/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/220818.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, August 18, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 159

                            Headlines

2U INC: Settlement in Consolidated Securities Suit Initially OK'd
AKAZOO SA: $1.47MM Class Settlement Hearing Set on September 28
ALLSTATE INSURANCE: S.D. Florida Refuses to Dismiss MSP Class Suit
AMAZON.COM INC: Seeks Dismissal of False Advertising Class Action
APPLE INC: Compelled to Produce Privileged Docs to Roseville ERS

APPLE INC: Judge Approves $14.8MM Class Action Settlement
BHP GROUP: Ruling in Dam Collapse Class Action Overturned
BOOT BARN HOLDINGS: Faces Labor Suit in California Court
BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Cole Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Ross Suit

BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Haynes Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Keller Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Heathington Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Roberson B3 Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Causation Opinions in Bass Suit

BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Causation Opinions in Coon Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Cook Opinions From Jones Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Cook Opinions in Beverly Suit
BRANDONBILT MOTORSPORTS: Case Management & Scheduling Order Entered
CARVANA CO: Bronstein Gewirtz Reminds of October 3 Deadline

CHICAGO BRIDGE: Class Settlement in Securities Suit Gets Final OK
CHICAGO BRIDGE: Court Wants Revised Order on Bid for Fees & Costs
COBIAN CORPORATION: CMP & Scheduling Order Entered in Abreu Suit
COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED: $3.5MM Jones Class Deal Wins Final Approval
COINBASE GLOBAL: Two Law Firms File Securities Class Lawsuits

CONNECTED INVESTORS: Ordered to Produce Silva's Requested Documents
COVETRUS INC: $35MM Class Settlement to be Heard on October 25
CREDIT CONTROL: Strasser FDCPA Suit Removed to E.D.N.Y.
D & A SERVICES: Pooler Files FDCPA Suit in D. South Carolina
DELOITTE CONSULTING: New York District Court Closes Bozin Suit

DENMAY INC: Jones Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DOGFISH TACKLE: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DOOZY CARDS: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DUKE ENERGY: Denial of Summary Judgment in Bellwether Suit Reversed
EDGEWELL PERSONAL: Court Narrows Claims in Moran Suit

ENOCHIAN BIOSCIENCES: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of Sept. 26 Deadline
EQUIFAX INC: Faces Class Suit Over Coding Error in Credit Scores
EVENTBRITE INC: Faces Two California Suits Over IPO
EVENTBRITE INC: Snow Class Suit Stayed Pending Arbitration
FARMLAND PARTNERS: Court Dismisses Brokop Shareholder Suit

FORD MOTOR: Faces Sulligan Suit Over Mustang Mach-E Vehicle Defect
GARDNER RESOURCES: Court Withdraws Bid to Certify Class
GEORGIA: Mark Birdow Substituted as Class Rep. in Harris v. DOC
GODADDY INC: 11th Circuit Ruling in TCPA Class Suit Discussed
GOYA FOODS: Court Refuses to Certify Brokers Class in Ortiz Suit

HENKEL CORPORATION: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
INNOVATIVE HEALTH: Bhambhani Appeals Court Judgment Dismissing Case
INTERGALACTIC INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JAN-PRO FRANCHISING: Wins Summary Judgment on Minimum Wage Claim
JOHN HANCOCK: Romano Appeals Final Judgment in ERISA Suit

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Remicade Antitrust Suit Settlement Has Prelim OK
KEESLER FEDERAL: Class Settlement in Lloyd Suit Wins Final Approval
KENTUCKY: District Court Dismisses Eaves v. Judge Jennings Suit
KEURIG DR. PEPPER: Settlement in Antitrust Suit Gets Final Nod
KIA AMERICA: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Theft Safety Defect

KIA AMERICA: TikTok Challenge Prompts Suit Over Safety Issues
KOOTENAI COUNTY, ID: Watkins Files Suit in D. Idaho
KRAFT HEINZ: Faces Securities Suit in Illinois Court
MATTEL INC: Hayes Appeals Reconsideration Bid Denial to 9th Cir.
MDL 2862: Wanhua Not Compelled to Show Additional Custodial Docs

META PLATFORMS: Court Stays False Advertising-Related Suit
MICROSOFT CORP: Walker May File Amended Suit to Cure Deficiencies
MISSFRESH LIMITED: Kessler Topaz Reminds of September 12 Deadline
NABORS COMPLETION: C.D. Calif. Awards LeMasters $131K in Damages
NABORS COMPLETION: Final Arbitration Award in Cisneros Suit OK'd

NOBLES & COMPANY: Greene Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
NPAS SOLUTIONS: 11th Circuit Refuses to Rehear Johnson Suit En Banc
ONEIDA COUNTY, NY: Class Deal in Barrett v. Jail Gets Prelim. Nod
OTIS WORLDWIDE: Faces Darnis Suit in Connecticut Court
OUTSET MEDICAL: Vincent Wong Law Reminds of September 6 Deadline

PBF ENERGY: Goldstein Appeals Court's Decertification Order
PENDLETON COMMUNITY: Faces Class Suit Over Overdraft Fee Practices
POPULUS GROUP: Class Settlement in Taylor Suit Initially Approved
REALREAL INC: $2.42-Mil. Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Sanders Suit
REALREAL INC: N.D. California Issues Final Judgment in Sanders Suit

RENAISSANCE FOOD: Padilla Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL: W.D. Washington Refuses to Dismiss Moore Suit
ROSEN HOTELS: Judge Approves $2.3MM Settlement in WARN Class Suit
ROSET USA CORPORATION: Cromitie Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ROWAN INC: Ramirez Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida

RTMH INC: Cromitie Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RVNB HOLDINGS: Walsh Suit Transferred From E.D. Texas to N.D. Texas
SAFE STREETS: Final Approval of Anderson's Class Settlement Denied
SIERRA HEALTH: Love Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
SNAP INC: Faces Biometric Privacy Class Action in Illinois

SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS: Lead Roles Named in Luo Securities Suit
STORKLAND/NAME DROPPER: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Court Certifies Class and Subclass in White Suit
SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Court Grants White's Bid for Summary Judgment
TAYLOR MORRISON: Appeals Court Decision on Homeowners' Suit

TTE TECHNOLOGY: $2.9MM Class Settlement to be Heard on January 19
U.S. RENAL CARE: Court Enters Protective Order in Bruno Class Suit
UKG INC: Faces Cornacchia Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
UKG INC: Faces Fuller Class Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
UKG INC: Faces Mysliewic Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages

UKG INC: Faces Taylor Class Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
UKG INC: Faces Ward Class Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
UNILEVER UNITED STATES: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
UNITY SOFTWARE: Vincent Wong Reminds of September 6 Deadline
VANCOUVER COLLEGE: Faces Class Action Over Sexual Abuse

VARSITY BRANDS: Mintz Lawyers Discuss Ruling in Antitrust Suit
VAXART INC: Settlement Stipulation Reached in Securities Suit
VISA INC: Sued Over Interchange Fees
WALMART INC: Kahn Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
WERNER ENTERPRISES: 8th Cir. Flips Judgment in Petrone Class Suit

WEST VIRGINIA: Class in Fain v. Health & Human Resources Certified
XCEL ENERGY: Faces Suit Over Colorado Wildfire Incident

                            *********

2U INC: Settlement in Consolidated Securities Suit Initially OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
2U, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 28, 2022, that an order preliminarily approving
the settlement in a consolidated securities suit has been entered
by the court in June 2022.

On August 7 and 9, 2019, Aaron Harper and Anne M. Chinn filed
putative class action complaints against the Company, Christopher
J. Paucek, the Company's CEO, and Catherine A. Graham, the
Company's former CFO, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, based upon allegedly false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business prospects and financial
projections.

The district court transferred the cases to the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, consolidated them
under docket number 8:19-cv-3455 (D. Md.), and appointed Fiyyaz
Pirani as the lead plaintiff in the consolidated action. On July
30, 2020, Mr. Pirani filed a consolidated class action complaint
(CAC), adding Harsha Mokkarala, the Company's former Chief
Marketing Officer, as a defendant.

The CAC also asserts claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, against Mr. Paucek, Ms.
Graham, members of the Company's board of directors, and the
Company's underwriters, based on allegations related to the
Company's secondary stock offering on May 23, 2018.

The proposed class consists of all persons who acquired the
Company's securities between February 26, 2018 and July 30, 2019.
On October 27, 2020, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On
August 5, 2021, the court largely denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss. On February 18, 2022, the court stayed discovery until
April 19, 2022, pending mediation.

On April 28, 2022, the parties informed the court that they had
reached a settlement in principle. On June 2, 2022, Plaintiffs
filed a motion for preliminary approval of the class action
settlement and accompanying documents. On June 23, 2022, the Court
entered an order preliminarily approving the settlement.

2U, Inc. online education platform company based in Maryland.


AKAZOO SA: $1.47MM Class Settlement Hearing Set on September 28
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. and Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP disclosed
that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York has approved the following announcement of a proposed
class action settlement that would benefit purchasers of securities
of Akazoo S.A (NASDAQ: SONG):

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY AND

advertisement
PROPOSED PARTIAL SETTLEMENT OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION

TO: All persons and entities who or which: (1) purchased or
otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of Akazoo S.A.
("Akazoo") between January 24, 2019 and May 21, 2020, both dates
inclusive, including but not limited to, those who purchased or
acquired Akazoo securities pursuant to the private placement
offering agreement, and were damaged thereby; (2) held common stock
of Modern Media Acquisition Corp. ("MMAC") as of August 9, 2019,
eligible to vote at MMAC's August 28, 2019 special meeting, and
were damaged thereby; and/or (3) purchased or otherwise acquired
Akazoo common stock pursuant or traceable to the company's
registration statement and prospectus issued in connection with the
September 2019 merger of MMAC and Akazoo Limited, and were damaged
thereby (the "Settlement Class").

THIS NOTICE WAS AUTHORIZED BY A COURT. IT IS NOT A LAWYER
SOLICITATION. PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY AND IN ITS
ENTIRETY.     

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, that the above-captioned
litigation (the "Action") has been preliminarily certified as a
class action on behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain
persons and entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by
definition as set forth in the full Notice of Pendency and Proposed
Partial Settlement of Class Action (the "Long Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Plaintiffs in the Action, have reached a
proposed partial settlement of the Action, which will yield
settlement funds of $1,470,000 (the "Crowe Settlement"). If the
Crowe Settlement is approved, it will resolve all claims in the
Action with respect to the Settling Defendant, Crowe U.K. LLP.

A hearing will be held on September 28, 2022 at 5:00 p.m., before
the Honorable Brian M. Cogan at the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, 225 Cadman Plaza East,
Courtroom 8D, Brooklyn, NY 11201, to determine: (i) whether the
proposed Crowe Settlement should be approved as fair, reasonable,
and adequate; (ii) whether the Action should be dismissed with
prejudice against Settling Defendant, and the Releases specified
and described in the Stipulation and Agreement of Partial
Settlement dated July 20, 2022 ("Stipulation") and in the Long
Notice should be granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of
Allocation should be approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv)
whether Class Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees
and reimbursement of Litigation Expenses should be approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the Settlement, and you may be entitled to share in the
Settlement Fund. The Long Notice and Proof of Claim and Release
Form ("Claim Form"), as well as a copy of the Stipulation (which,
among other things, contains definitions for the defined terms used
in this Summary Notice), can be downloaded from the website
maintained by the Claims Administrator, Strategic Claims Services,
www.strategicclaims.net/akazoo/. You may also obtain copies of the
Long Notice and Claim Form by contacting the Claims Administrator
at Akazoo S.A. Securities Litigation, c/o Strategic Claims
Services, P.O. Box 230, 600 N. Jackson St., Ste. 205, Media, PA
19063, Tel: (866) 274-4004; Fax: (610) 565-7985; Email:
info@strategicclaims.net.

If you previously submitted a valid and timely Claim Form in the
Akazoo Settlement, you do not need to do so again. Your prior valid
and timely Claim Form will be used for the Crowe Settlement. If you
are a member of the Settlement Class, have not already submitted a
valid and timely Claim Form as part of the Akazoo Settlement, and
wish to share in this Crowe Settlement's proceeds, you must submit
a Claim Form postmarked or electronically submitted no later than
October 7, 2022 to the Claims Administrator. If you are a
Settlement Class Member and do not submit a proper Claim Form, you
will not be eligible to share in the distribution of the net
proceeds of the Settlement, but you will nevertheless be bound by
any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than September 7, 2022
to the Claims Administrator, in accordance with the instructions
set forth in the Long Notice. If you properly exclude yourself from
the Settlement Class, you will not be bound by any judgments or
orders entered by the Court in the Action and you will not be
eligible to share in the proceeds of the Crowe Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Crowe Settlement, the proposed Plan
of Allocation, or Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, must be filed with the Court
and delivered to Class Counsel and Crowe's Counsel such that they
are received no later than September 7, 2022, in accordance with
the instructions set forth in the Long Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Crowe U.K.
LLP, or its counsel regarding this notice. All questions about this
notice, the proposed Crowe Settlement, or your eligibility to
participate in the Crowe Settlement should be directed to Class
Counsel or the Claims Administrator.

Requests for the Long Notice and Claim Form should be made to:
Akazoo S.A. Securities Litigation     
c/o Strategic Claims Services
P.O. Box 230
600 N. Jackson St., Ste. 205
Media, PA 19063
Tel: 866-274-4004
www.strategicclaims.net/akazoo/
Inquiries, other than requests for the Long Notice and Claim Form,
should be made to Class Counsel:

THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060

or

GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
Casey Sadler, Esq.
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Tel: (888) 773-9224 [GN]

ALLSTATE INSURANCE: S.D. Florida Refuses to Dismiss MSP Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Darrin P. Gayles of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Consolidated Class Action Complaint in the lawsuit
entitled MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, Plaintiff v. ALLSTATE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
20-cv-24140-GAYLES/OTAZO-REYES (S.D. Fla.).

Plaintiff MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC ("MSPRC") bring the
putative class action against Defendant Allstate Insurance Co.,
seeking reimbursement for conditional payments made on behalf of
Medicare Part C enrollees in accordance with the Medicare Secondary
Payer Act ("MSP Act").

                         The Assignments

MSPRC and its related entities are collection agencies that
specialize in recovering funds on behalf of various actors in the
Medicare Advantage system. MSPRC alleges that it has standing to
bring MSP Claims against Allstate based on assignments from AvMed,
Inc., Health First Health Plan, Inc. ("HFHP"), Family Physicians
Group d/b/a Family Physicians of Winter Park, P.A. ("FPGI"),
Trinity Physicians LLC ("TPS"), and Verimed IPA, LLC ("VMIL")
(collectively the "Assignors").

                          Prior Actions

MSPRC and its related entities have filed hundreds of actions
against insurance companies. Included in those many actions are two
prior actions filed by MSPA Claims 1, LLC ("MSPAC"), an original
Plaintiff in this action, against Allstate (MAO-MSO Recovery II,
LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 17cv2370 (N.D. Illl.) ("Prior Action
1") and MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., Case No.
2014-18500-CA-01 ("Prior Action 2")). In both of the prior actions,
MSPAC voluntarily dismissed its claims against Allstate.

                       The Current Action

On Oct. 9, 2020, MSPRC, MSPAC, and MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC, Series
PMPI, a segregated series of MAO-MSO II LLC ("MAO-MSO") filed this
action against Allstate and Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance
Co. alleging (1) a private cause of action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1395y(b)(3)(A), and (2) breach of contract via subrogation,
pursuant to 42 C.F.R. Section 411.24(e). On Feb. 24, 2021, the
Court entered an order consolidating this action with MSPA Claims
1, LLC v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co., Case No.
17-cv-20782-Gayles. On March 26, 2021, MSPRC filed the Consolidated
Class Action Complaint against Allstate.

To establish standing, MSPRC alleges thirteen examples of its
assignors' MSP claims. For each Exemplar, MSPRC alleges that (1) an
enrollee in either an AvMed, HFHP, FPGI, TPS, or VMIL Medicare
Advantage plan was injured in an accident; (2) the tortfeasor in
the accident had a primary policy of insurance with Allstate; (3)
AvMed, HFHP, FPGI, TPS or VMIL paid a portion of enrollee's
accident-related medical expenses; (4) Allstate indemnified its
insured tortfeasor and made payments pursuant to a settlement with
the enrollee; and (5) Allstate reported information regarding the
accident to Centers for Medicare and Medicare Services ("CMS").

In addition to the Exemplars, MSPRC alleges that a spreadsheet,
attached to the Consolidated Complaint as Exhibit A, identifies
"all of the instances where Defendant admitted, by reporting to
CMS, that it was obligated (pursuant to a liability policy) to
provide primary payment on behalf of Enrollees for conditional
payments made by Plaintiff's assignors and on information and
belief, in those instances where Defendant reported itself
responsible pursuant to liability policies, it did so as a result
of entering into settlement agreements with the Enrollee at issue."
The spreadsheet lists enrollees' member IDs and names (redacted),
enrollment dates, the contract plan numbers, the reporting primary
insurers (e.g., Allstate), the types of insurance, and the
assignors.

                      The Motion to Dismiss

On April 23, 2021, Allstate moved to dismiss the Consolidated
Complaint arguing (1) dismissal should be granted based on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B)'s "two dismissal" rule; (2)
MSPRC fails to sufficiently allege Allstate's responsibility to
pay; and (3) MSPRC's class allegations fail as a matter of law.

                         I. Res Judicata

Allstate argues that this action is barred by res judicata, through
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)'s "two-dismissal" rule,
because one of the original Plaintiffs in this action, MSPAC,
previously filed and voluntarily dismissed Prior Action 1 and Prior
Action 2 against Allstate.

At this stage of the litigation, the Court cannot find that MSPRC's
claims are barred by res judicata. While the Court is aware of the
prior actions, claim preclusion is not apparent from the face of
the Consolidated Complaint.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss on this ground is denied without
prejudice. Allstate may raise its res judicata defense in a motion
for summary judgment.

                    II. Responsibility to Pay

Allstate argues that MSPRC fails to allege a legitimate basis for
Allstate's payment responsibility. The MSP Act requires a primary
plan to reimburse Medicare only if it is demonstrated that such
primary plan has or had a responsibility to make payment with
respect to such item or service, Judge Gayles notes, citing MSP
Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Metropolitan General, No. 21-11547,
2022 WL 2800850, *6 (11th Cir. July 18, 2022).

Judge Gayles opines that with respect to the allegations regarding
demonstrated responsibility, MSPRC's allegations in the
Consolidated Complaint are indistinguishable from the allegations
found sufficient in Metropolitan General.

Accordingly, at this stage of the litigation, the Court finds that
MSPRC's allegations satisfy the demonstrated responsibility
prerequisite.

                     III. Class Allegations

Allstate also argues that MSPRC's class allegations fail as a
matter of law. The Court declines to address the class allegations
at this time. Allstate may raise its arguments as to the purported
class action in response to a motion for class certification.

Accordingly, Judge Gayles denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Consolidated Class Action Complaint. Allstate will
answer the Consolidated Class Action Complaint within twenty (20)
days of the date of this Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3wmy9kb4 from Leagle.com.


AMAZON.COM INC: Seeks Dismissal of False Advertising Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christina Tabacco, writing for Law Street, reports that on Aug. 5,
Amazon moved to dismiss a consumer case brought by an Amazon Prime
member for false advertising. The company said that reasonable
consumers would not be duped into believing that Audible, a service
which offers audiobook and other spoken-audio content, is "free"
for Prime members based on representations made on its website.

The dispute began in May, when the Californian plaintiff accused
Amazon of state law violations for deceptive advertising.
Specifically, the complaint said that the plaintiff was charged a
monthly subscription fee for Audible while under the belief that
Amazon offers the service for free to Prime subscribers. The
pleading also claimed that Amazon makes it difficult for customers
to cancel Audible subscriptions, and limits refunds when they do.

Amazon removed the case to federal court in July and filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint along with a request for judicial notice
of documents it wants the court to consider in support thereof.
Substantively, the company says its Audible-related advertisements
are neither misleading nor false.

Amazon clarifies that its advertising reads "Free Titles at
Audible: Prime members are invited to start an Audible Premium Plus
trial with 2 credits that can be used on any titles." As such, it
informs Prime members of the free credits as part of a trial, but
does not say that Audible membership is included as a gratuitous
Prime benefit, the motion argues.

Amazon points out that the plaintiff never claimed to have seen or
relied on "Free Titles" on Audible when subscribing to Prime.
Further, the motion argues that the plaintiff never claimed that
she had any difficulty canceling an Audible subscription, or that
she sought or was denied a refund.  

Ultimately, and though the pleading quotes online complaints by
others, "it does not allege how -- or even whether -- Plaintiff was
deceived or injured." As such, Amazon concludes that the complaint
fails to meet the standard pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the heightened ones that apply
to the plaintiff's fraud-based claims.

The case is before Judge Jeffrey S. White in Oakland, Calif.

The plaintiff is represented by Reese LLP and Amazon by Fenwick &
West LLP. [GN]

APPLE INC: Compelled to Produce Privileged Docs to Roseville ERS
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF ROSEVILLE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Plaintiff v. APPLE INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-02033-YGR (JCS) (N.D. Cal.), Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph C.
Spero of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiff's Motion
to Compel Production of Documents as Privileged.

The Plaintiff brings securities claims against Defendants Apple,
its CEO, Tim Cook, and CFO Luca Maestri based on allegedly
fraudulent and misleading statements Cook and Maestri made on Nov.
1, 2018 describing Apple's performance in China with respect to the
sale of iPhones. The Revised Consolidated Class Action Complaint
for Violation of the Federal Securities laws alleges that shortly
after these statements were made, on Nov. 5, 2018, the Nikkei Asian
Review published an article reporting that Apple was cutting
production of iPhones, contradicting these earlier statements about
strong demand for iPhones in China.

Then, the Plaintiff alleges, on Jan. 2, 2019, "after the close of
trading, Apple disclosed the true condition of its business,
including the impact of deteriorating economic conditions in China,
among its largest growth markets, and demand for the iPhone." This
pre-announcement was made in the form of a "Letter from Tim Cook to
Apple Investors" and informed investors that "revenue for 1Q19 was
expected to be $84 billion, far below the guidance range of $89 to
$93 billion Apple had announced on Nov. 1, 2018." This shortfall
was attributed, in part, to an unanticipated "economic
deceleration, particularly in Greater China," where iPhone sales
had been "poor" in 2018.

The Plaintiff brings a Motion to Compel Production of Documents as
Privileged, asserting that the Defendants have failed to justify
their assertion of attorney-client privilege as to five categories
of documents listed in their privilege logs. In the Motion, it
contends they have improperly asserted attorney-client privilege as
to the following five categories of documents: 1) documents related
to the Investor Letter that Defendants claim are privileged because
they were created at the behest of Apple in-house counsel; 2) two
documents related to the Nikkei article about supplier cuts that
Defendants redacted, first asserting the redactions were of
material concerning "contract issues" and subsequently claiming the
redacted material reflected "legal advice from in-house counsel
David Tom regarding response to" the Nikkei article; 3) emails that
were received by groups whose individual members have not been
identified; 4) seven unsent documents in files of Tim Cook, Tejas
Gala and Adam Talbot, who are not lawyers, as to which Defendants
claim privilege on the basis that they contain legal advice from
unidentified in-house counsel; 5) 209 email attachments as to which
the Plaintiff claims the assertion of privilege is either facially
improper based on the description provided or do not contain a
sufficient description to determine if the document is privileged.

The Defendants opposed the Motion as to all five categories of
documents and offered declarations in support of their privilege
assertions by Apple Discovery Manager Robin Goldberg and Apple
in-house counsel Sam Whittington.

A hearing on the Motion was held on April 15, 2022, and after
additional meet-and-confer efforts that reduced the number of
documents in dispute from 451 to 232, the parties submitted
supplemental briefs. They also lodged the documents that remained
in dispute with the Court and the undersigned has reviewed in
camera a sample of those documents. A second hearing was held on
July 29, 2022.

With respect to documents related to the Investor Letter, the
Plaintiff asserts it had a "plainly business, not legal, purpose"
in that it "preannounced many of the same financial performance
metrics that the Defendants routinely compile and publicly report,
and would do so in final form a few weeks later. It further
contends in the Motion that the privilege log entries as to this
category of documents are "woefully insufficient," failing to
adhere to the requirement that a party claiming privilege must
"describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible
things not produced or disclosed -- and do so in a manner that will
enable other parties to assess the claim."

In their Opposition brief, the Defendants argue these documents
were properly withheld, citing a declaration by in-house counsel
Sam Whittington that they contend "only bolsters the prima facie
showing of privilege they already made in every individual log"
relating to the Investor Letter. They argue that the additional
detailed information sought by the Plaintiff goes "far beyond" what
is required under the Court's standing order or the case law.

Judge Spero holds that with respect to internal communications
involving in-house counsel, the party claiming attorney-client
privilege must make a 'clear showing' that the 'speaker' made the
communications for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
advice." He says, there is no bright-line rule that communications
related to regulatory compliance are per se business or legal
communications. Rather, the content and context of such
communications must be considered in order to determine the primary
purpose of the communication.

Applying the principles, Judge Spero finds that some of the
communications withheld by the Defendants appear to involve
primarily business advice that does not fall within the
attorney-client privilege. To determine whether the disputed
communications in this category satisfy the primary purpose test,
he has reviewed in camera several of the documents the Defendants
have withheld as privileged. Based on his review, he finds that
some of the communications withheld appear to involve primarily
business advice that does not fall within the attorney-client
privilege.

According to the Plaintiff, the following documents in this
category remain in dispute: 31-32, 178-179, 285-291, 298-300, 329,
335, 361-366, 369-379, 382-389, 391, 395, 397-398, 400-411,
417-421, 449-452, 455, 459-464, 466, 469-472, 474, 478-480,
482-485, 488, 490-491, 497-498, 512-513, 515-520, 522, 524, 526,
532-534, 536-544, 571, 573-575, 577-578, 582-583, 587, 589, 594,
616-622, 625, 629, 630, 651, 653, 655-662, 670, 672-673, 682, 686,
688, 690-692, 951-953, 961, 965.

Judge Spero has identified six general subcategories of documents
within this category and has reviewed the documents listed in
square brackets: 1) documents that Whittington states were sent to
him and included explicit requests for legal advice [382]; 2)
documents that Whittington states were sent to him or to other
members of the legal department that he understood to be implicitly
requesting legal advice [363-364]; 3) documents that Whittington
says Adams made extensive comments and edits on (Entries 365 and
366) [365, 366]; 4) emails providing advice about the Investor
Letter sent collectively by Whittington, Adams and Andeer (Entries
389, 391, and 400-10) [389]; 5) documents that Whittington states
are related to the collection of back-up documentation to support
factual assertions in the Investor Letter [329, 449];7 and 6) the
emails addressed in paragraph 4 of the Adams Supplemental
Declaration described as a set of emails that "include
communications in which Mr. Cook asked me and Mr. Maestri for
feedback relating to topics he planned to cover in an upcoming
meeting of the Company's board of directors."

As to the first subcategory of documents, the privilege log and
declarations supplied by the Defendants in support of withholding
this document are sufficient only as to the message on the first
page of the document containing a "question to the legal team,"
which may be redacted on the basis of privilege. The remainder of
the document consists of communications between non-attorneys that
are not primarily for a legal purpose and therefore are not
protected by attorney-client privilege. That portion of the
document should be produced. In addition, the Defendants will
review the remaining documents in this category to ensure that only
material that relates to the request for legal advice is withheld.

As to the second subcategory of documents, Judge Spero finds
nothing in the communication that establishes it was primarily
aimed at seeking legal advice. Likewise, the attached investor
letter, Entry 364, includes comments on a draft investor letter
from Dowling that primarily relate to business concerns, supporting
the conclusion that the draft and cover email were not primarily
for the purpose of soliciting legal advice. The Defendants will be
permitted to file supplemental declarations of counsel to support
their claim of privilege as to this subcategory of documents so
long as the declarations are consistent with this Court's rulings
and contain detailed facts relating to each specific document. They
will review the remaining documents that have been withheld in this
subcategory to ensure similar communications have not been
improperly withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege.

As to the third subcategory, Entries 365 and 366, it is not clear
why Adams did not provide a supporting declaration, as required
under the Court's Order. Judge Spero concludes Adams was not acting
in a legal capacity with respect to these comments, which do not
fall within the attorney-client privilege. Defendants will produce
these documents.

The fourth subcategory of documents consists of emails from a group
of in-house counsel about drafts of the Investor Letter. Judge
Spero has reviewed Entry 389 and concludes the current record does
not establish that this communication is privileged. The Defendants
will be permitted to provide supplemental declarations consistent
with the Court's rulings to establish, if they can, that the subset
of documents in this subcategory that do not contain Whittington's
explicit instructions but that he understood were created at his
behest for a legal purpose, are protected by attorney-client
privilege because they were created for the primary purpose of
seeking legal advice or reflected Whittington's legal advice.

Judge Spero further finds that Whittington's supplemental
declaration is sufficient to support the Defendants' privilege
claims as to some but not all of the documents in the fifth
subcategory, containing "communications relating to an effort to
gather back-up documentation for the factual assertions" in the
Investor Letter. He further finds based on its in camera review of
Entry 449 that that communication is primarily for the purpose of
providing legal advice to the extent that it flags particular
issues as to which in-house counsel determined factual support was
needed.

The sixth subcategory (Entry Nos. 285-291, and 298-300) contains
the emails addressed in paragraph 4 of the Adams supplemental
declaration. Judge Spero finds  that Entry 288, a generic request
for feedback from Cook to both Adams and Maestri that does not
reference any specific legal concerns, is not primarily aimed at
seeking legal advice and therefore is not privileged. This document
should be produced. Entries 285 and 287 are privileged because they
contain Adam's response to Cook's request for input from her and
address legal topics, thus constituting legal advice. He further
finds based on its in camera review of Entry 290, which is an email
exchange between Tim Cook and Luca Maestri on which Adams is
copied, that that communication was not sent with the primary
purpose of obtaining legal advice and does not reveal any legal
advice. This document should be produced.

With respect to documents related to the Nikkei Article, the
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants have not adequately justified
the redaction of two documents (Entries 1263 and 1264) related to
the Nikkei article about supplier cuts. These documents are
described in Apple's privilege log as emails from Priya
Balasubrumaniam (Apple's Vice-President of Operations) to Jeff
Williams (Apple's COO); and the following individuals are copied on
them: Sabih Khan (sabih@apple.com); Daniel Rosckes
(drosckes@apple.com); and David Tom (davidtom@apple.com). The
Defendants counter that their description of the redactions is
sufficient because they are only required to "describe the nature
of the documents in a manner that, without revealing information
itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess
the claim."

Judge Spero finds that the Defendants have offered a declaration
attesting that these documents contain legal advice relating to
contractual remedies that Tom received from Apple's legal
department. Further, his review of the documents supports the
conclusion that the redacted material related primarily to legal
advice rather than business concerns, though both were clearly
present. Although Tom is not the attorney whose provided the advice
or whose advice was requested, the Court concludes that his
declaration is sufficient to support the assertion of privilege
given his first-hand knowledge of the contents of the documents,
even though the Defendants did not strictly comply with the Court's
Order.

With respect to the group emails, the Defendants have asserted that
the emails listed in Black Decl., Ex. 3, are protected by
attorney-client but have not identified the individuals who were in
email groups whose members were recipients of these emails.
According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants' refusal to provide this
information has made it impossible to determine "whether an
attorney received each of these group emails or whether such emails
were limited in distribution solely to Apple employees." In their
Opposition, the Defendants emphasize that an email may be
privileged even if an attorney is not copied on it, as the
Plaintiff concedes. They further assert that the privilege has not
been waived as to these emails.

Judge Spero has reviewed Entry 100 and finds that it contains a
general request for the Disclosure Committee members, most of whom
apparently are not attorneys, to review draft disclosures for
accuracy. On the current record, the purpose of this communication
was not primarily to obtain legal advice and this document should
have been produced. To the extent supplemental declarations might
establish that a particular communication served a specific purpose
that was primarily legal, the Defendants may file such declarations
to support their claims of privilege as to this subcategory of
documents. To the extent they are unable to provide such
declarations as to any document in this subcategory, that document
should be produced.

With respect to documents in files of non-attorneys, the Plaintiff
challenged the assertion of privilege as to seven documents that
were found in the custodial files of non-attorneys Tim Cook, Tejas
Gala and Adam Talbot. It argued the assertion of privilege as to
these documents was insufficient because the Defendants failed to
offer any details as to the nature of the advice or identify the
attorney who gave the advice.

The Defendants countered in their Opposition brief that "these
documents are simply loose files of privileged drafts of the
Investor Letter that do not contain a cover email." They asserted
that the drafts were privileged for the same reason they asserted
that documents relevant to the Investor Letter were privileged.
Further, according to the Defendants, they are not required to
identify the specific attorney who gave the legal advice or the
specific nature of the advice.

Judge Spero has reviewed the two documents in this category
(Entries 31 and 32) in camera and concludes these communications
were primarily for business purposes rather than to seek or provide
legal advice. Although Entry 31 contains comments on the Investor
Letter by Dowling (a non-attorney), the comments appear to relate
to business matters and do not seek or reveal legal advice of any
kind. Entry 32 contains no comments or apparent edits. As the
Defendants have not pointed any specific legal advice or request
for legal advice in these communications, he finds that they have
not established that they are protected under attorney-client
privilege. The Defendants will be permitted to file supplemental
declarations of counsel to support their claim of privilege as to
these documents so long as the declarations are consistent with the
Court's rulings and contain detailed facts from the attorney whose
advice was sought or given relating to each specific document.

With respect to the email attachments, the Plaintiff challenged the
assertion of attorney-client privilege as to 209 documents that
were described as attachments to emails, consisting of 39 documents
it asserted were facially non-privileged because they "clearly
concerned business topics," and 170 documents as to which it
asserted the Defendants had provided insufficient information in
their privilege log to allow for a determination of whether the
documents were privileged or if instead they were instances of
counsel acting in a business capacity. In their Opposition, the
Defendants asserted that they had not claimed that the attachments
were privileged merely because the parent emails were privileged,
noting that "an email attachment may be privileged if it
independently satisfies the criteria for attorney-client
privilege."

Judge Spero has reviewed in camera a sample of documents in this
category and finds, among other things, that Entries 85, 142, 174,
175, 270, and 466 contain communications that are not privileged
and should be produced to the Plaintiff.

Judge Spero concludes that the Defendants will provide to the
Plaintiff all of the specific documents that he has reviewed in
camera and found to be non-privileged except those as to which he
has specifically permitted the  Defendants to supply supplemental
declarations of counsel in support of their privilege claims. The
Defendants will provide to the Plaintiff: 1) all of the documents
that they find cannot be withheld on the basis of attorney-client
privilege based on the rulings and guidance contained in this
Order; and 2) the supplemental declarations (where permitted),
along with an amended privilege log consistent with the Court's
rulings reflecting any remaining disputed documents.

To the extent he has permitted the Defendants to submit
supplemental declarations to support their claims of privilege,
Judge Spero cautions the Defendants that any such declarations must
be consistent with the Court's rulings and guidance. The parties
will meet and confer as to the remaining disputed documents and
file a joint letter, not to exceed five pages, that identifies the
documents that remain in dispute, along with the supplemental
declarations of counsel, no later than Aug. 19, 2022. Upon receipt
of the letter and supporting materials, the Court will determine
whether any further briefing or oral argument is necessary to
decide the parties' remaining disputes.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4ht3zxu2 from Leagle.com.


APPLE INC: Judge Approves $14.8MM Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------
Patently Apple reports that a federal judge approved a $14.8
million settlement in a class action claiming Apple stored iCloud
subscribers' data on third-party servers without informing them,
even though the subscribers paid a premium for an iCloud
subscription, according to Courthouse News.

The original class action was filed on August 12, 2019, claiming
breach of contract, violations of California's False Advertising
Law, and violations of California's Unfair Competition Law. Apple
filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted in part without
prejudice.

The Plaintiff's continued their case in court and on January 13,
2022, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of a settlement
with Apple. The court held a hearing and granted the motion on
February 17, 2022. The plaintiffs then moved for final approval and
for attorney's fees, costs, and a service award. The court held the
final fairness hearing on August 4, 2022. The parties consented to
magistrate-judge jurisdiction. [GN]


BHP GROUP: Ruling in Dam Collapse Class Action Overturned
---------------------------------------------------------
Herbert Smith Freehills, in article for Mondaq, reports that the
Court of Appeal has held that claims brought in the English court
by over 200,000 claimants arising out of the 2015 collapse of the
Fundao Dam in Brazil can proceed, overturning the High Court's
decision which had struck out the claims as an abuse of process in
light of concurrent proceedings and compensation schemes in Brazil:
Municipio de Mariana v BHP Group (UK) Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 951.

Whilst set in a non-financial context, this decision is relevant to
UK-domiciled financial institutions who might be considered to be
at risk of claims being brought which allege a duty of care in
relation to the actions of their foreign subsidiaries or branches.

The High Court had concluded that the proceedings would be
"irredeemably unmanageable", and that allowing the claims to
progress simultaneously in England and Brazil would "foist upon the
English courts the largest white elephant in the history of group
actions". The Court of Appeal, however, held that unmanageability
could not itself justify a finding of abuse of process, and in any
event a conclusion as to unmanageability could not be reached
safely at such an early stage of the proceedings, when the precise
nature and scope of the issues between the parties had yet to be
identified. The proper time for considering how to manage the
proceedings would be at a case management conference before the
assigned judge, at which point the parties would be obliged to
co-operate in putting forward case management proposals.

It was also significant that the Court of Appeal disagreed with the
judge's conclusions as to the claimants' ability to obtain full
redress in Brazil against the particular defendants. In light of
the particular procedures in Brazil, and the uncertainty as to
which entities could properly bring proceedings, the court was
satisfied that there was a real risk that full redress could not be
obtained. [GN]

BOOT BARN HOLDINGS: Faces Labor Suit in California Court
--------------------------------------------------------
Boot Barn Holdings, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 25, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that on February 27, 2020,
one employee, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
employees, filed a class action lawsuit against the company, which
includes claims for penalties under California's Private Attorney
General Act, in the Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No.
34-2019-00272000-CU-OE-GDS, alleging violations of California's
wage and hour, overtime, meal periods and rest breaks, and an
alleged violation of the suitable seating requirement as per
California Labor Law among other things. The complaint seeks an
unspecified amount of damages and penalties.

Boot Barn Holdings, Inc. operates retail stores and e-commerce
websites that sell western and work boots and related apparel and
accessories based in California.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Cole Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons in the lawsuit
captioned WILLIE EARL COLE v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC, ET
AL. Section: "J"(5), Case No. 17-3649 (E.D. La.):

   (1) granting the Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
       Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
       filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively
       "BP");

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," see In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater
Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL
6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were
originally part of a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in
this Court. During the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court
approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition.

Plaintiff Willie Earl Cole was employed in the DWH oil spill
response cleaning beaches for approximately twelve months. This
work, Cole alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical
dispersants which caused the Plaintiff to develop a multitude of
adverse medical conditions, including cellulitis, skin boils,
blistering, crusting, dryness/flaking, inflammation, redness or
swelling, itching, lesions, peeling, scaling, sinusitis,
bronchitis, upper respiratory infection, decreased sense of smell,
facial pain or sinus pain, nasal congestion/discharge, throat
irritation, flu-like symptoms, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea,
abdominal cramps, dizziness, congestion, wheezing, bronchitis,
depression, headache, eye burning and irritation.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." The Court further observed
that the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue
of many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. Cole relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony as
to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with a
master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine. Dr. Cook's report is a non-case
specific, general causation expert report that has been used by
multiple B3 plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by name, including
Cole, and it does not address any specific plaintiff's work on the
spill response or the nature, duration, or type of exposure any
plaintiff had to any particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr.
Cook evaluates four categories of injuries or disease to see
whether they could be caused by exposure to crude oil or
dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded that three of the categories of
injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can result from
exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and the Court
itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases.
BP argues that in this case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Lance M. Africk identified
four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found that just one of
these four reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion,
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary
to cause the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Here, the
Court begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe determined
merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony: whether his
report identifies a particular chemical or the level of exposure to
any such chemical as would be necessary to cause Cole's specific
adverse health conditions.

Judge Barbier notes that further, in a BELO case, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the exclusion of a plaintiff's expert because he "was unable
to answer questions regarding how much time [the plaintiff] spent
scooping up oil, how, where, or in what quantity Corexit was used,
how exposure levels would change once substances were diluted in
seawater, or how [the plaintiff's] protective equipment would
affect exposure." Accordingly, here, to be reliable and, thus
admissible, Dr. Cook's report must, at a minimum, analyze Cole's
probable level of exposure.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Cole is alleging multiple adverse health conditions.
Because the Plaintiff used the same report by Dr. Cook here, Judge
Barbier points out that Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single specific chemical.

Mr. Cole admits that "Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually correct
in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data in
reaching his general causation opinions." In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Cole contends
that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use measurement/effect
criteria like the "exposure-response," "ever/never exposed," and
"job exposure matrix" because BP avoided or prevented the recording
of exposure and dose data. Cole argues, among other things, that
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular chemical or the level
of exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause the
specific symptoms is not a bar to finding that his methodology is
proper and reliable under Daubert.

However, Judge Barbier opines, while this argument may work in
response to BP's contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper
methodology, it does not prevail in response to BP's assertion that
Dr. Cook does not identify the harmful level of exposure for any
chemical or any medical condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held,
identification of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical is
one of the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case."

Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single chemical and, instead,
refers generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic
compounds, Judge Barbier states. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's
report were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude
oil, weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to
establish a harmful level of any chemical to the general
population. Thus, Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth
Circuit's minimal fact required: scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points
out himself, "[t]here is a toxicology maxim that the dose
determines the poison." Yet, Dr. Cook fails to identify the dose of
any such chemical that would result in the adverse health effects
contained in his report, and his report is, therefore, unreliable
and inadmissible, Judge Barbier holds.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, Judge Barbier finds that Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment dismissing Cole's claims. Cole has no other
medical expert for general causation, and expert testimony is
required. Therefore, Cole has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claims that his injuries were
caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff his requested relief,
it would be fruitless, as other sections of the Court have already
found, Judge Barbier notes, citing Harrison v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
2022 WL 2438502, at *7 (E.D. La. June 30, 2022) (Morgan, J.).
Moreover, as Judge Vance reasoned, "even if the Court were to
consider the 'ever/never' exposure model data, that would not cure
the lack of 'fit' between Dr. Cook's general causation report and
the facts of plaintiff's case."

                           Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier rules that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude the Causation Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.  The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines is
denied.

All claims of Plaintiff George Leonard Coon against Defendants BP
Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America Production Company; BP
p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Transocean Deepwater,
Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd4txryn from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Ross Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ERICA ROSS v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
INC., ET AL., Section: "J"(5), Case No. 17-4287 (E.D. La.), Judge
Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons:

   (1) granting the Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
       Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
       filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively
       "BP");

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613,
at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were originally part of
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in this Court. During
the course of the MDL proceedings, the Court approved the Deepwater
Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement. The B3
plaintiffs either opted out of the class action settlement
agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff Erica Ross was employed in the DWH oil spill response as
a beach cleanup worker, picking up oil and oil-covered debris on
the beaches of Gulfport, Mississippi; Long Beach, Mississippi;
Biloxi, Mississippi; Pass Christian, Mississippi; Bay St. Louis,
Mississippi; Waveland, Mississippi; Deer Island, Mississippi; and
Pascagoula, Mississippi for approximately four months. This work,
Ross alleges, exposed her to crude oil and chemical dispersants
which caused the Plaintiff to develop a multitude of adverse
medical conditions, including eye burning, eye irritation, rashes,
skin dryness/flaking, skin itching, skin peeling, nausea, vomiting,
diarrhea, allergic rhinitis, URI, swelling, throat irritation,
cephalgia, dizziness, numbness in extremities, migraines, anemia,
chronic bronchitis, pneumonitis due to chemicals, wheezing, and
pain in her left breast.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." The Court further observed
that the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue
of many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Here, Ross relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony as
to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with a
master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine. Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus,
non-case specific, general causation expert report that has been
used by many B3 plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by name,
including Ross, and it does not address any specific plaintiff's
work on the spill response or the nature, duration, or type of
exposure any plaintiff had to any particular toxin. Further, in the
report, Dr. Cook evaluates four categories of injuries or disease
to see whether they could be caused by exposure to crude oil or
dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded that three of the categories of
injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can result from
exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

To begin, BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and
this Court itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in
similar B3 cases. BP argues that in this case, the Court should
exclude Dr. Cook's opinions for the same reasons.  Judge Lance M.
Africk identified four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general
causation opinions were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found
that just one of these four reasons was substantial on its own to
permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of
exposure necessary to cause the Plaintiff's specific medical
condition. Specifically, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed
to identify a "particular chemical" or the level of exposure to any
such chemical as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms
that is to say, the dose necessary to cause the reported reaction.

The Court begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause Ross's
specific adverse health conditions. Accordingly, here, to be
reliable and, thus admissible, Dr. Cook's report must, at a
minimum, analyze Ross's probable level of exposure.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions,
emphasized that Dr. Cook's report failed to include even a single
mention of a specific chemical.

Because the Plaintiff used the same report by Dr. Cook here, Dr.
Cook's report fails to identify a single specific chemical, Judge
Barbier finds.

Ms. Ross admits that Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually correct
in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data in
reaching his general causation opinions. In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Ross contends
that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use measurement/effect
criteria like the "exposure-response," "ever/never exposed," and
"job exposure matrix" because BP avoided or prevented the recording
of exposure and dose data. Ross argues, among other things, that
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular chemical or the level
of exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause the
specific symptoms is not a bar to finding that his methodology is
proper and reliable under Daubert.

However, Judge Barbier opines, while this argument may work in
response to BP's contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper
methodology, it does not prevail in response to BP's assertion that
Dr. Cook does not identify the harmful level of exposure for any
chemical or any medical condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held,
identification of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical is
one of the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case."

Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil, dispersants,
and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's report
were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude oil,
weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to establish
a harmful level of any chemical to the general population. Thus,
Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth Circuit's minimal fact
required: scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to
a chemical.

As Dr. Cook even points out himself, there is a toxicology maxim
that the dose determines the poison. Yet, Dr. Cook fails to
identify the dose of any such chemical that would result in the
adverse health effects contained in his report, and his report is,
therefore, unreliable and inadmissible, Judge Barbier holds.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Ross's claims. Ross has no other medical expert for
general causation, and expert testimony is required.

Therefore, Judge Barbier holds that Ross has failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to her claims that her
injuries were caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff her requested relief,
it would be fruitless, as other sections of the Court have already
found, Judge Barbier explains. Moreover, as Judge Vance reasoned,
"even if the Court were to consider the 'ever/never' exposure model
data, that would not cure the lack of 'fit' between Dr. Cook's
general causation report and the facts of plaintiff's case."

                           Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier ruled that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude the Causation Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines is
denied.

It is further ordered that all claims of Plaintiff Erica Ross
against Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America
Production Company; BP p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.;
Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5n879fbh from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Haynes Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons in the lawsuit
styled ALEXANDER HAYNES v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., ET
AL., SECTION: "J" (1), Case No. 17-3271 (E.D. La.):

   (1) granting the Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
       Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
       filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively
       "BP");

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613,
at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were originally part of
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in this Court. During
the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff Alexander Haynes was employed in the DWH oil spill
response performing decontamination services and cleaning boats and
barges for approximately five months. This work, Haynes alleges,
exposed him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which caused the
Plaintiff to develop a multitude of adverse medical conditions,
including abdominal pains, diarrhea, nausea, dizziness, headaches,
depression, anxiety, eye irritation, nasal congestion, nosebleeds,
shortness of breath, wheezing, skin boils, skin dryness/flaking,
and skin itching.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, this Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." The Court further observed
that the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue
of many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Haynes relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony as to
general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with a
master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine. Dr. Cook's report is a non-case
specific, general causation expert report that has been used by
multiple B3 plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by name, including
Haynes, and it does not address any specific plaintiff's work on
the spill response or the nature, duration, or type of exposure any
plaintiff had to any particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr.
Cook evaluates four categories of injuries or disease to see
whether they could be caused by exposure to crude oil or
dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded that three of the categories of
injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can result from
exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and the Court
itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases.
BP argues that in this case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Lance M. Africk identified
four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found that just one of
these four reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion,
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary
to cause the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Here, the
Court begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe determined
merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony: whether his
report identifies a particular chemical or the level of exposure to
any such chemical as would be necessary to cause Haynes's specific
adverse health conditions.

Judge Barbier states that further, in a BELO case, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the exclusion of a plaintiff's expert because he
"was unable to answer questions regarding how much time [the
plaintiff] spent scooping up oil, how, where, or in what quantity
Corexit was used, how exposure levels would change once substances
were diluted in seawater, or how [the plaintiff's] protective
equipment would affect exposure." Accordingly, here, to be reliable
and, thus admissible, Dr. Cook's report must, at a minimum, analyze
Haynes's probable level of exposure, Judge Barbier holds.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Haynes is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions. Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr.
Cook's report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Because the Plaintiff used the same report by Dr. Cook
here, Judge Barbier says Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single specific chemical.

Mr. Haynes admits that "Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually
correct in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data
in reaching his general causation opinions." In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Haynes contends
that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use measurement/effect
criteria like the "exposure-response," "ever/never exposed," and
"job exposure matrix" because BP avoided or prevented the recording
of exposure and dose data. Haynes argues, among other things, that
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular chemical or the level
of exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause the
specific symptoms is not a bar to finding that his methodology is
proper and reliable under Daubert.

Judge Barbier, however, opines that while this argument may work in
response to BP's contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper
methodology, it does not prevail in response to BP's assertion that
Dr. Cook does not identify the harmful level of exposure for any
chemical or any medical condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held,
identification of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical is
one of the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case."

Here, Judge Barbier finds, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil, dispersants,
and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's report
were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude oil,
weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to establish
a harmful level of any chemical to the general population. Thus,
Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth Circuit's minimal fact
required: scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to
a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points out himself, "[t]here is a
toxicology maxim that the dose determines the poison." Yet, Dr.
Cook fails to identify the dose of any such chemical that would
result in the adverse health effects contained in his report, and
his report is, therefore, unreliable and inadmissible.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Haynes's claims, Judge Barbier holds. Haynes has no
other medical expert for general causation, and expert testimony is
required. Therefore, Haynes has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claims that his injuries were
caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Here, even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff his requested
relief, Judge Barbier holds that it would be fruitless, as other
sections of the Court have already found.

                           Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier rules that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude the Causation Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.  The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines is
denied.

All claims of Plaintiff George Leonard Coon against Defendants BP
Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America Production Company; BP
p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Transocean Deepwater,
Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.


A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3xxaxcnj from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Keller Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lance M. Africk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons in the lawsuit
styled BRIAN KELLER v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., ET AL.,
SECTION I, Case No. 13-1018 (E.D. La.), granting:

   -- a motion in limine to exclude the opinions of the
      Plaintiff's medical causation expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
      filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP
      America Production Company and BP p.l.c. (collectively,
      "BP"); and

   -- the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Defendants contend that if the Court grants their motion in
limine, then summary judgment will also be warranted because
Plaintiff Brian Keller will lack necessary expert testimony. Keller
opposes both motions.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve "claims
for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil
and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response (e.g.,
dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at
*10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021) (Barbier, J.). In the course of the MDL
proceedings, Judge Barbier approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical
Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement, which included a
Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO") permitting certain class
members to sue the defendants for later-manifested physical
conditions. The B3 plaintiffs, by contrast, either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition. To prevail on their claims, the "B3 plaintiffs must
prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the response."

Mr. Keller was employed in the Deepwater Horizon ("DWH") oil spill
response. According to his filings, he worked as a supervisor for
an onshore clean-up crew. He claims to have worked for about 3
months, wearing personal protective equipment provided by his
employer. The Plaintiff alleges that exposure to crude oil and
chemical dispersants caused him to develop a multitude of adverse
medical conditions, including chronic conjunctival injury, chronic
conjunctivitis, dry eye syndrome, bronchitis, stomach problems, and
sinusitis.

To support his claim that exposure to oil and dispersants caused
his health problems, Keller provides a medical causation analysis
completed by Cook. Cook is a retired Navy physician, a fellow of
the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine,
and is board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report utilized a "general causation approach to
determine if a reported health complaint can be from the result of
exposures sustained in performing clean-up work" and to assess "the
likelihood that occupational exposures that occurred during work in
oil spill cleanup caused disease, contributed to the development of
disease, affected the severity of disease, or exacerbated
pre-existing disease that workers have associated with potential
exposures."

Dr. Cook's report is organized into five chapters. The first
chapter outlines Cook's qualifications, which are not challenged.
The second chapter provides background on the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. The third chapter describes Cook's methodology. The fourth
chapter of Cook's report recounts the history of oil spills and
related clean-up efforts and analyzes prior studies on the health
effects associated with exposure to oil. Finally, the fifth chapter
contains Cook's opinions on general causation for four categories
of medical conditions: (1) respiratory conditions; (2) dermal
conditions; (3) ocular conditions; and (4) cancers. Ultimately,
Cook concludes that a "[g]eneral causation analysis indicates that
these acute and chronic [respiratory, dermal, ocular] conditions
can occur in individuals exposed to crude oil, including weathered
crude oil, during oil spill response and cleanup work."

The Defendants assert that Cook's general causation opinion should
be excluded because it is unreliable. Specifically, they argue,
among other things, that Cook's report failed to identify a harmful
dose of exposure to any particular chemical.

Judge Africk notes that the Cook report in the present case suffers
from the one of the same flaws, which the Court identified in an
earlier version of Cook's report excluded in Murphy v. BP Expl. &
Prod. Inc., No. 13-1031, 2022 WL 1460093 (E.D. La. May 9, 2022),
and Novelozo v. BP Expl. & Prod. Inc., No. 13-1033, 2022 WL 1460103
(E.D. La. May 9, 2022), insofar as Cook fails to identify a
particular chemical and corresponding dose to which Keller was
exposed.

Mr. Keller addresses this lack of dose-response data in Cook's
report by asserting that the Defendants' failure to conduct dermal
and biomonitoring of clean-up workers--which, Keller submits "would
have created a quantitative exposure and dose database for these
workers"--is evidence that "BP consciously, or in the most
favorable light negligently, avoided recording data which would
show the exposure doses of spill workers."

Yet, as noted by other courts, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
Unified Area Command, which was composed of several federal and
state agencies, "engaged in extensive and coordinated data
collection and environmental monitoring efforts, in what has been
characterized as 'the largest environmental investigation of an oil
spill ever undertaken,'" Judge Africk notes, citing In re Deepwater
Horizon Belo Cases, 2020 WL 6689212, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4,
2020). The availability of this data casts doubt on the assertion
that there is a lack of monitoring data associated with the spill,
Judge Africk points out.

Having determined that Cook's report should be excluded, the Court
now turns to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The issue of general causation is a necessary element of the
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants, Judge Africk notes. Cook
is Keller's sole expert on general causation. With Cook's opinion
on general causation now excluded, Keller lacks expert testimony
with respect to general causation, Judge Africk opines.

As a result, Judge Africk holds, Keller has failed to present a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claims that his
injuries were caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.
Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

For the reasons stated, Judge Africk rules that the motion in
limine to exclude the causation testimony of Dr. Jerald Cook is
granted. The motion for summary judgment is granted. Keller's
claims are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/tx7nwaas from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Heathington Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons in the lawsuit
entitled THOMAS HEATHINGTON v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., ET
AL., Section: "J"(5), Case No. 17-4353 (E.D. La.):

   (1) granting the Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
       Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
       filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively
       "BP");

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613,
at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were originally part of
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in this Court. During
the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff Thomas Heathington was employed in the DWH oil spill
response as a beach cleanup worker, picking up oil and oil-covered
debris from sand and coastal areas on the beaches of Pascagoula and
Petit Bois, Mississippi for approximately nine months. This work,
Heathington alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical
dispersants which caused the Plaintiff to develop a multitude of
adverse medical conditions, including rash, skin irritation,
bronchitis, cough, shortness of breath, sinus problems, sore
throat, and headaches.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." The Court further observed
that the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue
of many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. Heathington relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert
testimony as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy
physician with a master's degree in environmental toxicology and a
fellow of the American College of Occupational and Environmental
Medicine. He is board certified in occupational medicine, public
health, and general preventative medicine. Dr. Cook's report is an
omnibus, non-case specific, general causation expert report that
has been used by many B3 plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by
name, including Heathington, and it does not address any specific
plaintiff's work on the spill response or the nature, duration, or
type of exposure any plaintiff had to any particular toxin.
Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four categories of
injuries or disease to see whether they could be caused by exposure
to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded that three of the
categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can
result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

To begin, BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and
this Court itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in
similar B3 cases. BP argues that in this case, the Court should
exclude Dr. Cook's opinions for the same reasons. Judge Lance M.
Africk identified four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general
causation opinions were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found
that just one of these four reasons was substantial on its own to
permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of
exposure necessary to cause the plaintiff's specific medical
condition.

The Court begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Heathington's specific adverse health conditions. To be reliable
and, thus admissible, Dr. Cook's report must, at a minimum, analyze
Heathington's probable level of exposure, Judge Barbier points
out.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions,
emphasized that Dr. Cook's report failed to include even a single
mention of a specific chemical. Because the Plaintiff used the same
report by Dr. Cook here, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single specific chemical, Judge Barbier notes.

Mr. Heathington admits that "Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually
correct in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data
in reaching his general causation opinions." In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Heathington
contends that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use
measurement/effect criteria like the "exposure-response,"
"ever/never exposed," and "job exposure matrix" because BP avoided
or prevented the recording of exposure and dose data. Heathington
argues, among other things, that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a
particular chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar
to finding that his methodology is proper and reliable under
Daubert.

However, Judge Barbier opines, while this argument may work in
response to BP's contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper
methodology, it does not prevail in response to BP's assertion that
Dr. Cook does not identify the harmful level of exposure for any
chemical or any medical condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held,
identification of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical is
one of the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case."

Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil, dispersants,
and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's report
were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude oil,
weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to establish
a harmful level of any chemical to the general population. Thus,
Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth Circuit's minimal fact
required: scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to
a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points out himself, "there is a
toxicology maxim that the dose determines the poison." Yet, Dr.
Cook fails to identify the dose of any such chemical that would
result in the adverse health effects contained in his report, and
his report is, therefore, unreliable and inadmissible.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Heathington's claims. Heathington has no other medical
expert for general causation, and expert testimony is required.

Therefore, Judge Barbier holds, Heathington has failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claims that his
injuries were caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff his requested relief,
it would be fruitless, as other sections of the Court have already
found, Judge Barbier holds, citing Harrison v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
2022 WL 2438502, at *7 (E.D. La. June 30, 2022) (Morgan, J.).

                           Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier rules that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude the Causation Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines is
denied.

All claims of Plaintiff Thomas Heathington against Defendants BP
Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America Production Company; BP
p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Transocean Deepwater,
Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4nxsbt7h from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Roberson B3 Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons in the lawsuit
styled RAYNARD ROBERSON v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., ET
AL., Section: "J"(1), Case No. 17-4286 (E.D. La.):

   (1) granting the Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
       Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
       filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively
       "BP");

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613,
at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were originally part of
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in this Court. During
the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff Raynard Roberson was employed in the DWH oil spill
response as a security guard for ports and decontamination stations
in Mississippi for approximately seven months. This work, Roberson
alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which
caused the Plaintiff to develop a multitude of adverse medical
conditions, including diarrhea, nausea, blurred vision, burning and
tearing, hematuria, abscess, dermatitis, ulcers on lower
extremities, allergic contact dermatitis, chronic rhinitis and
sinusitis, shortness of breath, headaches, and dizziness.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." The Court further observed
that the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue
of many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Roberson relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony as
to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with a
master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine. Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus,
non-case specific, general causation expert report that has been
used by many B3 plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by name,
including Roberson, and it does not address any specific
plaintiff's work on the spill response or the nature, duration, or
type of exposure any plaintiff had to any particular toxin.
Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four categories of
injuries or disease to see whether they could be caused by exposure
to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded that three of the
categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can
result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and this Court
itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases.
BP argues that in this case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Lance M. Africk identified
four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found that just one of
these four reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion,
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary
to cause the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically,
Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular
chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would
be necessary to cause the specific symptoms . . . that is to say,
the dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."

The Court begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Roberson's specific adverse health conditions.

Further, in a BELO case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of
a plaintiff's expert because he was unable to answer questions
regarding how much time the plaintiff spent scooping up oil, how,
where, or in what quantity Corexit was used, how exposure levels
would change once substances were diluted in seawater, or how the
plaintiff's protective equipment would affect exposure.
Accordingly, here, to be reliable and, thus admissible, Dr. Cook's
report must, at a minimum, analyze Roberson's probable level of
exposure.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Roberson is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions. Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr.
Cook's report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Because the Plaintiff used the same report by Dr. Cook
here, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single specific
chemical, Judge Barbier notes.

Mr. Roberson admits that "Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually
correct in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data
in reaching his general causation opinions." In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Roberson
contends that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use
measurement/effect criteria like the "exposure-response,"
"ever/never exposed," and "job exposure matrix" because BP avoided
or prevented the recording of exposure and dose data. Roberson
argues, among other things, that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a
particular chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar
to finding that his methodology is proper and reliable under
Daubert.

However, Judge Barbier opines, while this argument may work in
response to BP's contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper
methodology, it does not prevail in response to BP's assertion that
Dr. Cook does not identify the harmful level of exposure for any
chemical or any medical condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held,
identification of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical is
one of the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case."

Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil, dispersants,
and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's report
were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude oil,
weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to establish
a harmful level of any chemical to the general population. Thus,
Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth Circuit's minimal fact
required: scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to
a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points out himself, "[t]here is a
toxicology maxim that the dose determines the poison." Yet, Dr.
Cook fails to identify the dose of any such chemical that would
result in the adverse health effects contained in his report, and
his report is, therefore, unreliable and inadmissible.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Roberson's claims. Roberson has no other medical expert
for general causation, and expert testimony is required. Therefore,
Roberson has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to
oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff his requested relief,
it would be fruitless, as other sections of the Court have already
found, Judge Barbier opines, citing Harrison v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
2022 WL 2438502, at *7 (E.D. La. June 30, 2022) (Morgan, J.).

                           Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier holds that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude the Causation Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines is
denied.

All claims of Plaintiff Raynard Roberson against Defendants BP
Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America Production Company; BP
p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Transocean Deepwater,
Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdfhdk5c from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Causation Opinions in Bass Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons in the lawsuit
entitled SAMUEL DESHUN BASS v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., ET
AL. SECTION: "J" (1), Case No. 17-3037 (E.D. La.):

   (1) granting the Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
       Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
       filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively
       "BP");

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613,
at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were originally part of
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in this Court. During
the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff Samuel Deshun Bass was employed in the DWH oil spill
response cleaning beaches and removing booms on the Mississippi and
Alabama coasts for approximately six months. This work, Bass
alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which
caused the Plaintiff to develop a multitude of adverse medical
conditions, including abdominal pains, nausea, diarrhea, memory
loss, headaches, skin irritation, dermatitis, rashes, itchiness,
URI, cough, nasal congestion, sinusitis, irritation around eye,
itching, and burning.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, this Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." The Court further observed
that the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue
of many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Here, Bass relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony as
to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with a
master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine. Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus,
non-case specific, general causation expert report that has been
used by many B3 plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by name,
including Bass, and it does not address any specific plaintiff's
work on the spill response or the nature, duration, or type of
exposure any plaintiff had to any particular toxin. Further, in the
report, Dr. Cook evaluates four categories of injuries or disease
to see whether they could be caused by exposure to crude oil or
dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded that three of the categories of
injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can result from
exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

To begin, BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and
this Court itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in
similar B3 cases. BP argues that in this case, the Court should
exclude Dr. Cook's opinions for the same reasons. Judge Lance M.
Africk identified four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general
causation opinions were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found
that just one of these four reasons was substantial on its own to
permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of
exposure necessary to cause the plaintiff's specific medical
condition. Here, the Court begins with the issue both Judge Africk
and Ashe determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert
testimony: whether his report identifies a particular chemical or
the level of exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to
cause Bass's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Bass is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which the
Plaintiff] complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause
the reported reaction. Because the Plaintiff used the same report
by Dr. Cook here, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single
specific chemical, Judge Barbier states.

Mr. Bass admits that "Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually correct
in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data in
reaching his general causation opinions." In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Bass contends
that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use measurement/effect
criteria like the "exposure-response," "ever/never exposed," and
"job exposure matrix" because BP avoided or prevented the recording
of exposure and dose data. Bass argues, among other things, that
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular chemical or the level
of exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause the
specific symptoms is not a bar to finding that his methodology is
proper and reliable under Daubert.

However, while this argument may work in response to BP's
contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it
does not prevail in response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does
not identify the harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any
medical condition, Judge Barbier holds. As the Fifth Circuit has
held, identification of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical
is one of the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case."

Judge Barbier notes, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single
chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil, dispersants, and
volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's report
were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude oil,
weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to establish
a harmful level of any chemical to the general population. Thus,
Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth Circuit's minimal fact
required: scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to
a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points out himself, "[t]here is a
toxicology maxim that the dose determines the poison." Yet, Dr.
Cook fails to identify the dose of any such chemical that would
result in the adverse health effects contained in his report, and
his report is therefore unreliable and inadmissible.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Bass's claims, Judge Barbier opines. Bass has no other
medical expert for general causation, and expert testimony is
required. Therefore, Bass has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claims that his injuries were
caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Here, even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff his requested
relief, it would be fruitless, as other sections of the Court have
already found, Judge Barbier holds. Moreover, as Judge Vance
reasoned, "even if the Court were to consider the 'ever/never'
exposure model data, that would not cure the lack of 'fit' between
Dr. Cook's general causation report and the facts of plaintiff's
case."

                           CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Judge Barbier rules that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude the Causation Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines is
denied.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute is
denied as moot.

All claims of Plaintiff Samuel Deshun Bass against Defendants BP
Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America Production Company; BP
p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Transocean Deepwater,
Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2cwecprd from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Causation Opinions in Coon Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled GEORGE LEONARD COON v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION INC., ET AL., Section: "J"(5), Case No. 17-3686 (E.D.
La.), Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons:

   (1) granting the Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
       Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
       filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively
       "BP");

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613,
at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were originally part of
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in this Court. During
the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff George Leonard Coon was employed in the DWH oil spill
response in the VoO program, recovering contaminated boom and
reporting spotted oil in Gulfport, Waveland, Biloxi, Lisotta Shrine
Lot, Cat Island, and the surrounding waters on the Mississippi
coast for approximately four months. This work, Coon alleges,
exposed him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which caused
Plaintiff to develop a multitude of adverse medical conditions,
including nausea, vomiting, dizziness, syncope, sinusitis, cough,
facial or sinus pain, nasal congestion/discharge, headache,
shortness of breath, wheezing, COPD exacerbation, emphysema,
stroke, slurred speech, weakness, numbness, polycystic kidney,
depression, rashes, skin blistering, dryness/flaking, inflammation,
redness, swelling, itching, and scaling.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." The Court further observed
that the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue
of many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Coon relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony as to
general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with a
master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine. Dr. Cook's report is a non-case
specific, general causation expert report that has been used by
multiple B3 plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by name, including
Coon, and it does not address any specific plaintiff's work on the
spill response or the nature, duration, or type of exposure any
plaintiff had to any particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr.
Cook evaluates four categories of injuries or disease to see
whether they could be caused by exposure to crude oil or
dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded that three of the categories of
injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can result from
exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and the Court
itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases.
BP argues that in this case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Lance M. Africk identified
four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found that just one of
these four reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion,
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary
to cause the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Here, the
Court begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe determined
merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony: whether his
report identifies a particular chemical or the level of exposure to
any such chemical as would be necessary to cause Coon's specific
adverse health conditions.

Judge Barbier notes that further, in a BELO case, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the exclusion of a plaintiff's expert because he "was unable
to answer questions regarding how much time [the plaintiff] spent
scooping up oil, how, where, or in what quantity Corexit was used,
how exposure levels would change once substances were diluted in
seawater, or how [the plaintiff's] protective equipment would
affect exposure." Accordingly, here, to be reliable and, thus
admissible, Dr. Cook's report must, at a minimum, analyze Coon's
probable level of exposure.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Coon is alleging multiple adverse health conditions.
Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Because the Plaintiff used the same report by Dr. Cook,
Judge Barbier points out that Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single specific chemical.

Mr. Coon admits that "Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually correct
in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data in
reaching his general causation opinions." In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Coon contends
that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use measurement/effect
criteria like the "exposure-response," "ever/never exposed," and
"job exposure matrix" because BP avoided or prevented the recording
of exposure and dose data. Coon argues, among other things, that
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular chemical or the level
of exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause the
specific symptoms is not a bar to finding that his methodology is
proper and reliable under Daubert.

However, Judge Barbier says, while this argument may work in
response to BP's contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper
methodology, it does not prevail in response to BP's assertion that
Dr. Cook does not identify the harmful level of exposure for any
chemical or any medical condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held,
identification of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical is
one of the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case."

Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil, dispersants,
and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's report
were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude oil,
weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to establish
a harmful level of any chemical to the general population. Thus,
Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth Circuit's minimal fact
required: scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to
a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points out himself, "[t]here is a
toxicology maxim that the dose determines the poison." Yet, Dr.
Cook fails to identify the dose of any such chemical that would
result in the adverse health effects contained in his report, and
his report is, therefore, unreliable and inadmissible.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Coon's claims, Judge Barbier holds. Coon has no other
medical expert for general causation, and expert testimony is
required. Therefore, Coon has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claims that his injuries were
caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff his requested relief,
it would be fruitless, as other sections of the Court have already
found, Judge Barbier opines, citing Harrison v. BP Expl. & Prod.,
2022 WL 2438502, at *7 (E.D. La. June 30, 2022) (Morgan, J.).

                           Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier rules that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude the Causation Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.  The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines is
denied.

All claims of Plaintiff George Leonard Coon against Defendants BP
Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America Production Company; BP
p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Transocean Deepwater,
Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/mxjrpj3e from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Cook Opinions From Jones Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled ANDRE JONES v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
INC., ET AL., Section: "J"(2), Case No. 17-4376 (E.D. La.), Judge
Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons:

   (1) granting Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c.'s Daubert Motion
       to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's
       Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook;

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment; and

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613,
at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were originally part of
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in this Court. During
the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff Andre Jones was employed in the DWH oil spill response
repairing boom located off-shore, and he also worked as a beach
cleanup worker, picking up oil and oil-covered debris from sand and
coastal areas on the beaches of Jackson County and Harrison County,
Mississippi for approximately five months. This work, Jones
alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which
caused the Plaintiff to develop a multitude of adverse medical
conditions, including foot rash, lesions, hives, boils, abscesses,
contact dermatitis, dizziness, giddiness, fatigue, headaches,
cardiac murmurs, percutaneous coronary procedure, coronary artery
diseases, chest pain, shortness of breath, coughing, wheezing,
burning eyes, tearing eyes, blurriness, loss of visual acuity, left
eye discharge, eye swelling, left ear pain, sore throat,
peritonsillar cellulitis, right ear pain, ear swelling, mental
health conditions, and suicidal history.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response. The Court further observed that
the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of
many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Judge Barbier notes that here, Jones relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to
provide expert testimony as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a
retired Navy physician with a master's degree in environmental
toxicology and a fellow of the American College of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine. He is board certified in occupational
medicine, public health, and general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus, non-case specific, general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs.
It mentions no plaintiff by name, including Jones, and it does not
address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill response or the
nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff had to any
particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four
categories of injuries or disease to see whether they could be
caused by exposure to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded
that three of the categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and
ocular -- can result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

To begin, BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and
the Court itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar
B3 cases. BP argues that in this case, the Court should exclude Dr.
Cook's opinions for the same reasons. Judge Lance M. Africk
identified four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general
causation opinions were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found
that just one of these four reasons was substantial on its own to
permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of
exposure necessary to cause the Plaintiff's specific medical
condition.

Specifically, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify
a "particular chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such
chemical as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms that
is to say, the dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."
Here, the Court begins with the issue both Judges Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Jones's specific adverse health conditions.

Accordingly, to be reliable and, thus admissible, Dr. Cook's report
must, at a minimum, analyze Jones's probable level of exposure,
Judge Barbier states.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Jones is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which [the
Plaintiff] was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such
chemical as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of
which [the Plaintiff] complains -- that is to say, the dose
necessary to cause the reported reaction. Because the Plaintiff
used the same report by Dr. Cook here, Dr. Cook's report fails to
identify a single specific chemical, Judge Barbier points out.

Mr. Jones admits that "Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually correct
in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data in
reaching his general causation opinions." In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Jones contends
that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use measurement/effect
criteria like the "exposure-response," "ever/never exposed," and
"job exposure matrix" because BP avoided or prevented the recording
of exposure and dose data. Jones argues, among other things, that
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular chemical or the level
of exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause the
specific symptoms is not a bar to finding that his methodology is
proper and reliable under Daubert.

However, while this argument may work in response to BP's
contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it
does not prevail in response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does
not identify the harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any
medical condition, Judge Barbier opines. As the Fifth Circuit has
held, identification of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical
is one of the "minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
burden in a toxic tort case."

Judge Barbier opines that Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil, dispersants,
and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's report
were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude oil,
weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to establish
a harmful level of any chemical to the general population. Thus,
Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth Circuit's minimal fact
required: scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to
a chemical.

As Dr. Cook even points out himself, there is a toxicology maxim
that the dose determines the poison, Judge Barbier notes. Yet, Dr.
Cook fails to identify the dose of any such chemical that would
result in the adverse health effects contained in his report, and
his report is therefore unreliable and inadmissible.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Jones's claims, according to Judge Barbier. Jones has no
other medical expert for general causation, and expert testimony is
required. Therefore, Jones has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claims that his injuries were
caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff his requested relief,
it would be fruitless, as other sections of the Court have already
found, Judge Barbier holds. Moreover, as Judge Vance reasoned, even
if the Court were to consider the 'ever/never' exposure model data,
that would not cure the lack of 'fit' between Dr. Cook's general
causation report and the facts of the Plaintiff's case.

                           Conclusion

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Exclude the Causation
Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert is granted. The Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for
Extension of Deadlines is denied.

All claims of Plaintiff Andre Jones against Defendants BP
Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America Production Company; BP
p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Transocean Deepwater,
Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8hbt3z from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid to Exclude Cook Opinions in Beverly Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JOY LASHAWN BEVERLY v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION INC., ET AL., SECTION: "J" (5), Case No. 17-3045 (E.D.
La.), Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana issued an Order & Reasons:

   (1) granting the Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
       Causation Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook,
       filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP
       America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively
       "BP");

   (2) granting BP's Motion for Summary Judgment;

   (3) denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines.

Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., join in the Daubert Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)," In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613,
at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). These cases were originally part of
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in this Court. During
the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff Joy LaShawn Beverly was employed in the DWH oil spill
response cleaning booms and boats in Theodore and Mobile, Alabama,
for approximately four months. This work, Beverly alleges, exposed
her to crude oil and chemical dispersants which caused Plaintiff to
develop a multitude of adverse medical conditions, including
abdominal pains, nausea, vomiting, occult blood, sinus problems,
chronic rhinitis, wheezing, SOB, sinusitis, bronchitis, weakness,
fatigue, abnormal glucose levels, blurred vision, dry eye, eye
pain, chronic conjunctivitis, anxiety, panic disorder, ganglion
NOS, and bone/skin neoplasm NOS.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." The Court further observed
that the issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue
of many B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Ms. Beverly relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony
as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with
a master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine. Dr. Cook's report is a non-case
specific, general causation expert report that has been used by
multiple B3 plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by name, including
Beverly, and it does not address any specific plaintiff's work on
the spill response or the nature, duration, or type of exposure any
plaintiff had to any particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr.
Cook evaluates four categories of injuries or disease to see
whether they could be caused by exposure to crude oil or
dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded that three of the categories of
injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can result from
exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude. In
response, the Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Extension of
Deadlines asking the Court to continue all scheduling deadlines and
to refrain from ruling on dispositive motions pending the
completion of general causation discovery.

                         Daubert Motion

BP points out that four other Sections of the Court, and the Court
itself, have excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases.
BP argues that in this case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Lance M. Africk identified
four primary bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
were unreliable, and Judge Barry W. Ashe found that just one of
these four reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion,
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary
to cause the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Here, the
Court begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe determined
merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony: whether his
report identifies a particular chemical or the level of exposure to
any such chemical as would be necessary to cause Beverly's specific
adverse health conditions.

Judge Barbier also notes that further, in a BELO case, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the exclusion of a plaintiff's expert because he was
unable to answer questions regarding how much time the plaintiff
spent scooping up oil, how, where, or in what quantity Corexit was
used, how exposure levels would change once substances were diluted
in seawater, or how the plaintiff's protective equipment would
affect exposure. Accordingly, here, to be reliable and, thus
admissible, Dr. Cook's report must, at a minimum, analyze Beverly's
probable level of exposure.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Beverly is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions. Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr.
Cook's report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Because the Plaintiff used the same report by Dr. Cook
here, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single specific
chemical, Judge Barbier holds.

Ms. Beverly admits that "Judge Ashe's conclusion is factually
correct in that Dr. Cook did not rely on quantitative exposure data
in reaching his general causation opinions." In an attempt to
articulate better than past plaintiffs why Dr. Cook does not
identify quantitative exposure data in his report, Beverly contends
that Dr. Cook and the scientific community use measurement/effect
criteria like the "exposure-response," "ever/never exposed," and
"job exposure matrix" because BP avoided or prevented the recording
of exposure and dose data. Beverly argues, among other things, that
Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular chemical or the level
of exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause the
specific symptoms is not a bar to finding that his methodology is
proper and reliable under Daubert.

Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil, dispersants,
and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr. Cook's report
were to identify a specific chemical present in the crude oil,
weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to establish
a harmful level of any chemical to the general population. Thus,
Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth Circuit's minimal fact
required: scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to
a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points out himself, "[t]here is a
toxicology maxim that the dose determines the poison." Yet, Dr.
Cook fails to identify the dose of any such chemical that would
result in the adverse health effects contained in his report, and
his report is, therefore, unreliable and inadmissible.

                   Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by the Court and Judges Africk, Ashe,
Vance, and Morgan, because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions
are excluded, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Beverly's claims, Judge Barbier holds. Beverly has no
other medical expert for general causation, and expert testimony is
required. Therefore, Beverly has failed to create a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to her claims that her injuries were
caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

                Motion for Extension of Deadlines

Even if the Court were to grant the Plaintiff her requested relief,
it would be fruitless, as other sections of the Court have already
found, Judge Barbier states. Moreover, as Judge Vance reasoned,
"even if the Court were to consider the 'ever/never' exposure model
data, that would not cure the lack of 'fit' between Dr. Cook's
general causation report and the facts of plaintiff's case."

                           Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier holds that the Defendants' Motion to
Exclude the Causation Opinion of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald
Cook is granted. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Deadlines is
denied.

All claims of Plaintiff Joy Lashawn Beverly against Defendants BP
Exploration & Production Inc.; BP America Production Company; BP
p.l.c; Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Transocean Deepwater,
Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated July 28,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3xazum9 from
Leagle.com.


BRANDONBILT MOTORSPORTS: Case Management & Scheduling Order Entered
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ERIC DE FORD and SANDRA
BADER, v. JAMES KOUTOULAS, JEFFREY CARTER, ERIK NORDEN, BRANDON
BROWN, BRANDONBILT MOTORSPORTS, LLC, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR STOCK
CAR AUTO RACING, LLC, CORPORATE DEFENDANT DOE, ARIS GEORGE
MICHALOPOULOS, THOMAS MCLAUGHLIN, CORAL CAPITAL LLC, CORAL CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT LLC, CORAL DEFI LP and ALEXANDER HOPE MASCIOLI, Case No.
6:22-cv-00652-PGB-DCI (M.D. Fla.), the Court entered a case
management and scheduling order as follows:

  -- Mandatory Initial Disclosures:      September 2, 2022

  -- Motions to Add Parties or to        January 27, 2023
     Amend Pleadings:

  -- Disclosure of Class
     Certification Expert Reports

                        Plaintiff:       May 19, 2023

                        Defendant:       July 25, 2023

  -- Defendants' deadline to file        July 25, 2023
     any Daubert motion(s) directed
     to Plaintiffs' expert’s class
     certification report:

  -- Plaintiffs Deadline for moving      June 23, 2023
     for Class Certification:

                 Response Deadline:      July 14, 2023

                    Reply Deadline:      July 28, 2023

  -- Deadline for Defendants' Brief      August 18, 2023
     opposing class certification:

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 2, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BP6o6Q at no extra charge.[CC]

CARVANA CO: Bronstein Gewirtz Reminds of October 3 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Carvana Co. ("Carvana" or the
"Company") (NYSE: CVNA) and certain of its officers, on behalf of a
class consisting of all persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired Carvana securities between May 6, 2020 and June
24, 2022, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Such investors
are encouraged to join this case by visiting the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/cvna.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Carvana faced serious, ongoing issues with documentation,
registration, and title with many of its vehicles; (2) as a result,
Carvana was issuing unusually frequent temporary plates; (3) as a
result of the foregoing, Carvana was violating laws and regulations
in many existing markets; (4) as a result of the foregoing, Carvana
risked its ability to continue business and/or expand its business
in existing markets; (5) as a result of the foregoing, Carvana was
at an increased risk of governmental investigation and action; (6)
Carvana was in discussion with state and local authorities
regarding the above-stated business tactics and issues; (7) Carvana
was facing imminent and ongoing regulatory actions including
license suspensions, business cessation, and probation in several
states and counties including in Arizona, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and North Carolina; and (8) as a result, defendants'
statements about Carvana's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/cvna or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or
his Law Clerk and Client Relations Manager, Yael Nathanson of
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered
a loss in Carvana you have until October 3, 2022, to request that
the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in
any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC represents investors in
securities fraud class actions and shareholder derivative suits.
The firm has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for
investors nationwide. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not
guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
Peretz Bronstein or Yael Nathanson
212-697-6484 |info@bgandg.com [GN]

CHICAGO BRIDGE: Class Settlement in Securities Suit Gets Final OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY N.V. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Case No. 1:17-cv-1580 (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Lorna G.
Schofield of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York grants the Settling Parties' application of for approval
of the Settlement set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement dated
Feb. 4, 2022.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge
Schofield finds that said Settlement is, in all respects, fair,
reasonable, adequate to, and in the best interests of, the Lead
Plaintiff, the Additional Plaintiffs, the Released Plaintiffs'
Parties, and each of the Class Members. Accordingly, the Settlement
is approved in all respects and will be consummated in accordance
with its terms and provisions. The Parties are directed to perform
the Stipulation.

Except as to any individual claim of those Persons who have validly
and timely requested exclusion from the Class, the Action and all
claims contained therein, as well as all the Settled Claims, are
dismissed with prejudice as against each and all of the Released
Defendants' Parties.

Upon the Effective Date, Lead Plaintiff, the Additional Plaintiffs,
the Released Plaintiffs' Parties, and each of the Class Members,
will be deemed to have, and by operation of the Judgment will have,
fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished, and discharged
all Released Claims (including Unknown Claims) as against the
Released Defendants' Parties, whether or not such Class Member
executes and delivers a Claim Form or participates in the
Settlement Fund.

Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in any way, the
Court retains continuing jurisdiction over: (a) implementation of
this Settlement; (b) disposition of the Settlement Fund; (c) all
Parties hereto for the purpose of construing, enforcing and
administering the Stipulation and the Judgment.

After completion of the processing of all claims by the Claims
Administrator, the Escrow Agent will disburse the Net Settlement
Fund in accordance with the Stipulation and Plan of Allocation
without further order of the Court.

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(4), Judge Schofield awards
Class Representative ALSAR Ltd. Partnership a compensatory award of
$60,000, Class Representative Iron Workers Locals 40, 361 & 417
Union Security Funds a compensatory award of $25,000, and Class
Representative Iron Workers Local 580 Joint Funds a compensatory
award of $20,000, to be paid after the Effective Date.

The Action is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice as to all
Defendants.

In the event that the Settlement does not become Final in
accordance with the Stipulation, or the Effective Date does not
occur, this Judgment will be rendered null and void to the extent
provided by and in accordance with the Stipulation and will be
vacated. In such event, all orders entered and releases delivered
in connection herewith will also be null and void to the extent
provided by and in accordance with the Stipulation, and this
litigation will revert to the state at which it existed on Jan. 9,
2022.

There is no just reason for delay in the entry of the Judgment and
immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is expressly directed
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motions at
Docket No. 434 and 436.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Final Judgment & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/23h8c3e6 from Leagle.com.


CHICAGO BRIDGE: Court Wants Revised Order on Bid for Fees & Costs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY N.V. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Case No. 7 Civ. 1580 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Lorna H.
Schofield of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York orders the Plaintiffs to file a revised proposed order
granting the requested fees and expenses.

On June 27, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed motions for final approval
of the class action settlement and for attorney fees and expenses.
They also filed a proposed order that combined relief on both
motions.

By Order dated August 2, 2022, the Court approved the class action
settlement and struck the proposed language pertaining to fees and
expenses.

Judge Schofield now orders the Plaintiffs to file a revised
proposed order granting the requested fees and expenses, with 50%
of the fees and all of the expenses to be payable upon entry of the
order, and the remaining 50% to be payable after substantially all
of the claims have been paid upon application to the Court.

The proposed order will use as a baseline the comparable median
percentage from NERA's Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation: 2021 Full-Year Review, which yields a comparable of
27.1% where the settlement value is between $25 million and $100
million for settlements in securities class actions, and will apply
the Goldberger factors to the baseline to reach the requested fee
amount of 331/3% of the gross settlement amount, for substantially
the reasons argued in the Plaintiffs' memorandum of law, including
particularly the first Goldberger factor as reflected in the
lodestar amount.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5bhzrmf6 from Leagle.com.


COBIAN CORPORATION: CMP & Scheduling Order Entered in Abreu Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LUIGI ABREU, Individually,
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. Cobian
Corporation, Case No. Case 1:22-cv-02105-VEC (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon.
Judge Valerie Caproni entered a civil case management plan and
scheduling order as follows:

  -- All fact discovery shall be          November 10, 2022
     completed no later than:

  -- All expert discovery, including      December 22, 2022
     reports, production of
     underlying documents, and
     depositions, shall be completed
     no later than:

  -- The next pretrial conference is      November 18,2022
     scheduled for:

Other issues to be addressed at the Initial Pretrial Conference,
are:

   The Plaintiff proposes that his class certification motion be
   filed by February 20, 2023; that Defendant shall have until
   March 20, 2023 to file opposition papers; and Plaintiff shall
   have until April 20, 2023 to file any reply.

Cobian Corporation was founded in 1995. The company's line of
business includes the wholesale distribution of footwear.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 2, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JI54Vp at no extra charge.[CC]

COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED: $3.5MM Jones Class Deal Wins Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHEYENNE JONES and SARA J. GAST, individually and as a
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, on behalf
of the Coca-Cola Consolidated, Inc. 401(k) Plan, Plaintiffs v.
COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED, INC., et al., Defendants, Docket No.
3:20-CV-00654-FDW-DSC (W.D.N.C.), Judge Frank D. Whitney of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
Charlotte Division, grants the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses, and Service Awards.

The Court finds that the amount of the Settlement -- $3,500,000 --
is fair, reasonable, and adequate, taking into account the costs,
risks, and delay of trial and appeal.

The matter came before the Court for hearing on Aug. 2, 2022, to
determine the fairness of the proposed Settlement presented to the
Court and the subject of the Court's March 8, 2022, Order Granting
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Preliminarily
Certifying a Class for Settlement Purposes, Approving Form and
Manner of Settlement Notice, and Setting Date for a Fairness
Hearing, and to determine whether the Plaintiffs' request for
attorneys' fees, payment of litigation expenses, and awards to the
Plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 should be
approved.

For the sole purpose of settling and resolving the Class Action,
Judge Whitney certifies this Class Action as a class action
pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The Settlement Class is defined as: All persons who participated in
the Plan at any time during the Class Period (Nov. 24, 2014,
through the date on which the Preliminary Approval Order is
entered), including any Beneficiary of a deceased person who
participated in the Plan at any time during the Class Period, and
any Alternate Payee of a person subject to a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order who participated in the Plan at any time during the
Class Period.

Judge Whitney appoints Cheyenne Jones and Sara J. Gast as the Class
Representatives for the Settlement Class, and Miller Shah LLP and
Capozzi Adler, P.C. as the Class Counsel for the Settlement Class.
He approves the Settlement and orders that the Settlement be
consummated and implemented in accordance with its terms and
conditions.

The Plan of Allocation is finally approved as fair, reasonable, and
adequate. The Settlement Administrator will distribute the Net
Settlement Amount in accordance with the Plan of Allocation and the
Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Administrator will have final
authority to determine the share of the Net Settlement Amount to be
allocated to each Class Member in accordance with the Plan of
Allocation approved by the Court.

The Class Representatives, the Class Members, and the Plan settle,
release, relinquish, waive, and discharge any and all rights or
benefits they may now have, or in the future may have, under any
law relating to the releases of unknown claims. They, acting
individually or together, or in combination with others, are
permanently and finally barred and enjoined from suing the
Defendant Released Parties in any action or proceeding alleging any
of the Released Claims. Each Class Member releases the Defendant
Released Parties, the Defense Counsel, and the Class Counsel for
any claims, liabilities, and attorneys' fees and expenses arising
from the allocation of the Settlement Fund or Net Settlement Amount
and for all tax liability and associated penalties and interest as
well as related attorneys' fees and expenses.

The Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of
$1,166,666.67 and expenses in the amount of $216,133.68, plus any
applicable interest, such amounts to be paid out of the Settlement
Fund within 30 calendar days of the Effective Date of the
Settlement.

The Plaintiffs are awarded $15,000 each as compensatory awards for
reasonable costs and expenses directly relating to the
representation of the Class, such amounts to be paid from the
Settlement Fund within 30 calendar days of the Effective Date of
the Settlement.

Judge Whitney dismisses the operative complaint and all claims
asserted therein in the Class Action with prejudice and without
costs to any of the Parties and the Defendant Released Parties
other than as provided for in the Agreement.

The Court will retain exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any
disputes or challenges that may arise as to the performance of the
Settlement Agreement or any challenges as to the performance,
validity, interpretation, administration, enforcement, or
enforceability of the Settlement Notice, the Plan of Allocation,
the Final Approval Order, the Settlement Agreement, or the
termination of the Settlement Agreement.

Any motion to enforce te Final Approval Order or the Agreement may
be filed in the Court, and the provisions of the Agreement and/or
the Final Approval Order may also be asserted by way of an
affirmative defense or counterclaim in response to any action that
is asserted to violate the Agreement.

In the event that the Agreement is terminated, in accordance with
its terms, the Final Approval Order will be rendered null and void,
ab initio, and will be vacated nunc pro tunc, and the Class Action
will revert to its status as of the day immediately before the day
the Settlement was reached. The Parties will be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to negotiate a new case management
schedule.

With respect to any matters that arise concerning the
implementation of distributions to Class Members who have an Active
Account (after allocation decisions have been made by the
Settlement Administrator in its sole discretion), all questions not
resolved by the Settlement Agreement will be resolved by the Plan
administrator or other fiduciaries of the Plan, in accordance with
applicable law and the governing terms of the Plan.

Within 21 calendar days following the issuance of all settlement
payments to the Class Members as provided by the Plan of Allocation
approved by the Court, the Settlement Administrator will prepare
and provide to the Class Counsel and the Defense Counsel a list of
each person who received a settlement payment or contribution from
the Settlement Fund and the amount of such payment or
contribution.

Upon entry of the Final Approval Order, all Settling Parties, the
Settlement Class, and the Plan will be bound by the Settlement
Agreement and the Final Approval Order.

Judge Whitney enters judgment on all claims, counts, and causes of
action alleged in the Class Action. Notwithstanding the reservation
of jurisdiction in Paragraph 15 of the Final Approval Order, it is
a final and appealable judgment that ends the litigation of the
Class Action. The Clerk is respectfully directed to enter this
judgment in the civil docket forthwith.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Order & Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mr2chpw5 from Leagle.com.


COINBASE GLOBAL: Two Law Firms File Securities Class Lawsuits
-------------------------------------------------------------
José Rodríguez, writing for iHodl, reports that law firm Bragar
Eagel & Squire has filed a class action lawsuit in New Jersey
District Court against crypto exchange Coinbase, while San Diego
law firm Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP has filed another
lawsuit.

According to the court documents, the crypto trading platform has
made "false and misleading statements" about the nature of its
activities.

The plaintiffs claim Coinbase offered crypto assets to investors
that were supposed to be registered as securities.

The lawyers have also cited a Bloomberg report about an alleged SEC
investigation into Coinbase. Allegedly, the reason was the possible
provision to US residents of access to trading in digital assets
that may be considered securities. The US Department of Justice has
previously announced the arrest of the exchange's former product
manager, Ishan Wahi, and two of his accomplices, who have been
charged with insider trading fraud. [GN]

CONNECTED INVESTORS: Ordered to Produce Silva's Requested Documents
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JO ANNE SILVA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. CONNECTED INVESTORS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 7:21-CV-74-BO (E.D.N.C.), Magistrate Judge Robert B.
Jones, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, Southern Division, allows the Plaintiff's motion to
compel discovery and denies the Defendant's motion to amend the
scheduling order.

The Plaintiff filed a complaint on April 26, 2021, individually and
on behalf of others similarly-situated in the putative class action
asserting claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. She
alleges that she received an automated voice message from Defendant
on or about March 31, 2021, advertising its products and services
without her prior express consent in violation of the TCPA.

The Plaintiff brings the case on behalf of a putative class defined
as "all persons in the United States who, within four years prior
to the filing of the action, (1) were sent a prerecorded message by
or on behalf of the Defendant, (2) regarding the Defendant's goods,
products or services, and (4) for which the Defendant failed to
secure the called party's express written consent and/or after the
called party requested to not received future prerecorded messages
from the Defendant.

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant, or its directed
third-parties, used prerecorded messages to make non-emergency
telephone calls to the cellular telephones and telephones of her
and the other members of the Class. The Defendant, in violation of
the TCPA, did not have prior express consent to call their cell
phones when its calls were made.

The Defendant answered the complaint on June 24, 2021. The court
issued its order for a discovery plan and, on July 25, 2021, the
parties filed their Joint Rule 26(f) Report. The Joint Rule 26(f)
Report contains the parties' proposed framework of discovery in
this case, including the type of discovery to be conducted, topics
to be discovered, and various case deadlines. On July 27, 2021, the
court entered its Scheduling Order approving as modified the
parties Joint Rule 26(f) Report. Neither the parties' Joint Rule
26(f) Report nor the court's Scheduling Order provide for phased or
bifurcated discovery.

The Plaintiff served written discovery requests on the Defendant on
July 25, 2021, including the Request for Production of Documents
("RFP") that are subject of her motion to compel. On Aug. 20, 2021,
the Defendant filed a motion to stay discovery pending the Court's
ruling on its motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed Aug. 11,
2021.

On Sept. 16, 2021, the Court allowed Defendant's motion to stay. It
instructed the parties that in the event the Defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings was denied the parties were to file a new
discovery plan within 14 days of its order denying the motion. On
Feb. 4, 2022, the Court denied the Defendant's motion for judgment
on the pleadings. On Feb. 15, 2022, the parties filed an Amended
Joint Rule 26(f) Report. As before, their proposal included the
type of discovery to be conducted, topics to be discovered, and
various case deadlines. There was no request by the parties,
jointly or otherwise in their proposal, to bifurcate discovery.

Correspondence between the counsel indicates the parties were
working toward producing documents at least in part in response to
Plaintiff's document requests. The counsel for the Plaintiff
reiterated this arrangement during the hearing.

On Feb. 22, 2022, the parties filed a consent motion for a
protective order. The Court entered the parties' Consent Protective
Order on March 1, 2022. Neither the parties' proposed consent
protective order nor the protective order entered provided for
bifurcated or phased discovery.

It appears that the Defendant retained new counsel sometime between
February and April 2022. It was indicated at the hearing, and also
reflected in correspondence, that after familiarizing themselves
with the case, the new counsel was not agreeable to producing
documents related to the putative class until the posture of the
case had changed and the Court had an opportunity to rule on
dispositive and jurisdictional issues that would be based on
individualized discovery.

On April 29, 2022, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel
seeking an order to compel the Defendant to provide documents
responsive to its written discovery. She seeks an order from the
court compelling the Defendant to provide documents responsive to
its RFPs 6-8, 10, 13-17, 20, 21, 24 and 26. On that same date,
through its new counsel, the Defendant moved to amend the
scheduling order.

Judge Jones holds that the new counsel's desire to modify the
scheduling order to comport with its litigation strategy,
essentially allowing the Defendant a "do-over," does not constitute
good cause to support modification of the scheduling order. He does
not find that altering the scheduling order to comport with new
counsel's defense strategy and to bifurcate discovery, which is a
significant departure than what was originally agreed, suffices as
good cause under Rule 16. Moreover, there is nothing that prevents
the Defendant from presenting its arguments regardless of whether
the case proceeds in a bifurcated fashion on not. Finally, although
not determinative of good cause under Rule 16, Judge Jones is not
convinced the issues urged by the Defendant are as clearly
dispositive as it asserts.

For these reasons, Judge Jones denies the Defendant's motion to
alter the Scheduling Order to allow for bifurcated discovery.
However, he finds good cause to extend those deadlines that have
lapsed during the pendency of the motions and to correspondingly
extend other case deadlines and will enter a new scheduling order.

Lastly, Judge Jones has carefully reviewed each of the Plaintiff's
document requests that are the subject of the motion to compel. The
Defendant has asserted boilerplate objections in its discovery
responses and these are overruled. It has also asserted objection
to these requests for the same reasons it made in support of its
motion to amend the scheduling order. Its objections to the
Plaintiff's discovery requests are overruled. Judge Jones does not
find the requests are otherwise objectionable. The Defendant is
ordered to produce the requested documents with 21 days of the
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4347rzr8 from Leagle.com.


COVETRUS INC: $35MM Class Settlement to be Heard on October 25
--------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD POLICE OFFICERS'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM and PEMBROKE PINES
PENSION FUND FOR FIREFIGHTERS AND
POLICE OFFICERS, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HENRY SCHEIN, INC.,COVETRUS, INC.,
STEVEN PALADINO, BENJAMIN SHAW, and CHRISTINE T. KOMOLA,

Defendants

No. 2:19-cv-5530 (GRB)(RLM)

CLASS ACTION

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION, CERTIFICATION OF
SETTLEMENT CLASS, AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS
HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

TO: All persons and entities who or which purchased or otherwise
acquired Covetrus, Inc. ("Covetrus" or the "Company") common stock
during the period from February 8, 2019, through August 12, 2019,
inclusive, (the "Settlement Class Period") and were allegedly
damaged thereby (the "Settlement Class")

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY; YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
THE SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, that the above-captioned
litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class action for
settlement purposes only on behalf of the Settlement Class, except
for certain persons and entities who are excluded from the
Settlement Class by definition as set forth in the full printed
Notice of (I) Pendency of Class Action, Certification of Settlement
Class, and Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Fairness Hearing;
and (III) Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement
of Litigation Expenses (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Court-Appointed Lead Plaintiffs, City of
Hollywood Police Officers' Retirement System and Pembroke Pines
Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers, on behalf of
themselves and the Court-certified Settlement Class in the
above-captioned securities class action (the "Action"), have
reached a proposed settlement for $35,000,000.00 (the
"Settlement"), that, if approved by the Court, will resolve all
claims in the Action.

A hearing will be held on October 25, 2022, at 2:00 p.m., before
the Honorable Roanne L. Mann at the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, United States Courthouse,
Courtroom 13C-S, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, NY 11201.  The
hearing will determine (i) whether the proposed Settlement should
be approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (ii) whether the
Action should be dismissed with prejudice against Defendants, and
the Releases specified and described in the Amended Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement dated June 17, 2022 (and in the Notice),
should be granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of Allocation
should be approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv) whether Lead
Plaintiffs' application for an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of Litigation Expenses should be approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Net Settlement Fund.  If you have not yet
received the Notice and Claim Form, you may obtain copies of these
documents by contacting the Claims Administrator at Covetrus
Securities Litigation, c/o A.B. Data, Ltd., P.O. Box 173059,
Milwaukee, WI 53217, by telephone at (877) 354-3780, or by email at
info@covetrussecuritieslitigation.com. Copies of the Notice and
Claim Form can also be downloaded from the website maintained by
the Claims Administrator, www.CovetrusSecuritiesLitigation.com.

If you are a Settlement Class Member, in order to be potentially
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim Form online at the Settlement website or by
mail. The Claim Form must be submitted online through the case
website, www.CovetrusSecuritiesLitigation.com, or postmarked no
later than December 3, 2022.  If you are a Settlement Class Member
and do not submit a proper Claim Form, you will not be eligible to
share in the distribution of the net proceeds of the Settlement,
but you will nevertheless be bound by any judgments or orders
entered by the Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than October 4, 2022,
in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice. If you
properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will not
be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action and you will not be eligible to share in the proceeds of the
Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Lead Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, must be filed with the Court
by October 4, 2022, and served to representatives of Lead Counsel
and Defendants' Counsel such that they are received no later than
October 4, 2022, in accordance with the instructions set forth in
the Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Covetrus,
Benjamin Shaw, or Defendants' Counsel regarding this notice.  All
questions about this notice, the proposed Settlement, or your
eligibility to participate in the Settlement should be directed to
the Claims Administrator or Lead Counsel.  Or you may visit
www.CovetrusSecuritiesLitigation.com or call toll-free at (877)
354-3780.

Requests for the Notice or Claim Form should be made to:

Covetrus Securities Litigation
c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.
P.O. Box 173059
Milwaukee, WI 53217
(877) 354-3780
www.CovetrusSecuritiesLitigation.com
info@covetrussecuritieslitigation.com

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice or Claim Form, may be
made to the Claims Administrator or to Lead Counsel:

Covetrus Securities Litigation
c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.
P.O. Box 173059
Milwaukee, WI 53217
(877) 354-3780
www.CovetrusSecuritiesLitigation.com
info@covetrussecuritieslitigation.com

or

SAXENA WHITE P.A.
Lester R. Hooker, Esq.
7777 Glades Rd., Suite 300
Boca Raton, FL 33434
(561) 206-6708
lhooker@saxenawhite.com
                                                                   
                                                                   
                Dated: July 15, 2022               

By Order of the Court                                              
                                                         

United States District Court                                       
                                                                
Eastern District of New York [GN]

CREDIT CONTROL: Strasser FDCPA Suit Removed to E.D.N.Y.
--------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned SARA STRASSER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CREDIT CONTROL SERVICES,
INC. d/b/a CREDIT COLLECTION SERVICES, Defendant, Case No.
520675/2022 (N.Y. Sup., Kings Cty., July 20, 2022) was removed to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on
August 3, 2022, and assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-04578.

This is a class action brought by the Plaintiff, on behalf of a
class of New York consumers, seeking damages and declaratory relief
due to Defendant's alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

According to the complaint, on February 20, 2022, the Defendant
sent the Plaintiff a collection letter regarding a debt she
allegedly owed to another party referred to as "Liberty". The
Plaintiff alleges that the letter seeks to overcharge her for
insurance that she already paid for on a monthly basis, as billed
by Liberty, until policy cancellation. Thus, the letter is
fraudulent on its face because it seeks an excessive amount due,
despite monthly payments having already been made, says the suit.

As a result of the Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair
debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged, the suit
asserts.

Credit Control Services, Inc. was founded in 1966. The Company's
line of business includes collection and adjustment services on
claims and other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert Yusko, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Suite 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          E-mail: ryusko@steinsakslegal.com

D & A SERVICES: Pooler Files FDCPA Suit in D. South Carolina
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against D & A Services LLC,
et al. The case is styled as Patricia Pooler, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. D & A Services LLC,
Bureaus Investment Group Portfolio NO 15 LLC, Case No.
4:22-cv-02622-RBH (D.S.C., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

D & A Services LLC -- https://dnasllc.com/ -- is a debt collection
agency in Des Plaines, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dawn Marie McCraw, Esq.
          PRICE LAW GROUP APC
          8245 North 85th Way
          Scottsdale, AZ 85258
          Phone: (818) 600-5585
          Email: dawn@pricelawgroup.com

DELOITTE CONSULTING: New York District Court Closes Bozin Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Lewis J. Liman of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York closes the lawsuit entitled DANIEL
BOZIN, et al., Plaintiffs v. DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, Defendant,
Case No. 20-cv-5070 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y.).

By Order dated July 2, 2020, the case was consolidated into case
number 1:20-cv-3962-LJL, Culbertson v. Deloitte Consulting LLP.

In that Order, the Court directed that "all orders in Culbertson
apply equally to this action." Culbertson was closed on Feb. 16,
2022, in connection with an order granting an unopposed motion for
final approval of a class action settlement. However, this member
case remains open.

In light of the closure of the lead case, Judge Liman directed the
Clerk of Court to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/nhk5w9j6 from Leagle.com.


DENMAY INC: Jones Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Denmay, Inc. The case
is styled as Damon Jones, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Denmay, Inc. d/b/a Blue Orange Games Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-06769 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Denmay, Inc. doing business as Blue Orange Games Inc. --
https://www.blueorangegames.com/ -- create, publish and promote
award-winning games with high quality and play value.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


DOGFISH TACKLE: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dogfish Tackle Co.
The case is styled as Luis Toro, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Dogfish Tackle Co., Case No.
1:22-cv-06780 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dogfish Tackle Co. -- https://dogfishtacklecompany.com/ -- is a
fishing store in Seminole, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


DOOZY CARDS: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Doozy Cards, LLC. The
case is styled as Andrew Toro, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Doozy Cards, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-06783
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Doozy Cards -- https://www.doozycards.com/ -- is a one-stop shop
that supplies all types of e-cards for a range of occasions like
birthdays and anniversaries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


DUKE ENERGY: Denial of Summary Judgment in Bellwether Suit Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Duke Energy Indiana, LLC, Appellant-Defendant v.
Bellwether Properties, LLC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Appellee-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals
Case No. 21A-CT-1848 (Ind. App.), the Court of Appeals of Indiana
reverses the trial court's denial of Duke's motion for summary
judgment.

Bellwether planned to build a warehouse on its property, but Duke
informed it that the design violated electrical safety codes
adopted by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission. Bellwether
built a slightly smaller warehouse and sued Duke, claiming the
latter had effectively taken part of its land without
compensation.

In 2002, the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission ("IURC") revised
Indiana's utility regulations to incorporate by reference the 2002
edition of the National Electric Safety Code ("NESC"). The IURC
adopted the NESC to govern electrical utilities' "overhead and
underground construction practices."  In prior years, the IURC had
incorporated by reference into its regulations previous editions of
the NESC.

The provisions of the National Electric Safety Code are
incorporated into Indiana's Administrative Code but are not set
forth in the Code. Instead, members of the public may access the
NESC by going to the IURC's office to view and copy the NESC, or by
obtaining a copy from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc., a not-for-profit entity that issues the NESC.

Among other requirements, the NESC provides that if someone wants
to build a certain size building near an electrical transmission
line of a given voltage, the builder must ensure there is twelve
and a half feet of horizontal clearance between the line and the
building.

In 2004, Bellwether purchased a 1.17-acre parcel of land in
Bloomington, Indiana. A prior owner had built a warehouse there.
The land was subject to a perpetual utility easement that a prior
landowner had granted to Duke's predecessor-in-interest. An
electrical transmission line ran through the property, in
accordance with the easement, and also provided electricity to the
warehouse. The easement is ten feet wide, centered on the line. At
the time of the purchase, Bellwether was aware of the utility
easement but was unaware of the NESC's requirements. Bellwether had
no plans at that time to construct any other buildings on the
property.

Almost a decade later, Bellwether decided to build another
warehouse. Bellwether hired an architectural firm to design the
building, and the architect ultimately planned a 3,200 square foot
warehouse. The architect was unaware of the NESC's horizontal
clearance requirements and did not incorporate them into the plan.
As a result, the planned warehouse would not have intruded upon the
easement but would have been inside the NESC-mandated horizontal
clearance zone.

In July 2013, a representative of Bellwether, Kevin Potter, met
with Jack Urrutia of Duke to discuss the proposed warehouse.
Urrutia indicated the warehouse could not be built as then designed
because the building would encroach upon the NESC horizontal
clearance zone. He explained the building would need to be
redesigned or moved.

Bellwether's architect revised the warehouse plans to avoid
encroaching on the line. As a result, the warehouse's footprint
shrank by approximately 150 square feet, reducing the number of
storage racks in the warehouse from thirty to twenty-nine.
Bellwether's architect apologized to Bellwether for failing to note
the NESC's requirements "during the design phase of the project"
and did not charge Bellwether for the revision.

In June 2015, Bellwether filed a proposed class action complaint
against Duke. It alleged Duke had engaged in inverse condemnation
of its property and properties owned by other similarly situated
landowners by telling Bellwether its proposed warehouse would have
to be redesigned or moved to comply with NESC clearance
requirements. Duke moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging it was
untimely. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and
Bellwether appealed. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court. It was vacated on transfer. On transfer, the Indiana
Supreme Court also reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint, but on different grounds.

On remand, Duke filed an answer to the complaint, followed by a
motion for summary judgment and supporting brief. Bellwether filed
a response in opposition. The trial court held a hearing on the
motion and denied it, concluding there were disputes of material
fact as to whether Duke's conduct amounted to a physical taking of
Bellwether's property. The court further determined Bellwether had
standing to bring its inverse condemnation claim. Next, Duke
requested permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The trial
court and a panel of the Court of Appeals granted permission. The
instant appeal followed.

The core issue is whether Duke took a portion of Bellwether's land.
Bellwether denies it has raised a regulatory taking claim. Instead,
it argues Duke engaged in a physical taking of its land by telling
it that its warehouse as originally designed was in violation of
the NESC's horizontal clearance zone. By contrast, Duke claims that
if any taking occurred, it was regulatory in nature, deriving from
the NESC's requirements rather than any physical imposition.

Under the facts presented, the Court of Appeals holds that
Bellwether's claimed taking by Duke, if valid, is regulatory in
nature rather than a direct physical taking. Duke's predecessor
installed the transmission line on the land Bellwether now
occupies. In addition, the IURC's enactment of the 2002 edition of
the NESC did not result in Duke physically intruding onto
Bellwether's property or requiring Bellwether to allow another
entity access to the property. The NESC's clearance requirements
place some limits on Bellwether's power to build on a small portion
of its land, but not all limits amount to a physical, rather than
regulatory, taking.

Duke argues Bellwether's regulatory takings claim must fail because
Bellwether must demonstrate Duke has deprived it of "'all or
substantially all economic or productive use of his or her
property.'"

The Court of Appeals ultimately agrees with Duke, but it disagrees
with its reading of precedent. It says, regulatory takings claims
are governed by the standard set forth in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646,
57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978). In Penn Central, the owner of Grand
Central Terminal in New York City challenged the city's historic
preservation regulations, claiming the city had reduced the
Terminal's value by rejecting its redevelopment proposals.

In the current case, the record does not contain any calculations
as to the economic impact of the NESC regulation on Bellwether's
property, but the impact appears to be minimal. Bellwether shrunk
the planned size of the warehouse by only 150 square feet and
reduced the number of storage racks from thirty to twenty-nine. The
1.17-acre property continues to have ample economic value.

In addition, the Court o Appeals cannot conclude the enforcement of
the NESC horizontal clearance regulation interfered with
Bellwether's reasonable investment-backed expectations for the
land. There was already a warehouse on the land at the time of
purchase, and Bellwether had no plans to build another one.
Finally, the character of the regulation at issue weighs against
determining a taking occurred. There appears to be no dispute that
the NESC's horizontal clearance standard is intended to protect
life and property from the risk of harm caused by buildings being
placed too close to electric transmission lines.

Bellwether argues the NESC regulates utilities rather than property
owners, and Duke effectively transferred to Bellwether the costs of
complying with the horizontal clearance regulation, thereby gaining
a windfall.

The Court of Appeals disagrees because Bellwether reasonably could
have avoided the dispute by discovering the NESC's requirements.
Bellwether was aware when it purchased the land in 2004 that an
electrical transmission line ran across part of the property. It
nevertheless failed to discover the NESC's requirements at the time
of purchase or when its architect designed the warehouse.

Considering the factors set forth in the Penn Central case, the
Court of Appeals concludes that Duke's enforcement of the NESC
horizontal clearance regulation did not violate the Takings Clause
or article 1, section 21 of the Indiana Constitution. Duke is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Hence, it reversed
the judgment of the trial court and remands with instructions to
grant Duke's motion for summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/39muzeu2 from Leagle.com.

Alan S. Brown -- abrown@fbtlaw.com -- Maggie L. Smith --
msmith@fbtlaw.com -- Darren A. Craig -- dcriag@fbtlaw.com -- Frost
Brown Todd, LLC, in Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for the
Appellant.

William N. Riley -- wriley@rileycate.com -- Russell B. Cate --
rcate@rileycate.com -- Sundeep Singh -- ssingh@rileycate.com --
RileyCate, LLC, Fishers, Indiana, Lonnie D. Johnson --
info@lawcjb.com -- Belinda R. Johnson-Hurtado, Clendening Johnson &
Bohrer, P.C., in Bloomington, Indiana, Attorneys for the Appellee.


EDGEWELL PERSONAL: Court Narrows Claims in Moran Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHELLE MORAN, v.
EDGEWELL PERSONAL CARE, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-07669-RS
(N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Richard Seeborg entered an order
granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss:

  -- The motion to dismiss is granted as to the Plaintiff's
     ability to pursue liability for advertisements other than
     the "Reef Friendly – No Oxybenzone or Octinoxate" claim on
     the sunscreen labels, and as to the claim for breach of
     implied warranty.

  -- The motion to dismiss is denied in all other respects.
     Although it appears unlikely the defects in the Complaint
     can be cured, the Plaintiff is granted leave to amend.

  -- Any amended complaint must be filed by 21 days from the
     date of this Order.

Michelle Moran brings this putative class action on behalf of
consumers nationwide who purchased Defendant EPC Banana Boat
branded sunscreen products. Moran avers that statements on Banana
Boat products indicating that the sunscreen is "Reef Friendly" are
false as the products contain ingredients harmful to coral reefs,
and that she would not have purchased a Banana Boat sunscreen with
that claim had she known the statement was false. She asserts
various common law claims on behalf of a proposed nationwide class,
and various violations of California law on behalf of a proposed
California subclass.

EPC sells sunscreen products under the brand Banana Boat. These
products, of which over ten are at issue in this lawsuit, contain a
claim on the label stating "Reef Friendly -- No Oxybenzone or
Octinoxate." On behalf of a proposed nationwide class and a
subclass of California consumers, Moran brings breach of warranty
and unjust enrichment/restitution claims.

Moran also brings three additional claims on behalf of the proposed
California subclass: violation of the California Unfair Competition
Law; California False Advertising Law ("FAL"); and the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA").

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 2, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zHo8yb at no extra charge.[CC]

ENOCHIAN BIOSCIENCES: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of Sept. 26 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WHY: Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Enochian BioSciences, Inc. (NASDAQ:
ENOB) between January 17, 2018 and June 27, 2022, both dates
inclusive, (the "Class Period"), including common stock issued by
Enochian in a private placement offering on or about February 16,
2018, of the important September 26, 2022lead plaintiff deadline.

SO WHAT: If you purchased Enochian BioSciences securities during
the Class Period you may be entitled to compensation without
payment of any out of pocket fees or costs through a contingency
fee arrangement.

WHAT TO DO NEXT: To join the Enochian BioSciences class action, go
to https://rosenlegal.com/submit-form/?case—id=6517 or call
Phillip Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the
class action. A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you
wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later
than September 26, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative party
acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.

WHY ROSEN LAW: We encourage investors to select qualified counsel
with a track record of success in leadership roles. Often, firms
issuing notices do not have comparable experience, resources or any
meaningful peer recognition. Many of these firms do not actually
handle securities class actions, but are merely middlemen that
refer clients or partner with law firms that actually litigate the
cases. Be wise in selecting counsel. The Rosen Law Firm represents
investors throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in
securities class actions and shareholder derivative litigation.
Rosen Law Firm has achieved the largest ever securities class
action settlement against a Chinese Company. Rosen Law Firm was
Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of
securities class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been
ranked in the top 4 each year since 2013 and has recovered hundreds
of millions of dollars for investors. In 2019 alone the firm
secured over $438 million for investors. In 2020, founding partner
Laurence Rosen was named by law360 as a Titan of Plaintiffs' Bar.
Many of the firm's attorneys have been recognized by Lawdragon and
Super Lawyers.

DETAILS OF THE CASE: According to the lawsuit, defendants
throughout the Class Period made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) co-founder and inventor, Serhat
Gumrukcu, was engaged in a variety of frauds; (2) Gumrukcu was not
a licensed doctor anywhere in the world; (3) as a result of the
foregoing, Gumrukcu's purported contributions to Enochian lacked a
reasonable basis; (4) as a result of the foregoing, Enochian had
overstated its commercial prospects; (5) Gumrukcu had improperly
diverted approximately $20 million from Enochian to entities he
owned; and (6) as a result of the foregoing, defendants' positive
statements about Enochian's business, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When
the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

To join the Enochian BioSciences class action, go to
https://rosenlegal.com/submit-form/?case—id=6517 or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

No Class Has Been Certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you retain one. You may select
counsel of your choice. You may also remain an absent class member
and do nothing at this point. An investor's ability to share in any
potential future recovery is not dependent upon serving as lead
plaintiff.

Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome.

View source version on
businesswire.com:https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220808005673/en/

CONTACT:
Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016

Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827

lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
www.rosenlegal.com [GN]

EQUIFAX INC: Faces Class Suit Over Coding Error in Credit Scores
----------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Goode, writing for National Mortgage Professional, reports
that consumer credit reporting giant Equifax is now the subject of
a proposed class action lawsuit related to a coding error that led
to possibly millions of erroneous credit scores being sent to
potential home and auto lenders earlier this year.

The suit, filed in federal court in northern Georgia -- where
Equifax is headquartered -- alleges that the company's electronic
glitch, which was introduced during a technology change-over,
caused a drastic and severe shift in credit scores that resulted in
consumers being denied home and car loans or paying much higher
interest rates.

The lead plaintiff in the case, Nydia Jenkins of Jacksonville,
Fla., claimed that Equifax's error caused her credit score to dip
by 130 points and resulted in her monthly payment for a
pre-approved auto loan to increase from $350 a month to $504 a
month.

The complaint alleges that Equifax should have foreseen the harm
the glitch caused, and that the harm could not be rectified by
simply updating affected credit reports.

The suit also alleges that the company violated its duties under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and continued to provide inaccurate
scores and reports even though they knew or should have known they
were inaccurate.

The complaint also alleges that even though the company said
publicly that no credit reports were affected, privately they
acknowledged that they were.

   -- As a result, the suit claims that the plaintiffs:

   -- Suffered a loss of use and access to financial accounts
and/or credit;

   -- Spent money and time to avail themselves of assets and/or
credit frozen or flagged due to inaccuracies;

   -- Suffered impairment of their credit scores, ability to
borrow, and/or ability to obtain credit;

   -- Suffered lowered credit scores resulting from credit
inquiries following inaccurate reports being provided to lenders;

   -- Suffered costs and lost time obtaining credit reports in
order to monitor their credit records to attempt to understand the
reasoning behind the denials due to the glitch;

   -- Suffered lost opportunity costs and loss of productivity from
efforts to mitigate and address the adverse effects of the error,
including but not limited to efforts to research how to prevent,
detect, contest, and recover from the it;

   -- Suffered the loss of the opportunity to control how their
personal information is used; and

   -- Continue to risk their financial health, which remains
subject to further harmful inaccurate reporting as long as Equifax
fails to undertake appropriate, legally required steps to protect
and ensure the maximum possible accuracy when creating consumer
reports using the personal information in its possession.

Equifax officials acknowledged in late May that the error occurred
in a three-week period from mid-March to early April, and that it
affected about 12% of the credit reports that were sent to mortgage
lenders during that time.

However, the company said at the time that less than 9% experienced
a change of 10 points or less; less than 3% experienced a change of
11 to 20 points; and less than 1% experienced a change of more than
20 points.

In a statement, company officials said that while they regret the
error and take the issue seriously, information on consumer credit
reports was not affected by the glitch, scores have been updated to
consumers and lenders, and that score shifts do not always result
in changes to credit decisions.

A company spokeswoman said on Aug. 8 that as part of Equifax's
commitment to resolving the issue, it has conducted an analysis of
credit scores used for consumers seeking credit during the time
period of the issue.

"Our analysis indicates that for those consumers there was no shift
in the majority of scores during the three-week timeframe of the
issue," the official said. "For those consumers that did experience
a score shift, initial analysis indicates that only a small number
of them may have received a different credit decision. While the
score may have shifted, a score shift does not necessarily mean
that a consumer's credit decision was negatively impacted. Equifax
will respond more fully in its court filings at the appropriate
time." [GN]

EVENTBRITE INC: Faces Two California Suits Over IPO
---------------------------------------------------
Eventbrite, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that beginning April 15,
2019, purported stockholders of the Company filed two putative
securities class action complaints in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, and three putative
securities class action complaints in the Superior Court of
California for the County of San Mateo, against the company,
certain of its executives and directors, and its underwriters for
the company's initial public offering (IPO).

Some of these actions also name defendants venture capital firms
that were investors in the Company as of the IPO.

Eventbrite, Inc. is a technology platform based in California.


EVENTBRITE INC: Snow Class Suit Stayed Pending Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------
Eventbrite, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that a second motion to
compel arbitration was granted by the court and stayed the class
action captioned "Snow, et al. v. Eventbrite, Inc.," Case No.
20-cv-03698 pending the results of arbitration.

On June 4, 2020, three plaintiffs, seeking to represent a proposed
class of individuals who purchased tickets on or after June 3,
2016, filed suit against the Company in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, in a case captioned
"Snow, et al. v. Eventbrite, Inc.," Case No. 20-cv-03698 (the Class
Action).

Plaintiffs allege that Eventbrite failed to provide an opportunity
for purchasers of tickets to events sold through Eventbrite's
platform to obtain a refund where the event is postponed,
rescheduled, or canceled.

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in addition to restitution and
monetary damages under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act,
False Advertising Law, and Unfair Competition Law, in addition to
claims brought under California common law.

Prior to answering Plaintiffs' complaint, Eventbrite brought a
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to its Terms of Service. The
Court denied that motion. The Company thereafter answered
Plaintiffs' Complaint and brought a second motion to compel
arbitration, based in part on facts established via the Company's
Answer. The Court granted that motion on September 2, 2021, and
stayed the suit pending the results of arbitration.

Two of the named Plaintiffs have since initiated individual
arbitrations pursuant to the Company's Terms of Service. The
Company has filed responses to Plaintiffs' demands for arbitration,
denying any and all liability. The cases are in their early stages.


Eventbrite, Inc. is a technology platform based in California.


FARMLAND PARTNERS: Court Dismisses Brokop Shareholder Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Farmland Partners Inc. (FPI) disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that on April 6, 2022,
the court issued an order granting the company's motion for summary
judgment in full, and on April 7, 2022, the court entered a final
judgment dismissing with prejudice a claim by a purported FPI
shareholder named Don Brokop.

That judgment became final on May 6, 2022, when the period for
Brokop to appeal the judgment expired.

Farmland Partners Inc., collectively with its subsidiaries, is a
real estate company that owns and seeks to acquire farmland located
in agricultural markets based in Colorado.


FORD MOTOR: Faces Sulligan Suit Over Mustang Mach-E Vehicle Defect
------------------------------------------------------------------
AMBER SULLIGAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-11668-VAR-JJCG (E.D.
Mich., July 20, 2022) seeks damages and a repair under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, state consumer protection acts, state
implied warranty acts, and unjust enrichment at common law arising
from the Defendant's misconduct of manufacturing Ford Mustang
Mach-E vehicles that are defective and prone to complete and
partial shut-down while driving.

According to the complaint, the Defendant knew or should have known
of the shut-down risk prior to launching the vehicles but it did
nothing to promptly warn owners and lessees, instead waiting over a
year after receiving numerous warranty claims exposing the defect
to announce a safety recall. And while Ford now admits that the
Mustang Mach-E has a serious safety defect that can cause
in-operation power loss and shutdown, it has chosen not to design
or issue a bona fide fix, but rather to degrade the charging and
motive power of the Mustang Mach-E so that its defectively designed
high-voltage battery main contactors do not overheat and fail, says
the suit.

Allegedly, the shutdown defect exposes Plaintiff and the putative
class members to an unreasonable risk of accident, injury, death,
or property damage if their vehicle completely or partially loses
power while in operation. The shutdown defect also exposes
passengers, other drivers on the road, and other bystanders to an
unreasonable risk of accident, injury, death, and property damage,
the suit asserts.

Plaintiff Sulligan purchased her first Mustang Mach-E in April
2021.

Ford Motor Co. is an American multinational automobile manufacturer
headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Steve W. Berman, Esq.
          Thomas E. Loeser, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP  
          1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
          E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com
                  toml@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          E. Powell Miller, Esq.
          Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
          Dennis A. Lienhardt, Esq.
          THE MILLER LAW FIRM PC
          950 W. University Drive, Suite 300
          Rochester, MI 48307
          Telephone: (248) 841-2200
          E-mail: epm@millerlawpc.com
                  ssa@millerlawpc.com
                  dal@millerlawpc.com

GARDNER RESOURCES: Court Withdraws Bid to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Sogbuyi-Whitney, et al.,
v. Gardner Resources Consulting, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:22-cv-10935 (D. Mass.), the Hon. Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton
entered an order withdrawing the motion to certify class.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Gardner Resources is a staffing and recruiting company.[CC]

GEORGIA: Mark Birdow Substituted as Class Rep. in Harris v. DOC
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, Macon
Division, grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to substitute a
class representative in the lawsuit captioned RICARDO HARRIS, et
al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-00365-TES (M.D. Ga.).

The Court ordered that Mark Birdow is substituted as a class
representative in the place and stead of Tony Moore.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y97pp6px from Leagle.com.


GODADDY INC: 11th Circuit Ruling in TCPA Class Suit Discussed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the August 8, 2022 edition of the ARM Compliance Digest, Hinshaw
partner David Schultz discusses an Eleventh Circuit ruling that
vacated a lower court's approval of class certification in a
Telephone Consumer Protection Act case, finding that some of the
named plaintiffs in the class did not have standing to sue in
federal court:

Drazen v. GoDaddy has a bizarre procedural history. Three putative
class action TCPA cases were consolidated and ultimately settled on
a class basis. The court granted approval of the settlement but an
objector complained about the coupon aspect of it and the amount of
fees. The court reduced the fees but allowed the settlement to
proceed. The objectors appealed the certification ruling.
Objections in class actions and appeals from them are rare.

The case took another turn on appeal. The 11th Circuit did not get
to the objections. Instead, it turned to the Article III aspect of
the case. There is relevant law that one text or call may not
confer Article III standing. The 11th Circuit said that in light of
the Ramirez v Transunion Supreme Court Article III ruling, each
class member needs to have standing. It then remanded the case for
the court to consider the impact of Ramirez v Transunion on the
certified class. It thus undid, at least for now, the class
settlement.

This is another example of the significant impact Ramirez v
Transunion has on consumer and class action litigation.

Read the full August 8, 2022 edition of the AccountsRecovery.net
Compliance Digest.

"Appeals Court Vacates Certification, Settlement in TCPA Case," ARM
Compliance Digest, August 8, 2022

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP is a U.S. based law firm with offices
nationwide. The firm's national reputation spans the insurance
industry, the financial services sector, and other highly regulated
industries. Hinshaw also serves as counsel to the professional
services sector, and provides business advisory and transactional
services to clients of all sizes. [GN]

GOYA FOODS: Court Refuses to Certify Brokers Class in Ortiz Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE ORTIZ and SAUL HERNANDEZ, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. GOYA FOODS,
INC., and A.N.E. SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-19003-SRC-CLW (D.N.J.), Judge Stanley R. Chesler of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denies the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

Goya is an international company that distributes, and sells a
variety of food products all around the world. It utilizes a
workforce of sales representatives ("Brokers"), to distribute Goya
products to supermarkets, grocery stores and restaurants. It
engages the Brokers to perform their work pursuant to a "Broker
Agreement" between a Broker and A.N.E., Goya's distribution arm.

As described within the Broker Agreement, all Brokers are deemed to
non-employee "independent contractors." According to the
Plaintiffs, the Defendants unlawfully misclassify their Brokers in
Pennsylvania as independent contractors and have taken unlawful
deductions from the Brokers' pay in violation of the Pennsylvania
Wage Payment and Collection Law.

During the pendency of the litigation, the Defendants introduced an
amendment to the Broker Agreement which the Brokers had the
opportunity to, but were not required to, enter into with the
Defendants ("the Arbitration Amendment"). Among other things,
Brokers who entered into the Arbitration Amendment received a
$2,000 payment in return for waiving their right to participate in
the instant litigation. Attendant with the Arbitration Amendment
the Brokers received a notice which explicitly informed the PA
brokers of the lawsuit, the claims asserted and damages sought, and
that they were potential putative class members. Sixteen of the 31
Brokers eligible to enter into the Arbitration Amendment did so.
Six putative class members ended their relationship with the
Defendants prior to the time they rolled out the Amendment.

On May 12, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Class
Certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
seeking to certify a putative class of: "All persons who worked, on
a full time basis, for the Defendants in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania from Oct. 15, 2016 to the time of trial as sales
representatives and signed a Broker Agreement, directly or on
behalf of a business entity."

Under Rule 23(a), before proceeding as a class Plaintiffs must
"demonstrate, first, that (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." The Defendants
contend that the Plaintiffs are unable to meet any of these four
requirements.

Because the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they can
establish the numerosity element of Rule 23(a), Judge Chesler
declines to consider the Defendants' remaining arguments. He holds
that the Defendants submit evidence sufficient to determine with
precision the number of putative class members: At its maximum
possible size, the Plaintiffs proposed class would amount to 37
members, including the two Plaintiffs. However, they have failed to
establish that nearly half of these individuals are eligible to
participate and, even if they had, joinder of the 37 brokers would
not be impracticable in light of the facts.

The Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence -- let alone a
preponderance of the evidence -- that would provide a reasonable
basis by which the Court can conclude that the Arbitration
Amendment is unenforceable. Accordingly, the putative class
consists of, at most, 21 brokers.

The Plaintiffs argue that the numerosity requirement is satisfied
notwithstanding that the Court excludes the Brokers who signed the
Arbitration Amendment, as a class size of 21 individuals is
sufficient to survive.

Judge Chesler disagrees. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court
considered the 16 brokers who signed the Arbitration Amendment to
be putative class members -- resulting in the maximum class size of
37 individuals -- joinder is not impracticable. He holds that (i)
the risk of overlapping discovery requests or duplicative motions
is relatively limited; (ii) bare speculation that the Broker's
feared retaliation from the Defendants is insufficient at this
phase, particularly in light of the discovery that the Parties have
conducted to date; (iii) the putative class members are relatively
well-compensated business owners seeking potentially substantial
monetary damages; (iv) the geographic distribution of the class is
not so onerous as to find joinder impracticable, where potential
class members are located across Pennsylvania and Delaware; and (v)
it is undisputed that the Plaintiff seeks only damages and does not
seek injunctive relief.

For these reasons, Judge Chesler opines that the Plaintiffs have
not met their burden to show that the evidence weighs in favor of
class certification. He denies their motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/26v46jxw from Leagle.com.


HENKEL CORPORATION: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Henkel Corporation.
The case is styled as Victoria Dicks, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Henkel Corporation, Case No.
1:22-cv-06751 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Henkel AG & Co. KGaA, commonly known as Henkel --
https://www.henkel.com/ -- is a German multinational chemical and
consumer goods company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com

INNOVATIVE HEALTH: Bhambhani Appeals Court Judgment Dismissing Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs RITU BHAMBHANI, M.D., et al., filed an appeal from a
court ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled RITU BHAMBHANI, M.D.,
et al., Plaintiffs v. INNOVATIVE HEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-00355-LKG, in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland at Baltimore.

Plaintiffs Dr. Ritu Bhambhani and Dr. Sudhir Rao bring the putative
class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated individuals alleging civil violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.
Section 1962; fraudulent misrepresentation; intentional
misrepresentation by concealment or non-disclosure; and civil
conspiracy claims against defendants, Innovative Health Solutions,
Inc. ("IHS"), Innovative Healthcare Solutions, LLC ("IHCS"),
Acclivity Medical, LLC, DragonSlayer Strategies LLC, Coleman
Certified Medical Billing & Consultant, LLC, Joy Long, and Ryan
Kuhlman.

The Defendants have moved for summary judgment in their favor with
regards to the Plaintiffs' claims, upon the ground that the
Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the action. The Plaintiffs also
sought leave to file a fourth amended complaint.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 27, 2022, Judge
Lydia Kay Griggsby of the District of Maryland issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order:

    (1) granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment;
    (2) denying the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a fourth
amended complaint; and
    (3) dismissing the third amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs seek a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Ritu Bhambhani v. Neuraxis,
Inc., Case No. 22-1764, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, filed on July 19, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants RITU BHAMBHANI, M.D. and SUDHIR RAO, M.D., on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, are represented
by:

          Nicole Patricia Allocca, Esq.
          John William Leardi, Esq.
          Paul D. Werner, Esq.  
          BUTTACI LEARDI & WERNER, LLC
          212 Carnegie Center
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (609) 799-5150

               - and -

          Ugo Colella, Esq.
          COLELLA ZEFUTIE LLC
          4200 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 920-0880

               - and -

          John J. Zefutie, Jr., Esq.
          COLELLA ZEFUTIE LLC
          116 Village Boulevard
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (609) 551-9771  

Defendants-Appellees NEURAXIS, INC., f/k/a Innovative Health
Solutions, Inc., et al., are represented by:

          Richard Marc Goldberg, Esq.
          Paul Mark Sandler, Esq.
          Joel Ira Sher, Esq.
          SHAPIRO SHER GUINOT & SANDLER
          250 West Pratt Street
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: (410) 385-4274

               - and -

          Jeffrey Teeters, Esq.
          WOOD & LAMPING
          600 Vine Street
          Cincinnati, OH 45202-0000
          Telephone: (513) 852-6050

               - and -

          Joseph Thomas Mallon, Jr., Esq.
          Marshall N. Perkins, Esq.
          MALLON, LLC
          300 East Lombard Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 727-7887

INTERGALACTIC INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Intergalactic, Inc.
The case is styled as Andrew Toro, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Intergalactic, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-06758-ER (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Intergalactic -- https://intergalactic.com/ -- is a design-focused
agency that crafts distinctive digital experiences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com

JAN-PRO FRANCHISING: Wins Summary Judgment on Minimum Wage Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GLORIA ROMAN, GERARDO
VAZQUEZ, and JUAN AGUILAR, v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL,
INC., Case No. 3:16-cv-05961-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge
William Alsup entered an order:

   1. granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Vazquez as
      to his individual minimum wage claim for cleaning work;

   2. granting summary judgment in favor of defendant as to
      plaintiff Roman's individual minimum wage claim for
      cleaning work;

   3. denying both parties' motions for summary judgment as to
      plaintiff Aguilar's individual minimum wage claim for
      cleaning work;

   4. granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs as to all
      their claims for travel time pay;

   5. denying both parties' motions for summary judgment as to
      all of plaintiffs' individual overtime claims; and

   6. denying both parties' motions for summary judgment as to
      all of plaintiffs' individual claims for expense
      reimbursements and unlawful deductions.

In this wage-and-hour class action involving misclassification of
janitorial workers, the plaintiffs previously moved for class
certification and summary judgment as to all claims.

The Defendant also moved for summary judgment as to all claims. A
prior order granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion
for class certification. That order granted summary judgment in
favor of plaintiffs as to all certified issues. Namely, it found
that all of the defendant's janitorial workers were employees for
purposes of the California wage orders.

And, it found defendant liable for mandatory training pay,
reimbursement for necessary expenses covered under the California
wage orders, and pay for unlawful deductions covered under the
California wage orders. It denied plaintiffs' request to amend the
complaint to include a claim regarding itemized wage statements.

The prior order, however, did not consider summary judgment as to
the following uncertified, individual labor code issues that remain
in this action: minimum wages for cleaning work and travel time;
overtime wages for cleaning work; reimbursement for necessary
expenses not covered under the California wage orders; and pay for
unlawful deductions not covered under the California wage orders.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 2, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3A6q3hm at no extra charge.[CC]

JOHN HANCOCK: Romano Appeals Final Judgment in ERISA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Eric Romano and Todd Romano filed an appeal from court
rulings entered in the lawsuit entitled ERIC ROMANO, et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (U.S.A.), the
Defendant, Case No. 19-21147-CIV-JG, in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida.

The suit seeks damages and equitable relief on behalf of Plaintiffs
and the Class resulting from the Defendant's violation of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs are the trustees of the
Romano Law, PL 401(k) Plan. The Plaintiffs, as trustees of the
Plan, purchased a Group Variable Annuity Contract from the
Defendant. The Defendant is a fiduciary of the Plan pursuant to
ERISA, and as such, owes the Plan a duty of loyalty and has a duty
not to engage in prohibited transactions. However, the Defendant
breached these duties by improperly retaining, for its own benefit,
foreign tax credits or deductions arising from assets and
investments held for the benefit of the Plan. As a result of these
breaches, Defendant was overpaid for services rendered under the
Contract, and the Plan's assets were diminished by the amount of
the foreign tax credits retained by Defendant but not credited to
the Plan and the income those overcharges would have earned had
they been properly credited to the Plan's Account, adds the
complaint.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 26, 2022, the Hon.
Judge Jonathan Goodman entered a redacted order on plaintiffs'
motion for class certification:

   1. granting Plaintiffs' class certification motion;

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as Class Representatives;

   3. appointing Podhurst Orseck, P.A. and Searcy Denney Scarola
      Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. as class counsel; and

   4. directing counsel to give absent class members appropriate
      notice under Rule 23.

The Plaintiffs file this appeal seeking a review of the following
rulings: the Final Judgment Order in Favor of Defendants, entered
on the docket on June 22, 2022; the Order on Defendant's Summary
Judgment Motion, a redacted version of which was entered on the
docket on May 9, 2022, and a sealed version of which was entered on
the docket on May 2, 2022; and the Omnibus Order on the Parties'
Daubert Motions, a public version of which was entered on the
docket on May 9, 2022, and a sealed version of which was entered on
the docket on May 2, 2022.

The appellate case is captioned as Eric Romano, et al. v. John
Hancock Life Insurance Company, Case No. 22-12366, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed on July 18,
2022.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ERIC ROMANO, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Matthew P. Weinshall, Esq.
          Peter Prieto, Esq.
          John Gravante, Esq.
          Alissa Del Riego, Esq.
          PODHURST ORSECK P.A.
          SunTrust International Center
          One Southeast 3rd Ave, Suite 2300
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 358-2800
          Facsimile: (305) 358-2382
          E-mail: pprieto@podhurst.com
                  jgravante@podhurst.com
                  mweinshall@podhurst.com
                  adelriego@podhurst.com

               - and -

          Christian D. Searcy, Esq.
          Jack Scarola, Esq.
          Boris L. Zhadanovskiy, Esq.
          SEARCY DENNEY SCAROLA BARNHART & SHIPLEY P.A.
          2139 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd.
          West Palm Beach, FL 33409
          Telephone: (561) 686-6300
          Facsimile: (561) 383-9467
          E-mail: _searcyteam@searcylaw.com
                  _scarolateam@searcylaw.com
                  _zhadanovskiyteam@searcylaw.com

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Remicade Antitrust Suit Settlement Has Prelim OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE REMICADE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Civil Action No.
17-4326-KSM (E.D. Pa.), Judge Karen Spencer Marston of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania grants the
Plaintiffs' Uncontested Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement.

The Court preliminarily approves the Settlement set forth in the
Stipulation of Settlement and Settlement Agreement, which appears
to be the product of serious, informed, and extensive arm's-length
negotiations between the Parties and appears to be fair, adequate,
and reasonable to the Settlement Class so as to fall within the
range of possible final approval.

The Court approves the proposed form and content of the short form
and long form notices and orders the Parties to proceed with
dissemination of the notices as provided in the Settlement
Agreement and Notice Plan.

Plaintiffs Local 295 Employer Group Welfare Fund and National
Employees Health Plan are appointed to act as the representatives
of the Class, and Robbins Geller as the Class Counsel, pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Giraldi & Co., LLC is appointed to serve as the Settlement
Administrator and will be responsible for administering the
settlement in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

All claim forms, opt-out requests, and objections will be due
within 120 days after the date of the Order.

Thirty days prior to the deadline for submitting claim forms,
opt-out requests, and objections, the Class Counsel will file with
the Court any motion for attorneys' fees and costs and any motion
for a service award for class representatives.

The Settlement Administrator will file proof with the Court that
notice was provided in accordance with the Agreement and the Order
by Feb. 6, 2022.

Upon passage of the deadline for claims forms, opt-out requests,
and objections, the Class Counsel will promptly file a motion for
final settlement approval.

A Final Approval Hearing is scheduled for Feb. 27, 2023, at 2:00
p.m., in Courtroom TBD of the James A. Byrne United States
Courthouse, 601 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/38tfn45j from Leagle.com.


KEESLER FEDERAL: Class Settlement in Lloyd Suit Wins Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHIRLEY LLOYD, on behalf of herself, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KEESLER FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant. VICTORIA MILLER, on behalf of herself, and all others
similarly situated Plaintiff v. KEESLER FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant, Civil No. 1:19cv351-HSO-BWR, Consolidated with Civil No.
1:21cv326-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss.), Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
Southern Division, grants the parties' Unopposed Motion for Final
Approval of the Class Action Settlement Agreement.

Class Representatives Lloyd and Miller and the Defendant entered
into the Class Action Settlement Agreement. They applied pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) for an order
preliminarily approving the proposed Settlement and preliminarily
approving the form and plan of notice and distribution as set forth
in the Settlement Agreement.

The Court previously certified for settlement and notice purposes
only the following class: All members of Defendant who, while
members of Defendant, have been charged an APPSN Fee or a Futile
ODT Fee during the Class Period.

On Feb. 9, 2022, the Court entered an order preliminarily approving
the Settlement Agreement, approving the forms of notice of the
Settlement Agreement to the members of the Settlement Class,
directing that appropriate notice of the Settlement Agreement be
given to Class Members, and scheduling a hearing on final
approval.

In accordance with the Settlement Agreement and the Preliminary
Approval Order: (1) the Settlement Administrator caused the Notice
of Class Action Settlement to be emailed and/or mailed by United
States First Class Mail to all known members of the Class; and (2)
the affidavit of notice filed with the Court by the Class Counsel
demonstrates compliance with the Preliminary Approval Order with
respect to the emailed and mailed notice and, further, that the
best notice practicable under the circumstances was, in fact,
given. The Class Counsel filed with the Court a listing of the
names of the members of the Settlement Class and the names of those
persons who submitted valid requests for exclusion from the Class.

On Aug. 2, 2022, at 9:30 a.m., the Court held a hearing on whether
the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the
best interests of the Class and whether to grant Class Counsel's
Motion for attorneys' fees and costs.

Judge Ozerden adopts and reaffirms the findings and conclusions set
forth in the Preliminary Approval Order. He finds that the
Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the
best interests of the Class and is approved in all respects. He
directs the Class Representatives, the Class, the Class Counsel,
the Defendant, and the Defendant's Counsel to effectuate the
Settlement Agreement according to its terms.

Judge Ozerden affirms the finding that the Settlement Class meets
the relevant requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
and (b)(3) for purposes of the Settlement.

For purposes of the Settlement only, he finds and determines that
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)(1),
Plaintiffs Lloyd and Miller will fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the Settlement Class in enforcing their rights in
the Action, and therefore re-affirms their appointment as the Class
Representatives. He re-affirms the following as the Class Counsel
to act on behalf of the Settlement Class and the Class
Representatives with respect to the Settlement: Christopher Weldy,
Esq. WELDY LAW FIRM, PLCC 1438 North State Street Jackson, MS 39202
Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq. Sophia G. Gold, Esq. KALIELGOLD PLLC 1100
15th Street NW 4th Floor Washington, DC 20005

The Settlement Agreement provides for certain benefits to Class
Members. Judge Ozerden approves those benefits and approves the
distribution plan for the Settlement Fund set forth in the
Settlement Agreement, and the parties are authorized to implement
that distribution after deductions for fees, expenses, and service
awards as approved by the Court.

The Court will have continuing jurisdiction over the Settlement
Fund.

Upon the occurrence of the Effective Date of the Settlement
Agreement, the Class Representatives and the Class Members release
and forever discharge the Defendant and its insurers, from all past
and present known and unknown claims, demands, damages, causes of
action or suits seeking damages, or other legal or equitable relief
arising out of or in any way related to the claims asserted or
which could have been asserted relating to (1) Futile ODT Fees; and
(2) APPSN Fees that were charged during the Class Period.
Plaintiffs expressly waive and relinquish all rights and benefits
they may have pursuant to Section 1542 of the California Civil Code
and any similar law of any state or territory of the United States
or any foreign tribunal. The release will not extend to any claims
by Class Members for bodily injury or under the Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act.

Subject to the Class Representatives' compliance with closure of
their Accounts under the Settlement Agreement, the Defendant
releases all claims of any kind or nature that have been or could
have been asserted against the Class Representatives, any Class
Member, or the Class Counsel relating to the filing or prosecution
of the Complaint.

If, consistent with the plan of distribution set forth in the
Settlement Agreement, any residual funds exist after the first
distribution, the residue will go to Settlement Class Members by
way of a secondary distribution, if economically feasible.
Following the second distribution, or if no second distribution is
required to be made, any remaining unclaimed settlement funds will
be distributed to two cy pres recipients, one nominated by the
Class Counsel and one nominated by the Defendant, agreed to by the
Parties, their attorneys and approved by the Court.

The Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $1
million and costs in the amount of $18,528.13, such amounts to be
paid from the Settlement Fund in accordance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

The Class Representatives are awarded Service Awards totaling
$12,500, such amount to be paid from the Settlement Fund in
accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Judge Ozerden awards funds to pay the Settlement Administrator for
its services in the manner described in the Agreement.

The lawsuit is dismissed without assessment of costs or attorneys'
fees against any party except as provided in the Settlement
Agreement and Court order.

The Order is a final judgment because it disposes of all claims
against all parties. The Court retains jurisdiction over the
Settlement Agreement, the parties to the Settlement Agreement, and
all matters relating to the administration and enforcement of the
Settlement Agreement.

There being no just reason for delay, Judge Ozerden accordingly
orders the entry of Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Final Approval Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/46f9a55e from Leagle.com.


KENTUCKY: District Court Dismisses Eaves v. Judge Jennings Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge David J. Hale of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky, Louisville Division, dismisses the case,
MICHAEL EAVES, Plaintiff v. JUDGE REBECCA JENNINGS, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-P374-DJH (W.D. Ky.).

Mr. Eaves, an inmate at the Lee Adjustment Center, filed the
instant pro se civil rights action. The matter is before the Court
upon initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007).

The Plaintiff sues Judge Jennings in her official and individual
capacities. He states that Judge Jennings "is the sitting District
Judge in case no. 3:21-cv-296-RGJ, Michael Eaves, et al, v. Dagon
Moon, et al.," which he states is a "prisoner rights deprivation
case against prison officials." He asserts that Judge Jennings
denied his motion for class certification and for appointment of
counsel for the class. He maintains that she also denied his
request to be allowed to file his complaint without using the
Court-approved complaint form, although she allowed another inmate
to file his complaint without using the complaint form.

Mr. Eaves states that "these actions by the Defendant are outside
her jurisdiction and are discriminatory to the Plaintiffs based
upon their disability, and disab. discrimination complaints, and
interfere with seeking Americans with Disabilities Act protection."
He maintains that Judge Jennings's actions deprived them of their
rights protected by the U.S. Constitution, 1st, 7th, 9th, and 14th
Amendments, the ADA/Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and at all times
herein the Defendant's actions and abuse of authority were under
color of law, they are capable of repetition but evades review. He
maintains that "no court order or Judgment can cure the injuries to
the Plaintiff's rights."

The Plaintiff further states, he fears retaliations by other court
workers and judges in these cases and others because of his
complaints against the the Defendant. He continues that the threat
is real and evidenced by him being denied other pro se liberties by
Judge Caldwell who refused to subpoena records and order the Clerk
to not send him signed but otherwise blank subpoenas that any of
the Defendants attorneys could have issued."

The Plaintiff asserts, he and the others similarly situated have a
right to access and to be treated equally in the court regardless
of skin color, disability, or sexually oriented as a reformed sex
offender, and Defendant Jennings denied equal treatment to Eaves
and other Plaintiffs with her actions." He alleges that Judge
Jennings also deprived him of a jury trial. He further states,
treating him unequally is a non-judicial action that she has no
authority or jurisdiction to do so.

As relief, the Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief.

Judge Hale holds that 28 U.S.C. Section 1654 does not permit
plaintiffs to appear pro se where interests other than their own
are at stake. Further, to the extent the Plaintiff is seeking to
bring a class action on behalf of himself and other inmates, courts
have repeatedly held that "pro se prisoners cannot adequately
represent a class." Therefore, as a pro se prisoner, the Plaintiff
cannot sue on behalf of others, and he is the only Plaintiff to the
action.

Because the Plaintiff asserts a violation of his civil rights and
sues a federal official, Judge Hale construes his claims to be
brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971). A claim brought against a
federal employee or official in his or her official capacity is
actually brought against the United States, as the official's
employer. Claims against the United States and against any federal
judges in their official capacity are subject to dismissal on the
basis that such claims are absolutely barred by sovereign immunity.
Therefore, the Plaintiff's official-capacity claim against Judge
Jennings is barred by sovereign immunity and must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Finally, Judge Hale finds that the Plaintiff's individual-capacity
claim is barred by absolute judicial immunity and must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. He
opines that judicial immunity protects "judicial independence by
insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled
litigants. It is evident that the Plaintiff's allegations arise
wholly from Judge Jennings's rulings in the prior 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 action before her. Furthermore, it is obvious that none of the
alleged actions by Judge Jennings were taken "in complete absence
of all jurisdiction." The Plaintiff's conclusory statements in his
complaint to the contrary are unsupported by facts.

The Court will enter a separate Order of dismissal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3sznazw6 from Leagle.com.


KEURIG DR. PEPPER: Settlement in Antitrust Suit Gets Final Nod
--------------------------------------------------------------
Keurig Dr. Pepper Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that final approval of a
class action settlement was granted and dismissed the claims in
June 2021.

A number of putative class actions asserting claims under the
federal antitrust laws and various state laws and seeking treble
monetary damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief and
attorneys' fees were previously filed on behalf of purported
indirect purchasers of Keurig's products.

In July 2020, Keurig reached an agreement with the putative
indirect purchaser class plaintiffs in the Multidistrict Antitrust
Litigation to settle the claims asserted for $31 million. The
settlement class consists of individuals and entities in the United
States that purchased, from persons other than Keurig and not for
purposes of resale, Keurig manufactured or licensed single serve
beverage portion packs during the applicable class period
(beginning in September 2010 for most states).

The court granted preliminary approval of the settlement in
December 2020, and the Company paid the settlement amount in
January 2021. In June 2021, the Court granted final approval of the
settlement, entered final judgment, and dismissed the indirect
purchasers' claims.

Keurig Dr. Pepper Inc. is a leading beverage company based in
Massachusetts.


KIA AMERICA: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Theft Safety Defect
----------------------------------------------------------------
Abraham Jewett, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that Kia
failed to disclose to consumers that its Kia and Hyundai model year
2011 through 2021 vehicles contain defects which makes them easier
to steal, and therefore more prone to auto theft, a new class
action lawsuit alleges.

Plaintiffs Ann Brady and Leah Price claim Kia refuses to fix the
alleged defect or to compensate consumers, despite allegedly
admitting that the vehicles have a problem with "theft and safety."


Brady and Price further claim Kia failed to "disclose, reveal, or
provide notice to customers" in their advertising and labeling that
the Kia and Hyundai vehicles are "defective" and "not fit for the
ordinary purposes for which the vehicles are used."

"Defendants knew their vehicles were defective . . . but failed and
refused to disclose these defects to customers, despite having the
capability and means to do so," the Kia class action states.

Brady and Price want to represent a nationwide class and Iowa
subclass of consumers who purchased or own a model year 2011
through 2021 Hyundai or Kia vehicle, with varying statute of
limitations stipulations.

Kia, Brady and Price argue, did not follow regulations set by the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) when manufacturing
the affected vehicles.

Brady and Price claim the affected Hyundai and Kia vehicles can
continue to be steered and moved forward even without a key in the
ignition, which them more prone to auto theft; it is also an
alleged violation of the FMVSS.

Kia accused of manufacturing vehicles without engine immobilizers
to prevent auto theft
Further, Kia allegedly did not follow FMVSS regulations by
manufacturing the vehicles without engine immobilizers, which exist
to make it harder to start a vehicle without having a key, the Kia
class action alleges.

"Defendants had the capability and means to add an engine
immobilizer or similar device, yet they failed to do so," the Kia
class action states.

Brady and Price claim Kia is guilty of unjust enrichment and
negligence, among other things, and in violation of Iowa's Private
Right of Action for Consumer Frauds Act and the Magnuson Moss
Warranty Act.  

Plaintiffs are demanding a jury trial and requesting injunctive
relief along with damages for themselves and all class members.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a recall
for more than 9,000 of Kia's model year 2022 EV6 vehicles in May
over concerns their parking brakes could disengage on their own and
roll away.

Do you own a model year 2011-2021 Hyundai or Kia vehicle? Let us
know in the comments.

The plaintiffs are represented by Jay M. Smith of Smith & McElwain;
and Kenneth B. McClain, Jonathan M. Soper, Kevin D. Stanley and
Chelsea M. Pierce of Humphrey, Farrington & McClain PC.

The Kia Theft Class Action Lawsuit is Brady, et al. v. Kia America
Inc., et al., Case No. 4:22-cv-00252, in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa. [GN]

KIA AMERICA: TikTok Challenge Prompts Suit Over Safety Issues
-------------------------------------------------------------
Clark Kauffman, writing for Iowa Capital Dispatch, reports that
amidst a rapid proliferation of social-media posts offering people
tips on how to easily steal a Kia or Hyundai automobile, two Iowans
have filed a class-action lawsuit against the car makers.

Ann Brady of Polk County and Leah Price of Decatur County are suing
Kia America, Inc., Hyundai Motor America, and Hyundai Kia America
Technical Center. They allege the companies produced a defect in
their vehicles that makes them "easy to steal, unsafe, and worth
less than they should be."

The lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa, alleges the companies "admit there is a theft and safety
problem with these vehicles but refuses to fix them, compensate
consumers or otherwise take actions" to address the issue.

The two Iowans are suing on behalf of themselves and a nationwide
class of thousands of persons who purchased a Kia or Hyundai in
recent years.

Brady claims that at some unspecified time, she purchased a 2019
Hyundai Tuscan at Stew Hanson Hyundai in Clive, and that it was
stolen in July 2022. Price says that in 2017, she purchased a new
Kia Sorento from Kia Des Moines and then, the following year,
purchased a 2012 Sorento and a 2016 Sorento from the same
dealership.

USB cords used to start cars
According to the lawsuit, one of the reasons older Kia and Hyundai
cars can so easily be stolen is that they do not comply with a
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard that requires vehicles to
have a starting system that, once they ignition key is removed,
prevents the activation of the engine and locks the steering
column.

In the "defective" vehicles, the lawsuit claims, "neither steering
nor forward self-mobility is prevented. If it were, the vehicles
would not be stolen at alarming rates … All a thief needs to do
is strip the ignition column, exposing a piece that pops off, and
then stick (in) a USB drive, a knife or some other similar tool, to
start the vehicle without a key or code."

The plaintiffs argue that considering the number of people who
charge their cell phones in their car using a USB cable inside the
vehicle, the only tool needed to steal a Kia or Hyundai "is usually
readily available to any thief."

Beginning in 2009, the lawsuit alleges, Kia sought to add a vehicle
immobilizer to its Amanti line of vehicles, telling the federal
government that this device was similar to other devices that have
been shown to reduce theft by 58 to 80%. In 2007, Hyundai initiated
similar efforts to add an immobilizer to its Azera line.

"Defendants are aware of the problems and even claim they have
attempted to 'fix' their 2022 vehicles to eliminate the safety
defects," the lawsuit alleges, "but are refusing to do anything
about the pre-2022 defective vehicles."

The Iowa plaintiffs are seeking a refund of all expenses tied to
their purchase of the vehicles, including the cost of anti-theft
devices and increased insurance premiums due to the alleged
defects.

The court has yet to rule on the plaintiffs' request for
class-action status, and the auto makers have not yet filed a
response to the lawsuit.

The plaintiffs are represented by Sioux City attorney Jay M.
Smith.

'Kia Challenge' on TikTok encourages theft
In recent weeks, several videos have been uploaded to TikTok,
YouTube and other social-media platforms instructing people on the
best methods for using a USB cord to steal a KIA manufactured from
2011 to 2021, or a Hyundai made from 2015 to 2021.

The videos have given rise to the "Kia Challenge" in which a group
of individuals calling themselves the "Kia Boyz" challenge others
to steal a vehicle using the USB method while recording the theft
to video.

In Lincoln, Nebraska, two teenagers recently recorded themselves
trying to steal a 2013 Hyundai from the parking lot of the Lincoln
Children's Zoo, according to Nebraska Public Media. Omaha police
say so far this year, there have been 230 Hyundais or Kias stolen
– as compared to 131 in the first seven months of 2021, the Omaha
World-Herald reported. Other cities around the nation have reported
a similar surge in thefts.

In a written statement, Kia America has said it "is aware of the
rise in vehicle thefts" and says all 2022 models have an
immobilizer in place. "All Kia vehicles for sale in the U.S. meet
or exceed Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards," the company
says.

Hyundai Motor America has said it is "concerned" with a reported
rise in thefts but that its vehicles "meet or exceed Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards." The company says engine immobilizers
"are standard equipment on all new Hyundai vehicles." [GN]

KOOTENAI COUNTY, ID: Watkins Files Suit in D. Idaho
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed Kootenai County Sheriff's
Office, et al. The case is styled as Kenneth Lee Watkins, and those
similarly situated v. Kootenai County Sheriff's Office, Robert B
Norris, Brett A. Nelson, Case No. 1:22-cv-00338-BLW (D. Idaho, Aug.
9, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Civil Rights.

Kootenai County Sheriff's Office -- https://www.kcsheriff.com/ --
is a Sheriff's department in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


KRAFT HEINZ: Faces Securities Suit in Illinois Court
----------------------------------------------------
The Kraft Heinz Company disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 25, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that the company and certain
of its current and former officers and directors are currently
defendants in a consolidated securities class action lawsuit
pending in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, "Union Asset Management Holding AG, et al. v.
The Kraft Heinz Company, et al."

The consolidated amended class action complaint, which was filed on
August 14, 2020 and also names 3G Capital, Inc. and several of its
subsidiaries and affiliates as defendants, asserts claims under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (the Exchange Act), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
based on allegedly materially false or misleading statements and
omissions in public statements, press releases, investor
presentations, earnings calls, Company documents, and SEC filings
regarding the Company's business, financial results, and internal
controls, and further alleges the 3G Entities engaged in insider
trading and misappropriated the Company's material, non-public
information.

The plaintiffs seek damages in an unspecified amount, attorneys'
fees, and other relief. The company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended class action complaint, which motion the court
denied in an order dated August 11, 2021. Plaintiffs filed a motion
for class certification on March 28, 2022.

The Kraft Heinz Company is into canned, frozen and & preserved
fruit, vegetables & food specialties based in Pennsylvania.


MATTEL INC: Hayes Appeals Reconsideration Bid Denial to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Objector JAMES J. HAYES filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in IN RE MATTEL, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No.
2:19-cv-10860-MCS-PLA, in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.

This securities fraud action stems from a "cover-up of known,
material misstatements in Mattel's financial results and known,
severe weaknesses in its internal controls" as recounted in large
part by Mattel's former tax director, Brett Whitaker.

The Plaintiffs bring claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act against Mattel, its top executives, its registered
accounting firm (PwC), and PwC's lead audit partner (Abrahams).

On May 18, 2022, the Court entered an order (1) granting
Plaintiffs' March 28, 2022 motion for final approval of settlement
and plan of allocation ; (2) granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiffs' March 28, 2022 motion for attorneys' fees and
litigation expenses; and (3) granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiffs' May 3, 2022 motion for leave to file supplemental
authority.

On June 10, 2022, Objector James J. Hayes filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court's order approving the plan of
allocation relating to the settlement of this securities class
action but Judge Mark C. Scarsi denied his request on June 13,
2022.

Mr. Hayes now seeks a review of the May 18, 2022 and June 13, 2022
orders.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Transcript was to be ordered by August 16, 2022;

   -- Transcript shall be filed by September 15, 2022;

   -- Appellant's opening brief and excerpts of record shall be
served and filed on October 24, 2022;

   -- Appellees' answering brief and excerpts of record shall be
served and filed on November 25, 2022; and

   -- The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and
served within 21 days of service of the appellees' brief, pursuant
to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.
Failure of the appellant to comply with the Time Schedule Order
will result in automatic dismissal of the appeal.

The appellate case is styled as Houston Municipal Employees Pension
System, et al v. Mattel, Inc., et al., Case No. 0:22-cv-55686 filed
in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on July 18,
2022.[BN]

MDL 2862: Wanhua Not Compelled to Show Additional Custodial Docs
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DIISOCYANATES ANTITRUST LITIGATION. This
Document Relates to All Cases, Master Docket Misc. No. 18-1001, MDL
No. 2862 (W.D. Pa.), Judge W. Scott Hardy of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denies the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendant Wanhua Chemical America Co.
Ltd. to Include Additional Document Custodian and to Produce
Certain Custodial Documents.

The multi-district litigation stems from an alleged conspiracy to
reduce supply and increase price for methylene diphenyl
diisocyanate ("MDI") and toluene diisocyanate ("TDI"), precursor
ingredients for the manufacture of polyurethane foam and
thermoplastic polyurethanes.

While WCA does not manufacture MDI or TDI, it does sell MDI through
swap agreements with other MDI suppliers. Megan Dingle joined WCA
in July of 2017 as a customer service representative and in June of
2018 she became a Sales and Operational Planning Coordinator ("S&OP
coordinator"). S&OP coordinators coordinate tanker shipments,
schedule railcars, and assist in the logistical management of
inventory levels to keep a level of product supply consistent with
the goals and directives of WCA as determined by Jacob Sturgeon,
CEO of WCA. Ms. Dingle did not have responsibility for and was not
involved in any sales, negotiations (including any negotiations
involving swap agreements), marketing, or pricing involving MDI or
TDI.

Ms. Dingle was first identified in discovery on May 26, 2021 as
someone with authority to make decisions "relating to production,
capacity, or inventory levels related to Your MDI and/or TDI
Products," and who was "knowledgeable about the swap transactions."
On Nov. 17, 2021, almost six months later, the Plaintiffs requested
WCA add Ms. Dingle as an additional document custodian. Within a
week, WCA responded that it did not intend to include Ms. Dingle as
a custodian in the already ongoing TAR review. Two months later, in
February of 2022, the Plaintiffs again objected to the exclusion of
Ms. Dingle as an additional custodian. WCA responded on Feb. 10,
2022 explaining its reason for not including Ms. Dingle. WCA
substantially completed its document review on March 21, 2022,
producing over 330,000 documents. The Plaintiffs filed the instant
Motion to Compel to add Ms. Dingle on June 21, 2022.

As to Marc Block, Sam Maddox, and Brian Morris, they were members
of WCA's ADI business unit (a separate unit from the MDI/TDI
business unit). On very limited occasions, ADI customers have a
need for and purchase MDI from WCA. In such cases, either the MDI
business unit and/or Jacob Sturgeon participate in those sales. ADI
custodians spend 2-3% of their time on MDI. During the relevant
time period, only four MDI customers purchased MDI through an ADI
custodian. At all relevant times, Jacob Sturgeon had sole pricing
authority and responsibility for MDI sales.

During negotiations of document custodians, in February of 2021,
the Plaintiffs and WCA agreed on 16 custodians, including the ADI
Custodians at issue. As to the ADI Custodians only, the parties
agreed to limit the search of ADI Custodians' documents to those
discussing MDI or TDI to filter out non-relevant documents about
ADI. The Plaintiffs now seek an order from the Court compelling WCA
to run a new TAR review of ADI Custodians' documents removing the
MDI/TDI filter terms and to search the ADI Custodians' files in
that same manner as every other custodian.

Standing on "fundamental fairness," the Plaintiffs come to the
Court, over a year after Ms. Dingle was identified, seven months
after there was an impasse between the parties regarding her
inclusion as a custodian, and three months after WCA substantially
completed their document review, seeking to have WCA reopen its TAR
review to include Ms. Dingle as an additional document custodian
because she was identified in discovery as someone who had
authority to make decisions "relating to production, capacity, or
inventory levels related to Your MDI and/or TDI Products," and who
was "knowledgeable about the swap transactions."

In response, WCA points out that while Ms. Dingle was part of the
S&OP team, which was responsible for managing MDI/TDI inventory,
she did not have sales, production or pricing responsibilities for
MDI/TDI, nor did she have responsibility for negotiation swap
agreements. She may have knowledge about swap transactions, which
is why she was identified, but she was not involved in
"negotiating" swap agreements. Additionally, Ms. Dingle worked with
more senior employees at WCA, including Heather Lunch, Melissa
Gutzler, Jianfei He, and Jacob Sturgeon, all of whom are part of
the 16 negotiated custodians of WCA and whose documents have been
produced. To that end, WCA argues that "Ms. Dingle's documents are
insignificant and substantively duplicative" when considered in
conjunction with "the burden of collecting, reviewing, and
producing" the documents such that the proportionality of the need
for the same is outweighed, "particularly given the delay in
requesting" the same. Thus, WCA argues that Ms. Dingle's role is
tangential and she is not an appropriate custodian in the case.

After a careful review of the evidence, Judge Hardy agrees with WCA
and finds that the documents identified by the Plaintiffs do not
suggest otherwise. Balancing the facts, as the Court must, he says,
the Plaintiffs' request is simply not proportionate and is unduly
burdensome given the documents already provided by those more
senior custodians, including not just Jacob Sturgeon, but also
Heather Lynch, Melissa Gutzler, and Jianfei Hi, along with
documents produced by other means (including Huntsman), and her
limited time and role as an S&OP coordinator (with no involvement
in any sales, negotiation, marketing, or pricing discussion
involving MDI/TDI) during the relevant period. He is unpersuaded
that any additional documents solely from Ms. Dingle would likely
lead to uniquely relevant information to the Plaintiffs' claims
when balanced with the above facts. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Compel with regard to Ms. Dingle is denied.

The parties agreed that the ADI Custodians would be included as
limited document custodians with filtered MDI/TDI search terms. The
Plaintiffs reserved the right, however, to revisit the issue as to
whether the document search should be limited, which they are now
exercising. They argue that the documents produced pursuant to the
filtered search are "woefully incomplete." To that end, they
request the Court enters an order compelling WCA to subject the ADI
Custodians to the same search terms and procedures as all other WCA
custodians.

In response, WCA provides that on limited occasions the ADI
Custodians served as liaisons between WCA's separate MDI/TDI sales
team for the small number of ADI customers who wanted to purchase
MDI. After negotiations, the parties agreed that WCA could use a
set of filter search terms to limit the review to those relevant to
MDI/TDI for the ADI Custodians. WCA performed the search and
produced the documents accordingly. Additionally, it points to the
untimely nature of the Plaintiffs' Motion as another reason to deny
the same. As a result, WCA argues that the Motion to Compel should
be denied.

Judge Hardy is focused on the claims of the civil case. He says,
there is no doubt that it is about a conspiracy to fix prices of
MDI and TDI. ADI is not a product at issue. The parties correctly
recognized, however, that the ADI Custodians do, on limited
occasions, deal with customers who would like to purchase MDI. To
that end, they agreed to apply a filter to the MDI/TDI search terms
as it relates to the ADI Custodians to find relevant documents.
Judge Hardy agrees that the relevant documents from ADI Custodians
would be those documents related to MDI/TDI. WCA produced to the
Plaintiffs the documents resulting from its search.

Documents unrelated to MDI/TDI, however, are not relevant to the
Plaintiffs' claims and the Plaintiffs have failed to convince the
Court otherwise. Accordingly, a document search of the ADI
Custodians untethered to MDI/TDI would yield excessive irrelevant
documents and exponentially increase the burden on WCA, making such
a search overly broad, unduly burdensome, and wholly
disproportionate to the needs of the case. Consequently, the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel as to the ADI Custodians is denied.

An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bdderfjn from Leagle.com.


META PLATFORMS: Court Stays False Advertising-Related Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Meta Platforms, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that the petition for
permission to appeal the district court's class certification order
was granted by the court and subsequently stayed the case against
the company involving false advertising.

Beginning on August 15, 2018, multiple putative class actions were
filed against the company alleging that the company inflated its
estimates of the potential audience size for advertisements,
resulting in artificially increased demand and higher prices.

The cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California and seek unspecified damages and
injunctive relief. In a series of rulings in 2019, 2021, and 2022,
the court dismissed certain of the plaintiffs' claims, but
permitted its fraud and unfair competition claims to proceed.

On March 29, 2022, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
class certification. On June 21, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit granted the company's petition for permission
to appeal the district court's class certification order, and the
district court subsequently stayed the case.

Meta Platforms, Inc. is a technology company based in California.


MICROSOFT CORP: Walker May File Amended Suit to Cure Deficiencies
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JONATHAN JENNINGS WALKER, Plaintiff v. MICROSOFT
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. C22-482-TL-MLP (W.D.
Wash.), Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, grants the
Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint correcting, to
the extent possible, the deficiencies she identified.

Mr. Walker is currently confined in the State of Arkansas where he
is serving a 450-year prison term imposed following his conviction
on charges which apparently involve the possession of materials
depicting child sexual abuse. He has submitted to the Court for
filing what purports to be a class action complaint brought under
42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985.

The Plaintiff alleges therein that the Microsoft's PhotoDNA system
searches private data sent electronically through internet service
providers ("ISP"), electronic service providers ("ESP"), electronic
communication services ("ECS"), or wireless communication service
providers ("WSP"), without a warrant or any probable cause, and
creates CyberTip Reports that are used to investigate, arrest,
prosecute, and incarcerate individuals. He alleges that use of the
PhotoDNA system violates provisions of both federal and state law.
He identifies the Microsoft and its PhotoDNA system as the
Defendants. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and
damages.

As the Plaintiff describes it, the PhotoDNA system automatically
scans the private digital data of individuals as the data passes
through Microsoft and other ESPs, ISPs, ECSs, and WSPs, seeking to
identify videos and images of possible illegal activity involving
child sexual abuse. The PhotoDNA system does this by creating a
unique hash value to represent each image that is scanned, and by
then comparing the created hash value against a hash value database
of known child sexual abuse materials ("CSAM") which is hosted and
maintained by the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children ("NCMEC").

According to the Plaintiff, the Photo DNA system is widely used and
most private data passing through most ISPs, ESPs, ECSs, and WSPs
in the United States is therefore automatically seized and scanned
without any warrant or good faith reason for doing so. He claims
that the NCMEC and law enforcement agencies worldwide use the
PhotoDNA system free of charge to review video and images contained
within what he maintains are illegally seized private data and
communications.

The Plaintiff asserts that on April 28, 2020, Microsoft's PhotoDNA
system scanned a private data file uploaded to a Microsoft OneDrive
account from an IP address registered to him, and the system
identified this private data as possible child sexual abuse
material. He further asserts that Microsoft then utilized the
PhotoDNA system to automatically create a CyberTip Report which was
sent to the NCMEC together with his IP address, the name of the
suspect file, the OneDrive account number to which the file was
uploaded, and a statement indicating that it had not been confirmed
by anyone at Microsoft whether or not the image file contained
child sexual abuse material.

The Plaintiff claims that on May 11, 2020, the NCMEC, without
viewing the possible image of child sexual abuse, sent the CyberTip
it received from Microsoft to the Arkansas State Police. He further
claims that on Aug. 6, 2020, the Arkansas State Police arrested him
and executed a search warrant on his apartment, all based upon the
PhotoDNA system's automated search and unconfirmed CyberTip Report.
The prosecuting attorney for Clark County, Arkansas, thereafter
prosecuted the Plaintiff based in part on what Plaintiff maintains
was an illegal search done by Microsoft's PhotoDNA system. He was
convicted and was sentenced to 450-years in the Arkansas Department
of Corrections.

The Plaintiff appears to identify 25 separate claims for relief in
his amended complaint. Specifically, he alleges that Microsoft
automatically seizes and then searches the personal communications
and/or data being sent from his IP address, and the IP addresses of
other class members, looking for possible criminal activity without
a warrant or any probable cause, and thereby violates his rights
and the rights of other class members under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, under 18
U.S.C. Sections 2510-2523, Sections 2701-2713, and Section 3121,
under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000aa, and under various provisions of
Washington and Arkansas state law. He further alleges that the
PhotoDNA system itself likewise violates federal and state law by
automatically seizing and searching private communications and/or
data for possible criminal activity without a warrant or any
probable cause, and by then automatically creating a CyberTip
Report that is sent to law enforcement agencies and has resulted in
the arrest and prosecution of the Plaintiff and the other class
members.

Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that Microsoft conspired with law
enforcement, the NCMEC, the International Center for Missing and
Exploited Children ("ICMEC"), the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS"), and unnamed other persons, institutions and agencies to
violate the rights guaranteed to him and to class members by the
United States Constitution and federal statutes when they created
the PhotoDNA system and put it online.

The Plaintiff, in his request for relief, requests declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages on behalf of himself and on behalf of
the purported class members. He also makes a request for damages
pertaining only to himself, asking that he be awarded compensatory
damages in the amount of $100,000 per year for every year of the
450-year sentence imposed by the Arkansas courts, for a total of
$45 million.

Judge Peterson has screened the Plaintiff's complaint in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(a) and concludes that the Plaintiff
has not adequately stated any cognizable claim for relief in his
pleading. Though it is not clear whether the Plaintiff will be able
to adequately state any claim for relief if given an opportunity to
amend his pleading, Judge Peterson nonetheless deems it appropriate
to grant the Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint
correcting, to the extent possible, the deficiencies identified.

The Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that
the complained of actions of Microsoft and/or the PhotoDNA system
constitute state action for purposes of Section 1983 and, thus, the
Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible ground for relief against
these entities under Section 1983. He likewise fails to state a
plausible conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985. He does
not identify in his pleading the specific subsection of Section
1985 that he intends to rely on, though Section 1985(3) appears to
be the only likely possibility. He alleges no facts demonstrating
that Microsoft's actions were motivated by racial or class-based
discriminatory animus.

In addition, Judge Peterson holds that though the Plaintiff does
not directly challenge the convictions underlying his current
confinement, the gravamen of his complaint appears to be that the
evidence upon which his convictions were based was unlawfully
obtained through the use of Microsoft's PhotoDNA system. It thus
appears that should he obtain a ruling in his favor on any of the
federal claims asserted, such a ruling would likely undermine the
validity of his convictions.

Finally, assuming the Plaintiff can overcome the multiple
deficiencies identified, Judge Peterson observes that the
Plaintiff's federal statutory claims, as well as his state law
claims, lack sufficient specificity to state any plausible claim
for relief. If the Plaintiff wishes to pursue such claims, he must
explain how his alleged set of facts entitles him to relief in
relation to the specific elements of the constitutional and/or
statutory provisions cited. He will also need to demonstrate, with
respect to his alleged statutory claims, that the cited statutes
provide for a private right of action.

Because of the deficiencies identified, Judge Peterson declines to
direct that the Plaintiff's amended complaint be served on the
Defendants. However, the Plaintiff is granted leave to file a
second amended complaint curing the noted deficiencies within 30
days of the date on which the Order is signed. He must ensure that
the amended complaint carries the same case number as his original
complaint. If no amended complaint is timely filed, or if he fails
to correct the deficiencies identified, the Court will recommend
that the action be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B).

The Plaintiff is advised that an amended pleading operates as a
complete substitute for an original pleading. Thus, any second
amended complaint must clearly identify each intended Defendant,
all intended claims, the specific facts which the Plaintiff
believes support each claim, and the specific relief requested.

The Clerk is directed to send the Plaintiff the appropriate forms
so that he may file a second amended complaint. The Clerk is
further directed to send copies of the Order to the Plaintiff and
to the Honorable Tana Lin.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yrtb99ab from Leagle.com.


MISSFRESH LIMITED: Kessler Topaz Reminds of September 12 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP (www.ktmc.com)
informs investors that a securities class action lawsuit has been
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York against Missfresh Limited ("Missfresh") (NASDAQ: MF).
The action charges Missfresh with violations of the federal
securities laws, including omissions and fraudulent
misrepresentations relating to the company's business, operations,
and prospects. As a result of Missfresh's materially misleading
statements and omissions to the public, Missfresh investors have
suffered significant losses.

CLICK HERE TO SUBMIT YOUR MISSFRESH LOSSES. YOU CAN ALSO CLICK ON
THE FOLLOWING LINK OR COPY AND PASTE IN YOUR BROWSER:
https://www.ktmc.com/new-cases/missfresh-limited?utm_source=PR&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=missfreshx&mktm=r

LEAD PLAINTIFF DEADLINE: SEPTEMBER 12, 2022

CLASS PERIOD: PURSUANT AND/OR TRACEABLE TO MISSFRESH'S JUNE 2021
IPO THROUGH JULY 12, 2022

CONTACT AN ATTORNEY TO DISCUSS YOUR RIGHTS:
James Maro, Esq. (484) 270-1453 or Toll Free (844) 887-9500 or
Email at info@ktmc.com

Kessler Topaz is one of the world's foremost advocates in
protecting the public against corporate fraud and other wrongdoing.
Our securities fraud litigators are regularly recognized as leaders
in the field individually and our firm is both feared and respected
among the defense bar and the insurance bar. We are proud to have
recovered billions of dollars for our clients and the classes of
shareholders we represent.

MISSFRESH'S ALLEGED MISCONDUCT
In June 2021, Missfresh conducted its initial public offering
(IPO), selling 21 million American Depository Shares ("ADSs") at
$13.00 per ADS.

On April 29, 2022, after trading hours, Missfresh filed a
Notification of Late Filing on a Form 12b-25, which announced that
Missfresh "will not be able to file its Annual Report on Form 20-F
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021 … by the prescribed
filing deadline of April 30, 2022." Missfresh explained that "[t]he
independent Audit Committee of [Missfresh]'s board of directors,
with the assistance of professional advisors, is in the process of
conducting an internal review of certain matters, including those
relating to transactions between [Missfresh] and certain
third-party enterprises." Following this news, Missfresh ADSs fell
13% to close at $0.448 per ADS on May 2, 2022, the next trading
day.

Then, on May 24, 2022, after trading hours, Missfresh issued a
press release entitled "Missfresh Announces Receipt of Nasdaq
Notification Regarding Late Filing of Form 20-F" announcing "that
it received a notification letter dated May 19, 2022 . . . from the
Listing Qualifications Department of The Nasdaq Stock Market Inc.
('Nasdaq'), indicating that [Missfresh] is not in compliance with
the requirements for continued listing." Following this news,
Missfresh ADSs fell 9% over the next two trading days to close at
$0.167 per ADS on May 26, 2022.

Finally, on July 1, 2022, Missfresh issued a press release entitled
"Missfresh Announces the Substantial Completion of the Audit
Committee-Led Independent Internal Review." In the press release,
Missfresh disclosed that "certain revenue associated with these
reporting periods in 2021 may have been inaccurately recorded in
[Missfresh]'s financial statements." As of the date the complaint
was filed, Missfresh ADSs closed at $0.389 per ADS, well below
Missfresh's IPO price of $13.00 per ADS.

WHAT CAN I DO?
Missfresh investors may, no later than September 12, 2022 seek to
be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class
through Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP or other counsel, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member. Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP encourages Missfresh investors who have
suffered significant losses to contact the firm directly to acquire
more information.

WHO CAN BE A LEAD PLAINTIFF?
A lead plaintiff is a representative party who acts on behalf of
all class members in directing the litigation. The lead plaintiff
is usually the investor or small group of investors who have the
largest financial interest and who are also adequate and typical of
the proposed class of investors. The lead plaintiff selects counsel
to represent the lead plaintiff and the class and these attorneys,
if approved by the court, are lead or class counsel. Your ability
to share in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether
or not to serve as a lead plaintiff.

ABOUT KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP prosecutes class actions in
state and federal courts throughout the country and around the
world. The firm has developed a global reputation for excellence
and has recovered billions of dollars for victims of fraud and
other corporate misconduct. All of our work is driven by a common
goal: to protect investors, consumers, employees and others from
fraud, abuse, misconduct and negligence by businesses and
fiduciaries. The complaint in this action was not filed by Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. For more information about Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP please visit www.ktmc.com.

CONTACT:
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
James Maro, Jr., Esq.
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
(484) 270-1453
info@ktmc.com [GN]

NABORS COMPLETION: C.D. Calif. Awards LeMasters $131K in Damages
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned KENNETH LEMASTERS, Petitioner v. NABORS
COMPLETION & PRODUCTION SERVICES CO., n/k/a C&J WELL SERVICES,
INC., a Delaware corporation Respondent, Case No.
2:22-cv-01181-DDP-JPR (C.D. Cal.), Judge Dean D. Pregerson of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California grants
the Petitioner's Petition to Confirm Final Arbitration Award and
for Further Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and to Enter Judgment
Against Respondent Nabors Completion and Production Services Co.

The Court enters judgment in favor of Kenneth LeMasters and against
Nabors in the amount of $131,439.30 in damages.

Petitioner LeMasters performed oil well plug and abandonment work
for Nabors in the Port of Long Beach, as part of a larger project
to replace the Gerald Desmond Bridge. On April 2, 2015, former
Nabors employees, who performed similar work on the project filed a
putative class action in state court against Nabors for violations
under the California Labor Code, on behalf of themselves and
similarly situated employees, including LeMasters. On May 7, 2015,
Nabors removed the action to this Court, and thereafter filed a
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties' arbitration
agreement.

On Oct. 13, 2015, the Court denied the motion to compel
arbitration. Nabors appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On Feb. 13,
2018, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the Court's denial of
the motion to compel arbitration.

On March 30, 2018, LeMasters submitted a Demand for Arbitration to
JAMS, asserting the following wage-and-hour violations: (1) failure
to pay prevailing wages; (2) waiting time penalties; (3) failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (4) unfair
competition. Thereafter, Honorable Jeffrey King (Ret.) was
appointed as arbitrator.

On Sept. 30, 2021, the matter proceeded to a virtual arbitration
hearing on the issue of Nabors' liability and damages. On Nov. 22,
2021, the Arbitrator ruled on Nabors' liability in favor of
LeMasters and issued an Interim Arbitration Award.

Petitioner LeMasters filed a motion to set the amount of attorney's
fees and costs with the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator accepted
LeMasters' requested lodestar fees and awarded a 1.5 multiplier to
the lodestar based on the contingent nature of the fee.

On Feb. 18, 2022, the Arbitrator issued a Final Arbitration Award.
Through the Final Award, the Arbitrator incorporated its previous
findings from the Interim Award, and awarded LeMasters $131,439.30
in damages, including statutory interest thru Nov. 19, 2021, and
continuing at $22.97 per day on the unpaid wages and interest at
the rate of 10% per annum until paid, $179,085 in attorneys' fees,
and $2,146.50 in costs.

Petitioner LeMasters now moves to confirm the Final Arbitration
Award and seeks $10,487.50 in post-award attorneys' fees and $402
in costs for filing of the initial complaint in this confirmation
action.

                Confirmation of Arbitration Award

Nabors contends that the Arbitrator exhibited a manifest disregard
of the law through several alleged errors with respect to Nabors'
liability and damages. Specifically, Nabors argues, among other
things, that the Arbitrator erred in rejecting, and giving no
deference to, the Labor Commissioner's decision that the Port of
Long Beach Project was not within the jurisdiction of California
Public Work Law and, therefore, exempt from prevailing wage
requirements.

Nabors, however, fails to identify any instances in the record
where the Arbitrator recognized the applicable law and then ignored
it, Judge Pregerson finds. The alleged errors are based on
misinterpretation or misapplication of the law -- such legal errors
are insufficient to vacate an Arbitration Award. Finding no
manifest disregard of the law exhibited in the Arbitration Award,
the Court declines to vacate the Arbitration Award.

The Court, therefore, grants LeMasters' Petition to confirm the
Arbitration Award.

                    Attorneys' Fees and Costs

As the prevailing party in this action, LeMasters is entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, including fees incurred in
connection with the confirmation action. Thus, the only issue
before the Court is whether the requested fees and costs are
reasonable.

LeMasters seeks $10,487.50 in attorneys' fees. The Court finds, and
Nabors does not dispute, that the rates set forth by LeMasters'
counsel are within the range of reasonable rates for attorneys in
the local community, taking into consideration the experience,
skill, and reputation of the attorney.

Specifically, the Court finds that the following rates are
reasonable: (a) Richard E. Donahoo, Attorney - $700/hour; and R.
Chase Donahoo, Attorney -  $425/hour.

With respect to the time spent for work performed on this matter,
LeMasters' counsel has submitted detailed billing records of work
performed and an accompanying declaration. Given that the Court
decided to take this matter under submission without a hearing, the
Court has subtracted 0.8 hours from the amount of time Richard
Donahoo anticipated billing for preparing for and attending the
hearing.

With these adjustments, the chart reflects the reasonable number of
hours expended by counsel in relation to the confirmation action
and request for post-award fees. Thus, LeMasters is entitled to
$8,950 in fees and $402 for the cost of filing the complaint, Judge
Pregerson holds.

                           Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Court grants LeMasters' Petition to
Confirm the Arbitration Award. The Final JAMS Arbitration Award
issued by Arbitrator Hon. Jeffrey King (Ret.) on Feb. 18, 2022, in
the Arbitration JAMS Case No. 1220058940, is confirmed. The Court
will enter judgment in favor of Kenneth LeMasters and against
Nabors in the amount of $131,439.30 in damages, including statutory
interest thru Nov. 19, 2021, and continuing at $22.97 per day on
the unpaid wages and interest at the rate of 10% per annum until
paid, $179,085 in attorneys' fees, and $2,146.50 in costs as
awarded by the Arbitrator.

The Court further grants LeMasters' request for post-award
attorneys' fees in the amount of $8,950 and for costs in the amount
of $402.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p93xn63 from Leagle.com.


NABORS COMPLETION: Final Arbitration Award in Cisneros Suit OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUAN CISNEROS, Petitioner v. NABORS COMPLETION &
PRODUCTION SERVICES CO., n/k/a C&J WELL SERVICES, INC., a Delaware
corporation Respondent, Case No. 2:22-cv-01871-DDP-JPR (C.D. Cal.),
Judge Dean D. Pregerson of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California grants Cisneros' Petition to Confirm Final
Arbitration Award and for Further Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and to
Enter Judgment Against Respondent Nabors.

Mr. Cisneros performed oil well plug and abandonment work for
Nabors in the Port of Long Beach, as part of a larger project to
replace the Gerald Desmond Bridge. On April 2, 2015, former Nabors
employees who performed similar work on the project, filed a
putative class action in state court against Nabors for violations
under the California Labor Code, on behalf of themselves and
similarly situated employees, including Cisneros.

Nabors removed the action to the present Court, and thereafter
filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties'
arbitration agreement. The Court denied the motion to compel
arbitration. Nabors then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the court's denial of the motion to
compel arbitration.

On March 30, 2018, Cisneros submitted a Demand for Arbitration to
JAMS, asserting the following wage-and-hour violations: (1) failure
to pay prevailing wages (Cal. Lab. Code Sections 1194, 1771, 1772,
1774 et seq.); (2) waiting time penalties (Cal. Lab. Code Section
203); (3) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements
(Cal. Lab. Code Section 226(a)); and (4) unfair competition (Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200 et seq.).  Thereafter, Hon. Richard
D. Aldrich (Ret.) was appointed as arbitrator.

Mr. Cisneros filed a motion for summary adjudication pursuant to
JAMS Employment Rule 18.  On April 5, 2021, the Arbitrator granted
Cisneros' motion, ruling on the issues pertaining to Nabors'
liability. On Sept. 21, 2021, the matter proceeded to a virtual
arbitration hearing on damages. On Jan. 5, 2022, the Arbitrator
issued a Phase I Final Award.

Through the Phase I Final Award, the Arbitrator awarded Cisneros
$263,873.95 in damages, including statutory interest thru Dec. 24,
2021, and continuing at $33.25 per day on the unpaid wages and
interest at the rate of 10% per annum until all wages and interest
thereon are paid in full. Cisneros then filed a motion to set the
amount of attorney's fees and costs with the Arbitrator. The
Arbitrator granted the motion, accepting Cisneros' requested fees
and awarding a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount. On Feb. 28,
2022, the Arbitrator issued a Final Arbitration Award, and awarded
Cisneros a total of $281,234 in fees and $4,983.63 in costs.

Mr. Cisneros now moves to confirm the Final Arbitration Award and
seeks $10,041.50 in post-award attorneys' fees and $402 in costs
for filing of the initial complaint in the confirmation action.

Nabors contends that the Arbitrator exhibited a manifest disregard
of the law through several alleged errors. Specifically, its argues
that the Arbitrator erred, including the following: (1) rejecting,
and giving no deference to, the Labor Commissioner's decision that
the Port of Long Beach Project was not within the jurisdiction of
California Public Work Law and therefore exempt from prevailing
wage requirements; (2) awarding Cisneros prevailing wages even
though there are no prevailing wage rates -- or applicable
classifications -- established by the Department of Industrial
Relations (DIR) for Cisneros' oil field work; and (3) awarding
Cisneros prevailing wages for non-publicly funded oil field work.

However, Judge Pregerson finds that Nabors fails to identify any
instances in the record where the Arbitrator "recognized the
applicable law and then ignored it." At best, the alleged errors
are based on misinterpretation or misapplication of the law, or a
misunderstanding of facts. Such errors are insufficient to vacate,
in whole or in part, an Arbitration Award. Furthermore, vacatur is
improper on the basis that the arbitrator rejected a party's
argument without analysis or explanation.

Because Nabors has not established that the Arbitrator acted with
manifest disregard of the law, Judge Pregerson declines to vacate
the Arbitration Award. He therefore grants Cisneros' Petition to
confirm the Arbitration Award.

As the prevailing party, Cisneros is entitled to reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs, including fees incurred in connection
with the confirmation action. Thus, the only issue before the court
is whether the requested fees and costs are reasonable.

Mr. Cisneros seeks $10,041.50 in attorneys' fees. Judge Pregerson
finds, and Nabors does not dispute, that the rates set forth by
Cisneros' counsel are within the range of reasonable rates for
attorneys in the local community, taking into consideration the
"experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney." Specifically,
he finds that the following rates are reasonable: Richard E.
Donahoo, Attorney; $557 to $700/hour; R. Chase Donahoo, Attorney:
$425/hour; Kelsey Ung, Paralegal: $295/hour. With respect to the
time spent for work performed, Cisneros' counsel has submitted
billing records detailing the work performed and an accompanying
declaration.

Applying the approved rates to the adjusted hours, the lodestar
method yields the following result: Richard E. Donahoo - $1,559.60;
Richard E. Donahoo - $2,100; R. Chase Donahoo - $2,847.50; and
Kelsey Unger - $354. The total is $6,861.10. With these
adjustments, these amounts reflect the reasonable number of hours
expended by counsel in relation to the confirmation action and
request for post-award fees. Thus, Cisneros is entitled to
$6,861.10 in fees and $402 for the cost of filing the complaint.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Pregerson grants Cisneros'
Petition to Confirm the Arbitration Award. The Final JAMS
Arbitration Award is confirmed. He enters judgment in favor of
Cisneros and against Nabors in the amount of $263,873.95 in
damages, including statutory interest thru Dec. 24, 2021, and
continuing at $33.25 per day on the unpaid wages and interest at
the rate of 10% per annum until all wages and interest thereon are
paid in full, $281,235 in fees and $4,983.63 in costs as awarded by
the Arbitrator. Judge Pregerson further grants Cisneros' request
for post-award attorneys' fees in the amount of $6,861.10 and for
costs in the amount of $402.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p8fejrz from Leagle.com.


NOBLES & COMPANY: Greene Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nobles & Company,
LLC. The case is styled as Vanazza Greene, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Nobles & Company, LLC
doing business as: YourIncomeSpace.com, Case No. 1:22-cv-22512-XXXX
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Nobles & Company, LLC doing business as YourIncomeSpace --
https://www.yourincomespace.com/ -- is the #1 trusted online
resource for location rental business owners to optimize their
business & maximize profits.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, PA
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone: (305) 479-2299
          Fax: (786) 623-0915
          Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com


NPAS SOLUTIONS: 11th Circuit Refuses to Rehear Johnson Suit En Banc
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHARLES T. JOHNSON, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, JENNA DICKENSON, Interested
Party-Appellant v. NPAS SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Case
No. 18-12344 (11th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit refuses to rehear the case en banc.

NPAS, a company that collects medical debts, repeatedly robocalled
Mr. Johnson on his cell phone, trying to collect a debt.
Unfortunately, it was trying to collect the debt from a person Mr.
Johnson did not know. Again and again, he informed NPAS that it was
calling the wrong number and asked it to stop calling. Yet NPAS
persisted with its collection calls.

Fed up, Mr. Johnson took the initiative to sue the company, on
behalf of himself and a putative class of similarly situated
individuals, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227. He hired legal counsel with
significant experience in TCPA class action litigation to
investigate his and the other class members' claims. No one
disputes that after initiating the suit, Mr. Johnson was "actively
involved in the case throughout the proceedings."

NPAS agreed to settle the claims with Mr. Johnson and the putative
class. The settlement agreement required NPAS to pay $1.432 million
into a settlement fund to compensate participating class members.
Under the terms of the agreement, Mr. Johnson would receive $6,000
from the fund for serving as class representative. The remainder of
the fund—the other 99.58% -- minus the Plaintiffs' attorney's
fees and costs, would be distributed equally among the
participating class members. The parties submitted the proposed
settlement agreement to the district court for preliminary approval
under Rule 23, and the court gave its approval. At the same time,
the district court set a deadline for any class member to file a
claim for recovery or object to the settlement agreement.

More than 9,500 class members submitted claims for recovery,
resulting in an estimated recovery of approximately $80 per class
member. No class member opted out. Only one class member, Jenna
Dickenson, objected to the settlement agreement. The district court
overruled the objections and approved the settlement, concluding
that it was "in all respects fundamentally fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the best interest of the class members." Dickenson
then appealed.

On appeal, the panel majority opinion reversed the incentive award
portion of the district court's order approving the settlement.
Despite acknowledging that incentive awards were "commonplace" in
modern class action litigation, the panel majority opinion
concluded that the district court lacked the power to approve the
$6,000 award to Mr. Johnson in the settlement agreement. The panel
majority opinion agreed with Ms. Dickenson that Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); and Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v.
Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), prohibit incentive awards included in
class action settlement agreements. According to the panel majority
opinion, for class representatives to receive incentive awards,
either the Supreme Court must overrule its decisions in Greenough
and Pettus or else the "Rules Committee or Congress" would need to
"amend Rule 23 or to provide for incentive awards by statute."

A petition for rehearing was filed and a member of the Court in
active service requested a poll on whether the case should be
reheard by the Court sitting en banc. A majority of the judges in
active service on the Court voted against granting rehearing en
banc. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit denies the rehearing of the
case en banc.

Judge Kevin Newsom concurs. He says, it has become customary for
the author of a panel opinion to file a "concurral" defending his
or her handiwork against a colleague's "dissental" when the full
Court declines to rehear a case en banc. Ordinarily, he'd be
inclined to do just that. The case, though, has been pending too
long already. The panel issued its decision in September
2020—almost two full years ago now. The parties and the bar are
entitled to closure. Given the circumstances, Judge Newsom is
content to let the panel opinion speak for itself.

Judge William Holcomb Pryor, Jr., joined by Circuit Judges Charles
R. Wilson, Alberto Jordan, and Robin S. Rosenbaum, dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc. He says, the panel majority opinion
fundamentally undermined class action law based on a
misinterpretation of two Supreme Court cases that long preceded the
creation of the modern class action. No other circuit has gone down
this path. Given the panel majority opinion's novel reading of
these cases, the circuit split it occasioned, and the magnitude of
its likely impact, this case is more than worthy of en banc review.
Unfortunately, by denying rehearing en banc, our court has struck a
lasting blow to class actions as a device for righting wrongs in
this circuit.

Given the Eleventh Circuit's failure to act, it will be up to the
Supreme Court to overrule or clarify Greenough and Pettus to undo
this problem of its making. If the Supreme Court does not act, then
Judge Pryor urges either the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to
amend Rule 23 or Congress to enact a statute that explicitly
authorizes incentive awards.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3ruee6sd from Leagle.com.


ONEIDA COUNTY, NY: Class Deal in Barrett v. Jail Gets Prelim. Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SARAH BARRETT, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ROBERT MACIOL, Oneida County
Sheriff, and LISA ZUREK, Chief Deputy Oneida County Jail,
Defendants, Case No. 9:20-CV-537 (MAD/DJS) (N.D.N.Y.), Judge Mae A.
D'Agostino of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
New York grants the parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval
of Class Action Settlement and the proposed Settlement Agreement.

Judge D'Agostino finds that the form, substance, and requirements
of the Notice to the Class of the Settlement Agreement, and the
distribution of the Notice is the best notice practicable under the
circumstances; constitutes notice that is reasonably calculated,
under the circumstances, to apprise the members of the class of the
proposed settlement agreement and their rights to object to any
aspect of the proposed settlement agreement; constitutes due,
adequate, and sufficient notice to all persons entitled to receive
notice of the proposed settlement agreement; and complies with the
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Within 10 days of the date the Order is entered, the Defendants
will distribute the Notice by the following means:

     a. Posting copies of the Notice in prominent and visible
locations accessible to all Plaintiffs housed at the Oneida County
Correctional Facility, ensuring that the Notice remains posted
during the entire comment period.

     b. Delivering a copy of the notice to every Plaintiff housed
at the Oneida County Correctional Facility during the notice
period.

The Defendants will maintain two copies of the proposed settlement
agreement for review by the Plaintiffs in any unit where they are
housed.

Within three days of the distribution of Notice, the Defendants
will file and serve a declaration affirming that the notice was
distributed and the proposed Settlement Agreement was made
available as required.

Judge D'Agostino has reviewed the proposed Settlement Agreement and
finds that the settlement memorialized therein falls within the
range of reasonableness and potential for final approval, thereby
meeting the requirements for preliminary approval, and that the
Notice should go out to the Plaintiffs Class.

For the purposes stated and defined in the Settlement Agreement,
she sets the following dates and deadlines:

     a. Notice Program Complete (including Initial Mailed Notice
and the Notice Re-Mailing Process) - 10 Days After The Order Is
Entered

     b. Motion for Final Approval, Application for Attorneys' Fees,
Expenses and Hearing Costs, and for a Service Award - 45 Days
Before Final Approval

     c. Last Day to Object - 30 Days Before Final Approval Hearing

     d. Last Day to Respond to Objections - 15 Days Before Final
Approval Hearing

     e. Final Approval Hearing - Oct. 21, 2022, at 12:00 p.m. in
Albany (Courtroom No. 5) before Judge Mae A. D'Agostino

All pretrial proceedings are stayed and suspended until further
order of the Court, except such actions as may be necessary to
implement the Settlement Agreement, the Preliminary Approval Order,
and final approval of the Settlement Agreement and class
certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2stst55u from Leagle.com.

LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK -- SYRACUSE, JOSHUA T. COTTER,
ESQ., SAMUEL C. YOUNG, ESQ., MAURIE G. HEINS, ESQ., in Syracuse,
New York, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs.

LEGAL SERVICES OF CENTRAL NEW YORK, INC. -- UTICA, SARA ADAMS,
ESQ., in Utica, New York, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs.

KENNEY SHELTON LIPTAK NOWAK LLP, DAVID H. WALSH, IV, ESQ. --
DHWalsh@kslnlaw.com -- DANIEL CARTWRIGHT, ESQ. --
DKCartwright@kslnlaw.com -- in Jamesville, New York, Attorneys for
the Defendants.


OTIS WORLDWIDE: Faces Darnis Suit in Connecticut Court
------------------------------------------------------
Otis Worldwide Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that on August 12, 2020,
a putative class action lawsuit captioned "Geraud Darnis et al. v.
Raytheon Technologies Corporation et al.," was filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut against Otis,
RTX, Carrier Global Corporation, which was also separated from UTC
when the company became an independent publicly-traded company,
each of their directors, and various incentive and deferred
compensation plans.

On September 13, 2021, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
against the three company defendants only. The named plaintiffs are
former employees of UTC and its current and former subsidiaries,
including Otis and Carrier.

They seek to recover monetary damages, as well as related
declaratory and equitable relief, based on claimed decreases in the
value of long-term incentive awards and deferred compensation under
nonqualified deferred compensation plans allegedly caused by the
formula used to calculate the adjustments to such awards and
deferred compensation from RTX, Carrier, and Otis following the
spin-offs of Carrier and Otis and the subsequent combination of UTC
and Raytheon Company.

Otis Worldwide Corporation is an elevator and escalator
manufacturing, installation and service company based in
Connecticut.


OUTSET MEDICAL: Vincent Wong Law Reminds of September 6 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Attention Outset Medical, Inc. ("Outset Medical") (NASDAQ: OM)
shareholders:

The Law Offices of Vincent Wong on Aug. 8 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has commenced on behalf of investors. This lawsuit
is on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased Outset
Medical common stock between September 15, 2020, and June 13,
2022.

If you suffered a loss on your investment in Outset Medical,
contact us about potential recovery by using the link below. There
is no cost or obligation to you.

https://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/outset-medical-class-action-lawsuit-submission-form?prid=30607&wire=4

ABOUT THE ACTION: The class action against Outset Medical includes
allegations that the Company made materially false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the
Company's flagship product, Tablo Hemodialysis System ("Tablo"),
would require an additional 510(k) application to be filed with The
United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), as defendants
had "continuously made improvements and updates to Tablo over time
since its original clearance"; (2) as a result, the Company could
not conduct a human factors study on a cleared device in accordance
with FDA protocols; (3) the Company's inability to conduct the
human factors study subjected the Company to the likelihood of the
FDA imposing a "shipment hold" and marketing suspension, leaving
the Company unable to sell Tablo for home use; and (4) as a result,
defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially false and misleading and
/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

DEADLINE: September 6, 2022

Aggrieved Outset Medical investors only have until September 6,
2022 to request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. You
are not required to act as a lead plaintiff in order to share in
any recovery.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Vincent Wong, Esq.
39 East Broadway
Suite 304
New York, NY 10002
Tel. 212.425.1140
E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]

PBF ENERGY: Goldstein Appeals Court's Decertification Order
-----------------------------------------------------------
PBF Energy Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 28, 2022, that plaintiffs in a class action
lawsuit filed against the company, filed a petition with the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal seeking permission to appeal the District
Court's decertification order.

On February 17, 2017, in the case captioned "Arnold Goldstein, et
al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al.," the company and PBF LLC,
and its subsidiaries, PBF Western Region LLC and Torrance Refining
Company LLC and the manager of the company's Torrance refinery
along with ExxonMobil were named as defendants in a class action
and representative action complaint filed on behalf of Arnold
Goldstein, John Covas, Gisela Janette La Bella and others similarly
situated.

The complaint was filed in the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles and alleges negligence, strict
liability, ultra-hazardous activity, a continuing private nuisance,
a permanent private nuisance, a continuing public nuisance, a
permanent public nuisance and trespass resulting from the February
18, 2015 electrostatic precipitator (ESP) explosion at the Torrance
refinery which was then owned and operated by ExxonMobil.

The operation of the Torrance refinery by the PBF entities
subsequent to the company's acquisition in July 2016 is also
referenced in the complaint. To the extent that plaintiffs' claims
relate to the ESP explosion, ExxonMobil retained responsibility for
any liabilities that would arise from the lawsuit pursuant to the
agreement relating to the acquisition of the Torrance refinery.

On July 2, 2018, the court granted leave to plaintiffs to file a
Second Amended Complaint alleging groundwater contamination. With
the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs added an
additional plaintiff, Hany Youssef.

On October 15, 2019, the judge granted certification to two limited
classes of property owners with Youssef as the sole class
representative and named plaintiff, rejecting two other proposed
subclasses based on negligence and on strict liability for
ultra-hazardous activities. The certified subclasses relate to
trespass claims for ground contamination and nuisance for air
emissions.

On February 5, 2021, the defendants' motion for Limited Extension
of Discovery Cut-Off and a Motion by plaintiffs for Leave to File
Third Amended Complaint were heard by the court. On May 5, 2021,
the Court granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint for the
third time to substitute Navarro for Youssef.

On May 12, 2021, plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint
(TAC) that contained significant changes and new claims, including
individual claims that were not included in the motion for leave to
amend plaintiffs presented to the Court.

On June 9, 2021, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss/Strike
the TAC. On June 23, 2021, plaintiffs filed their opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss/Strike, to which the defendants filed their reply
on July 2, 2021. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss/Strike the TAC
was held on August 2, 2021 and the court ordered that the TAC be
struck and that the parties meet and confer with respect to the
complaint. After meeting and conferring, plaintiffs agreed to
submit a corrected TAC with changes reflecting the removal of
Youssef and the substitution of Navarro as the named Plaintiff.

On August 23, 2021, the Court approved the parties' stipulation to
take Navarro's deposition on September 23, 2021. Also, on August
23, 2021, the Court approved the parties' stipulation to continue
the pretrial dates with the new deadlines.

On October 8, 2021, plaintiffs filed their Motion to Appoint
Navarro as Class Representative. On October 29, 2021, the
defendants filed their opposition to this motion. On November 15,
2021, plaintiffs filed their reply. On February 8, 2022, the Court
held a hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Navarro as Class
Representative but did not act on the motion. Instead, the court
ordered the parties to submit draft orders for the Court's
consideration.

After considering the parties' proposed orders, on July 5, 2022,
the Court issued a final order ruling that Plaintiffs' Motion to
Substitute José Navarro as Class Representative was denied and
decertifying both of Plaintiffs' proposed Air and Ground
Subclasses.

The order provided that the case will proceed with Navarro as the
sole plaintiff and required the parties to meet and confer and
propose a schedule for the remaining pretrial dates and a trial
date. On July 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a petition with the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal seeking permission to appeal the District
Court's decertification order finding that Navarro is an inadequate
class representative.

PBF Energy Inc. is an independent petroleum refiner and supplier
based in New Jersey.


PENDLETON COMMUNITY: Faces Class Suit Over Overdraft Fee Practices
------------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Shaak, writing for ClassAction.org, reports that a proposed
class action lawsuit seeks to hold Pendleton Community Bank
responsible for its allegedly unlawful practices of charging
overdraft fees on certain types of transactions and charging more
than one overdraft or insufficient funds (NSF) fee on a single
transaction.

According to the 29-page case, Pendleton's fee practices are not
authorized under the terms of its contracts with customers and have
allowed the bank to bring in "substantial revenue to the tune of
millions of dollars" at consumers' expense.

The lawsuit first looks to challenge Pendleton's practice of
assessing overdraft fees on what the case describes as "Authorize
Positive, Settle Negative" (APSN) transactions. Per the case, APSN
transactions occur when the bank initially authorizes a transaction
into positive funds but then charges an overdraft fee when the
transaction settles into a negative balance days later. According
to the suit, this situation can occur when an intervening
transaction depletes the funds in a customer's account after the
initial transaction was authorized but before it settles.

The suit argues, however, that because Pendleton sets aside funds
to cover the amount of the initial transaction when it is first
authorized and makes them unavailable for the customer's use, those
funds should always be available to cover the amount of the
transaction when it settles.

"For APSN Transactions, which are immediately deducted from a
positive account balance and held aside for payment of that same
transaction, there is always enough money to 'pay' the
transaction—yet Defendant assesses OD Fees on them anyway," the
complaint attests.

Per the suit, Pendleton's assessment of overdraft fees on APSN
transactions is rooted in its use of a "secret posting process"
whereby the bank releases the hold placed on funds "for a split
second" and then re-debits the APSN transaction a second time,
triggering an overdraft fee.

"This secret step allows Defendant to charge OD Fees on
transactions that never should have gotten them—transactions that
were authorized into sufficient funds, and for which Defendant
specifically set aside money to pay," the lawsuit argues.

The suit goes on to challenge Pendleton's alleged practice of
charging more than one NSF or overdraft fee on a single
transaction. Per the suit, when the bank rejects an electronic
payment, ACH item or check for insufficient funds, it will charge a
$35 fee. The case alleges, however, that when Pendleton attempts to
reprocess the same transaction, it treats the transaction as a new
item subject to another fee. Per the suit, there is "zero
indication" in Pendleton's account documents that one transaction
can be subject to multiple fees.

In fact, the lawsuit claims there is a "huge gap" between
Pendleton's overdraft practices as described in its account
documents and the bank's actual practices. The suit argues that
Pendleton has used its discretion to interpret its contracts with
customers "in a way that violates common sense and reasonable
consumers' expectations" in order to generate more fees.

The case looks to represent Pendleton checking accountholders who,
during the applicable statute of limitations period, were assessed
an overdraft fee on a debit card transaction that was authorized on
sufficient funds and settled on negative funds.

The suit also proposes to cover Pendleton checking accountholders
who, during the applicable statute of limitations period, were
assessed multiple fees on an item on their checking account. [GN]

POPULUS GROUP: Class Settlement in Taylor Suit Initially Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JEFFREY TAYLOR v. POPULUS
GROUP, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-00473-BAS-DEB (S.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Cynthia Bashant entered an order granting the
plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of class action
settlement:

  -- Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
     Procedure, the Court hereby conditionally certifies a class
     for settlement purposes only.

  -- The class shall consist of: all non-exempt employees who
     were assigned by Populus to work for Lime in California at
     any time during the Class Period.

  -- The Court appoints Davtyan Law Firm, Inc. and Cohelan
     Khoury & Singer as Class Counsel to represent the class.

  -- The Court appoints Jeffrey Taylor as Class Representative.

  -- The Court approves Simpluris, Inc. as Class Administrator.

  -- The Court preliminarily approves the Settlement Agreement
     and the terms and conditions of settlement.

  -- The Court will hold a fairness hearing on January 9, 2023.

  -- The Court specifies deadlines for the settlement and
     approval process as follows:

                    Event                   Deadline

     Deadline for Populus to              August 30, 2022
     provide Simpluris
     with Class List and Data:

     Deadline for Simpluris to            September 29, 2022
     mail Notice Packets to Class
     Members:

     Deadline for Class Counsel           November 14, 2022
     to file motion for attorneys'
     fees and costs and Class
     Representative Service
     Payment:

     Last day for Class Members to        November 28, 2022
     respond or object to Settlement
     Agreement:

     Deadline to file Motion for          December 12, 2022
     Order Granting Final Approval:

opulus Group founded in 2008. The Company's line of business
includes providing architectural services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 2, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3SGwYoS at no extra charge.[CC]

REALREAL INC: $2.42-Mil. Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Sanders Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled MICHAEL SANDERS, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE REALREAL, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-07737-EJD (N.D. Cal.), the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California awards
$2,420,000, in attorneys' fees to The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

District Judge Edward J. Davila notes that the capitalized terms
used have the meanings defined in the parties' Stipulation of
Settlement dated Nov. 5, 2021.

The Court has granted final approval of the Settlement of the class
action.

The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., appointed by the Court as Class Counsel
for the purposes of the Settlement, have petitioned the Court for
an award of attorneys' fees in compensation for services provided
to the Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class along with reimbursement
of expenses incurred in connection with prosecuting this action, to
be paid out of the Settlement Fund established pursuant to the
Settlement.

The Court awards Rosen Law 22% of the Settlement Fund, or $2.42
million, as attorneys' fees in this action, together with a
proportionate share of the interest earned on the fund at the same
rate as earned by the balance of the fund from the date of the
establishment of the fund to the date of payment. The Court finds
this fee award fair and reasonable. Rosen Law will have the ability
to allocate the attorneys' fees between Rosen Law and any
additional counsel.

Rosen Law is also awarded $59,828.16 in reimbursement of
out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with the prosecution
of the Action, which the Court finds fair and reasonable.

Except as otherwise provided here, the attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses will be paid in the manner and procedure
provided for in the Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/23hs2pn9 from Leagle.com.


REALREAL INC: N.D. California Issues Final Judgment in Sanders Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California issued an Order and Final Judgment in the
lawsuit titled MICHAEL SANDERS, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE REALREAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-07737-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

On July 28, 2022, a hearing having been held before the Court to
determine: (1) whether the terms and conditions of the Stipulation
of Settlement, dated Nov. 5, 2021, are fair, reasonable, and
adequate for the settlement of all claims asserted by the
Settlement Class against the Defendants (as defined in the
Stipulation), including the release of the Released Claims against
the Released Parties, and should be approved; (2) whether judgment
should be entered dismissing the Action with prejudice; (3) whether
to approve the proposed Plan of Allocation as a fair and reasonable
method to allocate the Net Settlement Fund among Settlement Class
Members; and (4) whether and in what amount to award Lead Counsel
fees and reimbursement of expenses.

Judge Davila notes that the Long Notice substantially in the form
approved by the Court in the Court's Order Preliminarily Approving
Settlement and Providing for Notice, dated March 24, 2022, was
mailed to all reasonably identifiable Settlement Class Members and
posted to the website of the Claims Administrator, both in
accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order and the
specifications of the Court. Summary Notice substantially in the
form approved by the Court in the Preliminary Approval Order was
published electronically once on the GlobeNewswire and in print
once in the Investor's Business Daily.

Hence, the Court finally certifies this action as a class action
for purposes of the Settlement, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all persons
and entities who purchased TRR common stock between June 27, 2019,
and Nov. 20, 2019, both dates inclusive, and were damaged thereby.
Included in the Settlement Class are all Persons who purchased TRR
common stock pursuant to and/or traceable to TRR's Registration
Statement issued in connection with TRR's June 27, 2019 IPO and all
persons and entities who purchased TRR common stock during the
Settlement Class Period at artificially inflated prices and were
damaged thereby.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
the purposes of this Settlement, the Plaintiffs are certified as
the class representatives on behalf of the Settlement Class and
Lead Counsel previously selected by Plaintiffs and appointed by the
Court is appointed as Class Counsel for the Settlement Class.

In accordance with the Court's Preliminary Approval Order, the
Court finds that the forms and methods of notifying the Settlement
Class of the Settlement and its terms and conditions met the
requirements of due process, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Section 21D(a)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(7), as amended by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; constituted the best
notice practicable under the circumstances; and constituted due and
sufficient notice of these proceedings and the matters set forth
here, including the Settlement and Plan of Allocation, to all
persons and entities entitled to such notice. No Settlement Class
Member is relieved from the terms and conditions of the Settlement,
including the releases provided for in the Stipulation, based upon
the contention or proof that such Settlement Class Member failed to
receive actual or adequate notice.

The Settlement is approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate under
Rule 23. The Parties are directed to consummate the Settlement in
accordance with the terms and provisions of the Stipulation.

The Action and all claims contained therein, as well as the
Released Claims, are dismissed with prejudice as against the
Defendants and the Released Parties. The Parties are to bear their
own costs, except as otherwise provided in the Stipulation.

The Court finds that the proposed Plan of Allocation is a fair and
reasonable method to allocate the Net Settlement Fund among
Settlement Class Members, and Class Counsel and the Claims
Administrator are directed to administer the Plan of Allocation in
accordance with its terms and the terms of the Stipulation.

The Court finds that the Parties and their counsel have complied
with all requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
as to all proceedings here.

The Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties and the
Settlement Class Members for all matters relating to the Action,
including the administration, interpretation, effectuation, or
enforcement of the Stipulation and this Order and Final Judgment,
and including any application for fees and expenses incurred in
connection with administering and distributing the Settlement
proceeds to the Settlement Class Members.

Without further order of the Court, the Defendants and Class
Representatives may agree to reasonable extensions of time to carry
out any of the provisions of the Stipulation.

In the event the Settlement is not consummated in accordance with
the terms of the Stipulation, then the Stipulation and this Order
and Final Judgment will be null and void, of no further force or
effect, and without prejudice to any Party, and may not be
introduced as evidence or used in any action or proceeding by any
Person against the Parties or the Released Parties, and each Party
will be restored to his, her, or its respective litigation
positions as they existed prior to July 26, 2021, pursuant to the
terms of the Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Final Judgment dated July
28, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/muez4m62 from
Leagle.com.


RENAISSANCE FOOD: Padilla Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Renaissance Food
Group, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Ericka Padilla, an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Renaissance Food Group, LLC, GH Foods CA, LLC, Does 1-100, Case No.
34-2022-00324956-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., Aug.
9, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

Renaissance Food Group is a family of talented and passionate
people who share a collective vision of creating really good
food.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David D. Bibiyan, Esq.
          BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.
          8484 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 500
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211-3243
          Phone: (310) 438-5555
          Fax: (310) 300-1705
          Email: david@tomorrowlaw.com

ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL: W.D. Washington Refuses to Dismiss Moore Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COOPER MOORE and ANDREW GILLETTE, on their own behalf
and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ROBINHOOD
FINANCIAL LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01571-BJR (W.D. Wash.),
Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, denies the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs Moore and Gillette brought the putative class action
against Defendant Robinhood, asserting claims under Washington's
Commercial Electronic Mail Act, RCW Section 19.190 et seq., and
Washington's Consumer Protection Act, RCW Section 19.86 et seq.

Robinhood is an online investments brokerage service firm that,
through its free mobile application and website, offers services
that enable its users to invest in stocks and other securities.
While it does not directly charge its users commissions on trades
executed through its brokerage service, it earns revenue through
"Payment for Order Flow" incentive fees paid to Robinhood by
principal trading firms to which Robinhood routes its users'
securities orders.

The Plaintiffs allege that, in 2020, the Securities and Exchange
Commission found that this trading model results in inflated trade
execution prices for Robinhood users relative to the prices they
would have received from its competitors. It also offers its users
a premium subscription-based service, "Robinhood Gold," which, for
a $5 monthly fee, provides subscribing users with a suite of
financial tools, data, and market research, and permits them to
borrow money from Robinhood in order to purchase securities on its
platform.

Robinhood promotes its services in part through its "Refer a
Friend" program, by which users are able to use the Robinhood App
to generate and send text messages to their phone contacts inviting
them to join Robinhood's platform. To do so, a user must click
"Rewards" or "Earn Rewards" in the Robinhood App homepage, which
prompts the user to click "Invite Contacts" or "Share Link," which
then prompts the user to select the individuals from his or her
phone's contact list to which the invitation will be sent. Upon
doing so, the user's phone's native text messaging application
automatically opens with a pre-composed message -- inviting the
non-user to join Robinhood, and containing a unique referral link
-- which the user can send as any ordinary text message.

To incentivize referrals, Robinhood compensates its users once
their invited contacts join the platform and link their bank
accounts to it. Specifically, it credits both the referring user
and the referred contact with either $5 or a randomly selected
stock that can be worth anywhere from $2.50 and $225. It includes a
promise of free stock in the invitational text messages generated
by the Robinhood App, and also displays alerts to users within the
Robinhood App reminding them to "Invite Friends" to earn free
stock.

On March 14, 2018, Moore received a text message from a prior
contact inviting him to join Robinhood's platform. The message
contained a link to Robinhood's website and stated: "Join Robinhood
and we'll both get a stock like Apple, Ford, or Sprint for free.
Make sure you use my link." On March 4, 2020, Gillette receives a
similar text message from a prior contact containing a link to
Robinhood's website and stating: "You now have a claim to a stock
like Apple, Ford, or Facebook. In order to keep this claim to your
stock, sign up and join Robinhood using my link."

On Aug. 9, 2021, Moore filed this lawsuit as a class action "on
behalf of persons who also received Robinhood's illegal spam
texts." In the Amended Complaint, which adds Gillette as a
plaintiff, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant, through its
Refer a Friend program, violated CEMA and the CPA. The Defendant
moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiffs opposed the
Motion and replied.

The Plaintiffs claim that Robinhood, though its Refer a Friend
program, violated CEMA by "assisting the transmission of one or
more commercial electronic text messages to them." The Defendant
argues that the Amended Complaint fails to state a CEMA claim on
several independent grounds.

The Defendant contends that the Amended Complaint alleges that
Robinhood had only "nominal involvement in sending the referral
text messages," which is "insufficient to state a claim of
'substantial assistance' under CEMA."

Judge Rostein finds the Defendant's contention unavailing. She
says, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint demonstrate
Robinhood's "substantial assistance" in the invitational text
messages received by the Plaintiffs. Contrary to its claim of
"nominal involvement," Robinhood developed and ordered the entire
"chain of events" leading to the messages' formulation and
transmission. Whether or not the Robinhood users had full control
over the final messages at the point of their transmission is of no
moment insofar as the Plaintiffs do not seek to establish that
Robinhood "initiated" the messages. The Plaintiffs seek to prove
only that Robinhood provided "substantial assistance or support" to
its users in formulating, composing, sending, originating,
initiating, or transmitting them. Judge Rothstein finds that the
Amended Complaint adequately alleges that the Defendant did so.

Next, the Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint does not
plead a CEMA violation for a second reason, to wit: that the
Plaintiffs "fail to allege facts demonstrating that Robinhood knew
or consciously avoided knowing that the users who initiated the
referral text messages were conducting business in Washington."

Judge Rothstein holds that the Defendants misreads RCW Section
19.190.010(1) and RCW Section 19.190.060(1) to require the
Plaintiffs to allege that the text messages' "initiators" (the
Robinhood users) were conducting business within the state. The
Plaintiffs are not required to allege this in order to state a CEMA
claim. Accordingly, since the Plaintiffs must only establish the
Defendant's CEMA violation, RCW Section 19.190.060(1) requires them
to allege only that Robinhood -- and not the users who sent them
the invitational messages -- had been conducting business in
Washington. As the Defendant does not dispute the Plaintiffs'
allegation that Robinhood has been doing so, the Plaintiffs have
satisfied the only "conducting business" requirement pertaining to
their claim.

The Defendant's final argument is that the invitational messages
received by the Plaintiffs did not constitute "commercial
electronic text messages" under CEMA because they did not "promote
real property, goods, or services for sale or lease." According to
them, the messages had only offered free stock without identifying
a specific service, and downloading the Robinhood App is free of
charge.

The Defendant's argument lacks merit, Judge Rothstein holds. She
says, the Amended Complaint alleges specific charges for
Robinhood's services that are not "intangible." The Plaintiffs
claim that users pay indirectly to use Robinhood's brokerage
service. The Plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate that Robinhood
charges its users both directly and indirectly in connection with
Robinhood Gold and its brokerage service, such that they constitute
services "for sale." Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged that the invitational messages they received were
"commercial electronic text messages."

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rothstein rejects the Defendant's
challenges to the adequacy of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, she
denies Defendant Robinhood's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/cc6y7p5u from Leagle.com.


ROSEN HOTELS: Judge Approves $2.3MM Settlement in WARN Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Emilie Shumway, writing for HRDive, reports that Rosen Hotels and
Resorts, an Orlando-based hospitality system, has preliminarily
settled class-action claims brought by a plaintiff and 3,631 other
employees through the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act. A judge approved the $2.3 million deal Aug. 2.

According to the complaint, hotel workers were put on a temporary
furlough in April 2020 (Turner v. Rosen Hotels and Resorts, Inc.,
No. 6:21-cv-00161 (M.D. Florida Jan. 22, 2021)). They remained on
furlough for six months without receiving notification of their
employment status, the complaint said. The workers suffered
"employment loss" as part of the mass layoff, and did not receive
the 60 days' advance written notice to which they were entitled
under the WARN Act, the complaint alleged.

In addition to failing to provide workers with notice of furlough,
the hotel system did not provide them with pay or benefits for 60
days following their respective layoffs exceeding six months, the
complaint alleged.

Dive Insight:
The WARN Act requires employers with at least 100 full-time workers
to provide 60 days' advance notice if they plan to submit at least
50 people at a single site to an employment loss, which is defined
as a termination, a layoff exceeding six months or a 50% or greater
reduction in hours during each month of a six-month period.

The law is intended to help workers transition from their
terminated position to a new role. Under the Workforce Investment
Act, each state has a designated rapid response team whose
assistance is triggered upon receipt of a WARN Act notice. The team
helps workers with their career transition by coordinating with the
employer to provide job search and placement assistance and
on-the-job or classroom training, among other resources.

The applicability of the WARN Act can be tricky for employers;
temporary, part-time and government employees are not protected
under its provisions, for example, and workers are also excluded if
offered a transfer to a site within reasonable commuting distance
or sustaining a break of no more than six months. In addition, an
employer may lay off 50-499 workers at a site without triggering
the WARN Act requirements if that number is still fewer than
one-third of its workforce.

The influence of COVID-19 on the WARN Act's application has been a
question on employers' minds in the wake of mass layoffs early in
the pandemic -- particularly as the act has an exception to the
60-day notice policy for layoffs resulting from natural disasters.
Recently, however, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the pandemic could not be considered a natural disaster for the
purposes of the act. [GN]

ROSET USA CORPORATION: Cromitie Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Roset USA
Corporation. The case is styled as Seana Cromitie, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Roset USA Corporation,
Case No. 1:22-cv-06762 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Roset USA Corporation manufactures household furniture.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com

ROWAN INC: Ramirez Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rowan, Inc. The case
is styled as Amanda Ramirez, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Rowan, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-22525-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Rowan -- https://heyrowan.com/ -- provides hypoallergenic earrings
and nickel free earrings for sensitive ears for children,
teenagers, and adults.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, PA
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone: (305) 479-2299
          Fax: (786) 623-0915
          Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com

RTMH INC: Cromitie Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RTMH, Inc. The case
is styled as Seana Cromitie, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. RTMH, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-06757 (S.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

RTMH, Inc. doing business as Rose Tarlow-Melrose House --
https://www.rosetarlow.com/ -- is an interior designer, a furniture
and textile designer, and an author based in Los Angeles,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


RVNB HOLDINGS: Walsh Suit Transferred From E.D. Texas to N.D. Texas
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARTIN J. WALSH, Secretary, United States Department
of Labor, Plaintiff v. ROBERT PETERSON, VASILIA PETERSON, PAUL
GENERALE, NEIL BROZEN, NICOLE PETERSON, 2012 IRREVOCABLE TRUST,
BROOKE PETERSON 2012 IRREVOCABLE TRUST, RVNB HOLDINGS, INC.
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN, Defendants, Civil Action No.
4:21-CV-867 (E.D. Tex.), Judge Amos L. Mazzant of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division, grants
the Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas.

On Sept. 27, 2019, Jason Coleman and Jessica Casey -- two
participants of the RVNB Holdings, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership
Plan -- filed a putative class action (Coleman v. Brozen, No.
4:19-CV-705, 2020 WL 220220, *1 (E.D. Tex. May 6, 2020)) in the
undersigned Court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974. The lawsuit was brought on behalf of the Plan and its
vested participants as of June 29, 2017, "against various alleged
Plan fiduciaries and one non-fiduciary for alleged violations of
ERISA." Some of the defendant fiduciaries named in the Coleman
action, among others, are Neil M. Brozen, Robert Peterson, Jr.,
Vasilia Peterson, the Nicole Peterson 2012 Irrevocable Trust, and
the Brooke Peterson 2012 Irrevocable Trust.

The Coleman action specifically alleges that the Defendants
violated ERISA by engaging in various prohibited transactions and
fiduciary breaches arising from a 2017 redemption plan for RVNB
stock held by the Plan. According to the Coleman plaintiffs, the
Plan and its participants, who were vested in shares of RVNB,
suffered losses when the defendants terminated the Plan and caused
the Plan to sell its shares of RVNB for far less than fair market
value. On May 27, 2020, the Court transferred the Coleman action to
the Northern District of Texas pursuant to the Plan's forum
selection clause.

On Oct. 29, 2021, over two years after the Coleman action was
filed, Plaintiff Walsh, in his official capacity as Secretary of
the United States Department of Labor ("DOL"), filed the present
action. The Walsh action names many of the same defendants as those
named in the Coleman action, including: Neil M. Brozen, Robert
Peterson, Jr., Vasilia Peterson, the Brooke Peterson 2012
Irrevocable Trust, and the Nicole Peterson 2012 Irrevocable Trust.
The Plaintiff sued to redress violations of ERISA regarding the
same 2017 stock redemption plan made the basis of the Coleman
action. Specifically, he alleges that the Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by engineering a scheme to sell and repurchase
RVNB shares for far less than their fair market value, which
resulted in the Plan and its participants to suffer millions of
dollars in losses.

On Feb. 11, 2022, the Plaintiffs in the Coleman action filed a
motion to transfer the Coleman action back to the Court. The
Northern District of Texas has yet to rule on the motion to
transfer as the Coleman action is currently stayed pending the
court's ruling on the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. On
Feb. 14, 2022, the Defendants filed the present motion, requesting
that the Walsh action be transferred to the Northern District of
Texas pursuant to the first-to-file rule, or, alternatively, under
28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). The Plaintiff filed a response in
opposition on Feb. 28, 2022, and the Defendants filed a reply on
March 7, 2022.

The Defendants request the Court transfers the case to the Dallas
Division of the Northern District of Texas because a substantially
similar case, the Coleman action -- filed over two years prior --
is currently being adjudicated in that court. They alternatively
request transfer under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). The Plaintiff
opposes transfer under either rule.

Judge Mazzant finds that transfer appropriate under the
first-to-file rule. He explains, under the first-to-file rule, a
court may, in its discretion, transfer an action if another federal
court is adjudicating a case that was first-filed and if "issues
raised by the cases substantially overlap."

The Plaintiff argues that the Court should decline to apply the
first-to-file rule, asserting that "though the same 2017 ESOP
transaction spurred both lawsuits, the lawsuits are distinct: The
Coleman action has some but not all of the same defendants,
different plaintiffs, and some discrete issues that are not present
in the instant case"

The first-to-file rule, however, "does not, require that cases be
identical." Rather, regardless of whether the issues or parties in
the cases are identical, "the crucial inquiry is one of
'substantial overlap,'" and if the cases "overlap on the
substantive issues, the cases are required to be consolidated in
the jurisdiction first seized of the issues."

In determining substantial overlap, courts in the Fifth Circuit
examine factors such as whether the core issues are the same,
whether much of the evidence produced will be the same, the extent
of the overlap, the likelihood of conflict between different
judgments, and the advantage and interest in each forum's resolving
the case.

Judge Mazzant finds that the Defendants have made an adequate
showing of substantial overlap to support an application of the
first-to-file rule. He says, the Plaintiff is correct that there
are some differences in the parties. Additionally, the Walsh action
names one defendant not named in the Coleman action, and the
Coleman action names three defendants not named in the present
case. Despite some differences in parties, the Coleman action and
the Walsh action were brought against almost identical individuals
and entities. Both cases center around the same operative facts and
seek similar forms of recovery on behalf of the Plan and Plan
participants. And the causes of action alleged in the Coleman
action square almost exactly with the causes of action alleged in
the present case. Thus, substantial overlap exists between these
lawsuits.

Moreover, the Plaintiff has not identified any "compelling
circumstances" that would warrant an exception to the rule's
application. Judge Mazzant recognizes that the first-to-file rule
is "not a 'rigid or inflexible rule to be mechanically applied'"
and should be employed "with a view to the dictates of sound
judicial administration." Yet, the Plaintiff "does not attempt to
articulate a single circumstance with any semblance of specificity
that would lead the Court to set aside the first-to-file rule."

The Plaintiff does argue that because the first-filed action is
stayed pending ruling on the Coleman defendants' motion to compel
arbitration, judicial efficiency weighs against transfer. Even
assuming in arguendo this constitutes a "compelling circumstance,"
Judge Mazzant is not persuaded by the Plaintiff's argument.
Contrary to their allegations, transfer under the first-to-file
rule is not inappropriate simply because the first-filed action is
stayed pending arbitration. There is no doubt that substantial
overlap exists between the Coleman action and the Walsh action, and
thus the court best-suited to resolve both cases is that of the
first-filed case -- the Northern District of Texas.

Lastly, because the Northern District of Texas has not yet ruled on
the motion to compel arbitration, transferring the Walsh action at
this juncture would promote judicial efficiency, not inhibit it as
the Plaintiff suggests. In other words, because the substantive
merits of the Coleman action have yet to be resolved, the
opportunity still exists for the Walsh action and the Coleman
action to be adjudicated concurrently. Thus, transferring the Walsh
action at this time avoids the significant burden that would arise
if two parallel actions were to proceed on separate paths,
requiring duplicative efforts, resulting in piecemeal litigation,
and leaving potential for inconsistent resolutions. Avoidance of
such burdens is the fundamental purpose of the first-to-file rule.
Therefore, Judge Mazzant finds the first-to-file rule applies to
the instant action, and no compelling circumstances exist to find
otherwise. Accordingly, transfer of the Walsh action to the
Northern District of Texas is appropriate under the circumstances.

As a final note, the parties both offer argument on transfer under
28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Judge Mazzant does not reach the merits
of these arguments. He sees no reason to reconsider the issue.
Accordingly, having found that substantial overlap exists between
the Coleman action and the Walsh action sufficient to support
transfer under the first-to-file rule, he does not reach whether
transfer would also be appropriate under Section 1404(a).

In light of the foregoing, Judge Mazzant grants the Defendants'
Motion to Transfer and transfers the case to the Dallas Division of
the Northern District of Texas.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/w5en43hf from
Leagle.com.


SAFE STREETS: Final Approval of Anderson's Class Settlement Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Mark Anderson, Plaintiff v. Safe Streets USA LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00323-KJM-JDP (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California denies Anderson's unopposed motion for final
approval of settlement of the PAGA action preliminarily approved by
the Court and his motion for attorneys' fees and other costs.

From October 2014 through December 2016, Defendant Safe Streets
employed Anderson as a service technician in Michigan and
California. On Feb. 12, 2018, he commenced the class action,
bringing claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California
Labor Code, and the Private Attorneys General Act.

Mr. Anderson's FLSA claim was resolved in arbitration and is no
longer part of this action. His only remaining claim is under PAGA.
The Court retained supplemental jurisdiction over Anderson's PAGA
claim under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c).

Following a mediation of Anderson's PAGA claim, and after further
negotiations, the parties reached a settlement of this claim.
Anderson sought preliminary approval of the settlement, which the
Court granted. He now moves for the settlement's final approval and
for attorneys' fees and other costs. The motions are unopposed. The
Court held a hearing on July 8, 2022.

The settlement provides a Gross Settlement Amount (GSA) of $1.49
million. Based on the GSA, the settlement allocates $800,000 for
PAGA claims and $690,000 for class claims. In other words, the PAGA
fund contains $800,000 while the class fund contains $690,000. The
settlement then provides for transferring $200,000 of the PAGA fund
to the class fund. After this transfer is effected, the PAGA fund
contains $600,000 while the class fund contains $890,000.

The balance of the PAGA fund is further reduced by the payment of
$491,700 in attorneys' fees, $10,000 in an incentive award payment,
up to $25,000 in litigation costs, and up to $12,000 in a
settlement administration fee. With these deductions, the net PAGA
fund is at least $61,300 while the class fund remains at $890,000.
The PAGA fund's balance of $61,300, which the parties acknowledge
could be higher based on the Court's adjustments, will be paid to
the LWDA.

Aggrieved employees will be paid a total of $890,000 from the class
fund. The estimated settlement payment to each employee is $7,177
while the highest estimated single payment to an employee is
$24,303.

Judge Mueller finds two primary issues with this settlement. First,
upon closer inspection following hearing, she can discern no basis
for dividing the GSA between PAGA and class claims because
Anderson's only remaining claim is under the PAGA. This is
especially problematic because the division dilutes the amount of
civil penalties that the LWDA is entitled to receive based on
Anderson's PAGA claim.

Second, as raised at hearing, the settlement does not distribute
75% of the civil penalties to the LWDA. Without te Court's making
any adjustments, the settlement provides a total of $61,300 to the
LWDA while providing aggrieved employees a total of $890,000. In
other words, the settlement provides $828,700 more to aggrieved
employees than the LWDA, although PAGA plainly requires most of the
civil penalties to be paid to the LWDA.

The Court cannot rewrite the parties' settlement to cure these
flaws. Judge Mueller thus denies the pending motions without
prejudice to a renewed motion addressing in detail the concerns.

The Order resolves ECF Nos. 49 and 50.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5n89exv4 from Leagle.com.


SIERRA HEALTH: Love Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sierra Health and
Wellness Centers LLC, et al. The case is styled as Aushara Love, ss
an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Sierra Health and Wellness Centers LLC, Does 1-50, Case No.
34-2022-00324971-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., Aug.
9, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

Sierra Health and Wellness Centers --
https://www.sierrahealthwellnesscenters.com/ -- was established to
develop and operate a network of leading behavioral health centers
in California and throughout the country.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP
          515 S Figueroa St., Ste. 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3316
          Phone: 213-488-6555
          Fax: 213-488-6554
          Email: lwlee@diversitylaw.com

SNAP INC: Faces Biometric Privacy Class Action in Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Hawkins, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that
Snapchat's parent company must face another proposed class action
alleging that the app scanned users' faces and collected their
biometric information without their consent, according to a new
complaint filed in state court in Illinois.

Snap Inc. has been sued several times over allegations that it
violated Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act by collecting
users' biometrics when they took photos of themselves with two
popular app features, lenses and filters.

Brianna Boone, Ashley McClinton, and K.F.C., a minor, said in their
Aug. 4. complaint that approximately 3.8 million individuals have
had their biometrics scanned and collected by the app. [GN]

SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS: Lead Roles Named in Luo Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Jose Chung Luo, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Spectrum
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-01612-CDS-BNW (D. Nev.), Judge Cristina D. Silva of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada grants International
Trading Group, Inc.'s motion for appointment of counsel and for
appointment as lead plaintiff.

The lawsuit is a securities class action case filed brought by
Plaintiff Jose Chung Luo on behalf of himself and others, who
acquired Spectrum securities between Dec. 27, 2018, and Aug. 5,
2021. Before the Court are competing motions of appointment to be
the lead plaintiff in this securities class action litigation.

On Aug. 31, 2021, Plaintiff Luo filed the complaint identifying the
nature of the case as a federal securities class action on behalf
of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than
Defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired Spectrum securities
during the relevant period. Luo sues under Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
He alleges that Defendants made materially false and misleading
statements about Rolontis, a developmental drug that Defendant
Spectrum Pharmaceuticals planned to submit to the Food and Drug
Administration for approval.

On Aug. 6, 2021, Spectrum announced receipt of a letter from the
FDA regarding Rolontis, which cited deficiencies related to
Spectrum's manufacturing and indicated that re-inspection of
Spectrum's manufacturing facility would be necessary. Luo alleges
that this news caused Spectrum's stock price to fall $0.70 per
share, or 21.54%, to close at $2.55 per share on Aug. 6, 2021. Due
to the decline in Spectrum's stock price, Luo argues that he and
other class members have suffered significant losses and damages.

On the same day that Luo filed suit, notice was issued pursuant to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")
advising potential class members of the claims alleged by Luo and
of the 60-day deadline for class members to move to be appointed as
lead plaintiff.

On Nov. 1, 2021, the final day of the deadline, five movants filed
similar motions for appointment as lead plaintiff and requested the
Court's approval for their selection of counsel (Mark Mehalic,
Changyoung Jung, Mark Kozubal, ITG and Steven Dunkleberger). Jung,
Mehalic, and Dunkleberger subsequently filed non-opposition
responses to the other prospective lead plaintiffs' motions.

The remaining movants, Kozubal and ITG, both assert that they
should be appointed lead plaintiff and filed responses and replies
to the other's motions. Essentially, the parties dispute what
method should be used to calculate whether Kozubal or ITG suffered
greater losses. Both parties also attack each other's adequacy to
be lead plaintiff in this action.

ITG claims that it suffered the greatest loss, claiming an amount
of $684,504.22. Kozubal claims that he lost $314,291.75. Kozubal
contends that most of ITG's losses are uncountable "in-and-out"
losses, which when excluded, leave ITG with compensable losses of
no more than $54,921.

ITG replied, asserting that Kozubal has failed to meet his burden
to persuade the Court as to why ITG's "in-and-out" losses are
uncountable and that Kozubal inappropriately raised an argument in
its response brief. Kozubal also replied, asserting that ITG itself
inappropriately raised an argument in its response brief.

                            Analysis

Judge Silva finds that the Plaintiff with the greatest financial
stake in this litigation is ITG. ITG also satisfies the adequacy
and typicality requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus, ITG should be the lead plaintiff.

Judge Silva explains that ITG has demonstrated the greatest
financial stake in this case. ITG also meets Rule 23's adequacy and
typicality requirements. ITG (like all members of the putative
class) purchased Spectrum's securities during the class period and
suffered losses that resulted from Spectrum's alleged
misrepresentations. ITG has retained qualified and experienced
proposed lead counsel to vigorously prosecute the case on behalf of
the class. Therefore, ITG satisfies the adequacy requirement.

                    ITG's Counsel is Approved

The PSLRA provides that once the Court selects a lead plaintiff,
that plaintiff "shall, subject to the approval of the court, select
and retain counsel to represent the class." The decision to approve
counsel selected by the lead plaintiff is entrusted to the
discretion of the district court.

Having reviewed the materials provided by ITG's selected counsel --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP -- the Court finds that ITG's
counsel can capably serve its role as counsel for the prospective
class. Counsel has a wealth of experience representing plaintiffs
in securities class actions.

                           Conclusion

For these reasons, ITG's Motion is granted. Judge Silva rules that
the lead plaintiff of the class action lawsuit is ITG. ITG's
requested counsel, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, is appointed
as counsel for the class.

Competing Plaintiffs' motions for appointment as lead plaintiff are
denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9hxeuk from Leagle.com.


STORKLAND/NAME DROPPER: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Storkland/Name
Dropper, LLC. The case is styled as Andrew Toro, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Storkland/Name
Dropper, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-06764 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Name Dropper, LLC -- https://namedropperkids.com/ -- is a
family-owned source since 1941 with kids' brand-name apparel &
shoes, plus nursery furniture & gear.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Court Certifies Class and Subclass in White Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RENALDO WHITE and RANDOLPH NADEAU, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SYMETRA
ASSIGNED BENEFITS SERVICE COMPANY; SYMETRA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 20-1866 MJP (W.D. Wash.), Judge Marsha J.
Pechman of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

The case involves Defendant Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Co.'s
("SABSCO") and Defendant Symetra Life Insurance Co.'s ("Symetra")
purchase of future payments under structured settlement annuities
("SSAs") they administered. The Plaintiffs are two individuals who
settled personal-injury lawsuits for lump sum and periodic
payments. The tortfeasors in those settlements assigned their
obligations to make periodic payments to SABSCO. SABSCO then
purchased an SSA from its affiliate Symetra to fund and administer
the future payments. The Plaintiffs later sold their rights to
future payments to SABSCO in exchange for immediate lump sum
payments at a significant discount.

The Plaintiffs allege the Defendants' solicitation of their rights
to the future payments under the SSAs was predatory and the result
of an illegal business scheme designed to induce annuitants into
selling their future payments at a steep discount. They pursue the
following claims: (1) Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act; (2) Violations of the Washington
Consumer Protection Act; (3) Violation of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing; (4) Breach of fiduciary duty against Symetra; (5)
Breach of fiduciary duty against SABSCO; (6) Breach of contract;
(7) Tortious interference with contract; (8) Civil conspiracy; and
(9) Unjust enrichment. They bring the action individually and on
behalf of others who similarly sold their right to future payments
to the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify the following class and subclass:

     a. Nationwide Class: All persons who are or were, at any time,
annuitants of an SSA that contemplated life contingent payments
issued by Symetra and who subsequently sold to a Symetra affiliate
the right to receive payments from that SSA in a factoring
transaction.

     b. Void Ab Initio Subclass: All members of the Class whose
contract defining the annuity at issue included language explicitly
stating that the annuitants lack the power to transfer their future
SSA payments.

Courts must undertake a "rigorous analysis" of all the Rule 23
factors to determine whether to certify a class. The plaintiff must
first meet all four requirements in Rule 23(a): Numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. The
plaintiff must also satisfy one of the Rule 23(b) factors.

The Plaintiffs seek certification under the "predominance" standard
of Rule 23(b)(3). To obtain certification of a class action for
money damages under Rule 23(b)(3), a putative class must establish
that "the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."

Judge Pechman concludes that the Plaintiffs have provided
sufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance the class
certification is appropriate and proper for their claims under
RICO, Washington CPA, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment and
contract claims under Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3).

Judge Pechman denies the Plaintiffs Motion to Certify a Class as to
their breach of fiduciary duty claims. He is unconvinced by their
argument that the existence of a fiduciary duty arises from the
Defendants legal relationship with class members. That
relationship, the Plaintiffs argue, coupled with the Defendants
promises to act as annuitants' advocate gives rise to a fiduciary
duty as a matter of law. But the Court is not aware of any
fiduciary duty arising as a matter of law between an administrator
of an SSA and an annuitant. Nor is the Court convinced by the
Plaintiffs' argument that a fiduciary duty arose as a matter of
fact. And because the Plaintiffs could only show a fiduciary duty
arising from fact, it would require an individualized inquiry not
suited to a class action. Judge Pechman finds that commonality and
predominance are absent for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The following classes are certified:

     a. Nationwide Class: All persons who are or were, at any time,
annuitants of an SSA that contemplated life contingent payments
issued by Symetra and who subsequently sold to a Symetra affiliate
the right to receive payments from that SSA in a factoring
transaction.

     b. Void Ab Initio Subclass: All members of the Class whose
contract defining the annuity at issue included language explicitly
stating that the annuitants lack the power to transfer their future
SSA payments.

Judge Pechman also appoints Alison Chase, Gretchen Freeman Cappio,
Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Adele Daniel, and Sydney Read of Keller
Rohrback LLP, and Daniel Simons of Marcus & Marcus PC, Edward Stone
of Edward Stone Law PC, and Jerome Marcus and Jonathon Auerbach of
Marcus & Auerbach LLC as the class counsel.

Judge Pechman also denies the Defendants request to strike.

The Clerk is ordered to provide copies of the Order to all
counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/wk7d9uw8 from Leagle.com.


SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Court Grants White's Bid for Summary Judgment
---------------------------------------------------------------
Senior District Judge Marsha J. Pechman of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington grants the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Choice of Law in the lawsuit
entitled RENALDO WHITE and RANDOLPH NADEAU, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SYMETRA
ASSIGNED BENEFITS SERVICE COMPANY; SYMETRA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 20-1866 MJP (W.D. Wash.).

The Plaintiffs bring a proposed class action challenging Defendants
Symetra Life Insurance Co. (Symetra) and its affiliate, Symetra
Assigned Benefits Service Co. (SABSCO), solicitation of putative
class members' rights to future periodic payments from structured
settlement annuities (SSAs) arising from prior personal injury
lawsuits. Plaintiffs Renaldo White and Randolph Nadeau each
sustained personal injuries that led to settlements, which included
immediate lump-sum payments and future periodic payments. The
tortfeasor in each respective case assigned their obligations to
make future periodic payments to SABSCO, which received a cash
payment from the tortfeasor or their liability insurer.

SABSCO purchased SSAs from its affiliate Symetra to fund and
administer the future payments. The Plaintiffs later sold their
rights to the future payments to SABSCO in exchange for an
immediate lump-sum payment at a significant discount. The
Plaintiffs now attack the Defendants' solicitation of the future
payments as predatory. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that the
Defendants engaged in common business practices that fraudulently
induced annuitants into selling their rights to future periodic
payments through a common communication scheme that contained
misrepresentations and omissions.

The Plaintiffs pursue claims for: (1) Violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); (2) Violations of
the Washington Consumer Protection Act; (3) Violation of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing; (4) Breach of fiduciary duty
against Symetra; (5) Breach of fiduciary duty against SABSCO; (6)
Breach of contract; (7) Tortious interference with contract; (8)
Civil conspiracy; and (9) Unjust enrichment. Only the Plaintiffs'
RICO claim falls under federal law. The Plaintiffs remaining claims
are state-law claims. The Plaintiffs brought this Motion asking the
Court to continue its application of Washington law, while the
Defendants argue that the law of all fifty states should apply.

         1. An Actual Conflict Exists as to Tort Claims,
                     but not Contract Claims

Because the Plaintiffs only concede that an actual conflict exists
as to their tort claims, the Court focuses on whether there is an
actual conflict concerning their breach of contract claims.

In contract actions where the contract contains no choice-of-law
provisions, Washington law requires that the validity and effect of
a contract be governed by the law of the state having the most
significant relationship with the contract, Judge Pechman notes,
citing Mulcahy v. Farmers Ins. Co., 152 Wn.2d 92, 100 (2004).

The Plaintiffs bring two contract/quasi-contract claims: (1) breach
of good faith and fair dealing; and, (2) breach of contract as to
the anti-assignment, or power language, provisions attached to each
subclass members' respective settlement agreements. The Defendants
do not contest the application of Washington law to the Plaintiffs'
breach of good faith and fair dealing claim.

The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that there is no conflict of
law as to the breach of contract claims because the elements of a
breach of contract claim are the same nationwide. Courts have
routinely held that form contracts are suitable for class
certification.

The Defendants do not contest the lack of conflict as to the
elements of the claims, but instead argue that states differ in
their enforcement and interpretation of anti-assignment provisions.
By way of support, the Defendants claim that California conflicts
with Washington law because California courts have previously found
"that contractual anti-assignment provisions are generally
ineffective in barring transfers of structured settlement payment
rights," citing 321 Henderson Receivables Origination LLC v.
Sioteco, 173 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1075 (2009).

But the Court of Appeals in Sioteco, did not hold that
anti-assignment provisions are always ineffective, Judge Pechman
states. It only held that "where no interested parties object to
the transfer of structured settlement payment rights,"
anti-assignment provisions in a structured settlement agreement "do
not bar" a court-approved transfer of structured settlement
payments. Where a party to the agreement objects to the transfer
under the anti-assignment clause, a California court would enforce
said clause. There is no Washington caselaw or statute to suggest
that the outcome would be any different under Washington law.
Rather, Washington courts have previously held that "assignments
are governed by general principles of contract law."

The Defendants also argue, among other things, that conflicts exist
because each of the settlement contracts is governed by different
choice of law provisions. But the Defendants can only point to
these three subclass members whose contracts contain such
provisions, despite being asked to produce them for each subclass
member in discovery, Judge Pechman points out.

In sum, the Court finds no conflict as to the Plaintiffs'
contract-based claims.

             2. The State with the Most Substantial
                   Relationship is Washington

If actual conflict exists, Washington law requires application of
the law of the forum that has the "most significant relationship"
to the action, Judge Pechman says, citing Johnson v. Spider Staging
Corp., 87 Wn.2d 557, 580 (1976). Washington has adopted the Second
Restatement of Law on Conflict of Laws (1971), which provides
guidance on this issue. The "most significant relationship" test
requires a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine which
state has the most significant relationship to the cause of action.
Second, if the relevant contacts to the cause are balanced, then
the court must consider "'the interests and public policies of
potentially concerned states and the manner and extent of such
policies as they relate to the transaction in issue.'"

Judge Pechman notes that the Plaintiffs have brought several tort
claims against Defendants. The Restatement of Conflicts Section 145
and 148 apply to all of these. Judge Pechman points out that the
Washington Supreme Court formally adopted Restatement Section 148,
finding it particularly applicable to fraud claims.

Neither party completely analyzes the contacts under Section 148,
and the Court finds that Section 148's considerations do not to
resolve the issue. Judge Pechman finds that the tort claims brought
by the Plaintiffs do not require reliance, making the first Section
148 element immaterial. The Judge adds that neither party has put
forth evidence to suggest putative class members were instructed as
to where to sign away their rights to future payments. On balance,
the Section 148 elements do not show a particular lean towards any
specific state.

Because Section 148 is not informative, the Court analyzes contacts
under Section 145. Section 145 asks to the Court to consider "a)
the place where the injury occurred, b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred, c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and d) the place where the relationship, if any, between
parties is centered."

Applying Section 145, the Court finds that Washington has the most
significant relationship to the claims. Though contacts with all 50
states exist, the Court does not merely count contacts, but instead
evaluates these contacts based on their significance. In this
context, the Court finds that the most significant contacts are to
Washington.

Judge Pechman explains that the Plaintiffs' claims focus on the
Defendants' conduct arising out of Washington. The Defendants'
decision about and implementation of the factoring program occurred
in Washington. Washington is also the place where the Defendants
developed their marketing materials and determined what to say and
not to say to the proposed class members. The Defendants' employees
were all located in Washington and it was from Washington that they
engaged with class members. None of the other factors bear much
significance, and in cases of fraud and misrepresentation there may
be little reason in logic or persuasiveness to say that one state
rather than another is the place of injury.

The Court, therefore, finds that Washington law applies to the tort
claims.

                           Conclusion

Judge Pechman holds that Washington law applies to all of the tort
and breach of contract claims. Although a conflict of law exists as
to the tort claims, Washington law still applies because it has the
most significant relationship to them. And because there is no
conflict of law as to the contract claims, the Court applies
Washington law to them except as to those three subclass members
who have valid and enforceable choice-of-law provisions.
Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion.

The Clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all
counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 28, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc5b6tcn from Leagle.com.


TAYLOR MORRISON: Appeals Court Decision on Homeowners' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Taylor Morrison Home Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that a class
action lawsuit filed against the company alleging violations under
various laws relating to homeowner associations is still on
appeal.

On April 26, 2017, a class action complaint was filed in the
Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County,
Florida by Norman Gundel, William Mann, and Brenda Taylor against
Avatar Properties, Inc. (an acquired AV Homes entity), generally
alleging that the company's collection of club membership fees in
connection with the use of one of its amenities in its East
homebuilding segment violates various laws relating to homeowner
associations and other Florida-specific laws.

The class action complaint seeks an injunction to prohibit future
collection of club membership fees. On November 2, 2021, the court
determined that the club membership fees were improper and that
plaintiffs were entitled to $35.0 million in fee reimbursements.
The company appealed the court's ruling to the Second District
Court of Appeal on November 29, 2021, and as of June 30, 2022, its
appeal remains pending.

Taylor Morrison Home Corporation is into residential homebuilding
and the development  of lifestyle communities based in Arizona.


TTE TECHNOLOGY: $2.9MM Class Settlement to be Heard on January 19
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The following is being released by A.B. Data, Ltd., the
Court-appointed Settlement Administrator for the Class Action
Settlement in Christopher Julian, et al. v. TTE Technology, Inc.
dba TCL North America, Case No. 3:20-CV-02857, U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California

TO ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED TCL TELEVISIONS IN THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FROM APRIL 24, 2016, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2021

Read This Notice Carefully. You Could Receive a Payment of up to
$40 From This Class Action Settlement. This Court-Authorized Notice
describes your rights and gives information about the proposed
settlement. This Notice is only a summary. Details of the
settlement are available at www.HZClassAction.com or by writing to
or calling the Class Action Settlement Administrator at the address
or toll-free number below.

What Is This Case About? In the lawsuit entitled Christopher
Julian, et al. v. TTE Technology, Inc., Case No. 3:20-CV-02857-EMC,
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
plaintiff Paul Fiskratti ("Plaintiff" or "Class Representative"),
on behalf of himself and a proposed class, alleges that TTE
Technology, Inc. dba TCL North America ("TCL") marketed certain of
its LCD televisions as having a "Hz" rating twice as high as its
actual refresh rate. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges TCL
deceptively advertised certain of its televisions with 60Hz native
refresh rate panels as "120Hz CMI," "120Hz Clear Motion Index,"
and/or "120Hz CMI Effective Refresh Rate." TCL denies that it
misled consumers, disputes that it has done anything wrong, and
believes its advertising was truthful and accurate and asserts that
does not mislead consumers regarding Hz ratings. The lawsuit seeks
money damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs and a court
order requiring TCL to stop the foregoing advertising practices.
The Court has not ruled on the merits of the claims or TCL's
defenses.

Who Is A Class Member? All persons who purchased, new, one of the
TCL Television models listed on www.HZClassAction.com between April
24, 2016 and December 31, 2021, in the state of California
("Settlement Class Members").

What Are The Terms Of The Settlement? TCL has agreed to pay
$2,900,000 ("Settlement Fund") in full and complete settlement and
release of all claims of Plaintiff and the Settlement Class
Members, as described in the Settlement Agreement. The funds will
be used to pay Settlement Awards to Settlement Class Members who
submit a valid Claim to the Settlement Administrator via a form on
the Settlement Website during the Claim Period, after attorneys'
fees, costs, and other expenses have been deducted. The Settlement
Awards will be set at $15 per valid Claim and subject to pro rata
increase (totaling up to $40) or decrease, depending on the number
of all approved Claims submitted. Class Counsel will ask the Court
to approve an award of up to 25% of the Settlement Fund for
attorneys' fees, totaling $725,000; an award of reasonable
litigation expenses and costs of approximately $148,000; and $2,500
to Plaintiff Fiskratti as Class Representative, all to be paid from
the Settlement Fund. If there are amounts remaining in the
Settlement Fund after payment of all Settlement Awards, that money
will be distributed cy pres to charity.

How Do You Make A Claim? In order to receive a Settlement Award,
you must submit a signed and completed Claim Form online to the
Class Action Settlement Administrator by no later than October 7,
2022. Claim Forms may also be submitted to the Class Action
Settlement Administrator by mail if postmarked no later than
October 7, 2022. The Claim Form is available at
www.HZClassAction.com.

What Are My Other Options? If you do not want to be legally bound
by the Settlement, you may opt out of the Settlement by sending a
request for exclusion to the Class Action Settlement Administrator
no later than October 7, 2022. If you exclude yourself from the
Settlement, you will not receive any money from the Settlement. If
you stay in the Settlement (i.e., do not exclude yourself from the
Settlement), you may object to the Settlement by writing to the
Court explaining why you do not like the Settlement by no later
than October 7, 2022. You will be bound by the Settlement if your
objection is rejected. If you do nothing (i.e., submit no Claim
Form or request for exclusion), you will not receive any benefits
from the Settlement, but will nevertheless be bound by any judgment
approving the Settlement and will give up any right to sue TCL or
related parties for any known or unknown claims relating to
marketing by TCL of the "Hz" rating of the televisions at issue.

Final Approval Hearing. The Court will hold a hearing in this case
to consider whether to approve the Settlement on January 19, 2023,
at 1:30 p.m., U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Courtroom 5 - 17th Floor, San
Francisco, CA 94102. The date of the Final Approval Hearing may
change without further notice to the class. Settlement Class
Members should be advised to check the settlement website or the
Court's PACER site to confirm that the date has not been changed
and whether the hearing may be held virtually due to COVID-19.

THIS NOTICE IS ONLY A SUMMARY. MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE LAWSUIT
AND THE PRECISE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT IS AVAILABLE
AT WWW.HZCLASSACTION.COM, OR WRITE OR CALL THE CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR AT HZ CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATOR, P.O. BOX 173007, MILWAUKEE, WI 53217 OR 877-888-8386
(TOLL-FREE), OR CLASS COUNSEL WHOSE CONTACT INFORMATION CAN BE
FOUND AT HTTPS://CRUEGERDICKINSON.COM OR HTTPS://MILBERG.COM, OR BY
ACCESSING THE COURT DOCKET IN THIS CASE, FOR A FEE, THROUGH THE
COURT'S PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS (PACER) SYSTEM AT
HTTPS://ECF.CAND.USCOURTS.GOV, OR BY VISITING THE OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF THE COURT FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE, COURTROOM
5 - 17TH FLOOR, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102, BETWEEN 9:00 A.M. AND 4:00
P.M., MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY, EXCLUDING COURT HOLIDAYS.

PLEASE DO NOT TELEPHONE THE COURT OR THE COURT CLERK'S OFFICE TO
INQUIRE ABOUT THIS SETTLEMENT OR THE CLAIM PROCESS. [GN]

U.S. RENAL CARE: Court Enters Protective Order in Bruno Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Wilner of the U.S. District Cour for
the Central District of California issues a Stipulate Protective
Order in the case, MANUEL BRUNO, individually and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. U.S. RENAL CARE, INC., an unknown business entity; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-04617 FLA
(MRWx) (C.D. Cal.).

The lawsuit is a putative class action asserting wage and hour
claims under California state law filed on behalf of all of the
Defendant's non-exempt employees in the state of California. The
Defendant is a provider of health services, specifically, dialysis
care and related services to patients living with kidney disease.

Discovery in the action will involve discovery into personnel,
compensation, and other financial information and records of such
employees. To the extent that such privacy-protected information or
records are appropriately discoverable, the protective order will
facilitate the production of such information and/or records. The
Defendant reserves the right to assert all appropriate objections
to specific discovery requests, and does not waive its right to
object or oppose any discovery on appropriate grounds by
stipulating to the protective order.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material. Any use of Protected
Material at trial will be governed by the orders of the trial
judge. The Order does not govern the use of Protected Material at
trial.

Even after final disposition of the litigation, the confidentiality
obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a
Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs. Final disposition will be deemed to be the later
of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses in this Action, with or
without prejudice; and (2) final judgment after the completion and
exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands, trials, or reviews
of the Action, including the time limits for filing any motions or
applications for extension of time pursuant to applicable law.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time that is consistent with the Court's
Scheduling Order.

After the final disposition of the Action, within 60 days of a
written request by the Designating Party, each Receiving Party must
destroy such material at the request of the Designating Party.

Any willful violation of the Order may be punished by civil or
criminal contempt proceedings, financial or evidentiary sanctions,
reference to disciplinary authorities, or other appropriate action
at the discretion of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Protective Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/muw8y7m3 from Leagle.com.

Andrew Kim -- andrewkim@goodwinlaw.com -- Attorneys for the
Plaintiff.

AARON H. COLE -- aaron.cole@ogletree.com -- DAVID SZWARCSZTEJN --
david.szwarcsztejn@ogletree.com -- OMAR M. ANIFF --
omar.aniff@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C., in Los Angeles, California, Attorneys for Defendant
U.S. RENAL CARE, INC.


UKG INC: Faces Cornacchia Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARY CORNACCHIA, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff vs. UKG, INC., and TUFTS MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
Defendants, Case No. 4:22-cv-40081 (D. Mass., July 20, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for negligence, intrusion upon
seclusion/invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty,
declaratory and injunctive relief, and for violation of the
Massachusetts Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and Class Members are
hourly employees who were not paid the full amount of wages to
which they are entitled for all of their work in a timely fashion
by Defendants. The Plaintiff and Class Members provided their
personally identifiable information (PII) to Defendants at their
request, including names, addresses, employee IDs, and social
security numbers. Due to Defendants' alleged failure to implement
and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff's PII,
criminals obtained access to Plaintiff's PII, which resulted in
substantial harm to Plaintiff and the Class, says the suit.

Specifically, the suit seeks to redress Defendants' unlawful
withholding of wages for Plaintiff and Class Members and the
negligent disclosure of over 8 million employees' PII in a massive
data breach on December 11, 2021. On that date, and possibly on
others, Defendants' inadequate security measures allowed
unauthorized individuals to access and render unusable a workforce
management software application Defendants used to process payroll
and store data that contained the PII of Plaintiff and other
individuals, the suit alleges.

The Plaintiff asserts that she bears an immediate and heightened
risk of all manners of identity theft. She added that she has
incurred, and will continue to incur damages in the form of, inter
alia, an imminent threat of identity theft, loss of privacy and the
value of personal information, deprivation of the benefit of the
bargain, and/or the additional damages.

UKG, Inc. is an American multinational technology company with dual
headquarters in Lowell, Massachusetts, and Weston, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON
           & GARBER, LLP
          One North Broadway, Suite 900
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Jack J. Canzoneri, Esq.
          Nicholas Wanger, Esq.
          MCDONALD LAMOND CANZONERI
          352 Turnpike Rd., Suite 210
          Southborough, MA 01772
          Telephone: (508) 485-6600
          E-mail: jcanzoneri@masslaborlawyers.com  
                  nwanger@masslaborlawyers.com

UKG INC: Faces Fuller Class Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY FULLER and PAULA ROBICHAUD, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. UKG, INC., and HEYWOOD
HEALTHCARE, INC., Defendants, Case No. 4:22-cv-40082 (D. Mass.,
July 20, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
negligence, intrusion upon seclusion/invasion of privacy, breach of
fiduciary duty, declaratory and injunctive relief, and for
violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs and Class Members are
hourly employees who were not paid the full amount of wages to
which they are entitled for all of their work in a timely fashion
by Defendants. The Plaintiffs and Class Members provided their
personally identifiable information (PII) to Defendants at their
request, including names, addresses, employee IDs, and social
security numbers. Due to Defendants' alleged failure to implement
and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiffs' PII,
criminals obtained access to Plaintiffs' PII, which resulted in
substantial harm to Plaintiffs and the Class, says the suit.

Specifically, the suit seeks to redress Defendants' unlawful
withholding of wages for Plaintiffs and Class Members and the
negligent disclosure of over 8 million employees' PII in a massive
data breach on December 11, 2021. On that date, and possibly on
others, Defendants' inadequate security measures allowed
unauthorized individuals to access and render unusable a workforce
management software application Defendants used to process payroll
and store data that contained the PII of Plaintiffs and other
individuals, the suit says.

The Plaintiffs assert that they bear an immediate and heightened
risk of all manners of identity theft. They added that they had
incurred, and will continue to incur damages in the form of, inter
alia, an imminent threat of identity theft, loss of privacy and the
value of personal information, deprivation of the benefit of the
bargain, and/or the additional damages.

UKG, Inc. is an American multinational technology company with dual
headquarters in Lowell, Massachusetts, and Weston, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON
           & GARBER, LLP
          One North Broadway, Suite 900
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Jack J. Canzoneri, Esq.
          Nicholas Wanger, Esq.
          MCDONALD LAMOND CANZONERI
          352 Turnpike Rd., Suite 210
          Southborough, MA 01772
          Telephone: (508) 485-6600
          E-mail: jcanzoneri@masslaborlawyers.com  
                  nwanger@masslaborlawyers.com

UKG INC: Faces Mysliewic Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
CATHERINE MYSLIEWIC, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. UKG, INC., and UMASS MEMORIAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC. Defendants, Case No. 4:22-cv-40083 (D. Mass., July 20,
2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence,
intrusion upon seclusion/invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary
duty, declaratory and injunctive relief, and for violation of the
Massachusetts Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and Class Members are
hourly employees who were not paid the full amount of wages to
which they are entitled for all of their work in a timely fashion
by Defendants. The Plaintiff and Class Members provided their
personally identifiable information (PII) to Defendants at their
request, including names, addresses, employee IDs, and social
security numbers. Due to Defendants' alleged failure to implement
and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff's PII,
criminals obtained access to Plaintiff's PII, which resulted in
substantial harm to Plaintiff and the Class, says the suit.

Specifically, the suit seeks to redress Defendants' unlawful
withholding of wages for Plaintiff and Class Members and the
negligent disclosure of over 8 million employees' PII in a massive
data breach on December 11, 2021. On that date, and possibly on
others, Defendants' inadequate security measures allowed
unauthorized individuals to access and render unusable a workforce
management software application Defendants used to process payroll
and store data that contained the PII of Plaintiff and other
individuals, the suit alleges.

The Plaintiff asserts that she bears an immediate and heightened
risk of all manners of identity theft. She added that she has
incurred, and will continue to incur damages in the form of, inter
alia, an imminent threat of identity theft, loss of privacy and the
value of personal information, deprivation of the benefit of the
bargain, and/or the additional damages.

UKG, Inc. is an American multinational technology company with dual
headquarters in Lowell, Massachusetts, and Weston, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON
           & GARBER, LLP
          One North Broadway, Suite 900
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Jack J. Canzoneri, Esq.
          Nicholas Wanger, Esq.
          MCDONALD LAMOND CANZONERI
          352 Turnpike Rd., Suite 210
          Southborough, MA 01772
          Telephone: (508) 485-6600
          E-mail: jcanzoneri@masslaborlawyers.com  
                  nwanger@masslaborlawyers.com

UKG INC: Faces Taylor Class Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ELIZABETH TAYLOR, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. UKG, INC., and BETH ISRAEL DEACONESS
HOSPITAL - PLYMOUTH, INC. Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-11168 (D.
Mass., July 20, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
negligence, intrusion upon seclusion/invasion of privacy, breach of
fiduciary duty, declaratory and injunctive relief, and for
violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and Class Members are
hourly employees who were not paid the full amount of wages to
which they are entitled for all of their work in a timely fashion
by Defendants. The Plaintiff and Class Members provided their
personally identifiable information (PII) to Defendants at their
request, including names, addresses, employee IDs, and social
security numbers. Due to Defendants' alleged failure to implement
and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff's PII,
criminals obtained access to Plaintiff's PII, which resulted in
substantial harm to Plaintiff and the Class, says the suit.

Specifically, the suit seeks to redress Defendants' unlawful
withholding of wages for Plaintiff and Class Members and the
negligent disclosure of over 8 million employees' PII in a massive
data breach on December 11, 2021. On that date, and possibly on
others, Defendants' inadequate security measures allowed
unauthorized individuals to access and render unusable a workforce
management software application Defendants used to process payroll
and store data that contained the PII of Plaintiff and other
individuals, the suit alleges.

The Plaintiff asserts that she bears an immediate and heightened
risk of all manners of identity theft. She added that she has
incurred, and will continue to incur damages in the form of, inter
alia, an imminent threat of identity theft, loss of privacy and the
value of personal information, deprivation of the benefit of the
bargain, and/or the additional damages.

UKG, Inc. is an American multinational technology company with dual
headquarters in Lowell, Massachusetts, and Weston, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON
           & GARBER, LLP
          One North Broadway, Suite 900
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Jack J. Canzoneri, Esq.
          Nicholas Wanger, Esq.
          MCDONALD LAMOND CANZONERI
          352 Turnpike Rd., Suite 210
          Southborough, MA 01772
          Telephone: (508) 485-6600
          E-mail: jcanzoneri@masslaborlawyers.com  
                  nwanger@masslaborlawyers.com

UKG INC: Faces Ward Class Suit Over Data Breach, Withheld Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
TANIA WARD, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. UKG, INC., UMASS MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE, INC., and
UMASS MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. Defendants, Case No.
4:22-cv-40084 (D. Mass., July 20, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendants for negligence, intrusion upon seclusion/invasion of
privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory and injunctive
relief, and for violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and Class Members are
hourly employees who were not paid the full amount of wages to
which they are entitled for all of their work in a timely fashion
by Defendants. The Plaintiff and Class Members provided their
personally identifiable information (PII) to Defendants at their
request, including names, addresses, employee IDs, and social
security numbers. Due to Defendants' alleged failure to implement
and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff's PII,
criminals obtained access to Plaintiff's PII, which resulted in
substantial harm to Plaintiff and the Class, says the suit.

Specifically, the suit seeks to redress Defendants' unlawful
withholding of wages for Plaintiff and Class Members and the
negligent disclosure of over 8 million employees' PII in a massive
data breach on December 11, 2021. On that date, and possibly on
others, Defendants' inadequate security measures allowed
unauthorized individuals to access and render unusable a workforce
management software application Defendants used to process payroll
and store data that contained the PII of Plaintiff and other
individuals, the suit alleges.

The Plaintiff asserts that she bears an immediate and heightened
risk of all manners of identity theft. She added that she has
incurred, and will continue to incur damages in the form of, inter
alia, an imminent threat of identity theft, loss of privacy and the
value of personal information, deprivation of the benefit of the
bargain, and/or the additional damages.

UKG, Inc. is an American multinational technology company with dual
headquarters in Lowell, Massachusetts, and Weston, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON
           & GARBER, LLP
          One North Broadway, Suite 900
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Jack J. Canzoneri, Esq.
          Nicholas Wanger, Esq.
          MCDONALD LAMOND CANZONERI
          352 Turnpike Rd., Suite 210
          Southborough, MA 01772
          Telephone: (508) 485-6600
          E-mail: jcanzoneri@masslaborlawyers.com  
                  nwanger@masslaborlawyers.com

UNILEVER UNITED STATES: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Unilever United
States, Inc. The case is styled as Valerie Dicks, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Unilever United
States, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-06752 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Unilever United States, Inc. -- https://www.unileverusa.com/ --
manufactures personal care products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


UNITY SOFTWARE: Vincent Wong Reminds of September 6 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong on Aug. 8 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has commenced on behalf of investors who purchased
between March 5, 2021 and May 10, 2022.

If you suffered a loss on your investment in Unity, contact us
about potential recovery by using the link below. There is no cost
or obligation to you.

https://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/unity-software-lawsuit-submission-form?prid=30609&wire=4

ABOUT THE ACTION: The class action against Unity includes
allegations that the Company made materially false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
deficiencies in Unity's product platform reduced the accuracy of
the Company's machine learning technology; (ii) the foregoing was
likely to have a material negative impact on the Company's
revenues; (iii) accordingly, Unity had overstated the Company's
commercial and/or financial prospects for 2022; (iv) as a result,
the Company was likely to have to reduce its fiscal 2022 guidance;
and (v) as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

DEADLINE: September 6, 2022
Aggrieved Unity investors only have until September 6, 2022 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. You are not
required to act as a lead plaintiff in order to share in any
recovery.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Vincent Wong, Esq.
39 East Broadway
Suite 304
New York, NY 10002
Tel. 212.425.1140
E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]

VANCOUVER COLLEGE: Faces Class Action Over Sexual Abuse
-------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Hainsworth, writing for Richmond News, reports that more
than 30 years ago, Canadians were horrified to hear tales of
physical and sexual abuse of boys by Christian Brothers operating
Newfoundland's Mount Cashel Orphanage.

A hearing to gain class-action certification began in B.C. Supreme
Court Monday (Aug. 8), alleging the church moved some of those men
to B.C. by where sexual abuse allegations continue to surface.

The proposed class-action suit, filed in March, says between 1976
and 1983, an order called the Christian Brothers transferred six
abusive members from Mount Cashel Orphanage to Vancouver College
and St. Thomas More Collegiate in Burnaby.

The suit was initially filed in February 2021 with representative
plaintiff Darren Liptrot. He said in the claim he attended
Vancouver College from 1980 to 1985, for grades 8 to 12, and that
Brother Edward English sexually abused him.

Named as defendants in the notice of civil claim filed in B.C.
Supreme Court Jan. 31 are Vancouver College Ltd. (VCL), St. Thomas
More Collegiate, Edward English, Joseph Burke, Douglas Kenny,
Gerard Gabriel McHugh, The Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of
St. John's, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Vancouver and the Catholic
Independent Schools of Vancouver Archdiocese (CISVA).

In a Jan. 31 response to Liptrot's amended notice of civil claim,
the defendants denied the Christian Brothers moved six members from
Mount Cashel to Vancouver College and St. Thomas More where they
had unfettered access to children, abused children and/or failed to
protect children from their fellow Christian Brothers.

Reidar Mogerman, a lawyer for Liptrot, who was in court on Aug. 8,
told Justice Simon Coval in the application for class-action
certification that such a trial method creates greater access to
justice for victims of systemic abuse through the identification of
common issues.

He said pursuing such cases individually creates economic burdens.

"People who have suffered abuses like this are hesitant to come
forward," Mogerman said.

The lawsuit says English confessed to abusing children at Mount
Cashel Orphanage before he was transferred.

The defendants denied Joseph Burke was moved to St. Thomas More and
was employed as a teacher at Vancouver College.

They further denied VCL was responsible for setting policies and
procedures for the operation of Vancouver College and that VCL
employed Christian Brothers and former Christian Brothers as
teachers and was responsible for vetting, screening, appointing,
training, managing and disciplining them.

The defendants denied Kenny was a teacher and dormitory supervisor
at Vancouver College from 1977 to 1979 and that he taught purported
class members and supervised them overnight as a dormitory
supervisor.

They further denied the archbishop of Vancouver oversaw and
operated the Catholic Independent Schools of Vancouver Archdiocese,
Vancouver College and St. Thomas More, including the transfer of
the Christian Brothers into the Vancouver Archdiocese and the
hiring and firing of Christian Brothers and former Brothers at the
schools.

Also denied are allegations CISVA oversaw, managed and conducted
the operations of Catholic schools in Vancouver, including
Vancouver College and St. Thomas More, that it had authority over
and set policies for the hiring, supervision and termination of
staff at Vancouver College and St. Thomas More.

The response said issues around Mount Cashel and movements of
Brothers after that were outside VCL's knowledge.

Mount Cashell Christian Brothers
In all, six of the Mount Cashell Christian Brothers were eventually
convicted of sexually or physically abusing orphans at that
facility.

Burke was one of those six.

The hearing documents contain a May 17, 2022 affidavit from John B.
Doe, who alleges that Burke was his teacher at Vancouver College, a
K-12 private school run by the Congregation of Christian Brothers.

His affidavit said he attended the school between 2007 and 2011 and
was sexually abused in grades 8 and 9.

"I have been struggling with the effects of this abuse all of my
adult life," John B. Doe said in the document. "I want to
understand how Joe Burke was allowed to return to a teaching
position at Vancouver College after being convicted of a criminal
offence for his actions at Mount Cashel."

A May 12 affidavit from John A. Doe said he attended St. Thomas
More between 1978 and 1982 and was molested by English. He said he
reported the abuse to RCMP some years later but no action was
taken.

"I want to know how it is that he was allowed to teach at St.
Thomas More after having admitted to sexually abusing boys at Mount
Cashel," John A. Doe said.

In a Jan. 27 affidavit, Richard Pedersen said he saw Burke and
English physically abuse students, at times hitting him or another
with closed fists hard enough to knock them from their seats.

He claims he saw Burke beat a student over the buttocks until the
stick he was using broke.

"My three years at St. Thomas More were a fear-filled experience,"
Pedersen said. "I was focused on self-preservation and keeping off
the radar of the Christian Brothers."

Mother Betty Pedersen's Jan. 7 affidavit recounts her confronting
Burke.

"I warned him never to touch my son again. I told him that I
expected more of him as a Christian, especially wearing the uniform
of the Christian Brothers, which was a black shirt with a white
collar insert, similar to a priest's attire. Burke yanked the white
collar insert out of his shirt, threw it on [the] ground, and said,
'That's all that means to me,'" she said.

Christopher Dziekan attended Vancouver College from 1976 to 1984.

"I was sexually abused by Brother English. I was also photographed
by Brother Raymond and subjected to acts of what I can only
describe as voyeurism by lay teacher Mr. Clavin and other Christian
Brothers whose names I don't recall at this time," Dziekan said in
the affidavit.

He said it was not uncommon to see students physically abused. He
recounted one boy screaming in pain as a Brother Duff strapped
him.

Dziekan said Clavin and some Brothers would line them up naked
before gym class showers.

"There was no reason for the Brothers to be there. They were not PE
teachers. As a result of this, I was scared to go to PE class," he
said.

"It seemed that teachers followed a practice of belittling,
threatening, emotionally manipulating, and physically hurting us,"
Dziekan said. "This behaviour was allowed and seen as normal."

Dziekan said Brother Raymond asked him to pose shirtless for
photos, and he described what appeared to be the start of a sexual
encounter beginning with stretch and massage instruction.

Dziekan said coming forward now has resulted in flashbacks and
nightmares and has caused a rift between him and his devout
parents.

Meanwhile, Hamish McArthur attended Vancouver College between 1985
and 1987, his May 11 affidavit said.

He said he was beaten by Burke on multiple occasions. He described
the atmosphere of fear as normal at the school.

"My relationship with my mother suffered greatly as a result of the
abuse I endured as I blamed her for the treatment I received,"
McArthur said. "I felt betrayed and unprotected and lost trust In
her. I was a 12-year-old child that was repeatedly beaten by a man
who told me he had my mother's permission to do so."

He added: "I find it abhorrent that Vancouver College denies
responsibility for abuse that took place at the school. I find it
incongruent to the Catholic doctrine of forgiveness and mercy."

Church files
An affidavit from Vancouver College director of finance and
facilities management (and employed by Vancouver College Limited)
Kelly Lattimer filed in court Jan. 31 said Liptrot's school records
show no reports of abuse.

Lattimer's affidavit also notes Burke was employed as a lay teacher
at Vancouver College between 1982 and 1989 and 1996 to 2013. He was
on medical leave December 2011 to April 2012. On Feb. 1 2013, he
was suspended with pay and terminated 12 days later.

Lattimer's document said there were no complaints of a sexual
nature against Burke.

A March case backgrounder from the lawyer handling the plaintiff's
case, Joe Fiorante of firm Camp Fiorante Matthews Mogerman, said
Burke was arrested in April 1989 and indicted on eight counts of
abuse committed at Mount Cashel between 1974 and 1979.  

The Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador convicted him in
1991 on three charges of indecent assault (for sexual abuse) and
one charge of assault causing bodily harm (for strapping a child on
the bare buttocks with a belt and causing bruising), the
backgrounder said.

Fiorante said Burke admitted at trial to hitting the child for
punishment purposes, and he apologized but denied the sexual abuse
allegations. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the assault causing
bodily harm charge but overturned the indecent assault
convictions.

Fiorante said the high court found in dismissing those counts that
the trial judge unreasonably relied on evidence, including
testimony by the complainants, that was uncorroborated or not
credible.

In the current case, are now multiple affidavits attached to the
suit in support of class certification the church is opposing.

If a B.C. Supreme Court judge certifies the action, Liptrot would
represent students of Vancouver College and St. Thomas More
Collegiate who were allegedly physically or sexually abused between
1976 and 1995.

The lawsuit says that RCMP began investigating allegations of
sexual abuse at Mount Cashel in 1975 and English confessed to
police that he had sexually abused boys at the orphanage.

None of the allegations have been proven in court.

The Archdiocese of Vancouver has been investigating reports of
abuse and has named priests of concern. [GN]

VARSITY BRANDS: Mintz Lawyers Discuss Ruling in Antitrust Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bruce D. Sokler, Esq., and Farrah Short, Esq., of Mintz, in an
article for The National Law Review, report that private equity
("PE") firms should already be aware that the government is
focusing on their acquisitions with increased antitrust scrutiny
and for potential challenges.[1] PE firms should also be concerned
with private litigation, particularly class action suits where even
if the PE firm ultimately prevails, the expense and exposure are
considerable. A decision in a case pending in Tennessee underscores
the point.

In that case, parents of competitive cheer athletes brought a class
action in 2020 against Varsity Brands (and affiliates) ("Varsity"),
a prominent host of competitive cheerleading competitions and camps
and a manufacturer of cheer apparel. Jessica Jones and Christina
Lorenzen on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated
v. Varsity Brands, LLC, et al., 2:20-cv-2892 (W.D. TN). Defendant
Jeff Webb had founded Universal Cheerleaders Association which
ultimately became a subsidiary of Varsity. Varsity grew by
acquiring other cheerleading businesses, apparel companies, and
event producers. Varsity also helped start the cheer governing
body, U.S. All Star Federation ("USASF"). The complaint alleged
that Varsity built a monopoly in the cheer supply market through
exclusive arrangements with gyms and also leveraged its market
power to receive kickbacks from the fees that families are charged
for participating in competitive cheerleading. In 2014, Varsity was
acquired by PE firm Charlesbank. Then in 2018, Varsity was acquired
by another PE firm Bain Capital. The district court ruled on
several motions to dismiss in the matter.

Motions to Dismiss by Defendants Varsity, USASF, and Webb

The district court denied defendants' motions to dismiss as to the
federal Sherman Act Claims, and as to certain state claims. It
granted defendants' motions to dismiss under other state claims.

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of indirect purchases of
Varsity products and services. Plaintiffs alleged three markets in
which Varsity, USASF, and Webb engaged: 1) cheer competitions, 2)
cheer camps, and 3) cheer apparel. In these markets, plaintiffs
alleged that Varsity offered exclusive agreements that resulted in
cheer gyms attending only Varsity events. They also alleged that
defendants engaged in an exclusionary scheme in all three markets.


On the Sherman Act Section 1 claim, defendants argued that
plaintiffs failed to plead that there were exclusive contracts,
that defendants are not capable of conspiring with one another
under the Copperweld Supreme Court decision, holding that parents
and subsidiaries cannot normally conspire with each other under the
Sherman Act and that allegations of conspiracy were not
sufficiently pled.

In a 61-page opinion, the district court denied the motion to
dismiss on these claims. It found that plaintiffs sufficiently pled
three exclusionary contracts: 1) Varsity's Network Agreements are
explicitly exclusionary, requiring consumers to buy apparel only
from Varsity, 2) Varsity's Family Plan is effectively exclusionary,
making it infeasible for cheer gyms to attend events of Varsity
competitors outside of the Varsity events they are obligated to
attend, and 3) Varsity's Impact Program is exclusionary, requiring
exclusivity in exchange for purchases of services from Varsity.

Applying the Supreme Court's teachings in Copperweld and its
progeny, the district court also found that defendants are capable
of conspiring with each other because they have divergent economic
purposes. Varsity is a corporate entity competing in the market to
maximize profits, whereas USASF is an independent nonprofit
organization. The district court noted that although Varsity
currently controls a majority of USASF's board, that control does
not change the lawful purpose of USASF to benefit its members. As
to a conspiracy with defendant Webb, the court noted that although
he correctly argued that he cannot conspire with Varsity as his
employer, Copperweld does not bar is liability for an alleged
conspiracy between himself, Varsity, USASF and others.

On the Sherman Act Section 2 claim, defendants argued that
plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege monopoly power, relevant
product or geographic markets, or willful anticompetitive conduct.
Defendant Webb also argued that plaintiffs insufficiently plead a
conspiracy to monopolize claim against him. The district court
denied the motion to dismiss on these claims. It found that
plaintiffs alleged that Varsity controlled approximately 80% of the
cheer competition and cheer apparel markets, and 75% of the cheer
camp market. The court also found that it is plausible that Webb,
as CEO, was actively and knowingly engaged in Varsity's alleged
anticompetitive behavior. The court also found that plaintiffs
plausibly alleged willful anticompetitive conduct through their
claims of illegal exclusive dealings, anticompetitive acquisitions,
and restrictions on competition.

Private Equity Defendants Bain Capital and Charlesbank Capital's
Separate Motion to Dismiss Also Fails
In a separate 17-page opinion, the district court denied PE
defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Sherman Act claims and the
statute of limitations challenge.

Plaintiffs alleged that during the period of Charlesbank's
ownership, Charlesbank conspired with Varsity and Webb to
consolidate Varsity's market power by acquiring its biggest rivals.
Plaintiffs further alleged that during the period of Bain's
ownership, Bain participated in the anticompetitve scheme by
sitting on Varsity's board of directors, funding their acquisitions
of competitors, and conspiring with Varsity and Webb to continue
and enhance the monopoly.

On plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims, PE defendants argued that
plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege their involvement in conduct
unlawful under the Sherman Act, and that any causes of action based
on Varsity's acquisitions of competitors are time-barred. PE
defendants also argued that under Copperweld, they were not capable
of conspiring with Varsity as they are legally considered part of
the same enterprise.

For the Sherman Act Section 1 claim, the district court held that a
Copperweld defense requires that Charlesbank and Bain be considered
as one enterprise with the other alleged conspirators. The district
court agreed with PE defendants that Charlesbank and Bain are not
separate actors from Varsity capable of conspiring under the
Sherman Act. However, the district court found that plaintiffs
could still pursue their claim based on their allegations that
Varsity (considered as one enterprise with the PE defendants) and
USASF engage in an unreasonable restraint of trade and conspired
together. Hence, the court kept the PE defendants in the Section 1
claim.

On the Section 2 monopolization claim, the district court held that
plaintiffs need only allege anticompetitive conduct by a single
actor. Thus, by alleging Varsity's exclusionary scheme, plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged a claim in which PE defendants could be viewed
as a shared enterprise with Varsity. On the Section to conspiracy
to monopolize claim, the district court held that plaintiffs still
needed to allege at least two participants. Finding for plaintiffs,
the district court followed the same rationale as it used for the
Section 1 claim; plaintiff's allegations did include a separate
entity—USASF.

The district court held that while Copperweld requires viewing the
PE defendants as a joint enterprise with Varsity, plaintiffs
asserting Sherman Act claims must still provide evidence that each
defendant participated independently to be held liable, and that
such participation must be more than mere ownership. The district
court found that plaintiff's sufficiently alleged independent
participation. As to Charlesbank, plaintiffs alleged its
involvement when it owned Varsity and provided necessary funding
for Varsity to enhance and extend its monopoly power through
acquisitions of competitors, and continued its involvement by
remaining on Varsity's board after it was sold to Bain. Likewise,
Bain also provided funding for acquisitions of competitors, sat on
the board, and maintained control of USASF.

Now that plaintiffs' survived the motion to dismiss, it will be
more difficult for PE plaintiffs to get out of the case unless they
defeat class certification, as denials of motions to dismiss are
normally not immediately appealable. And even if there is a
settlement before class certification, it will have to be approved
by the district court.

Government enforcement actions usually prompt immediate private
treble damage class actions. This case demonstrates an illustration
that private plaintiffs may have the circumstance in some cases to
bring PE entities into cases even where the conduct involved would
appear to be typical PE activities. [GN]

VAXART INC: Settlement Stipulation Reached in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Vaxart, Inc. disclosed in its Form 8-K Report dated July 27, 2022,
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022,
that a consolidated class action suit was filed against the company
and reached a settlement stipulation and agreement to resolve the
asserted claims against the company.

Two substantially similar securities class actions were filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
titled "Hovhannisyan v. Vaxart, Inc. et al.," which was eventually
consolidated and the matter was re-named "In re Vaxart Securities
Litigation."

On July 27, 2022, following a private mediation with the lead
plaintiffs, the parties reached a settlement stipulation and
agreement to resolve the asserted claims against the Company and
each of the individual defendants named in the Putative Class
Action.

Vaxart, Inc. is a biotechnology company based in California.


VISA INC: Sued Over Interchange Fees
------------------------------------
Visa Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 28, 2022, that on June 1, 2022, two class action
claims were filed against Visa with the UK Competition Appeal
Tribunal on behalf of UK businesses that accepted Visa-branded
payment cards at any time from June 1, 2016 alleging that UK
domestic, intra-European Economic Area, and inter-regional
interchange fees on commercial credit cards, and inter-regional
interchange fees on consumer cards, are anti-competitive.

Visa is a global payments technology company based in California.


WALMART INC: Kahn Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Walmart, Inc. The
case is styled as Yoram Kahn, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Walmart, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04177
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Walmart Inc. -- https://corporate.walmart.com/ -- is an American
multinational retail corporation that operates a chain of
hypermarkets, discount department stores, and grocery stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott H. Gingold, Esq.
          GINGOLD LEGAL
          1326 Isabella St.
          Evanston, IL 60201
          Phone: (773) 793-9093
          Email: scott@gingoldlegal.com


WERNER ENTERPRISES: 8th Cir. Flips Judgment in Petrone Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Philip Petrone, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v.
Werner Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Werner Trucking;
Drivers Management, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-2500
(8th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
vacates the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the
Defendants.

The class action arises out of claims by commercial truck drivers
who assert that they were not paid proper amounts while working for
the Defendants as part of the latters' Student Driver Program. In a
previous appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered the Defendants'
challenge to a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff Petrone and
others on some of their claims, concluding that the district court
erred in amending the scheduling order to allow them to submit an
expert report past the disclosure deadline without good cause.
Because this expert evidence was integral to the jury's verdict,
the Eighth Circuit determined that this error was not harmless, and
it vacated the judgment. The case returns to the Eighth Circuit
after the district court, on remand, entered judgment in favor of
the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs filed the action alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and Nebraska law stemming from an eight-week
student-driver training program run by the Defendants. The
Plaintiffs alleged that they were not properly compensated for
off-duty time spent on short rest breaks and time spent resting in
their trucks' sleeper-berths. After a three-day trial, the jury
awarded the Plaintiffs $779,127 on the short-term break claims and
found in favor of the Defendants on the sleeper-berth claims. The
Plaintiffs appealed, challenging various post-trial rulings, while
the Defendants cross-appealed, challenging the district court's
pre-trial rulings, specifically its ruling extending their deadline
to disclose expert reports, which allowed them to submit an
otherwise untimely expert report.

The Plaintiffs had previously timely submitted an expert report,
but after the "Defendants' deposition of their expert revealed
considerable flaws in the methodology used by their expert for
computing the allegedly uncompensated break and sleeper-berth
time," they moved, pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to modify the scheduling order to file a
supplemental expert report. The district court granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to extend the disclosure deadline and allowed
the new expert report to be timely submitted pursuant to the
amended scheduling order.

The Eighth Circuit resolved the Defendants' cross-appeal only,
concluding that it was dispositive to the resolution of both
appeals. It determined that the district court abused its
discretion when it granted the Plaintiffs' Rule 16(b) motion to
amend the scheduling order to extend the disclosure deadline,
pursuant to Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
expert reports without good cause. Further, because "the jury
clearly relied on the Plaintiffs' expert's opinion in reaching its
$779,127 damages award," it could not "say that its award would
have been the same without the new information and, therefore, the
district court's error was not harmless." Thus, it vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the district court for
proceedings consistent with its opinion."

On remand, the Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, asserting that,
even without the expert report, they could prove their damages
through individual pay and time records. They also sought, pursuant
to Rule 37(c)(1), to admit the untimely expert report, asserting
that our mandate left the district court with the discretion to do
so on remand. In the alternative, they sought a court-appointed
expert pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the mandate, asserting
that the only possible outcome in light of the mandate was
dismissal with prejudice.

The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion, granted the
Defendants' motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. It
concluded that the only evidence of damages that the Plaintiffs
presented was based on the improperly admitted new expert report,
rejected their contention that they could prove damages through a
Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence exhibit summarizing pay
and time records for 55,000 class members without expert testimony,
and found that the discovery deadlines had lapsed more than 6 years
previously and there was not good cause to amend the scheduling
order to allow disclosure of the new expert report. It also noted
that they have not submitted a Rule 1006 exhibit, nor identified a
witness who would prepare it, nor have the Defendants deposed this
witness about the preparation of the Rule 1006 exhibit.

In closing, the district court stated, the "Plaintiffs could not
have proved damages but for the admission of the untimely expert
report. Therefore, the only proceeding consistent with the opinion
of the Court of Appeals is dismissal of this action with
prejudice."

The Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in denying
their motion for a new trial because the Eighth Circuit's previous
opinion did not direct the district court to enter judgment in
favor of the Defendants; the district court failed to conduct the
requisite Rule 37(c)(1) analysis, erroneously concluded that the
Plaintiffs could not prove damages without expert evidence, and
failed to address their request for appointment of an expert
pursuant to Rule 706; and dismissal with prejudice is inconsistent
with the holding that, as a matter of law, Defendants violated the
FLSA.

The Eighth Circuit reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial
for a 'clear' abuse of discretion, with the key question being
whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of
justice. However, interpretation of an appellate mandate is a legal
issue which it reviews de novo.

The Eighth Circuit first considers what it mandate directed the
district court to do on remand. Next, it considers the Plaintiffs'
argument that the district court failed to conduct the requisite
analysis under Rule 37(c)(1) before excluding the expert testimony.
Finally, it considers whether the district court erred in
concluding that, without testimony from an expert witness, the
Plaintiffs could not prove damages.

The Eighth Circuit agrees with the district court. The evidence of
damages was so voluminous and complicated that the Plaintiffs' own
expert had difficulty correctly calculating damages, demonstrating
that this evidence is not of the type to which the jury could
simply apply basic math principles in order to calculate damages
without the assistance of expert testimony. In the absence of
expert testimony, summary evidence of wages and hours would not
"assist the jury in understanding the testimony already
introduced," and thus, Rule 1006 would not be appropriate in this
instance. The district court did not err in concluding that,
without expert testimony, the Plaintiffs would be unable to prove
damages.

In sum, while the district court properly determined that the
Plaintiffs could not present evidence of damages through summary
evidence pursuant to Rule 1006, it failed to conduct an analysis
pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) and failed to address their request for
appointment of an expert pursuant to Rule 706. These latter two
points amount to an abuse of discretion, which requires reversal
and vacatur of the judgment. Further, because it vacates the
district court's judgment, it need not consider the Plaintiffs'
argument regarding dismissal with prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, the Eighth Circuit vacates the judgment
and remands to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with its Opinion.

The other Plaintiffs-Appellants are Stewart Fisher; Jasbir Singh;
Brian Pankz, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly
situated; Jason Dewayne Gunn; Ahmad Abdinasir; Adam F. Akhalu;
Latoshia Denise Anderson; Derek C. Anglero; Alan Blane Arthur;
Christopher Ayala; Timothy McCabe Bailey; Csaba G. Barabas; Henry
Barentine; Joseph E. Barker; Diego Barraza; Richard Clair Bash;
Terry Lee Batko; Elizabeth Baumgartel; Jeremy Alfred Bennett; Gary
M. Bernstine; Stacy Lynn Bluebird; Rafarel K. Boadu; Damien Marcus
Boyer; Christina Bradley; Elias Bratcher; Justin Bristol; Karl
Matthew Emerson; Scott A. Larrow; Steve N. Neely; Tonya McDonald;
Micheal Anthony Brooks; Nicholas Brown; Olivia Bryant; Lawrence F.
Bunkowski; David Burgess; Steven Dale Burgess; Justin Burkholder;
Richard Calvert; Johnny Carter; Brett Carty; Joel
Castaneda-Dominguez; Lawrence Edward Cecil; Issac Houston Chase;
Victor Chavarria; Paul Cleaver; Thomas Ricky Coker; Kenya Dyone
Collins; Michael Ray Combs; Kenneth Ray Cook; Larry Nathaniel
Clinton, Jr.; Kenneth B. Cloud; Richard Copley; Howard Corley, Jr.;
Jeffrey G. Crissman; Jimmy Carl Criswell; Thomas Cross; Francisco
Cruz; James Michael Cullity; Kabik Daam; Wilson M. Dagaye; David
Davila; Michael Scott Davis; Jermey Leonard Dawson; Perry A. Deeke;
David Andrew Delisi; Louis James Dietry; John Michael Doss; Steven
Dubinsky; Luis Duran Saldivar; Carl Eberhardt; Harcourt P.
Edgecombe; Douglas Allen Elbon; Terry Lee Elkins; Paul Terry
Elliott, Jr.; Mark C. Eure; Seth Fezatte; Roscoe W. Forman; Anthony
Frank; Nathaniel Anthony Frazier, Jr.; Ernest G. Fulp, Jr.; Peter
Liyayi Gaitano; Jose Garcia-Gonzalez; JoAnna Hancock Geddings;
Clair Henry Gilmore, Jr.; Fred Glass, III; John Christopher Glover;
Jean Marie Gogolin; Steven Scott Goodman; Tamaro R. Graham; Eric
Franklin Green; August William Grow; Gary Eugene Gude; Debra Paula
Gugle; Fardrel J. Guice; Shaun Phillip Guthrie; Randy Halcomb;
Kathleen M. Hallmark; D'Andre LeMare Handy; John Robert Hardin;
Robert William Herrmann; Gail Marie Hess; Annette Fay Holder;
Charles Roy Honacher; Michael Hossler; Robert Edward Howes; Brett
Allen Huckstep; Byron Huffin; Loman Hutchings; Delandos Jackson;
Morris Jacobs, Jr.; Daniel Jefferson; Ciera Lillian Jenkins;
Darrell Wayne Johnson; David Allen Jones; Michael T. Jones; Willie
Lee Jones, Sr.; Michael A. Karpouskas; Behzad Kazemiseresht; Gary
Ward Kennerly; Kristopher Kibby; Ronald L. Kilpatrick; Nathan
Phillip Koehler; Michael Kovacsi; Timothy Michael Kyser; Martha L.
Lantz; Alonza David Lee; Guertho Lemorin; Darran LaVan Lewis;
Joshua Brooke Lipham; Russell E. Lourwood; Paul Lowe; Stacey Marie
Lowe; Krystel Lucas; Kevin L. Maehrer; Jonathan Michael Magnuson;
James Mancuso; Jeremy L. Maness; Thomas C. Marchione; William Clyde
Marks; David Jacob Marrs; Norrek McCarty; Matthew Jay McDaniel;
David Andrew McDevitt; Samuel Ray McMillian; Doug Anthony McSwain;
Jack Dean Michael; Steven Richard Milstead; Robert John Monroe;
Carl Montgomery; Gary C. Montgomery; Debra A. Moore; Michael W.
Moore; Clell Morgan, II; John Anthony Morris; Michael Wayne Murray;
Lorene Musabelli; Nathan Joel Nadell; Saleh M. Nasser; Chad Michael
Newsome; Aaron Jermain Nixon; Luis S. Ogando Colon; Peter B. Oh;
Marcus Oscar Orr; Christopher Otto; Donald Wade Owens; Charles D.
Paglicco, Jr.; James G. Paige, Jr.; Matthew Pereira; Michael Andrew
Pertle; William James Petty, Jr.; Jarrod Scott Pitts; James Matthew
Potts; Bryan James Pratt; David Frank Pressley; John Jason Pryor;
Joseph Pusateri; Noel Ramirez; Steven M. Ramsey; John Manson Ray;
Heath Daniel Reams; Jasper U. Reaves; John Reddick; Benjamin Reno;
Oscar Reyes; Brandon Richard; Gregory Scott Vian Risdon; Clarence
Robinson; Rayo Emmiito Robinson; Barney Robson; Brandon Roldan;
William Thomas Roop; Curtis Ryals; Nickilas Sams; Franklin L.
Schmidt, III; Barbara Ann Scoby; Joseph Franklin Scott; Robert A.
Scott, III; Vernon B. Seaborn, Jr.; Michael A. Sederquist; Phillip
Wayne Senecal; Guillermo Serrano-Lopez; Pablo A. Serrano-Lopez;
Charles Shackelford; Katherine P. Shoemaker; Howard Arthur Singer;
Harpal Singh; Dennis Dean Smith; Kyle Anthony Smith; Randy Shane
Smith; Timothy Leonardo Smith; Quitz Snider; Richard Adam Solomon;
Roman Stelter; Winston Stewart; Shawn Michael Stone; Derick Lynn
Sullins; James Julian Alan Surrency; Tim Swadley; George A. Tapia;
Shannon Leigh Terry; Noulieng Thisanakone; Dan Vilaythong; Erick
Thompkins; Brennon Thompson; Stephen Loyd Tillerson; David Wright
Tillman; Kevin Toll; Richard F. Torrisi; Jeffrey S. Torsrud;
Gregory D. Trent; Jose Valentine; Luanne Santoro Voght; Wayne
Woodrow Waite; David C. Waldron; Marisa Sabrinda Walker; Robert
Wallace; Lance Wallace; Patrick Mark Walters; Steven Anthony
Wasson; Joseph Kane Weatherford; Derrick Earl Webb; Stacey Webb;
Trey Anthony Webber; Keeley Wheeler, Jr.; Johnny Keith White; Kacy
Fonteze Williams; Tiffany Nicole Williams; Steven M. Willis; Reia
Winn; Marlon Dewayne Witcham; Devon Terelle Wofford; William Wood;
Mark Antonio Woods; Warren R. Wright; Carisma Concetta Weiss;
Robert Lee Plunkett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Werner Enterprises,
Inc., doing business as Werner Trucking; Drivers Management, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees. Philip Petrone; Brian Pankz, on behalf of
himself and all those similarly situated; Stewart Fisher, on behalf
of himself and all those similarly situated; Jasbir Singh, on
behalf of himself and all those similarly situated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5hfywfek from Leagle.com.


WEST VIRGINIA: Class in Fain v. Health & Human Resources Certified
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER FAIN, SHAUNTAE ANDERSON, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WILLIAM
CROUCH, in his official capacity as Cabinet Secretary of the West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources; CYNTHIA BEANE,
in her official capacity as Commissioner for the West Virginia
Bureau for Medical Services; WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN RESOURCES, BUREAU FOR MEDICAL SERVICES, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 3:20-0740 (S.D.W. Va.), Judge Robert C. Chambers of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Huntington Division, grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

The Plaintiffs are transgender West Virginian Medicaid
participants. Fain is a 46-year-old transgender man enrolled in
West Virginia Medicaid and is seeking surgical treatment for his
gender dysphoria diagnosis. Anderson is a 45-year-old transgender
woman enrolled in West Virginia Medicaid and is also seeking the
surgical treatment for her gender dysphoria.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the proposed class of "all
transgender people who are or will be enrolled in west Virginia
Medicaid and who are seeking or will seek gender-confirming care
barred by the Exclusion." The proposed class in this class exceeds
600 people annually, as 686 participants in the West Virginia
Medicaid Program submitted at least one claim with a diagnosis for
gender dysphoria or gender incongruence in 2021.

The West Virginia Medicaid Program provides a blanket exclusion for
"transsexual surgery," stating that such a service is not covered
"regardless of medical necessity." Thus, any transgender Medicaid
participant in West Virginia who may be diagnosed with gender
dysphoria is barred from coverage for the surgical treatment of
this diagnosis.

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes four
class certification requirements: (1) a class so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) questions of law or
fact common to the class; (3) a representative party whose claims
and defenses are typical of the class's claims and defenses; and
(4) a representative party that will fairly and adequately protect
the class's interests. In addition to these four requirements, a
plaintiff must also demonstrate that the proposed class action fits
into one of three forms permitted by Rule 23(b).

As a threshold matter, this Circuit requires that, in addition to
the explicit requirements of Rule 23, proposed classes must be
"readily identifiable." Judge Chambers opines that the criteria the
Plaintiffs present are clear. The class is comprised of all
transgender people who are or will be enrolled in west Virginia
Medicaid and who are seeking or will seek gender-confirming care.
Such factors are well documented and easily ascertainable. Thus,
while not all class members have been identified, such members can
be easily identified.

Judge Chambers finds that (i) the size of the class exceeds the
numerosity requirement and that joinder of all class members is
impracticable; (ii) the issues are common to all members of the
proposed class; (iii) the relief the Plaintiffs sought is identical
to other class members -- the declaration of the exclusion's
unlawfulness and an injunction precluding the enforcement of it;
(iv) the Plaintiffs are adequate representatives; and (v) the
Plaintiffs' proposed class counsel can fairly and adequately
represent the proposed class.

Judge Chambers further finds that certification of the class seems
appropriate given that the exclusion applies broadly to all members
of the proposed class and certification is warranted, as the
exclusion affects all proposed class members, and the declaratory
and injunctive relief sought would benefit all class members.

The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of the Order to the
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 2, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8thakx from
Leagle.com.


XCEL ENERGY: Faces Suit Over Colorado Wildfire Incident
-------------------------------------------------------
Xcel Energy Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 28, 2022, that in March 2022, a class
action suit was filed in Boulder County pertaining to a wildfire
ignited in Boulder County, Colorado.

In June 2022, Plaintiffs served the class action lawsuit. In July
2022, the Public Service Company of Colorado filed a Motion to
Dismiss.

Xcel Energy Inc. is into electric and other services combined based
in Minnesota.



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