/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/210930.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, September 30, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 190

                            Headlines

24 CAPITAL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Peters Broadcast Suit
ALLERGAN PLC: $130MM Class Settlement to be Heard on Nov. 17
AMAZON.COM INC: Can't Compel Arbitration in Jackson Class Suit
AUTUMN LAKE: Hall Sues Over Failure to Provide Proper Wages
AXOS BANK: Salcedo Sues Over Illegal Overdraft Fees

BECTON DICKINSON: Industriens Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
BOSTON PRIVATE: Savoy Files Suit Over SVB Merger Deal
BUTTERBALL LLC: Amended Figueroa Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
CALIFORNIA: Summary Judgment Bid in Fitzgerald v. Pollard Denied
CANADA GOOSE: Lin Files False Ad Suit Over Goose Down Jackets

CHRISTOPHER GODFREY: Culbertson Files Suit in S.D. West Virginia
CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE: Sears Seeks Overtime Pay for Pre-shift Hrs.
DAKOTA PLAINS: Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set for Oct. 25
DOMINIUM MGMT: Iliff Class Suit Remanded to Minnesota State Court
DUPAGE MEDICAL: Hughes Sues Over Data Breach

EDUCATIONAL CREDIT: Mahboob Appeals TCPA Case Dismissal
ENERGY SERVICES GROUP: Brown Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
EVERGREEN HOMECARE: Chung Seeks Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
FANSIDED INC: Carusillo Suit Gets Collective Action Certification
FLORIDA: Seeks to Extend Class Cert. Response Filing Date

FOREST RIVER: Fitzgerald Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
FRANK KENDALL: Sued Over Improper Denials of Discharge Upgrade
GEICO GENERAL: Rosenberg Suit Gets Class Certification
GEICO INDEMNITY: Grant of Summary Judgment in Moe Suit Recommended
GOLDMAN SACHS: Objections to Orders in Chen-Oster Suit Overruled

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Zambito Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime
GULF COAST HOLDINGS: Faces Dale Suit Over Dancers' Unpaid Wages
HCA HEALTHCARE: Bailey Sues Over Erroneous Collection Calls
HEALTHCARE PARTNERS: Rey Seeks Extension to File Class Cert. Bid
I 5 EXTERIORS: Bid to Quash Subpoenas in Stein TCPA Suit Denied

INMAR INC: Court Tosses MDI Bid to Certify Class w/o Prejudice
INTERACTIVE BROKERS: Parties Seek Modified Scheduling Order
JASMIN LARIAN: Crumwell Says Website Not Blind-accessible
K&N ENGINEERING: Eighth Circuit Affirms Judgment in Penrod Suit
KELLOGG CO: Mislabels Protein Content of Veggie Burger, Brown Says

KENTUCKY: Rhodes Appeals Ruling in Prisoner Civil Rights Suit
LEXINGTON INSURANCE: Menominee Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal
LION FOODS: Faces Ruiz Suit Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
MICHAEL CARVAJAL: Brandon Files Suit in S.D. West Virginia
NATIONAL WESTERN: W.D. Missouri Narrows Claims in Baldwin Suit

NEW JERSEY: Drayton Sues Over Racial Discrimination
NEW PENN: Mattson Appeals Class Cert. Bid Denial to 9th Circuit
NEW YORK: Not Dead Yet Appeals ADA Suit Dismissal
OKLAHOMA: Claims 2 & 3 in Cole v. ODOC Dismissed Without Prejudice
RAINMAKERS WORLDWIDE: Fabricant Files TCPA Suit in W.D. Washington

RECEIVABLE RECOVERY: Johnson Files FDCPA Suit in D. South Carolina
REP PROCESSING: Court Won't Revisit Arbitration Denial in Robertson
STATE FARM: Julian Files Suit in N.D. California
SUNSHINE LIFE: Alvarez Sues Over Unsolicited Telephonic Calls
TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Bettles Suit Over Defective HVAC System

WARREN SCREW PRODUCTS: Steen Action Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
WASHINGTON: Mickey Fowler Files Petition for Writ of Mandamus
WESCOM CENTRAL: Massey Files Suit in C.D. California
WHITEHOUSE ESTATES: Bid for Money Judgments in Casey Suit Granted
ZOCDOC INC: Smith Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.


                            *********

24 CAPITAL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Peters Broadcast Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PETERS BROADCAST ENGINEERING, Plaintiff v. 24 CAPITAL
FUNDING, LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-3135
(S.D. Ohio), Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division:

    (i) granted Defendants 24 Capital, LLC and Jason Sankov's
        Motion to Dismiss; and

   (ii) denied as moot Plaintiff Peters Broadcast's Amended
        Motion to Certify Class.

Background

The action arises between Plaintiff Peters Broadcast and Defendants
24 Capital and Jason Sankov. All parties agree that Peters
Broadcast is an Indiana corporation. The Defendants assert that
Peters Broadcast's principal place of business is in Fort Wayne,
Indiana, which Peters Broadcast does not dispute. The Defendants
further represent that 24 Capital is a New York limited liability
company with its principal place of business in Long Island City,
New York, and that Mr. Sankov is an individual residing in Sunny
Isles Beach, Florida, none of which Peters Broadcast disputes.

At issue is a contract formed between Peters Broadcast and 24
Capital, LLC on Feb. 21, 2019. Under the agreement, 24 Capital
provided an advance to Peters Broadcast in exchange for assuming
interest in Peters Broadcast's future receivables. Specifically, 24
Capital purchased $264,258.37 in receivables in exchange for a
$184,796.06 advance, minus costs and fees.  

A particular provision of the contract stated that Peters Broadcast
must deposit all receivables into a single bank account, from which
24 Capital would take a debit of $2,568.95 each weekday, until it
received the full purchase amount. The collection of this weekday
debit amount was meant to approximate collection of 25% of the
total monthly deposits. The agreement further specified that Peters
Broadcast should provide monthly bank statements to 24 Capital, and
24 Capital would accordingly credit or debit the account if it had
taken funds over or under the 25% mark.

A few months later, 24 Capital, believing that Peters Broadcast had
breached the agreement, moved for judgment by confession in the
Supreme Court of New York for Putnam County, which was granted. The
judgment was supported by an affidavit of confession of judgment
attested to by Robert Michael Peters, on behalf of Peters
Broadcast. The affidavit was prepared concurrently with the
contract, on February 21, 2019, and authorized judgment in the
state of New York if the agreement was breached. Peters Broadcast
moved to vacate the judgment of the New York court), but its motion
was denied in April 2020. Shortly thereafter, Peters Broadcast
initiated the instant action, with a Complaint filed on June 19,
2020. The Complaint has twice since been amended.

Peters Broadcast alleges that 24 Capital misrepresented the terms
of the agreement, promising that it would only exact payment in
proportion to incoming receivables, while instead taking the
weekday debits without regard to receivables. It further alleges
that once these debits had reduced the cash flow of the company, 24
Capital promised additional funding, which it never provided,
instead obtaining the confessed judgment in court. This, Peters
Broadcast says, is not an isolated event, but rather part of a
scheme in which 24 Capital regularly enters into these agreements
with "unwitting borrowers" before draining their funds, making
illusory promises to lend additional funds, and ultimately
obtaining confessed judgments in court.

Particularly, Peters Broadcast characterizes this alleged scheme as
racketeering activity, subject to civil remedy under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.
Sections 1961-1968. This RICO claim is the keystone of Peters
Broadcast's case, through which it claims personal jurisdiction
over the Defendants. For the six state-law claims it brings,
including intentional misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of
contract, the only asserted basis for personal jurisdiction is
pendent jurisdiction emanating from the RICO claim. Finally, it
alleges that all the foregoing claims are subject to class action,
for a class of "borrowers who received merchant cash advances and
were advised the repayment would be against receivables only."  

On May 3, 2021, Peters Broadcast filed an Amended Motion to Certify
Class. On May 7, 2021, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Each received a response in opposition, which were followed by
replies. The Motions are now fully briefed and ripe for
consideration. The Defendants raise defenses under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6) in their Motion to
Dismiss. Because the Court holds that the Defendants should prevail
on their defense of lack of personal jurisdiction under 12(b)(2),
and because jurisdiction is a threshold issue, it limits its
discussion to the same.

Discussion

Judge Jolson must consider whether Peters Broadcast sets out a
prima facie case for personal jurisdiction in the Court's Second
Amended Complaint. Peters Broadcast's only asserted basis for
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants is through RICO's venue
and process provisions, 18 U.S.C. Section 1965.

The choice is central to resolving whether the Court has personal
jurisdiction because Rule 4(k)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "serving a summons establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant when authorized by federal statute."
Of course, the exercise of jurisdiction also must comport with Due
Process, and whether the statute requires any defendant to be
connected to the forum state affects the scope of the "minimum
contacts" test. Notably, the Sixth Circuit has not made its
position known, so there is no controlling authority for the Court
to follow in the case.

The minority approach, adopted in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits,
holds that Section 1965(d) governs service over out-of-district
defendants. The majority approach, adopted in the Second, Third,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, holds that Section
1965(b) governs service over out-of-district defendants. Peters
Broadcast urges the Court to follow the minority approach and
suggests it is the path the Sixth Circuit is more likely to take.

In support, Peters Broadcast cites the Sixth Circuit's
consideration of nationwide service of process for cases arising
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), citing
NGS Am., Inc. v. Jefferson, 218 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2000)). Yet, in
the Plaintiff's relied-upon case, the Sixth Circuit did not reach
the ultimate issue of whether ERISA's nationwide service of process
provision would give the court personal jurisdiction over a
defendant with minimum national contacts. Instead, it concluded
that the action was "not brought under ERISA," and the "nationwide
service of process provision was thus not implicated." It did,
however, indicate that the "weight of Sixth Circuit precedent
supports acceptance of the national contacts approach" and that it
"likely would have to find personal jurisdiction in the case" if
ERISA applied.

Although the Sixth Circuit has adopted the national contacts
approach with respect to the nationwide service of process
provisions in these other statutes, the Court finds it appropriate,
in accordance with the Circuit's suggested process in NGS American,
Inc., to make a particularized consideration of the interests and
language of the RICO statute before reflexively adopting the
national contacts approach. So, to the extent that the Plaintiff
argues the Sixth Circuit's adoption of the national contacts
approach with respect to the Exchange Act, the federal receivership
statute, or ERISA are necessarily controlling in the context of
RICO, Judge Jolson disagrees. She says, those statutes have
structures, language, and aims that are distinct from the RICO
statute, which must be assessed here on its own terms.

Viewing the RICO venue and service provisions closely, Judge Jolson
finds the majority approach, recently outlined and adopted by the
Third Circuit in Laurel Gardens, LLC v. Mckenna, 948 F.3d 105,
116-17 (3d Cir. 2020), to be the best reading of the statute. This
reading of Section 1965 considers all its subsections in relation
to one another. First, Section 1965(a) provides that a civil RICO
proceeding may be brought against any person (that is, against a
defendant) in any district in which that person (the Defendant)
resides, has an agent, or transacts his or her affairs. Second,
Section 1965(b) allows "other parties" not residing in the district
(that is, additional defendants from outside the district) to be
brought before the court when "the ends of justice require." Third,
Section 1965(c) refers to the service of subpoenas on witnesses.
And finally, Section 1965(d) describes "all other process" which,
"must mean process different than a summons or a government
subpoena, both of which are dealt with in previous subsections."

Applied in the case, Peters Broadcast must assert that at least one
of the Defendants in the case had minimum contacts with Ohio in
order to set out a proper prima facie case for personal
jurisdiction under RICO. The Sixth Circuit has distilled the
requirements of minimum contacts to: (1) the defendant purposefully
availing itself "of the privilege of acting in the forum state or
causing a consequence in the forum state;" (2) the cause of action
"arising from the defendant's activities there;" and (3) whether
"the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant
have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make
the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable."

Peters Broadcast pleads "the conduct injuring it and continuing to
injure it occurred in the Southern District of Ohio. Defendant 24
Capital is not licensed to do business in the State of Ohio,
however it has transacted and continues to transact business in
Ohio. The acts complained of took place in the Southern District of
Ohio." It further purports that the alleged racketeering enterprise
"has a history of involvement within Ohio, Indiana, Florida,
Washington, D.C., and throughout the United States."  

These vague assertions of jurisdiction, according to Judge Jolson,
do not satisfy the "reasonable particularity" required in order to
establish a prima facie case. And, even if they did, she holds, the
Defendants have expressly refuted the assertions. In addition, the
Defendants have submitted evidence to support their position.

Given this, the burden necessarily shifts back to Peters Broadcast
to allege, with specific facts, the basis for the Court's
jurisdiction. It fails to do so. Peters Broadcast makes no specific
allegations of how this alleged racketeering activity concerned
Ohio in its response in opposition to the Motion. The only
supporting exhibit Peters Broadcast included with that response was
a certificate purporting to license Peters Broadcast, an Indiana
corporation, to transact business in Ohio. But whether the
Plaintiff was permitted to transact business in Ohio has no bearing
on whether Defendants transact business in Ohio.

At base, there has not been enough asserted by Peters Broadcast to
establish that the Court has personal jurisdiction over either
Defendant. Beginning with purposeful availment, there is no
particular action or consequence that Peters Broadcast has
connected between 24 Capital or Mr. Sankov to Ohio. Second, Peters
Broadcast has not specifically alleged how this cause of action
arises from either Defendant's conduct within Ohio. And finally,
nothing about the Defendants' connection to Ohio seems substantial
enough to make the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court
reasonable.

As a secondary argument, Peters Broadcast asserts that 24 Capital's
website should be a basis for personal jurisdiction over the
Defendants. Judge Joldon first notes that this argument is entirely
absent from its pleading), and that Peters Broadcast should have
separately moved to amend its pleading -- or included this argument
in one of the two prior revisions -- if it believed the website
forms a basis for jurisdiction. Rather, it makes this assertion
only in its response to the motion to dismiss, requesting leave to
amend. Still, taking the argument on its merits, Judge Jolson is
unconvinced it forms a proper basis for jurisdiction.

Peters Broadcast asks the Court to consider to what degree 24
Capital's website is interactive and intends interaction with
residents of Ohio. But, according to Judge Jolson, that would
settle only whether 24 Capital had purposefully availed itself of
the forum, which is only one of three requirements for minimum
contacts. Peters Broadcast would still need to assert that the
action is "arising from" 24 Capital's conduct in Ohio, and that 24
Capital's actions, or the consequences it caused, have a
"substantial enough connection with Ohio to make the exercise of
jurisdiction reasonable." And, Peters Broadcast has not made any
specific allegations as to the Defendants' actions in Ohio.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Jolson holds that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over the Defendants regarding the RICO claim. And as
the alleged basis for all accompanying state-law claims is pendent
jurisdiction, it necessarily lacks personal jurisdiction over
Defendants for those claims as well. Thus, Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss is granted. Because the Plaintiff's underlying claims are
not properly before the Court, and must be dismissed, its Amended
Motion to Certify Class is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/wdtasbum from Leagle.com.


ALLERGAN PLC: $130MM Class Settlement to be Heard on Nov. 17
------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IN RE ALLERGAN GENERIC DRUG PRICING
SECURITIES LITIGATION

Case No. 2:16-cv-09449 (KSH) (CLW)

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION AND PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES

This notice is directed to all members of the following Settlement
Class consisting of three subclasses:  (i) as to claims arising
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act"), all persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired Allergan plc1 common and/or preferred stock
between October 29, 2013 and November 2, 2016, both dates inclusive
(the "Class Period"), and were damaged thereby; (ii) as to claims
arising under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act in connection with
the merger between Actavis plc and Forest Laboratories, Inc.
("Forest") (the "Forest Merger"), all persons and entities who held
Forest common stock as of May 2, 2014, and were entitled to vote on
the Forest Merger, and acquired shares of Allergan common stock in
the Forest Merger and were damaged thereby; and (iii) as to claims
arising under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act in connection with
the merger between Actavis plc and Allergan, Inc. (the "Actavis
Merger"), all persons and entities who held Allergan, Inc. common
stock as of January 22, 2015, and were entitled to vote on the
Actavis Merger, and acquired shares of Allergan common stock in the
Actavis Merger and were damaged thereby.

Certain persons and entities are excluded from the Settlement Class
as set forth in detail in the Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement dated July 8, 2021 ("Stipulation") and the Notice
described below. Copies of the Stipulation and the Notice are
available at www.AllerganDrugPricingSecuritiesLitigation.com.

Please read this notice carefully; your rights will be affected by
a class action lawsuit pending in this court.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey ("Court"), that the above-captioned
securities class action ("Action") is pending in the Court.

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that the parties to the Action have reached a
proposed settlement for $130,000,000 in cash ("Settlement") that,
if approved by the Court, will resolve all claims in the Action.

A hearing ("Settlement Hearing") will be held on November 17, 2021
at 1:00 p.m., before the Honorable Cathy L. Waldor, United States
Magistrate Judge for the District of New Jersey, either in person
at the Martin Luther King Building & U.S. Courthouse, 50 Walnut
Street, Newark, NJ 07101, Courtroom 4D, or by telephone or
videoconference (in the discretion of the Court), to determine,
among other things: (i) whether, for purposes of the Settlement
only, the Action should be certified as a class action on behalf of
the Settlement Class, Lead Plaintiffs should be certified as Class
Representatives for the Settlement Class, and Lead Counsel should
be appointed as Class Counsel for the Settlement Class; (ii)
whether the proposed Settlement on the terms and conditions
provided for in the Stipulation is fair, reasonable, and adequate
to the Settlement Class, and should be finally approved by the
Court; (iii) whether the Action should be dismissed with prejudice
against Defendants and the Releases specified and described in the
Stipulation (and in the Notice) should be granted; (iv) whether the
motion by Lead Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees and
Litigation Expenses should be approved; and (v) any other matters
that may properly be brought before the Court in connection with
the Settlement. Any updates regarding the Settlement Hearing,
including any changes to the date or time of the hearing or updates
regarding in-person or remote appearances at the hearing, will be
posted to the Settlement website,
www.AllerganDrugPricingSecuritiesLitigation.com.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund. If you have not yet
received the detailed Notice of (I) Pendency of Class Action and
Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Hearing; and (III) Motion for
an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses ("Notice") and
Claim Form, you may obtain copies of these documents by contacting
the Claims Administrator at Allergan Generic Drug Pricing
Securities Litigation, c/o A.B. Data, Ltd., P.O. Box 173016,
Milwaukee, WI  53217, 1-877-777-9328,
info@AllerganDrugPricingSecuritiesLitigation.com. Copies of the
Notice and Claim Form can also be downloaded from the Settlement
website, www.AllerganDrugPricingSecuritiesLitigation.com.   

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim Form postmarked (if mailed), or online through
the Settlement website,
www.AllerganDrugPricingSecuritiesLitigation.com, no later than
December 27, 2021, in accordance with the instructions set forth in
the Claim Form. If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not
submit a proper Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in
the distribution of the net proceeds of the Settlement but you will
nevertheless be bound by any releases, judgments, or orders entered
by the Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than October 27, 2021,
in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice. If you
properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will not
be bound by any releases, judgments, or orders entered by the Court
in the Action and you will not be eligible to share in the net
proceeds of the Settlement. Excluding yourself is the only option
that may allow you to be part of any other current or future
lawsuit against Defendants or any of the other released parties
concerning the claims being resolved by the Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, and/or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
litigation expenses, must be filed with the Court and served on
Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that they are received no
later than October 27, 2021, in accordance with the instructions
set forth in the Notice.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE CLERK'S OFFICE, DEFENDANTS, OR
DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE. All questions about this
notice, the Settlement, or your eligibility to participate in the
Settlement should be directed to Lead Counsel or the Claims
Administrator.

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to the Claims
Administrator:

Allergan Generic Drug Pricing Securities Litigation
c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.
P.O. Box 173016
Milwaukee, WI  53217
1-877-777-9328
info@AllerganDrugPricingSecuritiesLitigation.com
www.AllerganDrugPricingSecuritiesLitigation.com

All other inquiries should be made to Lead Counsel:

        John C. Browne, Esq.
        Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP
        1251 Avenue of the Americas
        New York, NY  10020
        1-800-380-8496
        settlements@blbglaw.com

        Matthew L. Mustokoff, Esq.
        Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
        280 King of Prussia Road
        Radnor, PA  19087
        1-610-667-7706
        info@ktmc.com

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
United States District Court
District of New Jersey

1 Before June 15, 2015, Allergan plc was known as Actavis plc.
Allergan plc and Actavis plc are collectively referred to in this
notice as "Allergan."


AMAZON.COM INC: Can't Compel Arbitration in Jackson Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DRICKEY JACKSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AMAZON.COM, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-2365-WQH-BGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge William
Q. Hayes of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California denied the Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration,
Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to Stay.

Background

On Feb. 19, 2021, Plaintiff Jackson filed a First Amended Class
Action Complaint ("FAC") against Defendant Amazon. In the FAC, the
Plaintiff alleges that he is a member of the Amazon Flex program --
"a program by which Amazon pays regular people to deliver
packages." He alleges that he and many of the other approximately
800 Flex drivers joined "closed" or private Facebook groups to
discuss "a myriad of issues surrounding their employment,"
including strikes, protests, pay, benefits, deliveries, working
conditions, and unionizing efforts. He alleges that he has been a
member of closed Facebook groups for Flex drivers since 2016. The
Plaintiff alleges that he has communicated with other Flex drivers
in the closed Facebook groups and "believed he was only
communicating with other Flex Drivers." He alleges that Defendant
Amazon "has been secretly monitoring and wiretapping these closed
Facebook groups." The Plaintiff alleges that Amazon has created an
"Advocacy Operations Social Listening Team" to "monitor and/or
intercept" posts to closed Facebook groups "in real time using
automated monitoring tools." He alleges that his posts were tracked
and intercepted by Amazon without his consent.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of "all Flex Drivers in
the United States who were members of the closed Facebook groups,
and whose electronic communications were intercepted by the
Defendant." He further seeks to represent a subclass of "all Class
members in the State of California who were members of the closed
Facebook groups, and whose electronic communications were
intercepted by Defendant" ("California Subclass").

The Plaintiff brings the following claims on behalf of himself, the
Class, and the California Subclass: 1) interception and disclosure
of wire, oral, or electronic communications in violation of the
federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510, et seq.; 2)
manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising of wire,
oral, or electronic communication interception devices in violation
of the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2512; and 3)
violation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections
2701, et seq.

The Plaintiff brings the following claims on behalf of himself and
California Subclass: 1) violation of the California Invasion of
Privacy Act, Cal. Pen. Code Section 631; 2) violation of the
California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Pen. Code Section 635; 3)
intrusion upon seclusion; and 4) invasion of privacy under the
California Constitution.

The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, damages, including punitive
damages, restitution, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and
costs.

On March 16, 2021, Defendant Amazon filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration, Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to Stay. Amazon moves
to compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's claims on an individual
basis pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C.
Section 1, et seq., or Delaware law. It further moves to stay or
dismiss any remaining claims.

On April 12, 2021, the Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion
to Compel Arbitration. On April 26, 2021, Amazon filed a Reply. On
Aug. 3, 2021, the Court heard oral argument on the Motion to Compel
Arbitration.

Discussion

Defendant Amazon contends that the Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate
the claims alleged in the FAC on an individual basis. Amazon
contends that the Amazon Flex Terms of Service that took effect on
Oct. 3, 2019 ("2019 TOS") apply in the case because the Plaintiff
continued to perform deliveries after he "received notice that
Amazon was introducing the 2019 TOS." Amazon contends that "the
heart of the lawsuit is the allegation that Amazon monitored closed
Facebook groups in which Plaintiff and other Amazon Flex drivers
discussed their experiences with the Amazon Flex program --
including matters central to Flex drivers' contractual relationship
with Amazon." Amazon contends that there is no "serious dispute"
that the Plaintiff's claims fall within the scope of the
arbitration provision. It further contends that even if the Amazon
Flex Terms of Service that took effect on Sept. 21, 2016 ("2016
TOS") apply in the case, "its arbitration agreement would be
enforceable under California law."

Plaintiff Jackson contends that the 2016 TOS apply in the case. He
contends that "Amazon did not provide notice of the 2019 TOS, and
he never assented to the updated terms." The Plaintiff contends
that he is not required to arbitrate his claims because the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Rittmann v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020), that the arbitration provision
in the 2016 TOS is void for lack of governing law. He contends that
the claims alleged in the FAC do not fall within the scope of the
arbitration provision because the claims are "about Amazon spying
on his private posts to a private Facebook group" and do not relate
to his participation in the Flex program or performance of
services. The Plaintiff further contends that the arbitration
provision is unenforceable and unconscionable.

I. Applicable Agreement

Judge Hayes cannot conclude from the allegations in the Complaint
or the evidence presented by Amazon that the Oct. 3, 2019, email
provided the Plaintiff individualized notice of the "agreement's
existence and contents" adequate to demonstrate that he assented to
the 2019 TOS. Therefore, the Judge holds that Amazon fails to meet
its burden to demonstrate mutual assent to the 2019 TOS. He
concludes that the 2016 TOS applies in the case.

II. Governing Law

Judge Hayes concludes that there is no valid choice-of-law
provision that applies to the arbitration provision in the 2016
TOS. He states that where there is no choice-of-law provision, "the
forum will apply its own rule of decision unless a party litigant
timely invokes the law of a foreign state." The Judge says,
California courts have held that the California Arbitration Act,
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 1281, et seq. ("CAA"), applies even if
an agreement does not "explicitly reference the CAA." The plain
language of the 2016 TOS does not preclude application of
California law to the arbitration provision in absence of the FAA.
The Judge applies California state law to determine whether a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists in the case.

III. Scope of Arbitration Provision

Claims for intrusion upon seclusion under California common law and
claims for invasion of privacy under the California Constitution
"involve similar elements," Judge Hayes explains, citing Davis v.
Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956
F.3d 589, 601 (9th Cir. 2020), reh'g en banc denied, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19525 (9th Cir. June 23, 2020), cert. denied, Facebook, Inc.
v. Davis, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 1480 (Mar. 22, 2021). He says, courts
consider the claims together and ask whether: (1) there exists a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) the intrusion was highly
offensive." The California Invasion of Privacy Act and the federal
Wiretap Act prohibit the unauthorized interception of a
communication and the manufacture, possession, or sale of any
eavesdropping device. The Stored Communications Act prohibits
unauthorized "access" to "a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided."

The claims alleged in the FAC arise from Amazon's alleged intrusion
into the Plaintiff's private Facebook groups. The alleged wrongs
"exist independently" of the Plaintiff's employment relationship
with Amazon. The alleged wrongs do not arise out of or relate to
the 2016 TOS, the Plaintiff's participation in the Flex program, or
his performance of services. The Judge concludes that the Plaintiff
has met his burden to demonstrate that the claims alleged do not
fall within the scope of the arbitration provision. The Motion to
Compel Arbitration is denied.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, Judge Hayes denied Amazon's Motion to
Compel Arbitration, Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to Stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/35c33knm from Leagle.com.


AUTUMN LAKE: Hall Sues Over Failure to Provide Proper Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
JACQUELINE HALL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AUTUMN LAKE HEALTHCARE LLC and CAMEO NURSING
HOME, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-1108 (E.D. Wis., Sept. 22,
2021) is brought for purposes of obtaining relief under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection
Laws for Defendants' unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid regular
and agreed upon wages, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys' fees,
declaratory and/or injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants as an hourly-paid,
non-exempt employee in the position of Team Lead at Defendants'
facility in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Autumn Lake Healthcare LLC owns, operates, and manages skilled
nursing facilities and assisted living facilities throughout the
United States.

Cameo Nursing Home, LLC, which is commonly known as "The Suites at
Greenfield" and/or "Autumn Lake Healthcare at Greenfield," is a
skilled nursing facility located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          David M. Potteiger, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          235 N. Executive Drive, Suite 240
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                  dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com

AXOS BANK: Salcedo Sues Over Illegal Overdraft Fees
---------------------------------------------------
Roy Salcedo, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated brings a class action complaint against Axos
Bank, Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-01484, (S.D. Cal., September 20,
2021) seeking monetary damages, restitution and declaratory relief
from Axos Bank for the assessment and collection "overdraft fees"
on accounts that were never actually overdrawn in breach of
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.

Axos is primarily a national online bank with its headquarters and
principal place of business located in San Diego, California. It
has brick and mortar branches in California, Nevada, and Ohio.
Among other things, Axos is engaged in the business of providing
retail banking services, including Plaintiff and members of the
putative classes, which includes the issuance of debit cards for
use by its customers in conjunction with their checking accounts.
Axos conducts business, throughout the State of California and the
United States.

Salcedo was allegedly charged with inappropriate overdraft fees due
to transactions purportedly settled days later into a negative
balance. On May 1, 2019, he was charged a $25 overdraft fee, an
"insufficient funds" charge for a point-of-sale debit card
transaction that was authorized prior to this day on a sufficient
available balance which Salcedo claims is in breach of Axos'
Account Agreement with its customers. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Taras Kick, Esq.
     THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
     815 Moraga Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90049
     Phone: (310) 395-2988
     Fax: (310) 395-2088
     Email: taras@kicklawfirm.com

             - and -

      Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
      Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
      KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
      One West Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 500
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 525-4100
      Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
      Email: ostrow@kolawyers.com
             streisfeld@kolawyers.com


BECTON DICKINSON: Industriens Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, INDUSTRIENS PENSIONSFORSIKRING A/S, Individually and
On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. BECTON,
DICKINSON AND COMPANY, VINCENT A. FORLENZA, THOMAS E. POLEN, and
CHRISTOPHER R. REIDY, Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-02155-SRC-CLW
(D.N.J.), Judge Stanley R. Chesler of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint.

Background

The securities fraud action seeks to recover losses allegedly
sustained as a result of the failure of Becton, Dickinson and Co.
("BD") to disclose certain deficiencies in one of its flagship
medical products and the related regulatory action that would be
required by those deficiencies. Lead Plaintiff Industriens
Pensionsforsikring brings the putative class action pursuant to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15
U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B), on behalf of all persons or entities
who purchased or otherwise acquired the common stock of BD between
Nov. 5, 2019, and Feb. 5, 2020, inclusive.

BD is a New Jersey-based medical technology company engaged
primarily in manufacturing and selling medical devices, instrument
systems, and reagents. BD's business is comprised of three business
segments: BD Medical, BD Life Sciences, and BD Interventional. BD's
Medication Management Solutions ("MMS") unit, which is housed
within BD Medical, focuses primarily on infusion systems and
dispensing technologies.

In 2015, BD acquired CareFusion Corp., a San Diego-based medical
technology company giving BD the right to manufacture, market, and
distribute the Alaris infusion pump system and associated
technologies. Infusion pumps are electronic, external medical
devices that deliver fluids into a patient's body in a controlled
manner and commonly are used to deliver blood, nutrients, or
medications such as insulin, antibiotics, chemotherapy drugs, and
pain relievers.

The Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") asserts three causes of
action: (1) a claim for violation of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78a, et seq.
against BD and individuals Vincent Forlenza, Thomas Polen and
Christopher Reidy, (2) a control person claim pursuant to Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act against the Individual Defendants, and
(3) an insider trading claim pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20A of
the Exchange Act against Defendants Forlenza and Polen.

The SAC avers that beginning on Nov. 5, 2019 and throughout Feb. 6,
2020, the Defendants made 25 statements which were allegedly
misleading due to their failure to acknowledge severe issues with
respect to Alaris' performance and ongoing FDA scrutiny of the
device. The Defendants, the Plaintiff maintains, communicated
information about BD that was not consistent with this awareness.

In brief, Plaintiff contends that Defendants committed fraud when
they failed to disclose that BD's Alaris infusion pumps suffered
from various product defects, and that BD had over a five-year
period made numerous changes to Alaris products without approval by
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") through the FDA's 510(k)
application process while simultaneously recognizing internally
that such 510(k) clearance was required. On this basis, the claimed
securities fraud violation consists of allegedly misleading
statements concerning the Alaris devices, the Company's regulatory
compliance program, and the Company's financial guidance.

During the Class Period, Defendant Forlenza sold 198,137 shares of
BD common stock for total proceeds of $54,668,240.95. Nearly all
Forlenza's sales were made pursuant to a 10b5-1 trading plan that
he entered on Dec. 16, 2019 -- during the Class Period. Defendant
Polen sold 13,907 shares of BD common stock during the Class Period
-- all of which were sold on or about Dec. 16, 2019 -- for total
proceeds of $3,749,744.41.

Presently before the Court is the motion filed by BD and the
Individual Defendants to dismiss the SAC. The Plaintiff opposes the
motion.

Discussion

A. Securities Fraud Claim Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act

The Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the Rule 10b-5 claim on
several grounds. They argue that the SAC fails to set forth
particularized facts indicating why the alleged actionable
statements and omissions were misleading, fails to plead scienter
with the requisite particularity, and fails to plead loss
causation.

1. Plaintiff fails to allege material misstatements or omissions.

At the heart of the Plaintiff's allegations is the contention that
the Defendants failed to disclose either (i) that the FDA required
or would require a 510(k) application be filed and approved before
BD could continue to market and sell Alaris products or (ii) the
Company had previously determined that 510(k) approval would be
required for the continued marketing and sale of Alaris products.
Underlying these conclusions are the Plaintiff's claims that the
Defendants failed to disclose that Alaris suffered from "pervasive"
defects, which BD had attempted to correct through numerous
modifications without FDA clearance over a five-year period,
placing the product at imminent risk of adverse FDA action and the
Company at risk of missing guidance.

Judge Chesler finds that the SAC alleges that the FDA was
well-aware of the various pending software updates and potential
problems with the Alaris products prior to the Class Period, yet
the agency did not act against the Company until Fed. 3, 2020.
Absent a demonstration that the FDA had in some manner or other
made clear that it would require a new 510(k) application for
Alaris products, and that BD would be required to stop marketing
Alaris until that application was successfully resolved, the mere
possibility of administrative action is not enough to require
disclosure.

The allegations are insufficient to establish that teh Defendants
knew or even believed that the FDA was going to require a 510(k)
application for Alaris prior to the continued marketing of the
devices, nor were they obligated to predict the regulatory action
that the FDA would ultimately take, Judge Chesler holds.
Accordingly, he finds that the failure to disclose the 510(k)
application is actionable only if disclosure was necessary to
render the relevant statements not misleading.

2. Plaintiff fails to plead scienter

To evaluate the scienter of a corporate defendant such as BD,
courts "look to the state of mind of the individual corporate
official or officials who make or issue the statement." A corporate
defendant cannot be held liable "absent a showing that at least one
individual officer who made, or participated in the making of, a
false or misleading statement did so with scienter."

Judge Chesler finds that the Plaintiff has not established facts
sufficient to support the inference of personal knowledge. He says,
the SAC is replete with allegations demonstrating the various
problems with the Alaris software. What is absent, however, are
allegations sufficient to demonstrate that the Individual
Defendants acted with personal knowledge. In its efforts to
establish that these individuals acted with scienter, the Plaintiff
primarily relies on allegations made by certain unidentified former
employees and by implication from the Defendants' post-Class Period
statements.

Judge Chesler also finds that neither the Individual Defendants'
high-ranking positions nor the Core Operations Doctrine are
sufficient to support an inference of scienter. The Plaintiff also
attempts to plead scienter based on the Defendants' positions as
high-ranking executives and the relative importance of the Alaris
suite of products to the Company's financial performance. In
support of its argument, the Plaintiff points to the outsized
impact that Alaris had on the Company's bottom-line: BD Medical
made up over half of BD's total annual revenue in 2017, 2018, and
2019, and BD reported BD Medical's underlying revenue growth was
"driven" by the "MMS unit's installation of dispensing and infusion
systems." But, while the SAC demonstrates that Alaris was an
important product within the MMS unit , itself a "key driver" of
the BD Medical division, which in turn comprised about 50% of the
Company's revenue in 2019, this is not enough to impute scienter on
an executive by virtue of their position.

Lastly, Judge Chesler opines that Forlenza's and Polen's respective
stock trading does not support an inference of scienter. The fact
that Defendant Forlenza made trades pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan
entered into in December 2019 does not immunize those trades from
impacting the scienter analysis. The Judge says, the trades made
pursuant to the 10b5-1 trading plan that Forlenza entered into on
Dec. 16, 2019 are not entitled to the presumption that they were
made without the benefit of material non-public information. Still,
even when considering all the trades during the Class Period, the
Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to give rise to a strong
inference of scienter. Nor does the timing of the sales change the
equation. While certainly an outsized amount of sales compared to
preceding periods may indicate scienter, the handful of data points
that the Plaintiff provides do not give do so.

Finally, while the fact that all Individual Defendants are not
alleged to have engaged in insider trading does not prohibit the
Court from considering potential insider trading from certain of
the Individual Defendants, Judge Chesler opines that it cuts
against the implication that the statements were the result of a
coordinated attempt to defraud the shareholders. At the very least,
it undermines the Plaintiff's argument that Defendant Reidy -- who
is not alleged to have conducted any trades during the Class Period
-- acted with scienter.

B. Sections 20(a) and 20A Claims

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act "creates a cause of action
against individuals who exercise control over a 'controlled
person,' including a corporation, that has committed a violation of
Section 10(b)." A Section 20(a) claim thus imposes secondary
liability on the controlling person for the wrong committed by the
one who is controlled.

In the case, the Plaintiff's control person claim against Forlenza,
Polen and Reidy is predicated upon their primary liability of
Defendant BD under Exchange Act Section 10(b). Similarly, to
establish a violation under Section 20A of the Exchange Act, the
Plaintiff must, among other things, first identify a predication
violation of the Exchange Act.

Judge Chesler opines that the Defendants correctly argue that
because the SAC fails to state an actionable Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 violation, the Sections 20(a) and 20A claims necessarily fail
to state claims upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly,
these claims will be dismissed.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed in his Opinion, Judge Chesler grants the
Defendants' motion and dismisses the SAC pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Plaintiff is granted leave to
amend the complaint within 45 days of the entry of the Order to
issue with the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/rwdnvxnw from Leagle.com.


BOSTON PRIVATE: Savoy Files Suit Over SVB Merger Deal
-----------------------------------------------------
Richard Savoy, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc.,
Anthony Dechellis, Stephen M. Waters, Mark F. Furlong, Joseph C.
Guyaux, Deborah F. Kuenstner, Gloria C. Larson, Lizabeth H.
Zlatkus, Luis A. Ubinas and Kimberly S. Stevenson, Defendants, Case
No. 21-cv-11537 (D. Mass., September 20, 2021), seeks to enjoin
defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating or closing the merger between Boston
Private and SVB Financial Group, Inc.  The lawsuit further seeks
rescissory damages, costs of this action, including reasonable
allowance for plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such
other and further relief under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

On January 4, 2021, Boston Private and SVB entered into an
agreement and plan of merger, pursuant to which Boston Private
would merge into SVB, with SVB continuing as the surviving
corporate entity. The consideration Defendants negotiated per share
of Boston Private amounted to $2.10 in cash and 0.0228 shares of
SVB Financial common stock which was worth a mere $10.94 as of
December 31, 2020, the last trading day before the announcement of
the merger. In January 2020, prior to the stock market drop caused
by the pandemic, Boston Private shares had traded in the range of
$12 per share.

Savoy alleges that Boston's Chief Executive Officer was conflicted
because he had secured a high-profile post-merger role for himself
as the senior executive in charge of SVB's wealth management
business. In that role, DeChellis's total compensation was slated
to more than double and the value of his equity award would
increase by more than 300%, from $1.1 million to $3.5 million. He
accuses DeChellis of selling Boston Private for a bargain in
exchange for substantial personal gain. Boston Private's
shareholders voted to approve the merger as a direct result of
false and misleading statements and could not have occurred without
the dissemination of the definitive proxy, and the April 7 and
April 14, 2021 releases by Boston Private which were an essential
link in undermining shareholder opposition to the deal.

Savoy is, and has been a continuous stockholder of Boston Private.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
      Miles D. Schreiner, Esq.
      Jonathan T. Lerner, Esq.
      MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
      The Empire State Building
      350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
      New York, NY 10118
      Tel: (212) 971-1341
      Fax: (212) 202-7880
      Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
             mschreiner@monteverdelaw.com
             jlerner@monteverdelaw.com

             - and -

      Mitchell J. Matorin, Esq.
      MATORIN LAW OFFICE, LLC
      18 Grove Street, Suite 5
      Wellesley, MA 02482
      Tel: (781) 453-0100
      Email: mmatorin@matorinlaw.com

             - and -

      Evan J. Smith, Esq.
      Marc L. Ackerman, Esq.
      Ryan Cardona, Esq.
      BRODSKY SMITH
      Two Bala Plaza, Suite 805
      Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
      Tel: (610) 667-6200
      Fax: 610.667.9029
      Email: esmith@brodskysmith.com
             mackerman@brodskysmith.com
             rcardona@brodskysmith.com


BUTTERBALL LLC: Amended Figueroa Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OSVALDO FIGUEROA, Plaintiff v. BUTTERBALL, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 5:20-CV-585-D (E.D.N.C.), Judge James C.
Denver, III, of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, Western Division, issued an order:

   a. granting in part and denying in part Butterball's motion to
      dismiss Figueroa's amended complaint; and

   b. denying as moot Butterball's motion to strike Figueroa's
      collective action and class action allegations, or in the
      alternative, for Figueroa to provide a more definitive
      statement.

Background

On Nov. 4, 2020, Figueroa filed a complaint against Butterball
alleging claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
Sections 201 et seq. ("FLSA"), the North Carolina Wage and Hour
Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Sections 95-25.1, et seq. ("NCWHA"), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101, et seq.
("ADA"), and for North Carolina common law wrongful discharge.

Butterball, a turkey product producer, is a limited liability
corporation with its principal place of business in Gamer, North
Carolina. Figueroa is a resident of Clinton, North Carolina.
Figueroa worked for Butterball as a poultry loader/catcher at
Butterball's processing plant in Warsaw, North Carolina, from
approximately May 8, 2017, to May 2019.

As a loader/catcher, Figueroa corralled, caught, and loaded turkeys
onto trucks to be transported for slaughter. His work was
"unskilled, repetitive, and rote." He "did not receive specialized
training." He had no authority over the hiring and firing of other
employees, and he did not manage other employees.  

Mr. Figueroa typically worked six days per week, from 6:30 p.m.
until 9:30 a.m. the next day. Approximately once a month, the
machines the loaders/catchers used would break, and Figueroa would
work until 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. Butterball provided "a one-hour,
uninterrupted lunch break," but "the lunch break depended on the
general pace of the production line." Figueroa worked approximately
90 hours per week.

When Butterball hired Figueroa, Butterball informed Figueroa that
"he would be paid on a piece-rate basis at a rate of $12 per truck
load of turkeys." During the hiring process, both Figueroa's
manager and a representative from human resources told Figueroa
that he would be paid overtime for any hours worked in excess of 40
per week. Butterball required Figueroa to track his daily hours
worked, and Butterball reported Figueroa's hourly rate on
Figueroa's paystub. It paid Figueroa on a weekly basis.

Mr. Figueroa alleges that Butterball treated him like an hourly
employee. He alleges that Butterball systemically under-calculated
Figueroa's wages, and paid him less than his promised hourly rate.
Figueroa also alleges that he "should have been paid time and
one-half for all hours worked over 40 per week," and that
Butterball failed to pay Figueroa an overtime premium.  

Mr. Figueroa's paystub for Jan. 15, 2018, to Jan. 21, 2018,
indicates that he worked 66.18 hours and earned a gross total of
$1,382.15 for the pay period. He earned $1,147.62 in "LoadTrip" pay
and $234.53 in "OT Hours." The paystub also lists a "Rate" of
"18.54," but it does not further define the "Rate."

Mr. Figueroa alleges that Butterball failed to pay proper overtime
wages under the FLSA. He brings his FLSA claim as a collective
action on behalf of himself and all similarly situated employees.
Figueroa also brings a claim pursuant to the NCWHA. He brings his
NCWHA claim as a class action on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated employees. Figueroa seeks collective action
certification, class action certification, and monetary damages.

On Dec. 31, 2020, Butterball moved to dismiss Figueroa's ADA and
common law wrongful discharge claims and filed a memorandum in
support. On Jan. 20, 2021, Figueroa filed an amended complaint
omitting his ADA and common law wrongful discharge claims, and
responded to Butterball's partial motion to dismiss. On March 2,
2021, Figueroa filed a notice of consent for Francisco Vasquez to
join the suit as an opt-in plaintiff.

On March 5, 2021, Butterball moved to dismiss Figueroa's amended
complaint and to strike Figueroa's collective action and class
action allegations, or in the alternative, for Figueroa to provide
a more definitive statement, and filed an exhibit and a memorandum
in support. On March 24, 2021, Figueroa responded in opposition. On
April 7, 2021, Butterball replied.

Discussion

A.

Mr. Figueroa alleges that Butterball violated the FLSA by failing
to pay him and other loaders/catchers proper overtime wages.
Congress enacted the FLSA to "eliminate substandard labor
conditions." The FLSA requires a covered employer to pay a covered
employee one and one-half times the employee's regular rate for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Piece-rate earnings
must be converted to an hourly rate to determine whether the
earnings comply with overtime pay requirements.

Butterball contends that it properly compensated Figueroa on a
piece-rate system including an overtime premium. It also contends
that Figueroa does not plausibly allege that Butterball improperly
calculated Figueroa's piece-rate compensation or failed to pay him
overtime. In support, Butterball cites Figueroa's paystub. Figueroa
responds that Butterball improperly calculated his wages. Figueroa
also contends that the paystub does not show piece-rate
compensation but constitutes a promise to pay an hourly rate.

Judge Denver finds that Figueroa's amended complaint and paystub
evince an understanding of piece-rate compensation, not hourly pay.
He says, Figueroa fails to plausibly allege a lack of understanding
of piece-rate compensation. Butterball informed Figueroa that he
would be paid through piece-rate compensation with overtime.
Figueroa's paystub reflects this compensation structure.

Mr. Figueroa worked for Butterball for approximately two years, and
he filed the action over a year after leaving employment with
Butterball. Any confusion Figueroa may have about the role of
hourly wage calculations to determine overtime in a piece-rate
compensation structure does not suffice to state a claim under the
FLSA. Moreover, alleging written promises of hourly pay does not
help Figueroa's case when he failed to allege such facts in his
amended complaint. Thus, Figueroa fails to state a claim for relief
under the FLSA. Accordingly, Judge Denver grants Butterball's
motion to dismiss count one of the amended complaint.

B.

Mr. Figueroa alleges that Butterball violated the NCWHA.
Specifically, he alleges Butterball failed to pay "all promised
earned and accrued regular, straight, and overtime wages of one and
one-half times the promised wage rate, which is a part of all the
employees' accrued and earned wages, and which should have been
paid when due on the employees' regular payday." Figueroa thus
asserts a payday claim under North Carolina General Statute 95-25.6
for "all owed, earned, and accrued promised wages."

Under its "payday" provision, the NCWHA requires employers to "pay
every employee all wages and tips accruing to the employee on the
regular payday." Figueroa also alleges a violation of section
95-25.13, which "requires every employer to notify employees of the
promised wages and the day of payment as well as making available a
written version of the employment practices and policies regarding
promised wages."

Judge Denver holds that unlike Figueroa's NCWHA payday claim for
overtime, Figueroa's claim that Butterball failed to pay him a
promised hourly rate is not exempt under the NCWHA or preempted by
the FLSA because he asserts a claim independent of whether
Butterball failed to pay overtime. Thus, he says, Figueroa may
proceed with that NCWHA payday claim if he plausibly alleges such a
separate and distinct claim.

The Judge further holds that Figueroa has not plausibly alleged a
violation of section 95-25.13. Figueroa admits in his amended
complaint that when Butterball hired him, Butterball orally
informed him that he would be paid piece-rate compensation with
overtime. In doing so, Figueroa alleges actions that complied with
the notice requirements of section 95-25.13, which allows for oral
notice. Moreover, Butterball provided its employees with access to
policies and practices regarding promised wages in the
statutorily-allowed form of a paystub. Furthermore, the paystub is
not ambiguous. It provides for piece-rate compensation and
overtime. Accordingly, Figueroa has not plausibly alleged a
violation of section 95-25.13.

Conclusion

In sum, Judge Denver granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and
dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's amended complaint for
failure to state a claim. The Judge denied as moot the Defendant's
motion to strike. The Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by
Oct. 4, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/apcv3bcf from Leagle.com.


CALIFORNIA: Summary Judgment Bid in Fitzgerald v. Pollard Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RHONDA FITZGERALD, an individual, and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MARCUS POLLARD, et al.,
Defendants, Case No.: 20cv848 JM (NLS) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Jeffrey
T. Miller of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California denied the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants C. Moore, M. Pollard, A. Jackson, C. Mann-Little, and H.
Cruz.

Background

The federal civil rights action (42 U.S.C. Section 1983) with
pendant state claims arises out of a strip search of Plaintiff
Fitzgerald that occurred on Sept. 28, 2019, when she visited the
Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility to see her friend, inmate
Christopher Roberts.

Ms. Fitzgerald filed a declaration as part of her opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, in which she declares that she met
inmate Roberts in high school. She attests that following the death
of her parents in 2019 and 2020, Roberts' mother, Patricia Knight,
periodically telephoned her and that in early 2019 they developed a
friendship. Ms. Fitzgerald declares that at Ms. Knight's request,
she accompanied Knight on a visit to see Roberts on May 4, 2019.
This was Ms. Fitzgerald's first visit to Donovan. She then visited
Roberts 37 more times leading up to the Sept. 28, 2019 strip search
visit.

According to the declaration of Defendant Moore, while working at
Donovan Correctional facility in 2019, Moore "learned of inmate
Roberts' suspected illegal activities through the exchange of
information with Facility E staff," including Defendant Cruz,
Officer Fredrick, and Sergeant Eustaquio. Moore reviewed inmate
Roberts' files, which contained memoranda detailing interviews with
four confidential informants dating back to July 2018.

Moore further states that he only authorized the "unclothed" search
of Ms. Fitzgerald because he had a strong suspicion and good
reasons to believe that she might be attempting to bring contraband
drugs into the prison. They therefore had reasonable suspicion to
search her. According to the declaration of Defendant Cruz, in
2019, Defendant Moore tasked him with investigating inmate Roberts'
suspected drug activity. Cruz also reviewed inmate Roberts' files
and the four confidential memoranda.

Additionally, Defendants Cruz and Moore recount how inmate Roberts'
file contained two Rules Violation Reports from November 20184 and
June 2019. The reports document how the searching of Roberts' cell
resulted in the discovery of cell phones, which Roberts later
claimed ownership of.

Both Defendants Cruz and Moore note that Ms. Fitzgerald visited
inmate Roberts 38 times, beginning on May 5, 2019. They attest that
Ms. Fitzgerald was, with two exceptions, inmate Roberts' only
visitor during this period. Cruz claims this is important
information because Confidential Informants #1 and #4 stated that
inmate Roberts received his drugs from his visitors and brought
them back to the Facility after his visits.

Defendants Cruz and Moore declare that they discussed what they had
learned about inmate Roberts and his suspected drug activity on
Facility E, including the contents of the memos. After deciding
that they had reasonable suspicion to search Ms. Fitzgerald, Cruz
and Moore maintain that they prepared and signed a Notice of
Consent to Search Form. On the morning of Sept. 28, 2019, Moore and
Cruz attest that they informed Defendant Mann-Little that there was
reasonable suspicion to search Ms. Fitzgerald and instructed her to
ask Ms. Fitzgerald to consent to an unclothed body search. Moore
and Cruz declare they gave Mann-Little the signed Notice of Request
for Search Form.

On May 5, 2020, Ms. Fitzgerald filed the suit in district court,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the Defendants
violated her civil rights and committed torts against her. In the
Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts: (1) a claim for violation of her
Fourth Amendment right -- search without reasonable suspicion
against all the Defendants; (2) a claim for violation of her Fourth
Amendment right -- search without reasonable suspicion against
Defendant Pollard and Doe 1; and (3) a claim for violation of the
Fourth Amendment -- failure to train and supervise against
Defendant Pollard and Doe 1. Ms. Fitzgerald also brings state law
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
negligence, against all the Defendants.

Ms. Fitzgerald seeks to represent a Class consisting of: "Those
visitors to the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in the
Class Period who were required to submit to an unclothed search as
a condition to visiting an inmate and whose Notice of Request for
Search Form states no specific objective facts and rational
inferences establishing individualized reasonable suspicion to
believe that the person targeted for the search had an intention of
smuggling contraband into the Prison."

Ms. Fitzgerald seeks injunctive relief barring Defendants from
performing further random unclothed searches of visitors at the
prison, money damages, and attorney's fees and costs.

On June 1, 2021, the Defendants filed an early Motion for Summary
Judgment shortly after their request to bifurcate discovery was
granted in part. On June 28, 2021, Ms. Fitzgerald filed her
Response in Opposition, and, after being awarded a brief extension,
the Defendants duly filed their Reply. The motion has been fully
briefed and the Court held oral argument on Aug. 23, 2021.

Discussion

Before addressing the merits of the motion, Judge Miller first
addresses Ms. Fitzgerald's evidentiary objections.

I. Evidentiary Objections

Ms. Fitzgerald filed 30 objections, spanning 54 pages, related to
the declaration of Defendant Moore, objecting to numerous
paragraphs on various grounds including lack of foundation,
hearsay, inadmissible content, argumentative, and legal conclusion.
Additionally, she filed 29 objections, spanning 52 pages, related
to the declaration of Defendant Cruz objecting to numerous
paragraphs on the same grounds. Further, Ms. Fitzgerald filed 11
objections, spanning 23 pages, related to the confidential memo of
Officer Fredrick raising similar objections and including lack of
personal knowledge. Finally, Ms. Fitzgerald filed an objection,
spanning 6 pages, to the declaration of Defendant Mann-Little on
the grounds that paragraph 8 lacks foundation, is hearsay, and
contains inadmissible content.

In their Reply brief, the Defendants counter that the objections
are fundamentally flawed, and the documents satisfy foundational
evidentiary requirements under multiple basis, including the
"state-of-mind" exception to hearsay, set forth in Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(c).

Ms. Fitzgerald asserts Defendants Moore, Cruz, Mann-Little and
Fredrick lack personal knowledge to make various statements
regarding their conversations with other officers and the contents
of prison records, as set forth in their declarations. Judge Miller
finds these objections unpersuasive. He says, these Defendants have
personal knowledge of their own conversations with coworkers and
their own review of an inmate's files. Indeed, the Defendants'
statements go directly to whether they had reasonable suspicion to
perform a search of Ms. Fitzgerald, which forms the central dispute
of the case.

Ms. Fitzgerald's objections on the basis of "hearsay" are
unpersuasive for the same reasons, Judge Miller holds. He says, Ms.
Fitzgerald should be emphasizing, instead, that the Court should
give little or no weight to the Defendants' evidentiary submission.
Ms. Fitzgerald's objections are, therefore, overruled.

II. Discussion

All the Defendants move for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 claims. Defendant Pollard moves for summary
judgment on the failure to train and supervise claim. Additionally,
all the Defendants argue that the pendant state law claims should
be dismissed. Finally, the Defendants contend that the class action
claim should be dismissed because, without a claim, Fitzgerald
cannot adequately represent the putative class. The Plaintiff
opposes.

1. Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Search Claims

The Defendants move for summary judgment on Ms. Fitzgerald's Fourth
Amendment unreasonable search claims contending: (1) reasonable
suspicion supported the search and it was not random; and (2) Ms.
Fitzgerald voluntarily consented to the unclothed search of her
person. Ms. Fitzgerald maintains: (1) she did not voluntarily
consent to be strip searched; and (2) that triable issues of fact
exist regarding whether the search was reasonable and/or random.

Judge Miller states that there is no question that preventing
contraband, including illegal drugs, constitutes a legitimate
security concern for prison officials. The issue posed in the
Defendants' motion is whether reasonable suspicion supported the
strip search.

Judge Miller cannot conclude as a matter of law that there was
reasonable and individualized suspicion to search Ms. Fitzgerald.
For the same reasons, he is unable to conclude, as the Defendants
suggest, that Ms. Fitzgerald was not randomly selected for an
"unclothed" search. The Judge says, the conflicting accounts
surrounding the question of whether the search was random, provide
further support for this issue being ill-suited for summary
judgment. Consequently, the Defendants' motion to grant summary
judgment on the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claims is
denied.

2. Voluntariness of Search

The Defendants also argue that because Ms. Fitzgerald consented to
the unclothed body search, they did not violate her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. Further,
they contend that she did not object to the scope of the search
when it extended beyond her outer garments.

Judge Miller holds that when one focuses on the relevant
circumstances, disagreement abounds on nearly every material fact
surrounding Fitzgerald's consent with the parties relying on their
respective contributions to the evidentiary record. The
circumstances as propounded by Ms. Fitzgerald would vitiate her
consent. Consequently, the Judge holds that the Defendants have
fallen leagues short of their burden of establishing that no
genuine issue of material fact remains regarding consent and,
therefore, they are not entitled to summary judgment on this
question.

3. Claims Against Defendant Pollard

Defendant Pollard contends that he is entitled to summary judgment
on Ms. Fitzgerald's failure to train and Fourth Amendment claims.

a. Failure to Train Claim

The Defendant Pollard has moved for summary judgment on the failure
to train claim brought against him. In opposition, the Plaintiff
focuses on her recounting of Defendant Mann-Little's behavior and
claims "a comedy of errors establishes a genuine dispute as to
whether the Donovan corrections staff were woefully unprepared and
whether such lack of training caused the deprivation of the
Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights." After detailing the
interaction between Ms. Fitzgerald and Mann-Little, the opposition
brief concludes "since the need for additional training is obvious,
Warden Pollard's deliberate indifference can be inferred."

Judge Miller finds that the Plaintiff's admission of these
undisputed facts, and her failure to identify what specifically was
deficient in the training offered by Defendant Pollard, or that
even he was personally responsible for any such training, weighs in
favor of granting the motion for summary judgment on this claim.
However, because no depositions have been taken, the Judge says, if
the disputed statements Ms. Fitzgerald attributes to staff are
true, they point to a practice which could be problematic.
Consequently, Defendant Pollard's motion to grant summary judgment
on the failure to train claim is denied at this time, without
prejudice to the issue being addressed in later motion practice.

b. Fourth Amendment Claim

Defendant Pollard moves to have the Fourth Amendment claim against
him dismissed because he was not personally involved in the search
of Ms. Fitzgerald. Additionally, he argues that he cannot be held
vicariously liable for Fitzgerald's search. Defendant Pollard
argues that he was in no way involved in the search of Ms.
Fitzgerald and that there is no causal connection between action on
his part and the search itself.

Judge Miller finds that all of the Defendants, including Pollard,
have submitted declarations that attest he had nothing to do with
Ms. Fitzgerald's search. In contrast, Ms. Fitzgerald has submitted
a declaration asserting the opposite. Facing competing declarations
once more, Judge Miller concludes it would be inappropriate to
decide this issue on summary judgment because to do so would
require determining the credibility of the competing declarations
and weighing the question of any personal involvement by Pollard in
an evidentiary vacuum. Consequently, Defendant Pollard's motion for
summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim brought against him,
individually, is denied at this time, without prejudice to the
issue being addressed in later motion practice.

4. Qualified Immunity

The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity
for Ms. Fitzgerald's Fourth Amendment claims under either step of
the analysis. They assert there was no Fourth Amendment violation
and that the law governing Fitzgerald's search was not settled as
of Sept. 28, 2019.

a. Constitutional Violation

The Defendants argue that the search of Ms. Fitzgerald was
supported by the reliable information provided by the confidential
informants, which established an individualized and reasonable
suspicion that Fitzgerald could be assisting inmate Roberts in
trafficking narcotics in the prison. They contend that any officer
in the Defendants' position would believe that there was reasonable
suspicion to search Fitzgerald.

Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Fitzgerald,
a jury could reasonably find that the Defendants lacked a
reasonable and particularized suspicion to justify a strip search
and visual examination of Ms. Fitzgerald's body cavities. Thus,
Judge Miller cannot conclude there was no violation Ms.
Fitzgerald's Fourth Amendment right.

b. Clearly Established Right

In its order on the Defendants' earlier motion to dismiss, the
Court applied the "clearly established right" standard in denying
the Defendants' motion. An individual's clearly established rights
are only violated by a defendant when "'the state of the law' at
the time of an incident provided 'fair warning' to the defendant
that his or her conduct was unconstitutional."

Judge Miller stands firm in the Court's belief that at the time
Defendants Pollard, Moore, Cruz, Jackson and Mann-Little allegedly
acted, "any reasonable officer" in their position would have known
that visual body-cavity strip searches of prison visitors are
permissible only when based on reasonable and individualized
suspicion. In other words, such searches, when performed without
reasonable and particularized suspicion, or randomly, or on the
basis of a "hunch" are unconstitutional.

c. Conclusion Regarding Qualified Immunity

In light of the foregoing, Judge Miller cannot conclude that the
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at this time and
denies the motion for summary judgment on this ground.

Disposition

The Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yhfmberc from Leagle.com.


CANADA GOOSE: Lin Files False Ad Suit Over Goose Down Jackets
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jia Wang Lin, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Canada Goose US, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-07614, (S.D. N.Y., September 12, 2021), seeks restitution and
any other equitable relief, statutory damages and such other and
further legal and equitable relief for breach of implied warranty
of merchantability and for violation of the Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Trade Practices Acts of the New York General Business
Laws, the consumer fraud and deceptive trade practices acts of the
various states and District of Columbia and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act.

Canada Goose US, Inc. manufactures clothing products, the majority
of which contain goose down. It claims that its down blends contain
Canadian Hutterite down. "Hutterite" refers to a group of Christian
communities largely in Canada with a reputation for raising
excellent geese.

According to a Chinese government report of its investigation into
Canada Goose products, goose down accounted for only 16.8%, while
duck down accounted for 83.2%, of the down used in 190 down jackets
sampled. Accordingly, Defendant is not in fact using the "highest
quality" materials, but is largely using substandard materials with
inferior thermal performance, asserts the complaint.

Lin purchased two Canada Goose down jackets and claims that he
could have purchased comparable down jackets containing similar
proportions of duck and goose down for less the price he paid.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      John Troy, Esq.
      Aaron Schweitzer, Esq.
      Tiffany Troy, Esq.
      TROY LAW, PLLC
      41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
      Flushing, NY 11355
      Tel: (718) 762-1324
      Fax: (718) 762-1342
      Email: TroyLaw@TroyPllc.com

CHRISTOPHER GODFREY: Culbertson Files Suit in S.D. West Virginia
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Christopher Godfrey,
et al. The case is styled as Thomas Culbertson, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Christopher Godfrey and
U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
Case No. 2:21-cv-00532 (S.D.W. Va., Sept. 23, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights for the
Administrative Procedure Act.

Christopher J. Godfrey serves as the director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs at the U.S. Department of
Labor.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel Brown Petsonk, Esq.
          PETSONK
          P. O. Box 1045
          Beckley, WV 25802
          Phone: (304) 900-3171
          Fax: (304) 986-4633
          Email: sam@petsonk.com


CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE: Sears Seeks Overtime Pay for Pre-shift Hrs.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Quianah Sears, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 21-cv-17232, (D. N.J., September 20, 2021), seeks unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and
costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Jersey Wage
and Hour Law.

CoreCivic is a corporation that owns and operates detention
facilities across the United States where Quianah Sears worked for
CoreCivic as a correctional officer in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Sears
claims to undergo pre-shift security screening that lasts
approximately 10-20 minutes per day that is uncompensated. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Don J. Foty, Esq.
      HODGES & FOTY, LLP
      4409 Montrose Blvd, Ste. 200
      Houston, TX 77006
      Telephone: (713) 523-0001
      Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
      Email: dfoty@hftrialfirm.com

             - and -

      Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
      Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
      Alanna Klein Fischer, Esq.
      THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
      920 Rockefeller Building
      614 W. Superior Avenue
      Cleveland, OH 44113
      Tel: (216) 696-5000
      Fax: (216) 696-7005
      Email: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
             lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
             alanna@lazzarolawfirm.com

             - and -

      Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
      NILGES DRAHER LLC
      7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
      Massillon, OH 44646
      Telephone: (330) 470-4428
      Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
      Email: hans@ohlaborlaw.com

             - and -

      Ravi Sattiraju, Esq.
      SATTIRAJU & THARNEY, LLP
      50 Millstone Road, Building 300, Suite 202
      East Windsor, NJ 08520
      Tel: (609) 469-2110
      Fax: (609) 228-5649
      Email: rsattiraju@s-tlawfirm.com


DAKOTA PLAINS: Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set for Oct. 25
------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JON D. GRUBER, Individually And On Behalf
Of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff,

v.

RYAN R. GILBERTSON, et al.,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION

TO: ALL PERSONS AND ENTITIES WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED
DAKOTA PLAINS HOLDINGS, INC. COMMON STOCK DURING THE PERIOD MARCH
23, 2012 THROUGH AUGUST 16, 2016, INCLUSIVE (THE "CLASS")

A federal court has authorized this notice. This is not a
solicitation from a lawyer.

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY AND IN ITS ENTIRETY.
YOU MAY BE A MEMBER OF THE CLASS DESCRIBED HEREIN. AS SUCH, YOUR
RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY A PENDING CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT.
THIS NOTICE ADVISES YOU OF YOUR OPTIONS REGARDING THE CLASS
ACTION.

PLEASE DO NOT CALL OR WRITE THE COURT.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS AFTER READING THIS NOTICE, YOU
SHOULD CONTACT CLASS COUNSEL OR THE ADMINISTRATOR,
AS DISCUSSED FURTHER BELOW.

This Notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York ("Court") to inform you of a
class action lawsuit that is now pending in the Court under the
above caption ("Action") against former officers, directors, and
alleged controlling persons of Dakota Plains Holdings, Inc.
("Dakota Plains" or the "Company"). Dakota Plains is not a
defendant in the Action because it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection on December 16, 2016 and from that date there has been
an automatic stay of litigation against the Company. The assets of
Dakota Plains have been sold and the Company no longer exists as an
operating entity. The Defendants in the Action are: Ryan R.
Gilbertson, Michael L. Reger, former CEOs Gabriel G. Claypool and
Craig M. McKenzie, former CFO Timothy R. Brady, and former
directors Terry H. Rust, Paul M. Cownie, David J. Fellon, Gary L.
Alvord, and James L. Thornton (collectively, "Defendants"). The
Action has been certified by the Court to proceed as a class action
on behalf of the Class, as defined in 1 below. This Notice is not a
settlement notice and you are not being asked to submit a claim.

1. By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 17, 2019, the
Court certified the following Class and Subclass with plaintiff
John D. Gruber as the Class Representative:

Class: All persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
Dakota Plains Holdings, Inc.'s common stock during the period March
23, 2012 through August 16, 2016, inclusive (the "Class Period")
(the "Class"). Subclass: All persons and entities who, during the
Class Period, purchased Dakota Plains stock contemporaneously with
sales of Dakota Plains stock by defendants Ryan R. Gilbertson
and/or Michael L. Reger and/or any of their controlled custodians
or nominees (the "Subclass").

Excluded from the Class and Subclass by definition are: (i) any
Defendant in this Action; (ii) the officers and directors of the
Company at all relevant times; (iii) members of the immediate
families of the Defendants in this Action; (iv) any entity in which
Defendants have or had a controlling interest; (v) the legal
representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns
of any such excluded party.

2. This Notice is directed to you because you may be a member of
the Class. If you are a member of the Class, your rights will be
affected by this Action. If you do not fall within the Class
definition, this Notice does not apply to you.

If you are uncertain whether you are a member of the Class or
Subclass, contact Class Counsel listed in 19 below, or your
own attorney.

3. This Notice is not an admission by Defendants or an expression
of any opinion by the Court as to the merits of the Action, or a
finding by the Court that the claims asserted by the Class
Representative in this Action are valid. This Notice is intended
solely to inform you of the pendency of this Action and of your
rights in connection with it, including the right to request
exclusion from the Class. There is no judgment, settlement, or
monetary recovery at this time. Defendants have denied Class
Representative's claims. Defendants contend that they did not do
anything wrong, and that they are not liable for any harm alleged
by Class Representative on behalf of the Class.

4. The Class and Subclass definitions and certification decisions
may be subject to change by the Court pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

DESCRIPTION AND STATUS OF THE LAWSUIT

5. This is a securities class action against Defendants for alleged
violations of the federal securities laws during the Class Period.
In summary, Class Representative alleges that Defendants omitted
material information from various public statements regarding their
roles at Dakota Plains and the status of the Company's business.
More specifically, Class Representative alleges that Defendants
Gilbertson and Reger omitted to disclose their reportable share
ownership in Dakota Plains, and that the officer and director
defendants knew or recklessly disregarded this alleged fact. Class
Representative further alleges that defendants Gilbertson and Reger
and nominees they controlled engaged in insider selling of their
Dakota
Plains shares based on material nonpublic information causing
damage to Class and Subclass Members by driving down the price of
Dakota Plains stock during the Class Period. Class Representative
alleges that Dakota Plains' public statements during the Class
Period were materially false and misleading. Defendants deny all of
the allegations of wrongdoing asserted in the Action and deny any
liability whatsoever to any members of the Class.

6. In December 2016, the initial complaint was filed in this Court
asserting violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 78j(b) and 78t(a), and Rule
10b-5, promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.10b-5.

7. By Order entered April 7, 2017, the Court appointed Jon D.
Gruber, an investor in Dakota Plains, to serve as Lead Plaintiff in
the Action, pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, and approved Lead Plaintiff's selection of Cera LLP as
Lead Counsel.

8. On July 10, 2017, Lead Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Class
Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws
("SAC"). Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC on August 15, 2017.
Defendants' motions were fully briefed, and by Memorandum Opinion
and Order dated March 20, 2018, the Court granted in part and
denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss. Thereafter, on March
8, 2019, Lead Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Class Action
Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws ("TAC"),
which Defendants moved to dismiss on April 5, 2019. By Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated September 17, 2019, the Court dismissed
certain newly added claims and Defendants reflected in the TAC.
Lead Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint for
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws ("FAC") on November 11,
2019 to conform to the rulings of the Court. Defendants have since
answered the FAC, denying all allegations therein and asserting
certain defenses.

9. The parties have engaged in extensive fact and expert discovery,
which is now concluded.

10. On January 29, 2019, Lead Plaintiff filed his motion for class
certification, which Defendants opposed on May 13, 2019. Lead
Plaintiff filed a reply in further support of his motion on June
24, 2019. By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 17, 2019,
the Court granted Lead Plaintiff's motion, certifying the Class,
appointing Lead Plaintiff Jon D. Gruber as Class Representative,
and appointing Cera LLP as Class Counsel. The Defendants sought to
immediately appeal the class certification order, and on February
12, 2020, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied Defendants'
petition to appeal. The Court's Order certifying the Class does not
guarantee Class members will receive money or benefits; that will
be decided later in the lawsuit.

11. On June 17, 2021, the Court issued a Memorandum & Order denying
Defendants' motions for summary judgment, denying Defendants'
motion for decertification of the Class and Subclass, and granting
in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to exclude certain
expert evidence proffered by Lead Plaintiff.

12. No court has made a ruling on the merits of Class
Representative's claims or Defendants' defenses. Please note that
this Notice does not describe all claims and defenses asserted by
the parties. The section entitled "Where You Can Find Additional
Information" describes the process by which you can obtain
additional information about the Action and the claims and defenses
asserted.

YOUR RIGHTS AS A CLASS MEMBER

13. A class action is a type of lawsuit in which one or several
individuals or entities prosecute claims on behalf of all members
of a group of similarly situated persons and entities to obtain
monetary or other relief for the benefit of the entire group. Class
actions avoid the necessity of each member of a class having to
file his, her, or its own separate lawsuit to obtain relief. Class
actions are used to decide legal and factual issues that are common
to all members of a class.

14. If you purchased or otherwise acquired Dakota Plains common
stock between March 23, 2012 and August 16, 2016, inclusive, and
you are not excluded by definition from the Class, you are a member
of the Class. If you are amember of the Class, you have the right
to decide whether to remain a member of the Class. If you are a
member of the Class and wish to be excluded from the Class, you
must request exclusion in accordance with the procedures set forth
in 16 below. If you want to remain a member of the Class, you do
not need to do anything at this time and should retain any
documentation reflecting your transactions in Dakota Plains common
stock during the Class Period as discussed below in 15. Your
decision is important for the following reasons:

a. If you choose to remain a member of the Class, you will be bound
by all past, present, and future orders and judgments in the
Action, whether favorable or unfavorable. If any money is awarded
to the Class, either through a settlement with Defendants or a
judgment of the Court after a trial, you may be eligible to
receive a share of that award. However, if you remain a member of
the Class, you may not pursue a lawsuit on your own behalf with
regard to any of the issues in this Action. Pursuant to Rule
23(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is within the
Court's discretion whether to allow a second opportunity to request
exclusion from the Class if there is a settlement or judgment in
the Action after a trial; accordingly, this may be the only
opportunity to request exclusion from the Class. Please note that
if you remain a member of the Class, you will not be personally
responsible for Class Counsel's attorneys' fees or costs. Class
Counsel has agreed to represent the Class on a contingent fee
basis, which means that it will be awarded attorneys' fees and
costs by the Court only if it succeeds in obtaining a recovery from
one or more Defendants. Any attorneys' fees for Class Counsel will
be awarded by the Court from the settlement or judgment, if any,
obtained on behalf of the Class. As a member of the Class you will
be represented by Class Counsel. Alternatively, you may remain a
member of the Class and elect to be represented by counsel of your
own choosing. If you do retain separate counsel, you will be
responsible for that attorney's fees and costs and that attorney
must enter an appearance on your behalf by filing a Notice of
Appearance with the Clerk of the Court and mailing it to Class
Counsel at the address set forth in 20 below on or before October
25, 2021.

b. If you choose to be excluded from the Class, you will not be
bound by any orders or judgments in this Action, nor will you be
eligible to share in any recovery that might be obtained in this
Action. If you exclude yourself from the Class, you will retain any
right you have to individually pursue any legal rights that you may
have against any Defendants with respect to the claims asserted in
this Action. Please note however, that you may be time-barred from
asserting the claims covered by the Action by statutes of
limitation or a statute of repose. Class Counsel offers no advice
and no opinion on whether you will be able to maintain such claims.
Please refer to 16-19 below if you would like to request exclusion
from the Class.

15. Members of the Class will be eligible to participate in any
recovery that might be obtained in the Action.

While this Notice is not intended to suggest any likelihood that
Class Representative or members of the Class will obtain any
recovery, should there be a recovery, members of the Class will be
required to support their requests to participate in the
distribution of the recovery by demonstrating their membership in
the Class and documenting their purchases, acquisitions, and sales
of Dakota Plains common stock, and their resulting damages. For
this reason, please keep all records of your transactions and
holdings in this security. DO NOT mail them to Class Counsel or the
Administrator at this time.

HOW TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CLASS

16. To exclude yourself from the Class, you must send a letter by
first-class mail stating that you "request exclusion from the Class
in Gruber v. Gilbertson, et al., Civil Action No.
1:16-cv-09727-JSR." Your request must state your full name,
address, and telephone number, and be signed. If you are signing on
behalf of a Class member (such as an estate, corporation, or
partnership), please indicate your full name and the basis of your
authority to act on behalf of the Class Member. Your request for
exclusion must also state the amount of Dakota Plains common stock
purchased, acquired, and/or sold during the Class Period, as well
as the dates and prices of each such purchase, acquisition, and/or
sale. You must mail your exclusion request, postmarked no later
than October 25, 2021 to:

Dakota Plains Securities Litigation ATTN: Exclusion Request
P.O. Box 58699
Philadelphia, PA 19102

17. You cannot exclude yourself from the Class by telephone,
facsimile, text message, or email. Requests for exclusion that do
not comply with the above requirements will be invalid, unless
otherwise accepted by the Court, subject to any objections of the
parties to be resolved by the Court.

18. Do not request exclusion if you wish to participate in this
Action as a member of the Class.

19. If you properly request exclusion from the Class, you will not
be bound by any orders or judgments in this Action, but you also
will not be eligible to share in any recovery that might be
obtained in this Action. If you properly request exclusion from the
Class, you will be entitled to pursue any individual lawsuit,
claim, or remedy, if available, which you may have, at your own
expense. Please note, if you decide to exclude yourself from the
Class, you may be time-barred from asserting the claims covered by
the Action by a statute of limitations or a statute of repose.
Class Counsel offers no advice and no opinion on whether you will
be able to maintain such claims.

CLASS COUNSEL

20. The Court appointed the law firm of Cera LLP as Class Counsel.
If you have any questions concerning the
matters raised in this Notice, you may contact Class Counsel, as
follows:

CERA LLP
Solomon B. Cera, Esq.
595 Market Street, Suite 1350
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone: (415) 977-2230
Facsimile: (415) 777-5189
www.cerallp.com

21. As noted above, unless you elect to retain your own personal
lawyer, if you remain in the Class you will not have any direct
obligations to pay the costs of the litigation. If there is a
recovery by the Class in this Action, all costs and expenses of the
Action, including Class Counsel's attorneys' fees, will be paid
from that recovery in an amount approved by the Court.

22. If you want to be represented by your own lawyer, you may hire
one at your own expense. If you do retain your own lawyer, such
counsel must enter an appearance on your behalf by filing a Notice
of Appearance with the Office of the Clerk of the Court at the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street,
New York, NY 10007-1312, for Civil Action No. 16-cv-09727-JSR
(S.D.N.Y.), on or before October 25, 2021. Your Notice of
Appearance must also be mailed to Class Counsel at the address set
forth in par. 20 above, on or before October 25, 2021.

PLEASE KEEP YOUR ADDRESS CURRENT

23. To assist the Court and the parties in maintaining accurate
lists of Class members, you are requested to mail or email notice
of any changes in your address to:

         Dakota Plains Securities Litigation
         c/o Angeion Group
         1650 Arch Street, Suite 2210
         Philadelphia, PA 19103
         info@DakotaPlainsSecuritiesLitigation.com

24. If this Notice was forwarded to you by the postal service, or
if it was otherwise sent to you at an address that is not current,
you should immediately contact the Administrator, Angeion Group, by
mail or email at the address above or toll-free at (855) 340-7773
and provide them with your correct address. If the Administrator
does not have your correct address, you may not receive notice of
important developments in this Action.

WHERE YOU CAN FIND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

25. This Notice provides only a summary of the lawsuit, the claims
asserted by Class Representative, and the defenses asserted by
Defendants. For more detailed information regarding the Action, you
may contact Class Counsel or visit
www.DakotaPlainsSecuritiesLitigation.com.

26. Complete copies of the pleadings, orders, and other documents
filed in this Action are available at
http://www.pacer.govor Daniel Patrick Moynihan U.S. Courthouse, at
the office of the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, 500 Pearl Street, New York,
NY 10007 under Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-09727-JSR.

PLEASE DO NOT CALL OR WRITE THE COURT OR CLERK OF THE COURT.

NOTICE TO SECURITIES BROKERS AND OTHER NOMINEES

27. If, for the beneficial interest of any person or entity other
than yourself, you purchased or otherwise acquired Dakota Plains
common stock during the period March 23, 2012 through August 16,
2016, inclusive, you MUST EITHER: (a) WITHIN SEVEN (7) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this Notice, request from the Administrator
sufficient copies of the Notice to forward to all such beneficial
owners and WITHIN SEVEN (7) CALENDAR DAYS of receipt of those
Notices forward them to all such beneficial owners; or (b) WITHIN
SEVEN (7) CALENDAR DAYS of receipt of this Notice, provide a list
of the names and addresses of all such beneficial owners to the
Administrator at Dakota Plains Securities Litigation, c/o Angeion
Group, 1650 Arch Street, Suite 2210, Philadelphia, PA 19103. If you
choose the first option, YOU MUST send a statement to the
Administrator confirming that the mailing was made and YOU MUST
retain your mailing records for use in connection with any further
notices that may be provided in the Action. If you choose the
second option, the Administrator will send a copy of the Notice to
the beneficial owners based on the names and addresses
provided. Upon FULL AND TIMELY compliance with these directions,
such brokers or nominees may seek reimbursement of their reasonable
expenses actually incurred by providing the Administrator with
proper documentation supporting the expenses for which
reimbursement is sought.

DATED: August 10, 2021

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK


DOMINIUM MGMT: Iliff Class Suit Remanded to Minnesota State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael J. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota remanded the case, SUSAN ILIFF, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated Plaintiffs v. DOMINIUM
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil File No. 21-649
(MJD/TNL) (D. Minn.), to state court.

Introduction

On Sept. 14, 2021, Judge Davis entered an Order granting the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand to State Court and stating that a
Memorandum of Law would follow. Therefore, the Judge issues the
following Memorandum of Law.

Background

The Plaintiffs are eight tenants of Dominium's Minnesota properties
and one non-profit tenant advocacy organization, HOME Line,
headquartered in Bloomington, Minnesota. Each tenant Plaintiff has
paid a monthly fee for parking while living at Dominium's
properties.

In its leases, Dominium promises that it operates is premises in
accordance with Section 42 of the Internal Review Code of 1986.
This includes compliance with the LIHTC program. Under the Low
Income Housing Tax Credits ("LIHTC") program, the Defendants could
only charge for parking if their costs of parking construction were
not included in their eligible basis.

The Plaintiffs allege that Dominium engaged in fraudulent
misrepresentation of its construction costs to finance the
construction of its parking garages with LIHTC and then charge its
tenants for parking. They  allege that Dominium shifted the cost of
parking construction to other aspects of construction on its
application.  Thus, Dominium intentionally underreported the costs
of parking construction, shifted those costs to other portions of
the project, took LIHTC for those shifted costs, excluded the
underreported cost of parking construction, and then charged its
tenants parking rent. It did so for all properties at issue in the
lawsuit. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have harmed
their tenants by making them pay for a service (parking) they are
entitled to receive for free.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action in Hennepin County District
Court by serving a summons and complaint upon the Defendants on
Feb. 4, 2021. The class action Complaint asserts: Count 1:
Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act; Count 2: Minnesota
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Deceptive Lease Agreements; and
Count 3: Unjust Enrichment. All three counts are based on the
allegation that the Defendants fraudulently charged tenants parking
rent which they could not lawfully charge because Defendants had
received LIHTC based on an eligible basis that included the cost of
constructing the parking. The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of
all Dominium tenants in Minnesota who have paid parking rent.

The Defendants removed the case to the Court on March 5, 2021,
based on federal question jurisdiction. They filed a Motion to
Dismiss on April 12, 2021. On April 23, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed
a Motion to Remand the case to state court on the grounds that the
Court lacks jurisdiction. The parties agreed that the Court should
decide the motion to remand before briefing on the motion to
dismiss, and the Court ordered the motion to dismiss briefing
stayed pending a decision on the motion for remand.

Discussion

A. Legal Standard for Remand

In Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005), federal question jurisdiction can be
established in two manners: 1) if the plaintiffs plead a cause of
action created by federal law; or 2) if plaintiffs' "state-law
claims implicate significant federal issues" because the "claims
recognized under state law nonetheless turn on substantial
questions of federal law."

Under the second test, known as the Grable doctrine, federal
jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is:
(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and
(4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the
federal-state balance approved by Congress. All four requirements
must be met for federal question jurisdiction to apply.

B. Cause of Action under Federal Law

As both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants agree, the Plaintiffs'
Complaint pleads no causes of action created by federal law.

C. Grable Doctrine

Judge Davis holds that none of the four Grable factors apply;
therefore, Grable jurisdiction does not attach.

1. Whether Plaintiffs' Claims Necessarily Raise a Federal Issue

The Plaintiffs' claims do not necessarily raise a federal issue.
The parties agree on the relevant interpretation of the LIHTC
statute. They disagree on the facts of whether Defendants
misrepresented their parking construction costs to the Minnesota
Housing Finance Agency and whether the Plaintiffs state a claim
under Minnesota law given the governing written lease agreements
and the lack of a private cause of action under the LIHTC statute.

Judge Davis notes that the Plaintiffs are not seeking to redress
overpayment of LIHTC or the precise amount of LIHTC that the
Defendants should have received. The Plaintiffs are not the IRS or
any other entity seeking to recover ill-gotten tax credits. Rather,
they are Minnesota residents seeking to recover monthly parking
rent that they allege Defendants had no right to collect from them.
This, Judge Davis says, is a question that can be answered without
reference to a disputed question of federal law.

2. Whether the Case Presents an Actually Disputed Federal Issue

There is no actually disputed federal issue because the parties
agree on the relevant interpretation of the LIHTC statute. They
disagree on the facts and on the interpretation of Minnesota law,
but not federal law. Dominium understood that the law required it
to either receive LIHTC for parking-development costs or charge its
tenants for parking, but not both.

Judge Davis says, the case is not like Riseboro Community
Partnership Inc. v. SunAmerica Housing Fund No. 682, in which the
court held that Grable jurisdiction applied because deciding the
plaintiff's breach of contract claim regarding whether development
nonprofit had a right of first refusal ("ROFR") to purchase
low-incoming housing project required the court to "make binding
legal determinations of rights and liabilities under federal law"
because the plaintiff's "claims will require the Court to resolve
the parties' dispute over (1) whether 26 U.S.C. Section 42
contemplates any restrictions on an ROFR holder's ability to
exercise it, and (2) whether 26 U.S.C. Section 42(i)(7) envisions
an ROFR that differs from a common law ROFR."

3. Whether the Case Raises a Substantial Federal Issue

Judge Davis holds that the primary legal issue is one of Minnesota
law, not federal law. He finds that the case does not raise a
substantial federal issue. He says, although the federal LIHTC law
"provides the backdrop for the Plaintiffs' claims, and its
interpretation may be significant to the parties, there is no
indication that this regulation or any issues related to the
regulation are important to the federal system as a whole. No doubt
regulatory compliance is a federal interest in the abstract, but
that alone cannot be enough to classify a federal issue as
substantial."

4. Whether Litigation in State Court Presents a Risk of Disruption
of the Federal-State Balance Approved by Congress

In the case, the state court will not be resolving a dispute on the
interpretation of federal law or making a decision that will impact
how a federal entity acts. Rather, the focus will likely be on the
fact-intensive question of whether these interconnected Defendants
had a practice of misrepresenting their parking construction costs.
Judge Davis says, it is true that a decision regarding whether
Minnesota consumer protection statutes or equitable law permits
tenants to sue to recover rents paid based on a developer's
violation of federal affordable housing law could lead to an
increase in tenant lawsuits in Minnesota. However, these lawsuits,
he says, would be based on state, not federal law, and would not
change how the federal government or the state Allocators interpret
the requirements of the LIHTC Program. Nor would the lawsuits
curtail federal or state governments' ability to bring their own
enforcement actions.

Conclusion

Because no federal question jurisdiction exists, Judge Davis holds
that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter and the case is
remanded to state court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Memorandum of Law is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yy4e92s4 from Leagle.com.

Craig S. Coleman -- craig.coleman@faegredrinker.com -- Michael F.
Cockson -- michael.cockson@faegredrinker.com -- Evelyn Snyder --
evelyn.snyder@faegredrinker.com -- and Rachel L. Cardwell --
rachel.cardwell@faegredrinker.com -- Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath
LLP; and James W. Poradek and Margaret Kaplan, Housing Justice
Center, Counsel for the Plaintiffs.

Thomas H. Boyd -- tboyd@winthrop.com -- Matthew R. McBride --
mmcbride@winthrop.com -- Quin C. Seiler -- qseiler@winthrop.com --
and Olivia M. Cooper -- ocooper@winthrop.com -- Winthrop &
Weinstine, PA, Counsel for the Defendants.


DUPAGE MEDICAL: Hughes Sues Over Data Breach
--------------------------------------------
Jodi Hughes, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. DUPAGE MEDICAL GROUP, LTD. d/b/a DUPAGE MEDICAL GROUP,
Case No. 2021L000976 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Sept. 13, 2021), is brought
against the Defendant for disregarding the rights of Plaintiff and
Class Members by intentionally, willfully, recklessly or
negligently failing to take adequate and reasonable measures to
ensure its data systems were protected against unauthorized
intrusions; failing to disclose that it did not have adequately
robust computer systems and security practices to safeguard patient
Private Information; failing to take standard and reasonably
available steps to prevent the Data Breach and failing to provide
Plaintiff and Class Members accurate notice of the Data Breach.

According to its "Notice of Data Security Incident" and its report
of the breach to the Department of Health and Human Services Office
of Civil Rights, the data security incident that DuPage Medical
Group experienced resulted in Plaintiff's and 655,383 other current
and former patients' personally identifiable information and
protected health information as defined by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), including,
but not limited to, patients' names, addresses, dates of birth,
diagnosis codes, CPT (current procedural terminology) codes, Social
Security numbers and treatment dates (collectively, the "Private
Information") to be accessed and compromised by an unauthorized
third party (the "Data Breach").

The Data Breach was a direct result of Defendant's failure to
implement adequate and reasonable cyber-security procedures and
protocols necessary to protect the Plaintiff's and the Class
Members' Private Information despite the fact that ransomware
attacks against medical systems and healthcare providers are at an
all-time high. The mechanism of the cyberattack and potential for
improper disclosure of the Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private
Information was a known risk to the Defendant, through high news
reports and FBI warnings to the healthcare industry, and thus it
was on notice that failing to take steps necessary to secure the
Private Information from those risks left the property in a
dangerous and vulnerable condition. The Plaintiff's and Class
Members' identities are now at risk because of the Defendant's
conduct since the Private Information that Defendant collected and
maintained is now in the hands of data thieves, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a current patient of DuPage Medical Group who
received the notification letter dated September 1, 2021.

DuPage Medical Group, Ltd. d/b/a DuPage Medical Group is a medical
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Illinois with its headquarters in Downers Grove, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          MASON LIETZ & KLINGER LLP
          227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (202) 975-0477
          Email: gklinger@masonllp.com


EDUCATIONAL CREDIT: Mahboob Appeals TCPA Case Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Beheshta Mahboob filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled BEHESHTA MAHBOOB, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EDUCATIONAL
CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
3:15-cv-00628-TWR-AGS, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California, San Diego.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 3, 2021, Judge
Todd W. Robinson dismissed the case without prejudice.

Defendant Educational Credit Management Corp. ("ECMC") is a
non-profit organization that is a guaranty agency in the Federal
Family Education Loan Program. In the course of its business, the
Defendant places and receives a large amount of telephone calls.
During the period between Aug. 2, 2014 and March 31, 2015, the
Defendant recorded all inbound and outbound calls that reached a
live customer service representative using a phone dialer system
provided by Noble Systems Corp. During the class period, the Noble
Dialer was incorrectly programmed for some of Defendant's phone
lines such that the opening message was set as non-mandatory for
inbound calls.

The "Master List" of calls produced by the Defendant identifies
2,218 connected inbound calls from cellphone numbers with
California area codes with call durations over zero seconds and
hold times under four seconds to phone lines set as non mandatory.
This number equates to 1,767 unique cellphone numbers, or, as the
Plaintiff contends, 1,767 unique class members. The Plaintiff
contends that, "as a result of a negligent dialing system setup and
failure to notice the error, the Defendant violated the California
Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA") thousands of times by wrongly
recording private telephone calls with its customers without their
consent."

Plaintiff AJ Reyes initiated the putative class action on March 20,
2015, alleging violations of CIPA, Cal. Pen. Code Section 632.7,
and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C.
Section 227, et seq. On May 16, 2016, the Honorable Cynthia A.
Bashant granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff Reyes' TCPA claim and denied the motion as to the CIPA
claim. After this ruling, only the CIPA claim remained.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the order entered by Judge
Robinson dismissing the case without prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned as Beheshta Mahboob v. Educational
Credit Management, Case No. 21-56038, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Sept. 23, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Beheshta Mahboob Mediation Questionnaire is due
today, Sep. 30, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by Oct. 22, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on Nov. 22, 2021;

   -- Appellant Beheshta Mahboob opening brief is due on Jan. 3,
2022;

   -- Appellee Educational Credit Management Corporation answering
brief is due on Feb. 3, 2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant BEHESHTA MAHBOOB, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Kas Gallucci, Esq.
          Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
          Alexis M. Wood, Esq.  
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 696-9006

Defendant-Appellee EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION is
represented by:

          David J. Kaminski, Esq.
          Martin Schannong, Esq.
          CARLSON & MESSER LLP
          5901 W. Century Boulevard, Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90045
          Telephone: (310) 242-2200

ENERGY SERVICES GROUP: Brown Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Kenneth Brown and Mark Baron, on of behalf themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Energy Services Group
International, Inc. (ESGI), Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00611 (E.D.
Va., September 21, 2021), seeks to recover unpaid overtime and
other damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

ESGI provides workers to nuclear, fossil, and hydro power plants,
and government projects. Baron worked for ESGI at the Southern
Nuclear plant located in Georgia as a Scheduler from May 2018 until
February of 2019 while Brown worked as a Contract Engineer from
August 2016 until April of 2019. They claim to routinely work over
40 hours in a week without being paid overtime premiums. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Harris D. Butler, Esq.
      Zev H. Antell, Esq.
      BUTLER CURWOOD, PLC
      140 Virginia Street, Suite 302
      Richmond, VA 23219
      Tel: (804) 648-4848
      Fax: (804) 237-0413
      Email: harris@butlercurwood.com
             zev@butlercurwood.com

             - and -

      Richard J. Burch, Esq.
      BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
      11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 877-8788
      Fax: (713) 877-8065
      Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com

             - and -

      Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
      Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
      Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
      JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
      11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
      Houston, TX 77046
      Tel: (713) 352-1100
      Fax: (713) 352-3300
      Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
             adunlap@mybackwages.com
             rschreiber@mybackwages.com


EVERGREEN HOMECARE: Chung Seeks Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
Yoojin Chung, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Evergreen Homecare Service of NY Inc., SR
Homecare of NY, Inc., Elim Home Care Agency, LLC, Hyung Jong Koo,
James Koo, Seung Ryun Choi and Hye Ran Kim, Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-05264 (E.D. N.Y., September 21, 2020), seeks to recover
overtime and other compensation, as well as statutory penalties
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York labor laws.

Defendants operate as "SR Homecare," providing senior and adult
home health care services and other services to individuals in need
of medical or other assistance where Chung is a health and personal
care aide.

Chung has been employed by Defendants from February 2019 to the
present as a health aide at Evergreen Centers under New York's
Consumer Directed Personal Assistance Program. Chung claims not to
be paid the proper overtime compensation for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per week. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Scott K. Hur, Esq.
     Robert L. Lash, Esq.
     HUR, LASH & CHOE, LLP
     600 Sylvan Avenue, Suite 109
     Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632
     Email: (212) 468-5590


FANSIDED INC: Carusillo Suit Gets Collective Action Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRANDON CARUSILLO and
DAVID GATE, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, v.
FANSIDED, INC., d/b/a FANSIDED, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-04766-JPO
(S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge J. Paul Oetken entered an order:

   1. denying as moot the Defendants' motion to dismiss
      Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint;

   2. denying the Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
      Second Amended Complaint;

   3. granting the Defendants' motion to communicate with
      putative collective action members;

   4. directing the Plaintiffs to file any objections to the
      proposed notice regarding this litigation within two
      weeks;

   5. granting the Plaintiffs' motion for collective action
      certification;

   6. directing the Plaintiffs to modify the proposed notice in
      accordance with the Court's direction and re-submit the
      proposed notice within two weeks for the Court's review;

   7. directing the Defendants to submit any objections to the
      updated notice within one week after Plaintiffs'
      submission; and

   8. granting the Plaintiffs' motion for equitable tolling.

FanSided is a fandom-focused sports, lifestyle and entertainment
network of more than 300 websites.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 21, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39P5RCO at no extra charge.[CC]

FLORIDA: Seeks to Extend Class Cert. Response Filing Date
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JAC'QUANN (ADMIRE)
HARVARD; JEREMIAH HILL; JUAN ESPINOSA; JEROME BURGESS (a/k/a
SHAM'LA GOD ALLAH); JAMES W. KENDRICK, JR.; JOHNNY HILL; and TRACEY
DEAN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v.
MARK INCH, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Florida
Department of Corrections, and FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
an Agency of the State of Florida, Case No. 4:19-cv-00212-AW-MAF
(N.D. Fla.), the Defendants ask the Court to enter an order
granting extension of time to file their response in opposition to
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification on May
28, 2021.

On September 10, 2021, the parties held a joint telephonic
conference before the Court. The parties informed the Court that,
due to unforeseen circumstances, Defendants would need additional
time to file their Response. Specifically, one of Plaintiffs'
experts requested to postpone his deposition because of family
medical issues, and he is not available to be deposed until after
the present deadline for the Response.

The Plaintiffs have no objection to this extension and Defendants
have no objection to Plaintiffs receiving a similar extension to
file their Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.

The Florida Department of Corrections operates state prisons in the
U.S. state of Florida. It has its headquarters in Florida's capital
of Tallahassee. The Florida Department of Corrections operates the
third largest state prison system in the United States.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Sept. 21, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3umatcK at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Nicole Smith, Esq.
          Daniel J. Gerber, Esq.
          Samantha C. Duke, Esq.
          RUMBERGER, KIRK & CALDWELL
          Lincoln Plaza, Suite 1400
          300 South Orange Avenue (32801)
          Post Office Box 1873
          Orlando, FL
          Telephone: (407) 872-7300
          Telecopier: (407) 841-2133
          E-mail: dgerber@rumberger.com
                  sduke@rumberger.com

               - and -

          Nicole Smith, Esq.
          Jeffrey J. Grosholz, Esq.
          Joshua D. Lerner, Esq.
          RUMBERGER, KIRK & CALDWELL
          Post Office Box 10507
          Tallahassee, FL 32302-2507
          Telephone: (850) 222-6550
          Facsimile: (850) 222-8783
          E-mail: nsmith@rumberger.com
                  jlerner@rumberger.com

FOREST RIVER: Fitzgerald Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HEATHER R. FITZGERALD, on
behalf of herself and others similarly situated, v. FOREST RIVER
MANUFACTURING LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-01004-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order pursuant to Section
216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"):

   1. conditionally certifying the case as an FLSA collective
      action under Section 216(b) against Defendant Forest River
      on behalf of Plaintiff and others similarly situated,
      consisting of the following class:

      "All current and former employees of Defendant who
      work/worked for the Defendant as manufacturing employees
      in the United States, are/were paid entirely on a piece
      rate basis, and who worked more than 40 hours in at least
      one workweek beginning February 11, 2018 and continuing
      through the final disposition of this case;"

   2. directing that notice be sent by United States mail and
      email to all members of the foregoing class;

   3. approving the notice and consent to Join Form informing
      such present and former employees of the pendency of this
      collective action and permitting them to opt in to the
      case;

   4. directing Defendant to provide within 14 days a Roster of
      the foregoing class members, including their full names,
      dates of employment, last known home addresses, and
      personal email addresses. Additionally, directing
      Defendant to produce such Roster in Excel or similar
      exportable/importable format;

   5. directing that Notice, in the form approved by the Court,
      be sent to such present and former class members within 14
      days of Plaintiff's receipt of the Roster using the
      information containing the same;

   6. directing the Defendant to provide a Declaration that the
      produced Roster fully complies with the Court’s Order;

   7. directing a Notice Period of 90 days; and

   8. providing that duplicate copies of the Notice may be sent
      in the event that new, updated, or corrected mailing
      addresses or email addresses are found for one or more of
      such present or former employees.

Forest River is an American manufacturer of recreational vehicles,
cargo trailers, utility trailers, and pontoon boats.

A copy of the Plainitff's motion to certify class dated Sept. 21,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3F4gmAj
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert. P. Kondras, Jr., Esq.
          HASSLER KONDRAS MILLER LLP
          100 Cherry St.
          Terre Haute, IN 47807
          Telephone: (812) 232-9691
          Facsimile: (812) 234-2881
          E-mail: kondras@hkmlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
          Massillon, OH 44646
          Telephone: (330) 470-4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
                  sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Robi Baishnab, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          1360 E. 9th St., Suite 808
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 230-2955
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: rbaishnab@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite No. 126
          Columbus, Ohio 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

FRANK KENDALL: Sued Over Improper Denials of Discharge Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Martin Johnson and Jane Doe, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. FRANK KENDALL, Secretary of the Air Force,
Case No. 3:21-cv-01214-CSH (D. Conn., Sept. 13, 2021), is brought
to ask the Court to set aside and hold unlawful the AFDRB's
improper denials of discharge upgrade applications. They request
that this Court order the AFDRB to review their discharge upgrade
applications again and meaningfully apply the liberal consideration
standard. Finally, Ms. Doe and Mr. Johnson ask the Court to issue
injunctive relief to ensure that Air Force veterans may have their
discharge upgrade applications considered according to the
Constitution and as intended by Congress and the Department of
Defense.

According to the complaint, the Air Force forcibly separates
countless veterans from the military with less-than-Honorable
discharges due to minor infractions, and refuses to acknowledge
that their mental health or sexual trauma played a role in shaping
their conduct. These veterans are forever stigmatized, rejected
from jobs, and barred from benefits like education and healthcare
due to their discharge status. And it is the Air Force's most
marginalized members—airmen of color and women who
disproportionately experience this punishment.

Congress established the Discharge Review Boards (DRBs) to allow
veterans to seek relief when they have been improperly and
inequitably discharged. As more scientific evidence about mental
health and sexual violence has emerged, military leadership and
Congress have recognized that these experiences can cause
misconduct, and that military discharges must be considered in
light of these experiences. Yet binding agency guidance, lawsuits
challenging the failure of the Army and Navy to comply with these
laws, and clear congressional intent have all failed to shake the
Air Force Discharge Review Board's (AFDRB) entrenched skepticism of
veterans' mental health claims and experiences of sexual or
intimate partner violence (IPV).

The Air Force consistently refuses to apply the liberal
consideration standard and rejects hundreds of meritorious claims
annually, frequently without explaining what a veteran must show to
prevail or why their claims failed. In place of actual reasoning,
the Air Force deploys boilerplate language to reject their claims.
Through this process, veterans who have survived trauma, abuse, and
combat learn that they will forever be defined by their lowest
moments through standardized phrases that exemplify the AFDRB's
suspicion of mental health claims and disregard for the
case-by-case demands of liberal consideration. Jane Doe and Martin
Johnson thus bring this class action on behalf of themselves and
other Air Force veterans with less-than-Honorable discharges, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiffs are veterans of the United States Air Force.

Frank Kendall, Secretary of the Air Force, is sued here in his
official capacity.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David Bassali, Esq.
          Yael Caplan, Esq.
          Alexis Kallen, Esq.
          Shariful Khan, Esq.
          Bardia Faghihvaseghi, Esq.
          Meghan E. Brooks, Esq.
          Michael J. Wishnie, Esq.
          VETERANS LEGAL SERVICES CLINIC
          Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization
          Yale Law School
          P.O. Box 209090
          New Haven, CT 06520-9090
          Phone: (203) 432-4800
          Email: michael.wishnie@ylsclinics.org

               - and -

          Susan J. Kohlmann, Esq.
          Jeremy M. Creelan, Esq.
          Jacob Tracer, Esq.
          Laurel A. Raymond, Esq.
          Jenner & Block LLP
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          919 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022-3908
          Phone: (212) 891-1678
          Email: jcreelan@jenner.com


GEICO GENERAL: Rosenberg Suit Gets Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RANDY ROSENBERG, D.C.,
P.A., a/a/o Danielle Russell, and on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Case
No. 0:19-cv-61422-AMC (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Aileen M. Cannon
entered an order granting the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification

As always, even after a certification order is entered, the Court
may modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the
litigation, says Judge Cannon.

The Court said, "The Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that
the class mechanism is a superior method of adjudicating the claims
in the Amended Complaint, and GEICO does not offer a counterpoint
on this subject, except to argue again that "Plaintiff offers no
plan of how it can ascertain the class members and managing the
action." The Court determines that Plaintiff has reasonably
demonstrated, at this stage, that it can adequately ascertain the
putative class members. The alternatives to class certification --
piecemeal state court proceedings or individual negotiations with
GEICO -- are less efficient than resolving all claims collectively
in one action."

This putative class action arises from Plaintiff's assertion that
Defendant GEICO has a widespread practice of underpaying personal
injury protection claims in breach of its insurance policy.

In 2016, Plaintiff, Randy Rosenberg, D.C., P.A, provided
chiropractic services to Danielle Russell after she sustained
injuries from an automobile accident. Russell was insured under a
GEICO automobile insurance policy that provided personal injury
protection in compliance with Florida' Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 21, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39Q8XGB at no extra charge.[CC]


GEICO INDEMNITY: Grant of Summary Judgment in Moe Suit Recommended
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRANDON L. MOE, individually and on behalf of all
individuals of the class similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. GEICO
INDEMNITY CO., GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, and JOHN
DOES I-XX, Defendants, Case No. CV 19-23-BU-BMM-KLD (D. Mont.),
Magistrate Judge Kathleen L. DeSoto of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Montana, Butte Division, recommended that the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants GEICO Indemnity and
Government Employees be granted.

Discussion

On March 15, 2015, Moe was injured in an automobile accident when
the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger was struck from
behind by another vehicle driven by Loretta Wescott. At the time of
the accident, Wescott's vehicle was insured under an automobile
liability insurance policy issued by GEICO.

On March 17, 2015, Moe called GEICO and spoke with claims adjuster
Lilliana Stevens about the accident. He reported low back pain and
said he planned to go to his primary care physician the following
day. On March 18, 2015, Moe visited his primary care physician and
was referred to Health in Motion Physical Therapy + Wellness. Moe
visited Health in Motion 11 times for physical therapy between
March 19, 2015 and June 22, 2015. For those eleven visits, Moe
incurred medical bills totaling $2,345.

On March 18, 2015, GEICO sent Moe a letter requesting that he
complete a HIPAA compliant authorization form ("Medical
Authorization Form") that would give GEICO permission to request
documentation from his medical providers. During a call with
Stevens on May 18, 2015, Moe indicated he would submit the Medical
Authorization Form to GEICO once he had completed physical therapy.
Stevens' notes reflect that GEICO received the Medical
Authorization Form back from Moe on July 6, 2015.

During this period, Moe had health insurance through his employer
administered by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Montana. Although Moe
provided Health in Motion with his Blue Cross insurance card and
filled out an intake form authorizing Health in Motion to bill Blue
Cross, Health in Motion sent Moe's medical bills to GEICO. Moe
testified at his deposition that it was his understanding that
Health in Motion would submit his medical bills to GEICO for
payment. Between April 7, 2015 and Sept. 2, 2015, Health in Motion
submitted Moe's medical bills to GEICO six times. Each time, GEICO
responded with a form letter explaining that GEICO is "not a health
insurance carrier and specifically not an insurer of Brandon Moe,"
and suggesting that Health in Motion contact its "patient to secure
filing information."

On April 21, 2015, Health in Motion gave Moe a copy of GEICO's
April 15, 2015 form letter and informed Moe that his medical bills
were unpaid. On May 26, 2015, Health in Motion sent Moe a medical
lien and requested that he sign and return it. Moe did not sign and
return the form as requested. Health in Motion also mailed GEICO a
notice that it was claiming a medical lien.

On June 30, 2015, Moe's employer provided a completed wage
verification form to GEICO, which indicated that Moe was paid for
all time missed following the accident. Moe missed approximately
two-and-a-half days of work, and was compensated for his time off
by using sick leave.

On Aug. 14, 2015, Moe called GEICO and advised Stevens that he had
completed his physical therapy. Stevens told Moe that GEICO would
obtain his medical records and then begin an evaluation of his
claim for resolution. On Oct. 15, 2015, GEICO tried reaching Moe by
phone but could not reach him. The next day, GEICO sent Moe a
letter requesting that he contact GEICO regarding his claim.
Several weeks later, on Dec. 7, 2015, Moe called GEICO and advised
Stevens that he had a new phone number. During their call, Stevens
offered to settle Moe's claim for $1,000 plus outstanding medical
bills. Moe rejected the offer and stated that he would get an
attorney.

After Dec. 7, 2015, Moe became unresponsive to GEICO's attempt to
contact him regarding his claim. On Jan. 7, 2016, GEICO sent Moe a
letter asking him to contact GEICO regarding his claim. Moe did not
respond, and on March 15, 2016, GEICO sent Moe a letter advising
him of the statute of limitations on his claim and informing him
that GEICO would close his file due to lack of responsiveness if he
did not respond. Again, Moe did not respond.
All told, GEICO spoke with Moe six times between March 17, 2015 and
Dec. 7, 2015 regarding his bodily injury claim. GEICO also sent Moe
multiple letters and left him multiple voicemails regarding his
bodily injury claim during this period.

Mr. Moe first spoke with attorney Mark Luebeck regarding his claim
on June 20, 2016. In September 2016, Health in Motion sent Moe's
bills to collections and Credit Systems contacted Moe regarding his
unpaid medical bills. Moe formally retained Luebeck on Oct. 4,
2016. In a letter dated Jan. 6, 2017, Luebeck informed GEICO that
he was representing Moe. Luebeck stated it was his understanding
that GEICO had refused payment for Moe's accident-related medical
bills and asked GEICO to state in writing why it had denied
payment. GEICO responded by way of a letter dated Jan. 12, 2017,
explaining that it "did not refuse payment for Mr. Moe's medical
bills, Ridley was not requested."

On March 1, 2017, GEICO spoke with Luebeck about Moe's claim for
the first time. During the call, GEICO asked if Moe was still
treating and Leubeck stated that he would let GEICO know after
speaking with Moe. GEICO followed up with Luebeck by way of a
letter dated March 31, 2017, in which it asked for a status update
regarding Moe's claim, requested any documentation regarding
medical bills, and inquired when it could expect a demand. On April
28, 2017, Stevens left Luebeck a voicemail again asking for status
update on Moe's claim and whether Moe wanted advance payment of
medical bills. On May 24, 2017, after learning from Moe that he was
represented by counsel, Credit Systems sent Luebeck a letter for
the purpose of filing a medical lien for payment of the unpaid
medical bills from Health in Motion should Luebeck receive any
settlement money on Moe's behalf.

Approximately one month later, on June 29, 2017, Luebeck sent GEICO
a Ridley demand letter requesting that GEICO pay Moe's
accident-related medical bills and wage loss. GEICO responded with
a letter to Luebeck on July 7, 2017, acknowledging receipt of the
Ridley demand and requesting confirmation that Luebeck's office
would satisfying any medical liens. After a follow-up letter and
voicemail from GEICO, Luebeck advised GEICO on Sept. 7, 2017, that
his office would satisfy any valid medical liens. On Sept. 19,
2017, GEICO issued a check to Luebeck in the amount of $2,481 for
Moe's medical bills. On Oct. 10, 2017, GEICO issued a check to
Luebeck in the amount of $979 for Moe's alleged lost wages.

Mr. Moe commenced the action in December 2018, alleging that GEICO
Indemnity failed to promptly advance payment for his medical bills
and lost wages under Ridley v. Guaranty Nat'l. Ins. Co., 951 P.2d
987 (Mont. 1997) and Dubray v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 36 P.3d 897
(Mont. 2001) during the period when he was not represented by
counsel. In October 2019, Moe filed an Amended Complaint adding
Government Employees as a defendant.

The Amended Complaint asserts four claims for relief: (1)
declaratory and injunctive relief (Count I); (2) violations of
Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act ("UTPA") and common law bad
faith (Count II); (3) class action (Count III); and (4) common fund
(Count IV).

The Court has dismissed Moe's claim for declaratory and injunctive
relief in its entirety (Count I), and has dismissed Moe's UTPA
claim to the extent it alleges violations of Mont. Code Ann.
Section 33-18-201(1) and (3) (Count II). For purposes of GEICO's
summary judgment motion, Moe's remaining claims are for violations
of Mont. Code Ann. Section 33-18-201(4), (6) and (13) and for
common law bad faith (Count 11).

Discussion

GEICO moves for summary judgment as to Moe's remaining claims of
UTPA violations and common law bad faith on the grounds that that:
(1) GEICO had no duty to advance pay Moe's medical bills or alleged
lost wages because Moe did not request that it do so; (2) GEICO had
a reasonable basis in law and fact for not making advance payments
absent a request from Moe that it do so; (3) Moe suffered no actual
damages and his UTPA claim therefore fails as a matter of law; and
(4) Moe's common law bad faith claim is barred by the statute of
limitations. Moe opposes GEICO's motion on all fronts, and takes
the threshold position that many of GEICO's arguments are barred by
the law of the case.

Judge DeSoto concludes that GEICO is entitled to summary judgment
as to Moe's remaining claims of UTPA violations and common law bad
faith on the grounds that: (1) GEICO had no duty to advance pay
Moe's medical bills or alleged lost wages because Moe did not
request that it do so; (2) GEICO had a reasonable basis in law and
fact for not making advance payments absent a request from Moe that
it do so; and (3) Moe's common law bad faith claim is barred by the
statute of limitations.

Having so concluded, Judge DeSoto declines to address GEICO's
argument that Moe's UTPA also fails as a matter of law because Moe
suffered no actual damages. Because Moe's remaining individual
claims should be dismissed, the Judge says he cannot maintain those
claims on a behalf of a class.

Disposition

Accordingly, Judge DeSoto recommended that the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment be granted and the case be dismissed.

The Clerk will serve a copy of the Findings and Recommendations of
United States Magistrate Judge upon the parties. The parties are
advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636, any objections to
the findings and recommendations must be filed with the Clerk of
Court and copies served on opposing counsel within 14 days after
service thereof, or objection is waived.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Findings &
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/rhdrwr from
Leagle.com.


GOLDMAN SACHS: Objections to Orders in Chen-Oster Suit Overruled
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, H. CRISTINA CHEN-OSTER, LISA PARISI, SHANNA ORLICH,
ALLISON GAMBA, and MARY DE LUIS, Plaintiffs v. GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO.
and THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., Defendants, Case No. 10 Civ.
6950 (AT) (RWL) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Analisa Torres of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York overruled the
parties' objections to Judge Robert W. Lehrburger's March, August,
November, and December 2020 Orders.

Background

The Plaintiffs appeal Judge Lehrburger's March 26, 2020 order,
concluding that certain arbitration agreements are enforceable,
ordering a remedy with respect to one category of agreements, and
compelling arbitration. The Defendants also appeal that portion of
the March 2020 Order which determines that one category of
agreements warrants a remedy. The Plaintiffs appeal Judge
Lehrburger's Aug. 24, 2020 order, concluding that certain white
papers are privileged. They appeal Judge Lehrburger's Nov. 5, 2020
order, denying the Plaintiffs' motion to compel additional document
discovery of "boys-club" evidence. Finally, the Plaintiffs appeal
Judge Lehrburger's Dec. 3, 2020 order, denying the Plaintiffs'
request to compel a certain compensation analysis.

Discussion

I. March 2020 Order

On March 26, 2020, Judge Lehrburger determined that the Defendants
did not waive their right to compel arbitration. He also concluded
that four categories of agreements containing arbitration clauses
were enforceable, but that one of those categories--the equity
award agreements--were obtained in a "procedurally problematic"
manner and thus required remedial action under Rule 23.

A. Plaintiffs' Objections

The Plaintiffs object to the March 2020 Order on four grounds.
First, they argue that the Defendants waived arbitration. Second,
they contend that the three categories of agreements, aside from
the equity award agreements, warrant Rule 23(d) relief. Third, the
Plaintiffs argue that the equity award agreements are
unconscionable. Fourth, they contend that Judge Lehrburger's
opt-out remedy with respect to the equity award agreements is
inadequate. The National Employment Lawyers Association/New York
submitted an amicus brief in further support of the Plaintiffs'
stance.

Judge Torres rejects all four objections. First, she finds that the
Plaintiffs' contention that "courts consistently hold that a
defendant waives the right to arbitrate if it fails to raise any
intent to compel arbitration concurrently with class certification"
mischaracterizes the law. Accordingly, he finds no clear error in
Judge Lehrburger's conclusion that the Defendants did not waive
arbitration.

Second, the Judge finds no clear error in Judge Lehrburger's denial
of Rule 23 relief. She finds no evidence of deceptive conduct, no
evidence of coercion, no evidence of targeting the putative class
members, no evidence of imposing arbitration without agreement or
without additional consideration. To the contrary, the Plaintiffs,
who are well-educated and experienced professionals, received
substantial rewards through promotion, compensation or severance
pay, and entered into agreements based on standard forms that
Goldman had been using long before the lawsuit was filed and which
were extended to both men and women.

For these reasons, Judge Torres concludes that the Plaintiffs have
not established that the factual findings and legal conclusions in
the March 2020 Order are clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

B. Defendants' Objections

The Defendants object to the March 2020 Order on two grounds.
First, they argue that Judge Lehrburger improperly concluded that
equity award agreements were obtained in a "procedurally
problematic" manner. Second, they contend that, because the equity
award agreements are enforceable, Judge Lehrburger erred in
granting class members the right to opt-out of the class.

Judge Torres rejects both arguments. She holds that the Defendants
have not established that the factual findings and legal
conclusions in the March 2020 Order are clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. The Judge finds no clear error in Judge
Lehrburger's conclusion and finds no clear error in Judge
Lehrburger's reasoning.

Accordingly, the March 2020 Order is affirmed.

II. August 2020 Order

The Plaintiffs argue that the August 2020 Order incorrectly upholds
the Defendants' claim of attorney-client privilege over diversity
committee white papers. Documents prepared by non-attorneys may be
privileged "if they were made 'at the direction of counsel, to
gather information to aid counsel in providing legal services.'"

Judge Torres finds that Judge Lehrburger thoroughly reviewed one of
the documents at issue, other versions of it, and privileged
memoranda requesting the preparation of these documents. She has
also reviewed the documents in camera. Nothing in the record
suggests that the discovery order was clearly erroneous or contrary
to law, or that the substantial deference due to the resolution of
discovery disputes by a magistrate judge should not be accorded in
the instant matter." Judge Torres finds no clear error and will not
disturb Judge Lehrburger's assessment that the context that gave
rise to the white papers justifies keeping them privileged.
Accordingly, the August 2020 Order is affirmed.

III. November 2020 Order

On Nov. 5, 2020, Judge Lehrburger denied the Plaintiffs' motion to
compel the production of "boys-club" documents from senior
executives because the Plaintiffs failed to establish a direct link
between those executives and the three processes at issue. Judge
Lehrburger noted that he recently granted the Plaintiffs leave to
depose two of the senior executives, and, if new evidence emerges
from those depositions, that the Plaintiffs may alert him.

With those depositions still outstanding, the Plaintiffs moved for
reconsideration of the November 2020 Order with respect to three
senior executives. On Nov. 27, 2020, Judge Lehrburger found that
the Plaintiffs still had not presented sufficient evidence to
suggest that the three executives made decisions with respect to
the specific employment processes at issue. In their objections,
the Plaintiffs argue that the November 2020 Order erred in
preventing them from conducting further discovery with respect to
the senior executives.

The Plaintiffs argue that Judge Lehrburger erred in finding that
they had failed to establish a nexus between the senior leaders and
the three policies at issue. Because the senior leaders were
"apprised of disparities linked to the three processes," "consulted
whenever the Defendants considered making changes to two of the
processes," and involved at the end of the promotion process, the
Plaintiffs contend that they made such a showing. Judge Lehrburger
determined that the Plaintiffs' evidence demonstrated that the
senior leaders "indisputably were involved in the Defendants'
diversity initiatives at a general level," but that it did not
establish that the senior leaders "made decisions with respect to
the three processes at issue."

Judge Torres agrees. She holds that the Plaintiffs have not shown
that the senior executives directly controlled the three contested
processes. Accordingly, the November 2020 Order is affirmed.

IV. December 2020 Order

The Plaintiffs argue that the December 2020 Order incorrectly
upholds the Defendants' claim of attorney-client privilege over a
data file underlying an equal pay study. The Defendants represent
that the data was collected under the direction and supervision of
outside counsel, for the purposes of providing legal advice. Based,
in part, on this representation, Judge Lehrburger determined that
the analysis the Plaintiffs requested was privileged.

Judge Torres rejects the contention that the Defendants have not
shown that the study materials were created for a legal purpose.
She says, the Defendants' outside counsel attested to directing and
supervising data collection for the purposes of providing legal
advice. Under these circumstances, the data is protected by the
attorney-client privilege.

Nothing in the record suggests that the discovery order was clearly
erroneous or contrary to law, or that the substantial deference due
to the resolution of discovery disputes by a magistrate judge
should not be accorded in the instant matter." Judge Torres finds
no clear error and will not disturb Judge Lehrburger's assessment
that Defendants have established that the data is privileged.

Accordingly, the December 2020 Order is affirmed.

Conclusion

For the reasons she stated, Judge Torres overruled the parties'
objections to Judge Lehrburger's March, August, November, and
December 2020 Orders.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/mpe6j6aa from Leagle.com.


GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: Zambito Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Zambito, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Government Employees Insurance
Company Inc. (GEICO), Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-02223 (M.D. Fla.,
September 20, 2021), seeks unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid
minimum wages, liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest and attorneys' fees and costs to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

GEICO is in the business of providing vehicle insurance, property
insurance and business insurance. Zambito is a former non-exempt,
Region 6 Adjuster for GEICO. He claims to have performed
off-the-clock work for which he was not adequately compensated. He
claims to be regularly required by GEICO management to work
additional hours beyond this scheduled time while off-the-clock
without receiving compensation including working through meal
breaks. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Charlotte Fernée Kelly, Esq.
      FERNEE KELLY LAW
      1228 E 7th Ave, #200
      Tampa, FL 33605
      Tel: (813) 315-3981
      Email: charlotte@ferneekellylaw.com


GULF COAST HOLDINGS: Faces Dale Suit Over Dancers' Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
DESTINEE DALE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GULF COAST HOLDINGS, LLC dba OZ'S
GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, a Florida Limited Liability Company; PAUL
SCAGNELLI, an individual; DOE MANAGERS 1 through 3; and DOES 4
through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 8:21-cv-02246 (M.D.
Fla., Sept. 22, 2021) seeks damages due to the Defendants evasion
of the mandatory minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, illegally absconding with Plaintiff's tips and
demanding illegal kickbacks.

The Plaintiff worked as a dancer for the Defendants at various
times from approximately December 2018 to January 2021.

The Defendants operate an adult-oriented entertainment facility
located in Clearwater, Florida under the name "Oz's Gentlemen's
Club" or "Oz's."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raymond R. Dieppa, Esq.
          FLORIDA LEGAL, LLC
          14 Northeast 1st Avenue, Suite 1001
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 722-6977
          Facsimile: (786) 870-4030
          E-mail: ray.dieppa@floridalegal.law

               - and -

          John P. Kristensen, Esq.
          KRISTENSEN LLP
          12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, CA 90066
          Telephone: (310) 507-7924
          Facsimile: (310) 507-7906
          E-mail: john@kristensenlaw.com

               - and -

          Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
          ELLZEY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          1105 Milford Street
          Houston, TX 77066
          Telephone: (713) 554-2377
          Facsimile: (888) 995-3335
          E-mail: jarrett@hughesellzey.com

HCA HEALTHCARE: Bailey Sues Over Erroneous Collection Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------
Regina Bailey, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. HCA Healthcare, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-01740, (D. Nev., September 21, 2021), seeks statutory damages
and any other available legal or equitable remedies for violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

HCA Healthcare operate hospitals and emergency rooms across the US.
It began placing debt collection calls to Bailey's cellular
telephone using prerecorded messages. The latter says she has never
had an account with HCA and claims that she does not owe the
alleged debt HCA was attempting to collect. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gustavo Ponce, Esq.
     Mona Amini, Esq.
     KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
     6069 South Fort Apache Road, Suite 100
     Las Vegas, NV 89148
     Telephone: (800) 400-6808
     Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
     E-mail: gustavo@kazlg.com
             mona@kazlg.com


HEALTHCARE PARTNERS: Rey Seeks Extension to File Class Cert. Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TOMAS REY, et al., v. LCMC
HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-01188-BWA-JVM
(E.D. La.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order
extending the deadline to move for class certification from
September 25, 2021 until a later date which will be agreed by the
parties by consent.

LCMC Health is a Louisiana-based, not-for-profit hospital system
serving the healthcare needs of the Gulf Coast region.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Sept. 21, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zWqPdf at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joseph M. Bruno, Esq.
          Christopher J. Bruno, Esq.
          BRUNO & BRUNO, LLP
          855 Baronne Street
          New Orleans, LA 70113
          Telephone: (504) 525-1335
          Facsimile: (504) 561-6775
          E-mail: jbruno@brunobrunolaw.com
                  chris@cjbrunolaw.com

               - and -

          Megan C. Kiefer, Esq.
          KIEFER LAW
          2310 Metairie Road
          Metairie, Louisiana 70001
          Telephone: (504) 828-3313
          Facsimile: (504) 828-0024
          E-mail: megan@kieferlaw.com

I 5 EXTERIORS: Bid to Quash Subpoenas in Stein TCPA Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIC STEIN, Plaintiff v. I 5 EXTERIORS INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:21-CV-5093-DWC (W.D. Wash.), Magistrate Judge
David W. Christel of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Tacoma, denied the Defendant's Motion to
Quash.

Background

The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) by making telemarketing calls to his
phone number and the numbers of other putative class members
registered on the National Do Not Call Registry.

In May 2021, the Court granted a motion to quash the Plaintiff's
first subpoena to third-party LOGMEIN Communications, which sought:
(1) records of all outbound calls by I 5 Exteriors Inc. from Feb.
5, 2021 through the current date, and (2) records of all outbound
calls by any entity that used 360-718-2203 from Feb. 5, 2021
through the current date, and (3) A declaration confirming the
authenticity of the same.

The Court reasoned that because the Plaintiff sought information
outside the dates the Plaintiff alleges the Defendant called him,
the Plaintiff was "not seeking information related to the calls
made to him by the Defendant but to find a lead plaintiff."

On July 30, 2021, the Defendant filed another motion to quash. This
time, it seeks to quash two subpoenas the Plaintiff served upon
third-parties LOGMEIN and Cole's Neighborhood. On Aug. 11, 2021,
the Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. On Aug. 20, 2021,
the Defendant replied.

Meanwhile, on Aug. 13, 2021, the Court signed the parties'
Stipulated Protective Order.

Discussion

The subpoenas the Defendant seeks to quash are directed at
third-party LOGMEIN, which conducted telemarketing on behalf of the
Defendant, and third-party Cole's, from whom Defendant purchased
potential customer's phone numbers. The subpoena to LOGMEIN seeks:
(1) records of all outbound calls by I 5 Exteriors Inc. or I 5
Restoration Inc. from Feb. 5, 2017 through the current date; and
(2) A declaration confirming the authenticity of the same. And the
subpoena to Cole's seeks: (1) Records of telephone number[s] sold
to the defendant or I 5 Restoration, Inc. since Feb. 5, 2017 or
records of consent to receive calls from same; and (2) Records
reflecting any process of selling telephone numbers to the
defendant or I 5 Restoration, Inc. that include removing numbers
from the National Do Not Call Registry.

The Defendant objects to both subpoenas on a number of grounds.
First, according to the Defendant, the information sought is beyond
the scope of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) because the Plaintiff is
fishing for a client to be named the lead Plaintiff in a
not-yet-certified class action.

The Plaintiff persuasively rebuts this argument, explaining that
the information is sought to identify whether and when the
Defendant made telemarketing calls to him and the putative class
members. According to the Plaintiff, the documents he seeks will
also help to establish the number of alleged violations of the TCPA
by indicating how many calls were made to telephone numbers
registered on the National Do Not Call Registry, and whether
Defendant took measures to avoid calling such numbers.

Judge Christel concurs with the Plaintiff that the documents sought
in these subpoenas are relevant to class certification requirements
and potentially to both the claims and defenses.

The Defendant's next objection is that the Plaintiff has not proven
the telephone number in question -- (360) 718-2203 -- belongs to
the Defendant. In support of this argument the Defendant refers the
Court to paragraph six of the "Declaration of Chad Dillinger" which
states, "The phone records provided indicate that the number in
question (360) 718-2203, belongs to i5 9 (sic) Restoration, Inc.
and not I 5 Exteriors, Inc."

However, the Plaintiff offers evidence that I 5 Restoration's
website automatically redirects to Defendant I 5 Exterior's
website, that until recently (360) 718-2203 was the number listed
on I 5 Exteriors' website, that both businesses are registered with
the Secretary of State using the exact same address for their
Principle Place of Busines, and that in his complaint to the
Washington Attorney General regarding the unwanted calls from (360)
718-2203 the Plaintiff indicated the caller said she was from I 5
Exteriors.

Judge Christel finds the question of whom the telephone number
(360) 718-2203 is or was registered to during the relevant period
is a nonprivileged matter that is relevant to both claims and
defenses in the case, and is therefore discoverable under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Accordingly, the Defendant's argument that the
Plaintiff must prove this number was registered to it before he can
obtain discovery is without merit.

Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not established
Defendant ever called him. The Plaintiff responds that his "sworn
discovery responses state that he received telephone calls from
Defendant on April 17, 2018; Oct. 25, 2019; March 20, 2020; and
June 30, 2020." Again, the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff
must prove this number called him before he can obtain discovery to
prove it is without merit.

Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff may have been the one
to initiate calls between the parties, so seeking to discover calls
made from the Defendant to the Plaintiff is intended "to distort
the fact that the Defendant, and not the Plaintiff, first called
the other." Judge Christel finds the argument incongruous with the
Complaint alleging Defendant made unwelcome calls to the Plaintiff,
and the Defendant's admission that it "has served its own subpoenas
asking for incoming calls from the Plaintiff to the Defendant,"
which the Plaintiff has not moved to quash. The Defendant's
position that it "should be permitted to obtain its subpoenaed
records before the Plaintiff because such information will reveal
whether Plaintiff is indeed an adequate class representative" is
not well taken.

Next, the Defendant insists the Plaintiff's failure to produce "any
official proof from the Federal Trade Commission, National Do Not
Call Registry confirming the Plaintiffs registration on the Do Not
Call List" shows he may not be an adequate class representative.
The matter presently at bar is not a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 motion for
class certification, it is a motion to quash third-party subpoenas.
The Plaintiff needs not show official proof that he is an adequate
class representative in order to obtain precertification discovery.
Nevertheless, the Plaintiff has produced a screenshot of a
confirmation message indicating the telephone number ending in 0131
was successfully registered on the registry in 2003.

Next, the Defendant argues that the subpoenas seek "it's
confidential client lists so that the Plaintiff may call up the
numbers listed and solicit participation in this "class action" and
certify the class. This argument is belied by the plain language of
the subpoenas, which seek records of telephone numbers sold to and
called by Defendant, not Defendant's confidential client lists.
However, the Defendant does not cite any authority for the
proposition that lists of telephone numbers or telephone calls to
those numbers constitute confidential, proprietary commercial
information or trade secrets.

The Plaintiff compellingly argues that the Defendant's contention
is speculative, at best, and not supported by evidence or a
particularized argument showing how it has a proprietary interest
in other people's names and phone numbers, much less how such
information constitutes a "trade secret." Moreover, the Plaintiff
is correct that if any information responsive to the subpoena is
revealed to be confidential it can easily be safeguarded by the
existing Protective Order.

Finally, the Defendant argues the subpoenas are overbroad because
they seek information beginning Feb. 5, 2017, whereas the Plaintiff
alleges the Defendant first called him in the Spring of 2018.
However, Judge Chritel finds that the Defendant does not have
standing to object to third party subpoenas on grounds that the
subpoena seeks irrelevant information or would impose an undue
burden, "especially where the non-party, itself, has not objected."
Notably, he says, the Defendant's own subpoenas seek records of
calls made from numerous telephone numbers (not just the one
Plaintiff has identified as being called by Defendant, beginning in
February 2017).

Disposition

Judge Christel concludes that the Defendant has not met its burden
of showing the subpoenas to LOGMEIN and Cole's should be quashed.
Accordingly, he granted the Defendant's motion for extension of
time to file its reply and denied its motion to quash.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/nxnrnx5v from Leagle.com.


INMAR INC: Court Tosses MDI Bid to Certify Class w/o Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MR. DEE'S INC., et al v.
INMAR, INC., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-00141 (M.D.N.C.), the Hon.
Judge William L. Osteen, Jr. entered an order denying without
prejudice motion to certify class.

The suit alleges violation of Racketeering (RICO) Act.

Inmar develops technology and data analytics services.[CC]

INTERACTIVE BROKERS: Parties Seek Modified Scheduling Order
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT SCOTT BATCHELAR, v.
INTERACTIVE BROKERS, LLC, INTERACTIVE BROKERS GROUP, INC., and
THOMAS A. FRANK, Case No. 3:15-cv-01836-AWT (D. Conn.), the Parties
ask the Court to enter an order granting the modified scheduling
order as follows:

          Scheduling Order       Current         Modified
                                 Deadline        Deadline

-- Completion of non-expert   June 28, 2021       Completed
   document discovery
   related to class
   certification:

-- Completion of fact         July 28, 2021       Completed
   depositions related
   to class certification

-- Plaintiff's designation    Aug. 25, 2021       Completed
   of class certification
   experts and expert
   reports

-- Plaintiff must produce     Sept. 24, 2021      Oct. 20, 2021
   expert(s) for
   deposition(s)

-- Defendants' designation    Oct. 13, 2021        Nov. 5, 2021
   of class certification
   experts and expert
   reports

-- Defendants must produce    Oct. 27, 2021        Dec. 10, 2021
   expert(s) for
   deposition(s)

-- Plaintiff’s motion for     Dec. 1, 2021         Jan. 21, 2022
   class certification

-- Defendants' opposition    Dec. 29, 2021        Feb. 25, 2022
   to the motion for
   class certification

-- Plaintiff's reply to      Jan. 12, 2022        March 18, 2022
   the opposition to the
   motion for class
   certification

A copy of the Parties' joint motion dated Sept. 21, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zPJYxK at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William M. Bloss, Esq.
          Christopher M. Mattei, Esq.
          KOSKOFF, KOSKOFF & BIEDER, P.C.
          350 Fairfield Avenue
          Bridgeport, CT 06604
          Telephone: (203) 336-4421
          Facsimile: (203) 368-3244
          E-mail: bbloss@koskoff.com
                  cmattei@koskoff.com

               - and -

          Gary N. Reger, Esq.
          ORGAIN, BELL AND TUCKER, LLP
          207 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 301
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 861-0441
          E-mail: gnr@obt.com

               - and -

          L. DeWayne Layfield, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF L. DEWAYNE LAYFIELD, PLLC
          P.O. Box 3829
          Beaumont, TX 77704
          Telephone: (409) 832-1891
          E-mail: dewayne@layfieldlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Gary J. Mennitt, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          1095 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 698-3500
          Facsimile: (212) 698-3599
          E-mail: gary.mennitt@dechert.com

               - and -

          Thomas D. Goldberg, Esq.
          Andraya Pulaski Brunau, Esq.
          DAY PITNEY LLP
          242 Trumbull Street
          Hartford, CT 06103
          Telephone: (860) 275-0100
          Facsimile: (860) 275-0343
          E-mail: tgoldberg@daypitney.com
                  abrunau@daypitney.com

JASMIN LARIAN: Crumwell Says Website Not Blind-accessible
---------------------------------------------------------
Denise Crumwell, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated visually-impaired individuals, Plaintiff, v. Jasmin Larian
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-07691 (S.D. N.Y., September 14,
2021), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction, compensatory,
statutory and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this action together
with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other and
further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, New York
State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law.

Defendant operates the Cult Gaia online retail store as well as the
Cult Gaia website https://cultgaia.com/ and advertises, markets,
and operates in the State of New York and throughout the United
States. Crumwell is legally blind and claims that said website
cannot be accessed by the visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
      Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
      Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
      GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
      150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
      New York, NY 10003-2461
      Telephone: (212) 228-9795
      Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
      Email: Michael@Gottlieb.legal
             Jeffrey@gottlieb.legal
             Dana@Gottlieb.legal


K&N ENGINEERING: Eighth Circuit Affirms Judgment in Penrod Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, John Penrod; Gus Erpenbach; Juan Welsh, all
individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. K&N Engineering, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 20-1355 (8th Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirms the judgment of the district
court.

Background

The Plaintiffs are three individuals who purchased oil filters
designed by Defendant K&N. They seek to represent a nationwide
class of all purchasers of three styles of K&N oil filters that
they allege share a common defect, although most proposed class
members had oil filters that never exhibited the alleged defect.

Each of the Plaintiffs purchased a K&N designed KN-204 oil filter
that failed, causing varying levels of damage to their motorcycles.
Specifically, in the cases of Penrod and Erpenbach, the failure
caused oil to leak onto the rear tire of their motorcycles. In
Welsh's case, the failure caused catastrophic damage requiring him
to replace his motorcycle's engine at a cost of about $10,000.

The Plaintiffs filed suit in the District of Minnesota and sought
to represent a broad class of purchasers of three different styles
of oil filters designed by K&N and sold throughout the United
States. They allege that K&N failed to disclose a structural and
manufacturing defect that can cause these oil filters to suddenly
separate or fracture.

According to the Plaintiffs, the defect made the oil filters
susceptible to failure and increased the risk of catastrophic
failure such that, had K&N disclosed the defect, purchasers would
have found the risk unacceptable. Because of the defect, the
Plaintiffs claim they either paid too much for their filters or
would not have purchased them at all. While the named Plaintiffs
purchased oil filters that failed, their proposed class includes
purchasers whose oil filters never failed.

The Plaintiffs assert a number of different tort claims, including
breach of warranty, fraud, negligence, and strict liability. Each
claim is dependant upon CAFA as the source of federal
jurisdiction.

The district court found that the Plaintiffs' reliance on CAFA was
ineffectual because they failed to plausibly plead an aggregate
amount in controversy exceeding $5 million. In particular, the
court accepted as plausible the Plaintiffs' estimation of 2.5
million oil filters sold during the class period. The Plaintiffs
estimate that only 3/100ths of 1% of the oil filters at issue
failed. With approximately 750 alleged defective oil filters, the
damages must exceed $6,666.66 per oil filter failure to meet the
jurisdictional threshold. The court found the Plaintiffs'
assumption that each defective filter caused $10,000 in damages was
not plausible and neither was $6,666.66 per failure.

The Plaintiffs appeal, arguing they plausibly pleaded an amount in
controversy in excess of $5 million.

Analysis

The Eighth Circuit notes that the determinative issue is whether
the Plaintiffs have alleged an injury sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. In order for the Eighth Circuit to have jurisdiction
under CAFA, there must be a plausible allegation of $5 million in
damages. It is indisputably true that some of the proposed class
members lack standing. That said, how many of the proposed class
members lack standing is a question that need not be decided by the
Eighth Circuit because the determinative jurisdictional question is
whether the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged $5 million in
damages, as most of their proposed class members have no injury.

The Eighth Circuit finds that the Plaintiffs rely on various
contract cases and theories to argue that the uninjured class
members do, in fact, have cognizable injuries. They, however, have
not alleged a claim for breach of contract in their complaint. They
cannot now recast their product liability claim into a non-existent
breach of contract claim.

In the case, most of the oil filters at issue never failed. The
filters are like the drop-side crib in O'Neil and the off-road
vehicles in Polaris that were at risk of failing, but did not. The
Plaintiffs have not stated a products liability claim, and they
cannot "recast their product liability claim in the language of
contract" to state a claim.

Excluding the no-injury proposed class members, and even accepting
as plausible the Plaintiffs' estimation that 3/100ths of 1% of the
oil filters at issue were defective and failed (750 oil filters),
the Eighth Circuit holds that they simply cannot meet the
jurisdictional threshold for damages. Of the three named class
members, only one sustained engine failure that cost $10,000. The
filter failure on the other two motorcycles resulted in oil leaking
onto their rear tires.

Contrary to the Plaintiffs' argument, the Eighth Circuit finds that
this situation is not similar to George v. Omega Flex, Inc., 874
F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), in which diminution in
value could be appropriate. The plaintiffs in George alleged
corrugated stainless steel tubing installed in their buildings for
distribution of natural or propane gas caused their buildings to be
susceptible to failure when exposed to electrical arcing or direct
or indirect lightning strikes. Thie Eighth Circuit determined that
the plaintiffs had standing to bring a claim based on diminution in
value.

In the case, at issue is a consumable K&N oil filter that failed
occasionally or was otherwise used for its normal life and replaced
with a different oil filter as scheduled. The putative class
members' motorcycles are not now worth less due to their use of a
particular K&N oil filter. This situation is different in both kind
and degree from owning a building whose value is permanently
decreased due to faulty tubing.

Lastly, the Eighth Circuit rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that
separately analyzing their claims under state consumer protection
laws impacts the analysis. It finds that the Plaintiffs' complaint
still fails to plausibly allege damages to satisfy the
jurisdictional threshold. As to the Plaintiffs' proposed Oregon
subclass, Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act ("UTPA") allows
consumers to recover $200 in statutory damages if an individual
suffers an "ascertainable loss." Because most of the putative class
members did not suffer any loss, they got what they bargained for.
They did not suffer an "ascertainable loss" entitling them to
recover under Oregon's UTPA.

With regard to the Minnesota and Missouri subclasses, even assuming
a viable claim, the Eighth Circuit finds that the Plaintiffs do not
plead any facts regarding the size of these subclasses and, as
pled, it is impossible for us to conclude that they have plausibly
alleged the requisite amount of damages. Given that the Eighth
Circuit knows nothing about the size of two of the subclasses and
the Oregon statute requires an "ascertainable loss," it does not
find jurisdiction plausible in the three subclasses.

Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit concludes that the Plaintiffs' complaint does
not plausibly allege damages in excess of $5 million. The federal
courts are without CAFA jurisdiction to redress their defective
product claims. The Eighth Circuit affirms the judgment of the
district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/z7npvrhd from Leagle.com.


KELLOGG CO: Mislabels Protein Content of Veggie Burger, Brown Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
MOLLY BROWN, ADINA RINGLER, and CHRISTIAN LEMUS, as individuals, on
behalf of themselves, the general public and those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. KELLOGG COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
3:21-cv-07388 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 22, 2021) is a class action
asserting claims against the Defendant for violation of the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, false advertising, fraud,
deceit, and/or misrepresentation, unfair business practices and
unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, bring this class
action against Kellogg Company to seek redress for the Defendant's
deceptive practices in labeling and marketing its products under
the MorningStar Farms, Special K, RX, and Bear Naked brands.

According to the complaint, the Defendant prominently labels the
front of its products as providing specific amounts of protein per
serving depending on the product, such as "16G PROTEIN" on the
label of the MorningStar Farms Veggie Burger Grillers Original
product. Consumers including Plaintiffs, in turn, reasonably expect
that each product will provide the actual amount of protein per
serving that the front of the product package claims it will. In
truth, however, Defendant's products do not deliver the amount of
protein that the labels claim, says the suit.

Kellogg Company manufactures, distributes, markets, advertises, and
sells a variety of meat substitutes, cereals, bars, shakes, and
granola in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth A. Safier, Esq.
          Marie A. McCrary, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 336-6545
          Facsimile: (415) 449-6469

KENTUCKY: Rhodes Appeals Ruling in Prisoner Civil Rights Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Casey Rhodes filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit styled Casey Rhodes, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. John Tilley, James
Erwin and Randy White, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00019-GFVT, in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at
Frankfort.

The Plaintiff brought the class-action suit against the former
Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, James
Erwin, Deputy Commissioner Randy White, and the Secretary of the
Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, James Tilley in March of 2019.
The Plaintiff brings Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, as
well as state-law false imprisonment claims against the Defendants
related to the roughly twenty-seven hours in-between the Court of
Appeals' Order and his subsequent release.

The Plaintiff is seeking a review of the Court's Memorandum Opinion
and Order, and Judgment dated August 25, 2021, granting a motion
for summary judgment, which held that all claims against Defendant
Randy White are considered ABANDONED, and Defendant White is
DISMISSED as a party to this action. All pending motions were
DENIED as MOOT and the case was STRICKEN from the Court's active
docket.

The appellate case is captioned as Casey Rhodes v. John Tilley, et
al., Case No. 21-5899, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, filed on Sept. 22, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CASEY RHODES, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Aaron Bentley, Esq.
          Gregory A. Belzley, Esq.
          BELZLEY, BATHURST & BENTLEY
          P.O. Box 278
          Prospect, KY 40059
          Telephone: (502) 614-5962
          E-mail: abentley3b@gmail.com
                  gbelzley@aol.com

Defendants-Appellees SECRETARY OF THE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
CABINET JOHN TILLEY; and FORMER COMMISSIONER OF THE KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF JAMES L. ERWIN, Warden, are represented by:

          Richard Dale Lilly, Esq.
          KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
          P.O. Box 2400
          Frankfort, KY 40602
          Telephone: (502) 564-4001

               - and -

          Heather Lynn Becker, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          700 Capital Avenue, Suite 118
          Frankfort, KY 40601
          Telephone: (502) 696-5610

LEXINGTON INSURANCE: Menominee Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, et al., filed an
appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled MENOMINEE
INDIAN TRIBE OF WISCONSIN, et al., Plaintiffs v. LEXINGTON
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-00231-WHO,
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Francisco.

Plaintiffs Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, the Menominee
Indian Gaming Authority d/b/a Menominee Casino Resort and the Wolf
River Development Company's seek coverage from each Defendant for
the damages Plaintiffs sustained due to the COVID-19 pandemic and
resulting government closure orders.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 15, 2021, the case
was removed from the Alameda County Superior Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on Jan. 11,
2021.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the Court's Order and Judgment
dated Aug. 23, 2021, granting Defendants' motions to dismiss.

The appellate case is captioned as Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin, et al. v. Lexington Insurance Company, et al., Case NO.
21-16557, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, filed on Sept. 22, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellants Menominee Indian Gaming Authority, Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin and Wolf River Development Company
Mediation Questionnaire was due on Sept. 29, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by Oct. 20, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on Nov. 19, 2021;

   -- Appellants Menominee Indian Gaming Authority, Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin and Wolf River Development Company
opening brief is due on Dec. 29, 2021;

   -- Appellees Allied World National Assurance Company, Arch
Specialty Insurance Company, Endurance Worldwide Insurance Ltd t/as
Sompo International, Evanston Insurance Company, Hallmark Specialty
Insurance Company, Homeland Insurance Company of New York, Landmark
American Insurance Company, Lexington Insurance Company, Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Underwriters at Lloyd's - Aspen
Specialty Insurance Company, Underwriters at Lloyd's - Syndicate:
BRT 2987, Underwriters at Lloyd's - Syndicate: CNP 4444,
Underwriters at Lloyd's - Syndicates: ASC 1414, XLC 2003, TAL 1183,
MSP 318, ATL1861, KLN 510, AGR 3268, Underwriters at Lloyd's -
Syndicates: KLN 0510, ATL 1861, ASC 1414, QBE 1886, MSP 0318, APL
1969, CHN 2015, XLC 2003, Underwriters at Lloyd's - Syndicates: KLN
0510, TMK 1880, BRT 2987, BRT 2988, CNP 4444, ATL 1861, Neon
Worldwide Property Consortium, AUW 0609, TAL 1183, AUL 1274 and XL
Catlin Insurance Company UK Ltd. answering brief is due on Jan. 28,
2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WISCONSIN;
MENOMINEE INDIAN GAMING AUTHORITY, DBA Menominee Casino Resort; and
WOLF RIVER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Jennie Lee Anderson, Esq.
          ANDRUS ANDERSON LLP
          155 Montgomery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 986-1400

               - and -

          Jeff J. Bowen, Esq.
          Timothy Burns, Esq.
          BURNS BOWEN BAIR, LLP
          10 E Doty Street, Suite 600
          Madison, WI 53703
          Telephone: (608) 286-2391

               - and -

          Douglas A. Daniels, Esq.
          DANIELS & TREDENNICK PLLC
          6363 Woodway, Suite 700
          Houston, TX 77057
          Telephone: (713) 917-0024

               - and -

          Mark A. DiCello, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          7556 Mentor Avenue
          Mentor, OH 44060
          Telephone: (440) 953-8888  

               - and -

          W. Mark Lanier, Esq.
          THE LANIER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          2200 Geng Road
          Palo Alto, CA 94303
          Telephone: (650) 322-9100  

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Sixth Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900

Defendants-Appellees LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY; UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD'S - SYNDICATES: ASC 1414, XLC 2003, TAL 1183, MSP 318,
ATL1861, KLN 510, AGR 3268; UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S - SYNDICATE:
CNP 4444; UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S - SYNDICATES: KLN 0510, ATL 1861,
ASC 1414, QBE 1886, MSP 0318, APL 1969, CHN 2015, XLC 2003;
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S - SYNDICATE: BRT 2987; UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD'S - SYNDICATES: KLN 0510, TMK 1880, BRT 2987, BRT 2988, CNP
4444, ATL 1861, NEON WORLDWIDE PROPERTY CONSORTIUM, AUW 0609, TAL
1183, AUL 1274; HOMELAND INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK; ENDURANCE
WORLDWIDE INSURANCE LTD T/AS SOMPO INTERNATIONAL; XL CATLIN
INSURANCE COMPANY UK LTD.; HALLMARK SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY;
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S - ASPEN SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY;
EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY; ALLIED WORLD NATIONAL ASSURANCE
COMPANY; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; LANDMARK AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY; and ARCH SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY are
represented by:

          Ryan S. Appleby, Esq.
          Richard Joseph Doren, Esq.
          Matthew Allan Hoffman, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
          333 S Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
          Telephone: (213) 229-7353

               - and -

          Qianwei Fu, Attorney, Esq.
          ZELLE HOFMANN VOELBEL & MASON LLP
          44 Montgomery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 693-0700

               - and -

          William Eric Blumhardt, Esq.
          ARCHER NORRIS
          2033 N. Main Street
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 930-6600

               - and -

          Paul Bruce Converse, Esq.
          Timothy Mark Strong, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 1400
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          Telephone: (602) 285-5000

               - and -

          Jonathan Gross, Esq.
          Lawrence Hecimovich, Esq.
          MOUND COTTON WOLLAN & GREENGRASS LLP
          2200 Powell Street, Suite 1050
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (510) 900-9371

LION FOODS: Faces Ruiz Suit Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
EDY RUIZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LION FOODS LLC, California limited liability company;
and DOES through 50, inclusive, Case No. 21CV386961 (Cal. Super.,
Santa Clara Cty., Sept. 22, 2021) arises from the Defendants'
alleged unlawful business practices including but not limited to,
their failure to timely provide minimum, regular, and overtime
compensation due for all hours worked, failure to reimburse
business expenses, failure to provide compliant meal periods and
rest breaks to their employees or compensation in lieu thereof, and
failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants as a non-exempt hourly
employee around 2014. The Plaintiff's job duties include organizing
and restocking pre-packaged food.

Lion Foods LLC is doing business as Fresco Supermarket and owns and
operates supermarkets in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jose R. Garay, Esq.
          JOSE GARAY, APLC
          249 E. Ocean Blvd. #814
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (949) 208-3400
          Facsimile: (562) 590-8400
          E-mail: jose@garaylaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel J. Hyun, Esq.
          Shelly D. Song, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL J. HYUN
          1100 West Town and Country Road, Suite 1250
          Orange, CA 92868
          Telephone: (949) 596-4782
          Facsimile: (949) 528-2596
          E-mail: dh@danielhvunlaw.com
                  ss@danielhvunlaw.com

MICHAEL CARVAJAL: Brandon Files Suit in S.D. West Virginia
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Carver, et al. The
case is styled as Shanna Brandon, individually, and on behalf of
others similarly situated v. Warden Carver and BOP Director
Carvajal, Case No. 1:21-cv-00540 (S.D.W. Va., Sept. 23, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner - (Prison Condition) for
Federal Question: Bivens Act.

Michael Carvajal is the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


NATIONAL WESTERN: W.D. Missouri Narrows Claims in Baldwin Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MILDRED BALDWIN and DOUGLAS DYRSSEN SR., on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NATIONAL
WESTERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
2:21-CV-04066-WJE (W.D. Mo.), Magistrate Judge Willie J. Epps, Jr.,
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri,
Central Division, granted in part and denied in part NWL's Motion
to Dismiss.

Background

Ms. Baldwin and Mr. Dyrssen filed the putative class action on
behalf of themselves and three classes of National Western Life
Insurance ("NWL") policy holders and former employees: A nationwide
class, statewide Missouri class, and statewide California class.
The Plaintiffs claim NWL failed to properly protect their
personally identifying information ("PII"), and that NWL's poor
response to a subsequent data breach compromised that PII.

Ms. Baldwin, a Missouri resident, purchased a life insurance policy
from NWL in 1994, and provided her PII to NWL to enroll in the
policy. Mr. Dyrssen, a California resident, worked as an
independent insurance agent selling NWL insurance policies from
1993 to 1994, and provided his PII to NWL to work as an independent
agent on behalf of the company.

Beginning on Aug. 7, 2020, or earlier, digital intruders gained
unauthorized access to NWL's computer systems and acquired
policyholders' and employees' PII. On Aug. 15, 2020, NWL discovered
that unauthorized persons had accessed its computer systems when
malicious software caused its systems to malfunction. On Aug. 18,
2020, an independent data security research team informed NWL that
PII was extracted from its system, including customer Social
Security numbers, dates of birth, full names, dates of death,
states of residence, policy numbers, and policy termination dates.
The independent data security research team identified an online
post wherein perpetrators of the data breach claimed responsibility
for the attack.

In the online post made on Aug. 18, 2020, REvil, a ransomware
operator, disclosed that it was responsible for the attack. In the
post, REvil claimed that it stole 656 gigabytes of confidential
data from NWL during the breach, consisting of 25,110 folders that
contained 453,695 files. Days later, REvil made another post
detailing the information gained during its attack. Specifically,
on Aug. 23, 2020, REvil made an online post that included NWL
policyholders' and employees' PII. REvil claimed that it targeted
NWL and NWL's customers specifically, and solicited ransom payments
directly from NWL policyholders whose PII was stolen.

On Sept. 29, 2020, NWL enlisted a third-party firm to assess the
scope of the data breach. The third-party firm was tasked with
identifying all the individuals potentially impacted by the data
breach and the stolen information associated with each individual.
On Dec. 21, 2020, NWL publicly acknowledged the data breach.
Beginning on Jan. 14, 2021, NWL began notifying impacted
individuals about the data breach by mail. In doing so, NWL
disclosed that the recipients' personal information was stolen in a
data breach, but did not outline specifically the types of PII
stolen. The letters likewise advised recipients of a high
likelihood that their personal information would be misused, and
that recipients should contact credit-reporting bureaus to place
security freezes or fraud alerts on their credit reports.

Ms. Baldwin received a notice of data breach letter from NWL on
Jan. 25, 2021. Mr. Dyrssen also received a notice of data breach
letter from NWL in late January 2021. The notice letters informed
Ms. Baldwin and Mr. Dyrssen of the data breach and that there was a
risk that their PII would be misused. However, the letters did not
inform them that customers' and employees' PII was posted online in
August 2020.

Ms. Baldwin originally filed her Class Action Petition in the
Circuit Court of Pettis County, Missouri. NWL removed the case to
the Court on April 1, 2021. Both parties acknowledged this Court's
proper personal jurisdiction and venue in the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Leave to File Amended Complaint and to Set a Briefing Schedule,
which effectively mooted NWL's initial Motion to Dismiss. The
Plaintiffs then filed a nine-count Amended Complaint alleging
negligence, negligence per se, invasion of privacy, breach of
express/implied contractual duty, unjust enrichment, violation of
the Unfair Competition Law of California ("UCL"), violation of the
California Consumer Privacy Act, violation of California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), and violation of the California
Consumer Records Act.

NWL subsequently filed the instant Motion to Dismiss which is now
ripe for disposition. In its Motion to Dismiss, NWL argues that the
Plaintiffs fail to allege an actual or compensable injury resulting
from NWL's mishandling of PII. NWL further alleges that Ms. Baldwin
cannot sustain claims for negligence per se, invasion of privacy,
breach of express/implied contractual duty, or unjust enrichment.
Finally, NWL alleges that the California statutes on which Mr.
Dyrssen relies are inapplicable to conduct outside the state of
California and fail for a variety of other reasons.

Analysis

A. NWL's challenge to standing in a 12(b)(6) motion fails.

To challenge the Plaintiffs' claims generally, NWL argues thatthe
Plaintiffs failed to allege an injury sufficient to sustain any
claim against it, describing the Plaintiffs' injuries as "vague and
conclusory." NWL relies on TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct.
2190 (2021), to assert that the Plaintiffs' "entire case is
premised on an alleged risk of future harm completely untethered
from any actual, present injuries." NWL stresses that the
Plaintiffs' injuries do not satisfy the constitutional requirements
of standing.

First, Judge Epps holds that any standing challenge must be brought
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Standing is
required for the Court to have subject-matter jurisdiction. The
Judge states that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion allows for a party to
explicitly challenge the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
However, the instant Motion to Dismiss was filed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). Thus, thie Judge finds that NWL's standing challenge is
not proper pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and could have been pursued
via a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.

Furthermore, Judge Epps holds that NWL muddles the constitutional
injury-in-fact analysis for standing with the injury analysis in
the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which, of course, explores
whether the Plaintiffs can maintain their substantive claims. This
meshing of legal avenues, he says, renders inapplicable much of
NWL's cited case law. NWL correctly asserts that "the existence of
a legally cognizable injury is a 'threshold issue' that must be
decided at the outset of the case." However, NWL fails to cite to
any authority of a court performing an injury-in-fact analysis to
establish standing pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Thus, at
this stage in the legal proceedings, and absent relevant support in
the case law, the Judge will not engage in an injury-in-fact
analysis to determine whether the Plaintiffs maintain standing to
pursue their claims.

B. Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded their injuries to support their
substantive claims, except for their claims for damages for
emotional distress.

NWL maintains that the Plaintiffs' injuries are too vague,
speculative, and conclusory to support their substantive claims
under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Specifically, it challenges whether
the Plaintiffs' injuries, including time and effort monitoring
accounts, emotional distress, and "spam" phone calls and emails are
sufficient to sustain the Plaintiffs' tort claims, breach of
contract claims, unjust enrichment claim, and California statutory
claims. NWL relies on cases that analyze injury within the context
of standing.

First, Judge Epps finds that purported time and effort monitoring
accounts can qualify as an injury to support the Plaintiffs'
claims. Second, he dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims for damages for
emotional distress because they only allege that they suffered
emotional distress, but there is no indication in their Amended
Complaint of the severity of that distress or that it was medically
diagnosable. Third, the Judge finds that the allegations of spam
phone calls and emails can qualify as an injury to support the
Plaintiffs' claims. Fourth, the Plaintiffs' claims regarding the
other Class Members' injuries will not be dismissed because the
injuries alleged are sufficient to sustain the Plaintiffs'
substantive claims for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss.

C. Count II, the negligence per se claim, is properly pleaded and
will not be dismissed.

NWL challenges Ms. Baldwin's negligence per se claim. First, NWL
argues that Ms. Baldwin failed to plead any of the elements of
negligence per se. Second, it contends that Ms. Baldwin failed to
show causation and injury. Third, NWL states that Section V of the
Federal Trade Commission Act cannot form the basis of a negligence
per se claim because it does not outline a "definite standard of
care." It also argues that the injuries Ms. Baldwin alleges are not
the type of injuries that Section 5 was designed to prevent.

Judge Epps finds that Ms. Baldwin sufficiently pleads the elements
of negligence per se. In addition, he finds that Ms. Baldwin
sufficiently alleges causation and injury. NWL merely cites its
earlier arguments that Plaintiffs have not shown injury-in-fact.
And, the Judge finds that Ms. Baldwin sufficiently pleads, for
purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, that Section 5 can support a
claim for negligence per se.

D. Ms. Baldwin states a claim for invasion of privacy, so Count III
will not be dismissed.

NWL challenges Ms. Baldwin's invasion of privacy claim.
Specifically, it contends that Ms. Baldwin fails to state a claim
for "unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life"
because she fails to show that there was public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts.

Judge Epps finds that the invasion of privacy claim should stand.
The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint does not
specify which invasion of privacy tort they will advance at trial.
Even if Ms. Baldwin is asserting "unreasonable publicity given to
the other's private life," she alleged facts sufficient to support
this claim. The Judge may accept that there was public disclosure
of Ms. Baldwin's embarrassing private facts because the Court must
assume all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are true.
Therefore, Ms. Baldwin's invasion of privacy claim will not be
dismissed.

E. The breach of contract claim, Count IV, is pleaded sufficiently
and will not be dismissed.

NWL argues that Ms. Baldwin's claim for breach of contract should
be dismissed because she failed to plead the existence of a
contract. Specifically, it argues that Ms. Baldwin cannot sustain
her breach of contract cause of action because no contract existed
between the parties. Since NWL's Privacy Policy was not established
until 2004, 10 years after Ms. Baldwin did business with NWL, NWL
argues that no contract existed that it could breach. In addition,
NWL states that it did not breach any contract because Ms. Baldwin
failed to specify the obligations that NWL did not perform. Lastly,
NWL contends that Ms. Baldwin does not sufficiently plead that an
implied contract existed between NWL and the Plaintiffs. Ms.
Baldwin disagrees.

Judge Epps finds that Ms. Baldwin pleads facts to establish that a
valid contract did exist between the parties. Ms. Baldwin
sufficiently pleads that a valid contract existed between the
parties under Missouri law for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss.
Further, the Judge finds that Ms. Baldwin sufficiently pleads that
NWL breached that contract. s. Baldwin pleads that she and
purported Class Members "would not have entrusted their PII to
Defendant in the absence of such an agreement" and that NWL's
"failure to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of electronic
PII. Finally, the Judge finds that Ms. Baldwin sufficiently pleads
that an implied contract existed between the parties. He says, in
addition to breach of an express contract, the Plaintiffs
sufficiently allege that NWL breached its obligations of an implied
contract by failing to secure Ms. Baldwin's and purported Class
Members' PII.

F. The unjust enrichment claim, Count V, is properly pleaded and
will not be dismissed.

NWL next asserts that Ms. Baldwin does not state a claim for unjust
enrichment because she does not plead that she provided any benefit
to NWL or that she received anything less than what she bargained
for from NWL. Moreover, it argues that since Ms. Baldwin is already
arguing that there is an express contract governing the subject of
the transaction, she cannot also claim unjust enrichment.

Ms. Baldwin alleges that she conferred a benefit upon NWL when she
paid for life insurance and that part of those payments were for
data security. She states that she was deprived the full benefit of
these payments because NWL did not provide the data security for
which she expected and paid. The result, she claims, was the Data
Breach.

Judge Epps finds that Ms. Baldwin states a claim for unjust
enrichment for the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss. First, she
pleads that Plaintiffs conferred a benefit on NWL because they
provided payment to NWL to receive their life insurance policies.
In addition, Ms. Baldwin pleads that in exchange for payment, she
and members of the purported Classes believed NWL would securely
maintain their PII. However, Ms. Baldwin pleads that she and
members of the purported Classes did not receive the benefit of
securely maintained PII because their PII was disclosed in a data
breach. Moreover, NWL is correct in asserting that Ms. Baldwin
cannot prosecute both breach of an express contract and unjust
enrichment. However, the Amended Complaint specifically asserts
that the unjust enrichment claim is an alternative claim to the
breach of contract claim. Therefore, at this stage, the Judge will
not dismiss the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim.

G. Claims alleging violation of the Unfair Competition Law of
California (Count VI) and California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act
(Count VIII) will survive.

NWL, a Colorado corporation with a principal place of business in
Texas, argues California law is "inapplicable" to the claims of
this case. It further asserts that the Court should dismiss the UCL
claim because Mr. Dyrssen does not maintain "any consumer
relationship" with NWL and, "consequently, the UCL offers him no
remedy." Alternatively, NWL asserts that Mr. Dyrssen cannot sustain
a UCL claim because he fails to show a qualifying injury. It argues
that Mr. Dyrssen is bootstrapping violations of the California
Consumer Protection Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act onto
his UCL claim. Lastly, NWL also challenges Mr. Dyrssen's claim
pursuant to the CLRA, arguing he was not a consumer.

For the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, among other things,
Judge Epps holds that the Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that Mr.
Dyrssen was a consumer for the purposes of CLRA. Moreover, presuit
notice is not required when only injunctive relief is sought. The
Plaintiffs indeed seek injunctive relief in the case. Hence, the
CLRA claim survives.

H. Claims alleging violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act
(Count VII) and California Consumer Records Act (Count IX) will not
be dismissed.

While NWL suggests generally that all of Mr. Dyrssen's statutory
claims should be dismissed, it does not directly or specifically
challenge the claims alleging violation of the California Consumer
Privacy Act or California Consumer Records Act. Therefore, Counts
VII and IX survive the Motion to Dismiss.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Epps granted in part and denied in part NWL's
Motion to Dismiss. The claims for damages for emotional distress
are dismissed. All other claims survive.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/48vw9zsj from Leagle.com.


NEW JERSEY: Drayton Sues Over Racial Discrimination
---------------------------------------------------
Arnell Drayton, Marquise Jennings, on behalf of a class of others
similarly situated v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Case No. MER-L-001877-21
(N.J. Super. Ct., Mercer Cty., Sept. 13, 2021), is brought under
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) Public
Accommodation provision to redress the invidious discrimination
brought upon "Black" and Hispanic people through what was the State
of New Jersey's legacy enforcement of The Comprehensive Drug Reform
Act of 1986 ("CDRA") particularly as it relates to Cannabis
possession.

The complaint alleges that New Jersey knew or should have known
that it was discriminating against people of color, absent any
legitimate need (unlawful discrimination). In 2000, "Black" people
were 2.1 times more likely to be arrested for possessions compared
to Caucasians. In 2010, "Black" people were 2.84 times more likely
to be arrested for possessions compared to Caucasians. 33%
increase. The ACLU document showing these dramatic disparities was
reported in promise New Jersey newspapers and posted to the
internet. Yet, New Jersey failed to investigate and remediate the
discrimination it knew or should have known was occurring. New
Jersey knew or should have known the racial disparities in
possession offenses, says the complaint.

The State of New Jersey is a covered person under the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          William A. Riback, Esq.
          WILLIAM RIBACK, LLC
          1101 N. Kings Highway, Suite 210
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Phone: 856.857.0008
          Email: william.riback32@gmail

               - and -

          Mark Kancher, Esq.
          THE KANCHER LAW FIRM
          1101 N. Kings Highway, Suite 210
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Phone: 856.795.2440
          Email: mkancher@kancherlawfirm.com


NEW PENN: Mattson Appeals Class Cert. Bid Denial to 9th Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Erik Mattson filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit entitled Erik Mattson v. New Penn Financial, LLC,
Case No. 3:18-cv-00990-YY, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon, Portland.

The Plaintiff brings claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. Section 227. He accused New Penn Financial
of calling his cellphone while it was registered on the National Do
Not Call Registry. New Penn filed for summary judgment and the
court denied the motion, finding that a genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding whether Mattson's number was a residential
or business phone number.

After losing the motion, New Penn rallied and filed a motion to
deny class certification, arguing that the uncertainty about the
use of Mattson's phone number made him an atypical and inadequate
class representative.

Magistrate Judge Youlee Yim You issued a Findings and
Recommendation on March 8, 2021, in which she recommended that the
Court grant Defendant's Motion to Deny Class Certification. On July
9, 2021, the Court adopted in part Magistrate Judge You's Findings
and Recommendation, granting Defendant's motion to deny class
certification.

Plaintiff appeals the district court's July 9, 2021 order denying
class action certification.  The appellate case is captioned as
Erik Mattson v. New Penn Financial, LLC, Case No. 21-35795, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on
Sept. 22, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Erik Mattson Mediation Questionnaire was due on
Sepr. 29, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by Oct. 21, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on Nov. 22, 2021;

   -- Appellant Erik Mattson opening brief is due on Dec. 30,
2021;

   -- Appellee New Penn Financial, LLC answering brief is due on
Jan. 31, 2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner ERIK MATTSON, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          John P. Kristensen, Esq.
          KRISTENSEN LLP
          12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, CA 90066
          Telephone: (310) 507-7924
          E-mail: john@kristensenlaw.com

               - and -

          Leigh Skye Montgomery, Esq.
          ELLZEY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          1105 Milford Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554-0092

Defendant-Respondent NEW PENN FINANCIAL, LLC is represented by:

          Jeffrey G. Bradford, Esq.
          Robert A. Koch, Esq.
          TONKON TORP, LLP
          888 S.W. Fifth Avenue
          1600 Pioneer Tower
          Portland, OR 97204-2099  
          Telephone: (503) 802-5724
          E-mail: jeffrey.bradford@tonkon.com

               - and -

          Lauri Anne Mazzuchetti, Esq.
          James B. Saylor, Esq.
          Damon Suden, Esq.
          KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
          3 World Trade Center
          175 Greenwich Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 808-7800  
          E-mail: lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com
                  jsaylor@kelleydrye.com

NEW YORK: Not Dead Yet Appeals ADA Suit Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Not Dead Yet, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled Not Dead Yet, NMD United,
Disability Rights New York, Michelle Brose, Mike Volkman, Jessica
Tambor, and Peri Finkelstein, individually and on behalf of a class
of all others similarly situated v. Andrew Cuomo, Governor of the
State of New York, in his official capacity, and Howard A. Zucker
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, in his
official capacity, Case No. 2:20-cv-04819-GRB-AKT, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

The Plaintiffs, chronic ventilator users who reside in New York
State and organizations that represent them, bring this action on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated challenging
the New York State Department of Health's Ventilator Allocation
Guidelines. The Guidelines allow hospitals to reallocate the
personal ventilators of people who seek acute medical care in a
hospital during a time of triage to others deemed more likely to
survive based on a mechanical scoring system.

The Guidelines allegedly deprive people with disabilities of a
nondiscriminatory emergency preparedness program and risk placing
chronic ventilator users in potentially life-threatening situations
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Affordable Care Act.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the Court's Memorandum of
Decision and Order and Judgment dated August 13, 2021, granting
Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellate case is captioned as Not Dead Yet v. Cuomo, Case No.
21-2212, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, filed on September 10, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Not Dead Yet, NMD United, Disability Rights
New York, Michelle Brose, Mike Volkman, Jessica Tambor, and Peri
Finkelstein, individually and on behalf of a class of all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Jessica Barlow, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW YORK
          725 Broadway
          Albany, NY 12207
          Telephone: (518) 432-7861
          E-mail: jessica.barlow@drny.org

Defendants-Appellees Andrew Cuomo, Governor of the State of New
York, in his official capacity; and Howard A. Zucker, Commissioner
of the New York State Department of Health, in his official
capacity, are represented by:

          Barbara D. Underwood, Esq.
          NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          28 Liberty Street
          New York, NY 10005

OKLAHOMA: Claims 2 & 3 in Cole v. ODOC Dismissed Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN L. COLE, for himself and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff v. SCOTT CROW, Director, O.D.O.C.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. CIV-20-655-G (W.D. Okla.), Judge
Charles B. Goodwin of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma issued an order:

     i. dismissing without prejudice the Plaintiff's Claim Two,
        as well as any claim for relief within the Plaintiff's
        Claim Three premised upon the existence of a
        state-created liberty interest in the earning of sentence
        credits;

    ii. denying as moot the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; and

   iii. denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

I. Background

Plaintiff Cole, a state prisoner, brings the action under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, alleging violations by the Defendants of his
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. The
matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Gary M.
Purcell in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

Pursuant to title 21, section 13.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
Oklahoma law prohibits the application of earned credits to reduce
sentences imposed for certain violent crimes, including robbery
with a dangerous weapon, until the convicted individual has served
85% of his sentence. Based on the Plaintiff's conviction for
Robbery with a Firearm, he is not eligible for credits that reduce
his sentence lower than 85%.

Construing the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint liberally, the
Plaintiff raises several claims related to good time credits. In
his first and third claims, the Plaintiff explains that in order to
participate in Re-Entry/Stepdown and Reintegration Programs, which
are designed to prepare inmates for acclimating to life outside of
prison, the inmate has to be within 760 days from his discharge
date. As noted, 85% inmates cannot have their credits applied to
their sentence until they have formally served 85% of the same.

The Plaintiff contends this usually results in the inmates being
released upon meeting their 85% date because the sudden application
of their credits fulfills their 100% sentence, sometimes with extra
credits remaining. However, eligibility calculations for the
Re-Entry/Stepdown and Reintegration Programs use the 100% sentence
discharge date. This means that unlike the non-85% inmates, the 85%
inmates can never participate in these programs prior to their
release.

The Plaintiff contends this disparate treatment between the 85% and
non-85% inmates does not have a rational basis and is a violation
of his equal protection rights. Relying on his Consolidated Record
Card, the Plaintiff notes that he is accruing credits, though they
cannot be applied until he reaches his 85% date, and that he can
lose them before he reaches that date. Based on this, the Plaintiff
asserts both substantive and procedural due process claims, arguing
that since he can lose the credits that could otherwise be applied
in the future, he has a state created liberty interest in the
same.

In his second claim, the Plaintiff asserts that the prohibition
against his ability to apply good time credits to his sentence is a
violation of his due process rights. He contends it is a violation
of due process and equal protection to not permit 85% inmates to
receive the benefits of the credits they are allowed to earn.
Additionally, he asserts Okla. Stat. tit. 21, Section 13.1 does not
place any limits on the number of good time credits the 85% inmates
can earn before they reach their 85% discharge date, meaning that
some inmates earn more credits than necessary to take their
sentence to completion once they reach 85% and their credits are
applied.  When that occurs, the Plaintiff argues that he should
receive monetary compensation for the extra credits earned.

On July 30, 2021, Judge Purcell issued a Report and Recommendation.
In the R. & R., Judge Purcell addressed the Plaintiff's factual
allegations and the applicable standards of review. Judge Purcell
concluded that the due process claim raised in the Plaintiff's
Claim Two should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). He further recommended that the Plaintiff's
remaining claims be allowed to proceed and that the Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification be denied.

The Defendants filed a joint Objection to the R. & R. The Plaintiff
also objected to the R. & R., and additionally filed a Notice of
Dismissal. Neither party has responded to the other's Objection.

II. Plaintiff's Claim Two

Shortly after the R. & R. was issued, the Plaintiff filed a Notice
of Dismissal, seeking to dismiss and remove from his pleading
"Claim 2, which alleges 'deprivation of liberty,' along with the
due process portion of Claim 3 pertaining to this issue only." The
Defendants did not respond to the Plaintiff's filing or otherwise
object to dismissal of these claims.

Having reviewed the Plaintiff's request and the relevant record,
Judge Goodwin finds that dismissal is proper and should be allowed.
He says, the Plaintiff's Claim Two ("Deprivation of Liberty"), as
well as any request for relief within Claim Three premised upon a
state-created liberty interest in the earning of sentence credits,
will be dismissed without prejudice.

III. Plaintiff's Remaining Claims

The R. & R. found that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss "only
addressed the Plaintiff's second claim" and failed to "set forth a
basis of dismissal" for the Plaintiff's remaining due process and
equal protection claims -- i.e., the claims "focused on the ability
of non-85% inmates to participate in the Re-Entry/Stepdown and
Reintegration Programs." The Defendants now ask the Court to
consider a variety of reasons that the Plaintiff's remaining claims
should be dismissed, none of which "was raised in the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss" with respect to those claims.

With one exception, Judge Goodwin declines to consider these new
arguments. To the extent Defendants' Objection challenges this
Court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter, he says, such
a challenge "can of course be raised at any time prior to final
judgment." He therefore addresses those jurisdictional arguments.

A. Standing

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff lacks standing to raise the
claims alleged in his pleading, as required to invoke federal
subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.
They argue that the Plaintiff's allegations of injury arising from
the allegedly improper application of credits are conjectural and
hypothetical because they "all turn on the scenario that he will,
without a doubt, earn enough credits to be released once he hits
his 85% date, and that the 85% date will occur before the 760-day
eligibility mark." They claim that this scenario "is simply a wild
guess," as there are various adjustments to the Plaintiff's credits
that could occur during his incarceration that would result in
Plaintiff not being discharged upon reaching his 85% date.

Judge Goodwin disagrees and finds that the Plaintiff has alleged a
particularized injury that is sufficiently actual or imminent to
establish standing. He says, the Defendants' suggestions as to why
the Plaintiff's alleged injuries are overly conjectural are
themselves speculative in nature. Liberally construed, he says, the
Plaintiff has alleged that he is an 85% inmate and that he is
improperly being denied participation in certain cited programs
while incarcerated due to his eligibility being assessed by
reference to a date other than his 85% date. The Plaintiff's
alleged injury is not entirely based upon an expected release from
prison upon reaching the 85% date and, even assuming it was, he
specifically pleads that "immediate discharge" "does occur" "100%
of the time for 85% inmates" "on the 85% completion date." An
allegation of future injury may suffice if there is a 'substantial
risk' that the harm will occur.

The Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot establish
redressability -- i.e., that his injury is "likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision." More specifically, they assert
that the Plaintiff has received various misconducts in the prison
disciplinary system since filing his pleading. They claim that
those misconducts would prevent Plaintiff from being considered for
the cited programs until Oct. 16, 2022, which is after the
eligibility date he seeks to have implemented (that is, Jan. 23,
2021, the date 760 days prior to his 85% completion date), even
assuming the Court enters judgment in the Plaintiff's favor.

Judge Goodwin holds that although the Defendants attempt to rely on
the Special Report and outside materials to support their
contention, at this stage and in this posture, the Court "must
accept as true all material allegations of the complaint." Further,
implementation of the Plaintiff's requested calculation would
afford him a concrete benefit in the form of earlier consideration
for the inmate programs, even assuming the correctness of the
Defendants' facts. The Tenth Circuit has rejected the Defendants'
proposition that "complete redressability" is "required," finding
that this standing element is met when the requested judicial
relief "would alleviate the injury to some extent." Similarly,
"redressability is satisfied when a favorable decision relieves an
injury, not every injury."

Accordingly, Judge Goodwin overrules the Defendants' objection as
to the Plaintiff's Article III standing to sue.

B. Ripeness

The Defendants nominally argue that the Plaintiff's claims are not
ripe for review for the purpose of Article III jurisdiction. They
allege that because the Plaintiff's recently earned misconduct
points prevent him from being eligible for community placement
prior to October 2022, his constitutional claims are insufficiently
ripe for review.

The Tenth Circuit has explained, however, that "if a threatened
injury is sufficiently 'imminent' to establish standing, the
constitutional requirements of the ripeness doctrine will
necessarily be satisfied." And, again, the Defendants' reliance on
alleged factual disputes fails, at this stage of the litigation, to
undermine the Plaintiff's allegations of being currently and
actually injured by the prison officials' approach to sentence
credits. Judge Goodwin overrules the Defendants' ripeness
objection.

IV. Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification

As noted, the Plaintiff brought the lawsuit as a putative class
action, seeking to raise claims for himself and "on behalf of all
85% sentence inmates." The Magistrate Judge recommended denial of
class certification, primarily because the Plaintiff is appearing
pro se and therefore is unable to "fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class," as required to sue as a representative
party.

The Plaintiff's Objection challenges this recommendation on several
bases. First, the Plaintiff states that he "is suspicious that the
Magistrate Judge is performing as an agent of ODOC and is not
fairly adjudicating this case." Judge Goodwin entirely rejects this
baseless and frivolous contention.

Second, liberally construed, the Plaintiff objects that the Court
erred in denying his previous requests for counsel and thus errs in
relying upon his lack of counsel as a reason to deny class
certification.

Since initiating the lawsuit, Judge Goodwin finds that the
Plaintiff has filed two motions for appointment of counsel. In
denying those motions, Judge Purcell found that the Plaintiff "has
not shown that he is unable to adequately litigate this cause of
action" and "has demonstrated an understanding of and ability to
communicate the bases of his claims to the Court."

Upon de novo review, Judge Goodwin concurs with those rulings and
agrees that, on the current record, appointment of counsel is not
warranted. It follows that the Court will accept Judge Purcell's
recommendation that certification of a plaintiff class should be
denied at this time. "A litigant may bring his own claims to
federal court without counsel, but not the claims of others."

V. Conclusion

For the reasons he outlined herein, Judge Goodwin accepts the
Plaintiff's Notice of Dismissal and otherwise adopts the
recommended disposition of the Report and Recommendation issued
July 30, 2021.

Specifically:

(1) The Plaintiff's Claim Two, as well as any claim for relief
within Plaintiff's Claim Three premised upon the existence of a
state-created liberty interest in the earning of sentence credits,
is dismissed without prejudice;

(2) The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot; and

(3) The Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is denied.

The matter is re-referred to Judge Purcell for further proceedings
as to the Plaintiff's remaining claims in accordance with the
previous order of referral.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5zudfhv6 from Leagle.com.


RAINMAKERS WORLDWIDE: Fabricant Files TCPA Suit in W.D. Washington
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rainmakers Worldwide,
LLC. The case is styled as Terry Fabricant, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Rainmakers Worldwide,
LLC doing business as: Listing Help Desk, Case No. 2:21-cv-01294
(W.D. Wash., Sept. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Rainmakers Worldwide doing business as Listing Help Desk --
https://www.listinghelpdesk.com/ -- is a full service online
marketing and media company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS, LLP
          613 Williamson Street, Suite 201
          Madison, WI 53703
          Phone: (608) 237-1775
          Email: sam@turkestrauss.com


RECEIVABLE RECOVERY: Johnson Files FDCPA Suit in D. South Carolina
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Receivable Recovery
Systems. The case is styled as Michelle Johnson formerly known as:
Michelle Beaty, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Receivable Recovery Systems, Case No. 3:21-cv-03102-JMC
(D.S.C., Sept. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Receivable Recovery Systems -- https://www.receivablerecovery.com/
-- is a debt collection agency in Mount Pleasant, South
Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth Edward Norsworthy, Jr., Esq.
          NORSWORTHY LAW LTD CO
          218 Trade Street, Suite D
          Greer, SC 29651  
          Phone: (864) 804-0581
          Fax: (864) 670-5009
          Email: kenorsworthy@me.com


REP PROCESSING: Court Won't Revisit Arbitration Denial in Robertson
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ZACHARIAH ROBERTSON, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. REP PROCESSING, LLC, d/b/a
RIMROCK ENERGY PARTNERS, Defendant, Civil Case No.
19-cv-02910-PAB-NYW (D. Colo.), Judge Philip A. Brimmer of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado denied the Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration of Orders Denying Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Granting Motion to Strike.

Background

Rimrock seeks reconsideration of two orders. In one order, the
Court denied the Defendant and Third-Party Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration and for a Stay of Proceedings. In another order,
the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike or Sever
Third-Party Complaint and denied Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff
Rimrock's Motion for Leave to Amend Third-Party Complaint.

Analysis

A. Order Denying Rimrock's Motion to Compel Arbitration

Rimrock, a midstream oil and gas company, entered into an agreement
with Kestrel in 2019 for Kestrel to employ and supply workers to
Rimrock for one of its projects.  According to Rimrock, "a
consultant to Rimrock instructed Kestrel to assign the Plaintiff
to" Rimrock's project, which Kestrel did.  As part of the hiring
process, the Plaintiff entered into a "Mutual Arbitration
Agreement" with Kestrel. The arbitration agreement is "between the
Plaintiff and Kestrel." Even though the arbitration agreement is
between the Plaintiff and Kestrel, Rimrock sought to compel
arbitration of the Plaintiff's claims against Rimrock pursuant to
the agreement.

The Court found that Rimrock's broad reading of the arbitration
agreement was not supported by the agreement's plain language and
held that the arbitration requirement is limited to claims between
the Plaintiff and Kestrel.  It held that Rimrock did not and could
not point to any language in the arbitration agreement that
supported its broad interpretation of the contractual language
because nothing in the agreement's language indicated an intent to
include the Plaintiff's claims against Rimrock. Thus, the Court
held that the Plaintiff demonstrated that his claims fall outside
of the scope of the arbitration agreement. As to the agreement's
language, the Court found no intent to benefit Rimrock, but rather
found that the language disproved any notion of an intent to
benefit Rimrock. Lastly, the Court rejected Rimrock's assertion
that the Plaintiff must proceed individually in his claims against
Rimrock pursuant to the class action waiver.

Rimrock re-states many of its arguments in its motion for
reconsideration. First, Rimrock argues that, if the Court only took
another look at the class action waiver's ("Section 3") plain
language, it would see things Rimrock's way.

Judge Brimmer finds that notwithstanding any other provision in the
Agreement, the Class Action waiver will not be severable from the
Agreement in any instance in which a dispute is brought by a class
and/or collective action." Again, he says, the use of the defined
terms "Company" and "Agreement" clearly indicate that the class
action waiver applies only to claims between the Plaintiff and
Kestrel. The Judge finds no clear error in the Court's earlier
analysis.

Second, Rimrock argues that the class action waiver applies even if
the arbitration agreement does not, and the two sections are
severable.It argues that "beyond being written into the same
general Agreement, there is nothing in the Class Action Waiver in
Section 3 that ties it to the Arbitration Agreement in Section 1."

The argument, however, is not persuasive. As Judge Brimmer has
already noted, the prefatory paragraph, which defines the entire
agreement as being between the Plaintiff and Kestrel, applies to
both Sections 1 and 3, and Section 3 uses the same defined terms as
in the prefatory paragraph and in Section 1. Additionally, Section
3 itself clearly states that it is not severable from Section 1.
Section 3 states, "notwithstanding any other provision in this
Agreement, this Class Action waiver will not be severable from this
Agreement in any instance in which a dispute is brought by a class
and/or collective action."

Third, Rimrock argues that the Court should reconsider its order in
light of Bock v. Salt Creek Midstream, LLC, 2020 WL 5640669 (D.N.M.
Sept. 22, 2020), construing what Rimrock says is the same
arbitration agreement. It states that the court in Bock held that
the plaintiff was required to pursue his claims individually rather
than in a class or collective action.

As Judge Brimmer explained, the Court found that the plain and
ordinary language of the agreement between the Plaintiff and
Kestrel is that Sections 1 and 3 are not severable. He is thus not
left with the "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed" in the Court's earlier analysis. S

Finally, Rimrock argues that the Court "did not consider the
surrounding circumstances," which, Rimrock believes, show that
Rimrock "is entitled to arbitrate the Plaintiff's claims as a
third-party beneficiary."

Judge Brimmer says Rimrock is mistaken, however. First, he notes
that Rimrock raised these arguments in its original motion, and a
motion for reconsideration may not simply repeat arguments made in
the original motion. Second, the Court did consider the surrounding
circumstances, which disprove Rimrock's argument. Finally, two of
the three circumstances that Rimrock enumerates -- (1) that the
Plaintiff worked for Kestrel several times prior to his work on
Rimrock's project and was aware that Kestrel is a staffing company
and (2) that the Plaintiff "had to have known there was another
party involved in the arrangement" -- do not indicate an intent to
benefit Rimrock. The third circumstance that Rimrock lists is that
"both parties to the agreement knew that the Plaintiff's employment
with Kestrel was intended to benefit a third party: Rimrock." Id.
But this purported circumstance simply assumes what Rimrock is
trying to prove. The Judge finds no clear error because it is not
left with the definite and firm conviction that it has made a
mistake.

B. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and Denying
Rimrock's Motion for Leave to Amend

Next, Rimrock asks the Court to reconsider its order striking
Rimrock's third-party complaint against Kestrel. It, however,
states only "while it disagrees with the Court's analysis of those
issues, it understands the Court has reviewed conflicting
authorities, which have not been resolved by the Tenth Circuit or
the U.S. Supreme Court, and views the issues differently than
Rimrock." Rimrock states that it "respectfully requests that the
Court reconsider its order at this time because the Court's order
denies Kestrel the opportunity to defend its actions, which gave
rise to the Plaintiff's complaints in the first place, and which,
Rimrock believes, will eventually give rise to an indemnity
obligation on Kestrel's part."

Rimrock, thus, has not identified any clear error in the Court's
order granting the Plaintiff's motion to strike and denying
Rimrock's motion for leave to amend, and Judge Brimmer finds none.
Rather, Rimrock again cites the order in Bock, which is not binding
on this Court. Rimrock bemoans the Court's previous order as
putting "Kestrel in an unenviable position" of not being able to
defend itself in the action. The possibility that litigation may
put a non-party in an "unenviable" position is not sufficient to
justify the Court's reconsideration of a previous order where there
is no clear error in the Court's analysis.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Brimmer denied Rimrock's Motion
for Reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/pkdeacc7 from Leagle.com.


STATE FARM: Julian Files Suit in N.D. California
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company. The case is styled as Joan St.
Julian, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a Foreign
Insurance Company, Case No. 4:21-cv-07404 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 23,
2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance for Breach of Contract.

State Farm Insurance -- https://www.statefarm.com/ -- is a large
group of insurance companies throughout the United States with
corporate headquarters in Bloomington, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott Adam Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW PA
          1925 Century Park E, #1700
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (305) 975-3320
          Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com



SUNSHINE LIFE: Alvarez Sues Over Unsolicited Telephonic Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
Luis Alejandro Alvarez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. SUNSHINE LIFE & HEALTH ADVISORS, LLC, Case
No. 134477036 (Fla. 11th Judicial Cir. Ct., Miami-Dade Cty., Sept.
13, 2021), is brought under the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act
("FTSA").

To promote its goods and services, the Defendant engages in
telephonic sales calls to consumers without having secured prior
express written consent as required by the FTSA. The Defendant's
telephonic sales calls have caused Plaintiff and the Class members
harm, including violations of their statutory rights, statutory
damages, annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of their privacy.
Through this action, Plaintiff seeks an injunction and statutory
damages on behalf of himself and the Class members, as defined
below, and any other available legal or equitable remedies
resulting from the unlawful actions of the Defendant, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is an individual and a "called party" that received
the Defendant's telephonic sales calls.

The Defendant is a health and life insurance brokerage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone: 305-479-2299
          Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                 gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Phone: 305-975-3320
          Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Bettles Suit Over Defective HVAC System
-----------------------------------------------------------
JAMES BETTLES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION and TOYOTA MOTOR
SALES, U.S.A., INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-07560 (C.D. Cal.,
Sept. 22, 2021) is a class action asserting claims against Toyota
for fraudulent concealment, unjust enrichment, breach of warranty,
and violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the California's
Unfair Competition Law, the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

The Plaintiff brings his claims individually and on behalf of all
persons or entities in the United States who purchased or leased a
2006-2020 Toyota Prius, 2017-2020 Toyota Prius Prime, 2010-2015
Toyota PHV, 2012-2016 Toyota Prius C, and 2012-2017 Prius V, all of
which were delivered by Toyota with an identical and inherent
design defect in the vehicle's Heating, Ventilation, and Air
Conditioning System.

As a direct result of Toyota's alleged wrongful conduct, Plaintiff
and Class members have been harmed and have suffered actual
damages, including overpayment for their Class Vehicle, loss of use
of their Class Vehicle, costs, and lost time associated with
bringing in their Class Vehicle for diagnosis, repair, and
replacement of components, and the actual costs of diagnosis,
repair, and replacement components to address or repair the
defective HVAC system.

Toyota Motor Corporation is the world's largest automaker and
largest seller of automobiles in the United States. TMC is a
Japanese corporation headquartered in Toyota City, Aichi
Prefecture, Japan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.  
          1925 Century Park E #1700
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

               - and -

          Jason H. Alperstein, Esq.
          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Kristen Lake Cardoso, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          One West Las Olas, Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
          E-mail: alperstein@kolawyers.com
                  ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  cardoso@kolawyers.com
          
               - and -

          Steven G. Calamusa, Esq.
          Rachel A. Bentley, Esq.
          GORDON & PARTNERS, P.A.  
          4114 Northlake Boulevard
          Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
          Telephone: (561) 799-5070
          Facsimile: (561) 799-4050
          E-mail: scalamusa@fortheinjured.com
                  rbentley@fortheinjured.com

WARREN SCREW PRODUCTS: Steen Action Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Steen, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Warren Screw Products, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-12206, (E.D. Mich., September 20, 2021), seeks unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and
costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Jersey Wage
and Hour Law.

Warren Screw Products manufactures metal components and operates
manufacturing facilities throughout the United States where Steen
worked as a shift manager between approximately April 2021 and
September 2021 at its Warren, Michigan facility. Steen claims to
have regularly worked over 40 hours per week without being paid
overtime compensation. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jennifer Lossia McManus, Esq.
      FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C.
      25892 Woodward Avenue
      Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910
      Phone: 248-542-6300
      Facsimile: 248-542-6301
      Email: jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

             - and -

      Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
      Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
      Alanna Klein Fischer, Esq.
      THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
      920 Rockefeller Building
      614 W. Superior Avenue
      Cleveland, OH 44113
      Tel: (216) 696-5000
      Fax: (216) 696-7005
      Email: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
             lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
             alanna@lazzarolawfirm.com


WASHINGTON: Mickey Fowler Files Petition for Writ of Mandamus
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Mickey Fowler, et al., filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in the lawsuit styled MICKEY FOWLER, LESIA MAURER, and a
class of similarly situated individuals, v. TRACY GUERIN, Director
of the Washington State Department of Retirement Systems, Case No.
3:15-cv-05367-BHS, in the U.S. District Court for Western
Washington, Tacoma.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Hon. Judge
Benjamin H. Settle entered an order:

   1. denying the Plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunction
      without prejudice;

   2. granting the Plaintiffs' motion to clarify or modify class
      definition; and

   3. granting the Director's motion for leave to amend answer.

The Plaintiffs are public school teachers who participate in
Washington's Teachers' Retirement System (TRS), a public retirement
system managed by the Washington State Department of Retirement
Services (DRS). The TRS is comprised of three separate retirement
plans: Plan 1, Plan 2, and Plan 3. The Plaintiffs are current
members of Plan 3 and former members of Plan 2. As members of Plan
2, the Plaintiffs made contributions to their Plan 2 accounts from
each paycheck. DRS tracked the contributions and accumulated
interest in individual accounts. All contributions were transferred
to a state-managed comingled trust fund for investment purposes.
The Plaintiffs' contributions to Plan 2 accrued interest at a rate
specified by DRS -- 5.5%, compounded quarterly. DRS used the
quarter's ending balance to calculate interest. In February 2009,
the Plaintiffs challenged DRS's method of calculating interest on
funds transferred between TRS accounts in state court, continuing
litigation initiated in 2005 by another plaintiff who settled with
DRS.

The Plaintiffs requested that the Court clarify that these teachers
are included in the class definition or modify the class definition
to state "the class is defined to include all teachers who
transferred from TRS Plan 2 to TRS Plan 3 prior to January 20,
2002." The Director responded that, in the parties' data exchanges,
she has excluded data relative to "inactive" teachers because the
class definition includes only "active and retired" teachers and
she "could not agree to disclose personal information regarding
teachers outside the class definition." However, the Director does
not oppose modifying the class definition or providing the relevant
data following the modification. The Director proposed using "all
persons" rather than "all active and retired TRS members" and using
"during the class period (January 1, 1996 to January 20, 5 2002)"
rather than "prior to January 20, 2002" to avoid any ambiguity.

According to Judge Settle, "The Court takes the Director at her
word that she does not object to modifying the class definition.
The Court understands the parties' dispute about the prior
proceedings to be part of their broader dispute about the scope of
the Ninth Circuit's mandate rather than critical to deciding
Plaintiffs' motion to clarify or modify the class definition. As it
appears that the Director's proposed phrase identifying
participants is broader than Plaintiffs', the Court understands the
parties to be in agreement about the narrower phrase. The Director
also suggests using "during the class period (January 1, 1996 to
January 20, 2002)," but does not explain why this modification is
necessary, and the Plaintiffs' proposed phrase "prior to January
20, 2002" is consistent with the definition the Court previously
approved. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' motion is granted and the
class definition is modified to: "[a]ll teachers who transferred
from TRS Plan 2 to TRS Plan 3v prior to January 20, 2002."

The appellate case is captioned as Mickey Fowler, et al. v.
USDC-WAWTA, Case No. 21-71286, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Sept. 22, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners MICKEY FOWLER, LEISA MAURER, and a class of
similarly situated individuals, are represented by:

          David F. Stobaugh, Esq.
          BENDICH STOBAUGH & STRONG, P.C.
          701 Fifth Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 622-3536

               - and -

          Alexander F. Strong, Esq.
          Stephen K. Strong, Esq.
          BENDICH, STOBAUGH & STRONG
          126 NW Canal Street, Suite 100
          Seattle, WA 98107
          Telephone: (206) 622-3536

Real Party in Interest TRACY GUERIN, Director of the Washington
State Department of Retirement Systems, is represented by:

          Cameron G. Comfort, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          415 General Admin. Bldg., P.O. Box 40123
          Olympia, WA 98504
          Telephone: (360) 664-9429

               - and -

          Robert Bertelson Mitchell, Esq.
          Todd L. Nunn, Esq.
          Christopher M. Wyant, Esq.
          K&L GATES LLP
          925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 623-7580

WESCOM CENTRAL: Massey Files Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wescom Central Credit
Union, et al. The case is styled as Kali Massey, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Wescom Central Credit
Union, Does 1 through 5, inclusive, Case No. 2:21-cv-07622 (C.D.
Cal., Sept. 23, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Banks and Banking.

Wescom Credit Union -- https://www.wescom.org/online-banking -- is
a credit union and financial services company serving Southern
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David C. Wright, Esq.
          McCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP - Ontario, CA
          3281 E Guasti Ave., Ste. 100
          Ontario, CA 91761
          Phone: (909) 557-1250
          Fax: (909) 557-1275
          Email: dcw@mccunewright.com


WHITEHOUSE ESTATES: Bid for Money Judgments in Casey Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHRYN CASEY, LAURIE CAGNASSOLA, GERALD COHEN, BETTY
FURR, FRANCESA GAGLIANO, CAROLYN KLEIN, JOSEPH MORGAN, RICHARD
ROSE, JESSICA SAKS, AND KIRK SWANSON, Plaintiffs v. WHITEHOUSE
ESTATES INC, KIEPPEL & KOEPPEL INC, DUELL 5 MANAGEMENT LLC, WILLIAM
KOEPPEL, AND EASTGATE WHITEHOUSE ESTATES, LLC, Defendants,
111723/2011 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Gerald Lebovits of the Supreme
Court, New York County, issued an order:

   a. granting the branch of the Defendants' motion seeking money
      judgments against Gina Chatel and Laurie Cagnassola; and

   b. denying without prejudice the branch of the motion seeking
      judgments of possession and writs of assistance.

Background

The class action concerns the proper amount of rent owed by tenants
of a residential apartment building in Manhattan. The various
Defendants held, or now hold, ownership interests in the building.
The named Plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of a class of
present and former tenants to recover alleged rent overcharges
imposed by the Defendants.

Previous orders of the Court in the action required the tenants to
pay use and occupancy (U & O) pending a final determination of
their lawful regulated rents for the periods at issue. On the
current motion, the Defendants contend that two tenants, Chatel and
Cagnassola, have failed to pay the required U & O. The Defendants
therefore seek (i) money judgments against these two tenants for
back U & O plus interest; and (ii) judgments of possession and
writs of assistance to enable defendants to recover possession of
these tenants' apartments.

The Plaintiffs allege that the class members were rent-stabilized
or rent-controlled tenants in the Defendants' building; and that
the Defendants illegally deregulated the class-members' units and
assessed them excessive, market-rate rents for several years.

In 2014, Defendant Whitehouse (the building's former owner),
offered the tenants renewal leases at a rent of its choosing,
threatening to bring eviction proceedings if the tenants did not
accept. The tenants sought a preliminary injunction against
Whitehouse. This Court (Anil Singh J.) granted the preliminary
injunction. It held that the proper course was, in effect, for the
tenants to pay Whitehouse U & O pending the completion of the
action, at the rent set by the tenants' last expired leases.

In 2016, the Defendants asked this Court to fix the amounts owed by
the Plaintiffs in U & O, arguing that notwithstanding Justice
Singh's 2014 order, the Defendants had been unable in practice to
collect U & O from many of their tenants or to obtain judgments of
possession. This Court decided the Defendants' request for relief
in 2017. It agreed with the Defendants that as an equitable matter,
"a dispute concerning the amount of rent owed is no reason to allow
a tenant to occupy the landlord's property gratis."

But this Court concluded the state of the record was such that
"there is currently no way for the court to make a complete
calculation of the U & O that is due for each apartment from the
inception of the action." It therefore referred to a special
referee the issue of the appropriate amounts of U & O owed by each
tenant. Tenants who had not been paying U & O as directed by
Justice Singh would be required to post a bond equal to their U & O
obligation as determined based upon the special referee's
forthcoming report.  

As a procedural matter, this Court directed the Defendants, when
"submitting their motion to confirm or deny the Special Referee's
report," to "include a request that the court issue an order
requiring those Plaintiffs who have not paid any use and occupancy
to post a bond, equal to the amount of use and occupancy specified
in Justice Singh's May 21, 2014 order," following this Court's
decision on the motion to confirm. The Defendants could "thereafter
commence an action for ejectment against any plaintiff who fails to
post such a bond, and request that that action be referred to this
Court." The Appellate Division, First Department, recently affirmed
this court's order on the Defendants' U & O-related request (and on
other issues in the case not relevant in the case).

In late 2019, the Defendants brought separate actions against
Cagnassola and against Daniel Geller (another tenant in the
building), seeking money judgments for unpaid U & O, and judgments
awarding them possession of Cagnassola's and Geller's apartments.
In June 2020, this Court granted Cagnassola's and Geller's motions
under CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a) (4) to dismiss the actions against
them.

The Defendants now move in the action against Chatel and Cagnassola
for (i) money judgments in the amounts of $209,775, and $163,800,
respectively, in assertedly owed U & O; and (ii) judgments of
possession and writs of assistance based on Chatel and Cagnassola's
failures to pay accrued U & O.

Discussion

The Defendants contend that they are entitled to money judgments,
judgments of possession, and writs of assistance against Chatel and
Cagnassola for their respective failures to pay U & O as putatively
required by this Court's previous orders in the action. The
Plaintiffs have expressly declined to contest at this time the
Defendants' arguments about Chatel and Cagnassola's putative
failures to have paid required U & O. Instead, they argue that
under the COVID Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act
(CEEFPA), L 2020, ch. 381, and under L 2021, ch 417, this Court may
not now consider any part of the Defendants' motion.

I. The Branch of Defendants' Motion Seeking Judgments for
Possession and Writs of Assistance

The first question raised by the current motion is whether chapter
417 bars this Court even from considering the Defendants' requests
for judgments of possession and writs of assistance as against
Chatel and Cagnassola.

Judge Lebbovits concludes that chapter 417 does bar consideration
of those requests prior to its expiration in January 2022. First,
he concludes that when a landlord has formally requested a court
order granting the landlord recovery of possession of a residential
dwelling unit, that request constitutes an "eviction proceeding"
for purposes of chapter 417, whether the request has been made
within an existing action or as a freestanding application for
judicial relief.

Second, given Chatel and Cagnassola's submission of hardship
declarations, and the absence of a meritorious challenge to the
legal or factual basis of those declarations, Judge Lebovits holds
that chapter 417 bars the Defendants' claims for judgments of
possession and writs of assistance from proceeding until at least
Jan. 16, 2022. The Judge concludes that rather than leave the
eviction branch of the current motion open-but-stayed for at least
the next four months, the more economical course is to deny this
branch of the motion, without prejudice to the Defendants' again
moving for judgments of possession and writs of assistance against
Chatel and Cagnassola once the stay imposed by chapter 417 (and any
statutory extension of that stay) has been lifted or expires.

II. Whether Defendants May Obtain Money Judgments for Unpaid U & O

The other question raised by the current motion is whether, given
chapter 417, this Court may properly consider the branch of the
Defendants' motion seeking money judgments against Chatel and
Cagnassola. The Plaintiffs' affirmation in opposition contends that
"it is completely improper for the Defendants to pursue this
motion." And the Plaintiffs have indicated to this court that they
have chosen deliberately to rest their opposition to the motion on
that ground, rather than address the substance of the Defendants'
money-judgment claims. Consistent with that approach, neither the
Plaintiffs' original motion opposition, nor the Plaintiffs'
supplemental submissions after the initial round of briefing,
contest the Defendants' claim that they are entitled to money
judgments against Chatel and Cagnassola.

Judge Lebovits concludes that the Court may consider and determine
this branch of the Defendants' motion, though it is statutorily
barred at this time from considering the eviction branch of the
motion. And in the absence of arguments by the Plaintiffs against
the award of money judgments for the U & O that Chatel and
Cagnassola assertedly owe, the Judge concludes that this branch of
Defendants' motion should be granted.

Judge Lebobitz considers the branch of the Defendants' motion
seeking money judgments against Chatel and Cagnassola, and he may
grant the requested money judgments if those requests are
meritorious. He finds that the Defendant has provided evidentiary
support for its claim that Chatel and Cagnassola owe the amounts
claimed. And the Plaintiff has not identified any legal or factual
reason for this Court to conclude that the Defendants' requests for
money judgments against Chatel and Cagnassola in the amounts
claimed are unmeritorious. This branch of the Defendants' motion is
granted.

Conclusion

Judge Lebobitz agrees that the Court may not consider the
Defendants' requests for judgments of possession and writs of
assistance until after the expiration of the stay imposed by
chapter 417. But he sees no bar to considering and determining the
Defendants' request for money judgments.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the branch of the
Defendants' motion seeking the grant of judgments of possession and
writs of assistance as against Chatel and Cagnassola is denied
without prejudice. The branch of the Defendants' motion seeking a
money judgment against Chatel is granted, and the Defendants are
awarded a judgment against Chatel in the amount of $209,775, plus
prejudgment interest running from March 23, 2017, as a reasonable
intermediate date under CPLR 5001(b). The branch of the Defendants'
motion seeking a money judgment against Cagnassola is granted, and
the Defendants are awarded a judgment against Cagnassola in the
amount of $163,800, plus prejudgment interest running from March
23, 2017, as a reasonable intermediate date under CPLR 5001(b).

The Defendants serve a copy of the Order with notice of its entry
on all parties and on the office of the County Clerk, which will
enter judgment accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 15, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2xj7mnyf from Leagle.com.

Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph LLP, in New York
City (Ronald S. Languedoc of counsel), for the Plaintiffs.

Rosenberg & Estis, P.C., in New York City (Howard W. Kingsley --
hkingsley@rosenbergestis.com -- of counsel), for the Defendants.


ZOCDOC INC: Smith Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zocdoc Inc. The case
is styled as Rolland Smith, individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated who were employed by ZocDoc, inc.
related other affiliated entities v. ZOCDOC INC., AND RELATED OR
AFFILIATED ENTITIES, Case No. 158451/2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York
Cty., Sept. 13, 2021).

Zocdoc -- https://www.zocdoc.com/ -- is a New York City-based
company offering an online service that allows people to find and
book in-person or telemedicine appointments for medical or dental
care.[BN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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