/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/210923.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, September 23, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 185

                            Headlines

1105 MEDIA: Bennett Files Suit in E.D. Michigan
7CS FASHION HOUSE: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ABM INDUSTRIES: $140M Settlement Agreement Entered in Bucio Suit
AEGIS MEDIA: Kennedy Stayed Pending Supreme Court Ruling in Hughes
AEROVIRONMENT: INC: Sued Over Illegal Deductions and Overtime

ALASKA AIRLINES: Court Dismisses Shattenkirk's Amended Class Suit
ANITA SHAPOLSKY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
AVNET INC: Heikkia Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
AXION GALLERY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
BLUE PRINT: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

BRIGHTEDGE TECHNOLOGIES: Sales Reps Seek Unpaid Overtime Wages
CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Gonzalez Sues Over Delayed Wage Payments
CHULAIZHADAO: Resto Staff File Labor Suit to Recover Lost Wages
CIOX HEALTH: South Carolina Court Dismisses Thompson Class Suit
COFFEE HOLDING: Bid to Dismiss Brodsky & Diamond Suit Pending

COFFEE HOLDING: Continues to Defend Cohen Putative Class Suit
COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY: $95MM Settlement in Shareholders Suit Reached
CORRIDOR CONTEMPORARY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
CRAVIN JAMAICAN: Morgan Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
CREDITREPAIR.COM: Fischler Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website

DAVACO INC: Chacon Suit Removed to C.D. California
DAVID BENRIMON: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
DIGNITY HEALTH: Classes & Subclasses Certified in Van Bebber Suit
DOMO INC: Volonte Appeals Denial of Bid to Amend, Alter Judgment
ETHAN COHEN: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

FIRSTSUN CAPITAL: Faces Besser and Schoenberger Suit
FIRSTSUN CAPITAL: Faces McCollam Putative Class Suit in Colorado
FLEET NEW YORK: Li Sues Over EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Funds
FOGEL SERVICES: Conway Sues Over Faulty HVAC Systems
FOREST RIVER: N.D. Indiana Narrows Claims in Truitt Class Suit

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Mahar and West Can Intervene in Ap-Fonden Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Court Decertifies Texas Class in Siqueiros Suit
GENIUS BRAND: Akbar Sues Over Caffeine Supplements' False Ads
GLOBAL PROCESSING: Vanderwoude Files FDCPA Suit in D. Utah
GRAHAM SHAY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

HEALTHEQUITY INC: Settlement in Suit vs. WageWorks Gets Final Nod
HELICLINE FINE ART: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
HILLSHIRE BRANDS: Sanders Files Suit in S.D. Illinois
INTERNATIONAL FINE ART: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
KIMO MANAGEMENT: Aguilar Sues Over Restaurant Staff's Unpaid Wages

LASIK VISION: Williams Suit Moved From S.D. Ohio to W.D. Tennessee
LIBERTY MUTUAL: Oregon Court Dismisses North Pacific Class Suit
LOWE GALLERIES: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE: Consolidated Riviera Beach Suit Tossed
MASTERCARD: CAT Grants First Collective Proceedings Order

MDL 2807: Sonic Loses Summary Judgment Bid in Data Breach Suit
MEREDITH CORP: Dismissal of Iowa Class Suit Under Appeal
MERVIS DIAMOND: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MOBERG GALLERY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
MONARCH RECOVERY: McKee Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. North Carolina

NOVA MUD: Court Denies Bid to Compel Arbitration in Oldham Suit
OREGON MUTUAL: Court Dismisses Hillbro Class Suit With Prejudice
PENNY PUBLICATIONS: Bennett Files Suit in W.D. Michigan
PET SUPERMARKET: Kirchein Sues for Breach of Settlement Agreement
PWCC MARKETPLACE: Latham Files Suit in D. Oregon

RADIUS GLOBAL: O'Neill Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
RB HEALTH: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RESURGENT CAPITAL: Heppinstall Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Pa.
S.A. KITSINIAN: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SAFECO INSURANCE: Denial of Bid to Dismiss Folweiler Suit Reversed

SCIPLAY CORP: $8.2MM Class Settlement to be Heard on Nov. 15
STATE FARM: Stanton Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania
SURESTAFF LLC: McInnis Wins Leave to Take Jurisdictional Discovery
TAX SAVE: Robinson Files Suit in D. Nebraska
TENNESSEE: Court Denies McAlpin's Bid for Relief From Judgment

U.S. CLAIMS: E.D. Pennsylvania Grants Bid to Dismiss Austin Suit
UNITED STATES GYPSUM: Liston Files Wages and Hour Suit
UNITEDHEALTH: Davis, et al. Sue Over Denied Insurance Coverage

                            *********

1105 MEDIA: Bennett Files Suit in E.D. Michigan
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 1105 Media, Inc. The
case is styled as Oliver Hill, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. 1105 Media, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-12191-TLL-PTM (E.D. Mich., Sept. 17, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

1105 Media, Inc. -- https://1105media.com/ -- is a leading
business-to-business (B2B) services provider whose sole mission is
to help customers grow their business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Ave.
          New York, NY 10019
          Phone: (646) 837-7150
          Fax: (212) 989-9163
          Email: pfraietta@bursor.com


7CS FASHION HOUSE: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 7CS Fashion House,
LLC. The case is styled as Denise Crumwell, on behalf of herself
and all other persons similarly situated v. 7CS Fashion House, LLC,
Case No. 1:21-cv-07815 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 18, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

7cs Fashion House, LLC doing business as HUEB --
http://www.hueb.com/-- offers jewelry that is handcrafted with the
outmost attention to detail and each design embodies creativity,
elegance and attitude.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


ABM INDUSTRIES: $140M Settlement Agreement Entered in Bucio Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
ABM Industries Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended July 31, 2021, that the Company entered
into a class action settlement and release agreement to settle the
Consolidated Cases of Bucio and Martinez v. ABM Janitorial Services
case, for $140 million and to obtain a release of the certified
class claims that were asserted in the Bucio case.

The Bucio case is a class action pending in San Francisco Superior
Court that alleges ABM failed to provide legally required meal
periods and make additional premium payments for such meal periods,
pay split shift premiums when owed, and reimburse janitors for
travel expenses.

There is also a claim for penalties under the California Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"). On April 19, 2011, the
trial court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion to certify the
class. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court denied
plaintiffs' motion to certify the class.

On May 11, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, which
was denied. The plaintiffs appealed the class certification issues.
The trial court stayed the underlying lawsuit pending the decision
in the appeal.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate
District, heard oral arguments on November 7, 2017. On December 11,
2017, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying
class certification and remanded the matter for certification of a
meal period, travel expense reimbursement, and split shift class.

The case was remitted to the trial court for further proceedings on
class certification, discovery, dispositive motions, and trial.

On September 20, 2018, the trial court entered an order defining
four certified subclasses of janitors who were employed by the
legacy ABM janitorial companies in California at any time between
April 7, 2002, and April 30, 2013, on claims based on alleged
previous automatic deduction practices for meal breaks, unpaid meal
premiums, unpaid split shift premiums, and unreimbursed business
expenses, such as mileage reimbursement for use of personal
vehicles to travel between worksites.

On February 1, 2019, the trial court held that the discovery
related to PAGA claims allegedly arising after April 30, 2013,
would be stayed until after the class and PAGA claims accruing
prior to April 30, 2013, had been tried.

The parties engaged in mediation in July 2019, which did not result
in settlement of the case. On October 17, 2019, the plaintiffs
filed a motion asking the trial court to certify additional classes
based on an alleged failure to maintain time records, an alleged
failure to provide accurate wage statements, and an alleged
practice of combining meal and rest breaks. The trial court denied
the plaintiffs' motion to certify additional classes on December
26, 2019.

The case was reassigned to a new judge on January 6, 2020. ABM
filed motions for summary adjudication as to certain of plaintiffs'
class claims, and the trial court denied those motions in November
2020.

The parties engaged in another mediation in January 2021, which did
not result in a settlement of the case. Plaintiffs filed motions
for summary adjudication and/or summary judgment on some claims in
December 2020.

In February and March 2021, the parties engaged in expert discovery
which provided detailed information regarding the plaintiffs'
damage calculations on the class claims.

On February 25, 2021, the California Supreme Court issued an
opinion in Donohue v. AMN Services, which addresses the standard
for adjudicating meal period claims under California law and the
company believes it is supportive of ABM's legal position in the
Bucio case.

On May 5, 2021, the trial court denied all of the plaintiffs'
December 2020 motions for summary adjudication and/or summary
judgment, and the case was assigned to a new judge. On May 5, 2021,
the trial court ordered the parties to attend a mandatory
settlement conference before a separate judge on June 11, 2021. The
trial date was scheduled for July 12, 2021.

On July 7, 2021, the Company entered into a class action settlement
and release agreement to settle the Bucio case for $140 million and
to obtain a release of the certified class claims that were
asserted in the Bucio case.

The settlement will also resolve the PAGA claim. The release of the
certified class claims covers the time period from April 7, 2002,
through April 30, 2013. The release of the PAGA claim covers the
time period from November 15, 2005, through July 18, 2021. Any
attorneys' fees awarded by the trial court and all costs of notice
and claims administration will be paid from the $140 million
settlement fund.

Employees who will be a part of the settlement will receive
payments based on the number of pay periods they worked.

The settlement agreement is contingent upon the approval of the
trial court. On August 11, 2021, the plaintiffs filed the motion
for preliminary approval of class action settlement with the trial
court, which is currently pending.

ABM said, "If the settlement is preliminarily approved, members of
the certified class will receive notice of the settlement, and
there will be an opportunity for them to object to the settlement
before the trial court grants final approval of the settlement. No
payments will be made to employees until after the settlement is
finally approved by the trial court."

ABM Industries Incorporated is a facility services contractor. The
Company provides air conditioning, engineering, janitorial,
lighting, parking, security, and other outsourced facility services
to the commercial, industrial, and institutional customers across
North America. The company is based in New York, New York.


AEGIS MEDIA: Kennedy Stayed Pending Supreme Court Ruling in Hughes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Gregory H. Woods of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the Defendants' motion to stay all
proceedings in the case, STACEY PARK KENNEDY, ANGELA BOZELL, and
BRITTNEY WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AEGIS MEDIA AMERICAS, INC., BOARD
OF DIRECTORS OF AEGIS MEDIA AMERICAS, INC., THE PLAN INVESTMENT
COMMITTEE, JOHN DOES 1-30, Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-3624-GHW
(S.D.N.Y.).

The lawsuit is stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in
Hughes v. Northwestern University, No. 19-1401 (2021).

The Defendants sponsor a large 401(k) defined contribution plan
called the BenefitsPlus 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan. The Plaintiffs,
investors in the Plan, filed an amended putative class action
Complaint on May 8, 2020, bringing allegations that the Defendants
violated their duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). As is relevant in the
matter, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants "maintained
certain funds in the Plan despite the availability of identical or
similar investment options with lower costs and/or better
performance histories." The Defendants moved to dismiss the
Complaint, and their motion is currently pending.

On July 2, 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hughes.
The question presented to the Supreme Court in Hughes is whether
allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or
charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for
alternative available investment products or services are
sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of
the duty of prudence under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1)(B).

On Aug. 9, 2021, the Defendants moved to stay all proceedings in
this case, arguing that "the Supreme Court will address issues
identical to the claims the Plaintiffs assert, and the issues
raised in the Defendants' motion to dismiss." The Plaintiffs oppose
that motion.

Judge Woods states that courts in the district consider five
factors when determining whether to grant a stay: (1) The private
interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the
civil litigation as balanced against the prejudice to the
plaintiffs if delayed; (2) the private interests of and burden on
the defendants; (3) the interests of the courts; (4) the interests
of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public
interest. A court may also properly exercise its staying power when
a higher court is close to settling an important issue of law
bearing on the action.

Judge Woods finds that the balance of relevant factors weighs in
favor of staying all proceedings in the case pending the Supreme
Court's decision in Hughes. First, the Supreme Court's decision in
Hughes will settle a key issue that has direct bearing on
Defendants' motion to dismiss -- namely, whether a plaintiff states
a claim for breach of the duty of prudence under ERISA when it
alleges that the fiduciaries of a defined-contribution plan should
have invested in lower-cost, identical funds to those actually
offered. In the case, the Plaintiffs allege exactly that: Their
position is that the Defendants violated their duty of prudence by
failing to invest in identical, but lower-cost, Plan funds. Thus,
Hughes could prove dispositive of the Defendants' motion to dismiss
and ultimately determine whether the case will be dismissed; this
weighs in favor of a stay.

In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the Second Circuit's recent
decision in Sacerdote et al. v. NYU, 2021 WL 3610355 (2d Cir. Aug.
12, 2021) settles the issue of whether plaintiffs state a claim for
breach of the duty of prudence when they allege that fiduciaries
should have invested in lower-cost, identical plans. In Sacerdote,
the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs who alleged that plan
fiduciaries failed to invest in lower-cost, identical funds stated
a claim and could withstand a motion to dismiss.

But Judge Woods finds that the Plaintiffs overlook that Hughes will
decide the same issue and thus has the potential to abrogate the
relevant holding in Sacerdote. As such, though Sacerdote certainly
bears on the arguments in the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, its
impact may be temporary. Ultimately, a stay is favored because it
is Hughes, and not Sacerdote, that will ultimately "settle an
important issue of law bearing on the action."

The interests of the Court and the public also weigh in favor of a
stay, Judge Woods finds. He says, the Court's decision in Hughes
will clarify a critical issue currently before the Court, and in
doing so, promote the public and judicial "interest in the
efficient conduct of litigation." As other courts in this district
have found, "even a decision from the Supreme Court that would not
be dispositive of issues in this case could contain guidance that
would allow this litigation to proceed on a reasonable and
efficient basis."

The interests of the Defendants and third parties also weigh in
favor of a stay. The decision in Hughes could result in the
dismissal of the case, allowing the Defendants to avoid the
significant burdens imposed by continued proceedings and the
potential opening of discovery in the matter. This is particularly
true given "that the case is asserted as a class action." Moreover,
third parties have an interest in the stay because the Supreme
Court's decision could negate any need for third party discovery.

By contrast, the Plaintiffs will not suffer significant prejudice
because of a stay. While the Plaintiffs' alleged damages may amount
to "millions of dollars" on a class-wide basis, Judge Woods holds
that the harm to any given class member individual is unlikely to
be so significant as to outweigh the significant potential benefits
of a stay. Further, there is no indication that the Defendants
would be unable to satisfy a judgment for damages, or that a delay
would impact their ability to do so. Similarly, litigation holds
already in place will mitigate any concern over spoliation of
documents throughout the pendency of the stay.

As such, Judge Woods granted the Defendants' Motion to Stay All
Proceedings. The parties are directed to write the Court promptly
following the Supreme Court's decision in Hughes.

The Clerk of Court is directed to note the stay on the docket of
the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2nv2k8em from Leagle.com.


AEROVIRONMENT: INC: Sued Over Illegal Deductions and Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
AeroVironment, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2021, that the company is facing a
class action suit filed in the California Superior Court in Los
Angeles, California alleging various claims pursuant to the
California Labor Code related to wages, meal breaks, overtime and
other recordkeeping matters.

On August 9, 2021, a former employee filed a class action complaint
against AeroVironment in California Superior Court in Los Angeles,
California alleging various claims pursuant to the California Labor
Code related to wages, meal breaks, overtime and other
recordkeeping matters.

The complaint seeks a jury trial and payment of various alleged
unpaid wages, penalties, interest and attorneys’ fees in
unspecified amounts.

AeroVironment said, "As of the date of this filing, we have not
been served with the complaint."

AeroVironment, Inc. is an American defense contractor headquartered
in Arlington, Virginia, that is primarily involved in unmanned
aerial vehicles.

ALASKA AIRLINES: Court Dismisses Shattenkirk's Amended Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MADELEINE F. SHATTENKIRK, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01656-RSL (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert S.
Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, entered an order:

   a. dismissing with prejudice each and all of the Plaintiff's
      individual claims alleged against the Defendant in the
      First Amended Class Action Complaint; and

   b. dismissing without prejudice and without notice to the
      putative class, each and all of the putative class claims
      set forth in the Plaintiffs First Amended Class Action
      Complaint.

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plaintiff Shattenkirk and Defendant Alaska Airlines
stipulate and agree to the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' First
Amended Class Action Complaint.

Each Party will bear his, her, their, and its own costs and
expenses, including attorneys' fees, except as otherwise agreed to
by the Parties, and each Party waives any and all rights of
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/wkvpyvr from Leagle.com.

TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC Kim D. Stephens --
kstephens@tousley.com -- Rebecca L. Solomon -- rsolomon@tousley.com
-- in Seattle, Washington. LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP Courtney E.
Maccarone (pro hac vice), in New York City. KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER &
GRAIFMAN, P.C. Melissa R. Emert -- memert@ssbny.com -- (pro hac
vice), in Chestnut Ridge, New York, GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY Marc L.
Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- (pro hac vice) in Los Angeles,
California, GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC Daniel C. Hedlund (pro hac vice),
in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Counsel for the Plaintiff.

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, Gayle I. Jenkins -- gjenkins@winston.com --
(pro hac vice), in Los Angeles, California, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE,
Fred B. Burnside, Seattle, WA, STACK FERNANDEZ & HARRIS PA, Lazaro
Fernandez -- lfernandez@stackfernandez -- (pro hac vice), in Miami,
Florida, Counsel for the Defendant.


ANITA SHAPOLSKY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Anita Shapolsky
Gallery, Inc. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and
on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Anita
Shapolsky Gallery, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-05174-DG-RLM (E.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 17, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Anita Shapolsky Gallery --
https://anitashapolskygallery.com/newsite/ -- is an art gallery
that was founded in 1982.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


AVNET INC: Heikkia Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------
Angela Determan Heikkia and Natalie Lopez, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Avnet, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 21-cv-01531 (D. Ariz., September 8, 2021), seeks to
recover monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest,
and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees as a result of
failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Avnet is a distributor of electronic components where Heikkia and
Lopez were employed as Customer Service Representative and Inside
Sales Representative, respectively. They claim that they were
misclassified as independent contractors thus denying them overtime
for hours worked more than forty hours in a workweek. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Courtney Lowery, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM
      Post Office Box 39
      Russellville, AR 72811
      Tel: (479) 880-0088
      Fax: (888) 787-2040
      Email: courtney@sanfordlawfirm.com


AXION GALLERY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Axion Gallery LLC.
The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. Axion Gallery LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-05195 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Axion Gallery is an art gallery in Palm Beach, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


BLUE PRINT: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blue Print, LLC. The
case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated v. Blue Print, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-05196 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Blue Print -- https://blueprintstore.com/ -- is a furniture
boutique offering a wide array of antiques, art and accessories to
help designers and design-lovers create one-of-a-kind spaces.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


BRIGHTEDGE TECHNOLOGIES: Sales Reps Seek Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Keyse, Adam Mitro, Charles Berg and Drew Perrin, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Brightedge
Technologies, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-01737 (N.D. Ohio,
September 7, 2021), seeks to recover compensation for overtime
wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, interest
and reasonable attorney's fees and costs of this action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

BrightEdge designs and develops internet advertising and marketing
software solutions. The company offers search engine optimization
tools that allow customers to effectively direct traffic to their
website from internet search engines. Plaintiffs worked as Sales
Development Representatives for BrightEdge Technologies. Plaintiffs
claim that BrightEdge does not compensate them more than a set
number of overtime hours per week, regardless of the number of
hours actually worked. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Drew Legando, Esq.
      Tom Merriman, Esq.
      Edward S. Jerse, Esq.
      MERRIMAN LEGANDO WILLIAMS & KLANG, LLC
      1360 West 9th Street, Suite 200
      Cleveland, OH 44113
      Tel: (216) 522-9000
      Fax: (216) 522-9007
      Email: drew@merrimanlegal.com
             tom@merrimanlegal.com
             edjerse@merrimanlegal.com


CHEESECAKE FACTORY: Gonzalez Sues Over Delayed Wage Payments
------------------------------------------------------------
Noe Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-05017, (E.D. N.Y., September 8, 2021),
seeks redress for delayed payments and wage statement violations
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York labor laws.

The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants, Inc. operates a chain of
approximately 200 restaurants under the trade name "The Cheesecake
Factory" where Gonzalez worked as a manual laborer, as a line cook,
and as prep cook from 2009 until March 2021.

Cheesecake Factory  allegedly failed to pay wages earned for the
first workweek of each bi-weekly pay period within seven days after
the end of the workweek in which such wages were earned and also
allegedly failed to issue wage statements. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Steven J. Moser, Esq.
      MOSER LAW FIRM P.C.
      5 East Main Street
      Huntington, NY 11743
      Tel: (516) 671-1150
      Email: steven.moser@moserlawfirm.com

CHULAIZHADAO: Resto Staff File Labor Suit to Recover Lost Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Guanglei Jiao, Nan Yu, Ruiji Zhai and Yanjun Li, on their own
behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated Plaintiff, v.
Chulaizhadao Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-05002, (E.D. N.Y.,
September 7, 2021), seeks to recover lost wages, liquidated damages
equal to lost wages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest,
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, injunctive relief and any
such other and further legal and equitable relief pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and New York labor laws.

Chulaizhadao is the successor of Plaintiffs' employer, Shang Shang
Qian Inc., which operates a restaurant known as "Shang Shang Qian."
It is alleged of failing to pay its employees, including
Plaintiffs, minimum wage, and overtime compensation for all hours
worked over forty hours each workweek and failing to record all of
the time that employees work or worked, including all work done in
excess of forty hours each week. Plaintiffs sued Shang Shang Qian
Inc. for their unpaid wages on October 9, 2018. More than a year
after the commencement of the case, Shang Shang Qian terminated
their lease of their premises. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      John Troy, Esq.
      Aaron Schweitzer, Esq.
      Tiffany Troy, Esq.
      TROY LAW, PLLC
      41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 119
      Flushing, NY 11355
      Tel: (718) 762-1324
      Fax: (718) 762-1342
      Email: TroyLaw@TroyPllc.com


CIOX HEALTH: South Carolina Court Dismisses Thompson Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Tammie Thompson and Debra Love, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Ciox Health,
LLC, individually and d/b/a IOD Incorporated, and ScanSTAT
Technologies, LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:20-2847-BHH
(D.S.C.), Judge Bruce H. Hendricks of the U.S. District Court for
the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, grants
Defendant Ciox's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint.

Background

Plaintiffs Thompson and Love filed the proposed class action
against Defendants Ciox and ScanSTAT, asserting claims for
violation of South Carolina's Physicians' Patient Records Act, S.C.
Code Sections 44-115-10 through -160 (2018) ("Patient Records
Act"), breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and seeking a
declaratory judgment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and 2202.

Defendant Ciox filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Plaintiffs filed a response in
opposition to Ciox's motion, and the Defendant filed a reply.

Discussion

In its motion to dismiss, Ciox asserts that: (1) the Patient
Records Act does not apply to Ciox because it is neither a
physician nor an owner of medical records; (2) the Patient Records
Act does not create a private right of action; (3) Ciox permissibly
charged Plaintiff Thompson two search and handling fees; (4)
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Ciox's charge for
providing a CD containing imaging violated the Patient Records Act;
and (5) the Patient Records Act does not prohibit charging fees for
additional services beyond medical records provision, such as
Ciox's eDelivery Service and a Certification Fee.

The Plaintiffs oppose Defendant Ciox's motion, asserting that the
Patient Records Act creates an implied private right of action and
that the Act necessarily applies to Ciox. Additionally, they argue
that the complaint plausibly alleges that Ciox unlawfully charged
for patient records, and that their claims are not otherwise
subject to dismissal.

After a thorough review of the parties' briefs and the applicable
law, Judge Hendricks agrees with Defendant Ciox that the Patient
Records Act does not apply to Ciox because it is not a physician,
health care provider, or other owner of medical records.
Additionally, he agrees with Ciox that the Patient Records Act does
not create a private right of action, either express or implied.

First, the plain language of Section 44-115-80(A) refers to the
fees that "a physician, or other owner of medical records as
provided for in Section 44-115-130" may charge for search and
duplication of electronic medical records. Section 44-115-80(B)
refers to "a physician, health care provider, or other owner of
medical records," and Section 44-115-80(C) refers to a "physician."
Defendant Ciox is not a physician or health care provider.
Moreover, South Carolina law expressly prohibits it, as a medical
records company, from being an "owner of medical records." Stated
plainly, Judge Hendricks finds that if the South Carolina
Legislature wished to restrict the fees that a company like Ciox
can charge for its services by enacting the Patient Records Act, it
easily could have done so. However, because the Patient Records
Act, by its plain language, applies only to physicians and other
owners of medical records and does not apply to Ciox, he finds the
Plaintiffs' claims are subject to dismissal.

Next, Judge Hendricks agrees with Defendant Ciox that the Patient
Records Act does not create a private right of action, either
express or implied. In essence, he is not convinced by the
Plaintiffs' arguments that the Supreme Court of South Carolina
would find a private right of action based on the title, framework,
and purpose of the Patient Records Act. As Ciox points out in its
reply brief, the Patient Records Act was enacted for the general
welfare of the public and not for the special benefit of a private
party. Moreover, it is the Physicians' Patient Records Act, and the
legislative history of the Act indicates that it was geared toward
establishing rules governing how physicians maintain and control
medical records. Finally, the Legislature would not have amended
the Certificate of Need and Health Facility Licensure Act ("CON
Act"), S.C. Code Sections 44-7-110 through -394, to prevent
physician overcharges if it had already prohibited them when it
enacted the Patient Records Act just two years prior.

Lastly, because he agrees with Ciox on these first two points,
which are equally fatal to the Plaintiffs' complaint, Judge
Hendricks need not reach the remainder of the Defendant's
arguments.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Hendricks grants Defendant Ciox's
motion to dismiss. Moreover, although Defendant ScanSTAT did not
specifically join in Ciox's motion, because his findings that (1)
the Patient Records Act applies only to physicians, health care
providers, or other owners of medical records and (2) the Patient
Records Act does not create a private right of action would apply
equally to Defendant ScanSTAT, the Judge dismisses the Plaintiffs'
complaint in full.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/439k4zxf from Leagle.com.


COFFEE HOLDING: Bid to Dismiss Brodsky & Diamond Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Coffee Holding Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 13, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2021, that the company's motion to
dismiss the putative class action suit initiated by Eileen Brodsky
and Rhonda Diamond, is pending.

The Company was named as a defendant in a putative class action
lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois on or about December 21, 2020.

The plaintiffs, Eileen Brodsky and Rhonda Diamond, purporting to
represent a class of individuals who purchased coffee products at
Aldi, Inc., a supermarket chain, generally allege that Aldi sold
private label coffee products manufactured by the Company and
another coffee roasting company, which falsely described the number
of cups of coffee that could be made from the amount of product
purchased. Aldi and Pan American are also named as defendants in
the action.

The complaint asserts a variety of claims under New York and
California consumer protection laws, and seeks unspecified monetary
damages, including disgorgement and restitution, as well as other
forms of relief including class certification, declaratory and
injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and interest.

The Company believes the allegations in the complaint are wholly
without merit and that the claims asserted are legally deficient,
and the company intends to vigorously defend the action.

The Company has filed a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff has
sought leave to file an amended complaint.

Coffee Holding said, "At this time, the Company is unable to
predict the ultimate outcome of this lawsuit."

Coffee Holding Co., Inc. operates as a coffee roaster and dealer.
The Company focuses on roasting, blending, packaging, and
distributing coffee for sale under private labels and their own
brands for companies throughout the United States and Canada.
Coffee Holding also sells unprocessed green coffee to specialty
gourmet roasters. The company is based in Staten Island, New York.


COFFEE HOLDING: Continues to Defend Cohen Putative Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Coffee Holding Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 13, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2021, that the company's customer
continues to defend a putative class action suit initiated by David
Cohen, of which the company agreed to indemnify.

A significant customer of the Company was named as a defendant in a
putative class action lawsuit filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts on or about February 2,
2021, concerning the labeling on private label coffee productions
we sold to the customer.

The plaintiff, David Cohen, purporting to represent a class of
individuals who purchased coffee products from our customer,
generally allege that the customer sold private label coffee
products manufactured by the Company which falsely described the
number of cups of coffee that could be made from the amount of
product purchased.

The Company is not named as a defendant in the action, but has
agreed to indemnify the customer for the costs and expenses
incurred in defending the lawsuit and for any liability the
customer may suffer as a result. The complaint asserts a variety of
claims under Massachusetts consumer protection laws, and seeks
unspecified monetary damages as well as other forms of relief
including class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief,
attorneys' fees, and interest.

The Company believes the allegations in the complaint are wholly
without merit and that the claims asserted are legally deficient,
and intends to vigorously support the customer in defending the
action.

Coffee Holding said, "As of the filing of this Form 10-Q, the
Company is unable to predict the ultimate outcome of this
lawsuit."

Coffee Holding Co., Inc. operates as a coffee roaster and dealer.
The Company focuses on roasting, blending, packaging, and
distributing coffee for sale under private labels and their own
brands for companies throughout the United States and Canada.
Coffee Holding also sells unprocessed green coffee to specialty
gourmet roasters. The company is based in Staten Island, New York.


COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY: $95MM Settlement in Shareholders Suit Reached
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation said in its Form 8-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on
September 7, 2021, that the company had entered into a settlement
agreement, which provides for a payment of $95 million to the
putative class, in the previously disclosed consolidated putative
securities class action complaint against the Company and certain
former officers of the Company filed in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey.

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation has entered into a
settlement agreement that, subject to the approval of the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, would resolve
the previously disclosed consolidated putative securities class
action complaint against the Company and certain former officers of
the Company.

In the consolidated putative securities class action complaint
filed on behalf of a putative class of persons and entities who
purchased our common stock during the period between February 27,
2015 and September 29, 2016, the lead plaintiffs alleged violations
of the Exchange Act, based on allegedly false or misleading
statements related to potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, the company's business, prospects and operations,
and the effectiveness of the company's internal controls over
financial reporting and its disclosure controls and procedures.

The settlement agreement, which was filed by the parties with the
court on September 7, 2021, provides for a payment of $95 million
to the putative class (inclusive of attorneys' fees and litigation
expenses).

A substantial majority of the settlement payment will be covered by
the Company's insurers under the applicable directors and officers
insurance policies, after which there will be no amounts remaining
available to the Company under the policies applicable to this
matter and the Company's ongoing indemnification and advancement
obligations with respect to certain former officers of the Company.


The Company and the other defendants are entering into the
settlement agreement to eliminate the uncertainty, burden, and
expense of further protracted litigation.

The Company and the other defendants expressly deny that the
plaintiffs in the securities class action have asserted any valid
claims as to any of them.

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation provides information
technology consulting and technology services in North America,
Europe, and Asia. The company was founded in 1994 and is based in
Teaneck, New Jersey.


CORRIDOR CONTEMPORARY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Corridor Contemporary
LLC. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated v. Corridor Contemporary
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-05197 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Corridor Contemporary -- https://www.corridor-contemporary.com/ --
is a premier Philadelphia art gallery that specializes in local and
international contemporary works.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


CRAVIN JAMAICAN: Morgan Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
---------------------------------------------------
Vivien Morgan, on behalf of herself, and other similarly situated
employees, Plaintiff, v. Cravin Jamaican Cuisine Corp. and Peter
Murdock, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-07510, (S.D. N.Y., September 9,
2021), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest, compensatory and/or punitive damages for retaliatory
conduct and attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to the New York
Wage Theft Prevention Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants own and operate a Jamaican restaurant "CRAVIN JAMAICAN
CUISINE," located in New York where Morgan worked as a cook. She
claims to generally work over 40 hours per week without the
appropriate overtime premium and without the proper wage
statements. She also claims to have been terminated from work due
to her complaints. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Justin Cilenti, Esq.
      Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
      CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
      200 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
      New York, NY 10166
      Tel. (212) 209-3933
      Fax. (212) 209-7102
      Email: info@jcpclaw.com


CREDITREPAIR.COM: Fischler Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated visually-impaired individuals, Plaintiff, v.
CREDITREPAIR.COM, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-05009 (E.D. N.Y.,
September 7, 2021), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction,
compensatory, statutory and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment
and post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this action
together with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other
and further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, New
York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law.

Creditrepair is an online service (www.creditrepair.com) that helps
customers repair and monitor their credit status. When customers
sign up, Defendant will begin by checking their credit and
providing an evaluation that allows customers to identify areas
that can be challenged in order to improve their credit score. It
then liaises with credit companies to address these concerns and
remediate where necessary. Once changes have been made,
Creditrepair will continue to monitor customers' credit, addressing
issues as they arise. Plaintiff is legally blind and claims that
said website cannot be accessed by the visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
      LIPSKY LOWE LLP
      630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
      New York, NY 10017-6705
      Tel: (212) 392-4772
      Fax: (212) 444-1030
      Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


DAVACO INC: Chacon Suit Removed to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Charles Chacon, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Davaco, Inc., Case No. CVRI2103666
was removed from Riverside County Superior Court to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California on
Sept. 17, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:21-cv-01589 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

DAVACO -- https://www.davaco.com/ -- is a multi-site PROJECT
MANAGEMENT and RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT firm that supports a diversified
base of clients across both the public and private sectors with the
Development, Transformation, and Maintenance of their physical
sites.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Vassi Iliadis, Esq.
          HOGAN LOVELLS LLP
          1999 Avenue of the Stars Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 785-4640
          Fax: (310) 765-1601
          Email: vassi.iliadis@hoganlovells.com


DAVID BENRIMON: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against David Benrimon Fine
Art LLC. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. David Benrimon
Fine Art LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-05198 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

David Benrimon Fine Art, LLC -- https://www.davidbenrimon.com/ --
offers a wide selection of artworks by leading artists.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


DIGNITY HEALTH: Classes & Subclasses Certified in Van Bebber Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT VAN BEBBER, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated and the general public, Plaintiff v. DIGNITY
HEALTH, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00264-DAD-EPG (E.D. Cal.),
Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California:

   (i) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend; and
  (ii) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion
       for class certification.

Plaintiffs Robert Van Bebber, Rachel Clover, and Martha Ochoa, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated and the
general public, are proceeding in the wage-and-hour class action
suit against Defendant Dignity Health. The Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to amend and motion for class certification were referred to
a U.S. Magistrate Judge for issuance of findings and
recommendations.

On March 30, 2021, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings
and recommendations recommending that the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to amend be denied and that the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification be granted in part and denied in part. These findings
and recommendations were served on the parties and contained notice
that any objections thereto were to be filed within 14 days. On
April 13, 2021, the parties timely filed objections to the findings
and recommendations. On April 27, 2021, the parties filed timely
responses to the respective objections.

In their objections, the Plaintiffs argue that the Regular
Rate/Overtime Class and that the Rest Break Class should be
certified, but do not otherwise object to the findings and
recommendations. Specifically, they assert that the Regular
Rate/Overtime Class "involves a single unified objective issue,
namely whether the bonuses are non-discretionary and the answer
will be the same for each class member" such that it "effects a
cohesive group" of employees that warrants class certification. The
Plaintiffs also contend that the Rest Break Class should be
certified, pointing to their evidence, and submitted deposition
testimony to show that "in practical application compliant off-duty
rest periods were not made available to the class members."

On the other hand, the Defendant objects to the certification of
all four of the classes that the magistrate judge recommended be
certified. The Defendants largely reiterate the same arguments
previously made in their opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion to
certify class, asserting that the Plaintiffs have not supported
certification with sufficient evidence, that common issues do not
predominate, and that not all the Plaintiffs are typical of the
proposed classes. The Defendant additionally argues that the
Plaintiffs' Rounding Class claim is partially preempted, that a
different standard for "hours worked" applies to health care
employees such that the On Call/Standby Class should not be
certified, and that the Plaintiffs failed to address the governing
standards for "hours worked."

Both parties' objections in large part repeat the arguments and
reference evidence thoroughly analyzed and addressed by the
magistrate judge in the pending findings and recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1)(C), Judge Drozs has conducted a de novo review. Having
carefully reviewed the entire file, including the objections and
responses filed by both parties, the Judge concludes that the
findings and recommendation are supported by the record and proper
analysis, with the exception of the recommendation that Plaintiffs
Rachel Clover and Martha Ochoa be appointed as representatives of
the On Call/Standby Class.

In its objections, the Defendant correctly notes that only
plaintiff Rachel Clover was assigned on call/standby time and that
plaintiff Martha Ochoa was not. The Plaintiffs do not contest this
aspect of the Defendant's objections to the pending findings and
recommendations. Indeed, they only submitted evidence that Rachel
Clover was assigned on call/standby time, and did not submit any
such evidence as to Martha Ochoa. Therefore, Martha Ochoa's claims
are not typical of the class.

Accordingly, Judge Drozd adopts the findings and recommendations
with the exception that only Rachel Clover, and not Martha Ochoa,
will be appointed as the class representative for the On
Call/Standby Class.

Accordingly, Judge Drozd adopted in part the findings and
recommendations entered on March 30, 2021. The Judge denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend, and (ii) granted in part and
denied in part their motion for class certification.

The following classes and subclasses are certified:

      a. All non-exempt hourly employees of the Defendant who
worked at least one day at the Mercy Medical Center Merced facility
from July 13, 2013 to the date of the class certification order and
who were paid pursuant to the Defendant's rounding policy and
practice (Rounding Class);

      b. All non-exempt hourly clinical employees of the Defendant
who worked at least one  day at the Mercy Medical Center Merced
facility from July 13, 2013 to the date of the class certification
order and who were paid pursuant to the Defendant's rounding policy
and practice (Rounding Clinical Sub-Class);

      c. All non-exempt hourly patient care employees of Defendant
who worked at least one day at the Mercy Medical Center Merced
facility and worked at least one standby shift from Jan. 14, 2015
to the date of the class certification order (On Call/Standby
Class);

      d. All non-exempt hourly employees of the Defendant who
worked at least one day at the Mercy Medical Center Merced facility
from July 13, 2016 through the date of class certification order
who were provided a paystub (a.k.a. wage statement) from the
Defendant (Pay Stub Class); and

      e. All California based non-exempt hourly employees of the
Defendant who worked for Defendant at any time from Jan. 14, 2016
through the date of class certification, who are no longer employed
by Defendant and were not paid all their earned wages (Waiting Time
Penalty Class).

Certification is denied as to all other classes and subclasses not
specifically addressed, including the Regular Rate/Overtime Class,
the Second Meal Break Class, the Meal Period Waiver Sub-Class, the
Meal Break Sub-Class, the Meal Period Regular Rate Sub-Class, the
Rest Break Class, and the Rest Period Regular Rate Sub-Class.

Judge Drozd confirms Plaintiffs Robert Van Bebber and Martha Ochoa
as the class representatives for the Rounding Class, Plaintiff
Rachel Clover as the class representative for the Rounding Clinical
Sub-Class, Plaintiff Rachel Clover as the class representative for
the On Call/Standby Class, and Plaintiffs Robert Van Bebber, Rachel
Clover, and Martha Ochoa as the class representatives for the Pay
Stub Class and Waiting Time Penalty Class.

Judge Drozd confirms Joseph Antonelli and Janelle Carney of Law
Office of Joseph Antonelli and Robert L. Starr and Adam M. Rose of
Frontier Law Center as the class counsel.

The parties are directed to meet and confer promptly upon service
of the Order concerning the submission of a joint stipulated class
notice and distribution plan in compliance with Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

The parties are directed to file either a stipulated class notice
and distribution plan or a notice that no stipulation can be
reached within 21 days of service of the Order. If the parties
cannot agree to a class notice or distribution plan, the Plaintiffs
are directed to submit a proposed class notice and distribution
plan within 35 days of service of the Order, the Defendant is given
14 days following the Plaintiffs' submission of a proposed class
notice and distribution plan to file any objections thereto, and
the Plaintiffs are given seven days thereafter to submit a reply.

The matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for
further scheduling and other proceedings consistent with the
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3yzbxunt from Leagle.com.


DOMO INC: Volonte Appeals Denial of Bid to Amend, Alter Judgment
----------------------------------------------------------------
Domo, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on September 9, 2021, for the quarterly
period ended July 31, 2021, that the plaintiff in Volonte v. Domo,
Inc., et. al, Case No. 19-04-01778, has filed a notice of appeal on
the court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend or alter judgment
or for reconsideration.

In November 2019, a securities class action complaint captioned
Volonte v. Domo, Inc., et. al, Case No. 19-04-01778, was filed by a
stockholder of the Company in the Fourth Judicial District Court
for the County of Utah in the State of Utah against the Company,
certain of the Company's current and former officers and directors,
and the underwriters of the Company's June 2018 initial public
offering alleging violations of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933 in connection with the Company's initial
public offering and seeking unspecified damages.

On August 19, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Volonte complaint.

On April 13, 2021, the court granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint. On April 25, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend
or alter judgment or for reconsideration.

On June 2, 2021, the court denied the plaintiff's motion.

On June 14, 2021, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.

The Company believes this lawsuit is without merit and intends to
defend the case vigorously.

Domo, Inc. operates a cloud-based platform in the United States.
Its platform digitally connects chief executive officer to the
frontline employee with the people, data, and systems in an
organization, giving them access to real-time data and insights,
and allowing them to manage business from smartphones. The Company
was formerly known as Domo Technologies, Inc. and changed its name
to Domo, Inc. in December 2011. Domo, Inc. was founded in 2010 and
is headquartered in American Fork, Utah.


ETHAN COHEN: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ethan Cohen Fine Arts
LLC. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated v. Ethan Cohen Fine Arts
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-05199 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ethan Cohen Gallery -- https://www.ecfa.com/ -- is a New York City
based gallery that specializes on global art talent.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


FIRSTSUN CAPITAL: Faces Besser and Schoenberger Suit
----------------------------------------------------
FirstSun Capital Bancorp said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended July 31, 2021, that Sunflower Bank, N.A.
is facing a putative class action suit initiated by Samantha Besser
and Alan Schoenberger.

On June 10, 2021, Samantha Besser and Alan Schoenberger filed a
putative class action complaint against Sunflower Bank, N.A. (the
Bank) in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado.

The complaint alleges that the Bank improperly charged multiple
insufficient funds or overdraft fees when a merchant resubmits a
rejected payment request.

The complaint asserts claims for breach of contract, which
incorporates the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Plaintiffs seek to represent a proposed class of all the Bank's
checking account customers who were charged multiple insufficient
funds or overdraft fees on resubmitted payment requests. Plaintiffs
seek unspecified restitution, actual and statutory damages, costs,
attorneys' fees, pre-judgment interest, and other relief as the
Court deems proper for themselves and the purported class.

The Bank believes that the lawsuit is without merit and it intends
to vigorously defend against all claims asserted.

Firstsun Capital Bancorp is a bank holding company owning or
controlling one or more banks. The company is based in Denver,
Colorado.


FIRSTSUN CAPITAL: Faces McCollam Putative Class Suit in Colorado
----------------------------------------------------------------
FirstSun Capital Bancorp said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended July 31, 2021, that Sunflower Bank, N.A.
(the Bank) is facing a putative class action suit initiated by
Karen McCollam.  

On June 2, 2021, Karen McCollam filed a putative class action
complaint against the Bank in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado.

The complaint alleges that the Bank improperly charged overdraft
fees where a transaction was initially authorized on sufficient
funds but later settled negative due to intervening transactions.

The complaint asserts a claim for breach of contract, which
incorporates the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a
claim for violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiff seeks to represent a proposed class of all the Bank's
checking account customers who were allegedly charged overdraft
fees on transactions that did not overdraw their checking account.


Plaintiff seeks unspecified restitution, actual and statutory
damages, costs, attorneys' fees, pre-judgment interest, and other
relief as the Court deems proper for herself and the putative
class.

The Bank believes that the lawsuit is without merit and it intends
to vigorously defend against all claims asserted.

Firstsun Capital Bancorp is a bank holding company owning or
controlling one or more banks. The company is based in Denver,
Colorado.


FLEET NEW YORK: Li Sues Over EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Funds
------------------------------------------------------------------
SHANRU LI, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. FLEET NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGIONAL CENTER LLC, EEGH
II, L.P., LAGUARDIA PERFORMANCE CENTER, LLC, and RICHARD XIA a/k/a
YI XIA, Case No. 1:21-cv-05185 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 17, 2021) is a
class action lawsuit brought by the Plaintiff and other members of
the putative class who are foreign nationals who invested $500,000
in the partnership pursuant to the United States Government's EB-5
Immigrant Investor Program, plus an additional $50,000 in
administrative fees.

Under the EB-5 program, investors (and their spouses and unmarried
children under 21) are eligible to apply for a Green Card
(permanent residence) if they (a) make the necessary investment in
a commercial enterprise in the United States; (b) which results in
the creation or preservation of 10 permanent full-time jobs for
qualified U.S. workers.

The Plaintiff's capital was pooled with the capital of the
partnership's other investors and loaned to the Developer, an
affiliate of the General Partner.

The partnership, the General Partner, and the Developer are all
dominated and controlled by Xia.

According to the Limited Partnership Agreements, the Private
Placement Memoranda ("PPM"), and the Comprehensive Plans
(collectively the "Offering Documents") provided to Plaintiff and
Class Members to solicit their investments in the partnership
beginning in 2014 or 2015, the Developer would use the EB-5 funds
for the construction and development of a luxury hotel complex in
Corona, Queens County, New York City (the "Project").

The Offering Documents provided to Plaintiff and Class Members made
representations concerning the Project as follows:

   -- a total floor area of 1,199,578 square feet;

   -- a 29-story building, consisting of 25 floors of 5-star
ocean-
      view hotel rooms, as well as four additional stories,
      consisting of a convention center, retail space, restaurant
      space, and a parking garage;

   -- a total of 792 luxury hotel rooms;

   -- a modern convention center with 105,964 square feet;

   -- one of the largest modern performing arts centers in
      Northeastern USA;

   -- retail space across 6 floors of the hotel and restaurant
      space across floors of the hotel;

   -- the creation of 3,025 jobs within the first five years of
      operations;

   -- jobs "will be created by the two-year anniversary of the
      investor's admission as a conditional permanent resident or
      adjustment to conditional permanent resident";

   -- total projected revenue of approximately $293 million; 9 and
   -- the total development of the Project would take 44 months,
      with 30 months for construction.

However, these representations had no reasonable basis in fact at
the time they were made, and they grossly misrepresented the (1)
scope of the Project; (2) square footage, (3) development timeline;
and (4) job creation numbers, the Plaintiff contends.

The Defendants' misrepresentations of the Project constitute fraud,
and their failure to act with diligence to pursue development
constitutes breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting such
breach, the Plaintiff adds.

Given the alleged fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty committed by
Defendants, each Class Member has suffered damages, both from
failure to recoup their monetary investment as well as the failure
to obtain a permanent green card.

The EB-5 immigrant visa program ("EB-5 Program") is administered by
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), which
permits qualified foreign investors to obtain permanent residency
if they invest in certain commercial enterprises that meet certain
qualifications, including, but not limited to, the creation or
preservation of at least 10 jobs per investor.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shiyong Ye, Esq.
          Matthew Sava, Esq.
          REID & WISE LLC
          One Penn Plaza, Suite 2015
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: (212) 858-9968
          E-mail: sye@reidwise.com
                  sava@re idwise.com

               - and -

          Brian P. Murray, Esq.
          Gregory B. Linkh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Avenue, Suite 358
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          E-mail: bmurray@glancylaw.com
                  glinkh@glancylaw.com

FOGEL SERVICES: Conway Sues Over Faulty HVAC Systems
----------------------------------------------------
Kim Conway, individually, and on behalf of a class of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Fogel Services, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 2021CP1004156 (Comm. Pleas S.C., September 9, 2021), seeks
actual, consequential, expectation, and statutory damages expected
to exceed five million dollars, statutory and punitive damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees, costs of suit, prejudgment interest,
injunctive relief, and granting of such further relief resulting
from negligence and gross negligence/recklessness, breach of
implied warranties, Unfair Trade Practices and Strict Liability in
Tort under the South Carolina Code.

Kim Conway owns a home in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina that was
sold by Midtown Townhomes. Midtown hired Fogel Services, Inc. to
supply and install the heating, ventilation and air conditioning
the residences. Conway claims that said townhomes suffer greatly
from excess humidity and moisture; resulting to moisture, mildew,
and mold damage; and resulting to contamination. The excessive
humidity and moisture have allegedly made the homes unsafe,
unhealthy, and uninhabitable. Conway accuses Fogel of installing
unsuitable mechanical systems and other unfit components, using
unacceptable construction practices and poor workmanship. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Justin O'Toole Lucey, Esq.
     Collin Fuller, Esq.
     JUSTIN O'TOOLE LUCEY, P.A.
     415 Mill Street (29464)
     Post Office Box 806
     Mount Pleasant, SC 29465-0806
     Tel: (843) 849-8400
     Fax: (843) 849-8406
     Email: jlucey@lucey-law.com
            cfuller@lucey-law.com


FOREST RIVER: N.D. Indiana Narrows Claims in Truitt Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RANDY TRUITT, et al., Plaintiffs v. FOREST RIVER,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:20-CV-964 JD (N.D. Ind.), Judge Jon E.
Deguilio of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division, grants in part and denies in part
Forest River's Motion to Dismiss.

Background

On Nov. 17, 2020, Plaintiffs Randy Truitt, Lance Kuykendall,
Carlton Whitmire, David Trupp, Kevin Herinckx, and Fred Smith filed
a Complaint on behalf of themselves and a putative class of current
and former owners and lessees of recreational vehicles ("RVs")
manufactured, marketed, and distributed by Forest River, Inc. with
defective axles and a defective suspension. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3), the
Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of themselves and/or, in the
alternative, to a putative Nationwide Class, a California Class, an
Illinois Class, a Nevada Class, a Washington Class, and an Oregon
Class.

Forest River has at least 27 different lines of RVs, each of which
has an axle manufactured by Lippert Components. Lippert fabricates
the component parts, finishes and treats the axle shaft, and
installs the axle seals, before sending the completed axle to
Forest River to be used in each of their RVs.

The SKF Group, which the Plaintiffs describe as "a leading bearing
and seal manufacturing company," has published industry standards
for installation of seals on axles. According to their guide, the
proper installation of the axle depends on three conditions: (1)
the condition of the shaft; (2) the condition of the bore; and (3)
the proper techniques for seal installation. To prevent gas
leakage, the guide advises that a method known as "plunge grinding"
should be used to assure a proper finish on the shaft.
Additionally, the guide suggests using a heat-treated shaft finish
of "between 10 to 20 micro inches" to avoid grease leakage and
contamination.

The Plaintiffs allege that Lippert deviated from these best
practices. They contend that Lippert failed to plunge grind the
axle shafts to a commercially reasonable finish and did not heat
treat the shaft, resulting in a finish of only 63 microinches or
less. This failure resulted in grease contamination of the brakes,
which diminished the braking capability and increased the safety
risk of Forest River RVs.

The Complaint further alleges that Forest River knew of the axle
defect at "all times relevant." First, the Plaintiffs allege that
Forest River knew of the defect because of pre-sale durability
testing it conducted on the axles to make sure they were free from
defects. Second, the Complaint alleges that there were at least 10
public customer complaints providing Forest River with knowledge of
the axle defect. Third, the Plaintiffs allege that a statement made
by Lippert's Vice President of RV Sales on Feb. 17, 2017, provided
Forest River with knowledge of the axle defect.

The named Plaintiffs each allegedly purchased an RV from Forest
River unaware of the axle defect prior to purchase. The Complaint
alleges that, had these Plaintiffs been aware of the defect, they
would not have purchased the RV, or would have purchased only at a
lesser price. Each named plaintiff had similar, although slightly
different, purchasing experiences.

Each Plaintiff had a "Limited Warranty" covering their vehicle for
a period of one year against "substantial defects in materials and
workmanship attributable to Forest River." However, the one-year
Limited Warranty contained a restriction on the limitations period:
"No action to enforce express or implied warranties will be
commenced later than 90 days after expiration of the warranty
period." The Plaintiffs acknowledge in their Complaint that the
Limited Warranty includes this durational limitation, but allege
(1) that the Limited Warranty was provided only after the purchase,
and (2) that Forest River at all times "knew Class Vehicles
suffered from the Axle Defect yet failed to disclose the Defect to
the Plaintiffs."

After purchasing their Forest River RVs, the Complaint alleges the
axle defect resulted in "costly repairs, loss of vehicle use,
substantial loss in value and resale value of the vehicles, and
other related damage." Plaintiffs Kuykendall, Trupp, Herinckx, and
Whitmire each sought coverage under Forest River's Limited
Warranty. Plaintiffs Kuykendall, Trupp, and Herinckx were denied
coverage under the Limited Warranty, while Plaintiff Whitmire's
request for coverage was ignored by Forest River.

On Nov. 17, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit, asserting
fourteen claims in their complaint: Count I - Violations of
California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act; Count II - Violations of
California Unfair Competition Laws; Count III(a)1 - Breach of
Express Warranty Pursuant to California's Song - Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act; Count III(b) - Breach of Implied Warranty Pursuant to
California's Song - Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; Count IV -
Violation of Kansas Consumer Protection Act; Count V - Violation of
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act; Count
VI - Violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act; Count
VII - Violations of Washington Consumer Protection Act; Count VIII
- Violations of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act; Count IX -
Violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; Count X - Breach of
Express Warranty; Count XI - Breach of Implied Warranty; Count XII
- Common Law Fraud; and Count XIII - Unjust Enrichment.

Forest River moved to dismiss all counts for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

Discussion

(1) Counts I and II: Fraud Claims Under California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA") and Unfair Competition Laws ("UCL")

Forest River first moves to dismiss Counts I and II, which assert
claims brought under California's CLRA and UCL. Judge Deguilio
assumes that only Mr. Smith could bring a claim under either act,
as the Plaintiffs assert in their Response Brief. Mr. Smith alleges
that Forest River engaged in unfair and deceptive acts by knowingly
and intentionally concealing from the Plaintiffs the axle defect,
violating both statutes. Judge Deguilio finds that Mr. Smith has
not plead the specific facts required to support a plausible
inference that Forest River had knowledge of the defect. Because he
finds that the facts alleged do not support a plausible inference
of knowledge by Forest River, as required by the CLRA and UCL, the
Judge grants the motion to dismiss Counts I and II, and dismisses
both claims.

(2) Counts IV-VIII: Other State Law Fraud Claims

In Counts IV to VIII, the Plaintiffs bring claims under the
consumer protection acts of Kansas, Illinois, Nevada, Washington,
and Oregon. Forest River argues that the claims should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim of relief, adopting the same argument
as above.

Judge Deguilio agrees. He says, each of these claims is subject to
the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b) because they rely on the same fraudulent conduct that the UCL
and CLRA claims relied upon. Accordingly, when applying the Kansas,
Illinois, Nevada, Washington, and Oregon consumer protection
statutes, Federal Courts sitting in those states have applied Rule
9(b).

Like California, each of the consumer fraud statutes in Kansas,
Illinois, Nevada, Washington, and Oregon requires that the
defendant possess actual knowledge of the defect at the time of
purchase in order to make out a fraud by omission claim. In their
response brief, the Plaintiffs make no argument as to why Judge
Deguilio should alter his analysis. Judge Deguilio found that the
claims brought under the UCL and CLRA did not adequately allege
specific facts raising a plausible inference that Forest River
possessed knowledge of the defect under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b). The Judge finds that Counts IV-VIII each suffer
from the same pleading defect. Therefore, he grants the motion to
dismiss for Counts IV to VIII.

(3) Counts III(a) and III(b): Express and Implied Warranty Claims
Under California's Song-Beverly Act

Forest River next argues that because Mr. Smith purchased the RV
outside of California, the Song-Beverly Act is inapplicable, and
that both counts should be dismissed for failure to state a
plausible claim upon which relief could be granted.

Judge Deguilio again agrees. He explains that The Song-Beverly Act
is explicitly limited to goods sold in California. Under the
Song-Beverly Act, "sale" means "(1) the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price, or (2) a consignment for sale."
Cal. Civ. Code Section 1791(n). "California Law is clear that when
title passes outside of California, the Song-Beverly Act does not
apply."

The Plaintiffs do not allege that any Plaintiff purchased a vehicle
in California. Even the Plaintiff who resided in California, Mr.
Smith, left California and bought his Forest River RV in Arizona.
Accordingly, without any sale of an RV in California, Judge
Deguilio grants Forest River's motion to dismiss Counts III(a) and
III(b) for both claims brought under the Song-Beverly Act.

(4) Counts IX, X, and XI: Breach of Express Warranty, Implied
Warranty, and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

Forest River next argues that the Plaintiffs fail to assert a
plausible claim upon which relief can be granted for breach of
express warranty, implied warranty, and violations of the federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act because each claim has lapsed under the
statute of limitations. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, consumers can
"enforce written and implied warranties in federal court, borrowing
state law causes of action." "The court will then look to state law
to determine the remedies available." In the case, the Plaintiffs'
Magnuson-Moss Act claim hinges on their express and implied
warranty claims. Therefore, if their express and implied warranty
claims fail, then so too does their claim under the Magnuson-Moss
Act.

Forest River argues that the claims are barred because the Limited
Warranty reduced the period of limitations to a year and 90-days
from the date of purchase. (DE 19-1.) The most recent purchase of
an RV by a plaintiff was in February 2019. The Plaintiffs filed the
lawsuit on Nov. 17, 2020. So, if the reduction in the period of
limitations found in the Limited Warranty applies, each Plaintiffs'
claim for breach of warranty would be time barred as falling
outside of the year and 90 days limitation provided in the Limited
Warranty.

However, the Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not time barred
because the reduction of the statute of limitations contained in
the Limited Warranty is unconscionable. They claim that the
contract was procedurally unconscionable because Forest River only
provided "the Limited Warranty to buyers after the purchase was
complete." Furthermore, they claim that the contract was also
substantively unconscionable because Forest River "knew Class
Vehicles suffered from the Axle Defect and would continue to pose
safety risks after the Base Limited Warranty purportedly expired,
yet failed to disclose the Defect."

Judge Deguilio agrees with the Plaintiffs that the motion to
dismiss should be denied because of the allegation the warranty was
provided after the sale, but would not characterize this as an
issue of procedural unconscionability. It appears to the Judge that
the Plaintiff has mistaken procedural unconscionability with the
meeting of the minds required to form a contract. Unconscionability
is a question of law for the court to decide.

Judge Deguilio finds that the Plaintiffs' allegation that they
received the Limited Warranty following purchase, accepted as true,
creates a plausible claim that they were unaware of the warranty
limitation at time of purchase and that the restriction on the
limitations period was invalid. Therefore, the Judge denies Forest
River's Motion to Dismiss Counts IX, X, and XI.

(5) Count XII: Common Law Fraud

Forest River argues that the Plaintiffs' common law fraud claims
are really contract claims disguised as tort claims and that the
claims are being brought "under Indiana law." However, the
Plaintiffs' Complaint merely asserts they are bringing a claim of
"Common Law Fraud" without mentioning which particular state's
common law they are bringing the claim under. In order to determine
which jurisdiction's law should apply, Judge Deguilio considers
whether this is a tort or contract claim as part of a choice-of-law
analysis.

Judge Deguilio finds that Plaintiffs claims sound of tort. As they
argue in their Response to Forest River's Motion to Dismiss, the
Plaintiffs "fraud claim is not Forest River's failure to repair
under the Limited Warranty; it is Forest River's decision to sell
the Class Vehicles with a known safety-related Defect and conceal
that fact from purchasers to induce sales." Therefore, because the
claims sound in tort, Indiana choice-of-law analysis concerning
tort applies.

An essential element of common law fraud in Indiana, Illinois,
Kansas, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and California is that the
defendant has knowledge that the statement or omission was false.
Judge Deguilio holds that the Plaintiffs have not provided the
specific facts necessary to make out a plausible claim of Forest
River's knowledge of the defect under rule 9(b). This means that
there is not a difference between the laws of the states that is
"important enough to affect the outcome of the litigation." But it
also means that the Plaintiffs' common law fraud claims are
dismissed because they fail to state a plausible claim for relief
under any potentially applicable state law. Therefore, Judge
Deguilio grants Forest River's Motion to Dismiss Count XII.

(6) Count XIII: Unjust Enrichment

Lastly, Forest River moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim of
unjust enrichment. In support of their argument that the
Plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrichment should be dismissed, Forest
River again argues that this is just a contract claim in disguise.
However, in making this argument, Forest River cites to no cases
discussing unjust enrichment. Because Forest River provides no law
discussing unjust enrichment to support its argument, Judge
Deguilio denies its Motion to Dismiss Count XIII.

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Deguilio grants in part and denies in
part Forest River's Motion to Dismiss. He grants Forest River's
motion to dismiss Count I (Violations of California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act) and Count II (Violations of California's Unfair
Competition Laws). Each of these counts is dismissed with
prejudice.

The Judge grants Forest River's motion to dismiss Count III(a)
(Breach of Express Warranty Pursuant to Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act) and Count III(b) (Breach of Implied Warranty Pursuant
to Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act). Each of these counts is
dismissed with prejudice.

The Judge grants Forest River's Motion to Dismiss Counts IV
(Violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act), V (Violation of
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act),
VI (Violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act), VII
(Violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act), and VIII
(Violations of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act). Each of
these counts is dismissed with prejudice.

The Judge grants Forest River's Motion to Dismiss Count XII (Common
Law Fraud). The count is dismissed with prejudice.

The Judge denies Forest River's Motion to Dismiss Count IX
(Violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act), Count X (Breach of
Express Warranty), Count XI (Breach of Implied Warranty), and Count
XIII (Unjust Enrichment).

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4ewy3a from Leagle.com.


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Mahar and West Can Intervene in Ap-Fonden Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SJUNDE AP-FONDEN and THE CLEVELAND BAKERS AND
TEAMSTERS PENSION FUND, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-8457 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Jesse M.
Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the Proposed Intervenors' Motion to Intervene, and the
Defendants' motion to respond to the Proposed Intervenors'
arguments regarding class certification.

On Aug. 30, 2021, Proposed Intervenors Kevin Mahar and Mitchell
West, named plaintiffs in a consolidated class action pending in
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York,
Index No. 653648/2018, filed a motion to intervene under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24 for the limited purpose of partially
opposing the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. The motion
is granted as unopposed.

On Sept. 2, 2021, the Defendants filed a letter motion stating that
they do not oppose the motion to intervene and requesting the
opportunity to respond to the Proposed Intervenors' arguments
regarding class certification. The Defendants' motion is granted.
The Defendants will file any response to the Intervenors'
arguments, not to exceed ten pages, by Oct. 1, 2021.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate ECF Nos. 246 and 253.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/m49kruz8 from Leagle.com.


GENERAL MOTORS: Court Decertifies Texas Class in Siqueiros Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAUL SIQUEIROS, et al., Plaintiffs v. GENERAL MOTORS
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-07244-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward
M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order:

   a. denying the Defendant's motion to decertify all classes for
      lack of Article III standing under Transunion LLC v.
      Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190 (2021);

   b. denying the Defendant's motion to decertify the North
      Carolina class; and

   c. granting the Defendant's motion to decertify the Texas
      class.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendant GM knowingly manufactured and
sold a car engine with an inherent defect that caused excessive oil
consumption and engine damage. The alleged defect affected 2011 to
2014 model-year GM vehicles. The Plaintiffs assert claims under
various state consumer-protection and fraud statutes on behalf of a
nationwide class as well as various statewide classes. They filed
their class action complaint on Dec. 19, 2016. They have since
amended their pleadings several times; the operative complaint is
the seventh amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs allege that GM's Gen IV Vortec 5300 LC9 engine
suffers from an "inherent" oil-consumption defect. The "primary
cause" of the alleged defect is the piston rings installed by GM.
These piston rings "do not maintain sufficient tension to keep oil
in the crankcase," and the oil migration that occurs as a result
allows oil to "burn or accumulate as carbon buildup on the
combustion chamber's surfaces."

The Plaintiffs allege that the oil-consumption defect causes safety
problems in three ways: (1) oil consumption can lead to a lack of
adequate lubrication in the engine and dropping oil pressure levels
in vehicles; (2) the presence of excess oil in the combustion
chamber can cause spark plug fouling, which can cause engine
problems; and (3) when drivers experience these problems while
driving, they may be forced to pull over and stop alongside a road
or highway (or they may be stranded in such a location with an
inoperable vehicle), which places them in danger.

Initially, the Plaintiffs sought to include all four Gen IV engine
designs (the LC9, the LMG, the LH9, and the LMF) in the class
definition, but in the reply in support of their motion for class
certification, the Plaintiffs limited the proposed class definition
to vehicles with LC9 engines with Active Fuel Management (AFM). The
LC9 engine was installed in the 2010-2014 Chevrolet Avalanche;
2010-2014 Chevrolet Silverado; 2010-2014 Chevrolet Suburban;
2010-2014 Chevrolet Tahoe; 2010-2014 GMC Sierra; 2010-2014 GMC
Yukon; and the 2010-2014 GMC Yukon XL ("Class Vehicles").

On April 23, 2020, as to individual claims in the four bellwether
states (California, New Jersey, Ohio, North Carolina, and Texas),
the Court granted summary judgment to the Defendant on all but the
following:

     a. California: (1) Count 2 - Violations of the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1761; (2) Count 4 - Violations
of the implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1790; (3) Count 7 - Violations of the
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200;

     b. North Carolina: (4) Count 88 - Violations of the Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. Section 75-1.1;
(5) Count 90 - Breach of implied warranty of merchantability; (6)
Count 91 - Fraudulent omission;

     c. Texas: (7) Count 123 - Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act, Tex. Bus. & C. Code Section 17.01; and (8) Count
125 - Breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

On May 25, 2021, as to a second batch of states (Arkansas,
California, Idaho, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee), the
Court granted summary judgment to Defendant on all but the
following individual claims:

     a. Idaho: (9) Count 13 - Violation of Idaho Consumer
Protection Act, Idaho Code Ann. Section 48-601; (10) Count 16 -
Fraudulent omission;

     b. Massachusetts: (11) Count 18 - Breach of the Massachusetts
Regulation of Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 93A, Section 9(3); (12) Count 20 - Breach of implied
warranty of merchantability; (13) Count 21 - Fraudulent omission;

     c. Pennsylvania: (14) Count 30 - Breach of implied warrant of
merchantability;

     d. Tennessee: (15) Count 33 - Breach of Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. Section 47-18-101; and (16) Count
36 - Fraudulent omission.

The Court also dismissed the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA)
claims under Count 1 of the individual named plaintiffs in every
state except: California; North Carolina; Texas; Massachusetts; and
Pennsylvania.

Accordingly, the parties will proceed to try 16 individual claims.

Of the individual claims that survived summary judgment, the Court
certified the following for class-wide adjudication:

     a. California: (1) Count 4 - Violations of the implied
warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ.
Code Section 1790;

     b. Idaho: (2) Count 13 - Violation of Idaho Consumer
Protection Act, Idaho Code Ann. Section 48-601;

     c. North Carolina: (3) Count 90 - Breach of implied warranty
of merchantability; and

     d. Texas: (4) Count 125 - Breach of implied warranty of
merchantability.

Accordingly, the parties anticipate trying four claims on behalf of
subclasses in four separate states.

On June 15 and July 15, 2021, the Defendant filed the pending
motions to decertify the North Carolina and Texas classes, and to
decertify all classes for lack of Article III standing under
Transunion, respectively.

Discussion

I. Transunion Decertification Motion

The Court has twice held in the action that "each of the putative
class members who purchased a Class Vehicle has standing to receive
damages because the alleged defect caused them to overpay for their
vehicles." The Defendant urges the Court to reconsider this holding
-- which is now the controlling law of the case -- in light of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Transunion.

Judge Chen holds that Transunion actually confirms that the
Plaintiffs suffered a concrete injury by overpaying for their
vehicles. Transunion held that putative class members who were
incorrectly listed as terrorists on their Transunion credit reports
did not suffer a sufficiently concrete injury under Article III
unless those reports were disseminated to a third party. In other
words, the Judge says, the mere presence of an inaccuracy in an
internal credit file, if it is not disclosed to a third party,
causes no concrete harm.

In so holding, the Supreme Court contrasted the speculative injury
at issue in Transunion with monetary injuries like the Plaintiffs'
overpayment for their vehicles at issue: Certain harms readily
qualify as concrete injuries under Article III. The most obvious
are traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary
harms. If a defendant has caused physical or monetary injury to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered a concrete injury in fact
under Article III.

The Court's conclusion that the Plaintiffs have Article III
standing because they overpaid for their vehicles is thus entirely
consistent with the longstanding rule, reaffirmed in Transunion,
that monetary injuries are sufficiently tangible and concrete under
Article III.

The Defendant also contends "the overwhelming majority of class
members in each state" have suffered no concrete injury because
they "have not experienced the effects of the alleged
oil-consumption defect," just like the majority of the plaintiffs
in Transunion never had their credit reports disseminated to a
third party. This analogy, Judge Chen holds, does not work,
however, because the concrete injury is the reduction in the Class
Vehicle's monetary value, not the effects of the oil-consumption
defect. He says the addition of a terrorist designation did not
have diminished the monetary value of the credit reports in
Transunion because those credit reports -- unlike the Class
Vehicles in the case -- were free.

Finally, the Defendant unsuccessfully attempts to characterize the
Plaintiffs' injury as the fear of "future harm" from the
oil-consumption defect. Again, that reasoning does not apply in the
case because the Plaintiffs' injury is not the future "effects of
the oil-consumption defect," but the fact that they overpaid for
the defective Class Vehicles in the past, Judge Chen holds. He
states, the Plaintiffs need not suffer the "effects of the
oil-consumption defect" -- much like the class members in
Transunion who did have their credit reports disseminated did not
need to suffer the effects of that dissemination -- to have Article
III standing.

Therefore, the Plaintiffs who purchased defective vehicles suffered
a past concrete injury under Article III when they overpaid for
those vehicles, regardless of whether they feel the effects of the
oil-consumption defect in the future. Accordingly, Judge Chen
denies the Defendant's motion to decertify the classes for lack of
Article III standing under Transunion.

II. Motion to Decertify North Carolina and Texas Classes

The Defendant argues that the Court should decertify the implied
warranty claims in North Carolina and Texas because the laws of
those states, like the law of Pennsylvania, adhere to the manifest
defect rule which requires each putative class member to
demonstrate that the oil-consumption defect actually manifested in
their vehicles, i.e., caused excessive oil consumption or engine
wear in a manner which caused personal injury or property damage.

A. North Carolina

The Defendant cites only Bussian v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. for the
proposition that North Carolina law requires a defect to manifest
for a plaintiff to have a cognizable implied warranty claim. The
plaintiff in Bussian discovered that the ball joints in his vehicle
"had worn out prematurely and that failing to replace them would
constitute a safety hazard" when he took his Dodge Durango to a
mechanic for a routine inspection.  As a result, he paid the
mechanic $700 to replace the ball joints.

The federal court in the Middle District of North Carolina
concluded that the plaintiff "failed to make a legally sufficient
allegation that his Durango was not merchantable" because he "made
no allegation that the allegedly defective ball joints caused him
to suffer mechanical problems, lose control of his vehicle, or have
an accident." In other words, "the plaintiff's complaint made out
no allegations that his Durango was not fit for the purposes for
which it was intended, i.e., to provide safe and reliable
transportation."

Bussian, while supporting the Defendant's position, is not a
persuasive source of law, Judge Chen finds. He says it is a
decision by a federal court that did not rely on North Carolina
law. Bussian did not cite any North Carolina legal authority
requiring each putative class member to establish that a product
defect caused them mechanical problems or personal injury in order
to bring an implied warranty claim under North Carolina law. Nor
has the Defendant cited to any other applicable authority, state or
otherwise, for this proposition. Accordingly, the Judge denies the
Defendant's motion to decertify the North Carolina Class.

B. Texas

Under Texas law, products sold or leased by a merchant carry an
implied warranty of merchantability that the goods are 'fit for the
ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.' To establish a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff must
show that the product (1) contained a defect that renders it unfit
for its ordinary purpose, (2) the defect existed when it left the
manufacturer's possession, and (3) the defect caused the plaintiff
to suffer injury, citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Garza, 179 S.W.3d 76,
81 (Tex. App. 2005). The Texas Supreme Court has not addressed
whether the manifest defect rule bars class certification of
implied warranty claims in Texas, but the Court of Appeals have
held that it does.

Judge Chen finds that the Plaintiffs do not cite a single case
where a Texas state court held that the economic harm of purchasing
an allegedly defective vehicle was sufficient to recover for a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantanbility under Texas law.
To the contrary, Garza and Everett v. TK-Taito, LLC, conclusively
held that the manifest-defect rule in Texas requires the defect to
"manifest" in a way that disrupts the operation of the vehicle such
that it renders the vehicle unfit for its ordinary purpose of
moving people safely from one place to another. In the case,
because the oil-consumption defect did not disrupt the operation of
all the Texas class members' vehicles, class certification is
inappropriate. Accordingly, the Judge grants the Defendant's motion
to decertify the Texas class.

Conclusion

Judge Chen (1) denies the motion to decertify for lack of Article
III standing, (2) denies the motion to decertify the North Carolina
class, and (3) grants the motion to decertify the Texas class. His
Order disposes of Docket Nos. 325 and 347.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/h2az3zwz from Leagle.com.


GENIUS BRAND: Akbar Sues Over Caffeine Supplements' False Ads
-------------------------------------------------------------
SAYEED AKBAR, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE GENIUS BRAND, Defendant, Case No.
1:21-cv-5041 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 2021), is brought by the Plaintiff
claiming on behalf of himself and similarly situated purchasers of
the Genius Caffeine Extended Release Caffeine for violation of the
New York General Business Law, breach of express warranty, unjust
enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud.

According to the complaint, the Defendant represents that
"[t]hrough a sustained release, microencapsulation technique,
Genius Caffeine provides true sustained energy that simulates
thermogenesis, accelerating the rate at which your body burns
calories."

However, these representations are allegedly false. A peer-reviewed
study has found no difference between extended-release or sustained
release caffeine pills, like the product, and regular-release
caffeine supplements. The Defendant charges a price premium for the
product based on the representations that the product is superior
to standard caffeine supplements, added the suit.

The Defendant is a self-described leading manufacturer and seller
of "nootropics," which are supplements that allegedly improve brain
functioning. The Defendant's products are sold under the "Genius
Brand" label.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Max S. Roberts, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue, Third Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: mroberts@bursor.com

               - and -

          Rachel L. Miller, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          701 Brickell Ave., Suite 1420
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 330-5512
          Facsimile: (305) 676-9006
          E-mail: rmiller@bursor.com

GLOBAL PROCESSING: Vanderwoude Files FDCPA Suit in D. Utah
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Global Processing
Services. The case is styled as Jacob Vanderwoude, individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated v. Global Processing
Services, Case No. 1:21-cv-00132-HCN (D. Utah, Sept. 17, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Global Processing Services -- https://www.globalprocessing.com/ --
is a provider of a platform that processes payments and manages
credit, debit, or prepaid card transactions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David J. McGlothlin, Esq.
          Ryan L. McBride, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC
          2633 E Indian School Rd., Ste. 460
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Phone: (602) 900-1288
          Email: david@kazlg.com
                 ryan@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Theron D. Morrison, Esq.
          MORRISON LAW GROUP
          290 25TH ST STE 102
          OGDEN, UT 84401
          Phone: (801) 392-9324
          Email: therondmorrison@gmail.com


GRAHAM SHAY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Graham Shay 1857 Inc.
The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. Graham Shay 1857 Inc., Case
No. 1:21-cv-05201 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Graham Shay 1857 -- https://grahamshay.com/ -- is a private art
gallery, specializing in fine American paintings and American and
European sculpture, spanning a time-period from the 1840's through
the 20th Century.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


HEALTHEQUITY INC: Settlement in Suit vs. WageWorks Gets Final Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HealthEquity, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 31, 2021, that court in the putative
class action suit against WageWorks, Inc., a company subsidiary,
granted final approval of the settlement and entered a final
judgment on August 20, 2021.

On March 9, 2018, a putative class action was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

On May 16, 2019, a consolidated amended complaint was filed by the
lead plaintiffs asserting claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, against the
Company's subsidiary WageWorks, Inc., its former Chief Executive
Officer and its former Chief Financial Officer on behalf of
purchasers of WageWorks common stock between May 6, 2016 and March
1, 2018.

The complaint also alleged claims under the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, arising from WageWorks' June 19, 2017 common stock
offering against those same defendants, as well as the members of
its board of directors at the time of that offering. The class
action settled for $30.0 million.

During the quarter ended July 31, 2021, WageWorks contributed $5.0
million and its insurers paid the remaining $25.0 million. The
court granted final approval of the settlement and entered a final
judgment on August 20, 2021.

HealthEquity, Inc. is an American health care company that is
designated as a non-bank health savings trustee by the IRS. This
designation allows HealthEquity to be the custodian of health
savings accounts regardless of which financial institution the
funds are deposited with. The company is based in Draper, Utah.


HELICLINE FINE ART: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Helicline Fine Art,
Inc. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated v. Helicline Fine Art,
Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-05202 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Helicline Fine Art -- http://www.heliclinefineart.com/-- offers
20th Century American and European modernist paintings, sculptures,
works on paper, drawings, American scene and modernism.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


HILLSHIRE BRANDS: Sanders Files Suit in S.D. Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Hillshire Brands
Company. The case is styled as Erin Sanders, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. The Hillshire Brands
Company, Case No. 3:21-cv-01155 (S.D. Ill., Sept. 18, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

The Hillshire Brands Company --
https://www.tysonfoods.com/hillshire-brands -- manufactures and
markets food products for retail and foodservice markets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer I. Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Road, Ste. 409
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Phone: (516) 260-7080
          Fax: (516) 234-7800
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


INTERNATIONAL FINE ART: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against International Fine
Art Direct, Ltd., LLC. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for
himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v.
International Fine Art Direct, Ltd., LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-05203
(E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

International Fine Art Direct is an art gallery in Cleveland,
Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


KIMO MANAGEMENT: Aguilar Sues Over Restaurant Staff's Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
ISRAEL AGUILAR and ROLANDO TAYUN CHAN, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KIMO MANAGEMENT GROUP
CORP. d/b/a SUYO GASTROFUSION and NILSON DIAZ, in his individual
and professional capacities, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-07537
(S.D.N.Y., Sep. 9, 2021) arises from the Defendants' alleged
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

The complaint alleges that the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs
proper overtime compensation, failed to pay minimum wages, failed
to provide notices of pay rate, failed to furnish accurate wage
statements, failed to pay spread of hours premiums, failed to pay
all wages owed, and engaged in retaliatory practices.

Mr. Aguilar was employed by the Defendants as a chef from February
2020 through December 2020, and again from  February 21, 2021
through late March 2021.

Mr. Chan was employed by the Defendants as a dishwasher and busser
from March 2020 through December 2020, and again from February 2021
through July 21, 2021.

The Defendants own and operate a Latin-Asian fusion restaurant and
lounge in the Bronx, New York, doing business under the name, "Suyo
Gastrofusion."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Innessa M. Huot, Esq.
          Alex J. Hartzband, Esq.
          Camilo M. Burr, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: ihuot@faruqilaw.com
                  ahartzband@faruqilaw.com
                  cburr@faruqilaw.com

LASIK VISION: Williams Suit Moved From S.D. Ohio to W.D. Tennessee
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAMARA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. THE LASIK VISION
INSTITUTE, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:21-mc-10 (S.D.
Ohio), Chief Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division,
transferred the matter to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee for all further proceedings, including ruling
on Vision Group Holdings' Motion to Compel.

Background

LVI Intermediate Holdings, Inc., doing business as Vision Group
Holdings, LLC, commenced the miscellaneous action in support of
litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee, Williams v. The Lasik Vision Institute, LLC,
No. 2:20-cv-2402 (W.D. Tenn.).

Plaintiff Williams filed a putative class action against numerous
defendants, including Vision Group Holdings, in Tennessee state
court. The action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee. Discovery was bifurcated into
"class" discovery and "merits" discovery. The underlying litigation
is currently in the class discovery phase.

In June 2021, Vision Group Holdings issued and served a subpoena on
non-party Kismet New Vision Holdings, LLC seeking "documents,
records, and other materials" that were "inextricably linked to the
issues of the underlying action--and particularly to the issue of
whether a class should be certified." It alleges in its motion to
compel that "Kismet neither objected nor produced documents
responsive to the Subpoena by the set deadline of July 6, 2021."

On July 12, 2021, Vision Group Holdings initiated the instant
miscellaneous action in support of the pending litigation in the
Western District of Tennessee. Specifically, it moves the Court to
compel Kismet's compliance with the subpoena and transfer the
motion to compel to the Western District of Tennessee. Non-party
Kismet has neither entered an appearance nor filed any memoranda in
opposition to Vision Group Holdings' motions.

Discussion

The issue in the case is whether the Court should, within its
discretion, transfer Vision Group Holdings' motion to compel to the
Western District of Tennessee pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f).
Vision Group Holdings, as the proponent of transfer, "bears the
burden of showing that such exceptional circumstances are
present."

Judge Litkovitz finds that Vision Group Holdings has met its burden
to prove that exceptional circumstances exist warranting transfer
of the matter to the Western District of Tennessee. First, the
Judge finds that the underlying litigation is a putative class
action that has been pending in the Western District of Tennessee
for over 13 months. Accordingly, because the matter has been
pending in the Western District of Tennessee for over 13 months and
the records and documents sought by the subpoena have already been
the subject of several motions and rulings in the underlying
litigation, exceptional circumstances warranting transfer exist
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f).

Second, Judge Litkovitz finds that judicial economy warrants
transferring the matter to the Western District of Tennessee
because there "is a very real possibility that this Court's ruling
could conflict with any ruling issued by" the Tennessee Court. The
Tennessee court has knowledge of the underlying issues surrounding
Vision Group Holdings' attempts to secure the records sought by its
non-party subpoena. Accordingly, "judicial economy will be best
served by having all of these disputes resolved by the same
court."

Finally, Judge Litkovitz finds that the exceptional circumstances
outweigh any burden imposed on non-party Kismet. As Kismet has
failed to enter an appearance and respond to Vision Group Holdings'
pending motions before the Court, the Judge holds that it is
unclear exactly what burden Kismet would endure by transferring the
matter to the Western District of Tennessee. It is, however,
unlikely that any travel will be required of Kismet, as the
conferences in the underlying litigation have been exclusively held
via telephone or videoconference. Vision Group Holdings confirms
that "every hearing that has taken place in the underlying matter
thus far has been held by telephone or videoconference."

Conclusion

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f), Judge Litkovitz finds that the
exceptional circumstances warranting transfer of the matter to the
Western District of Tennessee outweigh any burden that transfer may
impose on Kismet. The matter is therefore transferred to the
Western District of Tennessee to avoid "disrupting the issuing
court's management of the underlying litigation." Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(f) advisory committee's note to the 2013 amendment.


Vision Group Holdings' Motion to Transfer is granted, and the
matter is transferred to the Western District of Tennessee for all
further proceedings, including ruling on Vision Group Holdings'
Motion to Compel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ywzkpfvu from Leagle.com.


LIBERTY MUTUAL: Oregon Court Dismisses North Pacific Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NORTH PACIFIC MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., Plaintiffs v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Wisconsin Company,
Defendant, Case No. 3:21-cv-00404-HZ (D. Or.), Judge Marco A.
Hernandez of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint
for failure to state a claim.

Background

Plaintiffs North Pacific Management, Inc., Airport Inn, LLC, BPS
Associates, LLC, Bean & Company, LLC, COHO.Res, LLC, JBH Property
Acquisitions, LLC, Suntek Park, LLC, TFBP Holdings, Inc., and
Triple S Enterprises, Inc. bring the class action lawsuit against
the Defendant seeking a declaratory judgment that their insurance
policies, provided by Defendant, cover their business income losses
stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. The Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendant breached its insurance contracts with them and similarly
situated policyholders when it denied coverage for their
pandemic-related business income losses.

Plaintiff North Pacific operates a property management company in
Tigard, Oregon. Plaintiff Airport Inn operates the Radisson Hotel
Portland Airport and a restaurant called Lakeside Bar & Grill in
Portland, Oregon. Plaintiff BPS Associates owns and operates
athletic clubs in Portland and Lake Oswego, Oregon. Plaintiff Bean
& Company owns and operates a restaurant in Aurora, Oregon, called
Filberts Farmhouse Kitchen. Plaintiff COHO.Res "owns and operates
an electronic inventory distribution for independent hotels" and is
located in Tigard, Oregon. Plaintiff Heathman Garage Associates
owns and operates a parking garage in Portland. Plaintiff JBH
Property Acquisitions owns and/or operates hotels in Portland and
Beaverton, Oregon. Plaintiff Suntek Park owns and operates office
buildings and retail centers in Portland. Plaintiffs TFBP Holdings
and Triple S Enterprises own and operate restaurants in Portland,
Oregon. Plaintiff North Pacific obtained business insurance on
behalf of all the Plaintiffs from Defendant Liberty Mutual.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and business closure orders issued by
the state of Oregon, the Plaintiffs "were forced to suspend, in
whole or in part, their business operations" leading to financial
losses. They tendered an insurance claim seeking coverage for their
financial losses stemming from its reduced business operations. The
Defendant denied the Plaintiffs' claim. The Plaintiffs allege that
the "business income," "extended period of restoration," and "extra
expense" coverages in their business insurance policy require the
Defendant to cover their financial losses resulting from reducing
their business operations.

The Policy covers "risks of direct physical loss or damage to
covered property as a result of an occurrence, unless excluded." It
does not define the phrase "direct physical loss or damage."
Section B of the Policy's Declarations (form RM1000) demonstrates
that the Policy covers real property, personal property, and
personal property of others. Id. The Policy also covers loss of
business income, including "the actual loss of business income you
incur during a period of restoration directly resulting from damage
by a peril insured against to the type of property covered by this
policy at a covered location."

Perils insured against are "causes of loss for which this policy
provides coverage." A covered loss under the Policy means "a loss
to covered property at a covered location resulting from a peril
insured against." Covered property "means property insured by this
policy." "Personal property" includes "tangible things, other than
real property, including improvements and betterments you have made
in buildings you do not own." Real property "means buildings and
any other structure, including: (1) Completed additions,
extensions, permanent fittings or fixtures; (2) Machinery and
equipment used to service the buildings; and (3) Yard fixtures."

The Policy also covers extra expenses, including necessary expenses
the insured incurs in excess of its normal operating expenses that
reduces its loss of business income. It provides an additional 60
days of loss of business income coverage under certain
circumstances. The Policy also covers loss of business income due
to the action of civil authority.

The Plaintiffs' Policy also covers "the actual loss of business
income you incur if your ingress to or egress from a covered
location is prevented as the direct result of a peril insured
against to the type of property covered by this policy within one
(1) statute mile of a covered location." The business income and
extra expense provisions of the Policy exclude coverage for "any
consequential, indirect or remote loss."

Discussion

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint because no
"direct physical loss or damage to covered property" occurred that
would trigger coverage under any provisions of the Policy and that
a virus exclusion bars their claims. The Plaintiffs argue that the
Policy's undefined terms "loss of," "damage to" and "direct
physical loss" cover their losses and that the virus exclusion does
not bar their claims.

I. Coverage Provisions

Judge Hernandez opines that the plain meaning of the phrase "direct
physical loss or damage" requires the Plaintiffs' property to be
lost or physically damaged for coverage to exist under any
provisions of their Policy. The Civil Authority provision extends
coverage for loss of business income when an action of civil or
military authority prohibits access to the property if the action
of civil or military authority "results from" a covered loss or
"damage by a peril insured against to the type of property covered
by this policy within one (1) statute mile of a covered location."
Thus, the Civil Authority provision requires that an action of
civil authority prohibited access to the Plaintiffs' property as a
result of the loss, destruction, dispossession of or injury to
property located within one mile of their covered locations.

Having determined the plain meaning of the undefined terms of the
Policy, Judge Hernandez now applies the plain meaning of those
terms to the language of the Policy to determine whether coverage
exists. The Defendant argues that the phrase "direct physical loss
or damage to covered property" requires the Plaintiffs to lose
property or demonstrate a physical alteration in the condition of
their property for coverage to apply.

Judge Hernandez agrees. He opines that the Plaintiffs' Complaint
alleges only that the state and local government orders issued in
Oregon in response to the pandemic caused them to suspend their
business operations. Although they allege that they expended money
to meet new public health requirements, the Plaintiffs do not
allege that any of their property was lost or damaged as a result
of the orders.

Absent from those allegations are any facts from which a factfinder
could conclude that the Plaintiffs' business property was lost or
damaged. Judge Hernandez says, the Plaintiffs' conclusory
allegations that they suffered direct physical loss or damage are
insufficient to state a claim. The absence of facts demonstrating
any physical loss or damage to Plaintiffs' business property is
fatal to the Plaintiffs' claim.

The Plaintiffs attempt to equate the temporary limitation or loss
of use of the property to direct physical loss, Judge Hernandez
finds. The two are not equivalent, he says. Construing the
Plaintiffs' allegations in the light most favorable to them, the
Judge holds that the losses the Plaintiffs allege are purely
economic and not the result of any "direct physical loss or damage
to property." As a result, the Plaintiffs have not met their burden
to demonstrate that coverage exists under the Policy.

II. Virus Exclusion

The Defendant argues that the virus exclusion in the Policy bars
the Plaintiffs' claims. The Plaintiffs argue that because they
alleged that the orders, not the virus or pandemic, were the
"direct, predominant, and efficient cause of the Plaintiffs' direct
physical loss or damage," they can avoid application of the virus
exclusion. Because the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
coverage exists, Judge Hernandez need not determine whether any
exclusion applies.

III. Leave to Amend

Because he finds that the Plaintiffs' Complaint cannot be amended
to plausibly allege a claim under the terms of the Policy, Judge
Hernandez denies leave to amend.

Conclusion

Judge Hernandez grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The
Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Defendant's
Request for Judicial Notice is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/58rwt6c2 from Leagle.com.

Kyle A. Sturm -- kyle.sturm@foremansturm.com -- Nicholas A. Thede
-- nick.thede@foremansturm.com -- Foreman Sturm & Thede LLP, in
Portland, Oregon.

Nicholas A. Kahl -- nick@nickkahl.com -- Nick Kahl, LLC, Portland,
Oregon, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs.

John A. Bennett, Stuart Duncan Jones Bullivant Houser Bailey PC,
Portland, Oregon.

James Kitces, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, LLP, in Minneapolis,
Minnesota.

Taylore Karpa, Robins Kaplan LLP, in Boston, Massachusetts,
Attorneys for the Defendant.


LOWE GALLERIES: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lowe Galleries, Inc.
The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. Lowe Galleries, Inc., Case
No. 1:21-cv-05204 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Lowe Galleries Inc. -- https://lowegallery.com/ -- is an Art
Gallery in Atlanta, Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE: Consolidated Riviera Beach Suit Tossed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH GENERAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-3608 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Vernon S.
Broderick of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Plaintiff's
Consolidated Complaint.

Background

In the action, Lead Plaintiff Moab Partners, L.P. asserts various
securities law claims against Defendant Macquarie Infrastructure
Corp. ("MIC"), Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc.
("MIMUSA"), Barclays Capital Inc., the Officer Defendants (James
Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam Stewart, Richard D. Courtney), Robert Choi,
Martin Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany III, Henry
E. Lentz, Ouma Sananikone, and William H. Webb (together with the
Officer Defendants, "Individual Defendants"). The Plaintiff's
claims center on its assertion that MIC and the other Individual
Defendants made "material misrepresentations and omissions" about
potential risks facing what it characterizes as MIC's "most
important operating division," and specifically that the Defendants
were "actively concealing MIC's exposure" to a soon-to-be-effective
environmental regulation.

Defendant Macquarie is a publicly traded Delaware holding company
that owns and operates various infrastructure and
infrastructure-related businesses. Central to the allegations in
the Consolidated Complaint is what the Plaintiff calls Macquarie's
"most important operating division," International-Matex Tank
Terminals-Bayone, Inc. ("IMTT"). IMTT is a wholly-owned MIC
subsidiary that operates large "bulk liquid storage terminals"
within the United States. Its terminals handle and store various
liquid commodities, most notably "petroleum," but also "biofuels,
chemicals, and vegetable/tropical oil products." IMTT does not buy
and sell petroleum or other liquid products; it is solely a service
provider to those who have title to various liquid products and
need those products stored and handled.

Just before the start of the alleged "Class Period" of Feb. 22,
2016 to Feb. 21, 2018, MIC's market capitalization was
approximately $5.75 billion, with around 80,084,457 shares of
common stock outstanding that had traded in the first quarter of
2016 at a high of $71.82.4 Just before the close of the Class
Period, MIC's market capitalization was still approximately $5.75
billion, with around 84,819,268 shares of common stock outstanding
that had traded in the first quarter of 2018 at a high of $67.84.5
By May of 2018, after the Class Period, MIC's market capitalization
had declined to around $3.2 billion.

Defendant MIMUSA acts as MIC's manager. Through a management
service agreement with MIC, MIMUSA assigns its employees to work at
MIC as MIC's officers. MIMUSA is compensated based on how MIC
performs financially, which considers factors including MIC's
market capitalization.

Defendants Hooke and Stewart were both MIMUSA employees assigned to
work as MIC officers; Hooke served as CEO of MIC from May 8, 2009
to Dec. 31, 2017, and Stewart has served as CFO of MIC since June
2015. Since 2008, Defendant Davis has been MIC's Head of Investor
Relations and a Vice President of MIC, and Defendant Courtney has
served as CEO and President of IMTT since February 2015.

The disputes in the case arise out of MIC's business, through IMTT,
in storing a category of refined petroleum known as "No. 6 fuel
oil." No. 6 fuel oil refers to a "group of heavy and residual fuel
oils" that "are generally what is left in the bottom of the barrel
at the end of petroleum refinement process." Because No. 6 fuel oil
has various environmentally noxious qualities, including a
relatively high percentage sulfur content compared to other oils,
governments and other institutions with regulatory authority have
sought to limit or ban No. 6 fuel oil's use for over a decade.
Regulation has led to declines in the usage of No. 6 fuel oil,
though this "the decline in residual fuel oil usage was masked by
increase in its use as a fuel for maritime bunkering." Indeed,
"large shipping vessels" were generally thought of as the main
users of No. 6 fuel oil by the start of the Class Period.

According to the allegations in the Consolidated Complaint, the use
of No. 6 fuel oil was threatened by a pending regulation known as
"IMO 2020." First adopted in October 2008 by the International
Maritime Organization ("IMO"), the United Nations body charged with
regulating global shipping, IMO 2020 sought to ban the use of fuels
with a sulfur content of 0.5% or more by the beginning of 2020.

The Plaintiff identifies the Defendants' first alleged statements
relating to No. 6 fuel oil as occurring during a May 3, 2012
earnings call. The Defendants did not again "publicly discuss the
storage of No. 6 fuel oil" until "near the end of the Class
Period." By comparison, one of MIC's main competitors used its
November 2016 earnings call to discuss the implications of IMO 2020
on the "storage of" "diesel and fuel oil."

On Nov. 13, 2016, the Defendants announced that MIMUSA would hold a
secondary public offering of 2.87 million shares of MIC common
stock, which represented about 40% of MIMUSA's holdings. The
Offering documents "did not discuss" No. 6 fuel oil or IMO 2020.
Around August 2017, the Defendants announced that MIC would acquire
Epic Midstream, another operator of storage terminals, for $171.5
million. At the time, the Epic acquisition price represented less
than 3% of MIC's market capitalization. Epic offered MIC diversity
in its storage offerings as it "principally stored jet fuel," a
business that would not be impacted by IMO 2020. MIC paid for Epic
"largely in shares of its stock," with stock representing about 72%
of the acquisition price.

At the end of the Class Period, on Feb. 21, 2018, MIC announced
that IMTT's utilization -- the amount of its storage tank capacity
actually contracted for use by IMTT's customers -- had dropped to
89.6%. Previously, at the end of the second quarter of 2017, IMTT's
utilization was 94%, and at the end of the third quarter of 2017,
utilization had been 93.2%. MIC also announced that it had missed
its financial projections and would be cutting its dividend
guidance.

On Feb. 22, 2018, MIC held an earnings call in which its new CEO,
Christopher Frost, who had replaced Hooke, said that MIC's
financial downturn was in large part due to the "structural decline
in the 6 oil market." Frost said that "in December 2017 and early
January 2018," many of IMTT's customers "terminated contracts for a
significant amount of 6 oil capacity at IMT's facility in St. Rose"
and even "shut down their operations and exited the industry."
Frost called this sudden downturn "a surprise." That same day,
MIC's stock price fell around 41%, from a price of $63.62 per share
the previous day to $37.41.

On April 23, 2018, Plaintiff City of Riviera Beach General
Employees Retirement System began the securities fraud class action
by filing its complaint. On Jan. 30, 2019, Judge Broderick granted
a motion to consolidate the action with the related action numbered
18-cv-3744 because it "set forth substantially identical questions
of law and fact," and the Judge appointed Moab as the Lead
Plaintiff. Moab then filed the Consolidated Complaint on Feb. 20,
2019.

The Consolidated Complaint alleges violations of (i) Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 against
MIC and the Officer Defendants - Count I; (ii) Section 20(a) of the
'34 Act against MIMUSA and the Officer Defendants - Count II; (iii)
Section 20A of the '34 Act against MIMUSA - Count III; (iv) Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933 against MIC, Barclays, and the
Individual Defendants - Count IV; (v) Section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act against MIC and Barclays - Count V; and (vi) Section
15 of the Securities Act against MIMUSA and the Individual
Defendants - Count VI.

The Individual Defendants filed their motion to dismiss and
memorandum of law on April 22, 2019. That same day MIC and MIMUSA
filed their motion to dismiss, memorandum of law, and declarations
with exhibits. Barclays also filed its motion and joinder
memorandum of law -- joining in the arguments made by the other
Defendants in their motions to dismiss -- on April 22, 2019. Moab
filed its opposition brief and declaration with exhibits on June
21, 2019, and Defendants MIC and MIMUSA filed their reply brief on
July 22, 2019. The Individual Defendants filed their reply brief
and reply declaration, and Barclays filed its joinder to the
replies of the other defendants on July 22, 2019.

Discussion

A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10-b5

The Plaintiff pleads a host of allegedly actionable misstatements
and omissions. The crux of the Plaintiff's argument is that the
"statements were false and misleading" because MIC "concealed from
investors that IMTT's single largest product was No. 6 fuel oil,"
which "constituted over 40% of IMTT's storage capacity" and which
"faced a near-cataclysmic ban on the bulk of its worldwide use
through IMO 2020." Accordingly, as the Plaintiff frames the case, a
key issue is whether the "Defendants had a duty to disclose" the
extent to which IMTT's storage capacity was devoted to No. 6 fuel
oil.

Judge Broderick holds that the Plaintiff does not identify any
statements that are actionable as half-truths due to the
Defendants' failure to disclose its business reliance on storing
No. 6 fuel oil. He finds that none of the Defendants' alleged
statements were literally true but misleading absent a disclosure
about how much No. 6 fuel oil IMTT's facilities could store, nor
does the Plaintiff identify any statements that share a reasonable
level of specificity with a breakdown of how much No. 6 fuel oil
IMTT stored or what other uses could be made of the IMTT's storage
tanks.

Moreover, Judge Broderick holds that the Plaintiff never pleads
facts to support its argument that the Defendants knew any alleged
statement was untrue or a half-truth when made. To the contrary,
the Plaintiff pleads that Christopher Frost, who replaced Hooke as
MIC's CEO after the end of 2017, stated that it was not until
"December of 2017 and early January" of 2018 that "a number of IMTT
customers terminated contracts," and that this loss of business was
"quite sudden" and "a surprise."

Thus, despite the Plaintiff's various arguments to the effect that
the Defendants must have already known that IMTT was experiencing a
downturn or at a major risk for a downturn, Judge Broderick holds
that the Plaintiff falls short of pleading facts showing that the
Defendants' statements were "not honestly believed when they were
made.

With respect to the alleged omission, Judge Broderick holds that
the Plaintiff's argument that the Defendants violated disclosure
obligations under Item 303 also fails. Although the Plaintiff
submits that Item 303 required Defendants to speak to "the
'increasing uncertainty'" MIC faced, he says, the Plaintiff does
not actually plead an uncertainty that should have been disclosed,
nor does the Plaintiff plead in what SEC filing or filings the
Defendants were supposed to disclose it. And, even if the Plaintiff
had identified some known trend or uncertainty that implicated
disclosure of IMTT's reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, the Plaintiff
would still have to allege that the "probability" of the event or
uncertainty coupled with "the anticipated magnitude" of it were
enough to make it material "in light of the totality of MIC's
company activity." More to the point, the Plaintiff does not allege
when the Defendants "actually knew" of some uncertainty that rose
to the level of requiring an Item 303 disclosure.

B. Scienter

The Plaintiff argues that they have pleaded scienter both through
the Defendants' motive and opportunity, and through the Defendants'
recklessness or conscious misbehavior.

As an initial matter, Judge Broderick finds that it does not appear
that the motive and opportunity theory is viable under the
circumstances presented here. Plaintiff's theory of the case is
that Defendants "actively concealed from investors" the extent of
"IMTT's" business in "No. 6 fuel oil." (MTD Opp. 28.) This is an
assertion of "conscious misbehavior or," at minimum,
"recklessness," and thus seems like a theory that cannot be
supported by a motive and opportunity theory. Nevertheless, JUdge
Broderick addresses both the Plaintiff's arguments related to
recklessness or conscious misbehavior and on motive and
opportunity.

First, with regard to recklessness or conscious misbehavior, Judge
Broderick states that the Plaintiff rehashes its already-rejected
arguments that the Defendants made "numerous statements" that it
later "admitted" were false and that the Defendants had actual
knowledge "contradicting their public statements." Second, with
regard to pleading scienter through motive and opportunity, the
Judge says the Plaintiff also fails. He finds that one of the
Plaintiff's arguments simply cannot provide a motive. The fact that
certain Defendants' compensation increased with MIC's "market
capitalization," does not move the ball for the Plaintiff, as
"motives that are common to most corporate officers, such as the
desire to keep stock prices high to increase officer compensation"
do not suffice to show scienter.

Even considering "all of the facts alleged, taken collectively,"
Judge Broderick cannot find that the Plaintiff has adequately
pleaded facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. At
best, it appears that the Defendants were negligent concerning the
risks IMTT faced in its exposure to a potential downturn in the
demand to store No. 6 fuel oil. However, that is not legally
sufficient to demonstrate scienter.

C. Plaintiff's Remaining Claims

The Plaintiff's remaining claims all fail because they depend on
its having successfully pleaded, at minimum, material
misrepresentations or omissions, which the Plaintiff failed to do,
Judge Broderick holds. Specifically, he says, each of the other
statutes the Plaintiff claims have been violated require a primary
violation and/or material misrepresentations or omissions.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Broderick granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss. The Clerk's office is directed to terminate the
open motions on the docket and to post notice of the Opinion &
Order on the docket for the related action numbered 18-cv-3744.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yzub8ch9 from Leagle.com.


MASTERCARD: CAT Grants First Collective Proceedings Order
---------------------------------------------------------
Bill Batchelor, Esq., and Bruce Macaulay Sym Hunt, Esq., of
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, disclosed that after
protracted challenges to class certification status in Merricks v
Mastercard, the U.K. Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) granted its
first collective proceedings order (CPO).  The claim remains huge,
comprising 46.2 million consumers, but Mastercard successfully
persuaded the CAT to narrow the class, potentially reducing the
claim by GBP5 billion.

Key Takeaways From This Case and the CAT's CPO Pipeline

   * The CPO order was uncontested. This suggests Mastercard
anticipated that the CAT would conclude that the case satisfied the
U.K. Supreme Court (UKSC) certification test -- in essence, whether
the claim is better suited to collective rather than individual
proceedings.

   * The CAT remains active in managing the breadth of claims. The
CAT decided in favour of Mastercard on the issues of interest
compounding and claims by deceased consumers, reducing the value of
the class action by around 35% (approximately GBP5 billion).

   * There are more opportunities for the CAT to play gatekeeper in
the pipeline.  The CAT's appetite for playing a meaningful role as
gatekeeper will become clearer from the forthcoming judgments
concerning various CPO applications that have been heard in the
last six months, including: Boundary Fares; Trucks; and FX.

   * The CAT has multiple tools with which to test the
appropriateness of collective proceedings. The upcoming Boundary
Fares judgment will illuminate the CAT's approach regarding how
precisely and individually would-be claimants need to demonstrate
causation and liability in antitrust damages actions in order to
obtain certification and survive strike-out.  Those issues show
that meeting the "suitability" test is not the end of the matter
when a class action is pursued under the CPO regime.

   * Lloyd v Google may open up an additional opt-out class action
regime. The fate of those other CPO applications will shape the
antitrust-specific regime for opt-out class actions. But the
viability of opt-out class actions for non-antitrust claims remains
an open question that the UKSC's anticipated judgment in Lloyd v
Google is expected to address.  That judgment could open the
floodgates for opt-out class actions across the spectrum of
disputes.

The Class Action and UKSC's Test for Collective Claims
In December 2007, the European Commission (EC) found that by
setting default interbank fees whenever consumers paid for goods or
services using their Mastercard in the EEA, Mastercard restricted
price competition between the banks and violated EU competition
law.

Walter Merricks, the proposed class representative, commenced an
extremely broad U.K. class action based on the EC decision. It
claimed on behalf of approximately 46.2 million U.K. consumers,
seeking GBP16 billion (including interest).  The claim was an
indirect one, made not by retailers that actually paid Mastercard's
fees, but by U.K. consumers for the allegedly inflated prices they
paid when retailers passed on allegedly unlawful charges.

The CAT, which must rule whether claims are suitable for collective
proceedings, initially refused a CPO.  It felt that the class was
too wide, and the proposed distribution methodology inadequate. The
English Court of Appeal, upheld by the UKSC, decided that the CAT
had not applied the correct test.5

The UKSC held that the test for CPOs was a relative judgement as to
whether claims are "suitable" for collective proceedings -- whether
the claims are more appropriately brought as collective proceedings
rather than individual proceedings. The same logic was applied in
deciding whether a claim is "suitable for an award of aggregate
damages" (a relevant factor in the overall assessment of
suitability).  An aggregate damages award need only be more
suitable than "a multitude of individually assessed claims for
damages".  The UKSC judgment therefore significantly circumscribed
the CAT's gatekeeper role.

The CAT's Remittal Decision on Merricks
On remittal, Mastercard did not oppose certification. Nonetheless,
it is instructive that Mastercard persuaded the CAT to narrow the
claim.

Compound Interest

The principal claim was estimated by Merricks to be worth up to
GBP7.2 billion. As of January 2021, the interest relating to this
claim amounted to: GBP6.6 billion in simple interest, or GBP8.8
billion in compound interest (i.e., GBP2.2 billion more than the
simple interest claim).

As a matter of English tort law, compound interest can be award as
damages, provided that it is specifically claimed and justified.
Merricks argued that all members of the class at some point during
the 16-year period would have borrowed money or had savings, so
they would have paid interest and/or lost the opportunity to earn
interest to the extent that they were deprived of money due to
Mastercard's alleged overcharges.

The CAT considered that, in the context of a "gargantuan" interest
claim worth up to GBP8.8 billion, a plausible or credible
methodology needed to be put forward at the certification stage;
and no such methodology had been put forward as to the amount of
the overcharge that would have been saved and/or used to reduced
debt, rather than spent, by consumers. This was particularly
significant given that the average class member's loss is thought
to be in the region of GBP10 per year, accruing over the course of
the year, so it was not readily inferable that the money would not
simply have been spent.

The CAT, therefore, found the compound interest claim not to be
"suitable" for collective proceedings and excluded it from the CPO.
Instead, the class may seek simple interest on a statutory basis.

Class Definition - Deceased Persons

Merricks's claim form expressly acknowledged that the class
definition excluded the estates of individuals who met the
substantive definition but died before the "domicile date".  The
notice of the CPO application made specific reference to the claim
being on behalf of individuals "who are living in the UK at the
time the claim is allowed to proceed".

Upon the remittal of the case to the CAT, Merricks confirmed that
he wished to include deceased persons in the class, thereby
increasing the class size by approximately 13.6 million, to 59.8
million (i.e., by 29%).  Merricks also recognised that the expert
calculation of aggregate damages included losses allegedly suffered
by now-deceased persons and, therefore, to the extent they are not
included in the class, the damages calculation would need to be
reduced.  The CAT rejected the argument that the existing class
definition included deceased persons and, consequently, Merricks
sought permission to amend the claim form so as to include "persons
who have since died".

The CAT refused permission, on various grounds.  In particular,
whilst the CAT saw no difficulty in principle in a class definition
including the estates of deceased persons, claims could not be
brought on behalf of deceased persons themselves, as opposed to
their estates, and, therefore, Merricks' proposed amendment was
incoherent.  The CAT also decided that, in the present case,
limitation rules precluded the inclusion of persons who were
deceased before the claim form was issued.  However, the CAT
remarked that Merricks could apply again to amend the claim form
and CPO to include the claims of the representatives of estates of
persons who die/have died during the course of the proceedings.

Litigation Funding Arrangements

Merricks has entered into a litigation funding agreement (LFA),
pursuant to which Merricks has access to GBP45.1 million for his
costs and disbursements, and has adverse costs cover of GBP15
million.  Mastercard did not challenge the adequacy of the quantum
of adverse costs cover, but objected on the basis that the LFA
expressly excluded third-party rights, arguing that it might not be
able to enforce a costs award in its favour.  The CAT was
sympathetic to Mastercard's concerns and, accordingly, Merricks's
funder agreed to undertake to the CAT that it would discharge a
liability for costs ordered against Merricks.

The CAT also emphasised that, despite the limited nature of
Mastercard's objection, it would scrutinise the LFA more fully,
saying it is "for the Tribunal to be satisfied as to the position
since the Tribunal has responsibility to protect the interests of
the members of the proposed class, and their interests are of
course not necessarily aligned with the interests of Mastercard".
The CAT found that, following some amendments, the Merricks LFA was
satisfactory.

Collective Proceedings Cases and Issues To Watch

Looking beyond Merricks, it is likely to see judgments on numerous
other applications for CPOs before the end of 2021 raising
interesting and novel issues:

Class Actions in Non-Follow-On Claims

Boundary Fares involves alleged double-charging by passenger train
operators.  There was no prior competition authority decision, and
the nature of the alleged violation is an obscure one, so this CPO
application is brought on a standalone basis.

An opt-out class action without any underlying infringement
decision is arguably the most extreme category of antitrust class
action that could proceed under the CPO regime, particularly where
such action relates to behaviour that, even if established, is not
readily identifiable as anticompetitive.  That is relevant to the
CAT's decision on whether claims should be opt-in (where
individuals only form part of the class if they expressly elect to
join the action) or opt-out (where individuals are part of the
class unless they expressly opt out), because one factor is the
strength of the claims.  The CAT's Guidance states that follow-on
claims, where a competition authority has decided that there was an
infringement, generally will be strong enough for this criterion
not to be in question.  For a standalone claim, however, showing
the strength of the claim is a potentially significant hurdle, to
the extent that proceedings may only be permitted to proceed on an
opt-in basis.

The would-be defendants in Boundary Fares have also argued that,
whilst Merricks shows that individualised damages calculations are
not necessary, it does not follow that causation and liability need
not be established on an individual basis.  This shows another
respect in which, for standalone cases, the onus on the proposed
class representative will be greater.

Alongside the CPO application, the CAT heard summary judgment and
strike-out applications brought by the proposed defendants.  This
follows the UKSC's remarks in Merricks that the CAT's summary
judgment and strike-out powers are an appropriate mechanism for the
CAT to exercise "merits-based control over collective proceedings"
at a pre-trial stage (e.g., at the CPO hearing). This gives rise to
the possibility that the claims could be found eligible for
inclusion in collective proceedings but simultaneously are struck
out or dismissed summarily.

Finally, the CAT expressed concerns that, where small amounts are
due to class members and it is difficult to establish that they are
entitled to a share of an award, the real winners may be litigation
funders, who might profit from any unclaimed portion of an award.
Therefore, the proposed class representative was requested to
provide information about the funder's remuneration structure and
the typical level of "take-up" by class members in North American
class actions.

Carriage Disputes

In FX and Trucks, the CAT is facing a "carriage dispute" between
two competing CPO applications.  In March 2020, the CAT decided in
the FX case that the carriage dispute should not be addressed as a
preliminary issue, so both CPO applications were heard in July
2021.  In each of FX and Trucks, it will be interesting to see
whether one, both or neither of the competing applications is
successful, and to gain greater insight about the CAT's approach to
competing applications.

Other Class Action Mechanisms

Merricks is the first English opt-out class action to be certified,
but the CPO regime is not the only avenue through which opt-out
class actions may emerge.  Last year's decision by the English
Court of Appeal in Lloyd v Google7 suggested a generous approach to
pursuing a representative action under CPR 19.6, deciding that four
million iPhone users had the "same interest" in claims for alleged
data protection breaches.  The UKSC recently heard Google's appeal
in this case, and the judgment is expected later this year.  The
UKSC's decision in Lloyd v Google regarding the meaning of "same
interest" will have implications across the spectrum of disputes. A
broad approach to CPR 19.6 could open the floodgates to opt-out
class actions in the U.K.

Comment

Each aspect of the CAT's decision shows that, whilst the UKSC has
established a threshold for "suitability" of claims for collective
proceedings, the CAT should be expected to take a proactive and
rigorous role in considering whether to grant a CPO and, if so,
what scope is appropriate.

   * On compound interest, the CAT made it clear that the issue is
distinct from the question of whether the principal claim is
suitable for inclusion in collective proceedings. Therefore, a
claimant must offer a plausible and credible methodology for
estimating the amount of compound interest it claims is due to the
various members of a class.  A further hurdle, which the CAT noted
but did not need to decide in Merricks, is whether compound
interest is a "common issue" across class members.  The CAT
recognised that this "is not an easy question", but stated that,
"if only a minority of class members suffered loss by way of
compound interest . . . , we would find it difficult to see how a
claim for compound interest can raise a common issue across the
class".

   * The CAT's refusal to allow Merricks to amend his claim form
presents a reminder that claim forms and pleadings must be
carefully considered and precisely worded. The CAT has been clear
that, particularly in cases where billions of pounds may be at
stake, it will not allow CPOs to be granted on the basis of
imprecise pleadings.

   * The CAT's sympathy towards Mastercard's concerns regarding the
LFA is a significant warning to claimants whose funding
arrangements for adverse costs are not readily enforceable by the
defendant.  Although no binding decision was made in this regard,
the CAT's comments signalled that claimants will be expected to
ensure that defendants have adequate recourse to adverse costs
cover.  This approach potentially has ramifications beyond
antitrust actions, given the increasing presence of third-party
funding across litigation.

Notwithstanding Mastercard's success in the present judgment,
Merricks illustrates a noteworthy feature of the developing U.K.
class action system: Indirect claims by a huge consumer base
seeking very substantial sums can proceed to certification with
relatively few obstacles.  Those indirect claims can be (and often
are) pursued in parallel with claims brought by commercial
counterparties against the same defendants.  Mass consumer classes
may increase pressure on defendants to come to terms with the class
rather than expose themselves even to a low risk of an adverse
judgment at trial.  The risk of these in terrorem settlements was
recognised by the UKSC in its Merricks ruling.

Conclusion

Merricks shows that the CAT's gatekeeper function will be a
significant feature of the CPO regime, notwithstanding the UKSC's
suitability test for certification.  The upcoming decisions, both
in the antitrust sphere and beyond, will be formative in the
development of the U.K.'s class action landscape.


MDL 2807: Sonic Loses Summary Judgment Bid in Data Breach Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: SONIC CORP. CUSTOMER DATA SECURITY BREACH
LITIGATION (FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS), Case No. 1:17-md-2807, MDL No.
2807 (N.D. Ohio), Judge James S. Gwin of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio denies the Defendants' summary
judgment motion.

Background

In 2017, unidentified third parties accessed Sonic customers'
payment card data. The hackers stole customer payment card
information from more than 700 Sonic franchised Drive-Ins.

The compromised Sonic Drive-In restaurants were independently
owned, but Sonic's franchise agreements required the franchisees
give Sonic access to the franchisees' transaction data through a
Sonic-managed virtual private network (VPN). The hackers accessed
the franchisees' transaction data using VPN credentials that Sonic
had issued to a transaction-processing service. In the case,
Plaintiff financial institutions sue the Defendants for negligence
in creating unsecure systems that led to the breach. The Court
certified a class action.

Between April and October 2017, hackers used malware installed on
point-of-sale systems at 762 Sonic-branded restaurants to steal
sales transaction payment card data. The hackers targeted Sonic
franchises that used an Infor-brand point-of-sale system.

Although franchisees were independently owned and operated, Sonic
set the parameters for transaction processing. Sonic required all
franchisees to process all credit card transactions through First
Data Merchant Services. Franchisees used point-of-sale vendors,
including Infor, for transaction-processing services that
interfaced with First Data.

Sonic stores used two types of transaction-processing systems: the
POPS system at drive-in stalls, and the PAYS system at the
drive-through window and inside the restaurant. The hack occurred
in the PAYS system.

The un-hacked POPS system encrypts customer data end-to-end.10 The
hacked PAYS system, instead, allowed unencrypted data to remain on
franchisee servers. The VPN system allowed the hackers to access
that unencrypted customer payment card data.

While the parties disagree about the extent of Sonic corporate's
involvement with franchisee technology systems, both recognize a
significant ongoing Sonic role.

Point-of-sale vendors like Infor process the transactions, but "the
general infrastructure of the PAYS environment is designed by
Sonic." Sonic also facilitates the VPN that vendors use to access
franchise systems remotely. As the Sonic Defendants acknowledge,
"Sonic corporate assisted its franchisees in setting up a dedicated
VPN solution" for Infor to provide remote service assistance. As
part of this assistance, Sonic issued credentials to Infor to
access the Sonic VPN.

The hackers -- likely German-based -- used the Infor credentials to
access the Sonic-created VPN channel. For more than six months, the
hackers were able to steal payment card data without detection.

Multiple factors facilitated the hackers' access to the Sonic VPN.
Sonic left Infor's remote access to the VPN "permanently enabled,"
meaning that a hacker who obtained the Infor credential could
connect to the VPN at any time. At the time of the breach, Sonic
had not yet introduced a centralized logging system to monitor or
alert for malicious activity. Outdated software and weak passwords
for both the Sonic-issued credential and the Infor servers also
contributed to the breach.

The parties dispute whether Sonic or Infor was responsible for
logging and monitoring VPN access, changing the password for the
Sonic-issued credential, and making the necessary changes to update
the software. Material facts remain unresolved.

The Defendants now seek summary judgment.

Discussion

After the Court partially granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss, only the Plaintiffs' negligence claim remains. Under
Oklahoma law, a negligence claim requires that (1) the Defendants
owed the Plaintiffs a duty of care; (2) the Defendants breached
their duty; and (3) the Defendants' breach caused the Plaintiffs'
injury.

The Defendants argue that the Court should grant their motion for
summary judgment because the Plaintiffs' claim fails on the duty
and causation requirements.

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Judge
Gwin disagrees. First, the Judge holds that Sonic had a duty to
prevent the criminal acts of hackers because Sonic's affirmative
acts created a risk of harm, and Sonic knew or should have known
that the risk of hacking made its flawed security practices
unreasonably dangerous. Second, there is sufficient evidence that
Sonic Defendants' actions were the proximate cause of the
Plaintiffs' injury to make summary judgment inappropriate.
Proximate cause is a question for the trier of fact in the case.

Conclusion

After reviewing the parties' extensive briefing, Judge Gwin
concludes that genuine fact questions remain. The Defendant fails
to show sufficient support for summary judgment. For these reasons,
he denies the Defendants' summary judgment motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/nefvkb2w from Leagle.com.


MEREDITH CORP: Dismissal of Iowa Class Suit Under Appeal
--------------------------------------------------------
Meredith Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended June 30, 2021, that the appeal on the
dismissal of the putative class action suit filed before the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, is pending.

On September 6, 2019, a shareholder filed a putative class action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York against the Company, its Chief Executive Officer, and its
Chief Financial Officer, seeking to represent a class of
shareholders who acquired securities of the Company between May 10,
2018 and September 4, 2019 (the New York Action).

On September 12, 2019, a shareholder filed a putative class action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa against the Company, its Chief Executive Officer, its Chief
Financial Officer, and its Chairman of the Board seeking to
represent a class of shareholders who acquired securities of the
Company between January 31, 2018 and September 5, 2019 (the Iowa
Action).

Both complaints allege that the defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, and failed to disclose material
adverse facts, about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects.

Both complaints assert claims under the federal securities laws and
seek unspecified monetary damages and other relief. On November 12,
2019, the plaintiff shareholder withdrew the New York Action, and
the action has been dismissed. On November 25, 2019, the City of
Plantation Police Officers Pension Fund was appointed to serve as
lead plaintiff in the Iowa Action.

On March 9, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint in
the Iowa Action, seeking to represent a class of shareholders who
acquired securities of the Company between January 31, 2018 and
September 30, 2019. On June 22, 2020, the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the Iowa Action.

On October 28, 2020, a U.S. District Judge granted defendants'
motion to dismiss, dismissing the Iowa Action with prejudice at
plaintiffs' cost due to plaintiffs' failure to satisfy applicable
pleading requirements. Specifically, the court held that plaintiffs
had failed to plead any actionable misstatement or omission,
scienter, or loss causation.

On November 23, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed a notice of appeal
of the District Court's dismissal.

Meredith said, "The parties have completed briefing in the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and it appears likely we will receive a
decision on the appeal sometime in late 2021 or 2022."

Meredith Corporation is a diversified media company that primarily
focuses on publishing and broadcasting. The Company's publishing
segment includes magazine and book publishing, marketing,
interactive media, licensing, and other related operations.
Meredith operates network-affiliated television stations and
develops syndicated television programs. The company is based in
Des Moines, Iowa.


MERVIS DIAMOND: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mervis Diamond
Corporation. The case is styled as Denise Crumwell, on behalf of
herself and all other persons similarly situated v. Mervis Diamond
Corporation, Case No. 1:21-cv-07817 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 18, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Mervis Diamond Corporation -- https://www.mervisdiamond.com/ -- is
located in Vienna, Virginia and is part of the Jewelry, Luggage,
and Leather Goods Stores Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


MOBERG GALLERY: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Moberg Gallery, Inc.
The case is styled as Jason Camacho, for himself and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. Moberg Gallery, Inc., Case
No. 1:21-cv-05206 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Moberg Gallery -- https://moberggallery.com/ -- is a contemporary
art gallery based in Des Moines, Iowa.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com



MONARCH RECOVERY: McKee Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. North Carolina
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Monarch Recovery
Management, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Kathleen McKee, also
known as: Kathleen Albright, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Monarch Recovery Management, Inc.,
First Portfolio Ventures I, LLC, Case No. 3:21-cv-00492-RJC-DSC
(W.D.N.C., Sept. 17, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Monarch Recovery Management -- https://monarchrm.com/ -- is a
collection agency based in Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C. Randolph Emory, Esq.
          THE EMORY LAW FIRM, P.C.
          11020 David Taylor Drive, Suite 102
          Charlotte, NC 28262
          Phone: (704) 371-4333
          Fax: (704) 371-3015
          Email: emorylawecf@gmail.com


NOVA MUD: Court Denies Bid to Compel Arbitration in Oldham Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES OLDHAM, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NOVA MUD, INC., RUSCO OPERATING,
LLC, and RIGUP, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-1166-KWR-GBW
(D.N.M.), Judge Kea W. Riggs of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico denied Defendant Nova Mud's Motion to
Dismiss and/or Compel Arbitration, or in the alternative stay.

Background

The case is a putative class action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") and New Mexico Minimum Wage Act ("NMMWA"). The
Plaintiff alleges that he and other similarly situated individuals
worked in excess of forty hours in a single workweek, but were not
paid overtime as required by the FLSA, allegedly as a result of
misclassification of himself and collective members as independent
contractors.

The Plaintiff executed an independent contractor agreement with now
dismissed parties RigUp and its wholly owned subsidiary, RUSCO, to
perform freelance services for third party companies. One of those
companies was the Defendant. The Plaintiff now alleges that the
Defendant violated the FLSA and NMMWA by failing to pay him and
others overtime.

On July 20, 2018, the Plaintiff, a resident of Texas, signed up to
RigUp's website and application to access job postings and apply to
potential employers as a mud engineer. RigUp, incorporated in
Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas, operates as
a workplace bidding platform largely in the oil and gas industry
and connects individuals who have signed up to its website or app
with potential employers. Signing up to the RigUp App does not
guarantee employment at any time or in any particular location. It
is undisputed that once a company does hire a worker through the
RigUp App, RigUp and its wholly-owned subsidiary, RUSCO, perform
human resources tasks such as background checks and payroll
functions.

During the registration process, the Plaintiff executed an
"AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL & RIGUP FOR USE OF
RIGUP SERVICE." Section 24 of the Terms of Service, incorporated by
reference in the Agreement, contained the agreement to arbitrate.
The Terms of Service also included a provision with respect to
third party disputes.

On Nov. 3, 2017, the Defendant executed a Master Services Agreement
("MSA") and Work Order with RUSCO and its "affiliate" RigUp for the
purpose of finding potential employees through the RigUp app. The
Defendant is incorporated in New Mexico with a principal place of
business in Hobbs, New Mexico. The MSA appears silent on
arbitration and provides that Texas law governs the agreement.

In February 2019, the Defendant hired the Plaintiff as a mud
engineer through the RigUp App. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff
performed work for the Defendant in both New Mexico and Texas. The
Plaintiff alleges that he was paid "a day rate of approximately
$700 per day or hourly wages in the amount of $58.33 without any
overtime pay in connection with work for the Defendants." The
Complaint alleges that the Defendant trained mud engineers
regarding performance of services, set their schedules, assigned
work locations and reviewed and verified timesheets. The Plaintiff
alleges that the timesheets "were submitted through RigUp, and
ultimately paid through RUSCO."

Discussion

The Defendant seeks to dismiss the complaint "and/or Compel
Arbitration, or in the alternative stay," filed Jan. 11, 2021,
pursuant to (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2) for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(3), "and/or" (3) for failure to state a claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.
Section 1-16. It seeks to enforce the Agreement's arbitration
clause against the Plaintiff. At issue is whether the Defendant, a
non-signatory to the Agreement, can enforce the arbitration clause
under the theories of (1) equitable estoppel and (2) third-party
beneficiary.

Judge Riggs opines that the Plaintiff need not rely on the terms of
the Agreement to make his FLSA claim. The Judge explains that it is
well settled that the economic realities of an individual's working
relationship with the employer determine whether the individual is
an employee under the FLSA. In determining whether an individual is
an employee under the FLSA, the inquiry is not limited to the
contractual terminology between the parties or the way they choose
to describe the working relationship." Although the Agreement may
be referenced in the case by the Defendant as evidence under the
economic realities test, the Plaintiff does not rely on that
contract in asserting his FLSA claims. Accordingly, the Judge
concludes that neither theory of estoppel supports the Defendant's
position under Texas law.

The results are no better for the Defendant under New Mexico law,
Judge Riggs opines. In New Mexico, "generally, a non-signatory to
an arbitration agreement cannot compel arbitration." The Defendant
is correct that the doctrine of equitable estoppel provides for two
circumstances that allow enforcement by a non-signatory: "(1) when
a signatory to the agreement must rely on the terms of the
agreement in making a claim against a non-signatory; or (2) when a
signatory alleges substantial interdependence and concerted
misconduct by both another signatory and a non-signatory, making
arbitration between signatories meaningless." For the reasons
stated previously, the first instance is inapplicable in the case.
The Judge says, the Plaintiff's claims arise out of the FLSA. Thus,
the Defendant's position turns on the issue of estoppel based on
allegations of substantial interdependence and concerted
misconduct.

Citing allegations in the Complaint where the Plaintiff claimed
that Defendant and dismissed Defendants RigUp and RUSCO operated
effectively as joint employers, the Defendant argues that the
Plaintiff has alleged substantial interdependence and concerted
misconduct between RigUp and the Defendant such that arbitration
should be enforced.

While Judge Riggs acknowledges the strong public policy favoring
arbitration in New Mexico, she cannot conclude that the instant
action warrants enforcement of an arbitration provision lacking
clear intent to include non-signatory third parties. The Judge
notes that in several cases in New Mexico in which the courts
applied this estoppel theory, there was a stronger relationship
than present in the case, such as a parent-subsidiary relationship,
between a party and the non-signatory third party seeking to
enforce arbitration. There is no such connection, where it is
undisputed that RigUp/RUSCO and Defendant are independent
entities.

Therefore, under the factual circumstances of the case, Judge Riggs
declines to equitably estop the Plaintiff under either Texas or New
Mexico law.

Conclusion

Judge Riggs concludes that, in light of the particular facts of the
case, the Defendant, a non-signatory to the Agreement, cannot
enforce the arbitration clause under the theories of (1) equitable
estoppel and (2) third-party beneficiary. She denied the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/dnarsdyr from
Leagle.com.


OREGON MUTUAL: Court Dismisses Hillbro Class Suit With Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HILLBRO LLC, dba HILLS RESTAURANT, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. OREGON
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Oregon corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 3:21-cv-00382-HZ (D. Or.), Judge Marco A. Hernandez of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon grants the Defendant's
motion to dismiss and dismisses the Plaintiff's Complaint with
prejudice.

The Plaintiff operates a restaurant and bar in Shoreline,
Washington. It insured its business with a business insurance
policy from the Defendant. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and
business closure orders issued by the state of Washington, the
"Plaintiff had to close, suspend, and/or curtail its business"
leading to financial losses. Although the closure orders allowed
restaurants to serve take-out food for off-premises consumption,
the Plaintiff's business revenues have significantly reduced
because it has been unable to use its dining room and full-service
bar for on-premises food and beverage consumption. The Plaintiff
admits that COVID-19 has not been detected in its restaurant.

The Plaintiff filed an insurance claim seeking coverage for its
financial losses stemming from its reduced business operations.
Defendant denied coverage. It alleges that the "Business Income,"
"Extended Business Income," "Extra Expense," "Civil Authority," and
"Ingress or Egress" coverages in its business insurance policy
cover its financial losses.

Section I of the Policy, which provides property coverage, states:
"We will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered
Property at the premises described in the Declarations caused by or
resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss." The capitalized phrases
in that sentence are defined terms. The phrase "direct physical
loss of or damage to" is not defined in the policy. "Covered
Property" includes Buildings, Business Personal Property, or both,
unless it is a kind of Property Not Covered. A "Covered Cause of
Loss" includes risks of "direct physical loss" unless the loss is
excluded or limited by other provisions in Section I.

The Policy provides "Additional Coverages" that include "Business
Income," "Extended Business Income," "Extra Expense," and "Civil
Authority" coverages. The Policy does not include an ingress or
egress coverage provision.

The Plaintiff brings the class action lawsuit against the Defendant
seeking a declaratory judgment that its insurance policy, provided
by the Defendant, covers its business income losses stemming from
the COVID-19 pandemic. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant
breached its insurance contracts with the Plaintiff and similarly
situated policyholders when the Defendant denied coverage for its
pandemic-related business income losses. The Plaintiff seeks a
declaratory judgment that the insurance policy covers its alleged
losses and seeks damages for breach of contract.

The Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to
state a claim. It moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint
because no "direct physical loss of or damage to" property occurred
to invoke coverage under the Business Income and Civil Authority
coverages, and no "direct physical loss or damage to" property
occurred that would provide coverage under the Extra Expense and
Ingress or Egress coverages. The Defendant also argues that the
Ordinance or Law Exclusion excludes coverage for the Plaintiff's
losses.

The Plaintiff argues that the Policy's undefined terms "loss of,"
"damage to" and "direct physical loss" cover its loss of the
functionality and use of its covered property for dine-in services
due to the closure orders.

Judge Hernandez disagrees. He opines that many businesses suffered
extreme hardship and financial loss as a result of the government
shutdown orders that state and local governments nationwide issued
to curb the spread of COVID-19 infections throughout the country.
People across the world have lost their lives and livelihood as a
result of the pandemic. The Judge sympathizes with the plight of
businessowners who suffered significant and even catastrophic
financial losses due to the government closure orders. The
Plaintiff's business insurance policy, however, does not cover its
loss of business income.

Judge Hernandez grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Because
he finds that the Plaintiff's Complaint cannot be amended to
plausibly allege a claim under the terms of the Policy, the Judge
denies leave to amend. The Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4nrvmj6z from Leagle.com.

Amy Williams-Derry -- awilliams-derry@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback LLP, in Seattle, Washington, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

R. Lind Stapley -- stapley@sohalang.com -- Rachel A. Rubin --
rubin@sohalang.com -- Soha & Lang, PS, in Seattle, Washington,
Attorneys for the Defendant.


PENNY PUBLICATIONS: Bennett Files Suit in W.D. Michigan
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Penny Publications,
LLC. The case is styled as Bonnie Bennett, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Penny Publications, LLC,
Case No. 1:21-cv-00807 (W.D. Mich., Sept. 17, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Penny Publications -- https://www.pennypublications.com/ -- is a
United States magazine publisher specializing in puzzles,
mysteries, and crosswords.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Ave.
          New York, NY 10019
          Phone: (646) 837-7150
          Email: pfraietta@bursor.com


PET SUPERMARKET: Kirchein Sues for Breach of Settlement Agreement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Kirchein, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Pet Supermarket, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
CACE-21-016910, (Fla. Cir., September 7, 2021), seeks injunctive
relief, statutory damages, attorneys' fees, costs together with
other relief for violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

On January 14, 2016, Kirchein filed a class action lawsuit against
Pet Supermarket in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida alleging Pet Supermarket had violated
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act amendment to the Fair
Credit Reporting Act which requires merchants to truncate certain
credit and debit card information on receipts. In August 2016,
after approximately eight months of litigation, the parties reached
a settlement and executed the Settlement Agreement, which was to
provide a $580,000 common fund to benefit all class members.
Despite this, on October 2, 2017, more than one year after
executing the Settlement Agreement, Pet Supermarket decided to
renege on the settlement by filing a motion "to vacate preliminary
approval order and settlement and to reopen case."

On December 22, 2017, the district court rejected Pet Supermarket's
arguments and denied its motion. However, the district court's
order notes that at the hearing on Pet Supermarket's motion to
vacate questioned the Court's jurisdiction to approve the
settlement in light of several recent decisions concerning federal
standing requirements. Subsequently Pet Supermarket filed a brief
arguing the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to move
forward with the Settlement Agreement. On February 8, 2018, after
hearing Pet Supermarket's arguments, the district court dismissed
Kirchein's case without prejudice on grounds that the federal
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Kirchein brings this action to remedy Pet Supermarket's repeated
breach of the Settlement Agreement, and resulting loss of the
benefit of the bargain Kirchein and the settlement class members
suffered as a result. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott D. Owens, Esq.
      SCOTT D. OWENS, P.A.
      3800 S. Ocean Dr., Ste. 235
      Hollywood, FL 33019
      Tel: (954) 589-0588
      Fax: (954) 337-0666
      Email: scott@scottdowens.com

             - and -

      Bret L. Lusskin, Esq.
      BRET LUSSKIN, P.A.
      20803 Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 302
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Tel: (954) 454-5841
      Fax: (954) 454-5844
      Email: blusskin@lusskinlaw.com

             - and -

      Keith J. Keogh, Esq.
      KEOGH LAW, LTD.
      55 W. Monroe St, Suite 3390
      Chicago, Illinois 60603
      Tel: (312) 726-1092
      Fax: (312) 726-1093
      Email: Keith@KeoghLaw.com


PWCC MARKETPLACE: Latham Files Suit in D. Oregon
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PWCC Marketplace,
LLC. The case is styled as Gregory Latham, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. PWCC Marketplace, LLC, Case No.
3:21-cv-01381-MO (D. Ore., Sept. 17, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

PWCC -- https://www.pwccmarketplace.com/ -- is the leader in the
trading card investment market and features robust analytics tools,
buy/sell marketplaces, secure storage including asset appraisal and
insurance, and capital lending services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas A. Kahl, Esq.
          NICK KAHL, LLC
          209 SW Oak Street, Suite 400
          Portland, OR 97204
          Phone: (971) 634-0829
          Fax: (503) 227-6840
          Email: nick@nickkahl.com


RADIUS GLOBAL: O'Neill Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Radius Global
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Michael O'Neill, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Radius Global
Solutions, LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-16567-ES-JSA (D.N.J., Sept. 7,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Radius Global Solutions LLC -- https://www.radiusgs.com/ --
provides debt recovery services and customer contact
solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Phone: (973) 227-5900
          Fax: (973) 244-0019
          Email: jkj@legaljones.com


RB HEALTH: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RB Health (US) LLC.
The case is styled as Denise Crumwell, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. RB Health (US) LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-07818 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 18, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

RB Health (US) LLC is located in Parsippany, New Jersey and is part
of the Home Health Care Services Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


RESURGENT CAPITAL: Heppinstall Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Pa.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Resurgent Capital
Services L.P., et al. The case is styled as Eric Von Heppinstall,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Resurgent Capital Services L.P., LVNV Funding LLC, John Does 1-25,
Case No. 3:21-cv-01611-RDM (M.D. Pa., Sept. 17, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Resurgent Capital Services -- https://www.resurgent.com/ --
provides financial services. The Company manages debt portfolios
for credit grantors and debt buyers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott H. Bernstein, Esq.
          SKOLNICK LEGAL GROUP, P.C.
          103 Eisenhower Parkway, Ste. 305
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Phone: (203) 246-2887
          Email: scott@skolnicklegalgroup.com


S.A. KITSINIAN: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against S.A. Kitsinian, Inc.
The case is styled as Denise Crumwell, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. S.A. Kitsinian, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-07816 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 18, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

S.A. Kitsinian, Inc. -- https://kitsinianjewelers.com/ -- was
founded in 1978. The company's line of business includes the
wholesale distribution of jewelry, precious stones and metals,
costume jewelry, watches, clocks, and silverware.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


SAFECO INSURANCE: Denial of Bid to Dismiss Folweiler Suit Reversed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FOLWEILER CHIROPRACTIC PS, Respondent v. SAFECO
INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA AND FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
d/b/a SAFECO CVO-WASHINGTON, Appellants, Case No. 81520-2-I (Wash.
App.), the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, reverses
the trial court's order denying its motion to dismiss, as well as
the trial court's order granting Folweiler's motion for class
certification.

Background

Folweiler filed a class action complaint against Safeco and First
National (collectively "Safeco"), alleging that Safeco's practice
of using a computer database to assess whether the amount billed by
medical providers was reasonable violated Washington law, including
the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW.

Washington law requires automotive insurers to offer personal
injury protection (PIP) coverage as an included option in insurance
policies. PIP coverage includes medical and hospital benefits,
which are payments for medical expenses incurred by or on behalf of
the insured in an automotive accident.

When Safeco receives a medical provider's bill, it determines if
(1) the medical provider administered treatment related to the
automobile accident and (2) if the amount billed is reasonable. To
determine if the amount billed is reasonable, Safeco relies on the
FAIR Health Database -- a database that compares the bill to the
cost of the same treatment in a common geographic area. Safeco then
pays the bill up to the 80th percentile in the database.

Safeco's use of software databases to determine the reasonableness
of providers' bills has been the subject of much litigation. In
2014, Safeco and its affiliate, Liberty Mutual, were sued in a
putative multistate class action in Illinois -- Lebanon
Chiropractic Clinic, PC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 5-15-0111,
2016 IL App (5th) 150111-U, 2016 WL 546909 (Feb. 9, 2016).

The parties reached a class settlement wherein Safeco and Liberty
Mutual would pay PIP claims at the 80th percentile of the FAIR
Health Database for five years. In return, class members stipulated
that such payments satisfy all of Safeco and Liberty Mutual's legal
and contractual obligations, and that class members would not bring
claims alleging otherwise.

Following the Lebanon settlement, Chan Healthcare Group, PS brought
a collateral attack against the settlement in Washington, arguing
that the interests of the Washington class members were not
adequately represented in the Illinois action. The trial court
certified a class, sustained Chan's due process attack on Lebanon,
and held that Washington medical providers could bring CPA claims
barred by the Lebanon settlement. The Court of Appeals reversed on
discretionary review, rejecting the due process argument and
enforcing the Lebanon settlement against Chan. The Washington
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, holding that the full faith and
credit clause required it to enforce the Illinois Court's
judgment.

Folweiler is a professional services corporation that provides
chiropractic care and massage therapy in King County. On March 12,
2019, Folweiler, a member of the Lebanon settlement class, filed a
class action complaint against Safeco. Despite Safeco's compliance
with its Lebanon obligations, Folweiler alleged that Safeco's
bill-review procedures violated the PIP statute, the Office of the
Insurance Commissioner's regulations governing investigation of
claims (WAC 284-30-330, WAC 284-30-395), and the CPA. Folweiler
claimed damages based on the reduced payment of its bills and
administrative expenses derived from the difficulty of managing
Safeco's payment system.

Safeco moved for summary judgment and dismissal based on the
Lebanon settlement. The trial court granted the motion in part,
stating that "the way it read Lebanon is frankly that Dr. Folweiler
can't bring suit on his own behalf." The court, however, permitted
Folweiler to file an amended complaint.

Folweiler filed an amended complaint claiming that providers have
"equitable assignment" of their patients' policy benefits, as well
as the statutory and WAC rights that govern the policy. Folweiler
claimed it derived this equitable assignment from the direct
billing relationship between the provider and insurer, the payments
of which are authorized by the insured.

Safeco moved to dismiss on the grounds that Folweiler was not a
valid assignee of any patient claims and that its new allegations
did not overcome the Lebanon covenant not to bring claims.
Folweiler concurrently moved for class certification.

The trial court denied Safeco's motion and granted class
certification to Folweiler. In doing so, it stated that Folweiler
and other providers have standing as equitable assignees of their
patients' rights under Safeco's policy and under Washington law. In
addition, the court held that the equitable assignment allows
Folweiler to bring per se CPA claims.

In light of the trial court's decisions, Folweiler again amended
its complaint. Folweiler now includes a per se CPA claim, claims
involving the PIP Statute, and WAC regulations governing the
investigation of claims.

Safeco sought, and the Court of Appeals granted, discretionary
review.

Analysis

Safeco argues that the Lebanon settlement bars Folweiler's claims,
including its "equitable assignment" claims.

The Court of Appeals agrees. The settlement's broad language is
clear: Folweiler and other Lebanon class members contractually
agreed that they would not bring any action or proceeding of any
kind challenging Safeco's payment of future claims. This language
is broad enough to include claims brought on behalf of third
parties under a claim of an equitable assignment. Folweiler's
attempt to bring action on behalf of its patients is an action or
proceeding challenging Safeco's payment future claims -- precisely
the type of action that Folweiler is contractually prohibited from
bringing under the plain language of the Lebanon settlement.

Folweiler argues that it can avoid the plain language of the
Lebanon settlement because the claims are brought on behalf of its
equitable assignees -- its patients. It argues, because its
patients are not bound by the Lebanon settlement, it is similarly
not bound.

The Court of Appeals disagrees. It holds that because of
Folweiler's participation in the Lebanon settlement and its broad
prohibitions on litigation, it may not bring any action or
proceeding of any kind, including an action based on direct or
equitable assignment.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for proceedings consistent with its Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 7, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/preu7nzz from Leagle.com.

Philip Albert Talmadge -- phil@tal-fitzlaw.com --
Talmadge/Fitzpatrick, 2775 Harbor Ave. SW, Third Floor, Ste. C, in
Seattle, Washington 98126-2138, John Michael Silk -- silk@wscd.com
-- Wilson Smith Cochran Dickerson, 901 5th Ave., Ste. 1700, in
Seattle, Washington 98164-2050, Marc Fuller -- mfuller@velaw.com --
Vinson and Elkins, 2001 Ross Ave., Ste. 3700, in Dallas, Texas
75201-2975, James Morsch -- jmorsch@butlerrubin.com -- Butler Rubin
Saltarelli & Boyd LLP, 70 West Madison Street, Suite 1800, in
Chicago, Illinois 60602-4257, Counsel for the Appellant(s).

David Elliot Breskin -- dbreskin@bjtlegal.com -- Breskin Johnson &
Townsend PLLC, 1000 2nd Ave., Ste. 3670, in Seattle, Washington
98104-1053, Cynthia J Heidelberg -- cheidelberg@bjtlegal.com --
Breskin, Johnson & Townsend, 1000 2nd Ave., Ste. 3670, in Seattle,
Washington 98104-1053, Brendan Wesley Donckers --
bdonckers@bjtlegal.com -- Breskin Johnson & Townsend, PLLC, 1000
2nd Ave., Ste. 3670, in Seattle, Washington 98104-1053, Daniel
Foster Johnson -- djohnson@bjtlegal.com -- Breskin Johnson &
Townsend PLLC, 1000 2nd Ave., Ste. 3670, in Seattle, Washington
98104-1053, Counsel for the Respondent(s).


SCIPLAY CORP: $8.2MM Class Settlement to be Heard on Nov. 15
------------------------------------------------------------
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

IN RE SCIPLAY CORPORATION SECURITIES
LITIGATION

Index No. 655984/2019

(Masley, J., Commercial Division Part 48)

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION, PROPOSED SETTLEMENT,
AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES

To:

All persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired the
Class A common stock of SciPlay Corporation ("SciPlay" or the
"Company") pursuant and/or traceable to the registration statement
for SciPlay's May 3, 2019 initial public offering of Class A common
stock, and were allegedly damaged thereby.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, New York County, that Lead Plaintiffs
Police Retirement System of St. Louis and Hongwei Li, on behalf of
themselves and the proposed Settlement Class,1 and SciPlay and the
other defendants in the Action, have reached a proposed settlement
of the above-captioned class action (the "Action") in the amount of
$8,275,000 that, if approved, will resolve the Action in its
entirety (the "Settlement").

This Action is a securities class action brought on behalf of those
Persons who purchased or acquired SciPlay Class A common stock
pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's Registration Statement
for SciPlay's May 3, 2019 initial public offering of Class A common
stock.  Lead Plaintiffs allege that the Registration Statement
contained misleading statements and omissions.  Defendants have
denied, and continue to deny, all of Lead Plaintiffs' allegations,
and deny that the Registration Statement was in any way materially
false or misleading.

A hearing will be held before the Honorable Andrea Masley, on
November 15, 2021 at 3:30 p.m. EDT, before the Court, either in
person at the Supreme Court, New York County, Courtroom 242, 60
Centre Street, New York, NY  10007, or remotely using directions
that will be posted in advance on the Settlement website, in the
Court's discretion (the "Settlement Hearing") to, among other
things, determine whether the Court should: (i) approve the
proposed Settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (ii) dismiss
the Action with prejudice as provided in the Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement, dated July 27, 2021; (iii) approve the
proposed Plan of Allocation for distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund; and (iv) approve Lead Counsel's Fee and Expense Application.
The Court may change the date of the Settlement Hearing without
providing another notice.  You do NOT need to attend the Settlement
Hearing to receive a distribution from the Net Settlement Fund.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE
AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO A
MONETARY PAYMENT.  If you have not yet received a Notice and Proof
of Claim and Release form ("Claim Form"), you may obtain copies of
these documents by visiting the website dedicated to the
Settlement, www.SciPlaySecuritiesSettlement.com, or by contacting
the Claims Administrator at:

         SciPlay Corporation Securities Litigation
         c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.
         P.O. Box 173062
         Milwaukee, WI 53217
         866-905-8128
         info@SciPlaySecuritiesSettlement.com

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice/Claim Form or for
information about the status of a claim, may also be made to Lead
Counsel:

         Alfred L. Fatale III Esq.
         LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
         140 Broadway
         New York, NY 10005
         www.labaton.com
         settlementquestions@labaton.com
         888-219-6877

If you are a Settlement Class Member, to be eligible to share in
the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a
Claim Form postmarked or submitted online no later than December
23, 2021.  If you are a Settlement Class Member and you do not
timely submit a valid Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share
in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, but you will
nevertheless be bound by the Settlement and all judgments or orders
entered by the Court in the Action, whether favorable or
unfavorable.

If you are a Settlement Class Member and wish to exclude yourself
from the Settlement Class, you must submit a written request for
exclusion in accordance with the instructions set forth in the
Notice such that it is received no later than October 25, 2021.  If
you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will
not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action, whether favorable or unfavorable, and you will not be
eligible to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund.
If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not timely and validly
exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will remain in the
Settlement Class and that means that, upon the Effective Date of
the Settlement, you will release all Plaintiffs' Released Claims
against the Defendant Releasees.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the Judgment, the
proposed Plan of Allocation, and/or Lead Counsel's Fee and Expense
Application must be mailed to the Court and counsel for the Parties
in accordance with the instructions in the Notice, such that they
are received no later than October 25, 2021.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, DEFENDANTS, OR
DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE.

DATED: September 8, 2021

BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY

1 All terms not defined herein shall have the definition assigned
to them in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, dated July
27, 2021. [GN]


STATE FARM: Stanton Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Norman Stanton, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated persons v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, was removed to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on Sept. 17, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-04129-MSG to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance Contract.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company --
https://www.statefarm.com/ -- operates as an insurance company. The
Company offers vehicle, auto, accident, homeowners, condo owners,
renters, life and annuities, fire and casualty, health, disability,
flood, business, and boat insurance products and services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James C. Haggerty, Esq.
          HAGGERTY, GOLDBERG, SCHLEIFER, & KUPERSMITH
          1835 Market Street, 27th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (267) 350-6600
          Email: chesser@hgsklawyers.com

               - and -

          John P. Goodrich, Esq.
          429 Fourth Avenue, Suite 900
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Phone: (412) 261-4663

               - and -

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          SHUB LAW FIRM LLC
          134 Kings Highway East
          Second Floor
          Haddonfield, NJ 08033
          Phone: (856) 772-7200
          Email: ecf@shublawyers.com

               - and -

          Scott B. Cooper, Esq.
          SCHMIDT KRAMER, P.C.
          209 State Street
          Harrisburg, PA 17101
          Phone: (717) 232-6300
          Email: scooper@schmidtkramer.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          John J. McGrath, Esq.
          PALMER & BARR PC
          1880 John F. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 401
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 557-0222
          Fax: (215) 557-0225
          Email: john.mcgrath@palmerbarr.com


SURESTAFF LLC: McInnis Wins Leave to Take Jurisdictional Discovery
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLEY MCINNIS, DEMETRIUS STEWART, SHARDAE BAILEY, and
DONAMEEN JONES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. SURESTAFF, LLC, and MINUTEMEN OF ILLINOIS,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 21 C 0309 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Robert W.
Gettleman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part the Plaintiff's motion
to remand or to take jurisdictional discovery.

Plaintiff McInnis filed a putative class action complaint against
Defendant Party City Corp. in the Circuit Court of DuPage County,
Illinois, alleging violations of the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act ("BIPA"), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. Party City removed the
case to the Court asserting subject matter jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(1)(B), and
Section 1453 ("CAFA"), which expands diversity jurisdiction for
class actions in which there are 100 or more class members, with at
least one class member diverse from at least one defendant (i.e.,
minimal diversity), and more and $5 million, in controversy.

The Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, adding three
staffing companies as defendants: 1) SureStaff, LLC; 2) Premier
Employee Solutions, LLC; and 3) Minute Men of Illinois, Inc. The
amended complaint also added three new plaintiffs, Demetrius
Stewart, Shardae Bailey, and Donameen Jones, all citizens of
Illinois. A few months later, the Plaintiffs dismissed Party City
and Premier, the only minimally diverse Defendants. SureStaff and
Minute Men, the only remaining Defendants, are both citizens of
Illinois, as are the named plaintiffs and, according to the
Plaintiffs, the entire putative class.

The Plaintiffs have now moved to remand the case back to the state
court, or in the alternative for leave to take jurisdictional
discovery, arguing that the Court should decline jurisdiction under
CAFA's: 1) home state exception (Section 1332(d)(4)(B)); 2) local
controversy exception (Section 1332 (d)(4)(A)); or 3) discretionary
jurisdiction (Section 1332(d)(3)). The Defendants object, arguing
that the Plaintiff's motion violates the well settled rule that
jurisdiction is decided at the time of removal, and that later
changes that compromise diversity do not destroy jurisdiction.

Judge Gettleman agrees with the Defendants to the extent that they
argue that the amendments to the complaint do not destroy the
Court's jurisdiction. That, however, is only half the equation. The
real issue is whether the Court, having jurisdiction, should
decline to exercise its jurisdiction under CAFA's exceptions.

The Defendants, citing Myrick v. WellPoint, Inc., 764 F.3d 662, 664
(7th Cir. 2014), again argue that the party proposing that the
district decline to exercise jurisdiction "may only properly invoke
the home-state or local controversy exceptions at the time of
removal." But Myrick says nothing of the sort. Myrick states that
"the party proposing that the district court 'decline to exercise'
jurisdiction that was properly invoked at the time of removal also
has the burden of production," Judge Gettleman finds. More
importantly, the court stated that "the 'decline to exercise'
clause of Section 1332(d)(4), like the local-law-remand provision
in 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c), concerns whether the court exercises
jurisdiction to the full, not whether it exists." Thus, Judge
Gettleman holds, it is clear that like under Section 1367(c),
changes to the action may be taken into account under CAFA's
"decline to exercise" clause.

In the instant case, the two remaining defendants are both citizens
of Illinois. There appears to be no question that at least one of
the Defendants is a defendant from whom significant relief is
sought, whose conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
asserted, the principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct
were incurred in Illinois, and that no other class action asserting
the same or similar factual allegations has been filed against
either defendant on behalf of the same or other persons.

Judge Gettleman finds that the Defendants correctly argue, however,
that it is the Plaintiffs' burden of production to show either that
greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of
the proposed class are also citizens of Illinois for purposes of
Section1332(d)(3), or that greater than two-thirds of the members
of the proposed class are citizens of Illinois (the state in which
the action was originally filed) for purposes of application of
Section 1332(d)(4)(A) or (B). Given that all of the proposed class
members had their fingerprints collected, received, otherwise
obtained, or disclosed by the Defendants while in Illinois, this
seems likely, but the Plaintiffs have presented no data from which
the court could reach that conclusion. Consequently, Judge
Gettleman grants the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to take
jurisdictional discovery to establish the citizenship of the
members of the proposed class.

For the reasons he described, Judge Gettleman granted in part the
Plaintiff's motion to remand or to take jurisdictional discovery.
The Plaintiff is granted leave to take discovery limited to the
issue of the citizenship of the proposed class members. The
Plaintiffs are directed to file a supplement to their motion to
remand by Oct. 8, 2021. The Defendants have until Oct. 22, 2021, to
respond. The Court will issue its ruling via CM/ECF.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 3, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/24yjwjp5 from
Leagle.com.


TAX SAVE: Robinson Files Suit in D. Nebraska
--------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tax Save Express,
Inc. The case is styled as Jessica Robinson, Stacey Jennings,
Priscilla McGowan, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Movant v. Tax Save Express, Inc., Respondent,
Case No. 8:21-cv-00364-BCB-CRZ (D. Neb., Sept. 17, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions for Motion
to Compel.

Tax Save Express, Inc. is in the Tax Return Preparation Services
business.[BN]

The Movants are represented by:

          Kyle J. Long, Esq.
          SORENSEN, HAHN LAW FIRM
          2122 Broadway
          Scottsbluff, NE 69361
          Phone: (308) 632-5111
          Email: klong@westnebraskalaw.com


TENNESSEE: Court Denies McAlpin's Bid for Relief From Judgment
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DOUGLAS McALPIN, Plaintiff v. ROBERT B. CLEM, DET.
GREEN, DET. RONNIE PERRY, DENT MORRISS, JEROME CONVERSE, JUDGE
JAMES E. WALTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TENNESEE, and the STATE OF
TENNESSEE, Defendants, Case No. CV 21-04-M-DLC (D. Mont.), Judge
Dana L. Christensen of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana, Missoula Division, denied the Plaintiff's motions for
relief from judgment and to amend complaint to advance class action
claims and to consolidate.

Introduction

Before the Court are several post-judgment motions filed by
Plaintiff McAlpin following the Court's dismissal of his pro se
compliant at the screening stage. These include three motions that
Judge Christensen construes as seeking relief from judgment and one
to amend the operative complaint to advance class action claims and
join the action with another action currently pending in the
District.

On Jan. 8, 2021, Mr. McAlpin filed his complaint against eight
defendants alleging that a conspiracy involving Tennessee officials
led to his wrongful conviction on state court charges between 1991
and 1992.

Because Mr. McAlpin was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the
Court screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915.
The Court concluded that Mr. McAlpin's claims failed because they
are Heck barred and fall outside the applicable statute of
limitations. It also noted it likely lacked personal jurisdiction
over the defendants and found that some defendants were either
immune from suit or that the allegations failed to plausibly
establish a claim against them. Mr. McAlpin's request for counsel
was also denied. Accordingly, the case was dismissed, and judgment
was entered in favor of the defendants. As noted, since then Mr.
McAlpin has filed four motions requesting various relief. Judge
Christensen adjudicates each in turn.

Discussion

I. Motions for Relief from Judgment

On May 19, 2021, Mr. McAlpin filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
requesting that the Court reconsiders the denial of his claims.
Specifically, he argued that he was also advancing a claim under 42
U.S.C. Section 1985 which the Court failed to address. On June 15,
2021, Mr. McAlpin filed an affidavit "in support of his request to
reconsider" his previous request for an attorney. He also
subsequently filed another motion reiterating his request for
counsel.

Because these filings challenge the Court's dismissal of his case
and entry of judgment, Judge Christensen construes them as motions
for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). As a general matter, motions for reconsideration "should not
be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the
district court is presented with newly discovered evidence,
committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the
controlling law."

Judge Christensen finds no basis for reconsidering the Court's
decision to dismiss Mr. McAlpin's lawsuit and deny his request for
counsel. First, Mr. McAlpin has not included any argument or
rebuttal regarding the Court's conclusion that his claims are Heck
barred, fall outside the applicable statute of limitations, fail to
state a claim against certain defendants, and are advanced against
defendants with immunity. As such, Judge Christensen denies Mr.
McAlpin's motion for relief from judgment to the extent it seeks
reconsideration of dismissal of his claims.

Mr. McAlpin's request for reconsideration of the Court's denial of
his motion for counsel is similarly denied. In this motion, Mr.
McAlpin exclusively argues he needs the assistance of counsel
because his case is complex and he lacks formal legal training. As
the Court previously told Mr. McAlpin, it is insufficient to
justify the appointment of counsel in a civil case, which is
limited to "exceptional circumstances." Nothing has changed since
the Court first concluded this standard was not met, and Judge
Christensen denies Mr. McAlpin's request for reconsideration of its
denial of his request for counsel.

II. Motion to Amend for Class Action Status and Joinder with
Huggler v. State of Montana, et al., CV 19-39-SPW-TJC

Mr. McAplin has also filed a motion seeking to amend his complaint
to assert class action claims on behalf of all "Montana citizens
that have been declared indigent by the Courts of Montana."

Judge Christensen construes this motion as one brought under Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 15, the
Court should "freely give leave to amend when justice so requires."
But it need not permit futile amendments. In the case, the Juduge
holds that any amendment would be futile for two reasons. First,
Mr. McAlpin is proceeding pro se. Pro se defendants cannot
prosecute class action lawsuits. Second, none of these amendments
would cure the defects this Court has previously identified in Mr.
McAlpin's claims. The Judge not permit an amendment to advance a
futile class action claim.

As a final matter, to the extent Mr. McAlpin's motion also seeks
joinder with the Huggler lawsuit, Judge Christensen construes it as
a motion for consolidation under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. A Court's consolidation decision is purely
discretionary. Both the Huggler matter and the case are closed and
both present distinct claims against different plaintiffs and
different defendants. This alone supports a denial of any request
for consolidation. The motion is denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons she stated, Judge Christensen denied Mr. McAlpin's
motions for relief from judgment and to amend complaint to advance
class action claims and to consolidate.

The Judge certifies pursuant to Rule 24(a)(3)(A) that any appeal of
the Order would not be taken in good faith. Mr. McAlpin has
attempted to advance implausible or barred claims against improper
defendants. The Clerk of Court will have the docket reflect the
foregoing certification.

No further filings will be entertained in the closed case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 3, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/7d7d5jbs from Leagle.com.


U.S. CLAIMS: E.D. Pennsylvania Grants Bid to Dismiss Austin Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW B. AUSTIN, Plaintiff v. PAUL HASHIM & U.S.
CLAIMS SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-1955 (E.D.
Pa.), Judge Gerald J. Pappert of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania grants the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

Last year, Austin represented Dominick DeSimone in a putative class
action against U.S. Claims Services and its employee Paul Hashim.
The Court dismissed DeSimone's amended complaint and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. While the appeal was pending,
Hashim and U.S. Claims sued DeSimone and Austin alleging wrongful
use of civil proceedings in violation of Pennsylvania's Dragonetti
Act. Hashim and U.S. Claims voluntarily dismissed that action in
September of 2020, presumably because the Third Circuit had not yet
resolved DeSimone's appeal.

Defendants Hashim and U.S. Claims have not re-filed their
Dragonetti suit against Austin. But, fearing they might, Austin has
gone on the offensive. He seeks a judgment declaring that he did
not violate the Dragonetti Act. Hashim and U.S. Claims move to
dismiss, arguing primarily that Austin's claim is not ripe for
adjudication.

Judge Pappert holds that the Defendants' Motion is best construed
as a facial attack on the Court's jurisdiction. So he accepts
Austin's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all
reasonable inferences from those allegations in his favor. Although
a complaint need only be "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," it must contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.

Judge Pappert finds that Austin does not plead a "concrete and
particularized" injury that is "actual or imminent." But it is
unclear what injury this has or will cause. The specter of
litigation may present an Article III injury in some cases, but
this is not one. Nor is the case in which courts in the Circuit
would typically entertain a request for declaratory judgment, Judge
Pappert adds.

Judge Pappert states that Austin is not seeking clarification of
his rights so he can take some affirmative action, and any conduct
for which the Defendants might sue has already occurred. He says,
Austin is instead trying to preempt the Defendant's supposedly
imminent lawsuit with an affirmative defense he could raise in
response to any suit that might be filed. And Austin has failed to
show that defending against a lawsuit (rather than pursuing this
one) would be 'inordinately expensive and impractical.'

Finally, Judge Pappert holds that no amendment would save Austin's
Amended Complaint. Uncertainty regarding whether his prior lawsuit
violated the Dragonetti Act has not and will not cause him any
concrete injury sufficient to establish Article III standing. If
Austin wants to "make a vigorous defense' of the Defendants'
oft-threatened Dragonetti action," he will have to wait until the
Defendants bring a Dragonetti action.

An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 3, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/vsvtwrwu from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES GYPSUM: Liston Files Wages and Hour Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Bryan K. Liston, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. United States Gypsum Company, Defendant,
Case No. 21-cv-00140, (S.D. Ind., September 9, 2021), seeks to
address wage and hour and overtime violations for underpaying wages
and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and
Indiana Wage Payment Statutes.

United States Gypsum Company mines and manufactures construction
materials, such as drywall and joint compound. Liston worked as a
manufacturing supervisor from December of 2015 to August 31, 2021.
Liston worked for US Gypsum at its Shoals, Martin County, Indiana
mine. He claims to be underpaid wages and overtime compensation for
the daily 15 minute mandatory work meetings.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert P. Kondras, Jr.
      HASSLER KONDRAS MILLER LLP
      100 Cherry Street
      Terre Haute, IN 47807
      Tel: (812) 232-9691
      Facsimile: (812) 234-2881
      Email: kondras@hkmlawfirm.com


UNITEDHEALTH: Davis, et al. Sue Over Denied Insurance Coverage
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rick Davis, Sr., Mathew Koohns and Brett A. Lockhart, Sr., on
behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. United Health Group Incorporated,
Unitedhealthcare Insurance Company, Unitedhealthcare of Washington,
Inc. and United Healthcare Services, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-01220 (W.D. Wash., September 7, 2021), seeks an order
requiring United to repay all class members, with interest, for the
amount of out-of-network benefits denied, an order for United to
reprocess all wrongfully denied appeals in compliance with plan
terms and without the improper reductions, equitable payments,
disbursements and expenses of this action, including reasonable
attorneys' fees and such other and further relief under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

Davis is insured under a self-funded health benefit plan, the
Target Corporation Employee Umbrella Welfare Benefit Plan, issued
through his wife's employer, the Target Corporation.

Koohns is insured under a fully insured health care benefit plan,
the Miles Sand & Gravel Welfare Benefit Plan, issued through his
employer, Miles Sand & Gravel. The MS&G plan is underwritten by
UnitedHealthcare of Washington, Inc. Pursuant to this fully insured
plan, United pays all covered medical expenses through its own
assets and serves as the plan's claims administrator and
fiduciary.

Lockhart is insured under a self-funded health care benefit plan,
the Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. Medical Plan through his
employer, the Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. UHS serves as the
plan's claims administrator.

United allegedly failed to reimburse claims for health care
benefits provided by "out-of-network" providers according to the
payment terms of the written plan. United allegedly bypassed the
requirement of certain plans that United first determine the
allowed amount of benefits according to any contract that the
provider might have with United or a vendor, affiliate, or
subcontractor of United. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Eleanor Hamburger, Esq.
      SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER PLLC
      3101 Western Avenue, Suite 350
      Seattle, WA 98121
      Tel. (206) 223-0303
      Fax. (206) 223-0246.
      Email: ehamburger@sylaw.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***