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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, September 27, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 187

                            Headlines

ABENGOA SA: Francisco Given Leave to File Third Amended Complaint
ACADIA PARISH, LA: Saporito's Bid to Join Dickinson Suit Denied
ADAPTHEALTH CORP: Robbins Geller Discloses Securities Class Action
ALLERGAN PLC: Class in Securities Suit Conditionally Certified
AMALGAMATED FINANCIAL: Ranelin-Silvers Hits Illegal Bank Charges

AMERICARE INC: Guzman Appeals Court Ruling in Labor Class Suit
APPLE INC: California Court Enters Rule 52 Order in Epic Games Suit
APPLE INC: Faces Suit for Allowing Phishing App in App Store
ARCHON INC: Saiyed Appeals Judgment in Labor Suit to Federal Cir.
ASTROTECH CORP: Discovery in Stein Class Action Ongoing

AVIVA CANADA: COVID-19 Class Action Fully Certified in Ontario
BHP GROUP: Dismissal of Samarco Bondholders Suit Affirmed
BHP GROUP: Unit to Appeal Denial of Declaratory Relief in AUS Suit
BLACKBERRY LTD: Bids to Exclude Opinions in Pearlstein Partly OK'd
BLUE CROSS: 60 Days Extension for Class Cert. Deadlines Sought

BOSTON BEER: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of November 15 Deadline
BOSTON BEER: Kahn Swick Reminds of November 15 Deadline
BRECKENRIDGE GRAND: Misclassifies Salespeople, Class Suit Says
BRINKER INT'L: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Data Breach Suit
CASSAVA SCIENCES: Kahn Swick Reminds of October 26 Deadline

CENTRA TECH: Court Certifies Class in Rensel Securities Fraud Suit
CHAMBERLAIN UNIVERSITY: Dean Appeals Tuition Refund Suit Dismissal
CHANGYOU.COM LTD: ODS Securities Suit Moved to S.D. New York
CHICAGO, IL: Class Action Filed Against CPD Over Alleged Suspension
CITIC CAPITAL: Tang Suit Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duties

COMCAST CABLE: 9th Cir. Flips Denial of Arbitration in Hodges Suit
COMMONSPIRIT HEALTH: Smith ERISA Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
COMMUNITY BANK: Thompson's Class Settlement Wins Final Approval
COPPERTONE USA: Settles Mineral-Based Sunscreen Class Action
CROWN ASSET: Court Grants Renewed Bid for Arbitration in Bey Suit

CUSTOMER CONNEXX: Cadena Appeals Labor Suit Ruling to 9th Cir.
CVS PHARMACY: Youngblood Appeals Consumer Suit Dismissal
DELOITTE TOUCHE: Court Enters Case Management Plan & Sched Order
DIAGEO NA: Fischer Files Mislabeling Class Action Over Rum Product
ELITE ENGINEERING: Class of Technicians in Lechuga Suit Certified

ELITE LOGISTICS: Lee Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under Labor Code
EQUIFAX INC: Shiyang Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
EQUILON ENTERPRSIES: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Dimercurio Suit
ESSENTIA HEALTH: Appeal in Kraft Product Liability Suit Dismissed
EXTRA SPACE: Makkinje FSCA Class Suit Removed to M.D. Florida

FACEBOOK INC: Vargas Appeals Case Dismissal Order to 9th Cir.
FCA US: Appeals Denial of Bid Decertify Class in Victorino Suit
FIELDALE FARMS: Settles Broiler Chicken Antitrust Suit for $181M
FORD MOTOR: Class Action Over Trucks' Defective Primer Dismissed
FROMMER LEGAL: Deloitte Forms Class-Action Defense Firm

GOLD BULL: Faces Correa Suit Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
GOLF & TENNIS PRO SHOP: Mason Sues Over Non-Blind Friendly Website
HEALTHCARE SERVICES: Koch Suit Gets Initial OK of Class Status
HONEST COMPANY: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of November 15 Deadline
HOOTERS MANAGEMENT: Sells Unsafe Hamburger, Eminova Suit Alleges

INTUIT INC: Shankar Sues Over Extra QuickBooks Fee on ACH Transfers
KRAFT HEINZ: Clarke Suit Transferred to From California to Illinois
LA LOMITA MEXICAN: Cruz Sues Over Restaurant Staff's Unpaid Wages
LAKESIDE RECOVERY: Vallian Must File Class Cert. by April 29, 2022
LE ENERGY LLC: Siggers Seeks Minimum, Overtime Pay

LEMOORE, CA: Four of Ponce's Claims to Be Dismissed as Duplicative
LONGEVERON INC: Bragar Eagel Reminds November 12 Deadline
LONGEVERON INC: Bronstein, Gewirtz Reminds of November 12 Deadline
LOUNGE GROUP: Faces Suit Over Unpaid Wages for Restaurant Staff
LUCKIN COFFEE: Banoon Putative Class Suit in Quebec Stayed

LUCKIN COFFEE: Putative Securities Class Suit Underway in New York
LUCKIN COFFEE: Term Sheet Entered to Settle Securities Class Suit
LUXOTTICA OF AMERICA: Goldstein's 1st Amended Complaint Dismissed
MACYS.COM LLC: Faces Salazar Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
MADAME PAULETTE: Brown Appeals Court Ruling in Labor Suit

MED-DATA INC: Gives Enough Reply to Show Cause Order in C.C. Suit
MICHIGAN: Smith Files Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
MISSOURI: AG Looks to Add Schools to CPS Lawsuit Over Mask Mandate
NATIONAL GENERAL: Dismissal of Tacoma South's Claims Affirmed
NATIONAL RUGBY: Concussion Lawsuit Resolved in Knights' Favour

NCAA: Morrison Suit Transferred to N.D. Illinois
NETFLIX INC: Appeals Remand Order in Gwinnett Cty. Suit
NEUTROGENA CORP: Dickerson Slams Toxic Benzene in Sunscreen
NEW MEXICO: Valdez Appeals Denial of Bid for Restraining Order
NIGHTHAWK SECURITY: Newby Files FLSA Suit in W.D. Kentucky

NUTANIX INC: NFLT Appointed as Lead Plaintiff in Options Class Suit
NUTRIBULLET LLC: Faces Keepman Suit Over Defective Blenders
NYE COUNTY, NV: Amended Whitesell Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
OCTAVIA ART: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
OPTIONS HOME: Faces Mihocik Suit Over Unpaid Minimum and OT Wages

PAULA CAREY: Budzyna Sues Over Safety of Hampden County Courthouse
PEDIATRIC HOME: Bid to Certify Class in Berridge FLSA Suit Denied
PHILIP MORRIS: Court Dismisses Securities Class Suit With Prejudice
PHILIPS NORTH: Wheeler Files Suit in W.D. Texas
PHOENIX FINANCIAL: Faces Felder Suit Over Illegal Debt Collection

PIH HEALTH: Rosario Files Suit in C.D. California
REAL ESTATE HEAVEN: Whittaker Files TCPA Suit in D. Arizona
REP PROCESSING: Asks Court Order Reconsiderations in Robertson Suit
REP PROCESSING: Day Rate Inspectors Get FLSA Class Certification
RILEY H. SMITH: Barnett Sues Over Unsolicited Telephonic Calls

RSC GROUP: Zamora Sues Over Construction Workers' Unpaid Wages
SEA WORLD PARKS: Gurwell Appeals Consumer Class Suit Dismissal
SEATTLE, WA: Faces Class Suit Over Misleading Green Power Claims
SIMON'S AGENCY: Chaga Sues Over Unfair Debt Collection Practices
SKYWEST AIRLINES: Horowitz's Claim for Unpaid OT Wages Dismissed

SOCLEAN INC: Wheeler Files Suit in W.D. Texas
ST. JOSEPH'S/CANDLER: Faces Suit After Hospital Ransomware Attack
STANEK STUDIOS: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
STATE FARM: Davis Insurance Suit Removed to M.D. Pa.
T-MOBILE USA: Brackman Files Suit in W.D. Washington

T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customers' Info, Billups Says
T-MOBILE USA: Halpern Sues Over Data Breach
TANDY LEATHER: Texas Putative Class Suit Withdrawn
TELACU CONSTRUCTION: Failed to Pay OT Under FLSA, Jones Suit Says
TENNESSEE: Faces Class Action Lawsuit for Ending Benefits Early

TEXAS: District Court Proceedings in Abortion Providers Suit Stayed
THAT'S HOW WE ROLL: Rodriguez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
TRIAD MANUFACTURING: Denial of Arbitration in Smith Suit Affirmed
TRINITA PARETE: Herrera Seeks Unpaid Wages for Restaurant Workers
ULTA SALON: Shortchanges Workers' Overtime Pay, Kabasele Says

UNCOMMON GROUNDS: Aguilar Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
UNITED SERVICES: Mapes Class Suit Moved From E.D.N.Y. to S.D.N.Y.
UNITED STATES: California Court Certifies Class in Castellar v. DHS
UNIVERSAL SCREEN: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Burzdak Case
VF OUTDOOR: Hearing on Bid to Deny Class Cert. Continued to Nov. 3

VITAL LINK: Underpays Paramedics, Wise Suit Alleges
VMWARE INC: N.D. California Narrows Claims in Lamartina Class Suit
VNGR BEVERAGE: Martinez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
WASTE PRO: Norton Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Drivers
WATERDROP INC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of November 15 Deadline

WATERDROP INC: Kahn Swick Reminds of November 15 Deadline
WATERDROP INC: Robbins Geller Reminds of November 15 Deadline
WELLS FARGO: Florida Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Mathieson Suit
WELLS FARGO: Hearing for Class Cert. Bid Continued to Nov. 1
WESTWOOD GALLERY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

ZEETO LLC: Williams Files TCPA Suit in S.D. California

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ABENGOA SA: Francisco Given Leave to File Third Amended Complaint
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In the case, MICHAEL FRANCISCO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ABENGOA, S.A., SANTIAGO
SEAGE, MANUEL SANCHEZ ORTEGA, BARBARA ZUBIRIA, and IGNACIO GARCIA
ALVEAR, Defendants, Case No. 15 Civ. 6279 (ER) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Edgardo Ramos of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to file their Proposed Third Amended Complaint.

Background

Lead Plaintiffs Jesse and Arlette Sherman and Plaintiff PAMCAH-UA
Local 675 Pension Fund, bring the federal securities class action
against Abengoa; Manuel Sanchez Ortega, Abengoa's former CEO;
Christopher Hansmeyer, the duly authorized representative for
Abengoa in the United States; and HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., Banco
Santander S.A., Canaccord Genuity Inc., Merrill Lynch
International, and Societe Generale, investment banks that served
as underwriters for Abengoa's United States offering ("Underwriter
Defendants").

In their Proposed Third Amended Complaint ("PTAC"), the Plaintiffs
seek to pursue remedies under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities
Act of 1933, as well as under Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, promulgated
thereunder. The Plaintiffs bring their claims on behalf of
purchasers of Abengoa American Depositary Shares ("ADSs") between
Oct. 17, 2013 and Aug. 3, 2015.

The action relates to Abengoa's Oct. 17, 2013 public offering on
the NASDAQ Global Select Market for €517.5 million, which the
Underwriter Defendants underwrote, and to the subsequent series of
events culminating in the company's filing for insolvency and
bankruptcy. Lead Plaintiffs Jesse and Arlette Sherman and Local 675
Pension Fund purchased Abengoa ADSs during the Class Period.
Specifically, the Shermans began trading Abengoa ADSs beginning
Nov. 18, 2014, and Local 675 Pension Fund first purchased Abengoa
ADSs on April 6, 2015.

In the PTAC, the Plaintiffs assert that two Spanish criminal
proceedings are relevant to the instant suit. First, on March 22,
2016, Abengoa's investors filed a criminal complaint against
Sanchez Ortega and Felipe Benjumea Llorente -- the former executive
chairman of Abengoa -- for allegedly misrepresenting Abengoa's
financial statements; Spanish prosecutors are supporting the
prosecution, which is in the "investigatory stage" pending in the
National Court in Madrid.

Second, in the Criminal Investigation Court in Seville, investors
filed a criminal action in June 2018 against two Abengoa
subsidiaries -- Abeinsa and Instalaciones Inabensa S.A. -- along
with various senior officers of Abengoa for accounting fraud and
misrepresentation; the PTAC does not indicate whether any of the
defendants in the instant suit are named in that proceeding.

The PTAC is silent as to whether either of these proceedings has
progressed beyond the investigatory stage.

Plaintiff Francisco, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, first filed his complaint bringing Exchange Act
claims against Abengoa, Seage, Sanchez Ortega, Zubiria Furest, and
Ignacio Garcia Alvear (Zubiria's Furest's successor) on Aug. 10,
2015. In a related case, Daniel LaMoureaux, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, filed suit against the
same parties on Sept. 3, 2015 (LaMoureaux v. Abengoa, S.A., No. 15
Civ. 6971 (S.D.N.Y.).

On Oct. 9, 2015, Jesse and Arlette Sherman moved to consolidate the
actions and for appointment as lead plaintiffs. Local 675 Pension
Fund similarly moved on Oct. 9, 2015. On May 24, 2016, the Court
granted the motions to consolidate and the Shermans' motion for
appointment as the Lead Plaintiffs, and denied the pension fund's.
The Shermans, together with Local 675 Pension Fund, filed a First
Amended Complaint on Aug. 2, 2016, seeking relief under both the
Securities Act and Exchange Act and naming as Defendants Abengoa,
21 individuals, and, for the first time, the Underwriter
Defendants.

On Sept. 10, 2019, Abengoa wrote to advise the Court that its
Chapter 15 case had been closed on Aug. 21, 2019. In a joint status
report, the Plaintiffs advised the Court that they intended to
submit an amended complaint and that they did not intend to pursue
claims against the individual defendants who had not yet been
served. As such, the only defendants remaining in the case were
Abengoa, the Underwriter Defendants, Sanchez Ortega, and
Hansmeyer.

On Oct. 28, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended
Complaint, which Underwriter Defendants, Sanchez Ortega, and
Abengoa moved to dismiss. On April 30, 2020, the Plaintiffs
requested a pre-motion conference for a contemplated motion for
leave to amend their complaint, citing new information that had
come to light in connection with the criminal proceedings in Spain.
At a teleconference on May 19, 2020, the Court denied that request
in light of the pending motions to dismiss, and the Plaintiffs
indicated that they would seek leave to amend their complaint in
the event that the Court granted the Defendants' motions.

On Aug. 20, 2020, the Court granted the Defendants' motions to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and granted the Plaintiffs
leave to move to amend their complaint; on Aug. 21, 2020, the Court
entered an amended order.

On Sept. 30, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the instant motion and
PTAC. The Plaintiffs bifurcate the PTAC into: (1) Securities Act
allegations and (2) Exchange Act allegations. To support those
allegations, the Plaintiffs rely on the accounts of a number of
confidential witnesses, as well as three reports conducted after
the Class Period.

Discussion

Abengoa, Sanchez Ortega, and the Underwriter Defendants each submit
their own motion and incorporate by reference the arguments of the
other movants. Together, the Defendants challenge the PTAC as
unduly delayed, brought in bad faith, and unduly prejudicial;
however, Judge Ramos notes that, while Sanchez Ortega fully briefs
the issue of futility, Abengoa and the Underwriter Defendants only
briefly discuss that issue, stating that instead they intend to
fully address it in a motion to dismiss should the Court grant the
Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Because it is the burden
of the non-movant to establish futility, and Abengoa and the
Underwriter Defendants have explicitly reserved that issue for a
motion to dismiss, Judge Ramos analyzes futility as to only Sanchez
Ortega.

Judge Ramos first turns to the issues fully addressed by all of the
Defendants -- namely, undue delay and bad faith, and undue
prejudice -- before turning to the arguments that are specific to
Sanchez Ortega.

A. Undue Delay and Bad Faith

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs should be denied leave to
amend because they have unduly delayed bringing the allegations
they have added to the PTAC. The Defendants assert that a party
engages in undue delay where a proposed amended complaint rests on
information that the party knew, or should have known, prior to
moving to amend, and where the party has had multiple chances to
assert their pleading. They contend that the PTAC is based on
years-old allegations that the Plaintiffs could have brought
earlier, and that the Plaintiffs fail to explain their failure to
do so.

Specifically, the Defendants assert that, prior to filing the
Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs knew or reasonably could
have known about information gathered from the following sources,
as information was available through public records and news
reports at that time: (1) Abengoa's 2013 arbitration against Spain,
(2) the Spanish criminal proceedings, (3) and the audits and other
reports referenced in the PTAC. And according to the Defendants,
despite the availability of that information, the Plaintiffs fail
to offer a satisfactory explanation for their failure to allege
those facts sooner -- especially given that the case was originally
brought back in 2015.

Judge Ramos concludes that the PTAC is neither unduly delayed nor
brought in bad faith. The Plaintiffs dispute the extent to which
they had previously known the allegations that they have added in
the PTAC, noting that most of the new information upon which they
rely was available only after the Spanish National Court issued an
order on Feb. 3, 2020 referencing that information. But that
dispute is immaterial. Even if the Plaintiffs had known -- or at
least, could have uncovered -- the new allegations prior to filing
their previous iteration of the complaint, Judge Ramos concludes
that the Plaintiffs have met their burden in providing a
satisfactory explanation for their delay.

B. Undue Prejudice

The Defendants also argue that they will be unduly prejudiced by
the PTAC, asserting that the Plaintiffs predicate their claims on
several factual allegations that have never appeared before in this
case, effectively rendering the matter an entirely new lawsuit.
Moreover, those allegations relate to projects and transactions
that stretch back to at least 2012, and the Defendants contend that
their ability to assemble evidence will be severely hampered due to
fading memories and relevant witnesses no longer being available.
Relatedly, the Defendants note that, since the suit began, Abengoa
has undergone a complete management overhaul and is currently
restructuring for the third time. As such, according to the
Defendants, the PTAC will require them to expend significantly more
time and expenses to litigate claims that should have been asserted
earlier.

Judge Ramos concludes that the Defendants are not unduly prejudiced
by the amendment. As an initial matter, the Judge notes that the
Defendants seem to contradict their position regarding undue delay:
whereas the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs have unduly
delayed bringing allegations that had previously been known or were
accessible to the public -- and therefore, the Defendants were on
notice, too -- they also argue that they will be unduly prejudiced
because the Plaintiffs allege a plethora of new allegations.

In any event, as the Plaintiffs note, although now incorporating
several new factual allegations to address the deficiencies
identified by the Court's Aug. 21, 2020 Order, the PTAC still
asserts the same causes of action and relies on the same alleged
misstatements, names the same Defendants, focuses on the same Class
Period, and puts forth the same theory of scienter as the Second
Amended Complaint did. Thus, contrary to the Defendants' assertion,
Judge Ramos finds that the Plaintiffs have not brought an entirely
new lawsuit through the PTAC, but instead have responded to the
Court's Aug. 21, 2020 Order to support the claims they had already
brought.

Further, although the Defendants are likely correct that they will
experience some hardship from the passage of time and the increased
expenses related to discovery, Judge Ramos holds that those factors
are not sufficient to constitute undue prejudice -- especially
where, as here, discovery has not even commenced. See Agerbrink,
155 F. Supp. 3d at 454; Bodum, 2020 WL 6135714, at *9-10. That is
especially true where, as in the case, the PSLRA expressly required
the Defendants to preserve "all documents, data compilations
(including electronically recorded or stored data), and tangible
objects that are in their custody or control and that are relevant
to the allegations, as if they were the subject of a continuing
request for production of documents from an opposing party under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."

Accordingly, Judge Ramos concludes that the PTAC does not unduly
prejudice Defendants. Because Abengoa and the Underwriter
Defendants do not otherwise contest the PTAC at this juncture, the
Plaintiffs' motion is granted as to those defendants, with the
exception of any claims against Banco Santander.

C. Futility of Claims Against Sanchez Ortega

1. Exchange Act Claims

In the PTAC, the Plaintiffs bring claims against Sanchez Ortega for
violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5,
as well as for violation of Section 20(a) of the Act. Sanchez
Ortega argues that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for a
violation of the Exchange Act.

To state a private civil claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
a plaintiff must plead that: (1) the defendant made a material
misrepresentation or omission, (2) with scienter, i.e., a wrongful
state of mind, (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, and (4) that the plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation or omission, thereby (5) causing economic loss.

Judge Ramos finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations, viewed
collectively, do not support a strong inference of scienter for
Sanchez Ortega. Because failure to plead a strong inference of
scienter alone is a sufficient basis for dismissal, the Judge
concludes that the Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Section 10 and
Rule 10b-5 is futile.

Even assuming that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a
section 10 claim against Abengoa and the Underwriter Defendants,
the Plaintiffs have failed to plead scienter as to Sanchez Ortega.
Accordingly, Judge Ramos holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim that Sanchez Ortega was a culpable participant
pursuant to section 20(a).

2. Securities Act Claims

In the PTAC, the Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to sections 11
and 15 of the Securities Act against Sanchez Ortega.

To allege a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act, a
plaintiff need show that a registration statement: (1) contained an
untrue statement of material fact; (2) omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein; or (3) omitted to state a
material fact necessary to make the statement therein not
misleading." A section 11 claim does not require a showing of
scienter, reliance, or loss causation.

Judge Ramos agrees that the majority approach should govern,
meaning that the Plaintiffs are not required to allege culpable
participation -- and accordingly, scienter -- as part of their
claim pursuant section 15. Sanchez Ortega argues only that the
Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Securities Act should be
dismissed because they fail to adequately allege scienter. Because
those claims do not require a showing of scienter, and Sanchez
Ortega has not otherwise addressed futility, Judge Ramos will grant
the Plaintiffs' motion as to their claims pursuant to the
Securities Act.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Ramos granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiffs' motion. Specifically, the Plaintiffs'
motion is granted as to all claims except their claims against
Sanchez Ortega pursuant to (1) section 10 and Rule 10b-5 and (2)
section 20(a), and all claims against Banco Santander. Because
further amendment of those claims would be futile, they are
dismissed with prejudice.

In light of Abengoa and the Underwriter Defendants' intention to
move to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, Judge Ramos directed
those parties to file their motions in accordance with the
following schedule: The motions to dismiss are due Oct. 1, 2021,
any opposition will be filed by Oct. 22, 2021, and the replies will
be filed by Oct. 29, 2021.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
motion, Doc. 142, and the requests for oral argument are denied as
moot, Docs. 142, 143, and 154.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/245tnvfs from Leagle.com.


ACADIA PARISH, LA: Saporito's Bid to Join Dickinson Suit Denied
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In the case, WILLIAM GLEN DICKINSON, JR. v. ACADIA PARISH JAIL, ET
AL., Docket No. 6:21-CV-1941 (W.D. La.), Magistrate Judge Carol B.
Whitehurst of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, Lafayette Division, denied the Motion to Join the
Lawsuit.

The Motion was filed by Acadia Parish pre-trial prisoner, Aaron
Saporito, who is requesting to join the present suit filed by
Plaintiff Dickinson.

Background

Plaintiff Dickinson filed the instant suit making several
allegations, including alleging that inmates are not allowed
outdoor recreation, inmates are locked in their cells for more than
12 hours per day, there is a shortage of mattresses, and the
mattresses and pillows are not disinfected prior to issuance to
inmates, and that the only book an inmate is allowed to receive in
the mail is the Bible. The Plaintiff states that he wishes to file
a class action against Acadia Parish, Louisiana, and seeks damages
in the amount of $100 million.

In his motion to join lawsuit, inmate Saporito stated that he
wanted to join the lawsuit because he was housed in Acadia Parish
Jail under the "same situations" as Dickinson.

Analysis

The pending motion to join the lawsuit, filed by an Acadia Parish
pre-trial detainee in an attempt to pursue a class action, should
be denied, Judge Whitehurst holds. She says, the class action
device exists primarily, if not solely, to achieve a measure of
judicial economy, which benefits the parties as well as the entire
judicial system. It preserves the resources of both the courts and
the parties by permitting issues affecting all class members to be
litigated in an efficient, expedited, and manageable fashion."

To obtain class certification under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Judge Whitehurst holds that the Plaintiffs must
satisfy the following requirements: "(1) numerosity ('a class so
large that joinder of all members is impracticable'); (2)
commonality ('questions of law or fact common to the class'); (3)
typicality (named parties' claims or defenses 'are typical of the
class'); and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives 'will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class')."
Additionally, the Plaintiffs must show that the action is
maintainable pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1), (2) or (3).

Requests for class certification by a prisoner acting pro se are
generally denied because the prisoner cannot "fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. Because the Plaintiff has not
met the requirements for class certification and fails to show that
he can properly serve as a representative party in a class action,
Judge Whitehurst will deny the pending motion to join the lawsuit.

Order

Accordingly, Judge Whitehurst denied the Motion to Join the
Lawsuit.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Memorandum Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2e8vk7hn from Leagle.com.


ADAPTHEALTH CORP: Robbins Geller Discloses Securities Class Action
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Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP announces that the AdaptHealth
class action lawsuit (Faille v. AdaptHealth Corp. f/k/a DFB
Healthcare Acquisitions Corp., No. 21-cv-03382) charges AdaptHealth
Corp. f/k/a DFB Healthcare Acquisitions Corp.
(NASDAQ:AHCO)(NASDAQ:AHCOW) and certain of its top executives with
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and seeks to
represent purchasers or acquirers of AdaptHealth securities between
November 11, 2019 and July 16, 2021, both dates inclusive (the
"Class Period"). The AdaptHealth class action lawsuit was commenced
on July 29, 2021 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff of the AdaptHealth class
action lawsuit, please provide your information by clicking here.
You can also contact attorney J.C. Sanchez of Robbins Geller by
calling 800/449-4900 or via e-mail at jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com.

CASE ALLEGATIONS: Prior to its business combination with
AdaptHealth, as described below, DFB was a special purpose
acquisition company (or "SPAC"), also known as a blank check
company. On July 8, 2019, DFB announced that it had entered into a
definitive agreement for a business combination with AdaptHealth,
the third largest distributor of home medical equipment in the
United States. Upon the closing of the merger, DFB renamed itself
"AdaptHealth Corp."

The AdaptHealth class action lawsuit alleges that, throughout the
Class Period, defendants made false and misleading statements and
failed to disclose that: (i) AdaptHealth had misrepresented its
organic growth trajectory by retroactively inflating past organic
growth numbers without disclosing the changes, in violation of U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulations; (ii)
accordingly, AdaptHealth had materially overstated its financial
prospects; and (iii) as a result, AdaptHealth's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On July 19, 2021, Jehoshaphat Research published a report alleging
that AdaptHealth is a "roll-up" company, or a company that is built
primarily through the acquisition of smaller companies with common
services or products, that obscures its organic growth by
"[r]etroactively changing past organic growth numbers to be higher,
with no disclosure about the change." Specifically, the report
stated that "[w]hile management claims (and consensus estimates
reflect) an organic growth trajectory of 8-10%, AHCO is in fact
experiencing double-digit organic decline. It is also, in our
opinion, taking steps to obscure that decline which are expressly
forbidden by the SEC." The report suggested that AdaptHealth's
manipulation of its organic growth trajectory was "a blatant
violation of non-GAAP disclosure rules, for which companies get
into huge trouble." On this news, AdaptHealth's stock price fell
nearly 6%, damaging investors.

THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROCESS: The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 permits any investor who purchased AdaptHealth
securities during the Class Period to seek appointment as lead
plaintiff in the AdaptHealth class action lawsuit. A lead plaintiff
is generally the movant with the greatest financial interest in the
relief sought by the putative class who is also typical and
adequate of the putative class. A lead plaintiff acts on behalf of
all other class members in directing the AdaptHealth class action
lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice to
litigate the AdaptHealth class action lawsuit. An investor's
ability to share in any potential future recovery of the
AdaptHealth class action lawsuit is not dependent upon serving as
lead plaintiff.

ABOUT ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP: With 200 lawyers in 9
offices nationwide, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is the largest
U.S. law firm representing investors in securities class actions.
Robbins Geller attorneys have obtained many of the largest
shareholder recoveries in history, including the largest securities
class action recovery ever - $7.2 billion - in In re Enron Corp.
Sec. Litig. The 2020 ISS Securities Class Action Services Top 50
Report ranked Robbins Geller first for recovering $1.6 billion for
investors last year, more than double the amount recovered by any
other securities plaintiffs' firm. Please visit
https://www.rgrdlaw.com/firm.html for more information.

Robbins Geller has launched a dedicated SPAC Task Force to protect
investors in blank check companies and seek redress for corporate
malfeasance. Comprised of experienced litigators, investigators,
and forensic accountants, the SPAC Task Force is dedicated to
rooting out and prosecuting fraud on behalf of injured SPAC
investors. The rise in blank check financing poses unique risks to
investors. Robbins Geller's SPAC Task Force represents the vanguard
of ensuring integrity, honesty, and justice in this rapidly
developing investment arena. [GN]

ALLERGAN PLC: Class in Securities Suit Conditionally Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE ALLERGAN PLC SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 18
Civ. 12089 (CM)(GWG)(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Colleen McMahon of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
DeKalb's motion to certify a class.

Background

The request is the second motion for class certification in the
putative class action, in which the Plaintiffs accuse Allergan and
associated Individual Defendants (collectively "Allergan") of
securities fraud for allegedly failing to disclose information
about a potential link between the company's textured silicone-gel
breast implants and a rare form of cancer.

Allergan is a global pharmaceutical and medical products company
that manufactures and sells, among other things, textured breast
implants for use in breast-augmentation and breast-reconstruction
procedures. During the class period, Allergan employed
approximately 17,000 people and had two classes of publicly traded
equity securities -- common stock and preferred stock. Two of
Allergan's breast implant product lines -- the "Natrelle 410" and
"Biocell" -- are the subject of the lawsuit.

The case was filed on Dec. 20, 2018.

On March 21, 2019, the Court appointed Boston Retirement Services
("BRS") to serve as the Lead Plaintiff. The Court imposed one
condition on the appointment of BRS as the Lead Plaintiff: that is
be represented by just one law firm, not by two. The Court ordered
BRS to select between Pomerantz LLP and the Thornton Law Firm; the
following day, BRS submitted a letter designating Pomerantz as the
Lead Counsel.

Pomerantz filed the Consolidated Amended Complaint ("CAC") -- the
operative complaint in the action -- on April 19, 2019, alleging
two counts against Allergan and seven individual defendants
affiliated with Allergan: (1) violation of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and the corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5 against all
defendants; and (2) violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
against the Individual Defendants.

On Sept. 20, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' motion to dismiss. There is one surviving allegation --
that Allergan's statements in the lead up to the ANSM recall "gave
investors a false impression that Allergan's implants were no more
linked with BIA-ALCL than other implants" manufactured by other
companies.

On Jan. 31, 2020, BRS moved to certify the class. However, through
the filings on the motion, the Court learned that not only had
Thornton remained involved in the litigation (under the guise of
"additional counsel"), but that it had effectively played the role
of co-lead counsel with Pomerantz -- to the point that BRS's
designated class representative testified that Thornton had been
fully involved in every aspect of the case.

Concluding that her order had been disregarded, Judge McMahon
determined that BRS could not "fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class," because "either BRS did not really
acquiesce in her directive, or it is incapable of controlling its
lawyers when they prove unwilling to abide by rulings of the cCourt
concerning who could serve as lead counsel." For that reason and
that reason alone, the Judge denied the first motion for class
certification.

On Dec. 7, 2020, the Court appointed DeKalb County Pension Fund as
the new Lead Plaintiff and its counsel, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP as the
Lead Counsel.

DeKalb filed the pending motion for class certification on Feb. 22,
2021. The newly appointed Lead Plaintiff seeks to certify a class
action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
consisting of: "All individuals and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired Allergan preferred stock or common stock between
Jan. 30, 2017 and Dec. 19, 2018, inclusive, and who were damaged
thereby."

Discussion

A motion for class certification is governed by the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which provides that
certification is appropriate only if: (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.

In addition to the four factors expressly outlined in 23(a), the
Second Circuit also requires that the proposed class be
ascertainable -- that "it is defined using objective criteria that
establish a membership with definite boundaries." The Plaintiffs
must also establish at least one of the three requirements listed
under Rule 23(b).

Because DeKalb moves for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), it must
demonstrate "that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."

In response to DeKalb's motion, Allergan disputes only one factor
that must be considered in undertaking class certification analysis
-- the predominance element under Rule 23(b)(3).

A. Rule 23(a)

1. Numerosity

Allergan is a publicly traded company with its common stock and
preferred stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").
Throughout the class period, the total number of Allergan common
shares issued and outstanding ranged from approximately 327.6
million to 345.7 million shares, with an average weekly trading
volume of approximately 13 million shares. The total number of
Allergan preferred shares issued and outstanding was 5.06 million
shares, with an average weekly trading volume of approximately
196,000 shares. Given the trading volume, Judge McMahon holds that
there is no question that the size of the proposed class is so
numerous that joinder of all possible Plaintiffs is impracticable.
The numerosity requirement is met.

2. Commonality

DeKalb alleges that the members of the proposed class have suffered
similar injury due to a series of similar misrepresentations and
omissions by Allergan. Further, the CAC includes several common
questions of law or fact that survived Allergan's motion to dismiss
-- for example, whether Allergan disseminated statements that
misrepresented or omitted material facts relating to incidence
rates of BIA-ALCL and its association with Allergan products,
whether it acted knowingly in making these statements or omissions,
and whether the market price of Allergan securities was affected
because of these actions. Notably, Allergan does not dispute that
there are questions of law or fact common to the putative class.
Judge McMahon holds that the Plaintiffs have thus met the
commonality requirement.

3. Typicality

Judge McMahon finds that there is no question that class members'
claims all arise from the same course of conduct: Allergan's
actions pertaining to the relationship between its textured
implants and ALCL. These actions, she says -- and the question of
whether they violated securities laws -- would have affected all
putative class members in the same way insofar as we are dealing
with the price of Allergan's stock. DeKalb's situation appears no
different from any other class member -- it claims that it acquired
Allergan securities at allegedly inflated prices due to Allergan's
misstatements and/or omissions, and that it suffered monetary
damages because of that alleged fraud. Clearly, all the class
members will seek to offer the same evidence to establish
Allergan's liability. There is no indication that DeKalb's
allegations differ from any other plaintiff's allegations such that
it would be "subject to unique defenses which threaten to become
the focus of the litigation." Hence, the typicality requirement is
satisfied.

4. Adequacy of Representation

Unlike BRS's motion for class certification, which was denied
because it was an inadequate class representative, DeKalb satisfies
this requirement, Judge McMahon finds. She says that DeKalb is an
institutional investor that had a sizeable investment in Allergan
securities during the class period. In the Court's first decision
to appoint a lead plaintiff, DeKalb was a "narrow loser" and there
is no reason to think that its position with respect to Allergan
has altered significantly since then. Allergan does not claim that
there are any conflicts of interest between DeKalb and any other
class member, and there are none of which the Court is aware.
Moreover, this is not an instance in which DeKalb seeks a
fundamentally different form of relief than other class members or
stands to benefit from a unique resolution of the case. The
adequacy of representation requirement is thus satisfied.

B. Ascertainability

Judge McMahon holds that the class is ascertainable. Determining
who is a putative class member is easily accomplished through
reference to investor records during the class period, which are
readily available and can be searched. There is no contention from
Allergan that the class is not ascertainable. Hence, the
requirement is met.

C. Rule 23(b)

DeKalb seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires
"that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods" of
adjudicating the controversy. Commonly expressed, these are the
requirements of predominance and superiority, and both must be
satisfied for the class to be certified.

1. Predominance

The main dispute between the parties is over predominance.
Predominance is satisfied if resolution of some of the legal or
factual questions that qualify each class member's case as a
genuine controversy can be achieved through generalized proof, and
if these particular issues are more substantial than the issues
subject only to individualized proof.

Judge McMahon finds that (i) Allergan has failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the ANSM recall -- the main
corrective disclosure according to DeKalb -- was not associated
with a negative price impact; (ii) DeKalb has provided a class-wide
model for calculating damages arising from its theory of liability;
and (iii) DeKalb has established that common questions of law and
fact predominate over individualized ones in the case.

2. Superiority

Finally, Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement mandates that a
court find that "a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."

Judge McMahon holds that with over 13 million shares of common
stock trading per week, there is no question that there may be an
exceedingly high number of individual lawsuits absent a class
action. Thus, class certification is the superior method for
adjudicating the case.

Conclusion

Judge McMahon granted DeKalb's motion to certify a class in
accordance with her Opinion.

The Judge certifies the following class: All individuals and
entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Allergan preferred
stock or common stock between Jan. 30, 2017 and Dec. 19, 2018,
inclusive ("Class Period"), and who were damaged thereby.

DeKalb's attorneys at Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP are appointed as the
class counsel.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at
Dkt. No. 198.

The Opinion constitutes the written order of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4k52snp4 from Leagle.com.


AMALGAMATED FINANCIAL: Ranelin-Silvers Hits Illegal Bank Charges
----------------------------------------------------------------
Cleo Ranelin-Silvers, on behalf of herself and all persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Amalgamated Financial Corp.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-07529 (S.D. N.Y., September 9, 2021),
seeks damages, restitution and injunctive relief arising from
Amalgamated's routine practice of assessing more than one
insufficient funds fee on the same item in breach of contractual
promises, and in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and New York general business laws.

Amalgamated Bank is engaged in the business of providing retail
banking services with corporate headquarters in New York, New York.
Ranelin-Silvers, is a resident of Cordova, Tennessee, and she holds
an Amalgamated checking account.

Amalgamated promises its customers that if their account drops too
low to cover a check, withdrawal or service charge, Amalgamated
will charge the customer a single $34 insufficient funds fee.
Ranelin-Silvers alleges that Amalgamated routinely charges its
customers multiple NSF Fees for the same item. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Taras Kick, Esq.
     THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
     815 Moraga Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90049
     Phone: (310) 395-2988
     Fax: (310) 395-2088
     Email: taras@kicklawfirm.com

            - and -

     Jeffrey Kaliel, Esq.
     KALIELGOLD PLLC
     1100 15th Street, N.W., 4th Floor
     Washington, DC 20005
     Telephone: (202) 350-4784
     E-mail: jkaliel@kalielgoldpllc.com

             - and -

     Sophia G. Gold, Esq.
     KELIELGOLD PLLC
     950 Gilman Street, Suite 200
     Berkeley, CA 94710
     Telephone: (202) 350-4783
     E-mail: sgold@kelielgoldpllc.com

             - and -

     Kevin P. Roddy, Esq.
     WILENTZ, GOLDMAN & SPITZER, P.A.
     90 Woodbridge Center Drive, Suite 900
     Woodbridge, NJ 07095
     Telephone: (732) 636-8000
     Facsimile: (732) 726-6686
     E-mail: kroddy@wilentz.com


AMERICARE INC: Guzman Appeals Court Ruling in Labor Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Laury Vasquez Guzman filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled LAURY VASQUEZ GUZMAN, Individually
and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs
v. AMERICARE, INC., MARTIN KLEINMAN and JOHN DOES #1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 24877-2018E, in the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, Bronx County.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants failed to pay her and the members of
the putative class the statutory minimum wage for all hours worked
in violation of New York Labor Law; that the Defendants failed to
pay her and the members of the putative class all wages due,
including minimum wages and overtime wages, as well as wages under
the NY Home Care Worker Wage Parity Act, for the hours they each
worked for the Defendants, and that by withholding wages and
overtime payments for time worked after 40 hours in one week from
the Plaintiff and the members of the putative class, pursuant to
New York Labor Law, the Defendants made unlawful deductions in
wages owed to Plaintiffs; that the Defendants failed to pay her and
the members of the putative class compensation at the required
overtime compensation rates for all hours worked in excess of 40
hours per workweek, in violation of the Labor Law and its
regulations; that the Defendants failed to pay her and the members
of the putative class additional compensation of one hour's pay at
the basic New York minimum hourly wage rate for each day that the
interval between the beginning and end of their workday was greater
than 10 hours (spread-of-hours pay), as required by the Labor Law
and its implementing regulations; and that she and the putative
class members furnished labor to the Defendants in furtherance of
the Defendants' performance of government contracts, but the
Defendants willfully paid the Plaintiff and the putative class
members less than the prevailing rates of wages and benefits to
which the Plaintiff and the putative class members were entitled
pursuant to New York Public Health Law.

The appellate case is captioned as Laury Vasquez Guzman v.
Americare, Inc. et al., Case No. 2021-03366, in the Supreme Court
of the State of New York Appellate Division, First Judicial
Department, filed on Sep. 14, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants AMERICARE, Inc., MARTIN KLEINMAN, and JOHN
DOES #1-10 are represented by:

          Kevin J. O'Connor, Esq.
          PECKAR & ABRAMSON, P.C.
          1325 Avenue of the Americas, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 382-0909
          Facsimile: (212) 382-3456
          E-mail: koconnor@pecklaw.com

APPLE INC: California Court Enters Rule 52 Order in Epic Games Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EPIC GAMES, INC., Plaintiff v. APPLE INC., Defendant.
APPLE INC., Counter-claimant v. EPIC GAMES, INC.,
Counter-Defendant, Case No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California entered a Rule 52 Order after trial on the
merits.

Background

Plaintiff Epic Games sued Apple alleging violations of federal and
state antitrust laws and California's unfair competition law based
upon Apple's operation of its App Store. Broadly speaking, Epic
Games claimed that Apple is an antitrust monopolist over (i)
Apple's own system of distributing apps on Apple's own devices in
the App Store and (ii) Apple's own system of collecting payments
and commissions of purchases made on Apple's own devices in the App
Store. Said differently, the Plaintiff alleged an antitrust market
of one, that is, Apple's "monopolistic" control over its own
systems relative to the App Store. Apple obviously disputed the
allegations.

Epic Games is a multi-billion dollar video game company. It defines
the relevant market by way of Apple's own internal operating
system. Apple has maintained control of its own operating system
for mobile devices, called iOS, since its inception in 2007.
Apple's creation and cultivation of the iOS device (and its
ecosystem) has been described as a walled garden. Said differently,
it is a closed platform whereby Apple controls and supervises
access to any software which accesses the iOS devices (defined as
iPhones and iPads; also referred to collectively as iOS devices).
Apple justifies this control primarily in the name of consumer
privacy, security, as well as monetization of its intellectual
property. Evidence supports the argument that consumers value these
attributes. Due in part to this business model, Apple has been
enormously successful and its devices are now ubiquitous.

Until the lawsuit, Epic Games' flagship video game product,
Fortnite, could be played on iOS devices. The product generated an
immensely profitable revenue stream for Epic Games. However, Epic
Games was also required by contract to pay Apple a 30% commission
on every purchase made through the App Store, whether an initial
download or an in-app purchase. Consequently, Fortnite generated a
profitable revenue stream for Apple as well. Epic Games tried to
use Fortnite as leverage to force Apple to reduce its commission
fee and to open its closed platform. When Apple refused, Epic Games
breached its contract, which it concedes, and filed this lawsuit.
Apple countersued for breach of contract.

Antitrust law protects competition and not competitors. Competition
results in innovation and consumer satisfaction and is essential to
the effective operation of a free market system. Antitrust
jurisprudence also evaluates both market structure and behavior to
determine whether an actor is using its place in the market to
artificially restrain competition.

Central to antitrust cases is the appropriate determination of the
"relevant market." Epic Games structured its lawsuit to argue that
Apple does not compete with anyone; it is a monopoly of one. Apple,
by contrast, argues that the effective area of competition is the
market for all digital video games in which it and Epic Games
compete heavily. In the digital video game market, Apple argues
that it does not enjoy monopoly power, and therefore does not
violate federal and state law.

Epic Games contends that Apple's restrictions on iOS app
distribution and in-app payment processing create anticompetitive
effects. The App Store is a two-sided transaction market, which may
make competitive effects difficult to evaluate. In two-sided
transaction markets, an anticompetitive price or restriction on one
side may well reflect a competitive equilibrium on the other side.
Thus, the experts agree that competitive effects can only be
determined after carefully considering both sides of the
transaction (developers and users), including any indirect network
effects. With this in mind, Judge Rogers reviews evidence of the
competitive effect of Apple's challenged conduct.

Turning to the evidence regarding in-app payment restrictions, Epic
Games focuses on the effects on price and quality. Although in-app
payment processing is an integrated part of the App Store, Judge
Rogers reviews its effects because third-party app stores could
compete on in-app payment processing -- and thus rectify some of
the effects -- if app distribution restrictions were loosened. The
Judge also considers procompetitive justifications unique to
payment restrictions as those relative to app distribution
restrictions apply here as well. Lastly, she considers the
anti-steering provision, which presents a separate subissue.

Epic Games constructs a framework to argue that there are three
separate product markets at issue. In the foremarket, Epic Games
identifies the product market as one for "Smartphone Operating
Systems." Epic Games contends in turn that there are two derivative
and relevant aftermarkets that flow from this initial foremarket,
including the "iOS App Distribution" market and "iOS In-App Payment
Solutions." Epic Games logic flows as follows: The iOS in-app
payment solutions market is an aftermarket of the iOS app
distribution market which is further an aftermarket of the
smartphone operating systems foremarket.

Apple, on the other hand, contends that there is only one relevant
product: Digital game transactions. This includes any and all
digital gaming transactions made on any gaming platform.

Epic Games brings two claims under Section 2 arguing monopoly
maintenance: Count 1 is based on its theory of the iOS distribution
market and Count 4 is based on the iOS in-app payment solutions
market. The legal framework is the same for both.

In Count 1, Epic Games claims that Apple has a monopoly in the "iOS
App Distribution Market" and has unlawfully maintained the monopoly
by prohibiting iOS app developers from distributing their apps
through alternative channels. In Count 4, Epic Games claims that
Apple has a monopoly in the "iOS In-App Payment Processing Market"
and has unlawfully maintained the monopoly by requiring "iOS app
developers that sell in-app content to exclusively use Apple's
In-App Purchase."

Epic Games asserts three claims against Apple under the Cartwright
Act: (i) Count 7 for unreasonable restraint of trade in the iOS app
distribution market; (ii) Count 8 for unreasonable restraint of
trade in the iOS in-app payment solutions market; and (iii) Count 9
for tying of app distribution and payment processing. Epic Games
argues that its Cartwright Act claims are based on the same conduct
as the analogous Sherman Act claims. Specifically, Count 7 is based
on the same conduct as Count 3; Count 8 is based on the same
conduct as Count 5; and Count 9 is based on the same conduct as
Count 6. The basic legal framework is the same for all three
claims.

In Count 10, California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Epic
Games challenges Apple's conduct under the "unlawful" and "unfair"
provisions of the UCL. Apple disputes both claims and further
argues that Epic Games lacks "customer" standing.

Analysis

Apple seeks a declaratory judgment that: (a) the Developer Product
Licensing Agreement ("DPLA") is valid, lawful, and enforceable
contracts; (b) Apple's termination of the DPLA with Epic Games was
valid, lawful, and enforceable; (c) Apple has the contractual right
to terminate the DPLA with any or all of Epic Games' wholly owned
subsidiaries, affiliates, and/or other entities under its control;
and (d) Apple has the contractual right to terminate the DPLA with
any or all of the Epic Affiliates for any reason or no reason upon
30 days written notice, or effective immediately for any
"misleading fraudulent, improper, unlawful or dishonest act
relating to" the DPLA.

Epic Games contends that Apple is not entitled to the declaratory
judgment it seeks on the basis that the challenged provisions of
the DPLA are "unlawful" and that Apple's termination of the DPLA as
to Epic Games was "unlawful" retaliation. The parties have not
litigated every aspect of the DPLA, and the Court has raised
concerns about issues lacking a full evidentiary record. Thus,
Judge Rogers is not inclined to make a broad pronouncement that the
DPLA in its entirety is valid, lawful, and enforceable.

That said, with respect to the sections of the DPLA requiring
developers not to "provide, unlock or enable additional features or
functionality through distribution mechanisms other than the App
Store," those have not been found to be unlawful under federal and
state antitrust law or the UCL.

The case does not involve retaliation, Judge Rogers finds. Epic
Games never showed why it had to breach its agreements to challenge
the conduct litigated. Two parallel antitrust actions prove the
contrary. Apple had contractual rights to act as it did. It merely
enforced those rights as the Plaintiff's own internal documents
show Epic Games expected. Accordingly, Judge Rogers finds that the
Plaintiff's challenges to Apple's claim for declaratory relief fail
as to the remaining requests.

The relief to which Apple is entitled is that to which Epic Games
stipulated in the event that the Court found it liable for breach
of contract, namely:

      (1) damages in an amount equal to (i) 30% of the $12,167,719
in revenue Epic Games collected from users in the Fortnite app on
iOS through Epic Direct Payment between August and October 2020,
plus (ii) 30% of any such revenue Epic Games collected from Nov. 1,
2020 through the date of judgment; and

      (2) a declaration that (i) Apple's termination of the DPLA
and the related agreements between Epic Games and Apple was valid,
lawful, and enforceable, and (ii) Apple has the contractual right
to terminate its DPLA with any or all of Epic Games' wholly owned
subsidiaries, affiliates, and/or other entities under Epic Games'
control at any time and at Apple's sole discretion.

Judge Rogers disagrees with both parties' definition of the
relevant market. Ultimately, after evaluating the trial evidence,
the Judge finds that the relevant market is digital mobile gaming
transactions, not gaming generally and not Apple's own internal
operating systems related to the App Store. The mobile gaming
market itself is a $100 billion industry. The size of this market
explains Epic Games' motive in bringing the action. Having
penetrated all other video game markets, the Judge says, the mobile
gaming market was Epic Games' next target and it views Apple as an
impediment.

Further, the evidence demonstrates that most App Store revenue is
generated by mobile gaming apps, not all apps. Thus, Judge Rogers
says, defining the market to focus on gaming apps is appropriate.
Generally speaking, on a revenue basis, gaming apps account for
approximately 70% of all App Store revenues. This 70% of revenue is
generated by less than 10% of all App Store consumers. These
gaming-app consumers are primarily making in-app purchases which is
the focus of Epic Games' claims. By contrast, over 80% of all
consumer accounts generate virtually no revenue, as 80% of all apps
on the App Store are free.

Having defined the relevant market as digital mobile gaming
transactions, Judge Rogers next evaluated Apple's conduct in that
market. Given the trial record, she cannot ultimately conclude that
Apple is a monopolist under either federal or state antitrust laws.
While she finds that Apple enjoys considerable market share of over
55% and extraordinarily high profit margins, the Judge finds these
factors alone do not show antitrust conduct. Success is not
illegal. The final trial record did not include evidence of other
critical factors, such as barriers to entry and conduct decreasing
output or decreasing innovation in the relevant market. The Judge
does not find that it is impossible; only that Epic Games failed in
its burden to demonstrate Apple is an illegal monopolist.

Nonetheless, the trial did show that Apple is engaging in
anticompetitive conduct under California's competition laws. Judge
Rogers concludes that Apple's anti-steering provisions hide
critical information from consumers and illegally stifle consumer
choice. When coupled with Apple's incipient antitrust violations,
these anti-steering provisions are anticompetitive and a nationwide
remedy to eliminate those provisions is warranted.

Conclusion

Judge Rogers concludes that the trial highlighted that "big tech"
encompasses many markets, including as relevant in the case, the
submarket for mobile gaming transactions. This lucrative, $100
billion, market has not been fully tapped and is ripe for economic
exploitation. As a major player in the wider video gaming industry,
Epic Games brought the lawsuit to challenge Apple's control over
access to a considerable portion of this submarket for mobile
gaming transactions. Ultimately, Epic Games overreached. As a
consequence, the trial record was not as fulsome with respect to
antitrust conduct in the relevant market as it could have been.

Thus, and in summary, Judge Rogers does not find that Apple is an
antitrust monopolist in the submarket for mobile gaming
transactions. However, she does find that Apple's conduct in
enforcing anti-steering restrictions is anticompetitive. A remedy
to eliminate those provisions is appropriate. This measured remedy
will increase competition, increase transparency, increase consumer
choice and information while preserving Apple's iOS ecosystem which
has procompetitive justifications. Moreover, it does not require
the Court to micromanage business operations which courts are not
well-suited to do as the Supreme Court has appropriately
recognized.

A separate judgment will issue based on the findings of fact and
conclusions of law she set forth, Judge Rogers will enter a
separate permanent injunction barring the noted restraints.

For the reasons set forthn, Judge Rogers finds in favor of Apple on
all counts except with respect to violation of California's Unfair
Competition law (Count 10) and only partially with respect to its
claim for Declaratory Relief. The preliminary injunction previously
ordered is terminated.

Each party will bear its own costs. No party will file any
post-trial motions based on previously-made arguments.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5ux7n2jf from Leagle.com.


APPLE INC: Faces Suit for Allowing Phishing App in App Store
------------------------------------------------------------
Apple's long-standing mantra has been that the App Store "is the
safest and most trusted place for users to get apps." Yet a new
9-count class action filed against Apple disagrees. It's being
reported that cryptocurrency users who downloaded an Apple
application called "Toast Plus" saw their money disappear, and now
they're suing Apple over it in a class action lawsuit that was
filed.

According to the complaint filed in federal court in Maryland,
Apple allowed hackers to place a spoof or "phishing" application
disguised as a cryptocurrency wallet in its on-line App Store,
inducing the plaintiff and others to download and install a
criminal portal into their crypto accounts.

The complaint, alleging negligence, fraud and a host of
computer-specific privacy torts, was filed on behalf of Maryland
resident Hadona Diep by Joshua Whitaker of the Baltimore law firm
Aldelphi Law.

Apple is liable because it failed to vet the software distributed
by its online store, which it tightly controls by allowing only
approved vendors and extracting a (until recently) 30% commission
on every sale, the lawsuit says, adding that the boilerplate
disclaimers in its user agreement don't apply: "The fact that Toast
Plus was not an actual application, but instead a medium for the
commission of fraud, makes any existing contract using it as
subject matter void."

Users of the Toast Plus app found it anything but trustworthy,
according to the lawsuit.

"Plaintiff believed that Toast Plus was a version of Toast Wallet,
a well known cryptocurrency wallet, as the names were similar and
the logo used for the application in the App Store was the same or
nearly identical," the lawsuit says.

In January of 2018 Diep transferred 474 Ripple ("XRP")
cryptocurrency coins to a cryptocurrency wallet which was shut down
the next month.

"Plaintiff thereafter linked her private XRP key, or a seed phrase,
into Toast Plus in March of 2021," the complaint says, but did not
transfer any of the money because she was holding the coins as an
investment.

Months later, in August, she checked the wallet to find that her
cryptocurrency was gone. In fact, according to the lawsuit, she
"discovered that not only did she have no XRP in the Wallet, her
account was 'deleted' on March 3, 2021."

Calls to the Toast Plus company, Apple and then law enforcement
followed, according to the complaint, but no one took
responsibility. The lawsuit says she lost more than $5,000.

An online message board frequented by cryptocurrency users tells a
similar story.

"I went to the App Store and downloaded the first wallet that came
up," a user calling themself Badinker wrote at ycombinator's
message board in March. "So, I went ahead and imported the private
key and instantly before I could send the exchange all the XRP was
transferred to . . . a known scam account."

The complaint says anyone who downloaded the Toast Plus software is
part of the class, "entitled to statutory damages of the greater of
$10,000 or $100 per day for each day of violation, actual and
punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and Defendant's
profits obtained from the above described violations."

Causes for Action

Count 1: Violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

Count 2: Violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act

Count 3: Interception of Electronic Communications in Violation of
Md. Code

Count 4: Disclosure of Electronic Communications in Violation of
Md. Code Ann., Wiretap & Electronic Surveillance Act

Count 5: Violation(s) of the Maryland Personal Information
Protection Act

Count 6: Violation(s) of Each State's Personal Information
Protection Acts

Count 7: Violation(s) of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act

Count 8: Violation(s) of the Each State's Consumer Protection Act

Count 9: Negligence

For more details on this case, review the full Class Action lawsuit
filing presented below in a Scribd document. [GN]

ARCHON INC: Saiyed Appeals Judgment in Labor Suit to Federal Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff AMJAD SAIYED filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit styled AMJAD SAIYED v. ARCHON, INC., et al., Case
No. 2:16-cv-09530-JMV-JBC, in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
commenced the putative class action on Nov. 21, 2014, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging, among
other things, that the Defendants failed to pay him and other
similarly situated employees overtime and minimum wage in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the New York Labor Law
("NYLL"), and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("NJWHL"). The Plaintiff
was employed by Defendant Archon Inc. and/or Archon Distribution,
Inc. from January 2009 until he was terminated on December 19,
2013.

The Plaintiff is from India, and represents that Archon submitted
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") Form I-129,
which enabled him to obtain a visa to work in the United States. He
maintains that throughout his employment, Archon represented on
USCIS forms that it paid him vastly different salary amounts than
what he was actually paid. The Plaintiff also contends that he was
forced to work under oppressive conditions and was mistreated. He
asserts that he tolerated these conditions out of fear of
deportation.

In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts claims under the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA");
common law fraud; the FLSA; NYLL; quantum meruit; and NJWHL on
behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated employees. On
April 9, 2018, the Clerk of the Court entered default as to the
Defendants for failure to plead or otherwise defend.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Opinion and Order
and Judgment dated August 11, 2021, and Amended Judgment and Order
dated August 16, 2021, granting in part and denying in part his
supplemental certification in support of his request for damages.
The Court had held that judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff and
against Defendants in the amount of $233,096.71.

The appellate case is captioned as AMJAD SAIYED, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v.
ARCHON, INC., ARCHON DISTRIBUTION, INC., RASHID PATEL, MOHAMED
ASHIF GAJRA, JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
21-2298, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, filed on Sept. 10, 2021.[BN]

ASTROTECH CORP: Discovery in Stein Class Action Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
Astrotech Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on September 21, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended June 30, 2021, that discovery is ongoing in
the class action and derivative lawsuit entitled, Stein v. Pickens,
et al., C.A. No. 2021-0322-JRS.

On April 15, 2021, a putative stockholder of the Company commenced
a class action and derivative lawsuit in the Delaware Court of
Chancery, Stein v. Pickens, et al., C.A. No. 2021-0322-JRS, in
which it is alleged, among other things, that the Company
improperly included broker non-votes in the tabulation of votes
counted in favor to approve an amendment to the Company's
Certificate of Incorporation and, thus the 2020 Certificate
Amendment was defective.

The Company investigated these allegations and disputes them.

Discovery in this matter is ongoing.

Astrotech Corporation is an Austin, Texas-based commercial
aerospace company. The Company currently owns, operates and
maintains spacecraft processing facilities; prepares and processes
scientific research in microgravity; and develops and manufactures
chemical sensor equipment.

AVIVA CANADA: COVID-19 Class Action Fully Certified in Ontario
--------------------------------------------------------------
canadianunderwriter.ca reports that an Ontario manufacturer shuts
down its factory for several weeks in the early stages of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Factory managers re-configure the facility to
allow workers to socially distance. Can that manufacturer get
business insurance coverage if its policy wording covers loss of
income 'by order of civil authority resulting from' a disease
outbreak?

This is one question before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
in a class-action lawsuit against Aviva Canada.

In Nordik Windows v. Aviva, released Sept. 10 by the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice, Justice Edward Belobaba ruled that four
Ontario firms involved in business interruption claims disputes
with Aviva Canada are suitable representative plaintiffs in a
class-action lawsuit.

Allegations that Aviva has breached insurance contracts, by denying
business interruption claims during the pandemic, have not been
proven in court.

The Sept 10 ruling is not on the merits of the lawsuit. Instead, it
simply allows the lawsuit to proceed through the courts. But Aviva
has lost its argument that Nordik Windows (along with Hangar9
Studios Inc., Cash and Carry Inc. and Real Food for Real Kids Inc.)
are not suitable class representatives in the lawsuit.

So as a result of the Sept. 10 ruling, the case is "fully
certified" as a class proceeding.

The four claimants filed claims with Aviva in 2020 after COVID-19
was declared a pandemic.

Unlike many BI claimants, the four in the Aviva class action did
not have an insurance policy that required an actual property loss
(such as wind, fire or water damage) in order to claim loss of
income.

Instead, their policy wording with Aviva covers loss of income
"caused by the interruption of the 'business' at the 'premises'
when ingress to or egress from the 'premises' is restricted in
whole or in part . . . . by order of civil authority resulting from
. . . . an outbreak of a contagious or infectious disease that is
required by law to be reported to government authorities."

In the case of Nordik Windows, it shut down for six weeks, in the
spring of 2020, to reconfigure the equipment and work-stations in
its manufacturing facility and achieve the recommended six-foot
physical distancing.

But Nordik Windows fell into the category of an "essential"
business, meaning it was not actually mandated, by the Ontario
government, to shut down its manufacturing operation.

Aviva Canada argues that advice or a recommendation, of a public
health authority, is not the same thing as "an order of civil
authority" which is covered in the Aviva policy language.

The definitive meaning of "an order of civil authority" will be
determined at a later stage of the class-action lawsuit, Justice
Belobaba said in his Sept. 10, 2021 ruling. What Justice Belobaba
ruled was that at this point, there is at least some evidence that
some portion of the business interruption losses sustained by
Nordik Windows were caused by an "order of civil authority."

In March of 2020, the opening words of the Ontario government's
closure order said in part:

And Whereas the temporary closure of places of non-essential
business is necessary to help protect the health and safety of the
people of Ontario in response to the declared emergency;

And Whereas the supply chain with respect to essential goods,
services and resources should continue to function to the full
extent possible, subject to the advice and recommendations of
public health officials, including their recommendations about the
importance of physical distancing.

Nordik Windows says when it shut down in the early stages of the
pandemic, it had to unbolt equipment, which then had to be moved by
heavy rollers and forklifts to new locations on the factory floor.

"Four employees spent about a month and a half on the
reconfiguration," Justice Belobaba wrote. "There is evidence that
otherwise the [claimant's] employees 'were basically on top of each
other' in some areas of the manufacturing facility." [GN]

BHP GROUP: Dismissal of Samarco Bondholders Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------
BHP Group Plc said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 21, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2021, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice in the
putative class action suit filed against Samarco Mineracao S.A, and
the plaintiff did not seek any further review of that decision.

On 14 November 2016, a putative class action complaint (Bondholder
Complaint) was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Samarco Mineracao
S.A's 10-year bond notes due 2022–2024 between 31 October 2012
and 30 November 2015.

The Bondholder Complaint was initially filed against Samarco and
the former Chief Executive Officer of Samarco.

The Bondholder Complaint asserted claims under the U.S. federal
securities laws and indicated that the plaintiff would seek
certification to proceed as a class action.

The Bondholder Complaint was subsequently amended to include BHP
Group Limited, BHP Group Plc, BHP Brasil, Vale and officers of
Samarco, including four of Vale and BHP Brasil's nominees to the
Samarco Board.

On 5 April 2017, the plaintiff discontinued its claims against the
individual defendants.

The amount of damages sought by the putative class was
unspecified.

On 7 March 2018, the District Court granted a joint motion from the
remaining corporate defendants to dismiss the Bondholder Complaint.


A second amended Bondholder Complaint was also dismissed by the
Court on 18 June 2019. On 9 July 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion
for reconsideration of that decision or for leave to file a third
amended complaint.

On 30 October 2019, the District Court denied the plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration and for leave to amend its complaint.

On 4 March 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal with prejudice and the plaintiff did not
seek any further review of that decision.

BHP Group Plc operates as a resource mining company. The Company
focuses on minerals, metals, petroleum products, and oil and gas
extraction and processing activities, as well as provides marketing
services. BHP Group serves customers worldwide.


BHP GROUP: Unit to Appeal Denial of Declaratory Relief in AUS Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
BHP Group Plc said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 21, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2021, that BHP Group Limited has now
sought leave to appeal the decision of the Full Court denying their
bid for declaratory relief to the High Court of Australia.

BHP Group Limited is named as a defendant in a shareholder class
action in the Federal Court of Australia on behalf of persons who
acquired shares in BHP Group Limited on the Australian Securities
Exchange or shares in BHP Group Plc on the London Stock Exchange
and Johannesburg Stock Exchange in periods prior to the Samarco dam
failure. The amount of damages sought in the class action is
unspecified.

On 12 May 2020, BHP Group Limited filed an application seeking
declaratory relief which, if successful, would narrow the group of
claimants in the class action.

BHP Group Limited was unsuccessful at first instance and on appeal
to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.

BHP Group Limited has now sought leave to appeal the decision of
the Full Court to the High Court of Australia.

BHP Group Plc operates as a resource mining company. The Company
focuses on minerals, metals, petroleum products, and oil and gas
extraction and processing activities, as well as provides marketing
services. BHP Group serves customers worldwide.


BLACKBERRY LTD: Bids to Exclude Opinions in Pearlstein Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARVIN PEARLSTEIN, Individually And On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. BLACKBERRY LIMITED (F/K/A
RESEARCH IN MOTION LIMITED), THORSTEN HEINS, BRIAN BIDULKA, and
STEVE ZIPPERSTEIN, Defendants, Case No. 13 Civ. 7060 (CM)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Colleen McMahon of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in
part the motions to exclude the opinions and potential testimony of
Professor Thomas Lys, Philip Schimmel, Professor Tulin Erdem, and
Professor Itamar Simonson.

Background

The case is a securities fraud class action lawsuit brought by
investors of BlackBerry, who allege that the company fraudulently
accounted for revenue from sales of certain devices in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2013. The Plaintiffs bring a securities
class action on behalf of purchasers of BlackBerry common stock
between March 28, 2013 and Sept. 20, 2013. They allege that the
BlackBerry Defendants (the company and several individual
defendants) made a series of materially false and misleading
statements and omissions concerning the company's new BlackBerry 10
smartphones ("BB10s") -- in particular the Z10 and Q10 devices --
during the class period.

The Plaintiffs allege that the BlackBerry Defendants made
misrepresentations to attempt to conceal these devices' poor sales
performance, and that Defendants violated Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP") by accounting for revenue from the
devices once the BB10s were shipped to carriers rather than when
they were sold to end consumers -- in accounting terms, by
recognizing revenue "Sell-In" rather than "Sell-Through."

In short, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants (i) made false
and misleading statements about the success of BlackBerry and the
BB10s; and (ii) issued false and misleading financial statements
regarding the same. This defrauded investors who bought BlackBerry
stock during the class period because they did so at inflated
prices, higher than what the stock was truly worth.

The Court denied BlackBerry's motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint on March 19, 2018 and certified a class of Plaintiffs on
Jan. 26, 2021.

Each side has offered expert testimony from an accounting expert
and a marketing expert. Each side has also filed motions to exclude
the opinions and potential testimony of the opposing side's
experts. These four motions to exclude the opinions and potential
testimony of four expert witnesses -- two Plaintiffs' witnesses:
Professors Thomas Lys and Tulin Erdem; and two Defense witnesses:
Philip Schimmel and Professor Itamar Simonson -- are currently
before the Court.

Discussion

Under the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, district courts act as "gatekeepers" in determining
whether an expert witness really qualifies as one. Rule 702 states:
"A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case."

The Second Circuit has distilled Rule 702's requirements into three
broad criteria: (1) qualifications, (2) reliability, and (3)
relevance and assistance to the trier of fact. The party proffering
the expert's opinions "has the burden to establish the Rule 702
admissibility requirements, with the district court acting as a
'gatekeeper' to ensure that the 'expert's testimony both rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.

1. Thomas Lys

Thomas Lys, Ph.D. is the Plaintiffs' accounting expert. The
Plaintiffs asked Lys to "opine on whether BlackBerry's accounting
treatment of its BB10 family of devices complied with U.S. GAAP and
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure requirements
and whether those statements were misleading and material to
investors." In conducting his review, Lys reviewed deposition
transcripts, corresponding exhibits and documents produced in this
litigation, and BlackBerry's financial statements, earnings
transcripts, and press releases.

Mr. Lys arrived at four general conclusions -- all of which the
Defendants seek to exclude -- including that BlackBerry's
accounting related to the BB10 devices was Inconsistent with GAAP's
conceptual framework because it subordinated substance by
manipulating the form of BB10 sales transactions to meet the
criteria for the Sell-In Revenue Recognition Method. Lys found
"that absent BlackBerry's outcome based reporting of BB10 sales,
the Company would have been required under GAAP to use the
Sell-Through Revenue Recognition Method for the sale of its BB10
devices beginning in Q4FY13." In other words, BlackBerry's use of
the "Sell-In" method of accounting (where sales revenue is reported
after a device was shipped to carriers) rather than the
"Sell-Through" method (where revenue is reported after the device
has been sold to an end consumer) was inappropriate under GAAP.

The Defendants make several arguments against Lys' opinions. First,
they argue that none of Lys's opinions on revenue recognition can
be admitted because he is not qualified to testify as an expert on
revenue recognition under GAAP because he is not a CPA, has never
worked as a corporate accountant or auditor, and has never
published on the topic of revenue recognition.

Judge McMahon holds that Professor Lys is an expert in accounting
who teaches people who work as CPAs and accountants how to do their
job. He has written numerous articles on various aspects of
accounting, including corporate accounting reporting, discretionary
accounting choices, and the economic consequences of alternate
financial reporting standards and financial decisions. He is thus
eminently qualified to offer opinions about BlackBerry's accounting
practices. His lack of practical, as opposed to academic,
experience is fodder for cross-examination; it is almost a given
that when a professor testifies, opposing counsel will make a
"those who can, do; those who can't, teach" argument. But that
argument is not a basis to exclude the expert's opinions outright.

The Defendants also argue that Lys's opinions should be excluded in
full because he did not ground his opinions in the factual record.
But Judge McMahon agrees with the Plaintiffs' view that this simply
represents a difference of opinion over what the facts show
(including what BlackBerry did or did not consider in reaching the
accounting conclusions that it did) and how the facts (as the jury
will find them) should be interpreted. If Lys ignored important
aspects of the Plaintiffs' accounting memoranda or the work done by
BlackBerry's outside accountants, that will come out on
cross-examination or in the testimony of the opposing expert, Mr.
Philip Schimmel. But this is not a basis upon which the entirety of
his opinions must be excluded.

The Defendants next argue that BlackBerry's recognition of revenue
via Sell-In (rather than Sell-Through) "potentially increased
incentive compensation" payable to CEO Heins and CFO Brian Bidulka"
must be excluded. Judge McMahon agrees. She holds that whether
BlackBerry's actions did or did not increase incentive compensation
for these executives is a question of fact that does not require
expert testimony to answer. This is especially true given that
Lys's opinion is simply that BlackBerry's actions "potentially"
increased compensation.

Finally, Judge McMahon holds that Lys will not be permitted to
opine on whether Blackberry's CEO made false statements during a
March 28, 2013 earnings call. She says, the jury will make this
determination, and no expert for either side will be permitted to
testify to this ultimate issue. The Judge agrees with the
Defendants that Lys is not acting as an expert on this issue but is
simply noting a difference between BlackBerry's public statements
and its internal data. Lys can report his observation of the
difference between the two numbers in his testimony if he relied on
that difference to reach any opinion to which he is permitted to
testify. But he can do no more than that.

For these reasons, Judge McMahon the motion to exclude Lys'
opinions is granted in part and denied in part.

2. Philip Schimmel

Philip Schimmel is the Defendants' accounting expert, and he offers
opinions that directly contradict those of Professor Lys.

BlackBerry asked Schimmel to evaluate the opinions of Professor
Lys, and he concluded that Lys's opinions were incorrect on all
fronts. For example, Schimmel concluded, from the evidence he
evaluated, "that the substance of the BB10 sales transactions" did
not "differ from their form," and that BlackBerry's revenue
recognition did not "fail to meet the GAAP criteria." The
Plaintiffs argue that Schimmel's opinions should be excluded
because he is unqualified and provides no reliable methodology for
analyzing his accounting opinions.

Judge MaMahon finds that Schimmel is every bit as qualified as
Professor Lys to offer the opinions in his report. Schimmel worked
as an auditor for KPMG for over forty years, including 31 years as
a partner at the firm. His work responsibilities included planning,
supervising, and executing the audits of public and private
companies, and he has served as an audit partner for some of the
largest corporations in the world. This work makes him intimately
familiar with GAAP accounting principles as well as the
"professional judgment" of someone who would be qualified as an
expert to testify on such matters.

Significantly, Mr. Schimmel does not include in his report any of
the improper testimony that can be found in Professor Lys's report.
He does not offer his opinions about ultimate legal conclusions
such as whether BlackBerry complied with SEC requirements, nor does
he offer opinions about factual matters that are for the jury to
decide, such as whether particular statements made by BlackBerry's
CEO were false or material.

In light of the foregoing, Judge McMahon concludes that Mr.
Schimmel's testimony is admissible in full and denied in full the
Plaintiffs' motion to exclude his opinions and potential
testimony.

3. Tulin Erdem

Professor Tulin Erdem, Ph.D. is the Plaintiffs' marketing expert.

The Plaintiffs asked Professor Erdem "to evaluate from a strategic
marketing perspective the circumstances and factors influencing the
commercial performance of BlackBerry's BB10 devices in the
smartphone market," and also "to consider the Z10 and Q10 devices'
general competitiveness, consumers' contemporaneous perceptions,
and the broader smartphone market leading up to and during the
relevant time period." Among other things, she concluded that
BlackBerry's BB10 devices "were not competitive" after considering
a variety of factors, including "the devices' flagship-status
pricing, consumers' issues with the unintuitive operating system,
and an Application ecosystem that lacked crucial Apps at the time
of launch.

Judge McMahon concludes that Professor Erdem is qualified to
testify about marketing issues -- what makes a product successful,
why things like App capacity or launch timing are critically
important to a product's success -- and to observe whether
information about such matters was available to BlackBerry at or
prior to the time when accounting decisions of import to the case
were being made. For these reasons, Judge McMahon granted in part
and denied in part the motion to strike Professor Erdem's
testimony.

4. Itamar Simonson

Professor Itamar Simonson is the Defendants' rebuttal marketing
expert, who is asked to counter the testimony of Professor Erdem.
Professor Simonson is the Sebastian S. Kresge Professor of
Marketing at Stanford's Graduate School of Business and is a
frequent expert witness in securities litigations. Simonson's
essential argument boils down to this: What is useful in the
business school classroom as a teaching tool is inappropriate in
the context of a legal dispute, because in that context such
studies are susceptible to obvious biases and the "cherry picking"
of evidence, which "may be susceptible to influence by the
attorneys on whose behalf the report is prepared and their
previously filed Complaint."

Professor Simonson offers no reason why expert testimony about
marketing conditions and decisions that is predicated on what was
actually known by decisionmakers at the time the decisions were
made qualifies as "biased" postmortem analysis that should be
excluded as unreliable. In fact, he acknowledges that my reading is
correct, and that Professor Erdem "did summarize some of the
pertinent facts" using contemporaneously available material.

Judge McMahon holds that she is prepared to allow Professor
Simonson to criticize the case study method used by Professor
Erdem, and to be cross-examined about whether he has ever, in his
extensive history as an expert witness, employed it. The Juduge is
prepared to allow him to take issue with specifically identified
decisions by Professor Erdem to emphasize or de-emphasize
particular points in her report -- but only to the extent that he
has cited or footnoted, in his current report, the evidentiary
basis for his disagreement with her points of emphasis and
de-emphasis. But that is all the testimony the Judge is prepared to
accept from him. Professor Simonson is not permitted to testify
about his (unsupported) views and conclusions on the state of the
smartphone industry, market-wide changes, or what any specific
company did or did not believe. Based on the report he has
submitted, his testimony should be brief indeed. For these reasons,
Judge McMahon granted in substantial part the motion to strike
Professor Simonson's testimony.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, Judge McMahon granted in part and denied
in part the motions to exclude the opinions and potential testimony
of Professor Thomas Lys, Philip Schimmel, Professor Tulin Erdem,
and Professor Itamar Simonson, in accordance with her opinion.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close Dkt. Nos. 498,
500, 512, and 514.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/583tsnyx from Leagle.com.


BLUE CROSS: 60 Days Extension for Class Cert. Deadlines Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVE C., KELLY W., JANE
DOE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
v. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., and BLUE
CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF MASSACHUSETTS HMO BLUE, INC., Case No.
1:18-cv-12278-ADB (D. Mass.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter
an order extending class certification and related deadlines 60
days while the parties are mediating.

The parties have mediation statements due to Judge Dein on
September 23, 2021, a pre-mediation conference with Judge Dein on
September 29, 2021 and a mediation scheduled for October 4, 2021
with the possibility of an additional session to be
scheduled.

The parties believe that their time is best spent in the coming
weeks focusing on the mediation.

The current dates and the proposed new dates sought by the motion:

            Event                Current Date     Proposed Date

-- Last day to file a motion    Sept. 28, 2021    Nov. 29, 2021
   for class certification

-- Deadline for opposition      Nov. 29, 2021     Jan. 28, 2022
   to motion for class
   certification

-- Deadline for reply brief     Dec. 20,2021      Feb. 18, 2022
   in support of motion for
   class certification

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Sept. 16, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39zJMrB at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Classes, are:

          Sean K. Collins, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SEAN K. COLLINS
          184 High Street, Suite 503
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (855) 693-9256
          Facsimile: (617) 227-2843
          E-mail: sean@neinsurancelaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan M. Feigenbaum, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JONATHAN M. FEIGENBAUM
          184 High Street, Suite 503
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 357-9700
          Facsimile: (617) 227-2843
          E-mail: jonathan@erisaattorneys.com

               - and -

          Brian S. King, Esq.
          BRIAN S. KING, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          336 South 300 East, Suite 200
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111
          Telephone: (801) 532-1739
          Facsimile: (801) 532-1936
          E-mail: brian@briansking.com

               - and -

          Mala M. Rafik, Esq.
          ROSENFELD & RAFIK, P.C.
          184 High Street, Suite 503
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: 617-723-7470
          Fax: 617-227-2843
          E-mail: mmr@rosenfeld.com

               - and -

          Kano S. Sams II, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: 310-201-9150
          Facsimile: 310-201-9160
          E-mail: esams@glancylaw.com

BOSTON BEER: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of November 15 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion no later than November 15, 2021 in a securities class action
lawsuit that has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
acquired the securities of The Boston Beer Company, Inc. ("Boston
Beer" or the "Company") (NYSE:SAM) from April 22, 2021 through
September 8, 2021 (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
alleges violations of the Securities Act of 1934.

If you purchased Boston Beer securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit The Boston Beer
Company Inc Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Rujul Patel
toll free at (877) 779-1414 or rpatel@bernlieb.com

According to the complaint, Boston Beer issued materially false
and/or misleading statements and failed to disclose adverse facts
pertaining to the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Boston Beer specifically failed to disclose to investors: (1) that
Boston Beer's hard seltzer sales were decelerating; (2) that, as a
result, Boston Beer was reasonably likely to incur inventory
write-offs; (3) that the Company was reasonably likely to incur
shortfall fees payable to third party brewers; (4) that, as a
result of the foregoing, Boston Beer's financial results would be
adversely impacted; and (5) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

On July 22, 2021 after the market closed, the Company reduced its
full year 2021 guidance, expecting earnings per share between $18
and $22, down from a prior range of $22 and $26. Boston Beer cited
softer-than-expected sales in the hard seltzer category and overall
beer industry and also stated that it had "overestimated the growth
of the hard seltzer category in the second quarter."

On this news, the price of Boston Beer shares fell $246.54, or 26%,
to close at $701.00 per share on July 23, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

On September 8, 2021, after the market closed, the Company withdrew
its 2021 financial guidance, citing decelerating sales of hard
seltzer products. The Company also stated that it "expects to incur
hard seltzer-related inventory write-offs, shortfall fees payable
to 3rd party brewers, and other costs" for the remainder of fiscal
2021.

On this news, Boston Beer's share price fell $21.09, or 3.7%, to
close at $538.31 per share on September 9, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than November 15, 2021. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Boston Beer securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/thebostonbeercompanyinc-sam-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-fraud-stock-438/apply/
or contact Rujul Patel toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
rpatel@bernlieb.com

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING. (C) 2021 Bernstein Liebhard LLP. The law firm
responsible for this advertisement is Bernstein Liebhard LLP, 10
East 40th Street, New York, New York 10016, (212) 779-1414. The
lawyer responsible for this advertisement in the State of
Connecticut is Michael S. Bigin. Prior results do not guarantee or
predict a similar outcome with respect to any future matter. [GN]

BOSTON BEER: Kahn Swick Reminds of November 15 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadline in the following securities class action lawsuit:

The Boston Beer Company, Inc. (NYSE:SAM)

Class Period: 4/22/2021 - 9/8/2021

Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: November 15, 2021

SECURITIES FRAUD

To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-sam/

If you purchased shares of the above company and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case link above.

If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.

                          About KSF

KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients -
including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors - in seeking to recover investment
losses due to corporate fraud and malfeasance by publicly traded
companies. KSF has offices in New York, California, Louisiana and
New Jersey.

To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.[GN]

BRECKENRIDGE GRAND: Misclassifies Salespeople, Class Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jenna deJong at summitdaily.com reports that a U.S. district judge
has granted a motion to allow a lawsuit against Breckenridge Grand
Vacations to move forward as conditionally certified, meaning that
others can "opt in" to the case.

Earlier this year, Arthur McMahon, who was formerly employed as a
salesperson with the company, filed a class action complaint for
how Breckenridge Grand Vacations classifies its salespeople and
independent contractors. McMahon is seeking to recover overtime
wages and benefits for time worked while employed. He is also
hoping to stop the company from classifying its salespeople as
independent contractors in the future.

According to court records, to obtain preliminary class-action
certification, McMahon needed to assert substantial allegations
that he and other salespeople were together the victims of a single
practice or policy. McMahon alleged that the company's business
practices and pay policies "impacted all sales personnel in the
same manner."

Breckenridge Grand Vacations argued that McMahon failed to show
that he and others were classified as an employee, but according to
court records, this was not required at this stage in the legal
proceeding. Rather, McMahon just needed to show that a pool of
other employees who held similar roles to him existed.

The company also argued that McMahon did not prove that he was
similar to other potential class members, but the court document
says this argument also fails.

In general, the judge called Breckenridge Grand Vacations'
arguments against certification "unpersuasive."

Moving forward, McMahon and his team will begin working to identify
other potential plaintiffs in the case. In the meantime, the judge
ordered Breckenridge Grand Vacations to produce a list of names and
contact information of potential class members.

The document states that all current and former sales personnel of
Breckenridge Grand Vacations working anywhere in the United States
between March 18, 2017 and the present are certified to join the
case. [GN]

BRINKER INT'L: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Data Breach Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Brinker International, Inc. filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled In re Brinker Data Incident
Litigation, Case No. 3:18-cv-686-TJC-MCR, in the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Defendant
Brinker, the parent company that owns Chili's restaurants,
experienced a data breach where customers' personal and payment
card information was stolen. Three Named Plaintiffs, Shenika Theus,
Michael Franklin, and Eric Steinmetz, sought to represent
themselves and those similarly situated in a class action against
Brinker, seeking compensation for the inability to use payment
cards, lost time, and other out-of-pocket expenses associated with
the breach.

The Plaintiffs filed suit on May 24, 2018, after which the Court
consolidated two related cases on Oct. 30, 2018. They filed a
Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, which Brinker
moved to dismiss. The Court issued an order granting in part and
denying in part Brinker's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint, and Brinker moved
to dismiss the new claims and the Plaintiffs' requests for
injunctive relief. The Court dismissed the new claims and again
affirmed that the Plaintiffs had standing but held that any future
injuries were too speculative; thus, it dismissed any requests for
injunctive relief. The surviving claims include (1) breach of
implied contract, (2) negligence, (3) violation of California's
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") Unlawful Business Practices (for
alleged violations of the FTC Act and California Civil Code Section
1798.81.5), and (4) violation of California's UCL Unfair Business
Practices.

The Defendant now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated April
14, 2021, granting in part and deferring in part Plaintiffs' motion
to certify class; denying Daubert Motion; and denying as moot
Defendant's motion to strike late-filed exhibits.

The appellate case is captioned as Eric Steinmetz, et al. v.
Brinker International, Inc., Case No. 21-13146, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed on Sept.
16, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
before Sept. 30, 2021 as to Appellant Brinker International, Inc.;
and

   -- Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
before Oct. 14, 2021 as to Appellee Michael Franklin.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant BRINKER INTERNATIONAL, INC. is represented by:

          Sarah Cornelia, Esq.
          Barton W. Cox, Esq.
          Jason K. Fagelman, Esq.
          Philip A. Tarpley, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
          2200 Ross Ave Ste 3600
          Dallas, TX 75201-2750
          Telephone: (214) 855-8000
          E-mail: jason.fagelman@nortonrosefulbright.com

               - and -

          Jonathan S. Franklin, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US, LLP
          799 9th St NW Ste 1000
          Washington, DC 20001-4501
          Telephone: (202) 662-0200

               - and -

          Brian Christopher Lawrence, Esq.
          Wayne Drew Sorrell, II, Esq.
          LOWNDES DROSDICK DOSTER
           KANTOR & REED, PA
          215 N Eola Dr, PO Box 2809
          Orlando, FL 32802
          Telephone: (407) 843-4600
          E-mail: brian.lawrence@lowndes-law.com
                  drew.sorrell@lowndes-law.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees ERIC STEINMETZ, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; MICHAEL FRANKLIN, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated; and SHENIKA THEUS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Jaclyn L. Anderson, Esq.
          Graham B. LippSmith, Esq.  
          LIPPSMITH LLP
          555 S Flower St Ste 4400
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 254-4800
          E-mail: glippsmith@klwtlaw.com  

               - and -

          Patrick A. Barthle, Esq.
          Francesca Kester, Esq.
          Jean Sutton Martin, Esq.
          John Yanchunis, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, PA
          201 N. Franklin St Fl 7
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          E-mail: pbarthle@forthepeople.com
                  jeanmartin@forthepeople.com
                  jyanchunis@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N Pennsylvania Ave
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120-4117
          Telephone: (405) 235-1560
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Kevin S. Hannon, Esq.
          THE HANNON LAW FIRM
          1641 Downing St
          Denver, CO 80218
          E-mail: khannon@hannonlaw.com

               - and -

          Frank A. Perez, Esq.
          KASDAN LIPPSMITH WEBER TURNER LLP
          360 E 2nd St Ste 300
          Los Angeles, CA 90012
          Telephone: (213) 254-4801
          E-mail: fperez@klwtlaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT, LLP
          555 Lancaster Ave
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (610) 200-0580

               - and -

          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          AHDOOT WOLFSON, PC
          1016 Palm Ave
          West Hollywood, CA 90069
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          E-mail: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com

CASSAVA SCIENCES: Kahn Swick Reminds of October 26 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadline in the following securities class action lawsuit:

Cassava Sciences, Inc. (NASDAQ:SAVA)

Class Period: 9/14/2020 - 8/27/2021

Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: October 26, 2021

SECURITIES FRAUD

To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqcm-sava/

SECURITIES FRAUD

To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-sam/

If you purchased shares of the above company and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case link above.

If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.

                        About KSF

KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients -
including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors - in seeking to recover investment
losses due to corporate fraud and malfeasance by publicly traded
companies. KSF has offices in New York, California, Louisiana and
New Jersey.

To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com. [GN]

CENTRA TECH: Court Certifies Class in Rensel Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Jacob Zowie Thomas Rensel and others, Plaintiffs v.
Centra Tech, Inc., Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-24500-Civ-Scola
(S.D. Fla.), Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr., of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida grants the Plaintiffs' renewed
motion for class certification.

Background

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs allege that Centra
Tech violated securities laws through its fraudulent and unlawful
sale of cryptocurrencies. Plaintiffs Jacob Zowie Thomas Rensel,
Wang Yun He, Chi Hao Poon, King Fung Poon, Jae J. Lee, and Mateusz
Ganczarek are current and former owners of Centra Tech Tokens ("CTR
Tokens") purchased during Centra Tech's initial coin offering
("ICO") from July 23, 2017 through Oct. 5, 2017.

Defendant Centra Tech is a company founded in May 2016 that
purported to sell cryptocurrency. It marketed the use of the Centra
Wallet or a Centra Card, forms of payment that would allow users to
pay for everyday purchases with cryptocurrencies. Centra Tech
falsely represented that the Centra Cards were purportedly backed
up MasterCard and Visa.

To raise funds to develop the marketed products, Centra Tech held
an initial coin offering ("ICO") between July 23, 2017 and April
20, 2018. The ICO involved the sale of "Centra Tech Tokens" or "CTR
Tokens." Each token entitled the holder to certain rights related
to Centra Tech, including a .08% of the "rewards of the network
profit generated inside of the terms and conditions of the token."
Thus, although not marketed as a security, the CTR Tokens were
securities similar to the stock sold at an initial public offering.
To entice investors, Centra Tech enlisted the promotional services
of two well-known celebrities, Floyd Mayweather, Jr. and DJ Khaled.
Centra Tech also began an online promotional campaign involving
regular blog posts touting the benefits of CTR Tokens. As a result
of those marketing efforts, thousands of investors, including the
Plaintiffs, participated in the ICO. Centra Tech raised $32 million
as a result of the ICO.

Centra Tech made several misrepresentations to investors in
promoting the ICO. It claimed that the Centra Tech Debit Card would
be able to operate on Visa and Mastercard networks and allow users
to make transactions in digital currencies in "real time." However,
Centra Tech was never authorized to use the Visa or Mastercard
networks and the Centra Tech Debit Card never allowed users to make
digital currency transactions in real time. Centra Tech also
fabricated fictional executives who they claimed were working with
Centra Tech, touted Centra Tech's nonexistent insurance policy, and
made false claims regarding its insurance and state licenses to
increase investor confidence and solicit additional purchases of
CTR Tokens. It made these statements to induce the Plaintiffs and
the general public to invest in more unregistered CTR Token
securities and as part of a scheme to artificially inflate the
value of the patently worthless unregistered CTR Token securities.

As a result of these misrepresentations, the founders of Centra
Tech, Defendants Sharma, Farkas, and Trapani, are currently the
subjects of an SEC enforcement action for securities fraud (S.E.C.
v. Sharma et al., No. 18-cv-2909-DLC (S.D.N.Y.) and are being
criminally prosecuted in the Southern District of New York for the
fraudulent Centra Tech scheme (United States v. Sharma et al., No.
18-cr-340-LGS (S.D.N.Y.)).

In the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged violations of
securities laws against Centra Tech, its principals, and promoters.
The Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against some
Defendants and the Court dismissed the claims against other
Defendants. Accordingly, the only claims that survive are those
against Centra Tech for securities fraud under Section 12(a)(1) of
the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 771(a)(1), Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act,
17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

Following Centra Tech's failure to appear in the action by a
court-ordered date, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a Clerk's
Entry of Default against Centra Tech, which the Clerk issued on
Jan. 31, 2019. On June 13, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for
a default judgement against Centra Tech and a motion for class
certification. Two days later, counsel for Centra Tech finally
entered a notice of appearance and filed a motion to set aside the
Clerk's Entry of Default. Centra Tech also filed a response in
opposition the Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment and motion
for class certification. The Court decided the disputes in separate
orders.

The Court denied the Plaintiffs' original motion for class
certification and their renewed motion for class certification. It
determined that the motion for class certification was untimely and
that the Plaintiffs had failed to show the class was ascertainable
by failing to prove administrative feasibility. It denied the
renewed motion for failure to adduce new evidence, changed
circumstances, or new information about the class members' claims.
Because Centra Tech had failed to appear in the case by a
court-ordered date and had failed to excuse its noncompliance, the
Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment and
entered a final judgment against Centra Tech. It found Centra Tech
liable to the individual Plaintiffs and awarded monetary damages to
each named Plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs appealed the Court's order denying their motion for
class certification. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
Court's order and remanded for further proceedings. It held that
the motion was timely, that administrative feasibility was not a
requirement of ascertainability or Rule 23, and that the
Plaintiffs' proposed classes (including the one at issue in the
renewed motion) "easily" satisfied the requirements of
ascertainability. Although the Eleventh Circuit did not reverse the
finding of liability against Centra Tech, the appellate court
vacated the final judgment in so far as it did not account for all
of the relief sought by the Plaintiffs.

After the Eleventh Circuit issued its mandate, the Court held a
status conference on the matter on Sept. 1, 2021. The Plaintiffs
requested that the Court rules on the arguments advanced in the
Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification (as opposed to
those in the initial motion). The Court granted the Plaintiffs'
request to proceed on their renewed motion, noting that the motion
had been fully briefed by both parties.

In the renewed motion for class certification, the Plaintiffs claim
that Centra Tech's deception and fraudulent scheme had the effect
of injuring thousands of persons who purchased CTR Tokens during
the ICO.

The Plaintiffs move to certify the following class: All persons and
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Centra Tech Tokens
(CTR Tokens) directly from Defendant Centra Tech in connection with
its official initial coin offering from July 23, 2017 through Oct.
5, 2017.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to appoint Plaintiffs Chi Hao Poon,
King Fung Poon, Jae J. Lee, and Mateusz Ganczarek as Class
Representatives and to appoint Levi & Korsinsky and Taylor-Copeland
Law as the Class Counsel. In their renewed motion, the Plaintiffs
have dropped Plaintiff Rodney Warren from the proposed Class
because he purchased his CTR Tokens outside the Class period.

Discussion

To show that class certification is appropriate under Rule 23, the
party seeking class certification must show that the action
satisfies the standards of both Rule 23(a) and 23(b). The parties
dispute whether the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class
certification is timely and whether the Plaintiffs have satisfied
the requirements of Rule 23. Additionally, the Plaintiffs aver that
because Centra Tech is a defaulted defendant it has lost its
opportunity to oppose class certification.

In an abundance of caution and because he finds Centra Tech's
arguments unavailing, Judge Scola addresses those arguments in the
Order. Moreover, he does not revisit the parties' timeliness
arguments because the Eleventh Circuit already determined that the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was timely. The Judge
likewise adopts the Eleventh Circuit's holding that the Plaintiffs
have "easily" shown that the proposed class is ascertainable.
Lastly, and after careful consideration, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 and the
motion is due to be granted.

A. Class Definition

Judge Scola finds that with a slight modification, the definition
is concise and specific such that the group is capable of being
identified. Specifically, he says, the proposed class should
include only those individuals or entities who actually purchased
and held CTR Tokens during the class period.

Accordingly, the proposed class is modified only to the extent that
it removes "otherwise acquired," from the proposed definition.
Notably, all the Plaintiffs, except Warren, purchased and held CTR
Tokens during the proposed class period. The proposed definition is
otherwise concise and specific as it excludes purchases made
through secondary markets, which could affect the required showing
of reliance on Centra Tech's misrepresentations. Judge Scola also
approves the exclusion of Centra Tech, its principals and their
family members, and controlling shareholders.

B. Ascertainability

Judge Scola states that he is not required to determine the issue
of ascertainability because the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Plaintiffs' proposed subclasses, including the class proposed,
"easily" met the standard for ascertainability. Among other things,
as the Eleventh Circuit held, the Plaintiffs have adduced
sufficient means to show that class membership is capable of being
determined. That the Plaintiffs have yet to obtain some of these
records from Centra Tech is not dispositive in the case because
discovery has not been meaningfully conducted and Centra Tech does
not dispute the existence of the documents or that the Plaintiffs
may obtain same through discovery.

C. Requirements of Rule 23(a)

Judge Scola holds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied all of the
requirements of Rule 23(a).

(1) Numerosity

Judge Scola finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the numerosity
requirement and Centra Tech does not dispute this in its response
to the renewed motion. The Plaintiffs allege that there are
thousands of Class members that will be confirmed through the
methods described in the prior section. The Centra Tech spreadsheet
identifies at least 3500 different purchases (not investors) during
the ICO, and the criminal complaint alleges that thousands of
individual and entities were harmed by Centra Tech's scheme. Judge
Scola is satisfied that the Plaintiffs satisfied the numerosity
requirement.

(2) Commonality

The Plaintiffs have met their burden because the Class members
share issues of law and fact relating to Centra Tech's
misrepresentations and the resulting financial harm to the
Plaintiffs, Judge Scola finds. The Plaintiffs advance a series of
questions that will be answered through common proof, including
whether Centra Tech sold unregistered securities; whether Centra
Tech knowingly engaged in a fraudulent scheme related to its ICO;
whether CTR Token prices were artificially inflated during the
Class period as a result of Centra Tech's misrepresentations; and
whether the Class member sustained damages as a result of Centra
Tech's sale of unregistered securities and fraudulent conduct.

(3) Typicality

Judge Scola holds that the claims of proposed class representatives
Hao Poon, Poon, Lee, and Ganczarek are typical of those of the
class. The Plaintiffs allege that: They each purchased CTR Tokens
during the ICO; CTR Tokens are unregistered securities; Centra Tech
made several misrepresentations to induce the Plaintiffs to
purchase CTR Tokens; Centra Tech worked in concert with its
principals and promoters to defraud investors; and the Plaintiffs
relied to their detriment on Centra Tech's misrepresentations.
Thus, the claims arise from the same event, are premised on the
same legal theory, and share the same essential characteristics.

(4) Adequacy

Judge Scola finds that the named Plaintiffs possess the same
interests as the other putative class members. Further, he is not
aware of any conflicts that would preclude the named Plaintiffs or
their counsel from adequately representing and protecting the
interests of the proposed class.

D. Requirements of Rule 23(b)

To satisfy Rule 23(b), a movant must show that the action satisfies
at least one of three alternative standards. The Plaintiffs move
for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), under which
certification is appropriate only if: (1) "questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members"; and (2) "a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy."

(1) Predominance

As evidence of their theory, the Plaintiffs have cited to the
criminal and enforcement actions against Centra Tech and its
individual principals for securities fraud, as well as the white
paper, blog posts, and social media posts that were circulated to
induce investors to purchase CTR Tokens during the ICO. Judge Scola
is satisfied that Centra Tech's misrepresentations, such as their
assurances that the offered securities were backed by Visa and
Mastercard, that they were insured by a third party, or even that
they had real and not fictitious managers, would have prevented CTR
Tokens from being marketed. In light of the foregoing, the Judge
finds that the plaintiff has satisfied the predominance requirement
of Rule 23(b)(3).

(2) Superiority

Judge Scola is not aware of any reason why the putative class
members might have a special interest in controlling their
individual claims. On the contrary, it appears that the class
members would favor class treatment because there are an abundance
of common issues and facts in the case.

Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Scola concludes that class
certification is warranted under Rule 23. The Judge grants the
Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification. Lead Plaintiffs
Jacob Zowie Thomas Rensel and Wang Yun He, and proposed class
representatives Chi Hao Poon, King Fung Poon, Jae J. Lee, and
Mateusz Ganczarek are appointed as the Class Representatives.
Additionally, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP and Taylor-Copeland Law are
hereby appointed as the Class Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yv68bxbu from Leagle.com.


CHAMBERLAIN UNIVERSITY: Dean Appeals Tuition Refund Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Tanesia Dean filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit entitled Tanesia Dean, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Chamberlain University, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, Case No. 1:21-cv-00145-JG, in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sep. 15, 2021, the
motion to dismiss the putative class action suit initiated by
Tanesia Dean against Chamberlain University has been granted.

On January 19, 2021, a putative class action was filed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
against Chamberlain University by Tanesia Dean on behalf of herself
and similarly situated students of Chamberlain.

The complaint alleged breach of contract and unjust enrichment
claims against Chamberlain related to its decision to transition
all classes online in March 2020, in light of the global pandemic,
without altering tuition or fees.

The putative class was defined to include all students, nationwide,
who paid tuition and fees during the following academic sessions:
May 2020, July 2020, September 2020, November 2020, and January
2021. Plaintiff sought monetary relief exceeding $5 million, and
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the dismissal order.

The appellate case is captioned as Tanesia Dean v. Chamberlain
University, LLC, Case No. 21-3821, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, filed on Sept. 14, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant TANESIA DEAN, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          James L. Simon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SIMON & SIMON
          5000 Rockside Road, Suite 520
          Independence, OH 44131
          Telephone: (216) 525-8890
          E-mail: jameslsimonlaw@yahoo.com  

Defendant-Appellee CHAMBERLAIN UNIVERSITY, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, is represented by:

          April M. Johnson, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          901 Lakeside Avenue, E., North Point
          Cleveland, OH 44114-1190
          Telephone: (216) 586-3939
          E-mail: amjohnson@jonesday.com

CHANGYOU.COM LTD: ODS Securities Suit Moved to S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled ODS CAPITAL LLC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. CHANGYOU.COM LIMITED, SOHU.COM
LIMITED, SOHU.COM (GAME) LIMITED, CHANGYOU MERGER CO. LIMITED, XIAO
CHEN, CHARLES ZHANG, JOANNA LV, Case No. 1:20-cv-05973, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York on September 21, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of New York assigned
Case No. 1:21-cv-07858-GHW to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of Sections
10(b), Section 13(e), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by filing a materially false and misleading transaction
statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in order
to trade Changyou American Depository Shares (ADSs) at artificially
inflated prices between February 14, 2020 and April 23, 2020.

ODS Capital LLC is a limited liability company doing business in
Florida.

Changyou.com Limited is a company that operates personal computer
and mobile application games, headquartered in China.

Sohu.com Limited is an online media, search, and game service
company based in China.

Sohu.Com (Game) Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sohu.com
Limited.

Changyou Merger Co. Limited is a direct wholly-owned subsidiary of
Sohu.Com (Game) Limited. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
        
         David J. Schwartz, Esq.
         Francis P. McConville, Esq.
         LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
         140 Broadway
         New York, NY 10005
         Telephone: (212) 907-0700
         Facsimile: (212) 818-0477
         E-mail: dschwartz@labaton.com
                 fmcconville@labaton.com

CHICAGO, IL: Class Action Filed Against CPD Over Alleged Suspension
-------------------------------------------------------------------
illinoisnewstoday.com reports that the proceedings against the city
of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department over the ministry's
suspension and active policy have been given the status of a class
action.

The law firm dealing with the proceedings said it meant that there
could be more than 2 million people reportedly suspended by police
for no reason between 2010 and 2017.

Lawyers said that these outages would have a disproportionate
impact on people of color. [GN]


CITIC CAPITAL: Tang Suit Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duties
-----------------------------------------------------------
John Yong Tang, Faris Al Kooheji, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CITIC Capital Holdings
Ltd., Harbin Pharmaceutical Group Holding Co., Ltd., Harbin
Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd., Kenneth A. Martindale, Tricia K.
Tolivar, Hsing Chow, Rachel Lau, Michele S. Meyer, Alan Wan, Yong
Kai Wong, Alan D. Feldman, Michael F. Hines, Amy B. Lane, Philip E.
Mallott, Robert F. Moran, Evercore Inc., Gregory Berube, ABC
Company, John Doe, Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-17008 (D.N.J.,
Sept. 15, 2021) arises from the alleged unlawful schemes by a
number of state-owned Chinese corporations and individuals, GNC
Holdings Inc.'s Directors of the Board and senior management,
certain GNC's secured lenders and financial advisor to conspire
with each other to enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiffs
and others similarly situated minority shareholders through
racketeering activities, conspiracy, fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, and conversion.

The Plaintiffs bring this class action lawsuit on behalf of all
similarly situated minority shareholders of GNC who owned Class A
Common Stock during February 13, 2018 and June 23, 2020, excluding
entities and individuals named as Defendants in this action.

According to the complaint, the Defendants devised and implemented
the scheme of self-dealing and depriving Plaintiffs of their
interest in GNC through at least two racketeering activities in
violation of the Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations Act
of 1970 and the New Jersey Racketeer influenced And Corrupt
Organizations Act. The Defendants' unlawful schemes allegedly
converged at the fabrication and completion of the sham Chapter 11
bankruptcy filing.

GNC, headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is a global health
and wellness brand that was founded in 1935.

CITIC Capital Holdings Limited operates as an investment management
firm.

Harbin Pharmaceutical Group Holding Co. Ltd. is the controlling
shareholder of Defendant Harbin Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd.,
which is a state-owned pharmaceutical company in China.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John Y. Tang, Esq.
          TANG PC
          655 Summit Avenue
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 676-0757
          Facsimile: (212) 981-4869
          E-mail: john.tang@gettang.com

COMCAST CABLE: 9th Cir. Flips Denial of Arbitration in Hodges Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRANDON HODGES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. COMCAST CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 19-16483 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
denial of Comcast's motion to compel arbitration of the claims
asserted against it by former cable subscriber Hodges.

Background

Mr. Hodges brought the putative class action challenging certain of
Comcast's privacy and data-collection practices and seeking a
variety of monetary and equitable remedies. Between October 2015
and January 2018, Hodges subscribed to Comcast's cable television
services at his home in Oakland, California. In February 2018,
Hodges filed a complaint in California state court on behalf of a
putative class of California residential Comcast subscribers,
alleging that Comcast violated class members' statutory privacy
rights in collecting "data about subscribers' cable television
viewing activity" as well as "personally identifiable demographic
data about its subscribers."

Specifically, Hodges alleged that Comcast violated the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable Act"), by (1) failing to
clearly inform subscribers of how long Comcast would keep such
information; (2) failing to provide subscribers with access to this
information upon request; and (3) failing to obtain subscribers'
consent before gathering information about viewing activity. See 47
U.S.C. Section 551(a)(1)(C), (b), (d).

Mr. Hodges also alleged that Comcast violated the California
Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"), by (1) failing to obtain
subscribers' consent before using its cable boxes to collect
viewing activity; and (2) failing to disclose, within 30 days of a
subscriber request, "individually identifiable subscriber
information" Comcast had collected. In addition, Hodges asserted
that the same five violations of the Cable Act and CIPA constituted
"unlawful" business practices, thereby giving rise to a derivative
cause of action under California's unfair competition law ("UCL"),
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE Section 17200 et seq.

On behalf of himself and the putative class, Hodges sought
liquated, statutory, and punitive damages; seven specified forms of
"statewide public injunctive relief"; and attorney's fees.

Comcast removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California based on federal question
jurisdiction, and diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act, id. Section 1332(d). Noting that each version of
Hodges' various "Subscriber Agreements" with Comcast contained an
arbitration provision, Comcast then moved to compel arbitration.
Hodges opposed the motion, arguing that the arbitration provision
was unenforceable under McGill because its non-severable "Waiver of
Class Actions and Collective Relief" impermissibly deprived Hodges
of the right to pursue public injunctive relief in any forum. In
reply, Comcast argued that McGill was inapplicable because Hodges
was not seeking public injunctive relief and that, in any event,
the McGill rule is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA").

Because the question of whether McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d
85, 87 (Cal. 2007) was preempted by the FAA had already been raised
in several cases before the Ninth Circuit, the district court
stayed the case pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution of that
issue. After the latter held in Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 928
F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2019), that the FAA did not preempt the
McGill rule, the district court denied Comcast's motion to compel
arbitration. Comcast filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the
district court's ruling, and the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. Section 16(a)(1)(B).

Discussion

The case involves one such ground for contractual invalidation
under California law, the so-called "McGill rule." Under that rule,
insofar as a contractual provision "purports to waive a party's
right to request in any forum public injunctive relief, it is
invalid and unenforceable under California law." The Ninth Circuit
held in Blair that "the FAA does not preempt the McGill rule," and
it therefore rejects Comcast's contrary arguments in the case. The
only remaining question before the Ninth Circuit, then, is whether
Comcast's enforcement of the Subscriber Agreement in the case
violates the McGill rule. The Ninth Circuit concludes that, because
Hodges' complaint does not seek public injunctive relief, the
McGill rule is not implicated and that rule therefore does not bar
enforcement of the arbitration provision.

A.

As an initial matter, Hodges argues that, in addressing whether the
McGill rule is implicated in the case, it is irrelevant whether his
complaint "actually includes a claim" for public injunctive relief.
All that matters, in his view, is whether the Subscriber
Agreement's language theoretically purports to waive public
injunctive relief in any case. The Ninth Circuit opines that this
argument is foreclosed by McGill itself. In addressing whether the
contract in that case was unenforceable, the California Supreme
Court stated that, in "answering this question, it first concludes
that McGill's complaint does, in fact, appear to seek public
injunctive relief." And in Mejia v. DACM Inc., 268 Cal.Rptr.3d 642
(Cal. Ct. App. 2020), the California Court of Appeal likewise began
its analysis of the applicability of the McGill rule by addressing
whether the operative complaint actually sought public injunctive
relief in the first place.

The same conclusion follows from the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
In Kilgore, it held that it was unnecessary to reach the particular
FAA preemption question presented there precisely because the
plaintiffs' requested injunctions in that case did not qualify as
public injunctive relief.

Under Hodges' flawed view of California law, the mere presence of a
requirement to arbitrate public injunctive relief in a contract
should have been enough to invalidate the arbitration provision in
Kilgore under the Broughton-Cruz rule -- meaning that the ability
to compel arbitration in Kilgore could not depend upon whether
public injunctive relief was actually being requested in that case.
But the Ninth Circuit held exactly the opposite, concluding that
the particular injunctions being sought by the plaintiffs in
Kilgore did not involve public injunctive relief; that the
Broughton-Cruz rule therefore was not implicated; that it therefore
did not need to decide whether that rule was preempted by the FAA;
and that arbitration was required.

The applicable precedent thus forecloses Hodges' argument that
courts should stretch to invalidate contracts based on hypothetical
issues that are not actually presented in the parties' dispute. The
Ninth Circuit therefore turns to whether Hodges' complaint requests
public injunctive relief within the meaning of the McGill rule.

B.

The Ninth Circuit begins by setting forth the standards for what
constitutes non-waivable public injunctive relief under California
law. In addressing that question, it "is bound by decisions of the
state's highest court," and in deciding any unresolved or unclear
questions of state law, the Ninth Circuit is guided by the
principles that the state high court has articulated. In construing
the substantive scope of McGill's contract-invalidation rule, it
also cannot lose sight of the critical limitations on that rule
that saved it from preemption as a matter of federal law in Blair.
It reviews all questions of law de novo.

First, given the loadbearing weight it placed on the aspects of
McGill in Blair, the Ninth Circuit thinks it is clear that any
broader conception of public injunctive relief, beyond what it has
set forth, would have required a different conclusion as to the
preemption issue. It holds that if California's McGill rule had
sought to preserve, as non-waivable, the right to formally
represent the claims of others, to seek retrospective relief for a
particular class of persons, or to request relief that requires
consideration of the individualized claims of non-parties, then
such a rule would plainly "interfere with the informal, bilateral
nature of traditional consumer arbitration."

Second, Hodges' argument would still fail for the independent and
alternative reason that their expansion of the McGill rule is
preempted by the FAA. The Ninth Circuit opines that by insisting
that contracting parties may not waive a form of relief that is
fundamentally incompatible with the sort of simplified procedures
the FAA protects, the Mejia-Maldonado rule effectively bans parties
from agreeing to arbitrate all of their disputes arising from such
contracts. To say that such a rule is not preempted would flout
Supreme Court authority, citing Maldonado v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc.,
275 Cal.Rptr.3d 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) and Mejia. And that the
Ninth Circuit cannot do.

C.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reaffirms that non-waivable "public
injunctive relief" within the meaning of the McGill rule refers to
prospective injunctive relief that aims to restrain future
violations of law for the benefit of the general public as a whole,
rather than a discrete subset of similarly situated persons, and
that does so without requiring consideration of the individual
claims of non-parties. With these principles in mind, the Ninth
Circuit addresses whether Hodges' complaint seeks such relief.
Although the complaint labels the requested relief as "public," it
must look beyond such conclusory assertions and assess for itself
whether, under the applicable standards, the relief requested
implicates the McGill rule.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that it does not.

The complaint seeks injunctive relief requiring Comcast to take the
following actions with respect to those persons who are "cable
subscribers" of Comcast (all emphasis added): (1) clearly and
conspicuously notify cable subscribers in writing, at the requisite
times, of the period during which it maintains their [personally
identifiable information (PII)], including video activity data and
demographic data; (2) stop using its cable system to collect cable
subscribers' personally identifiable video activity data for
advertising purposes without their prior written or electronic
consent; (3) destroy all personally identifiable video activity
data collected from cable subscribers for advertising purposes
without prior written or electronic consent and any information
derived in whole or part from such data; (4) change its procedures
to provide cable subscribers who request access to their PII with
access to all such PII in Comcast's possession, including video
activity data and demographic data; (5) stop using its cable system
to record, transmit, or observe video activity data about cable
subscribers without their express written consent; (6) destroy all
video activity data collected from cable subscribers through
Comcast's cable system without their express written consent; and
(7) provide cable subscribers who request access to their
individually identifiable subscriber information with access to all
such information gathered by Comcast within 30 days, including
video activity data.

The Ninth Circuit opines that at least some (but not all) of these
requested forms of relief seek forward-looking prohibitions against
future violations of law. But as it has explained, that alone is
not enough to classify the remedy as public injunctive relief
within the meaning of the McGill rule. These requests on their face
stand to benefit only Comcast "cable subscribers" -- i.e., by
definition they will only benefit a "group of individuals similarly
situated to the plaintiff." There is simply no sense in which this
relief could be said to primarily benefit the general public as a
more diffuse whole.

Moreover, it is apparent that administering any injunctive relief
of the sort sought here would entail the consideration of the
individualized claims of numerous cable subscribers, the Ninth
Circuit finds. It says, the relief sought is not the equivalent of
a simple prohibition on running a false advertisement or a
mandatory injunction to obtain certain licenses or to make
additional public disclosures in advertising. On the contrary, each
form of relief would require either consideration of which
particular consents each subscriber has or has not given or
examination of which individualized disclosures have or have not
been made. Administering an injunction of this sort, on this scale,
is patently incompatible with the procedural simplicity envisioned
by bilateral arbitration. The Ninth Circuit does not construe
California's McGill rule as purporting to insist that the right to
seek that sort of relief is non-waivable. But to the extent that
the McGill rule did so, it would be a much different rule from the
one the Panel confronted in Blair, and this broader version of the
rule is preempted by the FAA.

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit concludes that the district court misconstrued
what counts as "public injunctive relief" for purposes of the
McGill rule and that it therefore erred in concluding that the
complaint sought such relief. Because Hodges' complaint did not
seek such relief, the McGill rule is not implicated, and the
arbitration agreement should have been enforced. The Ninth Circuit
therefore reverses the district court's denial of Comcast's motion
to compel. It remands to the district court with instructions to
grant that motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ub6r2uyw from Leagle.com.

Mark A. Perry (argued) and Joshua M. Wesneski, Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, in Washington, D.C.; Michael W. McTigue Jr. --
mmctigue@akingump.com -- and Meredith C. Slawe --
mslawe@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Michael J. Stortz --
Michael.Stortz@dbr.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, in
San Francisco, California, for the Defendant-Appellant.

Karla Gilbride (argued), Public Justice P.C., in Washington, D.C.;
Ray Gallo -- rgallo@gallo.law -- Gallo LLP, in San Francisco,
California; Hank Bates and David Slade, Carney, Bates & Pulliam
PLLC, in Little Rock, Arkansas, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.


COMMONSPIRIT HEALTH: Smith ERISA Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YOSAUN SMITH, Plaintiff v. COMMONSPIRIT HEALTH, et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 20-95-DLB-EBA (E.D. Ky.), Judge
David L. Bunning of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, Northern Division, Covington, granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the Plaintiff's
Complaint with prejudice.

Background

Plaintiff Smith is a former employee of Defendant CommonSpirit
Health, a large, not-for-profit corporation that provides hospital
services across the United States. As part of her employment with
CommonSpirit, Smith paid into an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan.

Acting on behalf of a putative class of similarly-situated
individuals, the Plaintiff brings the action under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1001 et
seq. ("ERISA"), alleging that the committee overseeing
CommonSpirit's 401(k) retirement savings plan breached its
fiduciary duty to its members by providing an inadequate selection
of investment options and by allowing for unreasonable expenses to
be charged for the administration of the plan.

The gravamen of her Complaint is that the Defendants violated their
fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty under 29 U.S.C. Section
1104(a) by (1) selecting investment funds with higher fees and
subpar performance, (2) offering an investment menu that was more
expensive than that of comparable plans, and (3) allowing the Plan
to pay excessive recordkeeping fees to Fidelity. The Plaintiff's
allegations cover the time period from July 2, 2014 to the
present.

Count I of the Complaint sets forth Smith's breach of fiduciary
duty claim in detail, including the challenges to individual
investment offerings and the allegation that the Plan paid
excessive investment management fees and recordkeeping fees. In
Count II, Plaintiff asserts a theory of co-fiduciary liability
under 29 U.S.C. Section 1105(a), that is, CommonSpirit failed to
adequately monitor and oversee the conduct of the Committee, and
the Committee failed to adequately monitor and oversee its members.
In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that each of the Defendants
"knowingly participated" and "enabled" the breaches of the other
Defendants and "failed to make any reasonable effort under the
circumstances to remedy the breaches."

The third and final count in the Complaint alleges that, to the
extent the Defendants did not act as fiduciaries under ERISA, they
participated in a "knowing breach of trust" by "permitting the Plan
to offer a menu of poor and expensive investment options." The
Complaint states that such a theory of liability has been held to
be actionable under ERISA in cases where the defendant had "'actual
or constructive knowledge' of the circumstances surrounding an
underlying breach."

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.
In the brief in support of their Motion, the Defendants argue that
the Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to challenge Plan
investment options she has not invested in. The Defendants also
argue that the allegations in the Complaint fail to state a claim.

The Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition, and the
Defendants have replied. With leave of Court, the Defendants
supplemented their reply brief with updated data on the performance
of the challenged investment funds, to which the Plaintiff has
responded. In addition, the parties have submitted a total of
thirteen supplemental notices of authority along with responses.
The Court heard argument on Defendants' Motion on Aug. 25, 2021.

Analysis

A. Article III Standing

The Defendants challenge the Plaintiff's standing only with respect
to her claim that the Defendants imprudently chose investment
vehicles that underperformed relative to their peers. However,
Judge Bunning finds that the Plaintiff has alleged that she
suffered injury by investing in one of the challenged funds. This
provides the Plaintiff standing to challenge not only the fund she
invested in, but other similar funds alleged to have
underperformed.

Judge Bunning opines that the Plaintiff has a sufficient personal
stake in the adjudication of the claims relating to the American
Beacon Fund and the Allianz Fund. Those funds, like the Fidelity
funds the Plaintiff invested in, are alleged to have been
improperly included in the Plan menu due to poor performance and
high investment management fees. All the challenged funds,
moreover, are actively managed and are alleged to have
underperformed passively managed index funds or market indices.
Finally, the Plaintiff and members of the putative class are all
participants in the same plan administered by the Defendants. The
Court thus has jurisdiction over the claims relating to the
challenged funds which the Plaintiff has not invested in.

B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

1. Failure to Select Better Performing Funds

"A plaintiff may allege that a fiduciary breached the duty of
prudence by failing to properly monitor investments and remove
imprudent ones."  Furthermore, fiduciaries must review investments
at "regular intervals" and cannot assume that an investment that
was proper initially "will remain so indefinitely."

In the case, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants breached
their duty of prudence by offering investment funds that performed
poorly and that were far too expensive. The Plaintiff focuses her
attention on three investment offerings: The Fidelity Active Suite,
the American Beacon Large Cap Value Fund, and the AllianzGI NFJ
Small Cap Value Fund.

Judge Bunning finds that (i) the Defendants were not obligated to
choose the best fund available or to favor passively managed funds
over actively managed funds, and for these reasons, were not bound
by Morningstar's fund rankings or generalized investor preference;
(ii) without knowing how the relatively lower fees impacted the
Russell Index Fund's profitability, Plaintiff has not plausibly
alleged that Defendants acted unreasonably by not offering that
fund in place of the American Beacon Fund; and (iii) the Plaintiff
has failed to show that the AllianzGI Fund underperformed a
meaningful benchmark. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
plausibly showing that the challenged investment funds were
imprudently selected or retained, her claim on this basis is
dismissed.

2. Overly Expensive Investment Menu

In paragraph 48 of her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Plan's "investment menu was considerably more expensive than those
of comparable plans." As the Defendants point out, the Seventh
Circuit appears to have rejected this very argument under similar
facts.

Judge Bunning holds that the Plaintiff's sole allegation that the
total amount of investment management fees paid was higher than
average is insufficient to plead a claim that the Defendants
violated the fiduciary duty of prudence. Her claim on this basis is
therefore dismissed.

3. Excessive Recordkeeping Costs

The Plaintiff alleges that, during the relevant period, the Plan
paid Fidelity a flat fee of $30 to $34 per person for recordkeeping
services. She cites in her Complaint the 401(k) Averages Book (20th
ed.), an industry publication purportedly showing that plans with
100 participants and $5 million in assets in the year 2017 paid on
average $35 per participant for both recordkeeping and
administrative fees. The Plaintiff claims that given its much
larger size and resultant negotiating power, and "with prudent
management and administration, the Plan would have unquestionably
been able to obtain a per-participant cost significantly lower than
$30 per participant."

In the brief supporting their Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants
challenge the statistics the Plaintiff cites, arguing that she
misrepresented the data in the 401(k) Averages Book to
underestimate the average cost of recordkeeping.

Judge Bunning finds that the Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
plausibly showing that the recordkeeping fees paid were excessive.
Thus, it makes no difference that she alleges the Defendants
"engaged in no examination, comparison, or benchmarking of the
Plan's recordkeeping fees with similarly sized plans," or "that the
marketplace for service providers is very competitive" such that
Defendants should have negotiated a better rate. For these reasons,
the Plaintiff's duty-of-prudence claim related to excessive
recordkeeping fees is dismissed.

4. Duty of Loyalty

The Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that the Defendants
breached their duty of loyalty.

Judge Bunning states that the Plaintiff's loyalty claim must be
dismissed because the Complaint does not differentiate between the
Defendants' alleged violations of the duties of prudence and
loyalty. The Judge finds that although the Plaintiff clearly
attempts to plead both theories, none of her factual allegations
support an inference that the Defendants acted for the purpose of
providing benefits to third parties or themselves, as required for
a showing of disloyalty under ERISA.

5. Derivative Claims (Counts II and III)

The Plaintiff brings a derivative claim that the Defendants
violated their duty to monitor fiduciaries in violation of 29
U.S.C. Sections 1109(a) and 1132(a)(2). When an ERISA fiduciary
appoints another fiduciary, courts have recognized a limited duty
to monitor the appointed fiduciary's performance. However, a
monitoring claim must be dismissed where, as in the case, the
underlying breach by the appointed fiduciary is not sufficiently
pled. Judge Bunning will dismiss the claim accordingly.

Conclusion

Judge Bunning concludes that the Plaintiff has not alleged facts
from which the Court can infer imprudent conduct on the part of the
Defendants. Thus, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under
ERISA and the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The
Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The matter is
stricken from the Court's active docket. A Judgment in favor of the
Defendants will be entered contemporaneously therewith.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2mffhacb from
Leagle.com.


COMMUNITY BANK: Thompson's Class Settlement Wins Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TINA THOMPSON and SCOTT DOXEY, on behalf Of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. COMMUNITY BANK,
N.A., Defendant, Case No. 8:19-CV-919 (MAD/CFH) (N.D.N.Y.), Judge
Mae A. D'Agostino of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York grants Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement and Application for Attorneys'
Fees and Costs and Service Awards.

Background

On July 26, 2019, the Action was filed against Defendant Community
Bank, alleging multiple causes of action stemming from Community
Bank's policy regarding certain Overdraft Fees. The Action seeks
monetary damages, restitution, and declaratory relief due to the
Defendant's policy and practice of charging certain overdraft fees
that allegedly violated the account agreement between the
Plaintiffs and the Defendant.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that the overdraft fees charged
pursuant to Authorize Positive, Purportedly Settle Negative
("APPSN") Transactions despite a sufficient available balance in a
customer's account at the time the transaction was authorized, but
an insufficient available balance at the time the transaction was
presented to the Defendant for payment and posted to the customer's
account, violated the account agreement. The Action further claims
that Defendant improperly assessed overdraft fees as a result of
account verification processes that resulted in no change to the
account balances.

On Nov. 15, 2019, the Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. On
Dec 15, 2019, a motion to amend the complaint was filed, adding
Plaintiffs, Tina Thompson and Scott Doxey. On Feb. 18, 2020, the
Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's motion to
amend the complaint and granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss. Former Plaintiff Charles Kelly's
individual claims were dismissed and leave to amend was granted. On
Feb. 28, 2020, Plaintiffs Thompson and Doxey filed an Amended
Complaint alleging breach of contract. The Parties also
participated in formal discovery. Thereafter, the Parties engaged
in settlement discussions, including attending a mediation. Further
negotiations resulted in the Parties' Settlement Agreement.

On Jan. 14, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for Preliminary
Approval. On May 10, 2021, the Court granted Preliminary Approval
and directed that Notice be sent to Settlement Class members. On
Aug. 25, 2021, the Court held a Final Approval Hearing, during
which it signaled its intent to approve the Settlement and
requested attorneys' fees, costs, and Services Awards, and
indicated that a written decision would follow.

The total Value of the Settlement is $3,460,833.02, consisting of a
cash Settlement Fund of $2,850,000.00 and $610,833.02 in forgiven
Uncollected Overdraft Fees. Settlement Class Members Payments will
be distributed from the Net Settlement Fund. Further, the
Settlement Fund will cover any Court approved attorneys' fees and
costs awarded to Class Counsel, any Court approved Service Award to
the Class Representatives, and the Settlement Administration
Costs.

There are two classes in this Settlement:

     a. APPSN Fee Class - Current or former customers of Defendant
who were assessed APPSN Fees from Jan. 1, 2015 to Dec. 31, 2019.

     b. Account Verification Fee Class - Current or former
customers of Defendant who were assessed Account Verification Fees
from Jan. 1, 2015 to Dec. 31, 2019.

All Settlement Class members who did not timely opt-out of the
Settlement will release the Defendant from all claims that arise
out of and relate to the facts and claims alleged in the Action. In
addition, the Plaintiffs will provide a general release, including
a release of unknown claims.

Of the $2.85 million cash in the Settlement Fund, $2.83 million
(99.3%) will be allocated to the APPSN Fee Class and $20,000 (.7%)
to the Account Verification Fee Class. If applicable, Settlement
Class Members may receive payments as members of the APPSN Fee
Class and the Account Verification Fee Class. Based on this
allocation, Settlement Class Member Payments from the Net
Settlement Fund will be calculated as follows:

      i. Settlement Class Members of the APPSN Fee Class will be
paid per incurred APPSN Fee calculated as follows: (0.993 of the
Net Settlement Fund/Total APPSN Fees) x Total number of APPSN Fees
charged to and paid by each APPSN Fee Class member; and

      ii. Settlement Class Members of the Account Verification Fee
Class will be paid per incurred Account Verification Fee calculated
as follows: (0.007 of the Net Settlement Fund/Total Account
Verification Fees) x Total number of Account Verification Fees
charged to and paid by each Account Verification Fee Class member.

All Settlement Class Members who are Current Account Holders at the
time of distribution will be paid by direct deposit into their
Accounts. Settlement Class Members who are Past Account Holders at
the time of the distribution will be sent a check by the Settlement
Administrator at the address used to provide the Notice, or at such
other address as designated by the Settlement Class Member. See id.
No portion of the Settlement Fund will revert to Defendant.

The Class Counsel have requested an award of attorneys' fees in the
amount of $1,153,610, which constitutes 33.33% of the Value of the
Settlement. Additionally, the Class Counsel have requested
reimbursement of $12,992.70 in costs incurred to be paid from the
Settlement Fund.

To facilitate the logistics of executing this Settlement, the
Parties agreed to the appointment of Epiq Class Action and Claims
Solutions, Inc to serve as the Settlement Administrator. The
Settlement Administrator will receive up to $81,371 in fees and
costs from the Settlement Fund.

The Notice advised Settlement Class members of their right to
object or opt-out of the Settlement and explained how to do so.
There have been zero objections, and only two Settlement Class
members have opted-out of the Settlement.

Prior to distributing Notice to the Settlement Class members, the
Settlement Administrator established a website,
www.CommunityOverdraftSettlement.com, as well as a toll-free line
that Settlement Class members could access or call for any
questions or additional information about the proposed Settlement,
including the Long Form Notice. Once Settlement Class members were
identified via Defendant's business records, the Notices attached
to the Agreement and approved by the Court were sent to each
Settlement Class member. For Current Account Holders who have
elected to receive bank communications via email, Email Notice was
delivered. To Past Defendant Account Holders, and Current Account
Holders who have not elected to receive communications by email or
for whom the Defendant does not have a valid email address,
Postcard Notice was delivered by U.S. Mail.

The Settlement Administrator mailed 36,012 Postcard Notices and
sent 16,834 Email Notices to the Settlement Class, and as a result
of the Notice Program, 95% of the Settlement Class received Notice
of the Settlement.

Discussion

A. Class Certification

Judge D'Agostino grants the Plaintiffs' motion insofar as it seeks
class certification for settlement purposes. She finds that (i)
numerosity is easily satisfied because there are approximately
46,404 Settlement Class members; (ii) the case involves numerous
common issues; (iii) the Plaintiffs' claims arise from the same
factual and legal circumstances that form the bases of the
Settlement Class members' claims; (iv) there is no evidence that
the interests of Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class members are at
odds; (v) the Class Counsel also meets the Rule 23(a)(4)
requirements for adequate representation; (vi) common questions of
law and fact predominate over any questions that might affect the
individual Plaintiffs; and (vi) a class action is far superior to
requiring the claims to be tried individually given the relatively
small awards that each Settlement Class member is otherwise
entitled.

B. Fairness of the Proposed Settlement

Judge D'Agostino finds that the class action settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate. She holds that (i) arm's-length
negotiations raise a presumption that the Settlement meets the
requirements of due process; (ii) the settlement of the matter
avoided the delay that necessarily would have followed motion
practice and the time needed for the Court to act on those motions;
(iii) there are only two Settlement Class members that opted-out of
the Settlement and there have been no objections; (iv) the parties
exchanged more than a thousand pages of documents as well as a
separate production of transactional data, which was analyzed by
the Parties' experts; (v)  there is risk and additional expense
associated with obtaining class certification and maintaining both
conditional and class certification through trial; (vi) nothing
suggests that the settlement is unfair; (vii) weighing the benefits
of settlement against the available evidence and the risks
associated with proceeding in the litigation, the Value of the
Settlement is reasonable; and (viii) the Plaintiffs' proposed award
of attorneys' fees is reasonable.

C. Service Award

The named Plaintiffs seek Service Awards of $5,000 each for serving
as Class Representatives. The Class Counsel argue that these
Service Awards are appropriate and reasonable in light of the
substantial and meaningful work that Plaintiffs have contributed.

Judge D'Agostino holds that a Service Award of $5,000 for each
Class Representative is reasonable and within the range of awards
granted in the Circuit. Therefore, she approves a $5,000 Service
Award for each of the Class Representatives.

D. Costs

The Class Counsel request reimbursement of $12,992.70 in costs to
be paid from the Settlement Fund. The vast majority of the costs
are attributable to expert expenses and were necessary for the
Plaintiffs' expert to review and verify the calculations performed
by Community Bank's expert, which allowed the Plaintiffs to be
well-informed about the range of damages at issue in this matter
prior to engaging in settlement discussions. Accordingly, Judge
D'Agostino awards costs in the amount of $12,992.70.

E. Settlement Administrator Costs

The Class Counsel also seeks payment to Epiq Class Action and
Claims Solutions, Inc., which was selected to serve as the
Settlement Administrator, to be paid out of the Settlement Fund.
Notice of the selection and payment was provided to the Settlement
Class and no objections were made. Judge D'Agostino finds that this
expense (estimated at $81,371) is in line with cases of a similar
nature. Accordingly, she grants the Class Counsel's request, and
Epiq will be reimbursed for overseeing and implementing the Notice
Program and administering the Settlement up to $81,371.

F. Attorney's Fees

The Class Counsel move for an award of attorneys' fees in the
amount of $1,153,610, which constitutes a 33.33% of the Value of
the Settlement. Judge D'Agostino finds that the Class Counsel is
entitled to $1,153,610 in reasonable attorneys' fees.

G. Cy Pres Distribution

Pursuant to the Agreement, no money will revert to Defendant.
Instead, within one year after the date the Settlement
Administrator mails the first Settlement Class Member Payment, any
remaining amounts resulting from uncashed checks will be to the cy
pres beneficiary that the Parties will suggest, and Judge
D'Agostino approves.

Conclusion

After carefully reviewing the entire record in the matter, the
Parties' submissions, and the applicable law, Judge D'Agostino
granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for certification of the
Settlement Class, Final Approval of the class action Settlement,
approval of Service Awards, and approval of attorneys' fees and
costs.

The Clerk of the Court will enter judgment in the Plaintiffs' favor
and close the case.

The Clerk of the Court will serve a copy of the Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the Parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Memorandum-Decision &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/czv59mrx from
Leagle.com.

KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISLBERG GILBERT DANIEL TROPIN, ESQ. --
tropin@kolawyers.com -- JONATHAN M. STREISFELD, I, ESQ. --
streisfeld@kolawyers.com -- in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Attorneys
for the Plaintiff.

KOPELOWITZ, OSTROW LAW FIRM JEFFREY M. OSTROW, ESQ. --
ostrow@kolawyers.com -- in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Attorneys for
the Plaintiff.

DREYER BOYAJIAN LLP JAMES R. PELUSO, JR., ESQ. --
jpeluso@dblawny.com -- in Albany, New York, Attorneys for the
Plaintiff.

KALIEL PLLC, JEFFREY D. KALIEL, ESQ. -- jkaliel@kalielpllc.com --
SOPHIA GOREN GOLD, ESQ. -- sgold@kalielpllc.com -- in Washington,
D.C., Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

KATTEN, MUNCHIN LAW FIRM STUART M. RICHTER, ESQ. --
stuart.richter@katten.com -- ANDREW J. DEMKO, ESQ. --
andrew.demko@katten.com -- in Los Angeles, California, Attorneys
for the Defendant.

BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC — SYRACUSE JONATHAN B. FELLOWS, ESQ.
-- jfellows@bsk.com -- in Syracuse, New York, Attorneys for the
Defendant.


COPPERTONE USA: Settles Mineral-Based Sunscreen Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Consumers who purchased certain Coppertone mineral-based sunscreen
products may be eligible to claim up to $10 without proof of
purchase thanks as part of a $2.25 million class action settlement
agreement.

The Class includes retail consumers who purchased in the United
States one or more of the following Coppertone sunscreen products
for personal use, not resale, before Sept. 17, 2021, that included
the words "mineral-based" on the label in various sizes and forms:
Coppertone Water Babies Pure & Simple, Coppertone Kids Tear Free,
and Coppertone Sport Face.

A class action lawsuit had alleged the products were misleadingly
labeled as "mineral-based" when they actually contained chemical
active ingredients in addition to the mineral active ingredients.

Coppertone maker Bayer HealthCare denies all accusations of
wrongdoing, and the Court has not ruled in favor of either party.

A wide variety of sunscreen lotions, sprays, and sticks are sold
under the Coppertone label. [GN]

CROWN ASSET: Court Grants Renewed Bid for Arbitration in Bey Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAMONT BEY, Plaintiff v. CROWN ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-CV-00715-CCW (W.D. Pa.), Judge Christy
Criswell Wiegand of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part Crown's
Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration, or Alternatively, Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).

Background

In his three-count, putative class action complaint, Plaintiff Bey
claims that Crown's debt collection practices violate various
federal and Pennsylvania consumer debt collection laws and related
consumer protection statutes. Count I alleges violations of the
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. Sections
1692, et seq.; Count II alleges violations of Pennsylvania's Fair
Credit Extension Uniformity Act ("FCEUA"), 73 P.S. Sections 2270,
et seq.; and Count III alleges violations of Pennsylvania's Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 P.S.
Sections 201-1, et seq.

Crown moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, compel arbitration.
The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab, then-presiding, determined that the
proper course was for the Court to first determine whether to
compel arbitration, and concluded that a factual record was
necessary to decide "whether the Plaintiff and the Defendant (as
the assignee of Prosper) agreed to resolve this dispute in
arbitration." Accordingly, Judge Schwab denied Crown's motion
without prejudice and ordered a period of limited discovery on the
arbitration issue.

The case was then transferred to Judge Wiegand, and following the
close of the limited discovery period, Crown filed the instant
Motion.

Discussion

The only question for the Court to decide is "whether the Plaintiff
and the Defendant (as the assignee of Prosper) agreed to resolve
the dispute in arbitration." According to Mr. Bey, this question
should be answered in the negative because Pennsylvania's Consumer
Discount Company Act ("CDCA"), 7 Pa. Stat. Section 6214.I, provides
that "a licensee like Prosper may not sell contracts like the
Account to a person or corporation not holding a license under this
act like Crown without the prior written approval of the Secretary
of Banking." As such, according to Mr. Bey, Crown may not enforce
the arbitration agreement.

However, Judge Wiegand concludes that, under applicable
severability principles, any alleged problem under the CDCA with
the assignment of the Account is insufficient to block enforcement
of the Agreement. Thus, Crown's Motion to Compel Arbitration will
be granted.

Judge Wiegand finds that Mr. Bey's effort to resist arbitration,
although artfully framed, raises only a dispute as to the validity
of the assignment as a whole under state law but fails to either
(a) implicate the formation of the assignment or (b) directly
attack the arbitration or delegation provisions. That is, Mr. Bey
does not meaningfully dispute that a valid arbitration agreement
was formed between himself and Prosper. Nor does he meaningfully
dispute that Prosper assigned the Account and Agreement to Crown.
Rather, his opposition to Crown's Motion instead targets whether
the assignment of the Account and Agreement from Prosper to Crown
was valid under the CDCA. This is nothing more than a subtle
variation on the question that the Supreme Court addressed in
Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006), in
which the Court ultimately rejected the position that a state law
rendering a container contract void ab initio makes an otherwise
valid arbitration agreement unenforceable.

Thus, Judge Wiegand concludes the Agreement was a valid agreement
to arbitrate between Mr. Bey and Prosper, and that Prosper assigned
the Agreement to Crown. Furthermore, because the Agreement
encompasses "any dispute, claim, or controversy arising from or
relating to this Terms of Use Agreement or the relationship between
us and you," and because the Agreement also delegates "disputes
about the validity or enforceability of this Terms of Use Agreement
or the validity or enforceability of this Arbitration Section" to
the arbitrator, the Judge also finds that the merits of Mr. Bey's
underlying claims against Crown fall within the scope of the
Agreement. Therefore, Crown's Motion to Compel Arbitration will be
granted.

Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Wiegand granted in part and
denied in part Crown's Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration, or
Alternatively, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Crown's Motion to Compel Arbitration is
granted. Therefore, Mr. Bey's claims are compelled to arbitration
and that the case is stayed and administratively closed pending
arbitration. By administratively closing cases, courts remove cases
from their active files without a final adjudication.
Administrative closure is a docket control device used by the Court
for statistical purposes and does not prejudice the rights of the
parties in any way.

The parties will file a Joint Status Report regarding the
arbitration by Dec. 8, 2021, or within one week of the completion
of arbitration, whichever occurs sooner.

Judge Wiegand denied as moot Crown's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/sffx6u2v from
Leagle.com.


CUSTOMER CONNEXX: Cadena Appeals Labor Suit Ruling to 9th Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Cariene Cadena, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled CARIENE CADENA, et al., v.
CUSTOMER CONNEXX LLC and JANONE INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00233-APG
DJA, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, Las
Vegas.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 2, 2021, the Hon.
Judge Andrew P. Gordon entered an order holding that:

   -- the defendant Customer Connexx's motion to decertify is
      denied;

   -- the defendant Customer Connexx's motion for summary
      judgment and defendant JanOne's joinder are granted in
      part as to the plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Labor
      Standards Act;

   -- the plaintiffs' motion to certify a class, defendant
      JanOne's separate motion for summary judgment, and the
      defendants' motion to strike are denied as moot, without
      prejudice to raise those issues in the state court
      proceedings;

   -- the plaintiffs' state law claims are remanded to the state
      court from which this case was removed for all further
      proceedings; and

   -- the clerk of the court is instructed to close this case.

Judge Gordon held that the defendants' motion to decertify is
denied because the plaintiffs have presented evidence of a
company-wide policy of requiring employees to engage in some way
with their computers to open the timekeeping program before
clocking in. The employees must do so because CC maintained its
timekeeping program on the computer. The question of whether that
time is compensable under the FLSA is a question that can be
resolved on a collective basis, as demonstrated by CC's summary
judgment motion. By and large, CC does not make individualized
arguments about why the plaintiffs' FLSA claims fail. Rather, CC
argues the boot up and shut down times are not compensable under
the Portal-to-Portal Act or that the time is de minimis. It
alternatively contends that it did not and could not have known
that employees were working overtime because it had a mechanism for
employees to adjust their time. The fact that the amount of time
each employee spent on the boot up and shut down activities varied
does not counsel in favor of decertification. He, thus, declined to
decertify the collective action.

The Plaintiffs Cariene Cadena and Andrew Gonzales were hourly
employees working at a call center for defendant Customer Connexx
LLC (CC). CC is a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant JanOne Inc.
The plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and similarly situated
employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Nevada law,
claiming they were not paid for all time worked.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of Judge Gordon's order.

The appellate case is captioned as Cariene Cadena, et al. v.
Customer Connexx LLC, et al., Case No. 21-16522, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Sept. 15,
2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellants Cariene Cadena and Andrew Gonzales Mediation
Questionnaire was due Sep. 22, 2021;

   -- Appellants Cariene Cadena and Andrew Gonzales opening brief
is due on Nov. 16, 2021;

   -- Appellees Customer Connexx LLC, Does and JanOne, Inc.
answering brief is due on Dec. 16, 2021; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants CARIENE CADENA and ANDREW GONZALES, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented
by:

          Joshua D. Buck, Esq.
          Leah Lin Jones, Esq.
          Mark Russell Thierman, Esq.
          THIERMAN BUCK, LLP
          7287 Lakeside Drive
          Reno, NV 89511
          Telephone: (775) 284-1500
          E-mail: josh@thiermanbuck.com
                  leah@thiermanbuck.com
                  laborlawyer@pacbell.net

Defendants-Appellees CUSTOMER CONNEXX LLC and JANONE, INC. are
represented by:

          Paul Theodore Trimmer, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS, P.C.
          300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 900
          Las Vegas, NV 89101
          Telephone: (702) 921-2460
          E-mail: trimmerp@jacksonlewis.com

CVS PHARMACY: Youngblood Appeals Consumer Suit Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Brian Youngblood, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled Brian Youngblood, individually
and on behalf of all others situated v. CVS PHARMACY, a Rhode
Island Corporation, Case No. 2:20-cv-06251, in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 23, 2020, the
lawsuit alleges that the Defendant violated the False and
Misleading Advertising Law, Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair
Competition Law by making misleading statements in order to induce
consumers into purchasing Infants' Pain & Fever Acetaminophen.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant continues to make
misleading statements to sell the Product on a false premise, and
in marketing, advertising, labeling, and packaging of the Product.

As a whole, CVS's private label products are generally more
profitable for CVS than the name-brand products it sells. During
some or all of the Class Period, the "CVS Health" private label was
the retail chain's leading brand, generating sales two times higher
than the next brand. Included in Defendant's CVS Health portfolios
are over-the counter pain reliever and fever reducers, including
CVS Health Infants' Product. CVS positions its private label
product as a "national brand equivalent," selling it alongside
brand-name acetaminophen products, such as Infants' Tylenol and
Children's Tylenol.

The Plaintiff asserts that giving a child too much acetaminophen
can be dangerous and even fatal, a problem that terrifies parents
and causes them to be extra careful when buying medicine for their
young children and babies. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration
warns parents and caregivers to "be very careful when you're giving
your infant acetaminophen."

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated August
17, 2021, wherein the Court dismissed without leave to amend,
pursuant to the Court's order granting motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the Plaintiff's third amended complaint.

The appellate case is captioned as Brian Youngblood, et al. v. CVS
Pharmacy, et al., Case No. 21-56008, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Sept. 15, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellants Priscilla Herrera and Brian Youngblood Mediation
Questionnaire was due Sept. 22, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by October 14, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on November 15, 2021;

   -- Appellants Priscilla Herrera and Brian Youngblood opening
brief is due on December 23, 2021;

   -- Appellees CVS Pharmacy and Perrigo Company answering brief is
due on January 24, 2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants BRIAN YOUNGBLOOD and PRISCILLA HERRERA, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Sara Dawn Avila, Esq.
          Marc Alexander Castaneda, Esq.
          Gillian Leigh Wade, Esq.
          MILSTEIN JACKSON FAIRCHILD & WADE, LLP
          10990 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 396-9600
          E-mail: savila@mjfwlaw.com
                  mcastaneda@milsteinadelman.com
                  gwade@mjfwlaw.com

               - and -

          Mayo Makarczyk, Esq.
          MILSTEIN JACKSON FAIRCHILD & WADE, LLP
          10250 Constellation Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 396-9600

               - and -

          David F. Slade, Esq.
          CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC
          519 W. 7th Street
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 312-8500
          E-mail: dslade@cbplaw.com

               - and -

          Melissa S. Weiner, Esq.
          PEARSON SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2150
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 389-0600
          E-mail: mweiner@pswlaw.com  

Defendants-Appellees CVS PHARMACY, a Rhode Island Corporation; and
PERRIGO COMPANY are represented by:

          Ricky L. Shackelford, Esq.
          Hannah Beth Shanks-Parkin, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          1840 Century Park, E, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 586-7700
          E-mail: shackelfordr@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          Michael Fitzgerald Healy, Esq.
          Michael Kevin Underhill, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L. L. P.
          555 Mission Street, Suite 2300
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 544-1900

               - and -

          John K. Sherk, III, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP
          2555 Grand Boulevard
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 474-6550

DELOITTE TOUCHE: Court Enters Case Management Plan & Sched Order
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SAXON KNIGHT, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly-situated employees, v. DELOITTE
TOUCHE TOHMA TSU LIMITED; and DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, Case No.
1:20-cv-07114-JGK (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge John G. Koeltl o
entered an revised civil case management plan and scheduling order
as follows:

   1. Pre-Class Certification Fact Discovery (Individual and
      Class Claims):

      -- All pre certification fact discovery shall be completed
         on or before February 11, 2022.

      -- Plaintiff will file her motion for class certification
         (50 pages or less), supporting declarations, and expert
         report(s) on or before March 11, 2022.

      -- Defendant will file its opposition to Plaintiffs motion
         for class certification (60 pages or less), supporting
         declarations, and expert report(s) on or before May 13,
         2022.

      -- Plaintiff will file her reply in support of motion for
         class certification (25 pages or less), and rebuttal
         expert report(s) on or before June 13, 2022.

   2. Expert Discovery:

      -- All expert discovery on class certification shall be
         completed on or before June 30, 2022.

      -- Defendant will file any motion to strike Plaintiffs
         expert report in support of motion for class
         certification on or before June 17, 2022.

      -- Plaintiff will file any motion to strike Defendant's
         expert report in support of Defendant's opposition to
         Plaintiffs motion for class certification on or before
         July 8, 2022.

      -- Defendant will file any motion to strike Plaintiffs
         rebuttal expert report in support of Plaintiff's reply
         to motion for class certification on or before July 22,
         2022. Defendant will file its motion for summary
         judgment as to Plaintiffs individual claims on or
         before June 17, 2022.

   3. Trial:

      -- This case is to be trial by a jury.

      -- Parties must be trial-ready with 48 hours notice, 14
         days after submission of the Joint Pre-Trial Order.

Deloitte is a multinational professional services network with
offices in over 150 countries.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 16, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39zJMrB at no extra charge.[CC]


DIAGEO NA: Fischer Files Mislabeling Class Action Over Rum Product
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Perry Michael Fischer, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Diageo North America, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-07249 (C.D. Cal., September 9, 2021),
seeks to recover actual damages, statutory damages, attorney fees
and costs for breaches of express warranty, implied warranty of
merchantability and for violation of California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, California's Unfair Competition Law, California's
False Advertising Law, North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, various states' breach of express warranty statutes
and unjust enrichment.

Diageo North America, Inc. manufactures, imports, markets, labels
and sells Ron Zacapa 23 Centenario Rum from Guatemala which was
marketed as "aged for 23 years." Fischer claims that the rum's age
was falsely printed on it label considering that the traditional
dynamic aging process of rums of different ages and personalities
are first blended, then subsequently stored in selected barrels to
continue the maturing process. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
      Joshua Nassir, Esq.
      Ruhandy Glezakos, Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470
      Los Angeles, CA 90024
      Telephone: (424) 256-2884
      Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
      Email: bheikali@faruqilaw.com
             jnassir@faruqilaw.com
             rglezakos@faruqilaw.com

             - and -

      Melissa S. Weiner, Esq.
      PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
      800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2150
      Minneapolis, MN 55402
      Telephone: (612) 389-0600
      Facsimile: (612) 389-0610
      Email: mweiner@pswlaw.com


ELITE ENGINEERING: Class of Technicians in Lechuga Suit Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, David Lechuga and Shamsadin Muhammad, on behalf of
themselves and all similarly situated employees Plaintiffs v. Elite
Engineering, Inc., et al., Defendants, Judge Elaine E. Bucklo of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, grants the Plaintiffs' consent motion as to class
certification but denied it as to approval of the collective action
settlement.

Background

The named Plaintiffs in the action allege on behalf of themselves
and other similarly situated cable television installation
technicians that they performed work for the Defendants as de facto
employees of Elite Engineering, but the Defendants misclassified
them as independent contractors. As a result, the Plaintiffs claim,
they were denied overtime pay to which they were entitled under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and parallel laws of Missouri,
New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Plaintiff Lechuga also asserts
individual and class claims under New York law, alleging that the
Defendants failed to provide appropriate wage notices and wage
statements.

According to the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs and the class
members were cable television installation technicians who
performed the Defendants' primary business activity of installing
cable television in the above-named states. The Defendants' answer
denies that either named Plaintiff was an employee of Elite
Engineering; denies that Muhammad performed any work for Elite
Engineering at all; and denies that the Defendants misclassified
the members of the FLSA collective and putative class or
compensated any of them unlawfully. The Defendants also assert
various affirmative defenses.

In October 2020, Judge Bucklo granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification of the FLSA claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b). She later stayed the case by agreement while the
parties exchanged information bearing on liability and damages and
engaged in mediation.

In an unopposed, "consent" motion, the Plaintiffs now seek: (1)
certification of a Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") collective
action and Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin class actions
for settlement purposes, (2) approval of the parties' collective
action settlement, (3) preliminary approval of the parties' class
action settlement, (4) approval of notice to the putative
claimants, and (5) a hearing for final approval of the class action
settlement agreement.

In deciding a motion for preliminary approval of a class action
settlement and certification of a settlement class, Judge Bucklo
must undertake two essential inquiries: First, she must "conduct an
independent class certification analysis," giving "heightened
attention" to the requirements of Rule 23, given the parties'
non-adversarial posture. Second, the Judge must decide whether the
proposed settlement is "within the range of possible approval," as
the first of two steps to determine whether the proposed Rule 23
settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable, and not a product of
collusion.

Discussion

A. Class Certification

The parties seek to certify one settlement class defined as: "All
Technicians who performed work for the Defendants between June 8,
2017 and Dec. 4, 2021, and all persons who have previously filed
with the Court a consent to join the FLSA claim asserted in the
Litigation." The class, they agree, comprises 74individuals, all of
whom have been identified.

District courts have broad discretion to determine whether
certification of a class is appropriate. Nevertheless, courts must
perform a "rigorous analysis" to ensure that each prerequisite of
Rule 23(a) -- numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation -- is satisfied, as well as one subsection of Rule
23(b). In combined actions, i.e., suits alleging both FLSA
violations on behalf of a collective and state law violations on
behalf of a class, "the question whether a class should be
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) will turn -- as it always does -- on
the application of the criteria set forth in the rule."

Judge Bucklo holds that (i) the proposed class meets numerosity
because it comprises 75 individuals, which is well over the number
the Seventh Circuit has found sufficient to satisfy Rule 23; (ii)
commonality is satisfied because all class members held the same
job, were compensated in the same manner, and assert the same legal
theory based on the "economic reality test" -- which they seek to
establish using common evidence; (iii) typicality is met because
the parties agree that there are 75 individuals in the class, and
the Plaintiffs allege that all of them were wrongly classified as
independent contractors when the evidence -- WhatsApp logs, text
messages, and other communications between defendants and
technicians -- establishes that they were employees based on the
"economic reality of the working relationship"; (iv) adequacy of
representation is satisfied because no conflicts of interest are
apparent; and (v) while plaintiffs' counsel are qualified to
represent the class, such errors of inattention, if they persist,
may cause the Court to revisit the finding that they are adequate
representatives of the class in the case.

Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate if the proposed
class meets two additional requirements: common questions of law or
fact must "predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members," and class resolution must be "superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."

Judge Bucklo holds that the common question that predominates in
this case is whether the Defendants had a practice of
misclassifying the technicians who performed services for them as
independent contractors. If this question were tried, a negative
answer would eviscerate the class claims, while an affirmative
answer would entitle each class member to relief in an
individualized amount that can be -- and, indeed, has been --
calculated based on the Defendants' records.

The superiority requirement is also satisfied. Judge Bucklo finds
that the parties have provided information concerning the amount to
which each class member will be entitled under the settlement (more
on that issue shortly). While some class members have damages
claims valued in the thousands of dollars, many are closer to $100.
While that is more than a nominal recovery to be sure, it is
substantially less than the expenses any class member would likely
incur to litigate his or her claim on an individual basis.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Bucklo granted the motion as to
collective and class certification and is otherwise denied without
prejudice.

B. Preliminary Settlement Approval

In weighing whether to grant preliminary approval of a proposed
settlement, "courts must consider: (1) the strength of plaintiffs'
case compared to the terms of the proposed settlement; (2) the
likely complexity, length and expense of continued litigation; (3)
the amount of opposition to settlement among affected parties; (4)
the opinion of competent counsel; and (5) the stage of the
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed." While the
Plaintiffs' discussion of factors 2, 3, and 5 supports their motion
for preliminary approval, the record raises red flags with respect
to factors 1 and 4.

The first factor is the "most important factor relevant to the
fairness of a class action settlement." The Plaintiffs assert that
the class claims are "supported by substantial evidence," which
Judge Bucklo assumes refers to the "WhatsApp logs, emails, text
messages and other communications showing treatment of the
Technicians" they reference elsewhere in their motion. Against the
strength of this evidence, however, the Plaintiffs acknowledge that
the Defendants raise non-frivolous defenses; recognize the inherent
uncertainties of trial and the expense of continued litigation; and
perceive the benefits of compromise. So far so good.

Where things go awry is in the Plaintiffs' valuation of the class
claims in comparison with the value of the proposed settlement,
Judge Bucklo holds. The Plaintiffs state that "going into
mediation, the Plaintiffs' counsel calculated $368,375 in actual
overtime pay damages" for the class. By the Plaintiffs' account,
this means that they achieved a gross settlement amount equal to
about 109% of actual damages -- a figure they presumably base on
the Total Settlement Amount of $400,000. But the Total Settlement
Amount "has barely any connection to the settlement's value to the
class."

Indeed, the gross settlement amount of $400,000 includes not only
the damages payable to the class, but also attorneys' fees,
litigation costs, and administrative expenses. Accordingly, Judge
Bucklo holds that the Plaintiffs' claim to have obtained a
triumphant "109% of actual damages" is misleading, as the amounts
they compare shed little light on whether the settlement offers
fair and adequate compensation to the class members.

Moreover, while the settlement purports to provide $225,000 in
class damages, this provision, too, is misleading, as the
settlement agreement also includes a provision that, as Judge
Bucklo reads it, caps the Defendants' actual damages exposure at
only 45% of that amount, or $101,250.

Accordingly, the maximum amount actually available to the class as
damages is just $101,250, or about 27.5% of the actual overtime
damages that the Plaintiffs' counsel assessed as owing based on the
Defendants' records. That is a far cry from the 109% that the
Plaintiffs' counsel claim, and lower than all but the very lowest
end of the range of percentages deemed adequate in the cases they
cite.

The attorneys' fees provided in the proposed settlement are
inappropriate for similar reasons. The settlement allocates
$160,000, or 40% of the $400,000 Total Settlement Amount, to
attorneys' fees. Yet, Jucge Bucklo says, "the law is clear that
fees paid to lead and additional class counsel are not considered a
'value' to the class, as counsel should well know." Accordingly,
when attorneys' fees are calculated as a percentage of the recovery
obtained through a class settlement, "the Court must deduct costs
that do not directly benefit the class from the settlement amount
when determining the reasonableness of the fee." As noted, the
maximum value of the proposed settlement to the class appears to be
$101,250 -- less than the $160,000 it allocates to its attorneys.
The Counsel offer no justification or authority for an award of
attorneys' fees in excess of the total recovery available to the
class.

Judge Bucklo also has serious reservations about the proposed
claims process, as well as about the manner in which payments are
calculated and distributed. In particular, she is concerned that
the parties' agreement requires class members to submit claim forms
to obtain any recovery at all. Although "there is nothing
inherently suspect about requiring class members to submit claim
forms in order to receive payment, the Judge says, it is hard to
see the purpose of such forms in this case (if not to reduce the
likely number of claims), since both sides appear to know exactly
who is in the 75-member class and how many hours of unpaid overtime
each class member worked.

The Court notes that it is true that individuals wishing to be part
of the FLSA collective must opt in to participate in the settlement
of the federal claim, while those wishing to be part of a Rule 23
class will be deemed to participate in the settlement of their
state claim unless they opt out. But it does not follow that the
affirmative act of returning a claim form is required to receive
any payment at all. Instead, the notice sent to the individuals the
parties have identified as eligible to assert federal and state
claims can inform them that they have "two binary choices: (1)
decide whether to opt in and participate in the federal action; (2)
decide whether to opt out and not participate in the state-law
claims."  Such a claims procedure strikes Judge Bucklo as no more
complex or difficult to administer than the proposed settlement
agreement's sliding scale based on claim rates. Moreover, the
sliding scale itself reinforces my sense that the claims process is
designed to discourage, rather than encourage, the filing of
claims.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bucklo granted the Plaintiffs'
consent motion as to class certification but denied it as to
approval of the collective action settlement; denied as to
preliminary approval of the class settlement; denied as to approval
of notice; and denied as to the request for hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/6w95xuee from
Leagle.com.


ELITE LOGISTICS: Lee Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under Labor Code
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HYO KYUNG LEE, an Individual, for herself, on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and as aggrieved employees under the California
Private Attorney General Act, v. ELITE LOGISTICS CORP., a
California Corporation; MOON C. KANG, an Individual; and DOES 1
through 50, Inclusive, Case No. 21STCV34748 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., Sept. 21, 2021) seeks to recover unpaid overtime
wages, missed meal and rest breaks, statutory damages and
penalties, prejudgment interest, costs, attorneys' fees,
restitution, PAGA civil penalties, and other appropriate relief for
Defendants' violations of the California Labor Code and Industrial
Welfare Commission Wage Orders.

The Plaintiff was employed as an assistant accountant. She was
employed by the Defendants from August 2016 to January 30, 2021.
Plaintiff's daily jobs duties included inputing data into
computers, inputting driver payroll, account receivables, and
making cash and check deposits into the company bank account.

Elite is a logistics and trucking company. Elite hires truckers,
warehouse staff, as well as office workers. Defendants operate and
run their business in Compton, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Kim, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD KIM PC
          6131 Orangethorpe Ave., Suite 370
          Buena Park, CA 90620
          Telephone: (714) 276-1122
          Facsimile: (714) 276-1120
          E-mail: Rkim@Richkimlaw.com

EQUIFAX INC: Shiyang Files Petition for Writ of Certiorari
----------------------------------------------------------
Objector Shiyang Huang filed with the Supreme Court of United
States a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter styled
Shiyang Huang, Petitioner v. Brian Spector, James McGonnigal,
Randolph Jefferson Cary III, Robin D. Porter, William R. Porter,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et
al., Case No. 21-336.

Response is due on October 4, 2021.

The Objector petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in the case titled In re: Equifax Inc. Customer Data
Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 20-10249.

The question presented is: Whether class-action plaintiffs can
still rely on mere "risk of future harm" allegations alone to
establish Article III standing, achieve class certification under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, and obtain hundreds of
millions of dollars in money damages, in light of the Court's
recent decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190
(2021)?

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, with one caveat, the Northern
District of Georgia's approval of the settlement of the
consolidated class actions against Equifax Inc. and its affiliates
arising from the 2017 data privacy breach. The district court
described the parties' settlement as "the largest and most
comprehensive recovery in a data breach case in U.S. history by
several orders of magnitude." Notably, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the
attorneys general for 48 states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico all supported the settlement.

The one caveat the panel announced was that the incentive awards
for the class representatives that were approved by the district
court ran afoul of Johnson v. NPAS Solutions LLC. The panel
otherwise affirmed in all other respects and remanded solely for
the incentive awards to be vacated.

The Eleventh Circuit's decision resolved five consolidated appeals
by six objectors. The various objectors raised a slew of issues.
Among them, the objectors challenged Article III jurisdiction as
wells as the district court's decisions approving the class action
settlement, certifying the settlement class, and awarding
attorneys' fees and expenses. The panel rejected and dispensed with
all of these arguments in turn. The affirmance and the panel's
resolution of those issues have been widely reported. Less widely
reported, however, are the panel's interesting discussions of the
objectors' challenges to the requirements the district court
imposed on them for filing objections, the district court's process
for adopting its final order, and the appeal bonds imposed by the
district court.[BN]

Objector-Petitioner Shiyang Huang appears pro se.

Plaintiffs-Respondents Brian F. Spector, et al., are represented
by:

          Norman E. Siegel, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON, LLP
          460 Nichols Road Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          E-mail: siegel@stuevesiegel.com

EQUILON ENTERPRSIES: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Dimercurio Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant EQUILON ENTERPRSIES, LLC filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled MARCO DIMERCURIO, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. EQUILON ENTERPRISES LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-04029-JSC, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco.

The Plaintiffs are operators at a Shell oil refinery owned by
Equilon Enterprises, LLC. They allege that Defendant's standby
practices violate California's wage-and-hour laws, Unfair
Competition Law, and Private Attorneys General Act.

Equilon seeks a review of the Court's Order dated Aug. 30, 2021,
granting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The appellate case is captioned as Marco Demercurio, et al. v.
Equilon Enterprsies, LLC, Case No. 21-80098, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Sept. 14,
2021.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner EQUILON ENTERPRSIES, LLC, Does 1 Through and
Including 25, DBA Shell Oil Products US, is represented by:

          Gary Tracy Lafayette, Esq.
          LAFAYETTE & KUMAGAI LLP
          1300 Clay Street, Suite 810
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (415) 357-4600
          E-mail: glafayette@lkclaw.com

Plaintiffs-Respondents MARCO DEMERCURIO, CHARLES GAETH, JOHN
LANGLITZ, and MALCOLM SYNIGAL, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Kristina L. Hillman, Esq.
          Jannah V. Manansala, Esq.
          Alex Nazarov, Esq.
          Roberta D. Perkins, Esq.
          WEINBERG ROGER & ROSENFELD
          1375 55th Street
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (510) 337-1001
          E-mail: courtnotices@unioncounsel.net
                  jmanansala@unioncounsel.net
                  anazarov@unioncounsel.net
                  
               - and -

          David P. Pogrel, Esq.
          LEONARD CARDER, LLP
          1330 Broadway
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 272-0169

ESSENTIA HEALTH: Appeal in Kraft Product Liability Suit Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
An appeal filed by Defendants Essentia Health and Innovis Health,
LLC from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled Jessica
Kraft, individually and as parent to minors L.K., S.K., and O.K.;
Shelli Schneider, individually and as parent of minors A.S and
W.S.; and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Essentia
Health, John Doe Manufacturers, John Doe Distributor, Case No.
3:20-cv-00121-PDW-ARS, pending in the U.S. District Court for the
District of North Dakota - Eastern, has been dismissed.

Essentia Health sold and administered more than 100 time- and
temperature-sensitive pharmaceutical products manufactured by the
John Doe Manufacturers and stored and distributed by the John Doe
Distributor to Plaintiffs, their children and putative class
members, since at least as early as January 2017.

According to the complaint, on April 6, 2020, Essentia Health
notified approximately 50,000 patients, allegedly in Minnesota and
North Dakota, that medication or vaccines they received might have
been compromised by improper temperature storage by the John Doe
Distributor. The Plaintiffs and their minor children, as well as
Class members, have thus been injured by paying for the affected
medicines and associated medical visits without receiving the
benefit of the bargain, says the suit.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs brought this action for breach of express
and implied warranties, for violation of the consumer protection
laws of Minnesota and North Dakota, and for restitution.

The Defendants sought a review of the Court's Order dated Sept. 7,
2021. The appellate case was captioned as Jessica Kraft, et al. v.
Essentia Health, et al., Case No. 21-3043, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, filed on Sept. 10, 2021.

However, Appellants moved to dismiss the appeal which the court
granted on September 13, 2021. [BN]

Defendants-Appellants Essentia Health and Innovis Health, LLC,
doing business as Essentia Health, are represented by:

          Angela Elsperger Lord, Esq.
          Robert B. Stock, Esq.
          VOGEL LAW FIRM
          218 NP Avenue, P.O. Box 1389
          Fargo, ND 58107-0000
          Telephone: (701) 237-6983
          E-mail: alord@vogellaw.com
                  rbslitgroup@vogellaw.com

               - and -

          Briana L. Rummel, Esq.
          VOGEL LAW FIRM
          200 N. Third Street, P.O. Box 2097
          Bismarck, ND 58502-2097
          Telephone: (701) 258-7899
          E-mail: bhildebrand@vogellaw.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees Jessica Kraft, individually and as parent of
minors L.K, S.K. and O.K.; Shelli Schneider, individually and as
parent of minors A.S. and W.S.; Anne Bailey, individually and as
parent of minor D.B.; Amy Lavelle, individually and as parent of
minors Em.L. and El.L.; Elizabeth Beaton, individually and as
parent of minor M.B.; Amanda Fauske, individually and as parents of
minors C.R.F. and C.J.F.; Tyrell Fauske, individually and as parent
of minors C.R.F. and C.J.F.; Jennifer Rein, individually; and
Jessica Berg, individually and as parent of minors A.B. and S.B.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Brooke Achua, Esq.
          Melissa Ryan Clark, Esq.  
          FEGAN & SCOTT LLC
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005

               - and -

          Elizabeth Anne Fegan, Esq.
          FEGAN & SCOTT
          150 S. Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 741-1019
          E-mail: beth@feganscott.com   

               - and -

          John Barton Goplerud, Esq.
          Brian O. Marty, Esq.
          SHINDLER & ANDERSON
          5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100
          West Des Moines, IA 50265-5749
          Telephone: (515) 223-4567

               - and -

          McLain J. Schneider, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER LAW FIRM
          815 Third Avenue, S.
          Fargo, ND 58103-0000
          Telephone: (701) 235-4481
          E-mail: mac@schneiderlawfirm.com

EXTRA SPACE: Makkinje FSCA Class Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled AMBER MAKKINJE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC., Case No.
129164152, was removed from the Circuit Court of the Twelfth
Judicial Circuit in and for Manatee County, Florida, for the Middle
District of Florida on September 21, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Middle District of Florida assigned Case
No. 8:21-cv-02234 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violation of the
Florida Security of Communications Act by commercially using the
data derived from users' interactions on Extra Space's website
through its use of tracking, recording, and session replay
software, without obtaining users' consent, including the
Plaintiff.

Extra Space Storage Inc. is a real estate investment trust company,
headquartered in Cottonwood Heights, Utah. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
                 
         Allan R. Kelley, Esq.
         FOWLER WHITE BURNETT
         1395 Brickell Avenue, 14th Floor
         Miami, FL 33131
         Telephone: (305) 789-9200
         Facsimile: (305) 728-7508
         E-mail: AKelley@fowler-white.com

FACEBOOK INC: Vargas Appeals Case Dismissal Order to 9th Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Rosemarie Vargas, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled ROSEMARIE VARGAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-05081-WHO,
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.

According to the lawsuit, on March 3, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a
third amended complaint reasserting claims under the federal Fair
Housing Act and analogous California and New York laws challenging
Facebook, Inc.'s former practice of allowing advertisers to
self-select target audiences for their paid housing advertisements,
theoretically excluding protected classes of consumers from seeing
those advertisers' particular housing ads.

On August 20, 2021, Judge William H. Orrick entered an order
dismissing with prejudice the Plaintiffs' third amended complaint.
The Court held that while Plaintiffs have added additional details
regarding the searches they performed, those additional details do
not plausibly demonstrate that they were injured by any housing
advertiser's possible use of Facebook's now-discontinued targeting
criteria that could be used to direct paid ads at specific
categories of persons. And even if plaintiffs had been able to
allege facts plausibly supporting a harm to any of them sufficient
to confer standing, the claims plaintiffs' assert are barred by the
Communications Decency Act.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the case dismissal order
entered by Judge Orrick.

The appellate case is captioned as ROSEMARIE VARGAS; KISHA SKIPPER;
JAZMINE SPENCER; DEILLO RICHARDS; JENNY LIN, on behalf of
themselves individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and NEUHTAH OPIOTENNIONE; JESSICA
TSAI, Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
21-16499, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, filed on Sept. 10, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by October 12, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be filed by November 9, 2021;

   -- Appellant's opening brief and excerpts of record shall be
served and filed on December 20, 2021;

   -- Appellee's answering brief and excerpts of record shall be
served and filed on January 18, 2022; and

   -- The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and
served within 21 days of service of the appellee's brief. Failure
of the appellant to comply with the Time Schedule Order will result
in automatic dismissal of the appeal.[BN]

FCA US: Appeals Denial of Bid Decertify Class in Victorino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant FCA US LLC filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in
the lawsuit styled CARLOS VICTORINO and ADAM TAVITIAN,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-01617-GPC-JLB, in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California,
San Diego.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiff Victorino filed
the operative putative first amended class action complaint
("FAC"), on June 19, 2017, against Defendant FCA based on alleged
defects in the 2013-2015 Dodge Dart vehicles equipped with a Fiat
C635 manual transmission built on or before November 12, 2014. The
Plaintiff alleges that the alleged defect causes his vehicle's
clutch to fail and stick to the floor preventing him from
accelerating causing a safety hazard as well as adversely affecting
the vehicle's driveability.

After the Court's ruling on Defendant's motion for summary judgment
and subsequent motion for reconsideration, the remaining causes of
action in the case are the breach of implied warranty of
merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and a California unfair competition law
claim premised on the breach of implied warranty claims.

The Defendant now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated
September 9, 2021, denying its motion to decertify class.

The appellate case is captioned as Carlos Victorino v. FCA US LLC,
Case No. 21-80099, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, filed on September 16, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner FCA US LLC is represented by:

          Stephen A. D'Aunoy, Esq.
          Kathy Wisniewski, Esq.
          THOMPSON COBURN LLP
          One U.S. Bank Plaza
          505 N. 7th Street
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 552-6354
          E-mail: sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com
                  kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com  

Plaintiff-Respondent CARLOS VICTORINO, individually, and on behalf
of other members of the general public similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Robert Kenneth Friedl, Esq.
          12321 Ocean Park, No. 17
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (310) 569-2006
          E-mail: robert.friedl@capstonelawyers.com

               - and -

          Mark A. Ozzello, Esq.
          THE OZZELLO PRACTICE, PC
          17383 West Sunset Boulevard, Suite A380
          Pacific Palisades, CA 90272
          Telephone: (844) 774-2020

               - and -

          Cody Robert Padgett, Esq.
          Tarek Zohdy, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 712-8029

FIELDALE FARMS: Settles Broiler Chicken Antitrust Suit for $181M
----------------------------------------------------------------
Did you buy chicken from 2009 through 2020? Then you may be
eligible for a payment from a class action settlement for $181
million. The defendants include Fieldale Farms Corporation,
George's, Mar-Jac Poultry, Peco Foods, Pilgrim's Pride, and Tyson
Foods.
Prosecutors in the Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation allege that
several corporations conspired to stabilize the price and supply of
chicken, a violation of federal and state consumer antitrust laws.

Get news on the go with KHON 2GO, KHON's morning podcast, every
morning at 8

The law firm representing the plaintiff's posted notice of the
settlement with approval from United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. But, the settlements need final
approval by the court at a hearing on Dec. 20, 2021 before any
money is paid.

Anyone who purchased fresh or frozen raw chicken (excluding meat
marketed as halal, kosher, free-range, or organic) within several
states is eligible. Those states include California, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.

How much money should you expect?
That figure is still to be determined, depending on how many
claimants sign on and the settlement total being finalized.

As far as the payouts involved, Tyson will pay $99,000,000,
Pilgrim's will pay $75,500,000, George's will pay $1,900,000, Peco
will pay $1,900,000, Fieldale will pay $1,700,000 and Mar-Jac will
pay $1,000,000 if the settlements are approved.

While the per-consumer payout isn't yet known, we do know how much
the class action settlement lawyers will get:

"Co-Lead Counsel will seek attorneys' fees of no more than 33.3% of
the Settlement Fund or $60,273,000, and the total amount of costs
sought will be no more than $8.75 million. Co-Lead Counsel will
also request service awards of up to $2,000 for each of the Class
Representatives."

Everything left after legal fees will be distributed to members of
the settlement class.

There are several exceptions to the eligibility. File your claim
and check your eligibility by Dec. 31, 2022 at
www.overchargedforchicken.com or call 1-877-888-5428.

Tyson, Perdue to pay $35M to settle with chicken farmers
Two of the industry's biggest poultry companies have agreed to pay
nearly $35 million to settle a lawsuit that accused them and
several other firms of conspiring to dominate the industry and fix
the prices paid to farmers who raise the chickens. Tyson Foods and
Perdue Farms agreed to the settlements without admitting any
wrongdoing while the lawsuit remains pending against several other
industry giants, including Pilgrim's Pride, Koch Foods and
Sanderson Farms. The lawsuit says the contract grower system the
meat companies created pushed them deep into debt to build and
maintain chicken barns that met company standards. [GN]

FORD MOTOR: Class Action Over Trucks' Defective Primer Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------------
carcomplaints.com reports that a Ford F-150 class action lawsuit
has been dismissed after the plaintiff alleged the aluminum side
panels, hoods and roofs corrode because the paint bubbles and peels
away.

The one Ford F-150 owner who filed the class action lawsuit claims
the paint peeled on the roof, hood and side panel, followed by
corrosion of the body.

The plaintiff says a dealer technician told Ford there was probably
defective primer applied to the truck, not defective paint. The
technician allegedly said the evidence showed the paint simply
didn't stick to the primer.

The class action lawsuit says Ford allegedly knows about F-150
paint and primer problems based on technical service bulletins
(TSBs) issued to dealerships.

The F-150 class action mentions how Ford had always used steel for
their trucks but switched to aluminum to make the trucks lighter
and more fuel efficient.

One TSB (04-25-1) goes back to 2004 because of complaints about
2004 Ford F-150 trucks with bubbling under the paint on the
aluminum body. Ford said corrosion of the aluminum was caused by
iron particles entering the aluminum body before it was painted.

Model year 2004-2007 Ford F-150s were mentioned in TSB 06-25-15
because of corroded aluminum, and TSB 16-0028 informed dealers
about aluminum corrosion in 2004-2016 Ford F-150 trucks.

Another bulletin (TSB 17-0062 for 2002-2017 F-150s) went so far as
to tell technicians to replace any aluminum body panels that were
corroded.

According to the F-150 class action lawsuit, an extended warranty
offered by Ford really doesn't help truck owners because the
warranty says the aluminum must perforate. The plaintiff says this
won't happen because aluminum will never perforate.

Ford F-150 Class Action Lawsuit Dismissed
According to court documents, Ford and the plaintiff resolved the
lawsuit to the satisfaction of both parties.

"Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13(b), it is respectfully requested that
the Court direct the Clerk to remove any upcoming deadlines and
dates for this matter from its calendar and that the Court provide
Plaintiff and Defendant with twenty-eight (28) days with which to
complete their settlement and file a Stipulation of Dismissal
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)."

The Ford F-150 class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division: Tina
Nelson, v. Ford Motor Company.

The plaintiff is represented by Glassman, Wyatt, Tuttle & Cox,
P.C., and McGuire Law, P.C. [GN]

FROMMER LEGAL: Deloitte Forms Class-Action Defense Firm
-------------------------------------------------------
James Carstensen at law.com reports that Deloitte Legal has joined
forces with German boutique firm Frommer Legal to establish a law
firm in Munich focused on defending companies against class
actions.

The venture, called "Classreaction," in reference to the class
actions it will defend against, "combines the international legal
expertise of Deloitte Legal and the digital and process know-how of
Frommer Legal," according to the new firm's official statement.

"The phenomenon of the class action lawsuit is mainly known from
the USA. Legal proceedings cost the U.S. economy around $264
billion [] a year, $100 billion of which is borne by small and
medium-sized enterprises." the firm stated. "In Germany, too, the
risk of companies becoming the target of class actions has
increased in recent years."

The shareholders of the new firm are a combination of Frommer Legal
lawyers, including managing partner Björn Frommer, Axel Gillessen
and Katja Nikolaus, alongside Thomas Northoff, Deloitte Legal's
German managing partner, a person familiar with the newly formed
venture said.

Classreaction will make use of a cloud-based legal technology
platform developed by Frommer, dubbed JUNE, designed specifically
for class actions.

Deloitte similarly expanded into the business legal services and
alternative legal service provider space in the U.S. last month,
adding longtime New Law startup innovator Teju Deshpande and her
entire team from contract life cycle management startup Oya
Solutions. [GN]

GOLD BULL: Faces Correa Suit Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA CORREA, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GOLD BULL VEND, LLC (DBA AS SUDSY WATER
LAUNDRY & DRY CLEANERS) LECHANA CLARK, Defendants, Case No.
1:21-cv-07781 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 16, 2021) arises from the
Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
York Labor Law by failing to pay proper minimum and overtime wages,
failing to provide notice at time of hiring, and failing to provide
accurate wage statements.

The Plaintiff was employed to perform various duties such as
washing and drying at Defendants' Laundromat from approximately May
5, 2021 until August 20, 2021.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Laundromat located in New
York under the name "Sudsy Water Laundry & Dry Cleaners."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lina Stillman, Esq.
          STILLMAN LEGAL, PC
          42 Broadway, 12th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (800) 933-5620

GOLF & TENNIS PRO SHOP: Mason Sues Over Non-Blind Friendly Website
------------------------------------------------------------------
Portia Mason, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. and Does 1 to
10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-07290 (C.D. Cal.,
September 1, 2021), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction,
compensatory, statutory and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment
and post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this action
together with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other
and further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Defendant's website, https://www.pgatoursuperstore.com/, provides
consumers with access to the best and latest selection of golf and
tennis products from leading brands featuring golf clubs, shoes,
men's apparel, women's apparel, kid's apparel, technology, bags,
gear, balls, tennis racquets, and pickleball available in store and
online for purchase. Mason is legally blind and claims that said
website cannot be accessed by the visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Thiago Coelho, Esq.
     Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
     Binyamin I. Manoucheri, Esq.
     WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
     3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90010
     Tel: (213) 381-9988
     Fax: (213) 381-9989
     Email binyamin@wilshirelawfirm.com
           thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
           jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com


HEALTHCARE SERVICES: Koch Suit Gets Initial OK of Class Status
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEPHEN KOCH, et al., v.
HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP, INC., et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-01227-ER
(E.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge Eduardo C. Robreno entered an order:

   1. granting preliminary settlement class certification and
      settlement approval; and  

   2. denying as moot Plaintiff's motion certify class and
      appoint class representatives and counsel

Healthcare Services provides housekeeping, laundry, linen, facility
maintenance, and food services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 16, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zEvujZ at no extra charge.[CC]

HONEST COMPANY: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of November 15 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion no later than November 15, 2021 in a securities class action
lawsuit that has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
acquired the securities of The Honest Company, Inc. ("Honest " or
the "Company") (NASDAQ:HNST) from May 3, 2021 through September 15,
2021 (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit filed in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California alleges
violations of the Securities Act of 1934.

If you purchased Honest securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Honest Company Inc
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuitor contact Rujul Patel toll free at
(877) 779-1414 or rpatel@bernlieb.com

According to the complaint, Honest and the Offering Documents made
false and/or misleading statements and failed to disclose that: (1)
that, prior to the IPO, the Company's results had been
significantly impacted by a multimillion-dollar COVID-19 stock-up
for products in the Diapers and Wipes category and Household and
Wellness category; (2) that, at the time of the IPO, the Company
was experiencing decelerating demand for such products; (3) that,
as a result, the Company's financial results would likely be
adversely impacted; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

On May 6, 2021, Honest completed its IPO, selling approximately 26
million shares of common stock for $16.00 per share.

On August 13, 2021, Honest announced its second quarter 2021
financial results, reporting a net loss of $20 million, compared to
a net loss of only $0.4 million for the second quarter of 2020.
Honest disclosed that its revenue grew only 3% as compared to the
second quarter of 2020, because it was negatively impacted by "an
estimated $3.7 million COVID-19 stock-up impact primarily in
Diapers and Wipes in the prior year period." Honest also disclosed
that its Diapers and Wipes category revenue declined 2% compared to
the second quarter of 2020. Honest further disclosed that
"Household and Wellness revenue declined 6% from the second quarter
of 2020 as consumer and customer demand for sanitization products
decreased as consumers became vaccinated and customers managed
heavy levels of inventory."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $3.98 per share, or
28%, to close at $10.07 per share on August 13, 2021, on unusually
heavy trading volume.

On August 19, 2021, the Company's stock price closed at an all-time
low of $9.16 per share, a nearly 43% decline from the $16.00 per
share IPO price.

As of the time the complaint was filed, Honest's stock price
continues to trade below the $16.00 per share Offering price,
damaging investors.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than November 15, 2021. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Honest securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/honestcompanyinc-hnst-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-fraud-stock-441/or
contact Rujul Patel toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
rpatel@bernlieb.com

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING. (C) 2021 Bernstein Liebhard LLP. The law firm
responsible for this advertisement is Bernstein Liebhard LLP, 10
East 40th Street, New York, New York 10016, (212) 779-1414. The
lawyer responsible for this advertisement in the State of
Connecticut is Michael S. Bigin. Prior results do not guarantee or
predict a similar outcome with respect to any future matter. [GN]

HOOTERS MANAGEMENT: Sells Unsafe Hamburger, Eminova Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
NAZAKAT EMINOVA and EBRAHIM EBRAHIMI, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. HOOTERS MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 134965737 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 13th
Jud. Ct., Hillsborough Cty., September 21, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendants for negligence, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, negligence per se, and loss of consortium.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged distribution and
selling of an unsafe hamburger at its restaurant. Plaintiff Eminova
purchased a hamburger at the Defendant's restaurant and began to
choke and show signs of distress after eating the hamburger. She
and her spouse, Plaintiff Ebrahimi, then saw pieces of a foreign
object resembling metal wire in the hamburger. As a result of the
Defendant's alleged negligence, Plaintiff Eminova suffered
permanent bodily injury.

Hooters Management Corporation is an owner and operator of a
restaurant called Hooters, located at 4420 W. Gandy Blvd., Tampa,
Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                

         Marc Matthews, Esq.
         Sean T. Becker, Esq.
         McIntyre Thanasides Bringgold Elliott
         Grimaldi, Guito & Matthews P.A.
         500 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 200
         Tampa, FL 33602
         Telephone: (813) 530-1000
         Facsimile: (813) 830-7221
         E-mail: Marc@mcintyrefirm.com
                 Sean@mcintyrefirm.com

INTUIT INC: Shankar Sues Over Extra QuickBooks Fee on ACH Transfers
-------------------------------------------------------------------
SHANKAR NINAN & CO., LLP, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. INTUIT INC. and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 5:21-cv-07339-NC (S.D. Cal.,
September 21, 2021) is a class action against the Defendant for
breach of contract, fraud, conversion, and violation of the
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act and California's Unfair
Competition Law.

The case arises from the Defendant's breach of its agreement with
QuickBooks users, including the Plaintiff, by charging a one
percent transaction fee for automated clearing house (ACH)
transfers, with a maximum charge of $10 per transaction. Prior to
March 11, 2021, QuickBooks users had the option to process ACH
payments in two-to-seven business days without being charged a fee.
On March 11, 2021, the Plaintiff and other QuickBooks users
received an e-mail from the QuickBooks Team informing them that all
future ACH payments would be processed in one business day with no
extra fees. However, despite explicitly assuring customers that no
extra fees would be charged for the new next day deposits,
QuickBooks began charging a one percent transaction fee for ACH
transfers, the suit alleges.

Shankar Ninan & Co. LLP is a law firm and limited liability
partnership based in New York, New York.

Intuit Inc. is the developer of QuickBooks, an accounting software
package, headquartered in Mountain View, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         James A. Morris, Esq.
         Shane E. Greenberg, Esq.
         MORRIS LAW FIRM
         4001 W. Alameda Avenue, Suite 208
         Burbank, CA 91505
         Telephone: (747) 283-1144
         Facsimile: (747) 283-1143

KRAFT HEINZ: Clarke Suit Transferred to From California to Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California transferred the case, AARON CLARKE, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. THE KRAFT HEINZ COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-02437-RS (N.D. Cal.), to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.

Background

The case arises from the Plaintiffs' allegation that Kraft Macaroni
& Cheese, manufactured by Defendant Kraft, contains harmful
substances called phthalates. Kraft, which maintains a principal
place of business in Chicago, now moves to transfer the action to
the Northern District of Illinois where a substantially similar
action is pending.

The case was filed on April 5, 2021, one day before the action
pending in the Northern District of Illinois, Stuve v. The Kraft
Heinz Company, No. 1:21-cv-01845. When Kraft moved to transfer the
case on June 22, 2021, both actions purported to bring claims on
behalf of a nationwide class.

A few days before filing their opposition, however, the Plaintiffs
amended their complaint and narrowed their claims. They now seek
only to represent a California class. The Stuve plaintiffs
similarly amended their complaint to excise claims premised on a
nationwide class; they now bring claims on behalf of a 10-state
class. Two other putative class actions assert claims against Kraft
related to phthalates: Francione v. Kraft Heinz Foods Company, No.
1:21-cv-10928 in the District of Massachusetts and Tarantino v. The
Kraft Heinz Company, No. 2:21-cv-04013 in the Eastern District of
New York.

Kraft avers it is "in the process of seeking to transfer all of
these cases" to the Northern District of Illinois.

Discussion

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought or to
any district or division to which all parties have consented." A
motion to transfer venue requires courts to balance, among other
factors: "(1) plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) convenience of the
parties, (3) convenience of the witnesses, (4) ease of access to
the evidence, (5) familiarity of each forum with the applicable
law, (6) feasibility of consolidation with other claims, (7) any
local interest in the controversy, and (8) the relative court
congestion and time of trial in each forum." None of the factors
are dispositive.

Whether to transfer is left to the discretion of the district
court. District courts "must consider both private factors, which
go to the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and public
factors which go to the interests of justice."

A. Private Factors

Judge Seeborg finds that the first four, so-called "private
factors" weigh the Plaintiffs' choice of forum against the
convenience to parties and witnesses and the ease of access to
evidence. On balance, the private factors tip slightly in the
Plaintiffs' favor.

Initially, while they do bring class claims, Judge Seeborg finds
that both Plaintiffs reside in the district and contend they
purchased Kraft Macaroni & Cheese from stores in the district.
Their choice is thus entitled to some deference. The first factor
weighs in their favor.

The convenience factors, on the other hand, are neutral, Judge
Seeborg holds. He finds that Kraft is a Delaware corporation
co-headquartered in Chicago, Illinois and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Where "the gravamen of the case is whether the Defendant made false
and misleading statements in advertising, the Defendant's employees
responsible for the creation and approval of these advertisements
will be key witnesses."

In the case, all relevant "marketing, research and development, and
corporate quality" decisions emanated from Kraft's Chicago
headquarters, which suggests most of witnesses, and relevant
evidence, are located in the Northern District of Illinois. Yet
"the convenience of a litigant's employee witnesses are entitled to
little weight because litigants are able to compel their employees
to testify at trial, regardless of forum."

The inconvenience of transferring relevant evidence is similarly
not dispositive where, in the digital age, "ease of access is
neutral given the portability of electronic discovery." Kraft does
not indicate it intends to call any non-employee witnesses or
foresees producing, or paying for the transfer of, a significant
amount of non-electronic discovery. It is furthermore inarguable
that a large corporation like Kraft is much better situated to bear
the costs of travel and production than individual plaintiffs.
Thus, while it would ease the potentially heavy production burden
on Kraft to transfer the case, Judge Seeborg holds that there is a
possibility doing so would simply, and improperly, "shift the
inconvenience from one party to another."

B. Public Factors

In determining whether the interests of justice favor transfer,
Judge Seeborg explains that courts look primarily at considerations
of judicial economy. He states, the last four factors (familiarity
with the applicable law, feasibility of consolidation, local
interest in the controversy, and the relative court congestion)
guide this inquiry. Because transferring the case would increase
the chances of consolidation while decreasing the potential for
inconsistent verdicts, the public factors weigh markedly in favor
of transfer.

Judge Seeborg finds that public factors scale is thus tipped most
strongly by the possibility of consolidation, which weighs heavily
in favor of transfer because the Stuve action is already pending in
the Northern District of Illinois. He says, while Kraft does not
set forth the criteria for relation or consolidation in that
district, it is not unreasonable to assume that the disposition of
two, or potentially four, cases revolving around the alleged
presence of phthalates in Kraft Macaroni & Cheese will be
coordinated in some way.

Judge Seeborg holds that it would waste judicial resources for
multiple courts to become intimately familiar with the same nucleus
of facts only perhaps to contradict one another on the law. The
Plaintiffs make the logically tenuous counterpoint that because one
action is pending in the Court and one is pending in the Northern
District of Illinois, there is equal justification for keeping or
transferring the case. There is, however, no way to reap the
benefits of consolidation if this action remains in the case.
Because this factor weighs strongly in favor of transfer and the
private factors weigh only slightly in the Plaintiffs' favor, Judge
Seeborg will grant the motion.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Seeborg granted the motion to
transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/8dnsa7wu from Leagle.com.


LA LOMITA MEXICAN: Cruz Sues Over Restaurant Staff's Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JUANA CRUZ AND HUMBERTO GUERRA, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated Plaintiff v. LA LOMITA MEXICAN DELI
CORP., (DBA AS LA LOMITA) MAYRA PEREZ, MARIA PEREZ, AND ALBINO
PEREZ, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-07780 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 16,
2021) arises from the Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law by failing to pay proper
minimum and overtime wages, failing to provide notice at time of
hiring, and failing to provide accurate wage statements.

Plaintiffs Cruz and Guerra were employed by the Defendants from
approximately September 2019 until March 15, 2020 and from
approximately May 2017 until March 15, 2021, respectively, to
perform various duties such as waiting tables and preparing food,
and delivering the food at the Mexican restaurant that Defendants
own.

The Defendants own, operate and control a Mexican restaurant in New
York under the name "LA LOMITA."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Lina Stillman, Esq.
          STILLMAN LEGAL, PC
          42 Broadway, 12th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (800) 933-5620

LAKESIDE RECOVERY: Vallian Must File Class Cert. by April 29, 2022
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NATASHA VALLIAN,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
LAKESIDE RECOVERY SOLUTION, INC., Case No. 3:21-cv-01472-E (N.D.
Tex.), the Hon. Judge Ada Brown entered a scheduling order
regarding parties' joint status report as follows:

   1. The Plaintiff must file her Motion for Class Certification
      by April 29, 2022. The motion must otherwise comply with
      Local Rule 23.2 (except paragraph (f)), and must be
      accompanied by a supporting brief and all supporting
      evidence, including expert testimony, if any.

   2. Any motions requesting leave to join additional parties
      must be filed by November 16, 2021. Any motion for leave
      to amend pleadings under Federal Rule 15(a) must be filed
      by November 16, 2021. Any motion for leave to amend
      pleadings after that date must show good cause pursuant to
      Federal Rule 16(b).

   3. Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by order,
      plaintiff and defendant shall file a written designation
      of the name and address of each expert witness, if any and
      shall otherwise comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) on or
      before December 16, 2021.

   4. Discovery may begin immediately, but this discovery closes
      March 30, 2022. All written discovery must be sent in a
      timely manner such that any response is due before class
      certification discovery closes.

   5. The parties shall mediate this case no later than January
      14, 2022, and the parties shall file a Joint Report on
      mediation no later than 7 days after mediation occurs.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 16, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3lZ3aUB at no extra charge.[CC]

LE ENERGY LLC: Siggers Seeks Minimum, Overtime Pay
--------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Siggers, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. LE Energy, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 21-cv-01713 (N.D. Ohio, September 2, 2021), seeks to recover
unpaid minimum wages and overtime premiums, liquidated damages,
penalties, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys' fees and
costs, pre- and post-judgment interest and any other remedies under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards
and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act.

LE Energy operates Utility Gas and Power LLC, a licensed
alternative energy provider in Illinois and Ohio. Cleveland worked
as a State Tested Nursing Assistant at one of its facilities
located in Ohio. Siggers was a door-to-door salesman soliciting
customers for Utility Gas and Power.

Defendants allegedly misclassified Siggers as an independent
contractor as he was paid commission only. Siggers claims to have
rendered compensable working hours whether or not he makes a
sale.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
      Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
      NILGES DRAHER LLC
      7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
      Massillon, OH 44646
      Telephone: (330) 470-4428
      Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
      Email: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
             sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

             - and -

      Robi J. Baishnab, Esq.
      NILGES DRAHER LLC
      1360 E. 9th Street, Suite 808
      Cleveland, OH 44114
      Telephone: (216) 230-2955
      Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
      Email: rbaishnab@ohlaborlaw.com


LEMOORE, CA: Four of Ponce's Claims to Be Dismissed as Duplicative
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID PONCE, et al., Plaintiffs v. WASHBURN, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-01291-BAM (PC) (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California recommends that the Plaintiffs'
Claims I, II, III, and V be dismissed from the action as
duplicative.

Judge McAuliffe also directed the Clerk of the Court to:

   (1) randomly assign a district judge to the action;

   (2) re-designate the action as a civil action with nature of
       suit 440; and

   (3) update all the Plaintiffs' mailing addresses person
       numbers.

Background

Plaintiffs David Ponce, Anthony Barker, Jesse Gomez, Rene Luna, and
James Wallace are pretrial detainees proceeding pro se in the civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The action was
initiated on Aug. 25, 2021. The Plaintiffs have not filed
applications to proceed in forma pauperis or paid the $402 filing
fee for the action.

I. Plaintiffs' Allegations

Plaintiffs Ponce, Barker, Gomez, Luna, and Wallace are all
currently pretrial detainees incarcerated at the Kings County Jail
in Hanford, California. The Plaintiffs name the following
Defendants: (1) Officer Washburn, Lemoore Police Department; (2)
Officer Josh Chavez, Hanford Police Department; (3) Officer Acosta,
Lemoore Police Department; (4) Office Scandura, Hanford Police
Department; (5) Officer Loll, Kings County Sheriff's Department;
(6) Officer Gomez, Kings County Sheriff's Department; (7) Hanford
Police Department; (8) Lemoore Police Department; (9) Kings County
Sheriff's Department. The allegations in the complaint involve five
separate incidents involving each Plaintiff individually, though
Plaintiffs purport to bring a class action on behalf of other
pretrial detainees against the police in Kings County.

The allegations in the complaint are as follows:

     a. Claim I: On 3/22/21, Plaintiff D. Ponce was violently
attacked by Officer and K9 dog. Defendant Scandura was in the wrong
by his illegal search, seizure and detaining of Mr. Ponce. The
Plaintiff suffered over 62 dog bites from the K9. He did not
deserve to have his person treated cruel and unusually.

     b. Claim II: On 1/8/21, Plaintiff J. Gomez suffered an extreme
attack by K9 dog that resulted in the loss of his pinky finger, due
to excessive force by police brutality. This blatant acts of cruel
& unusual punishment is unexcusable and therefore violates the
Plaintiff's rights.

     c. Claim III: On 5/11/21, Plaintiff A. Barker suffered a
viscious attack by K9 dog under Officer Washburn's authority. He
asserts there was any merit for K9 to be used the way it was. The
Plaintiff was already apprehended when dog attacked him. The K9
tore into his tendons on left leg taking bites/chunks of leg while
in the process. This act was in violation of the Plaintiff's
constitutional rights.

     d. Claim IV: On 2/23/21, Plaintiff R. Luna was a victim of
police brutality by Officers Loll and Gomez of the Kings County
Sheriff's Department. Let it be known that the Plaintiff had/has a
intestinal problem that he was suffering from while officers
kneed/punched/kicked the Plaintiff while in a prone position. These
officers violated Mr. Luna's constitutional rights clearly. It was
so brutal it made the headline news.

     e. Claim V: On 7/28/21, Plaintiff J. Wallace was also a victim
of police brutality, by excessive force. Officer Acosta of Lemoore
Police Department tazed Mr. Wallace while the Plaintiff was already
down in a defenseless prone position. This act by the Department
was and is unexcusable.

II. Duplicative Actions

A. Pending Actions

1. Plaintiff David Ponce

Plaintiff Ponce has filed two prior actions whose allegations are
nearly identical to, or include, the allegations in Claim I of this
action.

a. Ponce I

On July 2, 2021, Plaintiff Ponce filed Ponce v. Hanford Police
Dep't K-9 Unit, No. 1:21-cv-01045-DAD-BAM ("Ponce I"). On Aug.t 9,
2021, the Court granted leave to file an amended complaint. The
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on Aug. 9, 2021. The
Court screened the first amended complaint and granted leave to
file an amended complaint on Aug. 24, 2021.

In the first amended complaint, the Plaintiff names the Hanford
Police Department and Office Scandura as defendants and alleges
that on March 22, 2021 he was illegally searched by a police
officer after the officer let the K9 dog go on him for no reason.
He further alleges that he suffered over 62 bites and has K9 teeth
marks (scars) as a result of this illegal search and seizure.

b. Ponce II

On July 22, 2021, Plaintiff Ponce filed Ponce v. Hanford Police
Dep't K-9 Unit, No. 1:21-cv-01110-AWI-BAM ("Ponce II"). In the
complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that on March 22, 2021, he was
sitting at a bus stop when a peace officer K-9 unit pulled up and
asked him if his name as David Ponce. He stood up and said yes, and
without warning the officer released his K-9 dog. After the K-9
took the Plaintiff down, the peach officer started kicking
Plaintiff in the back of the head. Plaintiff alleges that he has
over 62 dog teeth that ripped through his flesh.

2. Plaintiff Jesse Gomez

On Aug. 2, 2021, Plaintiff Gomez filed Gomez v. Kings Cty. Sherriff
Dep't, No. 1:21-cv-01170-NONE-BAM. In the complaint, Plaintiff
Gomez alleges that on or around Jan. 7, 2021 through Jan. 17, 2021,
he was attacked by a K9 dog and during the attack his right pinky
finger was bitten completely off. The claims raised in Gomez are
nearly identical to the allegations in Claim II of the action.

3. Plaintiff Anthony Barker

On Aug. 2, 2021, Plaintiff Barker filed Barker v. Washburn, No.
1:21-cv-01169-NONE-SAB. In the complaint, Plaintiff Barker alleges
that on May 11, 2021, he was attacked by K9 Officer Washburn's dog
while already apprehended by the Sheriff's officers of Lemoore. The
claims raised in Barker are nearly identical to the allegations in
Claim III of the action.

4. Plaintiff James Wallace

On Aug. 23, 2021, Plaintiff Wallace filed Wallace v. Lemoore PD,
No. 1:21-cv-01275-DAD-EPG. In the complaint, Plaintiff Wallace
alleges that on July 28, 2021, he suffered a variety of injuries
and police brutality brought on by the Lemoore Police Department,
specifically Officer Acosta. The Plaintiff alleges that he was
already detained in cuffs and apprehended by authorities when he
was pinned to the floor and tazed. The claims raised in Wallace are
nearly identical to the allegations in Claim V of the action.

B. Discussion

As described, Claims I, II, III, and V in the action are nearly
identical to the claims raised by Plaintiffs Ponce, Gomez, Barker,
and Wallace in Ponce I, Ponce II, Gomez, Barker, and Wallace. The
same defendants are named, and the same facts are alleged regarding
the dates and incidents at issue for each Plaintiff's claim. To the
extent the facts differ, it appears that the prior actions include
additional allegations not present in the instant case.

Therefore, Judge McAuliffe finds that Claims I, II, III, and V in
this case are duplicative of the Plaintiffs' prior current pending
cases because the claims, parties, and requested relief do not
significantly differ between the actions. The Judge will recommend
that the duplicative claims and parties -- the Defendants and the
Plaintiffs -- be dismissed from the action.

III. Person Numbers and Mailing Addresses

Judge McAuliffe notes that although the Plaintiffs have all signed
the complaint, only Plaintiff Ponce has included a person number
and a mailing address. However, the complaint indicates that all
the Plaintiffs are inmates housed at the Kings County Jail. Judge
McAuliffe therefore takes judicial notice of the Kings County
Jail's Inmate Locator and will direct the Clerk of Court to update
the person number and mailing address for each Plaintiff when
serving these findings and recommendations.

IV. Redesignate as Civil Action

In addition, upon further review by Judge McAuliffe, it has also
been determined that the present action is a regular civil action
and does not involve a prisoner or detainee litigating the
conditions of his confinement. Accordingly, the case will be
redesignated as a civil action.

Order and Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, Judge McAuliffe ordered the Clerk of the
Court to:

     1. Randomly assign a district judge to the action;

     2. Re-designate this action as a civil action with nature of
suit 440;

     3. Designate the case number in this action as follows: Case
No. 1:21-cv-01291-BAM;

     4. Update all Plaintiffs' mailing addresses to: Kings County
Jail (Hanford), P.O. Box 1699, Hanford, California 93230; and

     5. Update Plaintiffs Barker, Gomez, Luna, and Wallace's person
numbers as follows: Anthony Barker, H-1035662; Jesse Gomez,
H-1003491; Rene Luna, H-1007862; and James Wallace, H-1039658.

Furthermore, Judge McAuliffe that:

     1. Claims I, II, III, and V be dismissed from the action as
duplicative;

     2. Plaintiffs David Ponce, Anthony Barker, Jesse Gomez, and
James Wallace be dismissed from the action as duplicative; and

     3. Defendants Washburn, Chavez, Acosta, Scandura, Hanford
Police Department, and Lemoore Police Department be dismissed from
the action as duplicative.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United
States District Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28
U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after being served with
these Findings and Recommendations, the Plaintiffs may file written
objections with the Court. The document should be captioned
"Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations."
The Plaintiffs are advised that the failure to file objections
within the specified time may result in the waiver of the "right to
challenge the magistrate's factual findings" on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/87dpb3k from Leagle.com.


LONGEVERON INC: Bragar Eagel Reminds November 12 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, announces that a class action lawsuit has been
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida on behalf of investors that purchased or otherwise
acquired Longeveron Inc. ("Longeveron" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:
LGVN) securities pursuant and/or traceable to the offering
documents issued in connection with Longeveron's February 12, 2021
initial public offering (the "IPO") and/or Longeveron securities
between December 18, 2020 and August 10, 2021, both dates inclusive
(the "Class Period"). Investors have until November 12, 2021 to
apply to the Court to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the
lawsuit.

Longeveron is a clinical stage biotechnology company that engages
in developing cellular therapies for aging-related and
life-threatening conditions. The Company's lead investigational
product is Lomecel-B, a cell-based therapy product that is derived
from culture-expanded medicinal signaling cells that are sourced
from the bone marrow of young healthy adult donors. Longeveron is
conducting, among other trials, a Phase 2b trial of its Lomecel-B
product for aging frailty (the "Phase 2b Aging Frailty Trial"). The
Phase 2b Aging Frailty Trial's primary efficacy endpoint is the
change from baseline in the six-minute walk test at six months (or
180 days) for Lomecel-B subjects compared to placebo subjects.

On January 19, 2021, Longeveron filed a registration statement on
Form S-1 with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") in connection with the IPO, which, after several
amendments, was declared effective by the SEC on February 11, 2021
(the "Registration Statement").

On or about February 12, 2021, pursuant to the Registration
Statement, Longeveron's Class A common stock began trading on the
Nasdaq Capital Market ("NASDAQ") under the ticker symbol "LGVN."

Also on February 12, 2021, Longeveron filed a prospectus on Form
424B4 with the SEC in connection with the IPO, which incorporated
and formed part of the Registration Statement (the "Prospectus"
and, together with the Registration Statement, the "Offering
Documents").

Pursuant to the Offering Documents, Longeveron conducted the IPO,
issuing 2.66 million shares of its Class A common stock to the
public at the Offering price of $10.00 per share, for approximate
proceeds of $24.7 million to the Company after applicable
underwriting discounts and commissions, and before expenses.

The complaint alleges that the Offering Documents were negligently
prepared and, as a result, contained untrue statements of material
fact or omitted to state other facts necessary to make the
statements made not misleading and were not prepared in accordance
with the rules and regulations governing their preparation.
Additionally, throughout the Class Period, Defendants made
materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
business, operations, and compliance policies. Specifically, the
Offering Documents and Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Lomecel-B was not as
effective in treating aging frailty as Defendants had led investors
to believe; (ii) accordingly, Lomecel-B's clinical and commercial
prospects with respect to aging frailty were overstated; and (iii)
as a result, the Offering Documents and Defendants' public
statements throughout the Class Period were materially false and/or
misleading and failed to state information required to be stated
therein.

On August 13, 2021, Longeveron issued two press releases—one
announcing topline results of the Phase 2b Aging Frailty Trial, and
a second providing a corporate update and reporting the Company's
financial results for the second quarter of 2021. Both press
releases disclosed, among other results, that Lomecel-B had "not
achiev[ed] . . . statistical significance for the pairwise
comparison to placebo" with respect to the primary efficacy
endpoint.

On this news, Longeveron's stock price fell $1.51 per share, or
27.91%, to close at $3.90 per share on August 13, 2021,
representing a total decline of 61% from the Offering price.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Longeveron shares and
suffered a loss, are a long-term stockholder, have information,
would like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Brandon Walker, Melissa
Fortunato, or Marion Passmore by email at investigations@bespc.com,
telephone at (212) 355-4648, or by filling out this contact form.
There is no cost or obligation to you.

                   About Bragar Eagel

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York, California, and South Carolina. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in commercial,
securities, derivative, and other complex litigation in state and
federal courts across the country. For more information about the
firm, please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]

LONGEVERON INC: Bronstein, Gewirtz Reminds of November 12 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Longeveron Inc. ("Longeveron"
or the "Company") (NASDAQ: LGVN) and certain of its officers, on
behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise acquired: (a)
Longeveron Class A common stock pursuant and/or traceable to the
Offering Documents (defined below) issued in connection with the
Company's initial public offering conducted on or about February
12, 2021 (the "IPO" or "Offering"); and/or (b) Longeveron
securities between February 12, 2021 and August 12, 2021, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). Such investors are encouraged to join this
case by visiting the firm's site: www.bgandg.com/lgvn.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the manufacturing facility of ROLONTIS (eflapegrastim), a
long-acting granulocyte colony-stimulating factor for
chemotherapy-induced neutropenia, maintained deficient controls
and/or procedures; (2) the foregoing deficiencies decreased the
likelihood that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") would
approve the ROLONTIS Biologics License Application (the "ROLONTIS
BLA") in its current form; (3) Spectrum had therefore materially
overstated the ROLONTIS BLA's approval prospects; and (4) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/lgvn or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or
his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Nathanson of Bronstein,
Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in
Longeveron you have until November 12, 2021, to request that the
Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC is a corporate litigation
boutique. Our primary expertise is the aggressive pursuit of
litigation claims on behalf of our clients. In addition to
representing institutions and other investor plaintiffs in class
action security litigation, the firm's expertise includes general
corporate and commercial litigation, as well as securities
arbitration. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee
similar outcomes.[GN]

LOUNGE GROUP: Faces Suit Over Unpaid Wages for Restaurant Staff
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rolando Gutierrez at brownwhitelaw.com on July 15, 2021, a class
action lawsuit was initiated against various restaurant and bar
establishments owned or operated by Mario Marovic alleging wage
claims for:

Failure to Pay Minimum Wages.
Failure to Pay Overtime and Double Time Compensation;
Failure to Provide Meal Periods;
Failure to Provide Rest Periods;
Failure to Indemnify or Reimburse Business Expenses;
Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements;
Waiting Time Penalties; and
Unfair Competition and Unlawful Business Practices.

The lawsuit was filed in the Superior Court of California, County
of Orange, and is captioned Nicole Wheat v. Mario Marovic, et. al.,
Case No: 30-2021-01210986-CU-OE-CXC. A copy of the complaint can be
accessed here.

The class action lawsuit seeks to certify a class defined as:

"All current and former non-exempt employees who work or worked for
Lounge Group, Inc., The Balboa, LLC, Malarkey's Irish Pub, Inc.,
Orange Plaza Square, LLC, The Stag Bar, Inc., Muldoon's Pub, LLC,
Oceanfront Deli, Inc., Blackie's By The Sea, LLC, Orange Circle
Lounge, Inc., Newport Taco, LLC, Peninsula Restaurant Group, Inc.,
Newport Oceanfront, LLC, Cold Brew, LLC, Mariner's Restaurant, LLC,
100 North, LLC, Fullerton Lounge, Inc., Helmsman Ale House,
Malarky's Irish Pub, Stag Bar, Dory Deli, Muldoon's Irish Pub, Wild
Goose Tavern, Playa Mesa, The Country Club, Blackie's By The Sea,
The District Lounge Old Town Orange, Matador Cantina, 2j's Lounge,
Super Panga Taqueria, and/or Mario Marovic during the time-period
of July 15, 2017 to the present."

This class action lawsuit concerns numerous failures to compensate
non-exempt employees with overtime and/or double compensation for
work exceeding eight (8) hours per day and/or forty (40) hours per
week, as well as systemic meal and rest break violations.  The
lawsuit alleges that Mario Marovic owns and/or operates various
restaurant/bar establishments throughout the County of Orange.  In
an effort to circumvent the protections mandated under both the
California Labor Code and applicable Industrial Wage Orders, the
lawsuit alleges that Mario Marovic has concocted an elaborate
scheme whereby he creates numerous business entities that employ
non-exempt restaurant/bar employees to work at various
restaurant/bar establishments.  Each non-exempt employee is
required to sign a meal break waiver for each entity and works less
than five (5) hours a day per entity.  At the end of their 5-hour
shift, each employee is then required to travel to another
restaurant/bar establishment that is operated under a separate
business entity to work an additional five (5) hours. Thus, members
of the class work shifts exceeding eight (8) hours a day and/or
forty (40) hours a week without overtime or double time
compensation, and without being provided with statutorily required
meal or rest breaks.  But since each employee receive their payroll
checks under the name of each separate entity, Mario Marovic makes
it appear that each employee has worked no more than five (5) hours
per day despite having in fact worked more than eight (8) hours per
day, and thereby not paying his employees overtime compensation.

The class action lawsuit also alleges that under Mario Marovic's
unlawful business practices, the working conditions are
artificially created to be such that non-exempt employees, could
never take an uninterrupted meal or rest period. Under the guise of
an illegal and invalid meal break waiver, non-exempt employees are
denied their right to meal periods as mandated under the California
Labor Code and applicable Wage Orders, when they work in excess of
five (5) hours per shift, per entity, but less than six (6) hours.

Based on these allegations, this class action lawsuit seeks to
recover unpaid wages, premium wages for missed meal and rest
breaks, and other statutory penalties.  In addition to this class
action lawsuit, a claim under the California Private Attorney
General Act has been submitted to the California Labor and
Workforce Development Agency seeking civil penalties for these
Labor Code violations. [GN]

LUCKIN COFFEE: Banoon Putative Class Suit in Quebec Stayed
----------------------------------------------------------
Luckin Coffee Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 21, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the Superior Court of
Quebec has stayted the proceeding in the putative class action suit
initiated by Martin Banoon.

On or about April 14, 2020, an Application for Authorization to
Bring a Class Action was filed against Luckin Coffee Inc. by Martin
Banoon in the Superior Court of Quebec file no. 500-06-001058-201.


The Applicant seeks authorization to institute a class action on
behalf of the proposed class members comprised of holders of the
Company's American Depositary Shares (ADS), as a result of
Fabricated Transactions.

At the request of the Applicant, the Superior Court of Quebec
issued an order staying proceedings pending the Quebec Court of
Appeal's decision in an unrelated class action that is expected to
address jurisdictional defenses similar to those that Luckin Coffee
Inc. may raise in the Banoon class action.

Based in China, Luckin Coffee Inc. has pioneered a
technology-driven retail network to provide coffee and other
products of high quality, high affordability, and high convenience
to customers. Empowered by big data analytics, AI, and proprietary
technologies, the Company pursues its mission to be part of
everyone's everyday life, starting with coffee.



LUCKIN COFFEE: Putative Securities Class Suit Underway in New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
Luckin Coffee Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 21, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated putative securities class action suit
entitled, In re Luckin Coffee Inc. Securities Litigation,
651939/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).

On May 26, 2020, June 18, 2020, and June 23, 2020, putative
securities class actions complaints were filed in the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, County of New York, against the Company,
certain of its current and former directors and executives, and the
underwriters of the Company's initial public offering and follow-on
offering.

The lawsuits variously alleged that the company made false and
misleading statements and material omissions in its prior
registration statements and other public statements by failing to
disclose the Fabricated Transactions disclosed in the Company's
April 2, 2020 announcement, and the impact of those Fabricated
Transactions on the company's financial statements, in violation of
Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act.

On October 16, 2020, the court appointed co-lead plaintiffs and
consolidated the lawsuits under the caption In re Luckin Coffee
Inc. Securities Litigation, 651939/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).

A consolidated amended complaint was filed on December 23, 2020,
adding claims against investment vehicles owned by former officers
and directors of the Company and the Company's agent for service of
process, Cogency Global Inc.

The amended complaint also asserted claims under the Securities Act
on behalf of a class of purchasers of convertible senior notes
issued by Luckin in January 2020.

On March 30, 2021, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court issued an order
recognizing the Company's Cayman Proceeding as a foreign main
proceeding and imposing an automatic stay of litigation in the
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. against Luckin or its assets
in the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., to the extent provided
in section 362 of title 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

Based in China, Luckin Coffee Inc. has pioneered a
technology-driven retail network to provide coffee and other
products of high quality, high affordability, and high convenience
to customers. Empowered by big data analytics, AI, and proprietary
technologies, the Company pursues its mission to be part of
everyone's everyday life, starting with coffee.


LUCKIN COFFEE: Term Sheet Entered to Settle Securities Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Luckin Coffee Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 21, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company entered into
a binding term sheet with the lead plaintiffs in the provisionally
certified class action In re Luckin Coffee Inc. Securities
Litigation, Case No.1:20-cv-01293-JPC-JLC  (SDNY)

On February 13, 2020, April 2, 2020, April 8, 2020, and April 10,
2020, putative securities class action complaints were filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern and Southern Districts
of New York against the Company, certain of its current and former
directors and executives, and the underwriters of the Company's
initial public offering and follow-on offering.

These lawsuits have been consolidated in the Southern District of
New York, under the caption In re Luckin Coffee Inc. Securities
Litigation, 1:20-cv- 01293 (S.D.N.Y.).

On June 12, 2020, the court appointed co-lead plaintiffs pursuant
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and ordered
the lawsuits consolidated. A consolidated class action complaint
was filed on September 24, 2020 that alleges, among other things,
that the company made false and misleading statements and material
omissions in its prior registration statements and other public
statements by failing to disclose the Fabricated Transactions
disclosed in the Company's April 2, 2020 announcement, and the
impact of those Fabricated Transactions on the company's financial
statements.

The consolidated class action complaint variously alleges
violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and Sections 11 and
15 of the Securities Act for a putative class of ADS holders in the
period between May 17, 2019 and April 1, 2020.

The Company filed a motion to dismiss a portion of the claims on
November 24, 2020. On March 5, 2021, the court entered an Order
provisionally certifying the class for settlement purposes.

On March 30, 2021, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court issued an order
recognizing the proceeding in the Cayman Court with proceeding
number FSD 157 of 2020 as a foreign main proceeding and imposing an
automatic stay of litigation in the territorial jurisdiction of the
U.S. against Luckin or its assets in the territorial jurisdiction
of the U.S., to the extent provided in section 362 of title 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

Notice was disseminated to the class and the deadline to opt out of
the class action was September 17, 2021.

On September 20, 2021, the company entered into a binding term
sheet with the lead plaintiffs in the provisionally certified class
action In re Luckin Coffee Inc. Securities Litigation, Case
No.1:20-cv-01293-JPC-JLC  (SDNY) to fully resolve all claims that
have been or could be filed on behalf of the provisionally
certified class of purchasers Company's American Depositary Shares
(ADS) between May 17, 2019 through July 15, 2020, inclusive.

Pursuant to the Term Sheet, the settlement is subject to entering
into definitive documentation and obtaining approvals from the U.S.
Court overseeing the class action and the Cayman Court, which has
oversight of the provisional liquidation of the Company.

The Term Sheet provides that the U.S. class action settlement
amount will be calculated based on a Global Settlement Amount of
$187.5 million, which will be reduced on a pro-rata basis based on
the valid opt-out notices received pursuant to the U.S. Court's
prior order approving dissemination of a notice of pendency.

The final report of valid opt out notices received will be provided
to the U.S. Court on or before October 8, 2021.

Based in China, Luckin Coffee Inc. has pioneered a
technology-driven retail network to provide coffee and other
products of high quality, high affordability, and high convenience
to customers. Empowered by big data analytics, AI, and proprietary
technologies, the Company pursues its mission to be part of
everyone's everyday life, starting with coffee.


LUXOTTICA OF AMERICA: Goldstein's 1st Amended Complaint Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JASON GOLDSTEIN, Plaintiff v. LUXOTTICA OF AMERICA
INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-80546-CIV-Cannon-Reinhart (S.D. Fla.),
Judge Aileen M. Cannon of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, West Palm Beach Division, granted the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Class
Action Complaint filed on May 17, 2021.

On Aug. 4, 2021, the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge
Bruce E. Reinhart for a Report and Recommendation on any
dispositive matters. On Aug. 27, 2021, Judge Reinhart issued a
Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the Motion be
granted. The R&R states that the parties will file any objections
within fourteen days of the date of service of the R&R. The
Plaintiff timely filed an Objection to the R&R on Sept. 7, 2021.

Judge Cannon has conducted a de novo review of the R&R, the
Plaintiff's Objection, and the record in the case and is otherwise
fully advised in the premises. Upon review, the Judge finds the R&R
to be well reasoned and correct. She, therefore, agrees with the
analysis in the R&R and concludes that the Motion should be granted
for the reasons set forth therein.

Accordingly, Judge Cannon adopted the R&R. She granted the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the Plaintiff's First
Amended Class Action Complaint with prejudice.

The Clerk of Court will close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/taar78mc from Leagle.com.


MACYS.COM LLC: Faces Salazar Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
-----------------------------------------------------------------
VIVIAN SALAZAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MACYS.COM, LLC, an Ohio limited liability
company; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:21-at-00868 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 15, 2021) arises from the
Defendants' failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
website, https://www.macys.com, to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or visually
impaired people, in violation of the Americans With Disabilities
Act and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Ms. Salazar alleges that the Defendants had engaged in acts of
intentional discrimination due to the inaccessibility of its
website, and seeks a permanent injunction to cause Defendants to
change its corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
its website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually
impaired consumers.

Macys.com, Inc. provides television, catalog, and mail order
products distribution services. The Company offers apparels, shoes,
and accessories for men, women, and children.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          Binyamin Manoucheri, Esq.
          Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  binyamin@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com

MADAME PAULETTE: Brown Appeals Court Ruling in Labor Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs BENJAMIN BROWN, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit Benjamin Brown, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. John Mahdessian,
and Madame Paulette Lic, LLC, Madame Paulette Valet Services, Inc.,
MME Paulette Dry Cleaners of 65th St. Inc., all d/b/a Madame
Paulette, Case No. 154606/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit seeks to
recover unlawful deductions, unlawful charges, unlawful kickback of
wages, and unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation under New
York Labor Law.

The Defendants are in the business of providing specialty services
including green cleaning, climate controlled vault storage,
destination valet and closet concierge services.   

The appellate case is captioned as BENJAMIN BROWN et al. v. JOHN
MAHDESSIAN et al., Case No. 2021-03377, in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York Appellate Division, First Judicial Department,
filed on Sept. 14, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Respondents John Mahdessian, MADAME PAULETTE LIC, LLC,
MADAME PAULETTE VALET SERVICES, INC., MME PAULETTE DRY CLEANERS OF
65TH ST. INC., all d/b/a MADAME PAULETTE and related or affiliated
entities are represented by:

          Joshua Samuel Androphy, Esq.
          Lawrence F. Morrison, Esq.
          MORRISON + TENENBAUM, PLLC
          87 Walker St.
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (212) 620-0938

MED-DATA INC: Gives Enough Reply to Show Cause Order in C.C. Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, C.C., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MED-DATA INCORPORATED, Defendant,
Case No. 21-2301-DDC-GEB (D. Kan.), Judge Daniel D. Crabtree of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas issued a Memorandum
and Order holding that Med-Data's Response to Notice and Order to
Show Cause alleges sufficient details about the parties'
citizenship.

The Order stems from the Defendant's Response to Notice and Order
to Show Cause. For now, the parties have alleged enough about their
citizenship to reassure the Court that it has discharged its
obligation to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction is proper.
But also, the Court writes on this topic to communicate several key
aspects of the decision that deserve the Plaintiff and the
Defendant's attention.

First, and for now, Judge Crabtee accepts as sufficient the
Defendant's Response to Notice and Order to Show Cause. He finds
that this filing alleges and clarifies that the "Defendant is a
citizen of Washington and Texas" because it "is incorporated under
the laws of Washington State and maintains its principal place of
business in Texas." A corporation's citizenship -- for purposes of
the diversity jurisdiction analysis -- is determined by the
entity's state of incorporation and principal place of business.
So, the Judge holds that the Defendant's assertion suffices.

Second, and for present purposes only, Judge Crabtree accepts as
sufficient the Defendant's assertion in the Response that "upon
information and belief the Plaintiff is domiciled and therefore a
citizen of the state of Kansas." The Judge finds that the Defendant
evidently bases its allegation on the Plaintiff's state court
Petition, which alleges that the Plaintiff is a Kansas citizen. For
individuals, diversity jurisdiction turns on citizenship. See
generally 28 U.S.C. Section 1332. Citizenship determinations are
based on an individual's domicile. This allegation suffices to show
that the Plaintiff is a citizen of a state other than Washington
and Texas, where the Defendant is a citizen for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction.

Third, Judge Crabtree notes, however, several factual
irregularities in the parties' papers. And, the Judge directs the
parties to heed these details and take swift action if needed.
Specifically, the same passage of the Petition on which the
Defendant relies for its allegation about the Plaintiff's Kansas
citizenship also contains factual allegations which it denies. That
is, the Plaintiff's state court Petition alleges that "both the
Plaintiff and the Defendant are citizens of the State of Kansas."

The Defendant denies that it is a Kansas citizen. But it accepts as
true the other half of the same sentence because this detail
involves an allegation that the Plaintiff has made about herself.
Also, the Petition states that the Plaintiff resides in Kansas. And
the Court's Show Cause Order explained the problem with the
Defendant relying on this allegation as a basis for alleging
diversity jurisdiction.

Judge Crabtree explains why these details could matter. He says,
the lawsuit arises under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA). The Circuit has expressed a strict view about diversity
jurisdiction determinations in the context of CAFA's so-called
"home-state exception." Specifically, the Circuit has explained,
this "exception requires a district court to decline jurisdiction
if two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens
of the State in which the action was originally filed." And, the
Circuit has "rejected the applicability of a rebuttable presumption
of citizenship in the context of a CAFA exception invoked based on
the mere allegation of residence."

The Defendant contends it is diverse from Plaintiff for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. And its papers, to a limited extent anyway,
support this premise. These same details, according to the
Defendant's Notice of Removal, show that CAFA's home-state
exception doesn't apply in the case. But once before, Judge
Crabtree noted that the Plaintiff's Petition wasn't entirely clear
about the distinction between residence and domicile, which in turn
might create downstream jurisdictional problems for the Defendant's
Notice of Removal.

The Plaintiff hasn't filed anything with the Court suggesting she
disagrees with the Defendant's removal of the action. But if the
Plaintiff wishes to challenge removal, Judge Crabtree directs the
Plaintiff to move swiftly. As explained already, the Judge has an
independent obligation to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction
exists. And, he also must oblige CAFA's jurisdictional exceptions.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Crabtree orders that Defendant
Med-Data's Response to Notice and Order to Show Cause alleges
sufficient details about the parties' citizenship -- for the time
being and for the limited purpose of alleging diversity subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332.

Judge Crabtree further directed the Plaintiff to submit any papers
contesting his finding within 30 days of the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3azee7xh from Leagle.com.


MICHIGAN: Smith Files Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
--------------------------------------------------------
Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in his prisoner civil rights case captioned Smith #267009 v.
Probable Cause Conference Director et al., Case No.
1:21-cv-00794-SJB, in the U. S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan on Sept. 13, 2021.

The docket names as Petitioner Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith and all
37,000 prisoners that are currently/similarly situated at the
Muskegon Correctional Facility in Michigan.

The Respondents are Probable Cause Conference Director, 83 County
Chief Circuit Court Judges, James Schiebner Warden, 83 County
Prosecutors for Michigan, State Court Administrators Probable Cause
Conference Supervisor, Kim L. Worthy Wayne County Prosecutor, 83
County District Court Judges, 83 County Magistrate Judges, 83
County Prison Wardens, Heidi Washington MDOC Director.

Petitioner Derrick Lee Cardello-Smith appears pro se.[BN]

MISSOURI: AG Looks to Add Schools to CPS Lawsuit Over Mask Mandate
------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephanie Southey at columbiamissourian.com reports that Missouri
Attorney General Eric Schmitt announced he wants to add more
schools to his current lawsuit that challenges Columbia Public
Schools' mask mandate.

In a news release, Schmitt said he filed for class certification
and a preliminary injunction in the lawsuit against the district,
which was originally filed Aug. 24.

If the class certification is granted, it would apply to all public
school districts in the state that have a mask policy. If the
injunction is granted, mask mandates would be halted at public
schools that require them.

"Forcing children to wear masks in school all day long flies in the
face of science and could hinder crucial development by eliminating
facial cues and expressions," Schmitt said in the news release. "We
filed this case because we fundamentally don't believe in forced
masking, rather that parents and families should have the power to
make decisions on masks, based on science and facts. We plan to
continue to aggressively litigate this case moving forward."

The CDC recommends universal indoor masking by all students (age 2
and older), staff, teachers and visitors to K-12 schools,
regardless of vaccination status.

The original reverse class action lawsuit against Columbia Public
Schools names the district, the Columbia Board of Education, board
members and Superintendent Brian Yearwood as defendants.

The lawsuit includes three counts, including that "mandates are
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and that the mask mandate is
unlawful as to school children." It also says the mandate was not
approved by the Missouri Board of Education.

CPS issued a statement shortly after the lawsuit was announced in
August, in which it said the lawsuit would "waste taxpayer dollars
and resources which are better spent investing in our students."
The district also said it "intends to aggressively defend its
decision to keep its community and its scholars safe."

In addition to CPS, Harrisburg R-VII, Jefferson City School
District and Southern Boone Elementary have mask mandates in some
capacity.

The class action motion says this class action would cover at least
50 school districts across the state and "hundreds of school
officials." [GN]

NATIONAL GENERAL: Dismissal of Tacoma South's Claims Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TACOMA SOUTH HOSPITALITY, LLC, and all others
similarly situated throughout Washington State and the United
States of America, Appellants v. NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, an insurance company, and INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, an insurance company, Respondents, Case No. 55168-3-II
(Wash. App.), the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two,
affirms the trial court's order granting Integon's motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Tacoma South's claims.

Background

Tacoma South filed an action under the Consumer Protection Act
(CPA) against Integon National Insurance Co. and National General
Insurance Co. (collectively Integon) after Integon's insured
collided into a pylon sign advertising Tacoma South's hotel.

Cristian Altamirano was a guest staying in a hotel owned by Tacoma
South. On the day of the collision, there had been a heavy
snowfall, and the parking lot of the hotel was covered in
accumulated ice and snow. As Altamirano pulled into the hotel
parking lot, he lost control of his car and collided into the
hotel's pylon sign.

Mr. Altamirano was insured by National, which is underwritten by
its member, Integon. Altamirano's policy with Integon carried a
property damage policy limit of $10,000.

Tacoma South submitted a repair estimate of $12,769 for the damaged
sign to Integon. An adjuster for Integon responded by informing
Tacoma South that there was a policy limit issue because the
property damage coverage was limited to $10,000, and he advised
Tacoma South to contact its insurer so that Integon could arrange a
settlement with Tacoma South's insurer. Tacoma South declined to
involve its own insurer, stating that its insurer advised it to
deal directly with Integon.

Thereafter, Integon offered Tacoma South $10,000 to pay the claim.
Before it would issue a check, Integon required Tacoma South to
sign a liability release as to any further claims against either
Integon or Altamirano. When Tacoma South indicated that it would
not sign the release, Integon explained that it could not pay more
than $10,000 because of the policy limit.

Tacoma South retained an attorney to handle the claim and
negotiations moving forward. Through its attorney, Tacoma South
asserted that it did not seek more than $10,000 from Integon, but
because Tacoma South believed Altamirano was liable, it did not
want to release him from liability for damages above policy limits.
Integon explained that because it owed a duty to its insured, it
would not agree to issue its payment without the release. In
addition, Integon clarified that requiring the release was a
standard practice in settling claims that exceed property damage
policy limits. An excerpt from Integon's claims handling manual
instructs adjusters to require releases in property damage policy
limits cases.

In two emails sent during the settlement discussion, Integon
offered to contact Altamirano to determine whether Altamirano would
agree to pay the claimed damages above the policy limits. Tacoma
South did not directly respond to Integon's proposals to settle the
matter by making an arrangement with Altamirano for the excess
damages. Instead, Tacoma South declined to sign the release and
filed suit alleging that Integon violated the CPA. After Tacoma
South filed the CPA suit, Integon contacted Tacoma South confirming
that Altamirano agreed to pay excess damages and was hoping to
devise a payment schedule.

Tacoma South filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial court
judge and vacation of several adverse orders on the grounds that
the trial judge's partiality could reasonably be questioned
following his alleged surreptitious contact with Integon. Tacoma
South also argued that the trial judge covertly changed the record
because Tacoma South accessed the same electronic system several
days later, but the outcome designation changed to state "Ex-Parte
w/o Order Held."

Integon denied having any ex parte contact with the trial judge.
Integon explained that the entry was likely due to several filings
it submitted electronically on the same date as the alleged ex
parte contact. The trial court found that based on "objective and
subjective evidence," the trial judge did not engage in an ex parte
contact with Integon. The trial court denied Tacoma South's motion
for recusal.

Thereafter, Tacoma South filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, arguing that it established each necessary element of its
CPA claim based on Integon's violations of regulations that govern
unfair claims settlement practices in insurance, and that it was
entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. The only
remaining issue to resolve, Tacoma South argued, was damages. The
trial court denied Tacoma South's motion for partial summary
judgment.

Integon also filed a motion for summary judgment. In ruling on the
motion for summary judgment, the trial court considered Integon's
motion and attached declarations and exhibits, Tacoma South's
response, and Integon's reply and attached declarations and
exhibits. The trial court granted Integon's motion, dismissing
Tacoma South's claims. Tacoma South appeals.

Discussion

Tacoma South argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its
CPA claim by denying its motion for partial summary judgment and
granting Integon's motion for summary judgment. Tacoma South
alleged that the insurers engaged in an unfair claims settlement
practice by conditioning payment on Tacoma South's agreement to
release the insured from liability for excess damages. In addition,
Tacoma South argues that the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied its motion seeking recusal of the trial court judge,
delayed ruling on class certification until after it decided
Integon's motion for summary judgment, and when it denied its
motions to compel discovery.

The Court of Appeals holds that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the motion seeking recusal. It further
holds that because Tacoma South has not provided an adequate record
for it to review the trial court's order granting Integon's motion
for summary judgment, it cannot review that error. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals does not reach Tacoma South's assignment of error
regarding the trial court's order denying its motion for partial
summary judgment. Finally, the Court of Appeals holds that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it deferred ruling on
Tacoma South's motion for class certification, or when it denied
Tacoma South's motions to compel discovery pending the parties'
motions for a protective order.

Conclusion

With regard to Tacoma South's motions seeking recusal of the trial
judge and vacation of the trial judge's rulings, the Court of
Appeals holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because there was insufficient evidence of nefarious ex parte
contact to cause a reasonable person to question the trial court's
partiality. Because Tacoma South failed to set forth an adequate
record to allow us to review the trial court's order granting
Integon's motion for summary judgment on the merits, the Court of
Appeals holds that the trial court's order stands.

In addition, the Court of Appeals holds that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it reserved ruling on Tacoma South's
motion for class certification prior to deciding Integon's motion
for summary judgment. Finally, it holds that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in managing discovery when the trial court
deferred resolving the discovery dispute until it was presented
with a motion for a protective order.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2d2ybys4 from Leagle.com.

Seth Michael Reynolds, Attorney at Law, 980 Lancaster Rd., in
Selah, Washington 98942-9499, Counsel for the Appellant(s).

Clifford J. Wilson -- cwilson@smithfreed.com -- Smith Freed
Eberhard PC, 111 SW Columbia St., Ste. 800, in Portland, Oregon
97201-5813, Matthew Robert Taylor, Attorney at Law, 15610 SE 12th
St., in Vancouver, Washington 98683-8969, Counsel for the
Respondent(s).


NATIONAL RUGBY: Concussion Lawsuit Resolved in Knights' Favour
--------------------------------------------------------------
espn.com reports that James McManus' $1 million concussion claim
against Newcastle has ended without any compensation after the case
was resolved in the NRL club's favour.

McManus' four-year legal battle was settled, two days before a NSW
Supreme Court hearing was meant to commence for the former Knights
winger.

"The claim brought by James McManus against the Newcastle Knights,
which was managed by the NRL, has been finalised with the NSW
Supreme Court ordering judgment for the Knights," an NRL statement
read.

"The NRL is pleased that this long-running matter has been resolved
in the Knights' favour.

"The NRL was confident in its defence of the claim under the Civil
Liability Act and we are pleased that the matter could be resolved
without further cost and expense for all parties."

McManus was the first player to take serious legal action against
the sport over concussion, after the landmark $US1 billion class
action against the NFL in the USA in 2015.

The former NSW State of Origin flyer launched action in 2017 over
the Knights' handlings of concussions late in his career, with his
lawyers arguing he suffered several in 2015.

He played his last NRL game in round 20 of that season, before
retiring the following August.

It prompted his legal team to claim he'd missed out on more than
$700,000 in wages that would have come later in his career, as well
as claims for other medical costs.

In an early court hearing in 2017, Justice Ian Harrison had
described how McManus had planned to sue the Knights for allegedly
breaching its duty of care to him by continually exposing him to
the risk of concussion and failing to monitor or assess him
properly.

"He also contends that he should have been warned of the risks of
playing when concussed or doing so when recovering from concussion
but that he was not," Justice Harrison said at the time.

McManus' statement of claim detailed a number of ongoing
disabilities including cognitive impairment, impairment of memory,
mood swings, headaches, anxiety, depression, lethargy and sleep
disturbance.

But in a defence filed by the Knights at the time, the club had
claimed the risk to McManus was "obvious" and any claim should be
waived.

The most recent news means the NRL's concussion protocols will not
be contested in court.

It could also have a further impact on players considering taking
action against the game and its clubs over the handling of
concussion cases. [GN]

NCAA: Morrison Suit Transferred to N.D. Illinois
------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Mary Elizabeth Morrison, Richard Morrison,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association, Case No. 3:21-cv-00635,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois on Sept. 20, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:21-cv-04941 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Personal Injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association --
https://www.ncaa.org/ -- is a non-profit organization which
regulates athletes of 1,268 North American institutions and
conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA, LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: (713) 554-9099
          Fax: (713) 554-9098
          Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NETFLIX INC: Appeals Remand Order in Gwinnett Cty. Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Defendants NETFLIX, INC., et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled Gwinnett County, Georgia, et
al., Plaintiffs v. Netflix, Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No.
1:21-cv-00021-MLB, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 12, 2021, the
lawsuit was removed from the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, to
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on
Jan. 4, 2021. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:21-cv-00021-MLB to the proceeding.

On November 23, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory
judgment and other relief against Defendants in Gwinnett County
Superior Court alleging Defendants are video service providers
under the Television Act but have failed to comply with its
requirements.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's Order dated August
5, 2021, denying as moot their motion to stay and granting
Plaintiffs' motion to remand to State Court to the Superior Court
of Gwinnett County, Georgia.

The appellate case is captioned as Gwinnett County, Georgia, et al.
v. Neflix, Inc., et al., Case No. 21-13111, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed on Sept. 7, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- The appellant's brief is due on or before October 18, 2021;

   -- The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of
the appellant's brief;

   -- Appellant's Certificate of Interested Persons was due
September 21, 2021 as to Appellant DIRECTV, LLC; and

   -- Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
before October 5, 2021 as to Appellee City of Brookhaven,
Georgia.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants NETFLIX, INC., HULU, LLC, DISNEY DTC LLC,
DIRECTV, LLC, DISH NETWORK CORP., and DISH NETWORK, LLC are
represented by:

          Mary Rose Alexander, Esq.
          Robert C. Collins, III, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP
          330 N Wabash Ave Ste 2800
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Telephone: (312) 876-7700

               - and -

          Michael S. French, Esq.
          Tiffany Nicole Watkins, Esq.
          WARGO & FRENCH, LLP
          999 Peachtree St NE Fl 26
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 853-1563

               - and -

          John P. Jett, Esq.
          Ava J. Conger, Esq.
          John P. Jett, Esq.
          James Henry Walker, Esq.
          KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON, LLP
          1100 Peachtree St Ste 2800
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 815-6500

               - and -

          Jean A. Pawlow, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP
          555 11th St NW Ste 1000
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 637-2200

               - and -

          Victor Jih, Esq.
          WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI - CA
          633 W Fifth St Ste 1550
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (323) 210-2900

               - and -

          Eric Kohan, Esq.
          WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, PC
          650 Page Mill Rd
          Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
          Telephone: (650) 493-9300

               - and -

          Stephen Thomas LaBriola, Esq.
          Derek Schwahn, Esq.
          FELLOWS LABRIOLA, LLP
          225 Peachtree St NE Ste 2300
          Atlanta, GA 30303
          Telephone: (404) 586-2029

               - and -

          Jared R. Butcher, Esq.
          CROSSCASTLE LLC
          1701 Pennsylvania Ave NW Ste 200
          WASHINGTON, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 960-5800

               - and -

          John H. Elliott, Esq.
          William James Holley, II, Esq.
          Scott Zweigel, Esq.
          PARKER HUDSON RAINER & DOBBS, LLP
          303 Peachtree St NE Ste 3600
          Atlanta, GA 30308
          Telephone: (404) 523-5300

               - and -

          Matthew R. Friedman, Esq.
          Pantelis Michalopoulos, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP
          1330 Connecticut Ave NW
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 429-6255

Plaintiffs-Appellees GWINNETT COUNTY, GEORGIA; CITY OF BROOKHAVEN,
GEORGIA; and UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY, GEORGIA,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Robert L. Ashe, III, Esq.
          Jennifer L. Peterson, Esq.
          Timothy Scot Rigsbee, Esq.
          BONDURANT MIXSON & ELMORE, LLP
          1201 W Peachtree St NW Ste 3900
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 881-4169

               - and -

          Steven M. Berezney, Esq.
          Garrett R. Broshuis, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
          505 N 7th St Ste 3600
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 241-4844

NEUTROGENA CORP: Dickerson Slams Toxic Benzene in Sunscreen
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rebecca Dickerson, Ryan Dickerson, Jerl Dickerson and Charity
Dickerson, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals and entities, Plaintiffs, v. Johnson &
Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. and Neutrogena
Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-07230 (C.D. Cal., September
9, 2021), seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable
relief to enjoin and prevent Defendants from continuing to market
and sell sunscreen that may be adulterated with benzene, and
requiring Defendants to provide a full refund of the purchase price
of the sunscreen products for breach of express and implied
warranty, fraud and unjust enrichment.

Neutrogena Corp. is a subsidiary of the Johnson & Johnson
conglomerate and is one of the world's leading brands of skin care
hair care and cosmetics. It distributes its products, including
Neutrogena sunscreen products, throughout the United States.

Plaintiffs allege that several of the Neutrogena sunscreen products
have been independently tested and shown to be adulterated with
benzene, a known human carcinogen. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Roy T. Willey, IV, Esq.
      Eric M. Poulin, Esq.
      Blake G. Abbott, Esq.
      Jarrett W. Withrow, Esq.
      ANASTOPOULO LAW FIRM LLC
      32 Ann Street
      Charleston, SC 29403
      Tel: (843) 614-8888
      Fax: (843) 494-5536
      Email: roy@akimlawfirm.com
             eric@akimlawfirm.com
             blake@akimlawfirm.com
             jarrett@akimlawfirm.com


NEW MEXICO: Valdez Appeals Denial of Bid for Restraining Order
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs TALISHA VALDEZ and JENNIFER BLACKFORD filed an appeal
from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled Talisha Valdez,
Jennifer Blackford, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated v. Michelle Lujan Grisham, David Scrase, Officially and
Individually, Acting under the Color of Law, Case No.
1:21-cv-00783-MV-JHR, in the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico - Albuquerque.

Ms. Grisham is sued in her official capacity as Governor of New
Mexico.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, the original lawsuit was
filed on Aug. 19, two days after the Governor's new public health
order was announced. But a lot has changed in the last two weeks,
and that is highlighted in the governors' response to the lawsuit.

Plaintiff, Talisha Valdez, is the Union County extension agent and
a mom of two daughters who entered their 4-H animals in the State
Fair. According to the lawsuit, Valdez and her daughters are not
vaccinated and because of the health order, they cannotcparticipate
in the fair. Even if they wanted to get vaccinated, court documents
point out there is not enough time, "If a child receives their
first shot on Aug.18, that child is not fully vaccinated and able
to enter the New Mexico State Fair Grounds until September 22,
which is 3 days after the New Mexico State Fair ends."

Valdez said her daughters have spent at least 150 hours working
with their animals and spent over $9,000 to prepare for the fair.
Court documents said more than 35 families are in the same
position.

The original filing also points out that the state can't mandate a
vaccine that is not FDA approved under the Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act saying, "Where a medical product is 'unapproved' then
no one may be mandated to take it." Because of this, they are
saying they are being discriminated against and asking for a
temporary restraining order, as well as relief and damages –
saying the public health order is unconstitutional.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the Court's Memorandum Opinon
and Order dated Sep. 13, 2021, denying Plaintiffs' requests for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, as set
forth in Plaintiffs' Verified Class Action Complaint for Civil
Rights Violations Under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983; Violations of
Rights Protected by the New Mexico Civil Rights Act; Emergency
Request for a Temporary Restraining Order; and Request for
Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunctive Relief and Damages.

The appellate case is captioned as Valdez, et al. v. Lujan Grisham,
et al., Case No. 21-2105, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, filed on Sept. 15, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Docketing statement is due on Sept. 29, 2021 for Jennifer
Blackford and Talisha Valdez;

   -- Transcript order form is due on Sept. 29, 2021 for Talisha
Valdez; and

   -- Notice of appearance is due on Sept. 29, 2021 for Jennifer
Blackford, Michelle Lujan Grisham, David Scrase, and Talisha
Valdez. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants TALISHA VALDEZ, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated; and JENNIFER BLACKFORD, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, are represented by:

          A. Blair Dunn, Esq.
          WESTERN AGRICULTURE, RESOURCE AND
           BUSINESS ADVOCATES, LLP
          400 Gold Ave SW, Suite 1000
          Albuquerque, NM 87102

Defendants-Appellees MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, Officially and
individually, acting under the color of law; and DAVID SCRASE,
officially and individually, acting under the color of law, are
represented by:

          Holly Agajanian, Esq.
          Kyle P. Duffy, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
          490 Old Santa Fe Trail, Suite 400
          Santa Fe, NM 87501
          Telephone: (505) 476-2200

NIGHTHAWK SECURITY: Newby Files FLSA Suit in W.D. Kentucky
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nighthawk Security
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Curtis Newby, on Behalf of
Himself and All Others Similarly-Situated v. Nighthawk Security
Company, LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-00099-JHM-HBB (W.D. Ky., Sept. 21,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Nighthawk Security Company LLC -- https://nighthawksecurityco.com/
-- is a privately-owned security firm founded in Owensboro,
Kentucky who provide Armed and Unarmed Security Officer services in
the Midwest and Southeast regions of the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark N. Foster, Esq.
          P.O. Box 869
          Madisonville, KY 42431
          Phone: (270) 213-1303
          Fax: (270) 821-3158
          Email: mfoster@marknfoster.com


NUTANIX INC: NFLT Appointed as Lead Plaintiff in Options Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Nutanix, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 21, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2021, that the court appointed the
Norton Family Living Trust UAD 11/15/2002 as the lead plaintiff in
the Options Class Action.

Beginning on March 29, 2019, several purported securities class
actions were filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against the company and two of its
officers.

The initial complaints generally alleged that the defendants made
false and misleading statements in violation of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.

In July 2019, the court consolidated the actions into a single
action, and appointed a lead plaintiff, who then filed a
consolidated amended complaint (the "Original Complaint"). The
action was brought on behalf of those who purchased or otherwise
acquired our stock between November 30, 2017 and May 30, 2019,
inclusive.

The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Original
Complaint, which the court granted on March 9, 2020, while
providing the lead plaintiff leave to amend.

On April 17, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint (the "Current Complaint"), again naming the company and
two of its officers as defendants. The Current Complaint alleges
the same class period, includes many of the same factual
allegations as the Original Complaint, and again alleges that the
defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act,
as well as SEC Rule 10b-5.

The Current Complaint seeks monetary damages in an unspecified
amount.

On September 11, 2020, the court denied the company's motion to
dismiss the Current Complaint and held that the lead plaintiff
adequately stated a claim with respect to certain statements
regarding our new customer growth and sales productivity.

On January 27, 2021, lead plaintiff, Shimon Hedvat, filed a motion
to (i) withdraw as lead plaintiff and (ii) substitute proposed new
lead plaintiffs and approve their appointment of a new co-lead
counsel. On March 1, 2021, the court granted the lead plaintiff's
motion to withdraw as lead plaintiff but denied without prejudice
his motion to substitute proposed new lead plaintiffs.

The court also reopened the lead plaintiff selection process,
allowing any putative class member interested in serving as the new
lead plaintiff to file a lead plaintiff application. Following the
lead plaintiff selection hearing on April 28, 2021, on June 10,
2021 the court appointed California Ironworkers Field Pension Trust
as lead plaintiff and approved its appointment of counsel.

On May 28, 2021, one of the movants for lead plaintiff, John P.
Norton on behalf of the Norton Family Living Trust UAD 11/15/2002,
filed a separate class action complaint in the Northern District of
California on behalf of a class of persons or entities who
transacted in publicly traded call options and/or put options on
Nutanix stock during the period from November 30, 2017 and May 30,
2019, containing allegations substantively the same as those
alleged in the Current Complaint (the "Options Class Action").

On September 8, 2021, the court appointed the Norton Family Living
Trust UAD 11/15/2002 as the lead plaintiff in the Options Class
Action.

Nutanix said, "The litigation is still in the early stages, and we
plan to continue to vigorously defend against the allegations and
we are not able to determine what, if any, liabilities will attach
to the Current Complaint or the Options Class Action."

Nutanix, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, develops and
provides an enterprise cloud platform in North America, Europe, the
Asia Pacific, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. The
company was founded in 2009 and is headquartered in San Jose,
California.


NUTRIBULLET LLC: Faces Keepman Suit Over Defective Blenders
-----------------------------------------------------------
RACHEL ABIGGAIL KEEPMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NUTRIBULLET, LLC and CAPITAL
BRANDS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-02253-L (N.D. Tex.,
September 21, 2021) is a class action against the Defendants for
strict liability, negligent design defect, negligent failure to
warn, negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and breach of implied
warranty of merchantability.

According to the complaint, the Defendants are engaged in
designing, manufacturing, marketing and selling of defective
blenders under the NutriBullet and MagicBullet brand names. The
NutriBullet blenders are defectively designed and manufactured, in
that, the extremely fast-moving blade of the blenders heat the
contents of the sealed bullet-shaped canister, which can (and does)
unexpectedly explode when being used in its normal and intended
manner by consumers. Consumers use the NutriBullet blenders without
knowledge of the inherent risks. The Defendants knew or should have
known of these defects, but has nevertheless put profit ahead of
safety by continuing to sell its Nutribullet blenders to consumers,
failing to warn said consumers of the serious risks posed by the
defects, and failing to recall the dangerously defective
Nutribullet blenders regardless of the risk of significant injuries
to the Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers, the suit
alleges.

NutriBullet, LLC is a manufacturer of blenders, with its principal
place of business in Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, California.

Capital Brands, LLC is a consumer products manufacturer, with its
principal place of business in Los Angeles, Los Angeles County,
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Collen A. Clark, Esq.
         Jacob L. von Plonski, Esq.
         CLARK & MCCREA
         3500 Maple Avenue, Suite 1250
         Dallas, TX 75219
         Telephone: (214) 780-0500
         Facsimile: (214) 780-0501
         E-mail: eservice@clarkmccrea.com
                 jake@clarkmccrea.com

                  - and –

         Michael K. Johnson, Esq.
         Kenneth W. Pearson, Esq.
         Adam J. Kress, Esq.
         JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
         444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800
         Telephone: (612) 436-1800
         Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
         E-mail: mjohnson@johnsonbecker.com
                 kpearson@johnsonbecker.com
                 akress@johnsonbecker.com

NYE COUNTY, NV: Amended Whitesell Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN TONY WHITESELL, Plaintiff v. NYE COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-01209-APG-VCF (D.
Nev.), Magistrate Judge Cam Ferenbach of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada issued an order:

   a. granting Whitesell's motion for a copy of the amended
      complaint;

   b. granting Whitesell's application to proceed in forma
      pauperis;

   c. granting Whitesell's motion to amend complaint; and

   d. dismissing the Plaintiff's amended complaint without
      prejudice.

Background

The Plaintiff's filings present two questions: (1) whether
Whitesell may proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(e) and (2) whether Whitesell's complaint states a plausible
claim for relief.

I. Whether Whitesell May Proceed In Forma Pauperis

The Plaintiff has now filed his IFP application with his financial
certificate from the Nevada Department of Prisons as required by
the PLRA. He states that his average monthly deposits are about
$16, and his current balance is $0.41. Judge Ferenbach grants the
Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis.

II. Whether Whitesell's Complaint States a Plausible Claim

Because he grants Whitesell's application to proceed in forma
pauperis, Judge Ferenbach must review Whitesell's complaint to
determine whether the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a plausible claim. To state a claim under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must plead that the named defendant (1) acted "under
color of state law" and (2) "deprived the plaintiff of rights
secured by the Constitution or federal statutes."

In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L. Ed.
2d 253 (2005), the Wilkinson court found that a prisoner's "Section
1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) -- no matter the
relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target
of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or
internal prison proceedings) -- if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration."

Judge Ferenbach directs the clerk to send the Plaintiff a copy of
his proposed amended complaint. The Judge grants the Plaintiff's
motion to amend in part: The Judge will now screen his operative
complaint (the amended complaint at ECF No. 12-1). The Plaintiff is
currently incarcerated. His complaint is styled as a class-action
Section 1983 complaint against the Nye County Sheriff's Office and
Deputy Eric Anderson. The Plaintiff alleges that the defendants
violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when
he was unlawfully arrested and held in custody without probable
cause or due process.

Judge Ferenbach holds that the Plaintiff does not have standing to
bring a Section 1983 claim to challenge the alleged unlawful events
that led to his current confinement. The Plaintiff's claims
challenge the validity of his confinement due to lack of due
process and probable cause. He may raise these allegations in a
habeas corpus proceeding. This would require that the Plaintiff
file a habeas corpus petition and an in forma pauperis application
in a new action, meaning he may not file the petition for habeas
corpus in the action.

While a Section 1983 claim cannot be used to vacate convictions,
Judge Ferenbach holds that it can be used to "recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction." However, the "plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus." The Plaintiff gives no indication in his complaint that
his conviction has been challenged or overturned by any court.

Judge Ferenbach also holds that Whitesell fails to articulate a
claim or claims against the Defendants. It is possible that these
deficiencies may be cured through amendment. Whitesell's complaint
is dismissed without prejudice. Whitesell must file an amended
complaint explaining how the Court has jurisdiction over the
Defendants, the circumstances of the case, the relief Whitesell
seeks, and the law upon which he relies in bringing the case. The
amended complaint must be "complete in and of itself without
reference to the superseded pleading and must include copies of all
exhibits referred to in the proposed amended pleading.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, Judge Ferenbach granted Whitesell's
motion for a copy of the amended complaint. The Clerk of Court mail
a copy of the amended complaint to the Plaintiff. The Judge granted
Whitesell's application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Clerk of
Court will file the amended complaint. The Plaintiff's amended
complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

The Plaintiff has until Oct. 8, 2021 to file an amended complaint
addressing the issues discussed. Failure to timely file an amended
complaint that addresses the deficiencies noted in this Order may
result in a recommendation for dismissal with prejudice.
If the Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the Clerk of the Court
is directed not to issue summons on the amended complaint. Judge
Ferenbach will issue a screening order on the amended complaint and
address the issuance of summons at that time, if applicable.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y6bvyrnc from Leagle.com.


OCTAVIA ART: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Octavia Art and Film,
L.L.C. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Octavia Art and
Film, L.L.C., Case No. 1:21-cv-05208 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 20, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Octavia Art Gallery -- https://www.octaviaartgallery.com/ -- is a
sophisticated gallery who showcases contemporary fine artwork by
emerging & established global artists.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


OPTIONS HOME: Faces Mihocik Suit Over Unpaid Minimum and OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EVAN MIHOCIK, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs v. OPTIONS HOME SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:21-cv-04604-MHW-CMV (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 15, 2021) seeks
all available relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio
Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act for
Defendant's failure to pay proper minimum and overtime wages.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant on approximately
February 8, 2021, to work as a traveling caregiver and pro re nata
nurse.

Options Home Services, LLC is a non-medical home care provider in
Columbus, Ohio, that provides private duty caregiving services to
families living in the central Ohio area.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam L. Slone, Esq.
          BRIAN G. MILLER CO., L.P.A.
          250 West Old Wilson Bridge Road, Suite 270
          Worthington, OH 43085
          Telephone: (614) 221-4035
          Facsimile: (614) 987-7841
          E-mail: als@bgmillerlaw.com

               - and -

          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          Brian R. Noethlich, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH DEROSE WENTZ
           MCINERNEY PEIFER, LLP
          4200 Regent Street, Suite 210
          Columbus, OH 43219
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
                  bnoethlich@barkanmeizlish.com

PAULA CAREY: Budzyna Sues Over Safety of Hampden County Courthouse
------------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Budzyna and William Curtis, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. PAULA CAREY, in her
capacity as CHIEF JUSTICE OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT; JOHN
BELLO, in his capacity as COURT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
TRIAL COURTS; CHARLES O’BRIEN, in his capacity as DIRECTOR OF
FACILITIES MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL PLANNING DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT; and CAROL GLADSTONE, in her capacity as COMMISSIONER OF the
DIVISION OF CAPITAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, Case No. 3:21-cv-30093-MGM
(D. Mass., Sept. 8, 2021), arises out of a longstanding controversy
over the safety of the Roderick L. Ireland Courthouse in Hampden
County, one of the busiest courthouses in the Commonwealth.

According to the complaint, these controversies were previously
attempted to be resolved without litigation, but recent
environmental concerns and conduct by Defendants has forced
Plaintiffs to resort to Court intervention. There is a public
health and safety emergency at the Roderick L. Ireland Courthouse,
located 50 State Street, Springfield, Massachusetts, that has
rendered the courthouse constitutionally inadequate, thus requiring
this Court to order the immediate closure of the relocation1
Courthouse and emergency to another acceptable location in Hampden
County.

For at least the past decade, occupants of the Courthouse have
issued complaints about the poor environmental conditions. A number
of individuals who have worked at the Courthouse have developed
serious health issues. Employees at the Courthouse have received
inconsistent and conflicting information about the work done on the
FCUs, leading to continued concerns that the FCUs were not properly
cleaned. Additionally, the conditions at the Courthouse have only
deteriorated since the 2019 studies. When Court employees returned
to the Courthouse after the temporary COVID-19 shutdown, some
employees found clothing that had been left that building to be
covered in white mold.

On August 25, 2021, the continued environmental problems at the
Courthouse caused Hampden County District Attorney Anthony Gulluni
to evacuate his employees from the Courthouse until it was deemed
safe enough to return. The physical and mental pain and anguish
sustained by Plaintiffs and the Class includes but is not limited
to the following: a. fear that they could develop a health
condition due to the environmental conditions at the Courthouse; b.
fear that they are already suffering a health condition which was
caused by environmental conditions at the Courthouse; c. fear and
distrust that the Defendants will take the necessary steps to
correct the environmental conditions at the Courthouse; and d.
mental anguish of realizing over and over again that they were
subjected to unsafe and hazardous work conditions, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs live in Hampden County and works in Roderick L
Ireland Courthouse.

Paula Carey is named as a party in her capacity as the Chief
Justice for Administration and Management.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Laura D. Mangini, Esq.
          Robert A. DiTusa, Esq.
          Ryan E. Alekman, Esq.
          ALEKMAN DITUSA, LLC
          1550 Main Street, Suite 401
          Springfield, MA 01103
          Phone: (413) 781-0000
          Fax: (413) 827-0266
          Email: laura@alekmanditusa.com
                 robert@alekmanditusa.com
                 ryan@alekmanditusa.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Morneau, Esq.
          Chelsea Choi, Esq.
          CONNOR, MORNEAU & OLIN, LLP
          273 State Street, Second Floor
          Springfield, MA 01103
          Phone: (413) 455-1730
          Fax: (413) 455-1594
          Email: jmorneau@cmolawyers.com
                 cchoi@cmolawyers.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Kenefick, III, Esq.
          73 Chestnut Street
          Springfield, MA 01103
          Phone: (413) 734-7000
          Fax: (413) 731-1321
          Email: takenefick@takenefick.com


PEDIATRIC HOME: Bid to Certify Class in Berridge FLSA Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAKYA BERRIDGE, Plaintiff v. PEDIATRIC HOME
HEALTHCARE, LLC, THOMAS C. WHEAT, Defendants, Case No.
SA-20-CV-01025-XR (W.D. Tex.), Judge Xavier Rodriguez of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio
Division, denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Certification of
Collective Action.

Background

The case arises out of the alleged failure by Defendants Pediatric
Home Healthcare ("PHH") and Thomas C. Wheat to pay their employees
a proper overtime rate under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
Defendant PHH is a home healthcare company that provides at-home
care for patients throughout Texas. Defendant Wheat is the founder
and Chief Executive Officer of PHH.

Plaintiff Berridge is a former hourly-paid employee of PHH.
Berridge worked for PHH first as a Licensed Vocational Nurse, then
as a Registered Nurse. Berridge asserts that she typically worked
over forty hours each week, but the Defendants did not properly
compensate her and other similarly situated employees for overtime
work.

Specifically, Berridge brings a "regular rate" miscalculation
claim. She alleges that PHH paid non-discretionary bonuses to its
home healthcare workers when they would pick up an extra shift
("shift bonuses"), and PHH improperly excluded the bonuses from
employees' regular pay rate for purposes of calculating their
overtime rate.

Ms. Berridge now brings her motion to certify a collective action
for "all hourly-paid Home Healthcare Workers who worked over 40
hours a week after Nov. 10, 2017."

Discussion

Judge Rodriguez explains that a plaintiff bears the burden to
demonstrate that potential opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated
such that certification is proper. Once the plaintiff seeks
certification, "a district court must rigorously scrutinize the
realm of `similarly situated' workers." The plaintiff must
establish "that the putative class members were together the
victims of a single decision, policy, or plan infected by
discrimination." In examining whether an FLSA plaintiff has met her
burden for certification, courts may consider "whether potential
plaintiffs were identified; whether affidavits of potential
plaintiffs were submitted; and whether evidence of a widespread
discriminatory plan was submitted."

Ms. Berridge seeks to certify a collective action for "all
hourly-paid Home Healthcare Workers employed by the Defendants who
worked over 40 hours in any week after Nov. 10, 2017." However,
Judge Rodriguez finds that Berridge fails to present sufficient
evidence demonstrating that she is similarly situated to the
proposed class.

Judge Rodriguez finds that Berridge has failed to identify
potential plaintiffs, or submit any affidavits or other evidence
from potential plaintiffs. Berridge does not provide sufficient
evidence surrounding the amounts, the process concerning why or how
the bonuses were paid, the frequency of bonuses being offered to
other home healthcare workers, or any other evidence as to shift
bonuses received by other home healthcare workers in the San
Antonio office. Instead, she offers only her own testimony about
conversations with other home healthcare workers about their
dissatisfaction with PHH's pay policies. This is insufficient to
demonstrate that Berridge and her proposed class were subject to a
centralized policy and, by extension, that they are similarly
situated.

Furthermore, Judge Rodriguez finds that Berridge provides no
evidence of the existence of a centralized policy regarding payment
of shift bonuses outside of the San Antonio office. PHH has
thirteen offices. Each office is run by a different account
manager, and each account manager is responsible for that office's
payroll, including the discretion whether to offer employees shift
bonuses. Not every PHH office offers its home healthcare workers
the shift bonuses at issue in the case. Such is certainly the case
in the matter, where there is evidence of varied policies regarding
shift bonuses among each of PHH's 13 offices.

Conclusion

Because Plaintiff Berridge has failed to present sufficient
evidence that other potential opt-in plaintiffs seek to join the
lawsuit and that she is similarly situated to all home healthcare
workers employed by Defendant PHH, certification of the proposed
collective action is not appropriate. Judge Rodriguez denied the
Plaintiff's motion to certify.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/599ukztu from Leagle.com.


PHILIP MORRIS: Court Dismisses Securities Class Suit With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Master File No. 1:18-cv-08049 (RA), Nos. 1:18-cv-08814
(RA), 1:18-cv-09856 (RA) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Ronnie Abrams of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint with
prejudice.

Background

Lead plaintiffs Union Asset Management Holding AG and Teamsters
Local 710 Pension Fund bring the putative class action against
Philip Morris International ("PMI" or the "Company") and several
current and former officers of the Company, alleging that the
Defendants withheld material information about known health risks
associated with "iQOS," a cigarette-alternative device for which
they sought approval from the United States Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"). According to the Plaintiffs, the failure to
timely disclose that information constitutes securities fraud in
violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule
10(b)-5.

To combat the years-long decline in worldwide cigarette sales, PMI
has begun to develop and commercialize smoke-free alternatives to
cigarettes, first in Japan and then in the United States. iQOS, a
device into which a specially designed tobacco unit is inserted and
heated to generate an aerosol, is the Company's "flagship"
smoke-free product.

In order "to sell iQOS in the United States, and for permission to
market it as a Modified-Risk Tobacco Product ('MRTP')," PMI had to
obtain FDA approval. PMI thus sought two distinct authorizations
from the FDA: to sell the iQOS, and to market it as a MRTP. The
MRTP designation would permit PMI to market iQOS in the U.S. as
presenting less harm or risk of disease to users than traditional
tobacco. In December 2016, the Company submitted a Modified Risk
Tobacco Product Application ("MRTPA") to the FDA for iQOS, which
was formally accepted "for substantive scientific review" in May
2017.

Pursuant to Section 911(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act ("FD&C Act"), a tobacco product is eligible for a "risk
modification order" if it meets two conditions: That the product as
it is actually used by consumers, will (a) significantly reduce
harm and the risk of tobacco-related disease to individual tobacco
users; and (b) benefit the health of the population as a whole
taking into account both users of tobacco products and persons who
do not currently use tobacco products.

Tobacco products that do not meet the above requirements may be
marketed under a different type of order if, among other things,
"the scientific evidence that is available without conducting
long-term epidemiological studies demonstrates that a measurable
and substantial reduction in morbidity or mortality among
individual tobacco users is reasonably likely in subsequent
studies." This type of order, which requires that "the product as
actually used by consumers will not expose them to higher levels of
other harmful substances compared to the similar types of tobacco
products then on the market, is commonly known as a "exposure
modification order."

The Plaintiff, the City of Westland Police and Fire Retirement
System, a purchaser of PMI common stock during the Class Period,
commenced the action on Sept. 5, 2018 by filing a class action
complaint against Defendants PMI, Calantzopoulos, Martin King, and
Jacek Olczak. On Feb. 25, 2019, the Court appointed Union Asset
Management Holding AG and Teamsters Local 710 Pension Fund as
co-lead plaintiffs and consolidated three related actions. The
Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint on
May 10, 2019, which added Picavet, Peitsch, and Frank Ludicke as
named defendants, and identified roughly seventy statements as
false and/or misleading.

On Feb. 4, 2020, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' Consolidated
Amended Class Action Com int on the basis that they had failed to
adequately plead the required elements of falsity and scienter. The
Court granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint with
respect to one subset of their claims -- those concerning four
studies of the chemical composition of the aerosol generated by
iQOS, which the Plaintiffs allege were belatedly disclosed to the
FDA and contradicted the Company's positive statements about the
potential health benefits of the device, as compared to cigarettes.
The Court instructed the Plaintiffs to explain "with specificity
how the results of the undisclosed studies undercut the
truthfulness of the Defendants' statements about reduced risk
and/or reduced exposure."

The Plaintiffs timely amended their complaint with additional
allegations about these studies, and filed the Complaint on Sept.
28, 2020. The Defendants, arguing that the Plaintiffs had failed to
heed the Court's instruction, filed the instant motion to dismiss.
An oral argument was held on Aug. 24, 2021.

Discussion

The principal issue in the motion is whether the Plaintiffs have
plausibly alleged that the results of the four aerosol studies
either contradicted or rendered misleading the Defendants' positive
statements about iQOS.

The Defendants argue that dismissal is warranted because the
Plaintiffs have failed to set forth particularized allegations that
the challenged statements were materially false or misleading at
the time they were made, or that any Defendant acted with
fraudulent intent. They further assert that the FDA's authorization
of iQOS as a MRTP -- a decision that was made 30 months after the
Four Undisclosed Studies were provided to the FDA -- undercuts any
allegation of falsity.

The Plaintiffs maintain that they have specifically pled that the
Four Undisclosed Studies contradict, or at the very least
substantially undermine, the Defendants' affirmative
representations about iQOS. At oral argument, the Plaintiffs
clarified that their allegations of falsity focus on the
Defendants' representations that iQOS reduces the risk of harm to
users, rather than on claims about exposure to harmful chemicals.
In their view, those statements not only lacked any support in the
scientific evidence available to PMI at the time that they were
made but cannot be vindicated by the FDA's authorization, because
iQOS received only an "exposure modification" order.

I. Whether Defendants Violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5

To maintain a private damages action under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, "a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between
the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation." The Defendants' motion
challenges only the first two factors.

A. Whether Plaintiff Adequately Alleges that Defendants' Statements
Were False or Misleading

The Plaintiffs challenge 22 statements related to the iQOS studies,
made over an 18-month period, from July 26, 2016 to Dec. 20, 2017.
These statements can be grouped into three broad categories: 1)
statements about the potential of iQOS to reduce the risk of harm
to users; 2) factual descriptions of the clinical studies that PMI
did disclose prior to December 7, 2017; and 3) statements regarding
the chemical composition of iQOS aerosol.

Judge Abrams holds that the FDA essentially endorsed the
Defendants' statements about its scientific data, even after
considering the studies that the Plaintiffs characterize as
contradictory, severely undercuts any allegation that the
statements were false or misleading when made. Because the
allegedly contrary facts that the Defendants omitted did not
contradict, or substantially undermine, their statements about
risk, those statements were not misleading by omission. For similar
reasons, Judge Abrams cannot credit the Plaintiff's theory that the
Defendants' statements to the effect that IQOS had "potential to or
was "likely" to present less risk of harm, lacked scientific
support. In these circumstances, the "absence of any serious
conflict" between the Defendants' statements interpreting their own
data and the FDA's ultimate interpretation of that same data is
"fatal to the Plaintiffs' case."

Judge Abrams also holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to
plausibly allege that the Defendants' factually accurate statements
about their clinical trials were rendered misleading by virtue of
the failure to disclose results from a different category of
studies. Nor do the Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the Four
Undisclosed Studies contradict any representation made by PMI about
the results of the clinical studies. Moreover, the FDA's subsequent
approval of iQOS as an MRTP again undercuts any argument that the
results of the Four Undisclosed Studies in any way contradicted
PMI's reporting of its data. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have
failed to plausibly allege that the omitted data was inconsistent
with the Defendants' statements about the clinical risk markers of
iQOS.

Moreover, Judge Abrams finds that because the FDA, after
months-long analysis of the data, reached a conclusion about the
toxicity of iQOS aerosol that was substantially similar to the one
peddled by the Company during the Class Period, he cannot conclude
that the Company's statements were either false or misleading when
made. Moreover, because the Defendants were under no obligation to
disclose all facts that "cut the other way," their failure to
disclose the elevated presence of other chemicals in iQOS aerosol
did not render their interpretations misleading within the meaning
of the securities laws.

Summary

In sum, because it is apparent from the Complaint -- read in
conjunction with documents that are either referenced therein or of
which the Court may properly take judicial notice -- that the
Defendants' statements constituted reasonable interpretations of
the available data and were not substantially undermined by omitted
facts, Judge Abrams holds that the Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately plead falsity. The Plaintiffs' claims are thus dismissed
on that basis.

B. Whether Plaintiffs Adequately Pled Scienter

The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs fail to adequately
plead the requisite strong inference of scienter. To state a claim
under Section 10(b), the Plaintiffs must adequately allege that
each Defendant acted with scienter when making the allegedly false
or misleading representations. Where the defendant is a corporation
like PMI, the Plaintiffs must allege "that an agent of the
corporation committed a culpable act with the requisite scienter,
and that the act (and accompanying mental state) are attributable
to" the entity.

Judge Abrams again agrees with the Defendants. He concludes that
the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to raise a strong
inference of scienter as to any individual defendant or as to PMI.
In his view, the facts alleged in the Complaint make the opposing
inference -- that the Defendants did not purposely withhold from
the market a subset of studies, which they later disclosed to the
FDA (as one of fourteen amendments to their original application),
and which not only failed to contradict their positive statements
but appeared to support FDA approval -- more compelling. The
Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead scienter provides an
alternate basis for dismissal of their claims under Section 10(b).

II. Whether Defendants Violated Section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act

The Plaintiff further alleges that the Individual Defendants should
be held separately liable as "control persons" under Section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act. Liability under Section 20(a) is derivative.
In order to establish a prima facie case of controlling-person
liability, a plaintiff must show a primary violation by the
controlled person and control of the primary violator by the
targeted defendant, and show that the controlling person was in
some meaningful sense a culpable participant in the fraud
perpetrated by the controlled person.

Because the Plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie case of a
"primary violation" under Section 10(b), Judge Abrams holds that
they have not sufficiently pled that Defendants violated Section
20(a). Accordingly, those claims are dismissed.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Abrams granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. The
Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate items 137 and
139 on the docket and to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/n7pze8yf from Leagle.com.


PHILIPS NORTH: Wheeler Files Suit in W.D. Texas
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Philips North America
LLC, et al. The case is styled as William Wheeler, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Philips North America
LLC, Philips RS North America LLC, Koninklijke Philips N.V., Case
No. 1:21-cv-00835 (W.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

Philips North America LLC -- https://www.usa.philips.com/ -- is
located in Miami, Florida and is part of the Audio and Video
Equipment Manufacturing Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
          SHARP LAW, LLP
          4820 West 75th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Phone: (913) 901-0505
          Fax: (913) 901-0419
          Email: rsharp@midwest-law.com


PHOENIX FINANCIAL: Faces Felder Suit Over Illegal Debt Collection
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT L. FELDER, JR. v. PHOENIX FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, Case No.
8:21-cv-02235 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 21, 2021) is brought on behalf of
the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated alleging that the
Defendant routinely and intentionally communicates with and
discloses to third parties information in connection with the
collection of debts in violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The Plaintiff was alleged to owe Defendant a debt that stemmed from
transactions primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,
and os therefore a "debt," as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C.
section 1692a(5).

According to the complaint, the Defendant sent Plaintiff multiple
collection communications in an attempt to collect on a debt that
was in default at the time it was assigned by the original creditor
to Defendant for collection purposes. Moreover, these collection
communications stated in pertinent part, "THIS COMMUNICATION IS
FROM A DEBT COLLECTOR. THIS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT. ANY
INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.".

The Defendant is not the original creditor and was assigned the
debt for collection by the creditor after the debt was already in
default, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff seeks damages, costs and attorney's fees from
Defendant for the violations.

The Defendant is a nationwide debt collection company and
communicates with third parties in connection with thousands of
consumer debts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian L. Shrader, Esq.
          Alejandro J. Mendez, Esq.
          SHRADER LAW, PLLC
          612 W. Bay Street 100 S.
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 360-1529
          Facsimile: (813) 336-0832
          E-mail: bshrader@shraderlawfirm.com
                  amendez@shraderlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Katherine Earle Yanes, Esq.
          Gus M. Centrone, Esq.
          KYNES, MARKMAN & FELMAN, P.A.
          Ashley Drive, Suite 1400
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 229-1118
          Facsimile: (813) 221-6750
          E-mail: kyanes@kmf-law.com
                  gcentrone@kmf-law.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Wasylik, Esq.
          RICARDO & WASYLIK, PL
          P.O. Box 2245
          Dade City, FL 33526
          Telephone: (352) 567-3173
          Facsimile: (352) 567-3193
          E-mail: mike@ricardolaw.com

PIH HEALTH: Rosario Files Suit in C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PIH Health, Inc. The
case is styled as Aurora Rosario, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated and on behalf of the general public v.
PIH Health, Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-07221-JAK-PD (C.D. Cal., Sept.
8, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Personal Injury.

PIH Health Hospital -- https://www.pihhealth.org/ -- is a hospital
in Whittier, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Emrah M Sumer, Esq.
          James Robert Noblin, Esq.
          Robert S Green, Esq.
          GREEN AND NOBLIN PC
          4500 East Pacific Coast Highway 4th Floor
          Long Beach, CA 90804
          Phone: (562) 391-2487
          Fax: (415) 477-6710
          Email: gnecf@classcounsel.com
                 rsg@classcounsel.com


REAL ESTATE HEAVEN: Whittaker Files TCPA Suit in D. Arizona
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Real Estate Heaven
International Incorporated, et al. The case is styled as Brenda
Whittaker, an individual, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Real Estate Heaven International
Incorporated, a California corporation; Stone Sharp, an individual;
Case No. 3:21-cv-08212-DJH (D. Ariz., Sept. 20, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Real Estate Heaven (REH) -- https://rehrealestate.com/ --
specializes in the sale of residential homes and is one of
America's Fastest Growing Privately Held Companies in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Penny L Koepke, Esq.
          MAXWELL & MORGAN PC
          Pierpont Commerce Center
          4854 E Baseline Rd., Ste. 104
          Mesa, AZ 85206
          Phone: (480) 833-1001
          Fax: (480) 969-8267
          Email: pkoepke@hoalaw.biz


REP PROCESSING: Asks Court Order Reconsiderations in Robertson Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the putative class action lawsuit styled as ZACHARIAH ROBERTSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. REP
PROCESSING, LLC, d/b/a RIMROCK ENERGY PARTNERS, Case No.
1:19-cv-02910-PAB-NYW, the Defendant seeks reconsideration of two
court orders: (i) the denial of the Defendant and Third-Party
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and for a Stay of
Proceedings and (ii) the approval of the Plaintiff's Motion to
Strike or Sever Third-Party Complaint and denial of the Defendant's
Motion for Leave to Amend Third-Party Complaint.

Rep Processing, LLC, doing business as Rimrock Energy Partners, is
an oil and natural gas company in Dallas, Texas. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                

         James M. Cleary, Jr., Esq.
         MARTIN, DISIERE, JEFFERSON & WISDOM, LLP
         808 Travis, Suite 1100
         Houston, TX 77002
         Telephone: (713) 632-1700
         Facsimile: (713) 222-0101
         E-mail: cleary@mdjwlaw.com

REP PROCESSING: Day Rate Inspectors Get FLSA Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ZACHARIAH ROBERTSON,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, v. REP
PROCESSING, LLC, d/b/a RIMROCK ENERGY PARTNERS, Case No.
1:19-cv-02910-PAB-NYW (D. Colo.), the Hon. Judge Philip A. Brimmer
entered an order:

   1. conditionally certifying case as a collective action
      pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b);

      -- The collective action members are defined as follows:

         "All current and former inspectors, staffed through
         Kestrel Field Services, Inc. who worked for or on
         behalf of REP Processing, LLC d/b/a Rimrock Energy
         Partners and who were paid according to its day rate
         plan in the past three years (the "Day Rate
         Inspectors");"

   2. approving proposed notice subject to plaintiffs making the
      discussed revisions and incorporating the modifications
      reflected in the version of the notice;

   3. directing Rimrock, Within ten days, to provide to
      plaintiff’s counsel the names, physical addresses, email
      addresses, and telephone numbers for all putative members
      of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective in an
      electronically readable format; and

   4. directing the plaintiff within 15 days after receiving the
      list from Rimrock, to send the notice by mail, email, and
      text message to the last known address of each of the
      individuals identified on the above-referenced list.

The Court finds that plaintiff has presented substantial
allegations that members of the putative collective were subject to
a single policy –--the 2019 Rate Schedule -- that violated the
FLSA. These allegations satisfy the "lenient" standard for the
first stage of collective action certification.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 16, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CGWW2z at no extra charge.[CC]

RILEY H. SMITH: Barnett Sues Over Unsolicited Telephonic Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Barnett, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. RILEY H. SMITH, P.A. d/b/a THE RILEY SMITH GROUP, Case
No. 134267871 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Miami-Dade Cty., Sept. 9, 2021), is
brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") and
under the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act ("FTSA") for the
Defendant's telephonic sales calls into Florida without the
requisite prior express written consent.

To promote its goods and services, Defendant engages in telephonic
sales calls to consumers without having secured prior express
written consent as required under both the TCPA and FTSA, with no
regards for consumers' rights. The Defendant's telephonic sales
calls have caused Plaintiff and the Class members harm, including
violations of their statutory rights, statutory damages, annoyance,
nuisance, and invasion of their privacy. Through this action, the
Plaintiff seeks an injunction and statutory damages on behalf of
himself and the Class members and any other available legal or
equitable remedies resulting from the unlawful actions of
Defendant, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is an individual who received the Defendant's
telephonic sales calls.

The Defendant is a real estate brokerage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone: 305-479-2299
          Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                 gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Phone: 305-975-3320
          Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


RSC GROUP: Zamora Sues Over Construction Workers' Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE ZAMORA, JULIAN DURAN, ULISES OCHOA, SELVIN MARTINEZ, EUCEBIO
HERNANDEZ, CALIXTO FUNES GUZMAN, MANUEL FLORES, ADRIAN CANCELA,
WILSON CHUQUI, and ANDERSON ESTRADA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RSC GROUP, LLC, BRETT
STEINBERG individually, MARK DIMEDICI, individually, and FRANCISCO
TAVARES individually, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-07728 (S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 15, 2021) seeks to recover unpaid wages, overtime
compensation and other damages for Plaintiffs and similarly
situated employees pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as construction
workers.

RSC Group provides construction services, particularly masonry
services, throughout the New York City metro area.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brian S. Schaffer, Esq.
          Maria Laura Crespo, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375

SEA WORLD PARKS: Gurwell Appeals Consumer Class Suit Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Janet Gurwell, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled Janet Gurwell and Brad Sylvia,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff v. Seaworld Parks & Entertainment, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 2:20-cv-00312-RGD-LRL, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia at Norfolk.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 4, 2020, the
lawsuit seeks restitutionary damages, a full cash refund, an award
of reasonable attorney's fees and costs and such other and further
relief resulting from breach of contract/warranty and for violation
of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.

Seaworld Parks & Entertainment owns theme park destinations in
North America where Gurwell and Sylvia purchased annual memberships
for the parks. However, the Parks have been shut down as a result
of the COVID-19 pandemic and all passes were canceled. Seaworld has
yet to provide a discount or refund for its customers.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the Court's Opinion and Order
dated August 11, 2021, and Judgment dated August 12, 2021, granting
Defendant SeaWorld's Second Motion to Dismiss on all counts.

The appellate case is captioned as Janet Gurwell v. Sea World Parks
& Entertainment, Incorporated, Case No. 21-2004, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed on Sep. 13,
2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Opening Brief and Appendix is due on October 25, 2021; and

   -- Response Brief is due on November 22, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants JANET GURWELL, individually and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals; and BRAD SYLVIA, individually
and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, are
represented by:

          Jodie Elizabeth Buchman, Esq.
          Pierce C. Murphy, Esq.
          SILVERMAN, THOMPSON, SLUTKIN & WHITE
          201 North Charles Street
          Baltimore, MD 21201-0000
          Telephone: (410) 385-2225
          E-mail: jbuchman@silvermanthompson.com
                  pmurphy@silvermanthompson.com   

Defendant-Appellee SEA WORLD PARKS & ENTERTAINMENT, INCORPORATED, A
Florida Corporation is represented by:

          Michelle Ciszak Pardo, Esq.
          DUANE MORRIS, LLP
          505 9th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20004-1608
          Telephone: (202) 776-7844
          E-mail: mcpardo@duanemorris.com

               - and -

         John Morgan Simpson, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
          799 9th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20001-4501
          Telephone: (202) 776-7800
          E-mail: jmsimpson@duanemorris.com

SEATTLE, WA: Faces Class Suit Over Misleading Green Power Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
seattletimes.com reports that Lynda V. Mapes  at seattletimes.com
reports that the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe took the city of
Seattle to task in a class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of its
members and the public, stating the electric utility's green power
claims are misleading and hurting the tribe.

The lawsuit filed in King County Superior Court seeks an injunction
restraining Seattle City Light from advertising itself as a
fish-friendly, green and environmentally responsible utility until
Seattle provides fish passage at its three Skagit River dams.

"Until that happens, they are not as green as they say they are,"
said Nino Maltos, chairman of the tribe. "We believe it is a form
of greenwashing. They are deceiving the public, they are not being
honest and straight up."

More than 80% of City Light's energy comes from hydropower, which
does not directly emit climate-warming carbon dioxide.

The city of Seattle is in the midst of a multiyear re-licensing
process for its three hydroelectric dams on the Skagit River. The
tribe insists the utility can't claim its dams are green as long as
they block salmon passage on the region's premier salmon river.

The tribe filed the suit in King County Superior Court, alleging
Seattle City Light's slogan of "Nation's Greenest Utility" is
untruthful.

Julie Moore, spokeswoman for Seattle City Light, said the utility
won't comment on litigation. However, she said the utility is
committed to studying the viability of fish passage at the dams
during the re-licensing process.

The city operates the Skagit dams under a 1995 license agreed to
with multiple partners, including the tribe, Moore stated in an
email. The re-licensing process underway "gives us the opportunity
to update the research and determine what additional measures may
be necessary to protect fish moving forward. This includes looking
at fish passage."

The utility has a green power certification from the Low Impact
Hydropower Institute, Moore noted, adding City Light was the first
large utility to earn that recognition.

Maltos said the utility's power certification isn't good enough
because Skagit River salmon are still in decline.

Native wild Chinook salmon, steelhead and resident bull trout
within the Skagit River drainage all are threatened with extinction
and are listed for protection under the federal Endangered Species
Act. [GN]

SIMON'S AGENCY: Chaga Sues Over Unfair Debt Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Chaga, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Simon's Agency Inc. and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-04110 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 16, 2021) seeks
damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act due to the Defendants' deceptive,
misleading and false debt collection practices.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' collection efforts with
respect to the alleged debt from Plaintiff caused him to suffer
concrete and particularized harm, inter alia, because the FDCPA
provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right not to be
misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action regarding the
collection of any consumer debt.

Simon's Agency Inc. is a New York-based debt collection
agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Antranig Garibian, Esq.
          GARIBIAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          1800 JFK Blvd., Suite 300
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 326-9179
          E-mail: ag@garibianlaw.com

SKYWEST AIRLINES: Horowitz's Claim for Unpaid OT Wages Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GREGORY HOROWITZ, Plaintiff, v. SKYWEST AIRLINES,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-04674-MMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Maxine
M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted SkyWest's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim
for Unpaid Overtime, and dismissed the Second Cause of Action
without leave to amend.

Before the Court is SkyWest's Motion, filed June 24, 2021, to
Dismiss. Plaintiff Horowitz has filed opposition, to which SkyWest
has replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support
of and in opposition to the motion, Judge Chesney deems the matter
appropriate for determination on the parties' respective written
submissions, vacates the hearing scheduled for Sept. 10, 2021, and
rules on the Motion to Dismiss.

Mr. Horowitz was formerly employed by SkyWest as a pilot. In his
operative complaint, the "First Amended Class Action and Private
Attorneys General Act ('PAGA') Complaint" ("FAC") filed in state
court on May 10, 2021, Horowitz asserts 14 Causes of Action arising
from alleged violations of the California Labor Code.

By the instant motion, SkyWest seeks dismissal of the Second Cause
of Action, which is brought under "Labor Code sections 510 and
1194, and IWC Wage Order 9-2001 Wage Order 9" and is based on
allegations that SkyWest "failed to pay overtime wages for hours
worked in excess of eight hours in one day or 40 hours in one
week," and that "overtime wages that were paid were underpaid
because non-discretionary bonuses were not incorporated into the
regular rate of pay for the purposes of calculating overtime."

Pursuant to Section 510, all workers are entitled to overtime
compensation for work "in excess of eight hours in one workday,"
work "in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek," and work "on the
seventh day of work in any one workweek." Wage Order 9 provides the
same relief to workers in the "transportation industry."

SkyWest argues Horowitz's claims under Section 510 and Wage Order 9
are subject to dismissal in light of an exemption set forth in Wage
Order 9, specifically, that the Order "shall not be deemed to cover
those employees who have entered into a collective bargaining
agreement under and in accordance with the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act ['RLA'], 45 U.S.C. Sections 151 et. seq."

Judge Chesney agrees. At the outset, while acknowledging a district
court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, ordinarily may not
consider material beyond the complaint, the Judge finds itcan
consider three documents submitted by SkyWest in support of the
instant motion, namely, three versions of the "SkyWest Airlines
Pilot Policy Manual," each of which contains a signed "Letter of
Agreement between SkyWest Airlines Inc. and the SkyWest Airlines
Pilot Association," was in effect during a portion of the period in
which Horowitz was employed by SkyWest, and when taken together
cover the entirety of his period of employment.

In particular, an exception to the general rules exists where the
contents of a document are alleged in the complaint or the
complaint "necessarily relies" on a document not "explicitly
referenced" therein and the plaintiff does not dispute the
document's authenticity. In the case, Judge Chesney finds that
Horowitz, who does not dispute the authenticity of the Pilot Policy
Manuals, relies on SkyWest's definitions of "block times" and "duty
time" to support his claim for overtime compensation, and, although
not expressly acknowledged in the FAC, the definitions of those
words are contained in the Pilot Policy Manuals.

Moreover, as Horowitz acknowledges, Judge Chesney can take judicial
notice of the contents of the Pilot Policy Manuals, if requested, a
request SkyWest, contrary to Horowitz's argument, did make.

Next, contrary to Horowitz's argument, Juduge Chesney holds that it
is readily apparent from the Pilot Policy Manuals that they
constitute collective bargaining agreements under the RLA, as they
are agreements between a "carrier," SkyWest, and its "employees,"
the Pilot Association, that address in detail the terms and
conditions of all SkyWest pilots' employment, such as compensation,
training requirements, work scheduling practices, and corrective
action policies/grievance procedures.

Lastly, under California law, where a defendant establishes the
applicability of an exemption from a provision of a wage order,
and, consequently, bars any claim for violation of such provision,
Judge Chesney finds that the exemption likewise bars claims for
violation of identical provisions set forth in "statutes and
regulations." Consistent therewith, the Ninth Circuit has held that
where, as in the instant case, an airline employee is covered by a
collective bargaining agreement under the RLA, "the RLA exemption
excuses the airline from both Wage Order 9's overtime requirements
and Section 510's overtime requirements."

Accordingly, Judge Chesney holds that the Second Cause of Action is
subject to dismissal. For these reasons, the Judge granted
SkyWest's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Second Cause of
Action without leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/emm8hksh from Leagle.com.


SOCLEAN INC: Wheeler Files Suit in W.D. Texas
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against SoClean, Inc. The
case is styled as William Wheeler, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. SoClean, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-00837
(W.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

SoClean, Inc. -- https://www.soclean.com/ -- manufactures cleaning
devices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
          SHARP LAW, LLP
          4820 West 75th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Phone: (913) 901-0505
          Fax: (913) 901-0419
          Email: rsharp@midwest-law.com


ST. JOSEPH'S/CANDLER: Faces Suit After Hospital Ransomware Attack
-----------------------------------------------------------------
legalreader.com reports that patient files class action lawsuit
after hospital's IT system is compromised.

Daniel Elliott, a Georgia resident and patient of St.
Joseph's/Candler (SJ/C) Hospital Health System, recently filed a
class-action lawsuit on behalf of 1.4 million people who believe
they may have had their personal information compromised in the
ransomware attack against St. Joseph's/Candler hospital IT system
discovered earlier this year. The information that may have been
compromised, according to a letter issued by the hospital at the
time of the attack, includes "name in combination with address,
date of birth, Social Security number, driver's license number,
patient account number, billing account number, financial
information, health insurance plan member ID, medical record
number, dates of service, provider names, and medical and clinical
treatment information regarding care you received from SJ/C."

At the time of the data breach, hospital CEO and President Paul
Hinchey announced, "We're fully operational right now. There are a
few hotspots where we have to change out computers. But in terms of
the hospital, we're back electronically, which was a big sea change
for us, because we went from a fully integrated system to a paper
system, and we haven't done that in 25 years."

Hinchey added that the hospital system continues to take measures
ward off future attacks, saying, "These entities, they reinvent
themselves at warp speed. So, we've hired several national
companies, one who does all the security for Amazon, and we put in
all of these firewalls to make sure we mitigate that as best we can
from ever happening again because once is enough."

The health care system is also offering patients a one-year
membership to Experian's IdentityWorks, which helps ensure
sensitive information is protected moving forward.

Elliott's lawsuit has alleged, "SJ/C, the region's largest health
care system, violated its privacy policy and acted negligently when
it failed to adequately secure patients' information and take
preventive measures to avoid the ransomware attack and data breach,
which was detected on June 17. Subsequent investigations revealed
that the unauthorized party gained access to the hospital system's
IT network between Dec. 18, 2020, and June 17, 2021." It continues,
"Patients suffered an increased risk of identity theft and medical
identity theft, and have been forced to expend, and must expend in
the future, to monitor their financial accounts, health insurance
accounts, and credit files as a result of the data breach."

Elliot claims the hospital neglected to "design, adopt, implement,
control, direct, oversee, manage, monitor and audit appropriate
data security process, controls, policies, procedures, protocols
and software and hardware systems" to protect patients'
information.

Soumitra Bhuyan, assistant professor at the Edward J. Bloustein
School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University, said,
"On average it takes about 96 days to identify the data breach. In
some cases, it can take longer. There are hospitals that did not
identify that a breach happened for a year." This means, in some
cases, a host of information can be stolen long before an entity
even realizes there is an issue.

The class-action seeks a jury trial, an unspecified amount of
monetary relief for punitive damages, restitution and disgorgement,
and payment of attorney fees. [GN]

STANEK STUDIOS: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stanek Studios & Fine
Art Galleries LLC. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Stanek
Studios & Fine Art Galleries LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-05209 (E.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 20, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Stanek Studios & Fine Art Galleries --
https://www.stanekgallery.com/ -- is art gallery in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


STATE FARM: Davis Insurance Suit Removed to M.D. Pa.
----------------------------------------------------
The case styled DOREEN DAVIS and EVACIO VALERA, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated persons v. STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 2021-CV-7036-CV, was
removed from the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin
County, to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania on September 16, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania assigned
Case No. 1:21-cv-01608-CCC to the proceeding.

The complaint alleges that the Plaintiff is entitled to
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under a State Farm automobile
policy issued to her daughter due to bodily injuries she sustained
from a motor vehicle accident on October 19, 2017. The complaint
further asserts that State Farm breached the daughter's policy by
denying and disclaiming coverage under the policy and failing to
pay UIM benefits under that policy to Davis.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company operates as an
insurance company. The Company offers vehicle, auto, accident,
homeowners, condo owners, renters, life and annuities, fire and
casualty, health, disability, flood, business, and boat insurance
products and services. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
serves clients in the United States.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          John J. McGrath, Esq.
          PALMER & BARR, P.C.
          1880 John F. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 401
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 557-0222
          E-mail: john.mcgrath@palmerbarr.com

T-MOBILE USA: Brackman Files Suit in W.D. Washington
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against T-Mobile USA Inc. The
case is styled as Matthew Brackman, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. T-Mobile USA Inc., Case No.
2:21-cv-01277 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 21, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Personal Property.

T-Mobile US, Inc., doing business under the global brand name
T-Mobile -- http://www.t-mobile.com/-- is an American wireless
network operator.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew James Ide, Esq.
          7900 SE 28TH STREET, STE 500
          MERCER ISLAND, WA 98040
          Phone: (206) 625-1326
          Fax: (206) 622-0909
          Email: mjide@yahoo.com


T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customers' Info, Billups Says
------------------------------------------------------------
THALESSA BILLUPS, QUINTIN HUMPHREY, ELYSE TAMARA, JAMES GABRIEL,
PAOLA DOOLY, and WILLIAM HARRIS, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01266 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 16, 2021) is
brought by the Plaintiffs for negligence, negligence per se,
violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, and
declaratory judgment.

According to the complaint, the Defendant failed to properly secure
and safeguard highly-valuable, protected personally identifiable
information (PII), including without limitations, social security
numbers, phone numbers, names, physical addresses, unique IMEI
numbers (International Mobile Equipment Identity - a 15-digit
number unique to each mobile device), and driver licenses
information; failed to comply with industry standards to protect
information systems that contain PII; and failed to provide
adequate notice to Plaintiffs and other members of the Class that
their PII had been accessed and compromised.

On August 15, 2021, T-Mobile's data, which purports to include the
PII of over 100 million T-Mobile users, was put on a forum for sale
for 6 bitcoin, or approximately $270,000. T-Mobile announced that
it was continuing to investigate the breach but has confirmed that
the breach has occurred, and the PII is in the hands of criminals,
says the suit.

The Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief, including and
requiring T-Mobile to adopt reasonably sufficient practices to
safeguard PII that remains in T-Mobile's custody in order to
prevent incidents like the data breach from reoccurring in the
future.

T-Mobile is a mobile telecommunication company that provides mobile
telephone service, internet, banking, and television services and
products to individuals and businesses across the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stephen P. Connor, Esq.
          Anne-Marie E. Sargent, Esq.
          Derik Campos, Esq.
          CONNOR & SARGENT PLLC
          921 Hildebrand Lane NE, Suite 240
          Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
          Telephone: (206) 654-5050
          E-mail: steve@cslawfirm.net
                  aes@cslawfirm.net
                  derik@cslawfirm.net

               - and -

          Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          The Helmsley Building
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 223-6444
          Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
          E-mail: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com   

               - and -

          MaryBeth V. Gibson, Esq.
          THE FINLEY FIRM, P.C.
          3535 Piedmont Road
          Building 14, Suite 230
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Telephone: (404) 320-9979
          Facsimile: (404) 320-9978
          E-mail: mgibson@thefinleyfirm.com

               - and -

          Arthur M. Murray, Esq.
          MURRAY LAW FIRM
          701 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70139
          Telephone: (504) 525-8100      
          E-mail: amurray@murray-lawfirm.com

               - and -

          Brian C. Gudmundson, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED LLP
          1100 IDS Center
          80 South 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 341-0400
          Facsimile: (612) 341-0844
          E-mail: brian.gudmundston@zimmreed.com

T-MOBILE USA: Halpern Sues Over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------
Richard Halpern, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 21-cv-01226 (W.D. Wash., September 8, 2021), seeks to
recover damages and other relief resulting from a data breach,
including but not limited to, compensatory damages, reimbursement
of costs and declaratory judgment and injunctive relief resulting
from negligence, breach of express and implied contract, breach of
fiduciary duty and violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act
and Washington's Consumer Protection Act.

T-Mobile USA, Inc. is a nationwide telecommunications company
headquartered in Bellevue, Washington and is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG, headquartered in Bonn, Germany.
T-Mobile collects a significant amount of data from its current and
former customers, often including sensitive personal information
such as Social Security numbers, addresses, telephone numbers,
dates of birth, bank account numbers, credit card numbers,
financial transaction records, credit ratings and driver's license
numbers.

On August 19, 2021, T-Mobile announced a "Notice of Data Breach" on
its website that it had learned on August 17, 2021.

Halpern alleges that T-Mobile failed to safeguard the confidential
information of millions of current and former T-Mobile USA, Inc.
customers. The confidential information stolen appears to encompass
names, birthdays, Social Security numbers, driver's license
numbers, phone numbers, and account PINs, among other Personal
Identifying Information. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Anne-Marie E. Sargent, Esq.
      Stephen P. Connor, Esq.
      Derik Campos, Esq.
      CONNOR & SARGENT PLLC
      921 Hildebrand Lane NE, Suite 240
      Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
      Tel: (206) 654-5050
      Email: steve@cslawfirm.net
             aes@cslawfirm.net
             derik@cslawfirm.net

             - and -

      Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
      Nicholas A. Colella, Esq.
      CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
      1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
      Pittsburgh, PA 15222
      Telephone: (412) 322-9243
      Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
      Email: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
             ncolella@carlsonlynch.com

             - and -

      Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
      SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
      The Helmsley Building
      230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
      New York, NY 10169
      Telephone: (212) 223-6444
      Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
      Email: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com

             - and -

      MaryBeth V. Gibson, Esq.
      THE FINLEY FIRM, P.C.
      3535 Piedmont Road
      Building 14, Suite 230
      Atlanta, GA 30305
      Telephone: (404) 320-9979
      Facsimile: (404) 320-9978
      Email: mgibson@thefinleyfirm.com

             - and -

      Arthur M. Murray, Esq.
      MURRAY LAW FIRM
      701 Poydras Street
      New Orleans, LA 70139
      Telephone: (504) 525-8100
      Email: amurray@murray-lawfirm.com

             - and -

      Brian C. Gudmudson, Esq.
      Michael J. Laird, Esq.
      Rachel K. Tack, Esq.
      ZIMMERMAN REED LLP
      1100 IDS Center
      80 South 8th Street
      Minneapolis, MN 55402
      Telephone: (612) 341-0400
      Facsimile: (612) 341-0844
      Email: brian.gudmundston@zimmreed.com


TANDY LEATHER: Texas Putative Class Suit Withdrawn
--------------------------------------------------
Tandy Leather Factory, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 21, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the class action
suit pending before the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, has been withdrawn.

In November 2019, a class action lawsuit seeking unspecified
damages was brought by a stockholder in the Federal District Court
in Los Angeles, California, and subsequently transferred to the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas, against
the Company and members of its current and former management
relating to the company's announcement of the circumstances leading
to its restatement.  

The company believes that suit was without merit, and the suit was
withdrawn by the plaintiff in April 2020; however, there can be no
assurance that additional litigation against the Company and/or its
management or Board of Directors might not be threatened or brought
in connection with matters related to our restatement.

Tandy Leather Factory, Inc. is an American specialty retailer and
wholesale distributor of leather and leatherwork-related products.
It operates more than 100 stores worldwide. The company is based in
Fort Worth, Texas.

TELACU CONSTRUCTION: Failed to Pay OT Under FLSA, Jones Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TYLER JONES, on behalf of himself 18 all others similarly situated
v. TELACU CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT, INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-07533
(C.D. Cal., Sept. 21, 2021) alleges that the Defendant failed to
pay overtime as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant paid Tyler Jones, and
other workers like him, at the same hourly rate for all hours
worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek and 8 in a
day.

TELACU is a provider of construction management services to capital
improvement projects throughout the United States and its
territories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          SHELLIST | LAZARZ | SLOBIN LLP
          5670 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1800
          Los Angeles, CA 90036
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: marbuckle@eeoc.net
                  rprieto@eeoc.net

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

TENNESSEE: Faces Class Action Lawsuit for Ending Benefits Early
---------------------------------------------------------------
The attorney representing the unemployed in a class-action lawsuit
against the governor and the Tennessee Department of Labor is
asking the federal government to participate.

Meanwhile, the state is responding to the case. Still, those
impacted the most by the governor's decision to end federal
benefits early are not backing down.

For many Tennesseans, losing unemployment funds during the pandemic
doesn't affect just them.

"I have an 80-year-old father that I take care of. He has heart
problems—a 3-year-old. A 17-month-old and an 18 week old,"
Kingsport resident Heather Guynn said.

"I got my family right now in a hotel room. That's where I've been
living, this whole thing. That's what I wish Governor Lee would
see," Misha French said. "My family of four is in a hotel. Cause I
can't afford to go anywhere else."

It's why Guynn and French turned to Gary Blackburn for
representation in a class-action lawsuit against the state for
ending federal unemployment benefits early.

"We're asking the court to determine that governor lee did not have
the authority to terminate the contract with the United States,"
Blackburn said.

That's why Blackburn wants the federal government involved.

"The money that we're trying to retrieve for Tennesseans is in the
hands of the federal government. There's no Tennessee treasury
money involved in this," Blackburn said.

But the state's not backing down either. They filed a motion of
injunction, saying the unemployment claimants waited more than two
months to file. The suit, saying, "If this were truly an urgent
matter, Plaintiffs should have filed this case before the end of
July 2021."

News 4 reached out to the state for more comment, but they cannot
discuss pending litigation. However, for the families in this
lawsuit, they hope Gov. Bill Lee listens to their cries.

"The reason why I wanted to join this class action was to tell him
and these rich politicians and these rich people that we're poor .
. . but we freaking matter," French said.

Both Blackburn and the state have suggested dates in November to
continue the case.[GN]

TEXAS: District Court Proceedings in Abortion Providers Suit Stayed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH, on behalf of itself, its staff,
physicians, nurses, and patients, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees v.
JUDGE AUSTIN REEVE JACKSON; PENNY CLARKSTON; MARK LEE DICKSON;
STEPHEN BRINT CARLTON; KATHERINE A. THOMAS; CECILE ERWIN YOUNG;
ALLISON VORDENBAUMEN BENZ; KEN PAXTON, Defendants-Appellants, Case
No. 21-50792 (5th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit issued an order:

   a. denying the Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Defendant
      Dickson's appeal;

   b. granting Dickson's motion for stay of district court
      proceedings pending appeal; and

   c. expediting the appeal to the next available oral argument
      panel.

The other Plaintiffs-Appellees are ALAMO CITY SURGERY CENTER,
P.L.L.C., on behalf of itself, its staff, physicians, nurses, and
patients, doing business as Alamo Women's Reproductive Services;
BROOKSIDE WOMEN'S MEDICAL CENTER, P.A., on behalf of itself, its
staff, physicians, nurses, and patients, doing business as
Brookside Women's Health Center and Austin Women's Health Center;
HOUSTON WOMEN'S CLINIC, on behalf of itself, its staff, physicians,
nurses, and patients; HOUSTON WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES, on
behalf of itself, its staff, physicians, nurses, and patients;
PLANNED PARENTHOOD CENTER FOR CHOICE, on behalf of itself, its
staff, physicians, nurses, and patients; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF
GREATER TEXAS SURGICAL HEALTH SERVICES, on behalf of itself, its
staff, physicians, nurses, and patients; PLANNED PARENTHOOD SOUTH
TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER, on behalf of itself, its staff, physicians,
nurses, and patients; SOUTHWESTERN WOMEN'S SURGERY CENTER, on
behalf of itself, its staff, physicians, nurses, and patients;
WHOLE WOMEN'S HEALTH ALLIANCE, on behalf of itself, its staff,
physicians, nurses, and patients; MEDICAL DOCTOR ALLISON GILBERT,
on behalf of herself and her patients; MEDICAL DOCTOR BHAVIK KUMAR,
on behalf of himself and his patients; THE AFIYA CENTER, on behalf
of itself and its staff; FRONTERA FUND, on behalf of itself and its
staff; FUND TEXAS CHOICE, on behalf of itself and its staff; JANE'S
DUE PROCESS, on behalf of itself and its staff; LILITH FUND,
INCORPORATED, on behalf of itself and its staff; NORTH TEXAS EQUAL
ACCESS FUND, on behalf of itself and its staff; REVEREND ERIKA
FORBES; REVEREND DANIEL KANTER; and MARVA SADLER.

Background

The case presents a challenge to a recently enacted Texas law, S.B.
8, which authorizes private civil actions against persons who abort
an unborn child with a detectable fetal heartbeat. The Plaintiffs,
a coalition of Texas abortion providers, principally seek an
injunction against the Texas court system -- judges, clerks, and a
hypothetical private litigant -- to prevent any Texas court from
entertaining suits under S.B. 8. The unusual nature of the law and
of the challenge to it raise "complex and novel antecedent
procedural questions." The panel must address some of those
questions in order to decide a flurry of motions filed as the law
took effect last September 1.

A group of Texas abortion providers and others ("Plaintiffs")
brought a pre-enforcement challenge under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to
Senate Bill 8 ("S.B. 8"), a Texas abortion law that took effect on
Sept. 1, 2021. The Plaintiffs named as defendants several Texas
agency heads and a putative class of all Texas state judges and
clerks of court ("State Defendants") as well as a private Texas
citizen, Mark Lee Dickson ("Dickson"). They sought injunctive and
declaratory relief to prevent enforcement of the law.

S.B. 8 prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on "a
pregnant woman" if her unborn child has a detectable fetal
heartbeat, absent a medical emergency. Conspicuously, the law
limits enforcement to "private civil actions." In turn, section
171.208 provides that "any person" other than state officials may
bring a civil action against persons who perform prohibited
abortions and those who aid and abet them. If a violation is found,
courts will award injunctive relief, damages "not less than
$10,000" for each abortion, and costs and attorney's fees. Among
other affirmative defenses, a defendant may prove that the relief
sought "will impose an undue burden" on a woman or women the
defendant has standing to represent.

In light of S.B. 8's enforcement mechanism, the Plaintiffs have
adopted a novel strategy for their pre-enforcement challenge.
Principally, they seek to enjoin the entire Texas judiciary to
prevent any court from entertaining S.B. 8 lawsuits. To that end,
they have sued a putative class of all state judges and clerks of
court, as well as Dickson, who they allege is likely to bring a
future S.B. 8 civil action. Following the logic of that strategy,
their complaint groups these defendants -- judges, clerks, and
Dickson -- together. The complaint refers to Dickson as "a private
individual deputized to bring S.B. 8 enforcement actions under
color of state law."

As relevant in the case, all the Defendants moved to dismiss the
lawsuit on the grounds of sovereign immunity and Article III
standing. The district court denied those motions. The Defendants
appealed and sought from the Fifth Circuit an emergency stay of all
district court proceedings, including an impending preliminary
injunction hearing, as well as a temporary administrative stay
pending our resolution of the emergency stay motion. While those
motions were pending, the district court granted a stay as to the
State Defendants, allowing proceedings to continue against Dickson
alone. In the Fifth Circuit, the Plaintiffs filed an opposition to
Dickson's stay motion along with a motion to dismiss his appeal.
The Fifth Circuit then administratively stayed all district court
proceedings and requested a response from Dickson, which he filed.

Discussion

First, as to the state officials' appeal. The district court denied
the officials' Eleventh Amendment immunity defenses, and they
immediately appealed under the collateral-order doctrine. The
district court properly stayed proceedings against those
defendants. However, the Plaintiffs then sought an emergency motion
for injunction pending appeal, premised on their argument that the
district court's Eleventh Amendment immunity ruling was correct.
The Fifth Circuit previously denied that motion and now explains
why. It says, S.B. 8 emphatically precludes enforcement by any
state, local, or agency officials. The Defendant officials thus
lack any "enforcement connection" to S.B. 8 and are not amenable to
suit under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

Second, as to Dickson's appeal. The district court denied Dickson's
motion to dismiss, which relied on standing and other
jurisdictional grounds, and Dickson appealed. But the district
court declined to stay proceedings against Dickson and proposed to
go forward against him alone. Dickson then asked the Fifth Circuit
for a stay, and the latter temporarily stayed proceedings while
considering his request. In the meantime, the Plaintiffs moved to
dismiss Dickson's appeal.

The Fifth Circuit concludes that jurisdictional issues presented in
the proceedings against Dickson are related to the issues presented
in the state officials' collateral-order appeal. The notice of
appeal therefore divested the district court of jurisdiction over
Dickson as well as the officials. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
denies the Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Dickson's appeal, and
grants Dickson's motion to stay the district court proceedings
pending appeal.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the Fifth Circuit denied the Plaintiffs'
motion to dismiss Dickson's appeal. It granted Dickson's motion for
stay of district court proceedings pending appeal. The Fifth
Circuit expedited the appeal to the next available oral argument
panel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/39jkkjb4 from Leagle.com.


THAT'S HOW WE ROLL: Rodriguez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against That's How We Roll
LLC. The case is styled as Angel Rodriguez, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. That's
How We Roll LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-05224 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 20,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

That's How WE Roll LLC -- https://www.thwroll.com/ -- provides food
products. The Company offers chips, cookies, and other snack
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


TRIAD MANUFACTURING: Denial of Arbitration in Smith Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES SMITH, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the Triad Manufacturing, Inc.,
Employee Stock Ownership Plan, Plaintiff-Appellee v. BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF TRIAD MANUFACTURING, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 20-2708 (7th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirms the district court's
denial of Triad's motion to compel arbitration or, in the
alternative, to dismiss.

Background

In this complex ERISA case, James Smith sued fiduciaries of the
retirement plan offered by his former employer, Triad, for alleged
financial misconduct. Add in a class action, an arbitration
provision, and issues of notice and consent to plan amendments, and
the lawsuit gets even more complicated.

Mr. Smith worked for Triad, a shelving and fixture company, from
2015 to 2016. As part of his employment, Smith participated in
Triad's Employee Stock Ownership Plan, a defined contribution
employee retirement plan under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act. A defined contribution plan allows the employee or
the employer (or both) to contribute to the employee's individual
account (e.g., a 401(k) plan). By contrast, a defined benefit plan
provides a fixed monthly benefit based on a general pool of assets
(e.g., a pension plan).

Triad's board of directors, including shareholders David Caito,
Robert Hardie, and Michael McCormick, created the plan for its
employees in early December 2015. The plan provides that "the
Primary Sponsor reserves the right at any time to modify or amend
or terminate the plan in whole or in part." The primary sponsor,
per the plan, is Triad through its board.

On Dec. 17, 2015, Caito, Hardie, and McCormick sold all of Triad's
stock to the plan, which at $58.05 per share totaled more than $106
million. Triad's board appointed GreatBanc Trust Company as plan
trustee on Dec. 21, 2015, and GreatBanc approved the transaction in
short order, seemingly after it had already occurred. Notably, the
plan's holdings consisted entirely of Triad stock.

Triad's share price then dropped to $1.85 on Dec. 31, 2015,
according to the plan's financial statements. What had been valued
at over $106 million plummeted in two weeks to just under $4
million. But under the plan's provisions, no participant could sell
their shares until they vested -- at the earliest, on Dec. 31,
2016, for some employees. As of Dec. 31, 2018, Triad's share price
dipped to less than one dollar per share.

Directors Caito, Hardie, and McCormick, though, seem to have
benefited from the transaction. The plan financed its purchase of
their shares through loans provided by the three men. Triad
guaranteed these loans, charged against the company's equity that
had just been purchased by the plan. The plan also required Triad
to make retirement contributions in amounts no less than necessary
to service the loan payments. So Caito, Hardie, and McCormick
received repayment on the loans -- at least in theory -- no matter
Triad's financial situation.

On July 17, 2018, Triad's board, as the plan's primary sponsor,
amended the plan to include an arbitration provision with a class
action waiver. That amendment includes a subsection, "(a) Covered
Claims," requiring binding arbitration for any claim "which arises
out of, relates to, or concerns this plan; any claim asserting a
breach of, or failure to follow, the plan; and any claim asserting
a breach of, or failure to follow, any provision of ERISA or the
Internal Revenue Code." Another subsection -- entitled "(b) No
Group, Class, or Representative Arbitrations" -- warrants
emphasis.

That subsection requires, in relevant part, that: (i) all Covered
Claims must be brought solely in the Claimant's individual capacity
and not in a representative capacity or on a class, collective, or
group basis; and (ii) each arbitration will be limited solely to
one Claimant's Covered Claims, and that Claimant may not seek or
receive any remedy which has the purpose or effect of providing
additional benefits or monetary or other relief to any Eligible
Employee, Participant or Beneficiary other than the Claimant.

That subsection also, with respect to any claim brought under ERISA
Section 502(a)(2) to seek appropriate relief under Section 409,
expressly limits the Claimant's remedy. In other words, the
arbitration provision is nonseverable, at least for the claim at
issue in its invalidation. Smith, though, contends that he received
no notice of this arbitration provision before its addition to the
plan.

In April 2020, Smith filed a class action complaint against Triad's
board, Caito, Hardie, and McCormic, as well as GreatBanc, under 29
U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2) and (a)(3). The December 2015 transaction
between Triad and the plan, according to Smith, violated numerous
ERISA provisions. Three of the alleged violations are relevant now.
In Count II, Smith alleged that the board defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to monitor fellow fiduciary GreatBanc
as plan trustee, in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1)(A)
and (B). Smith alleged in Count IV that the board defendants
engaged in prohibited transactions in violation of 29 U.S.C.
Section 1106(a). And according to Smith in Count V, the board
defendants knowingly participated in GreatBanc's fiduciary
violations, in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1105(a)(1) and
(a)(3).

Mr. Smith's prayer for relief was wide-ranging. As relevant in the
matter, Smith requested that the district court "remove Great-Banc
as the Trustee of the Triad plan or bar it from serving as a
fiduciary of the plan in the future" and that it "appoints a new
independent fiduciary to manage the Triad plan and order the costs
of such independent fiduciary be paid for by Defendants." He also
asked that the district court "awards such other and further
relief" under Section 1132(a)(2) and/or (a)(3), Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(c), "or that is equitable and just."

Based on the class action waiver, the board defendants then moved
to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to dismiss Smith's
claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or (b)(6).
The district court denied that motion on two grounds. First,
assuming that ERISA claims are generally arbitrable and applying
Missouri state law, the district court held that because Smith had
not consented to the arbitration provision, it could not bind him.
Second, the district court relied on American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant to hold the arbitration provision
unenforceable because it prospectively waived Smith's right to
statutory remedies provided by ERISA.

After the district court denied the motion, the appeal followed.

Discussion

A.

The Seventh Circuit begins with the ERISA provisions relevant in
the matter. Section 1132(a)(2) provides that a civil action may be
brought "by the Secretary of Labor, or by a participant,
beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109
of this title." In turn, Section 1109(a) imposes liability for any
fiduciary who breaches his duties to the plan and holds him
"personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of
assets of the plan by the fiduciary." That provision also
authorizes "other equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary." Taken
together, Section 1109(a) creates fiduciary liability, and Section
1132(a)(2) allows for its enforcement.

In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, the Supreme
Court examined these provisions in the context of a defined benefit
plan. A plan participant in that case sued a fiduciary under
Section 1132(a) "for extra-contractual compensatory or punitive
damages caused by improper or untimely processing" of her plan
benefit claims, in violation of Section 1109(a). The Court held
that Section 1132(a) precluded such individualized relief.

The Supreme Court revisited Sections 1132(a) and 1109(a) in LaRue
v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., albeit in the defined
contribution plan context. There, a plan participant alleged that a
fiduciary's misconduct -- failing to make certain changes to his
401(k) account -- had "'depleted' his interest in the defined
contribution plan] by approximately $150,000, and amounted to a
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA." The Court held that Section
1132(a) permitted such individualized relief, distinguishing
Russell in the process.

With Russell cabined to defined benefit plans, LaRue concluded
"that although Section 1132(a) does not provide a remedy for
individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision
does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the
value of plan assets in a participant's individual account."

B.

Against this backdrop, the Seventh Circuit begins with a threshold
issue: Whether ERISA claims are arbitrable as a general matter. In
ERISA, the Seventh Circuit sees no "contrary congressional command"
precluding arbitration. True, ERISA provides that "the district
courts of the United States will have exclusive jurisdiction of
civil actions under this subchapter." Yet similar provisions in
other statutory schemes have not prevented the Court from
permitting arbitration. Joining every other circuit to consider the
issue, the Seventh Circuit recognizes that ERISA claims are
generally arbitrable.

C.

The pivotal question in the case is whether this ERISA arbitration
provision is enforceable. The Seventh Circuit concludes the answer
is no. It says, the correct resolution is straightforward, though.
The ERISA provisions Smith invokes have individual and plan-wide
effect. But the arbitration provision in Triad's defined
contribution retirement plan precludes relief that "has the purpose
or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary or other
relief to any Eligible Employee, Participant or Beneficiary other
than the Claimant."

Conclusion

Because that provision prohibits relief that ERISA expressly
permits, the Seventh Circuit affirms the district court's denial of
Triad's motion to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/r4py37kz from Leagle.com.


TRINITA PARETE: Herrera Seeks Unpaid Wages for Restaurant Workers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EDGAR HERRERA v. TRINITA PARETE LLC d/b/a/AMPIA ROOFTOP &
GNOCCHERIA WALL STREET RESTAURANT, MICHELE LULIANO, and ANISA
LULIANO, Case No. 1:21-cv-07860 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 21, 2021) seeks to
recover Plaintiff and similarly situated restaurant workers' unpaid
minimum and overtime wages, misappropriated gratuities, liquidated
damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and
attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
New York Labor Law, and the New York State Wage Theft Prevention
Act.

Throughout his employment as a food runner at Ampia & Gnoccheria,
Herrera worked between 15-42 hours per workweek, but the Defendants
allegedly failed to pay him overtime wages for hours worked in
excess of forty per workweek, in violation of FLSA and NYLL. The
Defendants unlawfully took a tip credit against Herrera's wages
despite requiring him and other tipped employees to share portions
of their tips with tip-ineligible employees, including a manager.
Further, the Defendants failed to pay Herrera spread-of-hours pay
for shifts that spanned over ten hours and failed to furnish him
with wage notices and wage statements as required by law, the
lawsuit says.

Trinita Parete LLC is a New York corporation that owns Ampia &
Gnoccheria and is located at 100 Broad Street, 2nd Floor, New York.
Ampia & Gnoccheria is a Mediterranean inspired rooftop and indoor
restaurant that serves authentic Italian food.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Louis Pechman, Esq.
          Gianfranco J. Cuadra, Esq.
          PECHMAN LAW GROUP PLLC
          488 Madison Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 583-9500
          E-mail: pechman@pechmanlaw.com
                  cuadra@pechmanlaw.com

ULTA SALON: Shortchanges Workers' Overtime Pay, Kabasele Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dorcas-Cothy Kabasele, individually, on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ULTA Salon, Cosmetics and
Fragrance, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 21-at-00854 (E.D. Cal.,
September 10, 2021), seeks general, compensatory, punitive, and
statutory damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, statutory
penalties, costs, and attorneys' fees, as well as the imposition of
civil penalties pursuant to the California Labor Code and
applicable California Industrial Wage Commission Order.

ULTA is one of largest beauty retailers in the United States.
Besides selling beauty products, ULTA stores also offer a
full-service salon. Kabasele worked for ULTA from June 2019 through
March 2021 in San Ramon, California as an hourly, non-exempt
employee. Kabasele claims that ULTA failed to include commissions,
non-discretionary bonuses and other items of compensation when
determining the regular rate of pay for purposes of overtime.
Kabasele claims to have work through meal and rest breaks due to
understaffing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert J. Wasserman, Esq.
      William J. Gorham, Esq.
      Nicholas J. Scardigli, Esq.
      MAYALL HURLEY, P.C.
      2453 Grand Canal Boulevard
      Stockton, CA 95207-8253
      Telephone: (209) 477-3833
      Facsimile: (209)473-4818
      Email: rwasserman@mayallaw.com
             wgorham@mayallaw.com
             nscardigli@mayallaw.com


UNCOMMON GROUNDS: Aguilar Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
-------------------------------------------------------------
BRIGIDO GALVEZ AGUILAR, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs, and the class, v. UNCOMMON GROUNDS ENTERPRISES, INC.
d/b/a DISHES, DISHES GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP. d/b/a DISHES, CITY
MINT, INC. d/b/a DISHES, MINI MINT, INC. d/b/a DISHES, MINT NO. 5,
INC. d/b/a DISHES, MOSHE MALLUL, and MARGARITA TALISMAN a.k.a
MAGGIE TALISMAN, Case No. 1:21-cv-07856 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 21, 2021)
alleges pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York
Labor Law that the Plaintiff and others similarly situated are
entitled to recover from Defendants including unpaid wages, unpaid
overtime premiums due to time shaving, unpaid minimum wages due to
invalid tip credit, improper meal credit deductions, statutory
penalties, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Plaintiff contends that although he regularly worked in excess
of 40 hours per workweek, the Defendants never paid him overtime
premium for weeks that he worked in excess of 40 hours, as required
under the FLSA and NYLL. Similarly, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and
Class members also worked similar hours that regularly exceeded 40
hours per week.

The Defendants collectively own and operate five restaurants as a
single integrated enterprise under the common trade name "Dishes”
in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

UNITED SERVICES: Mapes Class Suit Moved From E.D.N.Y. to S.D.N.Y.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled CHRISTINE MAPES, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE
ASSOCIATION, Case No. 2:21-cv-04534, was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York on September
21, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of New York assigned
Case No. 1:21-cv-07853-UA to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged negligence, negligence
per se, and violation of the New York General Business Law by
failure to properly secure and safeguard highly valuable, protected
personally identifiable information (PII); failure to comply with
industry standards to protect information systems that contain PII;
unlawful disclosure of the Plaintiff's and Class members' PII; and
failure to provide adequate notice to the Plaintiff and other Class
members that their PII had been disclosed and compromised.

United Services Automobile Association is a provider of insurance
and financial services, with its principal place of business in San
Antonio, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
        
         Christian Levis, Esq.
         Amanda Fiorilla, Esq.
         LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
         44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
         White Plains, NY 10601
         Telephone: (914) 997-0500
         Facsimile: (914) 997-0035
         E-mail: clevis@lowey.com
                 afiorilla@lowey.com

                - and –

         Anthony M. Christina, Esq.
         LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
         One Tower Bridge
         100 Front Street, Suite 520
         West Conshohocken, PA 19428
         Telephone: (215) 399-4770
         Facsimile: (914) 997-0035
         E-mail: achristina@lowey.com

                - and –

         Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
         Kelly K. Iverson, Esq.
         Nicholas A. Colella, Esq.
         CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
         1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
         Pittsburgh, PA 15222
         Telephone: (412) 322-9243
         Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
         E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
                 kiverson@carlsonlynch.com
                 ncolella@carlsonlynch.com

UNITED STATES: California Court Certifies Class in Castellar v. DHS
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE ORLANDO CANCINO CASTELLAR, et al., Plaintiffs v.
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-00491-BAS-AHG (S.D. Cal.), Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California grants in
part and denies in part the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class
certification.

In the action, individuals who were held in the custody of
Defendants Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and its agencies
challenge the Defendants for not providing prompt presentment to an
immigration judge within 48 hours of arrest. The Plaintiffs seek to
certify a class of individuals, other than unaccompanied minors or
individuals with administratively final removal orders, who are or
will have been in the civil custody of the San Diego offices of the
Defendants for longer than 48 hours and have not had a hearing
before an immigration judge for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Named Plaintiffs Jose Orlando Cancino Castellar, Ana Maria
Hernandez Aguas, and Michael Gonzalez, filed the Complaint on March
9, 2017. At the time of the filing of the Complaint, the Named
Plaintiffs had been in the Defendants' custody for more than 48
hours following their initial arrests without having seen an
immigration judge.

The Plaintiffs filed the action, alleging that Dthe efendants'
policies and practices violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures without probable
cause, and the APA, 5 U.S.C. Sections 702, 706(1), 706(2)(A)-(D).
As relief, the Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment, an
injunction barring the Defendants' allegedly unlawful policy and
practice, and the issuance of writs of habeas corpus commanding the
release of Plaintiffs and class members from detention "to the
extent necessary for the Defendant[s] to comply with their
constitutional and statutory obligations."

The Plaintiffs filed their first motion to certify the class, which
requested certifying the proposed class set forth in the Complaint:
"All individuals in the Southern District of California, other than
those with final removal orders, who are or will be detained by DHS
more than 48 hours without a hearing before an immigration judge or
judicial review of whether their detention is justified by probable
cause."

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court granted the Defendants'
motion and terminated the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class
as

After the Supreme Court decided Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct.
830 (2018), the Plaintiffs moved for a reconsideration of the
dismissal. The Court reinstated the Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment
claims but not the Fourth Amendment claims. The Defendants renewed
the motion to dismiss the Complaint, and the Court dismissed
Plaintiff Gonzalez's procedural due process claim and all the
Plaintiffs' Section 706(1) APA claims. The Court declined to
dismiss other Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims and all the
Plaintiffs' substantive due process claims raised under the Fifth
Amendment. The Court denied the Plaintiffs' second motion for
reconsideration.

The Plaintiffs renew their motion for class certification.

The Defendants have opposed, and the Plaintiffs have replied. The
Defendants invoke Section 242(e) and (f) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(e), (f), to argue
that the Court lacks jurisdiction to certify the class or grant
class-wide relief. The Court held an oral argument.

The Plaintiffs revise the class definition in their motion for
class certification to the following: "All individuals, other than
unaccompanied minors or individuals with administratively final
removal orders, who (1) are or will have been in the civil custody
of the San Diego Field Office of ICE, the San Diego Field Office of
CBP Office of Field Operations, the San Diego Sector of U.S. Border
Patrol, and/or the El Centro Sector of U.S. Border Patrol,
collectively, for longer than 48 hours and (2) have not had a
hearing before an immigration judge."

The Court is asked to decide whether it has jurisdiction under
Section 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. Section 1252, to certify the
class. The Court is also asked to decide whether the proposed class
definition in the renewed motion for class certification improperly
broadens the class, as compared to the class definition set forth
in the Complaint. After resolving these preliminary issues, the
Court must decide whether the proposed class satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Judge Bashant holds that the Court lacks jurisdiction under Section
1252(e)(1) to certify the class as to individuals screened for or
subject to expedited removal proceedings under Section 1225(b)(1)
because the statute requires that those individuals be held in
mandatory detention. She separately holds that Section 1252(f)(1)
strips it of jurisdiction to certify the class for injunctive
relief.

In addition, Judge Bashant finds that the Plaintiffs impermissibly
broaden the class by including individuals detained outside of the
district in the class definition, who were not included in the
initial proposed class definition set forth in the Complaint.

The Judge exercises jurisdiction to redefine the class as follows:
"All individuals in the Southern District of California -- other
than individuals subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C.
Section 1225(b)(1), unaccompanied minors, or individuals with
administratively final removal orders -- who (1) are or will have
been in the civil custody of the San Diego offices of the
Defendants for longer than 48 hours and (2) have not had a hearing
before an immigration judge."

Judge Bashant concludes that the Court has jurisdiction to certify
the class as redefined for declaratory relief and that the
redefined class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
(b)(2). Accordingly, the Judge grants in part and denies in part
the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/c2nw4j8s from Leagle.com.


UNIVERSAL SCREEN: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Burzdak Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Universal Screen Arts, Inc. filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled KAREN BURZDAK, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. UNIVERSAL SCREEN
ARTS, INC., an Ohio Corporation, Case No. 3:21-cv-02148, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Francisco.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on April 23, 2021, the
lawsuit is a class action complaint against the Defendant to stop
its practice of deceptively enrolling consumers into a paid and
automatically renewing membership program.

According to the complaint, after a consumer places an order from
one of the Defendant's websites, they are presented with a free
shipping option. Unbeknownst to consumers, however, selecting the
free shipping option automatically enrolls them into a 7-day free
trial to Universal's VIP Insider membership program that renews
every month for $14.95. The VIP Insider program allegedly gives
consumer free shipping at any of Universal's retailers as well as
cash back benefits on each purchase, the suit adds.

However, when enrolling consumers into the free trial of the VIP
Insider membership, Universal fails to clearly and conspicuously
disclose the terms of the membership including that there is any
charge associated with the membership, let alone that it
willcautomatically renew on a monthly basis, alleges the suit.

Once a consumer is entrapped in the membership, cancelling the VIP
Insider membership is an intentionally difficult task. When a
consumer discovers (if at all) that Universal enrolled them into a
paid VIP Insider program, Universal does not offer a timely and
easy-to-use mechanism for cancelling the membership, leading to
repeat and ongoing unauthorized charges.

Consumers like Plaintiff Burzdak and the putative Class, have been
unknowingly enrolled into a membership program they did not want
with no clear way to cancel. As such, the Defendant has violated
the California Automatic Renewal Law (ARL) and the California
Unfair Competition Law, said the complaint.

The Defendant now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated August
16, 2021, denying its motion to compel arbitration.

The appellate case is captioned as Karen Burzdak v. Universal
Screen Arts, Inc., Case No. 21-16519, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Sept. 15, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Universal Screen Arts, Inc. Mediation Questionnaire
was due on Sept. 22, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by October 14, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on Nov. 15, 2021;

   -- Appellant Universal Screen Arts, Inc. opening brief is due on
Dec. 23, 2021;

   -- Appellee Karen Burzdak answering brief is due on Jan. 24,
2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant UNIVERSAL SCREEN ARTS, INC., an Ohio
Corporation, is represented by:

          Kristin Haule, Esq.
          Christine Marie Reilly, Esq.
          Justin Jones Rodriguez, Esq.
          Benjamin G. Shatz, Esq.   
          MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
          2049 Century Park, E, Suite 1700
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 312-4248

Plaintiff-Appellee KAREN BURZDAK, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          150 California Street, 18th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 212-9300
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com  

               - and -

          Roger J. Perlstadt, Esq.
          EDELSON P.C.
          350 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1400
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589-6370

VF OUTDOOR: Hearing on Bid to Deny Class Cert. Continued to Nov. 3
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRIANA VALENCIA, an
individual, on behalf of all persons similarly situated on behalf
of the State of California, as a private attorney general, and on
behalf of all aggrieved employees, v. VF OUTDOOR, LLC, a California
limited liability company, and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, Case No.
1:20-cv-01795-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Sheila K. Oberto
entered an order:

   1. The hearing on Defendant's motion to deny class
      certification is continued to November 3, 2021.

   2. Plaintiff's opposition to the motion shall be 17 filed by
      no later than October 20, 2021, and Defendant's reply to
      Plaintiff's opposition shall be filed by no later than
      October 27, 2021.

VF Corporation (formerly Vanity Fair Mills until 1969) is an
American worldwide apparel and footwear company founded in 1899 and
headquartered in Denver, Colorado.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 16, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3m1NIaB at no extra charge.[CC]


VITAL LINK: Underpays Paramedics, Wise Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------
JILL WISE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. VITAL LINK, INC., Defendant, Case No.
3:21-cv-00193-DPM (E.D. Ark., Sept. 15, 2021) arises from the
Defendant's alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act due to its failure to pay minimum and
overtime wages to Plaintiff and other hourly clinical employees.

The Defendant employed Plaintiff as a paramedic from February of
2006 to the present.

The Defendant's primary business is providing emergency medical
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Ford, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040  
          E-mail: daniel@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

VMWARE INC: N.D. California Narrows Claims in Lamartina Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM LAMARTINA, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. VMWARE, INC., PATRICK P.
GELSINGER, and ZANE ROWE, Defendants, Case No. 5:20-cv-02182-EJD
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, grants in
part and denies in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss with
leave to amend.

Background

Lead Plaintiff Northeast Carpenters Pension Fund brings the
putative class action against Defendants VMware, VMware CEO Patrick
P. Gelsinger, and VMware CFO Zane Rowe, alleging violations of
Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
promulgated thereunder. The Lead Plaintiff brings the action
individually and on behalf of all persons other than the Defendants
who purchased or otherwise acquired VMware securities between Aug.
24, 2018 and Feb. 27, 2020, both dates inclusive.

The Lead Plaintiff is "a defined benefit pension plan with assets
of over $2.5 billion that provides retirement benefits to over
25,000 participants." It was a purchaser of VMware shares.

VMware is a company based in Palo Alto, California that provides
software products and services, including licenses, subscriptions,
and software as a service ("SaaS"). VMware operates in three market
segments: "Americas," "Asia Pacific & Japan," and "Europe Middle
East and Africa." During the Class Period, VMware experienced a
customer shift away from license-based revenue toward subscription-
and SaaS-based revenue.

Throughout the Class Period, VMware stocks were actively traded on
the New York Stock Exchange. VMware's publicly filed financial
statements are subject to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP").

The Lead Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made numerous
misleading and/or false statements in VMware's SEC filings and on
quarterly earnings calls for investors and analysts between
September 2018 and December 2019, during VMware's Fiscal Years
("FY") 2019 and 2020. These statements generally indicated that
VMware was meeting and would continue to meet its expectations for
revenue in FY 2019 and 2020, and the Lead Plaintiff alleges these
statements were misleading because VMware failed to disclose that
it was improperly managing its backlog in order to manipulate
revenue records and conceal potential risks regarding future
revenue. Specifically, the "Defendants engaged in a practice of
materially and artificially inflating both license revenue and
total backlog by pushing sales that were not required to meet
current period revenue or earnings guidance from the current
quarter into the next quarter, by deliberately leaving them
categorized as unfulfilled at quarter end."

According to the Lead Plaintiff, the Defendants engaged in a
practice of inflating VMware's backlog in order to "enhance its
prospects of meeting guidance and analyst expectations in future
periods, and to lead investors to believe that VMware's license and
total revenue guidance would be met in FY 2020." The Lead Plaintiff
alleges that this practice also allowed VMware to manipulate
records of its revenue growth in FY 2019 and, consequently, to
shape analyst expectations of its revenue growth in FY 2020. The
Lead Plaintiff asserts that the backlog inflation at VMware allowed
the Defendants to "conceal from investors and the market several
issues that would plague VMware in FY 2020: (i) a poorly performing
Americas segment following a reorganization in that region; and,
(ii) a failure to successfully weather the industry-wide shift away
from license products in favor of subscription and SaaS products."

The Lead Plaintiff alleges that VMware's practice of manipulating
its revenue records by inflating its backlog culminated in FY 2020.
In Q1 2020, VMware's stock price peaked, and VMware executives sold
large quantities of their VMware stock. Throughout the rest of FY
2020, the Lead Plaintiff says that a series of disclosures --
particularly ones regarding VMware's declining backlog -- coincided
with a drop in VMware stock prices. On Feb. 27, 2020, the last day
of the Class Period, the Defendants made several disclosures,
including that VMware was the subject of an SEC investigation
concerning its backlog practices. The Lead Plaintiff alleges that
these disclosures led to a dramatic drop in VMware stock prices.

On March 31, 2020, Plaintiff William Lamartina filed a putative
class action federal securities complaint with the Court. On July
20, 2020, the Court appointed Northeast Carpenters Pension Fund as
the Lead Plaintiff and its counsel as the lead counsel. On July 23,
2020, the parties stipulated to the Lead Plaintiff filing an
amended consolidated complaint, which the Lead Plaintiff filed on
Sept. 18, 2020.

On Nov. 17, 2020, the Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the
operative amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and for failure to plead claims with the requisite level
of particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15
U.S.C. 78u-4 et seq. Judge Davila finds the matter suitable for
decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule
7-1(b).

Discussion

A. Request for Judicial Notice

The Defendants request the Court takes judicial notice of the
documents attached as exhibits to the declaration of Elliot
Greenfield filed in support of the Defendants' motion to dismiss.
The documents in question consist of: VMware's Form 10-K, 10-Q, and
8-K reports filed with the SEC; transcripts of VMware earnings
calls; and Gelsinger and Rowe's Form 4 filings submitted to the
SEC.

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to judicially notice
an adjudicative fact if it is "'generally known,' or 'can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.'" Accordingly, "a court may take
judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment," but it may
not take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public
records.

Judge Davila holds it is appropriate for the Court to take judicial
notice of publicly available SEC filings where, as in the case,
such SEC filings form the basis of the Lead Plaintiff's claim.
Because the statements made in the VMware earnings calls are
incorporated into the complaint and serve as the basis for the Lead
Plaintiff's claims, judicial notice of the call transcripts is also
appropriate. The Lead Plaintiff does not oppose the Defendants'
request for judicial notice. Accordingly, Judge Davila grants the
Defendants' request for judicial notice.

B. Section 10(b) and 10b-5 Claim

The Lead Plaintiff alleges that all the Defendants engaged in a
scheme to defraud the market in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 when they disseminated materially false and misleading
statements in VMware's SEC filings and press releases and during
VMware's earnings calls.

To state a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Lead
Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish: "(1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation."

The Defendants argue the Lead Plaintiff fails to state a claim
under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 that satisfies the PSLRA's
heightened pleading standards. They challenge the adequacy of the
Lead Plaintiff's Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 allegations, arguing
that the Lead Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to
establish (1) a material misstatement or omission, (2) a strong
inference of scienter, and (3) loss causation.

1. Material misstatement or omission

The Defendants first argue that the Lead Plaintiff has failed to
satisfy the PSLRA's requirement to identify specific statements
alleged to be misleading and to explain why they are misleading. In
particular, they contend that: (1) the complaint does not contain
any facts from which it may be inferred that their statements about
VMware's backlog or revenue recognition were misleading; (2) the
PSLRA's safe harbor protects any forward-looking statements the
Defendants made; and (3) the Defendants' statements of corporate
optimism and puffery are nonactionable.

Initially, Judge Davila finds that beyond the paragraphs the Lead
Plaintiff cites in its opposition brief, the complaint identifies
numerous other instances of what the Lead Plaintiff asserts are
misleading statements in the Defendants' SEC filings and other
public statements concerning VMware's revenue and backlog status.
The Judge finds that the Lead Plaintiff relies primarily on its
manipulated backlog theory as the basis for why the Defendants'
statements were misleading. While such a theory may be viable, the
Judge says, the Lead Plaintiff has not pled facts with sufficient
particularity to support it. The only allegations in the nearly
50-page amended complaint concerning the genesis of the alleged
deception -- that VMware padded its backlog by deliberately
delaying fulfillment of contracts --appear in two paragraphs.

Next, Judge Davila finds that some of the statements the Lead
Plaintiff describes in the amended complaint fall within the PSLRA
safe harbor, but others do not. First, the Defendants concede that
under the Ninth Circuit's holding in Berson, backlog reporting
itself does not receive safe harbor protection. Second, the Lead
Plaintiff has not alleged facts necessary to substantiate its
theory of backlog manipulation.

Judge Davila also finds that
nothing in Paragraph 64 constitutes a factual statement regarding
any specific aspect of VMware's business; rather, it consists
solely of generalized statements of optimism about VMware's current
performance and its future outlook.
The same can be said for the other paragraphs that the Defendants
cite as puffery, except for factual statements concerning specific
revenue and backlog amounts in Paragraphs 87, 89, 91, 104, 112,
113, 115, and 116. Furthermore, certain statements in Paragraphs
106, 118, 119, and 121 are likewise not generalized statements of
optimism but rather either forward-looking statements about
projected revenue or concrete descriptions of the past and present
state of revenue recognized over a period of time.

2. Scienter

The Defendants argue that the Lead Plaintiff has failed to satisfy
the PSLRA's requirement that a complaint must "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind." The Lead
Plaintiff responds that it pleads facts alleging a strong inference
of scienter, including that the Defendants made unusual or
suspicious stock sales, that the Defendants controlled backlog
reporting, that the Defendants' GAAP violations were indicative of
scienter, that VMware's Chief Accounting Officer (CAO) resigned
around the time of the SEC investigation, and that only three
months passed between the Q4 2019 report concerning record backlog
and the first backlog draw down.

Judge Davila holds that (i) non-defendant executives' stock sales,
as currently pled, do not support an inference of scienter; (ii)
the Lead Plaintiff's arguments fail to allege particular facts
indicating that the Defendants' backlog reporting was improper or
that Defendants violated GAAP; (iii) the CAO resignation "adds a
piece to the scienter puzzle" but cannot support scienter by
itself; and (iv) each of the Lead Plaintiff's allegations
concerning scienter are, by themselves, subject to competing
inferences and while they may collectively create an inference of
scienter, the Judge cannot say at this time that that inference is
a sufficiently strong one or it is "at least as compelling as any
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.

3. Loss causation

The Defendants argue that the Lead Plaintiff has failed to plead
facts alleging loss causation. An inquiry into loss causation
"requires no more than the familiar test for proximate cause." To
prove loss causation, plaintiffs need only show a 'causal
connection' between the fraud and the loss by tracing the loss back
to the very facts about which the defendant lied. The Lead
Plaintiff alleges that, "because the Defendants failed to disclose
the true state of VMware's backlog and revenue, investors were not
aware of the true state of VMware's operations."

Judge Davila holds that these allegations are enough to give rise
to a plausible inference that the Defendants' disclosures were at
least partially responsible for the Lead Plaintiff's and other
putative class members' economic losses. The Judge finds that the
Lead Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts alleging loss
causation.

Summary

In sum, Judge Davila finds that the Lead Plaintiff has adequately
pled facts sufficient concerning loss causation, but not concerning
scienter or a material misstatement or omission. He therefore
dismisses the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim with leave to
amend.

C. Section 20(a) Claim

The Lead Plaintiff's second cause of action asserts a Section 20(a)
claim against the individual defendants, Gelsinger and Rowe.
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that certain
"controlling" individuals may be held liable for violations of
Section 10(b) and its underlying regulations.

Having found that Lead Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a
predicate violation under Section 10(b), the Court finds that Lead
Plaintiff does not state a controlling person liability claim
against Gelsinger or Rowe under Section 20(a).

D. Section 20A Claim

Lead Plaintiff's third cause of action asserts a Section 20A claim
against Gelsinger. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181-190. "Section 20A of the
Exchange Act creates a private cause of action for
'contemporaneous' insider trading." SEB Inv. Mgmt. AB v. Align
Tech., Inc., 485 F.Supp.3d 1113, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2020)." To satisfy
Section 20A, a plaintiff must plead [(1)] a predicate violation of
the securities laws; and (2) facts showing that the trading
activity of plaintiffs and defendants occur contemporaneously." Id.
(internal quotations removed).

Having found that the Lead Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a
predicate violation under Section 10(b) or otherwise, Judge Davila
finds that the Lead Plaintiff does not state a Section 20A claim
against Gelsinger.

E. Leave to Amend

In the event that a motion to dismiss is granted, "a district court
should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the
pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Because he
cannot say that the defects described cannot possibly be cured by
the allegation of other facts, Judge Davila grants the Lead
Plaintiff leave to amend to add facts that would support its claims
under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5.

Conclusion

For the reasons given, Judge Davila grants in part and denies in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend. The
Lead Plaintiff will file a second amended consolidated complaint by
Sept. 24, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3a8yzj3n from Leagle.com.


VNGR BEVERAGE: Martinez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against VNGR Beverage, LLC.
The case is styled as Pedro Martinez, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. VNGR
Beverage, LLC doing business as: Poppi, Case No. 1:21-cv-05225
(E.D.N.Y., Sept. 20, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

VNGR Beverage, LLC doing business as Poppi --
https://www.drinkpoppi.com/ -- is a functional prebiotic soda for
all.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


WASTE PRO: Norton Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------
BARRY B. NORTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WASTE PRO OF FLORIDA, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 9:21-cv-81785 (S.D. Fla., September 21, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and all others similarly
situated drivers overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40
hours in a workweek.

Mr. Norton was employed by the Defendant as a driver from March
2015 through October 2020.

Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. is a company that provides waste and
recycling collection services, with its principal place of address
located at 2101 W. Sr. 434, Longwood, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                

         Daniel Lustig, Esq.
         Robert C. Johnson, Esq.
         PIKE & LUSTIG, LLP
         1209 N. Olive Ave.
         West Palm Beach, FL 33401
         Telephone: (561) 855-7585
         Facsimile: (561) 855-7710
         E-mail: pleadings@pikelustig.com

WATERDROP INC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of November 15 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion no later than November 15, 2021 in a securities class action
lawsuit that has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
acquired shares of Waterdrop Inc. ("Waterdrop" or the "Company")
(NYSE: WDH) American Depositary Shares ("ADSs" or "shares") from
May 4, 2021 through September 14, 2021 (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York alleges violations of the Securities Act of
1934.

If you purchased Waterdrop securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Waterdrop Inc
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Rujul Patel toll free
at (877) 779-1414 or rpatel@bernlieb.com

According to the complaint, Waterdrop's IPO Registration Statement
contained false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Waterdrop had achieved a substantial portion of
its historical revenue growth through illicit means that ran afoul
of Chinese rules and regulations governing the insurance industry;
(2) Waterdrop had been ordered by the Chinese government to shut
down its mutual aid platform because of its failure to comply with
Chinese law; (3) Waterdrop was under investigation by regulatory
authorities for continued violations of Chinese law; (4) as a
result of the foregoing, there existed a material undisclosed risk
and substantial likelihood that Waterdrop would face severe adverse
actions by regulatory authorities following the IPO; (5)
Waterdrop's operating losses had increased more than four-fold in
the first quarter of 2021 as a result of the cessation of its
mutual aid business and rapidly growing customer acquisition costs;
and (6) as a result of the foregoing, the IPO registration
statement's representations regarding Waterdrop's historical
financial and operational metrics and purported market
opportunities did not accurately reflect the actual business,
operations, and financial results and trajectory of the Company in
the lead up to the IPO, were materially false and misleading, and
lacked a factual basis. When the true details entered the market,
the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

In May 2021, Waterdrop completed its initial public offering (the
"IPO"), selling 30 million ADSs at $12.00 per share.

On August 11, 2021, multiple news sources reported that China's
banking and insurance watchdog, the China Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission, had issued an order directing insurance
companies, including Waterdrop, to cease improper marketing and
pricing practices rampant in the industry and enhance their user
privacy protections.

On September 8, 2021, Waterdrop announced its financial results for
the quarter ended June 30, 2021, noting that operating losses had
continued to accelerate due to a sharp increase in the Company's
costs and operating expenses. On September 13, 2021, Waterdrop ADSs
dropped to a low of $3 per share, losing 75% of the value at which
it was sold to the investing public.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than November 15, 2021. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Waterdrop securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/waterdropinc-wdh-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-fraud-stock-440/apply/
or contact Rujul Patel toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
rpatel@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING. © 2021 Bernstein Liebhard LLP. The law firm
responsible for this advertisement is Bernstein Liebhard LLP, 10
East 40th Street, New York, New York 10016, (212) 779-1414. The
lawyer responsible for this advertisement in the State of
Connecticut is Michael S. Bigin. Prior results do not guarantee or
predict a similar outcome with respect to any future matter. [GN]

WATERDROP INC: Kahn Swick Reminds of November 15 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadline in the following securities class action lawsuit:

Waterdrop Inc. (NYSE:WDH)

Class Period: purchase of shares issued either in or after the May
2021 Initial Public Offering

Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: November 15, 2021

MISLEADING PROSPECTUS

To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-wdh/

SECURITIES FRAUD

To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-sam/

If you purchased shares of the above company and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case link above.

If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.

                            About KSF

KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients -
including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors - in seeking to recover investment
losses due to corporate fraud and malfeasance by publicly traded
companies. KSF has offices in New York, California, Louisiana and
New Jersey.

To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com. [GN]

WATERDROP INC: Robbins Geller Reminds of November 15 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP announces that purchasers of
Waterdrop Inc. (NYSE:WDH) American Depositary Shares ("ADSs")
pursuant and/or traceable to Waterdrop's May 2021 initial public
offering ("IPO") have until November 15, 2021 to seek appointment
as lead plaintiff. Filed by Robbins Geller, the Waterdrop class
action lawsuit charges Waterdrop, certain of its top executives and
directors, as well as the underwriters of Waterdrop's IPO with
violations of the Securities Act of 1933. The Waterdrop class
action lawsuit was filed on September 14, 2021 and is pending in
the Southern District of New York.

The plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which has extensive
experience in prosecuting investor class actions including actions
involving financial fraud. You can view a copy of the complaint by
clicking here.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff of the Waterdrop class
action lawsuit, please provide your information by clicking here.
You can also contact attorney Brian Cochran of Robbins Geller by
calling 800/449-4900 or via e-mail at bcochran@rgrdlaw.com. Lead
plaintiff motions for the Waterdrop class action lawsuit must be
filed with the court no later than November 15, 2021.

CASE ALLEGATIONS: The Waterdrop class action lawsuit alleges that
the IPO's Registration Statement failed to disclose that Waterdrop
was the subject of an intense regulatory investigation and pending
crackdown by Chinese authorities because of a variety of market
abuses perpetrated by Waterdrop used to artificially inflate
Waterdrop's short-term financial results in the lead up to the IPO,
including, among other things: (i) operating insurance platforms
without proper governmental authorizations; (ii) mispricing risks
for consumers; and (iii) illicitly using client information. The
Waterdrop class action lawsuit further alleges that, unbeknownst to
investors, the reason that Waterdrop had discontinued its mutual
aid segment was because it had been ordered to do so by Chinese
regulators. Furthermore, Waterdrop had suffered rapidly
accelerating operating losses in the first quarter of 2021 which
was completed weeks before the IPO.

On June 17, 2021, Waterdrop issued a press release announcing
Waterdrop's financial results for the quarter conducted before the
IPO. In doing so, Waterdrop reported that its operating costs and
expenses had ballooned over 75%, or RMB579.1 million, to RMB1,343.9
million (US$205.1 million). As a result, Waterdrop suffered an
operating loss for the quarter of RMB460.6 million (US$70.3
million), compared with operating loss of RMB111.1 million for the
same period of 2020 - a more than four-fold increase. This rapid
increase in operating expenses was due largely to the cessation of
Waterdrop's mutual aid business and growing customer acquisition
costs.

Then, on August 11, 2021, multiple news sources reported that
China's banking and insurance watchdog, the China Banking and
Insurance Regulatory Commission, had issued an order directing
insurance companies to cease improper marketing and pricing
practices rampant in the industry and enhance their user privacy
protections. Failure to comply would reportedly result in the
offenders being "severely punished" by Chinese authorities. As
Bloomberg reported, "[r]egulators have since moved to shutter some
operations including mutual aid healthcare platforms operated by
Waterdrop." The article continued: "The latest move will stymie
growth in an industry that had been expected to grow to 2.5
trillion yuan ($385 billion) in a decade."

Finally, on September 8, 2021, Waterdrop revealed that its
operating losses for the quarter ended June 30, 2021 had continued
to accelerate, totaling RMB815.4 million (US$126.3 million),
compared with an operating profit of RMB7.2 million for the same
period of 2020. This was once again due to a sharp increase in
Waterdrop's operating costs and expenses, as Waterdrop's operating
costs and expenses during the quarter increased by RMB1,081.1
million, or 160.5% year over year, to RMB1,754.7 million (US$271.8
million) from RMB673.6 million for the same period of 2020.

On September 13, 2021, Waterdrop ADSs dropped to a low of just $3
per ADS -75% below the price at which Waterdrop ADSs were sold to
the investing public just four months previously.

THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROCESS: The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 permits any investor who purchased Waterdrop
ADSs pursuant and/or traceable to the IPO to seek appointment as
lead plaintiff in the Waterdrop class action lawsuit. A lead
plaintiff is generally the movant with the greatest financial
interest in the relief sought by the putative class who is also
typical and adequate of the putative class. A lead plaintiff acts
on behalf of all other class members in directing the Waterdrop
class action lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can select a law firm of
its choice to litigate the Waterdrop class action lawsuit. An
investor's ability to share in any potential future recovery of the
Waterdrop class action lawsuit is not dependent upon serving as
lead plaintiff.

ABOUT ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP: With 200 lawyers in 9
offices nationwide, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is the largest
U.S. law firm representing investors in securities class actions.
Robbins Geller attorneys have obtained many of the largest
shareholder recoveries in history, including the largest securities
class action recovery ever - $7.2 billion - in In re Enron Corp.
Sec. Litig. The 2020 ISS Securities Class Action Services Top 50
Report ranked Robbins Geller first for recovering $1.6 billion for
investors last year, more than double the amount recovered by any
other securities plaintiffs' firm. Please visit
https://www.rgrdlaw.com for more information. [GN]

WELLS FARGO: Florida Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Mathieson Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCOTT MATHIESON and TRUDY MATHIESON, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as
Trustee for the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated as of June 1,
2006 Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2006-FR2
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-FRS, LLC; PHH
MORTGAGE CORPORATION; and ROBERTSON, ANSCHUTZ & SCHNEID, PL,
Defendants, Case No. 8:20-cv-2728-WFJ-SPF (M.D. Fla.), Judge
William F. Jung of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Florida, Tampa Division, grants the motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants Wells Fargo and PHH.

Background

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs Scott and Trudy
Mathieson bring two counts against both Defendants Wells Fargo and
PHH: (1) violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices
Act ("FCCPA"), Fla. Stat. Section 559 et seq. (Count I); and (2)
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15
U.S.C. Section 1692 et seq. (Count II). The second amended
complaint adds more detail surrounding the allegedly violative
communications, as well as the default status of the loan during
the relevant times Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and PHH, respectively,
were servicing the loan.

The Mathiesons purchased a home in Pasco County, Florida, in
January 2006. Mr. Mathieson executed a promissory note on Jan. 6,
2006. A mortgage to secure the loan was recorded on Jan. 18, 2006.
The loan was modified effective April 1, 2016.

Mr. Mathieson signed the April 2016 modification agreement on Feb.
10, 2016, and Ocwen signed on behalf of Wells Fargo on March 14,
2016. The modification agreement names the servicer at the time as
Ocwen.

In the action, the Mathiesons allege that as part of the April 2016
modification agreement, the parties "stipulated that the loan was
in default at the time the modification was extended and that there
was no sufficient income to make monthly mortgage payments." The
modification agreement itself supports this allegation, as it
contains the borrower's representation that the loan was in
default. The modification agreement further provides that if the
borrowers "do not comply with the terms of the Loan Documents, as
modified by this Agreement," then the borrowers "will be in
default.

In April 2017, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure action against the
Mathiesons. Ocwen was the servicer of the loan when the foreclosure
action was filed, as is indicated by Ocwen's verification of the
foreclosure complaint in March 2017. The state foreclosure
complaint alleged that the Mathiesons were in default on the "Note
and Mortgage by failing to pay the payment due as of May 1, 2016."
The May 2016 default date, however, derives from the payments due
under the loan modification.

Wells Fargo sought a deficiency judgment as part of the "wherefore"
clause at the end of the one-count complaint for foreclosure in the
event "the proceeds of the sale are insufficient." According to
Wells Fargo's counsel, though, a deficiency judgment was never
sought.

During the pendency of the foreclosure action, Defendant PHH became
the new servicer on the loan on June 1, 2019. The June 4 loan
transfer notice recites the "mini-Miranda" language at the bottom
of each page. A final judgment of foreclosure was filed and
recorded on Aug. 16, 2019. he property was noticed for foreclosure
sale to occur on Sept. 17, 2019, and later rescheduled for sale on
March 3, 2020, which was the date it sold.

After the foreclosure judgment but before the March 3 sale,
Defendants sent the Mathiesons four written communications -- three
letters and a motion to cancel the sale with affidavit attached.
Two of the three letters are not attached to the second amended
complaint but are attached to the response to the motion to
dismiss.

On Jan. 14, 2020, PHH sent the Mathiesons "an early intervention
borrower assistance letter," which "referenced foreclosure and that
the maturity [date] had been accelerated." The Mathiesons allege
Wells Fargo and PHH "then told the borrowers that reinstatement
could occur by paying the past due payments." The January 14
assistance letter states that PHH's "records indicate this account
is in foreclosure and its maturity date has been accelerated" and
that the "account can be reinstated by paying the past due
payment(s)." The letter separately lists eight "possible options,"
including "Reinstatement: The account can be reinstated by paying
the past due amount(s)."

The Mathiesons allege that "a loss mitigation hold was placed on
the borrowers file" on Jan. 29, 2020, which was "35 days prior to
the scheduled foreclosure sale and within two weeks of the
Defendant sending its correspondence." The January 29 letter states
that the application for mortgage assistance was received and that
the application was complete as of Jan. 27, 2020. Each page of the
letter contains the same debt collection language found in the
January 14 letter.

On Feb. 10, 2020, PHH wrote Mr. Mathieson that the Plaintiffs'
account qualified for certain "available options." The February 10
letter "conditionally approved the Plaintiffs for a short sale or a
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure." This loss mitigation letter gave the
Mathiesons until March 11, 2020, to send PHH four specific
documents.At the bottom of each page of the February 10 letter
appears the same debt collection disclaimer found in the January 14
and 29 letters.

The Mathiesons allege that they "started submitting the necessary
documents" on Feb. 25, 2020. Also on February 25, Wells Fargo filed
a motion to cancel the sale for the purposes of evaluating the
Mathiesons' "eligibility to participate in loss mitigation
opportunities" and gave them until March 11, 2020, to submit the
requested information. Wells Fargo submitted an affidavit of PHH
with an attachment in support of the motion. Attached to the
affidavit was the February 10 letter of conditional approval with
the disclaimer language at the bottom of each page. On Feb. 28,
2020, the state court denied the motion to cancel the sale.

The Mathiesons allege that the Defendants failed to follow the
explicit instructions provided in the judgment denying the
Defendants' motion to cancel the sale. Specifically, they allege
that the Defendants should have set the matter for hearing instead
of sending only a letter with a proposed order to the court. The
Mathiesons also allege that no renewed objection to the sale was
made, nor any attempt to rescind the sale.

Overall, as previously noted, the second amended complaint contains
more details surrounding the two communications discussed in the
Court's prior order, and it identifies additional communications.
The Mathiesons also expand on the allegations concerning the timing
of the transfer of the loan from Ocwen to PHH. These additional
allegations are addressed under the relevant grounds the Defendants
raise in support of dismissal.

Discussion

The Defendants argue that 1) neither Defendant is a debt collector,
2) the Mathiesons fail to identify any actionable communications,
3) the Defendants' conduct leading up to the denial of the motion
to cancel sale is not actionable, and 4) the claim that the
Defendants communicated directly with the Mathiesons when they were
represented by counsel is unsupported by any factual allegations.
The Mathiesons attach two new documents to their response to the
motion to dismiss: the January 14 and 29 letters from PHH. They
argue that the post-foreclosure letters, motion, and affidavit,
together with the Defendants' conduct leading up to the sale,
constitute a violation of the FDCPA and FCCPA.

A. Wells Fargo as a Debt Collector

The Defendants argue that the allegation that Wells Fargo is a debt
collector is not only conclusory but contradicted by other
allegations and attachments. They also contend that Wells Fargo is
a creditor not subject to the FDCPA or FCCPA.

Judge Jung agrees. He finds that the allegations and attachments
fail to demonstrate that Wells Fargo meets the statutory definition
of a debt collector under either the FDCPA or FCCPA, or any
exclusion under section 1692a(6)(F). He says, the Mathiesons'
argument that the disclaimers at the bottom of each page in the
written communications transform Wells Fargo into a debt collector
are discussed within the section regarding conduct and
communications.

B. PHH as a Debt Collector

The same statutory framework set forth applies to determine whether
PHH is a debt collector. The second amended complaint alleges that
PHH is a debt collector and a servicer of the loan. Because the
allegations, assumed as true, meet the initial statutory definition
of "debt collector," the issue becomes whether a statutory
exception under section 1692a(6)(F), specifically subsection (iii),
applies to exclude PHH from liability under the statute.

The Mathiesons argue, in part, that the status of PHH as a debt
collector derives from the status of Ocwen. They posit that if
Ocwen was a debt collector in both February 2016 (when it signed
the modification agreement) and June 2019 (when PHH became the
servicer), then PHH is also a debt collector.

Judge Jung holds that if Ocwen as a mortgage servicer began
servicing the loan before the mortgage was in default, PHH is not a
debt collector under the statute. Because Ocwen began servicing the
modification agreement before the Mathiesons defaulted under that
agreement, PHH is exempt under subsection section
1692a(6)(F)(iii).

C. Conduct and Communications by Wells Fargo and PHH

Even assuming Wells Fargo and/or PHH are debt collectors as pled by
the Mathiesons, Judge Jung finds that the alleged communications
and conduct do not fall under the FDCPA. The questioned
communications or conduct must be "related to" debt collection.
Although the foreclosure judgment states that the motion "must be
set for hearing," courts -- not counsel -- typically notice and set
hearings, and hearings are not necessarily set at the parties'
request. None of the exhibits central to the claim substantiate
that the motion was knowingly, improperly written to ensure its
denial. Moreover, inferring the underlying reasons for the denial
of the motion would only be conjecture on the part of anyone other
than the state court judge. Likewise, the Defendants' decision not
to renew or appeal within the brief three-day period between the
denial and the sale does not evidence that they never intended to
stop the sale.

Conclusion

Having concluded the allegations are insufficient to establish PHH
or Wells Fargo is a "debt collector" and the communications or
conduct are false or misleading, Judge Bunning finds dismissal of
the action appropriate. The allegations, and all reasonable
inferences therefrom, fail to allege a plausible claim -- such that
even an unsophisticated consumer would not be confused or misled by
the written communications or conduct. To the extent that the FCCPA
claims may be viable, the Judge declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, as strongly encouraged where federal claims are
dismissed prior to trial.

Therefore, Judge Bunning granted the motion to dismiss. Count II
seeking relief under the FDCPA is dismissed with prejudice. Count I
seeking relief under the FCCPA is dismissed without prejudice. The
Clerk is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 8, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4vf8d729 from Leagle.com.


WELLS FARGO: Hearing for Class Cert. Bid Continued to Nov. 1
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CAUDLEY SIMON, on behalf
of himself, all others similarly situated, v. WELLS FARGO BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a National Banking Association; and sDOES 1
through 100, inclusive,  Case No. 2:20-cv-00211-JAK-AS (C.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge John A. Kronstadt entered an order approving
stipulation to continue class certification-related motion hearing
dates as follows:

   -- The hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification
      and Plaintiff's motion for leave to add new class
      representative shall be continued from September 20, 2021,
      to November 1, 2021, at 8:30 a.m.

   -- No further briefing on the motions shall be filed;
      provided, however, this is without prejudice to the filing
      of an application for leave to do so.

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association operates as a bank. The Bank
offers online and mobile banking, home mortgage, loans and credit,
investment and retirement, wealth management, and insurance
services. Wells Fargo Bank serves commercial, retail, and
institutional customers in the United States.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 16, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2ZwXBW3 at no extra charge.[CC]

WESTWOOD GALLERY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Westwood Gallery,
Inc. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated v. Westwood Gallery, Inc.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-05210 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 20, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Westwood Gallery NYC -- https://www.westwoodgallery.com/ --
established in 1995 in New York City, focuses on a contemporary
program of artists, including rediscovered artist estates.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


ZEETO LLC: Williams Files TCPA Suit in S.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zeeto, LLC. The case
is styled as Edwin Williams, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Zeeto, LLC, Case No.
3:21-cv-01646-L-BLM (S.D. Cal., Sept. 20, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Zeeto -- https://www.zeeto.io/ -- is the first question-powered ad
network who helps publishers monetize their content and connect
brands only with the clients ready to engage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rebecca Leah Davis, Esq.
          LOZEAU DRURY, LLP
          410 12th Street, Suite 250
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Phone: (510) 836-4200
          Fax: (510) 836-4205
          Email: rebecca@lozeaudrury.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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