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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, July 18, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 136

                            Headlines

931 E. 11TH AVE: Fails to Pay Minimum, OT Wages, Pedersen Claims
ADVANT-E CORPORATION: Kreher Sues Over 2021 Reverse Stock Split
AIRGAS INC: Fails to Pay Proper OT Wages, Machion Suit Alleges
ALANI NUTRITION: S.D. California Narrows Claims in Vitiosus Suit
ALLURE MEDSPA: Faces Mota Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages

ANTHEM COMPANIES: Baker Bid to File Amended Complaint OK'd
ARGENT TRUST: DOL Says ERISA Class Claims Non-Arbitrable
ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS: Court Narrows Claims in Seroquel Suit
AVIS BUDGET: Settlement in Venerus Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD: Summary Judgment in Rowe Suit Partly Reversed

BARRINGTON SCHOOL: Court Approves Settlement in Yorba FLSA Suit
BEYOND MEAT: Products Have Less Protein as Labeled, Borovoy Says
BHP GROUP: Faces Class Action Suit Over 2015 Samarco Dam Disaster
BOFI HOLDINGS: Reaches $14.1-Mil. Settlement in Securities Suit
BP AMERICA: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Aguinaga BELO Suit

BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Martin BELO Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Summary Judgment; Naquin's Complaint Tossed
BRADFORD O'NEIL: Extension of Time to File Response OK'd
BRADLEY COUNTY, TN: Filing of Class Status Bid Due Oct. 31
BROOKLYN IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS: Carlson Shareholder Suit Dismissed

BROOKLYN IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS: Faces EPEF Shareholder Suit
CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Claim Under TCPA in Cheng v. Speier
CANADA: Reforms Needed to Address RCMP Systemic Problems
CASCADE COLLECTIONS: $55K in Atty. Fees, Costs Awarded in Rodriguez
CELLULAR SOUTH: Faces Johnson Suit Over Telemarketing Text Messages

CHERRY HILL: E.D. California Dismisses Ayers Suit Without Prejudice
COLORADO CORING: Seek Extension to File Class Cert Response
CORE CIVIC: Court Denies Bid to Reconsider Dismissal of Bacon Suit
CORECIVIC INC: Extension of Deadlines to File Responses Sought
CROW VOTE: Seeks to Reschedule Class Certification Bid Hearing

EAGLE EXPRESS: Emery Seeks Unpaid OT & Damages Under FLSA, IMWL
EL CAZADOR: Hernandez-Ramirez Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
EMERGENCY MEDICAL: 4th Cir. Favors Employees in FLSA Class Suit
ENHANCED RECOVERY: Madlinger Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
EXP REALTY: Faces Fulto Suit Over Unwanted Telemarketing Calls

FIELD ASSET: Ninth Cir. Flips Class Certification in Bowerman Suit
FIRST TRANSIT: Woods, et al., Seek FLSA Conditional Certification
FIRSTENERGY CORP: Opposition to Class Cert Bid Due August 17
FLOWERS FOODS: Court Grants Class Certification Bid in Ludlow Suit
FOTO CARE LTD: Iskhakova Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

FROST-ARNETT COMPANY: Weber Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
G & G MANHATTAN: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GATHERED FOODS: Zarzuela Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GHOST LLC: Faces Edelen Suit Over Misbranded Nutritional Powders
GOLDEN ENTERTAINMENT: Houston's Bid to Vacate Dismissals Denied

GPB HOLDINGS: Committed Fraud and Misrepresentations, Suit Says
GPB HOLDINGS: Faces Class Suit Over Texas Securities Act Violations
GPB HOLDINGS: Faces KMIRA Suit for Breach of Contract
GPB HOLDINGS: Faces Suit Over Misleading Business Practices
GPB HOLDINGS: Sued for Material Misstatement and Omissions

GROSS SKINCARE: Class Cert. Deadlines Amended in Gunaratna Suit
HERSHEY CANADA: Class Action Alleging Child Slave Labour Certified
HP INC: Cepelak Suit Seeks to Certify 8 Classes
INTERCONTINENTAL CAPITAL: Nelson Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
INTERDESIGN INC: Ortiz Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York

INTEX RECREATION: Ortiz Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
IONQ INC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds Investors of August 1 Deadline
J&M FOODS INC: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
KAISER FOUNDATION: Court Issues Discovery Order in Gamble Suit
LINCARE HOLDINGS: Kennedy Files Suit in N.D. California

MAVUNO LLC: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MAXIM HEALTHCARE: Wilson Suit Removed to S.D. California
MCG HEALTH: Fails to Secure Patients' Info, Osborne Suit Says
MCG HEALTH: Fails to Secure Patients' Personal Info, Mack Claims
MEDICAL MONKS: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

MELALEUCA INC: Joyner Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MERCK & CO: 400 More Women Join $250-Mil. Equal-Pay Lawsuit
METROPOLITAN LIFE: McHugh Sues Over Long-Term Care Insurance Policy
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Court Junks Suit Involving Price-Fixing
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Dismissal of Securities Class Suit Affirmed

MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Faces Six Class Suits in Canada
MNM TRADING LLC: Ortiz Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
MOD SUPER FAST: Final Approval of Settlement Issued in Pratz Suit
MORTON COUNTY, ND: Dismissal in Part of Thunderhawk Suit Reversed
MP MATERIALS: Bourque Named as Lead Plaintiff in Bernstein Suit

MYERS LLC: Fails to Pay Piece-Rate Employees' OT Wages Under FLSA
MYLAN INC: Bid to Compel Election of Defenses in EpiPen Suit Denied
NESTLE HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses Horti's 2nd Amended Complaint
NEW JERSEY: Court Terminates Planker v. Atkins Suit & Pending Bids
NORTH CAROLINA: Abdullah-Malik's Complaint Fails Initial Review

NPSG GLOBAL: Faces McClellan Class Action Suit Over Untimely Wages
OKTA INC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds Investors of Class Action
OKTA INC: Portnoy Law Firm Notes of Securities Class Action Lawsuit
OUTSET MEDICAL: Saxena White Files New Class Action Lawsuit
PEACE COFFEE: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

PLUSHCARE INC: Faces Robbins Class Suit in California Court
PP&G INC: Butler, et al., Seek Collective Conditional Certification
PROFESSIONAL CLAIMS: Spira Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
PROFESSIONAL FINANCE: Rodriguez Files Suit in D. Colorado
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY: Order on Class Certification Bid Entered

PROVIDENCE ST. MARY: Urged to Join Meeting to Address Malpractices
PUBLIC CONSULTING: Bid to Dismiss Martinez Suit Denied as Moot
PUP CULTURE: Munguia Seeks Unpaid Wages Due to Time-Shaving
QUINTESSENTIAL TOTS: Ortiz Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
REDSTONE FEDERAL: Hubbard Files Suit in N.D. Alabama

REYNOLDS CONSUMER: Faces Class Suit Over Mislabeled Recycling Bags
SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Order on Class Cert-Related Deadlines Sought
SAPPHIRE GENTLEMEN'S: Faces Class Suit Over Forced Prostitution
SHENG FENG SONG: Nationwide Suit Moved to W.D. North Carolina
SKILLZ INC: N.D. California Dismisses Jedrzejczyk Securities Suit

SOLANA FOUNDATION: Hit With Class Action Over SOL Tokens
SONY MUSIC: Class Action Over Michael Jackson Tracks Pending
STEVEN LABEL: Lopez Seeks Civil Penalties Under PAGA Labor Code
SYNCHRONY BANK: Extension of Class Cert Deadlines Sought
TRAVELERS HOME: Settlement in Stechert Suit Wins Final Approval

TRIBUNE MEDIA: Seventh Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Water Island Suit
U.S. RENAL CARE: C.D. California Narrows Claims in Bruno Class Suit
UNITED STATES: Biden Set to Announce Loan Forgiveness Program
UNITED STATES: Bids for Summary Judgment in Edakunni v. DHS Denied
UNITED STATES: Deal Reached in Lompoc Prison COVID-19 Class Suit

UNITY SOFTWARE: Das Securities Suit Filed Over False Financial Info
VACATIONS 4 YOU: Faces Mann Suit Over Illegal Membership Contract
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Audi Reaches Transmission Defect Suit Settlement
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Class Settlement in Mercado Suit Wins Final Nod
VOLT BANK: Bannister Investigates Collapse Following Funding Woes

WALMART INC: Bid for Amendment of Briefing Schedule Filed
WALMART INC: Faces Class Action Over Mislabeled Coffee Creamer
WALMART INC: Mayonnaise Dressing Falsely Labeled, Guzman Alleges
WISCONSIN: Department of Revenue Dismissed From Siebers Class Suit
YAHOO! INC: Denial of Attorneys' Fees in Data Breach Suit Affirmed

YAHOO! INC: Ninth Cir. Affirms Overruling of Miller's Objections

                            *********

931 E. 11TH AVE: Fails to Pay Minimum, OT Wages, Pedersen Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
TRAVIS PEDERSEN, on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, known and unknown v. 931 E. 11TH AVE. CORP.
D/B/A THE PARK TAVERN & RESTAURANT, LOUIS BELEGRATIS, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND KRISTENE ENRIQUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, Case No. 1:22-cv-01662 (D.
Colo., July 5, 2022) is a class action brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Colorado Minimum and Pay Standards Order No.
38.

The Plaintiff, and members of the Plaintiff Class, only received
their sub-minimum regular, straight time hourly rates of pay for
all hours worked, including overtime-eligible hours in excess of 40
in a work week such that Plaintiff and those similarly situated
were denied minimum and overtime compensation, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants compensated Plaintiff, and members of the Plaintiff
Class, on an hourly basis, typically via cash, but failed to pay
proper minimum wages and overtime premiums of one-and one-half
times the employees' regular hourly rates of pay. The Plaintiff,
and members of the Plaintiff Class, were paid sub-minimum hourly
rates of pay for all hours worked, including overtime-eligible
hours in excess of 40 in a work week in violation of the state and
federal laws, added the lawsuit.

All other unnamed Plaintiffs, known and unknown ("members of the
Plaintiff Class", "Plaintiff Class" or "similarly situated
Plaintiffs"), are past or present hourly employees who were also
paid less than the federal and/or state minimum wage and only
received their regular, straight time hourly rates for all hours
worked and did not receive overtime premiums at a rate of one-and
one-half their regular hourly rates of pay for hours worked in
excess of 40 in a workweek, the lawsuit further alleges.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel D. Engelson, Esq.
          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          7900 E. Union Ave., Suite 1100
          Denver, CO 80237
          Telephone: (720)-386-9006

ADVANT-E CORPORATION: Kreher Sues Over 2021 Reverse Stock Split
---------------------------------------------------------------
PETER J. KREHER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. ADVANT-E CORPORATION, JASON WADZINSKI, and JASON BOONE,
Case No. 2022-0584 (Del. Ch., July 1, 2022) arises from a 1 for
20,000 reverse stock split of common stock of Advant-e Corporation
that took place in December 2021 pursuant to a fatally flawed
process and at a price unfair to Advant-e's minority stockholders
("2021 Reverse Stock Split").

According to the complaint, any fractional shares that resulted
from the 2021 Reverse Stock Split resulted in a cash payment in
lieu of fractional shares at the unfair price of $5.25 per share on
a pre-split basis, or $105,000 per share on a post-split basis. The
2021 Reverse Stock Split was approved by written consent in lieu of
a special meeting on November 1, 2021, and was effective December
15, 2021.

Wadzinski, as the controlling stockholder of Advant-e who owned
more than 50% of the outstanding common stock of Advant-e, was able
to approve the 2021 Reverse Stock Split based solely on a vote of
his shares.

The 2021 Reverse Stock Split was not conditioned from the outset,
or at any point, on an affirmative vote of the minority
stockholders of Advant-e or on approval by an independent special
committee of the Board.

As a result of the 2021 Reverse Stock Split, minority stockholders
of Advant-e were cashed out of their positions through an unfair
process and at an unfair price of $5.25 per share on a pre-split
basis, which undervalued their common stock. For these reasons and
other reasons alleged below, the Individual Defendants breached
their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and all minority stockholders
who were cashed out in the 2021 Reverse Stock Split.

Also, as a result of paying an unfair price for fractional shares
that resulted from the 2021 Reverse Stock Split, Advant-e violated
Section 155 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del C.
section 155, which requires a corporation that decides to pay cash
for fractional shares to pay "fair value" for those shares. The
Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by approving
and carrying out the 2021 Reverse Stock Split that violated Section
155.

The Plaintiff was a stockholder of Advant-e at all times material
to the allegations. The Plaintiff's Advant-e common stock was
cashed out as a result of the Transaction at the unfair price of
$5.25 per share on a pre-split basis.

The Defendant Jason Wadzinski has served as a member of the Board
of Directors of the Company and/or Chairman of the Board since
2000. Wadzinski is also the President and CEO of Advant-e.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carmella P. Keener, Esq.
          COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
          1007 N. Orange Street
          The Nemours Building, Suite 1120
          Wilmington, DE 19801-1680
          Telephone: (302) 984-3816

               - and -

          Carl. L. Stine, Esq.
          Joshua W. Ruthizer, Esq.
          Leanna Loginov, Esq.
          WOLF POPPER LLP
          845 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 759-4600

AIRGAS INC: Fails to Pay Proper OT Wages, Machion Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN MACHION, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. AIRGAS, INC., Case No. 2:22-cv-02611 (E.D. Pa., July 5,
2022) contends that the Defendant has improperly failed to pay the
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees of Defendant
overtime compensation pursuant to the requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant an Industrial Wholesale
Account Executive. The Defendant improperly classified the
Plaintiff, as exempt employees under the FLSA and PMWA and did not
pay them overtime compensation. However, the Plaintiff and Class
Plaintiffs were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the FLSA
and PMWA and, as such, were entitled to overtime compensation for
all hours worked over 40 per week, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiffs bring this action as a representative action under
the FLSA and PMWA, seeking monetary damages, declaratory and
injunctive relief, and other equitable and ancillary relief, to
seek regress for Defendant’s willful, unlawful, and improper
conduct.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Murphy, Esq.
          Michael Groh, Esq.
          Andrew J. Schreiber, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC
          Eight Penn Center, Suite 2000
          1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 273-1054
          Facsimile: (215) 525-021
          E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  mgroh@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  aschreiber@phillyemploymentlawyer.com

ALANI NUTRITION: S.D. California Narrows Claims in Vitiosus Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDRES VITIOSUS, et al., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ALANI NUTRITION, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-2048-MMA (MDD) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael
M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the complaint and strike the nationwide class
allegations.

I. Introduction

On Dec. 8, 2021, Plaintiffs Andres Vitiosus, Debra Foley, and
Rachel Lumbra filed a putative class action complaint against
Defendant Alani, alleging violations of California and New York
consumer protection laws as well as claims for breach of express
warranty and unjust enrichment. The Defendant now moves to dismiss
the Complaint and strike the nationwide class allegations. The
Plaintiffs filed an opposition, to which the Defendant replied.

II. Background

The Defendant is the manufacturer of FIT SNACKS Protein Bars ("FIT
Bars" or the "Bars"). Generally speaking, the Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant misleads consumers by representing that FIT Bars are
healthy through its labeling, packaging, and advertising.
Specifically, they maintain they were misled when they observed the
term "FIT" on the wrapper of six FIT Bars flavors: (1) Munchies;
(2) Peanut Butter Crisp; (3) Blueberry Muffin; (4) Chocolate Cake;
(5) Confetti Cake; and (6) Fruity Cereal.

According to the Plaintiffs, FIT Bars are not healthy but instead
are high in fat and contain less than the daily value ("DV") of
Vitamin D and potassium. They also assert that the labeling "FIT"
violates the Food and Drug Administration's regulation and
therefore is misleading. As such, the Plaintiffs bring seven claims
against Defendant: (1) violation of California's Unfair Competition
Law, Cal. Bus. Prof. Code Section 17200 et seq. ("UCL"); (2)
violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ.
Code Section 1750 et seq. ("CLRA"); (3) violation of California's
False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. Prof. Code Section 17500 et seq.
("FAL"); (4) Violation of New York's General Business Law ("GBL")
Section 349; (5) violation of New York's GBL Section 350; (6)
breach of express warranty; and (7) unjust enrichment.

III. Discussion

The Plaintiffs bring seven causes of action against the Defendant
under both California and New York consumer protection laws, as
well as claims for breach of express warranty and unjust
enrichment. The Defendant seeks to dismiss all claims as well as
strike the nationwide class allegations.

The Plaintiffs put forth two theories supporting their claims, all
seven of which sound in fraud, citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA,
317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that where a
plaintiff alleges "a unified course of fraudulent conduct" and
relies on the conduct, the claim sounds or is grounded in fraud,
and "the pleading of that claim as a whole must satisfy the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)"). First, the Plaintiffs
contend that the term "FIT" on the Bars' label is an implied
nutrient content claim, suggesting that the product "may be useful
in maintaining healthy dietary practices," but that FIT Bars do not
meet the FDA's definition of "healthy." Second, the Plaintiffs
assert that "FIT" is misleading as it is not an "appropriately
descriptive term."

A. Preemption

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' state law claims are
preempted by federal law. The Plaintiffs contend that their state
law claims are not preempted because use of the term "FIT" violates
federal regulation.

Relevant to the case is the regulatory scheme relating to food
branding and labeling. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 ("FDCA") established the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
within the Department of Health and Human Services. "The FDCA
grants the FDA authority to regulate the field of food safety."

Judge Anello explains that California and New York broadly prohibit
the misbranding of food in language largely identical to that found
in the FDCA. California's Sherman Law, Cal. Health & Saf. Code
Section 109875 et seq., provides that food is misbranded "if its
labeling is false or misleading in any particular." It also
explicitly incorporates by reference "all food labeling regulations
and any amendments to those regulations adopted pursuant to the
FDCA," as California's food labeling regulations. New York's
Agriculture and Marketing Law similarly provides in relevant part
that food will be deemed misbranded "if its labeling is false or
misleading in any particular," and also incorporates the FDCA's
labeling provisions found in 21 C.F.R. Section 101. N.Y. Agric. &
Mkts. Law Section 201.

Thus, the Plaintiffs' claims will "not fail on preemption grounds
if the requirements they seek to impose are either identical to
those imposed by the FDCA and the NLEA amendments or do not involve
claims or labeling information of the sort described in sections
343(r) and 343(q)."

B. Implied Nutrient Content Claim

The NLEA includes an express preemption provision for certain
claims appearing on food labels. Section 343-1(a)(5), often
referred to as section 403A, expressly "preempts state or local
governments from imposing any requirement on nutrient content
claims made by a food purveyor 'in the label or labeling of food
that is not identical to the requirement of section 343(r).'"
Because section 403A(a)(5) preempts any state requirement that is
different than the FDCA's regulation in section 343(r)(1), there
are two ways plaintiffs may escape its preemptive force: (1) if the
plaintiffs' claims seek to impose requirements that are identical
to those imposed by the NLEA; or (2) if the requirements plaintiffs
seek to impose are not with respect to claims of the sort described
in Section 343(r)(1).

Judge Anello finds that all of the Plaintiffs' claims are premised
in part upon an alleged violation of 21 CFR Section 101.65(d)(2),
which regulates implied nutrient content claims (specifically,
general nutritional claims) that "use the term 'healthy' or related
terms." 21 CFR Section 101.65(d)(2). However, the Plaintiffs have
not plausibly pleaded an implied nutrient content claim or general
nutritional claim. The Plaintiffs' state law causes of action -- to
the extent they are premised upon the allegation that the
Defendant's "FIT" labeling violates 21 CFR Section 101.65 -- are
preempted. While the Plaintiffs plausibly plead that "FIT" is a
synonym of "healthy," they have not plausibly pleaded that section
101.65(d)'s definition of "healthy" extends to synonyms such as the
word "FIT." Contrary to their position, the FDA has not expanded
the definition of "healthy" to synonyms.

C. Terms Subject to Definition

"FIT" is not a derivative of "healthy." It is, at best, a synonym.
Therefore, it is plainly clear that the FDA's definition of
"healthy" does not apply to "FIT." Thus, Judge Anello holds that
the Plaintiffs cannot maintain state law causes of action based
upon the allegation that "FIT" violates 21 CFR Section
101.65(d)(2). To allow the Plaintiffs to proceed with this theory
would be to define "FIT" in such a way that the FDA has explicitly
chosen not to; the Plaintiffs cannot seek to impose the definition
in a way that is not identical to federal law. Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs state law causes of action, premised on the allegation
that "FIT" is an impermissible implied nutrient content claim
because the Bars do not meet the definition of "healthy," are
preempted. Accordingly, Judge Anello grants the Defendant's motion
on this basis.

Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs' state law causes of action, asserting
that "FIT" is misleading in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 343(a),
do not conflict with the NLEA and thus are not preempted.
Accordingly, Judge Anello denies the Defendant's motion in this
respect.

D. Article III Standing

The Defendant challenges Plaintiffs' Article III standing on
multiple grounds. To establish Article III standing at the motion
to dismiss stage, "the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has
suffered or is threatened with a 'concrete and particularized'
legal harm coupled with 'a sufficient likelihood that he will again
be wronged in a similar way,'" "the injury is 'fairly traceable' to
the challenged conduct," and the "injury is 'likely' to be
'redressed by a favorable decision.'"

First, Judge Anello finds that the Plaintiffs do not allege any
likelihood of future harm. They fail to specifically allege an
intent to ever purchase one of the Defendant's FIT Bars again. Such
an explicitly stated intention or desire to purchase in the future
is required to demonstrate a concrete injury for standing to seek
injunctive relief at the dismissal stage in the Ninth Circuit with
respect to UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims. Accordingly, the Defendant's
motion in this respect will be granted.

Second, the Plaintiffs do not allege that they were exposed to "a
uniform, widespread deceptive campaign" of marketing and
advertising; they allege solely that they observed and were misled
by the word "FIT" on the FIT Bars' wrapper. In both California and
New York, "a party does not have standing to challenge statements
or advertisements that she never saw."

Accordingly, because the Plaintiffs do not plead they saw the
following alleged representations, the Defendant's motion will be
granted as to:

      (1) the Defendant states on its website about the FIT SNACKS:
We crafted our line of supplements for people who take their health
and wellness seriously. From appropriate portions to balanced
ingredients, Alani Nu supplements are designed to help you find
your strength inside. Fill the gaps in your nutrition, find extra
motivation, or even balance your hormones with supplements to
assist in fitness and wellness goals;

      (2) Defendant states on every box of the Products SNACKS YOU
WON'T FEEL GUILTY ABOUT, FLAVORS YOU'LL LOVE;

      (3) Defendant has a marketing campaign that promotes the
Products as Balanced nutrition & superior taste, You've found a
protein bar that fits all your needs, and Care-free snacking just
got better; and

      (4) Defendant bases its marketing campaign on the claim that
snacking on the Products is without guilt. It says on its website
when purchasing the Products indulge your cravings without the
guilt. Smart snacking should be care-free and delicious which is
why we've come up with a pretty awesome protein bar to fit all your
needs. With our traditional flavors like Confetti Cake and Fruity
Cereal, and new flavors like Blueberry Muffin & Chocolate Cake.
Trust us, you're going to want one of each.

Third, Judge Anello finds that it is entirely unclear which Bars
each named Plaintiff purchased. It seems as though the Plaintiffs
may have purchased all six. Nonetheless, it appears that all six
FIT Bars are identical in terms of labeling and relevant
nutritional composition and therefore, all six satisfy both the
substantially similar and sufficiently similar tests. Accordingly,
Judge Anello grants the Defendant's motion on this basis.

Lastly, it is not a conflict of law or Rule 23(a) issue, it is an
Article III standing issue. The question is whether yjr Plaintiffs
have standing to hypothetically assert claims on behalf of unnamed
class members under potentially forty-eight (48) other states' laws
that do not govern their own claims. They do not, Judge Anello
finds. Accordingly, he grants the Defendant's motion on this
basis.

E. Rule 9(b) Particularity

As noted, all seven of the Plaintiffs' claims sound in fraud: they
are all premised upon the allegation that FIT Bars mislead
consumers to believe the product is healthy, and as such, all are
subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard. In order to
satisfy Rule 9(b), the Plaintiffs must plead the "who, what, when,
where, and how of the misconduct charged."

Judge Anello denies the Defendant's motion on this basis. Among
other thigns, he finds that the Plaintiffs plead that the Defendant
represents that six Bars are "FIT." They allege that "FIT" is a
synonym of "healthy," and therefore that the label conveys to the
reasonable consumer that the Bars are healthy. Their allegations
satisfy Rule 9(b) under both California and New York law.

F. Consumer Protection Claims

The Plaintiffs bring five consumer protection claims under the
following California and New York laws: (1) California's CLRA; (2)
California's FAL; (3) California's UCL; (4) New York's GBL Section
349; and (5) New York's GBL Section 350. The Defendant argues that
all five are subject to dismissal because the Plaintiffs do not
plausibly plead that the reasonable consumer would be misled by the
word "FIT" for various reasons.

Judge Anello turns to the reasonable consumer test. He finds that
(i) there is no authority under either California or New York law
standing for the proposition that a brand name cannot, as a matter
of law, mislead a consumer; (ii) he cannot conclude, as a matter of
law, that no reasonable consumer could read the word "FIT" and
believe the Bars were healthy; (iii) the Plaintiffs' opposition is
largely devoid of any mention of the weight loss and protein
allegations; and (iv) the Plaintiffs plausibly plead that the term
"FIT" is misleading as it falsely conveys to the reasonable
consumer that FIT Bars are healthy.

G. Breach of Express Warranty & Unjust Enrichment

Judge Anello holds that the Plaintiffs fail to identify any state
law providing for breach of express warranty or unjust enrichment
causes of action, a defect they concede. Accordingly, he grants the
Defendant's motion in this respect. Because the Plaintiffs do not
plead any applicable law, Judge Anello does not address the
Defendant's remaining arguments, challenging the claims under
California and New York law.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Anello grants the Defendant's
motion to dismiss in part. In particular, he dismisses the
Plaintiffs' sixth and seventh causes of action with leave to amend.
He dismisses their claims to the extent they are premised upon
advertising they do not allege they saw with leave to amend.

Judge Anello further dismisses the following without leave to
amend: The Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief; Plaintiffs'
claims to the extent they are premised upon the implied nutrient
content claim theory; the Plaintiffs' claims to the extent they are
based upon weight loss and protein benefits beliefs; and
Plaintiffs' nationwide class allegations. His ruling as to the
nationwide class allegations is without prejudice to additional
Plaintiff(s) bringing claims, and thus representing additional
class(es), under the laws of their respective states.

Judge Anello denies the remainder of the Defendant's motion.

If the Plaintiffs wish to file a First Amended Complaint curing the
deficiencies noted, they must do so on or before July 25, 2022. The
Defendant must then respond within the time prescribed by Rule 15.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/zsak4tdt from Leagle.com.


ALLURE MEDSPA: Faces Mota Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA MOTA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ALLURE MEDSPA, LLC, Case No. CACE-22-009819 (Fla. Cir.,
Broward Cty., July 6, 2022) contends that the Defendant promotes
and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited text
messages to wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act and the Florida Telephone Solicitation
Act.

The Defendant is an aesthetic treatment spa that utilizes licensed
aestheticians to develop custom skin care and medical treatment
options for its consumers including the sale of various aesthetic
treatments and products.

To promote its goods and services, Defendant engages in telephonic
sales calls to consumers without having secured prior express
written consent as required by the FTSA. The Defendant's telephonic
sales calls have caused Plaintiff and the Class members harm,
including violations of their statutory rights, statutory damages,
annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of their privacy, says the suit.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks an injunction and
statutory damages on behalf of herself and the Class members, as
defined below, and any other available legal or equitable remedies
resulting from the unlawful actions of Defendant.

The Defendant maintains its primary place of business and
headquarters in Boca Raton, Florida. The Defendant directs,
markets, and provides business activities throughout the State of
Florida and throughout the United States.

The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of
herself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated
persons as a class action pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.220(b )(2) and (b )(3). The "Class" that Plaintiff
seeks to represent is defined as:

   "All persons in Florida who, (1) were sent a telephonic sales
   call regarding Defendant's goods and/or services, (2) using the

   same equipment or type of equipment utilized to call the
   Plaintiff."

The Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the
Class. The Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in
the Class but believes the Class members number in the several
thousands, if not more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
         Garrett 0. Berg, Esq.
         SHAMIS & GENTILE P.A.
         14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
         Miami, FL 33132
         Telephone: (305) 479-2299
         E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                 gberg@shamisgentile.com

              - and -

         Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
         Christopher Gold, Esq.
         EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
         20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
         Aventura, FL 33180
         Telephone: (786) 289-9471
         Facsimile: (305) 975-3320
         E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                 chris@edelsberglaw.com

ANTHEM COMPANIES: Baker Bid to File Amended Complaint OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Deon Baker individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. The Anthem
Companies, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-04866-WMR (N.D. Ga.), the Hon.
Judge William M. Ray entered an order granting the request to file
an Amended Complaint; however, the Court directed the Plaintiff to
file a new motion to certify class rather than amend the current
Motion to Certify Class, to allow the Court ample time to consider
the motion timely pursuant the six months guidelines
and to allow any newly added Defendants time to respond and prepare
for the hearing.

The Court terminated the original Motion to certify class and
terminates as moot the unopposed motion for Leave to File Response
Out of Time, directing the Defendant to instead file a response to
the soon to be filed Motion to Certify Class.

The Court cancels the hearing currently scheduled on July 19, 2022.
The hearing will be reset once a new Motion to Certify Class has
been filed and briefed.

Anthem is a health benefits company. The company offers managed
healthcare-related products and administrative services.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3O2S5xZ at no extra charge.[CC]

ARGENT TRUST: DOL Says ERISA Class Claims Non-Arbitrable
--------------------------------------------------------
Robert Steyer, writing for Pensions & Investments, reports that a
lawsuit criticizing a private company's employee stock ownership
plan has turned into a policy dispute about arbitration clauses in
ERISA plans, pitting the U.S. Department of Labor against prominent
retirement industry trade organizations.

In its first-ever amicus brief about arbitration clauses in an
ERISA plan, the Labor Department supports a plaintiff suing his
employer and fiduciaries over the value of an ESOP. The defendants
argue that the complaint should be addressed by arbitration rather
than in the courts.

The DOL "is not here contending that ERISA claims are categorically
non-arbitrable," said the amicus brief filed June 10 in Cedeno vs.
Argent Trust Co. et al., which is now before the 2nd U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in New York. However, "a participant cannot be
compelled to arbitrate if they are deprived of the full range of
ERISA remedies that would be available had they brought the same
claim in federal court," the document said.

The Labor Department noted that Mr. Cedeno alleged fiduciary
breaches "that caused losses to the plan extending beyond his own
account," which, the DOL wrote, means "'appropriate' relief to
remedy those breaches could also extend accordingly."

But the "remedy provision" in the arbitration clause "categorically
precludes any participant from seeking recovery for the plan beyond
that which would inure to the participant's individual account,"
the Labor Department wrote, adding that this clause "cut off" an
arbitrator's ability to consider the "full range of relief"
depending on the context of the fiduciary breach claim.

The DOL declined to comment beyond its amicus brief.

"This has moved toward a bigger policy issue," said Chantel Sheaks,
vice president of retirement policy for the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Washington. "It's a broader issue" than an ESOP lawsuit.

The Chamber filed an amicus brief March 11 supporting the
defendants. It asked the appeals court to overturn a November 2021
New York U.S. District Court ruling that the arbitration clause was
unenforceable because it failed to protect participants' rights
under ERISA. "If the decision is allowed to stand, plaintiffs and
their lawyers will be emboldened to pursue wasteful and unnecessary
class action litigation," the Chamber's amicus brief said.

Simmering debate
Arbitration clauses in ERISA plans "are getting increased public
policy attention," said Lynn Dudley, senior vice president of
global retirement and compensation policy at the American Benefits
Council in Washington. The legal debate over arbitration clauses
"has been simmering for some time," Ms. Dudley said.

The American Benefits Council also filed a March 11 amicus brief
jointly with the ESOP Association, Washington, supporting the
defendants. "Individualized arbitration strikes an appropriate
balance between protecting benefits and encouraging growth of
employer-sponsored benefit plans," the amicus brief said. "This
court should reverse the District Court and uphold the arbitration
provision."

The wording of an arbitration clause was the primary issue in the
case in question. Ramon Cedeno, a participant in an ESOP run by
Strategic Financial Solutions LLC, New York, sued Argent Trust Co.,
Atlanta, and other fiduciary defendants in November 2020, alleging
they had violated ERISA by purchasing ESOP shares at more than
fair-market value and impairing participants' investments. Mr.
Cedeno sought class-action status.

The defendants responded that the Strategic Financial Solutions'
plan document contains an arbitration clause that governed Mr.
Cedeno's individual complaint.

"The defendants argue that a participant in a defined contribution
plan does not have the statutory right to seek plan-wide relief and
is limited to relief for that participant's individual account,"
wrote U.S. District Judge John G. Koeltl in New York on Nov. 2,
rejecting the defendants' request that the allegations be heard by
an arbitrator. "That argument is contrary to the text of ERISA as
well as to well-established precedent."

The arbitration clause precluded participants "from seeking relief
for the plan as a whole, a form of relief that is otherwise
provided for by ERISA," Mr. Koeltl wrote. "The plaintiff has the
right under (ERISA) to recover for the plan as a whole. That right
is not waivable."

The defendants subsequently appealed to the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals.

"In this case, the district court correctly held that arbitration
agreements cannot prospectively waive participants' right to pursue
ERISA's statutory remedies, including plan-wide relief," the DOL
amicus brief said. "The Secretary (of Labor) has a substantial
interest in ensuring that participants are not forced to arbitrate
under agreements that prohibit the plan-wide remedies that ERISA
provides."

Reduce litigation risk
Arbitration clauses in ERISA plans have been used by sponsors
hoping to reduce the risk of lawsuits, usually related to
allegations of excessive fees, poor investment choices and other
alleged abuses cited by plaintiffs' lawyers. Arbitration clauses
have occasionally been part of other ESOP lawsuits, too.

Rulings in different judicial jurisdictions — at the District
Court and appeals court levels — have been inconsistent in
determining whether an arbitration clause adequately protects
participants' ERISA rights.

No court has ruled that ERISA prohibits arbitration. Until or if
that happens, Ms. Sheaks said she doubts the Supreme Court would
agree to address a so-called circuit split in which there is clear
disagreement among appeals courts. "It's not quite a conflict," Ms.
Sheaks said, adding that the various court rulings reflect
"fact-driven" differences about whether arbitration clauses are
properly written.

Supporters of arbitration clauses say sponsors are using this
strategy to counteract a proliferation of ERISA lawsuits. "They
weren't doing it just because they wanted arbitration," Ms. Sheaks
said, adding that some sponsors that belong to the Chamber have
been sued more than once by different plaintiffs.

"I would tell the DOL to step very carefully because they could
undermine the very mission that EBSA is supposed to be performing,"
Ms. Dudley said, referring to the Employee Benefits Security
Administration. "ERISA was put in to stabilize the (retirement)
system."

Ms. Dudley and Ms. Sheaks added that inconsistent court rulings
aren't the retirement industry's only concern about arbitration
clauses and ERISA. They point to legislation introduced in the
Senate by Sen. Tina Smith, D-Minn., and in the House of
Representatives by Rep. Mark DeSaulnier, D-Calif., that would
declare arbitration clauses unenforceable in retirement and other
benefits plans covered by ERISA.

The legislation would "limit recovery amounts, increase the costs
of claims for benefits, and increase the time for courts to resolve
claims for benefits," the Chamber of Commerce wrote in a May 18
letter to members of the House Education and Labor Committee.

"The bill will increase costs for small businesses to operate a
retirement plan and will lead to more frivolous lawsuits against
plan sponsors," said a May 17 letter from the American Retirement
Association to the committee's top Democratic and top Republican
members. [GN]

ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS: Court Narrows Claims in Seroquel Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re Seroquel XR (Extended Release Quetiapine
Fumarate) Antitrust Litigation. This Document Relates to: All
Actions, Master Docket No. 20-1076-CFC (D. Del.), Judge Colm F.
Connolly of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
grants in part and denies in part the pending motions to dismiss.

I. Introduction

These three separately consolidated antitrust actions have been
coordinated for discovery and pretrial proceedings pursuant to a
stipulated order. The actions arise out of agreements to settle
patent litigation over extended-release quetiapine fumarate, an
anti-psychotic drug sold by Defendants AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals
LP and AstraZeneca LP (collectively, AstraZeneca) under the
brand-name Seroquel XR(R). Two of the consolidated actions are
class actions brought by pharmaceutical wholesalers (the Direct
Purchasers) and by union health and welfare funds and
municipalities (the End-Payors).

The third consolidated action consists of three cases filed by
pharmaceutical retailers (the Retailers). All the operative
complaints allege that AstraZeneca, Handa Pharmaceuticals LLC, Par
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Accord Pharmaceuticals, Inc. were
original or successor parties to unlawful noncash "reverse payment"
agreements that settled certain patent lawsuits and delayed and
suppressed competition among sellers of generic versions of
Seroquel XR(R). Plaintiffs claim that, as a result of these
agreements, they paid directly or indirectly supracompetitive
prices for branded and/or generic versions of Seroquel XR(R).

The operative complaints in the Direct Purchasers' and Retailers'
actions each allege five counts under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1, 2: Alleging violations of
Section 1 in Counts 1 and 3; alleging violations of Section 2 in
Counts 2,4, and 5; alleging violations of Section 1 in Counts 1 and
3; and alleging violations of Section 2 in Counts 2,4, and 5. The
operative complaint in the End-Payors' action alleges a series of
state law antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment
claims.

All the operative complaints name AstraZeneca, Handa, and Par as
defendants; the operative complaints in the Retailers' actions also
name Accord as a defendant in two counts (AstraZeneca, Handa, Par,
and Accord collectively, "Defendants").

Pending before the Court are (1) AstraZeneca, Handa, and Par's
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) the Consolidated Amended Complaint filed by the Direct
Purchaser Plaintiffs; (2) AstraZeneca, Handa, Par, and Accord's
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the three complaints
filed by the Retailer Plaintiffs; and (3) AstraZeneca, Handa, and
Par's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) the
Second Consolidated Amended Complaint filed by the End-Payor
Plaintiffs. Accord states in its briefing that it joins the first
motion. AstraZeneca UK Ltd. is named as a movant in all three
motions, but it is not a named defendant in the Direct Purchasers'
complaint.

II. Background

The antitrust claims in the case arise out of Abbreviated New Drug
Application or "ANDA" litigation and implicate patent law and the
so-called Hatch-Waxman Act amendments to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. Section 301 et seq.

AstraZeneca makes and sells brand and AG versions of Seroquel
XR(R). Before generic versions of Seroquel XR(R) were made
available on the market, AstraZeneca's annual sales of brand
Seroquel XR(R) in the United States exceeded $1 billion.
AstraZeneca listed U.S. Patent No. 5,948,437 (the #437 patent) in
the Orange Book for Seroquel XR(R). The #437 patent's expiration
date was May 28, 2017.

In 2008, Handa filed with the FDA the first ANDA for approval to
sell generic Seroquel XR(R) in four dosages: 50 mg, 150 mg, 200 mg,
and 300 mg. D.I. 135 ¶ 3. Handa also filed an ANDA for a 400 mg
dosage of Seroquel XR(R) in 2008, but Accord had filed earlier in
the year the first ANDA for that dosage. At least four other
manufacturers filed ANDAs for at least one dosage, and at least one
of those ANDAs covered all five dosages.

Both Handa and Accord filed paragraph IV certifications asserting
that the #437 patent was invalid, unenforceable, or would not be
infringed by their respective generic products. In response,
AstraZeneca filed patent infringement suits against Handa and
Accord in 2008 and 2009.

Over the course of AstraZeneca's litigation with Handa, based in
part on the court's claim construction rulings, "it became clear
that Handa's proposed generic versions of Seroquel XR(R) would not
infringe the #437 patent." Almost two years into the litigation, in
December 2010, the FDA granted tentative approval of Handa's ANDA,
having "determined that Handa's ANDA for generic Seroquel XR(R) was
approvable and satisfied all bioequivalence; chemistry,
manufacturing, and controls ('CMC'); and labeling requirements."
The FDA was unable to give final approval of Handa's ANDA because
of the 30-month stay that was triggered when AstraZeneca sued Handa
for infringement.

In September 2011, "rather than face the risk that Handa's proposed
generic versions of Seroquel XR(R) would be found not to infringe
the #437 patent, AstraZeneca decided to induce Handa with a large
'reverse payment' (i.e., a payment from the patent holder,
AstraZeneca, to the alleged infringer, Handa), to quit the patent
fight and not compete with AstraZeneca for up to five years." The
reverse payment came in the form of (1) a promise by AstraZeneca
not to sell its 50 mg, 150 mg, 200 mg, and 300 mg AG versions of
Seroquel XR(R) during Handa's 180-day first-filer exclusivity
period (i.e., from Nov. 1, 2016 through April 30, 2017) and (2) the
right to buy generic product from AstraZeneca to sell as Handa's
own product during its first-filer exclusivity period. The Direct
Purchasers and the End-Payors allege that AstraZeneca's "no-AG"
promise to Handa was worth more than $233 million -- i.e., the
difference, according to the Plaintiffs, between what Handa would
reasonably have expected to earn as the only generic seller on the
market for the 180 days after Nov. 1, 2016 and what it would
reasonably have expected to earn if it faced competition from an AG
during that period. The Retailers allege the no-AG promise was
worth more than $163 million. In exchange for the "reverse payment"
and the right to buy AG from AstraZeneca to sell as its own
generic, Handa agreed to "quit" its patent fight and delay the
launch of its generic Seroquel XR(R) products until Nov. 1, 2016.

The purpose and effect of the Handa/AstraZeneca settlement
agreement was to (1) delay until Nov. 1, 2016 the availability of
generic Seroquel XR(R) in the four Handa first-filer dosages, (2)
allocate to AstraZeneca through Nov. 1, 2016 100% of the U.S. sales
of Seroquel XR(R) in those dosages, (3) delay the entry of
AstraZeneca's AG for those dosages until May 1, 2017 and thereby
allocate to Handa 100% of U.S. sales of generic Seroquel XR(R)
between Nov. 1, 2016 and May 1, 2017, and (4) enable AstraZeneca
and Handa to sell at supracompetitive prices, respectively, brand
and generic Seroquel XR(R) in the four Handa first-filer dosages.

In 2012, Par acquired Handa's ANDA and an assignment of the
Handa/AstraZeneca settlement agreement. Under the terms of that
acquisition, Par and Handa share any profits obtained from sales of
generic Seroquel XR(R) products made pursuant to the settlement
agreement.

AstraZeneca reached a similar agreement with Accord. Like Handa,
Accord received tentative approval of its ANDA from the FDA in
December 2010. But unlike Handa, Accord conceded in its litigation
with AstraZeneca that its product infringed the #437 patent. In
October 2011, Accord executed a settlement agreement with
AstraZeneca pursuant to which Accord agreed to "quit" its "patent
fight" with AstraZeneca and delay its launch of generic 400 mg
Seroquel XR(R) tablets until Nov. 1, 2016. For its part,
AstraZeneca agreed not to sell AG 400 mg tablets until after
Accord's 180-day first-filer exclusivity period ended on April 30,
2017. The Direct Purchasers and the End-Payors allege that the
"no-AG" promise was worth more than $107 million to Accord. The
Retailers allege it was worth more than $75 million.

The Plaintiffs allege that the purpose and effect of the
Accord/AstraZeneca settlement agreement was to (1) delay until Nov.
1, 2016 the availability of generic 400 mg Seroquel XR(R), (2)
allocate to AstraZeneca through Nov. 1, 2016 100% of the U.S. sales
of 400 mg Seroquel XR(R), (3) delay the entry of AstraZeneca's 400
mg AG until May 1, 2017 and thereby allocate to Accord 100% of U.S.
sales of 400 mg generic Seroquel XR(R) between Nov. 1, 2016 and May
1, 2017, and (4) enable AstraZeneca and Accord to sell at
supracompetitive prices, respectively, brand and generic 400 mg
Seroquel XR(R).

On Nov. 1, 2016, Par began selling 50 mg, 150 mg, 200 mg, and 300
mg generic Seroquel XR(R) and Accord began selling 400 mg generic
Seroquel XR(R). AstraZeneca launched AG versions of Seroquel XR(R)
in 50 mg, 150 mg, 200 mg, 300 mg, and 400 mg dosages on May 1,
2017. Also in May 2017, other competitors launched their own
generic versions of Seroquel XR(R) in all dosage strengths.

Had Handa/Par and Accord not entered into their settlement
agreements with AstraZeneca, they would have obtained final FDA
approval for and sold their respective dosages of generic Seroquel
XR(R) before Nov. 1, 2016. Thus, but for the settlement agreements,
AstraZeneca's brand Seroquel XR(R) would have faced competition
from generics before Nov. 1, 2016 and the price of brand Seroquel
XR(R) would have been lower.

Also, but for those agreements, AstraZeneca would have sold AG
versions of Seroquel XR(R) contemporaneously with the market entry
by Handa/Par and Accord instead of after Handa/Par's and Accord's
180-day exclusivity periods. Thus, but for the settlement
agreements, there would have been competition in the market between
generic versions of Seroquel XR(R) and the price of generic
Seroquel XR(R) would have been lower.

Beginning on Aug. 2, 2015, the Direct Purchasers and the Retailers
purchased branded Seroquel XR(R) from AstraZeneca and generic
Seroquel XR(R) from Par or Accord at supracompetitive prices.
Beginning on Sept. 5, 2013, the End-Payors, who operate employee
and retiree health benefits plans, "indirectly purchased, paid
and/or provided reimbursement or reimbursed for some or all of the
purchase price of brand or generic Seroquel XR(R)" at
supracompetitive prices. The End-Payors bring their claims on
behalf of a class of "persons and entities" located in 35 states
and the District of Columbia who, similarly, indirectly purchased
or reimbursed the purchase of brand or generic Seroquel XR(R).

III. Discussion

The Defendants argue that dismissal of the Direct Purchasers'
operative complaint is required for two reasons: First, the
antitrust claims alleged in the complaint are barred by the statute
of limitations set forth in 15 U.S.C. Section 15b; and second, the
Plaintiffs have failed to plead an antitrust injury. The Defendants
contend that the Retailers' operative complaints should be
dismissed "for the same reasons set forth in Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Direct Purchasers' claims."

The Defendants argue that the End-Payors' claims "suffer from
myriad and substantive deficiencies" that include alleged failures
to satisfy state-specific pleading requirements. Although the
End-Payors have not alleged federal antitrust claims, they argue
that the End-Payors' state law claims "amount to a Frankensteinian
equivalent' of federal antitrust law" and that the state law claims
therefore "should be dismissed for the same reasons that the Direct
Purchasers' claims should be dismissed." They argue, and the
End-Payors do not dispute, that "if the Court concludes that the
Direct Purchasers' federal antitrust claims should be dismissed,
the End-Payors' claims should also be dismissed, and there is no
need to reach the remaining state law-specific issues."

Judge Connolly begins his analysis by considering the Defendants'
arguments with respect to the adequacy of the Direct Purchasers'
federal antitrust claims.

A. The Direct Purchasers' Federal Antitrust Claims

1. Whether the Direct Purchasers' Claims are Barred by Section 15b

The parties agree that under Section 15b the statute of limitations
for federal antitrust claims is four years. They also agree that
the claims alleged in the Direct Purchasers' operative complaint
were first brought when Smith Drug Co. filed the first complaint in
the Direct Purchasers' action -- that is, Aug. 2, 2019. And
finally, they agree that the Direct Purchasers' antitrust claims
that accrued more than four years before that date are barred by
the statute of limitations. The parties dispute, however, when the
Direct Purchasers' claims accrued.

The Defendants argue that the claims accrued when the settlement
agreements were executed and publicly announced in October 2011.
The Plaintiffs argue, and Judge Connolly agrees, that under Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research., Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971), the
claims accrued when the Defendants sold the Direct Purchasers
Seroquel XR(R) at supracompetitive prices. In Zenith, the Court
held: The basic rule is that damages are recoverable under the
federal antitrust acts only if suit therefor is 'commenced within
four years after the cause of action accrued,' plus any additional
number of years during which the statute of limitations was
tolled.

Applying this basic rule to the continuing antitrust conspiracies
alleged in the operative complaint, each time the Defendants sold
Seroquel XR(R) at a supracompetitive price to a Direct Purchaser,
they committed an overt act that injured that Direct Purchaser and
triggered a new limitations period. Accordingly, since Aug. 2, 2015
is the beginning of both the Class Period and the limitations
period, each sale of supracompetitive-priced Seroquel XR(R) by the
Defendants during the Class Period gives rise to a timely federal
antitrust claim. In sum, Judge Connolly finds that the Direct
Purchasers' federal antitrust claims are not barred by the statute
of limitations.

2. Whether the Direct Purchasers Have Pleaded Antitrust Standing

"In order to maintain an antitrust suit, a plaintiff must establish
antitrust standing, which is distinct from Article III standing."
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet this
standard because they have not alleged facts that plausibly imply
that the harm they say the Direct Purchasers suffered -- being
forced to pay supracompetitive prices for Seroquel XR(R) because of
Handa/Par's and Accord's delayed entry into the generic market --
flowed from (i.e., was caused by) the settlement agreements they
say were unlawful. They also argue that the Accord/AstraZeneca
agreement "did not injure the Plaintiffs because Accord's generic
infringed a valid patent, and so its launch was blocked by the
patent laws."

Although evidence produced during discovery may ultimately show
that Handa/Par would not have obtained final FDA approval before
Nov. 1, 2016, for the purposes of the pending motions, Judge
Connolly is required to accept the operative complaints'
allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiffs. Adopting the Defendants' arguments would require
him to draw from the alleged facts only negative inferences against
the Plaintiffs. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, the Handa/AstraZeneca agreement forced the Direct
Purchasers to pay supracompetitive prices and therefore caused them
to suffer antitrust injury.

Judge Connolly also holds that the Direct Purchasers failed to
adequately plead antitrust injury caused by the Accord/AstraZeneca
settlement agreement. He will therefore dismiss the federal
antitrust claims that are based on that agreement; but will deny
the motion to dismiss the federal antitrust claims that are based
on the Handa/AstraZeneca settlement agreement. In addition, because
the End-Payors do not dispute Defendants' contention that, if the
Direct Purchasers' federal antitrust claims should be dismissed,
the End-Payors' state law claims should also be dismissed, Judge
COnnolly will also dismiss the End-Payors' claims to the extent
that they are based on the Accord/AstraZeneca settlement
agreement.

B. The End-Payors' State Law Claims

Judge Connolly turns then to the End-Payors' state law claims that
are based on the Handa/AstraZeneca settlement agreement. The
End-Payors did not purchase Seroquel XR(R) from AstraZeneca or
Handa/Par. Rather, they reimbursed others who made such purchases
and thus were so-called indirect purchasers. Consistent with its
antitrust standing requirement, the Supreme Court held in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730, 735 (1977), that indirect
purchasers cannot bring federal antitrust claims. Indirect
purchasers, however, can assert antitrust claims under various
state laws; and the End-Payors have alleged here various state law
antitrust claims under the laws of 35 states and the District of
Columbia. The End-Payors have also alleged statute-based consumer
protection claims and common law unjust enrichment claims. The
Defendants have moved to dismiss some of the End-Payors' state law
claims for lack of standing, inadequate pleadings, and substantive
deficiencies.

1. Antitrust Claims

The Defendants argue that the End-Payors' antitrust claims under
the laws of 15 states should be dismissed for lack of Article III
standing, that their claims under the laws of five states should be
dismissed for lack of antitrust injury, and that the claims brought
under the laws of four states should be dismissed for failure to
allege intra-state effects.

First, Judge Connolly holds that (i) treatment of Rule 23 issues
first will not result in the End-Payors' evading their obligation
to demonstrate standing; (ii) the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practice Act (FDUTPA) permits indirect purchasers to bring
claims; (iii) the Defendants' failure to address whether the
express language of section 7(2) prohibits indirect purchaser class
actions only in Illinois state courts as implicitly conceding the
point for the purposes of the pending motion; (iv) the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore and any putative Maryland political
subdivision are not precluded from asserting claims under the
Maryland Antitrust Act; (v) the End-Payors lack antitrust standing
to assert claims under Massachusetts law; (vi) to the extent the
End-Payors seek to assert claims on behalf of putative class
members, the End-Payors allege only that class members "purchased,
paid and/or provided reimbursement for" brand or generic Seroquel
XR(R) "in Utah," not that putative class members are citizens or
residents of Utah; and (vii) the allegations are sufficient to
plausibly imply intra-state commerce effects in New York,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.

2. Consumer Protection Claims

The End-Payors bring claims under the consumer protection statutes
of 15 states. They move to dismiss on the grounds that the claims
are inadequately pleaded and that the alleged conduct is not
actionable under the requirements of the laws of Illinois, New
York, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, and North Carolina.

Judge Connolly finds that (i) the operative complaint alleges
anticompetitive conduct that plausibly deprived consumers of the
benefits of competition; (ii) the End-Payors can bring their claims
under the Illinois Antitrust Act; (iii) the End-Payors have not
alleged facts that suggest consumer deception; (iv) the End-Payors
have not alleged facts suggesting any intent to deceive; (v) the
End-Payors' failure to identify any allegation in the operative
complaints that a putative member of the End-Payors' class made
purchases for "personal, family, or household purposes" dooms their
Missouri claims; and (vi) the operative complaint alleges that the
Defendants' conduct had significant in-state effects in each of the
states identified in the complaint which is sufficient for the
North Carolina claim to proceed at this stage of the case.

3. Unjust Enrichment Claims

The Defendants argue that (1) all the End-Payors' unjust enrichment
claims are inadequately pleaded and therefore should be dismissed;
(2) the unjust enrichment claims brought under the laws of states
that follow Illinois Brick should be dismissed "as such claims
contravene those states' express policy decisions"; (3) the unjust
enrichment claims brought under the laws of the states that allow
for indirect purchaser antitrust claims should be dismissed as
"duplicative"; (4) the End-Payors' unjust enrichment claims
asserted under Georgia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia
laws should be dismissed for state-specific reason.

Judge Connolly finds that (i) the Defendants received excess
profits at the End-Payors' expense on account of Defendants'
alleged anticompetitive conduct and these facts are sufficient to
plausibly state prima facie unjust enrichment claims; (ii) the crux
of a plaintiff's claim will be the same, and, after all, unjust
enrichment is an equitable remedy, and it would be inequitable to
permit relief where the state has clearly made a policy
determination that no such relief should lie; (iii) the Defendants
have not explained why the relevant state laws render the unjust
enrichment claims duplicative; (iv) Georgia, Kentucky, and
Pennsylvania do not permit unjust enrichment claims by indirect
purchasers; and (v) because the Defendants have not explained why
the alleged delay prejudiced them, the West Virginia unjust
enrichment claims based on laches will not be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Connolly grants in part and denies
in part the pending motions to dismiss.

Judge Connolly dismisses:

     a. the Plaintiffs' claims in all the operative complaints to
the extent they are based on the Accord/AstraZeneca agreement;

     b. Counts I, II, and III of the End-Payors' Second
Consolidated Amended Complaint to the extent they include claims
brought under Utah or Maryland law, except for the claims brought
by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and any other unnamed
political subdivisions of Maryland that may be in the proposed
class;

     c. Counts III and IV of the End-Payors' Second Consolidated
Amended Complaint to the extent they include claims brought under
Massachusetts law;

     d. Count IV of the End-Payors' Second Consolidated Amended
Complaint to the extent it includes claims brought under New York,
Minnesota, or Missouri law; and

     e. Count V of the End-Payors' Second Consolidated Amended
Complaint to the extent it includes claims brought under Florida,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, or
Pennsylvania law.

Judge Connolly denies the motions to dismiss in all other
respects.

The Court will enter an Order consistent with the Memorandum
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2m3mcxe4 from Leagle.com.

Carmella P. Keener -- ckeener@coochtaylor.com -- COOCH AND TAYLOR,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Bruce E. Gerstein, Joseph Opper,
Kimberly M. Hennings, Daniel Litvin, GARWIN GERSTEIN & FISHER LLP,
New York, New York; Peter R. Kohn, Joseph T. Lukens, FARUQI &
FARUQI, LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; David F. Sorensen, Caitlin
G. Coslett, BERGER MONTAGUE PC, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Stuart
E. Des Roches, Amanda Hass, Chris Letter, Dan Chiorean, Thomas J.
Maas, ODOM & DES ROCHES, LLC, New Orleans, Louisiana; Susan C.
Segura, Erin R. Leger, David C. Raphael, Jr., SMITH SEGURA RAPHAEL
& LEGER, LLP, Alexandria, Louisiana; Russell A. Chorush, REIM PAYNE
& CHORUSH, LLP, Houston, Texas Interim Lead Counsel for the Direct
Purchaser Class and Counsel for Plaintiff J M Smith Corporation
d/b/a Smith Drug Company.

Michael J. Barry -- mbarry@gelaw.com -- GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Robert G. Eisler -- reisler@gelaw.com --
Deborah A. Elman -- delman@gelaw.com -- Chad B. Holtzman --
choltzman@gelaw.com -- GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., New York, New York
Interim Co-Lead Counsel for the Proposed End-Payor Class and
Counsel for Plaintiff Law Enforcement Health Benefits, Inc.

Sharon K. Robertson -- srobertson@cohenmilstein.com -- Donna M.
Evans -- devans@cohenmulstein.com -- Matthew W. Ruan, COHEN
MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC, New York, New York Interim Co-Lead
Counsel for the Proposed End-Payor Class and Counsel for Plaintiff
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland.

Michael J. Barry, GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., Wilmington, Delaware;
Jayne A. Goldstein -- jgoldstein@sfmslaw.com -- SHEPHERD,
FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP, Media, Pennsylvania Interim Co-Lead
Counsel for the Proposed End-Payor Class and Counsel for Plaintiffs
Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20, and Insurance Trust
Fund.

J. Clayton Athey -- jcathey@prickett.com -- Jason Wayne Rigby --
jwrigby@prickett.com -- PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Barry L. Refsin, Alexander J. Egervary,
Caitlin V. McHugh, HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN & SCHILLER,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Monica L. Kiley, Eric L. Bloom, HANGLEY
ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN & SCHILLER, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Counsel
for Plaintiffs CVS Pharmacy Inc., Rite Aid Corp., and Rite Aid
Headquarters Corp.

J. Clayton Athey, Jason Wayne Rigby, PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Scott E. Perwin, Lauren C. Ravkind,
Anna T. Neil, KENNY NACHWALTER, P.A., Miami, Florida Counsel for
Plaintiff Walgreen Co., The Kroger Co., Albertsons Companies Inc.,
Hy-Vee, Inc., and H-E-B, L.P.

Heidi M. Silton -- hmsilton@locklaw.com -- Jessica N. Servais --
jnservais@locklaw.com -- LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota Additional Counsel for Pipe Trades Services
MN Welfare Fund and the Proposed End-Payor Class.

Peter Safirstein -- psafirstein@safirsteinlaw.com -- SAFIRSTEIN
METCALF LLP, New York, New York Additional Counsel for Plaintiff
Sergeants Benevolent Association Health & Welfare Fund and the
Proposed End-Payor Class.

Archana Tamoshunas -- atamoshunas@tcllaw.com -- TAUS, CEBULASH &
LANDAU, LLP, New York, New York Additional Counsel for Plaintiff
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland and the End-Payor
Proposed Class.

Lee Albert -- lalbert@glancylaw.com -- Brian D. Brooks --
bbrooks@glancylaw.com -- GLANCY, PRONGAY, & MYRRAY, New York New
York Counsel for The Uniformed Firefighters' Association of Greater
New York Security Benefit Fund and the Retired Firefighters'
Security Benefit Fund of the Uniformed Firefighters Association.

Robert J. Kriner, Jr. -- RobertKriner@chimicles.com -- Tiffany
Joanne Cramer -- tiffanycramer@chimicles.com -- CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ
KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Dianne M. Nast,
Joseph N. Roda, Michael D. Ford, NASTLAW, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Michael L. Roberts -- mikeroberts@robertslawfirm.us
-- Stephanie E. Smith, ROBERTS LAW FIRM US, PC, Little Rock,
Arkansas Counsel for Plaintiff KPH Healthcare Services Inc.

Daniel M. Silver -- dsilver@mccarter.com -- Alexandrea M. Joyce --
ajoyce@mccarter.com -- MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware; John E. Schmidtlein, Benjamin M. Greenblum, Colette T.
Connor, Thomas S. Fletcher, Akhil K. Gola, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY,
Washington, District of Columbia Counsel for Defendant AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals L.P., AstraZeneca L.P. and AstraZeneca UK Ltd.

Arthur G. Connolly, III -- aconnolly@connollygallagher.com --, Alan
Richard Silverstein, CONNOLLY GALLAGHER LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
Christopher J. Marino, James E. Gallagher, DAVIS MALM & D'AGOST1NE,
P.C., Boston, Massachusetts Counsel for Defendant Handa
Pharmaceuticals LLC.

Jack B. Blumenfeld -- jblumenfeld@morrisnichols.com -- Michael J.
Flynn, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington Delaware;
Stephen J. McIntyre, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Los Angeles,
California; Brett J. Williamson, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Newport
Beach, California; Ben Bradshaw, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington,
District of Columbia Counsel for Defendant Par Pharmaceuticals
Inc.

John W. Shaw -- jshaw@shawkeller.com -- Karen E. Keller, Nathan
Roger Hoeschen, SHAW KELLER LLP, Wilmington Delaware; Thomas J.
Lang, Christina E. Fahmy, Peter M. Boyle, KILPATRICK TOWNSEND &
STOCKTON LLP, Washington, District of Columbia Counsel for
Defendant Accord Healthcare Inc.


AVIS BUDGET: Settlement in Venerus Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HEATHER VENERUS, Plaintiff v. AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL,
LLC and BUDGET RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC., Defendants, Case No.
6:13-cv-921-CEM-DAB (M.D. Fla.), Judge Carlos A. Mendoza of the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando
Division, grants in part and defers in part the Plaintiff's
Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action
Settlement.

The cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval. The United States Magistrate Judge issued
a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Motion be
granted in part.

After review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and noting that the parties
filed a Joint Notice of No Objection, Judge Mendoza accepts the
Magistrate Judge's recommended disposition.

Accordingly, he adopts in part the Report and Recommendation and
makes a part of the Order. The Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement is grants
in part and deferred in part.

Insofar as the Motion seeks approval of a service award to
Plaintiff Venerus, ruling is deferred pending a decision on the
petition for rehearing en banc in Johnson v. NPAS Solutions, LLC,
975 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2020). The Plaintiff will notify the
Court within 14 days of an issuance of that ruling and the funds
will remain in escrow until further order of the Court.

Judge Mendoza preliminarily approves the Settlement Agreement.
Class members may opt out or object to the Settlement pursuant to
the procedures and deadlines set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.

The Notice set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the exhibits
thereto is approved, and the parties will adhere to the deadlines
set forth therein.

The Settlement Class set forth in the Settlement Agreement is
provisionally certified. Edmund Normand, Esq. and Jacob Phillips,
Esq., of Normand Law PLLC, and Christopher J. Lynch, Esq. of
Christopher J. Lynch, P.A., are re-confirmed as the Settlement
Class counsel.

A final settlement approval hearing is set for Sept. 15, 2022, at
2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 5B.

The Class Counsel will file a motion for attorney's fees and costs
no later than 14 days before the objection deadline for class
members.

All deadlines other than those related to the Settlement remain
stayed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mwrcmv7p from Leagle.com.


BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD: Summary Judgment in Rowe Suit Partly Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN J. ROWE, ET AL. v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,
ET AL., Case No. 1221, September Term, 2020 (Md. App.), the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland affirms in part and reverses in part
the circuit court's order granting the County's motion for summary
judgment on state and federal constitutional claims in the
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint.

I. Introduction

The State of Maryland and its political subdivisions maintain
retirement systems for their employees. Some of the systems are
"noncontributory," meaning that the benefit is funded entirely by
the employer. Other systems are "contributory," meaning that the
benefit is funded in part by the employer and in part by
contributions that are deducted from the earnings of the employees
(or "members"). In a contributory system, the members'
contributions accumulate in an annuity savings fund, where they
earn interest at a rate set by law.

When members leave a job with one State agency or political
subdivision and take another job with another State agency or
political subdivision, they may sometimes transfer their "service
credit" (i.e., their credit for their years of service) from a
noncontributory system to a contributory system. When these members
retire and become entitled to benefits, they receive the benefits
from the contributory system. The contributory system is, however,
entitled to reduce the amount of the benefits to account for the
time during which the members were members of the noncontributory
system and thus were not contributing to the funding of their
benefits. The shortfall in contributions is called the
"contribution deficiency."

Section 37-203(f)(2) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article
("SPP") governs the computation of the contribution deficiency.
Under SPP Section 37-203(f)(2) as it stood before July 1, 2007, the
contributory system would calculate the reduction in benefits by:
(1) quantifying the contribution deficiency by identifying the
"accumulated contributions" that would have been deducted from the
members' pay had they been members of the contributory system from
the outset of their employment, "including interest on those
contributions"; and then (2) ascertaining the "actuarial
equivalent" of the accumulated contributions plus interest -- i.e.,
"translating the contribution deficiency into a reduction of the
amount of monthly retirement benefits." The statute did not
expressly identify the rate of interest that the contributory
system should employ in calculating the contribution deficiency.

In the 2007 legislative session, the General Assembly made what it
called "technical and clarifying" amendments to SPP Section
37-203(f)(2). The amended statute took effect on July 1, 2007. The
2007 amendments made it clear that, in computing the contribution
deficiency, the contributory system should employ the "regular"
rate of interest. The "regular" rate is the rate at which a
member's contributions accrue interest in the annuity savings fund
or its equivalent. In most systems, the regular rate is five
percent per annum, compounded annually.

The class action principally concerns the interest rate that a
contributory system must employ in computing the contribution
deficiency for members of a contributory system who earned some of
their service credit in a noncontributory system before the
clarifying amendments to SPP Section 37-203(f)(2) took effect on
July 1, 2007. In substance, the class members contend that the 2007
amendments did not change the law. Thus, they contend that the
retirement system was required to use the regular rate both before
and after July 1, 2007.

The employer, Baltimore County, responds that before July 1, 2007,
it had the discretion to select the applicable rate. The County
selected and employed the "valuation interest rate," which is the
assumed rate of return on its pension investments. Because the
valuation rate is considerably higher than the regular rate, the
use of the valuation rate increases the amount of a member's
contribution deficiency and thus reduces the amount of the benefits
that the member will receive.

Although the case was filed in Baltimore County, it proceeded to
judgment in Harford County, because all of the judges in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County recused themselves. On the
principal issue in this case, the court concluded that Baltimore
County was entitled to use the valuation rate for all members who
retired before July 1, 2007. The court, however, also concluded
that the County was required to use the regular rate for all
members who retired on July 1, 2007. The court rejected the
assertion that the County had violated the members' State and
federal constitutional rights by employing the valuation rate.

II. Background

Appellant Brian J. Rowe worked for the State of Maryland from 1975
until 1995. During that time, he was a member of the State's
noncontributory retirement system. In 1995 Mr. Rowe became the
Baltimore County Auditor. At that time, he transferred his vested
service credit from the State's noncontributory retirement system
to the Baltimore County Employees' Retirement System ("BCERS"), a
contributory system.

Before Mr. Rowe took the job with Baltimore County, BCERS's
auditors had advised the system to use the higher valuation rate
rather than the regular rate in calculating the contribution
deficiency for members who had transferred from a noncontributory
system to BCERS. BCERS, however, did not implement this so-called
"transfer policy" until 1998, when Mr. Rowe, as the Baltimore
County Auditor, suggested that it do so.

In 2000, while he was employed as the Baltimore County Auditor, Mr.
Rowe wrote to the Board of Trustees of BCERS, assertinh that BCERS
was incorrectly calculating his contribution deficiency, because it
was not employing the regular rate. The Board of Trustees declined
to change the calculation.

In 2003 Mr. Rowe sought the advice of the State Pension and
Retirement System as to whether BCERS should calculate his
contribution deficiency by using the valuation rate or the regular
rate. In a letter dated Aug. 26, 2003, the Special Assistant to the
Retirement Administrator agreed with Mr. Rowe that the valuation
rate was not the correct rate to use. Because BCERS paid regular
interest on member contributions at the rate of five percent
compounded annually, the Special Assistant asserted that BCERS
should calculate Mr. Rowe's contribution deficiency using that
rate, and not the higher valuation rate.

Mr. Rowe retired from his employment with Baltimore County on March
31, 2007. Upon his retirement, BCERS used the valuation rate,
compounded monthly, to calculate his contribution deficiency. By
using the valuation rate rather than the lower, 5% regular rate to
compute the contribution deficiency, BCERS increased the amount of
the contribution deficiency and reduced the amount of pension
benefits that Mr. Rowe would receive. BCERS increased the amount of
the deficiency even further and reduced the amount of Mr. Rowe's
benefits even further still, by compounding the interest on a
monthly basis rather than an annual basis.

Mr. Rowe appealed BCERS' computation to the Baltimore County Board
of Appeals. In an opinion and order dated June 3, 2008, the Board
of Appeals concluded that BCERS had miscalculated the amount of Mr.
Rowe's contribution deficiency. The Board directed BCERS to
recalculate Mr. Rowe's contribution deficiency by using the regular
interest rate of five percent, compounded annually.

BCERS moved for reconsideration. About three months later, the
Board denied the motion. Only then did BCERS petition for judicial
review. BCERS' petition was transferred from Baltimore County to
the Circuit Court for Harford County. The court found no abuse of
discretion. BCERS appealed to the Court of Appeals. In an
unreported opinion, it affirmed the circuit court's decision and
denied BCERS' petition for a writ of certiorari.

In the meantime, while the County's petition for judicial review
was pending, the Baltimore County Council passed Bill 30-10, part
of which is now codified in Section 5-1-220.1 of the Baltimore
County Code. In effect, Bill 30-10 attempted to ratify BCERS's
previous practice even after the Board of Appeals had ruled that
that practice was legally incorrect and that BCERS was required to
use the regular rate for periods of service before and after July
1, 2007.

The case began on Feb. 19, 2010. On that date, Mr. Rowe and another
retired County employee, David Willis, filed a complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief and for a writ of mandamus in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Among other things, they
requested that the court certify a class of all persons who are
retirees or active members of BCERS, and who transferred service
credit from a noncontributory system to BCERS before July 1, 2007.
As defendants, they named Baltimore County, BCERS, the Board of
Trustees of BCERS, and the director of the County's Office of
Budget and Finance. We will refer to the defendants, collectively,
as the "County." On June 15, 2010, the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Harford
County.

The operative complaint is the second amended complaint, which was
filed on Aug. 21, 2014. That complaint has three named Plaintiffs:
Mr. Rowe; Mr. Willis; and a third retiree, Joanne Wachter. Like the
original complaint, the second amended complaint requests the
certification of a class, but it expands the proposed class to
include persons who transferred service credit to BCERS before July
1, 2012 (rather than July 1, 2007). Like the original complaint,
the second amended complaint names Baltimore County, BCERS, the
Board of Trustees of BCERS, and the director of the County's Office
of Budget and Finance as defendants. At its core, the second
amended complaint challenges the use of the valuation rate in the
calculation of the contribution deficiency.

The second amended complaint contains eight counts: four on behalf
of the individual plaintiffs and four on behalf of the prospective
class. Count I requested the issuance of an injunction and a writ
of mandamus to require the County and its agents to use the regular
rate in the calculation of contribution deficiencies for the three
named plaintiffs; Count II requested the same relief on behalf of
the class. Count III alleged that the named plaintiffs had been
deprived of their property rights in violation of the Maryland
Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights; Count IV made
the same allegations on behalf of the class. Count V alleged that
the named plaintiffs had been deprived of substantive due process
in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; Count VI made the same
allegation on behalf of the class. Count VII requested a
declaration that the named plaintiffs had been deprived of their
property rights in violation of the Maryland Constitution; Count
VIII (incorrectly designated as Count VI) made the same allegation
on behalf of the class.

In addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, the issuance of a
writ of mandamus, and the certification of a class, the second
amended complaint contained an omnibus request for relief, which
included an award of damages equal to the amount "wrongfully
withheld" from the class, as well as prejudgment interest on that
award. The second amended complaint also requested the
establishment of a common fund, from which class counsel presumably
would be paid.

The case was stayed, at the County's request from June 14, 2012,
until May 10, 2017. Once the court lifted the stay, the County
consented to the certification of a class. The circuit court
formally certified a class on Feb. 5, 2020.

Subject to a number of exclusions that are not pertinent to this
case, the class consisted of: Those persons who transferred service
credit to BCERS from a noncontributory retirement plan or system
whose deficiency under [SPP Section 37-302(f)(2)] (or its
predecessor statutes) was calculated or under County law will be
calculated based on the valuation rate established by BCERS and not
the regular rate of interest applied by BCERS to member
contributions. The class consists of 171 members.

The court divided the class into three subclasses. Subclass 1
consisted of the members who retired before July 1, 2007. Subclass
2 consisted of the members who retired on or after July 1, 2007,
but before July 1, 2010, the effective date of Bill 30-10. Subclass
3 consisted of the members who retired on or after July 1, 2010.
The court designated Mr. Rowe as the representative for Subclass 1;
it designated Mr. Willis and Ms. Wachter as the representatives of
Subclass 2; and it designated one Patrick Roddy as the
representative of Subclass 3.

The County moved for summary judgment, asserting that, as a matter
of law, it was entitled to prevail on all claims in the second
amended complaint. The class members opposed the County's motion
and advanced a more limited cross-motion for summary judgment. In a
written opinion, the circuit court issued a split decision.

In an accompanying order, the court granted the County's motion for
summary judgment on the State and federal constitutional claims in
the second amended complaint. The court declared that the County
was permitted to use the valuation rate in computing the
contribution deficiency for members who had transferred from a
noncontributory system and retired before July 1, 2007. By
contrast, the court declared that the County was required to use
the regular rate in computing the contribution deficiency for
members who had transferred from a noncontributory system and
retired on or after July 1, 2007. To the extent that Section
5-1-220.1 mandates the use of the valuation rate in determining the
contribution deficiency for members who transferred from a
noncontributory system and retired on or after July 1, 2007, the
court declared that Section 5-1-220.1 conflicted with SPP Section
37-203(f)(2) and enjoined the County from enforcing it. The court
granted the County's motion for summary judgment as to the claims
of the members of Subclass 1, who retired before July 1, 2007. As
to the class members who retired on or after July 1, 2007, however,
the court ordered the County to recalculate the contribution
deficiency, using the regular rate, and to "adjust such members'
retirement accordingly including any additional amounts owed."

The class members noted a timely appeal. The County did not note a
cross-appeal.

III. Discussion

The class members pose eight questions, which the Court of Appeals
has distilled to six, rephrased, and reorganized:

     1. Did the circuit court err in its interpretation of SPP
Section 37-203(f)(2) and in concluding that the members of Subclass
1 were not entitled to additional benefits?

     2. Did the circuit court err in failing to address whether
interest should be compounded on an annual basis, as opposed to a
monthly basis, when calculating a contribution deficiency under SPP
Section 37-203(f)(2)?

     3. Did the circuit court err in not expressly declaring that
County Bill 30-10 (now Section 5-1-220.1 of the Baltimore County
Code) is unconstitutional?

     4. Did the circuit court err in failing to quantify the
benefits owed to the retired members of the class in an enforceable
judgment and in not allowing discovery to undertake the calculation
thereof?

     5. Did the circuit court err in failing to award prejudgment
interest to the class?

     6. Did the circuit court err in finding no deprivation of the
class members' property rights and substantive due process rights?

A. The Regular Rate or the Valuation Rate?

The central issue in the case is the correct interpretation of SPP
Section 37-203(f)(2) before the 2007 amendments -- specifically,
the correct interpretation of the phrase "interest on those
accumulated contributions." In this statute, did the word
"interest," unmodified by any adjective, mean that a retirement
system had the discretion to select the interest rate to apply when
calculating a contribution deficiency? Or did the structure,
legislative history, and administrative practice under the statute
demonstrate that the word "interest" meant "regular interest," as
the Attorney General opined in 2006? And did the 2007 amendments
change the law, or did they merely clarify what the law had always
been?

To answer these questions, the Court of Appeals turns to the
Attorney General's 2006 opinion, which is a masterpiece of
statutory interpretation. It holds that the circuit court erred in
concluding that BCERS was entitled to use the valuation rate in
computing the contribution deficiency of members who transferred
from a noncontributory system and retired before July 1, 2007. SPP
Section 37-203(f)(2) has always required BCERS to use the regular
rate in computing the contribution deficiency of all members who
transferred from a noncontributory system, regardless of when they
retired.

To reiterate, both before and after the 2007 amendments, the Court
of Appeals opines that SPP Section 37-203(f)(2) required the use of
"regular interest" in the calculation of a contribution deficiency.
Although it recognizes that the managers of a pension system must
make difficult decisions based on their evaluation of the law,
including unsettled questions of law, no one has a vested right in
an incorrect interpretation of a statute. On remand, the circuit
court should issue a revised declaratory judgment that conforms
with the conclusions in the Opinion.

B. Annual Compounding or Monthly Compounding?

In calculating a contribution deficiency, does the retirement
system compound the interest on the contributions on an annual
basis or a monthly basis? The class members complain that the
circuit court did not specify which compounding method BCERS must
use.

The Court of Appeals agrees that the court could have articulated
its views more clearly, especially because the County has
previously asserted the right to compound the interest on a monthly
basis, to the detriment of its retirees. It also agrees that in
calculating a contribution deficiency under SPP Section
37-203(f)(2), whether before or after the 2007 amendments, the
transferee system must compound regular interest on an annual
basis. Consequently, on remand, the circuit court should revise its
declaratory judgment to state that the County must compound regular
interest on an annual basis when calculating a contribution
deficiency under SPP Section 37-203(f)(2).

C. The Invalidity of Section 5-1-220.1 of the Baltimore County
Code

The class members complain that the circuit court did not expressly
declare that Bill 30-10 (Section 5-1-220.1 of the Baltimore County
Code) is invalid insofar as it conflicts with SPP Section
37-203(f)(2) by purporting to authorize the use of the valuation
rate in calculating the contribution deficiency for service credit
earned in a noncontributory system before July 1, 2007. Although
the invalidity of the County Code provision is evident (in various
ways) both from the circuit court's decision, the circuit's court
order, and  the Court of Appeals' opinion, the Court of Appeals
agrees that it is in the best interest of all, including the
citizens of Baltimore County, for the circuit court to declare the
parties' rights on this issue, as the class members requested.
Consequently, it directs the circuit court, on remand, to issue a
revised declaration that states expressly that Section 5-1-220.1 is
invalid insofar as it conflicts with SPP Section 37-203(f)(2).

D. Damages

The class members complain that the circuit court failed to enter
an enforceable judgment for back pay in favor of any of the class
members, even those who retired after July 1, 2007, and (according
to the court) had had their contribution deficiencies incorrectly
calculated. Instead, for members who retired on or after that date,
the court ordered the County "to recalculate the deficiency using
the regular rate of interest and adjust such members' retirement
accordingly including any additional amounts owed."

From the Court of Appeals' remote appellate perspective, it is not
entirely clear why the court ordered the County to do the
recalculation and what the court ordered the County to do. The
parties' briefs shed no light on the court's reasoning. In fact,
the County's brief does not even address the class members'
contention that the circuit court erred in failing to enter a money
judgment in favor of the class members.

Nonetheless, because the court rejected the State and federal
constitutional claims that were alleged in Counts III through VIII
of the second amended complaint, the Court of Appeals surmises that
the court must have ordered the County to recalculate the
contribution deficiencies under the only counts on which it agreed
(in part) with the class members -- Counts I and II. It opines that
the court did not err in granting relief in the form that the class
members requested. The court did err, however, in confining that
relief to the members of Subclasses 2 and 3 -- i.e., to the members
who retired on or after July 1, 2007.

On remand, the court should clarify its order to address these
questions, as well any other reasonable questions concerning when
and how the County must reimburse the class members for the portion
of the periodic payments that the County erroneously withheld
because it employed the valuation rate, compounded on a monthly
basis, and not the regular rate, compounded annually, in
calculating their contribution deficiencies.

E. Prejudgment Interest

In addition to complaining that the circuit court failed to
quantify their damages, the class members complain that the court
failed to award them prejudgment interest on their damages. The
County's brief does not respond to the contentions concerning
prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeals holds that the class members have a
contractual right to have their contribution deficiencies correctly
computed in accordance with the law. Moreover, the class members
have (and have had) a contractual right to receive the difference
between what their periodic pension payments would have been had
the contribution deficiency been correctly computed and the lesser
amounts that they have received to date.

On remand, the court should consider whether the County's
"'obligation to pay and the amount due had become certain,
definite, and liquidated by a specific date prior to judgment so
that the effect of the debtor's withholding payment was to deprive
the creditor of the use of a fixed amount as of a known date.'" If
the court answers that question in the affirmative, it must direct
the County to include prejudgment interest in reimbursing the class
members for the portion of the periodic payments that the County
erroneously withheld because it employed the valuation rate and not
the regular rate in calculating their contribution deficiencies. If
the court does not answer that question in the affirmative, it may,
but need not, direct the County to include prejudgment interest in
reimbursing the class members.

G. Mandamus and Injunctive Relief

The circuit court concluded that the County had miscalculated the
contribution deficiency only for the class members who retired on
or after July 1, 2007. It ordered the County to recalculate the
contribution deficiencies for those members, using the regular
rate, and to adjust their retirement benefits accordingly.

The Court of Appeals has interpreted the court's order as a writ of
mandamus, a permanent injunction, or both, requiring the County to
recalculate the contribution deficiencies for the members of
Subclasses 2 and 3, using the regular rate. It has required the
court, on remand, to revise its order to require the County to
recalculate the contribution deficiencies for all class members,
using the regular rate, compounded annually. It has also required
the court to revise its order to specify when and how the County
must reimburse the class members for the portion of the periodic
payments that the County erroneously withheld because it
miscalculated their contribution deficiencies by using the
valuation rate, compounded monthly. Finally, the Court of Appeals
has required the court to decide whether the class members should
or must receive prejudgment interest on the amounts that the County
erroneously withheld. Once the court complies with these directives
on remand, the court need not exercise its discretion to order
further relief by way of injunction or mandamus.

H. The Constitutional Claims and the Claim for Attorneys' Fees

The class members argue that the court erred in rejecting their
State and federal claims alleging a taking and the deprivation of
property without due process, as well as their related claim for
damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Court of Appeals sees no
error. In short, the circuit court did not err in rejecting the
constitutional claims or the Section 1983 claim. And as the class
members have no viable claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, they
have no right to their attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Section
1988. The Court of Appeals expresses no opinion as to whether an
award of attorneys' fees might ultimately be appropriate under
another theory.

I. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

On the final two pages of its 29-page brief, the County briefly
argues that all of the class members except for Mr. Rowe have
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. For that reason,
the County concludes that their claims are "barred." The County
raises the issue of exhaustion without having filed a cross-appeal.
It raised the issue of exhaustion below in its motion for summary
judgment.

The Court of Appeals opines that the County is attempting to
challenge the judgment without having taken an appeal. Not only has
the case been in litigation for more than a decade, but further
proceedings must occur on remand before the class members will be
properly compensated for the County's violation of their statutory
and contractual rights. Consequently, the Court of Appeals declines
to consider the County's argument that the class members, other
than Mr. Rowe, have failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies. Finally, even if it were to consider the unpreserved
issue of exhaustion, we would reject the proposition that the
doctrine of administrative exhaustion bars the class members'
claims. It is beyond dispute that the class members had no
obligation to exhaust administrative remedies before they pursued
their federal constitutional claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Court of Appeals disagrees with the
circuit court's conclusion that the County was entitled to use the
valuation rate in calculating the deficiency for any members,
regardless of when they retired. In its judgment, SPP Section
37-203(f)(2) required a retirement system to employ the regular
rate both before and after the clarifying amendments that took
effect on July 1, 2007. It agrees with the circuit court, however,
that the County did not violate the members' constitutional rights
by employing a colorable interpretation of an ambiguous statute in
calculating the deficiency.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirms the judgment in part,
reverses it in part, and remands the case for further proceedings
consistent with its Opinion. It reverses the circuit court's
conclusion that SPP Section 37-203(f)(2) required a retirement
system to employ the regular rate only for members who retired on
or after July 1, 2007. It also holds, however, that the circuit
court did not err in disposing of the class members' State and
federal constitutional claims on summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals remands the case to the circuit court for
further proceedings consistent with the Opinion. Those proceedings
will include the issuance of a writ of mandamus, a permanent
injunction, or both, requiring the County to correctly recalculate
the class members' contribution deficiencies in accordance with SPP
Section 37-203(f)(2), to adjust the periodic payments that the
class members will receive in the future so as to reflect the
amounts that they should receive under SPP Section 37-203(f)(2),
and to reimburse the class members for the amounts that the County
has wrongfully withheld from the periodic payments that they have
received in the past, with prejudgment interest if it is required
or appropriate; and a declaration that Section 5-1-220.1 of the
Baltimore County Code is invalid because it conflicts with SPP
Section 37-203(f)(2).

Three-fourths of the costs are to be paid by Baltimore County;
one-fourth of the costs are to be paid by the Appellants.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5n6p54ez from Leagle.com.


BARRINGTON SCHOOL: Court Approves Settlement in Yorba FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH YORBA, Individually and on behalf of other
employees similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Barrington School, LLC,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-691 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Edmund
A. Sargus, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, grants the Parties' Joint
Motion to Approve Settlement in the Fair Labor Standards Act
Collective Action.

I. Summary of the Claims and Procedural History

On Feb. 17, 2021, the Representative Plaintiff filed the case
against the Defendants on behalf of herself and other allegedly
similarly situated current and former hourly pre-school employees.

In the Action, the Representative Plaintiff alleged that the
Defendants failed to pay her and other hourly pre-school employees
of Defendants overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a
workweek in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Section 201
et seq. ("FLSA"). Specifically, she alleged that the Defendants
violated the FLSA by failing to account for all hours worked by
hourly employees at Defendants' various preschool locations. She
alleged that the Defendants paid employees through at least two (2)
different entities when employees worked at more than one
pre-school location during a given pay period and that such pay
practices violated the FLSA because the Defendants maintained
interrelated operations and common management/ownership of the
various preschools. She also alleged the Defendants failed to track
and pay her and other hourly employees for all travel time to and
from worksites during the workday resulting in unpaid overtime
wages.

The Defendants deny these allegations, deny any joint or single
employer relationship, and assert that they properly paid their
hourly employees, including the Representative Plaintiff, for all
hours worked.

On May 3, 2021, the Parties filed a Joint Motion to Stay the Case
because they agreed to engage in settlement discussions. The Court
granted the Parties' Motion to Stay the Case and ordered that they
file a joint status report on Aug. 27, 2021, unless the action was
dismissed first.

The Parties engaged in good faith settlement discussions over the
course of approximately three months. Prior to the Parties'
settlement discussions, the Defendants provided time and
compensation records for the Representative Plaintiff and other
hourly pre-school employees that Representative Plaintiff contends
are similarly situated.

The Plaintiffs' Counsel performed a damages analysis using this
information. After completing the analysis, the Plaintiff served a
settlement demand on Dec. 6, 2021. The Parties then exchanged
numerous settlement proposals before ultimately reaching an
agreement on principal terms on March 3, 2022. They filed a Status
Report on March 7, 2022, advising the Court of the settlement
reached days earlier. They filed additional status reports on April
6, 2022, May 9, 2022, and June 6, 2022.

In addition to the Representative Plaintiff, the following
individuals have joined the case to date: Sherry Rechtiene,
Darianne Seward, Kensington Brooks, and Kelly Brooks-Matheny
(collectively "Opt-In Plaintiffs").

II. Summary of the Key Settlement Terms

The total settlement amount is $44,000. This amount includes: (a)
all individual settlement payments to 61 Plaintiffs, including all
Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs, Representative Plaintiff and Opt-In
Plaintiffs in amount of $24,132.34; (b) a service award of $2,000
to the Representative Plaintiff for her services in bringing and
prosecuting this Action and general release provided to Defendants;
(c) the Plaintiffs' Counsel's attorney fees and litigation expenses
in the amount of $15,066.67; and (d) the cost of settlement
administration in the amount of $2,801.

The Representative Plaintiff, the Opt-In Plaintiffs, and the
Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs will receive their payments with the
Settlement Notice attached as Attachment B to the Settlement
Agreement, and only those Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs who endorse,
sign, and/or cash their payments will be bound by the terms of the
Agreement as Participating Plaintiffs.

The Settlement Agreement provides that the Plaintiffs' counsel will
seek an award of up to $17,867.66. However, this figure includes
the $2,801 to be paid to the settlement administrator, which will
be paid directly to the administrator by the Defendants.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' counsel are only seeking $15,066.66 in
attorney's fees and costs.

A Settlement Notice and Settlement Payment will be sent to each
Potential Opt-In Plaintiff, the Representative Plaintiff and the
Opt-In Plaintiff. The Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs who elect to
participate in the Settlement by endorsing, depositing and/or
cashing the Settlement Payment will become Participating Plaintiffs
under the Agreement and bound thereby. Those who do not retain the
right to pursue their own claims.

Total potential damages for the collective were calculated by
analyzing timekeeping and payroll data on total hours worked by the
Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs, the Representative Plaintiff and the
Opt-In Plaintiffs at all relevant facilities owned or operated by
Defendants. Individualized damages were then computed based on the
payroll and timekeeping data.

Thus, total alleged unpaid overtime for the collective was
determined to be $16,583.60 for a three-year period. Each Potential
Opt-In Plaintiff who elects to participate in the settlement will
receive 100% of their alleged calculated damages for a three-year
statute of limitations and approximately an additional 44% of their
damages as liquidated damages. This type of allocation is commonly
used in class and collective action settlements. Any Plaintiff who
did not have at least $25 in alleged damages will receive a minimum
payment of $25.

The Court finds that this recovery is imminently fair and
reasonable.

In exchange for the total settlement amount payment and other
consideration provided for in the Agreement, the Lawsuit will be
dismissed with prejudice, and the Plaintiffs (including the
Representative Plaintiff and the Opt-In Plaintiffs) will release
the Defendant from federal, state, and local wage-and-hour claims,
rights, demands, liabilities and causes of action that were
asserted, or could have been asserted, in the Lawsuit.

III. Discussion

The Settlement is subject to approval by the Court pursuant to
Section 216(b) of the FLSA. Court approval is warranted on all
scores, Judge Sargus opines.

A. The Seven-Factor Standard is Satisfied

The Court may approve a proposed settlement of the action under the
FLSA Section 216(b) "after scrutinizing the settlement for
fairness." The Sixth Circuit uses seven factors to evaluate class
action settlements: (1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the
complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the
amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (4) the likelihood
of success on the merits; (5) the opinions of class counsel and
class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class members;
and (7) the public interest, citing UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497
F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG
Corp., 962 F.2d 1203, 1205 (6th Cir. 1992)).

Judge Sargus opines that the settlement in the Action satisfies
each of these elements. He finds that (i) the Agreement was
achieved only after arm's-length and good faith negotiations
between the Parties over a period of several months; (ii) the
Settlement provides substantial relief to the Eligible Settlement
Participants promptly and efficiently, and amplifies the benefits
of that relief through the economies of class resolution; (iii) the
legal and factual issues in the case were thoroughly researched by
counsel for the Parties, and all aspects of the dispute are
well-understood by both sides; (iv) if the Action had not settled,
it is possible that there would be no recovery for the Potential
Opt-In Plaintiffs at all; (v) the Plaintiffs' Counsel opined that
the settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best
interests of the Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs, the Representative
Plaintiff and the Opt-In Plaintiffs; (vi) if the Court approves the
settlement, the Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs, the Representative
Plaintiff and the Opt-In Plaintiffs will receive a Notice of
Settlement and payment for their alleged damages as provided in the
Agreement; and (vii) the settlement confers immediate benefits on
the Eligible Settlement Participants, avoids the risks and expense
in further litigation, and conserves judicial resources.

B. The Settlement Distributions Are Fair, Reasonable and Adequate

In addition to evaluating the seven factors discussed, Judge Sargus
must also "ensure that the distribution of the settlement proceeds
is equitable."

First, the parties have provided evidence of the Plaintiffs'
Counsel work before negotiating settlement. Judge Sargus finds that
the ultimate damages amount was settled upon as reasonable based on
the information learned during settlement discussions, and informal
discovery with payroll and timekeeping data for the Plaintiffs. All
individual payments will be calculated proportionally. As such,
each Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to
obtain compensation for alleged unpaid wages that are proportional
to the amount of time he or she was employed by the Defendants and
the hours he or she worked each week within the period of time
covered by the settlement.

Second, the Agreement provides for a service award of $2,000 to
Representative Plaintiff in addition to her individual payment.
Judge Sargus finds that the Representative Plaintiff contributed
significant time, effort, and detailed factual information enabling
the Plaintiffs' Counsel to evaluate the strength of this case and
reach a settlement of the matter. In addition, the Representative
Plaintiff agreed to execute a global release of all of their claims
against the Defendants in exchange for her service payment.

Third, the Agreement provides a payment of attorneys' fees to the
Plaintiffs' Counsel in the amount of one-third of the total
settlement amount, or $14,666.67, Judge Sargus holds that given the
inherent complexity of a wage and hour collective action and the
disputed issues of fact and law in the case, an award of one-third
of the settlement fund appropriately compensates the Plaintiff's
counsel for their prosecution of the case, and advances the
public's interests in rewarding attorneys who bring wage and hour
cases.

Lastly, the Plaintiffs' Counsel will be reimbursed their litigation
expenses, which as of the date of this Joint Motion are $400. The
Settlement Administrator will additionally receive payment of
$2,801 from the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by the
Defendants within 30 days of settlement approval as provided by the
Agreement. Because the Plaintiffs' Counsel's litigation expenses
were incurred in the prosecution of the claims in the case and in
obtaining settlement, the Court should award reimbursement of these
expenses to the Plaintiffs' Counsel.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Sargus finds that the settlement is a
fair and reasonable resolution of the disputed issues, which is
consistent with the goal of securing the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action. He: (1) grants the Joint
Motion for Approval of Collective Action Settlement and Dismissal
with Prejudice; (2) approves the Plaintiffs' Counsel's request for
attorney fees and expenses; (3) approves the requested service
payment to the Representative Plaintiff; (4) approves the payment
to the Settlement Administrator; and (5) retains jurisdiction to
enforce the settlement if necessary.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4y8utubk from Leagle.com.


BEYOND MEAT: Products Have Less Protein as Labeled, Borovoy Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINE BOROVOY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, v. BEYOND MEAT, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
Case No. 3:22-cv-50242 (N.D. Ill., July 6, 2022) is a putative
class action against Beyond Meat alleges that Beyond Meat claims
that its products provide "equal or superior protein" as compared
to real meat, asserting claims against Defendant violations of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the
Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and unjust
enrichment.

According to the complaint, two different U.S. laboratories have
independently and separately conducted testing on a wide range of
Beyond Meat products. The test results were consistent with each
other: the results of both tests show that Beyond Meat products
contain significantly less protein than what is stated on the
product packaging. As such, the Defendant has engaged in widespread
false and deceptive conduct by overstating the amount of protein in
its products, says the suit.

Plaintiff Borovoy purchased Beyond Meat's Beyond Burger Plant-Based
Patties several times, starting in 2021. Beyond Meat products are
sold at many stores in and around Freeport, Illinois. When she
purchased the products, she relied on various labeling
representations about the nutritional qualities of the product,
including that it had 20 grams of plant protein per serving, and a
daily protein value of 40%. She read and relied on both the front
labeling, and the nutrition information on the back of the package,
the Plaintiff asserts.

However, the patties Plaintiff Borovoy purchased did not have 20
grams of protein per serving, and did not provide a daily protein
value of 40%. Instead, the products would have had approximately 18
grams of protein, and an actual daily protein value of
approximately 35%. The Defendant allegedly knows that its product
labeling is false. It is routine practice in the food industry to
regularly test products to confirm the accuracy of nutrition
labeling. The Defendant therefore would have tested the Products
before putting them on sale, the suit added.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent the following classes:

  -- National Class

     "During the fullest period allowed by law, all persons in the
     United States who purchased any of the Products for personal
     use and not for resale within the United States (the
     "Class");"

  -- Consumer Fraud Ten-State Class

     "All persons in the States of California, Florida, Illinois,
     Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New

     York, and Washington who purchased the Products for personal
     use and not for resale from the beginning of any applicable
     limitations period through the date of class certification'"

  -- Illinois Class

     "All persons in Illinois who purchased any of the Products
for
     personal use and not for resale within Illinois (the "Illinois

     Class")."

Beyond Meat manufactures, advertises, and sells plant-based meat
substitute products, such as the plant-based ground beef, sausages,
meatballs, and hamburger patties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          SHUB LAW FIRM LLC
          134 Kings Hwy E, Fl-2
          Haddonfield, NJ 08033
          Telephone: (856) 772-7200
          Facsimile: (856) 210-9088
          E-mail: jshub@shublawyers.com
                  klaukaitis@shublawyers.com

BHP GROUP: Faces Class Action Suit Over 2015 Samarco Dam Disaster
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Hans van Leeuwen of Financial Review reports that an English
appeals court has given 200,000-plus Brazilian litigants the green
light to pursue their GBP5 billion ($8.8 billion) class action
against BHP over the 2015 Samarco dam disaster.

The long-running courtroom saga can now go to a full trial, after
class action law firm PGMBM on Friday succeeded in getting the
Court of Appeal to overturn BHP's initial victory in March last
year.

The collapse of the Fundao dam in 2015 killed 19 and poured roughly
40 million cubic metres of mining waste into communities. AP

In November 2020, a lower court vetoed the lawsuit, ruling that the
huge class action would be too complex and costly, and might
duplicate litigation efforts in Brazil. The claimants then lost an
appeal against that decision last March - which seemed to kill off
the case.

But last month they won an "exceptional appeal" hearing to
reconsider that verdict. The ruling in their favour was handed down
on Friday.

The judges said the court case should proceed because the remedies
on offer in Brazil were "not so obviously inadequate that it can be
said to be pointless and wasteful to pursue proceedings" in
England.

"There is a realistic prospect of a trial yielding a real and
legitimate advantage for the claimants such as to outweigh the
disadvantages for the parties in terms of expense and the wider
public interest in terms of court resources," the ruling said.

In a statement, PGMBM said: "BHP will now finally face their day of
reckoning in the English courts . . . [and] will have to account
for their role in the 2015 disaster."
Claims of slow and inadequate redress

The collapse of the Fundao iron-ore tailings dam in 2015 killed 19
people and left hundreds homeless, as well as wreaking
environmental and infrastructure damage that extended across two
states.

Within weeks, a Brazilian class action was launched that ultimately
won a settlement of 20 billion Brazilian reals.

In response, BHP and its joint venture partner Vale set up the
Renova Foundation to remediate damage and compensate affected
individuals, which has so far spent more than 10 billion reals
($2.8 billion).

The litigants say they have had to turn to the English legal system
because they are getting only slow and inadequate redress through
the Brazilian courts - where a second, 155 billion-real lawsuit is
under way - and from the Renova Foundation.

BHP still has the option to try to prevent the trial by appealing
against Friday's decision to the Supreme Court. A spokesman said
the company was considering its response.

"We will continue to defend the action, which we believe remains
unnecessary as it duplicates matters already covered by the
existing and ongoing work of the Renova Foundation under the
supervision of the Brazilian courts, and legal proceedings in
Brazil," the spokesman said.

PGMBM's clients in the case include Brazilian businesses, churches,
municipalities, utility companies and individuals. The firm's
chairman, Harris Pogust, said the river remained contaminated and
people were still homeless.

He labelled BHP's publication of social-value targets last week as
"the best example of greenwashing I have ever seen".

"These social and environmental commitments are not worth the paper
they are written on until real justice is provided to the victims
of the Mariana Dam disaster," Mr Pogust said.

The BHP spokesman said that between the Renova Foundation and
Brazilian court settlements, about 30 billion reals would have been
spent on reparation and compensation by the end of this year.

The claimants counter that Renova has struggled to keep its 42
projects on track, and allege its real purpose is to limit BHP's
and Vale's liability, rather than deliver effective remedies.

The case has been running in England since 2018, but has yet to get
beyond the argument as to whether it can proceed. If BHP appeals to
the Supreme Court, another year could well elapse on this phase.

If the case goes to trial, it will be several years at least before
any judgment on BHP's liability or claimants' entitlements.[GN]

BOFI HOLDINGS: Reaches $14.1-Mil. Settlement in Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
This notice is for all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired
shares of the publicly traded common stock of BofI Holding, Inc.
(now known as Axos Financial, Inc.), as well as purchasers of BofI
call options and sellers of BofI put options, between September 4,
2013 through and including October 13, 2015. Certain persons and
entities are excluded from the Class as set forth in detail in the
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated April 13, 2022
("Stipulation") and the Notice described below.

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY; YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California ("Court"), that the parties
to the above-captioned action ("Action") have reached a proposed
settlement for $14,100,000 in cash ("Settlement") that, if
approved, will resolve all claims in the Action.

A hearing will be held on October 7, 2022, at 1:30 p.m., before the
Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel at the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California, Edward J. Schwartz United
States Courthouse, Courtroom 2D, 221 West Broadway, San Diego, CA
92101, to determine: (i) whether the proposed Settlement should be
approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (ii) whether the Action
should be dismissed with prejudice against Defendants, and the
releases specified and described in the Stipulation (and in the
Notice described below) should be entered; (iii) whether the
proposed Plan of Allocation should be approved as fair and
reasonable; and (iv) whether Class Counsel's application for an
award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses, and Lead
Plaintiff's application for a service award, should be approved.

If you are a member of the Class, your rights will be affected by
the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be entitled to
share in the Settlement Fund. This notice provides only a summary
of the information contained in the detailed Notice of (I) Proposed
Class Action Settlement; (II) Settlement Hearing; and (III) Motion
for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation
Expenses and Lead Plaintiff's Service Award ("Notice"). You may
obtain a copy of the Notice, along with the Claim Form, on the
website for the Settlement, www.BofISecuritiesLitigation.com. .You
may also obtain copies of the Notice and Claim Form by contacting
the Claims Administrator at In re BofI Holding, Inc. Securities
Litigation Settlement, c/o JND Legal Administration, P.O. Box
91425, Seattle, WA 98111; 1-888-921-1538;
info@BofISecuritiesLitigation.com.

If you are a member of the Class, in order to be eligible to
receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you must submit a
Claim Form postmarked no later than November 7, 2022, in accordance
with the instructions set forth in the Claim Form. If you are a
Class Member and do not submit a proper Claim Form, you will not be
eligible to share in the distribution of the net proceeds of the
Settlement but you will nevertheless be bound by any releases,
judgments or orders entered by the Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Class and wish to exclude yourself from
the Class, you must submit a request for exclusion such that it is
postmarked no later than August 8, 2022, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice. If you properly exclude
yourself from the Class, you will not be bound by any releases,
judgments or orders entered by the Court in the Action and you will
not be eligible to share in the net proceeds of the Settlement.
Excluding yourself is the only option that may allow you to be part
of any other current or future lawsuit against Defendants or any of
the other released parties concerning the claims being resolved by
the Settlement. Please note, however, if you decide to exclude
yourself from the Class, you may be time-barred from asserting the
claims covered by the Action by a statute of repose.

If you are a member of the Class and previously requested
exclusion, you now have the opportunity to opt-back into the Class
and participate in the Settlement. If you elect to opt-back into
the Class, you will be able to submit a Claim Form and be eligible
to share in the distribution of the net proceeds of the Settlement.
If you elect to opt-back into the Class, you will be bound by any
releases, judgments or orders entered by the Court in the Action,
regardless of whether or not you submit a Claim Form.

Class Counsel will apply to the Court to be paid from the
Settlement Fund, and any payment will be made only in the amount
that is approved by the Court. Class Counsel will ask the Court for
an award of attorneys' fees of no more than 25% of the Settlement
Fund (i.e., no more than $3,525,000). In addition, Class Counsel
will ask the Court to reimburse them out of the Settlement Fund for
the expenses they reasonably incurred and will incur in litigating
this case on behalf of Class Members, in an amount not to exceed
$1,400,000. Class Counsel will also ask the Court to approve a
Service Award of up to $15,000 for the Class Representative as an
award for its service to the Class as Plaintiff and Class
Representative out of the Settlement Fund. Class Counsel will also
request authorization to pay the Claims Administrator, directly
from the Settlement Fund, all Notice and Administration Costs
actually incurred and paid or payable up to $350,000, which Class
Counsel and the Claims Administrator estimate to be the maximum
amount likely to be required. Any amount in excess of that would be
payable from the Settlement Fund only upon further approval of the
Court. The amount of the Settlement Fund that remains after the
payment of all Court-approved attorneys' fees, reimbursement of
expenses, Service Award, and Notice and Administration Costs will
be distributed to Class Members who have submitted valid claims for
compensation and have not timely excluded themselves from the
Settlement in a manner approved by the Court.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, and/or Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses and Lead Plaintiff's requested Service
Award, must be filed with the Court and delivered to Class Counsel
and Defendants' Counsel such that they are received no later than
August 8, 2022, in accordance with the instructions set forth in
the Notice.

The issuance of this Notice is not an expression of any opinion by
the Court concerning the merits of any claim in the Action, and the
Court still has to decide whether to approve the Settlement. The
Defendants deny the allegations of wrongdoing asserted in this
Action, and deny any liability whatsoever to any member of the
Class.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE CLERK'S OFFICE, DEFENDANTS, OR
THEIR COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE. All questions about this
notice, the Settlement, or your eligibility to participate in the
Settlement should be directed to Class Counsel or the Claims
Administrator.

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to the Claims
Administrator:

In re BofI Holding, Inc. Securities Litigation
c/o JND Legal Administration
P.O. Box 91425
Seattle, WA 98111
888-921-1538
info@BofISecuritiesLitigation.com
www.BofISecuritiesLitigation.com

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim Form, may
be made to Class Counsel:

Richard M. Heimann, Esq.
Katherine Lubin Benson, Esq.
Michael K. Sheen, Esq.
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 956-1000
BofISettlement@lchb.com

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
United States District Court
Southern District of California [GN]

BP AMERICA: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Aguinaga BELO Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants BP's Motion for Summary Judgment in
the lawsuit titled STEVEN AGUINAGA v. BP AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,
SECTION: D (4), Case No. 17-3173-WBV-KWR (E.D. La.).

The Motion is filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc.,
BP America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively, "BP").
Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean, Ltd.,
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., Transocean Holdings,
LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Triton Asset Leasing GmbH have
also joined in the Motion. As of the date of this Order, no
opposition has been filed. In addition, Plaintiff, Steven Aguinaga,
has not moved for an extension of the submission date or the
deadline to file an opposition brief. Hence, the Motion is
unopposed.

I. Factual Background

The case arises from Steven Aguinaga's alleged exposure to toxic
chemicals following the Deepwater Horizon ("DWH") oil spill that
took place on April 20, 2010. On Jan. 11, 2013, while presiding
over the multidistrict litigation arising out of the DWH incident,
United States District Judge Carl J. Barbier approved the Deepwater
Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (the
"MSA"). The MSA includes a Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO") that
permits certain class members to sue BP for Later-Manifested
Physical Conditions ("LMPC's").

After opting out of the MSA on Oct. 15, 2012, Aguinaga filed an
individual complaint on April 11, 2017, against BP America, Inc.,
BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production Company,
Inc., BP p.l.c., Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean,
Ltd., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., Transocean
Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater, Inc., and Triton Asset Leasing
GmbH.

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that he was toxically
exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants by swimming in the
Gulf of Mexico, following the DWH Oil Spill Disaster. He further
alleges that he was "also toxically exposed as a coastal resident
via inhalation and dermal exposure to crude oil and dispersants
from the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Disaster." He alleges that, as
a result of the Defendants' actions, he has suffered physical
injury damages including, exposure to chemicals in crude oil, in
weathered crude, in dispersants, and in oil and dispersant mixtures
that have caused, or will cause, adverse health effects, as well as
"costs incurred and inconvenience sustained by obtaining medical
treatment for exposure to chemicals in the past and in the
future."

The Plaintiff also seeks injunctive and equitable relief, including
that the Defendants be ordered to provide continued environmental,
water supply, food supply, and air monitoring for him, and further
assert that, the "Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress caused
by concern over exposure to chemicals and their physical health
effects."

In a subsequent response to Pretrial Order No. 68, the Plaintiff
alleges that his injuries include "chemical exposure;"
"gastrointestinal problems including stomach acid in the lungs,
throat;" "neurological issues, including memory loss;" "nervous
system issues, pain, profuse sweating, sickness;" and "respiratory
issues." The Plaintiff also alleges that he suffered "emotional
distress caused by concern over exposure to chemicals and their
physical health effects." He seeks damages for his injuries,
including pain and suffering, disability and disfigurement, mental
anguish, loss of the capacity for the enjoyment of life, past and
future expense of hospitalization, medical and nursing care and
treatment, loss of earnings, loss of ability to earn money, and
aggravation of a pre-existing condition.

BP filed the instant Motion on May 27, 2022, asserting that it is
entitled to summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 because the
Plaintiff has provided insufficient admissible evidence to connect
his alleged conditions with exposure to oil or dispersants.
Specifically, BP claims that the Plaintiff has alleged various
health complaints due to the DWH oil spill, but he has not produced
any expert testimony in support of those claims. BP notes that
while the Plaintiff's case was part of the MDL, Plaintiff alleged
that he suffered from gastrointestinal problems, neurological
issues, nervous system issues, and respiratory issues as a result
of the oil spill response and cleanup. BP asserts that the
Plaintiff has failed to provide any expert report by the April 28,
2022 deadline set forth in the Court's Scheduling Order.

BP argues that the Fifth Circuit and at least ten Sections of this
Court have issued opinions addressing the obligation of a BELO
plaintiff to prove legal causation. According to BP, this
requirement derives from the fundamental principles governing proof
of causation in toxic tort cases decided under general maritime
law. BP claims that B3 plaintiffs, like Aguinaga, must satisfy the
same legal cause standard as BELO plaintiffs. BP further asserts
that, because of the technical nature of the proof, courts have
uniformly held that toxic tort plaintiffs must provide expert
testimony to meet their burden of proving causation.

BP contends that, since the nature of the proof is technical,
courts have repeatedly dismissed claims of plaintiffs who alleged
injuries from exposure to the DWH spill but failed to provide
expert support for their claims. Accordingly, BP argues that the
Plaintiff's claims lack the expert support required to carry his
burden of proof on causation.

As such, BP asks the Court to grant its Motion and to dismiss the
Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that
summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine disputed
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. No dispute of material fact exists if
the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.

III. Analysis

As BP highlights, Judge Barbier previously described the BELO and
B3 cases in similar terms, explaining that: "BELO cases and the B3
cases are similar in several important respects. Both allege
personal injuries or wrongful death due to exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the oil spill response. Furthermore, both
BELO plaintiffs and B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal cause
of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response."

In a separate matter, the Court recently explained that the Fifth
Circuit and at least nine Sections of the Court have uniformly held
that, with regard to BELO plaintiffs, absent expert testimony, a
BELO plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof on causation.

The Court finds that because Aguinaga failed to identify a
causation expert in this case by the Court's April 28, 2022
deadline and did not move for an extension of that deadline, or for
an extension of his deadline to respond to the instant Motion, he
cannot meet his burden of proof on causation. Indeed, the record
reveals no admissible evidence whatsoever to support general
causation. Accordingly, BP is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, BP's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and
Steven Aguinaga's claims against BP Exploration & Production Inc.,
BP America Production Company, BP p.l.c. Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc., Transocean, Ltd., Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., and Triton Asset Leasing GmbH are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated June 27,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdfdy7u7 from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Martin BELO Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Wendy B. Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana grants BP's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the lawsuit styled CHRIS ALBERT MARTIN, ET AL. v. BP
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., ET AL., SECTION: D (4), Case No.
17-3228-WBV-KWR (E.D. La.).

The Motion is filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc.,
BP America Production Company, and BP p.l.c. (collectively, "BP").
Defendants Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean
Deepwater, Inc., have also joined in the Motion. As of the date of
this Order, no opposition has been filed. In addition, Plaintiffs
Chris Martin and Jennifer Martin have not moved for an extension of
the submission date or the deadline to file an opposition brief.
Hence, the Motion is unopposed.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from Chris Martin's alleged exposure to toxic
chemicals following the Deepwater Horizon ("DWH") oil spill that
took place on April 20, 2010, and the derivative loss of consortium
claim of his wife, Jennifer Martin. On Jan. 11, 2013, while
presiding over the multidistrict litigation arising out of the DWH
incident, United States District Judge Carl J. Barbier approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement (the "MSA"). The MSA includes a Back-End Litigation
Option ("BELO") that permits certain class members to sue BP for
Later-Manifested Physical Conditions ("LMPCs").

After opting out of the MSA, Plaintiffs Chris and Jennifer Martin
filed a Complaint on April 11, 2017, against BP America, Inc., BP
Explorations & Production Inc., BP America Production Company,
Inc., BP p.l.c., Transocean Ltd, Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling Inc., Transocean Deepwater Inc., Transocean Holdings LLC,
Triton Asset Leasing GMBH, and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that they were exposed to
crude oil and chemical dispersants used during the oil spill
cleanup "in their environment through recreational activities in
the Gulf of Mexico." The Plaintiffs further allege that Chris
Martin was exposed to fumes from the oil spill and oil spill
response activities based upon the proximity of his home to the
Gulf of Mexico, including fumes and odors from the oil and
dispersants and the burning of oil slicks as a response measure.

The Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the Defendants' actions,
the "Plaintiff" has suffered physical injury damages including
exposure to chemicals in crude oil, in weathered crude, in
dispersants, and in oil and dispersant mixtures that have caused,
or will cause, adverse health effects, as well as "costs incurred
and inconvenience sustained by obtaining medical treatment for
exposure to chemicals in the past and in the future." The
Plaintiffs also seek injunctive and equitable relief, including
that the Defendants be ordered to provide continued environmental,
water supply, food supply, and air monitoring "for Plaintiff," and
further assert that, the "Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress
caused by concern over exposure to chemicals and their physical
health effects."

The Court notes that in his disclosure form dated April 10, 2017,
Chris Martin alleged that his injuries included "stress, anxiety,
transfusions, depression, loss of balance, chest pains, jaundice,
night sweats, and dizziness."

The Plaintiffs further assert that they have suffered and will
continue to suffer significant economic damages and loss of
business due to "the impacts and the stigma caused by the impacts,
on the marine environment, fish and shellfish populations, as well
as to the Gulf waters from the oil spill disaster and related
response efforts." Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege that, "the
Plaintiff suffered bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering,
disability and disfigurement, mental anguish, loss of the capacity
for the enjoyment of life, expense of hospitalization, medical and
nursing care and treatment, loss of earnings, loss of ability to
earn money, and aggravation of a preexisting condition." The
Plaintiffs also assert a loss of consortium claim against all of
the Defendants on behalf of Jennifer Martin.

BP filed the instant Motion on May 27, 2022, asserting that it is
entitled to summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 because the
Plaintiffs have provided insufficient admissible evidence to
connect Chris Martin's alleged conditions with exposure to oil or
dispersants, and Jennifer Martin's claims are entirely derivative
of her husband's injuries.

Specifically, BP claims that Martin has alleged various health
complaints due to the DWH oil spill, but he has not produced any
expert testimony in support of those claims. BP points out that
while his case was part of the MDL, Chris Martin alleged that he
suffered from stress, anxiety, transfusions, depression, loss of
balance, chest pains, jaundice, night sweats, and dizziness as a
result of the oil spill response and cleanup. BP also points out
that the Plaintiffs failed to provide an expert report by the May
11, 2022 deadline set forth in the Court's Scheduling Order.

BP argues that the Fifth Circuit and at least ten Sections of the
Court have issued opinions addressing the obligation of a BELO
plaintiff to prove legal causation. According to BP, this
requirement derives from the fundamental principles governing proof
of causation in toxic tort cases decided under general maritime
law. BP claims that B3 plaintiffs, like Chris Martin, must satisfy
the same legal cause standard as BELO plaintiffs. BP further
asserts that, because of the technical nature of the proof, courts
have uniformly held that toxic tort plaintiffs must provide expert
testimony to meet their burden of proving causation.

BP contends that, since the nature of the proof is technical,
courts have repeatedly dismissed claims of plaintiffs who alleged
injuries from exposure to the DWH spill but failed to provide
expert support for their claims. BP argues that, for these reasons,
Chris Martin's claims lack the expert support required to carry his
burden of proof on causation, which is a foundational element of
his claim and his wife's derivative claim.

As such, BP asks the Court to grant its Motion and to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that
summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine disputed
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. No dispute of material fact exists if
the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.

III. Analysis

As BP highlights, Judge Barbier previously described the BELO and
B3 cases in similar terms, explaining that: "BELO cases and the B3
cases are similar in several important respects. Both allege
personal injuries or wrongful death due to exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the oil spill response. Furthermore, both
BELO plaintiffs and B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal cause
of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response."

In a separate matter, the Court recently explained that the Fifth
Circuit and at least nine Sections of this Court have uniformly
held that, with regard to BELO plaintiffs, absent expert testimony,
a BELO plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof on causation.

The Court finds that because Chris Martin failed to identify a
causation expert in this case by the Court's May 11, 2022 deadline
and did not move for an extension of that deadline, or for an
extension of his deadline to respond to the instant Motion, he
cannot meet his burden of proof on causation. Indeed, the record
reveals no admissible evidence whatsoever to support general
causation. Additionally, both the Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana
Supreme Court have made clear that derivative loss of consortium
claims cannot be maintained independently of the original claim.

Because Chris Martin cannot meet his burden of proof on causation,
the Court likewise finds that Jennifer Martin cannot meet her
burden of proving causation regarding her derivative claim for loss
of consortium. Accordingly, BP is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, BP's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and
Chris and Jennifer Martin's claims against BP Exploration &
Production Inc., BP America Production Company, BP p.l.c., and
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean Deepwater,
Inc., are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated June 27,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9e5r9x from
Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Summary Judgment; Naquin's Complaint Tossed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled BRYANT A. NAQUIN v. B.P. EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., SECTION "R" (2), Case No. 17-3584 (E.D.
La.), Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana grants the BP parties' motion for
summary judgment and dismisses the Plaintiff's complaint.

The motion was filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production,
Inc., BP American Production Company, and BP p.l.c.'s (collectively
the "BP parties"). The remaining Defendants, Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc., Transocean Deepwater, Inc., Transocean Holdings,
LLC, and Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., join the BP
parties' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Bryant A. Naquin
does not oppose the motion.

I. Background

The case arises from Plaintiff Bryant Naquin's alleged exposure to
toxic chemicals following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico. The Plaintiff alleges that he was exposed to crude
oil and chemical dispersants while he was "living in close
proximity to coastal waters." He asserts that he has been
continuously exposed to these chemicals since April 20, 2010. He
also represents that this continuous exposure has resulted in
headaches, skin irritation, shortness of breath, the development of
COPD, insomnia, ringing in ears, some pain in muscles,
sluggishness, staph infections, occasional boils, and other
injuries.

Mr. Naquin's case was originally part of the multidistrict
litigation ("MDL") pending before Judge Carl J. Barbier. Naquin's
case was severed from the MDL as one of the "B3" cases for
plaintiffs who either opted out of, or were excluded from, the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. Naquin is a plaintiff, who opted out of the settlement.
After the Plaintiff's case was severed, it was reallocated to this
Court.

On July 28, 2021, the Court issued a scheduling order that
established, among other deadlines, that the Plaintiff's expert
disclosures had to be "obtained and delivered" to defense counsel
by no later than April 22, 2022.

The Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that, because
the Plaintiff has not identified any expert testimony, he is unable
to carry his burden on causation. The Plaintiff has not filed an
opposition to the Defendants' motion.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is warranted when the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must come forward
with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the
evidence went uncontroverted at trial. If the dispositive issue is
one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at
trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that
the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an
essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.

III. Discussion

The Plaintiff asserts claims for general maritime negligence,
negligence per se, and gross negligence against the Defendants, as
a result of the oil spill and its cleanup. The Defendants contend
that the Plaintiff cannot prove that exposure to oil or dispersants
was the legal cause of his alleged injuries, and, thus, that he
cannot prove a necessary element of his claims against the
Defendants.

In a toxic torts case, scientific knowledge of the harmful level of
exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was
exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain
the plaintiffs' burden, Judge Vance notes, citing Allen v. Pa.
Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996). And in cases, like
this one, where the plaintiff cannot expect lay fact-finders to
understand medical causation, expert testimony is, thus, required
to establish causation.

Judge Vance notes that there is no indication that the Plaintiff
has retained an expert to provide testimony at trial to establish
causation. Nor is there an indication that the Plaintiff will
present expert testimony from his treating physician. The Plaintiff
did not make any expert disclosures by the Court-ordered deadline,
nor did he move for an extension.

Without expert testimony, the Plaintiff is unable to carry his
burden on causation, Judge Vance holds. Because he cannot prove a
necessary element of his claims against the Defendants, the
Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
granted. The Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated June 27,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yzwa23jz from
Leagle.com.


BRADFORD O'NEIL: Extension of Time to File Response OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Clemons v. Bradford O'Neil
Agency, LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-00678 (E.D. Mo.), the Hon. Judge
Stephen R. Clark entered an order granting Defendants O'Neil
Insurance Agency, Inc., State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company's joint motion for extension of time to file response/reply
as to motion to certify class.

The nature of suit states restrictions of use of telephone
equipment.

State Farm Insurance is a large group of mutual insurance companies
throughout the United States with corporate headquarters in
Bloomington, Illinois.[CC]

BRADLEY COUNTY, TN: Filing of Class Status Bid Due Oct. 31
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DARRELL EDEN; RANDY BACON;
ESTATE OF CHRISTOPHER BROWN; through personal representative Paula
Rhea Brown; ESTATE OF MARTIN CHOUINARD, through administrator ad
litem April Hancock; SANDRA CULBERTSON; ESTATE OF DENISE CULPEPPER,
through personal representative April Richard; LAURA FULLER; ESTATE
OF BRANDON GASH, b/n/k Harry and Sheryl Gash; BENJAMIN NEWTON
HANNAH; KRIS HOLDER; AMANDA LENNIE; SHELBY LONG; TERA MILLER; BRYAN
WAMPLER; and SHARON WATERS, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated; and AVERY L. SHARP; CHELSEA COULTER; KENDRA
MICKEL; and ZACHARY GUINN, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, v. BRADLEY COUNTY, TENNESSEE; SHERIFF STEVE
LAWSON, in his official capacity; CAPTAIN JERRY JOHNSON, JR., in
his official capacity; ERIC WATSON, in his individual capacity; and
CAPTAIN GABRIEL THOMAS, in his individual capacity, Case No.
1:18-cv-217-CHS (E.D. Tenn.), the Hon. Judge Christopher H. Steger
entered a second amended scheduling order for class certification
briefing:

   1. The Plaintiffs shall file their         Oct. 31, 2022
      motion for class certification by:

   2. The Defendants shall file any           Jan. 9, 2023
      opposition to the motion for
      class certification by:

The parties engaged in an initial mediation in February 2022, and
then scheduled a follow-up mediation session for March 23, 2022.
Because of their mediation efforts and at the parties' request, the
Court entered an order extending the Plaintiffs' deadline to file
their motion for class certification to August 1, 2022.

On June 27, 2022, counsel for the parties advised the Court that
they have made progress in mediation, but that the second mediation
session had to be delayed until July 28, 2022. Based upon their
good faith belief that the case may settle through mediation, the
parties have requested an additional 90 day extension for briefing
of class certification issues.

Bradley County is a county located in the southeastern portion of
the U.S. state of Tennessee.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uJPxOk at no extra charge.[CC]

BROOKLYN IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS: Carlson Shareholder Suit Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Brooklyn ImmunoTherapeutics, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K/A
Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 1, 2022, that a class
action against the company was dismissed with prejudice in
September 2021.

On or about March 12, 2021, Douglas Carlson, a purported
stockholder of Brooklyn (then known as NTN Buzztime, Inc.), filed a
verified class action complaint against Brooklyn and its then
current members of the board of directors, for allegedly breaching
their fiduciary duties and violating Section 211(c) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law.  In particular, plaintiff seeks to compel
the defendants to hold an annual stockholder meeting.  

Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment at the same time that he
filed his complaint.  In order to moot the claim addressed in the
complaint, Brooklyn agreed to hold its annual meeting on June 29,
2021, which date was subsequently rescheduled to August 20, 2021.
On or about May 6, 2021, the parties entered into a stipulation,
which was "so ordered" by the court, extending defendants' time to
respond to the complaint and to file their answering brief in
opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on or before
July 16, 2021 and providing that plaintiff's reply brief in support
of his motion for summary judgment is due on or before August 20,
2021.

On or about July 12, 2021, the parties entered in a further amended
scheduling order, which provided that defendants were to respond to
the complaint and file their answering brief in opposition to
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on or before September 16,
2021 and plaintiff was to file its reply brief in support of his
motion for summary judgment on or before October 20, 2021.  

On August 20, 2021, Brooklyn convened its 2021 annual meeting. Due
to the lack of a required quorum, the meeting was adjourned to
September 3, 2021. Thereafter, Brooklyn obtained a quorum, and the
annual meeting was held on September 3, 2021. On September 10,
2021, Brooklyn filed a report on Form 8-K with the SEC announcing
the results of the annual meeting.

On September 16, 2021, the parties filed a stipulation seeking
voluntary dismissal of the complaint as moot. The Court entered the
dismissal on September 16, 2021 with prejudice as to the named
plaintiff and without prejudice as to other members of the
purported class and retained jurisdiction for the purpose of
determining any fee application to the extent it cannot be resolved
amicably the parties.

Thereafter, on or about November 12, 2022, the parties resolved
plaintiff's counsel's request for an award of fees and expenses for
the purported benefit that Carlson contended was received by
stockholders as a result of his action.

Brooklyn ImmunoTherapeutics, Inc. is a clinical-stage
biopharmaceutical company based in California.


BROOKLYN IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS: Faces EPEF Shareholder Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Brooklyn ImmunoTherapeutics, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K/A
Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 1, 2022, that a class
action lawsuit was filed against the company alleging breach of
fiduciary duty.

On March 30, 2022, a counsel to shareholder Emerald Private Equity
Fund, LLC advised the company that it was prepared to file suit
against it, certain current and former directors of the company,
and the company's financial advisor in connection with its merger
with NTN Buzztime, Inc., on behalf of Emerald and a class of
similarly situated stockholders with respect to some or all of the
foregoing matters, alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
conversion and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.

Emerald's counsel has expressed a willingness to engage in private
pre-suit early resolution discussions with the Company and its
financial advisor on behalf of individual stockholders whom counsel
represents in addition to Emerald.

Brooklyn ImmunoTherapeutics, Inc. is a clinical-stage
biopharmaceutical company based in California.


CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Claim Under TCPA in Cheng v. Speier
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CLYDE CHENG, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CONGRESSWOMAN JACKIE
SPEIER, Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-00083-SI (N.D. Cal.), Judge Susan
Illston of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California dismisses without leave to amend the Plaintiff's cause
of action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

On June 24, 2022, the Court held a hearing on Defendant
Congresswoman Jackie Speier's motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Background

On Jan. 6, 2022, Plaintiff Clyde Cheng filed a class action
complaint against Defendant Congresswoman Jackie Speier, who
represents California's 14th Congressional District. Cheng filed
the lawsuit to stop Congresswoman Speier from placing telephone
calls that play her prerecorded voice without first obtaining
permission, and to obtain redress for all persons injured by her
conduct.

Mr. Cheng asserts three causes of action against Congresswoman
Speier in both her official and individual capacities: (1)
Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47
U.S.C. Section 227(b); (2) Violation of the Unlawful Prong of the
California Unfair Competition Law; and (3) Violation of the Unfair
Prong of the California Unfair Competition Law.

The proposed TCPA class is defined as "all persons in the United
States who: (1) from the last 4 years to present (2) Defendant
called (3) on his or her cellular telephone."

Between November 2020 and July 2021, Cheng received four calls on
his cellular phone from Congresswoman Speier inviting him to
participate in town halls. He alleges that he never consented to
receive calls from Congresswoman Speier and that he tried to
opt-out but there were no instructions on how to do so.

Mr. Cheng reported the unsolicited phone calls to his attorney, and
in July 2021, Cheng's attorney wrote a letter to Congresswoman
Speier's office, informing her of the violation, requesting
information on how Cheng's number was obtained, and requesting that
Cheng be added to a "do not call" list. On July 27, 2021,
Congresswoman Speier's office responded that Cheng would be placed
on the "do not call" list, but did not explain how the office
obtained Cheng's phone number. On Dec. 15, 2021, Cheng received
another unsolicited call on his cell phone with Congresswoman
Speier's prerecorded voice, again inviting him to participate in a
town hall.

Mr. Cheng alleges Congresswoman Speier violated the TCPA by not
obtaining consent from the call recipients to receive the messages,
playing the prerecorded messages, failing to add Cheng to the "do
not call" list, and "willfully" and/or "knowingly" making such
calls. He alleges Congresswoman Speier invaded his and the class's
privacy, causing them to suffer actual damages that entitles them
to $500-$1,500 in civil fines for each violation and an injunction
requiring Congresswoman Speier to cease such calls.

Mr. Cheng alleges that Congresswoman Speier's actions also violated
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200. He alleges that Congresswoman
Speier violated the unlawful prong of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
Section 17200 based upon the TCPA violations. Furthermore, Cheng
alleges these calls offend "an established public policy or that
are immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers" and are therefore in violation of the
unfair prong of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200. He and the
class members seek injunctive relief under Cal. Civ. Code Section
17204 requiring Congresswoman Speier to cease the phone calls.

On April 14, 2022, Congresswoman Speier filed a Notice of
Substitution of the United States as Defendant on Counts II & III,
the state law causes of action. The Notice states that the Federal
Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346(b); 2671-2680 (the
"FTCA"), as amended by the Westfall Act, requires any suit against
federal employees for "their negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions taken within the scope of their office or employment" to
proceed as "a suit against the United States."

The Notice states the Attorney General can certify a federal
employee was acting within their official duties at the time of the
claim, and that once certified, the claim will be deemed an action
against the United States. Michelle Lo, Chief of the Civil
Division, has certified Congresswoman Speier was acting within the
scope of her employment. Cheng opposes the Notice and
certification.

On April 14, 2022, Congresswoman Speier moved to dismiss Cheng's
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Discussion

I. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227

A. Official Capacity

Congresswoman Speier moves to dismiss Cheng's TCPA claim against
her in her official capacity for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. The United States, as a
sovereign, is immune from suits if it has not consented to be sued
on each claim.

Congresswoman Speier contends that the Supreme Court has held that
the United States is immune from suits arising under the TCPA,
citing Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016).

Mr. Cheng's opposition does not address Campbell-Ewald. Instead,
Cheng asserts that he has alleged the elements of a TCPA claim, and
he cites several cases for the proposition that courts regularly
decline to dismiss well pled prerecorded voice TCPA claims, even
those originating from politicians and political parties. However,
as Congresswoman Speier notes in her reply, those cases are
inapposite as they involve TCPA claims against private political
campaigns and the courts were not evaluating whether the defendants
were entitled to sovereign immunity. Mr. Cheng cites other
inapposite cases involving claims against government contractors.

Judge Illston notes that here, Cheng is not suing a federal
contractor, but a member of Congress. Under Campbell-Ewald, the
"United States and its agencies are not subject to the TCPA's
prohibitions because no statute lifts their immunities."

Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss
Cheng's TCPA claim against Congresswoman Speier in her official
capacity on the basis of sovereign immunity.

B. Individual Capacity

Mr. Cheng has also brought suit under the TCPA against
Congresswoman Speier in her individual capacity. Congresswoman
Speier argues that the individual capacity claim must be dismissed
based on sovereign immunity because the federal government is the
real party in interest.

Congresswoman Speier argues that the federal government is the real
party in interest because any relief granted would necessarily
limit how a member of Congress allocates his or her resources and
dictate what members of Congress and their staffs may do when
contacting constituents. Congresswoman Speier asserts that
constituent communications are one of the basic functions of a
members' official duties, and she notes that costs related to
constituent communications are reimbursed from each member's
Representational Allowance, see 2 U.S.C. Section 5341, and that the
House Communication Standards Commission sets standards for
official mass communications from Members of Congress, including
robocalls.

For support, Congresswoman Speier cites the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Cunningham v. Lester, in which a consumer brought a
class action against federal employees in their individual
capacities alleging that the defendants violated the TCPA by
instructing a contractor to send prerecorded messages to
approximately 680,000 people, none of whom had previously consented
to receive such messages, advertising the availability of health
insurance coverage under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA).

Mr. Cheng does not address Cunningham, nor does he respond to the
Defendant's arguments that the remedy sought here -- injunctive
relief and class-wide monetary damages -- is actually relief
against the sovereign. Instead, Cheng asserts an individual
capacity suit is proper because Congresswoman Speier was not acting
within the scope of her employment because she had discretion in
how she contacted her constituents and the "course of her duties
did not require Ms. Speier to conduct numerous telephone virtual
halls or to repeatedly promote them without regard to who actually
wanted to be contacted or asked not to be contacted." He also
argues that Congresswoman Speier's conduct was unreasonable and,
circularly, that it violates the TCPA and is, therefore, outside
the scope of her employment.

The Court concludes that the federal government is the real party
in interest and, therefore, that sovereign immunity bars the
individual capacity TCPA claim.

Mr. Cheng does not dispute that constituent communications and town
halls are part of Congresswoman Speier's job duties; he does not
allege, nor could he, that Speier's phone calls were made for a
private purpose, or that her calls were unconstitutional. More
importantly, the relief Cheng seeks is effectively relief against
the sovereign. Cheng seeks TCPA damages of between $500-$1,500 per
violation on a class-wide basis, as well as injunctive relief.
Injunctive relief or a monetary judgment, such as Cheng seeks,
would alter how all members of Congress communicate with their
constituents and lead to a change in the allocation of funding for
reimbursements, Judge Illston opines.

Accordingly, because the federal government is the real party in
interest, the individual capacity claim is barred by sovereign
immunity and dismissed without leave to amend. As such, the Court
does not address the parties' arguments regarding whether
Congresswoman Speier would be entitled to qualified immunity on
this claim.

II. California Unfair Competition Law - Unlawful Prong & Unfair
Prong Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200

Because the Court has dismissed the federal cause of action, the
Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining causes
of action brought under California state law.

Accordingly, the Court does not address the parties' arguments
regarding the state law claims, including whether the United States
was properly substituted as a defendant on those counts or the
applicability of the FTCA and its exemptions.

Conclusion

For these reasons and for good cause shown, the Court dismisses the
TCPA cause of action without leave to amend and declines to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining California state law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c)(3).

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 4, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3svw9r6j from Leagle.com.


CANADA: Reforms Needed to Address RCMP Systemic Problems
--------------------------------------------------------
Toronto Star reports that the level of violence and incidents of
sexual assault that were reported in many claims were shocking, and
the number of sexual assaults that occurred . . . raises concerns
about workplace safety and security."

The leaders of any workplace beset by such violence would know
enough to call the police immediately. Except, apparently, when
those leaders are the police -- specifically, members of a Canadian
icon, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Yes, the workplace in the above quote is that of the RCMP, and the
quote comes from the recent report concerning just the latest,
though not the last, nor the least, class action lawsuit against
the Mounties.

The "Tiller report" details the systemic abuse of civilian
employees of the RCMP, such as clerical and support workers, who
were treated as the "lowest-of-the-low" by supervisors.

The employees were subjected to a daily deluge of pornography,
sexualized comments, unwanted touching and racial and ethnic slurs,
and they suffered lasting damage to their mental and physical
health, careers, finances and family and personal relationships.

These experiences echo those of female and sexual minority members
of the RCMP, such as RCMP officers, which were detailed in a
separate report issued in late 2020 by former Supreme Court of
Canada Justice Michel Bastarache.

Members of the RCMP described experiences almost identical to those
suffered by civilian employees, with Bastarache stating that the
"level of violence and sexual assault that was reported was
shocking." More than 130 cases of rape were documented, along with
a sexualized environment and highly degrading and discriminatory
comments and treatment.

These two reports won't be the end of the story, as the RCMP still
faces further class action lawsuits, and might well end up on the
hook for several billion dollars in damages. Clearly, the badge is
badly tarnished, and it will take a lot more than a little polish
to restore the reputation of the national police.

Bastarache therefore offered numerous recommendations for reform,
recommendations which authors of the Tiller report said they
"generally support." Perhaps most important, the justice called for
"an in depth, external and independent review of the organization
and future of the RCMP as a federal policing organization."

This recommendation, which has been supported by, among others, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Human
Rights Watch, the Feminist Alliance for International Action, and
by advocates for Indigenous women, would involve a comprehensive
review of the culture, structure and accountability of the RCMP.

Although an independent review will require a major commitment in
both human and financial terms, it won't prove more costly than yet
more abuse and more class action lawsuits. The RCMP's problems are
not merely within the system, but are rather, problems with the
system itself, which means the system -- the structure, core and
culture of the organization -- must be examined from the outside.

This is not to suggest that piecemeal reforms are irrelevant. Both
reports stress the urgency of establishing an external, independent
process for receiving and resolving complaints of harassment and
misconduct, and both emphasize the need to address the conditions
that lead to abuse.

Procedures involving recruitment, training, posting, promotions,
leadership, employment flexibility and parental leave all need to
be examined and rectified if they have a detrimental effect on
women and members of ethnic and sexual minority groups. That, too,
will require a major commitment, but it's a commitment the RCMP
must make.

After all, "the title 'Royal,'" states the federal government, "is
a sign of honour and distinction . . . It is very sparingly granted
and strict standards apply." Now it's time for RCMP to live up to
it. [GN]

CASCADE COLLECTIONS: $55K in Atty. Fees, Costs Awarded in Rodriguez
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah awards the
Plaintiff's counsel $55,000 for attorney fees, litigation costs,
and class administration costs and approves $1,000 incentive award
for the Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. CASCADE COLLECTIONS LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-00120-JNP-DBP (D. Utah).

The Court approves the award of $55,000 for attorney fees and
costs. Having reviewed Rodriguez's motion, the Court determines
that this amount is reasonable given the circumstances of this
case.

The Court, however, declines to approve the requested incentive
award. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provides for
the following remedies for a claim brought under this statute: (1)
actual damages; (2) in a class action lawsuit, statutory damages up
to $1,000 for each named plaintiff and "such amount as the court
may allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum
individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per
centum of the net worth of the debt collector"; and (3) attorney
fees and costs.

District Judge Jill N. Parrish notes that there is no claim for
actual damages in this case. And, as noted, the Court has approved
an award for attorney fees and costs. The only other authorized
remedy for Rodriguez, as a named plaintiff, is a statutory damages
award in an amount not to exceed $1,000.

Because the FDCPA does not authorize an additional incentive award
for a named plaintiff, the Court may not grant the relief requested
by Rodriguez, Judge Parrish opines, citing Nat'l R. R. Passenger
Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R. R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974).

Although Rodriguez cites a number of district court rulings
authorizing incentive awards for class representatives, those cases
are not persuasive, Judge Parrish holds. Most of these cases do not
involve a class action brought under the FDCPA. Although one of the
cases cited by Rodriguez does authorize an incentive award to a
class representative in an action brought under the FDCPA, that
case does not attempt to square the incentive award with the
remedies permitted under the Act (Gross v. Washington Mut. Bank,
F.A., No. 02 CV 4135 (RML), 2006 WL 318814, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,
2006)). Instead, the Gross court cited other district court rulings
approving incentive payments and, without analysis, found that the
incentive award agreed to by the parties was in line with the
amounts approved in those rulings.

At the hearing on Rodriguez's motion for approval of the incentive
award, the Court expressed its concerns regarding the requested
$1,500 incentive award. The parties then discussed the settlement
agreement out of the presence of the Court.

After the parties went back on the record, Rodriguez and Cascade
Collections orally agreed to modify their settlement agreement.
They agreed to delete the clause requiring Cascade to pay a $1,500
incentive award to Rodriguez and to replace it with Cascade's
agreement to pay $1,000 in statutory damages to Rodriguez in his
role as a named plaintiff in this action.

Because the parties have agreed to this amount, which comports with
15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(a), the Court approves the modified
agreement.

Conclusion

The Court approves the requested award for attorney fees,
litigation costs, and class administration costs in the amount of
$55,000. The Court also approves the modified request for an award
of statutory damages in the amount of $1,000 to named Plaintiff
Francisco Rodriguez.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order dated
June 27, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdctn7rz from
Leagle.com.


CELLULAR SOUTH: Faces Johnson Suit Over Telemarketing Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Faith Johnson, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Cellular South, Inc. d/b/a C Spire, Case No.
3:22-cv-00237 (S.D. Tex., July 5, 2022) is a class action for
damages resulting from the illegal actions of Cellular South in
placing repeated telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff's
telephone -- over Plaintiff's request for Defendant to stop -- in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, thereby
invading the Plaintiff's privacy.

C Spire is a technology company that sells internet and cellular
telephone services and consumer electronic devices. To encourage
people to purchase its good and services and advertise various
promotions, C Spire operates an aggressive telemarketing campaign
where it repeatedly sends text messages to telephone numbers that
have been placed on the National Do-Not-Call Registry and over the
messaged party's objections, the lawsuit says.

Indeed, the Plaintiff's telephone number has been listed on the
National Do-Not-Call Registry since August 2008, and Plaintiff has
repeatedly asked C Spire to "Stop" messaging her; however, C Spire
ignored the requests and proceeded to place repeated additional
telemarketing text messages to the Plaintiff, the lawsuit adds.

Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of similarly
situated persons who have also received unwanted telemarketing text
messages from C Spire, and to certify the following class:

  -- Do Not Call Registry Class

     "All persons in the United States who from four years prior
to
     the filing of this action (1) were sent text messages by or on

     behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-
     month period; (3) where the person's telephone number had been

     listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least
     30 days; (4) for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or
     rental of Defendant's products and/or services; and (5) where

     either (a) Defendant did not obtain prior express written
     consent to message the person or (b) the called person
     previously advised Defendant to "STOP" messaging them."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen Taylor, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, L.L.C.
          43 Danbury Road, 3rd Floor
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424
          E-mail: staylor@lemberglaw.com

CHERRY HILL: E.D. California Dismisses Ayers Suit Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
approved the parties' stipulation for voluntary dismissal, without
prejudice, of the lawsuit captioned REBECCA LOPPICOLO AYERS,
individually and on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CHERRY HILL PROGRAMS, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:20-cv-00493-DAD-BAM (E.D. Cal.).

On June 24, 2022, the parties filed a stipulation requesting
voluntary dismissal of this putative class action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). In particular, the parties
stipulated and agreed to dismissal of the action, without
prejudice, and with each party to bear their own attorney's fees
and costs.

In their stipulation, the parties invoke Rule 41(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for actions to be
dismissed "only by court order, on terms that the court considers
proper." The Court notes that the parties' stipulation appears to
be "a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared" and, therefore, could be dismissed under Rule 41(a)(1)
without entry of a court order.

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation and good cause appearing,
District Judge Dale A. Drozd ordered that:

   1. The action is dismissed, without prejudice;

   2. The parties will bear their own fees and costs in this
      action; and

   3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 27, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/fcw8v9u5 from Leagle.com.


COLORADO CORING: Seek Extension to File Class Cert Response
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as THOMAS SNIDER, on behalf
of himself and all other plaintiffs similarly situated, known and
unknown, v. COLORADO CORING & CUTTING, INC., a Colorado
Corporation; RICK GONZALEZ, individually; and REAL CONCRETE AND
CORING, INC., a Colorado Corporation d/b/a COLORADO CORING &
CUTTING, Case No. 1:22-cv-01289-RMR-SKC (D. Colo.), the Defendants
ask the Court to enter an order extending the deadline for their
Response to Plaintiff's amended motion for stage-one conditional
certification of collective action by 30 days, to and including
July 29, 2022.

The Plaintiff Thomas Snider filed his First Amended Complaint on
June 7, 2022. On June 8, 2022, the Defendants executed a waiver and
acceptance of service of the Complaint. The Defendants' deadline to
answer or otherwise respond to the First Amended Complaint is
August 8, 2022.

The  Plaintiff filed the Motion on June 8, 2022. The Plaintiff's
counsel provided Defendants' counsel with a copy of the Motion.

The Plaintiff does not oppose a 30-day extension. Defendants may
request an additional extension of time so that Defendants may
answer or otherwise respond to the First Amended Complaint before
responding to the Motion, should that become necessary, the
Defendants say.

No party will be prejudiced by the proposed extension. The proposed
extension will not affect any other deadlines in this matter, the
Defendants add.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated June 29, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3AKXk2h at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel D. Engelson, Esq.
          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          7900 E. Union Avenue, Suite 1100
          Denver, CO 80237
          E-mail: sengelson@billhornlaw.com
                  jbillhorn@billhornlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Susan S. Sperber, Esq.
          Abby C. Harder, Esq.
          LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP
          1601 19 th Street, Suite 1000
          Denver, CO 80202
          E-mail: ssperber@lewisroca.com
                  aharder@lewisroca.com

CORE CIVIC: Court Denies Bid to Reconsider Dismissal of Bacon Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Michael A. Bacon, Plaintiff v. Core Civic, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-00914-JAD-VCF (D. Nev.), Judge
Jennifer A. Dorsey of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada denies Bacon's motion for reconsideration of the Court's
dismissal order.

I. Background

Pro se Plaintiff Bacon brought a Bivens action alleging that the
conditions of his confinement at a privately run detention facility
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Because he applied to proceed
in forma pauperis, Judge Dorsey screened his claims under 28 U.S.C.
Sectuib 1915A. That screening revealed that he failed to state a
colorable Bivens claim, so she dismissed his complaint with limited
leave to amend. Bacon's amended complaint failed to cure the
deficiencies she noted in her initial dismissal order, so Judge
Dorsey dismissed that complaint with prejudice and closed the case.
Bacon appealed, but the appellate court dismissed that appeal for
lack of jurisdiction because his notice of appeal was untimely.

In the intervening period between Bacon's notice of appeal and the
Ninth Circuit's dismissal of his appeal, the magistrate judge in
the case denied Bacon's motions "for addresses, class action, and
copies" and "for docket sheets and for copies" because the Court
lacked jurisdiction to consider them while the appeal remained
pending. The magistrate judge instructed Bacon to refile the
motions once the Ninth Circuit's mandate issued.

Mr. Bacon now objects to that order, seeks to refile those motions
for this court's consideration, and -- through a series of
additional motions, objections, letters, memoranda, notices, and
requests for judicial notice -- attempts to revive his case and his
appellate rights. Judge Dorsey recognizes -- and is sympathetic --
that the developments in the case are frustrating to Bacon. But
because she finds that his arguments lack merit, she denies all his
requests with one exception: She directs the Clerk of Court to send
him a courtesy copy of the docket and the dismissal order in the
case.

II. Discussion

A. Referral to this district's Pro Bono Attorney Pilot Program does
not create a right to representation in civil-rights cases.

The central objection in many of Bacon's filings is that the Court
dismissed his case despite having granted his request for a pro
bono attorney. This objection is grounded in a fundamental
misunderstanding of what it means to have such a request granted.
Judge Dorsey holds that there is no constitutional right to an
attorney in a civil-rights case, but in an effort to assist some
unrepresented plaintiffs with their cases, the District of Nevada
adopted a Pro Bono Attorney Pilot Program. Although the Court
referred Bacon's case to the program in July 2020 with the goal of
having it find an attorney to take his case, by the time the Court
dismissed the case eight months later, the program had not located
an attorney to take his case, so Bacon remained unrepresented.
While it is true that Bacon's case was referred to the program,
that referral did not entitle him to an attorney; the Court's
decision to refer his case to the program was no guarantee that the
case would not get dismissed; the litigation was not stayed or
paused while the search for counsel proceeded; and Bacon's
unrepresented status does not now warrant reconsideration of the
case's dismissal.

B. To the extent that Bacon seeks reconsideration of the court's
dismissal order, his request is untimely and does not present
extraordinary circumstances.

Although none of Bacon's filings is styled as a motion for relief
from a final judgment due to excusable neglect under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 60(b), Judge Dorsey liberally construes
his objections to her dismissal order as one.

Mr. Bacon argues that the Court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss his
case while it was "suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic." He says
that someone who spoke to him about the Pro Bono Attorney Pilot
Program told him that the program was suspended during the early
days of the pandemic. Regardless of the status of the program or
its efforts to find him an attorney, Judge Dorsey says, Bacon's
case was never "suspended" -- indeed the docket shows that Bacon
knew his case continued to progress because he twice amended his
complaint between his referral to the program and the dismissal of
his case.

Even if the incorrect information Bacon allegedly received gave
rise to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,"
his objection was lodged 15 months after Judge Dorsey's dismissal
order and falls well beyond FRCP 60(b)(1)'s time restriction
requiring such a motion to be filed within one year of the entry of
judgment. And although FRCP 60(b)(6) does not have a time
restriction, Bacon's circumstances are not so extraordinary that
they warrant relief under that rule. The pandemic undoubtedly
impacted the judicial process, but it has been our shared reality
for more than two years now, and it had been so for more than a
year at the time Judge Dorsey dismissed with prejudice Bacon's
amended complaint. So she denies his motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal order.

C. Bacon's requests for information and copies

Many of Bacon's requests have been filed with the Court as letters
or other forms of correspondence. But the Court does not correspond
with litigants. The Court, including the Clerk of Court's office,
takes no action in response to letters. In addition, an
incarcerated litigant has no constitutional right to free
photocopying. A prisoner-litigant proceeding in forma pauperis who
wants copies of electronically filed documents from the court must
pay $0.10 per page to receive them. So, Judge Dorsey denies all of
Bacon's requests for copies. But she directs the Clerk of Court to
mail Bacon without charge a copy of the docket sheet in the case,
along with a copy of the dismissal order.

D. Bacon's request to reinstate his appeal rights

Finally, Bacon asks the Court to reinstate his right to appeal the
dismissal of the case. Though he did appeal, that challenge was
dismissed as untimely because it was filed more than eight months
late. Bacon argues that he is blameless for the delay because he
was not sent a copy of the dismissal order. But Bacon was sent a
copy of that order, and it was returned as undeliverable because he
had not yet notified the court of his change of address. Bacon's
failure to timely submit a notice of change of address does not
provide a reason to reinstate his right to an appeal.

Even if Bacon's circumstances could justify reinstating his
appellate rights, Judge Dorsey holds that the Court lacks the
authority to grant Bacon's belated request to do so. Because Bacon
filed his request more than 180 days after the dismissal order was
entered and more than 14 days after he received notice of that
order, reopening of the appellate deadline is not available from
the district court.

III. Conclusion

Judge Dorsey denies Bacon's motions, objections, letters,
memoranda, and requests.

The Clerk of Court is directed to send Bacon copies of the
dismissal order and of the docket sheet in the case.

No further documents may be submitted in the closed case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4bd6yar5 from Leagle.com.


CORECIVIC INC: Extension of Deadlines to File Responses Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, et
al., v. CORECIVIC, INC., Case No. 4:18-cv-00070-CDL (M.D. Ga.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order granting their motion for
an extension of the deadlines to file Responses to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification and Daubert Motion to Exclude
Defendant's Proposed Expert Dr. Joseph V. Penn's Testimony and
Opinions and the corresponding Replies, and to exceed the page
limitations for those filings:

                                  Current         Proposed
                                  Deadline        Deadline

-- Defendant's Response to     July 8, 2022      Aug. 5, 2022
    Motion for Class
    Certification:

-- Defendant's Response to     Aug. 5, 2022      July 8, 2022
    Daubert Motion:

-- The Plaintiffs' Reply       July 22, 2022     Sept. 9, 2022
    in support of Motion for
    Class Certification:

-- The Plaintiffs' Reply in    July 22, 2022     Sept. 9, 2022
    support of Daubert
    Motion:

CoreCivic, formerly the Corrections Corporation of America, is a
company that owns and manages private prisons and detention centers
and operates others on a concession basis.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated June 29, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3cdou7y at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Caitlin J. Sandley, Esq.
          Jaqueline Aranda Osorno, Esq.
          Rebecca Cassler, Esq.
          Meredith B. Stewart, Esq.
          Vidhi Bamzai, Esq.
          SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
          400 Washington Ave.
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (334) 303-6822
          Facsimile: (334) 956-8481
          E-mail: cj.sandley@splcenter.org
                  jackie.aranda@splcenter.org
                  rebecca.cassler@splcenter.org
                  meredith.stewart@splcenter.org
                  vidhi.bamzai@splcenter.org

               - and -

          Alan B. Howard, Esq.
          John T. Dixon, Esq.
          Emily B. Cooper, Esq.
          Jessica Tseng Hasen, Esq.
          Jessica L. Everett-Garcia, Esq.
          John H. Gray, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          1155 Avenue of the Americas, 22nd Floor
          New York, NY 10036-2711
          Telephone: (212) 262-6900
          Facsimile: (212) 977-1649
          E-mail: ahoward@perkinscoie.com
                  johndixon@perkinscoie.com
                  ecooper@perkinscoie.com
                  jhasen@perkinscoie.com
                  jeverettgarcia@perkinscoie.com
                  jhgray@perkinscoie.com

               - and -

          Azadeh Shahshahani, Esq.
          Priyanka Bhatt, Esq.
          PROJECT SOUTH
          9 Gammon Avenue SE
          Atlanta, GA 30315
          Telephone: (404) 622-0602
          Facsimile: (404) 622-4137
          E-mail: azadeh@projectsouth.org
          priyanka@projectsouth.org

The Defendants are represented by:

          Nicholas D. Acedo, Esq.
          Daniel P. Struck, Esq.
          Rachel Love, Esq.
          Nicholas D. Acedo, Esq.
          Ashlee B. Hesman, Esq.
          Jacob B. Lee, Esq.
          Eden G. Cohen, Esq.
          STRUCK LOVE BOJANOWSKI & ACEDO, PLC
          3100 West Ray Road, Suite 300
          Chandler, AZ 85226
          Telephone: (480) 420-1600
          Facsimile: (480) 420-1695
          E-mail: dstruck@strucklove.com
                  rlove@strucklove.com
                  nacedo@strucklove.com
                  ahesman@strucklove.com
                  jlee@strucklove.com
                  ecohen@strucklove.com

               - and -

          Jacob D. Massee, Esq.
          David Bobo Mullens, Esq.
          OLIVER MANER LLP
          PO Box 10186
          Savannah, GA 31412
          Telephone: (912) 236-3311
          Facsimile: (912) 236-8725
          E-mail: jmassee@olivermaner.com
                  dbmullens@olivermaner.com

CROW VOTE: Seeks to Reschedule Class Certification Bid Hearing
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRIDGET WARD and LISA
WARD, behalf of themselves and all persons on similarly situated,
v. CROW VOTE LLC, DARRIN AUSTIN, EDWARD MATNEY, and DOES 1 through
100 inclusive, Case No. 8:21-cv-01110-FWS-DFM (C.D. Cal.), the
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order rescheduling the hearing
on Plaintiffs' motion to certify class and consolidating it with
the hearing on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, from
July 28, 2022 to August 11, 2022 at 8 10:00 a.m., or another date
convenient to the Court, for the reasons that:

  1) the arguments 9 underlying the two motions are connected,
     and

  2) consolidation would be an efficient use of the Court's time
     and resources.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated June 29, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uGROdm at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Scott J. Hyman, Esq.
          SEVERSON & WERSON APC
          19100 Von Karman Avenue, Ste 700
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (949) 442-7110
          E-mail: sjh@severson.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Penner, Esq.
          Lewis S. Wiener, Esq.
          Ronald W. Zdrojeski, Esq.
          EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (US) LLP
          12255 El Camino Real, Ste 100
          San Diego, CA 92130-4088
          Telephone: (858) 252-2510
          E-mail: ScottPenner@eversheds-sutherland.us
                  LewisWiener@eversheds-sutherland.us
                  RonZdrojeski@eversheds-sutherland.us

EAGLE EXPRESS: Emery Seeks Unpaid OT & Damages Under FLSA, IMWL
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jenna Emery, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. Eagle Express Mail, LLC dba The MBS Store, and Eliot Louis
Deters, individually, Case No. 3:22-cv-01439 (S.D. Ill., July 6,
2022) is a class action against the Defendant under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law for unpaid overtime
compensation, and related penalties and damages.

The Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant and she alleges
that Defendant failed and refused to pay the statutorily required
overtime premium for all hours worked over 40 in a designated
workweek. She further asserts that the Defendant's payroll policies
and practices were and are in direct violation of the FLSA. The
Defendant's payroll policies and practices were and are in direct
violation of the IMWL.

Plaintiff Jenna Emery is an adult resident of Collinsville, St.
Clair County, Illinois. The Plaintiff and prospective members of
the collective are those current and former non-exempt employees of
Defendant who were not paid overtime premiums for hours worked over
40 in a workweek.

Eagle Express is in the Packaging and Labeling Services
business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip Oliphant, Esq.
          Alan G. Crone, Esq.
          Edward Rolwes, Esq.
          THE CRONE LAW FIRM, PLC
          88 Union Avenue, 14th Floor
          Memphis, TN 38103
          Telephone: (800) 403-7868
          Facsimile: (901) 737-7740
          E-mail: acrone@cronelawfirmplc.com
                  poliphant@cronelawfirmplc.com

EL CAZADOR: Hernandez-Ramirez Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE HERNANDEZ-RAMIREZ, on behalf of himself, and others similarly
situated v. EL CAZADOR, INC. and CAZADORES CORP., doing business as
EL CAZADOR RESTAURANT, and ALEJANDRO MENDOZA, individually, Case
No. 1:22-cv-05690 (S.D.N.Y., July 5, 2022) seeks to recover unpaid
wages and overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff was employed as a cook and grill person at
Defendants' restaurants known as "El Cazador,"  beginning in 2006,
through March 3, 2022 without interruption.

During his employment, the Plaintiff contends that he worked over
40 hours per week but was not paid at time and one-half his regular
rate of pay as required by the state and federal law.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter Hans Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          200 Park A venue - 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10166
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: pcooper@jcpclaw.com

EMERGENCY MEDICAL: 4th Cir. Favors Employees in FLSA Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kalvis Golde, writing for SCOTUS Blog, reports that the Petitions
of the Week column highlights a selection of cert petitions
recently filed in the Supreme Court. A list of all petitions we're
watching is available here.

The blog highlights cert petitions that ask the court to consider,
among other things, whether two groups of North Carolina employees
were denied pay or benefits by the state in violation of a federal
employment law and the Constitution.

Emergency Medical Services employees in Cleveland County, North
Carolina, work long shifts, and as a result are eligible for a mix
of "straight-time" and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. County EMS employees are salaried based on an hourly rate that
complies with the FLSA. In calculating that hourly rate, however,
the county includes all time worked by EMS employees, both
straight-time and overtime hours. EMS employee Sara Conner sued the
county in federal district court, arguing that this formula
violates the FLSA by artificially deflating the effective
straight-time wage she was promised in her salary - known in
employment law as a "gap-time" claim.

Siding with Conner and a group of EMS employees, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 4th Circuit viewed the FLSA as "silent" on the
question of gap-time wages. To resolve the stalemate, the court
granted deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. to a regulation by
the Department of Labor that reads the act in the employees' favor.
Under Skidmore deference -- a more lenient standard than the more
widely known Chevron deference -- courts may choose, but are not
required, to agree with an agency's reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous law if they view that interpretation as persuasive. In
Cleveland County v. Conner, the county asks the justices to decide
whether Skidmore deference was appropriate here, as well as whether
gap-time claims exist at all under the FLSA.

In Cleveland County and beyond, the state of North Carolina offers
several medical-insurance plans to all retired state employees. In
2011, the state legislature amended one of those plans to begin
requiring a small monthly premium. In doing so, it relied on a
clause in the original statute stating that the legislature
"reserves the right to alter, amend, or repeal" the health benefits
for retired employees at any time. That change triggered a lawsuit
from a group of retired state employees, which was certified as a
class action on behalf of the more than 220,000 former workers who
could have signed up for the previously premium-free plan.

The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled for the employees. The
contracts clause in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution
provides that "No State shall . . . pass any  . . . Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts." Although the right-to-amend clause
indicates that the legislature never intended to establish a
"contract" with retired state employees for health benefits, the
court held, the reliance of those former employees on the state
plans nevertheless creates a contractual right, and the state
violated that right by amending its plan. In State Health Plan for
Teachers and State Employees v. Lake, North Carolina asks the
justices to decide whether a law with a right-to-amend clause like
its own can create a contractual right under the Constitution.

A list of the featured petitions is below:
Cleveland County, North Carolina v. Conner
21-1538
Issues: (1) Whether the Fair Labor Standards Act allows an
employee, who has been paid at least the required minimum wage and
overtime pay at a rate that is at least one and one-half times her
regular rate, to sue her employer for and recover unpaid
straight-time wages earned in weeks when she worked overtime; and
(2) whether Skidmore v. Swift & Co. allows courts to independently
evaluate an agency's nonbinding interpretation of a statute.

State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees v. Lake
21-1565
Issue: Whether a state legislature's express reservation of the
right to amend a statute providing benefits to government employees
bars a claim under the Constitution's contracts clause based on the
legislature's later decision to amend those benefits.

Biogen International GmbH v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.
21-1567
Issue: Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112's requirement that a patent
specification "contain a written description of the invention" is
met when the specification describes the invention, or whether the
specification must also disclose data that demonstrates the claimed
invention is "effective" and emphasize the claimed invention by
singling it out and describing it more than once.

Spade v. Department of Justice
21-1570
Issue: Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to
address what injuries fall within the scope of the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act. [GN]

ENHANCED RECOVERY: Madlinger Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PATRICIA MADLINGER, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 21-00154 (FLW) (D.N.J.), Judge Freda L.
Wolfson of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint with
leave to amend.

I. Introduction

The action arises out of a debt collection letter. Plaintiff
Patricia Madlinger alleges that Defendant Enhanced Recovery Co.,
LLC ("ERC") violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the
"FDCPA") by sending out an allegedly misleading debt collection
letter in violation of 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692e and 1692g, and
improperly conveying the Plaintiff's private information to a
third-party in violation of Sections 1692c(b) and 1692f.

Pending before the Court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, as a threshold matter, the Court must
determine whether the Plaintiff has Article III standing to pursue
her claims. In that regard, both parties have submitted
supplemental briefing addressing the Plaintiff's standing.

II. Background

Ms. Madlinger allegedly took out a store credit card from Kohl's
for which Capital One, N.A. was the original creditor. At some
point thereafter, the Plaintiff failed to make further payments on
her account and defaulted. Capital One transferred the account to
ERC for the purpose of collecting the Plaintiff's debt.

As part of the Defendant's debt collection efforts, Defendant sent
a collection letter dated Jan. 6, 2020, to the Plaintiff. However,
the Plaintiff alleges that ERC did not mail the letter directly to
her. Instead, according to the Plaintiff, the Defendant relied on a
third-party vendor to prepare and mail the letter. She alleges
that, through its communication with the third-party vendor, the
Defendant disclosed personal and highly confidential information
about her, including her status as a debtor and the amount of debt
she owed to Capital One. In sharing this information, the Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant violated the FDCPA's prohibition on certain
communications with third parties, and used unfair means in
connection with the collection of a debt.   

Additionally, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated
sections 1692e, e(10), g, and g(b) of the FDCPA when it allegedly
confused her by including four separate addresses in its collection
letter. She alleges that the least sophisticated consumer would be
confused as to which "office" a debt verification letter should be
sent to because the fifth paragraph states that debt verification
should be sent to "ERC's office below," while the sixth paragraph
refers to "this office." According to the Plaintiff, "it is unclear
if 'ERC's office below' and 'this office' are the same or different
places," and the least sophisticated consumer could either conclude
that he or she would have to send out two separate debt
verification letters or be dissuaded from disputing the debt at
all.

Towards the bottom of the first page the letter includes a symbol
of an envelope and states "Send correspondence to: ERC(R), P.O. Box
57610, Jacksonville, FL 32241." There is a separate, detachable
pre-addressed portion of the letter below a perforated line that
includes both Madlinger's address, as well as another address for
ERC at P.O. Box 23870, Jacksonville, FL 32241-3870, that is
distinct from the "send correspondence to" address. Additionally,
at the top left of the detachable portion of the letter, it states
"Please do not send correspondence to this address. P.O Box 1259,
Dept 98696 Oaks, PA 19456." Finally, on the reverse side of the
letter alongside a federal notice and information directed to
residents from Tennessee, Minnesota, North Carolina, Colorado,
California, and Massachusetts, it states "Our Corporate Information
is: Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, Doing Business As, ERC(R)
and/or Enhanced Resource Centers 8014 Bayberry Road Jacksonville,
FL 32256."

The Plaintiff alleges that the "problem with the Collection Letter
is that it contains four separate addresses for the Defendant." In
short, she alleges that this confusion "overshadowed the disclosure
of the consumer's right to dispute the debt and obtain verification
of the debt."

On Jan. 5, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the
Defendant alleging that its use of multiple addresses in the
collection letter, dated Jan. 6, 2020, was false and misleading in
violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692, et seq.

The Defendant then moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's multiple
address claims. Following the Defendant's initial motion to
dismiss, the Plaintiff amended her complaint to add a third-party
disclosure claim. The Defendant moved to dismiss the amended
complaint. The Plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss.

Prior to assessing the pleadings, the Court denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss, without prejudice, pending further briefing from
the parties analyzing whether the Plaintiff has established
standing to bring each of her claims in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, ___ U.S. ___, 141
S.Ct. 2190 (2021).

III. Discussion

The question before the Court is whether the Plaintiff has alleged
that she suffered a concrete harm. The Supreme Court has explained
that "history and tradition offer a meaningful guide to the types
of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider." In
Spokeo, the Court instructed that courts should consider whether
the alleged injury has a "close relationship to a harm that has
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
English or American courts." Congress' judgment on the
identification of intangible harms is "instructive." Although
Congress plays an important role in identifying and elevating
intangible harms, a plaintiff does not satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement of standing whenever a statute grants a person a
statutory right, and authorizes lawsuits to vindicate that right.
Rather, "Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in
the context of a statutory violation."

Until recently, Spokeo left open the possibility that the mere
"risk of real harm" could satisfy the concreteness requirement. In
TransUnion, however, the Supreme Court clarified that material risk
of future harm can only serve as a basis for standing as a concrete
harm in suits where a person exposed to the risk of such harm
pursues injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring.

TransUnion involved a class-action against a credit reporting
agency that produced credit reports containing personal information
about individuals for purchase by third parties. The plaintiffs
claimed reputational injuries stemming from allegations that the
credit reporting agency, TransUnion, failed to use reasonable
procedures to ensure the accuracy of their credit files, in
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").

Specifically, TransUnion provided credit reports to third parties
bearing misleading alerts that the individual consumers' names were
"potential matches" to names on the U.S. Treasury Department's
Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") list of terrorists, drug
traffickers, and other serious criminals. However, while all class
members had OFAC alerts in their credit files, the parties
stipulated that only approximately 20% of the class had their
credit reports shared with third parties. Critically, the Court
held that only the members whose credit reports were shared with
third-party businesses demonstrated concrete reputational harm, and
thus had Article III standing.

In the instant case, the Plaintiff argues that she has suffered
concrete harms sufficient to confer Article III standing to bring
her multiple-addresses and disclosure claims in federal court.
"Standing is not dispensed in gross; rather plaintiffs must
demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each
form of relief that they seek (for example, injunctive relief and
damages)."

A. Plaintiff does not have standing to bring her multiple-addresses
claims.

In support of standing for her claim that the Defendant violated
sections 1692e and 1692g of the FDCPA by including multiple
addresses in its debt collection letter, the Plaintiff alleges that
the least sophisticated consumer would be confused as to where to
send a debt verification request and could believe that none of the
addresses in the letter was the correct address to dispute the
debt. With respect to injury and harm, the Plaintiff alleges that
she suffered "injury" by being "subjected to unfair and abusive
practices of Defendant" and "actual harm" by being "the target of
Defendant's misleading debt collection communications." The
Defendant agrees that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts
showing Article III standing.

As she has the independent obligation to assess standing, Judge
Wolfson disagrees with both parties. She opines that the
Plaintiff's allegations of confusion do not demonstrate a harm
closely related to fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.
Importantly, the Plaintiff does not allege reliance of any kind.
Indeed, she does not suggest that she relied on the multiple
addresses in the letter in making any decision about disputing or
verifying her debt. Rather, general allegations regarding the
possibility that the least sophisticated consumer would be confused
as to which address to send a debt verification letter are
insufficient.

Consequently, as the allegations stand, the Plaintiff's general
allegations of confusion and misleading debt communications in
violation of Sections 1692e, e(10), (g), and g(b) do not amount to
a concrete, injury-in-fact sufficient for Article III standing.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged Article III
standing to bring her multiple-addresses claims.

B. Plaintiff does not have standing to bring her disclosure
claims.

The Plaintiff next argues that by disclosing her confidential
information to a third-party mailing vendor, the Defendant violated
sections 1692c(b) and 1692f of the FDCPA. Section 1692c(b)
precludes debt collectors from "communicating, in connection with
the collection of any debt, with any person other than the
consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise
permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or
the attorney of the debt collector" without prior consent of the
consumer or express permission of the court.

The Plaintiff alleges that in communicating with the third-party
vendor, the Defendant disclosed sensitive information about the
Plaintiff, including "her name, the amount allegedly owed, the
Plaintiff's home address and other information." In doing so, the
Plaintiff alleges that this disclosure constituted an "unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt" in
violation of Section 1692f. According to the Plaintiff, she was
"harmed by being subject to abusive collection practices, from
which she had a substantive right to be free of having her privacy
invaded and by having her private and protected information shared
and disseminated with unauthorized parties."

Applying the same historical or common-law analogue exercise as
outlined, Judge Wolfson finds that the harm the Plaintiff alleges
most closely resembles the privacy cause of action for public
disclosure of private facts. New Jersey courts have instructed that
to state a claim for public disclosure of private facts, a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendant has given
publicity to matters that actually were private, (2) that
dissemination of such facts would be offensive to a reasonable
person and (3) that the public has no legitimate interest in being
apprised of the facts publicized.

Judge Wolfson finds that the Plaintiff's mail vendor theory of harm
fails for the same reason -- it involves no publicity. Indeed,
nothing in her amended complaint alleges that her information,
including her name, address, and debt owed, ever was made
accessible to more than a single individual who populated her
letter, let alone the broader public. The amended complaint alleges
only that her information was communicated to the third-party
letter vendor. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, even were the Court to construe the amended complaint as
alleging that a small group of letter vendor employees may have
read the collection letter, such a communication would be
insufficient. Accordingly, the Plaintiff does not have Article III
standing for her Sections 1692c(b) and 1692f claims.

IV. Conclusion

Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions, Judge
Wolfson finds that the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring both
multiple addresses and disclosure claims under the FDCPA. As such,
the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over her
claims. Nonetheless, to the extent the Plaintiff believes she can
plead additional facts that demonstrate that she relied on the
multiple addresses in the debt collection letter to her detriment,
she is given leave to further amend her amended complaint within 30
days from the date of the accompanying Order. The Plaintiff's
disclosure claims are dismissed without prejudice such that
Plaintiff may assert her claims in state court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Amended Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ye2a3fex from Leagle.com.


EXP REALTY: Faces Fulto Suit Over Unwanted Telemarketing Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
KELLY FULTO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. EXP REALTY, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-22042-CMA (S.D. Fla.,
July 6, 2022) contends that the Defendant promotes and markets its
merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited text messages to
wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act.

The Defendant is a real estate brokerage company. To promote its
services, the Defendant aggressively solicits consumers through
telephonic sales calls without consent and irrespective of
affirmative requests to stop repeatedly blasting consumers with
unwanted text messages. The Defendant and its agents do so through
an automated system for selecting or dialing the phone numbers to
which it places the unwanted telemarketing calls. Moreover, the
Defendant defies clear federal law by calls to phone numbers that
have been listed on the Do-Not-Call Registry, says the suit.

Despite Plaintiff's use of clear opt-out language, Defendant
ignored Plaintiff's opt-out demand and sent Plaintiff yet another
telemarketing text message on February 22, 2022, the suit added.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant’s illegal conduct and statutory damages on behalf of
herself and members of the class.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jake Phillips, Esq.
          Jacob Phillips, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: Jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com
                  Ean@normandpllc.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                    gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

FIELD ASSET: Ninth Cir. Flips Class Certification in Bowerman Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRED BOWERMAN; JULIA BOWERMAN, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. FIELD
ASSET SERVICES, INC.; FIELD ASSET SERVICES, LLC, n/k/a Xome OPINION
Field Services, LLC, Defendants-Appellants, Case Nos. 18-16303,
18-17275 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reverses the class certification order, reverses the
summary judgment order, and vacates the interim award of attorneys'
fees.

I. Introduction

Defendant-Appellant Field Asset Services, Inc. ("FAS") appeals the
certification of a class of 156 individuals who personally
performed work for FAS, the Plaintiffs-Appellees. It also appeals
the final judgment for eleven class members under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b), after the district court granted partial
summary judgment to all the class members as to liability. Finally,
FAS appeals the accompanying interim award of more than five
million dollars in attorneys' fees. The NInth Circuit has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 and reverse and
remand on all three issues.

I. Background

FAS is in the business of pre-foreclosure property preservation for
the residential mortgage industry. But FAS, itself, does not
perform pre-foreclosure property-preservation services for its
clients. Rather, it contracts with vendors who perform those
services. Some vendors are sole proprietorships; others are
corporations. Vendors have varying numbers of employees, from at
most a few to up to sixty-five. Some work almost exclusively for
FAS; others perform work for multiple companies, including FAS's
clients and competitors.

FAS exercises some control over the vendors' completion of their
work. It requires that jobs be completed within seventy-two hours;
provides detailed instructions for particular tasks; and imposes
insurance, photo documentation, pricing, and invoicing requirements
through its Vendor Qualification Packets ("VQPs") and work orders.
It offers training, although the parties dispute whether the
training is mandatory. And FAS monitors the vendors' job
performance through vendor scorecards and Approved Vendor Quality
Policies ("AVQPs"), which implement a discipline scale for vendor
noncompliance with FAS's or FAS's clients' instructions. FAS
classifies all its vendors as independent contractors.

Named Plaintiffs Fred and Julia Bowerman sued in 2013, seeking
damages and injunctive relief. Fred Bowerman was the sole
proprietor of BB Home Services, which contracted with FAS as a
vendor. The operative complaint alleged that FAS willfully
misclassified Bowerman and members of the putative class as
independent contractors rather than employees, resulting in FAS's
failure to pay overtime compensation and to indemnify them for
their business expenses.

The complaint also sought class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which the district court granted for a
class defined as: All persons who at any time from Jan. 7, 2009 up
to and through the time of judgment (the Class Period) (1) were
designated by FAS as independent contractors; (2) personally
performed property preservation work in California pursuant to FAS
work orders; and (3) while working for FAS during the Class Period,
did not work for any other entity more than 30 percent of the time.
The class excludes persons who primarily performed rehabilitation
or remodel work for FAS.

The parties later agreed to fix the class period as beginning on
Jan. 7, 2009, and ending on Dec. 20, 2016. FAS argued that the
proposed class failed Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement
because of the need for individualized damages hearings if
liability were found. The district court rejected this argument,
quoting our decision in Leyva v. Medline Industries Inc., 716 F.3d
510 (9th Cir. 2013), for the proposition that "the presence of
individualized damages cannot, by itself, defeat class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3)."

In March 2017, the district court granted partial summary judgment
in favor of the class members, finding that they had been
misclassified as independent contractors and that as a result, FAS
was liable to them for failing to pay overtime and business
expenses. In making that determination, the district court relied
on California's common law test for distinguishing between
employees and independent contractors, as outlined in S.G. Borello
& Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 769 P.2d 399
(Cal. 1989).

Under Borello, "the principal test of an employment relationship is
whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to
control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired."
Borello explained that "generally, the individual factors cannot be
applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and
their weight depends often on particular combinations." Applying
this test, the district court granted partial summary judgment on
the misclassification issue because it was "convinced that the
overwhelming evidence on the most important factor of the Borello
test."

The district court granted partial summary judgment to the class on
the misclassification issue. It also granted partial summary
judgment to the class on their overtime and expense reimbursement
claims, which were derivative of the misclassification claim. In
doing so, the district court relegated the issues of "whether a
particular class member worked overtime on a specific day" (or
ever), and "whether a specific expense" (or any) "was reasonable
and necessary" to the damages phase of the trial, rather than the
liability phase.

In July 2017, the district court held a bellwether jury trial to
determine damages for Named Plaintiff Fred Bowerman and ten of the
156 class members. After the bellwether trial, FAS filed a second
motion for class decertification, which the district court
construed as a motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration. Although the district court denied the motion, it
acknowledged the difficulty of calculating every class member's
damages on an individualized basis with no method for doing so
other than the class members' individualized testimony, noting that
"the damages phase of this class action will be far messier than
promised by the Plaintiffs' counsel when" the case was certified.

Between the district court's summary judgment decision and FAS's
first notice of appeal in July 2018, the California Supreme Court
decided Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1
(Cal. 2018), which established a different test for distinguishing
between employees and independent contractors in certain contexts,
commonly known as "the ABC test." The ABC test presumptively
considers all workers to be employees, and permits workers to be
classified as independent contractors only if the hiring business
demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies each of three
conditions": (a) that the worker is free from the control and
direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the
work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and
in fact; (b) that the worker performs work that is outside the
usual course of the hiring entity's business; and (c) that the
worker is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved
in the work performed.

The Ninth Circuit certified the issue of Dynamex's retroactivity to
the California Supreme Court in Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising
International, Inc., 939 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2019), and held FAS'
appeal in abeyance. The California Supreme Court held that Dynamex
does apply retroactively, Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l,
Inc., 478 P.3d 1207, 1208 (Cal. 2021), and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed that applying Dynamex retroactively comports with due
process, Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 986 F.3d 1106,
1117-18 (9th Cir. 2021).

In July 2018, the class counsel moved in the district court for an
award of attorneys' fees and related expenses, with no notice to
the class members. In November 2018, the district court issued an
interim fee award of $5,173,539.50. It awarded the lead counsel
$3,381,540 and the non-lead counsel $1,792,138.50 (they sought
$1,991,265). The district court reserved decision on whether to
apply a multiplier.

III. Discussion

FAS makes four arguments on appeal. It first maintains that the
district court abused its discretion by certifying the class,
despite the predominance of individualized questions over common
ones. Second, FAS argues that Borello, not Dynamex, applies to all
the class members' claims, because Dynamex does not apply to joint
employment claims, or to claims that are not based on or rooted in
one of California's wage orders. Third, it contends that the
district court erred by granting summary judgment under Borello's
multifactor and fact-intensive inquiry, because, among other
reasons, FAS does not control the manner and means of the class
members' work. And fourth, FAS argues that the district court
abused its discretion by awarding interim attorneys' fees without
giving FAS access to the time records on which the award was based,
without notifying class members of class counsel's fee motion,
without finding the facts specially, and without providing a
precise but clear explanation of its reasons for the award.

A. Class Certification

The Ninth Circuit opines that because the class members have not
necessarily suffered damages traceable to their alleged
misclassification, and because they have not presented a method of
calculating damages that is not excessively difficult, they have
failed to satisfy Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34
(2013)'s simple command that the case be "susceptible to awarding
damages on a class-wide basis." That failure provides an
independent basis for reversing the class certification.

B. The Proper Employment Test

The Ninth Circuit finds that the class members' expense
reimbursement claims are not based on a California wage order, but
on California Labor Code Section 2802.11 Nor are they "rooted in" a
California wage order, even though the class members belatedly
invoked Wage Order 16-2001 in their class certification briefing.
Wage Order 16-2001 does not "cover most of the section 2802
violations alleged," and its provisions are not "equivalent or
overlapping" with section 2802. Although section 2802 covers "all
necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct
consequence of the discharge of his or her duties," Wage Order
16-2001 covers only "tools or equipment." Indeed, many expenses for
which class members sought and recovered reimbursement at trial,
including insurance, cellphone charges, dump fees, and
mileage/fuel, are covered only by section 2802—not by Wage Order
16-2001's "tools and equipment" provision. Thus, Borello, not
Dynamex, applies to the expense reimbursement claims.

The Ninth Circuit also finds that the Plaintiffs-Appellees' counsel
conceded at oral argument that at least some of the class members
are employed by entities other than FAS. Thus, some of the class
members' theories of liability could depend on their ability to
establish that FAS was a joint employer. On remand, the district
court may consider the joint employment issue in the first instance
for class members who own or operate LLCs or corporations, which
are distinct legal entities.

C. Summary Judgment

The Ninth Circuit opines that the class members "exhibit classic
evidence of both an independent contractor and employee" under the
Borello test, which "evidence must be weighed by a trier of fact."
Thus, summary judgment on the class members' expense reimbursement
claims was inappropriate.

It also finds that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether
the exception applies to FAS and its vendors. For example, one
criterion is that "the business service provider be free from the
control and direction of the contracting business entity in
connection with the performance of the work, both under the
contract for the performance of the work and in fact." Another is
that "the business service provider be customarily engaged in an
independently established business of the same nature as that
involved in the work performed." As already explained at length,
FAS's control of its vendors, as well as the independence of the
vendors' businesses from FAS's business, are genuinely disputed
factual issues.17 Thus, because of the enactment of section 2776,
summary judgment is no longer warranted on the class's overtime
claims, even though summary judgment would be proper on those
claims under Dynamex for sole proprietors like Bowerman.

The Ninth Circuit further finds that there is a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the class members are employees or
independent contractors -- under Borello for the expense
reimbursement claims and under the business-to-business exception
for the overtime claims. But there is also a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the class members ever incurred
reimbursable expenses or ever worked overtime. Thus, summary
judgment was also improper for the very same reason that the class
certification was: A putative employer cannot be liable to an
entire class of putative employees for failing to reimburse their
business expenses and pay them overtime unless the putative
employer in fact failed to do so for each of them.

D. Attorneys' Fees

The Ninth Circuit opines that the interim award of attorneys' fees
must be vacated because the class certification and summary
judgment orders were issued in error. It exercises pendent
appellate jurisdiction over interim fee orders that are
inextricably intertwined with or necessary to ensure meaningful
review of final orders on appeal.

IV. Conclusion

Under the right circumstances, the Court of Appeals concludes that
class certification and summary judgment are useful mechanisms for
the speedy resolution of claims. But those circumstances are not
present in the present case. It therefore reverses the class
certification order, reverses the summary judgment order, vacates
the interim award of attorneys' fees, and remands to the district
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion, with costs
awarded to FAS.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4yf2abem from Leagle.com.

Frank G. Burt -- frank.burt@faegredrinker.com -- (argued) and Brian
P. Perryman -- brian.perryman@faegredrinker.com -- Faegre Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP, Washington, D.C.; Robert G. Hulteng --
rhulteng@littler.com -- and Aurelio J. Perez -- aperez@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson P.C., in San Francisco, California; Barrett K.
Green, Littler Mendelson P.C., in Los Angeles, California, for the
Defendants-Appellants.

Monique Olivier -- monique@dplolaw.com -- (argued), Olivier
Schreiber & Chao LLP, in San Francisco, California; Thomas E.
Duckworth -- tom@dpolaw.com -- Duckworth Peters LLP, San Francisco,
California; James E. Miller -- jmiller@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd
Finkelman Miller & Shah LLP, in Chester, Connecticut; for the
Plaintiffs-Appellees.


FIRST TRANSIT: Woods, et al., Seek FLSA Conditional Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JAMES WOODS, et al., v.
FIRST TRANSIT, INC., Case No. 1:21-cv-00739-CEF (N.D. Ohio), the
Plaintiffs move the Court to enter their proposed Order:

   1. granting Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) conditional
      certification;

   2. requiring the Defendant to provide contact information for
      the putative FLSA Collective members;

   3. authorizing the Plaintiffs to disseminate notice of this
      lawsuit to all people who have worked as a full-time
      employee of First Transit and drove a fixed-route bus in
      any week during the last three years (the "FLSA
      Collective").

First Transit is an American transportation company. Headquartered
in Cincinnati, Ohio, First Transit operates over 300 locations,
carrying more than 350 million passengers annually throughout the
United States in 39 states, Puerto Rico, Panama, India and four
Canadian provinces.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated June 29, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3P4J60y at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David J. Cohen, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Teresa M. Becvar, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP
          604 Spruce Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 873-4836
          E-mail: dcohen@stephanzouras.com
                  jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  tbecvar@stephanzouras.com

               - and -

          Daniel R. Karon, Esq.
          Beau D. Hollowell, Esq.
          KARON LLC
          700 West St. Clair Avenue, Suite 200
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 622-1851
          E-mail: dkaron@karonllc.com
                  bhollowell@karonllc.com

FIRSTENERGY CORP: Opposition to Class Cert Bid Due August 17
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Owens v. FirstEnergy
Corp., et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-03785 (S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge
Algenon L. Marbley entered an order on motion for extension of time
to file response/reply.

   -- The Defendants shall file their      Aug. 17, 2022
      Response in opposition to the
      Plaintiffs Motion for Class
      Certification on or before:

   -- The Plaintiffs shall file their      Sept. 28, 2022
      Reply in support of their Motion
      for Class Certification on or
      before:

The suit alleges violation of the Securities Exchange Act.

FirstEnergy is an electric utility headquartered in Akron, Ohio. It
was established when Ohio Edison acquired Centerior Energy in
1997.[CC]

FLOWERS FOODS: Court Grants Class Certification Bid in Ludlow Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL LUDLOW, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated; and WILLIAM LANCASTER, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. FLOWERS FOODS,
INC., a Georgia corporation; FLOWERS BAKERIES, LLC, a Georgia
limited liability company; and FLOWERS FINANCE, LLC, a limited
liability company, Defendants, Case No. 18cv1190-JO-JLB (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Jinsook Ohta of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California grants the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.

I. Introduction

The Plaintiffs are current and former delivery drivers alleging
they were misclassified by the Defendants as independent
contractors instead of employees. They bring a wage and hour action
arising from the alleged misclassification, asserting claims under
the California Labor Code and related wage orders for failure to
pay overtime, unlawful deductions from wages, failure to indemnify
for necessary expenditures, and failure to provide proper wage
statements. The Plaintiffs have filed a motion for class
certification of these claims. The Court held oral argument on
March 30, 2022.

II. Background

Defendant Flowers Foods is a national bakery company behind popular
brands such as Wonder Bread, Nature's Own, and Dave's Killer Bread.
It operates as the sole parent company of Defendant Flowers
Bakeries, LLC, which in turn operates as the sole parent company of
multiple operating subsidiaries located throughout California and
the United States. According to Flowers Foods' investor materials,
Flowers Foods is "America's premier baker" that "produces and
markets bakery products" in the "retail and food service" market.
It claims in its SEC filings that it is the "second largest
producer and marketer of packaged bakery foods in the US" and
"operates in the highly competitive fresh bakery market." Flowers
Foods' customers are retail and foodservice locations such as
Walmart and Costco. With sales of $3.9 billion in 2017, Flowers
Foods generates revenue from sales of the bakery products to its
retail and foodservice customers.

According to Flowers Foods, its key business functions include
distribution and delivery of these packaged bakery goods to its
customers. Its business model relies on a system of delivery
drivers such as the Plaintiffs to deliver the bakery products to
the retail and foodservice locations. Flowers Foods refers to these
delivery drivers as "distributors." Each distributor enters into a
standard and substantially identical distributor agreement with a
local operating subsidiary of Flowers Foods and Flowers Bakeries
that governs the distributor relationship.  

The Distributor Agreement ("DA") signed by the delivery drivers
sets forth the working relationship between the distributor and
Defendants. The DA labels the delivery drivers as "independent
contractors." As a prospective distributor, the delivery driver
purchases the "right" to deliver Flowers Foods' bakery products in
a specific geographic territory. The territory dictates which
specific bakery products are delivered to the customer locations in
the given territory. The distributor can purchase and own more than
one territory or resell his or her territory to another person for
a profit. Distributors may hire helpers to service their territory
while they hold other full-time jobs (so-called "absentee"
distributors).  

The DA also describes how the distributor purportedly earns money
with these territory rights. Under the DA, the distributor
"purchases" bakery products from Flowers Foods and then "re-sells"
those products to the retail and foodservice customers within their
given territory. The distributor earns money based on the standard
margin -- that is, the difference between the purchase price and
the sale price -- which is set by Flowers Foods based on its
negotiations with the customers on the product price. The DA
prohibits the distributor from selling stale products to the
customers, and so Flowers Foods will "repurchase" a percentage of
the distributor's stale products. Flowers Foods "repurchases" the
stale products by charging the distributors a fee. It also provides
the distributors with advertising and branded material to increase
sales. Some distributors use the marketing materials and displays
to promote their sales, while others do not.  

The DA further describes the quality standards that distributors
must meet as part of their job requirements. For example, the DA
requires the distributor to perform his or her services in
accordance with "the standards that have developed and are
generally accepted and followed in the baking industry," including
maintaining an adequate and fresh supply of products in the stores,
actively soliciting stores not being serviced, properly rotating
the products, promptly removing stale products, maintaining proper
service per the store's requirements, and maintaining equipment in
sanitary and safe conditions. It also requires the distributor to
obtain his or her own delivery vehicle and insurance, and to keep
the delivery vehicle clean, professional, and safe. It further
requires the distributor to use Flowers Foods' "proprietary
administrative services" to collect sales data or prepare sales
tickets. Flowers Foods charges the distributor a fee unilaterally
established by Flowers Foods to use these services. The DA does not
require a standard outfit or uniform, but some distributors wear a
polo shirt or branded shirt based on the recommendation of the
Defendants.

As set forth in the DA, the relationship between the distributor
and the Defendants is one of indefinite duration. Under the DA's
terms, the distributor relationship continues unless the
distributor sells the territory, Flowers Foods ceases to use
distributors in a territory for "business reasons," or Flowers
Foods terminates as a result of the distributor engaging in certain
enumerated activities deemed non-curable or repeated curable
breaches.  

III. Discussion

Class certification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23. To obtain certification, a plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that the class meets all four requirements of Rule 23(a)
and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a) sets
out four prerequisites: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3)
typicality, and (4) adequacy. If these four prerequisites are met
under Rule 23(a), the court must then decide whether the class
action is maintainable under Rule 23(b). Under Rule 23(b)(3), a
class may be certified if the court finds that "the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy."  

At the class certification stage, the court must take the
substantive allegations of the complaint as true, but it "also is
required to consider the nature and range of proof necessary to
establish those allegations." It must engage in a "rigorous
analysis" of each Rule 23(a) factor, which often "will entail some
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim." If
the court concludes that the moving party has carried its burden,
then the court is afforded "broad discretion" to certify the class.


The Plaintiffs argue that the ABC Test articulated in Dynamex
Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018), governs
this inquiry. The ABC Test provides that a hiring entity is an
employer if any one of the following three prongs is not met: (A)
that the worker is free from the control and direction of the
hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both
under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and
(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course
of the hiring entity's business; and (C) that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed.

Because the ABC Test requires all three prongs to be met before a
worker can be deemed an independent contractor, a class need only
establish that a hiring entity failed one prong in order to prove
its misclassification claim. The Defendants argue that before the
ABC Test can be applied to the Plaintiffs' claims, the Court must
first conduct individualized determinations of whether Flowers
Foods and Flowers Bakeries, as parent companies of the subsidiaries
that directly contract with the Plaintiffs, constitute "hiring
entities."

Judge Ohta disagrees with the Defendants. She finds that the
distributors provided delivery services that benefited Flowers
Foods and Flowers Bakeries, with the full knowledge of those
entities. Specifically, distributors were tasked with delivering
the parent companies' bakery products to their customers located
within delivery routes, which were owned, financed, and sold by
Flowers Foods. Flowers Foods, the ultimate parent company,
generated revenue from the sales of the bakery products delivered
by distributors. Flowers Bakeries, an intermediate parent company,
negotiated with the customers on the pricing of the delivered
bakery products and the specific customer service requirements and
quality standards for the delivery drivers to follow. Even though
Flowers Foods and Flowers Bakeries did not directly contract with
the delivery drivers through the DAs, the Plaintiffs provided both
entities a delivery service that they both knew about and
permitted. Therefore, Flowers Foods and Flowers Bakeries are
subject to the ABC Test without the need for a threshold "hiring
entity" test.

Having determined that the ABC Test is the applicable legal
framework for the Plaintiffs' misclassification claims, Judge Ohta
now turns to the class certification analysis.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify the Misclassification Class, which
they define as "All persons who worked in California pursuant to a
'Distributor Agreement' or similar arrangement with Flowers Food,
Inc., or one of its subsidiaries, that were classified as
'independent contractors' during the period commencing four years
prior to the commencement of this action through judgment.
'Absentee' distributors are not part of this class definition." The
two named Plaintiffs are proposed class representatives.

Judge Ohta first examines whether the four prerequisites of Rule
23(a) are satisfied with regard to the proposed class, then turns
to whether common questions of law or fact predominate, and finally
to whether a class action is the superior method for resolving the
controversy.

A. Plaintiffs Have Satisfied Rule 23(a)

Judge Ohta holds that (i) the proposed class of distributors is
sufficiently numerous; (ii) the named Plaintiffs are typical of the
class; (iii) the named Plaintiffs and the class counsel are
adequate; and (iv) the Court faces a common question at the heart
of the action -- whether the Defendants misclassified its
distributors as independent contractors instead of employees.

B. Plaintiffs Have Satisfied Rule 23(b)

Having concluded that the Plaintiffs have met Rule 23(a)
requirements, Judge Ohta now examines whether common questions will
predominate over individual ones in deciding the threshold
misclassification issue, and then, if necessary, the substantive
Labor Code claims of the class members. She examines the extent to
which common questions are presented in the Plaintiffs' substantive
wage claims.

Judge Ohta finds that (i) the legality of the Defendants'
class-wide policy of not paying overtime to all distributors,
regardless of hours worked, is an issue subject to common proof;
(ii) whether class-wide practices of charging distributors for
certain costs constituted unlawful deductions in violation of state
labor laws is a common question; (iii) while the amount of expenses
incurred by each class member is an individual question, the
legality of this common practice can be determined on a class-wide
basis with common proof; and (iv) the central and the common
questions of misclassification and liability under the Labor Code
predominate over these individualized issues of damages.

C. A Class Action is Superior

Having determined that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate, Judge Ohta also finds that a class action is
the superior method of resolving this controversy. Under Rule
23(b)(3), a class action may be superior if "class-wide litigation
of common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote greater
efficiency." In evaluating superiority, courts examine (a) the
class members' interests in individually controlling separate
actions; (b) the extent and nature of any preexisting related
litigation; (c) the desirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the forum; and (d) manageability.

The putative class action involves approximately 430 distributors
who were subject to identical DAs that classified them as
independent contractors. These 430 distributors assert the same
misclassification claims, and also the same substantive wage claims
stemming from the alleged misclassification. Because the issues of
both misclassification and liability for the substantive wage
claims are common class-wide questions susceptible to common proof,
Judge Ohta concludes that trying these issues together in a class
action would be more efficient and cost-effective.

For the same reason, she declines to conclude that this class would
not be manageable due to the need for individualized
determinations. The Defendants argue that individual actions are
more appropriate because damages could be significant and exceed
$150,000 for each class member. Judge Ohta is not convinced that
each distributor is necessarily entitled to such an amount, and
even if that were the case, the class action would still be more
efficient for the judicial system given the presence of significant
common questions on misclassification and liability. Accordingly,
she finds that a class action is the superior method of resolving
the controversy.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Ohta grants the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yybxd8sv from Leagle.com.


FOTO CARE LTD: Iskhakova Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Foto Care, LTD. The
case is styled as Marina Iskhakova, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Foto Care, LTD., Case No.
1:22-cv-03985 (E.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Foto Care -- https://www.fotocare.com/ -- offers the highest
quality professional photography equipment including DSLRs, Medium
Format Cameras & Studio Equipment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


FROST-ARNETT COMPANY: Weber Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Frost-Arnett Company.
The case is styled as Ari Weber, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated consumers v. Frost-Arnett Company, Case No.
1:22-cv-03989 (E.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Frost-Arnett -- https://www.frost-arnett.com/ -- is a debt
collection agency that resolves the patient-pay balance of accounts
receivable for healthcare providers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
          ADAM J. FISHBEIN, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, NY 11598
          Phone: (516) 668-6945
          Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


G & G MANHATTAN: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against G & G Manhattan
Fruitier, Inc. The case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. G &
G Manhattan Fruitier, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05786 (S.D.N.Y., July
7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

G & G Manhattan Fruitier -- https://www.manhattanfruitier.com/ --
offers specialty gift baskets filled with artisanal chocolates,
fresh fruit and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


GATHERED FOODS: Zarzuela Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gathered Foods
Corporation. The case is styled as Jose Zarzuela individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Gathered Foods
Corporation, Case No. 1:22-cv-05782 (S.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Gathered Foods -- https://www.gatheredfoods.com/ -- produces
plant-based products intended to provide an alternative to seafood
and other plant-based proteins.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


GHOST LLC: Faces Edelen Suit Over Misbranded Nutritional Powders
----------------------------------------------------------------
SEPTEMBER EDELEN, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED v. GHOST, LLC C/O CT Corporation Systems, Case No.
1:22-cv-05747-PGG (S.D.N.Y., July 6, 2022) arises from the
deceptive trade practices of Defendant in its manufacture and sale
of nutritional powders containing branched-chain amino acids
labeled  "Ghost BCAA X Swedish Fish" as well as "Ghost BCAA X Sour
Patch Kids" and its advertisements which imply or claim it contains
"5 calories", "0 calories", or omits that the Products contain
Calories, in violation of the the New York General Business Law,
bringing claims for breach of implied warranty, breach of express
warranty, fraud, unjust enrichment, and declaratory and injunctive
relief.

The "BCAA X Swedish fish" product is marketed as "Enjoy your
favorite candy flavor during your workout, throughout the day, or
before a night out" The "BCAA X Sour Patch Kids" product line
includes three flavor variations: Blue Raspberry, Pineapple,
Redberry, and Watermelon. Moreover, these products are sub-brands
of the BCAA Ghost portfolio, which contains several dozen stock
keeping units ("SKUs").

The BCAA Ghost portfolio of numerous-like products are purposely
misbranded for calorie content, with the "BCAA X Swedish Fish" line
of products positioning "5" calories per serving while the other
previously mentioned products all of which with purposely
misbranded Calorie content of "0 Calories," or which omit Caloric
information altogether from their respective nutritional labels.
Meanwhile, the actual Calorie estimate for the Product is likely an
approximate range from 40-42 Calories, depending on formulation and
use guidance, which can include multiple servings per day.

Ghost's representations regarding the number of Calories in the
Product on its labels, webpages, and other marketing and
advertising media and materials is purposely deceptive to create a
competitive advantage against compliant competitors. However, it is
the consumers that ultimately suffer by this deviant and
non-compliant behavior because Ghost knowingly provides non-factual
information and omits relevant information in an attempt to deceive
and entice sales to these consumers who are seeking to purchase 0
Calorie products conducive to weight loss and control, says the
suit.

The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") guidance relating to
nutritional labeling of food describes several methods for
estimating Calories in 21 CFR section 101.9(c)(1)(i). Of these
methods, only five are relevant to the Products. These methods
include (1) calories based on a per gram measurement of protein,
fat, and carbohydrate of specific foods and other ingredients (this
method is known as the Atwater Method); (2) calories calculated by
assigning four, four, and nine calories per gram for protein, total
carbohydrate, and total fat, respectively; (3) calories calculated
by assigning four, four, and nine calories per gram for protein,
total carbohydrate, and total fat, respectively, but then
subtracting two calories per gram for non-digestible carbohydrates
and between zero and three calories per gram of sugar alcohols; (4)
using data for specific food factors for particular foods or
ingredients approved by the FDA; and (5) using bomb calorimetry
data.

Nonetheless, Ghost continued to sell the Product with misleading
labels despite knowing the inaccuracy of such representations.
Ghost chose, and continues to choose, financial gain at the expense
of consumers by concealing and omitting disclosure of this critical
misrepresentation to consumers who, like Plaintiff, purchased the
Product based specifically upon this "0 Calories" representation,
for purposes of weight loss and control, the suit asserts.

The Plaintiff does not seek to impose requirements greater than
those required by FDA regulations. Plaintiff's claims do not seek
to expand upon, or call for stricter standards than, the labeling
or marketing requirements of caloric content established by FDA
regulations.

Plaintiff Edelen is a citizen and resident of The Bronx, New York.
Within the last three years, Plaintiff purchased the Product from
Defendant's website after viewing pictures of its label, which
omitted all mention of Calories, implying that 0 Calories were
present. However, independent testing demonstrated that the Product
contained substantially more Calories than Defendant advertised on
the Product's label.

At no point, either during Plaintiff Edelen's research on the
Product or at the point of sale, did Defendant disclose that the
Product actually contained significantly more Calories than the
amount of Calories it impliedly advertised, the suit further
alleges.

The Defendant is a Delaware limited liability corporation with its
principal office in the State of Nevada. Ghost makes and
distributes health supplements, vitamins, and nutritional protein
powders throughout the United States and, specifically, to
consumers in the state of New York.

The Defendant's Product is sold on its own and other third-parties'
websites, along with through various physical retailers, including
GNC, and the Vitamin Shoppe. The Product is purchased by consumers
for personal use and consumption in the state of New York and
throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          412 H Street NE, Suite 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                  jrathod@classlawdc.com

               - and -

          D. Aaron Rihn, Esq.
          Sara J. Watkins, Esq.
          ROBERT PIERCE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          707 Grant Street, Suite 125
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-7229
          E-mail: arihn@peircelaw.com
                  swatkins@peircelaw.com

               - and -

          Robert Mackey, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT MACKEY
          P.O. Box 279
          Sewickley PA 15143
          Telephone: (412) 370-9110
          E-mail: bobmackeyesq@aol.com

GOLDEN ENTERTAINMENT: Houston's Bid to Vacate Dismissals Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada denies the Plaintiff's Emergency Motion to
Vacate Dismissals and the motion to extend copywork limit in the
lawsuit titled Matthew Travis Houston, Plaintiff v. Golden
Entertainment, et al., Defendants, Case No.: 2:21-cv-00499-JAD-DJA
(D. Nev.).

Pro se plaintiff Matthew Travis Houston is an inmate at Nevada's
High Desert State Prison and a prolific litigant. He commenced this
action in March 2021 as an "objection" to a class-action settlement
notice he received in an action against Golden Entertainment.

A year later, Houston filed an "Amended Civil Rights Complaint"
against more than a dozen targets unrelated to the Golden
Entertainment class action. Houston has now filed a document
entitled "Emergency Motion to Vacate Dismissal(s)."

Judge Dorsey notes that the document contains no points or
authorities, and there is no "dismissal" in this case to vacate.
Houston also moves "to extend his copywork limit for the narrow
purposes of the instant habeas corpus proceedings." But this is not
a habeas proceeding, Judge Dorsey explains.

Judge Dorsey, therefore, ordered that the emergency motion is
denied; and the motion to extend copywork limit is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated July 4, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3va4ef34 from Leagle.com.


GPB HOLDINGS: Committed Fraud and Misrepresentations, Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
GPB Holdings II, LP disclosed in its Form 10/A Report, filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2022, that a
class action was filed against the company alleging fraud and
material omissions and misrepresentations.

In November 2019, plaintiffs filed a putative class action
captioned "Barbara Deluca and Drew R. Naylor, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated limited partners, v. GPB
Automotive Portfolio, LP et al.," Case No. 19-CV-10498), in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against GPB, GPB Holdings II, the Partnership, David Gentile,
Jeffery Lash, AAS, Axiom, Jeffry Schneider, Mark Martino, and
Ascendant.

The complaint alleges fraud and material omissions and
misrepresentations to induce investment and losses in excess of
$1.27 billion. The plaintiffs are seeking disgorgement,
compensatory, consequential, and general damages, disgorgement,
rescission, restitution, punitive damages and the establishment of
a constructive trust.

GPB Holdings II, LP is a holding company based in New York.


GPB HOLDINGS: Faces Class Suit Over Texas Securities Act Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------------
GPB Holdings II, LP disclosed in its Form 10/A Report, filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2022, that a
class action was filed against the company alleging violations of
the Texas Securities Act.

In November 2019, plaintiffs filed a putative class action,
"Stanley S. and Millicent R. Barasch Trust and Loretta Dehay,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. GPB
Capital Holdings, LLC, et al.," Case No. 19 Civ. 1079, in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
against, the Partnership and other GPB-managed limited
partnerships, AAS, and Ascendant, as well as certain principals of
the GPB-managed funds, auditors, a fund administrator, and
individuals.

The complaint alleges civil conspiracy, fraud, substantial
assistance in the commission of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
substantial assistance in the breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,
violations of the Texas Securities Act, and aiding and abetting
violations of the Texas Securities Act. Plaintiffs allege losses in
excess of $1.8 billion and are seeking compensatory and other
unspecified damages, declaratory relief, rescission, and costs and
fees.

GPB Holdings II, LP is a holding company based in New York.


GPB HOLDINGS: Faces KMIRA Suit for Breach of Contract
------------------------------------------------------
GPB Holdings II, LP disclosed in its Form 10/A Report, filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2022, that a
class action was filed against the company alleging violations of
the Texas Securities Act with regards to a October 2019 putative
class action captioned "Kinnie Ma Individual Retirement Account, et
al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
v. Ascendant Capital, LLC, et al.," Case No. 19-CV-1050, filed in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
against GPB, certain limited partnerships, including the
Partnership, for which GPB is the General Partner, AAS, and
Ascendant, as well as certain principals of the GPB-managed funds,
auditors, broker-dealers, a fund administrator, and other
individuals.

The complaint alleges violations and/or aiding and abetting
violations of the Texas Securities Act, fraud, substantial
assistance in the commission of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
substantial assistance in breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence.
Plaintiffs allege losses in excess of $1.8 billion and are seeking
compensatory damages in an unspecified amount, rescission, fees and
costs, and class certification.

GPB Holdings II, LP is a holding company based in New York.


GPB HOLDINGS: Faces Suit Over Misleading Business Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
GPB Holdings II, LP disclosed in its Form 10/A Report, filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2022, that a
class action lawsuit was filed against the company alleging
deceptive and misleading business practices.

In May 2020, plaintiffs filed a class action in New York Supreme
Court against GPB, Automile Holdings LLC (d/b/a Prime Automotive
Group), David Gentile, David Rosenberg, Philip Delzotta, Joseph
Delzotta, and other affiliated entities and individuals.

The complaint alleges deceptive and misleading business practices
of the defendants with respect to the marketing, sale, and/or
leasing of automobiles and the financial and credit products
related to the same throughout the State of New York. Plaintiffs
allege defendants' collection of fraudulent rebates exceeds
$1,000,000.

The plaintiffs are seeking class-wide injunctive relief requiring
defendant dealerships to disclose financing options, rebates,
interest rates, and risk of repossession; monetary and punitive
damages for violation of New York General Business Laws, unjust
enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract;
and also seek costs and fees.

GPB Holdings II, LP is a holding company based in New York.


GPB HOLDINGS: Sued for Material Misstatement and Omissions
----------------------------------------------------------
GPB Holdings II, LP disclosed in its Form 10/A Report, filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 30, 2022, that it is
facing a consolidated class action complaint in New York Supreme
Court.

Plaintiffs filed said case against GPB, GPB Holdings, GPB Holdings
II, GPB Holdings III, the Partnership, GPB Cold Storage, GPB Waste
Management, David Gentile, Jeffrey Lash, Macrina Kgil, a/k/a
Minchung Kgil, William Edward Jacoby, Scott Naugle, Jeffry
Schneider, Ascendant Alternative Strategies, Ascendant Capital, and
Axiom Capital Management.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the offering
documents for certain GPB-managed funds, include material
misstatements and omissions. The plaintiffs are seeking
disgorgement, unspecified damages, and other equitable relief.

GPB Holdings II, LP is a holding company based in New York.


GROSS SKINCARE: Class Cert. Deadlines Amended in Gunaratna Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MOCHA GUNARATNA and RENEE
CAMENFORTE, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. DR. DENNIS GROSS SKINCARE, LLC, a New York limited
liability company, Case No. 2:20-cv-02311-MWF-GJS (C.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald entered an order granting
stipulation to extend defendant's class certification opposition
and related motions deadline as follows:

                 Event               Current        Proposed
                                     Deadline       Deadline

  The deadline for Defendants'   July 7, 2022    July 14, 2022
  Counsel to file their
  Opposition to Motion for
  Class Certification, produce
  expert reports and necessary
  disclosures in support of
  Opposition to Motion for
  Class Certification, and
  file any motions Summary
  Judgment directed to the
  Named Plaintiff’s Claims:

  Deadline to complete           Aug. 30, 2022   Sept. 14,2022
  depositions and document
  production of Defendant's
  expert re Class
  Certification:

  Last Day to file reply in      Sept. 16, 2022  Sept. 30, 2022
  support of Motion:

  Last Day to file Daubert       Sept. 22, 2022  Oct. 20, 2022
  Motions for Class
  Certification:

  Last Day to file               Oct. 27, 2022  Nov 10, 2022
  Oppositions to Daubert
  Motions (Class
  Certification Experts):

Dr. Dennis Gross Skincare was established in 2000 as a line of
multi-tasking products.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ohMrhb at no extra charge.[CC]

HERSHEY CANADA: Class Action Alleging Child Slave Labour Certified
------------------------------------------------------------------
TopClassActions.com reports that Hershey Canada and the Hershey
Company were unable to convince a justice to dismiss a class action
lawsuit claiming they use child slave labour in their supply chain.


The justice overseeing the complaint made by plaintiff Scott Leaf
in the British Columbia Supreme Court certified the class action
lawsuit late last month.

Leaf claims the Hershey companies misrepresented through their
advertising, marketing and packaging that they "did not rely on and
benefit from child slavery and trafficked children in their supply
chains."

Leaf filed the class action lawsuit against the companies in March
2020, at which time he claimed that their alleged use of child
labour and slavery was "abhorrent."

The Hershey companies, in their attempt to get the class action
lawsuit thrown out, argued that Leaf had not established that he
had personally received or relied on the alleged misrepresentations
and that the complaint did not expressly state that they do
business in B.C.

Hershey's class action says companies deny using child labour

The companies have maintained that they do not use child labour in
their supply chains and oppose the use of it, according to the
Hershey's class action.

Justice Jasmin Ahmad, meanwhile, ruled against the Hershey
companies, allowing Leaf's complaint to move ahead.

"Mr. Leaf alleges that contrary to those representations, 'child
labour and slavery' are present in the defendants' supply chain. He
asserts claims against the defendants in misrepresentation at
common law and under the Competition Act," Ahmad wrote in her
decision.

A separate consumer filed a similar class action lawsuit against
Hershey Canada in 2020 also claiming the company uses child labour
while arguing that they would not have purchased Hershey's
chocolate products had they known.

Have you purchased Hershey's chocolate products? What do you think
of the slave labour allegations? Let us know in the comments!

The plaintiff is represented by A. Tanel and N. Gondek.

The Hershey's child labour class action lawsuit is Leaf v. Hershey
Canada Inc., et al., Case No. S202785, in the Supreme Court of
British Columbia. [GN]

HP INC: Cepelak Suit Seeks to Certify 8 Classes
-----------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN CEPELAK, JUDY
CHAMBERS, JIM DICKINSON and MARCIA NUPP, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, v. HP INC., Case No.
3:20-cv-02450-VC (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to:
enter an order certifying the following Classes:

  -- California Print-To-Stop Class

     "All persons who purchased the following HP printers in
     California at any time beginning four (4) years prior to
     the filing of this action until the present ("California
     Class Period"): HP OfficeJet 6100, 8600, 8702, 8100, 8210,
     8216, 8600 Plus, 8610, 8615, 8620, 8625, 8630, 8710, 8715,
     8717, 8720, 8725, 8730, 8740, 9010, 9015, 9015e, 9016,
     9018, 9019, 9020, 9025, and 9025e (the "Print-To-Stop
     Printers").

  -- California Underprinting Class

     "All persons who purchased any HP printer ("Printer(s)") in
     California at any time during the California Class Period
     (together with the California Print-To-Stop Class, referred
     to herein as the "California Classes").

  -- New York Print-To-Stop Class

     "All persons who purchased any of the Print-To-Stop
     Printers in New York at any time beginning six years prior
     to the filing of this action until the present ("New York
     Class Period").

  -- New York Underprinting Class

     "All persons who purchased any of the Printers in New York
     at any time during the New York Class Period (together with
     the New York Print-To-Stop Class".

  -- Arkansas Print-To-Stop Class

     All persons who purchased any of the Print-To-Stop Printers
     in Arkansas at any time beginning five years prior to the
     filing of this action until the present ("Arkansas  Class
     Period").

  -- Arkansas Underprinting Class

     "All persons who purchased any of the Printers in Arkansas
     at any time during the Arkansas Class Period (together with
     the Arkansas Print-To-Stop Class".

  -- Arizona Print-To-Stop Class

     "All persons who purchased any of the Print-To-Stop
     Printers in Arizona at any time beginning three (3) years
     prior to the filing of this action until the present."

  -- Arizona Underprinting Class

     "All persons who purchased any of the Printers in Arizona
     at any time during the Arizona Class Period (together with
     the Arizona Print-To-Stop Class, referred to herein as the
     "Arizona Classes")."

The Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order designating them
as Class Representatives and appointing their counsel, Faruqi &
Faruqi, LLP and Walsh P.L.L.C as Class Counsel.

The Plaintiffs also request the Court order the parties to meet and
confer and present this Court, within 15 days of an order granting
class certification, with a proposed notice to the certified
Classes.

HP Inc. is an American multinational information technology company
headquartered in Palo Alto, California, that develops personal
computers, printers and related supplies, as well as 3D printing
solutions.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify classes dated June 29,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3O4bMFq
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
          Joshua Nassir, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1060
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (424) 256-2884
          Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
          E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com
                  jnassir@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Bonner C. Walsh, Esq.
          WALSH P.L.L.C.
          1561 Long Haul Road
          Grangeville, ID 83530
          Telephone: (541) 359-2827
          Facsimile: (866) 503-8206
          E-mail: bonner@walshpllc.com

INTERCONTINENTAL CAPITAL: Nelson Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Intercontinental
Capital Group Inc. The case is styled as Tishia Nelson,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Intercontinental Capital Group Inc., Case No. 9:22-cv-80993-XXXX
(S.D. Fla., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Intercontinental Capital Group, Inc. --
https://intercontinentalcapital.com/ -- is a direct lending
mortgage bank specializing in home financing for one to four family
residential properties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, PA
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone: (305) 479-2299
          Fax: (786) 623-0915
          Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com


INTERDESIGN INC: Ortiz Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Interdesign, Inc. The
case is styled as Joseph Ortiz, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated v. Interdesign, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-00529 (W.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

InterDesign -- https://www.interdesigninc.com/ -- is a dynamic
force in the international housewares and home fashions
industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: jeffrey@gottlieb.legal

               - and -

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTFRIED & GOTTFRIED, LLP
          122 East 42nd. St., Suite 620
          New York, NY 10168
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


INTEX RECREATION: Ortiz Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Intex Recreation
Corp. The case is styled as Joseph Ortiz, on behalf of himself and
all other persons similarly situated v. Intex Recreation Corp.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-00524 (W.D.N.Y., July 6, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Intex Recreation -- https://intexcorp.com/ -- is a leading brand in
Above Ground Swimming Pools, Air Mattresses and PVC inflatable
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: jeffrey@gottlieb.legal

               - and -

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTFRIED & GOTTFRIED, LLP
          122 East 42nd. St., Suite 620
          New York, NY 10168
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal

IONQ INC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds Investors of August 1 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in a securities class action lawsuit that has been filed on
behalf of investors who purchased or acquired the securities of
IonQ, Inc. ("IonQ" or the "Company") (NYSE: IONQ) between March 30,
2021 and May 2, 2022, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland and alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

IonQ claims to "develop quantum computers designed to solve the
world's most complex problems." On or about September 30, 2021,
IonQ became a public entity via a business combination with dMY
Technology Group, Inc. III ("DTG"), a special purpose acquisition
company.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose: (1) that IonQ had not yet
developed a 32-qubit quantum computer; (2) that the Company's
11-qubit quantum computer suffered from significant error rates,
rendering it useless; (3) that IonQ's quantum computer is not
sufficiently reliable, so it is not accessible despite being
available through major cloud providers; and (4) that a significant
portion of IonQ's revenue was derived from improper roundtripping
transactions with related parties.

On May 3, 2022, Scorpion Capital released a research report
alleging, among other things, that IonQ is a "scam built on phony
statements about nearly all key aspects of the technology and
business." It further claimed that the Company' reported
"[f]ictitious 'revenue' via sham transactions and related-party
round-tripping."

On this news, the Company's stock fell 9% to close at $7.15 per
share on May 3, 2022.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 1, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased or acquired IONQ securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit IonQ, Inc.
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Peter Allocco at (212)
951-2030 or pallocco@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:
Peter Allocco
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(212) 951-2030
pallocco@bernlieb.com [GN]

J&M FOODS INC: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against J&M Foods, Inc. The
case is styled as Richard Mejia, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. J&M Foods, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-05800 (S.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

J&M Foods Inc. -- https://www.janis-melanie.com/ -- provides food
products. The Company specializes in cookies, flavoured cheese
straws such as holiday spice, rasberry, lemon, key lime, vanilla,
black walnut, bleu, as well as asagio cheese straws.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


KAISER FOUNDATION: Court Issues Discovery Order in Gamble Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Thomas S. Hixson of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California issued a Discovery Order in the
lawsuit styled LUNELL GAMBLE, et al., Plaintiffs v. KAISER
FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-06621-YGR (TSH) (N.D. Cal.).

In their Fourth Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Plaintiffs Lunell Gamble
and Sheila Kennedy sue various Kaiser entities on behalf of
themselves, as well as a class of similarly situated individuals.
The gist of the FAC is that Kaiser allegedly has a practice of
discriminating against African American employees. Plaintiff Gamble
worked in Kaiser's HR department for 16 years until she was
terminated in 2014. Plaintiff Kennedy worked in various positions
at Kaiser for 18 years until she was terminated in 2016, including
CPRD related positions of intern, substance abuse counselor, and
instructor at the domestic violence program.

The class the Plaintiffs seek -- or, at least, sought -- to
represent consists of all African Americans or persons of African
descent, who were employed by Kaiser in the Northern California
region, who were denied a promotion or an employment opportunity,
were involuntarily terminated, or who made or assisted in the
making of a complaint related to any employment issue.

District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers issued a scheduling order
that included a June 24, 2022 deadline to bring discovery motions
before the Magistrate Judge. The Plaintiffs have filed seven, to
which the Defendants have responded.

Discovery letter brief No. 1 seeks to have defendants state all
data and information, or identify documents containing such data,
as required by OFCCP regulations. The Plaintiffs state that because
it is a contractor for federal funds, Executive Order 11246
requires Kaiser to conduct self-audits and adopt affirmative action
plans, and to submit to desk audits, site visits and offsite
analysis by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP). The key word in the Plaintiffs' motion to compel is all.

The Plaintiffs argue that limiting production to only those
"establishments" where they worked was improper. The Plaintiffs
seek discovery into the company's knowledge of discriminatory
patterns, not just those patterns that might be seen in
"establishments" where they worked.

Discovery letter brief No. 2 seeks to compel production of
underlying data necessary to determine whether Kaiser terminates
African Americans using stereotypical assumptions. Such data must
include data on all Involuntary Terminations at any NCAL location
by job title, the racial make up of such terminations and data on
incumbency. The Plaintiffs state that the Defendants limited their
responses to data on employees, who were involuntarily terminated
while employed at locations the Plaintiffs worked, and to EEO job
group 5B - Clerical, but the Plaintiffs seek to obtain data on
involuntary terminations company-wide.

Discovery letter brief No. 3 seeks to compel production of
information and documents related to complaints by African American
employees who were at some point involuntarily terminated. Such
discovery must not be limited to "facilities" where the Plaintiffs
worked only, to complaints of racial discrimination only, or to
internal complaints only. The Plaintiffs are clear that they "seek
a list of information associated with complaints by other African
Americans terminated from any NCAL location." The Plaintiffs state
that the Defendants refused to produce discrimination complaints by
employees at locations other than where the Plaintiffs worked, or
filed in the courts.

Discovery letter brief No. 4 seeks "to compel production
information and documents related to investigations of, and
responses to, complaints by terminated African American employees.
Such discovery must not be limited to facilities where plaintiffs
worked, and should be sufficient to allow for the testing of
credibility of the employer's claim that it reasonably and fairly
investigates complaints and finds them all to be without factual
substantiations." The Plaintiffs argue that "Kaiser's limitation of
its responses to only the facilities where plaintiffs worked shows
why the responses are deficient."

Discovery letter brief No. 5 seeks "to compel production of
information and documents related to the resolution of complaints
by terminated African American employees. Such discovery must not
be limited in geographic scope, and should be sufficient to allow
the Court or the jury to obtain a complete picture of the otherwise
hidden costs to the employer for maintaining its pattern and
practice of racial discrimination."

Discovery letter brief No. 6 seeks to have the Defendants identify
each person and each document related to any employee, who was
disciplined, counseled, terminated or otherwise subjected to any
employment action because of a violation or alleged violation of
any policy against workplace race discrimination; and to produce
related documents.

Following these submissions, on June 25, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed
a Notice of Waiver of Class Certification and Statement of Intent
to Proceed as an Individual Action. The Plaintiffs state that they
"waive their right to seek class certification, and that they
intend to pursue the case as an individual action." The Plaintiffs
also request that the Court rule on pending discovery letter briefs
(ECF Nos. 202-214) notwithstanding this waiver. They state that
notwithstanding their waiver of the right to pursue class
certification, they request that the Court compel further responses
to the discovery in connection with their individual claims.

Judge Hixson notes that the first six letter briefs are easy to
resolve because discovery must be "proportional to the needs of the
case," citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1). With the class claims
gone, there is no conceivable justification for this sweeping
discovery in what is now a two-plaintiff employment dispute.

Accordingly, discovery letter briefs Nos. 1-6 are denied.

Judge Hixson finds that discovery letter brief No. 7 is really just
an opposition to the Defendants' motion for a protective order
concerning the Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice. The
four topics in the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice were plainly
written with a class action in mind. The sweeping breadth of these
topics is not proportional to the needs of a two-plaintiff
employment dispute.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) deposition notice is
quashed.

This order terminates ECF Nos. 202 through 213.

A full-text copy of the Court's Discovery Order dated June 27,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2s45tr3j from
Leagle.com.


LINCARE HOLDINGS: Kennedy Files Suit in N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lincare Holdings Inc.
The case is styled as Charlene Kennedy, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Lincare Holdings Inc., Case No.
4:22-cv-03974-DMR (N.D. Cal., July 6, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

Lincare Holdings Inc. -- https://www.lincare.com/ -- is a provider
of oxygen and other respiratory therapy services to patients in the
home..[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
          Cody Alexander Bolce, Esq.
          Laura Grace Van Note, Esq.
          COLE & VAN NOTE
          555 12th Street, Suite 1725
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Phone: (510) 891-9800
          Fax: (510) 891-7030
          Email: sec@colevannote.com
                 cab@colevannote.com
                 lvn@colevannote.com


MAVUNO LLC: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mavuno, LLC. The case
is styled as Richard Mejia, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Mavuno, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05798-KPF (S.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Mavuno -- https://mavunoharvest.com/ -- offers ethically sourced,
naturally delicious organic dried fruit and nut snacks sourced from
family farms in sub-Saharan Africa.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


MAXIM HEALTHCARE: Wilson Suit Removed to S.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Michael Wilson, a person lacking legal capacity;
Mosanthony Wilson, his conservator, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., Case
No. 37-02022-00019850-CU-BT-CTL was removed from the San Diego
Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California on July 7, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-00993-BAS-WVG to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for the Class Action
Fairness Act.

Maxim Healthcare Group -- https://www.maximhealthcare.com/ -- is a
privately held medical staffing company headquartered in Columbia,
Maryland.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alex Rafael Straus, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          280 South Beverly Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Phone: (865) 247-0080
          Fax: (865) 522-0049
          Email: astraus@milberg.com

               - and -

          Gregory Haroutunian, Esq.
          Michael Anderson Berry
          CLAYEO C. ARNOLD, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORP.
          865 Howe Avenue
          Sacramento, CA 95825
          Phone: (916) 239-4778

The Defendant is represented by:

          Matthew D. Pearson, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTELER, LLP
          11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90025
          Phone: (310) 820-8800
          Fax: (310) 820-8859
          Email: mpearson@bakerlaw.com


MCG HEALTH: Fails to Secure Patients' Info, Osborne Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
JANETTA OSBORNE, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. MCG HEALTH, LLC and PRIME HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC. dba CENTINELA HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, Case No.
2:22-cv-04590 (C.D. Cal., July 5, 2022) is a class action against
MCG and CHMC for their failure to properly secure and safeguard
Representative Plaintiff's and Class Members' personally
identifiable information stored within the Defendants' information
network, including, without limitation, medical codes ("personal
health information" or "PHI"), names, Social Security numbers,
postal addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of
birth, and gender, ("personally identifiable information" or
"PII").

With this alleged action, the Representative Plaintiff seeks to
hold Defendants responsible for the harms they caused and will
continue to cause Representative Plaintiff and the countless other
similarly situated persons in the massive and preventable
cyberattack discovered by Defendant MCG on March 25, 2022, by which
cybercriminals infiltrated Defendant MCG's inadequately protected
network servers and accessed highly sensitive PHI/PII and financial
information which was being kept unprotected (the "Data Breach").

The Representative Plaintiff further seeks to hold Defendants
responsible for not ensuring that the PHI/PII was maintained in a
manner consistent with industry, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPPA"), and other relevant
standards. While Defendants claim to have discovered the breach as
early as March 25, 2022, the Defendants did not begin informing
victims of the Data Breach until June 2022. Indeed, the Defendants
did not immediately report the security incident to Representative
Plaintiff or Class 6 Members. Accordingly, Representative Plaintiff
and Class Members were wholly unaware of the Data Breach until
she/they received letter(s) from Defendant MCG informing them of
it. In 8 , the letter Representative Plaintiff received was dated
June 20, 2022, the lawsuit says.

CHMC acquired, collected, and stored Representative Plaintiff's and
10 Class Members' PHI/PII and/or financial information in
connection with its provision of  healthcare services. MCG
acquired, collected, and stored Representative Plaintiff's and
Class Members' PHI/PII and/or financial information in connection
with its provision of patient healthcare guidelines to healthcare
providers and healthcare plans, including CHMC.  Therefore,  at all
relevant times, Defendants knew, or should have known, that
Representative Plaintiff and Class Members would use Defendants'
networks to store and/or share sensitive data, including highly
confidential PHI/PII, added the lawsuit.

The Representative Plaintiff provided highly sensitive medical and
financial information to CHMC in connection with her receipt of
healthcare services therefrom. CHMC further provided this
information to MCG in connection with MCG's provision of patient
19 guidelines to CHMC. As a result, Representative Plaintiff's
information was among the data allegedly accessed by an
unauthorized third-party in the Data Breach.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
          Laura Grace Van Note, Esq.
          Cody Alexander Bolce, Esq.
          COLE & VAN NOTE
          Web: www.colevannote.com
          555 12th Street, Suite 1725
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (510) 891-9800
          Facsimile: (510) 891-7030
          E-mail: sec@colevannote.com
                  lvn@colevannote.com
                  cab@colevannote.com

MCG HEALTH: Fails to Secure Patients' Personal Info, Mack Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIE MACK, JOANNE MULLINS, and INGRID COX on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated v. MCG Health, LLC, Case No.
2:22-cv-00935 (W.D. Wash., July 6, 2022) is a class action for
damages with respect to MCG Health for its failure to exercise
reasonable care in securing and safeguarding patients' sensitive
personal data -- including names, Social Security numbers, medical
codes, postal addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates
of birth, and gender ("PII").

This class action is brought on behalf of patients whose sensitive
PII was stolen by cybercriminals in a cyber-attack on MCG Health's
systems that took place in or around March 25, 2020 and which
resulted in the access and exfiltration of sensitive patient
information (the "Data Breach"). MCG Health reported to Plaintiffs
and members of the putative "Class" that information compromised in
the Data Breach included their PII, says the suit.

As a result of the Data Breach and Defendant's failure to promptly
notify Plaintiffs and Class members of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs
and Class members have experienced and will experience various
types of misuse of their PII in the coming months and years,
including but not limited to, unauthorized credit card charges,
unauthorized access to email accounts, identity theft, and other
fraudulent use of their Private Information. There has been no
assurance offered by MCG Health that all personal data or copies of
data have been recovered or destroyed. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs
assert claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of implied
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory and injunctive
relief, and state consumer protection claims, the suit further
asserts.

MCG Health is a clinical guidance company that uses software to
apply medical literature and data to patient information at
healthcare organizations and insurance companies to create care
guidelines. MCG Health has a principal place of business at 901 5th
Avenue, Suite 120, in Seattle, Washington. MCG Health's corporate
policies and practices, including those used for data privacy, are
established in, and emanate from the state of Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          Jennifer Rust Murray, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Telephone: (206) 816-6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
          E-mail: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
                  jmurray@terrellmarshall.com

               - and -

          Benjamin F. Johns, Esq.
          Samantha E. Holbrook, Esq.
          CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER
          & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP
          One Haverford Centre
          361 Lancaster Avenue
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 642-8500
          E-mail: bfj@chimicles.com
                  seh@chimicles.com

MEDICAL MONKS: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Medical Monks, Inc.
The case is styled as Richard Mejia, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Medical Monks, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-05791 (S.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Medical Monks -- https://medicalmonks.com/ -- sells disposable
medical goods online, primarily focused on ostomy, wound and
continence care.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


MELALEUCA INC: Joyner Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Melaleuca, Inc. The
case is styled as Sharon Joyner, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Melaleuca, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-05787 (S.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Melaleuca, Inc. -- https://www.melaleuca.com/ -- is one of the
largest online wellness shopping club.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


MERCK & CO: 400 More Women Join $250-Mil. Equal-Pay Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tracy Staton, writing for Fierce Pharma, reports that the $250
million gender bias suit against Merck & Co. just picked up more
steam. Conditionally certified as a class action in May, the
lawsuit has picked up more than 400 women to bolster allegations
that the company underpaid female sales reps.

Filed under the Equal Pay Act, the complaint alleges that Merck
paid female reps less than male salespeople and thwarted women's
attempts to rise up the company ladder. Women who were pregnant or
had children were often pushed to leave the company, and sexual
harassment created a hostile work environment, the suit says.

U.S. District Judge Michael Shipp said in April that four former
reps had delivered a "modest factual showing" that Merck's policies
affected them and other women across the company, qualifying the
suit for potential class-action status. A single plaintiff, former
rep Kelli Smith, filed the case back in 2013.

Merck maintains that the gender bias claims are weak. "We remain
confident that this case lacks merit and will not proceed as a
class action," the company said in a Thursday statement, citing its
family-friendly HR policies and official avenues for women to speak
up about any unfair treatment. "The company will continue to
vigorously defend itself, and remains fully committed to providing
equal employment opportunities for all employees."

The plaintiffs' co-lead lawyer, David Sanford of Sanford Heisler,
said the women also aim to win class action status for related
gender discrimination claims. "The message sent by these women is
clear: Many women across the country believe that they suffered pay
discrimination while working at Merck," Sanford said in a Thursday
statement.

The women say that Merck was a "boys club" where men were seen as
"breadwinners" who needed to advance to support their families,
while women really should "stay at home" with their children.
Pregnant women were often demoted upon return to work after
maternity leave, the reps claim.

The Merck reps' complaints mirror those in discrimination lawsuits
against Daiichi Sankyo, Forest Laboratories, Bayer, and Novartis.
The Swiss drugmaker lost its case at trial in 2010, and ended up
settling with the plaintiffs for $175 million.

But Merck itself prevailed in another gender discrimination suit.
Last year, a jury sided with the company, finding that a former
employee failed to prove she was discriminated against. Kerri
Colicchio claimed that she was passed over for a promotion to vice
president because she was preparing to take maternity leave. When
she returned to work after her son's birth, Colicchio claimed, the
new VP bullied and harassed her, and she was fired several months
later.

In its statement, Merck said it has "a strong anti-discrimination
policy that prohibits discrimination on the basis of
characteristics, such as gender, pregnancy, race, age, disability
and sexual orientation" and pointed out that at this stage of the
legal process, the plaintiffs in the putative class action haven't
proven that any women were treated unfairly. [GN]

METROPOLITAN LIFE: McHugh Sues Over Long-Term Care Insurance Policy
-------------------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA McHUGH, CHARLES PATRICK McHUGH, JOHN ELLSWORTH and all
others similarly situated v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a
New York Corporation, Case No. 22STCV21912 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., July 6, 2022) seeks compensation and other relief
arising from fraud, breaches of contract and other misconduct
committed by Met Life in connection with the pricing, marketing,
and sale of Met Life's individual long-term care insurance
policies.

According to the complaint, Met Life's "5% Automatic Compound
Inflation Protection Rider" 10 and "5% Automatic Simple Benefit
Increase Rider" -- which Met Life sold as additional benefits with
long-term care insurance policies -- falsely and misleadingly
promised policyholders, such as Plaintiffs, that their "benefit
amounts will automatically increase each year with no corresponding
increase in premium."

Further, Met Life told insureds who purchased the "5% Automatic
Compound Inflation Protection Rider" or "5% Automatic Simple
Benefit Increase Rider" that "Your premium is not expected to
increase as a result of the benefit amount increases provided by
this Rider. However, We reserve the right to adjust premiums on a
class basis." Met Life did not inform insureds how its need for
future premium increases would be determined. In addition to their
base premiums, Plaintiffs paid significant premiums in exchange for
the "5% Automatic Compound Inflation Protection Rider" or "5%
Automatic Simple Benefit Increase Rider" and those riders' promise
of increased benefits with no corresponding increase in premiums,
the Plaintiffs contend.

But Met Life's promises were lies. Plaintiffs' base premiums, and
those premiums paid for the Inflation Protection Riders, were
directly tied or related to the increasing daily benefit amounts
those Riders provided. There was a corresponding rate increase. The
premiums increased multiple times as a direct result of the
benefit amount increases the Inflation Protection Riders provided,
added the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves, and all
others similarly situated, pursuant to California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 382, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code section 382, on behalf
of the following Class:

   "All persons in the State of California who purchased an
   individual long-term care insurance policy containing an
   Inflation Protection Rider from Met Life (or a subsidiary or
   affiliate thereof) at any time during the period from January 1,

   1986 to the present and have been subjected to a class-wide rate

   increase that increased their base premium and the
   premium/charge paid for the Inflation Protection Riders."

MetLife is among the largest global providers of insurance,
annuities, and employee benefit programs, with 90 million customers
in over 60 countries.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Thomas C. Cronin, Esq.
          CRONIN & CO., LTD.
          120 LaSalle Street, 20 th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 500-2100
          E-mail: tcc@cronincoltd.com

               - and -

          Robert R. Duncan, Esq.
          James Podolny, Esq.
          DUNCAN LAW GROUP, LLC
          161 North Clark St, Suite 2550
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 818-4415
          E-mail: rrd@duncanlawgroup.com
                  jp@duncanlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Steven Mikuzis, Esq.
          MAG MILE LAW, LLC
          535 North Michigan Ave., Suite 200
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Telephone: (708) 576-1624
          E-mail: steven@magmilelaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew P. Kelly, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW P. KELLY
          4652 Glenalbyn Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90065
          Telephone: (310) 483-3608
          E-mail: mpk@matthewpkellylaw.com

MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Court Junks Suit Involving Price-Fixing
----------------------------------------------------------
Micron Technology, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 2, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 1, 2022, that the company's motion to
dismiss a class action against them was granted by the court.

On June 26, 2018, a complaint was filed against Micron and other
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) suppliers in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California. On October 28, 2019,
the plaintiffs filed a consolidated, amended complaint.

The consolidated complaint purported to be on behalf of a
nationwide class of direct purchasers of DRAM products. The
consolidated complaint asserted claims based on alleged
price-fixing of DRAM products under federal and state law during
the period from June 1, 2016 through at least February 1, 2018, and
sought treble monetary damages, costs, interest, attorneys' fees,
and other injunctive and equitable relief.

On December 21, 2020, the District Court granted Micron's motion to
dismiss and granted the plaintiffs permission to file a further
amended complaint. On January 11, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a
further amended complaint asserting substantially the same claims
and seeking the same relief.

On September 3, 2021, the District Court granted Micron's motion to
dismiss the further amended complaint with prejudice. On October 1,
2021, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Micron Technology, Inc. is into innovative memory and storage
solutions based in Idaho.


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Dismissal of Securities Class Suit Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Micron Technology, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 2, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 1, 2022, that in March 7, 2022, the
Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court's ruling dismissing
plaintiffs' claim in a class action lawsuit filed in April 27, 2018
against Micron and other dynamic random access memory (DRAM)
suppliers in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California.

In September 3, 2019, the District Court granted Micron's motion to
dismiss and allowed the plaintiffs the opportunity to file a
consolidated, amended complaint. In October 28, 2019, the
plaintiffs filed a consolidated, amended complaint that purported
to be on behalf of a nationwide class of indirect purchasers of
DRAM products.

The amended complaint asserted claims based on alleged price-fixing
of DRAM products under federal and state law during the period from
June 1, 2016 to at least February 1, 2018, and sought treble
monetary damages, costs, interest, attorneys' fees, and other
injunctive and equitable relief. In December 21, 2020, the District
Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims and entered judgment against
them.

In January 19, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On March 7, 2022, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling dismissing
plaintiffs' claims. On May 16, 2022, the Court of Appeals denied
the plaintiffs' request for rehearing.

Micron Technology, Inc. is into innovative memory and storage
solutions based in Idaho.


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Faces Six Class Suits in Canada
--------------------------------------------------
Micron Technology, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended June 2, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 1, 2022, that six cases have been filed
in the following Canadian courts on the dates indicated: Superior
Court of Quebec (April 30, 2018 and May 3, 2018), the Federal Court
of Canada (May 2, 2018), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (May
15, 2018), and the Supreme Court of British Columbia (May 10,
2018). The cases allege price fixing in dynamic random access
memory (DRAM) products.

The plaintiffs in these cases are individuals seeking certification
of class actions on behalf of direct and indirect purchasers of
DRAM in Canada (or regions of Canada) between June 1, 2016 and
February 1, 2018.

Micron Technology, Inc. is into innovative memory and storage
solutions based in Idaho.


MNM TRADING LLC: Ortiz Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MNM Trading LLC. The
case is styled as Joseph Ortiz, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated v. MNM Trading LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-00523 (W.D.N.Y., July 6, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

MNM Trading -- https://www.mnmtradingcorp.com/ -- offers car covers
and motorcycle covers, traffic equipment, custom accessories,
matting, AWC mod wheels, mod rack luggage carriers, foglamps, pc
film window tint and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: jeffrey@gottlieb.legal

               - and -

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTFRIED & GOTTFRIED, LLP
          122 East 42nd. St., Suite 620
          New York, NY 10168
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


MOD SUPER FAST: Final Approval of Settlement Issued in Pratz Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled ALYSSA MARIE PRATZ, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MOD SUPER FAST
PIZZA, LLC, d/b/a MOD PIZZA, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-757-RJD (S.D. Ill.), Magistrate Judge
Reona J. Daly of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois issued an order granting two unopposed motions filed by
the Plaintiff:

   (1) Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees, Costs,
       Administrative Expenses, and Service Award; and

   (2) Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
       Settlement.

Magistrate Judge notes that unless otherwise noted, all capitalized
terms used in this Order that are not otherwise defined here have
the same meaning assigned to them as in the Settlement Agreement
between Plaintiff Pratz and the Defendant.

The Court preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement by
Preliminary Approval Order dated Feb. 25, 2022, and the Court finds
that adequate notice was given to all members of the Rule 23
Settlement Class pursuant to the terms of the Preliminary Approval
Order.

The Court held a Final Approval Hearing on June 27, 2022, at which
time the Parties and all other interested persons were afforded the
opportunity to be heard in support of and in opposition to the
Settlement.

Based on the papers filed with the Court and the presentations made
to the Court by the parties at the Final Approval Hearing, the
Court now gives final approval to the Settlement and finds that the
Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the best
interests of the Rule 23 Settlement Class. The Plaintiff's counsel
states in his affidavit that the Settlement Agreement is the result
of arms-length negotiations.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court finally certifies, for settlement purposes only, the
following Rule 23 Settlement Class:

     All individuals who work or worked at a MOD Super Fast
     Pizza, LLC (Defendant or MOD) location in the State of
     Illinois and who registered for or used a finger scan
     timekeeping system in connection with their employment with
     MOD from June 30, 2016 to June 30, 2021, except for those
     individuals who previously released their BIPA claims
     against Defendant.

There have been no requests for exclusion from the Rule 23
Settlement Class.

For settlement purposes only, the Court confirms the appointment of
Plaintiff Alyssa Marie Pratz as Class Representative of the Rule 23
Settlement Class.

For settlement purposes only, the Court confirms the appointment of
the following counsel as Class Counsel, and finds they are
experienced in class litigation and have adequately represented the
Rule 23 Settlement Class: Benjamin J. Whiting, Esq., and Alex J.
Dravillas, Esq., of Keller Postman LLC, at 150 N. Riverside Plaza,
Suite 4100, in Chicago, Illinois 60606.

With respect to the Rule 23 Settlement Class, the Court finds, for
settlement purposes only, that: (a) the Rule 23 Settlement Class
defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (b) there are questions of law or fact common to the
Rule 23 Settlement Class, and those common questions predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members; (c) the Class
Representative and Class Counsel have fairly and adequately
protected, and will continue to fairly and adequately protect, the
interests of the Rule 23 Settlement Class; and (d) certification of
the Rule 23 Settlement Class is an appropriate method for the fair
and efficient adjudication of this controversy.

The Court has determined that the Notice given to the Rule 23
Settlement Class Members, in accordance with the Preliminary
Approval Order, fully and accurately informed Rule 23 Settlement
Class Members of all material elements of the Settlement and
constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
and fully satisfied the requirements of Rule 23, applicable law,
and the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and Illinois
Constitution.

The Court orders the Parties to the Settlement Agreement to perform
their obligations thereunder. The terms of the Settlement Agreement
will be deemed incorporated herein as if explicitly set forth and
will have the full force of an order of the Court.

The Court dismisses the Litigation with prejudice and without costs
(except as otherwise provided here and in the Settlement Agreement)
as to the Plaintiff's and all Rule 23 Settlement Class Members'
claims against the Defendants. The Court adjudges that the Released
Claims and all of the claims described in the Settlement Agreement
are released against the Releasees.

The Court adjudges that the Plaintiff and all Rule 23 Settlement
Class Members who have not opted out of the Rule 23 Settlement
Class will be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released,
relinquished, and discharged all Released Claims against the
Releasees, as defined under the Settlement Agreement.

The Released Claims specifically extend to claims that the
Plaintiff and Rule 23 Settlement Class Members do not know or
suspect to exist in their favor at the time that the Settlement
Agreement, and the releases contained therein, become effective.

The Court approves payment of attorneys' fees of 35% of the
settlement, along with costs and expenses of $402.00, to Class
Counsel, totaling $466,759.50. This amount will be paid from the
Settlement Fund in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

The Court approves the incentive award in the amount of $3,000 for
the Class Representative Alyssa Marie Pratz, and specifically finds
such amount to be reasonable in light of the services performed by
Plaintiff for the Rule 23 Settlement Class, including taking on the
risks of litigation, active engagement in discovery, and helping
achieve the results to be made available to the Rule 23 Settlement
Class. This amount will be paid from the Settlement Fund in
accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Neither this Final Order and Judgment, nor the Settlement
Agreement, nor the payment of any consideration in connection with
the Settlement will be construed or used as an admission or
concession by or against Defendant or any of the Releasees of any
fault, omission, liability, or wrongdoing, or of the validity of
any of the Released Claims. This Final Order and Judgment is not a
finding of the validity or invalidity of any claims in this
Litigation or a determination of any wrongdoing by the Defendant or
any of the Releasees. The final approval of the Settlement
Agreement does not constitute any position, opinion, or
determination of this Court, one way or another, as to the merits
of the claims or defenses of the Plaintiff, the Rule 23 Settlement
Class Members, or the Defendant.

The Parties, without further approval from the Court, are permitted
to jointly agree to and adopt such amendments, modifications and
expansions of the Settlement Agreement and its implementing
documents (including all exhibits to the Settlement Agreement) so
long as they are consistent in all material respects with the Final
Order and Judgment and do not limit the rights of the Rule 23
Settlement Class Members.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 27, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3zhsvtw2 from Leagle.com.


MORTON COUNTY, ND: Dismissal in Part of Thunderhawk Suit Reversed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, Cissy Thunderhawk, on behalf of herself and all
similarly situated persons; Waste Win Young, on behalf of herself
and all similarly situated persons; Reverend John Floberg, on
behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons; Jose Zhagnay,
on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Morton County; Sheriff Kyle Kirchmeier
Defendants. Governor Doug Burgum; Former Governor Jack Dalrymple;
Director Grant Levi; Superintendent Michael Gerhart, Jr.
Defendants-Appellants. Does 1-100; Tigerswan, LLC Defendants.
American Civil Liberties Union; American Civil Liberties Union of
North Dakota Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s), Cissy Thunderhawk, on
behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons; Wašte Win
Young, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons;
Reverend John Floberg, on behalf of himself and all similarly
situated persons; Jose Zhagnay, on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated persons Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Sheriff Kyle
Kirchmeier Defendant-Appellant. Governor Doug Burgum; Former
Governor Jack Dalrymple; Director Grant Levi; Superintendent
Michael Gerhart, Jr.; Tigerswan, LLC; Does 1-100; Morton County
Defendants. American Civil Liberties Union; American Civil
Liberties Union of North Dakota Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s),
Case Nos. 20-3052, 20-3053 (8th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reverses the order of the district court,
which granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

The putative class action arises from the highly publicized
protests against construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL)
across an area of North Dakota near the boundary of the Standing
Rock Indian Reservation. Between April 2016 and February 2017,
members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, along with tens of
thousands of self-identified "Water Protectors," engaged in
protests near where State Highway 1806 crosses the Cannonball
River. Following a significant skirmish between protestors and law
enforcement officials, law enforcement erected a barricade across
the Backwater Bridge, blocking through access on State Highway
1806.

The Plaintiffs, a group of tribal members and supporters, filed
suit against various state and county officials, alleging that the
closure of Backwater Bridge and a nine-mile section of road
violated their constitutional rights. The Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss, which the district court granted in part and denied in
part. As relevant to this appeal, the district court denied the
motion as it relates to the Defendants' entitlement to qualified
immunity, concluding that the qualified immunity analysis would be
more properly decided at the summary judgment stage. The Defendants
filed this interlocutory appeal, asserting that the district court
erroneously denied the motion to dismiss based on qualified
immunity.

In its 101-page opinion and order, the district court devoted less
than three pages to the qualified immunity analysis. As to the
first prong, the district court determined that "the Plaintiffs
have alleged facts showing violations of their constitutional right
to speech," and, as to the second prong, the district court stated
that "whether the law was clearly established so that a reasonable
official would know he or she was violating the constitutional
rights of another appears to be the biggest contention between the
parties."

Instead of deciding the clearly established prong, however, the
district court stated that the case is an example of why qualified
immunity is often best decided on a motion for summary judgment
when the details of the alleged deprivations are more fully
developed. It says, as the United States Supreme Court has noted,
when qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the
precise factual basis for the plaintiff's claim or claims may be
hard to identify and the answer to whether there was a violation
may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed,
citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 238-39 (2009).

The Eighth Circuit opines that while a district court may address
the prongs in any order, it 'may not deny qualified immunity
without answering both questions in the plaintiff's favor.'" The
district court's failure to answer the clearly established inquiry
was thus erroneous. The Defendants urge the Eighth Circuit to
conduct the clearly established inquiry in the first instance as it
involves a purely legal question. It declines to do so without the
benefit of the district court's analysis. It, therefore, remands to
the district court with instructions to conduct the requisite
clearly established analysis.

For the foregoing reasons, the Eighth Circuit reverses and remands
for proceedings consistent with its Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2bfm39ca from Leagle.com.


MP MATERIALS: Bourque Named as Lead Plaintiff in Bernstein Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Albregts of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada grants Denis Bourque's motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit styled Marc Bernstein,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. MP Materials Corp. f/k/a Fortress Value Acquisition
Corp., et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-00315-CDS-DJA (D.
Nev.).

The lawsuit is a federal securities class action arising out of
alleged misrepresentations that Defendants MP Materials Corp.;
James H. Litinsky; Ryan Corbett; Andrew A. McKnight; and Daniel N.
Bass allegedly made regarding MP Materials. Plaintiff Marc
Bernstein sues the Defendants for damages--on his behalf and on
behalf of other investors--alleging violations of the Securities
and Exchange Act. Fellow investors Denis Bourque, Carmelo Zappulla,
and Mark Jurkiewicz all moved to be appointed lead plaintiff.

No party objected to Bourque's motion. Zappulla and Jurkiewicz
later filed responses conceding that they did not have the greatest
financial stake in the outcome. Neither Zappulla nor Jurkiewicz
argued that Bourque would not adequately represent the class. The
Court finds these matters can be properly resolved without a
hearing.

I. Discussion

Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), the
court must select the lead plaintiff that is most capable of
adequately representing the interests of class members.

First, the Court will determine if the motion is timely. Second,
the Court will determine which plaintiff is presumptively the most
adequate by demonstrating the largest financial interest and
satisfying the requirements of Rule 23, particularly, typicality
and adequacy. Third, the Court will consider whether any party has
rebutted the presumption.

A. Bourque's motion is timely.

The plaintiff to first file an action must post notice of the
pending action in a widely circulated national business-oriented
publication or wire service, which must state that "any member of
the purported class may move the court to serve as lead plaintiff."
The statute gives lead plaintiffs of the purported class sixty days
from the notice to move the court to serve as lead plaintiff.

Here, Plaintiff Marc Bernstein filed a notice on Feb. 22, 2022.
Purported lead plaintiffs had until April 25, 2022, to file their
motions. Bourque timely filed his motion on April 25, 2022, Judge
Albregts holds.

B. Bourque demonstrates the largest financial interest, typicality,
and adequacy.

The court must determine which plaintiff is presumptively most
adequate. The plaintiff will have (1) filed the complaint or
motioned the court following notice; (2) the largest financial
interest in the relief sought by the class; and (3) otherwise
satisfy Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Albregts states that Bourque is presumptively the most
adequate Plaintiff. Undisputed by other potential lead plaintiffs
and Bernstein, Bourque has the largest financial interest because
he has suffered the greatest financial loss. Bourque attaches his
financial interest analysis to his motion, which demonstrates that
he lost $118,225.71 investing in MP Materials Corp. Jurkiewicz and
Zappulla--both of whom initially filed motions to be appointed as
lead plaintiffs--have also conceded that they do not have the
largest financial interest in the litigation.

Because Bourque, Jurkiewicz and Zappulla have analyzed their
financial interest in the litigation using their losses, the Court
finds that this method is both rational and consistently applied.

Judge Albregts finds that Bourque also satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23, particularly typicality and adequacy. He has suffered
the same injury as other Plaintiffs because he has suffered the
same losses in the value of his stock as they have. Other
Plaintiffs have been injured in the same way by the same alleged
course of conduct because they each allege losses suffered as a
result of the Defendants deceiving investors. Bourque also asserts
that there are no conflicts of interest between him and other class
members and his high losses means that he will vigorously prosecute
the action.

C. No party has rebutted the presumption.

The final step of the analysis allows other plaintiffs the
opportunity to rebut the presumption that the plaintiff with the
largest financial interest satisfies the requirements of typicality
and adequacy; see 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). To
rebut the presumption, it must be proved that the plaintiff "will
not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; or is
subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of
adequately representing the class."

Here, no party has opposed Bourque's motion to be appointed lead
plaintiff. In their non-opposition and response, respectively,
neither Jurkiewicz nor Zappulla assert that Bourque will not fairly
and adequately protect the interest of the class or is subject to
unique defenses. Thus, no party has rebutted the presumption that
he is the most adequate Plaintiff, Judge Albregts concludes.

D. The Court approves Bourque's counsel.

The PSLRA provides that once the Court selects a lead plaintiff,
that plaintiff will, subject to the approval of the court, select
and retain counsel to represent the class. The decision to approve
counsel selected by the lead plaintiff is entrusted to the
discretion of the district court.

Having reviewed the materials provided by Bourque's selected
counsel--Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP as lead counsel and the
Aldrich Law Firm, Ltd., as liaison counsel--the Court finds that
the firms are capable of serving in their respective roles. Both
firms have experience in securities litigation and class actions
and have demonstrated familiarity with their respective roles.

The Court, thus, grants Bourque's motion for selection of counsel.

Order

Judge Albregts grants Bourque's motion for appointment as lead
plaintiff and approval of counsel.

Mr. Zappulla's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and
approval of selection of counsel is denied.

Mr. Jurkiewicz's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and
appointment of counsel is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 27, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/36zx4zhe from Leagle.com.


MYERS LLC: Fails to Pay Piece-Rate Employees' OT Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DUSTIN BUTCHER, on behalf of himself and similarly situated
employees v. JAMES W. MYERS, LLC, Case No. 3:22-cv-00111-KRG (W.D.
Pa., July 6, 2022) seeks  all available relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant pays the above employees
on a piece-rate basis. Depending on the particular job, the
employees generally earn between 35 and 55 cents for each tie they
pre-plate. We will call these employees "Piece-Rate Employees."
Piece-Rate Employees regularly work over 40 hours per week at the
manufacturer's location. In addition, Piece-Rate employees (most of
whom reside in Pennsylvania) work additional hours traveling
long-distances to and from the towns in which the manufacturers'
facilities are located. The Defendant does not pay Piece-Rate
Employees any overtime wages for hours worked over 40 per week. The
Plaintiff has been sporadically employed by Defendant as a Piece
Rate Employee since approximately May 2019, says the suit.

The Plaintiff regularly works over 40 hours per week at the
manufacturer's facility. Specifically, the Plaintiff generally
works between 50 and 55 hours per week at the manufacturer's
facility and, in addition, has spent between 4 and 19 hours
traveling (one-way) between Pennsylvania and the towns in which the
manufacturers' facilities are located. The Plaintiff did not
receive any overtime wages for hours worked over 40 per week, the
suit added.

The Defendant provides Stella-Jones, Inc. and other railroad tie
manufacturers with employees who travel to the manufacturers'
facilities and "pre-plate" railroad ties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter Winebrake, Esq.
          WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
          715 Twining Road, Suite 211
          Dresher, PA 19025
          Telephone: (215) 884-2491
          E-mail: pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com

MYLAN INC: Bid to Compel Election of Defenses in EpiPen Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: EpiPen Direct Purchaser Litigation. THIS
DOCUMENT RELATES TO: All Actions, Case No. 20-CV-827 (ECT/JFD) (D.
Minn.), Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota denies the Plaintiffs' Amended
Motion to Compel Election of Defenses.

I. Background

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to
Compel Election of Defenses. The Court held a hearing on May 19,
2022, and denied the motion at the conclusion of the hearing. The
Court informed the parties that a written order providing the
Court's reasoning for the ruling would be issued and that the time
for any appeal would run from the date of the written order.

The Plaintiffs move for an order compelling the Defendants to (1)
identify all defenses and affirmative assertions they will raise in
defense of the alleged bribery, mail fraud, or wire fraud offenses
that they allege as RICO predicates; (2) disclose assertions about
their state of mind that they will use to defend against the
Plaintiffs' claims (i.e., that they acted in "good faith" or
believed their conduct was lawful); and (3) for each state-of-mind
assertion, elect to either (a) waive the attorney-client privilege
or work product protection for documents and testimony, or (b)
maintain the privilege or work-product claim and be precluded from
making the assertion in the case.

The Plaintiffs submit that the Defendants have put at issue since
the beginning of the case the Defendants' good faith, intent, and
beliefs about the law. They identify as examples several statements
in the Defendants' legal memoranda. The Plaintiffs quote from the
PBM Defendants' memorandum of law in support of a motion to
dismiss: The "Plaintiffs do not -- and cannot -- plausibly allege
that the PBMs knew they were violating bribery."

The Plaintiffs also identify statements by the Defendants in the
Rule 26(f) Report that they claim put the Defendants' state of mind
at issue. Finally, they observe that the Defendants used language
implicating good faith and belief about the law in their answers to
the First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

To obtain discovery on these arguments, statements, and
allegations, the Plaintiffs served in April 2021 requests for the
production of documents for the Defendants' "legal beliefs about
the federal antikickback statutes and their compliance with same,"
safe-harbor defenses, and preemption defenses. The Defendants
raised several objections, including that the discovery requests
sought information covered by the attorney-client privilege or
work-product doctrine. The Plaintiffs followed up in August 2021
with discovery requests asking for the Defendants' legal analysis
relating to safe-harbor defenses and any defense based on good
faith or state of mind, and Defendants again objected on the basis
of privilege.

In November 2021, the Plaintiffs asked each the Defendant to choose
to either (1) maintain its defenses implicating good faith,
knowledge, or intent, and waive all privilege or work-product
protection for documents and testimony concerning those topics; or
(2) maintain their assertions of attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection but waive any right to argue good faith,
knowledge, or intent in defending the case. The Defendants declined
to do so, stating they had not waived privilege by merely making
affirmative assertions about their state of mind and had not
invoked the advice of counsel as part of their defenses. They also
posited that the Plaintiffs, not the Defendants, bear the burden to
prove intent with respect to any violation of antikickback statutes
or state bribery laws.

The Plaintiffs now ask the Court to compel each Defendant to
formally choose to either:

      (a) raise defenses that involve affirmative assertions that
they acted in good faith, had no reason to believe that their
conduct violated bribery or kickback laws, or believed their
conduct was lawful or protected by a safe-harbor exception, and
thereby waive any and all privilege and work-product claims
regarding such topics, or

      (b) maintain their assertions of attorney-client privilege,
attorney work-product or other privilege claims regarding their
knowledge and understanding of the law, and thereby forego, in
defending this case, making assertions regarding their good faith
and/or knowledge or understanding of the law.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to compel Defendants to identify
at this time which safe harbor defenses they plan to assert
regarding the bribery statutes. The relief described in the
Plaintiffs' proposed order goes even further:

      1. Each Defendant is ordered to identify and disclose to the
Plaintiffs, within 14 days of the Order, all defenses and
affirmative assertions that it will raise in defense of the alleged
bribery or mail/wire fraud offenses the Plaintiffs have pled as
RICO predicates. No Defendant may thereinafter raise or argue any
defense or affirmative assertion not identified in accordance with
this Order.

      2. Each Defendant's disclosure will include each assertion
about its state of mind that it will use to defend the case,
including but not limited to assertions that it acted in good
faith, did not form the requisite intent to commit the alleged
bribery or mail/wire fraud offense, had no reason to believe that
its conduct violated bribery or mail/wire fraud laws, or believed
its conduct was lawful or protected by a safe harbor or other
exception.

      3. For each assertion each Defendant identifies and discloses
in response to No. 2 above, the Defendant must elect to either: (a)
waive any attorney-client or other privilege and work-product
claims over documents or testimony regarding or relating to the
assertion; or (b) maintain their privilege and attorney
work-product claims, and be precluded from making the assertion
thereafter in this litigation.

The Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged at the hearing that the relief
described in the proposed order was "overbroad." The Defendants
oppose the motion. They argue that the motion is procedurally
improper and substantively wrong; that discovery is ongoing, and
they have not yet settled on their defenses; and that the relief
sought is overbroad.

II. Discussion

A. Implied Waiver of Privilege or Work-Product Protection

Among other things, the Plaintiffs argue that if a party "makes
affirmative assertions regarding its state of mind (e.g., a good
faith belief, lack of knowledge or intent)" or asserts that "its
conduct complied with the law," then the party has placed its legal
analysis at issue and waived the attorney-client privilege by
implication.

Judge Docherty respectfully disagrees. If that were so, privilege
would be waived when, for example, a litigant accused of defamation
asserted a belief that a statement was true, or a litigant alleged
a good-faith defense. "A party does not lose the privilege to
protect attorney client communications from disclosure in discovery
when his or her state of mind is put in issue in the action." After
the Defendants identify their exact defenses, the Plaintiffs
propose, the Court can determine whether a privilege has been
waived, the scope of any such waiver, and what discovery should be
produced.

Although the Plaintiffs are not seeking a decision on implied
waiver through the present motion, Judge Docherty finds that
implied-waiver principles are informative to a determination
whether potential privilege issues warrant requiring the Defendants
to elect their defenses now. "A client may waive the protection of
the attorney-client privilege either expressly or by implication."
"Courts have found waiver by implication when a client testifies
concerning portions of the attorney-client communication, places
the attorney-client relationship directly at issue, or asserts
reliance on an attorney's advice as an element of a claim or
defense."

B. Procedural Considerations

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' motion is improper
because there is no case or rule providing a procedural vehicle for
the relief they request: To compel the Defendants to elect
defenses. The Court has broad discretion in case management and
scheduling. Accordingly, Judge Docherty does not doubt the Court's
authority to order the Defendants to elect their defenses by a
certain date, if warranted.

C. Whether Defendants Should Elect Their Defenses Now

Judge Docherty now turns to whether the Defendants should be
required to elect their defenses at this time, and concludes they
should not, for the following reasons. First, the Defendants have
not expressly or impliedly waived privilege or work-product
protection through their arguments made in legal memoranda,
statements in the Rule 26(f) Report, or allegations or affirmative
defenses in their answers. Second, the Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants should elect their defenses now to give them fair
notice. Third, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants must
elect their defenses now so that the parties can focus discovery.
Fourth and finally, the Plaintiffs direct the Court to the District
of Minnesota's Rule 26(f) scheduling template for patent cases,
which includes an interim date for a party to decide whether to
waive the attorney-client privilege on topics related to willful
infringement.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Docherty denies the Plaintiffs'
Amended Motion to Compel Election of Defenses.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/29z5w6t6 from Leagle.com.


NESTLE HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses Horti's 2nd Amended Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRUCE HORTI, et al., Plaintiffs v. NESTLE HEALTHCARE
NUTRITION, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-09812-PJH (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California grants the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint.

I. Background

The Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended
complaint ("SAC") came on for hearing before the Court on June 9,
2022. It is a putative consumer class action regarding advertising
of nutritional drinks. Plaintiff Horti is a resident of Concord,
California. Plaintiff Sandra George is a resident of Adelanto,
California. Plaintiff Jeanette Craig is a resident of Kingston, New
York. Defendant Nestle is a Delaware Corporation with a
headquarters in Bridgewater, New Jersey.

The Defendant makes several health drinks, including Boost Glucose
Control, Boost Glucose Control High Protein, and Boost Glucose
Control Max. The Plaintiffs allege that the representations on the
labels of each of these products mislead and "trick" reasonable
consumers into believing that the products can prevent and treat
diabetes. In particular, they allege the following representations
are misleading: (a) "Designed for people with diabetes"; (b) the
name of the Products: "BOOST Glucose Control"; and (c) "Helps
manage blood sugar." Boost Max does not include the representation
(a) "Designed for people with diabetes."

The Plaintiffs allege they bought Boost Glucose Control drinks in
retail stores. Each Plaintiff paid an unidentified "premium price"
for the drink that was "more expensive than other unidentified
choices." And each Plaintiff chose to purchase the drinks "based
upon the Products' diabetes-related representations." The
Plaintiffs do not allege that they consumed the products, they do
not describe if anything happened to them after they consumed the
products, and they do not allege that they are diabetic.

Much of the Plaintiffs' complaint is dedicated to a general
discussion of diabetes and other background information. As part of
this discussion, the Plaintiffs concede that there is no known cure
for diabetes, and that it is a condition that is managed both
through "healthy eating" and taking "insulin or other medicines."

The Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit by complaint filed Dec. 20,
2021. They filed the first amended complaint the same day. Pursuant
to stipulation, they filed the now-operative second amended
complaint with the corrected entity name for the Defendant on Feb.
4, 2022.

The Plaintiffs assert the following claims against Nestle: Count I:
violations of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code Section 17200 ("UCL"); Count II: violations of
California's False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section
17500 ("FAL"); Count III: California's Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1750 et seq. ("CLRA"); Counts IV and V:
New York General Business Law Sections 349 and 350 (together,
"GBL"); Count VI: breach of express warranty; and Count VII: unjust
enrichment. They seek to represent separate California and New York
subclasses of "All persons in the respective states who purchased
the Boost drinks for personal use and not for resale."

Nestle now asks the Court to dismiss the SAC in its entirety for
failure to state a claim and for lack of standing. In support of
the motion to dismiss, it requests that the Court take judicial
notice of certain materials.

II. Analysis

A. Request for Judicial Notice

The Defendant requests that the Court take notice of Exhibit A, a
reproduction of its webpages related to refunds for customers
dissatisfied with the taste of Boost products. Though the Defendant
contends that the Plaintiffs' complaint relies heavily on the Boost
website, a review of the SAC in totality reveals that it relies
little on the Boost website itself and rather on images from other
websites or retailers. The Plaintiffs have not referenced the Boost
website so much that it may be considered in its entirety, and the
Defendant's request is denied on this basis.

Further, the Defendant's reference to the refund page of the Boost
website is denied as moot. The Defendant contends that consumer
plaintiffs lack standing where a full refund was made available to
them prior to suit--the remedy of a refund moots plaintiff's
injury-in-fact, citing Savoy v. Collectors Universe, Inc., 2020 WL
4938464, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2020). The Savoy case is much
narrower than this general proposition, where a plaintiff's claim
for false advertising of a customer satisfaction guarantee was
deemed moot because he never attempted to utilize the refund policy
prior to filing suit. But, Judge Hamilton need not reach this
argument regarding the Plaintiffs' standing (and thus whether to
consider this exhibit) because the SAC fails on other grounds.

In contrast, the Defendant's Exhibit B is a copy of the same
informational webpage titled, "What is Diabetes?" on the CDC
website that plaintiffs cite to describe diabetes in the SAC. The
Plaintiffs' objection to the Court's consideration of this material
because it merely provides background on diabetes is nonsensical.
The Defendant cites to the material for the same purpose as
plaintiffs cite to the material in their pleading, and such
background information aids in assessing the "reasonable consumer"
standard, an element essential to the Plaintiffs' claims. Judge
Hamilton therefore grants the Defendant's request to take notice of
Exhibit B.

B. Motion to Dismiss

1. Whether Plaintiffs' Claims are Preempted by Federal Law

The Defendant argues that all of the Plaintiffs' product labeling
claims are preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"),
as amended by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act ("NLEA").
"The FDCA forbids the misbranding of food, including by means of
false or misleading labeling." The NLEA provides that "no State or
political subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly
establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food
in interstate commerce any requirement for the labeling of food
that is not identical to" federal requirements contained in the
relevant sections. Hence, state labeling obligations that are "not
identical to" those imposed by federal law are expressly
preempted.

The Defendant contests as preempted the Plaintiffs' argument that
the labels make "health claims" that needed to be "preauthorized by
the FDA." The Plaintiffs aver that their claims are not preempted
because the Boost product labels at issue amount to unauthorized
health claims in violation of one of NLEA's implementing
regulations.

Judge Hamilton finds that the product label for Boost Glucose
Control Max does not include the statement "Designed for people
with diabetes." The label of Boost Glucose Control Max does not
make any health claim, and it is thus preempted because it falls
outside the boundaries of the NLEA. Therefore, Judge Hamilton
dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims related to the third product,
Boost Glucose Control Max, with prejudice.

To the extent the Plaintiffs argue that the Boost product labels
make unsubstantiated "disease claims" under 21 C.F.R. Section
101.93(g)(2), their argument fails. As the Defendant highlights,
that regulation does not apply because it actually deals with
"dietary supplements," a different category under the FDCA. Even if
that regulation did apply, however, the statements on the Boost
labels do not constitute "disease claims" under that regulation
because the statements do not represent that "the product itself
can cure or treat a disease." The three statements identified by
the Plaintiffs do not declare or suggest that the Boost products
treat or cure diabetes.

2. Whether the Product Labels Would Deceive a Reasonable Consumer

The Plaintiffs' first three causes of action are brought under
California statutes: The Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), the False
Advertising Law ("FAL"), and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"). The Plaintiffs' fourth and fifth causes of action are
brought under similar New York consumer protection statutes,
General Business Law sections 349 and 350.

Judge Hamilton holds that the Plaintiffs fail to show that members
of the public, particularly the targeted consumer group, are likely
to be deceived by the Defendant's product labels. As the SAC
describes, diabetes is a serious, chronic disease in which a
person's ability to regulate blood sugar (glucose) is impaired.
There is no cure, but diabetes can be managed "with healthy eating
and being active, or your doctor may prescribe insulin, other
injectable medications, or oral diabetes medicines to help manage
your blood sugar and avoid complications."

A reasonable consumer would not be deceived by the representations
on the Boost product labels. The context of the Plaintiffs'
purchase of the allegedly misleading products only reinforces the
implausibility of their claims. No reasonable consumer of the
targeted consumer group would expect a novel diabetes treatment to
simply appear on grocery shelves out of the blue. In sum, it is not
plausible that a reasonable consumer would be deceived by the Boost
products labels. Judge Hamilton dismisses the Plaintiffs' first
five claims on this basis.

3. Whether Plaintiffs Have Alleged a Cognizable Injury

In Naimi v. Starbucks Corp., 798 F. App'x 67, 70 (9th Cir. 2019),
the Ninth Circuit held that although the plaintiffs alleged that
they paid a price premium for canned espresso, they did not allege
an injury in fact because they "did not allege how much they paid
for the beverage, how much they would have paid for it absent the
alleged deception, . . . or any other details regarding the price
premium."

In the present case, the Plaintiffs do not describe with any
particularity how they were injured. They do not state whether they
have diabetes, they do not describe whether they consumed the
products, and they do not articulate any injury they suffered as a
result of ingesting the Boost drinks. The Plaintiffs announce that
they have suffered injury based on their payment of a "premium
price" for a product that did not work as advertised and that they
would not have paid for had they known the truth, but this is
insufficient to adequately allege a cognizable injury. As in Naimi,
Judge Hamilton holds that the Plaintiffs' allegations lack any
detail about the prices they paid or the differences between Boost
Glucose Control products and non-premium products. The Plaintiffs
thus fail to make out a concrete injury. The Plaintiffs lack
standing for any of their claims and the SAC must be dismissed.

4. Whether the Pleading Satisfies the Standards of Rule 8 and Rule
9(b)

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs fall short of the
necessary particularity of their reliance on the allegedly
misleading product labels.

Judge Hamilton agrees that the Plaintiffs fail to plead
particularity, especially related to the "how" element of pleading
under Rule 9(b). The Plaintiffs allege that each of them "relied on
Nestle's diabetes-related factual representations on the Products'
labels." These bare contentions fall short of describing how the
Plaintiffs were led to believe that the Boost products treated
diabetes or otherwise fell short of the representations on the
labels. They offer no comparisons of these Boost products against
other Boost products or other glucose-control marketed food
products. Hence, the Plaintiffs' CLRA, FAL, and UCL claims are not
particularly pleaded, and they are therefore dismissed on this
basis as well.

5. Whether Plaintiffs Have Pleaded a Breach of Express Warranty

"To state a claim for breach of express warranty under California
law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the exact terms of the warranty;
(2) reasonable reliance thereon; and (3) a breach of warranty that
proximately caused plaintiff's injury."

Judge Hamilton holds that the Plaintiffs fail to identify the exact
terms of a warranty. As discussed in relation to the UCL, CLRA, and
FAL claims, the Plaintiffs have failed to identify an actionable
misrepresentation as a matter of law. This claim is therefore
dismissed.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, including the Plaintiffs' failures to state
a claim and to plead injury-in fact sufficient to establish
standing, Judge Hamilton grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss.
He grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's request for
judicial notice, as detailed. He dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims
related to Boost Glucose Control Max with prejudice. The
Plaintiffs' claims related to Boost Glucose Control and Boost
Glucose Control High Protein may be amended to address the
deficiencies noted in the Order. Any amended pleading must be filed
within 28 days from the date of the Order. No additional parties or
claims may be added without leave of court or stipulation of the
Defendant.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4hmabvfv from Leagle.com.


NEW JERSEY: Court Terminates Planker v. Atkins Suit & Pending Bids
------------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Madeline Cox Arleo of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey issued a Memorandum & Order in the
lawsuit titled KEVIN PLANKER, et al., Plaintiffs v. LAWRENCE
ATKINS, et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-4264 (MCA) (D.N.J.).

The matter has been opened to the Court by Kevin Planker and Ryan
Pittinger's filing of a civil complaint, alleging violations of
civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), and
under state tort law. The Plaintiffs paid the $400 filing fee when
they submitted the original complaint. Plaintiff Planker
subsequently filed a motion for post-filing fee indigency, a motion
to amend, and other miscellaneous motions.

On Feb. 10, 2022, Plaintiff Planker also submitted a certified
six-month prison account statement in support of his IFP
application. At this time, the Court will grant IFP status to
Plaintiff Planker only.

Federal law requires the Court, to review before docketing a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity (28 U.S.C. Section 1915A). This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(a)
because Plaintiff Planker is a "prisoner" and "seeks redress" from
a government entity and governmental employees. Because the Court
has granted Plaintiff Planker's IFP application, the complaint is
also subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B).

Prior to addressing the motion to amend and screening this matter,
the Court must address certain issues raised by the Plaintiffs'
submissions. First, Plaintiff Planker submitted a Declaration with
his original complaint. In that Declaration, Planker appears to
admit that he submitted a complaint in this District on behalf of
another Plaintiff, Frank Castaldo, in an action captioned Castaldo
v. State of New Jersey, et al., Civ. Action No. 18-14249. Plaintiff
Planker seeks to reopen that action and replace Castaldo as the
"named" Plaintiff.

Plaintiff Castaldo already made a similar request to the Honorable
Esther Salas in that action, and the Court denied the request by
letter Order dated Oct. 11, 2019. Judge Salas also construed
Castaldo's request to withdraw from the case as a voluntary
dismissal of the action, which has remained closed since that time.
This Court likewise denies Plaintiff Planker's request to replace
Castaldo as Plaintiff in Castaldo v. State of New Jersey, et al.,
or to consolidate this action with that closed matter.

The Court also denies the Plaintiff's request to proceed in this
matter as the named representative in a class action. The Plaintiff
is proceeding pro se and, therefore, cannot represent a putative
class, Judge Cox Arleo opines, citing  Lewis v. City of Trenton
Police Dep't, 175 F. App'x 552, 554 (3d Cir. 2006). As such, the
request for class action status is denied without prejudice.

There are additional irregularities that the Court must resolve
prior to screening this matter. Although the original complaint
lists Ryan Pittinger as a co-Plaintiff and the original complaint
is purportedly signed by him, the proposed amended complaint does
not list Ryan Pittinger as a Plaintiff and is not signed by him.
The proposed amended complaint lists another former inmate, Gary
Tozzi, as co-plaintiff. Gary Tozzi has not signed the proposed
amended complaint, and the Court does not consider him to be a
plaintiff in this action. Plaintiff Pittinger (alternately referred
to in the original complaint as "Ryan Pittenger") is allegedly a
former prisoner, who was released from Northern State Prison on
March 13, 2020. Pittinger's handwritten signature, however, is
strikingly similar to Plaintiff Planker's handwritten signature.

In light of Plaintiff's Planker's Declaration that he submitted a
complaint on behalf of Castaldo in a different action, the Court
notifies Planker that he is not permitted to sign the names of
other inmates and may be subject to sanctions if the Court learns
that he is engaging in such conduct in this action.

At this time, the Court will deny without prejudice Plaintiff
Planker's motion to amend and require Ryan Pittinger to notify the
Court in writing as to whether he seeks or consents to withdraw as
a Plaintiff in this matter. If Plaintiff Pittinger did not sign the
original complaint and consent to its submission on his behalf, he
should also notify the Court of that fact. If Plaintiff Pittinger
does not respond to this Order within 30 days, the Court will deem
him to have voluntarily withdrawn from this action, and will
reinstate the motion to amend.

The Court will also administratively terminate this matter for
docket management purposes pending Plaintiff Pittinger's response
to this Order. Once the Court receives a response from Plaintiff
Pittinger, or the time to submit a response expires, the Court will
screen the appropriate complaint and reinstate the motion to amend,
if appropriate. The remaining motions submitted by Plaintiff
Planker, ECF Nos. 8, 10, are also administratively terminated,
subjected to reinstatement after the Court screens this matter.

Order

Accordingly, Judge Cox Arleo grants Plaintiff Planker's motion for
post-filing IFP status, as to Plaintiff Planker only.

Plaintiff Planker's motion to amend is denied without prejudice for
the reasons stated here.

The request for class certification is denied without prejudice for
the reasons stated here.

The Clerk of the Court will send a copy of this Memorandum and
Order to Ryan Pittinger AKA Ryan Pittenger, at his last known
address; within 30 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order,
Mr. Pittinger will notify the Court in writing as to whether he
seeks or consents to withdraw as a Plaintiff in this matter; if Mr.
Pittinger did not sign the original complaint in this matter or
consent to its submission on his behalf, he should notify the Court
of that fact.

The Court directs Plaintiff Pittinger to submit his written
response to the Clerk of the Court, Martin Luther King Building &
U.S. Courthouse, at 50 Walnut Street, in Newark, New Jersey 07102,
and to reference Civil Action No. 20-4264, Planker. et al. v.
Atkins, et al.

If Plaintiff Ryan Pittinger does not respond to this Memorandum and
Order within 30 days, the Court will deem him to have voluntarily
withdrawn as a Plaintiff in this matter.

This matter and the remaining motions pending at ECF Nos. 8 and 10
will be administratively terminated pending Plaintiff Ryan
Pittinger's response to this Memorandum and Order and the Court's
screening of the matter.

Once Plaintiff Pittinger responds to the Court's Order or the time
to respond expires, the Court will reopen this matter for screening
and reinstate Plaintiff Planker's motions, if appropriate.

The Clerk of the Court will also send a copy of this Order to
Plaintiff Planker at the address listed on file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum & Order dated June 27,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3bzsa5zc from
Leagle.com.


NORTH CAROLINA: Abdullah-Malik's Complaint Fails Initial Review
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned NAFIS AKEEM-ALIM ABDULLAH-MALIK, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. FNU PARKER, et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:22-cv-00118-MR (W.D.N.C.), Judge Martin Rridinger of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
Charlotte Division, finds that the Plaintiff's complaint fails
initial review.

The matter is before the Court on initial review of the Plaintiff's
Complaint, filed under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; his pro se filings;
and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will allow
the Plaintiff 30 days to amend his Complaint.

I. Background

Pro se Plaintiff Nafis Akeem-Alim Abdullah-Malik is currently
confined at the Mecklenburg County Jail in Charlotte, North
Carolina. He filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
on March 16, 2022, on his own behalf as "Head of Class," and on
behalf of six identified individuals and "Jail Central Pretrial
Detainees." The Plaintiff names as Defendants 18 identified
individuals; an unidentified number of "Jane/John Does," described
as Mailroom Personnel, Aramark Food Services Personnel, and Policy
Writers; and "Jane Does" and "John Does" not otherwise identified.
The Plaintiff purports to state claims for violation of the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Plaintiff's Complaint is so meandering and nonsensical as to
preclude any meaningful summary by the Court here, Judge Rridinger
states.

II. Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

The Clerk has repeatedly ordered the Mecklenburg County Jail to
provide the Plaintiff's prisoner trust account statement. The
Court, however, has not received the statement. Because this
Complaint has now been pending initial review for over three
months, the Court will address the Plaintiff's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP) without the trust account statement. In his
Affidavit, the Plaintiff reports that he has no income, no assets,
and that he is currently detained.

The Court, therefore, will grant the Plaintiff's motion and allow
him to proceed without the prepayment of the filing fee in
accordance with the Clerk's usual procedure.

III. Standard of Review

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court
must review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to
dismissal on the grounds that it is frivolous or malicious or fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted (28 U.S.C. Section
1915(e)(2)). Furthermore, under Section 1915A the Court must
conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.

IV. Discussion

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States and must show that the deprivation of that
right was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

A. Multiple Plaintiffs

The Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of himself,
six other identified individuals, and "Jail Central Pretrial
Detainees." Although the Fourth Circuit has not explicitly
addressed this issue, many district courts in this Circuit have
prohibited multiple prisoners from joining together as plaintiffs
in a single Section 1983 action, primarily because of the filing
fee requirement found in the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"),
28 U.S.C. Section 1915(b)(1). See Davis v. Aldridge, No.
3:20-cv-00592, 2020 WL 5502306, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 11, 2020)
(collecting cases).

Moreover, Judge Rridinger opines, a pro se inmate may not represent
other inmates in a class action, Fowler v. Lee, 18 Fed. App'x 164,
165 (4th Cir. 2001), and may not sign pleadings on their behalf,
Davis, 2020 WL 5502306, at *1.

The Court, therefore, will dismiss the other Plaintiffs on initial
review. These individuals may bring suit on their own behalf and
are responsible for their own filing fees should they wish to do
so. The Court may later, in its discretion, consolidate the actions
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court, therefore, will review the Complaint as it relates to
the Plaintiff only.

B. Multiple, Unrelated Defendants

Moreover, a plaintiff may not assert unrelated claims against
unrelated defendants in a single action, Judge Rridinger notes.

Here, the Plaintiff appears to bring multiple unrelated claims
against unrelated Defendants. These may not be litigated in the
same action. The Court will not blindly select which related set of
facts and Defendants the Plaintiff might want to pursue in this
action.

C. Frivolous

The Plaintiff's Complaint is also so confusing, nonsensical, and
unintelligible that the Court is unable to determine the nature of
this action in any event, Judge Rridinger says. This matter cannot
proceed on the Complaint before the Court, which the Court finds
frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915A.

In sum, Judge Rridinger holds that the Plaintiff has failed to
state any claim for relief under Section 1983. The Court will allow
him 30 days to amend his Complaint if he so chooses, to properly
state a claim upon which relief can be granted in accordance with
the terms of this Order. Any amended complaint will be subject to
all timeliness and procedural requirements and will supersede the
Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted.

The Plaintiff is also admonished that if he again names
unidentified individuals as Defendants in this matter, he must name
them individually as John/Jane Doe defendants until they can be
identified through discovery or otherwise. Simply naming them as
"Jane/John Does Mailroom Personnel" or generically as "Jane Does"
and "John Does," for example, is insufficient and improper, Judge
Rridinger says. He must also clearly and specifically allege in
what conduct each individually named Doe Defendant engaged.

Finally, the Plaintiff is admonished that future filings that are
frivolous, duplicative, fail to comply with the Court's Orders or
the applicable procedural rules, address more than one case number,
or are otherwise abusive or improper will be stricken without
further notice.

V. Pro Se Filings

Since filing the Complaint in this matter, the Plaintiff has
submitted numerous other documents with the Court directed to
several pending cases. Judge Rridinger notes that these documents
are duplicative and far too nonsensical for the Court to
meaningfully address. Because the Plaintiff's filings fail to
comply with the most basic pleading requirements, they will be
stricken.

VI. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff's
Complaint fails initial review. The Court will allow the Plaintiff
30 days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to properly state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Should the Plaintiff fail
to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, the
Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

Order

Judge Rridinger rules that the Plaintiff will have 30 days in which
to amend his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order.
If the Plaintiff fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will
be dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff's pro se filings [Docs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14] are
stricken from the record in this matter as abusive and improper.

The Clerk is directed to enter its Order Waiving Initial Partial
Filing Fee and Directing the Correctional Facility to Transmit
Partial Payments.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail the Plaintiff a blank
prisoner Section 1983 form.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 27, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9brcw8 from Leagle.com.


NPSG GLOBAL: Faces McClellan Class Action Suit Over Untimely Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
JALON MCCLELLAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. NPSG GLOBAL, LLC, Case No. 608671/2022 (N.Y. Sup.,
Nassau Cty., July 5, 2022) seeks to recover damages for untimely
wages for the Plaintiff and his similarly situated hourly
non-exempt employees below the level of Project Manager, and
excluding administrative staff -- who work or have worked for NPSG
in New York between March 4, 2016 through May 17, 2022.

During the Plaintiff's employment, the Defendant required the
Plaintiff and other Putative Class Members to perform at least 25%
of their time on physical work duties. The Defendant, however, paid
the Plaintiff and other Putative Class Members on a biweekly basis,
says the suit.

The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated current and former Putative Class Members
pursuant to the New York Labor Law.

Mr. McClellan was employed by Defendant as an Hourly Worker at NPSG
from July 2021 through August 2021.

NPSG delivers warehouse implementation services, from design
consultation, to technical integration, to buildout, to
retrofits.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian S. Schaffer, Esq.
          Frank J. Mazzaferro, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375

OKTA INC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds Investors of Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in a securities class action lawsuit that has been filed on
behalf of investors who purchased or acquired the securities of
Okta Inc. ("Okta" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: OKTA) between March 5,
2021 and March 22, 2022, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California and alleges violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Okta provides identity solutions and cybersecurity products and
services for enterprises, small and medium-sized businesses,
universities, non-profits, and government agencies in the U.S. and
internationally.

Plaintiff alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants made
materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
business, operations, and compliance policies. Specifically,
Defendants allegedly made false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (i) Okta had inadequate cybersecurity
controls; (ii) as a result, Okta's systems were vulnerable to data
breaches; (iii) Okta ultimately did experience a data breach caused
by a hacking group, which potentially affected hundreds of Okta
customers; (iv) Okta initially did not disclose and later
downplayed the severity of the data breach; (v) all the foregoing,
once revealed, was likely to have a material negative impact on
Okta's business, financial condition, and reputation; and (vi) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On or around March 21, 2022, hackers known as LAPSUS$ posted
screenshots on their Telegram channel showing what they claimed was
Okta's internal company environment. Thereafter, on March 22, 2022,
the Company's Chief Executive Officer, Defendant Todd McKinnon,
stated on his Twitter account that "[i]n late January 2022, Okta
detected an attempt to compromise the account of a third party
customer support engineer working for one of our subprocessors";
that "[t]he matter was investigated and contained by the
subprocessor"; that "[w]e believe the screenshots shared online are
connected to this January event"; and that "[b]ased on our
investigation to date, there is no evidence of ongoing malicious
activity beyond the activity detected in January. On this news,
Okta's stock price fell $2.98 per share, or 1.76%, to close at
$166.43 per share on March 22, 2022.

On March 22, 2022, during after-market hours, the Company's Chief
Security Officer, Defendant David Bradbury, stated on Okta's
website, inter alia, that "[a]fter a thorough analysis of [the
LAPSUS$] claims, we have concluded that a small percentage of
customers - approximately 2.5% - have potentially been impacted and
whose data may have been viewed or acted upon. "Okta was
subsequently downgraded by Raymond James from "strong buy" to
"market perform," noting, among other things, that "[w]hile
partners were willing to trust Okta's track record, the handling of
its latest security incident adds to our mounting concerns. "After
these disclosures, the Company's stock price fell $17.88 per share,
or 10.74%, to close at $148.55 per share on March 23, 2022.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than July 19, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery does not require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased OKTA securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options please visit Okta Inc. Shareholder Class
Action Lawsuit or contact Peter Allocco at (212) 951-2030 or
pallocco@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:
Peter Allocco
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(212) 951-2030
pallocco@bernlieb.com[GN]


OKTA INC: Portnoy Law Firm Notes of Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Portnoy Law Firm advises Okta, Inc. (NASDAQ: OKTA) that a class
action has been filed on behalf of investors. Okta investors that
lost money on their investment are encouraged to contact Lesley
Portnoy, Esq.

Investors are encouraged to contact attorney Lesley F. Portnoy, by
phone 844-767-8529 or email: lesley@portnoylaw.com, to discuss
their legal rights, or click here to join the case via
www.portnoylaw.com. The Portnoy Law Firm can provide a
complimentary case evaluation and discuss investors' options for
pursuing claims to recover their losses.

Okta provides identity solutions for enterprises, small and
medium-sized businesses, universities, non-profits, and government
agencies in the United States and internationally.

The Okta class action lawsuit alleges that, throughout the Class
Period, defendants made false and misleading statements and failed
to disclose that: (i) Okta had inadequate cybersecurity controls;
(ii) as a result, Okta's systems were vulnerable to data breaches;
(iii) Okta ultimately did experience a data breach caused by a
hacking group, which potentially affected hundreds of Okta
customers; (iv) Okta initially did not disclose and subsequently
downplayed the severity of the data breach; (v) all the foregoing,
once revealed, was likely to have a material negative impact on
Okta's business, financial condition, and reputation; and (vi) as a
result, Okta's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

Please visit our website to review more information and submit your
transaction information.

The Portnoy Law Firm represents investors in pursuing claims
against caused by corporate wrongdoing. The Firm's founding partner
has recovered over $5.5 billion for aggrieved investors.

Contact:
Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
Admitted CA and NY Bar
lesley@portnoylaw.com
310-692-8883
www.portnoylaw.com[GN]


OUTSET MEDICAL: Saxena White Files New Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Saxena White P.A. has filed a securities fraud class action lawsuit
(the "Class Action") in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against Outset Medical, Inc.
("Outset Medical" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: OM) and certain of its
executive officers (collectively, "Defendants"). The Class Action
asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder on behalf of
all persons or entities that purchased Outset Medical common stock
between September 15, 2020 and June 13, 2022, inclusive (the "Class
Period"), and were damaged thereby (the "Class"). The Class Action
filed by Saxena White is captioned: Plymouth County Retirement
Association v. Outset Medical, Inc., No. 5:22-cv-04016 (N.D. Cal.)

Outset Medical is a medical technology company focused on kidney
dialysis, the primary treatment for acute and chronic kidney
failure. The Company's flagship product is the Tablo Hemodialysis
System ("Tablo"), a dialysis machine that purifies tap water and
then artificially purifies and removes toxins from the blood of
patients suffering from kidney failure.

Throughout the Class Period, Outset Medical touted that Tablo can
"serve as a dialysis clinic on wheels" that had been "cleared by
the [U.S.] Food and Drug Administration [(the "FDA")] for use in
the hospital, clinic or home setting" under Section 510(k) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the "FDCA"). Devices used by
non-professionals outside of a clinical setting and that can
present serious health consequences like Tablo are subject to
heightened scrutiny by the FDA, including post-market surveillance
studies pursuant to the FDCA. While performing further regulatory
studies during the Class Period, the Company assured investors that
it was conducting the studies "in accordance with the FDA approved
protocol," which required an appropriate demonstration of
"real-world" human testing given that the device would be used at
home by non-professionals.

The Class Action alleges that, during the Class Period, Defendants
misled investors and/or failed to disclose that (1) Defendants had
"continuously made improvements and updates to Tablo over time
since its original clearance" that required an additional 510(k)
application; (2) as a result, the Company could not conduct a human
factors study on a cleared device in accordance with FDA protocols;
(3) the Company's inability to conduct the human factors study
subjected the Company to the likelihood of the FDA imposing a
"shipment hold" and marketing suspension, leaving the Company
unable to sell Tablo for home use; and (4) as a result, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times.

The truth began to emerge on May 5, 2022, when the Company
announced disappointing results for the first quarter of 2022,
which analysts attributed, inter alia, to the untested nature of
Tablo in the home setting. In response to this disclosure, and as
the market digested this news, the price of Outset Medical common
stock declined more than 40% over the three trading days that
followed, from a closing price of $39.94 per share on Wednesday,
May 4, 2022, to a closing price of $23.06 per share on Monday, May
9, 2022.

Then, after the markets closed on June 13, 2022, Outset Medical
announced that the FDA had forced the Company to hold all shipments
of Tablo for use in the home until Tablo received proper regulatory
clearance. During an "FDA Review Call" held that day with analysts,
the Defendants acknowledged the "ship hold" had already been in
place for weeks before investors were provided this material
information, and that as a result of the shipment hold, the Company
was "suspending our prior full-year and long-term guidance."  On
this news, the price of Outset Medical stock fell an additional
33%, from a closing price of $20.41 per share on June 13, 2022, to
a closing price of $13.46 per share on June 14, 2022.

If you purchased Outset Medical common stock during the Class
Period and were damaged thereby, you are a member of the "Class"
and may be able to seek appointment as lead plaintiff. If you wish
to apply to be lead plaintiff, a motion on your behalf must be
filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California no later than September 6, 2022. The lead plaintiff is a
court-appointed representative for absent members of the Class. You
do not need to seek appointment as lead plaintiff to share in any
Class recovery in the Class Action. If you are a Class member and
there is a recovery for the Class, you can share in that recovery
as an absent Class member.

You may contact Wolfram T. Worms (wworms@saxenawhite.com), an
attorney at Saxena White P.A., to discuss your rights regarding the
appointment of lead plaintiff or your interest in the Class Action.
You also may retain counsel of your choice to represent you in the
Class Action.

You may obtain a copy of the Complaint and inquire about actively
joining the Class Action at www.saxenawhite.com.

Saxena White P.A., with offices in Florida, New York, California,
and Delaware, is a leading national law firm focused on prosecuting
securities class actions and other complex litigation on behalf of
injured investors. Currently serving as lead counsel in numerous
securities fraud class actions nationwide, Saxena White has
recovered billions of dollars on behalf of injured investors.

Contact:
Wolfram T. Worms, Esq.
wworms@saxenawhite.com
Saxena White P.A.
12750 High Bluff Drive, Suite 475
San Diego, CA 92130
Tel: (858) 256-5298
Fax: (858) 369-0096
www.saxenawhite.com[GN]


PEACE COFFEE: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Peace Coffee LLC. The
case is styled as Richard Mejia, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Peace Coffee LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05799 (S.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Peace Coffee -- https://www.peacecoffee.com/ -- has been proudly
roasting and pedaling outstanding fair trade and organic coffee in
the Twin Cities since 1996.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


PLUSHCARE INC: Faces Robbins Class Suit in California Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
Accolade, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended May 31, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 1, 2022, that a class action complaint was filed
against the company's subsidiary, PlushCare, alleging violations of
the California Automatic Renewal Law and the Federal Electronic
Funds Transfer Act.

On May 8, 2021, a purported class action complaint (Robbins v.
PlushCare, Inc. et al.) was filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California against PlushCare,
Inc.

The complaint alleges that certain of PlushCare's subscription
payment practices violate the California Automatic Renewal Law and
the Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act, among other claims,
arising from allegations that PlushCare failed to provide adequate
disclosures to members. The lawsuit seeks restitution of
subscription fees, statutory damages for each violation, subject to
trebling, reasonable attorneys' fees, and injunctive relief.

Accolade, Inc. provides personalized, technology-enabled solutions
based in Washington State.


PP&G INC: Butler, et al., Seek Collective Conditional Certification
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In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARQUITA BUTLER, et al.,
v. PP&G, INC., et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-03084-JRR (D. Md.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. Granting conditional certification of the proposed
      collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b);

   2. Approving and adopting Plaintiffs’ Proposed Notice Plan
      and authorizing Notice to all members of the putative
      collective action in accordance with Hoffman-La Roche v.
      Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989);

   3. Compelling Defendants to disclose and furnish, within 14
      days of entering such an order, the names (both legal
      names and stage names) and last-known contact information
      (including all mailing addresses, email addresses, phone
      numbers, and dates of employment) for all exotic dancers
      who have worked for Norma Jean's at any time from October
      22, 2017 through the present; and

   4. For all other relief to which the Plaintiffs may be
      entitled under law or in equity.

PPG Industries is an American global supplier of paints, coatings,
optical products, specialty materials, chemicals, glass, and
fiberglass.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated June 30,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3O54KAC
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William M. Hogg, Esq.
          David W. Hodges, Esq.
          HODGES & FOTY, LLP
          4409 Montrose Boulevard, Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: dhodges@hftrialfirm.com
                  whogg@hftrialfirm.com

               - and -

          Suvita Melehy, Esq.
          MELEHY & ASSOCIATES, LLC
          8403 Colesville Road, Suite 610
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Telephone: (301) 587-6364
          Facsimile: (301) 587-6308

PROFESSIONAL CLAIMS: Spira Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Professional Claims
Bureau, LLC. The case is styled as Malky Spira, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated consumers v. Professional
Claims Bureau, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-03951 (E.D.N.Y., July 6,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Professional Claims Bureau (PCB) -- https://www.pcbinc.org/ -- is
the leading full service healthcare revenue cycle management
solutions provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
          ADAM J. FISHBEIN, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, NY 11598
          Phone: (516) 668-6945
          Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


PROFESSIONAL FINANCE: Rodriguez Files Suit in D. Colorado
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Professional Finance
Company, Inc. The case is styled as Maritza Rodriguez, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Professional Finance
Company, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-01679-STV (D. Colo., July 6,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Personal Injury.

Professional Finance Company (PFC) -- https://www.pfcusa.com/ -- is
one of the nation's leading accounts receivable management
agencies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip Joseph Krzeski, Esq.
          CHESTNUT CAMBRONNE PA
          100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 1700
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Phone: (612) 767-3613
          Fax: (612) 336-2940
          Email: pkrzeski@chestnutcambronne.com


PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY: Order on Class Certification Bid Entered
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SIOBAHN CARROLL, et al.,
v. PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Case No.
2:21-cv-09217-FMO-RAO (C.D. Cal.),  the Hon. Judge Fernando M.
Olguin entered an order regarding motions for class certification
as follows:

  1. Joint Brief: The parties shall work cooperatively to create
     a single, fully integrated joint brief covering each
     party's position, in which each issue (or sub-issue) raised
     by a party is immediately followed by the opposing
     party's/parties' response.

  2. Citation to Evidence: All citation to evidence in the joint
     brief shall be directly to the exhibit and page number(s)
     of the evidentiary appendix, or page and line number(s) of
     a deposition. Parenthetical explanations 6 are encouraged.

  3. Schedule for Preparation and Filing of Joint Brief: The
     briefing schedule for the joint brief shall be as follows:

     A. Meet and Confer: In order for a motion for class
        certification to be filed in a timely manner, the meet
        and confer must take place no later than 35 days before
        the deadline for class certification motions set forth
        in the Court's Case Management and Scheduling Order.

     B. No later than seven days after the meet and confer, the
        moving party shall personally deliver or e-mail to the
        opposing party an electronic copy of the moving party's
        portion of the joint brief, together with the moving
        party's portion of the evidentiary appendix.

     C. No later than fourteen (14) days after receiving the
        moving party's papers, the opposing party shall
        personally deliver or e-mail to the moving party an
        electronic copy of the integrated motion, which shall
        include the party's portion of the joint brief, together
        with the opposing party's portion of the evidentiary
        appendix.

Progressive Casualty is an insurance company.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3yurPGQ at no extra charge.[CC]

PROVIDENCE ST. MARY: Urged to Join Meeting to Address Malpractices
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sheila Hagar, writing for Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, reports that
a Spokane attorney has asked Providence St. Mary Medical Center to
participate in a town hall meeting to address community concerns
over recent findings by the U.S. Department of Justice.

William Gilbert, whose law practice has filed a class-action
lawsuit representing dozens of neurosurgery clients from around the
region and beyond, said people included in the town hall invitation
were Providence executives, representatives from the Washington
state Attorney General Bob Ferguson's office and the Walla Walla
area community.

Gilbert's clients were allegedly harmed under the hands of Dr.
Jason Dreyer and Dr. Daniel Elskens, largely through their
neurosurgical practices while in Walla Walla.

On June 10, Gilbert sent a letter with the meeting request and more
to Providence officials. The move came after the health system
officials ran a full-page ad in the Sunday, June 5, Union-Bulletin
in which they referenced the legal situation surrounding those
neurosurgeons. The ad encouraged any patients of the surgeons with
questions about the care they received to reach out to the
hospital.

Providence eventually responded to Gilbert with a five-page letter
that gave no answers and ignored the town hall request, the
attorney said.

In April, the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of
Washington announced that its investigation found the two former
Walla Walla neurosurgeons had hurt their patients and committed
insurance fraud while practicing at St. Mary.

Department of Justice officials said the hospital was aware of the
situation and paid the surgeons bonuses for unnecessary and risky
surgeries.

As a result of an investigation by U.S. Attorney Vanessa Waldref,
St. Mary agreed to pay $22.7 million, the biggest health care
settlement in the history of Eastern Washington, and to follow
multiple quality-of-care and patient safety obligations.

As well, the hospital must use outside experts to review claims and
clinical quality systems.

The DOJ settlement, however, only provides about $10 million for
reimbursement to government health insurance claims. None of the
$22.7 million is slotted for individual patients who have suffered
due to Dreyer's and Elsken's surgeries.

In a letter to Providence legal counsel, Gilbert said the health
care system has an "undeniable" financial duty to patients harmed
by Elskens and Dreyer, something also not addressed in the recent
ad.

The ad Providence ran in the newspaper -- which was in the form of
a letter from Reza Kaleel, chief executive of Providence Southeast
Washington -- projected inaccuracies, Gilbert said, and omitted how
the hospital itself participated in the fraud.

The attorney said Providence, in misstating the basis of the
Department of Justice lawsuit, by soliciting direct communication
from patients -- leaving the court out of the loop -- and acting as
if those communications are part of continuing medical care is
improper and a continuing abuse of a position of trust with
vulnerable patients.

"Such behavior must stop," Gilbert wrote.

Kaleel said in his June 5 message that Providence had conducted a
"thorough internal investigation resulting in the surgeons leaving
the organization in 2018 and 2018, respectively."

April's announcement from Waldref's office was the first time
Providence officials admitted publicly they had been aware of
concerns raised by their own staff, chiefly by Dr. David Yam, then
head of St. Mary's neurosurgery department.

Instead of being fired and reported to authorities, however,
Elskens and Dreyer were allowed to resign from the hospital. Both
were hired elsewhere.

Dreyer went to MultiCare Rockwood Clinic in Spokane, where he was
fired in 2021. Administrators said then it was due to restrictions
placed on Dreyer's license to practice by Washington state's
Department of Health.

Elskens landed at Firelands Regional Medical Center in Sandusky,
Ohio in 2018.

On June 7, the Sandusky Register newspaper reported that Elskens
was part of the lawsuit filed by Gilbert. One day later, the paper
reported Elskens was closing his practice. Firelands' legal
counsel, Rob Moore, told the paper Elskens had planned to move to
Michigan for family reasons before the lawsuit was filed in May.

Providence's full-page newspaper letter also, according to Gilbert,
attempted to sidetrack people from seeking legal counsel, and he
demanded the hospital cease and desist this behavior.

"If your message is sincere, and you truly want to help these
people and regain trust in the community, then fix this."

To help make that happen, the attorney also invited Providence to
engage in public conversation in Walla Walla.

Such an event, Gilbert said, would allow a frank discussion of what
happened and why, lay out steps for recovery and -- regardless of
what happens legally -- reassure people the hospital is here for
the long run.

The meeting could provide an open forum for questions and answers,
he added, noting he'd sent a copy of his request to the Department
of Justice.

Robert Beatty-Walters, a Portland attorney also representing
patients allegedly harmed under Dreyer's care, confirmed that, in
an order signed on June 15, U.S. District Judge Thomas Rice said
Yam is allowed to testify about his Dreyer-related complaints made
to Providence administration in 2017 and 2018.

Court documents show Providence sought a protective order on Yam's
testimony, specifically the identity of anyone who served on a peer
review or quality improvement committee at anytime, the identity
and nature of any complaints regarding Dreyer that resulted in a
peer review or quality improvement investigation at Providence, and
any information gleaned as a result of peer review or quality
improvement proceedings.

In his ruling, Rice narrowed the scope of what Yam could be deposed
for, but decreed the former medical director of neurosurgery in
Walla Walla could testify to the existence of, location and time of
peer review or quality improvement committees, identify the nature
of any complaints regarding Dreyer that resulted in a review or
investigation and say whether Dreyer's privileges were ever
terminated, restricted or revoked and if so, why, the court order
shows.

Providence officials have continued to say they do not comment on
pending litigation.

On May 26, state Department of Health spokesperson Frank Ameduri
said no new investigations are open into Dreyer or Elskens.

Department of Justice spokesman Richard Barker said on Thursday,
June 30, his office could neither confirm nor deny being in
conversation with Dreyer at this time. [GN]

PUBLIC CONSULTING: Bid to Dismiss Martinez Suit Denied as Moot
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LISA MARTINEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. PUBLIC CONSULTING GROUP,
INC.; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.:
22-cv-813-WQH-MDD (S.D. Cal.), Judge William Q. Hayes of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California denies as
moot the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint
and Strike Class Allegations.

On April 1, 2022, Plaintiff Martinez initiated the action by filing
a Class Action Complaint alleging state law claims against
Defendant Public Consulting in San Diego County Superior Court,
where it was assigned case number 37-2022-00012198-CU-OE-CTL.

On June 2, 2022, the Defendant removed the action to the Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332(d) (diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act), 1441, and 1446. On June
3, 2022, the Defendant filed a Corrected Notice of Removal.

On June 9, 2022, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiff's Complaint and Strike Class Allegations pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f).

On June 28, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class Action
Complaint, as was her right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, addressing the
original Complaint, became moot once the First Amended Complaint
was filed.

Hence, the Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yp875bh2 from Leagle.com.


PUP CULTURE: Munguia Seeks Unpaid Wages Due to Time-Shaving
-----------------------------------------------------------
ELISA MUNGUIA, on behalf of herself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and
the Class v. PUP CULTURE LLC d/b/a PUPCULTURE, PUPCULTURE DUMBO LLC
d/b/a/ PUPCULTURE DUMBO, PUPCULTURE FIDI LLC d/b/a/ PUPCULTURE
FIDI, PUPCULTURE TRIBECA LLC d/b/a/ PUPCULTURE TRIBECA, PUPCULTURE
UWS LLC d/b/a/ PUPCULTURE WEST 57, JOHN DOE CORPORATION d/b/a
PUPCULTURE SOHO, and IBRAHIM ALIMIMEH, Case No. 1:22-cv-05744 (July
6, 2022) seeks to recover from Defendants unpaid wages due to
time-shaving, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

In May 2021, the Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants to work as a
Receptionist at Defendants' Pupculture Tribeca Facility.

During the course of her employment with the Defendants, the
Plaintiff was transferred to work at the Defendants' Pupculture
FIDI Facility for approximately a month. After working at the
Pupculture FIDI Facility for a month, the Plaintiff was transferred
back to work at the Pupculture Tribeca Facility. On February 18,
2022, the Defendants terminated Plaintiff employment with
Defendants when Plaintiff requested to use her paid-time-off, which
she accrued during her employment with the Defendants. When her
employment was terminated, the Plaintiff was not compensate for
this accrued paid-time-off pursuant to NYLL and the terms of her
employment. Terminated Class members with accrued paid-time-off
would be similarly deprived this owed compensation, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1180
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

QUINTESSENTIAL TOTS: Ortiz Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Quintessential Tots,
LLC. The case is styled as Joseph Ortiz, on behalf of himself and
all other persons similarly situated v. Quintessential Tots, LLC,
Case No. 1:22-cv-00530 (W.D.N.Y., July 7, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Quintessential Tots, LLC doing business as Itzy Ritzy --
https://www.itzyritzy.com/ -- is a community driven, industry
leading omni-channel brand, focused on innovative, on-trend baby
products for Millennial and Gen Z parents, delivering a sense of
identity and a supportive community through their parenting
journey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: jeffrey@gottlieb.legal

               - and -

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTFRIED & GOTTFRIED, LLP
          122 East 42nd. St., Suite 620
          New York, NY 10168
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


REDSTONE FEDERAL: Hubbard Files Suit in N.D. Alabama
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Redstone Federal
Credit Union. The case is styled as Isaac Hubbard, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Redstone Federal
Credit Union, Case No. 5:22-cv-00837-HNJ (N.D. Ala., July 6,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Banks and Banking.

Redstone Federal Credit Union -- https://www.redfcu.org/ -- is a
federally chartered credit union based in Huntsville, Alabama.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Frank Jerome Tapley, Esq.
          Hirlye Ray Lutz, III, Esq.
          Leila H Watson, Esq.
          CORY WATSON, P.C.
          2131 Magnolia Avenue, Suite 200
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Phone: (205) 328-2200
          Fax: (205) 324-7896
          Email: jtapley@corywatson.com
                 rlutz@corywatson.com
                 lwatson@corywatson.com


REYNOLDS CONSUMER: Faces Class Suit Over Mislabeled Recycling Bags
------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrado Rizzi of ClassAction.org reports that in Gudgel v. Reynolds
Consumer Products, Inc. et al., a proposed class action claims that
Hefty-brand "Recycling" bags are not recyclable at solid waste
disposal facilities in Florida and elsewhere.

The 13-page suit against manufacturer Reynolds Consumer Products
specifies that the Hefty "Recycling" bags at issue are made from
low-density polyethylene and thus not recyclable themselves, even
if the contents therein might be. The case alleges Reynolds has
violated Florida law by materially misrepresenting that the 13- and
30-gallon Hefty bags are suitable for recycling.

"Had Plaintiff known that the Hefty Recycle [sic] Trash Bags
product was not as advertised, she would not have purchased the
product," the filing states. "As a result of Defendants' deceptive
and unfair acts, Plaintiff and Class members have been damaged."

When the Hefty bags are delivered by waste haulers to Florida solid
waste disposal facilities, the bags and their recyclable contents
are not taken to a recycling facility but instead treated as
regular solid waste materials, the complaint says. The items within
a Hefty "Recycling" bag -- cardboard, glass, aluminum -- ultimately
end up in landfills or incinerators and are not recycled, the
lawsuit relays.

Per the case, Reynolds prominently emphasizes that the Hefty bags
at issue are "designed to handle all types of recyclables" and
"transparent for quick sorting and curbside identification."

The suit looks to represent all Florida residents who bought Hefty
Recycling Trash Bags through the date of class certification. [GN]

SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Order on Class Cert-Related Deadlines Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARIE DEMARTINI,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
SAFELITE FULFILLMENT, INC., an Ohio Corporation, and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Case No. 3:20-cv-05952-MMC (N.D. Cal.), the Parties ask
the Court to continue the deadlines regarding certification-related
dates as follows:

   1. The September 9, 2022 deadline         Jan. 27, 2023
      for the Plaintiffs to file their
      Motion for Class Certification
      is extended to:

   2. The October 28, 2022 deadline for      March 24, 2023
      the Defendant to file its
      Opposition to the Motion for
      Class Certification is extended to:

   3. The December 2, 2022 deadline for      April 21, 2023
      the Plaintiffs to file their Reply
      in support of their Motion for
      Class Certification is extended to:

   4. The January 2, 2023 at 9:00 a.m.       May 8, 2023
      hearing date for Plaintiffs' Motion
      for Class Certification is vacated
      and rescheduled for:

Safelite Fulfillment was founded in 2004. The company's line of
business includes the retail sale of paint, glass, and wallpaper.

A copy of the Partiws' motion to certify class dated June 29, 2022
is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3RtoQay at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for Plaintiff Marie Demartini, are:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Christina M. Lucio, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          E-Mail: christina@ jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  james@jameshawkinsaplc.com

The Attorneys for Plaintiff Willie Austin Jr., are:

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          Piya Mukherjee, Esq.
          Victoria Rivaplacio, Esq.
          Charlotte E. James, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          E-mail: norm@bamlawca.com
                  kyle@bamlawca.com
                  aj@bamlawca.com
                  aj@bamlawca.com
                  piya@bamlawca.com
                  victoria@bamlawca.com
                  charlotte@bamlawca.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          M. Leah Cameron, Esq.
          CDF LABOR LAW LLP
          601 Montgomery Street, Suite 350
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 981-3233
          Facsimile: (415) 981-3246
          E-Mail: lcameron@cdflaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Daneil J. Clark, Esq.
          Adam J. Rocco, Esq.
          Michael J. Shoenfelt, Esq.
          Amanda M. Miggo, Esq.
          VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP
          52 East Gay Street, P.O. Box 1008
          Columbus, OH 43216-1008
          Telephone: (614) 464-5497
          Facsimile: (614) 719-4760
          E-mail: DJClark@vorys.com
                  ajrocco@vorys.com
                  MJShoenfelt@vorys.com
                  ammiggo@vorys.com

SAPPHIRE GENTLEMEN'S: Faces Class Suit Over Forced Prostitution
---------------------------------------------------------------
A.J. McDougall, writing for Daily Beast, reports that a pair of
former dancers at New York City's Sapphire Gentlemen's Club have
accused the nightclub's leadership of creating a toxic work
environment, essentially forcing employees into prostitution.
"Sapphire dancers were coerced into servicing patrons, with any
sexual act a customer desired, for a price," states the lawsuit,
filed in Manhattan Supreme Court on behalf of Margaret O'Sullivan
and Stephanie Krauel and first reported by the New York Daily News.
"And because greed inevitably leads to more deplorable behavior,
the prostitution ring defendants created was a catalyst for a vast
array of other unlawful acts." The filing states that the club was
rife with "cocaine and condoms" -- creating an alleged atmosphere
where assault, underage drinking, and the use of illegal substances
were readily tolerated. A dancer might pull in $2,000 on a good
night at Sapphire, according to court documents, but if any of them
complained or spoke out, they could count on their earnings
dwindling to a few hundred dollars at most. The suit seeks class
action status and millions in damages. [GN]

SHENG FENG SONG: Nationwide Suit Moved to W.D. North Carolina
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATIONWIDE JUDGMENT RECOVERY, INC., Plaintiff v. SHENG
FENG SONG, Defendant, Case No. 21-MC-00114-P1-JGK-OTW (S.D.N.Y.),
Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York transfers the matter to the Western
District of North Carolina.

I. Background

In this miscellaneous action to register a federal judgment under
28 U.S.C. Section 1963, Defendant Sheng Feng Song has filed an
Order to Show Cause styled as a putative Rule 60(b) motion. The
Defendant argues that the judgment court, the Western District of
North Carolina, lacked personal jurisdiction over him when it
entered a judgment of $6,760.94 against him in a class action
arising from an SEC Receivership, Orso v. Disner, et al., No.
3:14-CV-91 (Feb. 28, 2014) ("Net Winner Class Action").

ZeekRewards, located in Lexington, North Carolina, was a division
of Zeekler.com, a penny auction website that offered items ranging
from personal electronics to cash. The Receivership Defendants
solicited investors in ZeekRewards by offering them false
opportunities to earn money. It was a Ponzi scheme.

On Nov. 29, 2016, the Western District of North Carolina found that
the Court-appointed Receiver was entitled to recover all funds
transferred to the Net Winner Class -- a group of individuals
comprised of all persons or entities who were "Net Winners" in
ZeekRewards of more than $1,000. The Receiver sought a final
judgment against each Net Winner class member in an amount to be
determined by their respective net winnings. The Defendant was
identified as one of 14,700 winners in the scheme, having received
$6,760.94.

II. Analysis

As the Plaintiff highlights, the Western District of North Carolina
is the appropriate venue for this motion. The SEC Receivership in
the Western District of North Carolina involved thousands of
parties and had been pending since 2012. The Western District of
North Carolina -- having managed the Receivership and the class
action -- is significantly more familiar with the facts and the law
at issue.

III. Conclusion

Judge Wang has reviewed the Defendant's submissions and the
Plaintiff's response, and concludes that the case should be
transferred to the Western District of North Carolina. Accordingly,
she transfers the matter to the Western District of North Carolina.


A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mrx5nwev from Leagle.com.


SKILLZ INC: N.D. California Dismisses Jedrzejczyk Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS JEDRZEJCZYK, et al., Plaintiffs v. SKILLZ INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-03450-RS (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California issued an order:

   a. granting in full the Skillz Defendants' motion to dismiss
      and the Underwriter Defendants' motion to dismiss; and

   b. granting the Plaintiffs leave to amend.

I. Introduction

In this putative securities class action, the Plaintiffs aver
various violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") and the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") by Skillz, various corporate officers named as individual
defendants, and underwriters. Skillz and the individual defendants
brought a motion to dismiss. The underwriters joined in portions of
Skillz's motion, and brought a separate motion to dismiss raising
additional arguments.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Skillz is a mobile gaming technology company. Its platform allows
users to play "contests" against each other. Two types of contests
are available on the Skillz platform: Paid contests, in which users
pay money for a chance to win cash prizes, and practice contests in
which users play for free. Skillz does not develop or distribute
games; instead, it offers a set of software tools and programs
called a Software Development Kit that game developers can
integrate into their own games if they want to use Skillz's
competitive gameplay platform. Those third-party games are
distributed for free on the Apple App Store and other mobile app
stores for use on a user's device. Currently, Skillz exclusively
generates revenue by collecting a percentage of the entry fees for
paid contests. Skillz shares a portion of the revenue collected
from entry fees with the third party game developer.

On Dec. 16, 2020, Skillz went public by merging with Flying Eagle
Acquisition Corp. On March 18, 2021, Skillz launched a secondary
underwritten public offering pursuant to a registration statement
on Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Form S-1 (the "March
2021 Offering"). After Skillz went public, the company experienced
various fluctuations in stock price.

On May 7, 2021, Plaintiff Jedrzejczyk filed an action in the Court.
On June 17, 2021, other plaintiffs filed a substantially similar
lawsuit, Schultz v. Skillz Inc. f/k/a Flying Eagle Acquisition
Corp.., et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-04662. On July 14, 2021, the two
cases were related by court order and then were consolidated on
Aug. 9, 2021.

On Oct. 8, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action
Complaint (the "Complaint"). They name four categories of
defendants: (1) the Company Defendant, Skillz; (2) the Officer
Defendants, who all served or currently serve as officers of
Skillz; (3) the Director Defendants, who all served or currently
serve on Skillz's Board of Directors; and (4) the Underwriter
Defendants, who served as underwriters for the March 2021 Offering.
The Officer Defendants and Director Defendants are also
collectively referred to as the Individual Defendants.

The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of persons who purchased
or otherwise acquired Skillz common stock between Dec. 16, 2020 and
May 4, 2021 (the "Putative Class Period") and all persons who
purchased Skillz's common stock in the March 2021 Offering. Among
other averments, Plaintiffs state that "Defendants disseminated
false and misleading statements and omissions that materially
misrepresented Skillz's purported financial condition and prospects
and concealed and obscured material facts" during the Putative
Class Period.

The Plaintiffs plead five counts in their Complaint. In Count One,
the Plaintiffs aver violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the Company and Officer
Defendants. In Count Two, they aver violations of Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act by the Officer Defendants. Count Three avers
violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act against all the
Defendants, except Aguirre. Count Four avers a violation of Section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act by Skillz and the Underwriter
Defendants. Count Five avers violations of Section 15 of the
Securities Act by the Individual Defendants.

The Plaintiffs aver seven types of misleading statements or
omissions: (1) there were declining play and downloads in top games
despite statements indicating growth; (2) the planned expansion
into India was years away from completion, rather than imminent;
(3) overstatement of Skillz's technical capabilities in terms of
synchronous play, as the capability was only in a testing phase (4)
across the board growth and engagement of its userbase, when in
reality Skillz made most of its money from a very small proportion
of users; (5) use of misleading metrics by attributing revenue
growth to higher monthly average users ("MAU") rather than
disclosing average revenue per paying user; (6) violation of SEC
disclosure rules by not identifying paying MAUs as the primary
driver of revenues in Defendants' financial statements; and (7)
materially understating Skillz's liabilities in its 2020 financial
statements due to its classification of SPAC warrants as assets,
rather than liabilities, and misrepresenting that its internal
disclosure controls were adequate.

Some of these alleged misstatements or omissions relate only to the
Exchange Act claims or only the Securities Act claims.

Skillz along with the Officer Defendants and Director Defendants
move to dismiss all of the claims. The Underwriter Defendants move
to dismiss Counts Three and Four, the only two counts in which the
Underwriter Defendants are named. The two motions are addressed
together, unless otherwise specified in the Order.

III. Discussion

A. Judicial Notice

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs explicitly reference in
the Complaint a variety of documents -- such as SEC filings,
publicly available short seller reports, and documents on the
company's website—and thus those documents are incorporated by
reference in the Complaint. They also request that the Court takes
judicial notice of those publicly available documents. The
Plaintiffs challenge the Defendants' request as to two types of
documents: A post-class period press release from Skillz (Exhibit G
to Skillz Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice) and two news
articles (Exhibits 4 and 5 to the Underwriter Defendants' Request
for Judicial Notice). As for the post-class period press release,
this document is irrelevant because it is outside of the class
period, and thus is not subject to judicial notice.

The articles, in contrast, are subject to judicial notice, but only
for a limited purpose. "Just because a document itself is
susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion
of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its
truth." Thus "judicial notice of these documents" will be taken
"not for the truth of the matter asserted, but 'for the purpose of
showing that particular information was available to the stock
market.'"

B. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims
alleged in the complaint. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be
based either on the "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or on "the
absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory." Complaints in securities cases must also meet the pleading
standards set forth by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA"). Furthermore, securities claims which are "grounded in
fraud" must meet the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). "To
satisfy Rule 9(b), a pleading must identify the who, what, when,
where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false
or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why
it is false."

1. Exchange Act Claims

The Plaintiffs aver a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and a derivative claim under Section 20(a). Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for "any person to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the SEC may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." Pursuant
to Section 10(b), the SEC has promulgated Rule 10b-5, which
provides, inter alia, that "it will be unlawful for any person to
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."

To establish a violation of Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must
demonstrate "(1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact,
(2) scienter, (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, (4) transaction and loss causation, and (5) economic
loss." In re Daou Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1014
(9th Cir. 2005). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint
stating claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must satisfy the
dual pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
and the PSLRA."

The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs have failed to plead falsity,
scienter or loss causation.

a. Falsity

The Plaintiffs plead five types of alleged misstatements or
omissions to underlie their Exchange Act claims: (1) failure to
disclose declining game downloads; (2) statements about launching
in India; (3) statements about synchronous gameplay; (4) statements
about userbase engagement and growth; and (5) metrics about decline
in revenue per paying user.

Judge Seeborg holds that although each type of alleged misstatement
or omission varies in strength, falsity is not pled as to any of
them. On the weakest end, he says, is the failure to disclose
declining game downloads. Statements about launching in India are
similarly weak because they are unactionable forward-looking
statements. Next, as for alleged misstatements about userbase
engagement or growth, statements such as touting a "stickier, more
engaging, and continuously improving" user experience and a
"vibrant and growing ecosystem" are non-actionable puffery.

Statements about synchronous gameplay come closer to meeting the
bar for falsity. As a reasonable investor would know Skillz is not
a game developer and that a statement about what is enabled on the
platform is not equivalent to what games are made available using
the platform, there is an inadequate showing that a reasonable
investor would have been misled. Finally, as to metrics about a
decline in revenue per user, the Plaintiffs have not adequately
alleged falsity as to this category of misstatements and
omissions.

For these reasons, the Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that
the failure to report certain metrics, or a switch in what metrics
were reported, rise to the level of falsity.

b. Scienter

Even if the Plaintiffs had adequately pled falsity, they would
still have scienter problems, Judge Seeborg holds. Taking the
strongest of the Plaintiffs' alleged misstatements and omissions --
the availability of synchronous gameplay -- he finds that scienter
would fail even if falsity were adequately alleged. Even if the
statements would have been interpreted by a reasonable investor to
mean that synchronous gameplay was available, the statements are
indeed subject to a contrary interpretation: That Skillz merely
offers the feature, not that any games are actively employing the
feature in fully-tested games. At worst, the statements appear to
be poorly worded explanations of what games Skillz offered, rather
than a statement made with "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud."

c. Loss Causation

Loss causation is "a causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the loss."

Jdge Seeborg says, although it is not necessary to discuss loss
causation in full due to the Complaint's failures in terms of
falsity and scienter, the Plaintiffs will face challenges in
establishing loss causation due to their reliance on short seller
reports. While courts have not categorically forbid the use of
short seller reports as corrective disclosures, numerous courts
have noted concerns with relying on reports written by entities
with serious financial incentives to damage a company's stock
price. Finally, the shortcomings in pleading the elements of the
Section 10(b) claim means the derivative claim under Section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act fails as well, because there is no underlying
violation of the Exchange Act. In short, the motion to dismiss is
granted as to the claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.

2. Securities Act Claims

As a threshold matter, the Defendants argue that the one named
Plaintiff bringing Securities Act claims, Kenny Tinkelman, lacks
statutory standing to bring claims under Section 11 or 12(a)(2)
because he has failed to trace his shares to the secondary
offering. They argue that the Court should follow another court in
this district, which held that a plaintiff's allegation that "they
purchased their shares on the day of the secondary offering and for
the same offering price" is insufficient to establish statutory
standing.

Judge Seeborg holds that the Plaintiffs lack statutory standing to
pursue their Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) claims. Even if they
did have standing, they have not adequately pled untrue statements
or omissions of material facts. As the Plaintiffs have not
adequately alleged a primary violation of the Securities Act, they
have not alleged a violation of their Section 15 derivative claim
either.

IV. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, the Skillz Defendants' motion to
dismiss and the Underwriter Defendants' motion to dismiss are both
granted in full. The Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend. Any
amended complaint must be filed within 30 days of the Order.
A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ek5drukb from Leagle.com.


SOLANA FOUNDATION: Hit With Class Action Over SOL Tokens
--------------------------------------------------------
Outlook India reports that a Mark Young, a Solana investor, has
filed a class action lawsuit against Solana Foundation, CEO Antoly
Yakovenko, co-founder Kyle Samani, and others alleging that they
have sold Solana (SOL) cryptocurrencies without a security
statement and that they have promoted these cryptocurrencies
despite they being unregistered securities, as per various media
sources.

"Solana Labs had its first public sale of SOL tokens in a 'Dutch
Auction' held in March 2020, which was tantamount to an Initial
Coin Offering (ICO). Since April 2020, funded by the proceeds they
made through their ICO, Defendants have spent vast sums of money
promoting SOL securities throughout the United States. These
promotional efforts took SOL securities from a relatively obscure
crypto-asset to one of the top crypto-assets in the world," read
the suit filing document.

                        Crypto Industry

Alex Dovbnya of U.TODAY reports that well-known venture capital
firm Multicoin Capital and its CEO Kyle Samani, one of the most
ardent Solana supporters, also appeared among the defendants.  

According to U.Today, the lawsuit could have massive implications
for the cryptocurrency industry since Mark Young, the lead
plaintiff, alleges that the SOL token is an unregistered security.
It adds that the defendants spent vast sums of money promoting SOL
securities. The defendant expected to derive profits from investing
in Solana based on the Solana Foundation's marketing efforts.

The SOL token exhibits all the hallmarks of a security under the
Howey test since the success of the project and its potential
returns were dependent on Solana's ability to deliver on its
promise to create the network.  

The defendants named in the lawsuit "personally profited" by
soliciting investors to buy the token on several online platforms.
Young claims that they managed to make "enormous" profits with the
help of the cryptocurrency.      

The plaintiff also claims that the blockchain is not decentralized
(contrary to the defendants' public representations).

Young wants the court to award him and other class members damages
"in an amount to be proved at trial."  

Despite being one of the best-performing tokens of 2021, SOL has
now plunged more than 85% from its record high of $259. [GN]

SONY MUSIC: Class Action Over Michael Jackson Tracks Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
Tina Benitez-Eves, writing for American Song Writer, reports that
three songs from Michael Jackson's 2010 album Michael have been
pulled from streaming platforms following allegations that the king
of pop never sang the tracks.

"Monster," featuring 50 Cent, "Keep Your Head Up," and "Breaking
News" are no longer available for sale or to stream on Spotify,
Apple Music, YouTube, and other platforms worldwide.

A spokesperson for Jackson's website confirmed three songs were no
longer available and stated that the removal "had nothing to do
with their authenticity."

"The Estate and Sony Music believe the continuing conversation
about the tracks is distracting the fan community and casual
Michael Jackson listeners from focusing their attention where it
should be," said the spokesperson, "on Michael's legendary and deep
music catalog."

The videos for the three tracks are no longer posted on Jackson's
official YouTube channel but are still available on fan and other
channels.

The tracks have been part of an ongoing lawsuit involving Jackson's
estate and Sony Music, which alleges that Jackson never sang the
three songs on Michael. In 2014, Vera Serova filed a class-action
lawsuit against Sony and the estate over the three songs for
violation of consumer laws, unfair competition, and fraud.

In the lawsuit, Serova claimed that three of the 10 tracks on
Michael were part of an "elaborate artistic fraud masterminded by
co-defendants Eddie Cascio and James Porte," who sold the tracks,
also known as the 'Cascio tracks,' to Jackson's estate for millions
of dollars following his death in 2009.

The back cover of the Michael album reads, "This album contains
nine previously unreleased vocal tracks performed by Michael
Jackson. These tracks were recently completed using music from the
original vocal tracks and music created by the credited
producers."

Serova isn't the only person who believes that Jackson did not sing
on the three tracks. Prior to the release of Michael, several
members of Jackson's family said that they believed the songs were
fakes. In 2010, Jackson's mother Katherine Jackson said that "some
of the tracks on the album are fake," while his sister, LaToya
Jackson stated "It doesn't sound like him." His nephew, Taryll
Jackson, and son of brother Tito Jackson added that he was present
when the songs were handed over to Sony.

"How they constructed these songs is very sneaky and sly," tweeted
Taryll Jackson. "I know my uncle's voice, and something's seriously
wrong when you have immediate family saying it's not him."

In 2018, Sony and the estate were cleared from the case, and an
appeal in 2020. The suit is currently in the California Supreme
Court. [GN]

STEVEN LABEL: Lopez Seeks Civil Penalties Under PAGA Labor Code
---------------------------------------------------------------
JULIO LOPEZ on behalf of himself, the State of California, and
others similarly situated and aggrieved v. STEVEN LABEL, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; STEVEN 18 LABEL CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; STEVEN LABEL, LLC, a 19 California Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Case No. 22STCV21691
(Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., July 5, 2022) is a representative
action filed by the Plaintiff on behalf of himself, other similarly
Aggrieved Employees and the State of California against the
defendants, pursuant to California's Private Attorney General Act,
Labor Code, to recover civil penalties (75% payable to the Labor
and Workforce Development Agency and 25% payable to Aggrieved
Employees) for the alleged Defendants' violations of the California
Labor Code.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a press operator or
similar title at one or more of Defendants facilities, including
but not limited to two of defendants' facilities located in Santa
Fe Springs, California, in the county of Los Angeles.

The Defendants are either a California limited liability company or
California corporation and/or a Delaware limited liability company
that, at all relevant times, were authorized to do business within
the State of California and are doing business in the State of
California.

The Defendants own, operate, or otherwise manage several plaints,
facilities, and/or locations in California including but not
limited to facilities in Santa Fe Springs, California and Temecula
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael R. Crosner, Esq.
          Zachary M. Crosner, Esq.
          Blake R. Jones, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL, PC
          9440 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 301
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 496-5818
          Facsimile: (310) 510-6429
          E-mail: mike@crosnerlegal.com
                  zach@crosnerlegal.com
                  blake@crosnerlegal.com

SYNCHRONY BANK: Extension of Class Cert Deadlines Sought
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DIANNE BEAR KING LUCAS, on
behalf of herself and others similarly situated, v. SYNCHRONY BANK,
Case No. 4:21-cv-00070-PPS-JEM (N.D. Ind.), the Defendant files
unopposed motion for extension of time for expert discovery and
class certification deadlines:

-- The Defendant's expert witness            Oct. 5, 2022
    disclosure and reports with
    respect to class certification
    are to be provided to Plaintiff by:

-- The deadline to complete all              Nov. 3, 2022
    fact and expert discovery on
    class certification is:

-- The deadline for Plaintiff to             December 4, 2022
    file a brief seeking class
    certification is:

Synchrony Bank offers consumer financing products, including
credit, promotional financing and loyalty programs, installment
lending to industries.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated June 29, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Ix5c9A at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (617) 485-0018
          Facsimile: (508) 318-8100
          E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com

               - and -

          Max S. Morgan, Esq.
          THE WEITZ FIRM, LLC
          1528 Walnut Street, 4 th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (267) 587-6240 Fax:
          Facsimile: (215) 689-0875
          E-mail: max.morgan@theweitzfirm.com

               - and -

          Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          401 Congress Avenue, Suite
          1540 Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 803-1578
          E-mail: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 550
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          E-mail: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Stephen J. Newman, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          2029 Century Park East, Floor 18
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-5800
          E-mail: snewman@stroock.com

               - and -

          Robert J. Schuckit, Esq.
          SHUCKIT & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          4545 Northwestern Drive
          Zionsville, IN 46077
          Phone: (317) 363-2400
          E-mail: rschuckit@schuckitlaw.com

TRAVELERS HOME: Settlement in Stechert Suit Wins Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Karen Spencer Marston of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania grants final approval to the
parties' class action settlement in the lawsuit captioned KYLE
STECHERT, et al., Plaintiffs v. THE TRAVELERS HOME AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-0784-KSM (E.D.
Pa.).

Pending before the Court are the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Plaintiffs' Supplemental
Brief in Further Support of Their Unopposed Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses to Class Counsel and
Service Awards to Class Representatives, and Plaintiffs'
Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Their Unopposed Motion for
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses to Class Counsel and Service
Awards to Class Representatives.

The Court certifies this settlement class pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3):

     All first party total loss vehicle claimants of personal
     lines private passenger auto policies issued by the
     following Travelers entities in Pennsylvania, Defendants THE
     TRAVELERS HOME AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS
     COMPANIES, INC., TRAVELERS PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
     and TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, and additional settling
     parties AMERICAN EQUITY SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
     DISCOVER PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, FARMINGTON
     CASUALTY COMPANY, FIDELITY AND GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
     FIDELITY AND GUARANTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, INC.,
     NORTHLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANY,
     ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, ST. PAUL
     GUARDIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE
     COMPANY, ST. PAUL PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE
     AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, THE
     CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE PHOENIX INSURANCE
     COMPANY, THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS
     CASUALTY COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF
     AMERICA, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT,
     TRAVCO INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY
     COMPANY, TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA,
     TRAVELERS CASUALTY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, TRAVELERS
     CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL
     CASUALTY COMPANY, TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
     TRAVELERS CONSTITUTION STATE INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVELERS
     PERSONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVELERS PERSONAL SECURITY
     INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF
     AMERICA, TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
     UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, CONSUMERS
     COUNTY MUTUAL, FIDELITY AND GUARANTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS
     INC., and FIRST FLORIDIAN AUTO AND HOME INSURANCE COMPANY,
     with a date of loss from January 16, 2011 to May 27, 2021,
     who were paid for 1-30 days under rental reimbursement
     extended transportation expenses coverage. Excluded from the
     Class are the assigned judge, the judge's staff and family.

The Court finds that the Notice Plan and the Notice constituted the
best notice practicable under the circumstances and constituted
valid, due, and sufficient notice to members of the Settlement
Class.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and the factors
set forth in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975), the
Court finds the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and
approves the Settlement.

The 17 valid exclusion requests will not be considered members of
the Settlement Class or bound by the Release in the Settlement
Agreement and may not receive any benefits of the Settlement. All
remaining Class Members will be bound by this Final Approval Order
and Judgment and by the Agreement and the Settlement embodies
therein.

As of the Effective Date, by operation of the entry of the Final
Approval Order and Judgment, each Settlement Class Member will be
deemed to have fully released, waived, relinquished and discharged,
to the fullest extent permitted by law, all Released Claims and
Unknown Claims that the Settlement Class Members may have against
all the Released Persons.

The Court awards Class Counsel $1,187,995.18 in attorneys' fees,
which the Court finds are fair and reasonable based on the Court's
independent analysis and consideration of the factors set forth in
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir.
2000) and In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent
Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 338 (3d Cir. 1998).

The Court awards Class Counsel $22,004.82 in out-of-pocket expenses
incurred in the prosecution of this action, which the Court finds
are fair and reasonable.

The Court approves and authorizes the Defendants' reimbursement of
$5,385.00 to Class Counsel for the partial payment made to JAMS, as
agreed in the Settlement Agreement.

The Court awards Kyle Stechert $20,000 as a Class Representative
service award.

The Court awards Marie Stechert $20,000 as a Class Representative
service award.

The matter is dismissed with prejudice. The Court maintains
jurisdiction over the enforcement of the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 27, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc2v7msm from Leagle.com.


TRIBUNE MEDIA: Seventh Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Water Island Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WATER ISLAND EVENT-DRIVEN FUND, LLC, formerly known as
The Arbitrage Event-Driven Fund, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v.
TRIBUNE MEDIA COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
20-1183 (7th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirms the district court's dismissal of the complaint on
the pleadings.

In May 2017, Tribune (a broadcast enterprise that had spun off its
newspaper assets in 2014) and Sinclair Broadcasting Group announced
an agreement to merge. In August 2018 Tribune abandoned the merger
and filed suit against Sinclair, accusing it of failing to comply
with its contractual commitment to "use reasonable best efforts" to
satisfy demands of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Communications Commission, both of which
had authority to block the merger or request the judiciary to stop
it. Sinclair sealed that suit for $60 million plus the transfer of
one broadcast station, though the settlement disclaims liability.

While the merger agreement was in place, many investors bought and
sold Tribune's stock. Late in 2017 Tribune's largest investor,
Oaktree Capital Management (which at one point held 22% of its
stock), sold some shares through Morgan Stanley in a registered
public offering. In this class action investors accuse Tribune,
Oaktree, Morgan Stanley, and some of their officers and directors,
of violating both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose that Sinclair was
playing hardball with the regulators, increasing the risk that the
merger would be stymied.

The Department of Justice wanted Sinclair to divest ten stations in
markets where both Tribune and Sinclair operated; Sinclair said no.
The Department offered to accept eight stations as sufficient;
Sinclair said no. When it feared that the Department would sue,
Sinclair finally said yes. But it did not mean by divestiture what
the Antitrust Division meant. Sinclair devised transactions that
would have left it in practical (though not legal) control of the
ten stations by putting them in friendly hands, which would have
enabled the sort of coordinated behavior that had concerned the
Antitrust Division. When the FCC got wind of those conditions, it
started an investigation that threatened to derail the merger
indefinitely. At that point Tribune bailed out and sought another
partner, finding one in September 2019, when it was acquired by
Nexstar Media Group.

The district court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings. The
principal claims, which rest on the 1934 Act because they concern
trading in the aftermarket, all failed, the district court found,
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA
or 1995 Act). Questionable statements, such as predictions that the
merger was likely to proceed, were forward-looking and shielded
from liability because Tribune expressly cautioned investors about
the need for regulatory approval and the fact that the merging
firms could prove unwilling to do what regulators sought. Moreover,
the judge observed, all the Defendants wanted the deal to close, so
the Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that any omissions
occurred with the requisite state of mind. The claims under the
1933 Act failed, the judge stated, because Oaktree's secondary
offering ended before the first sign that Sinclair was not
fulfilling its contractual commitment to use "reasonable best
efforts" to satisfy the regulators.

The Seventh Circuit starts with Section 12 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 771(a)(2), which creates liability for any false
statement or material omission, regardless of intent, "to the
person purchasing such security from him." In the case "him" is
Morgan Stanley, which purchased the securities from Oaktree and
sold them to the public in a registered offering covered by Section
11, 15 U.S.C. Section 77k.

Morgan Stanley contends that none of the Plaintiffs purchased
securities from it and that none has standing to sue. "Standing" is
a bad word for this argument. All the Plaintiffs allege losses that
could be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Morgan Stanley
maintains that they do not satisfy a statutory condition of
liability -- purchase direct from the underwriter. Failure to
satisfy a statutory condition differs from a lack of standing, and
the Supreme Court has urged the Seventh Circuit to avoid using that
word in a way that could confuse statutory criteria with the
absence of a constitutional case or controversy. So the Seventh
Circuit drops the word "standing" and ask whether the complaint
adequately alleges that at least some of the Plaintiffs bought from
Morgan Stanley.

The answer is yes, the Seventh Circuit holds. It finds that some
allegations in the complaint are mealy mouthed. The Plaintiffs'
main problem under the 1934 Act, as amended by the 1995 Act, is
that statements about prospects for the merger's success were
forward-looking. The press releases, proxy materials, and other
statements issued in connection with the proposed merger, plus the
quarterly reports filed before the merger was abandoned, all
correctly stated the terms of the deal, including Sinclair's
promise to use "reasonable best efforts" to win approval.

The complaint does not tell the Seventh Circuit when, if at all,
Tribune learned about the "entanglements" (the parties' word for
the conditions on divestiture) that led to the merger's demise; the
complaint is not specific about either dates or details. At all
events, the Plaintiffs do not deny that Tribune wanted the merger
to close; no one there had anything to gain by its failure, which
would diminish the price of management's stock (and Oaktree's
remaining holdings) as surely as it would injure outside investors.
Tellabs says that defendants are entitled to judgment on the
pleadings unless the allegations show that intent to defraud is at
least as likely as the absence of bad intent. Like the district
court, the Seventh Circuit thinks that this complaint's allegations
fall short.

Indeed, the Plaintiffs' complaint lacks any information about the
time that Tribune learned things, in relation to the public
statements that Tribune made, which makes it impossible to see how
Tribune could have had fraudulent intent on the dates it made
statements. Tribune says that the entanglements came to its
knowledge only after all of the contested public statements; if
that is so, there isn't even a colorable argument for fraudulent
intent. That leaves only the high-level-of-gen-erality arguments
about nondisclosure of Sinclair's negotiating posture, which are
not enough to show bad intent.

Two additional points are worth making. First, the Plaintiffs
suppose that, during a major corporate transaction, managers'
thoughts must be an open book. But, nothing in the 1934 Act or any
of the SEC's regulations requires this, the Seventh Circuit says.
To the contrary, secrecy can be valuable. It would be unwarranted
to read the securities laws as requiring businesses to surrender
that advantage when negotiating with the government.

Next, the Seventh Circuit considers Sinclair's effort to produce
the outward signs of divestiture (separate legal ownership) while
retaining practical control, which led the FCC to take steps that
doomed the merger. It doubts that Tribune would have understood
news about Sinclair's contemplated entanglements as adverse to
investors.

Recall why the Antitrust Division wanted divestiture: A merged firm
holding multiple broadcast assets in a given area obtains some
market power and could raise prices. That would work to the
detriment of advertisers (the customers for over-the-air
broadcasting) but to the benefit of investors in the merged firm.
Trying to put one over on regulators is a dangerous game, and once
the FCC caught on the merger was cooked, but if Sinclair's gambit
had succeeded investors would have been the winners. It is hard to
see an intent to harm Tribune's investors in thinking that the
gambit was worth the risk. With the benefit of hindsight, the
Seventh Circuit knows that Sinclair failed. But as Judge Friendly
observed long ago, there is no "fraud by hindsight."

Remaining disputes, such as loss causation and the derivative
liability of corporate insiders, need not be addressed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mrnjrn3z from Leagle.com.


U.S. RENAL CARE: C.D. California Narrows Claims in Bruno Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL BRUNO, Plaintiff v. U.S. RENAL CARE, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-04617-FLA (MRWx) (C.D. Cal.),
Judge Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California:

    (i) denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand; and

   (ii) grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's Motion
        to Dismiss.

Before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiff Bruno's Motion to
Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447; and (2) Defendant U.S.
Renal Care, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Both Motions are opposed. In August 2021, the Court found
these matters appropriate for resolution without oral argument and
vacated the hearing dates.

I. Background

The Plaintiff filed the putative employment class action on March
3, 2021, in Los Angeles Superior Court. The Complaint alleged 11
causes of action for violations of the California Labor Code,
California Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. (the
Unfair Competition Law, "UCL"), and 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). On June 4, 2021, the Defendant
removed the action to the Court, alleging both (1) federal question
jurisdiction in light of the FCRA claim, and (2) jurisdiction
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").

The Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on June 24,
2021, alleging nine causes of action for violations of: (1)
California Labor Code Sections 510 and 1198 (unpaid overtime); (2)
California Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 512(a) (unpaid meal period
premiums); (3) California Labor Code Section 226.7 (unpaid rest
period premiums); (4) California Labor Code Sections 1194, 1197,
and 1197.1 (unpaid minimum wages); (5) California Labor Code
Sections 201 and 202 (final wages not timely paid); (6) California
Labor Code Section 226(a) (non-compliant wage statements); (7)
California Labor Code Section 2800 and 2802 (unreimbursed business
expenses); (8) the UCL; and (9) the FCRA.

According to the FAC, the Defendant hired the Plaintiff as a
Dialysis Technician from approximately March to November 2020. The
Plaintiff was an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee. The Plaintiff
seeks to represent two classes: a proposed "Wage Class" consisting
of "all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who
worked for any of the Defendants within the State of California at
any time during the period from March 3, 2017 to final judgment and
who reside in California" and a proposed "FCRA Class" consisting of
"all of the Defendants' current and former employees and
prospective applicants for employment in the United States who
applied for a job with Defendants on whom a background check was
performed at any time during the period from March 3, 2016 to final
judgment."

II. Analysis

A. Motion to Remand

The Plaintiff's Motion to Remand argues the Defendant fails to show
that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million as required for
CAFA jurisdiction. He, however, does not address the court's
federal question jurisdiction, which arises from the fact that the
Complaint alleged a cause of action under a federal statute, the
FCRA. Thus, Judge Aenlle-Rocha holds that the Court has original
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.

On Reply, the Plaintiff argues that his FCRA claim is insufficient
to support removal because federal question jurisdiction permits
but does not require removal. He, however, does not cite any legal
authority for the proposition that a defendant may not remove an
action in which the plaintiff has asserted a federal claim, and
argues only that the removal statute must be strictly construed
against removal jurisdiction. While it is true that federal
question jurisdiction does not mandate removal, 28 U.S.C. Section
1446 vests the right of removal exclusively with the defendant. As
the Defendant has chosen to exercise that right, the Plaintiff's
argument fails.

The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims in the action, as all claims relate to the Plaintiff's
employment with the Defendant and "form part of the same case or
controversy" as the FCRA claim. At this time, Judge Aenlle-Rocha
will not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c).

Accordingly, he denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Having
found the Court has original jurisdiction over the FCRA claim and
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, he need not
assess whether the court also has jurisdiction under CAFA.

B. Motion to Dismiss

1. Use of "Open-Ended" Phrases

The Defendant moves to dismiss the first and fourth through eighth
causes of action of the FAC. First, the Defendant argues the
Plaintiff's first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of
action fail to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and are deficient
because they use "open-ended, catch all phrases" such as
"including, but not limited to" and "inter alia," which Defendant
maintains does not give fair notice of all of the grounds for his
claims. Thus, according to the Defendant, the "Plaintiff apparently
has not disclosed all of the grounds on which he intends to seek
classwide relief for minimum wage violations."

Among other things, upon review of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth,
and seventh causes of action, Judge Aenlle-Rocha finds the
allegations sufficient to satisfy Rule 8. Rule 8(a)(2) requires "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." The FAC pleads sufficient facts to meet that
standard. Accordingly, he denies the Defendant's Motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of
action on this basis.

2. Whether Plaintiff Pleads Sufficient Facts to Support the Fifth
Cause of Action (Untimely Final Wages)

In support of the Plaintiff's fifth claim for untimely paid final
wages in violation of these sections, the Plaintiff alleges in
relevant part: The "Plaintiff was not paid at the time of his
separation all wages earned and unpaid throughout his employment,
including but not limited to, minimum wages and overtime wages for
time worked off-the-clock and meal and rest period premium payments
for short, late, interrupted, and/or missed meal and rest periods."
The Defendant argues this is insufficient to support the claim, as
the Plaintiff "fails to identify the dates of his termination, the
dates of receipt of his final paycheck, the amounts of his final
paycheck, or the amounts for which he was unpaid."

Judge Aenlle-Rocha disagrees. In view of the legal definition of
"willful," he finds the Plaintiff's allegations sufficient under
Rule 8 to withstand the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. California
law makes clear, however, that "to be at fault within the meaning
of California Labor Code Section 203, the employer's refusal to pay
need not be based on a deliberate evil purpose to defraud workmen
of wages which the employer knows to be due. As used in section
203, 'willful' merely means that the employer intentionally failed
or refused to perform an act which was required to be done."
Accordingly, Judge Aenlle-Rocha the Motion to Dismiss on this
basis.

3. Whether Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action (Non-Compliant Wage
Statements) Fails as a Matter of Law

According to the Plaintiff, "because he and the other putative
class members' wage statements did not reflect the accurate number
of hours worked, they were unable to determine the total amount of
hours they worked, were unable to determine the total amount of
compensation they were owed, and were unable to verify they were
paid the proper amount."

The Defendant argues the Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for
inaccurate wage statements fails as a matter of law because it
relies upon his unpaid overtime, minimum wage, meal period, and
rest period claims, and thus seeks an impermissible double
recovery. They cite Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc., 22 Cal.
App. 5th 1308, 1336-37 (2018), for the proposition that a claim for
inaccurate wage statements that is purely derivative of other
claims for Labor Code violations is barred as an impermissible
double recovery.

Judge Aenlle-Rocha holds that the FAC alleges the wage statements
"failed to include the accurate total number of hours worked by the
Plaintiff and the other class members," as they "did not reflect
the time worked off-the-clock." He says, the off-the-clock work
allegedly included "job duties performed before and/or after
scheduled shifts such as tasks related to providing medical care
for patients, cleaning medical equipment and the work area, and
communicating with supervisors about work-related issues." The
Plaintiff, thus, alleges his wage statements failed to accurately
reflect all hours worked, which falls squarely within the scope of
claims giving rise to an inference of injury identified by
Maldonado.

Recovery of penalties for wage statements that were underinclusive
of the hours the Plaintiff worked is not duplicative of his Labor
Code claims for, e.g., unpaid overtime and unpaid meal and rest
periods. Accordingly, Judge Aenlle-Rocha the Motion to Dismiss on
this basis.

4. Whether Plaintiff States a Claim Under the UCL

The Plaintiff bases his UCL claim on the alleged Labor Code
violations and does not allege he lacks an adequate remedy at law.
Rather, he requests compensatory damages and other legal relief
stemming from the alleged Labor Code violations.

Judge Anelle-Rocha, thus, agrees with the Defendant that, in light
of the Plaintiff's request for damages, the Plaintiff cannot
establish there is an inadequate remedy at law. He, therefore,
grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's UCL claim
without leave to amend, as amendment would be futile.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Anelle-Rocha denies the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. He grants in part the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, and dismisses the Plaintiff's eighth cause of
action for violation of the UCL without leave to amend. The
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is otherwise denied. The Defendant
will file its Answer to the FAC within 14 days.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4smsmrfv from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Biden Set to Announce Loan Forgiveness Program
-------------------------------------------------------------
Addy Bink, writing for News3, reports that in the fall of 2021, the
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program was overhauled by the Biden
administration. Since then, thousands of borrowers have received
$8.1 billion in student debt relief.

But many others who may be eligible for the program under a
temporary waiver are running out of time to apply for loan
forgiveness.

The Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, or PSLF, was created
in 2007 with the intention of helping employees with nonprofit and
government agencies by forgiving their student loans after 10 years
of payments (120 total payments). The overall approval rate among
applicants has been low - just 1 in 5 of the 1.3 million borrowers
pursuing debt discharge through PSLF were on track to see relief by
2026, according to a September 2021 report from The Washington
Post.

In 2021, the U.S. Department of Education announced a change that
temporarily waives specific PSLF requirements to grant borrowers
credit toward loan cancellation regardless of their federal loan
type or if they had been enrolled in a specific payment plan, as
long as they consolidated their debt before the end of the waiver.

Before the waiver, borrowers needed to have a specific federal loan
-- a Direct Loan -- to qualify for PSLF. Borrowers could
consolidate their debt into Direct Loans for PSLF, but any payments
made on the loans before consolidation didn't count toward the
required tally.

This waiver is currently set to expire after October 31, 2022,
meaning eligible borrowers have only about four months to apply.
Richard Cordray, the head of Federal Student Aid, said at a
conference earlier that while he is pushing for the PSLF waiver to
be extended, President Biden may lack the executive authority to
approve such a move.

PSLF qualifications
A recent report from the Student Borrower Protection Center found
over nine million public service workers likely qualify for debt
cancellation through the PSLF program, but have yet to file the
paperwork to start the process. California, Texas, Florida, and New
York have the most public service workers with student loan debt,
according to SBPC.

As explained above, PSLF is intended to give eligible public
service employees debt forgiveness after a set number of payments
are made.

Eligible borrowers must:

   -- Be employed by a U.S. federal, state, local, or tribal
government or not-for-profit organization (federal service includes
U.S. military service)
   -- Work full-time for that agency or organization
   -- Have Direct Loans (or consolidate other federal student loans
into a Direct Loan)
   -- Make 120 qualifying payments
   -- Under the current PSLF waiver, eligible borrowers can receive
credit for payments made on other loan types, under any payment
plan, before consolidation, or after the due date. Those who
received Teacher Loan Forgiveness can apply the period of service
that led to their eligibility toward PSLF, if they can certify PSLF
employment for that period.

How to determine if you qualify
The first step in determining your eligibility is visiting the
FSA's website and logging into your account. You'll be able to
search your employer within the FSA's database and add information
about your employment. Once you find your employer, you'll be able
to see whether it qualifies under PSLF.

Next, according to SBPC's walkthrough guide, you'll want to
determine which type of federal student loans you have. Direct
Loans are eligible for PSLF while other loans need to be
consolidated into a Direct Consolidation Loan. Until the end of
October 2022, previous qualifying payments you've made on a
non-Direct Loan will count for the necessary 120 payments PSLF
requires for forgiveness.

Once you've completed the steps above, you'll need to confirm your
employment. You should then be able to submit your PSLF form.

The FSA has created a help tool to guide borrowers through
completing the form.

Who qualifies for the already-approved student loan forgiveness?
While widespread student loan forgiveness hasn't yet become a
reality, some U.S. borrowers have already received some debt
relief. Roughly 1.3 million borrowers have seen $26 billion in
student debt forgiveness since President Biden took office.

In addition to the thousands of borrowers that have received debt
cancellation under the revamped PSLF program, another 690,000
borrowers have had a total of $7.9 billion in student loans erased
through discharges due to borrower defense and school closures.
Over 400,000 borrowers have received more than $8.5 billion in debt
forgiveness through total and permanent disability discharge.

Last month, the Biden administration agreed to cancel $6 billion in
federal student debt for roughly 200,000 borrowers as part of a
proposed class-action settlement. The borrowers claim their college
defrauded them and their applications for relief from the
Department of Education were delayed for years.

Biden is expected to announce his plans regarding more widespread
student debt forgiveness in July or August. [GN]

UNITED STATES: Bids for Summary Judgment in Edakunni v. DHS Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEEPTHI WARRIER EDAKUNNI, et al., Plaintiff v.
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-00393-TL (W.D. Was.), Judge
Tana Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, denies the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment.

I. Background

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) case centers on claims that
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has
unlawfully delayed adjudicating the Plaintiffs' applications for
change or extension of their visa status and for work
authorization.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. Sections 1101,
et seq., regulates admission of nonimmigrants into the United
States. This putative class action suit concerns nonimmigrants
seeking to extend their H-4 or L-2 visa statuses (or change to H-4
or L-2 status) and to seek or renew Employment Authorization
Documents (EADs). The Plaintiffs are spouses of H-1B and L-1 visa
holders, and, as such, are derivative beneficiaries of the H-1B and
L-1 programs.

The Plaintiffs are dozens of individuals who had applied to extend
or change their H-4 or L-2 visa statuses and renew their associated
EADs. Defendant Alejandro Mayorkas is the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, which houses USCIS. He is sued in
his official capacity, in which he oversees adjudication of
immigration benefits requests. The Plaintiffs allege that USCIS has
unreasonably delayed the adjudication of their and putative class
members' H-4 visa extensions, L-2 visa extensions, and H-4 EADs.

The original class action complaint was filed on March 22, 2021. In
May 2021, the Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction seeking
adjudication of their pending I-539 and I-765 forms within seven
days. Upon a request for supplemental briefing, the Defendant
confirmed that a biometrics requirement from which the Plaintiffs
were seeking relief, among their other demands, had been suspended
as of May 17, 2021, for H-4 and L-2 applicants. Soon after, the
Defendant filed the Certified Administrative Record on the docket.


Several months later, the parties stipulated to consolidation of
the case with the later filed Sharma et al. v. Mayorkas,
2:21-cv-00546-RAJ, which was also pending before the Court and
featured "the same defendant, counsel, and questions of law."
Notably, the parties stipulated to informally supplementing the
administrative record with information about the Sharma plaintiffs
in chart form, rather than producing their individual application
documents. Finding good cause, the Court consolidated the cases.  

Per the briefing schedule requested by the parties and approved by
the Court, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment on June 28,
2021. Shortly after, the Plaintiffs moved for class certification
and then to amend the complaint again to add individual plaintiffs.
The case was re-assigned to Judge Lin on Dec. 13, 2021. In February
2022, the Court specifically asked the parties to brief, inter
alia, which the Plaintiffs still had justiciable claims. The
parties responded that all of the original and proposed amended the
Plaintiffs' applications had been adjudicated by USCIS. The
Plaintiffs later moved to file a third amended complaint to add
individual plaintiffs whose applications were still awaiting agency
review. Given that it was unopposed, the Court granted the motion
to file a third amended complaint.  

The Defendant seeks summary judgment denying the Plaintiffs' claims
on grounds that (1) many individual plaintiffs' I-539 and I-765
forms had already been adjudicated and approved, rendering their
claims moot; and (2) that the agency had not unreasonably delayed
adjudication of the remaining claims under the six-factor test
articulated in Telecommunications Research and Actions Center v.
Federal Communications Commission (the TRAC factors). In their
opposition briefing, Plaintiffs did not address the mootness
argument, see generally Dkt. No. 49, and they argued that USCIS had
provided an "incomplete" certified administrative record, which was
devoid of evidence "germane to the TRAC factors."

Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs claimed in their own summary judgment
motion that (1) USCIS had flouted "explicit statutory and
regulatory adjudication timelines and objectives"; and (2) the
administrative record is "at once both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive to the extent that it prevents judicial review and
fails to explain the agency's delay." The Defendant contests the
existence of "explicit, mandatory, or relevant deadlines" for
adjudication of the Plaintiffs' I-539 or I-765 forms. The Defendant
also vigorously refutes that the administrative record is
insufficient to facilitate judicial review of the Plaintiffs'
claims, including the TRAC factors.

II. Discussion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Defendant has argued, in the context of the motion for summary
judgment, that individuals whose applications have been approved no
longer have a live claim or controversy. The Plaintiffs contend in
a subsequent filing to the Court that "Defendant has a proclivity
in immigration benefit delay cases to pick off named plaintiffs and
move to dismiss once all named plaintiffs have received
adjudications of the work authorization."

Judge Lin is not able to determine whether Defendant has been
picking off plaintiffs, utilizing a FIFO system, or some
combination of both. However, she does not believe she needs to
make such a finding because of the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness.
Judge Lin says, a claim qualifies for this exception if "'the pace
of litigation and the inherently transitory nature of the claims at
issue conspire to make mootness requirement difficult to fulfill.'"
A pre-certification class action claim falls within this exception
if (1) "the duration of the challenged action is too short to allow
full litigation before it ceases," and (2) "there is a reasonable
expectation that the named plaintiffs could themselves suffer
repeated harm or it is certain that other persons similarly
situated will have the same complaint."

The need to repeatedly amend the complaint to add plaintiffs in the
case demonstrates that the claims presented are inherently
transitory and, therefore, fall into the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness.
Therefore, even if some or all of the proposed 14 new plaintiffs
from the third amended complaint have had their applications
adjudicated at this point, Judge Lin is satisfied that it has
subject matter jurisdiction and can proceed to assessing the
motions for summary judgment on their merits.

B. Existence of a Statutory or Regulatory Deadline

The Plaintiffs argue that the INA sets a 30-day deadline within
which USCIS must process L-2 benefit requests. They further assert
that "the plain language and clear purpose of the governing
regulations establish an adjudication timeline for H-4 visas and
EADs." They go on to mischaracterize a District of Columbia ruling,
stating that a court there "appears to concur that the outer limit
for adjudication of H-4 benefit requests is 180 days.

Judge Lin holds that (i) the Plaintiffs have failed to establish
that a 30-day timeline applies to L-2 visa extensions; (ii) though
USCIS had previously made rules regarding its commitment to process
H-4 extension applications within 90y days, the Plaintiffs concede
that "the agency decided to abandon these processing commitments";
and (iii) the Plaintiff has failed to establish that USCIS was
required to rule on their H-4 benefits requests within 180 days and
joins courts across the country in determining that there is no
mandatory timeframe within which USCIS must process H-4 applicants'
I-539 and I-765 form.

C. Scope of the Administrative Record

Turning now to the Plaintiffs' alternative argument, they argue the
certified administrative record produced by USCIS "is so over- and
underinclusive that it prevents effective judicial review," such
that the Court should remand to the agency "for production of a
proper administrative record."  

The Plaintiffs claim the record is over-inclusive "to the extent it
focuses on the creation of the now abandoned biometric recollection
requirement and public closures of USCIS offices in the wake of
COVID," and for including documents regarding creation of a new
form I-539A that must be filed for each dependent child. The
Defendants counter that the information about the biometrics
requirement provides information relevant to USCIS processing times
and "directly relates to Plaintiffs' argument that the suspended
biometrics submission policy demonstrates bad faith by the agency."
Still, all of the evidence that the Plaintiffs contend is
extraneous could aid the Court's determination of how USCIS'
processing times and reasons for delays should factor into its TRAC
analysis.

The Plaintiffs simultaneously argue that the administrative record
is insufficient to allow for judicial review about a number of
issues relevant to the TRAC analysis.

Judge Lin agrees with the Defendant that they did not misrepresent
how USCIS operations were carrying on during the pandemic, USCIS'
deference policy is irrelevant as it applies to extensions of
"petition validity" rather than to the two types of applications at
issue in the instant case (i.e., I-539 and I-765 forms), it is
clear that prioritizing the Plaintiffs' applications would
prejudice others who had filed their applications earlier, and past
adjudication practices also are irrelevant.  

Nevertheless, Judge Lin is not certain that at this time whether
she has all of the information she needs to engage in a thorough
examination of how the TRAC factors apply to the case. Given the
parties' disagreement on this issue, she will entertain a motion
from the Plaintiffs to supplement the administrative record with
respect to the FIFO processing rule and the newly-added plaintiffs
only, due no later than July 26, 2022.

The motion will be noted as a third-Friday motion, per LCR 7(d)(3)
and 7(e)(4), with the motion and response briefs not to exceed 12
pages and the reply brief not to exceed six pages. However, with
respect to the information about the newly-added plaintiffs, the
Court strongly encourages the parties to work cooperatively in
resolving this issue and to consider whether they can stipulate to
supplement this information in chart format, as they did when they
added information about the Sharma plaintiffs.  

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge Lin denies the Plaintiffs' and Defendant's
motions for summary judgment. The Plaintiff's motion is denied with
prejudice with respect to the argument regarding the existence of
explicit timelines for adjudication of the applications at hand.
The remainder of the cross-motions is denied without prejudice
pending appropriate supplementation of the administrative record.
Judge Lin also strikes the pending motion for class certification,
to be re-filed if appropriate after it rules on any renewed motions
for summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/49jn3at9 from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Deal Reached in Lompoc Prison COVID-19 Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dave Minsky of the Santa Maria Times reports that a settlement has
been reached in a class action lawsuit filed by Lompoc federal
inmates against U.S. prison officials who are accused of cruel and
unusual punishment for not doing enough to stop an outbreak of
COVID-19 at the beginning of the pandemic in 2020.

U.S. District Judge Consuelo B. Marshall approved the settlement on
June 27, more than two years after five inmates filed the
class-action against Bureau of Prisons Director Michael Carvajal,
and Louis Milsunic, identified as the Lompoc Federal Correctional
Complex warden at the time, Los Angeles federal court records show.
Filings list the current warden as Bryan Birkholz.

Five inmates -- Yonnedil Torres, Vincent Reed, Felix Garcia, Andre
Brown and Shawn Fears -- filed the class-action lawsuit May 16,
2020 with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, on behalf
of the nearly 2,700 inmates at the prison complex, which includes
the low security Federal Correctional Institution, the medium
security U.S. Penitentiary and satellite camps.

The plaintiffs sought early release and to enforce the March 26,
2020 and April 3, 2020 memoranda issued by then U.S. Attorney
General William Barr, and federal legislation, authorizing home
confinement for inmates vulnerable to the coronavirus.

A Los Angeles federal judge last week appointed a physician and
epidemiologist to inspect a Lompoc federal prison facility at the
center of a class-action lawsuit and massive COVID-19 outbreak that
infected most its inmates.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs and from the BOP did not return emails
seeking comment.

The outbreak at the prison was initially detected at the end of
March 2020, weeks after the pandemic was declared, and infected
about 1,200 inmates, and resulted in five deaths.

Under the terms of the settlement, officials agree to review all
inmates within the settlement class for home confinement pursuant
to Barr's memos, current BOP guidance and in accordance to several
court orders, including the July 14 2020 preliminary injunction
ordering officials to identify and release vulnerable inmates.

Inmates considered vulnerable to the coronavirus included those in
post-conviction, future inmates in custody at Lompoc FCI and USP
Lompoc, and those who have underlying health conditions such as
serious heart conditions, Type 2 diabetes, asthma, obesity, HIV and
other immuno-compromised conditions, according to the settlement.

Additionally, officials were ordered to "continue to make full and
speedy use of their authority" under the CARES Act when evaluating
each inmate's eligibility for home confinement and coronavirus risk
factors.

The settlement also sets conditions of confinement, including
testing of inmates who've had close or direct contact with those
infected with the coronavirus, daily testing of inmates in
quarantine, worker screenings and the provision of monthly updates
to plaintiffs' attorneys.

In addition, medical isolation using the Special Housing Unit must
be "operationally distinct" from disciplinary or administrative
restricted housing and include daily medical visits, access to
mental health services and increased access to telephones "to
maintain health and connection during isolation," according to the
settlement.

Both parties agreed that the settlement isn't considered an
admission of liability or wrongdoing.

The settlement will remain in effect until either Dec. 17, 2022,
the federal coronavirus emergencies are terminated or when the
Attorney General determines that emergency conditions "no longer
materially affect" the BOP functions -- whichever is sooner,
records show. [GN]

UNITY SOFTWARE: Das Securities Suit Filed Over False Financial Info
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ISHITA DAS, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. UNITY SOFTWARE INC., JOHN S. RICCITIELLO, KIMBERLY
JABAL, and LUIS FELIPE VISOSO, Case No. 3:22-cv-03962 (N.D. Cal.
July 6, 2022) is a federal securities class action on behalf of a
class consisting of all persons and entities other than the
Defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired Unity securities
between March 5, 2021 and May 10, 2022, both dates inclusive,
seeking to recover damages caused by the Defendants' violations of
the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, against the
Company and certain of its top officials.

According to the complaint, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations, and compliance policies.
Specifically, the Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that deficiencies in Unity's
product platform reduced the accuracy of the Company's machine
learning technology.

On May 10, 2022, after the market closed, Unity announced its
financial results for the first quarter of 2022. The Company also
reduced its fiscal 2022 guidance, citing "challenges with
monetization products." Specifically, Unity stated that "a fault in
Unity's platform resulted in reduced accuracy for [its] Audience
Pinpointer tool, a revenue expensive issue given that the
Pinpointer tool experienced significant growth post the IDFA
changes."

On this news, Unity's stock price fell $17.83 per share, or
approximately 37%, to close at $30.30 per share on May 11, 2022.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the suit.

Unity creates and operates an interactive real-time 3D content
platform. The Company's platform provides software solutions to
create, run, and monetize interactive, real-time 2D and 3D content
for mobile phones, tablets, PCs, consoles, and augmented and
virtual reality devices. One of the tools on the Company's product
platform is the Audience Pinpointer, a user acquisition service
which uses real-time user valuation at the time of an ad
request.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 405-7190
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

VACATIONS 4 YOU: Faces Mann Suit Over Illegal Membership Contract
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HELENA MANN, ASHLEY PROWANT, SAVANNAH SALERNO-CRITE & WILLIAM
CRITE, IVIE LYNCH, and TERRY MORRIS & ANA MORRIS, individually and
on behalf of all others situated, v. VACATIONS 4 YOU, LLC, Case No.
22C1332 (Tenn. Cir., Davidson Cty., July 5, 2022) involves V4U's
contract which not only provide its members with the right to
cancel, but also specifically states in bold letters that members
do not have the right to cancel their contracts.

V4U represents that it is "proud partners" with numerous hotel,
rental car, and cruise companies, including Hilton, Marriott,
Enterprise Rent-A-Car, and Norwegian Cruise Lines. V4U also
represents on its website that it was named Inc. Magazine's
"Fastest Growing Travel Company." However, a search of Inc.
Magazine's database of its annually compiled list of the 5,000
fastest growing companies returns no hits for V4U for any year
which V4U has existed. V4U purports that it is able to provide
cheaper, wholesale prices for vacations to its members because it
leverages the buying power of its membership to obtain bulk
discounts on travel accommodations, says the suit.

Buying clubs are required by Tennessee law (the "Buying Club Law"),
specifically Tenn. Code Ann. section 47-18-503, to allow new
members to cancel their memberships and ask for a refund within at
least three days after joining the service. Thus, purchase of a V4U
membership comes with a right to access a timeshare for a certain
amount of time every year. Therefore, despite its representations
to the contrary, V4U is in the business of selling timeshare
interests to its members. The Tennessee Time-Share Act of 1981 (the
"Timeshare Act") requires that contracts for the sale of timeshare
interests provide purchasers with the right to cancel the contract.
Despite the fact that V4U is both a buying club and a seller of
timeshare interests, its contracts do not provide members with a
right to cancel, the suit added.

V4U operates a membership service, through which it provides
purports to provide its members with cheaper, wholesale prices for
vacations. V4U's website promises that members receive "huge
savings" on travel -- up to "95% off the public rate." According to
its website, V4U also purports to provide members access to
"thousands of destinations worldwide. In more than 72,000
cities."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seamus T. Kelly, Esq.
          David J. Goldman, Esq
          MUSIC CITY LAW, PLLC
          1033 Demonbreun Street, Suite 300
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 200-0682
          E-mail: seamus@musiccityfirm.com
                  david@musiccityfirm.com

VOLKSWAGEN AG: Audi Reaches Transmission Defect Suit Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
TopClassActions.com reports that a new Volkswagen class action
lawsuit settlement resolves claims the automotive company built
certain Audi vehicles with a defective direct-shift gearbox (DSG)
transmission.

The settlement benefits current and former owners and lessees of
model year 2010, 2011, or 2012 Audi S4 or Audi S5 vehicles.

Audi is a subsidiary of Volkswagen and manufactures numerous luxury
car models. The brand is known for its expensive vehicles, but Audi
and Volkswagen have been subject to numerous recalls in recent
years -- including a new recall for fire risk.

Although 2010 to 2012 Audi S4 and S5 vehicles do not have a fire
risk like current recalls, the vehicles allegedly have defective
transmissions that can cost drivers thousands to repair.

A 2017 class action lawsuit claims the vehicles were built with
defective DSG transmissions. The transmissions allegedly shudder,
judder, rough shift, and unexpectedly enter "limp mode" for
seemingly no reason.

According to the class action lawsuit, drivers were forced to pay
out of pocket to repair these transmissions despite Volkswagen
being aware of the issue.

Volkswagen hasn't admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to settle
these transmission claims with a class action settlement.

Under the terms of the Audi transmission settlement, Class Members
can receive reimbursement payments and warranty extensions.

Class Members who had to pay out of pocket for transmission repairs
can be reimbursed for a portion of their expenses, as long as the
repairs occurred within 90,000 miles and nine years of service.
Reimbursement rates will vary depending on the number of miles on
the vehicle and the age of the vehicle at the time of the repairs.


Repairs within four years and 50,000 miles will be 100% reimbursed.
From this point, reimbursement rates drop off based on vehicle age
and mileage.

The lowest reimbursement rate is 20% for vehicles with 80,001 to
90,000 miles and eight to nine years in service.

A full table of reimbursement rates can be found on the Audi
transmission settlement website.

In addition to covering past repairs, the settlement extends Audi
warranties to cover future repairs. Under the extended warranty,
one transmission repair is covered within nine years or 90,000
miles. Repairs are covered if an authorized dealer diagnoses the
vehicle with transmission shuddering, juddering, rough shifting,
and/or "limp mode."

The deadline for exclusion and objection is April 25, 2022.

The final approval hearing for the Volkswagen and Audi DSG
transmission class action lawsuit settlement is scheduled for
August 18, 2022.

In order to receive reimbursement from the settlement, Class
Members must submit a valid claim form by July 29, 2022.

Claim forms must include documentation of expenses, including
receipts, invoices, and other proof.

Who's Eligible

The settlement benefits current and former owners and lessees of
model year 2010, 2011, or 2012 Audi S4 or Audi S5 vehicles.

Potential Award: Varies

Proof of Purchase: Documentation of expenses, including receipts,
invoices, and other proof.

Claim Form: TO FILE A CLAIM, CLICK
https://angeion-public.s3.amazonaws.com/www.DSGTransmissionSettlement.com/docs/AudiChessGillard_ClaimForm_FINAL_generic.pdf

NOTE: If you do not qualify for this settlement do NOT file a
claim.

Remember: you are submitting your claim under penalty of perjury.
You are also harming other eligible Class Members by submitting a
fraudulent claim. If you're unsure if you qualify, please read the
FAQ section of the Settlement Administrator's website to ensure you
meet all standards (Top Class Actions is not a Settlement
Administrator). If you don't qualify for this settlement, check out
our database of other open class action settlements you may be
eligible for.

Claim Form Deadline: 07/29/2022

Case Name: Gillard, et al. v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.,
Civil Action No. 4:17-cv-07287-HSG, in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California

Final Hearing: 08/18/2022

Settlement Website: DSGTransmissionSettlement.com

Claims Administrator:
DSG Transmission Settlement
1650 Arch Street, Suite 2210
Philadelphia, PA 19103
info@DSGTransmissionSettlement.com
844-957-4280

Class Counsel: MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC
               SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC

Defense Counsel: HERZFELD & RUBIN PC [GN]

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Class Settlement in Mercado Suit Wins Final Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VALERIA MERCADO and ANDREA KRISTY ANNE HOLMES,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. d/b/a AUDI OF
AMERICA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-02388-JWH-SPx (C.D.
Cal.), Judge John W. Holcomb of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California issued an Order and Judgment
granting:

   a. the Motion of Plaintiffs Valeria Mercado and Andrea Kristy
      Anne Holmes for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
      and exhibits thereto including the parties' Class
      Settlement Agreement; and

   b. the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses,
      and for Service Payments.

The Court held a final fairness hearing on June 24, 2022.

Judge Holcomb grants final approval of the Settlement and all of
its terms. The Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in
all respects satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and
the applicable law.

Judge Holcomb certifies, for the purpose of the Settlement, a
Settlement Class consisting of the following: All persons and
entities who purchased or leased any model year 2017 or 2018 Audi
Q7 vehicle that was imported and distributed by Volkswagen Group of
America, Inc. for sale or lease in the United States or Puerto
Rico.

The Judge grants final appointment of Plaintiffs Valeria Mercado
and Andrea Kristy Anne Holmes as the Settlement Class
Representatives, and the law firms of Milberg Coleman Bryson
Phillips Grossman PLLC and Ahdoot and Wolfson PC, collectively, as
the Settlement Class Counsel or the Class Counsel. He finds that
said the Settlement Class Representatives and the Settlement Class
Counsel have fairly and adequately represented, and will continue
fairly and adequately to represent, the interests of the Settlement
Class.

Judge Holcomb further grants final appointment of Angeion Group as
the Settlement Administrator to effectuate its duties and
responsibilities set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

Judge Holcomb excludes from the Settlement and Release, on the
basis of their timely and valid requests for exclusion, the 20
Settlement Class Members who are listed on Exhibit A annexed to the
Order and Judgment.

The prior objections of Philip Bieluch, Benjamin Gilbert, and
Deepesh Bhandari are withdrawn based upon their consent, and said
persons are now excluded from the Settlement. In addition, Judge
Holcomb accepts the resolutions and withdrawal of the objections by
Ludlow, Clonch, and Graham.

All objections to the Settlement are overruled for the reasons
stated (Joann Winchell, Renee Rosser, Xingjia Hua, Mark Murphy,
Mary Westmoreland, Roberta Cutillo, Ellenore Ohanrahan, Cherie
Pashley, James Gilbert Mares, Kristin Renee Cain, Francis Fernando,
Steven Guban, David Schroth, Adam Engelskirchen, Neal Sorell,
Barbara Deppensmith, and Scott Wirtz).

The Parties are directed to perform all obligations under the
Settlement Agreement in accordance with its terms.

The Parties and each person or entity within the Settlement Class
are bound in all respects by the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Agreement, including but not limited to the Released
Claims against all Released Parties contained therein, except for
the twenty persons identified in Exhibit A who have duly and timely
excluded themselves from the Settlement Class.

Judge Holcomb dismisses the Action with prejudice and without
costs.

The Final Approval Order and Judgment has been entered without any
admission by any Party regarding the merits of any allegation in
the Action and will not constitute a finding of either fact or law
regarding the merits of any claim or defense that was or could have
been asserted in the Action. Nothing in the Final Approval Order
and Judgment, the Settlement Agreement, the underlying proceedings,
or any documents, filings, submissions, or statements related
thereto, is or will be deemed, construed to be, or argued as, an
admission, or evidence, of any liability, wrongdoing, or
responsibility on the part of VWGoA or any Released Party, or of
any allegation or claim asserted in this Action, all of which are
expressly denied by VWGoA.

In the event that any provision of the Settlement or the Final
Approval Order and Judgment is asserted by VWGoA or any Released
Party as a defense (including, without limitation, as a basis for
dismissal and/or a stay), in whole or in part, to any claim, suit,
action or proceeding in any forum, judicial or otherwise, brought
by a Settlement Class Member or any person actually or purportedly
acting on behalf of any Settlement Class Member(s), that claim,
suit, action, and/or proceeding will immediately be stayed and
enjoined until the Court or the court or tribunal in which the
claim is pending has determined any issues related to such defense
or assertion.

The Released Claims, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, are
fully, finally, and forever deemed released, discharged, acquitted,
compromised, settled, and dismissed with prejudice against VWGoA
and all Released Parties.

Judge Holcomb has carefully reviewed, and approves, the request for
Service Awards of $5,000 to each of the Settlement Class
Representatives, Valeria Mercado and Andrea Kristy Anne Holmes, as
reasonable payment for their efforts as Settlement Class
Representatives on behalf of the Settlement Class, said Service
Awards to be paid by VWGoA in the manner provided in the Settlement
Agreement. Said payment will duly, completely, and forever satisfy,
release, and discharge any and all obligations of VWGoA, and any
Released Party, with respect to the Settlement Class
Representatives Service Awards.

In addition, Judge Holcomb has carefully reviewed, and approves,
the Class Counsel's request for an award of reasonable attorneys'
fees, costs, and expenses in the collective combined total amount
of $1.96 million (collectively, the "Fee and Expense Award"), which
amount will be paid by VWGoA within the time, and in the manner, as
set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The payment by VWGoA of said
Fee and Expense Award will constitute full and complete
satisfaction of, and will duly, completely, and forever release and
discharge the VWGoA and all Released Parties from, and with respect
to, any and all obligations for the payment of any and all attorney
fees, costs, and expenses in connection with the Action and
controversy.

Without further order of the Court, the Parties may agree to
reasonably necessary extensions of time to carry out any of the
provisions of the Settlement Agreement, the Order, and any
obligations thereunder.

Judge Holcomb finds that no just reason exists for delay in
entering the Final Order and Judgment. Accordingly, the Clerk is
directed to enter the Final Approval Order and Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Order & Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mr26xrb5 from Leagle.com.


VOLT BANK: Bannister Investigates Collapse Following Funding Woes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
David Simmons, writing for Business News Australia, reports that
Australian class action law firm Bannister Law has announced it is
investigating the collapse of neobank Volt Bank and the events
leading up to the voluntary appointment of administrators at debt
collector Collection House (ASX: CLH).

The two high-profile events came within one day of each other,
leading media outlets including Business News Australia to
speculate whether Collection House's debt facility with Volt,
secured against its investment in the neobank, was the spark that
fuelled the appointment of administrators at CLH.

According to Bannister Law, the firm is investigating the conduct,
management, forecasts and representations made to Volt investors as
part of the neobank's A-F equity funding rounds which raised $219
million in total.

Founded in 2017, neobank Volt told accountholders to withdraw all
funds by 5 July after it made the "difficult decision" to close
down and return its banking licence as it could not secure the
funding needed to continue.

This meant the neobank's customers, which had $113 million in
deposits with Volt as of April 2022, had to withdraw their money
and find an alternative bank.

"Selling remaining assets may yield a return to investors, but
investors may also incur a loss and Bannister Law Class Actions is
appealing to all investors in funding raises A-E to register their
details and encourages investors to tell us what and when they were
told by the company at the time of making their investments and
subsequently so that we can gain a full picture of what has
transpired," Bannister Law said.

Similarly, Bannister Law is appealing to "anyone who may be able to
assist in the investigation" of Collection House following the
appointment of voluntary administrators.

Collection House appointed FTI Consulting as voluntary
administrators to develop a plan to save the business which has
been hard-hit by the impact of COVID-19 on the debt collection
sector, flooding events in New South Wales, and a weak national
economic situation.

The administration came after CLH attempted on multiple occasions
to recapitalise and restructure the business, including by selling
off its debt ledger book to Credit Corp Group (ASX: CCP).

However, its connection to Volt Bank may have been Collection
House's undoing - the debt collector had a debt facility with the
now-collapsed neobank, secured against its substantial investment
in the company.

Collection House made an $8.5 million investment in Volt in January
2019, one day after the neobank had been given its authorised
deposit-taking institution (ADI) licence. By mid-2020 the value of
that investment had declined to $4.86 million, dropping further to
$3.5 million by mid-2021.

Voluntary administrators John Park, Ben Campbell and Kelly
Trenfield are currently conducting an independent assessment of the
business, engaging with key stakeholders regarding funding options,
and running an expedited sale and recapitalisation process for the
company.

Bannister Law said it was interested in the events that led to the
appointment of administrators as well as the collapse of the
company's share price which dived during the height of the pandemic
and fell further in the subdued debt collection environment.

At the beginning of 2020, shares in CLH were trading at around
$1.10 per share. Though the company is currently suspended from
trading, its last price on 28 June was just $0.07 per share.

"We are also interested in the projections made by the company in
November 2019," said Bannister Law, referencing a presentation made
to investors detailing the company's outlook for FY20, prior to the
impact of the pandemic on the company.

"Bannister Law Class Action is investigating the conduct of
management, forecasts and representations made to investors about
the company. We are particularly interested in the decisions made
to sell revenue streams for upfront payments," added Bannister
Law.

"Bannister Law is looking at the company's management in light of
section 180 of the Corporations Act over the last few years.
Bannister Law is also interested to hear from anyone who may be
able to assist in the investigation on behalf of shareholders."
[GN]

WALMART INC: Bid for Amendment of Briefing Schedule Filed
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DEARL POWELL, CHRISTINA
GAST and ELIJHA GONZALEZ, as 20 individuals and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, v. WALMART INC., a Delaware corporation;
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., a Delaware corporation; WAL-MART STORES,
INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Case No. 3:20-cv-02412-JLS-MSB (S.D. Cal.), the Parties ask the
Court to amend the briefing and hearing dates as follows:

  1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification:

     -- Deadline for Defendants to file from July 21, 2022, to
        September 22, 2022;

     -- Deadline for Plaintiffs to file reply from July 28,
        2022, to September 29, 2022; and

     -- The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
        Certification from 1:30 p.m. on August 11, 2022, to 1:30
        p.m. on October 13, 2022;

  2. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings:

     -- Deadline for Plaintiffs to file opposition from July 21,
        2022, to September 22, 2022;

     -- Deadline for Defendants to file reply from July 28,
        2022, to September 29, 2022; and

        The hearing on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
        Pleadings continued from 1:30 p.m. on August 11, 2022,
        to 1:30 p.m. on October 13, 2022.

Walmart is an American multinational retail corporation that
operates a chain of hypermarkets, discount department stores, and
grocery stores from the United States, headquartered in
Bentonville, Arkansas.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated June 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3RoMwNj at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Mai Tulyathan, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com
                  ktulyathan@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          B. James Fitzpatrick, Esq.
          Laura Franklin, Esq.
          FITZPATRICK & SWANSTON
          555 S. Main Street
          Salinas, CA 93901
          Telephone: (831) 755-1311
          Facsimile: (831) 755-1319
          E-mail: bjfitzpatrick@fandslegal.com
                  lfranklin@fandslegal.com

               - and -

          Dennis s. Hyun, Esq.
          HYUN LEGAL, APC
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: 213-488-6555
          Facsimile: 213-488-6554
          E-mail: dhyun@hyunlegal.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Paloma P. Peracchio, Esq.
          Mitchell A. Wrosch, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
          SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 239-9800
          Facsimile: (213) 239-9045
          E-mail: paloma.peracchio@ogletree.com
                  mitchell.wrosch@ogletree.com

WALMART INC: Faces Class Action Over Mislabeled Coffee Creamer
--------------------------------------------------------------
TopClassActions.com reports that a coffee drinker sued Walmart over
its Great Value brand Chocolate Caramel Coffee Creamer.

The plaintiff says the product is a whitener, not a creamer.
The case was filed in Illinois federal court.

Walmart markets one of its Great Value products as a "coffee
creamer" when it does not contain enough milk product to be a
creamer and is instead a "whitener," a new class action lawsuit
alleges.

Plaintiff Amer Knautz filed the class action lawsuit against
Walmart Inc. on July 1 in an Illinois federal court, alleging
violations of federal and state consumer laws.

Knautz says Walmart Inc.'s Great Value brand Chocolate Caramel
Coffee Creamer is actually a coffee whitener.

According to the lawsuit, the product is marketed as a "coffee
creamer," shown through its packaging and title, and as
pasteurized.

"Consumers are misled to expect the presence of cream from dairy
ingredients," Knautz says.

"By representing the Product with the statements, 'Coffee Creamer'
and 'Ultra Pasteurized,' consumers are misled because it lacks
cream and dairy ingredients beyond a de minimis amount of sodium
caseinate, a milk derivative, shown through the ingredient list,"
the Walmart class action says.

In place of cream, the Great Value creamer substitutes water and
sunflower oil to reduce costs, the lawsuit states.
Walmart class action claims Great Value creamer actually coffee
whitener

Knautz uses multiple dictionary definitions to delineate the
difference between coffee whiteners and coffee creamers.

She adds that non-dairy coffee whiteners were introduced in the
1960s and distinguished themselves from types of cream made from
dairy ingredients.

"First, they were sold under the generic name, 'coffee whiteners,'"
the Walmart class action says. "Second, they were stocked in the
frozen food sections of grocery stores. In contrast, coffee cream
and other dairy products were sold in the refrigerated foods
section in the dairy case."

According to the class action, the aggregate amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million.

Knautz looks to represent an Illinois class of consumer who bought
the product, plus a consumer fraud multistate class made up of
consumers who bought the product in North Dakota, Texas, West
Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Nebraska,
South Carolina, Kansas and Wyoming.

She's suing under Illinois consumer laws and for breach of
warranty, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and unjust enrichment.


Knautz is seeking certification of the class action, damages, fees,
costs and a jury trial.

Meanwhile, another new class action lawsuit alleges French vanilla
coffee creamer manufactured and sold by International Delight is
actually a coffee whitener.

What do you think of the allegations over Great Value creamer? Let
us know in the comments!

The plaintiff is represented by Spencer Sheehan of Sheehan &
Associates P.C.

The Walmart Great Value creamer class action is Amber Knautz v.
Walmart Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-50236, in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. [GN]

WALMART INC: Mayonnaise Dressing Falsely Labeled, Guzman Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Guzman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Walmart Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-03465 (N.D. Ill., July
5, 2022) alleges that Walmart manufactures, markets, labels and
sells mayonnaise dressing promoted as made "With Olive Oil" under
the Great Value brand ("Product") which gives consumers the
impression that it has a greater absolute and relative amount of
olive oil compared to traditional vegetable oil ingredients than it
does.

According to the complaint, the Defendant markets the product to
the increasing numbers of Americans seeking to consume traditional
foods but with ingredients known for providing health benefits,
like olive oil. By labeling and promoting the Product as made "With
Olive Oil," with green packaging evocative of the color of olives,
consumers expect a significant, non-de minimis amount of olive oil,
in relative and absolute amounts to all oils used, the suit
contends.

However, the ingredient list reveals a smaller than expected amount
of olive oil, in absolute and relative terms, and that the most
predominant oil is "Soybean Oil." The Defendant makes other
representations and omissions with respect to the Product
which are false and misleading. As a result of the false and
misleading representations, the Product is sold at a premium price,
approximately no less than no less than $2.80 for 30 oz, excluding
tax and sales, higher than similar products, represented in a
non-misleading way, and higher than it would be sold for absent the
misleading representations and omissions, the suit added.

The Plaintiff seeks certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 of the
following classes:

  -- Illinois Class

     "All persons in the State of Illinois who purchased the
     Product during the statutes of limitations for each cause of
     action alleged;" and

  -- Consumer Fraud Multi-State Class

     "All persons in the States of Alabama, North Carolina,
     Mississippi, Alaska, West Virginia, Utah, Kentucky, Montana,
     Idaho and Oklahoma who purchased the Product during the
     statutes of limitations for each cause of action alleged."

Walmart is an American multinational retail corporation that
operates a chain of over 5,000 supercenters across the U.S.,
selling furniture to groceries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd Ste 412
          Great Neck NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

WISCONSIN: Department of Revenue Dismissed From Siebers Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARGARET SIEBERS and VICTOR VARGO, individually and on
behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
PETER W. BARCA and the STATE OF WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-1109-jdp (W.D. Wis.), Judge James D.
Peterson of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin dismissed the Department of Revenue from the lawsuit.

I. Introduction

In this proposed class action, Plaintiffs Siebers and Vargo
challenge provisions of the Wisconsin Unclaimed Property Act under
the Takings Clause. The statute authorizes the state to take
custody of lost or abandoned property, invest the property, and
return the property if the owner claims it. The Plaintiffs contend
that the state unlawfully retains interest earned on unclaimed
property that was non-interest bearing when the state took
custody.

When the Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit, the statute did not entitle
them to the interest the state earned on non-interest-bearing
property. But less than a year later, Wisconsin revised its law to
pay interest on non-interest-bearing property in many situations.
But the Plaintiffs contend that the revised statute does not go far
enough. They bring claims against the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue and the department's secretary, Peter W. Barca.

The Defendants have filed two motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
complaint, one before and one after the unclaimed property act was
revised. The Plaintiffs move to amend their complaint in light of
the revised statute. The core questions in deciding all three
motions are whether the Plaintiffs' claims are: (1) mooted by the
revised statute; (2) ripe for review; barred by Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity; and (4) proper under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

II. Background

In 1970, Wisconsin enacted a version of the Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act, a type of law that has been adopted by many states to
govern property that has been lost or abandoned. The purpose of
unclaimed property laws is to create a system for the safekeeping
of lost or abandoned property, to provide owners with a process to
reclaim their property, and to allow state governments to benefit
from lost or abandoned property that is not reclaimed.

Under Wisconsin's law, property is presumed abandoned after a
period of inactivity by the property's owner. Businesses that hold
the property, typically financial institutions, must first attempt
to contact the owner to return the property. If the business is
unable to do so, it must turn the property over to the state along
with the owner's name and contact information. Common types of
unclaimed property include money in savings and checking accounts,
uncashed dividends, stocks and mutual funds, unpaid wages, gift
cards, and the contents of safe deposit boxes.

Abandoned property that is transferred to the state remains the
property of the original owner; the state serves as the custodian
of the property. If the unclaimed property is money, it is
deposited into Wisconsin's Common School Fund, which distributes
earnings to school districts each year. If the unclaimed property
is not money, such as stocks or mutual funds, the state may sell
the property after a certain period of time. The sale proceeds are
deposited into the common school fund. A portion of unclaimed
property and proceeds are also deposited into the state's general
fund to pay claims filed by property owners. Owners may reclaim
their property at any time by filing a claim with the state.

The Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in December 2020 challenging the
state's practice of withholding interest earned by the state on
non-interest-bearing property. In November 2021, after the lawsuit
was filed, Wisconsin repealed and replaced the statute with a
revised version.

The Plaintiffs are Wisconsin residents who own non-interest-bearing
property that was transferred into to state custody. Plaintiff
Siebers filed a claim for her property and received no interest
back. Plaintiff Vargo filed a claim but has not yet received a
disposition. In their proposed second amended complaint, the
Plaintiffs propose to add a third plaintiff, Carijean Buhk, who is
in the same position as Vargo. Vargo and Buhk allege that under the
revised statute, they will not receive adequate state-earned
interest on their property when the state settles their claims.

III. Analysis

The Plaintiffs contend that Wisconsin's practice of withholding
interest on non-interest-bearing property is an uncompensated
governmental taking in violation of the United States and Wisconsin
constitutions. Their claims sweep broadly, challenging the old and
revised statutes, and seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory
relief.

The Plaintiffs bring the action directly under the federal and
state takings clauses, U.S. Const. amend. V; Wis. Const. art. I,
Section 13.7, and under Section 1983. Their claims are not novel.
Three recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that a state's failure to return interest on unclaimed
property is a taking without just compensation. These decisions
provide the legal background for the Plaintiffs' claims, although
they are not directly dispositive of the issues now before the
Court.

In Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 578 (7th Cir. 2013) and
Kolton v. Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532, 533 (7th Cir. 2017), the court
held that Indiana and Illinois provisions that withheld interest on
interest-bearing property in state custody were unconstitutional
under the federal Takings Clause. In Goldberg v. Frerichs, the
court extended these rulings to unclaimed property statutes that
denied interest to owners of non-interest-bearing property. In all
three cases, the court relied on the well-settled principle that
the owner of an account owns both the principal and interest. The
cases stand for the rule that "a state may not take custody of
property and retain income that the property earns."

Three motions are before the Court. Before the revised statute was
enacted, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint
for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' claims
are unripe, barred by sovereign immunity, and not permitted under
Section 1983. After the statutory change, the Defendants filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss, asserting that the revised law has
mooted the Plaintiffs' claims.

The Plaintiffs are undeterred. They move for leave to amend their
complaint in four ways: (1) conform the complaint to the revised
statute; (2) add allegations related to Plaintiff Siebers' claim;
(3) add Plaintiff Buhk; and (4) delete the claim seeking a
declaration of the meaning of state law.

The Defendants oppose amendment, Dkt. 36, contending that amendment
would be futile because the Plaintiffs' new allegations suffer from
the same problems as the old allegations. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the court may grant leave to amend when
justice so requires. But the court need not grant leave when
amendment would be futile, which means that the new allegations
could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.

It makes sense to address the three motions together. The critical
question is whether amendment would be futile because the
Plaintiffs' new allegations raise claims that are moot, unripe,
barred by sovereign immunity, or improper under Section 1983.

A. Mootness

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' claims are mooted by
the revised statute, so a threshold question is whether the Court
has jurisdiction to decide the case. The Plaintiffs assert that
state procedures under the revised statute still deprive them of
interest on their property in several ways.  

Judge Peterson opines that both sides overstate their positions.
The revised statute narrows but does not eliminate the Plaintiffs'
constitutional concerns. So it is not "absolutely clear" that
alleged uncompensated takings will cease. And as long as the
Plaintiffs have a concrete interest in the dispute, however small,
the case is not moot. The Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint
also maintains claims for retrospective relief based on the old
statute. When a challenged statute is repealed or significantly
amended, the case is moot only if the plaintiff exclusively seeks
prospective relief. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs' claims are
not futile because of mootness.

B. Ripeness

The Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that the
Plaintiffs' claims are unripe because, although they filed claims
for the return of their property, the claims have not yet been
resolved. But the Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint states
that Siebers has completed the claim process and received no
state-earned-interest on her property. The Plaintiffs allege that
Vargo and Buhk have filed claims that remain unresolved.

Judge Peterson holds that there is no question that the state is
committed to a position. Siebers received no interest earned on her
unclaimed property. And the revised statute provides that Vargo and
Buhk are not entitled to interest on property valued at less than
$100 or interest earned before Jan. 2, 2019. This result is spelled
out in the statute, it is not hypothetical or speculative. THe
Defendants have identified no contingencies or uncertain events
that may not occur as anticipated with respect to the Plaintiffs'
claims. So, the Plaintiffs' claims are not futile on the grounds
that they are unripe.

C. Sovereign immunity

The Defendants contend that sovereign immunity bars the Plaintiffs'
suit. The Plaintiffs argue that none of their claims are barred,
either because they fall within an exception to sovereign immunity
known as the Ex Parte Young doctrine or because sovereign immunity
does not apply to their claims in the first place.

Judge Peterson opines that the Plaintiffs' claims are not entirely
barred by sovereign immunity. The Plaintiffs may proceed on
official-capacity claims against Barca in his official capacity
under Ex Parte Young. They may seek declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring the state to include earned interest with claims
paid in the future, but they may not seek interest associated with
already-settled claims.

Judge Peterson also opines that Wisconsin has not waived its
sovereign immunity in the case. He says, the weight of federal
precedent allows states to assert sovereign immunity defenses to
takings claims for money damages.  

Judge Peterson further opines that the Plaintiffs' request for the
return of their own property is "indistinguishable from an award of
damages against the state" and is barred by sovereign immunity. So,
the Plaintiffs may not pursue damages under this theory.

D. Section 1983

The Plaintiffs also assert Takings Clause claims under Section
1983, which authorizes private individuals to sue "persons" acting
under color of state law for constitutional deprivations. The
Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims should
be dismissed because neither the department nor Barca can be sued
under the statute.

Judge Peterson holds that official-capacity suits against state
officials seeking prospective relief are not considered actions
against the state and are permitted by Section 1983. Because the
Plaintiffs seek declarations and injunctions aimed at preventing
ongoing constitutional violations, he says, they may sue Barca for
prospective relief under Section 1983. He will dismiss the
Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims for damages and allow them to
proceed on Section 1983 claims for prospective relief against
Barca. It is not clear what this claim adds to the Plaintiffs'
lawsuit, because the relief available under Section 1983 and Ex
Parte Young is the same.

IV. Conclusion

Judge Peterson concludes that Wisconsin's revised unclaimed
property act does not moot the Plaintiffs' claims, which are not
unripe, or barred by sovereign immunity or Section 1983 principles.
Amendment would not be futile, so the Plaintiffs' will be granted
leave to amend. The Defendants' initial motion to dismiss will be
granted in part and their supplemental motion to dismiss will be
denied, consistent with the opinion. The Plaintiffs may bring
federal and state takings claims seeking prospective relief but
they may not seek money damages. The department will be dismissed
from the lawsuit. Siebers has no avenue for relief and also will be
dismissed. When the Plaintiffs move for class certification, they
will need to appoint a class representative whose claims share the
same essential characteristics as the class members' claims.

V. Order

Judge Peterson grants in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss and
denies the Defendants' supplemental motion to dismiss. He grants
the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. The Plaintiffs should
file the new operative complaint as a separate docket entry.
Plaintiff Siebers and Defendant Department of Revenue are
dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 5, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/346ytvnm from Leagle.com.


YAHOO! INC: Denial of Attorneys' Fees in Data Breach Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled In re: YAHOO! INC. CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY
BREACH LITIGATION. RONALD SCHWARTZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
JAMES McCAIN, Objector-Appellant v. YAHOO! INC.; AABACO SMALL
BUSINESS, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-16779 (9th Cir.),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms
the denial of the Appellant's motion for attorneys' fees and an
incentive award.

The appeal stems from a class action complaint alleging that Yahoo!
Inc. and Aabaco Small Business, LLC (collectively, Yahoo) failed to
employ sufficient security measures to protect class members'
personal information, resulting in multiple data breaches. The data
breach impacted approximately 194 million users.

After the parties reached an amended settlement agreement, James
McCain objected to the attorneys' fee award. The district court
overruled McCain's objection.

Mr. McCain subsequently moved for attorneys' fees and an incentive
award. McCain argued that he provided a material benefit to the
class through his objections. Specifically, McCain asserted that he
benefited the class by challenging class counsels' fee request as
excessive; highlighting and charting the per capita recoveries in
the Equifax and Anthem settlements; and discrediting Professor
Geoffrey P. Miller's opinions. See In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data
Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2800-TWT, 2020 WL 256132, at *44-45
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and
remanded, 999 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2021); and In re Anthem, Inc.
Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. 299, 318 (N.D. Cal. 2018). Professor
Miller was retained by the Plaintiffs as an expert. McCain
maintained that class counsel's fee award, which amounts to a 1.15
lodestar multiplier and 19.4% of the settlement, is virtually the
same amount urged by him on the high-end of his suggested range of
reasonableness. In sum, he takes credit for the district court's
reduction of the fees awarded to class counsel.

Mr. McCain's motion for attorneys' fees and an incentive award was
denied. The court pointed to McCain's shifting positions regarding
what percentage of the settlement fund would constitute a
reasonable fee. In addition, the court noted that McCain failed to
identify "significant facts" concerning the Equifax settlement on
which the court relied.

Mr. McCain filed this timely appeal. He argues that: (1) the
district court committed error as a matter of law in denying an
incentive award on the basis that the court would have arrived at
the same result; and (2) the district court abused its discretion
when it denied attorneys' fees despite him conferring a benefit on
the class.

The Court of Appeals finds that McCain has failed to demonstrate as
a matter of law that he is entitled to attorneys' fees for raising
objections of which the district court was already aware. As the
district court judge noted, she presided over the Anthem
settlement, and was already aware of the comparative recovery
considerations. The court acknowledged that McCain made a per
capita recovery comparison to the Equifax settlement amounts, but
also remarked that "long before" McCain's objection, the
Plaintiffs' expert, Ian Ratner (Ratner), performed similar
research. In essence, McCain's objection was merely a restatement
of Ratner's work.

The Court of Appeals has held that it is not "error to deny fees to
objectors whose work is duplicative, or who merely echo each
others' arguments and confer no unique benefit to the class"
(Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d at 658-59). That McCain later
applied Ratner's calculations to the Equifax settlement amounts did
not confer a benefit on the class, the Court of Appeals points
out.

The Panel is likewise not persuaded that the district court abused
its discretion by concluding that McCain's objections did not
increase the fund or substantially benefit the class. Rather than
relying on McCain's objections, the district court referenced
inconsistencies in Professor Miller's declaration and facts from
the Equifax settlement that were in the record to determine the
appropriate amount of fees for class counsel. In that circumstance,
there was no "unique benefit" conferred upon the class by McCain's
objections.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated June 27, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/356dsfnm from Leagle.com.


YAHOO! INC: Ninth Cir. Affirms Overruling of Miller's Objections
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms
the district court's judgment overruling Aaron Miller's objections
regarding AllClear ID services in the lawsuit titled In re: YAHOO!
INC. CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION. RONALD SCHWARTZ, et
al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, AARON MILLER, Objector-Appellant v.
YAHOO! INC.; AABACO SMALL BUSINESS, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 20-16633 (9th Cir.).

The appeal stems from a class action complaint alleging that Yahoo!
Inc. and Aabaco Small Business, LLC (collectively, Yahoo) failed to
employ sufficient security measures to protect class members'
personal information, resulting in multiple data breaches. The data
breach impacted approximately 194 million users.

The parties reached a settlement agreement, which included the
provision of credit monitoring services, to be administered by
AllClear ID. Objector Aaron Miller (Miller) challenged these
services, arguing, in relevant part, that: AllClear ID is
ineffective because it is the subject of numerous consumer
complaints, and the Attorneys' fees award should be reduced to
reflect the actual (lesser) value of the settlement.

The district court overruled Miller's objections.

Mr. Miller timely appealed.

Mr. Miller argues that: (1) the district court failed to analyze
prior complaints against AllClear ID using the appropriate "Higher
Standard of Fairness" analysis; and (2) "the attorneys' fees
awarded should be reduced proportionately to the value of the
settlement" in light of the limited (true) value amount of the
credit monitoring services.

The Court of Appeals opines that Miller's assertion that AllClear
ID was ineffective as a credit monitoring service did not render
the settlement inadequate. The district court's recognition that
AllClear ID possessed an A+ rating from the Better Business Bureau,
maintained a 96% customer satisfaction rating, had a 100% success
rate in resolving financial identity theft cases, and supplied
credit monitoring to over two million individuals around the world
supported the court's approval of the settlement.

Mr. Miller's reliance on the purported inadequacy of AllClear ID's
credit monitoring services also ignores the alternative remedy of
cash payouts to individuals, who already have credit monitoring or
identity protection, who have demonstrated out-of-pocket losses,
including loss of time, or who paid for Aabaco Small Business
services and Yahoo Mail services, the Panel explains.

Mr. Miller contends that the value of the credit monitoring
services disproportionately increased the attorneys' fees award,
and urges the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the district
court to determine whether the actual value of the credit
monitoring services adequately supports an award of attorneys' fees
to class counsel.

The district court addressed Miller's concern by agreeing that the
retail value of the credit services should not inflate the
Settlement Fund for the purposes of the attorneys' fee analysis.
However, the court noted that "most of the Settlement Class Members
have opted for Alternative Compensation" and "declined to treat the
Settlement Fund as larger because of the alleged surplus value
created by Yahoo's lump sum purchase of the Credit Services."

Under these circumstances, the Panel finds that Miller failed to
demonstrate that the district court's assessment lacked fairness,
was inadequate, or resulted in collusion among the parties.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated June 27, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5nja4v9d from Leagle.com.



                            *********

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Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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