/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/220711.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, July 11, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 131

                            Headlines

7-ELEVEN INC: Shanahan Labor Suit Removed to W.D. Washington
ACH FOOD: Mazola Canola Oil Contains Hexane, Richardson Claims
ADKIN'S BLUE: Court Amends Deadline for Dispositive Motions
ALLY FINANCIAL: Valiente Files Suit in S.D. Florida
AMAZON.COM INC: Daly Sues Over Automatic Renewal of Subscriptions

AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Davis Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
AMERICAN HONDA: Plotts Files Suit in C.D. California
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ARC ONE: Betancourt Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Security Guards
ASCENSION HEALTH: Denial of Halczenko's Bid for Injunction Affirmed

BOBBY BUKA MD: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BORAL STONE: De Botello Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Specialists
BP EXPLORATION: Bid to Exclude Cook Testimony in Caraway Suit OK'd
BP EXPLORATION: Bid to Exclude Cook Testimony in Storey Suit OK'd
BP EXPLORATION: Bid to Exclude Cook Testimony in Turner Suit OK'd

BP EXPLORATION: Cook Expert Testimony Excluded From Backstrom Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Cook's Expert Testimony Excluded From McIntosh Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook's Testimony From Barkley Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Dr. Cook Testimony in LaForce Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Dr. Cook's Testimony Excluded From Brandon Suit

BRITANNICA FLOOR: Faces Jackson Wage-and-Hour Suit in E.D.N.Y.
BROOKDALE SENIOR: Bid to Intervene Denial Affirmed in Callahan Suit
CAPODANNO PROPERTIES: Medina Seeks Restaurant Staff's Unpaid Wages
CAPSTONE LOGISTICS: Hood Suit Alleges Unpaid Wages for Unloaders
CHICCO USA: Seidl Files Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania

CLEAN HARBORS: Villamar Suit Removed to C.D. California
CORIANDER FACTORY: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Hernandez Claims
COTY INC: Court Terminates as Moot Bid to Dismiss Solis Class Suit
CPC LOGISTICS: Barajas Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to N.D. Cal.
CREATE & CULTIVATE: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CREDIT CONTROL: Stroman Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
CREDIT CONTROL: Worthington Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
DAKOTA STYLE FOODS: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DEERE & CO: Colvin Farms Suit Moved From N.D. Fla. to N.D. Ill.
DEERE & CO: Wells Sues Over Unlawful Monopolization

DOLLAR TREE: Incorrectly Classified Workers as Managers, Suit Says
DOT'S PRETZELS: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
EMPYREAN BENEFIT: Faces Randle Suit Over Unpaid Overtime for CSRs
ENERFIN RESOURCES: Trust Seeks Final OK of Class Action Settlement
EOG RESOURCES: Wake Energy Seeks to Certify Settlement Class

EQUIFAX INFO: Initial Case Management Conference Set for July 19
EXPRESSWAY REALTY: Rodriguez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
EYE CARE LEADERS: Forrester Files Suit in M.D. North Carolina
FASTENAL COMPANY: Petrosino Files Suit in N.D. New York
FEKKAI BRANDS: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

FIRST GUARANTY: Buckley Sues Over Termination Without Proper Notice
FREQUENCY THERAPEUTICS: FX-322 Phase 2a Study, "Biased," Dewey Says
FRESH-MEX & CO: Fails to Pay Restaurant Workers' Minimum, OT Wages
FUSION LEARNING: Murphy Employment Suit Goes to C.D. California
GEO GROUP: Gonzalez Files Suit in C.D. California

GEORGIA-PACIFIC WOOD: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime, Harris Claims
GETAROUND INC: Jimenez Seeks Blind's Equal Access to Online Store
GLV INC: Seventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in Mullen Suit
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Court Grants Hart's Bid for Equitable Tolling
GRASS CLIPS: Conditional Certification of Collective Action Sought

GROENDYKE TRANSPORT: Underpays Logistics Coordinators, Brown Claims
GRUMA CORPORATION: Samperio Suit Removed to C.D. California
ITS LOGISTICS: Judge Grosjean to Rule on Guthrie's Class Settlement
JAGUAR LAND ROVER: Rains Files Suit in D. New Jersey
JAGUAR LAND: Court Narrows Claims in Shaaya's 1st Amended Complaint

JAMES LEBLANC: Briefing for Class Cert. Bid Extended to July 21
JJB INC: Eddings Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages for Front Desk
JOHN VARVATOS: 3rd Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Class Complaint
JUUL LABS: School District Sues Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Ads
JUUL LABS: Triggers E-Cigarette Youth Crisis, Clark County Says

K&B AUTO: Counts 1 & 2 of Vogt's Second Amended Complaint Dismissed
KELLOGG SALES: Chewy Nut Bars' Label "Deceptive," Leshchiner Says
LIBERTY MUTUAL: Blain Files Suit in S.D. California
LIME CRIME INC: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LOLI BEAUTY PBC: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

LOMPOC, CA: Parties Seek to Certify Settlement Class
LOUISIANA: Little River's Low-Water Mark Boundary Setting Upheld
LUMONDI INC: Court Issues Final Order & Judgment in Biddick Suit
M-I LLC: Seeks Leave to File Sur-Reply on Class Certification Bid
M.A.C. COSMETICS: Maciel Labor Code Suit Goes to N.D. California

MAD HIPPIE LLC: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MAGGY LONDON: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MARKETING GROUP: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Family Medicine Suit
MCG HEALTH: Saiki Sues Over Inadequate Safeguarding of Information
MDL 2677: Court Grants Joint Bid to Dismiss Steiner's Complaint

MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Jones Files Suit in N.D. Georgia
MICHIGAN: Court Dismisses Riddle v. Russell and Corrections Dep't
MICROSOFT CORP: Court Grants Bid to Remand Two of Kashkeesh's Claim
MICROSOFT CORPORATION: Bhavilai Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
MILK + HONEY SPA: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

MOBILITYLESS LLC: Court Grants Swenson's Bid to Compel Discovery
MONSANTO CO: 8th Cir. Affirms Approval of Jones' Class Settlement
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Kushner Suit Remanded to Cuyahoga County Court
NAUTILUS INC: Class Settlement in Walker Gets Final Approval
NAVITAS LLC: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

NEW HK INC: Escalante Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages for Delivery Workers
NEW YORK TIMES: MacQuaid Files Suit in D. Oregon
NEXSTAR BROADCASTING: Wheeler Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
NEXTGEN LEADS: Sends Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls, Minor Alleges
NORDIC NATURALS: Fish Oil's 2X Label "Deceptive," Gabrielian Says

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY: Mismanaged Retirement Plans, Brookins Says
NYGG ASIA LTD: Puddu Wins Class Certification Bid
OLLY PUBLIC: Products Have Overdosed Melatonin Content, Suit Says
OPTUM INC: Coleman Sues Over Termination Without Proper WARN Notice
PACIFIC & EVEREST: Bunting Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

PENSKE LOGISTICS: Estrada Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
PEOPLECONNECT INC: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Knapke Suit Vacated
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING: Palomera Suit Removed to C.D. California
PETER MOHYLNY: Birmingham, et al., Seek Entry of Default Judgment
PLANET FITNESS: Hayes Files Suit in Mass. Super. Ct.

RACER TECHNOLOGIES: Underpays Courier Delivery Staff, Lupo Claims
RECKITT BENCKISER: Agreed Protective Order Issued in Sterling Suit
REGALIS IP INC: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RHYTHM SUPERFOODS: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ROOSEVELT FIELD: More Time to File Class Cert Reply Sought

SACHS ELECTRIC: Settlement in Durham Suit Gets Final Nod
SCWORX CORP: Yannes Suit Has Final Judgment & Order of Dismissal
SIEMENS INDUSTRY: Enomoto Labor Code Suit Goes to N.D. California
STAR WIRELESS: Faces Aguilar Wage-and-Hour Suit in S.D. Texas
STATE FARM: Wins Summary Judgment Bid vs Pedersen

TAMPA ELECTRIC: Covarubias Suit Moved to Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. Ct.
TITAN LOGISTICS: Case Management Order Entered in Johnston
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Miller Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
TRIBOROUGH CONSTRUCTION: All Seasons Suit Seeks Unpaid Balance
TRIUS TRUCKING: Settlement in Mondrian Suit Gets Initial Approval

TRUMP CORP: Sixth Amended CMP, Scheduling Order Entered in McKoy
TULSA COUNTY, OK: Court Amends Litigation Schedule in Feltz
TUTTLE-CLICK TUSTIN: Macias Consumer Suit Goes to C.D. California
UNIQUE PRETZEL: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
UPSLOPE LLC: Taylor Files Suit in D. Colorado

VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS: Rushing Files Suit in N.D. Texas
VERO BEACH POLICE: Taig Loses Bid to Certify Class
VI-JON LLC: Abron Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
VICTORIA ROAD: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
VILLA MONTE: Fails to Properly Pay Restaurant Cooks, Mariscal Says

WALMART INC: Knautz Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
WALMART INC: Millam Sues Over Great Value Bags' Recyclable Labels
WAYFAIR LLC: Hendrix Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to C.D. California
WELLS FARGO: Ardalan Sues Over Nearly 10% Drop of Stock Price
WEST VIRGINIA: Class Cert. Hearing Rescheduled to July 13

WETSUIT WEARHOUSE: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
WICHITA, KS: Court Denies Bid for Protective Order in Progeny Suit
WINE CHIPS: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
YIELDSTREET INC: Case Management Order Entered in Tecku Suit
YUMA REGIONAL MEDICAL: Clarke Files Suit in D. Arizona

ZIMMER BIOMET: Seeks Dismissal of Karl Suit

                            *********

7-ELEVEN INC: Shanahan Labor Suit Removed to W.D. Washington
------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled TANYA SHANAHAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. 7-ELEVEN INC. and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Case No. 22-2-01351-06, was removed from the Superior
Court of the State of Washington in and for the County of Clark to
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington on
July 1, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Washington assigned
Case No. 3:22-cv-05484 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to compensate
for missed meal periods and willful and intentional withholding of
wages.

7-Eleven Inc. is an American multinational chain of retail
convenience stores, headquartered in Dallas, Texas. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Nicholas A. Gillard-Byers, Esq.
         SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
         999 Third Avenue
         Seattle, WA 98104
         Telephone: (206) 946-4910
         Facsimile: (206) 946-4901
         E-mail: ngillard-byers@seyfarth.com

ACH FOOD: Mazola Canola Oil Contains Hexane, Richardson Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
CARIDAD HEREDIA and SHERISE RICHARDSON, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. ACH FOOD COMPANIES, INC., Case
No. 7:22-cv-05366 (S.D.N.Y., June 24, 2022) is a class action on
behalf of purchasers of Mazola Canola Oil in the United States.

The Defendant's product packaging prominently states that Mazola is
"100% Pure". Contrary to Defendant's representation, however,
testing has shown that Mazola contains hexane. Independent
laboratory testing has detected 0.79 micrograms of hexane per gram
of the Product, the suit says.

The presence of hexane is a tell-tale sign that Mazola was produced
by extracting canola oil from rapeseed using chemical solvents.
This is not the only method to produce canola oil. Canola oil can
also be produced by using a machine known as an "expeller press" to
physically squeeze canola oil out of rapeseed. Such a product does
not contain hexane or any other solvents and would appropriately be
labeled as "100% Pure." Reasonable consumers understand "100% Pure"
to indicate the Product does not contain hexane, the suit added.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is well-aware that
consumers value its "100% Pure" representation, and intentionally
placed the representation on the front of the Product packaging
despite knowledge of its falsity. Such a false statement of fact
cannot occur by happenstance. Moreover, the problem of hexane
content in solvent-extracted canola oil has been well-publicized by
major industry-wide studies, of which Defendant was undoubtedly
aware. The Defendant nonetheless intentionally manufactures and
sells Mazola that it knows contains hexane, while falsely
representing on packaging that the Product is 100% pure and
contains no hexane.

This is a proposed class action brought by Plaintiffs, on behalf of
a class of similarly situated individuals, against Defendant for
breach of express warranty, and violations of New York consumer
protection laws.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class defined as all persons in
the United States who purchased the Product. Excluded from the
Class are persons who made such purchases for purpose of resale.

The Defendant manufactures, markets, and distributes the product
throughout New York and the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Kopel, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: ykopel@bursor.com

               - and -

          Craig A. Eaton, Esq.
          EATON & TORRENZANO, L.L.P.
          1662 Sheepshead Bay Road
          Brooklyn, NY 11235
          Telephone (718) 332-7766
          Facsimile (718) 332-5898

ADKIN'S BLUE: Court Amends Deadline for Dispositive Motions
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JUAN LUNA, et al., v.
ADKIN'S BLUE RIBBON PACKING COMPANY, INC., Case No.
1:21-cv-00545-HYJ-RSK (W.D. Mich), the Hon. Judge Hala Y. Jarbou
entered an order granting the parties' joint motion to amend
deadline for dispositive motions:

  -- Dispositive motions shall be due        July 27, 2022
     on or before:

  -- The parties' Joint Motion for           July 8, 2022
     Conditional Class Certification
     and related documents shall be
     filed no later than:

Adkin's Blue provides farm services. The Company specializes in
packing the finest fresh and frozen blueberries.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3bxTXB8 at no extra charge.[CC]

ALLY FINANCIAL: Valiente Files Suit in S.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ally Financial, Inc.
The case is styled as Heriberto Valiente, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated v. Ally Financial, Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-22006-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Consumer Credit.

Ally Financial -- https://www.ally.com/ -- is a bank holding
company organized in Delaware and headquartered in Detroit,
Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


AMAZON.COM INC: Daly Sues Over Automatic Renewal of Subscriptions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARK DALY, ELENA NACARINO, SUSAN SYLVESTER, and MICHAEL
SONNENSCHEIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. AMAZON.COM, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:22-cv-00910 (W.D. Wash., June 29, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendant for conversion, unjust enrichment, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of the California's Unfair
Competition Law, the Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act, the
California's False Advertising Law, and the California's Consumers
Legal Remedies Act.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged illegal automatic
renewal scheme with respect to its subscription plans for
Amazon-branded products and services that are available exclusively
to consumers who enroll in its auto-renewal membership programs.
Specifically, the Defendant systematically violates the California
and Oregon Automatic Renewal Law (ARL) by: (i) failing to present
the automatic renewal offer terms in a clear and conspicuous manner
before a subscription or purchasing agreement is fulfilled and in
visual proximity to the request for consent to the offer; (ii)
charging consumers' credit card, debit card, or third-party payment
account without first obtaining their affirmative consent to the
agreement containing the automatic renewal offer terms; and (iii)
failing to provide an acknowledgment that includes the automatic
renewal offer terms and information regarding how to cancel in a
manner that is capable of being retained by the consumer, says the
suit.

Amazon.com, Inc. is an online retailer and provider of cloud and
web-based products and services, headquartered in Seattle,
Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Wright A. Noel, Esq.
         CARSON NOEL PLLC
         20 Sixth Avenue NE
         Issaquah, WA 98027
         Telephone: (425) 837-4717
         Facsimile: (425) 837-5396
         E-mail: wright@carsonnoel.com

                 - and –

         Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
         Frederick J. Klorczyk III, Esq.
         BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
         888 Seventh Avenue
         New York, NY 10019
         Telephone: (646) 837-7150
         Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
         E-mail: pfraietta@bursor.com
                 fklorczyk@bursor.com

                 - and –

         Neal J. Deckant, Esq.
         Julia K. Venditti, Esq.
         BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
         1990 North California Boulevard, Suite 940
         Walnut Creek, CA 94596
         Telephone: (925) 300-4455
         Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
         E-mail: ndeckant@bursor.com
                 jvenditti@bursor.com

AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Davis Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled AMAURIAN DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2022-0003427, was
removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Joaquin to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California on June 30, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 1:22-at-00495 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide
rest periods, failure to pay all wages, knowing and intentional
failure to comply with itemized employee wage statements, failure
to timely pay wages due at termination, and failure to timely pay
employees.

Amazon.com Services LLC is an online retailer, headquartered in
Seattle, Washington. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Megan Cooney, Esq.
         Katie M. Magallanes, Esq.
         GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
         3161 Michelson Drive
         Irvine, CA 92612-4412
         Telephone: (949) 451-3800
         Facsimile: (949) 451-4220
         E-mail: mcooney@gibsondunn.com
                 kmagallanes@gibsondunn.com

                 - and –

         Helen Avunjian, Esq.
         GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
         333 South Grand Avenue
         Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
         Telephone: (213) 229-7000
         Facsimile: (213) 229-7520
         E-mail: havunjian@gibsondunn.com

AMERICAN HONDA: Plotts Files Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Honda Motor
Co., Inc. The case is styled as Alec Plotts, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-04529 (C.D. Cal., July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

American Honda Motor Co., Inc. -- http://www.honda.com/-- develops
and manufactures automobiles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Trinette Gragirena Kent, Esq.
          KENT LAW OFFICES
          3219 East Camelback Road No 588
          Phoenix, AZ 85018
          Phone: (480) 247-9644
          Fax: (480) 717-4781
          Email: tkent@lemberglaw.com


AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American
International Industries Inc. The case is styled as Ramon Fontanez,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
American International Industries Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05583
(S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

American International Industries -- https://www.aiibeauty.com/ --
is the leading manufacturer and distributor of innovative, quality
beauty and skin care products for men and women.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


ARC ONE: Betancourt Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Security Guards
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ARMANDO BETANCOURT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ARC ONE PROTECTIVE SERVICES LLC, CHANCE
RAMOS, and AUSTIN WALLACE, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-21988 (S.D.
Fla., June 29, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
unjust enrichment and failure to compensate the Plaintiff and
similarly situated workers overtime pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours in a workweek in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant as a security guard
since January 2021.

Arc One Protective Services LLC is a private security and
consulting agency based in Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Yelina Angulo, Esq.
         ANGULO DIAZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
         780 NW 42 Avenue, Ste. 426
         Miami, FL 33126
         Telephone: (305) 468-9564
         E-mail: service@angulodiazlaw.com

ASCENSION HEALTH: Denial of Halczenko's Bid for Injunction Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned PAUL HALCZENKO, Doctor, on behalf of
himself and all those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v.
ASCENSION HEALTH, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
22-1040 (7th Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirms the denial of Dr. Halczenko's motion for
preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff Dr. Paul Halczenko lost his position as a pediatric
critical care specialist at St. Vincent Hospital in Indianapolis,
Indiana, for failing to comply with the hospital's vaccine mandate.
He objects to being vaccinated on religious grounds. Dr. Halczenko
sued under Title VII for religious discrimination and sought a
preliminary injunction requiring the hospital to reinstate him to
its pediatric intensive care unit.

The district court denied the motion, concluding not only that Dr.
Halczenko had failed to show irreparable injury from losing his
job, but also that Title VII afforded him adequate remedies other
than a preliminary injunction compelling St. Vincent to reinstate
an unvaccinated physician to its pediatric ICU.

I

A

Owned by Ascension Health, Inc., St. Vincent Hospital, like many
organizations, adopted a COVID-19 vaccine requirement in the summer
of 2021. Employees had until Nov. 12, 2021, to get vaccinated
unless they received a medical or religious exemption. In reviewing
requests for exemptions, St. Vincent and Ascension considered,
among other factors, the employee's position and amount of contact
with others, the current health and safety risk posed by COVID, and
the cost and effectiveness of other safety protocols.

Circuit Judge Michael Y. Scudder, Jr., writing for the Panel, notes
that until his suspension and ultimate termination, Dr. Halczenko
treated gravely ill children, including those suffering from or at
risk of organ failure. He did this within a pediatric ICU, and St.
Vincent operates one of only three such units in Indiana. St.
Vincent denied Dr. Halczenko's request for religious accommodation
on the ground that "providing an exemption to a Pediatric
Intensivist working with acutely ill pediatric patients poses more
than a de minim[i]s burden to the hospital because the vaccine
provides an additional level of protection in mitigating the risk
associated with COVID."

Dr. Halczenko and four other St. Vincent employees, including two
pediatric ICU nurses, responded by filing a U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint alleging religious
discrimination. All five were suspended without pay in November
2021, and St. Vincent terminated Dr. Halczenko's employment in
January 2022. Since losing his job, Dr. Halczenko has tried to find
similar work at other hospitals. He attributes his lack of success
to a non-compete agreement he has with St. Vincent, his preference
not to move his family, and otherwise limited demand at other
hospitals for an unvaccinated physician in his area of specialized
care.

In November 2021 Dr. Halczenko and the four other St. Vincent
employees filed a putative class action seeking injunctive relief
and damages, alleging St. Vincent violated Title VII by denying
their religious exemption requests. St. Vincent subsequently
afforded the other named plaintiffs--a nurse practitioner and three
nurses, including two in the pediatric ICU--religious
accommodations. The record does not tell the Panel why or how St.
Vincent differentiated between Dr. Halczenko and these other
employees. Regardless, Dr. Halczenko was the only named party left
seeking injunctive relief.

B

The district court denied preliminary relief, concluding that Dr.
Halczenko had shown neither irreparable harm nor an inadequate
remedy at law. Relying on E. St. Louis Laborers' Loc. 100 v. Bellon
Wrecking & Salvage Co., 414 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2005), the
district court explained that "a permanent loss of employment,
standing alone, does not equate to irreparable harm." And "the
possibility of reinstatement or back-pay at the end of litigation,"
the court added, "is usually enough to show that preliminary
injunctive relief is unnecessary."

As to irreparable harm, Dr. Halczenko staked out a stark litigating
position in the district court. He submitted a sworn declaration
stating that his professional skills would dull so rapidly and so
extensively during any period of extended leave that within six
months of being suspended--that is, by May 12, 2022--he would no
longer be fit to work in a pediatric ICU. He, therefore, insisted
that court-ordered reinstatement to his position at St. Vincent was
the only way to avoid this deterioration of skills.

Judge Scudder notes that the Panel cannot discern why Dr. Halczenko
seemed to chisel a specific date into stone. After pressing the
same point in his appellate briefs, his counsel backed off the
position at oral argument (held on May 31, 2022) when the Panel
observed that he was essentially asking a federal court to order
the reinstatement of a physician who, by his own admission, had
lost his competency to practice.

Regardless, the district court determined that Dr. Halczenko's
alleged harm was speculative. The court was "not convinced that
without immediate injunctive relief," Dr. Halczenko--a highly
trained physician with years of practice experience--would be
unable to continue his career as a pediatric ICU physician, even if
doing so required a touch of training to freshen his skills. The
district court also had trouble accepting that Dr. Halczenko,
though unvaccinated, was unable to secure any other work as a
physician during the pendency of the litigation.

Dr. Halczenko now appeals the denial of his motion for a
preliminary injunction.

II

A

Dr. Halczenko proceeds under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which prohibits an employer from taking an adverse employment
action because of a protected ground, including religion.

This religious protection has a limit, however. Judge Scudder notes
that an employer need not grant an accommodation if it can
demonstrate that doing so would pose an "undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business."

B

The district court was right to conclude that none of Dr.
Halczenko's alleged harms are irreparable, Judge Scudder finds.

First, Dr. Halczenko continues to contend that because he is only
able to practice his pediatric critical care skills in a hospital
setting, he will "rapidly lose his skills to the point that he will
be unable to practice as a pediatric critical care specialist" if
not reinstated by May 2022. Despite these contentions, Dr.
Halczenko did not move to expedite his appeal. Even more, though,
and like the district court, Judge Scudder says the Panel has a
hard time seeing this alleged harm as anything but speculative--too
much so to warrant the extraordinary remedy of preliminary
injunctive relief.

Judge Scudder adds, among other things, that Dr. Halczenko has not
proven a deterioration in skills that could only be prevented by
the issuance of an injunction.

Second, Dr. Halczenko contends that he will be irreparably harmed
because he faces an unusually difficult job search. The "CMS
vaccine mandate," he advances, "puts legal and economic pressure on
healthcare providers to only hire vaccinated individuals." Perhaps.
But career jeopardy alone does not amount to irreparable harm,
Judge Scudder points out.

Third, Dr. Halczenko urges the Panel to adopt a presumption of
irreparable harm in Title VII religious discrimination cases, much
like he sees the law do with Free Exercise Clause claims. Judge
Scudder points out that this position likewise misses the mark,
adding that case law is clear on this point, citing Anderson v.
U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 477-78 (7th Cir.
2001).

C

Because Dr. Halczenko has not shown an irreparable harm or that
legal remedies available under Title VII would be inadequate, the
Seventh Circuit needs not address the other injunction factors.

The Panel, nevertheless, pause to comment that, although the record
before the Panel is thin on the point, it does not support an
inference that St. Vincent's actions were motivated by an animus
towards religion. Rather, it seems St. Vincent ultimately chose to
accommodate around 300 workers who had applied for religious
exemptions, including two PICU, nurses who joined Dr. Halczenko in
bringing this lawsuit. That it chose not to do so for Dr. Halczenko
raises questions about the reasons for the differential treatment.
But it does not suggest an institutional hostility towards
religion--at least not on the record before the Panel, Judge
Scudder states.

Nothing in today's opinion precludes Dr. Halczenko from pursuing
the point further in the district court, Judge Scudder says. And
with litigation being a two-way street, Ascension and St. Vincent
will be able to offer their own explanation for affording nurses
religious exemptions but choosing to terminate Dr. Halczenko.

For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated June 23, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3v9nmpda from Leagle.com.


BOBBY BUKA MD: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bobby Buka, M.D. The
case is styled as Veronica Maddy, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Bobby Buka, M.D., Professional
Corporation, d/b/a The Dermatology Specialists, Case No.
1:22-cv-05653 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bobby Buka, M.D. doing business as The Dermatology Specialists
(TDS) -- https://www.thedermspecs.com/ -- is NYC's largest
dermatology group.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


BORAL STONE: De Botello Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Specialists
--------------------------------------------------------------
ESTELA BARAJAS DE BOTELLO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BORAL STONE PRODUCTS, LLC NOW
DOING BUSINESS AS WESTLAKE ROYAL STONE, LLC; and DOES 1-100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03863 (N.D. Cal., June 29,
2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violations of
California Labor Code and California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay minimum wages for all hours worked,
failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide and/or make
available meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest
periods, failure to reimburse business expenses, failure to provide
timely and accurate itemized wage statements, and unlawful business
practices.

The Plaintiff has been employed by the Defendants for various
projects as a production specialist in American Canyon, California
from January 2004 to present.

Boral Stone Products, LLC, now doing business as Westlake Royal
Stone, LLC, is a manufacturer of stone products, headquartered in
Roswell, Georgia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Carolyn H. Cottrell, Esq.
         Caroline N. Cohen, Esq.
         Andrew D. Weaver, Esq.
         Heather G. Fuchs, Esq.
         SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY LLP
         2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
         Emeryville, CA 94608
         Telephone: (415) 421-7100
         Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
         E-mail: ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
                 ccohen@schneiderwallace.com
                 aweaver@schneiderwallace.com
                 hfuchs@schneiderwallace.com

BP EXPLORATION: Bid to Exclude Cook Testimony in Caraway Suit OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL DEVON CARAWAY v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
INC., ET AL., SECTION: "J"(1), Civil Action No. 17-3120 (E.D. La.),
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the following two motions filed by
Defendants, BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c.:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Court -- In re Oil
Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1,
2021). During the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court
approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition.

Plaintiff Caraway was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
recovery technician on the beaches of Morgan City, Louisiana for
approximately eleven months. This work, Caraway alleges, exposed
him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which caused the
Plaintiff to develop increased frequency of seizures; vasovagal
syncope; dizziness; dermatitis; rash; change in hair/skin; itching;
fatigue; weakness; headache; blurred vision; constipation;
diarrhea; depression; facial pain or sinus pain; memory loss; and
shortness of breath.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." It further observed that the
issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of many
B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. Caraway relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony
as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with
a master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs.
It mentions no plaintiff by name, including Caraway, and it does
not address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill response or
the nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff had to any
particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four
categories of injuries or disease to see whether they could be
caused by exposure to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded
that three of the categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and
ocular -- can result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude.

II. Discussion

A. Daubert Motion

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is
qualified as an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's
"specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (2) the expert's
testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data"; (3) the expert's
testimony "is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and
(4) the principles and methods employed by the expert have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case. The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical framework for
determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.
Both the scientific and the nonscientific expert testimony are
subject to the Daubert framework, which requires trial courts to
make a preliminary assessment of "whether the expert testimony is
both reliable and relevant." When expert testimony is challenged
under Daubert, the party offering the expert's testimony bears the
burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a preponderance
of the evidence.

To begin, BP points out that two other Sections of the Court have
excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases. BP argues
that in the present case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Africk identified four primary
bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions were
unreliable, and Judge Ashe found that just one of these four
reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's
failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary to cause
the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically, Judge
Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular
chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would
be necessary to cause the specific symptoms that is to say, the
dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."

Judge Barbier begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Caraway's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Caraway is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which the
Plaintiff complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause
the reported reaction." Because the Plaintiff used the same report
by Dr. Cook, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single specific
chemical.

Mr. Caraway argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular
chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical as would be
necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar to finding
that his methodology is proper and reliable under Daubert. However,
while this argument may work in response to BP's contention that
Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it does prevail in
response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does not identify the
harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any medical
condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held, identification of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical is one of the "minimal
facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort
case."

Mr. Caraway argues that the reason neither he nor any other
plaintiff can present this specific quantitative data is due to
BP's failure to act during the spill to preserve evidence of the
workers' actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the
weathered oil. In reply, BP asserts that Caraway's argument misses
the mark because the general causation analysis "permits the expert
to consult the universe of epidemiological and toxicological
literature that has studied the constituents at issue," and "it
does not depend upon environmental sampling data taken as part of
the incident."

Therefore, the fundamental question in this general causation
inquiry is whether the chemicals, weathered oil, and dispersants to
which Caraway alleges he was exposed can cause the conditions he
alleges. Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to
identify a single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil,
dispersants, and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr.
Cook's report were to identify a specific chemical present in the
crude oil, weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to
establish a harmful level of any chemical to the general
population. Thus, Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth
Circuit's minimal fact required: scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points
out himself, "there is a toxicology maxim that the dose determines
the poison." Yet, Dr. Cook fails to identify the dose of any such
chemical that would result in the adverse health effects contained
in his report, and his report is therefore unreliable and
inadmissible.

Next, as a last-ditch attempt to save his case, Caraway appears to
make a spoliation argument despite stating in a footnote, "while
not relevant for this motion, the Plaintiffs inform the Court that
they will be filing spoliation-related motions." "Spoliation is the
destruction or the significant and meaningful alteration of
evidence." In the Fifth Circuit, "an adverse inference against the
spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator is permitted only upon
a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct.'"

Mr. Caraway argues that BP had a duty to take and preserve dermal
monitoring and biomonitoring of oil spill response workers in
addition to the air monitoring conducted by BP. The question before
the Court is whether BP acted with fraudulent intent when it did
not take dermal and biomonitoring of the oil spill response workers
for the purpose of suppressing the truth and depriving opposing
parties of its use. Caraway argues that BP's actions, or inactions,
show that BP intentionally failed to act during the oil spill
cleanup to preserve evidence of the workers' actual total exposure
to specific chemicals in the weather oil.

While perhaps BP could have done more to conduct dermal monitoring
and biomonitoring, Judge Barbier finds that Caraway has not met his
burden to show that BP acted with a culpable state of mind to
suppress the truth and deprive future parties of this data.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by both Judge Africk and Judge Ashe, cited,
because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions are excluded, Judge
Barbier holds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Caraway's claims. Caraway has no other medical expert
for general causation, and expert testimony is required. Therefore,
Caraway has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to
oil and dispersants.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier grants the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
and their Motion for Summary Judgment.  All the claims of Plaintiff
Caraway, against Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc.; BP
America Production Co.; BP p.l.c.; Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc.; Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with
prejudice.

Judge Barbier denies as moot the Defendants' Motions for Leave to
File Reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bdzctv7x from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Bid to Exclude Cook Testimony in Storey Suit OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL R. STOREY v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC.,
ET AL., SECTION: "J"(4), Civil Action No. 17-4593 (E.D. La.), Judge
Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana grants the following two motions filed by Defendants,
BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production Company,
and BP p.l.c.:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Court -- In re Oil
Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1,
2021). During the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court
approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition.

Plaintiff Storey was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
cleanup worker handling and transporting bagged oil to the
decontamination area and decontaminating tools, boots, and
equipment on the beaches of Orange Beach, Gulf Shores, and Dauphin
Island, Alabama for approximately three months. This work, Storey
alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which
caused the Plaintiff to develop stomach cramps; abdominal pain;
diarrhea; nausea; vomiting; fatigue; keratotic horn;
dryness/flaking; itching/scaling; depression/anxiety; dizziness;
headaches; high blood pressure; eye burning/irritation; nasal
congestion/ discharge; and throat irritation.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." It further observed that the
issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of many
B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. Storey relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony as
to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with a
master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs.
It mentions no plaintiff by name, including Storey, and it does not
address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill response or the
nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff had to any
particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four
categories of injuries or disease to see whether they could be
caused by exposure to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded
that three of the categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and
ocular -- can result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude.

II. Discussion

A. Daubert Motion

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is
qualified as an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's
"specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (2) the expert's
testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data"; (3) the expert's
testimony "is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and
(4) the principles and methods employed by the expert have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case. The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical framework for
determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.
Both the scientific and the nonscientific expert testimony are
subject to the Daubert framework, which requires trial courts to
make a preliminary assessment of "whether the expert testimony is
both reliable and relevant." When expert testimony is challenged
under Daubert, the party offering the expert's testimony bears the
burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a preponderance
of the evidence.

To begin, BP points out that two other Sections of this Court have
excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases. BP argues
that in the present case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Africk identified four primary
bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions were
unreliable, and Judge Ashe found that just one of these four
reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's
failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary to cause
the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically, Judge
Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular
chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would
be necessary to cause the specific symptoms that is to say, the
dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."

Judge Barbier begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Storey's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Storey is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which the
Plaintiff complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause
the reported reaction." Because the Plaintiff used the same report
by Dr. Cook, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single specific
chemical.

Mr. Storey argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular
chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical as would be
necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar to finding
that his methodology is proper and reliable under Daubert. However,
while this argument may work in response to BP's contention that
Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it does prevail in
response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does not identify the
harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any medical
condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held, identification of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical is one of the "minimal
facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort
case."

Mr. Storey argues that the reason neither he nor any other
plaintiff can present this specific quantitative data is due to
BP's failure to act during the spill to preserve evidence of the
workers' actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the
weathered oil. In reply, BP asserts that Storey's argument misses
the mark because the general causation analysis "permits the expert
to consult the universe of epidemiological and toxicological
literature that has studied the constituents at issue," and "it
does not depend upon environmental sampling data taken as part of
the incident."

Therefore, the fundamental question in this general causation
inquiry is whether the chemicals, weathered oil, and dispersants to
which Storey alleges he was exposed can cause the conditions he
alleges. Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to
identify a single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil,
dispersants, and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr.
Cook's report were to identify a specific chemical present in the
crude oil, weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to
establish a harmful level of any chemical to the general
population. Thus, Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth
Circuit's minimal fact required: scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points
out himself, "there is a toxicology maxim that the dose determines
the poison." Yet, Dr. Cook fails to identify the dose of any such
chemical that would result in the adverse health effects contained
in his report, and his report is therefore unreliable and
inadmissible.

Next, as a last-ditch attempt to save his case, Storey appears to
make a spoliation argument despite stating in a footnote, "while
not relevant for this motion, the Plaintiffs inform the Court that
they will be filing spoliation-related motions." "Spoliation is the
destruction or the significant and meaningful alteration of
evidence." In the Fifth Circuit, "an adverse inference against the
spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator is permitted only upon
a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct.'"

Mr. Storey argues that BP had a duty to take and preserve dermal
monitoring and biomonitoring of oil spill response workers in
addition to the air monitoring conducted by BP. The question before
the Court is whether BP acted with fraudulent intent when it did
not take dermal and biomonitoring of the oil spill response workers
for the purpose of suppressing the truth and depriving opposing
parties of its use. Storey argues that BP's actions, or inactions,
show that BP intentionally failed to act during the oil spill
cleanup to preserve evidence of the workers' actual total exposure
to specific chemicals in the weather oil.

While perhaps BP could have done more to conduct dermal monitoring
and biomonitoring, Judge Barbier finds that Storey has not met his
burden to show that BP acted with a culpable state of mind to
suppress the truth and deprive future parties of this data.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by both Judge Africk and Judge Ashe, cited,
because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions are excluded, Judge
Barbier holds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Storey's claims. Storey has no other medical expert for
general causation, and expert testimony is required. Therefore,
Storey has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to
oil and dispersants.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier grants the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
and their Motion for Summary Judgment.  All the claims of Plaintiff
Storey, against Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc.; BP
America Production Co.; BP p.l.c.; Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc.; Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4b9y3u9a from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Bid to Exclude Cook Testimony in Turner Suit OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL DARNELL TURNER v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
INC., ET AL., SECTION: "J"(2), Civil Action No. 17-4210 (E.D. La.),
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the following two motion filed by
Defendants, BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c.:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Court -- In re Oil
Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1,
2021). During the course of the MDL proceedings, the Court approved
the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition.

Plaintiff Turner was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
beach cleanup worker, picking up oil, tar balls, and oil-covered
debris from beaches as well as pressure washing booms in the areas
of Gulf Shores, Theodore, and Dauphin Island, Alabama for
approximately nineteen months. This work, Turner alleges, exposed
him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which caused Plaintiff to
develop hypertension, acute renal insufficiency, chronic kidney
disease stage III, hematuria, nephrotic range proteinuria, chest
pain, frontoparietal cerebrovascular accident, stroke, headaches,
blindness, obstructive sleep apnea, shortness of breath, wheezing,
depression, abdominal pain, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, dizziness,
decreased sense of smell, facial pain or sinus pain, nasal
congestion/discharge, throat irritation, skin blistering, boils,
skin dryness and flaking, inflammation, redness, swelling, itching,
peeling, and scaling.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." It further observed that the
issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of many
B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Turner relies on Dr. Cook to provide expert testimony as to general
causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with a master's
degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the American
College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine.  He is board
certified in occupational medicine, public health, and general
preventative medicine. His report is an omnibus, non-case specific
general causation expert report that has been used by many B3
plaintiffs. It mentions no plaintiff by name, including Turner, and
it does not address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill
response or the nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff
had to any particular toxin. See generally. Further, in the report,
Dr. Cook evaluates four categories of injuries or disease to see
whether they could be caused by exposure to crude oil or
dispersants. (Id.). Dr. Cook concluded that three of the categories
of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and ocular -- can result from
exposure to such. (Id.).

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude.

II. Discussion

A. Daubert Motion

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the
analytical framework for determining whether expert testimony is
admissible under Rule 702. Both scientific and nonscientific expert
testimony are subject to the Daubert framework, which requires
trial courts to make a preliminary assessment of "whether the
expert testimony is both reliable and relevant." When expert
testimony is challenged under Daubert, the party offering the
expert's testimony bears the burden of proving its reliability and
relevance by a preponderance of the evidence.

To begin, BP points out that two other Sections of the Court have
excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases. BP argues
that in this case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's opinions for
the same reasons. Judge Africk identified four primary bases for
which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions were unreliable, and
Judge Ashe found that just one of these four reasons was
substantial on its own to permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's failure to
identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary to cause the
Plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically, Judge Ashe
found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular chemical"
or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would be
necessary to cause the specific symptoms that is to say, the dose
necessary to cause the reported reaction."

Judge Barbier begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
Whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Turner's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Turner is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which he
complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause the
reported reaction." Because the Plaintiff used the same report by
Dr. Cook in the present case, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a
single specific chemical.

Mr. Turner argues that the reason neither he nor any other
plaintiff can present this specific quantitative data is due to
BP's failure to act during the spill to preserve evidence of the
workers' actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the
weathered oil. In reply, BP asserts that Turner's argument misses
the mark because the general causation analysis "permits the expert
to consult the universe of epidemiological and toxicological
literature that has studied the constituents at issue," and "it
does not depend upon environmental sampling data taken as part of
the incident."

As the Fifth Circuit has held, identification of the harmful level
of exposure to a chemical is one of the "minimal facts necessary to
sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort case. Dr. Cook fails
to identify the dose of any such chemical that would result in the
adverse health effects contained in his report, and his report is
therefore unreliable and inadmissible.

Next, as a last-ditch attempt to save his case, Turner appears to
make a spoliation argument despite stating in a footnote, "while
not relevant for this motion, the Plaintiffs inform the Court that
they will be filing spoliation-related motions." Spoliation also
includes "the failure to preserve property for another's use in
pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation." However, destroying,
altering, or failing to preserve does not necessarily mean that the
party has engaged in sanctionworthy spoliation because "a
spoliation claim has three elements: (1) the spoliating party must
have controlled the evidence and been under an obligation to
preserve it at the time of destruction; (2) the evidence must have
been intentionally destroyed; and (3) the moving party must show
that the spoliating party acted in bad faith." In the Fifth
Circuit, "an adverse inference against the spoliator or sanctions
against the spoliator is permitted only upon a showing of `bad
faith' or 'bad conduct.'"

Turner argues that BP had a duty to take and preserve dermal
monitoring and biomonitoring of oil spill response workers in
addition to the air monitoring conducted by BP. Assuming, arguendo,
that BP had a duty to preserve results of dermal and biological
monitoring of the oil spill response workers, Plaintiff must
additionally prove that BP acted in bad faith when it failed to do
so.

The question before the Court is whether BP acted with fraudulent
intent when it did not take dermal and biomonitoring of the oil
spill response workers for the purpose of suppressing the truth and
depriving opposing parties of its use. Turner argues that BP's
actions, or inactions, show that BP intentionally failed to act
during the oil spill cleanup to preserve evidence of the workers'
actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the weather oil.
Turner contends that BP knew that dermal monitoring and
biomonitoring of the workers was needed, but it did nothing to act
on that need. Instead, Turner asserts, BP continued to conduct only
monitoring for airborne hazards to the workers.

To support this argument, Turner cites to various emails. First,
Turner cites to a July 2, 2010 email from National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") Deputy Director Kitt to
Dr. Richard Heron, BP's Health/Medical Lead for the BP spill
response. Within this email, NIOSH details their plan to extend
response worker exposure and quantification by incorporating
biomonitoring "as part of the expanded health hazard evaluation
("HHE") efforts BP has asked NIOSH to do." NIOSH states that it is
developing protocols to use as a path forward with biomonitoring
that it will share with BP once the draft is complete.

Judge Barbier holds that while perhaps BP could have done more to
conduct dermal monitoring and biomonitoring, he finds that Turner
has not met his burden to show that BP acted with a culpable state
of mind to suppress the truth and deprive future parties of this
data.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by both Judge Africk and Judge Ashe, cited,
because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions are excluded, Judge
Barbier holds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Turner's claims. Turner has no other medical expert for
general causation, and expert testimony is required. Therefore,
Turner has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to
oil and dispersants.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier grants the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
and their Motion for Summary Judgment. All claims of Plaintiff
Turner against Defendants, BP Exploration & Production Inc.; BP
America Production Co.; BP p.l.c.; Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc.; Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with
prejudice.

Judge Barbier denies as moot the Defendants' Motions for Leave to
File Reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bdfnfutm from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Cook Expert Testimony Excluded From Backstrom Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID THOMAS BACKSTROM v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
INC., ET AL., Civil Action No. 17-3029 (E.D. La.), Judge Carl J.
Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana grants the following two motions filed by Defendants, BP
Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production Company, and
BP p.l.c.:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Court -- In re Oil
Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1,
2021). During the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court
approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition.

Plaintiff Backstrom was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
recovery technician in Biloxi, Mississippi on the beaches of
Harrison Country for approximately three months. This work,
Backstrom alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical
dispersants which caused the Plaintiff to develop sinus issues; eye
irritation, burning, and tearing; inguinal hernia; breathing
issues; shortness of breath; wheezing; irritation of lungs; chest
pulmonary hyperinflation; viral infection, possibly MRSA; insomnia;
depression; anxiety; skin issues; boils; acute cellulitis; and
stroke.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." It further observed that the
issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of many
B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. Backstrom relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony
as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with
a master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs.
It mentions no plaintiff by name, including Backstrom, and it does
not address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill response or
the nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff had to any
particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four
categories of injuries or disease to see whether they could be
caused by exposure to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded
that three of the categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and
ocular -- can result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude.

II. Discussion

A. Daubert Motion

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is
qualified as an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's
"specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (2) the expert's
testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data"; (3) the expert's
testimony "is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and
(4) the principles and methods employed by the expert have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case. The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical framework for
determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.
Both the scientific and the nonscientific expert testimony are
subject to the Daubert framework, which requires trial courts to
make a preliminary assessment of "whether the expert testimony is
both reliable and relevant." When expert testimony is challenged
under Daubert, the party offering the expert's testimony bears the
burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a preponderance
of the evidence.

To begin, BP points out that two other Sections of this Court have
excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases. BP argues
that in the present case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Africk identified four primary
bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions were
unreliable, and Judge Ashe found that just one of these four
reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's
failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary to cause
the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically, Judge
Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular
chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would
be necessary to cause the specific symptoms that is to say, the
dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."

Judge Barbier begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Backstrom's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Backstrom is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which the
Plaintiff complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause
the reported reaction." Because the Plaintiff used the same report
by Dr. Cook, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single specific
chemical.

Mr. Backstrom argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a
particular chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar
to finding that his methodology is proper and reliable under
Daubert. However, while this argument may work in response to BP's
contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it
does prevail in response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does not
identify the harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any
medical condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held, identification of
the harmful level of exposure to a chemical is one of the "minimal
facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort
case."

Mr. Backstrom argues that the reason neither he nor any other
plaintiff can present this specific quantitative data is due to
BP's failure to act during the spill to preserve evidence of the
workers' actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the
weathered oil. In reply, BP asserts that Backstrom's argument
misses the mark because the general causation analysis "permits the
expert to consult the universe of epidemiological and toxicological
literature that has studied the constituents at issue," and "it
does not depend upon environmental sampling data taken as part of
the incident."

Therefore, the fundamental question in this general causation
inquiry is whether the chemicals, weathered oil, and dispersants to
which Backstrom alleges he was exposed can cause the conditions he
alleges. Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to
identify a single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil,
dispersants, and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr.
Cook's report were to identify a specific chemical present in the
crude oil, weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to
establish a harmful level of any chemical to the general
population. Thus, Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth
Circuit's minimal fact required: scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points
out himself, "there is a toxicology maxim that the dose determines
the poison." Yet, Dr. Cook fails to identify the dose of any such
chemical that would result in the adverse health effects contained
in his report, and his report is therefore unreliable and
inadmissible.

Next, as a last-ditch attempt to save his case, Backstrom appears
to make a spoliation argument despite stating in a footnote, "while
not relevant for this motion, the Plaintiffs inform the Court that
they will be filing spoliation-related motions." "Spoliation is the
destruction or the significant and meaningful alteration of
evidence." In the Fifth Circuit, "an adverse inference against the
spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator is permitted only upon
a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct.'"

Mr. Backstrom argues that BP had a duty to take and preserve dermal
monitoring and biomonitoring of oil spill response workers in
addition to the air monitoring conducted by BP. The question before
the Court is whether BP acted with fraudulent intent when it did
not take dermal and biomonitoring of the oil spill response workers
for the purpose of suppressing the truth and depriving opposing
parties of its use. Backstrom argues that BP's actions, or
inactions, show that BP intentionally failed to act during the oil
spill cleanup to preserve evidence of the workers' actual total
exposure to specific chemicals in the weather oil.

While perhaps BP could have done more to conduct dermal monitoring
and biomonitoring, Judge Barbier finds that Backstrom has not met
his burden to show that BP acted with a culpable state of mind to
suppress the truth and deprive future parties of this data.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by both Judge Africk and Judge Ashe, cited,
because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions are excluded, Judge
Barbier holds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Backstrom's claims. Backstrom has no other medical
expert for general causation, and expert testimony is required.
Therefore, Backstrom has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claims that his injuries were
caused by exposure to oil and dispersants.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier grants the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
and their Motion for Summary Judgment.  All the claims of Plaintiff
Backstrom, against Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc.; BP
America Production Co.; BP p.l.c.; Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc.; Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3x3unee2 from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Cook's Expert Testimony Excluded From McIntosh Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM McINTOSH v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC,
ET AL., Civil Action No. 13-1020 (E.D. La.), Judge Carl J. Barbier
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
grants the following two motions filed by Defendants, BP
Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co.:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Court -- In re Oil
Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1,
2021). During the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court
approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition.

Plaintiff McIntosh was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
beach cleanup worker in Perdido Beach and Johnson's Beach, Florida
for approximately four months. This work, McIntosh alleges, exposed
him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which caused the
Plaintiff to develop chronic conjunctivitis; chronic dry eye;
conjunctival chemical injury; disc pallor; optic neuropathy; eye
irritation; sensitivity to light; rash; abdominal pain; diarrhea;
and steatosis.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." It further observed that the
issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of many
B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. McIntosh relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony
as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with
a master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs.
It mentions no plaintiff by name, including McIntosh, and it does
not address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill response or
the nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff had to any
particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four
categories of injuries or disease to see whether they could be
caused by exposure to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded
that three of the categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and
ocular -- can result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude.

II. Discussion

A. Daubert Motion

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is
qualified as an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's
"specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (2) the expert's
testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data"; (3) the expert's
testimony "is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and
(4) the principles and methods employed by the expert have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case. The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical framework for
determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.
Both the scientific and the nonscientific expert testimony are
subject to the Daubert framework, which requires trial courts to
make a preliminary assessment of "whether the expert testimony is
both reliable and relevant." When expert testimony is challenged
under Daubert, the party offering the expert's testimony bears the
burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a preponderance
of the evidence.

To begin, BP points out that two other Sections of the Court have
excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases. BP argues
that in the present case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Africk identified four primary
bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions were
unreliable, and Judge Ashe found that just one of these four
reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's
failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary to cause
the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically, Judge
Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular
chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would
be necessary to cause the specific symptoms that is to say, the
dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."

Judge Barbier begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
McIntosh's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and McIntosh is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which the
Plaintiff complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause
the reported reaction." Because the Plaintiff used the same report
by Dr. Cook, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single specific
chemical.

Mr. McIntosh argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a
particular chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar
to finding that his methodology is proper and reliable under
Daubert. However, while this argument may work in response to BP's
contention that Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it
does prevail in response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does not
identify the harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any
medical condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held, identification of
the harmful level of exposure to a chemical is one of the "minimal
facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort
case."

Mr. McIntosh argues that the reason neither he nor any other
plaintiff can present this specific quantitative data is due to
BP's failure to act during the spill to preserve evidence of the
workers' actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the
weathered oil. In reply, BP asserts that McIntosh's argument misses
the mark because the general causation analysis "permits the expert
to consult the universe of epidemiological and toxicological
literature that has studied the constituents at issue," and "it
does not depend upon environmental sampling data taken as part of
the incident."

Therefore, the fundamental question in this general causation
inquiry is whether the chemicals, weathered oil, and dispersants to
which McIntosh alleges he was exposed can cause the conditions he
alleges. Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to
identify a single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil,
dispersants, and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr.
Cook's report were to identify a specific chemical present in the
crude oil, weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to
establish a harmful level of any chemical to the general
population. Thus, Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth
Circuit's minimal fact required: scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points
out himself, "there is a toxicology maxim that the dose determines
the poison." Yet, Dr. Cook fails to identify the dose of any such
chemical that would result in the adverse health effects contained
in his report, and his report is therefore unreliable and
inadmissible.

Next, as a last-ditch attempt to save his case, McIntosh appears to
make a spoliation argument despite stating in a footnote, "while
not relevant for this motion, the Plaintiffs inform the Court that
they will be filing spoliation-related motions." "Spoliation is the
destruction or the significant and meaningful alteration of
evidence." In the Fifth Circuit, "an adverse inference against the
spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator is permitted only upon
a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct.'"

Mr. McIntosh argues that BP had a duty to take and preserve dermal
monitoring and biomonitoring of oil spill response workers in
addition to the air monitoring conducted by BP. The question before
the Court is whether BP acted with fraudulent intent when it did
not take dermal and biomonitoring of the oil spill response workers
for the purpose of suppressing the truth and depriving opposing
parties of its use. McIntosh argues that BP's actions, or
inactions, show that BP intentionally failed to act during the oil
spill cleanup to preserve evidence of the workers' actual total
exposure to specific chemicals in the weather oil.

While perhaps BP could have done more to conduct dermal monitoring
and biomonitoring, Judge Barbier finds that McIntosh has not met
his burden to show that BP acted with a culpable state of mind to
suppress the truth and deprive future parties of this data.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by both Judge Africk and Judge Ashe, cited,
because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions are excluded, Judge
Barbier holds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing McIntosh's claims. McIntosh has no other medical expert
for general causation, and expert testimony is required. Therefore,
McIntosh has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to
oil and dispersants.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier grants the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
and their Motion for Summary Judgment.  All the claims of Plaintiff
McIntosh against Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP
America Production Co. are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3xrw73wp from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook's Testimony From Barkley Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM BARKLEY v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC, ET
AL., Civil Action No. 13-1020 (E.D. La.), Judge Carl J. Barbier of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
grants the following two motions filed by Defendants BP Exploration
& Production Inc. and BP America Production Company:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Court -- In re Oil
Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1,
2021). During the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court
approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition.

Plaintiff Barkley was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
beach cleanup worker in Panama City, Destin, and Fort Walton Beach,
Florida for approximately one month. This work, Barkley alleges,
exposed her to crude oil and chemical dispersants which caused
Plaintiff to develop anemia, body pain, coughing, spinal tumor,
bowel issues, and monoclonal gammopathy.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." It further observed that the
issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of many
B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. Barkley relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony
as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with
a master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs.
It mentions no plaintiff by name, including Barkley, and it does
not address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill response or
the nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff had to any
particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four
categories of injuries or disease to see whether they could be
caused by exposure to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded
that three of the categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and
ocular -- can result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude.

II. Discussion

A. Daubert Motion

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is
qualified as an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's
"specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (2) the expert's
testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data"; (3) the expert's
testimony "is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and
(4) the principles and methods employed by the expert have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case. The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical framework for
determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.
Both the scientific and the nonscientific expert testimony are
subject to the Daubert framework, which requires trial courts to
make a preliminary assessment of "whether the expert testimony is
both reliable and relevant." When expert testimony is challenged
under Daubert, the party offering the expert's testimony bears the
burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a preponderance
of the evidence.

To begin, BP points out that two other Sections of the Court have
excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases. BP argues
that in the present case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Africk identified four primary
bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions were
unreliable, and Judge Ashe found that just one of these four
reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's
failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary to cause
the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically, Judge
Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular
chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would
be necessary to cause the specific symptoms that is to say, the
dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."

Judge Barbier begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Barkley's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Barkley is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which the
Plaintiff complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause
the reported reaction." Because the Plaintiff used the same report
by Dr. Cook, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single specific
chemical.

Mr. Barkley argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular
chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical as would be
necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar to finding
that his methodology is proper and reliable under Daubert. However,
while this argument may work in response to BP's contention that
Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it does prevail in
response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does not identify the
harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any medical
condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held, identification of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical is one of the "minimal
facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort
case."

Mr. Barkley argues that the reason neither she nor any other
plaintiff can present this specific quantitative data is due to
BP's failure to act during the spill to preserve evidence of the
workers' actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the
weathered oil. In reply, BP asserts that Barkley's argument misses
the mark because the general causation analysis "permits the expert
to consult the universe of epidemiological and toxicological
literature that has studied the constituents at issue," and "it
does not depend upon environmental sampling data taken as part of
the incident."

Therefore, the fundamental question in this general causation
inquiry is whether the chemicals, weathered oil, and dispersants to
which Barkley alleges she was exposed can cause the conditions she
alleges. Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to
identify a single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil,
dispersants, and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr.
Cook's report were to identify a specific chemical present in the
crude oil, weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to
establish a harmful level of any chemical to the general
population. Thus, Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth
Circuit's minimal fact required: scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points
out himself, "there is a toxicology maxim that the dose determines
the poison." Yet, Dr. Cook fails to identify the dose of any such
chemical that would result in the adverse health effects contained
in his report, and his report is therefore unreliable and
inadmissible.

Next, as a last-ditch attempt to save her case, Barkley appears to
make a spoliation argument despite stating in a footnote, "while
not relevant for this motion, the Plaintiffs inform the Court that
they will be filing spoliation-related motions." "Spoliation is the
destruction or the significant and meaningful alteration of
evidence." In the Fifth Circuit, "an adverse inference against the
spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator is permitted only upon
a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct.'"

Mr. Barkley argues that BP had a duty to take and preserve dermal
monitoring and biomonitoring of oil spill response workers in
addition to the air monitoring conducted by BP. The question before
the Court is whether BP acted with fraudulent intent when it did
not take dermal and biomonitoring of the oil spill response workers
for the purpose of suppressing the truth and depriving opposing
parties of its use.  Barkley argues that BP's actions, or
inactions, show that BP intentionally failed to act during the oil
spill cleanup to preserve evidence of the workers' actual total
exposure to specific chemicals in the weather oil.

While perhaps BP could have done more to conduct dermal monitoring
and biomonitoring, Judge Barbier finds that Barkley has not met her
burden to show that BP acted with a culpable state of mind to
suppress the truth and deprive future parties of this data.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by both Judge Africk and Judge Ashe, cited,
because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions are excluded, Judge
Barbier holds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Barkley's claims.  Barkley has no other medical expert
for general causation, and expert testimony is required. Therefore,
Barkley has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to her claims that her injuries were caused by exposure to
oil and dispersants.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier grants the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
and their Motion for Summary Judgment.  All the claims of Plaintiff
Barkley against Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP
America Production Co. are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4fewstv2 from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Dr. Cook Testimony in LaForce Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALLEN "BRADLEY" LAFORCE v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
INC., ET AL., SECTION: "J"(4), Civil Action No. 17-4402 (E.D. La.),
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the following two motions filed by
Defendants, BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c.:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Court -- In re Oil
Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1,
2021). During the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court
approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition.

Plaintiff LaForce was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
deckhand on vessels offshore near Bayou La Batre and Dauphin
Island, Alabama and the Mississippi shoreline for approximately
five months. This work, LaForce alleges, exposed him to crude oil
and chemical dispersants which caused the Plaintiff to develop
dizziness, shortness of breath, nausea, diarrhea, vomiting,
polyarthralgia, fatigue, malaise, migraine headaches with aura,
muscle spasms, dizziness/giddiness, memory loss, mood swings,
rashes, hypertension, chronic sinusitis, chronic rhinitis, throat
irritation, conjunctivitis, blurred vision, tears, loss of visual
acuity, burning, and irritation.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." It further observed that the
issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of many
B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. LaForce relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony
as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with
a master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs.
It mentions no plaintiff by name, including LaForce, and it does
not address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill response or
the nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff had to any
particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four
categories of injuries or disease to see whether they could be
caused by exposure to crude oil or dispersants. He concluded that
three of the categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and
ocular — can result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude.

II. Discussion

A. Daubert Motion

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is
qualified as an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's
"specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (2) the expert's
testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data"; (3) the expert's
testimony "is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and
(4) the principles and methods employed by the expert have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case. The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical framework for
determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.
Both the scientific and the nonscientific expert testimony are
subject to the Daubert framework, which requires trial courts to
make a preliminary assessment of "whether the expert testimony is
both reliable and relevant." When expert testimony is challenged
under Daubert, the party offering the expert's testimony bears the
burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a preponderance
of the evidence.

To begin, BP points out that two other Sections of this Court have
excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases. BP argues
that in the present case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Africk identified four primary
bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions were
unreliable, and Judge Ashe found that just one of these four
reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's
failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary to cause
the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically, Judge
Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular
chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would
be necessary to cause the specific symptoms that is to say, the
dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."

Judge Barbier begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
LaForce's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and LaForce is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which the
plaintiff complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause
the reported reaction." Because the Plaintiff used the same report
by Dr. Cook here, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single
specific chemical.

Mr. LaForce argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular
chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical as would be
necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar to finding
that his methodology is proper and reliable under Daubert. However,
while this argument may work in response to BP's contention that
Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it does prevail in
response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does not identify the
harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any medical
condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held, identification of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical is one of the "minimal
facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort
case."

Mr. LaForce argues that the reason neither he nor any other
plaintiff can present this specific quantitative data is due to
BP's failure to act during the spill to preserve evidence of the
workers' actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the
weathered oil. In reply, BP asserts that LaForce's argument misses
the mark because the general causation analysis "permits the expert
to consult the universe of epidemiological and toxicological
literature that has studied the constituents at issue," and "it
does not depend upon environmental sampling data taken as part of
the incident."

Therefore, the fundamental question in this general causation
inquiry is whether the chemicals, weathered oil, and dispersants to
which LaForce alleges he was exposed can cause the conditions he
alleges. Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to
identify a single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil,
dispersants, and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr.
Cook's report were to identify a specific chemical present in the
crude oil, weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to
establish a harmful level of any chemical to the general
population. Thus, Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth
Circuit's minimal fact required: scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points
out himself, "there is a toxicology maxim that the dose determines
the poison." Yet, Dr. Cook fails to identify the dose of any such
chemical that would result in the adverse health effects contained
in his report, and his report is therefore unreliable and
inadmissible.

Next, as a last-ditch attempt to save his case, LaForce appears to
make a spoliation argument despite stating in a footnote, "while
not relevant for this motion, the Plaintiffs inform the Court that
they will be filing spoliation-related motions." "Spoliation is the
destruction or the significant and meaningful alteration of
evidence." In the Fifth Circuit, "an adverse inference against the
spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator is permitted only upon
a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct.'"

Mr. LaForce argues that BP had a duty to take and preserve dermal
monitoring and biomonitoring of oil spill response workers in
addition to the air monitoring conducted by BP. The question before
the Court is whether BP acted with fraudulent intent when it did
not take dermal and biomonitoring of the oil spill response workers
for the purpose of suppressing the truth and depriving opposing
parties of its use. LaForce argues that BP's actions, or inactions,
show that BP intentionally failed to act during the oil spill
cleanup to preserve evidence of the workers' actual total exposure
to specific chemicals in the weather oil.

While perhaps BP could have done more to conduct dermal monitoring
and biomonitoring, Judge Barbier finds that LaForce has not met his
burden to show that BP acted with a culpable state of mind to
suppress the truth and deprive future parties of this data.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by both Judge Africk and Judge Ashe, cited,
because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions are excluded, Judge
Barbier holds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing LaForce's claims. LaForce has no other medical expert
for general causation, and expert testimony is required. Therefore,
LaForce has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to
oil and dispersants.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier grants the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
and their Motion for Summary Judgment.  All the claims of Plaintiff
LaForce, against Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc.; BP
America Production Co.; BP p.l.c.; Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc.; Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with
prejudice.

Judge Barbier denies as moot the Defendants' Motions for Leave to
File Reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/epczkufd from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Dr. Cook's Testimony Excluded From Brandon Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM ALLEN BRANDON v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
INC., ET AL., SECTION: "J"(5), Civil Action No. 17-3057 (E.D. La.),
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants the following two motions filed by
Defendants, BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c.:

   a. Daubert Motion to Exclude the General Causation Opinions of
      Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Jerald Cook; and

   b. Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon ("DWH") oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve
"claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to
oil and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response
(e.g., dispersant)." These cases were originally part of a
multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending in the Court -- In re Oil
Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1,
2021). During the course of the MDL proceedings, this Court
approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the
class action settlement agreement or were excluded from its class
definition.

Plaintiff Brandon was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
decontamination technician at a decontamination facility in
Theodore, Alabama for approximately two months. This work, Brandon
alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which
caused Plaintiff to develop SOB; sinusitis; chronic rhinitis; body
pains; chronic osteoarthritis; chronic lumbago; chronic pain
syndrome; rash; blood in stools; essential hypertension; blurred
vision; headaches; and nausea.

In the case management order for the B3 bundle of cases, the Court
noted that, to prevail, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal
cause of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response." It further observed that the
issue of causation "will likely be the make-or-break issue of many
B3 cases," which "will require an individualized inquiry."

Mr. Brandon relies on Dr. Jerald Cook to provide expert testimony
as to general causation. Dr. Cook is a retired Navy physician with
a master's degree in environmental toxicology and a fellow of the
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. He is
board certified in occupational medicine, public health, and
general preventative medicine.

Dr. Cook's report is an omnibus, non-case specific general
causation expert report that has been used by many B3 plaintiffs.
It mentions no plaintiff by name, including Brandon, and it does
not address any specific plaintiff's work on the spill response or
the nature, duration, or type of exposure any plaintiff had to any
particular toxin. Further, in the report, Dr. Cook evaluates four
categories of injuries or disease to see whether they could be
caused by exposure to crude oil or dispersants. Dr. Cook concluded
that three of the categories of injury -- respiratory, dermal, and
ocular -- can result from exposure to such.

Now, BP has filed the instant Daubert Motion to Exclude the General
Causation Opinions of Dr. Cook and Motion for Summary Judgment
premised on the Court's granting of BP's Motion to Exclude.

II. Discussion

A. Daubert Motion

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is
qualified as an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's
"specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (2) the expert's
testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data"; (3) the expert's
testimony "is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and
(4) the principles and methods employed by the expert have been
reliably applied to the facts of the case. The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical framework for
determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.
Both the scientific and the nonscientific expert testimony are
subject to the Daubert framework, which requires trial courts to
make a preliminary assessment of "whether the expert testimony is
both reliable and relevant." When expert testimony is challenged
under Daubert, the party offering the expert's testimony bears the
burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a preponderance
of the evidence.

To begin, BP points out that two other Sections of the Court have
excluded Dr. Cook's expert report in similar B3 cases. BP argues
that in the present case, the Court should exclude Dr. Cook's
opinions for the same reasons. Judge Africk identified four primary
bases for which Dr. Cook's general causation opinions were
unreliable, and Judge Ashe found that just one of these four
reasons was substantial on its own to permit exclusion, Dr. Cook's
failure to identify a harmful dose of exposure necessary to cause
the plaintiff's specific medical condition. Specifically, Judge
Ashe found that Dr. Cook had failed to identify a "particular
chemical" or the "level of exposure to any such chemical as would
be necessary to cause the specific symptoms that is to say, the
dose necessary to cause the reported reaction."

Judge Barbier begins with the issue both Judge Africk and Ashe
determined merited exclusion of Dr. Cook's expert testimony:
whether his report identifies a particular chemical or the level of
exposure to any such chemical as would be necessary to cause
Brandon's specific adverse health conditions.

BP argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify the harmful level of
exposure for any chemical or any medical condition is the most
fundamental deficiency. Because the law requires an expert to
identify the harmful level of exposure for each chemical and each
condition, BP contends that this failure is especially problematic
because Dr. Cook is investigating multiple allegedly toxic
chemicals, and Brandon is alleging multiple adverse health
conditions.

Judge Ashe, in his recent opinions, emphasized that Dr. Cook's
report failed to include even a single mention of a specific
chemical. Instead, Judge Ashe found that Dr. Cook's report "refers
generally to oil, dispersants, and volatile organic compounds," and
he "never identifies any particular chemical to which the Plaintiff
was exposed, much less the level of exposure to any such chemical
as would be necessary to cause the specific symptoms of which the
Plaintiff complains -- that is to say, the dose necessary to cause
the reported reaction." Because the Plaintiff used the same report
by Dr. Cook, Dr. Cook's report fails to identify a single specific
chemical.

Mr. Brandon argues that Dr. Cook's failure to identify a particular
chemical or the level of exposure to any such chemical as would be
necessary to cause the specific symptoms is not a bar to finding
that his methodology is proper and reliable under Daubert. However,
while this argument may work in response to BP's contention that
Dr. Cook did not follow the proper methodology, it does prevail in
response to BP's assertion that Dr. Cook does not identify the
harmful level of exposure for any chemical or any medical
condition. As the Fifth Circuit has held, identification of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical is one of the "minimal
facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort
case."

Mr. Brandon argues that the reason neither he nor any other
plaintiff can present this specific quantitative data is due to
BP's failure to act during the spill to preserve evidence of the
workers' actual total exposure to specific chemicals in the
weathered oil. In reply, BP asserts that Brandon's argument misses
the mark because the general causation analysis "permits the expert
to consult the universe of epidemiological and toxicological
literature that has studied the constituents at issue," and "it
does not depend upon environmental sampling data taken as part of
the incident."

Therefore, the fundamental question in this general causation
inquiry is whether the chemicals, weathered oil, and dispersants to
which Brandon alleges he was exposed can cause the conditions he
alleges. Judge Barbier finds that Dr. Cook's report fails to
identify a single chemical and, instead, refers generally to oil,
dispersants, and volatile organic compounds. Moreover, even if Dr.
Cook's report were to identify a specific chemical present in the
crude oil, weathered crude oil, or dispersants, his report fails to
establish a harmful level of any chemical to the general
population. Thus, Dr. Cook's report fails to satisfy Fifth
Circuit's minimal fact required: scientific knowledge of the
harmful level of exposure to a chemical. As Dr. Cook even points
out himself, "there is a toxicology maxim that the dose determines
the poison." Yet, Dr. Cook fails to identify the dose of any such
chemical that would result in the adverse health effects contained
in his report, and his report is therefore unreliable and
inadmissible.

Next, as a last-ditch attempt to save his case, Brandon appears to
make a spoliation argument despite stating in a footnote, "while
not relevant for this motion, the Plaintiffs inform the Court that
they will be filing spoliation-related motions." "Spoliation is the
destruction or the significant and meaningful alteration of
evidence." In the Fifth Circuit, "an adverse inference against the
spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator is permitted only upon
a showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct.'"

Mr. Brandon argues that BP had a duty to take and preserve dermal
monitoring and biomonitoring of oil spill response workers in
addition to the air monitoring conducted by BP. The question before
the Court is whether BP acted with fraudulent intent when it did
not take dermal and biomonitoring of the oil spill response workers
for the purpose of suppressing the truth and depriving opposing
parties of its use. Brandon argues that BP's actions, or inactions,
show that BP intentionally failed to act during the oil spill
cleanup to preserve evidence of the workers' actual total exposure
to specific chemicals in the weather oil.

While perhaps BP could have done more to conduct dermal monitoring
and biomonitoring, Judge Barbier finds that Brandon has not met his
burden to show that BP acted with a culpable state of mind to
suppress the truth and deprive future parties of this data.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

As in the cases decided by both Judge Africk and Judge Ashe, cited,
because Dr. Cook's general causation opinions are excluded, Judge
Barbier holds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Brandon's claims. Brandon has no other medical expert
for general causation, and expert testimony is required. Therefore,
Brandon has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to his claims that his injuries were caused by exposure to
oil and dispersants.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Barbier grants the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
and their Motion for Summary Judgment.  All the claims of Plaintiff
Brandon, against Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc.; BP
America Production Co.; BP p.l.c.; Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc.; Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; Transocean Holdings, LLC; and
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., are dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5u27yfp from Leagle.com.


BRITANNICA FLOOR: Faces Jackson Wage-and-Hour Suit in E.D.N.Y.
--------------------------------------------------------------
GLENN JACKSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BRITANNICA FLOOR COVERING, INC., and MICHAEL
KAHOUD, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-05447 (E.D.N.Y., June 28,
2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York State Labor Law
including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime
wages, failure to provide wage notices, failure to provide accurate
wage statements, and failure to timely pay wages, and breach of
contract.

Mr. Jackson was employed by the Defendants as a manual worker and
general worker from April 2016 to, through and including December
2019.

Britannica Floor Covering, Inc. is a manufacturer of floor
covering, headquartered in Amityville, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
         Jason Mizrahi, Esq.
         LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 792-0046
         E-mail: Joshua@levinepstein.com

BROOKDALE SENIOR: Bid to Intervene Denial Affirmed in Callahan Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms the
district court's denial of Appellant Neverson's motion to intervene
in the cases, CAROLYN D. CALLAHAN, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee v. BROOKDALE SENIOR
LIVING COMMUNITIES, INC., a Delaware corporation; BROOKDALE
EMPLOYEE SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware corporation; BROOKDALE EMPLOYEE
SERVICES CORPORATE, LLC, a Delaware corporation; SUMMERVILLE AT
ATHERTON COURT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;
BROOKDALE VEHICLE HOLDING, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; BKD PERSONAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; EMERITUS CORPORATION, a Washington corporation;
BROOKDALE LIVING COMMUNITIES, INC., a Delaware corporation; BKD
TWENTY-ONE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., a Delaware corporation;
BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING, INC., a Delaware corporation; DOES, 1
through 100, Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees v. MISHELLE NEVERSON,
Proposed Intervenor, Movant-Appellant. CAROLYN D. CALLAHAN, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING COMMUNITIES, INC., a
Delaware corporation; BROOKDALE EMPLOYEE SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware
corporation; BROOKDALE EMPLOYEE SERVICES CORPORATE, LLC, a Delaware
corporation; SUMMERVILLE AT ATHERTON COURT, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; BROOKDALE VEHICLE HOLDING, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; BKD PERSONAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; EMERITUS CORPORATION, a
Washington corporation; BROOKDALE LIVING COMMUNITIES, INC., a
Delaware corporation; BKD TWENTY-ONE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., a
Delaware corporation; BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING, INC., a Delaware
corporation; DOES, 1 through 100, Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees
v. MISHELLE NEVERSON, Proposed Intervenor, Movant-Appellant, and
NINA REJUSO, Proposed Intervenor; GENEFLOR SACRO, Proposed
Intervenor, Movants, Case Nos. 20-55603, 20-55761 (9th Cir.).

I. Introduction

Ms. Callahan is a plaintiff in an action brought against Brookdale
Senior Living Communities, Inc., her former employer, pursuant to
the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), Cal. Lab.
Code sections 2698-2699.5, which allows aggrieved employees to
recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of
themselves, the state, or other current or former employees. After
mediation, Callahan and Brookdale agreed to a settlement. Appellant
Neverson, who was a plaintiff in an overlapping PAGA case against
Brookdale, filed a motion to intervene in Callahan's action. The
district court denied Neverson's motion and approved the PAGA
settlement in Callahan's case in relevant part. Neverson appeals
both the denial of her motion to intervene and the district court's
order approving the Callahan settlement. The Panel consolidated
these two issues on appeal.

II. Background

Brookdale owns and operates senior living communities throughout
the United States. Callahan worked for Brookdale as a concierge
from approximately February 2006 to February 2018. On Nov. 26,
2018, she sent the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
("LWDA") notice of a number of Brookdale's alleged violations of
the California Labor Code.

On Nov. 27, 2018, Callahan filed a class action lawsuit against
Brookdale in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The complaint
alleged violations of the Labor Code and California's Unfair
Competition Law. She did not initially bring a claim under PAGA.
On Dec. 28, 2018, Brookdale removed the action to federal court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(d). That same day, Brookdale filed a notice of six
related cases against it that included the action brought by
Neverson (the "Related Actions").

Ms. Callahan's case did not proceed to litigation. Rather, on Jan.
31, 2019, Callahan and Brookdale filed a stipulation requesting
that Callahan's individual claims be stayed and submitted to
arbitration, that her class claims be dismissed, and that she be
permitted to file an amended complaint asserting a PAGA claim after
the notice period to the LWDA had been exhausted. The district
court approved the stipulation on Feb. 5, 2019. Callahan filed her
amended complaint on Feb. 6, 2019, which dismissed her class claims
and added claims under PAGA.

After participating in mediation on the PAGA claim, Callahan and
Brookdale agreed to settle Callahan's PAGA claim along with the
related PAGA claims of other plaintiffs (including Neverson) that
were pending against Brookdale. On Oct. 17, 2019, Callahan sent an
amended letter to the LWDA notifying it that the parties intended
to resolve Callahan's PAGA action and all related PAGA actions
against Brookdale, including Neverson's action. The LWDA did not
elect to investigate or prosecute the Labor Code violations alleged
in Callahan's original or amended notice letters during the
statutorily provided sixty-day period.

On Oct. 21, 2019, Callahan and Brookdale filed a Joint Notice of
Settlement advising the district court they had settled the case as
to all parties and causes of action. Three days later, Neverson
filed a notice of intent to intervene to object to the PAGA
settlement.

On Feb. 13, 2020, Callahan filed a second amended complaint, which
sought PAGA penalties based on predicate violations of Labor Code
sections 201, 202, 203, 203.1, 222.5, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 558,
1174, 1194, 1194.2, 2802, 2810.5 and Wage Order No. 4-2001. The
second amended complaint also added all the named defendants from
the Related Actions.

On March 4, 2020, Callahan and Brookdale filed a joint motion for
approval of the PAGA settlement. Their proposed settlement was
based on a Gross Settlement Fund of $920,000. The funds were
allocated as follows: $417,240.72 to the LWDA, $139,080.24 to the
aggrieved employees, $46,000 in administration costs, $306,666.67
in attorneys' fees, $8,512.36 in litigation costs and expenses, and
$2,500.00 as a service award for Callahan as the named plaintiff.

On March 13, 2020, Neverson filed her motion to intervene. On May
20, 2020, the district court denied her motion. The district court
denied Neverson's intervention as a matter of right under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) because she had "not cited, and the
Court ha[d] not found, any cases in which a court has granted
intervention as of right in a PAGA settlement." In considering
whether to grant permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b),
the court found (1) that it had jurisdiction to permit
intervention, (2) that Neverson's motion to intervene was timely,
and (3) that there were common questions of law and fact between
Neverson's and Callahan's claims. But the court ultimately denied
permissive intervention because Neverson and Callahan represented
the same legal interest and because "permitting intervention would
not contribute to the factual development of issues in the case."

On July 7, 2020, the district court entered an order granting in
part the joint motion for approval of the PAGA settlement. It
approved the settlement amount, but reduced the amount allocated
for attorneys' fees from $306,666.67 to $230,000.

Ms. Neverson timely appealed both the order denying her motion to
intervene and the district court's order approving the PAGA
settlement. The Ninth Circuit consolidated her two appeals on Sept.
4, 2020.

Ms. Neverson raises three arguments on appeal: (1) that she is
entitled to intervene in Callahan's PAGA action as a matter of
right; (2) that the district court abused its discretion in denying
her permissive intervention; and (3) that the district court abused
its discretion in finding that the PAGA settlement is fundamentally
fair, adequate, and reasonable.

After the initial briefing was completed in the case, the Ninth
Circuit issued two decisions that inform its judgment in the case.
First, Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., 999 F.3d 668 (9th Cir.
2021), held that a plaintiff seeking penalties under PAGA for
California labor law violations must satisfy the traditional
Article III standing requirement of an injury in fact. After the
Magadia decision was filed, we directed the parties to file
supplemental briefs to address its impact on the motion to
intervene, Callahan's standing to bring the PAGA suit, and
Neverson's standing to object to the PAGA settlement.

Second, the Ninth Cicrcuit decided Saucillo v. Peck, 25 F.4th 1118
(9th Cir. 2022), holding, as relevant here, that an objector to a
PAGA settlement who was not a party to the underlying litigation
may not appeal the approval of the settlement. The Peck opinion
notes that unlike a class action, "there is no individual component
to a PAGA action because every PAGA action is a representative
action on behalf of the state." And because objectors to a PAGA
settlement have no individual stake in the action, they "are not
'parties' to a PAGA suit in the same sense that absent class
members are 'parties' to a class action." The Ninth Circuit
consequently dismissed the non-party objector's appeal because "the
rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become
parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled."

After Peck was decided, the Ninth Circuit also ordered the parties
here to file supplemental briefs discussing its impact on the
present case. It specifically requested that the parties address
(1) whether someone that has been allowed to intervene in a PAGA
lawsuit or was improperly denied the opportunity to do so is a
"party to the lawsuit" entitled to file an appeal, and (2) whether
Neverson was still such a party assuming, arguendo, that she was
properly denied permission to intervene.

The Ninth Circuit has reviewed the parties' supplemental briefs and
letters directing it to additional authorities.

III. Discussion

A. Motion to Intervene as a Matter of Right

Ms. Neverson's primary contention is that her interests are not
adequately represented because the PAGA settlement amount is too
small. She claims that Callahan miscalculated the maximum PAGA
penalties and unreasonably discounted them in agreeing to the
settlement. But, the NInth Circuit finds that she provides no basis
for her own calculation of the total penalties under PAGA and no
basis for her contention that Callahan's valuation of the penalties
was incorrect. Neverson's argument that Callahan should not have
settled the PAGA action for the agreed-upon amount ultimately
amounts to a disagreement over litigation strategy.

Ms. Neverson also argues that her interests were not adequately
represented because her case was formally litigated and Callahan's
was not. However, Callahan still obtained significant informal
discovery prior to mediation, including copies of all of
Brookdale's relevant policies and procedures, three years' worth of
time and payroll data for a group of over 17,000 employees, and
copies of related PAGA actions currently pending against Brookdale
in California. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit is not persuaded by
Neverson's assertion that the absence of formal litigation in
Callahan's case left Callahan unable to adequately represent
Neverson's interests.

Ms. Neverson further argues that Callahan was not properly
deputized to pursue certain claims that were a part of the
settlement due to the statute of limitations having run on those
claims. However, even if Neverson is right, she does not establish
that she is the proper party to pursue the claims for which
Callahan was not properly deputized.

For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit concludes that Neverson has
failed to make the required showing that Callahan did not
adequately represent her interests. It therefore affirms the
district court's denial of her motion to intervene as of right.

B. Permissive Intervention

The Ninth Circuit next considers whether the district court abused
its discretion in denying Neverson permissive intervention. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), a district court has
discretion to permit intervention when the movant presents "(1) an
independent ground for jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a
common question of law and fact between the movant's claim or
defense and the main action."

Ms. Neverson first argues that the fact that she and Callahan both
represent the interests of the LWDA cannot be dispositive and
should not have been considered in the district court's analysis of
the Spangler discretionary factors. But contrary to Neverson's
assertions, it does not follow from the district court's decision
that a PAGA plaintiff can never be granted permissive intervention
in an overlapping PAGA case.

Ms. Neverson also argues that she should be granted permissive
intervention because her independent analysis of the value of the
PAGA claims would significantly contribute to the factual
development of Callahan's case. But again, Neverson promises much
and delivers little. Indeed, she provides no factual basis for her
determination that Callahan miscalculated the maximum PAGA
penalties. Under these circumstances, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that Neverson would not
significantly contribute to the factual issues in the case.

For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit concludes that the district
court acted within its discretion in denying Neverson permissive
intervention. It accordingly affirms the denial of Neverson's
motion to intervene.

C. Right to Appeal the Approval of the PAGA Settlement

Because Neverson's motion to intervene was properly denied, she
never became a party to the PAGA action. And as a non-party to the
action, she has no right to appeal the district court's approval of
the PAGA settlement. Neverson argues that she has a right to appeal
the settlement because "the weight of California authority supports
non-parties having a substantive right to intervene in overlapping
PAGA suits."

The Ninth Circuit opines that the well-settled rule in federal
court is that "only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment." Though the Court
has occasionally allowed a non-party to appeal when "`exceptional
circumstances' warrant a departure from this general rule,"
Neverson does not argue that such circumstances are present in the
case. Because Neverson lacks the right to appeal the PAGA
settlement, the Ninth Circuit dismisses her appeal of the
settlement approval and does not consider whether the district
court abused its discretion in approving the settlement.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth below, the Ninth Circuit affirms the
district court's denial of Neverson's motion to intervene. It holds
that Neverson is not a party to Callahan's case and may not appeal
the approval of the PAGA settlement. Under these circumstances, the
Ninth Circuit has no occasion to consider Neverson's substantive
objections to the PAGA settlement. It dismisses Neverson's second
appeal of the district court's approval of the PAGA settlement
because it concludes that she has no right to appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/mshy7h8p from Leagle.com.


CAPODANNO PROPERTIES: Medina Seeks Restaurant Staff's Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
LORIE MEDINA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CAPODANNO PROPERTIES LLC, WATERFRONT CAFÉ
INC., and JOHN TOTO, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-05449 (S.D.N.Y.,
June 28, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York State
Labor Law including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay
overtime wages, failure to provide wage notices, failure to provide
accurate wage statements, and failure to pay spread-of-hours
compensation.

Ms. Medina was employed as a waitress, bartender and general worker
at the Defendants' restaurant, known as Joe & John Toto's
Restaurant & Bar, located at 809 Father Capodanno Blvd., Staten
Island, New York from May 2018 until, through and including
September 2019.

Capodanno Properties LLC is an owner and operator of a restaurant
known as Joe & John Toto's Restaurant & Bar, located at 809 Father
Capodanno Blvd., Staten Island, New York.

Waterfront Cafe Inc. is an owner and operator of a restaurant known
as Joe & John Toto's Restaurant & Bar located, at 809 Father
Capodanno Blvd., Staten Island, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
         Jason Mizrahi, Esq.
         LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 792-0046
         E-mail: Joshua@levinepstein.com
                 Jason@levinepstein.com

CAPSTONE LOGISTICS: Hood Suit Alleges Unpaid Wages for Unloaders
----------------------------------------------------------------
TYLER HOOD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:22-cv-00292-RJC-DSC (W.D.N.C., June 30, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act including failure to
pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, and failure to
pay appropriate final wages.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as an unloader, team
lead, and clerk in Charlotte, North Carolina from approximately
February 2021 through February 2022.

Capstone Logistics, LLC is a provider of logistics services,
headquartered in in Peachtree Corners, Georgia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         John J. Nestico, Esq.
         SCHNEIDERWALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY LLP
         6000 Fairview Road, Suite 1200
         Charlotte, NC 28210
         Telephone: (510) 740-2946
         Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
         E-mail: jnestico@schneiderwallace.com

                 - and –

         Carolyn H. Cottrell, Esq.
         Ori Edelstein, Esq.
         Michelle S. Lim, Esq.
         SCHNEIDERWALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY LLP
         2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
         Emeryville, CA 94608
         Telephone: (415) 421-7100
         Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
         E-mail: ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
                 oedelstein@schneiderwallace.com

CHICCO USA: Seidl Files Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chicco Usa, Inc. The
case is styled as Candace Seidl, On Behalf Of Herself And All
Others Similarly Situated v. Chicco Usa, Inc., Case No.
5:22-cv-02586 (E.D. Pa., July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Chicco USA -- https://www.chiccousa.com/ -- is a retailer of toys,
furniture and accessories for children and babies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nancy Michelle Christensen, Esq.
          WEITZ & LUXENBERG PC
          700 Broadway
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 485-1897
          Email: nchristensen@weitzlux.com


CLEAN HARBORS: Villamar Suit Removed to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Erick Plaza Villamar, an individual and class
representative on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated non-exempt former and current employees v. Clean Harbors
Environmental Services Inc., Hydrochem LLC DBA Hydrochemps, Does 1
through 100, inclusive, Case No. 22STCV14726 was removed from the
Los Angeles Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on June 9, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-03966-DMG-JEM to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Jobs Civil Rights for Employment
Discrimination.

Clean Harbors, Inc. -- https://www.cleanharbors.com/ -- is an
American provider of environmental and industrial services,
including hazardous waste disposal for companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Grant Joseph Savoy, Esq.
          Shoham J. Solouki, Esq.
          SOLOUKI SAVOY LLP
          316 West 2nd Street Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90012
          Phone: (213) 814-4940
          Fax: (213) 814-2550
          Email: grant@soloukisavoy.com
                 shoham@soloukisavoy.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Paul M Smith, Esq.
          Michael J Nader, Esq.
          OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK AND STEWART PC
          500 Capitol Mall Suite 2500
          Sacramento, CA 95814
          Phone: (916) 840-3150
          Fax: (916) 840-3159
          Email: paul.smith@ogletree.com
                 michael.nader@ogletree.com


CORIANDER FACTORY: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Hernandez Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
MAURO HERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CORIANDER FACTORY INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-05655 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law including failure to pay overtime wages,
failure provide a wage notice, failure to provide wage statements,
and retaliation.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a non-exempt employee
from August 2021 until on April 29, 2022.

Coriander Factory Inc. is a manufacturing company in New York, New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq.
         AIDALA, BERTUNA & KAMINS, P.C.
         546 5th Avenue
         New York, NY 10036
         Telephone: (212) 486-0011
         E-mail: ls@aidalalaw.com

COTY INC: Court Terminates as Moot Bid to Dismiss Solis Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California terminates as moot the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the lawsuit styled YERALDINNE SOLIS, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. COTY, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-0400-BAS-NLS (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint in
response to Defendant Coty's Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the Court
terminates as moot the Defendant's Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 23, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4uba2ysn from Leagle.com.


CPC LOGISTICS: Barajas Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to N.D. Cal.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled OSCAR BARAJAS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. CPC LOGISTICS SOLUTIONS, LLC; CPC
LOGISTICS INC.; NEWCO DISTRIBUTORS, INC.; and DOES 1-100,
inclusive, Case No. 22CV011373, was removed from the Superior Court
of the State of California for the County of Alameda to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on July 1,
2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:22-cv-03911 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay
overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to permit
rest periods, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements,
failure to pay all wages due upon separation of employment, failure
to reimburse business expenses, and unfair competition.

CPC Logistics Solutions, LLC is a transportation services company
based in Missouri.

CPC Logistics Inc. is a logistics company based in Missouri.

Newco Distributors, Inc. is a distributor in California. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         David Szwarcsztejn, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         400 South Hope St., Suite 1200
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 239-9800
         Facsimile: (213) 239-9045
         E-mail: david.szwarcsztejn@ogletree.com

                 - and –

         Graham M. Helm, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         One Embarcadero Center, Suite 900
         San Francisco, CA 94111
         Telephone: (415) 442-4810
         Facsimile: (415) 442-4870
         E-mail: graham.helm@ogletree.com

CREATE & CULTIVATE: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed Create & Cultivate, LLC. The
case is styled as Linda Slade, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Create &
Cultivate, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-05634 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Create & Cultivate -- https://www.createcultivate.com/ -- is an
online platform and offline conference for women looking to create
& cultivate the career of their dreams.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


CREDIT CONTROL: Stroman Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Credit Control
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Rashon Stroman, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Credit Control
Services, Inc. d/b/a Credit Collection Services, Case No.
2:22-cv-04378 (D.N.J., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Credit Control -- https://www.credit-control.com/ -- is a
nationally licensed provider of customized, performance-driven
receivables management services that was founded in 1989.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Karra Kingston, Esq.
          22 Juniper Way
          Basking Ridge, NJ 07920
          Phone: (973) 979-9078
          Email: karralbonomo@gmail.com


CREDIT CONTROL: Worthington Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Credit Control
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Derrick Worthington,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Credit Control Services, Inc. d/b/a Credit Collection Services,
Case No. 2:22-cv-04377 (D.N.J., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Credit Control -- https://www.credit-control.com/ -- is a
nationally licensed provider of customized, performance-driven
receivables management services that was founded in 1989.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Karra Kingston, Esq.
          22 Juniper Way
          Basking Ridge, NJ 07920
          Phone: (973) 979-9078
          Email: karralbonomo@gmail.com


DAKOTA STYLE FOODS: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dakota Style Foods,
Inc. The case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Dakota Style Foods,
Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05667 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dakota Style -- https://www.dakotastyle.com/ -- is a snack food
company (Dakota Style Chips, Inc.) and brand of snack foods
produced by that company. It operates out of Clark, South
Dakota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


DEERE & CO: Colvin Farms Suit Moved From N.D. Fla. to N.D. Ill.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled COLVIN FARMS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. DEERE & CO. d/b/a JOHN DEERE, Case No.
1:22-cv-00126, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Florida to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois on June 28, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of Illinois assigned
Case No. 1:22-cv-03376 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the repair service
market for John Deere brand agricultural equipment with onboard
central computers known as engine control units (ECUs). John Deere
has deliberately monopolized the market for repair and maintenance
services of its agricultural equipment with ECUs by making crucial
software and repair tools inaccessible to farmers and independent
repair shops. As a result of the Defendant's monopolization, John
Deere and its dealerships have derived supracompetitive profits
from the sale of repair and maintenance services, says the suit.

Colvin Farms is a farm business located in Alachua and Jackson
County, Florida.

Deere & Co., doing business as John Deere, is an agricultural
equipment manufacturer, headquartered in Moline, Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Paul S. Rothstein, Esq.
         626 N.E. First Street
         Gainesville, FL 32601
         Telephone: (352) 376-7650
         Facsimile: (352) 374-7133
         E-mail: psr@rothsteinforjustice.com

DEERE & CO: Wells Sues Over Unlawful Monopolization
---------------------------------------------------
Trinty Dale Wells, on behalf of himself and the Class of all others
so similarly situated v. DEERE & CO. (d/b/a JOHN DEERE), Case No.
3:22-cv-50189 (N.D. Ala., Jan. 19, 2022), is brought against the
Defendant for violations of the Sherman Act by monopolizing or
attempting to monopolize the Deere Repair Services Market in a
manner that harmed competition and injured the purchasers of such
services by reducing choice and increasing prices in this market to
supracompetitive levels.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent those persons and entities who
purchased repair services from the Defendant Deere and Co. (d/b/a
John Deere) and Deere--affiliated independent Dealerships and
technicians in the Deere Repair Services Market for Deere
agricultural equipment from January 12, 2018 to the present. This
case is about John Deere's monopolization of the repair service
market for John Deere brand agricultural equipment with onboard
central computers known as engine control units, or "ECUs." Farmers
have traditionally had the ability to repair and maintain their own
tractors as needed, or else have had the option to bring their
tractors to an independent mechanic.

However, in newer generations of its agricultural equipment, Deere
has deliberately monopolized the market for repair and maintenance
services of its agricultural equipment with ECUs ("Deere Repair
Services") by making crucial software and repair tools inaccessible
to farmers and independent repair shops. Furthermore, Deere's
network of highly-consolidated independent dealerships (the
"Dealerships") is not permitted through their agreements with Deere
to provide farmers or repair shops with access to the same software
and repair tools the Dealerships have. As a result of shutting out
farmers and independent repair shops from accessing the necessary
resources for repairs, Deere and the Dealerships have cornered the
Deere Repair Services Market in the United States for Deere-branded
agricultural equipment controlled by ECUs and have derived
supracompetitive profits from the sale of and maintenance
services.

Modern John Deere tractors, combines, and other agricultural
equipment with ECUs have grown increasingly technologically
advanced. Tractors manufactured in the last two decades now require
proprietary software and associated repair tools (collectively
referred to as "Software") to perform or complete many repairs.
Despite the use of, and access to, this Software being essential to
the continued functionality of its Tractors, Deere has deliberately
made this necessary Software unavailable to individual owners and
independent repair shops. Instead, Deere makes the full Software
available only to Deere Dealerships and technicians, who are not
permitted by Deere to sell it.

Historically, farmers who owned Deere Tractors have had the option
of repairing their Tractors themselves or taking them to an
independent repair shop of their choosing. By making the Software,
for all practical purposes, unavailable, Deere has succeeded in
foreclosing competition in the multi-billion dollar Deere Repair
Services Market. Deere and the Dealerships are highly motivated to
prevent competition, either from independent repair shops selling
Deere Repair Services, or from farmers with the knowledge and
skills to perform their own repairs. Deere's business for its
Repair Services is three to six times more profitable than its
sales of original equipment. Deere's monopolization of the Deere
Repair Services Market allows Deere and the Dealerships to charge
and collect supracompetitive prices for its services every time a
piece of equipment requires the Software to diagnose or complete a
repair. Consequently, Plaintiff and Class members have paid
millions of dollars more for the repair services than they would
have paid in a competitive market.

As a result of Deere's unlawful withholding of the necessary
Software to perform repairs from farmers and independent repair
shops and its forced consolidation of the Dealerships, Plaintiff
and the Class paid artificially inflated prices for Deere Repair
Services during the Class Period. Prices in the Repair Services
Market exceeded the amount they would have paid if the prices had
been determined by a competitive market. Plaintiff and Class
members were therefore injured by Defendant's conduct. Deere's
illegal monopoly of the Deere Repair Services Market should be
enjoined and dismantled, and Plaintiff and the Class should be
reimbursed by Deere for the amount they overpaid for Deere Repair
Services, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Franklin County, Alabama who
purchased repair services from the Defendant.

Deere & Co. is a publicly traded company headquartered in Moline,
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric J. Artrip, Esq.
          D. Anthony Mastando, Esq.
          MASTANDO & ARTRIP, LLC
          Suite 302
          Huntsville, Alabama 35801
          Phone: (256) 532-2222
          Fax: (256) 513-7489
          Email: artrip@mastandoartrip.com
                 tony@mastandoartrip.com

               - and -

          Richard P. Rouco, Esq.
          QUINN, CONNOR, WEAVER, DAVIES & ROUCO LLP
          2-20th Street North, Suite 930
          Birmingham, Alabama 35203
          Phone: (205) 870-9989
          Fax: (205) 803-4143
          Email: rrouco@qcwdr.com

               - and -

          Joe R. Whatley, Esq.
          Tucker Brown, Esq.
          WHATLEY KALLAS, LLC
          2001 Park Place Suite 1000
          Birmingham, Alabama 35203
          Phone: (205) 488-1200
          Fax: (205) 800-922-4851
          Email: jwhatley@whatleykallas.com
                 tbrown@whatleykallas.com


DOLLAR TREE: Incorrectly Classified Workers as Managers, Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
SAMI RABIH, JENNAY FOSTER, AND AUBURN JOHNSON, individually and on
behalf of and similarly situated employees, v. DOLLAR TREE, INC.,
Case No. 5:22-cv-02482 (E.D. Pa., June 24, 2022) is a collective
and class action complaint against the Defendant alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act of 1968, and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law.

The Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit seeking recovery against
Defendant for violation of the FLSA, PMWA, and PWPCL.

Defendant Dollar Tree has engaged in systemic wage and hour
violations against their employees incorrectly classified as
managers. The Defendant has caused, contributed to, and perpetuated
unpaid wages through common policies, practices, including but not
limited to common compensation and centralized-decision making,
says the suit.

The Plaintiffs and putative members of the Collective and Class
action, primary duty was not managing the enterprise, or managing a
customarily recognized department or subdivision of the stores. The
Plaintiffs and putative members primary duty was nonmanagerial
tasks, such as working the cash register, assisting customers,
unloading and receiving trucks, unloading stock, and stocking
shelves.

By knowingly and intentionally, misclassifying these employees as
managers, Defendant has categorically denied Plaintiffs, and others
who are similarly situated, overtime compensation and minimum wage,
as required by state and federal wage laws, the suit added.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kenneth J. Hardin II, Esq.
          Ashley J. Giannetti, Esq.
          HARDIN THOMPSON, P.C.
          The Frick Building
          437 Grant Street, Suite 620
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 315-7195
          Facsimile: (412) 315-7386

DOT'S PRETZELS: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dot's Pretzels, LLC.
The case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Dot's Pretzels, LLC,
Case No. 1:22-cv-05666 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dot's Pretzels -- https://dotspretzels.com/ -- are pretzel twists
dusted with our top-secret seasoning blend giving our snacks an
undeniably amazing flavor.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


EMPYREAN BENEFIT: Faces Randle Suit Over Unpaid Overtime for CSRs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LATOSHA RANDLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. EMPYREAN BENEFIT SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 4:22-cv-02116 (S.D. Tex., June 28, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and common law including failure to pay overtime wages, breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a customer service
representative (CSR) from approximately September 2021 through
January 2022.

Empyrean Benefit Solutions, Inc. is a human resource technology and
services company, headquartered in Houston, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Matthew John Prebeg, Esq.
         Tom Bayko, Esq.
         Christopher M. Faucett, Esq.
         Stephen W. Abbott, Esq.
         Brent T. Caldwell, Esq.
         BAYKO, PREBEG, FAUCETT & ABBOTT, PLLC
         8441 Gulf Fwy., Ste. 307
         Houston, TX 77017-5066
         Telephone: (832) 742-9263
         E-mail: mprebeg@bpfalawfirm.com
                 tbayko@bpfalawfirm.com
                 cfaucett@bpfalawfirm.com
                 sabbott@bpfalawfirm.com
                 bcaldwell@bpfalawfirm.com

                  - and –

         Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
         Charles R. Ash, IV, Esq.
         Alana Karbal, Esq.
         SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
         One Towne Square, 17th Floor
         Southfield, MI 48076
         Telephone: (248) 355-0300
         E-mail: kstoops@sommerspc.com
                 crash@sommerspc.com
                 akarbal@sommerspc.com

ENERFIN RESOURCES: Trust Seeks Final OK of Class Action Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Joanne Harris Deitrich
Trust A, trustee Marian D. Browne, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, v. Enerfin Resources I Limited
Partnership, et al., Case No. 6:20-cv-00084-KEW (E.D. Okla.), the
Class Representative Joanne Harris Deitrich Trust A asks the Court
to enter an order for final approval of the:

  1. Proposed class action Settlement;

  2. Notice of Settlement and Plan of Notice; and

  3. Proposed Initial Plan of Allocation.

The Court already certified the following Settlement Class:

   "All non-excluded persons or entities who: (1) received late
   payments under the PRSA from Defendants (or Defendants'
   designee) for oil-and-gas proceeds from Oklahoma wells during
   the Claim Period; or (2) whose proceeds were remitted to
   unclaimed property divisions of any government entity by
   the Defendants during the Claim Period; and (3) whose
   payments or whose unclaimed property did not include the
   statutory interest required by the PRSA."

   Excluded from the Class are: (1) Defendants, their
   affiliates, predecessors, and employees, officers, and
   directors; (2) any Indian tribe as defined at 30 U.S.C.
   section 1702(4) or Indian allottee as defined at 30 U.S.C.
   section   1702(2); and (3) agencies departments, or
   instrumentalities of the United States of America or the
   State of Oklahoma.

Enerfin Resources Company and its affiliates own and operate
natural gas and crude oil midstream field services assets.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated June 27, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3y787Rz at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Reagan E. Bradford, Esq.
          Ryan K. Wilson, Esq.
          BRADFORD & WILSON PLLC
          431 W. Main Street, Suite D
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 698-2770
          E-mail: reagan@bradwil.com
                  ryan@bradwil.com

               - and -

          James U. White, Jr., Esq.
          JAMES U. WHITE, JR., INC.
          P.O. Box 54783
          Oklahoma City, OK 73154
          Telephone: (405) 842-7545
          Facsimile: (405) 235-1592
          E-mail: jwhite@wcgflaw.com

EOG RESOURCES: Wake Energy Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Wake Energy, LLC, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, v. EOG
Resources, Inc., Case No. 2:20-cv-00183-ABJ (D. Wyo.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying the
Settlement Class, preliminarily approving the Class Action
Settlement, and approving the form and manner of notice to the
Settlement Class.

EOG Resources is an American energy company engaged in hydrocarbon
exploration.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated June 27, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3R3rROz at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Reagan E. Bradford, Esq.
          Ryan K. Wilson, Esq.
          BRADFORD & WILSON PLLC
          431 W. Main Street, Suite D
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 698-2770
          Facsimile: (405) 234-5506
          E-mail: reagan@bradwil.com
                  ryan@bradwil.com

EQUIFAX INFO: Initial Case Management Conference Set for July 19
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CONRAD DIMANCHE, v.
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC, TRANSUNION, LLC, EXPERIAN
INFORMATION SOLUTIONS LLC, PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES LLC, and
FLAGSTAR BANK, Case No. 1:22-cv-02389-RA-SLC (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon.
Judge Sarah L. Cave entered an order scheduling initial case
management conference as follows:

  -- An initial conference in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 16
     will be held on Tuesday, July 19, 2022 at 4:00 p.m. on the
     Court's conference line.

  -- The parties are directed to call: (866) 390-1828; access
     code: 380-9799, at the scheduled time. At the conference,
     the parties must be prepared to discuss the subjects set
     forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and (c).

  -- The counsel shall meet and confer in accordance with Fed.
     R. Civ. P. 26(f) no later than 21 days before the Initial
     Case Management Conference.

  -- No later than one week before the conference, the parties
     shall  file a Report of Rule 26(f) Meeting and Proposed
     Case Management Plan, via ECF, signed by counsel for each
     party.

Equifax provides data solutions. The Company offers financial,
consumer and commercial data, and analytical solutions.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3OWeSfD at no extra charge.[CC]


EXPRESSWAY REALTY: Rodriguez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Expressway Realty
LLC, et al. The case is styled as David Rodriguez, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Expressway Realty
LLC, 3279 Food Service Corp., Case No. 2:22-cv-03453-JMA-LGD
(E.D.N.Y., June 10, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Expressway Realty -- https://expresswayrealty.realtor/ -- is a real
estate agency in Gloucester Township, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James E. Bahamonde, Esq.
          JAMES E. BAHAMONDE, P.C.
          2501 Jody Court
          North Bellmore, NY 11710
          Phone: (516) 783-9662
          Fax: (646) 435-4376
          Email: james@civilrightsny.com


EYE CARE LEADERS: Forrester Files Suit in M.D. North Carolina
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Eye Care Leaders
Holdings, LLC. The case is styled as Chad Forrester, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Eye Care Leaders
Holdings, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-00503 (M.D.N.C., July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

Eye Care Leaders -- https://eyecareleaders.com/ -- offers the most
comprehensive eye care solutions, focused on delivering solutions,
services, and software to ophthalmology practices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott C Harris, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          900 W. MORGAN STREET
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Phone: (919) 600-5000
          Fax: (919) 600-5035
          Email: sharris@milberg.com


FASTENAL COMPANY: Petrosino Files Suit in N.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fastenal Company. The
case is styled as Jonathan Petrosino, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Fastenal Company, Case No.
1:22-cv-00705-MAD-DJS (N.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor for Other Contract.

Fastenal -- https://www.fastenal.com/ -- is the largest fastener
distributor in North America offering a huge selection of OEM, MRO,
construction, industrial, and safety products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip Lawrence Fraietta, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.-NY OFFICE
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Phone: (646) 837-7150
          Email: pfraietta@bursor.com


FEKKAI BRANDS: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fekkai Brands LLC.
The case is styled as Veronica Maddy, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Fekkai Brands LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05646 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

FEKKAI -- https://fekkai.com/ -- is salon hair gone clean from
Frederic Fekkai.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


FIRST GUARANTY: Buckley Sues Over Termination Without Proper Notice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
LORI BUCKLEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FIRST GUARANTY MORTGAGE CORP., Defendant,
Case No. 4:22-mc-00127 (E.D. Tex., June 29, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violation of the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification (WARN) Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant allegedly terminated the
Plaintiff and similarly situated workers without cause as part of,
or as the result of, mass layoffs or plant closings beginning on or
about June 24, 2022, without providing the 60-day advance written
notice of their terminations as required by the WARN Act.

Ms. Buckley was employed by the Defendant as a senior credit policy
analyst from spring 2021 until her termination on June 24, 2022.

First Guaranty Mortgage Corp. is a company that offers mortgage
loans for home purchase and refinance throughout the U.S.,
headquartered in Plano, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Jeffrey P. Prostok, Esq.
         Matthew G. Maben, Esq.
         FORSHEY & PROSTOK, LLP
         777 Main Street, Suite 1550
         Fort Worth, TX 76102
         Telephone: (817) 877-8855
         Facsimile: (817) 877-4151
         E-mail: jprostok@forsheyprostok.com
                 mmaben@forsheyprostok.com

                 - and –

         Jack A. Raisner, Esq.
         Rene S. Roupinian, Esq.
         RAISNER ROUPINIAN LLP
         270 Madison Avenue, Suite 1801
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 221-1747
         Facsimile: (212) 221-1747
         E-mail: rsr@raisnerroupinian.com
                 jar@raisnerroupinian.com

FREQUENCY THERAPEUTICS: FX-322 Phase 2a Study, "Biased," Dewey Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA DEWEY, derivatively on behalf of Nominal Defendant FREQUENCY
THERAPEUTICS, INC., Plaintiff v. MARC A. COHEN, DAVID LUCCHINO, TIM
BARBERICH, CYNTHIA L. FELDMANN, MICHAEL HUANG, ROBERT S. LANGER,
and JOEL S. MARCUS, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00894-UNA (D.
Del., June 30, 2022) is a shareholder derivative action against the
Defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, waste of corporate assets,
and violations of Sections 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5.

According to the complaint, the Defendants authorized the issuance
of false and materially misleading information with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding Frequency
Therapeutics' Phase 2a study on the efficacy of FX-322, its lead
product candidate for treatment for severe sensorineural hearing
loss (SNHL). Specifically, the Defendants failed to disclose that
enrolled individuals had faked their word recognition screening
tests and had hopelessly biased Phase 2a to the point where it was
very unlikely the study would produce statistically significant
results in favor of FX-322. When the truth emerged, the company's
common stock price fell $28.30 per share, or approximately 78
percent, from $36.29 per share to $7.99 at market close on March
23, 2021. As of the date of this filing, Frequency's stock traded
at less than $2 per share, says the suit.

Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. is a pharmaceutical company with its
principal executive offices located in Lexington, Massachusetts.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
         Gina M. Serra, Esq.
         Herbert W. Mondros, Esq.
         RIGRODSKY LAW, P.A.
         300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 210
         Wilmington, DE 19801
         Telephone: (302) 295-5310
         Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
         E-mail: sdr@rl-legal.com
                 gms@rl-legal.com
                 hwm@rl-legal.com

FRESH-MEX & CO: Fails to Pay Restaurant Workers' Minimum, OT Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
PATTI LAUGHLIN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. FRESH-MEX & CO. CORP. d/b/a FRESH-MEX & CO. TEX-MEX
CANTINA, MICHAEL TOUSSAINT, individually, and AMANDA TOUSSAINT,
individually, Case No. 3:22-cv-00703 (M.D. Fla., June 24, 2022) is
a class/collective action complaint for damages and Demand for jury
trial against Defendants for failure to pay restaurant workers
state and federal minimum wages and overtime wages.

The Plaintiff brings this class and collective action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and Florida Minimum Wage Act on behalf of
herself and all restaurant workers paid at reduced hourly wages who
work or have worked at the Fresh-Mex restaurants in Jacksonville,
Florida during the applicable statute of limitations. The
Defendants committed state and federal minimum wage violations
because they compensate front-of-the-house restaurant workers at
the reduced "tip credit" wage notwithstanding that these workers
were not provided the sufficient state and federally mandated
notice of the tip credit requirements, says the suit.

The Defendants also violated the minimum wage requirements under
Florida and federal law because they permitted employees who do not
traditionally receive tips, including but not limited to
supervisors, managers, owners, employers, and/or other
non-customarily tipped employees, to receive tips from a tip pool.
The Defendants have also failed to properly compensate Plaintiff
and similarly situated workers in accordance with the federal
overtime laws when workers work in excess of 40 hours per week.
More specifically, Defendants fail to calculate all employees’
entitlement to overtime compensation on a weekly basis, and instead
only provide overtime compensation when employees work in excess of
eighty hours over a two-week period. Moreover, Defendants fail to
properly calculate the overtime premiums owed to front-of-the-house
employees. Because Defendants failed to provide reduced wage
employees with sufficient notice of the tip credit under state and
federal law, the Defendants are not permitted to rely on the tip
credit toward payment of overtime wages, asserts the suit.

As a result, Plaintiff, and similarly situated restaurant workers
have been denied applicable wages in one or more workweeks during
the relevant time period, the suit added.

The Plaintiff and the FLSA putative collective members are/were
restaurant workers paid at reduced hourly wages and/or improper
overtime wages who worked for Defendants within the last three)
years in Jacksonville, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jordan Richards, Esq.
          David M. Nudel, Esq.
          USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS-JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
          1800 SE 10th Ave, Suite 205
          Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316
          Telephone: (954) 871-0050
          E-mail: Jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
                  David@jordanrichardspllc.com

FUSION LEARNING: Murphy Employment Suit Goes to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled KEVIN MURPHY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. FUSION LEARNING, INC.; DANIELLE
RYCKMAN; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No. 22STCV12668,
was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on June 30, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:22-cv-04497 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay straight and overtime compensation,
failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit
rest periods, failure to keep accurate payroll records, failure to
pay waiting time penalties, failure to pay wages upon termination,
failure to pay minimum wages, and unfair competition.

Fusion Learning, Inc. is an operator of a private school, with its
principal place of business in Grand Rapids, Michigan. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Scott J. Witlin, Esq.
         Caroline C. Dickey, Esq.
         BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
         2029 Century Park East, Suite 300
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone: (310) 284-3880
         Facsimile: (310) 284-3894
         E-mail: scott.witlin@btlaw.com
                 caroline.dickey@btlaw.com

GEO GROUP: Gonzalez Files Suit in C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Geo Group, Inc.,
et al. The case is styled as Hugo Gonzalez, Jose Baca, Erick Lopez,
Mario Manjarrez, Ricardo Sandoval Guadarrama, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. The Geo Group,
Inc., Does 1-10, Case No. 2:22-cv-04014-CAS-MAA (C.D. Cal., June
10, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

The GEO Group, Inc. -- https://www.geogroup.com/ -- is a publicly
traded C corporation that invests in private prisons and mental
health facilities in North America, Australia, South Africa, and
the United Kingdom.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Catherine Elizabeth Sweetser, Esq.
          Rie E Ohta, Esq.
          UCLA LAW CLINICS
          385 Charles E Young Drive East
          Los Angeles, CA 90095
          Phone: (310) 267-5068
          Email: csweetser@sshhzlaw.com
                 ohta@law.ucla.edu

               - and -

          John Clay Washington, Esq.
          Paul L Hoffman, Esq.
          SCHONBRUN SEPLOW HARRIS HOFFMAN AND ZELDES LLP
          200 Pier Avenue No 226
          Hermosa Beach, CA 90245
          Phone: (310) 396-0731
          Email: jwashington@sshhzlaw.com
                 hoffpaul@aol.com


GEORGIA-PACIFIC WOOD: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime, Harris Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRUCE HARRIS and ROY McCullum, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC WOOD PRODUCTS, LLC and
GEORGIA-PACIFIC, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-02530-TWT (N.D. Ga., June
24, 2022) is a class action and a collective action brought by the
Plaintiffs, each individually and on behalf of all other
hourly-paid employees employed by the Defendants at any time within
a three-year period preceding the filing of this Complaint.

The Plaintiffs bring this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act for declaratory judgment,
monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and
costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, as a result of the
Defendants' alleged failure to pay the Plaintiffs and other
hourly-paid employees lawful overtime compensation for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours in a week.

Georgia-Pacific manufactures an array of building products, such as
plywood, OSB materials, gypsum boards, and lumber for residential
and commercial builds.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Steven E. Wolfe, Esq.
          LEGARE, ATTWOOD & WOLFE, LLC
          125 Clairemont Avenue, Suite 380
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (470) 823-4000
          Facsimile: (470) 201-1212
          E-mail: sewolfe@law-llc.com

               - and -

          Laura Edmondson, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: laura@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

GETAROUND INC: Jimenez Seeks Blind's Equal Access to Online Store
-----------------------------------------------------------------
VANESSA JIMENEZ, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GETAROUND, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-05472-JPO (S.D.N.Y., June 28, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the New York City Human Rights Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons. The Defendant's website, getaround.com,
contains access barriers which hinder the Plaintiff and Class
members to enjoy the benefits of its online goods, content, and
services offered to the general public through the website. The
accessibility issues include, but not limited to: (a) when the
website loads, the narrator cannot correctly read the top banner of
the page; (b) links are read as submenus by narrator and do not
work properly when clicked; (c) the website does not have textual
descriptions of the images on the page; (d) narrator does not read
page title when selected; (e) the calendar of the page to reserve
the cars does not work with the narrator; and (f) the narrator does
not read the button to return to the main page, the suit says.

The Plaintiff and Class members seek permanent injunction to cause
a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that the Defendant's website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired individuals.

Getaround, Inc. is an online retail company doing business in New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
         Jarrett S. Charo, Esq.
         William J. Downes, Esq.
         MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
         200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
         New York, NY 10281
         Telephone: (212) 595-6200
         Facsimile: (212) 595-9700
         E-mail: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com
                 jcharo@mizrahikroub.com
                 wdownes@mizrahikroub.com

GLV INC: Seventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in Mullen Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled LAURA MULLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GLV,
INC.; RICK BUTLER; and CHERYL BUTLER, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 20-3021 (7th Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirms the district court's ruling granting GLV's
motion for summary judgment.

Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, writing for the Panel, states
that the lawsuit has dwindled away. It began as a nationwide class
action on behalf of all customers of GLV, which operates in several
states as Sports Performance Volleyball Club. The district court
certified a class limited to customers of GLV's locations in
Illinois, 330 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 2019).

Later, the judge concluded that Laura Mullen, who asserts that GLV
committed fraud, is an unsuitable representative of that class and
invited her to find a substitute. She didn't. Although the class
was never decertified, Mullen's counsel conceded at argument that
this is now an individual rather than a representative suit. She
lost because the judge concluded that she had not been
injured--which made her a bad representative to boot. Mullen also
has dropped many of the substantive theories she presented in the
district court.

The suit's fade-out after the fashion of the Cheshire Cat raised
jurisdictional questions, because all litigants are citizens of
Illinois, the claim rests on state law, and the remaining stakes
are modest. The sole asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is the
Class Action Fairness Act, which applies to class actions with more
than 100 class members, stakes exceeding $5 million, and minimal
diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2)). But when
the claim is predominantly on behalf of citizens of a single state,
a district court often may or must decline to exercise that
jurisdiction. Given the class definition, which is limited to
customers, who purchased services in Illinois, the Panel wondered
whether these limitations apply.

Judge Easterbrook notes that the district court did not discuss the
possibility, and the parties ignored it, so the Seventh Circuit
ordered the filing of supplemental briefs.

Section 1332(d)(4) says that "a district court shall decline to
exercise jurisdiction" when more than two-thirds of the proposed
class members "are citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed" and other conditions are met. "Shall" is a
mandatory term, especially when contrasted with Section 1332(d)(3),
which says that district courts may decline to exercise
jurisdiction in certain circumstances, Judge Easterbrook explains.
Still, both (d)(3) and (d)(4) say "decline to exercise
jurisdiction." These subsections address how the jurisdiction
granted by Section 1332(d)(2) should be managed. This makes them
more like abstention doctrines than limitations on subject-matter
jurisdiction. And, because they are abstention rules, they need not
necessarily be enforced by a court of appeals on its own, when the
parties have overlooked them.

That they can be enforced without a request by a litigant follows
from their classification as abstention doctrines. The Supreme
Court has held that abstention "may be raised by the court sua
sponte," Judge Easterbrook notes, citing Belloli v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132, 143 n.10 (1976).

As it happens, however, the litigation depicted in the appellate
briefs is as the district judge shaped it--that is, as a one-state
class (with perhaps some people who drove into Illinois for
volleyball, but surely more than two-thirds citizens of Illinois),
Judge Easterbrook states. The initial pleading asked the district
court to certify a national class, and perhaps half of GLV's
business is conducted outside Illinois. Jurisdiction depends on the
state of matters when a suit begins. This means that the
requirements for jurisdiction under Section 1332(d)(2) have been
satisfied.

If abstention under Section 1332(d)(4) also depends on the original
complaint, then it would be inappropriate to dismiss this lawsuit,
Judge Easterbrook holds. But does abstention follow the same
date-of-filing norm as the rule that controls the existence of
subject-matter jurisdiction, or does abstention depend on the class
the district judge certifies (if any) and other circumstances that
may change as the case proceeds?

There appears to be a conflict among the circuits on that question,
Judge Easterbrook notes. Precisely because abstention, even under
Section 1332(d)(4), is discretionary when no one asks the court to
abstain, the Panel marks this subject as one needing attention--the
parties did not address it, even in their post-argument briefs--and
move to decision on the merits.

Rick Butler is among the country's most successful volleyball
coaches. Literature and websites promoting Sports Performance
Volleyball Club tout his success and assert that other members of
the staff are "extremely qualified." The Club's teams and graduates
have won multiple national championships.

Ms. Mullen does not contend that any of these statements is false.
Instead she observes that the Club's promotional material is silent
about the conclusions of two bodies--the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services and USA Volleyball--that in 1981,
1984, and 1987, Butler had sexual intercourse with at least three
underage girls he was training. The Department and USA Volleyball
both found, in reports issued in 1995, that the sexual relations
were immoral and unethical, whether or not they were lawful.

Mr. Butler maintains that the girls were 18 and the encounters
consensual. Mullen contends that Illinois law requires GLV to
notify all potential customers that Butler is a rapist (as Mullen
describes the 1980s events), though he has never been charged with
a crime. Between 2013 and 2018, Mullen enrolled her two daughters
in programs conducted by the Club (some by Butler personally), and
she maintains that she would not have done this (or would not have
paid as much) had the Club featured Butler's sexual history with
the same clarity as it trumpets the achievements of athletes he has
trained.

Ms. Mullen lost on summary judgment, however, because she concedes
knowing about the Department's and USA Volleyball's findings. These
reports were not buried in desk drawers and forgotten. They have
been discussed in public repeatedly. There is even a Wikipedia page
devoted to the subject. The page links to many public airings of
the accusations and findings. Mullen herself participated in online
discussions of this topic, and she posted messages that boil down
to a view that the Club's high-quality programs make events of
years ago less important. (No one has accused Butler of any sexual
misconduct since the 1980s, though he has coached thousands of
girls and women.) Mullen enrolled one of her daughters in one of
the Club's programs in 2018, after she filed this suit. All of this
made Mullen a poor representative of parents, who may have enrolled
daughters in ignorance, the district judge thought, and ultimately
scuttled Mullen's substantive claims because she could not show
injury.

Ms. Mullen replies that, although she knew about findings adverse
to Butler, she just didn't believe them--and wasn't prepared to
believe them unless Butler confessed on the Club's own website. She
does not say that she confronted Butler or any employee of the Club
with the findings and received a false answer. Instead she says
that Illinois law requires the Club to proclaim Butler's guilt as a
condition of doing business and that this principle entitles her to
damages no matter what she knew.

The district judge was not persuaded, writing that neither a state
statute nor the common law requires a person, who disputes the
accuracy of allegations made against him, to affirm his own guilt.
The judge added that claims of fraud, whether under a statute or
the common law, require proof of a guilty state of mind, and he
found that the evidence shows "that the Butlers subjectively
believed that despite Rick's past, he was qualified to coach girls
in volleyball, and Mullen does not point to any evidence supporting
a contrary inference."

Ms. Mullen's principal argument on appeal is that, whatever may be
true for common-law claims, two statutes dispense with both proof
of scienter and any need to show detrimental reliance on material
omissions. She is right about the latter proposition, Judge
Easterbrook holds.

Like the district judge, the Seventh Circuit does not take any
position on whether the reports are right about what happened in
the 1980s, let alone on whether Butler's behavior was ethical even
if the girls had reached the age of 18. Nor does the Seventh
Circuit decide whether a parent, who was unaware of the findings
adverse to Butler could state a claim under Illinois law.

Judge Easterbrook points out that it is enough to observe that no
one who professed ignorance stepped in to replace Mullen as a
potential class representative. This class was never decertified,
but in practice this became an individual suit by Mullen alone.
GLV's other customers were not notified and given an opportunity to
opt out, so the judicial decisions cannot affect them.

Today's outcome does not bind any other person whose children
attended the Club. On that understanding, Judge Easterbrook rules,
the judgment is

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated June 23, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3kfz6f7e from Leagle.com.


GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Court Grants Hart's Bid for Equitable Tolling
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUSAN OLIVIA HART, et al., Plaintiffs v. GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY d/b/a Geico, Defendant, Case No.
4:21-CV-00859 (M.D. Pa.), Judge Matthew W. Brann of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania grants
Hart's motion for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

I. Background

In 2021, Hart, on behalf of herself on all similarly situated
employees, commenced this civil action against Government Employees
Insurance Co. ("GEICO") alleging violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, and the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law.

Ms. Hart alleges that during the relevant period -- from May 2018
through the date of the complaint -- she was employed by GEICO as a
Region 1 Adjuster working in the State College, Pennsylvania area.
During the relevant period, GEICO paid its Region 1 Adjusters for
7.75 hours of work per day, based on an eight-and-one-half-hour
workday, with 45 minutes deducted for an unpaid lunch break.
Despite this schedule, Hart typically worked from 8 a.m. until 5:30
to 6:30 p.m. without taking a meal break. Hart and similarly
situated employees were directed by GEICO to enter only 7.75 hours
of work per day to avoid overtime pay.

GEICO allegedly implemented "company-wide policies and business
practices, carried out through intimidation tactics and implied
adverse employment consequences" to pressure Region 1 Adjusters to
enter only 7.75 hours of work per day, even if the adjuster worked
in excess of 7.75 hours. GEICO instructed its supervisors to inform
"Region 1 Adjusters that 7.75 hours of work per day was sufficient
if" the adjusters "were working hard and doing their job" and
thereby reinforced the notion that it was better for an adjuster's
career not to report any excess hours worked.

During the relevant period GEICO allegedly had actual knowledge
through "employee complaints, text messages, emails, internal
employee chat or messaging programs, and other employee monitoring
systems that GEICO's time sheet system and the content thereof was
not accurate" and that Hart and other Region 1 Adjusters typically
worked through their unpaid lunch period and worked in excess of
forty hours per week. GEICO nevertheless permitted the adjusters to
work in excess of forty hours per week without paying those
adjusters proper compensation.

After GEICO filed an answer to the complaint, in July 2021, Hart
file a motion to conditionally certify an FLSA class. Briefing on
the motion was completed on Aug. 24, 2021,11 and the Court granted
Hart's motion on Feb. 10, 2022. The Court permitted potential class
members to opt-in to the class on May 27, 2022.

Shortly thereafter, Hart filed a motion for equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations. She seeks equitable tolling for all
class members for the time between the filing of her motion to
conditionally certify the class and the deadline for potential
class members to opt-in to the class. She contends that her motion
should be granted because the delay in ruling on her motion for
conditional certification has harmed class members by depriving
them of more than one-quarter of the limitations period, occurred
through no fault of their own, and was not caused by any lack of
diligence on their part, and because GEICO would not be prejudiced
by equitable tolling.

GEICO responds that the motion should be denied for three reasons.
First, it asserts that Hart lacks standing to pursue this motion on
behalf of other class members, as members of an FLSA collective
action are individuals, not a class. Second, GEICO argues that the
FLSA statute itself prohibits equitable tolling. Third, GEICO
contends that, even if Hart's motion is appropriately before the
Court, equitable tolling is not warranted because there is no
evidence that the opt-in plaintiffs diligently pursued their
claims, and because the delay in ruling on Hart's motion for class
certification does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance.
Hart has filed a reply brief, and the motion is now ripe for
disposition.

II. Discussion

A. Whether Hart has Standing to Pursue Equitable Tolling

First, GEICO argues that Hart lacks standing to pursue equitable
tolling for other members of the class, as the other potential
class members are not parties to the case and rendering a decision
on equitable tolling would amount to issuing an advisory opinion.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "under the FLSA
'conditional certification' does not produce a class with an
independent legal status, or join additional parties to the
action," rather, those individuals "become parties to a collective
action only by filing written consent with the court."

In the time since Hart filed this motion, however, the deadline for
individuals to opt-in to the action has passed, and all potential
members have filed written consent with the Court to join the
action. Consequently, Judge Brann opines that those individuals are
parties to the action, and the Court may rule on a motion for
equitable tolling without rendering an impermissible advisory
opinion.

B. Whether the FLSA Prohibits Equitable Tolling

GEICO next argues that the language of the FLSA's limitations
period prohibits equitable tolling, as it specifically states that
"every FLSA action will be forever barred" if not brought within
the limitations period.

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has not addressed whether equitable tolling is permissible under
the FLSA, GEICO points to no cases within this circuit -- and the
Court has identified none -- that have held, based upon the
language of the FLSA, that equitable tolling is not permissible. To
the contrary, courts within this circuit routinely apply equitable
tolling to FLSA claims. Moreover, at least one court that
considered whether equitable tolling is barred by the language of
the FLSA has rejected such a contention and held that the language
contained therein does not "rebut the presumption of tolling on the
basis of congressional intent."

Judge Brann agrees that the language of the FLSA does not prohibit
the application of equitable tolling. He says, unlike the statute
that the Supreme Court in United States v. Brockamp found did not
permit equitable tolling, in the present case, the FLSA tolling
statute does not set "forth its time limitations in unusually
emphatic form" or "in a highly detailed technical manner, that,
linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing
implicit exceptions" but, rather, uses "fairly simple language."
Nor would reading equitable tolling into the FLSA limitations
period "create serious administrative problems" as it would have in
Brockamp.

Furthermore, although GEICO makes much of the fact that the FLSA
statute contains language stating that claims brought outside the
limitations period are "forever barred," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has examined identical language in a
different statute. In Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that, "'forever barred' language appears to be more a
vestige of mid-20th-century congressional drafting conventions than
a 'clear statement' of Congress' intent to include a jurisdictional
filing deadline in" those statutes.

Judge Brann agrees, based upon the statutes cited by the Ninth
Circuit in Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe that the language "forever
barred" does not indicate Congressional intent to prohibit
equitable tolling for the FLSA limitations period. Consequently, he
concludes that equitable tolling is permissible under the FLSA and
will therefore examine Hart's motion on its merits.

C. Whether Equitable Tolling is Warranted

Finally then, Judge Brann turns to the merits of Hart's request for
equitable tolling. The Third Circuit has observed that "equitable
tolling, if available, can rescue a claim otherwise barred as
untimely by a statute of limitations when a plaintiff has been
prevented from filing in a timely manner due to sufficiently
inequitable circumstances." At bottom, "a plaintiff will not
receive the benefit of equitable tolling unless she exercised due
diligence in pursuing and preserving her claim." "The principles of
equitable tolling thus do not extend to 'garden-variety claims of
excusable neglect.'" Accordingly, "the remedy of equitable tolling
is extraordinary, and courts should extend it 'only sparingly.'"

Judge Brann agrees with those courts that have held that judicial
delay may be an appropriate basis to equitably toll the FLSA
limitations period. Equitable tolling based upon judicial delay is
particularly appropriate "in the FLSA collective action context to
avoid prejudice to actual or potential opt-in plaintiffs that can
arise from the unique procedural posture of collective actions
under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b)."

GEICO nevertheless argues -- and many cases hold -- that the
diligence of the named Plaintiff cannot be imputed to opt-in
plaintiffs, and therefore equitable tolling should be denied on the
ground that the opt-in plaintiffs have not demonstrated due
diligence. Judge Brann disagrees with these cases, and instead
agrees with the numerous cases that have held that the diligence of
named plaintiffs is sufficient to warrant equitable tolling for
opt-in plaintiffs.

Turning then Hart's conduct in bringing suit, Judge Brann finds no
indication, or argument from GEICO, that she has been dilatory in
bringing this action. Rather, Hart appears to have both diligently
brought her action and diligently filed a motion to conditionally
certify the class. She was also diligent in filing a motion for
equitable tolling, having filed the motion less than one month
after this Court conditionally certified the proposed class in this
matter.

Because the Plaintiffs have diligently pursued their rights and
were impeded by external factors beyond their control, Judge Brann
concludes that equitable tolling is appropriate. The only remaining
question therefore is the duration of that tolling. Although Hart
requests that equitable tolling apply from the date that she filed
her motion for conditional class certification, Judge Brann finds
the date that briefing concluded to be a more appropriate date to
utilize, as no delays that may have occurred before that date may
be said to have been caused by judicial delay in ruling on the
motion for conditional class certification. Consequently, he
equitably tolls the limitations period for all class members from
Aug. 24, 2021, until May 27, 2022.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Brann concludes that equitable
tolling is appropriate. Consequently, Hart's motion for equitable
tolling is granted, and the limitations period is tolled from Aug.
24, 2021, until May 27, 2022.

An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/58haeum4 from Leagle.com.


GRASS CLIPS: Conditional Certification of Collective Action Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MANUEL VALENTIN CORTEZ,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, v.
GRASS CLIPS, INC., Case No. 1:22-cv-00717-AT (N.D. Ga.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order conditionally certifying
the case as a collective action and order that Court-approved
notice be sent to:

   "all landscapers, or those performing materially similar
   work, employed by the Defendant in the three-year period
   preceding the filing of the Collective Action Complaint in
   order to provide notice of this action and to allow such
   persons to opt-in to the action."

By consenting to this conditional certification, the Parties agree
that the Defendant does not waive any objections or arguments it
may have that the landscapers are not similarly situated, or other
objections or arguments it may have to this matter proceeding as a
Collective Action.

This is a collective action for overtime wages brought under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA").

The Plaintiff Manuel Valentin Cortez worked as a landscaper for
Defendant Grass Clips, Inc.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant violated the FLSA by
failing to pay him, and those similarly situated, overtime wages
for all time worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), the Parties jointly request
that the Court conditionally certify this case as a collective
action and order that Court-approved notice be sent to all
landscapers, or those performing materially similar work, employed
by the Defendant in the three-year period preceding the filing of
the Collective Action Complaint in order to provide notice of this
action and to allow such persons to opt-in to the action.

By consenting to this conditional certification, the Parties agree
that Defendant does not waive any objections or arguments it may
have that the landscapers are not similarly situated, or other
objections or arguments it may have to this matter proceeding as a
Collective Action.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3OZuZsK at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin M. Scott, Esq.
          Michael David Forrest, Esq.
          SCOTT EMPLOYMENT LAW, P.C.
          160 Clairemont Avenue, Suite 610
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (678) 780-4880
          Facsimile: (478) 575-2590
          E-mail: jscott@scottemploymentlaw.com
                  mforrest@scottemploymentlaw.com

               - and -

          Steven E. Wolfe, Esq.
          Marcela X. Johnson, Esq.
          LEGARE, ATTWOOD & WOLFE, LLC
          Decatur Town Center Two
          125 Clairemont Avenue, Suite 380
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (470) 823-4000
          Facsimile: (470) 201-1212
          E-mail: sewolfe@law-llc.com
                  mxjohnson@law-llc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Mark L. Keenan, Esq.
          BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
          3475 Piedmont Road N.E., Suite 1700
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Telephone: (404) 264-4044
          Facsimile: (404) 264-4033
          E-mail: mkeenan@btlaw.com

GROENDYKE TRANSPORT: Underpays Logistics Coordinators, Brown Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ASHLEY BROWN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GROENDYKE TRANSPORT INC., Defendant, Case
No. 5:22-cv-00549-J (W.D. Okla., June 29, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for its failure to compensate the Plaintiff
and similarly situated workers overtime pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours in a workweek in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a logistics coordinator
from approximately October of 2017 until March of 2022.

Groendyke Transport Inc. is a provider of logistic services based
in Oklahoma. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Drew N. Herrmann, Esq.
         Pamela G. Herrmann, Esq.
         Allison H. Luttrell, Esq.
         HERRMANN LAW, PLLC
         801 Cherry St., Suite 2365
         Fort Worth, TX 76102
         Telephone: (817) 479-9229
         Facsimile: (817) 840-5102
         E-mail: drew@herrmannlaw.com
                 pamela@herrmannlaw.com
                 allison@herrmannlaw.com

                 - and –

         Harold L. Lichten, Esq.
         Matthew Thomson, Esq.
         LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
         729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
         Boston, MA 02116
         Telephone: (617) 994-5800
         Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
         E-mail: hlichten@llrlaw.com
                 mthomson@llrlaw.com

GRUMA CORPORATION: Samperio Suit Removed to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Miguel Angel Samperio, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Gruma Corporation, Does 1 through
50, Case No. CIVSB2205552 was removed from the San Bernardino
Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California on June 10, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:22-cv-00969-SVW-SP to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Jobs Civil Rights for Employment
Discrimination.

GRUMA -- https://www.gruma.com/en -- is one of the leading corn
flour and tortilla producers, serving industrial, retail, and
foodservice customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Isandra Y Fernandez, Esq.
          James R Hawkins, Esq.
          Kacey E. Cook, Esq.
          James Hawkins APLC
          9880 Research Drive Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: (949) 387-7200
          Fax: (949) 387-6676
          Email: isandra@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 james@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 Kacey@jameshawkinsaplc.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Dan Forman, Esq.
          CDF LABOR LAW LLP
          707 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 5150
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Phone: (213) 612-6300
          Fax: (213) 612-6301
          Email: dforman@cdflaborlaw.com


ITS LOGISTICS: Judge Grosjean to Rule on Guthrie's Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled KEITH GUTHRIE, individually, on a
representative basis, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ITS LOGISTICS, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:21-CV-0729 AWI EPG (E.D. Cal.), the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California referred to Magistrate Judge Erica
P. Grosjean the pending motion for preliminary approval of class
action settlement.

On June 15, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a notice of motion for
preliminary approval of a class action settlement. The Plaintiff
did not file the motion as "motion" in the Court's ECF docketing
system and also did not set a hearing date for the matter. Despite
these filing errors, the Court will accept the notice as a
"motion."

So construing the filing, the Court finds that the pending motion
should be referred to Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean for entry
Findings and Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72.

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

   1. The pending motion for preliminary approval of class action
      settlement is Referred to Magistrate Judge Erica P.
      Grosjean;

   2. If Magistrate Judge Grosjean desires a hearing on the
      pending motion, Magistrate Judge Grosjean's Chambers will
      contact the parties and set a hearing date at Magistrate
      Judge Grosjean's convenience.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 23, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yeyjv9ev from Leagle.com.


JAGUAR LAND ROVER: Rains Files Suit in D. New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jaguar Land Rover
North America, LLC. The case is styled as Jason Rains, David
Cerutti, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-04370
(D.N.J., June 30, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act.

N Jaguar Land Rover -- https://www.jaguarlandrover.com/ -- is one
of the world's premier manufacturers of luxury sedans, sports cars
and SUVs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sofia Balile, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, LLC
          43 Danbury Road, 3rd Floor
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Phone: (917) 981-0849
          Fax: (888) 953-6237
          Email: sofia.balile@gmail.com


JAGUAR LAND: Court Narrows Claims in Shaaya's 1st Amended Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAOUD SHAAYA and MARK FREIBURGHOUSE, individually and
on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No.
2:20-cv-5679 (D.N.J.), Judge Claire C. Cecchi of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey grants in part and denies in
part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the First Amended Class
Action Complaint.

I. Background

Plaintiff Shaaya, a New York citizen, and Plaintiff Freiburghouse,
a California citizen, bring the instant putative class action on
behalf of purchasers of certain diesel-powered vehicles, which were
equipped with a diesel particulate filter ("DPF"). They allege that
the DPF, by design, suffers from two defects: (1) it is prone to
clogging under normal driving conditions; and (2) a warning light,
which indicates when to begin a filter-cleaning process that
prevents clogging, goes on too late or not at all. As alleged, a
clogged DPF can cause engine failure and poses major safety risks.
The Plaintiffs bring a variety of consumer claims, primarily
asserting that the Defendant defrauded consumers by failing to
disclose DPF defects.

Plaintiff Shaaya leased a 2018 model diesel Range Rover HSE from
the Land Rover Manhattan dealership in New York, New York, in July
2018. Freiburghouse purchased a 2017 model diesel Land Rover Range
Rover Sport HSE equipped with a diesel engine from Penske Jaguar
Land Rover in Cerritos, California in December 2016. Prior to
acquiring their vehicles, the Plaintiffs each "test drove the
vehicle, spoke with the dealer sales representative at length about
the vehicle, and viewed the Monroney sticker posted on the side of
the vehicle." They allege they were not informed that their
vehicles suffered from the DPF Defect and relied upon this fact.
They further allege that they would not have acquired their
vehicles if the DPF Defect has been disclosed.

In November 2018, with 3,325 miles on the odometer, Shaaya's
vehicle's DPF amber warning light illuminated, instructing him to
drive at highway speeds to activate regeneration. However, his
vehicle would not accelerate past nine miles per hour and the light
turned red (indicating full) within the hour. After unsuccessfully
attempting to perform the regeneration process himself, Shaaya
returned his vehicle to the dealership, where he was advised to
replace his DPF. He requested that the cost of this replacement be
covered pursuant to the vehicle's New Vehicle Limited Warranty (the
"NVLW"), but this request was denied. He paid "$3,122.98
out-of-pocket for the repair." Thereafter, in February 2019, with
4,766 miles on the odometer, Shaaya's DPF clogged again and
required a second replacement. Shaaya alleges that he was, at the
time of service, within the coverage of the NVLW and the "Emissions
Coverage."

For his part, Freiburghouse alleges that, in August 2020, with
approximately 22,396 miles on the odometer, his vehicle's check
engine light illuminated. He brought the vehicle to Penske Jaguar
on Aug. 18, 2020, where he was told that the DPF was clogged, and
the diesel exhaust fluid was compromised. The dealer induced
regeneration to clean the DPF and replaced the fluid. Two days
after picking up his vehicle, on Aug. 23, 2020, Freiburghouse
contacted Penske Jaguar to inform them his check engine light was
on again. Penske Jaguar replaced his diesel exhaust fluid and the
injector for the diesel exhaust fluid.

When Freiburghouse asked why his DPF warning light never went on,
the dealer service representative provided the following written
explanation via text: "the message for the particulate filter won't
come on unless the system is completely blocked/clogged and then
the vehicle would go into fail-safe mode (won't accelerate past 30
mph)." Although the dealership initially attempted to charge
Freiburghouse a $189 "diagnostic fee," Penske Jaguar Land Rover
ultimately agreed to cover this cost. Freiburghouse alleges that,
at the time of service, his vehicle was within the NVLW and the "96
months/80,000 miles Emissions Coverage."

Plaintiffs Shaaya and Freiburghouse allege that the Defendant knew
about the DPF Defect prior to their acquisition of the vehicles
because it is a design defect and because it conducted extensive
testing/analysis of the Class Vehicles prior to release, which
would have revealed the defect. They also allege that Defendant had
knowledge of the defect because a high number of consumers ordered
replacement exhaust filters, filed complaints (both publicly and
confidentially), and threatened litigation.

Mr. Shaaya initiated the action by filing a putative class action
complaint on May 7, 2020. On July 17, 2020, the Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the Complaint. That motion was withdrawn as the
parties consented to extending Shaaya's time to file an amended
complaint.

On Aug. 28, 2020, Shaaya, joined by Freiburghouse, filed the First
Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint asserts 10 causes of
action: violation of New York's General Business Law for Deceptive
Acts or Practices Section 349 by Shaaya (Count I); breach of
express warranty in violation of N.Y. U.C.C. Section 2-313 by
Shaaya (Count II); breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability in violation of N.Y. U.C.C. Section 2-314 by Shaaya
(Count III); fraudulent omission by both Shaaya and Freiburghouse
(Count IV); breach of implied and written warranty in violation of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("the MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. Section
2301, et seq., by both Shaaya and Freiburghouse (Count V); unjust
enrichment by both Shaaya and Freiburghouse (Count VI); violation
of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (the "CLRA"), Cal.
Civ. Code Section 1750, et seq., by Freiburghouse (Count VII);
violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (the "UCL"),
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200, et seq., by Freiburghouse
(Count VIII); breach of express warranty under Cal. Com. Code
Section 2313 by Freiburghouse (Count IX); and Breach of Implied
Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code Sections 1792 and 1791.1, et seq., by
Freiburghouse (Count X). Id. at 38-59. The First Amended Complaint
asserts subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).

On Oct. 2, 2020, the Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss
the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
arguing that Plaintiff Freiburghouse lacks Article III standing and
that both Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief. The
Plaintiffs filed an opposition on Nov. 23, 2020, to which the
Defendant replied on Dec. 14, 2020.

II. Discussion

A. Article III Standing

The Defendant argues that Freiburghouse failed to meet the first
element of standing; it does not contest the second or third
element. Specifically, the Defendant argues that Freiburghouse did
not establish an injury in fact because his service fees were
waived and his allegations are too speculative to confer standing.

However, Judge Cecchi finds that Freiburghouse's allegations are
sufficient to confer standing. Freiburghouse has demonstrated an
injury in fact because he alleges that, at the time of purchase, he
was under the impression that his vehicle's DPF functioned, but
later realized the vehicle's DPF was prone to clogging and had a
faulty warning light. Freiburghouse alleges that the Defendant's
product did not work as intended and, as such, he could not utilize
the vehicle to its full functionality -- he continues to own an
allegedly defective vehicle. Accordingly, Judge Cecchi finds that
Freiburghouse has demonstrated an injury in fact sufficient to
confer standing because he "set forth sufficient factual
allegations that, if proven true, would permit a factfinder to
determine that the suffered at least some economic injury" from his
purchase.

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Count I: Violation of N.Y. GBL Section 349 (Shaaya)

Under Count I, Shaaya contends that the Defendant violated N.Y.
G.B.L. Section 349, New York's consumer protection statute. Shaaya
alleges that the Defendant's failure to disclose the DPF Defect and
other material facts related to said defect: (1) constituted a
deceptive act directed at consumers, (2) was misleading in a
material way "because a reasonable person would have considered the
facts concealed or not disclosed in deciding whether or not to
purchase or lease Defendant's Class Vehicles, or to pay less for
them," and (3) caused injury to him and Class Members.

The Defendant argues that it did not have exclusive knowledge of
the alleged DPF Defect because it was mentioned in public
complaints, articles, and online forums. It argues that the section
349 claim must be dismissed because Shaaya has not alleged
sufficient facts concerning the relationship between itself and the
non-party dealership from which Shaaya purchased his vehicle.

Judge Cecchi holds that a section 349 claim based upon a fraudulent
omission satisfies the pleading requirements -- even if the
plaintiff purchased the product at issue from a non-party retailer
-- if the defendant, like the Defendant in the present case, had
"knowledge of the purported defect and failed to disclose that
information." Moreover, courts routinely allow section 349 claims
to proceed against a car manufacturer though the consumer purchased
his vehicle from a non-party dealership, without requiring
allegations of a direct relationship between the dealership and the
Defendant. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a
violation of section 349 by the Defendant and the motion to dismiss
Count I is denied.

2. Counts II and IX: Breach of Express Warranty (Shaaya and
Freiburghouse)

Under Count II, Shaaya asserts a claim for a breach of express
warranty under N.Y. U.C.C. Section 2-313. Under Count IX,
Freiburghouse asserts a claim for breach of express warranty under
Cal. Com. Code Section 231. The Plaintiffs assert that the
Defendant breached two different warranties, the NVLW and the
Federal Emission Control System Warranty (the "Federal Emissions
Warranty"), by failing to disclose the DPF Defect.

Judge Cecchi finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded
their breach of express warranty claims as to the NVLW but not as
to the Federal Emissions Warranty. Given that the DPF Defect may be
considered a manufacturing defect at this stage, the Plaintiffs
have sufficiently alleged a breach of the NVLW. However, there are
no allegations in the First Amended Complaint to support the
assertion that the Diesel Selective Catalyst Reduction (SCR) System
particulate filter is another name for the DPF, and the Plaintiffs
offer to address any pleading deficiency on the issue via
amendment.

Accordingly, Counts II and IX may proceed, as the Plaintiffs have
adequately pleaded that the DPF Defect is covered by the NVLW.
However, to the extent the Plaintiffs also alleges in Counts II and
IX that the Defendant breached the Federal Emissions Warranty, the
Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed without prejudice.

3. Count III: Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability
under N.Y. U.C.C. Section 2-314 (Shaaya)

Under Count III, Shaaya asserts that the Defendant breached the
implied warranty of merchantability in violation of N.Y. U.C.C.
Section 2-314. Shaaya alleges that the Defendant is a merchant with
respect to the sale of the Class Vehicles, which "were and are not
fit for their ordinary purpose of providing reasonably reliable and
safe transportation because the Class Vehicles suffer from a DPF
Defect that can make driving unreasonably dangerous." The Defendant
contends that Shaaya failed to sufficiently support his claim that
the Class Vehicles were not fit for their ordinary purpose and that
the implied warranty of merchantability claim is barred for failure
to establish privity between itself and Shaaya.

Judge Cecchi dismisses each of the Defendant's arguments. First,
under New York law, the 'ordinary purpose' of a motor vehicle is
"to enable the purchaser to transport herself upon the streets and
highways in a reasonably safe manner." Based on Shaaya's
allegations, the Court may reasonably infer that the DPF Defect
prevents him from using his vehicle in a reasonably safe manner and
may impede his ability to transport himself. Accordingly, Shaaya
has sufficiently pleaded that the Class Vehicles are not fit for
their ordinary purpose and are thus unmerchantable.

Furthermore, Shaaya is excused from pleading privity. Although
privity of contract is generally required for a purchaser to
recover under a breach of implied warranty theory, New York law
recognizes two exceptions: (1) where the product in question is a
"thing of danger," meaning that, "when used for the purpose for
which it is made it is likely to be a source of danger to several
or many people if not properly designed and fashioned"; and (2)
where plaintiff is asserting the claim as a third-party
beneficiary." Both exceptions apply in the case.

Accordingly, Shaaya is excused from pleading privity and
sufficiently stated a claim for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability under Count III.

4. Count IV: Fraudulent Omission (Shaaya and Freiburghouse)

Under Count IV, both Plaintiffs plead a cause of action for common
law fraudulent omission, alleging that the Defendant intentionally
concealed and failed to disclose the DPF Defect. For the purposes
of this motion only, the parties assume that the laws of both New
York and California are applicable to Count IV. The Defendant
argues that the Plaintiffs insufficiently allege that it owed a
duty to disclose the DPF Defect and fail to meet the particularity
standards under Rule 9(b).

First, Judge Cecchi finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that the Defendant owed a duty to disclose the DPF Defect
under both New York and California law. Although the Defendant
contests the second element, the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged
that information available to the Defendant about the DPF Defect
was not available to them because it had the benefit of
confidential reports and complaints, testing data, and other
insider knowledge.

Further, the Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent omission satisfy the
Rule 9(b) particularity requirements. In order to satisfy Rule
9(b), fraudulent omissions claims must set out: "(1) what the
omissions were; (2) the person responsible for the failure to
disclose; (3) the context of the omissions and the manner in which
they misled the plaintiff; and (4) what the defendant obtained
through the fraud."

The Plaintiffs allege the who (Defendant), what (the DPF Defect),
when (prior to the sale of the class vehicles to the present),
where (the various channels of information through which Defendant
sold the Class Vehicles, including interactions with sales
representations at authorized dealerships in New York and
California, and viewing Monroney stickers), and how (had the
Plaintiffs and class members known about the DFP Defect they would
not have purchased or leased the vehicles, or would have paid less
for them).

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a fraudulent
omission claim and Count IV may proceed.

5. Count V: Breach of Implied and Written Warranties under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Shaaya and Freiburghouse)

Under Count V, Shaaya and Freiburghouse assert that Defendant
breached implied and written warranties in violation of the MMWA,
15 U.S.C. Section 2301 et seq. To state a claim under the MMWA,
plaintiffs must adequately plead a cause of action for breach of
written or implied warranty under state law. To that effect, claims
under the MMWA stand or fall with the express or implied warranty
claims under state law. Because Shaaya and Freiburghouse have
sufficiently stated a claim for a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability (see supra section 3(d); infra section 3(i)), their
claims under Count V may proceed at this time.

6. Count VI: Unjust Enrichment (Shaaya and Freiburghouse)

Under Count VI, Shaaya and Freiburghouse assert unjust enrichment
claims under their respective state's laws. New York allows for
free-standing unjust enrichment claims. To plead an unjust
enrichment claim under New York law, a plaintiff must establish:
"(1) that the defendant benefitted; (2) at the plaintiff's expense;
and (3) that equity and good conscience require restitution." The
Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims must
be dismissed because they are duplicative of other claims.

However, at the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, a plaintiff
may plead unjust enrichment as an alternative theory of relief to
other related claims asserted in the complaint. The Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendant has unjustly profited by selling and
leasing vehicles with malfunctioning DPF systems, as well as
charging owners and lessees to repair these DPF Defects. Thus, as
the Plaintiffs have asserted that Defendant unjustly benefited at
their expense, the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged an unjust
enrichment claim. Accordingly, Count VI may proceed.

7. Count VII and VIII: Violations of California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act and Unfair Competition Law (Freiburghouse)

Under Counts VII and VIII, Freiburghouse asserts that the Defendant
violated the CLRA Section 1750 et seq. and the UCL, Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code Section 17200 et seq., respectively, by knowingly
concealing (or failing to disclose) the alleged DPF Defect. To
assert a claim under the CLRA pursuant to a theory of omission, the
plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the defendant omitted
material facts "contrary to a representation actually made by the
defendant, or an omission of fact the defendant was obliged to
disclose." Similarly, to succeed under the UCL on a theory of
fraudulent omission, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant had a duty to disclose the omitted fact.

The Defendant argues that Freiburghouse's CLRA and UCL claims must
be dismissed because he fails to sufficiently allege that Defendant
had a duty to disclose the alleged DPF Defect.

Under California law, a manufacturer's duty to disclose is analyzed
the same under the CLRA and the UCL as it is for a common law
fraudulent concealment claim. Thus, for the she reasons stated,
Judge Cecchi finds that Freiburghouse has sufficiently alleged a
duty to disclose the DPF Defect under the CLRA and the UCL.
Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts VII and VIII
is denied.

8. Count X: Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability in
violation of California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
(Freiburghouse)

Under Count X, Freiburghouse asserts that Defendant breached the
implied warranty of merchantability in violation of the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code Sections 1792
and 1791.1, et seq., by selling him an unsafe and unreliable
vehicle. There is no privity requirement under the Song-Beverly
Act.

Freiburghouse alleges that in August 2020 he experienced an issue
with the DPF's warning light system, which did not alert him when
the DPF was clogged. Despite repairs, Freiburghouse alleges that
his warning lights system is still defective and his vehicle still
suffers from the DPF Defect, which can cause sudden and unexpected
loss of power, exhaust inhalation by vehicle occupants, and
increased risk of fire.

Given these purportedly dangerous defects, the Court finds that
Freiburghouse has sufficiently alleged that his vehicle fails to
provide safe and reliable transportation. Accordingly,
Freiburghouse has sufficiently stated an implied warranty of
merchantability claim, and Count X may proceed at this time.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss. Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and X may
proceed. Counts II and IX may also proceed to the extent the
Plaintiffs allege the Defendant breached the NVLW, but not to the
extent that the Plaintiffs allege the Defendant breached the
Federal Emissions Warranty. Regarding the Federal Emissions
Warranty, the Plaintiffs may file a second amended complaint that
cures the pleading deficiencies discussed herein within 30 days of
the date of the Opinion. An appropriate Order follows the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/22fwduup from Leagle.com.


JAMES LEBLANC: Briefing for Class Cert. Bid Extended to July 21
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRIAN HUMPHREY, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. JAMES LEBLANC,
Case No. 3:20-cv-00233-JWD-SDJ (M.D. La.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order extending the briefing schedule for class
certification by three weeks, as follows:

   -- The Plaintiffs' motion for class      July 21, 2022
      certification:

   -- Defense response to motion for        August 22, 2022
      class certification:

   -- The Plaintiffs' reply regarding       September 6, 2022
      motion for class certification:

A copy of the Court's order Plaintiff's motion dated June 27, 2022
is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3NBMkai at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mercedes Montagnes, Esq.
          Rebecca Ramaswamy, Esq.
          Elena Malik, Esq.
          Nishi Kumar, Esq.
          THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE INITIATIVE
          1024 Elysian Fields Avenue
          New Orleans, LA 70117
          Telephone: (504) 529-5955
          Facsimile: (504) 595-8006
          E-mail: mmontagnes@defendla.org

               - and -

          William Most, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM MOST, L.L.C.
          201 St. Charles Ave., Ste. 114 #101
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 509-5023
          E-mail: williammost@gmail.com

               - and -

          Michael Kanovitz, Esq.
          Stephen Weil, Esq.
          Kelly Jo Popkin, Esq.
          LOEVY & LOEVY
          311 N. Aberdeen, 3 rd FL
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: (312) 243-5900
          Facsimile: (312) 243-5902
          E-mail: weil@loevy.com

JJB INC: Eddings Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages for Front Desk
---------------------------------------------------------------
DENNIS EDDINGS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. JJB, INC. and HAMANT KUMAR PATEL, in his
individual capacity, Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-01980 (E.D. La.,
June 28, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for failure
to compensate the Plaintiff and similarly situated workers overtime
pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a front desk staff at
Best Western Slidell Inn from approximately February 8, 2013
through April 13, 2022.

JJB, Inc., doing business as Best Western Slidell Inn, is a hotel
management company, located at 120 Taos Street, Slidell, Louisiana.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Rene F. Rocha, Esq.
         MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
         400 Poydras St., Suite 1505
         New Orleans, LA 70130
         Telephone: (504) 636-6310
         Facsimile: (954) 327-3018
         E-mail: rrocha@forthepeople.com

                - and –

         C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
         MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
         N. Orange Ave., 16th Floor
         P.O. Box 4979
         Orlando, FL 32802
         Telephone: (407) 420-1414
         Facsimile: (407) 867-4791
         E-mail: rmorgan@forthepeople.com

                - and –

         Chanelle J. Ventura, Esq.
         MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
         8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
         Plantation, FL 33324
         Telephone: (954) 318-0268
         Facsimile: (954) 327-3039
         E-mail: cventura@forthepeople.com

JOHN VARVATOS: 3rd Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Class Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled In re: John Varvatos Enterprises Inc., et
al., Debtors. TESSA KNOX, individually and as the Certified
Representative of the Class of Judgment Creditors, Appellant v.
LION HENDRIX CAYMAN LIMITED, Case No. 21-2766 (3d Cir.), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirms the dismissal
of the Appellant's adversary complaint.

In May 2020, menswear company John Varvatos Enterprises, Inc.
("Varvatos") -- like many retailers in recent years -- filed for
bankruptcy. Just prior to filing, the company became liable for
millions in damages stemming from a class action challenging its
policy of giving free clothes to male, but not female, employees.
Bankruptcy would leave this class of judgment creditors (the
"Class") with only a fraction of that sum. So the Class filed an
adversary complaint in the Bankruptcy Court seeking to subordinate
the claim of a senior secured creditor so its own unsecured claim
could be paid in full.

The Court dismissed its complaint, and the District Court affirmed.
The Third Circuit does the same.

I.

Varvatos sold its brand name "John Varvatos" menswear in stores
nationwide. It gave its male sales professionals $12,000 a year in
brand clothing to wear at work. Female sales professionals had no
clothing allowance but were, in 2013, offered the ability to
purchase clothes at a 50% discount from a different retailer,
AllSaints.

In 2017, Tessa Knox, a former Varvatos employee, brought a
sex-discrimination class action alleging that the company's
clothing-allowance policy violated the Federal Equal Pay Act, the
New York Equal Pay Act, the New York Human Rights Law, and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court certified a class of
69 current and former women sales professionals, with Knox serving
as class representative.

A jury found that Varvatos violated the civil rights laws and was
liable for punitive damages under Title VII. On March 24, 2020, a
judgment was entered in favor of the Class and against the company
for $3,516,051.23. On May 6, Varvatos and two affiliated entities
(collectively, the "Debtors") filed voluntary petitions for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Debtors signed that same day an asset purchase agreement with
Appellee Lion/Hendrix Cayman Limited ("LHCL"). At the time, LHCL
owned Lion/Hendrix Corp., which owned Varvatos. LHCL in turn was
majority-owned and controlled by affiliates of Lion Capital Fund
III Partnerships. Under the proposed purchase agreement, LHCL would
buy substantially all the Debtors' assets for $19,450,000 in cash
and a credit bid of $76 million in secured debt held by it.

Because the sale would, if approved, leave little for holders of
unsecured claims, the Class filed an adversary proceeding in the
Bankruptcy Court seeking to equitably subordinate (that is,
deprioritize) LHCL's secured claim. It alleged it would be unjust
for LHCL to be paid before the Class because LHCL and its
affiliates "encouraged" and "facilitated" Varvatos's unlawful
clothing-allowance policy. The Bankruptcy Court held that the Class
failed to state a claim for equitable subordination and dismissed
its complaint without providing leave to amend. The District Court
affirmed, and the Class now appeals to the Third Circuit.

II.

Circuit Judge Thomas L. Ambro, writing for the Panel, states that
the Third Circuit reviews de novo a district court's appellate
review of a bankruptcy court's decision, exercising the same
standard of review as the district court. At the motion-to-dismiss
stage, the Third Circuit accepts all factual allegations as true to
determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for
relief.

III.

The claims of a debtor's creditors are paid per a priority scheme.
As relevant here, that secured claims (like that of LHCL) are given
priority and paid before unsecured claims (like that of the Class).
This scheme is "fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code's operation,"
Judge Ambro explains, citing Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137
S.Ct. 973, 984 (2017).

The Code does, however, permit a bankruptcy court to disturb the
claim hierarchy "under principles of equitable subordination;" see
11 U.S.C. Section 510(c)(1). That doctrine lets the court
subordinate distribution of all or part of a higher priority claim
in favor of a lower priority claim where justice so requires. For
it to apply, three factors must be met: (1) the higher priority
creditor must have engaged in inequitable conduct, (2) that conduct
injured a lower priority creditor or unfairly advantaged the
misbehaving creditor, and (3) claim subordination would not be
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.

Judge Ambro states that the Panel begins and ends with the first
factor, as the Panel agrees with the Bankruptcy and District Courts
that the Class failed to allege any inequitable conduct, citing
Citicorp Venture Cap., Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured
Claims, 323 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).

The Class asserts that LHCL -- though not a party in the class
action proceedings -- acted inequitably by encouraging and
facilitating Varvatos's discriminatory clothing-allowance policy.
It premises this conclusion on a single allegation: that during the
class action trial Ann Byron, Varvatos's former Vice President of
Human Resources, testified that the "head of Lion" spoke with John
Varvatos about Varvatos's clothing-allowance policy and agreed that
they would simply offer women sales professionals a 50 percent
discount off the full retail price of certain clothes at another
store in Lion's Fund III portfolio, AllSaints.

Judge Ambro finds that this allegation overreads Byron's actual
trial testimony:

   Q. Ms. Byron, do you recall when the AllSaints discount policy
      was instituted?

   A. I believe it was talked about potentially or instituted in
      2013.

   Q. And how did it come to be put in place?

   A. The head of L[i]on Capital and John Varvatos spoke about
      the possibility of wanting to provide our female associates
      with a benefit since we did not produce any clothing for
      female associates.

That testimony suggests only that an individual from "Lion Capital"
discussed with Varvatos the possibility of providing some benefit
to the latter's women sales professionals, Judge Ambro notes. It
does not support a reasonable inference that LHCL acted inequitably
toward the Class, Judge Ambro holds.

The Class submits that, if given another chance, it could offer
more facts indicating LHCL's inequitable conduct. It, thus,
contends the Bankruptcy Court erred in holding that any amendment
to the complaint would be futile.

The Third Circuit reviews a court's "denial of leave to amend for
abuse of discretion, and review de novo its determination that
amendment would be futile," citing U.S. ex rel. Schumann v.
AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).
Applying that standard, the Third Circuit also concludes amendment
would be futile.

The Class specifies no additional facts that might raise a
reasonable inference that LHCL behaved badly, Judge Ambro opines.
The Class broadly asserts that it could allege facts demonstrating
that LHCL -- rather than some other Lion entity -- offered Varvatos
the AllSaints discount and that Varvatos would, in the absence of
that benefit, have changed its clothing-allowance policy.

But even if available and proven, this would suggest only that the
provision of an LHCL-related benefit to Varvatos's women sales
professionals contributed to Varvatos's decision to continue its
prior misconduct, not that LHCL itself engaged in misconduct, Judge
Ambro holds.

For these reasons, the Third Circuit affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated June 23, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3m2pknr5 from Leagle.com.


JUUL LABS: School District Sues Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Ads
--------------------------------------------------------------
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ALMA CENTER-HUMBIRD-MERRILLAN, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS,
INC. F/K/A PAX LABS, INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS
PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH; RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA
CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP
MORRIS USA, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03869 (N.D. Cal.,
June 30, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
negligence, gross negligence, and violations of the Wisconsin
Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

School District of Alma Center-Humbird-Merrillan is a public school
district with its administrative offices in Alma Center,
Wisconsin.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Thomas P. Cartmell, Esq.
         Jonathan P. Kieffer, Esq.
         Tyler W. Hudson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF & CARTMELL LLP
         4740 Grand Ave., Ste. 300
         Kansas City, MO 64112
         Telephone: (816) 701-1100
         Facsimile: (816) 531-2372
         E-mail: tcartmell@wcllp.com
                 jpkieffer@wcllp.com
                 thudson@wcllp.com

                 - and –

         Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
         Brad Honnold, Esq.
         GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
         9500 Nall Ave., Ste. 400
         Overland Park, KS 66207
         Telephone: (913) 451-3433
         E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com
                 bhonnold@gohonlaw.com

                 - and –

         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com

                 - and –

         Rahul Ravipudi, Esq.
         PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP
         11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700
         Los Angeles, CA 90025
         Telephone: (310) 477-1700
         Facsimile: (310) 477-1699
         E-mail: ravipudi@psblaw.com

                 - and –

         John P. Fiske, Esq.
         BARON & BUDD, P.C.
         11440 West Bernardo Court Suite 265
         San Diego, CA 92127
         Telephone: (858) 251-7424
         Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
         E-mail: jfiske@baronbudd.com

                 - and –

         Khaldoun Baghdadi, Esq.
         WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER, P.C.
         650 California Street, 26th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94108
         Telephone: (415) 617-1269
         E-mail: kbaghdadi@walkuplawoffice.com

JUUL LABS: Triggers E-Cigarette Youth Crisis, Clark County Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, by and through the Clark County Board
of Education, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case
No. 3:22-cv-03845 (N.D. Cal., June 29, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and
violations of Kentucky Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

The Clark County Public Schools case has been consolidated in MDL
No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge William H. Orrick.

Clark County Public Schools is a school district with its offices
located on Lexington Avenue in Winchester, Clark County, Kentucky.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Nu Mark LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria Group, Inc.,
with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Ronald E. Johnson, Jr., Esq.
         Sarah N. Emery, Esq.
         Hendy Johnson Vaughn Emery, Esq.
         909 Wright's Summit Parkway, Suite 210
         Ft. Wright, KY 41011
         Telephone: (859) 578-4444
         Facsimile: (859) 578-4440
         E-mail: rjohnson@justicestartshere.com
                 semery@justicestartshere.com

K&B AUTO: Counts 1 & 2 of Vogt's Second Amended Complaint Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LILLIAN LOUISE MORGAN VOGT, individually and as the
Representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff(s) v. K&B AUTO SALES, LLC, et al., Defendant(s), Case No.
4:22-cv-00385-SRC (E.D. Mo.), Judge Stephen R. Clark of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, grants K&B's Motion to Dismiss Vogt's Second Amended
Complaint.

I. Introduction

After the used minivan Lillian Vogt purchased did not work as
expected, she discovered that it had been totaled in a crash just
four months before. Believing that K&B Auto and Progressive each
fraudulently concealed the damage to the minivan, Vogt filed this
lawsuit in state court, and Progressive removed the case. K&B moves
to dismiss, arguing that Vogt's allegations against it, even if
true, fail to state a claim. The Court agrees and grants the
motion.

II. Background

In October 2020, Vogt purchased a 2014 Dodge Grand Caravan from K&B
for $6,500. After noticing the minivan was "not performing as
expected," Vogt had it evaluated and learned that it had been
involved in a crash in June 2020. After that crash, Progressive
Casualty Insurance Co. declared the minivan a total loss and
purchased it for salvage. Despite the minivan's history,
Progressive obtained a clean title and sold the minivan without
disclosing that "it was a salvage vehicle." Though Vogt does not
allege how K&B obtained the minivan, Vogt does claim that K&B sold
it to her in October 2020 without identifying it as a "salvaged
vehicle."

Ms. Vogt filed the putative class-action lawsuit in state court,
though she only brings individual claims against K&B. She directs
counts 1 and 2 of her Second Amended Complaint at K&B.

In count 1, Vogt seeks recission of the contract for the sale of
the minivan and a refund of the $6,500 purchase price, based on her
allegation that K&B fraudulently misrepresented the minivan's
history. According to Vogt, "K&B was aware, or should have been
aware, of the history and prior damage" to the minivan, and,
further, concealed the minivan's history and damage from her. Vogt
also claims K&B "made specific representations to her about the
quality of the Automobile and its history."

In count 2, Vogt brings a claim under the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act ("MMPA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. Sections 407.010-407.130,
seeking damages in excess of $25,000, interest and costs, punitive
damages, and injunctive relief.

While the case was still in state court, K&B moved to dismiss, or
in the alternative, for a more definite statement. After
Progressive removed the case, Vogt responded to K&B's motion, which
is now ready for the Court's consideration.

III. Discussion

K&B moves to dismiss counts 1 and 2 of Vogt's Second Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim. It argues that count 1
"fails to properly allege all essential elements of fraud,
fraudulent representation, fraudulent misrepresentation and/or
fraudulent concealment." It also contends that count 1 fails to
identify: (1) "the source of Defendant K&B's duty regarding
disclosure of the subject vehicle history;" (2) "how Defendant K&B
concealed the subject vehicle history known to K&B;" (3) "how
Defendant K&B's duty arose regarding the subject vehicle's history
beyond acquiring and conveying a clean Missouri Certificate of
Title for the subject vehicle to Plaintiff;" and (4) "what specific
representations were made by Defendant K&B to Plaintiff regarding
the vehicle history." K&B similarly argues that count 2 "fails to
detail or adequately specific all elements of fraud and the
particular damages the Plaintiff is claiming were caused to her by
the alleged action and/or inaction of Defendant K&B."

In response, Vogt argues that "failing to 'allege all essential
elements' is no grounds for dismissal." She also argues that her
complaint --  specifically her allegation that "K&B failed to
disclose the Automobile was a salvage vehicle to her when it sold
the Automobile to her on Oct. 27, 2020 -- provides a "short and
plain statement of the claim" and properly alleges the "who, what,
where, when, and how" the alleged fraud occurred. Further, Vogt
claims that her reference to the MMPA in count 2 provides the
source of K&B's common-law duty to disclose in count 1.

A. Count 1

The allegations in count 1 correspond to the elements of fraudulent
nondisclosure. Vogt asserts that: (1) K&B knew of the damage to the
minivan; (2) K&B was silent in the face of a duty to disclose that
information; (3) the concealment was material; (4) K&B intended for
Vogt to rely on the concealment; (5) Vogt was ignorant of the
minivan's history; (6) Vogt relied on K&B's representation about
the minivan; (7) Vogt had a right to rely on K&B's representations;
and (8) Vogt "was damaged by her reliance on the statements,
representations, and concealments of K&B."

But Judge Clark says he need not, and does not, accept as true
Vogt's conclusory allegation that "K&B had a duty to disclose to
the Plaintiff the prior damage and history of the Automobile." Vogt
fails to allege any facts supporting her duty-to-disclose
allegation; for example, she does not allege that K&B had superior
information, or that the damage to the minivan was not discoverable
by ordinary diligence. And her allegation that Progressive sold the
minivan to K&B "with a clean title and without disclosing it was a
salvage vehicle," weakens, rather than supports, K&B's having
superior information.

Ms. Vogt argues, without support, that the MMPA -- under which she
brings her second count -- serves as the source of K&B's common-law
duty to disclose, since the MMPA requires K&B to refrain from "the
omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or
advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce."

But Vogt's reference to the MMPA in count 2 does not satisfy the
requirement to plausibly allege facts supporting K&B's common-law
duty to disclose in count 1, because the elements are not the same,
Judge Clark holds. For example, the Supreme Court of Missouri
observed in Hess that the MMPA's definition of "'material fact' is
broader than the materiality requirement of common law fraud," and
the MMPA's definition of "omission of a material fact imposes a
broader duty on sellers than the common law imposes for fraud
liability." For these reasons, Judge Clark finds that Vogt fails to
establish the first element of fraudulent nondisclosure.

B. Count 2

Incorporating all of her earlier allegations, in count 2 Vogt
claims that K&B violated the MMPA, which broadly prohibits "the
act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the
concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in
connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in
trade or commerce." The MMPA creates a private right of action.

Judge Clark finds that Vogt's allegations against K&B are similarly
"replete with general statements and conclusory allegations" that
"fail to plead fraud with the specificity required by Rule 9(b)."
She fails to allege the "who" -- the identity of the person or
persons making the misrepresentation. And to the extent that Vogt's
claims rely on specific representations K&B employees made to her
about the minivan's quality and history, Vogt also fails to
identify the "what" -- the content of those representations.

Finally, Vogt concludes her brief by requesting, in the
alternative, "leave to amend the Complaint to add any legally
required detail." However, Rule 7(b)(1) requires parties to request
court orders by a written motion and "state with particularity the
grounds for seeking the order" and "the relief sought." And "courts
do not construe a request for leave to amend in a brief as a proper
motion for leave to amend." Judge Clark therefore cannot, and does
not, "rule on the question of amendment."

Judge Clark does note, however, the uphill climb Vogt faces in
amending. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court instructed district courts to
"draw on their judicial experience and common sense" in assessing
the plausibility of a pleader's allegations. Given the ready
availability of vehicle-history reports such as CarFax
(https://www.carfax.com/vehicle-history-reports/) that detail a
car's accident, damage, and repair history, he observes that
plausibly pleading the necessary elements of the claims asserted in
the Second Amended Complaint may prove futile. Judge Clark, of
course, leaves that question for another day.

IV. Conclusion

Accepting as true all well pleaded factual allegations in Vogt's
Second Amended Complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in
her favor, Judge Clark finds that Vogt fails to plausibly allege a
duty to disclose and therefore fails to state a common-law claim
for fraud against K&B. He also finds that Vogt fails to allege with
particularity a claim against K&B under the MMPA. Accordingly, he
grants K&B's Motion to Dismiss, dismissing counts 1 and 2 of Vogt's
Second Amended Complaint. He denies as moot K&B's alternative
Motion for a More Definitive Statement.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9372d5 from Leagle.com.


KELLOGG SALES: Chewy Nut Bars' Label "Deceptive," Leshchiner Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MISHA LESHCHINER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. 1:22-cv-03464 (N.D. Ill., July 3, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for negligent misrepresentation, fraud,
unjust enrichment, breaches of express warranty, implied warranty
of merchantability/fitness for a particular purpose and the
Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, and violations of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and State Consumer Fraud
Acts.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in false,
deceptive, and misleading advertising, labeling, and manufacturing
of cranberry almond chewy nut bars under the Special K brand. The
product's front label shows pictures of whole almonds and
cranberries, which gives consumers the impression it has a greater
absolute and relative amount of cranberries and almonds than it
does. The name, "Cranberry and Almond – Chewy Nut Bars" does not
tell consumers that the product contains an approximately
equivalent amount of cranberries and raisins. The product
substitutes lower valued peanuts and raisins for higher valued
almonds and cranberries. Had the Plaintiff and similarly situated
consumers known the truth, they would not have bought the product
or would have paid less for it, the suit says.

Kellogg Sales Company is a food manufacturer with its principal
place of business in Battle Creek, Michigan. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
         SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 Cuttermill Rd., Ste. 412
         Great Neck, NY 11021
         Telephone: (516) 268-7080
         E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

LIBERTY MUTUAL: Blain Files Suit in S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Liberty Mutual Fire
Insurance Company. The case is styled as Sarah Blain, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Liberty Mutual
Fire Insurance Company, Case No. 3:22-cv-00970-BEN-RBB (S.D. Cal.,
July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Liberty Mutual -- https://www.libertymutual.coop/ -- offers home,
farm, mobile, seasonal property, renters, personal umbrella,
business owners, commercial insurance, and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manfred P. Muecke, Esq.
          MANFRED, APC
          600 Broadway Avenue, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 550-4005
          Fax: (619) 550-4006
          Email: mmuecke@manfredapc.com

               - and -

          Robert L. Schug, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER PLLP
          80 South Eighth Street
          4700 IDS Center
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Phone: (612) 256-3200
          Email: schug@nka.com


LIME CRIME INC: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lime Crime, Inc. The
case is styled as Ramon Fontanez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Lime Crime, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-05577 (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Lime Crime -- https://limecrime.com/ -- is an American cosmetics
brand that was founded and launched by Doe Deere.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


LOLI BEAUTY PBC: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LOLI Beauty PBC. The
case is styled as Ramon Fontanez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. LOLI Beauty PBC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05578 (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

LOLI -- https://lolibeauty.com/ -- is on a mission to stir up clean
beauty with sustainable and natural beauty products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


LOMPOC, CA: Parties Seek to Certify Settlement Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RICHARD GARRIES; ANDREW
YBARRA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. LOUIS MILUSNIC, in his capacity as Warden of Lompoc,
et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-04450-CBM-PVC (C.D. Cal.), the Parties ask
the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying as the Settlement Class the class that was
      provisionally certified on July 14, 2020, pursuant to
      Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23(c)(1)(C), (e),
      10 and (g):

      "all current and future people in post-conviction custody
      at FCI Lompoc and USP Lompoc over the age of 50, and all
      current and future people in post-conviction custody at
      FCI Lompoc and USP Lompoc of any age with underlying
      health conditions, including chronic obstructive pulmonary
      disease; serious heart conditions such as heart failure,
      coronary artery disease, or cardiomyopathies; Type 2
      diabetes; chronic kidney disease; sickle cell disease;
      immunocompromised state from a solid organ transplant;
      obesity (body mass index of 30 or higher); asthma;
      cerebrovascular diseases; cystic fibrosis; hypertension or
      high blood pressure; immunocompromised state from blood or
      bone marrow transplant; immune deficiencies, HIV, or those
      who use corticosteroids, or use other immune weakening
      medicines; neurologic conditions such as dementia; liver
      diseases; pulmonary fibrosis; thalassemia; Type 1
      diabetes; and smokers ("Underlying Health Conditions");"

   2. preliminarily approving the proposed settlement agreement;

   3. approving the proposed Notice to the Class; and

   4. setting the proposed case schedule and fairness hearing.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3OFoiwv at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Terry W. Bird, Esq.
          Dorothy Wolpert, Esq.
          Shoshana E. Bannett, Esq.
          Kate S. Shin, Esq.
          Oliver Rocos, Esq.
          Christopher J. Lee, Esq.
          BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT,
          NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG &
          RHOW, P.C.
          1875 Century Park East, 23 rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561
          Telephone: (310) 201-2100
          Facsimile: (310) 201-2110
          E-mail: tbird@birdmarella.com
                  dwolpert@birdmarella.com
                  sbannett@birdmarella.com
                  kshin@birdmarella.com
                  orocos@birdmarella.com
                  clee@birdmarella.com

               - and -

          Naeun Rim, Esq.
          Ima E. Nsien, Esq.
          David Boyadzhyan, Esq.
          MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
          2049 Century Park East, Suite 1700
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 312-4000
          Facsimile: (310) 312-4224
          E-mail: nrim@manatt.com
                  insien@manatt.com
                  dboyadzhyan@manatt.com

               - and -

          Donald Specter, Esq.
          Sara Norman, Esq.
          Sophie Hart, Esq.
          dspecter@prisonlaw.com
          snorman@prisonlaw.com

          Patrick Booth, Esq.
          Jacob J. Hutt, Esq.
          PRISON LAW OFFICE
          1917 Fifth Street
          Berkeley, CA 94710
          Telephone: (510) 280-2621
          Facsimile: (510) 280-2704
          E-mail: sophieh@prisonlaw.com
                  patrick@prisonlaw.com
                  jacob@prisonlaw.com

               - and -

          Peter J. Eliasberg, Esq.
          Peter Bibring, Esq.
          ACLU FOUNDATION OF
          SOUTHERN th CALIFORNIA
          1313 West 8 Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 977-9500
          Facsimile: (213) 977-5297
          E-mail: peliasberg@aclusocal.org
                  pbibring@aclusocal.org

               c- and -

          C. Ryan Fisher, Esq.
          MANATT. PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
          695 Town Center Drive, 14th Floor
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (714) 371-2500
          Facsimile (714) 371-2550
          E-mail: cfisher@manatt.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Tracy L. Wilkison, Esq.
          United States Attorney
          David M. Harris, Esq.
          Assistant United States Attorney
          Chief, Civil Division
          Joanne S. Osinoff, Esq.
          Assistant United States Attorney
          Chief, General Civil Section
          Daniel A. Beck, Esq.
          Chung H. Han, Esq.
          Jasmin Yang, Esq.
          Paul B. Green, Esq.
          Assistant United States Attorney

LOUISIANA: Little River's Low-Water Mark Boundary Setting Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVE CROOKS, ET AL. v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Case No. 21-716 (La. App.),
the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Third Circuit issued an
order:

   a. affirming the judgment of the trial court setting the
      low-water mark boundary of the Little River at 24.08 feet;
      and

   b. reversing the trial court's grant of res judicata in favor
      of the Plaintiffs-Appellees.

I. Background

The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Natural Resources
(LDNR), appeals the trial court's determination of the low-water
mark of the Little River in the Catahoula Basin. LDNR further filed
exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no right of
action following the appeal.

The case involves a long history of complex issues surrounding the
classification of a body of water for purposes of determining
whether LDNR wrongfully expropriated and damaged the Plaintiffs'
lands in various ways, including obstructing the Plaintiffs'
servitude of drainage and the taking of mineral interest royalties
belonging to the Plaintiffs. While it has already been held that
the body of water in question is a river rather than a lake, the
low-water mark needed to be determined in order to classify what
belonged to the riparian owners versus what was owned by LDNR.
These proceedings pertain to the determination by the trial court
of the low-water mark at 24.08 feet in the Little River located in
the Catahoula Basin. The crux of LDNR's argument is that the trial
court improperly used a summary proceeding, which is inappropriate
for a boundary action, in setting the low-water boundary and
improperly excluded all of its evidence relating to the low-water
mark.

In May 2006, the Plaintiffs filed a "Class Action Petition to Fix
Boundary, For Damages and For Declaration Judgment," primarily
asserting inverse condemnation, damages to the Plaintiffs'
property, and the right to the recovery of oil and gas royalties
and other payments. Following a 10-day bench trial in January 2015,
the trial court rendered a final judgment in May 2017. That
judgment included a reference to its May 16, 2016 Reasons for
Judgment. The judgment declared awards of attorney fees, ordered
the deposit of funds into the registry of the court, and made
determinations regarding a variety of fees and incentive awards for
the class Plaintiffs' representatives.

This judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeal. In Crooks v.
State, 17-750, p. 23 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/28/18), 263 So.3d 540, 557,
writ granted, 19-160 (La. 5/6/19), 269 So.3d 691, aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 19-160 (La. 1/29/20), ___ So.3d ___, the Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that the Catahoula "Lake"
was "'a permanent river that seasonally over-flowed and covered its
banks.'" It affirmed the trial court's rulings relating to the
acreage and value per acre and found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's determination of damages.

Thereafter, LDNR was granted a writ of certiorari on the issue of
whether the lower court "erred in failing to find that the
Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claims have prescribed." It filed
a peremptory exception of no cause of action, asserting that the
Plaintiffs had no cause of action for mineral royalties and
requested that the award of $4,694,309.68 be vacated. The supreme
court reversed the court of appeal and held that the Plaintiffs'
claims for inverse condemnation were barred by the three-year
prescriptive period. While the supreme court specifically overruled
the sums awarded for inverse condemnation, it did not make any
statements regarding the mineral royalty award, but did state, "In
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed."

The record resumes with the appeal of the current matter, which
began with the "Plaintiffs' Motion Regarding Issues on Remand (With
Incorporated Memorandum of Authorities)" filed on July 6, 2020. In
it, the Plaintiffs argued that the only issues that were changed on
appeal were the award of damages for inverse condemnation and the
allocation of the trial court's attorney's fee award between LDNR
and the common fund.

The Plaintiffs thereafter requested the appointment of a special
master because "certainly, partitioning 30,000+ acres of riparian
land in a way that provides each owner with a proportionate share
qualified as a 'complicated factual issue.'" However, they went on
to state in a subsection relating to a motion for contempt and/or
for writ of mandamus.

On April 16, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of video
deposition to cover certain topics including "The dimensions of the
bank of the Little River through the Catahoula Basin property
litigated in this case, viz, the land that the final judgment in
this case determined the Plaintiffs owned." On April 26, 2021, LDNR
filed a motion to quash the notice of video deposition. On May 10,
2021, a hearing was held on LDNR's motion to quash notice of 1442
deposition.

The Plaintiffs filed a "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion Regarding Issues on Remand" on June 3, 2021,
urging that it was entitled to additional funds for mineral
royalties. They requested additional funds for oil and gas lease
royalties, changing the sum allegedly owed to $10,129,825.15.

LDNR filed a "Partial Concurrence and Partial Opposition to the
Class Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion
Regarding Issues on Remand" on June 2, 2021. In it, LDNR claimed
that future royalties were not part of the trial court judgment and
do not belong to the Class, but will belong to the proper
landowners once boundaries are established. However, LDNR did not
dispute the finality of the judgment awarding $4,694,309.68 for
past royalties.

On June 4, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for
matters on remand. On June 17, 2021, it rendered a judgment
following a June 4, 2021 hearing on the "Plaintiffs' motion
regarding issues on remand." The trial court denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for mandamus or contempt and granted their motion "to
determine the low-water mark of the Little River within two
months." It further denied LDNR's request for additional time
before the trial on the low-water mark. The judgment set the matter
for trial on Aug. 10, 2021.

The trial court's June 17, 2021 judgment relating to the June 4,
2021 hearing denied the Plaintiffs' motion for mandamus or contempt
against the Louisiana State Treasurer the Louisiana Department of
Treasury, or the Defendant Department of Natural Resources. It
granted the Plaintiffs' motion to determine the low-water mark of
the Little River within two months and denied the Defendant
Department of Natural Resources' objection and request for
additional time before trial on the low-water mark. The matter was
set for trial on the location of the low-water mark on Aug. 10,
2021.

On June 24, 2021, LDNR filed a motion to add one day to the trial
and to continue the Aug. 10, 2021 trial date. On July 2, 2021, the
Plaintiffs filed all opposition to LDNR's motion to continue. On
July 7, 2021, LDNR filed a "Reply ill Support of its Motion to Add
One Day To the Trial and to Continue the August 10, 2021 Trial Date
And Motion ill Limine Regarding the Scope of the August 10, 2021
Trial." On July 19, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed an "Opposition to
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources' Motions in Limine"
regarding the restriction of Mayeux's testimony and also the
low-water mark issues. On July 22, 2021, LDNR filed a "reply in
support of its motion in limine regarding the scope of the August
10, 2021 trial and motion in limine."

The trial court rendered an order on July 22, 2021 stating that the
Aug. 10, 2021, trial in the matter will be held to determine only
the ordinary low-water stage of the Little River in the Catahoula
Basin (the area formerly known as Catahoula Lake). The Parties may
present evidence relevant to both the computation of the ordinary
low-water stage and its location in the Little River/Catahoula
Basin. The parties will not present evidence at the trial as to the
location of oil or gas wells or units, the rights of any riparian
owners, rights in any mineral interests, or locations of servitudes
or other real property interests.

An order rendered on July 22, 2021 by the trial court stated that
the Aug. 10, 2021, trial in the matter will be held to determine
only the ordinary low-water stage of the Little River in the
Catahoula Basin (the area formerly known as Catahoula Lake). The
Parties may present evidence relevant to both the computation of
the ordinary low-water stage and its location in the Little
River/Catahoula Lake.

On July 16, 2021, LDNR filed an exception of nonjoinder.

On July 26, 2021, the Plaintiffs' opposition to LDNR's exception of
non-joinder was filed into the record. That same day, the
Plaintiffs also filed a "Peremptory Exception of Res Judicata or
Alternative Motion in Limine (with incorporated memorandum of
authorities)," urging that LDNR could not limit the evidence,
particularly relating to the location of oil and gas wells, that
the trial court could consider in determining the low-water mark.

An Aug. 2, 2021 judgment filed on August 30, 2021, denied LDNR's
exception of nonjoinder.

On Aug. 6, 2021, LDNR filed a dilatory exception of unauthorized
use of a summary proceeding, urging that the Aug. 10, 2021 hearing
constituted a boundary action which required ordinary process. On
Aug. 9, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed an "Opposition to State's
Exception of Improper Use of Summary Proceeding."

On Aug. 9, 2021, LDNR filed an "Opposition to for trial on the
ordinary low-water stage," in which it stated that the trial court
was competent to determine the ordinary low-water stage and argued
that "nothing prevents this Court from considering the evidence and
making its own decision on the location of the ordinary low-water
stage." This filing appears to be in response to the Plaintiffs'
exception of res judicata.

On Aug. 9, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a "Motion To Exclude the
Testimony of the State's Expert Witnesses or, Alternatively, to
Limit Their Testimony." LDNR also filed a "Pre-Trial Brief for
Trial on the Ordinary Low-water Stage," a "Reply to the Class
Plaintiffs' Opposition to the State's Exception of Unauthorized Use
of a Summary Proceeding," and an "Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
to Exclude Testimony of the State's Expert Witnesses, or
Alternatively, to Limit Their Testimony."

Following a hearing on Aug. 10, 2021, the trial court rendered
judgment denying LDNR's exception for unauthorized use of summary
proceeding, granting the Plaintiffs' exception of res judicata,
denying the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude/limit the testimony of
LDNR's expert witnesses, and found that "the ordinary low-water
mark of the Little River within the Catahoula Basin is 24.08 feet
above mean sea level." It further found that the contours of that
ordinary low-water mark of 24.08 feet above mean sea level are
shown on the surveys prepared by Michael Mayeux and introduced into
evidence as Exhibits P-11 and P-12, which are hereby adopted as
part of this judgment and attached thereto.

LDNR now appeals and assigns the following errors:

     1. The district court erred by improperly trying a boundary
action as a summary proceeding.

     2. The district court erred by not joining all immoveable
property and mineral interest owners whose rights are impacted by
the boundary setting.

     3. The district court erred by granting the Plaintiffs'
exception of res judicata, even though the only operative claim was
the Plaintiffs' own oral motion.

     4. The district court erred by denying LDNR a right to present
testimony and evidence.

     5. The district court erred by applying the law to result in
absurd consequences.

     6. The district court erred by post hac ruling that LDNR's
witnesses would be limited to their deposition testimony.

Subsequent to the filing of appeal, LDNR filed "exceptions of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action on appeal of
the Defendant/Appellant, the State of Louisiana, Through the
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources," essentially claiming
sovereign immunity from the Plaintiffs' boundary-action claim on
appeal and asserting that a low-water mark boundary is ambulatory
and unfixable by law.

II. Discussion

The Court of Appeal addresss LDNR's exceptions of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and no cause of action on the merits. LDNR
first argues that it is entitled to sovereign immunity relating to
the fixing of the low-water mark or, alternatively, that the
low-water mark is "ambulatory and unfixable by law" and any claim
to fix such a boundary in perpetuity does not state a viable cause
of action.

1. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction-Sovereign Immunity

In this exception, waived sovereign immunity from lawsuits to
determine ownership or boundaries of public property, the courts do
not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the boundary dispute
claim currently on appeal in the matter."

The Court of Appeal finds that the present case distinguishable as
its origination is in inverse condemnation rather than just a
declaration of ownership (a petitory action). The constitutional
command of Article 1, Section 4 requires no legislative
authorization to sue and, LDNR does not enjoy sovereign immunity
under these circumstances. So, the exception of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction is denied.

2. No Cause of Action

If that first argument fails, LDNR argues that the Plaintiffs have
failed to assert a cause of action because a permanent boundary
cannot be determined, as waterway boundaries are ambulatory and
non-fixable.

The Court of Appeal has reviewed the entire record of the case.
Initially, LDNR claimed it did not have enough time to determine
the low-water mark, then it arrived at a low-water mark of 28 feet,
and now it claims the low-water mark cannot be determined because
it is ambulatory and non-fixable. While the Court of Appeal does
not doubt that the low-water is subject to fluctuation, it says, a
low-water mark based on an average of the low-water over an
extended period of time is a method used by experts in determining
a boundary for legal purposes. LDNR had its chance to provide
expert testimony as to the alleged ambulatory and unfixable nature
of the low-water mark on Aug. 10, 2021, yet it did not do so. The
time to advance this argument has long since passed. The
Plaintiffs' petition sets forth a valid claim to determine the
low-water mark boundary. Accordingly, LDNR's exception of no cause
of action is denied.

3. Boundary Action

LDNR argues that an action to set a low-water stage is a boundary
action which must be via an ordinary proceeding, and the boundary
dispute is not a mere incidental question. The Plaintiffs, on the
other hand, argue that the issue of the low-water mark is merely
incidental to the supreme court's judgment affirming the finding
that Catahoula Basin is actually a river.

The Court of Appeal finds this distinction irrelevant from the
standpoint of a pleading. It says, there is no purpose in setting a
boundary without delineating its location. Moreover, the petition
clearly prayed for the setting of the exact low-water mark. LDNR,
by its own admissions and motions over the years as noted in the
factual summary, has known that the low-water mark boundary would
need to be determined. While LDNR states the focus of the previous
years of litigation related only to the lake versus river issue,
based on the original pleadings and the subsequent litigation, it
would be unreasonable for LDNR to not anticipate that the boundary
setting was forthcoming LDNR had many years to prepare for this
issue.

At the very least, in June 2020 (over a year before the June 4,
2021 hearing setting the boundary matter for trial on Aug. 10,
2021), LDNR knew that the boundary determination was imminent when
the Plaintiffs filed their motion "regarding remand matters." LDNR
had sufficient notice and time to gather evidence and testimony of
expert witnesses pertaining to the low-water mark boundary.
Therefore, the Court of Appeal finds no error in the trial court's
denial of the LDNR's exception of improper use of summary
proceedings. This assignment of error is without merit.

4. Joinder

LDNR argues that all immovable property owners whose property will
be changed by the setting of the ordinary low boundary must be
joined before a trial to set the boundaries can commence. At the
hearing, LDNR argued that the federal government had never been
served and that there are others affected such as mineral interest
owners who are not landowners.

The Court of Appeal disagrees. This argument also rests on the
underlying premise that LDNR and/or the other opt-out plaintiffs
could not anticipate that a boundary determination would result
from the class action petition which sought to "Fix Boundary, For
Damages and For Declaration Judgment."

In May 2014, LDNR filed a joint motion with the Plaintiffs to
permit the Catahoula National Wildlife Refuge and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to "opt-out" out of the class, which was granted
by the trial court. These parties will not now be forced to join in
the litigation. Regarding the mineral interest owners, particularly
Tensas Delta who, according to LDNR, owns more mineral interests
than anyone else in the Catahoula Basin, the Court of Appeal is
certain that a sophisticated party of this nature would be well
aware of the lengthy litigation over an area in which it has a
significant financial interest. More importantly, the absence of
Tensas Delta from the litigation fifteen years into the litigation
has no effect on the class members achieving complete relief.
La.Code Civ.P. art. 641(1). Assuming the accuracy of LDNR's
allegations, Tensas Delta has other remedies at law that it can
pursue if necessary.

Finally, as to any other parties that LDNR claims should be joined,
"a definitive judgment on the merits rendered in a class action
concludes all members of the class, whether joined in the action or
not, if the members who were joined as parties fairly insured
adequate representation of all members of the class." Accordingly,
the Court of Appeal finds the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the exception of non-joinder, and this
assignment of error is without merit.

5. Res Judicata

In this assignment of error on res judicata, LDNR argues the trial
court's grant of the Plaintiffs' peremptory exception of res
judicata was procedurally erroneous.

The Court of Appeal agrees. It finds it was procedurally
inappropriate for the Plaintiffs to file an exception of res
judicata in this matter. While the former trial court did, in fact,
award the Plaintiffs $4,694,309.68 in mineral interests
attributable to mineral production from May 2003 through the date
of trial, it made no finding as to the location of the gas wells in
relation to the low-water mark. As LDNR points out, the location of
the oil and gas wells is a matter of public record.

While the Plaintiffs strenuously argue that the Court of Appeal
must necessarily find that these wells are above the low-water
mark, there is simply insufficient evidence in the record to make
such a determination. The low-water mark boundary and the location
of the oil and gas wells are two separate independent findings that
may or may not correlate. While it does not disagree that the legal
conclusion must be that the profit from the wells already awarded
was above the yet-to-be-determined low-water mark, the Court of
Appeal cannot substitute that legal finding for the scientific one
that establishes the actual low-water mark, the sole reason for the
Aug. 10, 2021 hearing. Moreover, in reading through the transcript
relating to the exception of res judicata filed by the Plaintiffs,
it ise unsure upon what grounds the trial court based its grant of
the exception.

6. Evidence Assignments four and six

In assignments of error four and six, LDNR argues the trial court
erred in prohibiting testimony and evidence at the summary
proceeding because it was not disclosed during discovery and the
trial court systematically and consistently prevented the
presentation of almost all of LDNR's testimony and evidence. LDNR
argues that the trial court misapplied Daubert and excluded any
evidence that was contrary to the plaintiffs' theory of the case.

A review of the testimony at the hearing and the proffered evidence
makes clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and
that the admission of the evidence would not have changed the
outcome of the trial court's ruling.

7. Absurd Result

Finally, relying on La.Civ.Code art. 9, LDNR claims that the
factual finding of the low-water mark boundary at 24.08 feet will
lead to absurd results based on previous findings by the court. It
then goes on to discuss how the finding of the low-water mark at
24.08 feet will lead to absurd consequences in the river bed.

The Court of Appeal considered all of LDNR's proffered testimony
and find that conclusions alleged cannot be reached based on that
evidence. The veracity of these allegations cannot be determined
from the record. LDNR's proffered expert testimony failed to
address the alleged absurdities and their effect on the waterway.
We can only rely on evidence in the record, and there is none.
Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

III. Conclusion

The Court of Appeal denies LDNR's exceptions. It affirms in part
and reverses in part the trial court's judgment. The exceptions of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action filed by
the Defendant-Appellant, the State of Louisiana, through the
Department of Natural Resources, are denied. The judgment of the
trial court setting the low-water mark boundary of the Little River
at 24.08 feet is affirmed. The trial court's grant of res judicata
in favor of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, Steve Crooks et al., is
reversed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the
Defendant-Appellant, the State of Louisiana, through the Department
of Natural Resources.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p94jz29 from Leagle.com.

Richard Traina -- rtraina@steeglaw.com -- Steeg Law Firm, 201 Saint
Charles Avenue, Suite 3201, in New Orleans, Louisiana 70170, (504)
582-1199, COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: State of Louisiana,
through the Department of Natural Resources.

Scott David Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, 1200 North Third
Street, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802, (225) 326-6085, COUNSEL
FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: State of Louisiana, through the
Department of Natural Resources.

Machelle R. L. Hall, Morgan D. Rogers, Ryan S. Montegut, Ryan M.
Seidemann, Steven B. "Beaux" Jones, Louisiana Department of
Justice, Post Office Box 94005, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
70804-9005, (225) 326-6000, COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
State of Louisiana, through the Department of Natural Resources.

Robert McCuller Baldwin -- rbaldwin@hpblaw.com -- G. Adam Cossey --
acossey@hpblaw.com -- Hudson, Potts & Bernstein, Post Office Drawer
3008, in Monroe, Louisiana 71210-3008, (318) 388-4400, COUNSEL FOR
THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Steve Crooks, et al.

James J. Davidson, III, Christopher Joseph Piasecki --
cpiasecki@davidsonmeaux.com -- Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier,
McElligott, Fontenot, Gideon & Edwards LLP, 810 South Buchanan
Street, in Lafayette, Louisiana 70502, (337) 237-1660, COUNSEL FOR
THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Steve Crooks, et al.

J. Michael Veron , Turner D. Brumby , Veron Bice Palermo & Wilson
LLC, Post Office Box 2125, in Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602-2125,
(337) 310-1600, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Steve Crooks,
et al.

Charles S. Weems, III -- cweems@goldweems.com -- Robert G. Nida,
Gold Weems Bruser Sues & Rundell, Post Office Box 6118, in
Alexandria, Louisiana 71307-6118, (318) 445-6471, COUNSEL FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Steve Crooks, et al.

V. Russell Purvis, Jr. -- vrpurvis@bellsouth.net -- Smith
Taliaferro & Purvis, Post Office Box 298, in Jonesville, Louisiana
71343, (318) 339-8526, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Steve
Crooks, et al.

James L. Carroll, Attorney at Law, 107 Riser Street, in Columbia,
Louisiana 71418, (318) 649-9284, COUNSEL FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Steve Crooks, et al.

Bernard E. Boudreaux, Jr., Emma Elizabeth Daschbach, John T.
Arnold, Lindsay E. Reeves, Christopher W. Swanson --
cswanson@pipesmiles.com -- Jones, Swanson, Huddell, 301 Main
Street, Suite 1920, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70801, (225)
810-3165, COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Catahoula Lake
Investments, LLC, et al.

Gladstone N. Jones, III, Kevin E. Huddell, Jones, Swanson, Huddell,
601 Poydras Street, Suite 2655, in New Orleans, Louisiana 70130,
(504) 523-2500, COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Catahoula Lake
Investments, LLC, et al.

Dale R. Baringer, William H. Caldwell, Ferdinand P. Leonards,
Baringer Law Firm, 201 Saint Charles Street, in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana 70802, (225) 383-9953, COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Foster Investment Corporation.

Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr. -- jfaircloth@fairclothlaw.com -- Mary
Katherine Price -- kprice@fairclothlaw.com -- Faircloth Melton
Sobel & Bash, LLC, 105 Yorktown Drive, in Alexandria, Louisiana
71303, (318) 619-7755, COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Justiss
Oil Company, Inc.


LUMONDI INC: Court Issues Final Order & Judgment in Biddick Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
issued a Final Approval Order and Judgment in the lawsuit captioned
SCOTT BIDDICK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LUMONDI, INC., Defendant, Case No.
20-CV-8091 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y.).

On June 22, 2022, District Judge Vernon S. Broderick held a Final
Approval Hearing in this case. The Court ordered, adjudged, and
decreed as follows.

The Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release filed with the
Court on Nov. 22, 2021, including its exhibits, and the definition
of words and terms contained therein, are incorporated by reference
in the Final Approval Order and Judgment.

The Court has jurisdiction over the Action, the Plaintiff,
Defendant Lumondi, and all members of the following Settlement
Class certified for settlement purposes:

     All consumers nationwide who purchased (or received as a
     gift) one or more Luminox Watch Series 3000/3900, 3050/3950,
     3120, 3150, 3160, 3180, 3190, 3250, 3500, 3510, 3580, 3590,
     3600, 3610, 3800, 3810, 7050, 7060, 7200, 7250 that
     contained an original Lumondi Warranty Card (the Original
     Warranty) at the time of purchase on or after June 1, 2018
     through the date of preliminary approval by the Court
     (November 30, 2021).

Excluded from the Settlement Class are: the Defendant and its
officers, directors, and employees; Class Counsel and their
partners, associates, lawyers, and employees; the judicial officers
and their immediate family members and associated Court staff
assigned to this case; and Settlement Class Members, who submit a
valid Request for Exclusion prior to the Opt-Out Deadline.

The Court finally certifies the Settlement Class for settlement
purposes and finds that the Settlement Class satisfies all the
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is the product of
arm's-length settlement negotiations between Plaintiff Scott
Biddick and Class Counsel and Defendant and Defendant's counsel,
and was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator,
Honorable Judge James Holderman (Ret.) of JAMS. There is no
evidence of collusion in reaching the Settlement Agreement.

The Court further finds and concludes that the Class Notice and
claims submission procedures set forth in the Settlement Agreement
fully satisfy Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the requirements of due process, were the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, and support the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the Settlement Class as contemplated in the
Settlement Agreement and this Final Judgment.

No Settlement Class Members submitted timely and proper requests
for exclusion. There was one objection which the Court overrules.

The Court finally approves the Settlement Agreement and the
Settlement contemplated thereby, and finds that the terms
constitute, in all respects, a fair, adequate, and reasonable
settlement as to all Settlement Class Members. Each Settlement
Class Member is bound by the Settlement Agreement.

The Court dismisses the Action with prejudice, without costs to any
party, except as expressly provided for in the Settlement
Agreement.

The Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members fully and finally
release and forever discharge the Released Parties from the
Released Claims.

All Settlement Class Members are bound by all of the terms in the
Settlement Agreement, including the terms of this Final Judgment
and the Release provided for in the Settlement Agreement, and,
therefore, are barred from bringing or participating in any action
in any forum against the Released Parties concerning the Released
Claims.

The Court grants Class Counsel's application for fees and costs,
and awards $189,070.78 in attorneys' fees and $13,429.22 in
litigation costs and expenses. It finds these amounts appropriate,
fair, and reasonable. It awards the Class Representative $5,000 as
a service award and finds this amount fair and reasonable.

Finding that there is no just reason for delay, the Clerk of the
Court is directed to enter this Order on the docket and enter final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) forthwith.

The Court retains jurisdiction of all matters relating to the
interpretation, administration, implementation, effectuation, and
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Final Approval Order and Judgment
dated June 23, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/mt3nuckx
from Leagle.com.


M-I LLC: Seeks Leave to File Sur-Reply on Class Certification Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Donovin Last, an
individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
v. M-I, LLC and DOES 1 through 10, Case No. 1:20-cv-01205-DAD-BAK
(E.D. Cal.), the Defendant submits a Request for Leave to File the
attached Sur-Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification
and supporting documentation in this action.

This Request is made pursuant to this Court's Standard Procedures.
As set forth below, courts have granted litigants the right to file
a sur-reply for each of the key issues that Defendant responds to
in its proposed Sur-Reply.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated June 27, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3R8iEVo at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Heather D. Hearne, Esq.
          Robert P. Lombardi, Esq.
          Maryjo L. Roberts, Esq.
          THE KULLMAN FIRM
          4605 Bluebonnet Blvd., Suite A
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 906-4245
          Facsimile: (225) 906-4230
          E-mail: hdh@kullmanlaw.com
                  rpl@kullmanlaw.com
                  mlr@kullmanlaw.com

M.A.C. COSMETICS: Maciel Labor Code Suit Goes to N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled IGNACIO MACIEL and RUTH TORRES, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. M.A.C. COSMETICS INC.
and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No. CGC-22-599387, was removed from
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San
Francisco to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California on June 30, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:22-cv-03885 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to reimburse
business expenses and losses and unfair business practices in
violation of the California Labor Code and the California's
Business and Professions Code.

M.A.C. Cosmetics Inc. is an American cosmetics manufacturer
headquartered in New York, New York. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Kathy H. Gao, Esq.
         Julianne G. Park, Esq.
         MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
         300 South Grand Avenue
         Twenty-Second Floor
         Los Angeles, CA 90071-3132
         Telephone: (213) 612-2500
         Facsimile: (213) 612-2501
         E-mail: kathy.gao@morganlewis.com
                 julianne.park@morganlewis.com

MAD HIPPIE LLC: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mad Hippie, LLC. The
case is styled as Ramon Fontanez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Mad Hippie, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05580-JPO (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

MadHippie -- https://madhippie.com/ -- offers advance skin care,
leaving out harmful chemicals, paraben, synthetic fragrance &
color, mad hippie helps your skin achieve true harmony.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


MAGGY LONDON: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Maggy London
International, LTD. The case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Maggy London International, LTD., Case No. 1:22-cv-05596 (S.D.N.Y.,
June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Maggy London International Ltd. -- https://maggylondon.com/ --
manufactures fashion apparels for women and girls and offers a
modern collection of both effortless and timeless silhouettes
designed to take from desk to dinner in style.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


MARKETING GROUP: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Family Medicine Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FAMILY MEDICINE PHARMACY, LLC, Plaintiff v. STEWART
GOODMAN, et al., Defendants, Civ. Act. No. 1:20-cv-369-TFM-MU (S.D.
Ala.), Judge Terry F. Moorer of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order denying:

   a. Defendant Mark Gehrmann's Motion to Dismiss Counts II and
      III of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (filed
      April 22, 2022); and

   b. Defendant Meridian Marketing Group, Inc.'s Motion to
      Dismiss Counts II and III of the Plaintiff's First Amended
      Complaint (filed April 22, 2022).

I. Introduction

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Family Medicine alleges
that Defendant Stewart Goodman and others are liable for sending
unsolicited facsimile ("fax") transmissions to Family Medicine's
place of business in violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. Section 227. The case now comes before the
Court on Defendant Mark Gehrmann's ("Gehrmann") Motion to Dismiss
and Defendant Meridian's Motion to Dismiss. Both motions are
opposed by Plaintiff Family Medicine and further supplemented by
Defendants Mark Gehrmann ("Gehrmann") and Meridian with their
consolidated reply (filed May 23, 2022). After the Court set a
hearing, the Defendants filed a joint Motion to Set Aside Order
Setting Hearing and Consent to Jurisdiction (filed June 16, 2022).

II. Background

The action arises under the TCPA. Thus, the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1331. Personal
jurisdiction was raised in the subject motions, but ultimately
waived. Venue is not contested and adequate evidence supports venue
in the Southern District of Alabama.

On July 23, 2020, Family Medicine filed the putative class action
against Defendants Goodman and Ads for Academics, Inc. Family
Medicine is an Alabama limited liability corporation with its place
of business (and its fax machine) physically located in Clarke
County, Alabama, which is in the Southern District of Alabama.
Goodman is a licensed insurance agent and a resident of Maryland.
Ads for Academics is a Delaware corporation.

In the initial complaint, Family Medicine alleges in the first half
of 2020, Goodman and Ads for Academics faxed three unsolicited
advertisements to Family Medicine without already having an
established business relationship with Family Medicine in violation
of 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(C). These faxes advertised "SIMPLY
SMARTER HEALTH INSURANCE," with "TOP COMPANIES REPRESENTED,"
listing the names and logos of health insurance companies and a
chart of "sample monthly rates" for various age groups and familial
configurations. The faxes included a website and phone number for
those interested in obtaining health insurance. According to the
complaint, the BetterPlans.Net website listed on the faxes
identifies Better Plans Inc. as a "National Agency providing Health
Insurance and Financial Services for the Self-Employed, Individual,
and Family," with its principal office in the District of
Columbia.

However, no corporation named Better Plans, Inc. exists or is
authorized to sell insurance in the District of Columbia. The
initial complaint alleges Defendants, including Goodman, maintain
the BetterPlans.net website as a front to conceal their true
identities as the actual parties behind the unlawful
BetterPlans.net marketing faxes. Goodman's affidavit does not deny
the allegation.

On June 15, 2020, an individual named Shannon Tyndall called the
800 number listed on the faxes to identify who was behind the
faxes. Tyndall's uncontradicted affidavit states the person who
accepted her call "identified themselves as a representative of
Better Plans Insurance Agency." From that discussion, the
BetterPlans representative sent Tyndall an email from via an
electronic document signature website containing an acknowledgement
that Tyndall would be provided a Manhattan Life insurance policy.
The "reply-to" address provided on that email was "Insurance
services."

On June 22, 2020, Goodman was licensed by the Alabama Department of
Insurance to sell "Accident & Health or Sickness" insurance
policies from Manhattan Life. On the same day, Manhattan Life sent
Tyndall a letter enclosing a copy of her new Manhattan Life policy,
advising her to log in and set up an account on Manhattan Life's
Website, and inviting her to "call your agent STEWART GOODMAN or
our Customer Service Center at 1-800-[number redacted]" if she had
difficulty logging on to the website or if she needed any
additional information.

Family Medicine amended its complaint on Feb. 17, 2022, adding
Defendants Gehrmann and Meridian. Family Medicine alleges that both
Ads for Academics and Meridian serve as the alter ego of Gehrmann,
who they allege is behind the fax-blasting scheme. The Plaintiff
submitted an interrogatory by Ads for Academics confirming that Ads
for Academics has no employees, other members, or other partners
besides Gehrmann. The Defendants admit only that Gehrmann is the
owner of both.

In the amended complaint, Family Medicine also alleges that
Gehrmann has fraudulently conveyed "substantially all" of Ads for
Academics's assets to Meridian to defeat a potential future
judgment against Ads for Academics in this action. From Sept. 27,
2019 to July 10, 2020, the Plaintiff alleges that Ads for Academics
made eight transfers to Meridian in amounts ranging from $15,000 to
$50,000, totaling $235,000. Family Medicine filed the initial
complaint on July 23, 2020. Thereafter, from Aug. 5, 2020 to Oct.
7, 2021, the Plaintiff alleges that Ads for Academics made six more
transfers to Meridian in amounts ranging from $80,000 to $300,000,
totaling over $1,059,000.

The counsel for Ads for Academics on Sept. 25, 2020 claimed that
Ads for Academics "is a company of limited means and possesses no
significant assets," but the Plaintiff alleges then Ads for
Academics had approximately $271,903 in its account and was
receiving approximately $83,000 a month from insurance commissions.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff alleges that Meridian (i.e., they claim,
Gehrmann) received these transfers "with knowledge of this action
and with the intent to hinder, delay, and/or avoid the claims of
Plaintiff and the class."

To support their motions to dismiss, the Defendants provide an
affidavit signed by Gehrmann that states in relevant part that
though he is the owner of both Ads for Academics and Meridian, he
has "never been physically present in Alabama," does not
"personally conduct any business in the state of Alabama," and that
"any banking transactions described in the Complaint" for either
Ads for Academics or Meridian "took place either in-person in
Virginia, or electronically when he was outside the state of
Alabama."

The Plaintiff notes that the Defendant does not deny the
allegations that the transfers were "an intentional attempt to
frustrate any judgment in this case." It has also produced evidence
purporting to demonstrate both the fact that Gehrmann knew he was
"operating an unlawful blast fax scheme" and a "pattern and
practice of closing down one corporate shell as soon as it gets
caught conducting his blast fax scheme and moving his scheme over
to another of his successive corporate entities to continue the
scheme."

Crucially, the Defendants consent to personal jurisdiction in their
joint Motion to Set Aside Order Setting Hearing and Consent to
Jurisdiction "as it pertains to the claims asserted in the Amended
Complaint." The Court granted that motion and cancelled the
scheduled evidentiary hearing for June 21, 2022. However, the
Defendants' motions to dismiss remain as they did not formally
withdraw the motion.

III. Discussion & Analysis

To overcome a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
"the plaintiff must establish that personal jurisdiction over the
defendant comports" with two requirements: "(1) the forum State's
long-arm statute and (2) the requirements of the due-process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Alabama's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal
jurisdiction to the limits of the United States Constitution, Ala.
R. Civ. P. 4.2(b), so the two requirements are the same in the
present case, and exercising personal jurisdiction is proper if
doing so comports with constitutional due process requirements.

In their Motion to Set Aside Order Setting Hearing and Consent to
Jurisdiction, Judge Moorer finds that the Defendants explicitly
consent to personal jurisdiction "as it pertains to the claims
asserted in the Amended Complaint." Consent grants the Court
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants regardless of either "the
forum state's long-arm statute" or "the due process minimum
contacts analysis." Accordingly, Judge Goodman need not engage in
further due process analysis.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Moorer concludes that personal jurisdiction
exists over the claims against both Gehrmann and Meridian.
Therefore, the Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction are denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3v7va8cx from
Leagle.com.


MCG HEALTH: Saiki Sues Over Inadequate Safeguarding of Information
------------------------------------------------------------------
Diana Saiki, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MCG HEALTH, LLC, a Washington limited liability
company, Case No. 2:22-cv-00849-RSM-DWC (W.D. Wash., June 16,
2022), is brought to address the Defendant's inadequate
safeguarding of Class Members' Private Information that the
Defendant collected and maintained, and for failing to provide
timely and adequate notice to Plaintiff and other Class Members
that their information had been subject to the unauthorized access
by an unknown third party.

As a condition of its services, the Defendant requires patients
and/or patient healthcare networks to provide sensitive and private
information, including, but not limited to, patient names, gender,
telephone numbers, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security
numbers, and medical and code information. On March 25, 2022, the
Defendant discovered an unauthorized party previously obtained
certain personal information of its customers' patients and members
that matched data stored on the Defendant's systems (the "Data
Breach"). The affected patient and/or member data included some or
all of the following data elements: names, Social Security numbers,
medical codes, postal addresses, telephone numbers, email
addresses, dates of birth and gender.

Upon learning of the issue, the Defendant investigated the Data
Breach and discovered that an unauthorized party may have acquired
the Private Information of the Plaintiff and 1,100,000 Class
Members on or around February 25, 2022 and February 26, 2022
Despite discovering the Data Breach on March 10, 2022, Defendant
did not notify Plaintiff and Class Members until June 10, 2022
("Notice of Data Breach"). As a result of the Data Breach, the
Plaintiff and over a million Class Members suffered injury and
ascertainable losses in the form of the present and imminent threat
of fraud and identity theft, loss of the benefit of their bargain,
out-of-pocket expenses, loss of value of their time reasonably
incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the attack, and the
loss of, and diminution in, value of their personal information.

The Defendant maintained the Private Information in a reckless
manner. In particular, the Private Information was maintained on
the Defendant's computer network in a condition vulnerable to
cyberattacks. The mechanism of the hacking and potential for
improper disclosure of the Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private
Information was a known risk to the Defendant and entities like it,
and thus Defendant was on notice that failing to take steps
necessary to secure the Private Information from those risks left
that property in a dangerous condition and vulnerable to theft.

The Defendant disregarded the rights of the Plaintiff and Class
Members by, inter alia, intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or
negligently failing to take adequate and reasonable measures to
ensure its data systems were protected against unauthorized
intrusions; failing to disclose that it did not have adequately
robust computer systems and security practices to safeguard patient
Private Information; failing to take standard and reasonably
available steps to prevent the Data Breach; failing to properly
train its staff and employees on proper security measures; and
failing to provide Plaintiff and Class Members prompt notice of the
Data Breach, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was a patient at an Indiana University Health Center
which was an affiliate of the Defendant.

The Defendant is a HIPAA business associate that provides patient
care guidelines to healthcare providers and health plans.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Rebecca L. Solomon, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1200 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700
          Seattle, WA 98101-3147
          Phone: (206) 682-5600
          Fax: (206) 682-2992
          Email: jdennett@tousley.com
                 rsolomon@tousley.com

               - and -

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (202) 429-2290
          Email: gklinger@milberg.com

               - and -

          Bryan L. Bleichner, Esq.
          CHESTNUT CAMBRONNE PA
          100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 1700
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Phone: (612) 339-7300
          Fax: (612) 336-2940
          Email: bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com


MDL 2677: Court Grants Joint Bid to Dismiss Steiner's Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the multidistrict litigation entitled In re: DAILY FANTASY
SPORTS LITIGATION, MDL No. 16-02677-GAO (D. Mass.). This Document
Relates To: STEINER v. DRAFTKINGS, INC., and FANDUEL, INC., Civil
Action No. 16-10297-GAO, Judge George A. O'Toole, Jr., of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts grants the
Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed by Nelson
C. Steiner.

The case consolidates for centralized pretrial proceedings more
than 80 individually brought actions and putative class actions
filed in this Court or transferred here by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML"). The underlying complaints allege
improper and illegal conduct by DraftKings, Inc., FanDuel, LLC, and
FanDuel Deposits, LLC, which are providers of online daily fantasy
sports contests (collectively, the "DFS defendants"), and by
Paysafecard.com USA, Inc., and Vantiv, Inc., companies providing
payment processing services for DraftKings and FanDuel. A First
Amended Master Class Action Complaint ("Amended Complaint") asserts
27 state law and federal statutory claims against the Defendants.

One claim asserted in the Amended Complaint is by Nelson C.
Steiner, a resident and citizen of Florida. Steiner originally
brought suit in the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida.
DraftKings, with the consent of FanDuel, removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
The JPML subsequently transferred the action to this Court, and
Steiner's claim was consolidated into the Amended Complaint.

According to his allegations, Steiner has never had an account with
either of the DFS Defendants or himself participated in any of
their online contests. Rather, his complaint asserts that he
"brings this action as a concerned citizen of the State of
Florida," purporting to act "as a representative for the use and
benefit of the State of Florida" against the Defendants. He alleges
that "illegal gambling is injurious to the citizens of Florida and
deprives the state of Florida" of economic benefits, including tax
revenues and lawful employment opportunities. He claims that he is
authorized to bring suit as a representative of the State under
title 46, section 849.12 of the Florida Statutes.

The DFS Defendants have jointly moved to dismiss Steiner's claims
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
In support of their motion, the Defendants argue, in relevant part,
that Steiner lacks standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the
federal courts because he has not alleged that he himself suffered
any actual injury caused by the Defendants. Steiner does not
dispute that contention.

As noted, Steiner alleges no personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation. Rather, he purports to proceed in effect as a private
attorney general seeking to enforce a Florida statute on behalf of
the State. He does not allege a distinct and palpable injury to
himself. Indeed, he disclaims any personal injury to himself. Under
well-established doctrine, Steiner does not have Article III
standing to invoke the Court's jurisdiction, Judge O'Toole holds.

The parties, apparently agreeing that the Court lacks jurisdiction
to hear Steiner's claim for lack of standing, focus their dispute
on the appropriate response. Steiner urges remand, whereas the
Defendants request dismissal with prejudice, cursorily arguing that
he has no standing to bring a claim in a Florida state court
either.

Judge O'Toole says he thinks the appropriate response is to remand
Steiner's claim to the Florida state court. First, 28 U.S.C Section
1447(c) provides that if at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
the case will be remanded. Further, whether Steiner has standing to
pursue the claim in state court is a question properly directed to
the Florida state courts.

For these reasons, the Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint is granted to the extent described here. The case will be
remanded to the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida.

It is so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated June 23,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/bderd9wb from
Leagle.com.


MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Jones Files Suit in N.D. Georgia
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC, et al. The case is styled as Wynetta Jones, Leila Spagnole
Negron, Fred Robanser, Susanna Melanson, Denise Salles, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC, Daimler AG, Case No. 1:22-cv-02628-MHC (N.D. Ga., July 1,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability for the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC -- https://www.mbusa.com/en/home -- is a
Mercedes-Benz Group-owned distributor for passenger cars in the
United States, headquartered in Sandy Springs, Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Annika K. Martin, Esq.
          Daniel R. Leathers, Esq.
          LIEFF, CABRASHER, HEIMAN & BERNSTEIN, LLP-NY
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013-1413
          Phone: (212) 355-9500
          Email: akmartin@lchb.com
                 dleathers@lchb.com

               - and -

          Ketan A. Patel, Esq.
          CORPUS LAW PATEL
          303 Peachtree St, N.E., Suite 4100
          PO BOX 724713
          Atlanta, GA 30308
          Phone: (678) 597-8020
          Email: kp@corpus-law.com

               - and -

          Mark P. Chalos, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP - NASHVILLE
          222 2nd Avenue South, Suite 1640
          Nashville, TN 37201
          Phone: (615) 313-9000
          Fax: (615) 313-9965
          Email: mchalos@lchb.com


MICHIGAN: Court Dismisses Riddle v. Russell and Corrections Dep't
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III, of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, dismisses the
lawsuit styled TREQUAN RIDDLE, Plaintiff v. RICHARD RUSSELL, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-11315 (E.D. Mich.).

Plaintiff Trequan Riddle filed a pro se complaint against eight
Michigan Department of Corrections employees for alleged violations
of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. The Court granted the
Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Background

The Plaintiff alleged that he was an inmate in the mental health
residential treatment program at the Macomb Correctional Facility.
He claimed that he was serving a loss-of-privileges sanction when
he asked a recreational therapist if he could use the gym and
weight pit because it was a therapeutic service rather than a mere
recreational privilege. The therapist told the Plaintiff to seek
permission from the unit chief or warden. He then requested that
the Defendants permit him to use the gym and weight pit, but his
requests and grievances were denied.

The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to his mental health when they refused to let him to
use the prison gym and weight pit, which he claimed was part of his
recreational therapy. He noted that similar forms of therapy,
including music and movie groups, were not cut off when other
inmates lost privileges.

In the end, the Plaintiff requested monetary damages "for emotional
and psychological stress" resulting from "mental health services
being denied and disciplined as [his] mental health treatment
separated from other recipients."

Legal Standard

Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, the Court must sua sponte
dismiss a prisoner's complaint if it determines that the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.

Discussion

The Eighth Amendment bans any punishment that involves "the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Judge Murphy notes,
citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). Deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, the Judge adds, citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).

To start, the Court will liberally construe the pro se complaint to
present an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Although
the Plaintiff alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment
rights, the Plaintiff claimed only that his right to 1st Amendment
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness was violated.

Because the First Amendment does not guarantee life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, and because the Plaintiff alleged no
other violations of the First Amendment, the Court will construe
the complaint to rest only on Eighth Amendment grounds.

Put simply, Judge Murphy holds that the Plaintiff failed to state
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Three reasons
support the finding.

First, prison officials may deny prisoners periodic use of
recreational and exercise opportunities without violating the
Eighth Amendment. The Plaintiff's complaint does not allege how
long he was prohibited from using the gym and weight pit. He
asserted only that he was prohibited from using the gym and weight
pit because of an administrative sanction. Thus, the Plaintiff
failed to allege facts sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment
claim.

Second, even if the violation here did not involve the denial of a
mere recreational or exercise opportunity, and was instead a denial
of his recreational therapy, the claim still fails. The Plaintiff
asserted that the gym and weight pit were part of his recreational
therapy, and he requested their use to treat his depression. Yet
the allegation, standing alone, does not satisfy the first
deliberate indifference prong. To be sure, the Plaintiff's
assertion is factually sympathetic, as exercise is well known to be
beneficial for mental health. But his vague allegation fails to
show that he was suffering from a "sufficiently serious"
psychological need that required uninterrupted mental health care
in the form of recreational therapy.

Third, the Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second deliberate
indifference prong. The Plaintiff's claim that he was denied access
to the gym and weight pit as a form of recreational therapy,
without more, does not plausibly show that the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to any serious mental health need. Apart
from the claim that the Defendants denied him gym and weight pit
use for an unknown duration, the Plaintiff failed to allege that
any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his mental health
needs. And although the Plaintiff claimed he was housed in the
mental health unit, he did not assert that recreational therapy at
the gym and weight pit was the only form of mental health treatment
he was receiving. Indeed, the Plaintiff did not allege whether he
was otherwise being treated for his depression, and he has no
constitutional right to a particular therapy of his choice.

Last, the Plaintiff requested the Court to allow all recipients to
participate in psychological services provided by the mental health
recreational therapist. But the Plaintiff may not sue on behalf of
similarly situated Michigan prisoners or represent them here
because a pro se prisoner cannot adequately represent the interests
of fellow inmates in a class action.

Conclusion

All told, Judge Murphy holds that the Plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1983, and he
may not proceed on behalf of other Michigan prisoners.

Thus, the Court will dismiss the case without prejudice. The Court
will also deny leave to appeal in forma pauperis because the
Plaintiff cannot take an appeal in good faith.

Order

Judge Murphy ordered that the complaint is dismissed without
prejudice.

The Court will deny the Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on
appeal.

This is a final order that closes the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated June 23,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2s36w82m from
Leagle.com.


MICROSOFT CORP: Court Grants Bid to Remand Two of Kashkeesh's Claim
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMAD KASHKEESH and MICHAEL KOMORSKI, individually and
on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs
v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 21 C 3229 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Gary Feinerman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, grants the
Plaintiffs' motion to remand two of their claims back to state
court.

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs Kashkeesh and Komorski brought the putative class action
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against Microsoft,
alleging violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy
Act ("BIPA"), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. Microsoft removed the suit to
federal court, and the Plaintiffs move to remand two of their
claims back to state court.

II. Background

The Plaintiffs are former Uber drivers who worked primarily in
Chicago. Upon registering as Uber drivers, each was required to
submit his name, vehicle information, driver's license, and a
profile picture to Uber through its mobile application. To gain
access to Uber's platform and commence his driving duties, each had
to photograph his face in real time through Uber's "Real Time ID
Check" security feature.

Unbeknownst to the Plaintiffs, their pictures were transferred to
Microsoft's Face Application Programming Interface ("Face API"),
which is integrated into Uber's phone application as a security
feature. Microsoft's Face API collected and analyzed the
Plaintiffs' facial biometrics to create a "geographic template"
that it compared to the geographic template from the original
profile picture to verify their identities

Microsoft never obtained the Plaintiffs' written consent to
capture, store, or disseminate their facial biometrics. It also
failed to make a publicly available policy regarding retention and
deletion of their biometric information, and it profited from
receiving that information.

III. Discussion

The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction, and federal courts should interpret the removal
statute narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiff's
choice of forum in state court.

In an uncommon twist on a common theme, the Plaintiffs argue that,
in light of Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617 (7th
Cir. 2020), and Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241 (7th
Cir. 2021), they lack Article III standing to pursue in federal
court their claims under Sections 15(a) and 15(c) of BIPA, 740 ILCS
14/15(a), (c), requiring the remand of those claims for want of
subject matter jurisdiction.

Microsoft responds that the Plaintiffs have Article III standing
because (1) their Section 15(a) claim alleges an "informational
injury" sufficient to confer standing under the principles set
forth in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190 (2021), and (2)
their Section 15(c) claim alleges the disclosure of private
information sufficient to confer standing under the principles set
forth in TransUnion and Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., 184
N.E.3d 466 (Ill. App. 2021), appeal allowed, 184 N.E.3d 1029 (Ill.
2022).

A. Section 15(a) Claim

Section 15(a) of BIPA requires "a private entity in possession of
biometric identifiers or biometric information" to "develop," "make
available to the public," and "comply with" "a retention schedule
and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and
biometric information" at certain junctures.

Like the plaintiff in Bryant, Judge Feinerman opines that the
Plaintiffs allege only that Microsoft failed to disclose its
retention and destruction policy, not that it failed to comply with
that policy. Under Bryant, it follows that the Plaintiffs lack
Article III standing to bring their Section 15(a) claim.

Pressing the contrary result, Microsoft argues that TransUnion
undermined Bryant. Specifically, Microsoft contends that TransUnion
"reaffirmed precedent" -- Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524
U.S. 11, 21 (1998), and Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,
491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) -- "holding that 'downstream consequences'
are not required where, as in the present case, the plaintiff
allegedly 'fails to obtain information which must be publicly
disclosure pursuant to a statute.'" But Bryant expressly considered
and distinguished Akins and Public Citizen in ruling that a mere
failure to comply with Section 15(a)'s disclosure duty does not
give rise to Article III standing. That TransUnion reaffirmed Akins
and Public Citizen therefore has no impact, one way or the other,
on the continued viability of Bryant.

Microsoft also contends that TransUnion made clear, contrary to
Bryant, that an informational injury can support Article III
standing where, as in the present case, the plaintiff alleges
"denial of information subject to public-disclosure or sunshine
laws that entitle all members of the public to certain
information."

That contention fails to persuade, Judge Feinerman opines. As an
initial matter, TransUnion "did not involve such a
public-disclosure law," and thus cannot properly be read to
implicitly overrule Bryant's holding that the mere violation of
such a law does not give rise to Article III standing. In any
event, the Seventh Circuit adhered to Bryant's holding in a
post-TransUnion opinion that, in fact, cited TransUnion. From the
perspective of a federal district court, Cothron v. White Castle
Sys., Inc., 20 F.4th 1156, 1161 (7th Cir. 2021) defeats Microsoft's
submission that TransUnion fatally undermines Bryant.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue
their Section 15(a) claim.

B. Section 15(c) Claim

Section 15(c) of BIPA prohibits private entities in possession of
biometric information from "selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise
profiting from a person's or customer's biometric information."

The Seventh Circuit's holding in Thornley -- that Article III
standing cannot rest on a mere violation of Section 15(c) -- rests
on the premise that Section 15(c) imposes only a "general
regulation."  But the Appellate Court of Illinois subsequently
rejected that premise in Tims, holding that Section 15(c) creates
an action "for publication of matter violating the right of
privacy." That is significant to the Article III inquiry, as the
disclosure of private information is a harm "traditionally
recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts,"
and therefore one sufficient to predicate Article III standing.

Thus, the question whether Plaintiffs have Article III standing to
pursue their Section 15(c) claim in federal court turns on whether,
from the perspective of the Court, the state appellate court's
decision in Tims undermines the Seventh Circuit's understanding in
Thornley of the nature of a Section 15(c) claim. Under the Seventh
Circuit's view of the Erie doctrine, the answer to that question is
no. And because the Seventh Circuit's understanding of Section
15(c) as imposing a general regulatory rule retains its
precedential force notwithstanding the state appellate court's
contrary understanding in Tims, the Plaintiffs do not have standing
to pursue their Section 15(c) claim in federal court.

IV. Conclusion

Because the Plaintiffs do not have Article III standing to pursue
their Section 15(a) and 15(c) claims, Judge Feinerman grants their
motion to remand those claims. When a case is filed in state court
and removed to federal court, and when the federal court finds that
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the appropriate disposition
(with narrow exceptions not pertinent here) is remand to state
court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c). Where, as in the present
case, the court lacks jurisdiction over only a portion of a suit,
it should remand only that portion.

Accordingly, the Section 15(a) and 15(c) claims are severed under
Civil Rule 21 from the rest of the suit and remanded to state
court. If the Supreme Court of Illinois, whether in the appeal it
allowed in Tims or at any other juncture, adopts the state
appellate court's understanding in Tims of the nature of a Section
15(c) claim, Microsoft may once again attempt to remove that claim
to federal court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mpnfrza2 from
Leagle.com.


MICROSOFT CORPORATION: Bhavilai Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Microsoft
Corporation. The case is styled as Pasinee Bhavilai, individually
and on behalf of similarly situated individuals v. Microsoft
Corporation, Case No. 1:22-cv-03440 (N.D. Ill., June 30, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

Microsoft Corporation -- https://www.microsoft.com/ -- commonly
known as Microsoft, is an American multinational technology
corporation which produces computer software, consumer electronics,
personal computers, and related services.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


MILK + HONEY SPA: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Milk + Honey Spa
Downtown LLC. The case is styled as Ramon Fontanez, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Milk + Honey Spa
Downtown LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-05581 (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Milk + Honey -- https://milkandhoneyspa.com/ -- is a thriving
collection of premier day spas and salons.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


MOBILITYLESS LLC: Court Grants Swenson's Bid to Compel Discovery
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BARBARA SWENSON; GERALD SHEARON and all similarly
situated persons, Plaintiffs v. MOBILITYLESS, LLC; GABOR SMATKO, et
al., Defendants, Civil Case No. 3:19-30168-MGM (D. Mass.),
Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel Discovery.

I. Relevant Background

The lawsuit is a putative class action referred to the undersigned
for pretrial management. The named Plaintiffs, Barbara Swenson and
Gerald Shearon, allege in their second amended complaint (SAC) that
Defendant Smatko operates a website through which he advertises
various products for sale, including electric tricycles. The named
Plaintiffs assert that each of them ordered an electric tricycle
through Smatko's website and that Smatko's business shipped
defective and nonconforming goods and committed various fraudulent
acts when the named Plaintiffs sought to repair or return the
defective goods they had received.

The SAC notes that in 2006, the State of Connecticut filed suit
against Smatko and his registered business, which sold mobility
scooters, electric scooters, and gas-powered scooters primarily to
the elderly, for violating the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act by a variety of unlawful acts. In 2010, Smatko and his company
entered into a consent decree with the State of Connecticut that
prohibited them from engaging in enumerated illegal acts and
required them to pay restitution to customers who had filed
complaints against the company. The SAC further notes that in 2014,
the State of Connecticut filed a motion for contempt against Smatko
and his company that was resolved by a stipulated post-judgment
order that enjoined them from engaging in various fraudulent acts
and committed them to paying additional restitution to injured
customers. The SAC alleges that, after this litigation in
Connecticut, Smatko opened two limited liability companies in
Massachusetts in an attempt to continue his business operations
beyond the reach of the Connecticut Attorney General and has
continued to engage in conduct similar to the conduct that caused
him to be sued by the State of Connecticut.

The Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on Dec. 23, 2019. On
May 12, 2020, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion to make
alternative service of process based on evidence submitted by the
Plaintiffs' counsel that the Defendants were seeking to evade
service of process. On June 22, 2020, the Court entered a notice of
default as to the Defendants. With the Plaintiffs' assent, the
entry of default was set aside. The Defendants' motion to dismiss
the first amended complaint was denied.

Now before the Court, against this backdrop, is the Plaintiffs'
First Motion to Compel Discovery, which seeks to compel production
of additional documents and answers to interrogatories from Smatko
and Mobilityless. The Court held an April 21, 2022 hearing on the
Plaintiffs' motion, and took the Plaintiffs' motion under
advisement.

II. Analysis

The Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants engage in business
practices that are fraudulent and in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 93A, Sections 2 and 9, including policies related to returns of
goods, cancellations of orders, substitution of goods, confusing,
untruthful and fraudulent responses to customer complaints, and
illegal debt collection practices, that they have engaged in
fraudulent transfers to conceal assets, and that the entire
enterprise's affairs, which rely on interstate communications and
transportation of goods, are conducted through a pattern of
racketeering activity. The Plaintiffs seeks to represent a class of
individuals harmed by the Defendants' conduct.

The Plaintiffs have agreed that their requests for documents be
limited to documents dated on Sept. 6, 2018 through the present.
The Court's orders for supplemental production incorporate this
time limit which generally is referred to as the relevant period.

A. Plaintiff's Discovery Requests

1. Plaintiff's document requests to Mobilityless, LLC

The Plaintiffs' document requests 5 and 6 request all documents
relating to Mobilityless' acquisition of the goods it sold to its
customers, including electric tricycles, which are the type of
goods purchased by the named Plaintiffs. Mobilityless has objected
to producing such records, principally on the grounds of
overbreadth and undue burden, representing that the company does
not maintain a searchable database reflecting the company's
acquisition of goods and therefore cannot respond to this request

Judge Robertson holds that where the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants consistently sold damaged and nonconforming goods to
their customers, the Plaintiffs' document requests 5 and 6 are
reasonably related to acquiring information relevant to their
claims and to identifying potential class members. Mobilityless,
through Smatko, is directed to produce all documents in its
possession, custody or control responsive to the Plaintiffs'
document requests 5 and 6. To the extent Mobilityless, through
Smatko, takes the position that it has no additional documents
responsive to these requests, Mobilityless must so indicate without
ambiguity through a supplement document production response.

The Plaintiffs' document requests 7 and 8 request production of all
documents related to product warranties sold by Mobilityless to its
customers, including the named Plaintiffs, during the relevant
period. Mobilityless objects on the grounds that these requests
seek information that is not in the possession, custody, or control
of Mobilityless and that the company has already produced
documents.

Where the Plaintiffs have requested information about warranties
sold to Mobilityless' customers by Mobilityless, Judge Robertson
holds that the claim that the request seeks documents that are not
in Mobilityless' possession, custody, or control is not credible.
In view of the Plaintiffs' allegations about Mobilityless'
consistent failure to honor warranties, the information sought is
relevant to the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims and identification
of a potential class or classes of plaintiffs. Mobilityless,
through Smatko, is directed to produce all documents in its
possession, custody, or control responsive to this request. To the
extent Mobilityless, through Smatko, takes the position that it has
no additional documents responsive to these requests, it must so
indicate without ambiguity through a supplemental document
production response.

The Plaintiffs' document request 9 seeks production of all email
correspondence sent and received by support@mobilityless4less.com
from Sept. 6, 2018, through the present. The Plaintiffs represent
that communications through support@mobilityless4less.com will
reveal the identities of customers and customer complaints. In a
case in which the Plaintiffs plausibly allege that there is a
record of consumer complaints about Mobilityless, including
complaints about breaches of warranties and refusals to accept
returns of defective goods, and that the Defendants have exhibited
a pattern of deceit and attempts to conceal relevant information,
all email communications through support@mobilityless4less.com are
relevant for purposes of discovery. To the extent documents that
are responsive to this request exist, they must be produced to the
Plaintiffs. To the extent Mobilityless, through Smatko, takes the
position it has no additional documents responsive to this request,
it must so indicate without ambiguity.

The Plaintiffs' document requests 12 through 15 and 17 seek
documents that will show what items Mobilityless has shipped to
customers and what shippers Mobilityless has employed for shipping.
The Plaintiffs allege that they received damaged and nonconforming
goods and that Mobilityless blames the shippers and disclaims
responsibility for the damage to the goods. Judge Robertson holds
that the documents sought by these requests are relevant and must
be produced. To the extent Mobilityless, through Smatko, takes the
position that it has no additional documents responsive to these
requests, it must so indicate without ambiguity through a
supplemental document production response.

The Plaintiffs' document requests 16, 34, and 35 seek production of
documents concerning customers' attempts to return goods to
Mobilityless. The Plaintiffs allege that Mobilityless' policies
addressing returns were unfair and deceptive and that the company
consistently shipped damaged goods, failed and refused to accept
returns of damaged and noncompliant goods, then fraudulently sought
to obtain additional money from their complaining customers.
Mobilityless' response is that the requests seek documents that are
not within its possession, custody, or control and that it has
produced some records. It cannot be true that responsive documents
are not in Mobilityless' possession, custody, or control, and the
production of some documents does not satisfy Mobilityless'
obligations.

Judge Robertson holds that there is no doubt that documents
concerning Mobilityless' return policies and practices and the
identities of customers who sought to return damaged goods to
Mobilityless are relevant to the Plaintiffs' claims and the
identities of other potential plaintiffs. To the extent
Mobilityless has records in its possession, custody or control
concerning customer returns from Sept. 6, 2018, that it has not
already produced, those records are relevant and must be produced.
To the extent Mobilityless, through Smatko, takes the position that
it has no additional documents responsive to these requests, it
must so indicate without ambiguity through a supplemental document
production response.

The Plaintiffs' document request 23 asks for complete copies of
Mobilityless' state and federal tax returns filed after Sept. 6,
2018. The Plaintiffs represent that, while the Defendants have
produced partial copies of the tax returns for Gabor and Monica
Slatko for 2018, 2019 and 2020, they have produced no tax returns
for Mobilityless for the relevant period. Judge Robertson holds
that Mobilityless has not shown that historical information about
its income and profits is available from another source. To the
extent these tax returns exist, they must be produced to the
Plaintiffs. To the extent no such documents exist, Mobilityless
must so indicate without ambiguity through a supplemental document
production response.

The Plaintiffs' documents requests 38 and 39 seek production of
documents related to restocking and processing fees charged to
customers by Mobilityless. The Mobilityless document response
appears to represent that Mobilityless has produced all such
documents in its possession, custody, or control. In the absence of
any indication that this representation is inaccurate, so much of
the Plaintiffs' motion as seeks to compel Mobilityless to produce
documents responsive to requests 38 and 39 is denied. Mobilityless
will, however, be required to serve a supplemental response to this
request stating unambiguously that it does not possess or control
any documents responsive to these requests that it has not
produced.

The Plaintiffs' document requests 45 and 61 seek production of all
documents concerning communications between Mobilityless and
Paypal. Ms. Swenson alleges that she paid for her electric tricycle
from Mobilityless through Paypal, that Paypal opened an
investigation into Mobilityless because of customer complaints, and
that after Paypal refunded Ms. Swenson the purchase price of her
tricycle, Defendants pursued her for payment. Judge Robertson finds
that the communications between Paypal and Mobilityless are
relevant to the Plaintiffs' claims of fraud. Again, the
Mobilityless document response appears to represent that
Mobilityless has produced all documents in its possession, custody,
or control responsive to Plaintiffs's document requests 45 and 61.
In the absence of any indication that this representation is
inaccurate, so much of the Plaintiffs' motion as seeks to compel
Mobilityless to produce documents responsive to requests 45 and 61
is denied. Mobilityless is, however, required to serve a
supplemental response to this request stating unambiguously that it
does not possess or control any documents responsive to these
requests that it has not already produced.

The Plaintiffs' document requests 49 and 53 seek production of all
records related to the locations from which Mobilityless has
shipped goods to its customers and records relating to
Mobilityless' use of property located in Connecticut. Judge
Robertson is not persuaded that the requests for these documents
are wholly proportional to the needs of the case. Mobilityless'
shipping and operating locations are likely to be discernable from
documents responsive to Plaintiffs' other document requests,
including requests 12-15 and 17, and, in the court's view,
production of documents responsive to these requests is sufficient,
except that Mobilityless must produce documents related to its use
of property in Connecticut.

The Plaintiffs' document request 62 seeks production of records
showing whether Mobilityless remitted sales tax to any taxing
authority during the relevant period. The Plaintiffs claim that
they were charged for sales tax in connection with their purchases
from Mobilityless under false pretenses. Plaintiff represents that
document the Defendants produced in response to this request do not
disclose the requested information. Documents that may disclose
whether Defendants' business(es) remitted the sales taxes they
collected to the taxing authorities may be relevant on the issue of
fraud. To the extent such documents exist, Mobilityless must
produce them To the extent Mobilityless takes the position that it
has no documents responsive to this request in its possession,
custody, or control, Mobilityless must so indicate without
ambiguity through a supplemental document production response.

The Plaintiffs' document requests 66 and 67 seek copies,
respectively, of all documents relating to Defendants' affirmative
defenses, and all documents Defendants may rely upon at trial. It
is well-established that the Plaintiffs are entitled to production
of documents related to a defendant's affirmative defenses and
documents on which Defendants will rely at trial. The Defendants'
answer to the initial complaint (the only complaint they have
answered) identified fifteen affirmative defenses, a number of
which are boilerplate defenses. As propounded, this request is
difficult to assess in that it does not request documents related
to any specific affirmative defense. It appears unlikely that there
would be documents relating to each of the affirmative defenses in
the Defendants' answer and Defendants claim to have produced
documents responsive to this request. With no explanation by the
Plaintiffs as to why they believe that Mobilityless has documents
responsive to these requests that have not been produced, there is
not an adequate record justifying a court order of production. For
these reasons, Judge Robertson denies without prejudice so much of
the Plaintiffs' motion to compel as seeks production of documents
responsive to their document request 66.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), the Plaintiffs are
entitled to identification, and, on request, production of all
documents that the Defendants may use to support their defenses at
trial. Here too, however, the Plaintiffs' request is broad and
Defendants have waived any objection to producing responsive
documents and claim to have produced documents responsive to this
request. With no explanation by the Plaintiffs as to why they
believe that Mobilityless has documents responsive to this request
that have not been produced, there is not an adequate record
justifying a court order of production. For these reasons, Judge
Robertson denies without prejudice so much of the Plaintiffs'
motion to compel as seeks production of documents responsive to
their document request 67.

As to each of these requests, however, to the extent Mobilityless
takes the position that it has produced all responsive documents in
its possession, custody, or control, Mobilityless must so indicate
without ambiguity through a supplemental document production
response.

2. Plaintiffs' Interrogatories to Mobilityless

The Plaintiffs' Interrogatory number 5 must be answered by
Mobilityless for the reasons set forth above in connection with the
Plaintiffs' document requests 16, 34, and 35.

The Plaintiffs' Interrogatories numbers 7 and 8. To the extent that
Mobilityless produces tax returns and profit and loss statements to
Plaintiffs, it need not answer this interrogatory. To the extent
that Mobilityless fails to produce documents from which this
information can be derived, Judge Robertson orders that
Mobilityless must answer this interrogatory in full, stating its
expenses and assets for the relevant period.

The Plaintiffs' Interrogatory number 11 is duplicative of document
production requests to Mobilityless. To the extent Mobilityless
produces documents that identify all shippers and warehouses that
the company used during the relevant time to ship goods,
Mobilityless need not answer this interrogatory. To the extent that
Mobilityless fails to produce documents identifying all shippers
and warehouses that uses, Mobilityless must answer this
interrogatory in full for the relevant period.

The Plaintiffs' Interrogatory number 14 requests information about
a check that Plaintiffs allege that Mobilityless forged, through
Smatko, for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff Barbara Swenson.
Judge Robertsin holds that Mobilityless must answer this
interrogatory concerning its acquisition/creation and use of the
check in Ms. Swenson's name in full.

The Plaintiffs' Interrogatory number 15 requires Mobilityless to
identify each instance in which it has issued a refund or exchanged
goods for a customer who complained about delivery of defective
goods. The information requested is relevant to Plaintiffs' claims
and Mobilityless has not adequately established that responding
would be an undue burden. SFor the reasons set forth in Judge
Robertson's ruling on the Plaintiffs' document requests 16, 34 and
35, Mobilityless must answer this interrogatory.

The Plaintiffs' Interrogatory number 16 requests that Mobilityless
state the factual basis for each of fifteen affirmative defenses
asserted in the only answer Defendants have filed in the case.
While the Plaintiffs are entitled to discover the factual bases of
the Defendants' affirmative defenses, this blanket request, which
makes no attempt to distinguish between affirmative defenses that
may depend on facts and those that do not, is overbroad as
propounded. For the reasons set forth, this aspect of Plaintiffs'
motion to compel is denied without prejudice, Judge Robertson
states.

3. Plaintiffs' document requests to Smatko.

The Plaintiffs' document requests 13 and 14 seek copies of all
documents evidencing communications between Smatko and Mobilityless
customers. In light of the Plaintiffs' allegations, communications
between Smatko and Mobilityless customers are relevant. Smatko's
claims that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome are
not persuasive. To the extent these documents are not produced in
response to the Plaintiffs' requests to Mobilityless, they must be
produced by Smatko. To the extent Smatko takes the position that he
has no documents responsive to these requests in his possession,
custody, or control or that all such documents have been produced,
Smatko must so indicate without ambiguity through a supplemental
document production response.

The Plaintiffs' document request 20 seeks copies of all records
related to Smatko's shipment of goods on behalf of Mobilityless.
Smatko objects based on undue burden, overbreadth, and a lack of
relevance. In view of the allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint
and for the reasons set forth, none of these objections is
persuasive. To the extent Mobilityless does not produce records
responsive to this request, Smatko must do so. To the extent Smatko
takes the position that he has no documents responsive to this
request in his possession, custody, or control or that all such
documents have been produced, Judge Robertson orders that Smatko
must so indicate without ambiguity through a supplemental document
production response.

The Plaintiffs' document requests numbers 21 and 48 seek production
of all documents showing communications between Smatko and any bank
or credit card processing company relating to Mobilityless.
Smatko's objections of a lack of relevance and overbreadth have
some merit. It is not apparent that these requests are reasonably
tailored to elicit production of documents bearing on these topics.
Because the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that these relatively
broad requests are reasonably tailored to elicit relevant
information, so much of their motion to compel as seeks production
of documents responsive to their requests 21 and 40 to Smatko is
denied.

The Plaintiffs' document request number 29 seeks production of all
documents evidencing communications between Smatko and PayPal. The
Plaintiffs have clearly demonstrated the relevance of all documents
during the relevant period showing communications between Smatko
and PayPal. To the extent these documents are not produced by
Mobilityless, Judge Robertson holds that they must be produced by
Smatko. To the extent Smatko takes the position that he has no
documents responsive to this request in his possession, custody, or
control or that all such documents have been produced, Smatko must
so indicate without ambiguity through a supplemental document
production response.

The Plaintiffs' document request number 39 seeks production of
state and federal tax returns during the relevant period for each
business owned by Smatko. Smatko did not object to producing these
documents (Dkt. No. 54-3 at 9), but the Plaintiffs represent that
production is incomplete. For the reasons set forth, and because
the Plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims of fraud and
fraudulent transfer and asserted claims that carry potential
punitive damages, and Smatko has not demonstrated that information
contained in tax returns can be derived from other documents, tax
returns for the relevant period for all businesses owned by Smatko
must be produced to the extent such documents exist. To the extent
Smatko takes the position that he has no documents responsive to
this request in his possession, custody, or control or that all
such documents have been produced, Smatko must so indicate without
ambiguity through a supplemental document production response.

The Plaintiffs' document requests 44, 45, and 46 request copies of
all documents showing, respectively, Smatko's use of funds
generated by Mobilityless; his receipt of income from sales of
goods by Mobilityless; and transfers of funds from accounts used by
Mobilityless to any other account. Smatko's objections to these
requests are essentially meaningless boilerplate objections of
irrelevance, burdensomeness and lack of possession, custody, or
control. Smatko also objects on the grounds that the Plaintiffs
have obtained documents sought by these requests from other
sources.

In Judge Robertson's view, the Plaintiffs are entitled to have
Smatko produce documents in his possession, custody or control that
show all income he has derived from Mobilityless, and all documents
showing transfers of funds from accounts used by Mobilityless to
any other account for the relevant period. To the extent Smatko
takes the position that he has no documents responsive to theses
request in his possession, custody, or control or that all such
documents have been produced, Smatko must so indicate without
ambiguity through a supplemental document production response.

The Plaintiffs' document request number 60 seeks all documents
relating to Smatko's use of the property located at 30 North Plains
Industrial Road in Wallingford, Connecticut, including "rent
receipts, lease documents and shipping records." Smatko's
boilerplate objections to this request are unpersuasive, and his
opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion to compel offered no
explanation as to why he could or should not be required to produce
documents responsive to this request. Given that Smatko has waived
any valid objection to producing documents in response to the
Plaintiffs' document request number 60, he will be required to
produce rent receipts, lease documents, and shipping records for
the relevant period to the extent Mobilityless has not already done
so. To the extent Smatko takes the position that he has no
documents responsive to this request in his possession, custody, or
control or that all such documents have been produced, Smatko must
so indicate without ambiguity through a supplemental document
production response.

4. Plaintiffs' interrogatories to Smatko

The Plaintiffs' interrogatory number 12 asks Smatko to disclose the
annual sum of sales tax remitted on behalf of Mobilityless LLC for
each year the company has been in operation. Smatko did not object
to answering this interrogatory, but his answer is nonresponsive.
For the reasons set forth, Judge Robertson orders that Smatko is
required to provide this information to the Plaintiffs. To the
extent the Defendants fail to provide this information in response
to the interrogatory directed to Mobilityless, Smatko must provide
the information.

The Plaintiffs' interrogatory number 13 asks Smatko to provide a
date and description of each of his communications with a
Mobilityless customer related to a customer's return of goods or
request to return goods. Smatko did not object to the
interrogatory. He did not answer it on the grounds that he does not
have a database that contained this information. The information is
relevant to the Plaintiffs' claims and to identification of
potential class members. The Defendants' poor record-keeping is not
an adequate excuse to avoid the production of relevant information.
To the extent Mobilityless fails to provide this information,
Smatko must do so.

III. Conclusion

Judge Robertson grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery
on the terms set forth. The Defendants will serve the supplemental
responses required by the Memorandum and Order by no later than
July 22, 2022, unless the parties mutually agree to a different
date. The Plaintiff's request for fees and costs is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc3p4u8z from Leagle.com.


MONSANTO CO: 8th Cir. Affirms Approval of Jones' Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirms the order
of the district court approving the class action settlement in the
case, Lisa Jones; Horacio Torres Bonilla; Kristoffer Yee,
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Monsanto Company, Defendant-Appellee, Anna
St. John, Objector-Appellant, State of Montana; State of Arkansas;
State of Indiana; State of Louisiana; State of Mississippi; State
of Nevada; State of North Dakota; State of South Carolina; State of
Texas; State of Utah, Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s), Case No.
21-2292 (8th Cir.).

I. Introduction

Anna St. John objected to a class action settlement between
Defendant Monsanto and Plaintiffs Lisa Jones, Horacio Torres
Bonilla, and Kristoffer Yee, on behalf of a class of consumers. The
district court overruled St. John's objections, approved the
settlement, and awarded Plaintiffs attorney's fees. St. John
appeals.

II. Background

The Plaintiffs filed suit in February 2019, pleading multiple
claims arising out of the allegedly deceptive labeling of Roundup
products manufactured by Monsanto. Specifically, Roundup products
bore a label indicating that the active ingredient, glyphosate,
"targets an enzyme found in plants but not in people or pets."
Plaintiffs alleged, however, that Monsanto knew that glyphosate is
in fact present in gut bacteria in both humans and animals, so the
label was false.

In August, the parties attended a formal mediation. Throughout the
fall and winter, they continued to exchange discovery and negotiate
the details of a settlement. As part of this process, both parties
commissioned experts to quantify the measure of damages. The
experts surveyed consumers to determine how much less they might
expect to pay for the Roundup product without the misleading label.
The Plaintiffs' expert estimated that the misleading label
constituted 7.9% to 15.9% value. The Plaintiffs concluded,
therefore, that 15.9% of the value of the products purchased was
the best-case damages after victory at trial. Monsanto's expert
found no significant difference in the value of a product with and
without the challenged label and estimated no more than 2.5% of the
value as damages.

An initial proposed settlement agreement was presented to the
district court for preliminary approval in March 2020. The parties
agreed to a total Common Fund of $39.55 million. They agreed that
Monsanto would not object to the Plaintiffs' counsel seeking 25% of
that amount as an attorney's fee. The class members who filed
claims were to receive 10% of the average retail price for the
product(s) they bought, and any remaining funds after the costs of
administration would be distributed cy pres.

Before the district court ruled on that motion, the parties
executed a Second Corrected Class Action Settlement Agreement that
made four changes to the initial agreement: (1) narrowed the scope
of the class members' release of claims; (2) added the Plaintiffs'
intent, unopposed by Monsanto, to seek an incentive payment of
$2,500 for each named Plaintiff; (3) proposed two cy pres
recipients—the National Consumer Law Center and the National
Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau -- and clarified
the cy pres selection process; and (4) extended the notice period
and opt-out deadline. The notice documents were updated to reflect
these changes, though they did not identify the cy pres
organizations specifically. The district court granted preliminary
approval, certified a national settlement class, and approved
notice to putative class members.

The 90-day notice period began on May 28 and ended on Aug. 28,
2020. In July, midway through the notice period, the parties
directed the claims administrator to initiate a supplemental notice
program to augment the notice obtained. The claims administrator
calculated that these combined notice efforts reached 82% of class
members with an average frequency of 2.51 contacts.

In October 2020, the parties sought approval from the district
court for another updated settlement and notice. First, the parties
proposed amending the settlement to allow for a possible upward
adjustment of payments to claimants of up to 50% of product value
rather than the 10% figure previously agreed to. They also added a
third proposed cy pres recipient, the Berkeley Center for Consumer
Law & Economic Justice. The parties proposed an additional notice
period of 90 days for the updated notice, which would include the
original forms of notice and the supplemental forms of notice
initiated in July, plus new television and radio advertising. The
revised notice would inform class members of the possible pro rata
increase in payments to claimants. The district court approved this
proposal.

The supplemental notice and claim period ended on Feb. 16, 2021.
The following week, the claims administrator reported that it had
received 285,399 total claims accounting for slightly more than 1
million products, though it anticipated rejecting approximately
43,000 of those as duplicative or deficient. This represented a
2-3% estimated claims rate based on total sales of almost 89
million units during the relevant period. The validity of some
claims had not been verified at the time of briefing, but the
parties indicate that the value of the valid claims will range
between $11.72 million and $13.34 million. The 25% award to the
attorneys is $9.89 million, and the administrator's fees amounted
to $1.8 million. This leaves approximately $14 to $16 million to be
distributed cy pres, depending on the final value of the valid
claims.

Ms. St. John made three objections to the settlement, all of which
she renews on appeal. First, St. John argues that there are further
steps the parties could take to identify and encourage the
participation of more class members. At the very least, St. John
argues, the payment to class members who have made claims should be
increased to 100% of the price of the products purchased before
donating proceeds cy pres. Second, St. John argues that the
district court's order allowing funds to be donated to the cy pres
organizations constitutes compelled speech in violation of her
First Amendment rights. Finally, St. John argues that the cy pres
should be excluded from the total value of the Common Fund for
purposes of calculating the attorney's fee and that time spent on
related litigation in another district court should be excluded
from the compensable time considered in the lodestar analysis.

III. Discussion

A. Size of the Cy Pres

Ms. St. John's first objection is to the size of the cy pres
distribution. She argues that the district court should have (1)
required the parties to take additional steps to identify
additional class members and (2) increased the pro rata portion of
the Common Fund up to 100% of the weighted average retail price.

The Eighth Circuit holds that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that notice to the class was sufficient in
light of the comprehensive notice plan and the estimated results
from the claims administrator. The Eighth Circuit has noted that "a
claim rate as low as 3% is hardly unusual in consumer class actions
and does not suggest unfairness."

There is also no further discussion in the record of the
feasibility of St. John's proposed approach. The Eighth Circuit
does not doubt that there are circumstances in which pursuing
records from retailers is a reasonable and effective way to get
relief to class members, especially because it might allow for
direct payments to affected consumers without a cumbersome claims
process. Based on this record, however, it finds that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by not requiring the parties to
pursue this approach in addition to the notice plan that had
already been implemented, which advertised the settlement in a
targeted way across numerous platforms and was revised twice in an
effort to reach more consumers.

The second issue St. John raises is whether the class members who
have been identified are entitled to a larger proportion of the
price of the product, up to 100%, before the residual funds are
allocated cy pres. Relying on In re BankAmerica Corp. Securities
Litigation, 775 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2015), St. John argues that
because class members' damages are unliquidated, they should be
able to recover up to the full purchase price before the district
court may order cy pres distribution. Concerns about a windfall to
class members, St. John asserts, are not relevant in the context of
unliquidated damages.

This argument overstates BankAmerica's holding, the Eighth Circuit
holds. In BankAmerica, it finds that the reversible error in
BankAmerica was not that the plaintiffs had not received the full
change in stock value but that the district court had not
determined the measure of class members' damages and whether they
had been fully compensated before granting a cy pres distribution.

In the present case, the district court conducted such an analysis,
and the Eighth Circuit finds no abuse of discretion in its
conclusion that a payment to class members of 50% of the average
weighted retail price for the items they purchased "fully
compensated" the class members and that they had no equitable claim
to the remaining funds, which were appropriately distributed cy
pres. The district court reasoned that even if class members
claimed they would not have purchased Roundup if it had not borne
the allegedly misleading label, their damages would still have to
be reduced from 100% to account for the value they received from
using Roundup. The conclusions of both parties' experts also
support this finding—Monsanto's expert's survey found a 2.5%
differential and the Plaintiffs' expert's survey found a
differential of 7.9% to 15.9%. The Eighth Circuit sees no clear
error of judgment in the district court's conclusion.

B. First Amendment

Ms. St. John's next argument is that the district court ordering a
cy pres distribution to particular charitable organizations is a
form of compelled speech of the class members in violation of the
First Amendment.

The Eighth Circuit disagrees. It explains, the First Amendment
prevents the government from compelling the endorsement of ideas
that it approves. Compelling a person to subsidize the speech of
other private speakers raises similar First Amendment concerns. But
class members have not been compelled to subsidize speech when
residual funds are distributed cy pres. Cy pres distribution of
residual funds pursuant to the settlement agreement neither
constitutes speech by any individual class member nor infringes on
their First Amendment rights.

C. Attorney's Fee.

Finally, St. John challenges the attorney's fee of 25% of the
Common Fund to be paid to class counsel. She urges the Eighth
Circuit to exclude the cy pres from the value of the lawsuit in
calculating the attorney's fee because the cy pres is not a benefit
to the class.

But the funds that are ultimately allocated cy pres were available
for class members to claim. If the Eighth Citcuit affirms the
adequacy of the notice to the class, then it cannot fault the
Plaintiffs' counsel for the fact that class members, for myriad
possible reasons, did not submit enough claims to exhaust the
Common Fund. Furthermore, by its very name, a cy pres distribution
"must be for the next best use," that is, "for indirect class
benefit," and "for uses consistent with the nature of the
underlying action." Because the cy pres is "distributed for a
purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives underlying
the lawsuit and the interests of class members," the district court
did not abuse its discretion in including the amount allocated cy
pres in calculating the attorney's fee.

Ms. St. John also argues that the district court erred in assigning
any value to the parties' agreement that Monsanto will change the
Roundup label since the settlement does not give the Plaintiffs any
say in the wording of the new label, and in fact, Monsanto had
already begun the regulatory process to change the label before the
settlement agreement was reached.

Again, the Eighth Circuit disagrees. Because the prior label had
been approved by the EPA, it was presumptively legal, and the
Plaintiffs could not have obtained an injunction against the label
from the court. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Monsanto agreeing to change its label was an
element of the class's overall success. The fact that the
settlement does not control the text of any new labeling Monsanto
may adopt does not persuade the Eighth Circuit otherwise.

Ms. St. John's final argument is that the district court erred in
including work that was done in prior litigation, Blitz v. Monsanto
Co., No. 17-473 (W.D. Wis.), in the fee award. In Miller v. Dugan,
the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the general principle that a fee
award could include time spent on separate litigation "if the
effort resulted in work product that was actually used in the
instant case, the time spent was inextricably linked to issues
raised in the instant case, and the plaintiff was not otherwise
compensated for counsel's work in the ancillary proceeding."

The Eighth Circuit is satisfied that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the close relationship
between Blitz and the case permitted time spent on Blitz to be
included in the lodestar analysis. Blitz also raised state-specific
and nationwide class claims based on the allegedly false Roundup
label. Monsanto and the Plaintiffs stipulated to the use of
discovery from Blitz, including depositions, and avoided
duplicating in the litigation work that had already been done. And
the settlement agreement that resolves the case also resolves
Blitz, so the attorneys will not be compensated separately for
their related work on that case. It was therefore not a clear error
in judgment for the district court to include the Plaintiffs'
counsel's work on Blitz in its assessment of a reasonable
attorney's fee.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit affirms the order of the
district court approving the class action settlement in the
matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/bddfxw8z from Leagle.com.


NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Kushner Suit Remanded to Cuyahoga County Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Bridget M. Brennan of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, grants the Plaintiff's
motion to remand to state court the lawsuit entitled PAUL KUSHNER,
Plaintiff v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:22-CV-00598 (N.D. Ohio).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff lives in Cleveland, Ohio. Defendant Nationstar is a
limited liability company, organized under the laws of Delaware,
with its principal place of business in Texas.

The dispute is centered on the Plaintiff's allegations that
Nationstar charged improper fees related to his residential
mortgage. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges Nationstar charged
improper "Third Party Reconveyance Preparation Fees" or "Third
Party Reconveyance/Release Preparation Fees" that were "not limited
to actual payments to any third parties," as well as "County
Recording Fees" in excess of the actual amount of fees paid to the
government (collectively, the "Fees"). He brings one cause of
action under Ohio Rev. Code Section 5301.36(B). He brings this
action on behalf of himself and a class of individuals, who were
similarly charged these Fees.

The Plaintiff filed his class action complaint in the Cuyahoga
County Common Pleas Court on March 7, 2022. On March 28, 2022, he
filed an Amended Complaint in the same court. On April 13, 2022,
Nationstar timely removed this case to federal court pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). In its notice of removal,
Nationstar stated that it satisfied the CAFA removal requirements
because the parties are minimally diverse, there are at least 100
class members, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.

Nationstar attached to its notice of removal the declaration of
Courtney Ehinger, Senior Vice President Performing Services at
Nationstar. (Ehinger stated that a review of Ohio customers
potentially charged the Fees disputed in the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint exceeded 40,000 customers. Noting that the Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint failed to state a specific amount in controversy,
Nationstar stated that, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Section
5301.36(C), the applicable calculation of damages is $250 per
violation, which suggests that this particular matter could exceed
$10 million in damages, far in excess of CAFA's $5 million
jurisdictional threshold.

On April 14, 2022, the Plaintiff moved to remand his case to the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for want of subject matter
jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c). Nationstar
filed an opposition on April 28, 2022, and the Plaintiff replied on
May 2, 2022. Nationstar then filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 12,
2022.

Given the pending Motion to Remand to State Court, the Court
granted Plaintiff's request to withhold opposing the Motion to
Dismiss until the Motion to Remand was resolved. The Court does so
now.

II. Analysis

The Plaintiff's motion seeking remand challenges two points raised
in Nationstar's Notice of Removal: the number of class members and
the amount in controversy.

Specifically, the Plaintiff argues that Nationstar's definition of
the class is inconsistent with the plain language in the Amended
Complaint because Nationstar only provides the Court with the
number of individuals charged the Fees and not, as a true reading
of the Amended Complaint indicates, the number of individuals
charged Fees that were not limited to actual payments to any third
parties or were in excess of the amount paid to the government. A
true reading of the Amended Complaint results in a much smaller
class size.

Similarly, the Plaintiff argues that because the class alleged in
the Amended Complaint is much smaller that the class suggested by
Nationstar, the amount in controversy is below the $5 million
threshold. Because the Amended Complaint does not state any federal
causes of action and the Plaintiff has not alleged an amount in
controversy, the Plaintiff correctly notes that the only removal
available to Nationstar is under CAFA, Judge Brennan notes.
Therefore, if Nationstar does not satisfy its removal burden under
CAFA, the case must be remanded.

Nationstar explicitly disclaims that anyone, including the
Plaintiff, "was charged an inflated county recorder's fee or an
improper third-party preparation fee." But Nationstar also argues
that it has satisfied CAFA's jurisdictional burden. Nationstar
responds to the Plaintiff's remand arguments by asserting that it
established that at least 40,000 individuals were charged the Fees
and, under the Plaintiff's theory that damages are $250 per alleged
violation, the potential damages are $10 million.

Nationstar argues that the Plaintiff's motion would have Nationstar
conduct a file-by-file analysis to prove removal, which, it argues,
would require Nationstar to admit liability. Nationstar argues this
is inconsistent with Sixth Circuit caselaw stating what Nationstar
must do -- and what it is not required to prove (namely, the
Plaintiff's damages) -- to satisfy removal.

1. Minimal Diversity

Minimal diversity, as defined by CAFA, occurs when "any member of a
class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant" (28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2)(A)). The parties do not
dispute minimal diversity here: Mr. Kushner is a citizen of Ohio
and Nationstar is a corporation incorporated under the laws of
Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas.

Accordingly, Judge Brennan finds that minimal diversity is present
here.

2. Numerosity

CAFA does not gives federal courts original jurisdiction if "the
number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the
aggregate is less than 100" (28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(5)(B)).

Judge Brennan finds that Nationstar has plausibly demonstrated that
the class size will exceed 100 members. Nationstar asserts that
111,710 accounts were charged a third-party reconveyance
preparation fee or a county recording fee during the relevant time
period. While this number likely overstates the members of the
class, the number is sufficient to ascertain that the number of
individuals improperly charged one of the Fess is greater than 100
persons.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Nationstar satisfied its burden
of proving numerosity by a preponderance of the evidence here.

3. Amount in Controversy

Judge Brennan holds that Nationstar has not proven by the
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million. Nationstar argues that the class contains
111,710 individuals. Using that number with the multiplier of $250
results in a number greater than $5 million. But the class is only
those who were improperly charged the Fees, not those who were
charged fees generally:

     All persons who were charged by Nationstar Mortgage LLC or
     Mr. Cooper (or any predecessor, successor, nominee, or agent
     of either) for any third party reconveyance preparation fee
     (or similar fee) or government recording fee, more than
     actual government recording fees paid to record release of
     satisfied mortgages, except where: (a) Applicable Law (as
     defined in class members' mortgages) expressly allowed for
     the charging of the fees (fees other than actual government
     recording fees) for releasing Security Instruments and (b)
     the fees charged were for amounts actually paid to
     unaffiliated parties for releasing services done and to
     governments for actual recording fees; and all persons who
     were otherwise charged more fees than expressly allowed by
     Applicable Law.

Nationstar has not proffered any evidence regarding the number of
individuals potentially within this class. In fact, Nationstar
explicitly contends, though again without evidence, that no one,
including the Plaintiff, was overcharged a county recorder fees or
an improper third-party preparation fee.

Judge Brennan notes that a court in this district reached a nearly
identical conclusion. In Pittman, the Court was presented with a
removal petition for a class action alleging Chase failed to timely
record mortgages pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Section 5301.36(B); see
Pittman v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 1:05-CV-2470, 2007 WL 2156395
(N.D. Ohio July 25, 2007). Chase presented evidence that it
serviced over 125,000 loans and was the named mortgagee for more
than 20,000 of those loans, thereby, satisfying the $5 million
amount in controversy requirement.

Here, like Chase, Nationstar cannot rest on its assertion that the
number of accounts charged the Fees -- when multiplied by $250 --
establishes the required amount in controversy, Judge Brennan
holds. Because the number of individuals charged one of the Fees
identified by Nationstar is a broader universe of individuals than
those identified in the class, which only includes individuals
improperly charged one of the Fees, Nationstar cannot rely upon its
number of 111,710 to support the jurisdictional minimum of $5
million.

Accordingly, Nationstar has not proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.

III. Conclusion

Nationstar has not carried its burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. For
the reasons stated, the matter is remanded to the Court of Common
Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
June 23, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4sm6dxjm from
Leagle.com.


NAUTILUS INC: Class Settlement in Walker Gets Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT WALKER v. NAUTILUS,
INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-03414-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge
Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. entered an order granting final approval of
class action settlement.

-- The Court hereby approves the plan of allocation as set
    forth in the Notice as fair and equitable.

-- The Court directs Class Counsel and The Angeion Group, the
    claims administrator, to proceed with processing Claims and
    the administration of the Settlement under the terms of the
    Settlement and, upon completion of the claim processing
    procedure, to present to this Court a proposed final
    distribution order for the distribution of the remaining
    Settlement funds, if any.

-- The Court hereby dismissed with prejudice this Action and
    all of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant. Plaintiffs and
    the Defendant shall bear their own fees and costs.

-- The Court also considered Plaintiff's motion for Attorneys'
    Fees, Expenses, and Class Representative Service Award,
    hereby:

    a. concludes that Class Counsel’s requested fee award equal
       to one third of the Common Fund, or $1,416,666.67, is
       fair and reasonable and may be deducted from the Common
       Fund and paid in accordance with the Settlement;

    b. concludes that Class Counsel’s requested reimbursement of
       litigation expenses of $5,561.05, is fair and reasonable,
       and that the settlement administration expenses of
       Angeion, in the amount of $120,000, were reasonable and
       necessary in the prosecution of this Action on behalf of
       the Class, and may be deducted from the Common Fund and
       paid in accordance with the Settlement;

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3aavGku at no extra charge.[CC]


NAVITAS LLC: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Navitas LLC. The case
is styled as Ramon Fontanez, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Navitas LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-05573
(S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Navitas -- https://www.navitas.com/ -- identifies energy
conservation strategies and implement facility improvements.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


NEW HK INC: Escalante Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages for Delivery Workers
------------------------------------------------------------------
MARVIN ESCALANTE, NELSON MURILLO, and VICTORINO ANTONIO VICTORIA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. THE NEW HK INC. (D/B/A HUMMUS KITCHEN), SHARON HOOTA,
and MAOR ONONO, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-05650 (S.D.N.Y., July
1, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law including
failure to pay appropriate minimum wages, failure provide a wage
notice, failure to provide wage statements, failure to reimburse
business expenses, unlawful tip and wage deductions, and failure to
timely pay wages.

Plaintiffs Escalante, Murillo, and Victoria were employed by the
Defendants as delivery workers at Hummus Kitchen from June 2018
until November 2021, from July 2018 until October 2021, and from
January 2017 until March 19, 2022, respectively.

The New HK Inc., doing business as Hummus Kitchen, is an owner and
operator of a Mediterranean Restaurant, located at 1613 2nd Ave.,
New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Catalina Sojo, Esq.
         CSM LEGAL, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 317-1200
         Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

NEW YORK TIMES: MacQuaid Files Suit in D. Oregon
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The New York Times
Company. The case is styled as Thea MacQuaid, Sarah Renfrow, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. The New
York Times Company, Case No. 3:22-cv-00955-MO (D. Ore., July 1,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions.

The New York Times Company -- https://www.nytco.com/ -- is an
American mass media company that publishes The New York Times
newspaper.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stanton R. Gallegos, Esq.
          MARKOWITZ HERBOLD PC
          1455 SW Broadway, Suite 1900
          Portland, OR 97201
          Phone: (503) 295-3085
          Fax: (503) 323-9105
          Email: stantongallegos@markowitzherbold.com


NEXSTAR BROADCASTING: Wheeler Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nexstar Broadcasting,
Inc., et al. The case is styled as John Wheeler, an individual, on
behalf of himself, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated
v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., Nexstar Broadcasting Group, Inc.,
Does 1 through 50, Inclusive, Case No. CGC22600499 (Cal. Super.
Ct., San Francisco Cty., July 1, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Non-Exempt Complaints."

Nexstar Media Group, Inc. -- https://www.nexstar.tv/ -- is an
American publicly traded media company with headquarter offices in
Irving, Texas, New York City, and Chicago.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas James Blouw, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037-3107
          Phone: 858-952-0354
          Fax: 858-551-1232

          Email: DeBlouw@bamlawca.com


NEXTGEN LEADS: Sends Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls, Minor Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HEATHER LEE MINOR, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NEXTGEN LEADS, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00949-BEN-NLS (S.D. Cal., June 28, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendant for violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant transmitted telemarketing
calls and text messages to the Plaintiff and similarly situated
consumers whose cellular telephone numbers are registered on the
National Do Not Call Registry without prior express written
consent. As a result of the Defendant's misconduct, the Plaintiff
and Class members have been harmed in the form of annoyance,
nuisance, and invasion of privacy, says the suit.

NextGen Leads, LLC is a marketing agency, headquartered in San
Diego, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Rachel E. Kaufman, Esq.
         KAUFMAN P.A.
         237 South Dixie Highway, Floor 4
         Coral Gables, FL 33133
         Telephone: (305) 469-5881
         E-mail: rachel@kaufmanpa.com

NORDIC NATURALS: Fish Oil's 2X Label "Deceptive," Gabrielian Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ARA GABRIELIAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NORDIC NATURALS, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:22-cv-04463 (C.D. Cal., June 29, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendant for breach of express warranty, breach of implied
warranty, quasi contract/unjust enrichment/restitution, and
violations of the California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, the
California's False Advertising Law, and the California's Unfair
Competition Law.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged false and deceptive
advertising, labeling, and marketing of its Ultimate Omega 2X fish
oil product. The product's "2X" and "Ultimate Omega"
representations lead reasonable consumers to believe the product
has twice the strength of the Defendant's regular Ultimate Omega
product. However, unbeknownst to consumers, the product does not
contain twice the amount of Omega-3s per serving than that found in
the Defendant's regular Ultimate Omega product. The product only
contains 2150 milligram (mg) of Omega-3s per serving, which
represents a 16 percent shortfall per serving for consumers. Had
the Plaintiff and Class members known the truth, they would not
have purchased the product or would have paid significantly less
for it, says the suit.

Nordic Naturals, Inc. is a manufacturer of Omega-3 fish oil
supplements, with its principal place of business in Watsonville,
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Robert Abiri, Esq.
         CUSTODIO & DUBEY, LLP
         445 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2520
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 593-9095
         Facsimile: (213) 785-2899
         E-mail: abiri@cd-lawyers.com

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY: Mismanaged Retirement Plans, Brookins Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
OSCAR T. BROOKINS, individually and as the representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, and on behalf of The
Northeastern University Retirement Plan, Plaintiff v. NORTHEASTERN
UNIVERSITY, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 403(b) INVESTMENT COMMITTEE,
and JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-11053 (D.
Mass., June 30, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
breach of fiduciary duty of prudence and failure to monitor
fiduciaries in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.

According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to employ a
prudent process for managing the Northeastern University Retirement
Plan. The Defendants limited the Plan's participants to
low-performing, high-cost investment options such as the
consistently underperforming College Retirement Equities Fund
(CREF) Stock Account or the costly Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association (TIAA) Real Estate Account. They also subjected
participants to dramatically high recordkeeping costs over several
years in the Class Period, well higher than similar plans.
Moreover, many of these options were flagged as imprudent in prior
ERISA litigation of which the Defendants could and should have been
aware. The Defendants' mismanagement of the Plan has cost
participants millions of dollars, leading to their paying excess
fees and losing out on retirement income, says the suit.

Northeastern University is a private university and educational
institution headquartered in Suffolk County, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Stephen Churchill, Esq.
         Osvaldo Vazquez, Esq.
         FAIR WORK, P.C.
         192 South Street, Suite 450
         Boston, MA 02111
         Telephone: (617) 607-3260
         Facsimile: (617) 488-2261
         E-mail: steve@fairworklaw.com
                 oz@fairworklaw.com

NYGG ASIA LTD: Puddu Wins Class Certification Bid
-------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPH PUDDU, MARK GHITIS,
VALERY BURLAK, and ADAM BUTTER, v. NYGG (ASIA) LTD. and BENJAMIN
TINBIANG WEI a/k/a/ BENJAMIN WE, Case No. 1:15-cv-08061-DLC
(S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Denis Cote entered an order:

   1. granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification:

      "All persons and entities, other than Defendants and their
      affiliates, who purchased the publicly traded common stock
      of 6D Global Technologies, Inc. from June 16, 2014 through
      September 10, 2015, both dates inclusive, or in private
      placements taking place on September 29, 2014, and
      November 21, 2014;" and

   2. appointing Rosen Law Firm as class counsel.

The Defendant Benjamin Wey opposes the motion on the ground that
the plaintiffs have not adequately demonstrated their reliance on
his alleged misrepresentations and omissions.

The plaintiffs filed this action on October 13, 2015, and
filed the SAC on April 4, 2016, bringing claims on behalf of
themselves and a putative class of 6D shareholders.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3OX4ep3 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jonathan Richard Horne, Esq.
          Phillip C. Kim, Esq.
          Michael Alex Cohen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016

The Defendants are represented by:

          Warren Angelo Raiti, Esq.
          WARREN RAITI
          1345 Avenue of the Americas
          Ste 33rd Floor
          New York, NY 10105

               - and -

          Adam Brad Sherman, Esq.
          Tom M. Fini, Esq.
          Catafago Fini LLP
          One Grand Central Place, Ste 47th Floor
          New York, NY 10165

OLLY PUBLIC: Products Have Overdosed Melatonin Content, Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Hope Murphy and Carol Lesh, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Olly Public Benefit Corporation, Case
No. 3:22-cv-03760 (N.D. Cal., June 24, 2022) is a class action suit
about the Plaintiffs wanting Olly to fix its manufacturing
practices and sell its melatonin products with accurate dosing and
labelling.

According to the complaint, if Olly fixes its products, so that
they are accurately dosed and labelled, the Plaintiffs would buy
them again. But given Olly's past deception, the Plaintiffs cannot
rely on Olly's word alone that it has fixed the problem. The
Plaintiffs face an imminent threat of harm because they will not be
able to rely on Olly's labels in the future, and will not be able
to buy Olly Melatonin, even if Olly claims to have fixed the issue,
the suit says.

Melatonin is a neurohormone that regulates the brain's sleep cycle.
Millions of consumers take over-the-counter melatonin supplements
to help them sleep. Because melatonin alters brain chemistry, it is
important that these supplements are accurately dosed and
labelled.

As the results show, the melatonin content of Olly is consistently
(and randomly) overdosed. For example, the bottle of Olly Sleep had
nearly three times the amount of melatonin listed on the label, and
the bottle of Olly Extra Strength had nearly twice the amount of
listed melatonin. Something is systematically and seriously wrong
with Olly's dosing and labelling, added the suit.

Plaintiff Hope Murphy is domiciled in Vista, California. She
purchased a bottle of Olly Sleep in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonas B. Jacobson, Esq.
          Simon Franzini, Esq.
          DOVEL & LUNER, LLP
          201 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 600
          Santa Monica, CA 90401
          Telephone: (310) 656-7066
          Facsimile: (310) 656-7069
          E-mail: jonas@dovel.com
                  simon@dovel.com

OPTUM INC: Coleman Sues Over Termination Without Proper WARN Notice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
VERNAIZE K. COLEMAN, CYNTHIA HOLMES, DANIELA PORCINO, REBECCA
ANGULO, TERRY POWELL and NANCY SHUSTERMAN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. OPTUM, INC.,
INSIGHT GLOBAL, LLC, APEX SYSTEMS, INC., EQUITY STAFFING GROUP,
INC., ADECCO USA, INC. and NEW YORK CITY HEALTH and HOSPITALS
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-05664 (S.D.N.Y., July 1,
2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violations of
the New York Worker Adjustment, Retraining and Notification Act,
the New York Labor Law, the Worker Adjustment, Retraining and
Notification Act, and the New York Wage Theft Protection Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' failure to provide 90-day
advance notice before terminating the Plaintiffs and similarly
situated employees in March and April 2022. The Plaintiffs were
terminated by the Defendants without cause on their part, as part
of or as the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mass layoff
or plant closing. Moreover, Defendant New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation (HHC) failed to provide a written statement
or paystub that complied with the requirements of the law when it
paid the Plaintiffs and Class members their final compensation,
says the suit.

The Plaintiffs were hired as case investigators and/or monitors
whose job was to separate the COVID-19 infected and exposed persons
from the population in New York, New York.

Optum, Inc. is a healthcare services company with its headquarters
at 13625 Technology Drive, Eden Prairie, Minnesota.

Insight Global, LLC is a staffing agency, with headquarters at 1224
Hammond Dr., Suite 1500, Atlanta, Georgia.

Apex Systems, Inc. is an employment agency, headquartered at 4400
Cox Rd., Ste. 100, Glen Allen, Virginia.

Equity Staffing Group, Inc. is a staffing and recruiting company
headquartered in Englewood, Colorado.

Adecco USA, Inc. is a recruitment and staffing services company
headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida.

New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation is a public health
care delivery system in New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Jack A. Raisner, Esq.
         Rene S. Roupinian, Esq.
         RAISNER ROUPINIAN LLP
         270 Madison Avenue, Suite 1801
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 221-1747
         Facsimile: (212) 221-1747
         E-mail: rsr@raisnerroupinian.com
                 jar@raisnerroupinian.com

PACIFIC & EVEREST: Bunting Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pacific & Everest
Lifestyle Company. The case is styled as Rasheta Bunting,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons v. Pacific & Everest Lifestyle Company, Case No.
1:22-cv-03889 (E.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Pacific & Everest Lifestyle Co. -- https://pacificeverest.com/ --
brings innovative outdoor gear and apparel to the global
marketplace.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


PENSKE LOGISTICS: Estrada Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Penske Logistics LLC.
The case is styled as Jose Estrada, an individual, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Nexstar Broadcasting,
Inc., Penske Logistics LLC, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2022-0004749 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., June 9, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Unlimited Civil Other Employment."

Penske Logistics -- https://www.penskelogistics.com/ -- delivers
value through its design, planning and execution in transportation,
warehousing, freight management, and dry-van truckload
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nazo Koulloukian, Esq.
          KOUL LAW FIRM
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010-2003
          Phone: 213-761-5484
          Fax: 818-561-3938
          Email: nazo@koullaw.com


PEOPLECONNECT INC: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Knapke Suit Vacated
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BARBARA KNAPKE, Plaintiff-Appellee v. PEOPLECONNECT,
INC., Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 21-35690 (9th Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacates the district court's
denial of PeopleConnect's motion to compel arbitration and remands
for further proceedings.

I. Introduction

Ms. Knapke claims that PeopleConnect uses her name and likeness in
its Classmates.com school yearbook database without her consent.
Knapke, an Ohio resident, wanted to pursue an individual and class
action right of publicity claim against PeopleConnect under Ohio
law. Knapke retained an attorney, Christopher Reilly, but the
record does not reflect when she retained him. Reilly created a
Classmates.com account and searched for Knapke on the site. By
creating the account, Reilly agreed to the site's Terms of Service,
which contained an arbitration provision.

Ms. Knapke eventually filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, represented by Reilly and his law
firm. PeopleConnect sought to compel arbitration through a motion
to dismiss and alternatively asked for the right to conduct
arbitration-related discovery. Applying Ohio law, the district
court denied the motion, holding that there was no evidence that
Knapke gave her counsel authority to bind her to the Terms of
Service containing the arbitration provision. The district court
also denied discovery.

The district court erred. First, Washington law, not Ohio law,
governs the threshold question of arbitrability. And second, on the
record before the district court, questions of fact precluded
ruling on the motion to compel arbitration. These questions of fact
include whether Knapke and Reilly had an agency relationship when
Reilly agreed to the Terms of Service; if they did have an agency
relationship, whether and how Knapke limited Reilly's authority as
her agent; and whether Knapke ratified Reilly's agreement to
arbitrate even if Reilly initially lacked authority to bind her to
the agreement. PeopleConnect has a right to conduct discovery on
these and related arbitrability issues before the district court
decides the motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit has
jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. Section 16(a)(1).

II. Background

PeopleConnect, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Seattle, Washington, owns and operates Classmates.com,
an online library of more than 450,000 yearbooks. Although any
Classmates.com user may access some of that library, a user must
register for either a free or paid account to access most of it. To
register, a user must agree, by clicking "Submit", to hyperlinked
Terms of Service and a privacy policy. The Terms of Service contain
an arbitration provision. The arbitration provision covers, with
almost no exceptions, "any and all disputes that have arisen or may
arise" between the user and an array of PeopleConnect entities. The
Terms of Service also allow a user to "opt-out and not be bound by
the arbitration provision by sending written notice of the decision
to opt-out" within 30 days.

Ms. Knapke lives in Sidney, Ohio. Her class action complaint is
based on Classmates.com's use of her and other Ohioans' names and
likenesses to advertise its products without their consent in
violation of Ohio's right to publicity statute. The complaint
included screenshots from parts of Classmates.com accessible only
to a user who had first agreed to the Terms of Service. Some
screenshots show that a user named "Christopher" was logged into a
Classmates.com account when the screens captured in the screenshots
were displayed. And PeopleConnect confirmed that Christopher
Reilly, Knapke's attorney, created a Classmates.com account on Jan.
7, 2021, and purchased a three-month subscription on Jan. 29, 2021.
Reilly could not have done either without first agreeing to the
Classmates.com Terms of Service.

PeopleConnect moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the
arbitration clause covered this dispute. PeopleConnect argued that
Knapke was bound by the arbitration clause because her counsel,
Reilly, had agreed to the Terms of Service (which include the
arbitration provision) while acting as her agent. PeopleConnect's
Associate Director of Compliance and Intellectual Property declared
that users must agree to the Terms of Service before accessing the
results of a Classmates.com search or registering for either a free
or paid account. PeopleConnect also asserted that Reilly was
Knapke's attorney and agent, but it did not offer evidence that
Knapke had either retained or otherwise given authority to Reilly
when he agreed to the Terms of Service. It stated, as well, that if
the district court denied its motion, it wished to engage in
limited discovery about Knapke's "knowledge of and acquiescence to
counsel's use of Classmates.com on her behalf" and "the identity of
the person who took the screenshots that appear in the complaint."

Ms. Knapke argued that she had no relationship with PeopleConnect
and that Reilly's agreement to the Classmates.com Terms of Service
did not bind her. She maintained that she had never been a
Classmates.com customer, had never seen the arbitration agreement,
and that the "hidden" nature of the clause within the "several
thousand-word" Terms of Service accessible via hyperlink rendered
the clause "irrelevant" regardless. Knapke also argued that her
counsel created the account to satisfy his obligations under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b); in her view, "the failure to
check if a plaintiff's identity was in fact publicized by the
website would likely draw sanctions." And Knapke claimed that
PeopleConnect's attempt to bind her to the arbitration clause was
"extraordinary overreach" because it would allow websites to force
every plaintiff into arbitration. She maintained that her counsel
did not discuss creating a Classmates.com account with her -- and
that the discussions they did have were privileged.

The district court denied PeopleConnect's motion to compel
arbitration. It applied Ohio law "because Knapke resides in Ohio
and Ohio law should apply to interpreting any attorney-client
relationship that she entered into from her domicile." It rejected
PeopleConnect's argument that Reilly's agreement to the Terms of
Service bound Knapke. The district court also found there was "no
evidence that Knapke gave her counsel any authority to bind her to
Classmates' terms of service." It found no evidence that Reilly
acted at Knapke's direction or that Classmates.com understood
counsel's actions to have been undertaken on Knapke's behalf. Id.
And it found both that Knapke did not discuss creating a
Classmates.com account with Reilly and that the Terms of Service
forbade the creation of accounts on behalf of others.

The district court also found that Reilly created and used the
Classmates.com account to satisfy his Rule 11 obligations. And the
district court rejected PeopleConnect's request for discovery
because, in its view, Knapke had disclosed in her opposition both
the extent of her knowledge of and acquiescence to Reilly's use of
the account and the identity of the person who took the screenshots
used in the complaint (Reilly). PeopleConnect timely appealed.

III. Discussion

Because the FAA does not "alter background principles of state
contract law regarding the scope of agreements (including the
question of who is bound by them)," state law governs this inquiry.
Knapke's status as a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement does
not alter the applicability of state law. PeopleConnect, "as the
party seeking to compel arbitration, must prove the existence of a
valid agreement by a preponderance of the evidence." It has not
proven the existence of such an arbitration agreement binding
Knapke at this initial stage.

A. Choice of Law

The district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis by applying
Ohio law, Knapke argued that Ohio law applied, and PeopleConnect
argued that Washington law applied, but neither claimed that the
choice of law would affect the outcome. However, both parties now
agree that Washington law applies. District courts sitting in
diversity apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. And
Washington, the forum state, employs the "most significant
relationship test" to determine choice-of-law questions. But before
courts apply that test, "an actual conflict between the law of
Washington and the law of another state must be shown to exist."
"Absent such a showing, the forum may apply its own law." In the
case, because no conflict has been shown to exist between
Washington and Ohio law, Washington law applies.

B. Arbitration Agreement

The record does not establish whether Reilly was Knapke's attorney
when he agreed to the Classmates.com Terms of Service. But even if
the record showed that Reilly agreed to the Terms of Service after
Knapke retained him that would not be enough on its own to show
that the arbitration clause binds Knapke.

1. Agency Relationship

The Ninth Circuit opines that it is unclear whether Reilly and
Knapke had an attorney-client relationship, and thus an
agent-principal relationship, when Reilly agreed to the Terms of
Service. Under Washington law, "the burden of establishing an
agency relationship is on the party asserting it exists" -- in the
case, PeopleConnect.

The Ninth Circuit further opines that the record does not show when
Knapke and Reilly formed their agency relationship. Reilly did
become Knapke's attorney at some point. But it is unclear if that
happened before Reilly initially registered for his Classmates.com
account, or if not, before he bought his three-month subscription.
The screenshots are evidence of Reilly's assent to the arbitration
agreement. But the record does not establish when Reilly became
Knapke's agent, whether as her attorney or otherwise. This issue
might be material to determining whether Knapke is bound by
Reilly's agreement to the Terms of Service. The Ninth Circuit thus
remands for discovery on this issue.

Ms. Knapke focuses on PeopleConnect's decision not to take
discovery on this issue before moving to compel arbitration.
PeopleConnect conditionally, and sufficiently, requested discovery
in its motion to compel. Nothing required PeopleConnect to seek
discovery first, and the district court never found (nor could it
have) that PeopleConnect waived taking discovery.

2. Binding Effect

Because of a factual dispute about the scope of Reilly's authority,
the Ninth Circuit opines that the record does not allow a
determination of whether Knapke is bound to the arbitration through
Reilly's assent. It says, under Washington law, "arbitration
agreements may encompass nonsignatories under contract and agency
principles." Washington also recognizes various theories under
which a nonsignatory may be bound by a contract, including agency.
"An agency relationship may exist, either expressly or by
implication, when one party acts at the instance of and, in some
material degree, under the direction and control of another." And
an agent may bind a principal through either actual authority
(express or implied) or apparent authority.

A principal may also be bound by contracts her agent makes without
authority if the principal later ratifies the agent's agreement. "A
principal ratifies an agent's agreement if the principal (1)
receives, accepts, and retains benefits from the contract; (2)
remains silent or fails to repudiate the contract; or (3) otherwise
exhibits conduct demonstrating adoption and recognition of the
contract."

Under both implied actual authority and ratification, the Ninth
Circuit holds that it is unclear if Reilly's agreement to the
arbitration provision binds Knapke, even if Reilly were Knapke's
attorney when he agreed. Knapke's status as an undisclosed
principal when Reilly was her agent does not alter the application
of Washington agency law here. Nor does Reilly's obligation under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to adequately investigate
Knapke's claim.

a. Implied Actual Authority

The parties dispute whether Reilly had implied actual authority to
agree to the Classmates.com Terms of Service on Knapke's behalf.
Under Washington law, "implied authority is actual authority,
circumstantially proved, which the principal is deemed to have
actually intended the agent to possess." And "actual authority to
perform certain services on a principal's behalf results in implied
authority to perform the usual and necessary acts associated with
the authorized services." Such usual and necessary acts can include
agreeing to contracts. Attorneys licensed in Washington also
possess the same implied authority to act on behalf of their
clients.

The Ninth Circuit finds that at some point, Knapke retained Reilly
and his law firm to file suit against PeopleConnect based on
Classmates.com's alleged unauthorized use of her image. But the
scope of both their agreement and Reilly's corresponding authority
are unclear on this record. Discovery could reveal, among other
things, both the contours of Knapke's agreement with Reilly's law
firm and the limits, if any, on Reilly's authority to act on
Knapke's behalf. PeopleConnect is entitled to discovery in these
areas and need not accept at face value the statements Knapke's
counsel made in a memorandum of law.

On remand, the Ninth Circuit says, the district court should
determine the contours of the attorney-client privilege and any
potential waiver of that privilege. The district court should also
determine the consequences, if any, of Knapke simultaneously
denying an agency relationship regarding the arbitration agreement
and asserting a privilege for communications that would bear
directly on that issue.

b. Ratification

On this record, the Ninth Circuit says it is also unclear if Knapke
is bound because she ratified Reilly's agreement to the Terms of
Service, even if she would not otherwise be bound. In its motion to
compel arbitration, PeopleConnect noted in conditionally requesting
discovery that it would ask about Knapke's "knowledge of and
acquiescence to Reilly's use of Classmates.com on her behalf."
Acquiescence is one method of ratification. Ratification by silence
or acquiescence requires knowledge and either "acceptance of the
benefits from the contract or prejudicial reliance by the other
party."

The record does not establish whether Knapke knew that Reilly had
agreed to the Terms of Service on her behalf. There is no evidence
that Knapke knew, when she filed her complaint, that Reilly had
even agreed to the Terms of Service. And were that still the state
of the record following discovery, it would follow that there could
be no evidence that Knapke knew that Reilly had agreed to the Terms
of Service on her behalf. But the ratification inquiry looks not
only to the principal's knowledge, but also to the principal's
later actions.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that the record does not establish the
facts necessary to decide this issue, including what Knapke knew
and when she knew it. Knapke's supposed silence even after
PeopleConnect moved to compel arbitration does not necessitate a
finding of ratification on the current record. Thus, PeopleConnect
is also entitled to discovery on ratification.

c. Undisclosed Principal Status

Ms. Knapke's status as a possible undisclosed principal does not
alone determine whether she is bound by Reilly's agreement. Knapke
argues that Reilly did not intend to agree to the Terms of Service
on her behalf, and so as an undisclosed principal, she is not
bound. But "an undisclosed principal only becomes a party to a
contract when an agent acts on the principal's behalf in making the
contract. Thus, an undisclosed principal does not become a party to
a contract when the agent does not intend to act for the
principal." The question is thus whether Reilly acted on Knapke's
behalf in agreeing to the Classmates.com Terms of Service, not, as
Knapke argues, whether Reilly intended to bind her. Further factual
development is necessary to answer this question.

d. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires attorneys to make a
reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts and law supporting
intended claims. Knapke argues that "one, if not the primary, use
of the Classmates.com account by Mr. Reilly was to satisfy his
obligations under Civil Rule 11." First, the Ninth Circuit holds
that nothing in Reilly's declaration supports that proposition or
even discusses Rule 11. And second, while Reilly's motivations
could perhaps inform whether he agreed to the Terms of Service on
Knapke's behalf, that issue, while relevant, is not necessarily
determinative. Moreover, Reilly's obligation under Rule 11 to
adequately investigate Knapke's claim does not alter the
application of Washington agency law.

Rule 11 cannot explain Reilly's choice not to opt out of
arbitration, either. Under the Terms of Service, users may opt out
of arbitration through written notice within 30 days of first using
Classmates.com. Reilly could have satisfied his Rule 11 obligation
by creating his Classmates.com account and then opting out of
arbitration to retain the right to judicial recourse. He simply did
not do so.

IV. Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit vacates and remands on an open record. The
parties will bear their own costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/35dn54bs from Leagle.com.

Ian Heath Gershengorn (argued) -- igershengorn@jenner.com -- and
Illyana A. Green -- igreen@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, in
Washington, D.C.; Clifford W. Berlow, Debbie L. Berman, and Wade A.
Thomson, Jenner & Block LLP, in Chicago, Illinois; Brent Caslin,
Jenner & Block LLP, in Los Angeles, California; for the
Defendant-Appellant.

Roger Perlstadt (argued)-- rperlstadt@edelson.com -- Ryan D.
Andrews -- randrews@edelson.com -- and Ben Thomassen --
bthomassen@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, in Chicago, Illinois; Philip
L. Fraietta, Bursor & Fisher P.A., in New York City; for the
Plaintiff-Appellee.


PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING: Palomera Suit Removed to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled RODOLFO CELIS PALOMERA, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING, INC.;
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING GROUP, INC.; and DOES 1 through 20,
inclusive, Case No. 30-2022-0156009-CU-OE-CXC, was removed from the
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Orange
to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
on June 30, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 8:22-cv-01243 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay
overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to permit
rest breaks, failure to reimburse business expenses, failure to
provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay wages timely
during employment, failure to pay all wages due upon separation of
employment, and unfair competition.

Performance Contracting, Inc. is a specialty contractor, with its
principal place of business in Lenexa, Kansas.

Performance Contracting Group, Inc. is a specialty contractor, with
its principal place of business in Lenexa, Kansas. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Hardy Ray Murphy, Esq.
         David Szwarcsztejn, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 239-9800
         Facsimile: (213) 239-9045
         E-mail: hardy.murphy@ogletree.com
                 david.szwarcsztejn@ogletree.com

PETER MOHYLNY: Birmingham, et al., Seek Entry of Default Judgment
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Ryan Birmingham, Roman
Leonov, Steven Hansen, Mitchell Parent, and Jonathan Zarley,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Alex Doe, et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-23472-RNS (S.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiffs Ryan Birmingham, Roman Leonov, Steven Hansen,
Mitchell Parent, Jonathan Zarley, and others similarly situated
persons move the Court for entry of default judgment as to
liability only against the following Defaulting Defendants:

  -- Peter Mohylny
  -- The Investing Online
  -- Ester Holdings, Inc.
  -- Wealthy Developments LP
  -- VDD-Trading, Ltd.
  -- Dmytro Fokin
  -- Ivan Hrechaniuk
  -- Manuchar Daraselia
  -- Brass Marker s.r.o.
  -- Sergiy Prokopenko
  -- Profit Media Group LP
  -- Auro Advantages, LLC
  -- Borys Konovalenko
  -- Mayon Holding Ltd.
  -- Marina Garda
  -- Mayon Solutions Ltd.
  -- Olga Tielly
  -- Notus, LLC
  -- Global E-Advantages, LLC
  -- Alla Skala
  -- Olga Abrykosova
  -- Easy Com, LLC
  -- ShopoStar, LLC
  -- Grovee, LLC
  -- Trans-Konsalt MR Ltd.
  -- Art Sea Group Ltd.

Between 2018 and 2021, an informal association of Ukrainians (the
"RoFx Operators") operated a phony foreign exchange trading service
via RoFx.net -- a website hosted in Jacksonville, Florida.

The RoFx Operators claimed to have artificially intelligent
software that could conduct foreign exchange trading on behalf of
customers; the customers needed only to send funds to the RoFx
Operators and, in return, the customers were promised passive
income.

The RoFx Operators perpetrated this years-long fraud using a
sophisticated website, active customer service team, invoices,
account statements, foreign exchange activity reported on
third-party websites, and promotions via advertisements and
sponsored articles -- and even allowed some customers to withdraw
limited funds.

As explained in the Amended Complaint, all of this was elaborate
stage dressing: the RoFx Operators never conducted foreign exchange
trading and, instead, pocketed the customers' funds.

By the time the RoFx.net website went dark in September 2021 -- and
the RoFx Operators stopped responding to customers -- the RoFx
Operators had stolen at least $75 million from customers.

Such a large amount of stolen money does not disappear without
help. The RoFx Operators created an intricate and international
network of shell companies and relationships with financial
intermediaries to launder the illicit funds (the "Money Laundering
Enterprise").

The Money Laundering Enterprise consists of a set of companies
directly receiving customer funds ("Front Companies"); another set
of companies with existing cross-border transaction volume that
would obfuscate the flow of funds between RoFx customers, Front
Companies, and ultimately to the RoFx Operators ("Layering
Companies"); and the final level of companies acting as the exit
point for the laundered funds ("Cash-Out Companies"). To distance
themselves from the various sets of companies, the RoFx Operators
collaborated with a set of individuals and entities ("Company
Organizers") who were tasked with creating, acquiring, and managing
Front Companies and transferring funds throughout the Money
Laundering Enterprise. The Money Laundering Enterprise began
operating as early as January 2018 and continues to this day, with
Defendants opening and closing entities and shifting transaction
volume as needed to evade regulatory scrutiny, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiffs filed the present class action on September 29,
2021, after the RoFx Operators disappeared with their ill-gotten
gains. The Plaintiffs amended their complaint on February 14, 2022,
with the Court's leave, bringing several claims against the
Defaulting Defendants: Violation of the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count I);
RICO Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. section 1962(d) (Count II); Common Law
Fraud (Count III); Conspiracy to Commit Fraud (Count IV); Aiding
and Abetting Fraud (Count V); Conversion (Count VI); Conspiracy to
Commit Conversion (Count VII); and Aiding and Abetting Conversion
(Count VIII).

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated June 27,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3I5LXUp
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Dennis A. Gonzalez, Esq.
          HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
          701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3300
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 374-8500
          E-mail: Dennis.gonzalez@hklaw.com

PLANET FITNESS: Hayes Files Suit in Mass. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Planet Fitness Center
Salem Trust, et al. The case is styled as Jonathan Hayes, Katherine
Hayes, on behalf of Themselves and all others similarly situated v.
Planet Fitness Center Salem Trust, Planet Fitness Asset Co LLC,
Planet Fitness Franchising LLC, Planet Fitness Holdings LLC, Planet
Fitness Inc, ABC Financial Services Inc., Case No. 2284CV01305
(Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk Cty., June 10, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Contract / Business Cases."

Planet Fitness is a local gym in Salem, Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew Thomas LaMothe, Esq.
          Brian McNiff, Esq.
          LAMOTHE, MCNIFF, RELETHFORD
          2 Margin St PO Box 4526
          Salem, MA 01970

The Defendants are represented by:

          Edward V. Colbert, III, Esq
          David Koha, Esq.
          CASNER AND EDWARDS LLP
          303 Congress St.
          Boston, MA 02210


RACER TECHNOLOGIES: Underpays Courier Delivery Staff, Lupo Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
NICOLETTE LUPO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RACER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:22-cv-05448 (S.D.N.Y., June 28, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York State Labor Law including failure to pay
overtime wages, failure to provide wage notices, failure to provide
accurate wage statements, and failure to pay spread-of-hours
compensation.

Ms. Lupo was employed by the Defendant as a cook, courier, and
supervisor from on or around May 1, 2022 through and including June
10, 2022.

Racer Technologies, Inc. is an owner and operator of a courier
delivery service known as Racer, with its principal place of
business at 40 Rivington Street, New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
         Jason Mizrahi, Esq.
         LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 792-0046
         E-mail: Joshua@levinepstein.com

RECKITT BENCKISER: Agreed Protective Order Issued in Sterling Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge P. Kevin Castel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York issued a Protective Order in the case, CITY OF
STERLING HEIGHTS POLICE & FIRE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. RECKITT
BENCKISER GROUP PLC, RAKESH KAPOOR, and SHAUN THAXTER, Defendants,
Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-10041-PKC (S.D.N.Y.).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the Plaintiffs
and the Defendants respectfully request that the Court issues a
protective order to protect certain confidential, proprietary, or
private information that may be produced or re-produced in the
course of discovery in the Action, and to guard against the waiver
of attorney-client privilege, work-product protection pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), and other applicable privileges.
The Parties, by and through their respective undersigned counsel,
stipulate to the terms governing the pre-trial phase of the Action,
subject to the Court's approval.

Protected Information means information subject to a claim of
attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product protection, or
other applicable privilege, that a Producing Party inadvertently
discloses to a Receiving Party in the Action. Nothing in the Order
prejudices in any way any objection to, or position concerning,
production of the foregoing.

Any person subject to the Order who receives from any Producing
Party Discovery Material that is designated as "Confidential" will
not disclose such Confidential Discovery Material, except as
expressly permitted. Any violation of the terms of the Order will
be punishable by relief the Court deems appropriate.

Unless otherwise directed by the Court, Confidential Discovery
Material will not be disclosed, summarized, described,
characterized, or otherwise communicated or made available, in
whole or in part, to any person other than the individuals
described in the Protective Order.

All Discovery Material (including, but not limited to, Confidential
Discovery Material) will be used solely for the prosecution or
defense of the Action, and will not be used for any other purpose
whatsoever. Confidential information will not be disclosed except
in accordance with the terms of the Order.

Each Party must promptly advise the Producing Party through counsel
of any losses, or compromises, of the confidentiality of the
Confidential Discovery Material governed by the Order. The Order
does not apply to any information or material that: (i) was, is or
becomes public knowledge other than through a breach of this Order;
(ii) is acquired or learned by the Receiving Party independent of
discovery in this Action; or (iii) is required by law to be made
available to third Parties.

In the event additional Parties join or are joined in the action,
the newly joined Party will not have access to Confidential
Discovery Material until its counsel has executed and, at the
request of any Party, filed with the Court, its agreement to be
fully bound by the Order.

Notwithstanding any other provision, no document may be filed with
the Clerk under seal without a further Order of this Court
addressing the specific documents or portions of documents to be
sealed. Confidential Discovery Material may only be filed under
seal pursuant to a court order authorizing the sealing of the
specific Confidential Discovery Material at issue. If a request to
file Confidential Discovery Material under seal is denied by the
Court, then the Receiving Party may file the information in the
public record unless otherwise instructed by the Court.

A Party or Non-Party may object to the designation of Discovery
Material as "Confidential" at any time. Failure to do so at the
time of the designation does not operate as a waiver of any
Receiving Party's right to challenge the "Confidential" designation
of any Discovery Material by any Designating Party.

The return, sequester or destruction of any Protected Information
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) will not in
any way preclude the Receiving Party from moving the Court for an
Order compelling production of the Protected Information.

To the extent that any Non-Party produces Discovery Material in
this Action that contains Confidential Discovery Material of a
Party to this Action, any Party may designate such Discovery
Material as "Confidential," for purposes of this Order by
delivering written notice of such designation to the Parties within
60 days of receipt by counsel for all Parties of the Non-Party's
production of such Discovery Material. Until the expiration of the
60-day period, the Parties will treat any Discovery Material
produced by a Non-Party as Confidential Discovery Material.
Thereafter, only those portions of such Discovery Material
designated as "Confidential" will be deemed Confidential Discovery
Material.

As soon as practicable, and in no case more than five business
days, after a Receiving Party's receipt of written responses and
objections and/or Discovery Material provided or produced in
response to a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45, a request pursuant to the Hague Convention, or any other
process for obtaining Discovery Material, including any court
filings related to such subpoena or request, that Receiving Party
must make copies of such written responses and objections, court
filings, and/or Discovery Material available to all other Parties.

Within 60 days after receiving notice of entry of an order,
judgment or decree finally ending the Action, including, without
limitation, any appeals therefrom, or the running of time to take
such an appeal, if later, all persons having received Confidential
Discovery Material will make commercially reasonable efforts to
identify and destroy all such Confidential Discovery Material,
including all copies thereof and information derived therefrom, or
return such materials to counsel for the Producing Party.

Notwithstanding the foregoing provision, the counsel are entitled
to retain archival copies of all pleadings, motion papers,
transcripts, legal memoranda, e-mail and other correspondence or
attorney work-product, even if such materials contain Confidential
Discovery Material under the Order. Any such archival copies that
contain or constitute Confidential Discovery Material remain
subject to the Order.

The Court will retain jurisdiction over all persons subject to this
Order to the extent necessary to enforce any obligations arising
thereunder or to impose sanctions for any contempt thereof.

Any violation of the terms of the Order will be punishable by
relief deemed appropriate by the Court.

The Parties agree to meet and confer concerning any dispute between
the Parties regarding the Order before seeking assistance from the
Court. If the Parties are unable to resolve the dispute, any Party
may make an appropriate application to the Court for relief.

The Order will become effective as a stipulation among the Parties
immediately upon its execution, even if not yet entered by the
Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Protective Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2yz6zn43 from Leagle.com.

TIMOTHY PERLA -- TIMOTHY.PERLA@WILMERHALE.COM -- WILMER CUTLER
PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP, Timothy J. Perla, in Boston,
Massachusetts, Michael G. Bongiorno, in New York City, Jessica L.
Lewis, in San Francisco, California, Counsel for Defendants
Reckitt, Benckiser Group PLC and Rakesh Kapoor.

ALAN I. ELLMAN -- aellman@rgrdlaw.com -- ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN &
DOWD LLP, Samuel H. Rudman, Mario Alba Jr., Alan I. Ellman,
Christopher T. Gilroy, Sarah E. Delaney, in Melville, New York,
Lead Counsel for the Lead Plaintiff and the Class.

VANOVERBEKE, MICHAUD & TIMMONY, P.C., Thomas C. Michaud --
tmichaud@vmtlaw.com -- in Detroit, Michigan, Attorneys for the
Plaintiffs.

PAUL A. STRAUS -- pstraus@kslaw.com -- KING & SPALDING LLP, Israel
Dahan, Richard T. Marooney, Paul A. Straus, in New York City,
Counsel for Defendant Shaun Thaxter.


REGALIS IP INC: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Regalis IP, Inc. The
case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Regalis IP, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-05651 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Regalis IP, Inc. doing business as Regalis Foods --
https://www.regalisfoods.com/ -- is New York City's leading
importer of exceptional, elusive food products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


RHYTHM SUPERFOODS: Fontanez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rhythm Superfoods,
LLC. The case is styled as Ramon Fontanez, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Rhythm Superfoods, LLC,
Case No. 1:22-cv-05575 (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Rhythm Superfoods -- https://rhythmfoods.com/ -- is an innovator in
plant-based snacking.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


ROOSEVELT FIELD: More Time to File Class Cert Reply Sought
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Sapuy v. Roosevelt Field
Mall Dental, P.C., Case No. 2:21-cv-00322-JMA-AYS (E.D.N.Y.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order granting a second extension
to the deadlines to respond and reply to the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification, which was filed June 1, 2022.

           Event                  Original           New
                                  Deadline           Deadline

-- Response to Motion          June 29, 2022      Aug. 19, 2022

-- Reply to Motion             July 6, 2022       Sept. 2, 2022

Roosevelt Field is a medical group practice located in Garden City,
New York that specializes in Dentistry.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3R6mfmP at no extra charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kierstan Schultz, Esq.
          NIXON PEABODY LLP
          kschultz@nixonpeabody.com
          900 Elm Street
          Manchester, NH 03101-2031
          Telephone: (603) 628-4031
          Facsimile: (844) 675-4275
          E-mail: nixonpeabody.com
                  @NixonPeabodyLLP

SACHS ELECTRIC: Settlement in Durham Suit Gets Final Nod
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WILLIAM DURHAM, et al., v.
SACHS ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-04506-BLF (N.D.
Cal.), the Court entered a final approval order of the class action
settlement in this wage and hour class action pertaining to workers
at the California Flats Solar Project.

   -- The settlement provides for a gross settlement amount of
      $775,000 to be distributed to class members.

   -- The following pre-distribution deductions from the gross
      settlement amount are approved:

      (1) an attorneys' fees award of $258,333;

      (2) costs of $8,141.81;

      (3) settlement administrator costs of $11,000;

      (4) a California Private Attorney General Act payment of
          $22,500; and

      (5) a $5,000 class representative service award to Mr.
          Durham. No oppositions have been filed and there are
          no objectors. The Court held a hearing on the Motion
          on June 16, 2022.

Mr. Durham filed this action against Sachs Electric on July 25,
2018, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. In his
First Amended, Mr. Durham alleged that he was employed by
Defendants in connection with the California Flats Solar
Project.

Mr. Durham alleged that the Defendants required him and other
employees to "badge in" at a security entrance to the Project site
at the beginning of their shifts.  Once they had entered the site,
employees were required to travel approximately 12 miles at a slow
speed limit using non-public roads to reach site parking lots. Mr.
Durham alleged that the time recorded for employees' hours worked
did not reflect travel time (1) from the security gate to the
parking lots or (2) from the parking lots to specific work sites on
company buggies.

Sachs Electric is a national electrical contracting,
communications, instrumentation, and engineering company.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3OEErSC at no extra charge.[CC]

SCWORX CORP: Yannes Suit Has Final Judgment & Order of Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL YANNES, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. SCWORX CORPORATION and MARC
S. SCHESSEL, Defendants, Civil Action No. 20-CV-3349-JGK
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge John G. Koeltl of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York enters Final Judgment and Order of
dismissal with prejudice.

The matter came before the Court on the application of the Lead
Plaintiff for approval of the Settlement set forth in the
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement between the Parties dated
Feb. 11, 2022.

By Order dated March 22, 2022, the Court (a) preliminarily approved
the Settlement; (b) ordered that notice of the proposed Settlement
be provided to the potential Settlement Class Members; (c) provided
the Settlement Class Members the opportunity to opt out of the
Settlement Class or object to the proposed Settlement; and (d)
scheduled a hearing regarding final approval of the Settlement. Due
and adequate notice of the Settlement was provided to the
Settlement Class;

The Court conducted the Settlement Fairness Hearing on June 29,
202. Having reviewed and considered the Stipulation, all papers
filed and proceedings held therein in connection with the
Settlement, all oral and written comments received regarding the
Settlement, and the record in the Action, and good cause appearing
therefor, Judge Koeltl grants final certification of the Settlement
Class consisting of all persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired SCWorx common stock on the Nasdaq or other U.S.
exchanges or in a U.S. transaction between April 13, 2020 and April
17, 2020, inclusive.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
for purposes of settlement only, Lead Plaintiff Vy Nguyen is
certified as the Settlement Class Representative and Lead Counsel
Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP is appointed as the Class Counsel.

Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judge Koeltl approves the Settlement and finds that said Settlement
is, in all respects, fair, reasonable, adequate to, and in the best
interests of Lead Plaintiff, the Settlement Class, and each of the
Settlement Class Members. Additionally, he finds that the terms and
conditions of the exchange of the issuance of the Settlement Shares
for the settlement and release of the claims asserted in the Action
are fair and reasonable. No objections to the proposed settlement,
in have been felted. Accordingly, the Settlement is approved in all
respects and will be consummated in accordance with its terms and
provisions. The Parties are directed to perform the terms of the
Stipulation.

Except as to any individual claim of those persons who have validly
and timely requested exclusion from the Settlement Class, the
Action and all claims contained therein, as well as all of the
Released Claims, are dismissed with prejudice as against each and
all of the Releasees. The Parties are to bear their own costs,
except as provided in the Settlement and therein.

Pursuant to and in full compliance with Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Koeltl finds and concludes that the
Plan of Allocation set forth in the Notice is in all respects fair
and reasonable and he approves the Plan of Allocation. After
completion of the processing of all claims by the Claims
Administrator, the Escrow Agent will disburse the Net Settlement
Fund in accordance with the Stipulation and Plan of Allocation.

Pursuant to and in full compliance with Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Koeltl finds and concludes that the
requested fee award is reasonable and awards attorneys' fees of 25%
percent of the Settlement Fund in the same proportion of cash and
stock as the recovery by the Settlement Class (i.e., $675,000 in
cash (plus interest), $150,000 in Settlement Shares, and 25,000 of
the Schessel Shares), plus reimbursement of Litigation Expenses
totaling $45,474.62. These amounts are to be paid from the
Settlement Fund pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation.

Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in any way, the
Court retains continuing jurisdiction over: (a) implementation of
this Settlement; (b) disposition of the Settlement Fund; (c)
hearing and determining applications for attorneys' fees,
Litigation Expenses, and interest in the Action; and (d) all
Parties thereto for the purpose of construing, enforcing, and
administering the Stipulation and the Judgment.

Judge Koeltl dismisses with prejudice the Action in its entirety
and all Released Claims against each and all Released Persons
without costs as to any of the Settling Parties as against the
others. As there is no just reason for delay in the entry of tes
Judgment, immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is expressly
directed pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Final Judgment &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4r9nab49 from
Leagle.com.


SIEMENS INDUSTRY: Enomoto Labor Code Suit Goes to N.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled CHANIELLE ENOMOTO, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. SIEMENS INDUSTRY, INC. and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive, Case No. 22CV011810, was removed from the
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Alameda
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
on July 1, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:22-cv-03904 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay
overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to permit
rest periods, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements,
failure to reimburse all business expenses, failure to timely pay
all wages and commissions due upon separation of employment, and
unfair business practices.

Siemens Industry, Inc. is a provider of engineering and
technological solutions, headquartered in Illinois. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Christopher W. Decker, Esq.
         Vi Applen, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 239-9800
         Facsimile: (213) 239-9045
         E-mail: christopher.decker@ogletree.com
                 vi.applen@ogletree.com

STAR WIRELESS: Faces Aguilar Wage-and-Hour Suit in S.D. Texas
-------------------------------------------------------------
SANTOS A. AGUILAR, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. STAR WIRELESS LLC, Defendant, Case No.
4:22-cv-02146 (S.D. Tex., June 29, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendant for its failure to compensate the Plaintiff and
similarly situated workers overtime pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours in a workweek in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant as a maintenance worker
since October 2021.

Star Wireless LLC is a telecommunications contractor in Harris
County, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James M. Dore, Esq.
         JUSTICIA LABORAL LLC
         6232 N. Pulaski Road, Suite 300
         Chicago, IL 60646
         Telephone: (773) 415-4898
         E-mail: jdore@justicialaboral.com

STATE FARM: Wins Summary Judgment Bid vs Pedersen
-------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DANNY PEDERSEN, as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert L. Lindsay; BETTY
L. RADOVICH; WANDA WOODWICK; and ROSALIE KIERNAN, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Rebecca Nicholson; individually and
on behalf of those similarly situated, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Case No.
4:19-cv-00029-BMM-JTJ (D. Mont.), the Hon. Judge Brian Morris
entered an order:

   1. denying the Plaintiffs' motion to certify Questions of
      Substantive Law;

   2. denying the Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel;

   3. denying in part and granting in part the Plaintiffs'
      Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint;

      The Plaintiffs' motion is denied in all respects except to
      allow substitution of Randy Tarum for Danny Pedersen as
      personal representative for Robert Lindsay's estate. In
      that respect, Plaintiffs' motion is construed as a motion
      to substitute for a proper party;

   4. granting State Farm's motion for Summary Judgment; and

   5. denying as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class.

In light of the Court's ruling on summary judgment against all the
named Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs motion for class certification
must be denied as moot. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiffs
fail to adequately demonstrate the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement for
commonality. A common question "must be of such a nature that it is
capable of classwide resolution -- which means that determination
of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." The
Plaintiffs' motion fails to demonstrate that the special
relationship inquiry could be answered in one stroke. Whether a
special relationship between an automobile insurer and its insured
exists poses an individualized inquiry in these circumstances.

The Plaintiffs Betty Radovich, Wanda Woodwick and decedents Robert
Lindsay and Rebecca Nicholson sustained injuries in separate
automobile accidents while insured under automobile insurance
policies issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
The negligent party in each accident possessed insufficient
liability coverage to compensate the Plaintiffs fully for their
damages. Plaintiffs' automobile insurance policies included
liability coverage and uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, but did
not include underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Plaintiffs allege
that their State Farm insurance agents acted negligently by failing
to explain and offer UIM coverage to them. The Plaintiffs claim
that they would have purchased UIM coverage if their insurance
agents had offered it. Plaintiffs contend that their insurance
agents breached their common law duty of reasonable care when they
failed to explain and offer UIM coverage. The Plaintiffs have
asserted claims against State Farm for declaratory relief,
negligence, professional negligence, deceit, common law bad faith,
and actual malice.

The Court determined previously that State Farm agents possessed
the duty to explain and offer UIM coverage only if a State Farm
agent shared a special relationship with an individual Plaintiff.
Absent establishing a special relationship between the State Farm
agent and the insured, Plaintiffs would fail to demonstrate that
State Farm was required to explain and offer UIM coverage.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ydquUH at no extra charge.[CC]

TAMPA ELECTRIC: Covarubias Suit Moved to Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled ELEAZAR COVARUBIAS and SHERMAN MCCARTHY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY, MOSS & ASSOCIATES, LLC, and TRAVELERS
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA, Case No. 20-CC-14918, was
transferred to the County Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit
in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, on June 29, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the County Court of the Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit assigned Case No. 22-CA-005572 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs bring this class action against the Defendants for
lien foreclosure for non-payment of manual labor services and
breach of payment bond. According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs
and Class members have not been paid the contracted wages for the
manual labor services provided on the Wimauma Solar Project
pursuant to their agreement with Moss & Associates.

Tampa Electric Company is an electric power services provider based
in Florida.

Moss & Associates, LLC is a construction management company based
in Florida.

Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America is an insurance
company based in Connecticut. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Jason Whittemore, Esq.
         Alan F. Wagner, Esq.
         WAGNER MCLAUGHLIN, P.A.
         601 Bayshore Blvd., Suite 910
         Tampa, FL 33606
         Telephone: (813) 225-4000
         E-mail: Jason@wagnerlaw.com
                 Alan@wagnerlaw.com

                 - and –

         Rolando J. Santiago, Esq.
         RJS LAW GROUP
         306 N. US Hwy 41
         Ruskin, FL 33570
         Telephone: (813) 641-0010
         Facsimile: (813) 641-0022
         E-mail: roland@rjslawgroup.com

TITAN LOGISTICS: Case Management Order Entered in Johnston
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GLENWOOD JOHNSTON; et al.,
on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employee, v. TITAN
LOGISTICS & RESOURCES, LLC; TONY DIGIAMBERDINE; and UNITED VISION
LOGISTICS, Case No. 2:17-cv-01617-NBF (W.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge
entered a case management order as follows:

  -- The discovery deadline is:                Dec. 11, 2022

  -- The parties shall meet and                Aug. 31, 2022
     confer and file Joint Discovery           and
     Status Reports by:                        Oct. 28, 2022

  -- Any affirmative expert reports            Sept. 15, 2022
     shall be submitted by:

  -- Depositions of any experts shall          Oct. 30, 2022
     be completed by:

  -- Rebuttal expert reports shall             Nov. 19, 2022
     be submitted by:

  -- Depositions of any rebuttal               Dec. 11, 2022
     experts shall be completed by:

Titan Logistics & Resources LLC is a full service oil field
logistics company specializing in a wide range of oil and gas field
operations.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3R4qPSn at no extra charge.[CC]

TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Miller Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Transworld Systems
Inc. The case is styled as Mark H. Miller, on behalf of himself and
all other similarly situated consumers v. Transworld Systems Inc.,
Case No. 2:22-cv-03871 (E.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Transworld Systems Inc. (TSI) -- https://tsico.com/ -- provides
receivables collection and management services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
          ADAM J. FISHBEIN, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, NY 11598
          Phone: (516) 668-6945
          Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


TRIBOROUGH CONSTRUCTION: All Seasons Suit Seeks Unpaid Balance
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALL SEASONS WINDOW & DOOR SYSTEMS, INC., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TRIBOROUGH
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., 1815 PACIFIC LLC, GEORGE HSU, JOHN
HSU, and "JOHN DOE," Defendants, Case No. 518898/2022 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Kings Cty., July 1, 2022) is a class action against the
Defendants for breach of contract.

According to the complaint, the Defendants owed the Plaintiff an
aggregate sum of $192,311.99, for the projects located at 1668
Eastern Parkway, Brooklyn, New York and 131 22nd Street, New York,
New York with interest thereon from October 24,2019.

The Plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the
Defendant, Triborough Construction Services, was hired and engaged
to furnish materials in connection with the said projects.

All Seasons Window & Door Systems, Inc. is a full-service window
and door company based in New Jersey.

Triborough Construction Services, Inc. is a construction company
based in New York.

1815 Pacific LLC is a real property owner in Brooklyn, New York.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Stuart S. Zisholtz, Esq.
         ZISHOLTZ & ZISHOLTZ, LLP
         200 Garden City Plaza, Suite 408
         Garden City, NY 11530
         Telephone: (516) 741-2200

TRIUS TRUCKING: Settlement in Mondrian Suit Gets Initial Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AUGUSTUS MONDRIAN, et al.,
v. TRIUS TRUCKING, INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-00884-DAD-SKO (E.D.
Cal.), the Court entered an order granting preliminary approval of
class action settlement and conditional class certification.

  -- The Proposed Settlement

     The parties request approval of the following class of
     an estimated 524 individuals:

     "all individuals who worked for Defendant, Trius Trucking
     in California as Truck Drivers at any location in
     California during the time period May 10, 2012 to December
     31, 2016."

     The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Plaintiffs
     do not specify a collective in the terms of their motion
     or in the parties' Settlement Agreement. However, the
     Settlement Agreement defines "FLSA Opt-In Members" as 20
     "those Participating Class Members who worked for
     Defendant during the period May 10, 2013 21 to December
     31, 2016 and who timely execute and return the FLSA
     Consent Form."

     Similarly, the parties' proposed FLSA Consent Form is
     addressed "to all individuals 23 who worked for defendant
     Trius Trucking in California as truck drivers at any
     location in California during the period May 10, 2013 to
     December 31, 2016."

     Therefore, the court will preliminarily approve the
     following collective:

     "all individuals who worked for defendant Trius Trucking

     in California as truck drivers at any location in
     California during the period May 10, 2013 to December 31,
     2016."

     The Plaintiffs have defined "Aggrieved Employees" as
     "those individuals who worked for Defendant, Trius
     Trucking in California as Truck Drivers at any location in
     California during the time period May 10, 2015 to December
     31, 2016."

     The Settlement Period

     For settlement purposes, the parties have defined the
     "Class Period" as the time period of "May 10, 2012 up
     through and including December 31, 2016." (Id. at 8.) By
     contrast, and as described, the relevant period for the
     FLSA collective action is May 10, 2013 through December
     31, 2016.

     Further, the plaintiffs have defined the "PAGA Period" as
     extending from May 10, 2015 to December 31, 2016

     The Release of Claims

     The Settlement Agreement defines the Released Parties as
     "Trius Trucking, Inc. and its 15 past and present parent
     companies, subsidiaries, divisions, and other affiliated
     or related employees, current and former employees,
     officers, directors, agents, representatives, attorneys,
     insurers, partners, shareholders, representatives, joint
     venturers, owners, and successors and assigns of each."

     Summary of the Settlement Terms

     Under the proposed settlement, defendant will pay a total
     of $995,000.00 (the "Qualified Settlement Fund" or "QSF")
     allocated as follows:

     1) up to $248,750 for attorneys' fees and up to $15,000
        for plaintiffs' counsel's documented litigation costs;

     2) $10,000 incentive awards for each plaintiff;

     3) $10,000 in civil PAGA penalties, with $7,500 of the
        penalties payable to the California Labor and Workforce
        Development Agency ("LWDA"); and

     4) up to $15,000 for settlement administration costs.

The Plaintiff Mondrian worked for defendant from February 2016
through April 2016 as a truck driver, and plaintiff Rhonda Jones
worked for defendant from March 2016 through September 2016 as a
truck driver.

The Plaintiff Mondrian originally filed this class action complaint
in the Fresno County Superior Court on May 10, 2016. On January 5,
2017, plaintiff Mondrian, joined by plaintiff Jones, filed a first
amended complaint in that court.

On March 27, 2017, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, and
on May 29, 2019, plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint in
state court. The Plaintiffs' third amended complaint asserts wage,
hour, and other labor-related claims in violation of the
California Labor Code, California Business and Professions Code,
and federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), which plaintiffs
claim give rise to penalties under California's Private Attorney's
General Act ("PAGA").

Trius Trucking is a "transportation company that provides dry and
temperature controlled hauls and boasts more than one hundred
trucks operating in California."

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ydrdFp at no extra charge.[CC]

TRUMP CORP: Sixth Amended CMP, Scheduling Order Entered in McKoy
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CATHERINE MCKOY, et al.,
v. THE TRUMP CORPORATION, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-09936-LGS-SLC
(S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Sarah L. Cave entered a sixth amended
civil case management plan and scheduling order as follows:

  1. All fact discovery, including              Aug. 31, 2022
     depositions, shall be completed
     by:

  2. The parties shall file a joint             Sept. 7, 2022
     letter certifying the completion
     of fact discovery:

  3. All expert discovery shall be              Jan. 24, 2023
     completed by:

  4. The parties shall file a joint             Jan. 31, 2023,
     letter certifying the completion
     of expert discovery and advising
     whether they wish for the Court
     to conduct a settlement conference;

  5. The briefing schedule for
     Plaintiffs' anticipated motion
     for class certification is
     amended as follows:

     a. The Plaintiffs shall By                 Feb. 14, 2023
        the Motion:

     b. The Defendants shall file               April 1, 2023
        their opposition to the
        Motion:

     c. The Plaintiffs shall file               April 28, 2023
        their reply, if any:

The Trump Organization is a group of about 500 business entities of
which Donald Trump is the sole or principal owner. Around 250 of
these entities use the Trump name. The organization was founded in
1927 by Donald Trump's paternal grandmother, Elizabeth Christ
Trump, and his father, Fred Trump, as E. Trump & Son.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3OPMcoQ at no extra charge.[CC]


TULSA COUNTY, OK: Court Amends Litigation Schedule in Feltz
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RICHARD FELTZ and ASHTON
DENNIS, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated,
v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TULSA COUNTY, et al., Case No.
18-CV-00298-SPF-JFJ (N.D. Okla.), the Court entered an order
amending the litigation schedule as follows:

    -- Plaintiff rebuttal reports to       August 18, 2022
       be produced by:

    -- Expert discovery to close on:       September 19, 2022

    -- Class certification motion and      October 12, 2022
       Daubert motions to be filed by:

    -- Class certification oppositions     November 3, 2022
       to be filed by:

    -- Class certification replies to      November 17, 2022
       be filed by:

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3NE7cxs at no extra charge.[CC]

TUTTLE-CLICK TUSTIN: Macias Consumer Suit Goes to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled MONTE MACIAS and MARIE MACIAS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. TUTTLE-CLICK TUSTIN,
INC. d/b/a TUTTLE-CLICK'S TUSTIN CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM; FIAT
CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES (FCA) US, LLC; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case
No. 30-2022-01261851, was removed from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Orange to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California on July 1, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 8:22-cv-01250-JWH-ADS to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged fraud and deceit,
negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, negligence, breach
of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and violations of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, California's Unfair Competition
Law, and California's False Advertising Law.

Tuttle-Click Tustin, Inc., doing business as Tuttle-Click's Tustin
Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, is a car dealer in Tustin, California.

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) US, LLC is an automobile
manufacturer, headquartered in Auburn Hills, Michigan. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Alexander M. Carnevale, Esq.
         THOMPSON COBURN LLP
         10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 500
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone: (310) 282-2500
         Facsimile: (310) 282-2501
         E-mail: acarnevale@thompsoncoburn.com

                 - and –

         Stephen A. D'Aunoy, Esq.
         Scott H. Morgan, Esq.
         THOMPSON COBURN LLP
         One US Bank Plaza
         St. Louis, MO 63101
         Telephone: (314) 552-6000
         Facsimile: (314) 552-7000
         E-mail: sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com
                 smorgan@thompsoncoburn.com

UNIQUE PRETZEL: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Unique Pretzel Bakery
Inc. The case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Unique Pretzel Bakery
Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05665 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Unique Pretzel Bakery -- https://www.uniquesnacks.com/ -- is a
store specializing in pretzels in eclectic flavors, including
horseradish, mustard & chocolate.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


UPSLOPE LLC: Taylor Files Suit in D. Colorado
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Upslope, LLC. The
case is styled as Megan Taylor, Spencer Heintz, individuals, on
behalf of themselves, the general public, and those similarly
situated v. Upslope, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-01639-MEH (D. Colo.,
July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Upslope, LLC doing business as Upslope Brewing Company --
https://www.upslopebrewing.com/ -- is a craft brewery based in
Boulder, Colorado who specialize in hand-crafted, all natural beers
that are packaged in aluminum cans.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kali R. Backer, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          4450 Arapahoe Avenue, Suite 100
          Boulder, CO 80303
          Phone: (415) 639-9090
          Email: kali@gutridesafier.com


VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS: Rushing Files Suit in N.D. Texas
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Verizon
Communications, Inc. The case is styled as Michelle Rushing,
individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. Verizon
Communications, Inc., Case No. 6:22-cv-00030-C (N.D. Tex., July 1,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as All Other Real Property.

Verizon Communications Inc., commonly known as Verizon --
http://www.verizon.com/-- is an American multinational
telecommunications conglomerate and a corporate component of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jarrett L Ellzey, Jr., Esq.
          Alexander Kykta, Esq.
          Leigh S Montgomery, Esq.
          ELLZEY & ASSOCIATES PLLC
          1105 Milford Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: (713) 554-2377
          Fax: (888) 276-3455
          Email: jarrett@ellzeylaw.com
                 alex@ellzeylaw.com
                 leigh@ellzeylaw.com


VERO BEACH POLICE: Taig Loses Bid to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KEITH TAIG, individually,
and on behalf of others similarly situated, v. CHIEF DAVID CURREY
in his individual capacity, CAPTAIN KEVIN MARTIN (RETIRED) in his
individual capacity, LIEUTENANT JOHN PEDERSEN in his individual
capacity, DETECTIVE PHIL HUDDY in his individual capacity,
DETECTIVE SEAN CROWLEY in his individual capacity, and DETECTIVE
MIKE GASBARRINI in his individual capacity, Case No.
9:21-cv-80391-RLR (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Robin L. Rosenberg
entered an order denying motion to certify class.

The Court could find no case law to support certification as to
liability but not damages in this case. The Court reviewed Navelski
v. Int'l Paper Co., 261 F. Supp. 3D 1212 (N.D. Fla. 2017), which
Plaintiffs offered as an example of a case in which a court
certified the class as to liability only.

However, Navelski is inapposite because causation -- a key
component of liability—could be proven uniformly across the class
there. In Navelski, the putative class were people whose homes,
located in the same neighborhood, were flooded because of a dam
failure. A singular event -- the failure of the dam -- caused harm
to each member of the class. And failure of that dam could have
been proven uniformly, by the same evidence, for the entire class.
But here, certifying the class as to liability only would be
improper because, causation would have to be proven individually.
Yes, Plaintiffs can use generalized proof to establish that each
member of the class went to East Spa on the relevant dates and was
subject to allegedly unlawful surveillance. But that's only half of
the causation question. The Plaintiffs must also be able to prove
that this surveillance and disclosure of their names in the course
of the investigation caused reputational harm. This they cannot do
on a class-wide basis. Accordingly, the Court will not certify the
class as to liability only.

In 2018, members of the Vero Beach Police Department ("VBPD") began
investigating a local massage parlor in response to allegations of
prostitution. DE 72 ¶¶ 24-36. Pursuant to a warrant and upon a
finding of probable cause, the VBPD conducted video surveillance
within the spa for 60 days, during which time the officers observed
approximately 100 sex acts for money.

In January 2019, the VBPD issued arrest warrants for various East
Spa customers for solicitation of prostitution. In addition, the
VBPD held a press conference during which the VBPD named customers
under investigation and made their photographs public.

Criminal trials and convictions followed suit. The Plaintiff Taig
was among the spa's customers who were criminally charged, though
the charges were later dropped. He then filed this class action
lawsuit in February 2021, and the case was reassigned to the
undersigned in August 2021.

Taig filed the operative Amended Complaint in October 2021, and the
Amended Motion for Class Certification in November 2021. Taig
maintains that he suffered an invasion of privacy, arrest, and
prosecution as a result of the video surveillance at East Spa and
seeks compensatory damages for the alleged harms on behalf of the
putative class.

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3),
Taig seeks certification of a class of:

   "customers who visited [East] Spa from November 29, 2018, to
   January 27, 2019, who were illegally video-recorded without
   their knowledge or consent, criminally charged, identified in
   the media for their wrongful charge during the referenced
   time period, and publicly humiliated in the media as being
   involved."

The Vero Beach Police Department is comprised of a group of
dedicated men and women who strive to exceed the expectations of
our fine community.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3IabZ8R at no extra charge.[CC]

VI-JON LLC: Abron Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vi-Jon, LLC. The case
is styled as Stacy Abron, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Vi-Jon, LLC, Case No. 3:22-cv-50238 (N.D.
Ill., July 2, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Vi-Jon -- https://www.vijon.com/ -- is one of the nation's oldest
private brand Health and Beauty Care manufacturers, serving
retailers throughout North America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Road, Ste. 412
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Phone: (516) 268-7080
          Fax: (516) 234-7800
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


VICTORIA ROAD: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Victoria Road LLC.
The case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Victoria Road LLC, Case
No. 1:22-cv-05597-JGK (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Victoria Road -- https://victoria-road.com/ -- is an online and
physical space for designers to create timeless pieces from
sustainable materials that are constructed to last.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


VILLA MONTE: Fails to Properly Pay Restaurant Cooks, Mariscal Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
APULEYO JOSE MARISCAL (a/k/a PABLO), individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VILLA MONTE PIZZERIA &
RESTAURANT, INC. (D/B/A VILLA MONTE PIZZERIA), VILLA MONTE II
PIZZERIA & RESTAURANT, INC. (D/B/A VILLA MONTE PIZZERIA), VILLA
MONTE DI POSITANO, RESTAURANT & PIZZERIA, INC. (D/B/A VILLA MONTE
PIZZERIA), GINO'S DEMONTEPERTUSO PIZZERIA & RESTAURANT, INC. (D/B/A
GINO'S VILLA MONTE PIZZERIA), AUGUSTO MANDARA, and ANTHONY MANDARA,
Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-03788 (E.D.N.Y., June 28, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the New York State Labor Law including
failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages,
failure to provide wage notices, failure to provide accurate wage
statements, and failure to pay spread-of-hours compensation.

Mr. Mariscal was employed by the Defendants as a cook from
approximately July 1994 until November 2021.

Villa Monte Pizzeria & Restaurant, Inc., doing business as Villa
Monte Pizzeria, is a pizzeria and restaurant owner and operator,
located at 7001 Amboy Staten Island, New York.

Villa Monte II Pizzeria & Restaurant, Inc., doing business as Villa
Monte Pizzeria, is a pizzeria and restaurant owner and operator,
located at 7001 Amboy Staten Island, New York.

Villa Monte Di Positano, Restaurant & Pizzeria, Inc., doing
business as Villa Monte Pizzeria, is a pizzeria and restaurant
owner and operator, located at 7001 Amboy Staten Island, New York.

Gino's Demontepertuso Pizzeria & Restaurant, Inc., doing business
as Gino's Villa Monte Pizzeria, is a pizzeria and restaurant owner
and operator, located at 2811 Richmond Ave, Staten Island, New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Catalina Sojo, Esq.
         CSM LEGAL, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 317-1200
         Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

WALMART INC: Knautz Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Walmart Inc. The case
is styled as Amber Knautz, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Walmart Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-50236 (N.D.
Ill., July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Walmart Inc. -- https://corporate.walmart.com/ -- is an American
multinational retail corporation that operates a chain of
hypermarkets, discount department stores, and grocery stores from
the United States, headquartered in Bentonville, Arkansas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Road, Ste. 412
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Phone: (516) 268-7080
          Fax: (516) 234-7800
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


WALMART INC: Millam Sues Over Great Value Bags' Recyclable Labels
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DARREN MILLAM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WALMART INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:22-cv-01090-SSS-SP (C.D. Cal., July 1, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for fraud, deceit and/or misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, and violations
of the California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act and False
Advertising Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in false,
deceptive, and misleading advertising, labeling, and manufacturing
of Great Value brand Recycling Drawstring Bags. The Defendant
markets Great Value brand trash bags as "Recycling" bags. Next to
the "Recycling" claim, the Defendant includes a large recycling
symbol and the claim "Municipal Programs." In reality, the bags
contaminate the recyclable waste stream, decrease the recyclability
of otherwise recyclable materials, and are not themselves
recyclable because they are made from low density polyethylene
plastic. Had the Plaintiff and Class members known that the
products were not suitable for recycling and not recyclable, they
would not have purchased them, or at a minimum, they would not have
paid a premium for them, says the suit.

Walmart Inc. is an American multinational retail corporation that
operates a chain of hypermarkets, discount department stores, and
grocery stores, with its principal place of business in
Bentonville, Arkansas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Seth A. Safier, Esq.
         Marie McCrary, Esq.
         GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
         100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
         San Francisco, CA 94111
         Telephone: (415) 639-9090
         Facsimile: (415) 449-6469
         E-mail: seth@gutridesafier.com
                 marie@gutridesafier.com

WAYFAIR LLC: Hendrix Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled CHARLES HENDRIX, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. WAYFAIR LLC and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Case No. CVR12201919, was removed from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Riverside to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on June 30,
2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 5:22-cv-01088 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay
overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to
authorize and permit rest breaks, failure to timely pay wages due
and payable, failure to pay all wages earned at separation of
employment, failure to reimburse business expenses, failure to
furnish itemized wage statements, and unfair competition.

Wayfair LLC is an online store company, with its principal place of
business in Boston, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Gary T. Lafayette, Esq.
         John T. Madden, Esq.
         Ingrid M. Ahuja, Esq.
         Saisruthi Paspulati, Esq.
         LAFAYETTE & KUMAGAI LLP
         1300 Clay Street, Suite 810
         Oakland, CA 94612
         Telephone: (415) 357-4600
         Facsimile: (415) 357-4605
         E-mail: glafayette@lkclaw.com
                 jmadden@lkclaw.com
                 iahuja@lkclaw.com
                 spaspulati@lkclaw.com

WELLS FARGO: Ardalan Sues Over Nearly 10% Drop of Stock Price
-------------------------------------------------------------
KHOSROW ARDALAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, CHARLES W. SCHARF,
MICHAEL P. SANTOMASSIMO, KLEBER R. SANTOS, and CARLY SANCHEZ,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03811 (N.D. Cal., June 28, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

According to the complaint, the Defendants made materially false
and misleading statements regarding Wells Fargo's business,
operations, and compliance policies in order to trade Wells Fargo
common stock at artificially inflated prices between February 24,
2021 and June 9, 2022. Specifically, the Defendants failed to
disclose that: (i) Wells Fargo had misrepresented its commitment to
diversity in the company's workplace; (ii) Wells Fargo conducted
fake job interviews in order to meet its Diverse Search
Requirement; (iii) the foregoing conduct subjected Wells Fargo to
an increased risk of regulatory and/or governmental scrutiny and
enforcement action, including criminal charges; (iv) all of the
foregoing, once revealed, was likely to negatively impact Wells
Fargo's reputation; and (v) as a result, the company's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times, says the suit.

When the truth emerged, Wells Fargo's common stock price fell $0.44
per share, or 1.04 percent, over two trading sessions, closing at
$41.67 per share on May 20, 2022. Stock price further fell $3.68
per share, or 8.62 percent, over the following two trading
sessions, closing at $38.99 per share on June 13, 2022.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the company's common
stock, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, added the suit.

Wells Fargo & Company is a financial services company, with
principal executive offices located at 420 Montgomery Street, San
Francisco, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
         POMERANTZ LLP
         1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
         Los Angeles, CA 90024
         Telephone: (310) 405-7190
         E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com

                 - and –

         Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
         J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
         POMERANTZ LLP
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 661-1100
         Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
         E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                 ahood@pomlaw.com

WEST VIRGINIA: Class Cert. Hearing Rescheduled to July 13
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTOPHER FAIN, SHAUNTAE
ANDERSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. WILLIAM CROUCH, in his official capacity as Cabinet
Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources; CYNTHIA BEANE, in her official capacity as Commissioner
for the West Virginia Bureau for Medical Services; WEST VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, BUREAU FOR MEDICAL
SERVICES, Case No. 3:20-cv-00740 (S.D.W.Va.), the Hon. Judge Robert
C. Chambers entered an order as follows:

  -- The Court cancels the current hearing for July 11, 2022,
     and reschedules the hearing for July 13, 2022, at 1 p.m. in
     Huntington.

  -- The Court intends to hear argument on the cross motions for
     summary judgment at 1 p.m. and will hear argument on the
     motion for class certification immediately thereafter.

  -- The Court grants permission for Plaintiffs' attorney to
     appear virtually to argue the motion for class
     certification.

  -- The Court directs the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to
     counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3QXBnCV at no extra charge.[CC]

WETSUIT WEARHOUSE: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wetsuit Wearhouse,
Inc. The case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Wetsuit Wearhouse, Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-05587 (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Wetsuit Wearhouse -- https://www.wetsuitwearhouse.com/ -- is the
largest wetsuit specialty shop in the world offering wetsuits for
surfing, SCUBA, triathlon, kayaking, waterskiing and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


WICHITA, KS: Court Denies Bid for Protective Order in Progeny Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PROGENY, a program of Destination Innovations, Inc.,
et al., on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS, Defendant, Case No.
21-1100-EFM-ADM (D. Kan.), Magistrate Judge Angel D. Mitchell of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas denies the
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order.

I. Introduction

In this putative class action, the Plaintiffs challenge the
constitutionality of the Wichita Police Department's ("WPD") use
and maintenance of a "Gang List" created under KAN. STAT. ANN.
Sections 21-6313 to -6316. The matter is now before the Court on
Defendant City of Wichita's Motion for Protective Order. By way of
this motion, the City asks the court to find that the City does not
need to produce certain documents that are responsive to the
Plaintiffs' discovery requests because they are protected by the
law enforcement privilege.

II. Background

Under Kansas law, persons identified as members of "criminal street
gangs" are subject to different and greater penalties upon arrest.
The WPD has created a "Gang List," which is a list of persons whom
WPD personnel have determined meet the definition of a "criminal
street gang member" under the criteria listed in KAN. STAT. ANN.
Section 21-6313(b). WPD Policy 527 puts Section 21-6313 into
practice by defining the procedures for including an individual on
the Gang List. WPD Policy 527 provides that, after WPD adds an
individual to the Gang List, the individual will remain on either
"active" or "associate" status for a minimum of three years. If
after three years the individual has not engaged in documented
criminal street gang activity, the individual will be designated
"inactive" on the Gang List. But this three-year period starts over
if a WPD officer documents that the individual either meets the
criteria set out in Section 21-6313(b) or that the individual has
been involved in criminal street gang activity or a gang-related
incident.

In April 2021, the Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the City,
which supervises and is responsible for the WPD. The lead named
Plaintiff is Progeny, a Wichita nonprofit organization whose stated
purpose is "reimagining the juvenile justice system and reinvesting
in community-based alternatives." Progeny claims the Gang List is
contrary to its mission and programs. The other four named
Plaintiffs -- Christopher Cooper, Elbert Costello, Martel Costello,
and Jeremy Levy, Jr. -- are individuals who claim they have been
wrongfully designated as "criminal street gang members" and added
to the Gang List. They assert that they have been subjected to
unconstitutional actions by the WPD by virtue of being placed on
the Gang List, and that this has negatively affected their lives in
a host of ways.

The Plaintiffs allege that Section 21-6313 is facially
unconstitutional and that the WPD's practices and procedures
regarding the Gang List violate their constitutional rights of due
process, equal protection, and free association and expression. As
pertinent to the current discovery dispute, the Plaintiffs assert
that Section 21-6313(b)'s criteria for placing or keeping
individuals on the Gang List can lead to persons being labeled as
criminal gang members for innocuous conduct, such as wearing
certain clothes, visiting certain places, and associating with
family and friends. The Plaintiffs allege that "members of the
WPD's Gang Unit are instructed to surveil community members' social
media accounts to find photographs of people with known gang
members" and that WPD "regularly monitors the social media accounts
of community members to identify evidence that could be used to
label individuals as gang members."

Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege that "some WPD officers
maintain fake social media profiles in order to befriend members of
the community to more easily have access to photos and other
information that would allow the officers to add more people to the
Gang List." They state that such social-media surveillance
"profoundly affects how the Plaintiffs interact with their friends
and families and move about the community" because they fear close
proximity to certain people or places will lead the WPD to label
them as gang members. Likewise, they say it has a chilling effect
on their expression because wearing certain colors or sport-team
clothing are criteria that lead to placement on the Gang List.

On Jan. 27, 2022, the Plaintiffs served their First Requests for
Production of Documents ("RFPs") on the City. In response, the City
objected to producing two categories of documents: (1) documents
responsive to RFPs 19, 20, and 23 "regarding [WPD's] use of social
media in criminal investigations and collection of criminal
intelligence"; and (2) documents or ESI responsive to RFP 36 "that
relate to the Mongols Motorcycle Gang." At the parties' request,
the court convened a discovery conference on May 4 to discuss the
parties' dispute over whether the City must produce the subject
documents. The City asserted it was withholding the documents under
the law enforcement privilege, which is a qualified privilege that
protects confidential criminal intelligence and investigation
materials. After consultation with the parties, the court set the
issue for motion practice.

The City now moves for a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) allowing it to withhold information
pursuant to the law enforcement privilege. The Plaintiffs oppose
the motion, arguing the City has failed to follow the procedure
required to invoke the privilege and, even if the City had properly
invoked the privilege, that the Plaintiffs' need for the
information overrides the privilege.

III. Discussion

Federal common law recognizes a qualified "law enforcement
investigative privilege," which is "based primarily on the harm to
law enforcement efforts which might arise from public disclosure of
investigatory files," citing United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d 825,
831 (10th Cir. 1981). "Its purpose 'is to prevent disclosure of law
enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the
confidentiality of sources, to protect witness and law enforcement
personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an
investigation and otherwise to prevent interference with an
investigation.'"

"To assert the privilege, 'the responsible official in the
department must lodge a formal claim of privilege, after actual
personal consideration, specifying with particularity the
information for which protection is sought, and explain why the
information falls within the scope of the privilege.'" "The party
seeking documents protected by the law enforcement privilege has
the burden to establish a need for the documents." Relevance alone
does not establish need.

A. The City Has Not Property Invoked The Privilege

As noted, the Tenth Circuit in Winner set forth what is required to
assert the law enforcement privilege: "the responsible official in
the department must lodge a formal claim of privilege, after actual
personal consideration, specifying with particularity the
information for which protection is sought, and explain why the
information falls within the scope of the privilege."

In the case, Judge Mitchell finds that the City has not even
minimally met Winner's invocation requirement. The City has not
submitted a sworn declaration or affidavit of any "responsible
official in the department" specifying with particularity the
information over which the privilege is asserted. Nor has the City
submitted a privilege log indicating documents it is withholding
under the privilege. The City has therefore has failed to assert
the law enforcement privilege by formally lodging its privilege
claim, specifying with particularity the information withheld, and
explaining why the information falls within the scope of the
privilege. Judge Mitchell therefore denies the City's motion for a
protective order on this basis because the invocation requirement
"must be strictly adhered to" for the law enforcement privilege to
apply.

B. Even If The Privilege Applies, It Is Overcome By Plaintiffs'
Substantial Need For The Information

Judge Mitchell also briefly addresses the Plaintiffs' argument that
their need for the requested information overrides any law
enforcement privilege that applies. This argument is well-taken,
Judge Mitchell finds. As he discussed, the law enforcement
privilege is a qualified privilege that a party may overcome by
demonstrating a substantial need for the documents that outweighs
the agency's need for confidentiality.

In weighing the parties' competing interests, Judge Mitchell finds
that the Plaintiffs' substantial need for the withheld documents in
order to properly support their constitutional claims overcomes any
interest the City may have in not disclosing the documents under
the protective order. Thus, even if the Court were to find that the
City properly invoked the law enforcement privilege, it would find
that the Plaintiffs have overcome the qualified privilege and
therefore deny the City's request for a protective order on this
basis.

C. The City's Other, Boilerplate Objections Also Fail To Support
Entry Of A Protective Order

The bulk of the City's request for a protective order focuses on
its assertion of the law enforcement privilege. But the City also
relies on boilerplate objections of overbreadth, relevance, and
proportionality in arguing the motion. In all but one instance, the
City's statements in this regard are wholly conclusive and not
supported by argument or authority, Judge Mitchell finds. Such
conclusory statements, she says, are insufficient to support the
City's request for a protective order.

The lone exception is the City's overbreadth objection to RFP 19,
which sought documents regarding "social media tracking or
monitoring by the Gang Unit or any other departments, units, or
divisions of the Wichita Police Department." It is apparent that
the parties have not adequately met and conferred in an attempt to
narrow the scope of RFP 19, so this issue is premature.

In sum, the City has not shown good cause for the entry of a
protective order based on its boilerplate, unsupported objections.
The City's motion for a protective order on this basis also is
denied.

IV. Conclusion

Judge Mitchell denies the City's Motion for Protective Order
because he finds that the City has not properly invoked the
qualified privilege and, even if the Court were to find that it
applies, the Plaintiffs would overcome it.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5n8e3nd9 from Leagle.com.


WINE CHIPS: Hernandez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wine Chips, Inc. The
case is styled as Mairoby Hernandez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Wine Chips, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-05598 (S.D.N.Y., June 30, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Wine Chips -- https://winechips.com/ -- is a manufacturer of cheese
potato chips intended to be eaten with wine.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


YIELDSTREET INC: Case Management Order Entered in Tecku Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL TECKU; DAVID
FINKELSTEIN; And LAWRENCE TJOK; Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, v. YIELDSTREET, INC.; YIELDSTREET
MANAGEMENT, LLC; YS ALTNOTES I, LLC YS ALTNOTEES I, LLC; AND
MICHAEL WEISZ, Case No. 1:20-cv-07327-VM (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge
Victor Marrero entered a case management order as follows:

-- Initial Requests for the Production        Aug. 19, 2022
    of Documents to be served by:

-- Initial Interrogatories to be              Aug. 19, 2022
    served by all parties by:

-- Depositions to be completed by:            June 28, 2023

-- Any additional contemplated                June 28, 2023
    non-expert discovery activities
    and anticipated completion date:

-- Requests to Admit to be served no          June 28, 2023
    later than:

-- All expert discovery (ordinarily
    conducted following the completion
    of fact discovery) including parties'
    expert reports and depositions,
    witness lists and identification of
    documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
    26(a)(2), (3), and 35(b), is to be
    completed by:

    Initial Disclosure and Report Deadline:    Aug. 15, 2023

    Rebuttal Expert Disclosures and Report:    Oct. 16, 2023

    Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Expert         Nov. 17, 2023
    Discovery Cutoff (including filing of
    Discovery Motions):

Yieldstreet is an American company based in New York City. The
company focuses on investments and other similar areas. Yieldstreet
provides investments in art, marine, legal, and various other
industries.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 27, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uhKlRA at no extra charge.[CC]

YUMA REGIONAL MEDICAL: Clarke Files Suit in D. Arizona
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Yuma Regional Medical
Center. The case is styled as Dillan Clarke, Elayne Martinez,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Yuma Regional Medical Center, Case No. 2:22-cv-01115-MHB (D. Ariz.,
July 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Personal Injury for Breach of
Contract.

Yuma Regional Medical Center (YRMC) --
https://www.yumaregional.org/Home -- is a hospital in Yuma,
Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Cody Alexander Bolce, Esq.
          Laura Grace Van Note, Esq.
          Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
          COLE & VAN NOTE
          555 12th St., Ste. 1725
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Phone: (510) 891-9800
          Fax: (510) 891-7030


ZIMMER BIOMET: Seeks Dismissal of Karl Suit
-------------------------------------------
In the case captioned James Karl, on behalf of himself and
similarly situated sales representatives of medical devices v.
ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC., a business entity; ZIMMER US, INC., a
Delaware corporation; BIOMET U.S. RECONSTRUCTION, LLC, a business
entity; BIOMET BIOLOGICS, LLC, a business entity; BIOMET, INC., an
Indiana corporation; DONALD QUIGLEY, an individual; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. 3:22-cv-03435-WHA (N.D. Cal., June
17, 2022), the Defendant Zimmer Biomet filed a motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's complaint.

According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action
for Unlawful Retaliation, fails to state a claim because Plaintiff
does not set forth factual allegations sufficient to plausibly
allege that he was an "employee" rather than an "independent
contractor" of Zimmer US, Inc. or that he engaged in protected
conduct under the statute. The Plaintiff's Second, Third, and
Fourth Causes of Action for Failure to Pay Wages Due and Owning,
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; and
Unfair/Unlawful Competition Practices, are barred under the class
action settlement as "Released Claims." The Plaintiff also fails to
set forth factual allegations sufficient to plausibly allege that
he was an "employee" rather than an "independent contractor" of
Zimmer US, Inc. as required to state these claims. The Plaintiff's
Fifth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress (IIED) fails to state a claim because it is barred by the
exclusionary provision of California Workers' Compensation and
because Plaintiff does not set forth factual allegations sufficient
to allege "outrageous" or "extreme" conduct. The Plaintiff's Sixth
Cause of Action for Retaliation for Filing an Employee Safety
Complaint, fails to state a claim because Plaintiff has not set
forth factual allegations sufficient to allege that he engaged in a
protected activity under the statute. The Plaintiff's Seventh and
Eighth Causes of Action for Negligent and Intentional
Misrepresentation fail to state a claim because Plaintiff does not
allege detrimental reliance and damages separate from his wrongful
termination claim.

Zimmer US, Inc. bases this motion on this Notice of Motion, the
supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and all exhibits
attached thereto, and such other evidence and arguments as Zimmer
US, Inc. may present on reply and at oral argument before the
Court.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Eric Meckley, Esq.
          Roshni C. Kapoor, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Market, Spear Street Tower
          San Francisco, CA 94105-1596
          Phone: +1.415.442.1000
          Fax: +1.415.442.1001
          Email: eric.meckley@morganlewis.com
                  roshni.kapoor@morganlewis.com

               - and -

          Troy S. Brown, Esq.
          Liza B. Fleming, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1701 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: +1.215.963.5000
          Fax: +1.215.963.5001
          Email: troy.brown@morganlewis.com
                 liza.fleming@morganlewis.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

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