/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/211123.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, November 23, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 228

                            Headlines

180 3RD AVENUE: Court Issues $31K Judgment in Castaneda Suit
310 RECOVERY: Faces Rusk Wage-and-Hour Suit in California
3M COMPANY: Gentile Suit Claims PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
3M COMPANY: Parties Must Submit Proposed Briefing Order by Dec. 1
AEI PAINTING: Chirinos-Anariba Sues Over Painters' Unpaid Overtime

AIR & LIQUID: Marcher Sues Over Side Effect From Asbestos Exposure
AIR CANADA: Court Grants Preliminary Injunction in Vozzolo Suit
AMAZON.COM.DEDC: Chiu Seek to Certify Hourly Employee Class
AMERICAN CENTURY: Schall Law Firm Reminds of January 10 Deadline
APPHARVEST INC: Gross Law Firm Announces Shareholder Class Action

APPLE INC: Settles Employee Bag Check Class Action for $29.9-Mil.
ARRAY TECHNOLOGIES: Bid for Reconsideration in Plymouth Suit OK'd
ATERIAN INC: Derivative Suits Deconsolidated From Securities Suit
AUSTRALIA: Faces Class Action Over Agriculture Visa Program
AUSTRALIA: Faces Suit Over Mistreatment of Aboriginal Children

BAYER US: Anti-Fungal Products Contain Benzene, Villarreal Claims
BENTON HARBOR, MI: Residents File Suit Over Lead Water Crisis
BISHOP OF CHARLESTON: Loses Protective Order Bid in Nestler Suit
BLACK DIAMOND: $340K Class Settlement in Borelli Suit Has Final OK
BLACKROCK INSTITUTIONAL: Baird's $9.65M Class Deal Wins Final Nod

BLOCK.ONE: Williams' Counsel Must Give More Info for $27.5M Deal
BLUE CROSS: L.P. Appeals Ruling in Insurance Suit to 8th Cir.
BRANDREP LLC: Bid to Dismiss/Remove Amended Schick TCPA Suit Denied
BRISTOL COMPRESSORS: Court Enters Judgments in Messer WARN Act Suit
CARLOTZ INC: Plaintiff Must File Consolidated Amended Complaint

CEBRIDGE TELECOM: Can't Compel Arbitration in Vasquez Class Suit
CENTERRA GROUP: Monarrez Loses Bid to Remand Suit to Superior Court
CENTRUS ENERGY: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Matthews Class Suit
CENTRUS ENERGY: Shortridge Sues Over Forced COVID-19 Vaccine Order
CHARLES SCHWAB: Asks Court to Dismiss Class Suit Over Cash Sweeps

CHARLES SCHWAB: Class Certification in CA Putative Suit Tossed
CHICKEN OF THE SEA: Initial OK of Settlements Nixed w/o Prejudice
CHILDREN'S LEARNING: Farrior Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
CHRISTOPHER AHERN: Verification & Affidavit Filed in Richter Suit
CHULA VISTA INC: Sartin Seeks Certification of Class Action

CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Troy Stacy Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal
CITIGROUP INC: Seeks Partial Dismissal of Consolidated Amended Suit
CLAY & DOMINGUE: Nov. 30 Extension for Class Cert Response Sought
COCA-COLA CO: Extension of Time to File Class Cert. Reply Sought
COMMUNITY HEALTH: Underpays Care Providers, Wells Suit Alleges

CONAGRA BRANDS: Alvarez Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to C.D. California
CORALREEF PRODUCTS: Faces Class Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
COTY INC: Court Approves Dismissal of Lewis Class Suit
CRONOS GROUP: Rosen Law Probes Firm for Possible Class Action
DEBT RESOLUTION: Time Extension for Class Cert. Filing Sought

DENNIS GROSS: Ct. Amends Scheduling Order in Gunaratna Class Suit
DIAMOND NAIL: Seeks to Decertify Lu Conditional Class Certification
DSP GROUP: Misleads Stockholders to Approve Merger, Smith Alleges
E.I. DU PONT: Moon Retirement Plan Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
EVERQUOTE INC: Faces Putative Class Suit Over FTSA Violations

FINANCIAL CARRIER: Faces Suit Over Improper Business Practices
FIRSTENERGY CORP: Seeks Reconsideration of Class Cert. Order
FULTON FINANCIAL: Judge Endorses Initial OK of Settlement in Kress
GENESIS HEALTHCARE: Valdez Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Workers
GERBER PRODUCTS: Court Narrows Claims in Gavilanes Consumer Suit

GOLDMAN SACHS: 8-Month Tolling Period in Chen-Oster Suit Approved
GOLDMAN SACHS: Sjunde-AP-Fonden Seeks to Certify Class Action
GOOGLE LLC: Gowling WLG Attorneys Discuss UK Supreme Court Ruling
GOOGLE LLC: Ruling Shows Lack of Legislation on Mass Claims Redress
GOOGLE LLC: UK Supreme Court Overturns Court of Appeal's Ruling

GOSSAMER BIO: Settlement for $2.4M Reached in Kuhne Suit
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Class Status Granted in Texas ACV Lawsuit
GREAT KILLS: Court Enters Scheduling Order in Lobato Class Suit
GREATER CINCINNATI: Cert. of Kleinhans' FLSA Collective Endorsed
HAWAII: Court OKs Settlement Deal in Chatman Class Action

HEALTH IQ: W.D. Oklahoma Dismisses Armado's 1st Amended Suit Claims
HEARST COMMUNICATIONS: Disclosed Personal Info, Hicks Suit Says
HG OHIO: Miller Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
HOME FAMILY: New York Court Certifies Turgunbaev as Class Action
IANTHUS CAPITAL: Court Discontinues Zaboroski Statement of Claim

IANTHUS CAPITAL: Plaintiff Allowed to Amend Claim in Class Suit
IANTHUS CAPITAL: Plaintiff Bid to File 2nd Amended Suit Pending
ILLINOIS: Boone Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
INDIANA: Court Allows Powell to Amend Complaint Against IDOC
INTER-COAST INT'L: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of Nguyen Labor Suit

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS: Frutarom CEO Seeks Dismissal of Class Suit
INTRICON CORP: Settlement in Hoffman Suit vs HHE Gets Initial Nod
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: Burks Suit Seeks to Certify Class
JACK IN THE BOX: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Szwanek Suit
JC & BC: Resto Staff Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages

JOHNSON CONTROLS: Wisconsin Court Tosses Gumm's Amended Class Suit
JUUL LABS: Daleville City Sues Over E-Cigarette Campaign to Youth
JUUL LABS: Faces Brandywine Suit Over Youth Health Crisis in Del.
JUUL LABS: Faces Griffith Suit Over Youth Health Crisis in Indiana
JUUL LABS: Indianapolis Sues Over E-Cigarette Campaign to Youth

JUUL LABS: Triggers E-Cigarette Youth Crisis, Etowah Suit Claims
KENSINGTON REDWOOD: Tolosa Suit Remanded to San Mateo Super. Court
KEYCITY CAPITAL: Motion to Compel Non-Party Filed in Starling Suit
LEPRINO FOODS: Seeks to Strike Evidence in Howell Class Cert Bid
LINCOLN NATIONAL: Settlement Reached in Suit vs Subsidiaries

LOS ANGELES RAMS: Loses Bid to File Trial in Relocation Class Suit
MARRIOTT INT'L: Court Overrules Objection in Hall Consumer Suit
MATCH GROUP: Class Claims in Candelore Class Suit Stayed
MAZDA MOTOR: Vance Sues Over Mazda Vehicles' Defective Fuel Pumps
MDL 2924: Bids for Final Judgment in Zantac Suit Granted in Part

MICHIGAN: Faces Class Action Over Benton Harbor's Drinking Water
MIDDLESEX WATER: Faces Suit Over Notice on Perfluorooctanoic Acid
MISSOURI: Republican AG Seeks Texts, Emails About Mask Mandates
NAR INC: Seeks to Strike Ortiz-de-Lozano's Class Claims
NASSAU, NY: Abbananto Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action

NATIONAL WESTERN: Settlement Reached in Baldwin Class Suit
NATURAL NINE: Sayles Sues Over Unpaid Wages, Illegal Kickbacks
NEW NELLO: Roman Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages
NEW YORK CITY, NY: Seeks Extension to Oppose Class Cert. Bid
NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR: Lawyer May Sue Regarding Cyber Attack

NORTONLIFELOCK INC: Holden Voluntarily Dismisses Class Suit
NORTONLIFELOCK INC: Settlement Reached in CA Consolidated Suit
OCTAPHARMA AG: Agrees to Pay $10M to End BIPA Class Action Suit
OHIO LIVING: Response to Kordie Class Cert. Bid Extended to Dec. 3
OHIO: Court Denies Briscoe's Bid to Depose Fellow Inmate Hurayt

OREGON: Court Extends Discovery & PTO Deadlines in Terrill Suit
PACC SENIOR: Sheridan Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Caregivers
PENN NATIONAL: Faces Potential Securities Class Action Amid Losses
PEOPLECONNECT INC: Loses Bid to Stay Proceedings in Callahan Suit
PFIZER INC: Faces New Chantix Suit Over Nitrosamine Impurities

PILLPACK LLC: Washington Court Decertifies Class in Williams Suit
PRANAV INN: Website Inaccessible to Disabled Persons, Sarwar Says
PRECIGEN INC: Seeks Dismissal of Second Amended Suit
PROCTER & GAMBLE: Faces Almanzar Suit Over Mislabeled Diapers
PROSPECT INT'L: Ramirez Suit Remanded to San Mateo Superior Court

REALREAL INC: Settlement in Shareholder Suit Awaits Initial OK
RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Rokack Sues Over Misleading Letters
RELIN GOLDSTEIN: New York Court Dismisses Braun FDCPA Class Suit
ROBINHOOD MARKET: Hit With Class Action Suit Over Data Breach
ROHOHO INC: Faces Reid Suit Over Failure to Reimburse Expenses

SAINT-GOBAIN: Settles PFOA Class Action Suit for $34.15 Million
SAM DONG OHIO: Made Unauthorized Background Check, Ekleberry Says
SCHEAR CONSTRUCTION: Seeks Denial of Sarmiento Class Certification
SCOREMORE LLC: Attendees Who Accept Refund Could Waive Right to Sue
SILVERBACK THERAPEUTICS: Dresner Sues Over Drop in Share Price

SMILEDIRECTCLUB INC: Court Amends Scheduling Order in Ciccio Suit
SNAP INC: Faces Shareholder Class Action Over Apple Privacy Updates
SNAP INC: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of January 10, 2022 Deadline
SNAP INC: Schall Law Reminds of January 10 Deadline
SOCIAL FINANCE: Court Stays Discovery in Juarez Suit for 60 days

SORENSON CONCRETE: Class Certification Denial in Sams Suit Affirmed
SQUARETRADE INC: Bids to Dismiss Amended Shuman Class Suit Granted
STEPHEN SMITH: Plaintiffs File Renewed Bid for Class Certification
STITCH FIX: Kasilingam Files Appeal in Consolidated Securities Suit
SUBWAY: Faces Class Action Over "100 Percent Tuna" Claims

SUMMIT PIZZA: Does Not Properly Pay Delivery Drivers, Glosser Says
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY: Ex School Dean Sued Over False Admissions Data
TENNESSEE: Governor Bill Lee Signs Mask Rollback Bill Into Law
TEXAS SOUTHERN: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Chevis Suit Alleges
TRADE DESK: Plaintiff in Delaware Suit Oppose Bid to Dismiss

TRICIDA INC: Seeks Dismissal of Perdi Putative Class Suit
TULANE UNIVERSITY: Jones Appeals Tuition Refund Suit Dismissal
TWITTER INC: $809.5MM Class Action Settlement Hits Earnings
UNITED COAL: Ct. Enters Conditional Class Cert. Order in Chapman
UNITED KINGDOM: Supreme Court Dismisses Data Protection Class Claim

UNITED PARCEL: Female Employees File Discrimination Class Action
UNITED PARCEL: Workers' Calif. Suit Alleges Bias Against Women
UNITED STATES: Allows H-1B Visa Holders' Spouses Job Authorization
UNITED STATES: Settlement Favors L-1 & H-1B Visa Holders' Spouses
UNITED STATES: Soldiers Used as "Guinea Pigs" in Military Program

UNITED STATES: Yeganeh Suit Over Denial of Visa Applications Tossed
UNIVERSAL CREDIT: Court Extends Pretrial Dates in Thompson Suit
USAA GENERAL: Ct. Enters Order Setting Deadlines in Drozdz Suit
VAIL CORP: Gibson Deadlines Stayed Pending Hamilton II Deal Ruling
VBI VACCINES: Initial Hearing on Suit vs Unit Set for June 9, 2022

VIATRIS INC: Antitrust Class Suit Ongoing
VIATRIS INC: Faces Class Suit Over Securities Act Violations
VIATRIS INC: Gill Antitrust Suit Moved From N.D.N.Y. to D. Kansas
VICTORIA: Faces Class Action Over COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate
VISPRING LUXURY: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

WAITR HOLDINGS: Mediation Session Scheduled
WASHINGTON STATE: New LTC Program Hit With Class Action Lawsuit
WILDCAT INVESTMENTS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Foley Alleges
WILLIAM JOHNSON: Settlement in Vataj Suit Gets Final Nod
WISE MEDICAL: Filing of Class Cert Response Extended to Dec. 3

XPO LAST: Extension of Class Cert Deadlines Sought in Green

                            *********

180 3RD AVENUE: Court Issues $31K Judgment in Castaneda Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
issued a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs in the sum of $31,000
in the lawsuit titled JAIME CASTANEDA and LEONEL CASTANEDA,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. 180 3RD AVENUE LLC. (D/B/A WESTSIDE MARKET, 74-84 WESTSIDE
MARKET LLC (d/b/a WESTSIDE MARKET), GEORGE ZOITAS, GUILLERMO DOE,
and ALEX DOE, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-00961 (S.D.N.Y.).

Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Defendants 180 3RD AVENUE LLC. (D/B/A WESTSIDE MARKET), and 74-84
WESTSIDE MARKET LLC (d/b/a WESTSIDE MARKET), offered to allow
Plaintiffs JAIME CASTANEDA and LEONEL CASTANEDA ("Plaintiffs") to
take a judgment against them, in the sum of $31,000 in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the Defendants' Rule 68 Offer
dated Oct. 19, 2021 and filed as Exhibit A to Docket Number 44.

The sum is inclusive of all of the Plaintiffs' and putative
collective or class action members' claims, attorney's fees, costs,
and expenses.

On Oct. 19, 2021, the Plaintiffs' attorney has confirmed the
Plaintiffs' acceptance of the Defendants' Offer of Judgment.

Accordingly, the Court ruled that Rule 68 Judgment is entered in
favor of Plaintiffs JAIME CASTANEDA and LEONEL CASTANEDA, in the
sum of $31,000, inclusive of all of the Plaintiffs' claims,
attorney's fees, costs, and expenses, in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the Defendants' Rule 68 Offer dated Oct. 19,
2021, and filed as Exhibit A to Docket Number 44.

The Court also ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the case is
dismissed as it related to all the Defendants and will be closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Rule 68 Judgment dated Nov. 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/p4x2a3dj from
Leagle.com.


310 RECOVERY: Faces Rusk Wage-and-Hour Suit in California
---------------------------------------------------------
NOLAN RUSK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 310 RECOVERY, INC.; VALENTINE GASPARYAN; H.
PARKER FEHN; and DOES 1 to 25, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
21STCV42406 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., November 16, 2021) is a
class action against the Defendants for violation of the Private
Attorneys General Act including failure to pay minimum wages,
failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide rest periods,
failure to provide meal periods, failure to keep accurate and
complete payroll records, failure to pay earned and due wages upon
separation of employment, failure to reimburse business-related
expenses, and failure to provide sick pay.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a med and lead tech from
April 2019 until October 21, 2020.

310 Recovery, Inc. is a company that operates drug and alcohol
rehabilitation center in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Harout Messrelian, Esq.
         MESSRELIAN LAW INC.
         500 N. Central Ave., Suite 840
         Glendale, CA 91203
         Telephone: (818) 484-6531
         Facsimile: (818) 956-1983
         E-mail: hm@messrelianlaw.com

3M COMPANY: Gentile Suit Claims PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
----------------------------------------------------------------
JERRY GENTILE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company; ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.;
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-03760-RMG
(D.S.C., November 17, 2021) is a class action against the
Defendants for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design
defect, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express
and implied warranties, and wantonness.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to use
reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture,
labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and
distribution of aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) products
containing synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances
collectively known as PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF products are
dangerous to human health because PFAS are highly toxic and
carcinogenic chemicals and can accumulate in the blood and body of
exposed individuals. The Defendants have also failed to warn public
entities and firefighter trainees who they knew would foreseeably
come into contact with their AFFF products. The Plaintiff used the
Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products in their intended manner,
without significant change in the products' condition due to
inadequate warning about the products' danger. He relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products,
added the suit.

As a result of the alleged exposure to the Defendants' AFFF
products, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul.
Minnesota.

ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products
based in Exton, Pennsylvania.

Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based
in Trussville, Alabama.

Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North
America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld
and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates &
hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of
business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina.

Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida.

Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company
based in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty
chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located
at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin.

Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in
Baytown, Texas.

Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium
technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in
Wilmington, Delaware.

Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection
systems based in United Kingdom.

Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte,
North Carolina.

Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company
based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic
iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma.

Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical
company based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production
of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York.

E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and
specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market
Street, Wilmington, Delaware.

Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems
based in Ashland, Massachusetts.

Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in
Mebane, North Carolina.

Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic
chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina.

National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam
proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting
equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East
Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania.

The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals
with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington,
Delaware.

Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul
Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system
components and ancillary building construction products, including
Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street,
Marinette, Wisconsin.

United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational
conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged
with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon
Technologies.

UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE
Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control
systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
         Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
         GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         270 West Main Street
         Sayville, NY 11782
         Telephone: (631) 600-0000
         Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

                 - and –

         Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
         Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
         Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
         ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
         2160 Highland Avenue South
         Birmingham, AL 35205
         Telephone: (205) 328-9200
         Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Parties Must Submit Proposed Briefing Order by Dec. 1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JARROD JOHNSON,
individually, and on Behalf of a Class of persons similarly
situated, v. 3M COMPANY, et al., Case No. 4:20-cv-00008-AT (N.D.
Ga.), the Hon. Judge Amy Totenberg entered an order granting the
joint motion for extension of time, and extending the deadline for
the parties to submit a Proposed Briefing Order regarding class
certification briefing through and including December 1, 2021.

The 3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate
corporation operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, US
health care, and consumer goods.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HAXdas at no extra charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Robert B. Remar, Esq.
          Monica P. Witte, Esq.
          Katherine L. D'Ambrosio, Esq.
          ROGERS & HARDIN LLP
          229 Peachtree Street NE
          2700 International Tower
          Atlanta, GA 30303
          Telephone: (404) 522-4700
          Facsimile: (404) 525-2224
          E-mail: rremar@rh-law.com
                  mwitte@rh-law.com
                  kdambrosio@rh-law.com


AEI PAINTING: Chirinos-Anariba Sues Over Painters' Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------------
MELVIN ODIR CHIRINOS-ANARIBA, individually and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AEI PAINTING CONTRACTORS,
LLC and CHAD SKINNER, jointly and severally, Defendants, Case No.
1:21-cv-04532-AT (N.D. Ga., November 2, 2021) is a collective
action complaint brought against the Defendants to recover unpaid
overtime premium pay pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a painter from
approximately November 1, 2017 to July 30, 2021.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants jointly set unlawful
payroll policies, thereby willfully violating the FLSA. Throughout
his employment with the Defendants, he was only paid straight-time
despite working in excess of 40 hours. The Plaintiff asserts that
the Defendants did not pay him overtime premium at the rate of one
and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 per workweek.

AEI Painting Contractors, LLC provides painting services. Chad
Skinner is an owner, officer, director and/or managing agent of the
Corporate Defendant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon A. Thomas, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF BRANDON A. THOMAS, PC
          1 Glenlake Parkway, Suite 650
          Atlanta, GA 30328
          Tel: (678) 330-2909
          Fax: (678) 638-6201
          E-mail: brandon@overtimeclaimslawyer.com


AIR & LIQUID: Marcher Sues Over Side Effect From Asbestos Exposure
------------------------------------------------------------------
NIKOLAUS J. MARCHER and LYNNE MARCHER, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AIR & LIQUID
SYSTEMS CORPORATION (sued individually and as successor-in-interest
to BUFFALO PUMPS, INC.); 3M COMPANY a/k/a MINNESOTA MINING AND
MANUFACTURING COMPANY; AES CORPORATION; AMETEK, INC. (sued
individually and as successor-in-interest to HAVEG INDUSTRIES,
INC., successor-in-interest to HERCULES, INC.); ANHEUSER-BUSCH
COMPANIES, LLC; ANHEUSER-BUSCH, LLC f/k/a ANHEUSER-BUSCH,
INCORPORATED; BECHTEL CORPORATION; CALAVERAS ASBESTOS, LTD.;
CALPORTLAND COMPANY f/k/a CALIFORNIA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY;
CHAMPLAIN CABLE CORPORATION (sued individually and as
successor-in-interest to HERCULES, INC., successor-in-interest to
HAVEG INDUSTRIES, INC.); CITY OF RIVERSIDE UTILITIES; CLEAN
HARBORS, INC. (sued individually and as successor to VEOLIA ES
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC. f/k/a BRAND INSULATIONS, INC.);
COPES-VULCAN, INC.; CRANE CO.; DANIEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION;
DELEK US ENERGY, INC. f/k/a DELEK US HOLDINGS, INC. (sued
individually and as successor-in-interest to ALON USA ENERGY,
INC.); E.F. BRADY COMPANY, INC.; FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, LLC (sued
individually and as successor-in-interest to INDUSTRY SUPPLY, and
as successor-by-merger to FAMILIAN CORPORATION successor to
FAMILIAN PIPE & SUPPLY CO.); FLUOR CONSTRUCTORS INTERNATIONAL
f/k/a/ FLUOR CORPORATION; FLUOR CONSTRUCTORS INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
FLUOR DANIEL SERVICES CORPORATION; FLUOR ENTERPRISES, INC.; FORMOSA
PLASTICS CORPORATION, U.S.A. (sued individually and as parent,
alter ego and successor-in-interest to J-M MANUFACTURING COMPANY
and to J-M A/C PIPE CORPORATION); FRYER-KNOWLES, INC.; GENERAL
ELECTRIC COMPANY; HAJOCA CORPORATION; HERCULES LLC f/k/a HERCULES
INCORPORATED; HILL BROTHERS CHEMICAL CORPORATION; HOPEMAN BROTHERS,
INC.; J-M MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. WHICH WILL DO BUSINESS IN
CALIFORNIA AS J-M PIPE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. (sued
individually and successor-in-interest to JM A/C PIPE CORPORATION);
J. T. THORPE & SON, INC.; KAISER GYPSUM COMPANY, INC.; KEENAN
PROPERTIES, INC.; KERR-MCGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION (sued
individually as successor-in-interest to AMERICAN POTASH AND
CHEMICAL COMPANY); M. SLAYEN AND ASSOCIATES, INC.; METALCLAD
INSULATION LLC f/k/a METALCLAD INSULATION CORPORATION (sued
individually and as successor-in-interest to METALCLAD INSULATION
COMPANY, INC.); METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a wholly owned
subsidiary of METLIFE INC.; NATIONAL STEEL AND SHIPBUILDING
COMPANY; NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION (sued individually and as
successor-in-interest to RYAN AERONAUTICAL COMPANY); NRG ENERGY,
INC.; OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (sued individually and as
successor-in-interest to AMERICAN POTASH AND CHEMICAL COMPANY);
PFIZER INC.; PLANT PRODUCTS & SUPPLY CO.; PRIME HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC.; ROHR, INC. f/k/a ROHR AIRCRAFT CORPORATION; SAN
DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY; SEQUOIA VENTURES INC. f/k/a BECHTEL
CORPORATION; SHELL OIL COMPANY; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY;
TRONOX LLC f/k/a KERR-MCGEE CHEMICAL LLC (sued individually and as
successor-in-interest to AMERICAN POTASH AND CHEMICAL COMPANY);
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION; VIACOMCBS INC. f/k/a CBS CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation f/k/a VIACOM, INC., successor-by-merger to CBS
CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, f/k/a WESTINGHOUSE
ELECTRIC CORPORATION successor-in-interest to BF STURTEVANT; WARREN
PUMPS, LLC; WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. (sued individually and as
successor-in-interest to BRAND INSULATIONS, INC. and BRAND
MID-ATLANTIC, INC.); YUBA HEAT TRANSFER, LLC; and DOES 1-450,
INCLUSIVE, Defendants, Case No. 21STCV42171 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., November 16, 2021) is a class action against the
Defendants for negligence, conspiracy, and loss of consortium.

The case arises from Plaintiff Nikolaus Marcher's development of
malignant mesothelioma as a result of his alleged exposure to
asbestos from the Defendants' asbestos-containing products and/or
products designed to be used in association with asbestos
products.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation is an industrial equipment
supplier based in Virginia.

3M Company a/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company is an
American multinational conglomerate corporation, headquartered in
Saint Paul, Minnesota.

AES Corporation is an electric power distribution company,
headquartered in Virginia.

Ametek, Inc. is an American global manufacturer of electronic
instruments and electromechanical devices, headquartered in
Pennsylvania.

Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC is an American brewing company
headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri.

Anheuser-Busch, LLC f/k/a Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated is an
American brewing company headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri.

Bechtel Corporation is an American engineering, procurement,
construction, and project management company, headquartered in
Reston, Virginia.

Calaveras Asbestos, Ltd. is an asbestos company based in
California.

Calportland Company f/k/a California Portland Cement Company is a
building material company based in California.

Champlain Cable Corporation is a cable manufacturer based in
Vermont.

City Of Riverside Utilities is a public utility in California.

Clean Harbors, Inc. is an American provider of environmental and
industrial services based in Massachusetts.

Copes-Vulcan, Inc. is a manufacturer of industrial equipment
headquartered in Pennsylvania.

Crane Co. is an American industrial products company based in
Stamford, Connecticut.

Daniel International Corporation is a construction firm in
Greenville, South Carolina.

Delek US Energy, Inc. f/k/a Delek US Holdings, Inc. is an energy
company based in Tennessee.

E.F. Brady Company, Inc. is a subcontractor in California.

Ferguson Enterprises, LLC is a plumbing supplier headquartered in
Newport News, Virginia.

Fluor Constructors International f/k/a/ Fluor Corporation is a
construction engineering company based in Greenville, South
Carolina.

Fluor Constructors International, Inc. is a construction
engineering company based in Greenville, South Carolina.

Fluor Daniel Services Corporation is an engineering construction
company based in Texas.

Fluor Enterprises, Inc. is an engineering construction company
based in Texas.

Formosa Plastics Corporation, U.S.A. is a chemicals company based
in Taiwan.

Fryer-Knowles, Inc. is a construction company based in Washington.

General Electric Company is an American multinational conglomerate
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts.

Hajoca Corporation is a wholesale distributor of plumbing, heating,
and industrial supplies based in Pennsylvania.

Hercules LLC f/k/a Hercules Incorporated is a chemical and
munitions manufacturing company based in Wilmington, Delaware.

Hill Brothers Chemical Corporation is a chemical manufacturer in
San Jose, California.

Hopeman Brothers, Inc. is an operator of nonresidential buildings
based in Virginia.

J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. is a manufacturer of plastic pipe,
fittings and tubing products based in California.

J. T. Thorpe & Son, Inc. is a refractory contractor in California.

Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. is a gypsum company based in North
Carolina.

Keenan Properties, Inc. is a commercial real estate in Missouri.

Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation is an energy company in Oklahoma.

M. Slayen and Associates, Inc. is a company in California.

Metalclad Insulation LLC f/k/a Metalclad Insulation Corporation is
a manufacturer of insulation products based in California.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of
MetLife Inc., is a life insurance company based in New York, New
York.

National Steel and Shipbuilding Company is an American shipbuilding
company based in San Diego, California.

Northrop Grumman Corporation is an American multinational aerospace
and defense technology company based in Virginia.

NRG Energy, Inc. is a large American energy company, headquartered
in Houston, Texas.

Occidental Petroleum Corporation is an American company engaged in
hydrocarbon exploration in the United States, the Middle East, and
Colombia as well as petrochemical manufacturing in the United
States, Canada, and Chile.

Pfizer Inc. is an American multinational pharmaceutical and
biotechnology corporation headquartered in New York, New York.

Plant Products & Supply Co. is a supplier of plant products in
Ontario.

Prime Healthcare Services, Inc. is a healthcare company based in
California.

Rohr, Inc. f/k/a Rohr Aircraft Corporation is an aerospace
manufacturing company based in Chula Vista, California.

San Diego Gas & Electric Company is a public utility company based
in California.

Sequoia Ventures Inc. f/k/a Bechtel Corporation is an American
venture capital firm based in California.

Shell Oil Company is an oil company based in Houston, Texas.

Southern California Edison Company is an electricity supply company
in California.

Tronox LLC f/k/a Kerr-McGee Chemical LLC is a chemicals company
based in Connecticut.

Union Carbide Corporation is an American chemical corporation
headquartered in Houston, Texas.

ViacomCBS Inc. f/k/a CBS Corporation is an American diversified
multinational mass media and entertainment conglomerate corporation
based in New York, New York.

Warren Pumps, LLC is a pump manufacturing company based in
Massachusetts.

Waste Management, Inc. is an American waste management company,
headquartered in Houston, Texas

Yuba Heat Transfer, LLC is a supplier of heat transfer equipment
based in Oklahoma. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                

         Benjamin H. Adams, Esq.
         DEAN OMAR BRANHAM SHIRLEY, LLP
         302 N. Market Street, Suite 300
         Dallas, TX 75202
         Telephone: (214) 722-5990
         Facsimile: (214) 722-5991
         E-mail: badams@dobslegal.com

AIR CANADA: Court Grants Preliminary Injunction in Vozzolo Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMILIO L. VOZZOLO, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AIR CANADA, Defendant, Case No.
20-CV-03503 (PMH), Rel. Nos. 20-CV-04988 (PMH), 20-CV-11037 (PMH)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Philip M. Halpern of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction.

Introduction

Plaintiffs Emilio L. Vozzolo, Thomas Piercy, and Barry Winograd
commenced these consolidated putative class actions on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, seeking refunds from Air
Canada for airline tickets purchased for flights that were
cancelled as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. More than one year
following the onset of the pandemic, on April 13, 2021, the
Defendant began a program in which it offered refunds to customers
holding otherwise non-refundable or partially refundable tickets
whose flights were cancelled for any reason from March 1, 2020 to
present. The Plaintiffs now seek a preliminary injunction directing
the Defendant to set aside a portion of any yet-to-be paid refunds
to the putative class for attorney's fees, pending a determination
of whether the Plaintiffs' suits were a substantial cause of the
Refund Offer.

Background

The COVID-19 pandemic needs no introduction. It has been a
widespread and devastating event that has had and continues to have
a profound impact on individuals and industries across the globe.
The case involves the pandemic's effects on a carrier in the
aviation industry. It was brought by and on behalf of individuals
who were set to travel somewhere on Air Canada flights in early
2020. The Air Canada flights were cancelled due to COVID-19 and
these customers did not receive a refund for the price paid for
their tickets.

Travel restrictions affecting domestic and international air travel
began on Jan. 31, 2020, leading to "do-not-travel" warnings and
bans and the closure of borders—all of these restrictions were
imposed in an effort to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The Defendant
began cancelling flights in March 2020 because of the travel
restrictions. The Plaintiffs, who had purchased tickets for flights
on March 31, 2020, April 2, 2020, April 29, 2020, and April 30,
2020, were advised by the Defendant that their flights had been
cancelled. Instead of offering or issuing a full refund for these
cancelled flights, the Defendant advised the Plaintiffs and the
other passengers that they were entitled only to a travel voucher
to be used within a certain amount of time.

Because of the Defendant's refusal to provide passengers with full
refunds, litigation soon materialized: On March 20, 2020, a
putative class action was commenced against the Defendant and other
airlines entitled Lachaine vs. Transat et al., in the Superior
Court of Quebec, Montreal District, Docket Number
500-06-001052-204. The plaintiffs in Lachaine sought to certify
three separate classes, including one comprised of U.S. residents,
who held a ticket for an Air Canada flight that was cancelled due
to COVID-19 and who were not provided a refund.

On March 23, 2020, a putative class action was commenced against
the Defendant in the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division,
entitled Levu v. Air Canada, Inc., Case No. 6:20-CV-00703.  On
March 27, 2020, another putative class action was commenced in
Canada against Defendant and others, entitled Donaldson vs. Swoop
et al., Docket Number T-428-20, seeking to certify a class of
individuals residing "anywhere in the world" who had a confirmed
booking on Air Canada before March 11, 2020. Also on March 27,
2020, a third putative class action was filed in Canada similarly
seeking to represent "all persons anywhere in the world" who
contracted with Defendant for flights from March 13, 2020 onward,
that were cancelled and not issued a refund.

In addition to these class actions filed in the United States and
Canada, the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") communicated
with the Defendant concerning thousands of consumer complaints
seeking refunds for their cancelled flights, the DOT's requirements
that both domestic and foreign airlines refund tickets for flights
cancelled due to COVID-19, and threatened enforcement action
against the Defendant.

As of April 8, 2020, the United States Government had given the
domestic aviation industry a $50 billion bailout, and as of April
30, 2020, the European Governments announced the first € 26
billion bailout to their carriers. The Defendant, however, had not
been provided similar government-relief packages at that time.

On May 4, 2020, the Defendant noted in its First Quarter 2020
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Results of Operations and
Financial Condition that "not refunding non-refundable tickets may
expose Air Canada to litigation, including class actions, as well
as enforcement action by regulators in certain jurisdictions."
Three putative class actions had already been commenced against the
Defendant in Canada, one had been commenced in the United States,
and the DOT was threatening enforcement action.

The following day, on May 5, 2020, the Vozzolo putative class
action was commenced. The next week the DOT issued an enforcement
notice dated May 12, 2020, again threatening enforcement action
against the Defendant. On May 26, 2020, a fourth putative class
action was filed in Canada entitled Genest vs. Air Canada et al.,
Docket Number 200-06-000248-206, seeking to represent a class
comprised of any person who purchased a ticket for an Air Canada
flight prior to March 19, 2020. On June 29, 2020, the Piercy
putative class action was commenced.

On July 24, 2020, the DOT sent a letter to Defendant setting forth
its position that Air Canada's practice of not offering a refund to
a ticketed passenger when the carrier cancels or significantly
changes the passenger's flight constitutes an unfair practice. The
same day, July 24, 2020, a fifth putative class action was filed in
Canada entitled Jaswall vs. Air Canada et al., Docket Number
S-207356, seeking to represent a class of Canadian residents who
held tickets to travel on or after March 1, 2020 and who did not
receive a refund for flight cancellation. On Aug. 12, 2020, the
Winograd action was initially filed in Superior Court for the State
of California, County of Alameda.

On April 12, 2021, more than one year following the onset of the
pandemic, the Defendant announced that it had entered into a series
of debt and equity financing agreements with the Canadian
Government whereby it agreed to a number of commitments, inter
alia, related to customer refunds. The Canadian Government provided
Dthe efendant with over CAD $5 billion through the Large Employer
Emergency Financing Facility Program. The Defendant immediately
announced the Refund Offer, providing the option of a refund to all
eligible customers globally who purchased a non-refundable fare but
could not travel due to COVID-19. The Refund Offer was initially
available to customers until June 12, 2021, and was later extended
to July 12, 2021.

On April 14, 2021, the Defendant advised the Court of the
commencement of the Refund Offer and set forth its position that
the Refund Offer mooted the Plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that
the putative class is the same group of customers for whom it was
then offering a full refund. The Court did not make any
determination concerning the alleged mootness of the claims, but,
because of the changed circumstances and in light of its order
consolidating Piercy and Winograd into Vozzolo, it directed the
filing of a consolidated amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for a preliminary
injunction on June 29, 2021. On July 26, 2021, following a July 12,
2021 conference with the Court, the Defendant filed opposition to
the motion. The Plaintiffs' reply was filed on Aug. 9, 2021. The
Plaintiffs, in their notice of motion, had also sought a
determination as to whether their claims were mooted by the Refund
Offer. After the motion was fully briefed, however, on Aug. 27,
2021, the Plaintiffs requested that the Court takes any deadlines
to file a consolidated amended complaint off the calendar because,
based on their evaluation of information provided by the Defendant,
the Plaintiffs believed the Refund Offer had mooted out the
putative class members' claims.

The Court accepts both sides' position that the Plaintiffs' claims
have become moot as a result of the Refund Offer. Accordingly, the
sole issue presently before the Court is whether the Plaintiffs are
entitled to a preliminary injunction directing the Defendant to set
aside a portion of any yet-to-be paid refunds for attorney's fees,
pending a determination of whether the Plaintiffs' suits were "a
substantial cause" of the Refund Offer.

Analysis & Conclusion

Judge Halpern finds that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that
irreparable harm will follow if a preliminary injunction is not
granted, as well as substantial questions going to the merits of
their claim for attorney's fees, and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in their favor. Accordingly, the grants the Plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction as follows: The Defendant is
enjoined from disbursing refunds not yet paid to the putative class
members as of Aug. 12, 2021, unless 5% of such refunds is placed in
an escrow account pending the Court's final determination of
whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney's
fees.

Judge Halpern dispenses with the filing of a bond.

A hearing has been scheduled on the issue of causation on Jan. 11,
2022 at 11:30 a.m. at the Hon. Charles L. Brieant Jr. Federal
Building and Courthouse, 300 Quarropas Street, White Plains, New
York 10601. The Court will advise the parties of the courtroom
before the appearance date.

All members of the public, including attorneys, appearing at a
Southern District of New York courthouse must complete a
questionnaire and have their temperature taken before being allowed
entry into that courthouse. On the day that they are due to arrive
at the courthouse, click on the following weblink:
https://app.certify.me/SDNYPublic. They must follow the
instructions and fill out the questionnaire. If their answers meet
the requirements for entry, they will be sent a QR code to be used
as the SDNY entry device at the courthouse entrance.

The parties may engage in discovery as to the causation issue and
will file pre-hearing memoranda, limited to 15 double-spaced pages,
concerning causation and the Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's
fees by Jan. 4, 2022. The causation hearing will not be adjourned
because discovery concerning causation has not been completed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/27jwfchk from
Leagle.com.


AMAZON.COM.DEDC: Chiu Seek to Certify Hourly Employee Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DIANE VACCARO and JENNIFER
CHIU, v. AMAZON.COM.DEDC, LLC., Case No. 3:18-cv-11852-FLW-TJB
(D.N.J.), the Plaintiff Chiu asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23
      on behalf of:

      "all current and former hourly fulfillment center
      employees who worked for Defendant in New Jersey, and who,
      during at least one workweek from two years prior to the
      original date of the filing of the Complaint, May 11,
      2018, through the present, worked at least 40 hours
      according to Defendant's timekeeping system and underwent
      a Security Screening or Temperature Screening;" and

   2. appointing Swartz Swidler, LLC as class counsel and
      herself as class representative.

Amazon.com.dedc, LLC retails auto parts. The Company offers towing
mirrors, air suspension, retainer clips kits, and wheel chocks.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Nov. 12,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3cgQq7D
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew D. Miller, Esq.
          Joshua S. Boyette, Esq.
          Justin L. Swidler, Esq.
          Richard S. Swartz, Esq.
          SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC
          1101 Kings Highway North, Ste. 402
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Telephone: (856) 685-7420
          Facsimile: (856) 685-7417

AMERICAN CENTURY: Schall Law Firm Reminds of January 10 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against American
Century Value Fund ("American Century Value Fund" or "the Fund")
(NASDAQ: TWVLX, AVLIX, AVUYX, TWADX, ACLCX, AVURX, AVUGX, AVUDX)
for violations of the federal securities laws.

Investors who purchased the Fund's securities from November 5, 2018
to the present, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to
contact the firm before January 10, 2022.

If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to
participate.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2460, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
310-301-3335, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. The Fund misrepresented its investment
strategy in registration statements and prospectuses made publicly
available to investors. The Fund used a "closet indexing" strategy
yet charged high fees justified by purported active management.
When the market learned the truth about American Century Value
Fund, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and rules of ethics. [GN]

APPHARVEST INC: Gross Law Firm Announces Shareholder Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of The Gross Law Firm issues the
following notice on behalf of shareholders in the following
publicly traded companies. Shareholders who purchased shares in the
following companies during the dates listed are encouraged to
contact the firm regarding possible Lead Plaintiff appointment.
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff is not required to partake in any
recovery.

AppHarvest, Inc. (NASDAQ:APPH)

Investors Affected: May 17, 2021 - August 10, 2021

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
AppHarvest, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) AppHarvest lacked sufficient training for its
recently expanded labor force; (2) as a result, the Company could
not produce Grade No. 1 tomatoes consistently; (3) as a result, the
Company's financial results would be adversely impacted; and (4) as
a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about
the Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/appharvest-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=21174&from=1

Lightning Emotors, Inc (NYSE:ZEV)

Investors Affected: May 7, 2021 - August 16, 2021

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Lightning Emotors, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) the Company would record a substantially greater
net loss per share in the second quarter of 2021 compared to the
second quarter of 2020 and would pull its full year guidance for
the remainder of 2021; (ii) accordingly, the Company materially
overstated its financial position and/or prospects; and (iii) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/lightning-emotors-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=21174&from=1

Camber Energy, Inc. (NYSE:CEI)

Investors Affected: February 18, 2021 - October 4, 2021

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Camber Energy, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Camber overstated the financial and business
prospects of Viking as well as the combined company post merger;
(ii) Camber failed to apprise investors of, and/or downplayed, the
fact that its acquisition of a controlling interest in Viking would
exacerbate the Company's delinquent financial statements and
listing obligations with the NYSE; (iii) an institutional investor
was diluting Camber's shares at a significant rate following the
Company's July 12, 2021 update regarding the number of its shares
of common stock issued and outstanding; and (iv) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/camber-energy-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=21174&from=1

The Gross Law Firm is committed to ensuring that companies adhere
to responsible business practices and engage in good corporate
citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who
incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the
omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial
inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

The Gross Law Firm
15 West 38th Street, 12th floor
New York, NY, 10018
Email: dg@securitiesclasslaw.com
Phone: (212) 537-9430
Fax: (833) 862-7770 [GN]

APPLE INC: Settles Employee Bag Check Class Action for $29.9-Mil.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
iPhone in Canada's Nehal Malik, citing Bloomberg, reports that
Apple has agreed to pay $29.9 million USD to settle an 8-year-old
class-action lawsuit, filed by Apple Store workers in 2013 over
lost wages from employee bag checks Apple enforced at its outlets
for security.

The settlement was reached after a prolonged, eight-year legal
battle between the two parties. On Friday, lawyers for the
plaintiffs filed for a federal judge to ratify the settlement
agreement.

The suit, which was escalated to a class action in 2015, claimed
Apple was violating California law by not paying employees for the
time it took to conduct bag checks when they left work after their
shifts, or during.

Apple argued the security checks were a necessary measure to make
sure Apple Store employees were not hiding stolen products in their
bags. At one point, Apple's lawyers said workers brought bag checks
upon themselves by bringing bags into work, and that anyone who
didn't like the policy could choose not to carry a bag.

The class action only covered employees at California's 52 Apple
Stores. According to the court filing, the class consists of 14,683
workers, each of whom will get $1,286 USD from the settlement.

The case had been dismissed by a U.S. District Judge back in 2015,
but was revived last year when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that Apple was obligated to pay employees for the time they
spent having their bags checked. Apple declined to comment on the
settlement. The company said in the settlement agreement that its
bag check policy was discontinued in December 2015.

The case is Frlekin v. Apple, 13-cv-03451, U.S. District Court,
Northern District of California (San Francisco). [GN]

ARRAY TECHNOLOGIES: Bid for Reconsideration in Plymouth Suit OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
grants Erste Asset Management's motion for reconsideration of the
Court's Order dated Sept. 21, 2021, in the lawsuit styled PLYMOUTH
COUNTY RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff v. ARRAY TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 21 Civ. 4390 (VM) (S.D.N.Y.).

On Sept. 21, 2021, the Court appointed the Plymouth County
Retirement Association and the Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for
Northern California (collectively, the "Institutional Investor
Group" or "IIG"), as co-lead plaintiffs in this securities class
action. In doing so, the Court denied Erste Asset Management's
("Erste AM") motion for appointment as lead plaintiff on the
grounds that Erste AM was subject to unique standing defenses.

Now before the Court is Erste AM's motion for reconsideration of
the Sept. 21 Order.

Background

Four Plaintiffs moved for appointment as lead plaintiff of this
action pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA"). The Institutional Investor Group and the Public
Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico ("PERA") filed
briefs opposing Erste AM's appointment as lead plaintiff. The
Institutional Investor Group argued that Erste AM's motion was
untimely because Erste AM filed a certification that was not in
compliance with 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(2)(A), and this also
subjected Erste AM to unique standing defenses. PERA also argued
that Erste AM was subject to unique standing defenses because of
questions about whether Erste AM was assigned the claims at issue
from another entity, Erste Fonds Nr. 566 ("Erste 566"), which is
the entity that bought and sold the securities at issue.

Erste AM now moves the Court for reconsideration of the Order. The
Institutional Investor Group opposed Erste AM's motion on the
grounds that Erste AM is still subject to various unique defenses.

Discussion

The Court finds that reconsideration of the Order is warranted to
revise the prior finding that Erste AM did not have standing
because Erste 566 assigned the claim after the first complaint was
filed. Erste AM has cited several cases in which courts have found
that a lead plaintiff has standing even when an assignment
declaration was executed after the complaint was filed by another
plaintiff.

As a result, the Court modifies its prior holding and finds that
Erste AM would not be subject to standing defenses merely based on
the timing of the alleged assignment. Upon reconsideration,
however, the Court finds that there is still a risk that Erste AM
will be subject to unique standing defenses.

The Court noted in its Order that the Second Circuit has held that
a party that did not purchase securities underlying a claim
nonetheless has standing where it was assigned a property interest
in the claim.

District Judge Victor Marrero notes that there is a serious risk
that Erste AM will be subject to unique standing defenses regarding
the invalidity of the Assignment Declaration for failing to convey
a property interest. As PERA and the Institutional Investor Group
have argued, Erste AM has not established that the Assignment
Declaration was sufficient under Austrian law to confer Erste AM
with the requisite property interest under W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt.
Co. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2008)).

As a result, Judge Marrero holds, it is unclear whether Erste AM
was granted a property interest in the claims under Austrian law,
as required by Huff. Given this uncertainty, the Court finds that
there is a non-speculative risk that Erste AM's standing could be
successfully challenged, citing Schaffer v. Horizon Pharma Plc,
2016 WL 3566238, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2016). Nevertheless, such
an explanation may have involved complex issues of foreign law that
ultimately militate against Erste AM's appointment.

Instead of providing an explanation of Austrian law, Erste AM cited
cases in which courts found that an Austrian asset manager had
standing. The Court already explained in its Order why those cases
are distinguishable. Notwithstanding, in one of these cases the
plaintiff did timely submit a declaration from an expert on
Austrian law, which the court relied on but only to find that the
asset manager had third-party standing; see In re Vivendi
Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 605 F.Supp.2d 570, 581 (S.D.N.Y.
2009). Erste AM also cites Boynton Beach Firefighers' Pension Fund
v. HCP, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 1106, 2017 WL 5759361, at *4-7 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 28, 2017), for the proposition that other courts have accepted
the type of assignment in this case, which other European investors
executed. But the HCP court also relied on arguments for how the
assignments were sufficient under German law, Judge Marrero notes.

In its reply brief in support of its motion for reconsideration,
Erste AM also submitted, for the first time, a declaration from an
expert on Austrian law, Professor Martin Karollus, to support its
prior assertions that it has third-party standing. Erste AM submits
Professor Karollus's declaration in response to the Institutional
Investor Group's arguments that Erste 566 lacks "legal personality"
and "existence."

Since the Court's holding does not rest on whether Erste 566 lacks
"legal personality" or "existence," and because Erste AM has not
moved for reconsideration of the Court's finding that Erste AM did
not have third-party standing, the Court will not consider
Professor Karollus's declaration. Moreover, to the extent that
Erste AM seeks to revive its arguments that it has third-party
standing, the Court finds Erste AM's submission of Professor
Karollus's declaration untimely since it should have submitted the
declaration with its original motion.

Order

For the reasons stated, the Court ordered that the motion filed by
Plaintiff Erste Asset Management ("Erste AM") for reconsideration
of the Court's Order, dated Sept. 21, 2021, is granted. Erste AM's
application to submit materials supplementing its reply brief in
support of reconsideration is denied. Erste AM's motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff and lead counsel is denied.

For reasons stated in the Court's September 21 Order, the motion of
the Plymouth County Retirement Association and the Carpenters
Pension Trust Fund for Northern California for appointment of lead
plaintiff for the proposed class in this action and for appointment
of Labaton Sucharow LLP as lead counsel is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision and Order dated Nov. 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/tyjsbmz from Leagle.com.


ATERIAN INC: Derivative Suits Deconsolidated From Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SHAOXUAN ZHANG, derivatively on behalf of ATERIAN,
INC., Plaintiff v. YANIV SARIG, FABRICE HAMAIDE, ARTURO RODRIGUEZ,
BARI A. HARLAM, WILLIAM KURTZ, GREG B. PETERSEN, and AMY VON
WALTER, Defendants, and ATERIAN, INC., Nominal Defendant. MICHAEL
SHELLER, Derivatively on behalf of ATERIAN, INC., Plaintiff v.
YANIV SARIG, FABRICE HAMAIDE, GREG B. PETERSEN, BARI A. HARLAM, AMY
VON WALTER, AND WILLIAM KURTZ, Defendants, -and- ATERIAN, INC., a
Delaware corporation, Nominal Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-08657-VM,
Master Case No. 1:21-cv-04323, Case No. 1:21-cv-08733-VM
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Victor Marrero of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York entered an order:

     (i) deconsolidating shareholder derivative actions from
         related securities action;

    (ii) reopening derivative actions; and

   (iii) consolidating derivative actions.

Upon review of letter application by the counsel for Plaintiffs
Shaoxuan Zhang and Michael Sheller in the shareholder derivative
actions, captioned Zhang v. Aterian, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:21-cv-08657 ("Zhang Action") and Sheller v. Aterian, Inc., et
al., Case No. 1:21-cv-08733 ("Sheller Action"), seeking, inter
alia, deconsolidation of the Zhang Action and the Sheller Action
from a related securities class action, captioned Nolff, et al. v.
Aterian, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-04323 ("Securities Class
Action"); and after due deliberation thereon; Judge Marrero
determines that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Letter
establish just cause for the deconsolidation of the Zhang Action
and the Sheller Action from the Securities Class Action. The
Parties must coordinate discovery and other pretrial proceedings to
the greatest extent possible in these Actions.

Furthermore, upon consideration of the Letter's request that the
Zhang Action and the Sheller Action be consolidated for all
purposes into a consolidated derivative action; and after due
deliberation thereon, having reviewed the complaints and other
papers filed with the Court in the Zhang Action and the Sheller
Action; Judge Marrero determines that in all material respects the
papers describe substantially similar underlying events arising out
of the same or similar operative facts, and that the parties in the
Zhang Action and the Sheller Action are substantially the same
parties, establishing just cause for the consolidation of the Zhang
Action and the Sheller Action into a consolidated derivative
action.

Accordingly, the Court ordered the following:

     1. The Zhang Action, captioned Zhang v. Aterian, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-08657, is deconsolidated from the Securities Class
Action, captioned Nolff, et al. v. Aterian, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:21-cv-04323;

     2. The Zhang Action, captioned Zhang v. Aterian, Inc. et al.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-08657, is reopened as an active matter before the
Court;

     3. The Sheller Action, captioned Sheller v. Aterian, Inc., et
al., Case No. 1:21-cv-08733, is deconsolidated from the Securities
Class Action, captioned Nolff, et al. v. Aterian, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-04323;

     4. The Sheller Action, captioned Sheller v. Aterian, Inc., et
al., Case No. 1:21-cv-08733, is reopened as an active matter before
the Court for the limited purpose of the entry of the Order;

     5. The Zhang Action and Sheller Action are consolidated for
all purposes;

     6. All filings in connection with the consolidated derivative
action will be docketed against the lower numbered case, Case No.
1:21-cv-08657; and

     7. Following the consolidation of the Zhang Action and the
Sheller Action, the referenced higher numbered case, 1:21-cv-08733,
will be closed and removed from the Court's docket.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ykwawhx8 from Leagle.com.


AUSTRALIA: Faces Class Action Over Agriculture Visa Program
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joanna Howe, writing for The Australian, reports that the
agriculture industry is in crisis. The visa program bringing in
Pacific workers is facing a class action lawsuit amid allegations
of a "slave trade". A landmark decision by the Fair Work Commission
has decreed piece rates must be paid above a minimum wage floor
because of widespread exploitation on farms.

Even before it has begun, the new agriculture visa is beset by
immigration scams in Southeast Asian nations and there are now more
undocumented migrants on farms than ever before.

These are not new problems and they are echoed around the globe in
countries where temporary migrants toil to pick fresh fruit and
vegetables against a backdrop of wage theft, exploitation and
illegal work.

The flip side to this farm labour crisis is an Australian
agriculture industry that has faced labour challenges for decades.
This has been accelerated by closed borders during the pandemic and
will continue in the summer harvest, with consequences ranging from
crop losses to unmanageable workloads for both farmers and
workers.

There is an urgent need for a bipartisan approach to solving the
farm labour crisis, one that goes beyond party politics and that is
prepared to canvass politically difficult solutions.

The federal government's own report on a National Agriculture
Workforce Strategy develops a blueprint to address the farm labour
crisis. The first reform principle is that visa programs that bring
in temporary migrants should be regulated and monitored in a
consistent way.

This doesn't sound like rocket science, yet we have arrived at a
system where multiple visa programs operate to supply migrant
labour to farmers. Each of these programs is regulated in different
ways and by different government departments.

Some visas, particularly the working holiday visa, are not
regulated at all. The result: a race to the bottom in labour
standards on farms whereby farmers can play off different cohorts
of migrant workers against each other in order to maximise
profits.

Now the government is proposing the new agriculture visa into the
mix. Will this mirror the worker-protective requirements in the
Seasonal Worker Program or the more diluted requirements in the
Pacific Labour Scheme? Or will the visa be based on a light-touch
approach that exists within the working holiday visa?

There is no country around the world with as many visa programs as
Australia for meeting farmers' needs and yet ironically none of
these programs, either individually or cumulatively, has been
effective in meeting labour needs.

New Zealand provides an example of how this could be done much
better. Its approach, built over two decades, is based on
tripartite management of a single visa program, which facilitates
the entry of Pacific workers onto farms. Employers have to be
pre-approved to access overseas workers, they lose their right to
do so if they are found exploiting workers; worker-protective
conditions are monitored and enforced; and unions and peak farm
bodies work together to administer the program. There is no race to
the bottom between different cohorts of temporary migrants on
different visas and both unions and peak bodies have a critical
role in weeding out exploitative contractors and farmers, and
managing the caps and other settings in the program.

This points to the second principle that should govern Australia's
response: tripartism is essential if a way forward is to be found.
The National Farmers Federation, AusVeg and Australian Fresh
Produce Alliance must acknowledge and own the depth and breadth of
exploitation in their industry. This is not a case of a few bad
apples but of an industry that has an entrenched problem with
noncompliance with labour standards.

Similarly, the United Workers Union and the Australian Workers
Union must be prepared to come to the negotiating table with
farmers and government to design a uniform fit-for-purpose visa
program and career pathways for local workers that are economically
sustainable for the industry and will meet its needs.

Underpinning these principles is an urgent need to address the role
of the supermarkets and, of course, the elephant in the room -- the
agriculture industry's dependence on undocumented migrants.

Undocumented migrants on farms, which the government's own report
suggests number between 60,000 and 100,000 workers, is the dark
underbelly of an agriculture industry that relies on an unregulated
migrant workforce to pick fruit and vegetables. As long as farmers
and contractors can undercut legal sources of labour with
undocumented migrants, the race to the bottom continues.

Given the paucity of Australia's enforcement efforts, the
geographical dispersion of farms and the substantial numbers of
undocumented migrants, there is little merit in the current
approach based on detection and deportation. Instead, there needs
to be a pathway for this group to regularise their immigration
status and move on to the new agriculture visa with a pathway to
permanency. Although such a reform is politically inconceivable
without bipartisan support, considerable headway was made earlier
this year when the National Party came out in favour of status
resolution for undocumented migrants.

There is no silver bullet for solving the farm labour crisis. But
in the National Agriculture Workforce Strategy there is a template
for how it should be done, and the government would do well to heed
its own report.

Dr Joanna Howe is an associate professor in law at the University
of Adelaide and a member of the Ministerial Advisory Council on
Skilled Migration [GN]

AUSTRALIA: Faces Suit Over Mistreatment of Aboriginal Children
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Smit at nit.com.au reports that a lawsuit taking on the
Western Australian state government for treatment of Aboriginal
children at the Banksia Hill Juvenile Detention centre is set to be
one of the largest of its kind.

Lead by Stewart Levitt of Levitt Robinson lawyers, the lawsuit will
alleges that the West Australian Government has failed in its duty
of care to Aboriginal children incarcerated at the detention
centre.

State justice advocates have claimed that children who were
incarcerated at Banksia Hill have come out worse off than they went
in.

Around 450 people former inmates, or family of former inmates, are
involved in the case from across the state; solicitor on the case
Dana Levitt said it's one of the largest human rights cases she's
been involved in.

"It's a very large cohort of people that have very bad and very
shared experiences," she said.

Advocates Megan Krakouer and Gerry Georgatos have been travelling
around Western Australia to find complainants.

Levitt said Krakouer and Georgatos have been instrumental in
bringing the cohort together.

"They've been all around Western Australia speaking to families,"
she said.

"They've been really active in going out and seeing families in a
home, and sitting down with families and getting the information we
need."

"As you appreciate, these kids move around a lot. They don't have
addresses or phone numbers, and they're pretty hard to pin down, so
it's so important that we've got people like Megan and Jerry that
have those connections, because otherwise it would be virtually
impossible to coordinate."

Krakour said many plaintiffs have come forward after seeing
information on the class action online or in the media.

"They feel like they went into Banksia Hill and came out worse off
because of lack of psychological support, lack of education, some
being slammed to the ground, some alleging some of the most
horrendous and horrific treatment, and they want to be validated,"
she said.

"They want to be heard, and they want their voice to count."

Krakouer said the class action gives people a way to deal with the
injustices they suffered while at the detention centre.

"There's it's certainly a lot of momentum, it gives a lot of people
hope as well," she said.

"[They can say] hang on, you're not alone here, I also suffered
this when I was a young person that Banksia Hill.

"This is bringing cohorts right across the state together."

Levitt said the team will likely file in February, after going
through the Australian Human Rights Commission.

"There's a few procedural things that we have to do first, but we
are well underway in terms of compiling evidence, and also our
pleadings, etc," she said. [GN]

BAYER US: Anti-Fungal Products Contain Benzene, Villarreal Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE VILLARREAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BAYER U.S. LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:21-cv-04221-BCW (W.D. Mo., November 17, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendant for breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty, violation of consumer protection statutes,
fraudulent concealment, and unjust enrichment.

The case arises from Bayer's manufacture and distribution of the
over-the-counter anti-fungal medications Tinactin and Lotrimin
Anti-Fungal (AF) spray products without disclosing that they
contain high levels of benzene, a known human carcinogen. Bayer
knew or should have known of the dangerous and carcinogenic effects
of benzene and should have known that it was producing products
that contained benzene. Nevertheless, Bayer produced, distributed,
and sold millions of cans of Tinactin and Lotrimin AF sprays that
contained benzene, alleges the suit.

Bayer U.S. LLC is a pharmaceutical company with its principal place
of business located in Whippany, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Tim E. Dollar, Esq.
         DOLLAR BURNS BECKER & HERSHEWE, L.C.
         1100 Main Street, Suite 2600
         Kansas City, MO 64105
         Telephone: (816) 876-2600
         Facsimile: (816) 221-8763
         E-mail: timd@dollar-law.com

                 - and –

         Steven L. Bloch, Esq.
         Ian W. Sloss, Esq.
         SILVER GOLUB & TEITELL LLP
         184 Atlantic Street
         Stamford, CT 06901
         Telephone: (203) 325-4491
         Facsimile: (203) 325-3769
         E-mail: isloss@sgtlaw.com

                 - and –

         Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
         FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
         10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470
         Los Angeles, CA 90024
         Telephone: (424) 256-2884
         Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
         E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com

                 - and –

         Timothy J. Peter, Esq.
         FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
         1617 JFK Boulevard, Suite 1550
         Philadelphia, PA 19103
         Telephone: (215) 277-5770
         Facsimile: (215) 277-5771
         E-mail: tpeter@faruqilaw.com

BENTON HARBOR, MI: Residents File Suit Over Lead Water Crisis
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Spears at abc57.com reports that Benton Harbor residents have
filed a class action lawsuit against state and city officials over
the lead water crisis.

In the lawsuit filed, plaintiffs accuse government leaders of
making an active decision not to enforce the Safe Drinking Water
Act by failing to tell the public about extreme, toxic levels of
lead in their water.

The lawsuit names Governor Gretchen Whitmer, Mayor Marcus Muhammad,
and a dozen other officials or entities as defendants.

The governor's office issued the following statement:

"Every Michigander deserves access to safe drinking water and every
community deserves lead-free pipes. Since the first lead exceedance
was detected in 2018, the State of Michigan has been on the ground
in Benton Harbor working with local partners on a solution to
address the aging infrastructure. In accordance with the state's
strict Lead and Copper Rule, the state began urging the city to
immediately conduct outreach to residents and ordered the city to
apply corrosion control to try to bring down the levels and
stabilize the drinking water. That is why the governor has issued
an executive directive to bring a whole-of-government approach to
ensuring that the people of Benton Harbor have safe drinking water.
The state is providing free bottled water and setting an aggressive
timeline to replace all the lead pipes in the next 18 months, which
would've otherwise taken nearly 15 years to complete under state
law. Work began to replace lead pipes in Benton Harbor, and we will
continue to take every step necessary with the urgency and haste
this threat demands to ensure parents in Benton Harbor can give
their kids a glass of water with confidence." [GN]

BISHOP OF CHARLESTON: Loses Protective Order Bid in Nestler Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Gary Nestler, Viewed Student Female 200, Viewed
Student Male 300, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. The Bishop of Charleston, a Corporation
Sole, Bishop England High School, Tortfeasors 1-10, The Bishop of
the Diocese of Charleston, in his official capacity, and Robert
Guglielmone, individually, Defendants, Civil Action No.
2:21-613-RMG (D.S.C.), Judge Richard Mark Gergel of the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston
Division, entered an Order and Opinion denying both:

    (i) the Defendants' motion for a protective order regarding
        the testimony of Maria Aselage; and

   (ii) Non-party witness Aselage's motion for order of
        protection and to quash subpoena.

I. Facts

Before the Court is Defendants The Bishop of Charleston, a
Corporation Sole ("Diocese"), Bishop England High School,
Tortfeasors 1-10, The Bishop Diocese of Charleston, in his official
capacity, and Robert Guglielmone's motion for a protective order
regarding the testimony of Aselage. Also before the Court is
Aselage's motion for order of protection and to quash subpoena.

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action alleging that, for
roughly two decades, students at Bishop England High School
("BEHS") were made to disrobe in locker rooms which contained
"large glass windows" whereby BEHS employees, agents, and/or others
may have viewed students.

On May 1, 2019, BEHS employee Jeffrey Scofield was arrested after
BEHS reported to law enforcement that he took videos and made
photographs of male students changing clothes in one of the
school's locker rooms.

The Plaintiff filed the suit on Feb. 3, 2021. The next day, the
Defendants issued a press release regarding the lawsuit that
identified Aselage as Director of Media Relations for the Diocese
and provided her contact information.

The Plaintiffs deposed Aselage. During her deposition, Aselage
testified that, as of February 2021, her company, Hearsay
Communications, performed "contract work" for the Diocese and that
Aselage served as the Diocese's "director of media relations."
Aselage testified that she generally had no personal knowledge of
or involvement with the matters discussed in the press release or
in Plaintiff's lawsuit. During Aselage's deposition, Aselage's
personal attorney instructed her not to answer questions regarding
conversations Aselage had with the Diocese's General Counsel.

On Oct. 13, 2021, the Defendants moved for a protective order
requesting that the Court finds Aselage is not required to testify
or provide documents or other discovery regarding her discussions
with the Diocese's General Counsel. The Plaintiffs oppose.

On Oct. 14, 2021, Aselage moved for a protective order seeking
substantially the same relief as the Defendants.

The Defendants and Aselage's motions are fully briefed and ripe for
disposition.

II. Analysis

In diversity cases, the application of the attorney-client
privilege is governed by state law -- in the case, the law of South
Carolina. The attorney-client privilege protects against disclosure
of confidential communications by a client to his attorney." The
burden of establishing the attorney-client privilege rests upon the
party asserting it."

The privilege consists of the following essential elements: (1)
Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived. And "although the presence of a third-party would normally
destroy the attorney-client privilege, several exceptions do
exist." In the case, citing In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir.
1994), the Defendants argue that the "functional equivalent
exception" applies to the Diocese's relationship with Aselage.

Judge Gergel finds that no attorney-client relationship exists
between the Diocese and Aselage. To the extent South Carolina law
recognizes the "functional equivalent" test, the Defendants and
Aselage have failed to establish that Aselage's "relationship to
the client is the sort that justifies the application of the
privilege." The Defendants and Aselage's conclusory arguments that
Aselage is the functional equivalent of an employee of the Diocese
are simply unavailing.  Accordingly, Judge Gergel finds no
attorney-client relationship exists between the Diocese and Aselage
and that Aselage's communications with the Diocese's General
Counsel are not entitled to protection from discovery.

Last, the Defendants and Aselage argue that all oral and written
communications between the Diocese's General Counsel and Aselage
are entitled to protection from disclosure as "attorney work
product."

Judge Gergel finds that neither the Defendants nor Aselage provided
the Court a single document for in camera review in support of the
contention the Diocese's General Counsel shared attorney-work
product with Aselage as opposed to -- for example -- information
intended for dissemination via the press release.

Judge Gergel rejects the Defendants' arguments that Aselage's
communications or emails with the Diocese's General Counsel are
entitled to protection as attorney work product. The Defendants and
Aselage have failed to meet their burden of showing the Diocese's
General Counsel shared any work-product with Aselage. They argue
this point in a conclusory fashion, having failed to submit
documents to this effect for the Court's in camera review.

Further, to the extent the Defendants and Aselage argue the
Diocese's General Counsel orally shared opinion work product with
Aselage with the intent that such information be maintained in
confidence, Judge Gergel rejects the contention as unsupported by
the record before it. Aselage's testimony does not indicate any
involvement in the substance of this lawsuit. To the contrary, the
record establishes, at most, that the Diocese's General Counsel
shared information with Aselage for the express purpose that
Aselage draft the press release at issue.

Accordingly, Judge Gergel denies the Defendants and Aselage's
motions in full. The Plaintiff may redepose Aselage concerning the
questions posed that the witness was instructed not to answer.
Further, and consistent with this Order, Aselage must comply with
the Plaintiffs' Oct. 13, 2021 document request to Aselage and
Hearsay Communications.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Gergel denied the Defendants'
motion for protective order regarding the testimony of Maria
Aselage. He also denied Aselage's motion for order of protection
and to quash subpoena. Judge Gergel further ordered the Plaintiffs
and the Defendants to meet and confer, schedule, reconvene and
complete the deposition of Aselage in accordance with this Order.
By this date, Aselage will also respond to the Plaintiff's Oct. 13,
2021 document request to Aselage and Hearsay Communications.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order & Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/52jw9c6h from Leagle.com.


BLACK DIAMOND: $340K Class Settlement in Borelli Suit Has Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Edward Borelli, et al., Plaintiffs v. Black Diamond
Aggregates, Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:14-cv-02093-KJM-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California issued
an order granting the Plaintiffs':

   a. motion for class certification and final approval of a
      settlement agreement in the action for violations of the
      Fair Labor Standards Act and California wage and hour laws;
      and

   b. counsel's requests for an award of reasonable attorneys'
      fees.

Background

According to the operative complaint, Black Diamond used a
compensation scheme that paid drivers less than minimum wages and
wrongfully withheld pay for required rest breaks and other working
time. The complaint also includes claims for wrongfully withheld
meal breaks, faulty pay stubs, and related wage and hour claims,
among others. It seeks certification of a class action as well as a
collective action under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).

Black Diamond successfully moved to compel arbitration in 2017. The
Court also compelled Basic Resources to participate in the
arbitration, finding the two companies were alter egos. While the
arbitration was still ongoing, the parties participated in
mediation with Lisa Klerman, a mediator whom California district
courts have described as experienced and well-respected in wage and
hour class actions. The parties eventually reached an agreement to
settle on behalf of all former Black Diamond truck drivers with the
same wage and hour claims.

The agreement creates three overlapping subclasses of former Black
Diamond employees: One with claims under California labor law, a
second with federal FLSA claims, and a third with claims under the
California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). In total the class
includes 85 drivers who worked at Black Diamond between 2010 and
2014, when the company ceased operations.

Black Diamond and Basic Resources agree to pay $340,000 to settle
these claims. Of that sum, the parties agree that up to $112,000
may cover attorneys' fees, $12,000 may be allocated to costs, and
$7,500 will be paid to each of the three named Plaintiffs as
service awards. The parties estimate $5,200 will be paid to
administer the settlement. The settlement amount will be reduced by
any resulting payroll taxes, approximately $11,300, and a $7,500
payment to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA), as required by the California Labor Code. These deductions
would result in a net settlement amount of approximately $169,300,
slightly less than half the gross.

The parties proposed that notice be given to class members and
money distributed from the net settlement fund using the contact
information in Black Diamond's employment records. Members of the
putative Rule 23 subclass could opt out or object; members of the
FLSA collective action were required to either opt in or consent as
provided in the FLSAv; and membership in the PAGA subclass is
automatic under California law. No class member would receive less
than $25. The parties proposed that any unclaimed funds be paid cy
pres to the Salvation Army in Modesto.

The Court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement. It
certified the proposed FLSA collective action on a preliminary
basis and approved the parties' proposed notice.

The Plaintiffs then arranged for notice to be sent to the proposed
class members. None objected to the proposed class action, none
opted out, and only one claimant disputed the worksheets used to
calculate the pro rata awards. The claims administrator rejected
the dispute as unsubstantiated. Of the 66 former employees who were
eligible to participate in the FLSA collective action, 42 opted in.
With these final counts, according to data provided by the
settlement administrator, the average recovery per proposed class
member would be a little more than $2,000, not including incentive
payments. The maximum recovery would be almost $6,000 (to
Christiana Pitassi, one of the named Plaintiffs, again, not
including incentive payments), and no class member would receive
less than $25. The other two named plaintiffs would receive
$1,305.36 and $5,172.62, respectively.

The Plaintiffs now move for final approval and certification, and
they request an award of $112,200, the maximum fee to which the
defendants agreed not to object. The counsel also lodged
confidential copies of the parties' mediations briefs, which the
Court has reviewed in camera. The Defendants do not oppose the
pending motions. The Court held a hearing on Oct. 8, 2021. Harvey
Sohnen appeared for the Plaintiffs, Barbara Cotter appeared for
Black Diamond, and Bryan Hawkins appeared for Basic Resources.

Discussion

I. Rule 23 Class

For the reasons explained in the Court's previous order, Judge
Mueller finds that the proposed classes meet the requirements of
Rule 23. No new evidence or other developments suggest otherwise.
No proposed class member has objected or opted out. The proposed
class is certified.

Judge Mueller also finds the settlement agreement to be reasonable
despite the substantial incentive awards to the named Plaintiffs.
The named Plaintiffs spent many hours on the case, which has gone
on for some time and not rewarded them with any personal benefits
outside of the benefits to the class as a whole. Although the case
was not widely publicized, the named Plaintiffs have attached
themselves to it, and as a result, they may face negative
consequences from any employers who assume past participation in
litigation is a potential liability. The amount of the incentive
award is also reasonable given the size of the net award to class
members, both in total and on average.

The proposed cost reimbursement is also reasonable, Judge Mueller
finds. She says, the amount, $11,307.99, is modest for a case of so
many years' duration.

Finally, only one of the three commonly cited "red flags" of
collusion might be cause for concern in the case: The parties'
clear-sailing agreement. Judge Mueller is persuaded, however, after
reviewing the parties' supplemental submissions, that the risk of
collusion is low despite the defendants' agreement not to contest
the proposed attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards. The
agreed amounts are relatively modest, and any amounts not awarded
would revert to the class.

II. FLSA Collective Action

For the reasons she discussed, Judge Mueller also approves the
terms of the proposed FLSA collective action settlement. She finds
that the members of the proposed collective action assert
violations of the FLSA, are "similarly situated," have
affirmatively opted in, and the dispute is "bona fide" under the
commonly applied test.

III. PAGA Claims

The PAGA provides that courts may exercise their discretion to
lower the amount of civil penalties awarded "if, based on the facts
and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would
result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or
confiscatory." Because state law enforcement agencies are the "real
parties in interest" for PAGA claims, the court's task in reviewing
the settlement is to ensure the state's interest in enforcing the
law is upheld. But the PAGA does not establish any more specific
standard for evaluating PAGA settlements. Nor has any California
state court established a "benchmark for PAGA settlements, either
on their own terms or in relation to the recovery on other claims
in the action."

In the absence of such guidance, Judge Mueller notes that the Court
and at least one other California federal district court have
referred to the factors in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,
1026 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).  These factors are not
unique to class action lawsuits. They bear on the fairness of
settlements involving many plaintiffs. The Court, as it has before,
finds these factors useful in evaluating a PAGA settlement. And for
the reasons she discussed, Judge Mueller finds those factors favor
approval of the settlement agreement.

IV. Fees & Costs

Judge Mueller holds that although a 33% award is above the Ninth
Circuit benchmark, she finds it is reasonable. A cross-check
against the lodestar fee also confirms the proposed fee award is
reasonable. The class counsel tabulated the hours they dedicated to
this litigation and noted which attorneys devoted how many hours at
what rates. The amount of the hypothetical lodestar award supports
the counsel's fee request and judge Mueller confirms it is
reasonable.

Conclusion

Judge Mueller grants the motions for final approval and fees. The
parties are ordered to comply with and carry out the terms of the
Settlement Agreement. Every person in the California Settlement
Class will be bound by the Settlement Agreement and be deemed to
release and forever discharge all Released State Law Claims, as set
forth in the Settlement Agreement. Every person in the FLSA
Settlement Class who filed a consent form with the court or sent an
opt-in claim form to the Settlement Administrator is an FLSA
Settlement Class Member and will be bound by the Settlement
Agreement and be deemed to release and forever discharge all
Released Federal Law Claims, as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement. Every person in the PAGA Settlement Class will be bound
by the Settlement Agreement and be deemed to release and forever
discharge all Released PAGA Claims, as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.

The Court retains jurisdiction over the administration and
effectuation of the Settlement including, but not limited to, the
ultimate disbursal to the participating Settlement Class Members,
payment of attorneys' fees and expenses, the service awards to the
Class Representatives, payment to the Settlement Administrator, and
other issues related to the Settlement. Nothing in the Order will
preclude any action to enforce the parties' obligations under the
Settlement or under the Order. The Plaintiff will notify the Court
within seven days after administration and effectuation of the
settlement is complete.

The Order resolves ECF Nos. 104 and 105.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/36vwjmvv from Leagle.com.


BLACKROCK INSTITUTIONAL: Baird's $9.65M Class Deal Wins Final Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHARLES BAIRD, et al., Plaintiffs v. BLACKROCK
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST COMPANY, N.A., et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-01892-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California entered
an order:

   a. granting the Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of class
      action settlement; and

   b. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs' motion
      for attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive award.

Background

Plaintiff Baird filed his original complaint on April 5, 2017,
challenging the Defendants' management of the BlackRock Retirement
Savings Plan. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants engaged in several
rounds of motions to dismiss and amendment, concluding in the
Court's order granting in part and denying in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The parties then
engaged in extensive discovery regarding the claims and defenses in
the case, including a substantial number of discovery disputes that
required joint letter briefing before Magistrate Judge Westmore.

The Plaintiffs then moved to certify two classes. One class, the
BlackRock Plan Class, consisted of only current and former
participants in the BlackRock Plan. The other class, the putative
CTI Class, consisted of participants in numerous retirement plans
whose retirement savings were invested in certain BlackRock
collective trust investment vehicles that engaged in securities
lending.

On Feb. 11, 2020, the Court certified the BlackRock Plan Class but
denied the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the CTI Class. The
Plaintiffs sought but were denied a Rule 23(f) appeal of the
Court's denial of certification of the CTI Class.

Following class certification, the parties engaged in expert
discovery. After expert discovery closed, the Plaintiffs moved for
partial summary judgment and the Defendants moved for summary
judgment on all claims. The Court denied both motions on Jan. 12,
2021.

In preparation for trial, the Plaintiffs submitted numerous
filings, including two motions in limine and a trial brief and
pre-trial conference statement. Shortly before trial was scheduled
to begin, the Court referred the Parties to a magistrate judge
settlement conference. At a Feb. 5, 2021 settlement conference
facilitated by Magistrate Judge Ryu, the parties reached a
settlement in principle. The Plaintiffs then moved for preliminary
approval of the class action settlement on April 23, 2021.

Following the hearing on the motion for preliminary approval, and
in response to the Court's concerns about the Settlement
Agreement's proposed method of communication with current and
former Plan participants, the Defendants filed a supplemental
declaration. That declaration explained that Plan participants
affirmatively choose their communication delivery preference to be
either email or U.S. mail, and that 88% of Plan participants have
affirmatively elected to have legal and plan notices communicated
to them via email. With this concern addressed, the Court granted
the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement
on July 12, 2021 and ordered the parties to implement the proposed
class notice plan and seek independent fiduciary review.

The proposed Settlement releases the claims of the BlackRock Plan
Class (and only the BlackRock Plan Class) in the case in return for
a payment of $9.65 million. That money will be distributed by the
Settlement Administrator, Settlement Services, Inc. ("SSI"),
according to a Plan of Allocation that allocates settlement funds
proportional to the assets each Class member held in
BlackRock-managed funds in the Plan.

The Settlement Agreement resolves all the claims asserted by the
certified BlackRock Plan Class, which is defined as follows: "All
participants (and their beneficiaries) in the BlackRock Retirement
Savings Plan during the Class Period." The Class Period is the
period from April 5, 2011 through the date of the entry of the
Preliminary Approval Order in the case (July 12, 2021). There are
18,289 Class members.

Under the Settlement Agreement, the Defendants will pay $9.65
million into an escrow account established for the benefit of the
Class by the Class Counsel and trusteed by an escrow agent
("Qualified Settlement Fund" or "QSF"). Following deductions for
(i) any Court-approved Attorneys' Fees and Expenses; (ii) any
Court-approved Class Representative Service Awards; and (iii)
Administrative Expenses, the Net Settlement Amount will be
distributed to the Class in accordance with the Plan of Allocation
attached to the Settlement Agreement.

The Plan of Allocation provides that each Class member will receive
a share of the Net Settlement Amount that is proportionate to the
value of her individual account allocations to BlackRock-managed
investments relative to the aggregate value of all the Class
members' allocations to BlackRock-managed investments.

In exchange for the relief provided in the Settlement, the Class
releases the Released Parties from the "Released Claims." The
Settlement Agreement does not release any claim brought on behalf
of any person or entity other than a member of the BlackRock Plan
Class against the Released Parties.

II. Discussion

A. Final Settlement Approval

To assess whether a proposed settlement comports with Rule 23(e),
the Court "may consider some or all" of the following factors: (1)
the strength of plaintiff's case; (2) the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk
of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the
amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery
completed, and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and
views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant;
and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement. "The relative degree of importance to be attached to
any particular factor" is case specific. In addition, "adequate
notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement under
Rule 23(e)."

After considering and weighing the factors, Judge Gilliam finds
that the settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable,
and that the settlement Class Members received adequate notice.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the class
action settlement is granted.

B. Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses, and Incentive Award

The Class Counsel also asks the Court to approve: (1) an award of
attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,798,500 to the Class Counsel;
(2) a reimbursement of $641,557.58 in litigation expenses advanced
by the Class Counsel; and (3) service awards in the amount of
$15,000 to each of the Named Plaintiffs as the Class
Representatives.

First, Judge Gilliam finds the hourly rates reasonable given the
Class Counsel's experience. As to the number of hours billed, he
says, the Class Counsel states that she removed erroneously
attributed time entries and "exercised billing judgment" to remove
all time entries associated with the Plaintiffs' Rule 23(f)
petition on the denial of class certification for the putative CTI
Class. Thus, Class Counsel's fee request of $2,798,500 amounts to
only approximately 26% of the $10,586,183.75 lodestar. This is a
reasonable request. In recognition of the favorable settlement, the
substantial risks of litigation, and the financial burden assumed,
the attorneys' fees of $2,798,500 is granted.

Next, Judge Gilliam is satisfied that the costs were reasonably
incurred and grants the motion for costs in the amount of
$641,557.58. He finds that the Class Counsel's request reflects the
type of expenses routinely charged to paying clients. The amount
requested is also within range of approval.

Lastly, Judge Gilliam holds that Mr. Baird and Ms. Slayton are
entitled to compensation for their work on behalf of the class and
for the financial or reputational risk they undertook to litigate
the case. After reviewing the Plaintiffs' declarations, and
considering the circumstances of this lengthy ERISA case, he finds
that a $10,000 service award is reasonable to compensate the
Plaintiffs for their efforts. He therefore grants the request for
an incentive award, but in the amount of $10,000.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Gilliam grants the motion for final approval of
class action settlement, and grants in part and denies in part the
motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards. He
approves the settlement amount of $9.65 million; an award of
attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,798,500 to the Class Counsel; a
reimbursement of $641,557.58 in litigation expenses advanced by the
Class Counsel; and service awards in the amount of $10,000 to each
of the Named Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives.

The parties and settlement administrator are directed to implement
the Final Order and the settlement agreement in accordance with the
terms of the settlement agreement. The parties are further directed
to file a short stipulated final judgment of two pages or less
within 14 days from the date of the Order. The judgment need not,
and should not, repeat the analysis in the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/46hrz6dp from Leagle.com.


BLOCK.ONE: Williams' Counsel Must Give More Info for $27.5M Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, CHASE WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs v. BLOCK.ONE, et
al., Defendants. CRYPTO ASSETS OPPORTUNITY FUND LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. BLOCK.ONE, et al., Defendants, Case Nos. 20-cv-2809
(LAK), 20-cv-3829 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered
Memorandum and Order asking the Plaintiff's counsel to provide
additional information in order to make an informed judgment on
the:

    (i) the Plaintiff's motion for approval of a proposed class
        action settlement of the case, which would provide for a
        settlement fund of $27.5 million; and

   (ii) the Plaintiff's counsel's motion for an award of
        approximately $5.5 million as attorneys' fees.

The amended stipulation of settlement defines "Settlement Class" as
"all persons or entities who, directly or through an intermediary,
purchased or otherwise acquired ERC-20 Tokens and/or EOS Tokens at
any time during the period of June 26, 2017 through May 18, 2020,
inclusive," subject to certain exclusions not relevant in the
case.

Despite that broad definition, the Plaintiff submits that "because
the majority of EOS purchasers were foreign and because the price
of EOS fluctuated significantly during the Class Period, they
estimated that only 25% of the 900 million tokens issued by
Block.one are likely eligible to recover as part of the Settlement
agreement." The settlement amount is reduced accordingly. However,
the Plaintiff has not explained how it determined -- or estimated
-- that a "majority of EOS purchases were foreign."

Judge Kaplan is concerned also with the proposed method for
administering the settlement assuming it were approved. He says,
the Plaintiff has informed the Court only of one similar settlement
in the cryptocurrency context. And the Plaintiff acknowledges that
the referenced settlement was different from the one proposed in
the case. Despite the novelty of this settlement, the Plaintiff has
provided only general information regarding the claims
administration and verification process.

Finally, with regard to the motion for attorneys' fees, the parties
have submitted a lodestar calculation based on 2,824.5 hours of
work by 9 lawyers and 3 paralegals. Hourly rates or, in some cases,
ranges of hourly rates, are given for individuals or categories of
personnel. But virtually no information has been provided about
just what the hours were spent on, except of course in a very
general way.

In light of the above, Judge Kaplan requires additional information
in order to make an informed judgment on the motions before it.
Accordingly, he orders the Plaintiff's counsel will provide the
following:

     1. A consolidated summary lodestar spread sheet setting forth,
for each individual for whom compensation is sought, (a) the number
of hours at each hourly rate in effect for that individual at the
time the hours were devoted and (b) a summary line reflecting the
total hours and the individual's blended historical hourly rate
over the course of the litigation.

     2. An analysis of the categories of work for which
compensation is sought, the hours devoted to each category by each
individual for whom compensation is sought, and the "lodestar" for
that category of work by each individual based on historical rates.
For the guidance of counsel, Judge Kaplan found the categories used
in In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Secur. Litig., 94 F.Supp.3d 517,
529 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd sub nom. DeValerio v. Olinski, 673 Fed.
Appx. 87 (2d Cir. 2016), to have been helpful. He, however,
recognizes that other sets of categories also might be helpful or
more helpful as well as more easily employed. He is open to another
approach. The counsel, however, would be well advised to inform the
Court in advance of the manner in which they propose to supply this
information.

     3. Judge Kaplan notes that biographical information has not
been provided for all persons for whom compensation has been
sought. That deficiency should be remedied.

     4. It is the burden of the Plaintiff's counsel to establish
the reasonableness of the hourly rates on which the lodestar is
based. That involves, among other considerations, the time keepers'
titles and roles (including whether persons performing similar
roles typically are billed to paying clients on an hourly basis),
years and quality of experience, and market rates for similar
professionals, among other factors. The counsel would be well
advised to address these and related issues.

     5. The counsel has applied also for an award of a significant
amount of expenses. But these include a $25,000 item described only
as "PH," over $4,000 for undescribed "service fees," and other
items for which greater explanation should be provided.

     6. The Plaintiff has informed the Court that "the majority of
EOS purchasers were foreign," but has not provided the Court with
any grounds for that assumption. The counsel should provide a
detailed explanation of that statement and its impact on the
settlement amount. In doing so, they should consider the analysis
in In re Tezos Sec. Litig., No. 17-cv-06779 (RS), 2018 WL 4293341
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018) and Barron v. Helbiz Inc., No. 20-cv-4703
(LLS), 2021 WL 229609 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021) vacated and remanded
on other grounds., No. 21-278, 2021 WL 4519887 (2d Cir. Oct. 4,
2021), although Judge Kaplan expresses no view with respect to the
analysis in either case. The counsel further should address the
implication of the Securities and Exchange Commission's recent
instruction that trading platforms such as Poloniex qualify as
national securities exchanges under the Exchange Act and Exchange
Act Rule 3b-16(a).

     7. The counsel should address whether Plaintiff Crypto Assets
Opportunity Fund is typical of other putative class members with
regard to the classification of its purchases as domestic or
foreign and the basis for the assertion that it is an adequate
class representative.

     8. The Plaintiff has submitted a proof of claim form which
directs claimants to provide the wallet address from which crypto
was contributed for the purchases of ERC-20 or EOS tokens. Judge
Kaplan orders additional information regarding the claims
administration process, including:

          i. How the administrator will confirm that the wallet
address provided is owned by the individual requesting payment.

          ii. How the claims process will differ for investors who
purchased EOS or ERC-20 through an exchange that allows for
off-chain transactions (i.e., which wallet address will such
claimants provide) and how the administrator will confirm purchases
and sales made on such platforms,

          iii. The counsel must address whether the information
provided by claimants will be sufficient to identify how a purchase
of EOS or ERC-20 was made (i.e., through a particular exchange,
platform, or other method) and whether that information will be
sufficient to analyze whether a transaction should be deemed
foreign or domestic (i.e., location of purchaser, location of
validating node, etc.).

     9. For claimants who have not sold their EOS or ERC-20 tokens,
the proof of claim form requires documentation confirming that
claimants held these tokens on May 18, 2020. What documentation
will be required? The counsel must explain how that documentation
would be sufficient to confirm ownership of tokens on May 18,
2020.

     10. The plan of allocation described in the Plaintiffs
submission states that the "recognized loss amount" for each
claimant will be used only to "weigh the claims of claimants
against one another for the purposes of making pro rata allocations
of the Net Settlement Fund." Judge Kaplan asks the counsel to
address whether a claimant's recovery from the settlement fund in
any circumstances may exceed its recognized loss amount and, if
that is the case, please explain why such a result is justified.

     11. The plan of allocation provides that any balance remaining
in the settlement fund after the initial distributions will be
allocated in an "equitable and economic fashion." The counsel
should explain what that means.

     12. The plan of allocation specifies that the dates of a
claimants' purchases and sales "shall be deemed to have occurred on
the 'contract' or 'trade' date as opposed to the 'settlement' or
'payment' date." The counsel must explain what those terms mean in
the context of a cryptocurrency transaction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/j7v7prdc from Leagle.com.


BLUE CROSS: L.P. Appeals Ruling in Insurance Suit to 8th Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff L.P. filed a cross-appeal from a court ruling entered in
the lawsuit styled L.P., by and through her father, J.P.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. BCBSM, Inc. d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Minnesota, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-01241-MJD, in the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

According to the complaint, when Plaintiff LP was a teenager, she
suffered from mental-health concerns such as such as depression,
suicide ideation, self-harm, and reactive attachment disorder,
which led her parents to enroll her for inpatient treatment at
Change Academy at Lake of the Ozarks, a Missouri residential
treatment center, from June 30, 2016 through November 6, 2017. At
that time, LP was covered under a self-funded employee benefits
plan sponsored by Bolton & Menk, Inc. the employer of her father,
JP, and administered by Defendant BCBSM, Inc. d/b/a Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Minnesota. Change Academy was an out-of-network,
non-participating provider, so JP paid Change Academy's bills
directly and then sought reimbursement from Blue Cross.

Blue Cross paid $83,554.55 to JP toward some Change Academy claims,
denied other claims, and later determined that none of the claims
were covered.

LP appealed Blue Cross's denial of the Change Academy claims. In
March 2018, Blue Cross upheld its denial on the grounds that Change
Academy was not a qualified residential behavioral health treatment
facility as defined in LP's Plan. Under the Plan, a residential
behavioral health treatment facility is a facility licensed under
state law providing inpatient treatment for mental health
disorders, alcoholism, substance abuse, or substance addiction,
under the direction of a doctor and "does not, other than
incidentally, provide educational or recreational Services as part
of its Treatment program." In its final denial letter, Blue Cross
stated that it denied the Change Academy claims because the
facility provided substantial recreational services, there was a
lack of required physician oversight, and the fact that "the
charges are being submitted under an all-inclusive room and board
code (1001) which identifies these services as hospital-based. The
facility does not appear to be hospital-based."

On September 21, 2021, Judge Michael J. Davis entered a Memorandum
of Law and Order which held that (1) Plaintiff's Motion for
Judicial Review Following Remand, Entry of Judgment, and Attorney's
Fees is granted in part and denied in part as follows: Plaintiff is
entitled to $32,028.16 in benefits for the Change Academy claims,
which is less than the $83,554.55 Defendant previously paid on
those claims; therefore, judgment is entered against Defendant for
$0. Defendant's counterclaim is denied; and (2) Defendant's Letter
Request for Permission to File Motion for Reconsideration is
denied.

The appellate case is captioned as L.P. v. BCBSM, Inc., Case No.
21-3446, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, filed on Nov. 1, 2021.

The cross-appeal briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states
that:

   -- Appendix is due on December 21, 2021;

   -- BRIEF OF APPELLANT BCBSM, Inc. is due on December 21, 2021;
and

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court issues
the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of appellant.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant L.P., by and through her father, J.P.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, is
represented by:

          David Walfred Asp, Esq.
          Susan E. Ellingstad, Esq.
          Jennifer Jacobs, Esq.
          Charles Nathan Nauen, Esq.
          Derek C. Waller, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE & GRINDAL
          100 Washington Avenue, S., Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401-0000
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900

               - and -

          Jordan M. Lewis, Esq.
          KELLEY & UUSTAL
          Courthouse Law Plaza, Third Floor
          Southeast Third Avenue
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone: (954) 616-8995

Defendant-Appellee BCBSM, Inc., doing business as Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Minnesota, is represented by:

          Joel Allan Mintzer, Esq.
          BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF MINNESOTA
          P.O. Box 64560
          Saint Paul, MN 55164-0560
          Telephone: (651) 662-6383

               - and -

          David M. Wilk, Esq.
          LARSON & KING
          30 E. Seventh Street, Suite 2800
          Saint Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (651) 312-6500

BRANDREP LLC: Bid to Dismiss/Remove Amended Schick TCPA Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SYLVIA SCHICK, et al., Plaintiffs v. BRANDREP LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-03013-SI (N.D. Cal.), Judge Susan Illston
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to transfer.

BrandRep moved to dismiss the first amended complaint ("FAC")
pursuant to rule 12(b)(3)1 and motion for a transfer of venue under
28 U.S.C. Section 1404.

I. Background

On April 26, 2021, Plaintiffs A1 On Track Sliding Door Repair and
Installation, Inc. (A1), Sylvia Schick, and Deborah Schick filed
the class action against BrandRep to: "(1) stop the Defendant's
practice of placing calls using 'an artificial or prerecorded
voice' to the telephones of consumers nationwide without their
prior express consent; and (2) obtain redress for all persons
injured by Defendant's conduct." The FAC alleges BrandRep violated,
and continues to violate, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47
U.S.C. Section 227, et seq. ("TCPA" or "Act") and its regulations
by causing "an artificial or prerecorded voice" ("prerecorded
calls") to call telephone subscribers who have not expressly
consented to receiving such calls.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly
situated individuals, seek an injunction requiring BrandRep to
cease all unauthorized prerecorded calling activities and an award
of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees. They bring the action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on
behalf of themselves and the Class.2

The FAC states Plaintiff A1 is a California corporation with its
principal place of business located in the San Jose Bay area for
more than 18 years. The FAC alleges that, while located in the
Northern District, A1 received two prerecorded telemarketing calls
from BrandRep on Feb. 7, 2021 and Feb. 18, 2021. The FAC further
alleges that, after each of the calls, BrandRep sent follow-up
emails, which again solicited A1 to purchase BrandRep's services.
According to the FAC, Plaintiff S. Schick was a resident within the
Northern District of California between 2001 through October 2018
and received a prerecorded telemarketing call from BrandRep on
August 13, 2017. According to the FAC, Plaintiff D. Schick was a
resident within the Northern District of California from 2001
through October 2018, and received prerecorded telemarketing calls
from BrandRep on July 27, 2017 and Aug. 21, 2017.

On April 26, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed the instant action and
three days later, on April 29, 2021, filed the FAC. On Aug. 27,
2021, BrandRep filed the instant motion to dismiss under 12(b)(3)
and a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404.

II. Discussion

In the Ninth Circuit, district courts have "discretion to
adjudicate motions for transfer according to an 'individualized,
case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.'" In making
the determination, a court may consider: (1) where the relevant
agreements were negotiated and executed; (2) the state most
familiar with the governing law; (3) plaintiff's choice of forum;
(4) the respective parties' contacts with the forum; (5) contacts
relating to plaintiff's cause of action in the chosen forum; (6)
differences in litigation costs in the two forums; (7) ability to
compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses; (8) ease of
access to sources of proof; (9) presence of a forum selection
clause; and (10) relevant public policy of the forum state, if
any.

The moving party bears the burden of showing a transfer is "more"
appropriate. A defendant seeking transfer must "make a strong
showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff's
choice of forum."

Because venue is proper in the Northern District of California,
Judge Illston proceeds to weigh the interests of convenience and
justice to determine whether transfer is appropriate to the Central
District of California. She notes that courts evaluate several
factors in making this determination. Parties agree the first and
second Jones factors are neutral and the ninth is inapplicable.

Having weighted the various Jones factors and finding most of them
neutral, and keeping in mind the broad discretion granted to
district courts when deciding a motion to transfer venue, Judge
Illston concludes venue is appropriate in the Northern District. A
strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the
Plaintiff's choice of forum has not been made. Keeping the matter
in the venue promotes judicial economy and allows the case to move
forward without undue delay.

III. Order

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Illston denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the first amended complaint and motion for
transfer of venue.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y925nm69 from Leagle.com.


BRISTOL COMPRESSORS: Court Enters Judgments in Messer WARN Act Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James P. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, Abingdon Division, entered judgments against
the Defendant in the case, TONY A. MESSER, ET AL., Plaintiffs v.
BRISTOL COMPRESSORS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:18CV00040 (W.D. Va.).

In the class action alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification ("WARN") Act, following Judge Jones'
denial of the Defendant's motions for summary judgment claiming it
was exempted from giving employees the 60 days' notice of
termination required under the WARN Act, the counsel for the
Defendant withdrew from representation at the Defendant's request.
The Defendant was given the opportunity to find substitute counsel
but did not do so.

On July 19, 2021, the Court held a bench trial to determine
liability and the amount of damages. No representative of the
Defendant appeared at the trial.

By Order entered following the trial, Judge Jones found that the
Defendant had violated the WARN Act and that 128 Class Members are
owed damages as provided in 29 U.S.C. Section 2104(a)(1)-(2). In
addition, he found that the Class Members of Subclass Three are
owed stay bonuses in the amount of $1,000 each.

By Opinion and Order entered Oct. 8, 2021, Judge Jones found that
the Plaintiffs are entitled to payment for the workdays included in
the 60 calendar days following their terminations without cause and
without 60 days' notice. He further found that the Class Members
are entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of their
terminations.

The Plaintiffs have submitted damages calculations for Subclass One
and Subclass Three based upon a Declaration of Thomas M. Hicok,
CPA, CVA, CFFA, who qualified as an expert on such matters and
testified at the trial. These calculations include prejudgment
interest to Oct. 29, 2021, for both Subclasses based on the federal
statutory interest rate calculated from the Class Members'
termination dates, compounded annually. Judge Jones finds it
appropriate to use the calculations based on the federal statutory
rates in effect at the time of the Class Members' terminations as
contained in the Hicok Declaration Exhibits 3 and 4.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Jones granted the Class Members of
Subclass One judgment against the Defendant in the individual
amounts shown on Hicok Declaration Exhibit 3. The Class Members of
Subclass Three are granted judgment against the Defendant in the
individual amounts shown on Hicok Declaration Exhibit 4. The total
amount of all individual damages and prejudgment interest awarded
is $1,392,915.40. Exhibits 3 and 4 are appended to the Opinion and
Order.

Judge Jones accordingly entered judgments as described. Upon entry
of those judgments, the Class Counsel may file within 21 days
thereafter a motion for award of attorney's fees and non-taxable
costs pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(h) and
54(d)(2). In accord with Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(iv), the motion must
disclose the terms of any agreement about fees for the services for
which the claims were made.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ve3ccbxc from Leagle.com.

Mary Lynn Tate -- mtate@law.gwu.edu -- TATE LAW PC, in Abingdon,
Virginia, for the Plaintiffs.


CARLOTZ INC: Plaintiff Must File Consolidated Amended Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------------
CarLotz, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that on Oct. 26, the
Court entered an order requiring the lead plaintiff to file a
consolidated amended complaint on or before Dec. 14, 2021, and
requiring that briefing on any motion to dismiss the consolidated
amended complaint be completed on or before June 10, 2022.

On July 8, 2021, purported CarLotz stockholder Daniel Erdman,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a
putative class action complaint in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, alleging that CarLotz and
certain of its executive officers made various false and misleading
statements or omissions about the Company's business, operations,
financial performance and prospects in violation of Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated
thereunder. See Daniel Erdman v. CarLotz, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:21-cv-05906-RA.

The action is stated to be brought on behalf of purchasers of the
stock of Acamar Partners Acquisition Corp. and CarLotz during the
period from December 30, 2020 to May 25, 2021.

The action seeks to recover unspecified compensatory damages
allegedly caused by the defendants' purported violations of the
federal securities laws, plus interest and costs and expenses.

On July 20, 2021, purported CarLotz stockholder Michael Widuck,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a
putative class action complaint in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, alleging that CarLotz and
certain of its executive officers made various false and misleading
statements or omissions about the Company's business, operations,
financial performance and prospects in violation of Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated
thereunder.

The action is stated to be brought on behalf of purchasers of the
stock of Acamar Partners Acquisition Corp. and CarLotz during the
period from December 30, 2020 to May 25, 2021.

The action seeks to recover unspecified compensatory damages
allegedly caused by the defendants' purported violations of the
federal securities laws, plus interest and costs and expenses.

On August 5, 2021, purported CarLotz stockholder Michael Turk,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a
putative class action complaint in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, alleging that CarLotz and
certain of its executive officers made various false and misleading
statements or omissions about the Company's business, operations,
financial performance and prospects in violation of Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated
thereunder. See Michael Turk v. CarLotz, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:21-cv-06627-RA.

The action is stated to be brought on behalf of purchasers of the
stock of Acamar Partners Acquisition Corp. and CarLotz during the
period from December 30, 2020 to May 25, 2021.

The action seeks to recover unspecified compensatory damages
allegedly caused by the defendants' purported violations of the
federal securities laws, plus interest and costs and expenses.

The above three cases were consolidated by the Court on August 31,
2021 under In re CarLotz, Inc. Securities Litigation, Case No.
1:21-cv-05906-RA.

On October 15, 2021, the Court appointed a lead plaintiff and lead
counsel for the putative class.

"On October 26, 2021, the Court entered an order requiring the lead
plaintiff to file a consolidated amended complaint on or before
December 14, 2021 and requiring that briefing on any motion to
dismiss the consolidated amended complaint be completed on or
before June 10, 2022." the Company said.

CarLotz, Inc. operates as a used vehicle consignment and retail
remarketing business.

CEBRIDGE TELECOM: Can't Compel Arbitration in Vasquez Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICK VASQUEZ, Plaintiff v. CEBRIDGE TELECOM CA, LLC,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-06400-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California denies Suddenlink's motion to compel the entirety of
the action to arbitration.

Introduction

Plaintiff Nick Vasquez, individually, as a private attorney
general, and on behalf of a putative class of other customers
similarly situated, alleges that Defendants Cebridge Telecom CA,
LCC and Altice, USA, Inc., doing business as Suddenlink
Communications (collectively, "Suddenlink" or "Defendants"),
engaged in false advertising by failing to disclose a "Network
Enhancement Fee" for internet services, and misrepresenting that
the fee is a tax or government regulation. Vasquez asserts claims
under California law pursuant to the Consumer Legal Remedies Act,
False Advertising Law and Unfair Competition Law seeking public
injunctive relief, declaratory relief and restitution.

Now pending is Suddenlink's motion to compel the entirety of the
action to arbitration subject to an arbitration agreement that
prohibits non-individualized relief. In the alternative, Suddenlink
argues Plaintiff Vasquez lacks Article III standing to bring the
action.

Background

The operative complaint alleges that Suddenlink has engaged, and
continues to engage, in a false advertising scheme in California by
publicly advertising specific flat monthly rates for its internet
service plans for a specified time period, but then charging
"higher monthly rates during that period via a disguised and
fabricated extra charge on the bill (which Suddenlink calls the
'Network Enhancement Fee')." The Second Amended Complaint alleges
the "Network Enhancement Fee" was concocted by Suddenlink as a
means to covertly increase customers' rates, including during their
advertised and promised fixed-rate promotional period. Furthermore,
the SAC alleges that Suddenlink does not disclose that it can
increase customers' monthly service rates, even during a promised
fixed-rate promotional period, by increasing the amount of the
Network Enhancement Fee.

The Plaintiff brings claims individually, as a private attorney
general, and on behalf of a putative class consisting of "all
current and former Suddenlink customers who were charged a 'Network
Enhancement Fee' on their bill for Suddenlink internet services
received in California within the applicable statute of
limitations."

The Plaintiff brings claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"), California Civil Code Section 1750 et seq., False
Advertising Law ("FLA"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17500 et
seq., and Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
Section 17200 et seq. The SAC seeks public injunctive relief to
stop Suddenlink's allegedly ongoing false and deceptive price
advertising to the general public under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA.

Separately but still pursuant to his claim under the UCL, FAL and
CLRA, the Plaintiff seeks, on behalf of himself and the proposed
class, restitution, damages and a private injunction prohibiting
Suddenlink from continuing to charge the Network Enhancement Fee to
him and the class of current subscribers who signed up for service
after being induced by Suddenlink's allegedly misleading pricing
scheme.

The Plaintiff filed the action in Humboldt County Superior Court on
May 3, 2021, and the Defendants were served with the Summons and
Complaint on July 20 and 21, 2021, respectively. The Defendants
timely filed a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b) on
Aug. 18, 2021. They assert the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332, because the
putative class action has 100 or more class members (allegedly
20-30,000 class members, id. at 3), the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million, and there is minimal diversity (the
Plaintiff is a citizen of California, Defendants Altice and
Cebridge are Delaware corporations with their principal place of
business in New York, id. at 3-4).

Now pending is the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration agreement the Plaintiff entered into
and to stay these proceedings during the pendency of arbitration.
The Defendants' reply brief on this motion challenged, for the
first time, Plaintiff Vasquez's standing to pursue public
injunctive relief in the action under Article III.

At the hearing on the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration, the
Court allowed the Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint on the
limited ground to address issues related to his Article III
standing to pursue public injunctive relief. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff filed the operative SAC on Oct. 25, 2021. The Defendants
were granted leave to file a supplemental brief in response to the
SAC regarding the Plaintiff's standing to bring the action, which
they did.

Discussion

In the Order, Judge Chen examines the Defendants' arguments on the
Plaintiff's standing and in support of their motion to compel
arbitration. Suddenlink moves to compel arbitration based on its
Residential Services Agreement ("RSA"), which Plaintiff Vasquez
agreed to when he signed up for Suddenlink's services online. The
parties agree that they entered into the RSA. The relevant
provisions of the arbitration agreement upon which Suddenlink moves
the Court to compel arbitration are contained in a section titled
"Binding Arbitration." The RSA also includes an express provision
for "Waiver of Class and Representative Actions."

A. Plaintiff Vasquez's Standing under Article III to Pursue Public
Injunctive Relief

As a threshold matter, Suddenlink argues that Plaintiff Vasquez
lacks Article III standing to seek a public injunction directed at
Suddenlink's advertising regarding the "Network Enhancement Fee,"
and thus the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
action.

Judge Chen finds that Plaintiff Vasquez has standing to seek public
injunctive relief because he has adequately alleged injury-in-fact
under Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 969 (9th Cir.
2018) (noting that plaintiff can establish standing for injunctive
relief claims if she alleges that "she will be unable to rely on
the product's advertising or labeling in the future, and so will
not purchase the product although she would like to"); (observing
that plaintiff may seek public injunctive relief because she
"remains a USAA customer and nothing indicates that she wants to
stop being a customer" and "thus she has standing under
Davidson.").

Judge Chen holds that the SAC demonstrates Vasquez desires to
purchase Suddenlink's fixed-rate promotional price services in the
future if he were confident that Suddenlink had ceased its
allegedly false advertising practices. The SAC also demonstrates
that Vasquez is similarly situated to the plaintiff in Davidson who
had standing to pursue her claims: Vasquez is harmed by his
"inability to rely on the validity of the information advertised"
by Suddenlink "despite his desire to purchase a truly fixed rate
promotional period of internet service."

B. Suddenlink's "Binding Arbitration" and "Waiver of Class and
Representative Actions" Provisions Violate McGill

In McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945, 956 (2017), the
California Supreme Court has found that agreements to arbitrate
claims for public injunctive relief under the CLRA, the UCL, or the
false advertising law are not enforceable in California. Claims for
public injunctive relief include "injunctive relief that has the
primary purpose and effect of prohibiting unlawful acts that
threaten future injury to the general public." The Ninth Circuit
has ruled that the FAA does not preempt McGill.

Suddenlink concedes that the RSA provisions are unenforceable as to
claims for public injunction under McGill. Suddenlink does not
argue otherwise in its briefs. Instead, it contends that the
Plaintiff "is seeking private relief" so "McGill does not apply."
Judge Chen rejects Suddenlink's argument.

C. The SAC Seeks "Public Injunctive Relief" Within the Meaning of
McGill

Judge Chen finds that the Plaintiff's SAC seeks this "paradigmatic
example" of public injunctive relief: To enjoin Suddenlink from
falsely advertising its internet service plans to the general
public via public injunctions under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA -- the
very same statutes and type of relief at issue in McGill. Moreover,
the SAC specifically seeks four public injunctions addressing the
various aspects of Suddenlink's false advertising, stemming from
his CLRA, FAL and UCL claims. Thus, Judge Chen holds that the SAC
seeks public injunctive relief within the meaning of McGill, and,
thus, the arbitration provisions are unenforceable as to those
claims. This is true even though the Plaintiff seeks private relief
in addition to public injunctive relief.

D. The Arbitration Agreement's Severability Clause Requires the
Entirety of Plaintiff's Claims to Proceed in the Court

Judge Chen finds that Vasquez seeks public injunctive relief under
each of the three claims in his complaint -- California's false
advertising law, unfair competition law and Consumer Legal Remedies
Act. Therefore, the class action waiver provision of the
arbitration agreement is unenforceable as each of those claims. The
private remedies sought by the Plaintiff flow from the same claims.
Thus, pursuant to the arbitration agreement's severability clause,
Vasquez must litigate the entirety of each of those claims before
the Court, including his requests for restitution, declaratory
relief and injunctive relief for himself and the putative class.
Suddenlink does not contest this reading of the severability
provision and makes no argument to the contrary. Accordingly, there
is no basis for the Court to compel any portion of the claims in
the Plaintiff's SAC to arbitration. Finally, because there is no
basis for the Court to compel any portion of the Plaintiff's claims
to arbitration, Judge Chen need not address Suddenlink's request to
stay proceedings pending arbitration.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chen finds that Plaintiff Vasquez
has standing to pursue the action for public injunctive relief and
denies Suddenlink's motion to compel arbitration.

The Order disposes of Docket No. 12.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/46xp5cj2 from Leagle.com.


CENTERRA GROUP: Monarrez Loses Bid to Remand Suit to Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEANNIE MONARREZ, individually, and on behalf of other
members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
CENTERRA GROUP, LLC; CENTERRA SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
WACKENHUT SERVICES, INC.; GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-03596-JWH-PLAx
(C.D. Cal.), Judge John W. Holcomb of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California denies the Plaintiff's motion to
remand the action to the Superior Court of the State of California
for the County of Los Angeles.

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On Feb. 24, 2021, Monarrez filed her Complaint commencing the
putative class action in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. In
her Complaint, Monarrez asserts 10 claims for relief against for
violation of various provisions of the California Labor Code and
the California Business and Professions Code against Defendants
Centerra Group, LLC ("CGL"); Centerra Services International, LLC
("CSI"); Wackenhut Services, Inc.; and G4S Government Solutions,
Inc. On April 28, 2021, the Defendants removed the action to the
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, asserting jurisdiction
under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d).

Ms. Monarrez filed the instant Motion on May 28, 2021; the
Defendants opposed on June 11; and Monarrez replied a week later.

B. Factual Allegations

The Defendants employed Monarrez as an hourly-paid, non-exempt
employee from around May 2010 until October 2018. Monarrez alleges
that the Defendants hired her and the other hourly-paid non-exempt
employee class members ("PCMs") and failed to compensate them for
all hours worked, including missed meal periods and rest breaks.
She and the PCMs "worked over eight hours in a day, and/or 40 hours
in a week during their employment with the Defendants," yet the
Defendants failed to pay them "overtime compensation for all
overtime hours worked."

Ms. Monarrez alleges that the Defendants "engaged in a pattern and
practice of wage abuse" against Monarrez and the PCMs, including by
failing to pay them "for all regular and/or overtime wages earned
and for missed meal periods and rest breaks in violation of
California law." She further alleges that the Defendants failed to
pay in a timely manner all wages owed to Monarrez and the other
PCMs upon their discharge or resignation. The Defendants also
allegedly failed to pay minimum wages; failed to provide accurate
wage statements; failed to maintain accurate payroll records; and
failed to reimburse Monarrez and the PCMs for business-related
expenses. Finally, Monarrez avers that those business practices,
taken together, are unlawful in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
Sections 17200, et seq.

Ms. Monarrez purports to assert those claims on behalf of herself
and a putative class defined as "all current and former hourly-paid
or non-exempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants within
the State of California at any time during the period from four
years preceding the filing of this Complaint to final judgment and
who reside in California." She also defines the following two
subclasses:

   a. Subclass A:

      All class members who were subject to the Defendants'
      practice of rounding time recorded for compensation of
      regular and overtime wages; and

   b. Subclass B:

      All class members who were subject to Defendants' policy to
      require its hourly paid or non-exempt employees to remain
      on the work premises during rest breaks.

C. Allegations in the Notice of Removal and Supporting Evidence

In their Notice of Removal, the Defendants state that Monarrez is a
resident of California and that each Defendant is diverse from
Monarrez (i.e., no Defendant is a citizen of California). They
Defendants also assert that the aggregate amount in controversy for
all PCMs exceeds $5 million.

Before the Court is the motion of Monarrez to remand the action to
state court.

II. Discussion

The Defendants removed the action to the Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1441, asserting jurisdiction under the CAFA.
Therefore, they bear the burden of establishing that the Court has
original subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

A. Monarrez's Evidentiary Objections

Ms. Monarrez objects to the Declaration of John Bolen in support of
the Opposition on multiple grounds, including lack of
authentication and lack of foundation.

Judge Holcomb finds that the Bolen Declaration establishes that Mr.
Bolen, in his capacity as Vice President of North American
Operations for Constellis LLC (which includes the affiliated
entities CSI and CGL), has the requisite personal knowledge of the
employment records and payroll data for CSI and CGL. Accordingly,
he overrules Monarrez's Evidentiary Objections.

B. Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice

The Defendants request that the Court takes judicial notice of the
complaint in an unrelated action, Vasquez v. RSI Home Products,
Inc., Case No. 8:20-cv-01494-JWH-JDEx (C.D. Cal.). Monarrez objects
that the complaint in an unrelated action is irrelevant and that
the Court cannot properly take judicial notice of the facts alleged
in that complaint.

Judge Holcomb grants the Defendants' request for judicial notice.
He takes judicial notice of the complaint filed in Vasquez and the
allegations therein, but not the truth of those allegations (i.e.,
Judge Holcomb takes judicial notice of the fact that certain
allegations were made).

C. Legal Standard Under the CAFA

As a threshold matter, Monarrez does not dispute that there is
minimal diversity, as required by the CAFA. The only jurisdictional
dispute pertains to the amount in controversy requirement under the
CAFA.

D. Amount in Controversy

Ms. Monarrez challenges the Defendants' invocation of CAFA
jurisdiction on the ground that the Defendants have not satisfied
the amount in controversy requirement. In their Notice of Removal,
the Defendants allege that the aggregate amount in controversy for
all PCMs exceeds $5 million. To calculate the amount in
controversy, the Defendants analyzed the payroll and employment
records of Defendant CSI for the four-year period from Feb. 24,
2017, through March 29, 2021 ("Class Period"). They also analyzed
the same employment data for Defendant CGL. Based on these data,
for the purpose of removal, the Defendants calculated the amount in
controversy for CSI PCMs is $5,348,192.23 in total.
Monarrez argues that the Defendants have not shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets
or exceeds the $5 million threshold because, according to Monarrez,
Defendants' assumptions are unreasonable.

Judge Holcomb finds that the amount in controversy for the Unpaid
Wage Claims for CSI PCMs only is $954,570.24,50 with liquidated
damages in the amount of $200,781. Furthermore, for the same
reasons, he credits the Defendants' calculations of the amount in
controversy for the Unpaid Wage Claims for CGL PCMs, submitted in
support of the Opposition, in the amount of $997,164, with
liquidated damages in the amount of $249,291. In sum, the total
amount in controversy for the Unpaid Wage Claims is $2,401,806.24.

With respect to Monarrez' claims for unpaid meal and rest period
premiums ("Meal and Rest Claims"), Judge Holcomb finds that
Defendants' assumed 20% violation rate for the CSI PCMs, which is
based upon the average length of those PCMs' workday, is
reasonable. To bolster their calculations, the Defendants submit
further evidence for the CGL PCMs. Based upon the average workday
of the CGL PCMs (6.56 hours), the Defendants assume a 5% violation
rate,60 which the Court finds to be reasonable. Therefore, the
amount in controversy for the Meal and Rest Claims for CSI PCMs is
$1,272,760.33, and the amount in controversy for the Meal and Rest
Claims for CGL PCMs is $997,164. In sum, the total amount in
controversy for the Meal and Rest claims is $2,269,924.33.

With respect to her Waiting Time Penalties Claim, Monarrez contends
that th Defendants unreasonably "assume maximum violations for all
of the 199 CSI PCMs that ended their employment during [the
limitations period." Judge Holcomb finds that the Defendants'
assumption is reasonable. Accordingly, he finds that the
Defendants' assumption of maximum penalties is reasonable. The
amount in controversy for the Waiting Time Penalties Claim for CSI
PCMs is $1,272,760.33, and the amount in controversy for the
Waiting Time Penalties Claim for CGL PCMs is $997,164. In sum, the
total amount in controversy for the Waiting Time Penalties Claim is
$2,758,312.65.

Judge Holcomb need not address the amount in controversy for
Monarrez's other claims because the amount in controversy for the
claims addressed in the preceding sections exceeds $5 million. In
view of the analysis set forth, he calculates the total amount in
controversy for the CSI and CGL PCMs, $7,430,043.22 in total, as
follows: Unpaid Wage Claims - $2,401,806.24; Meal and Rest Claims -
$2,269,924.33; Waiting Time Penalties Claim - $2,758,312.65.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Holcomb concludes that the
Defendants have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy meets or exceeds the $5 million threshold
under the CAFA. Accordingly, he denies Monarrez's Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3p2exhth from Leagle.com.


CENTRUS ENERGY: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Matthews Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Centrus Energy Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision
and dismissed the class action complaint initiated by James
Matthews, Jennifer Brownfield Clark, Joanne Ross, the Estate of
A.R., and others similarly situated. Plaintiffs have 90 days to
file a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.

On November 27, 2019, the Company, Enrichment Corp. and six other
U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") contractors who have operated
facilities at the Portsmouth GDP site were named as defendants in a
class action complaint filed by James Matthews, Jennifer Brownfield
Clark, Joanne Ross, the Estate of A.R., and others similarly
situated (the "Matthews Plaintiffs"), in the Common Pleas Court of
Pike County, Ohio.

On January 3, 2020, the complaint was removed to the U.S. District
Court in the Southern District of Ohio for adjudication. The
complaint sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, statutory
damages, and any other relief allowed by law for alleged off-site
contamination allegedly resulting from activities on the Portsmouth
GDP site.

The Matthews Plaintiffs expressly contended that the ongoing and
continuous releases that injured the Plaintiffs and class members
were not "nuclear incidents" as that term is defined in the
Price-Anderson Act, but rather "freestanding state law claims
concerning traditional-style state regulation."

On July 27, 2020, the court granted the Company, Enrichment Corp.
and the other defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint because
the Matthews Plaintiffs had opted not to proceed under the
Price-Anderson Act which preempts state law.

On August 18, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

On October 6, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision and dismissed the case.

"Plaintiffs have 90 days to file a petition for certiorari with the
U.S. Supreme Court; the Plaintiffs must file such a petition by
January 4, 2022 for the U.S. Supreme Court to consider whether it
will hear the case," the Company said.

Centrus Energy Corp. supplies nuclear fuel and services for the
nuclear power industry in the United States, Japan, Belgium, and
internationally. The Company operates in two segments, Low-Enriched
Uranium (LEU) and Contract Services. The Company was formerly known
as USEC Inc. and changed its name to Centrus Energy Corp. in
September 2014. Centrus is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland.

CENTRUS ENERGY: Shortridge Sues Over Forced COVID-19 Vaccine Order
------------------------------------------------------------------
DANNY SHORTRIDGE, CRAIG MOORE, BRENDA PATTON, DOUG MCLAUGHLIN, GARY
ENTLER, DOCKIE TACKETT, and CHRISTINE BUTTERMORE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CENTRUS
ENERGY CORP., FLUOR-BWXT PORTSMOUTH, LLC, MID-AMERICA CONVERSION
SERVICES, LLC, and PORTSMOUTH MISSION ALLIANCE, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 2:21-cv-05336-ALM-EPD (S.D. Ohio, November 17, 2021) is a
class action against the Defendants for violations of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Emergency
Use Authorization (EUA) Statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' failure to provide the
Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees the required medical or
religious accommodations and failure to engage in an interactive
process to provide reasonable accommodations. The Plaintiffs seek
to remedy the Defendants' alleged constitutional and statutory
violations, and their discrimination against employees who
requested religious and medical accommodations from their mandate
to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.

Centrus Energy Corp. is a supplier of nuclear fuel and services for
the nuclear power industry, located in Ohio.

Fluor-BWXT Portsmouth, LLC is the U.S. Department of Energy's
contractor for the decontamination and decommissioning of the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio.

Mid-America Conversion Services, LLC is a joint venture led by
Atkins Nuclear Secured, LLC, with Westinghouse Electric and Fluor
Federal Services.

Portsmouth Mission Alliance, LLC is a joint venture between North
Wind and Swift and Staley. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                

         Warner Mendenhall, Esq.
         Thomas W. Connors, Esq.
         MENDENHALL LAW GROUP
         190 North Union St., Suite 201
         Akron, OH 44304
         Telephone: (330) 535-9160
         Facsimile: (330) 762-9743
         E-mail: warner@warnermendenhall.com
                 tconnors@warnermendenhall.com

CHARLES SCHWAB: Asks Court to Dismiss Class Suit Over Cash Sweeps
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Berman at thinkadvisor.com reports that Charles Schwab is
trying to get the class-action complaint that was filed against it
in September by three investors over cash sweeps in its robo-advice
service thrown out.

In a motion filed by Schwab in U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California in Oakland, the firm asked that the court
dismiss the case "for lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative,
for failure to state a claim on the merits."

John T. Jasnoch, an attorney with law firm Scott + Scott in San
Diego who is representing the plaintiffs, did not immediately
respond to a request for comment.

The three investors who sued Schwab had alleged the firm violated
its fiduciary duties by "wrongfully overconcentrating" clients'
Schwab Intelligent Portfolios robo-advisor accounts in cash
positions that ended up costing them hundreds of millions of
dollars.

In the complaint, filed on Sept. 10, Lauren Marie Barbiero,
Kimberly Jo Lopez and William Kenneth Lopez alleged that Charles
Schwab Investment Advisory, the subsidiary that manages the firm's
robo-advisor program, kept the plaintiffs' and other clients'
Schwab Intelligent Portfolios accounts "overconcentrated in cash
positions," costing investors hundreds of millions of dollars and
violating the firm's fiduciary duties.

                       'Doomed to Fail'

On Feb. 24, 2022, or as soon as the matter may be heard in the
Oakland court, Schwab will move to dismiss the complaint, it said
in court filing.

The complaint "rests entirely on state-law claims that Congress
forbade" in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Schwab
alleged. The plaintiffs "assert a classic securities claim: that
[Schwab] misrepresented to SIP clients how it would invest their
funds in certain nationally traded securities and instead caused
Plaintiffs to be overly invested in cash deposits at an affiliated
bank," according to Schwab. [GN]

CHARLES SCHWAB: Class Certification in CA Putative Suit Tossed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Charles Schwab Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the court
denied the motion for class certification in the putative class
suit filed in the Northern District of California.

On July 13, 2016, a securities class action lawsuit was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on
behalf of a putative class of customers executing equity orders
through CS&Co.

The lawsuit names CS&Co and CSC as defendants and alleges that an
agreement under which CS&Co routed orders to UBS Securities LLC
between July 13, 2011 and December 31, 2014 violated CS&Co's duty
to seek best execution. Plaintiffs seek unspecified damages,
interest, injunctive and equitable relief, and attorneys' fees and
costs.

Defendants consider the allegations to be entirely without merit
and have been vigorously contesting the lawsuit. After a first
amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, plaintiffs
filed a second amended complaint on August 14, 2017.

Defendants again moved to dismiss, and in a decision issued
December 5, 2017, the court denied the motion.

"Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on April 30,
2021, and in a decision on October 27, 2021, the court denied the
motion and held that certification of a class action is
inappropriate" the Company said.

The Charles Schwab Corporation is an American multinational
financial services company. It offers banking, commercial banking,
an electronic trading platform, and wealth management advisory
services to both retail and institutional clients.

CHICKEN OF THE SEA: Initial OK of Settlements Nixed w/o Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, , Case No. 3:15-md-02670-DMS-MDD (S.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge Dana M. Sabraw entered an order denying without prejudice
class Plaintiffs Motions For Preliminary Approval Of Settlements
With Defendants Chicken Of The Sea And Thai Union Group.

If counsel are able to resolve these issues and renegotiate their
respective settlements, and wish to submit renewed motions for
preliminary approval of those settlements, they should submit those
motions on or before December 1, 2021, says Judge . Sabraw.

This case comes before the Court on the Class Plaintiffs' requests
to reconsider their motions for preliminary approval of their
respective settlements with Defendants Chicken of the Sea and Thai
Union Group. The motions came on for hearing on November 9, 2021.
John Roberti appeared on behalf of the COSI Defendants, Betsy
Manifold appeared on behalf of the End Payer Plaintiff (EPP) Class,
Michael Lehmann appeared for the Direct Purchaser Plaintiff (DPP)
Class, Blaine Finley appeared for the Commercial Food Preparers
(CFP) Class, and Belinda Lee appeared for Defendants StarKist Co.
and Dongwon Industries Co., Ltd.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 10, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HuRQtl at no extra charge.[CC]


CHILDREN'S LEARNING: Farrior Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wendy Farrior, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. Tony Stroud, Dail Ballard and
Children's Learning Center II of Wilmington, Inc., Defendants, Case
No. 21-cv-00191 (E.D. N.C., November 4, 2021), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, attorney fees, costs and other
relief for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act.

Defendants own and operate a day care facility where Farrior was
employed as a non-exempt hourly employee from 2004 through 2021 in
their facility in Wilmington, North Carolina. He claims to be
denied overtime pay despite regularly working more than 40 hours in
a workweek. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew Hanley, Esq.
      Nathanial Ulmer, Esq.
      CROSSLEY McINTOSH COLLIER HANLEY & EDES, PLLC
      5002 Randall Parkway
      Wilmington, NC 28403
      Telephone: (910) 762-9711
      Facsimile: (910) 256-0310


CHRISTOPHER AHERN: Verification & Affidavit Filed in Richter Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the putative class action lawsuit styled DEBORAH RICHTER, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. CHRISTOPHER
AHERN, CHERYL A. LARABEE, DANIEL R. MAURER, P. SCOTT STUBBS,
MICHAEL T. BIRCH, RONALD G. GARRIQUES, EDWARD TERINO, and TAYLOR D.
SMITH, Case No. 2021-0982, the Plaintiff filed with the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware on November 16, 2021 her
verification and affidavit to authorize this class action
complaint's filing. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Blake Bennett, Esq.
         COOCH & TAYLOR PA-WILMINGTON
         1000 W St 10th Fl
         Wilmington, DE 19899
         Telephone: (302) 984-3889
         Facsimile: (302) 984-3939
         E-mail: bbennett@coochtaylor.com

CHULA VISTA INC: Sartin Seeks Certification of Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPH SARTIN, KENNETH
RICHE, TONY EDWARDS, ROBERT SILBERMAN, and SCOTT WILLOCK,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
CHULA VISTA, INC., et al., Case No. 18-cv-1890-WED (E.D. Wisc.),
the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order granting their
motion for class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. and
for any other further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Chula Vista, Inc. provides hospitality services. The Company offers
facilities for stay, restaurants, and bars, as well as hosts venue
for events and meetings.

A copy of the the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Nov.
12, 2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3Fnx64X at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Steven A. Hart, Esq.
          Brian H. Eldridge, Esq.
          Ben Shrader, Esq.
          ART MCLAUGHLIN & ELDRIDGE, LLC
          22 W. Washington Street, Ste. 1600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 955-5545
          Facsimile: (312) 971-9243
          E-mail: shart@hmelegal.com
                  beldridge@hmelegal.com
                  bshrader@hmelegal.com

CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Troy Stacy Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Troy Stacy Enterprises Inc., et al., filed an appeal
from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled TROY STACY
ENTERPRISES INC., SWEARINGEN SMILES LLC, ELEISHA J. NICKOLES DDS,
REEDS JEWELERS OF NIAGARA FALLS, INC., BURNING BROTHERS BREWING
LLC, CHICAGO MAGIC LOUNGE LLC, AND CDC CATERING, INC. T/A BROOKSIDE
MANOR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, THE CINCINNATI
CASUALTY COMPANY, THE CINCINNATI INDEMNITY COMPANY, AND CINCINNATI
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Defendants, Master Case No. 1:20-cv-312, in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at
Cincinnati.

This is a consolidated action arising from business closures
related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting economic
shutdowns. Though they run different kinds of businesses, the
Plaintiffs have all been forced to reduce or suspend their
operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In short, because of
COVID-19 and the resulting shutdown orders, the Plaintiffs could
not run their businesses as they normally would.

The Plaintiffs all had insurance policies with Cincinnati. In those
policies, Cincinnati agreed to provide coverage for lost "Business
Income": "We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income . . .
you sustain due to the necessary suspension of your operations
during the period of restoration. The suspension must be caused by
direct loss to property at a premises caused by or resulting from
any Covered Cause of Loss."

The Plaintiffs sought coverage under the "Business Income," "Extra
Expense," and "Civil Authority" provisions. However, the Defendants
denied coverage.

The Plaintiffs bring four claims for breach of contract, seeking
business income coverage, civil authority coverage, extra expense
coverage, and sue-and-labor coverage. They also bring four claims
for declaratory judgment under the same four coverage provisions.
    
As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 7, 2021, Judge
Matthew W. McFarland of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Western Division, Cincinnati, granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss and denied as moot their motion to
stay.

The Plaintiffs are taking an appeal from this ruling in their
appellate case captioned as Troy Stacy Enterprises Inc., et al. v.
Cincinnati Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 21-4008, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, filed on
November 1, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant brief is due on December 13; 2021 and

   -- Appellee brief is due on January 12, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants TROY STACY ENTERPRISES INC., dba Craft &
Vinyl; SWEARINGEN SMILES LLC; ELEISHA J. NICKOLES, DDS; REEDS
JEWELERS OF NIAGRA FALLS, INC.; BURNING BROTHERS BREWING LLC;
CHICAGO MAGIC LOUNGE LLC; and CDC CATERING, INC., individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, dba Brookside Manor,
are represented by:

          John Scott Black, Esq.
          DALY & BLACK
          2211 Norfolk Street, Suite 800
          Houston, TX 77098
          Telephone: (713) 655-1405

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER
          10 N. Dearborn Street, Sixth Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com  

               - and -

          Marc M. Seltzer, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY
          1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6029
          Telephone: (310) 789-3100

Defendants-Appellees CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, CINCINNATI
CASUALTY COMPANY, CINCINNATI INDEMNITY COMPANY, and CINCINNATI
FINANCIAL CORPORATION are represented by:

          Michael Kevin Farrell, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER
          1900 E. Ninth Street, Suite 3200
          Cleveland, OH 44114-3485
          Telephone: (216) 621-0200
          E-mail: mfarrell@bakerlaw.com

CITIGROUP INC: Seeks Partial Dismissal of Consolidated Amended Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that on Sept. 14, 2021,
defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint
captioned THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF
GOVERNMENTS v. BANK OF AMERICA CORP., ET AL. in part.

On August 6, 2021, the plaintiffs in the nationwide putative class
action filed a consolidated amended complaint.

On September 14, 2021, defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated
amended complaint in part.

Additional information concerning this action is publicly available
in court filings under the docket number 19-CV-1608 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Furman, J.).

Citigroup Inc. or Citi is an American multinational investment bank
and financial services corporation headquartered in New York City.

CLAY & DOMINGUE: Nov. 30 Extension for Class Cert Response Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT MUNOZ, JUVENTINO
CASTILLON, and JAMES ERIC SHORT, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, v. CLAY & DOMINGUE, LLC and DARRING
CLAY, Case No. 5:20-cv-01414-HJB (W.D. Tex.), the Defendants asks
the Court to enter an order granting their motion to extend their
response deadline to the motion for Conditional Certification to
November 30, 2021.

The Defendants are seeking an extension to the current response
deadline to Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification.

On October 29, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Conditional
Certification. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Defendants' response deadline is Friday, November 12, 2021.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Nov. 12, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3qPjvPR at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Adam D. Boland, Esq.
          Soma Ramirez, Esq.
          Charles Hayes, Esq.
          2301 Broadway
          CLARK HILL STRASBURGER
          San Antonio, TX 78215
          Telephone: (210) 250-6000
          Facsimile: (210) 250-6100
          E-mail: aboland@clarkhill.com
                  sramirez@clarkhill.com
                  chayes@clarkhill.com

COCA-COLA CO: Extension of Time to File Class Cert. Reply Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KATHLEEN SPANER, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, v. THE COCA-COLA CO.,
Case No. 1:19-cv-22210-JEM (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff submits an
unopposed motion to extend the time to file a reply to Defendant's
response in opposition to Plaintiff's motion to certify.

On October 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for class
certification. The Defendant was originally scheduled to file a
response to Plaintiff's motion to certify the class by November 8,
2021.

On November 2, 2021, Defendant filed an unopposed motion for
extension of time to respond to Plaintiff's motion to certify the
class, asking the Court for a four-week extension.

The unopposed motion also asked the Court to extend Plaintiff's
time to reply to its response in opposition to Plaintiff's motion
to certify the class until January 17, 2021.

On November 5, 2021, the Court granted Defendant's unopposed motion
for an extension of time, giving Defendant until December 6, 2021
to respond to Plaintiff's motion to certify the class.

The Coca-Cola Company is an American multinational beverage
corporation incorporated under Delaware's General Corporation Law
and headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Nov. 11, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3qKQjtw at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
          Christopher R. Reilly, Esq.
          Joshua D. Arisohn, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1420
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 330-5512
          Facsimile: (305) 676-9006
          E-mail: scott@bursor.com
                  creilly@bursor.com
                  jarisohn@bursor.com

COMMUNITY HEALTH: Underpays Care Providers, Wells Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
LISA WELLS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-00865 (M.D. Tenn., November 17, 2021)
is a class action against the Defendants for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Tennessee common law by failing to
compensate the Plaintiff and similarly situated care providers
overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek.

Ms. Wells was employed by the Defendants as a care provider in
Knoxville, Tennessee from approximately October 2012 until October
2020.

Community Health Systems, Inc. is a provider of general hospital
healthcare services, headquartered in Franklin, Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Charles P. Yezbak, III, Esq.
         YEZBAK LAW OFFICES
         2002 Richard Jones Rd., Suite B-200
         Nashville, TN 37215
         Telephone: (615) 742-5900
         Facsimile: (615) 742-5958
         E-mail: yezbak@yezbaklaw.com

                - and –

         Clif Alexander, Esq.
         Austin Anderson, Esq.
         ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
         819 N. Upper Broadway
         Corpus Christi, TX 78401
         Telephone: (361) 452-1279
         Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
         E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                 austin@a2xlaw.com

CONAGRA BRANDS: Alvarez Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled HILDA ALVAREZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. CONAGRA BRANDS, INC.; CONAGRA FOODS
PACKAGED FOODS, LLC; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
21STCV37375, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on November
17, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:21-cv-09005 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay
overtime compensation, failure to provide meal periods, failure to
authorize and permit rest breaks, failure to indemnify necessary
business expenses, failure to timely pay final wages at
termination, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements,
and unfair business practices.

Conagra Brands, Inc. is an American consumer packaged goods company
headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.

ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC is an American consumer packaged
goods company headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:          
         
         Jennifer Hinds, Esq.
         HUSCH BLACKWELL LLP
         300 S. Grand Ave., Suite 1500
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 337-6567
         Facsimile: (213) 337-6551
         E-mail: Jennifer.hinds@huschblackwell.com

CORALREEF PRODUCTS: Faces Class Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrado Rizzi reports that the company that does business as Nine9
faces a proposed class action that alleges the modeling and acting
agency has illegally sent unsolicited text messages to thousands of
consumers.

The 12-page suit claims defendant Coralreef Products, Inc. has
violated the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, in
particular by sending automated telemarketing text messages to
consumers without obtaining prior express consent to do so.

The plaintiff, a Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania resident, claims
to have received the following text messages from Nine9, in which
an agent promoted the company's services and advertised
professional headshots. Per the case, the plaintiff informed Nine9
on more than one occasion that he was not interested in the
company's products or services:

The lawsuit contends that Nine9's text messages constitute
telemarketing in that they encourage the future purchase or
investment in property, goods or services. According to the suit,
the talent agency does not have a written policy for maintaining an
internal do-not-call list as the law requires.

The plaintiff did not provide Nine9 with his express written
consent to be contacted, the case says, arguing that to the extent
the agency had the plaintiff's consent to contact him for
promotional purposes, such permission was revoked when the
plaintiff demanded the text messages stop.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff seeks up to $1,500 in
damages for each text placed in violation of the TCPA.

"Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual
harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance,
intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion," the suit
alleges. "Defendant's text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff
and caused disruption to his daily life." [GN]

COTY INC: Court Approves Dismissal of Lewis Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Coty Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2021, that following the dismissal of
the case captioned Crystal Garrett-Evans v. Coty Inc. et al., Case
No. 1:20-cv-07277, plaintiff in the case captioned Chris Lewis v.
Becht et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-09685 agreed to dismiss the case and
the court has approved the dismissal as of October 2021.

The Lewis action, filed on Nov. 17, 2020, is a purported
stockholder class action and derivative complaint, alleging
violations of the U.S. securities laws in connection with the P&G
beauty brands acquisition and the Kylie Brands transaction as well
as claims for breach of fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, abuse
of control, gross mismanagement, and waste of corporate assets by
certain current and former officers and directors of the Company,
is pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York.

The Company was named as a nominal defendant.

The plaintiff seeks, among other things, injunctive and/or monetary
relief.

This action was voluntarily stayed during the pendency of the
motion to dismiss the Evans Action.

"Following the dismissal of the Evans Action, counsel for the
plaintiff in the Lewis Action agreed to dismiss the case and the
court has approved the dismissal of the action as of October 2021,"
the Company said.

Coty Inc. is an American multinational beauty company founded in
1904 by François Coty.

CRONOS GROUP: Rosen Law Probes Firm for Possible Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
WHY: Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces
an investigation of potential securities claims on behalf of
shareholders of Cronos Group Inc. (NASDAQ: CRON) resulting from
allegations that Cronos may have issued materially misleading
business information to the investing public.

"[t]he Company's financial statements for this period should
therefore no longer be relied upon."

Tweet this
SO WHAT: If you purchased Cronos securities you may be entitled to
compensation without payment of any out of pocket fees or costs
through a contingency fee arrangement. The Rosen Law firm is
preparing a class action seeking recovery of investor losses.

WHAT TO DO NEXT: To join the prospective class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-2202.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

WHAT IS THIS ABOUT: On November 9, 2021, Cronos filed a Form 8-K
with the SEC in which it disclosed that it had determined the
previous day that the Company would "be required to restate its
previously issued unaudited interim financial statements for the
three and six months ended June 30, 2021" and that "[t]he Company's
financial statements for this period should therefore no longer be
relied upon." On this news, Cronos' share price dropped nearly 16%,
damaging investors.

WHY ROSEN LAW: We encourage investors to select qualified counsel
with a track record of success in leadership roles. Often, firms
issuing notices do not have comparable experience, resources or any
meaningful peer recognition. Be wise in selecting counsel. The
Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the
largest ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese
Company. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class
Action Services for number of securities class action settlements
in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the top 4 each year since 2013
and has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. In
2019 alone the firm secured over $438 million for investors. In
2020, founding partner Laurence Rosen was named by law360 as a
Titan of Plaintiffs' Bar. Many of the firm's attorneys have been
recognized by Lawdragon and Super Lawyers.

Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome. [GN]

DEBT RESOLUTION: Time Extension for Class Cert. Filing Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARY MCGALLOWAY,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
DEBT RESOLUTION DIRECT, LLC, d/b/a DEBT ADVISORS OF AMERICA, Case
No. 2:20-cv-01740-SCD (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order extending the time in which to file a motion for
class certification and any amended pleadings, through January 18,
2022.

On June 7, 2021, the Court entered the Scheduling Order in the
present matter, which provided for a deadline of November 19, 2021
to file any amended pleadings and Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

Since the Scheduling Order was entered, the Defendant has retained
new counsel, and the Parties are currently in the process working
to resolve various outstanding discovery issues, including issues
related to class certification.

Given the Parties are still in the process of resolving such
issues, the Plaintiff requests a 60-day extension on the deadline
to file any amended pleading and motion for class certification.

The Plaintiff's counsel has conferred with counsel for Defendant
and received assurance that Defendant will not oppose such
request.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Nov. 12, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2YSLe6C at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI, LLP
          3620 E. Layton Ave.
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: 414-482-8000
          Facsimile: 414-482-8001
          E-mail: bslatky@ademilaw.com

DENNIS GROSS: Ct. Amends Scheduling Order in Gunaratna Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Mocha Gunaratna v. Dennis
Gross Cosmetology LLC et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-02311-MWF-GJS (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald entered an order
granting plaintiff's motion to amend the scheduling order

Plaintiff is ordered to file an amended scheduling order that
reflects a 90-day extension of all class certification deadlines.
Counsel for Plaintiff should meet and confer with counsel for
Defendants to see if the deadlines should be slightly adjusted
based on the schedules of all counsel, says Judge Fitzgerald.

The Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint on March 10, 2020,
accusing the Defendants of selling a line of collagen cosmetic
products that "do not contain any collagen whatsoever." The
deadline for Plaintiff to move for class certification is November
30, 2021.

A copy of the Court's civil minutes -- general dated Nov. 10, 2021
is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3qIL8u0 at no
extra charge.[CC]


DIAMOND NAIL: Seeks to Decertify Lu Conditional Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHANGMING LU and MARIA
OLGA LLIGUICOTA, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of others
similarly situated, v. DIAMOND NAIL SALON, LLC d/b/a Diamond Nail &
Spa, GREENWICH NAILS & SPA, LLC d/b/a Diamond Nail & Spa, GREENWICH
DIAMOND NAILS & SPA INC. d/b/a Diamond Nail & Spa, GUI BIAO QI
a/k/a Guibiao Qi a/k/a Leo Qi, ELAINE BAO a/k/a Elaine Ying Bao
a/k/a Elaine Y Bao a/k/a Ying Bao a/k/a Helen Bao a/k/a Ellen Bao,
and JOSE F. ROJAS, Case No. 3:19-cv-02017-VAB (D. Conn.), the
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order decertifying conditional
class certification.

On April 14, 2021, the Plaintiff Lu filed a notice of appearance
pro se stating that he had accepted an under-the-table settlement
in the amount of $35,000 by the Defendants.

A copy of the Defendants' motion to decertify class dated Nov. 12,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3clnUl7 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          John Troy, Esq.
          Aaron Schweitzer, Esq.
          Troy Law, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Blvd., Suite 103
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: 718-762-2332
          E-mail: johntroy@troypllc.com

DSP GROUP: Misleads Stockholders to Approve Merger, Smith Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EDWARD SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DSP GROUP, INC., SHIRA FAYANS BIRENBAUM,
OFER ELYAKIM, THOMAS A. LACEY, CYNTHIA L. PAUL, YAIR SEROUSSI,
NORMAN P. TAFFE, and KENNETH H. TRAUB, Defendants, Case No.
1:21-cv-01624-UNA (D. Del., November 17, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendants for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, Defendant DSP filed a materially
misleading and incomplete proxy statement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in order to convince stockholders to approve
the company's proposed merger with Synaptics Incorporated.
Specifically, the proxy statement omits material information
concerning DSP's financial projections and the data and inputs
underlying the financial valuation analyses that support the
fairness opinion provided by the company's financial advisor,
Goldman. The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Defendants from
conducting the stockholder vote on the proposed merger unless and
until the said material information is disclosed to the holders of
the company's common stock.

DSP Group, Inc. is a provider of wireless chipset solutions, with
its principal executive offices located at 2055 Gateway Place,
Suite 480, San Jose, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Brian D. Long, Esq.
         LONG LAW, LLC
         3828 Kennett Pike, Suite 208
         Wilmington, DE 19807
         Telephone: (302) 729-9100
         E-mail: BDLong@longlawde.com

                 - and –

         Alexandra B. Raymond, Esq.
         810 Seventh Avenue, Suite 620
         New York, NY 10019
         Telephone: (646) 860-9158
         Facsimile: (212) 214-0506
         E-mail: raymond@bespc.com

E.I. DU PONT: Moon Retirement Plan Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as M.P. MOON, individually
and as representative of a class of participants and beneficiaries
in and on behalf of the DuPont Pension and Retirement Plan, v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours and Company, Case No. 1:19-cv-01856-SB (D.
Del.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   a. certifying the action as a class action pursuant to Fed.
      R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of the following Classes:

      -- the Monetary Class

        "All participants and beneficiaries of the Plan from
        1999 to the present, excluding DuPont and any
        participant who is a fiduciary to the Plan, who was
        eligible for unreduced retirement benefits from the Plan
        prior to attainment of normal retirement age of 65 and
        whose unreduced retirement benefits commenced on a date
        that was later than his or her earliest eligibility for
        unreduced pension benefits;" and

     -- the Structural Changes Class

        "All participants and beneficiaries of the Plan from
        1999 to the present, excluding DuPont and any
        participant who is a fiduciary to the Plan, who DuPont
        provides notices concerning benefits available to
        participants in the Plan;"

   b. appointing Plaintiff's counsel as Class Counsel; and

   c. appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative.

E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company, doing business as DuPont,
provides agriculture and specialty products.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Nov. 12,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3qGGCMx
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael C. McKay, Esq.
          MCKAY LAW, LLC
          5635 N. Scottsdale Road, Suite 170
          Scottsdale, AZ 85258
          Telephone: (480) 681-7000
          Facsimile: (480) 348-3999
          E-mail: mmckay@mckaylaw.us

               - and -

          P. Bradford deLeeuw, Esq.
          DELEEUW LAW LLC
          1301 Walnut Green Road
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Telephone: (302) 274-2180
          Facsimile: (302) 351-6905
          E-mail: brad@deleeuwlaw.com

EVERQUOTE INC: Faces Putative Class Suit Over FTSA Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------
EverQuote, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the company is
facing a putative, statewide (Florida) class action lawsuit
alleging violation of the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act
(FTSA).

On November 1, 2021, the Company was named a defendant in a
putative, statewide (Florida) class action lawsuit in the Circuit
Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade
County.

The complaint alleges violations of the FTSA.

"Specifically, the plaintiff alleges the Company engaged in
telephonic sales calls to consumers without having secured the
prior express written consent of those consumers, as required by
the FTSA," the Company said.

The Company believes the plaintiff's claims lack merit.

The Company intends to vigorously defend the suit.

EverQuote, Inc. operates a leading online marketplace for insurance
shopping, connecting consumers with insurance providers. The
company's goal is to reshape insurance shopping for consumers and
improve the way insurance providers, which the company views as
including both carriers and agents, attract and connect with
customers shopping for insurance. The company is based in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

FINANCIAL CARRIER: Faces Suit Over Improper Business Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
GASAWAY HOTSHOTS, LLC; and LARRY JOE GASAWAY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. FINANCIAL
CARRIER SERVICES, INC.; FINANCIAL CARRIER SERVICES, LLC;
TRANSPORTATION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, LLC; TRANSPORTATION FINANCE
MANAGEMENT, INC. dba FINANCIAL CARRIER SERVICES; CORPORATE DOE;
DEFENDANT A-Z; and DOE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDNAT A-Z, Defendants, Case
No. 3:21-cv-00720-HTW-LGI (S.D. Miss., Nov. 15, 2021) alleges that
the Defendants engaged in improper business practices.

In August of 2021, the Plaintiff begin the process of obtaining
financing for his business and for the first time learned that
Financial Carrier Services had filed a UCC-3 listing the Plaintiff
as a debtor and had taken a security interest against it. The
Plaintiff inquired with the Defendants to identify its right to
such lien, and it claimed that the Plaintiff was obligated by the
Factoring Agreement.

According to the complaint, the UCC-3 filed by the Defendants
against the Plaintiffs were filed without any right or notice to do
so. The Plaintiffs due to the actions of the Defendants has been
unable to operate as a motor carrier with full financing behind it
because it was unable to timely obtain the financing from other
sources that will allow the full unfettered operation of its
business.

The Plaintiffs purchased in August 2021 two trucks and trailers
that were unable to operate because of the actions of the
Defendants. The Plaintiffs have lost and continues to lose revenue,
profits, lost marketing capacity, loss of opportunities, loss of
customers and suffered other damages at the hands of Defendants and
its coercive and unlawful practices, the suit says.

FINANCIAL CARRIER SERVICES, INC. is a full-service transportation
factoring and financing company. The company specializes in low
rates, no games, and no hidden fees. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          G. Clark Monroe II, Esq.
          Christopher G. Dunnells, Esq.
          Lauren T. Carpenter, Esq.
          DUNBARMONROE, PLLC
          270 Trace Colony Park Drive
          Ridgeland, MS 39157
          Telephone: (601) 898-2073
          Facsimile: (601) 898-2074
          Email: gcmonroe@dunbarmonroe.com
                 cdunnells@dunbarmonroe.com
                 lcarpenter@dunbarmonroe.com

FIRSTENERGY CORP: Seeks Reconsideration of Class Cert. Order
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the three class action lawsuits against FirstEnergy Corp., et
al., the Defendants FirstEnergy Corp., FirstEnergy Service Co.,
Steven E. Strah, and K. Jon Taylor move the Court to reconsider and
withdraw or vacate its order granting Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

While the Court described the latter motion as "unopposed," the
Defendants' deadline to respond to the motion under the governing
Scheduling Order has yet to pass and, accordingly, the motion was
not ripe for decision.

The FirstEnergy Defendants intend, and have the right, to respond
to the class certification motion by the deadline outlined in the
Scheduling Order, and to have the Court consider that response.

The FirstEnergy Defendants therefore file this motion to correct a
clear error and prevent the manifest injustice that would result
from granting Plaintiffs' unripe motion for class certification.

As previously reported in the class action reporter, the Hon. Judge
Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. entered an order granting Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification in three class action lawsuits against
FirstEnergy Corp., et al.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a Class defined as:

   "All persons and entities resident in the state of Ohio who
    have and/or will have to pay a monthly surcharge for
    electric service pursuant to House Bill 6."

    HB 6 was scheduled to impose the nuclear bailout fee on all
    ratepayers throughout the State of Ohio. In addition,
    customers of FirstEnergy's Electric Distribution Utilities
    (“EDUs”) continue to pay a legacy bailout fee for two old
    coal-powered plants and, until recently, paid tens of
    millions of dollars of rate stabilization charges, also
    known as “decoupling.” While collection of these fees has
    been suspended, FirstEnergy allegedly collected fees before
    such corrective legislation.

The Plaintiffs contend that they have met their burden under Rule
23(a) and move for class certification under Rules 23(b)(1)(A),
23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3). The Court agrees.

The class action lawsuits are captioned as:

   "JACOB SMITH v. FIRSTENERGY CORP. AND FIRSTENERGY SERVICE
   CO., Case No. 2:20-cv-3755 (S.D. Ohio);"

   "BRIAN HUDOCK AND CAMEO COUNTERTOPS, INC., v. FIRSTENERGY
   CORP., et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-3954 (S.D. Ohio);" and

   "JAMES BULDAS v. FIRSTENERGY CORP., et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-
   3987 (S.D. Ohio)."

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Nov. 12, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FjrgBu at no extra charge.[CC]

FULTON FINANCIAL: Judge Endorses Initial OK of Settlement in Kress
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fulton Financial Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that a
magistrate judge for the Court issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending that the Court grant preliminary approval of the
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Settlement
and Provisional Certification of Settlement Class and Collective in
the case captioned D. Kress v. Fulton Bank, N.A., Case No.
1:19-cv-18985.

On October 15, 2019, a former Fulton Bank teller supervisor, D.
Kress filed a putative collective and class action lawsuit on
behalf of herself and other teller supervisors, tellers, and other
similar non-exempt employees in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey, D. Kress v. Fulton Bank, N.A., Case No.
1:19-cv-18985. Fulton Bank accepted summons without a formal
service of process on January 20, 2020.

The lawsuit alleges that Fulton Bank did not record or otherwise
account for the amount of time D. Kress and putative collective and
class members spent conducting branch opening security procedures.


The allegation is that, as a result, Fulton Bank did not properly
compensate those employees for their regular and overtime wages.

The lawsuit alleges that by doing so, Fulton violated: (i) the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act and seeks back overtime wages for
a period of three years, liquidated damages and attorney fees and
costs; (ii) the New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law and seeks back
overtime wages for a period of six years, treble damages and
attorney fees and costs; and (iii) the New Jersey Wage Payment Law
and seeks back wages for a period of six years, treble damages and
attorney fees and costs.

The lawsuit also asserts New Jersey common law claims seeking
compensatory damages and interest.

The Corporation and counsel representing plaintiffs have reached
and executed a formal Settlement Agreement to resolve this lawsuit.


Plaintiffs' Counsel has filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class and Collective Settlement and Provisional Certification of
Settlement Class and Collective with the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey.

In September 2021, a magistrate judge for the Court issued a Report
and Recommendation recommending that the Court grant preliminary
approval of the Motion.

The Corporation is not able to provide any assurance that the Court
will grant the Motion.

If the Court does grant the Motion, the Settlement Agreement will
be administered according to its terms and thereafter subject to
final approval by the Court.

"The financial terms of the Settlement Agreement are not expected
to be material to the Corporation," the Company said.

The Corporation established an accrued liability during the third
quarter of 2020 for the costs expected to be incurred in connection
with the Settlement Agreement.

Fulton Financial Corporation is a multi-bank holding company. The
Banks offer a full range of general retail and commercial banking
services, including deposits, loans, equipment leasing and
financing, and credit cards. Fulton operates in Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey. The company is based in
Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

GENESIS HEALTHCARE: Valdez Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Workers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JUANA OLIVOS VALDEZ, an
individual; DANILLIE WILLIE, and individual; and PATRICIA THEUS, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, and as aggrieved employees under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004, v. GENESIS HEALTHCARE LLC, a
Delaware Corporation; GENESIS HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware
corporation; GENESIS ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; ALEXANDRIA CARE CENTER, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; THE REHABILITATION CENTRE OF BEVERLY
HILLS, a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Case No. 2:19-CV-00976-DMG-JC (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order certifying the following class pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, subdivisions (a) and
(b)(3):

   "all persons who worked for defendants Genesis Healthcare
   LLC, Genesis Healthcare, Inc., Genesis Administrative
   Services, LLC and/or Alexandria Care Center, LLC as non-
   exempt employees at Defendants' healthcare facilities in
   California at any time from September 20, 2014, through the
   date of the order granting class certification.

   In the alternative, the Plaintiff seeks to certify the
   following subclasses:

   -- Meal Break Class

      "all persons who worked for Defendants as non-exempt
      employees at Defendants' healthcare facilities in
      California at any time from September 20, 2014, through
      the date of the order granting class certification, who
      worked one or more shifts over five hours;"

   -- Rest Break Class

      "all persons who worked for Defendants as non-exempt
      employees at Defendants' healthcare facilities in
      California at any time from September 20, 2014, through
      the date of the order granting class certification, who
      worked one or more shifts over 3.5 hours;" and

   -- Off-the-Clock Class

      "all persons who worked for Defendants as non-exempt
      employees at Defendants' healthcare facilities in
      California at any time from September 20, 2014, through
      the date of the order granting class certification, who
      worked "off the clock" and were not paid for all such
      hours worked."

The Plaintiff also moves the Court for an order:

   (1) certifying the derivative claims for failure to pay all
       wages upon separation, failure to furnish accurate
       itemized wage statements and unfair business practices;

   (2) appointing her as class representative; and

   (3) appointing Matthew J. Matern, Launa Adolph, Kayvon
       Sabourian and Shooka Dadashzadeh of Matern Law Group, PC,
       and Ronald H. Bae and Olivia D. Scharrer of Aequitas
       Legal Group as class counsel.

Genesis Healthcare provides health care services.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Nov. 12,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oAeV5i
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Launa Adolph, Esq.
          Kayvon Sabourian, Esq.
          Shooka Dadashzadeh, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531-1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
          E-mail: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
                  ladolph@maternlawgroup.com
                  ksabourian@maternlawgroup.com
                  shooka@maternlawgroup.com

GERBER PRODUCTS: Court Narrows Claims in Gavilanes Consumer Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the lawsuit captioned ROSSY GAVILANES, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GERBER
PRODUCTS COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-05558 (E.D.N.Y.).

Defendant Gerber moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint of
Plaintiff Gavilanes for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

I.

Plaintiff Gavilanes is a Queens resident, who purchased Gerber's
Good Start Grow Toddler Drink from Amazon, because she wanted a
food which was nutritionally adequate for a toddler in her care.
Defendant Gerber manufactures, markets, and sells Gerber Good Start
Grow (the "Product"), a milk-based powder supplemented with iron.

The Plaintiff alleges as follows: The American Academy of
Pediatrics (AAP) recommends "exclusive breastfeeding for the first
6 months of life with the addition of complementary foods and the
continuation of breastfeeding until at least 12 months of age."
While breastfeeding is recommended, infant formula with added iron
is an accepted alternative when breastfeeding is not an option.
Pediatric health organizations, including committees from the AAP
and the World Health Organization ("WHO"), have advised that after
12 months, "children's nutritional needs should be met with whole
cow's milk, water and healthy foods as part of a balanced diet."
Experts "universally oppose consumption of added sugars by children
between 12 and 24 months." "Follow-up" or "transition" formulas are
not recommended.

The Product is such a "transition formula"--a milk-based formula
with added iron, marketed for children aged 12 to 24 months. The
Product is marketed similarly to another Gerber product, Good Start
GentlePro Infant Formula, through "common labeling formats, images,
design, type, size, fonts, call-outs and graphics." The label
information is also nearly identical.

The Plaintiff contends that these similar labels trick caregivers
into purchasing food that is not nutritionally sound and that is in
contravention of global recommendations. The labeling implies both
that the Product is the "next step" in the Good Start nutritional
program, and that the Product is specifically designed for
toddlers' nutritional needs, though that is not the case. The
Product does not indicate that foods with added sugars are
inconsistent and contrary to their nutritional needs.

The Product's label also pictures a seal that certifies it is not
made with genetically engineered ingredients, which intentionally
mimics the seal of the independent organization, the Non-GMO
Project. The Non-GMO Project's Product Verification Program is
widely recognized and verifies products as not being derived from
GMO crops or from animals fed GMO crops. The Product, however, has
not been verified by the Non-GMO Project--and could not be--because
its dairy ingredients are derived from cows fed GMO grains.
Therefore, the Product's Non-GMO label misleads the consumer about
the origins of the ingredients, the Plaintiff alleges.

The Plaintiff asserts claims for the violation of the New York
State General Business Law Sections and 350, breach of express
warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and
violation of Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, as well as negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and unjust enrichment.

II.

Senior District Judge Frederic Block notes that a case is properly
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate it, citing Makarova v. United
States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). To survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).

Where, like here, a party moves for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6), "the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)
challenge first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and
objections become moot," Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990).

III.

The Defendant seeks a stay or dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims
pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The Defendant argues
that the Plaintiff has conceded this argument by failing to address
it in their opposition. However, though the court may deem a
defense waived in such a situation, Jennings v. Hunt Companies,
Inc., 367 F.Supp.3d 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), the Court declines to
do so here, because the primary jurisdiction doctrine is not
appropriately invoked.

Technical or Policy Considerations Within the Agency's Expertise

Judge Block holds that this factor weighs against invoking primary
jurisdiction. Courts have routinely held that cases involving the
mislabeling of food products are far less about science than they
are about whether a label is misleading, and the
reasonable-consumer inquiry upon which some of the claims in these
cases depend is one to which courts are eminently well suited, even
well versed to handle.

Judge Block finds that this is such a case.

Question Within the Agency's Discretion

This factor weighs in favor of invoking primary jurisdiction, Judge
Block holds. Undoubtedly, the FDA has discretion in this area. Its
mission includes ensuring that foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary,
and properly labeled. In addition, infant formulas--though not
transition formulas--have their own set of regulatory requirements.
However, that regulations already exist weighs against invoking
primary jurisdiction.

Existence of a Substantial Danger of Inconsistent Rulings

This factor weighs against invoking primary jurisdiction, Judge
Block finds.

Judge Block opines that there is not substantial danger of
inconsistent rulings. First, this matter is not before the FDA.
Second, there is no concern about conflict within the same matter
because any existing petitions to the FDA ask to consider whether
to publish a generally applicable rule rather than adjudicate a
specific issue between the parties.

Prior Application to the Agency

This factor weighs against invoking primary jurisdiction, Judge
Block holds, citing Canale v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 258 F.Supp.3d
312, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

The Defendant repeatedly states that an application is pending
before the FDA that necessitates stay or dismissal, but neither
party has filed an application or petition. Rather, the application
to which the Defendant refers is a submission by the Public Health
Advocacy Institute ("PHAI") asking the FDA to enforce existing
regulations against transition formulas and to amend its regulation
to expressly prohibit certain labeling on transition formulas.
However, the FDA has made no promise or indication that it will
take any action. Indeed, its January 25, 2021 response indicates
that the submission has not yet been reviewed. Further, if the FDA
were to adopt petitioner's suggestions, it would, as in
Colgate-Palmolive Co., promulgate a generally applicable rule and
not adjudicate a specific issue between the parties.

For these reasons, as in similar cases, the Court declines to apply
the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

IV.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's request for injunctive
relief should be denied for lack of standing, as the Plaintiff has
not sufficiently pled a "real or immediate threat" of future
injury. The Plaintiff alleges an injury because she is unable to
rely on the Product's label in the future, which causes her to
avoid purchasing the Product even though she would like to.

Here, the Court agrees with the Defendant. Therefore, the Court
must deny the Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.

V.

The Defendant moves to dismiss all of the Plaintiff's claims,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court grants the Defendant's motion
as to the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act violation, and denies the
motion as to the rest.

The Plaintiff's Magnuson Moss claim must be dismissed, but not for
reasons offered by the Defendant, Judge Block says. The Defendant
argues that because the Plaintiff's state warranty claims fail, so
must her federal. However, the Plaintiff has not failed to
establish a state claim for breach of warranty.

Rather, the claim must fail because a claim is not cognizable if
the amount in controversy of any individual claim is less than the
sum or value of $25 or if the action is brought as a class action,
and the number of named plaintiffs is less than one hundred, Judge
Block opines. And, though a class action may be appropriate, the
Complaint does not name 100 plaintiffs.

Conclusion

For these reasons, Gerber's motion is denied in part, and granted
in part.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Nov. 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4acsnza4 from
Leagle.com.

BRYAN A. MERRYMAN -- bmerryman@whitecase.com -- DEEMA ABINI --
deema.abini@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, SEQUOIA KAUL --
sequoia.kaul@whitecase.com -- PAULA KATES --
paula.kates@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, in New York City,
for the Plaintiff.

SPENCER SHEEHAN -- spencer@spencersheehan.com -- Sheehan &
Associates, P.C., in Great Neck, New York; in Los Angeles,
California, for the Defendant.


GOLDMAN SACHS: 8-Month Tolling Period in Chen-Oster Suit Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, H. CRISTINA CHEN-OSTER, SHANNA ORLICH, ALLISON GAMBA,
and MARY DE LUIS, Plaintiffs v. GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO. and THE
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., Defendants, Case No. 10-cv-6950 (AT)
(RWL) (S.D.N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for an order tolling
the statute of limitations with respect to equitable tolling.

Introduction

Following the Court's decision compelling or conditionally
compelling approximately 1,840 class members to individually
arbitrate their employment discrimination claims against the
Defendants ("Goldman"), the Plaintiffs have moved for an order
tolling the statute of limitations. Specifically, the Plaintiffs
request that the limitations period for the class members compelled
to arbitrate be tolled until 90 days following a class liability
determination, or, alternatively, for a period of eight months.

The primary reason given for the request is that the class members
who are compelled to arbitrate may not even know that they have
been subject to such a ruling and, in any event, they need time to
obtain legal advice and determine whether and how to proceed with
arbitration on an individual basis. Goldman opposes the request,
arguing that the Court does not have authority to grant tolling for
now-excluded members, and that, in any event, the Plaintiffs have
not established the diligence and extraordinary circumstances
required to invoke equitable tolling.

Background

The Plaintiffs filed the employment discrimination action on Sept.
16, 2010. On March 30, 2018, the Court certified a class of present
and former Goldman Sachs Associates and Vice-Presidents. Notice was
sent to the putative class members on Nov. 30, 2018. After
expiration of the opt-out period, the class included approximately
3,320 members. Trial, although not yet scheduled, will occur in two
phases; the first phase -- Phase I -- will focus on certain
liability issues common to the class.

On April 12, 2019, Goldman filed a motion to compel individual
arbitration with class members who had executed any of four
categories of agreements containing arbitration clauses. On March
26, 2020, the Court issued a decision and order ("Arbitration
Decision") that (1) granted the motion with respect to
approximately 1,150 class members who were parties to three
categories of agreements ("Fully Excluded Members"), and (2)
conditionally granted the motion with respect to approximately 690
class members who were parties to a category of agreements known as
Equity Award Agreements ("Conditionally Excluded Members"). The
Arbitration Decision provided the Conditionally Excluded Members
with a 45-day period -- which will not begin until they are
notified of the Arbitration Decision -- during which they may opt
out of arbitration and remain in this class action.

Both parties filed objections to the Arbitration Decision. On Sept.
15, 2021, District Judge Torres overruled the objections and
adopted the Arbitration Decision in full On Oct. 1, 2021, the
Plaintiffs requested tolling of the Excluded Members' claims.

On Oct. 18, 2021, the Court ruled on the form and notice that will
be sent to the Conditionally Excluded Members to apprise them of
the Arbitration Decision and their opportunity to opt out of
arbitration and remain in the action. The Court stayed issuance of
that notice, however, until after the decision on the instant
tolling question.

The parties have submitted extensive correspondence addressing the
Plaintiffs' tolling request. Judge Lehrburger finds no need for
additional briefing, and the parties have not requested any.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs' request, together with Goldman's opposition, give
rise to three distinct issues: (1) whether the tolling issue may be
decided by the Magistrate Judge or instead by the District Judge;
(2) regardless of the particular judge, whether the Court has
authority to rule on the tolling issue with respect to class
members who have been compelled to arbitrate or instead must leave
that issue to be resolved in arbitration; and (3) in the event the
Court has authority to rule on the issue, whether the requirements
for equitable tolling are met.

A. The Magistrate Judge May Rule On The Tolling Issue

The Plaintiffs argue that their tolling application should be
decided by the District Judge, Judge Torres. Goldman argues that
the Magistrate Judge, Judge Lehrburger, may decide the
application.

Judge Lehrburger explains that rhe scope of a federal magistrate
judge's authority is defined by statute. Where, as in the case, a
matter has been referred by the district judge to the magistrate
judge for general pre-trial purposes, the magistrate judge may
decide non-dispositive issues but must issue reports and
recommendations for dispositive issues absent consent of the
parties. Like motions to amend, a motion for equitable tolling
falls into the more ambiguous category. A decision that equitable
tolling does not apply can be dispositive.

Judge Lehrburger holds that whether the issue is dispositive or
not, the parties can seek review of the Magistrate Judge's decision
by the District Judge. The only difference will be the standard of
review applied, clear error or de novo review. In any event, the
Magistrate Judge may rule on the instant tolling issue.

B. The Court Has Authority to Issue a Tolling Decision

Apart from the question of the scope of magistrate judge authority,
the parties disagree about whether the federal district court has
authority at all to decide the tolling issue. Goldman contends that
the Excluded Members who have been compelled to arbitrate are no
longer members of the class, and therefore the Court may not render
a ruling as to whether the statute of limitations for those
now-excluded members should be equitably tolled. Rather, Goldman
says, that question is reserved for arbitration to the extent any
Excluded Member in fact proceeds with arbitration.

Judge Lehrburger does not agree. First, he says, the Conditionally
Excluded Members currently remain in the class and have not yet
been compelled to arbitrate. Accordingly, the Court has the
authority to decide the tolling issue with respect to them. Second,
the Court also has the requisite authority to toll the statute of
limitations for Fully Excluded Members. While there are significant
differences in class actions pursuant to Rule 23 and collective
actions pursuant to the FLSA, the underlying concern when tolling
is invoked is the same: To avoid prejudice to members of the class
or collective.

Having determined that the Court possesses the requisite authority
to equitably toll the statute of limitations with respect to
Excluded Members, the question becomes whether the requirements for
equitable tolling are satisfied. Judge Lehrburger says, the answer
to that is yes.

C. The Elements of Equitable Tolling Are Met

The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to toll a statute
of limitations when a claimant can demonstrate that they have
pursued their rights diligently and that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in the way of timely asserting their rights.
Whether equitable tolling applies is determined "on a case-by-case
basis to prevent inequity." While equitable tolling applies "only
in rare and exceptional circumstances, it is sometimes necessary as
a matter of fairness."

The two requirements for equitable tolling are met, Judge
Lehrburger holds. First, he says, the Plaintiffs acted with
reasonable diligence. Moreover, the Excluded Members can hardly be
faulted for acting without diligence when they have not yet been
notified of their exclusion from the class and their need to pursue
arbitration if they wish to preserve their claims. Judge Lehrburger
also concludes that extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant
application of equitable tolling. None of Goldman's arguments
against invoking equitable tolling stand up to scrutiny.

All that said, Judge Lehrburger does not agree that it would be
appropriate to toll the statute until 90 days after resolution of
Phase 1 of the class litigation as the Plaintiffs request. That is
too indefinite, and it remains to be seen whether there will even
be a Phase 1 trial given currently pending motions by Goldman for
summary judgment and to decertify the class. A fixed tolling period
best serves the purposes of protecting newly Excluded Members while
comporting with their obligation to act to preserve their claims.
As alternative relief, the Plaintiffs ask for an 8-month tolling
period. Judge Lehrburger endorses that request.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Lehrburger granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion with respect to equitable
tolling. The statute of limitations for the Excluded Members to
file their claims in arbitration is tolled for a period of 240 days
following entry of the Order. Notwithstanding that tolling period,
the Conditionally Excluded Members must still exercise their option
to opt out of arbitration to remain in the class within the 45-day
period prescribed by the notice that will be sent to them.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/9km3522k from Leagle.com.


GOLDMAN SACHS: Sjunde-AP-Fonden Seeks to Certify Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SJUNDE AP-FONDEN,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. THE
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-12084-VSB
(S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying this action as a class action pursuant to
      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3), on
      behalf of the following class:

      "All persons and entities that purchased or otherwise
      acquired The Goldman Sachs Group Inc.'s common stock
      during the period from October 29, 2014 through December
      14, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period") and were damaged
      thereby. Excluded from the Class are: (I) Defendants; (ii)
      Goldman's subsidiaries and affiliates; (iii) any officer,
      director, or controlling person of Goldman, and members of
      the immediate families of such persons; (iv) any entity in
      which any Defendant has a controlling interest; (v)
      Defendants' directors' and officers' liability insurance
      carriers, and any affiliates or subsidiaries thereof; and
      (vi) the legal representatives, heirs, successors, and
      assigns of any excluded party;"

   2. appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative for the
      proposed Class; and

   3. appointing Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, as Class
      Counsel for the Class and Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
      Grossmann LLP as Liaison Counsel for the Class.

Sjunde AP-Fonden operates as a pension fund.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. is an American multinational
investment bank and financial services company headquartered in New
York City. It offers services in investment management, securities,
asset management, and prime brokerage.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Nov. 12,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ckmWWw
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew L. Zivitz, Esq.
          Matthew L. Mustokoff, Esq.
          Johnston de F. Whitman, Jr., Esq.
          Eric K. Gerard, Esq.
          Jamie M. McCall, Esq.
          Margaret E. Mazzeo, Esq.
          Nathan A. Hasiuk, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ
          MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: azivitz@ktmc.com
                  mmustokoff@ktmc.com
                  jwhitman@ktmc.com
                  egerard@ktmc.com
                  jmccall@ktmc.com
                  mmazzeo@ktmc.com
                  nhasiuk@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Salvatore J. Graziano, Esq.
          James M. Fee, Esq.
          Rebecca E. Boon, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ
          BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
          1251 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 554-1400
          Facsimile: (212) 554-1444
          E-mail: sgraziano@blbglaw.com
                  james.fee@blbglaw.com
                  rebecca.boon@blbglaw.com

GOOGLE LLC: Gowling WLG Attorneys Discuss UK Supreme Court Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Davenport, Esq., and Louise Macdonald, Esq., of Gowling WLG,
in an article for Mondaq, report that the greatly-anticipated
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lloyd v Google LLC has
been handed down today, bringing an end to a class action against
Google worth around GBP3 billion.

The decision is a milestone in the development of UK data
protection litigation. It confirms that the Data Protection Act
1998 (predecessor to the UK GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018) does
not allow damages to be awarded for "loss of control" of personal
data where there is no material damage (i.e. financial loss) or
mental distress arising from the unlawful processing of data
itself. An anticipated "floodgates" situation, where data
controllers could have faced US style opt-out class actions for
breaches of data protection law without proof of loss, is for now
kept at bay, bringing relief to organisations in a wide range of
sectors.

The viability of representative actions under Civil Procedure Rule
19.6 (CPR 19.6), likened to US style "opt out" class action
litigation, was examined and broadened by the Supreme Court. The
judges' consideration of CPR 19.6 shines a positive light on that
mechanism for group litigation in the future, provided the
represented parties meet the "same interest" requirement under the
rule and that damages can be calculated on a basis common to all
persons represented.

Background
This was an action brought against Google LLC by Mr Richard Lloyd,
former director of Which?, who acted as a representative under
court rule CPR 19.6 for more than 4 million affected Apple iPhone
user individuals in England and Wales.

Mr Lloyd's claim arose from Google's use of a work-around to bypass
the cookie settings on the Safari browser and place tracking
cookies for commercial purposes without the individual's knowledge
or consent in a period of time from August 2011 to February 2012.
The tracking enabled advertisers to target adverts at users based
on their browsing history. The claim was for damage allegedly
suffered by the group of Apple iPhone users as a result of unlawful
processing by Google of their personal data in breach of the
requirements of the Data Protection Act.

Mr Lloyd sought to rely on a procedure contained in CPR 19.6 which
allows a claim to be brought by (or against) one or more persons as
representatives of others who have the "same interest" in the
claim. Mr Lloyd argued that the "same interest" requirement was
satisfied and that this representative procedure can be used to
recover a uniform sum of damages for each person whose data
protection rights have been infringed, without having to
investigate their individual circumstances. A sum of GBP750 per
person was suggested, which, multiplied by the number of people
grouped into the representative class, would produce an award of
damages in the region of GBP3 million.

As Google is incorporated in Delaware, Mr Lloyd needed the court's
permission to serve the claim form on Google outside the
jurisdiction.

The Data Protection Act 1998 has since been replaced by the UK
General Data Protection Regulation supplemented by the Data
Protection Act 1998, but it was in force at the time of the alleged
breaches and applies to this claim.

First instance and Court of Appeal decisions
In the high court, Warby J was not persuaded that Mr Lloyd's claim
was viable and refused permission to serve the proceedings on
Google. He decided in favour of Google that (1) damages cannot be
awarded under the DPA 1998 without proof that a breach of the
requirements of the Act caused an individual to suffer financial
damage or distress; and (2) the claim in any event was not suitable
to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6.

The Court of Appeal reversed Warby J's decision and granted Mr
Lloyd permission to serve out of the jurisdiction. Google then
appealed to the Supreme Court resulting in today's judgment which
restores Warby J's first instance decision.

The implications of the Supreme Court judgment
This decision makes clear that compensation cannot be recovered for
alleged loss of control of personal data without in fact proving
there has been some financial damage or distress caused. This
brings relief for many organisations, in particular those where
data is at the heart of operations. The Court of Appeal judgment in
April had precipitated the filing of some representative group
action claims, the risk posed by which is now significantly
reduced. Not all class actions filed are doomed, but this decision
has clearly undermined the representative class action mechanism in
a data protection context.

The judgment is also expected to impact on the appetite of claimant
law firms to litigate other data privacy group actions in light of
the new necessity to prove financial loss or distress, and with the
potential fallback option of "loss of control" damages now not
available. At the very least, the decision will impel claimant law
firms to consider how they might conduct such litigation cost
effectively.

The court has broadened the "same interest" test required in the
representative action mechanism under CPR 19.6 which will likely
attract claimants and litigation funders to examine approaches
which may succeed for calculating compensatory damages on a basis
common to all class members. [GN]

GOOGLE LLC: Ruling Shows Lack of Legislation on Mass Claims Redress
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Tobin, writing for The Law Society Gazette, reports that more
than four million people may have lost the prospect of receiving
GBP750 each after the Supreme Court blocked a multi-billion-pound
claim against Google for alleged data protection breaches. But the
landmark ruling in Lloyd v Google, dismissing a proposed GBP3bn
claim on behalf of iPhone users, has wider ramifications for mass
representative claims (currently) beloved by litigation funders.

Of course 'class actions' do not exist as such in England and
Wales: mass claims can be brought via a group litigation order,
collective proceedings (but only in competition law) or, as in
Lloyd, a representative action.

The rationale for preventing US-style class actions is
understandable. The procedure is said, for example, to encourage
lawyers to tout for potential claimants. The idea that claimants
could be party to litigation without even knowing of its existence,
as in the 'opt-out' procedure, and still be bound by orders of the
court is equally unsettling.

However, the Supreme Court's ruling, described by one lawyer as 'a
missed opportunity to send a powerful message to the big tech
companies', was not founded on the premise of whether 'class
actions' were a good or a bad thing.

Lloyd was not even about whether class actions had a place in the
civil justice system of England and Wales. As Lord Leggatt pointed
out, in 2009 the government rejected the Civil Justice Council's
recommendation to introduce a generic class action regime and
favoured a 'sector-based approach'. The only sector, so far, to
have such a regime is competition law.

The crux of Lloyd was rather whether section 13 of the Data
Protection Act 1998 -- the statute in force at the time of the
alleged breach -- allowed for compensation to be awarded for the
'loss of control' of personal data, without the need to prove a
claimant suffered any material damage or distress.

Leggatt was clear: 'An individual is only entitled to compensation
under section 13 where "damage" -- or in some circumstances
"distress" -- is suffered.'

But, as ever with rulings from the UK's highest court, the devil is
in the detail, and it is not all bad news for potential claimants.
The representative claim procedure, provided by CPR 19.6, has
effectively been endorsed.

It is not a bar to a representative claim, the court held, 'that
each represented person has in law a separate cause of action nor
that the relief claimed consists of or includes damages or some
other monetary relief'.

Richard Lloyd himself is entitled to bring a claim against Google
'which has a real prospect of success', Leggatt said. Whether it
makes sense for him to pursue a tech giant with a
multi-billion-pound turnover for less than GBP1,000 was another
matter – and that, in a broader context, is now a matter for
parliament.

Parliament introduced collective proceedings for breaches of
competition law in 2015. Lloyd's solicitor, James Oldnall, managing
partner at claimant firm Milberg, told the Gazette the recent
success of the regime was 'exciting', but it has been slow going.

Only three collective proceedings orders have been granted, two of
them in the past three months. The third, a mammoth GBP14bn claim
against Mastercard, was granted only after it went to the Supreme
Court and back over the course of nearly five years. Even where
parliament has legislated for something approaching class actions,
redress is still not easy to come by.

The impact of the Supreme Court's ruling in the short term is
probably that similar mass data protection claims are unlikely to
be pursued, certainly not with the backing of litigation funders --
whom Google's lawyers said will not now have 'any appetite' to
bring such claims. Similar actions against TikTok and Facebook,
apparently encouraged by the Court of Appeal's more permissive
approach in Lloyd, may well struggle to get backing.

The door has not been completely shut -- it has been 'left ajar for
innovative use' of CPR 19.6, according to former Law Society
president David Greene. But how such a claim proceeds is unclear,
given Lloyd's 'unusual and innovative use' of it has been
comprehensively rejected.

Leggatt said Lloyd illustrates how 'the development of digital
technologies has added to the potential for mass harm for which
legal redress may be sought'. A 'detailed legislative framework' to
provide redress in these circumstances would be 'preferable', he
added. Perhaps it is time for the 'sector-based approach' to move
beyond a single sector. [GN]

GOOGLE LLC: UK Supreme Court Overturns Court of Appeal's Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
On November 10, 2021, the UK Supreme Court issued a unanimous
Judgment in Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, overturning a ruling
of the Court of Appeal and disallowing a data privacy class action.
The Judgment denied Mr. Lloyd the ability to pursue a collective
claim for compensation on behalf of around four million iPhone
users in England and Wales whose internet activity data were
allegedly collected by Google in late 2011 and early 2012 for
commercial purposes without the users' knowledge or consent, and in
alleged breach of section 4(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998
("the 1998 Act"). The 1998 Act has since been replaced by the UK
GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 ("the 2018 Act"). The claim
was backed by substantial litigation funding.

The Supreme Court's Judgment provides, in brief, that the
procedural mechanism used to bring the claims on a collective basis
(known as a "representative action") can be used for claims of this
kind, but only for the purposes of establishing liability for a
breach of relevant data protection laws. The question of damages
cannot be addressed through a representative action, and would have
to be dealt with through individual claims, which could be managed
together through group litigation case management devices (see
below).

The Court held that a representative action is unsuitable for
damages assessment in a case of this kind because:

-- first, damages for mere loss of control of data (as distinct
from damages for actual loss or distress caused by the data breach)
are not available for breaches of the 1998 Act (although the
Supreme Court intimated that they may have been for another tort,
misuse of private information); and
-- second, even if such damages had been available, assessment of
loss can only be determined on the basis of an individualised
assessment of the alleged misuse of each individual's data by
Google.

In this alert we provide an overview of the Supreme Court's
decision and offer our observations on the implications of the
Judgment.

Background to Collective Actions in the UK

There are a number of ways in which collective actions can be
brought in the UK. Typically, such claims are brought on an
"opt-in" basis. For example under the Data Protection Act 2018,
individuals can authorise non-profit organisations to bring certain
proceedings on their behalf, or under a group litigation order
("GLO"), courts can manage in a co-ordinated way claims which give
rise to "common or related issues" of fact or law (Civil Procedure
Rules ("CPR") Parts 19.10 and 19.11).

However, there are two procedures that can be used in England and
Wales to bring collective claims on an "opt-out" basis:

-- A collective redress regime for competition claims, which was
introduced on 1 October 2015 under the Consumer Rights Act 2015,
and which provides for opt-out claims to be brought in appropriate
circumstances for damages for certain breaches of competition laws
(see our alert on the Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Merricks v
Mastercard for more information on these types of claims). Opt-in
claims can also be brought under the Consumer Rights Act 2015
regime; and
-- The "representative action" procedure, under which Lloyd v
Google was brought, in which a party brings the claim as a
"representative" of a group of litigants who have the "same
interest" in the claim (under CPR 19.6). The "same interest"
requirement has to date been interpreted strictly by the courts as
requiring the claimants to have a common interest and grievance
(which generally precludes claims relying on different fact
patterns) and to all benefit from the remedy sought (which
generally precludes claims for different remedies).

Summary of the Lloyd Action and Judgment

Background

The alleged conduct by Google had given rise to a number of
individual claims in the U.S. and the UK which had settled, and had
been the subject of a civil settlement between Google and the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission. In May 2017, the claimant, Richard Lloyd,
a consumer rights activist, commenced proceedings alleging that
Google breached the 1998 Act, seeking damages on behalf of himself
and other affected individuals under section 13(1) of the 1998 Act.
That section provides: "An individual who suffers damage by reason
of any contravention by a data controller of any of the
requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data
controller for that damage." He did not allege or prove any
distinctive facts affecting any of the individuals, save that they
did not consent to the abstraction of their data.

Mr. Lloyd applied for permission to serve the claim on Google
outside England & Wales, namely, in the U.S. As with any such
application, in order to succeed, Mr Lloyd had to establish that
his claim has a reasonable prospect of success (CPR Part
6.37(1)(b)), that there is a good arguable case that the claim fell
within one of the so-called jurisdictional "gateways" in paragraph
3.1 of CPR Practice Direction 6B (in this case, he sought to show
that damage was sustained either within the jurisdiction or from an
act committed within the jurisdiction), and that England and Wales
was clearly or distinctly the most appropriate jurisdiction in
which to try the claim (CPR Part 6.37(3)).

Google opposed the application on the grounds that: (i) the pleaded
facts did not disclose any basis for claiming compensation under
the 1998 Act; and (ii) the court should not permit the claim to
continue as a representative action.

At first instance, Warby J refused to grant Mr. Lloyd permission to
serve Google outside the jurisdiction on the basis that: (a) none
of the represented class had suffered "damage" under section 13 of
the 1998 Act; (b) the members of the class did not have the "same
interest" within CPR 19.6(1) so as to justify allowing the claim to
proceed as a representative action; and (c) the court's discretion
under CPR Part 19.6(2) should be exercised against allowing the
claim to proceed.

The Court of Appeal reversed Warby J's judgment on each of these
issues, holding that: (a) the members of the class were entitled to
recover damages pursuant to section 13 of the 1998 Act, based on
the loss of control of their personal data alone, regardless of
whether they had suffered actual pecuniary loss or distress as a
result of Google's alleged breaches; (b) the members of the class
did, in fact, have the "same interest" for the purposes of CPR
19.6(1) and Warby J had defined the concept of "damage" too
narrowly; and (c) the Court should exercise its discretion to
permit Mr Lloyd to bring the claim on a representative basis.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

The claimant was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The
three issues for determination by the Supreme Court were:

Are damages recoverable for loss of control of data under section
13 of 1998 Act, even if there is no pecuniary loss or distress?
Do the four million individuals allegedly affected by Google's
conduct share the "same interest"?
If the "same interest" test is satisfied, should the Court exercise
its discretion and disallow the representative action in any
event?
The Supreme Court's Judgment

The Supreme Court's unanimous Judgment, delivered by Lord Leggatt,
reverses the Court of Appeal and re-instates the order of Warby J
denying permission to serve out, essentially bringing the
proceedings to an end. The key issues emerging from the Judgment
are as follows:

The representative action is a long-standing "flexible tool of
convenience in the administration of justice", which might be used
today in appropriate cases to bring mass tort claims arising in
connection with alleged misuse of digital technologies,
particularly in matters involving mass, low-value consumer claims.

There are limitations on the appropriateness of the use of
representative actions to bring damages claims. Damages, as a
remedy, by its very nature under English law, will typically
require individualised assessment of loss, which requires
participation of the affected parties.

In the case at hand, the question of liability (i.e., whether
Google had breached the 1998 Act) was suitable to be brought
through a representative action. The purpose of such a claim may be
to obtain declaratory relief, which could include a declaration
that affected persons may be entitled to compensation for the
breaches identified. However, damages would need to be assessed on
an individualised basis. The Supreme Court noted that the claimant,
Mr. Lloyd, had not proposed such a two-stage approach, presumably
because that declaratory relief would not itself have generated an
award of damages that would provide his litigation funders with a
return on their investment.

Section 13 of the 1998 Act does not, on its own wording, allow for
damages claims on the "loss of control of data" basis pleaded by
Mr. Lloyd. The Supreme Court appears to have acknowledged that
"loss of control" damages may be available for the tort of misuse
of private information, but held that section 13 could not be
interpreted as giving an individual a right to compensation without
proof of material damage or distress. Lord Leggatt indicated that,
had a claim of this kind been brought, such damages would have been
an appropriate way to assess loss, but no case had been brought
under that tort. Even if loss of control damages were available,
there would be a need to individualised assessment of the unlawful
data processing in the case of each individual claimant; again,
this would be inconsistent with proceeding by means of a
representative action.
Analysis of the Lloyd Judgment

This Judgment appears to represent a significant victory for Google
and other major data controllers, and a blow to funding-assisted
collective actions in the data protection field in England and
Wales.

While it is notable that the Supreme Court was at pains to assert
the potential utility of the representative action in mass data
rights violations in appropriate circumstances, it is not obvious
what those circumstances are, and it seems unlikely that the
representative action will represent a fruitful mechanism for
bringing such claims going forward. At the very least, future
claimants and their funders will need to give careful thought to
the economics of bifurcated claims involving the bringing of a
representative action for a declaration of liability and
entitlement to compensation, followed by a large volume of
coordinated damages claims for which a GLO is sought.

The historic nature of the claims offers little comfort to
claimants here. The Judgment relates to the regime in place prior
to entry to the GDPR. Article 82(1) of the GDPR, which is retained
in law in the UK post-Brexit, provides: "Any person who has
suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an
infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive
compensation from the controller or processor for the damage
suffered." It is an open question whether the English courts will
consider the Supreme Court's analysis of section 13 to apply
equally to Article 82(1), but the reasoning seems to apply.

Furthermore, even in observing, at paragraph 4 of the Judgment,
that "Parliament has not legislated to establish a class action
regime in the field of data protection", the Supreme Court did not
take the obvious opportunity to encourage Parliament to do so.
Parliament will be in no doubt that, if a collective action regime
is to be developed to address consumer data rights, it will need to
legislate for it - it would now seem unlikely that such a culture
can be developed from the procedural tools currently available to
claimants.

Some claimants may find encouragement in the Judgment's indication
that the relatively new tort of misuse of private information may
be used to recover "loss of control" damages, without proof of
specific loss. The circumstances in which that tort will be
relevant to breaches of the GDPR and the 2018 Act, however, may be
limited in practice, due to the need to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy supported by evidence of facts particular to
each individual claimant.

In sum, major data controllers will be content with this outcome,
and the nascent plaintiff bar and funding industry in the UK will
likely be turning its attention to other areas of potential
multi-party actions - unless and until, of course, Parliament
intervenes. With the current challenges facing the British
government, that may be some time.

This alert was prepared by Patrick Doris, Doug Watson, Harriet
Codd, Gail Elman, Ahmed Baladi, Vera Lukic, Ryan Bergsieker, Ashlie
Beringer, Alexander Southwell, and Cassandra Gaedt-Sheckter.

Gibson Dunn lawyers are available to assist in addressing any
questions you may have about these developments. Please contact the
Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or any
member of the firm's Privacy, Cybersecurity and Data Innovation
practice group.

Privacy, Cybersecurity and Data Innovation Group:

Europe
Ahmed Baladi - Co-Chair, PCDI Practice, Paris (+33 (0)1 56 43 13
00, abaladi@gibsondunn.com)
James A. Cox - London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4250, jacox@gibsondunn.com)
Patrick Doris - London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4276,
pdoris@gibsondunn.com)
Kai Gesing - Munich (+49 89 189 33-180, kgesing@gibsondunn.com)
Bernard Grinspan - Paris (+33 (0)1 56 43 13 00,
bgrinspan@gibsondunn.com)
Penny Madden - London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4226,
pmadden@gibsondunn.com)
Michael Walther - Munich (+49 89 189 33-180,
mwalther@gibsondunn.com)
Alejandro Guerrero - Brussels (+32 2 554 7218,
aguerrero@gibsondunn.com)
Vera Lukic - Paris (+33 (0)1 56 43 13 00, vlukic@gibsondunn.com)
Sarah Wazen - London (+44 (0) 20 7071 4203, swazen@gibsondunn.com)

Asia
Kelly Austin - Hong Kong (+852 2214 3788, kaustin@gibsondunn.com)
Connell O'Neill - Hong Kong (+852 2214 3812,
coneill@gibsondunn.com)
Jai S. Pathak - Singapore (+65 6507 3683, jpathak@gibsondunn.com)

United States
Alexander H. Southwell - Co-Chair, PCDI Practice, New York (+1
212-351-3981, asouthwell@gibsondunn.com)
S. Ashlie Beringer - Co-Chair, PCDI Practice, Palo Alto (+1
650-849-5327, aberinger@gibsondunn.com)
Debra Wong Yang - Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7472,
dwongyang@gibsondunn.com)
Matthew Benjamin - New York (+1 212-351-4079,
mbenjamin@gibsondunn.com)
Ryan T. Bergsieker - Denver (+1 303-298-5774,
rbergsieker@gibsondunn.com)
David P. Burns - Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3786,
dburns@gibsondunn.com)
Nicola T. Hanna - Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7269,
nhanna@gibsondunn.com)
Howard S. Hogan - Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3640,
hhogan@gibsondunn.com)
Robert K. Hur - Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3674,
rhur@gibsondunn.com)
Joshua A. Jessen - Orange County/Palo Alto (+1 949-451-4114/+1
650-849-5375, jjessen@gibsondunn.com)
Kristin A. Linsley - San Francisco (+1 415-393-8395,
klinsley@gibsondunn.com)
H. Mark Lyon - Palo Alto (+1 650-849-5307, mlyon@gibsondunn.com)
Karl G. Nelson - Dallas (+1 214-698-3203, knelson@gibsondunn.com)
Ashley Rogers - Dallas (+1 214-698-3316, arogers@gibsondunn.com)
Deborah L. Stein - Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7164,
dstein@gibsondunn.com)
Eric D. Vandevelde - Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7186,
evandevelde@gibsondunn.com)
Benjamin B. Wagner - Palo Alto (+1 650-849-5395,
bwagner@gibsondunn.com)
Michael Li-Ming Wong - San Francisco/Palo Alto (+1 415-393-8333/+1
650-849-5393, mwong@gibsondunn.com)
Cassandra L. Gaedt-Sheckter - Palo Alto (+1 650-849-5203,
cgaedt-sheckter@gibsondunn.com)[GN]

GOSSAMER BIO: Settlement for $2.4M Reached in Kuhne Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Gossamer Bio, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that on Oct. 29, 2021,
the parties in the Kuhne class suit informed the Court that they
have reached a settlement and Company has agreed to pay
approximately $2.4 million.

On April 3, 2020, Scott Kuhne, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, filed a putative class action lawsuit
against the Company, certain of its executive officers and
directors, and the underwriters of its IPO in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California (Case No.
3:20-cv-00649-DMS-DEB).

The operative complaint was filed on November 20, 2020.

The complaint was filed on behalf of all investors who purchased
the Company's securities pursuant to or traceable to the Company's
February 8, 2019 initial public offering ("IPO").

The complaint alleged that the Company, certain of its executive
officers and directors, and the underwriters of its IPO made false
and/or misleading statements and failed to disclose material
adverse facts about its business, operations and prospects in
violation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended.

The plaintiff sought damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and
other unspecified equitable relief. The Company moved to dismiss
the complaint on January 19, 2021.

On April 19, 2021, the Court granted the Company's motion to
dismiss in substantial part without leave to amend, and denied the
motion to dismiss as to single claim.

On October 29, 2021, the parties informed the Court that they have
reached a settlement in principle, and the Court has vacated all
deadlines.

While the specific terms of the settlement remain to be finalized,
the Company has agreed to pay approximately $2.4 million, in
exchange for customary releases and settlement terms.

"In accordance with the authoritative guidance on the evaluation of
loss contingencies, the Company recorded a $2.4 million litigation
charge related to this matter, which is included as a component of
General and Administrative expense in the Condensed Consolidated
Statements of Operations for the three and nine month ended
September 30, 2021," the Company said.

Gossamer Bio, Inc. operates as a biopharmaceutical company. The
Company focuses on discovering, acquiring, and developing
therapeutics in the disease areas of immunology, inflammation, and
oncology. Gossamer Bio serves customers in the United States. The
company is based in San Diego, California.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Class Status Granted in Texas ACV Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
repairerdrivennews.com reports that a federal judge has granted
class action status for a lawsuit accusing GEICO of having
systematically underpaid damage claims.

In the suit, the plaintiffs say that GEICO violated Texas law by
failing to include associated costs in settling its customers'
total loss claims. Under state law, actual cash value (ACV) must
include sales tax and fees for title transfer, registration,
inspection and emissions.

The class includes anyone insured under a GEICO Texas policy who
made a first-party auto property damage claim during the past four
years, and who received a total loss payment for less than the
adjusted vehicle value plus associated taxes and fees.

An attorney for the plaintiffs asserted that the insurer owes its
customers tens of millions of dollars.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs - Philip Angell, Steven Brown, Tonnie
Beck, Tammy Morris and Dawn Burnham, all Texas residents -
estimated that the class includes tens of thousands of motorists,
all of whom had similar agreements with the insurer.

"GEICO has been well aware for many years now that its standard
insurance policy requires it to the pay the transaction costs
associated with replacing a vehicle that is a total loss. This
includes tax, title, and registration fees," attorney Richard Daly
of Daly & Black, P.C., representing the plaintiffs, said in a
statement.

"Texans lost between 300,000 and 500,000 vehicles in Hurricane
Harvey, alone in 2017. GEICO saved tens of millions on those claims
by knowingly refusing to reimburse Texans those incurred costs.
GEICO will now be responsible for paying those costs plus interest
and attorneys' fees," Daly said.

Judge Keith P. Ellison heard arguments and approved the motion to
certify the class against GEICO on Oct. 28 in the Southern District
of Texas, Houston Division. Policyholders who qualify will
automatically join the class action against GEICO unless they
specifically opt out.

The plaintiffs accused GEICO of failing to include Texas' 6.25
percent sales tax in its settlement of claims for leased vehicles,
even though Texas law does not distinguish between whether a
vehicle is leased or owned.

In addition, they accused GEICO of not always including title fees,
which range from $28 to $33 by county; state registration fees of
$50.75, plus county registration fees of $10 to $31.50, and
inspection fees, which range from $7.50 to $14.25.

GEICO responded that sales tax is paid by a vehicle's owner, which
in the case of a lease is the leasing company, though it did
acknowledge that lessors are not prevented from passing the sales
tax along to the lessee.

GEICO also noted that "a consumer may be entitled to a registration
fee refund" in the event of a total loss.

The defendents in the case include GEICO Advantage Insurance
Company, GEICO Indemnity Company, Government Employees Insurance
Company, GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company and GEICO Choice
Insurance Company. [GN]

GREAT KILLS: Court Enters Scheduling Order in Lobato Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Lobato v. Great Kills
Marina Cafe Inc. et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-05579 (E.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge Sanket J. Bulsara entered a scheduling order as follows:


   -- A hearing on the motion for class certification will be
      held on 12/2/2021 at 2:00 P.M. The hearing will proceed by
      video. The Court will send a Microsoft Teams meeting link
      to the email addresses listed on the docket.

   -- Counsel may request that the Court send the link to email
      addresses not on the docket by providing the email
      addresses to Chambers' email no later than Nov. 29, 2021.

   -- All others may join the conference via telephone by using
      the toll-free number (877) 336-1274 and passcode 6534420.
      Parties shall join five minutes prior to the start of the
      conference.

   -- Persons granted remote access to proceedings are reminded
      that photographing, recording, or rebroadcasting of any
      Court proceeding or communication with the Court is
      prohibited.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.[CC]

GREATER CINCINNATI: Cert. of Kleinhans' FLSA Collective Endorsed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled AUSTIN KLEINHANS, et al., Plaintiffs v.
GREATER CINCINNATI BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, Defendant, Case No.
1:21-cv-70 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western
Division, recommends that the Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally
certify a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Austin Kleinhans and Tessa Bradley initiated this action
against GCBHS, a behavioral health services provider and their
former employer, on Jan. 31, 2021. The Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint on April 23, 2021. They allege that GCBHS violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), which requires employers
to compensate employees for all hours they work and to pay overtime
to all employees who are covered by the FLSA's provisions. They
allege that GCBHS violated the FLSA by misclassifying them as
"exempt" employees under the FLSA's "professional exemption"
provision and by willfully failing to pay them overtime wages

Plaintiffs Kleinhans and Bradley allege they were employees of
GCBHS, who provided case management services to individuals with
chronic illnesses or disabilities. Kleinhans worked for GCBHS from
approximately Aug. 28, 2020, to Jan. 4, 2021, and Bradley worked
for GCBHS from approximately Jan. 21, 2020, to April 28, 2020. The
Plaintiffs describe their typical duties as driving to and from
GCBHS's clients' homes, the hospital, group homes, court hearings,
GCBHS's offices, and medical and personal appointments, which they
assert was their primary job duty, among other duties.

The Plaintiffs allege that GCBHS required them and similarly
situated Case Managers to "work over 40 hours per week," and they
regularly worked an average of approximately 50 to 60 hours per
week. The Plaintiffs allege that GCBHS failed to pay them and
similarly situated Case Managers overtime compensation at the rate
of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour
worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, and GCBHS failed to
preserve payroll and other employment records.

II. Collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b)

The Plaintiffs move for conditional certification of a collective
class under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). They seek to represent a
class of similarly situated former and current employees of GCBHS
who have worked as Case Managers and were not paid overtime wages.
They define the putative opt-in class as:

     All current and former individuals in positions, job titles,
     job codes, job classifications, or job descriptions of 'Case
     Manager' and all other similar nomenclature performing
     substantially identical functions employed by Greater
     Cincinnati Behavioral Health Services between January 31,
     2018 and the present.

III. Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification

The Plaintiffs argue the putative class should be conditionally
certified for notice purposes because they have shown they are
similarly situated to the potential opt-in plaintiffs. They argue
that the allegations of their amended complaint, their
declarations, and the declarations of putative opt-in class members
submitted in support of their motion constitute a "modest factual
showing" that they are similarly situated to the putative class
members.

GCBHS argues in response that the Court should not conditionally
certify a class. Initially, GCBHS urges the Court to decline to
follow a two-tiered conditional certification approach and either
(1) deny the Plaintiffs' motion, or (2) order limited discovery for
the purpose of determining whether the proposed class of employees
is "similarly situated" under the FLSA.

Assuming the Court proceeds to consider whether conditional
certification is warranted, GCBHS argues the Court should deny
conditional certification because the Plaintiffs have not met their
burden of proving that they and the putative class members are
similarly situated. GCBHS also argues, among other things, that the
Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to potential opt-in
plaintiffs who signed a collective action waiver as part of a
severance agreement with GCBHS.

In reply, the Plaintiffs argue that GCBHS has erroneously focused
on the merits of their claims and asked the Court to consider
"alleged individual inquiries" and to determine facts and
credibility issues. The Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to
conditional certification because they have shown that they and the
putative class members are "unified by common theories of
Defendant's statutory violations" and have identified a plan or
policy that violates the FLSA.

A. The two-tiered conditional certification procedure applies.

Initially, the Court rejects GCBHS's proposal that the Court
decline to follow the two-tiered conditional certification
procedure. In support of its argument that the Court should reject
the two-tiered approach, GCBHS relies on a recent decision from the
Fifth Circuit which it argues "persuasively lays out a more
appropriate framework for deciding a motion for collective action
certification" than the "two stage certification method," citing
Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, No. 19-60847, 2021 WL 98229, at
*2 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2021).

But the Court says it is bound by the law of the Sixth Circuit,
which follows the two-tiered conditional certification approach.
Further, judges in the Southern District of Ohio have not eschewed
the two-tiered approach and have continued to apply it subsequent
to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Swales (see Cockrell, 2021 WL
1850702, at *2; Crace, 2021 WL 764072, at *2). Thus, the Court will
follow the two-tiered approach here.

B. The Plaintiffs have met their burden to show members of the
proposed class are similarly situated.

The Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence to make a
"modest" showing that they are similarly situated to the potential
opt-in plaintiffs. To meet their burden, the Plaintiffs have
submitted their declarations and declarations from six opt-in class
members. The Plaintiffs also state that they observed GCBHS treat
other Case Managers in the same manner by not compensating Case
Managers for all hours they worked, including the hours in excess
of 40 hours that Case Managers worked each workweek.

GCBHS contends that the Plaintiffs have not made even a "modest"
showing that they are similarly situated to the putative class
members. GCBHS challenges the Plaintiffs' representations that they
and the potential class members are "similarly situated."

Initially, the Court declines to consider at this juncture the
competing declarations of current employees submitted by GCBHS to
rebut plaintiffs' allegations and show that not all Case Managers
are similarly situated. The Court lacks the authority to weigh the
parties' competing factual assertions and evidence at the
conditional certification stage. Thus, the Court cannot resolve the
factual disputes that GCBHS attempts to create by submitting
competing declarations at this stage of the case.

Instead, the Court must limit its consideration to the Plaintiffs'
evidence to determine whether they have satisfied their "modest
burden" to show that they are similarly situated to the putative
class members.

Here, the Plaintiffs' evidence does not fall short of the standards
discussed in the cases GCBHS cites, Judge Litkovitz finds. The
Plaintiffs have provided factual support for the application of an
FLSA-violating policy to a class of employees who performed case
management services for GCBHS. The Plaintiffs have identified a
class of potential opt-in plaintiffs which, according to GCBHS,
numbers approximately 461 current and former employees who held the
same job title.

Judge Litkovitz opines that the Plaintiffs have adequately shown
through their declarations and the declarations of the six opt-in
plaintiffs that the named plaintiffs and the class of potential
opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated for purposes of the FLSA.

The evidence plaintiffs have submitted through their sworn
declarations and those of the opt-in plaintiffs distinguishes this
case from other district court cases in the Sixth Circuit that
GCBHS relies on to show the Plaintiffs have not satisfied their
"modest" burden, Judge Litkovitz holds. Thus, conditional
certification of the proposed class is warranted.

C. Restricting the class is not appropriate at this stage

GCBHS argues that if the Court decides to conditionally certify a
class, putative class members who signed a collective action waiver
in 2020, when GCBHS eliminated multiple staff members' jobs as part
of a reduction in force, must be excluded from the class. In reply,
the Plaintiffs assert that the law in this Circuit is not
consistent with the decisions from other federal circuits that
GCBHS cites.

The Court finds it is not appropriate to determine the waiver issue
at the conditional certification stage. Whether certain employees
should be excluded from the proposed class because they signed
collective action waivers requires factual determinations. Judge
Litkovitz holds that this factual determination is not
appropriately made at the conditional certification stage.

For these reasons, the Court declines to determine at this stage
whether any potential class member is barred from participating in
the collective action because he or she executed a class action
waiver.

D. Temporal scope of notice

The Plaintiffs' proposed class notice does not indicate when the
class period should commence, i.e., three years prior to the date
of the filing of the lawsuit or three years prior to the date of
any decision conditionally certifying the class. Judge Litkovitz
acknowledged in Bradford, 2020 WL 3496150, at *6 (citing Adams v.
Wenco Ashland, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-1544, 2020 WL 2615514, at *7 (N.D.
Ohio May 22, 2020) that there is no consensus among courts in the
Sixth Circuit as to when the statute of limitations on FLSA claims
begins to run for opt-in plaintiffs.

Therefore, the notice to putative class members should run from the
date of any order adopting Judge Litkovitz's recommendation.

E. Contents, form, and means of the notice

The Plaintiff proposes that notice be sent to putative opt-in
plaintiffs by U.S. mail, email, and text message. GCBHS argues that
the Plaintiffs' proposed methods of notice are not proper. GCBHS
argues that courts generally approve only a single method of notice
unless there is reason to believe that particular method is
ineffective.

Judge Litkovitz notes that the Plaintiffs have not shown that
notice by U.S. mail and email would be ineffective in this case.
Thus, consistent with the "growing trend" in this district, the
Court will permit plaintiffs to send the Notice and Consent forms
via U.S. mail and e-mail to all putative class members upon
issuance of any conditional certification order. The Plaintiffs may
not notify any potential opt-in plaintiff of the lawsuit via text
message unless notice by U.S. mail and email have been returned as
undeliverable for a particular individual, in which event the
Plaintiffs may not contact a potential opt-in plaintiff via text
without first obtaining further permission from the Court.

GCBHS requests that the proposed notice be modified to provide
additional information regarding GCBHS's position on the merits of
the litigation and to inform potential opt-in plaintiffs that they
may have discovery and other related obligations if they join the
action.

Judge Litkovitz holds that GCBHS has not cited any authority for
adding this language and has not proposed any specific language to
add. GCBHS's request is, therefore, denied.

GCBHS argues that plaintiffs' expedited discovery requests should
be modified to (1) eliminate the requirement that GCBHS provide the
email address and telephone number for all 461 potential opt-in
plaintiffs because U.S. mail notice is sufficient; and (2) extend
the proposed response time of 14 days for GCBHS to provide
information about the potential opt-in class members to at least 30
days.

Because the Court has found that the Plaintiffs are entitled to
send the notice and consent forms via U.S. mail and email, GCBHS is
required to provide only the postal and email addresses for the
potential opt-in plaintiffs upon the issuance of any conditional
certification order.

The Plaintiffs do not object to GCBHS's request for an extension of
time to provide information about the potential opt-in plaintiffs.
The Court will, therefore, grant GCBHS's request and allow GCBHS 30
days from the date of any conditional certification order to
provide the information.

Disposition

Judge Litkovitz recommended that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Order
for Conditional Certification, Expedited Opt-In Discovery, and
Court Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs be granted.
The Plaintiffs will file an amended notice consistent with the
Court's findings herein within fourteen (14) days of the entry of
any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation, subject to any
additional findings or conclusions by the District Judge.

A full-text copy of the Court's Report and Recommendation dated
Nov. 1, 2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3yc98ma4 from
Leagle.com.


HAWAII: Court OKs Settlement Deal in Chatman Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANTHONY CHATMAN, FRANCISCO
ALVARADO, ZACHARY GRANADOS, TYNDALE MOBLEY, and JOSEPH DEGUAIR,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. MAX
N. OTANI, Director of State of Hawai'i, Department of Public
Safety, in his official capacity, Case No. 1:21-cv-00268-JAO-KJM
(D. Haw.), the Hon. Judge Jill Otake entered an order that:

   (1) The requirements of FRCP 23(e) have been satisfied and
       the Settlement Agreement and Fee Settlement Agreement are
       fair, reasonable, and adequate.

   (2) The Court approves $250,540 in attorneys' fees.

   (3) This case is dismissed with prejudice.

   (4) The Court retains jurisdiction regarding all matters
       relating to the administration, consummation, and
       enforcement of the Settlement Agreement and Fee
       Settlement Agreement and for any other necessary purpose
       relating to the settlement.

   (5) The Court directs the Clerk's Office to enter final
       judgment and close the case.

In this class action, the Plaintiffs challenge the conditions in
Hawaii's prisons and jails that have contributed to multiple
COVID-19 outbreaks. They contend that the Department of Public
Safety ("DPS"), headed by Defendant Max Otani, has mishandled the
pandemic and failed to implement its Pandemic Response Plan in
violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

On July 13, 2021, the Court issued an Order (1) Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Provisional Class Certification and (2)
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The Court
provisionally certified the following classes pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23:

  -- Post-Conviction Class: All present and future sentenced
     prisoners incarcerated in a Hawai'i prison.

  -- Post-Conviction Medical Subclass: Includes all present and
     future Post-Conviction Class members whose medical
     condition renders them especially vulnerable to COVID-19 as
     determined by guidelines promulgated by the CDC.

  -- Pretrial Class: All present and future pretrial detainees
     incarcerated in a Hawai'i jail.

  -- Pretrial Medical Subclass: Includes all present and future
     Pretrial Class members whose medical condition renders
     them especially vulnerable to COVID-19 as determined by
     guidelines promulgated by the CDC.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 10, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Hunp6A at no extra charge.[CC]

HEALTH IQ: W.D. Oklahoma Dismisses Armado's 1st Amended Suit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TARA ARMADO and MAKI TURNER, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. HEALTH IQ
INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. CIV-21-608-F (W.D.
Okla.), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma dismissed without prejudice Tara Armado's claims alleged
in the Plaintiffs' first amended class action complaint.

Plaintiffs Armado and Turner, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, bring this putative class action seeking
injunctive relief and statutory damages for alleged violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section
227, et seq.

According to the First Amended Class Action Complaint, Armado is a
citizen of and domiciled in California and Turner is a citizen of
and domiciled in Oklahoma. Defendant, Health IQ is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View,
California.

Both Plaintiffs claim that Health IQ caused prerecorded voice
telemarketing messages to be transmitted to their cellular
telephone numbers without their express written consent, in
violation of the TCPA.

In response to the Plaintiffs' amended pleading, Health IQ has
moved to dismiss the claims of Armado on the ground that the Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant with respect to
those claims. Armado contends that dismissal of her claims is not
appropriate because the Court may exercise pendent personal
jurisdiction over Health IQ as to her claims.

District Judge Stephen P. Friot notes that in U.S. v. Botefuhr, 309
F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2002), the Tenth Circuit explained that
pendent personal jurisdiction "exists when a court possesses
personal jurisdiction over a defendant for one claim, lacks an
independent basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant for
another claim that arises out of the same nucleus of operative
fact, and then, because it possesses personal jurisdiction over the
first claim, asserts personal jurisdiction over the second claim."

In essence, the claim over which the district court lacks
independent basis for personal jurisdiction is piggybacked onto the
claim over which the court possesses personal jurisdiction.
However, for this to occur, the claim must arise from the same
facts as the claim over which the court] has proper personal
jurisdiction.

Assuming without deciding that pendent personal jurisdiction can
apply in circumstances where a plaintiff seeks to piggyback her
claims to another plaintiff's claims against a defendant, the Court
concludes its application is not appropriate in this case.

Despite Armado's arguments to the contrary, the Court concludes
that her claims do not arise from the same facts as Turner's
claims. Armado's claims are based upon prerecorded voice
telemarketing messages transmitted to her cellular telephone while
domiciled in California and Turner's claims are based upon
prerecorded voice telemarketing messages transmitted to her
cellular telephone while she was domiciled in Oklahoma. The
messages were left on the Plaintiffs' cellular telephones on
different dates. Although Armado pleads the same violations of the
TCPA and seeks the same relief as Turner, the Court concludes that
Armado's claims do not arise out of the same nucleus of operative
fact.

Because Armado cannot rely upon pendent personal jurisdiction and
she does not make a prima facie showing that the Court possesses
personal jurisdiction--specific or general--over Health IQ with
respect to her claims, the Court concludes that Armado's claims
against the Defendant should be dismissed without prejudice for
lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Accordingly, Defendant Health IQ Insurance Services, Inc.'s "Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint" is granted to the
extent that the claims of the Plaintiff, Tara Armado, against the
Defendant alleged in the First Amended Class Action Complaint are
dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Nov. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/cskt5tav from Leagle.com.


HEARST COMMUNICATIONS: Disclosed Personal Info, Hicks Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Joyce Hicks and Stephen Goldberger, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Hearst Communications,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-09093 (S.D. N.Y., November 3,
2021), seeks compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages,
prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded, an order of
restitution and all other forms of equitable monetary relief,
injunctive relief and an order awarding reasonable attorneys' fees
and expenses and costs of suit for violation of Ohio's Right of
Publicity Law.

Hearst Communications is the publisher of Bicycling, Car and
Driver, Cosmopolitan, Country Living, Elle, Elle Decor, Esquire,
Food Network Magazine, Harper's Bazaar, HGTV Magazine, House
Beautiful, Marie Claire, Men's Health, Popular Mechanics,
Prevention, Road & Track, Runner’s World, Town and Country,
Veranda, Woman's Day and Women's Health magazines, as well as its
flagship publication Good Housekeeping magazine.

Plaintiffs allege that Hearst discloses its magazine subscribers'
names and identities to data aggregators and appenders, which then
provide Hearst with supplemental about each subscriber that they
have separately collected. It then packages this information into
its Data Brokerage Products that are licensed to its Data Brokerage
Clients, all without seeking its customers' prior consent, written
or otherwise, for any of these disclosures, and its customers
remain unaware that their identities are being rented and exchanged
on the open market. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Arun G. Ravindran, Esq.
     Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
     HEDIN HALL LLP
     1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1140
     Miami, FL 33131
     Tel: (305) 357-2107
     Fax: (305) 200-8801
     Email: aravindran@hedinhall.com
            fhedin@hedinhall.com


HG OHIO: Miller Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JANAE MILLER and TYLOR
ARMSTRONG, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
v. HG OHIO EMPLOYEE HOLDING CORP., et al., Case No.
2:21-cv-03978-EAS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), the Plaintiff asks the Court,
pursuant to Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the case as an FLSA collective
      action under Section 216(b) against Defendants HG Ohio
      Employee Holding Corp., HG Ohio Operations LLC, and
      Holland Management, Inc. on behalf of Named Plaintiffs and
      others similarly situated;

   2. implementing a procedure whereby Court-approved Notice of
      FLSA claims is sent by U.S. mail and email to:

      "All current and former hourly, non-exempt healthcare
      employees of Defendants who had a meal break deduction
      applied during any workweek in which they were paid for at
      least 40 hours of work, beginning three years prior to the
      final disposition of this case;"

   3. approving the proposed Notice and Consent forms;

   4. directing Defendants to provide, within 14 days of an
      order granting conditional certification, a roster of
      Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs that includes their full
      names, their dates of employment, their locations worked,
      job titles, their last known mailing addresses, and their
      personal email addresses; and

   5. directing that the Court-approved Notice and Consent to
      Join forms be sent to such present and former employees
      within 14 days of receipt of the Roster using the
      Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs' mailing and email addresses.

The Plaintiffs were scheduled to work, or did work, 40 or more
hours per workweek. The Defendants allegedly had a policy or
practice of deducting 30 minutes from Plaintiffs' daily work hours
for a meal break. 10 Such deduction was made either by requiring
employees to clock out for their meal break -- regardless of
whether it would be interrupted/taken or not -- or Defendants
applying the deduction when the employee was not able to clock out
for a break that day.

Indeed, many times Defendants' facilities were understaffed or so
busy that Plaintiffs were unable to clock out and take a meal
break; even when they were able to clock out, their meal breaks
would still be interrupted with substantive work duties due to the
inherently busy nature of their workplace and understanding that
they must prioritize residents' needs at all times.

The Defendants own and operate community-based senior living
communities throughout the State of Ohio. At all relevant times,
Defendants employed Plaintiffs to work at their facilities.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Nov. 11,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3clPSgx
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          Adam C. Gedling, Esq.
          Kelsie N. Hendren, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite No. 126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  agedling@mcoffmanlegal.com
                  khendren@mcoffmanlegal.com

HOME FAMILY: New York Court Certifies Turgunbaev as Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IKRAM TURGUNBAEV and MASHRAB ASROROV, Individually and
on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. HOME
FAMILY CARE, INC., Defendant, Docket No. 515325/15 (N.Y. Sup.),
Judge Lawrence Knipel of the Supreme Court in Kings County granted
the Plaintiffs' motion for an order:

   -- certifying the action as a class action;

   -- designating Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, and Naydenskiy Law
      Firm, LLC, as the class counsel; and

   -- approving for publication the proposed Notice of Class
      Action Lawsuit and Publication Order annexed to their
      papers.

Introduction

Plaintiffs Turgunbaev and Asrorov, individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated, move, in motion sequence 6, for an
order certifying the action as a class action, designating Virginia
& Ambinder and Naydenskiy Law Firm as the class counsel, and
approving for publication the proposed Notice of Class Action
Lawsuit and Publication Order annexed to their papers.

Background

On Dec. 17, 2015, Plaintiff Turgunbaev commenced the instant action
individually and on behalf of a putative class consisting of home
health care attendants employed by Defendant Home Family Care (HFC)
who did not live in the homes of the Defendant's clients but worked
24-hour shifts providing them with personal care, assistance,
health related tasks, and other services in the State of New York.
Among other things, the complaint sought damages under the Labor
Law and New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations based upon
defendant's alleged failure to provide legally required wage
statements and notices, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime
compensation, and unpaid spread of hours pay.

On July 25, 2016, the Defendant moved for summary judgment
dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint. In so moving, the Defendant
argued that, under the New York State Department of Labor's (DOL)
interpretation of its Miscellaneous Industries and Occupations
Minimum Wage Order (the Wage Order), it was only required to pay
the Plaintiff and members of the putative class for 13 hours per
24-hour shift provided that they were afforded at least eight hours
of sleep and actually received five hours of uninterrupted sleep,
and that they were afforded three hours for meals.

The Defendant further noted that the Plaintiff did not allege in
her complaint that she and members of the putative class failed to
receive the requisite hours for sleep and meals. It also argued
that the Plaintiff's action must be dismissed inasmuch as a class
action was not a proper remedy for resolving the underlying wage
claims. Finally, the Defendant argued in the alternative, the Court
should stay the action pending the outcome of the appeal of the
case of Andryeyeva v New York Health Care, Inc. (45 Misc.3d 820
[2014]) in the Appellate Division, Second Department.

In an order dated Aug. 19, 2016, the Kings County Supreme Court
stayed the case pending the Appellate Division's determination in
Andryeyeva. On Sept. 13, 2017, the Appellate Division issued its
decision in Andryeyeva, which upheld the lower court's ruling
granting class certification (Andryeyeva v New York Health Care,
Inc., 153 A.D.3d 1216 [2017). In so ruling, the Appellate Division
found that the DOL's interpretation of the Wage Order was neither
rational nor reasonable because it conflicted with the plain
language of the Order.

On March 26, 2019, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division's ruling in Andryeyeva. In this regard, it determined that
the Appellate Division erred in ruling that the DOL's
interpretation of the Wage Order was irrational and unreasonable.
The Court further remitted the matter "for consideration of
alternative grounds for class-certification for alleged violations
of New York's Labor Law, inclusive of the Defendants' alleged
systematic denial of wages earned and due, unaddressed by the
courts below because of their erroneous rejections of DOL's
interpretation of the Wage Order." Further, although the Court did
not rule on the merits of the Plaintiffs' class certification
motions, in dicta, it addressed the Defendants' argument that,
because each putative class member's claim is fact specific and
turns on whether the attendant received the required number
uninterrupted sleep and meal hours, the Plaintiffs could not offer
generalized proof on a class-wide basis.

In an order dated Oct. 18, 2019, the court granted, without
opposition, the Plaintiff's motion to vacate the stay and to amend
the complaint and directed that the Plaintiff file an amended
complaint. On Oct. 22, 2019, the Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint which contained new causes of action, new factual
allegations and added Plaintiff Mashrab Asrorov to the caption. The
amended complaint also removed causes of action for failure to
provide wage notices and wage statements and added claims for
failure to pay wages and breach of contract. These new factual
allegations included claims that the Plaintiff and the members of
the putative class did not receive the requisite amount of time for
sleep and meals when working 24-hour shifts as required by the Wage
Order.

On Jan. 22, 2021, the court issued an order directing that all
pre-class certification discovery including depositions be
completed by March 22, 2021, that the Plaintiffs move for class
certification 30 days after the completion of discovery, and that
the plaintiffs file a note of issue by June 18, 2021. In an order
dated March 22, 2021, the court denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment. The instant motion is now before the Kings County
Supreme Court.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs move, pursuant to CPLR 901, for an order certifying
the action as a class action with the class defined as: "All
individuals who performed work on behalf of Defendant as
non-residential home health aides and/or personal care assistants
in the State of New York at any time between December 2009 and
today."

The Plaintiffs also move for an order designating Virginia &
Ambinder, LLP and Naydenskiy Law Firm, LLC as the class counsel and
approving for publication the proposed Notice of Class Action
Lawsuit and Publication Order attached to their motion papers.

Given this evidence, the Plaintiffs argue that they have satisfied
all five requirements for class certification set forth in CPLR
901. They Plaintiffs also maintain that they have satisfied the
requirement that common questions of law and fact predominate over
any questions affecting individual members of the class. In further
support of their motion for class certification, they argue that
their claims are typical of the putative class claims. The
Plaintiffs also argue that a class action is superior to other
available forms of relief. As a final matter, the Plaintiffs note
that numerous lower court cases have granted class certification in
cases involving facts and allegations virtually identical to those
involved in the case. (i.e., the underpayment of home health
aides).

In opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification,
HFC argues that the proposed class action is not superior to other
remedies available to the Plaintiffs. HFC also argues that class
certification should be denied because the Plaintiffs' wage claim
based upon lack of sleep and lack of meal break allegations cannot
and should not be resolved on a class basis since individualized,
fact-specific determinations would need to be made concerning
hundreds of different aides during thousands of different shifts.

Defendant HFC further contends that the named Plaintiffs' claims
are not typical of the proposed class. In further opposition to the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, HFC argues that
plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the interests of the class.
As a final matter, HFC argues that the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification must be denied because they have not satisfied the
manageability requirement under CPLR 902.

In reply to RFC's opposition papers, the Plaintiffs maintain that
there is no merit to defendant's argument that the DOL's audit
precludes certification of the class.

First, Judge Knipel finds that that fact that Turgunbaev and other
members of the putative class received compensation for unpaid
overtime wages pursuant to the DOT audit is insufficient to show
that individual issues will predominate. In particular, he says,
the DOT audit only dealt with unpaid overtime wages and did not
address the bulk of the Plaintiffs' claims, which include failure
to compensate for full 24-hour shifts when the requisite meal and
sleep breaks were not taken and failure to pay spread of hours
compensation. While it is true the compensation paid to Turgunbaev
and members of the putative class will have to he taken into
account when calculating damages, differing damage awards is an
insufficient basis to defeat a motion for class certification.

Next, Judge Knipel finds that the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs
on behalf of themselves and the putative class all arise out of
HFC's alleged policy of systematically and uniformly underpaying
home health aides. Furthermore, the fact that claims may differ
among class members is insufficient to demonstrate a lack of
typicality. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have satisfied the
requirements of CPLR 901(a)(3).

Judge Knipel also finds that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that
they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
In particular, contrary to HFC's claim, the fact that Turgunbaev's
was compensated pursuant to the DOL audit does not demonstrate that
he lacks an interest in this suit. As previously noted, the audit
did not address the bulk of Turgunbaev's claims in the action.
Further, Mr. Kiselev's claim that Asrorov did not attend any
training sessions is insufficient to demonstrate that his personal
characteristics preclude him from being a class representative.
Finally, it is not disputed that the Plaintiffs' attorneys have the
skills and experience necessary to represent the class.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of CPLR
901(a)(4).

As a final matter, Judge Knipel finds that the factors set forth in
CPLR 902 weigh in favor of granting class certification. Most of
the factors set forth in CPLR 902 have already been considered by
the court in its discussion of CPLR 901(a)(1)(2), (3), and (5). In
addition, HFC has not identified any pending litigation between it
and current or former home health aides involving wage disputes.
Further, the Kings County Supreme Court is an appropriate forum
since all of the class members were employed as home health aides
in the state of New York. The Plaintiffs, therefore, have satisfied
the requirements of CPLR 902.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
granted and leave is granted for the Plaintiffs to prosecute their
action on behalf of a class consisting of: "All individuals who
performed work on behalf of Defendant as non-residential home
health aides and/or personal care assistants in the State of New
York at any time between December 2009 and today." Furthermore, the
proposed Notice of Class Action Lawsuit attached the Plaintiffs'
motion papers as exhibit L (NYSCEF Document no. 91) is approved for
publication.

Within 30 days after entry of the Order, HFC will furnish the
Plaintiffs' counsel with a class list containing the names of all
individuals employed by HFC as non-residential home health aides in
New York between December 2009 and today. This list will include
the individuals' last known mailing and email addresses and, to the
extent possible, the list is to he furnished in electronic form.

Within 30 days after the Plaintiffs' counsel receives this list,
the Plaintiffs will cause of a copy of the Notice of Class Action
to be mailed to every class member in English, Russian, Spanish,
Polish, and Chinese once by first class mail and once by electronic
mail (when possible). In addition, within 30 days after the
Plaintiffs' counsel receives the class list, the counsel will cause
a copy of the Notice of Class Action to he made available at a
designated location on Virginia & Ambinder, LLP's website located
at www.vandallp.com.

Conclusion

In summary, the Plaintiffs' motion for an order for an order
certifying this action as a class action, designating Virginia &
Ambinder, LLP and Naydenskiy Law Firm, LLC as the class counsel,
and approving for publication the proposed Notice of Class Action
Lawsuit and Publication Order annexed to their papers is granted.

The Order constitutes the decision and order of the Kings County
Supreme Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/rd8fzfwe from Leagle.com.


IANTHUS CAPITAL: Court Discontinues Zaboroski Statement of Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that by court
order dated Sept. 27, the Statement Claim filed by Sean
Zaboroski was discontinued.

On April 13, 2021, Zaboroski, a shareholder of the Company, filed a
Statement of Claim in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List ("OSCJ") for a putative class action lawsuit
against the Company, its former Chief Executive Officer, its
current Interim Chief Executive Officer, and its current Board of
Directors alleging gross negligence on the part of the iAnthus
Defendants.

By court order dated September 27, 2021, the Statement of Claim
filed by Zaboroski was discontinued.

iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. owns and operates licensed cannabis
cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities throughout the
United States, providing investors diversified exposure to the U.S.
regulated cannabis industry. The company is based in New York, New
York.


IANTHUS CAPITAL: Plaintiff Allowed to Amend Claim in Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that on Sept 27,
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice Commercial List (OSCJ)
granted leave for plaintiff to amend its claim.

On July 23, 2020, a proposed class action was issued in the OSCJ in
Toronto against the Company, the Company's former Chief Executive
Officer, and the Company's Chief Financial Officer.

On September 27, 2021, the OSCJ granted leave for the plaintiff to
amend its claim.

In the amended claim, the plaintiff seeks to certify the proposed
class action on behalf of two classes.

"Class A" consists of all persons, other than any executive-level
employee of the Company and their immediate families ("Excluded
Persons"), who acquired the Company's common shares in the
secondary market on or after April 12, 2019, and who held some or
all of those securities until after the close of trading on April
5, 2020.

"Class B" consists of all persons, other than Excluded Persons, who
acquired the Company's common shares prior to April 12, 2019, and
who held some or all of those securities until after the close of
trading on April 5, 2020.

Among other things, the plaintiff alleges statutory and common law
misrepresentation, and seeks an unspecified amount of damages
together with interest and costs.

The plaintiff also alleges common law oppression for releasing
certain statements allegedly containing misrepresentations inducing
Class B members to hold the Company's securities beyond April 5,
2020.

No certification motion has been scheduled.

"A motion for leave to proceed with a secondary market claim under
the Securities Act (Ontario) is scheduled to be heard on March 29,
2022," the Company said.

iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. owns and operates licensed cannabis
cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities throughout the
United States, providing investors diversified exposure to the U.S.
regulated cannabis industry. The company is based in New York, New
York.

IANTHUS CAPITAL: Plaintiff Bid to File 2nd Amended Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, On Oct. 28, the
parties in a New York class action suit filed a Stipulation and
Proposed Scheduling Order Regarding Lead Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.  Pursuant to this
stipulation, the defendants take no position as to whether the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(SDNY should grant the Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a
Second Amended Complaint, which motion remains pending before the
SDNY.

On April 20, 2020, a shareholder filed a class action lawsuit with
the SDNY against the Company and is seeking damages for an
unspecified amount against the Company, its former Chief Executive
Officer, its current Chief Financial Officer and others for alleged
false and misleading statements regarding certain proceeds from the
issuance of long-term debt, that were held in escrow to make
interest payments in the event of default on such long-term debt.

On July 9, 2020, the SDNY issued an order consolidating the Class
Action Lawsuit and the Hi-Med Complaint and appointed a lead
plaintiff.

On September 4, 2020, the Lead Plaintiff filed a consolidated
amended class action lawsuit against the Company (the "Amended
Complaint").

On November 20, 2020, the Company and its Chief Financial Officer
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

On January 8, 2021, the Lead Plaintiff filed an opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

The Company and its Chief Financial Officer's reply to the
opposition was filed on February 22, 2021.

In a memorandum of opinion dated August 30, 2021, the SDNY granted
the Company's and its Chief Financial Officer's Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint.

The SDNY indicated that the Lead Plaintiff may move for leave to
file a proposed second amended complaint by September 30, 2021.

On October 1, 2021, the Lead Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to
amend the Amended Complaint.

On October 28, 2021, the parties filed a Stipulation and Proposed
Scheduling Order Regarding Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File a Second Amended Complaint.

"If the SNDY does grant this motion, the Company will have the
right to file a Motion to Dismiss Lead Plaintiff's second amended
complaint no later than 45 days after the filing of Lead
Plaintiff's second amended complaint," the Company said.

iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. owns and operates licensed cannabis
cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities throughout the
United States, providing investors diversified exposure to the U.S.
regulated cannabis industry. The company is based in New York, New
York.

ILLINOIS: Boone Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALVIN BOONE, BRANDON
HESTER, LINDSEY QUISENBERRY, TAMMY PARKHILL, SUSAN CHRISTNER,
individually, as well as on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN
AFFAIRS, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH, and JAY R PRITZKER, in his official capacity as
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Case No. 3:21-cv-03229-SEM-TSH
(C.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b), to enter an order authorizing the
Plaintiffs to maintain this cause as a class action.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of other adult individuals
who are employed, either directly or via agency contract, by IDOC,
IDHS, IDVA, ICMS, and IDJJ, in congregate care facilities operated
by those agencies, and who have a moral objection to being
vaccinated or submit to testing for Covid-19.

The number of adult individuals who are employed, either directly
or via agency contract, by IDOC, IDHS, IDVA, ICMS, and IDJJ, in
congregate care facilities operated by those agencies, is estimated
to be more than 5,000 individuals.

The number of adult individuals who are employed, either directly
or via agency contract, by IDOC, IDHS, IDVA, ICMS, and IDJJ, in
congregate care facilities operated by those agencies, and who have
a moral objection to being vaccinated or submit to testing for
Covid-19, is over 600 persons.

The Plaintiffs have filed this cause against the Defendants seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Illinois Department of Corrections is a multicultural agency
deeply committed to ensuring diversity, equity, and inclusion.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Nov. 11,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Dr3rXU
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Bethany D. Hager, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF BETHANY D. HAGER
          Attorney for Plaintiffs
          917 North Walnut Street
          Danville, IL 61832
          Telephone: 217-497-3486
          E-mail: bhagerlaw@gmail.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Laura K. Bautista, Esq.
          Joshua D. Ratz, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL
          500 S. Second Street
          Springfield, IL 62701
          E-mail: Laura.Bautista@ilag.gov

INDIANA: Court Allows Powell to Amend Complaint Against IDOC
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned WILLIE POWELL, et al., Plaintiffs v.
STANLEY KNIGHT, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-03248-JPH-MPB
(S.D. Ind.), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis, issued an order screening and dismissing
complaint, and providing opportunity to file amended complaint.

Plaintiffs Willie Powell, Andra Ragland, and Richard Reeves,
Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) inmates at Plainfield
Correctional Facility (Plainfield) filed their complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Because the Plaintiffs are "prisoners"
as defined by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(c), the Court has an
obligation under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(a) to screen their
complaint before service on the Defendants.

The action was filed by 12 plaintiffs, all inmates at Plainfield.
The Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification stating that
they intended this action to be a class action rather than joint
litigation among prisoners. The Court denied the motion to certify
class action because the Plaintiffs, as pro se litigants, cannot
adequately represent a class.

To date, only Plaintiffs Powell, Ragland, and Reeves remain
litigants in this action.

Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In
determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies
the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Pro se complaints, such as that filed by the Plaintiffs, are
construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, District Judge James Patrick
Hanlon notes.

The Complaint

The Plaintiffs name 21 Defendants, inclusive of IDOC employees,
medical staff, and Aramark food service workers. The Plaintiffs'
complaint relates to outbreaks of coronavirus (COVID-19) at
Plainfield, beginning in March 2020. The Plaintiffs allege that the
IDOC transported inmates from the Regional Diagnostic Center and
the Indiana Women's Prison to Plainfield for dialysis treatment,
and some of these inmates or employees who worked among the
facilities were positive for COVID-19.

The Plaintiffs "believe that the earliest inmate cases of the
infection are found to be linked to the doctors and nurses and
offices as then they passed it onto the dialysis patients and the
dialysis patients then brought it back into the dorms giving it to
lots of other inmates."

In particular, the Plaintiffs allege that the east dorm, home to
232 inmates including themselves, "was hit very hard by the
coronavirus" with 26 inmates who tested positive and 4 deaths. The
Plaintiffs allege that inmates in east dorm were not isolated from
those who had contracted COVID-19, were instructed by officers to
pack up belongings and bedding of sick inmates, and were not
provided with proper personal protective equipment (PPE) or fresh
face masks.

The Plaintiffs state they never knew if they were in close contact
with other inmates who had tested positive. The Plaintiffs allege
that facility employees knowingly came to work sick or after
testing positive, or after being directly exposed to the virus.
Social distancing was not enforced, and the inmates were not
provided adequate cleaning supplies, protective equipment and
masks, hand soap, paper towels, or clean bed linens. In sum, the
Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants failed to comply with Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) COVID-19 guidelines.

The Plaintiffs further allege they were denied the ability to file
grievances related to these issues. The Plaintiffs state that the
Defendants' conduct spanned March 2020 through late October 2020.

The Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the form of better medical
treatment, better cleaning of the dorms, better screening for the
virus, more protective clothing and masks, and an order requiring
IDOC and its employees to follow COVID-19 protocols and CDC
guidelines. The Plaintiffs additionally seek monetary damages from
each Individual Defendant.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs necessarily bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to their needs in violation of their Eighth Amendment
rights.

For the reasons explained in the Order, Judge Hanlon holds that the
allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint do not state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, and the complaint must be dismissed.

First, the Plaintiffs seek multiple forms of injunctive relief.
However, time has passed since the allegations that form the basis
of the Plaintiffs' complaint, and the initial onset of COVID-19
outbreaks at Plainfield between the spring and fall of 2020. To
date, the knowledge regarding COVID-19 itself has evolved
significantly, and there are vaccinations widely available that are
used to protect against contraction and spread of the virus. It is
unclear what, if any, ongoing risk or harm the plaintiffs are
currently experiencing at Plainfield as a result of the conditions
described in their complaint. In the absence of an ongoing risk of
harm, any claim for injunctive relief is moot.

Thus, the Plaintiffs are afforded the opportunity to amend their
complaint accordingly, to include allegations of any ongoing
serious risks of harm present at Plainfield related to COVID-19,
and the specific injunctive relief they seek to remedy that ongoing
harm.

Second, the Plaintiffs seek monetary damages against the Individual
Defendants. However, Judge Hanlon notes, it is unclear from the
complaint what injury the three Plaintiffs have suffered.

Judge Hanlon opines that there is no factual basis upon which to
conclude that any Defendants' failure to follow COVID-19 protocols
or guidelines violated the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

The Plaintiffs allege they were unable to file grievances related
to the allegations in this complaint. This too, without more, fails
to state a claim, Judge Hanlon holds. Likewise, there is no First
Amendment right to a grievance process.

Finally, the Plaintiffs have not alleged that they themselves were
symptomatic for COVID-19 or were refused medical treatment as a
result of the Defendants' alleged misconduct, Judge Hanlon opines.
For example, even accepting as true the allegations that Warden
Knight patrolled the dorms after being directly exposed to a
positive case of COVID-19, or that Nurse Walker intentionally
coughed on dialysis patients stating that everyone should just get
COVID-19 and get it over, there is no factual basis to conclude
that the remaining Plaintiffs were negatively impacted by this
alleged misconduct.

Thus, the Plaintiffs are afforded the opportunity to amend their
complaint to include allegations of any direct harm they
experienced at Plainfield related to alleged conduct of the
Defendants, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Opportunity to Amend

The dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint will not lead to
dismissal of the action at present. Instead, the Plaintiffs will
have through Nov. 30, 2021, to amend their complaint to cure the
deficiencies as outlined by the Court.

An amended complaint will completely replace the original
complaint, Judge Hanlon states, citing Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d
897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017). Therefore, it must set out every
Defendant, claim, and factual allegation the Plaintiffs wish to
pursue in this action and identify which Defendants are responsible
for each alleged constitutional violation. It must also have the
proper case number, 1:20-cv-03248-JPH-MPB, and the words "Amended
Complaint" on the first page.

If the Plaintiffs file an amended complaint, it will be screened
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(b). If the Plaintiffs fail to
do so, this action will be dismissed without further notice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Nov. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/nredfedm from Leagle.com.


INTER-COAST INT'L: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of Nguyen Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY NGUYEN, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants v.
INTER-COAST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING, INC., Defendant and Respondent,
Case No. B305944 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California
for the Second District, Division Four, affirmed the order granting
Inter-Coast's motion to dismiss and denying the Plaintiffs' request
to amend the complaint.

Introduction

Plaintiff Nguyen filed a class-action lawsuit in May 2011 against
employer Inter-Coast for various Labor Code violations. The
five-year period for the case commenced on May 13, 2011, when
Nguyen filed a class-action complaint against Inter-Coast, alleging
six causes of action for various wage-and-hour violations. Nguyen
alleged that Inter-Coast, doing business as Intercoast Colleges,
failed to pay employees for all time worked, failed to pay
overtime, failed to provide adequate meal and rest breaks, and
committed other Labor Code violations.

Plaintiff Cheryl Alexander was added as a named Plaintiff in May
2015, and the court granted class certification in September 2015.
The case was stayed twice while Inter-Coast appealed court rulings
denying petitions to compel arbitration. A trial was set for
January 2020, just inside the five-year deadline under Code of
Civil Procedure, section 583.310.

The parties discovered at the final status conference two weeks
before trial that the court had granted summary judgment in favor
of Inter-Coast against a majority of class members, but the court
had not served the written ruling on the parties. The Plaintiffs
then requested additional time to name a new class representative.

Inter-Coast moved to dismiss under the five-year rule, asserting
that the active time of the case, not including the two stays
during appeals, exceeded five years. The Plaintiffs opposed the
motion to dismiss, asserting that an additional 14-day stay should
be subtracted from the five-year period, and that the court's
failure to serve the parties with a ruling on a discovery motion
prevented them from completing discovery before trial. The court
rejected the Plaintiffs' contentions, granted Inter-Coast's motion
to dismiss, and denied plaintiffs' request to amend the complaint.

The Plaintiffs appealed.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs argue that the five-year deadline had not yet
expired when the court granted Inter-Coast's motion to dismiss.
They assert that in addition to the two appeal stays, the court
should have subtracted time while the two arbitration petitions
were pending, and the periods in which the court failed to serve
the rulings on the motion for summary judgment and the October 2019
discovery motion. Inter-Coast asserts that other than the two
appeal stays, no other time should be subtracted from the five-year
period.

The Court of Appeals finds that the court imposed a 14-day stay in
May and June 2012 while Inter-Coast's first petition to compel
arbitration was pending, and no other time periods are exempted
from the five-year period. Thus, the five-year period had expired
when the court ruled on Inter-Coast's motion to dismiss on Feb. 13,
2020, and the motion was appropriately granted. Because it finds no
error regarding the court's dismissal, the Court of Appeals does
not address the Plaintiffs' additional contention that the court
erred in granting Inter-Coast's motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirms. It concludes that the active time in
the case exceeded five years, subtracting the two appeal stays and
a 14-day stay in May and June 2012 while Inter-Coast's first
petition to compel arbitration was pending. The Plaintiffs have
failed to demonstrate that any additional periods, including the
time in which the court did not serve the discovery ruling on the
parties, should be deemed a period in which it was "impossible,
impracticable, or futile" for the Plaintiffs to bring the case to
trial.

Because it finds no error regarding the court's ruling on
Inter-Coast's motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals does not
address the Plaintiffs' additional contentions that the court erred
in granting Inter-Coast's motion for summary judgment and denying
the Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend the complaint after
summary judgment was granted.

The judgment is affirmed. The Respondent is awarded costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/k8b689am from Leagle.com.

Aequitas Legal Group, Ronald H. Bae -- rbae@aequitaslegalgroup.com
-- Olivia D. Scharrer -- oscharrer@aequitaslegalgroup.com -- for
the Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Neil C. Evans and Neil C. Evans -- evanstnt@aol.com;
Roxborough, Pomerance, Nye & Adreani and Michael B. Adreani --
mba@rpnalaw.com -- for the Defendant and Respondent.


INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS: Frutarom CEO Seeks Dismissal of Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 8, 2021, for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2021, that an IFF shareholder filed a motion to approve a class
action in Israel against, among others, Frutarom, Frutarom CEO and
President Ori Yehudai, and Frutarom's former board of directors,
alleging that former minority shareholders of Frutarom were harmed
as a result of the US $20 million bonus paid to Yehudai. The
parties to this motion agreed to attempt to resolve the dispute
through mediation to take place regarding the aforesaid claim
against Yehudai.

On July 27, 2021, counsel to the movant in the class action filed a
notice with the court that the mediation process ended without an
agreement. On August 26, 2021, a motion to dismiss the class action
application was filed by Yehudai and certain former directors of
Frutarom. On September 9, 2021, an additional motion to dismiss was
filed by other former directors of Frutarom together with ICC
Industries, Inc. and its affiliates.

On July 27, 2021, counsel to the movant in the class action filed a
notice with the court that the mediation process ended without an
agreement.

On August 26, 2021, a motion to dismiss the class action
application was filed by Yehudai and certain former directors of
Frutarom.

"On September 9, 2021, an additional motion to dismiss was filed by
other former directors of Frutarom together with ICC Industries,
Inc. and its affiliates," the Company said.

New York-based International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., together
with its subsidiaries, engages in the creation and manufacture of
flavor and fragrance products in the United States and
internationally.

INTRICON CORP: Settlement in Hoffman Suit vs HHE Gets Initial Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Intricon Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the Court
preliminarily approved the settlement on the putative class action
lawsuit filed by Mark Hoffman against Hearing Help Express, Inc.
("HHE"), a subsidiary of the Company. Final Approval Hearing is
scheduled with the Court for Jan. 5, 2022.

On October 9, 2019, plaintiff Hoffman filed a putative class action
lawsuit against HHE in the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Washington (the "Court") alleging violations of the
federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

HHE's investigation revealed third-party lead generator Triangular
Media Corp. provided Hoffman's information to HHE.

Hoffman claims he did not provide the requisite prior express
written consent for auto-dialed telemarketing calls regarding
hearing aids to be placed to his cellphone.

He also claims he did not provide the requisite permission for
telemarketing calls to his number registered on the Do-Not-Call
("DNC") registry.

Since the initial complaint was filed, Hoffman amended his
complaint several times to add additional parties, including
Triangular, Triangular's alleged owner, an alleged entity related
to Triangular called LeadCreations.Com, LLC, Intricon, Inc., and
Intricon Corporation.

With respect to HHE, Hoffman sought to certify a class of certain
automated outbound telemarketing calls HHE allegedly made without
prior consent and calls made to numbers on the DNC registry, in the
last four years.

Hoffman also sought to hold the Company vicariously liable for all
of the calls HHE made without prior consent. The potential exposure
under the TCPA is $500 per call, or $1,500 per call if the
violation is deemed willful or knowing.

On July 26, 2021, the Company and the other defendants entered into
a Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release ("Settlement
Agreement") with Hoffman for himself and on behalf of the
settlement class relating to this matter.  

The Settlement Agreement was submitted to the Court for approval on
July 28, 2021.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, among other things, (a) the
Company has agreed to pay total cash consideration of $1.3 million
into a settlement fund, and (b) Hoffman and the settlement class
members agreed to a release of claims against the Company,
Intricon, Inc. and HHE relating to any claim or potential claim
relating to the marketing activities described in the complaint.

The class members releasing claims include any person who received,
on or after October 9, 2015, a non-emergency telephone call from or
on behalf of HHE and whose contact information was received either
directly or indirectly from Triangular and another vendor who
supplied phone numbers to HHE.

The Settlement Agreement will become effective, and payment will be
due, upon the first date after which the following events and
conditions have occurred: (a) the Court has entered a final
judgment; and (b) the final judgment has become final in that the
time for appeal or writ has expired or, if any appeal and/or
petition for review is taken and the settlement is affirmed, the
time period during which further petition for hearing, appeal, or
writ of certiorari can be taken has expired.

The $1.3 million settlement fund has been fully accrued for in the
Company's 2021 second quarter results because the amount of the
settlement was set forth in a confidential settlement term sheet
between the parties in June 2021.

The settlement fund is required to be paid within seven days after
the effective date. In entering into the Settlement Agreement, the
Company and the other defendants are making no admission of
liability.

The Settlement Agreement is subject to approval by the Court.

The Court preliminarily approved the settlement on August 4, 2021.


The Final Approval Hearing is scheduled with the Court for January
5, 2022.

The Settlement Agreement provides for a period of time during which
class members will be notified of the settlement and given an
opportunity to file a claim to receive a settlement payment, opt
out of the class, object to the settlement or do nothing.

"If the Court gives final approval to the settlement in January
2022, the release will be effective as to all class members who do
not validly out opt of the class, regardless of whether they filed
a claim form and received a payment," the Company said.

Intricon Corporation (together with its subsidiaries is an
international company and joint development manufacturer ("JDM") of
micromedical components, sub-assemblies and final devices. The
Company serves as a JDM partner to leading medical device original
equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") by designing, developing,
engineering, manufacturing, packaging and distributing micromedical
products for high growth markets, such as diabetes, peripheral
vascular, interventional pulmonology, electrophysiology and hearing
healthcare. The company is based in Arden Hills, Minnesota.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: Burks Suit Seeks to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALAN BURKS, et al., v.
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Case No. 1:16-cv-01102-CRC
(D.D.C.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the class in this action; and

   2. approving Plaintiffs' choice of The Perles Law Firm, P.C.
      and Fleischman Bonner & Rocco LLP to serve as counsel for
      the Class.

The Plaintiffs seek the certification of a Class consisting of:

   "all U.S. service members, military contractors and American
   civilians injured by terrorist attacks (the "EFP Attacks")
   involving explosively formed penetrators ("EFPs") during the
   U.S. military's operations in Iraq between 2005 and 2011 (the
   "Class Period"), the personal representatives of individuals
   killed in EFP Attacks, and the immediate family members of
   the foregoing individuals, with the exception of people who
   have retained counsel other than Class Counsel to pursue
   those claims."

All members of the Class assert one claim against the defendants,
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps, pursuant to the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign
immunity.

The Class Members' injuries arise from Iran's role in fashioning
EFPs, distributing them to Shi'a militia members in Iraq, and
educating those terrorists in assembling and using EFPs, to deadly
effect.

This case arises from Iran's campaign to distribute and deploy
sophisticated and powerful EFPs in Iraq that targeted members of
the U.S. military, military contractors, and other U.S. citizens.
Iran executed that campaign of terrorist attacks between 2005 and
the time U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Nov. 12,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3cnzv34
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

           Steven R. Perles, Esq.
           Edward B. MacAllister, Esq.
           Joshua K. Perles, Esq.
           PERLES LAW FIRM, PC
           816 Connecticut Ave., NW, 12th Floor
           Washington, DC 20006
           Telephone: (202) 955-9055

                - and -

           James P. Bonner, Esq.
           Patrick L. Rocco, Esq.
           Susan M. Davies, Esq.
           Thomas M. Caroccia, Esq.
           FLEISCHMAN BONNER & ROCCO LLP
           447 Springfield Avenue, 2nd Fl.
           Summit, NJ 07901
           Telephone: (908) 516-2045

JACK IN THE BOX: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Szwanek Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUDY SZWANEK; JAMES LOPEZ II, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants v.
JACK IN THE BOX, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
20-16942 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court order granting Jack in the
Box's motion to dismiss the operative complaint in the putative
class action.

To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must
show that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2)
the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a
place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied
public accommodations by the defendant because of her disability."
There is no dispute that Szwanek and Lopez are disabled, nor that
Jack in the Box restaurants are "places of public accommodation."
The only issue is whether Szwanek and Lopez were denied
accommodations "because of" their blindness.

The Ninth Circuit notes that in Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480,
1484 (9th Cir. 1996), a facially neutral policy, like the one at
issue in the case, violates the ADA only if it burdens a plaintiff
"in a manner different and greater than it burdens others." It
finds that the operative complaint does not plausibly allege that
the Jack in the Box policy did so. The refusal to serve food to
pedestrians at drive-through windows does not impact blind people
differently or in a greater manner than the significant population
of non-disabled people who lack access to motor vehicles. If these
non-disabled individuals wish to purchase food at Jack in the Box
restaurants when the dining rooms are closed, they face precisely
the same burden as blind people -- they must arrive at the
drive-through window in a vehicle driven by someone else.

Crowder is not to the contrary. At issue in that case was a Hawaii
policy requiring a 120-day quarantine for all dogs entering the
state. In finding the policy violated Title II of the ADA, the
Ninth Circuit stressed that although Hawaii's quarantine
requirement applies equally to all persons entering the state with
a dog, its enforcement burdens visually-impaired persons in a
manner different and greater than it burdens others. Because of the
unique dependence upon guide dogs among many of the
visually-impaired, Hawaii's quarantine effectively denies these
persons -- the Plaintiffs in the instant case -- meaningful access
to state services, programs, and activities while such services,
programs, and activities remain open and easily accessible by
others. It also noted the legislative history and governing
regulations made clear that "the general intent of Congress" in
enacting the ADA was "to ensure that individuals with disabilities
are not separated from their service animals."

In the case, in contrast, the Jack in the Box policy burdens the
Plaintiffs in precisely the same manner as non-disabled individuals
who wish to purchase food when indoor dining is not available at
the restaurants and do not drive or have access to motor vehicles.
Nor do ADA regulations give special solicitude to those who wish to
obtain takeout meals when restaurant dining rooms are closed.
Finally, there is no indication in the legislative history that
Congress meant to do so. The district court did not err in
dismissing the operative complaint.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/9n5sb66v from Leagle.com.


JC & BC: Resto Staff Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
------------------------------------------------
Evelia Martinez and Froylan Cortes, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. JC & BC, Inc., Hoon Ae
Chaing, Jung Yong Chaing and Does 1 through 20, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 21STCV40544 (Cal. Super., November 3, 2021),
seeks unpaid wages and interest thereon for failure to pay for all
hours worked and minimum wage rate, failure to authorize or permit
required meal periods, and failure to authorize or permit required
rest periods.  The Plaintiff also seeks statutory penalties for
failure to provide accurate wage statements, waiting time penalties
in the form of continuation wages for failure to timely pay
employees all wages due upon separation of employment, unfair
competition, injunctive relief and other equitable relief,
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest pursuant to
California Labor Code and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission
Wage Orders.

Defendants operate a sushi restaurant "Hama Restaurant" located at
213 Windward Ave., Venice, California where Plaintiffs worked as
non-exempt restaurant staff. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Kasey Diba, Esq.
      Amir T. Alavi, Esq.
      FINNEGAN & DIBA, A LAW CORPORATION
      3660 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800
      Los Angeles, CA 90010
      Telephone: (213) 480-0292
      Facsimile: (213) 480-0805


JOHNSON CONTROLS: Wisconsin Court Tosses Gumm's Amended Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARLENE D. GUMM, et al., Plaintiffs v. ALEX A.
MOLINAROLI, et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-1093-pp (E.D. Wis.),
Judge Pamela Pepper of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin issued an order:

   a. granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I and II
      of the amended complaint;

   b. granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts III
      through XII of the amended complaint but declining to
      exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims;

   c. granting the Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to File
      Supplemental Brief;

   d. denying as the Plaintiffs' motion to modify the PSLRA stay
      of discovery; and

   e. denying as moot the Plaintiffs' Rule 7(h) motion for leave
      to serve subpoenas on non-parties.

Background

The Plaintiffs are a group of former shareholders of Johnson
Controls, Inc. (JCI). In August 2016, they brought the class action
suit against JCI, its officers and directors, the Irish corporation
Tyco (with which JCI since has merged to form a new company) and
Merger Sub (the subsidiary through which the merger was
effectuated). The 134-page complaint alleged that JCI and its
leadership, as well as the entities with whom it (at that time)
intended to merge, had (in various combinations) violated federal
and state securities laws and federal tax laws, breached fiduciary
duties to the plaintiffs, been unjustly enriched, committed
state-law conversion, conspired, committed tortious interference
with contract and breach of contract and breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

In January 2017, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, after which the Plaintiffs amended the
complaint. The amended complaint raises 12 claims.

The first two claims are based on federal statutes. Count I asserts
that in making the allegedly false and misleading statements in the
S-4, the JCI Defendants violated Section 14(a) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Sections 78n(a)), SEC Rule
14a-9 (17 C.F.R. Section 240.14a-9) and SEC Rule 14a-101 (17 C.F.R.
Section 240.14a-101). It also asserts that the individual
Defendants violated Section 20 of the Act as "controlling persons."
In Count II, the Plaintiffs allege that the corporate Defendants
either filed, or were going to file, false Forms 1099 in violation
of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights II (26 U.S.C. Section 7434).

The last 10 claims are state-law claims. In Count III, the
Plaintiffs allege that the individual Defendants violated state law
fiduciary duties of due care, disclosure, good faith, loyalty, and
fair dealing by structuring the merger to benefit the corporation
and harm the Plaintiffs. Count IV alleges that the corporate
defendants aided and abetted the individual Defendants in violating
these duties. Count V alleges that all the defendants were unjustly
enriched by the merger structure and demands restitution. Count VI
alleges that the individual Defendants aided and abetted the unjust
enrichment of JCI and JCplc. Count VII claims that the corporate
defendants wrongfully converted the Plaintiffs' JCI stock through
the merger, and that the individual Defendants aided and abetted
that conversion.

Count VIII asserts that the JCI defendants violated Wis. Stat.
Section 180.0601 by treating shareholders with shares in taxable
accounts differently from shareholders with shares in non-taxable
accounts. Count IX alleges that all the Defendants conspired to
"(1) shift a substantial portion of JCI's and JCplc's liability for
U.S. income taxes to the Minority Taxpaying JCI Shareholders and
(2) impose on JCI shareholders the Inversion-Driven Costs to enable
Defendants to avoid the anti-inversion tax consequences imposed by
the Code on inverting corporations and their officers and
directors."

Count X alleges that the JCI defendants tortiously interfered with
JCI's duties under its articles of incorporation, a valid contract
under Wisconsin law. Count XI alleges that JCI breached its
contractual duties under its articles of incorporation by
structuring the merger to impose tax burdens on the Plaintiffs and
to reduce the Plaintiffs' equity in the new company. Finally, Count
XII alleges that JCI breached the covenants of good faith and fair
dealing.

The amended complaint does not identify the statutory basis for the
court's jurisdiction. The Court assumes that the Plaintiffs
intended to assert that the court has 28 U.S.C. Section 1331
federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in
Count I (violations of federal securities laws) and Count II
(violation of the federal Taxpayer Bill of Rights II), because the
Plaintiffs describe those two claims in the jurisdictional
statement. They also mention "the Court's pendent jurisdiction;" by
this, the Court assumes they mean that because it has federal
question jurisdiction to hear the first two claims, it may exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367 over the
ten state-law claims.

On April 3, 2017, the Defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim. They seek dismissal with
prejudice. The motion was fully briefed by June 15, 2017. The
Court, however, did not rule. In fact, it took over two years for
the Court to hold oral argument on the motion to dismiss; the Court
held that hearing on Oct. 17, 2019.

At the end of the hearing, the Court took the motion to dismiss
under advisement. It had planned to contact the parties "shortly"
to schedule a date for the Court to issue an oral ruling on the
motion to dismiss, and it told the parties as much. But although at
the Oct. 17, 2019 hearing, the Court had apologized to the parties
for the already-extensive delay in addressing the motion, the Court
did not act "shortly," or promptly. It did not rule, either orally
or in writing. It has been over two years since that hearing with
no ruling on the motion, even though the Plaintiffs since have
filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief, a motion to
modify the stay of the discovery under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, and a Civil Local Rule 7(h) expedited,
non-dispositive motion to serve subpoenas.

The delay finally prompted the Plaintiffs to petition for mandamus
from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. While the Court has
explanations for the delay, they are of no moment or succor to the
parties. There is no excuse for the Court having delayed this long
in ruling on the motion to dismiss, or the other pending motions.

Analysis

I. The Parties' Arguments

A. Defendants' opening motion

The Defendants first argue that Count I of the amended complaint
does not meet the heightened pleading standard that the PSLRA
imposes on Section 14(a) claims. Second, they argue that to state a
claim under Section 14(a), the Plaintiff must plead that any
misrepresentation or omission was "material;" they contend that
they have failed to demonstrate that any of the alleged
misrepresentations or omissions were material. Third, they argue
that the PSLRA and the case law require the Plaintiff to plead loss
causation. Fourth, they argue that the complaint does not plead a
Section 14(a) claim against the non-director officers of JCI or the
directors who did not sign the proxy statement. Finally, they
assert that the amended complaint does not state a "plausible
control-person claim" under Section 20(a).

The Defendants argue that the court also must dismiss Count II, the
claim that the corporate Defendants (the term the Plaintiffs use to
refer to JCI, Tyco/JCplc and Merger Sub) violated the Taxpayer Bill
of Rights II (26 U.S.C. Section 7434). The Defendants assert that
the Court must dismiss any claims relating to breach of fiduciary
duty because the Wisconsin business judgment rule supports the
judgment of corporate boards, officers and directors and because
"with a shareholder base as broad and diverse as JCI's, it is
simply not possible to please each shareholder with every decision,
and the law does not require that boards do so."

Finally, the Defendants assert that the remaining state law claims
are "just aliases" for the breach of fiduciary duty claims and must
fail for the same reasons.

B. Plaintiffs' opposition

The Plaintiffs respond that the amended complaint meets the
heightened pleading standard under the PSLRA, because with respect
to each alleged false and misleading statement in the S-4, they
have given reasons why the statement is misleading. They assert
that because the sufficiency of a pleading under the PSLRA's
heightened pleading standard is determined on a case-by-case basis,
"rulings in other cases on the adequacy of a complaint's
allegations are of limited utility." They next assert that the
omitted facts are material, emphasizing the failure to disclose
that JCI stockholders allegedly were short-changed $5.46 billion to
achieve a tax savings of only $450 million and the allegation that
the Defendants and their financial advisors did not consider the
impact of the inversion structure on stockholders like them. They
assert that they have adequately alleged loss causation by alleging
the $5.46 billion cost of the $450 million tax savings and the fact
that they are being forced to pay hundreds of millions in taxes.
They assert that they have alleged "control person" liability under
Section 20, noting that this is a factual question often not
susceptible to determination at the pleadings stage.

The Plaintiffs also assert that they have stated a claim under the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, arguing that the 1099s issued by JCplc
to the JCI shareholders were "the product of a scheme that was
conceived by the Individual Defendants in breach of their fiduciary
duties and approved by uninformed JCI shareholders on the basis of
a misleading proxy statement that violated Rule 14a-9." The
Plaintiffs assert that the actions that led to the issuance of the
1099s constituted intentional violations of legal duties; had those
violations not happened, the plaintiffs would not have had to pay
taxes and 1099s would not have been needed.

The Plaintiffs assert that the amended complaint states a claim for
various breaches of fiduciary duty. They emphasize a board's duty
to maximize shareholder value, and while they concede that there
were shareholder groups with varying interests, they argue that the
Defendants chose to maximize their own interests over those of any
shareholder group. They argue that the Wisconsin business judgment
rule applies only when corporate directors make "informed good
faith decisions." They assert that the Defendants did not do that
in structuring the merger and in failing to disclose information
about that structure. They assert that their other state-law claims
are sufficiently pled.

C. Defendants' reply

In their reply brief, the Defendants argue that the amended
complaint violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. They argue that despite the
length of their opposition brief, the Plaintiffs still have not
identified what statements were misleading as the result of what
omissions or why. They reiterate that the plaintiffs seek to assert
a Section 20 claim against individual Defendants who did not allow
their names to be used to solicit proxies or participate in any
drafting.

The Defendants again emphasize that the Plaintiffs have not
identified how the 1099s were inaccurate and repeat that the Court
must dismiss the Taxpayer Bill of Rights claim. They argue that the
Plaintiffs' fiduciary duty claims cannot survive the application of
the Wisconsin business judgment rule. They also urge the Court to
dismiss the claim as to the individual officer Defendants because
the amended complaint does not specify what each did wrong. They
conclude by briefly touching, again, on the remaining state-law
claims.

D. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a supplemental brief

After the October 2019 hearing on the motion to dismiss, the
Plaintiffs asked the court to allow them to file a supplemental
brief. They sought to respond to two issues raised at that hearing.
The proposed supplemental brief is only five pages. In it, the
Plaintiffs first sought to respond to a case the Defendants had
cited at oral argument, Trahan v. Interactive Intelligence Grp.,
Inc., 308 F.Supp.3d 977 (S.D. Ind. 2018). The Plaintiffs argue that
Trahan is distinguishable from the facts in the case for several
reasons. Id. at 1-4. Second, the plaintiffs recount that at oral
argument, "the Court mentioned TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) and asked whether the Amended Complaint
contained any allegations that the shareholder vote would have been
different had the alleged omissions been disclosed." They point out
that they need not prove that the allegedly omitted information
would have caused any shareholder to change his or her vote.

The Defendants responded to the motion. They asserted that the
Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish Trahan does the opposite -- it
supports the Defendants' assertion that the Court should dismiss
the amended complaint. As for the question the Court asked at the
hearing, the Defendants responded that "it is black letter law that
Plaintiffs must plead facts that demonstrate that an omitted fact
would have been significant to a reasonable investor in deciding
how to vote."

Judge Pepper finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead the
first and second elements of a Section 14(a)/Rule 14a-9 securities
fraud claim -- material omissions and loss causation. She says, it
would be futile to allow the Plaintiffs to amend the complaint a
second time to try to cure this defect, because the Plaintiffs'
allegations are claims of breach of fiduciary duty masquerading as
securities fraud claims. Judge Pepper will grant the Defendants'
motion to dismiss Count I of the amended complaint with prejudice.

Judge Pepper will also grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss
Count II with prejudice. She concludes that the Plaintiffs have
failed to state a claim for a violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7434.
Count II, like Count I, is an attempt to force the square peg of a
breach of fiduciary duty claim through the round hole of a 26
U.S.C. Section 7434 claim. The Plaintiffs have not alleged that the
Defendants were not going to make the payments that they announced
they would report on the Forms 1099. Nor have they alleged that the
payments the Defendants planned to report on the Forms 1099 would
fraudulently misstate the source, amounts or recipients of the
payments. They allege only that the Defendants should not have had
reason to file Forms 1099 because they could have acted in such a
way as to avoid giving rising to the tax obligations that required
the filing of the forms.

The remaining claims -- Counts III through XII -- are state-law
claims, all relating to the Plaintiffs' allegations that the
individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs by structuring the merger to protect themselves and the
new company from tax liability and to shift the tax burden to the
Plaintiffs.

Judge Pepper will dismiss Counts III through XII without prejudice,
relinquishing the Court's supplemental jurisdiction over those
claims. She disagrees that the Court should exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims in Counts III
through XII. She has concluded that the fiduciary duty and related
state-law claims substantially predominate over the claims over
which it had original jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. Section
1367(c), that would have been a reason for the Court to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction even had it not dismissed the
federal causes of action. Finally, Judge Pepper cannot say that it
is "absolutely clear" that the Plaintiffs have not alleged facts
sufficient to state a claim that the actions of the individual
Defendants were not subject to some exception to Wisconsin's
business judgment rule.

Conclusion

Judge Pepper grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I and
II of the amended complaint and orders that those counts are
dismissed with prejudice. She also grants the Defendants' motion to
dismiss Counts III through XII of the amended complaint but
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims
and orders that those counts are dismissed without prejudice.

Judge Pepper grants the Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to File
Supplemental Brief.

The Clerk of Court must docket the supplemental brief at Dkt. No.
71-1 as a separate, supplemental brief in opposition to the motion
to dismiss.

Judge Pepper denies as moot the Plaintiffs' (i) motion to modify
the PSLRA stay of discovery and (ii) Rule 7(h) motion for leave to
serve subpoenas on non-parties.

The case is dismissed. The clerk will enter judgment accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mj4vxtf4 from Leagle.com.


JUUL LABS: Daleville City Sues Over E-Cigarette Campaign to Youth
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DALEVILLE CITY SCHOOLS, DALE COUNTY, STATE OF ALABAMA, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS,
INC. F/K/A PAX LABS, INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS
PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH; RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA
CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP
MORRIS USA, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-08897 (N.D. Cal.,
November 17, 2021) is a class action against the Defendants for
negligence, gross negligence, and violations of Alabama Public
Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, the suit says.

Daleville City Schools, Dale County, State of Alabama is a school
district with its offices located at 626 N. Daleville Ave.,
Daleville, Alabama.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  

         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         Davis S. Vaughn, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW
         METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Davis.Vaughn@BeasleyAllen.com

JUUL LABS: Faces Brandywine Suit Over Youth Health Crisis in Del.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRANDYWINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA GROUP,
INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC, ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN, NICHOLAS
PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, AND RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case No.
3:21-cv-08923-WHO (N.D. Cal., November 17, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and
violations of Delaware Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, the suit says.

Brandywine School District is a school district with its offices
located on 1311 Brandywine Boulevard, Wilmington, Delaware.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Khaldoun Baghdadi, Esq.
         WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER, P.C.
         650 California Street, 26th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94108
         Telephone: (415) 617-1269
         E-mail: kbaghdadi@walkuplawoffice.com        

                 - and –

         Philip C. Federico, Esq.
         Brent P. Ceryes, Esq.
         Matthew P. Legg, Esq.
         SCHOCHOR, FEDERICO & STATON, P.A.
         The Paulton
         1211 St. Paul Street
         Baltimore, MD 21202
         E-mail: pfederico@sfspa.com

                 - and –

         John P. Fiske, Esq.
         BARON & BUDD, P.C.
         11440 West Bernardo Court Suite 265
         San Diego, CA 92127
         Telephone: (858) 251-7424
         Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
         E-mail: jfiske@baronbudd.com

                 - and –

         Chase T. Brockstedt, Esq.
         BAIRD MANDALAS BROCKSTEDT LLC
         1413 Savannah Rd., Suite 1
         Lewes, DE 19958
         E-mail: chase@bmbde.com

JUUL LABS: Faces Griffith Suit Over Youth Health Crisis in Indiana
------------------------------------------------------------------
GRIFFITH PUBLIC SCHOOLS, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX LABS,
INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH;
RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-08861 (N.D. Cal., November 16, 2021)
is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of Indiana Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, the suit says.

Griffith Public Schools is a public-school corporation with its
offices located on North Raymond in Griffith, Indiana.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Thomas P. Cartmell, Esq.
         Jonathan P. Kieffer, Esq.
         Tyler W. Hudson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF & CARTMELL LLP
         4740 Grand Ave., Ste. 300
         Kansas City, MO 64112
         Telephone: (816) 701-1100
         Facsimile: (816) 531-2372
         E-mail: tcartmell@wcllp.com
                 jpkieffer@wcllp.com
                 thudson@wcllp.com

                 - and –

         Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
         Brad Honnold, Esq.
         GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
         9500 Nall Ave., Ste. 400
         Overland Park, KS 66207
         Telephone: (913) 451-3433
         E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com
                 bhonnold@gohonlaw.com

                 - and –

         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW
         METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com

                 - and –

         Rahul Ravipudi, Esq.
         PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP
         11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700
         Los Angeles, CA 90025
         Telephone: (310) 477-1700
         Facsimile: (310) 477-1699
         E-mail: ravipudi@psblaw.com

                 - and –

         John P. Fiske, Esq.
         BARON & BUDD, P.C.
         11440 West Bernardo Court Suite 265
         San Diego, CA 92127
         Telephone: (858) 251-7424
         Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
         E-mail: jfiske@baronbudd.com

                 - and –

         Khaldoun Baghdadi, Esq.
         WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER, P.C.
         650 California Street, 26th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94108
         Telephone: (415) 617-1269
         E-mail: kbaghdadi@walkuplawoffice.com

JUUL LABS: Indianapolis Sues Over E-Cigarette Campaign to Youth
---------------------------------------------------------------
INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX LABS,
INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH;
RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-08863 (N.D. Cal., November 16, 2021)
is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of Indiana Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, the suit says.

Indianapolis Public Schools is a public school district with its
offices located on East Walnut Street in Indianapolis, Indiana.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Thomas P. Cartmell, Esq.
         Jonathan P. Kieffer, Esq.
         Tyler W. Hudson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF & CARTMELL LLP
         4740 Grand Ave., Ste. 300
         Kansas City, MO 64112
         Telephone: (816) 701-1100
         Facsimile: (816) 531-2372
         E-mail: tcartmell@wcllp.com
                 jpkieffer@wcllp.com
                 thudson@wcllp.com

                 - and –

         Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
         Brad Honnold, Esq.
         GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
         9500 Nall Ave., Ste. 400
         Overland Park, KS 66207
         Telephone: (913) 451-3433
         E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com
                 bhonnold@gohonlaw.com

                 - and –

         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW
         METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com

                 - and –

         Rahul Ravipudi, Esq.
         PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP
         11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700
         Los Angeles, CA 90025
         Telephone: (310) 477-1700
         Facsimile: (310) 477-1699
         E-mail: ravipudi@psblaw.com

                 - and –

         John P. Fiske, Esq.
         BARON & BUDD, P.C.
         11440 West Bernardo Court Suite 265
         San Diego, CA 92127
         Telephone: (858) 251-7424
         Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
         E-mail: jfiske@baronbudd.com

                 - and –

         Khaldoun Baghdadi, Esq.
         WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER, P.C.
         650 California Street, 26th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94108
         Telephone: (415) 617-1269
         E-mail: kbaghdadi@walkuplawoffice.com

JUUL LABS: Triggers E-Cigarette Youth Crisis, Etowah Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
ETOWAH COUNTY SCHOOLS, STATE OF ALABAMA, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A
PAX LABS, INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER;
HOYOUNG HUH; RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT
SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS
USA, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-08910 (N.D. Cal., November
17, 2021) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence,
gross negligence, and violations of Alabama Public Nuisance Law and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, the suit says.

Etowah County Schools, State of Alabama is a school district with
its offices located at 3200 West Meighan Blvd., Gadsden, Alabama.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  

         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         Davis S. Vaughn, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW
         METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Davis.Vaughn@BeasleyAllen.com

KENSINGTON REDWOOD: Tolosa Suit Remanded to San Mateo Super. Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMILY TOLOSA, Plaintiff v. KENSINGTON REDWOOD CITY
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-05564-MMC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted Tolosa's Motion to Remand Action to
State Court filed on Aug. 19, 2021.

In her complaint, filed June 2, 2021 in state court, Tolosa, who
alleges she formerly was jointly employed by Defendants KSL and
KRC, asserts, on her own behalf and on behalf of a putative class
of other employees, eight state law claims, all arising out of two
unwritten employment policies or practices.

As to the first, Tolosa alleges that "from time to time," the
Defendants "required" employees to "work without paying them for
all the time they were under defendants' control," which work
Tolosa describes as "work before and after the beginning of a
shift," and that, when such "off-the-clock" work was performed, the
Defendants had a "uniform policy and practice" not to pay employees
for such work. As to the second, Tolosa alleges, the Defendants
required employees to "carry communication devices, such as radios
and/or walkie-talkies, on them during their entire shifts,"
including during all meal and rest breaks, thereby causing
employees to remain "on-call and on-duty during what was supposed
to be their off-duty period."

On July 20, 2021, KSL removed the instant action, asserting the
district court has diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d). It is undisputed
that Tolosa is a citizen of California, and Judge Chesney finds KSL
has sufficiently shown it is a cJudge Chesney next turns, is
whether the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.

KSL argues, the amount in controversy is $6,646,573.59. However,
Judge Chesney finds the amount in controversy established by a
preponderance of the evidence is, at best, $4,539,014.81. First, as
to the meal break claim, she finds KSL has sufficiently
demonstrated the amount in controversy is $1,509,321.24 (69,426
shifts worked in excess of six hours × $21.74 average hourly
rate), and, as to the rest break claim, the amount in controversy
is $1,674,914.82 (77,043 shifts worked in excess of 3.5 hours ×
$21.74 average hourly rate).

Second, as to the "waiting time penalty" claim, i.e., the claim
that the Defendants did not pay employees at the end of their
employment all "wages" due, in particular "wages" due for "missed
meal and rest breaks," Judge Chesney finds that KSL has
sufficiently shown the amount in controversy as to former full-time
employees is $550,919.86 (111 employees × 30 day statutory period
x $21.74 average hourly rate × 7.61 average shift length) and that
the amount in controversy as to former part-time employees is
$295,903.14 (65 employees × 30 x $21.74 × 6.98 average shift
length), for a total of $846,823.

Third, as to the claim that the Defendants provided employees with
inaccurate paychecks, in that, for example, the paychecks failed to
show "missed meal and rest periods," Judge Chesney finds KSL has
sufficiently shown the amount in controversy is $237,000 ((142 wage
statements × $50 penalty) + (2299 wage statements x $100
penalty)).

The total amount in controversy as to the discussed claims is
$4,268,059.06. Consequently, as to the remaining claims for which
KSL has endeavored to calculate an amount in controversy,
specifically, claims for overtime compensation, payment of the
minimum wage, and an award of attorneys' fees,6 the remaining issue
is whether KSL has shown that amount totals at least $731,940.95.

With respect to the claim for overtime compensation, KSL asserts
the amount in controversy is $326,589.15, calculated by multiplying
30,045, the number of hours its records reflect were worked in
excess of eight hours per shift, by $10.87, half the average hourly
rate. As explained by KSL, it understands Tolosa to be claiming
employees who were credited with more than eight hours of work were
paid their regular hourly rate for those additional hours rather
than at the time-and-a-half rate applicable to overtime work. KSL,
however, misreads Tolosa's complaint. The overtime compensation
claim does not seek an additional sum for recorded hours, but,
rather, full payment for time worked off the clock, i.e., time not
recorded, when such work was in excess of eight hours a day or 40
hours in a workweek. Moreover, the complaint does not include facts
suggesting the frequency by which employees worked off the clock,
and KSL has not submitted any evidence that might otherwise
indicate the claimed frequency.

As to the claim for failure to pay minimum wages, KSL asserts the
amount in controversy is $213,660.72, calculated by multiplying
9,828, the number of applicable pay periods, by $21.74, the average
hourly rate. As explained by KSL, it understands Tolosa to be
claiming each employee was not paid for one hour of regular
off-the-clock work every two weeks. Although, in this instance, KSL
has not misread the complaint, its calculation is not based on any
factual allegation as to frequency, nor has KSL submitted any
evidence that might otherwise indicate the claimed frequency and
length of such occurrences. Additionally, even if KSL had been able
to provide a reasonable estimate as to frequency, such figure would
not be multiplied by the employees' regular rate of pay, but,
rather, by the applicable minimum wage, which, during the class
period, ranged from $10.50 to $14.

Lastly, as to the claim for attorneys' fees, KSL argues the amount
in controversy is 25% of the amount the putative class seeks on its
substantive claims. As the Ninth Circuit has held, however, even
where it may be appropriate to use a "percentage-based method" to
estimate the amount of claimed attorneys' fees, such percentage
cannot be based on damages awarded on claims for which a state does
"not allow recovery of attorneys' fees," such as, in California,
"legal work relating to meal and rest breaks."

In the case, Judge Chesney holds that even assuming KSL can rely on
a percentage method, the amount in controversy would be limited to
25% of the amount in controversy KSL has shown is attributable to
claims other than the meal and rest break claims, i.e., the claims
for waiting time penalties and inaccurate paychecks. The amount in
controversy as to those two claims is, as noted, $1,083,823, and
25% thereof is $270,955.75, which amount, when added to
$4,268,059.06, the amount in controversy KSL has sufficiently
demonstrated as to the substantive claims, totals $4,539,014.81, a
figure below the requisite statutory minimum.

Accordingly, KSL has failed to show the Court has jurisdiction over
Tolosa's complaint.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Chesney granted Tolosa's motion
to remand, and the action is remanded to the Superior Court of
California, in and for the County of San Mateo.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/52mzjve4 from Leagle.com.


KEYCITY CAPITAL: Motion to Compel Non-Party Filed in Starling Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the putative class action lawsuit styled KIMBERLY STARLING, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. KEYCITY
CAPITAL, LLC and TIE LASATER, Case No. 1:21-cv-11866, the Plaintiff
filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts on November 17, 2021 a motion to compel non-party
Mobilesphere, LLC, doing business as Slybroadcast, to produce
documents pursuant to a subpoena served on the non-party in the
case captioned as Starling v. KeyCity Capital, LLC et al., Case.
No. 3:21-cv-818-S on April 9, 2021.

Mobilesphere, LLC, doing business as Slybroadcast, is a
telecommunications service provider in Boston, Massachusetts.

KeyCity Capital, LLC is a private equity firm in Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
                  
         Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
         PARONICH LAW, P.C.
         350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
         Hingham, MA 02043
         Telephone: (617) 485-0018
         Facsimile: (508) 318-8100
         E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com

                 - and –

         Chris Miltenberger, Esq.
         THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER, PLLC
         1360 N. White Chapel, Suite 200
         Southlake, TX 76092
         Telephone: (817) 416-5060
         Facsimile: (817) 416-5062
         E-mail: chris@crmlawpractice.com

                 - and –

         Max S. Morgan, Esq.
         Eric H. Weitz, Esq.
         THE WEITZ FIRM, LLC
         1528 Walnut Street, 4th Floor
         Philadelphia, PA 19102
         Telephone: (267) 587-6240
         Facsimile: (215) 689-0875
         E-mail: max.morgan@theweitzfirm.com
                 eric.weitz@theweitzfirm.com

LEPRINO FOODS: Seeks to Strike Evidence in Howell Class Cert Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANDREW HOWELL, on behalf
of himself and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals, v. LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation;
LEPRINO FOODS DAIRY PRODUCTS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; and
DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No. 1:18-cv-01404-AWI-BAM (E.D. Cal.),
the Defendants ask the Court to enter an order striking certain
evidence submitted by the Plaintiff in support of his motion for
class certification, specifically Dkt. 84-3 and 84-4, pages 4
through 17 and pages 22 through 38.

This motion is made on the grounds that Plaintiff has filed
declarations containing false and misleading testimony, which is
significantly contradicted by the declarants' deposition testimony,
the Defendants contend.

Leprino Foods is an American company with headquarters in Denver,
Colorado that produces cheese, lactose, whey protein and sweet
whey.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Nov. 15, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FppAqj at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Sandra L. Rappaport, Esq.
          Lisa M. Pooley, Esq.
          Winston K. Hu, Esq.
          Gymmel Trembly, Esq.
          HANSON BRIDGETT LLP
          425 Market Street, 26th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 777-3200
          Facsimile: (415) 541-9366
          E-mail: srappaport@hansonbridgett.com
                  lpooley@hansonbridgett.com
                  whu@hansonbridgett.com
                  gtrembly@hansonbridgett.com

LINCOLN NATIONAL: Settlement Reached in Suit vs Subsidiaries
------------------------------------------------------------
The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 8, 2021, for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2021, that the parties in the case captioned Hanks v. Lincoln Life
& Annuity Company of New York ("LLANY") and Voya Retirement
Insurance and Annuity Company informed the presiding judge that
they have reached a settlement of the action, subject to court
approval.

Hanks v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Company of New York ("LLANY") and
Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company, filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, No.
1:16-cv-6399, is a putative class action that was served on LLANY
on August 12, 2016.

Plaintiff owns a universal life policy originally issued by Aetna
(now Voya) and alleges that (i) Voya breached the terms of the
policy when it increased non-guaranteed cost of insurance rates on
Plaintiff's policy; and (ii) LLANY, as reinsurer and administrator
of Plaintiff's policy, engaged in wrongful conduct related to the
cost of insurance increase and was unjustly enriched as a result.

Plaintiff seeks to represent all owners of Aetna life insurance
policies that were subject to non-guaranteed cost of insurance rate
increases in 2016 and seeks damages on their behalf.

On March 13, 2019, the court issued an order granting plaintiff's
motion for class certification for the breach of contract claim and
denying such motion with respect to the unjust enrichment claim
against LLANY, and, on September 12, 2019, the court issued an
order approving the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal with
respect to the unjust enrichment claim and dismissed LLANY as a
defendant in the case.

In light of LLANY's role as reinsurer and administrator under the
1998 coinsurance agreement with Aetna (now Voya), and of the
parties' rights and obligations thereunder, LLANY continues to be
actively engaged in the defense of this case.

On September 30, 2020, the court denied plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment and granted in part Voya's motion for summary
judgment.

On October 22, 2021, the parties informed the presiding judge that
they have reached a settlement of the action, subject to court
approval.

The parties requested the suspension of the current case-schedule,
including trial date, and 45 days to prepare a final settlement
agreement and motion for preliminary approval.

On October 25, 2021, the presiding judge approved the parties'
request.

"The terms of the provisional settlement remain confidential," the
Company said.

The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company provides insurance
services. The Company focuses on life insurance, annuities,
accident, health, dental, accident, critical illness, group
benefits, individual and group retirement plans. Lincoln National
Life Insurance serves customers in the United States. The company
is based in Fort Wayne, Indiana.


LOS ANGELES RAMS: Loses Bid to File Trial in Relocation Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Birmingham, writing for California News Times, reports that
Rams may have moved from St. Louis many years ago, but trials for
the move continue to take place in the city.

The National Football League and the Los Angeles Rams have lost
efforts to file a scheduled January trial in a lawsuit over the
relocation of the team elsewhere in Missouri, rather than the
team's former hometown of St. Louis.

The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected the bid with a simple
decision that did not elaborate on the reasons for the decision.
The NFL, Rams and other defendants argued that the trial should be
transferred because of the risk of prejudice against the league and
team from the jury in St. Louis.

The City, St. Louis County, Regional Convention and Sports Complex
Authority have sued the NFL and Rams. 2017, claim The league did
not respect its own relocation policy and negotiated in good faith
to prevent Rams from relocating from the city in 2016.

The defendants in the proceedings are Rams owner Croenke Sports &
Entertainment, 31 other professional soccer teams, and their
owners.

The proceedings seek damages of at least $ 1 billion.

defendant Tried to move the trial Get out of the St. Louis area by
quoting Rule 51.04, which allows you to move the trial if there is
a favor for pre-trial propaganda.

The lawsuit said the city lost $ 1.85 million to $ 3.5 million
annually in entertainment and ticket collection, $ 7.5 million in
property tax and $ 1.4 million in sales tax, for a total loss of
more than $ 100 million. Insist.

Last month, the judge who handled the case fined four NFL owners
about $ 44,000 for failing to file the case's financial
statements.

And in a trial scheduled for January, the proceedings appear to
have caused friction among NFL owners. According to the article by
ESPNRams owner Stan Kroenke angered other owners in an attempt to
transfer responsibility for the proceedings-related bill to another
team.

Attorneys' fees related to the Rams relocation include a class
action proceeding settled in 2018 for $ 24 million.

Rams has settled with a fan who has sued the team to replenish the
money for a personal seat license.

The NFL team charges fans a one-time fee that gives them the right
to buy season tickets and use their proceeds to fund the stadium.

Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones defended Kroenke at the NFL's Fall
Conference in New York City, according to an ESPN report. Jones is
also mentioned in the St. Louis proceedings. This suggests that
Kroenke and Jones allegedly colluded to "plan to move the Rams to
Los Angeles and convince other member teams to approve the move."

The proceedings also allege that Kroenke and Jones discussed the
current SoFi stadium site in Inglewood, California. Dating back to
2013. And it claims that Jones "intentionally hampered" St. Louis'
"reasonable business expectations."

Legend, a hospitality and marketing company co-owned by Jones
Benefited From the movement of Rams. The company signed a
sponsorship deal with Rams to help land the stadium. Naming rights
deal Contracted with SoFi in 2019. The deal is said to be worth
more than $ 30 million annually. Bloomberg.

Legends was founded in 2008 by Jones Concessions LP, an affiliate
of the New York Yankees and Cowboys.The parties sold most of the
legend to a private equity firm Six Street January last year.
According to PitchBook, the deal is worth about $ 688 million and
the legend is valued at $ 1.35 billion.

In addition to damages, plaintiffs are also seeking some of the
increased valuations associated with Rams' move. Worth $ 4.8
billion, according to Rams Forbes. That's an increase from $ 1.5
billion in 2015, last season in St. Louis, Rams.

NFL and Rams lose court fight to move relocation trial out of St.
Louis Source link NFL and Rams lose court fight to move relocation
trial out of St. Louis [GN]

MARRIOTT INT'L: Court Overrules Objection in Hall Consumer Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled TODD HALL, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MARRIOTT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01715-JLS-AHG (S.D.
Cal.), District Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California overrules the
Defendant's objection to a magistrate judge's order.

The Defendant filed an Objection to Magistrate Judge Goddard's
Order Resolving Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery
Dispute.

Background

In this putative consumer class action, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant engages in false and deceptive advertising in the way it
represents the prices for its hotel rooms, services, and amenities
and assert causes of action on behalf of a putative class for: (1)
violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (2)
violations of the False Advertising Law ("FAL"); (3) violations of
the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (4) unjust enrichment/quasi
contract; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6)
concealment/non-disclosure; and (7) intentional misrepresentation.

The factual allegations in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Class Action
Complaint ("TAC") relevant to the Court's resolution of the instant
matter are summarized as follows. The Defendant is a multinational
hospitality company that owns, manages, and franchises at least 189
hotels and resorts worldwide. The Defendant advertises its
available rooms and daily room rates online through its own website
and the websites of third-party online travel agencies ("OTAs"),
such as Priceline and Expedia.

When a consumer uses the Defendant's website to search for a hotel
room by destination and date, the website will list various hotels
and rooms with matching availability and provide the consumer with
a quoted daily room rate. At this initial stage, the quoted daily
room rate for each hotel does not include or mention any additional
fees the consumer will be required to pay.

Once a consumer selects a particular hotel, Defendant's website
directs the consumer to another webpage that lists the available
rooms at that hotel, along with the daily rates for those rooms, in
large, bold font. This webpage also displays a light blue box at
the top of the page with small, blue, bold font that states that a
"daily destination amenity fee will be added to the room rate,"
followed by the hours for the property's concierge
lounge--apparently linking the destination amenity fee to use of
the concierge lounge.

Once the consumer selects a specific room from the selected hotel,
the Defendant's website brings the consumer to another webpage
titled "Review Reservation Details." This webpage displays a
picture of the room; the details of the reservation, such as the
reservation date, number of rooms, and guests per room; the quoted
daily room rate; and additional "USD Taxes and fees" to be charged.
There are also two drop-down menus at the bottom of this webpage,
one titled "Choose Room Features" and the other titled "Summary of
Charges." If the consumer clicks the Summary of Charges drop-down
menu, a breakdown of what charges are included in the "USD Taxes
and fees" charge appears: the "destination amenity fee" and
"estimated government taxes and fees."

By combining the amenity fee with tax payments in a generic heading
of "USD Taxes and fees," the Defendant misleads the consumer into
believing the amenity fees are government-imposed charges. Also
included in the Summary of Charges breakdown in smaller,
lighter-colored font is a list of "Additional Charges," including
rates for on-site and valet parking. The Defendant does not inform
the consumer what is included in either the destination amenity fee
(e.g., wifi, use of the concierge lounge, use of the business
center, etc.) or the government taxes and fees.

The Defendant further misleads consumers with inconsistent
representations on its website regarding what amenities are covered
by the amenity fee or are offered complimentary.

As with its own website, the Defendant fails to include resort
and/or amenity fees in the quoted room rates advertised by OTAs.
When a consumer searches for a hotel room using the reservation
system on Expedia, for example, the consumer receives a quoted room
rate that does not include or mention any resort or amenity fee.
When the consumer clicks "Select your room" under the quoted daily
room rate on Expedia's webpage, the consumer is directed to another
webpage that again quotes the same rate without inclusion or
mention of a resort or amenity fee.

The Defendant also deceives consumers on OTA websites by misusing
former price comparisons. For example, the Defendant may advertise
a room rate on an OTA's website by putting a lower rate in large,
bold font (the "bargain" rate or "bait" price) next to a higher
room rate in smaller, strikethrough font. Then, later in the
vending process, the Defendant increases the bargain/bait price to
include additional fees/taxes, bringing the total room rate back up
to the originally-advertised strikethrough price.

Procedural Background of the Instant Discovery Dispute

On June 4, 2021, the Plaintiff served amended objections and
responses to the Defendant's first set of discovery requests. On
June 24, 2021, the parties brought a dispute to Magistrate Judge
Goddard pursuant to her Chambers Rules concerning Defendant's
Request for Production ("RFP") No. 16, which seeks: All documents
dated Jan. 1, 2012, to Dec. 31, 2017, relating to any purchase by
the Plaintiff or someone acting on his behalf and/or at his
direction of any product or service for which he was charged and
paid a mandatory fee, including but not limited to fees associated
with hotels, airline tickets, sporting event tickets, and concert
tickets.

After conducting a telephonic discovery conference, Judge Goddard
issued a briefing schedule, and the parties filed a Joint Motion
for Determination of Discovery Dispute ("Joint Motion") on July 15,
2021.

On Aug. 5, 2021, Judge Goddard issued an order resolving the Joint
Motion and denying the Defendant's request to compel the Plaintiff
to produce documents in response to RFP No. 16.

The Defendant filed the instant Objection to Judge Goddard's Aug.
5, 2021 Order on Aug. 19, 2021.

Analysis

As an initial matter, the Defendant appears to be using this review
process to raise a new argument that it did not raise to Judge
Goddard, Judge Sammartino observes. In the Joint Motion, the
Defendant framed its argument concerning the relevancy of RFP No.
16 solely based on the Plaintiff's credibility before a jury.

Nevertheless, because the Defendant based its credibility argument
on the same theory that it now bases its standing argument--that
the Plaintiff's familiarity with partition pricing in general,
regardless of the industry, is relevant to whether he was deceived
by or actually relied on the Defendant's pricing disclosures--the
Court will address this aspect of the Defendant's Objection.

In her order, Judge Goddard disagreed with the Defendant's theory,
finding that the fee structures and disclosures, as well as
purchasing models for other industries, such as those identified by
RFP No. 16, are distinguishable from the hotel reservations at
issue in this case, and, therefore, irrelevant.

Judge Sammartino opines that this determination was not clearly
erroneous. First, as Judge Goddard found, the Defendant has not met
its burden to show that the Plaintiff's familiarity or experience
with partition pricing in other industries is probative of whether
he actually relied on or was deceived by the Defendant's use of
partition pricing.

The Defendant's position that the crux of this case is about
whether partition pricing--irrespective of the form it takes--is or
is not deceptive is rebutted by the Plaintiff's detailed
allegations in the TAC of how the Defendant allegedly deceives
consumers with partition pricing on its website or on the websites
of OTAs and the Plaintiff's reliance on the Defendant's specific
practices, Judge Sammartino notes. Although the Plaintiff may be
familiar with the concept of partition pricing generally from
exposure to the practice in, for example, the music, airline, or
sporting industries, whether or not the Plaintiff was deceived by
the Defendant's practices may be highly dependent on the manner in
which the Defendant uses partition pricing.

The Defendant acknowledges in its Objection that not all companies,
who sell goods and services over the internet, use partition
pricing in the same way but draws no comparison between the
practices in the other industries it seeks discovery in and those
used by the Defendant. The Defendant posits that Judge Goddard
failed to make any meaningful comparison between the Defendant's
pricing practices and the pricing practices used in other
industries, but it is the Defendant's burden to show relevance, not
the Court's, Judge Sammartino points out. Based on the arguments
that were before her, Judge Goddard made a relevancy determination
in her discretion that is not clearly erroneous.

Moreover, Judge Goddard's decision to deny the Defendant's motion
to compel is further bolstered by its failure to show that RFP No.
16 is proportional to the needs of the case, Judge Sammartino
holds. In the TAC, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's use
of partition pricing is only one of several ways the Defendant
engages in deceptive advertising practices.

Judge Sammartino notes that even if the Defendant had demonstrated
that (1) its partition pricing practices are sufficiently analogous
to the pricing practices in other industries, and (2) that the
Plaintiff's familiarity or experience with purchasing goods or
services in those industries is probative of whether he was
deceived by the Defendant's practices, partition pricing is only
one aspect of this case. And, as noted by Judge Goddard, the
Defendant has also requested from the Plaintiff in RFP No. 9 all
documents constituting or relating to reservations at a
non-Marriott Hotel charging a Resort Fee made by the Plaintiff.

Given that the Defendant has received, or will receive, at least
some information lending to the Plaintiff's experience with
partition pricing in the hotel industry, Judge Sammartino opines
that the Defendant has not shown that the benefit of RFP No. 16
outweighs the Plaintiff's burden or expense of producing responsive
documents, even if the Defendant simply asks that the Plaintiff
apply a few dozen search terms to his email accounts. Again, it is
the Defendant's burden as the moving party to show
proportionality.

Finally, the Court notes that RFP No. 16, as written, is overbroad.
The Defendant argued to Judge Goddard that it drafted RFP No. 16 to
discover the experiences the Plaintiff had with partition pricing
before he made the subject Marriott reservation. However, this is
not the only information the request captures. RFP No. 16 requests
all documents relating to any purchase by the Plaintiff of any
product or service for which he was charged and paid a mandatory
fee.

Judge Sammartino points out that the Defendant did not tailor RFP
No. 16 specifically to the Plaintiff's purchases where he was
charged a mandatory fee after first being advertised a lower price,
i.e., the Plaintiff's experience with partition pricing. To be
sure, if the Court compelled the Plaintiff to produce all documents
responsive to RFP No. 16, many--if not most--of the documents the
Plaintiff would produce may be irrelevant.

Conclusion

Judge Goddard's resolution of the parties' dispute with respect to
RFP No. 16 was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Accordingly, the Defendant's Objection is overruled.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Nov. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/47574t3w from Leagle.com.


MATCH GROUP: Class Claims in Candelore Class Suit Stayed
--------------------------------------------------------
Match Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the trial court in
the Allan Candelore suit issued an order staying the class claims
in the case pending the Ninth Circuit's decision on appeal made in
the case captioned Lisa Kim v. Tinder, Inc., No. 18-cv-3093.

On May 28, 2015, a putative statewide class action was filed
against Tinder in state court in California. The case is captioned
Allan Candelore v. Tinder, Inc., No. BC583162 (Superior Court of
California, County of Los Angeles).

The complaint principally alleged that Tinder violated California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act by offering and charging users age 30 and
over a higher price than younger users for subscriptions to its
premium Tinder Plus service.

The complaint sought certification of a class of California Tinder
Plus subscribers age 30 and over and damages in an unspecified
amount.

On December 29, 2015, in accordance with a prior ruling sustaining
Tinder's demurrer, the court entered judgment dismissing the
action.

On January 29, 2018, the California Court of Appeal (Second
Appellate District, Division Three) issued an opinion reversing the
judgment of dismissal.

On May 9, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied Tinder's
petition seeking interlocutory review of the Court of Appeal's
decision and the case was returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.

In a related development, on June 21, 2019, in a substantially
similar putative class action captioned Lisa Kim v. Tinder, Inc.,
No. 18-cv-3093 (Central District of California) asserted the same
substantive claims and is pending in federal district court in
California. The court entered judgment granting final approval of a
class-wide settlement, the terms of which are not material to the
Company.

Because the approved settlement class in Kim subsumes the proposed
settlement class in Candelore, the judgment in Kim would
effectively render Candelore a single-plaintiff lawsuit.

Accordingly, on July 11, 2019, two objectors to the Kim settlement,
represented by the plaintiff's counsel in Candelore, filed a notice
of appeal from the Kim judgment with the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

Oral argument on the appeal occurred on January 15, 2021.

On August 17, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the district court's decision.

On October 4, 2021, Kim and defendants filed a motion for
preliminary approval of a new settlement, the terms of which are
not material to the Company.

"On November 13, 2019, the trial court in Candelore issued an order
staying the class claims in the case pending the Ninth Circuit's
decision on the Kim appeal," the Company said.

On October 5, 2021, the trial court lifted the stay.

the Company believe that the allegations in the Candelore lawsuit
are without merit and will continue to defend vigorously against
it.

Match Group, Inc. provides dating products worldwide. It operates a
portfolio of brands, including Tinder, Match, PlentyOfFish, Meetic,
OkCupid, OurTime, Pairs, and Hinge, as well as other brands. Match
Group, Inc. offers its dating products through its applications and
Websites in approximately 40 languages. The company was
incorporated in 2009 and is headquartered in Dallas, Texas. Match
Group, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of IAC/InterActiveCorp.

MAZDA MOTOR: Vance Sues Over Mazda Vehicles' Defective Fuel Pumps
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TOWNSEND VANCE and ZACHARY HAINES, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA,
INC. D/B/A MAZDA NORTH AMERICAN OPERATIONS, MAZDA MOTOR
CORPORATION, DENSO CORPORATION, and DENSO INTERNATIONAL AMERICA,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 8:21-cv-01890 (C.D. Cal., November 16,
2021) is a class action against the Defendants for strict product
liability, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty
of merchantability, negligent recall/undertaking, fraudulent
omission, and violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty, the False Advertising Law, the
Unfair Competition Law, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged manufacturing,
distribution, and marketing of Mazda vehicles with defective fuel
pump. The defect causes Mazda vehicles to stall, their engines to
shut down or fail to start, and creates a substantial risk of
injury and death for any person operating or riding in a vehicle
equipped with the defective fuel pump. Despite being aware of this
problem for years, Mazda and Denso failed to disclose it to the
Plaintiffs until November 12, 2021 when Mazda announced a recall.
Denso issued a general recall of its fuel pumps in April 2020, the
suit says.

Mazda Motor of America, Inc., doing business as Mazda North
American Operations, is an automobile company based in California.

Mazda Motor Corporation is a multinational automaker based in
Hiroshima, Japan.

Denso Corporation is a global automotive components manufacturer
headquartered in Japan.

Denso International America, Inc. is a supplier of automotive
technology based in Michigan. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                

         Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
         Paula R. Brown, Esq.
         Jennifer L. Macpherson, Esq.
         Craig W. Straub, Esq.
         BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON, LLP
         501 West Broadway, Suite 1490
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 338-1100
         Facsimile: (619) 338-1101
         E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com
                 pbrown@bholaw.com
                 cstraub@bholaw.com
                 jmacpherson@bholaw.com

MDL 2924: Bids for Final Judgment in Zantac Suit Granted in Part
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida grants
in part and denies in part the Defendants' motions requesting entry
of final judgment in the multidistrict litigation titled IN RE:
ZANTAC (RANITIDINE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2924,
Case No. 20-MD-2924 (S.D. Fla.).

The motions before the Court are the Distributor, Retailer, and
Pharmacy Defendants' Motion for Entry of Final Judgment in all
Cases Naming Distributor, Retailer, and Pharmacy Defendants (the
"Retailers" and the "Retailers' Motion") and the Generic
Manufacturers' Motion for Entry of Final Judgment in
Mixed-Defendant Cases (the "Generics" and the "Generics' Motion").
Both Motions have been fully briefed.

In addition to shorthand references to the movants, the Retailers
and the Generics, the Court will also refer to Defendants
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Chattem, Inc., Sanofi
US Services Inc., Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, Patheon Manufacturing
Services, LLC, Pfizer Inc., and GlaxoSmithKline LLC as the
"Brands."

The multidistrict litigation arises from alleged defects in the
formulation of the heartburn medication ranitidine, commonly known
as Zantac. In prior orders of dismissal, the Court dismissed all
claims against the Generics (and most of the claims against the
Retailers) with prejudice but permitted claims against the Brands
to proceed. Because most of the Plaintiffs have brought claims
against the Brands, most of the individual Plaintiffs' cases have
survived the Defendants' motions to dismiss and are now at issue.

Since most of the Plaintiffs' cases have survived, the dispute
before the Court is whether the Court's partial dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' claims may be appealed immediately through the Court's
entry of final judgment and, if so, whether the judgment should be
a full, unqualified final judgment (entered under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 58), a partial final judgment (entered under Rule
54(b)), or both.

The parties' dispute focuses primarily on the process the Court
should follow to perfect the Plaintiffs' appeals, not on whether
the Plaintiffs are entitled to appeal. To explain the parties'
dispute as to the appropriate process, however, the Court divides
the individual cases at issue in the Motions into two categories.
First, there are cases in which the Plaintiffs have named only the
Generics--no other Defendants are named. The Court refers to this
category of cases as "Generic-Only" cases. Second, there are cases
in which the Plaintiffs have named other Defendants in addition on
the Generics. The Court refers to this category as "Mixed-Generic"
cases.

Turning to specifics, District Judge Robin L. Rosenberg notes,
despite their agreement on the ultimate result--the Plaintiffs'
pending appeals, perfected--the parties' positions on how the
Plaintiffs' appeals should be perfected could not be more varied or
more confusing. As for the Plaintiffs, they have taken the position
that the Court's orders of dismissal were final and appealable at
the time of entry and that no further order of the Court is
necessary to perfect their appeals.

In the alternative, the Plaintiffs argue that Rule 58 final
judgment should be entered in the Generic-Only cases, but that no
final judgment should be entered in any other case, including the
Mixed-Generic cases. Most of the Generics agree that the Plaintiffs
should receive final judgment in the Generic-Only cases, but they
argue that the Court should also enter partial final judgment under
Rule 54(b) in the Mixed-Generic cases.

Generic Defendant Apotex Corp. argues that only a single partial
final judgment (under Rule 54(b)) should be entered in the MDL--not
in any individual case. The Retailers seek entry of Rule 54(b)
judgment in any case in which they are named as Defendants.
Finally, the Brands argue that final judgment must be entered in
order to perfect the Plaintiffs' appeals, but the Court should
enter judgment without delving into why or how the judgment should
be entered so as to permit the Eleventh Circuit to have the first
say on the matter. The Plaintiffs oppose the entry of a Rule 54(b)
partial final judgment in any case.

Who, then, is correct and how is the Court to sort through the
parties' varied, nuanced positions? The Court concludes that the
answer to this question lies in how this MDL was organized and,
more specifically, how the Court structured the Plaintiffs' master
pleadings in Pretrial Order # 31. Accordingly, the Court first
considers (A) the relevant procedural history of this MDL and the
specifics of Pretrial Order # 31. Viewing all subsequent analysis
through the prism of Pretrial Order # 31, the Court then addresses
a disputed premise underpinning the parties' competing legal
positions. That disputed premise is the threshold question of
whether, consistent with the Pretrial Order # 31, the individual
cases in this MDL have temporarily merged and lost their individual
appellate rights for the duration of the MDL. This concept of
merger and the corresponding loss of appellate rights frames the
parties' competing legal positions, with some of the parties
arguing that the individual cases in this MDL do not have a right
to immediate appeal, and other parties arguing that the individual
cases have retained their right to appeal.

To resolve this dispute, the Court (B) summarizes the applicable
law on the temporary merger of cases in an MDL and then (C) applies
that law to Pretrial Order # 31 and the structure of this MDL.
Because the Court ultimately concludes that the individual cases in
this MDL have not lost their individual identities and
corresponding appellate rights, the Court utilizes that premise in
its subsequent analysis of (D) the parties' competing requests for
entry of Rule 58 final judgment in the Generic-Only cases.

The Court must also address the Mixed-Generic cases and cases
involving the Retailers, and thus, the Court then turns to the
question of whether a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b)
should be entered in any case in the MDL. The Court's analysis on
this topic is preceded by (E) a summary of the law applicable to
the Retailers' and Generics' requests for entry of partial judgment
under Rule 54(b) before finally turning to (F) the Generics' Motion
for Entry of Judgment, (G) the Retailers' Motion for Entry of
Judgment, and (H) the specifics of the Court's forthcoming entry of
final judgment.

The Court's Pretrial Order # 31

In mid-June 2020, a few months into the MDL, the parties submitted
to the Court a proposed order, that they had negotiated and agreed
upon, to address the filing of a master pleading on behalf of all
individual Plaintiffs who assert personal injury claims in this
MDL. The Court entered the proposed order as Pretrial Order # 31.
Pretrial Order # 31 explains that the parties agreed to the
procedures in the Order due to the number of complaints filed, and
likely to continue to be filed, in the MDL and due to the
inefficiencies in drafting unique complaints and individual answers
to those complaints. To avoid those inefficiencies, Pretrial Order
# 31 required the Plaintiffs to file one Master Personal Injury
Complaint on behalf of all Plaintiffs asserting personal injury
claims related to the use of ranitidine.

The Order states that, "All claims pleaded in the Master Personal
Injury Complaint will supersede and replace all claims pleaded in
any complaint previously filed in or transferred to MDL No. 2924,
to the extent applicable under the procedural and substantive law
that applies to previously filed actions, including this Order." In
addition to the filing of a Master Personal Injury Complaint, the
Order required individual Plaintiffs to file "Short Form
Complaints" to provide certain information specific to each
Plaintiff. Among this information, each Plaintiff was required to
list the Defendant(s) against whom he or she asserted claims and to
specify the causes of action in the Master Personal Injury
Complaint that the Plaintiff adopted. The Short Form Complaints
also could contain additional allegations or causes of action not
pleaded in the Master Personal Injury Complaint. The Order
explained that, "For each action directly filed in or transferred
to MDL No. 2924 subject to this Order, the Master Personal Injury
Complaint together with the Short Form Complaint shall be deemed
the operative Complaint."

Each of the three provisions in Pretrial Order # 31 are important
to the Court's ultimate analysis of the Motions for Entry of
Judgment, infra. First, consistent with the parties' agreement the
master pleadings are, for the most part, the only operative
pleadings for personal injury claims in this MDL--the master
pleadings supersede all prior pleadings in individual cases.
Second, the Short Form Complaints that each individual Plaintiff
files are also operative pleadings insofar as the Short Form
Complaints select (in each individual case) the various parts of
the master complaints that an individual Plaintiff incorporates
into his or her individual case. Third and finally, the Short Form
Complaints are a theoretical vehicle for an individual Plaintiff to
plead claims not pled in the master complaints.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Judgment

Following the Court's Orders on the second round of motions to
dismiss, the Plaintiffs moved for entry of judgment in all cases
wherein individual Plaintiffs named Generics and/or Retailers as
the only Defendants in their Short Form Complaints. The Plaintiffs
asserted in their motion that the individual Plaintiffs' cases
retained their separate identities--that is, that they had not
"merged"--for the purpose of appeal.

Among their arguments, the Plaintiffs maintained that (1) although
the Master Personal Injury Complaints were filed on behalf of all
Plaintiffs, the Short Form Complaints also remained operative
complaints in the individual cases; (2) consolidation of cases for
MDL purposes could not impair a Plaintiff's right to appeal when
his or her own case had been fully resolved; and (3) merger would
deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction by destroying
diversity of citizenship.

The Plaintiffs asserted that, because the Court had dismissed
without leave to amend all claims against the Generics and
Retailers in the master complaints, no claims remained pending in,
and the Plaintiffs could therefore appeal, the individual cases
with Short Form Complaints naming Generics and/or Retailers as the
only Defendants. Therefore, the Plaintiffs sought entry of final
judgments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) in those cases to remove any
doubt about their appellate rights.

All but one of the Generics, together with all of the Retailers,
responded by joining the Plaintiffs' request for entry of Rule 58
judgments in the individual cases with Short Form Complaints naming
Generics and/or Retailers as the only Defendants. The remaining
Generic, Apotex, responded that there had been a merger, as
evidenced by the fact that, under Pretrial Order # 31, the Master
Personal Injury Complaints superseded and replaced all claims pled
in the individual cases.

The Court denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 58 judgments. The
Court explained that its Order dismissing the claims against the
Retailers without leave to amend had rejected as implausible the
Plaintiffs' attempt, through the master complaints, to impose
global MDL liability on the Retailers without any concrete,
particularized, or individualized allegation of negligence. But the
Court did not intend to preclude individual Plaintiffs, in their
own cases, from seeking to plead a negligence claim on
case-specific facts, provided an individual Plaintiff has a factual
basis to do so. And the Court suggested that such case-specific
claims could be addressed outside of this MDL.

Thus, the Court determined that entry of Rule 58 judgments in
individual cases naming the Retailers was inappropriate. As to
Generic-Only cases, the Court explained that its dismissal of the
claims in the master complaints against the Generics, unlike the
Retailers, "had nothing to do with the need for individualized,
case-specific facts" and that it was "the Court's intent that, at
the proper time and upon proper motion, the Court could enter a
final order of dismissal or a final judgment in an individual case"
against one or more Generics.

The Generics' and Retailers' Motions for Entry of Judgment

Two motions for entry of judgment are currently before the Court.
One of the motions is brought by all of the Generics except Apotex
and requests two forms of relief. First, the Generics seek entry of
judgments (without specifying whether the applicable Rule is 54(b)
or 58) in the Generic-Only cases. The Generics provide a list of
such cases and ask that Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel be ordered to
identify any cases that should be added to the list.

Second, the Generics seek entry of Rule 54(b) judgments in the
Mixed-Generic cases. According to the Generics, granting both forms
of relief in tandem will ensure that the Court's rulings as to the
Generics will be reviewed once by one appellate court, avoiding
piecemeal appeals. In the alternative to Rule 54(b) judgments, the
Generics propose that the Court sever the claims against them from
the Mixed-Generic cases and enter Rule 58 judgments as to those
severed claims.

The Retailers filed the second motion that is currently before the
Court. The Retailers seek entry of Rule 54(b) judgments in all
individual cases naming them among the Defendants. They argue that
they are entitled to judgment because no claim remains pending
against them in any Master or Short Form Complaint. Although the
Court stated in its previous Order that it did not intend to
preclude individual Plaintiffs from seeking to plead negligence
claims based on case-specific facts, the Retailers argue that no
such individualized claims have been pled.

The Court's Analysis and Conclusion as to the Generics' Request
under Rule 54(b)

A concern for courts overseeing MDLs is the possibility that, upon
remand, the court's various rulings will be appealed in piecemeal
fashion to appellate courts across the federal judicial system.
This precise concern is the reason that courts have entered Rule
54(b) judgments in MDLs, such as in the case of In re:
Fontainebleau Las Vegas Contract Litigation.

Applying Las Vegas Contract to the instant case, the Plaintiffs
have already filed an appeal of an important, dispositive legal
issue in this MDL--the Court's conclusion that the Plaintiffs'
claims against the Generics were pre-empted by federal law. Also
like Las Vegas Contract, the Court's ruling was completely
dispositive for a small portion of the cases consolidated in the
MDL. However, despite the Court's ruling applying equally to all of
the cases against the Generics in this MDL, only a small number of
the cases brought against the Generics are on appeal--a subset of
the Generic-Only cases.

Just as in Las Vegas Contract, should this Court deny Rule 54(b)
certification, there is a possibility that eventually the parties
could receive different, inconsistent rulings on federal
pre-emption in every circuit court in the United States, Judge
Rosenberg notes. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed such
a problem in In re Food Lion, Inc., 73 F.3d 528 (1996).

In Food Lion, an MDL court dismissed approximately half of the
cases in the MDL at summary judgment. Toward the conclusion of the
MDL, the cases were remanded to the transferor courts. Upon remand,
some of the dismissed plaintiffs filed appeals of their dismissal.
The Fourth Circuit declined to consider the merits of the
dismissal, and instead held that any consideration of the merits
would frustrate the very purpose of an MDL.

Notwithstanding the Court's conclusion that the Brands would be
entitled to Rule 54(b) judgment for claims dismissed with prejudice
on federal pre-emption grounds, the Brands have not yet moved for
the same. Therefore, at this time the Court will not enter a Rule
54(b) judgment in favor of the Brands.

The Court's Analysis and Conclusion as to the Retailers' Motion

The Retailers request the entry of Rule 54(b) judgments in every
individual case in the MDL where they are named as Defendants in a
Short Form Complaint.

The Retailers' request for entry of Rule 54(b) judgments as to the
Plaintiffs' general negligence claims fails under the first prong
of a Rule 54(b) analysis, wherein the Court must determine that it
has rendered a final decision, Judge Rosenberg holds. The Court has
not done so. As the Court has explained, the Court has not entered
a final decision on the Plaintiffs' general negligence claims
against the Retailers.

Judge Rosenberg holds that the Plaintiffs sought to impose global
MDL liability on the Defendants without any concrete,
particularized, or individualized allegation of negligence. The
Court's dismissal rejected this global theory. Such a theory would
be akin to the Plaintiffs alleging medical malpractice claims
against thousands of doctors who prescribed ranitidine. As with
negligence claims, medical malpractice claims are highly
individualized, highly case-specific claims that do not necessarily
lend themselves easily to resolution in an MDL setting.

The Court's dismissal of medical malpractice claims from a master
pleading (just as the dismissal of Plaintiffs' negligence claims
without leave to amend) would not preclude the individual
Plaintiffs from ever bringing a medical malpractice claim--they
simply could not press such a claim in the MDL.

In summary, the master complaints are not a procedural vehicle for
individual Plaintiffs' individual allegations of negligence, Judge
Rosenberg points out. The Court will hear from the parties at a
forthcoming status conference whether individualized negligence
claims should be pled in the Short Form Complaints, whether the
Court should utilize a case management procedure to address
individualized negligence claims, and how and when, if at all, the
claims should be remanded. As for the Retailers' request for Rule
54(b) judgment on the Plaintiffs' negligence claims, the request is
denied.

In the Plaintiffs' initial master pleadings, the Retailers faced
many claims besides negligence. By way of example, the Plaintiffs
brought a strict liability failure to warn claim against the
Retailers. The Court dismissed almost all of the Plaintiffs'
non-negligence claims with prejudice, utilizing a similar federal
pre-emption analysis that the Court applied to the claims brought
against the Generics.

Therefore, for the same reason the Generics are entitled to a Rule
54(b) judgment--to avoid piecemeal appeals of the Court's prior
rulings on federal pre-emption--the Retailers are also entitled to
a Rule 54(b) judgment. Stated another way, because the Court's
entry of Rule 58 judgments in favor of the Generics will permit the
Plaintiffs to raise an issue on appeal that implicates the Court's
pre-emption rulings as to the Retailers, the Retailers are granted
Rule 54(b) judgment so that they may join and be heard in the
appeal.

The Court's Entry of Judgment

For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court will enter Rule
58 judgments in Generic-Only cases with a notice of appeal. The
Court will also enter Rule 54(b) partial final judgment as to the
Generics and the Retailers on the main MDL docket.

The Court clarifies its intent in entering Rule 54(b) judgment on
three points. First, it is the Court's intent to perfect any appeal
that the Plaintiffs may seek to bring against the Generics flowing
from the Court's rulings on the master complaints. Second, it is
the Court's intent to perfect any appeal that the Plaintiffs may
seek to bring against the Retailers for claims the Court dismissed
with prejudice, but the Court does not certify for 54(b) judgment
the Plaintiffs' general negligence count against the Retailers.
Third and finally, the Court does not certify any ruling specific
to the class complaints because (1) it appears that no party has
sought such a certification, (2) the class complaints remain
pending, and (3) any appellate ruling on conflict pre-emption or
obstacle pre-emption in the context of the personal injury
complaints would necessarily have the same effect in the context of
the class action complaints.

Having clarified its intent, the Court will enter Rule 54(b)
judgment as follows:

The Generics

The Court will enter Rule 54(b) judgment as to the Generics for all
claims dismissed with prejudice from the master personal injury
complaints.

The Retailers

As to the original Master Personal Injury Complaint at docket entry
887, the Court will enter Rule 54(b) final judgment as to the
Retailers for Counts I though VI, and Counts VIII through XII,
which the Court dismissed with prejudice on conflict pre-emption
grounds at docket entry 2513.

The Court addresses one final matter. A primary basis for the
Plaintiffs' objection to Rule 54(b) judgment is that the entry of
the judgment would require them to pay excessive appellate filing
fees. If the Plaintiffs are correct, that is a ramification that
flows from the way the Plaintiffs have prosecuted their appeals.
First, the Plaintiffs have taken the position that, master
pleadings notwithstanding, each individual case in this MDL has
retained its full identity and corresponding appellate rights; were
the Plaintiffs to adopt the opposite position and conclude that the
more efficient merger doctrine applies, there would be no need to
take many appeals from many individual cases.

Second, the Plaintiffs have elected to take appeals and seek Rule
58 final judgments in only a very few, select cases. For the
reasons set forth in this Order, the Plaintiffs' decision to seek
individual appeals in this manner is the reason the Defendants are
entitled to Rule 54(b) judgment; had the Plaintiffs sought to
appeal through another avenue--such as through a 28 U.S.C. Section
1292(b) interlocutory appeal--there would be no need to take many
appeals from many individual cases.

In summary, the Plaintiffs' appellate filing fees are not grounds
to deny the Defendants what they are entitled to--a Rule 54(b)
judgment--particularly when the fees flow from the Plaintiffs'
unilateral decisions. Even so, the Court stands ready to issue any
order that the Plaintiffs may identify as a valid option to reduce
or eliminate filing fees, such as the procedural avenues identified
by the Generics at docket entry 4149.

For these reasons, it is ordered and adjudged that the Distributor,
Retailer, and Pharmacy Defendants' Motion for Entry of Final
Judgment in all Cases Naming Distributor, Retailer, and Pharmacy
Defendants [3934] is granted in part and denied in part and the
Generic Manufacturer's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment in
Mixed-Defendant Cases [3933] is granted in part and denied in part
as more fully set forth in this Order.

The parties will confer and submit joint proposed final judgments
that conform to the Court's rulings herein. The proposed final
judgment will be sent to zantac_mdl@flsd.uscourts.gov in Microsoft
Word format and be due within four (4) business days of the date of
rendition of this Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Nov. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5brns5v8 from Leagle.com.


MICHIGAN: Faces Class Action Over Benton Harbor's Drinking Water
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that Michigan and local officials have
been targeted in a lawsuit over high levels of lead in Benton
Harbor's drinking water.

The lawsuit, filed in federal court, accuses the state and city of
"deliberate indifference" in their response to the problem, which
began to emerge in 2018.

Doretha Braziel, one of many Benton Harbor residents listed in the
lawsuit, said she only recently became aware that she should avoid
drinking the water.

"The number of injured individuals who have been injured by
exposure to lead in the Benton Harbor water is in the thousands,"
according to the lawsuit, which seeks class-action status.

The lawsuit was filed a week after the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency said it found a variety of violations at the
Benton Harbor water plant as well as problems with how the city had
communicated with residents about lead in the water.

The state has been supplying free bottled water for weeks and is
pledging to help Benton Harbor replace lead service lines outside
homes.

Lead has been leaching from old pipes, although chemicals to reduce
corrosion have been applied.

A spokesman for Gov. Gretchen Whitmer defended the state's
response. Bobby Leddy said regulators ordered corrosion control and
urged the city to reach out to residents.

Benton Harbor is a predominantly Black, mostly low-income community
of 9,100 people, about 100 miles (160 kilometers) from Chicago.

A judge gave final approval to a $626 million settlement with Flint
residents whose water was contaminated in 2014-15 with lead and
bacteria. The state is paying $600 million. [GN]

MIDDLESEX WATER: Faces Suit Over Notice on Perfluorooctanoic Acid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kathy Chang at centraljersey.com reports that an Avenel resident,
who suffers from specific health concerns and a severely
compromised immune system, filed a class action lawsuit in
Middlesex County Superior Court against Middlesex Water Company
seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred following the company's
drinking water notice regarding perfluorooctanoic acid.

Attorneys Stephen P. DeNittis, Joseph A. Osefchen, and Shane T.
Prince of DeNittis Osefchen Prince P.C., Marlton, Burlington County
filed a 17-page complaint on behalf of Tomas Vera on Oct. 29.


Attorneys Michael A. Galpern and Zachary M. Green of Javerbaum,
Wurgaft, Hicks, Kahn, Wikstrom and Sinins P.C., Vorhees, Camden
County, filed the complaint on behalf of a proposed class similar
to Vera.

When Vera receiving Middlesex County Water Company's notice on or
about Oct. 22, he did "exactly what the notice urged him to do."

He followed the notice's "written directives to consult with his
doctor and buy bottled water as a substitute for his contaminated
tap water. Vera "incurred out-of-pocket expenses, including a
co-pay for that doctor's consultation and the cost of bottled
water, costs which were fully foreseeable to [the water company] at
the time of the notice," according to the complaint.

When asked for a comment, Bernadette M. Sohler, vice president of
corporate affairs for Middlesex Water, said the company does not
comment on litigation matters.

News of the class action lawsuit comes at the heels of an
announcement municipalities. affected by the water company's
drinking water notice, banded together to retain Vlasac and
Shmaruk, LLC, Iselin, and Berger Montague PC, Philadelphia, to
investigate the actions implemented by 3M and Middlesex Water
Company to comply with federal and state safe drinking water
standards.

The notice includes all residential and retail customers served by
the water company's Park Avenue treatment plant in South
Plainfield. Residential and retail customers are in South
Plainfield, Clark, Edison, Metuchen, Woodbridge and Carteret.

New Jersey is one of seven states that have enforceable regulation
drinking water standards for perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).

"Just like we combined forces to engage environmental experts, it
makes good sense to join together on any litigation efforts because
we collectively represent over 300,000 residents and that makes us
a powerful force," Woodbridge Mayor John E. McCormac said.

Edison Mayor Thomas Lankey said he believes litigation "is
absolutely necessary" including "assessing the accurate level of
PFOA contamination, insure continued truthful and timely public
release of critical information, and the complete details on what
Middlesex Water Company is actively doing to limit continued
exposure, and ultimately mitigate this pollutant."

McCormac, Lankey, Carteret Mayor Daniel J. Reiman, Metuchen Mayor
Jonathan Busch, South Plainfield Mayor Matthew P. Anesh, and Clark
Mayor Sal Bonaccorso announced the collaboration in a press release
through Woodbridge Township on Nov. 9.

Since the initial notice on Oct. 22, the municipalities have held
meetings with their respective residents with representatives from
the water company explaining the notice of the exceedance of the
PFOA drinking water standard, which officials said is a Tier 2
violation.

Dennis Doll, the president and chief executive officer of the
company, has said there is "no immediate threat" with the violation
and the water is safe for customers to use.

Doll, at the meetings, explained the water company began evaluating
treatment options to remove the chemical from its groundwater
supply in 2019.

PFOA is a member of the group of chemicals called per- and
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), used as a processing aid in the
manufacture of fluoropolymers used in non-stick cookware and other
products, as well as other commercial and industrial uses, based on
its resistance to harsh chemicals and high temperatures.

PFOA has also been used in aqueous film-forming foams for
firefighting and training, and it is found in consumer products
such as stain-resistant coatings for upholstery and carpets,
water-resistant outdoor clothing, and greaseproof food packaging,
according to the water company.

Current scientific research suggests exposure to high levels of
certain PFAS over many years may lead to adverse health outcomes.

The company has completed the design of a facility for enhanced
treatment to comply with new state regulations in New Jersey for
PFOA.

The plant, which is estimated at approximately $47 million, will
use granular activated carbon, which has proved effective against
PFOA and PFAS. The plant is expected to go into service by
mid-2023.

Doll said the company has evidence to believe PFOA has been put
into the ground by the 3M Corporation and has filed a lawsuit
against the corporation in U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey to recoup wellfield remediation costs. He said similar
lawsuits have been filed across the country.

Along with the hiring of the law firm, municipalities have also
come together to retain T&M Associates, headquartered in
Middletown, Monmouth County, as an environmental consultant.
McCormac had announced the collaboration at its meeting on Oct.
25.

The environmental consultant will review and analyze water quality
reports, tests and related documents from 3M and Middlesex Water
Company as it relates to the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection's drinking water maximum contaminant level (MCL)
standard for perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), according to the
release.

Reiman said for many years the borough has "aggressively and
successfully fought to protect the health of our residents and to
hold polluters accountable in the court of law.

"We demand immediate action, first to correct the exceedance of
PFOA in drinking water, second to compensate our residents and
businesses for the added costs of buying bottled water and the
installation of water filters," he said in the release.

Busch said "after thorough consideration" they have decided to join
"the filing of this lawsuit to help protect our residents'
interests."

Anesh said he is requesting the South Plainfield Borough Council to
consider joining the lawsuit at a meeting on Nov. 15.

Middlesex Water Company has provided literature on PFOA treatment
on its website as well as its notice to residents.

The notice stated people with specific health concerns, a severely
compromised immune system, have an infant, are pregnant, or are
elderly, may be at higher risk than other individuals and should
seek advice from health care providers about drinking the water.

Doll noted at the meetings "because the science and research
regarding PFOAs in drinking water is not yet mature, the medical
field does not have any information."

The New Jersey Department of Health advises that infant formula and
other beverages for infants, such as juice, should be prepared with
bottled water when PFOA is elevated in drinking water, the notice
further stated, noting boiling water will not remove PFOA.

Women who are pregnant, nursing or considering having children may
choose to use bottled water for drinking and cooking to reduce
exposure to PFOA. Residents can consider installing in-home water
treatment (filters) that are certified to lower the levels of PFAS
in the water, according to information provided during a
presentation the water company held in Woodbridge on Oct. 25.

For more information, contact the company's Customer Service
Department at 800-549-3802 or visit www.middlesexwater.com/alerts.
Also customers can visit the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection website at www.nj.gov/dep/watersupply/pfas. [GN]

MISSOURI: Republican AG Seeks Texts, Emails About Mask Mandates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rudi Keller, writing for Missouri Independent, reports that
Republican Attorney General Eric Schmitt wants to know what four
Democratic executives in Missouri's largest metro areas said in
emails, texts and other communications about mask mandates to fight
the spread of COVID-19.

His office said Friday seeking the records is part of Schmitt's
determination to fight "tyrannical government overreach." A
spokesman for St. Louis Mayor Tishaura Jones said Schmitt's true
goal is to "gain a little bit of clout" in the crowded Republican
Senate primary field for 2022.

On Nov. 5, Schmitt sent an open records request to Jones seeking
all her email, text and voicemail messages since July 1 with 34
other officials -- St. Louis County Executive Sam Page, Kansas City
Mayor Quinton Lucas, Jackson County Executive Frank White and the
28 members of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen.

The final two names on the list are Rep. Cori Bush, D-St. Louis,
and Dr. Frederick Echols, commissioner of the St. Louis Health
Department.

He made two other requests.

Schmitt asked for communications with the Centers for Disease
Control, the World Health Organization, the National Education
Association, the Missouri School Boards Association, the National
Federation of Independent Business and the Missouri Chamber of
Commerce. And He wants contracts for legal services signed since
the start of 2019 and bills from law firms since Jan. 1.

The request was made public by the city on its public records
archive, a posting of all requests received by the city. The
Independent confirmed that similar requests were sent to Page,
Lucas and White by inquiries to their offices.

Morgan Said, spokeswoman for Lucas, said the request is being
processed in the city attorney's office.

"Certainly the mayor does not think this is a good use of
resources," she said.

Schmitt is suing St. Louis, St. Louis County, Kansas City and
Jackson County over mask mandates imposed in July as the Delta
variant surged through the state. The requests come as cases are
starting to surge again, with daily new cases up more than 40
percent statewide since the start of the month.

Mask requirements remain in place in St. Louis and St. Louis
County.

The Jackson County Legislature voted Friday afternoon to end the
requirement immediately. The mandate in Kansas City ended Nov. 5
except for schools and school buses.

The requests under Missouri's Sunshine Law are in addition to any
documents Schmitt's office might obtain through demands for records
in the lawsuits.

"This office has been committed to fighting against tyrannical
government overreach," a statement from Schmitt's office said.
"Whether it is through legal discovery or the sunshine process, we
are seeking to uncover the truth about what science and decision
making processes that the City of St. Louis and other local
governments relied upon to implement the mask mandates and other
restrictions."

The records request for Jones' communications is still being
processed, said Nick Dunne, her spokesman. It will be handled like
all other records requests, he said.

"He is running for the Senate," Dunne said. "He is looking for
clout and he is leveraging his position to give him perceived
leverage for his Senate race. He is going to continue to waste
state resources and everyone's time on something that he thinks
will gain a little bit of clout."

Schmitt is competing against former Gov. Eric Greitens, U.S. Reps.
Vicky Hartzler and Billy Long, and St. Louis attorney Mark
McCloskey for the GOP nomination to replace U.S. Sen. Roy Blunt.

Since Aug. 1, while the mask orders have been in effect, St. Louis
and St. Louis County have lower per capita infection rates than the
surrounding counties without mask mandates - St. Charles, Franklin
and Jefferson - according to state Department of Health and Senior
Services data.

Jackson County outside Kansas City, however, has a higher infection
rate than Kansas City and adjoining counties. Kansas City's per
capita infection rate for the period is below Cass and Clay
counties and above Platte County.

After leaving mitigation measures in the hands of local officials
for most of the pandemic, Missouri lawmakers this year passed
legislation that limits the authority and scope of public health
orders aimed at curbing the spread of a contagious disease. That is
the law Schmitt is using to challenge local mask mandates.

Schmitt is also suing Columbia Public Schools over its classroom
mask mandate. He lost the first major decision in the case, an
effort to make it apply as a class action against all districts
requiring students to wear masks during class time.

The Columbia Board of Education renewed the policy on Nov. 8.

"This office will continue to use every legal tool at our disposal
to safeguard the freedoms and liberty of every Missouri citizen,"
the statement from Schmitt's office read.

St. Louis County has prevailed over Schmitt in recent hearings but
no final ruling on whether the new law covers mask orders has been
issued in any of the lawsuits.

"We make all public health decisions based on advice from the St.
Louis Metropolitan Pandemic Task Force, our Department of Public
Health and other public health experts," Doug Moore, spokesman for
Page, wrote in an email. "It appears Mr. Schmitt is deeply
committed to a political stunt. We are deeply committed to saving
lives." [GN]

NAR INC: Seeks to Strike Ortiz-de-Lozano's Class Claims
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JUANA ORTIZ-DE LOZANO,
individually and on behalf of the Class Members, v. N.A.R., INC.
d/b/a NORTH AMERICAN RECOVERY, a foreign corporation, Case No.
2:21-cv-01774-APG-BNW (D. Nev.), the Defendant asks the Court to
enter an order granting its motion to strike plaintiff's class
claims or, in the alternative, to deny class certification.

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Plaintiff was in an
accident, that as a result of that accident Plaintiff sought and
received treatment from Accident Chiropractic, that in connection
with receiving that treatment Plaintiff signed a lien agreement
(the Lien Agreement) pursuant to which Plaintiff granted Accident
Chiropractic a lien on the proceeds of Plaintiff's claim relating
to her accident, that Accident Chiropractic wound up it operations
in January 2020 and assigned Plaintiff's account to NAR, that NAR
subsequently filed a state court lawsuit seeking to collect the
Account, and that the filing of the state court lawsuit constitutes
a breach of the Lien Agreement and a violation of the FDCPA and
Nev. Rev. Sat. 598, et. seq.

North American Recovery provides debt collection services.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Nov. 15, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3wVkA9X at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Donna Armenta, Esq.
          DONNA ARMENTA LAW
          4955 S Durango Dr., Suite 174
          Las Vegas, NC 89113
          Telephone: (702) 525-1364
          Facsimile: (702) 973-7170
          E-mail: Donna@DonnaArmentaLaw.com

               - and -

          Jason M. Kerr, Esq.
          Ronald F. Price, Esq.
          PRICE PARKINSON & KERR, PLLC
          5742 West Harold Gatty Drive Suite 101
          Salt Lake City, UT 84116
          Telephone: (801) 530-2900
          E-mail: jasonkerr@ppktrial.com
                  ronprice@ppktrial.com

NASSAU, NY: Abbananto Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RENEE ABBANANTO, SUSAN
CHODKOWKSI, DANIELLE DAVIDSON, JAMES DELAHUNTY, MATTHEW SARTER, and
all others similarly situated, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, v. CIVIL
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., REGION 1/LOCAL 1000,
AFSCME-CIO (CSEA); AND CSEA LOCAL 830, Case No.
2:19-cv-01102-GRB-JMW (E.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. certifying this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23
      of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

   2. requiring Defendants to furnish to Plaintiffs' counsel a
      computer-readable data file containing the names,
      addresses, and telephone numbers of all PCOs and PCOSs who
      currently work for or who have currently worked for the
      Defendants dating back six years from the filing of the
      Verified Complaint on February 25, 2019, so that notice
      may provided and the option to opt-out of the action may
      be given to members of the class; and

   3. authorizing notice by United States Postal Service first
      class mail or via email to all similarly situated persons
      employed by Defendants as PCOs and PCOSs dating back six
      years from the filing of the Verified Complaint on
      February 25, 2019, to inform them of their right to opt-
      out of this lawsuit, the cost to be paid by Defendants as
      well as for notice to be filed for two months in the CSEA
      Workforce newspaper.

Nassau County occupies a portion of Long Island immediately east of
the New York City borough of Queens.

A copy of the the Plaintiffs' motion dated Nov. 15, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Fp8BV4 at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Louis D. Stober, Jr., Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF LOUIS D. STOBER JR., LLC.
          98 Front Street
          Mineola, NY, 11501
          Telephone: (516) 742-6546

NATIONAL WESTERN: Settlement Reached in Baldwin Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
National Western Life Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8,
2021, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the
parties in the Mildred Baldwin class suit agreed on preliminary
terms to settle the litigation and the settlement is subject to
court approval.

The Company reported that it experienced a data event in which an
intruder accessed and exfiltrated certain data from the Company's
network.  

As a result of this event, the Company reported that it was aware
of two proposed class actions filed against National Western:
Mildred Baldwin, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated
vs. National Western Life Insurance Company, Missouri Circuit Court
for the 18th Judicial Circuit (Pettis County) filed February 16,
2021, and Douglas Dyrssen Sr., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated vs. National Western Life Insurance
Company and National Western Life Group, Inc., United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California filed March
8, 2021.

The parties agreed to consolidate those two proposed class actions
into a single proposed class action, Mildred Baldwin, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated vs. National Western Life
Insurance Company, United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri.

Baldwin is seeking an undetermined amount of damages, attorneys'
fees and costs, injunctive relief, declaratory and other equitable
relief, and enjoinment.

National Western filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 16, 2021. On
July 26, 2021, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Stay Pending
Mediation, which the court denied.

On September 15, 2021, the court granted in part and denied in part
National Western's Motion to Dismiss.

At the mediation held on October 12, 2021, the parties agreed on
preliminary terms to settle the litigation.

"The parties filed a Joint Notice of Settlement and Motion to Stay
Deadlines with the court on October 20, 202," the Company said.

The settlement terms are subject to court approval.

The Company accrued $4.4 million at September 30, 2021 for this
matter.

National Western Life Group, Inc. provides life insurance products
for the savings and protection needs of policyholders and annuity
contracts for the asset accumulation and retirement needs of
contract holders. The company is based in Austin, Texas.

NATURAL NINE: Sayles Sues Over Unpaid Wages, Illegal Kickbacks
--------------------------------------------------------------
BRITANNY SAYLES and CHANELLE CLARK, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NATURAL NINE, INC. dba
SAM'S HOFBRAU, a California Corporation; ALAN KIYOSHI MINATO, an
individual; DOE MANAGERS 1-3; and DOES 4-10, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:21-cv-09040 (C.D. Cal., November 17, 2021) is a class
action against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the California Labor Code including failure to
pay minimum wage, failure to pay overtime wages, unlawful taking of
tips, illegal kickbacks, forced tip sharing, failure to furnish
accurate wage statements, and waiting time penalties.

The Plaintiffs worked as exotic dancers/entertainers at Sam's
Hofbrau, located at 1751 E. Olympic Blvd, Los Angeles, California.

Natural Nine, Inc. is an operator of an adult-oriented
entertainment facility under the name Sam's Hofbrau, located at
1751 E. Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles, California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                

         John P. Kristensen, Esq.
         Jesenia A. Martinez, Esq.
         KRISTENSEN LLP
         5757 Century Blvd., Suite 680
         Los Angeles, CA 90045
         Telephone: (310) 507-7924
         Facsimile: (310) 507-7906
         E-mail: john@kristensenlaw.com
                 jesenia@kristensenlaw.com

NEW NELLO: Roman Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
ERNESTO ROMAN, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NEW NELLO OPERATING CO., LLC d/b/a NELLO,
and DANIEL IANELLO, Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-00853 (N.D. Ind.,
November 2, 2021) brings this complaint as a collective action
against the Defendants for their alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as an hourly paid
Production Employee from approximately June 2019 to the present.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants have common business
policies and practices that caused him and other similarly situated
employees to be denied their overtime premium required under the
FLSA. The Defendants allegedly deducted the costs of a "Uniform
Rental" from their employees' pay. In addition, the Defendants
failed to include nondiscretionary bonuses when calculating its
employees' rates of pay for the purpose of calculating their
overtime premium due to them. As a result, despite regularly
working more than 40 hours per workweek, the Plaintiff and others
similarly situated employees were not properly paid their lawfully
earned overtime premium at the rate of one and one-half times their
regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per
workweek, the Plaintiff added.

New Nello Operating Co., LLC d/b/a Nello is in the business of
manufacturing utility and cellular phone towers. Daniel Ianello is
the owner of the company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert F. Hunt, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT J. HUNT, LLC
          1905 South New Market St., Suite 168
          Carmel, IN 46032
          Tel: (317) 743-0614
          Fax: (317) 743-0615
          E-mail: rob@indianawagelaw.com

                - and –

          Robert P. Kondras, Jr., Esq.
          HASSLER KONDRAS MILLER LLP
          100 Cherry Street
          Terre Haute, IN 47807
          Tel: (812) 232-9691
          Fax: (812) 234-2881
          E-mail: kondras@hkmlawfirm.com

NEW YORK CITY, NY: Seeks Extension to Oppose Class Cert. Bid
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Chalmers, et al. v. City
of New York, Case No. 1:20-cv-03389-AT (S.D.N.Y.), the Defendant
asks the Court to enter an order granting a one-week extension of
time, from November 15, 2021 to November 22, 2021, to file its
opposition to plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The Defendant's counsel says that it is defendant's second request
for an extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' motion. The
first request was granted. The Plaintiffs' counsel has consented to
this request. They request that the deadline for their reply be
extended commensurately, from December 6, 2021 to December 13,
2021. The Defendant consents to their request.

A copy of the the Defendant's motion  dated Nov. 12, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DsGQKy at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Amanda C. Croushore, Esq.
          LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW DIVISION
          Telephone: (212) 356-4074
          Facsimile: (212) 356-2438
          E-mail: acrousho@law.nyc.gov

NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR: Lawyer May Sue Regarding Cyber Attack
--------------------------------------------------------------
vocm.com reports that a prominent St. John's lawyer is looking at
launching a class-action lawsuit in relation to the cyber attack
that has crippled the province's healthcare system, and compromised
the personal information of thousands.

Bob Buckingham says never before has a class action been filed
that's affects every person in the province.

He says they're not sure how it will work, but Buckingham and his
team are putting their minds to it.

He states there are a lot of issues in terms of who the defendants
would be in such a case, but does say they see the Provincial
Government, the NL Centre for Health Information, and the regional
health authorities as defendants in the case.

Buckingham believes the situation is the result of "gross
negligence," noting that there have been several warnings about
ransomware-including one issued by Meditech, the company behind the
province's software, one year ago.

That's why, Buckingham says, government is responsible. He says
they had lots of warnings and notice, and they could have stopped
it but didn't. To think that some medical information was
unencrypted is something he calls "incredulous. [GN]

NORTONLIFELOCK INC: Holden Voluntarily Dismisses Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
NortonLifeLock Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended October 1, 2021, that on Sept. 9, 2021,
Plaintiff Lauren Holden filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
Without Prejudice and the Court entered an Order on Sept. 16, 2021,
dismissing the case without prejudice.

On February 8, 2021, Lauren Holden filed a putative class action in
the Circuit Court for Duval County, Florida alleging that the
Company violated the Florida wiretapping statute, Florida Security
of Communications Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. section 934.01, et. seq.,
through the use of session replay technology on www.us.norton.com.


The complaint defines the class as consisting of Florida residents
who visited the website and whose electronic communications were
alleged to have been intercepted by the Company without prior
consent and, on behalf of the class, seeks statutory damages,
attorney's fees and costs, and injunctive relief.

On March 12, 2021, the Company removed the case to the District
Court for the Middle District of Florida and filed its Answer and
Affirmative Defenses to the complaint.

The Company then filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on
April 20, 2021.

On April 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint.

On July 22, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an
amended complaint and deemed the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings moot.

On August 5, 2021, the Company filed a Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint.

On September 9, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal Without Prejudice and the Court entered an Order on
September 16, 2021, dismissing the case without prejudice.

NortonLifeLock Inc., formerly known as Symantec Corporation is an
American software company headquartered in Tempe, Arizona, United
States.[BN]

NORTONLIFELOCK INC: Settlement Reached in CA Consolidated Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
NortonLifeLock Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended October 1, 2021, that the parties in a
consolidated securities class action in California reached
settlement and the Settlement Fairness Hearing is set for February
12, 2022.

Securities class action lawsuits, which have since been
consolidated, were filed in May 2018 against the Company and
certain of the Company's former officers, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California.

The lead plaintiff's consolidated amended complaint alleged that,
during a purported class period of May 11, 2017 to August 2, 2018,
defendants made false and misleading statements in violation of
Sections 10(b) and 20(a), and that certain individuals violated
Section 20A, of the Securities Exchange Act.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Court granted in an
order dated June 14, 2019.

Pursuant to that order, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to
amend and a proposed first amended complaint on July 11, 2019.

The Court granted the motion in part on October 2, 2019 and the
first amended complaint was filed on October 11, 2019.

The Court's order dismissed certain claims against certain of the
Company's former officers.

Defendants filed answers on November 7, 2019.

On April 20, 2021, to resolve an alleged conflict of interest
raised with respect to the lead plaintiff and its counsel, the
Court ordered a second Class Notice disclosing the circumstances of
the alleged conflict and providing a further period for class
members to opt out, which closed on July 2, 2021. The initial class
opt-out period closed on August 25, 2020.

On May 24, 2021, the parties reached a proposed settlement and
release of all claims in the class action, for $70 million, and on
June 8, 2021, the parties executed a Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement, subject to Court approval and exclusive of any claims
that may be brought by shareholders who opted out of the class
action.

Of the $70M, $67.1 million was covered under the applicable
insurance policy with the remainder to be paid by the Company.

On July 6, 2021, the plaintiff filed its Motion for Preliminary
Settlement Approval and the Court preliminary approved the
settlement on September 12, 2021.

The Court also ordered an additional opt-out period extending until
January 13, 2022.

"The Settlement Fairness Hearing is set for February 12, 2022," the
Company said.

NortonLifeLock Inc., formerly known as Symantec Corporation is an
American software company headquartered in Tempe, Arizona, United
States.[BN]

OCTAPHARMA AG: Agrees to Pay $10M to End BIPA Class Action Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Holland at cookcountyrecord.com reports that a federal judge
has been asked to sign off on a nearly $10 million settlement that
would end a class action lawsuit accusing plasma donation company
Octapharma of violating Illinois' biometrics privacy law.

The action began in December 2019 when Mary Crumpton sued
Octapharma Plasma in Cook County Circuit Court, alleging it
violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act without
providing disclosures or obtaining consent to collect fingerprints
for its donor management system.

Crumpton's attorneys, J. Eli Wade-Scott and Schuyler Ufkes, of
Edelson, PC, of Chicago, and David Fish, of Fish Potter Bolaños,
PC, of Naperville, filed a motion Nov. 3 asking U.S. District Judge
Virginia Kendall to approve a settlement deal.

According to the motion, Germany-based Octapharma would create a
settlement fund worth $9.99 million to compensate 76,826 plasma
donors who used the system between Dec. 2, 2014, and Feb. 4, 2020.
Class members would have to submit valid claim forms, by mail or
online, to obtain a prorated share.

Crumpton's could get up to 35% of the total settlement in fees, or
about $3.5 million. Crumpton would get a $5,000 incentive award as
class representative.

The amount donors could receive from the settlement will depend on
how many donors submit valid claims.

If every donor submitted a valid claim, each would collect about
$84, according to details submitted with the court. However,
Crumpton's attorneys anticipate a claims rate of just 10-20%,
meaning valid claims could be worth $400-$800 per plasma donor
claimant.

"This amount dwarfs the amounts recovered in many other statutory
privacy class actions, particularly against a backdrop where
settlements have commonly secured no relief to the class. . .,"
according to the motion. "Some BIPA settlements, too, have
depressed the amount defendants have to pay with credit monitoring,
caps on the amount claiming class members can recover and reversion
of unclaimed funds."

While the agreement does not provide for any of the funds to revert
to Octapharma, it does stipulate that funds from any unchashed
checks or rejected electronic payments would go to the American
Civil Liberties Union of Illinois for its government accountability
and personal privacy work.

By signing up you agree to receive email newsletters or alerts from
Cook County Record. You can unsubscribe at any time. Protected by
Google ReCAPTCHA.

According to its website, Octapharma operates five Illinois plasma
donation sites, including sites in Chicago, Riverside, Melrose Park
and Bridgeview.

According to the motion, Crumpton and all plasma donors had to
provide a fingerprint scan to enroll in the donor management system
and then use their prints before each successive donation. She
accused Octapharma of "failing to develop a data-retention policy
and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric data, failing
to publicly disclose any such policy and failing to comply with any
such policy."

Octapharma removed the complaint to federal court and argued
federal law pre-empts BIPA and that it is exempt because it already
complies with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act. In January 2021, Judge Kendall fully rejected the federal
pre-emption argument with prejudice and struck parts of
Octapharma's affirmative defense concerning HIPPA and that the
prints were used to validate scientific testing or screening.

If Kendall does approve the settlement, it affects only Octapharma
and not its third-party software vendor, Haemonetics Corporation.
Crumpton's lawsuit alleges that company stored fingerprint data
without donors' consent or knowledge, which constitutes a different
BIPA violation.

In addition to the monetary relief, Octapharma has agreed to
destroy any biometric data from Illinois donors who haven't visited
an Octapharma facility in at least three years, as well as to
maintain the informed written consent plan and retention and
deletion policy it launched Feb. 4, 2020.

Octapharma will submit a list of all donors who would qualify for
the settlement, including last known mail and email addresses so
the administrator can directly provide eligibility notification and
directions to the settlement website.

Octapharma has been represented in the case by attorneys Daniel T.
Graham, Timothy R. Herman and Jeffrey M. Sniadanko, of the firm of
Clark Hill PLC, of Chicago. [GN]

OHIO LIVING: Response to Kordie Class Cert. Bid Extended to Dec. 3
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Kordie v. Ohio Living et
al., Case No. 2:21-cv-03791 (S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Magistrate Judge
Chelsey M. Vascura entered an order granting motion for extension
of time to file response regarding motion to certify class for
conditional class certification and court-authorized Notice to
Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b):

-- Responses due by Dec. 3, 2021.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.[CC]

OHIO: Court Denies Briscoe's Bid to Depose Fellow Inmate Hurayt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James S. Gwin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio denied the Plaintiff's motion for leave to depose
Defendant Mark Hurayt in the lawsuit entitled ELVERT S. BRISCOE,
JR., Plaintiff v. GARY MOHR, et al., Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-02417 (N.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Elvert S. Briscoe, Jr., an Ohio prisoner proceeding pro
se, has filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
against multiple Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
("ODRC") officials and Mark Hurayt, a fellow inmate.

In March 2019, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court also
dismissed Briscoe's claims against Hurayt, although with little
discussion regarding the claim.

The Plaintiff appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff
Briscoe's equal protection and excessive force claims and vacated
this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff Briscoe's procedural due
process and retaliation claims. Plaintiff Briscoe did not argue to
the Sixth Circuit that this Court erred in dismissing Briscoe's
state law claim against Defendant Hurayt.

After an October 2021 jury trial, a verdict was returned for
Plaintiff Briscoe against Defendant Steve Weishar. The jury awarded
Plaintiff Briscoe $1,000 in damages and an additional $2,000 in
punitive damages.

Rulings

The Court ruled on motions during pretrial hearings and during
trial. Those rulings are summarized as follows.

Plaintiff Briscoe moved for leave to depose Defendant Hurayt. The
ODRC Defendants opposed. The Court denied this motion.

Plaintiff Briscoe moved for default judgment against Defendant
Hurayt. Plaintiff Briscoe brought a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Ohio State law against
Defendant Hurayt. Because Plaintiff Briscoe did not argue this
claim on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, he abandoned it. Therefore,
the Court denied this motion;

The ODRC Defendants moved in limine to exclude the proffer of
evidence and arguments that Plaintiff Briscoe suffered collateral
injuries because his security classification increased after his
Rules Infraction Board hearing conviction. The Court granted in
part and denied in part this motion. The Plaintiff was allowed to
proffer evidence that the Rules Infraction Board hearing conviction
elevated his security classification from Level 1 to Level 4. The
Plaintiff was not allowed to proffer evidence regarding any
subsequent emotional difficulties he suffered or any potential
impact on parole.

The ODRC Defendants moved in limine to exclude the proffer of
evidence and witnesses at trial relating to Plaintiff Briscoe's
claimed mental health and emotional injuries. The Court granted
this motion.

The Plaintiff moved for a continuance to allow counsel to appear,
to seek newly discovered evidence, to receive discovery, and to
file a class action related to his procedural due process claim.
The Court denied this motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated Nov. 1, 2021,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/9raypy4h from Leagle.com.


OREGON: Court Extends Discovery & PTO Deadlines in Terrill Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Terrill v. State of
Oregon, et al., Case No. 6:21-cv-00588 (D. Or.), the Hon. Judge Ann
L. Aiken entered an order granting joint motion for extension of
Discovery & PTO Deadlines as follows.

   -- Motion for Class Certification is due by 3/18/2022.

   -- Discovery is to be completed 120 days after the Court's
      ruling on the motion for class certification.

   -- The parties shall file amended pleadings and join all
      claims 120 days after the Court's ruling on the motion for
      class certification.

   -- Expert Witness Disclosures and Reports are due 30 days
      after the close of fact discovery.

   -- Expert Rebuttal Reports are due 30 days after Expert
      Disclosures.

   -- Expert Discovery to be completed 30 days after Rebuttal
      Reports are due.

   -- Dispositive Motions are due 30 days after close of Expert
      Discovery.

   -- Pretrial Order is due 30 days following the Court's ruling
      on any dispositive motions.

The suit alleges violation of Americans with Disabilities Act.[CC]


PACC SENIOR: Sheridan Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Caregivers
--------------------------------------------------------------
JANINE SHERIDAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PACC SENIOR CARE, LLC D/B/A HOME INSTEAD
SENIOR CARE, Defendant, Case No. 4:21-cv-01124-LPR (E.D. Ark.,
November 17, 2021) is a class action against the Defendant for
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum
Wage Act by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and similarly
situated caregivers overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of
40 hours in a workweek.

Ms. Sheridan was employed by the Defendant as a caregiver from
November 2018 until March 2020.

PACC Senior Care, LLC, doing business as Home Instead Senior Care,
is a provider of in-home non-medical care for elderly adults,
located in Conway, Arkansas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Chris Burks, Esq.
         WHLAW | WE HELP
         1 Riverfront Pl., Suite 745
         North Little Rock, AR 72114
         Telephone: (501) 891-6000
         E-mail: chris@wh.law

PENN NATIONAL: Faces Potential Securities Class Action Amid Losses
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominic Marius-Markham at gamblinginsider.com reports that
Penn National Gaming is facing an investigation from the Schall Law
Firm regarding alleged violations of securities law.

The casino and racetrack operator has been confronted with claims
from the California-based law firm, on behalf of shareholders,
concerning "misleading" statements and/or its failure to provide
investors with important information.

November 4, Penn National reported a net income of $0.52 per share
on $1.5bn in revenue for the third quarter of 2021. This figure
fell far short of expectations, with Penn having reported $0.93 per
share for the equivalent period last year. As a result, shares of
the company experienced a marked drop.

After missing its Wall Street consensus earnings estimate, the
company's shares took a 21% tumble by market close on 4 November,
taking many investors by surprise.

"The investigation focuses on whether the company issued false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose information
pertinent to investors," stated Schall.

"Penn National announced its financial results for the third
quarter of 2021 on November 4, 2021. The company reported net
income of $0.52 per share, which fell far short of the $0.93 per
share for the same quarter of the prior year."

"Based on this news, shares of Penn National fell sharply on the
same day."

Subsequently, many shareholders suffered a loss, leading Schall,
which specialises in securities law and shareholder rights, to call
on any investors who did to get in touch.

While this case has not yet been certified - as reiterated by
Schall - it could lead to a class-action lawsuit if the firm's
preliminary investigation yields adequate grounds.[GN]

PEOPLECONNECT INC: Loses Bid to Stay Proceedings in Callahan Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MEREDITH CALLAHAN, et al., Plaintiffs v.
PEOPLECONNECT, INC., Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-09203-EMC (N.D.
Cal.), District Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California issued an order:

   -- denying the Defendant's motion to stay pending appeal;

   -- granting in part and denying in part the Defendant's motion
      to dismiss and strike; and

   -- denying the Defendant's motion to stay discovery

Plaintiffs Meredith Callahan and Lawrence Geoffrey Abraham have
filed a class action against Defendant PeopleConnect, Inc.
According to the Plaintiffs, PeopleConnect misappropriated their
names, photographs, and likenesses and used the same in advertising
its products and services, including reprinted yearbooks and
subscription memberships to the website Classmates.com.

Factual & Procedural Background

PeopleConnect is a company that collects yearbooks, scans the
yearbooks, and extracts information from the yearbooks (such as
names, photographs, schools attended, and so forth) to be put into
a database. It aggregates the extracted information into digital
records associated with specific individuals, and then the digital
records are exploited commercially--to promote and sell
PeopleConnect's products--but without the individuals' consent.
PeopleConnect sells products through its website (Classmates.com).
The products sold on the website are (1) reprinted yearbooks and
(2) a subscription membership.

According to the Plaintiffs, by misappropriating and misusing
millions of Californian's names, photographs, and likenesses
without consent, PeopleConnect has harmed the Plaintiffs and the
class by denying them the economic value of their likenesses,
violating their legally protected rights to exclusive use of their
likenesses, and violating their right to seclusion. PeopleConnect
has also earned ill-gotten profits and been unjustly enriched.

The Plaintiffs have asserted theses claim for relief: (1) Violation
of California Civil Code Section 3344 (i.e., the right of
publicity); (2) Violation of California Business & Professions Code
Section 17200 (both the unlawful and unfair prongs); (3) Intrusion
upon seclusion; and (4) Unjust enrichment.

Motion to Stay Pending Appeal

Previously, PeopleConnect moved to compel the instant case to
arbitration, but the Court denied the motion. PeopleConnect has
since appealed that decision. Now, PeopleConnect moves to stay
proceedings pending the Ninth Circuit's disposition of that
appeal.

The Court concludes that, in the instant case, PeopleConnect has
failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Although
PeopleConnect has cited two federal district court cases in support
of its position, neither addressed Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 38
Cal.3d 396 (1985). See Jimenez v. Menzies Aviation Inc., No.
15-cv-02392-WHO, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127875, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal.
Sep. 23, 2015); see also Britton v. Co-op Banking Grp., 916 F.2d
1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990).

Furthermore, even if the two cases were enough to raise serious
questions on the merits, PeopleConnect would still have to show
that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor in order
for a stay to be justified, Judge Chen notes. Judge Chen finds that
PeopleConnect has failed to make that showing.

Although PeopleConnect's argument is not without any merit, it is
not persuasive, Judge Chen holds. Even assuming that the Court were
to deny the motion to dismiss and strike in its entirety, that
would not deprive PeopleConnect of the arbitral forum, he points
out. The denial of the motion to dismiss would not resolve the case
or obviate an arbitration should it be so ordered. PeopleConnect,
therefore, would not suffer irreparable harm warranting a stay.

Accordingly, PeopleConnect's motion to stay pending appeal is
denied.

Motion to Dismiss and Strike

Because the Court denies the motion to stay pending appeal, it
addresses PeopleConnect's motion to dismiss and strike on the
merits. In the motion to dismiss, PeopleConnect argues that: (1)
the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by federal law (specifically, the
Communications Decency Act and the Copyright Act); (2) the
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief for all four
causes of action; and (3) PeopleConnect's conduct is protected by
the First Amendment. In the motion to strike, PeopleConnect argues
that the California anti-SLAPP statute bars the Plaintiffs'
complaint.

A. Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act

According to PeopleConnect, all of the Plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"). The CDA provides
in relevant part as follows: "No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider."

In the instant case, PeopleConnect relies heavily on decisions
issued by Judge Beeler in Callahan v. Ancestry.com Inc., No.
20-cv-08437-LB, to support its claim of CDA immunity. In fact,
PeopleConnect contends that the Court must give Judge Beeler's
decisions collateral estoppel effect because the plaintiffs in the
Ancestry case are the same as the Plaintiffs here.

The Court rejects the collateral estoppel argument. Judge Beeler's
Ancestry case was a federal court case, but predicated on diversity
jurisdiction. However, under the federal common law, where the
prior judgment was predicated on diversity jurisdiction, state law
on preclusion applies rather than federal law because there is no
need for a uniform federal rule, Judge Chen opines. In the instant
case, there is no dispute that the Ancestry plaintiffs have
appealed Judge Beeler's decisions to the Ninth Circuit; therefore,
collateral estoppel cannot apply under California law because there
is no final judgment, Judge Chen holds.

In its papers, PeopleConnect protests the application of California
law on collateral estoppel. PeopleConnect contends that this is a
case where federal interests compel the application of federal
preclusion principles, apparently because a federal issue--CDA
immunity--is at stake. The Court is not persuaded. Application of
state law on collateral estoppel (in particular to the finality
requirement) will not impair in any systemic way the application of
CDA immunity, the Judge holds.

Turning to the merits of PeopleConnect's CDA argument, the Court
finds that it is not persuasive.

In the instant case, the Court concludes that, at the very least,
there is a question of fact as to whether a reasonable person in
the position of PeopleConnect (the service provider) would conclude
that the yearbook authors/publishers (the information content
providers) intended the yearbooks to be published on the internet.
As the Plaintiffs point out, the yearbooks at issue were published
in the 1990s and early 2000s when the Internet was in its infancy
and social media did not exist. Moreover, there is a difference
between publishing a yearbook for a school or local community and
publishing a yearbook on the internet where the audience is far
broader. Thus, it would be hard to conclude that, as a matter of
law, PeopleConnect is a publisher of information provided by
another information content provider and is, thus, entitled to
immunity under the CDA.

Judge Chen also states that in the instant case, it is obvious that
the yearbook users/purchasers were not the creators or developers
of the yearbooks. Instead, the yearbook authors/publishers were the
content providers. PeopleConnect cannot claim the benefit of CDA
immunity, absent a reasonable basis to believe that the yearbook
authors/publishers intended for there to be publication on the
Internet. This presents a question of fact that cannot be resolved
at the 12(b)(6) phase of proceedings, Judge Chen points out.

B. Copyright Preemption

According to PeopleConnect, even if there is a question of fact on
CDA immunity, the Copyright Act bars most of the Plaintiffs'
claims--in particular, their Section 3344, Section 17200, and
unjust enrichment claims (but not their intrusion-on-seclusion
claim).

The Plaintiffs argue first that PeopleConnect is precluded from
raising the copyright preemption defense based on a decision from a
Washington district court in Knapke v. Peopleconnect Inc., No.
C21-262 MJP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150249, at *10-11 (W.D. Wash
Aug. 10, 2021). In Knapke--where PeopleConnect was sued for the
same basic conduct as that at issue in the case at bar--the court
rejected the copyright preemption defense because a publicity-right
claim is not preempted when it targets nonconsensual use of one's
name or likeness on merchandise or in advertising.

In its papers, PeopleConnect contends first that Knapke should not
be given collateral estoppel effect because federal law on
collateral estoppel should apply. That argument, like the one
above, is not persuasive, Judge Chen holds. State courts often
opine on copyright preemption even though it is a federal defense,
and the application of state law on collateral estoppel is not
incompatible with federal interests.

PeopleConnect asserts that Knapke cannot be given collateral
estoppel effect because no final judgment has been reached in that
case. In response, the Plaintiffs contend that a final judgment
need not be a formal final judgment closing the case in its
entirety; rather, the question is whether the Knapke court
essentially reached a final decision in rejecting copyright
preemption.

Judge Chen holds that the Plaintiffs are correct that a formal
final judgment or decision is not necessary. However, the
Plaintiffs have not pointed to any Washington state court authority
holding that a decision made at the pleadings stage is sufficiently
final to give rise to a preclusive effect. More important, even
though it is clear that the Knapke court rejected the copyright
preemption defense in its decision, it is not clear that the court
was, thereby, foreclosing PeopleConnect from raising the defense
again. The Court, therefore, declines to apply collateral estoppel
and considers the merits of PeopleConnect's copyright preemption
argument.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs' Section 3344, Section 17200,
and unjust enrichment claims are preempted by the Copyright Act,
but only in part. The Section 3344, Section 17200, and unjust
enrichment claims are preempted to the extent they are based on the
use of the Plaintiffs' names and likenesses taken from the
yearbooks themselves to advertise those reprinted yearbooks. To the
extent those claims are based on the use of the Plaintiffs' names
and likenesses to advertise the subscription membership, there is
no preemption, the Judge points out.

C. Failure to State a Claim for Relief

PeopleConnect argues that, for the remaining claims, dismissal is
warranted for failure to state a claim for relief under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

PeopleConnect challenges the Section 3344 claim on various grounds:
(1) that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead an injury; (2) that
the Plaintiffs have failed to plead unlawful advertising; and (3)
that the "public affairs" exception applies.

The Court acknowledges that there are some authorities to support
PeopleConnect's position. Nevertheless, it finds the authorities
cited more persuasive. Economic value may reasonably be inferred
from PeopleConnect's use of the images to advertise, and this is
sufficient to defeat a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), Judge Chen
holds.

Judge Chen opines, among other things, that the Plaintiffs have
adequately stated a Section 3344 claim based on PeopleConnect's use
of their names and likenesses to (allegedly) promote its
subscription membership: (1) the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged an economic injury; (2) they need not allege that the
advertising suggested they endorsed the product; (3) it is a
question of fact as to whether their names and likenesses were used
to advertise the subscription membership; and (4) the public
affairs exception has no application to the subscription
membership.

The Court dismisses the intrusion-on-seclusion claim. The dismissal
is without prejudice but, at this juncture, without leave to amend.
If the Plaintiffs, through discovery, find additional facts
suggesting a good faith basis to support the
intrusion-upon-seclusion claim, then they may file a motion for
leave to amend. The Court also allows the Plaintiffs to proceed
with the theory of unjust conferral of a benefit through, in
effect, misappropriation.

D. First Amendment and California's Anti-SLAPP Statute

Finally, PeopleConnect argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the First Amendment and should be stricken under
California's anti-SLAPP statute--essentially making an argument
similar to the public affairs argument.

Judge Chen notes that it is unnecessary for the Court to address
these issues because the Section 3344, Section 17200, and unjust
enrichment claims are preempted to the extent the claims are based
on PeopleConnect's reprinting of yearbooks and advertising of the
yearbooks. PeopleConnect has failed to make a First Amendment and
anti-SLAPP argument with respect to any claims based on the use of
the images and likenesses in advertising its subscription
membership.

Motion to Stay Discovery

In its motion to stay discovery, PeopleConnect asks the Court to
stay discovery pending resolution of its motion to dismiss and
strike. This stay motion is moot as (1) this order has now issued
and (2) a significant part of the Plaintiffs' case has survived the
motion to dismiss and strike.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court denies the motion to stay pending
appeal, grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss and
strike, and denies the motion to stay discovery. The Section 3344,
Section 17200, and unjust enrichment claims are preempted in part
by the Copyright Act. The intrusion-upon-seclusion claim is
dismissed without prejudice but, at this juncture, without leave to
amend. The Plaintiffs' case may otherwise proceed. PeopleConnect
will file a response to the complaint within thirty (30) days of
the date of this order.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 26, 28, and 49, as well as
Docket Nos. 60, 64, and 71.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Nov. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3e29jckr from Leagle.com.


PFIZER INC: Faces New Chantix Suit Over Nitrosamine Impurities
--------------------------------------------------------------
On September 16, 2021, Pfizer expanded the nationwide Chantix
(varenicline) recall to include all lots of the medication due to
potentially unsafe levels of the carcinogen N-nitroso-varenicline.

Now, the company faces increasing litigation from consumers who
have used its Chantix products. One of those is a new class-action
Chantix lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.

Plaintiff Claims Pfizer Misrepresented Varenicline Products
The plaintiff in the class-action case lives in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. According to her complaint, she paid money for one or
more of Pfizer's varenicline-containing drugs (VCDs). The products
she purchased bore a unique National Drug Code that indicated it
was sold, manufactured, and/or distributed in the U.S. by Pfizer.
It was branded the same as Chantix.

The plaintiff claims that the product was not Chantix, and was not
of the quality represented by Pfizer.

Chantix is a first-line therapy to help smokers quit smoking
cigarettes. It came onto the market in May 2006 and quickly became
a popular smoking-cessation product. Pfizer's sales of Chantix
remained strong until the recall, totaling $919 million in sales in
2020, making it one of Pfizer's eight best-selling products that
year.

Pfizer has patent protection on the drug through 2022, preventing
any generic versions until then. Meanwhile, it represented and
warranted to consumers that its VCDs were equivalent to the
FDA-brand-name drug Chantix.

The plaintiff claims that these other VCDs, however, were
adulterated or misbranded through contamination with
n-nitroso-varenicline, and potentially other carcinogenic
nitrosamines as well.

Plaintiff Seeks to Represent All Chantix Consumers in the U.S.
On July 2, 2021, and again on July 19, 2021, Pfizer initiated
recalls of VCDs because they could contain unsafe levels of
N-nitroso-varenicline. Then in September, it extended the recall to
all Chantix products.

The plaintiff claims that the presence of N-nitroso-varenicline
reclassifies the product as a new, unapproved drug and not the
Chantix consumers expected.

"This new and unapproved drug with additional active ingredients
(such as nitrosamines in the subject VCDs) cannot have the same
label as the brand-name drug," her lawsuit states, "as the two
products are no longer the same."

At the very least, she adds, drugs with different and dangerous
ingredients are adulterated and misbranded, making them illegal to
sell on the market.

She seeks to represent all individuals and entities in the U.S. who
paid for a VCD that was manufactured, distributed, or sold by
Pfizer, as well as all individuals and entities in Georgia who did
the same.

Other Drugs Affected by Nitrosamine Contamination
This is one of several drugs that have been affected by
nitrosamines. The manufacturers recalled all lots of Zantac in
April 2020 because of potential contamination with
N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), another carcinogen. Manufacturers of
valsartan, losartan, and metformin have implemented similar recalls
for the same nitrosamine.

Currently, all of these manufacturers are defending lawsuits
brought by consumers who used these drugs and now fear the health
consequences. [GN]

PILLPACK LLC: Washington Court Decertifies Class in Williams Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AARON WILLIAMS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PILLPACK, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
19-5282 RJB (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert J. Bryan of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma,
entered an Order:

   a. denying without prejudice the Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify
      the Class Definition;

   b. granting PillPack's Motion to Decertify the Class;

   c. denying without prejudice PillPack's motion to limit the
      class definition;

   d. denying as moot the Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Approve
      Notice Plan and Second Amended Motion to Approve Notice
      Plan; and

   e. denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to File Documents under Seal
      or in Open Court as to the deposition of Josh Grant, and
      granting in all other respects.

I. Background

In this class action, the Plaintiffs allege that PillPack violated
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C.
Section 227, et seq. The class was certified on Feb. 12, 2021. The
Plaintiffs filed their original Motion to Approve Notice Plan on
March 12, 2021. After the motion was continued so that the parties
could engage in further discovery, with leave of court, the
Plaintiffs filed their Amended Motion to Approve Notice Plan. Their
original motion was stricken as moot. As a result of new
information gained through discovery, the Plaintiff now moves to
modify the class definition and in his reply proposed another
variation in the class definition.

The Plaintiffs move have the class definition modified as follows:
"All persons or entities within the United States who between March
13, 2018 and June 16, 2019, received a non-emergency telephone call
placed by Prospects DM promoting PillPack LLC's goods or services,
as part of the PillPack Performance Media campaign: (i) to a
cellular telephone number through the use of an automatic telephone
dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice; or(ii) to a
cellular or residential telephone number that had been registered
on the national Do Not Call Registry for at least 31 days and who
received more than one call as part of the PillPack Performance
Media campaign within any twelvemonth period.

Excluded from the class are persons or entitles: (1) whose
telephone numbers were obtained from the www.rewardzoneusa.com,
nationalconsumercenter.com, or surveyvoices.com websites operated
by Fluent, Inc. between June 19, 2017 and May 3, 2019 or (2) whose
calls were transferred to ExactCare Pharmacy but not PillPack.

The Plaintiffs do not seek modification of the Transfers Sub-Class
definition which is: "Transfers Sub-Class: All Class members who
were transferred at least once to a PillPack call center on the
Dialed Number Identification Service at: 866-298-0058."

Due to the change in the Plaintiff's proposed amended class,
PillPack was granted leave, and filed, an updated response.
PillPack opposes the newly modified version, arguing that the
Plaintiff's new proposed class definition does not cure the flaws.
It maintains that the Plaintiff cannot satisfy key requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The Plaintiffs filed a supplemental reply.

On Oct. 29, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Motion
to Approve Notice Plan.  This is the day that the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Modify the Class Definition, PillPack Motion to Decertify
the Class, and the Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Approve Notice
Plan were noted for consideration. Although under Local Rule W.D.
Wash. 7, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Motion to Approve Notice
Plan should not have been noted for the same day it was filed,
because the class should be decertified, no further briefing on
this motion is required. Additionally, the Plaintiffs' Motion to
File Documents under Seal or in Open Court should also be addressed
at this time.

II. Discussion

Judge Bryan first addresses the c, then the motions related to
class notification, and lastly, the Plaintiffs' motion to file
documents under seal.

A. Class Definition Related Motions

1. Motions to Modify Class Definition

Judge Bryan holds that the Plaintiff's motion to modify the class
definition should be denied without prejudice. He finds that the
Plaintiff's newly proposed class definition suffers from the very
deficiencies that the Court was attempting to address in the
original order on certification. The class is no longer able to
meet the typicality or commonality requirements of Rule
23(a)(2)-(3) or the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). The
proposed class attempts to bring in too many people, resulting in
too many individualized inquiries. While they may be able to define
a much narrower class, they have not proposed to do so in this
motion.

2. PillPack's Motion to Decertify Class or Limit the Definition

Judge Bryan holds that the Defendant's motion to decertify the
class should be granted. He finds that the Plaintiff is no longer a
member of the original class. The newly proposed class definition
fails to meet the requirements under Rule 23. The Plaintiff fails
to address whether the proposed limits to the class definition
offered by PillPack met the Rule 23 requirements. He has that
burden, accordingly, to the extent PillPack's motion to modify the
class definition to just those people whose contact information was
sourced from the same website as Plaintiff Williams' information,
that motion should be denied without prejudice.

B. Plaintiff's Motions to Amend Approve Notice Plan

Judge Bryan holds that the Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Approve
Notice Plan and Second Amended Motion to Approve Notice Plan should
be denied as moot.

C. Plaintiffs' Motion to Seal

In support of their supplemental reply, the Plaintiffs filed
certain pleadings under seal, including the deposition of Josh
Grant, the Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deponent of Prospects DM, a
document produced by third party Byte Success, and two additional
document previously filed under seal and ordered to remain under
seal by order dated Jan. 8, 2021. The Plaintiffs also filed their
supplemental reply under seal and filed a redacted version. The
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to File Documents Under Seal or in Open
Court which was noted for consideration for Nov. 19, 2021.

First, as to the deposition of Josh Grant, the Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(b)(6) deponent of Prospects DM, PillPack filed this portion of
his deposition under seal with an accompanying motion. That motion
to keep Mr. Grant's deposition under seal was denied on Oct. 26,
2021. Accordingly, that portion of the Plaintiffs' motion should be
denied for the reasons provided in that Oct. 26, 2021 order, Judge
Bryan says. The Plaintiffs should be ordered to file an unredacted
copy of this deposition by Nov. 12, 2021.

The document produced by Byte Success which is the subject of this
motion to seal, contains financial account information.
Accordingly, pursuant to Local Rule Western District of Washington
5.2, it should remain under seal.

The last pleadings subject to the motion to seal are emails
originally filed under seal in the record and refiled under seal
again. Contrary to the Plaintiffs' assertion, the Court ruled on
their prior motion to seal these emails on Jan. 8, 2021. That prior
order remains in effect and those pleadings should remain under
seal. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion to keep those emails
under seal should be granted.

III. Order

Therefore, Judge Bryan (i) denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Modify the Class Definition, (ii) granted PillPack's
Motion to Decertify the Class; (iii) denied without prejudice
PillPack's motion to limit the class definition; (iv) denied as
moot the Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Approve Notice Plan and
Second Amended Motion to Approve Notice Plan; (v) denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion to File Documents under Seal or in Open Court as
to the deposition of Josh Grant, and granted in all other respects.
The Plaintiff will file an unredacted copy of the deposition of
Josh Grant. The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of the
Order to all counsel of record and to any party appearing pro se at
said party's last known address.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y6fkafwj from Leagle.com.


PRANAV INN: Website Inaccessible to Disabled Persons, Sarwar Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, SAIM SARWAR, individually, Plaintiff v. PRANAV INN LLC, a
New York Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 7:21-cv-09019 (S.D.N.Y.,
November 2, 2021) arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the New York State Human
Rights Law.

The Plaintiff is an individual with disabilities as defined by the
ADA. The Plaintiff is ambulated in a wheelchair or other support
and has limited use of his hands.

The Plaintiff claims that when he reviewed the ORS on multiple
occasions for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not he would
be able to book an accessible room and stay at the Defendant's
hotel during a trip he plans to take next year, he found that many
of the Defendant's website did not identify or allow for booking of
any accessible guest rooms. The website also failed to provide
sufficient information so that the Plaintiff or other disabled
persons could ascertain whether or not the hotel's rooms and
features are accessible. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant
has discriminated him and other similarly situated disabled persons
by denying them access to, and full and equal enjoyment of, the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or
accommodations of the subject ORS.

As a result of the Defendant's alleged unlawful conduct, the
Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer, stigmatic harm,
dignitary harm, frustration and humiliation. Thus, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated handicapped persons, the
Plaintiff brings this complaint against the Defendant seeking for
injunctive relief and damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs.

Pranav Inn LLC operates a hotel. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tristan W. Gillespie, Esq.
          THOMAS B. BACON, P.A.
          600 Blakenham Court
          Johns Creek, GA 30022
          Tel: 404-276-7277
          E-mail: Gillespie.tristan@gmail.com

PRECIGEN INC: Seeks Dismissal of Second Amended Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Precigen, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that on Sept. 27, that
the lead plaintiff in several shareholder class action suits filed
a second amended complaint and defendants intend to move to its
dismissal.

In October 2020, several purported shareholder class action
lawsuits were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on behalf of certain purchasers of the
Company's common stock. The complaints name as defendants the
Company and certain of its current and former officers.

The plaintiff's claims track the allegations in the SEC's
administrative order but challenge disclosures about the MBP
program through September 2020, i.e., the date of the SEC
administrative order.

The plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, interest, and an award of
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

In April 2021, the court granted an order consolidating the claims
and appointed a lead plaintiff and lead counsel in the case,
captioned Abailla v. Precigen, Inc., F/K/A Intrexon Corp., et al.
In May 2021, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint.

The defendants moved to dismiss that complaint.

In September 2021, the court issued an order mooting the
defendants' motion to dismiss in light of the lead plaintiff's
stated intent to file a second amended complaint in response to the
motion to dismiss.

On September 27, 2021, the lead plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint.

The defendants intend to move to dismiss that complaint.

Precigen, Inc. is a dedicated discovery and clinical-stage
biopharmaceutical company advancing the next generation of gene and
cell therapies with the overall goal of improving outcomes for
patients with significant unmet medical needs. The company is based
in Germantown, Maryland.

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Faces Almanzar Suit Over Mislabeled Diapers
-------------------------------------------------------------
ANGELINA ALMANZAR, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-09196 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 7, 2021) is an
action alleging that the Defendant mislabeled its disposable
diapers marketed as "Pure" with a "Plant-based liner enriched with
shea butter," under the Pampers brand ("Product").

According to the complaint, the Product's label is covered in
shades of green, with a green "heart" symbol underneath the words,
"Pure Protection," and the statement, "Plant-based liner enriched
with shea butter," in green font. Moreover, the other
representations, including the heavy use of green and the word
"Pure," cause consumers to expect a higher percentage of
plant-based materials are used.

By labeling the Product in this manner, the Defendant gained an
advantage against other companies, and against consumers seeking to
purchase a product which contained a greater amount and percentage
of plant-based materials than it did. Had the Plaintiff and
proposed class members known the truth, they would not have bought
the Product or would have paid less for it, added the suit.

The Product is allegedly sold for a price premium compared to other
similar products, no less than approximately $35.99 for a package
of 76 diapers, a higher price than it would otherwise be sold for,
absent the misleading representations and omissions.

THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY manufactures and markets consumer
products in countries throughout the world. The Company provides
products in the laundry and cleaning, paper, beauty care, food and
beverage, and health care segments. Procter & Gamble products are
sold primarily through mass merchandisers, grocery stores,
membership club stores, drug stores, and neighborhood stores. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd Ste 409
          Great Neck NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com

PROSPECT INT'L: Ramirez Suit Remanded to San Mateo Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUIS R. CHAVARRIA RAMIREZ, Plaintiff v. PROSPECT
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants,
Case No. 21-cv-06250-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California:

    (i) grants Ramirez's motion for remand for lack of subject
        matter jurisdiction; and

   (ii) vacates the case management conference set for Nov. 29,
        2021.

I. Background

Plaintiff Ramirez filed the action against Defendants Prospect
International Airport Services Corp., Prospect Airport Services,
Inc., and Does 1 to 100, inclusive. Ramirez alleges 10 causes of
action, namely, violations of California Labor Code and California
Business & Professions Code.

On June 18, 2021, Ramirez filed the putative class action lawsuit
against the Defendants, inclusive, in the Superior Court of the
State of California, County of San Mateo, Dkt. No. 1-1, Case No.
21-CIV-03392 ("State Court Action"). Ramirez asserts individual and
class claims against Prospect Airport for wage-and-hour and
unfair-competition causes of action. He seeks unpaid overtime and
minimum wages, unpaid meal and rest period premiums, waiting time
and wage statement penalties, reimbursement of business expenses,
and attorneys' fees.

Mr. Ramirez purports to bring the claims on behalf of himself and a
class consisting of "all current and former hourly-paid or
non-exempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants within
the State of California at any time during the period from four
years preceding the filing of this Complaint to final judgment."

On Aug. 12, 2021, Prospect Airport removed the complaint to the
Court by Notice of Removal filed Aug. 12, 2021, asserting federal
jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").

Now before the Court is Ramirez's motion to remand for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the sole basis that the Defendants
have not demonstrated that the amount in controversy exceeds $5
million under the diversity jurisdictional requirements of the
Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d). The parties
have fully briefed the motion.

II. Analysis

The sole issue in dispute is whether CAFA's $5 million
amount-in-controversy threshold has been met. While the State Court
Action did not plead the particular sum Ramirez and the class
sought to recover, the complaint stated that the amount in
controversy was less than $75,000. In its Notice of Removal,
Prospect Airport called the claimed amount "a baseless attempt by a
class representative to limit the scope of relief available to the
class" and concluded that "such bald assertions of the amount in
controversy have no weight." Prospect Airport argued that the
amount in controversy was satisfied, and, in support, attached a
declaration executed by Vicki Strobel, Prospect Airport's President
and CEO.

Using the information supplied by the Strobel Declaration --
putative class size, average wage, total workweeks, and average
workweeks per year, Prospect Airport calculated the amount of
damages put at issue by Ramirez's asserted individual and class
claims at $13,109,408 (without counting for attorneys' fees) and
concluded that the CAFA amount-in-controversy requirement had been
met.

Mr. Ramirez contests that Prospect Airport has failed to meet the
CAFA amount in controversy requirement because the conclusions in
Prospect Airport's Notice of Removal are based on assumptions so
unfounded that Prospect Airport's "chain of reasoning and its
underlying assumptions" cannot be considered reasonable. Prospect
Airport counters that it has met its burden of proving that the
requirement has been satisfied.

Judge Gonzalez holds that the evidence before the Court is
insufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
the amount in controversy has been satisfied. Because Prospect
Airport relied on unfounded evidence to calculate the total
potential damages for each of Ramirez's claims, Judge Gonzalez
holds that Prospect Airport has not met its burden to establish
CAFA jurisdiction, citing Lockhart v. Columbia Sportswear Co., 2016
WL 2743481, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2016) (finding human resources
declaration "lacks foundation and cannot provide sufficient support
for the calculations on which Columbia's entire amount in
controversy analysis relies" where "nowhere in his declaration does
Young describe the records he reviewed or how he arrived at those
numbers").

III. Conclusion

For the reasons she discussed, Judge Gonzalez granted Ramirez's
motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She
further vacated the case management conference set for Nov. 29,
2021. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case and
remand to the San Mateo County Superior Court.

The Order terminates Docket Number 12.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/n22cfux9 from Leagle.com.


REALREAL INC: Settlement in Shareholder Suit Awaits Initial OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
The RealReal, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the plaintiff in a
purported shareholder class action complaint filed an executed
stipulation of settlement and motion for preliminary approval of
the settlement with the federal court.

On September 10, 2019, a purported shareholder class action
complaint was filed against the Company, its officers and directors
and the underwriters of its initial public offering ("IPO") in the
Superior Court of the State of California in the County of San
Mateo.

Three additional purported class actions, also alleging claims
arising from the IPO were subsequently filed in Marin County and
San Francisco County Superior Courts.

The San Mateo case was voluntarily dismissed, refiled in Marin
County Superior Court and consolidated with the cases there.

On January 10, 2020, the Marin County plaintiffs filed a
consolidated amended complaint.

The plaintiffs in the San Francisco Superior Court case have filed
a request for dismissal.

Separately an additional purported class action was filed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California on November 25, 2019.

On February 12, 2020, a lead plaintiff was appointed in the federal
action and an Amended Consolidated Complaint was filed on March 31,
2020.

Defendants' filed a demurrer and motion to strike in the state
court action on March 13, 2020 and filed a motion to stay the
proceedings in favor of the federal action on May 1, 2020.

On August 4, 2020, the court granted the defendants' motion to stay
the state court action and deferred ruling on the demurrer and
motion to strike pending the outcome of the federal court action.

A motion to dismiss the Amended and Consolidated Complaint in the
federal court action was filed on May 15, 2020. On March 31, 2021,
the court entered an order on the motion to dismiss, dismissing the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 claims and some of the claims
alleged under the Securities Act of 1933.

The court provided plaintiffs with an opportunity to amend the
complaint and, on April 30, 2021, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended
Complaint in federal court.

The state court complaint, and the Second Amended Complaint in
federal court each allege claims under the Securities Act of 1933
on behalf of a purported class of shareholders who acquired the
Company's stock pursuant to or traceable to the registration
statement for the Company's IPO.

The federal complaint also alleges claims under the Exchange Act on
behalf of a purported class of shareholders who purchased the
Company's stock from June 27, 2019 through November 20, 2019.

The complaints seek, among other things, damages and interest,
rescission, and attorneys' fees and costs.

On July 27, 2021, the Company reached an agreement in principle to
settle this shareholder class action.

On November 5, 2021, the plaintiff filed the executed stipulation
of settlement and motion for preliminary approval of the settlement
with the federal court.

The stipulation of settlement is subject to preliminary and final
approval by the court.

The financial terms of the stipulation of settlement provide that
the Company will pay $11.0 million within thirty days of the later
of preliminary approval of the settlement or plaintiff's counsel
providing payment instructions.

"In connection with the settlement, the Company recorded
approximately $11.0 million for the three months ended June 30,
2021 under the Company's Operating expenses as a Legal settlement,"
the company said.

The Company intends to pay for the settlement with available
resources.

The RealReal, Inc. owns and operates a members-only consignment
marketplace for luxury goods. The Company specializes in curating
and authenticating a full range of previously owned luxury products
such as clothing, shoes, accessories, and jewelry that are sold on
consignment. The RealReal markets its products and services
throughout the United States. The company is based in San
Francisco, California.

RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Rokack Sues Over Misleading Letters
------------------------------------------------------------
NAHMAN ROKACH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-06103 (E.D.N.Y., November 2, 2021) is a
class action complaint brought against the Defendant for its
alleged abusive debt collection practices that violated the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant sent a collection letter
to the Plaintiff on or about April 14, 2021 in an attempt to
collect an alleged debt incurred to T-Mobile as successor in
interest to Sprint, the original creditor. The Defendant's letter
makes it appear that it offered a true settlement offer by stating
that the Plaintiff's account will be settled if the 50% of the
current balance is being paid. The Plaintiff asserts that the
Defendant's letter is deceptive because it implies that in exchange
of 50% of the balance the Plaintiff will achieve some form of
settlement and saving money, when in actuality it is unclear what
form of settlement the letter is offering. Moreover, the letter has
a heading at the top of the letter stating "SAVE MONEY SETTLEMENT
OFFER," which implies that the Plaintiff can reduce his balance,
thereby reinstating his account. The Plaintiff claims that he has
confused and misled by the Defendant's offer, whether it was an
actual settlement or not and as a result did not accept the offer.

Receivables Performance Management, LLC is a debt collector. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Tel: (201) 282-6500 ext. 122
          Fax: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: rdeutsch@SteinSaksLegal.com


RELIN GOLDSTEIN: New York Court Dismisses Braun FDCPA Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Charles J. Siragusa of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York grants the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the lawsuit titled SOLOMON BRAUN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RELIN,
GOLDSTEIN & CRANE, LLP, Defendant, Case No. 21-CV-6071 (CJS)
(W.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Solomon Braun ("Braun") filed this putative class action
complaint against Defendant Relin, Goldstein & Crane, LLP ("RGC")
alleging that RGC violated his rights under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). Specifically, Braun claims
that: (1) in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e, RGC falsely and
deceptively represented that an attorney was meaningfully involved
in sending a collection letter to Braun, and (2) RGC's conduct
constituted a threat of potential legal action that "overshadowed"
RGC's disclosure of Braun's rights under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g.

Background

On July 12, 2020, the law firm of Relin, Goldstein & Crane, LLP
("RGC") generated a letter to Solomon Braun, on the firm's
letterhead. The letter states that the creditor is American Express
and the principal amount due is $1,254.43.

The letter contained handwriting in blue ink, which recorded the
date and inscribed a signature purportedly of V.S. Vilkhu, Esq.
Beneath the hand-written signature, there were two checkboxes: one
for Joseph M. Shur, Esq., and one for V.S. Vilkhu, Esq. The box for
V.S. Vilkhu, Esq., contained a hand-written checkmark, also in blue
ink. Beneath the checkboxes was a notice which stated: "This
communication is from a debt collector. This is an attempt to
collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that
purpose." On the second page of the letter RGC listed activities
that it was prohibited from engaging in under the FDCPA, as well as
forms of income that it was not permitted to take to pay the
debts.

Mr. Braun's complaint is based entirely upon the letter he received
from RGC. In his first cause of action, Braun alleges, in pertinent
part: The Letter purports to be signed by V.S. Vilkhu, Esq.; Upon
information and belief, the Letter was not authored by V.S. Vilkhu,
Esq.; and Upon information and belief, V.S. Vilkhu, Esq was not
involved in the sending of the Letter. The Letter allegedly
misleads consumers into believing that there was meaningful
attorney involvement in the collection of the debt.

Based on these allegations, Braun claims that RGC made false and
deceptive representations in connection with the collection of an
alleged debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e.

In his second cause of action, Braun claims that RGC violated 15
U.S.C. Section 1692g because the potential threat of legal action
overshadows the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the
debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. That
is, Braun claims that RGC's use of its law firm letterhead, its
representation that the letter was from an attorney, its omission
of a disclaimer that it was acting only as a debt collector, and
its inconspicuous placement of the required validation notice
violated the FDCPA because it would cause the "least sophisticated
consumer" to become uncertain or confused as to his rights.

RGC has moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the Plaintiff has failed to plead
a sufficient factual basis for either cause of action.

Discussion

In its memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss, RGC maintains
that Braun's claim that an attorney was not meaningfully involved
in sending RGC's letter amounts to nothing more than a bald
assertion that RGC committed an FDCPA violation and should be
dismissed for failure to allege sufficient facts.

With respect to Braun's claim that the threat of legal action
"overshadowed" the required notices and disclaimers regarding debt
collection by a law firm, RGC argues that the count should be
dismissed for failure to allege sufficient facts because their
letter makes no mention of legal action and makes no threats
whatsoever. Braun opposes RGC's motion, and maintains that his
complaint is supported by "well-settled tenets" of Second Circuit
law and the FDCPA.

Mr. Braun's Claim Under Section 1692e

As indicated, Braun alleges that the letter he received from RGC
constituted a violation of Section 1692e because it suggested that
an attorney had been meaningfully involved in the review of Braun's
debt when in fact no attorney was meaningful involved.

RGC maintains that these allegations amount to nothing more than a
bald assertion of an FDCPA violation.

The Court agrees with RGC that Braun's pleadings allege an
insufficient factual basis to state a claim for violation of
Section 1692e based on a lack of meaningful attorney involvement.
To begin with, Braun's allegation that RGC's letter stated that it
was relying solely on information provided by its client in sending
the letter is factually inaccurate, Judge Siragusa holds. The
letter itself does not include the word "solely," or any synonym of
"solely," and indicates simply that the letter was "based on
account information provided by our client."

This distinction, though subtle, is important, Judge Siragusa
opines. Braun's allegation in this regard, in and of itself, is,
therefore, insufficient to establish misrepresentation under the
FDCPA.

More to the point, Braun's other relevant allegations are
conclusory, Judge Siragusa finds. Braun claims that the
standardized fields are undoubtedly merged electronically without
any review, but fails to support that assertion with any particular
or plausible factual allegations.

Similarly, Judge Siragusa finds, Braun fails to plead any specific
facts that would justify the conclusion that there was no
meaningful attorney involvement in either the preparation of his
letter or the review of his debt. Without providing some factual
detail to justify these assertions, such allegations are
insufficient to support the conclusion that there was no meaningful
attorney involvement, the Judge points out.

Mr. Braun's Claim Under Section 1692g

Mr. Braun's second cause of action alleges that RGC's letter
violates 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g because it fails to advise him of
the fact that the assignment of his alleged Debt to a law firm does
not override his right to dispute or seek validation of the alleged
debt.

Judge Siragusa opines that there is no reference in the letter to
potential legal action, the language regarding Braun's validation
rights is clear, and the closing lines of the body of the letter
merely invite Braun to contact RGC by phone between 8 am and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, to resolve the unpaid balance on his
credit card. In short, nothing in the letter overshadows or
contradicts the required notices.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court rules that Defendant RGC's motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Braun's complaint is granted, and the Clerk of
Court is directed to close this case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision and Order dated Nov. 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y82vv3ah from
Leagle.com.


ROBINHOOD MARKET: Hit With Class Action Suit Over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robinhood Markets Inc. is the target of a class action lawsuit in
New York federal court over allegedly failing to protect millions
of current and former customers' confidential information.

Names, email addresses, zip codes, and dates of birth appeared to
have been stolen, plaintiffs Adam Zullo, David Perez, Thomas
Barretti, and Thomas Richardson said in their complaint filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

The full extent of the personal information stolen is not yet
known, they added. [GN]


ROHOHO INC: Faces Reid Suit Over Failure to Reimburse Expenses
--------------------------------------------------------------
AMANDA REID, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff v. ROHOHO, INC. d/b/a PAPA JOHN'S PIZZA,
Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-03604-BHH (D.S.C., November 2, 2021)
brings this complaint as a collective action alleging the Defendant
of violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, who has worked for the Defendant as a delivery
driver, asserts that the Defendant has employed a reimbursement
policy which reimburses drivers on a per-delivery or per-mile basis
that equates to below the IRS business mileage reimbursement rate
and/or much less than a reasonable approximation of its drivers'
automobile expenses. Allegedly, the Defendant's systemic failure to
adequately reimburse automobile expenses constitutes a "kickback"
to the Defendant. As a result of the alleged conduct, the Plaintiff
and other similarly situated delivery drivers' net wages are
diminished beneath the federal minimum wage requirements.

Rohoho, Inc. d/b/a Papa John's Pizza operates numerous Papa John's
Pizza franchise stores. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben Whaley Le Clercq, Esq.
          LE CLERCQ LAW FIRM, P.C.
          708 S. Shelmore Suite 202
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
          Tel: (843) 722-3523
          E-mail: Ben@leclercqlaw.com

                - and –

          Jolie N. Pavlos, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          20 N. Orange Ave., 14th Floor
          P.O. Box 4979
          Orlando, FL 32802-4979
          Tel: (407) 245-3517
          Fax: (407) 204-2206
          E-mail: JPavlos@forthepeople.com

SAINT-GOBAIN: Settles PFOA Class Action Suit for $34.15 Million
---------------------------------------------------------------
cbs6albany.com at after more than five years, attorneys announced a
settlement with Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation for
people in Bennington affected by PFOA contamination.

The settlement compensates property owners for their PFOA
contamination and provides medical monitoring for eligible
residents who drank contaminated water and have above-background
levels of PFOA in their blood.

MORE: Companies settle for $65M with residents in Hoosick Falls
water crisis

The total settlement to be paid by Saint-Gobain is $34.15 million,
including both compensation for eligible property owners and up to
$6 million for the medical monitoring program. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Vermont must approve the settlement,
including the method for allocating the money, before the
settlement funds will be available and the medical monitoring
program is established.

Under the settlement, compensation to the property class will be
supervised by a court-approved special master, with amounts for
individual property owners proposed to be based on several factors,
including the value of the property before the contamination was
discovered and whether the owners drank from a PFOA-contaminated
well.

MORE: Lawsuit in Vermont PFOA contamination case now class-action

The medical monitoring program, also supervised by a court-approved
administrator, will provide free testing and monitoring for certain
medical conditions. The program will be based at Southwestern
Vermont Medical Center using local physicians, but arrangements
will also be made for eligible class members who have moved away.

"This settlement provides significant compensation and medical
monitoring to the Bennington community affected by the PFOA
contamination, and we strongly support it," said James Sullivan,
spokesperson for the named plaintiffs and class representatives.
"We especially want to initiate the medical monitoring program as
soon as possible. " [GN]

SAM DONG OHIO: Made Unauthorized Background Check, Ekleberry Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Ekleberry, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Sam Dong Ohio, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 21-cv-05200 (S.D. Ohio, November 3, 2020), seeks monetary,
actual and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief,
prejudgment interest, costs, fees and attorneys' fees, expenses and
costs of prosecuting this action and such other and further relief
for invasion of privacy and for violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

Scott Ekleberry worked for Sam Dong Ohio, Inc. from January of 2018
until October of 2018 as a Quality Engineer at the company's
manufacturing facility in Delaware, Ohio. Prior to his hiring,
Ekleberry signed an "Applicant Authorization and Consent for
Release of Information" stating that Sam Dong may obtain a
background check report on Ekleberry using a third-party vendor
named Employment Screening Associates. Ekleberry was eventually
employment in which he sued for violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act alleging various claims for disability
discrimination. During the court case, Sam Dong produced a
background check report it had obtained regarding Ekleberry.
Ekleberry claims that the procurement of this report constituted an
invalid authorization. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jason E. Starling, Esq.
      Kevin R. Kelleher, Esq.
      WILLIS SPANGLER STARLING
      4635 Trueman Boulevard, Suite 100
      Hilliard, OH 43026
      Telephone: (614) 586-7915
      Facsimile: (614) 586-7901
      Email: jstarling@willisattorneys.com
             kkelleher@willisattorneys.com

             - and -

      John C. Camillus, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF JOHN C. CAMILLUS, LLC
      P.O. Box 141410
      Columbus, OH 43214
      Telephone: (614) 558-7254
      Facsimile: (614) 559-6731
      Email: jcamillus@camilluslaw.com


SCHEAR CONSTRUCTION: Seeks Denial of Sarmiento Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JHON SARMIENTO,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
SCHEAR CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Case
No. 0:20-cv-61249-WPD (S.D. Fla.), the Defendant asks the Court to
enter an order declining to certify a Rule 23 class.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's failure to timely seek
class certification, the Court should rule that certification of a
class under Rule 23 is improper in this action.

On June 25, 2020, the Plaintiff Sarmiento sued Schear Construction,
alleging claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and
under the Virgin Islands Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff ostensibly brought the action as a hybrid
collective/class claim, styling the claim as such and "checking the
boxes in the Complaint for both collective relief (under Section
16(b) the FLSA) and class relief (under the Virgin Islands FLSA).

A copy of the Court's order the Defendant's motion dated Nov. 15,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Z37VFu
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Ashwin R. Trehan, Esq.
          Jesse I. Unruh, Esq.
          Spire Law, LLC
          2572 W. State Road 426, Suite 2088
          Oviedo, FL 32765
          E-mail: jesse@spirelawfirm.com
                  whitney@spirelawfirm.com
                  ashwin@spirelawfirm.com
                  sarah@spirelawfirm.com

SCOREMORE LLC: Attendees Who Accept Refund Could Waive Right to Sue
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sophie Caraan, writing for Hypebeast, reports that attendees of
Travis Scott's 2021 Astroworld Festival could be waiving their
right to sue the organizers if they accept refunds.

West Coast Trial Lawyers president and co-founder Neama Rahmani
explained to Insider that attendees who take ScoreMore's offer of a
refund can possibly sign the right away because they will get
something of value in return. "Courts generally uphold those types
of waivers," Rahmani shared. "The classic case is arbitration
agreements. Everyone kind of scrolls through. No one reads the fine
print, and guess what, you've waived your right to a jury trial,
waived your right to file a lawsuit, to demand arbitration."

ScoreMore confirmed that they, along with Live Nation and Scott's
Astroworld team, will be offering full refunds to those who
purchased tickets, but did not confirm whether the process will be
automatic for all ticketholders or if they will need to request for
the refunds themselves. Meanwhile, Live Nation's ticket service
waiver specifies that those who purchase tickets via its website
"agree that any dispute or claim" will be settled by individual
arbitration outside the court: "By agreeing to individual
arbitration, you and we each waive any right to participate in a
class-action lawsuit or class-wide arbitration."

However, John Jay College of Criminal Justice adjunct assistant
professor Dmitriy Shakhnevich suggests that ticketholders who agree
to receive a refund will not waive their right to sue, stating, "If
after an event that is traumatizing and that is difficult to
overcome, you give somebody a refund for a ticket and sneak in some
language in there, at the very least, that can be challenged in
court in good faith."

Both Rahmani and Shakhnevich do agree that the terms of use for
Live Nation's ticket provider can be "challenged in court," with
Rahmani sharing that attendees who accept the refund can argue that
they were not aware that there was a chance of violence occurring
at the festival. "The terms discuss Live Nation's website, mobile
app, tickets, COVID, etc., but not the potential for serious injury
or death caused by the setup of the event, security or lack
thereof, or artists encouraging violence," Rahmani said.

As of writing, 110 lawsuits have been reportedly filed in regards
to the tragedy, with some naming the likes of Live Nation, Scott,
the organizers and others involved. Civil rights attorney Benjamin
Crump and lawyer Alex Hilliard recently revealed that they will
file lawsuits on behalf of 200 attendees, while there are 90 more
lawsuits currently in the works.

In case you missed it, Scott and his team shared a new statement
directly addressing the families involved in the tragedy. [GN]

SILVERBACK THERAPEUTICS: Dresner Sues Over Drop in Share Price
--------------------------------------------------------------
BENJAMIN DRESNER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SILVERBACK THERAPEUTICS, INC.;
LAURA K. SHAWVER; JONATHAN PIAZZA; RUSS HAWKINSON; PETER THOMPSON;
VICKIE L. CAPPS; ROBERT HERSHBERG; SAQIB ISLAM; ANDREW POWELL;
JONATHAN ROOT; THILO SCHROEDER; and SCOTT PLATSHON, Defendants,
Case No. 2:21-cv-01499 (W.D. Wash., Nov. 5, 2021) is a federal
securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of all
persons and entities other than Defendants that purchased or
otherwise acquired: (a) Silverback common stock pursuant and
traceable to the Offering Documents issued in connection with the
Company's initial public offering conducted on or about December 3,
2020 (the "IPO" or "Offering"); and (b) Silverback securities
between December 3, 2020 and September 10, 2021, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to pursue claims against
the Defendants under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").

According to the complaint, on or about December 3, 2020, pursuant
to the Registration Statement, Silverback's common stock began
trading on the Nasdaq Global Market ("NASDAQ") under the ticker
symbol "SBTX." On December 4, 2020, Silverback filed a prospectus
on Form 424B4 with the SEC in connection with the IPO, which
incorporated and formed part of the Registration Statement (the
"Prospectus" and, together with the Registration Statement, the
"Offering Documents").

Pursuant to the Offering Documents, Silverback conducted the IPO,
issuing 11.5 million shares of common stock priced at $21.00 per
share. The Offering Documents were negligently prepared and, as a
result, contained untrue statements of material fact or omitted to
state other facts necessary to make the statements made not
misleading and were not prepared in accordance with the rules and
regulations governing their preparation, says the suit.

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants allegedly made
materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
business, operations, and compliance policies. Specifically, the
Offering Documents and the Defendants made false and misleading
statements and failed to disclose that: (i) Silverback's lead
product candidate SBT6050 was less effective than the Company had
represented to investors; (ii) accordingly, the Company had
overstated SBT6050's commercial and clinical prospects; and (iii)
as a result, the Offering Documents and Defendants' public
statements throughout the Class Period were materially false and
misleading and failed to state information required to be stated
therein.

As of the time this Complaint was filed, the price of Silverback
common stock continues to trade below the $21.00 per share Offering
price, damaging investors. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful
acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value
of Silverback's securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have
suffered significant losses and damages.

Silverback Therapeutics, Inc. operates as a biotechnology company.
The Company discovers and develops novel and proprietary ImmunoTAC
technology, which is designed to create potent therapeutic
molecules that can be systemically administered to patients. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Duncan C. Turner, Esq.
          BADGLEY MULLINS TURNER PLLC
          19929 Ballinger Way NE, Suite 200
          Seattle, WA 98155
          Telephone: (206) 621-6566
          Email: dturner@badgleymullins.com

               -and-

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Thomas H. Przybylowski, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                 ahood@pomlaw.com
                 tprzybylowski@pomlaw.com


SMILEDIRECTCLUB INC: Court Amends Scheduling Order in Ciccio Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SmileDirectClub, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the Court entered
an Amended Scheduling Order in the case captioned Ciccio, et al. v.
SmileDirectClub, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-00845 (M.D. Tenn.)
effectively staying merits discovery, and setting deadlines of
March 30, 2022, to complete class certification fact discovery and
to complete briefing on motions regarding class certification.

In September 2019, a putative class action on behalf of a consumer
and three orthodontists was brought against the Company in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The case is
captioned Ciccio, et al. v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, et al., Case No.
3:19-cv-00845 (M.D. Tenn.).

The Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of warranty, false
advertising under the Lanham Act, common law fraud, and various
state consumer protection statutes relating to the Company's
advertising.

Following a proactive voluntary dismissal by the majority of
consumer plaintiffs, one consumer has since sought to rejoin the
Middle District of Tennessee litigation or, in the alternative, to
intervene, which the Court granted. That ruling has been appealed,
and the Court stayed the consumer claims pending the appeal.

On June 25, 2021, the appellate court reversed the district court
and remanded with instructions to order the intervening plaintiff
to mandatory binding arbitration.

All remaining consumer claims remain stayed.

Litigation is in the discovery stage.

"On October 13, 2021, the Court entered an Amended Scheduling
Order, effectively staying merits discovery, and setting deadlines
of March 30, 2022, to complete class certification fact discovery
and September 2, 2022, to complete briefing on motions regarding
class certification," the company said.

The Company denies any alleged wrongdoing and intends to defend
against this action vigorously.

SmileDirectClub, Inc. operates a teledentistry platform that
provides members with a customized clear aligner therapy treatment
in the United States and internationally. The company manages the
end-to-end process, which includes marketing, aligner
manufacturing, fulfillment, treatment by a doctor, and monitoring
through completion of their treatment proprietary with a network of
approximately 240 state-licensed orthodontists and general dentists
through its teledentistry platform, SmileCheck. It offers aligners,
impression kits, whitening gels, and retainers. The company was
founded in 2014 and is headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee.

SNAP INC: Faces Shareholder Class Action Over Apple Privacy Updates
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Gizmodo's Alyse Stanley, citing Reuters, reports that Snap is
facing a lawsuit from one of its shareholders for allegedly
exaggerating how well it could adapt to the privacy updates Apple
rolled out earlier this year, Reuters reports.

In a class-action complaint filed in federal court, Snap investor
Kellie Black accused the social media company of downplaying how
much Apple's new privacy policy would tank advertising revenue.
Since debuting in April, Apple's App Tracking Transparency feature,
which lets iOS users grant or deny apps permission to track their
activity, has pissed off more than a few social media companies
whose business models rely on this kind of tracking for targeted
advertising.

According to one estimate, the iOS feature has cost Snap, Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube as much as $9.85 billion in lost revenue in
the second half of 2021.

Snap, whose profits largely come from selling digital advertising
on its popular photo and video app, has been among the hardest hit.
The company's stock plummeted by roughly 25% last month following
an unimpressive third-quarter earnings report, which it attributed
in part to fallout from Apple's privacy updates.

The lawsuit, which was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, accuses Snap of violating federal
securities laws. As cited in the filing, Snap's chief business
officer, Jeremi Gorman, expressed confidence to investors back in
February about adapting Snap's business model to Apple's
then-upcoming policy change.

"Overall, we feel really well prepared for these changes," she
during an earnings call, though she also cautioned that "changes to
this ecosystem are usually disruptive and the outcome is
uncertain."

During another earnings call in July, Gorman outlined several new
privacy-centric features for advertisers that Snap launched in
preparation for Apple's privacy update, such as Advanced
Conversions, which uses cryptographic tech to measure conversion
data without identifying individual users.

Black, the investor behind the lawsuit, claims Gorman made several
"materially false and/or misleading" statements during this call to
paint a brighter picture about the effects of Apple's new policy
when in reality the damage was already beginning to show. The suit
argues that "Snap overstated its ability to transition its
advertising with Apple's privacy changes" and "knew of, but
downplayed, the risks of the impact that Apple's privacy changes
had on the Company's advertising business."

According to the filing, Snap's shareholders "have suffered
significant losses and damages" because of plummeting stock prices
as well as Snap's "wrongful acts and omissions." Black is seeking
"to recover compensable damages" caused by Snap's alleged violation
of federal securities laws, though the filing does not name a
precise dollar amount.

Apple's privacy updates have also dealt a blow to other companies
that depend on online advertising to turn a profit. The VP of
product marketing at Meta-owned Facebook, Graham Mudd, said in
September that the company "expected increased headwinds from
platform changes, notably the recent iOS updates, to have a greater
impact in the third quarter compared to the second quarter."
Previously, Facebook engaged in a full-blown PR campaign against
Apple throughout 2020 and the beginning of this year to try to
convince users that having more control over their data is actually
a bad thing. [GN]

SNAP INC: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of January 10, 2022 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
WHY: Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Nov. 15
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Snap Inc. (NYSE: SNAP) between July
22, 2020 and October 21, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period"). A
class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than January
10, 2022.

SO WHAT: If you purchased Snap securities during the Class Period
you may be entitled to compensation without payment of any out of
pocket fees or costs through a contingency fee arrangement.

WHAT TO DO NEXT: To join the Snap class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-2188.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action. A class
action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than January 10, 2022.
A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of
other class members in directing the litigation.

WHY ROSEN LAW: We encourage investors to select qualified counsel
with a track record of success in leadership roles. Often, firms
issuing notices do not have comparable experience, resources or any
meaningful peer recognition. Be wise in selecting counsel. The
Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the
largest ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese
Company. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class
Action Services for number of securities class action settlements
in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the top 4 each year since 2013
and has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. In
2019 alone the firm secured over $438 million for investors. In
2020, founding partner Laurence Rosen was named by law360 as a
Titan of Plaintiffs' Bar. Many of the firm's attorneys have been
recognized by Lawdragon and Super Lawyers.

DETAILS OF THE CASE: According to the lawsuit, defendants
throughout the Class Period made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Apple's privacy changes would
have, and were having, a material impact on the Company's
advertising business; (2) Snap overstated its ability to transition
its advertising with Apple's privacy changes; (3) Snap knew of, but
downplayed, the risks of the impact that Apple's privacy changes
had on the Company's advertising business; (4) Snap overstated its
commitment to privacy; and (5) as a result of the foregoing,
defendants' public statements and statements to journalists were
materially false and/or misleading at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

To join the Snap class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-2188.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

No Class Has Been Certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you retain one. You may select
counsel of your choice. You may also remain an absent class member
and do nothing at this point. An investor's ability to share in any
potential future recovery is not dependent upon serving as lead
plaintiff.

Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome.

Contact Information:

Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
www.rosenlegal.com [GN]

SNAP INC: Schall Law Reminds of January 10 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
reminds investors of a class action lawsuit against Snap Inc.
("Snap" or "the Company") (NYSE: SNAP) for violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between July 22,
2020 and October 21, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before January 10, 2021.

If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to
participate.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2460, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
310-301-3335, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Apple's device privacy changes were
having a material negative impact on Snap's advertising business.
The Company had touted its ability to maintain advertising as
related to Apple's privacy changes. The Company downplayed the
risks to its business presented by Apple's changes. The Company
overstated its commitment to user privacy. Based on these facts,
the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Snap, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and rules of ethics. [GN]

SOCIAL FINANCE: Court Stays Discovery in Juarez Suit for 60 days
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RUBEN JUAREZ, CALIN CONSTANTIN SEGARCEANU, EMILIANO
GALICIA, and JOSUE JIMENEZ, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SOCIAL FINANCE, INC. d/b/a SOFI,
and SOFI LENDING CORP. d/b/a SOFI, Defendants, Case No.
4:20-cv-03386-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
stays discovery in the lawsuit for 60 days.

On May 19, 2020, Plaintiff Juarez filed a putative class action
Complaint against SoFi in the matter, asserting violations of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and the
California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code Sections 51, et
seq.

On July 30, 2020, Plaintiffs Juarez and Segarceanu filed a First
Amended Complaint, adding named Plaintiff Segarceanu and claims
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681, et
seq.

On May 3, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (as
authorized by the Court), incorporating additional named Plaintiffs
Jimenez and Galicia.

Following the May 4, 2021 case management conference, the Court
entered a Scheduling Order on May 12, 2021, pursuant to which fact
discovery closes April 3, 2022.

On July 15, 2021, the Parties participated in a private mediation
session with JAMS arbitrator David Geronemus, Esq., during which
they were ultimately unable to reach a settlement.

Since July, the Parties have moved forward with litigation, while
the mediator has remained engaged and the Parties have also
continued to explore avenues for a potential resolution of the
matter. They are at the point where they have made substantial
progress on the material terms of a proposed settlement such that
they wish to focus their efforts on negotiating the remaining terms
and, if an agreement is finalized, memorializing those terms into a
written settlement agreement, thereby conserving resources and
limiting the accrual of attorneys' fees and costs on both sides.

In the absence of a stay, the Parties would need to press forward
with costly and time-consuming discovery, including five party
depositions noticed for November, and related motion practice, in
order to meet the current discovery deadlines. A stay will further
conserve judicial resources.

The Parties affirm that no party will be prejudiced by this
stipulation, nor will the requested extension unduly delay the
case. Therefore, the Parties, stipulated and agreed, through their
respective counsel that:

     1. All formal discovery, discovery obligations and motion
practice will be suspended and stayed for 60 days, (until Dec. 28,
2021) to enable the Parties to conserve resources and focus their
efforts on settlement;

     2. The Parties will submit an update to the Court by Dec. 28,
2021 in which they will apprise the Court of the status of their
settlement efforts and propose a timeline for either settlement
approval or renewed litigation;

     3. In the event the stay is lifted, the Parties will work
cooperatively together to reschedule depositions and deadlines to
any other pending discovery demands in a timely manner;

     4. The stipulation is without prejudice to the rights, claims,
arguments, and defenses of all Parties; and

     5. All other signatories listed, and on whose behalf the
filing is submitted, concur with the content in the Stipulation and
have authorized the filing.

Pursuant to the stipulation, Judge Gilliam so ordered. The parties
are cautioned that to the extent they are unable to settle the case
by December 28, the parties should be prepared to proceed under the
current case schedule.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mpbpdfvd from Leagle.com.

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP, Moira Heiges-Goepfert -- mhg@outtengolden.com
-- in San Francisco, California, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Oren
Nimni -- onimni@lawyersforcivilrights.org -- in Boston,
Massachusetts, Ossai Miazad -- om@outtengolden.com -- in New York
City, Mikael Rojas -- mrojas@outtengolden.com -- OUTTEN & GOLDEN
LLP, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class.

McGUIREWOODS LLP, Jamie D. Wells -- jwells@mcguirewoods.com -- in
San Francisco, California, K. Issac deVyver --
kdevyver@mcguirewoods.com -- (pro hac vice), Karla Johnson --
kjohnson@mcguirewoods.com -- (pro hac vice), in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Defendants Social Finance, Inc. d/b/a
SoFi and SoFi Lending Corp. d/b/a SoFi.


SORENSON CONCRETE: Class Certification Denial in Sams Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TRAVIS SAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant v. SORENSON
CONCRETE, INC., Defendant and Respondent, Case No. C088905 (Cal.
App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the Third District,
Butte, issued an Opinion:

   a. remanding the case to the trial court with directions to
      allow Sams a reasonable opportunity to amend the complaint
      to name new class representatives, to define new
      subclasses, or both; and

   b. affirming the order denying class certification.

I. Background

Mr. Sams filed a wage and hour class action suit against his former
employer, Sorenson. In response to the suit, Sorenson entered into
agreements with the majority of putative class members to release
the claims alleged in the suit for monetary payments.

Sorenson is a construction company in Chico, California that
specializes in concrete work. Sorenson employs about 30 people on
its construction crews. Sams worked as a construction laborer for
Sorenson from October 2016 to March 2017.

On Oct. 4, 2017, Sams filed a class action complaint against
Sorenson alleging seven causes of action for violations of the
Labor Code and one cause of action under Business and Professions
Code section 17200. Sams alleged that Sorenson violated the Labor
Code and related regulations and wage orders regarding: (1)
overtime wages, (2) meal, rest and cool-down breaks, (3)
termination wages, (4) work-related expenses, and (5) itemized wage
statements. Sams' Business and Professions Code section 17200 claim
was predicated on the labor law violations and sought restitution
and a permanent injunction.

On Nov. 8, 2018, after 13 months, Sams moved for class
certification. On Nov. 26, 2018, Sorenson filed an opposition to
the motion. The court denied certification in a one-paragraph
ruling, reasoning that (1) Sams' "claims are atypical of the
proposed putative class because Plaintiff did not sign a release
agreement, but the class members he seeks to represent did," and
(2) "there are credibility problems sufficient enough to reject the
adequacy of Plaintiff acting as class representative."

II. Discussion

The Court of Appeals agrees with the trial court that Sams did not
meet the typicality requirement of a class representative for the
putative class members who signed releases. It does not find that
the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the
typicality requirement for class certification was not met.

The Court of Appeals also concludes that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that Sams was not an adequate
representative because he had "credibility problems," given his
criminal history and his inaccurate and incomplete deposition
testimony on the subject.

However, the Court of Appeals concludes that the trial court erred
in denying Sams a reasonable opportunity to amend the complaint.
The trial court rejected -- essentially without explanation --
Sams' request for leave to amend the complaint to add a class
representative who had signed a release. The lack of an adequate or
typical class representative alone does not justify the denial of a
class certification motion. The Court of Appeals opines that the
trial court should have given Sams a reasonable opportunity to
amend the complaint to add a class representative, subclass, or
both. On that basis, the order of the trial court is reversed and
the case remanded to the trial court for that limited purpose.

III. Disposition

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court with
directions to allow Sams a reasonable opportunity to amend the
complaint to name new class representatives, to define new
subclasses, or both. It otherwise affirmed the order denying class
certification. The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/j4ch4axe from Leagle.com.


SQUARETRADE INC: Bids to Dismiss Amended Shuman Class Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL SHUMAN, et al., Plaintiffs v. SQUARETRADE
INC., Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-02725-JCS (N.D. Cal.), Chief
Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California entered an order:

   a. denying the motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff
      Shuman's remaining claims ("Shuman Motion"); and

   b. granting the motions to dismiss the claims of the two new
      Plaintiff, Tommy Gonzales and Kathleen Abbott, under Rule
      12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Gonzales
      Motion" and "Abbott Motion").

Introduction

The putative class action was initiated by Plaintiff Michael
Shuman, who alleges that Defendant SquareTrade, which sells service
contracts for the protection of consumer goods, consistently fails
to provide consumers with the full terms and conditions of the
contract at the time of purchase and systematically pays
reimbursement in an amount that is less than the purchase price of
the covered item when claims are filed. After the Court granted in
part and denied in part SquareTrade's motion to dismiss, a First
Amended Class Action Complaint ("FACC") was filed adding Gonzales
and Abbott as Plaintiffs.

Presently before the Court are the Abbott Motion and the Gonzales
Motion. A hearing on the motions was held on Oct. 29, 2021, at 9:30
a.m.

Background

A. Michael Shuman

In the original complaint, Shuman asserted claims under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301, et seq., the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1790,
and California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") (Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code Section 17200, et seq.). He also asserted claims for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment. In response to SquareTrade's motion
to dismiss, Shuman stipulated to the dismissal of the
Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act and Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
claims.

The Court granted SquareTrade's motion to dismiss as to the UCL
claim, finding that Pennsylvania law rather than California law
governed Shuman's claims. It denied SquareTrade's motion as to the
unjust enrichment claim, concluding that while an unjust enrichment
claim cannot be established where there is an express contract that
covers the same subject matter, Shuman could plead the two theories
in the alternative.

SquareTrade now seeks entry of summary judgment as to Shuman's two
remaining claims, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The
primary argument SquareTrade advances in its summary judgment
motion is that Shuman's claims fail because they are premised on
the allegation that SquareTrade promised him that he would receive
the purchase price of his bag if he filed a claim under the
protection plan and there is no evidence that such a promise was
ever made to Shuman, either in writing or orally. To the contrary,
SquareTrade contends, Shuman's deposition testimony confirms that
the sales clerk who sold Shuman the protection plan told him the
plan covered repair or replacement and that he would be "made
whole" if he filed a claim but said nothing about reimbursement.
Shuman further testified that he understood that "made whole" meant
repair, replacement or reimbursement and that payment of the
replacement cost was a way to make him whole.

The Plaintiffs contend that SquareTrade's argument fails because it
mischaracterizes the theory of his breach of contract claim,
arguing that "the complaint makes clear that SquareTrade can
provide product protection in three forms (repair, replacement, or
reimbursement), and that since replacement is one of those options,
any reimbursement amount can be equal to either purchase price or
replacement price (if the latter is cheaper)." They further contend
SquareTrade's argument that Shuman was not promised he would
receive the purchase price has no bearing on his unjust enrichment
claim, which does not depend on any contractual obligation on the
part of SquareTrade.

In its reply brief, SquareTrade argues that Shuman is trying to
"pivot" to a new theory to avoid summary judgment, which should not
be permitted because it would be unfair and prejudicial to
SquareTrade at this stage of the case. Even if the Court were to
allow this new theory, SquareTrade contends, it fails because
Shuman "has not alleged that his bag was not available to be
purchased for the amount he received from SquareTrade." Finally,
SquareTrade requests that if the Court allows Shuman to go forward
based on his "new theory" it at least hold that there is no
disputed issue of material fact that Shuman was not promised his
purchase price."

B. Tommy Gonzales

Gonzales asserts the following claims in the FACC: 1) breach of
contract; 2) violation of California's UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
Section 17200 et seq.; and 3) unjust enrichment.

In its motion to dismiss, SquareTrade challenges Gonzales's UCL
claim on the grounds that: 1) no reasonable consumer would
interpret the terms describing the protection plan Gonzales alleges
he saw to require that SquareTrade pay the purchase price of the
product in the event of a covered claim; 2) Gonzales has an
adequate remedy at law based on his breach of contract claim
seeking expectation damages and therefore cannot seek restitution
under the UCL; 3) the "restitution" Gonzales seeks under the UCL is
actually expectation damages, which is a legal remedy and therefore
unavailable under the UCL; and 4) Gonzales has not alleged facts
showing he has standing to seek injunctive relief, which is the
only other remedy available under the UCL.


SquareTrade contends the breach of contract claim is insufficiently
pled because the contract that Gonzales alleges exists is too
indefinite to be enforced and he has alleged no facts showing
mutual assent to SquareTrade's alleged coverage obligations.
Finally, it argues that Gonzales' unjust enrichment claim should be
dismissed "because it is premised entirely on the same facts that
are insufficient to state a UCL claim, and because he has not
alleged that anything unjust has occurred, given that SquareTrade
provided coverage for his claim in an amount that exceeds what he
paid for her Protection Plans."

C. Kathleen Abbott

In the FACC, Abbott asserts the following claims: 1) breach of
contract; 2) violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Sections 349, 350
("GBL claims"); and 3) unjust enrichment.

SquareTrade argues that all of Abbott's claims should be dismissed
because they are insufficiently alleged. First, it contends the GBL
claims fail because a reasonable consumer would not conclude based
on seeing the word "protection" on the cover of a brochure (without
reading the brochure) and hearing a clerk describe the protection
plan as a "warranty" that the protection plan entitled a claimant
to the full purchase price of the covered product. Moreover,
SquareTrade contends, the terms and conditions that were inside the
brochure negate Abbott's claim. Similarly, SquareTrade asserts, the
words "protection" and "warranty" are too indefinite to give rise
to an enforceable contract and therefore that claim fails as well.
SquareTrade argues further that the unjust enrichment claim fails
to state a claim because Abbott alleges no enrichment on the part
of SquareTrade (which allegedly paid out $268.12 under a policy
that cost Abbott $27) and no unjust conduct.

I. Motions to Dismiss

a. Gonzales Motion

Judge Spero finds that all of Gonzales's claims fail to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6). He therefore grants SquareTrade's Motion
to Dismiss and dismisses all of Gonzales's claims with leave to
amend.

First, he finds that the FACC contains no specific allegations
reflecting an agreement about the scope of "coverage" or
"protection" under the contract allegedly formed between Gonzales
and SquareTrade with respect to what (if any) payment would be
provided if a covered product could not be repaired or replaced.
Because the allegations relating to the contract between Gonzales
and SquareTrade do not provide a basis for the Court to determine
whether a breach has occurred or to provide a rational basis for
computing damages, the claim fails on the basis of indefiniteness.
The Plaintiffs will be given leave to amend to allege more specific
facts about the contract alleged to exist between Gonzales and
SquareTrade and how the alleged contract was breached.

Second, Judge Spero finds that Gonzales contends his claim for
equitable relief under the UCL is based on a different theory than
the breach of contract claim to the extent that he relies on
"unfair" conduct rather than failure to abide by the terms of the
protection plans. Yet the factual predicate and the theory
underlying his claim of unfair conduct appear to be essentially the
same as his breach of contract claim. Therefore, Judge Spero
rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that Gonzales's claim for
restitution under the UCL is "more certain, prompt, or efficient"
than the legal remedy he seeks on his breach of contract claim.

Lastly, Judge Spero Gonzales' claim for unjust enrichment is based
on the same allegations and theory as his UCL claim, namely, that
he was entitled to the full purchase price of covered items under
SquareTrade's protection plans but was paid less than that amount.
Therefore, Gonzales's unjust enrichment claim fails to state a
claim for the same reasons his breach of contract and UCL claims
fail.

b. Abbott Motion

Judge Spero finds that all of Abbott's claims fail to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). He therefore grants SquareTrade's Motion to
Dismiss and dismisses all of Abbott's claims with leave to amend.

First, Judge Spero finds that the only terms Abbott alleges are
that she saw references to "protection" on the cover of a brochure
and that a sales clerk referred to a "warranty." These allegations
provide no basis for the Court to determine the intention of the
parties as to the scope of the coverage that would be provided or
whether the alleged contract required SquareTrade to pay the full
purchase price, the replacement cost or some other amount under the
protection plan. Therefore, Judge Spero concludes that Abbott fails
to state a claim for breach of contract. He will permit the
Plaintiffs to amend as to Abbott's breach of contract claim.

Next, Judge Spero holds that Abbott's allegations in support of her
GBL claims are scant. The allegations are insufficient, as a matter
of law, to establish that a reasonable consumer would have been
deceived by the references to "protection" and "warranty" into
thinking SquareTrade's protection plan covered the full purchase
price of covered products.

Lastly, for the same reasons he finds Gonzales has failed to state
a claim for unjust enrichment, Judge Spero finds that Abbott's
claim fails as well.

II. The Summary Judgment Motion

The Plaintiffs do not dispute, as a factual matter, that when
Shuman purchased his SquareTrade protection plan he was not
explicitly promised that he would be reimbursed the purchase price
of his bag if he filed a claim under the plan. Indeed, they
stipulated at the hearing that there is no evidence that
SquareTrade was obligated to pay them the full purchase price of
the items covered under SquareTrade's protection plans regardless
of the cost to replace the items at the time the Plaintiffs
submitted their claims. Thus, the question the Court must decide is
if this undisputed fact defeats Shuman's claims on summary
judgment, as SquareTrade contends.

Judge Spero concludes that it does not. First, he is not persuaded
that the theory the Plaintiffs set forth in their Opposition brief
is new. In any event, the allegations as to Shuman raise a
plausible inference that failure to pay the original purchase price
of his bag amounted to a failure to pay the replacement cost
because the cost of the bag had not dropped in the intervening
period. SquareTrade fails to address Shuman's allegation that he
paid the same amount for his replacement bag as for his original
bag.

Given that the Plaintiffs allege in the breach of contract claim
that SquareTrade "offered the Plaintiffs and the Class members
product protection that provided reimbursement of purchase price
(or reimbursement of the cost of replacing the product)," Judge
Spero concludes that the theory upon which the Plaintiffs base
Shuman's breach of contract claim is not new. Moreover, there is a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether SquareTrade breached
its contractual obligation to Shuman by paying less than the full
purchase price of his bag. For the same reasons, Judge Spero
rejects SquareTrade's argument that it is entitled to summary
judgment on Shuman's unjust enrichment claim because "nothing
unjust has occurred."

Finally, because the FACC makes clear that Shuman's allegation that
he was owed the original purchase price on his claim are based, in
part, on the fact that the replacement cost was the same as the
original purchase price, Judge Sperorejects SquareTrade's argument
that it would be unfair to allow Shuman to proceed on that theory.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Spero denied the Shuman Motion.
He granted the Gonzales and Abbott Motions, and dismissed the
claims asserted by Gonzales and Abbott with leave to amend. The
Plaintiffs' amended complaint will be filed by Dec. 3, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/kse9fjvd from Leagle.com.


STEPHEN SMITH: Plaintiffs File Renewed Bid for Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as A.M.C., by her next
friend, C.D.C., et al., v. STEPHEN SMITH, in his official capacity
as Deputy Commissioner of Finance and Administration and Director
of the Division of TennCare, Case No. 3:20-cv-00240 (M.D. Tenn.),
the Plaintiffs ask the Court, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to enter an order for a
certification of a Plaintiff Class defined as:

   "All individuals who meet the eligibility criteria for
   TennCare coverage and who, since March 19, 2019, have been or
   will be disenrolled from TennCare. The class excludes
   individuals, and the parents and legal guardians of
   individuals, whose termination is due to a requested
   withdrawal from the TennCare program."

The Plaintiffs also move for certification of a subclass,
represented by S.L.C., Michael S. Hill, William C. Monroe, Linda
Rebeaud, and Johnny Walker, referred to as the Disability Subclass
and consisting of all:

   "The Plaintiff Class members who are "qualified individuals
   with a disability" as defined in 42 U.S.C. section 12131(2)."

TennCare is the state Medicaid program in the U.S. state of
Tennessee. TennCare was established in 1994 under a federal waiver
that authorized deviations from the standard Medicaid rules.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Nov. 12,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/324aE2p
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michele Johnson, Esq.
          Gordon Bonnyman, Jr., Esq.
          Catherine Millas Kaiman, Esq.
          Vanessa Zapata, Esq.
          TENNESSEE JUSTICE CENTER
          211 7th Avenue North, Suite 100
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 255-0331
          Facsimile: (615) 255-0354
          E-mail: gbonnyman@tnjustice.org
                  ckaiman@tnjustice.org
                  vzapata@tnjustice.org

               - and -

          Jane Perkins, Esq.
          Elizabeth Edwards, Esq.
          Sarah Grusin, Esq.
          NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM
          1512 E. Franklin St., Ste. 110
          Chapel Hill, NC 27514
          Telephone: (919) 968-6308
          E-mail: perkins@healthlaw.org
                  edwards@healthlaw.org
                  grusin@healthlaw.org

               - and -

          Gregory Lee Bass, Esq.
          NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW
          AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE
          275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1506
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 633-6967
          E-mail: bass@nclej.org

               - and -

          Faith Gay, Esq.
          Jennifer M. Selendy, Esq.
          Andrew R. Dunlap, Esq.
          Amy Nemetz, Esq.
          Babak Ghafarzade, Esq.
          SELENDY & GAY PLLC
          1290 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10104
          Telephone: (212) 390-9000
          E-mail: fgay@selendygay.com
                  jselendy@selendygay.com
                  adunlap@selendygay.com
                  anemetz@selendygay.com
                  bghafarzade@selendygay.com

STITCH FIX: Kasilingam Files Appeal in Consolidated Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Ganesh Kasilingam filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled Ganesh Kasilingam v. Stitch Fix,
Inc., et al., Case Nos. 3:18-cv-06208-JD, 3:18-cv-06565-JD,
3:18-cv-06965-JD, 3:18-cv-07427-JD in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, on October 11, 2018,
October 26, 2018, November 16, 2018, and December 10, 2018, four
putative class action lawsuits alleging violations of the federal
securities laws were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, naming as defendants Stitch Fix,
Inc. and certain of its officers.

The four lawsuits each make the same allegations of violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, by Defendant and
its officers for allegedly making materially false and misleading
statements regarding their active client growth and strategy with
respect to television advertising between June 2018 and October
2018.

The Plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary damages and other relief.
The four lawsuits have been consolidated and a lead plaintiff has
been appointed.

On September 18, 2019, the lead plaintiff in the consolidated class
action lawsuits filed a consolidated complaint for violation of the
federal securities laws.

On October 28, 2019, Stitch Fix and other Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the consolidated complaint.

Court-appointed lead plaintiff, Ganesh Kasilingam, filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss on December 9, 2019, and Stitch
Fix and the other Defendants filed their reply in support of their
motion to dismiss on December 30, 2019.

The Court granted Stitch Fix's motion to dismiss on September 30,
2020, but allowed the lead plaintiff to file an amended complaint.


On November 6, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
Stitch Fix filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on
December 7, 2020. The lead plaintiff filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss on January 8, 2021, and Stitch Fix filed its
reply in support of its motion to dismiss on January 22, 2021.  The
court took the motion under submission.

The appellate case is captioned as Ganesh Kasilingam v. Stitch Fix,
Inc., et al., Case No. 21-16837, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on November 1, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Ganesh Kasilingam Mediation Questionnaire was due
on November 8, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by November 29, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on December 28, 2021;

   -- Appellant Ganesh Kasilingam opening brief is due on February
7, 2022;

   -- Appellees Katrina Lake, Stitch Fix, Inc. and Paul Yee
answering brief is due on March 8, 2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant GANESH KASILINGAM, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Shawn Anthony Williams, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, LLP
          One Montgomery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 288-4545
          E-mail: shawnw@rgrdlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees STITCH FIX, INC., KATRINA LAKE, and PAUL YEE
are represented by:

          Patrick Edward Gibbs, Esq.
          Claire A. McCormack, Esq.
          COOLEY, LLP
          3175 Hanover Street
          Palo Alto, CA 94304
          Telephone: (650) 843-5535
          E-mail: pgibbs@cooley.com

               - and -

          Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria, Esq.
          COOLEY, LLP
          4401 Eastgate Mall
          San Diego, CA 92121-1909
          Telephone: (858) 550-6453
          E-mail: jsantamaria@cooley.com

SUBWAY: Faces Class Action Over "100 Percent Tuna" Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
Hypebeast reports that in a newly filed California class action
lawsuit, Subway has once again been accused of deceiving customers
with its Tuna Sandwich option.

Despite claiming that the menu offering contains "100 percent
tuna," tests conducted by marine biologists noted in the lawsuit
found "no detectable tuna DNA sequences." From 20 samples acquired
at different Subway locations throughout Southern California, all
20 samples contained detectable sequences of chicken DNA, 11
contained traces of pork DNA and seven featured cattle DNA.

Serving as the third lawsuit filed by Karen Dhanowa and Nilima
Amin, the two states, the "Defendants do not take sufficient
measures to control or prevent the known risks of adulteration to
its tuna products." Adding, "On the contrary, they actively
perpetuate actions and steps that encourage mixing or allowing
non-tuna ingredients to make their way into the tuna products."
Dhanowa and Amin are seeking unspecified damages from Subway for
violations of California consumer protection laws.

Subway has offered a response to the latest lawsuit, "The
plaintiffs have filed three meritless complaints, changing their
story each time." Highlighting, "This third, most recent amended
claim, was filed only after their prior complaint was rightfully
dismissed by a federal judge. Our legal team is in the process of
evaluating the plaintiffs' amended claim, and will once again file
a new motion to dismiss this reckless and improper lawsuit. The
fact remains that Subway tuna is real and strictly regulated by the
FDA in the U.S., and other government entities around the world."

For more food and beverage news, Shake Shack goes bold with its
Roasted Garlic Mushroom menu. [GN]

SUMMIT PIZZA: Does Not Properly Pay Delivery Drivers, Glosser Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
Brandi Glosser, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Summit Pizza, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-06148
(W.D. Mo., November 3, 2021), seeks to recover monetary damages,
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

Summit Pizza owns and manages multiple Pizza Hut franchises
throughout Missouri where Glosser worked as a delivery driver.
Summit allegedly took a tip credit from Plaintiff when she was
making deliveries and made her use her own car for deliveries. She
claims that the delivery fee she gets is not enough to cover her
vehicular expenses. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Courtney Harness, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM
      Post Office Box 39
      Russellville, AR 72811
      Tel: (479) 880-0088
      Fax: (888) 787-2040
      Email: harness@sanfordlawfirm.com


TEMPLE UNIVERSITY: Ex School Dean Sued Over False Admissions Data
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Anna O'Neill-Dietel, writing for The Daily Pennsylvanian, reports
that former dean of Temple University's Fox School of Business
Moshe Porat saw his first day on trial for falsifying admissions
data to improve the business school's national rankings, The
Philadelphia Inquirer reported.

Porat and two other Temple employees, Statistics professor Isaac
Gottlieb and former administrator Marjorie O'Neill, were indicted
for inflating data on the business school's online MBA program to
improve its ranking in U.S. News and World Report, NBC Philadelphia
reported. The falsified data led to the business school's online
MBA program being ranked No. 1 for four consecutive years,
according to NBC Philadelphia.

The indictment claims that Gottlieb reverse-engineered the data
required by the ranking system to benefit Temple, and O'Neill
submitted the manipulated data. This included falsified GPAs and
how many incoming students took tests, as well as falsified
information regarding how much graduates owned in loans.

The Inquirer reported that the trial will likely last about three
weeks and is thought to be the first in which a university
administrator faces criminal prosecution for falsifying college
ranking submissions. Over 40 witnesses, including current and
former Temple employees, may be called to testify in the trial.

According to Poets&Quants, Temple increased enrollment in its
online MBA program by 57% following its No. 1 ranking in the U.S.
News and World Report.

Ibrahim Fetahi, a graduate of Temple's online MBA program,
testified at the beginning of the trial that he chose to attend
Temple based on its high national rankings. When he learned of the
misconduct, he felt disappointed and angry because he believed his
MBA degree was devalued as a result of the scandal.

"In my mind, I paid for fine dining, and I got McDonald's," Fetahi
told the Inquirer. "I will always have a scar on my resume."

In 2018, U.S. News and World Report claimed Temple's online MBA
data was false and booted the school from its rankings, according
to NBC Philadelphia. Temple then settled a class-action suit
brought by MBA students and graduates affected by the ranking,
awarding $250,000 in scholarships to students enrolling in the
programs in coming years. Temple was also required to pay the
United States Department of Education a settlement of $700,000 for
the fraud.

The indictment against Porat also alleges that the school
manipulated data for its part-time MBA program, which led the
business school to climb from No. 53 to No. 7 in the rankings, NBC
Philadelphia reported.

In 2020, Temple's online MBA program returned to the rankings at
No. 88. This year, it is tied for No. 100 with 11 other online
business programs. [GN]

TENNESSEE: Governor Bill Lee Signs Mask Rollback Bill Into Law
--------------------------------------------------------------
Marta W. Aldrich, writing for Chalkbeat Tennessee, reports that
Gov. Bill Lee has signed into law a sweeping bill to curb COVID-19
restrictions in Tennessee, including prohibiting public schools
from mandating masks except when infections reach catastrophic
levels.

The Nov. 12 mask rollback takes effect immediately, even as a
handful of large districts with mask mandates are still figuring
out how to navigate conflicting state and federal laws on the
issue. Legal challenges are expected.

Three federal judges in Memphis, Nashville, and Knoxville have
ruled in favor of the mandates to protect students with
disabilities who are more susceptible to COVID without universal
masking.

School leaders have huddled with lawyers to review their legal
options and obligations since GOP lawmakers approved the state's
rollback in the early hours of Oct. 30 during a special legislative
session they called on COVID protocols.

In an emergency motion filed Nov. 11 in Memphis, Shelby County
government asked U.S. District Court Judge Sheryl Lipman if
students there must still wear face coverings. Lipman -- who in
September blocked the governor's executive order allowing parents
to opt out of local mask requirements -- responded on Nov. 12 that
Shelby County continues to have the authority to require masks,
even under the new state law. The case is based on a class-action
lawsuit filed by some parents who contend the governor's order
violates the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Officials with Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools said they
expect their concerns about conflicting laws "will be resolved in
the courts as well."

"Our preference would be that MNPS could continue to keep students
safe and make decisions based on facts and not politics," spokesman
Sean Braisted said on Nov. 11, adding that the district "always
seeks to follow the law."

Most other Tennessee districts with mandates dropped them in the
weeks after the bill's passage. But mask mandates also remain in
place in districts in Knox and Williamson counties under rulings by
two other federal judges.

In Williamson County, south of Nashville, Superintendent Jason
Golden announced Nov. 11 that he will recommend that school board
members vote Nov. 15 to rescind the mandate they approved in late
August when the district's COVID cases peaked. He noted changes
under the anticipated new law but also cited a downward trend in
new COVID cases. The district had 52 students reporting a positive
test, compared to 544 on Aug. 27.

The latest round of mask confusion comes as the spread of the virus
continues to slow across Tennessee. As of midweek, Tennessee was
averaging about 1,100 new infections per day, about half of the
count a month ago.

But with new virus surges in Europe, concerns about another U.S.
wave heading into wintertime, and higher death rates among
unvaccinated people, health officials worry that Tennessee is
dialing back mitigation strategies prematurely.

Tennessee's vaccination rate -- with less than half of Tennesseans
fully vaccinated -- remains among the lowest in the nation. And
universal masking in K-12 schools is still recommended by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, regardless of
vaccination status.

The approval of a COVID vaccine for children ages 5-11 is viewed as
a game-changer, allowing families with younger school-age kids to
seek a layer of protection beyond masking and social distancing.
About 12,500 Tennessee children -- or 2% of children in that age
group -- had gotten their first dose as of Nov. 11, according to
the state health department's dashboard.

Also this week, the head of the Shelby County Health Department
urged parents to get their kids vaccinated. "That's going to give
that extra layer of protection that frankly many families have been
waiting for almost an entire year," Dr. Michelle Taylor told
reporters in Memphis.

The new law allows Tennessee school boards to enact mask mandates
for two weeks at a time, on a school-by-school basis, if specific
conditions are met: The governor must declare a COVID-specific
state of emergency, a principal must request universal masking, and
there must be "severe conditions." If the mandate is approved,
families also could seek exemptions from face coverings for medical
or religious reasons.

The measure defines "severe conditions" as a county average of at
least 1,000 new infections for every 100,000 residents. The CDC
defines "substantial" community spread as 50-99 new cases per
100,000 residents and "high" as more than 99. By the CDC's
measurements, community transmission in most of Tennessee remains
substantial or high.

In an effort to address the federal Americans with Disabilities
Act, the state law requires schools to offer education settings
with masking and social distancing for students approved for a
"reasonable accommodation."

"We're going to make sure we honor that," Williamson County's
Golden told school board members at a Nov. 11 workshop.

But more lawsuits are likely for the same reasons that Lee's
executive order has been taken to court, said Nicole Tuchinda, a
University of Memphis law professor who specializes in health law.

"I think this governor knows that masks are helpful in preventing
the spread of COVID," Tuchinda said. "He also knows that this new
law is going to face a lot of legal problems because of the
American with Disabilities Act and the general notion that public
schools are not supposed to exclude children with disabilities,
whose health conditions make them more susceptible to COVID."

Tuchinda said the government has a responsibility to serve the
public good, especially its most vulnerable citizens. She cited
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme court case that in
1905 upheld that state's mandatory smallpox vaccination law over
the challenge of a pastor who alleged that it violated his
religious liberty rights.

"The court's decision articulated the view that individual liberty
is not absolute and is subject to the police power of the state to
protect the health and safety of the public," she said. "I think
Gov. Lee is doing what he thinks is right for some kids, but he's
not doing what's right for all kids, in my opinion."

She added that having a new vaccine for school-age children is not
enough to change the government's obligation to give greater
protection to students with disabilities.

"It's not clear how many parents will vaccinate their children, so
wearing a mask at school is still important at this point,"
Tuchinda said. [GN]

TEXAS SOUTHERN: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Chevis Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
DELENA CHEVIS; WILLI JONES; and EKUNDAYO NKULULEKO, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TEXAS
SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY, Defendant, Case No. 4:21-cv-03649 (S.D. Tex.,
Nov. 5, 2021) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as security guards.

TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY offers degrees in both undergraduate and
graduate level curriculum. The University offers a wide array of
diverse programs to compliment its diverse student body and faculty
and provides various opportunities for internships, cooperative
education, teacher training, and research. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John Cruickshank, Esq.
          Joshua Estes, Esq.
          716 S. Union St.
          Richmond, Texas 77469
          Telephone: (281) 238-5400
          Facsimile: (281) 238-5015
          Email: john@cruickshank.attorney
                 joshuaestes@estespc.net

TRADE DESK: Plaintiff in Delaware Suit Oppose Bid to Dismiss
------------------------------------------------------------
The Trade Desk, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the plaintiff in a
Delaware class action filed an opposition to the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the complaint.

On June 28, 2021, a class action lawsuit was filed against the
Company, the members of the Company's board of directors, and one
of the Company's executive officers in the Court of Chancery of the
State of Delaware.

The complaint alleges generally that the Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties to the Company's stockholders in connection with
the negotiation and approval of the amendments to the Company's
certificate of incorporation and related matters voted on at the
Special Meeting of Stockholders held on December 22, 2020.

Plaintiff seeks a court order rescinding the Amendments, as well as
monetary damages. On August 27, 2021, the Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint.

On October 8, 2021, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.

The Company believes that all of the claims asserted in the
complaint are without merit and intends to defend against them
vigorously.

"However, litigation is inherently uncertain and there can be no
assurance regarding the likelihood that the Defendants' defense of
the action will be successful," the Company said.

The Trade Desk, Inc. is a technology company that empowers buyers
of advertising. Through its self-service, cloud-based platform, ad
buyers can create, manage, and optimize more expressive data-driven
digital advertising campaigns across ad formats and channels,
including display, video, audio, native and social, on a multitude
of devices, such as computers, mobile devices, and connected TV
(CTV). The company is based in Ventura, California.

TRICIDA INC: Seeks Dismissal of Perdi Putative Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Tricida, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint captioned Pardi v. Tricida,
Inc., et al., 21-cv-00076. A hearing on the motion is currently
scheduled for December 2021.

On January 6, 2021, a putative securities class action was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
against the Company and its Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and
Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), Pardi v. Tricida, Inc., et al.,
21-cv-00076. In April 2021, the court appointed Jeffrey Fiore as
lead plaintiff and Block & Leviton LLP as lead plaintiffs' counsel.


In June 2021, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint which
alleges that during the period between June 28, 2018 through
February 25, 2021, the Company and its senior officers violated
federal securities laws, including under Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, through alleged public misrepresentations and/or
omissions of material facts concerning the Company's NDA for
veverimer and the likelihood and timing of approval of veverimer by
the FDA. The amended complaint makes claims against the Company and
its CEO.

"In July 2021, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint and a hearing on the defendants' motion is currently
scheduled for December 2021," the Company said.

No damages amount is specified in the Securities Class Action.

Tricida, Inc. operates as a bio-pharmaceutical company. The Company
focuses on the discovery and clinical development of novel
therapeutics to address renal, metabolic, and cardiovascular
diseases. Tricida serves patients in the United States. The company
is based in South San Francisco, California.

TULANE UNIVERSITY: Jones Appeals Tuition Refund Suit Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Sylvia Jones, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled Sylvia Jones, individually and
on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, Defendant, Case Nos.
20-cv-02505, 2:20-CV-2518 in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, the consolidated
complaint seeks disgorgement of all amounts wrongfully obtained for
tuition, fees, on-campus housing, and meals, injunctive relief
including enjoining Tulane University of Louisiana from retaining
the pro-rated, unused monies paid for tuition, fees, on-campus
housing and meals, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded and
such other and further relief as may be just and proper, refunds of
all tuition fees paid on a pro-rata basis, together with other
damages resulting from breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund manage the Tulane
University of Louisiana, a higher learning campus in New Orleans
where Jones is currently enrolled for the Spring 2020 semester at
Tulane's A.B. Freeman School of Business. Tulane decided to close
campus, constructively evict students, and transition all classes
to an online/remote format as a result of the Novel Coronavirus
Disease. Jones claims to be deprived the benefits of in-person
instruction, access to campus facilities, student activities and
other benefits and services in exchange for which they had already
paid fees and tuition. Tulane refused to provide reimbursement for
the tuition, fees and other costs.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the Court's Order and Judgment
dated September 29, 2021, granting Defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, and dismissed the case with
prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned as Jones v. Admin of the Tulane
Educational Fund, Case No. 21-30681, in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, filed on November 1, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Sylvia Jones, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated; and John Ellis, on behalf of himself and
all other individuals similarly situated, are represented by:

          Michael Tompkins, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          1 Old Country Road
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516) 873-9550
          E-mail: mtompkins@leedsbrownlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund,
doing business as Tulane University of Louisiana, also known as
Tulane University, is represented by:

          James M. Garner, Esq.
          SHER GARNER CAHILL RICHTER KLEIN & HILBERT, L.L.C.
          909 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70112
          Telephone: (504) 299-2100
          E-mail: jgarner@shergarner.com

TWITTER INC: $809.5MM Class Action Settlement Hits Earnings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Trevor Jennewine, writing for The Motley Fool, reports that Twitter
reported earnings yesterday after the market closed. This stock is
down over 10% today. We'll get into that in just a second, but
revenue came in at $1.3 billion -- that was roughly in line with
management's forecasts -- up 37%. The big surprise was operating
income was -$743 million, and that was a huge miss. Management was
expecting roughly flat operating income, around $0 to slightly
positive. A huge miss and, of course, that trickled down to the
bottom line. On a GAAP basis, earnings per share was -$0.67. Again,
huge miss.

The reason for that, there was a class action shareholder lawsuit
filed back in 2016, and the company ended up paying $809.5 million
to settle that lawsuit. There were some insurance benefits they
kicked back the other direction. The net charge was $766 million.
When you back that out, the company did have a positive operating
income. Even if you do back it out, though, the operating income is
still down from where it was in the previous year.

On the bright side, daily active users hit 211 million. That's up
13%, and that's a slight sequential acceleration. It jumped 11% in
the previous quarter. And cash from operations was $389 million, up
81%.

This being an ad-supported business, Apple's changes to the iOS
privacy terms were one of management's focuses here. They did say
that it's too early to assess the long-term impact of the iOS
changes, but they did think that the impact to quarter three was
less than what they were expecting. Maybe a small silver lining
there for shareholders, but definitely something worth paying
attention to in the coming quarters.

One other thing that management mentions is that they're going to
be selling MoPub, which has an ad exchange they bought back in
2013, I believe. That sale is going to be closing in the first
quarter of fiscal 2022. They mentioned that might be a headwind to
revenue, as the teams at MoPub shift to other areas of the
business. The reason they're making the sale is, Twitter sees
opportunities in performance advertising and, specifically, in
commerce as well on the platform. They're pursuing what they
consider to be higher value opportunities. They did mention that
this sale will not impact their previous forecast, that they will
reach $7.5 billion in annual revenue by 2023.

Turning to the outlook, they're expecting $1.5 billion to $1.6
billion in revenue for the fourth quarter, that will be up 24%.
They're looking for operating income in the $130 million to $180
million range. That would be down 29% the prior year. Overall
operating income coming in light this quarter. The weak guidance
for the next quarter spooked Wall Street and the stock did sell off
pretty significantly today. [GN]

UNITED COAL: Ct. Enters Conditional Class Cert. Order in Chapman
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHAUN CHAPMAN, v. UNITED
COAL COMPANY, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00137-CEA-CRW (E.D.
Tenn.), the Hon. Judge Charles E. Atchley, Jr. entered an order
relating to motion for conditional class certification:

   -- Plaintiff’s motion for class certification shall be filed
      on or before December 1, 2021. Defendant’s response shall
      be filed on or before December 21, 2021. The Plaintiff's
      reply, if any, shall be filed on or before January 3,
      2022.

   -- The Court will convene a case management conference after
      resolution of Plaintiff’s motion for conditional class
      certification to set remaining pretrial deadlines.

United Coal Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Metinvest
Holding Company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 10, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3wPU95j at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED KINGDOM: Supreme Court Dismisses Data Protection Class Claim
-------------------------------------------------------------------
jdsupra.com reports that the the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom has delivered its long-awaited decision in the case of
Lloyd [2021] UKSC 50, rejecting an attempt to bring a
representative claim for compensation for "loss of control" over
personal data. The Court's ruling has far-reaching implications for
UK class actions concerning data protection matters.

Background
In 2017, Richard Lloyd brought a claim against an internet search
engine operator, alleging that it had acted in breach of its duties
as a data controller under the Data Protection Act 1998 (the "DPA
1998").1 Mr. Lloyd alleged that between August 2011 and February
2012, a "workaround" had been used to bypass his browser's blocking
of third party cookies, and collect his personal data without his
knowledge or consent. Mr. Lloyd sought to bring the claim on behalf
of around 4.4 million allegedly affected individuals, under Rule
19.6 of the Civil Procedure Rules ("CPR"), which allows a
representative action to be brought on behalf of a defined class of
individuals who share the "same interest" in the claim.

Initially, the application was dismissed by Warby J in the High
Court. Mr. Lloyd appealed to the Court of Appeal on three points:

The Court of Appeal considered whether the judge was right to hold
that a claimant cannot recover uniform "per capita" damages for
infringement of their data protection rights without proving
pecuniary loss or distress. It concluded that damages were
recoverable where a claimant had suffered a "loss of control" over
personal data, without needing to prove pecuniary loss or distress
suffered.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the judge was right to hold
that the members of the class did not have the same interest under
CPR Part 19.6(1) and were not identifiable. It held that the 4.4
million allegedly affected users did have the "same interest" under
CPR 19.6, in that they had all suffered a loss of control over
their personal data, and that they were identifiable,
(notwithstanding practical challenges associated with such
identification).

The Court of Appeal considered whether the judge's exercise of
discretion can be vitiated. It concluded that it was open to the
Court to exercise its discretion afresh, and that the claim should
be allowed to proceed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether Mr.
Lloyd should have been refused permission to serve his
representative claim out of the jurisdiction, on the grounds that:

-- damages cannot be awarded under the DPA 1998 without proof of
both: (i) a breach of the requirements of the DPA 1998; and (ii)
material damage or distress resulting from that breach; and
-- the claim in any event is not suitable to proceed as a
representative action.

The Judgment
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, restoring the
dismissal of the application by the High Court. The Supreme Court
held that Mr. Lloyd's claim was unsustainable as a representative
action for damages. The Supreme Court noted that Mr. Lloyd could
have adopted a bifurcated process, in which a representative claim
is brought for the purposes of establishing an infringement of the
DPA 1998, and then individual claims for compensation would follow.
However, Mr. Lloyd did not take that approach - the Supreme Court
presumed that this was due to the fact that such a strategy would
not be an effective way to generate a financial return. Instead, Mr
Lloyd attempted to bring the entire claim as a representative
action.

An important aspect of Mr. Lloyd's claim was the argument that any
non-trivial infringement of the DPA 1998 gives rise to a right to
compensation for "loss of control" over personal data. Earlier
cases established the principle that compensation for "loss of
control" over personal data is available in the context of a claim
for the tort of misuse of private information. However, Mr. Lloyd
did not bring a claim for misuse of private information in this
case, and the Supreme Court rejected the argument that claims for
misuse of private information and claims for infringements of the
DPA 1998 should be subject to equivalent rules. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court rejected Mr. Lloyd's attempt to bring a
representative claim for damages under the DPA 1998 while at the
same time arguing that it was not necessary to demonstrate unlawful
processing of personal data in relation to any particular
individual, and that it was not necessary to demonstrate that any
individual had suffered material damage or distress as a result of
such processing. The Supreme Court also noted that the need to
obtain evidence on an individual basis would be incompatible with
Mr Lloyd's representative claim.

Comment
This was a complex case involving multiple interveners and
substantial questions of law. English law has historically been
reluctant to permit class action claims of the kind commonly seen
in the US (and, more recently, Canada and Australia). As the
Supreme Court noted, the only area of English law in which such a
regime has been implemented is competition. In February 2021, the
UK Government concluded, as part of a consultation and statutory
review, that a class action regime was not necessary in the field
of data protection.

While the Supreme Court's decision is clearly good news for
controllers, it is important to note that this decision explicitly
focused on the law that applied in 2011-2012, rather than the law
as it currently stands. While it is possible that the same outcome
would be reached under the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act
2018, this is by no means certain. As claims for alleged breaches
of data protection law are becoming increasingly common, businesses
would be well-advised to keep an eye on developments in this space.


1 The DPA 1998 has since been replaced by the UK GDPR and Data
Protection Act 2018.

Thomas Harper, a Trainee Solicitor at White & Case, assisted in the
development of this publication. [GN]

UNITED PARCEL: Female Employees File Discrimination Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lawyer Monthly reports that United Parcel Service (UPS) is facing a
$250 million proposed class action accusing the company of systemic
bias against its female workers.

Three female employees who work at a UPS hub in Oakland filed a
complaint in California federal court on Wednesday. The complaint
claims that female staff are routinely given dead-end jobs, leading
to lower pay and fewer opportunities for progression within the
company than their male colleagues. The complaint also says that
such issues are compounded for older female workers at the company.
UPS does not have effective procedures in place for filing
complaints or enforcing anti-discrimination policies, the complaint
says. It alleges that UPS ignores the disparities between its male
and female workers.

The plaintiffs, who are all in their 40s and 50s, say they have
been denied opportunities to progress and are not afforded the
benefits of seniority that are granted to male workers at the
company. They also say that they have faced harassment for taking
medical leave.

UPS is accused of violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the federal Equal Pay Act, and comparable California laws,
with the plaintiffs representing a nationwide class of female UPS
employees who have been at the company since November 2017. They
seek at least $250 million in actual, compensatory and punitive
damages. [GN]


UNITED PARCEL: Workers' Calif. Suit Alleges Bias Against Women
--------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Wiessner at Reuters reports that United Parcel Service Inc
is facing a $250 million proposed class action accusing the package
delivery giant of systemic bias against "outwardly feminine" and
older female workers. [GN]

UNITED STATES: Allows H-1B Visa Holders' Spouses Job Authorization
------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial Express reports that the United States will offer
automatic work authorisation permits to spouses of H-1B visa
holders -- a move that would benefit thousands of Indian
professionals working in the country.

The move stems from a class-action lawsuit filed by the American
Immigration Lawyers' Association for immigrant spouses, many of
whom lost their jobs due to long delays in processing work
authorisation applications.

A US court directed the US Citizenship and Immigration Services to
allow automatic extension of up to 180 days on work authorisation
for spouses of H-1B and L-1 visa holders. While spouses of L-1 visa
holders will get the extension without applying, H-4 visa holders
will need to apply for an extension once their employment permit
expires.

H-4 and L2 visas: The difference
The US' latest immigrant-friendly amendment would benefit the
spouses of L-1 or H-1B visa holders as their work authorisation
will now be auto extended for 180 days.

The US Citizenship and Immigration Services issues H-4 visas to the
immediate family members (children under 21 and spouses) of H-1B
visa holders. According to data from the US government, women
constitute over 94% of H-4 visas. Of these, nearly 93% are from
India.

L-1 visas are non-immigrant visas with a relatively short validity
period. This visa allows multinationals to temporarily shift
foreign employees to their offices in the US for specialised
positions. L-2 visas are issued to an L-1 visa holder's dependent
spouse or unmarried children under the age of 21 to enter the US.
L-2 visa holders can also acquire Employment Authorisation
Documents to seek employment in the country.

What the new policy means for H-4 and L-2 visa holders
The US Citizenship and Immigration Services will now grant auto
extension of up to 180 days on work authorisation for spouses of
H-1B and L-1 visa holders. But while L-2 visa holders will get an
automatic extension, H-4 visa holders will have to apply.

Jon Wasden, one of the American Immigration Lawyers' Association's
litigation partners, told The Indian Express that the US
Citizenship and Immigration Services failed to grant employment
authorisation to L-2 visa holders despite the plain statutory
language.

The other issue related to the work permit of H-4 visa holders that
expired before their H-4 status.

This group always met the regulatory test for automatic Employment
Authorisation Documents extension, but the agency forced them to go
through a reauthorisation process, Wasden said.

The new US Citizenship and Immigration Services policy is likely to
remove some bottlenecks that forced many L-1 and H1-B spouses out
of their jobs. A large percentage of H-1B visa holders in the
country are Indian IT professionals working for US companies.

The Obama administration had previously given work authorisation to
some H-4 categories. US government data showed that work
authorisation had been issued to over 90,000 H-4 visa holders.

Why the policy change
The move stems from the American Immigration Lawyers' Association's
settlement with the US Department of Homeland Security in the
Shergill, et al. v. Mayorkas case. The cases for H-4 and L-2
plaintiffs who sought extensions or reauthorisation of employment.

Shergill was an extension of a pending lawsuit, filed in March,
that sought lawful status and work authorisation.

In the current Shergill case, the American Immigration Lawyers'
Association argued that processing delays for work authorisation
led to H-1B and L-1 dependents being forced out of their jobs.

An Indian named Divya Jayaraj, a plaintiff in the case, reportedly
came to the US to study before returning later as the spouse of an
H-1B holder. After her spouse's extension in August 2020, she
applied to extend her H-4 status. Jayaraj, however, lost her
employment "because of agency inaction".

Wasden told PTI the H-4 visa holders always met the regulatory test
for automatic extension of employment authorisation documents.
However, the agency forced them to wait for reauthorisation. People
were losing high-paying jobs for no reason, harming them and US
businesses.

The settlement reverses the agency's earlier policy that prohibited
H-4 holders from getting automatic employment authorisation
extensions while their applications were pending. It will also
allow L-2 holders get automatic work permits based on their status
-- meaning the spouses of managers and executives will no longer
need to apply for employment authorisation documents before working
in the country. [GN]

UNITED STATES: Settlement Favors L-1 & H-1B Visa Holders' Spouses
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart Anderson at forbes.com reports that if you are the spouse of
an L-1 or H-1B visa holder, good news has been rare in recent
years. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
exacerbated the wait for employment-based green cards by causing
long processing delays for work authorization, resulting in the
spouses of many high-skilled foreign nationals stopping work and
losing their jobs. A new legal settlement with USCIS brings relief
to many of these spouses, although continued litigation is needed
for additional changes.

"Once implemented by the agency, L-2 spouses will no longer have to
apply for work authorization and need an EAD (Employment
Authorization Document) as proof in order to work in the United
States," said Jesse Bless, director of litigation at the American
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), in an interview. "For H-4
spouses who have lawful status and merely need to renew their
employment authorization, they will now enjoy an automatic
extension of their authorization for 180 days after expiration
should the agency fail to process their timely-filed
applications."

Bless notes the settlement in Shergill evolved from a still-pending
lawsuit (Edakunni). Edakunni, filed in March 2021, sought lawful
status and work authorization. The case settled with USCIS,
Shergill, was filed on behalf of L-2 and H-4 plaintiffs who sought
reauthorization (or extensions) of employment. [GN]

UNITED STATES: Soldiers Used as "Guinea Pigs" in Military Program
-----------------------------------------------------------------
newschannel5.com reports that a top-secret military program treated
active-duty U.S. soldiers like they were guinea pigs according to a
class action lawsuit that shed light on what happened.

For 20 years the government tested chemicals on soldiers who were
not aware what was being put in their bodies.

The testing took place at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland from 1955
through 1975.

Nashville veteran Dennis Paul, 79, discussed his experience in the
program with NewsChannel 5 Investigates, saying he it impacted him
long after he left the Army.

Paul was serving at Fort Bliss in Texas in 1968, when he
volunteered for what he thought would be an easy assignment.

"The word got around they were looking for volunteers for testing,"
Paul said.

"Weekends off and relaxing that's why I took it," Paul remembered.

He showed a black and white photo of a large group of soldiers in
front of a sign "Medical Volunteers."

"That's me" he said pointing to a younger version of himself.

He said the group was told they would help test military equipment
like gas masks.

But instead, the military deliberately exposed them to chemical and
biological agents.

Attorney James Hancock works with the California law firm Morrison
& Foerster, which filed a class action lawsuit back in 2008 against
the CIA and Department of Defense.

"These were active-duty U.S. service members being used as human
guinea pigs," Hancock said.

The lawsuit detailed how the military secretly tested drugs and
chemicals on thousands of soldiers -- including dangerous nerve
gases like Sarin and incapacitating agents like LSD and BZ, that
Paul called Benzene.

"It's an important story that needs to be told and it's a story
that frankly a lot of people don't know," Hancock said.

Declassified military films show soldiers being given drugs and
then being monitored to see their impacts.

"For the actual test Private Zadrovney received a high dose of the
incapacitating agent," the film's narrator said.

One film showed soldiers being injected with BZ, which in high
doses can lead to hallucinations and confusion.

After receiving the drug, soldiers were monitored to see if they
could do basic tasks like run an obstacle course.

"Shortly after receiving the drug, he is grossly impaired," a
narrator said as a soldier struggled through an obstacle course.

In the midst of the Cold War, the military was concerned chemical
agents could be used against U.S. soldiers.

The lawsuit quoted a 1954 report to President Dwight Eisenhower
which urged him to approve the human testing program, "If the
United states is to survive, long standing American concepts of
fair play must be reconsidered."

"It's sobering to hear the words and discussion that was happening
about setting this program up," Hancock said.

Hancock said the class action lawsuit led to nearly 10 years of
litigation.

It forced the Army to locate soldiers who were in the testing
program and send them documentation detailing what happened to
them.

It also released soldiers from their oath of secrecy.

Paul's paperwork shows he received BZ, which he said felt like he
was in a nightmare for hours at a time.

"You can't coordinate anything you know. You can't hardly walk, and
your mind is going so many different directions," Paul said.

"I'm glad to be talking to you about it. I feel like in my heart
there's a lot of guys out there that went through the same thing I
did," Paul said.

Documents reveal after getting BZ, Paul was put in temperatures of
105 degrees -- then 125 degrees -- for up to seven hours, to see if
the drug impacted the way soldiers sweated.

"The doctor said, 'we're giving this test to see it in a warmer
climate.' So, when I received the shot, we went into a heat room,"
Paul said.

But it wasn't just BZ he received.

Paul showed us an interview from April of 1968.

A nurse or doctor asked him questions after he was put in a chamber
and exposed to an irritant, likely tear gas.

He was asked "Did you have pain every time you took a breath?"

He answered "Yes."

And "How would you compare this test with the last one?"

"Today was worse," he responded.

"We did volunteer," Paul said. "But not to get messed up," he
continued.

"They didn't know they were signing up to get mystery chemicals
injected into their bodies," Hancock said.

Paul retired from the military and went on to raise a family in
Nashville.

At 79 years old, he actively harvests honey from his bee farm.

But he's haunted by what happened to him at Edgewood.

He believes the testing hurt him emotionally and stole part of his
life.

"I missed out on so much with my family, not being able to say,
when they were little boys, you know, I love them. It wasn't the
real me there," Paul said.

The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs has a page about the
testing on its website.

"About 7,000 soldiers took part in the experiments that involved
exposures to more than 250 chemicals," it stated.

It claimed "no significant health effects have been observed" in
those who were tested.

Paul disagreed.

But now he just wants people to know what he and others endured.

"I've read several of the guys say they were never the same after
BZ, and they are telling the truth," Paul said.

The chemical testing on soldiers stopped in 1975.

"It's important that these soldiers who served their country are
honored and get to the tell their story," Hancock said.

The Army is now required to provide medical care to veterans if
they can prove their health issues are the result of the
testing.[GN]

UNITED STATES: Yeganeh Suit Over Denial of Visa Applications Tossed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OMID YEGANEH, et al., Plaintiffs v. ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, et al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-02426-EMC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim.

Introduction

The Plaintiffs are Iranian nationals who applied for visas and
naturalization, and several U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents who filed family-based visa petitions on behalf of their
Iranian-national relatives. They allege their applications were
denied or will be denied based on terrorism-related inadmissibility
grounds ("TRIG") due to their prior service in the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC") in Iran. The Plaintiffs, for
themselves and on behalf of a putative class, seek an order
compelling the Defendants to create a mechanism for a TRIG waiver
or exemption for the ineligibility resulting from service in the
IRGC.

Now pending is the Defendants' motion to dismiss the action for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

Background

The Plaintiffs are primarily unadmitted and nonresident noncitizens
who have applied for various nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, as
well as several U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who
filed family-based visa petitions on behalf of their relatives. In
their First Amended Complaint, they allege that they were -- or
expect to be -- denied visas or immigration benefits under 8 U.S.C.
Section 1182(a)(3)(B). The amended complaint also includes three
lawful permanent residents "who have applied for naturalization,
but who expect to be denied for prior involuntary service with the
IRGC."

The Plaintiffs also seek to "represent a nationwide class
consisting of all Iranians who have applied for an immigrant,
nonimmigrant, or naturalization benefit under U.S. law but have
been denied" due to their employment with the IRGC pursuant to 8
U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(3)(B).

First, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants' actions have
created a visa application process where the applicant Plaintiffs
"are told that they are inadmissible for life based on their prior
employment by the IRGC and that there is no waiver process
available." Second, the Plaintiffs claim that the "Defendants'
actions have resulted in visa adjudication processes without any
consistent and meaningful process by which to submit evidence of
waiver eligibility or to have such evidence considered by DOS
consular officers, resulting in a lack of any review of findings of
inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(3)(B)." Third, the
Plaintiffs allege that "creating a policy where all former members
of the IRGC, whether through involuntarily service and conscription
or not, are inadmissible to the United States for life, without a
possibly of waiver" violates their "liberty interest in family
reunification without due process."

The Plaintiffs ask the Court for a determination that the
"Defendants' actions in creating a policy where involuntary service
in the IRGC leads to automatic findings of inadmissibility under 8
U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(3)(B), and that no waiver of this finding is
possible, is a violation the INA, APA, and the U.S. Constitution."
They seek vacatur of "all findings made under 8 U.S.C. Section
1182(a)(3)(B) against the Plaintiffs," and "any agency guidance,
policies, and procedures that implement 8 U.S.C. Section
1182(a)(3)(B) for involuntary service in the IRGC." The Plaintiffs
further seek an order "directing the Defendants involved in
deciding the admissibility of individuals under INA 212(a)(3)(B) 8
U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(3)(B), to reopen the decisions and have them
processed subject to the possibility of a waiver."

The Plaintiffs summarize that they "are seeking an order compelling
Defendants to create a mechanism for a TRIG waiver or exemption for
the ineligibility resulting from their involuntary service in the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps."

The Plaintiffs filed the action on April 4, 2021. They filed the
operative first amended complaint on June 28, 2021. Now pending is
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction as to certain Plaintiffs and for
failure to state a claim as to all the Plaintiffs and the proposed
class.

Discussion

The Defendants argue that certain Plaintiffs' claims should be
dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. They
contend that the remaining claims and class allegations should be
dismissed because the Plaintiffs fail to state claims.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1. Redressability

The Defendants identify three Plaintiffs whose visas were denied
under an independent statutory ground other than TRIG, or for an
independent statutory ground in addition to TRIG. Specifically,
three Plaintiffs had their visas denied under Section 306 of the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act ("EBSVERA"). The
Plaintiffs' complaint does not challenge the lawfulness of any of
the Defendants' denials of the Plaintiffs' visas under Section 306
of EBSVERA. The Plaintiffs challenge only the Defendants' denials
of visa pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(3)(B). Thus, the
Defendants argue that these three Plaintiffs' injuries would not be
redressable should even if the Court were to grant the Section
1182(a)(3)(B)-specific relief that the Plaintiffs demand.

Judge Chen finds that the Plaintiffs seem to concede the
Defendants' argument. Rather than showing that these Plaintiffs
have satisfied their burden at the pleading stage to allege facts
that demonstrate redressability for the purposes of the Court's
standing analysis, the Plaintiffs contend only that it "would be
inefficient to dismiss these three individuals" because they "may
gain some legal protection if they are included in a class action
after class certification."

Judge Chen's Article III standing analysis, however, does not turn
on whether keeping a certain Plaintiff in a case is "efficient." He
says, absent any argument or facts alleged in the complaint
demonstrating that these three Plaintiffs can satisfy the
redressability prong of standing in light of the denials of their
visas under EBSVERA, he dismisses the visa-denial claims of
Plaintiffs Ahvan Ghaderi, Mehrdad Mohtadi and Ali Khadempar
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

2. Ripeness

The Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss those the
Plaintiffs whose claims are not ripe and point to six Plaintiffs
who "state that their various applications are pending and that
they expect to be denied at some point based on their IRGC
service." The Plaintiffs respond that because the "Defendants admit
that once the IRGC was designated as a Tier I terrorist
organization, that there is no waiver or exemption available to
those who have served in the organization" and thus "the issue of
ripeness is not dispositive because the Defendants cannot claim
that these Plaintiffs will see their applications approved."

Judge Chen holds that the three Plaintiffs whose applications for
immigrant visas satisfy the standard for ripeness because the Court
can "firmly predict" that their visas will be denied. Since the
government's April 2019 designation of the IRGC as a Tier I
organization, there is no indication that any visa applicant who
served in the IRGC at any point in the past has been granted an
immigrant visa. Indeed, the State Department's current policy is
that exemptions are not available for immigrant visa applicants who
served mandatory military service in the IRGC.

By contrast, there is no indication that it is inevitable that the
three Plaintiffs whose claims for naturalization are currently
pending (Mikaeli, Lari, and Kassaian) will have their applications
denied. Thus, the Court cannot "firmly predict" that these
Plaintiffs' applications for naturalization will be denied. The
claims of Plaintiffs Mikaeli, Lari and Kassaian "rest upon
contingent future events that may not occur" and are, therefore,
not ripe for judicial review.

Thus, Judge Chen grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
claims of Plaintiffs Arash Mikaeli, Roozbeh Lari and Seyed Ebrahim
Kassaian as unripe under Rule 12(b)(1). He denies the motion as to
the claims of Plaintiffs Ali Rashidi Alavijeh, Babk Parhoudeh, and
Mehrdad Mohtadi.

B. Failure to State a Claim

The Plaintiffs allege two claims in the FAC: That by failing to
create an individualized waiver process for TRIG inadmissibility
for the Plaintiffs who involuntary served in the IRGC, Defendants
violated (1) violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5
U.S.C. Section 706(2)(C), and (2) violated the Plaintiffs' right to
due process under the Fifth Amendment.

The Defendants respond that the Plaintiffs fail to state claims on
either ground. First, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs'
APA claims are precluded from judicial review under the doctrine of
consular nonreviewability and because the authority to grant group
or situational exemptions from TRIG is committed to the "sole
unreviewable discretion" of the Secretaries of State and Department
of Homeland Security under 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(d)(3)(B)(i).
Second, the Defendants argue that, pursuant the holdings of binding
authority, the Plaintiffs lack constitutionally-protected interests
that can serve as the basis for their constitutional claims.

Judge Chen holds that the Plaintiffs fail to meaningfully oppose
any of the Defendants' arguments. Given the Plaintiffs' failure to
develop any arguments grounded in any legal authority in response
to the Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion, he finds that the Plaintiffs
have waived and abandoned all arguments in opposition to the
government's motion. Because the Plaintiffs have waived and
abandoned all responses to the Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion, Judge
Chen grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss all of the
Plaintiffs' claims.

Furthermore, Judge Chen dismisses the complaint with prejudice. He
does so without addressing the merits of, e.g., the contours of
consular nonreviewability and its application in the case. In light
of the Plaintiffs' failure to meaningfully defend their claims,
Judge Chen concludes it would be futile to allow the Plaintiffs to
amend their complaint.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chen grants the Defendants' motion
to dismiss. He dismisses the claims of Plaintiffs Ahvan Ghaderi,
Mehrdad Mohtadi and Ali Khadempar, Arash Mikaeli, Roozbeh Lari and
Seyed Ebrahim Kassaian for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1). He dismisses all other claims for the
Plaintiffs' failure to state a clam under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Order disposes of Docket No. 29. The Clerk is directed to enter
judgment and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/rh3v34ac from Leagle.com.


UNIVERSAL CREDIT: Court Extends Pretrial Dates in Thompson Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRANDON THOMPSON, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, v. UNIVERSAL
CREDIT SERVICES, INC., Case No. 0:21-cv-61336-AHS (S.D. Fla.), the
Hon. Judge Raag Singhal entered an order extending pretrial
deadlines as follows:

   1. The Joint Motion to Extend Deadline to Complete Class
      Certification Discovery is granted.

   2. All previous deadlines remain in effect except for the
      following:

      Dec. 15, 2021: Deadline for completing class certification
                     discovery.

Universal Credit Services a financial services company specializing
in credit reports, credit checks, and credit reports services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3os4XTu at no extra charge.[CC]

USAA GENERAL: Ct. Enters Order Setting Deadlines in Drozdz Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AGATA DROZDZ, an
individual and TEAKRE VEST, an individual, v. USAA GENERAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION and USAA
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 2:20-cv-01010-JCC (W.D.
Wash.), the Hon. Judge John C. Coughenour entered an order setting
deadlines and continuing all other case deadlines until after
resolution of the motion for class certification:

                Event                            Deadline

   -- Plaintiffs' Motion for Class             March 4, 2022
      Certification and any supporting
      expert reports

   -- Deadline for completion of expert        April 15, 2022
      discovery relating to class
      certification issues – Plaintiffs'
      expert(s)

   -- Defendants' Response to                  May 20, 2022
      Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
      Certification and any supporting
      expert reports

   -- Deadline for completion of expert        July 1, 2022
      discovery relating to class
      certification issues – Defendants'
      expert(s)

   -- Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of          July 22, 2022
      Motion for Class Certification

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 10, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FlsA73 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Toby J. Marshall, Esq.
          Blythe H. Chandler, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34 th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103
          Telephone: (206) 816-6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
          E-mail: tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com
                   bchandler@terrellmarshall.com

               - and -

          Young-Ji Ham, Esq.
          WASHINGTON INJURY LAWYERS PLLC
          1700 7th Avenue, Suite 2100
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (425) 312-3057
          E-mail: youngji@washinjurylaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Michael A Moore, Esq.
          Victoria Ainsworth, Esq.
          CORR CRONIN LLP
          1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3900
          Seattle, WA 98154-1051
          Telephone: (206) 625-8600
          Facsimile: (206) 625-0900
          E-mail: mmoore@corrcronin.com
                  tainsworth@corrcronin.com

               - and -

          Jay Williams, Esq.
          Paula M. Ketcham, Esq.
          SCHIFF HARDIN LLP
          233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 7100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 258-5629
          Facsimile: (312) 258-5600
          E-mail: jwilliams@schiffhardin.com
                  pketcham@schiffhardin.com

VAIL CORP: Gibson Deadlines Stayed Pending Hamilton II Deal Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANNA GIBSON and ZACHARIAH SAIZ-HAWES on behalf of
themselves and all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE VAIL
CORPORATION D/B/A VAIL RESORTS MANAGEMENT COMPANY and DOES 1
THROUGH 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-01260-KJM-AC
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California stays all deadlines in the
action pending approval of class settlement in Hamilton v. Heavenly
Valley, Limited Partnership, SC20210148 (El Dorado County Superior
Court) ("Hamilton II").

Plaintiffs Anna Gibson and Zachariah Hawes and Defendant Vail
Resorts notified the Court that they had reached a settlement to
resolve all claims in the wage and hour class and collective action
case on Aug. 12, 2021.

The Court ordered the Plaintiffs to file their Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement by Oct. 15, 2021.

The Court granted the Parties' Joint Stipulation to Continue
Plaintiffs' Deadline to File Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Settlement, to give the Parties additional time to finalize a
long-form settlement agreement, which would, among other things,
determine how to consolidate this action with the other related
actions that will be included in the settlement (Heggen v. Heavenly
Valley, Limited Partnership, 2:21-cv-00107-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal.);
Hamilton v. Heavenly Valley, Limited Partnership,
2:21-cv-01608-MCE-DB (E.D. Cal.) ("Hamilton I"); and Hamilton II;
continuing the Plaintiffs' deadline to file their Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement to Oct. 29, 2021.

The Parties have now finalized a long-form settlement agreement,
which will resolve all of the claims pled in the action, Heggen,
Hamilton I, and Hamilton II, and are in the process of collecting
client signatures on the agreement. They have agreed in the
long-form settlement agreement to seek approval of the class
settlement in Hamilton II, and to immediately stay all deadlines in
the instant case, Heggen, and Hamilton I pending approval of the
class settlement in Hamilton II.

The Plaintiffs anticipate filing a Motion for Preliminary Approval
of the Class Action Settlement in Hamilton II at the earliest
possible date.

The Parties request the Court issues an order to stay all deadlines
in the instant action and requiring the Parties file a Joint Status
Report addressing the status of the settlement approval process,
and any additional information that the Court requires, on Jan. 27,
2022, or such other date that the Court deems appropriate.

Having reviewed the parties' stipulation, and of good cause
appearing, Judge Mueller stays all deadlines in the action pending
approval of class settlement in Hamilton II. The parties will file
a Joint Status Report addressing the status of the settlement
approval process on Jan. 27, 2022. The Order resolves ECF No. 15.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2nvnm5yr from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Liu -- jliu@liulawpc.com -- THE LIU LAW FIRM, P.C., in
Menlo Park, California.

Robert Ottinger -- robert@ottingerlaw.com -- THE OTTINGER FIRM,
P.C., in San Francisco, California, Counsel for the Plaintiffs and
the Proposed FLSA Collective and Class Additional Counsel listed on
the next page.

Evan R. Moses -- evan.moses@ogletree.com -- Melis Atalay --
melis.atalay@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C., in Los Angeles, California, Counsel for the
Defendant.

Julian Burns King -- julian@kingsiegel.com -- Elliot J. Siegel --
elliot@kingsiegel.com -- KING & SIEGEL LLP, in Los Angeles,
California.

Justin Toobi, Esq., in Los Angeles, California, Counsel for the
Plaintiffs and the Proposed FLSA Collective and Class.


VBI VACCINES: Initial Hearing on Suit vs Unit Set for June 9, 2022
------------------------------------------------------------------
VBI Vaccines Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that the next
preliminary hearing on two civil claims against the company's
subsidiary, SciVac, is scheduled to be held on June 9, 2022.

On September 13, 2018, two civil claims were brought in the
District Court of the central district in Israel naming the
Company's subsidiary SciVac as a defendant.

In one claim, two minors, through their parents, allege, among
other things: defects in certain batches of the Company's 3-antigen
prophylactic HBV vaccine discovered in July 2015; that the
Company's 3-antigen prophylactic HBV vaccine was approved for use
in children and infants in Israel without sufficient evidence
establishing its safety; that SciVac failed to provide accurate
information about the Company's 3-antigen prophylactic HBV vaccine
to consumers; and that each child suffered side effects from the
vaccine.

The claim was filed together with a motion seeking approval of a
class action on behalf of 428,000 children vaccinated with the
Company's 3-antigen prophylactic HBV vaccine in Israel from April
2011 and seeking damages in a total amount of NIS 1,879,500,000
(not in thousands) ($582,069).

The second claim is a civil action brought by two minors and their
parents against SciVac and the Israel Ministry of Health alleging,
among other things, that SciVac marketed an experimental,
defective, hazardous or harmful vaccine; that the Company's
3-antigen prophylactic HBV vaccine was marketed in Israel without
sufficient evidence establishing its safety; and that the Company's
3-antigen prophylactic HBV vaccine was produced and marketed in
Israel without approval of a western regulatory body.

The claim seeks damages for past and future losses and expenses as
well as punitive damages.

SciVac believes these matters to be without merit and intends to
defend these claims vigorously.

The District Court has accepted SciVac's motion to suspend reaching
a decision on the approval of the class action pending the
determination of liability under the civil action.

Preliminary hearings for the trial of the civil action began on
January 15, 2020, with subsequent preliminary hearings held on May
13, 2020, December 3, 2020 and September 30, 2021.

"The next preliminary hearing is scheduled to be held on June 9,
2022," the Company said.

VBI Vaccines Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, develops and sells
vaccines to address unmet needs in infectious disease and
immuno-oncology in Israel and internationally. The company was
formerly known as SciVac Therapeutics Inc. and changed its name to
VBI Vaccines Inc. in May 2016. The company is headquartered in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

VIATRIS INC: Antitrust Class Suit Ongoing
-----------------------------------------
Viatris Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2021, that on Sept. 21, 2021, after
Plaintiffs' then operative complaint was dismissed with an option
to file a limited amended complaint, Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint asserting federal antitrust claims similar to those in
the putative indirect purchaser class actions.

On February 14, 2020, the Company, together with other non-Viatris
affiliated companies, were named as defendants in a putative direct
purchaser class action filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas relating to the pricing and/or marketing of the
EpiPen Auto-Injector.

On September 21, 2021, after Plaintiffs' then operative complaint
was dismissed with an option to file a limited amended complaint,
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting federal antitrust
claims which are based on allegations that are similar to those in
the putative indirect purchaser class actions.

"Plaintiffs' seek monetary damages, declaratory relief, attorneys'
fees and costs," the Company said.

Viatris Inc. is a global healthcare company formed in November 2020
through the combination of Mylan and the Upjohn Business whose
mission is to empower people worldwide to live healthier at every
stage of life. The company is based in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.

VIATRIS INC: Faces Class Suit Over Securities Act Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
Viatris Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 8, 2021, for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2021, that the Company and certain of
its officers and directors were named as defendants in a putative
class action lawsuit alleging violations of Securities Act of
1933.

On October 28, 2021, the Company and certain of its officers and
directors were named as defendants in a putative class action
lawsuit filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania on behalf of former Mylan shareholders who received
Company common stock in connection with the Combination.

A non-Viatris affiliated company and persons were also named as
defendants.

The complaint alleges violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15
of the Securities Act of 1933 for purportedly failing to disclose
or misrepresenting material information in the registration
statement and related prospectus issued in connection with the
Combination.

"Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, reasonable costs and expenses,
and certain other equitable and injunctive relief," the Company
said.

Viatris Inc. is a global healthcare company formed in November 2020
through the combination of Mylan and the Upjohn Business whose
mission is to empower people worldwide to live healthier at every
stage of life. The company is based in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.


VIATRIS INC: Gill Antitrust Suit Moved From N.D.N.Y. to D. Kansas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled MICHAEL GILL, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. VIATRIS INC., Successor-in-Interest to
Mylan N.V.; MYLAN SPECIALTY L.P.; MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; and
HEATHER BRESCH, Case No. 5:21-cv-01187, was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas on November 16,
2021.

The Clerk of Court for the District of Kansas assigned Case No.
2:21-cv-02534-DDC-TJJ to the proceeding.

The case arises from Mylan's alleged monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and tying in violation of New York Antitrust
Statute, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act and New York State Consumer Protection Law.

Viatris Inc. is an American global healthcare company headquartered
in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.

Mylan N.V. is a specialty pharmaceuticals company headquartered in
Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.

Mylan Specialty L.P. is a pharmaceutical company headquartered
Morgantown, West Virginia.

Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is a pharmaceutical company
headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
         
         Mark S. Reich, Esq.
         Courtney E. Maccarone, Esq.
         LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (212) 363-7500
         E-mail: mreich@zlk.com
                 cmaccarone@zlk.com

               - and –

         Rosemary M. Rivas, Esq.
         GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
         505 14th Street, Suite 110
         Oakland, CA 94612
         Telephone: (510) 350-9700
         Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
         E-mail: rmr@classlawgroup.com

VICTORIA: Faces Class Action Over COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate
--------------------------------------------------------------
Greg Videon, writing for SunraysiaDaily, reports that a Mildura
surgeon who joined a class action against vaccine mandates was
never stood down and has been fully vaccinated.

Mildura Health Private Hospital says a surgeon who joined a class
action against the Victorian Chief Health Officer's COVID-19
vaccination mandate was never stood down and has been fully
vaccinated.

Sunraysia Daily reported on Saturday that Dimitrius Tryfonopoulos
was named among 129 people bringing the class action, which was
before Victoria's Supreme Court. [GN]



VISPRING LUXURY: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vispring Luxury
Mattress Store, LLC. The case is styled as Denise Crumwell, on
behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated v.
Vispring Luxury Mattress Store, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09380
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 12, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Vispring Luxury Mattress Store -- https://www.vispringnyc.com/ --
is a renowned British heritage brand and home of bespoke luxury
beds and mattresses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


WAITR HOLDINGS: Mediation Session Scheduled
-------------------------------------------
Waitr Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 2, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2021, that an initial
mediation session in a class action lawsuit has been scheduled for
mid-November 2021.

In April 2019, the Company was named as a defendant in a class
action complaint filed by certain current and former restaurant
partners, captioned Bobby’s Country Cookin', et al v. Waitr,
which is currently pending in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana.

"Plaintiffs allege, among other things, claims for breach of
contract, violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
seek recovery on behalf of themselves and two separate classes,"
the Company said.

Based on the current class definitions, as many as 10,000
restaurant partners could be members of the two separate classes
that the representative plaintiffs are attempting to certify.  

An initial mediation session is scheduled for mid-November 2021.

Waitr maintains that the underlying allegations and claims lack
merit, and that the classes, as pled, are incapable of
certification.

Waitr continues to vigorously defend the suit.

Waitr operates an online ordering technology platform, providing
delivery, carryout and dine-in options, connecting restaurants,
drivers and diners in cities across the United States.

WASHINGTON STATE: New LTC Program Hit With Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
insurancenewsnet.com reports that three businesses and six
individuals who oppose a mandatory payroll tax to fund Washington
state's new long-term care program filed a class action lawsuit in
federal court.

The suit seeks to stop the January start of the payroll premium for
most employees in the state.

None of the individuals who filed the suit in the federal court for
the Western District of Washington purchased a private, long-term
care insurance plan before Nov. 1, the deadline to qualify for an
exemption to the payroll tax.

The WA Cares Fund requires workers in Washington state to pay a
premium of 0.58% of their total pay per paycheck, meaning an
employee with a salary of $50,000 will pay $290 a year into the
fund.

Beginning Jan. 1, 2025, people who need assistance with at least
three activities of daily living can tap into the fund to pay for
in-home care, home modifications, home-delivered meals and
transportation to medical appointments. Unpaid family caregivers
also can be reimbursed through the fund.

The lifetime maximum benefit is $36,500, with annual increases to
be determined based on inflation.

The benefit is not portable, so workers who pay into the program
but move outside of Washington state will not be able to access it.
In addition, the program covers only the taxpayers, not a spouse or
dependent. The benefit also is not available to those who work in
Washington but live in neighboring states.

The lawsuit contends that the fund violates a federal law
forbidding the state from passing any law requiring employees to
participate in a plan that provides sickness or medical benefits.
It also contends that the law violates the Equal Protection and the
Privileges and Immunities clauses of the U.S. Constitution by its
disparate treatment of people who pay the tax but don't receive
benefits if they are not a Washington state resident.

In addition, the suit contends that people who are within 10 years
of retirement will pay into the fund but not receive benefits, a
violation of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act. [GN]

WILDCAT INVESTMENTS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Foley Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES FOLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WILDCAT INVESTMENTS, LLC, dba JIMMY JOHN'S,
Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-05234-SDM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio, Nov. 5, 2021)
seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime
compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Foley was employed by the Defendant as delivery driver.

WILDCAT INVESTMENTS, LLC, dba JIMMY JOHN'S owns and operates
multiple Jimmy John's franchises throughout Ohio, engaging as a
sandwich fast food restaurant chain. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, Arkansas 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

               -and-

          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          Brian R. Noethlich, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH DEROSE COX, LLP
          4200 Regent Street, Suite 210
          Columbus, OH 43219
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          Email: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
                 bnoethlich@barkanmeizlish.com

WILLIAM JOHNSON: Settlement in Vataj Suit Gets Final Nod
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTOPHER VATAJ, v.
WILLIAM D. JOHNSON, et al., Case No. 4:19-cv-06996-HSG (N.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. entered an order:

   1. granting the motion for final approval of class action
      settlement;

   2. granting the motion for attorneys' fees and incentive
      award.

      -- The Court awards attorneys' fees in the amount of $2.5
         million and costs in the amount of $82,046.46;

   3. directing the parties and settlement administrator to
      implement this Final Order and the settlement agreement in
      accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement; and

   4. directing the parties to file a short stipulated final
      judgment of two pages or less within 21 days from the date
      of this order.

The Plaintiffs bring this securities class action against
Defendants PG&E Corporation and certain of its officers and
directors regarding representations that Defendants made about
PG&E's safety protocols following PG&E's bankruptcy and in the wake
of several California wildfires caused by PG&E equipment.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class defined as "all persons
and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired PG&E securities"
on the New York Stock Exchange between December 13, 2018, and
October 28, 2019.

The Plaintiffs allege that following the devastating California
wildfires between 2015 and 2018, PG&E initiated three measures in
an effort to reduce the risk of future wildfires: (1) temporary
power shutoffs when high winds and low humidity made wildfires
particularly likely (what Plaintiffs refer to as
"de-energization"); (2) visual inspections of all of its poles
6 located in high fire threat areas; and (3) inspection for and
removal of vegetation overhanging or abutting its power lines.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to disclose that: (i)
PG&E's new wildfire prevention and safety protocols were inadequate
and missed dangerous conditions; and (ii) PG&E was unprepared for
the rolling power outages.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 5, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/30fo4aZ at no extra charge.[CC]

WISE MEDICAL: Filing of Class Cert Response Extended to Dec. 3
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AMANDA FORTIN v. WISE
MEDICAL STAFFING, INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-01467-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio),
the Hon. Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers entered an order granting the
Defendant's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
Plaintiff's Pre-Discovery Motion for Conditional Certification.

The Defendant shall have until December 3, 2021, to file a response
to Plaintiff's Pre-Discovery Motion for Conditional
Class Certification and Court-Authorized Notice to Potential Opt-In
Plaintiffs Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), says Judge
Deavers.

Wise Medical Staffing provides medical staffing solutions.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 12, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oGm9VD at no extra charge.[CC]


XPO LAST: Extension of Class Cert Deadlines Sought in Green
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LEON GREEN and WALDO
TEJADA, on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. XPO LAST
MILE, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-01896-JAM (D. Conn.), the parties ask
the Court to enter an order extending, nunc pro tunc, the current
deadlines as follows:

   1. Discovery: The last day for the parties to complete all
      discovery, including depositions of parties and witnesses
      from November 3, 2021, to December 3, 2021.

   2. Class Certification Motions: The last day for the
      Plaintiffs to file a motion for class certification from
      December 3, 2021, to January 2, 2022. The last day for the
      Defendant to file a response to Plaintiffs' motion for
      class certification from January 14, 2022, to February 14,
      2022. The last day for the Plaintiffs to file a reply to
      their motion for class certification from February 11,
      2022, to March 11, 2022.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Nov. 11, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HutfVB at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zachary L. Rubin, Esq.
          Harold L. Lichten, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Weber, Esq.
          Olena Savytska, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston St., Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          E-mail: hlichten@llrlaw.com
                  bjweber@llrlaw.com
                  OSavytska@llrlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          David R. Golder, Esq.
          Carolyn A. Trotta, Esq.
          Adam L. Lounsbury, Esq.
          Juan C. Obregon, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          90 Statehouse Square, 8th Floor
          Hartford, CT 06103
          Telephone: (860) 522-0404
          Facsimile: (860) 247-1330
          E-mail: David.Golder@jacksonlewis.com
                  Carolyn.Trotta@jacksonlewis.com
                  Adam.Lounsbury@jacksonlewis.com
                  juan.obregon@jacksonlewis.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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