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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, August 29, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 166

                            Headlines

AMAZON WEB: Court Refuses to Stay Discovery in Dorian BIPA Suit
ATHENEX INC: Awaits Ruling on Bid to Toss Shareholder Suit
ATONOMI LLC: Class of ATMI Token Buyers Certified in Hunichen Suit
BOSTON UNIVERSITY: Wins Summary Judgment in Covid-19 Refund Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Dismisses With Prejudice Wright's B3 Suit

BUCK KNIVES: C.D. California Issues Judgment in Houriani Suit
CABELL HUNTINGTON: $5.7M Class Settlement in Blenko Suit Approved
CALIFORNIA UNITED: Bid to Remand Alcazar Suit to State Court Denied
CARGUARD ADMINISTRATION: E.D. Pennsylvania Tosses Baccari TCPA Suit
CBOE GLOBAL: Securities Suit in New York Court Dismissed

CENTENE CORP: Lukaszewicz Deposition in Duff Suit Will Be Sealed
CENTRAL FREIGHT: Cox's Bid for Default Judgment Granted in Part
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Sansone Loses Bid for Entry of Judgment
CHERRY CREEK MORTGAGE: Rendon Files FCRA Suit in S.D. California
CLEAR SKY LOCAL: Fabricant Files TCPA Suit in N.D. New York

CLEARVIEW AI: Filing of Amended Consumer Privacy Suit OK'd in Part
CLOOPEN GROUP: Bids to Dismiss St. John's Amended Complaint Denied
COMMERCE ENERGY: Court Issues Procedures on Uncashed Wage Checks
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Jackson FDCPA Suit Removed to D. New Jersey
CRST INT'L: Final Judgment Entered in Markson Suit as to Western

D & A SERVICES: Webb FDCPA Suit Removed to D. New Jersey
DANESSA MYRICKS BEAUTY: Arceo Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
DEERE & CO: Perry Suit Transferred to N.D. Illinois
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM: Faces Dinkevich Suit in Delaware Court
DON'T RUN OUT: Casillas Sues Over Misleading and False Advertising

EDUCATIONAL CREDIT: Sadigh Wins Leave to File Amended Complaint
ENERGY TRANSFER: New Mexico Funds Appointed Lead Plaintiffs in Vega
FCA US: Class Action Settlement in Green Suit Wins Final Approval
FEDERAL INSURANCE: W.D. Washington Refuses to Toss Smartsheet Suit
FIRST SOLAR INC: Faces Securities Suit in Arizona Court

FOOD ROCKET: Howard Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
FORNEY INDUSTRIES: Allen Files Suit in W.D. Missouri
GAP INC: Velazquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GASKETS ACQUISITION: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GOHEALTH LLC: Doyle Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls

HARDER MECHANICAL: Court Seeks More Briefing on Ellis Class Deal
HDFC BANK: Faces Class Action in New York Court
HELBIZ INC: Loevy & Loevy Appointed as Lead Counsel in Barron Suit
HENNESSY CAPITAL: White Files Suit in Del. Chancery Ct.
HOBBY LOBBY STORE: Mahoney Files ADA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania

ILLINOIS: Court Grants Class Certification in Simpson v. Dart
IMPERIAL WHOLESALE: Cromitie Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
J. MARK SUBLETTE: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JEANNE D'ARC CREDIT: Osorio Sues Over Unlawful Fee Maximization
JSSK INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

KERRY INC: Delgado Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
KIND SAGE: Barba Files ADA Suit in C.D. California
KINETIC CONTENT: Hartwell Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
L'OREAL USA: Iskhakova Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
LADERACH (USA): Velazquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

LANE BRYANT BRANDS: Velazquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LASH LOUNGE: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
LINCARE HOLDINGS: Chang Files Suit in M.D. Florida
LIONEL LLC: Calcano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MARCHESE & CO: Gomez Wins Bid for Conditional Class Certification

MATTERPORT INC: Wins in Part Summary Judgment Bid in Stemmelin Suit
MCG HEALTH: Batt Sues Over Failure to Provide Data Security
MDL 2295: S.D. California Stays Portfolio Recovery TCPA Litigation
MDL 2548: $16.6MM Attys.' Fees OK'd in Commodity Gold Futures Suit
MDL 2548: $2MM in Expenses Awarded in Commodity Gold Futures Suit

MDL 2548: Incentive Awards in Commodity Gold Futures Suit Approved
MDL 2548: S.D. New York Issues Final Judgment in Gold Futures Suit
MDL 2670: Bid for Summary Judgment in Packaged Seafood Suit Denied
MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Court Grants Maadanian Leave to Amend Complaint
MERCER ADVISORS INC: Jackson Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

MERLE NORMAN COSMETICS: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
METRO DERMATOLOGY: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
MICROSOFT CORPORATION: Jones Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
MIDDLESEX WATER COMPANY: Vera Suit Removed to D. New Jersey
MILLIARD ENTERPRISES: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

MORGAN THOMAS: Barba Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
MYEYEDR. OPTOMETRY: Turner Sues Over Pre-recorded Message Calls
NORTH AMERICAN BANCARD: Jones Sues Over False Credit Card Contract
NURTURE INC: Interim Co-Lead Counsel Appointed in Baby Food Suit
OAKLAND COUNTY, MI: Dover Glen Sues Over Unpaid Just Compensation

OCWEN FINANCIAL: Wins Bid to Decertify Class in Weiner Suit
PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER: Golden's Appeal From Discovery Order Dismissed
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Court Dismisses UFCW Local 464A Class Suit
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Faces Antitrust Suit in Illinois Court
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Faces Consolidated Antitrust Suit

PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Faces Hogan Suit in Colorado Court
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Settlement Deal in Class Suit Awaits Final OK
PROVENA FOODS: Lee Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
PURE PROACTIVE: Pacheco-Sanchez Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
RA SUSHI ADDISON: Mims Files FLSA Suit in N.D. Texas

RISK PLACEMENT SERVICES: Velazquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ROMANO'S MACARONI: Cashaw Files Suit in D. Hawaii
ROSE CASTLE: Bid to Quash Subpoena in Cornejo Suit Granted in Part
SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE: Blunt Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
SERRANO ELECTRIC: Bover Sues Over Unpaid Compensations

SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE: Perry Files Suit in Mass. Super. Ct.
SOCLEAN INC: Harris Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
SOCLEAN INC: Meles Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
SOCLEAN INC: Renn Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
SOCLEAN INC: Simms Files Suit in W.D. Texas

SONY ELECTRONICS: Bui Sues Over Unlawful Business Practices
SOVEREIGN LENDING: Mannacio TCPA Suit Transferred to W.D. Wash.
SPAVIA INTERNATIONAL: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
STATE STREET CORP: Faces EFC Over Antitrust Violations
STATE STREET CORP: Faces ERISA Suit Over Invoicing Practices

STATE STREET CORP: Faces Gomes Class Suit
STRONGHOLD DIGITAL: Co-lead Plaintiffs Appointed in Winter Suit
SUPERIOR DUCT: Corlew Suit Removed to C.D. California
SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Court Certifies Class, Subclass in White Suit
T-MOBILE US: Faces Dale Antitrust Suit Over Sprint Merger

THERMA LLC: Cisneros Sues to Recover Unpaid Wages
THOS. MOSER CABINETMAKERS: Cromitie Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
TILLAMOOK CREAMERY: Order Dismissing Claims in Bohr Suit Affirmed
US STEEL: Court Approval of Settlement in Class Suit Pending
VISION ROPEWALK: Walsh Sues Over Omission from Original Leases

WHAT IF HOLDINGS: Williams Sues Over Unlawful Serial Wiretapping
ZARA USA: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Gillett Labor Suit
ZAXBY'S COMPANY: Dorton Sues Over Unlawful Telephonic Sales Calls

                            *********

AMAZON WEB: Court Refuses to Stay Discovery in Dorian BIPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John H. Chun of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, denies the Defendant's motion to
stay discovery in the lawsuit titled JACINDA DORIAN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AMAZON
WEB SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-00269 (W.D.
Wash.).

Plaintiff Jacinda Dorian is an Illinois resident, who took multiple
remote tests while attending two colleges in Illinois. Both
colleges used a proctoring software developed by ProctorU, Inc., to
administer the tests. The ProctorU software required the Plaintiff
to submit her image, as well as an image of a valid identification
document. ProctorU then used Amazon Web Services Inc.'s ("AWS's")
facial recognition program Rekognition to analyze and compare the
Plaintiff's images to verify her identity.

The Plaintiff alleges that AWS violated Section 15(a) and 15(b) of
the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act by possessing her
biometric data without publishing a "publicly-available retention
and deletion schedule," and collecting the same data without
providing adequate notice and obtaining her consent. The Plaintiff
asserts claims on behalf of herself and a putative class defined as
"all Illinois residents who had their biometric information or
biometric identifiers collected, captured, received, possessed, or
otherwise obtained by Amazon's Rekognition service and stored in
AWS's servers."

The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and Motion to Strike Class Allegations under
Rule 12(f) on May 16, 2022. The Plaintiff responded to the motion
on July 6, 2022. The Defendant then filed a Motion to Stay
Discovery on July 12, 2022.

AWS seeks a stay of discovery until after the Court rules on its
motion to dismiss and/or until the Northern District of Alabama
resolves Thakkar v. ProctorU, Inc. No. 2:21-cv-01565-NAD (N. D.
Ala.), a case it argues "overlaps substantially" with this case. In
the alternative, it requests that the Court stay discovery until
after discovery is complete in Thakkar or until after the Thakkar
court rules on ProctorU's motion to dismiss. The Court declines to
exercise its discretion to grant a stay of discovery on either of
these bases.

        A. The Court Declines to Stay Discovery Based on
              Defendant's Pending Motion to Dismiss

The Court cannot say--after taking a "preliminary peek"--that a
stay is warranted in this case. First, in such a situation, courts
in this jurisdiction typically stay discovery only when the
dispositive motion in question raises preliminary "threshold"
issues that may preclude a court from reaching the merits of a
claim.

AWS's motion to dismiss--which includes arguments regarding the
scope of BIPA as it relates to "back-end service providers," the
legal definitions of several terms of the Act such as "collect" and
"possess," and the applicability of the Illinois
extraterritoriality doctrine and the Constitution's Dormant
Commerce Clause--does not present such threshold issues, Judge Chun
opines.

Further, several of the Plaintiff's arguments, as well as AWS's
defenses, appear to require fact-based analyses that discovery
would inform, Judge Chun notes. For example, the parties dispute
whether the Plaintiff's claims violate the extraterritoriality
doctrine, which implicates the factual question of whether the
Defendant's alleged violations occurred primarily and substantially
in Illinois. Similarly, AWS's Dormant Commerce Clause argument also
hinges on the location of the alleged violations. Additional
information regarding the methods and technology AWS uses in its
Rekognition software would inform both these questions.

Accordingly, the Court cannot say at this point that the pending
motion can be decided without additional discovery.

Lastly, the Court is not convinced that the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss will prevail and, accordingly, dispose of the case. The
Court notes that numerous actions have been filed in this district
and others challenging the collection of biometric information
under BIPA, and the defendants in those cases made similar
arguments at the motion to dismiss phase that were rejected by the
court.

Although the Court's preliminary look is not intended to prejudice
the outcome of the motion, the actions of other federal district
courts in similar actions at the motion to dismiss phase are
instructive. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its
discretion to stay discovery based on AWS's pending motion to
dismiss.

    B. The Court Declines to Stay Discovery Based on Thakkar

Although district courts have discretionary power to stay
proceedings pending the outcome of parallel proceedings in another
district court under Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254
(1936), only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be
compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the
rule of law that will define the rights of both. In determining
whether such a stay is appropriate, the competing interests which
will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be
weighed, Judge Chun states, citing Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398
F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).

Those interests include: (1) "the possible damage which may result
from the granting of a stay," (2) "the hardship or inequity which a
party may suffer in being required to go forward," and (3) "the
orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or
complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be
expected to result from a stay."

The Court finds that the Lockyer factors weigh in favor of denying
the Defendant's motion. With respect to the first factor, the Court
notes that the Plaintiff seeks injunctive and equitable relief as
necessary to protect their interests and the interests of the
putative class. Thus, there is a fair possibility that a delay in
litigation will cause them harm.

With respect to the second factor, Judge Chun finds that the
Defendant has not explained why they would be prejudiced if this
Court denies their motion to stay, beyond general references to the
financial burden of participating in discovery in this case while
simultaneously participating in discovery in Thakkar as a
non-party. However, being required to defend a suit, without more,
does not constitute a clear case of hardship or inequity within the
meaning of Landis, Judge Chun points out.

Further, if there are indeed similar discovery requests in Thakkar
and this case, AWS and ProctorU may share information or subpoena
each other to minimize duplicative work, Judge Chun states. Lastly,
the Defendant does not convincingly argue that the proceedings in
Thakkar will narrow or clarify the questions at issue in this
action.

While the Thakkar case may be factually related, it involves
different parties, a narrower class, and only somewhat overlapping
legal issues at this stage in the litigation, Judge Chun explains.
Indeed, much of AWS's motion to dismiss relies on the argument that
it provided only behind-the-scenes cloud services to ProctorU, and
that ProctorU was the party that "possessed" or "collected" the
Plaintiff's data within the meaning of BIPA. These statements cut
against their argument that the cases substantially overlap, since
clearly this case implicates a distinct theory of liability from
Thakkar.

Thus, the Court is not convinced that staying discovery pending a
resolution in Thakkar would advance the orderly course of justice
by simplifying issues, proof, and questions of law.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc6jnysc from Leagle.com.


ATHENEX INC: Awaits Ruling on Bid to Toss Shareholder Suit
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Athenex, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period Ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 29, 2022, that two class action lawsuits were
filed against the company in March 2021, and its motion to dismiss
has been fully briefed and waiting for the decision of the court.

Two purported securities class action lawsuits were filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York on March
3, 2021 and March 22, 2021, respectively, against the Company and
certain members of its management team seeking to recover damages
for alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaints generally allege that between August 7, 2019 and
February 26, 2021 (the purported class period), the company and the
individual defendants made materially false and misleading
statements regarding the Company's business in connection with the
company's development of Oral Paclitaxel for the treatment of
metastatic breast cancer and the likelihood of FDA approval, and
that the plaintiffs suffered losses when the company's stock price
dropped after its announcement on February 26, 2021 regarding
receipt of the CRL.

The complaints seek class certification, damages, fees, costs, and
expenses. On August 5, 2021, the Court consolidated the two actions
and appointed a lead plaintiff and lead counsel. Pursuant to a
stipulated scheduling order, the lead plaintiff filed an amended
complaint on November 19, 2021.

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on January 25, 2022.
Plaintiffs filed their opposition to that motion on March 28, 2022
and the defendants filed their reply brief on May 20, 2022. The
motion to dismiss is now fully briefed and awaits the Court's
decision.

Athenex, Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company based in New York.

ATONOMI LLC: Class of ATMI Token Buyers Certified in Hunichen Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in
the lawsuit captioned CHRIS HUNICHEN, Plaintiff v. ATONOMI LLC, et
al., Defendants. ATONOMI LLC, Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff
v. CHRIS HUNICHEN, Counter-Defendant, & DAVID PATRICK PETERS, et
al. Third-Party Defendants, Case No. 19-0615-RAJ-SKV (W.D. Wash.).

Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable S.
Kate Vaughan, United States Magistrate Judge, any objections or
responses, and the remaining record, the Court adopts the Report
and Recommendation.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is granted and this
matter is certified as a class action. The class is defined as:

     All persons who purchased ATMI tokens via a Series 1 or
     Series 2 SAFT with Atonomi, LLC in 2018. Excluded from the
     Class are Defendants and persons or entities directly
     affiliated with any Defendant, and persons who affirmatively
     assented to the Atonomi Terms of Token Sale.

Plaintiff Hunichen is appointed Class Representative. His
representatives Joel Ard of Ard Law Group PLLC, Angus Ni of AFN Law
PLLC, and William Restis of The Restis Firm, P.C., are appointed
Class Counsel for the class.

The parties are ordered to meet and confer concerning a plan to
notify the class of certification, and will jointly propose a form
of notice and notice plan for the Court's consideration and
approval within 21 days of the Order.

The Clerk is directed to send copies of the Order to the parties
and to Judge Vaughan.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3urtm92y from Leagle.com.


BOSTON UNIVERSITY: Wins Summary Judgment in Covid-19 Refund Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard G. Stearns of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts issued a Memorandum and Order in the
consolidated class action lawsuit styled IN RE: BOSTON UNIVERSITY
COVID-19 REFUND LITIGATION, Case No. 20-10827-RGS (D. Mass.):

   (1) allowing in part and denying in part BU's motion for
       summary judgment; and

   (2) denying the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
       without prejudice.

Plaintiffs Julia Dutra, Gabriella Dube, Shakura Cox, Natalie
Silulu, Valaauina Silulu, Olivia Bornstein, and Venus Tran brought
putative class action claims against the Trustees of Boston
University (BU), alleging that BU reneged on a promise to its
students to provide in-person instruction and services when BU's
campus closed at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court consolidated the individual cases into a single action,
and the Plaintiffs filed a Second Consolidated Class Action
Complaint bringing claims for breach of contract (Count I), breach
of implied contract (Count II), and unjust enrichment (Count III).
After discovery, the parties reciprocally moved for summary
judgment.

The Plaintiffs are former BU students seeking reimbursement of at
least some of their tuition and student activity fees for the
spring of 2020 semester. Before the semester began, the Plaintiffs
enrolled in classes through BU's online registration portal and
paid full tuition and several mandatory fees. Partway through the
semester, COVID-19's spread led to fundamental changes to the
structure of BU's educational services. On March 16, 2020, BU
transitioned its in-person classes to remote platforms. The
following day, BU announced that students were required to vacate
the campus by March 22, 2020.

The campus remained shut, and classes continued in a
distance-learning mode for the remainder of the semester. BU's
actions were taken in compliance with Massachusetts Governor
Baker's emergency orders. Specifically, the Governor had, on March
15, 2020, limited public gatherings to twenty-five persons or fewer
and, on March 23, closed all nonessential businesses and banned
public gatherings of more than ten persons.

Prior to the commencement of the spring 2020 semester, the
Plaintiffs enrolled as full-time students for in-person courses.
Cox paid $17,568 in tuition for the semester, while the remaining
Plaintiffs each paid $27,360, through direct payment and/or
institutional aid and loans. BU did not refund any portion of the
tuition to the Plaintiffs after transitioning to remote
instruction. The Plaintiffs completed their courses online and
progressed toward their degrees.

Critical to BU's motion are certain BU policies and statements.

BU publishes annual online "Bulletins" describing BU's academic
programs, courses, and policies. The 2020 Bulletin stated that it
was the document of authority for all students and that
requirements listed here take precedence over information found
elsewhere. The bottom of the Bulletin's home page contained a link
labeled "Disclaimer." The Disclaimer stated: "Boston University
reserves the right to change the policies, fees, curricula, or any
other matter in this Bulletin without prior notice and to cancel
programs and courses. This Bulletin is to be read neither as part
of a contractual agreement nor as a guarantee of the classes,
courses, or programs described herein."

BU also posts on its website a statement titled "Access to
University Facilities." The relevant portion states that the
University reserves the right to grant or restrict access to any or
all of its grounds, facilities, and programs. During business
hours, the University's nonresidential facilities on both the
Charles River and Medical Campuses will be open to students,
parents, employees, contractors, guests, and invitees. During
nonbusiness hours, access to nonresidential facilities will be
limited to authorized personnel only.

BU's Student Accounting Services website, which is linked to the
website used by students and their parents to make tuition
payments, includes a page setting out BU's "Official Withdrawal and
Refund Policy." In the spring of 2020, the webpage opened with the
admonition that students not attending Boston University must
complete an official Withdrawal/Leave of Absence Form. Only after
completion of the Form would tuition be canceled "in accordance
with the published refund schedule, based on the effective date of
a student's official withdrawal or leave of absence." The
Withdrawal and Refund Policy further stated that refunds apply to
tuition only, and that all fees are nonrefundable once classes have
begun.

The refund schedule provided that BU would give a 100% refund to
students, who withdrew on or before Jan. 20, 2020, with the amount
of the refund decreasing in steps to 20% on Feb. 26, 2020. After
that date, BU would not extend any refunds to withdrawing students.
No Plaintiff sought a refund before the prescribed cutoff date(s).

The Plaintiffs also seek a refund of fees they had paid before the
spring 2020 semester began. These fees include: Community Service
Fee, Student Services Fee, Health & Wellness Fee, and Sports Pass.

                BU's Motion for Summary Judgment

Judge Stearns notes that there is a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether BU made a binding promise to provide students
in-person instruction (or tuition refunds should in-person classes
become unavailable), a promise on which students relied in
prospectively paying their tuition. The Plaintiffs locate this
contractual right in certain representations made in BU's course
registration materials.

Judge Stearns finds that BU has failed to produce evidence that
would conclusively preclude the possibility that a reasonable jury
might agree that such a binding contract existed. First, the
Withdrawal and Refund Policy did not state that enrolled students
would remain obligated to pay full tuition if classes moved online
after Feb. 26, 2020. By its own terms, the Withdrawal and Refund
Policy's deadlines applied only to students taking leaves of
absence or withdrawing from BU, and thus, the Plaintiffs argue,
they have no relevance to their refund claims.

Second, the Plaintiffs contend that BU's Bulletin Disclaimer does
not act as a bar to their claims. The Disclaimer explicitly states
that the Bulletin is not to be read as part of a contractual
agreement, and thus, even if it identified in-person instruction as
one of the matters in this Bulletin that BU reserved the right to
revise or revoke, the Disclaimer has no bearing on the contractual
right to in-person instruction, Judge Stearns opines. A jury could
find that the Withdrawal and Refund Policy and the Bulletin
Disclaimer, singly or jointly, do not persuasively rebut the
Plaintiffs' reasonable expectation of being offered in-person
classes.

BU additionally argues that it met the Plaintiffs' reasonable
expectations by providing high-quality remote instruction as a
substitute for in-person instruction, and by spending their tuition
money solely on academic purposes. Both arguments miss the point,
Judge Stearns holds.

Judge Stearns opines that whether remote classes were an adequate
substitute for in-person instruction goes to the issue of damages,
not breach; the question of whether a breach occurred is whether BU
ceased offering in-person classes in violation of direct or
indirect assurances to the contrary that it had given to the
student Plaintiffs. Similarly, BU's use of the students' tuition
money for academic expenses would not absolve it of any promise to
provide an in-person educational experience, Judge Stearns points
out.

BU also has not established that the Plaintiffs will be unable to
prove damages, Judge Stearns finds. For the spring 2020 semester,
BU offered full-time and part-time online curricula for certain of
its graduate programs. The parties dispute whether BU charged less
on a per-credit basis for online instruction than for in-person
instruction, though BU notably admitted in discovery that it
charged a lower tuition per credit for online-only courses as
compared to courses that occur in-person.

Judge Stearns explains that this admission is probative of the
Plaintiffs' contention that they received an education of lesser
value than the one they might have reasonably expected when they
paid tuition for the Spring 2020 semester. BU now argues that it in
fact charged the same tuition for full-time students regardless of
whether their classes were in-person or online. The admission
"conclusively establishes" that BU charged less per-credit for
online than for in-person instruction, and BU has not moved to
amend or withdraw the admission, Judge Stearns notes.

While under the educational malpractice bar, the Plaintiffs may not
attempt to calculate damages based on an alleged subjective
difference in quality between an in-person and an online education,
they may be able to prove damages by showing an actual difference
between the amount BU charged for each type of coursework, Judge
Stearns opines, citing In re Suffolk Univ. Covid Refund Litig.,
2022 WL 2713732, at *2 (D. Mass. July 13, 2022).

BU also argues that it never contracted to provide on-campus
services in exchange for student payments of the Community Service
Fee, the Student Services Fee, the Health and Wellness Fee, and the
Sports Pass Fee. BU first raises the Withdrawal and Refund Policy's
statement that students cannot obtain fee refunds once classes have
begun. But, as previously noted, the policy only applies to
students, who withdraw from BU or take leaves of absence. BU also
relies on its website's descriptions of the fees, which it contends
do not create any reasonable expectation of in-person services.

The Court rejected this argument in deciding the earlier motion to
dismiss. Because there are genuine disputes of material fact as to
whether BU breached its contractual obligations, whether express or
implied, to the student Plaintiffs, Judge Stearns holds that BU's
motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claims will
be denied.

Judge Stearns notes that unjust enrichment is a theory of equitable
recovery, not a separate cause of action; thus, a party with an
adequate remedy at law cannot claim unjust enrichment. As that
determination has been made here on summary judgment, Judge Stearns
holds the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim will be dismissed.

             Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

According to the Memorandum and Order, a threshold issue to the
Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment is the application of
the one-way intervention rule, which provides that the question of
whether a class will be certified should be resolved before the
merits of an action are decided.

The Plaintiffs argue that BU waived any argument that the one-way
intervention rule applies when it assented to the Court's
scheduling order, which directed the parties to file dispositive
motions before the Plaintiffs moved for class certification. In the
event the Court finds no waiver, the Plaintiffs agree with BU that
the Court should defer ruling on their motion.

The Court agrees with BU that its assent to a briefing schedule
fashioned and ordered by the Court did not amount to a constructive
waiver of the one-way intervention rule. Accordingly, the one-way
intervention rule applies, and the Court will deny the Plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment without prejudice to its refiling after
a decision has been made on class certification.

For these reasons, BU's motion for summary judgment is allowed as
to the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim, and denied as to the
Plaintiffs' contract claims. The Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment is denied without prejudice. The Plaintiffs will file a
motion for class certification within 30 days of the entry of this
Order, with BU's opposition due 21 days thereafter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Aug. 8,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2z9bnra3 from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Dismisses With Prejudice Wright's B3 Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDRE S. WRIGHT v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC.
ET AL., SECTION: H (5), Civil Action No. 17-4241 (E.D. La.), Judge
Jane Triche Milazzo of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants:

    (i) the Motion in Limine to Exclude the General Causation
        Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   (ii) the Motion for Summary Judgment Due to Plaintiff's
        Inability to Prove Medical Causation, both filed by
        Defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc.; BP America
        Production Co.; BP p.l.c.; Transocean Holdings, LLC;
        Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Offshore Deepwater
        Drilling, Inc.; and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

The case is one among the "B3 bundle" of cases arising out of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. This bundle comprises "claims for
personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil and/or
other chemicals used during the oil spill response (e.g.,
dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a multidistrict
litigation ("MDL") pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana
before Judge Barbier. During this MDL, Judge Barbier approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement, but the B3 plaintiffs either opted out of this agreement
or were excluded from its class definition. Subsequently, Judge
Barbier severed the B3 cases from the MDL to be reallocated among
the judges of this Court. This case was reassigned to Section H.

Wright alleges continuous exposure to oil and dispersants starting
in July 2010 during his work as a decontamination worker engaged in
cleanup efforts in Fort Walton Beach, Florida and Theodore,
Alabama. He claims to suffer from a host of medical conditions
because of the exposure, including intermittent blindness, blurred
vision, eye burning and irritation, wheezing, chronic sinusitis,
chest pain, dizziness, headaches, nausea, and more. He asserts
claims under the general maritime law of negligence, negligence per
se, and gross negligence with respect to the spill and its
cleanup.

Now before the Court are the Defendants' Motion in Limine to
Exclude the General Causation Opinions Testimony of Plaintiff's
Expert and their Motion for Summary Judgment Due to Plaintiff's
Inability to Prove Medical Causation. In the Motion in Limine, the
Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's expert on medical causation,
Dr. Cook, fails to satisfy the Fifth Circuit requirements for an
admissible general causation opinion in toxic tort cases and should
therefore be excluded as unreliable. In the Motion for Summary
Judgment, they argue that assuming their Motion in Limine is
granted, the Plaintiff lacks expert testimony on general causation
and therefore fails to present a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether his injuries were caused by exposure to oil and
dispersants. The Plaintiff opposes.

Judge Milazzo explains that B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." "The plaintiff's burden with
respect to causation in a toxic tort case involves proof of both
general causation and specific causation." "General causation is
whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or
condition in the general population, while specific causation is
whether a substance caused a particular individual's injury."

Dr. Cook is listed as the Plaintiff's only expert witness on
causation. On this topic, he produced a report dated March 14, 2022
and entitled "Health Effects Among Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Response and Cleanup Workers: A Cause and Effect Analysis." This
report is not unique to the case; another judge of the Court has
described it as "an omnibus, non-case specific general causation
expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs." Five other
sections of the Eastern District of Louisiana have excluded Dr.
Cook based on this same report before the Court.

After carefully and thoroughly reviewing those decisions, and for
the same reasons articulated by Judges Ashe, Vance, Barbier,
Morgan, and Zainey, Judge Milazzo grants the Defendants' Motion in
Limine. Accordingly, she also grants their Motion for Summary
Judgment. All of the Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4wjs877c from Leagle.com.


BUCK KNIVES: C.D. California Issues Judgment in Houriani Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
issued a judgment in the lawsuit titled RODNEY HOURIANI, an
individual, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. BUCK KNIVES, INC., a Nevada Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01908-DSK-SK (C.D. Cal.).

The Court has entered the Order Granting Motion for Final Approval
of Class Action Settlement approving the parties' stipulated
Settlement.

Hence, the Court rules that judgment is entered in accordance with
the Final Approval Order; and the Plaintiff's claims asserted
against the Defendant are dismissed with prejudice without costs to
any party except as provided for in the Final Approval Order or
Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Judgment dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/29ucrhz4 from Leagle.com.


CABELL HUNTINGTON: $5.7M Class Settlement in Blenko Suit Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARTHA BLENKO and LAURA MULLARKY, and JANE DOE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. CABELL HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant, Civil
Action No. 3:21-0315 (S.D.W. Va.), Judge Robert C. Chambers of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Huntington Division, grants the Parties' Joint Motion to Certify
Class for Settlement Purposes and to Approve Class Settlement and
Notice.

The case arises out of Cabell's decision to amend its retiree
healthcare benefits plan. The Defendant served as administrator of
all the employee welfare benefit plans and, in this role, operated
a unified health and welfare plan for active workers and retirees
from 1955 through 2019, which was called Plan 501. This Plan was
not formally recorded in writing until 2013. Once Plan 501 was
written in a formal document, this Plan contained what is known as
"Reservation of Right" language, which stated that, although
Defendant planned to continue the Plan indefinitely, it reserved
the right to amend, modify, change, or terminate the Plan at any
time and for any reason. Further, the Plan indicated that the
Defendant did not "guarantee the continuation of any Benefits
during employment or after termination thereof."

The Defendant claimed that the only Plan document for the 501 Plan
was both the Plan document and the Plan's Summary Plan Document
(SPD). It was statutorily obligated to distribute an SPD for the
Plan, but it is undisputed that it never distributed any SPD. Since
the beginning of the Plaintiffs' employment with the Defendant, the
Plaintiffs allege its human resources staff repeatedly informed
them and co-workers that it would pay premiums for retiree welfare
benefits through their lifetimes once they had met the conditions
for retirement. The Defendant's staff also informed them that
retiree spouses would receive health insurance under its welfare
benefits plan until the spouses reached the age of 65. The
Plaintiffs allege that, prior to the January 2021 letter, they were
not informed of its right to terminate retiree welfare benefits.

In 2019, the Defendant adopted a new "wrap" welfare benefit plan
referred to as the 506 Plan. The Plaintiffs were informed that the
Plan was available to them upon request or online. In October of
2019, the Defendant distributed to employees and retirees an open
enrollment guide for insurance coverage with respect to the 506
Plan. These guides contained the language that it reserved the
right to amend or terminate the Plan and informed participants to
look to official Plan documents for complete information regarding
benefits. This document also explained that the descriptions of the
Plan were not guarantees of any benefit coverage.

In 2021, the Defendant decided to terminate the retiree welfare
benefits. A letter was sent to retirees on Jan. 28, 2021, which
announced that, effective March 31, 2021, Post-65 retirees would no
longer have coverage under the Plan and that Pre-65 retirees would
be charged a premium to cover a portion of the cost of coverage
under the Plan if they chose to remain enrolled. This coverage
would terminate for the Pre-65 group once they turned 65 or first
became Medicare eligible. On Feb. 12, 2021, the Defendant issued a
letter to Post-65 retirees informing them that Defendant would
extend benefits through May 31, 2021. On March 8, 2021, it issued a
letter to Pre-65 retirees extending their benefits to June 30,
2021.

The Defendants next issued a letter to retirees in April 2021 which
extended Post-65 benefit coverage through Sept. 30, 2021, and
moving forward, offered to retirees to deposit $250 a month into a
Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) to pay for retirees' healthcare.
However, this letter, unlike the others, informed the retirees that
it reserved right to terminate the benefits under the Plan at any
time. Additionally, it issued to Pre-65 retirees a letter that it
would pay for these retirees' medical and prescription benefits
through the end of June, and that effective July 1, 2021, retirees
would have to pay a portion of their premium for their medical and
prescription drug healthcare.

After the commencement of the current lawsuit, the Defendant once
again extended benefits to Pre-65 retirees through Oct. 1, 2021. On
Aug. 13, 2021, it issued a letter notifying Pre-65 retirees that if
they wished to enroll in a lower-cost high-risk plan, they would
have to take action by Sept. 7, 2021. On Aug. 20, 2021, a letter
was sent to Post-65 retirees which reiterated that it would
terminate retirees Medicare supplement on September 30 and informed
retirees that they could join an information session to learn how
to use the HRA.

The Defendant denies these allegations but nonetheless agrees to
the class action settlement. The Parties participated in mediation
on May 24, 2022, and reached a settlement agreement in this matter.
The proposed settlement totals $5,694,500. The Parties filed the
Motion to Certify Class for Settlement Purposes and to Approve
Class Settlement and Notice on July 8, 2022.

First, Judge Chambers examines the class certification. He finds
that there is one central dispute regarding a retiree healthcare
benefit plan. The parties agree that the Rule 23(a) requirements of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation
have been met. They also purport that the matter falls within Rule
23(b)(3), as the class wide settlement provides a uniform
resolution to the common claims regarding the same healthcare
benefit plan.

Judge Chambers opines that (i) the joinder of over 200 class
members would be impracticable; (ii) by certifying the class, the
Court may resolve the questions of fact and law that are common to
all of the proposed class members; (iii) the Parties represent that
the claims and defenses of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims
or defenses of the proposed class members because all proposed
class members are similarly affected by the Defendant's the
termination of the retirees' healthcare benefits -- this injury is
suffered by Plaintiffs and is suffered by all members of the
proposed class members; and (iv) the named Plaintiffs will fairly
and adequately protect the interest of the proposed class members
and the Plaintiffs' counsel have demonstrated their experience in
representing complex ERISA cases and serve as fair and adequate
class counsel.

Moreover, Judge Chambers opines that the Plaintiffs' claims rise
from questions of law and facts that are common to all proposed
class members. These questions and facts predominate over any
potential individual proposed class members' factual questions.
Further, because joinder is impractical, and to promote judicial
efficiency and economy, class action is an appropriate method of
adjudicating this matter.

Thus, he grants the Motion to Certify Class.

Next, Judge Chambers examines the class settlement. The Parties
assert that the Court should approve of the settlement because it
is fair to the class and that the class counsel will provide
adequate notice to the proposed class members. They assert that the
settlement terms are fair to the class because: 1) the Parties
mediated at arms' length before Magistrate Judge Eifert; 2) the
Plaintiffs completed class discovery; 3) the class counsel are
experienced in similar litigation; and 4) the number of objectors
is anticipated to be minimal.

The Parties provided a copy of the Mediation Agreement and also
summarized the structure of the settlement. They assert that this
settlement represents strong value for the proposed class. There
are 211 proposed class members of eligible retirees who were
affected by the challenged actions regarding the retiree benefit
plan. The settlement's Common Fund equals $4,974,500. The proposed
attorney fee in the settlement is 20% of the Common Fund, or
$994,900, to be distributed at the time the settlement is fully
funded by the Defendant, leaving $3,979,600 in the Common Fund.
Divided between the 211 proposed class members, this totals
$18,860.66 per class member. Without the settlement, the class
members receive $250/month in the HRA, or $3,000 a year, subject to
Defendant's right to terminate all payments at any time. The
settlement amount represents over six years future benefits, in
addition to coverage through the High-Risk Fund.

Judge Chambers finds that the class representatives and counsel
have adequately represented the interests of the class. The
proposed settlement was negotiated and agreed upon at arm's length
before Magistrate Judge Eifert, avoiding the costs, risks, and
delay of trial and appeal. Further, the settlement provides
detailed and efficient proposed methods of distributing HRA funds
to the proposed settlement class as well as fair terms for proposed
attorney's fees. This settlement certainly benefits the proposed
class members equally. The proposed class currently risk losing
benefits under the Defendant's right to terminate payments and
currently have no High-Risk Fund benefit. This settlement gives the
proposed settlement class over six years of benefits and access to
the High-Risk Fund. Thus, Judge Chambers preliminarily approves of
this settlement.

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires that the proposed class receive the best
notice that is practicable under the circumstances. The Parties
propose two rounds of individualized class notice by U.S. Mail. The
first round will notify the class of certification and proposed
settlement, enabling objections or opting out, and noticing the
fairness hearing. The second round will inform the class as to
whether the Court has approved the final settlement agreement and
how they can retrieve and utilize their settlement payments. A
60-day period for notice is proposed as a customary and reasonable
amount of time to unsure due consideration and opportunity to opt
out. The proposed class notice submitted by the Parties.

Judge Chambers holds that this notice properly informs the class
members of the nature of the action, the definition of the
certified class, the claims and issues, the option to appear at the
hearing, the option to be excluded from the class, and the binding
effect of the class settlement.

Judge Chambers grants the Motion to Certify the Class for
Settlement Purposes and to Approve Class Settlement and Notice.

A Final Approval Hearing will be held on Oct. 31, 2022, at 1:30
p.m.

The notice must be sent to the proposed class 14 days after the
entry of the Order.

Any class member who objects to the settlement will have 60 days to
notify the Clerk of the Court of their objection.

Judge Chambers directs the Clerk to send a copy of the Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented
parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/5n7cc9z5 from
Leagle.com.


CALIFORNIA UNITED: Bid to Remand Alcazar Suit to State Court Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denies the Plaintiff's motion to
remand the case, ESTEBAN ALCAZAR, Plaintiff v. CALIFORNIA UNITED
MECHANICAL, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-09003-HSG (N.D. Cal.),
back to state court.

UMI is an HVAC and plumbing company. Mr. Alcazar began working as
an hourly-paid non-exempt employee for UMI in 2015.

Mr. Alcazar alleges that UMI systematically failed to pay him wages
for missed meal periods, missed rest periods, and both regular and
overtime hours. He also alleges that UMI did not keep accurate
payroll records or wage statements; reimburse business-related
expenses; or allow legally required meal and rest periods. Lastly,
he alleges that he did not receive wages owed at the time of his
discharge or resignation. His employment terminated in 2018.

Mr. Alcazar filed the putative class action lawsuit in the Santa
Clara County Superior Court in September 2021.  He brings causes of
action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
employees for unpaid overtime, unpaid meal period premiums, unpaid
rest period premiums, unpaid wages, untimely final wages,
non-compliant wage statements, unreimbursed business expenses, and
unfair business practices under California Labor Code and
California Business & Professions Code.

In November 2021, UMI removed the action to federal court on the
ground that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 185, preempts Mr. Alcazar's claims. Mr.
Alcazar now moves to remand.

The Complaint alleges that UMI failed to pay overtime wages and
therefore violated Cal. Lab. Code Section 510 and Section 1198, as
well as IWC Wage Orders. The question is whether Mr. Alcazar's
overtime claim involves a "right that exists solely" because of a
collective-bargaining agreement.

Mr. Alcazar's primary disagreement is that, in his view, the CBA
does not expressly guarantee sufficient wages to all employees
covered by the CBA because the wage and fringe schedules "only
cover the wages and fringes for predominantly two classifications
of employees -- Building Trades (BT) and Light Commercial (LC),
when other classifications exist such as Residential or
Industrial."

In Curtis the Ninth Circuit held that overtime claims under Cal.
Lab. Code Section 510 are controlled by the CBA so long as the CBA
satisfies the requirements of Cal. Lab. Code Section 514. Section
514, in turn, provides that Section 510 and 511 do not apply to an
employee covered by a valid CBA if the agreement expressly provides
for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the
employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all
overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those
employees of not less than 30% more than the state minimum wage.

Judge Gilliam finds that the CBA meets the requirements of Section
514. He finds that (i) it is uncontested that Mr. Alcazar's
employment was covered by the CBA; (ii) the agreement must
expressly provide for the wages, hours of work, and working
conditions of the employees; (iii) UMI has met its burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the CBA provides
for a regular hourly rate of pay that is at least 30 percent
greater than the state minimum wage as to Mr. Alcazar and all
employees covered by the CBA.

This means that Mr. Alcazar's Section 510 claim for overtime is
"controlled" by a CBA and is therefore preempted by Section 301 of
the LMRA. The Court accordingly has federal question jurisdiction
over it.

UMI contends that because the Court has exclusive federal
jurisdiction over Mr. Alcazar's overtime claim, it should exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Judge Gilliam agrees. Mr. Alcazar's remaining claims under
California law arise from the same working conditions and
relationship with UMI during the same period as his overtime claim.
Therefore, he finds that the claims derive from a "common nucleus
of operative fact" and thus will exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining claims.

Judge Gilliam denies the motion to remand and sets a telephonic
case management conference on Sept. 13, 2022, at 2:00 p.m. The
parties will submit a joint case management statement by Sept. 6,
2022. Given the age of the case, the parties are advised that the
Court intends to promptly set a case schedule that, at minimum,
sets the class certification hearing for no later than August
2023.

All counsel will use the following dial-in information to access
the call: Dial-In: 888-808-6929; Passcode: 6064255

For call clarity, parties will not use speaker phone or earpieces
for these calls, and where at all possible, parties will use
landlines.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/368zwpen from Leagle.com.


CARGUARD ADMINISTRATION: E.D. Pennsylvania Tosses Baccari TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned as ANTHONY BACCARI, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CARGUARD
ADMINISTRATION, INC., Defendant, Case No. 22-CV-1952 (E.D. Pa.),
Judge Wendy Beetlestone of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Baccari brings the putative class action against Carguard
for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA"), after he received telemarketing calls from an entity,
which is not part of this litigation but which he alleges made the
calls on behalf of Carguard. Carguard has filed, in successive
order: (1) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); (2) a motion to strike
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); and, (3) a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1).

As pled in Baccari's complaint, the facts are plain. Baccari had
placed his cell phone number on the National Do Not Call Registry.
Despite his registration, he began receiving telemarketing calls in
late September 2021 about auto warranties. During one of the calls,
he asked the person on the other end of the line to identify who he
worked for--and was told it was A-List Marketing Solutions, Inc. In
the call, the representative tried to sell to Baccari Carguard's
warranty services. Following the call, Baccari received a proposed
service contract from Carguard.

Mr. Baccari alleges that Carguard and A-List had a marketing
agreement, and pursuant to that agreement, "A-List Marketing was
contractually required to promote CarGuard products on their
telemarketing calls." He alleges CarGuard had "day-to-day control
over A-List Marketing's actions," including by instructing A-List
about the number of calls it should make and the geographies in
which it should make them. Baccari further alleges that Carguard
had previously received complaints about its telemarketing calls
and that, in a statement to the Better Business Bureau, it
acknowledged that it had the power to tell companies like A-List to
stop making its calls.

                        Motion to Strike

As an initial matter, Judge Beetlestone finds that Carguard's
Motion to Strike pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is
untimely because it falls afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(g)(2), which provides that except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2)
or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make
another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that
was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion

A motion to strike is "a motion under" Rule 12; specifically, a
motion to strike is one made under Rule 12(f), Judge Beetlestone
notes.

Because Carguard filed a separate motion to strike after it already
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), it has failed
to comply with Rule 12(g)'s mandate to consolidate all motions
available to it into a single motion, Judge Beetlestone holds.

                  Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
                   Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A reading of Rule 12(g) would also suggest that Carguard should
have consolidated its motion for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction with its two other motions, Judge Beetlestone says.
But a challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time and is not subject to the consolidation and
waiver provisions of Rule 12. Accordingly, the Court will consider
Carguard's only argument, which is that Baccari lacks standing to
bring this case.

Judge Beetlestone finds that Carguard raises a factual attack,
because it presents evidence directly contradicting the bases for
Baccari's standing. In particular, Carguard disputes facts in the
complaint tending to show that it caused Baccari's injury. The
complaint alleges, for example, that "A-list Marketing was
contractually required to promote Carguard's products on their
telemarketing calls in order to potentially generate new
customers."

Carguard's CEO, however, attests in a declaration that A-List was
"contractually prohibited from engaging in any form of
telemarketing to market Carguard's products." The CEO's statement
is confirmed both by the marketing agreement between Carguard and
A-List, and the Exclusivity Agreement, (also attached), which
clearly states that A-List will not use any form of telemarketing
to market the products.

Carguard's declaration raises further factual disputes concerning
whether it caused Baccari's injury, Judge Beetlestone finds. For
example, the complaint alleges that Carguard has previously
received complaints regarding the telemarketing conduct of its
third-party vendors, and that Carguard was knowingly and actively
accepting the business that originated through the illegal
telemarketing calls through the issuance of vehicle service
contracts. In contrast, Carguard's declaration states that
"Carguard was unaware that A-List was making any sort of
prerecorded calls during the timeframes at issue in the Complaint.
It would not have accepted any contracts from A-List had it been
aware of those facts at the time it accepted the contracts."

When a "defendant contests the jurisdictional allegations . . .
under oath, then it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to respond to
the defendant's sworn factual assertions. In doing so, a conclusory
response will not suffice," Judge Beetlestone opines, citing Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 673
F.2d 700, 711-12 (3d Cir. 1982). Instead, the plaintiff must
present proof of jurisdiction countering the defendant's facts "by
affidavits or other sworn proofs."

Here, Baccari has failed to do just that, Judge Beetlestone holds.
In response to the evidence Carguard presented to break the factual
link between itself and Baccari's harm, Baccari only provides a
lengthy discussion about the law concerning principles of agency,
and restates allegations in the complaint. Judge Beetlestone
elaborates that Baccari merely re-asserts that A-List was
contractually required to use telemarketing practices to reach
customers like himself.

Because Baccari has not met his burden to produce evidence
responding to Carguard's factual attack, Judge Beetlestone holds
that Carguard's motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will
be granted, and the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.
Further, as Baccari's complaint is being dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, Carguard's motion to dismiss it for
failure to state a claim will be denied as moot.

An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Aug. 8,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/mtby9zdd from
Leagle.com.


CBOE GLOBAL: Securities Suit in New York Court Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------
CBOE Global Markets, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period Ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 29, 2022, that a class action lawsuit
against its subsidiary Bats Global Markets, Inc. and Direct Edge
Holdings LLC has been dismissed after the court dismissed the
plaintiffs appeals in June 2022.

On April 18, 2014, the City of Providence, Rhode Island filed a
securities class action lawsuit in the federal district court for
the Southern District of New York (Lower Court) against Bats and
Direct Edge Holdings LLC, as well as 14 other securities
exchanges.

The action purports to be brought on behalf of all public investors
who purchased and/or sold shares of stock in the United States
since April 18, 2009 on a registered public stock exchange
(Exchange Defendants) or a U.S.-based alternate trading venue and
were injured as a result of the alleged misconduct detailed in the
complaint, which includes allegations that the Exchange Defendants
committed fraud through a variety of business practices associated
with, among other things, what is commonly referred to as high
frequency trading.

On May 2, 2014 and May 20, 2014, American European Insurance
Company and Harel Insurance Co., Ltd. each filed substantially
similar class action lawsuits against the Exchange Defendants which
were ultimately consolidated with the City of Providence, Rhode
Island securities class action lawsuit. On June 18, 2015, the Lower
Court held oral argument on the pending Motion to Dismiss and
thereafter, on August 26, 2015, the Lower Court issued an Opinion
and Order granting Exchange Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
dismissing the complaint in full.

On September 24, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2nd Circuit), seeking to
appeal the August 26, 2015 dismissal opinion and order. On January
7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their opening brief with the 2nd Circuit
and on April 7, 2019, the Exchange Defendants filed their
opposition brief with the 2nd Circuit. Oral argument was held on
August 24, 2016.

Following oral argument, the 2nd Circuit issued an order requesting
that the SEC submit an amicus brief on whether the Lower Court had
jurisdiction and whether the Exchange Defendants have immunity in
the claims alleged. The SEC filed its amicus brief with the 2nd
Circuit on November 28, 2016 and Plaintiffs and the Exchange
Defendants filed their respective supplemental response briefs on
December 12, 2016.

On December 19, 2017, the 2nd Circuit reversed the Lower Court's
dismissal and remanded the case back to the Lower Court. On March
13, 2018, the 2nd Circuit denied the Exchange Defendants' motion
for re-hearing. The Exchange Defendants filed their opening brief
for their motion to dismiss May 18, 2018, Plaintiffs' response was
filed June 15, 2018 and the Exchange Defendants' reply was filed
June 29, 2018.

On May 28, 2019, the Lower Court issued an opinion and order
denying the Exchange Defendants' motion to dismiss. On June 17,
2019, the Exchange Defendants filed a motion seeking interlocutory
appeal of the May 28, 2019 dismissal order, which was denied July
16, 2019. Exchange Defendants filed their answers on July 25, 2019.


Targeted discovery regarding class certification and legal
preclusion concluded on April 26, 2021. On May 28, 2021, (1)
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification, (2) Bats and
NYSE filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment on Grounds of Legal
Preclusion and a joint Motion for Summary Judgment on Grounds of
Lack of Article III Standing, and (3) Nasdaq filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment for Legal Preclusion. Briefing on these
dispositive motions concluded in December 2021.

The parties also filed motions to exclude some of the other's
experts. Oral argument regarding the joint Motion for Lack of
Article III Standing and Exchange Defendant's motion to exclude the
testimony of one of Plaintiffs' experts occurred on March 11, 2022.


On March 28, 2022, the Lower Court entered an opinion and order
dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims, without prejudice, against
the Exchange Defendants and ordered that judgment be entered for
the Defendant Exchanges. On April 25, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a
Notice of Appeal with the 2nd Circuit, seeking to appeal the March
28, 2022 dismissal order and the judgment entered against them.

During May and June 2022, all of the Exchange Defendants entered
into settlement agreements with Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs moved to
dismiss their pending appeals from the March 28, 2022, dismissal
order. On June 13, 2022, the 2nd Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs'
appeals with respect to Bats and Direct Edge Holdings LLC and the
litigation was concluded.

Cboe Global Markets, Inc. is a provider of market infrastructure
and tradable products based in Illinois.


CENTENE CORP: Lukaszewicz Deposition in Duff Suit Will Be Sealed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Douglas R. Cole of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Western Division, issued an Opinion and Order in
the lawsuit styled MISTY DUFF, et al., Plaintiffs v. CENTENE
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-750 (S.D. Ohio):

   (1) granting the parties' Motion to File Under Seal the
       Deposition Transcript of Natalie Lukaszewicz; and

   (2) denying without prejudice the parties' Joint Motion to
       File Under Seal the Expert Report of Adam Block, Ph.D.

The parties request permission to file under seal the transcript
of, and exhibits to, the Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(B)(6) deposition of
Natalie Lukaszewicz, corporate representative for Defendants
Centene Corp., Centene Management Co., LLC, and Buckeye Community
Health Plan, Inc. The parties jointly argue that these documents
warrant seal because Lukaszewicz's deposition discusses "internal
company policies and procedures," including "the computer system
that handles contracts between the company and health care
providers, the computer system that handles approval and denials of
insurance claims, and the computer system that handles the provider
directory."

As for the exhibits, the parties insist that those contain
"confidential business records," such as "internal policy and
procedure on Network Development & Contracting; internal network
adequacy geography maps; Defendants' network adequacy spreadsheets
including listings of providers under contract (exhibit 12 native
excel spreadsheet); internal policy and procedure on Provider Data
and Analytics."

The parties also request, for seemingly similar reasons, permission
to file under seal the expert report of the Plaintiffs' expert, Dr.
Adam Block. According to the parties, this report contains internal
business practices and procedures relating to Defendants' health
insurance products in Ohio, including their network with health
care providers in Ohio, as well as their fraud prevention
techniques.

Judge Cole notes that a district court's decision to seal court
records is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, citing Beauchamp v.
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 658 F. App'x 202, 207 (6th Cir. 2016)
(citing Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825
F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2016)). But in the sealing context, that
decision is not accorded the deference that standard normally
brings.

In short, under Shane Group, the Court must determine whether the
asserted competitive interests are compelling, whether the
interests served by sealing this information outweigh the value of
public disclosure, and whether the seal is narrowly tailored to
protect those privacy interests.

With respect to the parties' first motion, which requests
permission to file under seal the deposition of Natalie Lukaszewicz
and the exhibits thereto, the Court concludes that the parties have
identified a compelling interest that outweighs the value of public
disclosure. The deposition the parties seek to seal includes, among
other things, the technical aspects of the Defendants' claims
decision processes.

Moreover, Judge Cole finds the exhibits include copies of written
internal procedures explaining the Defendants' internal standards
for network adequacy, as well as detailed charts illustrating
provider coverage, including how far members in any given county
must travel to reach a particular type of care provider. This
information is sufficiently specific and detailed that its
disclosure could harm the Defendants' competitive standing.

The Court also determines that the Defendants' compelling
competitive interest in sealing its sensitive business information
outweighs the public's interest in disclosure. Shane Group
articulates several reasons why the public might have an interest
in an open review of a court's docket materials. For example, a
public docket ensures the public's right to guard against
corruption and the public's right to be on notice about what is and
what is not a violation of law.

The Defendants' internal policies and procedures regarding network
adequacy are less integral to the case than are the Defendants'
outward representations about that adequacy, Judge Cole notes.
Additionally, the parties request to file the deposition and
exhibits under seal for purposes of citation in upcoming class
certification briefing. Such briefing is not concerned with
ultimate liability, but with whether the instant suit is amenable
to treatment as a class action.

Given the competitive interests outlined, the Court finds, at least
at this stage, that the public's interest in disclosure does not
outweigh the parties' interest in sealing.

The final issue the Court must address is Shane Group's
narrow-tailoring requirement. The parties request permission to
file the Lukaszewicz deposition and associated exhibits under seal
in their entirety. Having reviewed these materials, the Court
concludes that the references to the Defendants' sensitive business
information is pervasive throughout, such that it would be
impracticable to cull any portions that do not contain such
information. As such, the Court grants the parties' Joint Motion
File Under Seal the Deposition Transcript of Natalie Lukaszewicz.

Turning to the parties' second motion, which requests permission to
file under seal the expert report of Dr. Adam Block, the Court
comes to a different conclusion. Having reviewed the report in
camera, the Court struggles to identify the portions discussing the
Defendants' "internal business practices and procedures" or their
"fraud prevention techniques."

Rather, Judge Cole finds, the report overwhelmingly cites public
sources, including state insurance regulators' websites, online
newspaper articles, and academic journals. The report does cite the
Lukaszewicz deposition on three occasions, but even these citations
make only general reference to company policies and practices.

Thus, the Court concludes that, with respect to the expert report
of Dr. Block, the parties have not identified a sufficiently
specific compelling interest to outweigh the public's interest in
disclosure.

As such, the Court denies without prejudice the parties' Joint
Motion to File Under Seal the Expert Report of Adam Block, Ph.D.

The parties may renew their request for a seal, explaining in more
detail, if they can, why Dr. Block's report warrants sealing under
the standards set forth here.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Aug. 8,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc3znxxc from
Leagle.com.


CENTRAL FREIGHT: Cox's Bid for Default Judgment Granted in Part
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Alan D. Albright of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas, Waco Division, grants in part the Plaintiff's
motion for default judgment in the lawsuit captioned AARON COX, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
CENTRAL FREIGHT LINES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 6:21-cv-01295-ADA
(W.D. Tex.).

The action arises out of an alleged violation of the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.
Section 2101-2109. Central Freight is a Texas Corporation that
employed the Plaintiff at its facility in Waco, Texas. It also
maintains separate facilities that employed other members of the
Class Action throughout the United States.

Plaintiff Cox and approximately 2,100 other employees of Central
Freight were fired as part of a mass layoff ordered by Central
Freight on Dec. 13, 2021. According to him, Central Freight failed
to provide him and other similarly situated former employees at
least 60 days of advance written notice of termination, as required
by the WARN Act.

On Dec. 14, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the action, asserting that
the Defendant was liable under the WARN Act. In the Complaint, he
requests (1) amount equal to the sum of: wages, salary,
commissions, bonuses, accrued holiday pay, accrued vacation pay
pension and 401(k) contributions and other Employee Retirement
Income Security Act benefits for sixty working days following
termination, (2) certification that the Plaintiff and other
similarly laid-off employees constitute a single class, (3)
interest as allowed by law on the amounts owed, (4) appointment of
the Plaintiff's attorneys as Class Counsel, (5) appointment of the
Plaintiff as the Class Representative and payment of reasonable
compensation for his services as such, (6) reasonable attorney's
fees and costs, (7) further relief the Court may deem just and
proper. He properly served Central Freight on Dec. 28, 2021.
Central Freight failed to answer, appear, or otherwise defend
itself in this action.

On Feb. 8, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Clerk's Entry
of Default. On March 7, 2022, the Clerk of the Court entered the
default of Central Freight, at the request of the Plaintiff. As of
the date of this Order, the Defendant has not answered or otherwise
responded to the Complaint.

When determining whether a default judgment is procedurally
warranted, the Court considers six factors under Alvarado Martinez
v. Eltman L., P.C., 444 F.Supp.3d 748, 752 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (citing
Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998)). The
factors are: "(1) whether material issues of fact exist; (2)
whether there has been substantial prejudice; (3) whether the
grounds for default are clearly established; (4) whether the
default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable neglect;
(5) the harshness of a default judgment; and (6) whether the court
would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the
defendant's motion."

Judge Albright finds that default judgment against the Defendant is
procedurally warranted. The Judge holds that all six factors weigh
in favor of granting default judgment.

Because the Complaint states every element required by the WARN
Act, the Plaintiff's claim has merit, Judge Albright holds.
Therefore, when the Complaint is taken as true, the Defendant is
liable for back pay, lost benefits, civil penalties, and attorneys'
fees.

The Plaintiff requests damages and class certification to properly
bring this suit as a class action.

Judge Albright notes that the Plaintiff has not yet briefed the
Court on the actual amount of damages. Instead, the Plaintiff only
requested damages in the form of "(A) back pay for each day of
violation at a rate of compensation not less than the higher
of--(i) the average regular rate received by such employee during
the last 3 years of the employee's employment; or (ii) the final
regular rate received by such employee; and (B) benefits under an
employee benefit plan described in section 1002(3) of this title,
including the cost of medical expenses incurred during the
employment loss which would have been covered under an employee
benefit plan if the employment loss had not occurred. Such
liability shall be calculated for the period of the violation, up
to a maximum of 60 days, but in no event for more than one-half the
number of days the employee was employed by the employer."

Thus, the Plaintiff seeks the damages available under the WARN Act.
The Court finds these categories of damages appropriate, but the
Court lacks sufficient information to determine the actual dollar
amount of these damages.

Recognizing the lack of information, the Plaintiff requests a
hearing on damages and damage categories, both of which fall within
the bounds of the requests of the initial pleadings. The Court
finds this relief appropriate. However, the current Motion is too
vague in terms of what the Plaintiff wants from the hearing, the
Judge notes. The Court requires supplemental briefing before a
hearing on damages will be granted.

Finally, the Plaintiff appears to seek a judgment on behalf of a
class. No class has been certified yet, Judge Albright says. Thus,
a class judgment is denied without prejudice. If heseeks to certify
a class, he must file a motion for class action certification,
along with a proposed order that clearly defines the class, Judge
Albright says.

Having considered the facts and legal principles, Judge Albright
rules that the Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment is
granted-in-part.

The Court grants the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment as to
holding that the Defendant violated the WARN Act.

The Court grants-in-part the Plaintiff's motion for default
judgment as to categories of damages. The Plaintiff is ordered to
file a motion for relief that details the precise relief the
Plaintiff seeks and set forth the reasons why the Court should
grant that relief, along with a proposed order that explicitly sets
forth the relief to be ordered.

Judge Albright further ordered that the Plaintiff is given leave to
file a motion for class action certification and proposed order.

The Plaintiff will allow three weeks for the Defendant to respond
to the motions, and the Plaintiff will email the Court's law clerk
thereafter to arrange a hearing if the Defendant fails to file an
opposition.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yczzb5hy from Leagle.com.


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Sansone Loses Bid for Entry of Judgment
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William Q. Hayes of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denies the Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed in the lawsuit entitled JENNIFER M. SANSONE, and
BALDEMAR ORDUNO, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of Other ORDER
Members of the Public Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; TWC ADMINISTRATION LLC; CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-1880-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal.).

On Dec. 6, 2017, Plaintiffs Sansone and Orduno, filed the First
Amended Class Action Complaint against Defendants Charter
Communications, Inc., TWC Administration LLC, and Charter
Communications, LLC. The Plaintiffs brought the following six
causes of action against Defendants: (1) violation of California
Labor Code Section 227.3 for failure to pay vested vacation wages
at the time of termination; (2) violation of California Labor Code
Section 227.3 for reduction in the valuation of the vested vacation
wages; (3) willful failure to timely pay wages at termination in
violation of California Labor Code Sections 201 and 203; (4) breach
of contract regarding base compensation; (5) breach of contract
regarding commissions; and (6) unfair competition.

On May 31, 2019, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. On Sept. 18, 2019, the Court issued an Order granting
summary judgment to the Defendants on all claims.

On Oct. 1, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal as to the
Court's Order granting summary judgment. On Oct. 19, 2020, the
Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Opinion reversing the Court's
grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the Plaintiffs'
Section 227.3 claims, on the basis that the Plaintiffs were
terminated within the meaning of Section 227.3. The Court of
Appeals further held that because it reverses the district court's
grant of summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' Section 227.3 claims,
it also reverses summary judgment on the derivative claims for
waiting time penalties and unfair competition.

On Jan. 3, 2022, the Defendants filed a Partial Motion for Summary
Judgment on the claim for waiting time penalties under Section 203
on the alternative basis--not addressed by the Court of Appeals in
its Memorandum Opinion--that the Defendants' failure to pay
vacation wages when the Plaintiffs were terminated was not willful.
On May 10, 2022, the Court issued an Order granting the Partial
Motion for Summary Judgment.

On May 27, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Entry of
Judgment. They request that the Court direct entry of final
judgment as to the Section 203 waiting time penalties claim
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On
June 21, 2022, the Defendants filed a Response. On June 24, 2022,
the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Non-Opposition.

The Plaintiffs contend that all factors supporting entry of Rule
54(b) judgment as to the waiting time penalties claim are
satisfied. They contend that the Defendants would not be
prejudiced, and have not raised any reasoned objection to the Court
granting entry of final judgment. They contend that there is no
just reason to delay entering final judgment as to the waiting time
penalties claim to allow for an immediate appeal. They contend that
it is appropriate to stay class certification and other proceedings
on their remaining claims pending the outcome of their appeal to
conserve the Court's and all parties' resources.

The Defendants "do not oppose" the Plaintiffs' motion. The
Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' motion nevertheless
"misstates" various aspects of the record, including the holding
and effect of the Memorandum Opinion of the Court of Appeals, the
Order of the Court granting the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, the content of prior discussion between the parties'
counsel, and the possibility of mootness should the Plaintiffs'
motion be granted.

The Plaintiffs request entry of final judgment as to the claim for
waiting time penalties under Section 203. The Court previously
granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the waiting
time penalties claim. The waiting time penalties claim was
cognizable, and the Court's decision constituted an ultimate
disposition of that claim.

The Court finds that the decision on the Section 203 waiting time
penalties claim is a final judgment.

The Court determined that the Defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on the Section 203 waiting time penalties claim because
the Defendants' failure to pay vacation wages at termination was
not willful. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the Section 203
waiting time penalties claim is "derivative" of the Plaintiffs'
Section 227.3 claims.

While the Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiffs were
terminated within the meaning of Section 227.3, the Defendants
assert that they have other defenses to the Section 227.3 claims.
The Plaintiffs have not sought or obtained judgment in their favor
on the Section 227.3 claims. Any interlocutory adjudication
concerning the Section 203 "willfulness" requirement would be
rendered moot in the event that the Defendants prevail on the
Section 227.3 claims.

The Court finds that, at this point in the litigation, there exists
a just reason to delay the entry of final judgment as to the claim
for waiting time penalties under Section 203.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/27rphphs from Leagle.com.


CHERRY CREEK MORTGAGE: Rendon Files FCRA Suit in S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cherry Creek
Mortgage, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Aaron Rendon,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Cherry
Creek Mortgage, LLC, Advantage Credit, Inc., Case No.
3:22-cv-01194-BEN-MSB (S.D. Cal., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

Cherry Creek Mortgage, LLC -- https://www.cherrycreekmortgage.com/
-- are a full service mortgage banking company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 308
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: (619) 222-7429
          Fax: (866) 431-3292
          Email: DanielShay@TCPAFDCPA.com

               - and -

          Joshua Branden Swigart, Esq.
          Spencer L. Pfeiff, Esq.
          SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
          2221 Camino Del Rio S., Ste. 308
          San Diego, CA 92108-3611
          Phone: 866-219-3343
          Fax: 866-219-8344
          Email: josh@swigartlawgroup.com
                 spencer@swigartlawgroup.com


CLEAR SKY LOCAL: Fabricant Files TCPA Suit in N.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Clear Sky Local, LLC,
et al. The case is styled as Terry Fabricant, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Clear Sky Local, LLC,
Case No. 1:22-cv-00843-GTS-CFH (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Clear Sky Local, LLC -- https://clearskylocal.com/ -- is helping
local & national companies with online marketing, lead generation,
and appointment setting solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln St., Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (617) 485-0018
          Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com


CLEARVIEW AI: Filing of Amended Consumer Privacy Suit OK'd in Part
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re Clearview AI, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litigation,
Case No. 21-cv-0135 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to file a second amended complaint in this
multi-district litigation, along with amending the underlying
complaints in:

   (1) Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 20-cv-512 (N.D. Ill.);
   (2) Vestrand v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 20-cv-3372
       (N.D. Ill.); and
   (3) Hurvitz v. Clearview AI, Inc.

The Plaintiffs allege the Clearview Defendants' conduct violated
their privacy rights and their use of their biometric information
was without their knowledge and consent in violation of the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq.
They also bring statutory and common law claims under Virginia,
California, and New York law.

In the present motion, the Plaintiffs seek to add the following
eight Defendants: (1) Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., now known as
Macy's Retail Holdings, LLC; (2) Macy's Corporate Services, Inc.,
now known as Macy's Corporate Services, LLC; (3) AT&T Inc.; (4)
Kohl's, Inc.; (5) Best Buy Stores, L.P.; (6) Albertsons Companies,
LLC; (7) Walmart Inc.; and (8) The Home Depot, Inc.

On May 25, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed the operative amended
consolidated class action complaint naming Defendant Macy's Inc. as
the named representative on behalf of the putative defendant class
called the "Clearview Client Class." In their present motion, they
explain that the first two additional defendants they seek to add
are other Macy's entities subject to the same liability as Macy's,
Inc. Because original defendant Macy's Inc. did not object to their
motion for leave to amend, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion
to add Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., now known as Macy's Retail
Holdings, LLC, and Macy's Corporate Services, Inc., now known as
Macy's Corporate Services, LLC, as named defendants to the relevant
lawsuits.

The remaining defendant retailers, however, are not Macy's
entities, but were clients of the Clearview defendants. Judge
Coleman first notes that the deadline for joining new parties was
Oct. 1, 2021, the date the Plaintiffs proposed in the parties'
March 2021 Joint Proposed Management and Discovery Plan. The
Plaintiffs, however, not only missed that deadline, but did not
address the deadline until their reply brief, after the Clearview
defendants pointed it out to the Court.

Meanwhile, in response, the Clearview defendants argue the addition
of these defendant retailers would severely prejudice them in light
of the Sept. 26, 2022 fact discovery deadline, which is a hard
deadline.

Judge Coleman agrees because "prejudice is more likely when an
amendment comes late in the litigation and will drive the
proceedings in a new direction." The class plaintiffs have switched
gears by first asserting that Macy's would be the named
representative for the defendant "Clearview Client Class," but now
seek to add more retail defendants as the "Client Defendants."
Although the Plaintiffs' attempt to amend their pleadings is not
late in this overall litigation, it is late in relation to the
upcoming fact discovery deadline. Equally important, the Plaintiffs
do not explain why Macy's Inc. and its affiliates are inadequate
named representatives nor do they cogently explain why these
additional defendants are necessary to their claims at this
juncture, especially because they were aware that these retailers
were Clearview's clients before they filed the operative complaint
in May 2021.

The Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend has other problems. For
example, under Illinois law, BIPA claims brought under sections
15(c) and (d) have a one-year limitations period. In their motion
for leave to amend, the Plaintiffs do not explain how their BIPA
claims under sections 15(c) and (d) against the new defendant
retailers relate back to the date of the original pleadings under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C).

Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs now argue that if the Court does not
grant them leave to add these defendants, they will file separate
complaints against the additional named defendants causing multiple
inefficiencies in this MDL and possible future tag-along cases.
That may be true, but as this ruling indicates, the Plaintiffs'
attempt to file new lawsuits may be difficult due to timeliness
issues. As it stands, Judge Coleman grants in part and denies in
part the Plaintiffs' motion.

On a final note, the Clearview defendants' argument about the new
allegations in relation to Defendant Rocky Mountain is moot due to
the Court's July 25, 2022 denial of the Clearview defendants' Rule
54(b) motion for reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/33v3szte from Leagle.com.


CLOOPEN GROUP: Bids to Dismiss St. John's Amended Complaint Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SONNY ST. JOHN, Plaintiff v. CLOOPEN GROUP HOLDING
LIMITED, CHANGXUN SUN, YIPENG LI, KUI ZHOU, QINGSHENG ZHENG,
XIAODONG LIANG, ZI YANG, MING LIAO, FENG ZHU, LOK YAN HUI, JIANHONG
ZHOU, CHING CHIU, COGENCY GLOBAL INC., COLLEEN DEVRIES, GOLDMAN
SACHS (ASIA) L.L.C., CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS, INC., CHINA
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL CORPORATION HONG KONG SECURITIES LIMITED,
TIGER BROKERS (NZ) LIMITED, FUTU, INC., Defendants, Index No.
652617/2021 (N.Y. Sup.), the Supreme Court of New York County
denies the motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by the
Cloopen Group and the Underwriters.

The lawsuit is a putative class action alleging strict liability
and negligence claims pursuant to Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933 based on the final registration
statement and Prospectus (Offering Documents) issued by Cloopen
Group, a cloud-based communications solution provider in China, in
connection with its Feb. 9, 2021 initial public offering (the IPO)
of 23 million American Depositary Shares (ADSs) at $16 per share
where it raised $340.2 million in net proceeds.

The Company conducted an IPO through its agent Cogency Global Inc.
The Registration Statement was signed by Ms. DeVries as an employee
of Cogency and by Changxun Sun, Yipeng Li, Kui Zhou, Qingsheng
Zheng, Xiaodong Liang, Zi Yang, Ming Liao, Feng Zhu, Lok Yan Hui,
Jianhong Zhou, Ching Chiu (the Individual Defendants), each of whom
were on the board of the Company at the time of the IPO. The
Underwriters were the underwriters for the IPO who performed a due
diligence investigation, helped draft the Offering Documents,
caused the Registration Statement to be filed with the SEC, and met
with investors to present information in connection with the IPO.

According to the well-pled amended complaint, the Offering
Documents were materially misleading and violated the 1933 Act
because, among other things, the Offering Documents (i) indicated
that the Company's dollar-based net customer retention rate was
stable at a high rate when in fact it had nose-dived from
approximately 95% to 63% in Q4 of 2020, which quarter closed
approximately two months before the IPO and (ii) indicated that the
Series F Warrant had a value of approximately $34 million (based on
a $2.8814 exercise price and 11,799,685 shares) but failed to
disclose the massive known looming liability associated with the
Series F Warrant. This undisclosed liability ultimately caused the
Company's net loss to skyrocket to 466.9% year-over-year.

On March 26, 2021, the Company published its report for Q4 2020 and
the fiscal year 2020. The Q4 2020 $39.6 million revenue was $2
million short of analysts' consensus, net losses of RMB 305.4
million represented a 466.9% increase year-over-year net loss, and
operating expenses of RMB 180.4 million represented a 30% increase
from operating expenses in the fourth quarter of 2019. As a result
of this news, the Company's stock price fell from $14.42 per ADS on
March 25, 2021 to $11.75 per ADS on March 26, 2021. When the
Company filed its annual report on Form 20-F, finally revealing
that its dollar-based net customer retention rate fell from 102.7%
in 2019 to 86.8% in 2020 and that the fair value of the Series F
Shares issued when the Series F Warrant was exercised was, as of
Dec. 31, 2020, $5.50 per share, the value of the Company's ADS fell
from $9.89 to $8.97 (i.e., 9.3%) between May 11, 2021 and May 12,
2021. As of the date of the filing of the AC, the stock traded as
low as $3.98 per ADS.

The Supreme Court explains that it is well settled that in order to
survive a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, a claim brought under the
1933 Act need not satisfy the heightened pleading standing of CPLR
3016(b) and must only satisfy CPLR 3013's notice pleading
requirements.

The Defendants argue that the AC must be dismissed because, among
other things, they never said their strategy was working, they
disclosed certain risks in the Offering Documents associated with
government regulations and COVID-19's effect on certain smaller
customers less equipped to manage the impact of COVID-19, they did
not say that the customer base was stable, and they otherwise did
not have to disclose their 2020 Q4 performance because the time to
report such performance had not yet come.

These arguments fail, the Supreme Court holds. Given that the Q4
2020 dollar-based net customer retention rate decline was material
and substantially different than the stabilizing picture that the
Offering Documents otherwise portrayed, it does not matter that the
omission was one of interim financial data or that Offering
Documents disclosed that the dollar-based net customer retention
rate had experienced decline in the past. Nor can it be said that
the statements in the Offering Documents were inactionable puffery
because nothing here bespoke caution.

The Company also cannot whisk away its alleged Series F Warrant
1933 Act violation because it disclosed the methodology in which
liabilities are calculated or because the Offering Documents
indicated that the Company adjusts warrant liabilities periodically
given the known liability at the time of the IPO. The Company
disclosed its Series E Warrant liability and should have disclosed
its Series F Warrant liability. Under the circumstances, only
disclosing that it had a $34 million Series F Warrant when it knew
of its significant Series F Warrant liability was a material
omission, because it would have been viewed by a reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of
information made available.

Thus, the Company's motion to dismiss and Goldman Sachs (Asia) LLC,
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Tiger Brokers (NZ) Limited, and
Futu, Inc.'s (Underwriters) motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR
3211(a)(1) and (a)(7) must be denied.

For the avoidance of doubt, by Stipulation dated Jan. 14, 2022, the
claims asserted against Colleen DeVries and the second and third
causes of action against Cogency were voluntarily dismissed. Ms.
DeVries and Cogency's motion to dismiss is therefore denied as
moot.

The Defendants will file an answer within 20 days of the date of
the Order.

The parties will appear at a preliminary conference on Sept. 8,
2022, at 12:00 p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ydyatree from Leagle.com.

Scott & Scott LP -- rjscott@scottandscottllp.com -- 230 Park Ave,
17th Floor, in New York City, for the Plaintiff.

Wilson Sinsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C., 1301 Avenue of the
Americas, 40th Floor, in New York City, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart
Preston Gates Ellis LLP, 599 Lexington Ave., in New York City,
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, 787 7th Ave., in New York City, for
the Defendants.


COMMERCE ENERGY: Court Issues Procedures on Uncashed Wage Checks
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVINA HURT, et al., Plaintiffs v. COMMERCE ENERGY,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 12-cv-00758 (N.D. Ohio), Judge
James S. Gwin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, upon the parties' joint motion, orders the following:

     1. For uncashed wage checks issued to class members whose last
known address is in the states of California, Georgia, Florida,
Illinois, Michigan, Ohio or South Carolina:

          a. The Defendant will follow the California, Georgia,
Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio or South Carolina escheatment;

          b. However, for class member is in the re-issue phase,
the Defendant will re-issue payment to that class member before
sending the unclaimed wage funds to the state;

          c. Until the time that the class members' wage checks are
sent to the applicable states pursuant to paragraph one, the
Defendant will continue to take reasonable steps to provide
verification which will assist a financial institution in honoring
an issued wage check. It will also continue to participate in the
verification process for check re-issue that the parties have been
engaging in for the past several months should a class member be
located before the funds have escheated to the appropriate state;
and

          d. To the extent that any additional class members are
determined to be deceased, the procedures outlined for the Court in
Doc. 986 will apply to the extent that the funds have not yet
escheated to the estate.

     2. For (1) uncashed wage checks for class members in
Pennsylvania and Maryland and (2) the liquidated damages checks for
class members in all states:

          a. Said checks are not considered unclaimed under state
escheatment law (to the extent said laws are applicable, which Just
Energy contends, although the Plaintiffs do not concede) until July
2024 at the earliest;

          b. The Plaintiffs' counsel will continue to attempt to
locate these individuals by running their names through a
change-of-address database in June of each year;

          c. To the extent that any additional class members are
determined to be deceased, the procedures outlined for the Court in
Doc. 986 continue to apply;

          d. The Defendant will continue to honor any liquidated
damages checks that are presented for payment, or as applicable and
upon request, verify for a financial institution that a check may
be honored, and it will continue to participate in the verification
process for check re-issue that the parties have been engaging in
for the past several months;

          e. The obligations in 2 (a)-(d) above will continue until
such time the Court issues a further ruling upon the disposition of
those funds (should there even be any uncashed checks as of July
2024); and

          f. The parties will continue to annually file a joint
report with the Court by July 25 of each year to advise of the
status of any remaining uncashed wage or liquidated damages checks
and the appropriate distribution of said funds, should that be
necessary.

In this Fair Labor Standards Act class action case, approximately
61 class members (of the original 531 class members) have not yet
cashed Just Energy checks issued under the Court's previous order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5fb37a2k from Leagle.com.


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Jackson FDCPA Suit Removed to D. New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Sheldon Jackson, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., John
Does 1-50, ABC Corp. 1-50, Case No. ESX-L-000361-22 was removed
from the Superior Court of Essex County, to the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey on June 28, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-04308-EP-AME to
the proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Convergent -- https://www.convergentusa.com/outsourcing/ -- is one
of America's leading collections agencies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lawrence C. Hersh, Esq.
          17 Sylvan Street, Suite 102B
          Rutherford, NJ 07070
          Phone: (201) 507-6300
          Email: lh@hershlegal.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Aaron Raphael Easley, Esq.
          SESSIONS, ISRAEL& SHARTLE, LLC
          3 Cross Creek Drive
          Flemington, NJ 08822
          Phone: (908) 237-1660
          Fax: (908) 237-1663
          Email: aeasley@sessions.legal


CRST INT'L: Final Judgment Entered in Markson Suit as to Western
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CURTIS MARKSON, MARK McGEORGE, CLOIS McCLENDON, and
ERIC CLARK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. CRST INTERNATIONAL, INC., CRST EXPEDITED,
INC.; C.R. ENGLAND, INC., WESTERN EXPRESS, INC., SCHNEIDER NATIONAL
CARRIERS, INC., SOUTHERN REFRIGERATED TRANSPORT, INC., COVENANT
TRANSPORT, INC., PASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC., STEVENS TRANSPORT,
INC., and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
5:17-cv-01261-SB (SPx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr.,
of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
enters Final Judgment in the action as to the Settling Defendants
in accordance with the Settlements and the Final Approval Order.

The Court has granted final approval of the Class Action
Settlements between the Plaintiffs and the Settling Defendants,
through its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement and Partially Granting Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

All Settlement Class Members, as defined in the Final Approval
Order and the Settlements, are bound by the Final Approval Order
and this Final Judgment as to the Settling Defendants.

The Settlement Class consists of the following: "All current and
former motor drivers Under Contract as motor vehicle carriers with
CRST International, Inc., CRST Expedited, Inc., C.R. England, Inc.,
Western Express, Inc., Schneider National Carriers, Inc., Southern
Refrigerated Transport, Inc., Covenant Transport, Inc., Paschall
Truck Lines, Inc. and/or Stevens Transport, Inc., at any time from
May 15, 2013 through the Preliminary Approval Date. Excluded from
the Settlement Class are officers, directors, senior executives,
employees of Defendants who are not motor vehicle carrier drivers,
and personnel in human resources and recruiting departments of the
Defendants in this Action."

Nothing contained in the Final Judgment will constitute a release
of the Plaintiffs' claims, and the claims of the Settlement Class
members, against the Non-Settling Defendants CRST International,
Inc., CRST Expedited Inc., and C.R. England, Inc., which remain
pending. The Order constitutes the Court's Final Judgment as and
between the Settling Parties only.

In accordance with the Court's Final Approval Order, the Court
approved the gross non-reversionary total settlement amount of
$9,750,000, including $700,000 from Paschall; $750,000 from
Schneider; $800,000 from Covenant and Southern, together; $2
million from Western; and $5.5 million from Stevens. Dkt. Nos.
537-3 at 10, 537-4 at 10, 537-5 at 11, 537-6 at 10, and 564-3 at
12-13. The settlement fund of $9,750,000 will be used to pay (1)
costs of class notice and administration of the settlement fund,
(2) incentive awards to the named Plaintiffs, (3) attorneys' fees
and litigation expenses awarded by the Court, and (4) the remainder
will be paid to the Settlement Class members pro rata based on the
weeks worked by each class member for Defendants.

In accordance with the Final Approval Order and the Settlements,
$252,650 in settlement administration costs will be paid from the
settlement fund to JND Legal Administration LLC, the settlement
administrator.

In accordance with the Final Approval Order, (i) the named
Plaintiffs will be paid Class Representative Incentive Awards from
the settlement fund as follows: $15,000 for Curtis Markson; $13,500
for Mark McGeorge; $12,000 for Clois McClendon; and $12,000 for
Eric Clark; and (ii) the lass Counsel will be paid from the
settlement fund attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,437,500, and
litigation costs will also be reimbursed from the settlement fund
in the amount of $2,716,510.45.

Any checks paid to Settlement class members will advise that they
will remain valid and negotiable for 180 calendar days from the
date of their issuance and may thereafter automatically be canceled
if not cashed by a Settlement Class member within that time, at
which time the Settlement Class member's check will be deemed void
and have no further force and effect. Any Settlement Participant's
failure to negotiate and/or cash any such check will not abrogate
or affect that Settlement Class member's releases under the
Settlements. The funds associated with any checks which are not
timely negotiated will be paid to an appropriate cy pres
beneficiary, such as St. Christopher Truckers Relief Fund.

Final Judgment in entered on the Settlements as to the Settling
Defendants Western Express, Inc., Schneider National Carriers,
Inc., Southern Refrigerated Transport, Inc., Covenant Transport,
Inc. Paschall Truck Lines, Inc. And Stevens Transport, Inc.
Following entry of the Order, the Court will dismiss the Settling
Defendants from the action with prejudice by separate order.

Although the Settling Defendants will be dismissed from the action
with prejudice, the Court will maintain jurisdiction over the
Settling Defendants for one year from the date of entry of its
Judgment as to the Settling Defendants for purposes of enforcing
the terms of the Settlements, the Final Approval Order and this
Judgment as to the Settling Defendants, and/or making further
orders regarding the disbursal of funds associated with uncashed
settlement checks, notwithstanding the entry of the dismissal order
and final judgment as to the Settling Defendants.

The Clerk is directed to enter this judgment as to the Settling
Defendants as final judgment as to the Settling Defendants pursuant
to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure there being
no just reason for delay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Final Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2ep4aj3k from Leagle.com.


D & A SERVICES: Webb FDCPA Suit Removed to D. New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Douglas Webb, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. D & A Services, LLC, Dynia &
Associates, LLC, John Does 1-25, ABC Corp. 1-50, Case No.
ESX-L-000243-22 was removed from the Superior Court Essex County,
to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on June
29, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-04326-ES-ESK to
the proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

D&A Services, LLC -- https://dnasllc.com/ -- offers a fully
compliant debt management environment that connects collections,
recovery, and customer communications in one complete
ecosystem.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lawrence C. Hersh, Esq.
          17 Sylvan Street, Suite 102b
          Rutherford, NJ 07070
          Phone: (201) 507-6300
          Email: lh@hershlegal.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Aaron Raphael Easley, Esq.
          SESSIONS, ISRAEL & SHARTLE, LLC
          3 Cross Creek Drive
          Flemington, NJ 08822
          Phone: (908) 237-1660
          Fax: (908) 237-1663
          Email: aeasley@sessions.legal


DANESSA MYRICKS BEAUTY: Arceo Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Danessa Myricks
Beauty, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Kelly Arceo, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Danessa Myricks
Beauty, LLC, Does 1 through 20, Inclusive, Case No.
STK-CV-UF-2022-0007120 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., Aug. 15,
2022).

The case type is stated as "Unlimited Civil Fraud."

Danessa Myricks Beauty -- https://danessamyricksbeauty.com/ --
sells the best beauty products offering makeup, eyeshadow pigments,
eyelashes,eyelash adhesives, highlighters and makeup
education.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Allison Willett, Esq.
          WILLETT & WILLETT LLP
          9171 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 500
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210-5536
          Phone: 424-276-0065
          Fax: 424-276-0151
          Email: allison@willettlaw.com


DEERE & CO: Perry Suit Transferred to N.D. Illinois
---------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Richard Perry, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Deere & Co. doing business as: John
Deere, was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois on June 29, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-50243 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Anti-Trust for Antitrust
Litigation.

Deere & Co. doing business as John Deere --
https://www.deere.com/en/index.html -- is an American corporation
that manufactures agricultural machinery, heavy equipment, forestry
machinery, diesel engines, drivetrains used in heavy equipment, and
lawn care equipment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bryan John O'Connor , Jr., Esq.
          WHITESIDE & GOLDBERG, LTD.
          155 N. Michigan, Suite 540
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Phone: (312) 854-7825
          Email: boconnor@wglawgroup.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Amanda Balos Maslar, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          77 West Wacker
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Phone: (312) 269-4151
          Email: amaslar@jonesday.com


DEUTSCHE TELEKOM: Faces Dinkevich Suit in Delaware Court
--------------------------------------------------------
T-Mobile US, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period Ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 29, 2022, that on June 1, 2021, a
putative shareholder class action and derivative lawsuit captioned
"Dinkevich v. Deutsche Telekom AG, et al.," Case No. C.A. No.
2021-0479 was filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery against its
mother company Deutsche Telekom AG (DT), SoftBank and certain of
its current and former officers and directors, asserting breach of
fiduciary duty claims relating to the repricing amendment to the
Business Combination Agreement, and to SoftBank's monetization of
its T-Mobile shares.

T-Mobile US, Inc. is a radio telephone communications company based
in Washington State.


DON'T RUN OUT: Casillas Sues Over Misleading and False Advertising
------------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Casillas, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. DON'T RUN OUT, INC. D/B/A PUBLIC GOODS, Case No.
2:22-cv-01153-AC (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., July 1, 2022),
is a consumer protection and false advertising class action lawsuit
against the Defendant regarding its misleading business practices
with respect to the labeling, marketing, and sale of its Public
Goods Sunscreen advertised as "100% reef safe."

The Defendant markets and sells a chemical sunscreen with labeling
and advertising that leads consumers to believe that the sunscreen
is "100% reef safe", when in fact the chemical sunscreen contains
active ingredients known to damage coral reefs and the marine life
that inhabit them.

Sunscreen pollution is among the serious threats to coral reefs and
the marine life that inhabit them. The sunscreen that you apply
does not stay on your skin. When you swim or shower, sunscreen
washes off and enters our waterways. It is estimated that each year
between 4,000 to 6,000 metric tons of sunscreen enter in the oceans
from swimmers, snorkelers, and divers. To win over consumers and
obtain a premium price over their competitors, companies such as
the Defendant, have responded in kind by trying to hide, confuse,
or play loose with the term "reef safe." Consumers believe they are
purchasing a superior, cleaner, and healthier Product from
Defendant because of the Defendant's deceptive advertising and
labeling of the Product.

The Defendant's chemical sunscreen is sold and advertised as "100%
reef safe" and "more eco-friendly than other reef-safe sprays on
the market," yet contains avobenzone, octocrylene, and octisalate,
chemicals shown to harm marine life. The Defendant's sunscreen
product is falsely advertised to consumers who purchase the
sunscreen product at a premium in reliance on the Defendant's false
and deceptive advertising.

The Plaintiff and other consumers paid an unlawful premium for the
sunscreen Product they were made to believe was "100% reef safe."
The Defendant's Product, which is sold online on the Defendant's
website, is consistently advertised as "clean," "sustainable,"
"healthy," and "cruelty-free," and leads reasonable consumers to
believe the Product is part of a brand that sells genuinely clean
and safe products, not a brand that falsely claims its products are
"healthy" and "clean." The Plaintiff and other consumers would have
paid significantly less for the Product had they known that the
Product contained active ingredients that would harm coral reefs
and marine life. Therefore, the Plaintiff and other consumers
purchasing the Product suffered injury in fact and lost money as a
result of the Defendant's false, unfair, and fraudulent practices,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased Public Goods SPF 50 spray sunscreen for
personal use from the Defendant.

Public Goods is advertised as a healthy and sustainable company
that provides products free from harmful chemicals that contribute
to pollution.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
          Alexis M. Wood, Esq.
          Kas L. Gallucci, Esq.
          Lilach Halperin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CS 92103
          Phone: (619) 696-9006
          Facsimile: (619) 564-6665
          Email: ron@consumersadvocates.com
                 alexis@consumersadvocates.com
                 kas@consumersadvocates.com
                 lilach@consumersadvocates.com


EDUCATIONAL CREDIT: Sadigh Wins Leave to File Amended Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YVETTE SADIGH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EDUCATIONAL CREDIT
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, ALLIED INTERSTATE, LLC, and IQOR HOLDINGS,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 22-CV-00298 (HG) (JRC) (E.D.N.Y.), Judge
Hector Gonzalez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York issued a Memorandum and Order:

   a. granting the Plaintiff's request for leave to file an
      amended complaint, as currently proposed; and

   b. permitting the Defendants to file motions to dismiss the
      amended complaint.

The Plaintiff has brought a putative class action asserting claims
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Section 349 of New
York's General Business Law, along with common law claims for
unjust enrichment and conversion. Her claims generally arise from
the Defendants' alleged attempts to collect on her supposedly
defaulted student loans. She asserts that her supposed default is
memorialized by an unintelligible and unenforceable judgment that
reflects an improper rate of interest and allegedly inflated
collection costs that violate federal law.

Defendant Educational Credit Management Corp. ("ECMC") is a
guaranty agency that guarantees certain types of student loans and,
according to ECMC, "owes a due diligence obligation to the U.S.
Department of Education to collect unpaid student loans." The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Allied is a subsidiary of
Defendant iQor and that they both "regularly act as debt collectors
for ECMC." She alleges that both Allied and iQor "regularly
communicated by telephone and email with her" as part of their
attempts to collect her allegedly unpaid student loans.

The Defendants filed pre-motion letters seeking permission to file
motions to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint. The letter submitted
by Allied and iQor asserted that her complaint "fails to
distinguish the alleged acts and/or omissions of the three
defendants from one another or with which of the defendants she
communicated." They argued that she "does not even allege that
either Allied or iQor is actively pursuing collection of the
Judgment." In particular, iQor asserted that it "is a holding
company with no employees and takes no actions as a debt
collector."

The Plaintiff responded by filing a letter arguing that the bases
for the Defendants' proposed motions to dismiss were meritless but
nevertheless requested permission to file an amended complaint. She
later filed a proposed amended complaint. The proposed amended
complaint addressed Allied's and iQor's arguments that they were
not involved in collecting her supposedly unpaid student loans by
adding multiple allegations about specific interactions that
Plaintiff had with iQor and Allied. In particular, she alleged that
she received communications related to her student loans that were
"purportedly from Allied" but sent by email addresses that were on
their face affiliated with iQor, such as "documents@iQor.com and
Documents1@iqor.com." She further alleged that people who
represented themselves to be iQor employees told her counsel that
"Iqor personnel were working on behalf of ECMC and Allied" "due to
short staffing."

The Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint also included the
following new allegations: "Plaintiff, through counsel, in August
2021 had a phone call with Brendan Lee, of Iqor, regarding the
unenforceability of the Judgment (defined below). In this
conversation Mr. Lee represented that the Judgment was enforceable
and would be enforced. According to LinkedIn, Brendan Lee is 'SVP -
Chief Litigation Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer at iQor.'"

In response to the Court's directive, Allied and iQor submitted an
opposition to the Plaintiff's inclusion of these sentences in any
future amended complaint. They argued that these allegations: (i)
"serve no useful purpose," (ii) improperly disclose "settlement
discussions," and (iii) improperly "make the unnamed Plaintiff's
attorney a witness in the case" contrary to New York's Rules of
Professional Conduct governing attorneys.

ECMC filed no opposition to the Plaintiff's proposed amended
complaint within the time specified by the Court. The Court
therefore treats the Plaintiff's request for leave to amend her
complaint as unopposed by ECMC. It also finds it appropriate to
treat the parties' pre-motion letters as the Plaintiff's motion for
leave to amend her complaint because the relief she seeks is
non-dispositive. Furthermore, the Plaintiff, Allied, and iQor have
each had the opportunity to make multiple submissions that address
in sufficient detail the issues related to the Plaintiff's motion
for leave to amend.

Although Allied and iQor have not asked to file a formal motion to
strike the supposedly offensive sentences in the Plaintiff's
proposed amended complaint, they have essentially asked for such
relief. Similarly, they have not asked to file a formal motion to
disqualify the Plaintiff's attorney, but they argue that allowing
her proposed amendments would potentially create cause to
disqualify.

Judge Gonzalez finds that the Plaintiff's time period to amend her
complaint as of right has expired because she filed her proposed
amended complaint more than 21 days after filing her original
complaint and more than 21 days after Defendants filed their
pre-motion letters seeking permission to move to dismiss.
Nevertheless, he finds that justice requires granting leave to
amend because the Plaintiff's proposed amendments address the
arguments raised in the Defendants' pre-motion letters,
particularly Allied's and iQor's arguments that her original
complaint failed to allege that they participated in the efforts to
collect her student loans. The Plaintiff's decision to request
leave to amend "promptly upon reviewing" the Defendants' pre-motion
letters demonstrates an absence of bad faith, which is the sole
ground on which Allied and iQor oppose the amendment.

Additionally, although the Defendants do not argue that they will
be prejudiced by the proposed amended complaint, Judge Gonzalez
finds that no prejudice exists because the amendments do not seek
to add any new claims or new parties but only new facts related to
the claims in the Plaintiff's current complaint. The Defendants
will have an opportunity to move to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended
complaint, notwithstanding her newly-alleged facts.

The Plaintiff's proposed amendments are also proper even though
Allied and iQor assert that certain sentences in paragraph 10 of
the proposed amended complaint describe settlement discussions. Her
allegations simply reveal that the Defendants believe the judgment
related to her student loans is enforceable, a belief which Allied
and iQor concede "is already clear, by virtue of this lawsuit."

Finally, Judge Gonzalez does not deny the Plaintiff's request for
leave to amend based on Allied's and iQor's concerns that her
attorney described in paragraph 10 of the proposed amended
complaint may someday need to testify at trial. It is "premature"
to address this issue at such an early stage of the case. However,
his decision to allow the Plaintiff to file her amended complaint
is without prejudice to the Defendants filing a motion to
disqualify the attorney described in paragraph 10 therein "at a
later juncture if and when the attorney-witness issue becomes
ripe."

For these reasons, Judge Gonzalez grants the Plaintiff's request
for leave to file an amended complaint, as currently proposed,
including the sentences to which Defendants Allied and iQor object.
She will re-file her proposed amended complaint as an amended
complaint.

Judge Gonzalez further grants the Defendants' requests for
permission to file motions to dismiss. They will file their
Answer(s), move to dismiss, or otherwise respond to the Plaintiff's
amended complaint by Sept. 14, 2022. If they move to dismiss the
Plaintiff's amended complaint, they may do so without first filing
pre-motion letters, as otherwise required by the Court's Individual
Practices, but any other requests for relief by any party must
comply with the Court's Individual Practices. If any Defendant
files a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended complaint, then
the Plaintiff will file her opposition papers by Oct. 12, 2022, and
the Defendant(s) will file reply papers by Oct. 22, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bder3p52 from Leagle.com.


ENERGY TRANSFER: New Mexico Funds Appointed Lead Plaintiffs in Vega
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MIKE VEGA, on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. ENERGY TRANSFER LP, KELCY L. WARREN, THOMAS E. LONG,
MARSHALL S. MCCREA III, BRADFORD DICERKSON WHITEHURST, and JOHN W.
MCREYNOLDS, Defendants, Case No. 22 Civ. 4614 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y.),
Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York appointed:

   (i) New Mexico State Investment Council and Public Employees
       Retirement Association of New Mexico as the Lead
       Plaintiffs; and

  (ii) Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP as the Lead Counsel.

The class action alleges that Energy Transfer, a company engaged in
natural gas and propane pipeline transport whose shares trade on
the NYSE, and its directors and officers, made materially false and
misleading statements, and also failed to disclose, that (i) Energy
Transfer had inadequate internal controls and procedures to prevent
contractors from engaging in illegal conduct with respect to
drilling activities, or failed to mitigate properly known issues;
(ii) Energy Transfer, through its subsidiary hired third-party
contractors whose conduct caused severe pollution; and (iii) Energy
Transfer continually downplayed its potential civil liabilities
while the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was actively
investigating Energy Transfer's wrongdoing.

The Complaint seeks relief on behalf of all those who purchased or
otherwise acquired common shares of Energy Transfer between April
13, 2017 and Dec. 20, 2021, under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. Sections 78j(b)
and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
Section 240.10b-5.

On Aug. 2, 2022, four potential class members disclosed their
financial interest and moved to be appointed as lead plaintiff and
for their respective counsel to be appointed lead counsel -- Police
and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit claiming $7.3
million loss); Mike Vega claiming $3,699.36 loss; Josephine Dameyer
claiming $276,639.72 loss; New Mexico State Investment Council and
Public Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico ("New Mexico
Funds") claiming $55,200,000 loss.

In light of the disclosures, the parties stipulated that the New
Mexico Funds are the presumptive lead plaintiffs and ask the Courte
to appoint them as lead plaintiffs and their counsel, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, as lead counsel.

Under the PSLRA, there is a rebuttable presumption that the most
adequate plaintiff is the person or group of persons that (aa) has
either filed the complaint or made a motion in response to a notice
(bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest financial
interest in the relief sought by the class; and (cc) otherwise
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As to financial interest, "courts have consistently held
that the magnitude of the loss suffered is most significant." And
as to Rule 23, "at this early stage of litigation," only typicality
and adequacy are pertinent.

Judge Hellerstein finds that he New Mexico Funds have the greatest
financial interest, making them the presumptive lead plaintiff
under the PSLRA. Although the motion to appoint them as lead
plaintiffs is now unopposed, he still must "consider the factors
under the PSLRA to ensure that the movants care the most adequate
plaintiffs. He holds that they are.

The New Mexico Funds meet the statutory requirements. First, their
motion is timely because it was filed by the statutory deadline.
Second, and most importantly, the New Mexico Funds have the
greatest financial interest, as they claim losses of greater than
$55.2 million. The losses far exceed those claimed by any other
movant, rendering the New Mexico Funds the "presumptive lead
plaintiff" under the PSLRA. Finally, they satisfy the typicality
and adequacy requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The New Mexico Funds also are adequate plaintiffs because they have
retained class counsel that is qualified, experienced, and
generally able to conduct the litigation; there is no conflict
between the New Mexico Funds and the members of the class; and,
they have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to
ensure vigorous advocacy. In addition, they are sophisticated
institutional investors -- the type of investor whose participation
Congress sought to encourage, predicting that their involvement
would significantly benefit class members. Moreover, the New Mexico
Funds are well-versed in the obligations and responsibilities of a
lead plaintiff based on their prior (successful) service in
multiple other securities cases. And, as noted, they have retained
counsel that is experienced, qualified, and capable.

Accordingly, because the New Mexico Funds moved timely, have the
greatest financial interest in the litigation, and satisfy the
typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23, Judge Hellerstein
appoints the New Mexico Funds as the Lead Plaintiffs. In addition,
he sees no reason to disturb the New Mexico Funds' reasonable
choice of lead counsel, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.
Accordingly, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is appointed as the
Lead Counsel.

The case will proceed under the name In re Energy Transfer
Securities Litigation. The New Mexico Funds will file an amended
complaint, conforming the caption date (TBD). The Defendants will
answer or otherwise respond by (TBD). The parties will appear for
an initial pre-trial conference on (TBD), at 10 a.m. The Clerk of
Court will terminate the open motions (ECF Nos. 11, 15, 19, 23).

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/chbwvt9s from Leagle.com.


FCA US: Class Action Settlement in Green Suit Wins Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled GABRIEL GREEN and VALERIE HALL-GREEN,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. FCA US LLC, Defendant, Case No. 20-13079 (E.D.
Mich.), Judge George Caram Steeh of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion
and Order granting motions for final certification of class,
approval of class action settlement, and for attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs Gabriel Green and Valerie Hall-Green seek final approval
of their proposed class-action settlement with Defendant FCA US,
LLC. The Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement on
March 31, 2022. Notice of the proposed settlement was mailed to
approximately 27,000 class members. No objections have been filed
and the Plaintiffs received only six requests for exclusion. The
Court must now determine whether class members received sufficient
notice, consistent with Rule 23 and due process, and whether the
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. On Aug. 8, 2022, the
Court held a hearing via Zoom videoconferencing technology; no
objections were lodged at the hearing.

The Plaintiffs brought the suit under the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act, alleging that FCA failed to provide them
with adequate notice of their right of continued health care
coverage. They alleged that the COBRA notice they received was not
"written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
plan participant" as required by 29 C.F.R. Section 2590.606-4.

The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted in
part and denied in part, noting that although perhaps a close call,
the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the COBRA notice is not
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan
participant because it contains a misstatement of law. The
Defendant also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
denied.

Subsequently, the parties engaged in mediation and reached a
preliminary settlement. The total settlement amount to be paid by
the Defendant is $600,000. Once proposed attorney's fees
($200,000), litigation costs ($6,549), settlement administration
costs ($73,516), and proposed Plaintiff service awards ($10,000)
are subtracted, each class member is expected to receive a net
payment of $10.40.

                       Class Certification

The settlement class is defined as follows:

     "All participants and beneficiaries in a FCA US LLC health
      plan that is subject to ERISA and COBRA who were sent the
      COBRA Notice by or on behalf of Defendant at any time
      during the Class Period [i.e., between November 18, 2017
      and November 18, 2020] who did not elect COBRA."

As part of its preliminary approval order, the Court granted class
certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3). The
Court finds that the factual basis for this decision has not
changed and that class certification remains warranted.

Judge Steeh holds that this case is appropriate for class
certification. The class is numerous (over 27,000), and the
commonality and typicality prongs are met because there are common
factual and legal issues between class members, as they all
received the same challenged COBRA notice. The common issues
regarding this standard COBRA notice predominate over potential
individual issues, and class treatment is a superior method of
litigating a large number of relatively small claims in an
efficient manner.

The class representatives are proposing that they receive $5,000
each ($10,000 total) as a "service award" for bringing this action.
Judge Steeh notes that this is substantially in excess of the
$10.40 each that other class members are expected to receive.

In this case, Judge Steeh notes, a $5,000 award to each class
representative ($10,000 to a married couple) has the effect of
creating a substantial misalignment of the interests of the
representatives and the class. The Court will reduce the incentive
award to $1,000 each, to more closely align the Plaintiffs'
interests with those of the class, yet still reflect the time and
effort the Plaintiffs expended in bringing and assisting in this
litigation. With that modification, the Court will grant final
class certification.

                             Notice

The Plaintiffs hired American Legal Claim Services, LLC, to
disseminate notice of the proposed settlement to the class.
Accounting for undelivered mail, approximately 98% of the class
(26,618 persons) received postcards notifying them of the
settlement. The notice fairly apprised the class of essential
information regarding the settlement, including the nature of the
action, terms of the settlement, and class members' options.

The Court finds that the notice provided here -- notice by mail to
98% of the class -- meets the requirements of Rule 23 and due
process.

                     Adequacy of Settlement

Judge Steeh finds that the parties' settlement was facilitated by a
neutral mediator and there is no evidence of fraud or collusion.
Each class member will automatically be mailed a check without
having to submit a claim. This method of distributing relief will
be effective, given the success in mailing notice to 98% of the
class.

The total amount of the settlement and net amount to be received by
each class member is relatively modest; however, given the
technical nature of the alleged violation and the uncertain amount
of actual damages suffered, the relief appears adequate, Judge
Steeh observes. The inevitable costs and delays of litigation and
the real risk of ultimately recovering nothing underscore this
conclusion. With the exception of the class representatives, all
class members are to be treated equally.

Unclaimed funds will not revert to the Defendant, but will be paid
to a cy pres recipient. The Court approves the parties' selected
recipient: Legal Services of Eastern Michigan, a nonprofit legal
aid organization. No objections to the settlement have been filed,
and only six members chose to opt out. These individuals are Ahra
Shall, Yassin Osman, Thomas Miller Jr., Charles Mullikin, Takia M.
Reed, and Kristen Mann, who are not bound by the settlement.

Class counsel is experienced in litigating similar class actions
and has provided zealous and competent representation here.

Accordingly, in light of these considerations, the Court finds the
settlement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.

                         Attorneys' Fees

The Plaintiffs' counsel requests an award of $200,000 in attorneys'
fees representing one third of the common fund, as well as $6,549
in litigation costs.

The Plaintiffs' counsel undertook this litigation on a contingent
fee basis, bearing the risk of non-recovery. Considering the
outcome of the case, the novel legal questions presented, the
benefit rendered to the class, counsel's skill and experience, and
the effort expended, Judge Steeh finds the proposed fee is
reasonable. Counsel also seek to be reimbursed for the mediator's
fee, filing fee, and service fees in the amount of $6,549, which
are supported by the record and reasonable.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motions for final approval of class
action settlement and for attorneys' fees are granted, consistent
with this Opinion and Order. The Court retains jurisdiction to
enforce the settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order  dated Aug. 8,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/43sjkb73 from
Leagle.com.


FEDERAL INSURANCE: W.D. Washington Refuses to Toss Smartsheet Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled SMARTSHEET, INC., Plaintiff v. FEDERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendant, Case No. C22-314 MJP (W.D.
Wash.), Senior District Judge Marsha J. Pechman of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle,
denies the motions to dismiss separately filed by Defendants
Federal and Freedom Specialty Insurance Co.

A local software company, Plaintiff Smartsheet, has filed suit
against its insurers to obtain declaratory relief as to the scope
of coverage due under its directors and officers policies. It also
asserts breach of contract, bad faith, and Washington Insurance
Fair Conduct Act claims against variously against certain
Defendants. The underlying facts relevant to the Motions to Dismiss
concern two groups of lawsuits filed against different directors
that allege the directors duped early investors into selling their
shares before the Company went public in April 2018.

Two of Smartsheet's insurers, Federal and Freedom, seek dismissal
of some of the claims on the theory that the coverage available to
Smartsheet is limited to one policy year and not two. They argue
that under the claims-made policy all of the claims Smartsheet
faced are "related claims" that are covered only under the earliest
policy period, not both years.

           Claims against Smartsheet and its Directors

While a private company, Smartsheet had a number of investors,
including Insight Ventures Partners VII, L.P., which invested
significant sums in the Company. Insight appointed its managing
director, Ryan Hinkle, to be a director at Smartsheet. While Hinkle
was a director of Smartsheet in April 2017, Insight agreed to
purchase over 6.6 million shares of Smartsheet stock at a price of
$8.3035 per share (the "Tender Offer").

Through the Tender Offer, Insight acquired over 5.3 million shares
of stock from the other private investors. In December 2017, after
the Tender Offer, Smartsheet then filed a draft registration
statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue
common stock through an Initial Public Offer. On April 27, 2018,
Smartsheet's shares began to trade publicly and closed that day at
a price of $19.50 per share.

Investors, who sold in the Tender Offer were unhappy to learn that
Smartsheet went public and that public shares were trading at a far
higher price than offered in the Tender Offer. In December 2019,
Patrick Colacurcio filed a class action lawsuit against Hinkle and
Insight, which the parties refer to as the Colacurcio Class
Action.

According to Smartsheet, the plaintiffs in the Colacurcio Class
Action alleged "among other things, that plaintiffs were induced to
sell their Smartsheet shares to Insight at artificially reduced
prices in part because Hinkle improperly failed to disclose
knowledge relating to a potential future Smartsheet IPO that he
allegedly obtained in his role as a Director of Smartsheet."

In January 2021, Hinkle and Insight filed suit against Smartsheet
demanding the advancement of defense costs arising out of the
Colacurcio Class Action. And in April 2021, Smartsheet served an
arbitration demand against a former employee, David Hanson, who was
a named plaintiff in the Colacurcio Class Action that Smartsheet
alleged violated a separation agreement. Hanson filed a
counterclaim that Smartsheet violated the Washington State
Securities Act by failing to disclose the potential future IPO to
Tender Offer purchasers. The Parties refer to the action filed by
Hinkle and Insight and the Hanson arbitration as the "Ancillary
Actions."

Separately, in June 2018, Megan Colacurcio served an arbitration
demand on her ex-husband and Smartsheet's founder/director, Brett
Frei, alleging Frei duped her into disposing of her Smartsheet
shares before the Tender Offer. Colacurcio alleged that she agreed
to sell her Smartsheet shares to Frei as part of their divorce
settlement for far less than the Tender Offer price ("Frei
Demand").

According to Colacurcio's arbitration demand, Frei withheld the
fact that Colacurcio could have sold her shares in the Tender Offer
for far more than she sold them through the settlement. Colacurcio
also alleged that Frei violated a representation and warranty in
the divorce settlement agreement that Smartsheet was not intending
to go public within 18 months of the agreement. Colacurcio alleged
various claims including a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
Frei in his capacity as a director of Smartsheet. The Court refers
to this as the Frei Demand.

                     Smartsheet's Insurance

Smartsheet purchased Directors & Officers and Entity Securities
Liability Insurance Policy No. 8251-3818 from Federal for the
policy period of April 27, 2018, to April 27, 2019 (the "2018
Policy"). Smartsheet purchased a series of excess policies for this
same period on the same general terms and conditions of the Policy.
The 2018 Policy covers claims against Smartsheet and any natural
person who was, now is or will become a duly elected or appointed
director of Smartsheet.

Through the 2018 Policy, Federal agreed to pay, on behalf of an
Organization (Smartsheet), Loss on account of a Claim first made
against an Insured Person during the Policy Period, to the extent
the Organization pays or indemnifies such Loss. Through the 2018
Policy, Federal agreed to "pay, on behalf of an Organization, Loss
on account of a Securities Claim first made against the
Organization during the Policy Period."

Under the 2018 Policy, a "claim" "includes (A) any written demand
for monetary or non-monetary relief against an Insured for a
Wrongful Act, and (B) any proceeding against an Insured for a
Wrongful Act commenced by the service of a civil complaint or
similar pleading." And the 2018 Policy defines "Securities Claim"
as a claim: (A) against an Insured for a violation of any United
States securities law, but solely in connection with the securities
of an Organization; (B) against an Insured for a common law cause
of action, plead in tandem with, or in lieu of, any securities law
violation described in Subsection (A) above and brought by: (1) A
securityholder of an Organization with respect to his interest in
the securities of such Organization; or (2) Any person or entity in
connection with the purchase, sale or offer to purchase or sell
securities of an Organization.

The 2018 Policy also defines "Wrongful Act" as (A) "any error,
misstatement, misleading statement, act, omission, neglect, or
breach of duty committed, attempted, or allegedly committed or
attempted by: (1) an Insured Person in his capacity as such; or (2)
for purposes of any coverage afforded under Insuring Clause (C),
Entity Securities Coverage, by the Organization;" or (B) "any other
matter claimed against an Insured Person solely by reason of
serving in his capacity as such."

Of particular importance to the pending motions to dismiss is the
claims-made provision, which states that: "All Related Claims
[Claims for Wrongful Acts based upon, arising from, or in
consequence of the same or related facts, situations, transactions
or events or the same or related series of facts, situations,
transactions or events] shall be deemed a single Claim made in the
Policy Period in which the earliest of such Related Claims was
first made."

For the 2019-2020 coverage year, Smartsheet obtained Directors &
Officers and Entity Securities Liability Insurance Policy No.
8251-3818 from Federal for the policy period of April 27, 2019, to
April 27, 2020 (the "2019 Policy"). Smartsheet obtained excess
coverage from a host of other insurers, including Freedom. Freedom
did not provide coverage for the 2018-2019 coverage year. The
claims-made language in the 2019 Policy mirrors the language in the
2018 Policy.

                       Motions to Dismiss

Federal argues that the Frei Demand, the Colacurcio Class Action,
and the Ancillary Actions are related claims and must be considered
as a single claim under the 2018 Policy. Freedom agrees with this
position and asserts that because there are no claims under the
2019 Policy, it owes no coverage and the claims against it must be
dismissed. Smartsheet opposes the Motion on the theory that the
Frei Demand is distinct from the Colacurcio Class Action and
Ancillary Actions and that the Frei Demand is not a "claim" under
either Policy. It does not oppose treating the Colacurcio Class
Action and the Ancillary Actions as related under the 2018 Policy.

The Motions to Dismiss present two primary issues to resolve.
First, as Smartsheet argues in its opposition, the Court must first
determine whether the Frei Demand is a "claim" under the Policy.
Second, the Court must determine whether the Colacurcio Class
Action and the Frei Demand are related claims that are subject only
to coverage under the 2018 Policy.

                   The Frei Demand is a Claim

Smartsheet argues that the claims in the Frei Demand cannot be
construed as a "claim" under the Policies because it only attacked
personal acts Frei took in the underlying divorce settlement. This
argument lacks merit, Judge Pechman holds. As the underlying demand
makes clear, Colacurcio accused Frei of breaching his fiduciary
duties to her as a director of Smartsheet in hiding the details of
the Tender Offer. While Colacurcio included other claims against
Frei in his personal capacity, they were not to the exclusion of
his acts as a director. Under the Policy, the Frei Demand
constitutes a "claim."

Smartsheet argues that the Court should allow discovery on this
issue before deciding it or to at least construe the claims in the
First Amended Complaint in its favor. While the Court construes the
claims in Smartsheet's favor, the Court also considers the actual
contents of the Frei Demand given that the complaint refers
expressly to it.

Judge Pechman opines that Smartsheet fails to advance any basis for
the Court to second-guess these allegations, which appear to be
non-frivolous and facially valid. The Court, therefore, rejects
these arguments and finds that the Frei demand is a claim under the
Policy.

                    The Claims Are Unrelated

The Court finds that the Frei Demand and the Colacurcio Class
Action are unrelated and distinct claims under the Policies.

The Colacurcio Class Action and Frei Demand share only limited
overlap and several key distinctions, Judge Pechman states. It is
true that both concern alleged misrepresentations and omissions
relating to the Tender Offer and the IPO.

Judge Pechman points out, among other things, that the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions are distinct, that the injuries
alleged are distinct as between the two actions, and that the
misrepresentations and omissions differ between the two actions and
were made by two different individuals. The two actions attack to
two distinct misrepresentations made by different directors with
different motives.

The Frei Action and Colacurcio Class Action focus on the different
harms, involve different time periods, and attack distinct
fraudulent acts, Judge Pechman holds.

Having considered the Parties' arguments and the underlying
allegations, the Court denies the Motions to Dismiss.

Although the Court finds the Frei Demand to be a "claim" under the
Policy, it finds that it is a distinct claim from the Colacurcio
Class Action and Ancillary Actions. As such, neither Federal nor
Freedom is entitled to dismissal of the claims they put at issue in
their motions, and the Court denies the Motions.

The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all
counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5ezu5frk from Leagle.com.


FIRST SOLAR INC: Faces Securities Suit in Arizona Court
-------------------------------------------------------
First Solar, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period Ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 29, 2022, that plaintiffs in January 7,
2022, a putative class action lawsuit titled "City of Pontiac
General Employees' Retirement System v. First Solar, Inc., et al.,"
Case No. 2:22-cv-00036-MTL, was filed in the Arizona District Court
against the Company and certain of its current officers. The
complaint was filed on behalf of a purported class consisting of
all purchasers of First Solar common stock between February 22,
2019 and February 20, 2020, inclusive.

The complaint asserts violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 based on allegedly
false and misleading statements related to the Company's Series 6
solar modules and its project development business. It seeks
unspecified damages and an award of costs and expenses.

On April 25, 2022, the Arizona District Court issued an order
appointing the Palm Harbor Special Fire Control & Rescue District
Firefighters' Pension Plan and the Greater Pennsylvania Carpenters'
Pension Fund as Lead Plaintiffs. On June 23, 2022, Lead Plaintiffs
filed an Amended Complaint that brings the same claims, and
Defendants' deadline to file a motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint is August 22, 2022.

First Solar, Inc. is a solar technology company and a provider of
PV solar energy solutions based in Arizona.


FOOD ROCKET: Howard Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Food Rocket LLC, et
al. The case is styled as Jasmine Howard, individually and on
behalf of all, others similarly situated v. Food Rocket LLC,
Foodcast, Inc., Does 1 through 20, Inclusive, Case No. CGC22601259
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., Aug. 15, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Non-Exempt Complaints."

Food Rocket -- https://www.foodrocket.me/ -- is a Chicago-based
foodtech startup that provides the fastest grocery delivery in the
US.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jessica L. Campbell, Esq.
          AEGIS LAW FIRM
          9811 Irvine Center Dr., Ste. 100
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: 949-379-6250


FORNEY INDUSTRIES: Allen Files Suit in W.D. Missouri
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Forney Industries,
Inc. The case is styled as Nicolas Allen, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Forney Industries, Inc., Case No.
4:22-cv-00421-RK (W.D. Mo., June 29, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Tort Product Liability.

Forney Industries -- https://www.forneyind.com/ -- is one of
America's longest operating family-owned welding and metal working
product companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul Douglas Anderson, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Soper, Esq.
          Kenneth B. McClain, Esq.
          Kevin Daniel Stanley, Esq.
          HUMPHREY, FARRINGTON, & MCCLAIN, PC
          221 West Lexington, Suite 400
          P. O. Box 900
          Independence, MO 64051
          Phone: (816) 836-5050
          Fax: (816) 836-8966
          Email: pda@hfmlegal.com
                 jms@hfmlegal.com
                 kbm@hfmlegal.com
                 kds@hfmlegal.com


GAP INC: Velazquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Gap, Inc. The
case is styled as Bryan Velazquez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. The Gap, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-06925
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Gap, Inc. -- https://www.gap.com/ -- commonly known as Gap Inc.
or Gap, is an American worldwide clothing and accessories
retailer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


GASKETS ACQUISITION: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gaskets Acquisition
LLC. The case is styled as Ramon Fontanez, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Gaskets Acquisition LLC,
Case No. 1:22-cv-05457-ER (S.D.N.Y., June 28, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Gaskets Acquisition LLC is a Georgia Foreign Limited-Liability
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


GOHEALTH LLC: Doyle Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Doyle, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. GOHEALTH, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-04291-MCA-JRA (D.N.J.,
June 27, 2022), is brought against Defendant to stop Defendant from
violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") and
invading the privacy of Plaintiff and the putative class by making
unsolicited telemarketing calls using a pre-recorded and/or
artificial voice without their consent in violation of the TCPA.

The Defendant made an unauthorized telephone call to Plaintiff's
cellular telephone using an artificial and/or pre-recorded voice
for the purpose of soliciting business from Plaintiff. The TCPA was
enacted to protect consumers from unsolicited and unwanted
telephone calls exactly like those alleged in this case. In
response to the Defendant's unlawful conduct, the Plaintiff seeks
an injunction requiring the Defendant to cease all unsolicited
artificial and prerecorded voice phone calls as well as an award of
statutory damages to the members of the Class per violation,
together with court costs, reasonable attorneys' fees, and treble
damages (for knowing and/or willful violations), says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of New Jersey and currently resides in
Morris County, New Jersey.

The Defendant sells health insurance to consumers throughout the
country, including within this District.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ross H. Schmierer, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP A.P.C.
          3000 Atrium Way, Suite 200
          Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
          Phone: (732) 588-8688
          Email: ross@kazlg.com


HARDER MECHANICAL: Court Seeks More Briefing on Ellis Class Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARY ELLIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. HARDER MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00844-JSW (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Jeffrey S. White of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California issued an order requiring supplemental
briefing on the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of a class action settlement.

The supplemental briefing must address the following questions:

     1. The Plaintiffs propose filing their motion for fees,
services awards, and costs no later than 14 days before the
deadline to opt-out and to object. The Northern District Procedural
Guidance for Class Action Settlements suggest that class members
should have at least 35 days to object to the settlement and the
motion for attorneys' fees. Are the Plaintiffs amenable to filing
the motion for attorneys' fees, representative payments, and costs
35 days prior to the deadline to opt-out and to object?

     2. The Court is concerned by the fact that the Plaintiffs'
monetary recovery under the settlement is small in comparison to
the maximum potential recovery. The Plaintiffs contend that "the
defenses to Labor Code Sections 203 and 1194.2 claims warrant a
substantial discount." However, they have not given the Court
enough information to determine if this discount is warranted. Can
the Plaintiffs provide additional information to assist the Court
in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of their case and
determining whether the proposed discount is appropriate?

     3. Can the Plaintiffs provide the Court with the information
set forth in paragraph 11 of the Northern District's Procedural
Guidance for Class Action Settlements?

     4. Can the Plaintiffs provide an explanation for the
differences between the settlement class and the class and
sub-classes proposed in the First Amended Complaint?

The matter is scheduled for a hearing on to consider the
Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval. Judge White
has considered the parties' papers, relevant legal authority, and
the record in the case, and he concludes supplemental briefing is
required to address these questions. The parties will address them
in writing. If the Court determines the motion can be resolved
without a hearing, it will notify the parties in advance of the
hearing date.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mt983452 from Leagle.com.


HDFC BANK: Faces Class Action in New York Court
-----------------------------------------------
HDFC Bank Limited disclosed in its Form 20-F Report for the fiscal
year ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 29, 2022, that on September 3, 2020, a
securities class action lawsuit was filed against HDFC Bank and
certain of its current and former directors and officers in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
The complaint was amended on February 8, 2021. HDFC Bank, on July
23, 2021, through its legal counsel, has filed the reply memorandum
of law in further support of the motion to dismiss the securities
class action suit. HDFC Bank's motion to dismiss remains pending
before the Court.

HDFC Bank is a new generation private sector bank in India.


HELBIZ INC: Loevy & Loevy Appointed as Lead Counsel in Barron Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RYAN BARRON, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. HELBIZ INC., ET
AL., Defendants, Case No. 20 Civ. 04703 (LLS) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Louis S. Stanton of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York appointed Mr. Rahman as the Lead Plaintiff and
Loevy & Loevy as the Lead Counsel.

Before the Court is a single, unopposed motion seeking to appoint
as lead plaintiffs Messrs. Bulgarini, Dasari, Echols, and Rahman to
represent Class 2 on Counts 10-12 of the Amended Complaint in this
putative securities class action.

Counts 10-12 allege violations of the Securities Exchange Act
Sections 9, 10(b), and 20(a) for manipulating the price of
HelbizCoin and making false and misleading statements in connection
with the selling and promoting of HelbizCoin in the Initial Coin
Offering and on exchanges thereafter.

In the Amended Complaint, the movants seek relief on behalf of "all
purchasers of HelbizCoin during the class period and seeks recovery
under Counts IX-XI of this complaint."

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.
Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i), requires the Court to appoint as lead
plaintiff the class members "most capable of adequately
representing the interties of the class." It further provides that
the court will adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff
in any private action arising under this chapter is the person or
group of persons that (aa) has either filed the complaint or made a
motion in response to a notice under subparagraph (A)(i); (bb) in
the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest
in the relief sought by the class; and (cc) otherwise satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Stanton finds that Messrs. Bulgarini, Dasari, Echols, and
Rahman filed the Amended Complaint and made this letter motion in
response to a notice, satisfying the first requirement.

The Movants also meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
relevant to lead plaintiff appointment. Their claims are typical of
the class, as both the Movants and the class members purchased and
held Helbizcoin during the class period and claim damages due to
Defendants' allegedly false and misleading statements and acts of
price manipulation. Their interests are aligned with the putative
class, and they have retained competent counsel to fairly and
adequately prosecute their claims.

Mr. Rahman suffered the largest loss at $23,262.41. Messrs.
Bulgarini, Dasari, and Echols each respectively lost $5,082.82,
$3,646.20, $2,474.95. Because Mr. Rahman suffered the largest loss,
he will serve as the Lead Plaintiff. His law firm of choice, Loevy
& Loevy, is appointed as the Lead Counsel for the class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/32j5m2hj from Leagle.com.


HENNESSY CAPITAL: White Files Suit in Del. Chancery Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hennessy Capital
Partners IV LLC, et al. The case is styled as Paul L. White Jr.,
and all others similarly situated v. Hennessy Capital Partners IV
LLC, Bradley Bell, Daniel J. Hennessey, Greg Ethridge, Gretchen W.
McClain, James F. O Neill III, Juan Carlos Mas, Nicholas A.
Petruska, Peter Shea, Richard Burns, Defendants; New Castle County,
Sheriff, Case No. 2022-0571-LWW (Del. Chancery Ct., June 29,
2022).

The case type is stated as "Breach of Fiduciary Duties."

Hennessy Capital -- https://www.hennessycapllc.com/ -- is an
alternative investment platform focused on industrial sector.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter Bradford deLeeuw, Esq.
          Phone: (302) 274-2180
          Fax: (302) 351-6905

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kevin R Shannon, Esq.
          Phone: (302) 984-6000
          Fax: (302) 658-1192

               - and -

          Christopher N Kelly, Esq.
          Phone: (302) 984-6000
          Fax: (302) 658-1192

               - and -

          Daniel Rusk IV, Esq.
          Phone: (302) 984-6000
          Fax: (302) 658-1192

The Sheriff is represented by:

          Sheriff New Castle County, Esq.
          Phone: (302) 395-8457
          Fax: (302) 395-8460


HOBBY LOBBY STORE: Mahoney Files ADA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hobby Lobby Store,
Inc. The case is styled as John Mahoney, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., Case No.
2:22-cv-02519-BMS (E.D. Pa., June 28, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Hobby Lobby -- https://www.hobbylobby.com/ -- are an arts and
crafts stores offering the best in project, party and home
supplies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David S. Glanzberg, Esq.
          GLANZBERG TOBIA & ASSOCIATES PC
          123 S. BROAD STREET SUITE 1640
          PHILADELPHIA, PA 19109
          Phone: (215) 981-5400
          Email: dglanzberg@aol.com


ILLINOIS: Court Grants Class Certification in Simpson v. Dart
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, grants the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the lawsuit captioned
JOSEPH D.G. SIMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs v. SHERIFF TOM DART, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-0553 (N.D. Ill.).

After the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification on Sept. 13, 2021, they petitioned the Seventh
Circuit for permission to appeal the class certification ruling.
The Seventh Circuit granted their petition under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(f) and vacated the Court's denial of class
certification as to certain subclasses (Simpson v. Dart, 23 F.4th
706 (7th Cir. 2022)). After the mandate issued, the Plaintiffs
filed a third amended complaint and the parties filed supplemental
class certification briefs under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3).  

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, filed the putative class action challenging the hiring
practices for Correctional Officers at the Cook County Department
of Corrections as racially discriminatory against
African-Americans. They bring the lawsuit against Cook County
Sheriff Tom Dart in his official capacity and the Cook County
Sheriff's Merit Board. At issue in this class certification motion
is the Plaintiffs' Title VII disparate impact claim in relation to
certain hiring steps conducted by the Merit Board.

At issue in the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification are the
Merit Board's hiring examinations, namely, the initial written
examination, the second written examination, and the physical
ability test. In their third amended complaint, they set forth four
subclasses encompassing these examinations:

   * Class 1. All Black applicants for Correctional Officer
     positions at the Cook County Jail who took and did not pass
     the first written test during or after July 2014 and before
     April 2016;

   * Class 2. All Black applications for Correctional Officer
     positions at the Cook County Jail who took and did not pass
     the first written test during or after April 2016;

   * Class 3. All Black applicants for Correctional Officer
     positions at the Cook County Jail who took and passed the
     first written test during or after July 2014 and then took
     but did not pass the second written test; and

   * Class 4. All Black applicants for Correctional Officer
     positions at the Cook County Jail who took and passed the
     first written test during or after July 2014, but did not
     pass the physical abilities test.

Before examining the class certification requirements under Rule
23(a), the Court turns to the Defendants' argument that the
Plaintiffs are attempting to extend their Title VII class period by
defining three of the four Subclasses with a starting date of July
2014, which is well over 300 days before the first U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Charge was filed on Jan.
8, 2016 (Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist. 203, 392 F.3d 236, 239
(7th Cir. 2004)). Rather than June 2014, the Defendants argue the
starting point of the Subclasses should be March 14, 2015, which is
300 days prior to the first EEOC Charge that was filed on Jan. 8,
2016.

The Plaintiffs first contend the unlawful hiring practice involves
the written and physical examinations and that the 300-day period
was triggered when class members were excluded from each round of
hiring. The Plaintiffs' first assertion squares with the Lewis
Court's holding, Judge Coleman notes, citing Lewis v. City of
Chicago, Ill., 560 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2010).

Yet, to reach back to July 2014, the Plaintiffs also argue that the
occurrence triggering the 300-day limitations period was when
certain class members failed an examination. They explain that the
written testing date of July 2014 should be included in the class
definition because it corresponds to hiring rounds that took place
after March 14, 2015, which was 300 days before the first EEOC
charge was filed.

Judge Coleman opines that the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis
does not support the Plaintiffs' argument because Lewis stands for
the proposition that later implementation of a policy that causes
as disparate impact can qualify as a new, actionable employment
practice. The Lewis Court did not hold that a plaintiff can reach
back to the testing date even it if it outside of the 300-day
period. Accordingly, to reach back to June 2014, the Plaintiffs
must have filed an EEOC Charge sometime in March 2015, which they
failed to do.

The Court, however, will not deny the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification based on these class definitions as the Defendants
argue. Instead, their Subclasses 1, 3, and 4 must include the time
period starting on March 14, 2015, which is 300 days prior to the
first EEOC Charge, rather than July 2014.

Turning to the four factors set out in Rule 23(a), the Defendants
do not challenge the numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1).
They, however, argue that the Plaintiffs' Subclasses fail Rule
23(a)(2)'s commonality factor, which requires questions of law or
fact common to the class.

Judge Coleman finds that the Plaintiffs' disparate impact claims
are well-suited for class adjudication, and they have, thus,
fulfilled the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a)(2).

The Defendants also challenge the Plaintiffs' Subclasses under Rule
23(a)(3)'s typicality factor, which requires "the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class." There is no question the named Plaintiffs'
claims arise from the standardized tests and are based on the same
legal theory, disparate impact. As such, the representative
Plaintiffs' claims have the same essential characteristics as the
class claims, Judge Coleman opines.

The Defendants nonetheless argue the representative Plaintiffs
cannot satisfy the typicality requirement because they prepared for
the standardized tests in different ways and attempted to pass the
examinations at different times. These minor variances make no
difference to the Court's class certification analysis, especially
because the Defendants have not identified any legal authority
suggesting these differences defeat the typicality requirement,
Judge Coleman points out.

Next, the Defendants contend there are adequacy issues under Rule
23(a)(4) as to the named Plaintiffs based on the scope of their
EEOC charges. The Defendants assert the "scope of the charge issues
will be addressed at the summary judgment stage, but those issues
have clear implications for class certification as well." Because
the Defendants tacitly admit this issue is best left for summary
judgment, the Court will not address the scope of the EEOC charges
at this juncture. Indeed, this issue, along with the Defendants'
arguments about the physical abilities test, goes to the merits,
not class certification, Judge Coleman states.

Because there is no indication from the parties' arguments that the
class representatives will not fairly and adequately protect the
interest of the class, the Court concludes the Plaintiffs have
fulfilled Rule 23(a)(4).

Turning to Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must ask whether there are
common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual
questions and determine if a class action is superior to other
available methods of resolving the lawsuit. In this lawsuit, the
predominate common questions of law and fact weigh heavily in favor
of class-wide treatment due to the uniform hiring practice
involving standardized testing. Answering the question of whether
the alleged disparate impact of these standardized tests in the
context of a class action, rather than piecemeal litigation, is
efficient and fair under the circumstances. Thus, Judge Coleman
finds that the Plaintiffs have fulfilled Rule 23(b)(3)'s
requirements.

The Defendants, however, argue that an individualized analysis of
each applicant would be required under the circumstances because
there are more steps involved in the hiring process than just the
standardized tests. More specifically, they assert that proof of
who would have been hired under the multiple-step hiring process
would complicate this class action lawsuit, especially in relation
to damages.

As the Court explained in an earlier ruling in this lawsuit, in the
context of disparate impact cases, Title VII guarantees minorities
and women the opportunity to compete equally with white workers
based on job-related criteria. Therefore, losing the opportunity to
compete equally or being excluded from jobs due to race or gender
are actionable injuries. As such, Judge Coleman holds the
Plaintiffs need not prove that the Defendants would have hired them
as the Defendants suggest.

Based on the foregoing, the Court, in its discretion, grants the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in accordance with this
ruling.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
Aug. 8, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/j8n3ankp from
Leagle.com.


IMPERIAL WHOLESALE: Cromitie Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Imperial Wholesale,
Inc. The case is styled as Seana Cromitie, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. Imperial Wholesale, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-06919 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Imperial Wholesale, Inc. -- https://imperialwholesale.shop/ -- is
the largest provider of affordable natural stone, ceramic tile,
wood flooring, and carpet in Mesa, Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


J. MARK SUBLETTE: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against J. Mark Sublette
Medicine Man Gallery Inc. The case is styled as Luis Toro, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. J. Mark
Sublette Medicine Man Gallery Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-06937
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

J. Mark Sublette Medicine Man Gallery Inc. --
https://www.medicinemangallery.com/ -- exhibits of Native American
& Western artwork & crafts, including paintings by Maynard
Dixon.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


JEANNE D'ARC CREDIT: Osorio Sues Over Unlawful Fee Maximization
---------------------------------------------------------------
Francis Osorio, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. JEANNE D'ARC CREDIT UNION, Case No. 22-1489-BLS1 (Mass.
Super. Ct., Suffolk Cty., July 1, 2022), is brought concerning the
Defendant's unlawful business practices of assessing multiple $30
fees on an item.

Overdraft fees and insufficient funds fees ("NSF fees") are among
the primary fee generators for banks. Unfortunately, the customers
who are assessed these fees are the most vulnerable customers.
Younger, lower-income, and non-white account holders are among
those who were more likely to be assessed overdraft fees.

The Defendant unlawfully maximizes its already profitable fees
through the deceptive and contractually-prohibited practice of
charging multiple NSF fees, or an NSF fee followed by an overdraft
fee, on an item. Unbeknownst to consumers, when Defendant
reprocesses an electronic payment item, ACH item, or check for
payment after it was initially rejected for insufficient funds, the
Defendant chooses to treat it as a new and unique item that is
subject to yet another fee. But the Defendant's contract never
states that this counterintuitive and deceptive result could be
possible and, in fact, promises the opposite.

Besides being deceptive, this practice breaches promises made in
the Defendant's adhesion contract. The Plaintiff and other
customers of the Defendant have been injured by the Defendant's
improper fee maximization practice. The Plaintiff brings claims for
the Defendant's breach of contract, including the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and/or unjust enrichment, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Lowell, Massachusetts
and has maintained a checking account with Defendant.

The Defendant is a bank with more than $1.8 billion in assets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael S. Appel, Esq.
          SUGARMAN, ROGERS, BARSHAK & COHEN, PC.
          101 Merrimac Street, 9th Floor
          Boston, MA 02114
          Phone: 617) 227-3030
          Email: appel@sugarmanrogers.com

               - and -

          Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
          COHEN & MALAD, LLP
          One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 4204
          Phone: (317) 636-6481
          Email: ltoops@cohenandmalad.com

               - and -

          James Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
          223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Phone: (615) 254-8801
          Fax: (615) 255-5419
          Email: gerards@bsjfirm.com


JSSK INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against JSSK, Inc. The case
is styled as Luis Toro, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. JSSK, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-06935 (S.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

JSSK, Inc. is in the machinery, equipment, and supplies merchant
wholesalers, merchant wholesalers, durable goods, wholesale trade,
vending machines and supplies business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


KERRY INC: Delgado Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Maria Delgado, individually and on behalf of
other persons similarly situated v. Kerry, Inc., Case No.
2022CH06334 was removed from the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois on Aug. 15, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-04309 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Kerry Group -- https://www.kerry.com/ -- is a public food company
and is an international leader in taste & nutrition
innovation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alejandro Caffarelli, Esq.
          Nicole Marie Young, Esq.
          CAFFARELLI & ASSOCIATES LTD.
          224 S Michigan, Suite 300
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Phone: (312) 763-6880
          Email: acaffarelli@caffarelli.com
                 nyoung@caffarelli.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Erin Bolan Hines, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
          111 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4700
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 704-7700
          Email: ehines@shb.com


KIND SAGE: Barba Files ADA Suit in C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Kind Sage, LLC,
et al. The case is styled as Jovany Barba, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. The Kind Sage, LLC doing
business as: Sage Vegan Bistro, Does 1 to 10, inclusive Case No.
:22-cv-04500-PA-PVC (C.D. Cal., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Kind Sage, LLC doing business as Sage Vegan Bistro --
https://www.sageveganbistro.com/ -- is dedicated to providing vegan
comfort food.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago Merlini Coelho, Esq.
          Binyamin I. Manoucheri, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Boulevard 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Phone: (213) 381-9988
          Fax: (213) 381-9989
          Email: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                 binyamin@wilshirelawfirm.com


KINETIC CONTENT: Hartwell Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Hartwell, an individual; and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. KINETIC CONTENT, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; NETFLIX US, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; NETFLIX, INC., a Delaware Corporation; DELIRIUM TV, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; DOES 1-10, business entities,
forms unknown; DOES 11-20, individuals; and DOES 21-30, inclusive,
Case No. 22STCV21223 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., June 29,
2022), is brought to seeks unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid
minimum wages, waiting time penalties, statutory penalties,
restitution, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and
costs, prejudgment interest, and other appropriate relief pursuant
the Private Attorneys General Act.

The Defendants willfully misclassified employees as independent
contractors despite Defendants exercising substantial and excessive
control over the manner, means, and timing of the work performed by
the Plaintiff. The Defendants failed and continue to fail to
compensate the Plaintiff for all hours worked, including minimum
wage and overtime hours, as a result of maintaining a practice of
requiring the Plaintiff to work up to 20-hour days, seven days per
week, while paying them a flat amount of $1,000.00 per filming
week. The Defendants failed and continue to fail to pay all
formerly employed the Plaintiff their compensation due at
termination, as required by Labor Code, in part because Defendants
failed and continue to fail to pay wages for all hours worked by
each the Plaintiff, including regular wages, minimum wages, and
overtime wages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed with Defendants from April 24, 2021
through at least May 1, 2021 as a contestant for the Netflix
reality TV show, "Love Is Blind," which Defendants cast and produce
for online streaming on Netflix.

Kinetic Content is in the business of creating and producing
content, including a variety of non-scripted productions,
docuseries, and competition shows, for the global market.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chantal Mccoy Payton, Esq.
          Laurel N. Holmes, Esq. (SBN 308515)
          PAYTON EMPLOYMENT LAW, PC
          3807 W. Sierra Highway, Suite 206
          Acton, CA 93510
          Phone: (661) 434-1144
          Facsimile: (661) 434-1144
          Email: CPayton@PaytonEmploymentLaw.com
                 LHolmes@PaytonEmploymentLaw.com


L'OREAL USA: Iskhakova Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against L'Oreal USA, Inc. The
case is styled as Marina Iskhakova, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-04801 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

L'Oreal USA, Inc. -- https://www.loreal.com/en/usa/ -- manufactures
and markets cosmetic products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


LADERACH (USA): Velazquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Laderach (USA), Inc.
The case is styled as Bryan Velazquez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Laderach (USA), Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-06945 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Laderach -- https://laderach.com/us-en/ -- is a Swiss chocolate and
confectionary manufacturer based in Ennenda (Glarus).[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


LANE BRYANT BRANDS: Velazquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lane Bryant Brands
Opco, LLC. The case is styled as Bryan Velazquez, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Lane Bryant Brands
Opco, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-06918 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Lane Bryant Inc. -- https://www.lanebryant.com/ -- is an American
women's apparel and intimates specialty retailer focusing on
plus-size clothing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


LASH LOUNGE: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Lash Lounge
Franchise, LLC. The case is styled as Marta Hanyzkiewicz, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. The Lash Lounge
Franchise, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04798-HG (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 15,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Lash Lounge -- https://www.thelashlounge.com/franchise/ -- is a
premier eyelash salon franchise, specializing in custom lash
extensions, lash lifts, tinting, threading and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


LINCARE HOLDINGS: Chang Files Suit in M.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lincare Holdings Inc.
The case is styled as Martha Chang, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Lincare Holdings Inc., Case No.
8:22-cv-01472-JSM-AAS (M.D. Fla., June 28, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Lincare Holdings Inc. -- https://www.lincare.com/ -- is a provider
of oxygen and other respiratory therapy services to patients in the
home.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raina C. Borrelli, Esq.
          Samuel J Strauss, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS LLP
          613 Williamson Street, Suite 201
          Madison, WI 53703
          Phone: (608) 237-1775
          Fax: (608) 509-4423
          Email: raina@turkestrauss.com
                 sam@turkestrauss.com

               - and -

          Rachel Elizabeth Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Phone: (305) 773-6641
          Email: rachel@kaufmanpa.com

               - and -

          Avi Robert Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          237 S Dixie Hwy, 4th Floor
          Coral Gables, FL 33133
          Phone: (305) 469-5881
          Email: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Jason A. Pill, Esq.
          John D. Mullen, Esq.
          Michael S. Hooker, Esq.
          PHELPS DUNBAR, LLP
          100 S Ashley Dr Ste 2000
          Tampa, FL 33602-5315
          Phone: (813) 222-7664
          Fax: (813) 472-7570
          Email: jason.pill@phelps.com
                 john.mullen@phelps.com
                 michael.hooker@phelps.com


LIONEL LLC: Calcano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lionel L.L.C. The
case is styled as Marcos Calcano, on behalf of himself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Lionel L.L.C., Case No.
1:22-cv-06949 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Lionel, LLC -- http://www.lionel.com/-- is an American designer
and importer of toy trains and model railroads that is
headquartered in Concord, North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (917) 796-7437
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: danalgottlieb@aol.com


MARCHESE & CO: Gomez Wins Bid for Conditional Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALFREDO GOMEZ, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. V. MARCHESE & CO., and CUT FRESH,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-1802-pp (E.D. Wis.), Judge Pamela
Pepper of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin issued an order:

   a. granting the Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his Rule 7(h)
      motion to compel;

   b. denying as moot the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File
      Reply Brief;

   c. denying the Plaintiff's motion to strike;

   d. construing as motions to restrict and denying without
      prejudice the Plaintiff's motions to seal documents;

   e. denying without prejudice the Defendants' requests to
      impose sanctions on the Plaintiff's counsel;

   f. granting the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
      certification as to Cut Fresh; and

   g. denying without prejudice the Plaintiff's motion to certify
      the class.

Mr. Gomez, who worked for Cut Fresh as a sanitation employee and at
times also cleaned fruits and vegetables, filed an amended
complaint on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
alleging that the Defendants failed to pay for the principal
activities performed at the beginning and end of their shifts.
These activities include washing hands and donning and doffing
protective gear. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants
failed to count meal breaks of less than thirty minutes as hours
worked by the employees. He alleges that he himself never had a
full thirty minutes for lunch. According to him, the Defendants
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and Wisconsin law,
specifically Wis. Stat. Section 103.02 and Section 109.03(1) and
(5).

In the year after he filed the amended complaint, the Plaintiff
filed eight motions, including a motion to compel, motions to
supplement, a motion to strike, motions to seal and motions related
to conditional and class certification. All these filings have
created an unnecessary procedural tangle and have prompted requests
from the Defendants to be reimbursed for the cost of having to
respond to some of them.

    I. Plaintiff's Expedited Non-Dispositive Motion to Compel
       Response to Request to Admit; Plaintiff's Motion for Leave
       to File Reply Brief; Defendants' Requests for
       Reimbursement of Costs; Plaintiff's Motion to Strike;
       Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record on Conditional
       Certification

On Sept. 27, 2021 -- only three months or so into the discovery
process -- the Plaintiff filed a document titled "Plaintiff's
Expedited Non-Dispositive Motion to Compel Response to Request to
Admit." But the motion did not comply with procedure provided in
Civil Local Rule 7(h) of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which
requires a party seeking to utilize it to designate the motion "as
a 'Civil L.R. 7(h) Expedited Non-Dispositive Motion.'"

Judge Pepper grants the Plaintiff's request to supplement the
record on conditional certification. She does not allow him to
"withdraw" the motion to compel; it's not clear how one "withdraws"
an electronically filed document. She, however, denies the motion
to compel as moot and denies the motion to strike. Most of these
motions, responses or replies were unnecessary.

For the same reason, Judge Pepper denies the Defendants' requests
that the Court requires the Plaintiff's counsel to reimburse them
for their fees. She says their requests for sanctions did not
address the effectiveness of lesser sanctions and only gave cursory
treatment to the other factors. Nor did the Defendants address
their own role in driving up their litigation costs by continuing
to file what was virtually the same brief in response to each of
the Plaintiff's filings.

Judge Pepper expects that as the case moves forward, both parties
will hew carefully to the requirements of the federal and local
rules and that they will make every effort to communicate with each
other -- not just by email, but by talking to each other -- before
bringing their misunderstandings or even disagreements to the
Court.

                 II. Plaintiff's Motions to Seal

The Plaintiff has filed two motions to seal. The first motion asks
the Court to seal four documents attached to counsel's declaration
in support of his motion for conditional certification and the
portion of the supporting brief that references the four exhibits.
He says that these documents describe internal policies and
procedures to safeguard the cleanliness and safety of the produce
products, marketing material that states Cut Fresh's commitment to
delivering safe and healthful products and how it promises to
fulfill its commitment and internal analysis of hazards associated
with the processing and storage of produce.

The Plaintiff filed a second motion, indicating that footnote 1 in
his reply brief in support of his motion for conditional
certification cites two documents that Cut Fresh has deemed
confidential. The motion asks the Court "to file under seal the
portion of the Memorandum of Law that references non-publicly
available information solely derived from documents that Cut Fresh
has designated as confidential."

Judge Pepper finds that neither of the Plaintiff's motions to seal
contain sufficient information to justify the Court granting the
motion. Neither motion provides detailed information explaining why
public access to the documents attached to the declaration or the
portions of the reply brief (whatever they may be) could harm Cut
Fresh or deprive it of competitive advantage. The motions do not
provide the court with enough information to determine whether
there is good cause to restrict the documents (or parts of them)
from public view, and a review of the reply brief indicates that
there is no basis for restricting the entire brief from public
view.

Judge Pepper construes the motions as motions to restrict but
denies the motions without prejudice. After carefully reviewing
this order and Rule 79(d)(3), either party (or the parties
together) may file a motion to restrict the documents, explaining
which portions of the documents the party seeks to have restricted
and giving a detailed analysis of why there is good cause for the
court to restrict. If a party believes that there is good cause to
restrict a portion of a document, it must submit with the motion to
restrict a redacted copy marking out the portions the party
believes should not be accessible to the public. The Court will
order that the clerk's office continue to restrict the documents
for 30 days from the date of the Order. If neither party has filed
a motion to restrict by the end of that 14-day period, the Court
will instruct the clerk to make the documents available to the
public.

      III. Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification
           and Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record on
           Conditional Certification

The Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification asked the
court to authorize him to send notice of the collective action to
"all employees who were involved in the processing, handling,
and/or storage of produce at the Cut Fresh facility during the time
period between Feb 9, 2018 to the present." The motion asked the
Court to send notice of the collective action to "all drivers
employed by either or both of the Defendants during the same time
period between Feb. 9, 2018 to the present." The motion itself does
not mention, or request, conditional certification anywhere except
in its title.

The Plaintiff filed two briefs in support of the motion for
conditional certification. The brief relates that the Plaintiff
seeks to give notice to putative collective members of "his claim
that the Defendants failed to compensate them for time spent
donning required sanitary uniforms, washing their hands, and
walking to the time clock," his claim "that the Defendants violated
the FLSA by failing to compensate them for reported breaks that
were too short to constitute bona fide meal breaks" and his claim
that the Defendants violated the FLSA for failing to compensate
drivers "for breaks that were too short to constitute bona fide
meal breaks."

The Defendants opposed the motion to give notice to the two groups
the Plaintiff had identified. They argued that he had failed to
make even a modest showing that defendants had a pattern or
practice of failing to pay him or proposed collective members. They
argued that his request to include Marchese drivers in the meal
claim lacked support because he had offered no payroll records or
statements from any truck drivers. Finally, they asked that if the
Court grants conditional certification, it require the Plaintiff to
modify the proposed notice to warn that opt-in members might be
required to pay their costs if they prevail, and that the opt-in
period to be shortened from 60 to 45 days.

Because the Plaintiff's allegations concern company-wide practices
that would affect a collective of similarly situated employees,
Judge Pepper grants conditional certification of the two
collectives of Cut Fresh employees. She requires the Plaintiff to
modify the proposed notice, however, to clearly reflect that the
collectives include only Cut Fresh employees.

She also grants the Defendant's request and requires the Plaintiff
to modify the proposed notice from "there will be no attorney's
fees or costs chargeable to you from plaintiff's lawyers" to "If
you do not prevail on your claim, court costs and expenses may
possibly be assessed against the class." She also expects that if
any potential collective member contacts the Plaintiff's attorney
to discuss opting in, the counsel will inform that individual of
that possibility.

Finally, Judge Pepper denies the Defendants' request to shorten the
opt-in period to 45 days. The Plaintiff's suggested opt-in period
of 60 days is reasonable; it will give the Plaintiff a bit more
time to address returned notices and potential members a bit more
time to process the information contained in the notice.

             IV. Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class

Finally, the Plaintiff asks the court to certify him as
representative, and the Previant Law Firm as class counsel, for a
Rule 23 class. The proposed class consists of "all hourly employees
employed by Defendant Cut Fresh, LLC who during the time period
between Nov. 6, 2018 and the present either (a) worked as a
production or maintenance employee for Cut Fresh; or (b) punched in
after a meal break less than 30 minutes after punching out for the
break."

Among other things, the Defendants protest that the Plaintiff
"fails to even come close to adequately representing the class he
proposes." They maintain that it is "clear the Plaintiffs are
removing V. Marchese from the case and focusing solely on employees
of Cut Fresh," without amending the pleadings; they say they would
agree to his modification of the class, but only if Marchese is
dismissed as a defendant.

Judge Pepper denies the Plaintiff's class certification motion
without prejudice and gives him the opportunity to file another
motion that addresses the numerosity requirement. She explains, the
key numerosity inquiry under Rule 23(a)(1) is not the number of
class members alone but the practicability of joinder. It may be
that joinder is impracticable, but the Plaintiff has not made even
a "sparse evidentiary showing" to show as much. He has done nothing
more than assert that the putative meal break class has at least
forty, and likely more, members and that the putative donning class
may have as many as 127 members.

                           Disposition

In light of the foregoing, Judge Pepper grants the Plaintiff's
motion to supplement the record on conditional certification to
allow him to supplement the record with information obtained from
the defense after he filed the motion to compel. She denies as moot
the Plaintiff's (i) expedited, non-dispositive motion to compel
response to request to admit; (ii) motion for leave to file reply
brief; and (iii) motion to strike.

Judge Pepper denies without prejudice the Defendants' requests for
reimbursement of costs and fees. She construes as motions to
restrict and denies without prejudice the Plaintiff's motions to
seal. Any party wishing to restrict these documents, or parts of
the documents, may file a motion to restrict by the end of the day
on Sept. 9, 2022. The Clerk of Court must continue to restrict
access to Dkt. Nos. 49-2, 49-3, 49-5, 49-6 and 63 pending
resolution of any renewed motion. If no party files a motion to
restrict by the end of the day on Sept. 9, 2022, the clerk must
make those documents available to the public.

Judge Pepper grants in part the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
certification. She orders him to make the modifications to the
notice described in her Order.

Judge Pepper denies without prejudice the Plaintiff's motion to
certify the class. The Plaintiff may renew the motion; if he does
so, he must address the Anderson standard for meeting the
numerosity requirement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mr2ycf88 from Leagle.com.


MATTERPORT INC: Wins in Part Summary Judgment Bid in Stemmelin Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN STEMMELIN, Plaintiff v. MATTERPORT, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. C 20-04168 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William
Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion
for partial summary judgment.

In this false and deceptive advertising action, the Defendants move
for partial summary judgment regarding the Plaintiff's Section
17200, Section 17500, and implied covenant claims, as well as his
requested equitable relief.

Defendants Matterport and its officers (together, "Matterport")
market "3D cameras that create 3D models of real-world places,
which have many potential applications, including in connection
with real estate sales." Supporting these cameras, Matterport also
offers services such as software for three-dimensional image
manipulation and cloud storage. Relevant, it also developed a
Matterport Service Partner (MSP) program as a way for individuals
that purchased a camera to start their own business selling 3D
scans taken using the camera.

Mr. Stemmelin of Illinois saw Matterport's ads for the MSP program
around January 2017 and purchased his first camera in February. In
May, he applied for the MSP program. Matterport's MSP ads allegedly
made several material misrepresentations and omissions regarding
how the program could help members build their own "lucrative,
self-owned business." After many hours learning to use the cameras
and attempting to start his own 3D scanning business, Stemmelin had
spent tens of thousands of dollars but had little to show for it.

Mr. Stemmelin brought the lawsuit as a putative class action in
June 2020, alleging violations of, among other claims, unfair and
false advertising laws as well as numerous states' business
opportunity laws. A November 2020 order granted defendants' motion
to dismiss. A later order granted in part Stemmelin's motion for
leave to amend his complaint. The remaining claims alleged
violations of: (1) California Civil Code Section 17200 and Section
17500; (2) the Illinois Consumer Fraud Deceptive Business Practices
Act (ICFA); (3) the Illinois Business Opportunity Sales Law (BOSL);
(4) the California Seller-Assisted Marketing Plan Act (SAMP Act);
and (5) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Only the BOSL claim survived as to the named directors.

A March 2022 order denied Stemmelin's motion to certify an Illinois
class and a national class. Matterport now moves for partial
summary judgment regarding Stemmelin's Section 17200 and Section
17500 claims, his implied covenant claim, and the equitable relief
he seeks. In his opposition, Stemmelin voluntarily withdrew his
BOSL and ICFA claims, which Matterport does not contest.

First, Matterport argues Stemmelin's Section 17200 and Section
17500 claims fail because he has an adequate remedy at law, citing
for support our court of appeals' recent decision Sonner v. Premier
Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020).

Judge Alsup disagrees. He says Stemmelin may seek equitable relief,
including restitution, because he lacks an adequate remedy at law.
California favors enforcement of choice-of-law provisions. A
reasonable basis exists for the choice of California law.
Matterport cannot now dispute the applicability of its own contract
provisions or California's interest in having its law apply to
Matterport. Because choice-of-law considerations preclude his ICFA
claim, Stemmelin's Section 17200 and Section 17500 claims address
different conduct than his other claims seeking legal damages. He
lacks an adequate remedy at law and may seek equitable restitution.
And, although the parties focus on restitution, the same reasoning
recited applies to other forms of equitable relief such as
prospective injunctions.

Matterport next argues that Stemmelin lacks Article III standing to
seek prospective, equitable relief. All plaintiffs in federal court
must demonstrate Article III standing for each form of relief that
they seek, e.g., an injunction or declaratory relief. To establish
standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact that is
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) that the
injury was likely caused by the defendants; and (3) that the injury
would likely be redressed by judicial relief.

Judge Alsup finds that Stemmelin has Article III standing to seek
an injunction prohibiting Matterport from competing against MSPs
for 3D scanning business. Matterport does not contest that it
continues to operate its capture services, its in-house service
that performed ostensibly the same function as MSPs. At this
posture, this evidence demonstrates an adequate risk of future
harm. Stemmelin has standing to seek this prospective relief.

However, Stemmelin does not have standing to seek declaratory
relief that "he is the owner of his scanned images." Judge Alsup
finds this declaratory relief request somewhat confounding.
Stemmelin only seeks this relief in passing in the context of his
Section 17500 false advertising claim. He does not mention it in
his prayer for relief. If there were a genuine dispute over the
meaning of the MSP contracts as to ownership of the images then
Stemmelin would have standing to raise the issue, but no such
dispute is set forth in the pleading and the need for such relief
simply comes out of left field with no anchoring pleadings.

Finally, Matterport argues it is entitled to summary judgment on
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim because
the agreement with Stemmelin expressly authorized its conduct.

Judge Alsup disagrees. Given the language in Section 1 about
providing leads and the context of the agreement as a whole,
ambiguity exists about whether the no-warranty provision for the
number of leads means that Matterport can provide no leads at all.
Stemmelin also presented evidence that Matterport advertised that
it would provide MSPs pre-qualified, local leads. Matterport's
no-warranty provision is thus not coextensive with the conduct
Stemmelin has asserted violates the implied covenant.

When a contract does not expressly permit certain conduct,
"difficulty arises in deciding whether such conduct, though not
prohibited, is nevertheless contrary to the contract's purposes and
the parties' legitimate expectations." That problem presents itself
here. This order finds further evidence on these issues necessary.
Matterport has failed to demonstrate there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, so it's summary judgment motion as to Stemmelin's
implied covenant claim fails.

In sum, Judge Alsup grants in part and denies in part Matterport's
motion. He denies Matterport's motion for summary judgment as to
Stemmelin's Section 17200 and Section 17500 claims. Because
Stemmelin lacks Article III standing for the declaratory relief he
seeks, Matterport's motion as to that remedy is granted. But
Matterport's summary judgment motion as to Stemmelin's request for
injunctive relief is denied. Finally, Judge Alsup denies
Matterport's motion as to the claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/s4bt3cnf from Leagle.com.


MCG HEALTH: Batt Sues Over Failure to Provide Data Security
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kelley Batt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MCG Health, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-04486-MCS-PVC (C.D.
Cal., June 30, 2022), is brought against the Defendant for its
failure to put adequate security measures in place to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of private data about their customers or
potential customers.

As a business serving healthcare providers, Defendant collects the
most sensitive and confidential PI of individuals, including their
first and last names, Social Security numbers, medical codes,
postal addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of
birth, and genders. As a corporation doing business in California,
Defendant is legally required to protect PI from unauthorized
access and exfiltration.

On March 25, 2022, Defendant determined that an unauthorized party
unlawfully accessed Defendant's systems and obtained certain PI
that matched data stored on MCG's systems. The files that were
accessed contained sensitive PI of Plaintiff and putative class
members, causing their sensitive and confidential PI to be
illegally exposed.

On June 10, 2022--almost three months after the data breach
occurred breach--the Defendant reported the unauthorized data
breach to state Attorney General's offices across the United States
and provided an estimation that approximately 1,100,0001
individuals were impacted by the data breach. The Defendant also
provided notice to Plaintiff and others similarly situated affected
by the breach including a brief description of what happened and
what information was impacted. On June 20, 2022, Plaintiff received
a notice from Defendant alerting her that her PI was impacted by
the data breach.

As a result of the Defendant's failure to provide reasonable and
adequate data security, the Plaintiff's and putative class members'
PI has been exposed to those who should not have access to it. The
Plaintiff and putative class members are now at much higher risk of
identity theft and for cybercrimes of all kinds, especially
considering the highly valuable and sought-after PI stolen here.
Through negligence in securing the Plaintiff's and putative class
members' PI and allowing an unauthorized party to access to the
Plaintiff's and putative class members' PI, Defendant failed to
employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against
unauthorized access to the Plaintiff's and the putative class
members' PI, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the State of California
and was impacted by the unauthorized data breach stemming from an
unauthorized party who accessed Defendant's systems

MCG Health, LLC is a HIPAA business associate that provides patient
care guidelines to healthcare providers and health plans.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan M. Lebe, Esq.
          Yuri A. Chornobil, Esq.
          Nicolas W. Tomas, Esq.
          LEBE LAW, APLC
          777 S. Alameda Street, Second Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90021
          Phone: (213) 444-1973
          Email: Jon@lebelaw.com
                 Yuri@lebelaw.com
                 Nicolas@lebelaw.com


MDL 2295: S.D. California Stays Portfolio Recovery TCPA Litigation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Houston of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California grants the Plaintiff's motion to stay the
multidistrict litigation titled IN RE PORTFOLIO RECOVERY
ASSOCIATES, LLC, TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT LITIGATION, Case
No. 11md02295 JAH-BGS (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs seek a stay of this action pending the resolution of
Brickman v. Facebook, Inc., currently before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. They contend the Ninth Circuit will resolve the
issue of whether the definition of an automatic dialing system
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act includes a system that
stores numbers to be called using a random or sequential number
generator.

The Plaintiffs disagree with the Court's interpretation of the
Supreme Court's holding in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.C.t 1163
(2021) that an ATDS must randomly generate the telephone numbers to
be called. The Plaintiffs maintain a stay will promote judicial
economy, can avoid the Court rendering a decision on the
Defendant's motion summary judgment that may need to be revisited
and will avoid substantial hardship to the Plaintiffs in the form
of inconsistent rulings and costly, potentially unnecessary
litigation because Brickman's challenges to the definition of an
ATDS go to the heart of the Plaintiffs' claims in this case.

According to the Plaintiffs, they are able to show that the systems
used by the Defendant use a random or sequential number generator
to store numbers and thus qualify as an ATDS, if the Ninth Circuit
agrees with Brickman's arguments that an ATDS does not have to
randomly generate the telephone numbers dialed. Additionally, they
argue the Defendant will suffer no harm from a stay given the class
action was filed in 2010 and that the MDL was created in 2011 and
the stay would be a short delay.

The Defendant argues the Plaintiffs' request is inefficient and
untimely because it was filed just three usiness days before their
response to the motion for summary judgment was due, three weeks
after the motion was filed and two weeks after the Court's order
setting the briefing schedule on the motion and the briefing in the
Brickman matter was completed on June 1, 2022.

The Defendant further argues the equities do not favor another stay
of the action given the length of the lawsuit, the precedential
effect of Duguid and the uncertain nature of the delay imposed by a
stay based on Brickman. The Defendant suggests the Court has the
discretion, following the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, to take the matter under advisement and order
supplemental briefing after Brickman if the Court finds the
Defendants' cited authority insufficiently persuasive.

Additionally, the Defendant argues the definition of an ATDS is
settled, and Brickman will not provide guidance that the Court
needs because it is highly unlikely to change the outcome of the
summary judgment motion here.

In its order denying the Plaintiffs' application to reopen
discovery, the Court rejected the Plaintiffs' theory that the
Supreme Court in Duguid determined a dialing system qualifies as an
ATDS if it uses a random or sequential number generator to either
store numbers or store the numbers in a list and call them, upon
finding the definition of an autodialer does not concern systems
that randomly or sequentially store and dial numbers from a list
that is generated in a non-random and non-sequential way.

The Defendant's pending motion for summary judgment argues the
Plaintiffs' TCPA claims fail because the Defendant's dialing
systems do not have the capacity to randomly or sequentially
generate phone numbers to call. In Brickman, the plaintiff argues
the district court erred in dismissing his TCPA action which
alleged the dialing system at issue uses a random or sequential
number generator to store numbers in a sequential or random order
and send a text in the sequential or random order determined by the
number generator.

Similar to the Plaintiffs here, Judge Houston notes, Brickman does
not allege the telephone numbers called are created by the
defendant's equipment but are from a preproduced list. As such, the
Brickman action pending before the Ninth Circuit will address an
issue currently before the Court.

The Court finds a stay of the action pending the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Brickman will not result in undue prejudice to the
Defendant and will promote the orderly course of justice by
simplifying issues. To avoid any unnecessary hardship to the
Defendant, the Court will not require it to refile its pending
motion for summary judgment, which is fully briefed. The motion
will be withdrawn without prejudice to permit the Defendant to
re-notice the motion with a new hearing date once the stay is
lifted.

Accordingly, it is ordered:

   1. The Plaintiffs' motion to stay is granted;

   2. The action is stayed pending the Ninth Circuit's decision
      in Brickman v. Facebook;

   3. The parties will notify the Court of the decision in
      Brickman no later than two (2) weeks after the Ninth
      Circuit issues its decision;

   4. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment is withdrawn
      without prejudice; and

   5. The hearing set for the Defendant's motion for summary
      judgment is vacated to be rescheduled at a later date.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/682acdmp from Leagle.com.


MDL 2548: $16.6MM Attys.' Fees OK'd in Commodity Gold Futures Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Valerie E. Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York grants Co-Lead Counsel's motion for
attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards in the lawsuit
styled IN RE: COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC., GOLD FUTURES AND OPTIONS
TRADING LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: All Actions, MDL No.
14-MD-2548 (VEC), Case No. 14-MC-2548 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.).

Judge Caproni awards attorneys' fees equal to $16,640,000 and
interest on such attorneys' fees at the same rate as the earnings
in the Settlement Fund, accruing from the inception of such Fund.
Co-Lead Counsel is authorized to allocate these awards with other
firms that assisted them in a manner in which, in Co-Lead Counsel's
judgment, reflects the contributions of such counsel to the
prosecution and settlement of the Action.

In making this award of fees and expenses to Co-Lead Counsel, the
Court has considered and found that the Settlement has created a
fund of $50,000,000 in cash, creating a total of $152,000,000 in
total cash settlements in the Action; numerous members of the
Settlement Class who have submitted valid Proof of Claim and
Release forms will benefit from the settlements created by Co-Lead
Counsel; and the fee sought by Co-Lead Counsel is fair and
reasonable.

Approximately 358,000 copies of the Notice were disseminated to
potential members of the Settlement Class. The Notice indicates
that Co-Lead Counsel would move for attorneys' fees in an amount
not to exceed $16,640,000, and no objections to the fees were filed
by members of the Settlement Class.

The Court also found, among other things, that the amount of
attorneys' fees is appropriate to the specific circumstances of
this Action, and consistent with awards in similar cases.

The fee award is independent of the Court's consideration of the
fairness, reasonability, and adequacy of any of the settlements
reached in this Action, and is also independent of the Court's
consideration of the Plans of Allocation. Any appeal or any
challenge affecting the Court's approval regarding the current fee
award will in no way disturb or affect the finality of the final
judgments entered with respect to the settlements, the Plans of
Allocation, the prior fee award, the expense awards, or the
incentive awards.

The fee award and interest awarded here will constitute a final
order and will be payable to Co-Lead Counsel from the Settlement
Fund upon entry of the final judgment related to the Settlement.

In the event that the Settlement is terminated or does not become
Final or the Effective Date does not occur in accordance with the
terms of that particular Stipulation, the Order will be rendered
null and void to the extent provided in that Stipulation and will
be vacated in accordance with that Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3cx23fm5 from Leagle.com.


MDL 2548: $2MM in Expenses Awarded in Commodity Gold Futures Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Valerie E. Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York grants Co-Lead Counsel's motion for
attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards in the lawsuit
styled IN RE: COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC., GOLD FUTURES AND OPTIONS
TRADING LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: All Actions, MDL No.
14-MD-2548 (VEC), Case No. 14-MC-2548 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.).

Judge Caproni awards $2,074,874.96 in payment of litigation
expenses and interest on such expenses at the same rate as the
earnings in the Settlement Funds, accruing from the inception of
each such Fund. Co-Lead Counsel is authorized to allocate this
award with other firms that assisted them in a manner in which, in
Co-Lead Counsel's judgment, reflects the contributions of such
counsel to the prosecution and settlement of the Action.

In making this award of expenses to Co-Lead Counsel, the Court has
considered and found that the Settlement has created a fund of
$50,000,000 in cash, creating a total of $152,000,000 in total cash
settlements in the Action; numerous members of the Settlement
Class, who have submitted valid Proof of Claim and Release forms
will benefit from the settlements created by Co-Lead Counsel; and
the expenses sought by Co-Lead Counsel are reasonable and were
necessarily incurred.

Approximately 358,000 copies of the Notice were disseminated to
potential members of the Settlement Class. The Notice indicates
that Co-Lead Counsel would move for costs, charges and expenses in
an amount not to exceed $3,500,000, plus interest, and no
objections to the expenses were filed by members of the Settlement
Class.

The expense award and interest awarded will constitute a final
order and will be payable to Co-Lead Counsel from the Settlement
Funds upon entry of final judgment related to the Settlement.

In the event that the Settlement is terminated or does not become
Final or the Effective Date does not occur in accordance with the
terms of that particular Stipulation, the Order will be rendered
null and void to the extent provided in that Stipulation and will
be vacated in accordance with that Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yya3xb2h from Leagle.com.


MDL 2548: Incentive Awards in Commodity Gold Futures Suit Approved
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Valerie E. Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York grants Co-Lead Counsel's motion for
attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards in the lawsuit
styled IN RE: COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC., GOLD FUTURES AND OPTIONS
TRADING LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: All Actions, MDL No.
14-MD-2548 (VEC), Case No. 14-MC-2548 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.).

Judge Caproni approves the payment of incentive awards to those
whose services to the class are described in paragraphs 88 to 93 of
the June 3, 2022 Joint Declaration. Each such plaintiff will be
paid in accordance with the discussion in Section II of the Fee,
Expense, & Incentive Motion and the Joint Declaration.

In approving the proposed incentive awards, the Court has
considered and found that the Settlement has created a fund of
$50,000,000 in cash, creating a total of $152,000,000 in total cash
settlements in the Action; numerous members of the Settlement Class
who have submitted valid Proof of Claim and Release forms will
benefit from the settlements created by Co-Lead Counsel; and the
requested awards are reasonable.

Approximately 358,000 copies of the Notice were disseminated to
potential members of the Settlement Class. The Notice indicates
that Co-Lead Counsel may apply for incentive awards to be paid to
those who served as named Plaintiffs. The Notice indicates that
Co-Lead Counsel would move for incentive awards, and no objections
to the Fee, Expense, & Incentive Motion were filed by members of
the Settlement Class.

The incentive awards will constitute a final order and will be
payable from the Settlement Fund upon entry of final judgments
related to the Settlement.

In the event that the Settlement is terminated or does not become
Final or the Effective Date does not occur in accordance with the
terms of that particular Stipulation, this Order will be rendered
null and void to the extent provided in that Stipulation and will
be vacated in accordance with that Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4fpyd3xh from Leagle.com.


MDL 2548: S.D. New York Issues Final Judgment in Gold Futures Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Valerie E. Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York issued a final judgment in the
multidistrict litigation entitled IN RE: COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC.,
GOLD FUTURES AND OPTIONS TRADING LITIGATION. This Document Relates
To: All Actions, Case No. 14-MD-2548 (VEC), No. 14-MC-2548 (VEC)
(S.D.N.Y.).

The matter came before the Court for hearing pursuant to the Class
Plaintiffs' application for final approval of the settlement set
forth in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement with Barclays
Bank PLC, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Societe Generale, and The London
Gold Market Fixing Limited, dated Oct. 11, 2021.

The Class Plaintiffs are Compania Minera Dayton SCM, Frank
Flanagan, Quitman D. Fulmer, KPFF Investment, Inc., Duane Lewis,
Larry Dean Lewis, Kevin Maher, Robert Marechal, Blanche McKennon,
Kelly McKennon, Thomas Moran, J. Scott Nicholson, Santiago Gold
Fund LP, Steven Summer, and David Windmiller.

Based on the record before the Court, including the Preliminary
Approval Order, the submissions in support of the settlement
between Class Plaintiffs, for themselves individually and on behalf
of each Settlement Class Member in the Action, and Barclays Bank
PLC, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Societe Generale, and The London Gold
Market Fixing Limited (the "Settling Defendants" and together with
Class Plaintiffs, the "Settling Parties"), and any objections and
responses thereto, pursuant Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court certifies solely for settlement
purposes this Settlement Class:

     All persons or entities who during the period from
     January 1, 2004 through June 30, 2013, either (A) sold any
     physical gold or financial or derivative instrument in which
     gold is the underlying reference asset, including, but not
     limited to, those who sold (i) gold bullion, gold bullion
     coins, gold bars, gold ingots or any form of physical gold,
     (ii) gold futures contracts in transactions conducted in
     whole or in part on COMEX or any other exchange operated in
     the United States, (iii) shares in Gold exchange-traded
     funds (ETFs), (iv) gold call options in transactions
     conducted over-the-counter or in whole or in part on COMEX
     or any other exchange operated in the United States;
     (v) gold spot, gold forwards or gold swaps over-the-counter;
     or (B) bought gold put options in transactions conducted
     over-the-counter or in whole or in part on COMEX or on any
     other exchange operated in the United States.

Judge Caproni holds that the requirements of Rules 23(a) and
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been
satisfied.

The law firms of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, and Berger
Montague PC are appointed, solely for settlement purposes, as
Co-Lead Counsel for the Settlement Class.

Class Plaintiffs Compania Minera Dayton SCM, Frank Flanagan,
Quitman D. Fulmer, KPFF Investment, Inc., Duane Lewis, Larry Dean
Lewis, Kevin Maher, Robert Marechal, Blanche McKennon, Kelly
McKennon, Thomas Moran, J. Scott Nicholson, Santiago Gold Fund LP,
Steven Summer, and David Windmiller are appointed, solely for
settlement purposes, as class representatives for the Settlement
Class.

Pursuant to Rule 23(e), the Court grants final approval of the
Settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement on the basis that
the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate as to, and in the
best interests of, all Settlement Class Members, and is in
compliance with all applicable requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered
the factors set forth in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495
F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by
Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir.
2000).

The Court concludes that the settlement set forth in the Settlement
Agreement was fairly and honestly negotiated by counsel with
significant experience litigating antitrust class actions and other
complex litigation and is the result of vigorous arm's-length
negotiations undertaken in good faith.

Except as to any individual claim of those Persons (identified as
Gordon R. Hauglie, Joan M. Hauglie, Yvonne McKown, and Bacno
Central de Bolivia) who have validly and timely requested exclusion
from the Settlement Class ("Opt-Outs"), the Action and all claims
contained therein, as well as all of the Released Claims, against
Barclays Bank PLC, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Societe Generale, and
The London Gold Market Fixing Limited by the Class Plaintiffs and
Releasing Parties are dismissed with prejudice. The Settling
Parties are to bear their own costs, except as otherwise provided
in the Settlement Agreement and the orders of the Court.

The Opt-Outs identified have timely and validly requested exclusion
from the Settlement Class and are excluded from the Settlement
Class for all purposes, are not bound by this Final Judgment and
Order of Dismissal, and may not make any claim or receive any
benefit from the Settlement Agreement.

The lone objection made to the Settlement Agreement was withdrawn
by the objecting party and is moot.

The Settling Parties are directed to consummate the Settlement
according to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Without further
Court order, the Settling Parties may agree to reasonable
extensions of time to carry out any of the provisions of the
Settlement Agreement.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter this Final Judgment and
Order of Dismissal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure immediately. The Clerk of Court is also directed to
terminate Defendants Barclays Bank PLC, The Bank of Nova Scotia,
Societe Generale, and The London Gold Market Fixing Limited.

A full-text copy of the Court's Final Judgment dated Aug. 8, 2022,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/39hp5pjj from Leagle.com.


MDL 2670: Bid for Summary Judgment in Packaged Seafood Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief District Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California issued an order in the
multidistrict litigation styled IN RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS
ANTITRUST LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: Associated
Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, et al.,
3:18-cv-01014-DMS-MDD, MDL No. 15-MD-2670 DMS (MDD) (S.D. Cal.):

   (1) granting the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration;

   (2) denying motion for summary judgment based on lack of
       personal jurisdiction; and

   (3) denying as moot motion for transfer, or certification of
       Rule 54(b) judgment.

On March 28, 2022, the Court issued an Order granting Defendant
Christopher Lischewski's motion for summary judgment based on lack
of personal jurisdiction. In that Order, the Court agreed with the
Defendant that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction was
not viable, and even if it was, the Plaintiff had not made the
necessary showing for a finding of conspiracy jurisdiction over
Lischewski.

In response to that Order, the Plaintiff filed the present motion
for reconsideration, in which it argues that the Court's analysis
of conspiracy jurisdiction is clearly erroneous. The Defendant
filed an opposition to the motion, and the Plaintiff filed a
reply.

After reviewing the parties' briefs, the record on file, and
reconsidering the case law, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration, and on reconsideration, denies the motion for
summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Plaintiff argues reconsideration is warranted here because the
Court committed clear error in its analysis of the conspiracy
theory of jurisdiction.

The Court's discussion of the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction
began with a citation to Melea, Ltd. v. Jawer SA, 511 F.3d 1060
(10th Cir. 2007). As the Court stated in its Order, a
co-conspirator's presence within the forum might reasonably create
the 'minimum contacts' with the forum necessary to exercise
jurisdiction over another co-conspirator if the conspiracy is
directed towards the forum, or substantial steps in furtherance of
the conspiracy are taken in the forum.

In its Order, the Court found the Plaintiff had not made that
showing. In particular, the Court found the Plaintiff failed to
show the conspiracy was directed toward Kansas or that substantial
steps in furtherance of the conspiracy were taken in Kansas. On
reconsideration, Judge Sabraw holds that finding was in error.

Judge Sabraw finds that the Plaintiff clearly demonstrated, and the
Defendant does not dispute, that the Defendants, including Bumble
Bee, sold millions of dollars' worth of price-fixed tuna in Kansas.
Those sales in Kansas were "acts in furtherance of the conspiracy"
that resulted in economic harm to the Plaintiff in Kansas, Judge
Sabraw opines, citing Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 282 Kan. 433,
473-74 (2006).

The Court's alternative finding that Lischewski was not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Kansas because he was acting "as an
officer of Bumble Bee" is also erroneous, Judge Sabraw states.
Although there is no dispute Lischewski was acting as an officer of
Bumble Bee, the conspiracy at issue here did not involve only
Bumble Bee and Lischewski. It also involved COSI, StarKist, Bumble
Bee's former Senior Vice President of Sales Scott Cameron, Bumble
Bee's former Senior Vice President of Trade Marketing Kenneth
Worsham, and StarKist's former Senior Vice President of Sales
Stephen L. Hodge.

The holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752, 769 (1984), that "officers or employees of the same firm
do not provide the plurality of actors imperative for a Section 1
conspiracy" is, therefore, inapplicable to the facts of this case,
Judge Sabraw points out.

In this case, Judge Sabraw opines there is no dispute about the
existence of a conspiracy, no dispute about Lischewski's
participation in the conspiracy, and no dispute that the Defendants
sold millions of dollars in tuna in Kansas. On these facts,
Lischewski is subject to personal jurisdiction in Kansas under the
conspiracy theory of jurisdiction.

For these reasons, the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is
granted, and on reconsideration, the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.

In light of this ruling, the Court vacates its order denying as
moot the Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment against
Lischewski. The Court will reconsider that motion and issue a
further order. The Court also denies as moot the Plaintiff's motion
to sever and transfer the Plaintiff's claims against Lischewski to
this Court, and the Plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ynek3uak from Leagle.com.


MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Court Grants Maadanian Leave to Amend Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, grants the parties' stipulated motion for leave to amend
the complaint filed in the lawsuit styled SEYYED JAVAD MAADANIAN,
LEONARDO CACHO, WENDER JEUDY, SEAN K. LEE, TINA MARIE, RULESHA
MCKINNEY, FRANCY DIAZ PEREZ, JEFFREY ROBINSON, MARCIO SINELLI,
THOMAS STEFANOPOULOS, JENNIFER WALKER, and BETTY WALTON,
Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, MERCEDES-BENZ
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, and MERCEDES-BENZ GROUP AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,
Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-00665-RSL (W.D. Wash.).

On Aug. 5, 2022, pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Plaintiffs filed a Stipulation Motion for
Leave to Amend the Complaint to add additional plaintiffs and
allegations. The Defendants do not oppose the Motion. Rule 15(a)(2)
provides that a court should freely grant leave to amend a pleading
when justice so requires.

After considering the Motion, the Court grants the Motion, finding
that justice so requires.

It, therefore, ordered that Stipulated Motion to Amend the
Complaint is granted. The Plaintiffs may, therefore, file the
Second Amended Class Action Complaint attached as Exhibit 1 to the
Declaration of Timothy W. Emery filed with the Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ccyam9eu from Leagle.com.

EMERY REDDY, PLLC, Timothy W. Emery -- Tim@emeryreddy.com --
Attorney for the Plaintiffs.


MERCER ADVISORS INC: Jackson Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mercer Advisors Inc.
case is styled as Sylinia Jackson, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Mercer Advisors Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-06947 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Mercer Advisors -- https://www.merceradvisors.com/ -- is a
full-service wealth management firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (917) 796-7437
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: danalgottlieb@aol.com


MERLE NORMAN COSMETICS: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Merle Norman
Cosmetics, Inc. The case is styled as Victoria Dicks, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Merle Norman
Cosmetics, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-06933 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Merle Norman Cosmetics Inc. -- https://www.merlenorman.com/homepage
-- or simply known as Merle Norman, is an American multinational
cosmetics company that manufactures skin care and makeup products
founded in 1931 by Merle Norman.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


METRO DERMATOLOGY: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Metro Dermatology of
NY, P.C. The case is styled as Marta Hanyzkiewicz, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Metro Dermatology of
NY, P.C., Case No. 1:22-cv-04797 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Metro Dermatology of NY -- https://metrodermatology.net/ -- provide
services in general dermatology, pediatric dermatology, cutaneous
surgery, photo-medicine, dermatopathology, skin laser surgery, and
cosmetic dermatology.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


MICROSOFT CORPORATION: Jones Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Natasha R. Jones, individually and on behalf of
similarly situated individuals v. Microsoft Corporation, Case No.
2022-CH-05145 was removed from the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois on June 30, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-03437 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Microsoft Corporation -- https://www.microsoft.com/ -- is an
American multinational technology corporation which produces
computer software, consumer electronics, personal computers, and
related services headquartered at the Microsoft Redmond campus
located in Redmond, Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Steven Russell Beckham, Esq.
          Myles P. McGuire, Esq.
          Paul T. Geske, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Dr., 9th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Phone: (312) 893-7002
          Email: SBeckham@mcgpc.com
                 mmcguire@mcgpc.com
                 pgeske@mcgpc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Elizabeth Brooke Herrington, Esq.
          Benjamin Kabe, Esq.
          Gregory Thomas Fouts, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          110 N. Wacker Dr., Suite 2800
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 324-1000
          Email: beth.herrington@morganlewis.com
                 benjamin.kabe@morganlewis.com
                 gregory.fouts@morganlewis.com


MIDDLESEX WATER COMPANY: Vera Suit Removed to D. New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Thomas Vera, Joel Verez, Margaret Kennedy, Donna
Zielinski, Michael Zielinski, Marco L. Nead, Renee Williams, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. MIDDLESEX
WATER COMPANY, Defendant; 3M COMPANY, Third Party Defendant; Case
No. MID-L-006306-21 was removed from the Superior Court of New
Jersey Middlesex County, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey on July 6, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-04446-KM-ESK to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Personal Property for
Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle.

Middlesex Water Company -- https://www.middlesexwater.com/ -- is a
water utility based in the U.S. state of New Jersey that was first
incorporated in 1897.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen Patrick Denittis, Esq.
          DENITTIS OSEFCHEN, PC
          5 Greentree Centre
          525 Route 73 North, Suite 410
          Marlton, NJ 08053
          Phone: (856) 797-9951
          Fax: (856) 797-9978
          Email: sdenittis@denittislaw.com

The Defendant and Third Party Defendant are represented by:

          Vincenzo Pozzuto, Esq.
          COZEN O'CONNOR
          3 WTC
          175 Greenwich St.
          New York, NY 10006
          Phone: (212) 908-1284
          Email: vpozzuto@cozen.com

               - and -

          Donald J Camerson, II, Esq.
          James Wylie Crowder, IV, Esq.
          BRESSLER, AMERY & ROSS, ESQS.
          325 Columbia Turnpike
          PO Box 1980
          Florham Park, NJ 07932
          Phone: (973) 514-1200
          Email: djcamerson@bressler.com
                 jcrowder@bressler.com


MILLIARD ENTERPRISES: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Milliard Enterprises
Limited Liability Company. The case is styled as Richard Mejia,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Milliard Enterprises Limited Liability Company, Case No.
1:22-cv-05456-AT (S.D.N.Y., June 28, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Milliard Enterprises doing business as Milliard Bedding --
https://milliardbedding.com/ -- offers premium folding beds,
mattresses, pillows, and other innovative accessories for home and
bedroom.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


MORGAN THOMAS: Barba Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
---------------------------------------------------
Austin Barba, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. MORGAN THOMAS CAVANAUGH, VMD, INC., a
California corporation, MORGAN CAVANAUGH, an individual, and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive, Case No. 22STCV21196 (Cal. Super. Ct., June
29, 2022), is brought alleging a representative wage and hour
complaint against the Defendants.

In actuality, the Plaintiff was forced to work without compensation
through meal and rest periods. The Plaintiff was also left without
compensation for work done while off the clock. In essence, the
Defendants used an inaccurate time sheet to circumvent California's
Labor Code and secure more labor for less cost, at the expense of
their employees. The Plaintiff was not compensated the minimum wage
for all hours worked and was forced to work hours off the clock;
was not provided with accurate itemized wage and hour statements;
was not provided compliant meal breaks; was not provided compliant
rest breaks; was not compensated all wages earned and owed in a
timely manner; and worked more than 8 hours in any given day and/or
more than 40 hours in any given week, but was not paid overtime
compensation pursuant to applicable Labor Code requirements, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants.

The Defendants owned and operated a corporation and availed itself
of the rights and privileges of the State of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan P. LaCour, Esq.
          Lisa Noveck, Esq.
          Jameson Evans, Esq.
          EMPLOYEES FIRST LABOR LAW P.C.
          65 N. Raymond Ave., Suite 260
          Pasadena, CA 91103
          Phone: (310) 853-3461
          Facsimile: (949) 743-5442
          Email: jonathanl@pierrelacour.com
                 lisan@pierrelacour.com
                 jamesone@pierrelacour.com


MYEYEDR. OPTOMETRY: Turner Sues Over Pre-recorded Message Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
Latanya Turner, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MyEyeDr. Optometry of Florida, LLC, Case No.
3:22-cv-00725-TJC-LLL (M.D. Fla., June 30, 2022), is brought
pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the "TCPA") and
its implementing Regulations as a result of the Defendant's
prerecorded message calls.

To market its business, the Defendant uses prerecorded message
calls to send prerecorded voice messages to individuals' cellular
phone numbers without first obtaining the required express written
consent. Defendant also ignores requests to stop calling those it
calls and calls numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry.
Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's
illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy,
harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of
thousands of individuals. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory
damages on behalf of Plaintiff and members of the Class, and any
other available legal or equitable remedies, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Florida
within the Middle District of Florida.

The Defendant sells eyeglasses and provides eye exams throughout
the state of Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Eisenband, Esq.
          EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
          515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
          Ft. Lauderdale, Fl 33301
          Phone: 954.533.4092
          Email: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: 954.400.4713
          Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

NORTH AMERICAN BANCARD: Jones Sues Over False Credit Card Contract
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dayo Jones d/b/a DayoSense, on behalf of a class of similarly
situated persons v. NORTH AMERICAN BANCARD, LLC, Case No.
22-2-10072-9 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct., King Cty., June 30, 2022), is
brought against the Defendant seeking a declaratory judgment under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and recovery of actual
damages and injunctive relief under Washington's Consumer
Protection Act.

The Defendant has alleged that the Plaintiff entered into a
contract with it for credit card processing services and that the
Plaintiff now owes it $61,583.00. the Defendant seeks to collect
from the Plaintiff the amount it alleges is due through
arbitration, which it seeks to compel through a mandatory
arbitration provision contained in a contract that it alleges the
Plaintiff agreed to.

The Plaintiff never entered into a contract with the Defendant and
never received $61,583.00 from the Defendant. The Plaintiff was a
victim of identity theft, which resulted in fake accounts being
opened in her name and the name of her catering business. The
Plaintiff provided the Defendant significant documentation and
numerous affidavits stating the same, yet the Defendant continues
to pursue her for the amounts she does not owe.

The Defendant's attempts to collect from the Plaintiff are unfair
and she should be compensated her actual damages and her attorney's
fees and costs incurred in seeking to enjoin the Defendant's
collection attempts. the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the
Defendant does not have the right to collect from her and an award
of her damages and attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending
against the Defendant's collection attempts, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is the sole proprietor of a catering business named
DayoSense, which she operates out of Seattle, Washington.

NAB is a credit card processing company that solicits customers
from across the United States, including Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sam Leonard, Esq.
          LEONARD LAW, PLLC
          6040 California Ave. Ste. C
          Seattle, WA 98136
          Phone: 206-486-1176
          Fax: 206-458-6028
          Email: sam@seattledebtdefense.com


NURTURE INC: Interim Co-Lead Counsel Appointed in Baby Food Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York grants the Stewart Movants' application to
appoint Lori G. Feldman and Rebecca A. Peterson as Interim Co-Lead
Counsel for the putative class in the lawsuit entitled In re:
NURTURE BABY FOOD LITIGATION, This Document Relates To: All
Actions, Master File No. 1:21-cv-1217-MKV (S.D.N.Y.).

The litigation consists of consolidated actions that all arise out
of the alleged presence of heavy metals and perchlorates in baby
foods manufactured and sold by Defendant Nurture, Inc., as exposed
in a recent legislative report, Baby Foods Are Tainted with
Dangerous Levels of Arsenic, Lead, Cadmium, and Mercury, issued by
the Subcommittee on Economic and Consumer Policy, Committee on
Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of Representatives on Feb. 4,
2021.

Before the Court are three competing applications -- the Stewart
Movants, the W-R Movants, and the Philippe Movants, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g), from various Plaintiffs'
counsel seeking appointment as Interim Co-Lead Counsel in this
consolidated class action against Nurture, Inc.

The application, at Case No. 21-cv-08030, Dkt No. 9, to appoint
Steven L. Bloch and Aaron Zigler as Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel
was withdrawn prior to the June 14, 2022 hearing.

Judge Vyskocil notes that each of the applicants rightfully boasts
impressive and significant experience in litigating complex class
actions, including multi-state consumer claims. However, several
facts militate in favor of appointment of the Stewart Movants.

The Stewart Movants effectively managed the early stages of this
litigation and have demonstrated that they would be more than able
to represent the interests of the Plaintiffs moving forward, Judge
Vyskocil states. The Stewart Movants were the first to file one of
these cases and moved to consolidate the cases filed in this
district against Nurture, and continued to push this case forward
by submitting revised Proposed Orders and supplemental submissions
as the additional related cases were filed against Nurture.

At the Aug. 27, 2021 hearing on the motion to consolidate, Ms.
Feldman addressed the Court at length regarding the merits of the
motion, the appropriate language for the Court's order on same, and
the proposed leadership briefing schedule.

Of significance to this case, Ms. Peterson was recently appointed
interim co-lead counsel in In re Plum Baby Food Litigation, No.
4:21-cv-00913-YGR (N.D. Cal.), a consumer protection case that
involves the same claims of misleading and deceptive baby food
packaging based on allegations of non-disclosure of heavy metals.
Moreover, in that case, counsel secured a favorable decision on a
motion by defendants to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay.
Ms. Peterson' appointment as co-lead counsel both in this action
and in In re Plum Baby Food Litigation, No. 4:21-cv-00913-YGR (N.D.
Cal.) will generate efficiency and economy that will inure to the
benefit of the putative class, Judge Vyskocil points out.

Finally, Ms. Feldman is based in New York, was admitted to the
Southern District of New York in 1991 and is licensed in New York.
Judge Vyskocil opines that this fact alone should bestow certain
efficiencies and advantages in a complex consolidated action
pending in New York, against a New York defendant. Moreover, as a
longtime member of the New York Bar, and having been admitted to
this district for almost thirty years, Mr. Feldman should be
familiar with this Court's rules and practices, which itself will
generate efficiencies and economies.

Judge Vyskocil rules that the request to appoint an executive
committee is denied. As discussed with each set of moving counsel
at the hearing, committees of counsel can lead to substantially
increased costs and unnecessary duplication of efforts. At this
preliminary stage of the litigation, a leadership structure
consisting of two co-lead counsel will be sufficient to address the
various complexities that may arise, while keeping unnecessary
costs to a minimum, Judge Vyskocil opines, citing In re Bystolic
Antitrust Litig., No. 20-CV-5735 (LJL), 2020 WL 6700830, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2020).

Accordingly, for these reasons, the Motion to Appoint Lori G.
Feldman and Rebecca A. Peterson as Interim Co-Lead Counsel for the
putative class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3) is granted. The
motion to appoint an executive committee is denied. The application
to appoint Melissa S. Weiner and Michael R. Reese as Interim
Co-Lead Counsel is denied. The application to appoint the law firms
Gibbs Law Group LLP, Pollock Cohen LLP, and Kohn Swift & Graf,
P.C., as Interim Co-Lead Counsel is denied.

Pursuant to Rule 23(g)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Interim Counsel must fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class. Interim Counsel also will be generally
responsible for coordinating the activities of the proposed
class(es) during pretrial proceedings.

Any discussions of a settlement of this litigation will be
conducted by Interim Co-Lead Counsel and any counsel designated by
Interim Co-Lead Counsel.

Judge Vyskocil directs the Interim Co-Lead Counsel to serve a copy
of this Order promptly by overnight delivery service, electronic
mail, facsimile, or other expeditious electronic means on counsel
for the Plaintiffs in each related action not yet consolidated in
this proceeding to the extent that Interim Co-Lead Counsel is aware
of any such action(s) and on all attorneys for the Plaintiffs whose
cases have been so consolidated but who have not yet registered for
ECF.

The Clerk of Court is requested to terminate docket entries 69, 73,
and 85.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 8, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2zjy42vt from Leagle.com.


OAKLAND COUNTY, MI: Dover Glen Sues Over Unpaid Just Compensation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dover Glen Condominium Association, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated v. OAKLAND COUNTY, a Governmental Unit,
and ANDREW MEISNER, as Treasurer of Oakland County, Case No.
2:22-cv-11468-NGE-JJCG (E.D. Mich., June 29, 2022), seeking unpaid
"just compensation" for violations of Michigan's Constitution and
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.

The Plaintiff operated condominiums in the City of Madison Heights,
Michigan and from time to time, would exercise its authority to
assess and collect dues and other charges on its residents. In some
instances, residents would not pay charges and Plaintiff would
record liens on the property to secure its right to receive payment
on the underlying debt should any action take place that resulted
in the sale of the property and generation of proceeds. Dover filed
and recorded a lien with the Oakland County Register of Deeds
against one of its properties, located at and commonly known as 266
East 13 Mile Road, Apartment 22, Madison Heights, Michigan, 48071,
Unit 22, Dover Glen Condominium ("Condo").

Dover, like many other Condominium or Homeowner Associations,
filing and recording of liens was done as prescribed under Michigan
law. As such, they were entitled to and expected persons on notice
of the liens to honor their rights, adhere to the law on
foreclosure, liens and real property and not take action that was
unconstitutional, illegal or otherwise inconsistent with their
rights to receive payment on the liens, including Defendants.

At the time of the tax foreclosure on the Condo, the Plaintiff had
an interest in the Subject Property in the form of a recorded lien
in the amount of $3,957.00, ("Owed Amount"). Owners of the Subject
Property owed $4,753.88, or less to the County for delinquent taxes
and/or assessments, interests, penalties, and fees reasonably
related to the foreclosure and sale of the Subject Property.
Following the tax foreclosure, the Treasurer, on behalf of the
County, directed, implemented, or gave instructions that the
Subject Property be sold at auction.

On August 7, 2017, the Treasurer, on behalf of the County, deeded
the Subject Property to a third party. The Treasurer, on behalf of
the County, received net proceeds of $40,000.00 as a result of that
sale at auction. the net amount received by the Treasurer on behalf
of the County at the auction sale exceeded the Owed Amount by at
least $43,246.12 ("Surplus Proceeds").

The Defendant Oakland County retained the Surplus Proceeds. The
Surplus Proceeds were deposited into the County's General Fund
account. Oakland County has derived investment income from the
retention of the Surplus Proceeds. The Plaintiff maintains a common
law right to the Surplus Proceeds. The Plaintiff has a vested right
and interest in the Surplus Proceeds by virtue of the lien filed
and recorded before the foreclosure says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was a Condominium Association organized under the
Laws of the State of Michigan, with an interest in property located
in the City of Madison Heights, Michigan.

Oakland County is a governmental unit in the State of Michigan
governing the political body known as Oakland County.[BN]

the Plaintiff is represented by:

         Jason J. Thompson (P47184)
         SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
         One Town Square, 17th Floor
         Southfield, MI 48076
          Phone: (248) 355-0300
          Email: jthompson@sommerspc.com


OCWEN FINANCIAL: Wins Bid to Decertify Class in Weiner Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAVID WEINER,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the public
similarly situated, v. OCWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Florida
corporation, and OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, Case No. 2:14-cv-02597-TLN-DB (E.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Troy L. Nunley entered an order granting Ocwen's motion
for decertification.

The parties are ordered to file a Joint Status Report within 30
days of the electronic filing date of this Order indicating:

  (1) their willingness to attend a Settlement Conference before
      a magistrate judge;and

  (2) their willingness to proceed to trial if they are not
      willing to attend a Settlement Conference; and (3) what
      impact, if any, this Order has on the pending Motion to
      Compel Testimony.

The Court said, "The Court at this juncture cannot take at face
value Ocwen's assertion that "almost half of the borrowers in
Plaintiff's purported class never paid and will never have to pay
the fee" because that is disputed. Similar to the foregoing cases,
however, the Court is convinced that ascertaining which class
members have or have not paid the fees will entail an
individualized inquiry. At issue in this case is the class members'
payment of allegedly unlawfully assessed fees, which is a monetary
harm recognized by the Supreme Court as one "with a close
relationship to harms traditionally recognized as providing a basis
for lawsuits in American courts"."

Pursuant to TransUnion, every class member have suffered this
monetary harm in order to establish Article III standing to proceed
before this Court. Because Plaintiff cannot definitively establish
at this juncture that each class member in each of the three
classes certified by Judge England has suffered this concrete harm,
the Court finds "that the questions of law and fact common to class
members" does not 16 predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members" under Rule 23(b)(3). Accordingly, the Court
grants Ocwen's Motion for Decertification," the Court adds.

The Plaintiff alleges that his mortgage servicer, Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC and OLS's parent company, Ocwen Financial
Corporation improperly assessed default-related service fees that
contained substantial, undisclosed mark-ups that violated the terms
of Plaintiff's mortgage contract. The Plaintiff further alleges
that Ocwen misapplied his payments in violation of the terms of the
applicable Deed of Trust.

Ocwen assumed the servicing of the Plaintiff's home mortgage in
late 2012 or 2013. According to the Complaint, the previous
servicer on the loan, GMAC, had paid the Plaintiff's property taxes
in 2010 and accordingly had established an escrow account for the
Plaintiff's pre-payment of those expenses in the future.

The Plaintiff nonetheless claims that after fully reimbursing GMAC
for the taxes it paid in early 2011 and paying a $400 escrow fee,
Plaintiff arranged with 12 to pay his own property taxes going
forward and to provide timely proof of his payments.

Despite meeting his commitment in that regard, the Plaintiff
asserts that after Ocwen became his loan servicer it began charging
a $600 annual escrow account fee and further began diverting funds
to that escrow account such that the account carried a positive
balance of more than $10,000.00, none of which was accessible by
the Plaintiff.

Ocwen is a provider of residential and commercial mortgage loan
servicing, special servicing, and asset management services, which
has been described as "debt collectors, collecting monthly
principal and interest from homeowners".

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 3, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BZMXZ8 at no extra charge.[CC]


PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER: Golden's Appeal From Discovery Order Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TASHANNA B. GOLDEN, Plaintiff-Appellee v. PENNSYLVANIA
HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY, Defendant-Appellant, Case No.
22-MC-01899 (HG) (E.D.N.Y.), Judge Hector Gonzalez of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismisses
PHEAA's motion for leave to appeal a discovery order issued in an
adversary proceeding pending before Judge Elizabeth Stong of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York.

In February 2016, the Plaintiff filed a voluntary petition for
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy
Court. At that time, she was the borrower on various loans that she
entered into to finance her attendance at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School in the mid-2000s. The Bankruptcy Court
issued a discharge order in the Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding
on Aug. 3, 2016. The Plaintiff commenced the underlying adversary
proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court in January 2017, alleging that
the Defendants continued attempting to collect certain of her
student loans, even though she alleges those loans had been
discharged. She alleges that the collection efforts undertaken by
the Defendants violate 11 U.S.C. Section 524 and are punishable by
civil contempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 105.

In the adversary proceeding, the Plaintiff seeks to assert these
claims not only on behalf of herself, but also on behalf of a class
of similarly situated borrowers of certain types of student loans.
Accordingly, on July 13, 2020, she filed a motion for class
certification pursuant to Rule 7023 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The motion, which is still pending in the Bankruptcy Court, seeks
to certify the following class: Individuals who received private
loans owned, held, or serviced by the Defendants which were not
within the cost of attendance at Title IV institutions as defined
in 26 U.S.C. Section 221(d); who obtained bankruptcy discharges
after Oct. 17, 2005; who were subsequently subjected to the
Defendants' acts to collect on the loans; and who have not
reaffirmed their loans.

The Plaintiff's definition of the class excludes various people
affiliated with the Defendants, the Plaintiff's counsel, and
Bankruptcy Judge Stong, as well as "any debtors who have validly
reaffirmed their debts to the Defendants or whose debts were
expressly held to be non-dischargeable."

The Plaintiff's definition of the putative class includes only
individuals who received "private loans which were not within the
cost of attendance at Title IV institutions as defined in 26 U.S.C.
Section 221(d)," because Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code
specifically defines the "categories of educational debt that
cannot be discharged in bankruptcy absent a showing of undue
hardship." These discharge exceptions are "confined to those
plainly expressed in the Bankruptcy Code," and a "creditor bears
the burden of establishing that a debt is excepted from
discharge."

The Bankruptcy Code therefore establishes "that three categories of
educational debt cannot be discharged in bankruptcy: (1) loans and
benefit overpayments backed by the government or a nonprofit; (2)
obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit,
scholarship, or stipend; and (3) qualified private educational
loans." The "qualified private educational loans" encompassed by
this third discharge exception include private loans only if they
fall "within the cost of attendance at the institution as defined
by Internal Revenue Code Section 221(d)."

On June 29, 2021, the Defendants filed separate oppositions to the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification. In its opposition,
PHEAA argued that the Plaintiff failed to satisfy several of the
class certification requirements in Rule 23, including the
requirement "that the proposed class be 'so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable.'"

The Plaintiff filed her reply brief in further support of her
motion for class certification on Sept. 2, 2021. However, both the
Plaintiff and the Defendants, including PHEAA, continued to engage
in additional discovery related to class certification after the
briefing on Plaintiff's motion was nominally complete. After her
reply brief was filed, the Defendants asked the Bankruptcy Court
for permission: (i) to conduct an additional deposition of the
Plaintiff's expert regarding opinions relied on in her reply brief,
and (ii) to file a sur-reply in further opposition to Plaintiff's
motion for class certification. The Bankruptcy Court discussed that
request with the parties during a conference on Sept. 29, 2021, and
ultimately adopted a stipulation allowing those requests.

During that same conference, the Plaintiff's counsel raised the
issue of needing additional discovery that he believed was
responsive to arguments that PHEAA and other Defendants made in
opposition to her motion for class certification. The Bankruptcy
Court directed her to serve a supplemental discovery request
specifying exactly what information she was seeking. Although the
Plaintiff's counsel made at least one comment during that early
stage that the requested discovery was unnecessary "to proceed on
the motions that are on your docket," the Bankruptcy Court made
several comments suggesting that the discovery might potentially
prove relevant to the Plaintiff's pending motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiff served supplemental discovery requests pursuant to
the Bankruptcy Court's instruction, and the Bankruptcy Court
discussed the Defendants' objections to that discovery during a
conference on Nov. 18, 2021, before the Plaintiff made a formal
motion to compel the discovery. During that conference, the
Bankruptcy Court reiterated that it considered the information
addressed by the Plaintiff's requested discovery to be relevant to
class certification.

Ultimately, the Plaintiff made a motion to compel the discovery,
and the Bankruptcy Court held two hearings on her motion on
February 2 and May 23, 2022. At the end of the first hearing, the
Bankruptcy Court instructed her "to supplement the record with a
description of how each of these categories of discovery requested
relates to a disputed matter before the Court on the question of
class certification and not the merits of the underlying claims."
When giving this instruction, the Bankruptcy Court made clear that
it would consider additional information related to the issue of
class certification even though the parties' briefing on that
motion was nominally complete and had been "filed a long time ago."
It emphasized its desire to allow whatever discovery was necessary
to "permit the Court to have the record it needs to make a good
decision that it realizes is an extraordinarily important decision
in the case." The Plaintiff filed the supplemental information
requested by the Bankruptcy Court, and each Defendant filed an
opposition to the Plaintiff's arguments therein.

Based on the parties' numerous briefs and court appearances, the
Bankruptcy Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to compel with
respect to two discovery requests in an order dated June 13, 2022.
Those requests asked the Defendants, for each loan made to a person
who received a bankruptcy discharge within the putative class
period, to "identify the lender, originator, servicer or guarantor
other than You" and "whether the loan was originated or funded by a
nonprofit or governmental entity."

The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the information sought by these
discovery requests was relevant to whether the Plaintiff's putative
class could satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 because,
loans that were originated or funded by a nonprofit or government
entity fall within a discharge exception and were therefore
excluded from the definition of the Plaintiff's proposed class. It
further found that such discovery was not "unduly burdensome or
disproportionate to the needs of the case." It ordered PHEAA to
begin producing information responsive to these discovery requests
by Aug. 12, 2022, and to complete its production by Sept. 12, 2022.
PHEAA timely filed a motion for leave to appeal within the 14-day
period allowed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002 and 8004.

Since the Bankruptcy Court's discovery order is not appealable as
of right, PHEAA's motion for leave to appeal is governed by the
discretionary appeal provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 158(a)(3). That
provision allows courts to accept appeals from interlocutory orders
only if "the order (1) involves a controlling question of law (2)
as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of
opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Judge Gonzalez holds that PHEAA has not met any of the criteria
required to take an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's
discovery order, starting with the requirement that the Bankruptcy
Court's order must present a controlling question of law. Its first
purportedly controlling question simply misstates the law applied
within the Second Circuit to disputes about discovery related to
class certification. Its attempt to graft its necessity requirement
onto the scope of permissible class certification discovery is
based principally on case law from district courts outside of the
Second Circuit, which the Court need not follow even if PHEAA has
accurately characterized those decisions.

Judge Gonzalez therefore won't disturb the Bankruptcy Court's
judgment that the Plaintiff's requested discovery was proper in
light of the issues raised by her motion for class certification.
An interlocutory appeal would be especially misguided in these
circumstances because the parties' discovery dispute is anything
but the "pure question of law that the Court could decide quickly
and cleanly without having to study the record."

The Plaintiff's class certification motion and motion to compel
discovery collectively resulted in more than 300 pages of briefing
by the parties and were discussed by the Bankruptcy Court during no
less than four status conferences that yielded more than 330 pages
of transcripts. The complexity of the parties' dispute clearly
demonstrates why "questions that arise during the course of a
bankruptcy proceeding concerning the appropriate scope of discovery
and that do not involve controlling questions of law are left to
the sound discretion of the court that is fully familiar with the
entire proceeding -- the bankruptcy judge."

PHEAA's motion for leave to appeal also fails for the independent
reasons that PHEAA has not demonstrated that the other requirements
for an interlocutory appeal are satisfied. Although PHEAA obviously
has a different opinion than the Bankruptcy Court about the
propriety of Plaintiff's requested discovery, "merely claiming that
a court's decision was incorrect is insufficient to establish
substantial ground for difference of opinion." Finally, PHEAA's
proposed interlocutory appeal "would not materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation" because the Bankruptcy
Court's discovery order "is irrelevant to the merits of the
underlying dispute." Inserting the Court into the parties'
discovery dispute would have the opposite effect and "would prolong
rather than hasten the termination of the litigation."

For the reasons he explained, Judge Gonzalez exercises its
discretion to deny PHEAA's motion for leave to appeal, and PHEAA's
appeal is dismissed. Since the Court has dismissed PHEAA's
underlying appeal, he denies "as moot" PHEAA's motion for a stay of
its discovery obligations pending the appeal. He respectfully
directs the Clerk of Court to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/59ky2bue from Leagle.com.


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Court Dismisses UFCW Local 464A Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation (PPC) disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended June 26, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that the
Colorado Court granted the motion to dismiss a class action lawsuit
with prejudice as to all claims.

On July 6, 2020, United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union Local 464A (UFCW), acting on behalf of itself and a putative
class of persons who purchased shares of PPC stock between February
9, 2017 and June 3, 2020, filed a class action complaint in the
Colorado Court against PPC, and then CEO Wiliam Lovette, executive
Jayson Penn and then Chief Financial Officer Fabio Sandri.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that PPC's public
statements regarding its business and the drivers behind its
financial results were false and misleading due to the defendants'
purported failure to disclose its participation in an antitrust
conspiracy as alleged in the Broilers Litigation and the
Indictment.

On September 4, 2020, UFCW and the New Mexico State Investment
Council (NMSIC) filed competing motions to be appointed lead
plaintiff under the Private Litigation Securities Reform Act, and
on March 17, 2021, the court appointed NMSIC as lead plaintiff.

On May 26, 2021, NMSIC filed an amended complaint, and PPC and the
other defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on July 19,
2021, which is now fully briefed. On March 8, 2022, the Colorado
Court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice as to all
claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment on
April 5, 2022, which is now fully briefed and awaiting a decision
from the Colorado Court.

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation is a chicken producer based in
Colorado.


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Faces Antitrust Suit in Illinois Court
-------------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation (PPC) disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended June 26, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that class
action lawsuits were filed against the company alleging violations
of antitrust and unfair competition laws.

Between September 2, 2016 and October 13, 2016, a series of federal
class action lawsuits styled as "In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust
Litigation," Case No. 1:16-cv-08637 were filed with the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against PPC
and other defendants by and on behalf of direct and indirect
purchasers of broiler chickens alleging violations of antitrust and
unfair competition laws.

The complaints seek, among other relief, treble damages for an
alleged conspiracy among defendants to reduce output and increase
prices of broiler chickens from the period of January 2008 to the
present. The class plaintiffs have filed three consolidated amended
complaints: one on behalf of direct purchasers and two on behalf of
distinct groups of indirect purchasers.

Between December 8, 2017 and September 1, 2021, 82 individual
direct action complaints were filed with the Illinois Court by
individual direct purchaser entities naming PPC as a defendant, the
allegations of which largely mirror those in the class action
complaints. Subsequent amendments to certain complaints added
allegations of price fixing and bid rigging on certain sales.

On February 8, 2022, the Illinois court issued a revised scheduling
order for certain plaintiffs who limited their claims to reduction
of output, which sets the first trial date in fall 2023. The
schedule for the rest of the plaintiffs is still awaiting an order
from the Illinois Court. On May 27, 2022, the Illinois Court
certified each of the three classes.

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation is a chicken producer based in
Colorado.


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Faces Consolidated Antitrust Suit
--------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation (PPC) disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended June 26, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that in
January 27, 2017, a purported class action on behalf of broiler
chicken farmers was brought against PPC and four other producers in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
alleging, among other things, a conspiracy to reduce competition
for grower services and depress the price paid to growers.

Plaintiffs allege violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
Packers and Stockyards Act and seek, among other relief, treble
damages. The complaint was consolidated with a subsequently filed
consolidated amended class action complaint styled as In re Broiler
Chicken Grower Litigation, Case No. CIV-17-033-RJS.

The defendants (including PPC) jointly moved to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint on September 9, 2017. The Oklahoma
Court granted only certain other defendants' motions challenging
jurisdiction. On January 6, 2020, the Oklahoma Court denied the
motion to dismiss, and lifted the stay on discovery.

On October 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion with the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation seeking consolidation of
a series of copycat complaints filed in September and October 2020
in the U.S. District Courts for the District of Colorado, the
District of Kansas, and the Northern District of California.

On December 15, 2020, the JPML ordered the transfer of all cases to
the Oklahoma Court for consolidated or coordinated pretrial
proceedings.

On November 8, 2021, the Oklahoma Court entered a revised case
management order in the multidistrict litigation setting a deadline
of August 1, 2022 for the close of fact discovery. That order also
set a deadline of March 17, 2023 for the filing of class
certification motions, with deadlines of April 28, 2023 for
opposition briefing and June 9, 2023 for reply briefing. Under the
order, motions for summary judgment are to be filed on July 31,
2023, with oppositions and replies due September 22, 2023, and
October 13, 2023, respectively.

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation is a chicken producer based in
Colorado.


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Faces Hogan Suit in Colorado Court
---------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation (PPC) disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended June 26, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that in
October 20, 2016, Patrick Hogan, acting on behalf of himself and a
putative class of persons who purchased shares of PPC's stock
between February 21, 2014 and October 6, 2016, filed a class action
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
against PPC and its named executive officers.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that PPC's SEC filings
contained statements that were rendered materially false and
misleading by PPC's failure to disclose that PPC colluded with
several of its industry peers to fix prices in the broiler-chicken
market as alleged in said litigation, its conduct constituted a
violation of federal antitrust laws and PPC's revenues during the
class period were the result of illegal conduct. The complaint
seeks compensatory damages as well as attorneys' fees and costs.

On April 4, 2017, the Colorado Court appointed another stockholder,
George James Fuller, as lead plaintiff. On May 11, 2017, the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which extended the end date
of the putative class period to November 17, 2016. PPC and the
other defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on June 12,
2017, and on March 14, 2018, the Colorado Court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint without prejudice and issued final judgment
in favor of PPC and the other defendants.

On April 11, 2018, the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the
Colorado Court's decision and for permission to file a second
amended complaint. On November 19, 2018, the Colorado Court denied
the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration but granted the
plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. On June 8,
2020, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against the
same defendants, based in part on the indictment.

On July 31, 2020, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint. The Colorado Court granted the motion to dismiss
on April 19, 2021 and issued judgment in favor of defendants. On
May 17, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion for amended judgment,
which the Colorado Court denied on November 29, 2021.

The plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal on December 28, 2021,
and the appeal was opened in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, which is now fully briefed with oral argument set
for September 27, 2022.

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation is a chicken producer based in
Colorado.


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Settlement Deal in Class Suit Awaits Final OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation (PPC) disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended June 26, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that in June
14, 2021, PPC entered into a binding Settlement Agreement to settle
all claims with the putative class of plant workers for $29.0
million and paid the plaintiffs this amount during the third
quarter of 2021.

The court granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their
complaint and its settlement agreement is still subject to final
approval.

Between August 30, 2019 and October 16, 2019, four purported class
action lawsuits were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland against PPC and a number of other chicken
producers, as well as Webber, Meng, Sahl & Company and Agri Stats.


The plaintiffs seek to represent a nationwide class of processing
plant production and maintenance workers. They allege that the
defendants conspired to fix and depress the compensation paid to
Plant Workers in violation of the Sherman Act and seek damages from
January 1, 2009 to the present.

On November 12, 2019, the Maryland Court ordered the consolidation
of the four cases for pretrial purposes. The defendants (including
PPC) jointly moved to dismiss the consolidated complaint on
November 22, 2019. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs amended their
complaint on December 20, 2019.

The consolidated amended complaint asserts largely similar
allegations to the pleadings in the consolidated complaint, but it
was extended to include more class members and turkey processors as
well as chicken processors.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint on March 2, 2020. The Maryland Court dismissed PPC and a
number of other defendants on September 16, 2020 without prejudice.
The plaintiffs subsequently filed amended complaints on November 2,
2020 re-naming PPC and the other dismissed defendants. Defendants
moved to dismiss on December 18, 2020, which the Maryland Court
denied on March 10, 2021.

On June 14, 2021, PPC entered into a binding Settlement Agreement
to settle all claims with the putative class of Plant Workers for
$29.0 million and paid the plaintiffs this amount during the third
quarter of 2021. PPC recognized this expense within Selling,
general and administrative expense in the Consolidated Statement of
Income for the year ended December 26, 2021.

On December 17, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to
amend their complaint, which the Maryland Court granted on March
21, 2022. The PPC Settlement Agreement is still subject to final
approval by the Maryland Court.

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation is a chicken producer based in
Colorado.


PROVENA FOODS: Lee Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Provena Foods, Inc.,
et al. The case is styled as Alexi Lee, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Provena Foods, Inc., Swiss
American Sausage Co., an unknown entity, Case No.
STK-CV-UOE-2022-0005511 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., June
30, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Unlimited Civil Other Employment."

Provena Foods Inc. is a specialty food processor that supplies food
products to other food processors, distributors, and canners.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 510
          Los Angeles, CA 90010-1145
          Phone: 213-381-9988
          Fax: 213-381-9989
          Email: justin@wilshirelawfirm.com


PURE PROACTIVE: Pacheco-Sanchez Sues Over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Javier Pacheco-Sanchez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. PURE PROACTIVE HEALTH, INC. d/b/a BETR
HEALTH, Case No. 6:22-cv-01122-RBD-EJK (M.D. Fla., June 29, 2022),
is brought against the Defendant's engagement in unsolicited text
messaging in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
(the "TCPA"), and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act ("FTSA").

To promote its goods and services, the Defendant engages in
unsolicited text messaging to those who have not provided Defendant
with their prior express written consent as required by the FTSA.
The Defendant also engages in telemarketing without the requisite
policies and procedures and training required under the TCPA and
its implementing regulations. The Defendant's telephonic sales
calls have caused the Plaintiff and the Class members harm,
including violations of their statutory rights, statutory damages,
annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of their privacy, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Seminole County,
Florida.

The Defendant is a foreign corporation and a "telephone
solicitor."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rachel N. Dapeer, Esq.
          DAPEER LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 417
          Aventura, FL 333180
          Phone: 305-610-5223
          Email: rachel@dapeer.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: 954.400.4713
          Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


RA SUSHI ADDISON: Mims Files FLSA Suit in N.D. Texas
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ra Sushi Addison
Corp. The case is styled as Ayasha Mims, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Ra Sushi Addison Corp, Case No.
4:22-cv-00722-DPM (N.D. Tex., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Ra Sushi Addison Corp. -- https://rasushi.com/locations/addison/ --
is a sushi restaurant, snazzy Japanese fusion chain known for its
inventive sushi, cocktails & happy-hour deals at the bar.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Jon Sanford, Esq.
          Lydia Hicks Hamlet, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          10800 Financial Centre Parkway
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Phone: (501) 221-0088
          Fax: (888) 787-2040
          Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com
                 lydia@sanfordlawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Sara Schretenthaler Staha, Esq.
          HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
          200 Crescent Court, Suite 1600
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Phone: (214) 964-9448
          Fax: (214) 964-9501
          Email: sara.staha@hklaw.com


RISK PLACEMENT SERVICES: Velazquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Risk Placement
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Bryan Velazquez, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Risk Placement
Services, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-06941 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Risk Placement Services, Inc. -- https://www.rpsins.com/ --
provides insurance services. The Company offers property and
casualty insurance services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


ROMANO'S MACARONI: Cashaw Files Suit in D. Hawaii
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Romano's Macaroni
Grill, et al. The case is styled as Nakeycia Cashaw, James
Buechler, Bobbi Ohumukini, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. Romano's Macaroni Grill, Redrock Partners,
LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-00289-HG-WRP (D. Haw., June 30, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Breach of
Contract.

Romano's Macaroni Grill -- https://www.macaronigrill.com/ -- is a
casual dining restaurant chain specializing in Italian-American
cuisine.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brandee J K Faria, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF BRANDEE J.K. FARIA
          1164 Bishop St Ste 933
          Honolulu, HI 96813
          Phone: (808) 523-2300
          Email: brandee@farialawfirm.com


ROSE CASTLE: Bid to Quash Subpoena in Cornejo Suit Granted in Part
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JOSE CORNEJO and CARLOS CORNEJO, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ROSE
CASTLE CORP. d/b/a ROSE CASTLE, ROSE CASTLE PARTY FUNCTION CORP.,
ROSE CASTLE CATERING INC., YIDEL HIRSCH, ABRAHAM ROSENBERG, and any
other related entities, Defendants, Index No. 500178/2016 (N.Y.
Sup.), Judge Debra Silber of the New York Supreme Court, Kings
County, grants in part a non-party's motion to show cause for an
order quashing a subpoena served upon it.

The lawsuit is a class action for unpaid wages, tips, service
charges, and gratuities. The class is defined in a prior 2017 order
of the Court, which certified the class as "all individuals who
performed work as servers, attendants, bussers, bartenders, food
runners, captains and in related service positions at Defendants'
catered events from October 2009 to the present, including those at
the facility commonly known as Rose Castle."

The action was commenced in Nassau County and was transferred to
Kings County by so-ordered stipulation in 2016. It was discontinued
as against Defendant Yidel Hirsch in 2016, but it was not
so-ordered. The Court orders that his name be removed from the
caption, as well as "any other related entities."

In Motion Seq. #16, non-party DTF (New York State Department of
Taxation and Finance) moves by order to show cause for an order
quashing a subpoena served upon it. In Motion Seq. #17, non-party
DTF moves by notice of motion for the same relief. The two motions
were submitted on consent and without argument on June 20, 2022.

The first motion was an order to show cause signed on Sept. 9,
2021, and was originally returnable on Dec. 9, 2021. It seeks an
order pursuant to CPLR "quashing, vacating, canceling, and setting
aside the subpoena duces tecum dated 8/11/21." The second motion
was filed on Nov. 3, 2021, and was originally returnable on Dec. 1,
2021. It seeks an order "quashing a subpoena served upon the
Department for certain tax records, upon the grounds that the
subpoena was improperly served and, alternatively, that the
subpoena violates the New York State Tax Law's secrecy provisions"
which subpoena is dated Oct. 26, 2021.

The Movant distinguishes the two motions thusly the non-party New
York State Department of Taxation and Finance filed a proposed
order to show case, with supporting affirmation, seeking similar
relief as set forth in further detail here. However, the Court has
not acted on this proposed order to show cause, and more recently
issued a separate subpoena dated Oct. 26, 2021, which is the
subject of this new motion.

The Court notes that it cannot "act" upon a motion before the
parties agree that it is fully briefed and ready for argument or
submission. Here, there are several stipulations which were e-filed
with briefing schedules. Both motions were submitted on June 30,
2022, for decision.

The first subpoena (Doc. 189 dated Aug. 10, 2021) sought:

   1. All Form NYS-45 for each quarter from 2009 until the
      present submitted by or related to Rose Castle Corp., Rose
      Party Functions Corp., Rose Castle Catering, Inc., and
      Coqui's Corp. (defendant entities); and

   2. A list of all individuals known to have been employed by
      [the four defendant entities] from 2009 to the present and
      their last known contact information.

Coqui's Corp. is not a defendant.

The second subpoena was issued on Oct. 26, 2021, in response to the
Plaintiffs' motion filed by notice of motion on Aug. 10, 2021
(Motion Seq. #13) for the issuance of said subpoena. It requested
the same items. In fact, it is the same subpoena, Judge Silber
notes. That is, when the Plaintiffs filed the notice of motion for
Motion Seq. #13, the proposed subpoena was e-filed as an exhibit to
the motion. But instead of e-filing it correctly as an exhibit, it
was e-filed as "subpoena (request to so order)".

Therefore, it was sent to Judge Silber to sign immediately upon
filing. Unaware that there had been a motion made for the issuance
of the subpoena, a motion which is not necessary, but is
permissible, the Court signed the subpoena. Then, when the motion
was submitted for decision, the second identical subpoena was
signed. As the motion was not served upon the NYS DTF, it was not
opposed. Therefore, as there was really only one subpoena,
admittedly signed twice, there is no distinction to be made with
regard to the Court's analysis of one of these two motions versus
the other, Judge Silber holds.

Judge Silber notes that the Plaintiffs have tried to obtain the
information from the Defendants but have been unsuccessful. For
example, the Court directed the Defendants to provide
authorizations for the release of their tax returns from 2009 to
the present on Sept. 10, 2021, but the Defendants have not
complied. As a result, they have been unable to identify the
members of the class. Further, their employer seems to close its
business and open under a new name on a regular basis.

The subpoena is not overly broad or unduly burdensome, Judge Silber
finds. It is not facially deficient insofar as it provides
sufficient notice of the "circumstances or reasons" why the
disclosure was "sought or required" from the Plaintiffs. The NYS
DTF is a government agency, which is supposed to monitor that
employers pay to it all withheld income taxes, and, ideally, that
the amounts match the amounts on an employee's W-2 at the end of
the year.

                       Conclusions of Law

DTF's rationale for moving to quash the subpoena is erroneous, in
the Court's opinion. The records sought are records of the
Plaintiffs' own funds, which were withheld from their paychecks and
should have been turned over to DTF.

The Plaintiffs allege that gratuities were included in the
customer's contracts for catering services but were not turned over
to them. The counsel for the Plaintiffs is entitled to see what
their employer reported as their wages, and the amounts, which were
withheld for state and local taxes. There is no other way to
compare this information with the Plaintiffs' W-2 forms.

The subpoena requests two types of information. First, it requests
the Defendants' business' filings of withheld State and local
income taxes (as well as withheld unemployment insurance) for their
employees, which employers are obligated to turn over to the State
of New York each quarter on Form NYS-45. Second, it requests a list
of employees for the entities with their last known addresses.

While this would be helpful for notifying potential class members,
Judge Silber notes, it appears this is not information kept in this
format by the moving non-party DTF. Form NYS-45 asks for only the
names and social security numbers of the employees. Further, it
appears the New York State Department of Labor provided similar
information to the Plaintiffs' counsel after the subpoena at issue
here was served upon that agency.

To be clear, form NYS-45 Part A, regarding unemployment insurance,
asks employers to provide a total number of employees for the
quarter, the total "renumeration" paid (in total) in the quarter,
and by applying the appropriate percentage of the wages subject to
contribution, the amount that was withheld from employees and the
amount that must be paid to New York State for unemployment
insurance. None of this information is specific to any person, nor
does it reveal any private or secret information.

Part B of the form asks the employer how much was withheld from its
employees' pay for State and NYC income taxes, in a lump sum and
not specific to each employee, and how much, in turn, must be
turned over to New York State. Part C of the form asks for each
employee's name, social security number, gross wages for the
quarter, and amounts for each employee withheld for unemployment
insurance and for State and local income taxes. Part D is for
corrections and additions, presumably for an amended form, and Part
E asks for change of business information, if the business is sold
or transferred, and to what entity. Other than the social security
numbers of the employees, there is nothing on these forms that
needs to be redacted, or which reveals any secret or private
information, Judge Silber points out.

With regard to the subpoena for records of Coqui's Corp., a
corporation listed as inactive since Aug. 18, 2016, on the New York
State Department of State, Division of Corporation's database, an
entity which is not a party, the Court grants the motion. It is not
clear why the Plaintiffs' subpoena and affirmation in opposition
refers to this corporation as a defendant. Thus, the subpoena is
quashed with regard to this entity.

With regard to Defendant Rose Castle Corp., d/b/a Rose Castle, a
corporation listed as inactive since Dec. 26, 2001, on the New York
State Department of State, Division of Corporation's database, as
"dissolved by proclamation" for not filing NYS tax returns, the
Movant must respond in some fashion to the subpoena, perhaps solely
to state that there were no filings by this corporation for 2009 or
later. If there were NYS-45 filings, then DTF should turn them
over, with the social security numbers of the employees redacted.

Next, with regard to Defendant Rose Party Functions Corp., a
corporation listed as inactive since Dec. 29, 2004, on the New York
State Department of State, Division of Corporation's database, as
"dissolved by proclamation" for not filing NYS tax returns, the
Movant must respond in some fashion to the subpoena, perhaps solely
to state that there were no filings by this corporation for 2009 or
later. If there were filings, then DTF should turn them over, with
the social security numbers of the employees redacted, Judge Silber
says. The Court notes that this State website indicates that it was
this corporation that was doing business as "Rose Castle," not Rose
Castle Corp.

Finally, with regard to Defendant Rose Castle Catering Inc., an
active corporation according to the NYS Department of State,
Division of Corporations database, the motion is denied with regard
to the NYS-45 forms. DTF must comply with the subpoena, with the
social security numbers of the employees redacted.

The Court notes that it appears that the same individuals involved
with the defendant corporations have conducted business under other
similar names, all corporations with their principal office in
Kings County, which are not parties to this action, including Rose
Castle Hall Inc. [started in 2011] and Rose Castle Party Services
Corp. [started in 2013], both of which are listed as active
corporations on the New York State Department of Corporations
public website.

The Plaintiffs may have been working for all of these entities. The
multiplicity of entities with "Rose Castle" in their name organized
in Kings County gives an appearance, at least to this Court, of an
entity trying to evade its paperwork obligations, if not more
nefarious goals, and while the audit division of DTF may already be
investigating this situation, these Plaintiffs will not necessarily
benefit from any such investigation, Judge Silber points out.

Accordingly, it is ordered that the motion is granted with regard
to Coqui's Corp., which is not a party defendant, and is denied
with respect to the three named corporate defendants, and DTF will
turnover all of the NYS-45 forms filed by the three defendant
corporations from 2009 to the present, with the social security
numbers of the employees redacted, within 60 days.

It is further ordered that the motion is granted with respect to
the subpoena's request for "A list of all individuals known to have
been employed by [the four defendant entities] from 2009 to the
present and their last known contact information," and that part of
the subpoena is quashed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision/Order dated Aug. 8, 2022,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/4s7k6j8n from Leagle.com.


SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE: Blunt Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against San Francisco Health
Care and Rehab, Inc. The case is styled as Tiana Blunt,
individually, and on behalf of others, similarly situated v. San
Francisco Health Care and Rehab, Inc. d/b/a, San Francisco Health
Care, a corporation, Case No. CGC22601260 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco Cty., Aug. 15, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Non-Exempt Complaints."

San Francisco Health Care and Rehab, Inc. -- https://sfhcr.com/ --
is a nursing home in San Francisco, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tagore O. Subramaniam, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Ave., Ste. 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266-2497
          Phone: 310-531-1900
          Fax: 310-531-1901
          Email: tagore@maternlawgroup.com


SERRANO ELECTRIC: Bover Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
------------------------------------------------------
Tami Marie Bover, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. SERRANO ELECTRIC, INC.; and DOES 1 through
20, inclusive, Case No. 22CV399734 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara
Cty., June 29, 2022), is brought to seek monetary relief against
Defendants to recover, among other things, unpaid wages,
unreimbursed business expenses, benefits, interest, attorneys'
fees, costs and expenses, and penalties pursuant to the Labor
Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants engaged in a systematic
pattern of wage and hour violations under the California Labor Code
and Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Wage Orders, all of which
contribute to Defendants' deliberate unfair competition. The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have increased their profits
by violating state wages and hour laws by, among other things:
failing to pay all wages (including minimum wages and overtime
wages); failing to provide lawful meal periods or compensation in
lieu thereof; failing to authorize or permit lawful rest breaks or
provide compensation in lieu thereof; failing to reimburse
necessary business-related costs; failing to provide accurate
itemized wage statements; failing to pay wages timely during
employment; and failing to provide all wages due upon separation of
employments, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants in California during the
Class Period.

The Defendants provide services or goods throughout
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kashif Haque, Esq.
          Samuela Wong, Esq.
          Jessica L. Campbell, Esq.
          AEGIS LAWFIRM, PC
          9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: (949) 379-6250
          Facsimile: (949) 379-6251
          Email: icampbell@aegislawfirm.com

SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE: Perry Files Suit in Mass. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing, et al. The case is styled as Dianna Perry, Robert Perry,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, PHH Mortgage Services, Case No.
2279CV00381 (Mass. Super. Ct., Hampden Cty., July 1, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Contract / Business Cases."

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing --
https://www.shellpointmortgageservicing.com/ -- is a financial
services company offering mortgage loan services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Chelsea Kim Choi, Esq.
          Jeffrey Morneau, Esq.
          CONNOR AND MORNEAU, LLP
          273 State St 2nd Floor
          Springfield, MA 01103


SOCLEAN INC: Harris Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Barry Harris, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. SoClean Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-01314-JRS-MJD was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania on July 1, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01088 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

SoClean, Inc. -- https://www.soclean.com/ -- manufactures cleaning
devices. The Company produces automated continuous positive airway
pressure (CPAP) cleaners and sanitizers which improves health
outcomes and quality of life for those suffering from obstructive
sleep apnea and other sleeping disorders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Colin E. Flora, Esq.
          Eric S. Pavlack, Esq.         
          PAVLACK LAW, LLC
          50 E. 91st St., Suite 305
          Indianapolis, IN 46240
          Phone: (317) 251-1100
          Fax: (317) 252-0352
          Email: colin@pavlacklawfirm.com
                 eric@pavlacklawfirm.com

The Defendant appears pro se.


SOCLEAN INC: Meles Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
--------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Mark Meles, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. SoClean Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-02354 was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania on June 29, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-00943-JFC to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

SoClean, Inc. -- https://www.soclean.com/ -- manufactures cleaning
devices. The Company produces automated continuous positive airway
pressure (CPAP) cleaners and sanitizers which improves health
outcomes and quality of life for those suffering from obstructive
sleep apnea and other sleeping disorders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          SHUB LAW FIRM LLC
          134 Kings Highway, Second Floor
          Haddonfield, NJ 08033
          Phone: (856) 772-7200
          Email: ecf@shublawyers.com


SOCLEAN INC: Renn Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Donna Renn, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. SoClean, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-00396-ECM-SMD
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania on July 6, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01071 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud for Personal Injury.

SoClean, Inc. -- https://www.soclean.com/ -- manufactures cleaning
devices. The Company produces automated continuous positive airway
pressure (CPAP) cleaners and sanitizers which improves health
outcomes and quality of life for those suffering from obstructive
sleep apnea and other sleeping disorders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Danielle L. Perry, Esq.
          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          MASON LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Ave., Suite 305
          Washington, DC 20016

               - and -

          Ronald Verdell Johnson, IV, Esq.
          Russell L. Johnson, Esq.
          DEAKLE-JOHNSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
          P.O. Box 2072
          Hattiesburg, MS 39403
          Phone: (601) 544-0631

               - and -

          Ruth Anne French-Hodson
          Sarah T. Bradshaw, Esq.
          SHARP LAW FIRM
          4820 W. 75th St.
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Phone: (913) 901-0505

               - and -

          Jubal L. Hamil, Esq.
          DEAKLE, SHOLTIS & HAMIL
          Mobile, AL 36633
          Phone: (251) 432-6020
          Fax: (251) 432-6071
          Email: jhamil@dshfirm.com


SOCLEAN INC: Simms Files Suit in W.D. Texas
-------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against SoClean Inc. The case
is styled as Amin Simms, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. SoClean Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-00633-LY (W.D.
Tex., June 29, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

SoClean, Inc. -- https://www.soclean.com/ -- manufactures cleaning
devices. The Company produces automated continuous positive airway
pressure (CPAP) cleaners and sanitizers which improves health
outcomes and quality of life for those suffering from obstructive
sleep apnea and other sleeping disorders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rex A Sharp, Esq.
          SHARP LAW, LLP
          4820 W. 75th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Phone: (913) 901-0505
          Fax: (913) 901-0419
          Email: rafrenchhodson@midwest-law.com


SONY ELECTRONICS: Bui Sues Over Unlawful Business Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
Hai Bui, and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. Sony Electronics, Inc., Case No. 22CV399577 (N.D. Cal., June 27,
2022), is brought to seek injunctive and declaratory relief
curtailing unlawful business practices related to consumer products
designed, manufactured, distributed, sold, and warranted by the
Defendant in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA").


For years the Defendant has produced marketed and sold personal
consumer electronic products including the Sony 75" Class - X81CH -
4K UHD LED LCD TV (the "Product") at issue in this litigation. The
Defendant also provides consumers with a three-year warranty for
its products. Specifically, the Defendant states to consumers that
their Warranty will be void if the consumer use third-party repair
services to fix their products. Yet this type of warranty-voiding
condition, where the warranty is "tied" to exclusive repair by the
manufacturer, is expressly prohibited by the MMWA, and its
implementing regulations.

The MMWA allows consumers to open the electronics without voiding
the warranty regardless of what the language of that warranty says.
And this fact has far-reaching implications as manufacturers, such
as the Defendant, have stepped up their attempts to monopolize the
device repair market.

These intentional misrepresentations of law and fact are made to
help manufacturers like the Defendant maintain a monopoly on
repairing the devices that they sell, and on manufacturing,
marketing, and selling after-market parts and accessories. Most
people won't attempt relatively simple inexpensive repairs--or use
and expensive third-party repair services--if they believe that in
doing so the manufacturer subsequently will refuse to honor the
warranty. The Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief
against the Defendant for its violation of the MMWA. Specifically,
the Plaintiff seeks to prevent to the Defendant from continuing to
make material misrepresentations and emissions to California
consumers as to their warranty rights in violation of the MMWA,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased the Products from the Defendants which
was--and remains--subject to a warranty that the Defendant states
will be void if the Plaintiff uses a third-party for repair

The Defendant manufactures a host of audio-visual products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gillian L. Wade, Esq.
          Sara D. Avila, Esq.
          Marc A. Castaneda, Esq.
          MILSTEIN JACKSON FAIRCHILD & WADE, LLP
          10990 Wilshire Blvd., 8th Floor
          Los Angeles, California 90024
          Phone: (310) 396-9600
          Fax: (310) 396-9635
          Email: gwade@mjfwlaw.com
                 savila@mjfwlaw.com
                 mcastaneda@mjfwlaw.com


SOVEREIGN LENDING: Mannacio TCPA Suit Transferred to W.D. Wash.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Eugene Mannacio, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Sovereign Lending Group
Incorporated, Case No. 3:21-cv-09193 was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, to the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington on June 30,
2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-05498-RJB to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Sovereign Lending Group Incorporated --
https://www.slgmortgage.com/ -- is a financial services company
that provides consolidation loans, home loans, and mortgage
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
          Raina C Borrelli, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS LLP
          613 WILLIAMSON ST., STE 201
          MADISON, WI 53703
          Phone: (608) 237-1775
          Fax: (608) 509-4423
          Email: sam@turkestrauss.com
                 raina@turkestrauss.com

               - and -

          Anthony Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln St., Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (615) 485-0018
          Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com

               - and -

          Susan S. Brown, Esq.
          SUSAN BROWN LEGAL SERVICES
          388 Market Street, Suite 1300,
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Email: susan@susanbrownlegal.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Joshua Briones, Esq.
          Cesar Dulanto, Esq.
          Esteban Morales Fabila, Esq.
          MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY & POPEO PC (LOS)
          2049 Century Park E Ste 300
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 586-3200
          Email: jbriones@mintz.com
                 cmdulanto@mintz.com
                 emorales@mintz.com

               - and -

          Charles K Cooper, IV, Esq.
          Shir Davidovicz, Esq.
          WEINER BRODSKY KIDER PC
          1300 19th Street NW, Ste. 5th Floor
          Washington, DC 20036
          Phone: (202) 628-2000
          Fax: (202) 628-2011
          Email: cooper@thewbkfirm.com
                 shir.davidovicz@gmail.com

               - and -

          Joshua Abram Rosenthal, Esq.
          MEDLIN & HARGRAVE, P.C.
          3562 Round Barn Circle, Suite 212
          Santa Rosa, CA 95403
          Phone: (510) 832-2900
          Fax: (510) 832-2945
          Email: jrosenthal@mhlawcorp.com


SPAVIA INTERNATIONAL: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Spavia International,
LLC. The case is styled as Veronica Maddy, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. Spavia International, LLC, Case
No. 1:22-cv-06930-ALC (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Spavia -- https://spaviadayspa.com/ -- offers high quality,
customized, affordable spa services in a relaxing atmosphere and
believes the day spa experience is no longer a costly luxury.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


STATE STREET CORP: Faces EFC Over Antitrust Violations
------------------------------------------------------
State Street Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that in August 2021, two
former Currenex clients filed a putative civil class action
lawsuit, captioned "Edmar Financial Company, LLC et al v. Currenex,
Inc. et al"  in the Southern District of New York alleging
antitrust violations, fraud and a civil Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act violation against Currenex, State
Street and others.

State Street Corporation is a financial holding company based in
Massachusetts that owns the Currenex platform.


STATE STREET CORP: Faces ERISA Suit Over Invoicing Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
State Street Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that in March 2017, a
purported class action was commenced against the company alleging
that its invoicing practices violated duties owed to retirement
plan customers under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).

State Street Corporation, referred to as the Parent Company, is a
financial holding company based in Massachusetts.


STATE STREET CORP: Faces Gomes Class Suit
-----------------------------------------
State Street Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that eight participants in
its Salary Savings Program filed a purported class action complaint
captioned "Gomes, et al. v. State Street Corp." in May 2021 on
behalf of participants and beneficiaries who participated in the
Program and invested in its proprietary investment fund options
between May 2015 and the present.

The complaint names the Plan Sponsor as well as the committees
overseeing the Plan and their respective members as defendants, and
alleges breach of fiduciary duty and violations of other duties
owed to retirement plan participants under the Employee Retirement
Income and Security (ERISA).

State Street Corporation is a financial holding company based in
Massachusetts.


STRONGHOLD DIGITAL: Co-lead Plaintiffs Appointed in Winter Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Stronghold Digital Mining Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 17, 2022, that on
August 4, 2022, co-lead plaintiffs were appointed in Winter v.
Stronghold Digital Mining Inc., et al., in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York.

On April 14, 2022, a punitive class action complaint was filed
against the Company, and certain of its current and former
directors, officers and underwriters.

In the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the Company made
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose material facts in
violation of Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. Section
77k and Section 15 of the Securities Act, about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects in the Company's registration
statement on Form S-1 related to its initial public offering, and
when subsequent disclosures were made regarding these operational
issues when the Company announced its fourth quarter and full year
2021 financial results, the Company's stock price fell, causing
significant losses and damages.

As a relief, the plaintiffs are seeking, among other things,
compensatory damages.

On August 4, 2022, co-lead plaintiffs were appointed. The Company
anticipates that plaintiffs will file an amended complaint in the
next few weeks and anticipates that defendants will move to dismiss
the amended complaint.

The defendants believe that the allegations in the initial
complaint are without merit and intend to defend the suit
vigorously.

Stronghold Digital Mining, Inc., a crypto asset mining company,
focuses on mining Bitcoin in the United States. It also operates
coal refuse power generation facilities. The company was
incorporated in 2021 and is headquartered in New York, New York.

SUPERIOR DUCT: Corlew Suit Removed to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Henry Corlew, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated v. Superior
Duct Fabrication, Inc., Does 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
22STCV13075 was removed from the Los Angeles Superior Court, to the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on June
30, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-04466-JLS-E to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Jobs Civil Rights.

Superior Duct Fabrication Inc. -- https://www.sdfab.com/ -- is a
sheet metal fabrication company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          Arman Marukyan, Esq.
          Won Christina Chang, Esq.
          LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE, PC
          410 Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Phone: 818-265-1020
          Fax: 818-265-1021
          Email: edwin@calljustice.com
                 arman@lfjpc.com
                 w.christina@calljustice.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          LaLonnie Villa Gray, Esq.
          Lonnie D Giamela, Esq.
          FISHER AND PHILLIPS LLP
          444 South Flower Street Suite 1500
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (213) 330-4500
          Fax: (213) 330-4501
          Email: lgray@fisherphillips.com
                 lgiamela@fisherphillips.com


SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Court Certifies Class, Subclass in White Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RENALDO WHITE and RANDOLPH
NADEAU, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. SYMETRA ASSIGNED BENEFITS SERVICE COMPANY; SYMETRA
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 2:20-cv-01866-MJP (W.D. Wash.),
the Hon. Judge Marsha J. Pechman entered an order:

   1. denying the Defendants' request to strike; and

   2. denying the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class as to
      their breach of fiduciary duty claims.

The Court certifies the following classes:

   -- Nationwide Class

      "All persons who are or were, at any time, annuitants of
      an SSA that contemplated life contingent payments issued
      by Symetra and who subsequently sold to a Symetra
      affiliate the right to receive payments from that SSA in a
      factoring transaction;" and

   -- Void Ab Initio Subclass

      "All members of the Class whose contract defining the
      annuity at issue included language explicitly stating that
      the annuitants lack the power to transfer their future SSA
      payments."

The Court also appoints Alison Chase, Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Lynn
Lincoln Sarko, 16 Adele Daniel, and Sydney Read of Keller Rohrback
LLP, and Daniel Simons of Marcus & Marcus PC, Edward Stone of
Edward Stone Law PC, and Jerome Marcus and Jonathon Auerbach of
Marcus & Auerbach LLC as class counsel.

The Court said, "The Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence
to establish by a preponderance the class certification is
appropriate and proper for their claims under RICO, Washington CPA,
civil  conspiracy, unjust enrichment and contract claims under Rule
23(a) and 23(b)(3)."

This case involves Defendant Symetra Assigned Benefits Service
Company's and Defendant Symetra Life Insurance Company's purchase
of future payments under structured settlement annuities they
administered. The Plaintiffs are two individuals who settled
personal-injury lawsuits for lump sum and periodic payments. The
tortfeasors in those settlements assigned their obligations to make
periodic payments to SABSCO. SABSCO then purchased an SSA from its
affiliate Symetra to fund and administer the future payments. The
Plaintiffs later sold their rights to future payments to SABSCO in
exchange for 9 immediate lump sum payments at a significant
discount.

The Plaintiffs allege Defendants' solicitation of their rights to
the future payments under the SSAs was predatory and the result of
an illegal business scheme designed to induce annuitants into
selling their future payments at a steep discount.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 3, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3bXuX7a at no extra charge.[CC]

T-MOBILE US: Faces Dale Antitrust Suit Over Sprint Merger
---------------------------------------------------------
T-Mobile US, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period Ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 29, 2022, that on June 17, 2022,
plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint in the
Northern District of Illinois captioned Dale et al. v. Deutsche
Telekom AG, et al., Case No. 1:22-cv-03189 against Deutsche Telekom
AG, T-Mobile, and Softbank, alleging that the T-Mobile and Sprint
merger violated the antitrust laws and harmed competition in the
U.S. retail cell service market.

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and trebled monetary damages on
behalf of a purported class of AT&T and Verizon customers who
plaintiffs allege paid artificially inflated prices due to the
merger.

T-Mobile US, Inc. is a radio telephone communications company based
in Washington State.


THERMA LLC: Cisneros Sues to Recover Unpaid Wages
-------------------------------------------------
Anicia Cisneros, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. THERMA, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and
Does 1-50, inclusive, Case No. 22CV399660 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa
Clara Cty., June 28, 2022), is brought against the Defendant to
recover unpaid wages, restitution, penalties and other related
relief, in alleged violation of the California Labor Code and
Business and Professions Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay for all
minimum and overtime wages due to their uniform timekeeping
policies/practices which failed to accurately capture and record
all hours worked. The Plaintiff further alleges that the
Defendants' meal and rest period policies and practices did not
allow and permit all compliant and timely meal and rest periods or
pay premium wages at the "regular rate of pay" in lieu thereof. AS
a result, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant failed to
provide non-exempt employees with accurate written itemized wage
statements and failed to timely pay all final wages upon separation
of employment, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs was employed by the Defendant as a non-exempt
employee.

Therma, LLC is a mechanical fabrication company manufacturing
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning ("HVAC") systems and
components in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua S. Falakassa, Esq.
          FALAKASSA LAW, P.C.
          1901 Avenue Of The Stars, Ste. 450
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6006
          Phone: 818-456-6168
          Email: josh@falakassalaw.com

               - and -

          Mehrdad Bokhour, Esq.
          BOKHOUR LAW GORUP, PC
          1901 Avenue Of The Stars, Ste. 450
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6006
          Phone: 310-975-1493
          Fax: 310-675-0861
          Email: mehrdad@bokhourlaw.com


THOS. MOSER CABINETMAKERS: Cromitie Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Thos. Moser
Cabinetmakers, Inc. The case is styled as Seana Cromitie, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. Thos. Moser
Cabinetmakers, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-06927 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Thomas Moser -- https://www.thosmoser.com/ -- offers handmade
American furniture, designed to last for generations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


TILLAMOOK CREAMERY: Order Dismissing Claims in Bohr Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Sonja BOHR, Tamara Barnes, Karen Foglesong, and Mary
Wood, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Respondents v. TILLAMOOK COUNTY CREAMERY ASSOCIATION, an
Oregon cooperative corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Sonja BOHR,
Tamara Barnes, Karen Foglesong, and Mary Wood, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants
v. TILLAMOOK COUNTY CREAMERY ASSOCIATION, an Oregon cooperative
corporation, Defendant-Respondent, Case No. 19CV36208; A175575 (Or.
App.), the Court of Appeals of Oregon affirms the trial court's
order dismissing claims that were based on a "price inflation or
fraud on the market theory" and a "prohibited transaction" theory.

Tillamook is an Oregon cooperative corporation that does business
in Oregon and across the United States. In 2017, its revenue
attributable to its dairy products was $800 million. According to
the Plaintiffs, Tillamook has engaged in a deceptive marketing
campaign: Per their complaint, "Tillamook's marketing deceptively
claims its dairy products are (1) sourced (exclusively) from dairy
farms located in Tillamook County, (2) made using production
practices that closely resemble small-scale traditional farming,
and (3) from cows allowed to graze on pasture and treated better
than those on factory farms." According to them, those deceptive
claims are made through Tillamook's "website, in print and
television advertisements, and across social media platforms."

According to the Plaintiffs' complaint, in reality, contrary to
Tillamook's marketing representations, Tillamook "sources upwards
of two thirds of the milk for its products from the largest and
most industrialized dairy factory farm in the country -- a
Concentrated Animal Farming Operation ('CAFO') with over 70,000
total cows and 32,000 dairy cows confined in a single location."
The CAFO is not located in Tillamook County but, instead, in
eastern Oregon. They allege that the CAFO consists of a "complex of
cementfloored production facilities and barren dirt feedlots, where
cows are continuously confined, milked by robotic carousels, and
afflicted with painful udder infections," and is "a far cry from
the rolling green hills of the Tillamook County family farms shown
throughout Tillamook's marketing campaign."

The Plaintiffs brought the putative class action under Oregon's
Unlawful Trade Practices Act against Tillamook, on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of all "persons in Oregon who purchased
Tillamook dairy products in Oregon" during the one-year period
preceding the date that their complaint was filed. Their complaint
asserts that Tillamook engaged in practices prohibited by the
UTPA.

More specifically, the Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that
"Tillamook has engaged in a deceptive marketing campaign to
convince consumers that the dairy cows who provide milk for its
products graze on pastures in Tillamook County" and deceptively
represented to consumers that its "products are sourced from small
family farms whose traditional farming practices are better for the
environment, the local community, and of course the cows than are
the industrial dairy facilities that Tillamook derides as 'Big
Food.'" It included both a "price-inflation" theory of causation,
as well as an "inducement" theory of causation, and what the
Plaintiffs characterize as "prohibited transaction" claims.

The Plaintiffs' complaint was filed by four named Plaintiffs. Each
of them alleges that, "having seen the Tillamook representations,"
each thought that "she was purchasing a product that aligned with
her values" and that, had each known the truth about Tillamook's
products, "she would have bought other dairy products instead of
Tillamook's, or would not have paid as much as she did for the
Tillamook products." The complaint further alleged that each
"regularly seeks out, and is willing to pay more for, dairy
products that she perceives as being more humane and coming from
small, pasture-based dairies."

Tillamook moved to dismiss the complaint for the reason, among
others, that the named Plaintiffs and the putative class members
had not pleaded reliance. It argued, among other points, that the
Plaintiffs could not avoid pleading reliance by alleging "a
non-cognizable 'priceinflation' theory" or by characterizing their
UTPA claims against it as "prohibited transaction" claims.

The trial court granted Tillamook's motion to dismiss in part and
denied it in part. In its view, although the complaint adequately
pleaded reliance with regard to the named Plaintiffs, it did not do
so with regard to the putative class. That putative class, as the
trial court observed, included individuals who purchased Tillamook
products "without ever having observed any Tillamook marketing."

The trial court directed that the class be limited to consumers who
had purchased Tillamook products in reliance on Tillamook's
marketing representations described in the Plaintiffs' complaint.
It further dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims -- both those of the
named Plaintiffs and those of the putative class -- that were
"based on a price inflation or fraud on the market theory," and the
Plaintiffs' claims that were based on a "prohibited transaction"
theory.

In its order granting in part and denying in part Tillamook's
motion to dismiss, the trial court certified seven controlling
questions of law for interlocutory review by the Court of Appeals
pursuant to ORS 19.225 (five from the Plaintiffs and two from
Tillamook). The parties then separately applied for leave to appeal
the trial court's order.

The Court of Appeals granted both the Plaintiffs' and Tillamook's
applications for interlocutory appeal.

The Plaintiffs' first two assignments of error correspond to the
following four of the controlling questions certified by the trial
court:

     1. For their claims alleging a violation of the Unlawful Trade
Practices Act, ORS 646.608(1)(b), are the Plaintiffs and the
members of the putative class required to plead and prove that they
observed and relied upon the Defendant's representations?

     2. For their claims alleging a violation of the Unlawful Trade
Practices Act, ORS 646.608(1)(d), are the Plaintiffs and the
members of the putative class required to plead and prove that they
observed and relied upon the Defendant's representations?

     3. For their claims alleging a violation of the Unlawful Trade
Practices Act, ORS 646.608(1)(e), are the Plaintiffs and the
members of the putative class required to plead and prove that they
observed and relied upon the Defendant's representations?

     5. If the Plaintiffs plead and prove that Defendant violated
21 USC Sec. 331 by selling 'misbranded goods' as defined in 21 CFR
101.18(c), or that the Defendant disseminated a 'false
advertisement' as prohibited by ORS 616.215(5) and as defined in
ORS 616.265 or ORS 616.270, are the Plaintiffs and the members of
the putative class required to plead and prove reliance upon the
Defendant's representations for their claims that it violated the
Unlawful Trade Practices Act, ORS 646.608(1)(b), (1)(d), and
(1)(e)?

In their first assignment of error, the Plaintiffs assert that the
trial court "erred in granting Tillamook's motion to dismiss on the
ground that they and members of the putative class were required to
plead and prove that they observed and relied upon the Defendant's
representations." In their second assignment of error, they assert
the trial court "erred in granting Tillamook's motion to dismiss on
the ground that they were required to plead and prove that they
relied upon the Defendant's representations with respect to their
prohibited transaction claims."

The Court of Appeals answers those four questions "yes," and in
doing so rejects the Plaintiffs' first two assignments of error,
and it affirms the trial court's rulings on Tillamook's motion to
dismiss as to those issues, and remands for further proceedings
consistent with its Opinion.

Based on the Plaintiffs' application for interlocutory appeal, it
understands that its answer to those four questions -- and its
rejection of their first two assignments of error -- to
"functionally resolve the claims of members of the putative class."
That is, it concludes that the putative class needed to plead
reliance to go forward with their claims. But, as the trial court
determined, no class-wide reliance was pleaded -- as the class
included individuals who never observed Tillamook's representations
-- and the trial court's determination that the class did not plead
reliance is not before it on appeal. And, so, because class-wide
reliance was required to be pleaded but was not, the Court of
Appeals conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing the
claims of the putative class for failing to plead reliance, and it
affirms that ruling. Therefore, with its conclusions in its
Opinion, the claims of the putative class have been functionally
resolved.

Having resolved the claims of the putative class, mindful that
interlocutory appeals in class actions under ORS 19.225 should be
reserved for "exceptional cases," citing Pearson v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 208 Or.App. 501, 514, 145 P.3d 298 (2006), and that its
review under ORS 19.225 is discretionary, the Court of Appeals
declines to address the remaining questions certified for
interlocutory appeal. Lastly, it says the resolution of the
remaining issues presented in the interlocutory appeal would apply
to only the named Plaintiffs, and there are prudential reasons not
to reach them.

The Court of Appeals concludes that the Plaintiffs'
"price-inflation" theory is not a viable theory in the case.
Further, that the Plaintiffs' inducement and "prohibited
transaction" theories required that they plead reliance on
Tillamook's alleged misrepresentations. Thus, it rejects the
Plaintiffs' first two assignments of error, answer the four
questions that it has undertaken to address on interlocutory appeal
"yes," and it therefore affirms the trial court's order as to those
limited issues.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p89y72x from Leagle.com.

Amanda Howell, Texas, argued the cause for Sonja Bohr, Tamara
Barnes, Karen Fogelsong, and Mary Wood. Also on the briefs were
David F. Sugerman -- david@sugermandahab.com -- Nadia H. Dahab --
info@sugermandahab.com -- and Sugerman Law Office, Tim Quenelle and
Tim Quenelle PC, Kelsey Eberly, California, and Animal Legal
Defense Fund.

Michael J. Sandmire -- msandmire@buchalter.com -- argued the cause
for Tillamook County Creamery Association. Also on the opening and
answering briefs were Alexandra M. Shulman --
ashulman@buchalter.com -- Daniel L. Lis -- dlis@buchalter.com --
and Buchalter Ater Wynne. Also on the reply brief were Alexandra M.
Shulman and Buchalter Ater Wynne.


US STEEL: Court Approval of Settlement in Class Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
United States Steel Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period Ended June 30, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 29, 2022, that a class
action lawsuit was filed against the company in 2017 and the court
approval of its settlement is currently pending.

On October 2, 2017, an Amended Shareholder Class Action Complaint
was filed in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania consolidating previously-filed actions.
The underlying consolidated class action lawsuit alleges that U. S.
Steel, certain current and former officers, an upper-level manager
of the Company and the financial underwriters who participated in
the August 2016 secondary public offering of the Company's common
stock (collectively, the Class Action Defendants) violated federal
securities laws in making false statements and/or failing to
discover and disclose material information regarding the financial
condition of the Company.

The lawsuit claims that this conduct caused a prospective class of
plaintiffs to sustain damages during the period from January 27,
2016 to April 25, 2017 as a result of the prospective class
purchasing the Company's common stock at artificially inflated
prices and/or suffering losses when the price of the common stock
dropped.

The plaintiffs seek to recover losses that were allegedly
sustained. The Class Action Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs'
claims. On September 29, 2018 the Court ruled on those motions
granting them in part and denying them in part. On March 18, 2019,
the plaintiffs withdrew the claims against the Class Action
Defendants related to the 2016 secondary offering. As a result, the
underwriters are no longer parties to the case.

On December 31, 2019, the court granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
certify the proceeding as a class action. The Company's appeal of
that decision was denied. Discovery followed and concluded. On May
20, 2022, the Plaintiffs and Class Action Defendants agreed to
settle the Shareholder Class Action in the amount of $40 million to
be fully funded by the Company's insurers. Court approval of the
class action settlement is currently pending.

United States Steel Corporation is into steel works, blast furnaces
rolling mills based in Pennsylvania.

VISION ROPEWALK: Walsh Sues Over Omission from Original Leases
--------------------------------------------------------------
Madeline Walsh, Christopher Sharpe, Andrew Parent and Molly
Mollica, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
v. VISION ROPEWALK, LLC, CHARLESTOWN ROPEWALK, LLC, ROPEWALK
MANAGING MEMBER, LLC, VISION PROPERTIES, LLC and COLDWELL BANKER
REAL ESTATE LLC, Case No. 22-1517 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk Cty.,
July 6, 2022), is brought against the Defendants to recover damages
and to enjoin the unfair, deceptive and unlawful practices by
intentionally omitting from the original leases with regards to
private parking arrangements.

The Plaintiffs claim that prior to the inception of their tenancies
at Ropewalk, specifically on January 7, 2019, the Defendants
entered into a Transportation Access Plan Agreement ("TAPA") with
the City of Boston whereby the Defendants explicitly promised the
City that every one of its residential leases with its tenants
would require every tenant who owned a motor vehicle to obtain and
provide to the Defendants proof of private parking arrangements. In
accordance with the TAPA, if the Ropewalk residents failed to
purchase private parking, this would give rise to the Defendants'
right to terminate the lease. Despite the clear and explicit terms
of the TAPA, none of the leases executed by the Plaintiffs and the
Class contained any language informing the tenants of this
obligation. Additionally, shortly after the execution of the leases
by the Plaintiffs and the Class (and after the Plaintiffs and the
Class began to reside on the premises) the Defendants attempted to
unilaterally amend the leases with a parking addendum which, for
the first time, notified the tenants of their obligation to
purchase private parking as established by the TAPA.

The Plaintiffs contend that the intentional omission from the
original leases of the TAPA language, followed by the demand to
comply with the parking addendum (with the threat of lease default
for failure to do so) constituted clear violations of M.G.L.c. 186,
Section 14, the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Plaintiffs further
contend that the same acts and omissions constituted unfair and
deceptive business practices in violation of M.G.L.c. 93A, and that
said violations were committed willfully and/or knowingly, in were
bad faith and with resulting damages to Plaintiffs and the Class.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs contend that following the collection
of the Security Deposits, the Defendants; a) failed to deposit the
Security Deposits in a bank in compliance with G.L.c. 186, Section
15B; b) failed to timely provide the Plaintiffs and the Class
receipts indicating the name and location of the bank, as well as
the associated account number; and c) failed to immediately forfeit
the Security Deposits, together with appropriate interest, upon the
class wide demand which was made upon Defendants by Plaintiffs in
connection with these claims, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs are former and current residential tenants of
Ropewalk.

The Defendants are the owners and/or managing agents of the
Ropewalk Apartments.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John R. Yasi, Esq.
          Paul E.X. Yasi, Esq.
          YASI & YASI, P.C.
          2 Salem Green
          Salem, MA 01970
          Phone: (978) 741-040
          Email: john.yasi@yasiandyasi.com
                 paul@yasi@yasiandyasi.com


WHAT IF HOLDINGS: Williams Sues Over Unlawful Serial Wiretapping
----------------------------------------------------------------
Loretta Williams, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. What If Holdings, LLC d/b/a C4R Media Corp.,
and ActiveProspect, Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-03780-SK (N.D. Cal.,
June 27, 2022), is brought to obtain redress for, and to put an end
to, the Defendants' serial wiretapping of the electronic
communications of visitors to C4R Media's websites, including
claim.foundmoneyguide.com, in violation of the California Invasion
of Privacy Act ("CIPA").

The wiretaps are embedded in the computer code on C4R Media's
websites and are used by Defendants to covertly observe and record
visitors' keystrokes and clicks in real time. Such actions violated
the CIPA, and invaded Plaintiff's and class members' privacy
rights.

Defendant ActiveProspect offers a product to lead generators and
telemarketers known as "TrustedForm," This product is designed to
allow these lead generators and telemarketers to attempt compliance
with the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act by documenting
alleged evidence of prior express consent to receive telemarketing
calls provided on websites. One feature of ActiveProspect's
"TrustedForm" product is a "video replay" function, which records,
in real time, a person's interaction with a website that is using
TrustedForm.

ActiveProspect enters into partnerships with various telemarketers
and lead generators who wish to utilize TrustedForm. ActiveProspect
then provides its software and scripts to those partners. One such
entity is C4R Media, which uses TrustedForm on its website
claim.foundmoneyguide.com and other websites that it operates. C4R
Media knows that TrustedForm captures strokes, clicks, and other
interactions on its websites—it is a primary reason why C4R Media
contracts with ActiveProspect for the TrustedForm product in the
first place.

Unfortunately for Defendants, their conduct constitutes wiretapping
under California law because the Defendants do not secure prior
express consent before recording their movements on the websites.
As a result of the Defendants' violations of the CIPA, the
Plaintiff and the members of the Class were deprived of their
privacy rights guaranteed to them by California law, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person and citizen of the State of
California.

C4R Media is a limited liability company with its principal place
of
business located in Fort Lee, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rebecca Davis, Esq.
          LOZEAU DRURY LLP
          1939 Harrison St., Suite 150
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Phone: (510) 836-4200
          Facsimile: (510) 836-4205
          Email: rebecca@lozeaudrury.com

               - and -

          Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
          Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Avenue, Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Phone: (720) 213-0675
          Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
          Email: ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com
                 swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com


ZARA USA: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Gillett Labor Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LATRELL GILLETT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ZARA USA, INC., and
INDITEX USA LLC, Defendants, Case No. 20 Civ. 3734 (KPF)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Katherine Polk Failla of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York denies the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

Mr. Gillett, on behalf of himself and other hourly employees of the
fashion retailer Zara, brought the class and collective action
against his former employers, the Defendants, asserting
wage-and-hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
Sections 201-219, and the New York Labor Law, N.Y. Lab. Law
Sections 195, 198, 650-665. In particular, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants violated the overtime compensation provisions
of the FLSA and the NYLL, as well as the NYLL's provisions
regarding timely payment of wages, spread-of-hours pay, wage
notices, and wage statements.

Zara is a fashion retailer, headquartered in New York, New York,
that operates more than 95 stores throughout the United States.
From approximately March 2018 until Aug. 16, 2019, the Plaintiff
was an employee at various Zara retail locations and was
compensated on an hourly basis plus sales commissions. More than a
quarter of his job responsibilities were physical tasks, such as
lifting and stacking shipment boxes, placing clothes on shelves,
and price-tagging items. The majority of Zara's over 5,000
employees in the United States are, like him, hourly workers, and
they include stock associates, sales associates, and cashiers.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' compensation policies
for hourly workers violated state and federal wage-and-hour laws in
several ways. Beginning with the Defendants' policy regarding
overtime compensation, she alleges that they failed to include
hourly workers' commissions when calculating rates of overtime pay,
as required by law. The Defendants allegedly maintained this
practice of short-changing hourly workers on their overtime pay,
despite being faced with multiple lawsuits challenging this precise
policy.

As another potential violation of the wage-and-hour laws, the
Plaintiff alleges that when hourly employees worked more than 10
hours in a day, the Defendants denied them the spread-of-hours pay
to which they were entitled under New York law. She further alleges
that the Defendants paid hourly employees on a bi-weekly basis, as
opposed to within seven calendar days after the end of the week in
which the wages were earned, as New York law requires. Finally, she
recounts that the Defendants failed to furnish hourly workers with
either a proper wage notice when they were hired or wage statements
when they received their wages, as mandated by New York law.

Although these documents are neither explicitly mentioned nor
directly referenced in the Amended Complaint, the Defendants seek
dismissal of the Plaintiff's untimely wage claim based on a series
of collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") that Zara USA entered
into with Local 1102 of the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store
Union District Council, United Food and Commercial Workers, which
CBAs purportedly governed the terms and conditions of the
Plaintiff's employment, as well as that of many others in the
Plaintiff's putative class of New York hourly workers. The
Defendants cite several provisions of the CBAs as bearing on their
arguments for dismissal.

The Plaintiff initiated the action on May 14, 2020, by filing the
underlying Complaint asserting federal and state wage-and-hour
claims on behalf of himself and a putative collective and class of
Zara hourly workers. The Defendants answered the Complaint on July
20, 2020, after which the matter was referred to the Court-annexed
mediation program for FLSA cases. Approximately one month after the
referral, on Aug. 26, 2020, the Plaintiff wrote to the Court to
relate that the parties did not believe that mediation would be
feasible prior to the Court's resolution of her anticipated motion
for conditional certification pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).
At the parties' request, the Court withdrew the case from the
mediation program and set a briefing schedule for Plaintiff's
motion for conditional certification.

By Opinion and Order dated May 3, 2021, the Court granted the
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification as to a collective
composed of hourly workers employed at Zara retail stores from May
14, 2017, through July 1, 2019, who were not paid adequate
overtime.

The Court keyed the beginning of the notice period to the
three-year timeframe prior to the filing of the Complaint, on the
understanding that timeliness challenges to any individual
plaintiff's claims would be resolved at a later stage in the
proceedings. Two weeks after, on May 17, 2021, the Defendants moved
for reconsideration of the Court's conditional certification order,
arguing that the Court had erred in setting the opt-in and notice
periods based on the date the Complaint was filed, rather than the
date the Court issued its ruling on Plaintiff's conditional
certification motion.

In light of the reconsideration motion, the Court stayed the
deadlines for the Defendants to provide the Plaintiff with
information concerning the employees in the conditionally certified
collective and for her to disseminate notice to the putative
collective. The parties also agreed to toll the statute of
limitations pending Defendants' motion for reconsideration.

By oral decision on June 24, 2021, the Court denied the Defendants'
motion for reconsideration and granted the Plaintiff leave to file
an amended complaint. It also extended the stay of the deadlines
for distribution of notice to the opt-in class and tolled the
statute of limitations for the putative collective action pending
resolution of the Defendants' previewed motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on July 9, 2021. On June
23, 2021, the Defendants filed a pre-motion letter indicating their
intent to move to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Four days later,
the Court issued an endorsement granting the Defendants leave to
file their motion to dismiss, setting a briefing schedule, and
reaffirming the stay of the deadlines for distribution of notice to
the collective.

On Sept. 13, 2021, the Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff filed his opposition papers one
month later. On Oct. 27, 2021, the Defendants filed their reply
brief. Since the close of formal briefing, the parties have each
submitted a notice of supplemental authority, bringing to the
Court's attention recent decisions out of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York bearing on the
issues.

The Plaintiff alerted the Court to an order issued by United States
District Judge Rachel P. Kovner denying a defendant's request to
certify an order for interlocutory appeal on the basis that there
was not ground for substantial difference of opinion regarding
either (i) the existence of a private right of action under NYLL
Section 191 or (ii) whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a
claim under the NYLL based on a temporary deprivation of money. The
Defendants apprised the Court of a decision issued by United States
District Judge Joanna Seybert holding that a plaintiff had not
adequately alleged standing to bring a claim based on untimely
payment of wages.  The Court accepts these submissions and deems
the Defendants' motion to be fully briefed.

Of the Plaintiff's six causes of action, the Defendants target only
one for dismissal -- the Plaintiff's claim for failure to pay
timely wages pursuant to NYLL Section 191. Theys offer three
distinct arguments for dismissal of this claim: (i) the Plaintiff
lacks Article III standing to bring his timely payment claim
because he received all of the wages to which he is entitled; (ii)
her claim is preempted by both Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act; and (iii)
Section 191 does not create a private right of action.

Judge Failla holds that none of the Defendants' arguments carries
the day. First, she opines that the Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged that he suffered a concrete injury in fact, which gives him
standing to bring his claim for untimely payment of wages.
Accordingly, she denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss the claim
for untimely payment of wages pursuant to NYLL Section 191 for lack
of Article III standing.

Second, Judge Failla opines that the Defendants' preemption
arguments rest on a fundamental flaw that makes them procedurally
premature. In brief, the Defendants' preemption claims under the
LMRA and NLRA depend entirely on the CBAs, which are documents the
Court is legally precluded from considering at this stage of the
proceedings. Because the Court may not consider the documents at
the heart of these preemption claims, the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's timely payment claim based on federal labor
law preemption principles must be denied. Accordingly, she declines
to consider the CBAs on this motion and, therefore, denies the
Defendants' motion to dismiss based on federal labor law preemption
principles.

Lastly, as to the Defendants' final argument for dismissal -- that
the NYLL does not provide for a private right of action to enforce
the pay frequency rights outlined in Section 191 -- Judge Failla
opines that they have presented no persuasive reason why the Court
should depart from the myriad decisions in this Circuit that have
followed Vega v. CM & Assocs. Constr. Mgmt., LLC, 107 N.Y.S.3d 286,
288 (1st Dep't 2019), in finding a private right of action to
enforce Section 191. Rather, the Defendants attack the reasoning of
Vega, relying exclusively on pre-Vega decisions that do not
indicate to the Court that the New York Court of Appeals is poised
to revisit the First Department's decision.

Because they offer no "persuasive evidence that the state's highest
court would reach a different conclusion" than the First Department
did in Vega, the Court is "bound to apply the law as interpreted
by" the intermediate appellate court, citing V.S. v. Muhammad, 595
F.3d 426, 432 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, applying Vega, Judge Faila
finds that the NYLL affords a private right of action to enforce
the late payment of wages. She therefore denies the Defendants'
motion to dismiss for lack of a private right of action under
Section 191.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Failla denies the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the
Defendants are ordered to file their answer to the Amended
Complaint by Aug. 31, 2022. The parties are ordered to file a joint
status letter regarding the next steps and proposed case management
plan by Sept. 9, 2022.

Furthermore, in light of her decision, Judge Failla lifts the stay
of the parties' deadlines concerning the distribution of the notice
of pendency to the putative collective members. With respect to the
notice-related deadlines, it is her understanding that the parties
have agreed to the joint retention of an independent
administrator.

Thus, to the extent they have not already done so, the parties are
ordered to meet and confer regarding the language of the proposed
notices. The Plaintiff will file the revised proposed notices by
Aug. 31, 2022. If the Defendants still have objections, they may
file objections within seven days from the date of the Plaintiff's
submission.

The Defendants are ordered to provide the Plaintiff, in a
computer-readable format, with the names, last known addresses,
telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, work locations, and dates of
employment for employees within the putative class by Aug. 31,
2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/vcrs7cu8 from Leagle.com.


ZAXBY'S COMPANY: Dorton Sues Over Unlawful Telephonic Sales Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Hope Dorton, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ZAXBY'S COMPANY RESTAURANTS LLC, Case No. (Fla. 13th
Judicial Cir. Ct., Hillsborough Cty., July 1, 2022), is brought
against the Defendant for the Defendant's engagement in telephonic
sales calls in violations of the Florida Telephone Solicitation
Act.

To promote its goods and services, Defendant engages in telephonic
sales calls to consumers without having secured prior express
written consent as required by the FTSA. The Plaintiff and the
Class members have been aggrieved by the Defendant's unlawful
conduct, which adversely affected and infringed upon their legal
rights not to be subjected to the illegal acts at issue. Through
this action, the Plaintiff seeks an injunction and statutory
damages on behalf of
Plaintiff individually and the Class members and any other
available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the unlawful
actions of the Defendant, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is an individual and a "called party."

The Defendant is a restaurant chain.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin W. Raslavich, Esq.
          KUHN RASLAVICH, P.A.
          2110 West Platt Street
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Phone: (813) 422 – 7782
          Facsimile: (813) 422 – 7783
          Email: ben@theKRfirm.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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