claim.

For these reasons, Judge Griesbach grants the Defendants' motion to
dismiss. The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and is dismissed for that reason pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court may dismiss a
case with prejudice when there is no doubt that there exists no set
of facts from which a plaintiff can prove she is entitled to
relief. The Plaintiff has already amended her complaint once and
has not requested leave to do so again in the face of the motion to
dismiss. Therefore, Judge Griesbach dismisses the case with
prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/msu46yz7 from Leagle.com.


POLLACK & ROSEN: Benjamin Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pollack & Rosen,
P.A., et al. The case is styled as Gerard Benjamin, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Pollack & Rosen,
P.A., Credit Corp Solutions, Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-00936 (M.D.
Fla., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Pollack & Rosen, P.A. -- https://www.pollackrosen.com/ -- is one of
Florida's largest collections firms providing comprehensive
collection services nationwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Zeig, Esq.
          ZEIG LAW FIRM, LLC
          3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 310
          Hollywood, FL 33021
          Phone: (754) 217-3084
          Fax: (754) 217-3084
          Email: justin@zeiglawfirm.com


PRACTICEMAX INC: Knox Files Suit in D. Arizona
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PracticeMax
Incorporated. The case is styled as Justin Knox, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. PracticeMax
Incorporated, Case No. 2:22-cv-01455-SPL (D. Ariz., Aug. 29,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Personal Property for Breach
of Contract.

PracticeMax -- https://practicemax.com/ -- has over 31 years of
experience providing business management and information technology
solutions to a diverse mix of health care providers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Cristina Perez Hesano, Esq.
          PEREZ LAW GROUP PLLC
          7508 N 59th Ave.
          Glendale, AZ 85301
          Phone: (623) 826-5593
          Email: cperez@perezlawgroup.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N Pennsylvania Ave.
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Phone: (405) 235-1560
          Email: wbf@federmanlaw.com


PREMIER HR: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Estrada Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
NORMA ESTRADA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PREMIER HR; and ANTHONY RECINOS, Defendants,
Case No. 22STCV27168 (Cal. Sup., Los Angeles Cty., Aug. 22, 2022)
is an action against the Defendant for failure to pay minimum
wages, overtime compensation, provide meals and rest periods, and
provide accurate wage statements.

Plaintiff Estrada was employed by the Defendants as staff.

PREMIER HR we specialize in HR and recruiting services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zorik Mooradian, Esq.
          Andrina G. Hanson, Esq.
          Nanor C. Kamberian, Esq.
          MOORADIAN LAW, APC
          24007 Ventura Blvd., Suite 210
          Calabasas, CA 91302
          Telephone: (818) 487-1988
          Facsimile: (888) 783-1030
          Email: zorik@mooradianlaw.com
                 andrina@mooradianlaw.com
                 nanor@mooradianlaw.com


PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Oyenuga Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
OLUDARE OYENUGA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICES LLC; and
ISMAIL QADAR, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-04972 (E.D.N.Y., Aug.
23, 2022) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, provide meals and rest
periods, and provide accurate wage statements.

Plaintiff Oyenuga was employed by the Defendants as security
personnel.

PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY & TRAINING SERVICES, LLC was founded in 2011.
The company's line of business includes providing various
commercial services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
          Jason Mizrahi, Esq.
          LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 792-0046
          Email: Joshua@levinepstein.com


PREVEA CLINIC: Court Narrows Claims in Nohara's 2nd Amended Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALISON J. NOHARA and PATTI J. SZYDEL, Plaintiffs v.
PREVEA CLINIC INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-C-1079 (E.D.
Wis.), Judge William C. Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin grants in part and denies in part
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs, participants in the Prevea Clinic, Inc., 401(k) and
Retirement Plan, bring the case as a proposed class action under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2), against Defendants Prevea and its Board
of Directors. They allege that, at all relevant times, the Plan's
fees were excessive when compared with other comparable 401(k)
plans offered by other sponsors that had similar numbers of plan
participants and similar amounts of money under management.

The Plaintiffs claim that, during the putative Class Period, which
is defined as July 20, 2014, through the date of judgment, the
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to the Plan, to
them, and to other plan participants by (1) failing to objectively
and adequately review the Plan's investment portfolio with due care
to ensure that each investment option was prudent, in terms of
cost; (2) maintaining certain funds in the Plan despite the
availability of identical or similar investment options with lower
costs and/or better performance histories; and (3) failing to
monitor the recordkeeping and administration fees paid by the Plan
to ensure that they were reasonable and, as a result, authorizing
the Plan to pay objectively unreasonable and excessive
recordkeeping and administration fees relative to the recordkeeping
and administration services received. The Defendants' recordkeeper
during the Class Period was Transamerica Retirement Solutions, LLC,
a "wellknown provider" of recordkeeping and administration
services.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to regularly
monitor the Plan's recordkeeping and administration fees paid to
covered service providers, including Transamerica, failed to
regularly solicit quotes and/or competitive bids from covered
service providers in order to avoid paying unreasonable fees for
the recordkeeping and administration services, and failed to ensure
that the Plan paid no more than a competitive reasonable fee for
recordkeeping and administration services. They assert that, from
the years 2014 through 2018, the Plan had, on average, 1,945
participants and paid an average effective annual recordkeeping and
administration fee of at least approximately $318,411, which
equates to an average of at least approximately $164 per
participant.

They claim that, for the same time period, the annual recordkeeping
and administration fees paid by other plans of similar sizes with
similar amounts of money under management ranged from $41 to $73.
Based on this information, they assert that a prudent plan
fiduciary for the Plan would have on average an effective annual
recordkeeping and administration fee of around $53 per participant.
They allege that, because the Defendants did not act in the best
interests of the Plan, the Plan cost its participants a total
minimum amount of approximately $1,076,525 in unreasonable and
excessive recordkeeping and administration fees.

In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants did not
engage in an objectively reasonable process when selecting funds
for the Plan. They claim that the Defendants chose an investment
option that effectively charges a fee that is almost 11% higher
than an alternative investment option that provides the identical
services of the same portfolio manager. They allege that, had the
Defendants acted in the best interests of the Plan's participants,
the Defendants would have selected funds with lower "net investment
expense to retirement plans" than those funds actually selected by
Defendants.

The Plaintiffs claim that, during the Class Period, they had no
knowledge of the Defendants' process for selecting and regularly
monitoring investments to ensure that the investments remained
prudent selections, the recordkeeping and administration fee
structure, or the revenue sharing rates associated with the
investments selected by the Defendants. They allege that, had the
Defendants chosen other investment options, the Plan's participants
would have received virtually identical portfolio management
services at a lower cost.

The Plaintiffs claim that both the expense ratios and the "net
investment expense to retirement plans" of the Plan's investment
options between the years 2014 to 2020 were more expensive by
significant multiples of comparable passively managed and actively
managed alternative funds in the same investment style. They assert
that, because Defendants failed to act in the best interests of the
Plan's participants by engaging in an objectively reasonable
investigation process when selecting its investments, Defendants
caused objectively unreasonable and unnecessary losses to them and
the Plan's participants in the amount of approximately $3,041,829
through 2018.

The Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants failed to fully disclose
fees charged to the Plan investments in the participants' quarterly
statements and participant fee disclosure documents. They allege
that the Defendants failed to disclose to plan participants the
revenue sharing rates of each investment option the Defendants made
available to plan participants which represent a refund and had the
effect of lowering the effective annual expense ratios of the
investment funds for which a plan service credit applies. They
assert that, as a result, plan participants were unable to
determine the actual net investment expense paid by retirement plan
participants for each of their investment options.

The Plaintiffs assert four claims for relief: Breaches of duties of
loyalty and prudence regarding recordkeeping and administration
fees (Count I); breaches of duty of loyalty and prudence regarding
investment management fees (Count II); failure to adequately
monitor other fiduciaries regarding recordkeeping and
administration fees (Count III); and failure to adequately monitor
other fiduciaries regarding investment management fees (Count IV).

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on
Nov. 20, 2020, and Plaintiff Nohara filed a motion for leave to
amend the complaint on March 10, 2021. On Sept. 30, 2021, the Court
stayed and administratively closed the case pending the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Northwestern
University, No. 19-1401. The Supreme Court issued a decision in
Hughes on January 24, 2022. 142 S.Ct. 737 (2022). That same day,
the Court lifted the stay and invited the parties to submit
simultaneous supplemental briefing in light of the Supreme Court's
decision. The parties submitted supplemental briefs on Feb. 7,
2022. On May 12, 2022, the Court granted the motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint. The Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the second amended complaint on June 16, 2022.

Initially, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by causing the Plan to pay excessive recordkeeping
costs, failing to retain the least costly share class of each fund,
retaining high-cost funds, and failing to disclose revenue-sharing
information to participants.

Judge Griesbach holds that (i) the second amended complaint
plausibly alleges that the Defendants' failure to solicit bids and
negotiate for reasonable fees was imprudent; (ii) the Plaintiffs
have stated a claim that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty
by retaining high-cost actively managed investments; (iii) it is
plausible to infer from the Plaintiffs' allegations that the
Defendants breached the duty of prudence by failing to retain
low-cost share classes of four mutual funds for the Plan; and (iv)
the Defendants are not required to disclose fees charged or
credited to the Plan investments with the level of detail sought by
Plaintiffs.

The second amended complaint asserts claims of breach of the duty
of loyalty. In response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the
Plaintiffs stated that they are no longer pursuing their duty of
loyalty claims in Counts I and II. Therefore, the Plaintiffs'
breach of the duty of loyalty claims are dismissed.

The Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants breached their duty to
monitor. Their breach of the duty to monitor claim is derivative of
the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Because the Plaintiffs have
stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the
recordkeeping fees and investment management fees, Judge Griesbach
finds that they have also stated a claim that the Defendants
breached their duty to monitor.

The Defendants assert that the Board of Director defendants and
individual director defendants (denominated as John Does 1-10)
should be dismissed. The Plaintiffs agree that the individual
director defendants should be dismissed from the case. As to the
Board of Director Defendants, the Defendants argue that the
Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the Board had fiduciary
responsibility for the misconduct alleged. The second amended
complaint alleges, however, that "Prevea Clinic acted through its
officers, including the Board Defendants, and their members, to
perform Plan-related fiduciary functions in the course and scope of
their business." Accepting the Plaintiffs' allegation as true, as
the Court is required to do at this stage, Judge Griesbach holds
that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Prevea Clinic
Board of Directors are fiduciaries.

For these reasons, Judge Griesbach grants in part and denies in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss. He grants the motion with
respect to the Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim regarding
the Defendants' failure to properly disclose revenue sharing
information to participants and breach of the duty of loyalty
claims, and those claims are dismissed. The individual director
defendants are dismissed as defendants. Judge Griesbach denies the
motion all other respects. The Clerk is directed to set the matter
on the Court's calendar for a Rule 16 telephonic scheduling
conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yt4hnsrx from Leagle.com.


PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Court Certifies Class in Buffington Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN BUFFINGTON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED INSURANCE
CO., Defendant, Case No. 20-CV-07408 (PMH) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Philip
M. Halpern of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York grants the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

Mr. Buffington, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, brings the action against Progressive for allegedly
underpaying the "actual cash value" ("ACV") of total-loss vehicles
to policyholders by omitting sales tax from the calculation
thereof. He initially brought three claims for relief: (i) breach
of contract; (ii) violation of New York General Business Law
("NYGBL") Section 349; and (iii) unjust enrichment. He Plaintiff
thereafter voluntarily withdrew his unjust enrichment claim with
prejudice.

The Plaintiff was a named insured under an automobile policy issued
for comprehensive and collision coverage issued by the Defendant.
He insured a vehicle he leased, a 2016 Toyota Sienna minivan under
the Policy. The Policy provided for a "limit of liability," by
which the Defendant was obligated to pay "the lowest of the ACV of
the stolen or damaged property at the time of the loss reduced by
the applicable deductible or the amount necessary to replace the
stolen or damaged property reduced by the applicable deductible" in
the event of a total loss.

The Plaintiff was involved in a total loss accident with the
Insured Vehicle on March 1, 2019 and thereafter filed a claim with
the Defendant. The Defendant, in turn, elected to pay out the ACV
of his vehicle: $17,816.60. The Plaintiff alleges that this amount
did not include sales tax as "mandated by New York laws." He
alleges that he "still owed money under his lease" after the
Defendant paid out $17,816.60 to his leasing company (i.e., Toyota)
in an amount that "would have been satisfied or diminished had it
included the sales tax in the ACV payment." He also alleges that he
"replaced his total loss vehicle and incurred sales tax in doing
so."

The Policy contains the same limitation of liability for lessees
(like the Plaintiff) as it does for vehicle owners. The Defendant,
however, "has made the business decision to pay sales tax for owned
vehicles" because of Reg. 64. "For leased vehicles, however, the
Defendant generally does not include sales tax" based on an
understanding that Reg. 64 does not apply. The Proposed Class
contains all lessees and owners who "were not paid full sales tax
for their total-loss claim."

The Plaintiff moved, on Sept. 2, 2021, to certify a class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).

The "Proposed Class" is defined as: All persons: (a) who insured a
vehicle for physical damage coverage under a New York automobile
insurance policy issued by Progressive Advanced Insurance Company,
(b) who made a claim under the policy for physical damage to the
vehicle, (c) whose claim was adjusted as a total loss between
September 10, 2014, and the date of certification of the Class, and
(d) who were not paid the applicable New York sales tax owed for
their total-loss claim.

The Plaintiff also seeks appointment as class representative and
appointment of his attorneys as class counsel. The Defendant
opposed the Plaintiff's motion on Oct. 11, 2021, and the motion was
fully submitted upon the filing of the Plaintiff's reply papers on
Nov. 10, 2021.

Judge Halpern explains that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
instructs that class certification is appropriate where the
putative class: (1) is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. There is also an implied requirement of
ascertainability in this Circuit -- i.e., that there be an
identifiable class.

Once the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met, the plaintiff must
then show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed
class is "maintainable" by meeting at least one of the requirements
set forth in Rule 23(b). Certification in the case is sought under
Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that "the Court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy."

Judge Halpern opines that the Plaintiff has carried his burden with
respect to all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and the implied
requirement of ascertainability. He finds that (i) the Plaintiff
avers that the class size exceeds 4,000 members and the Defendant
does not dispute this assertion or that the numerosity element has
been met; (ii) whether the Defendant underpaid or failed to pay
sales tax to a given insured, the question remains the same for
class members -- did the Defendant pay what it owed under its form
policy and did it represent the same to consumers?; (iii) the
Plaintiff has sufficiently shown that his claims arise from the
same course of conduct as putative class members' claims do -- the
Defendant's breach of a form contract; (iv) the Plaintiff does not
have any conflicts with the putative class and has sufficiently
demonstrated his commitment to the case to-date; (v) the
Plaintiff's counsel is sufficiently experienced, and adequate to
serve as the class counsel; and (vi) the Plaintiff has met his
modest burden on ascertainability.

As to the requirements of Rule 23(b), Judge Halpern finds that
because the Plaintiff has identified a common measure for
calculating damages -- multiplication of the sales tax rate by the
vehicle's ACV -- the need for individualized calculations "alone
cannot preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He also finds
that the Plaintiff has shown that "the case will be far more
manageable than many class actions that are regularly certified
because the class is ascertainable from the defendant's own
records." He agrees that manageability considerations here weigh in
favor of certification, especially given the size of the Proposed
Class. Hence, the Plaintiff has met his burden under Rule
23(b)(3).

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Halpern grants the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He certifies a
class comprised of all persons: (a) who insured a vehicle for
physical damage coverage under a New York automobile insurance
policy issued by Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, (b) who
made a claim under the policy for physical damage to the vehicle,
(c) whose claim was adjusted as a total loss between Sept. 10, 2014
and the date of this Order, and (d) who were not paid the
applicable New York sales tax owed for their total-loss claim.

Judge Halpern grants the Plaintiff's unopposed application to
appoint Plaintiff Steven Buffington as the class representative
and, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1), appoints Edward A. Normand and
Amy L. Judkins of Normand PLLC, Joseph N. Kravec of Feinstein Doyle
Payne & Kravec, LLC, and Antonio Vozzolo of Vozzolo, LLC as the
class counsel.

The parties will meet and confer to consider a proposed joint
notice plan; and will notify the Court jointly within 14 days of
the date of the Memorandum Opinion and Order of the results of
their discussion, including a proposed joint notice plan. If for
any reason the parties cannot agree, each will file, within 14 days
of the date of the Memorandum Opinion and Order, their proposed
notice plan in one joint letter of no more than five double-spaced
pages.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion
sequence pending at Doc. 59.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdcttpuz from
Leagle.com.


QUICKZIP SHEET: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The QuickZip Sheet
Company, Inc. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated v. The QuickZip Sheet
Company, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07310 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

QuickZip -- https://quickzip.com/ -- make smarter, faster easier
bedding.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


RAY MOLES: Sept. 27 Scheduling Conference in Colores Suit Vacated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FILEMON COLORES, as an individual and on behalf all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RAY MOLES FARMS, INC., a
California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendant, Case No.
1:21-cv-00101-JLT-BAM (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Barbara A.
McAuliffe of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California, Fresno Division, vacates the Scheduling Conference
currently set for Sept. 27, 2022.

Mr. Colores filed his First Suit in Tulare County Superior Court,
which was Removed by Ray Moles on Jan. 25, 2021. The First Suit
constituted an FRCP 23 Class Action Complaint alleging 7 causes of
action for claimed payroll violations of various wage and hour
provisions of the California Labor Code. It seeks an FRCP 23 Class
Action consisting of all of the current and former non-exempt
employees of Defendant Ray Moles Farms, Inc. who worked in
California at least one shift during the four years immediately
preceding the filing of the lawsuit through the present.

On Jan, 26, 2021, Ray Moles filed an Answer to Colores' FRCP 23
Class Action Complaint. That Answer at the Second Affirmative
Defense asserted that the entire suit was subject to exclusive and
binding Arbitration due to the Arbitration Agreement which
Plaintiff Colores had signed on Dec. 5, 2016.

On May 19, 2021, Ray Moles filed a Motion to Dismiss the FRCP 23
Class Action First Suit. That is still pending for decision.

On Feb. 12, 2021, Colores filed against Ray Moles a Second. It was
a single action which sought duplicate and redundant ("stacked")
civil penalties under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004
("PAGA") for the very same alleged wage and hour labor code
violations that were set forth in the First Suit.

On May 14, 2021, Ray Moles filed a Cross-Complaint against Colores
alleging that PAGA is unconstitutional. On the same day, Ray Moles
filed an FRCP 5.1 Notice of Constitutional Challenge of State
Statute upon the Attorney General of California giving him notice
of his right to intervene into the unconstitutional Cross-Complaint
lawsuit for up to 60 days from receipt of the 5.1 Notice. The
Attorney General waived by not intervening.

On May 19, 2021, a Minute Order was issued from District Court
Judge Dale A. Drozd to the Clerk of the Court ordering the Clerk of
the Court to likewise serve a Notice upon the office of the
Attorney General of the State of California, likewise giving him an
opportunity for 60 days to intervene into the lawsuit. The Attorney
General waived by not intervening.

On April 22, 2021, the Plaintiff and the Defendant filed a
stipulation to consolidate the First and Second Suit for all
purposes, including trial. Then an Order the next day was issued by
Judge Drozd consolidating the cases. Therein Judge Drozd stated
that the First Suit was the Lead Case and that all future filings
were to be made under that Case Number, and that the Second Case
No. of 1:21-cv-00467-NONE-SAB was to be closed by the Clerk of the
Court.

On May 19, 2021, Ray Moles filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated First Suit and Second Suit with a hearing date of June
22, 2021, which is now under submission for decision. A very
similar Motion to Dismiss was filed by the Defendant's law firm in
the Bakersfield branch of this Eastern District Federal Court at
Mayen v. Cal Central Harvesting, Case No. 1:21-cv-00145AWI-JLT.
Said Motion to Dismiss was granted in large part by Judge Anthony
W. Ishii on Oct. 25, 2021.

On May 26, 2021, the parties filed a Stipulation to Continue the
Mandatory Scheduling Conference due to their agreement to go to an
early Mediation on Nov. 2, 2021 before retired Presiding Tulare
County Judge Howard Broadman.

On May 26, 2021, U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe filed
an Order accepting the Stipulation. That Order also rescheduled the
Status Conference to Nov. 30, 2021 so as to give the parties an
opportunity to mediate on Nov. 2, 2021 with Mediator Retired Judge
Howard Broadman. Further the Magistrate's Order granted the
Plaintiff Colores a continuance to file his response to the
Unconstitutionality Cross-Complaint until Dec. 17, 2021. Likewise,
Magistrate McAuliffe granted Colores a continuance to file an
Opposition to Ray Moles' pending Motion to Dismiss the First and
Second Suits until Dec. 17, 2021.

On May 14, 2021, Ray Moles filed an Answer to the Consolidated
Complaints. At its Second (2nd) Affirmative Defense, its Answer
asserted that the entire two lawsuits should be compelled to
exclusive and binding Arbitration due to Arbitration Agreement that
Colores had signed on Dec. 5, 2016. It also asserted in the 33rd
Affirmative Defense that the PAGA action was unconstitutional,
and/or was prohibited from "stacking" or seeking "redundant"
penalties for alleged labor code violations when those labor code
sections otherwise specifically already provide for penalties.

On Oct. 6, 2021, Ray Moles filed a Verified Motion/Petition to
Compel Individual Arbitration and to dismiss and/or stay both
Complaints' litigation. Its Petition is under submission awaiting a
decision. Recently, on June 15, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued
a decision in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana, 596 U.S. ___ (2022),
No. 20-1573, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts
state law, so that Moriana was compelled to individual arbitration,
and the putative class (group) was dismissed by the Viking U.S.
Supreme Court. The Defendant further notes that, even before Viking
River, namely on Dec. 30, 2019, a very similar Petition to Compel
Arbitration was granted by Judge Dale A. Drozd in the case of
Mayreli Martinez v. Vision Precision Holdings, LLC, Case No,
1:19-cv-01002-DAD-JLT; therein Judge Drozd dismissed the lawsuit
and ordered arbitration. The language of Judge Drozd's Order is
quoted at page 5 within Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of the Verified Petition to Compel
Arbitration.

In a very similar case involving another client of this law firm
(Defendant Bee Sweet Citrus, Inc., which is similarly defending a
class action suit by a purported class of agricultural workers)
Magistrate Judge Helena M. Barch-Kutcha on Sept. 13, 2021 issued a
Minute Order in that Case No. of 1:21-cv-00382-NONE-HBK. There,
Magistrate Barch-Kutcha in essence issued an Order upon our Ex
Parte Application to Vacate the MSC granting our Application due to
the pending Motion to Dismiss and the pending Motion to Consolidate
in that case.

Also, in a very similar case, on Nov. 3, 2020, Magistrate Judge
Erica P. Grosjean sua sponte issued an Order vacating a MSC also
involving defendant Bee Sweet in a putative class of farm workers
case. It was vacated by Magistrate Grosjean due to a pending Motion
to Dismiss so that if necessary the MSC would be set after those
rulings.

Further, in another similar class action which the law firm is
defending for Sun Valley Packing L.P. against another putative
class of farm workers, Magistrate Erica P. Grosjean on Aug. 27,
2021 vacated the MSC due to pending Motions to Dismiss, Motion to
Consolidate, and a Petition to Compel Arbitration. That Order said
if necessary, after the ruling on those motions, then Magistrate
Grosjean will reschedule the MSC.

In this Consolidated case, on 11/23/2021, Magistrate McAuliffe,
citing the pending Ray Moles' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's
consolidated suits, and citing its pending Motion to Compel
Arbitration, moved the Nov. 29, 2021 Status Conference to April 19,
2022. Then again, citing those same still pending Defendant Motions
to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration and citing the Attorney General's
Motion to Intervene and also citing the Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss that Cross-Complaint, she moved that status conference
again to Sept. 27, 2022. All these motions are still pending for
decision. Ray Moles again requests that Magistrate McAuliffe
vacates the MSC until after those motions are ruled upon.

Therefore, Ray Moles requests that the Court issues an Order
vacating the Scheduling Conference currently set for Nov. 30, 2021
until after there are rulings on the pending Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Consolidated First and Second Suit, and on the pending
Verified Petition to Compel Arbitration of both the Consolidated
First and Second Suit (due to the Arbitration Agreement signed by
Colores on Dec. 5, 2016), and on the pending Motion to Intervene
and on the pending Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. After those four
pending rulings, then if necessary, the MSC would be re-set by the
Magistrate.

Judge McAuliffe vacates the Scheduling Conference currently set for
Sept. 27, 2022, to be reset, if needed, following resolution of
said four motions. Ray Moles will notify the Court within 10 days
following resolution of these motions and indicate whether a
Scheduling Conference should be set.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/56pptab5 from Leagle.com.

Thomas E. Campagne -- tcampagne@campagnelaw.com -- Campagne &
Campagne A Professional Corporation Airport Office Center, in
Fresno, California, Attorneys for Defendant Ray Moles Farms, Inc.


REALPAGE INC: Denial of Subclass Certification in Kelly Vacated
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN JOSEPH KELLY; KARRIEM BEY, On behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants v.
REALPAGE INC., d/b/a ONSITE; RP ON SITE, LLC, Case No. 21-1672 (3d
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacates the
District Court's order denying class certification of the Direct
Requests subclass.

RealPage is a CRA that specializes in providing property managers
with consumer reports, which it terms "Rental Reports," to help
them evaluate their prospective tenants. To generate Rental Reports
for those clients over the Class Period, RealPage collected
public-record information, including criminal records and eviction
filings, from third-party vendors like LexisNexis and HygenicsData,
stored that information in its own databases, and compiled it to
respond to client requests. A client procuring a Rental Report
could also instruct RealPage to make a courtesy copy of that report
available to the prospective tenant, who would then be notified of
the option to download the Rental Report from RealPage's website.

Consistent with its obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq., RealPage also disclosed
information in response to consumers' direct requests for their
files. Regardless of whether a consumer downloaded her courtesy
copy of a Rental Report requested by a property manager or
initiated her own independent request for her information on file,
RealPage provided the consumer with the exact same report, the
Rental Report -- which did not disclose the third-party-vendor
"sources of the information."

In late 2018, Appellants Kelly and Bey found themselves in just the
sort of frustrating predicament the FCRA was designed to avoid. The
Appellants are two prospective tenants whose Rental Reports
contained inaccuracies and who therefore sought information from
RealPage to try to correct those errors.

After Kelly and Bey submitted lease applications for apartments at
different properties, the respective property managers requested
Appellants' consumer reports from RealPage. In response, RealPage
generated and sent their clients Appellants' Rental Reports, each
of which contained inaccurate public record information. Kelly's
report mistakenly included two DUI convictions and a record of an
outdated vehicle inspection tag, the latter of which the report
described as a misdemeanor conviction rather than a non-criminal
summary offense. Bey's report incorrectly stated that a civil
action for possession was filed against him and included an
erroneous eviction filing.

Not surprisingly, the property managers turned down both the
Appellants based on inaccurate consumer reports generated by
RealPage, although in Kelly's case, the manager eventually
relented.  RealPage would not correct the reports unless the
Appellants obtained proof of the error from its sources; and the
identity of RealPage's sources was not included in the disclosures
to Appellants, despite their requests for their files.

So the Appellants availed themselves of the remedy Congress
provided and sued RealPage, claiming it had violated its obligation
under the FCRA to disclose on request "all information in the
consumer's file at the time of the request" and "the sources of
that information." They sought damages and attorneys' fees not only
for themselves but also on behalf of a purported class and
subclass.

Kelly and Bey moved to certify the following class and subclass:

     a. An All Requests class, including individuals who had a
Rental Report sent or caused to be sent to them by RealPage, Inc.
through its On-Site operation which did not include the name of the
private vendor source(s) from which public record information in
the file was obtained within the Class Period; and,

     b. a Direct Requests subclass consisting of individuals in the
All Requests class who received a Rental Report following a
documented direct request by the consumer to RealPage or On-Site.

These class definitions reflect the three different methods by
which putative class members could have received their Rental
Reports during the Class Period, i.e., as a courtesy copy of the
property manager's report; through a consumer's direct request
using the request form RealPage provided on its website; or through
a direct request by correspondence or documented call.
Approximately 2.2 million consumers, comprising the All Requests
class, received copies of their Rental Reports through one or more
of these methods during the Class Period. The Direct Requests
subclass includes only a subset of these consumers: the 16,659
consumers who obtained their Rental Reports using the website form,
plus those who submitted requests via documented calls, letters, or
emails.

The class action did not get far. The District Court denied the
Appellants' motion for class certification on the grounds that they
failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance and superiority
requirements and that their proposed class and subclass were not,
in any event, ascertainable.

The Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing in
relevant part that the District Court erred in its ascertainability
determination because the "presence or absence of public records is
objectively determinable from the face of the reports." They also
pointed to evidence in the existing record that RealPage retained
copies of the Rental Reports in a "searchable electronic format,"
and submitted additional testimony from RealPage -- obtained after
the class certification briefing -- that the data is "stored in a
database that can be queried to retrieve these reports."

The Court denied the motion, rejecting what it described as a "bald
assertion  as to how the Appellants] would conduct the
computer-aided administrative task" of identifying the proposed
class members and declining to consider their explanation on the
ground that it had only been raised in a footnote, which it
declined to consider pursuant to its individual rules.

The Appellants also sought leave to redefine the subclass and to
file a renewed motion for class certification to address the
District Court's ascertainability and predominance concerns in
light of the Court's novel interpretation of Section 1681g(a).
Construing that request as a motion to amend the scheduling order,
the District Court denied it for lack of diligence, concluding that
Appellants "had or could have obtained all of the information on
which they base their reconsideration motion before the Court ruled
on class certification."

The Appellants then filed a petition for interlocutory review under
Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Third
Circuit granted.

RealPage argues that the Appellants lack a sufficiently concrete
injury to satisfy the Supreme Court's standing requirements, while
they challenge the District Court's grounds for denying class
certification. The Third Circuit first addresses whether the
Appellants established standing before discussing the District
Court's rulings on predominance and ascertainability.

As to standing, the Third Circuit opines that the Appellants have
standing because they have made the requisite showing of (1) the
omission of information to which they claim entitlement, (2)
"adverse effects" that flow from the omission, and (3) the
requisite nexus to the "concrete interest" Congress intended to
protect. So it upholds the District Court's determination that the
Appellants have standing.

Though it agrees with the District Court's standing analysis, the
Third Circuit disagrees, at least in part, with its bases for
denying class certification, predominance, and ascertainability. As
to predominance, it finds that the text, context, and structure of
the FCRA provide that the District Court was right to distinguish
between consumers who made direct requests under Section 1681g and
consumers who received courtesy copies of the property managers'
Rental Reports (presumably under Section 1681e(c)). Only the former
were entitled to the disclosure of all the information in the
consumers' files and the "sources" of that information. The All
Requests class, however, consists of both types of consumers, so
the District Court correctly concluded that the "essential element"
of who made the request, could not be established "with common, as
opposed to individualized, evidence," and that certification of the
All Requests class should therefore be denied. It further finds
that when read as a whole, the statute is unambiguous in providing
that any generalized "request" by a consumer for the CRA's
information about her triggers the CRA's disclose obligation under
Section 1681g(a). Indeed, despite the legal arguments it now raises
to the contrary, RealPage itself has conformed its conduct to that
understanding of the statute. Throughout the Class Period, whether
a consumer directly requested her Rental Report or her "file,"
RealPage disclosed to her the exact same document. Nor did RealPage
provide for alternative disclosures for the 16,659 consumers who
made direct requests on its website; they were instructed only that
a request via the website would yield a "report and any of the
disclosures required by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act."

Because the District Court erroneously concluded that
individualized proof would be needed to distinguish requests for
"reports" from those for "files," it found predominance lacking on
that basis. And as that decision rested on "an errant conclusion of
law," the Third Circuit will vacate and remand for the District
Court to consider whether Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance and
superiority requirements are satisfied with respect to the
subclass.

Lastly, the Third Circuit opines that it not allow the Defendants
to defeat ascertainability with a strategic decision to house
records across multiple sources or databases. To the extent
RealPage's objection is to the number of records that must be
individually reviewed, that is essentially an objection to the size
of the class. To hold otherwise would be to categorically preclude
class actions where defendants purportedly harmed too many people,
which would "seriously undermine the purpose" of a class action to
"vindicate meritorious individual claims in an efficient manner."
So long as the review is for information apparent on the face of
the document, the number of files does not preclude
ascertainability.

In sum, the District Court misapprehended the case law and
therefore erred in denying certification of the Direct Requests
subclass on the basis of ascertainability, as well as
predominance.

For the foregoing reasons, because the District Court based its
predominance analysis on a misinterpretation of Section 1681g(a)
and erred in applying its ascertainability precedent, the Third
Circuit vacates the District Court's order denying class
certification of the Direct Requests subclass and remands for the
Court's reconsideration in light of its Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yckjk4t2 from Leagle.com.

Lauren K.W. Brennan -- lbrennan@consumerlawfirm.com -- James A.
Francis -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- John Soumilas --
jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com -- [ARGUED], Francis Mailman
Soumilas, 1600 Market Street, Suite 2510, Philadelphia, PA 19103,
Counsel for the Appellants.

Ronald I. Raether, Jr. -- ron.raether@troutman.com -- Troutman
Pepper, 5 Park Plaza, Suite 1400, Irvine, CA 92614.

Misha Tseytlin -- miiha.tseytlin@troutman.com -- [ARGUED], Troutman
Pepper, 227 West Monroe Street, Suite 3900, Chicago, IL 60606,
Counsel for the Appellees.

Mark W. Mosier -- mmosier@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, 850 10th
Street, N.W., One City Center, Washington, DC 20001, Counsel for
Amici Curiae Consumer Data, Industry Association and Professional
Background Screening Association.

Nicole A. Saharsky -- nsaharsky@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown ,
1999 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006, Counsel for Amicus
Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.


RENOWN HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Nevett's 2nd Amended Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMILY NEVETT and BONNIE NOBLE, on behalf of themselves
and all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs v. RENOWN
HEALTH, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-00319-RCJ-CSD (D.
Nev.), Judge Robert C. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada grants in part and denies in part Renown's
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs Nevett and Noble allege, in their Second Amended
Complaint, that their former employer, Renown, failed to properly
pay them overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C Section 207, and state law, Nev. Rev. Stat.
Section 608.018. They also allege Renown failed to pay them for all
time worked as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 608.016 and
failed to pay them all wages due and owing when they stopped
working for Renown as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 608.020.

Plaintiff Nevett worked as a registered nurse for Renown from July
2018 to October 2019. Plaintiff Noble worked for Renown as a
certified nursing assistant and as a unit clerk from 2015 to about
August 2020.

Renown used a time-keeping system known as "KRONOS" by which
employees would clock in at the beginning of their shift and clock
out at the end their shift. Employees would not clock out for meal
breaks (and thus would not clock in at the end of a meal break).
Rather, in computing the hours worked by an employee for each
shift, Renown would deduct 30 minutes for the meal break. Renown
did not verify whether an employee had taken a meal break.

During meal breaks, the Plaintiffs were required to carry a
Renown-owned telephone or radio, to respond to any calls, and were
not permitted to leave Renown's premises.

As part of their duties, the Plaintiffs documented patient care
notes and records in Renown's electronic medical records system,
known as "EPIC." The EPIC system would record the specific time
that the Plaintiffs entered data into the system. The Plaintiffs
allege that this time stamp in EPIC would, if compared to the
KRONOS time records, show that they entered data into the EPIC
system during meal breaks and when they were not clocked into the
KRONOS system, i.e., when they were off-the-clock. Nevett alleges
she worked in EPIC while not clocked into KRONOS on July 25, 2018.
Noble alleges she worked in EPIC while not clocked into KRONOS
"when she was the only unit clerk the first few weeks of 2018."

Ms. Nevett had a regular schedule of three 12.5-hour shifts each
week. For each shift, Renown compensated Nevett for 12 hours of
work after deducting 30 minutes for the meal break. In addition to
her regular shifts, she was also required to work a 12-hour on-call
shift once each month. She alleges she worked approximately 10
on-call shifts during her employment. Nevett further alleges 0
working more than 40 hours in thirteen specific workweeks, which
she identifies in paragraph 13 of the Second Amended Complaint.

Ms. Noble initially had a regular schedule of three 12.5-hour
shifts each week. Beginning sometime in 2019, Noble had a regular
schedule of five 8.5-hour shifts each week. As with Nevett, for
each shift Renown compensated Noble for 12 hours of work (for the
12.5-hour shifts) and 8 hours of work (for the 8-hour shifts) after
deducting 30 minutes for the meal break. Noble does not allege any
specific workweek in which she worked more than 40 hours.

Plaintiffs Noble and Nevett each allege they "regularly and
routinely worked through" their meal breaks "in order to complete
work tasks including charting in the EPIC system, caring for
patients, and/or taking calls on the Renown provided
telephone/radio specific to patients under their care." Nevett
alleges specifically recalling working during her meal break on
Sept. 6, 2018, Feb. 4, 2019, June 24, 2019, and Aug. 16, 2019.
Noble alleges specifically recalling working during her meal break
on May 19, 2019. Both allege that they were not compensated for
working through their respective meal breaks on the identified
dates.

Ms. Nevett further alleges that she received a non-discretionary
bonus of $1,514.74 that was based upon her employee earnings during
the preceding year. She alleges this bonus payment was not included
in calculating her regular rate of pay for overtime payment
calculations.

Ms. Nevett further alleges that her regular rate of pay for a
regular shift was $30.62 per hour. She alleges her regular base pay
for her on-call shift was $45.93 per hour. She alleges that, for
the weeks she worked an on-call shift, she was actually paid a
total of $1,653.48 (representing 36 hours at $30.62 and 12 hours at
$45.93). She thus alleges that her regular rate of pay for weeks
that she worked an on-call shift was $34.45 ($1,653.48 divided by
48 hours) and the overtime rate during such weeks was $51.68.
Accordingly, she calculates that she should have been paid
$1,791.44 (40 hours at $34.45 plus 8 hours at $51.68); that is, she
alleges she was underpaid by $137.96 in weeks that she worked an
on-call shift in addition to her 3 regular shifts.

Ms. Noble alleges that, when she ceased working for Renown, she was
being paid approximately $16.40 per hour.

Ms. Nevett initiated the matter in state court in April 2020, as a
class action suit against Renown, alleging 3 state law claims for
failure to pay overtime, failure to compensate for all hours
worked, and failure to pay wages due and owing. In June 2021,
Renown moved for partial summary judgment. In response, Nevett
moved to amend her complaint. Before Nevett was granted leave to
amend, Renown removed the matter to the Court. Nevett moved to
remand the litigation back to state court. The parties then
stipulated that Nevett could file her proposed First Amended
Complaint, and Nevett withdrew her motion to remand. The First
Amended Complaint both added Noble as a plaintiff and added the
FLSA claim as a collective action.

Renown moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs
opposed the motion. The Court granted the motion in part, denied it
in part, and granted the Plaintiffs leave to file an amended
complaint to cure the deficiencies of their dismissed claims.

The Plaintiffs filed the instant Second Amended Complaint. Renown
now moves to dismiss the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action.
The Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

As to the First Cause of Action, FLSA claim for overtime hours
worked in a given week, Judge Jones accepts as true the Plaintiffs'
allegations that they were required to remain on premises during
meal breaks. The remain-on-premises requirement does not, of
itself, cause a meal break to not be bona fide. Rather, Section
785.19(b) expressly recognizes that a remain-on-premises
requirement can be consistent with bona fide meal breaks. The
Plaintiffs' additional allegations that they were also required to
carry a Renown-owned telephone or radio and to respond to any calls
does not raise a plausible inference that, during their meal
breaks, the Plaintiffs were performing activities predominately for
the benefit of Renown.

Judge Jones finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient
facts to raise a plausible inference that, because they were
on-call, none of their meal breaks were bona fide. While they have
sufficiently alleged that they remained on-call during their meal
breaks, they have not alleged facts showing that this on-call
status, of itself, precluded them for adequately and comfortably
taking their meal break under the required circumstances. As such,
the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to raise a
plausible inference that their on-call status caused their meal
breaks to be compensable time.

The Plaintiffs' allegations that a comparison of the EPIC and
KRONOS time stamps will show that they entered data during meal
breaks are likewise insufficient to raise a plausible inference
that they were never given a bona fide meal break. Further, their
allegation that a comparison of the EPIC and KRONOS time stamps
will show they performed data entry during meal breaks does not
meet their burden of showing that they worked during a given meal
break or the amount of hours worked. Accordingly, Judge Jones
rejects the Plaintiffs' apparent argument that they have
sufficiently alleged that every meal break was not bona fide.

Judge Jones next addresses the dates on which the Plaintiffs allege
they specifically recall working through their meal break. He finds
that neither Plaintiff has alleged facts permitting an inference
that they worked more than 40 hours during the workweek in which
they worked through the meal break. For similar reasons, neither
Nevett nor Noble has alleged facts suggesting that they worked more
than 40 hours during any week in which they specifically identified
working in EPIC while not on the clock. And, neither of them has
alleged facts suggesting that they worked more than 40 hours in the
workweeks for which they specifically identified that they worked
in EPIC while not clocked in.

Finally, Judge Jones again finds that Noble has not alleged
sufficient facts to raise a plausible inference that, after she
began working five 8.5 hour shifts with meal breaks per workweek,
she worked in excess of 40 hours for any given week for which she
was not paid appropriate overtime wages under the FLSA. Her
conclusory and general allegations that she "routinely worked extra
shifts and extra hours" for which she was not compensated does not
meet her pleading burden.

Accordingly, Judge Jones dismisses Nevett's FLSA claim to the
extent she seeks damages for working off-the-clock while entering
data into the EPIC system and working through a meal break. He
dismisses Noble's FLSA claim in its entirety.

As to the First Cause of Action, improperly calculated overtime
pay, Judge Jones again declines to dismiss Nevett's FLSA overtime
claim to the extent it rests upon her allegation that Renown
improperly calculated her overtime compensation that it paid to
her. In moving to dismiss, Renown has not offered any argument that
Nevett's allegations regarding her regular rate of pay are
insufficient to raise a plausible inference that she was not
properly compensated for her overtime hours in the approximately 10
weeks she had an on-call shift. Accordingly, Judge Jones permits
Nevett's FLSA claim to go forward solely as to her theory that her
regular rate of pay was incorrectly calculated during the
approximately 10 weeks in which she had an on-call shift in
addition to her three regular shifts and the additional weeks she
has specifically identified as having worked overtime.

Judge Jones denies Renown's motion as to Second Cause of Action,
state claim for failure to pay wages for all hours worked, as to
both Defendants. In contrast to their FLSA claim, the Plaintiffs
are not required to allege facts raising an inference that the
specific days in which they worked off-the-clock or during meal
breaks resulted in working more than 40 hours in a week. Their
identification of the specific dates of these events is sufficient
to provide Renown with notice. Further, they have alleged that that
they performed compensable work for which they did not receive any
compensation. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have stated a colorable
claim in their Second Cause of Action for failure to pay wages for
all hours worked.

In the Third Cause of Action, Noble seeks damages pursuant to NRS
608.018 for not receiving overtime wages in (a) workweeks in which
she worked more worked more than 40 hours, and (b) days on which
she worked more than 8 hours. Renown argues this claim must be
dismissed for the same reasons as Noble's FLSA claim. Judge Jones
agrees that, with respect to Noble's claim for overtime wages for
working more than 40 hours in a workweek, this claim fails for the
same reasons as Noble's FSLA claim fails. She has not alleged facts
raising a plausible inference that, for a given week, she worked in
excess of 40 hours for which she did not receive overtime
compensation.

However, the reasoning underlying the Court's dismissal of Noble's
FLSA claims does not apply to her claim for overtime wages for days
in which she worked more than 8 hours. Noble has sufficiently
alleged that she worked more than 8 hours on that day but did not
receive overtime compensation for that work. Accordingly, Judge
Jones denies Renown's motion on Noble's theory that she was not
paid overtime wages on days that she worked more than 8 hours.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Jones grants in part and denies in
part Rowan's Partial Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint. He
(i) denies the Motion as to Nevett's claim, in her First Cause of
Action, that she was not fully compensated for overtime work
because her regular rate of pay was incorrectly calculated; (ii)
denies as to the Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action; (iii) denies
as to Noble's claim, in her Third Cause of Action, that she was not
fully compensated for overtime work performed in excess of 8 hours
in a workday; and (iv) grants without prejudice as to all remaining
claims.

The Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their Second Amended
Complaint to correct the deficiencies of the dismissed claims. Any
such amended complaint must be filed not later than 30 days from
the date the Order is entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yacd8fx8 from Leagle.com.


RINGS END: Hwang Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rebecca Rings End,
Incorporated. The case is styled as Jenny Hwang, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Rings End,
Incorporated, Case No. 1:22-cv-05132 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ring's End -- https://www.ringsend.com/ -- is a building supply and
home improvement company with design & decor services serving CT
and southern NY since 1902.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


RON'S TOWING: Garrett Sues Over Unpaid Tow Truck Operators' OT
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case, PAUL GARRETT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RON'S TOWING, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:22-cv-01853-E (N.D. Tex., August 22, 2022) is brought by
the Plaintiff as a collective action alleging the Defendant of
willful violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant on and off as a tow
truck operator from approximately October 2009 until June 2022.

The Plaintiff claims that he and other tow truck operators
regularly worked more than 40 hours per week. The Defendant paid
them a set percentage for each tow. Specifically, the Plaintiff was
paid 28% of the amount of the cost to the customer for each tow.
However, some of their hours worked went unrecorded and
uncompensated because the Defendant required them to record their
shifts as lasting exactly eight hours, even though they were
regularly required to work longer than 8 hours. As a result, they
were deprived by the Defendant of sufficient overtime compensation
at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay
for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the
Plaintiff

The Plaintiff seeks for damages, for himself and for all other
similarly situated Tow Truck Operators, for all unpaid wages
against the Defendant, as well as liquidated damages in an amount
equal to all unpaid overtime compensation, prejudgment interest,
reasonable attorney's fees and all cost, and other relief as the
Court may deem just and proper.

Ron's Towing, Inc. provides light-duty and heavy-duty towing
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Colby Qualls, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Tel: (501) 221-0088
          Fax: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: colby@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

RUSH CAR: Viera Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Drivers and Car Cleaners
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE MAGDALENO VIERA and EDIN EUCEDA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. RUSH CAR WASH LLC and
LAWRENCE RUSH, Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-05007 (E.D.N.Y., August
24, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law
including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime
wages, failure to provide wage notices, and failure to provide
accurate wage statements.

Plaintiffs Viera and Euceda were employed by the Defendants as
drivers and car cleaners from July 2013 until December 2020 and
from July 2015 until July 2021, respectively.

Rush Car Wash LLC is a provider of car cleaning services, with a
principal executive office located at 1199 Newbridge Rd., North
Bellmore, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                
      
         Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
         HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
         Kew Gardens, NY 11415
         Telephone: (718) 263-9591
         Facsimile: (718) 263-9598

SCRIPPS HEALTH: Must File Response in Franklin Suit by Sept. 9
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHELLE FRANKLIN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SCRIPPS HEALTH, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-367-MMA (MDD) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael
M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California issues an interim order on the Defendant's motion to
stay.

Judge Anello directs the Defendant to file a response by Sept. 9,
2022, indicating whether it agrees that a Landis stay is
appropriate.

On March 21, 2022, Plaintiffs Michelle Franklin and Irene Gamboa
initiated the putative class action against Scripps Health
("Defendant") and DOES 1 through 10. The Defendant now moves the
Court to stay the case pending resolution of parallel state court
actions pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine, citing Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976). The Plaintiffs have filed a statement of non-opposition.
They specifically request that a stay be "without prejudice to
seeking to lift the stay at a later time as warranted by the facts
and law in the case and related matters."

Having reviewed the Defendant's motion, Judge Anello has
reservations that the state court actions would completely resolve
the issues in the case. While he appreciates the significant
overlap in the issues and claims, he nonetheless has substantial
doubt that following resolution of the state court actions there
would be "nothing further to do." For example, should the state
court actions settle out of court, and the Plaintiffs opt-out of
those classes, the matter will need to be litigated in full.

Therefore, it appears that a discretionary stay may be more
appropriate, citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
Accordingly, Judge Anello directs the Defendant to file a response
by Sept. 9, 2022, indicating whether it agrees that a Landis stay
is appropriate. Alternatively, it must provide supplemental
briefing on the Court's concern noted. The Plaintiffs may then file
a further response or statement of position no later than Sept. 16,
2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Interim Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mu55mzyf from Leagle.com.


SERVICELINK NLS: Rinsch Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled DANIEL RINSCH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. SERVICELINK NLS, LLC, SERVICELINK
HOLDINGS, LLC, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
22STCV18156, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles, to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California on August 23, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:22-cv-05989 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide
rest periods, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum
wages, failure to pay all wages due to discharged and quitting
employees, failure to reimburse business expenses, failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unlawful business
practices.

ServiceLink NLS, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ServiceLink
Holdings, LLC, with its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania.

ServiceLink Holdings, LLC is a real estate company and wholly-owned
subsidiary of ServiceLink Holdings, Inc., with its principal place
of business in Florida. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Ryan H. Crosner, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 239-9800
         Facsimile: (213) 239-9012
         E-mail: ryan.crosner@ogletree.com

                 - and –

         Madeleine K. Lee, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         Park Tower, Fifteenth Floor
         695 Town Center Drive
         Costa Mesa, CA 92626
         Telephone: (714) 800-7900
         Facsimile: (714) 754-1298
         E-mail: madeleine.lee@ogletree.com

TARGET CORP: Conditional Certification in Babbitt Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Tammy Babbitt and William Carter, individually and on
behalf of other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs v.
Target Corporation, Defendant, Civil No. 20-490 (DWF/ECW) (D.
Minn.), Judge Donovan W. Frank of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota affirms the Magistrate Judge's order dated
April 5, 2022, granting the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification.

Plaintiffs Babbitt and Carter brought the action against Target on
behalf of themselves and similarly situated current and former
Target Executive Team Leaders ("ETLs") to recover overtime pay
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The Plaintiffs allege
that Target has misclassified ETLs in violation of the FLSA.

The FLSA authorizes similarly situated employees to bring
collective actions against their employer for unpaid overtime pay.
To become party to an FLSA collective action, an employee must
opt-in, meaning that each prospective member of the collective must
give "consent in writing" to the Court. Id. Courts can facilitate
the opt-in process by conditionally certifying a class and
authorizing court-supervised notice to potential opt-in
plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs moved to conditionally certify the collective of
ETLs who worked for Target on or after July 20, 2018, and the
Magistrate Judge granted the Plaintiffs' motion. Target objects to
the conditional certification, arguing that the Magistrate Judge
(1) applied the wrong standard; (2) failed to consider Target's
evidence; and (3) erroneously concluded that the Plaintiffs
provided a colorable basis that the putative class members are
victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.

In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 74 (2013), the
Supreme Court has emphasized the distinction between class actions
and collective actions. "Rule 23 actions are fundamentally
different" from collective actions under the FLSA. Unlike a Rule 23
class action, conditional certification "does not produce a class
with an independent legal status or join additional parties to the
action." Rather, "the sole consequence of conditional certification
is the sending of court-approved written notice to employees, who
in turn become parties to a collective action only by filing
written consent with the court." "Whatever significance
'conditional certification' may have in Section 216(b) proceedings,
it is not tantamount to class certification under Rule 23."

Given the nature of collective actions under the FLSA, Judge Frank
agrees with the Plaintiffs that a motion for conditional
certification of a collective action is separate from a motion "to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action." Significantly,
however, hi decision is the same even under a de novo review.

Judge Frank finds that the Order notes that Target's written
policies and training materials indicate that ETLs are required to
spend more than 50% of their time on leadership activities. Even
so, their job descriptions include hourly tasks. ETLs are required
to "jump in and assist with hourly tasks on occasion" and then
"jump out at the right time to ensure they are spending the clear
majority of their time on leadership." As the Order indicates,
Target did not submit any evidence that provided how ETLs were to
determine when the "jump out" of hourly tasks. Moreover,
depositions and declarations of ETLs support the Plaintiffs'
assertion that they are required to "jump in" more often because
Target does not sufficiently staff its stores.

The Order acknowledges the fact that the Plaintiffs have only
provided testimony from less than 1% of the collective, but the
testimony comes from "ETLs working at stores across the country."
While Target claims that its practices are decentralized, Judge
Frank opines that the Plaintiffs have put forth enough evidence to
show that their experience is not unique to one store or region.
Rather, ETLs in several states report spending a majority of their
time on hourly tasks. This evidence "cannot be merely explained by
a rogue manager or region." He agrees that "there is evidence of a
pattern or practice by Target of using ETLs to shore up their
hourly workers across the country." At this stage in the
certification process, the Plaintiffs have met their burden.

Judge Frank concludes that the "sole consequence of conditional
certification is the sending of court-approved written notice to
employees." At this stage, the Plaintiffs need only establish a
colorable basis for their claim that the putative class members
were victims of a single decision, policy, or plan. The standard is
intentionally lenient. The Plaintiffs have provided enough evidence
to warrant notice to the collective. For that reason, Magistrate
Judge Wright's order is affirmed and the Defendant's objection is
overruled.

The parties are directed to contact the Magistrate Judge to
establish a new timeline to meet and confer regarding notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3vc7fkr3 from
Leagle.com.


TCA LOGISTICS: Faces Zambrano Wage-and-Hour Suit in E.D.N.Y.
------------------------------------------------------------
JORGE ZAMBRANO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TCA LOGISTICS CORP., Defendant, Case No.
2:22-cv-05026-KAM-ST (E.D.N.Y., August 24, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law including failure to pay minimum
wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide wage
notices, failure to provide accurate wage statements, and failure
to pay spread-of-hours pay.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a delivery worker in
New York from early March 2015 until March 22, 2022.

TCA Logistics Corp. is a shipping and delivery services company,
with its principal place of business located at 102 Lauman Lane,
Hicksville, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                
      
         Jon L. Norinsberg, Esq.
         Michael R. Minkoff, Esq.
         JOSEPH & NORINSBERG, LLC
         110 East 59th Street, Suite 3200
         New York, NY 10022
         Telephone: (212) 227-5700
         Facsimile: (212) 656-1889
         E-mail: jon@norinsberglaw.com
                 michael@employeejustice.com

TELADOC HEALTH: Labaton Named Lead Counsel in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE TELADOC HEALTH, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case
No. 22cv4687 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Denise Cote of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York appoints
Leadersel Innotech ESG as the Lead Plaintiff and Labaton Sucharow
LLP as the Lead Counsel.

On Aug. 5, 2022, five applicants submitted a motion to be appointed
as the lead plaintiff in the securities class action. Since then,
each applicant except Leadersel Innotech ESG has withdrawn their
motion.

Accordingly, Leadersel Innotech ESG is appointed the Lead Plaintiff
and Labaton Sucharow LLP will serve as the Lead Counsel.

Every pleading filed in the action, and in any separate action
subsequently included therein, will bear the following caption:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IN RE
TELADOC HEALTH, INC. 22cv4687 (DLC) SECURITIES LITIGATION

When a class action that relates to the same subject matter as the
action is filed in or transferred to the Court and assigned to
Judge Cote, it will be consolidated with the action (provided that
any case transferred to the Court solely for pretrial proceedings
will be consolidated only to that extent absent further order of
this Court), and the Clerk of Court shall: file a copy of this
Order in the separate file for such action.; mail a copy of the
Order of assignment of counsel for the Plaintiffs and the counsel
for each defendant in the consolidated actions; make an appropriate
entry in the Docket; mail to the attorneys for the Plaintiff(s) in
the newly filed or transferred case a copy of the Order; and upon
the first appearance of any new Defendant(s), mail to the attorneys
for such Defendant(s) in such newly filed or transferred case a
copy of the Order.

The Clerk will maintain a separate file for each of the
consolidated actions and filings will be made therein in accordance
with the regular procedures of the Clerk of the Court except as
modified by the Order.

The Court requests the assistance of counsel in calling to the
attention of the Clerk the filing or transfer of any case which
might properly be consolidated with the Action.

The Order will apply to each class action assigned Judge Cote
alleging claims similar to those set forth in the action against
Acorda and others. t will apply to each such case which is
subsequently filed in or transferred to the Court, and which is
assigned to Judge Cote unless a party objecting to the
consolidation of that case or to any other provision of the Order
serves an application for relief from the Order or from any of its
provisions within 10 days after the date on which the Clerk mails a
copy of the Order to counsel for that party. The provisions of the
Order will apply to such action pending the Court's ruling on the
application. Unless a plaintiff in a subsequently filed or
transferred case is permitted by the Court to use a separate
complaint, the Defendants will not be required to answer, plead or
otherwise move with respect to that complaint in any such case. If
a plaintiff in any such case is permitted to use a separate
complaint, each defendant will have 30 days from the date the Court
grants such permission within which to answer, plead or otherwise
move with respect to any such complaint.

The Lead Plaintiff will file an amended complaint for the action
and any actions subsequently consolidated with it by Sept. 30,
2022. The Defendants will file an answer to the amended complaint
or a motion to dismiss the amended complaint by Oct. 21, 2022.

Pending filing and service of the amended complaint, the Defendants
will have no obligation to move, answer, or otherwise respond to
any complaints in any actions subsequently consolidated with the
action. If a motion to dismiss the amended complaint is filed, the
Lead Plaintiff may further amend its complaint by Nov. 11, 2022. It
is unlikely that the Lead Plaintiff will have a further opportunity
to amend. If the Lead Plaintiff elects not to further amend the
complaint, it will file its opposition to the motion to dismiss by
Nov. 11, 2022. The Defendants will file their reply to the
opposition to the motion to dismiss by Nov. 25, 2022. They will
supply the Court with two courtesy copies of the motion papers at
the time the reply is served.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Class Management
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/49sebneb from
Leagle.com.


TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Blue Cross Sues Over Copaxone Drug Monopoly
----------------------------------------------------------------
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF VERMONT; and THE VERMONT HEALTH PLAN,
Plaintiffs v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, LTD., TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., TEVA SALES AND MARKETING, INC., and TEVA
NEUROSCIENCE, INC., Defendants, Case No. 5:22-cv-00159-gwc (D. Vt.,
Aug. 22, 2022) alleges violation of the Sherman Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Teva manipulated the
purchasing decisions of health plan members by circumventing the
cost-sharing obligations that health plans used to help make
members sensitive to price. Most health plans require members to
pay co-insurance or copayments, which represent a portion of the
purchase price of prescription drugs and other medical care. These
payments are designed to make members at least partially
internalize the cost of prescriptions so they will prefer more
affordable treatment options and not cause plan payors to incur
excessive costs. Given these cost-sharing arrangements, Teva knew
plan members would prefer more affordable generic versions of
glatiramer acetate, says the Plaintiff.

Rather than making the price of Copaxone more affordable, Teva
provided health plan members with coupons" that relieved them of
some or all of their cost-sharing obligations if they purchased
Copaxone. This meant that for health plan members. Copaxone would
be less expensive than generics. Unfortunately, for health plan
payors, the entities that pay the bulk of the cost for all
prescriptions, Copaxone remained excessively priced. In this way,
Teva avoided price competition by insulating decision-makers from
the true cost of Copaxone. Teva thus induced health plan payors to
continue paying for Copaxone instead of lower-cost generics,
alleges the suit.

TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LIMITED operates as a pharmaceutical
company. The Company develops, manufactures, and markets generic
and branded human pharmaceuticals, as well as active pharmaceutical
ingredients. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries serves customers
worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bridget C. Asay, Esq.
          Michael N. Donofrio
          15 East State Street Suite 2
          Montpelier, VT 05602
          Telephone: (802) 858-4285
          Facsimile: (802) 858-4465
          Email: basay@stris.com
                 mdonofrio@stris.com

              - and -

          Elizabeth Rogers Brannen, Esq.
          777 South Figueroa Street, Suite 3850
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 995-6800
          Email: ebrannen@stris.com

               - and -

          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Matthew M. Gerend, Esq.
          Felicia J. Craick, Esq.
          Natida Sribhibbhadh, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
          Email: Isarko@kellerrohrback.com
                 gcappio@kellerohrback.com
                 mgerend@kellerohrback.com
                 feraick@kellerohrback.com
                 sread@kellerohrback.com

               - and -

          Alison E. Chase, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK, L.L.P.
          801 Garden Street, Suite 301
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496
          Email: achase@kellerrohrback.com

TEXAS: Attorney General Sued Over Strict Anti Abortion Laws
-----------------------------------------------------------
FUND TEXAS CHOICE; THE NORTH TEXAS EQUAL ACCESS FUND; THE LILITH
FUND FOR REPRODUCTIVE EQUITY; FRONTERA FUND; THE AFIYA CENTER; WEST
FUND; JANE'S DUE PROCESS; CLINIC ACCESS SUPPORT NETWORK; and DR.
GHAZALEH MOAYEDI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KEN PAXTON, in his Official
Capacity of Attorney General; SUSAN R. DESKI, in her Official
Capacity of County Attorney of Burleson County, Texas, and on
behalf of a class of all Texas County Attorneys similarly situated;
JULIE RENKEN, in her Official Capacity of District Attorney for
Washington County, Texas; WILEY B. "SONNY" MCAFEE, in his Official
Capacity of District Attorney for Blanco, Burnet, Llano, and San
Saba Counties, Texas; JOSE GARZA in his Official Capacity of
District Attorney for Travis County, Texas; and FRED H. WEBER, in
his Official Capacity of District Attorney for Caldwell County, and
on behalf of a class of all Texas District Attorneys similarly
situated, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00859 (W.D. Tex., Aug. 23,
2022) seeks to challenge any criminal prosecution of the Plaintiffs
under Texas anti-abortion statutes for lawful exercise of their
constitutional rights.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the
Defendants from applying Texas's anti-abortion laws to the
Plaintiffs for the legal exercise of their rights. The Plaintiffs
also seek a declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional, null
and void the retroactive application of the Pre-Roe Statutes and to
enjoin the Defendants from applying them against the Plaintiffs,
their staff, volunteers, and donors for conduct that preceded the
Dobbs decision.

TEXAS is a state in the South Central region of the United States.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:


          Jennifer R. Ecklund, Esq.
          Elizabeth G. Myers, Esq.
          Allyn Jaqua Lowell, Esq.
          John Atkins, Esq.
          Elizabeth Rocha, Esq.
          Alexandra Wilson Albright, Esq.
          THOMPSON COBURN LLP
          2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (972) 629-7100
          Facsimile: (972) 629-7171
          Email: jecklund@thompsoncoburn.com
                 emyers@thompsoncoburn.com
                 alowell@thompsoncoburn.com
                 jatkins@thompsoncoburn.com
                 erocha@thompsoncoburn.com
                 aalbright@adjtlaw.com

               -and-

          Marcy Hogan Greer, Esq.
          515 Congress Ave., Suite 2350
          Austin, TX 78701-3562
          Telephone: (512) 482-9300
          Facsimile: (512) 482-9303
          Email: mgreer@adjtlaw.com

               -and-

          Kevin Dubose, Esq.
          1844 Harvard Street
          Houston, TX 77008
          Telephone: (713) 523-2358
          Facsimile: (713) 522-4553
          Email: kdubose@adjtlaw.com

               -and-

          Kirsten M. Castaneda, Esq.
          8144 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 1000
          Dallas, TX 75231-4388
          Telephone: (214) 369-2358
          Facsimile: (214) 369-2359
          Email: kcastaneda@adjtlaw.com

THEDACARE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Glick ERISA Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH B. GLICK, individually and as a representative
of a class of participants and beneficiaries of the ThedaCare
Retirement and 403(b) Savings Plan, Plaintiff v. THEDACARE INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 20-C-1236 (E.D. Wis.), Judge William C.
Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion
to dismiss.

Mr. Glick, a participant in the ThedaCare, Inc. Retirement and
403(b) Savings Plan (the Plan), brings the case as a proposed class
action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2), against Defendants ThedaCare
and its Board of Directors.

On Sept. 4, 2018, the Plaintiff was hired as a surgical technician
by ThedaCare. ThedaCare terminated Plaintiff's employment on July
27, 2020. ThedaCare is both the plan sponsor and plan administrator
of the ThedaCare Retirement and 403(b) Savings Plan. The Plan is a
"defined contribution" pension plan under 29 U.S.C. Section
1102(2)(A) and 1002(34), meaning that ThedaCare's contribution to
the payment of plan costs is guaranteed but the pension benefits
are not. The Plan has approximately $612 million in assets and over
7,900 participants.

The Plaintiff claims that, at all relevant times, the Plan's fees
were excessive when compared with other comparable 401(k) and
403(b) plans offered by other sponsors that had similar numbers of
plan participants and similar amounts of money under management. He
also alleges that the excessive fees led to lower net returns than
those that participants in comparable 401(k) and 403(b) plans
enjoyed.

The Plaintiff asserts that during the putative Class Period, which
is defined as Aug. 12, 2014, through the date of judgment, the
Defendants, as fiduciaries of the Plan, breached the duties owed to
the Plan, to him, and to all other plan participants by (1) failing
to objectively and adequately review the Plan's investment
portfolio with due care to ensure that each investment option was
prudent, in terms of cost; (2) maintaining certain funds in the
Plan despite the availability of identical or similar investment
options with lower costs and/or better performance histories; (3)
failing to monitor the recordkeeping and administration fees paid
by the Plan to ensure that they were reasonable and, as a result,
authorizing the Plan to pay objectively unreasonable and excessive
recordkeeping and administration fees, relative to the
recordkeeping and administration services received; and (4) failing
to adequately disclose fees associated with the Plan to plan
participants.

The Defendants' recordkeeper during the Class Period was
Transamerica Retirement Solutions, which the Plaintiff alleges is
"well known as a high cost recordkeeper and administrator and tends
to have platforms that encourage higher fee funds."

The Plaintiff asserts six claims for relief: breaches of duties of
loyalty and prudence regarding recordkeeping and administration
fees (Count I); breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence
regarding managed account service fees (Count II); breaches of
duties of loyalty and prudence regarding investment management fees
(Count III); failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries
regarding recordkeeping and administration fees (Count IV); failure
to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding managed account
services fees (Count V); and failure to adequately monitor other
fiduciaries regarding investment management fees (Count VI).

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended
complaint on Dec. 4, 2020. On Sept. 30, 2021, the Court stayed and
administratively closed the case pending the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Hughes v. Northwestern University, No. 19-1401.
The Supreme Court issued a decision in Hughes on Jan. 24, 2022. 142
S.Ct. 737 (2022). That same day, the Court lifted the stay and
invited the parties to submit simultaneous supplemental briefing in
light of the Supreme Court's decision. The parties submitted
supplemental briefs on Feb. 7, 2022.

First, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing because he does not allege that he invested in any of the
allegedly imprudent investment options or paid any of the fees
about which he complains.

Judge Griesbach holds that the Plaintiff has satisfied the
requirements of Article III standing by alleging that he suffered
objectively unreasonable and unnecessary monetary losses through
injuries to the Plan's assets unrelated to specific funds. The
Plaintiff has a "concrete stake" in the lawsuit because if
Plaintiff wins his suit, he alleges that his account balance will
be greater based on the excessive fees and expenses returned to his
individual account by the Defendants. Because the Plaintiff has
alleged his own injury in fact, he has standing to assert claims on
behalf of other affected plan participants. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff has standing to assert all of the claims brought in the
action.

Next, the Plaintiff alleges the Defendants breached their fiduciary
duties by causing the Plan to pay excessive recordkeeping costs,
failing to retain the least costly share class of each fund,
retaining high-cost funds, failing to disclose revenue-sharing
information to participants, and failing to follow a prudent
process in providing managed account services.

Judge Griesbach holds that (i) the amended complaint plausibly
alleges that the Defendants' failure to solicit bids and negotiate
for reasonable fees was imprudent; (ii) the Plaintiff has stated a
claim that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by
retaining high-cost actively managed investments and offering the
Prudential GIC without undertaking an appropriate process; (iii) it
is plausible to infer from the Plaintiff's allegations that the
Defendants breached the duty of prudence by failing to retain
low-cost share classes of nine mutual funds for the Plan; (iv)
although the Defendants dispute whether the alternative services
are appropriate comparisons, at this stage, the Plaintiff has
asserted allegations from which it can be inferred that the
Defendants followed an imprudent process in selecting Transamerica
to provide managed account services; and (v) the Defendants are not
required to disclose fees charged or credited to the Plan
investments with the level of detail sought by the Plaintiff.

As to their remaining claims, the Plaintiff asserts that the
Defendants breached ERISA's duty of loyalty, which requires
fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries. Their breach of the duty of loyalty claim is based
on the same allegations as the breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Judge Griesback holds that they must do more than recast
allegations of purported breaches of fiduciary duty as disloyal
acts. The Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations beyond
those pertaining to an alleged breach of fiduciary duty; therefore,
the Plaintiff's breach of the duty of loyalty claims must be
dismissed.

The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants breached their duty
to monitor. Judge Griesbach finds that their breach of the duty to
monitor claim is derivative of the breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Because the Plaintiff has stated claims for breach of fiduciary
duty with respect to the recordkeeping fees paid, managed account
services fees, and investment management fees, he has also stated a
claim that the Defendants breached their duty to monitor.

For these reasons, Judge Griesbach grants in part and denies in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The motion is granted with
respect to the Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim regarding
the Defendants' failure to properly disclose revenue sharing
information to participants and breach of the duty of loyalty
claims, and those claims are dismissed. The motion is denied in all
other respects. The Clerk is directed to set the matter on the
Court's calendar for a Rule 16 telephonic scheduling conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3vk3durm from Leagle.com.


TRINITY PACKAGING: Prelim. Approval of Robertson Class Deal Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLAUDE ROBERTSON and JOHN SZALASNY, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TRINITY
PACKAGING CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-CV-659(JLS)(JJM)(W.D.N.Y.), Judge John L. Sinatra, Jr., of the
U.S. District Court for Western District of New York denies the
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement and for Certification of Class for Settlement
Purpose.

On May 21, 2019, Robertson, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, filed a Collective Action Complaint
against his former employer, Trinity, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b) alleging that it willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq. After the Defendant
answered the Complaint, District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo, to whom
the case was previously assigned, referred the case to Magistrate
Judge Jerimiah J. McCarthy for all proceedings under 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(b)(1)(A) and (B).

On Dec. 27, 2019, Robertson and Szalasny, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, filed an Amended
Collective and Class Action Complaint alleging that the Defendant
willfully violated the FLSA, New York Labor Law, Sections 650 et
seq. and 190 et seq., and 12 NYCRR Section 142-1.1 et seq.
(collectively, the "NYLL").

On May 12, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed an "Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and for
Certification of Class for Settlement Purposes," which attached a
"Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release" proposing to settle
all NYLL class claims as well as all FLSA collective claims. On
June 21, 2022, Judge McCarthy issued a Report and Recommendation,
recommending that the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion be denied.

Neither party objected to the Report and Recommendation and the
time to do so has expired. A district court may accept, reject, or
modify the findings or recommendations of a magistrate judge. It
must conduct a de novo review of those portions of a magistrate
judge's recommendation to which a party objects. But neither 28
U.S.C. Section 636 nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 requires
a district court to review the recommendation of a magistrate judge
to which no objections are raised.

Though not required to do so, Judge Sinatra nevertheless reviewed
Judge McCarthy's Report and Recommendation. Based on that review,
and absent any objections, he accepts the Recommendation. For the
reasons he stated, he denies the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion. The
case is referred back to Judge McCarthy for further proceedings
consistent with the referral order of July 31, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/buccjd2v from Leagle.com.


TUSIMPLE HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Nov. 1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Johnson Fistel, LLP announces that a
class action lawsuit has commenced on behalf of investors of
TuSimple Holdings, Inc. ("TuSimple" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:
TSP). The class action is on behalf of shareholders who purchased
or otherwise, acquired TuSimple stock between April 15, 2021 and
August 1, 2022, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period").
Investors are hereby notified that they have until November 1, 2022
to move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff in this action.

What actions may I take at this time? If you suffered a loss and
are interested in learning more about being a lead plaintiff,
please contact Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) by email or phone
at 619-814-4471. If emailing, please include a phone number.

To join this action, you can click or copy and paste the link below
in a browser:

https://www.johnsonfistel.com/investigations/tusimple-holdings-inc

There is no cost or obligation to you.

According to the complaint, on August 1, 2022, the Wall Street
Journal published an article entitled "Self-Driving Truck Accident
Draws Attention to Safety at TuSimple," which brought to light a
number of previously undisclosed concerns that undermined
Defendants' representations and omissions concerning the safety of
the Company's autonomous driving technology. The article referenced
an April 6, 2022 accident involving a truck fitted with TuSimple's
technology, and reported that, among other things, "[t]he accident.
. .  underscores concerns that the autonomous-trucking company is
risking safety on public roads in a rush to deliver driverless
trucks to market, according to independent analysts and more than a
dozen of the company's former employees."

A lead plaintiff will act on behalf of all other class members in
directing the TuSimple class-action lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can
select a law firm of its choice to litigate the class-action
lawsuit. An investor's ability to share any potential future
recovery of the TuSimple class action lawsuit is not dependent upon
serving as lead plaintiff. For more information regarding the lead
plaintiff process please refer to
https://www.johnsonfistel.com/lead-plaintiff-deadlines.

                      About Johnson Fistel

Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
law firm with offices in California, New York and Georgia. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits. Johnson Fistel
seeks to recover losses incurred due to violations of federal
securities laws. For more information about the firm and its
attorneys, please visit http://www.johnsonfistel.com.Attorney
advertising. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes. [GN]

UNCOMMON GROUNDS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Amended Aguilar Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIGIDO GALVEZ AGUILAR, Plaintiff v. UNCOMMON GROUNDS
ENTERPRISES, INC., DISHES GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP., CITY MINT, INC.,
MINI MINT, INC., MINT NO. 5. INC., MOSHE MALLUL, MARGARITA
TALISMAN, Defendant, Index No. 150552/2022 (N.Y. Sup.), Mary V.
Rosado of the Supreme Court, New York County, grants the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint on behalf of himself and a
purported Class on Jan. 18, 2022. In the Complaint, he alleged that
the Defendants collectively own and operate five restaurants as one
integrated enterprise under the name "Dishes." He further alleged
that he worked for Dishes from December 2014 to March 2020.

The Plaintiff alleged on behalf of himself and the class that the
Defendants engaged in improper time shaving, improper tip credit
practices, improper meal credit practices, and a variety of other
violations of New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). He describes the
proposed class as delivery persons, servers, runners, bussers,
cashiers, porters, cooks, line-cooks, food preparers, and
dishwashers employed by Dishes. He also proposed a subclass of
tipped employees comprised of waiters, servers, runners, delivery
persons, and busboys ("Tipped Subclass").

The Defendants did not file an Answer. Rather, they filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. They moved to dismiss on
numerous grounds. First, they argued that the Plaintiff does not
have standing to represent the class since he never alleges to have
been a server, runner, busser, cashier, porter, cook, line-cook,
food preparer, or dishwasher, but only a delivery person. They also
claim that because the Plaintiff does not cite to any specific
section of NYLL that provides a basis for relief, the Complaint
must be dismissed. They further assert that Plaintiff cannot bring
a class action for record keeping violations or statutory penalties
pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") Section 901(b).
The Defendants argue dismissal is also appropriate because the
Plaintiff's "off the clock allegations" are too individualized to
warrant class treatment. They also produced affidavits from current
employees and the Plaintiff's manager that contradict their
affidavit.

In response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff
filed an Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint contained the
same allegations as the original Complaint. The only difference
between the Complaint and the Amended Complaint was that rather
than alleging Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to liquidated
damages and statutory penalties, in the Amended Complaint, the
Plaintiff sought to recover liquidated damages and statutory
penalties solely for himself. One week after filing his Amended
Complaint, the Plaintiff moved for class certification.

The Defendant and the Plaintiff agreed to moot the Defendant's
first motion to dismiss in lieu of the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint. The Defendants did not file an Answer to the Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint. Instead, they moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, arguing that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be
dismissed pursuant to CPLR Sections 3211(a)(2) and (7) for
essentially the same reasons as their original motion to dismiss.
They also argued that because the Plaintiff has not individually
waived his own statutory penalty claims, he cannot pursue class
relief. The Plaintiff opposed arguing that he has met the liberal
pleading standard of the CPLR, that the Defendants' affidavits are
self-serving, and that failure to specify under which provision of
the NYLL he seeks relief is not fatal to his Complaint.

Judge Rosado finds that the Defendants have conclusively shown that
the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint seeking class relief is barred as
a matter of law. In his Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff has not
waived his right to an award of statutory penalties. Not only does
he fail to notice Defendants what section of the NYLL he is seeking
relief under, but the Plaintiff has not pled that the statutory
penalties he seeks for himself are specifically authorized to be
recovered in a class action. Therefore, as the Amended Complaint is
currently pled, the Plaintiff cannot seek class relief while also
seeking statutory penalties for himself, especially when he does
not state under which provisions of the NYLL he seeks relief.

However, a plaintiff can avoid application of CPLR Section 901(b)
by waiving her right to penalties. Thus, the Plaintiff's Complaint
is dismissed without prejudice. The Plaintiff is granted leave to
correct the deficiencies in his Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff's motion for class certification is rendered moot as
the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Moreover, a motion to
certify a class action is premature if it is made before a
Defendant's time to serve an answer has expired. The Plaintiff may
renew its motion for class certification if it files a second
Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, Judge Rosado grants the motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint as the Plaintiff's claim for statutory penalties bars the
class action complaint. She grants the Plaintiff leave to replead
within 21 days of the date of service of her Decision and Order
with notice of entry.

The Defendant will serve and file a responsive pleading within 35
days of the date of service of the Decision and Order with notice
of entry.

Judge Rosado renders moot the motion for class certification
because the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Decision + Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/27wx9juw from Leagle.com.


VICTORIA: Police Uses Capsicum Spray Against Protesters, Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
abc.net.au reports that a class action has been launched against
the Victorian government over the use by police of capsicum spray
against anti-mining protesters in Melbourne three years ago.

The legal action relates to demonstrations outside the
International Mining and Resources Conference at the Melbourne
Exhibition Centre in October 2019.

Police arrested numerous people over several days of protests, and
used capsicum spray to break up climate activists who'd gathered
outside the venue.

The class action claims the use of capsicum spray was unlawful and
excessive, and that protesters were not causing an immediate threat
to police officers or the public.

The writ was lodged by Inner Melbourne Community Legal on behalf of
lead plaintiff Jordan Brown, who was sprayed by police during the
protest.

"I've been documenting protests for two decades, and see that
police continue to systematically suppress basic civil and
political rights throughout Australia in increasing measure," Mr
Brown said.

"This class action provides a pathway towards some meaningful
change in Victoria."

The Special Counsel leading the case, Olivia McMillan said police
used excessive force when they sprayed the group of between 50 and
100 protesters.

"Mr Brown suffered redness and dry eyes for a couple of days, quite
severe pain and continues to have apprehension when interacting
with police," she said.

"There's ample footage of protesters being indiscriminately
sprayed. Given the important role, trust and position the police
play, it's important they be held to account."

Victoria Police said it could not comment on court action.

At the time of the protest, then-Police Minister Lisa Neville said
she was "100 per cent comfortable" with police action.

"They are allowing people to peacefully protest, which we are not
seeing . . .  and allowing people to go about their day-to-day
business without being affected," she told ABC Radio Melbourne.

"Surrounding conference attendees is just inappropriate behaviour.

"I commend them [police]. Without police being there, those
protesters would be surrounding and making it physically dangerous
for those people attempting to attend a legal conference in
Victoria." [GN]

WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Court Certifies Class in Nelson FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Carla Baldwin of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada conditionally certify the case, CHRISTOPHER
NELSON, Plaintiff v. WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant, Case No.
3:21-CV-00066-MMD-CLB (D. Nev.), as a collective action for notice
purposes.

Mr. Nelson and all current Opt-In Plaintiffs -- all non-exempt
hourly paid warehouse workers -- sue Wal-Mart under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201, et seq., for its
alleged failure to pay employees for pre-shift activities and
labor, and bring related claims under Nevada law. Pending before
the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion for circulation of notice
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). Defendant Wal-Mart
Associates, Inc. ("Walmart") opposed the motion, and the Plaintiffs
replied. For the reasons discussed, the Court will grant the
motion, in part, and conditionally certify this case as a
collective action for notice purposes because the Plaintiffs have
persuaded the Court they are sufficiently similarly situated under
the FLSA.

Mr. Nelson is a non-exempt hourly employee of Defendant's Grocery
Distribution Center ("GDC") warehouse in Sparks, Nevada. The
warehouse is divided into a "Dry" Section and "Cold" Section.
Nelson was a former processor in the Cold Section, where all of the
Defendant's frozen and refrigerated items are distributed, and
currently works as a processor in the Dry Section. He works four
shifts per week, for ten paid hours per shift.

Mr. Nelson alleges the Defendant requires all Dry Section employees
to be prepared at the start of their shift time but does not permit
them to clock in until immediately before their shift. In
preparation for their shift, employees must check out and bring
back a mobile scanner and printer from Defendant's system control
window, which takes approximately 15 minutes. Nelson maintains that
the scanner and printer are "integral and indispensable" to his job
since Dry Section workers need the equipment to label and take
inventory of Defendant's products. He alleges that he and other
similarly situated workers are not compensated for this pre-shift
activity, which amounts to around one hour per workweek or $33.53
of overtime pay for him.

Mr. Nelson alleges the Defendant similarly requires all Cold
Section workers to be prepared at the start of their shift but does
not permit them to clock in until immediately before their shift.
In preparation for their shift, the Defendant requires Cold Section
employees to put on personal protective equipment ("PPE") for
safety reasons due to the cold working environment. According to
Nelson, the PPE includes RefrigiWear insulated bibs, a RefrigiWear
thermal jacket, a thermal hooded sweatshirt, a stocking hat, and
wool socks. He alleges that the PPE is "integral and indispensable"
to the job of a Cold Section worker since they "cannot perform
their job safely and/or effectively without donning" the apparel.
He estimates that the process of donning the PPE takes 15 minutes
per shift and employees are not compensated for this pre-shift
activity, which amounts to around one hour per workweek or $33.90
of overtime pay for him.

Mr. Nelson subsequently filed the collective and class action,
asserting the following claims in the FAC: (1) failure to pay
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"); (2) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of the
Nevada Constitution; (3) failure to pay wages for all hours worked
in violation of Nevada Revised Statute ("NRS") Section 608.140 and
Section 608.016; (4) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of
NRS Section 608.140 and Section 608.018; and (5) failure to timely
pay all wages due and owing upon termination pursuant to NRS
Section 608.140 and Sections 608.020-608.050.

The District Court granted, in part, a motion to dismiss the FAC,
wherein it dismissed, without prejudice the claim for failure to
timely pay all wages due and owing upon termination pursuant to NRS
Section 608.140 and Sections 608.020-608.050 based on a lack of
standing.

In the instant motion, Nelson seeks conditional certification of
his case as a collective action under the FLSA.

The question before the Court is whether the Plaintiffs are
similarly situated such that notices will be sent out to other
potential plaintiffs, who could then opt-in to Plaintiffs' proposed
collective action. The Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that
the Plaintiffs have not shown they are similarly situated such that
notices should be sent out. They argue in the alternative, that if
the Court chooses to preliminarily certify the collective action,
the Notice should be revised and only sent to those impacted GDC
associates in Nevada and South Carolina. In reply, the Plaintiffs
agree to limit the notice at this time to only those similarly
situated individuals who were employed by Defendant at its McCarran
(Nevada) and Pageland (South Carolina) facilities.

With this concession in mind, Judge Baldwin finds the Plaintiffs
employed at the Nevada and South Carolina facilities are similarly
situated because they have made the "requisite showing that they
and the proposed collective action members were allegedly 'victims
of a common policy or plan,' thereby warranting conditional
certification." She says, the Plaintiffs' operative pleading and
the limited evidence they have presented to the Court sufficiently
show that they were victims of the Defendants' common policy --
that they were suffered and/or permitted to work without
compensation prior to the start of their shift. She thus finds they
have satisfied the plausibility requirement for conditional
collective action certification.

As discussed, the Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that
such factual and legal similarities exist to satisfy the "lenient
standard that requires a modest showing" at this stage of the
litigation.

Judge Baldwin therefore conditionally certifies the case as a
collective action -- limited to GDC workers in the Nevada and South
Carolina locations. Accordingly, she orders the parties to work
collaboratively to reconcile and resolve all notice disputes --
consistent with the limitation of workers to the Nevada and South
Carolina locations -- and come up with a revised notice together.

Judge Baldwin notes that the parties made several arguments and
cited to several cases not discussed. She has reviewed these
arguments and cases and determines that they do not warrant
discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the motion before
the Court.

For these reasons, she grants the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification in part, as specified. She conditionally
certifies a collective action consisting of GDC workers at the
McCarran, Nevada and Pageland, South Carolina locations.

The parties must work together to resolve all collective action
notice issues, and if they are unable to reach an agreement, they
must present their notice disputes in a motion that complies with
the Local Rules.

They will have 60 days to submit a revised notice to the Court for
approval.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4hmv4hnf from Leagle.com.


WEDRIVEU INC: Chatman Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled PRECIOUS CHATMAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. WEDRIVEU, INC. and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Case No. 22-CIV-02197, was removed from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on August
24, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:22-cv-04849 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code.

WeDriveU, Inc. is an operator of shuttle transportation solutions
in California. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Christopher A. Braham, Esq.
         MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
         2049 Century Park East, Suite 3200
         Los Angeles, CA 90067-3206
         Telephone: (310) 277-4110
         Facsimile: (310) 277-4730
         E-mail: cbraham@mwe.com

WINCO HOLDINGS: Court Dismisses Putman Suit With Leave to Amend
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GENEVA PUTMAN, on behalf of herself and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WINCO HOLDINGS, INC.,
an Idaho corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01760-MCE-JDP
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California denies the Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand and grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with
leave to amend.

Through the action, Putman seeks relief from WinCo for wage and
hour violations of the California Labor Code and California's
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200 et
seq. Presently before the Court are the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or, in the Alternative, to Strike or,
in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings, and the Plaintiff's Motion
to Remand.

Judge England has addressed materially identical motions in the
related cases Castanon v. WinCo Holdings, Inc., Case No.
2:20-cv-01656-MCE-JDP, and Phoung v. Winco Holdings, Inc., Case No.
2:21-cv-02033-MCE-JDP. He adopts his remand analysis from Phoung
here, and denies the Plaintiff's instant Motion for the same
reasons set forth therein. Based on the evidence presented by the
Defendant in thw case, there is simply no doubt that the diversity
and amount in controversy requirements under the Class Action
Fairness Act have been met.

In addition, for the same reasons stated in his evaluation of
previous motions to dismiss filed in those cases, Judge England
finds that the Plaintiff's instant Complaint is wholly conclusory
and fails to state any claim here as well. The Plaintiff concedes
that her pleading as constituted is likely insufficient to meet
federal standards. She thus foregoes making any arguments in
opposition to dismissal and seeks leave to amend, which Judge
England agrees should be permitted. Given the foregoing
disposition, Judge England declines to strike class allegations or
stay the case.

In sum, for the reasons he stated, Judge England denies the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and grants the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss with leave to amend. He denies as moot the Defendant's
alternative requests to strike the class allegations or stay
proceedings.

Not later than 20 days following the date the Order is
electronically filed, the Plaintiff may, but is not required to,
file an amended complaint. If no amended pleading is timely filed,
the action will be deemed dismissed with prejudice upon no further
notice to the parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3mxsyf8u from Leagle.com.


WINCO HOLDINGS: Court Narrows Claims in Castanon's 2nd Amended Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ESMERALDA CASTANON and JOHN DURON, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WINCO
HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, doing business as WINCO
FOODS; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:20-cv-01656-MCE-JDP (E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr.,
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
grants in part and denies in part Winco's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.

Through the present class action proceeding, Castanon challenges
various wage and hour practices utilized by her employer, Defendant
Winco, both on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated. According to her, Winco has failed 1) to pay its
employees all wages owed, including overtime; 2) to provide legally
compliant meal and rest periods; and 3) to pay all wages due upon
separation. She further alleges that wage statements provided by
Winco have been legally non-compliant.

Winco operates at multiple locations in California as a retailer
providing supermarket products to consumers. The Plaintiff was
employed as a non-exempt customer service employee between 2001 and
2019 (her title was Loss Prevention Agent) at Winco's location in
Chico, California.

The Plaintiff alleges that she, as well as all other non-exempt
Winco employees working in California, were required to check in
and out of their shifts by using an electronic time clock that
rounded total time worked each day to the nearest 15-minute
inverval. While minutes were rounded to the closest 15-minute
period (with an employee working seven minutes rounded down but
eight or more minutes rounded up), according to the SAC, Winco's
time clock also calculated seconds and always rounded down to the
nearest minute.

The Plaintiff alleges that by always rounding total seconds down to
the previous minute in this matter, Winco's rounding policy
systematically undercompensates its employees and is not neutral on
its face. Moreover, citing her own personal experience, she alleges
that 43% of her shifts over 8 hours fell between 8:01 and 8:07,
hours as opposed to only 5% falling between 8:08 and 8:14, making
it far more likely that her time was rounded down rather than up.
She further alleges that some 80% of her total shifts worked from
May of 2019 to July of 2019 were rounded down.

As an alternative to the Plaintiff's claim that because the
rounding practices employed by Winco were not neutral, she and
other class members were deprived of the total wages they were
owed, she further points to bonuses that were not included in her
regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime.

The Plaintiff goes on to claim that she and others were also not
provided lawful meal and rest breaks and were not compensated for
breaks that were missed. According to her, she and others were
impeded and/or discouraged from taking breaks when a manager was
either unavailable or could not be readily located.

In addition to alleging that Winco failed to pay wages owed and
further failed to provide mandated meal and rest breaks, the
Plaintiff also alleges a failure on Winco's part to provide
accurate, lawful itemized wage statements to both herself and other
class members because the correct rates of pay were not properly
itemized.

Finally, when Winco terminated her employment on July 15, 2019,
rather than paying her immediately for all wages due and unpaid as
of that time, the Plaintiff claims that she was underpaid due to
all the factors discussed, including improper rounding, and unpaid
meal and rest period premiums occasioned by Winco's failure to
provide legally compliant breaks.

Winco previously moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint on grounds that because the allegations contained therein
were generic and lacked specificity, they failed to state any
legally cognizable claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
12(b)(6). That Motion, which also moved to strike, in accordance
with Rule 12(f), the FAC's class action allegations as formulaic
and conclusory, was granted in part and denied in part on Sept. 30,
2021. Because the Plaintiff was accorded leave to amend, a Second
Amended Complaint was filed on Oct. 20, 2021. Now before the Court
is an additional Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively to Strike, on
the same grounds.

First, Judge England concludes that, given the new averments
contained in the SAC, the First Cause of Action, for failing to pay
proper wages, survives Winco's pleading challenge for failure to
state a claim. In now moving to dismiss the Plaintiff's
subsequently filed SAC, Winco argues that she has still not pled a
cause of action. Judge England disagrees saying unlike its
predecessor, the SAC plausibly alleges how the rounding practices
employed by Winco, in always rounding seconds down to the previous
minute as set forth, impermissibly favors Winco when rounding to
the nearest 15-minute interval in certain circumstances.

In addition to augmenting her factual allegations concerning the
potential bias of Winco's rounding policies, the Plaintiff has also
added new allegations pertaining to Winco's payment of "gift card"
bonuses that, because they apply to all employees working during
the bonus period who are still employed at the time a bonus is
distributed, are non-discretionary in nature and consequently
should have been included in their regular rate of pay but were
not.

Next, as to Second and Third Causes of Action for meal and rest
period violations, Judge England concludes that the Plaintiffs'
allegations are sufficient to state a viable cause of action. While
the California Supreme Court, in Augustus v. ABM Security Services,
Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 257 (2016), noted that particularly with a short
break period "one would expect that employees will ordinarily have
to remain on site or nearby," the Plaintiffs allege written
personnel policies that prohibit an employee from even leaving the
inside of a store without management approval. On its face, such a
policy would prohibit even a short walk outside or a smoke break.

With respect to the Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action, which seeks
waiting time penalties based on Winco's alleged failure to timely
pay wages owed upon separation, purports to be based upon the
requirements of California Labor Code Section 201 and 202, Judge
England concludes that although he believes the allegations suffice
for purposes of alleging a claim premised on Section 201, they do
not state a claim for a Section 202 violation, and the Plaintiff
cannot be a class representative for an injury she did not
experience and has no standing to assert. Consequently, Winco's
Motion is granted to the extent the Fourth Cause of Action asserts
a claim premised on Section 202 but is otherwise denied.

In the Fifth Cause of Action of her FAC, the Plaintiff alleged that
Winco failed to comply with the items required to be included in
her wage statement under California law, including time records,
meal periods, split shift intervals, and total daily hours worked.
She failed to identify, however, even a single deficient wage
statement.

Although he rejected those allegations given their lack of any
factual specificity, Judge England finds that in the SAC Plaintiff
has alleged at least one wage statement with overtime adjustment
codes that failed to itemize the total hours and rates of pay,
making it impossible for her to determine how the adjustments were
calculated. Moreover, to the extent that her Fifth Cause of Action
is derivative of the unpaid wages/overtime and non-compliant meal
and rest period claims already discussed, which the Court deemed
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, the Fifth Cause of
Action is adequately pled on that ground as well.

The Plaintiff's Unfair Business Practices claim under California
Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq., as set forth
in the Sixth Cause of Action, is explicitly predicated upon the
validity of her other state law claims. As a derivative claim, it
rises and falls on the viability of those claims which the Court
has already rejected. Because the Plaintiff has now identified
viable claims that can serve as the factual predicate for her
unfair business practices cause of action, Judge England holds that
her Section 17200 claim also passes pleadings muster.

Finally, in addition to moving to dismiss the Plaintiff's
substantive claims as discussed above, Winco reiterates its
previous request, as already rejected in its challenge to the FAC,
to strike her class allegations as impermissibly "formulaic and
conclusory" because they state only that the requirements for class
certification have been satisfied, with no real factual basis for
such an assertion. While conceding that courts generally refrain
from ruling on the issue of class certification at the pleadings
stage, Winco nonetheless claims that she has not pled enough facts
to show any entitlement to relief on a class-wide basis.

As the Court already remarked in previously rejecting Winco's
earlier challenge to the Plaintiff's class allegations, the weight
of authority holds that class action allegations should not be
tested at the pleadings stage, and instead should be addressed only
after one party has filed a motion for class certification, unless
it is clear from the complaint that no class claims can be
maintained. Because the Plaintiff has identified allegations that
may potentially apply on a class-wide basis, Judge England cannot
say at the onset that class action treatment is unwarranted.
Moreover, while Winco cites several unpublished decisions that have
dismissed class action allegations at the pleadings stage, such
action is still rare in advance of a class certification motion.

For all the foregoing reasons, Judge England denies the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, except with respect to the Fourth Cause of
Action, which is granted to the extent said cause of action asserts
a claim under California Labor Code Section 202. The Plaintiff may,
but is not required to, file an amended pleading properly asserting
a Section 202 claim not later than 20 days after the date this
Memorandum and Order is electronically filed. If no amended
complaint is timely filed, the claims dismissed by virtue of the
Memorandum and Order will be deemed dismissed with prejudice upon
no further notice to the parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/zzk9xpwc from Leagle.com.


WINCO HOLDINGS: E.D. California Dismisses Phoung's 1st Amended Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SOMRET PHOUNG, an individual, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WINCO HOLDINGS, INC.,
an Idaho corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-2033-MCE-JDP
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California:

   (i) grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First
       Amended Complaint or, and denies as moot its Motion in the
       Alternative, to Strike or, in the Alternative, to Stay
       Proceedings; and

  (ii) denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

Through the action, Phoung seeks relief from Winco for wage and
hour violations of the California Labor Code and California's
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200, et
seq.

The Defendant, who operates grocery stores, employed the Plaintiff
as an hourly, non-exempt employee until Feb. 26, 2021. According to
the Plaintiff, the Defendant frequently enforces multiple practices
and/or policies that violate state law which are intended to
increase their own profits to the detriment of its employees.

Regarding rest breaks, the Plaintiff and the class members
allegedly, from time to time, worked in excess of four hours, or a
major fraction thereof, during workdays without being provided at
least a 10-minute rest period in which they were relieved of all
duties. Similarly, she alleges that the Defendant periodically
failed to permit her and the class members to take timely, off-duty
meal breaks of not less than 30 minutes for each five consecutive
hours of work. The Defendant also allegedly on occasion failed to
provide them with suitable seating during their employment.

The FAC further alleges that the Defendant frequently failed to
timely pay all wages owed upon termination and failed to furnish
accurate wage statements to the Plaintiff and the class members.
Finally, the Plaintiff contends that he and the class members were
paid sick leave wages at their base hourly rates of pay, which is
less than required under the California Labor Code. Given the
foregoing, the Defendant allegedly also engaged in unfair
competition.

On Sept. 24, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in
the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated. The Complaint alleges the
following causes of action: (1) failure to pay earned wages,
including overtime; (2) failure to properly calculate and pay sick
leave wages; (3) failure to provide rest breaks; (4) failure to
provide timely, uninterrupted meal breaks; (5) failure to provide
suitable seating; (6) failure to reimburse for required business
expenses; (7) failure to timely pay all wages owed upon
termination; (8) failure to provide accurate itemized wage
statements and maintain accurate records; and (9) unfair business
practices.

The Plaintiff filed the FAC in the state court action on Nov. 2,
2021. The following day, on Nov. 3, 2021, the Defendant removed the
case to the Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2) ("CAFA").

The Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the original Complaint
on Nov. 10, 2021. However, the Plaintiff refiled the FAC in the
Court on Nov. 23, 2021, and in response, the Defendant withdrew its
motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, on Dec. 7, 2021, the
Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's FAC and
the Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand.

In its Notice of Removal, the Defendant, in part, contends that the
total aggregate potential liability based on the Plaintiff's claims
regarding meal breaks and rest periods alone exceeds the statutory
amount. In support, it provides two declarations from its Senior
Programmer and Analyst, Mr. Rudel.

Based on the Defendant's electronic payroll system and electronic
databases regarding its employees, and through the use of various
search and filter functions, Mr. Rudel asserts that "the
approximate number of hourly, non-exempt employees in California
employed from Aug. 9, 2017, to Aug. 9, 2021 is 16,688," and that
"the approximate number of work weeks for that period is
approximately 1,253,884." He also states that "the approximate
average hourly rate of pay of hourly, non-exempt employees in
California employed for this time period is approximately $15.61
per hour."

The Defendant contends that there is at least $12,538,840 in
controversy for missed meal breaks and $12,538,840 for rest
periods, both of which are "based on a conservative estimate that
each putative class member failed to receive compliant rest or meal
periods only once each workweek and was paid a meal or rest period
premium of $10 per hour for each purported violation." Each number
was reached by multiplying the number of workweeks (1,253,884) by
$10 (reduced hourly rate from $15.61) by 1 (missed meal or rest
period per workweek), which amounts to a 20% violation rate.

Based on the allegations in the FAC and Mr. Rudel's declarations,
and absent evidence to the contrary from the Plaintiff, Judge
England finds that the amount in controversy requirement is
satisfied based on the rest period and meal break claims alone.
Accordingly, he denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

The Defendant seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's First Cause of
Action on grounds that it fails to meet the minimum pleading
requirements for wage and hour claims. The FAC, in relevant part,
alleges that the "Plaintiff and the putative class are employees of
Defendants working in their grocery stores," and that the Plaintiff
was employed by the Defendant until Feb. 26, 2021.

However, Judge England finds that the Plaintiff does not provide
any allegations "relating to his employment with the Defendant,
such as when his employment began, his work location, or even his
job title, let alone any facts regarding his own experiences as a
nonexempt employee or the circumstances that led to him allegedly
experiencing any Labor Code violation." Furthermore, there are no
allegations as to the length of his average workweek, his average
rate of pay, how often he worked overtime, the number of hours
involved, or the amount of overtime wages he believes is owed.
Because the minimum pleading requirements are not met, the
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action is dismissed with leave to
amend.

The Second Cause of Action asserts a violation of California Labor
Code Section 246, specifically that the Defendant failed to
properly pay sick leave wages. However, courts have routinely found
that Section 246 does not create a private right of action. Because
the Plaintiff does not challenge the legal sufficiency of this
claim and amendment would nonetheless be futile, Judge England
dismisses the Second Cause of Action without leave to amend.

In the Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the Plaintiff alleges
that he and the class members "missed breaks due to the press of
work," and that "when breaks were provided, they were cut short
because they were required to wear protective gear, which they had
to take off and put on during their breaks, cutting into the time
they were allowed to take rest." Similarly, he alleges that they
"were often too busy and understaffed to take time away from their
duties for breaks," and when he "was able to take a meal period, he
was frequently interrupted as he had to remain available to assist
managers and customers." Lastly, he claims that he "never received
second meal breaks during shifts of 10 hours or longer."

Like the First Cause of Action, these conclusory allegations are
devoid of supporting factual allegations, Judge England holds. When
faced with similar assertions that the plaintiff, due to a "heavy
work load," was not provided meal and rest periods "within the
legally required time" and was not permitted to leave her work area
without permission, the court in Ovieda v. Sodexo Operations, LLC,
No. CV 12-1750-GHK (SSx), 2012 WL 1627237, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 7,
2012), described the allegations as "bare-bones" and "devoid of
sufficient factual enhancement to allow a reasonable inference" of
liability.

To pass pleading muster, the Ovieda court reasoned that the
complaint should have included details concerning the plaintiff's
shift schedules, job duties, what specific policies and practices
were used to manage her, and whether such policies were
company-wide or unique to the plaintiff's job site. The FAC here
contains no such details, and therefore, the Plaintiff's Third and
Fourth Causes of Action are dismissed with leave to amend.

Under the Fifth Cause of Action, the Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant "failed to provide them with suitable seating during
their employment as required by section 14 of the applicable Wage
Order." However, there are no allegations in the FAC as to the
Plaintiff's job position or that the Defendant "had a company-wide
policy of not providing seats to Plaintiff or other employees when
the nature of their work reasonably permits the use of a seat."
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action is dismissed
with leave to amend.

Under the Sixth Cause of Action, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant "required them to purchase and use their own personal
carving knives for work related duties and they were required to
take the knives home to sharpen them and bring them back for use at
work but failed to reimburse Plaintiff and employees for this use."
There are no allegations, however, as to "how or when the Defendant
failed to reimburse the Plaintiff, or any other potential class
members, for business expenses," or the "specific nature of the
business expenses at issue." As such, the Plaintiff's Sixth Cause
of Action is dismissed with leave to amend.

The Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action purports to be based upon
the requirements of California Labor Code Sections 201 and 202,
which provide that wages must be paid within a certain time
following an employee's separation from service. The FAC contains
absolutely no facts as to how the Plaintiff separated from his
employment, indicating only that his last day at work was Feb. 26,
2021.

Consequently, Judge England cannot determine on what basis the
Plaintiff seeks to hold the Defendant liable, let alone ascertain
what final wages may have been owed and not paid. To the extent the
Plaintiff argues this cause of action is derivative of his previous
claims, Judge England has already determined those claims to be
insufficiently pleaded. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Seventh Cause
of Action is dismissed with leave to amend.

In the Eighth Cause of Action, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant "knowingly and intentionally failed to furnish them with
accurate itemized statements from time to time for each pay period
that they worked, and frequently failed to maintain accurate
payroll records of the Class Members." Such inaccuracies were
allegedly caused by the "Defendants' unlawful timekeeping practices
that resulted in underreporting hours worked and overtime hours
worked." The Plaintiff, however, fails to identify a single
deficient wage statement. Again, to the extent the Plaintiff argues
that that this cause of action is derivative of his previous
claims, those claims are insufficiently pleaded. As such, the
Eighth Cause of Action is dismissed with leave to amend.

The Plaintiff's Unfair Business Practices claim under California
Business and Professions Code Sections 17200 et seq., as set forth
in the Ninth Cause of Action, is explicitly predicated on the
viability of the Plaintiff's other state law claims. As a
derivative claim, it rises and falls on the viability of those
claims which the Court has already rejected. Judge England
therefore dismisses the Ninth Cause of Action with leave to amend.

In addition to seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff's substantive
claims as discussed, the Defendant also moves to strike the class
allegations as insufficient. While conceding that courts generally
refrain from ruling on the issue of class certification at the
pleading stage, it still claims that the Plaintiff has not pleaded
enough facts to show any entitlement to relief on a class-wide
basis.

Given the fact that the Court dismissed all of the Plaintiff's
causes of action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),
the Defendant's additional Motion to Strike the class allegations
is moot since the claims for which class action treatment was
sought are not viable at this time. In sum, the Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff's FAC is granted, and as a result, its Motion
to Strike and alternative Motion to Stay Proceedings are denied as
moot.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge England grants the Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. He
dismisses the Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action without leave to
amend. All remaining causes of action are dismissed with leave to
amend.

The Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file an amended
complaint not later than 20 days after the date the Memorandum and
Order is electronically filed. Failure to timely do so will result
in the action being dismissed, in its entirety, without further
notice to the parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3vjmcc8k from Leagle.com.


ZIGNEGO CO: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Cardenas Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
MARISOL CARDENAS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ZIGNEGO, CO., INC., Defendant,
Case No. 22-cv-961 (E.D. Wis., Aug. 22, 2022) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Cardenas was employed by the Defendant as dump truck
driver.

Zignego Company, Incorporated was founded in 1980. The Company's
line of business includes highway and street construction. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yingtao Ho, Esq.
          THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM S.C.
          310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100 MW
          Milwaukee, WI 53203
          Telephone: (414) 271-4500
          Facsimile: (414) 271-6308

[*] Kyle Roche to Withdraw as Counsel in Crypto Class Action Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
cointelegraph.com reports that in the wake of allegations made by
CryptoLeaks, high-profile crypto lawyer Kyle Roche has filed to
withdraw as counsel on several crypto class-action lawsuits.

According to a series of court records released on Aug. 31, Roche
is understood to be "no longer involved" in Roche Freedman's class
action practice.

The law firm has also filed to withdraw Roche as counsel in class
action lawsuits involving Tron and Global Trading.

In a motion to withdraw as attorney in the Tether and Bitfinex
Crypto asset litigation case, cryptocurrency law firm Roche
Freedman said, "Roche would withdraw as one of the attorneys for
the Proposed Class," and "Mr. Roche is no longer involved in RF's
class action practice."

The motions do not mean the lawsuits will be dropped altogether, as
they could still proceed without Roche.

Roche's withdrawal from the lawsuit comes amid the ongoing fallout
from a recent CryptoLeaks expose, which features videos of Roche
allegedly revealing a relationship with Ava Labs, and a "secret
pact" to "harm" competitors through the United States legal
system.

On Aug. 30, Roche released a statement denying the allegations,
claiming they are an attempt by a disgruntled defendant from a
previous case.

Ava Labs CEO Emin Gün Sirer followed suit, denying the alleged
arrangement with Roche, calling it "conspiracy theory nonsense."

CryptoLeaks, an anonymous website that claims to launch
investigations based on information from whistleblowers and expose
attacks and scams in the crypto world, has not backed away from its
claims.

Related: Ripple CEO comments on CryptoLeaks, denies funding law
firm to target others

Roche's withdrawal from the case soon after the leak has seen
speculation as to the cause, but there has yet to be any
confirmation from Roche Freedman about the reason for his
withdrawal and whether they will proceed with the lawsuits.[GN]


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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