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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, February 21, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 31

                            Headlines

4400 WE TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Gomez Wage-and-Hour Suit in C.D. Cal.
A & D PRODUCE: De La Cruz Seeks OT, Minimum Wages for Cashiers
AIMBRIDGE HOSPITALITY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Migyanko Suit
AIR METHODS: $4.093 MM Settlement Fund Approved in Wagner Suit
ALEXION PHARMA: Extension of Time to Oppose Class Cert. OK'd

AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Malloy Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
AMAZON.COM: Loses Summary Judgment v. Steven Vance, et al.
AMERICAN CAMPUS: Case Management Deadlines Amended in Perna Suit
AMERICAN GENERAL: Stipulation on Class Cert Docs Production OK'd
AMN HEALTHCARE: Has Until March 10 to Reply to Oliveria Complaint

APEX CLEARING: Trading Suspension Harmed Investors, Chavez Claims
BERGEN RECYCLING: San Pedro Suit Seeks Overtime Pay for Cashiers
BIOGEN INC: Two ERISA Suits Consolidated in D. Mass.
BLAND LANDSCAPING: Partial Bid to Dismiss Roldan FLSA Suit Denied
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Loses Objection to Wheeler's Bid to Compel

BOWMAR NUTRITION: Wins Bid to Dismiss or Strike Amended Complaint
BRADLEY UNIVERSITY: Seeks to Vacate Feb. 18 Response Deadline
BRIDGECREST ACCEPTANCE: Loses Bid to Strike Canady's Class Claims
BUREAU OF PRISONS: Bid to Certify Class Tossed in Abbott Suit
BUTTERFLY NETWORK: Faces Rose Securities Suit Over Stock Price Drop

C.H. ROBINSON: Amended Scheduling Orders Entered in 2 Class Suits
CARDINAL HEALTH: Files Bid to Dismiss Meds Price-rigging Charge
CARDINAL HEALTH: Loses Bid Dismiss Securities Suit
CATS: W.D. North Carolina Dismisses Beyan's Amended Complaint
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Harper Bid to Compel Nixed w/o Prejudice

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Dustin Suit Stayed to Continue Mediation
CUDAHY PLACE: Order on Class Certification Deadlines Entered
CVS HEALTH: Bowman Sues Over Unpaid OT for Pharmacy Technicians
DAVID SHINN: Seeks More Time to File Class Cert. Response
DEVA CONCEPT: Counsel Has Until Feb. 25 to Answer Robaina's Request

DUKE ENERGY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Turpin's Amended Complaint
ECHO GLOBAL: Cienega Class Suit Transferred to N.D. Illinois
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Second Amended Phase I Sched Order Entered
EVOLUTION WELL: Copley's Bid for Conditional Cert. Partly Granted
FEDEX GROUND: Filing of Rule 23 Motion Extended to July 15

FERRO CORP: Fails to Pay All Hours Worked, Lewis Suit Alleges
FUJI HANA: Bid to Certify FLSA Collective Action Withdrawn
GEISINGER HEALTH: Case Management Order Entered in Antitrust Suit
GENERAL DYNAMICS: Class & Subclass Certified in Piron Suit
GLENS FALLS: Richard Seeks Initial Approval of Class Settlement

HILLCREST HEALTHCARE: Walton Suit Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE: Appeal on Antitrust Suit Pending
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE: Plaintiffs Await Ruling on Class Status
IRON HORSE: Fisher Sues Over Unpaid OT for Plumbing Technicians
JENKINS MEMORIAL: Massey Seeks Proper OT Pay for Waiver Workers

KANSAS CITY LIFE: Class Cert. Bid Partly Granted in Meek Suit
LAKESIDE COMMUNITY: Underpays Youth Workers, Guynes Suit Claims
LIBERTY MUTUAL: W.D. Washington Grants Bid to Stay H Lodge Suit
LONGHORN PIZZA: Serrano Seeks Unpaid Wages, OT for Delivery Drivers
LONGHORN PIZZA: Velasco Seeks Unpaid Minimum Wages Under FLSA

LOYAL SOURCE: Settlement in Ortega Suit Wins Final Nod
LUMENTUM HOLDINGS: Ryan Securities Suit Dismissed
MARSHALL & ASSOCIATES: Gartrell's Third Class Cert. Bid Tossed
MDL 2197: Two Suits Consolidated in ASR Hip Implant Products Case
MDL 2244: Four Suits Consolidated in Pinnacle Hip Implants Case

MDL 2406: Hoover Suit Consolidated in Blue Cross Antitrust Case
MDL 2670: Bid to Revisit Price-Fixing Conspiracy Finding Denied
MDL 2738: Corbett Suit Consolidated in J&J Talcum Liability Row
META PLATFORMS: Court Narrows Claims in Consolidated Class Suits
META PLATFORMS: Dismissal of Securities Class Suit Under Appeal

META PLATFORMS: Faces Multiple Securities Suits in Federal Courts
NATURAL GROCERS: Faces Labor Suit in Over Unpaid Overtime
NEW YORK: Loses Bid to Dismiss ADA Amended Complaint
NOIR BAKERY: Faces Salas Suit Over Unpaid Wages for Cafe Workers
NOVARTIS INC: Hypertension Meds Suits Consolidated in S.D. N.Y.

NVR INC: Parties Seek Conditional Status of Collective Action
OPEN TEXT: First Circuit Remands Securities Suits to District Court
OPTIO SOLUTIONS: Debt Settlement Offer "Deceptive," Farmer Claims
PAOLA PAINTING: Faces Montesdeoca Suit Over Time-Shaving Violations
PAPA JOHN'S: Court Approves Class Settlement in Cook FLSA Suit

PAYPAL HOLDINGS: Seeks to Dismiss Amended Securities Suit
PEOPLEASE LLC: Bids to Stay Espinoza Suit Pending Appeal Granted
PHOENIX, AZ: Puentem, et al., Lose Partial Summary Judgment Bid
PIZZA TO YOU: Waters Seeks Initial Approval of Settlement
POLARIS INDUSTRIES: Court Enters Protective Order in Hellman Suit

PRUDENT FIDUCIARY: Scheduling Order Entered in Ahrendsen Suit
PUBLIX SUPER: Amara Sues Over Antitussive Drug's Non-Drowsy Label
PULSE BIOSCIENCES: Faces Ngosiok Class Suit Over Share Price Drop
QUALCOMM INC: Antitrust Suit Remanded to District Court
QUALCOMM INC: Faces Multiple Antitrust Suits

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: Conditional Cert. Bid Nixed w/o Prejudice
SAFETY-KLEEN: Fails to Pay Premium OT Wages, Logan Labor Suit Says
SAGINAW, MI: Bid to Direct Notice of Class Certification OK'd
SAM MOON: Underpays Assistant Managers, Chang FLSA Suit Alleges
SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Plan to Distribute $65MM Baker Deal OK'd

SENTINEL TRANSPORTATION: Crocitto Must Reply to Show Cause Order
SIRIUS XM: Flo & Eddie Copyright Suit vs Subsidiary Dismissed
SOCLEAN INC: Ieyoub Consumer Suit Moved From E.D. La. to W.D. Pa.
SOCLEAN INC: Lange Suit Moved From D. Arizona to W.D. Pennsylvania
SPOTIFY TECHNOLOGY: Ferrick Copyright Suit Settlement Final

STATE FARM: Court Refuses to Dismiss Schwartz's 2nd Amended Suit
SUBURBAN PROPANE: Court Dismisses Electricity Pricing Case
TARGET CORPORATION: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Cumberbatch Says
TAYLOR CORPORATION: Mismanaged 401(k) Plan, Fritton ERISA Suit Says
TIVITY HEALTH: Seeks Reschedule on Class Cert Evidentiary Hearing

TRAININGMASK LLC: CMP & Scheduling Order Entered in Tavarez Suit
UBATUBA ACAI: Order on Class Cert. Bid Entered in Alonzo Suit
UMPQUA BANK: Camenisch Suit Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
UNITED STATES: Braidwood Appeals Ruling in Civil Rights Suit
UNITED STATES: Broadfield Seeks to Certify Class of Prisoners

UNITED STATES: California Court Tosses Thompson Suit With Prejudice
UNITED STATES: Court Strikes Bids to Seal in Wagafe v. Biden
UNITED STATES: Motion to Transfer Filed in Vaccine Mandate Suit
UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE: Arredondo Wins Class Certification Bid
US BANKCORP: Court Junks Steve Kim's Bid for Protective Order

USA DEBUSK: Faces Buck FLSA Suit Over Unpaid Overtime for Drivers
VERTICAL SCREEN: Garcia's Bid for Collective Certification Granted
VITAMINS BECAUSE: Malgeri Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
VIVINT INC: Cunningham, Perrong File Class Certification Bid
WELLS FARGO: N.D. California Tosses Consolidated Shareholder Suit

WESTCO CHEMICALS: Parties Must File Settlement Bid or Trial Date
XAPT CORP: Court Refers Deere Suit to Magistrate Judge Peterson

                            *********

4400 WE TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Gomez Wage-and-Hour Suit in C.D. Cal.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LUZ GOMEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 4400 WE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. d/b/a PATTERN
JOBS; PATTERN LABS, INC.; and RADIAL, INC., Defendants, Case No.
5:22-cv-00283 (C.D. Cal., February 14, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for violations of the California Labor Code
and the California's Business and Professions Code including
failure to pay for all hours worked, failure to pay minimum wage
for all hours worked, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to
authorize and permit and/or make available meal and rest periods,
failure to provide timely and accurate itemized wage statements,
waiting time penalties, and unlawful business practices.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a warehouse associate in
Rialto, California from September 2021 until December 2021.

4400 We Technologies, Inc., doing business as Pattern Jobs, is a
staffing services provider, with its principal place of business
located in New York, New York.

Pattern Labs, Inc. is a staffing services provider, with its
principal place of business located in Nederland, Colorado.

Radial, Inc. is an administrative services provider based in
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Carolyn Hunt Cottrell, Esq.
         Eugene Zinovyev, Esq.
         Andrew Weaver, Esq.
         Philippe M. Gaudard, Esq.
         SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY LLP
         2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
         Emeryville, CA 94608
         Telephone: (415) 421-7100
         Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
         E-mail: ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
                 ezinovyev@schneiderwallace.com
                 aweaver@schneiderwallace.com
                 pgaudard@schneiderwallace.com

A & D PRODUCE: De La Cruz Seeks OT, Minimum Wages for Cashiers
--------------------------------------------------------------
GLORIA DE LA CRUZ, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated v. A & D PRODUCE CORP. d/b/a as STAR FARM, and FAWZI
KHALIL, Case No. 1:22-cv-00832 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 15, 2022) seeks to
recover compensation for unpaid overtime, unpaid minimum wages,
unpaid spread of hours wages and notice damages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all
similarly situated current and former cashiers and market workers
who elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
sections 201 et seq., and specifically, the collective action
provision of 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), to remedy violations of the
wage-and-hour provisions of the FLSA that occurred at Defendants'
business (the "FLSA Collective").

The Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective also bring this action under
the Wage Theft Prevention Act for the Defendants' alleged failure
to provide written notice of wage rates in violation of said laws.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants maintained a policy and
practice of requiring Plaintiff (and all similarly situated
employees) to work in excess of 40 hours a week without paying
appropriate minimum wage, spread of hours compensation and overtime
compensation as required by federal and state laws.

From in or about November 2019 to October 1, 2021, the Plaintiff
worked as a cashier at Star Farm located at 4401 New Utrecht
Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.

Star Farm is a grocery store which offers a variety of fresh or
packaged food products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Vincent E. Bauer, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF VINCENT E. BAUER
          425 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 575-1517

AIMBRIDGE HOSPITALITY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Migyanko Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the case, RONALD MIGYANKO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AIMBRIDGE HOSPITALITY, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-1095-NR (W.D. Pa.).

Mr. Migyanko filed the putative class action against Aimbridge
seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief, which would require
Aimbridge to ensure that its beds and sleeping surfaces in its
accessible rooms comply with the requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Mr. Migyanko, who uses a wheelchair, alleges that
the beds in Aimbridge's accessible rooms are too high for him to
independently transfer from his wheelchair seat to the bed. As a
result, he claims that Aimbridge has denied him an experience that
is functionally equivalent to that of the non-disabled guests of
its hotels. According to him, that's actionable discrimination
under the general accessibility mandate of Title III of the ADA.

Aimbridge has a very different view of the case. Aimbridge argues
that Mr. Migyanko's claim fails as a matter of law because he
cannot point to a specific violation of the ADA's implementing
regulations, the ADA Accessibility Guidelines.

Mr. Migyanko concedes that he cannot point to such a violation
because the ADAAG is silent on bed height. He contends, however,
that he doesn't have to plead a violation of the ADAAG.

The United States, which filed a statement of interest in the case,
agrees with Mr. Migyanko. The United States argues that "where the
Department of Justice has not issued specific design or technical
standards, public accommodations' actions are governed by the ADA's
general nondiscrimination requirements and the ADA's overarching
equal access mandate."

Judge Ranjan holds that Mr. Migyanko and the United States are
correct. He says, as Judge Colville of the Court recently held in a
virtually identical case, Mullen v. Concord Hosp. Enters. Co., LLC,
No. 20-1530, 2022 WL 295880, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2022)
(Colville, J.), a plaintiff can state a "claim under the general
nondiscrimination requirements of Title III of the ADA" where he or
she has alleged that a hotel operator has a "policy or practice of
offering only inaccessible and unusable beds" in its "purportedly
accessible hotel rooms." That's the case even though the ADA
Standards "do not address, in any relevant manner, bed height
specifically or even sleeping surfaces generally."  Otherwise, a
hotel operator could "effectively refuse to provide its services
altogether to individuals with disabilities" who "allegedly cannot
use the beds" in the hotel rooms.

And that's precisely what Mr. Migyanko has alleged in the case --
that Aimbridge has violated the general accessibility mandate of
the ADA by failing to provide accessible beds in its purportedly
accessible hotel rooms. Judge Ranjan agrees with Judge Colville's
holding and applies it in the present case. As a result, he will
deny Aimbridge's motion to dismiss. In doing so, however, he makes
these two additional observations.

First, while he agrees with the concept set forth in Mullen, Judge
Ranjan finds the prevailing mode of analysis for addressing claims
like the one presented by the case somewhat unworkable. Second, by
denying Aimbridge's motion to dismiss, Judge Ranjan is not in any
way suggesting that Aimbridge has failed to make reasonable
accommodations to provide an experience comparable to that afforded
to non-disabled guests.

For these reasons, Judge Ranjan denied Aimbridge's motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Memorandum Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/29ev8ndh from Leagle.com.


AIR METHODS: $4.093 MM Settlement Fund Approved in Wagner Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
TOM WAGNER, SUSAN BRZEZINSKI, MATTHEW DeBROSSE, JOHN GLAZIER, JAMES
HOWE, KEVIN MOFFITT, LAURA WALKER, DANIELLE NOWISKI, GENE
STALSBERG, KRISTEN GRADO, GEORGE RAMEY, NIKOLAS REPETA, and
STEPHANIE PAULEY on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. AIR METHODS CORPORATION, a Colorado corporation, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00484-RBJ (D. Colo.), the Hon. Judge R. Brooke Jackson
entered an order that:

   1. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter, and
      personal jurisdiction over the parties, throughout the
      implementation and administration of the Amended
      Settlement Agreement and all payments thereunder;

   2. The Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for final certification
      of class action and final approval of the amended class
      action Settlement Agreement and Release which includes a
      Gross Settlement Fund of $4,093,000.00, which includes
      $1,227,900 in attorneys' fees, together with costs of
      $45,765.83 is hereby granted;

   3. The Court finds that the Amended Settlement Agreement is
      within the range of reasonableness, and is adjudicated to
      be fair, reasonable, and adequate within the meaning of
      Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and the CAFA;

   4. The Court approves the Individual Settlement Payments
      listed on the Payout Sheet to the Amended Settlement
      Agreement, with the exception that the payment amounts
      allocated to those 32 Class Members who timely opted-out
      shall revert back to Defendant;

   5. The Court finds that the Settlement Notice to the Amended
      Settlement Agreement satisfied Due Process; and

   6. The schedule for effectuating the Amended Settlement
      Agreement is approved.

Air Methods is an American privately owned helicopter operator.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GGetcQ at no extra charge.[CC]

ALEXION PHARMA: Extension of Time to Oppose Class Cert. OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Boston Retirement System
v. Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-02127 (D.
Conn.), the Hon. Judge Alvin W. Thompson entered an order granting
the Defendants' motion for an interim extension of time to oppose
the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification

The nature of suit state other statutes – Securities /
Commodities / Exchange.

The Boston Retirement System is a governmental defined benefit
pension system.

Alexion Pharmaceuticals, a subsidiary of AstraZeneca, is an
American pharmaceutical company headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts that specializes in orphan drugs to treat rare
diseases.[CC]

AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Malloy Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
DWIGHT MALLOY, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-00286 (D.
Nev., Feb. 15, 2022) alleges that the Defendant failed to
compensate for all hours worked in violation of the Nevada Revised
Statutes 608.140 and 608.016; failure to pay minimum wages in
violation of the Nevada Constitution; failed to pay overtime in
violation of NRS 608.140 and 608.018; and failed to timely pay all
wages due and owing in violation of NRS 608.140 and 608.020-050.

This is a class action lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Dwight Malloy,
individually and on behalf the Class Members to recover unpaid
wages, penalties, and attorneys' fees and costs. Defendant
Amazon.com Services, LLC implemented an illegal policy requiring
its non-exempt workers to undergo a COVID-19 screening each shift
without pay. This physical and medical examination constitutes
compensable time that was worked by the Plaintiff and the Class
Members. By failing to pay for this time worked, Amazon has
allegedly violated Nevada law. In addition to the Plaintiff, Amazon
has failed to pay for the time spent undergoing COVID-19 screenings
by thousands of other workers across the State of Nevada, says the
suit.

Amazon Services LLC offers many of the Web service platforms that
are Amazon offers. The Company was founded in 2006 and is based in
Seattle, Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq.
          RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
          Telephone: (702) 320-8400
          Facsimile: (702) 320-8401
          E-mail: esther@rodriguezlaw.com

               - and -

          Don J. Foty, Esq.
          William M. Hogg, Esq.
          HODGES & FOTY, LLP
          4409 Montrose Boulevard, Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: dfoty@hftrialfirm.com
                  whogg@hftrialfirm.com

AMAZON.COM: Loses Summary Judgment v. Steven Vance, et al.
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVEN VANCE, et al., v.
AMAZON.COM, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-01084-JLR (W.D. Wash.), the Hon.
Judge James L. Robart entered an order:

   1. The court strikes Amazon's motion for summary judgment
      without prejudice to Amazon renewing its motion after the
      parties complete the discovery ordered below;

   2. The court grants in part Plaintiffs' Federal Rule of Civil
      Procedure 56(d) motion for additional discovery as
      follows:

      (a) The Plaintiffs may take the depositions of Dr. Stefano
          Soatto, Dr. Yuanjun Xiong, Dr. Wei Xia, Dr. Michele
          Donini, Dr. Nashlie Sephus, and Dr. Tal Hassner (the
          Amazon Declarants) and Dr. Michele Merler. Because
          Plaintiffs have already deposed Dr. Merler in relation
          to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Dr.
          Merler's deposition shall be focused on the issues
          raised by Amazon's motion for summary judgment;

      (b) Amazon shall produce to Plaintiffs within 14 days
          after entry of this order all documents upon which the
          Amazon Declarants relied in drafting their
          declarations in support of Amazon's motion for summary
          judgment;

      (c) Amazon shall identify to Plaintiffs within 14 days
          after entry of this order all non-attorney individuals
          with whom the Amazon Declarants consulted in preparing
          the declarations;

      (d) Amazon shall produce to Plaintiffs by no later than 30
          days after entry of this order all non-privileged
          documents in its possession or control that were
          drafted, sent, received, or reviewed by the Amazon
          Declarants that refer or relate to non-party
          International Business Machines Corporation's ("IBM")
          Diversity in Faces ("DiF") Dataset;

      (e) The parties shall complete the above discovery by no
          later than Friday, April 29, 2022;

      (f) The court has not yet ruled on the additional
          discovery requested by Plaintiffs in their Rule 56(d)
          motion. If, after Plaintiffs complete their
          depositions of the Amazon Declarants, additional
          discovery is necessary to oppose summary judgment,
          they may file a second Rule 56(d) motion specifically
          identifying that additional discovery by no later than
          Thursday, May 12, 2022; and

      (g) If Plaintiffs do not file a second Rule 56(d) motion,
          Amazon shall file its renewed motion for summary
          judgment, if any, by no later than Thursday, May 12,
          2022. The motion shall be noted in accordance with
          Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(d)(3). If Plaintiffs do
          file a second Rule 56(d) motion, the court will set a
          revised deadline for the motion for summary judgment
          based on its ruling on Plaintiffs' motion.

   3. The court strikes Plaintiffs' motion for class
      certification without prejudice to Plaintiffs re-filing
      their motion after the court decides Amazon's motion for
      summary judgment. Because the motion for class
      certification has been stricken, the court denied
      Amazon's motion to supplement the class certification
      record as moot; and

   4. The court grants Plaintiffs' counsel's request to waive
      the requirement set forth in Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR
      83.1(d)(2) that local counsel sign all motions and other
      documents filed with this court. The court reminds
      counsel, however, that local counsel must be prepared to
      handle this matter in the event pro hac vice counsel are
      unable to be present on any date scheduled by the court.

Amazon.com is an American multinational technology company which
focuses on e-commerce, cloud computing, digital streaming, and
artificial intelligence.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oLbfym at no extra charge.[CC]

AMERICAN CAMPUS: Case Management Deadlines Amended in Perna Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MONIQUE PERNA and JAKE
PERNA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
v. AMERICAN CAMPUS COMMUNITIES, INC., Case No.
3:20-cv-00846-MMH-LLL (M.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Marcia Morales
Howard entered an order that:

  1. The joint motion for amendment to an adoption of revised
     scheduling order is granted.

  2. The case management deadlines are amended as follows:

     Deadline to file Motion for Class         May 6, 2022
     Certification:

     Deadline for Defendant to file            June 21, 2022
     Response to Motion for Class
     Certification:

     Disclosure of Expert Reports

                       Plaintiff:              Sept. 23, 2022

                       Defendant:              Oct. 24, 2022

     Deadline for completing discovery         Nov. 23, 2022
     and filing motions to compel:

     Deadline for filing dispositive           Dec. 22, 2022
     and Daubert motions:

     Deadline for filing all other             March 27, 2023
     motions including motions
     in limine

     Joint Final Pretrial Statement:           April 10, 2023

     Final Pretrial Conference                 April 17, 2023

American Campus is the largest developer, owner and manager of
student housing communities in the United States.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LvvsC6 at no extra charge.[CC]

AMERICAN GENERAL: Stipulation on Class Cert Docs Production OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LSIMC, LLC, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, v. AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 2:20-cv-11518-SVW-PVC (C.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Pedro V. Castillo entered an order granting joint
stipulation regarding document production for upcoming class
certification motion:

  1. The Defendant need not produce additional policy level data
     for the remaining policies prior to the conclusion of the
     parties' briefing on class certification.

  2. The Defendant shall produce any remaining additional policy
     level data for the remaining policies following the Court's
     decision on class certification if a class is certified.

  3. For purposes of the February 10, 2022 class certification
     motion deadline and related briefing, the parties
     acknowledge that the policy level data produced to date is
     representative of all policy level information kept on all
     of the Defendant's products that contain the "expectations
     of future investment earnings" language that is the subject
     of this litigation. As such, the Defendant agrees that its
     arguments on class certification and the Rule 23 factors
     will be limited to arguments applicable to those plan codes
     and policies for which it has produced policy level data.

  4. Should the Court deny Plaintiff's upcoming class
     certification motion, the Plaintiff agrees that such order
     shall apply to all plan codes that contain the
     "expectations of future investment earnings" language that
     is the subject of this litigation.

American General operates as an insurance company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LqAZd5 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Steven G. Sklaver, Esq.
          Glenn C. Bridgman, Esq.
          Lear Jiang, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
          1900 Avenue of the Stars, 14th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 789-3100
          Facsimile: (310) 789-3150
          E-mail: ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com
                  gbridgman@susmangodfrey.com
                  ljiang@susmangodfrey.com

               - and -

          Seth Ard, Esq.
          Ryan C. Kirkpatrick, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
          1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 336-8330
          Facsimile: (212) 336-8340
          E-mail: sard@susmangodfrey.com
                  rkirkpatrick@susmangodfrey.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Dan E. Marmalefsky, Esq.
          Nancy R. Thomas, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 6000
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-3543
          Telephone: (213) 892-5200
          Facsimile: (213) 892-5454
          E-mail: dmarmalefsky@mofo.com
                  nthomas@mofo.com

          - and -

          David T. McDowell, Esq.
          MCDOWELL HETHERINGTON LLP
          1001 Fannin Street, Suite 2700
          Houston, TX 77002-6707
          Telephone: (713) 337-5580
          Facsimile: 713-337-8850
          E-mail: david.mcdowell@mhllp.com

AMN HEALTHCARE: Has Until March 10 to Reply to Oliveria Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHARON OLIVERIA, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AMN
HEALTHCARE, INC., a Nevada corporation; DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 3:22-cv-00003-LL-WVG (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Linda Lopez of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted the Joint Motion to Extend
Defendant's Time to Respond to the Complaint.

Plaintiff Oliveria, individually and on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, brings the putative class action for
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 201,
et seq. (the "FLSA"), and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act,
O.R.C. 4111.01, et seq. (the "OMWFSA"), against the Defendant AMN
and Does 1 through 10.

On Jan. 3, 2022, the Plaintiff filed suit, alleging claims for
relief for (1) off-the-clock work in violation of the FLSA; (2)
off-the-clock work in violation of the OMFWSA; (3) failure to
include bonus pay in overtime rate in violation of the FLSA; (4)
failure to include bonus pay in overtime rate in violation of the
OMFWSA; (5) unlawful unpaid breaks in violation of the FLSA; (6)
unlawful unpaid breaks in violation of the OMFWSA; (7) improper
kickbacks in violation of the FLSA; and (8) improper kickbacks in
violation of the OMFWSA.

On Jan. 18, 2022, the Plaintiff served the Defendant, meaning the
Defendant has until Feb. 8, 2022, to respond. On Jan. 31, 2022, the
Plaintiff and the Defendant filed the instant Joint Motion to
extend Defendant's time to respond to the complaint by 15 days.

The Defendant seeks a 15-day extension of time to respond to the
complaint, extending their deadline from Feb. 8, 2022, to Feb. 23,
2022. It argues the additional time is necessary given the
complaint alleges eight claims for relief and contains 134
paragraphs of allegations.

Judge Lopez finds good cause exists to grant the Joint Motion. She
grants a 30-day extension of time to respond, meaning the Defendant
will have until March 10, 2022, to respond to the complaint.
However, further extensions will not be granted absent a showing of
good cause.

The Plaintiff is reminded that with respect to Does 1 through 10,
"a plaintiff may refer to unknown defendants as Defendant John Doe
1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and so on, but he must allege specific
facts showing how each particular doe defendant violated his
rights." Where a plaintiff fails to link the alleged wrong or
explain how any of the unidentified parties he sued personally
caused a violation of his rights, the court must dismiss those
individuals, especially when they have not been served.

In the case, the Plaintiff's complaint to does not contain specific
allegations against specific doe defendants. Thus, absent service
upon specific defendants within 30 days, the Court will dismiss the
doe defendants without prejudice. The Plaintiff can always seek
leave to amend to add additional defendants at a later date
pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5dxww4jj from Leagle.com.


APEX CLEARING: Trading Suspension Harmed Investors, Chavez Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ERIK CHAVEZ and PETER JANG, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. APEX CLEARING CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-01233 (S.D.N.Y., February 14, 2022) is
a class action against the Defendant for negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and tortious interference with business
relationship.

The case arises from the Defendant's decision to implement a
unilateral, one-way trading suspension of AMC Entertainment
Holdings, Inc., GameStop Corporation, and Koss Corporation stocks
on January 28, 2021. The Defendant failed to adequately mitigate
risk and knew or should have known that the abruptly implemented,
one-way trading suspension it imposed directly and through its
introducing broker-dealers would and did harm its customers and
investors. By imposing restrictions on only the purchasing side of
the transaction, the Defendant not only deprived the Plaintiffs and
Class members of the ability to buy the suspended stocks, but it
intended to and did cause the price of the suspended stocks to
spiral downward to artificially suppressed prices by allowing
selling to continue. As a result, the Plaintiffs and Class members
were forced to sell at artificially suppressed prices or watch as
the value of their holdings fell precipitously, says the suit.

Apex Clearing Corporation is a digital wealth management solutions
provider, headquartered in Dallas, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Peter Safirstein, Esq.
         SAFIRSTEIN LAW LLC
         45 N. Broad Street, Suite 100
         Ridgewood, NJ 07450
         Telephone: (917) 952-9458
         E-mail: psafirstein@safirsteinlaw.com

                 - and –

         Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
         KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, P.C.
         747 Chestnut Ridge Road
         Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977
         Telephone: (845) 356-2570
         Facsimile: (845) 356-4335
         E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com

BERGEN RECYCLING: San Pedro Suit Seeks Overtime Pay for Cashiers
----------------------------------------------------------------
NOEL CLEMENTE SAN PEDRO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. BERGEN RECYCLING INC. AND MARIA
MONTEFERRARIO, Case No. 2:22-cv-00821 (D.N.J., Feb. 15, 2022) seeks
equitable and legal relief for Defendants' violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, and
the New Jersey Wage Payment Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a cashier and recycling
employee from in or around February 2001 until on or around March
18, 2020.

As a cashier and recycling employee, the Plaintiff's principal job
duties included, inter alia, purchasing recyclable materials from
customers; weighing recyclable materials; loading recyclable
materials into trailers; operating a forklift; answering phone
calls; and answering customer inquiries.

Although Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Rule 23
Class regularly worked more than 40 hours per week during their
employment with Defendants, the Defendants allegedly failed to
compensate the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the
Rule 23 Class with overtime wages at a rate of one and one-half
times their regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 per week.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Katherine Morales, Esq.
          KATZ MELINGER PLLC
          370 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1512
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 460-0047
          Facsimile: (212) 428-6811
          E-mail: kymorales@katzmelinger.com

BIOGEN INC: Two ERISA Suits Consolidated in D. Mass.
----------------------------------------------------
Biogen Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K Annual Report for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, in September 2020 the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts consolidated two
cases filed against the company in July and August 2020 by
participants in the Biogen 401(k) Savings Plan alleging breach of
fiduciary duty under Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). Plaintiffs seek a declaration of the action as a class
action and monetary and other relief. No trial date has been set.

Biogen is a global biopharmaceutical company based in
Massachusetts.


BLAND LANDSCAPING: Partial Bid to Dismiss Roldan FLSA Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MANUEL ROLDAN, Plaintiff v. BLAND LANDSCAPING
COMPANY, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:20-CV-00276-KDB-DSC
(W.D.N.C.), Judge Kenneth D. Bell of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, denies
the Defendant's partial motion to dismiss.

The matter is before the Court on Defendant Bland Landscaping
Company, Inc.'s Partial Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the
Pleadings, the Memorandum and Recommendation of the Honorable
Magistrate Judge David S. Cayer ("M&R") entered March 15, 2021, and
Bland's Objection to the M&R.

Discussion

In the putative collective and class action, the Plaintiff, a
foreman who is seeking to represent other current and former
full-time foremen for Bland's landscaping business, asserts that
Bland violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.
Section 201 and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA").
Specifically, the Plaintiff has filed claims for (1) unpaid
overtime wages under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 207; (2)
reimbursement under the NCWHA for improper deductions for uniforms
and uniform cleaning services under N.C. Gen. Stat. Section
95-25.8; and (3) unpaid wages under the NCWHA, including overtime
resulting from Bland's miscalculation of wages and work performed
during lunch breaks, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.6.

Only the final claim is at issue. In its Rule 12 motions, Bland
moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's NCWHA claims for overtime
compensation under N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.6, North
Carolina's "payday" statute, and now objects to the Magistrate
Judge's recommendation that the motions be denied.

Bland offers three grounds for its objection. First, it claims that
the North Carolina "payday" statute doesn't apply to Plaintiff's
"disputed overtime" claims. Second, it argues that the Plaintiff's
claims are exempted from the "payday" statute. And, finally, Bland
contends that Plaintiff's "payday" claim is preempted by the FLSA.
The Court finds that the M&R correctly recommends that the
Plaintiff's "payday" claim be permitted to go forward at this
initial stage of the case and, therefore, Bland's motion will be
denied.

Bland's first argument that the Plaintiff's "payday" claims cannot
proceed because Bland "disputes" the claims misunderstands and
misstates both the Plaintiff's claims and the relevant authority,
Judge Bell holds. Simply put, the Plaintiff alleges here that he
and the other foremen, who make up the requested class, have not
been paid for all the time they worked for the Defendant during
lunch breaks and otherwise. Particularly considering the governing
standard of review, which requires the Court to accept the
Plaintiff's allegations as true, this states a claim under Section
95-25.6.

The Defendant relies on Queen v. RHA Health Servs., No.
1:00CV00101, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26118 *7-8 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 22,
2001) and McKeithan v. Novant Health, Inc., No. 1:08CV374, 2008 WL
5083804, at *1-3 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2008). However, Judge Bell
holds, those cases are distinguishable because the underlying
employment contracts at issue specifically designated the time for
which plaintiffs sought pay as non-compensable and there was a
dispute whether or not the employees were actually working during
the disputed periods (e.g. while they were "on-call").

Again, in contrast, the asserted "dispute" here is not about
whether work during a purported "lunch break" is compensable, but
rather how much, if any, the Plaintiffs worked during that time
without being paid, Judge Bell notes. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. Section
95-25.6, employees may seek to recover unpaid wages for actual work
time; therefore, this "dispute" (on which the Court expresses no
view as to the merits) states a claim under the "payday" statute,
Judge Bell points out.

The Defendant's second objection is that the Plaintiff's NCWHA
"payday" claim cannot proceed because the NCWHA exempts employees,
who work for employers who are subject to the FLSA from the
protection of the NCWHA overtime statute (presumably because they
can rely on the FLSA). For the reasons discussed here, the Court
will permit the claim to go forward as recommended by the
Magistrate Judge, but without prejudice to Bland having an
opportunity to again raise this issue at summary judgment.

The Plaintiff's claim under the NCWHA is based upon the Defendants'
failure to pay the Plaintiff "all owed, earned, and promised
wages," in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.6.

By its terms, Section 95-25.14(a) does not exempt "payday" claims
under Section 95-25.6 for employees of "FLSA employers," Judge Bell
finds. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's NCWHA "payday" claim (which in
any event seeks broader relief than recovery of overtime wages) is
not exempted and will not be dismissed at this time.

The Defendant's final objection is that the FLSA preempts any claim
under the NCWHA "payday" statute. As the M&R described in detail,
the Court has recently addressed this argument, holding that
because the FLSA only preempts state laws that provide lesser
protections than the FLSA, state "payday" statutes, such as N.C.
Gen. Stat. Section 95-25.6, which provides additional protection to
employees, are not preempted.

Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in the M&R, the Court finds
that the Plaintiff's NCWHA "payday" claim under Section 95-25.6 is
not preempted by the FLSA.

Order

The Court adopts the findings and conclusions of the M&R and
accepts its recommendation to deny the Defendant's motion.

The Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the
Pleadings is denied. This matter will proceed towards a decision on
the merits in the absence of a voluntary resolution of the
Plaintiff's claims between the parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p99rbpt from Leagle.com.


BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Loses Objection to Wheeler's Bid to Compel
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, denies the
Defendant's objection to order granting motion to compel in the
lawsuit captioned RASHONDA WHEELER, Plaintiff v. BMW OF NORTH
AMERICA LLC, Defendant, Case No. 3:20-cv-36-RJC-DSC (W.D.N.C.).

The matter comes before the Court on the Defendant's Objection to
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and response in
opposition. The Objection seeks to modify or set aside the
Magistrate Judge's Order granting the Plaintiff's motion to compel
certain discovery.

Background

The Plaintiff filed the action in January 2020, alleging she
purchased a vehicle with a N63 engine that burns too much oil),
from an authorized dealer of Defendant BMW of North America LLC,
and that she was misled and deceived regarding the defective
engine. Prior to filing the action, the Plaintiff opted out of a
class action settlement involving defects with the N63 engine, like
the Vehicle, Bang v. BMW of North America, LLC, Case No.
2:15-cv-06945 (D.N.J.) (the "Bang Class Action").

The Plaintiff's counsel also represents other plaintiff opt-outs of
the Bang Class Action settlement, including, among others, those in
Schneider, et al. v. BMW of North America, LLC, No.
1:18-cv-12239-IT (D. Ma. Apr. 13, 2020) (the "Schneider Action"),
with similar claims as the current case.

The Complaint brings claims for (1) Breach of Warranty Pursuant to
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (2) Breach of Implied Warranty of
Merchantability Pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Federal Act; (3)
Breach of Express Warranties; (4) Violation of the North Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act; and (5) Fraudulent Concealment. The
Defendant asserts, among other defenses, a statute of limitations
defense, which the Plaintiff argues should be tolled because the
defect was concealed.

On Nov. 4, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the Motion to Compel, which
the Defendant opposed. The Motion to Compel seeks, as relevant to
the Defendant's Objection, production of four categories of
documents that the Plaintiff asserts are relevant to her claims:

   1. Documents and material Defendant previously produced in the
      Schneider Action;

   2. Certain documents Defendant previously produced in the Bang
      Class Action, including The Technical Training Manual for
      N63 Engine (3/1/2011) and Individual Customer
      Warranty/Goodwill Records Data (re Oil Consumption);

   3. Emails between BMW and AGA Tools & Products, Inc. relating
      to development of valve stem seals repair tool; and

   4. Emails relating to valve stem seals going bad in N63
      engines.

The Magistrate Judge granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, for
the reasons set forth in the Plaintiff's briefing. Now the
Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's Order and ask the Court
to modify or set it aside, which the Plaintiff opposes.

Discussion

The Defendant argues that the materials the Plaintiff discovery
requests seek are not responsive or not relevant, exceed the scope
of discovery, are overbroad, and/or are disproportionate to the
needs of this single-plaintiff case. On the other hand, the
Plaintiff argues the materials requested are relevant to her
statute of limitations defense and to her case-in-chief to
demonstrate the Defendant's state of mind regarding the defect in
valve stem seals. Moreover, for the majority of the materials
requested, the Plaintiff argues there is little burden to the
Defendant since the materials have already been produced in other,
similar cases, but are otherwise protected by protective orders.

Judge Conrad opines that under Rule 26, the Plaintiff may seek
discovery that is relevant to her claims and defense and
proportional to the needs of this case. In granting the Motion to
Compel, the Magistrate Judge, with broad discretion to consider
discovery disputes, concluded the Plaintiff's requests did not
exceed the scope of discovery and were proportional.

After fully reviewing the record, the parties' arguments, and the
Magistrate Judge's Order, the Court also finds the Plaintiff's
arguments persuasive. The Defendant's Objection largely makes, and
relies on, the same arguments already presented to and rejected by
the Magistrate Judge rather than sufficiently presenting to the
Court the reasons that the Magistrate Judge's Order is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.

Thus, the Court concludes the Magistrate Judge's Order is
consistent with the law and not clearly erroneous and the Objection
is denied.

Conclusion

The Defendant's Objection to Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel is denied.

The Magistrate Judge's Order is adopted.

The Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted pursuant to the terms
set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/28huz93r from Leagle.com.


BOWMAR NUTRITION: Wins Bid to Dismiss or Strike Amended Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STACIE BASS, CAROLINE
CULP, KRISTEN DESTEPHANO, JULIA GREER, DANIELLE LARSON, ERIN
LEONARD, DEANA LOZANO, SHANNON MAINES, AMANDA MESSER, ALIZA MOR,
MARISSA STEWART, MARY BETH TEW, and COURTNEY WEYMOUTH, individually
and on behalf of all those similarly situated, v. BOWMAR NUTRITION,
L.L.C., an Iowa limited liability company, Case No.
4:21-cv-00307-JAJ-HCA (S.D. Iowa), the Hon. Judge John A. Jarvey
entered an order granting the Defendant Bowmar's December 17, 2021,
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, strike Plaintiffs' first
amended complaint, as follows:

   1. The parts of Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and based on
      purchases within the class period but outside the
      applicable statutes of limitations are dismissed without
      prejudice;

   2. The equitable claims under California law in Counts 13,
      14, and 15 are dismissed without prejudice; and

   3. The unjust enrichment claim in Count 2 is dismissed
      without prejudice for failure to plead the inadequacy of
      legal remedies, but the class action part of that claims
      is stricken with prejudice.

The Court further ordered that with the exception of the class
action part of the unjust enrichment claim in Count 2, the
plaintiff Consumers are granted leave to amend to attempt to cure
the deficiencies in the First Amended Complaint.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BmFZv0 at no extra charge.[CC]

BRADLEY UNIVERSITY: Seeks to Vacate Feb. 18 Response Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ORION EDDLEMON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
BRADLEY UNIVERSITY, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Case
No. 1:20-cv-01264-MMM-JEH (C.D. Ill.), Bradley University asks the
Court to enter an order:

   1. vacating the February 18, 2022 automatically generated
      deadline to respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Class
      Certification;

   2. confirming the Agreed Schedule setting the University's
      response deadline as May 12, 2022; and

   3. granting other relief this Court deems equitable and just.

Bradley University is a private university in Peoria, Illinois.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/360GqPM at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Gregory E. Ostfeld, Esq.
          Tiffany S. Fordyce, Esq.
          Kara E. Angeletti, Esq.
          Greenberg Traurig, LLP
          77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 456-8400
          E-mail: ostfeldg@gtlaw.com
                  fordycet@gtlaw.com
                  angelettik@gtlaw.com


BRIDGECREST ACCEPTANCE: Loses Bid to Strike Canady's Class Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denies the
Defendant's motion to strike class allegations in the lawsuit
styled Tonya Canady, Plaintiff v. Bridgecrest Acceptance
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. CV-19-04738-PHX-DWL (D. Ariz.).

Relevant Background

In the action, which was initiated in July 2019, Plaintiff Tonya
Canady alleges that Bridgecrest violated the Telephone
Communications Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227, et seq.
("TCPA"), by placing calls to her cell phone throughout 2018 and
2019 without her consent while using an artificial or automated
voice.

The complaint is styled as a "Class Action Complaint" and alleges
that Canady is pursuing claims "individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated." To that end, in the "Class Allegations"
section of the complaint, Canady alleges that she is bringing
claims on behalf of a "Pre-recorded Class," which "consists of: (1)
All persons in the United States (2) subscribing to a cellular
telephone number (3) to which Bridgecrest placed a non-emergency
telephone call (4) using a pre-recorded message (5) within 4 years
of the date this complaint is filed (6) after receiving a request
to no longer call that number."

The complaint also includes allegations concerning why there are
questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class that
predominate over any questions that affect only individual class
members; allegations concerning why Canady is a proper class
representative; and allegations concerning Canady's counsel's
experience in handling class actions.

On Oct. 2, 2019, Bridgecrest moved to compel arbitration based on
an arbitration agreement that Canady's husband signed when
purchasing a truck from Bridgecrest's predecessor in interest.

On April 23, 2020, the Court issued an order denying Bridgecrest's
motion, concluding that Canady was not bound by the arbitration
agreement because she did not sign it (or otherwise agree to it)
and was not equitably estopped from avoiding it.

On May 1, 2020, Bridgecrest filed an answer to the complaint.

On Aug. 11, 2021, following the issuance and lifting of a stay for
reasons unrelated to the current dispute, the parties filed the
Rule 26(f) report. In the report, Bridgecrest asked the Court to
bifurcate class discovery from merits discovery and to set a
deadline in August 2022 for Canady to file any motion for class
certification. Bridgecrest asserted that such bifurcation would be
efficient and economical in part because Canady does not require
intrusive merits discovery to pursue certification in the case.

On Aug. 24, 2021, the Court issued the Rule 16 scheduling order.
Per Bridgecrest's request, the Court set a deadline of March 9,
2022, for completion of precertification discovery, set a deadline
of Aug. 28, 2022, for Canady to file a motion for class
certification, held that the deadline for completion of all fact
discovery would not expire until 120 days after the issuance of the
Court's decision on the certification request, and similarly held
that various expert disclosure and other deadlines would not expire
until after the issuance of the Court's decision on the
certification request.

On Sept. 1, 2021, Bridgecrest filed two motions: (1) a motion for
judgment on the pleadings; and (2) the pending motion to strike
Canady's class allegations. Bridgecrest requested that the Court
defer ruling on the latter until it had ruled on the former.

In December 2021, the motion for judgment on the pleadings became
fully briefed.

On Jan. 21, 2022, the Court issued an order denying the motion for
judgment on the pleadings. This ruling, coupled with the completion
of the briefing on the motion to strike means the motion to strike
is now ripe for resolution, District Judge Dominic W. Lanza notes.

Discussion

Bridgecrest moves, pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to strike the class allegations from Canady's
complaint. In a nutshell, Bridgecrest argues that Canady's class
allegations should be stricken because there is no way she will
succeed on a certification request under Rule 23 (due to the
predominance of individual questions, a lack of commonality, and
Canady's inability to represent the putative class) and allowing a
facially uncertifiable class to proceed beyond the pleadings can
result in significant prejudice to a defendant in the form of
excessive and unnecessary discovery.

In response, Canady argues that Bridgecrest's motion is
procedurally deficient for two reasons--first, it is untimely under
Rule 12(f)(2); and second, it does not seek the sort of narrow
relief contemplated by Rule 12(f)(1)--and, at any rate, fails on
the merits because it does not establish there are no circumstances
under which the proposed class could be certified. In reply,
Bridgecrest briefly addresses Canady's procedural objections before
spending the bulk of its brief discussing why any class
certification request in this case will ultimately prove
unsuccessful.

The Court agrees with Canady's procedural objections. The case has
been pending for approximately two and a half years, Bridgecrest
has already answered the complaint, the Court has already (at
Bridgecrest's request) bifurcated the discovery process, and the
deadline for completing certification-related discovery will soon
expire. The Court has also set an August 2022 deadline for Canady
to formally move for class certification under Rule 23. To the
extent Bridgecrest believes class certification is inappropriate,
it will have a full and fair opportunity to make its case when it
opposes Canady's certification motion.

Judge Lanza holds that it would be inappropriate, at least against
this procedural backdrop, to allow Bridgecrest to seek
certification-related relief now under Rule 12(f). As an initial
matter, Bridgecrest's motion is untimely. Under Rule 12(f)(2), a
party may file a motion to strike material from a pleading "either
before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed,
within 21 days after being served with the pleading."

Here, Bridgecrest filed its answer in May 2020, so the motion to
strike (filed in September 2021) comes 16 months too late, Judge
Lanza points out. Bridgecrest's only response to Canady's
timeliness objection is to note that, under Rule 12(f)(1), the
court may strike material from a pleading "on its own" at any time,
but this provision is obviously inapplicable here because the Court
is not acting sua sponte--it is addressing a motion filed by
Bridgecrest.

Bridgecrest also lacks an entitlement to relief for other reasons,
Judge Lanza finds. Bridgecrest is not, to be clear, moving to deny
class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Instead, Bridgecrest is seeking to strike the class
allegations in Canady's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f).

Not only are Rule 12(f) motions to strike "viewed with disfavor"
and "not frequently granted," Operating Eng'rs Local 324 Health
Care Plan v. G & W Constr. Co., 783 F.3d 1045, 1050 (6th Cir.
2015), but the text of Rule 12(f) provides that a motion to strike
may only be directed at "an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter," Judge Lanza
explains. These limited categories do not map neatly onto a class
allegation. Such an allegation is not a defense, is not redundant,
is not impertinent, and is not scandalous. At most, the Judge
points out, it might be said that a facially deficient class
allegation is "immaterial," but even that is something of a
stretch.

That is the case here, Judge Lanza finds. Bridgecrest's essential
argument is that Canady's class allegations should be stricken
because, when it comes time to formally take up the issue of
certification under Rule 23, Canady won't be able to meet her
burden because individual questions of revocation predominate,
putative class members lack commonality, and the Plaintiff is not
representative of the class. These are the same issues that will be
decided when determining whether to grant class certification, so
Bridgecrest's reliance on Rule 12(f) is misplaced, Judge Lanza
holds.

Accordingly, Judge Lanza ruled that Bridgecrest's motion to strike
is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3ucbns7e from Leagle.com.


BUREAU OF PRISONS: Bid to Certify Class Tossed in Abbott Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WILLIAM R. ABBOTT v. US
BUREAU OF PRISONS, ET AL., Case No. 2:21-cv-03890-JDC-KK (W.D.
La.), the Hon. Judge James D. Cain, Jr. entered an order:

   -- denying the motion to certify class and motion to appoint
      counsel; and

   -- denying motion to amend/add co-Plaintiff; and

   -- denying amended motion for class action status.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons is a United States federal law
enforcement agency under the Department of Justice responsible for
the care, custody, and control of incarcerated individuals.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uNqgUy at no extra charge.[CC]

BUTTERFLY NETWORK: Faces Rose Securities Suit Over Stock Price Drop
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CRAIG M. ROSE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. BUTTERFLY NETWORK, INC. F/K/A LONGVIEW ACQUISITION
CORP., TODD M. FRUCHTERMAN, STEPHANIE FIELDING, JONATHAN M.
ROTHBERG, JOHN RODIN, LARRY ROBBINS, MARK HOROWITZ, WESTLEY MOORE,
DEREK CRIBBS, and RANDY, Case No. 2:22-cv-00854 (D.N.J., Feb. 16,
2022) is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of (a) all persons or entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired Butterfly securities between February 16, 2021
and November 15, 2021, both dates inclusive, and/or (b) all holders
of Butterfly common stock as of the record date for the special
meeting of shareholders held on February 12, 2021 to consider
approval of the merger between Longview and Butterfly and entitled
to vote on the Merger.

The suit seeks to recover damages caused by the Defendants' alleged
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b), 14(a), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 arising from the materially false or misleading
statements or omissions issued during the Class Period and in the
proxy statement issued in connection with the Merger.

Longview was a special purpose acquisition company ("SPAC") formed
for the purpose of effecting a merger, capital stock exchange,
asset acquisition, stock purchase, reorganization, or similar
business combination with one or more businesses.

Butterfly, a digital health company, develops, manufactures, and
commercializes ultrasound imaging solutions in the United States
and internationally. The Company offers Butterfly iQ, a handheld
and single-probe whole body ultrasound system; and Butterfly iQ+, a
point-of-care ultrasound imaging device that connects with a smart
phone or tablet.

Between late 2019 and early 2020, a novel strain of the coronavirus
disease, commonly referred to as COVID-19, became an ongoing global
pandemic, with the outbreak first identified in Wuhan, China, in
December 2019. The virus quickly spread to other countries,
including the U.S., prompting state, federal, and private parties
to enact various health and safety measures to halt the spread of
the disease, which has since claimed millions of lives.

On November 20, 2020, almost one year into the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic, Butterfly issued a press release announcing that it had
entered into a merger agreement with Longview. On the basis of the
defective Proxy, on February 12, 2021, Longview shareholders voted
to approve the Merger at a special shareholder meeting. Following
the consummation of the Merger on February 16, 2021, Longview
changed its name to "Butterfly Network, Inc." and Butterfly stock
began trading on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").

Allegedly, the Proxy was negligently prepared and, as a result,
contained untrue statements of material fact or omitted to state
other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading
and were not prepared in accordance with the rules and regulations
governing its preparation.

Additionally, throughout the Class Period, Defendants made
materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
business, operations, and compliance policies. Specifically, the
Proxy and Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that Butterfly had overstated its post-Merger
business and financial prospects.

On November 15, 2021, Butterfly announced its financial results for
the third quarter of 2021. In a press release, Butterfly advised,
among other things, that the Company's total gross margin for the
quarter was negative 35% and that the Company expected its revenue
for 2021 to be $60 million to $62 million this year, significantly
below the guidance it gave out in Q1 of $76 million to $80
million.

On this news, Butterfly's stock price fell $1.08 per share, or
12.55%, to close at $7.52 per share on November 15, 2021.

Subsequent to, and due to, the closing of the Merger, the price of
Butterfly common stock declined precipitously as the truth about
Butterfly and the Proxy's false and misleading nature were revealed
over time.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the suit.

The Plaintiff acquired Butterfly securities at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period and/or held Butterfly
common stock as of the January 15, 2021 record date and was
entitled to vote on the Merger at the February 12, 2021 special
meeting of shareholders. The Plaintiff has suffered damages due to
Defendants' alleged violations of the Exchange Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas H. Przybylowski, Esq.
          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (917) 463-1044
          E-mail: tprzybylowski@pomlaw.com
                  tprzybylowski@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          Facsimile: (212) 697-7296
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com

C.H. ROBINSON: Amended Scheduling Orders Entered in 2 Class Suits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the two class action lawsuits filed vs C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE,
INC., et al., the Hon. Judge Richard B. Solum entered an amendment
of prior scheduling orders as follows:

   1. JMR Plaintiffs' Motion for
      Class Certification:

      -- Plaintiffs' motion to be             Oct. 22, 2021
         made on or before:

      -- The defendants' response             Dec. 10,2021
         shall be made on or before:

      -- The Plaintiffs' reply on or          Jan. 7, 2022
         before:

   2. Commission Data:

      -- CHR to produce commission            Jan. 14, 2022
         data to plaintiffs on or
         before:

   3. Freight Data:

      -- CHR to Reproduce freight data        Jan. 21, 2022
         in pipe delimited format to
         Plaintiffs on or before:

   4. Moore Discovery Requests:

      -- CHR to respond to Moore              Jan. 26, 2022
         discovery requests on or
         before:

   5. Fact Discovery Completed:               Feb. 11, 2022

   6. The Plaintiffs' Expert Reports:

      -- Plaintiffs' affirmative expert       Feb. 11, 2022
         reports in Moore and JMR shall
         be produced on or before:

   7. The Defendants' Expert Reports:

      -- Defendants' affirmative expert       March 14, 2022
         reports in Moore and JMR
         shall be produced on or before:

   8. Expert Rebuttal Reports:

      -- Both parties' rebuttal expert        April 4, 2022
         reports in Moore and JMR shall
         be produced on or before:

   9. Rule 56 Motions:

      -- No party in either the Moore
         case or JMR case shall be
         permitted to file a Rule 56
         motion while the class
         certification motion is pending.

      -- The court will include a
         deadline for Rule 56 motions
         in its class certification order.

  10.    Trial Readiness:                     April 15, 2022

The two lawsuits are captioned as:

   "DAVID MOORE d/b/a MOORE FAMILY FARMS, et al., Case No. 20-
   cv-252-PJS/HB (D. Minn.), v. C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC.
   et al.;" and

   "JMR FARMS, INC., et. al, individually and in behalf of
   others similarly situated, v. C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC.
   et al., Case No. 20-cv-879-PJS/HB (D. Minn.)."

C.H. Robinson is an American Fortune 500 provider of multimodal
transportation services and third-party logistics. The company
offers freight transportation, transportation management, brokerage
and warehousing.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HMyQX9 at no extra charge.[CC]

CARDINAL HEALTH: Files Bid to Dismiss Meds Price-rigging Charge
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cardinal Health, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Quarterly Report for
the quarterly period ended December 31, 2021, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that the
company has filed motion to dismiss the class action complaints
alleging that it encouraged manufacturers to increase prices,
provided anti-competitive pricing information to manufacturers and
improperly engaged in customer allocation.

In December 2019, pharmaceutical distributors including the company
were added as defendants in a civil class action lawsuit filed by
indirect purchasers of generic drugs, such as hospitals and retail
pharmacies. The indirect purchaser case is part of multidistrict
litigation consisting of multiple individual class action matters
consolidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

The company has filed a motion to dismiss the complaints.

Cardinal Health, Inc. is a company that provides healthcare
services and products in Ohio.


CARDINAL HEALTH: Loses Bid Dismiss Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------
Cardinal Health, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended December 31, 2021, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that the court denied
its motion to dismiss in September 2021.

In August 2019, the Louisiana Sheriffs' Pension & Relief Fund filed
a purported class action complaint against Cardinal Health and
certain current and former officers and employees in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio purportedly
on behalf of all purchasers of Cardinal common shares between March
2015 and May 2018.

In June 2020, the court appointed 1199 SEIU Health Care Employees
Pension Fund as lead plaintiff and a consolidated amended complaint
was filed in September 2020. The amended complaint alleges that the
defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by making misrepresentations and omissions
related to the acquisition and integration of the cardiovascular
and endovascular devices business and inventory and supply chain
problems within it, and seeks to recover unspecified damages and
equitable relief for the alleged misstatements and omissions. The
complaint also alleges that one of the individual defendants
violated Section 20A of the Exchange Act because he sold shares of
Cardinal Health stock during the time period.

Cardinal Health, Inc. is a company that provides healthcare
services and products in Ohio.


CATS: W.D. North Carolina Dismisses Beyan's Amended Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
Charlotte Division, dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiff's
amended complaint filed in the lawsuit styled JAMES L. BEYAN, JR.,
Plaintiff v. CATS, Defendant, Case No. 3:21-cv-00681-RJC-DCK
(W.D.N.C.).

Plaintiff James L. Beyan, Jr., a North Carolina citizen, filed this
action on Dec. 29, 2021, naming CATS, identified as North Carolina
corporation, as the sole Defendant. The Plaintiff asserted "class
action" and "discrimination" as bases for federal question
jurisdiction, but also asserted diversity jurisdiction. He alleged
only that he has been directly and indirectly put into harms' way
by the Defendant's negligence. The Plaintiff seeks monetary damages
for his pain and suffering.

On Jan. 11, 2022, on initial review, the Court found that the
Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
and allowed him 30 days to amend his complaint. The Court
specifically provided that the Plaintiff's allegations do not
support jurisdiction with this Court and that while detailed
factual allegations are not required, Rules 8 "demands more than an
unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."

The Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint, which is before
the Court now on initial review. In his Amended Complaint, the
Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction only, claiming that
his rights have been violated under "Title VII (7), Discrimination
and Civil Rights violations or the Civil Rights Act of 1964." The
Plaintiff now alleges that he has been directly and indirectly put
into harms' way and discriminated against by bus drivers. The
Plaintiff seeks $3 million for pain and suffering due to
negligence.

Discussion

District Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr., finds that the Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint also fails initial review. The Plaintiff bases
his claim against Defendant CATS on violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that he has been discriminated
against by bus drivers presumably employed by the Defendant. The
Plaintiff has again failed to state a claim for relief.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act") prohibits an
employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. Title VII does not apply outside the employment context.
The Plaintiff does not allege that he is or was employed by
Defendant CATS. He has, therefore, failed to state a claim for
relief under Title VII, Judge Conrad holds.

The Plaintiff also purports to bring his claim under the Act
generally, but he does not allege what other provisions might
afford him relief, Judge Conrad states.

To state a claim under Title VI, a plaintiff must allege (1) that
the defendant is engaging in racial discrimination and (2) that
defendant receives federal funds, Judge Conrad notes, citing Farmer
v. Ramsey, 41 F.Supp.2d 587, 592 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 1999).

Even ignoring the Plaintiff's failure to identify Title VI in the
first place and with a very generous read of the Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint to satisfy the first element, the Plaintiff has
failed to allege that Defendant CATS receives federal funds, thus,
subjecting it to the protections of Title VI, Judge Conrad opines.
The Court is aware of no other provision of the Act that might
afford the Plaintiff relief under the very few facts alleged.

The Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.

Conclusion

The Court will dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on initial
review for failure to state a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915(e)(2). Because the Plaintiff again fails to state a
claim for relief after having been afforded the opportunity to
amend his complaint, the Court will dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint with prejudice.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.

The Clerk is instructed to terminate the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/245pjezd from Leagle.com.


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Harper Bid to Compel Nixed w/o Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LIONEL HARPER, et al., v.
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, Case No. 2:19-CV-0902-WBS-DMC (E.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Dennis M. Cota entered an order:

   1. denying without prejudice the Plaintiff Harper's motion to
      compel;

   2. denying without prejudice the Defendant's ex parte motion
      to extend the deadline to produce sampling data relating
      to Plaintiff Harper's California's Private Attorney
      General Act (PAGA) claim is denied without prejudice; and

   3. vacating the hearing set for February 23, 2022, on
      Plaintiff Harper's motion to compel.

The District Judge issued an order on October 13, 2021, addressing
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration. In that motion, Defendant
sought: (1) to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Harper's claims and
stay the action pending arbitration; and (2) compel arbitration of
claims by Plaintiffs Turner, Vasquez, and Abascal and dismiss those
claims from the case. The District Judge granted Defendant's motion
and stayed the action as to Counts One through Nine of the second
amended complaint pending arbitration of individual claims raised
by Plaintiff's Harper, Turner, Vasquez, and Abascal. On Plaintiffs'
counsel's request at the hearing, the District Judge also stayed
Plaintiff Sinclair's individual claims pending arbitration.

The Plaintiffs Lionel Harper, Daniel Sinclair, Hassan Turner, Luis
Vasquez, and Pedro 18 Abascal, who are proceeding with retained
counsel, bring this civil action pursuant to PAGA, California Labor
Code section 2698.

Charter offers traditional cable video programming, high-speed
Internet access, telephone services, and advanced broadband
services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GHBjRn at no extra charge.[CC]

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Dustin Suit Stayed to Continue Mediation
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DUSTIN S. SOULEK,
individually and as representative of a Class of Participants and
Beneficiaries of the Costco 401(k) Retirement Plan, v. COSTCO
WHOLESALE CORPORATION, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-00937-WCG (E.D.
Wisc.), the Court entered an order granting the parties'
stipulation to stay the action to allow the parties to continue the
voluntary mediation process.

The Court said, "he action be stayed in its entirety, including all
deadlines. The parties shall file a status report or the plaintiff
will file a motion for preliminary approval of the class action
settlement with this Court on or before February 28, 2022, after
which time the Court will reset the deadline for the parties to
file their supplemental briefs in the matter in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Northwestern University, if
necessary."

Costco is an American multinational corporation which operates a
chain of membership-only big-box retail stores.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HJ51qt at no extra charge.[CC]

CUDAHY PLACE: Order on Class Certification Deadlines Entered
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHARLETTA HARWELL-PAYNE On
behalf of Herself and all others similarly situated, v. CUDAHY
PLACE SENIOR LIVING, LLC, MANAGEMENT, LLC, Case No. 21-CV-328 (E.D.
Wisc.), the Hon. Judge Pamela Pepper entered an order regarding
class ceritification deadlines as follows:

  -- The briefs in opposition to the           Feb. 17, 2022
     plaintiff's motion for conditional
     certification and Rule 26 class
     certification are due by the end
     of the day on:

  -- Replies are due by the end of the         March 3, 2022
     day on:

  -- The deadline for the parties to           Aug. 19, 2022.
     complete discovery is:

  -- The deadline for the parties to           Sept. 16, 2022
     file dispositive motions and a
     motion to decertify the Fair
     Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
     collective (if necessary) is:

  -- The parties shall file a joint            Sept. 16, 2022
     status report if they choose not
     to file a dispositive motion by:

On Feb. 8, 2022, the Plaintiff move the Court to certify her as the
class representative, and the Previant Law Firm S.C. as class
counsel, for each of the following two subclasses.

The first subclass is defined as: All hourly employees who worked
at a Wisconsin facility administered by 41 Management, LLC during
the time period after 41 Management implemented temperature checks
and screening questionnaires. or (b) during the time period.

The second proposed subclass is defined as: All hourly employees
who worked at a Wisconsin facility administered by Management, LLC
who, during the time period of January 13, 2019 to the present,
ever punched in after a break less than 30 minutes after they
punched out for the break.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yingtao Ho, Esq.
          THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM
          310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100MW
          Milwaukee, WI 53203
          Telephone: (414) 271-4500
          Facsimile: (414) 271-6308
          E-mail: yh@previant.com
                  yh@previant.com

CVS HEALTH: Bowman Sues Over Unpaid OT for Pharmacy Technicians
---------------------------------------------------------------
VONQUET BOWMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CVS HEALTH CORPORATION and NEW JERSEY CVS
PHARMACY, L.L.C., Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00071 (D.R.I.,
February 14, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to compensate
the Plaintiff and similarly situated pharmacy technicians overtime
pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a pharmacy
technician from 2013 to 2021.

CVS Health Corporation is an operator of retail pharmacy chains in
the U.S., with headquarters at 1 CVS Dr., Woonsocket, Rhode
Island.

New Jersey CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CVS
Health Corporation. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Peter N. Wasylyk, Esq.
         LAW OFFICES OF PETER N. WASYLYK
         1307 Chalkstone Avenue
         Providence, RI 02908
         Telephone: (401) 831-7730
         Facsimile: (401) 861-6064
         E-mail: pnwlaw@aol.com

                 - and –

         Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
         Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
         MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
         412 H Street NE, 3rd Floor
         Washington, DC 20002
         Telephone: (202) 470-3520
         Facsimile: (202) 800-2730
         E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                 jrathod@classlawdc.com

DAVID SHINN: Seeks More Time to File Class Cert. Response
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Earl F. Crago v. David
Shinn, et al., Case No. 4:21-cv-00423-JAS (D. Ariz.), the
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order granting a 20-day
extension to February 28, 2022, to file their response to
Plaintiff's motion certifying case as a class action.

The deadline for filing a Response is currently February 8, 2022.
The current deadline coincides with several other deadlines
undersigned counsel has in other matters.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oNKpGa at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Michael E. Gottfried, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          2005 North Central Avenue
          Phoenix, AZ 85004-1592
          Telephone: (602) 542-1645
          Facsimile: (602) 542-7670
          E-mail: Michael.Gottfried@azag.gov

DEVA CONCEPT: Counsel Has Until Feb. 25 to Answer Robaina's Request
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DEVA CONCEPTS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION,
MASTER FILE: 1:20-cv-01234-GHW (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Gregory H. Woods
of the U.S.  District Court for the Southern District of New York
ordered the counsel for both Lead Plaintiffs and the Defendant to
respond to Katherine Robaina's Feb. 3, 2022 motion for leave to
leave to be excluded from the class action settlement no later than
Feb. 25, 2022.

The Court has received Ms. Robaina's motion. The responses should
state whether that relevant party opposes Ms. Robaina's motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mvpd4d3r from Leagle.com.


DUKE ENERGY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Turpin's Amended Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
Charlotte Division, denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint filed in the lawsuit entitled WILLARD TURPIN AND
MICHAEL JOHNSON, Plaintiffs v. DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION, DUKE ENERGY
BENEFITS COMMITTEE AND JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-30, Defendants, Case
No. 3:20-CV-00528-KDB-DSC (W.D.N.C.).

The matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint, the Memorandum and Recommendation of the
Honorable Magistrate Judge David S. Cayer ("M&R") entered March 4,
2021, and the Defendants' Objection to the M&R. The Court has
carefully considered this motion, the parties' briefs and other
pleadings of record in the action.

Facts and Procedural History

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs, who allege they are a
current and former participant in the Duke Energy Retirement
Savings Plan, assert claims under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Section 1001, et seq.
("ERISA"), on behalf of themselves and other current and former
Plan participants against Defendants Duke Energy Corp., the Duke
Energy Benefits Committee, and other unnamed individuals or
entities to whom Duke Energy delegated fiduciary functions or
responsibilities (currently designated as John and Jane Does
1-30).

In summary, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants breached
their fiduciary duties with respect to the Plan in violation of
ERISA by requiring Plan participants to pay "excessive"
record-keeping fees and managed account fees and otherwise failing
to adequately monitor the Plan's expenses charged to participants.

Upon the filing of an Amended Complaint, the Defendants moved to
dismiss the action on the grounds that the Plaintiffs' amended
pleading did not sufficiently state a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. The Court referred the motion to the Magistrate Judge, who
issued an M&R concluding that under the applicable pleading
standard the Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA. The Defendants timely filed an objection to the
M&R.

Discussion

After a de novo review of the Defendants' motion to dismiss and
their objections to the M&R, the Court concludes that the M&R is
correct in finding that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. While the ultimate
truth of the Plaintiff's allegations will be determined through
discovery and further proceedings, the Plaintiffs have alleged that
Plan participants paid excessive record keeping and account
management fees (albeit with a quite modest level of specificity as
noted by the Defendants) and failed to adequately monitor the
expenses charged to Plan participants, District Judge Kenneth D.
Bell opines. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled at this
earliest stage of the case to an opportunity to pursue their
claims.

The Defendants' objections that the Plaintiffs' claims are
"meritless" and fail to adequately establish that Duke did not act
in the best interests of Plan participants are, in primary effect,
arguments on the merits rather than grounds as a matter of law to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint with prejudice, Judge
Bell notes. Again, the full merits of the Plaintiffs' claims are
yet to be determined, but in light of the Supreme Court's recent
unanimous decision in Hughes v. Northwestern University overruling
the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a similar claim as well as
this Court's allowing similar claims to proceed past a motion to
dismiss in part in reliance on the M&R at issue here, see Jones v.
Coca-Cola Consol., Inc., No. 320CV00654FDWDSC, 2021 WL 1226551, at
*4 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2021), the Defendants' objections cannot be
accepted as consistent with the governing law.

Accordingly, the Court will accept the recommendation in the M&R
and deny the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Order

Therefore, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint
is denied.

Pursuant to Local Rule 16.1, the Parties are required to conduct an
Initial Attorney's Conference within 14 days of the Order and file
a Certificate of Initial Attorneys' Conference within seven days of
the conference.

The case will thereafter proceed towards a resolution of the merits
of the Plaintiffs' claims in the absence of a voluntary resolution
of the dispute among the parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2w7xyk4v from Leagle.com.


ECHO GLOBAL: Cienega Class Suit Transferred to N.D. Illinois
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California transferred the case, Aris Cienega,
et al., Plaintiffs v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 2:21-cv-00533-KJM-JDP (E.D. Cal.), to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois.

I. Background

The Plaintiffs bring the class action alleging violations of
California, Illinois and federal overtime law.

Echo Global Logistics employed Aris Cienega and Zakeia Hampton as
sales representatives. Cienega is a resident of Sacramento County
and worked in Echo's Sacramento Office for two years. Hampton is a
resident of Clark County, Nevada and worked in the Chicago office
for about five months. Cienega and Hampton allege they
"consistently worked more than 8 hours per day and more than 40
hours per workweek without receiving overtime compensation for all
the hours they worked." They claim Echo had a policy of "depriving
the Plaintiffs of their earned overtime wages." They bring the
action alleging Echo violated federal, California and Illinois law
and "seek to recover unpaid overtime compensation and other damages
for themselves and similarly situated co-workers." They identify
three classes and collectives:

     1. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Action
claims, brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b), on behalf of those who worked for Echo as an
exempt-classified Sales Representative nationwide since Dec. 11,
2016.

     2. California Class Allegations, brought on behalf of all
exempt-classified Sales Representatives who are or have been
employed by Echo in the State of California at any time since Dec.
11, 2015.

     3. Illinois Class Allegations, brought on behalf of all
exempt-classified Sales Representatives who are or have been
employed by Echo in the State of Illinois at any time since Dec.
11, 2015.

Echo is incorporated in Delaware and has its headquarters in
Illinois. It has more than 30 offices throughout the country,
including three in California, one of which is in this district.
Since 2005, Echo's human resources department has been based in its
Chicago office. According to its Chief Human Resources Officer,
"decisions and discussions about company-wide employment practices
and policies are all made by employees" in Chicago. The company's
payroll department, its compensation and timekeeping records, and
the employees who manage those files are all in Chicago, as are the
employees who run the company's information technology department.
Based on Echo's records, about 1,300 of the employees who might
fall within the collective or classes identified above worked in
Illinois, and about 200 worked in California.

The operative complaint asserts nine claims: 1) failure to pay
overtime in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 201; 2)
failure to pay overtime in violation of California law, Cal. Lab.
Code Sections 510, 1194, 1198; 3) failure to provide wage
statements in violation of California law, id. Section 226; 4)
failure to pay all wages upon termination in violation of
California law, id. Sections 201, 202 & 203; 5) failure to timely
pay wages in violation of California law, id. Sections 204, 210; 6)
failure to indemnify and reimburse business expenses in violation
of California law, id. Sections 2802; 7) unfair competition in
violation of California law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200,
et seq.; 8) failure to pay overtime in violation of Illinois law,
820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1, et seq.; and 9) violation of the
California Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab. Code Section
2698.

Echo now moves to transfer the action to the Northern District of
Illinois or, in the alternative, to dismiss or strike certain
claims. The matter is fully briefed. Judge Mueller held a hearing
on the motions.

Mr. Cienega filed a declaration in support of the Plaintiffs'
opposition. In the declaration, he identifies his former
supervisors and avers they knew of his job duties; he writes he
"believes that all of his managers observed him performing work
outside of his scheduled shifts." He "believes this because his
managers instructed him" to not record his overtime hours. Echo
objects to this declaration based on lack of personal knowledge,
relevance and vagueness.

Judge Mueller finds that Cienega's statements are neither
speculative nor vague, and the Court has not relied on any of his
averments about events or facts for which he has no personal
knowledge. Nor has the Court relied on irrelevant statements in
resolving the motion. The objections are overruled.

II. Analysis

The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the matter could have been
brought in the Northern District of Illinois because Echo is
subject to that the Court's general personal jurisdiction.

Judge Mueller is persuaded a transfer would satisfy the statutory
recognition of the "interest of justice," for the following three
reasons. First, Echo has shown a transfer to Illinois would avoid
inconvenience to non-party witnesses. Second, a transfer to
Illinois would likely lead to a speedier resolution by avoiding
threshold jurisdictional litigation and ensuring all of the
relevant claims are litigated together in one action. Third, the
parties' contacts with Illinois are more significant than their
contacts with this District. Therefore, Judge Mueller will transfer
the matter as the Defendants request.

III. Conclusion

Judge Mueller granted the motion to transfer. She transferred the
action to the U.S. Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The
Clerk of Court is directed to transfer the matter and then close
the case. The Order resolves ECF No. 22.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mvuepssp from Leagle.com.


ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Second Amended Phase I Sched Order Entered
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NORMA LINDE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. ENVISION
HEALTHCARE CORP., et al., Case No. 20-cv-2661-HLT-TJJ (D. Kan.),
the Hon. Judge Teresa J. James entered a second amended phase I
scheduling  order as follows:

              Event                Current         Amended
                                   Deadline        Deadline

-- Conditional and Class       Feb. 14, 2022     March 16, 2021
   Certification Motion

-- Response to Motion for      March 16, 2022    April 15, 2022
   Conditional and Class
   Certification

-- Reply in Support of         April 6, 2022     May 6, 2022
   Conditional and Class
   Certification

-- Mediation Notice or         Feb. 14, 2022     March 16, 2022
   Confidential Settlement
   Reports

-- Mediation Complete          April 29, 2022    May 30, 2022

Envision is an American healthcare company and national
hospital-based physician group.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at  https://bit.ly/3rQwOzT at no extra charge.[CC]

EVOLUTION WELL: Copley's Bid for Conditional Cert. Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania grants in part and denies in part
the motion for conditional certification filed in the lawsuit
entitled RYAN COPLEY, PAT MCGEENEY, JOE TILLEY, Plaintiffs v.
EVOLUTION WELL SERVICES OPERATING, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-CV-1442-CCW (W.D. Pa.).

Before the Court is a Motion for Conditional Certification under 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b) filed by Plaintiffs Ryan Copley, Pat
McGeeney, Joe Tilley, and Opt-In Plaintiff Brian Hanes
(collectively, "Employees").

Background

Plaintiffs Mr. Copley, Mr. McGeeney, and Mr. Tilley filed their
operative Second Amended Complaint on Feb. 24, 2021, naming
Evolution Well Services, LLC, and Evolution Well Services
Operating, LLC, as Defendants. The Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
Evolution Well Services, LLC, without prejudice, on April 13, 2021.
The remaining Defendant, Evolution Well Services Operating, LLC
("EWSO"), then moved to dismiss. The Court granted in part and
denied in part EWSO's motion. EWSO filed an Answer, and the case
then proceeded into discovery. While EWSO's motion to dismiss was
pending, Mr. Hanes joined this action as an opt-in plaintiff.

On Oct. 29, 2021, the Court set a briefing schedule for Employees'
Motion for Conditional Certification. In accordance with that
schedule, the Employees filed their Motion, brief, and supporting
exhibits. The Employees seek conditional certification of a
putative collective under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) defined as
follows:

     All current and former rotational non-exempt employees who
     were employed by Defendant on or after August 25, 2017 and
     who elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to the FLSA, 29
     U.S.C. Section 216(b) (the FLSA Collective).

EWSO has filed its opposition to the Employees' Motion, and, with
the Court's permission, the Employees filed a reply.

The Employees are former non-overtime exempt hourly workers
employed by EWSO. During their employment, the Employees worked
14-day "hitches" at remote worksites during which EWSO required
Employees to reside at EWSO-controlled housing. The Employees
worked one 12-hour shift each day of a hitch, not including time
spent (1) in meetings and performing other tasks prior to departing
for the worksite each day and (2) commuting from EWSO housing to
the worksite (and back), during which Employees allegedly engaged
in work-related activities.

According to the Employees, the commute took an average of three
hours, roundtrip (i.e. 1.5 hours each way). The Employees allege
that EWSO failed to compensate them as required under the FLSA for
certain categories of time spent traveling and performing
work-related tasks. The following categories of allegedly unpaid
wages under the FLSA survived EWSO's motion to dismiss and are
relevant here: (1) "time spent traveling to the remote work
location at the beginning and end of a hitch"; (2) "regular 15-20
minute meetings at the employer-controlled housing during which
time calls and/or discussions with supervisors, temperature checks,
and, occasionally, random drug testing were conducted"; and (3)
"travel to and from the job site each day, during which time
work-related activities were routinely performed."

Analysis

As noted, the Employees seek conditional certification under 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b) of a collective action regarding the
allegedly unlawful policies or practices of EWSO.

EWSO concedes that the Employees have made a modest factual showing
as to their claim for unpaid travel time between March 5, 2020, and
Jan. 1, 2021, to and from company housing to the job site, but
maintains that the (1) Employees' proposed collective is too
broadly defined and (2) Employees have not otherwise met their
burden to show any unlawful policy or practice regarding
non-payment of wages for either (a) preliminary and postliminary
activities allegedly performed at the company housing or during the
drive to the pad outside of the March 5, 2020, through Jan. 1, 2021
timeframe, or (b) for travel from home to company-controlled
housing.

A. Employees Have Made the Requisite Modest Factual Showing

At the conditional certification stage, courts do not consider the
merits of the claim(s), decide credibility issues or resolve
factual disputes, citing Bonds v. GMS Mine Repair & Maint., Inc.,
No. 2:13-CV-1217, 2014 WL 2957394, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 1, 2014)
(McVerry, J.).

The Court concludes that the Employees have met their burden to
make a modest factual showing with regard to their claims for
unpaid travel away from home and for daily pre- and post-liminary
activities. As to their claim for unpaid time spent traveling from
home to EWSO-controlled housing, the Employees' declarations state
that "hitch employees" would arrive at the EWSO-controlled housing
the day before the start of a hitch, that the Employees provided
their own transportation to the EWSO-controlled housing, and that,
per EWSO policy, such travel time was not compensated.

Similarly, Employees' declarations state that EWSO required them to
meet in the lobby of the EWSO-controlled housing each day before
departing to the work site; during these meetings the Employees
would participate in work-related meetings and undergo occasional
drug testing and regular COVID screenings; that this pre-departure
process could last anywhere from 10 to 30 minutes; and that EWSO
did not compensate them for that time.

Against this showing, EWSO offers arguments that attempt to either
contest the sufficiency of the Employees' factual showing or strike
at the merits of the Employees' claims. None of these arguments are
persuasive, Judge Wiegand holds. EWSO contends the Employees'
Motion should fail as to their claim for travel from their homes to
EWSO-controlled housing because the Employees' declarations do not
specify the time of day they typically made these trips. EWSO
claims this is a fatal deficiency because, under the applicable
regulation, to be compensable, work-related travel that keeps an
employee away from home overnight must "cut across the employee's
workday."

However, Judge Wiegand notes, the declarations state that Employees
would arrive on the "day" before the start of a hitch, and,
furthermore, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that the
Employees worked 12-hour "day" (i.e. 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.) or
"night" (i.e. 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) shifts that varied by hitch
"or by another period of time determined by" EWSO. On the present
record, therefore, it is not "patently clear" that the Employees'
travel did not "cut across" their workday.

Judge Wiegand also notes, among other things, that it may be the
case that EWSO is correct and the Employees' time spent traveling
from their homes to the EWSO-controlled housing is not compensable
under the FLSA. But, at this juncture, it is not "patently clear"
that the Employees cannot prevail as a matter of law.

Thus, while it remains to be seen whether the Employees will be
able to satisfy the more exacting "similarly situated" showing they
must make at the final certification/decertification stage, for the
purposes of the present Motion, the Employees have met their
burden, Judge Wiegand holds.

Accordingly, because the Employees have made the requisite "modest
showing" for the three types of allegedly unpaid time at issue, the
Court will grant conditional certification and authorize
dissemination of notice to the putative members of the collective.

B. Employees' Proposed Collective is Overly Broad

EWSO advances two arguments in support of its position that the
Employees' proposed collective is overly broad in scope. First,
EWSO argues that only some categories of rotational non-exempt
employees were subject to the alleged travel policy. Second, EWSO
contends that, assuming a willful violation by EWSO, the proposed
collective should be limited to the period December 2018-present,
not August 2017-present as proposed by the Employees, because the
statute of limitations under the FLSA for a potential opt-in
plaintiff's claims continues to run until said opt-in plaintiff
files his or her consent to join the action.

As to the first reason to limit the scope of the proposed
collective, the Employees represent in their supporting brief that
the Defendant's counsel indicated to the Plaintiffs' counsel that
supervisory employees may have been compensated for their time
spent traveling but has not provided evidence to support such
assertions. If discovery reveals that this assertion is true, the
Plaintiffs will revise their collective definition at the second
step of the FLSA certification process.

Thus, Judge Wiegand holds, the declaration provided by EWSO's
Director of Human Resources supports the proposition that some
employees were compensated for the time they spent traveling
between EWSO-controlled housing and the worksite, the Travel Policy
itself appears to acknowledge that some employees would be
compensated for commuting time, and the Employees contemplate
potentially amending their proposed collective definition if
presented with appropriate proof.

That said, because discovery is ongoing and because it is not clear
from the face of the policy exactly which employees were or were
not compensated for commuting time, the Court will not exclude any
categories of rational non-exempt employees from the proposed
collective at this time. However, the parties may, as appropriate,
amend the collective definition when submitting their proposed
forms of notice.

As to EWSO's statute of limitations argument, the Court agrees with
EWSO that the period of time proposed by Employees for the
collective is overly broad. Because the maximum look-back period
under the FLSA is three years, the Court will limit the proposed
collective to the period Feb. 1, 2019, to present.

C. Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs

For purposes of providing notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs,
the Employees request that the Court order EWSO to produce "a list,
in electronic and importable format, of all members of the putative
collective class, including their name, job title, address, email
address, mobile telephone number, dates of employment, date of
birth, and last four digits of their Social Security number." EWSO,
by contrast, requests that the parties be ordered to meet and
confer to attempt to reach an agreement "with respect to the
appropriate scope of the employee information Plaintiffs seek and
the proper means to communicate Notice and Consent Forms." Both
parties request an opportunity to meet and confer regarding a
proposed form of notice to be distributed.

Recently, in reviewing a similar disagreement about the categories
of information to be produced by the employer and the means
authorized for the distribution of the collective action notice,
the Court found that it is appropriate in the modern digital age to
distribute notice by mail, email, and text, because although people
frequently move and change addresses, they typically retain the
same email addresses and phone numbers, but also decided production
of social security numbers was unnecessary because the plaintiff's
request already seeks a number of pieces of personal identifying
information for each potential opt-in, which should be sufficient
for her counsel to appropriately direct notice.

The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion. As such,
EWSO will be ordered to produce, within 10 days, the information
requested by the Employees, with the exception of social security
numbers. Furthermore, the Court will authorize the distribution of
notice by mail, e-mail, and text message.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Employees' Motion for Conditional
Certification under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) is granted in part and
denied in part.

A proposed collective consisting of "All current and former
rotational non-exempt employees who were employed by Defendant on
or after February 1, 2019 and who elect to opt-in to this action
pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b)" is conditionally
certified.

The parties will meet and confer regarding a proposed form of
notice. The parties will submit either an agreed-upon form of
notice or individual proposed forms of notice to the Court.

Within 10 days of the Court's approval of the form of notice, EWSO
will produce, a list, in electronic and importable format, of all
members of the putative collective class, including their name, job
title, address, email address, mobile telephone number, dates of
employment, and date of birth.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
Jan. 31, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc5x8hum from
Leagle.com.


FEDEX GROUND: Filing of Rule 23 Motion Extended to July 15
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JANE DOE and RUTH ZERON,
on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated employees and a
class of employees, v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC. and ALLIED
FACILITY CARE, LLC, Case No. 3:21-cv-00395 (M.D. Tenn.), the Hon.
District Judge  Aleta A. Trauger entered an order granting
extension of deadline for Plaintiffs to file their Rule 23 Motion
to July 15, 2022.

The Plaintiffs and the Opt-in Plaintiffs and Defendant Allied
inform the Court that they have resolved through an arm's-length
settlement all the claims that the Plaintiffs brought against
Allied in this litigation. Considering their settlement of all
claims, the Plaintiffs will not file a motion for conditional
certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, and Allied will not answer Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC").

The Plaintiffs and Allied have executed all the settlement
documents, but Plaintiffs have not yet received the settlement
consideration from Allied. The Plaintiffs will move to dismiss
Allied from litigation and will seek to amend the SAC accordingly
once they receive the settlement monies from Allied. The Plaintiffs
and Allied appreciate the Court's patience while they finalized
their agreement and executed the settlement documents, and
Plaintiffs anticipate moving to dismiss all claims against Allied
by February 18, 2022.

Fedex Ground provides package delivery services. Allied Facility is
a commercial cleaning company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LkwkJX at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Charles P. Yezbak, III, Esq.
          N. Chase Teeples, Esq.
          YEZBAK LAW OFFICES PLLC
          2021 Richard Jones Road, Suite 310A
          Nashville, TN 37215
          Telephone: (615) 250-2000
          Facsimile: (615) 250-2020
          E-mail: yezbak@yezbaklaw.com
                  teeples@yezbaklaw.com

The Attorneys for FedEx Ground, are:

          Charles K. Grant, Esq.
          Sharonda Fancher, Esq.
          1600 West End Avenue, Suite 2000
          Nashville, TN 37203
          E-mail: cgrant@bakerdonelson.com
                  sfancher@bakerdonelson.com

The Attorneys for Allied, are:

          Zachary S. Cate, Esq.
          BROWN PRUITT WAMBSGANSS
          DEAN FORMAN & MOORE, P.C.
          600 N. Carroll Ave. Ste. 100
          Southlake, TX 76092
          E-mail: zcate@brownpruitt.com

               - and -

          Wendy L. Longmire, Esq.
          ORTALE KELLEY LAW FIRM
          330 Commerce Street, Suite 110
          Nashville, TN 37201
          E-mail: wlongmire@ortalekelley.com


FERRO CORP: Fails to Pay All Hours Worked, Lewis Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
ROBIN LEWIS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. FERRO CORPORATION, Case No. 1:22-cv-00253-JG (N.D. Ohio, Feb.
15, 2022) alleges that Ferro does not pay its non-exempt employees,
including Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, for all
hours worked, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

The Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing/production
employees frequently worked over 40 hours per week. They worked on
average over 40 hours each week but only paid for work performed
between their scheduled start and stop times, and were not paid for
the following work performed before and after their scheduled start
and stop times: a) changing into and out of their personal
protective equipment, including, but not limited to, pants, shirt,
jacket, helmet/hard hat, gloves, boots, safety glasses, earplugs,
respirator, and/or hazmat suit; b) getting work instructions and/or
assignments; c) walking to and from their assigned area of the
manufacturing/production floor; d) performing their
production/manufacturing work; and/or e) showering after their
shifts, the Plaintiff says.

The Defendant employed Plaintiff between November and December 2021
as production employee at its Cleveland, Ohio
manufacturing/production facility.

The Defendant is a producer of technology-based performance
materials for manufacturers, focusing on four core segments:
performance colors and glass; pigments, powders, and oxides;
porcelain enamel; and tile coatings systems. In the United States
Defendant operates manufacturing/production facilities in Ohio,
Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Heritage Bldg., Suite 250
          34555 Chagrin Boulevard
          Moreland Hills, OH 44022
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com

FUJI HANA: Bid to Certify FLSA Collective Action Withdrawn
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Lin, et al., v. Fuji Hana
Restaurant, Corp., et al., Case No. 1:2021cv03832 (E.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge James R. Cho entered an order granting Letter
Plaintiffs' withdrawal of the motion for conditional collective
class certification.

Motion to Certify Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Action
is hereby withdrawn, Judge Cho says.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Fuji Hana offers sushi and other Japanese favorites.[CC]

GEISINGER HEALTH: Case Management Order Entered in Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit re: Geisinger Health and Evangelical
Community Hospital Healthcare Workers Antitrust Litigation, Case
No. 4:21-cv-00196-MWB (M.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge Matthew W. Brann
entered a case management order as follows:

  -- Substantial Completion of Production       April 6, 2022
     of Structured Data in Response to
     Requests for Production served on or
     before Dec. 1, 2021:

  -- Deadline to Begin Rolling Production       May 2, 2022
     of Documents in Response to Requests
     for Production served on or before
     Dec. 2, 2021:

  -- Substantial Completion of Document         July 8, 2022
     Production in Response to Requests
     for Production served on or before
     Dec. 2, 2021:

  -- Deadline for Completion of Non-Expert:     April 7, 2023

  -- Depositions Close of Fact Discovery:       June 9, 2023

  -- Expert reports:                            June 30, 2023

  -- Opposing expert reports:                   Aug. 11, 2023

  -- Rebuttal expert reports:                   Sept. 25, 2023

  -- Expert Witness Depositions:                Oct. 23, 2023

  -- Motions for Class Certification/           Nov. 20, 2023
     Daubert Motions and supporting
     briefs:

  -- Oppositions to Motions for Class           Jan. 8, 2024
     Certification/Daubert Motions:

  -- Replies in Support of Daubert Motions:     Jan. 29, 2024

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/33c5diO at no extra charge.[CC]


GENERAL DYNAMICS: Class & Subclass Certified in Piron Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MOLLIE PIRON, et al., v.
GENERAL DYNAMICS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC., Case No.
3:19-cv-00709-REP (E.D. Va.), the Hon. Judge Robert E. Payne
entered an order:

   1. certifying the following Class and Subclass pursuant to
      Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

      "The GDIT employees who worked on its OPM contract and
      were terminated between July and December 2019 and
      have not filed a timely request to opt-out of the class;"
      and

      -- Case Management Travel Subclass:

         "The GDIT employees who worked on its OPM contract as
         Background Investigator, Project/Task Supervisor or
         similarly situated positions and were terminated
         between July and December 2019 and have not filed a
         timely request to opt-out of the class;"

   2. appointing the Plaintiffs Mollie Piron, Stephanie Merino,
      Bounsou Thamvanthongkham, and Christina Beecroft as the
      Class Representatives;

   3. appointing the law firm Raisner Roupinian LLP as counsel
      for the Class; and

   4. approving the proposed form of Notice to the Class.

General Dynamics is a global aerospace and defense company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gFRq7e at no extra charge.[CC]

GLENS FALLS: Richard Seeks Initial Approval of Class Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAPHNE RICHARD v. GLENS
FALLS NATIONAL BANK, Case No. 1:20-cv-00734-BKS-DJS (N.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

  1. preliminarily approving the Settlement;

  2. approving the proposed plan of notice to the Class;

  3. appointing the lower bidder of the two claims
     administrators to administer the program outlined in this
     motion; and

  4. setting a schedule of dates for further action on this
     Settlement Agreement, including a hearing pursuant to Rule
     23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine
     whether the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
     adequate and should be finally approved, together with
     such other and further relief as the Court may deem just
     and proper.

  -- Settlement Agreement And Release

     A. On July 1, 2020, Plaintiff Daphne Richard filed a
        putative class action complaint. Ms. Richard alleged
        claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied
        covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust
        enrichment/restitution, money had and received, and
        violations of the New York General Business Law Section
        349.

        On March 3, 2021, the Court granted Glens Falls' Motion
        to Dismiss with respect to Named Plaintiff's claims for
        breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
        dealing, unjust enrichment/restitution, and money had
        and received. She filed an Amended Complaint on March
        17, 2021.

     B. On or about February 4, 2022, the parties agreed that
        the Plaintiff will file, contemporaneously with the
        motion for preliminary approval of the class-action
        settlement, a consent motion for leave to amend the
        Amended Complaint to include Arrow Financial and
        Saratoga as additional defendants.

  -- Waivers and Account Disclosures

     As a result of this lawsuit, Defendants agree to waive the
     right to collect any Uncollected Overdraft Fees that were
     assessed to any Class Member from July 1, 2014 to July 1,
     2021. The Defendants further agree to waive all Multiple
     NSF Fees for all customers for a period of three years
     following the date of the entry of the Final Approval
     Order, which is estimated at approximately $100,000 per
     year. The Defendants further agree to distribute the
     Account Agreement to all Glens Falls and Saratoga customers
     on or before March 1, 2022.

  -- Class Action Settlement

     The Plaintiff shall propose and recommend to the Court that
     settlement classes be certified, which classes shall be
     comprised of the Class Members. Defendants agree solely for
     purposes of the settlement provided for in this Agreement,
     and the implementation of such settlement, that this case
     shall proceed as a class action; provided, however, that if
     a Final Approval Order is not issued, then Defendants shall
     retain all rights to object to maintaining this case as a
     class action.

  -- Preliminary Settlement Approval

     Class Counsel shall use reasonable efforts to file a motion
     seeking a Preliminary Approval/Notice Order by February 7,
     2022.

  -- The Settlement Fund and Distribution

     The Payments shall be made from the Settlement Fund as
     follows:

     Plaintiffs' Fees and Costs: The Plaintiffs' reasonable
     attorneys' fees and costs, as determined and approved by
     the Court, shall be paid from the Settlement Fund 10
     days after entry of the Final Approval Order. Class Counsel
     shall apply for an award of attorneys' fees of one-third
     (33-1/3%) of the Value of the Settlement, plus
     reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs, to be
     approved by the court.

     Service Award: The Plaintiff may apply to the Court for a
     service award of up to 15,000 for serving as class
     representative. Subject to the Court's approval, the
     service award shall be paid from the Settlement Fund 10
     days after the Effective Date.

     Claims Administrator's Fees: The Claims Administrator's
     fees and costs, including estimated fees and costs to fully
     implement the terms of this Agreement, as approved by the
     Court, shall be paid within (0) days after the
     Effective Date.

     Payments to Class Members. Of the $1,475,000 Settlement
     Fund, $1,015,000 (68.8%) is allocated to the "Sufficient
     Funds Class;" and $460,000 (31.2%) is allocated to the
     "Multiple NSF Fees on a Single Item Class"; on this
     allocation, payments from the "Net Settlement Fund" shall
     be calculated as follows:

  -- General Release: Except as to the rights and obligations
     provided for under the terms of this Agreement, Named
     Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and each of the Class
     Members, hereby releases and forever discharges
     Defendants, and all of their past, present and future
     predecessors, successors, parents, subsidiaries,
     divisions, employees, affiliates, assigns, officers,
     directors, shareholders, representatives, attorneys,
     insurers and agents (collectively, the "Defendant
     Releasees") from any and all losses, fees, charges,
     complaints, claims, debts, liabilities, demands,
     obligations, costs, expenses, actions, and causes of
     action of every nature, character, and description,
     whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted,
     suspected or unsuspected, fixed or contingent, which Named
     Plaintiff and Class members who do not opt out now have,
     own or hold against any of the Defendant Releasees that
     are alleged in the Amended Complaint and Second Amended
     Complaint.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34OyXmm at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Taras Kick, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
          815 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Telephone: (310) 395-2988
          Facsimile: (310) 395-2088
          E-mail: taras@kicklawfirm.com

               - and -

          John C. Cherundolo, Esq.
          J. Patrick Lannon, Esq.
          CHERUNDOLO LAW FIRM, PLLC
          AXA Tower I, 15th Floor
          100 Madison Street
          Syracuse, NY 13202
          Telephone: (315) 449-9500
          Facsimile: (315) 449-9804
          E-mail: jcherundolo@cherundololawfirm.com
                  plannon@cherundololawfirm.com

               - and -

          Kevin P. Roddy, Esq.
          WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER, P.A.
          90 Woodbridge Center Drive, Suite 900
          Woodbridge, NJ 07095
          Telephone: (732) 636-8000
          Facsimile: (732) 726-6686
          E-mail: kroddy@wilentz.com

HILLCREST HEALTHCARE: Walton Suit Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DELANDRIA WALTON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. HILLCREST HEALTHCARE COMMUNITIES, INC., Case
No. 3:22-cv-62 (E.D. Tenn., Feb. 16, 2022) is class action lawsuit
brought by the Plaintiff and on behalf of all current and former
non-exempt hourly employees who worked for Hillcrest Healthcare,
and were paid shift differentials, at any time from three years
preceding the filing of the Original Complaint through the final
disposition of this matter, seeking all available relief, including
compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs,
pursuant the Fair Labor Standards Act.

This lawsuit includes a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29
U.S.C. sections 201–19 to recover overtime wages, attorneys'
fees, and other applicable penalties.

The Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members routinely work (and
worked) in excess of 40 hours per workweek. They were not paid
overtime of at least one and one-half their regular rates for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, the lawsuit says.

The decision by Defendant not to pay overtime compensation to
Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members at the correct rate was
neither reasonable nor in good faith. The Defendant knowingly and
deliberately failed to compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class
Members overtime of at least one and one-half their regular rates
for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, the
lawsuit adds.

Hillcrest Healthcare offers a comprehensive portfolio of services
and therapies, including skilled nursing, rehabilitation, and
long-term care. Hillcrest operates four facilities for the
residential care of elderly and/or disabled individuals, and also
offers "non-medical, personal care services for seniors in the
greater Knoxville area and surrounding counties."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bryce W. McKenzie, Esq.
          DELIUS & MCKENZIE, PLLC
          124 Court Avenue
          Sevierville, TN 37862
          Telephone: (865) 428-8780
          Facsimile: (865) 428-5254
          E-mail: bryce@deliusmckenzie.com

               - and -

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com

INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE: Appeal on Antitrust Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (ICE) disclosed in its Form 10-K
Annual Report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022,
that on November 29, 2021, the Second Circuit heard the oral
argument on the merits of the plaintiff's underlying appeal of the
court's March 26, 2020 decision and order granting the ICE and the
motions of its 18 multinational banks and various of their
respective subsidiaries and affiliates to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. Parties are still awaiting a decision.

In 2019, three virtually identical purported class action
complaints were filed in the Southern District against ICE and
several of its subsidiaries, including ICE Benchmark Administration
Limited, or IBA, as well as 18 multinational banks and various of
their respective subsidiaries and affiliates, by, respectively,
Putnam Bank, a savings bank based in Putnam, Connecticut; two
municipal pension funds affiliated with the City of Livonia,
Michigan; and four retirement and benefit funds affiliated with the
Hawaii Sheet Metal Workers Union. IBA is the administrator for
various regulated benchmarks, including the ICE London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR) benchmark that is calculated daily based upon
the submissions from a reference panel.

The plaintiffs sought to litigate on behalf of a purported class of
all US-based persons or entities who transacted with ICE's 18
multinational banks and various of their respective subsidiaries
and affiliates by receiving a payment on an interest rate indexed
to a one-month or three-month USD LIBOR-rate benchmarked during the
period from February 1, 2014 to the present. The plaintiffs alleged
that the ICE and its affiliates engaged in a conspiracy to set the
LIBOR benchmark at artificially low levels, with an alleged purpose
and effect of depressing payments by ICE's affiliates to members of
the purported class.

Subsequent to the filing of the individual complaints, the various
plaintiffs referenced above filed a consolidated amended complaint
against the ICE and its affiliates. As with the individual
complaints, the consolidated amended complaint asserted a claim for
violations of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts and sought
unspecified treble damages and other relief. The ICE and its
affiliates filed motions to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint.

Among other things, the court found that the amended complaint
"…is made up of almost entirely conclusory allegations and is
essentially devoid of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, to
support the conclusion that Defendants colluded with one another."

The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Second Circuit. While
briefing of the appeal was ongoing, each of the named plaintiffs
withdrew from the case. DYJ Holdings, LLC, a New Jersey-based
holding company, was permitted, over the objection of the
defendants, to intervene for the purpose of serving as named
plaintiff and representative of the purported class.

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. provides market infrastructure,
data services and technology solutions to a broad range of
customers including financial institutions, corporations and
government entities based in Georgia.


INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE: Plaintiffs Await Ruling on Class Status
------------------------------------------------------------------
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. disclosed in its Annual Report on
Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that
the motion for class certification and motions for summary judgment
on the basis of preclusion and lack of standing are still awaiting
decisions from the court.

Plaintiffs in said class action filed a motion for class
certification while the defendants, including two of the company's
subsidiaries, filed said motions for summary judgment.

In 2014, New York Stock Exchange LLC and NYSE Arca, Inc., two of
the company's subsidiaries, were among more than 40 financial
institutions and US-based equity exchanges named as defendants in
four purported class action lawsuits filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, or the Southern
District, by the City of Providence, Rhode Island, and other
plaintiffs. In a subsequent consolidated amended complaint filed
against only the exchange defendants (which include exchanges owned
and operated by Nasdaq and CBOE), the plaintiffs asserted claims on
behalf of a class of "all public investors" who bought or sold
stock from April 18, 2009 to the present on the named exchanges.

In 2015, the district court granted a motion to dismiss filed by
the exchange defendants and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently state
a claim under Sections 10(b) and 6(b) of the Exchange Act, and
additionally that some of the claims were barred by the doctrine of
self-regulatory organization immunity.

The plaintiffs appealed, and in 2017 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, or the Second Circuit, issued a decision
vacating the dismissal and remanding the case to the district court
for further proceedings. The Second Circuit held that the claims
against the exchanges were not barred by the doctrine of
self-regulatory organization immunity because (in the view of the
Second Circuit) the exchanges were not carrying out regulatory
functions while operating their markets and engaging in the
challenged conduct at issue, and that the plaintiffs had adequately
pleaded claims against the defendants under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. The Second Circuit directed that, on remand, the
district court should address and rule upon various other defenses
raised by the exchanges in their motion to dismiss (which the
district court did not address in its prior opinion and order).

In 2019, the district court denied a new motion to dismiss filed by
the defendants, and the exchanges filed answers to the complaint,
denying the principal allegations of the plaintiffs, denying
liability in the matter, and asserting various affirmative
defenses.

During 2021, the parties conducted discovery, relating largely to
class certification issues.

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. provides market infrastructure,
data services and technology solutions to a broad range of
customers including financial institutions, corporations and
government entities based in Georgia.


IRON HORSE: Fisher Sues Over Unpaid OT for Plumbing Technicians
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN FISHER, III, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. IRON HORSE MECHANICAL & PLUMBING
SERVICES, LLC (a/k/a Iron Horse Plumbing), Defendant, Case No.
4:22-cv-00111-P (N.D. Tex., February 14, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and similarly situated
plumbing technicians overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of
40 hours in a workweek.

Mr. Fisher was employed by the Defendant as a plumbing technician
from December 15, 2015 until January 3, 2022.

Iron Horse Mechanical & Plumbing Services, LLC is a provider of
mechanical and plumbing services, with its principal place of
business located at 403 East Washington Street, Stephenville,
Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Allen R. Vaught, Esq.
         VAUGHT FIRM, LLC
         1910 Pacific Ave., Suite 9150
         Dallas, TX 75201
         Telephone: (972) 707-7816
         Facsimile: (972) 591-4564
         E-mail: avaught@txlaborlaw.com

JENKINS MEMORIAL: Massey Seeks Proper OT Pay for Waiver Workers
---------------------------------------------------------------
KIM MASSEY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. THE JENKINS MEMORIAL CHILDREN'S CENTER AND JENKINS
INDUSTRIES, INC., Case No. 4:22-cv-00148-KGB (E.D. Ark., Feb. 15,
2022) seeks a declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated
damages, prejudgment interest, and a reasonable attorney's fee and
costs as a result of Defendant's failure to pay proper overtime
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas
Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, it was the Defendant's commonly applied
practice not to pay Plaintiff and other Waiver Workers for all the
hours during which they performed work for Defendant. The Defendant
used Paylocity as a means for Plaintiff and other Waiver Workers to
clock in and out. The Plaintiff clocked in at the beginning of her
shift and clocked out at the end of her shift.

The Plaintiff contends that she regularly worked shifts
approximately 18 hours and stayed at Defendant's location
overnight. The Defendant automatically deducted the hours worked
between 12:00 AM and 6:00 AM from Plaintiff's and other Waiver
Workers' time. She and other Waiver Workers were regularly or
occasionally required to perform duties between the hours of 12:00
AM and 6:00 AM, despite not being paid for that time.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as an hourly paid Waiver
Worker from 2014 to the present. The Defendant directly hired
Waiver Workers and other employees to work on its behalf, paid them
wages and benefits, controlled their work schedules, duties,
protocols, applications, assignments and employment conditions, and
kept at least some records regarding their employment. As a Waiver
Worker, the Plaintiff performed duties on the Defendant's behalf
such as assisting adults with intellectual disabilities, says the
suit.

The Jenkins Memorial Children's Center and Jenkins Industries, Inc.
provides health care services. The Company offers medical
outpatient care facilities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Josh Sanford, Esq.
         Lydia Hamlet, Esq.
         SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
         Kirkpatrick Plaza
         10800 Financial Centre Parkway, Suite 510
         Little Rock, AR 72211
         Telephone: (501) 221-0088
         Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
         E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com
                 lydia@sanfordlawfirm.com

KANSAS CITY LIFE: Class Cert. Bid Partly Granted in Meek Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTOPHER Y. MEEK,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 19-00472-CV-W-BP (W.D.
Mo.), the Hon. Judge Beth Phillips entered an order granting in
part Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The Court certifies a class of:

   "All persons who own or owned a Better Life Plan, Better Life
   Plan Qualified, LifeTrack, AGP, MGP, PGP, Chapter One,
   Classic, Rightrack (89), Performer (88), Performer (91),
   Prime Performer, Competitor (88), Competitor (91), Executive
   (88), Executive (91), Protector 50, LewerMax, Ultra 20 (93),
   Competitor II, Executive II, Performer II, or Ultra 20 (96)
   life insurance policy issued or administered by Defendant, or
   its predecessors in interest, that was active on or after
   January 1, 2002, and purchased the life insurance policy
   while domiciled in Kansas."

   Excluded from the Class are: KC Life; any entity in which KC
   Life has a controlling interest; any of the officers,
   directors, employees, or sales agents of KC Life; the legal
   representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns of KC Life;
   anyone employed with Plaintiff's counsel's firms; and any
   Judge to whom this case is assigned, and his or her immediate
   family.

   This class is certified as to only Counts I–IV, which seek
   monetary damages; it is not certified as to Count V, which
   seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. Christopher Meek is
   appointed as class representative, and Stueve Siegel Hanson,
   LLP is appointed as class counsel.

   The Court recognizes that this case presents a variety of
   unsettled legal questions. Because the Court believes that
   this order resolves several "controlling question[s] of law";
   that there is "substantial ground for difference of opinion"
   on some of those questions, especially the choice-of-law and
   borrowing statute issues; and that an immediate appeal could
   "materially advance the ultimate termination of the
   litigation," the Court exercises its discretion to certify
   this order for an immediate interlocutory appeal under 28
   U.S.C. section 1292(b).

   The parties are directed to meet and confer to determine
   whether either party wishes to attempt to immediately appeal
   this order. If either party wishes to attempt to immediately
   appeal this order, the parties are invited to file a motion
   staying either the case or any upcoming deadlines.
   Accordingly, if both parties decide not to avail themselves
   of this option, the partiesshould meet and confer to propose
   a mechanism for giving notice and the opportunity to opt out
   to class members.

The Defendant Kansas City Life Insurance Company sells life
insurance policies.

The Plaintiff Christopher Meek purchased one of Defendant's
policies in 1984, and alleges that a large number of Defendant's
policies are materially identical to his. The policies at issue are
"universal life insurance" contracts, which combine features of a
standard life insurance policy and a savings account: the insured
pays premiums each month, and is able to collect interest on the
accumulated premiums, which the policies refer to as the "Cash
Value" or "Accumulated Value" of the insured's account.

Because different people use universal life insurance policies for
different purposes, the Defendant sells policies through
independent agents who engage in face-to-face discussions with
potential customers and help the potential customers decide which
product best fits their needs.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gEaFyb  at no extra
charge.[CC]



LAKESIDE COMMUNITY: Underpays Youth Workers, Guynes Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREA GUYNES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LAKESIDE COMMUNITY COMMITTEE, Defendant,
Case No. 1:22-cv-00784 (N.D. Ill., February 14, 2022) is a class
action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law by failing to
compensate the Plaintiff and similarly situated youth workers
overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a youth worker from
December of 2014 until December of 2021.

Lakeside Community Committee is a social services organization in
Chicago, Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Colby Qualls, Esq.
         Josh Sanford, Esq.
         SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
         Kirkpatrick Plaza
         10800 Financial Centre Pkwy., Suite 510
         Little Rock, AR 72211
         Telephone: (501) 221-0088
         Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
         E-mail: colby@sanfordlawfirm.com
                 josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

LIBERTY MUTUAL: W.D. Washington Grants Bid to Stay H Lodge Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Tacoma, grants the Plaintiff's motion to
stay in the lawsuit titled H LODGE LLC, Plaintiff v. LIBERTY MUTUAL
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. C21-5184 BHS (W.D.
Wash.).

I. Background

H Lodge operates a hotel and restaurant in Vancouver, Washington.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Jay Inslee issued several
emergency proclamations that mandated business closures across the
state. As a result, H Lodge was forced to suspend its business
operations. When permitted to reopen, H Lodge had to make changes
to its business practices and to its premises to accommodate new
regulations related to COVID-19.

H Lodge has an "all-risk" insurance policy from Defendant Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which covers risks of direct
physical loss or damage to covered property unless excluded. One
exclusion is the actual or suspected presence or threat of any
virus. Another exclusion is for acts or decisions of any
governmental employee, agent, group, organization, agency, or
body.

H Lodge filed a putative class action against Liberty Mutual in
March 2021, arguing that it, and similarly situated businesses,
suffered "direct physical loss and damage" and "business
interruption" losses under its insurance policy and that it is
entitled to coverage for those losses along with related extra
expenses. H Lodge also argues that Liberty Mutual breached their
contract. H Lodge seeks class certification, declaratory judgments
that they had suffered such losses, damages, pre- and post-judgment
interest, and attorney fees and costs.

In June 2021, Liberty Mutual moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that H Lodge had failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted because the insurance
policy provided no coverage for the stated claims. H Lodge argued
that its claims were covered under the insurance policy and that
none of the policy's exclusions applied.

In October 2021, the Ninth Circuit decided a similar case from
California, affirming the district court's decision that the
defendant businesses did not suffer "direct physical loss of or
damage to property" and that the loss of business income and extra
expense fell within the policy's virus exclusion (Mudpie, Inc. v.
Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 15 F.4th 885, 893-94 (9th Cir.
2021)). The Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing
addressing that case's impact on H Lodge's claims. Both parties
filed supplemental briefing in November, Liberty Mutual arguing
that Mudpie supported dismissal, and H Lodge arguing that Mudpie is
distinguishable because it applies California law and the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the policy was incorrect.

In January 2022, the Washington State Supreme Court agreed to hear
a direct appeal in Hill and Stout PLLC v. Mutual of Enumclaw
Insurance Co., addressing the interpretation of "direct physical
loss" and causation. H Lodge now moves to stay this case pending
the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Hill and Stout. Liberty
Mutual opposes a stay, arguing that the Court has sufficient
authority to rule on its motion to dismiss and that this is a
straightforward contract interpretation that does not require the
input of the Washington Supreme Court.

II. Discussion

H Lodge seeks a stay pending the Washington State Supreme Court's
decision in Hill and Stout, which it claims has "overlapping state
questions of law that are directly on point."

The issue in the case is largely the same, and both parties have
repeatedly acknowledged the relevance of Hill and Stout to H
Lodge's claims. Liberty Mutual asks the Court to rely on the
Superior Court's decision in Hill and Stout but in the same breath
argues that this Court need not wait for the Washington Supreme
Court to issue a decision in that case.

The Court recognizes that both state and federal courts across the
country have heard numerous cases involving the same or similar
questions posed here. No Washington state appellate court has yet
considered this issue. Without guidance from the Washington Supreme
Court, or even from the Washington Court of Appeals, this Court
would be left to predict how Washington appeals courts would rule.
As a result of the Washington Supreme Court's acceptance of Hill
and Stout, there is no need for this Court to make a prediction,
Judge Settle points out.

Liberty Mutual argues, among other things, that it would suffer a
hardship if the Court granted a stay and that H Lodge has not
established it would suffer a hardship if a stay was denied.
Liberty Mutual argues that the delay invariably caused by a stay
works a hardship on it, especially given that it filed this case in
March 2021, filed its motion to dismiss in June, and filed
supplemental briefing in November.

H Lodge argues that the parties will not suffer any damage if the
case is stayed and that they may suffer prejudice absent a stay
because of the potential for conflicting rulings.

The Court agrees with H Lodge. While a delay in proceedings
certainly imposes some hardship on both parties, the hardship that
could result from conflicting rulings would be far greater, Judge
Settle holds. The Court concludes that H Lodge has shown good cause
for a stay.

III. Order

Therefore, it is ordered that H Lodge's Motion to Stay is granted.
The Clerk is directed to remove Defendant Liberty Mutual's motion
to dismiss from consideration.

After the Washington Supreme Court has issued its decision, the
parties will meet and confer and submit a joint status report
recommending a renoting date for Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss
and dates for supplemental briefing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4jyy2d2d from Leagle.com.


LONGHORN PIZZA: Serrano Seeks Unpaid Wages, OT for Delivery Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA SERRANO, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, v. LONGHORN PIZZA, INC., RICHARD HAFNER, JOSEPH ROMANO,
and ROBERT BRENT HAMILL, individually, Case No. 3:22-cv-00373-C
(N.D. Tex., Feb. 15, 2022) seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages
and overtime hours under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants employ delivery drivers who use their own
automobiles to deliver pizza and other food items to their
customers. However, instead of reimbursing delivery drivers for the
reasonably approximate costs of the business use of their vehicles,
Defendants allegedly use a flawed method to determine reimbursement
rates that provides such an unreasonably low rate beneath any
reasonable approximation of the expenses they incur that the
drivers' unreimbursed expenses cause their wages to fall below the
federal minimum wage during some or all workweeks.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants during the statutory
period from 2003 to July 2021 as a delivery driver at Defendants'
Domino's store located in El Paso, Texas.

The Defendants operate numerous Domino's Pizza franchise
stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Forester, Esq.
          Katherine Serrano, Esq.
          David Burns, Esq.
          Jessica Wells, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          400 North Saint Paul St. Ste. 700
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          Facsimile: (469) 399-1070
          E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com

LONGHORN PIZZA: Velasco Seeks Unpaid Minimum Wages Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH VELASCO, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons v. LONGHORN PIZZA, INC., RICHARD HAFNER, JOSEPH ROMANO, and
ROBERT BRENT HAMILL, individually, Case No. 3:22-cv-00378-L (N.D.
Tex., Feb. 16, 2022) seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and
overtime hours owed to the Plaintiff under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Defendants operate numerous Domino's Pizza franchise stores.
The Defendants employ delivery drivers who use their own
automobiles to deliver pizza and other food items to their
customers.

According to the complaint, instead of reimbursing delivery drivers
for the reasonably approximate costs of the business use of their
vehicles, the Defendants use a flawed method to determine
reimbursement rates that provides such an unreasonably low rate
beneath any reasonable approximation of the expenses they incur
that the drivers' unreimbursed expenses cause their wages to fall
below the federal minimum wage during some or all workweeks.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants during the statutory
period and from May 2014 to August 2021 as a delivery driver at
Defendants' Domino's store located in El Paso, Texas.

The Defendants require their delivery drivers to maintain and pay
for safe, legally-operable, and insured automobiles when delivering
pizza and other food items.

The Defendants' delivery drivers incur costs for gasoline, vehicle
parts and fluids, repair and maintenance services, insurance,
depreciation, and other expenses ("automobile expenses") while
delivering pizza and other food items for the primary benefit of
the Defendants.

The Defendants' delivery driver reimbursement policy reimburses
drivers on a per-mile basis, but the per-mile reimbursement equates
to below the IRS business mileage reimbursement rate or any other
reasonable approximation of the cost to own and operate a motor
vehicle. The result of Defendants' delivery driver reimbursement
policy is a reimbursement of much less than a reasonable
approximation of its drivers' automobile expenses, says the
suit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Forester, Esq.
          Katherine Serrano, Esq.
          David Burns, Esq.
          Jessica Wells, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          400 North Saint Paul St. Ste. 700
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          Facsimile: (469) 399-1070
          E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com

LOYAL SOURCE: Settlement in Ortega Suit Wins Final Nod
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ISMAEL ORTEGA, KRISINDA
WOLFE, DORIS WILLIAMS-JENKINS, and LILIA SILVA, individuals, on
behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, v. LOYAL
SOURCE GOVERNMENT SERVICES LLC, a Limited Liability Company; and
Does 1 through 50, Inclusive, Case No. 3:20-cv-00879-LAB-NLS (S.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Larry Alan Burns entered an order:

  1. granting final approval of the Settlement;

  2. certifying the Settlement Class;

  3. appointing the Plaintiffs Ismael Ortega, Krisinda Wolfe,
     Doris Williams-Jenkins and Lilia Silva as Class
     Representatives and the approving the incentive awards
     requested in the Fee Motion;

  4. approving the payments to Claims Administrator KCC, LLC
     requested in the Fee Motion;

  5. appointing Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP as
     Class Counsel and approving the attorneys' fees requested
     in the Fee Motion; and

  6. dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs' claims in accordance
     with the terms of the Order.

     -- Definition of Class and Class Members

        The Court adopts the Preliminary Approval Order's
        definitions of the "California Class," comprised of the
        "California Class Members," and the "Fair Credit
        Reporting Act (FCRA) Class," comprised of the "FCRA
        Class Members." Those class definitions are reproduced
        below:

        a. The California Class is defined as:

           "all individuals who worked for Defendant in
           California as non-exempt employees during the
           California Class Period."

           The "California Class Period" is February 14, 2016 to
           September 29, 2020.

        b. The FCRA Class is defined as:

           "all employees or prospective employees of the
           Defendant in the United States for whom Defendant
           procured a background check during the FCRA Class
           Period.

           The "FCRA Class Period" is February 14, 2018 to
           September 29, 2020.

           The Court excludes from the Classes individuals who
           requested such an exclusion.

     -- The Settlement Affords Meaningful Relief

        Accounting for the fees, costs, service awards, and
        Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) payment provided
        for in this Order, the FCRA Class will receive $786,955,
        or 7 114.83 per class member. The California Class will
        receive $1,132,448:$1,435.30 per class member or $37.16
        for each week that a class member worked during the
        period. Each FCRA Class member's recovery amounts to
        114% of the statutory minimum recovery, a reasonable
        amount in settlement. The California Class's recovery is
        27% of the damages estimated by Plaintiffs' expert.

        The PAGA payment of $30,000, with $22,500 going to the
        California Labor and Workforce Development Agency and
        $7,500 to be distributed among the subset of the
        California Class that worked for Defendant during the
        PAGA Period, is approved.

     -- Costs and Fees

        The fees and expenses of KCC, LLC in administrating the
        settlement, in the amount of $70,000, are fair and
        reasonable. The Court hereby grants final approval to
        and orders that the payment of that amount be paid out
        of the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance with the
        Agreement.

        The requested Class Representative Service Payments and
        attorneys' fees and costs are fair and reasonable. The
        Court hereby grants final approval to and orders that
        the payment of the amounts of $5,000 to each of the four
        Plaintiffs for their Class Representative Service
        Payments, $687,500.00 for attorneys' fees to Class
        Counsel, and $23,097.30 for reimbursement of costs be
        paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance
        with the Settlement.

Loyal Source specializes in government contract staffing for a
number of US federal agencies.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GHBfB7  at no extra charge.[CC]

LUMENTUM HOLDINGS: Ryan Securities Suit Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------
Lumentum Holdings Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended January 1, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that in the case
styled as "Walter Ryan v. Oclaro, Inc., et al.," No.
3:18-cv-03174-VC, filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California on May 29, 2018 has been
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in May 2018. Lumentum acquired
Oclaro Inc. in December 2018.

The Ryan action named Oclaro Inc. and its directors as defendants
only and did not name Lumentum. Said lawsuits generally alleged,
among other things, that Oclaro and its directors violated Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14a-9
promulgated thereunder by disseminating an incomplete and
misleading Form S-4, including proxy statement/prospectus. The
lawsuits further alleged that Oclaro's directors violated Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act by failing to exercise proper control
over the person(s) who violated Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.

Lumentum Holdings Inc. is a provider of optical and photonic
products based in California.


MARSHALL & ASSOCIATES: Gartrell's Third Class Cert. Bid Tossed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JACARA MONIQUE GARTRELL,
on behalf of Herself and all others similarly situated, v. J.J.
MARSHALL & ASSOCIATES, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-00442-TJC-JBT (M.D.
Fla.), the Hon. Judge Timothy G. Corrigan entered an order:

   1. denying the Plaintiff Jacara Gartrell's third motion for
      class certification of:

      "All persons in the state of Florida who received at least
      one collection letter from JJ Marshall and who thereafter
      made a payment to JJ Marshall on the debt referenced in
      the collection letter;" and

   2. directing the parties to file a proposal on how to proceed
      no later than March 11, 2022.

The Court said, "This motion is Gartrell's third attempt to certify
a class. The first Motion for Class Certification was withdrawn
following the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Trichell. The second
was withdrawn after Gartrell's counsel stated at the hearing on the
motion that Gartrell intended to propose a new class. Now, Gartrell
proposes to represent a class of which she is not even a member.
The Court cannot certify such a class."

Gartrell alleges that Marshall violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the Florida Consumer Collection
Practice Act ("FCCPA") by sending her a collection letter without
registering as a debt collector in Florida as required under state
law.

Founded in 1976, J.J. Marshall & Associates provides specialized
consumer and commercial debt collection service.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HT6HxB at no extra charge.[CC]

MDL 2197: Two Suits Consolidated in ASR Hip Implant Products Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the product liability litigation captioned "In Re: Depuy
Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation,"
MDL No. 2197, Judge Karen K. Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, transfers two cases
from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio and,
with the consent of that court, assigned to Jeffrey J. Helmick for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

The action shares factual questions arising from alleged injuries
arising from DePuy's recalled ASR XL Acetabular Hip System.
Plaintiff moved to vacate the conditional transfer order
principally by arguing that federal jurisdiction is lacking over
her case. The panel held that the case is best addressed by the
transferee judge, who can structure pretrial proceedings to
accommodate the needs of all parties to this litigation.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 1, 2022 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/3GRtgkT


MDL 2244: Four Suits Consolidated in Pinnacle Hip Implants Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the product liability litigation, "In Re: Depuy Orthopaedics,
Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation," MDL No.
2244, Judge Karen K. Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, transfers two cases from the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida and one case
each from the U.S. District Courts for the Northern District of
Illinois and the Northern District of Ohio to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas and, with the consent of
that court, assigned to James E. Kinkeade for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.

The action shares factual questions arising from alleged injuries
from DePuy's Pinnacle Acetabular Cup System hip implants.
Plaintiffs in the four actions moved to vacate the panel's order
conditionally transferring the actions to MDL No. 2244 while
Defendants, Medical Device Business Services, Inc. (f/k/a DePuy
Orthopaedics Inc.), DePuy Synthes Sales Inc., Johnson & Johnson and
Johnson & Johnson Services Inc., opposed the motion.

Plaintiffs moved to vacate the conditional transfer orders by
arguing principally that federal jurisdiction is lacking over their
cases. However, the panel held that such jurisdictional objections
generally do not present an impediment to transfer, and that the
four actions involve injuries related to DePuy Pinnacle Acetabular
Cup System hip implants and fall within the MDL's ambit.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 1, 2022 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/3sIiXuv

MDL 2406: Hoover Suit Consolidated in Blue Cross Antitrust Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2406,
Judge Karen K. Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transfers Hoover, et al. v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Association, et al., Case No. 1:21−23448 (September
27, 2021, S.D. Fla.), to the U.s. District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama and, with the consent of that court, assigned
to Judge R. David Proctor for inclusion in the coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Hoover moved to vacate said transfer order conditionally
transferring his action to MDL No. 2406. Defendants opposed the
motion. The MDL is comprised of actions involving "the licensing
agreements between and among the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association
(BCBSA) and its 38 licensees (Blue Plans)." There are two
categories of MDL plaintiffs, health insurance subscribers and
healthcare providers, both of which "contend that the 38 Blue Plans
are independent health insurance companies that, but for any
agreement to the contrary, could and would compete with one
another." Hoover is a health insurance subscriber who opted out of
a class settlement covering the subscriber portion of the MDL.

Hoover largely opposed transfer because the subscriber class
settlement obviates the need for transfer and that informal
alternatives to centralization, like discovery sharing, are
workable. The panel, however, held that the relative merits of
transferring new tag-along actions to an ongoing MDL can change
over time as the transferee court completes its primary tasks and
cases already in the centralized proceedings progress toward trial
or other resolution.

"[w]e find that this action involves common questions of fact with
the actions previously transferred to MDL No. 2406, and that
transfer under 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of the litigation," the panel ruled.

A full-text copy of the Court's February 2, 2022 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/3HS4kLD


MDL 2670: Bid to Revisit Price-Fixing Conspiracy Finding Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
This Document Relates To: Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v.
Bumble Bee Foods LLC et al., case no. 18cv1014-JLS-MDD Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc. et al. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC et al., case no.
16cv17-JLS-MDD End Payer Class Actions Commercial Food Preparer
Class Actions Direct Purchaser Class Actions, Case No. 15-MD-2670
DMS (MDD) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California granted in part and
denied in part Starkist Co.'s motion for reconsideration and to
correct clerical mistakes and vacating hearing.

Pending before the Court is Defendant StarKist Co.'s ("StarKist")
motion to reconsider a finding and correct two clerical errors in
the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 order granting in part and denying in
part Direct Action Plaintiffs' and End Purchaser Plaintiffs'
motions for partial summary judgment against StarKist based on
guilty pleas and admissions in parallel criminal proceedings.

StarKist requests the Court to reconsider and reverse its finding
on summary adjudication that StarKist participated in the
price-fixing conspiracy as of June 1, 2011. It urges the Court to
reconsider in light of (1) testimony of Stephen Hodge at trial of
Christopher Lischewski that "he did not enter into any unlawful
agreements until November 2011"; (2) Hodge's recent deposition
testimony to the same effect in another case; and (3) StarKist's
expectation of Charles Handford testifying, "hypothetically, that
he did not enter into any unlawful agreements."

StarKist contends it was deprived of this evidence when it filed
its opposition brief on Nov. 7, 2019. In its Reply, StarKist also
wants the Court to consider the deposition testimony of Joe Tuza
and a letter from Hodge to Judge Edward M. Chen prior to sentencing
in the criminal case against him.

Hodge, Handford, and Tuza were deposed in the MDL in 2018 during
the pendency of parallel criminal proceedings. Hodge and Handford
invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to answer any
substantive questions. StarKist claims the Court's adverse finding
was the product of "unlucky timing" for StarKist.

Lischewski's trial commenced on Nov. 4, 2019, and ended on Dec. 3,
2019. Hodge testified on November 12, 13, and 15. With its
opposition filed Nov. 7, 2019, StarKist included selected trial
excerpts available at that time. The Plaintiffs submitted their own
selected trial excerpts, including excerpts of Hodge's testimony,
with their reply briefs filed Dec. 12, 2019. For two years,
StarKist neither objected to the Plaintiffs' trial excerpts nor
requested leave to submit additional trial excerpts of its own.

StarKist argues that due to the invocation of the Fifth Amendment
in deposition, Hodge's subsequent testimony and Handford's
proffered willingness to "uninvoke" if he were deposed again
constitute "newly discovered evidence" justifying reconsideration.
Offering no binding authority in support of its argument, StarKist
assumes that invocation of the Fifth Amendment in deposition
automatically entitles it to reconsideration if the deponent later
decides to "uninvoke."

Judge Sabraw holds that none of the cited cases so holds. Moreover,
StarKist's assumption is contrary to authority holding that courts
have discretion to prohibit the "uninvoking" witness from
testifying at trial and to draw negative inferences from the
invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a previous deposition.

StarKist also suggests that denying relief would amount to
reversible error. However, Judge Sabraw finds that the cited cases
do not support StarKist's conclusion. United States v. Mark, 795
F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2015), the only published Ninth Circuit opinion
cited by StarKist on this point, does not address analogous
circumstances, as it is a criminal case reversing a district
court's denial of motion to reconsider denial of a motion to
dismiss indictment. Finally, in none of StarKist's cited cases did
the party seeking reconsideration wait for two years after
obtaining relevant evidence to bring it to the court's attention,
thus subjecting the court and opposing parties to unnecessary
motions.

StarKist further argues that this "newly" discovered evidence
"refutes" the finding that StarKist was involved in the
price-fixing conspiracy before November 2011. Judge Sabraw
disagrees. She says StarKist's proffer is carefully limited to the
propositions that Hodge did not enter into any unlawful agreements
or personally participate in the conspiracy before November 2011,
and that Handford will testify he did not enter into any unlawful
agreements. Taken at face value, StarKist's proffers are not
inconsistent with, and do not contradict, direct evidence that
StarKist was involved in the price-fixing conspiracy as early as
June 1, 2011. Accepting StarKist's propositions and drawing all
justifiable inferences in StarKist's favor, they are insufficient
to raise a genuine issue of fact.

To the contrary, StarKist's contention that a reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that StarKist was not involved in the
conspiracy before November 2011, is negated by Hodge's own trial
testimony. Together with the evidence discussed in the summary
judgment order, and drawing all justifiable inferences in
StarKist's favor, Judge Sabraw holds that Hodge's trial testimony
supports rather than raises questions about the finding that
StarKist, through its officers an10 employees, participated in the
price-fixing conspiracy before November 2011.

After the Plaintiffs highlighted the foregoing testimony in their
Opposition to reconsideration, StarKist brought up for the first
time in its Reply Tuza's deposition testimony and Hodge's letter to
the sentencing judge. Aside from the fact that it is inappropriate
to raise new arguments in a reply brief, neither warrants changing
the summary judgment order, Judge Sabraw finds.

Tuza's deposition was taken on May 1, 2018. StarKist presents him
as a key witness in defense against liability prior to November
2011. His testimony was available well in time for opposition to
the Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion on Nov. 7, 2019, yet it was
not argued either in StarKist's opposition brief or even in its
Motion seeking reconsideration. This is not newly discovered
evidence and StarKist has presented no compelling reason for not
arguing it until this late date. Furthermore, as with Hodge and
Handford, the relevant proffered excerpts are limited to Tuza not
entering into agreements.

StarKist also relies on Hodge's letter to the sentencing judge to
argue that Hodge was "speculating" when he testified at
Lischewski's trial, suggesting that his testimony should not be
credited. However, this argument is refuted by the letter itself.
Far from shrinking from his trial testimony, Hodge admitted he knew
that StarKist was "bending the rules" before November 2011,
although he did not know that the conduct was illegal.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Sabraw denied StarKist's request
to reconsider and reverse the finding that it was participating in
the price-fixing conspiracy as of June 1, 2011. The parties are
reminded of the Court's recent admonition "not to bring motions for
reconsideration unless the counsel really believes, in good faith,
after careful thought and consideration, that it is appropriate."

StarKist's motion is granted insofar as it seeks correction of two
clerical errors. The Court will issue an amended order changing
"Dongwon Enterprises Co. Ltd." to "Dongwon Industries Co., Ltd."
and changing "Dongwon Group's Vice Chairman Nam-jung Kim" to
"Dongwon Enterprise Co., Ltd. Vice Chairman and StarKist Board
Member Nam-jung Kim." Judge Sabraw denied the Motion in all other
respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2yy8feb4 from Leagle.com.


MDL 2738: Corbett Suit Consolidated in J&J Talcum Liability Row
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the product liability litigation captioned In re: JOHNSON &
JOHNSON TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2738, Judge Karen K.
Caldwell, Chairperson of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, transfers Corbett v. Walmart Inc., Case No.
1:21−00996 (W.D. N.Y., September 2, 2021) to the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey and, with the consent of that
court, assigned it to Judge Freda L. Wolfson for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.

The Plaintiff moved to vacate the panel's order that conditionally
transferred Corbett to the District of New Jersey for inclusion in
MDL No. 2738. Defendant Walmart Inc. opposed the motion.

In support of her motion to vacate, the Plaintiff argued that
transfer is not warranted because, unlike most of the actions in
the MDL, Corbett is a consumer class action against Walmart seeking
economic damages relating to its sale of Johnson's Baby Powder. The
original complaint involves allegations that Johnson & Johnson's
talcum powder products (namely, Johnson's Baby Powder and Shower to
Shower body powder) cause ovarian cancer following perineal
application.

The panel, however, pointed out that, from its outset, this MDL has
encompassed consumer class claims alleging that defendants
deceptively marketed Johnson & Johnson's talcum powder products for
feminine hygienic use without disclosing talc's alleged
carcinogenic properties.

The panel indicated that though the claims in the Corbett action
are directed against Walmart, not Johnson & Johnson, it does not
weigh against transfer in this instance. Corbett involves common
questions of fact with the actions transferred to MDL No. 2738, and
transfer under 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. Moreover, Corbett -- which at its core
involves allegations that Johnson & Johnson's talcum products can
cause cancer -- shares multiple questions of fact with the actions
already in the MDL, it added.

A full-text copy of the Court's January 31, 2022 Transfer Order is
available at https://bit.ly/3sKPxvR

META PLATFORMS: Court Narrows Claims in Consolidated Class Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------
Meta Platforms, Inc. disclosed in its Annual Report on Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that on
January 14, 2022, the court granted, in part, and denied, in part,
Meta Platforms' motion to dismiss the class action lawsuits that
were consolidated.

Multiple putative class actions have also been filed in state and
federal courts in the United States against Meta Platforms, Inc.
alleging violations of antitrust laws and other causes of action in
connection with these acquisitions and other alleged
anticompetitive conduct, and seeking damages and unspecified
injunctive relief.

Several of the cases brought on behalf of certain advertisers and
users were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California.

Meta Platforms, Inc. provides computer programming, data processing
services based in California.


META PLATFORMS: Dismissal of Securities Class Suit Under Appeal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Meta Platforms, Inc. disclosed in its Annual Report on Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that
plaintiffs in a class action securities case filed a notice of
appeal on January 17, 2022 after the court dismissed their case,
their third amended complaint.

The Meta platform and user data practices, as well as the events
surrounding the misuse of certain data by a developer, became the
subject of U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), state attorneys
general, and other government inquiries in the United States,
Europe, and other jurisdictions.

On March 20, 2018, multiple putative class actions and derivative
actions were filed in state and federal courts in the United States
and elsewhere against the company and certain of their directors
and officers alleging violations of securities laws, breach of
fiduciary duties, and other causes of action in connection with
their platform and user data practices as well as the misuse of
certain data by a developer that shared such data with third
parties in violation of their terms and policies, and seeking
unspecified damages and injunctive relief.

Beginning on July 27, 2018, two putative class actions were filed
in federal court in the United States against the company and
certain of their directors and officers alleging violations of
securities laws in connection with the disclosure of the company
earnings results for the second quarter of 2018 and seeking
unspecified damages.

These two actions subsequently were transferred and consolidated in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
with the putative securities class action described above relating
to the company's platform and user data practices. On September 25,
2019, the district court granted the company's motion to dismiss
the consolidated putative securities class action, with leave to
amend.

On November 15, 2019, a second amended complaint was filed in the
consolidated putative securities class action. On August 7, 2020,
the district court granted the company's motion to dismiss the
second amended complaint, with leave to amend. On October 16, 2020,
a third amended complaint was filed in the consolidated putative
securities class action.

Both parties entered into a settlement and modified consent order
to resolve the FTC inquiry, which took effect in April 2020 and
required the company to pay a penalty of $5.0 billion and to
significantly enhance their practices and processes for privacy
compliance and oversight. The state attorneys general inquiry and
certain government inquiries in other jurisdictions remain ongoing
and could subject to additional substantial fines and costs,
require them to change their business practices, divert resources
and the attention of management from the business, or adversely
affect the company's business.

Meta Platforms, Inc. provides computer programming, data processing
services based in California.


META PLATFORMS: Faces Multiple Securities Suits in Federal Courts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Meta Platforms, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K Annual Report for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that it was named
defendant in several class action lawsuits alleging violations of
securities laws.

Beginning on October 27, 2021, multiple putative class actions were
filed in federal court in the United States against the company and
certain of their directors and officers alleging violations of
securities laws in connection with the same matters.

Meta Platforms, Inc. provides computer programming, data processing
services based in California.


NATURAL GROCERS: Faces Labor Suit in Over Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------------
Natural Grocers by Vitamin Cottage, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q
Report for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2021, filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that
the litigation is currently in the discovery stage.

In January 2020, a former assistant store manager filed a purported
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado on behalf of current and former assistant
store managers alleging that the Company violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and Colorado labor laws by misclassifying the
assistant store managers as exempt.

The alleged violations relate to failure to pay for overtime work.
In November 2020, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification with regard to the FLSA claim. In
September 2021, the court ordered 56 opt-in plaintiffs to
individual arbitration, leaving 101 FLSA plaintiffs in the FLSA
collective action. The litigation is currently in the discovery
stage.

Natural Grocers by Vitamin Cottage, Inc. operates natural and
organic grocery and dietary supplement stores.


NEW YORK: Loses Bid to Dismiss ADA Amended Complaint
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as H.A., by her guardians
L.A. and S.A., and L.A. and S.A. individually 1 , et al., v.
KATHLEEN HOCHUL, in her official capacity as Governor of the State
of New York, et al., Case No. 1:16-cv-00735-LJV-HKS (W.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo entered an order:

   1. denying the state's motion to dismiss the amended
      complaint; and

   2. denying without prejudice as premature the plaintiffs'
      motion for class certification.

The Court said, "The plaintiffs move to certify the Residents and
the Caregivers as plaintiff classes. The state opposes that motion
as premature and "anticipates that narrow discovery will be
required before class certification issues can be fully
briefed."For their part, the plaintiffs apparently concede that
discovery may well be necessary for full briefing on their class
certification motion. In light of the potential necessity for
further discovery to refine the question of class certification,
the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Docket Item 33, is
denied without prejudice as premature.

On September 13, 2016, five plaintiffs with developmental
disabilities and their caregivers filed a complaint under Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). They alleged that
the defendants, then Governor Andrew Cuomo and Dr. Theodore
Kastner, then-Commissioner of the New York State Office for People
with Developmental Disabilities ("OPWDD"), unlawfully had denied
them access to OPWDD-funded programs that provide supported and
community-based residential placements.

The plaintiffs also moved to certify two classes. This Court
granted the state's motion to dismiss on July 11, 2020. Although
this Court determined that home-based segregation could plausibly
constitute unjustified isolation under the ADA and Section 504, it
concluded that the plaintiffs had not alleged facts sufficient to
support that theory. And because the associational claims of the
caregiver plaintiffs hinged on whether the underlying claims of the
individuals with developmental disabilities were viable, this Court
concluded that those associational claims likewise failed. But
because neither set of claims was implausible as a matter of law,
this Court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their
claims.

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and again moved for class
certification on September 8, 2020. The state moved to dismiss the
amended complaint on October 23, 2020. The plaintiffs responded on
December 11, 2020 and on January 15, 2021, the state replied.

The plaintiffs in this case comprise two discrete groups. The Court
first addresses the allegations of the "Residents" -- "adults with
developmental disabilities who qualify for services from [OPWDD];
who are not capable, by virtue of their developmental disabilities,
of living in the community without assistance and support; who are
presently living with parents and/or related caregiver(s); and who
would prefer to live in the community in a supported residential
setting but cannot because
there are insufficient available appropriate residential settings."


A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uHBDxd at no extra charge.[CC]


NOIR BAKERY: Faces Salas Suit Over Unpaid Wages for Cafe Workers
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA AURELIA SALAS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NOIR BAKERY, INC. (D/B/A NOIR BAKERY &
CAFE), NANCY SINAI, TIRAN SINAI, and DEAN SINAI, Defendants, Case
No. 1:22-cv-00826 (E.D.N.Y., February 14, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants in violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law including failure to pay minimum
wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay
spread-of-hours premium, failure to provide accurate wage notice,
failure to provide accurate wage statements, and failure to timely
pay wages.

The Plaintiff was employed as a live-in houseworker and deli worker
at the residence located at 47 Beach Rd., Great Neck, New York, and
at the cafe located at 25 Cutter Mill Rd., Great Neck, New York,
respectively, from 2004 until December 9, 2021.

Noir Bakery, Inc. is an owner and operator of a cafe under the name
Noir Bakery & Cafe, located at 25 Cutter Mill Rd., Great Neck, New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Catalina Sojo, Esq.
         CSM LEGAL, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 317-1200
         Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

NOVARTIS INC: Hypertension Meds Suits Consolidated in S.D. N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Novartis Inc.  disclosed in its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on February 2, 2022, that class action cases
have been consolidated in the Southern District of New York and the
claims are being vigorously contested.

Since 2018, Novartis Group companies as well as other
pharmaceutical companies have been sued by various direct and
indirect purchasers of Exforge in multiple US individual and
putative class action complaints. Exforge is a high blood pressure
medication that combines calcium channel blocker amlodipine
besylate (Norvasc) and the angiotensin-II receptor blocker
valsartan (Diovan).

They claim that Novartis made a reverse payment in the form of an
agreement not to launch an authorized generic, alleging violations
of federal antitrust law and state antitrust, consumer protection
and common laws, and seeking damages as well as injunctive relief.

Novartis Inc. is in to pharmaceutical preparations based in Basel,
Switzerland.


NVR INC: Parties Seek Conditional Status of Collective Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MELISSA COSSABOOM f/k/a
MELISSA COLLINS, ANN ADAIR HATCH, and JESSICA PETTRY, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, v. NVR, INC. and NVR
MORTGAGE FINANCE, INC., Case No. 9:21-cv-80627-AMC (S.D. Fla.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order granting conditional
certification of collective action.

On February 1, 2022, this Court entered its Order requiring, among
other things, that the parties confer and file a revised proposed
Notice in conformance with the Court's Order.

NVR is a company engaged in home construction.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JpgXOn at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Paolo C. Meireles, Esq.
          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          Logan A. Pardell, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 447-8888
          E-mail: pmeireles@shavitzlaw.com
                  gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
                  lpardell@shavitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Michele R. Fisher, Esq.
          Kayla M. Kienzle, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          80 South 8th Street, Suite 4700
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          E-mail: fisher@nka.com
                  kkienzle@nka.com

The Defendant are represented by:

          Kevin M. Young, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          1075 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 2500
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 885-6697
          E-mail: kyoung@seyfarth.com

               - and -

          Barry J. Miller, Esq.
          Hillary J. Massey, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          Two Seaport Lane, Ste. 300
          Boston, MA 02210
          Telephone: (617) 946-4800
          E-mail: bmiller@seyfarth.com
                  hmassey@seyfarth.com

OPEN TEXT: First Circuit Remands Securities Suits to District Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Open Text Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended December 31, 2021, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that the First Circuit
Court issued a decision reversing and remanding the Securities
actions to the district court for further proceedings after the
Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the securities action.

On August 1, 2019, prior to the company's acquisition of the
company, Carbonite Inc., a purported stockholder of Carbonite filed
a putative class action complaint against Carbonite, its former
Chief Executive Officer, Mohamad S. Ali, and its former Chief
Financial Officer, Anthony Folger, in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts captioned "Ruben A. Luna,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Carbonite, Inc., Mohamad S. Ali, and Anthony Folger," Case No.
1:19-cv-11662-LTS.

The complaint alleges violations of the federal securities laws
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. The
complaint generally alleges that the defendants made materially
false and misleading statements in connection with Carbonite's
Server Backup VM Edition, and seeks, among other things, the
designation of the action as a class action, an award of
unspecified compensatory damages, costs and expenses, including
counsel fees and expert fees, and other relief as the court deems
appropriate.

On August 23, 2019, a nearly identical complaint was filed in the
same court captioned "William Feng, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Carbonite, Inc., Mohamad S. Ali,
and Anthony Folger," Case No. 1:19-cv-11808-LTS. On November 21,
2019, the court consolidated the Securities Actions, appointed a
lead plaintiff, and designated a lead counsel. On January 15, 2020,
the lead plaintiff filed a consolidated amended complaint generally
making the same allegations and seeking the same relief as the
complaint filed on August 1, 2019.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Securities Actions on March 10,
2020. The motion was fully briefed in June 2020 and a hearing on
the motion to dismiss the Securities Actions was held on October
15, 2020. Following the hearing, on October 22, 2020, the court
granted with prejudice the defendants' motion to dismiss the
Securities Actions. On November 20, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed
a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
On December 21, 2021, the First Circuit issued a decision reversing
and remanding the Securities Actions to the district court for
further proceedings.

Open Text Corporation provides computer integrated system design
services based in Ontario, Canada.


OPTIO SOLUTIONS: Debt Settlement Offer "Deceptive," Farmer Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JAMIE FARMER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. OPTIO SOLUTIONS, LLC, doing business as
QUALIA COLLECTION SERVICES, and DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No.
3:22-cv-00907 (N.D. Cal., February 14, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, and the California's Unfair Competition Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant sent a materially false,
deceptive, and misleading collection letter to the Plaintiff for an
alleged credit card debt owed to Capital One, N.A. The Defendant's
letter offered to settle the debt for a 50 percent discount and
stated the settlement offer expired 45 days from the date of the
letter. In reality, the Defendant had authority to extend the
settlement offer beyond the 45-day deadline and can increase the
amount of the discount offered to the Plaintiff after the said
deadline. As a result of the Defendant's alleged deceptive debt
collection practice, the Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers
developed a false sense of urgency to accept the settlement offer
as quickly as possible.

Optio Solutions, LLC, doing business as Qualia Collection Services,
is a debt collection agency in Petaluma, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Amy L. B. Ginsburg, Esq.
         GINSBURG LAW GROUP, P.C.
         1012 N. Bethlehem Pike, Suite 103, Box #9
         Ambler, PA 19002
         Telephone: (855) 978-6564
         Facsimile: (855) 777-0043
         E-mail: aginsburg@ginsburglawgroup.com

                  - and –

         THOMASSON PLLC
         402 West Broadway #950
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (973) 312-0774
         Facsimile: (973) 559-5579
         E-mail: amy@thomassonpllc.com

PAOLA PAINTING: Faces Montesdeoca Suit Over Time-Shaving Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------------
RONALD MONTESDEOCA, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs, and the Class v. PAOLA PAINTING AND RENOVATIONS LLC
d/b/a SUREGREEN, PAOLA CASTANEDA, and RAUL CASTANEDA, Case No.
7:22-cv-01276 (S.D. Fla., Feb. 15, 2022) seeks to recover unpaid
overtime due to a fixed salary, unpaid wages, including overtime,
due to time-shaving, unpaid wages due to rounding, liquidated
damages and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff brings claims for relief as a collective action
pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), on behalf
of all non-exempt employees (including, but not limited to,
drivers, laborers, helpers, construction workers, and painters)
employed by the Defendants on or after the date that is six years
before the filing of the Complaint in this case.

Paola Painting is a construction company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

PAPA JOHN'S: Court Approves Class Settlement in Cook FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
Paducah Division, grants the Joint Motion for Approval of
Settlement and Dismissal of Case with Prejudice filed by the
parties in the lawsuit titled GARRICK COOK, individually and on
behalf of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. PAPA JOHN'S
PADUCAH, LLC, and ROBERT WORKMAN, individually, Defendants, Case
No. 5:20-cv-00129 (TBR) (W.D. Ky.).

The case was filed on Aug. 4, 2020. On Feb. 1, 2021, Cook filed an
Amended Complaint against all the Defendants. In the Amended
Complaint, Cook alleges that the Defendants--Papa John's Paducah,
LLC, and Robert Workman--reimbursed their delivery drivers for less
than the reasonably approximate costs of the business use of their
vehicles. On Dec. 3, 2021, the parties filed a joint motion for
settlement agreement.

A. Settlement Agreement Terms

In the case, there is a bona fide dispute as to whether the
Defendants pay and reimbursement policies resulted in a failure to
compensate delivery drivers at the federal minimum wage. The
federal minimum wage has been $7.25 per hour since July 24, 2009.
Here, the Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a delivery
driver.

The Plaintiff claims that instead of reimbursing delivery drivers
for the reasonably approximate costs of the business use of their
vehicles, the Defendants use a flawed method to determine
reimbursement rates that provides such an unreasonably low rate
beneath any reasonable approximation of the expenses they incur
that the drivers' unreimbursed expenses cause their wages to fall
below the federal minimum wage in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Defendants deny these allegations and claim the
Plaintiff is not entitled to reimbursement or other damages.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a bona fide dispute as
to whether the Plaintiff was properly compensated pursuant to the
FLSA.

Next, the Court must determine whether the settlement is a fair and
reasonable resolution of the bona fide dispute. The Sixth Circuit
has established a seven-favor test to assess whether or not a class
action settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate' under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) (Does 1-2 v. Deja Vu Servs., Inc.,
925 F.3d 886, 894 (6th Cir. 2019)). These factors include: (1) the
risk of fraud or collusion, (2) the complexity, expense and likely
duration of the litigation, (3) the amount of discovery engaged in
by the parties, (4) the likelihood of success on the merits, (5)
the opinions of class counsel and class representatives, (6) the
reaction of absent class members, and (7) the public interest.

The Court finds that the settlement agreement was the result of
"arm's length" negotiations. Hence, the first factor weighs in
favor of finding the settlement fair and reasonable. The Court
agrees that continuing to litigate this case would result in
greater expense for both parties and increase the duration of the
litigation. Thus, the second factor factor weighs in favor of
finding the settlement fair and reasonable.

Although the parties have engaged in only informal discovery, they
claim that the production of payroll and reimbursement records
facilitated both Parties' ability to make detailed legal and
factual analyses of the claims and defenses. Since more thorough
discovery has not been conducted, Senior District Judge Thomas B.
Russell finds that the third factor weighs only slightly in favor
of finding the settlement fair and reasonable.

Given that the parties have not engaged in substantial discovery or
motion practice, it is difficult to gauge the likelihood of the
Plaintiffs' success at trial, Judge Russell notes. However, both
parties recognize and have considered the inherent risks in
bringing the matter to trial. Indeed, the Plaintiff will be
required to prove that the Defendants' policies and practices
violated the FLSA and present evidence regarding each Plaintiff's
specific damages. Therefore, the Court finds the fourth factor
weighs in favor of finding the settlement fair and reasonable.

In deciding whether a proposed settlement warrants approval, the
informed and reasoned judgment of plaintiffs' counsel and their
weighing of the relative risks and benefits of protracted
litigation are entitled to great deference, Judge Russell notes,
citing Ross v. Jack Rabbit Servs., LLC, No. 3:14-CV-44-DJH, 2016 WL
7320890, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 15, 2016). In the case, the
Settlement Agreement states that "counsel for the Parties are
satisfied that the terms and conditions of the Agreement are fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and Class Counsel is satisfied that this
Agreement is in the best interest of the Class."

As reported by counsel, Judge Russell holds that the fifth factor
weighs heavily in favor of finding the settlement fair and
reasonable.

Approximately 16 individuals joined the Named Plaintiff in this
collective action. However, the Court is unaware of any objections
to the Settlement Agreement. Thus, the sixth factor weighs in favor
of finding the settlement fair and reasonable.

The Settlement Agreement states that the Parties considered the
inherent risks in bringing the matter to trial, judicial resources,
and the costs and time associated with further litigation and
determined a settlement would be in the public's interest. The
Court agrees and finds that the seventh factor weighs in favor of
finding the settlement fair and reasonable.

Since each of the seven factors weighs in favor of finding the
Settlement Agreement a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona
fide dispute over FLSA provisions, the Court approves the
Settlement Agreement.

B. Allocation of Settlement Proceeds

After deductions for attorneys' fees, costs and service awards, the
settlement proceeds will be distributed to the Class on a pro-rata
basis according to an equitable formula determined by class
counsel. The formula will take into account: (1) the total number
of deliveries driven by each class member; (2) the wage rate earned
by each class member; and (3) the reimbursement rate paid to each
class member during each class member's applicable limitations
period, provided that each class member will receive a minimum
payment of $100.

The Court finds that the proposed allocation of settlement proceeds
is fair, reasonable, and adequate as it apportions funds based on
the circumstances of each class member's employment by the
Defendants. Therefore, the Court approves the proposed allocation
of settlement proceeds.

C. Incentive Award

The Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement also seeks approval of
the payment of an additional enhancement amount to the Named
Plaintiff of $2,500.

In this case, the parties claim that the Named Plaintiff helped
counsel with factual background and assisted with the review of
case documents to inform litigation strategy. Moreover, the Named
Plaintiff was involved in the protracted settlement negotiations.
Thus, the parties argue, the Plaintiff's conduct benefited all
Opt-Ins. Additionally, the parties note that the Named Plaintiff
initiated this lawsuit under his name and was directly and
regularly involved in this litigation and accepted both financial
and reputation risks by commencing and supporting it.

Finally, the Court finds further support for the incentive award in
the fact that no objections were filed. Based on this, the
incentive award, as agreed to by the parties, is approved.

D. Attorneys' Fees and Costs

Finally, the parties seek approval of the attorneys' fees and costs
as outlined in the Settlement Agreement.

The Plaintiffs' counsel, Katherine Serrano, submitted a
supplemental declaration stating that she has experience litigating
wage and hour collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and is currently representing delivery drivers in numerous other
matters. Since initiating this action, the Plaintiffs' counsel has
collectively spent over 60 hours on the case. Mrs. Serrano also
estimates that the Plaintiff's Counsel will bill an additional 20
hours or more addressing any questions or concerns that arise
during the distribution of the settlement proceeds to the Class
Members.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiffs' counsel seeks
$14,666.67 in attorneys' fees. Additionally, the Settlement
Agreement provides for up to $5,000 in out-of-pocket costs incurred
in pursuing the litigation.

The parties agree that the amount of attorneys' fees and costs is a
fair and reasonable compromise of the actual fees and costs
incurred by the Plaintiffs' counsel during this near year-long
litigation and those that will be incurred by the Plaintiffs'
counsel to fully administer the settlement.

Thus, the Court finds that the $14,666.67 attorneys' fee and $5,000
for costs proposed in the Settlement Agreement is reasonable.

Conclusion

For the stated reasons, it is ordered that the Motion for
Settlement is granted. The Court will enter an Order
contemporaneous to this Memorandum Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Jan. 31,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2v5au3fy from
Leagle.com.


PAYPAL HOLDINGS: Seeks to Dismiss Amended Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
PayPal Holdings, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K Annual Report for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that it was facing a
Securities suit triggered by a share price drop where the company
filed a motion to dismiss an amended complaint. Said motion is due
on March 28, 2022.

On August 20, 2021, a putative securities class action captioned
"Kang v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., et al.," Case No. 21-cv-06468, was
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California (the Securities Action). The Securities Action asserts
claims relating to the disclosure of the CFPB PayPal Credit Matter
and the SEC Debit Card Program Matter in the Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021. The
Securities Action purports to be brought on behalf of purchasers of
the company's stock between February 9, 2017 and July 28, 2021 (the
Class Period), and asserts claims for violations of Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against the
Company, its Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer.


The complaint alleges that certain public statements made by the
company during the Class Period were rendered materially false and
misleading (which, allegedly, caused the company's stock to trade
at artificially inflated prices) by the defendants' failure to
disclose that, among other things, PayPal's business practices with
respect to PayPal Credit and regarding interchange rates paid to
its bank partner related to its bank-issued co-branded debit cards
were non-compliant with applicable laws and/or regulations.

The Securities Action seeks unspecified compensatory damages on
behalf of the putative class members. On November 2, 2021, the
court appointed a Lead Plaintiff, and on January 25, 2022, the Lead
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint alleges
a class period between April 27, 2016 and July 28, 2021 (the
"Amended Class Period"), and in addition to the Company, its Chief
Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer, also names other
Company executives as defendants.

The amended complaint alleges that various statements made by the
defendants during the Amended Class Period were rendered materially
false and misleading, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, by PayPal's alleged violations
of the 2015 Consent Order with the CFPB, federal consumer financial
laws, and Regulation II.

PayPal Holdings, Inc. is a technology platform that enables digital
payments and simplifies commerce experiences.


PEOPLEASE LLC: Bids to Stay Espinoza Suit Pending Appeal Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled DEMIS ESPINOZA, on behalf of himself and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PEOPLEASE,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-22684-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
(S.D. Fla.), Judge Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, grants:

   -- Defendant Managed Labor Solutions, LLC's ("MLS") Motion to
      Stay Case Pending Appeal ("MLS Motion"), filed on Jan. 13,
      2022; and

   -- Defendant Peoplease, LLC's ("Peoplease") Motion to Stay
      Case Pending Appeal ("Peoplease Motion"), filed on Jan. 14,
      2022.

To date, the Plaintiff has not filed a response to the Motions.

On June 1, 2021, the Plaintiff initiated the putative class action
against Defendants MLS and Peoplease, arising from the Defendants'
purported violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
("FCRA"). On Dec. 17, 2021, the Court entered an Omnibus Order
denying MLS's Motion to Stay Case and Compel Arbitration, or, in
the Alternative, to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Class Action
Complaint, and Peoplease's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceedings.

In that Order, the Court held that the Plaintiff's FCRA claims do
not fall within the arbitration clause of the Notice and Agreement
of Co-Employment. On Jan. 13, 2022, and Jan. 14, 2022,
respectively, the Defendants appealed the Court's Order. The
Defendants now seek to stay these proceedings pending resolution of
the appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.

Upon careful review, the Court agrees that a stay pending
resolution of the appeal is appropriate under the circumstances.
Indeed, the Court cannot conclude that the appeal is frivolous.
Additionally, the Court agrees with the Defendants that
considerations of preserving time and resources warrant divesting
the Court of its authority to proceed in a case where a pending
appeal concerns a right not to litigate the dispute at all.

Accordingly, the Motions are granted. The case is stayed pending
resolution of the appeal before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, Appeal No. 22-10110.

The Clerk of Court will close this case for administrative purposes
only. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any scheduled
hearings are canceled, all pending motions are denied as moot, and
all deadlines are terminated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Omnibus Order dated Jan. 31, 2022,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yckkysy7 from Leagle.com.


PHOENIX, AZ: Puentem, et al., Lose Partial Summary Judgment Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Puentem et al., v. City of
Phoenix, et al., Case No. CV-18-02778-PHX-JJT (D. Ariz.), the Hon.
Judge John J. Tuchi entered an order:

   1. denying the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
      judgment;

   2. granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
      plaintiffs' classwide claims; and

   3. granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion
      for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' individual claims.

On August 22, 2017, President Donald Trump held a rally at the
Phoenix 7 Convention Center, and approximately 6,000 demonstrators
-- both pro-Trump and anti-Trump -- gathered outside the Convention
Center. The Phoenix Police Department ("PPD") had about a week's
advance notice of the rally, during which it made preparations to
try to ensure the safety of the downtown area and the public during
the expected demonstrations.

The preparations included setting up a "free speech zone"
designated for anti-Trump 12 on the north side of the Convention
Center, across Monroe Street. The free speech zone was bordered by
2nd Street to the west, 3rd Street to the east, and Monroe Street
to the south, and demarcated by a three-foot high pedestrian fence
and "Do Not 15 " tape. PPD anticipated that certain groups of
demonstrators would be present, including Antifa -- a national,
militant political protest movement opposing fascism and right-wing
ideology whose groups had disrupted several other demonstrations,
including one in Charlottesville, Virginia, in the weeks preceding
President Trump's Phoenix visit -- as well as Plaintiff Puente -- a
Phoenix grassroots organization representing migrant communities
through lobbying, advocacy, and activism -- and Plaintiff Poder in
Action ("Poder") -- a Phoenix grassroots organization with a
mission of empowering victims of injustice through leadership
development, civic engagement, and policy advocacy.

The Plaintiffs moved to certify their claims as a class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the Court granted
their Motion in part. The Court certified a "damages class"
consisting of:

   "those persons who were present on August 22, 2017, at the
   Trump Protest area north of the Convention Center which was
   designated as the "free-speech zone" (the area for anti-Trump
   protestors bounded to the south by Monroe Street, 2nd Street
   to the west, and 3rd street to the east) and forced by PPD
   onto adjacent streets at any point between 8:25 and 10:00
   P.M., who neither threw objects nor attempted to breach the
   "free speech zone" barrier along Monroe Street, and who were
   subjected to the PPD's dispersal by the use of force, or
   other unlawful police activity arising from the police
   response to anti-Trump protestors."

The Court also certified an "injunctive relief class" consisting
of:

   "all persons who have in the past, including those present at
   the anti-Trump protest on August 22, 2017, between 8:25 and
   10:00 P.M., or may in the future, participate in, or be
   present at, demonstrations within the City of Phoenix in the
   exercise of their rights of free speech and assembly without
   engaging in any conduct justifying the use of force.

Phoenix is the capital of the southwestern U.S. state of Arizona.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gBvIBx at no extra charge.[CC]


PIZZA TO YOU: Waters Seeks Initial Approval of Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned Kirk Waters, On behalf of
himself and those similarly situated, v. Pizza to You, L.L.C., et
al., Case No. 3:19-cv-372-TMR (S.D. Ohio), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order:

   1. preliminarily approving the proposed settlement;

   2. approving the content, form, and distribution of the class
      notice;

   3. preliminarily approving the service award for the
      Plaintiff;

   4. provisionally approving Class Counsel's request for
      attorneys' fees and costs;

   5. scheduling a fairness hearing approximately 150 days after
      preliminary approval.

      -- Summary of Settlement Terms

         The Settlement Agreement requires Defendants to pay a
         total of $1,500,000 to resolve Plaintiffs' claims. The
         $1,500,000 is inclusive of expenses, service awards,
         and attorneys' fees.

         The fund will be distributed to every class member,
         without requiring anyone to submit a claim form. Each
         class member will receive his or her prorated share,
         based on the number of hours that they worked. However,
         no Plaintiff will receive a payment of less than $20
         and the 49 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective
         members that have already opted into the case will
         receive a 1.25 × share due to their additional claims.

         The Defendants will make a first payment of $750,000      
            
         within 40 days of the Court granting final settlement
         approval or by June 1, 2022, whichever is later. Within
         14 days of receiving that first payment from
         the Defendants, the Claims Administrator will issue the
         first round of checks to Plaintiffs.

         The Defendants will make a second payment of $750,000     
    
         on or before June 1, 2023. Within 14 days of receiving
         that second payment from Defendants, the Claims
         Administrator will issue the second round of checks to
         the Plaintiffs.

This litigation began on November 22, 2019, when Kirk Waters, a
pizza delivery driver, sued Defendants under state and federal wage
laws. The Defendants include various entities and individuals that
Plaintiffs allege own and operate five Jet's Pizza franchise
locations. The Defendants dispute that some of the individuals
and/or entities qualify as "employers"
for purposes of wage and hour laws.

This lawsuit alleges several wage and hour claims, all centered on
Defendants' vehicle reimbursement policy. Specifically, the
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants required delivery drivers to
provide their own vehicles to deliver Defendants' pizza and other
food. The crux of the Parties' dispute is whether the reimbursement
provided by Defendants adequately reimbursed Plaintiffs for their
vehicle expenses.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Feb. 7,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GBIMRS
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew R. Biller, Esq.
          Andrew P. Kimble, Esq.
          Riley E. Kane, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          8044 Montgomery Road, Suite 515
          Cincinnati, OH 45236
          Telephone: (513) 715-8711
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: abiller@billerkimble.com
                  akimble@billerkimble.com
                  rkane@billerkimble.com


POLARIS INDUSTRIES: Court Enters Protective Order in Hellman Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California entered a Stipulated Protective
Order in the case, MICHAEL HELLMAN, individually on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated; FRANCISCO BERLANGA,
individually on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated; TIM ARTOFF, individually on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated; CY MITCHELL, individually on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated; and JONATHAN LOLLAR,
individually on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. POLARIS INDUSTRIES INC., a Delaware
corporation; POLARIS SALES INC., a Minnesota corporation; POLARIS
INC. (f/k/a POLARIS INDUSTRIES INC.), a Minnesota corporation,
Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-00949-JAM-DMC (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs and the Defendants agree that during the course of
discovery it may be necessary to disclose certain confidential and
proprietary information relating to the subject matter of the
Action. They agree that the documents and other information,
including the substance and contents thereof, designated by any
party as confidential and proprietary, and produced by that party
in response to any formal or informal request for discovery in the
Action, will be subject to the terms of the Protective Order.

Good cause exists to support the entry of the Order because the
information sought in discovery includes information that at least
one party considers confidential and proprietary, including trade
secret and confidential research, development, or commercial
information, or other information that a party deems confidential
and protectable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Divulging
such information without any protection from disclosure to the
general public, or to the parties for purposes other than the
Action, could be detrimental to the ongoing business of the
parties, particularly those parties who are conducting business in
a highly competitive environment.

The purpose of the Order is to expedite the exchange of discovery
material, facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over
confidentiality and privilege, and protect material to be kept
confidential or privileged pursuant to the Court's inherent
authority, its authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c) and Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), and the judicial
opinions interpreting such Rules. For good cause shown under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), Judge Cota granted the
parties' joint request and entered the Protective Order.

The Order covers Information that the Producing Party designates
"Confidential" or "Highly Confidential." Disclosure of Confidential
or Highly Confidential Information does not waive the confidential
status of such Information.

Any party may object to the propriety of the designation of
specific material as Confidential or Highly Confidential by serving
a written objection upon the Producing Party's counsel.

Confidential Information and Highly Confidential Information must
be used only in this proceeding, except that nothing in the
Protective Order will be construed as limiting any party from
disclosing a potential safety defect to an appropriate government
agency. The use of Confidential or Highly Confidential Information
during the trial will be determined by Order of the Court.

Within 90 days of the termination of any party from all proceedings
in this proceeding, that party, its employees, attorneys,
consultants and experts must destroy or return (at the election of
the Receiving Party) all originals and/or copies of documents with
Confidential Information or Highly Confidential Information.
Polaris will retain possession of all files returned by the
Plaintiffs' Counsel at the termination of all proceedings for a
period of five years. A Receiving Party is permitted to retain a
list of the documents by Bates Number that are produced by a
Producing Party under this Protective Order.

The Protective Order will remain in force and effect until
modified, superseded, or terminated by order of the Court. Unless
otherwise ordered, or agreed upon by the parties, the Protective
Order will survive the termination of the action. The Court retains
jurisdiction even after termination of the action to enforce the
Protective Order and to make such amendments, modifications,
deletions and additions to the Protective Order as the Court may
from time to time deem appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Protective Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yt7ajemy from Leagle.com.

David A. Klein -- david.klein@kirkland.com -- KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,
Los Angeles, CA, Richard C. Godfrey, P.C. (pro hac vice), Andrew B.
Bloomer, P.C. (pro hac vice), Paul Collier, P.C. (pro hac vice), R.
Allan Pixton -- allan.pixton@kirkland.com -- (pro hac vice),
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, in Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for
Defendants Polaris Industries Inc., Polaris Sales Inc., and Polaris
Inc. (f/k/a Polaris Industries Inc.)


PRUDENT FIDUCIARY: Scheduling Order Entered in Ahrendsen Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHARI AHRENDSEN, et al.,
v. PRUDENT FIDUCIARY SERVICES, LLC, et al., Case No.
2:21-cv-02157-HB (E.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge Harvey Bartle III
entered a first scheduling order as follows:

  1. All class certification and merit         Jan. 31, 2023
     discovery shall proceed forthwith
     and continue in such a manner as
     will  assure that all requests for,
     and responses to, discovery  will
     be served, noticed, and completed
     by:

  2. The Plaintiffs shall file any             Aug. 1, 2022
     motion for class certification
     on or before:

  3. The Defendants shall file any             Aug. 31, 2022
     briefs in opposition to
     plaintiffs' motion for
     class certification on or before:

  4. The Plaintiffs shall file any             Sept. 14, 2022
     reply briefs in support of class
     certification on or before:

  5. The Plaintiffs shall serve any            March 17, 2023
     reports of expert witnesses.
     on or before:

  6. The Defendants shall serve any
     reports of expert witnesses on            May 1, 2023
     or before:

  7. The Plaintiffs shall serve, any           May 22, 2023
     reports of rebuttal expert
     witnesses responding only to
     those issues raised for the first
     time in the reports of defendants'
     experts on or before:

  8. The Parties shall conduct any             July 6, 2023
     depositions of expert witnesses
     on or before:

Prudent Fiduciary Services to provide independent fiduciary,
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) compliance
consulting, and expert witness services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34BFCk1 at no extra charge.[CC]


PUBLIX SUPER: Amara Sues Over Antitussive Drug's Non-Drowsy Label
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PHILIP AMARA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 8:22-cv-00367-VMC-JSS (M.D. Fla., February 14, 2022) is a class
action against the Defendant for breach of contract, breaches of
express warranty, implied warranty of merchantability/fitness for a
particular purpose and the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, unjust enrichment, and violations of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act and State Consumer
Fraud Acts.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in false,
deceptive, and misleading advertising, labeling, and marketing of
an antitussive drug product under the Publix brand. The Defendant
marketed its product as "non-drowsy" but in reality, it contains
dextromethorphan Hbr, which is well-known for causing drowsiness.
The representation of "non-drowsy" misleads consumers who expect
they are purchasing a cold and flu product that will not make them
drowsy or increase the chances they become drowsy. Had the
Plaintiff and Class members known the truth, they would not have
bought the product or would have paid less for it.

Publix Super Markets, Inc. is a supermarket company, with a
principal place of business in Lakeland, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Will Wright, Esq.
         THE WRIGHT LAW OFFICE, P.A.
         515 N Flagler Dr Ste P300
         West Palm Beach FL 33401-4326
         Telephone: (561) 514-0904
         E-mail: willwright@wrightlawoffice.com

                - and –

         Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
         SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 Cuttermill Rd., Ste. 409
         Great Neck, NY 11021
         Telephone: (516) 268-7080
         E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

PULSE BIOSCIENCES: Faces Ngosiok Class Suit Over Share Price Drop
-----------------------------------------------------------------
VIRON BRYAN NGOSIOK, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. PULSE BIOSCIENCES, INC., DARRIN UECKER, and
SANDRA A. GARDINER, Case No. 3:22-cv-00959 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16,
2022) is a class action on behalf of persons and entities that
purchased or otherwise acquired Pulse securities between January
12, 2021 and February 7, 2022, inclusive pursuing claims against
the Defendants under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

In October 2020, Pulse initiated its investigational device
exemption ("IDE") study to evaluate the treatment of sebaceous
hyperplasia lesions using the CellFX System. The data from this
study was intended to support a 510(k) submission to expand the
indication for use of the CellFX System to treat sebaceous
hyperplasia lesions.

On February 8, 2022, before the market opened, Pulse announced that
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") concluded there was
insufficient clinical evidence to support the Company's 510(k)
submission to expand the label for the CellFX System to treat 27
sebaceous hyperplasia. Among other things, the FDA found "that the
Company had not met the primary endpoints of the sebaceous
hyperplasia FDA-approved IDE study."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $3.74, or over 34%, to
close at $7.12 per share on February 8, 2022, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants allegedly made materially
false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, the Defendants failed to disclose to
investors that the IDE study evaluating the use of the CellFX
System to treat sebaceous hyperplasia lesions failed to meet its
primary endpoints.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the suit says.

Plaintiff Ngosiok purchased Pulse securities during the Class
Period, and suffered damages as a result of the alleged federal
securities law violations and false and/or misleading statements
and/or material omissions.

Pulse is a bioelectric medicine company. Its only commercial
product is the CellFX System which uses the Company's proprietary
Nano-Pulse Stimulation technology ("NPS") to treat a variety of
applications. In February 2021, Pulse received clearance from the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") of the CellFX System for
dermatologic procedures requiring ablation and resurfacing of the
skin. The Individual Defendants are Officers of the company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: rprongay@glancylaw.com
                  clinehan@glancylaw.com
                  prajesh@glancylaw.com

QUALCOMM INC: Antitrust Suit Remanded to District Court
-------------------------------------------------------
Qualcomm Inc. disclosed in its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for
the quarterly period ended December 26, 2021, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 2, 2022, that the
Ninth Circuit remanded an anti-trust/unfair competition class
action case to the district court.

Since January 18, 2017, a number of consumer class action
complaints have been filed against Qualcomm Inc. in the United
States District Courts for the Southern and Northern Districts of
California, each on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of
cellular phones and other cellular devices. In April 2017, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases
that had been filed in the Southern District of California to the
Northern District of California. On July 11, 2017, the plaintiffs
filed a consolidated amended complaint alleging that the company
violated California and federal antitrust and unfair competition
laws by, among other things, refusing to license standard-essential
patents to the company's competitors, conditioning the supply of
certain of their baseband chipsets on the purchaser first agreeing
to license their entire patent portfolio, entering into exclusive
deals with companies, including Apple Inc., and charging
unreasonably high royalties that do not comply with their
commitments to standard setting organizations.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages and disgorgement and/or
restitution, as well as an order that the company be enjoined from
further unlawful conduct. On August 11, 2017, Qualcomm Inc. filed a
motion to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. On November
10, 2017, the court denied the motion, except to the extent that
certain claims seek damages under the Sherman Antitrust Act.

On July 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification, and on September 27, 2018, the court granted that
motion. On January 23, 2019, the Ninth Circuit granted the company
permission to appeal the court's class certification order, and on
January 24, 2019, the court stayed the case pending the appeal.

On December 2, 2019, a hearing on the appeal of the class
certification order was held before the Ninth Circuit, and on
September 29, 2021, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
class certification order, ruling that the court had failed to
correctly assess the propriety of applying California law to a
nationwide class. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court and instructed the court to consider the effect of
United States Federal Trade Commission v. QUALCOMM Incorporated
(which the Ninth Circuit decided in favor of Qualcomm in August
2020) on this case.

Qualcomm Inc. is into radio and TV broadcasting and communications
equipment based in California.


QUALCOMM INC: Faces Multiple Antitrust Suits
---------------------------------------------
Qualcomm Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended December 26, 2021, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on February 2, 2022, that a number of class
action complaints were filed against it alleging violations of
competition and consumer protection laws.

Since November 2017, several other consumer class action complaints
have been filed against the company in Canada (in the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice, the Supreme Court of British Columbia
and the Quebec Superior Court), Israel (in the Haifa District
Court) and the United Kingdom (in the Competition Appeal Tribunal),
each on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of cellular phones
and other cellular devices, alleging violations of certain of those
countries' competition and consumer protection laws. The claims in
these complaints are similar to those in the U.S. consumer class
action complaints. The complaints seek damages.

Qualcomm Inc. is into radio and TV broadcasting and communications
equipment based in California.


RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: Conditional Cert. Bid Nixed w/o Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WALONA HEATH, et al., v.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-00125-LAG (M.D.
Ga.), the Hon. Judge Leslie A. Gardner entered an order denying
without prejudice the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification.

The Court said, "In support of their assertion that there are
similarly situated employees, the Plaintiffs present only (1)
"unsupported assertions" that lack evidentiary footing and (2) that
there would be additional plaintiffs. Although their burden at this
stage is "not heavy," the Plaintiffs have failed to provide
"detailed allegations supported by affidavits" or any other
evidence, and their unsupported allegations do not suffice for
conditional certification. The Court will therefore exercise its
discretion and deny conditional certification of a collective
action."

The Plaintiffs Heath, Mays, and Henderson initiated this action
against Defendant on July 7, 2020, on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated individuals. They allege that Defendant
violated the Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938 (FLSA), "repeatedly
and willfully" by failing to count their and other similarly
situated employees' waiting time in violation of the FLSA’s
overtime provisions and failing to calculate and pay their properly
for the hours that they and other similarly situated employees
worked, the Plaintiffs contend.

The Plaintiffs work for the Defendant as drivers.

Resource Management Systems operates non-emergency transit systems
in 15 southwest Georgia counties.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oKUAeo at no extra charge.[CC]

SAFETY-KLEEN: Fails to Pay Premium OT Wages, Logan Labor Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
Craig Logan, Love Williams, Thomas Murphy, Kevin Miller, Andrew
Tyson, Louis Wells, Clarence Fisher and Robert Reid, on behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated v. Safety-Kleen
Systems, Inc., and Clean Harbors, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-00868
(E.D.N.Y., Feb. 16, 2022) seeks compensation for wages paid at less
than the statutory minimum wage, unpaid wages for overtime work,
and liquidated damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs complain that they are each entitled, under the
applicable state laws of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, to
(i) compensation for wages paid at less than the statutory minimum
wage; (ii) back wages for overtime work for which defendants
willfully failed to pay overtime premium pay as required by
applicable state law (and the supporting regulations); (iii) unpaid
spread-of-hours compensation for shifts worked lasting in excess of
10 hours from start to finish in the state of New York; (iv)
liquidated damages pursuant to applicable state law for these
violations; and (iv) statutory damages for the defendants'
violations of the Wage Theft Prevention Act in New York and
similarly applicable Pennsylvania and New Jersey law.

The Collective Action Members are similarly situated to the
Plaintiffs in that they were employed by the defendants as
non-exempt employees, and were denied payment at the statutory
minimum wage and/or were denied premium overtime pay for hours
worked beyond 40 hours in a week, says the suit.

Clean Harbors operates an environmental and industrial services
business, including waste handling and disposal, throughout North
America.

Clean Harbors' wholly owned subsidiary, Safety-Kleen, provides
environmental services nationwide, including the re-refining and
recycling of oil and parts washing services. In 2012, Safety-Kleen
was acquired by Clean Harbors, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Samuel, Esq.
          THE SAMUEL LAW FIRM
          1441 Broadway, Suite 6085
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 563-9884
          E-mail: michael@thesamuellawfirm.com

SAGINAW, MI: Bid to Direct Notice of Class Certification OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALISON PATRICIA TAYLOR v.
CITY OF SAGINAW and TABITHA HOSKINS, Case No. 1:17-cv-11067-TLL-PTM
(E.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge Thomas L. Ludington entered an order
granting the Plaintiff's motion to direct class notice.

Further, the Court ordered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c), that:

   1. The Plaintiff's proposed postcard, and the long-form
      notice to which that postcard refers, are approved as
      class notice sufficient for purposes of Federal Rule of
      Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B).

   2. The Plaintiff is directed to make all necessary
      arrangements for the mailing of postcards to all addresses
      associated with the payment of a City parking ticket
      within the class period. Such postcards must be
      substantially identical in form and substance to
      Plaintiff's proposed postcard, and must be mailed on or
      before March 15, 2022.

   3. The Plaintiff is directed to make all necessary
      arrangements for the publication of a notice in a local
      newspaper of general circulation. Such notice must consist
      of language substantially identical in form and substance
      to Plaintiff's proposed postcard, and must be published
      weekly beginning the week of March 15, 2022, until the
      termination of the opt-out period.

   4. The Defendant City of Saginaw is directed to broadcast a
      notice on Saginaw Government Television (SGTV). Such
      notice must consist of language substantially identical in
      form and substance to Plaintiff's proposed postcard, and
      must be broadcast as part of SGTV's regularly scheduled
      programming, at least once a day, beginning on March 15,
      2022, until the termination of the opt-out period,
      identified below.

   5. The opt-out period for the subclass shall TERMINATE on
      April 15, 2022. Purported opt-out notices must be
      postmarked no later than April 15, 2022, to be effective.

This is a putative class action challenging an age-old practice in
parking enforcement: tire- chalking. On behalf of herself and a
class of similarly situated motorists, the Plaintiff Taylor alleges
that the City of Saginaw violated the Fourth Amendment by chalking
the tires of vehicles to record how long they had been parked.

In addition to naming the City as a Defendant, Plaintiff also names
the City's "most prolific [parking-ticket] issuer," Tabitha
Hoskins, who allegedly ticketed Plaintiff times. In January 2022,
this Court granted Plaintiff's motion for class certification,
certifying two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b):
(1) a primary, non-damages class and (2) a damages subclass.

The primary class is defined as:

   "All persons (excluding the presiding judicial officer, his
   staff, the case counsel and their staff) who had and/or will
   have a vehicle tire chalked by a City of Saginaw parking
   enforcement officer, without a warrant, from April 5, 2014 to
   present."

The subclass is defined as:

   "All persons within the [primary] class who paid a parking
   ticket from April 5, 2014 to present as a result of the
   warrantless chalking of vehicle tire(s).

The primary class was certified under (b)(2), while the subclass
was certified under (b)(3). Id. at PageID.2248.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3rLUNju at no extra charge.[CC]


SAM MOON: Underpays Assistant Managers, Chang FLSA Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHAN I. CHANG and HYUN JU CHANG, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SAM MOON TRADING
ENTERPRISES, LTD., Defendant, Case No. 3:22-cv-00359-S (N.D. Tex.,
February 14, 2022) is a class action against the Defendant for
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to compensate
the Plaintiff and similarly situated assistant managers overtime
pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

Plaintiffs Chan I. Chang and Hyun Ju Chang were employed as
assistant managers by the Defendant from 2011 until January of 2022
and from March of 2006 until December of 2021, respectively.

Sam Moon Trading Enterprises, Ltd. is an operator of retail stores
in Texas, with its principal address located at 2605 Lyndon B.
Johnson Freeway, Suite A, Dallas, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Philip Bohrer, Esq.
         Scott E. Brady, Esq.
         BOHRER BRADY, LLC
         8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
         Baton Rouge, TX 70809
         Telephone: (225) 925-5297
         Facsimile: (225) 231-7000
         E-mail: phil@bohrerbrady.com
                 scott@bohrerbrady.com

                  - and –

         Jay D. Ellwanger, Esq.
         David Henderson, Esq.
         ELLWANGER LAW LLLP
         400 S. Zang Blvd., Suite 600
         Dallas, TX 75208
         Telephone: (737) 808-2260
         Facsimile: (737) 808-2260
         E-mail: jellwanger@equalrights.law
                 dhenderson@equalrights.law

SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Plan to Distribute $65MM Baker Deal OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled LOU BAKER, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 14-cv-2129-MMA (AGS) (S.D.
Cal.), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California grants the Class Representatives' Motion for Approval of
Distribution Plan.

The Motion is made pursuant to Paragraph 28 of the Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement dated Feb. 11, 2020.

By its Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Class
Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation; and Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses dated July 24,
2020, and its Judgment and Order of Dismissal dated July 24, 2020,
the Court approved the terms of the Settlement and the proposed
plan for allocating the net settlement proceeds to eligible Class
Members ("Plan of Allocation").

The Court directed the parties to consummate the terms of the
Settlement and Plan of Allocation.

The Settlement provided for consideration of $65 million in cash
and, pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, the Settlement
Amount was deposited into an escrow account established by Class
Counsel for the benefit of the Class.

As set forth in the mailed Postcard Notice and the posted Notice of
(I) Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Fairness Hearing; and
(III) Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses, the
deadline for Class Members to submit Claims to the Court-appointed
claims administrator for the Settlement, Epiq Class Action & Claims
Solutions, Inc., in order to be potentially eligible to participate
in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund has passed.

In satisfaction of due process requirements, all Class Members who
submitted Claims that were in any way ineligible or deficient were:
(i) informed that their Claims were ineligible or deficient; and
(ii) given opportunities to correct any curable deficiencies prior
to their Claims being finally rejected, or to contest the
determination as to such deficiencies, by requesting judicial
review;

The process of reviewing Claims has been completed.

Class Representatives, through Class Counsel, now seek
authorization to distribute the proceeds of the Settlement Fund to
Authorized Claimants, after deduction of any taxes, fees, and
expenses previously approved by the Court or approved by this Order
("Net Settlement Fund"). The Court retained jurisdiction over this
Action, the Parties, and each of the Class Members for all matters
relating to this Action, including any motion to approve the Class
Distribution Order.

Upon careful consideration of: (i) the Declaration of Nicholas
Schmidt in Support of Class Representatives' Unopposed Motion for
Approval of Distribution Plan submitted on behalf of Epiq ("Schmidt
Declaration"); (ii) the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Class Representatives' Unopposed Motion for Approval of
Distribution Plan; and (iii) the other submissions and papers on
file with the Court; and upon all prior proceedings theretofore and
therein, and after due deliberation, the Court grants Class
Representatives' motion and orders that all capitalized terms not
otherwise defined will have the same meanings as set forth in the
Stipulation and in the Schmidt Declaration.

The administrative determinations of Epiq accepting the Claims
described in the Schmidt Declaration and listed on Exhibits C-1 and
C-2 thereto, calculated pursuant to the Court-approved Plan of
Allocation set forth in the Notice, are approved, and said Claims
are accepted. The administrative determinations of Epiq rejecting
the Claims described in the Schmidt Declaration and listed on
Exhibit C-3 thereto are approved, and said Claims are rejected.

Epiq will be paid the sum of $17,833 from the Net Settlement Fund
as payment for its fees and expenses to be incurred in conducting
the Initial Distribution of the Net Settlement Fund.

Epiq will conduct the Initial Distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund as set forth in the Schmidt Declaration. As set forth in the
Schmidt Declaration, 90% of the Net Settlement Fund will be
distributed in the Initial Distribution and the remaining 10% of
the Net Settlement Fund will be held in reserve in order to address
any claims administration-related contingencies that may arise
following the Initial Distribution. Any Authorized Claimant who
would have received a distribution of $10 or more, but less than
$100 based on the total amount of the Net Settlement Fund will be
paid their full award now ("Claims Paid in Full") and will not
receive any future distributions from the Net Settlement Fund. Any
Authorized Claimant who would have received a distribution of $100
or more based on the total amount of the Net Settlement Fund will
be paid 90% of their award now.

The Net Settlement Fund will be distributed to the Authorized
Claimants listed on Exhibits C-1 and C-2 to the Schmidt Declaration
pursuant to the Court-approved Plan of Allocation in proportion to
each Authorized Claimant's Recognized Claim as compared to the
total Recognized Claims of all Authorized Claimants as shown on
such Exhibits.

All checks to Authorized Claimants issued in the Initial
Distribution will bear the notation "DEPOSIT PROMPTLY, VOID AND
SUBJECT TO RE-DISTRIBUTION IF NOT NEGOTIATED BY [DATE 90 DAYS AFTER
ISSUE DATE]." Class Counsel and Epiq are authorized to take
appropriate actions to locate and/or contact any Authorized
Claimant who has not cashed his, her, or its check within said
time.

Authorized Claimants, who do not cash their checks within the time
allotted, will irrevocably forfeit all recovery from the
Settlement.

After making reasonable and diligent efforts to have Authorized
Claimants negotiate their Initial Distribution checks, but not
earlier than nine months after the Initial Distribution, Epiq will,
if cost-effective to do so, redistribute any funds remaining in the
Net Settlement Fund, including from the Reserve and all uncashed
checks, to Authorized Claimants who have cashed their Initial
Distribution checks and who would receive at least $10 from such
redistribution based on their pro rata share of the remaining
funds, after deducting Epiq's fees and expenses incurred in
connection with administering the Settlement for which it has not
yet been paid (including the costs for such redistribution), and
after deducting any estimated taxes, the costs of preparing
appropriate tax returns and any escrow fees.

Epiq may make additional distributions of balances remaining in the
Net Settlement Fund to Authorized Claimants who have cashed their
prior checks and who would receive at least $10 on such additional
distributions if Class Counsel, in consultation with Epiq,
determines that additional distributions, after deducting any fees
and expenses as described above, would be cost-effective.

At such time as Class Counsel, in consultation with Epiq, determine
that further distribution of the funds remaining in the Net
Settlement Fund is not cost-effective, any otherwise valid Claims
received after Sept. 30, 2021, or Claims adjusted after Sept. 30,
2021, may be paid in accordance with the Schmidt Declaration.

Any balance that remains in the Net Settlement Fund after further
distributions or payment of any otherwise valid Claims received
after Sept. 30, 2021, or Claims adjusted after Sept. 30, 2021, in
accordance with the Schmidt Declaration, which is not
cost-effective to reallocate, will be contributed, after deducting
any fees and expenses as described, to non-sectarian,
not-for-profit organization(s) recommended by Class Counsel and
approved by the Court.

The Court finds that the administration of the Settlement and the
proposed distribution of the Net Settlement Fund comply with the
terms of the Stipulation and the Plan of Allocation and that all
persons and entities involved in the review, verification,
calculation, tabulation, or any other aspect of the processing of
the Claims submitted in connection with the Settlement of this
Action, or who are otherwise involved in the administration or
taxation of the Settlement Fund or the Net Settlement Fund are
released and discharged from any and all claims arising out of such
involvement, and, pursuant to the release terms of the Settlement,
all Class Members, whether or not they are to receive payment from
the Net Settlement Fund, are barred from making any further claims
against the Net Settlement Fund or the parties released pursuant to
the Settlement beyond the amount allocated to them pursuant to this
Order.

Epiq is authorized to destroy paper copies of Claims and all
supporting documentation one year after the Second Distribution of
the Net Settlement Fund, if that occurs, or, if there is no Second
Distribution, two years after the Initial Distribution and all
electronic copies of the same one year after all funds have been
distributed.

The Court retains jurisdiction over any further application or
matter which may arise in connection with this Action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bdfjxttd from Leagle.com.


SENTINEL TRANSPORTATION: Crocitto Must Reply to Show Cause Order
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Lee Crocitto v. Sentinel
Transportation, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-04648-MEMF-PVC (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Percy Anderson entered an order directing the
plaintiff to show cause in writing why plaintiff's class
allegations should not be stricken for failure to timely file a
Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiff's response to the order to show cause shall be filed
no later than February 22, 2022. The Plaintiff's failure to
adequately or timely respond to this Order by that date will,
without further warning, result in the Court striking plaintiff's
class allegations, the Court says.

The Plaintiff commenced this action on behalf of himself and a
putative class. On July 13, 2021, the Court issued a Minute Order
and a Civil Trial Scheduling Order. In the Court's July 13, 2021
Minute Order, the Court set a deadline of October 12, 2021, for the
plaintiff to file a motion for class certification.

Sentinel is located in Wilmington, Delaware and is part of the
general freight trucking industry.

A copy of the Civil Minutes -- General dated Feb. 8, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LwgWKv at no
extra charge.[CC]

SIRIUS XM: Flo & Eddie Copyright Suit vs Subsidiary Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sirius XM Holdings Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K Annual Report
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 1, 2022, that a
class action lawsuit alleging Pandora Media LLC, its wholly-owned
subsidiary, violated their alleged exclusive copyright ownership
rights to the reproduction and public performance of sound
recordings was dismissed with prejudice on October 6, 2021.

On October 2, 2014, Flo & Eddie Inc. filed a class action suit
against Pandora in the federal district court for the Central
District of California. The complaint alleges a violation of
California Civil Code Section 980, unfair competition,
misappropriation and conversion in connection with the public
performance of sound recordings recorded prior to February 15, 1972
(pre-1972 recordings). On December 19, 2014, Pandora filed a motion
to strike the complaint pursuant to California's Anti-Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute, which
following denial of Pandora's motion was appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. In March 2017, the Ninth Circuit
requested certification to the California Supreme Court on the
substantive legal questions. The California Supreme Court accepted
certification. In May 2019, the California Supreme Court issued an
order dismissing consideration of the certified questions on the
basis that, following the enactment of the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob
Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (MMA), Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132
Stat. 3676 (2018), resolution of the questions posed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals was no longer "necessary to settle an
important question of law."

The MMA grants a potential federal preemption defense to the claims
asserted in the aforementioned lawsuits. In July 2019, Pandora took
steps to avail itself of this preemption defense, including making
the required payments under the MMA for certain of its uses of
pre-1972 recordings. Based on the federal preemption contained in
the MMA (along with other considerations), Pandora asked the Ninth
Circuit to order the dismissal of the Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora
Media, Inc. case. On October 17, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals issued a memorandum disposition concluding that the
question of whether the MMA preempts Flo and Eddie's claims
challenging Pandora's performance of pre-1972 recordings "depends
on various unanswered factual questions" and remanded the case to
the District Court for further proceedings.

In October 2020, the District Court denied Pandora's renewed motion
to dismiss the case under California's anti-SLAPP statute, finding
the case no longer qualified for anti-SLAPP due to intervening
changes in the law, and denied Pandora's renewed attempt to end the
case. Alternatively, the District Court ruled that the preemption
defense likely did not apply to Flo & Eddie's claims, in part
because the District Court believed that the MMA did not apply
retroactively. Pandora promptly appealed the District Court's
decision to the Ninth Circuit, and moved to stay appellate briefing
pending the appeal of a related case against Sirius XM. On January
13, 2021, the Ninth Circuit issued an order granting the stay of
appellate proceedings pending the resolution of a related case
against Sirius XM.

On August 23, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit issued an Opinion in a related case, Flo & Eddie Inc.
v. Sirius XM Radio Inc. The related case also concerned a class
action suit brought by Flo & Eddie Inc. regarding the public
performance of pre-1972 recordings under California law. Relying on
California's copyright statute, Flo & Eddie argued that California
law gave it the "exclusive ownership" of its pre-1972 songs,
including the right of public performance. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the District Court's grant of partial summary judgment to
Flo & Eddie Inc. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court in
this related case erred in concluding that "exclusive ownership"
under California's copyright statute included the right of public
performance. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for entry of
judgment consistent with the terms of the parties' contingent
settlement agreement, and on October 6, 2021, the parties to the
related case stipulated to its dismissal with prejudice.

Sirius XM Holdings Inc. is a radio broadcasting station based in
New York.


SOCLEAN INC: Ieyoub Consumer Suit Moved From E.D. La. to W.D. Pa.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled TIMOTHY IEYOUB, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. SOCLEAN, INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-02053,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania on February 14, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-00272-JFC to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, breach of warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law by marketing a defective
continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) sanitizing device.

SoClean, Inc. is a manufacturer of cleaning devices, with its
principal place of business at 12 Vose Farm Road, Peterborough, New
Hampshire. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Peter J. Wanek, Esq.
         Lindsay G. Faulkner, Esq.
         Megan T. Jaynes, Esq.
         WANEK KIRSCH DAVIES LLC
         1340 Poydras St., Ste. 2000
         New Orleans, LA 70112
         Telephone: (504) 324-6493
         Facsimile: (504) 324-6626
         E-mail: pwanek@wkdlawfirm.com
                 lfaulkner@wkdlawfirm.com
                 mjaynes@wkdlawfirm.com

SOCLEAN INC: Lange Suit Moved From D. Arizona to W.D. Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled DORIAN LANGE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. SOCLEAN, INC., Case No. 3:21-cv-08242,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania on February 14, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-00274-JFC to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, breach of warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and violation of the Consumer Fraud Act by
marketing a defective continuous positive airway pressure
sanitizing device.

SoClean, Inc. is a manufacturer of cleaning devices, with its
principal place of business at 12 Vose Farm Road, Peterborough, New
Hampshire. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Mark A. Kille, Esq.
         MINGUS MOUNTAIN LAW GROUP, PLLC
         7550 East Addis Avenue
         Prescott Valley, AZ 86314
         Telephone: (928) 775-9398
         Facsimile: (928) 775-9817
         E-mail: docket@northernarizonainjurylaw.com

                 - and –

         Michael C. Rader, Esq.
         Edward "Kip" Robertson, Esq.
         Edward "Chip" Robertson, Esq.
         James P. Frickleton, Esq.
         BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON RADER, P.C.
         4000 W. 114th St., Suite 310
         Leawood, KS 66211-2298
         Telephone: (913) 266-2300
         Facsimile: (913) 266-2366
         E-mail: mrader@bflawfirm.com
                 krobertson@bflawfirm.com
                 crobertson@bflawfirm.com
                 jimf@bflawfirm.com

                 - and –

         Brett Votava, Esq.
         Andrew Nantz, Esq.
         Todd Johnson, Esq.
         VOTAVA, NANTZ & JOHNSON, LLC
         9237 Ward Parkway, Suite 100
         Kansas City, MO 64114
         Telephone: (816) 895-8800
         Facsimile: (816) 895-8801
         E-mail: bvotava@vnjlaw.com
                 andrew@vnjlaw.com
                 tjohnson@vnjlaw.com

SPOTIFY TECHNOLOGY: Ferrick Copyright Suit Settlement Final
-----------------------------------------------------------
Spotify Technology S.A. disclosed in its Form 20-F Annual Report
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022, that as of
April 2019, Spotify's settlement of the "Ferrick et al. v. Spotify
USA Inc.," Case No. 1:16-cv-8412-AJN, S.D. N.Y., putative class
action lawsuit, which alleged that Spotify unlawfully reproduced
and distributed musical compositions without obtaining licenses,
was final and effective.

Spotify Technology S.A. is a radio broadcasting station based in
Luxembourg.


STATE FARM: Court Refuses to Dismiss Schwartz's 2nd Amended Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANA SCHWARTZ, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00328-KWR-SCY
(D.N.M.), Judge Kea W. Riggs of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, filed Nov. 5, 2021.

I. Background

The class action arises out of a dispute over "underinsured
motorist coverage." The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant
misrepresented or failed to adequately explain to her and similarly
situated class members the extent of "underinsured motorist"
coverage when purchased at the minimum level of $25,000.

The Plaintiff was the victim of a car crash on Dec. 11, 2012. While
the Plaintiff was stopped at a red light on Academy Blvd. in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, the tortfeasor attempted to slip between
her and another stopped car, crashing into both. She received
$25,000 in compensation from the tortfeasor's minimum liability
policy. Because she alleges her damages were in excess of $25,000,
she apparently sought benefits from her own uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage from her insurance company,
Defendant State Farm. Her policy with the Defendant included
minimum limit uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage
($25,000).

The Defendant allegedly denied coverage according to the insurance
policy and New Mexico law, because the amount received from
tortfeasor's minimum liability insurance was offset against the
Plaintiff's $25,000 uninsured and underinsured policy. Defendant
State Farm claims to have paid under the underinsured motorist
provisions for property damage, but the Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant denied underinsured motorist coverage for bodily harm.

The Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant misrepresented the
nature of underinsured motorist coverage she purchased, causing her
to reasonably expect that the purchased coverage would compensate
her for damages that were greater than the limits of the
tortfeasor's liability limits. She claims that the Defendant did
not inform her of the limited nature of underinsured motorist
coverage when purchased at the minimum level.

The Plaintiff's complaint asserted the following claims: Count I:
Negligence; Count II: Violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act
(N.M.S.A.1978, Section 57-12-2); Count III: Violations of the
Unfair Insurance Practices Act (N.M.S.A.1978, Sections 59A-16-1 et
seq.) (UIPA); Count IV: Breach of Contract and Claim for Motorist
Coverage; Count V: Breach of Contract and Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing; Count VI: Injunctive Relief; Count VII:
Declaratory Judgment; and Count VIII: Punitive Damages.

The Court denied in part and granted in part the Defendant's first
motion to dismiss. The Court concluded that "the majority of the
Plaintiff's claims (Counts I, II, and portions of III) state a
plausible claim for relief. However, the Court will dismiss Counts
IV, V, and VI, because the Plaintiff only pled a bare, formulaic
recitation of the elements of the claims, with leave to amend.
Moreover, the Court dismisses several claims under Count III (NMSA
Section 59A-16-20(B)-(D)) with leave to amend, and dismisses with
prejudice the claim pursuant to Section 59A-16-20(E)."

Judge Johnson found that the "Plaintiff is not objecting to the
offset provision, but to the Defendant's misrepresentations or
failure to disclose that the coverage at the minimum level was
generally worthless." "The policy does not spell out that the
underinsured motorist provision is effectively non-existent, under
circumstances where both the tortfeasor and the insured have
minimum liability limits."

Although the Court dismissed portions of Count III, IV, V, and VI,
it gave leave to amend to fix the deficiencies identified in the
opinion.

The Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, repleading her
claims except for NMSA Section 59A-16-20(B)-(D)) under Count III.

In Crutcher v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., et al., Case No.:
18-cv-00412-JCH-LF (D.N.M.), District Judge Judith C. Herrera
certified the following questions to the New Mexico Supreme Court:
Under N.M. Stat. Ann. Section 66-5-301, is underinsured motorist
coverage on a policy that offers only minimum UM/UIM limits of
$25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident illusory for an insured who
sustains more than $25,000 in damages caused by a minimally insured
tortfeasor because of the offset recognized in Schmick v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and, if so, may insurers
charge a premium for that non-accessible underinsured motorist
coverage?

The matter was stayed pending the New Mexico Supreme Court's
answer. The New Mexico Supreme Court answered this question. The
New Mexico Supreme Court answered the question, concluding that (1)
underinsured motorist coverage at the minimum limits was illusory
in the sense that it was misleading to the average insured, but (2)
the future sale of such insurance was lawfully permitted as long as
the limitations of minimum limits underinsured motorist coverage
were disclosed to insureds in the form of an "exclusion."

The Defendant moved to dismiss the claims in the case again.

II. Analysis

A. Crutcher v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. does not mandate dismissal of
the claims in this case.

The Defendant asserts that the Court should dismiss all claims in
the case in light of the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in
Crutcher.

Judge Riggs disagrees and concludes that Crutcher generally
supports the Plaintiff's claims. She says, Crutcher was consistent
with the Court's prior decision in the case that "merely reading
the offset provision in the policy would not inform an insured that
the underinsured motorist coverage she purchased at the minimum
level would in fact have little to no value."

Moreover, the Defendant's argument ignores the reasoning of the
rest of the Crutcher opinion. The New Mexico Supreme Court
concluded that the minimum limit underinsured motorist coverage in
Crutcher was illusory in the sense that it was misleading to the
average insured. The Defendant appears to believe that the New
Mexico Supreme Court gave it immunity from misrepresentation claims
as to its minimum limit underinsured motorist coverage. Such
immunity would be inconsistent with the New Mexico Supreme Court's
reasoning that the sale of minimum level underinsured motorist
coverage was misleading to insureds and the statutory language did
not provide insurers with immunity.

Judge Riggs also does not believe that the singular use of the word
"hereafter" rises to the level generally used by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in announcing that a rule is prospective. Generally,
New Mexico has expressly stated when a case applies prospectively
and explained with reasoned analysis why it applies prospectively.
Therefore, Judge Riggs finds that the New Mexico Supreme Court did
not expressly state that Crutcher applies prospectively as to
misrepresentation claims.

In sum, Judge Riggs concludes that the presumption of retroactive
application has not been overcome as to the misrepresentation
claims. In other word, Crutcher does not provide Defendant with
immunity for misrepresentation claims which arose pre-Crutcher.
B. The Court already found that Plaintiff stated a plausible claim
as to Counts I, II, and III, and it will not revisit that
decision.

The Court found that the Plaintiff stated a plausible claim as to
Counts I, II, and portions of Count III1, and allowed her to file
an amended complaint to fix deficiencies in other counts. The
Defendant now argues that the Court should review Counts I-III and
dismiss them in light of Crutcher. However, Crutcher supports the
Court's decision not to dismiss Counts I, II, and III. Crutcher
provided that underinsured motorist coverage was illusory in that
it was misleading or misrepresented the extent of coverage to the
insured. Therefore, Crutcher supports the Court's prior decision,
and does not provide a basis to reconsider the decision that the
Plaintiff stated a plausible claim as to Counts I, II, and III.

The Defendant argues that the policy provision in Crutcher is
different from the one in the case. But the Court already found
that the Plaintiff pled a plausible claim that the policy in the
case was misleading. The policy in the case contained an offset
provision. The Crutcher court found that an average insured would
not understand that the offset rule meant they would not receive
underinsured motorist coverage.

C. Court declines to dismiss Breach of Contract (Count IV) and Good
Faith and Fair Dealing (Count V) claims.

The Defendant argues that the breach of contract and good faith and
fair dealing claims should be dismissed, as the Plaintiff failed to
fix the deficiencies identified by Judge Johnson.

Judge Riggs disagrees and declines to dismiss these claims. She
agrees that the Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that the
contract was ambiguous. Although the Defendant purported to sell
minimum limit underinsured motorist coverage, the offset provision
meant that little to no underinsured motorist coverage would in
fact be provided. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant charged
a premium for underinsured motorist coverage, despite the fact that
the offset provision meant that Defendant would not pay out claims
under the underinsured motorist provision. At this procedural
stage, Judge Riggs accepts these well pled factual allegations as
true. Therefore, she declines to dismiss the breach of contract and
good faith and fair dealing claims.

D. Injunctive Relief (Count VI).

The Defendant argues that the injunctive relief claim is now moot
after the Crutcher court ordered insurers to disclose the
limitations of minimum limit underinsured motorist coverage. The
complaint does not allege whether the Defendant has complied with
that directive. At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court may not take
evidence to determine whether the Defendant is in fact remedying
the misrepresentations. Therefore, Judge Riggs declines to dismiss
the Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief as moot. Moreover,
the Plaintiff has amended her complaint to allege irreparable harm,
which fixes the deficiencies identified by the Court.

E. Declaratory Judgment Claim (Count VII).

The Defendant asserts that the Court should dismiss the claim for
declaratory judgment because her substantive claims fail and
Crutcher has mooted her claim for declaratory relief.

The Court has not dismissed any of the substantive claims under the
Second Amendment Complaint, and declaratory relief is not moot
following Crutcher, as the Defendant appears to continue to contest
the matters in the case.

F. Punitive Damages (Count VIII).

The Defendant requests that the Court dismisses Count VIII, under
which the Plaintiff requests punitive damages. In its prior
opinion, the Court allowed the Plaintiff to seek punitive damages
although it recognized that punitive damages are not an independent
cause of action. Punitive damages are potentially allowable under
multiple claims in the action. The Plaintiff has plausibly pled
punitive damages, therefore Judge Riggs declines to dismiss this
claim.

III. Conclusion

The Plaintiff states plausible claims as to the counts asserted in
her Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, Judge Riggs declines to
dismiss any claims. She denied State Farm's Motion to Dismiss for
reasons described in her Memorandum Opinion and Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/s2h5at6j from
Leagle.com.


SUBURBAN PROPANE: Court Dismisses Electricity Pricing Case
----------------------------------------------------------
Suburban Propane Partners LP disclosed in its Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended December 25, 2021, filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 3, 2022,
that the class action lawsuit against the company alleging a number
of claims under various consumer statutes and common law was
dismissed by the Northern District Court of New York.

Suburban Propane Partners' natural gas and electricity business is
currently a defendant in a putative class action suit in the
Northern District of New York.  The complaint alleges a number of
claims under various consumer statutes and common law in New York
and Pennsylvania regarding pricing offered to electricity customers
in those states.  

The complaint was dismissed in part by the district court, but
causes of action based on the New York consumer statute and breach
of contract were allowed to proceed.

Suburban Propane Partners LP is in to retail marketing and
distribution of propane, fuel oil and refined fuels, as well as the
marketing of natural gas and electricity in deregulated markets
based in New Jersey


TARGET CORPORATION: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Cumberbatch Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH CUMBERBATCH, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 1:22-cv-01236 (S.D.N.Y., February 14, 2022) is a class
action against the Defendant for its failure to timely pay wages in
violation of the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a manual worker at a
Target store location in New York, New York from approximately July
2021 to October 2021.

Target Corporation is an American big box department store chain,
headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Yitzchak Kopel, Esq.
         Alec M. Leslie, Esq.
         BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
         888 Seventh Avenue
         New York, NY 10019
         Telephone: (646) 837-7150
         Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
         E-mail: ykopel@bursor.com
                 aleslie@bursor.com

TAYLOR CORPORATION: Mismanaged 401(k) Plan, Fritton ERISA Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JASON C. FRITTON, MAREA GIBSON, BRIAN W. MOTZENBEEKER, DAWN DUFF,
and CHRISTOPHER SHEARMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TAYLOR CORPORATION, the BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF TAYLOR CORPORATION, the FIDUCIARY INVESTMENT
COMMITTEE, and JOHN DOES 1-30, Defendants, Case No. 0:22-cv-00415
(D. Minn., February 14, 2022) is a class action against the
Defendants for breaches of their fiduciary duties under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

According to the complaint, the Defendants breached the duties they
owed to the Taylor Companies 401(k) and Profit Sharing Plan, to the
Plaintiffs, and other Plan participants by failing to adequately
monitor and control the Plan's administrative and recordkeeping
costs. The Plan's per participant administrative and recordkeeping
fees were unreasonable when benchmarked against similar plans.
Throughout the Class period, the Defendants should have known of
the existence and availability of lower-cost share classes but
failed to promptly transfer the Plan's investments into these less
expensive share classes. The Defendants' alleged failure to select
the lowest-cost share class available caused Plan participants to
pay excessive fees, which has and will continue to diminish the
value of their individual 401(k) accounts.

Taylor Corporation is a printing company, with its principal place
of business at 1725 Roe Crest Drive, North Mankato, Minnesota.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
         Daniel C. Hedlund, Esq.
         David A. Goodwin, Esq.
         Tony J. Stauber, Esq.
         GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
         120 South Sixth Street, Suite 2600
         Minneapolis, MN 55402
         E-mail: dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com
                 dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com
                 dgoodwin@gustafsongluek.com
                 tstauber@gustafsongluek.com

                 - and –

         Eric Lechtzin, Esq.
         Marc H. Edelson, Esq.
         EDELSON LECHTZIN LLP
         3 Terry Drive, Suite 205
         Newtown, PA 18940
         Telephone: (215) 867-2399
         Facsimile: (267) 685-0676
         E-mail: elechtzin@edelson-law.com
                 medelson@edelson-law.com

                 - and –

         Mark K. Gyandoh, Esq.
         CAPOZZI ADLER, P.C.
         312 Old Lancaster Road
         Merion Station, PA 19066
         Telephone: (610) 890-0200
         Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
         E-mail: markg@capozziadler.com

                 - and –

         Donald R. Reavey, Esq.
         2933 North Front Street
         Harrisburg, PA 17110
         Telephone: (717) 233-4101
         Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
         E-mail: donr@capozziadler.com

TIVITY HEALTH: Seeks Reschedule on Class Cert Evidentiary Hearing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT STROUGO,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
TIVITY HEALTH, INC., et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-00165 (M.D. Tenn.),
the Defendants ask the Court to enter an order rescheduling the
evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

On February 3, 2022, the Court entered an Order setting an
evidentiary hearing on Tuesday, March 8, 2022 at 9 a.m., in part,
to allow Defendants' expert, Professor Paul Gompers, to testify.

Professor Gompers has teaching responsibility on the scheduled
date, and is, thus, unavailable for an in-person hearing on March
8, 2022, the Defendants contend.

The Defendants have conferred with Plaintiff's counsel and
Professor Gompers regarding alternative dates for a rescheduled
hearing. The parties and necessary witnesses are all available
March 3, March 9, April 6, April 7, or April 8 for the rescheduled
hearing.

Tivity Health is a provider of health  improvement, fitness and
social engagement solutions. Tivity Health is headquartered in
Franklin, Tennessee with offices in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania
and Chandler, Arizona.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Feb. 4, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JcOo6U at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher Wood, Esq.
          Darren J. Robbins, Esq.
          Sara B. Polychron, Esq.
          Caroline M. Robert, Esq.
          Michael Albert, Esq.
          Danielle S. Myers, Esq.
          Shawn A. Williams, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
          & DOWD LLP
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-2203
          E-mail: cwood@rgrdlaw.com
                  darrenr@rgrdlaw.com
                  spolychron@rgrdlaw.com
                  crobert@rgrdlaw.com
                  malbert@rgrdlaw.com
                  danim@rgrdlaw.com
                  shawnw@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Jerry E. Martin, Esq.
          BARRETT JOHNSON MARTIN &
          GARRISON LLC
          Philips Plaza
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-2202
          E-mail: jmartin@barrettjohnston.com

               - and -

          Michael E. Heffernan, Esq.
          ALLOTTA FARLEY CO., L.P.A.
          2222 Centennial Road
          Toledo, OH 43617
          Telephone: (419) 535-0075
          E-mail: mheffernan@allottafarley.com

               - and -

          Brian Schall, Esq.
          SCHALL LAW FIRM
          2049 Century Park East
          Suite 2460
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 301-3335
          E-mail: brian@schallfirm.com

               - and -

          Guillaume Buell, Esq.
          David Bricker, Esq.
          THORNTON LAW FIRM LLP
          1 Lincoln Street
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 720-1333
          E-mail: gbuell@tenlaw.com
                  dbricker@tenlaw.com

               - and -

          John Tate Spragens, Esq.
          SPRAGENS LAW PLC
          311 22nd Ave. N.
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 983-8900
          E-mail: john@spragenslaw.com

               - and -

          Madeline Korber, Esq.
          THAV GROSS PC
          30150 Telegraph Road, Suite 444
          Bingham Farms, MI 48025
          Telephone: (617) 720-1333
          E-mail: mkorber@tenlaw.com

               - and -

          Gustavo F. Bruckner, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood, II, Esq.
          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          E-mail: gfbruckner@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Paul Kent Bramlett, Esq.
          BRAMLETT LAW OFFICES
          40 Burton Hills Blvd., Suite 200
          P O Box 150734
          Nashville, TN 37215
          Telephone: (615) 248-2828
          E-mail: pknashlaw@aol.com
                  robert@bramlettlawoffices.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Esq.
          Briana T. Sprick Schuster, Esq.
          BASS, BERRY & SIMS PLC
          150 Third Avenue South, Suite 2800
          Nashville, TN 37201
          Telephone: (615) 742-6200
          E-mail: jcrace@bassberry.com
                  briana.sprick.schuster@bassberry.com

               - and -

          Jessica P. Corley, Esq.
          Lisa R. Bugni, Esq.
          Brandon R. Keel, Esq.
          Logan R. Hobson, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          1180 Peachtree Street, N.E.
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 572-4600
          E-mail: jpcorley@kslaw.com
                  lbugni@kslaw.com
                  bkeel@kslaw.com
                  lhobson@kslaw.com

TRAININGMASK LLC: CMP & Scheduling Order Entered in Tavarez Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as VICTORIANO TAVAREZ,
Individually, and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
TRAININGMASK L.L.C., Case No. 1:21-cv-09772-LJL (S.D.N.Y.), the
Court entered a case management plan and scheduling order as
follows:

  -- Any motion to amend or to join            March 3, 2022
     additional parties shall be filed
     no later than:

  -- Initial disclosures pursuant to           Feb. 15, 2022
     Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules
     of Civil Procedure shall be
     completed no later than:

  -- All fact discovery is to be               June 1, 2022
     completed no later than:

  -- All expert discovery, including           July 18, 2022
     disclosures, reports, production
     of underlying documents, and
     depositions shall be completed
     by:

  -- All discovery shall be completed          July 25, 2022
     no later than:

  -- The proposed joint pretrial order         Aug. 24, 2022
     shall be submitted on ECF in
     accordance with the Court's
     Individual Practices in Civil
     Cases and Federal Rule of Civil
     Procedure 26(a)(3) no later than:

  -- A post-discovery status conference        July 25, 2022
     shall be held on:  

  -- Any motion for summary judgment           Aug. 8, 2022
     must be filed no later than:

Trainingmask is located in Cadillac, Michigan and is part of the
other miscellaneous manufacturing industry.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LqBi7J at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William J. Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          www.mizrahikroub.com
          200 Vesey St., 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Telephone: (212) 595-6200
          Facsimile: (212) 595-9700

The Defendant is represented by:

          Karla Del Pozo Garcia, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          www.dentons.com
          1221 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 768-6700

UBATUBA ACAI: Order on Class Cert. Bid Entered in Alonzo Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as THUY THANH ALONZO v.
UBATUBA ACAI, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:21−cv−08523−FMO−MRW
(C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Fernando M. Olguin entered an order
regarding motions for class certification:

   1. Joint Brief:

      The parties shall work cooperatively to create a single,
      fully integrated joint brief covering each party's
      position, in which each issue (or sub-issue) raised by a
      party is immediately followed by the opposing
      party's/parties' response.

   2. Citation to Evidence:

      All citation to evidence in the joint brief shall be
      directly to the exhibit and page number(s) of the
      evidentiary appendix, or page and line number(s) of a
      deposition.

   3. Unnecessary Sections:

      The parties need not include a "procedural history"
      section, since the court will be familiar with the
      procedural history. The court is also familiar with the
      general standard for class certification, so that need not
      be argued.

   4. Page Limitation:

      Each separately-represented party shall be limited to 25
      pages, exclusive of tables of contents and authorities.

   5. Evidentiary Appendix:

      The joint brief shall be accompanied by one 24 separate,
      tabbed appendix of declarations and written evidence
      (including documents, photographs, deposition excerpts,
      etc.).

   6. Evidentiary Objections: All necessary evidentiary
      objections shall be made in the relevant section(s) of the
      joint brief.

   7. Schedule for Preparation and Filing of Joint Brief – The
      briefing schedule for the joint brief shall be as follows:

      A. Meet and Confer: In order for a motion for class
         certification to be filed in a timely manner, the meet
         and confer must take place no later than 35 days before
         the deadline for class certification motions set forth
         in the Court's Case Management and Scheduling Order.

      B. No later than seven days after the meet and confer, the
         moving party shall personally deliver or e-mail to the
         opposing party an electronic copy of the moving party's
         portion of the joint brief, together with the moving
         party's portion of the evidentiary appendix.

      C. No later than 14 days after receiving the moving
         party's papers, the opposing party shall personally
         deliver or e-mail to the moving party an electronic
         copy of the integrated motion, which shall include the
         opposing party's portion of the joint brief, together
         with the opposing party's portion of the evidentiary
         appendix.

      D. No later than two days after receiving the integrated
         version of the motion and related papers, the moving
         party shall finalize it for filing. The moving party
         may not make any further revisions to the joint brief
         other than finalizing the document for filing.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BbOpFo at no extra charge.[CC]

UMPQUA BANK: Camenisch Suit Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHELA CAMENISCH, et al.,
v. UMPQUA BANK, Case No. 3:20-cv-05905-RS (N.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order certifying the following
class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure:

   "All persons who invested money with Professional Financial
   Investors, Inc. (PFI) or Professional Investors Security
   Fund, Inc. (PISF) through secured or unsecured debt
   instruments or an LLC membership purchase agreement; who did
   not recover the principal amount of their investment prior to
   July 14, 2020; and who have a valid, allowed claim in In re
   Professional Financial Investors, Inc., Case No. 20-bk-30604
   (Bankr. N.D. Cal.) or any of its affiliated debtor bankruptcy
   cases, jointly administered under Case No. 20-bk-30604. "

The Plaintiffs further ask the Court that in connection with
granting class certification, the Court appoint Shela  Camenisch,
Dale Dean, Luna Baron and Eva King as class representatives, and
appoint Michael Schrag and Linda Lam of Gibbs Law Group LLP and
Scott Silver of Silver Law Group as co-lead class counsel pursuant
to Rule 23(g).

UMPQUA is a financial holding company based in downtown Portland,
Oregon.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Feb. 8,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34W9IhV
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael L. Schrag, Esq.
          Linda P. Lam, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street, Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
          E-mail: mls@classlawgroup.com
                  lpl@classlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Scott L. Silver, Esq.
          Ryan A. Schwamm, Esq.
          SILVER LAW GROUP
          11780 W. Sample Road
          Coral Springs, FL 33065
          Telephone: (954) 755-4799
          Facsimile: (954) 755-4684
          E-mail: ssilver@silverlaw.com
                  rschwamm@silverlaw.com

UNITED STATES: Braidwood Appeals Ruling in Civil Rights Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Braidwood Management, Incorporated, et al., filed an
appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled BEAR
CREEK BIBLE CREEK et al., Plaintiffs v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:18-CV-824, in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort
Worth.

In 2020, the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964's sex discrimination prohibition forbids employers from
firing employees based on homosexuality or transgender status,
because to do so is a form of discrimination based on sex. See
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020). The Bostock
Court expressly left open the implications for religious liberties
and other matters arising from its decision. Plaintiffs sought a
declaration that they, and others similarly situated, are permitted
to refrain from employing those who engage in conduct that violates
their sincerely held religious beliefs and First Amendment
protections. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that Bostock does
not prohibit sex-neutral codes of conduct.

The Plaintiffs initially sued the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, seeking declarations that (1) the First Amendment and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act give Plaintiffs the right to
operate their churches and businesses in accordance with their
sincerely held religious beliefs that homosexual behavior is
immoral, and (2) any federal statute, executive order, or agency
rule, policy, or regulatory guidance that infringes or burdens that
right is unenforceable. The Court stayed the proceedings pending
resolution of the "Bostock" suit.

In response to "Bostock," Plaintiffs amended their complaint to
reassert their claims for declaratory judgment seeking religious
exemption from Title VII. The Amended Complaint asserts five claims
for declaratory judgment: (1) The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Compels Exemptions To Bostock's Interpretation Of Title VII; (2)
The Free-Exercise Clause Compels Exemptions To Bostock's
Interpretation Of Title VII; (3) The First Amendment Right Of
Expressive Association Compels Exemptions To Bostock's
Interpretation Of Title VII; (4) Title VII, As Interpreted In
Bostock, Does Not Prohibit Discrimination Against Bisexual
Employees; and (5) Title VII, As Interpreted In Bostock, Does Not
Prohibit Employers From Establishing SexNeutral Rules Of Conduct
That Exclude Practicing Homosexuals And Transgender People.
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. The
Court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in part
and granted the motion in part. The Court held that Plaintiffs have
Article III standing to pursue this litigation but that any cause
of action against the Attorney General was too speculative.

The Plaintiffs then filed a motion to certify a class and a motion
for summary judgment on May 24, 2021. Defendants also filed a
motion for summary judgment on June 28, 2021.

On January 12, 2022, the Court entered an amended final judgment
granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Class and granting in part and denying in part their Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court also granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Braidwood Management v. EEOC,
Case No. 22-10145, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, filed on Feb. 14, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Braidwood Management, Incorporated and Bear
Creek Bible Church, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Jonathan F. Mitchell, Esq.
          111 Congress Avenue
          Austin, TX 78701-0000
          Telephone: (512) 686-3940
          E-mail: jonathan@mitchell.law

Defendants-Appellees Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Charlotte A. Burrows, United States of America, Janet Dhillon,
Jocelyn Samuels, Andrea R. Lucas, Keith E. Sonderling, in their
official capacities as chair, vicechair, and commissioners of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Merrick Garland, U.S.
Attorney General are represented by:

          Brian Walters Stoltz, Esq.
          U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          1100 Commerce Street
          Dallas, TX 75242-1699
          Telephone: (214) 659-8626

               - and -

          Benjamin Thomas Takemoto, Esq.
          U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          P.O. Box 883
          Washington, DC 20044-0000
          Telephone: (202) 532-4252

UNITED STATES: Broadfield Seeks to Certify Class of Prisoners
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRIAN BROADFIELD AND
CLASS, v. MERRICK GARLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, AND MICHAEL CARVAJAL DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00301-X-BN (N.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order:

   1. determining that this action may be maintaining as a class
      action on behalf of the following Class:

     "All prisoners detained or incarcerated under the custody
      og the Attorney General of the United States of America,
      who are eligible to earn Federal Time Credits under 18
      U.S.0 3632 (d)(4)(A)(i) and (ii), and 18 U.S.0 3624 (g)(1)
      (B) and (g)(1)(D)(i), and 18 U.S.0 3632 (d)(5);" and

   2. appointing him as representative; and

   3. appointing class counsel to represent the class.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons is a United States federal law
enforcement agency under the Department of Justice responsible for
the care, custody, and control of incarcerated individuals.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Feb. 7,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3swAYfk
at no extra charge.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.[CC]

UNITED STATES: California Court Tosses Thompson Suit With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed with prejudice the
lawsuit entitled Rodney Thompson, Plaintiff v. IRS, Defendant, Case
No. 21-cv-09672-PJH (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff, a Texas state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil
action against a governmental entity. He has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis.

The Plaintiff seeks court intervention in obtaining his economic
impact payment ("EIP") pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (The "CARES Act"), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134
Stat. 281 (2020).

Background

In Scholl v. Mnuchin, 494 F.Supp.3d 661 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (Scholl
II), the court summarized the underlying issue that is central to
the Plaintiff's complaint: The CARES Act, codified in part at
section 6428 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 6428,
establishes a tax credit for eligible individuals in the amount of
$1,200 ($2,400 if filing a joint return), plus $500 multiplied by
the number of qualifying children. . . . A Payment made to someone
who is incarcerated should be returned to the IRS by following the
instructions about repayments. For a Payment made with respect to a
joint return where only one spouse is incarcerated, you only need
to return the portion of the Payment made on account of the
incarcerated spouse. This amount will be $1,200 unless adjusted
gross income exceeded $150,000.

In Scholl v. Mnuchin, 489 F.Supp.3d 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (Scholl
I), the court preliminary certified the following class:

     All United States citizens and legal permanent residents
     who:

     (a) are or were incarcerated (i.e., confined in a jail,
         prison, or other penal institution or correctional
         facility pursuant to their conviction of a criminal
         offense) in the United States, or have been held to have
         violated a condition of parole or probation imposed
         under federal or state law, at any time from March 27,
         2020 to the present;

     (b) filed a tax return in 2018 or 2019, or were exempt from
         a filing obligation because they earned an income below
         $12,000 (or $24,400 if filing jointly) in the respective
         tax year;

     (c) were not claimed as a dependent on another person's tax
         return; and

     (d) filed their taxes with a valid Social Security Number,
         and, if they claimed qualifying children or filed
         jointly with another person, those individuals also held
         a valid Social Security Number.

     Excluded from the class are estates and trusts; defendants;
     the officers, directors, or employees of any defendant
     agency; and, any judicial officer presiding over this action
     and his/her immediate family and judicial staff.

In Scholl II, the court granted final certification of this class
and entered the following declaratory relief: "The court finds and
declares that title 26 U.S.C. Section 6428 does not authorize
defendants to withhold advance refunds or credits from class
members solely because they are or were incarcerated. The court
further finds and declares that defendants' policy that persons who
are or were incarcerated at any time in 2020 were ineligible for
advance refunds under the Act is both arbitrary and capricious and
not in accordance with law."

A permanent injunction was entered and defendants were to
reconsider EIPs that were denied solely due to an individual's
incarcerated status.

With respect to specific payments the court stated: "The court
takes no position on whether plaintiffs or class members are in
fact owed advance refund payments or the amount of those payments.
Indeed, the court's Rule 23(b)(2) finding was premised on the
indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy
warranted but not an individualized award of monetary damages. Dkt.
50 at 42 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
360-61, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed. 2d 374 (2011)). The court's
determination in this order is that the IRS's action was arbitrary,
capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law and the
appropriate remedy is to hold unlawful and set aside that agency
action. 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2). It is incumbent on the IRS, as the
agency charged by Congress, to make individual determinations
whether an individual is an eligible individual and meets the
various criteria delineated in the Act."

Discussion

The Plaintiff is incarcerated and part of the Scholl class. He
filed the case on Dec. 15, 2021. He states that he has not received
his EIPs. For relief, he requests the Court to compel the IRS to
provide his EIPs.

To the extent the Plaintiff argues that his EIP was denied due to
his incarcerated status, he is already a member of the Scholl
class; therefore, he is not entitled to separate individual relief,
Judge Hamilton holds. An individual suit for injunctive and
equitable relief may be dismissed when it duplicates an existing
class action's allegations and prayer for relief, Judge Hamilton
explains, citing Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir.
2013); Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc).

Nor is the Plaintiff entitled to relief to the extent he seeks the
Court to compel the IRS to provide his EIPs pursuant to Scholl or
the CARES Act, Judge Hamilton adds. The court in Scholl found that
the EIP could not be denied only because an individual was
incarcerated. However, the court was clear that it took no position
on whether individual incarcerated plaintiffs were owed the EIP,
which is the relief sought in the instant case. That responsibility
fell to the IRS to make an individual determination.

More importantly, Judge Hamilton notes, funds cannot now be
distributed pursuant to the CARES Act. The CARES Act imposed a
deadline of Dec. 31, 2020, for EIPs to be made or allowed. That
deadline has passed, and no more funds may be issued. The Plaintiff
cannot obtain the relief he seeks in this case.

For all these reasons, the Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
relief, Judge Hamilton holds. The complaint will be dismissed
without leave to amend because it is clear that no amount of
amendment would cure the deficiencies noted.

Conclusion

The action is dismissed with prejudice. The clerk will close the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ruhdwmjm from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Court Strikes Bids to Seal in Wagafe v. Biden
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lauren King of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, issued an order striking the
parties' motions to seal in the lawsuit captioned ABDIQAFAR WAGAFE,
et al., Plaintiff v. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, President of the United
States, et al., Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-00094-LK (W.D. Wash.).

The case was recently reassigned to Judge King. There are currently
17 pending motions that either seek to seal materials or request
leave to file "highly sensitive documents" under seal. These latter
motions are themselves sealed.

Background

The Plaintiffs brought the class action in early 2017 against
Donald J. Trump, then-President of the United States; the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Service ("USCIS"), a component
of the Department of Homeland Security; and several USCIS
directors. The Plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive
relief from President Trump's Executive Order 13780, "Protecting
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,"
which suspended entry into the United States for citizens or
nationals of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Libya.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs sought to compel USCIS to adjudicate
pending immigration benefit applications for citizens and nationals
of these seven countries, and enjoin USCIS from applying its
"extreme vetting" policy to their immigration applications.

Prior to discovery, the Court approved the parties' Stipulated
Protective Order, which purports to shield from public disclosure
materials that qualify as "Confidential Information." The
Stipulated Protective Order defines "Confidential Information" to
encompass 16 subcategories of materials including, to name a few,
personally identifiable information; information relating to the
basis on which Defendants have identified any individual as a
"National Security Concern" under the "extreme vetting" policy of
its Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP);
information related to the content or status of an individual's
immigration benefit application to the extent that it is linked to
the applicant's identity; information protected by state and
federal statutes and regulations; trade secrets and other
confidential research, development, and commercial information;
nonpublic proprietary information purchased or obtained from a
private entity; information compiled for law enforcement purposes;
and medical records.

The Court also issued a Limited Protective Order prohibiting public
disclosure of names, "Alien numbers," and the application filing
dates of unnamed plaintiffs in the Naturalization and
Adjustment-of-Status Classes.

Although the parties may designate materials "Confidential
Information," they must take care to limit any such designation to
specific material that qualifies under the appropriate standards
and only those parts of the material that qualify, so that other
portions of the material for which protection is not warranted are
not swept unjustifiably within the ambit of the Stipulated
Protective Order. And, most notably, mass, indiscriminate, or
routinized designations are prohibited.

Against this backdrop, the Court now highlights the legal standards
governing the sealing of judicial records and documents, for those
standards will guide the parties' analyses as they compile a
concise statement consolidating their positions on the materials
they wish to seal.

Discussion

The Court recognizes that in many instances the Defendants
designated the materials "Confidential Information," and,
therefore, bear the burden of satisfying Local Rule 5(g)(3)(B) and
the applicable legal standard. In many instances, though not all,
the Defendants resort to conclusory references to the Stipulated
Protective Order, Judge King finds. And while they cite to the
applicable legal standards, they fail to explain the specific harms
that might result from public access.

Thus, the fact that certain documents are labeled "Confidential
Information" is not per se proof that they must be sealed. Such an
approach fails to overcome the Court's strong presumption in favor
of public access to court filings. Nor does it comply with Local
Civil Rule 5(g), Judge King points out.

The sealed pleadings and materials in the case, most with attendant
responses and replies, have spun a labyrinthine web of
back-and-forth motion practice. With 17 pending motions on the
docket, it would be inefficient for the Court to rule on the
parties' arguments in piecemeal fashion. A reset is in order, Judge
King holds, citing Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052,
1060 (9th Cir. 2005).

Conclusion

The Court, accordingly, strikes the parties' motions to seal and
motions for leave to file "highly sensitive documents." See Dkt.
Nos. 459, 464, 465, 474, 479, 484, 489, 496, 501, 505, 513, 514,
543, 544, 562, 564, 578.

The Court further orders the parties to meet and confer and file a
joint statement concisely consolidating their positions on any
materials for sealing within 60 days, or by March 29, 2022. The
joint statement shall adhere to the requirements of Local Civil
Rule 5(g) and include supporting analysis explaining why each item
should be sealed under the applicable law, as set forth above.

The joint statement will include a chart of the parties' positions
in this form:

   Dkt. No. Detailed Designating Specific Reasons Why
   Alternatives Document Party Harm to Sealing, Such as
   Description Redactions, are Insufficient

The parties will also submit to the Court a joint digital copy of
the proposed materials for sealing on a flash drive. The documents
in the flash drive must appear in the order that they appear in the
chart. Where the designating party is proposing that only portions
of a document be sealed, the redacted version will immediately
precede the document for sealing.

The Court further orders the parties to file an updated Joint
Status Report.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3zx6mx2d from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Motion to Transfer Filed in Vaccine Mandate Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In this putative class action lawsuit styled NAVY SEAL 1, United
States Navy, NAVY SEAL 2, United States Navy, SENIOR CHIEF PETTY
OFFICER, United States Navy, CHAPLAIN, United States Navy, NAVY EOD
OFFICER, United States Navy, COMMANDER SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER,
United States Navy, NAVY CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER, United States Navy
Reserve, COLONEL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OFFICER, United States Marine
Corps, LIEUTENANT COLONEL 1, United States Marine Corps, LIEUTENANT
COLONEL 2, United States Marine Corps, RESERVE LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
United States Marine Corps, MAJOR, United States Marine Corps,
CAPTAIN, United States Marine Corps, CAPTAIN 2, United States
Marine Corps, CAPTAIN 3, United States Marine Corps, FIRST
LIEUTENANT, United States Marine Corps, SECOND LIEUTENANT, United
States Marine Corps, CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3, United States Marine
Corps, LANCE CORPORAL 1, United States Marine Corps, LANCE CORPORAL
2, United States Marine Corps, MAJOR, United States Air Force,
CHAPLAIN, United States Air Force, RESERVE LIEUTENANT COLONEL 1,
United States Air Force, RESERVE LIEUTENANT COLONEL 2, United
States Air Force, MASTER SERGEANT SERE SPECIALIST, United States
Air Force, TECHNICAL SERGEANT, United States Air Force, CADET,
United States Air Force Academy, COLONEL, United States Army, ARMY
RANGER, United States Army, NATIONAL GUARDSMAN, Virginia Army
National Guard, PILOT, United States Coast Guard, LCDR PILOT,
United States Coast Guard, LIEUTENANT, United States Coast Guard,
MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAM ANALYST, Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Department of Homeland Security, STATE DEPARTMENT
EMPLOYEE 1, and FEDERAL CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR EMPLOYER, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. LLOYD AUSTIN, in
his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department
of Defense, CHRISTINE WORMUTH, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the United States Army, CARLOS DEL TORO, in his
official capacity as Secretary of the United States Navy, GEN.
DAVID H. BERGER, in his official capacity as Commandant of the
United States Marine Corps, FRANK KENDALL, in his official capacity
as Secretary of the United States Air Force, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in
his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, ROBIN CARNAHAN, in her official capacity as Administrator
of the United States General Services Administration, KIRAN AHUJA,
in her official capacity as Director of the United States Office of
Personnel Management, LESLEY A. FIELD, in her official capacity as
Acting Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, Office of
Management and Budget, and MATHEW C. BLUM, in his official capacity
as Chair of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, Case No.
8:22-cv-00364-SDM-TGW, the Defendants filed a motion to transfer
with the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on
February 14, 2022.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged enforcement of the
federal COVID-19 vaccine mandate and refusal to grant the
Plaintiffs' and similarly situated military personnel's request for
exemption from COVID-19 shots based on their religious beliefs.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Mathew D. Staver, Esq.
         Horatio G. Mihet, Esq.
         Roger K. Gannam, Esq.
         Daniel J. Schmid, Esq.
         Richard L. Mast, Esq.
         LIBERTY COUNSEL
         P.O. Box 540774
         Orlando, FL 32854
         Telephone: (407) 875-1776
         E-mail: court@lc.org
                 hmihet@lc.org
                 rgannam@lc.org
                 dschmid@lc.org
                 rmast@lc.org

UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE: Arredondo Wins Class Certification Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRIANNA ARREDONDO, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v. UNIVERSITY
OF LA VERNE, Case No. 2:20-cv-07665-MCS-RAO (C.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge Mark C. Scarsi entered an order:

   1. granting the motion for class certification of:

      "All University of La Verne undergraduate students who
      paid tuition and/or the Mandatory Fees at La Verne's
      Main/Central campus location during the Spring 2020
      term/semester."

   2. appointing Plaintiff Brianna Arredondo as Class
      Representative;

   3. appointing Charon Law, Shoop APLC, The Sultzer Law Group
      PC, and Leeds Brown Law PC as Class Counsel

   4. directing the parties, within 14 days of this Order, to
      file a proposed schedule for the remaining events in this
      case, including the final date for hearing a dispositive
      motion, the date for a final pretrial conference and
      pretrial filings, and a date for trial;

   5. annticipating that any motion for summary judgment should
      be heard in early May 2022,  approximately five weeks
      after the close of expert discovery, and a trial date
      should be set in early August 2022;

   6. denying the Defendant's ex parte applications to file
      supplemental briefing and an expert report.

The University of La Verne offers undergraduate, graduate, and
online degree programs across nine diverse California locations.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Bkkwmd at no extra charge.[CC]


US BANKCORP: Court Junks Steve Kim's Bid for Protective Order
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVE KIM v. US BANKCORP,
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Case No. 2:20-cv-00032-TL-BAT (W.D.
Wash.), the Hon. Judge Brian A. Tsuchida entered an order setting
briefing schedule for class certification and decertification
motions and denying motion for protective order.

The parties are ordered to again confer in good faith and to
provide to the Court by February 17, 2022, an agreed upon sample
percentage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective,
predicated on particular characteristics of the FLSA Collective,
with a selection process involving both the Plaintiff and the
Defendants.

U.S. Bancorp is an American bank holding company based in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and incorporated in Delaware. It is the
parent company of U.S. Bank National Association, and is the fifth
largest banking institution in the United States.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34R46ph at no extra charge.[CC]


USA DEBUSK: Faces Buck FLSA Suit Over Unpaid Overtime for Drivers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY BUCK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. USA DEBUSK LLC, Defendant, Case No.
4:22-cv-00486 (S.D. Tex., February 14, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and similarly situated
drivers overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in
a workweek.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a driver from
January 2020 until June 2021.

USA DeBusk LLC is a mechanical and industrial cleaning services
provider, headquartered in Deer Park, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Melissa Moore, Esq.
         Curt Hesse, Esq.
         MOORE & ASSOCIATES
         Lyric Centre
         440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1110
         Houston, TX 77002-1063
         Telephone: (713) 222-6775
         Facsimile: (713) 222-6739
         E-mail: melissa@mooreandassociates.net
                 curt@mooreandassociates.net

VERTICAL SCREEN: Garcia's Bid for Collective Certification Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned WILLIAM GARCIA, for himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VERTICAL SCREEN, INC., Defendants,
Case No. 18-4718 (E.D. Pa.), the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum:

   -- granting the Plaintiff's motion for final collective
      certification;

   -- denying Vertical Screen's motion for decertification on the
      FLSA claims; and

   -- denying the Plaintiff's motion for Rule 23 class
      certification on the state law claims.

Plaintiff William Garcia, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, brings this collective action and class action
lawsuit against Vertical Screen for failing to pay overtime in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA").

District Judge Anita B. Brody states that she exercised federal
question jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' PMWA claims.

The Plaintiffs, employees of Vertical Screen, allege that they were
unpaid for overtime under the FLSA and the PMWA when they spent
uncompensated time logging into their computers and the Company's
timekeeping system.

I. Background

On July 24, 2019, Judge Jan E. DuBois granted conditional
certification of the Plaintiff's claims and approved notice to an
FLSA collective action class composed of "all persons who have
worked as full-time, hourly-paid Researchers or Team Leaders for
defendant during the past three years." This case was reassigned
from the Honorable Judge DuBois on May 11, 2021. Of those
employees, 66 have opted in to the FLSA collective action. Before
the Court are two motions: Plaintiff's Motion to Certify a Rule 23
Class Action and to Grant Final FLSA Certification, and Vertical
Screen's Motion to Decertify the Conditionally Certified
Collective.

The Plaintiffs were full-time employees, not exempt from the FLSA's
overtime requirements. The Plaintiffs were paid hourly for up to 40
hours of work per week, and time-and-a-half for any hours worked
above 40. Defendant Vertical Screen's daily work involves running
pre-employment background checks in various databases (court
records, criminal records, education records, employment records,
etc.) for people applying for work with Vertical Screen's clients.

The Plaintiffs' job was to run these databases. Vertical Screen has
two facilities: a corporate headquarters and operations facility in
Warminster, Pennsylvania, and a technology and operations facility
in New Jersey. All the Plaintiffs worked at the Warminster,
Pennsylvania campus of Vertical Screen, in three separate buildings
that are a third of a mile apart.

To track employees' work hours, Vertical Screen uses an online
timekeeping software called Workforce Now, known as ADP. The
Plaintiffs recorded their time through ADP by logging into the
software at the beginning of their shifts. The Plaintiffs report
experiencing significant difficulty logging into Vertical Screen's
timekeeping software: first, the Plaintiffs dealt with delays
logging into their computers. Even after successfully logging into
their computer, numerous Plaintiffs report additional delays
logging into the ADP system itself, ranging from delays of three
minutes to thirty.

The ADP timekeeping system rounds all employee time to the nearest
quarter of the hour. Therefore, employees, who clock in within
seven minutes after the hour (for example, at 7:07 a.m.) will be
paid as if they clocked in at the hour (at 7:00 a.m.). Employees
who clock in eight minutes after the hour, on the other hand, will
be paid as if they clocked in fifteen minutes after the hour.
Employees who believe they have worked time that was not recorded
in the ADP system can report this to their supervisor or manager,
and a correction can be made.

II. Collective Action Final Certification Under FLSA

Vertical Screen moves to decertify the conditionally certified
collective action class. Plaintiff Garcia opposes decertification
and asks the Court to grant final certification on his FLSA
claims.

Under the collective action provision of the FLSA, an employee
alleging an FLSA violation can bring suit on behalf of himself and
other employees similarly situated. To be included in a collective
action, plaintiffs must be "similarly situated" and must opt in by
giving written consent to participate.

The Third Circuit has set forth a two-step process for determining
whether plaintiffs are "similarly situated." The first step occurs
at the conditional certification stage. The named plaintiff must
make a "modest factual showing," which requires that a plaintiff
produce some evidence, beyond pure speculation, of a factual nexus
between the manner in which the employer's alleged policy affected
her and the manner in which it affected other employees (Zavala v.
Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 536 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir.
2011), rev'd on other grounds, 569 U.S. 66 (2013)). On July 24,
2019, Judge DuBois found that Plaintiff Garcia had made such a
showing and granted conditional certification.

The second step occurs at the final certification stage. The
plaintiffs bear the burden of making this showing by a
preponderance of the evidence, Zavala, 691 F.3d at 537.

Judge Brody finds that the first Zavala factor weighs in favor of
certification. The second Zavala factor also weighs in favor of
final certification: the Plaintiffs advance similar claims. The
third Zavala factor directs a court to consider whether the
plaintiffs seek substantially the same form of relief. This factor
weighs in favor of certification.

The fourth Zavala factor asks whether class members had similar
salaries and circumstances of employment. Judge Brody finds that
all of the Plaintiffs were full-time employees, earned the same or
approximately the same hourly wage for regular and overtime work,
had the same job descriptions, received the same training, and used
the same systems for payroll. Therefore, this factor weighs in
favor of certification. Because all of the Zavala factors weigh in
favor of certification, the Plaintiffs are similarly situated.

Because the Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that they are similarly situated with
respect to their FLSA claim, Judge Brody grants final
certification.

III. Rule 23 Class Action Certification Under PMWA

Plaintiff Garcia moves for Rule 23 class certification of his
claims under the PMWA. He seeks damages under Pennsylvania law for
the same claims advanced under the FLSA: unpaid overtime work prior
to ADP system login. His proposed class comprises: "All people who
have worked as a full-time, hourly-paid Vertical Screen Researcher
or Team Leader in Pennsylvania since November 1, 2015."

In this case, Plaintiff Garcia seeks certification under Rule
23(b)(3), which imposes the additional requirements that "(i)
common questions of law or fact predominate (predominance), and
(ii) the class action is the superior method for adjudication
(superiority)." The Plaintiffs seeking certification pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(3) must also demonstrate that the proposed class is
ascertainable.

Vertical Screen raises numerous objections to class certification.
Because the Plaintiff's claim fails to meet the necessary
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), Judge Brody addresses
that factor alone.

To satisfy the first requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must
show that "questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."

In the present case, the putative class fails the predominance
requirement because individual questions of fact, both relating to
liability and to damages, predominate over class-wide questions,
Judge Brody finds. This is so even though class members are
similarly situated under the FLSA. The primary common questions
relating to liability are about the Plaintiffs' roles and
responsibilities and Vertical Screen's payment policies:
essentially all remaining questions will require individualized
inquiries. Judge Brody points out that all of these liability
questions will likely require in-depth individualized examinations
before a fact-finder.

Plaintiff Garcia proposes no alternative methodology for
calculating class-wide damages or for dividing damages among class
members. Judge Brody notes, among other things, that determining
each of these questions for more than 60 individual plaintiffs will
require dozens of mini-trials that will certainly predominate over
questions of what those plaintiffs' claims have in common.

Because Plaintiff Garcia has not shown, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that common questions of fact predominate, Judge Brody
will deny class certification of his PMWA claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Jan. 31, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8fc32p from Leagle.com.


VITAMINS BECAUSE: Malgeri Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NOAH MALGERI, KALYN WOLF,
BILL WILSON, SHANNON HOOD, ERIC FISHON, and ROBERT MCKEOWN on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. VITAMINS
BECAUSE LLC, CT HEALTH SOLUTIONS LLC, GMAX CENTRAL LLC, and
ASQUARED BRANDS LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-22702-KMW (S.D. Fla.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certify this action and Plaintiffs proposed classes
      because the proposed classes meet the requirements of
      Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3);

   2. appointing the Plaintiffs as class representatives; and

   3. appointing Gary S. Graifman and Jay Brody of Kantrowitz.

      -- The Plaintiffs' proposed nationwide class is defined as
         follows:

         "All persons who purchased the subject product through
         Amazon.com in or as a resident of the United States of
         America."

      -- The Plaintiff Malgeri's proposed Nevada class is
         defined as follows:

         "All persons who purchased the subject product through
         Amazon.com in or as a resident of Nevada."

      -- The Plaintiff Wolf's proposed Arizona class is defined
         as follows:

         "All persons who purchased the subject product through
         Amazon.com in or as a resident of Arizona."

         The Plaintiff Wilson's proposed California class is
         defined as follows:

         "All persons who purchased the subject product through
         Amazon.com in or as a resident of California."

      -- The Plaintiff Hood's proposed New York class is defined
         as follows:

         "All persons who purchased the subject product through
         Amazon.com in or as a resident of New York."

      -- The Plaintiff Mckeown's proposed Texas class is defined
         as follows:

         "All persons who purchased the subject product through
         Amazon.com in or as a resident of Texas."

      -- The Plaintiffs Wolf's, Hood's, and Mckeown's proposed
         aSquared class is defined as follows:

         "All persons who purchased the subject product as sold
         by aSquared through Amazon.com in or as a resident of
         the United States of America.

      -- The Plaintiff Wilson's proposed nationwide class is
         defined as follows:

         "All persons who purchased the subject product as sold
         by Gmax through Amazon.com in or as a resident of the
         United States of America."

The Plaintiffs seek the return of the monies class members paid for
the worthless subject product S-adenosylmethionine (SAMe)
supplements which they purchased, and to stop Defendants' business
practice of manufacturing, labeling, and/or selling false and
misleadingly labeled SAMe supplements.

The Plaintiffs also seek additional and alternative forms of
damages on behalf of the proposed classes, including: punitive
damages, statutory damages, attorneys fees and litigation costs.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify classes dated Feb. 8,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gJqm7g
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
          EGGNATZ ǀ PASCUCCI
          7450 Griffin Road, Suite 230
          Davie, FL 33314
          Telephone: (954) 889-3359
          Facsimile: (954) 889-5913
          E-mail: JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com

               - and -

          Jay I. Brody, Esq.
          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER &
          GRAIFMAN, P.C.
          747 Chestnut Ridge Road
          Chestnut Ridge, New York 10977
          Telephone: (845) 356-2570
          E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com
                  jbrody@kgglaw.com

               - and -

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street N.E., Ste. 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470-3520
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com

The Attorneys for Defendants Vitamin Because, LLC and CT Health
Solutions, LLC, are:

          David S. Johnson, Esq.
          JOHNSON DABOLL ANDERSON, PLLC
          2011 W. Cleveland Street, Suite F
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 377-2499
          Facsimile: (813) 330-3156
          E-mail: djohnson@jdalegal.com

The Attorneys for Defendant GMAX Central LLC, are:

          Leon N. Patricios, Esq.
          Joseph I. Zumpano, Esq.
          ZUMPANO PATRICIOS, P.A.
          312 Minorca Avenue
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 444-5565
          Facsimile: (305) 444-8588
          E-mail: lpatricios@zplaw.com
                  jzumpano@zplaw.com

               - and -

          Richard J. Oparil, Esq.
          Kevin M. Bell, Esq.
          ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY LLP
          1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 677-4030
          E-mail: richard.oparil@agg.com
                  kevin.bell@agg.com

The Attorneys for the Defendant aSquared Brands LLC, are:

          Alessandro A. Apolito, Esq.
          Brendan H. Little, Esq.
          LIPPES MATHIAS WEXLER
          FRIEDMAN LLP
          822 N. A1A, Suite 101
          Ponte Vedra Beach, FL 32082
          Telephone: (904) 660-0020
          Facsimile: (904) 660-0029
          E-mail: aapolito@lippes.com
                  blittle@lippes.com


VIVINT INC: Cunningham, Perrong File Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CRAIG CUNNINGHAM and
ANDREW PERRONG, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, v. VIVINT, INC. and DSI DISTRIBUTING, INC. d.b.a DSI
SYSTEMS, Case No. 2:19-cv-00568-DBB-CMR (D. Utah), the Plaintiffs
seek to represent a class of consumers to seek injunctive relief
under Rule 23(b)(2) consisting of the
following subclasses:

   -- National Do Not Call Registry Class

      "All persons within the United States to whom: (a)
      Defendants, and/or a third party acting on their behalf,
      made at least two telephone solicitation calls during a
      12-month period; (b) to a residential telephone number;
      (c) that had been listed on the National Do Not Call
      Registry for more than 31 days prior to the first call;
      (d) promoting the goods or services of the Defendants; (e)
      at any time in the period that begins four years before
      the date of filing the Complaint to trial;"

   -- Automated Call Class

      "All persons within the United States to whom: (a)
      Defendants, and/or a third party acting on their behalf,
      made one or more non-emergency telephone calls; (b) to
      their cellular telephone number or number that is charged
      per call; (c) using an automatic telephone dialing system
      or an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (d) at any time
      in the period that begins four years before the date
      of the filing of the Complaint to trial.

   -- Internal Procedures Class

      "All natural persons within the United States to whom: (a)
      Vivint, and/or a third party acting on its behalf, made
      two or more calls in a 12-month period; (b) which
      constitute telemarketing; (c) at any time in the period
      that begins four years before the date of the filing
      of the Complaint to trial."

The Plaintiffs Andrew Perrong and Craig Cunningham brought this
action to enforce the consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

Vivint allegedly conducts telemarketing both directly and through
partnering with a series of "dealers" and "subdealers," such as DSI
and its vendors. As to these partnerships, Vivint trains the
dealers and subdealers as to how to telemarket its products and
services, provides the scripts for the calls, and works with the
dealers and subdealers to develop incentives to increase their
volume of leads and sales. The dealers and subdealers could either
log sales in Vivint's system or transfer calls directly to Vivint
employees. Vivint employees are also authorized to make
telemarketing calls directly, the lawsuit says.

This nationwide putative class action lawsuit has not been enough
to make Vivint and DSI come into compliance with the TCPA.
Throughout the pendency of this lawsuit, each Plaintiff has been
called repeatedly by various DSI vendors and each received text
messages directly from Vivint despite their requests for Vivint and
DSI to stop contacting them. Moreover, even prior to the calls at
issue in this lawsuit, each of the Plaintiffs had complained to
Vivint about unlawful telemarketing calls and settled those claims.
Due to the fact that the automated telemarketing campaigns at issue
were conducted en masse, there are thousands of consumers similarly
situated to the Plaintiffs that have been and continued to be
contacted without their consent. An injunction to stop calling the
Plaintiffs is not sufficient to remedy the broad classwide harm
caused by Vivint and DSI's telemarketing, the lawsuit adds.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Feb. 7,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uG21aB
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brian K. Murphy, Esq.
          Jonathan P. Misny, Esq.
          MURRAY MURPHY MOUL + BASIL LLP
          1114 Dublin Road
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 488-0400
          Facsimile: (614) 488-0401
          E-mail: murphy@mmmb.com
                  misny@mmmb.com

WELLS FARGO: N.D. California Tosses Consolidated Shareholder Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE WELLS FARGO & COMPANY STOCKHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION. This Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Case No.
20-cv-08750-MMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California granted
Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss.

Nominal Defendant Wells Fargo & Company ("Wells Fargo" or "the
Company") moved on June 22, 2021, for the dismissal of the Verified
Consolidated Shareholder Derivative Complaint pursuant to Rule 23.1
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. Background

The Plaintiffs, who assert they are shareholders of Wells Fargo,
allege that, in response to "unlawful and pervasive sales practices
that led to consumer abuses spanning nearly two decades," Wells
Fargo, on Feb. 2, 2018, entered into a regulatory consent order
with the Federal Reserve System ("FRS") and, thereafter, on April
20, 2018, entered into "two coordinated consent orders" with,
respectively, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"). The
Plaintiffs allege the FRS consent order required Wells Fargo to
"improve Board oversight and remediate Wells Fargo's compliance and
operational risk management policies and procedures," and that the
CFPB and OCC consent orders similarly required Wells Fargo to
"strengthen its compliance and risk management." They further
allege that the FRS consent order imposed an asset cap whereby
Wells Fargo "would be restricted from growing any larger than its
total asset size as of the end of 2017," and that the CFPB and OCC
consent orders imposed on Wells Fargo $1 billion in fines.

According to the Plaintiffs, the Individual Defendants subsequently
"publicly represented that Wells Fargo had implemented and would
continue to implement meaningful corporate reforms, and that their
reform efforts were in compliance with the regulatory consent
orders," which "representations were false." In particular, they
allege that, despite Wells Fargo's obligations to meaningfully
address its risk and compliance programs, such programs "continued
to be woefully deficient" and that Wells Fargo was so advised by
the above-referenced regulatory agencies.

In particular, the Plaintiffs allege that on March 4, 2020, the
House Committee on Financial Services reported that "Wells Fargo
had repeatedly failed to satisfy the terms of the consent orders,"
that "the risk management plans that Wells Fargo submitted to the
FRS were 'materially incomplete' despite the Company having
received constant feedback and guidance from the FRS," that "Wells
Fargo was informed that its plan submitted to the FRS was 'riddled
with errors and discrepancies, such as incorrect progress
indicators for deliverables and illogical timeframes for achieving
future milestones,'" that "the OCC had admonished the Company's
'very slow' progress," most of which "appeared to come after
repeated pressure by the regulators, calling out missed deadlines,
failed validations, and poor quality action plans," and that "the
Company's risk management infrastructure remained broken and
woefully inadequate to prevent future harm to consumers."

In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that, on March 10, 2020, Scharf
testified before the House Committee on Financial Services and
"admitted that Wells Fargo had not yet done what is necessary to
address its shortcomings, noting that the Company's 'culture was
broken.'"

Based on said allegations, the Plaintiffs, seeking to proceed
derivatively on behalf of Wells Fargo, bring claims against certain
of the Individual Defendants for violation of section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and against all Individual
Defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate assets,
and unjust enrichment. The Plaintiffs also assert a claim against
Sloan and Shrewsberry for contribution under sections 10(b) and 21D
of the Exchange Act.

II. Discussion

Wells Fargo moves to dismiss the complaint on the asserted ground
that the Plaintiffs have failed to make a pre-suit demand on the
Board and have failed to plead, with the particularity required by
Rule 23.1, facts sufficient to excuse the Plaintiffs' failure to
make such demand on the Board. In response, the Plaintiffs point to
their allegations that a demand would have been "futile" because,
according to plaintiffs, at least half of the members of the Demand
Board face a substantial likelihood of liability for violating
section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and breaching their fiduciary
duties.

In resolving that issue, Judge Chesney first turns to the
Plaintiffs' federal claims, specifically, Counts I and V.

A. Count I - Violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act

The Plaintiffs allege that seven members of the Demand Board as
well as Sloan, a former Board member, "negligently issued" in Wells
Fargo's proxy statement filed March 14, 2018 "materially false and
misleading written statements" pertaining to (1) "a proposal to
reelect the members of the Board" and (2) "two stockholder
proposals" demanding, respectively, that (a) Wells Fargo "engage
independent experts or resources to reform its executive
compensation policy with social responsibility" and (b) the Board
"prepare a report on the Company's employee incentive compensation
and the risk of material losses," after which the stockholders
voted in favor of reelecting the Board members and voting against
the two stockholder proposals.

In seeking to excuse their lack of demand with respect to their
section 14(a) claim, the Plaintiffs allege that at least half of
the members of the Demand Board, specifically, Clark, Craver,
James, Morris, Pujadas, Sargent, and Vautrinot, face a "substantial
likelihood of liability" for "the negligently made statements in
the materially misleading 2018 Proxy" referenced.

The Defendants, noting the Plaintiffs expressly base their section
14(a) claim "solely on negligence" and disclaim reliance on "any
reckless or knowing conduct by or on behalf of the Defendants,"
point to Wells Fargo's charter, titled Restated Certificate of
Incorporation. As they further point out, the clause tracks the
language of Delaware General Corporation Law, and, in particular,
section 102(b)(7).

Given that Wells Fargo's charter exempts directors from liability
for negligent conduct, and the Plaintiffs do not allege any other
conduct for which the referenced seven directors may be held liable
under section 14(a), Judge Chensey holds that the Plaintiffs have
failed to show those directors would face a "substantial likelihood
of liability" for violating section 14(a), and, accordingly, the
Plaintiffs have failed to show their failure to make a demand is
excused as futile. In any event, even assuming the exculpation
clause is unenforceable, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege an
actionable false or misleading statement, and, for that separate
reason, have failed to show the referenced directors face a
substantial likelihood of liability under section 14(a).

In sum, for all of the reasons she stated, Judge Chesney holds that
the Plaintiffs have failed to plead, with the particularity
required by Rule 23.1, that at least half of the members of the
Demand Board face a substantial likelihood of liability for
violating section 14(a), and, consequently, they have failed to
show demand would have been futile. Accordingly, demand will not be
excused, and the Plaintiffs' section 14(a) claim will be dismissed
without leave to amend.

B. Count V - Contribution Under Sections 10(b) and 21D of the
Exchange Act

The Plaintiffs' fifth claim, brought against Sloan and Shrewsberry
only, is based on allegations that "the Company, along with
Defendants Sloan and Shrewsberry, is named as a defendant in
securities class actions" and that "if and when the Company is
found liable, the Company's liability will be in whole or in part
due to Defendants Sloan and Shrewsberry's willful and/or reckless
violations of their obligations as officers and directors of the
Company." In light thereof, the Plaintiffs further allege, "Sloan
and Shrewsberry are liable under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), which creates a private right of action
for contribution, and section 21D of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 78u-4(f), which governs the application of a private right
of action for contribution arising out of violations of the
Exchange Act."

As noted, the Plaintiffs' fifth claim is asserted only against
Sloan and Shrewsberry, not against any member of the Demand Board,
and, consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to show that at least
half of the members of the Demand Board face a substantial
likelihood of liability under Count V. Moreover, when a claim is
"contingent upon the outcome of a separate, pending lawsuit, courts
generally dismiss it as premature."

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs having failed to plead, with the
particularity required by Rule 23.1, demand would have been futile,
demand will not be excused, and the Plaintiffs' contribution claim
will be dismissed without leave to amend.

C. Counts II, III, and IV - State Law Claims

The Court's jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state law claims,
specifically, Counts II, III, and IV, is supplemental in nature.
Where a district court "has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction," such court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. In
this instance, as the case remains at the pleading stage, there are
no apparent considerations weighing in favor of retaining
jurisdiction over the state law claims, Judge Chesney finds it
appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' state law claims
will be dismissed without prejudice.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Chesney granted Wells Fargo's
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 23.1, and dismissed the
complaint as follows:

   1. Counts I and V are dismissed; and

   2. Counts II, III, and IV are dismissed without prejudice to
      refiling said claims in state court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/b3a2mztr from Leagle.com.


WESTCO CHEMICALS: Parties Must File Settlement Bid or Trial Date
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Daniel Draney v. Westco
Chemicals, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-01405-ODW-AGR (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Otis D. Wright II entered an order directing
the parties to file, no later than March 8, 2022, one of the
following:

   (1) an amended class action settlement approval motion, or

   (2) a stipulation to a new trial date and set of pre-trial
       dates and deadlines, along with a short proposal
       describing how the parties wish to proceed.

On September 29, 2021, the Court denied the parties' motion for
class certification and preliminary approval of class action
settlement.

The Court reiterates that the total settlement amount to which the
parties have agreed may well be fair and workable and hopes the
parties have been able to make progress in accordance with the
Court's observations set forth in the Order.

That said, as of today's date, no amended settlement approval
motion has been filed, and no trial date is currently set.

Westco is a supply and distribution company.

A copy of civil minutes -- general dated Feb. 7, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/35Zhbxj  at no extra
charge.[CC]


XAPT CORP: Court Refers Deere Suit to Magistrate Judge Peterson
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Tana Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington referred the case, DEERE & COMPANY, et al., Plaintiff
v. XAPT CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-00126-TL (W.D.
Wash.), to Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson for certain
specific purposes and types of motions.

The action is assigned to Judge Lin. All future documents filed in
the case must bear the cause number 2:22-cv-00126-TL-MLP.

Judge Lin has reviewed the files and records, and determined that
certain pretrial matters are appropriate to refer to a Magistrate
Judge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A) and Local
Magistrate Judge Rule ("Local MJR"), she refers to Magistrate Judge
Peterson all non-dispositive pretrial matters, other than those
matters excluded by 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(a) governs any objections to Magistrate Judge
Peterson's rulings concerning any non-dispositive motions.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and Local Rule
MJR 4, Judge Lin also refers to Magistrate Judge Peterson for
preparation of a report and recommendation all motions for (1)
injunctive relief, (2) judgment on the pleadings, (3) summary
judgment, (4) dismissal or to permit maintenance of a class action,
(5) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (6) involuntarily dismissal of an action, and (7) the
pending motion to quash as well as to transfer the motion to quash
subpoena. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) governs any further
proceedings in the Court after Magistrate Judge Peterson files a
report and recommendation.

Accordingly, Judge Lin referred the action to Magistrate Judge
Peterson for the specific purposes and types of motions she
described. She further directed and empowered Magistrate Judge
Peterson to conduct hearings and make further necessary orders
consistent with 28 U.S.C. Section 636, the local rules, and the
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4eunptue from Leagle.com.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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