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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, August 30, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 167

                            Headlines

1-800 CONTACTS: Loses Bid to Compel Arbitration in Fridman Suit
1350 S DIXIE: Videa Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages
3M COMPANY: Anderson Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Betka Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Borchardt Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF

3M COMPANY: Cash Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Dowd Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Eble Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Harris Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Hills Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF

3M COMPANY: Jimenez Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Johnson Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Lowder Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Mark Smith Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Martin Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF

3M COMPANY: Mikolajcik Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Nojunas Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Perez Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Rodriguez Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Sanchez Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF

3M COMPANY: Scullawl Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Shires Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Smerage Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Smith Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Steele Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF

3M COMPANY: Switana Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Vanness Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Williams Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
3M COMPANY: Zanders Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Settlement with PCCRS Gets Final Approval

ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Zaidi Putative Class Action Underway
AKIMA SUPPORT: Avery's Bid for Initial Settlement Approval Denied
ALABAMA: Faces Hurst Habeas Corpus Suit in M.D. Alabama
ALEXANDRIA CARE: California Appeals Court Flips Judgment in Zuniga
ALLAKOS INC: Continues to Defend Kim Securities Class Action

ALLIANCEONE RECEIVABLES: Moore FDCPA Suit Seeks to Certify Class
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY: Perry Allowed to File 2nd Amended Class Suit
ALPHABET INC: Ct. Must Meet & Confer with Plaintiffs in Meyers Suit
AMAZON.COM INC: Summary Judgment Order in Heimbach Suit Vacated
AMC ENTERTAINMENT: Class Cert. Bid in NY Securities Suit Granted

AMYRIS INC: Discovery in California Securities Class Suit Ongoing
ANAPTYSBIO INC: Continues to Defend Etokimab-Related Suit
ANTERO RESOURCES: Braxton Minerals Files Suit in N.D. West Virginia
ANTHEM COMPANIES: Nonresidents' Dismissal From Canaday Suit Upheld
APPLE AMERICAN: Seeks OK of Joint Motion to Withdraw Class Cert Bid

ARIZONA: Plaintiffs Seek to Withdraw Class Status Bid
ARIZONA: Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Transgenders
ASPEN AMERICAN: Berkseth-Rojas Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal
ASSURANCE IQ: Javier Appeals Wiretapping Class Suit Dismissal
ATERIAN INC: Bid to Consolidate Tate and Coon Suits Pending

ATI PHYSICAL: Burbige Slams Share Drop Over Staff Attrition
BERKSHIRE HILLS: Berkshire Bank Faces Suit by 93A Claimant
BLUE NILE: Johnson's Wiretapping Complaint Dismissed With Prejudice
BOSTON BEER COMPANY: Galvez Files Suit in S.D. California
BUCKINGHAM PROPERTY: Bid for Final OK of $600K Ferrell Deal Denied

BUENA VISTA: Cala Seeks Overtime Pay, Missing Paystubs
CALIFORNIA REHABILITATION: Chambers Suit Removed to C.D. California
CATALYST FORWARD: Hawkins Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
CHEGG INC: Settlement Reached in ADA Related Class Suit in New York
CHEGG INC: Settlement Reached in Unruh Violation Related Suit

CHEMOCENTRYX INC: Avacopan Related Putative Class Suits Underway
CIGNA CORP: Class Certification Bid Extended to October 8
CITYR GROUP: Edwards Suit Removed to N.D. Oklahoma
CLIENT SERVICES: Conditional Cert. of Settlement Class Sought
COMPASS CALIFORNIA: Charman Sues Over Unsolicited Phone Call Ads

COMPASS COUNSELING: Gitipour Seeks Home Based Residents' Unpaid OT
COMSCORE INC: Settlement in Privacy Suit Gets Final Approval
CONSUMER SAFETY: Ohio Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Dover Class Suit
CONVERGENT HEALTHCARE: Page Files FDCPA Suit in C.D. Illinois
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Suit Alleges Collection Letter "Deceptive"

CORECIVIC INC: Agreement in Principle Reached in Grae Suit
CORECIVIC INC: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in ICE Detainees Suit
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Deadline Extension of Class Cert. Filing Sought
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Dunn Appeals Denied Class Cert. Bid Denial
CRST INTERNATIONAL: Markson Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass

DALLAS JONES: McClurg Seeks Approval to Send Notice to Collective
DAVID RANDALL: Court Approves Joint Bid to Extend Deadlines
DEMAR LOGISTICS: Faces Cisneros Wage-and-Hour Suit in N.D. Ill.
DEVON ENERGY: Court Enters Scheduling Order in Wake Energy Suit
DISH NETWORK: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Dec. 6

DOMINION ENERGY: Settlement Reached in Scana Merger Related Suit
DREAMWEAR INC: Black Employees Racially Harassed, Doe Suit Alleges
DRESSER LLC: Extension of Class Certification Deadlines Sought
E.MERGE TECHNOLOGY: Faces Assad Suit Over ICA and IAA Violations
EAGLE BANCORP: Settlement in NY Suit Awaits Preliminary Approval

EDUCATIONAL CREDIT: Court Junks Reyes Class Action w/o Prejudice
EFINANCIAL LLC: Court Dismisses Borden TCPA Suit With Prejudice
EHEALTH INC: Bid to Nix Securities Class Suit in California Pending
ENCHANCED RECOVERY: Dunn FDCPA Suit Removed to M.D. North Carolina
ENPHASE ENERGY: Hurst Securities Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend

EOG RESOURCES: Court Certifies Settlement Class in WFM Suit
EURO PHARMA: Dotson Appeals Dismissal of False Labeling Suit
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Weber Files FCRA Suit in E.D. New York
FCA US: Eastern District of Michigan Narrows Claims in Johnson Suit
GANNETT CO: Suris Appeals ADA Suit Dismissal to 2nd Circuit

GARDEN CITY: Court Dismisses Fourstar Suit Without Prejudice
GENIE ENERGY: Preliminary Bid to Dismiss Davis Suit Pending
GEORGETOWN MEMORIAL: Marshall Files ADA Suit in D. South Carolina
GO ACQUISITION: Assad Sues Over Failure to Meet ICA Obligations
GOOGLE LLC: Sweepstakes Suit Moved From N.D. Cal. to S.D.N.Y.

GRAPHIC PACKAGING: Illinois Court Stays Roberts BIPA Class Suit
GREYSTAR REAL: Seeks 14-Day Extension to File Class Cert Response
GRUBHUB HOLDINGS: Misclassifies Delivery Drivers, Levine Suit Says
H&R BLOCK: Bid to Junk Snarr's Public Injunctive Relief Pending
H&R BLOCK: Swanson Putative Class Suit Stayed Pending Arbitration

HARTFORD CASUALTY: Florida Court Dismisses Bourgier Class Suit
HOME DEPOT: Burcham Seeks to Certify Class of Employees
HOME DEPOT: Court Grants in Part Summary Judgment Bids in Barragan
HOME POINT: Faces Berniz Suit Over 17.7% Drop of Stock Price
HOMETOWN AMERICA: Seeks Continuance of Class Cert Briefing Schedule

HY-VEE INC: Greenstate Appeals Dismissal in Credit Suit
IDAHO: $115K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in K.W. Suit v. IDHW
IML LABELS: Faces Perez Class Suit Over Collection of Biometrics
INOVIO PHARMA: Discovery in McDermid Putative Class Suit Ongoing
INTERACTIVE BROKERS: Bid to Junk Short-Squeeze Suits Due August 30

INTERACTIVE BROKERS: Plaintiff's Bid for Class Status Due Nov. 1
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE: Extension of Class Cert. Filing Sought
IRHYTHM TECHNOLOGIES: Putative Class Suit Underway in California
J2 GLOBAL: Bid to Dismiss Garcia Amended Complaint Pending
J2 GLOBAL: Settlement in Davis Suit Gets Initial Approval

JAKKS PACIFIC: Seeks Settlement and Dismissal of Brown Class Suit
JAMI SNYDER: Hennessy-Waller Class Certification Bid Withdrawn
JJ MARSHALL: Gartrell FDCPA Suit Seeks to Certify Class
JONES FINANCIAL: Settlement in Bland Suit Granted Final Approval
JOSE PEPPER'S: Donelon and Boulware Named Joint Counsel in Florece

KANSAS CITY ROYALS: Appeal Class Cert. Ruling in Senne Case
KANSAS: Court Issues Show Cause Order in Page v. Schnurr and HCF
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Bastasch, Mest Sue Over Defective Ventilators
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Devices Contain PE-PUR Foam, Miller Suit Says
KONINKLIJKE PHILLIPS: Henry Files Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania

LABORATORY CORP: Anderson Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
LANNETT COMPANY: Bid to Certify Class in Utesch Fraud Suit Granted
LEIF JOHNSON: Certification of Class in Smith TCPA Suit Affirmed
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY: Extension to File Class Cert. Reply Sought
LYONS DOUGHTY: Madlinger Class Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice

MADISON COUNTY, IL: Evans Can't Proceed as Class Action v. Jail
MADISON SQUARE: Faces Stockholder Derivative Complaint in Delaware
MAPLEBEAR INC: Denial of Arbitration in Malaspina Suit Affirmed
MCCREARY VESELKA: Texas Court Certifies Class in Perez FDCPA Suit
MCKINSEY & COMPANY: Blankenship Sues Over Opioid Crisis in W. Va.

MDL 2460: Bid to Certify Class in Niaspan Antitrust Suit Denied
MDL 2972: Court Narrows Claims in Customer Data Breach Litigation
MED-TRANS CORP: Black Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
MELINDA COONROD: Seeks Approval of Revised Class Status Deadlines
MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summ. Judgment Ruling in Pleasant Beach Case

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Bruneu Case
MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Fagan Case
MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Forbes Case
MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Holley Case
MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Krieger Case

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Swarthout Case
MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Woods Case
MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Zelenak Case
MIDLAND CREDIT: Arbitration Bid in Branum Suit Held in Abeyance
MIDLAND CREDIT: Johnson Seeks Extension to File Class Cert. Bid

NATURAL POWER: Court Dismisses Landy TCPA Suit Without Prejudice
NCAA: Morrison Files Suit in S.D. Indiana
NESTLE CORP: Court Tosses Stuckey Bid to Certify Class Action
NIO INC: New York Court Refuses to Dismiss Securities Litigation
NOOM INC: Court Dismisses Graham's Wiretapping Suit With Prejudice

NORTON HEALTHCARE: Settlement Class Certified in Disselkamp Suit
NUTANIX INC: Proposed Case Schedule in Securities Suit OK'd
NUVE MIGUEL: Santos Seeks Conditional Collective Certification
OREGON: Maney's Bid to Release Decedents' Medical Records Granted
PAPA MURPHY'S: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Ruling in Brown Suit

PARAMEDICS LOGISTICS: Faces Nettles Suit Over Unpaid Wages & OT
PATRICIA COGNE-FAQUE: Debritto Loses Class Certification Bid
PEI WEI: Class Cert. Discovery Deadline Extended to November 1
PENN CREDIT: Landazuri Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
PHH MORTGAGE: 4632 CWELT-2008 Suit Removed to S.D. Florida

PHIA GROUP: Cross Bids for Summary Judgment in Weyant Suit Denied
PING IDENTITY: Faces New York Class Suit Over Common Stock Drop
PORCH.COM INC: Bid for Settlement Approval in Preston Due Nov. 12
PRETIUM PACKAGING: California Court Enters Judgment in Moreno Suit
PROBUILD COMPANY: Sengvong Seeks Final Approval of Settlement Deal

PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Buffington Suit Seeks to Certify Class
PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Buffington Suit Seeks to Certify Class
RENTGROW INC: Mcintyre Appeals Class Certification Bid Denial
RICHMOND POLICE: Briefing Schedule for Class Cert. Bid Vacated
RIVINGTON LAUNDROMAT: Cordoba Seeks Overtime Pay, Missing Paystubs

RUANE CUNIFF: Court Allows Ferguson to File 3rd Amended Complaint
SCHWAB CHARITABLE: Pinkert Appeals Fiduciary Breach Suit Dismissal
SELECT EMPLOYMENT: Romero Suit Seeks to Certify Class, Subclasses
SENEX LAW: Virginia Court Narrows Claims in Lord FDCPA Suit
SERVICEMASTER CO: Can Compel Arbitration in Cooley Class Suit

SHUN LEE PALACE: Nov. 17 Deadline to File Class Cert. Bid Sought
SIMMONS FIRST: Faces Pace Second Putative Class Suit
SPECTRUM HEALTH: Abernathy's Bid to Certify Class Action Denied
SPIRIT AIRLINES: Court Grants Voluntary Dismissal of Garcia Suit
ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL: Fails to Properly Pay OT, Hudson Claims

STATE AUTOMOBILE: Bluegrass Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal
STATE FARM: Seeks to Stay Activity Pending 4th Cir. Resolution
STATE TEACHERS: Southern District of Ohio Dismisses Dennis Suit
SUBIRANA TRANSPORT: Flores Class Suit Seeks Drivers' Unpaid Wages
SVD CORP: Almedarez Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages

SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES: ERS Hawaii Class Cert. Bid Pending
T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customers' Data, Carp Suit Alleges
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS: Court Modifies Schedule Order in Keuch Suit
TFORCE LOGISTICS: Ninth Cir. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Lim Suit
THOMSON REUTERS: Seeks Approval of Stipulation on Case Schedule

TINDER INC: Ninth Cir. Flips Class Settlement Approval in Kim Suit
TOEZPECUNIA INC: Amador Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Exotic Dancers
TOTAL MERCHANT: California Court Seeks Information in Abante Suit
TREATMENT ASSESSMENT: Court Amends Scheduling Order in Briggs Suit
TTE TECHNOLOGY: Pacana Suit Seeks to Certify Classes

TYSON FOODS: $21MM Settlement Reached in Chicken Grower Suit
TYSON FOODS: Bid to Dismiss Cattle Antitrust Suit Pending
TYSON FOODS: Bid to Dismiss Peterson Suit Still Pending
TYSON FOODS: Direct Purchaser Class Settlement Gets Final Nod
TYSON FOODS: Discovery in Pork Antitrust Litigation Ongoing

U.S. FINANCIAL: Bumpus Suit Stayed Pending Ruling in McHugh Suit
UMAR SERVICES: Court Extends Case Deadlines in Staley Suit
UNITED PARCEL: Rizvanovic Labor Code Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
UNITED STATES: Court Grants Bids to Dismiss Mattwaoshshe Suit
UNITED STATES: Elbert, et al., File Renewed Bid for Class Status

UNITED STATES: Snitko Suit Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
VELODYNE LIDAR: Amended Complaint Scheduled to be Filed by Sept. 1
WALMART STORES: Lisowski Appeals Sales Tax Case Dismissal
WELLS FARGO: Aided MJ Companies' Ponzi Scheme, Bautista Suit Says
WYNN RESORTS: Ferris Putative Class Suit Underway

ZIRTUAL STARTUPS: Macaluso's $150K Class Settlement Wins Final OK

                            *********

1-800 CONTACTS: Loses Bid to Compel Arbitration in Fridman Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled MICHAEL FRIDMAN, Plaintiff v. 1-800
CONTACTS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-21700-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
(S.D. Fla.), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied the Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration, Strike
Class Allegations, and Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay
Proceedings.

The Plaintiff initiated the class action against the Defendant on
March 16, 2021, in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and form
Miami-Dade County, Florida. On May 3, 2021, the Defendant removed
the case to this Court, alleging jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). The Plaintiff's Complaint asserts
claims for violation of the Florida Security of Communications Act
("FSCA"), Florida Statutes, Sections 934.03 (Count 1), 934.04
(Count 2), and invasion of privacy (Count 3).

In the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant utilizes
the services of Quantum Metric, Inc. ("QM") to provide marketing
analytics software for its website, 1800contacts.com ("Website").
QM's software provides a feature called "Session Replay" that
allows a company to essentially reproduce any user's interaction
with a website for the purpose of helping businesses improve their
website design and customer experience. In the process of recording
a user's interactions with a website, Session Replay collects
sensitive user information such as passwords and credit card
numbers, which leaves users vulnerable to data leaks. The Plaintiff
contends that QM's software, as used by the Defendant, functions as
a wiretap.

The Plaintiff alleges further that QM's Replay Session feature
recorded the Plaintiff's keystrokes and mouse clicks on the
Defendant's Website when he visited it at the end of 2020 and
placed an order for prescription contact lenses. According to the
Plaintiff, the QM wiretap captured other data, including the date,
time, and duration of his visit, the Plaintiff's IP address,
location, browser type, and operating system. The Plaintiff
contends that QM's software additionally captures personally
identifiable information and protected health information without
seeking a user's consent.

In the Motion, the Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of the
Plaintiff's claims individually based upon the Website's Terms of
Service, which include an arbitration provision and a class-action
waiver provision. In support of the Motion, the Defendant has
submitted the Declaration of Rico Lujan, which attaches two
exhibits (Defendant's Terms and an Order Summary Page), and the
Declaration of Brad Scott).

The Plaintiff filed his Response, attaching the Declaration of
Brian Levin, which includes ten supporting exhibits (illustrating
the account set-up and navigation process on the Defendant's
Website), the Declaration of Michael Fridman, the receipt for the
Plaintiff's Dec. 25, 2020 purchase, and a copy of the court's
opinion in Vitacost.com, Inc. v. McCants, No. 4D16-3384 (published
at 210 So.3d 761 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). To its Reply, the Defendant
attaches additional printouts of screenshots from the website.

Discussion

At the outset, the Court notes that the parties do not dispute the
following facts. On Jan. 24, 2019, the Plaintiff opened an account
with 1-800 Contacts and made a purchase for contact lenses on the
Website. The Plaintiff made a second purchase on the website on
Dec. 25, 2020. Various Website pages, including the homepage and
the order summary page, include a direct hyperlink to the Terms.

In the Motion, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims are
subject to the mandatory arbitration provision and the class action
waiver contained in the Terms governing the use of its Website. The
Defendant contends that by using the Website, the Plaintiff agreed
to the applicable Terms. The Defendant argues further that
arbitration clauses are independently enforceable contractual
rights. The Plaintiff responds that he was unaware of the Terms and
did not view or agree to them through any of his interactions with
the Website, and as a result, the arbitration provision and class
action waiver are unenforceable.

In determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular
dispute, a court must first consider "any formation challenge to
the contract containing the arbitration clause," District Judge
Beth Bloom notes, citing Solymar Invs., Ltd. v. Banco Santander
S.A., 672 F.3d 981, 990 (11th Cir. 2012). This is because a party
plainly cannot be bound by an arbitration clause to which it does
not consent.

Therefore, the Court must determine whether an agreement exists in
the case such that the Plaintiff should be bound by the arbitration
or class action waiver provisions in the Terms. However, the
parties disagree with respect to which state's law applies in
making this determination.

Choice of Law

The Defendant argues that the Court should apply Utah law due to
the Term's choice of law provision, while the Plaintiff argues that
the Court should apply Florida law. The Court agrees with the
Plaintiff. Based on the Plaintiff's challenge to the very existence
of an agreement, applying Utah law would be improper because
applying the choice-of-law clause to resolve the contract formation
issue would presume the applicability of a provision before its
adoption by the parties has been established.

Moreover, in determining a state law issue, a federal court applies
the choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction in which it sits. The
record in this case indicates that Fridman, a Florida resident,
accessed the Defendant's website and made purchases while located
in Florida. Accordingly, the issue of contract formation is
governed by Florida law in this case, Judge Bloom holds.

Validity of the Browsewrap Agreement

Florida courts have recognized two main types of internet
contracts: (1) clickwrap agreements: when a website directs a
purchaser to the terms and conditions of the sale and requires the
purchaser to click a box to acknowledge that they have read those
terms and conditions; and (2) browsewrap agreements: when a website
merely provides a link to the terms and conditions and does not
require the purchaser to click an acknowledgement during the
checkout process.

The Motion, Response, and Reply, including the attachments thereto,
reveal no dispute regarding an essential fact: a user of the
Website is not required to affirmatively consent to the Terms
before being allowed access to the Website or prior to making a
purchase through the Website. Moreover, the parties both refer to
the Terms as a browsewrap agreement. Under Florida law, a
browsewrap agreement is enforceable when the purchaser has actual
knowledge of the terms and conditions, or when the hyperlink to the
terms and conditions is conspicuous enough to put a reasonably
prudent person on inquiry notice.

The Defendant does not contend that the Plaintiff was on actual
notice of the Website's Terms. In addition, the Plaintiff states
that prior to filing the lawsuit, he never saw the Terms, did not
know that they included an arbitration agreement, and he never
agreed to the Terms or to arbitrate any dispute with the
Defendant.

The Defendant has provided no evidence to rebut the Plaintiff's
assertion that he lacked actual knowledge of the Terms prior to the
initiation of this case. Therefore, the Court does not find that
the Plaintiff was an actual notice of the Terms. The Court must,
therefore, determine whether the hyperlink to the Terms was
sufficient to place the Plaintiff on constructive notice of the
arbitration and class action waiver provisions.

The Defendant contends that the Terms are conspicuous enough to
place a consumer on inquiry notice because they are located
separate from the list of other hyperlinks and are not buried in
text or otherwise difficult to locate. In response, the Plaintiff
argues that the hyperlink to the Terms was not conspicuous enough
to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry notice specifically
because the hyperlink to the Terms is in small font at the bottom
of the page, which requires a user to scroll down numerous times
before the link becomes visible.

Notably, the Plaintiff also points out that a user can complete the
entire process of creating an account and purchasing contact lenses
without ever scrolling to the bottom of the Website pages where the
hyperlink to the Terms is visible. The Plaintiff relies primarily
upon Vitacost.com and Herman v. Seaworld Parks & Ent., Inc., No.
8:14-cv-3028-T-35JSS, 2016 WL 7447555, at *3 n.2 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
26, 2016). Upon review, the Court finds these cases to be
instructive.

Contrary to the Defendant's assertions, the hyperlink to the Terms
is not prominent or particularly remarkable at the bottom of the
pages where it is featured, Judge Bloom finds. In the screenshots
provided by the Defendant, the hyperlink is listed at the very
bottom in small font, and the same size and color as the other
hyperlinks, which include "Privacy practices," "Terms and
conditions," "Accessibility," and "Ad Choices."

Judge Bloom also holds that the Defendant has provided no evidence
to rebut the Plaintiff's assertion that a user can avail himself of
the Website's services, including setting up an account and
ordering contact lenses, without ever having to scroll to the
bottom of the Website's pages that feature the hyperlink to the
Terms. Indeed, the Defendant's own screenshot of the Order Summary
page illustrates that a user can place an order, and when he
reaches the Order Summary page, can view an order confirmation with
an estimated delivery date, complete an insurance form for
reimbursement, upload a prescription, claim an offer for 25% of
glasses, view the detailed order summary, and print an invoice, all
without scrolling to the bottom of the page where the hyperlink to
the Terms is located.

As the Plaintiff points out, the receipt for his order on Dec. 25,
2020, contains no reference to the Terms, Judge Bloom finds. Here,
as in Vitacost.com, the Plaintiff's use of the Website and ability
to make a purchase through the Website never required him to
actually view or agree to the Terms because the record reflects
that Plaintiff could set up an account and purchase contact lenses
without ever having to scroll to the bottom of the webpages where
the hyperlink to the Terms is located. In addition, similar to
Herman, in which the court found no constructive notice, the
location of the hyperlink alone is insufficient to place a user on
notice of the Terms.

As a result, the record does not support the conclusion that the
Plaintiff was on constructive notice of the Website's Terms, which
include the arbitration and class action waiver provisions, Judge
Bloom holds. As such, the Court finds that there is no valid
agreement in this case, which would require that the Plaintiff's
claims must proceed through arbitration on an individual basis.

Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiff is not bound by the
Terms in the case, the Court does not consider the Defendant's
remaining arguments with respect to the scope of the agreement or
the Defendant's alternative request to stay the proceedings in this
case.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ordered and adjudged as follows:

   1. Defendant's Motion is denied; and

   2. Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending a Ruling on
      Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration is, therefore,
      denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/e92rkkvw from Leagle.com.


1350 S DIXIE: Videa Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, KAREN G. VIDEA, and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff v. 1350 S DIXIE LLC d/b/a THESIS HOTEL, Defendant, Case
No. 1:21-cv-22993-PCH (S.D. Fla., August 18, 2021) arises from the
Defendant's alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, who has worked for the Defendant from approximately
October 1, 2020 to July 31, 2021 as a non-exempted, full-time,
hourly-paid housekeeper and lead housekeeper, brings this complaint
as a collective action against the Defendant to recover unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees under the provisions of the FLSA.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant willfully failed to pay her
overtime hours at the rate of one and one-half times his regular
rate of pay for every hour that she worked in excess of 40. In
addition, the Defendant pay her on a bi-weekly basis with paystubs
that did not reflect the actual number of hours worked. The
Defendant purported failed to keep track of the number of hours she
has worked as well as of other similarly situated employees, added
the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff also alleges that she was fired by the Defendant due
to discriminatory reasons, and she is in the process of filing her
Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.

Thesis Hotel provides hospitality services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Tel: (305) 446-1500
          Fax: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com

3M COMPANY: Anderson Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
---------------------------------------------------------------
DENNIS ANDERSON v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02574-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Anderson case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy C. Shafer, Esq.
          BANNER LEGAL
          445 Marine View Avenue, Suite 100
          Del Mar, CA 92014
          Telephone: (760) 479-5404
          E-mail: jshafer@bannerlegal.com

               - and -

          S. James Boumil, Esq.
          BOUMIL LAW OFFICES
          120 Fairmount Street
          Lowell, MA, 01852
          Telephone: (978) 458-0507
          E-mail: sjboumil@boumil-law.com

               - and -

          Konstantine Kyros, Esq.
          KYROS LAW
          17 Miles Rd.
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (800) 934-2921
          E-mail: kon@kyroslaw.com

3M COMPANY: Betka Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
------------------------------------------------------------
EDWARD JOHN BETKA v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02558-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Betka case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Borchardt Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
----------------------------------------------------------------
DOUGLAS LEE BORCHARDT v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02559-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Borchardt case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Cash Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-----------------------------------------------------------
STANFORD WRIGHT CASH v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02560-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Cash case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous
Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Dowd Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOHN JOSEPH DOWD v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02561-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Dowd case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous
Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Eble Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-----------------------------------------------------------
JAMES WELDON EBLE v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02562-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Eble case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re: Aqueous
Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Harris Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-------------------------------------------------------------
BENJAMIN HARRIS v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02533-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Harris case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Hills Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS JAY HILLS v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02534-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Hills case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Jimenez Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
--------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL AGUILAR JIMENEZ v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02535-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Jimenez case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Johnson Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
--------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIE ROY JOHNSON v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02564-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Johnson case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Lowder Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN CHARLES LOWDER v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02565-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Lowder case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Mark Smith Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARK STEVEN SMITH v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02545-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Smith case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Martin Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT JAMES MARTIN v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02566-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Martin case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Mikolajcik Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-----------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHEN JOSEPH MIKOLAJCIK v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02536-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Mikolajcik case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Nojunas Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALBERT JOHN NOJUNAS v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02537-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Nojunas case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Perez Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
------------------------------------------------------------
VINCENT MICHAEL PEREZ v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02539-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Perez case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Rodriguez Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
----------------------------------------------------------------
GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02540-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Rodriguez case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Sanchez Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE TORRES SANCHEZ v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02541-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Sanchez case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Scullawl Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
---------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR LEON SCULLAWL JR. v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02567-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Scullawl case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Shires Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-------------------------------------------------------------
FRANK CURT SHIRES v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02542-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Shires case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Smerage Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
--------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID WARREN SMERAGE v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02543-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Smerage case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Smith Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES BERNARD SMITH v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02544-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Smith case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Steele Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
-------------------------------------------------------------
LEON TIMOTHY STEELE v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02546-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Steele case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Switana Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
--------------------------------------------------------------
DENNIS WILLIAM SWITANA v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02568-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Switana case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Vanness Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
--------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM THOMAS VANNESS v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02547-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Vanness case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Williams Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
---------------------------------------------------------------
THEODORE LLOYD WILLIAMS v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02548-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 10,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Williams case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

3M COMPANY: Zanders Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic AFFF
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH ANTHONY ZANDERS v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company), BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, CHEMGUARD,
INC., CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, CHUBB FIRE, LTD., CORTEVA, INC., DU
PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.), DYNAX CORPORATION,
E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, KIDDE-FENWAL, INC., KIDDE PLC,
NATIONAL FOAM, INC., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY, TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-02569-RMG (D.S.C., Aug. 11,
2021) seeks damages for personal injury sustained by the Plaintiff
and others similarly situated resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams containing the toxic chemicals collectively
known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. AFFF has been used for decades by military
and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires.

According to the complaint, the Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS.

PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. PFAS includes perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and
perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals,
including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. The Defendants
knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body
while presenting significant health risks to humans, the suit
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages
arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a
direct result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products at
various locations during the course of the Plaintiff's training and
firefighting activities.

The Zanders case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, U.S. health
care, and consumer goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Settlement with PCCRS Gets Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the settlement in
Plymouth County Contributory Retirement System initiated putative
class suit received final approval from the court on April 13,
2021, at which time the court entered the Amended Judgment and
Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and the
Judgment became final June 14, 2021.

On May 13, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit alleging
violations of the federal securities laws was filed by Plymouth
County Contributory Retirement System against the Company and
certain of the Company's current and former directors and officers
in California Superior Court for the County of Alameda (Case No.
RG19018715).

The lawsuit alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933 by the
Company and certain of the Company's current and former directors
and officers for allegedly making false statements and omissions in
the registration statement and prospectus filed by the Company in
connection with its January 24, 2018, secondary public offering of
common stock.

On October 29, 2020, Adamas signed a Memorandum of Understanding to
settle this lawsuit for a payment of $7.5 million to eligible
settlement class members in resolution of claims asserted against
the Company, its officers, directors, and the other defendants,
which was memorialized in a Stipulation of Settlement on November
24, 2020.

The settlement was paid by the Company's Director & Officer
liability insurance. The Company and the other defendants continue
to deny each of the plaintiff's claims and deny any liability, but
the Company agreed to the settlement solely to resolve the
disputes, to avoid the costs and risks of further litigation, and
to avoid further distractions to management.

This settlement received final approval from the court on April 13,
2021, at which time the court entered the Amended Judgment and
Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement as set
forth in the Stipulation of Settlement.

This Judgment became final June 14, 2021, at which time the
settlement and its releases became effective.

Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc., incorporated on November 15, 2000, is
a pharmaceutical company. The Company is engaged in developing
medicines to manage the daily lives of those affected by chronic
neurologic disorders. The Company offers a platform based on an
understanding of time-dependent biologic effects of disease
activity and drug response to achieve relief without tolerability
issues. The company is based in Emeryville, California.


ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Zaidi Putative Class Action Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a putative class action suit initiated by Ali
Zaidi.

On December 10, 2019, another putative class action lawsuit
alleging violations of the federal securities laws was filed by Ali
Zaidi against the Company and certain of the Company's current and
former directors and officers in federal court in the Northern
District of California (Case No. 4:19-cv-08051).

This lawsuit alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by the Company and certain of the Company's current and former
officers.

On March 16, 2020, a shareholder derivative lawsuit was filed by
Patrick Van Camp in federal court in the Northern District of
California (Case No. 4:20-cv-01815) naming the Company and certain
of the Company's current and former directors and officers as
defendants.

This lawsuit alleges breaches of fiduciary duty and violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by certain of the Company's
current and former directors and officers.

The Company is named as a nominal defendant only.

On April 6, 2020, another, virtually identical, shareholder
derivative lawsuit was filed by James Druzbik in federal court in
the Northern District of California (Case No. 4:20-cv-02320) naming
the Company and certain of the Company's current and former
directors and officers as defendants.

This lawsuit contains the same allegations, claims, and defendants
as the first derivative action.

The Company is named as a nominal defendant only.

Other similar cases may be filed in the future.

In all of these actions, Plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary
damages and other relief.

These actions are ongoing.

The Company believes it has strong factual and legal defenses to
all actions and intends to defend itself vigorously.

Adamas Pharmaceuticals, Inc., incorporated on November 15, 2000, is
a pharmaceutical company. The Company is engaged in developing
medicines to manage the daily lives of those affected by chronic
neurologic disorders. The Company offers a platform based on an
understanding of time-dependent biologic effects of disease
activity and drug response to achieve relief without tolerability
issues. The company is based in Emeryville, California.


AKIMA SUPPORT: Avery's Bid for Initial Settlement Approval Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Chief District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of a settlement
agreement in the lawsuit styled Devier Avery, et al., Plaintiffs v.
Akima Support Operations, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00924-KJM-AC
(E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Devier Avery is pursuing wage and hour claims on behalf
of a putative class against defendant Akima Support Operations, LLC
(ASO). The parties have reached a settlement agreement, and the
matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement.

Background

Plaintiff Avery worked for ASO as a grounds maintenance worker in
San Joaquin County from December 2017 to April 2018. He alleges ASO
undercompensated him and other class members for hours worked and
wrongfully withheld timely pay and accurate, written wage
statements.

The Plaintiff filed the lawsuit in California state court on April
3, 2019, against Akima, LLC, ASO and 50 unnamed doe defendants. The
Defendants timely removed this case to this District in May 2019 as
the events took place on a federal enclave, namely the Tracy
Defense Distribution Depot. The Plaintiff amended his complaint in
July 2019.

The operative complaint makes five claims on behalf of the class:
(1) failure to compensate for all hours worked, (2) failure to
provide accurate written wage statements, (3) failure to pay
waiting time penalties, (4) unfair competition and (5) civil
penalties under California Labor Code section 2699. The parties
conducted some discovery before and after filing the amended
complaint.

The parties eventually reached an agreement to settle on behalf of
all "hourly, non-exempt employees of [ASO] who performed work for
Defendant at the Tracy Defense Distribution Depot located in Tracy,
California, any time between April 3, 2015 and March 1, 2020."

As of March 1, 2020, the class includes 54 individuals. ASO agrees
to pay $74,500 to settle the action. Of that sum, the parties agree
that one third, $24,833 may cover attorneys' fees, $5,000 may be
allocated to litigation costs of class counsel, and $5,000 will be
paid to the named Plaintiff. The parties estimate $7,500 will be
paid to administer the settlement. The settlement will also be
reduced by a $5,000 civil penalty, 75% of which, $3,750, will go to
the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and
25%, $1,250, will go to the settlement class as required by the
California Labor Code.

The Defendant's share of state and federal payroll taxes will be
calculated by the claims administrator and paid separately by it in
addition to the settlement amount. These deductions would result in
a net settlement amount of approximately $27,167, slightly more
than one-third of the gross. The settlement payments to each class
member will be based on the number of paychecks issued to that
member divided by the total number of paychecks issued to all
settlement class members multiplied by the net settlement amount.

The parties propose that within seven days of an order granting
preliminary approval, the Defendant will provide the claims
administrator, in an appropriate format, the names, last-known
mailing addresses, social security numbers, and number of paychecks
issued to each settlement class member. Within 14 days of receiving
the Defendant's information, the notice of the class action
settlement and hearing date will be sent to the class members. The
notice will be written in English and sent by first class mail.

The Notice will provide that class members may opt-out by signing
and delivering a request "clearly stating their intention to be
excluded from the settlement" within the notice period. The parties
propose that the Notice clarify that any unclaimed funds escheat to
the State of California. The parties have not provided the Notice
itself as an attachment; rather the parties attached the letter
sent to the LWDA.

The Plaintiff moves for class certification for settlement purposes
only and moves for preliminary approval of the class and collective
claims and of the settlement agreement under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is unopposed and the court
submitted it without oral argument.

Discussion

Judge Mueller notes that the parties have stipulated to provisional
class certification. Because the Plaintiffs' claims here are likely
to satisfy the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the Court turns to
Rule 23(b). The Plaintiffs request certification under Rule
23(b)(3). A Rule 23(b)(3) class may be certified only if (1) the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and (2) a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Here, the Named Plaintiff alleges he and the putative class members
were all hourly workers and either grounds maintenance workers or
similarly situated employees for the same company. The Plaintiff
worked during the same general time period as other class members;
the class includes people who were employed from April 2015 to
March 2020, while the Plaintiff worked from December 2017 to April
2018.

At this stage, the case appears to involve none of the
individualized factual disputes that have derailed other motions to
certify wage and hour classes, Judge Mueller observes. In the case,
the Plaintiff's injuries arise from not being compensated during a
security check required to enter the employer's facility.

Next, the Court turns to superiority and finds a class action will
be superior to other methods of dispute resolution. Specifically,
the dollar amounts at issue--$505 at most if the settlement were to
be split evenly among the 54 class members--are likely smaller than
the costs of individual litigation.

In sum, in light of these considerations, the proposed class is
likely to be certified at this preliminary stage, Judge Mueller
holds.

Likely certification is only the first step to preliminary approval
under Rule 23, Judge Mueller notes. The second is the agreement's
likely compliance with Rule 23(e)(2), which requires the court to
decide whether the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate"
after considering whether: the class representatives and class
counsel have adequately represented the class, and the proposal was
negotiated at arm's length, among other factors.

Applying these factors suggests the proposed settlement's terms are
within the range of possible approval, Judge Mueller observes. She
adds that counsel is experienced in wage and hour class actions.
The proposed agreement treats class members similarly, with the
exception of the proposed service award, and ensures that each
member receives at least a small award. Counsel believes the
settlement is fair. Any uncashed settlement checks will escheat to
the State of California, and the arrangement does not contain a
"clear sailing" provision.

Other factors, however, raise concerns, Judge Mueller finds. The
Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a declaration with claim-by-claim
estimates of the Defendant's exposure. According to his estimate, a
full recovery for the Plaintiff class would be $333,829.47. Here,
the total settlement agreement is $74,500, or only 22% of that
amount. Counsel identified a number of risks in further litigating
the action that justifies the reduction of this damages amount. And
finally, the settlement will render potentially costly, risky, and
time-consuming litigation unnecessary.

Judge Mueller notes that risks such as these may justify a
significant discount. Here, the Court will require a more searching
analysis of these risks before granting final certification.

The attorney's declaration states that the parties engaged in
"extensive negotiations at arms' length and exchanged data,
documents, and information." Counsel conducted fact investigation,
reviewed informal disclosures between the parties, and deposed the
Plaintiff. However, the parties do not appear to have attended any
formal mediation sessions, and they do not describe the extent of
their negotiations, Judge Mueller observes. For final approval, the
Court will require more information regarding the types of
discovery completed and how the negotiations came to occur.

Under the scrutiny the Court engages in the case, the parties'
proposals raise red flags, Judge Mueller states. First, counsel
requests one-third of the gross settlement award. The benchmark for
attorney's fees in the Ninth Circuit is 25%. Courts in this
district have approved fees at 33% of the settlement fund for
matters involving state law claims. But departures from that
benchmark are possible only if properly supported and justified.

Judge Mueller notes that counsel's primary support for the size of
the fee is a list of prior wage and hour classes in which other
courts approved these attorneys' fees. Counsel provides no detail
on the hours attorneys or paralegals spent on the case nor an
hour-by-hour or task-by-task breakdown. Judge Mueller says it
appears the Plaintiff's counsel is aware of this deficiency, as the
motion for preliminary approval states counsel will file a
"separate and more detailed motion for an award of attorneys' fees
and costs before the deadline for the class members to make
objections."

Without more information, the Court cannot at this point signal
that the proposed fee is reasonable nor that counsel's hours and
rates could serve as a useful cross-check for the 33% fee award.
The Court will require greater support before final approval can be
granted.

The proposed incentive awards are also cause for concern, Judge
Mueller points out. The settlement provides the named Plaintiff
$5,000 as an incentive award, which is 10 times an average
settlement award and comprises close to 6.7% of the $74,500 gross
settlement, a significant amount.

In support of the incentive award, counsel represents that the
named Plaintiff worked with class counsel, provided "factual
information and documentation" necessary to the action, submitted a
deposition, responded to written discovery, and faced a risk of
having to pay the Defendant's legal fees. This is helpful, but not
enough for the Court to say it will bless the incentive award at
the time of final approval, Judge Mueller holds. The Court will
require greater support at that time to be persuaded.

The Court recognizes that any of the above fees, costs and
incentive payments not approved will be returned to the State of
California. This proviso, along with the absence of any other
indication counsel or the named Plaintiff has shirked their
responsibilities to the absent class members, mitigates the
negative implications of the fee and incentive award proposals.
Still, the Court defers a decision on the proposed fee and
incentive awards.

The Court is mindful of the strong judicial policy favoring
settlement of class actions. For that reason, the Court concludes
at this point the substance of the agreement is likely to be
approved under Rule 23(e)(2) if the concerns expressed in this
Order can be resolved at the final approval stage.

At a minimum, the Court will require a more searching analysis of
(1) the risks of further litigation, (2) support and justification
for attorneys' fees greater than the 25% benchmark, including
sufficient information to perform a lodestar cross-check, and (3)
greater support for the requested incentive award to the named
class member in final approval. To be clear, the Court does not
need the parties to address these issues until they seek final
approval.

For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), "the court must direct
to class members the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort."

As noted, the parties appear to have reached consensus on a form of
notice of the proposed settlement to class members. However, the
parties appear to have attached only the LWDA letter as the notice.
Judge Mueller holds that this is insufficient given the
requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B). In order to conclude the proposed
notice satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b), the Court needs to view the notice itself.

The Court will allow class counsel to supplement the record on the
pending motion with a copy of the notice and up to five pages of
briefing explaining why the notice satisfies the applicable law.

Conclusion

The motion for preliminary approval is tentatively granted, subject
to the parties' filing within 14 days an acceptable form of notice
to class members as discussed.

The Court dismisses the Doe Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycs9ft6y from Leagle.com.


ALABAMA: Faces Hurst Habeas Corpus Suit in M.D. Alabama
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against State of Alabama, et
al. The case is captioned as Hurst v. State of Alabama, et al. Case
No. 2:21-cv-00537-ECM-JTA (M.D. Ala., Aug. 11, 2021).

The lawsuit is a habeas corpus proceeding involving Plaintiffs'
prison condition.

The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Emily C. Marks.

The Defendants include Limestone Correctional Facility, State of
Alabama, and Alabama Department of Corrections.[BN]

Plaintiff Adam James Hurst, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, appears pro se.

ALEXANDRIA CARE: California Appeals Court Flips Judgment in Zuniga
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ROSALINDA ZUNIGA, Plaintiff and Appellant
v. ALEXANDRIA CARE CENTER, LLC, et al., Defendants and Respondents,
Case No. B297023 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California,
Second District, Division Seven, reverses the trial court's
judgment in favor of Alexandria Care.

Ms. Zuniga appeals the judgment in favor of Alexandria Care Center,
LLC, Skilled Healthcare, LLC and Skilled Healthcare Group, Inc.
(collectively Alexandria Care) entered after a five-day bench trial
of her representative claim for penalties under the Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, Section
2698, et seq.). She contends that the trial court erred in
excluding the testimony of her two proposed expert witnesses, Dean
Van Dyke and Richard Drogin, Ph.D., and the spreadsheets prepared
by Van Dyke's company, iBridge LLC, which provided the basis for
Dr. Drogin's opinions establishing Alexandria Care's Labor Code
violations.

Background

Ms. Zuniga, employed by Alexandria Care as a housekeeper from 2006
through 2012, filed a complaint on Dec. 6, 2013, asserting claims
on behalf of herself and a putative class of current and former
nonexempt employees of Alexandria Care for violations of various
provisions of the Labor Code and the governing Industrial Welfare
Commission wage order, including failure to provide required meal
periods, failure to provide required rest periods, failure to
indemnify employees for necessary expenditures incurred in the
discharge of their duties and failure to maintain required records.
She also asserted a cause of action for unfair and unlawful
business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code
section 17200 on behalf of herself and the putative class and a
representative action for civil penalties under PAGA.

The PAGA claim identified six categories of violations: failure to
compensate employees for missed meal periods; failure to properly
compensate for overtime; failure to pay the minimum wage; failure
to maintain records for employees; failure to provide employees
with accurate itemized wage statements; and failure to pay all
wages due. Prior to filing her lawsuit, Zuniga gave notice to
Alexandria Care and the Labor Workforce Development Agency (LWDA)
of the alleged Labor Code and wage order violations at issue. The
LWDA advised Zuniga it did not intend to investigate the
allegations.

The trial court granted Alexandria Care's motion to compel
arbitration of Zuniga's individual claims on May 20, 2014. The PAGA
claim was stayed. On Feb. 1, 2016, the parties settled Zuniga's
individual claims. The PAGA claim was not part of the settlement.
The court lifted its stay and ultimately scheduled a bench trial on
the PAGA claim for Nov. 26, 2018.

Ms. Zuniga intended to prove her PAGA claim through her own
testimony; the testimony of Alexandria Care's corporate
person-most-knowledgeable designee, Sherry Ann Alvarez, and its
former administrator, Holly Ianieri; the expert opinion testimony
of Dr. Drogin, who performed statistical analyses of Alexandria
Care's timekeeping and payroll records; and the testimony of Van
Dyke regarding the conversion of Alexandria Care's records,
produced in discovery in portable document format (PDF) and
admitted into evidence as exhibits 2, 3 and 4, into
computer-readable spreadsheets (Excel) by iBridge, which were
marked as trial exhibits 5, 6 and 7.

At the final status conference on Oct. 29, 2018, the trial court
ordered Zuniga to serve her expert witness reports no later than
Nov. 9, 2018, and to produce her experts for deposition no later
than Nov. 16, 2018. Various problems arose in scheduling Van Dyke's
deposition, including a delay caused by Zuniga's failure to timely
produce all the converted spreadsheets created by iBridge upon
which Dr. Drogin relied for his opinions. Van Dyke ultimately sat
for a videotaped deposition on Nov. 29, 2018, several days after
trial began. Because of a long-planned European vacation, Van Dyke
was not available to testify in person when trial resumed the
following week.

Dr. Drogin, a professor emeritus of statistics at California State
University, Hayward, analyzed the timekeeping and payroll data
contained in the iBridge spreadsheets as it related to Zuniga's
claims that Alexandria Care failed to compensate employees for
missed meal breaks and that Alexandria Care's rounding policy
resulted in underpayment of wages earned. Dr. Drogin was deposed on
Nov. 20, 2018, and initially testified in court on Nov. 27, 2018,
the second day of trial. Alexandria Care did not challenge Dr.
Drogin's qualifications as an expert witness.

Dr. Drogin testified his consulting firm had recommended using
iBridge in a number of cases in which information had been obtained
in paper-copy format and needed to be entered into a computer to
produce computer-readable documents, such as Excel. On
cross-examination Dr. Drogin acknowledged he needed the iBridge
data compilation to conduct his analysis and confirmed he had not
spoken to anyone at iBridge, including Van Dyke, with respect to
the data provided to him for Zuniga's case.

On Dec. 4, 2018, after hearing argument of counsel, the court ruled
that Van Dyke was not qualified as an expert to testify about
computer data processing: "He doesn't have the education or the
background. He doesn't have the experience or the training in data
processing in the conversion of information from raw data to
spreadsheets." The court excluded Van Dyke's testimony.

The court additionally ruled Van Dyke had not provided the
necessary foundation for the iBridge spreadsheets and excluded
exhibits 5, 6 and 7.

At this point Zuniga sought to recall Dr. Drogin to testify
concerning Dr. Drogin's independent verification of the accuracy of
the iBridge data conversion spreadsheets, based on an analysis done
on Nov. 30, 2018, following Dr. Drogin's initial trial testimony
and Alexandria Care's challenge to the foundation for exhibits 5, 6
and 7. The court permitted the testimony subject to Alexandria
Care's objection and motion to strike.

After Dr. Drogin completed his additional testimony, the court
granted Alexandria Care's motion to strike on the ground the
opinions had not been disclosed during his deposition and the
analysis was undertaken after his deposition and his trial
testimony. Under the circumstances, the court stated, "it would be
unjust, in violation of the rules of evidence and the rules of
procedure to allow the testimony to stand."

Following the court's evidentiary rulings, Zuniga rested her case.
Indicating it intended to file a motion for judgment pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8, Alexandria Care also rested.
Alexandria Care filed its motion, and the court set a further
briefing and hearing schedule.

After further argument on Jan. 30, 2019, the court granted
Alexandria Care's motion for judgment. The court memorialized its
reasoning in a statement of decision filed March 18, 2019.

The statement of decision summarized the court's rulings regarding
Zuniga's expert witnesses, explaining it had found Van Dyke was not
qualified as an expert to testify about computer data processing
and had not provided the necessary foundation for the spreadsheets
created by iBridge. In a footnote the court stated Zuniga's failure
to adhere to the required procedures to have Van Dyke testify
through his deposition rather than at trial constituted an
additional ground for excluding the testimony and the
spreadsheets.

In light of the exclusion of Zuniga's experts and the iBridge
spreadsheets, Zuniga's evidence of Labor Code violations consisted
of her own testimony, the two fact witnesses she called during her
case-in-chief and Alexandria Care's records. Based on that evidence
and its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the court
found that Zuniga had "failed to meet her burden to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) she was an aggrieved
employee and (2) she or any other employees suffered any of the
below Labor Code violations."

The statement of decision briefly identified the elements of the
alleged Labor Code violations and found, as to her meal break and
rest break claims, Zuniga had not provided credible testimony
concerning any instances during the PAGA period in which she or
other employees were not provided or permitted to take compliant
breaks. As to her claims regarding unpaid time based on Alexandria
Care's rounding policy, the court ruled that using such a policy
was not unlawful and found the evidence confirmed Zuniga had been
compensated for all hours worked during the PAGA period.
Additionally, Zuniga had provided no admissible evidence that she
or other employees worked off the clock during the PAGA period or
that Alexandria Care maintained an unlawful preapproved overtime
policy that resulted in a failure to pay employees any wages they
had earned.

Ms. Zuniga's claims regarding failure to maintain required employee
records and to provide accurate itemized wage statements, the court
concluded, were derivative of her meal period, rest period and
unpaid overtime and minimum wage claims and, therefore, also lacked
merit. To the extent not derivative of her other claims, Zuniga had
presented no credible evidence of any violation. Finally, the court
found Zuniga had failed to establish that Alexandria Care did not
indemnify her or any other employees for any necessary expenditures
incurred in the discharge of their duties.

Judgment was entered on March 18, 2019. Zuniga filed a timely
notice of appeal.

Discussion

As the Supreme Court explained last year in Kim v. Reins
International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 (Kim), PAGA was
enacted to facilitate broader enforcement of provisions of the
Labor Code intended to protect the health, safety and compensation
of workers. Under PAGA an employee may seek civil penalties for
Labor Code violations committed against her and other aggrieved
employees by bringing, on behalf of the state, a representative
action against her employer.

In addition to ruling that Zuniga had failed to carry her burden of
proving she or other employees had suffered any Labor Code
violations, the trial court appeared to find, as an alternate
ground for granting judgment in favor of Alexandria Care, that
Zuniga lacked standing to assert a PAGA claim as an aggrieved
employee. Indeed, Alexandria Care in its respondent's brief argues
any error in excluding expert evidence was harmless because Zuniga
failed to establish her standing as an aggrieved employee under
PAGA "in the first place."

The Supreme Court's opinion in Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th 73, decided a
year after judgment was entered in the trial court, makes clear the
trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect understanding of
Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (c)'s standing requirement
and, in particular, whether the PAGA plaintiff need only allege she
had suffered an applicable Labor Code violation or must prove she
suffered actual injury as a result of the violation.

Presiding Justice Dennis M. Perluss notes that Zuniga's status was
identical to Kim's. She was employed by Alexandria Care and alleged
she had personally suffered at least one Labor Code violation on
which the PAGA claim was based. Her individual clams were settled
after arbitration had been ordered. Whether or not she had any
unredressed injuries following that settlement, she, like Kim, was
an "aggrieved employee" with standing to pursue penalties on the
state's behalf, the Judge holds.

Although the trial court refused to permit Zuniga to introduce Van
Dyke's deposition testimony at trial, it separately determined his
testimony failed to provide the necessary foundation for the
spreadsheets created by iBridge and used by Dr. Drogin for his
analysis of Zuniga's PAGA claim. The court's exclusion of the
iBridge spreadsheets did not constitute an abuse of discretion,
Judge Perluss holds.

The iBridge spreadsheets are writings within the meaning of
Evidence Code section 250. As such, for them to be admissible,
Zuniga needed to introduce evidence sufficient to sustain a finding
that they, in fact, accurately reflected the conversion into a
computer-readable form of the PDF timekeeping and payroll records
provided by Alexandria Care, Judge Perluss explains.

Although the trial court might well have exercised its discretion
differently, its decision to exclude the iBridge spreadsheets
because Zuniga failed to provide foundational testimony necessary
to authenticate them was far from arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd, Judge Perluss points out.

There can be no doubt Dr. Drogin's expert opinion analyzing
Alexandria Care's meal break practices and the impact of its
rounding policy would be admissible if it had been based on the PDF
timekeeping and payroll records produced by Alexandria Care in
discovery, Judge Perluss notes. Such expert testimony analyzing an
employer's records is commonplace in wage-and-hour and PAGA cases.

Evidence Code section 801, however, does not limit an expert to the
use of admissible evidence in forming an opinion. It expressly
provides the basis for the opinion must be reliable, "whether or
not admissible."

Accordingly, if the trial court rejected Dr. Drogin's testimony
simply because it was based on inadmissible evidence, without
further consideration of the reliability of the data used, the
court committed legal error, Judge Perluss holds.

Although the Appellate Court affirms the ruling excluding the
spreadsheets as within the trial court's discretion, there was
nothing speculative or conjectural about them, Judge Perluss
states. He explains that issues as to the accuracy of iBridge's
conversion work go to the weight of Dr. Drogin's testimony, not its
admissibility, and was the proper subject of cross-examination by
counsel for Alexandria Care.

In sum, Judge Perluss holds, the court's ruling excluding Dr.
Drogin's testimony because it was based on iBridge spreadsheets
exceeded the bounds of the court's discretion. He adds, among other
things, that the exclusion of Dr. Drogin's testimony prejudiced
Zuniga.

Disposition

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Ms. Zuniga is to recover her costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J. and FEUER, J., concurs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/8bh4zure from Leagle.com.

Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern -- MMatern@maternlawgroup.com
-- Dalia Khalili -- dkhalili@maternlawgroup.com -- and Andrew J.
Sokolowski -- asokolowski@maternlawgroup.com -- for the Plaintiff
and Appellant.

Littler Mendelson P.C., Curtis A. Graham -- cagraham@littler.com --
and James Payer -- jpayer@littler.com -- for Defendants and
Respondents Alexandria Care Center, Skilled Healthcare, LLC and
Skilled Healthcare Group, Inc.


ALLAKOS INC: Continues to Defend Kim Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Allakos Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to defend itself
against a putative securities class action complaint captioned Kim
v. Allakos et al., No. 20-cv-01720 (N.D. Cal.).

On March 10, 2020, a putative securities class action complaint
captioned Kim v. Allakos et al., No. 20-cv-01720 (N.D. Cal.) was
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California against the Company, its Chief Executive Officer, Dr.
Robert Alexander, and its former Chief Financial Officer, Mr. Leo
Redmond.

The complaint asserts claims for violations of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder and seeks damages based on alleged material
misrepresentations and omissions concerning its Phase 2 clinical
trials of lirentelimab.

The proposed class period is August 5, 2019, through December 17,
2019, inclusive. On August 28, 2020, the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint, adding as defendants Adam Tomasi, the Company's
President and Chief Operating Officer, and Henrik Rasmussen, the
Company's Chief Medical Officer.

Allakos said, "Given the early stage of this litigation matter, the
Company cannot reasonably estimate a potential future loss or a
range of potential future losses, if any, and has not recorded a
contingent liability accrual as of June 30, 2021."

Allakos Inc. is a clinical stage biotechnology company developing
lirentelimab (AK002), formerly known as antolimab, the company's
wholly-owned monoclonal antibody, for the treatment of various mast
cell and eosinophil related diseases. The company is based in
Redwood City, California.


ALLIANCEONE RECEIVABLES: Moore FDCPA Suit Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHAWN MOORE, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, v. ALLIANCEONE RECEIVABLES
MANAGEMENT, INC., Case No. 0:21-cv-60895-RAR (S.D. Fla.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying the following
class:

   "All persons (a) with a Florida address to which AllianceOne
   Receivables Management, Inc. sent, or caused to be sent, a
   written debt collection communication, (b) in connection with
   the collection of a consumer debt, (c) that RevSpring, Inc.
   printed and mailed, or had printed and mailed, (d) where
   AllianceOne Receivables Management, Inc. provided RevSpring,
   Inc. with information contained in the debt collection
   communication from February 1, 2021 through February 28,
   2021."

The Plaintiff additionally requests that this Court appoint him as
the representative for the proposed class, and appoint Greenwald
Davidson Radbil PLLC as counsel for the proposed class.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") at section
1692c(b) reads: Except as provided in section 1692b of this title,
without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the
debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent
jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a
post-judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not
communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with
any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer
reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the
attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

Against this backdrop, the Eleventh Circuit, in Hunstein v.
Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., considered a scenario
where a debt collector transmitted information about a consumer to
a third-party letter vendor, for purposes of having the letter
vendor print and mail a debt collection letter to the consumer on
the debt collector's behalf.

On February 11, 2021, RevSpring, on behalf of Defendant, printed
and mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff. The Letter, which
was addressed to Plaintiff, referenced an alleged debt, the account
number for the Alleged Debt, the creditor to whom the Alleged Debt
was owed, the creditor's reference number for the Alleged Debt, and
the balance of the Alleged Debt.

Allianceone provides financial services.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Aug. 25,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ymfkv8
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Counsel for the Plaintiff and the proposed class, are:

          Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          7601 N. Federal Hwy., Suite A-230
          Boca Raton, FL 33487
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          E-mail: aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com
                  mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Matthew Bavaro, Esq.
          LOAN LAWYERS
          3201 Griffin Road, Suite 100
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33312
          Telephone: (954) 523-4357
          E-mail: Matthew@Fight13.com

ALLSTATE INDEMNITY: Perry Allowed to File 2nd Amended Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ANDREA PERRY, individually and on behalf
of all other Ohio residents similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL., Defendants, Case No.
1:16CV01522 (N.D. Ohio), the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order:

   -- granting Plaintiff Andrea Perry's Motion for Leave to File
      Second Amended Class Complaint to Add New Party Plaintiff;
      and

   -- denying Defendant Allstate Indemnity Company's Motion for
      Judgment on the Pleadings.

In her Motion, Perry asks the Court to allow her to amend her
Complaint to add Ning Xu as a named Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's
Motion is in response to the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, which challenges Perry's status as a real party in
interest due to her Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Because Perry's
bankruptcy status has no bearing on the merits of the putative
class action, Perry seeks leave to amend to add another named
plaintiff and moot the Defendant's Motion.

Allstate opposes Perry's Motion, arguing Perry is not a real party
in interest because she had a Chapter 7 bankruptcy that converted
to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy that she never disclosed to Allstate,
this Court and the Court of Appeals until recently. Because an
action by a debtor must be prosecuted in the name of the trustee,
Allstate contends Perry lacks standing to prosecute the litigation
in her name. Moreover, her failure to disclose her bankruptcy to
the Court and this suit to the bankruptcy court requires denying
her Motion for Leave and militates in favor of Judgment on the
Pleadings due to judicial estoppel. Finally, Allstate argues that
Perry's Motion for Leave is untimely and amendment would be futile
as Xu's claims are time barred per the terms of the insurance
policy.

Standing

According to Allstate, Perry lacks standing to pursue her claims
and even to file a Motion for Leave to Amend because in a
bankruptcy the action must be maintained in the name of the
trustee. In 2017, Perry motioned to convert her Chapter 7
bankruptcy to a Chapter 13 and has amended her schedules to include
this action in her bankruptcy with the approval of her Chapter 13
Trustee.

While there seems to be little dispute that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
trustee is the real party in interest for prepetition claims, the
law in the Sixth Circuit regarding the real party in interest in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is far from settled. Allstate cites the Sixth
Circuit decision of Rugiero v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 580 F. App'x
376, 378 (6th Cir. 2014), wherein Patrick Rugiero filed for Chapter
13 bankruptcy and then filed a suit challenging a foreclosure. In
affirming summary judgment for defendants the Sixth Circuit, in an
unpublished opinion, held Rugiero lacked standing to bring the
foreclosure challenge as he had a pending Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

Senior District Judge Christopher A. Boyko says the overwhelming
authority militates in favor of finding that a debtor in a Chapter
13 bankruptcy standing is the real party in interest to prosecute
an action. Moreover, Perry had standing to bring the action when it
was initially filed as the case was filed in May 2016 and Perry did
not file for bankruptcy until August 2016. However, there are two
additional reasons to allow the Plaintiff to proceed with this
action at this stage and allow her Motion for Leave, Judge Boyko
holds.

First, the Sixth Circuit in Kolesar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 814 F.
App'x 988, 990 (6th Cir. 2020) held, "Standing is not a mere
pleading requirement but rather 'an indispensable part of the
plaintiff's case, and each element of standing must be supported
'with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive
stages of the litigation" in the same way as "any other matter on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof." Thus, this issue is
more appropriately determined on summary judgment.

Second, courts in this circuit have held "bankruptcy debtors
misfiling claims in their own names have been allowed to salvage
their cases by returning to the bankruptcy court to amend their
schedules, to allow the trustee to abandon the claims, or to have
the trustee ratify the lawsuit's filing."

The Court denies Allstate's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
because: 1) the weight of authority allows that Perry is a real
party in interest, 2) that it is premature to determine issues of
standing and real party in interest on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under these circumstances and 3) because the Court must
allow the trustee time to ratify or abandon the suit.

Judicial Estoppel

Allstate moves the Court to deny Perry leave to amend and grant
judgment for Allstate based on judicial estoppel for Perry's
failure to add this action as an asset in her bankruptcy.

Here, Judge Boyko notes, Perry represents in her Opposition that
her failure to originally list this action in her bankruptcy was
due to her mistaken impression that she did not need to do so. This
presents a factual issue improperly addressed on a motion brought
under F.R.C.P. 12(c).

Delay

Allstate also contends that leave to amend should be denied because
Perry delayed filing for leave. Her motion was filed after close of
discovery and after the court-appointed time to amend had passed.
Furthermore, Allstate contends the proposed Second Amended
Complaint seeks to expand the class to include those parties that
have already been paid under the insurance policies at issue. Thus,
it will unnecessarily delay proceedings requiring additional
discovery and motion practice.

However, Judge Boyko points out, delay, by itself, does not justify
denial of leave to amend, citing Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 800
(6th Cir.2002).

Judge Boyko holds that while some additional discovery may be
needed, it will be limited and will largely be information already
in Allstate's possession. Also, this case has not yet proceeded to
class certification and no trial date has been set. Thus, prejudice
is minimal and the Court finds it does not militate against
amendment.

Futility

Lastly, Allstate argues that allowing the amendment would be futile
because Xu's claim falls outside the contractual one-year
limitation period set in the relevant insurance policy.

Upon review of the parties' briefs and arguments, the Court finds
that the key considerations of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 weigh in favor of
allowing the Plaintiff to amend.

At the outset, the Court is guided by the well-settled principle
that federal courts have a strong preference for trials on the
merits, citing Clark v. Johnston, 413 F.App'x 804, 819 (6th Cir.
2011). In that vein, Allstate raises issues which are not
appropriately resolved upon an amendment motion.

The dispute over the suitability of the proposed new party
plaintiff and viability of the Plaintiffs' claims are more
appropriately addressed through summary judgment motion practice
and not at the pleading stage of the litigation, Judge Boyko
notes.

The Court is mindful that the amendment deadline has expired, but
the necessity and expense of additional motion briefing do not
constitute such prejudice that would warrant denying leave to
amend.

Therefore, for these reasons, the Court denies Allstate's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings and grants the Plaintiff Leave to
File her Second Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint was due on August 18. The parties are further instructed
to confer and submit to the Court a joint proposed schedule to
include class certification motion and hearing dates going
forward.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Aug. 12,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2zfvbb5k from
Leagle.com.


ALPHABET INC: Ct. Must Meet & Confer with Plaintiffs in Meyers Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HENK MEYERS, et al., v.
ALPHABET, INC., et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-01767-FMO-MAA (C.D. Cal.),
the Court entered an order regarding motions for class
certification:

   1. Joint Brief:

      The parties shall work cooperatively to create a single,
      fully integrated joint brief covering each party's
      position, in which each issue (or sub-issue) raised by a
      party is immediately followed by the opposing
      party's/parties' response.

   2. Meet and Confer:

      In order for a motion for class certification to be filed
      in a timely manner, the meet and confer must take place no
      later than 35 days before the deadline for class
      certification motions set forth in the Court's Case
      Management and Scheduling Order.

   3. Supplemental Memorandum:

      After the joint brief is filed, each party may file a
      supplemental memorandum of points and authorities no later
      than 14 days prior to the hearing date.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 26, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DpmimU at no extra charge.[CC]


AMAZON.COM INC: Summary Judgment Order in Heimbach Suit Vacated
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: AMAZON.COM, INC., Fulfillment Center Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and Wage and Hour Litigation. NEAL HEIMBACH;
KAREN SALASKY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMAZON.COM, INC.;
AMAZON.COM DEDC, LLC; INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-5942 (6th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacates the district court's order
granting summary judgment in the Defendants' favor.

Amazon warehouse workers filed the putative class action against
Amazon, and its affiliates, seeking compensation under the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA") for time spent undergoing
mandatory security screenings after their shifts. The district
court granted summary judgment in the Defendants' favor, holding
that this time was not compensable under that state statute.

The Plaintiffs appealed and the Sixth Circuit certified the
following two questions to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:

     (1) Is time spent on an employer's premises waiting to undergo
and undergoing mandatory security screening compensable as hours
worked within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, 43
Pa. Cons. Stat. Section 333.101 et seq.?

     (2) Does the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, as
described in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680
(1946) and Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220 (2014), apply
to bar claims brought under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, 43
Pa. Cons. Stat. Section 333.101 et seq.?

The state court answered that "time spent on an employer's premises
waiting to undergo and undergoing, mandatory security screening
constitutes 'hours worked' under the PMWA; and there exists no de
minimis exception to the PMWA."

The Sixth Circuit holds that the district court's decision is
inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision.
Accordingly, it vacates the district court's judgment and remands
for further proceedings in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/kre7hmfw from Leagle.com.


AMC ENTERTAINMENT: Class Cert. Bid in NY Securities Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motion for class
certification filed in the consolidated putative class action suit
before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, has been granted.

On January 12, 2018 and January 19, 2018, two putative federal
securities class actions, captioned Hawaii Structural Ironworkers
Pension Trust Fund v. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00299-AJN, and Nichols v. AMC Entertainment
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-00510-AJN, respectively,
were filed against the Company in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.

The Actions, which name certain of the Company's officers and
directors and, in the case of the Hawaii Action, the underwriters
of the Company's February 8, 2017 secondary public offering, as
defendants, assert claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to alleged material
misstatements and omissions in the registration statement for the
secondary public offering and in certain other public disclosures.
On May 30, 2018, the court consolidated the Actions.

On January 22, 2019, defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Class Action Complaint. On September 23, 2019, the court granted
the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part.

On March 2, 2020, plaintiffs moved to certify the purported class.


On March 30, 2021, the court granted the motion to certify the
class.

AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., through its subsidiaries,
involved in the theatrical exhibition business. The company owns,
operates, or has interests in theatres. The company was founded in
1920 and is headquartered in Leawood, Kansas. AMC Entertainment
Holdings, Inc. is a subsidiary of Dalian Wanda Group Co., Ltd.


AMYRIS INC: Discovery in California Securities Class Suit Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Amyris, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that discovery is ongoing in the securities
class action suit filed in the .S. District Court for the Northern
District of California.

On April 3, 2019, a securities class action complaint was filed
against Amyris and the company's CEO, John G. Melo, and former CFO,
Kathleen Valiasek, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages on behalf of a purported
class that would comprise all persons and entities that purchased
or otherwise acquired our securities between March 15, 2018 and
March 19, 2019.

The complaint, which was amended by the lead plaintiff on September
13, 2019, alleges securities law violations based on statements and
omissions made by the Company during such period.

On October 25, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
securities class action complaint, which was denied by the court on
October 5, 2020.

The Company filed its answer to the securities class action
complaint on October 26, 2020.

In early 2021, the parties attended court-ordered mediation, but as
the case did not settle, the parties commenced discovery.

Amyris, Inc. provides various alternatives to a range of
petroleum-sourced products worldwide. The company uses its
industrial bioscience technology to design microbes primarily
yeast, as well as to convert plant-sourced sugars into renewable
ingredients. The company is based in Emeryville, California.


ANAPTYSBIO INC: Continues to Defend Etokimab-Related Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
AnaptysBio, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend itself in a putative shareholder class action suit related
to its drug etokimab.

On March 25, 2020, a putative securities class action was filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California naming the Company and certain of its current or former
officers as defendants.

The complaint purports to assert claims under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, Exchange Act Rule
10b-5, and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, on behalf of persons
and entities who acquired our common stock between October 10, 2017
and November 7, 2019.

An amended complaint was filed on September 30, 2020 alleging that,
during the Class Period, the defendants made material
misrepresentations or omissions regarding our etokimab product
candidate that artificially inflated the company's stock price.

The plaintiff seeks, among other things, damages in an unspecified
amount, as well as costs and expenses.

The company believes that the plaintiff's allegations are without
merit and intend to vigorously defend against the claims.

On May 3, 2021, a shareholder derivative complaint was filed in the
same Court based on allegations substantially similar to those in
the class action, and purporting to assert claims on the Company's
behalf against current or former officers and directors for alleged
violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, breach
of fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, waste of corporate assets
and insider selling.

AnaptysBio said, "Because the Company is in the early stages of
these litigation matters, we are unable to estimate a reasonably
possible loss or range of loss, if any, that may result from these
matters."

AnaptysBio, Inc. is a clinical stage biotechnology company
developing first-in-class immunology therapeutic product candidates
to patients. The Company is based in San Diego, California.


ANTERO RESOURCES: Braxton Minerals Files Suit in N.D. West Virginia
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Antero Resources
Corporation. The case is styled as Braxton Minerals III, LLC,
Steven Crowe, Deborah Crowe, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Antero Resources Corporation, Case No.
1:21-cv-00119-IMK (N.D.W. Va., Aug. 25, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Antero Resources Corporation -- https://www.anteroresources.com/ --
is a company engaged in hydrocarbon exploration.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          George A. Barton, Esq.
          Stacy A. Burrows, Esq.
          BARTON AND BURROWS, LLC
          5201 Johnson Dr., Suite 110
          Mission, KS 66205
          Phone: (913) 563-6250
          Fax: (913) 563-6259
          Email: george@bartonburrows.com
                 stacy@bartonburrows.com

               - and -

          Jonathan R Marshall, Esq.
          Samuel A. Hrko, Esq.
          Victor S. Woods, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          209 Capitol Street
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Phone: (304) 345-6555
          Fax: (304) 342-1110
          Email: jmarshall@baileyglasser.com
                 shrko@baileyglasser.com
                 vwoods@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Larry Lee Javins, II, Esq.
          Taylor M. Norman, Esq.
          BAILEY, JAVINS & CARTER, LC
          P.O. Box 3712
          Charleston, WV 25337
          Phone: (304) 345-0346
          Fax: (304) 345-0375
          Email: ljavins@bjc4u.com
                 tnorman@bjc4u.com


ANTHEM COMPANIES: Nonresidents' Dismissal From Canaday Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAURA CANADAY, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. THE ANTHEM
COMPANIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 20-5947 (6th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms the
district court's order dismissing the nonresident Plaintiffs
without prejudice, leaving a collective action of Tennessee-based
nurses.

Anthem provides health insurance. To ensure that it pays only for
medically necessary procedures, it hires nurses to review insurance
claims. The company pays those nurses a salary but does not pay
them overtime. Canaday, an Anthem nurse who lives in Tennessee,
filed a proposed collective action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act in federal court in Tennessee, claiming that the company
misclassified her and others as exempt from the Act's overtime pay
provisions. A number of Anthem nurses in other States opted into
the collective action.

From its headquarters in Indiana, Anthem offers a host of
health-related insurance policies. To ensure that the insurance
company pays only covered claims, Anthem subsidiaries pay nurses to
conduct what have come to be called "utilization reviews." In
conducting these reviews, nurses assess the necessity of medical
procedures under each health plan. Anthem treats these nurses as
exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions.

Since 2017, Canaday has worked for Anthem as a review nurse in
Tennessee. Two years into her tenure, Canaday filed the proposed
collective action in federal court in Tennessee, alleging that the
company misclassified her and other review nurses as exempt from
the federal overtime rules. Dozens of nurses opted into the action
by filing written consent forms with the federal court. Some worked
for Anthem in Tennessee. Others worked for the company in other
States across the country.

Ms. Canaday moved to certify a collective action of all utilization
review nurses that Anthem classified as exempt from overtime.
Anthem moved to dismiss all out-of-state nurses for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the nonresident
Plaintiffs without prejudice, leaving a collective action of
Tennessee-based nurses.

Ms. Canaday sought to certify the order for interlocutory appeal.
The district court granted Canaday her request, and so did the
Sixth Circuit.

Discussion

Ms. Canaday takes on this conclusion in several ways. First, she
contends that the Plaintiffs do not have to show that their claims
arose out of Anthem's contacts with Tennessee because they filed
federal claims in federal court. All they must show, in her view,
is that their claims arose out of Anthem's contacts with the United
States as a whole, not Tennessee.

The Sixth Circuit opines that in one sense, Canaday is right, at
least potentially right. Congress could empower a federal court to
exercise personal jurisdiction to the full reach of the federal
government's sovereign authority, as opposed to the limits of
Tennessee's authorit. But this is not the choice that the FLSA
makes or that Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
makes. Many federal laws provide for nationwide service on
defendants and personal jurisdiction over them in any federal
district court in the country.

While the FLSA shows no reticence in setting nationwide labor
standards, it does not establish nationwide service of process.
That silence rings loudly when juxtaposed with the many other
instances in which Congress included nationwide service of process
provisions in laws enacted before and after the FLSA's passage in
1938.Because "Congress knows how to authorize nationwide service of
process when it wants to provide for it," the absence of express
language in the statute "argues forcefully that such authorization
was not its intention."

Second, Canaday claims that, even if the "named Plaintiff" --
namely she -- must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment, the
nonresident Plaintiffs need not. Under her view, a collective
action may proceed with all similarly situated plaintiffs
regardless of where the nonresident plaintiffs' injuries occurred,
so long as the named plaintiff complies with Civil Rule 4(k).

The Sixth Circuit disagrees. It finds that after Anthem appeared in
the case in response to Canaday's service of the complaint, it is
true, the nonresident Plaintiffs served their "written notices"
under Civil Rule 5(a)(l)(E) on Anthem to opt into the collective
action, and they had no additional service obligation under Civil
Rule 4(k). But that reality does not eliminate Civil Rule 4(k)'s
requirement that the defendant be amenable to the territorial reach
of that district court for that claim. The federal court's
authority to assert personal jurisdiction over the Defendant with
respect to the nonresident Plaintiffs' claims remains constrained
by Civil Rule 4(k)(1)(A)'s territorial limitations. Even with
amended complaints and opt-in notices, the district court remains
constrained by Civil Rule 4(k)'s -- and the host State's --
personal jurisdictional limitations.

Third, in a variation on that theme, Canaday presses the Sixth
Circuit to analyze personal jurisdiction at the level of the suit
rather than at the level of each claim. But the Supreme Court has
said otherwise. "What is needed" for a court to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction "is a connection between the forum and the
specific claims at issue." Supreme Court caselaw preceding
Bristol-Myers supports the claim-specific inquiry.

Fourth, Canaday laments the inefficiencies created by this
approach, noting that the Plaintiffs are challenging a single
policy and that this same policy applies in similar fashion to
employees across the country.

The Sixth Circuit opines that no doubt, Civil Rule 4(k) and an
absence of nationwide personal jurisdiction under the FLSA create
jetties, cross currents, and other obstacles to prompt relief for
the Plaintiffs. The short answer is that these limitations are
designed principally to protect the Defendants, not to facilitate
the Plaintiffs' claims. They are designed "to protect the
particular interests of the defendant" whose rights hang in the
balance, no matter the "efficiency" concerns that cut in the other
direction.

Even then, the Sixth Circuit finds that the employees may file a
nationwide collective action under the FLSA so long as they do so
in a forum that may exercise general jurisdiction over the employer
-- namely its principal place of business or its place of
incorporation. It is not obvious, at any rate, that state-based
collective actions are necessarily inefficient.

Congress apparently did not think so. It gave the federal and state
courts authority to hear FLSA claims, noting that collective
actions may be filed "in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction." In the face of that choice and in the face of
Congress' decision not to add a nationwide service of process
provision to the FLSA, it would be odd to attribute to the National
Legislature a desire to confine state court FLSA actions to the
conventional Fourteenth Amendment rules and sotto voce to permit
nationwide service for the same FLSA action in federal court.

Fifth, Canaday suggests that pendent personal jurisdiction offers
another way to establish jurisdiction over the nonresident
Plaintiffs' claims and Anthem. But the Sixth Circuit has never
recognized this exception to these due-process limitations. It sees
no good reason to do so now. No less importantly, no federal
statute or rule authorizes pendent claim or pendent party personal
jurisdiction. No such law exists -- not in 28 U.S.C. Section 1367,
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, not in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Sixth, Canaday claims that the same personal jurisdiction rules for
class actions apply to FLSA collective actions. All in all, the
representative nature of class actions may create an exception to
the general rules of personal jurisdiction recognized in
Bristol-Myers for "mass actions" and applicable to collective
actions under the FLSA. But that exception does not apply in the
case.

Seventh, Canaday worries that, by applying Bristol-Myers to the
FLSA collective action, the Sixth Circuit will create obstacles to
some types of multidistrict litigation. And those obstacles, she
urges, may be more imposing than they are for FLSA actions.

The Sixth Circuit opines that most FLSA actions involve one
defendant, allowing the Plaintiff to use general personal
jurisdiction to file a nationwide action in the State in which the
company is incorporated or does most of its business. Some
multidistrict litigation, however, involves several Defendants,
making it less likely that one State will have general jurisdiction
for all of them. That is a fair point. But the answer is that the
Sixth Circuit's decision today by no means resolves the application
of Bristol-Myers to multidistrict litigation. Multidistrict
litigation implicates a different statute, a different history.
Those material differences may lead to a distinct approach, just as
the differences between class actions and collective actions
required different approaches today.

For the foregoing reasons, the Sixth Circuit affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Opinion available at
https://tinyurl.com/yrhm63zm from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Adam W. Hansen -- adam@apollo-law.com -- APOLLO LAW LLC, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the Appellant.

Brett C. Bartlett -- bbartlett@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP,
in Atlanta, Georgia, for the Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Adam W. Hansen, Colin R. Reeves -- colin@apollo-law.com
-- APOLLO LAW LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Rachhana T. Srey --
srey@nka.com -- Caroline E. Bressman, NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, William B. Ryan, DONATI LAW FIRM, PLLC, in
Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellant.

Brett C. Bartlett, Kevin M. Young, Lennon B. Haas, SEYFARTH SHAW
LLP, in Atlanta, Georgia, James M. Harris, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, in
Los Angeles, California, for the Appellee.

Scott L. Nelson -- litigation@citizen.org -- PUBLIC CITIZEN
LITIGATION GROUP, in Washington, D.C., Nicole A. Saharsky, MAYER
BROWN LLP, in Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.


APPLE AMERICAN: Seeks OK of Joint Motion to Withdraw Class Cert Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BARTLEY M. MULLEN, JR.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
APPLE AMERICAN GROUP LLC; APPLE PENNSYLVANIA LLC, Case No.
2:19-cv-00996-MJH (W.D. Pa.), the Parties' ask the Court to enter
an order granting their joint motion to withdraw Plaintiff's motion
for class certification without prejudice:

The Plaintiff filed his Motion for Class Certification on October
13, 2020. The Motion was fully briefed by the parties by January 5,
2021, and the Court held a hearing on the Motion on March 2, 2021.

On May 11, 2021, the Court extended class certification discovery
regarding the topic of commonality through August 9, 2021 and
issued a supplemental class certification briefing schedule at that
time.

The parties have been working on discovery; however, they have not
yet been able to complete depositions and document production.

Additionally, the parties have agreed to mediate this matter, and
have begun the process of scheduling the mediation. The parties
have also embarked upon settlement negotiations.

A copy of the Parties motion to certify class dated Aug. 27, 2021
is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gCE0th at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Bruce Carlson, Esq.
          Kelly K. Iverson, Esq.
          Nicholas A. Colella, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
          E-mail: bcarlson@carlsonlynch.com
                  kiverson@carlsonlynch.com
                  ncolella@carlsonlynch.com

ARIZONA: Plaintiffs Seek to Withdraw Class Status Bid
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as D.H., by and through his
mother, Janice Hennessy-Waller; and John Doe, by his guardian and
next friend, Susan Doe, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, v. Jami Snyder, Director of the Arizona Health
Care Cost Containment System, in her official capacity, Case No.
4:20-cv-00335-SHR (D. Ariz.), the Plaintiffs D.H and John Doe ask
the Court to enter an order withdrawing the motion for class
certification they filed on January 11, 2021.

The Plaintiffs are young men who are unable to obtain the male
chest reconstruction necessary for treating their gender dysphoria
because of a coverage exclusion enforced by Defendant Jami Snyder,
Director of the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System
("AHCCCS").

The coverage exclusion, codified at Ariz. Admin. Code
R9-22-205-B(4)(a) (the "Challenged Exclusion"), expressly prohibits
Medicaid coverage for "gender reassignment surgeries." It thus
prevents Plaintiffs and all transgender Medicaid beneficiaries in
Arizona from having an equal opportunity to demonstrate that their
transition-related surgical care is medically necessary and thus
entitled to coverage by AHCCCS.

On August 6, 2019, the Plaintiffs initiated this litigation,
asserting that the Challenged Exclusion facially violates the
Medicaid Act, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs assert that the
Challenged Exclusion facially violates the Medicaid Act, and the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

The Plaintiffs' complaint asserts claims on behalf of themselves
and:

   "[a]ll transgender individuals under age 21 who are or will
   be enrolled in AHCCCS, have or will have a diagnosis of
   gender dysphoria, and are seeking or will seek coverage for
   male chest reconstruction surgery following a determination
   by their respective health care providers that the procedure
   is necessary to treat their gender dysphoria."

The Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System is the state agency
that administers Arizona's Medicaid program. Medicaid was created
to provide healthcare to individuals who qualify by financial
need.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Aug. 25, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BlXSsF at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brent P. Ray, Esq.
          Andrew J. Chinsky, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          110 N. Wacker Street, Suite 3800
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: +1 (312) 995 6333
          Facsimile: +1 (312) 995 6330
          Email: bray@kslaw.com
                  achinsky@kslaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel C. Barr, Esq.
          Janet M. Howe, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          2901 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2000
          Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788
          Telephone: +1 (602) 351 8085
          Facsimile: +1 (602) 648 7085
          E-mail: dbarr@perkinscoie.com
                  jhowe@perkinscoie.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Chinsky, Esq.
          Asaf Orr, Esq.
          NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS
          870 Market Street, Suite 370
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: +1 (415) 392 6257
          Facsimile: +1 (415) 392 8442
          E-mail: aorr@nclrights.org

               - and -

          Abigail K. Coursolle, Esq.
          Catherine McKee, Esq.
          NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM
          3701 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 750
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: +1 310 204 6010
          E-mail: coursolle@healthlaw.org
                  mckee@healthlaw.org

The Defendant is represented by:

          Logan T. Johnston, Esq.
          JOHNSTON LAW OFFICES, P.L.C.
          14040 N. Cave Creek Rd., Suite 309
          7 Phoenix, Arizona 85022
          E-mail: ltjohnston@live.com

               - and -

          David Barton, Esq.
          C. Christine Burns, Esq.
          BURNSBARTON PLC
          2201 E. Camelback Road, Suite 360
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          E-mail: david@burnsbarton.com
                  christine@burnsbarton.com

ARIZONA: Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Transgenders
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as D.T., a minor, by and
through his parent and next friend Lizette Trujillo; et al., v. ,
v. Dr. Cara M. Christ, in her official capacity as State Registrar
of Vital Records and Director of the Arizona Department of Health
Services, et al., Case No. 4:20-cv-00484-JAS (D. Ariz.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the Proposed Class under Rule 23(b)(2) for
      declaratory and injunctive relief:

      "All transgender individuals born in Arizona, now and in
      the future, who seek to change the sex listed on their
      birth certificates but have not undergone a "sex change
      operation" as treatment for their gender dysphoria;"

   2. designating them as class representatives; and

   3. designating their undersigned attorneys at Cooley LLP,
      Osborn Maledon, P.A., and the National Center for Lesbian
      Rights as class counsel.

The Plaintiffs contend that they meet Rule 23's requirements for
certification of a class.

The Plaintiffs are transgender young people who were born in
Arizona. The Plaintiffs meet the diagnostic criteria for gender
dysphoria. Due to their age, there is no medically appropriate
surgical treatment for Plaintiffs' gender dysphoria. And, because
of advances in the treatment of gender dysphoria, the Plaintiffs
may never need surgery to alleviate their gender dysphoria, the
suit says.

Denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the sex listed on their
birth certificates through the private administrative process
created by Subsection (A)(3) -- which requires proof that the
applicant received a "sex change operation" -- causes them
substantial present and future harm.

Living with inaccurate birth certificates means the Plaintiffs
either risk disclosing private medical information and intensely
personal aspects of their identities to participate in activities
-- from in-person schooling to recreational sports -- or forgo
participation altogether. That forced disclosure negatively affects
their overall health, development, and well-being and limits their
interest and ability to engage in those everyday activities, the
suit adds.

The Plaintiffs include Jane Doe, a minor, by and through her parent
and next friend Susan Doe; Helen Roe, a minor, by and through her
parent and next friend Megan Roe; James Poe, a minor by and though
his parent and next friend Laura Poe; and Carl Voe, a minor by and
though his parent and next friend Rachel, Voe.

The Defendants include Thomas Salow, in his official capacity as
Branch Chief of the Division of Public Health Licensing Services at
the Arizona Department of Health Services; and Krystal Colburn, in
her official capacity as Bureau Chief and Assistant State Registrar
of the Bureau of Vital Records at the Arizona Department of Health
Services.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated August 25,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Dp1o74
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and Proposed Class, are:

          Patrick Gunn, Esq.
          Barrett J. Anderson, Esq.
          COOLEY LLP
          101 California Street, 5th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111-5800
          Telephone: (415) 693-2070
          Facsimile: (415) 693-2222
          E-mail: pgunn@cooley.com
                  banderson@cooley.com

               - and -

          Mary O'Grady, Esq.
          Colin Proksel, Esq.
          Payslie Bowman, Esq.
          OSBORN MALEDON, P.A.
          2929 North Central Avenue, 21st Floor
          Phoenix, AZ 85012-2793
          Telephone: (602) 640-9000
          Facsimile: (602) 640-9050
          E-mail: mogrady@omlaw.com
                  cproksel@omlaw.com
                  pbowman@omlaw.com

               - and -

          Asaf Orr, Esq.
          NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS
          870 Market Street, Suite 370
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (415) 392-6257
          Facsimile: (415) 392-8442
          E-mail: aorr@nclrights.org

ASPEN AMERICAN: Berkseth-Rojas Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Christie Jo Berkseth-Rojas filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled CHRISTIE JO BERKSETH-ROJAS
DDS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
v. ASPEN AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 3:20-cv-948, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 22, 2021, the Hon.
Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater entered an order granting Aspen's motion
to dismiss the class action with prejudice.

Plaintiff Christie Jo Berkseth-Rojas DDS ("Dr. Berkseth-Rojas")
brought this action against defendant Aspen American Insurance
Company to recover under an "all risk" commercial property
insurance policy for losses to her dental practice suffered due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. The Policy provided business interruption
coverage for certain losses to Dr. Berkseth-Rojas' dental practice
occurring during the period December 6, 2019 to December 6, 2020.
Dr. Berkseth-Rojas alleged that, due to COVID-19 and related
executive orders limiting non-essential services (the "Orders"),
she suffered direct physical loss of or damage to her dental
practice "because COVID-19 made the property unusable in the way
that it had been used before COVID-19." She maintained that the
Policy provides coverage under four provisions: the Practice
Income, Extra Expense, Civil Authority, and Sue and Labor
provisions.

In his ruling dismissing the class action, Judge Fitzwater held
that Dr. Berkseth-Rojas has failed to plead a plausible claim for
breach of the Sue and Labor provision. The court held that as Aspen
pointed out, this provision is best characterized as an obligation
on Dr. Berkseth-Rojas, not on Aspen. The heading of the section in
which the Sue and Labor provision appears is entitled "Duties in
the Event of Damage," and it imposes other obligations on Dr.
Berkseth-Rojas, such as to "[n]otify the police if a law may have
been broken" and "[c]ooperate with us in the investigation or
settlement of the claim." As one court has noted, this type of
provision is "plainly not a coverage provision." Judge Fitzwater,
therefore, granted Aspen's motion to dismiss to the extent it
sought dismissal of Dr. Berkseth-Rojas' breach of contract claims.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Berkseth-Rojas v. Aspen American
Insurance Company, Case No. 21-10801, in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, filed on August 13, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Christie Jo Berkseth-Rojas, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          W. Mark Lanier, Esq.
          LANIER LAW FIRM
          10940 W. Sam Houston Parkway, N.
          Houston, TX 77064
          Telephone: (713) 659-5200
          E-mail: wml@lanierlawfirm.com  

Defendant-Appellee Aspen American Insurance Company is represented
by:

          Yvette Ostolaza, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN, L.L.P.
          2021 McKinney Avenue
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 981-3401
          E-mail: yvette.ostolaza@sidley.com

ASSURANCE IQ: Javier Appeals Wiretapping Class Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Florentino Javier filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled FLORENTINO JAVIER, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. ASSURANCE IQ, LLC and
ACTIVEPROSPECT INC., Case No. 4:20-cv-02860-JSW, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on May 19, 2020, the
lawsuit is brought against the Defendants for wiretapping the
electronic communications of visitors to Assurance IQ's Web sites,
in violation of the California Invasion of Privacy and the
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act.

The wiretaps, which are embedded in the computer code on the Web
sites -- http://Assurance.com/and http://Nationalfamily.com/--
are used by the Defendants to secretly observe and record Web site
visitors' keystrokes, mouse clicks, and other electronic
communications, including the entry of Personally Identifiable
Information and Protected Health Information, in real time, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that he visited Nationalfamily.com in
January 2019. During this visit, the Defendants recorded his
electronic communications in real time, used the intercepted data
to attempt to learn his identity, zip code, date of birth, height,
weight, use of prescription medications and tobacco products, and
other PII and PHI.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Order and Judgment
dated August 06, 2021, granting Defendants' motion to dismiss
second amended complaint.

The appellate case is captioned as Florentino Javier v. Assurance
IQ, LLC, et al., Case No. 21-16351, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on August 18, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Florentino Javier Mediation Questionnaire was due
on August 25, 2021;

   -- Appellant Florentino Javier opening brief is due on October
18, 2021;

   -- Appellees ActiveProspect Inc. and Assurance IQ, LLC answering
brief is due on November 15, 2021; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant FLORENTINO JAVIER, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joel D. Smith, Esq.
          Lawrence Timothy Fisher, Esq.  
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 N. California Boulevard, Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          E-mail: jsmith@bursor.com
             
Defendants-Appellees ASSURANCE IQ, LLC and ACTIVEPROSPECT INC. are
represented by:

          Kelly M. Klaus, Esq.
          Jonathan H. Blavin, Esq.
          Rosemarie T. Ring, Esq.
          MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON, LLP
          560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 512-4017
          E-mail: kelly.klaus@mto.com
                  jonathan.blavin@mto.com
                  rose.ring@mto.com

               - and -

          Nefi D. Acosta, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON, LLP
          350 S Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 683-9564
          E-mail: nefi.acosta@mto.com

ATERIAN INC: Bid to Consolidate Tate and Coon Suits Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
Aterian, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motion to
consolidate the securities class action suits initiated by Andrew
Tate and Jeff Coon, respectively, is pending.

On May 13, 2021, a securities class action complaint was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by
Andrew Tate naming the company, Yaniv Sarig, and Fabrice Hamaide as
defendants.

On June 10, 2021, a substantially similar securities class action
complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York by Jeff Coon against the same defendants.

Both complaints assert violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, claiming
that the defendants made false and materially misleading statements
and failed to disclose material adverse facts regarding the
company's business, operations and prospects, specifically
regarding (1) the company's acquisitions of certain e-commerce
business brands from 9830 Macarthur LLC, ZN Direct LLC, and
Reliance Equities Group, LLC (as announced on December 1, 2020) and
from Healing Solutions, LLC (as announced on February 2, 2021); (2)
the company's organic growth; (3) the company's AIMEE software; and
(4) the company's marketing practices.

Several stockholders and their respective counsel have sought
consolidation of the two actions and appointment as lead plaintiff
and class counsel, respectively.

The Court has yet to act on those motions.

Aterian said, "We intend to vigorously defend against these
actions. However, the outcome of this legal proceeding is uncertain
at this point. Based on information available to us at present, we
cannot reasonably estimate a range of loss for this action.
Accordingly, we have not accrued any liability associated with this
action."

Aterian, Inc. is a technology-enabled consumer products platform
that builds, acquires and partners with e-commerce brands. Aterian
was founded on the premise that if a company selling consumer
packaged goods was founded today, it would apply AI and machine
learning, the synthesis of massive quantities of data and the use
of social proof to validate high caliber product offerings as
opposed to over-reliance on brand value and other traditional
marketing tactics. The company is based in New York, New York.

ATI PHYSICAL: Burbige Slams Share Drop Over Staff Attrition
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Burbige and Ziyang Nie, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ATI Physical Therapy, Inc.
Labeed Diab, Joseph Jordan, Andrew A. Mcknight, Joshua A. Pack,
Marc Furstein, Leslee Cowen, Aaron F. Hood, Carmen A. Policy,
Rakefet Russak-Aminoach and Sunil Gulati, Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-04349, (N.D. Ill., August 16, 2021), seeks damages,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees,
expert fees and other costs and such other and further relief under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

ATI is an outpatient physical therapy company. It owns and operates
nearly 900 physical therapy clinics across 25 states. On June 17,
2021, ATI became public via a business combination with Fortress
Value Acquisition Corp. II.

On July 26, 2021, before the market opened, ATI reported its
financial results for second quarter 2021, the period in which the
Business Combination was completed. Among other things, ATI
reported that "the acceleration of attrition among its therapists
in the second quarter and continuing into the third quarter,
combined with the intensifying competition for clinicians in the
labor market, prevented it from being able to meet the demand and
increased labor costs." It eventually reduced its fiscal 2021
forecast due to the foregoing factors. On this news, its share
price fell $3.62, or 43%, to close at $4.72 per share on July 26,
2021, on unusually heavy trading volume. The share price continued
to decline the next trading session by as much as 19%.

Plaintiffs alleges that ATI failed to disclose it was experiencing
attrition among its physical therapists, that it faced increasing
competition for clinicians in the labor market thus faced
difficulties retaining therapists and incurred increased labor
costs resulting in opening fewer new clinics.

Burbige and Nie purchased ATI securities and suffered damages as a
result of ATI's share price decline.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
      J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
      POMERANTZ LLP
      600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 661-1100
      Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
      Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
             ahood@pomlaw.com

             - and -

      Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
      Louis C. Ludwig, Esq.
      POMERANTZ LLP
      10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
      Chicago, IL 60603
      Telephone: (312) 377-1181
      Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
      Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com
             lcludwig@pomlaw.com

             - and -

      Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
      Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
      Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
      GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
      1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
      Los Angeles, CA 90067
      Telephone: (310) 201-9150
      Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
      Email: rprongay@glancylaw.com
             clinehan@glancylaw.com
             prajesh@glancylaw.com


BERKSHIRE HILLS: Berkshire Bank Faces Suit by 93A Claimant
----------------------------------------------------------
Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that Berkshire Bank faces
a class action suit initiated by the original 93A claimant.

On September 11, 2020, the Company received notice of a demand
letter served on the Company and the Bank by a former mortgagee of
Berkshire Bank pursuant to the Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act, M.G.L Ch. 93A.

The demand letter alleges that a mortgage payoff statement tendered
by the Bank to the mortgagee included a mortgage discharge
preparation fee that is purportedly impermissible under
Massachusetts law.

The demand letter also claims that the Bank failed to provide a
copy of the recorded mortgage discharge to the mortgagee in a
timely manner.

The demand letter further purports to state claims on behalf of a
putative class of similarly situated Massachusetts mortgage
customers of the Bank, who allegedly may have suffered similar
violations of Massachusetts law.

The demand letter seeks monetary damages for the original mortgagee
claimant and the putative class, plus double or treble damages and
reasonable attorneys' fees, as may be allowed under Chapter 93A.

The Company and the Bank have retained outside litigation counsel
in this matter, and discussions have proceeded between the parties
to find a mutually acceptable resolution.

On July 28, 2021, a class action complaint was filed by the
original 93A claimant against the Bank in the Massachusetts
Superior Court for Suffolk County, pursuant to a pre-negotiated
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between the parties.

In accordance with the MOU, the parties will file a motion for
court approval of a mutually agreed upon settlement agreement,
under to which the Bank expects to pay damages of approximately
$510,000 in exchange for the dismissal with prejudice and release
of all claims that have been or could have been asserted in the
filed class action lawsuit on behalf of the plaintiff and all
putative settlement class members, plus certain costs for
administration of the class action settlement and legal fees
incurred by the named plaintiff up to the amount of $85,000.

Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc. operates as a bank holding company
for Berkshire Bank that provides various banking products and
services. It offers various deposit accounts, including demand
deposit, NOW, regular savings, money market savings, time
certificates of deposit, and retirement deposit accounts; and
loans, such as commercial real estate, commercial and industrial,
consumer, and residential mortgage loans. Berkshire Hills Bancorp,
Inc. was founded in 1846 and is headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts.


BLUE NILE: Johnson's Wiretapping Complaint Dismissed With Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUSAN JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. BLUE NILE, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-08183-LB (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Laura Beeler of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California, San Francisco Division, grants Defendants Blue
Nile's and FullStory's motion to dismiss.

Introduction

Blue Nile sells jewelry online and uses FullStory's software to see
what visitors to its website are doing. The Plaintiff -- on behalf
of a putative California class -- claims that this is an illegal
wiretap and a violation of her right to privacy under California
law. The Court previously dismissed the case primarily because the
Plaintiff did not plausibly plead wiretapping.

The previous dismissal order summarized the allegations about the
alleged wiretapping. The main allegations in the current complaint
have not changed. In short, Blue Nile uses FullStory's "session
replay" software to watch what its users are doing. The current
complaint adds allegations about how FullStory accesses and
analyzes data for its clients (such as indexing it for the client's
use and showing a user's purchase history).

The previous order found no specific jurisdiction over FullStory, a
Georgia-based company incorporated in Delaware. The current
complaint adds jurisdictional allegations: Blue Nile advertises its
products in California, and FullStory "wiretaps geolocation
information.

The case is related to Graham v. Noom, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-06903-LB
(N.D. Cal.), and raises similar issues. The Court held a hearing on
Aug. 12, 2021.

Analysis

Judge Beeler holds that the reasoning in Graham v. Noom controls in
the case: FullStory is not a third-party wiretapper because it is
not an outsider and instead is a software vendor that provides a
service that allows Blue Nile to analyze its own data. The
Plaintiff does not state a claim for wiretapping (or invasion of
privacy based on the wiretapping) for the reasons in the Court's
earlier order. The new allegations -- illuminating the
functionalities of the software -- do not change this conclusion.

The Judge further holds that the Plaintiff also lacks standing for
the claim under California's Invasion of Privacy Act: There is no
wiretapping, there thus is no injury that creates a private right
of action under the statute, and there is no injury in fact that
conveys Article III standing.

There is no personal jurisdiction over FullStory either, the Judge
adds. She says, it is a Georgia-based vendor incorporated in
Delaware that sold a product to Blue Nile. The basis for specific
personal jurisdiction remains wiretapping. If there were
wiretapping, then there would be personal jurisdiction. But there
is no wiretapping. The analysis for Blue Nile is slightly
different: It sells to customers. But the Plaintiff predicates
jurisdiction on wiretapping, there is no wiretapping, and thus
there is no tort establishing jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Judge Beeler dismisses the complaint with prejudice because the
Plaintiff did not cure the earlier complaint's deficiencies. Her
Order disposes of ECF No. 57.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/m4nfmv4w from Leagle.com.


BOSTON BEER COMPANY: Galvez Files Suit in S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Boston Beer
Company Inc. The case is styled as Tatiana Galvez, James Kelly, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. The
Boston Beer Company Inc., Case No. 3:21-cv-01508-L-BGS (S.D. Cal.,
Aug. 25, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Deceptive Trade
Practices.

The Boston Beer Company -- http://www.bostonbeer.com/-- is a
well-known brewery with a long history that lures locals & visitors
with tours, tastings & a gift shop.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael David Braun, Esq.
          KUZYK LAW
          1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (213) 401-4100
          Fax: (213) 401-0311
          Email: mdb@kuzykclassactions.com


BUCKINGHAM PROPERTY: Bid for Final OK of $600K Ferrell Deal Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled KEVIN FERRELL and CHERYL BAKER, on behalf of
themselves and others, Plaintiffs v. BUCKINGHAM PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00332-NONE-SAB (E.D. Cal.),
District Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California issued an order:

   -- declining to adopt the magistrate judge's findings and
      recommendations;

   -- denying the motion for final approval of class action
      settlement; and

   -- denying the motion for attorneys' fees, costs and incentive
      awards.

Plaintiffs Kevin Ferrell and Cheryl Baker, individually and on
behalf of others, filed motions for final approval of their
class-action settlement agreement in this case and for attorneys'
fees and costs on Jan. 6, 2021. The assigned magistrate judge
issued findings and recommendations, recommending that their
motions be granted, on Feb. 10, 2021. The findings and
recommendations were served on the parties and contained notice
that any objections to them were to be filed within 14 days from
the date of service. No objections were filed, and the time for
filing objections has passed.

On June 11, 2021, the Court entered an order directing the parties
to file supplemental briefing addressing concerns that Judge Drozd
had with respect to the pending motions. The parties filed
supplemental briefing, together with declarations, on June 25,
2021.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1)(C), the Court has conducted a de novo review of the case.


Discussion

A. Reversion of Employee's PAGA Portion

Briefly described, the maximum payment under the settlement
agreement is $600,000. A portion of that $600,000 is allocated to
the "Class Settlement Amount," from which members of the proposed
class are paid their Individual Class Payments, which are based on
how many weeks participating employees worked for the Defendant
during the relevant period ("Workweeks"). At least 63% of that
amount (the Minimum Distribution Floor) must be distributed to the
class; if under 63% of the Workweeks are claimed, then claimants'
shares are increased pro rata. Any unclaimed Workweeks beyond 63%
of the Class Settlement Amount--called the Remainder--revert to the
Defendant. Thus, the maximum possible reversion is 37% (100%-63%)
of the Class Settlement Amount.

Only 147 members of the class participated, accounting for 24.15%
of the Workweeks. Thus, 24.15% of the Class Settlement Amount has
been claimed--far short of the 63% minimum threshold. Those who
claimed an amount have, thus, had their proposed amounts increased
pro rata, and 37% is scheduled to revert to the Defendant. Based
upon this, the parties now propose setting a $324,556.03 Class
Settlement Amount, with 63% of that ($204,470.30) being distributed
to the participating class members.

After reviewing the Settlement Agreement and the pending findings
and recommendations, the Court ordered the parties to submit
additional briefing addressing the issue of whether the reversion
is permissible here because the Plaintiffs' claims include civil
penalties brought under the Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA").

PAGA prescribes the distributions for civil penalties received for
claims brought thereunder: "Civil penalties recovered by aggrieved
employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent to the Labor
and Workforce Development Agency and 25 percent to the aggrieved
employees."

The Plaintiffs' counsel has now twice averred that in reaching the
final settlement amount of $600,000, the parties took the maximum
value of each of the Plaintiffs' claims, calculated various
discounts, and came to a final agreed-upon value. In the end, the
parties settled on a $5,000 payment for the PAGA civil penalties,
with 25%, or $1,250, becoming the Employee's PAGA Portion.

In its order for supplemental briefing, the Court expressed concern
that reverting the Employee's PAGA Portion violates PAGA.

The parties contend that the proposed reversion does not violate
PAGA. The parties emphasize that the overall proposed payment to
employees is $204,470.30, which exceeds the $1,250 Employee's PAGA
Portion, implying that this is all that is required in order to
satisfy the requirements of PAGA. Put another way, the parties
contend that money is fungible, and so long as more than $1,250 is
distributed to the class and $3,750 to the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency, Section 2699(i) is satisfied. However, the
parties cite no authority in support of their argument in this
regard, Judge Drozd holds.

Judge Drozd notes that instructive on this point is the decision in
Millan v. Cascade Water Services, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593 (E.D. Cal.
2015). There, the court considered a motion for preliminary
approval of a class-action settlement agreement, which included
claims brought under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA").

Here, Judge Drozd explains, the parties appear to contend that the
money being distributed to the class is fungible, and because more
than $1,250 will be distributed to participating class members
overall, application of the reversion clause to the entire
settlement amount (as opposed to just the non-PAGA amount) is
appropriate. Under this reasoning, requiring a separate share for
the Employee's PAGA Portion appears to place form over substance,
Judge Drozd holds.

But there is a substantial flaw in that logic, Judge Drozd finds.
The Settlement Agreement specifically allocates $5,000 to PAGA
civil penalties, designated as the "PAGA Settlement Amount" in the
Settlement Agreement. That entire amount is included within the
Maximum Settlement Amount of $600,000. A number of items are then
to be deducted from that $600,000, including attorney's fees,
costs, incentive awards, the settlement administrator fees, and
$3,750 LWDA payment of the $5,000 PAGA civil penalties. What
remains after those deductions is the "Net Settlement Amount."

The Net Settlement Amount is then divided into two separate
buckets. Ninety-five percent (95%) of the Net Settlement Amount is
allocated to the Class Settlement Amount. This includes the $1,250
"Employee's PAGA Portion" of the PAGA Settlement Amount. That
entire Class Settlement Amount (including the $1,250) is subject to
the 63% minimum distribution floor. Thus, the $1,250 Employee's
PAGA Portion is whittled down by the reversionary clause along with
all of the other components that make up the Class Settlement
Amount.

As mentioned, under the current Settlement Agreement's arrangement,
the $1,250 Employee's PAGA Portion is a part of the Class
Settlement Amount by definition and is not distinguished in any way
from the overall Class Settlement Amount, which is subject to the
reversion provision and the 63% Minimum Distribution Floor. The
parties appear to suggest that because they are distributing at
least $1,250 to the class, the Court should construe the
distribution(s) as including the entire Employee's PAGA Portion.

However, that is not what the Settlement Agreement says, Judge
Drozd points out. It does not treat the Employee's PAGA Portion
differently from the rest of the Class Settlement Amount when
calculating the reversion.

Judge Drozd opines that reversion of any portion of a PAGA civil
penalty is impermissible under the holding in Iskanian v. CLS
Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348, 379 (2014) and under the logic
employed by the district court in Millan. A settlement agreement
that allocates funds to PAGA civil penalties and then permits some
those same funds to revert to a defendant indirectly exempts an
employer from its violation of the law. Such an agreement is
"against public policy and may not be enforced," Judge Drozd holds,
citing Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 382 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code Section
1668).

To cure the PAGA violation here, the parties could amend their
Settlement Agreement to treat the $1,250 Employee's PAGA Portion
not as part of the Class Settlement Amount but instead as a
deduction from the Maximum Settlement Amount, Judge Drozd holds.
Doing so would result in a slightly lower Class Settlement Amount
of $323,306. Applying the Minimum Distribution Floor (63%) to that
amount one arrives at $203,682.80. Under this alternative
arrangement, the class members would also receive the full $1,250
portion allocated to them under Labor Code Section 2699(i) as part
of the PAGA penalties. Thus, class members would receive shares
from a slightly higher total fund of $204,932.80.

Judge Drozd notes that if the only changes made to the Settlement
Agreement are to correct the PAGA issue, the class will not need to
be provided with further notice.

B. Signs of Collusion

The Court has previously expressed hesitations about possible
collusion between the parties with respect to this settlement.

The magistrate judge discussed the possibility of collusion in
depth in the pending findings and recommendations. In addition,
Judge Drozd inquired about relative response rates between the
Defendant's current and former employees. If response rates were
lower among current employees, that would possibly indicate that
the Defendant pressured class members over whom it has authority
not to participate. However, in fact, the response rate is higher
among current employees.

Moreover, the Defendant's president has filed a declaration stating
that the Defendant had taken several affirmative steps to increase
the response rate among its current employees. The Court,
therefore, adopts the findings and recommendations' reasoning
concerning the potential for collusion.

C. Other Aspects of Settlement Agreement

The Court briefly notes that it finds the Settlement Agreement is
otherwise fair, reasonable and adequate. At the final approval
stage, courts reviewing proposed settlement agreements must ensure
that the agreements are fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

Consideration of the Rule 23(e)(2) factors would, but for the
reversionary clause related to the PAGA aspect of the settlement,
incline the Court to grant final approval. First, class
representatives and counsel have litigated this case for years and
the Court does not conclude that they have colluded. Second, the
agreement was reached after an arm's-length negotiation, which
involved a professional mediator.

Third, other than with respect to the PAGA issue, the Court agrees
with the analysis set forth in the findings and recommendations
that the relief provided to the class is adequate. The magistrate
judge carefully considered the risks and delay of further
litigation, as compared to the amount offered in the settlement.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is otherwise adequate
relief for the class.

Fourth, class counsel and the Plaintiffs filed declarations
indicating that there were no other agreements that would need to
be disclosed under Rule 23(e)(3). This factor, therefore, favors
approval. Finally, the settlement proposal treats class members
equitably relative to each other; participating class members are
paid based on the number of weeks they worked. Accordingly, other
than with respect to the reverting of the Employee's PAGA Portion,
the settlement agreement could otherwise be approved.

D. Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Incentive Awards

Because the Court is denying the motion for final approval, the
Court declines to address the merits of the Plaintiffs' motion for
attorneys' fees and costs and incentive awards at this time. If the
parties reach another settlement agreement and file renewed
motions, the Court will consider attorneys' fees at that time.

Conclusion and Order

The Court declines to adopt the magistrate judge's Feb. 10, 2021
findings and recommendations.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval and Motion for Attorneys'
Fees, Costs and Incentive Awards are denied without prejudice.

If the parties submit a revised settlement agreement as part of a
renewed motion for final approval, they need not re-brief matters
that have previously been briefed but are directed to submit a
redlined version of any amended settlement agreement along with
targeted briefing addressing any changes made in the settlement.

Judge Drozd will retain this matter, and any renewed motion for
final approval of a revised settlement agreement is to be directed
to him.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4nk55res from Leagle.com.


BUENA VISTA: Cala Seeks Overtime Pay, Missing Paystubs
------------------------------------------------------
Edwin Cala, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Buena Vista Tortillas Corp., Noe Baltazar
and Michaela Vargas, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-06890 (S.D. N.Y.,
August 16, 2021), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime
wages and spread-of-hours pay pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 and New York Labor Law, including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a Mexican corn products factory
in Bronx, New York under the name "Buena Vista Tortillas," where
Cala was employed as a package worker. He claims to have generally
worked in excess of 40 hours a week without overtime for hours in
excess of 40 hours per workweek and denied spread-of-hours premium
for workdays exceeding 10 hours. He also claims to have never
received wage statements and appropriate minimum wage. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
      Email: michael@faillacelaw.com


CALIFORNIA REHABILITATION: Chambers Suit Removed to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled ALEXANDRIA CHAMBERS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. CALIFORNIA REHABILITATION
INSTITUTE, LLC; CRI ES, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, Case No.
21STCV20399, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on August 20,
2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:21-cv-06775 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged failure to furnish
accurate itemized wage statements pursuant to the California Labor
Code.

California Rehabilitation Institute, LLC is a physical medicine and
rehabilitation hospital located in Century City, California.

CRI ES, Inc. is a general contractor based in Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:          
         
         Ndubisi A. Ezeolu, Esq.
         Edward W. Racek, Esq.
         Maia Mdinaradze, Esq.
         TUCKER ELLIS LLP
         515 South Flower Street
         Forty-Second Floor
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 430-3400
         Facsimile: (213) 430-3409
         E-mail: ndubisi.ezeolu@tuckerellis.com
                 edward.racek@tuckerellis.com
                 maia.mdinaradze@tuckerellis.com

CATALYST FORWARD: Hawkins Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled CARRELL HAWKINS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. CATALYST FORWARD GROUP, US FOODS,
INC., SHIFTABLEHR, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
30-2021-01197275-CU-OE-CXC, was removed from the Superior Court of
California for the County of Orange to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California on August 20, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 8:21-cv-01373 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code including failure to provide required meal periods, failure to
provide required rest periods, failure to pay overtime wages,
failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay all wages due to
discharged and quitting employees, failure to maintain required
records, failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements,
failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures incurred
in discharge of duties, unfair and unlawful business practices, and
penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act.

Catalyst Forward Group is a logistics company doing business in
California.

US Foods, Inc. is an American foodservice distributor,
headquartered in Rosemont, Illinois. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Joseph C. Liburt, Esq.
         ORRICK, HERRINGTON & STUCLIFFE LLP
         1000 Marsh Road
         Menlo Park CA 94025
         Telephone: (650) 614-7400
         Facsimile: (650) 614-7401
         E-mail: jliburt@orrick.com

                  - and –

         Annie H. Chen, Esq.
         ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
         777 South Figueroa Street, Suite 3200
         Los Angeles, CA 90017-5855
         Telephone: (213) 629-2020
         Facsimile: (213) 612-2499
         E-mail: annie.chen@orrick.com

CHEGG INC: Settlement Reached in ADA Related Class Suit in New York
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Chegg, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that the class action suit in New York,
related to the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), has been
settled.

On December 1, 2020, the company received notice that a class
action lawsuit was filed against Chegg in New York alleging
violations of the ADA.

The claim asserted that one of Chegg's websites is not compatible
with software used by vision-impaired individuals.

Chegg said, "During the six months ended June 30, 2021, we settled
this matter for an immaterial amount.:

Chegg, Inc. operates direct-to-student learning platform that
supports students on their journey from high school to college and
into their career with tools designed to help them pass their test,
pass their class, and save money on required materials. Chegg, Inc.
was founded in 2003 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.

CHEGG INC: Settlement Reached in Unruh Violation Related Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chegg, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that the class action suit related to the
company's violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, has been
settled.

On August 18, 2020, the company received notice that a class action
lawsuit was filed against Chegg in California alleging violations
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

The claim asserted that one of Chegg’s websites is not compatible
with software used by vision-impaired individuals.

During the six months ended June 30, 2021, we settled this matter
for an immaterial amount.

Chegg, Inc. operates direct-to-student learning platform that
supports students on their journey from high school to college and
into their career with tools designed to help them pass their test,
pass their class, and save money on required materials. Chegg, Inc.
was founded in 2003 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


CHEMOCENTRYX INC: Avacopan Related Putative Class Suits Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
ChemoCentryx, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend putative shareholder class action suits related to New Drug
Application, or NDA, for avacopan.

The Company and its Chief Executive Officer are named as defendants
in two putative shareholder class actions filed on May 5, 2021, and
June 8, 2021, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California.

The cases have been related and are expected to be consolidated
into the lead case, Homyk v. ChemoCentryx, Inc., No.
4:21-cv-03343-JST (N.D. Cal.).

The action alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act in connection with statements regarding the
company's New Drug Application, or NDA, for avacopan, and seeks an
award of damages, interest and attorneys' fees.

A lead plaintiff has not yet been selected. The company intends to
file a motion to dismiss the complaint, and to vigorously defend
against these claims.

ChemoCentryx said, "Given the early stages of these cases, we are
unable to estimate a reasonably possible range of loss, if any,
that may result from the litigation."

ChemoCentryx, Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the
development and commercialization of new medications targeting
inflammatory disorders, autoimmune diseases and cancer. The company
is based in San Carlos, California.


CIGNA CORP: Class Certification Bid Extended to October 8
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BANAFSHEH AKHLAGHI, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v. CIGNA
CORPORATION; CIGNA HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No.
4:19-cv-03754-JST (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Jon S. Tigar entered
an order granting joint stipulation to continue all class
certification, pre-trial and trial dates approximately 28 days:

         Event                       Old Date       New Date

-- Class certification motion    Sept. 10, 2021    Oct. 8, 2021
   due:

-- Plaintiff's class             Sept. 10, 2021    Oct. 8, 2021
   certification expert
   disclosures:

-- Class certification           Dec. 7, 2021      Jan. 4, 2022
   opposition due:

-- Defendants' class             Dec. 7, 2021      Jan. 4, 2022
   certification expert
   disclosures:

-- Class certification           Feb. 18, 2022     Mar. 18, 2022
   reply due:

-- Class certification           Feb. 18, 2022     Mar. 18, 2022
   expert discovery
   deadline:

-- Mediation deadline:           Mar. 30, 2022     Apr. 27, 2022

-- Hearing on class              Apr. 28, 2022     May 26, 2022
   certification motion:

Cigna is an American multinational managed healthcare and insurance
company based in Bloomfield, Connecticut.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 26, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3sThyAY at no extra charge.[CC]


CITYR GROUP: Edwards Suit Removed to N.D. Oklahoma
--------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Regina Edwards, Sandra Edwards, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. CityR Group at
Vista Shadow, LLC, P Vista Shadow, LLC, Case No. CJ-21-02123 was
removed from the Tulsa Cty. Dist. Ct., to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma on Aug. 25, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:21-cv-00352-TCK-JFJ to
the proceeding.
The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Cityr Group Vista Shadow LLC -- http://www.cityrgroup.com/-- is
located in Tulsa, Oklahoma and is part of the Lessors of Real
Estate Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Frederic Dorwart, Esq.
          FREDERIC DORWART LAWYERS
          124 E 4TH ST
          TULSA, OK 74103-5010
          Phone: (918) 583-9922
          Fax: (918) 583-8251
          Email: fdorwart@fdlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          David Charles Senger, Esq.
          COFFEY, SENGER & WOODWARD PLLC
          4725 East 91st Street, Suite 100
          Tulsa, OK 74137
          Phone: (918) 292-8787
          Fax: (918) 292-8788
          Email: david@cswlawgroup.com


CLIENT SERVICES: Conditional Cert. of Settlement Class Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MEGAN MILITELLO, as
administrator of the Estate of Elizabeth Militello on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. CLIENT SERVICES, INC;
CSI INTERCO, LLC; and JOHN DOES 1-25, Case No. 7:20-cv-07805-KMK
(S.D.N.Y.), the Parties ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. granting conditional certification of a settlement class
      defined as:

      "All New York consumers who were sent letters and/or
      notices from Client Services, Inc., between September 22,
      2019 and September 22, 2020, concerning a debt owed to
      another, which included a monetary amount for "Interest
      Since Charge-Off" but also stated a "Balance Due at
      Charge-Off" of $0.00, and also stated an amount of
      "Interest Since Charge-off" greater than $0.00, and/or

      We are offering you the ability to resolve your account
      balance for the amount of $xxx.xx. To accept this offer,
      our office must receive payment within 40 days of the date
      of this notice. This offer is contingent timely receipt of
      your payment. If payment is not received in our office
      within 40 days of the date of this notice, this offer will
      be withdrawn and will be deemed null and void, with the
      remainder of the balance being due and owing. We are not
      obligated to renew this offer. Please note that no
      interest will be added to your account balance through the
      course of Client Services, Inc. collection efforts
      concerning your account. This offer does not affect your
      right to dispute the debt as described above."

   2. approving conditionally the settlement of this action upon
      the terms and conditions set forth in the Class Action
      Settlement Agreement;

   3. conditionally approving the defined Class for the purposes
      of Settlement;

   4. approving the form and substance of, and the directing the
      manner of service of, the notice to the Class;

   5. setting a date, time and place for a Fairness Hearing; and

   6. granting the parties to this action and the Class such
      other and further relief as this Court may deem just and
      proper.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/38lIrnB at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          One Grand Central Place
          60 East 42 nd . Street, 46 th Floor
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (646) 459-7971

The Defendant is represented by:

          Brendan H. Little, Esq.
          LIPPES MATHIAS WEXLER FRIEDMAN, LLP
          50 Fountain Plaza, Suite 1700
          Buffalo, New York 14202
          Telephone: (716) 853- 5100

COMPASS CALIFORNIA: Charman Sues Over Unsolicited Phone Call Ads
----------------------------------------------------------------
THANE CHARMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. COMPASS CALIFORNIA, INC., RON SCHOONOVER,
MARK REVETTA, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them,
Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-01467-AJB-LL (S.D. Cal., August 18,
2021) is a class action complaint brought against the Defendants
for their alleged negligent and willful violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

In an attempt to solicit the Plaintiff to purchase its services,
the Defendants purportedly contacted the Plaintiff on his cellular
telephone number ending in -1119 beginning in or around Fall of
2020 by using an "automatic telephone dialing system" (ATDS). The
Plaintiff did not provide his "prior express consent" to the
Defendant to contact him using an ATDS or an artificial or
prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone number that has been
registered on the Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days prior
to the Defendants contacting him, says the suit.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated individuals were harmed by the Defendants' unsolicited
calls which caused them to incur certain charges or reduced
telephone tie for which they had previously paid, and invaded their
privacy.

On behalf of himself and all other similarly situated individuals,
the Plaintiff brings this complaint seeking statutory ad treble
damages, and any other available legal or equitable remedies that
the Court deems just and proper.

Compass California, Inc. is a licensed real estate brokerage. The
Individual Defendants are agents of the Corporate Defendant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Tel: (323) 306-4234
          Fax: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com

COMPASS COUNSELING: Gitipour Seeks Home Based Residents' Unpaid OT
------------------------------------------------------------------
BEHNAZ GITIPOUR, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. COMPASS COUNSELING SERVICES OF NORTHERM
VIRGINIA, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-00941 (E.D. Va., August
18, 2021) is a class and collective action complaint brought
against the Defendant for its alleged unlawful payroll policy that
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Virginia Wage Payment
Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant as a home based resident
during the period of 2020 through June 2021.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated home based residents customarily performed compensable
work duties for the primary benefit of the Defendant and its
clients for about 45 to 50 hours per week. However, because the
Defendant misclassified them as "exempt" from the Federal and
Virginia overtime requirement, they were denied of overtime
compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular
rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of 40 per workweek,
the suit alleges.

The Plaintiff brings this complaint for himself and all other
similarly situated Hoe Based Residents to recover actual damages
against the Defendant, as well as liquidated damages, pre- and
post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements,
and other legal and/or equitable relief as the Court deems
necessary, just and proper.

Compass Counseling Services of Northern Virginia, LLC provides
mental health and related services to individuals with physical
and/or mental disabilities in nearly all countries and cities
throughout Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
          ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC
          8757 Georgia Ave., Suite 400
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Tel: (301) 587-9373
          E-mail: GGreenberg@ZAGFirm.com

                - and –

          Matthew T. Sutter, Esq.
          SUTTER & TERPAK, PLLC
          7540 A Little River Turnpike, First Floor
          Annandale, VA 22003
          Tel: (703) 265-1800
          E-mail: Matt@SutterandTerpak.com

COMSCORE INC: Settlement in Privacy Suit Gets Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
ComScore, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that settlement with
plaintiffs in the class action litigation over alleged violation of
the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, gets the court's
final approval.

On September 11, 2017, the Company and a wholly-owned subsidiary,
Full Circle Studies, Inc. received demand letters on behalf of
named plaintiffs and all others similarly situated alleging that
the Company and Full Circle collected personal information from
users under the age of 13 without verifiable parental consent in
violation of Massachusetts law and the federal Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act.

The letters alleged that the Company and Full Circle collected such
personal information by embedding advertising software development
kits in applications created or developed by The Walt Disney
Company.

The letters sought monetary damages, attorneys' fees and damages
under Massachusetts law.

On June 4, 2018, the plaintiffs filed amended complaints with the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California adding
the Company and Full Circle as defendants in a purported class
action (captioned Rushing, et al v. The Walt Disney Company, et
al., Case No. 3:17-cv-04419-JD) against Disney, Twitter and other
defendants, alleging violations of California's constitutional
right to privacy and intrusion upon seclusion law, New York's
deceptive trade practices statute, and Massachusetts' deceptive
trade practices and right to privacy statutes. The complaints
alleged damages in excess of $5.0 million, with any award to be
apportioned among the defendants.

On February 26, 2020, the Company and Full Circle reached an
agreement with the plaintiffs to settle the complaints in full,
with no admission of liability, in return for injunctive relief and
payment of the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, to be covered by the
Company's insurance.

The settlement received preliminary court approval on September 24,
2020.

The settlement received final court approval on April 12, 2021.

comScore, Inc. operates as an information and analytics company
that measures audiences, consumer behavior, and advertising across
media platforms worldwide. The company was founded in 1999 and is
headquartered in Reston, Virginia.


CONSUMER SAFETY: Ohio Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Dover Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY DOVER, Plaintiff v. CONSUMER SAFETY
TECHNOLOGY, LLC, d/b/a INTOXALOCK, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-04321
(S.D. Ohio), Judge Algenon L. Marbley of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, grants
Defendant Intoxalock's Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

Plaintiff Dover brought the putative class action against Defendant
Intoxalock under the Consumer Leasing Act (CLA"), 15 U.S.C. Section
1667, and its implementing regulations, 12 C.F.R. Section 1013, et
seq. ("Regulation M") on Aug. 24, 2020. Defendant Intoxalock leases
its ignition interlock devices through the use of "consumer leases"
to lessees.

The Lease is the subject of the parties' dispute. The Lease itself
is a multi-page document. The first page contains subdivided tables
with fees and charges. The remaining pages contain additional
information on the Lease terms and conditions. Much of the parties'
arguments focus on the first page of the Lease. The first page of
the Lease is subdivided into two sections, the upper portion and
the lower portion. The upper portion, in turn, is further
subdivided into four columns.

On May 18, 2020, the Defendant installed an ignition interlock
device in Mr. Dover's vehicle. In connection with that
installation, Plaintiff signed the lease at issue. The Plaintiff
contends that Defendant violated the CLA and Regulation M in
multiple respects by failing to make Plaintiff's payment
obligations as "clear and conspicuous" as the statute and
regulation require.

The Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6).

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standing

Standing is an Article III principle: without standing, a federal
court cannot exercise jurisdiction because there is no case or
controversy. Standing requires three elements: (1) an injury in
fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.

The Defendant claims that the Plaintiff fails to allege facts
demonstrating that he suffered injury-in-fact from the alleged
statutory violations. In particular, it seeks dismissal for lack of
standing, maintaining that the Plaintiff was charged for and paid
only the fees that were disclosed clearly and conspicuously in the
Lease. Thus, no injury-in-fact resulted since Intoxalock charged
only the amounts disclosed on the Lease.

Judge Marbley finds that that Mr. Dover has standing. The TILA is a
remedial consumer-protection statute aimed at assuring a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and
avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices. What is more, where Congress confers a procedural right
to protect a concrete interest, a violation of the procedure may
demonstrate a sufficient risk of real harm, without the need to
allege any additional harm. Accordingly, the Judge finds that Mr.
Dover has standing exists as the Plaintiff alleged sufficiently a
disclosure violation that is meant to protect an individual's
concrete interests.

B. The Consumer Leasing Act ("CLA") & Regulation M

Congress enacted the Consumer Leasing Act ("CLA"), 15 U.S.C.
Sections 1667-1667e in 1977 to extend the disclosure requirements
under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1601 et seq. The
CLA itself requires a lessor to make certain disclosures in a
consumer's lease "in a clear and conspicuous" manner. Regulation M
expands these statutory requirements. It is a disclosure-driven
regulation, covering certain consumer leases for a term exceeding
four months. A brief summary of Regulation M requirements is
useful.

C. Failure to State a Claim Analysis

Turning to the arguments in Mr. Dover's Complaint, the Plaintiff
alleges that Intoxalock's Lease failed to comply with Regulation M
by clustering rather than segregating the potential fees and
charges. Moreover, the Plaintiff argues that the Lease is generally
difficult to read, forcing the lessee to wade through boilerplate
fine print to decipher the purpose and potential imposition of fees
and charges. To the extent any such descriptions may be found
scattered among the numerous pages of the Lease, the Defendant
still failed to meet its burden under the CLA and Regulation M
because any such disclosures are not properly segregated from other
information in the Lease, and thus not provided in a manner
substantially similar to the applicable model form.

The Defendant seeks dismissal, contending that because the Lease
complies with the CLA and Reg. M, the Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

The parties disagree on whether the following sections of the Lease
comply with the clear-and-conspicuous standard: (1) "Other
Important Terms" in the lower portion of the Lease's first page;
(2) "Other Charges" in the upper portion's third column; and (3)
"Total of Payments" in the upper portion's last column. The
Defendant seeks dismissal, contending that the Lease is nearly
identical to the model form included in Reg. M and clearly and
conspicuously makes all required disclosures.

First, Judge Marbley finds that the Lease's "Other Important Terms"
section is substantially similar to the model form, and that the
changes are fairly minimal and not so extensive as to affect the
substance and clarity of the disclosures. Second, he finds that
nothing in Section 1667a(4) requires a separation of potential and
mandatory fees. All that statutory subsection requires is a
disclosure of the amount of the charges not included in the
periodic payments. This defense to dismissal does not succeed
either.

Third, the Judge finds that the Lease described with sufficient
clarity the "Other Important Terms" section; it does not run afoul
of Section 1667a(4) or Section 1013.4(d) of Regulation M. Each of
the 15 charges and fees listed under the "Other Important Terms"
section is listed clearly and conspicuously and contains an
adequate description of the whether and when the lessee would be
assessed these charges and fees. The Defendant's inclusion of the
"Other Important Terms" section directly under the segregated
columns did not violate the CLA or Reg. M. And Regulation M
provides explicitly for this method of calculation: the Total of
Payments sum is "less any portion of the periodic payment paid at
lease signing." The Defendant is entitled to dismissal for this
reason as well.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Marbley grants the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss. The case is dismissed in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3rcwcdfp from Leagle.com.


CONVERGENT HEALTHCARE: Page Files FDCPA Suit in C.D. Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Convergent Healthcare
Recoveries, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Alessandra Page,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Convergent Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., John Does 1-25, Case No.
1:21-cv-01241-JBM-JEH (C.D. Ill., Aug. 25, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Convergent Healthcare Recoveries, Inc. --
https://www.convergentusa.com/ -- is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yaakov Y. Saks, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Suite 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601-2726
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com



CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Suit Alleges Collection Letter "Deceptive"
------------------------------------------------------------------
NATAN GOLDSTEIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC., and JOHN DOES
1-25, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-04640-DG-JRC (E.D.N.Y., August
18, 2021) is a class action complaint brought against the Defendant
for its alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

The Plaintiff has an alleged debt incurred to PayPal, Inc.
primarily for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of
creditors using the U.S. Postal Services, telephone and internet.

Accordingly, the Defendant was contracted by PayPal, Inc. to
collect the alleged debt. Subsequently on or about September 10,
2020, the Defendant sent a collection letter to the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant's letter is deceptive and
misleading because it implies that in exchange of 50% of the
balance the consumer will achieve some form of settlement, when in
actuality it is unclear what form of settlement the letter is
offering. The letter merely states that upon partial payment that
the Defendant will cease collection activity, which is of no
benefit to the Plaintiff because the balance still remains and can
simply be collected through another collection agency. In addition,
the Plaintiff called PayPal, Inc. and confirmed that he did not owe
any balance, and that his account was in good standing, says the
suit.

Moreover, the Defendant's collection efforts with respect to this
alleged debt from the Plaintiff caused the Plaintiff to suffer
concrete and particularized harm. The Plaintiff brings this
complaint seeking to recover statutory and actual damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, pre- and post-judgment
interest, and other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. is a debt collector. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Tel: (201) 282-6500 ext. 107
          Fax: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com

CORECIVIC INC: Agreement in Principle Reached in Grae Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
CoreCivic, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the Company reached an
agreement in principle to settle the Grae v. Corrections
Corporation of America et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-02267 lawsuit.  

In a memorandum to the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons
("BOP") dated August 18, 2016, the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
directed that, as each contract with privately operated prisons
reaches the end of its term, the BOP should either decline to renew
that contract or substantially reduce its scope in a manner
consistent with law and the overall decline of the BOP's inmate
population.  

Following the release of the August 18, 2016 DOJ memorandum, a
purported securities class action lawsuit was filed on August 23,
2016 against the Company and certain of its current and former
officers in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee, captioned Grae v. Corrections Corporation of
America et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-02267.  

The lawsuit was brought on behalf of a putative class of
shareholders who purchased or acquired the Company's securities
between February 27, 2012 and August 17, 2016.

The Plaintiffs were seeking compensatory damages and costs incurred
in connection with the lawsuit.

In general, the lawsuit alleged that, during this timeframe, the
Company's public statements were false and/or misleading regarding
the purported operational, programming, and cost efficiency factors
cited in the DOJ memorandum and, as a result, the Company's stock
price was artificially inflated.  

The lawsuit alleged that the publication of the DOJ memorandum on
August 18, 2016 revealed the alleged fraud, causing the per share
price of the Company's stock to decline, thereby causing harm to
the putative class of shareholders.  

On April 16, 2021, the Company reached an agreement in principle to
settle the lawsuit.  

The monetary terms of the settlement include a payment by the
Company of $56.0 million in return for a dismissal of the case with
prejudice and a full release of all claims against all defendants,
including the Company and its current and former officers.  

The proposed settlement contains no admission of liability,
wrongdoing, or responsibility by any of the defendants, including
the Company, and is subject to the negotiation and execution of a
definitive settlement agreement, and court approval of such
definitive settlement agreement.  

CoreCivic said, "As a result of the settlement, the Company
recognized an expense of $54.3 million during the six months ended
June 30, 2021, which is net of the remaining insurance available
under the Company's policies."

CoreCivic, Inc. is a diversified government solutions company with
the scale and experience needed to solve tough government
challenges in flexible, cost-effective ways. The company is based
in Nashville, Tennessee.


CORECIVIC INC: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in ICE Detainees Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
CoreCivic, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals granted CoreCivic's petition to appeal the class
certification ruling, in the class action suit initiated by two
former U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detainees.

On May 31, 2017, two former ICE detainees, who were detained at the
Company's Otay Mesa Detention Center ("OMDC") in San Diego,
California, filed a class action lawsuit against the Company in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
California.

The complaint alleged that the Company forces detainees to perform
labor under threat of punishment in violation of state and federal
anti-trafficking laws and that OMDC's Voluntary Work Program
("VWP") violates state labor laws including state minimum wage law.


ICE requires that CoreCivic offer and operate the VWP in
conformance with ICE standards and ICE prescribes the minimum rate
of pay for VWP participants.

The Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, exemplary damages,
restitution, penalties, and interest as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief on behalf of former and current detainees.

On April 1, 2020, the district court certified a nationwide
anti-trafficking claims class of former and current detainees at
all CoreCivic ICE detention facilities. It also certified a state
law class of former and current detainees at the Company's ICE
detention facilities in California. The court did not certify any
claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.

On March 10, 2021, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
CoreCivic's petition to appeal the class certification ruling.  

Since this case was initially filed, four similar lawsuits have
been filed in other courts in California, Texas, Maryland and
Georgia.

The Company disputes these allegations and intends to take all
necessary steps to vigorously defend itself against all claims.

CoreCivic said, "Due to the stage of this proceeding, the Company
cannot reasonably predict the outcome, nor can it estimate the
amount of loss or range of loss, if any, that may result.  As a
result, the Company has not recorded an accrual relating to this
matter at this time, as losses are not considered probable or
reasonably estimable at this stage of these lawsuits."

CoreCivic, Inc. is a diversified government solutions company with
the scale and experience needed to solve tough government
challenges in flexible, cost-effective ways. The company is based
in Nashville, Tennessee.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Deadline Extension of Class Cert. Filing Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRUCE CORKER d/b/a RANCHO
ALOHA, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, a Washington corporation;
et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-00290-RSL (W.D. Wash.), the Plaintiffs ask
the Court to enter an order granting a 14-day extension of the
deadline for class certification.

The Plaintiffs and certain Defendants are working to negotiate a
longer extension of most of the case deadlines, including the class
certification deadline, to facilitate continued mediation and
settlement efforts. A short extension of the class certification
deadline is necessary to permit the parties to complete those
discussions on a more comprehensive extension.

Under the current case schedule, motions for class certification
must be filed by August 27, 2021. In the interim, the majority of
the Defendants have settled and have been dismissed from this
matter. The Plaintiffs and Defendant L&K have agreed to a
three-month extension of the case schedule, including the class
certification deadline, to facilitate mediation and settlement
efforts. The Plaintiffs are working to reach similar agreement on
the extension with Defendant Kroger.

An extension of the case schedule will facilitate continued
mediation and settlement efforts with Defendant L&K. A short
extension of the class certification deadline will permit the
parties to finalize negotiations on the more comprehensive
extension. No party not already subject to a stay of case deadlines
has indicated any opposition this motion.

The Plaintiffs are Bruce Corker d/b/a Rancho Aloha; Colehour
Bondera and Melanie Bondera d/b/a Kanalani Ohana Farm, Robert Smith
and Cecelia Smith d/b/a SmithFarms, and SmithFarms LLC.

Costco Wholesale is an American multinational corporation which
operates a chain of membership-only big-box retail stores. As of
2020, Costco was the fifth largest retailer in the world, and the
world's largest retailer of choice and prime beef, organic foods,
rotisserie chicken, and wine as of 2016.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Dvq8KW at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua M. Howard, Esq.
          Nathan T. Paine, Esq.
          Paul Richard Brown, Esq.
          Daniel T. Hagen, Esq.
          701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: 206.223.1313
          E-mail: npaine@karrtuttle.com
                  pbrown@karrtuttle.com
                  dhagen@karrtuttle.com

               - and -

          Michael W. Sobol, Esq.
          Jason L. Lichtman, Esq.
          Daniel E. Seltz, Esq.
          Andrew Kaufman, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN &
          BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: 415.956.1000
          E-mail: msobol@lchb.com
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013-1413
          Telephone: (212) 355-9500
          E-mail: jlichtman@lchb.com
                  dseltz@lchb.com
                  akaufman@lchb.com

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Dunn Appeals Denied Class Cert. Bid Denial
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Hope Dunn filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in
the lawsuit styled HOPE DUNN an Individual v. COSTCO WHOLESALE
CORPORATION, a Washington Corporation; MASSIMO ZANETTI BEVERAGE
USA, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; EXCELCO TRADING, L.P, a New York
Limited Partnership; and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, Case No.
2:21-cv-01751-JFW-AGR, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 29, 2021, the
Plaintiff asked the Court to enter an order (1) certifying a class
of "all persons who purchased Kirkland Signature (TM) Dark Roast
Fine Ground Decaffeinated Arabica Coffee for personal use in
California since September 16, 2016"; (2) appointing Plaintiff as
the Class Representative; and (3) appointing Plaintiff's
counsel-Mark Lanier, Alex Brown, Jonathan Wilkerson and Shalini
Dogra-as Class Counsel.

The case is a false advertising suit alleging that Defendants
violated California's consumer protection statutes present an
epitomal example of a lawsuit suitable for class action treatment.

The Defendants mislabeled every cannister of "Kirkland Signature
(TM) Dark Roast Fine Ground Decaffeinated Arabica Coffee" as "100%
Arabica Coffee" even though the Beans actually lacked a pure
arabica composition, and deceptively lead reasonable consumers to
believe the Beans were made solely from arabica beans, the
complaint says.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the order dated July 30, 2021
entered by Judge John F. Walter, denying her motion for class
certification.

The appellate case is captioned as Hope Dunn v. COSTCO, et al.,
Case No. 21-80093, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, filed on August 17, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner HOPE DUNN, an individual, and behalf of other
members of the general public similarly situated, is represented
by:

          Shalini M. Dogra, Esq.
          DOGRA LAW GROUP
          4065 Glencoe Avenue, Suite 312
          Marina Del Rey, CA 90292
          Telephone: (747) 234-6673
          E-mail: shalini@dogralawgroup.com   

               - and -

          Mark Lanier, Esq.
          THE LANIER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          10940 W. Sam Houston Parkway N.
          Suite 100
          Houston, TX 77064
          Telephone: (713) 659-5200
          E-mail: mark.lanier@lanierlawfirm.com

Defendants-Respondents COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, MASSIMO
ZANETTI BEVERAGE USA, INC., and EXCELCO TRADING L.P., a New York
Limited Partnership, are represented by:

          Andrew David Castricone, Esq.
          GORDON REES LLP
          275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 986-5900
          E-mail: acastricone@grsm.com   

               - and -

          Lara Cullinane-Smith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF LARA C. SMITH
          1086 Arlington Blvd
          El Cerrito, CA 94530
          Telephone: (510) 919-3214

               - and -

          Shawn Patrick Regan, Esq.
          HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
          200 Park Avenue, 52nd Floor
          New York, NY 10166
          Telephone: (212) 309-1046
          E-mail: sregan@hunton.com

               - and -

          Alexandrea Young, Esq.
          HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
          550 South Hope Street, Suite 2000
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-2627
          Telephone: (213) 532-2000

CRST INTERNATIONAL: Markson Seeks to Certify Class & Subclass
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CURTIS MARKSON, MARK
MCGEORGE, CLOIS MCCLENDON, and ERIC CLARK, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, v. CRST INTERNATIONAL,
INC., CRST EXPEDITED, INC., C.R. ENGLAND, INC., WESTERN EXPRESS,
INC., SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., SOUTHERN REFRIGERATED
TRANSPORT, INC., COVENANT TRANSPORT, INC., PASCHALL TRUCK LINES,
INC., STEVENS TRANSPORT, INC., and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No.
5:17-cv-01261-SB-SP (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. certifying the following CRST California Driver Class:

      "all persons who (1) signed a Pre-Employment Driver
      Training Agreement or Driver Employment Contract with
      Defendant CRST Expedited, Inc., (2) participated in CRST
      Expedited, Inc.'s Driver Training Program in California,
      and (3) were charged for their DOT physical, DOT drug
      screening, administrative fees, and/or the $3,950 or
      $6,500 Contract Fee after 12 to complete their
      contractually-required 8 to 10 month Employment Term, at
      any time between May 15, 2013 through the date of the
      Court's class certification;"

   2. certify the following 2013 Subclass:

      "all persons who (1) signed a Pre-Employment Driver
      Training Agreement or Driver Employment Contract with
      Defendant CRST Expedited, Inc., (2) participated in CRST
      Expedited, Inc.'s Driver Training Program in California,
      and (3) were charged for their DOT physical, DOT drug
      screening, administrative fees, and/or the $3,950 or
      $6,500 Contract Fee after failing to complete their
      contractually-required 8 to 10 month Employment Term, at
      any time between May 15, 2013 through January 21, 2014, or
      who opted-out of the settlement in Montoya et al. v. CRST
      Expedited, Inc., et al.;"

   3. appointing Plaintiffs Curtis Markson, Mark McGeorge, and
      Clois McClendon as class representatives for the CRST
      California Driver Class and 2013 Subclass; and

   4. appointing Susman Godfrey L.L.P, Mayall Hurley P.C.,
      Ackermann and Tilajef, P.C., and Melmed Law Group P.C. as
      class counsel for the CRST California Driver Class and
      2013 Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules
      of Civil Procedure.

CRST is an American freight company based in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
Founded in 1955 by Herald and Miriam Smith, it is a privately held
company with a current fleet of about 4,500 trucks and annual
revenues of $1.5 billion.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3sWS8SZ at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert J. Wasserman, Esq.
          William J. Gorham III, Esq.
          MAYALL HURLEY, P.C.
          2453 Grand Canal Boulevard
          Stockton, CA 95207-8253
          Telephone: (209) 477-3833
          Facsimile: (209) 473-4818
          E-mail: rwasserman@mayallaw.com
                  wgorham@mayallaw.com

               - and -

          Craig J. Ackermann, Esq.
          ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (310) 277-0614
          E-mail: cja@ackermanntilajef.com

               - and -

Marc M. Seltzer, Esq.
          Steven G. Sklaver, Esq.
          Krysta Kauble Pachman, Esq.
          Rohit D. Nath, Esq.
          Matthew R. Berry, Esq.
          Ian M. Gore, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
          1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, California 90067
          Telephone: (310) 789-3100
          E-mail: mseltzer@susmangodfrey.com
                  ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com
                  kpachman@susmangodfrey.com
                  rnath@susmangodfrey.com
                  mberry@susmangodfrey.com
                  igore@susmangodfrey.com

               - and -

          Johnathan Melmed, Esq.
          MELMED LAW GROUP P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (310) 824-3828
          E-mail: jm@melmedlaw.com

DALLAS JONES: McClurg Seeks Approval to Send Notice to Collective
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHNNY McCLURG, on Behalf
of Himself and All Others Similarly-Situated, v. DALLAS JONES
ENTERPRISES INC, d/b/a CLAY'S TRUCKING, Case No.
4:20-cv-00201-JHM-HBB (W.D. Ky.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order approving the sending of notice to the following
collective:

          "All persons who were employed by Dallas Jones
          Enterprises, Inc. (which has done business as "Clay's
          Trucking") as a truck driver and were not paid
          overtime compensation for work performed in excess of
          40 hours in one or more workweeks within the three
          years preceding this notice."

In the alternative, the Plaintiff moves that the Court approve the
sending of notice to the following collective, which is a sub-group
of the preceding proposed collective:

          "All persons who were employed by Dallas Jones
          Enterprises, Inc. (which has done business as "Clay's
          Trucking") as a truck driver and were not paid
          overtime compensation for work performed in excess of
          40 hours in one or more workweeks within the three
          years preceding this notice and who did not drive in
          interstate commerce but instead operated solely in
          intrastate commerce pursuant to a medical waiver from
          the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (and/or under a
          "K" intrastate-only restriction on his or her
          commercial driver's license).

The Plaintiff alleges that the Motor Carrier's Act ("MCA")
exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") does not apply
and that Defendant therefore violated the FLSA in failing to pay
overtime compensation.

Having been accused by the Defendant of missing the forest for the
trees, and occasionally through counsel having been guilty of this
problem, the Plaintiff stepped back and conducted a detailed legal
and factual investigation relating to the fundamental issue that is
the subject of this motion -– "whether potential plaintiffs are
'similarly situated' for the FLSA" such that the Court should
direct that a notice be sent to those employees of this lawsuit and
the employees' right to join and (B) the fundamental question in
this case: whether Defendant may benefit from the Motor Carrier's
Act exemption to the FLSA with respect to its truck driver
employees, the suit says.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated August 25,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zlwbj3
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark N. Foster, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MARK N. FOSTER, PLLC
          Madisonville, KY 42431
          Telephone: (270) 213-1303
          E-mail: MFoster@MarkNFoster.com

DAVID RANDALL: Court Approves Joint Bid to Extend Deadlines
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NATIONWIDE MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY v. DAVID RANDALL ASSOCIATES, INC. et al., Case
No. 2:20-cv-04972-JMY (E.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge John Milton Younge
entered an order granting the parties' joint motion to extend
deadlines:

   1. The parties shall comply with the following deadlines:

      a. All discovery shall be completed by November 1, 2021.

      b. All motions for summary judgment and class
         certification shall be filed no later than December 20,
         2021. Responses to such motions shall be filed no later
         than January 20, 2022. Replies to such motions, if
         necessary, shall be filed no later than February 3,
         2022.

   2. At the parties' request, this matter will be referred to
      the Honorable Carol Sandra Moore Wells, United States
      Magistrate Judge, for settlement discussions. Referral
      requests shall be submitted to the Court via email to
      Chambers_Younge@paed.uscourts.gov and copied to
      all counsel. Such requests shall be made at the earliest
      possible stage of the litigation when settlement
      discussions will be productive. As a general rule, the
      Court will not extend or stay the foregoing case
      management deadlines pending the conduct of settlement
      discussions.

   3. A final pretrial conference will be held on Thursday,
      April 7, 2022 at 11:00 a.m. in Room 4007, James A. Byrne
      United States Courthouse, 601 Market Street, Philadelphia.
      No later than seven days before the Final Pretrial
      Conference, the parties shall file their Pretrial
      Memoranda in accordance with Local Rule of Civil Procedure
      16.1(c) and Judge Younges Policies and Procedures. A
      trial date, and deadlines for other pretrial submissions,
      will be set by the Court at, or shortly after, the Final
      Pretrial Conference.

Randall Associates is a commercial roofing contractor.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 26, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zsVjEk at no extra charge.[CC]



DEMAR LOGISTICS: Faces Cisneros Wage-and-Hour Suit in N.D. Ill.
---------------------------------------------------------------
BENJAMIN CISNEROS, JESUS FLORES GARCIA, and SANDRO ARCENTALES,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. DEMAR LOGISTICS, INC. and GENE DOERR, Defendants,
Case No. 1:21-cv-04454 (N.D. Ill., August 20, 2021) is a class
action against the Defendants for violations of the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act by misclassifying delivery drivers as
independent contractors, making unlawful deductions from their pay,
and failing to reimburse them for business expenses.

The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendants as delivery drivers in
Illinois at any time between 2011 and 2021.

DeMar Logistics, Inc. is a logistics company, with its headquarters
in Carol Stream, Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:          
                  
         Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
         WERMAN SALAS P.C.
         77 W. Washington St., Ste. 1402
         Chicago, IL 60602
         Telephone: (312) 419-1008
         Facsimile: (312) 419-1025
         E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com

                - and –

         Harold L. Lichten, Esq.
         Olena Savytska, Esq.
         LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
         729 Boylston Street., Ste. 2000
         Boston, MA 02116
         Telephone: (617) 994 5800
         Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
         E-mail: hlichten@llrlaw.com
                 osavytska@llrlaw.com

DEVON ENERGY: Court Enters Scheduling Order in Wake Energy Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WAKE ENERGY, LLC, et al.,
v. DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION COMPANY, L.P., Case No.
5:21-cv-00352-PRW (W.D. Okla.), the Hon. Patrick W. Wyrick Judge
entered a scheduling order:

                 Event                     Proposed Deadline

   Motions for leave to amend or             September 30, 2021
   add additional parties:

   Class certification fact                  March 4, 2022
   discovery cutoff

   Plaintiffs' class certification           April 4, 2022
   expert report

   Defendant's class certification           May 4, 2022
   expert report

   Plaintiff's class certification           May 25, 2022
   expert deposition not later than

   Defendant's class certification           June 15, 2022
   expert deposition not later than

   Class Certification Motion filed          July 15, 2022
   with all supporting evidence

   Class Certification Response              August 15, 2022
   filed with all supporting
   evidence

   Class Certification Reply                 August 31, 2022
   filed with any rebuttal evidence

   Class Certification Hearing               To be set by Court

Devon Energy Corporation is a leading independent oil and natural
gas exploration and production company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 25, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zlLuYQ at no extra charge.[CC]

DISH NETWORK: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Dec. 6
--------------------------------------------------------------
DISH Network Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the settlement final
approval hearing in ity of Hallandale Beach Police Officers' and
Firefighters' Personnel Retirement Trust ("City of Hallandale") v.
Ergen, et al., Case No. A-19-797799-B, has been scheduled for
December 6, 2021.  

On July 2, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit was filed by a
purported EchoStar stockholder in the District Court of Clark
County, Nevada under the caption City of Hallandale Beach Police
Officers' and Firefighters' Personnel Retirement Trust ("City of
Hallandale") v. Ergen, et al., Case No. A-19-797799-B.  The lawsuit
named as defendants Mr. Charles W. Ergen, the other members of the
EchoStar Board, as well as EchoStar, certain of its officers, DISH
Network and certain of DISH Network's and EchoStar's affiliates.  

Plaintiff alleges, among other things, breach of fiduciary duties
in approving the transactions contemplated under the Master
Transaction Agreement for inadequate consideration and pursuant to
an unfair and conflicted process, and that EchoStar, DISH Network
and certain other defendants aided and abetted such breaches.  

In the operative First Amended Complaint, filed on October 11,
2019, the plaintiff dropped as defendants the EchoStar board
members other than Mr. Ergen.  

The Court granted, in part, the plaintiff's motion for class
certification on January 15, 2021.  

The trial of this matter is scheduled to start sometime during the
five-week "stack" beginning September 7, 2021.

Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, including the issuance of
additional DISH Network Class A common stock, monetary relief and
other costs and disbursements, including attorneys' fees.

The parties have entered into a global settlement agreement,
subject to court approval.  

The parties’ joint motion for preliminary approval has been
approved and the final approval hearing has been scheduled for
December 6, 2021.  

DISH Network said, "If the settlement is not approved, we intend to
vigorously defend this case, but cannot predict with any degree of
certainty the outcome of this suit or determine the extent of any
potential liability or damages."

DISH Network Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, provides
pay-TV services in the United States. The company operates in two
segments, Pay-TV and Wireless. DISH Network Corporation was founded
in 1980 and is headquartered in Englewood, Colorado.


DOMINION ENERGY: Settlement Reached in Scana Merger Related Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominion Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the parties reached an
agreement in principle in the amount of $63 million to resolve the
matter.

Dominion Energy's acquisition of SCANA Corporation was completed on
January 1, 2019 pursuant to the terms of the SCANA Merger
Agreement, which was entered on January 2, 2018. The SCANA Merger
Approval Order was issued by the South Carolina Commission on
December 21, 2018.

In January 2018, a purported class action was filed against SCANA,
Dominion Energy and certain former executive officers and directors
of SCANA in the State Court of Common Pleas in Lexington County,
South Carolina (the City of Warren Lawsuit).

The plaintiff alleges, among other things, that defendants violated
their fiduciary duties to shareholders by executing a merger
agreement that would unfairly deprive plaintiffs of the true value
of their SCANA stock, and that Dominion Energy aided and abetted
these actions. Among other remedies, the plaintiff seeks to enjoin
and/or rescind the merger.

In February 2018, a purported class action was filed against
Dominion Energy and certain former directors of SCANA and DESC in
the State Court of Common Pleas in Richland County, South Carolina
(the Metzler Lawsuit).

The allegations made and the relief sought by the plaintiffs are
substantially similar to that described for the City of Warren
Lawsuit. In September 2019, the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina granted the plaintiffs' motion to
consolidate the City of Warren Lawsuit and the Metzler Lawsuit (the
Federal Court Merger Case).

In October 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against
certain former directors and executive officers of SCANA and DESC,
which stated substantially similar allegations to those in the City
of Warren Lawsuit and the Metzler Lawsuit as well as an inseparable
fraud claim.

In November 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In
April 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina denied the motion to dismiss.

In May 2020, SCANA filed a motion to intervene, which was denied in
August 2020. In September 2020, SCANA filed a notice of appeal with
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

In June 2021, the parties reached an agreement in principle in the
amount of $63 million to resolve this matter as well as the State
Court Merger Case, subject to court approval. This settlement was
reached in contemplation of and will be partially satisfied by the
State Court Derivative Case settlement described above.

Dominion Energy, Inc., formerly Dominion Resources, Inc.,
incorporated on February 18, 1983, is a producer and transporter of
energy. Dominion is focused on its investment in regulated electric
generation, transmission and distribution and regulated natural gas
transmission and distribution infrastructure. Dominion manages its
operations through three primary segments: Dominion Virginia Power
operating segment (DVP), Dominion Generation, Dominion Energy, and
Corporate and Other. The company is based in Richmond, Virginia.


DREAMWEAR INC: Black Employees Racially Harassed, Doe Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jane Doe 1, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Jane Doe 2, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. Dreamwear Inc., Joseph Franco, Elliot
Franco,JOHN OR JANE DOE 1 THROUGH 100, fictitious names being
natural persons at present unidentified, XYZ CORPORATIONS 1 THROUGH
100, fictitious names being corporations at present unidentified,
ABC ENTITIES 1 THROUGH 100, fictitious names being commercial
entities at present unidentified Defendant(s), Case No.
HUD-L-003183-21 (New Jersey Super., Aug. 11, 2021) is a class
action suit involving black women who have allegedly suffered the
indignities of sexual harassment, racial slurs, and diminished
opportunities for advancement because the Defendants foster a
hostile work environment and enforce a de facto racial hierarchy
among its staff in violation of the New Jersey and Federal Civil
Rights Acts.

According to the complaint, in its New York office, Defendant Dream
wear has segregated its Black/African-American employees from the
majority of non-black staff. Among its almost 200 employees, the
few black women employed possess exceptional qualifications and
perform well as reflected in annual reviews. Despite these facts,
black women neatly congregate lower rungs of Dream wear's
organizational hierarchy regardless or tenure, experience, or
demonstrated ability, says the suit.

Its leadership disregards credible claims of sexual harassment and
racially motivated misconduct. Its response has been to enact
policies and procedures designed to suppress reports of misconduct,
harassment and retaliation, the lawsuit adds.

Dreamwear's owners, Elliot and Joseph Franco, have allegedly
allowed unchecked an environment hostile to black women within
Defendants' workplace, causing Plaintiff(s) emotional distress,
violating their civil rights, and causing irreversible economic
harm.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declarative relief, damages,
including economic, compensatory, liquidated, and punitive
damages.

The Plaintiffs are African American females who are employed by the
Defendants.

Dreamwear Inc. s a multinational fashion wear enterprise selling
products and producing fashionwear for corporate clients including,
Amazon, Macys, and Target, and employees working remotely and
globally, with headquarters at 183 Madison Ave 10th Fl. New York,
New York. Mr. Franco is Founder and Principal of Dreamwear.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kwame L.A. Dougan, Esq.
          SCOTCH & PALM PRIVATE CLIENT
          LAW GROUP, LLC
          252 Nassau St.
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          E-Mail: kwame.dougan@scotchpalm.com
          Telephone: (917) 737-9920

DRESSER LLC: Extension of Class Certification Deadlines Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHELLE BARTON and
William Barton Individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated, v. DRESSER LLC, et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-00502-BAJ-RLB
(M.D. La.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order
extending all remaining deadlines in the current scheduling order
for class certification until the Court issues a ruling on the
pending motion to transfer.

The Plaintiffs are property owners in Rapides Parish, Louisiana who
filed a class action lawsuit against the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and a class of
similarly situated owners, renters and residents whose property was
contaminated by a toxic release of chlorinated compounds, including
Trichloroethylene, a known carcinogen, and other hazardous
substances emanating from the industrial valve manufacturing
facility located at 8011 Shreveport Highway, Pineville, Louisiana
that has been historically owned and operated by Dresser. The
relief sought includes damages to property, personal injury and
injunctive relief.

On November 23, 2020, the Court issued a scheduling order for
purposes of class certification, which set an August 31, 2021
deadline for completion of fact discovery.

The remaining deadlines pursuant to that order include a September
15, 2021 deadline for Plaintiffs to submit expert reports; a
December 15, 2021 deadline for Dresser to submit expert reports; a
March 31, 2022 deadline for completion of expert discovery; and an
April 15, 2022 deadline to file a Motion for Class Certification.

Dresser designs, manufactures, and markets energy infrastructure
products and services.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2UUaTtG at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Scott R. Bickford, Esq.
         Lawrence J. Centola, Esq.
         Neil F. Nazareth, Esq.
         Jason Z. Landry, Esq.
         Jeremy J. Landry, Esq.
         mARTZELL, BICKFORD, & CENTOLA
         338 Lafayette Street
         New Orleans, LA 70130
         Telephone: (504) 581-9065
         Facsimile: (504) 581-7635
         E-mail: srb@mbfirm.co m
                 ljc@mbfirm.com
                 nfn@mbfirm.com
                 jzl@mbfirm.com
                 jjl@mbfirm.com

              - and -

         Thomas B. Wahlder, Esq.
         Stephen J. Hecker, Esq.
         1740 Jackson Street
         P.O. Box 7918
         Alexandria, LA 71306
         Telephone: (318) 442-9417

E.MERGE TECHNOLOGY: Faces Assad Suit Over ICA and IAA Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGE ASSAD, directly on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, and derivatively on behalf of E.MERGE
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION CORP., Plaintiff v. E.MERGE TECHNOLOGY
ACQUISITION CORP., Nominal Defendant v. E.MERGE TECHNOLOGY SPONSOR
LLC, S. STEVEN SINGH, JEFF CLARKE, GUY GECHT, SHUO ZHANG, DAVID
IBNALE, CURTIS FEENY, ALEX VIEUX and STEVEN FLETCHER, Case No.
1:21-cv-07072 (S.D.N.Y., August 20, 2021) is a class action against
the Defendants for declaratory judgment and violations of 15 U.S.
Constitution.

The case arises from E.Merge and the Defendants' alleged failure to
meet their obligations under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(ICA) and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA). The Defendants
suggest that they can avoid the ICA and IAA because, they say,
E.Merge is not an investment company but a special purpose
acquisition company (SPAC). They say that the company's primary
purpose is not to invest in securities but instead to acquire an
operating business. However, investing in securities is all the
company has ever done since its initial public offering (IPO), says
the suit.

The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment stating that the company
is an investment company under the ICA and the Advisor Defendants
are its investment advisors under the IAA. Further, the Plaintiff
requests a court order asking for damages as a result of E.Merge's
alleged capital structure, operations, and compensation scheme that
violate the ICA and IAA.

E.Merge Technology Acquisition Corp. is a blank check company
headquartered in California.

E.Merge Technology Sponsor LLC is a Delaware limited liability
company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
                  
         Mark Lebovitch, Esq.
         Daniel E. Meyer, Esq.
         Joseph W. Caputo, Esq.
         BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
         1251 Avenue of the Americas
         New York, NY 10020
         Telephone: (212) 554-1519
         Facsimile: (212) 554-1444
         E-mail: MarkL@blbglaw.com

                 - and –

         Gregory V. Varallo, Esq.
         BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
         500 Delaware Avenue, Suite 901
         Wilmington, DE 19801
         Telephone: (302) 364-3601
         E-mail: Greg.Varallo@blbglaw.com

                 - and –

         Shawn J. Rabin, Esq.
         Stephen Shackelford, Esq.
         Cory Buland, Esq.
         Beatrice Franklin, Esq.
         SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
         1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
         New York, NY 10019
         Telephone: (212) 336-8330
         Facsimile: (212) 336-8340
         E-mail: SRabin@susmangodfrey.com

                 - and –

         Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Esq.
         John Morley, Esq.
         BUZIN LAW, P.C.
         111 Broadway, Suite 1204
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (914) 819-7527
         E-mail: john.morley@yale.edu

                 - and –

         Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
         RM LAW, P.C.
         1055 Westlakes Dr., Ste. 300
         Berwyn, PA 19312
         Telephone: (484) 258-1585
         Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
         E-mail: rm@rmclasslaw.com

EAGLE BANCORP: Settlement in NY Suit Awaits Preliminary Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
Eagle Bancorp, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the parties in the
putative class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, awaits the court's order
preliminarily approving the settlement.

On July 24, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit was filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against the Company, its current and former President and Chief
Executive Officer and its current and former Chief Financial
Officer, on behalf of persons similarly situated, who purchased or
otherwise acquired Company securities between March 2, 2015 and
July 17, 2019.

On November 7, 2019, the Court appointed a lead plaintiff and lead
counsel in that matter, and on January 21, 2020, the lead plaintiff
filed an amended complaint on behalf of the same class against the
same defendants as well as the Company's former General Counsel.

The plaintiff alleges that certain of the Company's 10-K reports
and other public statements and disclosures contained materially
false or misleading statements about, among other things, the
effectiveness of its internal controls and related party loans, in
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder and Section 20(a) of that act, resulting
in injury to the purported class members as a result of the decline
in the value of the Company's common stock following the disclosure
of increased legal expenses associated with certain government
investigations involving the Company.

As previously disclosed by the Company, on December 24, 2020, by
stipulation of the parties, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York stayed the putative class action
lawsuit pending a non-binding mediation that had been scheduled for
April 13, 2021.

Immediately following the non-binding mediation, the parties
continued a settlement dialogue and reached an agreement to settle
the putative class action lawsuit, involving a total payment by the
Company of $7.5 million in exchange for the release of all of the
defendants from all alleged claims in the class action suit,
without any admission or concession of wrongdoing by the Company or
the other defendants. The Company expects that the full amount of a
final settlement will be paid by the Company's insurance carriers
under applicable insurance policies.

On June 28, 2021, the lead plaintiff filed the executed Stipulation
and Agreement of Settlement with the Court, along with an unopposed
motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement.

The Court has scheduled a preliminary approval hearing for August
12, 2021; the Company anticipates that a final approval hearing
will be held later this year.

Eagle Bancorp said, "There can be no assurance, however, that the
agreement will receive court approval and/or meet all other
conditions."

Eagle Bancorp, Inc. operates as the bank holding company for
EagleBank that provides commercial and consumer banking services
primarily in the United States. It accepts business and personal
checking, NOW, tiered savings, and money market accounts, as well
as individual retirement, certificate of deposit, and investment
sweep accounts; and time deposits. Eagle Bancorp, Inc. was founded
in 1997 and is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland.


EDUCATIONAL CREDIT: Court Junks Reyes Class Action w/o Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as A. J. Reyes, on behalf of
himself, and all others similarly situated, v. Educational Credit
Management Corporation, Case No. 3:15-cv-00628-TWR-AGS (S.D. Cal.),
the Court entered an order:

   -- dismissing this action without prejudice; and  

   -- denying as moot the motion to certify class

Educational Credit Management Corporation is a United States
nonprofit corporation based in Minnesota. Since 1994, ECMC has
operated in the areas of student loan bankruptcy management and
loan collection.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 25, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3kwLteo at no extra charge.[CC]


EFINANCIAL LLC: Court Dismisses Borden TCPA Suit With Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID BORDEN, Plaintiff v. EFINANCIAL, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. C19-1430JLR (W.D. Wash.), Judge James L. Robart of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, eFinancial's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's second
amended complaint.

Background

Mr. Borden filed his original complaint in the proposed class
action on Sept. 9, 2019. On Aug. 10, 2020, Mr. Borden filed an
amended complaint, asserting one cause of action on behalf of
himself and a proposed class under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. Section 227 ("the TCPA").

The TCPA prohibits companies from using an "automatic telephone
dialing system" ("ATDS" or "autodialer") to make calls to a
telephone number assigned to a cellular service. It defines an ATDS
as "equipment which has the capacity (A) to store or produce
telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number
generator; and (B) to dial such numbers." The TCPA does not impose
liability where the "called party" provides "prior express consent"
to receive calls.

Mr. Borden alleged that after completing a basic form on
Progressive.com's website that offered a quote for life insurance,
he was directed to a page on eFinancial's website that requested
additional information, including his phone number. After
completing the eFinancial form, Mr. Borden clicked a button labeled
"Next, your rates," to proceed with the rate quote. Mr. Borden
alleged that he did not see a message in fine print below the
"Next, your rates" button before he clicked.

Although Mr. Borden decided not to move forward with his
application for life insurance, he subsequently began to receive
marketing text messages from eFinancial on his personal cell phone.
He alleged that eFinancial sent its Insurance Text Message
Advertisements using an ATDS and that the "Next, your rates" button
and the fine print beneath it were insufficient to establish that
he gave "prior express consent" to receive messages.

On Oct. 16, 2020, the Court granted eFinancial's motion to stay
this matter pending the Supreme Court's decision in Facebook, Inc.
v. Duguid, No. 19-511 (U.S.), which promised to resolve a split
among the Courts of Appeals regarding how to interpret the
statutory definition of "automatic telephone dialing system."

The Supreme Court issued its decision on April 1, 2021. It held
that "a necessary feature of an ATDS is the capacity to use a
random or sequential number generator to either store or produce
phone numbers to be called." Thus, it concluded that "because
Facebook's text message notification system neither stores nor
produces numbers 'using a random or sequential number generator,'"
it is not an ATDS, and Mr. Duguid's TCPA claim was properly
dismissed. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court abrogated
prior Ninth Circuit precedent that had held that an ATDS need only
have the capacity to "store numbers to be called" and to "dial such
numbers automatically."

After the Supreme Court issued its decision, the parties agreed
that Mr. Borden would file an unopposed motion to file a second
amended complaint and that eFinancial would then move for
dismissal. The Court granted leave to amend, and Mr. Borden filed
his second amended complaint on May 11, 2021. In his second amended
complaint, Mr. Borden adds allegations that eFinancial uses a
sequential number generator to store and produce telephone numbers
to which it sends the eFinancial Insurance Text Message
Advertisements.

Thus, Mr. Borden alleges that eFinancial uses a sequential number
generator to (1) determine the order in which to pick phone numbers
to be dialed from a stored list or database of phone numbers and
(2) populate the LeadID field that is assigned to a phone number
and used to identify phone numbers in its database. Mr. Borden does
not allege that eFinancial generates random or sequential phone
numbers and sends text messages to those phone numbers.

Mr. Borden also amended his allegations that he did not provide
prior express consent to receive the eFinancial Insurance Text
Message Advertisements.

On June 8, 2021, eFinancial filed the instant motion to dismiss Mr.
Borden's second amended complaint.

Analysis

eFinancial contends that Mr. Borden's TCPA claim must be dismissed
with prejudice because (1) he acknowledges that he provided his
phone number to eFinancial and, as a result, the phone number was
not randomly or sequentially generated as required to plausibly
allege the use of an ATDS, and (2) he gave prior express consent to
receive the text messages when he clicked the "Next, your rates"
button on the eFinancial website. Mr. Borden counters that (1)
Duguid does not require that a phone number be randomly or
sequentially generated to plausibly allege the use of an ATDS and
(2) his allegations do not establish that he gave prior express
consent to receive eFinancial's text messages.

Judge Robart holds that Mr. Borden's allegations are insufficient
to establish that eFinancial's system is an ATDS. He alleges that
eFinancial's system uses a sequential number generator to select
which stored phone numbers to dial and to populate the LeadID field
that eFinancial's system uses to identify "or 'point to'" phone
numbers in its database. He does not, however, allege that
eFinancial's system "generates random or sequential phone numbers"
to be dialed; instead, he expressly alleges that he provided his
phone number to eFinancial through the ABOUT form. The Judge finds
that eFinancial's use of its system to send advertisement text
messages to consumers who entered their phone numbers into a form
on its website simply does not implicate the problems caused by
autodialing of random or sequential blocks of numbers that Congress
sought to address when it passed the TCPA.

Because Mr. Borden has not plausibly alleged that the system that
eFinancial used to send its Insurance Text Message Advertisements
was an ATDS within the meaning of the TCPA, the Judge need not
address whether Mr. Borden plausibly alleged that he did not
provide prior express consent for eFinancial to send him those text
messages. He grants eFinancial's motion to dismiss Mr. Borden's
second amended complaint. Further, because Mr. Borden expressly
alleges that he provided his phone number to eFinancial -- and thus
the text messages at issue necessarily were not sent through an
ATDS -- the Judge concludes that amendment would be futile and
dismisses the action with prejudice.

Conclusion

Judge Robart eFinancial's motion to dismiss and dismisses Mr.
Borden's second amended complaint with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/krps7wnp from Leagle.com.


EHEALTH INC: Bid to Nix Securities Class Suit in California Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
eHealth, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motion to dismiss
filed in the consolidated putative class action suit entitled, In
re eHealth Securities Litig., Master File No. 4:20-cv-02395-JST
(N.D. Cal.)., is pending.

On April 8, 2020 and April 30, 2020, two purported class action
lawsuits were filed against the company, its chief executive
officer, Scott N. Flanders, its then-chief financial officer, Derek
N. Yung, and its then-chief operating officer, David K. Francis, in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.

The cases are captioned Patel v. eHealth, Inc., et al., Case No.
5:20-cv-02395 (N.D. Cal.) and Bertrand v. eHealth, Inc. et al.,
Case No. 4:20-cv-02967 (N.D. Cal.).

The complaints allege, among other things, that we and Messrs.
Flanders, Yung and Francis made materially false and misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose material information regarding
the company's accounting and modeling assumptions, rate of member
churn and the company's profitability during the alleged class
period of March 19, 2018 to April 7, 2020.

The complaints allege that we and Messrs. Flanders, Yung and
Francis violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The complaints seek compensatory and (in the Patel lawsuit)
punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and such other relief
as the court deems proper.

On June 24, 2020, the Court consolidated the above-referenced
matters under the caption In re eHealth Securities Litig., Master
File No. 4:20-cv-02395-JST (N.D. Cal.).

The Court also appointed a lead plaintiff and lead counsel for the
consolidated matter. The lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint
on August 25, 2020, which Defendants moved to dismiss.

The motion to dismiss has been fully briefed.

eHealth, Inc. provides private health insurance exchange services
to individuals, families, and small businesses in the United States
and China. The company operates through two segments, Medicare; and
Individual, Family and Small Business. eHealth, Inc. was
incorporated in 1997 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


ENCHANCED RECOVERY: Dunn FDCPA Suit Removed to M.D. North Carolina
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Dede Dunn, Muriel Lytle, on Behalf of Themselves
and Others Similarly Situated v. Enhanced Recovery Company LLC,
Case No. 21-CVS-1406 was removed from the Rowan County Superior
Court to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina on August 25, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:21-cv-00665 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC -- https://ercbpo.com/ -- provides
debt collection and asset recovery and reporting services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Scott C. Harris, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Phone: (919) 600-5000
          Fax: (919) 600-5035
          Email: sharris@milberg.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Richard Leonard Pinto, Esq.
          PINTO COATES KYRE & BOWERS, PLLC
          3203 BRASSFIELD RD.
          GREENSBORO, NC 27410
          Phone: (336) 282-8848
          Fax: (336) 282-8409
          Email: rpinto@pckb-law.com


ENPHASE ENERGY: Hurst Securities Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GREGORY A. HURST, Plaintiff v. ENPHASE ENERGY, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-04036-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, grants the Defendants'
motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

On June 17, 2020, Plaintiff Hurst filed a securities class action
suit in the Court alleging violations of various securities laws
against Enphase, Enphase CEO Badrinarayanan Kothandaraman, and
Enphase CFO Eric Branderiz.

On Jan. 22, 2021, Hurst filed an amended complaint. The FAC alleges
that between Feb. 26, 2019, and June 16, 2020, the Defendants made
materially false and misleading statements or failed to disclose
material adverse facts to cover up the fact that "Enphase's
improbable financial performance was fraudulent."

According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants misrepresented and/or
failed to disclose to investors that: (1) its revenues, both U.S.
and international, were inflated; (2) the Company engaged in
improper deferred revenue accounting practices; and (3) the
Company's reported base points expansion in gross margins were
overstated. The FAC identifies numerous false or materially
misleading statements made by Defendants in or related to their SEC
filings between FY2018 and FY2020 Q1. The identified statements
generally contained allegations about Enphase's revenue, cash flow,
and GAAP and non-GAAP gross margins.

The FAC's allegations are largely derived from a short seller
report published by Prescience Point Capital Management on June 17,
2020. The Prescience Report announced, among other things, that
financial statements filed with the SEC by Enphase are fiction.
Based on their research, they estimate that at least $205.3m of
Enphase's reported US revenue in FY 2019 was fabricated. Based on
statements provided by former employees and other solar industry
participants, it appears that the Company inflated its
international revenue significantly as well. They also believe that
most, if not all, of the enormous 2,080 Bps expansion in the
Company's gross margin during Defendant Badrinarayanan
Kothandaraman's tenure as CEO -- from 18.4% in Q2 2017 to 39.2% in
Q1 2020 -- is fiction. They believe government bodies should
investigate ENPH, Deloitte should launch an in-depth investigation
of the Company's accounting practices, and the Board of Directors
should establish an independent committee to examine the findings
and analyses presented in the report.

The Prescience Report purports to be based on an analysis of
Enphase's reported financials along with a "private investigation"
based on interviews with former employees of Enphase's Bangalore,
India office.

Following the publication of the Prescience Report, the Plaintiff
contends Enphase's stock price "plummeted from its June 16, 2020
closing price of $52.76 per share to a June 17, 2020 closing price
of $39.04 per share, a one-day drop of $13.72 or approximately
26%." The same day the Prescience Report was published, the
Plaintiff filed suit.

Now before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this
putative securities class action. Judge Freeman held a hearing on
the Motion on July 29, 2021.

Discussion

I. Request for Judicial Notice

The Defendants request that the Court takes judicial notice of
Exhibit A, Enphase's annual report on Form 10-K for fiscal year
2019 publicly filed with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") on February 21, 2020; Exhibit B, Enphase's
annual report on Form 10-K for fiscal year 2018 publicly filed with
the SEC on March 15, 2019; Exhibit C, Enphase's definitive proxy
statement on Schedule 14A publicly filed with the SEC on April 2,
2018; Exhibit D, Enphase's annual report on Form 10-K for fiscal
year 2020 publicly filed with the SEC on February 16, 2021; Exhibit
E, a report by Prescience Point Capital Management dated July 25,
2018; Exhibit F, a report by Prescience Point Capital Management
dated August 15, 2018; Exhibit G, the historical price of Enphase
common stock from September 6, 2017 to January 22, 2021; and
Exhibit H, a Form 4 for Eric Branderiz dated June 5, 2020. The
Plaintiff does not oppose the request.

Judge Freeman finds that Exhibits A, B, E, and H are incorporated
by reference into the FAC. The incorporation by reference doctrine
permits the Court to take into account documents "whose contents
are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party
questions, but which are not physically attached to the Plaintiff's
pleading."

The Judge also finds that Exhibits C and D -- Enphase's 2018
Schedule 14A and 2020 Form 10-K—are matters of public record, not
subject to reasonable dispute, and available from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned -- the SEC's public
website. The remaining Exhibits -- F and G -- are an August 2018
report by Prescience Point Capital Management and the historical
price of Enphase common stock. Both documents are publicly
available, and their accuracy is not disputed by the Plaintiff. The
Judge thus takes judicial notice of the existence of these
exhibits. The Defendants' request for judicial notice is granted.

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Claim 1: Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

Judge Freeman rejects the Defendants' motion to the extent it is
predicated on loss causation. She finds that the FAC properly
pleads loss causation. Plaintiff has alleged that the Prescience
Report resulted in a significant drop in Enphase's stock price.

Although unconvinced by the Defendants' loss causation contentions,
the Judge nonetheless grants the Defendants' motion. She holds that
the FAC fails to plead a material misrepresentation or omission.
The Plaintiff claims that Enphase's financial statements, as well
as accompanying certifications by Enphase executives, were false or
misleading due to (1) deferred revenue accounting, (2) tariffs on
solar products manufactured in China, (3) a supposed related party
transaction, (4) a shrinking market share, and (5) "fabricated"
safe harbor revenues. The misrepresentations the Plaintiff alleges
are far from trivial.

The FAC also fails to point to any accounting standard that Enphase
misapplied, the Judge holds. She says, the FAC alleges that Enphase
adopted the ASC 606 accounting standard on Jan. 1, 2018. What it
fails to do, however, is allege how Enphase ran afoul of this
standard. The remaining grounds supporting the Plaintiff's
allegation of falsity similarly lack the PSLRA's requisite
particularly.

Nonetheless, to aid in the Plaintiff's amendment process, the Judge
further determines that the FAC further fails to plead scienter.
She says, the Plaintiff must plead facts that give rise to a
"strong inference" of scienter. The FAC does not supply
particularized allegations establishing the employees' reliability
and personal knowledge. Nor is the Judge fully satisfied that the
Plaintiff and his counsel have independently investigated all of
the Prescience Report's allegations.

As for the Plaintiff's reliance on insider stock sales, the Judge
finds that the Defendants correctly highlight that seven of the
eight identified insiders are not named in the action, and such
sales are irrelevant to scienter. That leaves only the stock sales
by Defendant Branderiz to consider. But the allegation also fails
to contribute to a finding of scienter as the FAC does not allege
facts that explain why the sale was unusual or suspicious. Further,
it is simply implausible that Branderiz had advance warning of the
Prescience Report, which allegedly prompted his stock sell off.

B. Claim 2: Section 20(a)

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act extends liability for Section
10(b) violations to those who are "controlling persons" of the
alleged violations. To prevail on his claim for violations of
Section 20(a), the Plaintiff must first allege a violation of
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.

Judge Freeman finds that the Plaintiff has failed to do so in the
case. Accordingly, she grants the motion to dismiss the Section
20(a) against Defendants Kothandaraman and Branderiz.

Order

Judge Freeman grants the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with leave
to amend. The Plaintiff will file an amended complaint, if he is
able to rectify the defects discussed above, no later than 60 days
from the date of the Order. No parties or claims may be added
without leave of Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ndznvh8u from Leagle.com.


EOG RESOURCES: Court Certifies Settlement Class in WFM Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WHITE FAMILY MINERALS,
LLC, v. EOG RESOURCES, INC., Case No. 19-cv-409-RAW (E.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Kimberly E. West entered an order:

   1. certifying Settlement Class defined as follows:

      "All non-excluded persons or entities to whom Defendant
      (or Defendant's designee): (1) made Late Payments between
      and including October 10, 2014 and January 12, 2021 for
      oil and gas proceeds from Oklahoma wells, and (2) the
      payments did not include the statutory interest under
      Oklahoma's Production Revenue Standards Act (PRSA), 52
      O.S. section 570.1 et seq. A "Late Payment" for purposes
      of this class definition means payment of proceeds from
      the sale of production from an oil and/or gas well after
      the statutory periods identified in 52 O.S. section 570.10
      (B)(l) and (B)(3)(a). Late Payments do not include: (a)
      payments of proceeds to an owner under 52 O.S. section
      570.10(B)(3) (minimum pay) if paid annually for the twelve
      months accumulation of proceeds totaling at least $10; (b)
      pass-through payments; or (c) prior period adjustments
      (PPAs);"

      Excluded from this class are: (1) agencies, departments,
      or instrumentalities of the United States of America,
      including any federally recognized Indian Tribes and
      Indian allottees for whom Defendant makes payments to the
      United States; (2) Commissioners of the Land Office of the
      State of Oklahoma (CLO); (3) publicly traded oil and gas
      companies and their affiliates; (4) persons or entities
      that Plaintiff's counsel may be prohibited from
      representing under Rule 1.7 of the Oklahoma Rules of
      Professional Conduct including, but not limited to,
      Charles David Nutley, Danny George, William L. Galbreath,
      Verdeen L. Slatten, Jack A. Slatten, Verdeen L. Slatten
      Family Limited Partnership, Neva M. Dorman, Ann Ellis
      Boles, Fischer-Jones, LLC, B.N. Taliaferro, Jr.
      individually and as Trustee of the B. N. Taliaferro
      Management Trust, Jack B. Searle, Tamara D. Searle, OGI,
      Inc., and their relatives; (5) officers of the court; and
      (6) persons or entities (and their affiliates) who are the
      Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) designated operator
      of more than 50 active Oklahoma wells as of April, 2021;

   2. preliminarily certifying the proposed Settlement resulted
      from extensive arm's-length negotiations;

   3. preliminarily approving the proposed manner of
      communicating the Short Form Notice, Summary Notice, and
      Long Form Notice to the Settlement Class;

   4. authorizing the Plaintiff's Counsel to act on behalf of
      the Settlement Class with respect to all acts required by,
      or which may be given pursuant to, the Settlement
      Agreement, or such other acts that are reasonably
      necessary to consummate the proposed Settlement set forth
      in the Settlement Agreement; and

   5. appointing JND Legal Administration to act as Settlement
      Administrator and perform the associated responsibilities
      set forth in the Settlement Agreement;

The Court finds the Settlement Class satisfies all prerequisites of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) for purposes of the proposed
class settlement:

This is a class action lawsuit brought by the Plaintiff White
Family, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated
against EOG Resources, for the alleged failure to pay statutory
interest on payments made outside the time periods set forth in the
PRSA for oil and gas production proceeds from oil and gas wells in
Oklahoma.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 25, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jn4ErC at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff's counsel are:

          Andrew G. Pate, Esq.
          Bradley E. Beckworth, Esq.
          Trey Duck, Esq.
          Susan Whatley, Esq.
          NIX PATTERSON, LLP
          3600 N Capital of Texas Hwy.
          Austin, TX78746
          Telephone: (512) 328-5333
          Facsimile: (512) 328-5332
          E-mail: bbeckworth@nixlaw.com
                  dpate@nixlaw.com
                  tduck@nixlaw.com
                   swhatley@nixlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick M. Ryan, Esq.
          Phillip G. Whaley, Esq.
          Jason A. Ryan, Esq.
          Paula M. Jantzen, Esq.
          RYAN WHALEY COLDIRON
          JANTZEN PETERS & WEBBER PLLC
          400 North Walnut Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73104
          Telephone: (405) 239-6040
          Facsimile: (405) 239-6766
          E-mail: pryan@ryanwhaley.com
                  pwhaley@ryanwhaley.com
                  jryan@ryanwhaley.com
                  pjantzen@ryanwhaley.com

               - and -

          Michael Burrage, Esq.
          WHITTEN BURRAGE
          512 N. Broadway Ave., Suite 300
          Oklahoma City, OK 73103
          Telephone: (405) 516-7800
          Facsimile: (405) 516-7859
          E-mail: mburrage@whittenburragelaw.com

               - and -

          Robert N. Barnes, Esq.
          Patranell Lewis, Esq.
          Emily Kitch, Esq.
          BARNES & LEWIS , LLP
          208 N.W. 60th St.
          Oklahoma City, OK 73118
          Telephone: (405) 843-0363
          Facsimile: (405) 843-0790
          E-mail: rbarnes@barneslewis.com
          plewis@barneslewis.com
          ekitch@barneslewis.com

The Defendant's Counsel are:

          J. Todd Woolery, Esq.
          Patrick L. Steinv
          MCAFEE & TAFT, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          Eighth Floor, Two Leadership Square
          211 N. Robinson Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102-7103
          Telephone: (405) 235-9621
          Facsimile: (405) 235-0439
          E-mail: todd.woolery@mcafeetaft.com
                  patrick.stein@mcafeetaft.com

               - and -

          Daniel M. McClure, Esq.
          Rebecca J. Cole, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
          1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
          Houston, TX 77010-3095
          Telephone: (713) 651-5151
          Facsimile: (713) 651-5246
          E-mail: rebecca.cole@nortonrosefulbright.com
                  dan.mcclure@nortonrosefulbright.com

EURO PHARMA: Dotson Appeals Dismissal of False Labeling Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Michael Dotson filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled MICHAEL DOTSON, individually, and on
behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. EURO PHARMA, INC. d/b/a TERRY NATURALLY, Defendant,
Case No. 2:20-cv-09651-AB-AGR, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Los Angeles.

The lawsuit is an action for damages, injunctive relief, and any
other available legal or equitable remedies, for violations of the
Unfair Competition Law, common law fraud, and unjust enrichment,
resulting from the alleged illegal actions of Defendant, in
intentionally labeling its curcumin and turmeric supplements as
providing "pain relief", when Defendant's products do not relieve
pain.

The Plaintiff seeks a review of the Court's Order dated July 22,
2021, granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's third
amended complaint with prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned as Michael Dotson v. Euro Pharma,
Inc., Case No. 21-55868, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, filed on August 13, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Michael Dotson Mediation Questionnaire was due
August 20, 2021;

   -- Appellant Michael Dotson opening brief is due on October 15,
2021;

   -- Appellee Euro Pharma, Inc. answering brief is due on November
15, 2021; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MICHAEL DOTSON, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Adrian Bacon, Esq.
          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD FRIEDMAN PC
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          E-mail: abacon@toddflaw.com  

Defendant-Appellee EURO PHARMA, INC., DBA Terry Naturally, is
represented by:

          Anahit Tagvoryan, Esq.
          BLANK ROME, LLP
          2029 Century Park E, 6th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (424) 239-3465
          E-mail: atagvoryan@blankrome.com

EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Weber Files FCRA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Experian Information
Solutions, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Samuel Weber, on
behalf of all similarly situated consumers v. Experian Information
Solutions, Inc., Trans Union, LLC, Equifax Information Services,
LLC, Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Case No. 1:21-cv-04807 (E.D.N.Y., Aug.
25, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc. -- https://www.experian.com/
-- operates as an information services company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
          ADAM J. FISHBEIN, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, NY 11598
          Phone: (516) 668-6945
          Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


FCA US: Eastern District of Michigan Narrows Claims in Johnson Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DORTHEA JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-12690 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Matthew F.
Leitman of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, granted in part and denied in part
FCA's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims.

I. Background

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs bring a variety of
statutory and common-law claims against Defendant FCA arising out
of an alleged defect in the interior trim panels of their FCA
vehicles.

FCA was one of the world's leading automakers. The Plaintiffs are
consumers who purchased 2014 model year and later "Chrysler 300s,
Dodge Chargers, and Dodge Challengers sold in the United States."
According to the Plaintiffs, the Class Vehicles suffer from an
"inherent defect that results in interior trim panels (e.g., door
panels, center console, dash console, kick panels) warping and
pulling away from the vehicle frame."

The Plaintiffs explain that the interior trim panels are bonded to
the vehicle frame by an adhesive. Over time, the attachment fails,
causing the panels to pull away from the frame and warp, leaving a
gap between the panel and the frame that exposes the 'guts' of the
automobile, including airbags, wiring, controls, and electrical
components.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Panel Defect causes two primary
problems with the Class Vehicles. First, they say that the Panel
Defect "creates a condition that is embarrassing and unsightly to
those that have purchased or leased these expensive, high end
muscle cars and luxury vehicles." Second, the Plaintiffs assert
that the Panel Defect "raises serious safety concerns."

Finally, the Plaintiffs claim that even though FCA "has known about
the Panel Defect for many years," FCA has "actively concealed the
Panel Defect from customers and continued to market the Class
Vehicles in a manner that misrepresented the quality of the
defective interior trim." The Plaintiffs insist that "had FCA
disclosed the truth, for example in its advertisements or other
materials or communications, the Plaintiffs and the class would
have been aware of the Panel Defect and would not have bought or
leased the Class Vehicles or would have paid less for them."

The Plaintiffs filed their Amended Class Action Complaint, the
operative pleading in the action, on Jan.y 22, 2021.

The named Plaintiffs are as follows:

      a. Dorthea Johnson, a California resident who purchased a
used 2016 model Chrysler 300C in California in early 2018;

      b. Jason Player, a Texas resident who purchased a new 2016
model Dodge Charger from an authorized Dodge dealer in Texas in
December 2015;

      c. Tom Vensky, an Oregon resident who purchased a used 2016
model Dodge Charger R/T from an authorized Dodge dealer in Oregon
at an unidentified time;

      d. Charles Wartelle, a Louisiana resident who purchased a
used 2017 model Chrysler 300C in Louisiana in April 2018;

      e. Francisco Fernandez, a Florida resident who purchased a
new 2016 model Dodge Charger SRT Hellcat and a new 2016 model Dodge
Challenger SRT Hellcat from authorized Dodge dealers in Florida in
or about July 2017;

      f. Andrew Bennett, a North Carolina resident who purchased a
used 2017 model Dodge Charger in North Carolina in August 2020;

      g. Lois Miller, a North Carolina resident who purchased a new
2016 model Chrysler 300 from an authorized Chrysler dealer in North
Carolina in April 2016; and

      h. Ryan Sturgill, a New Mexico resident who purchased a new
2016 model Dodge Charger from an authorized Dodge dealer in New
Mexico in 2016.

The Plaintiffs bring claims against FCA for breach of express and
implied warranties under state law and under the federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301, et seq. (the
"MMWA"), fraud, unjust enrichment, and violations of the consumer
protection laws of various states. They seek to represent a class
of nationwide plaintiffs and individual state-specific
sub-classes.

FCA first moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims on Dec. 14, 2020.
Rather than respond to that motion, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint that sought to remedy the pleading deficiencies
identified by FCA. On Feb. 23, 2021, FCA moved to dismiss the
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). The Court held a video hearing on the motion on July 20,
2021, and a second video hearing on Aug. 6, 2021.

II. Discussion

FCA moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims on several different
grounds.

A.

FCA first argues that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs'
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, MMWA,
fraud, and unjust enrichment claims to the extent that Plaintiffs
bring those claims on behalf of a nationwide class. It contends
that even though the named Plaintiffs have Article III standing to
assert these claims on their own behalf, they "lack Article III
standing to pursue claims on a nationwide basis because they do not
plead a single fact which arguably connects any one of their
vehicle purchases or injuries to any state other than" their home
states.

Judge Leitman explains that in Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card,
LLC, 660 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2011), the plaintiffs "hoped to
represent a nationwide class of consumers" who were allegedly
defrauded by a healthcare discount program. In the district court,
the defendant "filed a motion to strike the class allegations"
under Rule 23. The defendant argued that class certification was
impermissible under Rule 23 because (1) Ohio's choice-of-law rules
(which governed the action) required the court to evaluate each
class member's claim under the law of his or her home state and (2)
the substantial differences between the relevant laws in the
different states made a class action unmanageable and far
outweighed any common features of the claims. The district court
granted the motion and struck the nationwide class allegations.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It agreed with the district court that
a "class action in this setting was neither efficient nor workable
nor above all consistent with the requirements of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Notably, however, the Sixth
Circuit did not suggest that the named plaintiff lacked Article III
standing to assert claims on behalf of the proposed class members
on the ground that those claims would be governed by the
substantively-distinct laws of different states. And that seems
significant. Article III standing is an essential component of a
federal court's subject matter jurisdiction, and the Sixth Circuit
has repeatedly recognized its independent obligation to "verify the
existence of its subject matter jurisdiction" as a "threshold
matter" even where "the parties do not raise the issue of
jurisdiction on appeal."

For all of these reasons, Judge Leitman declines to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' nationwide class claims for lack of Article III
standing.

B.

FCA next argues that the express warranty claims brought by
Plaintiffs Player and Fernandez fail for several reasons. FCA first
argues that the applicable express warranty "does not cover the
defect alleged.

Judge Leitman declines to dismiss Player's or Fernandez' express
warranty claim on the basis that they plead only a design defect
claim. Just because Player and Fernandez plead allegations
involving a class of vehicles does not preclude the possibility of
a manufacturing defect.  It is also reasonable to infer from the
allegation that because FCA approved repairs of the Panel Defect,
FCA believed that the defect was covered by the applicable written
warranty.6 That plausible inference further counsels against
dismissing Player's or Fernandez' express warranty claim at the
pleading stage. For all of these reasons, Judge Leitman declines to
dismiss Player's or Fernandez' express warranty claim on the basis
that they plead only a design defect claim.

Second, FCA argues that the express warranty "was not breached." It
says that Player and Fernandez do not plead a cognizable breach of
the express warranty because "neither Player nor Fernandez plead
they were denied a free repair during the warranty period."

Judge Leitman declines to dismiss Player's or Fernandez' breach of
express warranty claim on this basis. With respect to Fernandez,
Fernandez plausibly alleges a breach of his express warranty. He
plausibly contends, in effect, that FCA's express promise to repair
his vehicle included a promise that the repair would be completed
within a reasonable period of time, and he reasonably alleges that
no repair was performed on his vehicles because FCA could not
timely provide the required parts. FCA has not yet persuaded the
Court that requiring Fernandez to wait more than six months (and
perhaps considerably longer) for a repair was reasonable.

With respect to Player, Judge Leitman holds that Player plausibly
alleges that this repair was not successful. He contends that the
repair was a mere temporary and insufficient fix rather than a
proper repair that restored the panels to their original and
working condition. And courts have held that where a plaintiff
alleges that a repair "did not remedy the underlying defective
components," then determining "whether Defendant fulfilled its
responsibilities under the Warranty is a fact question." For these
reasons, Judge Leitman declines to dismiss Player's express
warranty claim on the ground that he fails to plead a breach of the
warranty.

Finally, FCA argues that Player's breach of express warranty "claim
fails for lack of notice." Judge Leitman holds that in Weidman v.
Ford Motor Co., 2019 WL 3003693 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2019), a case
relied upon by FCA, another Judge of the Court explained that
"under Texas law, a claim for breach of express warranty requires a
plaintiff to have provided pre-suit notice of the alleged breach to
both the seller and remote manufacturer of the defective product."
And the court noted that "the manufacturer must be made aware of a
problem with a particular product purchased by a particular
buyer."

That is what Player alleges. He claims that he provided notice of
the Panel Defect to his local authorized FCA dealership, and that
the dealership then submitted photographs of Player's car and
Player's request for a repair directly to FCA via FCA's "digital
imaging" system. Under these circumstances, Player plausibly
alleges that he provided sufficient pre-suit notice of the Panel
Defect to FCA.

For all of the reasons stated above, the Sixth Circuit declines to
dismiss Player's or Ferndanez' breach of express warranty claims.

C.

The Sixth Circuit now turns to Player's and Fernandez' implied
warranty claims.  FCA first argues that these claims fail because
Player and Fernandez do not plead that the Class Vehicles were
unmerchantable.

The Sixth Circuit agrees. Player and Fernandez allege that their
vehicles were unmerchantable and not suitable for their "ordinary
purpose" in two respects: (1) the Panel Defect constituted a
"safety hazard" and (2) the ordinary purpose of their vehicles was
not simply to provide transportation, but instead the vehicles were
"part art," and the Panel Defect interfered with that latter
purpose. Neither argument persuades the Sixth Circuit that the
Class Vehicles were unmerchantable. It will therefore dismiss
Player's and Fernandez' implied warranty of merchantability
claims.

D.

The Sixth Circuit now turns to FCA's argument that the Plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim is "subject to dismissal because a
'comprehensive' express contract governed their rights to obtain
free vehicle repairs from FCA." It agrees. As the Court recently
explained when rejecting similar unjust enrichment claims brought
by a group of vehicle owners against the manufacturer of their
vehicles, a vehicle purchaser cannot maintain an unjust enrichment
claim where there is an express warranty that governs the same
subject matter as his unjust enrichment claims. Accordingly, teh
Sixth Circuit will dismiss the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claim.

E.

Finally, FCA argues that the Sixth Circuit should dismiss the
Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims, which include both a common-law
fraud claim and "statutory fraud claims under the laws of each
Plaintiffs' state of residence." The Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims
rest on two different predicates: alleged affirmative
misrepresentations and alleged fraudulent omissions.

The Sixth Circuit agrees that the Plaintiffs fail to state viable
claims based on either affirmative misrepresentations or fraudulent
omissions. It says, Courts in the district have repeatedly held
that the kind of broad, non-quantifiable statements about a
vehicle's safety or reliability that the Plaintiffs identify here
are non-actionable puffery, and the Sixth Court agrees with those
rulings. Hence, the Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims that arise out
of FCA's alleged affirmative misrepresentations are therefore
dismissed.

Turning to the Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims that arise out of
FCA's alleged fraudulent omissions, the Sixth Circuit holds that
the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that FCA had
pre-sale knowledge of the Panel Defect. It therefore dismisses the
Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims to the extent that they are based on
alleged fraudulent omissions.

III. Leave to Amend

During the hearing on FCA's motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs'
counsel suggested that if granted the opportunity, the Plaintiffs
may be able to amend their Amended Complaint to potentially cure at
least one of the deficiencies identified by FCA. Requests to amend
are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which
provides that a "court should freely give leave when justice so
requires."  The Plaintiffs have not filed a proper motion to amend,
nor have they presented the Court a proposed Second Amended
Complaint that includes the specific factual allegations they wish
to add. The Sixth Circuit declines to grant the Plaintiffs leave to
amend based upon their oral general request to amend at the hearing
on the motion to dismiss.

IV. Order

For all of the reasons it explained, the Sixth Circuit granted in
part and denied in part FCA's motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit
denied the motion with respect to the claims by Plaintiffs Player
and Fernandez for breach of express warranty under state law and
under the MMWA (Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint). The
motion is further denied to the extent that it seeks dismissal of
the nationwide class allegations on the basis that that the
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring claims on behalf of a
nationwide class. The Sixth Circuit will later decide, when and if
either party raises the issue by motion, whether Player and
Fernandez may pursue their claims on behalf of a nationwide (or
some other) class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The motion is granted in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/kfu2jx5w from Leagle.com.


GANNETT CO: Suris Appeals ADA Suit Dismissal to 2nd Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Yaroslav Suris filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled Suris v. Gannett Co., Inc., Case No.
20-cv-1793, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Brooklyn).

The Plaintiff brought this class action for retribution for the
Defendants' actions against deaf and hard of hearing individuals
residing in New York and within the United States. The Defendants
have allegedly denied the Plaintiff, who is deaf and deaf and
hard-of-hearing individuals' access to goods and services provided
to non-disabled individuals through its Website, www.usatoday.com,
and in conjunction with its physical location of offices, video,
television and blog studios, newspaper publishing, live events,
telecommunication offices, advertising offices and hosting
locations, is a violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the
American with Disabilities Act.

The Defendants provide goods and services to the public through its
Website. However, due to alleged barriers that make it difficult
for deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals to use the Website, the
Plaintiff, and other deaf and hard of hearing individuals cannot
understand the audio portion of videos on the Website and cannot
analyze and learn about breaking news, sports, money, life,
weather, technology and travel news -- all updated 24 hours a day,
seven days a week in addition to interactive features,
infographics, and multi-media functions including audio, video,
blogs, podcasts and live Webcasts and other video content that
non-deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals can.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Memorandum Decision
and Order dated July 14, 2021, and Court's Judgment dated July 15,
2021, granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the case.

The appellate case is captioned as Suris v. Gannett Co., Inc., Case
No. 21-1981, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, filed on August 13, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Yaroslav Suris, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Mitchell Segal, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MITCHELL S. SEGAL P.C.
          1129 Northern Boulevard
          Manhasset, NY 11030
          Telephone: (516) 415-0100
          E-mail: msegal@segallegal.com

Defendants-Appellees Gannett Co., Inc., DBA USA Today; and Gannett
Satellite Information Network, Inc., DBA USA Today, are represented
by:

          Cynthia Neidl, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          54 State Street
          Albany, NY 12207
          Telephone: (518) 689-1435
          E-mail: neidlc@gtlaw.com

GARDEN CITY: Court Dismisses Fourstar Suit Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia dismissed without prejudice the case, VICTOR CHARLES
FOURSTAR, JR., Plaintiff v. GARDEN CITY GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-00966 (UNA) (D.D.C.).

Plaintiff Fourstar, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is a
prisoner currently incarcerated at the Englewood Federal
Correctional Facility, located in Littleton, Colorado. He initiated
the matter on April 24, 2018. On June 14, 2018, the court noted
that another matter filed by the Plaintiff had been
administratively closed, and therefore, the Plaintiff was granted
an extension and provided with an opportunity to file an amended
complaint in the matter in an effort to consolidate and clarify his
intended claims.

By March 29, 2019, no amended complaint had been filed and the
deadline had long-elapsed, therefore, the case was dismissed
without prejudice. On May 3, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a motion to
reopen, which was granted on May 7, 2019. The Plaintiff was again
provided 45 days to file a proper amended complaint.

The Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on July 1, 2019. On
Aug. 19, 2019, the Court reviewed the pleading, and found several
noted deficiencies, including the Plaintiff's incompliance with
Federal Rule 8 and his misplaced intention to bring the matter as a
class-action. It dismissed the first amended complaint and provided
the Plaintiff with another opportunity to file an amended pleading
within 30 days. Over the course of the next two years, the
Plaintiff filed, and/or attempted to file, a flurry of motions, and
was granted additional extensions to file an amended pleading. On
July 26, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the operative second amended
complaint. He has failed, however, to correct the noted
deficiencies, despite multiple opportunities to do so.

The second amended complaint lists 17 myriad defendants,
approximately half of which are unidentified. He then broadly
alleges that the Defendants have interfered with his rights under
several constitutional amendments and treaties.

The Plaintiff alleges that unspecified Defendants have conspired
against him to commit fraud resulting in an unfavorable outcome
rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. He then incongruently alleges that some of the
Defendants "intentionally and willfully conspired to conceal fraud
in the administration of the Moderna vaccine, and DTP vaccine,
causing the Plaintiff to suffer severe physical pain and mental
anguish to Fourstar."

Next, he alleges that some of the Defendants "willfully conspired
to conceal fraud with unknown Fort Peck Community College Financial
Aid Administration -- for to deny Cobell Scholarship in abuse of
discretion." Id. Finally, he vaguely challenges indefinite
determinations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
and of the Social Security Administration.

Judge Sullivan finds it unclear how these allegations or any of the
Defendants relate to one another, aside from the Plaintiff's belief
in a wide-scale and overarching conspiracy against him. The
Plaintiff demands damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and
once again, asks the Court to designate him as a class-action
representative. As to the latter, the Judge reiterates once again
that a pro se litigant can represent only himself or herself in
federal court.

Though the Plaintiff has already been notified, the Judge again
notes that Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires complaints to contain "(1) a short and plain statement of
the grounds for the court's jurisdiction and (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."

The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of
the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive
answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine
of res judicata applies. When a "complaint contains an untidy
assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated,
nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp
harangues and personal comments," it does not fulfill the
requirements of Rule 8. The second amended complaint falls within
this category. And the claims as pled, fail to provide any notice
of a claim or any basis for either federal jurisdiction, venue in
the District, or personal jurisdiction over many of the
Defendants.

Furthermore, Judge Sullivan holds that the Court generally lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to intervene in the determinations of
other federal courts.

For all of these reasons, the case is dismissed without prejudice.
A separate order accompanies the Memorandum Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4k2863jz from Leagle.com.


GENIE ENERGY: Preliminary Bid to Dismiss Davis Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
Genie Energy Ltd. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the preliminary motion
to dismiss the putative class action suit initiated by Danelle
Davis, is pending.

On February 18, 2020, named Plaintiff Danelle Davis filed a
putative class action complaint against Residents Energy and Genie
Retail Energy (GRE) in United States District of New Jersey
alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47
U.S.C Section 227 et seq.

Residents Energy denies allegations in the complaint and plans to
vigorously defend this action.

On or around October 9, 2020, Residents Energy filed a preliminary
motion to dismiss one of the counts in the complaint, and to
dismiss GRE as a named defendant.  

Genie said, "Although Residents Energy and GRE denies any
wrongdoing in connection with the complaints, the parties settled
the matter for a minimal amount which was included in selling
general and administrative expenses for three months ended March
31, 2021."

Genie Energy Ltd., through its subsidiaries, operates as a retail
energy provider; and an oil and gas exploration company. The
company operates through three segments: Genie Retail Energy; Genie
Energy Services; and Genie Oil and Gas, Inc. Genie Energy Ltd. was
incorporated in 2001 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


GEORGETOWN MEMORIAL: Marshall Files ADA Suit in D. South Carolina
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Geogetown Memorial
Hospital. The case is styled as Loretta Sabrina Marshall,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Geogetown Memorial Hospital, Case No. 2:21-cv-02733-RMG-JDA
(D.S.C., Aug. 25, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Georgetown Memorial Hospital doing business as Tidelands Health --
https://www.tidelandshealth.org/ -- delivers high-quality health
care to the people of Georgetown and surrounding counties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Alan Nauheim, Esq.
          NAUHEIM LAW OFFICE
          815 Savannah Highway, Suite 201B
          Charleston, SC 29407
          Phone: (843) 534-5084
          Email: david@nauheimlaw.com

               - and -

          Joshua Thomas Mangan, Esq.
          MANGAN LAW OFFICE
          101 Sycamore Avenue
          Charleston, SC 29407
          Phone: (864) 985-9137
          Email: josh@nauheimlaw.com


GO ACQUISITION: Assad Sues Over Failure to Meet ICA Obligations
---------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGE ASSAD, directly on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, and derivatively on behalf of GO ACQUISITION
CORP., Plaintiff v. GO ACQUISITION CORP., Nominal Defendant v. GO
ACQUISITION FOUNDER LLC, NOAM GOTTESMAN, M. GREGORY O'HARA, JEREMY
ISAACS, GILBERT AHYE, and NORMA CORIO, Case No. 1:21-cv-07076
(S.D.N.Y., August 20, 2021) is a class action against the
Defendants for declaratory judgment and violations of 15 U.S.
Constitution.

The case arises from Go Acquisition's and the Defendants' alleged
failure to meet their obligations under the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (ICA). The Defendants suggest that they can avoid the ICA
because, they say, Go Acquisition is not an investment company but
a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC). They say that the
company's primary purpose is not to invest in securities but
instead to acquire an operating business. However, investing in
securities is all the company has ever done since its initial
public offering (IPO), says the suit.

The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment stating that the company
is an investment company under the ICA. The Plaintiff further
requests a court order asking for damages as a result of the
company's alleged capital structure, operations, and compensation
scheme that violate the ICA.

Go Acquisition Corp. is a blank check company headquartered in New
York.

Go Acquisition Founder LLC is a Delaware limited liability company.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
                  
         Mark Lebovitch, Esq.
         Daniel E. Meyer, Esq.
         Joseph W. Caputo, Esq.
         BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
         1251 Avenue of the Americas
         New York, NY 10020
         Telephone: (212) 554-1519
         Facsimile: (212) 554-1444
         E-mail: MarkL@blbglaw.com

                 - and –

         Gregory V. Varallo, Esq.
         BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
         500 Delaware Avenue, Suite 901
         Wilmington, DE 19801
         Telephone: (302) 364-3601
         E-mail: Greg.Varallo@blbglaw.com

                 - and –

         Shawn J. Rabin, Esq.
         Stephen Shackelford, Esq.
         Cory Buland, Esq.
         Beatrice Franklin, Esq.
         SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
         1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
         New York, NY 10019
         Telephone: (212) 336-8330
         Facsimile: (212) 336-8340
         E-mail: SRabin@susmangodfrey.com

                 - and –

         Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Esq.
         John Morley, Esq.
         BUZIN LAW, P.C.
         111 Broadway, Suite 1204
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (914) 819-7527
         E-mail: john.morley@yale.edu

                 - and –

         Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
         RM LAW, P.C.
         1055 Westlakes Dr., Ste. 300
         Berwyn, PA 19312
         Telephone: (484) 258-1585
         Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
         E-mail: rm@rmclasslaw.com

GOOGLE LLC: Sweepstakes Suit Moved From N.D. Cal. to S.D.N.Y.
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled SWEEPSTAKES TODAY, LLC, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. GOOGLE LLC, ALPHABET INC. and
YOUTUBE, LLC, Case No. 5:20-cv-08984, was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York on August 20,
2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of New York assigned
Case No. 1:21-cv-07034-PKC to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act by engaging in a series
of inorganic strategic acquisitions, anticompetitive contracts and
anticompetitive tactics to maximize their advertising profits,
protect their valuable monopolies against competitive threats, and
extend their monopolies globally and across the entire digital
advertising chain.

Sweepstakes Today, LLC is an online publisher with its principal
place of business located at 2914 South 122nd East Avenue, Tulsa,
Oklahoma.

Google LLC is an American multinational technology company that
specializes in Internet-related services and products,
headquartered in Mountain View, California.

Alphabet Inc. is an American multinational conglomerate
headquartered in Mountain View, California.

YouTube, LLC is an American online video sharing and social media
platform owned by Google LLC, headquartered in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
         
         Daniel J. Pfefferbaum, Esq.
         ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
         Post Montgomery Center
         One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
         San Francisco, CA 94104
         Telephone: (415) 288-4545
         Facsimile: (415) 288-4534
         E-mail: dpfefferbaum@rgrdlaw.com

                  - and –

         David W. Mitchell, Esq.
         Steven M. Jodlowski, Esq.
         ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
         655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 231-1058
         Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
         E-mail: davidm@rgrdlaw.com
                 sjodlowski@rgrdlaw.com

                  - and –

         John C. Herman, Esq.
         HERMAN JONES LLP
         3424 Peachtree Road, N.E., Suite 1650
         Atlanta, GA 30326
         Telephone: (404) 504-6555
         Facsimile: (404) 504-6501
         E-mail: jherman@hermanjones.com

GRAPHIC PACKAGING: Illinois Court Stays Roberts BIPA Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOCELYN ROBERTS, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiff v. GRAPHIC PACKAGING
INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 21-CV-750-DWD (S.D. Ill.),
Judge David W. Dugan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois granted the Defendant's Motion to Stay, and
denied without prejudice the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

In the putative class action, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
("BIPA"), 40 ILCS Section 14/1, et seq., through its use of hand
geometry scans.

Now before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings.
The Defendant seeks a stay of all proceedings in the matter pending
decisions from the Seventh Circuit in In Re: White Castle System,
Inc., No. 20-8029 (Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 467
F.Supp.3d 604 (N.D. Ill. 2020), and two pending Illinois Appellate
Courts' decisions in Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., No.
1-20-0562, and Marion v. Ring Container Techs., LLC, No.
3-20-0184.

The Defendant argues that the issues addressed in these appeals are
fundamental to this case and may supply guidance on the accrual of
claims under BIPA which could result in dismissal of the
Plaintiff's claims, or otherwise impact the scope of any putative
class in this case.

In White Castle, the Seventh Circuit has been asked to decide when
BIPA claims accrue, and to specifically determine whether a private
entity violates BIPA when it first collects or discloses an
individual's biometric information or identifiers, or whether a
private entity violates BIPA each time it collects or discloses
biometric data in violation of Sections 15(b) or 15(d). In Tims and
Marion, the Illinois appellate courts could decide whether BIPA
claims are potentially subject to a one-, two-, or five-year
statute of limitations period.

The Plaintiff opposes the motion to stay, arguing that a stay would
greatly prejudice her ability to conduct discovery. She asserts
that she intends to conduct discovery from the third-party
manufacturer of the Defendant's biometric data and is concerned
that a stay would increase the risk of spoliation of evidence
because third parties generally have no duty to preserve evidence.

The Plaintiff also contends that discovery in general would become
more difficult should a stay issue because class members would
become more difficult to locate, witness memories could fade, and
documents and evidence could be lost. Finally, the Plaintiff argues
that the Court is capable of resolving the Defendant's statute of
limitations arguments without guidance from the Illinois appellate
courts, and that none of the issues currently before the Court
implicate the accrual date of the Plaintiff's claims so the Seventh
Circuit's decision in White Castle will not assist the Court in the
matter.

Judge Dugan is not persuaded that a determination of the accrual
date for claims under BIPA by the Seventh Circuit is irrelevant in
the case. He says, while the Plaintiff is correct that a
determination on whether a one-, two-, or five-year limitations
period will guide the parties, the Judge finds that the accrual
date is also relevant.

Similarly, the Judge finds that the decisions in Tims and Marion
may also advance judicial economy because both cases will address
the currently unsettled question of which statute of limitations
period applies to BIPA claims. As the Illinois Supreme Court has
not yet decided the applicable statute of limitations for BIPA
claims, a decision from the Illinois appellate courts may be
binding in the case. Accordingly, it appears that that issue, once
decided, may serve to control the statute of limitations applicable
in the case. Therefore, the Judge finds that a stay pending the
outcome of White Castle, Tims and Marion would simplify the issues
and reduce the burden of litigation in the case.

Finally, the Judge finds that any prejudice to the Plaintiff is not
undue and that a stay is appropriate. In so finding, he notes that
the stay will be of limited duration. The Tims and Marion cases are
fully briefed, and White Castle is set for oral argument on Sept.
14, 2021. Further, the Plaintiff's claims of discovery delays and
his ability to locate prospective class members because of this
delay, while possible, is speculative at best.

In short, weighing all the relevant facts, the Judge joins with the
well-reasoned decisions by other district courts in the Circuit,
and finds that a stay is appropriate. Should circumstance change
significantly such that a recognizable prejudice befalls the
Plaintiff during the stay of the matter, the Plaintiffs are free to
seek the Court's consideration. However, it remains under the
present circumstances that notions of judicial economy weigh in
favor of a stay of the matter.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Dugan granted the Defendant's
Motion to Stay. All proceedings and deadlines in this matter are
stayed pending the resolution of Cothron v. White Castle System,
Inc. No. 20-3202, Tims v Black Horse Carriers, Case No. 1-20-0562,
Marion v. Ring Container Techs, LLC, No. 3-20-0184. The parties are
ordered to file a status report within 14 days of each decision.
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied without prejudice, and
with leave to refile once the stay is lifted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4n3hhrd8 from Leagle.com.


GREYSTAR REAL: Seeks 14-Day Extension to File Class Cert Response
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KATRINA WALLACE, on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated, v. GREYSTAR REAL ESTATE
PARTNERS, LLC, GREYSTAR GP II, LLC, GREYSTAR MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
L.P., GREYSTAR RS NATIONAL, INC., GREYSTAR RS SE, LLC, GREP
SOUTHEAST, LLC; and INNESBROOK APARTMENTS, LLC, d/b/a SOUTHPOINT
GLEN, Case No. 1:18-cv-00501-LCB-LPA (M.D.N.C.), the Moving
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order granting a 14 day
extension of time in which to serve a response brief to Plaintiff's
motion for class certification.

The Moving Defendants contend that the Plaintiff filed her brief in
Motion for Class Certification on July 23, 2021 and that they
require additional time to file an appropriate response to
Plaintiff's memorandum. Moving Defendants add that they are not
requesting an extension for any improper purpose or to needlessly
delay this matter.

Greystar is an international real estate developer and manager
based in the United States.

A copy of the Moving Defendants' motion dated Aug. 26, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2UXo0KO at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Counsel for the Defendants Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC,
Greystar Management Services, L.P., Greystar RS National, Inc.,
Greystar RS SE, LLC, and GREP Southeast, LLC, are:

          Rudolf Garcia-Gallont, Esq.
          WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
          One West Fourth Street
          Winston-Salem, NC 27101
          Telephone: (336) 721-3600
          Facsimile: (336) 721-3660
          E-mail: Rolf.Garcia-Gallont@wbd-us.com

GRUBHUB HOLDINGS: Misclassifies Delivery Drivers, Levine Suit Says
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STEPHEN LEVINE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. GRUBHUB HOLDINGS, INC. and GRUBHUB, INC., Case No.
21-1840G (Mass. Super., Aug. 11, 2021) is brought on behalf of
individuals who have worked as independent contractor delivery
drivers for GrubHub in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

GrubHub is a delivery service that provides delivery drivers who
can be scheduled and dispatched through a mobile phone application
or through its website and who will deliver food and other goods
from restaurants and stores to customers at their homes and
businesses.

GrubHub has allegedly misclassified certain delivery drivers as
independent contractors when they are actually employees, in
violation of Mass. Gen. L. c. 149 section 148B. In so doing,
GrubHub has violated Mass. Gen. L. c. 149 section 148 by failing to
reimburse these drivers' necessary business expenses such as gas
and car maintenance and Mass. Gen. L. c. 151 seciton 1, 7 by
failing to pay these drivers the Massachusetts minimum wage after
accounting for drivers' expenses and excluding their tips (as
GrubHub is not entitled to take the tip credit against the minimum
wage), says the suit.

The Plaintiff is an adult resident of Lynn, Massachusetts. He has
worked as a GrubHub independent contractor delivery driver in the
Boston, Massachusetts, area and the North Shore since January
2021.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          Michelle Cassorla, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw com
                  mcassorla@llrlaw.com

H&R BLOCK: Bid to Junk Snarr's Public Injunctive Relief Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
H&R Block, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company's motion to
dismiss the plaintiff's claim for public injunctive relief filed in
Snarr v. HRB Tax Group, Inc., et al., is pending.

On May 17, 2019, a putative class action complaint was filed
against H&R Block, Inc., HRB Tax Group, Inc. and HRB Digital LLC in
the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San
Francisco (Case No. CGC-19576093).

The case is styled Snarr v. HRB Tax Group, Inc., et al. The case
was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California on June 21, 2019 (Case No.
3:19-cv-03610-SK).

The plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on August 9, 2019,
dropping H&R Block, Inc. from the case.

In the amended complaint, the plaintiff seeks to represent classes
of all persons, between May 17, 2015 and the present, who (1) paid
to file one or more federal tax returns through H&R Block's
internet-based filing system, (2) were eligible to file those tax
returns for free through the H&R Block Free File offer of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Free File Program, and (3) resided
in and were citizens of California at the time of the payments.

The plaintiff generally alleges unlawful, unfair, fraudulent and
deceptive business practices and acts in connection with the IRS
Free File Program in violation of the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, California Civil Code Sections 1750, et seq.,
California False Advertising Law, California Business and
Professions Code Sections 17500, et seq., and California Unfair
Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code Sections
17200 et seq.

The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, restitution,
compensatory damages, punitive damages, interest, attorneys' fees
and costs.

The company filed a motion to stay the proceedings based on the
primary jurisdiction doctrine and a motion to compel arbitration,
both of which were denied. The company's appeal of the court's
order on the motion to compel arbitration was denied; the company
filed a petition for review with the United States Supreme Court.

The company filed an answer to the amended complaint. The company
filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration, which the court
denied on May 13, 2021; the company's appeal is pending. The
company also filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for
public injunctive relief, which is pending.

A trial date is set for June 6, 2023.

H&R Block said, "We have not concluded that a loss related to this
matter is probable, nor have we accrued a liability related to this
matter."

H&R Block, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides assisted income
tax return preparation, digital do-it-yourself (DIY) tax solutions,
and other services and products related to income tax return
preparation to the general public primarily in the United States,
Canada, and Australia. H&R Block, Inc. was founded in 1946 and is
headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri.


H&R BLOCK: Swanson Putative Class Suit Stayed Pending Arbitration
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H&R Block, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the putative class
action suit entitled, Swanson v. H&R Block, Inc., et al. has been
stayed, pending arbitration.

On September 26, 2019, a putative class action complaint was filed
against H&R Block, Inc., HRB Tax Group, Inc., HRB Digital LLC and
Free File, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri (Case No. 4:19-cv-00788-GAF) styled Swanson v.
H&R Block, Inc., et al.

The plaintiff seeks to represent both a nationwide class and a
California subclass of all persons eligible for the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) Free File Program who paid to use an H&R
Block product to file an online tax return for the 2002 through
2018 tax filing years.

The plaintiff generally alleges unlawful, unfair, fraudulent and
deceptive business practices and acts in connection with the IRS
Free File Program in violation of the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, California Civil Code Sections 1750, et seq.,
California False Advertising Law, California Business and
Professions Code Sections 17500, et seq., California Unfair
Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code Sections
17200, et seq., in addition to breach of contract and fraud.

The plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement, compensatory
damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, interest, attorneys'
fees and costs.

The court granted a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Free File,
Inc. for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the
company's motion to compel arbitration and stayed the case pending
the outcome of individual arbitration.

H&R Block said, "We have not concluded that a loss related to this
matter is probable, nor have we accrued a liability related to this
matter."

H&R Block, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides assisted income
tax return preparation, digital do-it-yourself (DIY) tax solutions,
and other services and products related to income tax return
preparation to the general public primarily in the United States,
Canada, and Australia. H&R Block, Inc. was founded in 1946 and is
headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri.

HARTFORD CASUALTY: Florida Court Dismisses Bourgier Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami
Division, grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit
entitled PATRICE BOURGIER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 21-21053-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla.).

Plaintiff Patrice Bourgier, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against
Defendant Hartford Casualty Insurance Company for alleged covered
losses and expenses pursuant to the policy issued to Bourgier by
Hartford. The covered losses and expenses are related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Hartford now moves to dismiss the class action
complaint for failure to state a claim because the alleged losses
and expenses are not covered by the policy.

Background

Ms. Bourgier is the owner and operator of a full-service salon
located at 64 Southwest 10th Street, in Miami, Florida. In May
2019, Bourgier obtained an "all-risk" property insurance policy
that was issued and underwritten by Hartford, whereby Bourgier paid
monthly premiums to Hartford in exchange for Hartford's coverage of
certain losses. The Policy has a policy period of July 3, 2019, to
July 3, 2020, and the insured premise listed is Bourgier's salon in
Miami.

As alleged, in March 2020, Bourgier was forced to close the salon
as a result of contamination by the coronavirus and related
government orders. And, while the salon re-opened after the closure
orders were lifted, it re-opened in a physically transformed,
altered, and impaired state that was subject to the continuous and
constant risk of recontamination.

According to Bourgier, to address this risk, significant necessary
physical alterations were made to the salon to minimize, contain
and mitigate coronavirus contamination. Those alterations included
restrictions of the physical use of the property and physical
alterations to the property's layout, such as the reconfiguration
of seating, the installation of plexiglass shields and additional
sanitizer dispensers, the enhancement of air filtration systems and
the more frequent replacement of equipment due to the increased
rate of deterioration from increased cleaning.

Ms. Bourgier alleges that these alterations have severely impaired
her ability to make use of the property and, therefore, she has
suffered a cessation, suspension and/or a slowdown of business
operations. She claims that the losses and expenses incurred in
relation to the slowdown of its business operations are covered
under the Policy.

Ms. Bourgier's class action complaint includes claims for
declaratory judgment and breach of contract as it relates to the
following Policy provisions: Business Income Coverage (Counts 1 and
2); Extra Expense Coverage (Counts 3 and 4); Civil Authority
Coverage (Counts 5 and 6); and the Virus Coverage Endorsement
Coverage (Counts 7 and 8).

Hartford attached a copy of the Policy to its motion to dismiss.
The Policy's "Special Property Coverage Form," under a heading of
"Coverage," provides that Hartford will pay for direct physical
loss of or physical damage to Covered Property caused by or
resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss. "Covered Causes of Loss"
are subsequently defined as "RISKS OF DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS" unless
the loss is otherwise excluded or limited by the Policy.

Under the Policy, the Business Income, Extra Expense, and Virus
provisions all require direct physical loss to property before any
coverage can be triggered. The Civil Authority provision requires a
Covered Cause of Loss, and, thus, only applies to risks of direct
physical loss unless otherwise excluded or limited by the Policy.

Hartford moves to dismiss Bourgier's class action complaint for
failure to state a claim because each Policy provision implicated
in this action requires direct physical loss or damage to property,
which is not present here. Notably, Hartford cites to, and Bourgier
does not address, this Court's decision in Town Kitchen LLC v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2021 WL
768273, at *3-7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2021) (rejecting the
plaintiff's loss of use and physical contamination theories,
finding that such theories did not constitute direct physical loss
under the policy, and dismissing case for failure to state a
claim).

Discussion

Hartford seeks to dismiss Bourgier's class action complaint in its
entirety because all the Policy provisions implicated in the
alleged causes of action require direct physical loss, or risk
thereof, and, according to Hartford, Bourgier has not plausibly
alleged such loss in the complaint. The parties do not dispute that
the Court must apply Florida law when interpreting the Policy.

A. Direct Physical Loss

The parties disagree as to whether Bourgier has plausibly alleged
losses covered by the Policy, that is, that the losses were direct
physical losses. As noted by Hartford in its motion to dismiss and
reply, the Court already decided this issue in Town Kitchen, 2021
WL 768273, at *3-7.

District Judge Federico A. Moreno opines that in the case, Bourgier
has failed to plausibly allege a direct physical loss covered by
the Policy under Florida law. Like the plaintiff insured in Town
Kitchen, Bourgier advances loss of use and physical contamination
theories, which the Court rejected in Town Kitchen.

Thus, given that the Business Income, Extra Expense, Civil
Authority, and Virus policy provisions all require "direct physical
loss" for coverage, Hartford's motion to dismiss is granted because
Bourgier has failed to plausibly allege such a loss.

Alternatively, even if Bourgier has plausibly alleged a direct
physical loss, there are other grounds for dismissing her claims
based on the plain language of the Civil Authority and
Virus-related provisions, Judge Moreno adds.

B. Civil Authority Provision

In its motion to dismiss, Hartford contends that Bourgier has
failed to show Civil Authority coverage was triggered here because
such coverage requires (1) a Covered Cause of Loss, i.e., direct
physical loss to property in the immediate area of its premises;
(2) that access to its premises was specifically prohibited by the
order of civil authority; and (3) the order of civil authority was
taken directly in response to the physical damage or loss. The
Court agrees with Hartford.

Judge Moreno holds that dismissal is also appropriate of Bourgier's
Civil Authority coverage claim because she has failed to allege a
"direct physical loss" to property in the immediate area of the
scheduled premises. The Judge also holds that there was not a
complete prohibition of access, and, Bourgier has failed to allege
that she was prohibited from accessing the premises, citing Raymond
H Nahmad DDS PA v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 499 F.Supp.3d 1188
(S.D. Fla. 2020).

The parties also disagree as to whether the civil authority orders
here were issued "as the direct result of a Covered Cause of Loss
to property in the immediate area of your 'scheduled premises'." In
its motion to dismiss, Hartford cites cases for the proposition as
that Florida courts have rejected similar civil authority claims
because the COVID-19 orders were aimed at preventing a future harm
to people, not existing property loss or damage, including Pane
Rustica, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., Case No. 8:20-cv-1783-KKM-AAS,
2021 WL 1087219, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2021).

Given the authorities presented, the Court finds that, even if the
preceding policy requirements were met, there is no civil authority
coverage because Bourgier has failed to show that the civil
authority orders were issued "as the direct result of a Covered
Cause of Loss to property in the immediate area of your 'scheduled
premises'."

C. The Virus-related Provisions

Hartford maintains that a "Virus Exclusion" bars coverage for all
of Bourgier's claims. On the other hand, Bourgier characterizes the
provision as a "Virus Coverage Endorsement" and maintains that it
provides coverage for the losses here.

Judge Moreno opines that even if Bourgier's complaint plausibly
alleged a direct physical loss covered under the Policy, any
coverage for such losses are excluded by the Policy unless the
virus is the result of (1) fire; lightning; explosion, windstorm or
hail; smoke; aircraft or vehicles; riot or civil commotion;
vandalism; leakage from fire extinguishing equipment; sinkhole
collapse; volcanic action; falling objects; weight of snow, ice or
sleet; water damage; or (2) an Equipment Breakdown Accident [that]
occurs to Equipment Breakdown Property, if Equipment Breakdown
applies to the affected premises. Because Bourgier has not shown
that coverage exists under the Policy's limited grant of coverage
for virus-related loss or damage, the losses here, caused directly
or indirectly by COVID-19, are not covered base on the Policy's
Virus Exclusion.

Given that Bourgier has failed to show that the Policy's limited
grant of virus coverage applies here, dismissal of her claims under
the "Virus Exclusion" is appropriate, Judge Moreno points out.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for these reasons, it is adjudged that:

   1. Hartford's Motion to Dismiss is granted;

   2. Bourgier's Class Action Complaint is dismissed with
      prejudice; and

   3. The Clerk is directed to close this case and all pending
      motions are denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5x9aemc7 from Leagle.com.


HOME DEPOT: Burcham Seeks to Certify Class of Employees
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DONNIE SANCHEZ BARRAGAN
ARACELI BARRAGAN, and JEREMEY BURCHAM, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a
Delaware Corporation, Case No.  3:19-cv-01766-AJB-AGS (S.D. Cal.),
the Plaintiff Jeremey Burcham asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying the following class:

      "All non-exempt Home Depot employees in California who
      received a minimum (e.g., $100) "Success Sharing" bonus
      and worked overtime during the same Success Sharing plan
      period, within three years of the filing of the complaint
      in this action until June 20, 2018;" and

   2. appointing Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP, and Glick Law Group,
      P.C., as class counsel.

Home Depot is a home improvement retailer in the United States,
supplying tools, construction products, and services. The company
is headquartered in incorporated Cobb County, Georgia, with an
Atlanta mailing address.

A copy of the Plaintiff Burcham's motion to certify class dated
Aug. 26, 2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/2WtAoTg at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Craig M. Nicholas, Esq.
          Shaun A. Markley, Esq.
          NICHOLAS & TOMASEVIC, LLP
          225 Broadway, 19 Floor
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 325-0492
          Facsimile: (619) 325-0496
          E-mail: cnicholas@nicholaslaw.org
                  smarkley@nicholaslaw.org

               - and -

          Noam Glick, Esq.
          GLICK LAW GROUP, P.C.
          225 Broadway, 19 th Floor
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 382-3400
          E-mail: noam@glicklawgroup.com

HOME DEPOT: Court Grants in Part Summary Judgment Bids in Barragan
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In the case, DONNIE SANCHEZ BARRAGAN, ARACELI BARRAGAN, and JEREMEY
BURCHAM, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01766-AJB-AGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge
Anthony J. Battaglia of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California issued an Order:

   a. granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff Jeremey
      Burcham's motion for summary judgment;

   b. granting in part and denying in part Defendant Home Depot's
      motion for summary judgment;

   c. granting in part the Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for
      Reconsideration; and

   d. denying as moot the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a
      sur-reply in support of the ex parte motion for
      reconsideration.

I. Background

The wage and hour putative class action is brought by three
Plaintiffs. The case is a wage and hour class action centering
around Home Depot's Success Sharing bonus program. Home Depot's
Success Sharing bonus program rewards Home Depot's associates for
meeting sales objectives and company goals. If a particular Home
Depot store achieves between 95% and 110% of its sales goal for the
year, a bonus award is given to the store that must be divided up
among eligible store employees. Each employee's Success Sharing
bonus is based on a relative percentage of his or her earnings
compared with the earnings of others at the store. Important for
this dispute, if an employee's share of the bonus is below a
designated minimum amount ($100 for most employees, $200 for
department supervisors), the employee will receive a lump sum
minimum bonus payment.

The gravamen of the Plaintiffs' operative Complaint is that prior
to September 2018, Home Depot did not adjust overtime payments to
account for the additional wages it paid through the Success
Sharing program when it awarded the minimum ($100 or $200) Success
Sharing bonus payments. In September 2018, Home Depot apparently
changed course and started adjusting overtime pay to account for
minimum Success Sharing payments under the following formula: Bonus
amount divided by non-overtime hours during the bonus period
multiplied by 1.5 times overtime hours worked.

Plaintiff Burcham (and not the other two Plaintiffs) received a
minimum, $100, Success Sharing payment in March 2018 for the August
2017 through January 2018 Success Sharing plan period. He also
worked overtime during this Success Sharing plan period in October,
November, and December of 2017 and again in January of 2018.
Consistent with Home Depot's practices in the early 2018 timeframe,
it did not adjust Plaintiff Burcham's overtime wage to account for
the additional Success Sharing pay attributable to the August 2017
through January 2018 Success Sharing plan period.

Plaintiff Burcham's employment with Home Depot came to an end in
February 2019. Plaintiff Burcham contends because Home Depot had
not adjusted his overtime wages to account for his March 2018
minimum Success Sharing bonus as of his termination in February
2019, he was not paid all wages owed upon termination.

On Aug. 12, 2019, Plaintiffs Donnie Sanchez Barragan and Araceli
Barragan filed the first Complaint with a single cause of action in
San Diego Superior Court. The single cause of action alleged the
failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements. Home Depot
removed the action to the Court on Sept. 13, 2019.

In December 2019, the same two named Plaintiffs filed a First
Amended Complaint ("FAC"). The FAC added three new causes of action
arising out of Home Depot's failure to properly pay overtime wages:
(1) failure to pay overtime, (2) failure to pay all wages due upon
termination, and (3) violation of California's unfair competition
law ("UCL").

In July 2020, after further discovery and investigation into Home
Depot's pay practices, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC"). The SAC added a new named Plaintiff, Jeremey
Burcham, and also added a new claim, styled as the third cause of
action, for failure to pay all wages earned each pay period.

The Plaintiffs' SAC asserted five claims for (1) failure to provide
accurate itemized wage statements (brought by all three
Plaintiffs), (2) failure to pay overtime (brought by Plaintiff
Burcham only), (3) failure to pay all wages earned each pay period
(brought by all three Plaintiffs), (4) failure to pay all wages due
upon termination (brought by all three Plaintiffs), and (5)
violation of California's UCL, (brought by all three Plaintiffs).

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration

Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is
presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error
or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is
an intervening change in controlling law. The Plaintiffs argue: (1)
there is an intervening change in the law that warrants
reconsideration of the Court's prior order, and (2) dismissing the
third cause of action with prejudice and without leave to amend was
clear error.

Based on the second ground, Judge Battaglia grants in part the
motion for reconsideration, and provides the Plaintiffs leave to
amend their third claim. In dismissing the Plaintiffs' third claim
without leave to amend, the previous order noted that the
"Plaintiffs have amended their complaint multiple times. Nothing in
the Plaintiffs' filings indicate that the newly alleged claims in
the third cause of action were not discoverable when Plaintiffs
filed their initial complaint."

While this may have been true, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs'
reconsideration motion also highlights that the parties had
stipulated to leave to amend to add the third claim for meal/rest
break violations. This is a point not considered by the Court in
its previous order. Accordingly, because denial of leave was not
based on futility of the amendment, and in light of this new
consideration, the Judge provides the Plaintiffs one final attempt
to allege a claim based on the failure to pay premium wages at the
correct wage. In this amended claim, the Plaintiffs are to clearly
and concisely set forth its claim in a short and plain statement
such that Home Depot can adequately defend against the allegations
raised.

To be clear, the Plaintiffs' motion is granted in part. The Judge
does not reverse its earlier decision to dismiss the third claim.
The third claim remains dismissed for failure to provide a short
and plain statement of the relief Plaintiffs are entitled to.
However, the Order amends the prior portion of the order which
denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Battaglia grants in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, and denies as moot their
request to file a sur-reply.

B. The Parties' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

Having addressed the ex parte motion for reconsideration, Judge
Battaglia turns to arguments related to the pending summary
judgment motions. Both Plaintiff Burcham and Home Depot filed cross
motions for summary judgment. To the extent the parties' arguments
overlap, they will be addressed together. The Judge additionally
notes that the parties agree on most material facts, and the
disagreement centers around the application of those undisputed
facts to the law.

1. The Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Home Depot argues in its motion for summary judgment that the
Plaintiffs have no Article III standing with respect to the first
claim for inaccurate itemized wage statements. The Plaintiffs agree
with Home Depot and asks the Court to remand the entire case to
state court based on this one claim. While the parties agree as to
the standing arguments, where the parties differ is the appropriate
remedy. Home Depot advocates for a dismissal of the claim, whereas
the Plaintiffs seek a remand of the entire case.  

Judge Battaglia holds that both parties are incorrect. He finds
that the Plaintiffs adequately allege they did not receive the full
information they were entitled to under the law. Therefore, Magadia
precludes a finding that the Plaintiffs lack standing to assert
their wage statement claim. Although Home Depot disagrees with the
premise that required information was omitted, this does not
invalidate the Plaintiffs' initial concerns that certain
information was absent from their wage statements. There is no
requirement under the law that a plaintiff proves they are likely
to succeed on the merits before they can be deemed to have
standing. Therefore, Home Depot's argument regarding standing, and
the Plaintiffs' request for remand based on lack of standing both
fail.

In addition, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs seem to request
the remand of the entire case, including the other claims regarding
overtime, failure to pay all due wages, and the derivative claims.
These other claims are not contingent on the success of the
Plaintiffs' inaccurate wage statement claim. Even if he were to
find that it had no jurisdiction over the wage statement claim
(which it does not), the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs do not
adequately explain how that would warrant a remand of the entire
action. There is no argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
the remaining causes of action.

Accordingly, the Judge concludes that the Court has jurisdiction
over the action.

2. The Merits of Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief for Inaccurate
Wage Statements

Finding that the Plaintiffs have standing to bring their first
claim for relief for inaccurate wage statements, Judge Battaglia
turns to the substantive merits of Home Depot's motion for summary
judgment as to this wage statement claim. This claim is brought by
all three Plaintiffs and alleges inaccurate wage statements based
on Home Depot's failure to account for the bonus payments in
calculating the hourly rate. Labor Code Section 226, the relevant
provision, requires employers to include on wage statements, "all
applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the
corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the
employee."

Judge Battaglia finds that because Home Depot must retroactively
calculate the overtime adjustment based on work from prior periods,
it is not an "hourly rate in effect during the pay period."
Instead, it is a "fictional" hourly rate calculated only after the
pay period has closed. Thus, the law does not mandate that this
fictional hourly rate appear on wage statements. It follows that
Home Depot may not be liable for failing to disclose this rate on
its wage statements. Accordingly, the Judge grants summary judgment
in favor of Home Depot as to the first claim for relief in the
SAC.

3. Plaintiff Burcham's Second Claim for Failure to Pay Overtime

The parties also filed cross summary judgment motions on the second
claim for relief. The second claim for relief--brought by Plaintiff
Burcham only--asserts that Home Depot failed to pay all overtime
wages owed. In essence, the dispute concerns whether Home Depot
owed overtime when it awarded Plaintiff Burcham a minimum $100
bonus. The gravamen of Plaintiff Burcham's claim is that Home Depot
should have recalculated overtime pay after it paid him a $100
bonus.

Judge Battaglia finds that because no genuine dispute as to any
material fact exists, Plaintiff Burcham is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. The evidence in the record does not support Home
Depot's interpretation of the bonuses as percentage-based. The
evidence shows that after applying the first percentage, and
determining that the amount is less than $100, the bonus is paid as
lump sum. If he were to accept Home Depot's interpretation of
percentage bonuses, the Judge finds that all flat sum bonuses could
be recharacterized as percentage-based, eviscerating 29 C.F.R.
Section 778.210.

That is not to say that Home Depot did not at some point attempt to
calculate the bonus using a percentage. The evidence only indicates
that after using a percentage-based calculation, and after
determining that this calculation yielded a total less than $100,
Home Depot converted the bonus to a lump sum. Because no genuine
dispute as to any material fact exists, Plaintiff Burcham is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Judge
grants summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Burcham as to the
second claim for overtime law violations. Home Depot's motion for
summary judgment is denied on this claim.

4. Plaintiff Burcham's Fourth Claim for Waiting-Time Penalties

The parties also both argue they are entitled to summary judgment
as to the fourth claim for waiting time penalties. Section 203 of
the California Labor Code provides for penalties where an employer
"willfully" failed to pay wages at the time an employee is
terminated.

Plaintiff Burcham argues that because Home Depot intended not to
pay overtime resulting from the bonus payment, he is entitled to a
liability determination on his claim for waiting time penalties
under Labor Code Section 203. To support this claim, Plaintiff
Burcham asserts that Home Depot's competitors attempted to pay
overtime on similar bonus programs, which undercuts any reasonable
belief that Home Depot was excused from overtime obligations when
paying minimum Success Sharing bonuses. By contrast, Home Depot
moves for summary judgment on this same claim as well, arguing that
there is no willful failure to pay wages if the legal duty to pay
was unclear at the time of the violation.

Judge Battaglia agrees with Home Depot. The record shows Home Depot
reasonably believed that it did not owe Plaintiff Burcham premium
wages at the time he left his employment based on the legal
defenses of the percentage-based exception. As stated, this defense
proved to be unsuccessful. But it is still a defense "based in law"
that "would preclude recovery on the part of the employee."
Although that court did not address the issue of the $100 minimum
bonus, there was at least some reasonable basis to mistake the $100
minimum bonus as a percentage-based bonus. Plaintiff Burcham's
Labor Code Section 203 claim thus fails. In accordance with the
foregoing, the Judge grants Home Depot's motion, and enters summary
judgment on the fourth claim for Home Depot.

5. Plaintiff Burcham's Fifth Claim for Violation of the UCL

Next, the parties both move for summary judgment as to the UCL
claim. Home Depot argues that Burcham's UCL claim fails as it is
entirely duplicative of his overtime claim, and therefore
redundant. It explains the UCL would allow only the recovery of
additional wages out to a four-year statute of limitations period,
beyond the three years otherwise granted to claims for unpaid wages
in California. Burcham's sole claim to allegedly unpaid wages
arises out of a Success Sharing bonus paid in March 2018,
approximately two years before filing his claims in the operative
Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, Burcham's UCL claim adds no
possible recovery on top of Burcham's overtime claim, and it should
be dismissed as redundant.

Judge Battaglia holds that in moving for summary judgment on this
claim, Plaintiff Burcham concedes his claim is derivative of his
overtime claim. Plaintiff Burcham, however, argues that his claim
is not redundant because injunctive relief may still be necessary.
However, former employees lack standing to bring a claim for
injunctive relief against their employers because such employees do
not stand to benefit from the injunction. Accordingly, Plaintiff
Burcham's UCL claim may properly be dismissed as duplicative.

Conclusion

In sum, Judge Battaglia grants summary judgment in favor of Home
Depot on Plaintiff Burcham's UCL cause of action. He (i) grants in
part the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration; (ii) denies as
moot the motion for leave to file a sur-reply; (iii) grants in part
and denies in part the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; and
(iv) grants in part and denies in part Home Depot's motion for
summary judgment.

In sum, Judge Battaglia grants summary judgment in favor of Home
Depot as to the first (inaccurate wage statements), fourth (failure
to pay all wages due upon termination), and fifth (UCL) causes of
action. He grants summary judgment for Plaintiff Burcham as to the
second (overtime) claim.

The parties must contact Magistrate Judge Andrew G. Schopler's
chambers for further scheduling of the matter in light of the
decision, including a time line for an amended complaint addressing
the "third claim" only.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/aw26m4u8 from Leagle.com.


HOME POINT: Faces Berniz Suit Over 17.7% Drop of Stock Price
------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDER BERNIZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HOME POINT CAPITAL INC., WILLIAM A. NEWMAN,
MARK E. ELBAUM, AGHA S. KHAN, STEPHEN A. LEVEY, and ERIC L.
ROSENZWEIG, Case No. 2:21-cv-15842 (D.N.J., August 20, 2021) is a
class action against the Defendants for violations of Sections 11
and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.

According to the complaint, the Defendants filed materially
misleading offering documents with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in order to trade Home Point common stock at
artificially inflated prices in connection to Home Point's January
29, 2021, initial public offering (IPO). Specifically, the offering
documents made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Home Point's aggressive expansion of its broker
partners would dramatically increase the company's expenses; (2)
the mortgage industry was anticipating industry-wide decreased
gain-on-sale margins as a result of rising interest rates in 2021
and Home Point would be subject to the same competitive pressures;
(3) accordingly, the company had overstated its business and
financial prospects; and (4) as a result, the offering documents
were materially false and/or misleading and failed to state
information required to be stated therein, the suit says.

When the truth emerged, Home Point's stock price allegedly fell
$1.66 per share, or 17.7%, to close at $7.72 per share on May 6,
2021, damaging investors.

Home Point is a residential mortgage originator and service
provider, with principal executive offices located at 2211 Old
Earhart Road, Suite 250, Ann Arbor, Michigan. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
                  
         Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
         THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
         One Gateway Center, Suite 2600
         Newark, NJ 07102
         Telephone: (973) 313-1887
         Facsimile: (973) 833-0399
         E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

HOMETOWN AMERICA: Seeks Continuance of Class Cert Briefing Schedule
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as EDWIN BARTOK, on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated individuals; BARBARA LEE, on
behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals; and THE
MANUFACTURED HOME FEDERATION OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., on behalf of
its members and other similarly situated individuals, v. HOMETOWN
AMERICA, LLC; HOMETOWN AMERICA MANAGEMENT, LLC; HOMETOWN OAKPOINT
I, LLC; HOMETOWN OAKPOINT II, LLC; MILLER'S WOODS MHC, LLC; and
RIVER BEND MHC, LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-10790-LTS (D. Mass.), the
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order granting for a
continuance of the existing briefing schedule set for Plaintiffs
Edwin Bartok, Barbara Lee, and the Manufactured Home Federation of
Massachusetts, Inc.'s Motion for Class Certification.

Hometown seeks a continuance of the Class Certification Briefing
Schedule until the Court can hold a scheduling conference and enter
a case management scheduling order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b) and L.R. 16.1(f).

On May 20, 2021, the Plaintiffs simultaneously filed their First
Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages,
and their Motion for Class Certification. In the FAC, the
Plaintiffs allege that Hometown violated M.G.L. ch. 140, section
32L(2) by charging residents of the Miller's Woods and Oak Point
manufactured housing communities disparate rents for similar leased
home sites.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Wv6r56 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Lisa C. Goodheart, Esq.
          Andrea Studley Knowles, Esq.
          Tristan P. Colangelo, Esq.
          SUGARMAN, ROGERS, BARSHAK & COHEN, P.C.
          101 Merrimac Street, Suite 900
          Boston, MA 02114-4737
          Telephone: (617) 227-3030
          E-mail: goodheart@sugarmanrogers.com
                  knowles@sugarmanrogers.com
                  E-mail: colangelo@sugarmanrogers.com

               - and -

          W. Scott Simpson, Esq.
          SIMPSON, MCMAHAN, GLICK
          & BURFORD, PLLC
          2700 Highway 280, Suite 203W
          Birmingham, AL 24112
          Telephone: (205) 876-1600
          E-mail: wsimpson@smgblawyers.com

               - and -

          Lee E. Bains, Jr., Esq.
          Thomas W. Thagard, Esq.
          James C. Lester, Esq.
          MAYNARD, COOPER & GALE, P.C.
          1901 Sixth Avenue North, Suite 1700
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 254-1000
          E-mail: lbains@maynardcooper.com
                  tthagard@maynardcooper.com
                  jlester@maynardcooper.com

HY-VEE INC: Greenstate Appeals Dismissal in Credit Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Greenstate Credit Union filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled Greenstate Credit Union, on
Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Hy-Vee, Inc.,
Case No. 0:20-cv-00621-DSD, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 30, 2020, the
dispute arises from the Defendant's alleged negligence and
violation of the Minnesota Plastic Card Security Act regarding its
handling of a data breach that exposed sensitive payment card data.
The Plaintiff contends that, from November 2018 to August 2019,
computer hackers installed malicious software on the Defendant's
point-of-sale systems at its fuel pumps, drive-thru coffee shops,
and restaurants. This malware allowed the hackers to access Hy-Vee
customers' payment card data, including the cardholder's name,
credit or debit card number, and expiration date.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant failed to implement
adequate data security measures to ward off such data breaches and
failed to timely discover and contain the data breach.
Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant "refused to
implement certain best practices, failed to upgrade critical
security systems, used outdated point-of-sale systems, ignored
warnings about the vulnerability of its computer network, and
disregarded and/or violated applicable industry standards."

On November 10, 2020, the District Court denied Hy-Vee, Inc.'s
motion to dismiss for improper venue or lack of personal
jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to transfer venue.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated July
19, 2021 and Judgment dated July 20, 2021, granting Defendant's
motion to dismiss.

The appellate case is captioned as Greenstate Credit Union v.
Hy-Vee, Inc., Case No. 21-2867, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, filed on August 20, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Transcript is due on or before September 29, 2021;

   -- Appendix is due on October 12, 2021;

   -- BRIEF APPELLANT, Greenstate Credit Union is due on October
12, 2021; and

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court issues
the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of appellant.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Greenstate Credit Union, on Behalf of Itself
and All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, Esq.
          Stephen Matthew Owen, Esq.
          Karen Riebel, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE & GRINDAL
          100 Washington Avenue, S., Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401-0000
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900
          E-mail: kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com
                  smowen@locklaw.com
                  khriebel@locklaw.com

               - and -

          Bryan L. Bleichner, Esq.
          Jeffrey D. Bores, Esq.
          Karl L. Cambronne, Esq.
          Christopher Paul Renz, Esq.
          CHESTNUT & CAMBRONNE, P.A.
          100 Washington Avenue, S.
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Telephone: (612) 339-7300
          E-mail: bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com
                  kcambronne@chestnutcambronne.com
                  
               - and -

          Jamisen A. Etzel, Esq.
          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          CARLSON & LYNCH
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          E-mail: jetzel@carlsonlynch.com
                  glynch@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Lauren S. Frisch, Esq.
          Charles Hale Van Horn, Esq.
          BERMAN & FINK
          3475 Piedmont Road, N.E., Suite 1100
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Telephone: (404) 261-7711
          E-mail: lfrisch@bfvlaw.com
                  cvanhorn@bfvlaw.com  

Defendant-Appellee Hy-Vee, Inc. is represented by:

          Maria Ann Boelen, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER
          One N. Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 416-8174
          E-mail: mboelen@bakerlaw.com

               - and -

          Paul G. Karlsgodt, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER
          1801 California Street, Suite 4400
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 764-4013
          E-mail: pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com  

               - and -

          Jeffrey J. Lindquist, Esq.
          GRIES & LENHARDT
          12725 43rd Street, N.E., Suite 201
          Saint Michael, MN 55376
          Telephone: (763) 497-3099  
          E-mail: jeff@glalawfirm.com

IDAHO: $115K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in K.W. Suit v. IDHW
------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, K.W., by his next friend D.W., et al., Plaintiffs
(lead case) v. RICHARD ARMSTRONG, et al., Defendants. TOBY SCHULTZ,
et al., Plaintiffs v. RICHARD ARMSTRONG, et al., Defendants, Case
Nos. 1:12-cv-00022-BLW, 3:12-cv-58-BLW (D. Idaho), Judge B. Lynn
Winmill of the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho issued
a Memorandum Decision and Order:

      a. granting the Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs;
      b. denying the Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees; and
      c. deeming moot the Defendants' Motion to Strike.

The Court certified a class of disabled adults to challenge the
budget tool, notice form, and hearing procedures. After the Court
granted summary judgment in the Plaintiffs' favor, the parties
settled the class claims. In the Class Action Settlement Agreement,
approved by the Court on January 12, 2017, the Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare (IDHW) agreed to develop a new budget tool and
to keep the Plaintiffs' benefits at their prior high level until
the new budgets could be approved and implemented. As part of the
settlement, the Department set a goal of developing and
implementing the new budget tool within 24 months. If the
Department failed to implement the new tool within three years (no
later than January 2020), the Plaintiffs could ask the Court "to
set a reasonable completion deadline."

When the Department did not complete its work within 24 months,
both sides asked the Court to impose their version of a reasonable
completion deadline. In briefs that were filed before the COVID-19
pandemic began, the Department asked the Court to set a completion
deadline of January 12, 2023, while the Plaintiffs wanted the
Department to be done in 120 days. After the pandemic hit, the
Department asked the Court to extend the completion deadline to
January 2024. The Plaintiffs asked the Court to send the parties to
ADR.

Initially, the Court indicated it would impose a two-track deadline
system, with one track being a longer deadline for the
restructuring of services and the other track being a shorter
deadline for creation of the new budget tool. Later, though, the
Court denied the Plaintiffs' request to send the parties to ADR and
scheduled a hearing to resolve outstanding issues. In December
2020, after hearing the parties' arguments, the Court ordered a
reasonable completion deadline of June 2022.

After the Court decided the reasonable completion deadline, both
parties filed the pending motions for attorneys' fees. In an
earlier order, the Court approved a form of notice, which informed
the class about the class counsel's efforts to obtain a fee award.

The Plaintiffs ask for an award of $115,730. The Defendants ask for
roughly $99,000.

Analysis

Judge Winmill has reviewed the briefing, as well as the letters
submitted by the class members during the recent weeks.

The settlement agreement allows either party to seek an attorneys'
fee award if the Court is called upon to resolve a dispute arising
under the agreement.

The relevant provision provides: "The Parties agree to bear their
own attorneys' fees and costs relating to ordinary monitoring of
and compliance with the Agreement and any orders or judgment that
the Court enters with respect to this Agreement. However, either
Party may petition the Court for an award of attorneys' fees and
costs if the applicable dispute resolution or noncompliance
procedures set forth in this Agreement fail and a motion, petition,
or court decision or order therefore resolves a dispute arising
under this Agreement (including disputes over approval, compliance,
enforcement, interpretation, modification, clarification, or
termination under the Agreement). As to any such claims for
attorneys' fees or costs, the Parties agree that the 42 U.S.C.
Section 1988 standard for fee awards will apply, including as to
whether fees may be assessed against Plaintiffs, whether a Party is
a prevailing Party entitled to an award, and the appropriate amount
of an award."

According to this provision, the Judge looks to 42 U.S.C. Section
1988 to decide which party is the "prevailing party," whether fees
can be assessed against the Plaintiffs, and the appropriate amount
of any fee award.

1. Plaintiffs are the Prevailing Party

Both sides declare victory. The Plaintiffs focus on the overall
result -- pointing out that after the latest round of motion
practice, they have emerged with a deadline in hand: The Department
must implement the new budget tool by June 2022. The Department,
however, says it won the day, because the Plaintiffs asked for a
much earlier "reasonable completion date" than they got.

Judge Winmill finds that the Department's behavior has been
modified in a way that directly benefits the Plaintiffs: The budget
tool will be finished two years earlier than the Department had
wanted. Of course, the other side of that argument is that the
Department got far more time than the Plaintiffs had wanted. But,
as already pointed out, a significant win for the Plaintiffs is
that they now have a firm deadline, rather than just goals.

All told, the Judge holds that is enough to push the Plaintiffs
across the statutory threshold into prevailing-party status. The
governing legal standard here is generous: The Plaintiffs may be
considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if
they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit, citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

2. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Reasonable Fee Award

The next step is to determine a reasonable fee award. As a
threshold matter, Judge Winmill is is not persuaded by the
Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs should not recover any
fees, even if the Court determines -- as it has -- that the
Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties. The Department argues that
it would be "unfair to the Defendants to force it to pay for the
Plaintiff's losing efforts, when the Defendants had to present
evidence to the Court of a reasonable deadline." For all the
reasons discussed, though, the Judge does not view the Plaintiffs
as having mounted a "losing effort." Nor does he find "special
circumstances" that would justify denying the Plaintiffs'
attorney's fees. The Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties, and a
fee award is warranted.

3. The Lodestar Calculation

To determine a reasonable fee, Judge Winmill begins by calculating
the lodestar figure, which is done "by multiplying the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable
hourly rate." Then, where appropriate, he should "adjust the
`presumptively reasonable' lodestar figure based upon the factors
listed in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70
(9th Cir. 1975), that have not been subsumed in the lodestar
calculation."

The Judge holds that although the Plaintiffs didn't get everything
they asked for, the relief they did receive justifies awarding them
the entire amount of attorneys' fees sought. The Plaintiffs did
emerge with a key victory: They now have a firm deadline for
completion of the budget tool in hand. This justifies a full fee
award.

4. The Motion to Strike

Finally, Judge Winmill moots the Defendants' motion to strike. In
that motion, the Defendants seized on an error in two of the
attorney declarations filed in support the Plaintiffs' fee motion.
Those declarations failed to include the critical boilerplate
phrase, "I hereby swear under penalty of perjury" that the
statements are true. The Defendants capitalized on that omission,
using it as the basis for a motion to strike the Plaintiffs' entire
fee motion.

To be sure, Judge Winmill holds that the Defendants had every right
to make sure counsel submitted declarations under penalty of
perjury. But the way to handle that sort of issue is simple: Reach
out to counsel, point out the error, and request sworn
declarations. If the Plaintiffs' counsel had failed to correct the
error, then the Defendants could have argued for a reduction in
fees, based on the deficient attorney declarations. As matters
stand, though, the motion to strike was unnecessary. The Judge
moots the motion and remind counsel that Rule 1 -- "that first and
greatest of the Rules" -- obligates the "court and the parties" to
construe the rules "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."

Order

Based on the foregoing, Judge Winmill granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Fees and Costs. He awarded the Plaintiffs $115,380 in
attorneys' fees. The Judge denied the Defendants' Motion for
Attorney Fees. He deemed moot the Defendants' Motion to Strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum Decision &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2zeyhmnm from
Leagle.com.


IML LABELS: Faces Perez Class Suit Over Collection of Biometrics
----------------------------------------------------------------
OSCAR PEREZ, on behalf of himself and other persons similarly
situated v. IML LABELS CHICAGO, INC., Case No. 2021L000852 (Ill.
Cir., DuPage Cty., Aug. 11, 2021) is an action by Mr. Perez on
behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals to
obtain statutory damages and other equitable relief under the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

The Plaintiff contends that he and the class members are subject to
the unlawful biometric scanning and storage practices of the
Defendant. As past and present employees of the Defendant, they
were required to provide it with their personalized biometric
indicators and the biometric information derived therefrom
(biometric data). Specifically, Defendant collects and stores its
employees' fingerprints and requires all the employees to clock-in
and clock-out by scanning their fingerprints into a
fingerprint-scanning machine, the Plaintiff adds.

The Plaintiff and class members have not been notified where their
fingerprints are being stored, for how long Defendant will keep the
fingerprints, and what might happen to this valuable information.

Unlike other forms of personal identification, such as photo IDs or
passwords, fingerprints are immutable aspects of our bodies. This
makes them a promising source of future identification-related
technology, particularly in our increasingly insecure technological
world, the suit asserts.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff bring this action on behalf of himself
and class members pursuant to obtain statutory damages and
injunctive relief for violations of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
          William H. Beaumont, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          107 W. Van Buren, Suite 209
          Chicago, IL 60605
          Telephone: (773) 831-8000
          E-mail: rlc@beaumontcostales.com
                  whb@beaumontcostales.com

INOVIO PHARMA: Discovery in McDermid Putative Class Suit Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that discovery is ongoing
in the purported shareholder class action suit entitled, McDermid
v. Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and J. Joseph Kim.

On March 12, 2020, a purported shareholder class action complaint,
McDermid v. Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and J. Joseph Kim, was
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, naming the company and J. Joseph Kim, the
company's Chief Executive Officer, as defendants.

The lawsuit alleges that the company made materially false and
misleading statements regarding its development of a vaccine for
COVID-19 in the company's public disclosures in violation of
certain federal securities laws.

The plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary damages on behalf of the
putative class and an award of costs and expenses, including
reasonable attorneys' fees.

On June 18, 2020, the court appointed Manuel Williams to serve as
lead plaintiff. On August 3, 2020, Mr. Williams filed a
consolidated complaint, naming the company and three of its
officers as defendants.

On September 21, 2020, Mr. Williams and another purported
stockholder, Andrew Zenoff filed a first amended complaint, naming
us and three of our officers as defendants. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint on November
5, 2020.

On February 16, 2021, the court issued an order granting in part,
and denying in part, Defendants' motion to dismiss. The court
granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, and dismissed with
prejudice, the claims premised on the April 30 and June 30, 2020
statements. The court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to
the remaining statements.

On March 9, 2021, Defendants filed their answer to the complaint.

On July 29, 2021, Plaintiffs moved to certify the class action.

The case is now in discovery.

Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. researches and develops
pharmaceuticals. The Company develops cancer DNA and infectious DNA
vaccines, anti-inflammatory drugs, and animal health products.
Inovio Pharmaceuticals serves the healthcare sector in the United
States. The company is based in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania.


INTERACTIVE BROKERS: Bid to Junk Short-Squeeze Suits Due August 30
------------------------------------------------------------------
Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that defendants' motions
to dismiss the "Reddit-related short-squeeze" cases are due on
August 30, 2021.

Beginning in late January 2021, more than three dozen federal class
action lawsuits were filed in different jurisdictions against
various brokers and other market participants claiming that the
defendants acted improperly in restricting trading in the shares of
and options on GameStop Corp. and other companies that were subject
to unusual trading in January 2021 in what has been referred to as
the "Reddit-related short-squeeze".

Most of these cases assert federal antitrust claims, including
alleging an illegal antitrust conspiracy among the defendants, as
well as various state and federal securities-related claims. IB LLC
and its affiliates have been named as defendants in several of
these class action lawsuits.

The cases were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation
("MDL"), and were transferred to the Southern District of Florida
on April 1, 2021 for pre-trial proceedings.

By the Order dated May 18, 2021, the Court divided the cases into
four tranches: (1) antitrust claims ("Antitrust Tranche"); (2)
state-law claims against Robinhood entities ("Robinhood Tranche");
(3) state-law claims against other defendants ("Other Broker
Tranche"); and (4) federal security law claims ("Federal Securities
Tranche").

The same Order appointed lead plaintiffs' counsel for the
Antitrust, Robinhood, and Other Broker Tranches. On July 13, 2021,
the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the Robinhood Tranche case.
Master complaints for the Antitrust and Other Broker Tranche cases
were due on July 26, 2021.

The defendants' motions to dismiss for those cases are due on
August 30, 2021.

The pleading dates for the Federal Securities Tranche will not be
set until lead plaintiffs' counsel for that case is appointed. The
Company believes that the claims asserted against IB LLC and its
affiliates lack merit on their face and the Company intends to
file, at the appropriate time, a motion to dismiss any class action
that might name IB LLC and its affiliates as defendants.

Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. operates as an automated electronic
broker worldwide. It specializes in executing and clearing trades
in securities, futures, foreign exchange instruments, bonds, and
mutual funds. Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. was founded in 1977
and is headquartered in Greenwich, Connecticut.


INTERACTIVE BROKERS: Plaintiff's Bid for Class Status Due Nov. 1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that plaintiff's motion
for class certification is due on November 1, 2021.

On December 18, 2015, a former individual customer filed a
purported class action complaint against Interactive Brokers LLC
("IB LLC"), the company (IBG, Inc.), and Thomas Frank, Ph.D., the
Company's Executive Vice President and Chief Information Officer,
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.

The complaint alleges that the purported class of IB LLC's
customers were harmed by alleged "flaws" in the computerized system
used to close out (i.e., liquidate) positions in customer brokerage
accounts that have margin deficiencies.

The complaint seeks, among other things, undefined compensatory
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

On September 28, 2016, the District Court issued an order granting
the Company's motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, and
without providing plaintiff leave to amend.

On September 28, 2017, plaintiff appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On September 26, 2018, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims of
breach of contract and commercially unreasonable liquidation but
vacated and remanded back to the District Court plaintiff's claims
for negligence.

On November 30, 2018, the plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint. The Company filed a motion to dismiss the new complaint
on January 15, 2019, which was denied on September 30, 2019.

On December 9, 2019, the Company filed a motion requesting that the
District Court certify to the Connecticut Supreme Court two
questions of Connecticut law directly relevant to the motion to
dismiss. The Court denied the Company's motion to certify on May
15, 2020.

Currently, Plaintiff's motion for class certification is due on
November 1, 2021.

The Company does not believe that a purported class action is
appropriate given the great differences in portfolios, markets and
many other circumstances surrounding the liquidation of any
particular customer's margin-deficient account.

Interactive Brokers said, "IB LLC and the related defendants intend
to continue to defend themselves vigorously against the case and,
consistent with past practice in connection with this type of
unwarranted action, any potential claims for counsel fees and
expenses incurred in defending the case may be fully pursued
against the plaintiff."

Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. operates as an automated electronic
broker worldwide. It specializes in executing and clearing trades
in securities, futures, foreign exchange instruments, bonds, and
mutual funds. Interactive Brokers Group, Inc. was founded in 1977
and is headquartered in Greenwich, Connecticut.


INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE: Extension of Class Cert. Filing Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JANE DOE, by her Personal
Representative, on Ms. Doe's own behalf and, for certain claims, on
behalf of all others similarly situated, v. INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTHCARE, INC. and SELECTHEALTH, INC., Case No.
2:18-cv-00807-RJS-JCB (D. Utah), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order extending the deadline for a motion for class
certification to no sooner than 90 days after the Defendants'
motion to dismiss is ruled upon or otherwise resolved.

Intermountain Healthcare is a not-for-profit healthcare system and
is the largest healthcare provider in the Intermountain West of the
United States.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Aug. 26,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zsSuDw
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew W. Stavros, Esq.
          Austin B. Egan, Esq.
          STAVROS LAW P.C.
          8915 South 700 East, Suite 202
          Sandy, UT 84070
          Telephone: (801) 758-7604
          Facsimile: (801) 893-3573
          E-mail: andy@stavroslaw.com
                  austin@stavroslaw.com

               - and -

          Meiram Bendat, Esq.
          PSYCH-APPEAL, INC.
          7 West Figueroa Street, Suite 300
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (310) 598-3690
          Facsimile: (888) 975-1957
          E-mail: mbendat@psych-appeal.com

               - and -

          D. Brian Hufford, Esq.
          Andrew N. Goldfarb, Esq.
          ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
          485 Madison Avenue, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 704-9600
          Facsimile: (212) 704-4256
          E-mail: dbhufford@zuckerman.com
                  agoldfarb@zuckerman.com

IRHYTHM TECHNOLOGIES: Putative Class Suit Underway in California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
iRhythm Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a putative class action suit filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.

On February 1, 2021, a putative class action lawsuit was filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California alleging that the Company and our former Chief Executive
Officer, Kevin M. King, violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

On August 2, 2021, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint
that, in addition to the Company and Mr. King, also names the
company's former Chief Executive Officer, Michael J. Coyle, and
current interim Chief Executive Officer, Douglas J. Devine, as
defendants.

The purported class in the amended complaint includes all persons
who purchased or acquired the company's common stock between August
4, 2020 and July 13, 2021.

The amended complaint seeks unspecified damages purportedly
sustained by the class.

The Company believes the class action to be without merit and plans
to vigorously defend itself.

iRhythm Technologies, Inc. is a digital healthcare company
redefining the way cardiac arrhythmias are clinically diagnosed by
combining its wearable biosensing technology with cloud-based data
analytics and deep-learning capabilities. The company is based in
San Francisco, California.


J2 GLOBAL: Bid to Dismiss Garcia Amended Complaint Pending
----------------------------------------------------------
j2 Global, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motion to dismiss
the amended complaint in the putative class action suit initiated
by Jeffrey Garcia, is pending.

On July 8, 2020, Jeffrey Garcia filed a putative class action
lawsuit against J2 Global in the Central District of California
(20-cv-06906), alleging violations of federal securities laws.

J2 Global has moved to dismiss the consolidated class action
complaint.

The court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff has filed
an amended complaint. J

2 Global has moved to dismiss the amended complaint.

j2 Global, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, provides Internet
services worldwide. It operates through three segments: Fax and
Email Marketing; Voice, Backup, and Security; and Digital Media.
The company was formerly known as j2 Global Communications, Inc.
and changed its name to j2 Global, Inc. in December 2011. j2
Global, Inc. was founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Los
Angeles, California.


J2 GLOBAL: Settlement in Davis Suit Gets Initial Approval
---------------------------------------------------------
j2 Global, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement in Davis Neurology, P.A.
filed a putative class action lawsuit against two J2 Global
affiliates in the Circuit Court for the County of Pope, State of
Arkansas (58-cv-2016-40), has been granted.

On January 21, 2016, Davis Neurology, P.A. filed a putative class
action lawsuit against two J2 Global affiliates in the Circuit
Court for the County of Pope, State of Arkansas (58-cv-2016-40),
alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The
case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas (No. 4:16-cv-00682).

On March 20, 2017, the District Court granted a motion for judgment
on the pleadings filed by the J2 Global affiliates and dismissed
all claims against the J2 Global affiliates.

On July 23, 2018, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
judgment and remanded to district court with instructions to return
the case to state court. On January 29, 2019, after further appeals
were exhausted, the case was remanded to the Arkansas state court.


On April 1, 2019, the state court granted a motion for class
certification filed by the plaintiff in 2016. Because the prior
removal to federal court had deprived the state court of
jurisdiction, the J2 Global affiliates had not yet filed an
opposition brief to the 2016 motion when the state court granted
the motion. The J2 Global affiliates appealed the order.

On July 15, 2019, the J2 Global affiliates removed the case to
federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. On
November 26, 2019 the court denied the Plaintiff's motion to
remand. On December 20, 2019, the court granted the Plaintiff's
motion for leave to amend its complaint.

On May 21, 2020, the court denied J2 Global affiliates' motion to
dismiss.

On February 18, 2021, the parties filed a motion for preliminary
approval of the class settlement, certification of a settlement
class and for permission to disseminate notice, which was granted
on May 11, 2021.

The notice is in the process of being distributed.

j2 Global, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, provides Internet
services worldwide. It operates through three segments: Fax and
Email Marketing; Voice, Backup, and Security; and Digital Media.
The company was formerly known as j2 Global Communications, Inc.
and changed its name to j2 Global, Inc. in December 2011. j2
Global, Inc. was founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Los
Angeles, California.


JAKKS PACIFIC: Seeks Settlement and Dismissal of Brown Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JAKKS Pacific, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company intends to
seek settlement and dismissal of the purported class action suit
entitled, Brown v. JAKKS Pacific, Inc. et al.

A purported class action lawsuit was filed on November 10, 2020 in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
(Brown v. JAKKS Pacific, Inc. et al) alleging that the Proxy
Statement issued in connection with the shareholder meeting held in
June 2020 contained misstatements regarding the manner in which
broker votes would be counted and that such votes were improperly
included in approving the company's Reverse Stock Split at the
meeting.

The purported class action seeks damages in an unspecified amount,
alleging breach of fiduciary duties by our directors.

The company intends to vigorously defend the lawsuit. Since the
action was recently commenced, however, the company cannot assure
you of its outcome and cannot estimate the range of any potential
damage award.

On April 30, 2021,  the company held a Special Meeting of the
Shareholders to obtain shareholder ratification of the filing of
the Certificate of Amendment to the company's Certificate of
Incorporation effecting the Reverse Stock Split, in accordance with
ratification procedures under Delaware law, which approval was
obtained.

JAKKS said, "We intend to seek settlement and dismissal of the
lawsuit."

JAKKS Pacific, Inc. develops, produces, and markets consumer and
related products worldwide. The company operates through three
segments: U.S. and Canada, International, and Halloween. JAKKS
Pacific, Inc. was founded in 1995 and is headquartered in Santa
Monica, California.

JAMI SNYDER: Hennessy-Waller Class Certification Bid Withdrawn
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Janice Hennessy-Waller, et
al., v. Jami Snyder, Case No. 4:20-cv-00335-SHR (D. Ariz.), the
Hon. Judge Scott H. Rush entered an order:

   1. granting the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to withdraw
      motion for class certification;

   2. withdrawing and mooting Plaintiffs' motion for class
      certification.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 26, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DpmimU at no extra charge.[CC]


JJ MARSHALL: Gartrell FDCPA Suit Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JACARA MONIQUE GARTRELL,
on behalf of Herself and all others similarly situated, v. JJ
MARSHALL & ASSOCIATES, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-00442-TJC-JBT (M.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "All persons in the state of Florida who received at least
      one collection letter from JJ Marshall and who thereafter
      made a payment to JJ Marshall on the debt referenced in
      the collection letter"

   2. appointing her to act as representative; and

   3. appointing her attorneys to act as counsel for the Class.

The class period for Plaintiff's FDCPA claims runs from April 17,
2018 to the present due to the one-year statute of limitations
pursuant to section 1692k(d). The class period for the Plaintiff's
FCCPA claim runs from April 17, 2017 to the present due to the
two-year statute of limitations pursuant to Fla. Stat. section
559.77(4);

Plaintiff Gartrell files her Third Motion for Class Certification
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, to secure
redress for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. section 1692 et seq., and the Florida Consumer
Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA").

On February 2, 2019, JJ Marshall, sent a standard form debt
collection letter to Plaintiff, a Florida resident, without
disclosing that it was unregistered and therefore not legally
permitted to take such actions. JJ Marshall has sent similar
collection letters to 256 Florida consumers who thereafter made
payments to JJ Marshall on these debts. The predominant common
issue asks whether collecting consumer debts from Florida consumers
without being registered violates the FDCPA and/or the FCCPA, the
lawsuit says.

JJ Marshall is a Michigan-based debt collection company and is not,
and never has been, registered as a debt collector in Florida.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Aug. 27,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2WzwfNj
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian W. Warwick, Esq.
          Janet R. Varnell, Esq.
          VARNELL & WARWICK , P.A.
          1101 E. Cumberland Ave., Suite 201H, #105
          Tampa, Florida 33602
          Telephone: (352) 753-8600
          Facsimile: (352) 504-3301
          E-mail: bwarwick@varnellandwarwick.com
                  jvarnell@varnellandwarwick.com
                  kstroly@varnellandwarwick.com

               - and -

          Glenn Banner, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF GLENN S. BANNER, P.A.
          5245 Commissioners Drive
          Jacksonville, FL 32224
          Telephone: (904) 240-4401
          E-mail: gbanner@gbannerlaw.com

               - and -

The Defendant is represented by:

          Dale T. Golden, Esq.
          GOLDEN SCAZ GAGAIN, PLLC
          1135 Marbella Plaza Drive
          Tampa, FL 33619
          E-mail: dgolden@gsgfirm.com

JONES FINANCIAL: Settlement in Bland Suit Granted Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
6, 2021, for the quarterly period ended June 25, 2021, that the
settlement in Bland v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., et al., has
been granted final approval.

On May 24, 2018, Edward Jones and the company (JFC) were named as
defendants in a putative class action lawsuit (Bland v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., L.P., et al.) filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois by a former financial advisor under
42 U.S.C. Section 1981, alleging that the defendants discriminated
against the former financial advisor and other financial advisors
and financial advisor trainees on the basis of race.  

On July 27, 2018, two named plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
adding allegations of discrimination and retaliation under 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
retaliation under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.

Three named plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on November
26, 2018 and a third amended complaint on December 30, 2020. The
plaintiffs sought equitable and injunctive relief, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages.  

On May 4, 2021, the district court granted a motion plaintiffs
filed on March 19, 2021 seeking preliminary approval of a
settlement agreement reached by the parties.

On July 1, 2021, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking final approval
of the settlement. The district court granted the motion at a
hearing on July 12, 2021 and issued a final approval order on July
15, 2021.  

The settlement is in the process of being administered.

The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P., through its subsidiary,
Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., operates as a registered
broker-dealer. The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P. was founded
in 1871 and is based in Des Peres, Missouri.


JOSE PEPPER'S: Donelon and Boulware Named Joint Counsel in Florece
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KIRA FLORECE, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JOSE PEPPER'S RESTAURANTS, LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 20-2339-ADM (D. Kan.), Magistrate Judge
Angel D. Mitchell of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas issued a Memorandum and Order:

   a. granting in part and denying in part without prejudice
      Plaintiff Florece's Unopposed Motion for Conditional Class
      Certification and Preliminary Approval of Stipulation of
      Settlement Agreement and Release;

   b. conditionally certifying the Fair Labor Standards Act
      ("FLSA") collective action and certifying the Missouri
      Minimum Wage Law ("MMWL") class action;

   c. appointing Plaintiff Florece as the representative of the
      MMWL class, and Brendan J. Donelon of Donelon, P.C., and
      Brandon Boulware and Erin Lawrence of Boulware Law as the
      joint class counsel;

   d. denying preliminarily approval of the Settlement Agreement
      at this time; and

   e. denying without prejudice as premature Florece's Unopposed
      Motion for Approval of Attorney's Fees, Costs and Service
      Award.

Plaintiff Florece, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, asserts that Defendants Jose Pepper's and Geiselman
violated the FLSA and MMWL. Jose Pepper's owns and operates nine
restaurants in Kansas, and Gieselman owns and operates four Jose
Pepper's restaurants in Missouri.

Ms. Florece worked as a server at the Jose Pepper's restaurant in
Belton, Missouri, from April 2019 through February 2020. She filed
the lawsuit as a putative collective and class action in July 2020,
alleging that she and other servers who work at the 13 Jose
Pepper's locations were not properly paid minimum wage and overtime
compensation as required by the FLSA and, as to Missouri employees,
the MMWL.

Specifically, Florece's complaint alleges that she and similarly
situated employees were: (1) required to be present and working
before they clocked in but they were prohibited from clocking in
until they began serving customers; (2) allowed to work overtime if
they did not clock in; (3) denied overtime compensation after
defendants removed reported overtime hours from the timekeeping
system; and (4) asked to report overtime hours worked as regular
hours worked under another employee's name. Florece's amended
complaint further alleges that defendants (5) asked servers to work
off the clock during the COVID-19 pandemic solely for tips,
inappropriately pooled and shared those tips with non-tipped
employees, and had servers spending more than 20% of their time
during workweeks performing non-tipped tasks; and (6) failed to
inform servers of the FLSA's tip credit provisions. The Defendants
deny Florece's allegations.

The Court bifurcated discovery into two phases, beginning with
discovery relating to conditional certification of the FLSA
collective action. In the first phase, the parties exchanged
initial disclosures and written discovery. The Defendants produced
personnel-related records, payroll records, timekeeping data, and
policies and procedures related to timekeeping, compensation, and
training. The parties also had a dispute over the scope of
pre-certification discovery, with the Court ultimately ordering the
Defendants to produce the names, contact, and employment
information for servers and lead managers. Florece engaged a
statistical and pay data expert, Liesl Fox, Ph.D., to prepare a
report regarding alleged damages; defendants responded and provided
their own analysis. The Defendants also deposed Florece.

The parties mediated the case and reached a settlement before
Florece filed any motions to certify a collective or class action.
Florece now seeks conditional certification of an FLSA collective
action and certification of a Rule 23 class action for settlement
purposes.  She also seeks preliminary approval of the parties'
settlement agreement, including the parties' proposed notices to
class and collective members, objection process, and claim process.
The Defendants do not oppose Florece's motion.

Discussion

A. Certification

1. Rule 23 Class Certification for the MMWL Settlement Class

Judge Mitchell finds that Florece has met the requirements of Rule
23(a) and (b)(3). She therefore grants the aspect of Florece's
motion seeking preliminary certification of the following
settlement-only MMWL class: All persons who worked as hourly
nonexempt servers at Defendants' four restaurant locations in the
state of Missouri from July 7, 2017, through May 21, 2021.

The Judge further appoints Florece as the class representative and
Brendan J. Donelon of Donelon, P.C. and Brandon Boulware and Erin
Lawrence of Boulware Law as the joint class counsel.

2. Conditional Certification of FLSA Collective Action

Judge Mitchell now turns to Florece's request that the Court
conditionally certifies an FLSA collective action. The parties'
proposed FLSA settlement collective consists of "all persons who
worked as hourly nonexempt servers at Defendants' thirteen
restaurant locations in the state of Kansas from May 21, 2018,
through May 21, 2021."

Given the lenient standard applicable to conditional certification,
the Judge finds it appropriate to certify a collective action for
the purpose of sending an opt-in notice to potential plaintiffs.
She therefore grants the aspect of Florece's motion seeking
conditional certification of the following settlement-only FLSA
collective: "All persons who worked as hourly nonexempt servers at
Defendants' four restaurant locations in the state of Missouri from
July 7, 2017, through May 21, 2021."

B. Preliminary Settlement Approval

Judge Mitchell now turns to the Settlement Agreement, which
proposes to resolve the MMWL class action and FLSA collective
action. The Settlement Agreement requires the Defendants to pay no
more than $1.75 million to settle the case. Out of the Gross
Settlement Fund, the Defendants will pay court-approved attorneys'
fees, expenses, and costs; costs and expenses incurred for the
services provided by Simpluris, Inc., the third-party administrator
the parties selected to assist with settlement administration; and
Florece's service award, resulting in a Net Settlement Fund from
which the MMWL class members' and FLSA collective members' claims
will be paid.

The Settlement Agreement limits the Plaintiffs' counsel to seeking
$577,500 in attorneys' fees (33% of the Gross Settlement Fund) and
an estimated $13,154.33 in expenses and costs. Florece will seek a
service award of $2,000. The Settlement Agreement does not specify
the amount of the Claims Administrator's anticipated costs and
expenses, but Florece's motion states that they will be $21,500

After these deductions, the Net Settlement Fund will consist of
approximately $1,135,845 to divide amongst class and collective
members who return a Claim and Release Form. Florece's expert
witness Dr. Fox analyzed payroll data for class and collective
members and calculated: minimum and overtime wages owed for
off-the-clock work, by applying an average time -- 30 minutes --
for each shift worked during the relevant time period; minimum
wages owed if defendants were not able to apply a tip credit; and
minimum and overtime wages owed as a result of formula errors in
defendants' payroll system.

The parties have agreed to a Plan of Allocation by which the amount
paid to each class and collective member under the Settlement
Agreement will be a prorated portion of the Net Settlement Fund
based on Dr. Fox's calculations of the minimum and overtime wages
owed to each. Prior to proration, Dr. Fox will apply a 1.3
multiplier to the amounts owed to class members to reflect the
greater recovery possible under the MMWL because of its three-year
statute of limitations and treble damages provision. Under the Plan
of Allocation, the average payment to class and collective members
will be $568.49, and no payment will be less than $50.

1. FLSA Settlement Approval

Judge Mitchell does not preliminarily approve the Settlement
Agreement at this time. Given the parties' positions and the
Court's prior experience with the case, the Judge concludes that a
bona fide dispute over whether the Defendants violated the FLSA
exists, and it is possible that either side could prevail if the
case continued. However, he has identified more obvious, threshold
flaws in the proposed settlement.

First, Florece has not provided enough information for the Court to
evaluate whether the Settlement Agreement provides adequate
compensation to the collective members. Second, the release is
mostly focused on wage-related claims, which is permissible. But it
is overbroad to the extent that it also requires collective members
to release any ERISA claims regardless of whether they are related
to the wage-related claims asserted in the lawsuit. Hence, the
Judge will not approve the parties' Settlement Agreement until the
release provision is narrowed. Third, the Judge declines to approve
the Settlement Agreement because the confidentiality provision
undermines the FLSA's purpose. Fourth, because he cannot evaluate
whether a $2,000 service award is fair and reasonable, the Judge
also will not preliminarily approve this aspect of the Settlement
Agreement. Finally, because Florece has not shown that the
Settlement Agreement is fair and equitable, any motion seeking
approval of these fees, expenses, and costs is premature.

2. MMWL Settlement Approval

Judge Mitchell turns now to settlement approval under Rule 23. A
court may approve the settlement of a certified class action only
upon finding that it is "fair, reasonable, and adequate."

Judge Mitchell holds that Florece's motion does not specifically
address whether the court would "likely be able to" approve the
proposed settlement under Rule 23(e)(2). After reviewing the
factors set forth in Rule 23(e)(2), she concludes that Florece has
not made the showing required for preliminarily settlement
approval. In particular, she says, Florece has not provided enough
information for the Court to evaluate whether the Settlement
Agreement provides adequate compensation to the class members.
Because she cannot fully evaluate that compensation, the Judge
cannot evaluate whether the proposed Settlement Agreement provides
adequate relief to class members. She therefore declines to
preliminarily approve the Settlement Agreement.

C. Notices and Claim Forms

Florece asks the Court to allow the parties to send their proposed
Notices and Claim Forms to the class and collective members.
Because the FLSA requires potential collective members to opt in,
they must "receive accurate and timely notice concerning the
pendency of the collective action, so that they can make informed
decisions about whether to participate."

Because she has declined to approve the Settlement Agreement, Judge
Mitchell holds that approving the parties' proposed Notices and
Claim Forms would be premature at this time. However, she has
identified at least the following areas of concern in the proposed
Notices and Claim Forms:

     a. The proposed Notices state that the lawsuit alleges servers
were required to work off the clock and were not provided adequate
notice of how wages were to be paid to tipped employees under the
law, and that these practices allegedly denied servers minimum
wages and overtime. This explanation does not fully and accurately
explain Florece's claims in the lawsuit.

     b. The proposed Notices state that the class is made up of an
estimated 1,998 servers employed by the Defendants at its Missouri
and Kansas restaurants. But the court has certified an FLSA
collective and a separate MMWL class, and each group spans a
specific time period. The statement in the proposed Notices is
therefore also inaccurate.

     c. The proposed Notices do not provide an estimate for what
the Claims Administrator's costs and expenses will be, nor do they
explain that those costs and expenses will be paid out of Gross
Settlement Fund.

     d. The proposed Notices should clarify that collective and
class members who chose to opt out and collective members who do
nothing will be free to pursue their claims on an individual basis
subject to the applicable statute of limitations.

     e. The proposed Notice does not inform class members of their
right to enter an appearance in the lawsuit through an attorney if
desired, as required by Rule 23(c)(2)(b)(iv).

     f. The proposed Claim Form for MMWL class members states that
they are consent[ing] to join the action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. It is not accurate because the court is certifying
the MMWL class as a Rule 23 class action, not an FLSA collective
action.

These issues should be corrected in advance of filing a renewed
motion for preliminary settlement approval.

Conclusion

For the reasons she discussed, Judge Mitchell conditionally
certifies the FLSA collective action and certifies the MMWL class
action but cannot preliminarily approve the Settlement Agreement at
this time. The parties may address the issues in the Settlement
Agreement and attached proposed Notices and Claim Forms that the
Court has identified and file a renewed unopposed or joint motion
seeking the court's approval.

Plaintiff Florece's Unopposed Motion for Conditional Class
Certification and Preliminary Approval of Stipulation of Settlement
Agreement and Release is granted in part and denied in part without
prejudice.

Plaintiff Florece is appointed as the representative of the MMWL
class, and Brendan J. Donelon of Donelon, P.C. and Brandon Boulware
and Erin Lawrence of Boulware Law are appointed as the joint class
counsel.

Plaintiff Kira Florece's Unopposed Motion for Approval of
Attorney's Fees, Costs and Service Award is denied without
prejudice as premature.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/sr4vjfds from Leagle.com.


KANSAS CITY ROYALS: Appeal Class Cert. Ruling in Senne Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Defendants OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, et al., filed an
appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled AARON
SENNE, et al., Plaintiffs v. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 6, 2021, Chief
Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero of the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff Cody
Sedlock's Motion for Rule 23(b)(2) Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs are minor league baseball players who assert claims
under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the
wage-and-hour laws of California, Arizona, and Florida against
Major League Baseball ("MLB"), MLB Commissioner Bud Selig, and 22
MLB franchises ("Franchise Defendants"). Plaintiff Sedlock is a
current minor league baseball player; the remaining plaintiffs are
former minor league baseball players.

Early on in the case, the Franchise Defendants brought a Motion to
Dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint in Part for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim. In
that motion, the Franchise Defendants asked the Court to dismiss
certain state law causes of action under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that
Plaintiffs lacked standing as to these claim and/or that they
failed to state a claim. The Court disagreed, concluding that it
was appropriate to defer ruling on standing until the class
certification stage of the case. Dkt. No. 420 ("Article III
Standing Order").

In March 2016, the Plaintiffs moved the Court to certify Rule
23(b)(3) and Rule 23(b)(2) classes under the laws of eight states'
laws to pursue minimum wage and overtime violation claims for
baseball activities performed throughout the year. The Court denied
the motion in full. It found, inter alia, that because Plaintiffs
sought compensation for work players performed during the off
season, it would be difficult to determine class membership. It
denied certification of the Rule 23(b)(2) classes for the
additional reason that all of the named Plaintiffs at that time
were former minor league players and therefore, they did not have
standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief.

The Plaintiffs subsequently brought a motion for reconsideration,
asking the Court to certify narrower classes under Rule 23(b)(2)
and (b)(3). In particular, they asked the Court to certify under
Rule 23(b)(3) an Arizona class and a Florida class for work
performed in those states during spring training, extended spring
training, and the instructional leagues.  They also asked the Court
to certify under Rule 23(b)(3) a California class that included
players who participated in the California League during the
championship season. In addition, the Plaintiffs requested
certification of Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief classes consisting
of current minor league players who participate in spring training,
extended spring training, or the instructional leagues in Florida
and Arizona.

The Defendants now seek a review of the order entered by Chief
Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiff Cody Sedlock's Motion for Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Certification.

The appellate case is captioned as Aaron Senne, et al. v. Office of
the Commissioner of Baseball, et al., Case No. 21-80091, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on
August 9, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Petitioners OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL,
ALLAN HUBER SELIG, KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP., MIAMI
MARLINS, L.P., SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES, LLC, ANGELS
BASEBALL LP, ST. LOUIS CARDINALS, LLC, COLORADO ROCKIES BASEBALL
CLUB, LTD., THE BASEBALL CLUB OF SEATTLE, LLLP, THE CINCINNATI REDS
LLC, HOUSTON BASEBALL PARTNERS LLC, ATHLETICS INVESTMENT GROUP,
LLC, ROGERS BLUE JAYS BASEBALL PARTNERSHIP, PADRES L.P., SAN DIEGO
PADRES BASEBALL CLUB, L.P., MINNESOTA TWINS, LLC, DETROIT TIGERS,
INC., LOS ANGELES DODGERS LLC, LOS ANGELES DODGERS HOLDING COMPANY
LLC, STERLING METS, L.P., AZPB L.P., PITTSBURGH ASSOCIATES, LP, NEW
YORK YANKEES PARTNERSHIP, RANGERS BASEBALL EXPRESS, LLC, RANGERS
BASEBALL, LLC, CHICAGO CUBS BASEBALL CLUB, LLC, MILWAUKEE BREWERS
BASEBALL CLUB, INC., MILWAUKEE BREWERS BASEBALL CLUB, L.P., are
represented by:

          Elise M. Bloom, Esq.
          Mark David Harris, Esq.
          Adam M. Lupion, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          11 Times Square
          New York, NY 10036-8299
          Telephone: (212) 969-3000
          E-mail: ebloom@proskauer.com
                  alupion@proskauer.com

               - and -

          John E. Roberts, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          One International Place
          Boston, MA 02110  

Plaintiffs-Respondents AARON SENNE, MICHAEL LIBERTO, OLIVER ODLE,
BRAD MCATEE, CRAIG BENNIGSON, MATT LAWSON, KYLE WOODRUFF, RYAN
KIEL, KYLE NICHOLSON, BRAD STONE, MATT DALY, AARON MEADE, JUSTIN
MURRAY, JAKE KAHAULELIO, RYAN KHOURY, DUSTIN PEASE, JEFF NADEAU,
JON GASTON, BRANDON HENDERSON, TIM PAHUTA, LEE SMITH, JOSEPH NEWBY,
RYAN HUTSON, MATT FREVERT, ROBERTO ORTIZ, WITER JIMENEZ, KRIS
WATTS, MITCH HILLIGOSS, DANIEL BRITT, EDGARDO BAEZ, JORGE JIMENEZ,
JORGE MINYETY, EDWIN MAYSONET, JOSE DIAZ, NICK GIARRAPUTO, LAUREN
GAGNIER, LEONARD DAVIS, GASPAR SANTIAGO, GRANT DUFF, OMAR AGUILAR,
MARK WAGNER, DAVID QUINOWSKI, BRANDON PINCKNEY, and CODY SEDLOCK,
Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated, are
represented by:

          Jamie L. Boyer, Esq.
          Garrett R. Broshuis, Esq.
          Stephen M. Tillery, Esq.
          George A. Zelcs, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
          505 North 7th Street
          St. Louis, MO 63101-1625
          Telephone: (314) 241-4844
          E-mail: gbroshuis@koreintillery.com
                  stillery@koreintillery.com
                  gzelcs@koreintillery.com  

               - and -

          Rachel Jenny Geman, I, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (212) 355-9500
          E-mail: rgeman@lchb.com

               - and -

          Samuel Kornhauser, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SAMUEL KORNHAUSER
          155 Jackson St.
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 981-6281
          E-mail: skornhauser@earthlink.net

               - and -

          Brian Murray, Esq.
          GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG LLP
          77 Water Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 382-2221
          E-mail: bmurray@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas Jerome Nolan, Esq.
          Clifford Harris Pearson, Esq.
          Michael H. Pearson, Esq.
          Bobby Pouya, Esq.
          Daniel Leon Warshaw, Esq.
          PEARSON SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          E-mail: bpouya@pswlaw.com
                  dwarshaw@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          Randall K. Pulliam, Esq.
          CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC
          519 W. 7th Street
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 312-8500
          E-mail: rpulliam@cbplaw.com

               - and -

          Anne Shaver, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 956-1000
          E-mail: ashaver@lchb.com

               - and -

          Benjamin Ernest Shiftan, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          350 Sansome Street, Suite 680
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-9000
          E-mail: bshiftan@pswlaw.com

KANSAS: Court Issues Show Cause Order in Page v. Schnurr and HCF
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEVON M. PAGE, Plaintiff v. DAN SCHNURR, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 20-3289-SAC (D. Kan.), Judge Sam A. Crow of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas ordered the
Plaintiff to show cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed.

I. Nature of the Matter before the Court

The Plaintiff Devon M. Page, a state prisoner at the Hutchinson
Correctional Facility (HCF) in Hutchinson, Kansas, brings the pro
se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The
Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis.

The Plaintiff's Complaint centers around an incident which occurred
in September of 2020. He states he was cleaning his cell when
Corrections Officer Swann gave him a sack lunch. The Plaintiff told
Swann that he had given him the wrong lunch. Swann responded by
saying it was not his problem. The Plaintiff lost his temper,
grabbing a cup of disinfectant cleaning liquid and throwing it at
Swann. The cup hit Swann. Swann then called a code, and Plaintiff
was taken to an MRA ("More Restricted Area") cell without any
clothing, mattress, bedding, or toilet paper. After several hours,
another officer brought Plaintiff his clothing. The clothes were
wet and smelled of urine. The Plaintiff then used a sheet to
attempt to hang himself. He was put on Crisis Level 2 for two weeks
then returned to an MRA cell for some period of time.

The Complaint includes three counts. Count One alleges that
Defendant Swann demonstrated racial discrimination against the
Plaintiff causing him mental anguish and pain and suffering. In
addition to the exchange recounted, the Plaintiff states Swann made
statements such as "F**k the Black Lives Matter movement" and "They
deserve to die" on a regular basis.

Count Two asserts that the Plaintiff was denied protection from
cruel and unusual punishment and his due process rights were
violated by being held in an MRA "slam cell." The Plaintiff alleges
the plumbing in the MRA cells is disconnected, preventing the
toilet from being flushed from inside the cell. He must rely on
corrections officers to flush the toilet, which they do on an
irregular basis. This forces Plaintiff to eat, sleep, and live with
the sight and smell of his own excrement. The Plaintiff further
claims the MRA cells are too small, measuring only 40 square feet;
and there is an extra brick enclosure and steel door, resulting in
a lack of natural light and sound. The Plaintiff states he is
required to spend all but five hours a week in the MRA cell.

In addition, the Plaintiff alleges his MRA status has stopped him
from receiving adequate mental health care. He states he has been
diagnosed as having a personality disorder, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, bipolar depression, and anxiety. He
receives his medication but has been denied mental health books or
participation in substance abuse group therapy and counseling. The
Plaintiff asserts he is allowed medication and perhaps a monthly
suicide check.

Count Three alleges Unit Team Sergeant Hertel denied Plaintiff
access to the courts by interfering with his attempts to exhaust
his administrative remedies. The Plaintiff claims Hertel refused to
address his staff misconduct claim involving Swann, rejected his
grievances about the toilet and door in the MRA cell without
consideration, failed to put a log number on his injury claim and
failed to give the claim to the warden.

The Plaintiff names as Defendants Dan Schnurr, warden of HCF;
Correctional Officer Swann; and Unit Team Sergeant Hertel. He seeks
an injunction ordering the firing of Defendant Swann and the
retraining of Defendant Hertel, as well as compensatory and
punitive damages for his psychological pain and suffering. Also, he
requests the suit be declared a class action.

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of such entity to determine whether summary dismissal is
appropriate. Additionally, with any litigant, such as the
Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has a
duty to screen the complaint to determine its sufficiency. Upon
completion of this screening, the Court must dismiss any claim that
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.

III. Discussion

Judge Crow holds that the Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to
dismissal for the following reasons.

A. Failure to State a Claim

a. Count One - Racist Remarks

The Plaintiff alleges Defendant Swann demonstrated racial
discrimination through the use of racial slurs. To state a claim
under Section 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a
plaintiff must show that he is a member of a class of individuals
that is being treated differently from similarly situated
individuals who are not in that class.

Judge Crow finds that the Plaintiff, as an African-American, is a
member of a protected class, and the mistreatment he asserts is
being subjected to racist remarks. However, the Tenth Circuit has
made clear that "verbal harassment or abuse is not sufficient to
state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,"
citing Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)
(citations omitted). While Swann's racist comments to the Plaintiff
are "deplorable and unprofessional," they do not constitute an
Equal Protection violation. Because the Plaintiff includes no other
allegation of racial discrimination beyond racist remarks from one
correctional officer, he does not state a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause.

b. Count Two - MRA "Slam" Cell

In Count Two, the Plaintiff actually brings at least two claims
that fall under the Eighth Amendment: A conditions of confinement
claim and an inadequate mental health care claim. In order to state
a claim that conditions of confinement result of cruel and unusual
punishment, the plaintiff has to establish "deliberate
indifference." The deliberate indifference standard includes both
an objective and subjective component. To satisfy the objective
component, a prisoner must allege facts showing he or she is
"incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm." The objective component is met only if the condition
complained of is "sufficiently serious."

First, Judge Crow finds that the Plaintiff's allegations do not
plausibly demonstrate, based on precedent, that the Defendants have
consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to him.
Second, he finds that the Plaintiff has failed to state how long he
was exposed to such conditions, and such information is crucial to
the determination of whether he has stated a claim for violation of
his Eighth Amendment rights.

Third, the Judge holds that the Plaintiff's allegation that he has
been diagnosed with personality disorder, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, bipolar depression, and anxiety is
sufficient at this stage "to establish the objective component of
his deliberate indifference claim regarding his mental health
needs." Finally, he finds that the Plaintiff's desire for
additional or different treatment is best framed as a disagreement
about his course of treatment.

c. count Three - Access to the Courts

The Plaintiff alleges in Count Three that the Defendants denied him
ability to exhaust his administrative remedies, thereby denying him
access to the courts.

Judge Crow explains that in Fogle v. Gonzales, the plaintiff argued
that the defendant's refusal to give him a grievance form meant he
could not exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42
U.S.C. Section 1997e, and without exhausting his administrative
remedies, he could not access the courts.

Tenth Circuit found the plaintiff's theory to be "misguided." It
held that when a prison official prevents a prisoner from accessing
the administrative grievance process, administrative remedies are
'unavailable' such that the prisoner may proceed directly to court
without first exhausting the grievance process.  This means that
after Gonzales denied the grievance form, Fogle was free to file
suit. Because Gonzales' denial of the grievance form in no way
prevented or hindered Fogle from bringing suit in court, his
access-to-the-courts claim indisputably lacks merit. The
Plaintiff's claims in Count Three are subject to dismissal for
failure to state an actionable claim.

B. Requested Relief

The Plaintiff's request to have Swann fired is not the type of
relief this Court has the authority to provide. The remedies in
federal court do not include the firing of state employees. There
may be state administrative procedures for those actions, but Judge
Crow holds that they are not within the jurisdiction of the Court.

The Plaintiff also asks to have the suit declared a class action.
However, it is generally recognized that a pro se plaintiff may not
serve as a class representative "because the competence of a layman
is clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.
Additional party plaintiffs may litigate their own claims and to
either pay the filing fee or seek leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Finally, the Plaintiff's request for compensatory damages
is subject to dismissal as barred by 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(e).
The Plaintiff's claim for actual or compensatory damages is subject
to being dismissed unless he alleges facts showing a prior physical
injury.

IV. Response Required

For the reasons he stated, Judge Crow holds that the Plaintiff's
Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915A(b)
and 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. The Plaintiff is, therefore, required to show good
cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed. He is warned that
his failure to file a timely response may result in the Complaint
being dismissed for the reasons stated herein without further
notice.

The Plaintiff is granted to and including Sept. 17, 2021, in which
to show good cause, in writing, why his Complaint should not be
dismissed for the reasons stated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/pj8nhwsw from Leagle.com.


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Bastasch, Mest Sue Over Defective Ventilators
------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Bastasch and Douglas Mest, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Koninklijke Philips N.V.,
Philips North America LLC, Philips Holdings USA, Inc. and Philips
RS North America, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-06300 (N.D. Cal.,
August 16, 2021), seeks injunctive and declaratory relief,
compensatory, actual, statutory, consequential, punitive and/or any
other form of damages, restitution, disgorgement and/or other
equitable relief, costs of this action, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, and, where applicable, expert fees, prejudgment
and post judgment interest, award of such other and further relief
resulting from breach of implied warranty under the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act and for violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California
Unfair Competition Law, Unfair Competition Law.

Philips recalled its Bi-Level Positive Airway Pressure, Continuous
Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) and mechanical ventilator devices
involving an estimated 3 million to 4 million devices globally.
Said products contained polyester based polyurethane foam that
degrades and can be inhaled by the users, causing health risks,
including respiratory issues and cancer.

Plaintiffs were diagnosed with sleep apnea. Bastasch and Mest
purchased REMStar CPAP Device and Respironics Model DSX500HIIC
CPAP, respectively. Because of the defect, they claim to be facing
the risk of possible exposure to off-gassed or degraded
polyurethane foam in the devices. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael F. Ram, Esq.
      Marie N. Appel (SBN 187483)
      MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
      711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 500
      San Francisco, CA 94102
      Telephone: (415) 358-6913
      Facsimile: (415) 358-6923
      Email: mram@forthepeople.com
             mappel@forthepeople.com

             - and -

      Glenn A. Danas, Esq.
      GDanas@RobinsKaplan.com
      MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
      2049 Century Park East, Suite 3400
      Los Angeles, CA 90067
      Telephone: (310) 229-5410
      Email: GDanas@RobinsKaplan.com

             - and -

      Kevin Hannon, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
      1641 Downing Street
      Denver, CO 80218
      Telephone: (303) 264-1769
      Facsimile: (303) 264-1795
      Email: khannon@forthepeople.com

             - and -

      Justin Sobodash, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
      8335 W. Sunset Blvd., Ste. 366
      West Hollywood CA 90069
      Telephone: (323) 337-9010
      Facsimile: (323) 656-7155
      Email: Justin@Sobodashlaw.com


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Devices Contain PE-PUR Foam, Miller Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
BRAD MILLER, MARK MACKENZIE, and PATRICK NIELSON, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS
N.V.; PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC; and PHILIPS RS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
Case No. 3:21-cv-01174-SB (D. Or., Aug. 10, 2021) is a class action
complaint on behalf of himself and a proposed class of purchasers
and users of Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) and
Bi-Level Positive Airway Pressure (Bi-Level PAP) devices and
mechanical ventilators manufactured by Philips, which contain
polyester-based polyurethane sound abatement foam ("PE-PUR Foam").

On April 26, 2021, Philips made a public announcement disclosing it
had determined there were risks that the PE-PUR Foam used in
certain CPAP, Bi-Level PAP, and mechanical ventilator devices it
manufactured may degrade or off-gas under certain circumstances.

On June 14, 2021, Royal Philips issued a recall in the United
States of its CPAP, Bi-Level PAP, and mechanical ventilator devices
containing PE-PUR Foam, because Philips had determined that (a) the
PE-PUR Foam was at risk for degradation into particles that may
enter the devices' pathway and be ingested or inhaled by users, and
(b) the PE-PUR Foam may off-gas certain chemicals during operation.
Philips further disclosed in its Recall Notice that "these issues
can result in serious injury which can be life-threatening, cause
permanent impairment, and/or require medical intervention to
preclude permanent impairment," says the suit.

According to the complaint, Philips has disclosed that the absence
of visible particles in the devices does not mean that PE-PUR Foam
breakdown has not already begun. Philips reported that lab analysis
of the degraded foam reveals the presence of harmful chemicals,
including: Toluene Diamine ("TDA"), Toluene Diisocyanate ("TDI"),
and Diethylene Glycol ("DEG").

Prior to issuing the Recall Notice, Philips received complaints
regarding the presence of black debris/particles within the airpath
circuit of its devices (extending from the device outlet,
humidifier, tubing, and mask). Philips also received reports of
headaches, upper airway irritation, cough, chest pressure and sinus
infection from users of these devices, added the suit.

Philips recommended that patients using the recalled CPAP and
Bi-Level PAP devices immediately discontinue using their devices
and that patients using the recalled ventilators for
life-sustaining therapy consult with their physicians regarding
alternative ventilator options.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on, inter alia,
Philips' alleged breach of express warranty, breach of implied
warranties, misrepresentations, omissions, and breaches of state
consumer protection laws in connection with its manufacture,
marketing and sales of devices containing PE-PUR Foam on behalf of
themselves and the proposed Class Members. In addition, Plaintiffs
seek medical monitoring damages for users of Philips' devices
identified in the Recall Notice, who are at risk of suffering from
serious injury, including irritation (skin, eye, and respiratory
tract), inflammatory response, headache, asthma, adverse effects to
other organs (e.g., kidneys and liver) and toxic carcinogenic
affect.

The Plaintiff purchased and used the CPAP devices for personal use
as they related to a sleep apnea diagnosis. All Plaintiffs were
harmed and suffered damages, the suit alleges.

Royal Philips is a Dutch multinational corporation with its
principal place of business located in Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Royal Philips is the parent company of the Philips Group of
healthcare technology businesses, including Connected Care
businesses focusing on Sleep & Respiratory Care. Royal Philips
holds directly or indirectly 100% of its subsidiaries Philips NA
and Philips RS. Royal Philips controls Philips NA and Philips RS in
the manufacturing, selling, distributing, and supplying of the
recalled CPAP, Bi-Level PAP, and mechanical ventilator devices.

Philips NA is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business located at 222 Jacobs Street, Floor 3, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02141. Philips NA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Royal Philips.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert Klonoff, Esq.
          David S. Stellings, Esq.
          Katherine McBride, Esq.
          Gabriel Panek, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          2425 S.W. 76th Ave.
          Portland, OR 97225
          Telephone: (503) 702-0218
          Facsimile: (503) 768-6671

KONINKLIJKE PHILLIPS: Henry Files Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Koninklijke Philips
N.V., et al. The case is styled as William S. Henry, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated v. Koninklijke Philips
N.V., Philips North America LLC, Philips RS North America LLC, Case
No. 2:21-cv-01129-MRH (W.D. Pa., Aug. 25, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. -- https://www.philips.com/global -- is a
Dutch multinational conglomerate corporation that was founded in
Eindhoven.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Arnold Levin, Esq.
          Frederick S. Longer, Esq.
          Laurence S. Berman, I, Esq.
          Sandra Duggan, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Phone: (215) 592-1500
          Fax: (215) 592-4663
          Email: alevin@lfsblaw.com
                 flonger@lfsblaw.com
                 lberman@lfsblaw.com
                 sduggan@lfsblaw.com


LABORATORY CORP: Anderson Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHERYL ANDERSON, MARY
CARTER, TENA DAVIDSON, ROBERT HUFFSTUTLER, RAMZI KHAZEN, CHAIM
MARCUS, LILY MARTYN, JONAH MCCAY, HOLDEN SHERIFF, VICTORIA SMITH,
MICHELLE SULLIVAN, SHONTELLE THOMAS, JOSEPH WATSON, and MICHAEL
WILSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, Case No.
1:17-cv-193-TDS-JLW (M.D.N.C.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order

   1. certifying the case for class treatment; and

   2. appointing Wolf Popper LLP as counsel for the classes and
      subclasses and Ellis & Winters LLP as local counsel for
      the classes and subclasses.

Labcorp provides vital information to help doctors, hospitals,
pharmaceutical companies, researchers, and patients make clear and
confident decisions.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Aug. 26,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2XUlINu
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jonathan D. Sasser, Esq.
          Jeremy M. Falcone, Esq.
          ELLIS & WINTERS LLP
          4131 Parkdale Avenue, Ste. 400
          Raleigh, NC 27612
          Telephone: 919-865-7000
          E-mail: jon.sasser@elliswinters.com
                  jeremy.falcone@elliswinters.com

               - and -

          Robert C. Finkel, Esq.
          David A. Nicholas, Esq.
          Matthew Insley-Pruitt, Esq.
          Timothy D. Brennan, Esq.
          WOLF POPPER LLP
          845 Third Avenue 12th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          E-mail: Rfinkel@wolfpopper.com

LANNETT COMPANY: Bid to Certify Class in Utesch Fraud Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
grants the motion for class certification in the lawsuit titled
JOHN UTESCH, et al., Plaintiffs v. LANNETT COMPANY, INC., ARTHUR P.
BEDROSIAN, MARTIN P. GALVAN, Defendants, Case No. 16-5932 (E.D.
Pa.).

In the proposed securities fraud class action against Defendants
Lannett, Bedrosian (Lannett's former CEO) and Galvan (its former
CFO), Lead Plaintiff University of Puerto Rico Retirement System
("UPRRS") and Plaintiffs Ironworkers Locals 40, 361, and 417 Union
Security Funds assert securities fraud claims under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 against all
Defendants, and claims against the individual defendants under
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The Plaintiffs now move to certify a class pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), to be appointed class
representatives, and for the appointment of class counsel. Both
Plaintiffs and Defendants seek to exclude the opposing party's
expert report for failure to comply with the standard of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Background and Procedural History

During the presented class period--July 15, 2014, to Oct. 31,
2017--the Plaintiffs allege that they purchased Lannett's common
stock at prices that were artificially inflated because of the
Defendants' false and misleading statements concerning the pricing
of generic drugs and investigations into price-fixing in the
generic drug market.

The Plaintiffs allege that anticompetitive conduct among Lannett's
competitors caused price increases for five generic drugs, which
together accounted for most of Lannett's total annual sales from
2013 to 2016. Lannett publicly disclosed that it received a
subpoena and interrogatories from the Connecticut Attorney General
in connection with an investigation of anti-competitive conduct in
the generic drug industry at the start of the class period in July
2014, and grand jury subpoenas in connection with a federal
investigation in November and December 2014. However, say the
Plaintiffs, even as it began to be revealed during the Class Period
that several of Lannett's competitors were implicated in illegal
price-fixing and anti-competitive conduct, the Defendants assured
investors that Lannett's past financial results were the product of
competitive market forces; and, that the Company's pricing strategy
and future results would not be impacted by regulatory scrutiny of
anticompetitive conduct in the industry, or the threat of being
implicated in any price-fixing or anticompetitive scheme.

Throughout the class period, Lannett's stock price fell as
information became public that revealed potential anticompetitive
conduct in the generic drug industry and Lannett's potential
exposure to liability. The Plaintiffs allege that Lannett's stock
value fell 13% in December 2014 after Lannett disclosed that it had
received the federal grand jury subpoenas, and fell 26% following
the publication of a Bloomberg article in November 2016 describing
the possibility that criminal charges would be filed against
pharmaceutical companies, including Lannett.

At the close of the class period, on Oct. 31, 2017, Lannett's stock
price dropped 14% after the Connecticut Attorney General filed a
complaint alleging a conspiracy among generic drugs makers,
including Lannett, to engage in anticompetitive conduct and
price-fixing.

The Plaintiffs now move to certify this damages class:

     All persons and entities who purchased or acquired the
     publicly traded common stock of Lannett Company, Inc.
     during the period from July 15, 2014 and October 31, 2017,
     inclusive, and who were damaged thereby.

Discussion

A. Rule 23(a) Pre-Requisites

To satisfy Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
proponent of class certification must establish that (1) "the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable"
(numerosity); (2) "there are questions of law or fact common to the
class" (commonality); (3) "the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class" (typicality); and, (4) "the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" (adequacy
of representation).

The Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiffs have established
numerosity and commonality, but do argue that the Plaintiffs have
failed to establish typicality and adequacy.

District Judge Wendy Beetlestone finds that numerosity and
commonality requirements are satisfied. She also finds that the
Plaintiffs' proposed class counsel, Abraham, Fruchter & Twersky,
LLP, is qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the
proposed litigation, and is, therefore, adequate. She adds that the
Plaintiffs' and class members' interests are aligned in that they
all purchased or acquired and lost money on Lannett's artificially
inflated common stock during the class period. Accordingly,
adequacy is satisfied.

The Defendants argue that the representative parties are not
typical of the class because they are subject to unique defenses as
to the element of reliance in their Section 10(b) claim, citing
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 810
(2011).

Judge Beetlestone notes that the Plaintiffs' claims arise from the
same event, practice or course of conduct as that of the class
members and are based on the same legal theory as the claims of the
class. The Plaintiffs' and class members' claims under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 arise from the
same set of alleged misrepresentations, and the same set of
allegations that they purchased Lannett's stock at artificially
inflated prices and were injured when the stock price dropped after
the alleged fraud was revealed. Accordingly, Judge Beetlestone
opines, absent a finding that the Defendants have defenses that are
unique to the Plaintiff representatives, the Plaintiffs are typical
of the class.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Beetlestone holds that the
Defendants have not met their burden to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the named Plaintiffs are subject to a unique or
atypical defense that is likely to become a major focus of the
litigation. Because UPRRS and Ironworkers have satisfied each of
the requirements of Rule 23(a), they will be appointed as
representatives of the class.

B. Rule 23(b) Requirements

The Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiffs have established
superiority and ascertainability. They do argue, however, that the
Plaintiffs have not established predominance specifically because
they have failed to comply with the requirements of Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013).

Judge Beetlestone holds that absent the class action device many
potential claims would not be filed. Numerous potential plaintiffs
with small damages claims would not be warranted in litigating a
lengthy securities fraud action such as this, while others, who may
have more at stake, would flood the courts with individual cases
seeking damages on the same theory. Certainly, class members would
have no ability to control the prosecution of separate actions.

Further, concentration of the case in a class action would be an
efficient use of limited judicial resources, Judge Beetlestone
explains. Adjudication by class action presents no obvious
manageability problems, as common questions of law and fact are
central to each class member's claims. As such, a class action is
superior to alternative methods for adjudicating the case, Judge
Beetlestone holds.

Judge Beetlestone also finds that as the Plaintiffs explain, and
the Defendants do not dispute, class members can be identified
using records of shareholder acquisitions. Thus, the
ascertainability requirement is met.

The Defendants do not dispute that predominance is satisfied as to
the Defendants' liability for the Plaintiffs' claims. They do,
however, argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
damages can be calculated consistent with the Plaintiffs' theory of
liability. Their challenge to predominance arises in the context of
their discussion of the applicability of Comcast.

The Plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence
that the predominance requirement is satisfied as to damages, Judge
Beetlestone holds. Here, they have adequately established that
damages are susceptible to class-wide proof by showing that damages
can be measured on a class-wide basis. As set out in the Coffman
Report, the Plaintiffs propose to calculate damages using a damages
methodology that is applicable to the entire class: the
out-of-pocket method. Chad Coffman is the Plaintiffs' proposed
damages expert.

As it is undisputed that common issues will predominate as to the
Defendants' liability, and because the Plaintiffs have adequately
established that damages can be calculated on a class-wide basis
and that the necessity of individualized damages calculations for
each class member does not defeat predominance, the predominance
requirement is satisfied, Judge Beetlestone holds.

Accordingly, Judge Beetlestone finds that the Plaintiffs have
satisfied each of the superiority, ascertainability, and
predominance requirements of Rule 23(b), as well as each of the
class action pre-requisites of Rule 23(a). The case, therefore, may
proceed as a certified class action.

Daubert Motions

Chad Coffman's report focuses on whether the market for Lannett
common stock was efficient during the class period and whether
calculating damages is subject to a common methodology under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. He concludes that the answer to both
questions is yes. In response, the Defendants submitted a report by
Jennifer Marietta-Westberg opining to the contrary that Coffman did
not put forth a methodology for calculating damages on a class-wide
basis in a manner consistent with the Plaintiffs' theory of
liability. Both parties argue that the other party's expert fails
to satisfy the Daubert standard for the admission of expert
evidence.

In addition to the questions regarding qualifications, reliability,
and fit, there is an additional overlay--the expert's relevance to
the class certification determination--that must be considered,
Judge Beetlestone notes. Specifically, under In re Blood Reagents
Antitrust Litigation, where a party relies on expert testimony to
meet class certification requirements the court must evaluate any
Daubert challenges to such expert testimony in deciding the class
certification motion.

Judge Beetlestone explains that is because the proponent of
certification must satisfy Rule 23(b) with "evidentiary proof," and
expert testimony that is insufficiently reliable to satisfy the
Daubert standard cannot establish through evidentiary proof that
Rule 23(b) is satisfied.

Judge Beetlestone notes that it is not disputed that Coffman
possesses the requisite specialized knowledge to be qualified as an
expert. With respect to the reliability requirement, that too is
satisfied. She points out that Coffman's experience, expertise,
understanding of the Plaintiffs' claims, and explanation of the
out-of-pocket method render him reliable. Coffman's opinion also
satisfies the fit requirement.

Because Coffman is qualified as a damages expert, and his opinion
is reliable and fits with this case, Coffman's opinion meets the
Daubert standard and the Defendants' motion to exclude will be
denied, Judge Beetlestone holds.

The Plaintiffs move to exclude Marietta-Westberg's opinion,
contending that Marietta-Westberg is unqualified, her opinion is
unreliable, and that it fails to fit the issues presented at class
certification. Marietta-Westberg opines that Coffman "has not put
forth an appropriate methodology that can measure damages in a
manner consistent with Plaintiffs' theory of liability."

However, Judge Beetlestone notes, her report challenges neither the
use of the out-of-pocket method in this case nor that this method
could be applied on a class-wide basis. To the contrary, she
testified during the Daubert hearing that she "does not dispute the
out-of-pocket method," but instead "disputes the lack of detail in
the damages method." In other words, her report does not challenge
the central premise of the Plaintiffs' argument for why
predominance is satisfied as to damages--that is, because damages
can be calculated on a class-wide basis using the out-of-pocket
method--but only raises issues regarding the details of how this
method will be applied.

Accordingly, because predominance--the sole disputed class
certification requirement for which the Marietta-Westberg Report is
offered--does not turn on her report, it is not critical to class
certification, and therefore, the Plaintiffs' Daubert challenge
need not be addressed.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Daubert motions will be denied, the motion
for class certification will be granted, UPRRS and Ironworkers will
be appointed class representatives, and Abraham, Fruchter &
Twersky, LLP, will be appointed class counsel. An appropriate order
follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4rn2dw34 from Leagle.com.


LEIF JOHNSON: Certification of Class in Smith TCPA Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DENNIS N. SMITH, JR., ET AL., Respondent v. LEIF
JOHNSON FORD, INC., Appellant v. DIRECT MARKETING ADVANTAGE, LLC,
Third-Party Defendant, Case No. ED109494 (Mo. App.), the Court of
Appeals of Missouri for the Eastern District, Division One, affirms
the circuit court's order certifying a class action.

Mr. Smith filed the lawsuit individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated plaintiffs alleging a violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"). Smith, a Missouri resident, filed
a putative class action against Ford, a Texas car dealership doing
business nationwide and in Missouri. Smith alleged Ford violated
the TCPA by sending ringless voicemails promoting Ford's automotive
sales and service business without prior express written consent to
the cellphones of Smith and the class members in May 2019.

Ford's general manager, Anthony Hewitt, entered into a contract
with Direct Marketing Advantage ("DMA") to market its business to
customers and potential customers in Texas in May 2019. Ford
maintained Hewitt only authorized a direct mail marketing campaign
within the State of Texas and did not discuss or request other
marketing tools with DMA, including ringless voicemails. Smith
produced evidence in the record showing that Hewitt authorized DMA
to provide marketing services to Ford through ringless voicemails,
e-mails, and mailings, including a contract showing DMA would make
8,408 ringless voicemails. DMA engaged another company, "My Lead
Guys," to place the ringless voicemails.

Mr. Smith and other class members received the ringless voicemail
messages. Smith produced a call-log spreadsheet listing the phone
numbers that received the ringless voicemails (the "Manifest").
Fred Trudeau, employed as President of Ford, stated by affidavit
that the Manifest was a business record of Ford's. The circuit
court determined Trudeau confirmed that ringless voicemails were
delivered to the phone numbers on the Manifest in May 2019. Ford
denied creating the Manifest and denied knowing who created the
Manifest. The Manifest contains 3,769 entries of individuals with
associated phone numbers and addresses. The entries list Texas
addresses and reflect various area codes. Two phone numbers in the
Manifest have area code (314) phone numbers, one of which belonged
to Smith.

Ford moved for summary judgment, arguing it was not liable because
it never authorized, requested, agreed to, or ratified DMA to
engage in a ringless voicemail campaign on its behalf. Based on the
evidence in the summary judgment record, the circuit court denied
Ford's motion for summary judgment.

Mr. Smith then moved for class certification. Following briefing
and oral argument in which the circuit court considered the
pleadings and evidence from affidavits and deposition testimony as
well as the summary judgment record, the circuit court entered its
order granting class certification in February 2021. The circuit
court addressed the criteria in Rule 52.08(a) and made detailed
findings that the class satisfied the requirements for numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy.

Relevant to the appeal, the circuit court found the class satisfied
the typicality requirement because Smith alleged the owners of the
3,769 cellphone numbers listed on the Manifest received ringless
voicemails without prior express written consent in violation of
the TCPA. Regarding the issue of predominance, the circuit court
likewise found the proposed class met the requirements of Rule
52.08(b)(3) in that the class had a TCPA claim stemming from Ford's
alleged actions in causing ringless voicemails to be delivered to
the 3,769 phone numbers on the Manifest without prior express
written consent. In finding that a class action would be the
superior method for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy under Rule 52.08(b)(3), the circuit court noted that
Ford raised no objection to adjudicating the matter in the circuit
court of St. Louis County.

The circuit court granted Smith's motion to certify the following
class: "Those individuals who owned at the relevant time the
cellphone numbers listed on the Manifest of those numbers to which
prerecorded [ringless voicemails] were placed in May, 2019,
promoting Ford's automotive sales and service business."

Ford sought leave to appeal the interlocutory order of class
certification. The Court of Appeals granted leave, and the appeal
follows.

Discussion

Ford raises two points on appeal. Point One argues the circuit
court erred in certifying the class because Smith's claims are
different from and atypical of the class, and Smith is not a member
of the class. Point Two asserts the circuit court erred in
certifying the class because individual issues predominate over
common issues.

A. Point One - The Class Satisfies Typicality under Rule 52.08(a)

Point One contends the circuit court erred in certifying the class
because Smith is not typical of the class and is not a member of
the class.

The Court of Appeals holds that examining the record regarding
substantive questions to be answered at trial, the circuit court
noted that Ford produced no evidence that any owners of the phone
numbers listed on the Manifest provided prior express written
consent to receive the ringless voicemails so as to distinguish
them from Smith.

The Court of Appeals notes that when presented with a similar
certification issue involving a class of individuals with phone
numbers registered on the National Do Not Call Registry who alleged
receiving text messages in violation of the TCPA, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Missouri determined that
typicality was satisfied, despite some factual variances between
the named plaintiff and other class members because the claims here
arise out of the same conduct -- the sending of text messages to
individuals registered on the national do-not-call registry. These
facts give rise to the same legal and remedial theory under the
TCPA."

In the case, the Court of Appeals finds that Smith alleges that
neither he nor the class members consented to the ringless
voicemails, making him a typical class member for purposes of the
alleged TCPA violation.

Given the admonition that a court should err in favor of
certification of a class, the Court of Appeals is not persuaded
that the circuit court abused its discretion by acting in an
illogical, arbitrary, or unreasonable manner when deciding the
class satisfied the typicality requirement. Point One is denied.

B. Point Two - Common Questions Predominate under Rule 52.08(b)(3)

Point Two challenges the circuit court's order certifying the class
with a claim that the individual issues relevant to Smith and other
class members predominate over common issues shared by them.

The Court of Appeals finds that Ford's speculation as to potential
variations on some individual facts and party defenses does not
meet its burden of proving circuit court error, because the
predominant common issue presented in the litigation is the central
legal question of whether the owners of the phone numbers on the
Manifest during the relevant timeframe consented to receive the
ringless voicemails. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals is not
persuaded the circuit court's certification of the class lacked
careful consideration, went against the logic of the circumstances,
or was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of
its discretion. Hence, Point Two is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Sherri B. Sullivan, C.J., and Kelly C. Broniec, J., concur.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ue2dr8mh from Leagle.com.


LIBERTY UNIVERSITY: Extension to File Class Cert. Reply Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STUDENT A, STUDENT C, and
STUDENT D, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, INC., d/b/a LIBERTY UNIVERSITY,
Case No. 6:20-cv-00023-NKM-RSB (W.D. Va.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court to enter an order granting a seven-day extension of time to
file their Reply in further support of their motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiffs' Reply is currently due on August 31, 2021. Because
of other professional commitments, counsel seeks an additional
seven days, through and including September 7, 2021, to submit
Plaintiffs' Reply.

Briefing will be completed once Plaintiffs' Reply is filed. A
hearing on Plaintiffs' motion is scheduled for September 27, 2021,
and the Parties do not believe the extension Plaintiffs seek will
affect the hearing date.

Liberty University is a private evangelical Christian university in
Lynchburg, Virginia. It was founded by Jerry Falwell Sr. and Elmer
L. Towns in 1971.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Wr1I4V at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class are:

          Laura E. Reasons, Esq.
          E. Kyle McNew, Esq.
          J. Gregory Webb, Esq.
          Lisa S. Brook, Esq.
          MICHIEHAMLETT
          310 4th Street, NE
          P.O. Box 298
          Charlottesville, VA 22902
          Telephone: (434) 951-7231
          Facsimile: (434) 951-7254
          E-mail: kmcnew@michiehamlett.com
                  gwebb@michiehamlett.com
                  lbrook@michiehamlett.com

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Amy E. Keller, Esq.
          Laura E. Reasons, Esq.
          DI CELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Sixth Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: 312-214-7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
                  akeller@dicellolevitt.com
                  lreasons@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          Matthew S. Miller, Esq.
          MATTHEW S. MILLER LLC
          77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: 312-741-1085
          E-mail: mmiller@msmillerlaw.com

LYONS DOUGHTY: Madlinger Class Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SCOTT MADLINGER v. LYONS
DOUGHTY & VELDHUIS P.C., Case No. 3:19-cv-21117-FLW-DEA (D.N.J.),
the Hon. Judge Freda L. Wolfson entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part the Defendant's
      motion for summary judgment;

   2. denying the Plaintiff's motion for class certification;

   3. dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff's complaint; and

   4. directing the Clerk of the Court to mark this matter as
      closed.

Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuis operates as a law firm.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 26, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BmqzW3 at no extra charge.[CC]


MADISON COUNTY, IL: Evans Can't Proceed as Class Action v. Jail
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JULIUS EVANS, #93874, KADEEM NOLAND, TROY LACEY, MARIO
MENDOZA, EARL BARBER, MARVIN TREADWAY, OTIS HARRIS, FRED WILLIAMS,
KEITH SANDERS, MICHAEL FOOTS, RONNIE JACKSON, MARKELL TAYLOR, and
CHARLTON K. MERCHANT, Plaintiff v. KRISTOPHER THARP and PAUL
SARHAGE, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-00905-JPG (S.D. Ill.), Judge J.
Phil Gilbert of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order addressing several
preliminary matters, including each Plaintiff's obligation to pay
the filing fee for the action, the group's request to proceed with
a class action, and the joinder of the Plaintiffs' claims in a
single suit.

The case was opened on Aug. 11, 2021, when the Court received a
Complaint signed by 13 inmates who are housed together in South
B-block of Madison County Jail. Together, they seek to bring a
class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to address
the conditions of their confinement at the Jail.  More
specifically, the Plaintiffs challenge their punishment with a
30-day lockdown and related restrictions arising from false
disciplinary charges. They request monetary relief.

Before the Plaintiffs can proceed any further with their claims,
the Court addresses several preliminary matters. This includes each
Plaintiff's obligation to pay the filing fee for the action, the
group's request to proceed with a class action, and the joinder of
the Plaintiffs' claims in a single suit.

A. Filing Fee

The Plaintiffs commenced the action without prepaying a filing fee
and without filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
("IFP motion"). Each plaintiff incurred the obligation to pay a
$402 filing fee for the action at the time the case was opened.
They cannot avoid the obligation by filing a single complaint
naming all 13 Plaintiffs. Each Plaintiff must either prepay the
full filing fee of $402 or file a properly completed IFP motion by
the Court-imposed deadline of Sept. 10, 2021. Any Plaintiff who
fails to do so will be dismissed. The only way to avoid this
obligation is to request voluntary dismissal, in writing, on or
before the Court-imposed deadline for doing so.

B. Class Action

In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs indicate that they would like to
proceed with a class action. However, they did not file a motion
seeking class certification. Until certification is granted, there
is no class action; there is merely the possibility of one. The
only action is the suit brought by multiple plaintiffs.

Even if the Court construes the Complaint as including a motion for
class certification, the motion is subject to denial. This is
because all 13 Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, and a prisoner
bringing a pro se action cannot represent a class of the
Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Judge Gilbert construes the Complaint as
being brought by 13 separate Plaintiffs.

C. Joinder

Judge Gilbert next turns to the issue of joinder. In Boriboune v.
Berge, 391 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2004), the court addressed the
difficulties of administering group prisoner complaints. District
courts are required to accept joint complaints filed by multiple
prisoners if the criteria of permissive joinder under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 20 are satisfied. Rule 20 permits plaintiffs to
join together in one lawsuit if they assert claims "arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to these
persons will arise in the action." If the requirements for
permissive joinder are satisfied, complaints filed by multiple
plaintiffs can proceed together in the same action.

The Judge finds that allowing the Plaintiffs to proceed together
would result in unnecessary and avoidable confusion, delay,
prejudice, and cost. The Court may, at any time, add or drop a
party or sever a claim on just terms. The Judge finds that
severance is necessary to ensure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination" of the case. At the same time, severance now does
not preclude consolidation later of an issue, a hearing, a trial,
or otherwise. It also does not preclude the Plaintiffs from
coordinating their efforts. For now, the Judge deems it necessary
and appropriate to require the Plaintiffs to proceed with their
claims in separate suits. The Clerk of Court will therefore be
directed to open a new lawsuit for each Plaintiff.

Disposition

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Gilbert orders that each
Plaintiff is required to proceed with his claims in a separate
suit. The following Plaintiffs are dismissed from the matter:
Kadeem Noland, Troy Lacey, Mario Mendoza, Earl Barber, Marvin
Treadway, Otis Harris, Fred Williams, Keith Sanders, Michael Foots,
Ronnie Jackson, Markell Taylor, and Charlton K. Merchant. The Clerk
of Court is directed to terminated these Plaintiffs as parties to
the action in CM/ECF.

The Clerk of Court is directed to open a separate case for each
Plaintiff, other than Plaintiff Julius Evans, and file the
following documents in each newly-severed case: the Complaint and
the Memorandum and Order Severing Case.

Each Plaintiff will instead be responsible for paying the filing
fee for his newly-opened case, and not the action, unless he timely
advises the Court that he does not wish to proceed with the
newly-opened case.

The only plaintiff remaining in the action is Plaintiff Julus
Evans. The Clerk of Court is directed to modify the case caption as
follows: Julius Evans, Plaintiff vs. Kristopher Tharp and Paul
Sarhage, Defendants.

Finally, Plaintiff Evans is advised that he is under a continuing
obligation to keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party
informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This will be done in
writing and not later than seven days after a transfer or other
change in address occurs. Failure to comply with the Order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal for want of prosecution.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/8fxenz9w from Leagle.com.


MADISON SQUARE: Faces Stockholder Derivative Complaint in Delaware
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Charles F. Dolan et
al. The case is captioned as City of Miramar Retirement Plan and
Trust Fund for General Employees et al. v. Charles F. Dolan et al.,
Case No. 2021-0692-KSJM (Del. Ch., Aug. 11, 2021).

The Plaintiffs submit this verified class action and stockholder
derivative complaint derivatively on behalf of Madison Square
Garden Entertainment Corp. and directly on behalf of themselves and
a class of similarly situated stockholders of MSGE against the
Defendants for breaches of fiduciary duty in their capacities as
directors, officers, and/or controlling stockholders of the
Company.

The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Kathaleen St Jude
McCormick.

The Defendants include Brian G. Sweeney, Charles F. Dolan, Charles
P. Dolan, Frederic V. Salerno, Isiah L. Thomas III, James L. Dolan,
John L. Sykes, Joseph J. Lhota, Kristin A. Dolan, Marianne Dolan
Weber, Martin Bandier, Matthew C. Blank, Paul J. Dolan, Quentin F.
Dolan, Ryan T. Dolan, Thomas C. Dolan, and Vincent Tese.

The Nominal Defendants include Madison Square Garden Entertainment
Corporation and New Castle County, Sheriff.[BN]

Plaintiffs City of Miramar Management Retirement Plan and City of
Miramar Retirement Plan and Trust Fund for General Employees, are
represented by:

          Nathan A. Cook, Esq.
          Mae Oberste, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          260 Franklin Street, Suite 1860
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (302) 499-3601
          Facsimile: (617) 507-6020
          E-mail: Nathan@blockesq.com

MAPLEBEAR INC: Denial of Arbitration in Malaspina Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Three,
affirms the order denying the motion to compel arbitration in the
lawsuit captioned CHRISTIAN MALASPINA, Plaintiff and Respondent v.
MAPLEBEAR INC. dba INSTACART, Defendant and Appellant, Case No.
A160556 (Cal. App.).

Maplebear Inc., doing business as Instacart, appeals from the trial
court's order denying its petition to compel arbitration of a
Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) action brought by Instacart
shopper Christian Malaspina. In denying the petition, the trial
court followed the Supreme Court's decision in Iskanian v. CLS
Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, which held
that a worker's right to bring a representative action under PAGA
cannot be waived and that this state law rule is not preempted by
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Background

Instacart operates a communications and logistics platform through
its website and smartphone application which facilitates grocery
shopping and delivery services in certain areas throughout the
United States. Through the Instacart app, Instacart connects
"shoppers" with consumers seeking grocery shopping and delivery
services. Before offering these services, a shopper must download
the Instacart app and complete the registration process. This
includes signing the Independent Contractor Agreement.

In June 2017, Malaspina completed the registration required to be a
shopper and signed the Agreement. Section 7 of the Agreement,
entitled MUTUAL AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE DISPUTES (Arbitration
Provision), contains several provisions regarding dispute
resolution between Instacart and Malaspina, respectively referred
to in the Agreement as Company and Contractor.

The Arbitration Provision states that, unless first resolved
amicably between the parties, "all disputes, claims or
controversies arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
Services performed by Contractor shall be resolved by final and
binding arbitration by a neutral arbitrator." Claims subject to
arbitration include disputes under the California Labor Code and
the California Wage Orders. The Arbitration Provision further
states, "The Parties agree that the enforceability of this
Arbitration Provision is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. Sections 1, et seq."

Additionally, the Arbitration Provision contains a provision
entitled "Waiver of Representative Action Claims."

Mr. Malaspina filed a putative class action complaint against
Instacart alleging the Company systemically violated the employment
rights of shoppers through unlawful compensation and payroll
policies. In December 2019, he filed the operative second amended
complaint asserting only a single cause of action for civil
penalties under PAGA.

Instacart moved to compel Malaspina to arbitrate his PAGA claim on
an individual basis and to stay the court proceedings pending
arbitration on the basis that the Arbitration Agreement required
all disputes or claims relating to Malaspina's services to be
arbitrated and contained a representative action waiver governed by
the FAA and applicable to his claim. While Instacart recognized
that "the California Supreme Court in Iskanian held that PAGA
waivers in arbitration agreements were unenforceable on public
policy grounds," it argued that subsequent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1612),
and Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 139 S.Ct. 1407, affirmed the
enforceability of Malaspina's waiver under the FAA and overruled
Iskanian.

The trial court denied Instacart's petition to compel arbitration,
and Instacart timely appealed.

Discussion

Instacart argues the trial court erred in resting its decision on
Iskanian, which the Company contends cannot survive the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions in Epic Systems and Lamps Plus. Based on de
novo review (Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853,
864), Justice Ioana Petrou, writing for the Panel, rejects these
contentions and concludes the trial court properly denied
Instacart's petition to compel arbitration.

Instacart argues that Epic Systems and Lamps Plus addressed the
same question as Iskanian--enforceability of a PAGA waiver--but
decided it differently. The Appellate Court disagrees that either
Epic Systems or Lamps Plus addressed the same PAGA waiver issue
decided in Iskanian and finds Iskanian controls the outcome of this
appeal.

Analogizing the FLSA's private remedial function and public law
enforcement function to PAGA, Instacart contends that the same
principles set forth in Epic Systems regarding waiver of the right
to bring a collective action under the FLSA "apply in equal measure
to bar a PAGA claim." Not so, Judge Petrou holds. As the U.S.
Supreme Court explained, the question in Epic Systems was whether
employees and employers should "be allowed to agree that any
disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one
arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their
claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed
with their employers?" In addressing these questions, the U.S.
Supreme Court did not decide or consider whether a worker may waive
a right to bring a representative action on behalf of a state
government.

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Epic Systems did not
address the basis for this District's Supreme Court's decision in
Iskanian, namely, that a PAGA action is not an individual dispute
between private parties but an action brought on behalf of the
state by an aggrieved worker designated by statute to be a proper
representative of the state to bring such an action. Accordingly,
Epic Systems did not consider the same issue concerning PAGA
waivers decided in Iskanian, much less reach a contrary conclusion
on that issue, Judge Petrou holds.

Judge Petrou also opines, among other things, that Instacart's
contention that Lamps Plus overrules Iskanian is unavailing. Lamps
Plus did not decide or consider whether a worker may waive a right
to bring a representative action on behalf of a state government.
Lamps Plus, which involves class claims, does not mention PAGA or
similar laws in other states. Nor did the reasoning in Lamps Plus
address the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Iskanian,
namely, that a PAGA action is not an individual dispute between
private parties but an action brought on behalf of the state by an
aggrieved worker designated by statute to be a proper
representative of the state to bring such an action. Accordingly,
like Epic Systems, Lamps Plus did not consider the same question
concerning PAGA waivers decided in Iskanian, much less reach a
contrary conclusion on that issue, Judge Petrou rules.

While not the basis for its finding the argument forfeited, the
Appellate Court takes this opportunity to note Instacart's minimal
and far from fully developed presentation of this issue in its
opening brief. It is only belatedly in the reply brief that
Instacart first advances any developed argument attacking the "same
question" standard with citation to several authorities for the
first time to which Malaspina had no opportunity to respond.

Because the Panel concludes the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in
Epic Systems or Lamps Plus did not decide the same PAGA waiver
question differently than this District's Supreme Court did in
Iskanian, there is no conflict to reconcile and the Panel need not
address Instacart's arguments that the Appellate Court are bound by
those U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Accordingly, the Appellate
Court follows the decision of the Supreme Court in Iskanian and
concludes the PAGA waiver in the Agreement between Instacart and
Malaspina was unenforceable.

Disposition

The trial court's order denying Instacart's petition to compel
arbitration and stay proceedings is affirmed. Malaspina will
recover his costs on appeal.

Fujisaki, Acting P.J. and Chou, J., concurs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y85mpdv9 from Leagle.com.


MCCREARY VESELKA: Texas Court Certifies Class in Perez FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIELA PEREZ, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. McCREARY, VESELKA, BRAGG & ALLEN,
P.C., and MVBA, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-CV-724-RP (W.D.
Tex.), Judge Robert Pitman of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas, Austin Division:


    (i) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' Motion
        for Summary Judgment;

   (ii) granted the Defendants' summary judgment as to Perez's
        claims against MVBA PC and Perez's claim based on Section
        1692(f);

  (iii) denied Perez's Motion for Summary Judgment; and

   (iv) granted Perez's Motion to Certify Class.

Ms. Perez brings claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA"). Shortly after May 2, 2019, Perez received a letter
stating that "MVBA has been retained to collect an outstanding debt
due," with regards to a utility bill for $486.57 that was
delinquent as of May 1, 2015. The letter was dated May 2, 2019. The
letter included a heading at the top that stated "MVBA LLC," and
requested payment be mailed to "McCreary Veselka Bragg & Allen,
L.L.C." and "MVBA" at the bottom of the letter. It states that
"payment in full is required." Because the debt was more than four
years old, it was no longer legally enforceable under the Texas
statute of limitations.

Ms. Perez's debt account was placed with MVBA LLC prior to May
2019. MVBA LLC used a program to identify accounts that were
delinquent for more than four years, after which they would be
placed on "hold" and collection activity would not occur on those
accounts. Despite this policy, the letter was printed and mailed to
Perez on May 2, 2019. Additionally, 55 similar letters were mailed
to Texas residents more than four years after debt had been
delinquent.

MVBA PC is the sole owner of MVBA LLC. MVBA LLC works with consumer
accounts subject to the FDPCA, whereas MVBA PC collects debts not
subject to the FDCPA. The Defendants argue that only MVBA LLC
drafted and sent the letter to Perez, and MVBA PC "does not
exercise any daily control or oversight over MVBA LLC and its
letter processes."

Ms. Perez claims the letter is "false and misleading to the least
sophisticated consumer because it failed to disclose a) that the
alleged Debt was time barred debt and unenforceable, and b) that
any partial payment could reinstate the applicable statute of
limitations." Perez also brings a claim under 15 U.S.C. Section
1692(f), which states that a "debt collector may not use unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt."

Ms. Perez and the Defendants each seek summary judgment in their
favor, and Perez moves for class certification.

Discussion

A. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Standing

The Defendants first argue that Perez lacks standing because she
was not injured. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that she has (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2)
that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision." For an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show
that she suffered "'an invasion of a legally protected interest'
that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.'"

Judge Pitman finds that Perez has standing to bring her claims
under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692(e)(2)(A) and (10). Assuming that the
letter violates the FDCPA, then Perez's "alleged injury is that she
received false, misleading, and deceptive debt collection
communications, and that is precisely what the debt collection laws
are, in part, intended to prevent." Additionally, even if Perez is
required to show an injury in addition the FDCPA violation itself,
familiarity with the FDCPA does not foreclose confusion from a
misleading letter, similar to the "anxiety, and worry" that other
courts have found to be sufficient for an injury regarding an FDCPA
claim.

2. MVBA PC

Perez brings her claims against MVBA LLC and MVBA PC, seeking that
they be held jointly and severally liable. Although MVBA LLC sent
the letter to Perez, she argues that MVBA PC should be held liable
under either a theory of alter ego, joint enterprise, or vicarious
liability.

Judge Pitman holds that none of Perez's proposed theories allow her
to hold MVBA PC liable. He finds that (i) Perez alleges broadly
that MVBA PC used MVBA LLC as its alter ego to "circumvent a
statute," presumably the FDCPA, but offers no evidence that MVBA PC
used its subsidiary company in this way. Second, each company
working on different aspects of debt collection and coordinating
operations in shared office space is insufficient to demonstrate
that there was an agreement to jointly carry out a common purpose.
Lastly, the Judge is unpersuaded that a reasonable jury could find
that the abbreviation "MVBA" on the letter was not an abbreviated
reference to MVBA LLC, which was listed elsewhere on the letter,
and was instead a reference to MVBA PC—which was not mentioned in
the letter.

Because Perez does not present evidence that indicates that MVBA PC
is a debt collector under the FDCPA, Perez cannot hold MVBA PC
vicariously liable. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment
to Defendants as to Perez's claims against MVBA PC.

3. FDCPA

Judge Pitman next turns to the merits of the FDCPA claims against
MVBA LLC. "The FDCPA was passed to protect consumers from deceptive
or harassing actions taken by debt collectors." "When determining
compliance with the FDCPA, the Fifth Circuit has held that a court
must evaluate any potential deception in a collection letter under
an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer standard."

First, Judge Pitman denies the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to whether the letter's failure to disclose that the
debt was judicially unenforceable violated the FDCPA. Second, the
Defendants' argument that the letter' misrepresentation was
immaterial does not support summary judgment. Third, because
Perez's Section 1692(f) claim is based on the same allegations as
her Section 1692(e) claim, the Judge grants summary judgment to the
Defendants on Perez's Section 1692(f) claim. Foruth, the repeated
error from Defendants' procedures creates an outstanding fact issue
as to whether MVBA LLC had reasonably adapted procedures to avoid
this error. Hence, summary judgment is denied as to the bona fide
error defense.

B. Ms. Perez's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment

Because Judge Pitman has already granted the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment as to Perez's claims against MVBA PC, he does not
address arguments regarding MVBA PC in the briefing on Perez's
motion for summary judgment. Similarly, because he granted the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Perez's Section
1692(f) claim, the Judge does not address that claim. Finally, the
Judge denies the Defendants' arguments regarding Perez's standing
for the same reasons as already discussed.

C. Motion to Certify Class

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Perez moves to a
certify the following class: (i) all persons at a Texas address
(ii) to whom Defendants sent a letter in the form of Exhibit A
(iii) which were not returned as undeliverable (iv) in an attempt
to collect a debt incurred for personal, family, or household
purposes as shown by Defendants' or the creditors' records (v)
which includes a Delinquency Date of more than four years prior to
the date of the respective letter in the form of Exhibit A (vi)
during the one year prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Perez
believes that the size of the class is 55 individuals who were also
sent similar letters.

Under Rule 23(a) the moving party must demonstrate that: (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable
(numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class (typicality); and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). The
Defendants challenge each of these requirements.

As to numerosity, Judge Pitman finds that under the circumstances
in the case, 55 individuals are sufficiently numerous, and it would
be otherwise impracticable to litigate each class members' claims
separately. As to commonality and typicality, the Judge is
unpersuaded that any questions pertaining to standing interfere
with commonality among the potential class members. Because the
Defendants' challenge to the typicality requirement of class
certification also revolves around Perez "facing different
arguments and defenses due to the standing question in her case,"
the Judge similarly rejects those arguments.

With respect to adequacy, Perez provides a sworn declaration in
which she attests that she understands the legal parameters of her
case and her responsibilities as the class representative as
explained to her by her counsel. As such, Perez has demonstrated
competence and willingness to serve as a class representative. As
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b), the Judge reiterates that standing is
unlikely to require more than a cursory inquiry of each class
member, which would be feasible in a class action. Because each
potential class member received a similar letter with the same
alleged FDCPA violations, a class action is proper in the case.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Pitman granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. He grants the Defendants
summary judgment as to Perez's claims against MVBA PC and Perez's
claim based on Section 1692(f). The motion is denied in all other
respects.

The Judge denied Perez's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted
Perez's Motion to Certify Class.

The parties will confer about the proposed schedule for issuing
class notice and receiving response. They will submit a joint
proposed class notice and schedule on Aug. 30, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/tn84m2v8 from Leagle.com.


MCKINSEY & COMPANY: Blankenship Sues Over Opioid Crisis in W. Va.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HADEN TRAVIS BLANKENSHIP, individually and as the next friend of
minor Z.D.B.B. and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, INC., MCKINSEY & COMPANY, INC.
UNITED STATES, and MCKINSEY AND COMPANY, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-00465 (S.D. W. Va., August 20, 2021)
is a class action against the Defendants for civil conspiracy,
nuisance, public nuisance, negligence and gross negligence, and
medical monitoring.

The case arises from the integral role of the Defendants in
creating and deepening the opioid crisis in West Virginia. The
Defendants knew of the dangers of opioids, and of the misconduct of
opioid manufacturer Purdue Pharma, but nonetheless they advised
Purdue and implemented a marketing strategy to increase the sales
of OxyContin, a brand-name opioid, says the suit.

The Plaintiffs bring this action against McKinsey for the
consulting services it provided to opioid companies in connection
with designing the companies' marketing plans and programs that
helped cause and contribute to the opioid crisis, including
prenatal exposure to opioids.

McKinsey & Company, Inc. is a management consultant company, with a
principal place of business located at 711 Third Avenue, New York,
New York.

McKinsey & Company, Inc. United States is a management consultant
company, with a principal place of business located at 55 E 52nd
Street, New York, New York.

McKinsey & Company, Inc. Washington, D.C. is a management
consulting firm, with its principal place of business in
Washington, D.C. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
        
         Stephen P. New, Esq.
         NEW, TAYLOR AND ASSOCIATES
         430 Harper Park Dr.
         Beckley, WV 25801
         Telephone: (304) 250-6017
         Facsimile: (304) 250-6012
         E-mail: steve@newlawoffice.com

                - and –

         Kevin W. Thompson, Esq.
         David R. Barney, Jr., Esq.
         Melissa Ellsworth, Esq.
         Sarah Surber, Esq.
         THOMPSON BARNEY
         2030 Kanawha Boulevard, East
         Charleston, West Virginia 25311
         Telephone: (304) 343-4401
         Facsimile: (304) 343-4405
         E-mail: kwthompsonwv@thompsonbarneylaw.com
                 drbarneywv@gmail.com
                 mellsworth@thompsonbarneylaw.com
                 ssurber@thompsonbarneylaw.com

                - and –

         Scott R. Bickford, Esq.
         MARTZELL, BICKFORD & CENTOLA
         338 Lafayette Street
         New Orleans, LA 70130
         Telephone: (504) 581-9065
         Facsimile: (504) 581-7635
         E-mail: sbickford@mbfirm.com
                 srd@mbfirm.com
                 usdcndoh@mbfirm.com

                - and –

         Celeste Brustowicz, Esq.
         Barry J. Cooper, Jr., Esq.
         Stephen H. Wussow, Esq.
         Victor Cobb, Esq.
         THE COOPER LAW FIRM, LLC
         1525 Religious Street
         New Orleans, LA 70130
         Telephone: (504) 399-0009
         E-mail: cbrustowicz@clfnola.com
                 bcooper@clfnola.com
                 swussow@clfnola.com
                 vcobb@clfnola.com

                - and –

         Donald Creadore, Esq.
         CREADORE LAW FIRM, P.C.
         450 Seventh Ave., Suite 1408
         New York, NY 10123
         Telephone: (212) 355-7200
         E-mail: Donald@creadorelawfirm.com

                - and –

         Kent Harrison Robbins, Esq.
         THE LAW OFFICES OF KENT HARRISON ROBBINS, P.A.
         242 Northeast 27th Street
         Miami, FL 33137
         Telephone: (305) 532-0500
         Facsimile: (305) 531-0150
         E-mail: khr@khrlawoffices.com

                - and –

         James F. Clayborne, Esq.
         CLAYBORNE, SABO & WAGNER, LLP
         525 West Main Street, Suite 105
         Belleville, IL 62220
         Telephone: (618) 239-0187
         Facsimile: (618) 416-7556
         E-mail: jclayborne@cswlawllp.com

MDL 2460: Bid to Certify Class in Niaspan Antitrust Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE NIASPAN ANTITRUST LITIGATION, MDL No. 2460 (E.D.
Pa.), Judge Jan E. DuBois of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the End-Payor Plaintiffs'
Renewed Motion for Class Certification.

This document (Memorandum) relates to all actions.

The multidistrict litigation involves what has come to be known as
a "pay-for-delay," or "reverse payment," settlement -- a practice
in which a brand-name drug manufacturer brings a
patent-infringement action against a generic drug manufacturer and
then compensates the generic drug manufacturer for its agreement to
delay entering the market with a competing generic version of the
brand-name drug. In the case, End-Payor Plaintiffs ("EPPs") aver
that the brand-name manufacturer of the drug Niaspan, Kos
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., entered into anticompetitive settlement
agreements with the generic manufacturer of that drug, Barr
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in March of 2005 in order to terminate
patent-infringement litigation brought by Kos against Barr in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York.

On Dec. 19, 2018, EPPs filed a motion to certify classes of
consumers and third-party payors ("TPPs") which paid for brand or
generic Niaspan. That motion alleged that the Defendants' conduct
"violated the antitrust laws of 16 states, the consumer protection
laws of 5 states, the unfair trade practices laws of 7 states, and
the unjust enrichment laws of 25 states—a total of 53 state laws
from 26 jurisdictions." On June 2, 2020, the Court denied EPPs'
motion for class certification.

On Sept. 4, 2020, EPPs filed the pending Renewed Motion for Class
Certification. In their Renewed Motion, EPPs seek certification of
a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), defined as
follows: All entities in the United States and its territories who
[sic] purchased, paid, and/or provided reimbursement for some or
all of the purchase price for Niaspan and/or generic versions of
Niaspan in Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin for consumption by themselves, their families, or
their members, employees, insureds, participants, or beneficiaries
during the period April 3, 2007 through Jan. 31, 2018.

The proposed class excludes the following entities: The Defendants
and their subsidiaries, or affiliates; all federal or state
government entities other than cities, towns or municipalities with
self-funded prescription drug plans; all entities that, after Sept.
20, 2013, paid and/or provided reimbursement for branded Niaspan
and did not pay and/or provide reimbursement for generic Niaspan;
all entities who purchased Niaspan for purposes of resale or
directly from Defendants or their affiliates; fully insured health
plans (i.e., plans that purchased insurance from another third
party payor covering 100% of the Plan's reimbursement obligations
to its members); and Pharmacy Benefit Managers.

The proposed class in EPPs' Renewed Motion "differs from the
previous proposed class" by (1) "omitting 'persons' (i.e.,
consumers) from the class definition," and (2) "invoking only 23
state laws." In support of their Renewed Motion, EPPs submitted a
chart of state law claims, a proposed trial plan, and a model
verdict form.

The Defendants filed their Opposition to EPPs' Renewed Motion and
Supplemental Opposition to EPPs' Renewed Motion on Nov. 6, 2020,
and Dec. 4, 2020, respectively. EPPs filed a reply on Dec. 18,
2020. Thereafter, the parties submitted numerous documents related
to the Renewed Motion, including EPPs' Motion for Leave to File the
Expert Reply Report of Ms. Laura Craft, which was granted by Order
dated Feb. 24, 2021. The last of these documents was not filed
until May 27, 2021.

Judge DuBois holds that the Renewed Motion will be denied on the
ground that EPPs failed to satisfy the ascertainability requirement
of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) that they provide a
reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for distinguishing
between class members and intermediaries in drug transactions which
are excluded from the class.

The Judge concludes that EPPs have not presented an
administratively feasible mechanism to distinguish between class
members and mere intermediaries such as fully insured plans. EPPs
may not adopt a methodology that changes as defendants test its
reliability and, in the end, fails to accomplish what is required.
In its June 2, 2020 Memorandum denying class certification, the
Court stated that EPPs failed to provide "a comprehensive
methodology for systematically applying exclusions in the case."
The Judge holds that the Court remains of the view that EPPs have
failed to provide a methodology to systematically apply the class
exclusion for fully insured health plans. Accordingly, the Judge
concludes that EPPs have not satisfied the ascertainability
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

Having ruled that EPPs have not satisfied the ascertainability
requirement, Judge DuBois need not address whether EPPs have
satisfied the requirements of superiority and predominance.

For these foregoing reasons, Judge DuBois denied EPPs' Renewed
Motion for Class Certification. An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4cvdf4w4 from Leagle.com.


MDL 2972: Court Narrows Claims in Customer Data Breach Litigation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the multidistrict litigation styled IN RE: BLACKBAUD, INC.,
CUSTOMER DATA BREACH LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL
ACTIONS, Case No. 3:20-mn-02972-JMC, MDL No. 2972 (D.S.C.), the
U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Columbia
Division, grants in part and denies in part Blackbaud's motion to
dismiss.

Blackbaud moved to dismiss seven of the Plaintiffs' statutory
claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Background

Blackbaud is a publicly traded cloud software company incorporated
in Delaware and headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina. The
Company provides data collection and maintenance software solutions
for administration, fundraising, marketing, and analytics to social
good entities, such as non-profit organizations, foundations,
educational institutions, faith communities, and healthcare
organizations ("Social Good Entities"). Blackbaud's services
include collecting and storing Personally Identifiable Information
("PII") and Protected Health Information ("PHI") from its
customers' donors, patients, students, and congregants.

In this action, the Plaintiffs represent a putative class of
individuals whose data was provided to Blackbaud's customers and
managed by Blackbaud. Thus, the Plaintiffs are patrons of
Blackbaud's customers rather than direct customers of Blackbaud.

The Plaintiffs assert that from Feb. 7, 2020, to May 20, 2020,
cybercriminals orchestrated a two-part ransomware attack on
Blackbaud's systems ("Ransomware Attack"). Cybercriminals first
infiltrated Blackbaud's computer networks, copied the Plaintiffs'
data, and held it for ransom. When the Ransomware Attack was
discovered in May 2020, the cybercriminals then attempted but
failed to block Blackbaud from accessing its own systems. Blackbaud
ultimately paid the ransom in an undisclosed amount of Bitcoin in
exchange for a commitment that any data previously accessed by the
cybercriminals was permanently destroyed.

The Plaintiffs maintain that the Ransomware Attack resulted from
Blackbaud's deficient security program. They assert that Blackbaud
failed to comply with industry and regulatory standards by
neglecting to implement security measures to mitigate the risk of
unauthorized access, utilizing outdated servers, storing obsolete
data, and maintaining unencrypted data fields.

The Plaintiffs further allege that after the Ransomware Attack,
Blackbaud launched a narrow internal investigation into the attack
that analyzed a limited number of Blackbaud systems and did not
address the full scope of the attack. On July 14, 2020, Blackbaud
received the investigation report ("Forensic Report") which
acknowledged that "names, addresses, phone numbers, email
addresses, dates of birth, and/or SSNs" were disclosed in the
breach but stated that the investigation was unable to detect
credit card data while reviewing exfiltrated data. The Plaintiffs
claim the Forensic Report improperly concludes that no credit card
data was exfiltrated because such data could have existed in the
unexamined database files.

The Plaintiffs contend that Blackbaud failed to provide them with
timely and adequate notice of the Ransomware Attack and the extent
of the resulting data breach. They claim that they did not receive
notice of the Ransomware Attack until July of 2020 at the earliest.
The NonProfit Times reported that Blackbaud had been the subject of
a ransomware attack and data breach and Blackbaud issued a
statement about the Ransomware Attack on its website. In both
disclosures, Blackbaud asserted that the cybercriminals did not
access credit card information, bank account information, or SSNs.

The Plaintiffs allege that they subsequently received notices of
the Ransomware Attack from various Blackbaud customers at different
points in time from July 2020 to January 2021. They maintain that
some of the notices stated that SSNs, credit card data, and bank
account information were not accessed during the Ransomware Attack
while others stated that SSNs but not credit card data or bank
account information were exposed during the Ransomware Attack.

The Plaintiffs maintain that although Blackbaud initially
represented that sensitive information such as SSNs and bank
account numbers were not compromised in the Ransomware Attack,
Blackbaud informed certain customers in September and October 2020
that SSNs and other sensitive data were in fact stolen in the
breach. Additionally, on Sept. 29, 2020, Blackbaud filed a Form 8-K
with the Securities and Exchange Commission stating that SSNs, bank
account information, usernames, and passwords may have been
exfiltrated during the Ransomware Attack.

After the Ransomware Attack was made public, putative class actions
arising out of the intrusion into Blackbaud's systems and
subsequent data breach were filed in state and federal courts
across the country. On Dec. 15, 2020, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all federal litigation
related to the Ransomware Attack into this multidistrict litigation
("MDL") for coordinated pretrial proceedings.

On April 2, 2021, 34 named Plaintiffs from 20 states filed a
Consolidated Class Action Complaint ("CCAC") alleging that their
PII and/or PHI was compromised during the Ransomware Attack. They
assert six (6) claims on behalf of a putative nationwide class, as
well as ninety-one (91) statutory claims on behalf of putative
state subclasses.

To facilitate the efficient resolution of the litigation, the Court
ordered that the first phase of motions practice address
jurisdictional issues, certain statutory claims, and specific
common law claims. On May 3, 2021, Blackbaud filed a Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) ("Jurisdictional Motion to
Dismiss"). The Court denied Blackbaud's Jurisdictional Motion to
Dismiss on July 1, 2021.

Blackbaud filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) on June 4, 2021, contending that the Plaintiffs'
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 ("CCPA"), California
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act ("CMIA"), Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA"), New York General Business Law
("GBL"), Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law ("UTPCPL") and South Carolina Data Breach Security
Act ("SCDBA") claims (collectively, "Select Statutory Claims")
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Plaintiffs
filed a Response on July 6, 2021. The Court held a hearing on the
Motion on July 20, 2021.

Motion to Dismiss

Blackbaud contends that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs'
Select Statutory Claims for failure to state a claim.

A. California Consumer Privacy Act Claims

California Plaintiffs Kassandre Clayton, Philip Eisen, Mamie Estes,
and Shawn Regan allege claims under the CCPA.

District Judge J. Michelle Childs finds that the California
Plaintiffs adequately allege that Blackbaud qualifies as a
"business" under the CCPA. The Court rejects Blackbaud's argument
that Blackbaud is not a "business" under the CCPA because it
qualifies as a "service provider" under the Act.

As the California Plaintiffs adequately assert that Blackbaud
constitutes a "business" under the CCPA, they sufficiently allege
violations of the CCPA. Accordingly, the Court denies Blackbaud's
Motion to Dismiss California Plaintiffs' claims under the CCPA.

B. California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act Claims

The California Plaintiffs also assert claims under California's
CMIA. Blackbaud asserts that the California Plaintiffs' CMIA claims
should be dismissed because their "medical information" was not
exposed as a result of the Ransomware Attack and Blackbaud does not
qualify as a "provider of health care" under the CMIA.

Here, Eisen, Estes, and Regan have not plausibly alleged that
information relating to their medical history, mental or physical
condition, or treatment was disclosed during the Ransomware Attack,
thus, they have failed to sufficiently assert that their "medical
information" was exposed as a result of the data breach, Judge
Childs opines. She adds that it is also not plausible that their
"medical information" was disclosed during the Ransomware Attack
because they allege that their PII was exposed as a result of their
relationships with non-profit organizations rather than their
interactions with medical providers. Thus, they do not state claims
under the CMIA.

However, Judge Childs holds, Clayton plausibly alleges that her
"medical information" was disclosed during the Ransomware Attack.
Accordingly, Clayton has plausibly alleged that "information
relating to [her] medical history, mental or physical condition, or
treatment" was exposed during the Ransomware Attack. Judge Childs
also holds that the California Plaintiffs plausibly allege that
Blackbaud constitutes a "provider of health care" under Cal. Civ.
Code Section 56.06(b).

In summary, the Court grants in part and denies in part Blackbaud's
Motion to Dismiss the California Plaintiffs' CMIA claims. The Court
grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss as to California Plaintiffs
Eisen's, Estes', and Regan's CMIA claims because they do not allege
that their "medical information" was compromised in the Ransomware
Attack. However, the Court denies Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss as
to California Plaintiff Clayton because she sufficiently asserts
that her "medical information" was exposed as a result of the
Ransomware Attack and that Blackbaud qualifies as a "medical
provider" under the CMIA.

C. Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practice Act Claims

To state a claim for damages under FDUTPA, a plaintiff must allege:
"(1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3)
actual damages," City First Mortgage Corp. v. Barton, 988 So.2d 82,
86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).

The Florida Plaintiffs allege that Blackbaud committed nine (9)
deceptive acts or unfair practices. In summary, they claim that
Blackbaud: failed to adopt reasonable security measures and
adequately notify customers and the Plaintiffs of the data breach;
misrepresented that certain sensitive PII was not exposed during
the breach, it would protect the Plaintiffs' PII, and it would
adopt reasonable security measures; and concealed that it did not
adopt reasonable security measures.

Viewing the CCAC in the light most favorable to them, the Florida
Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently establish the actual damages
leg of the FDUTPA liability tripod, Judge Childs holds, citing
Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006). Accordingly, the Florida Plaintiffs can only recover for
damages to the data management products organizations purchased
from Blackbaud to maintain the Florida Plaintiffs' PII.

As the Florida Plaintiffs have not alleged damages to the property
that is the subject of the consumer transaction, they have failed
to sufficiently assert "actual damages" under FDUTPA, Judge Childs
opines. Therefore, the Court grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss
the Florida Plaintiffs' FDUTPA claims seeking damages.

Although the Florida Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for damages
under FDUTPA, they adequately state a claim for injunctive relief
under FDUTPA, Judge Childs finds. She notes that Blackbaud
presently does not dispute that the Florida Plaintiffs have alleged
that Blackbaud engaged in a deceptive act or unfair practice.

As the Florida Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief under FDUTPA, the Court denies
Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss Florida Plaintiffs' FDUTPA
declaratory and injunctive relief claims. (ECF No. 110.)

D. New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act Claims

Blackbaud contends that New Jersey Plaintiffs Martin Roth's and
Rachel Roth's claims under the NJCFA should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. Blackbaud asserts its services do not
fall within the purview of the NJCFA because it sells services to
sophisticated businesses and entities, not the general public. As
such, the New Jersey Plaintiffs are not "consumers" of its services
protected by the NJCFA.

Although Blackbaud does not explicitly contend that the New Jersey
Plaintiffs lack statutory standing, the Court construes Blackbaud's
assertion that New Jersey Plaintiffs' claims "fall outside the
NJCFA's purview" as a challenge to statutory standing.

Judge Childs finds that the New Jersey Plaintiffs are not
"consumers" entitled to the protection of the NJCFA. Thus, the CCAC
does not plausibly allege that Martin Roth purchased any services
for consumption. Similarly, Rachel Roth does not plausibly contend
that she is a "consumer" of Blackbaud's services.

Therefore, Judge Childs holds, the New Jersey Plaintiffs fail to
state claims under the NJCFA because they do not plausibly allege
that they are "consumers" of services entitled to the NJCFA's
protection. Accordingly, the Court grants Blackbaud's Motion to
Dismiss New Jersey Plaintiffs' NJCFA claims.

E. New York General Business Law Section 349 Claims

New York Plaintiffs Ralph Peragine and Karen Zielinski assert
claims under GBL Section 349. Blackbaud contends that the New York
Plaintiffs have failed to establish the first element of a GBL
Section 349 claim.

Contrary to Blackbaud's assertions, Judge Childs finds that the New
York Plaintiffs adequately plead that Blackbaud's allegedly
deceptive acts were "consumer-oriented." The New York Plaintiffs
allege that Blackbaud engaged in nine deceptive acts or practices
in violation of GBL Section 349.

Viewing the CCAC in the light most favorable to them, the New York
Plaintiffs plausibly claim that such deceptive acts had a broader
impact on consumers at large, Judge Childs holds. Accordingly, it
is plausible that Blackbaud's misrepresentations and omissions
impacted a broad segment of New York consumers.

Since the New York Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that
Blackbaud engaged in acts in violation of GBL Section 349 that were
"consumer-oriented," the Court denies Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss
the New York Plaintiffs' GBL Section 349 claims.

F. Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
Claim

Pennsylvania Plaintiff Christina Duranko asserts a claim under the
UTPCPL. The Pennsylvania Plaintiff's UTPCPL claim is premised on
both Blackbaud's alleged misrepresentations and its alleged
omissions. She asserts that Blackbaud misrepresented that it would
protect the privacy and confidentiality of her information, the
scope of the Ransomware Attack, and that it would comply with
common law and statutory duties pertaining to the security and
privacy of her information.

However, Judge Childs notes, the Pennsylvania Plaintiff does not
sufficiently allege that she relied on such alleged
misrepresentations and omissions. Thus, even viewing the CCAC in
the light most favorable to her, the Pennsylvania Plaintiff has
failed to adequately establish the reliance requirement of a UTPCPL
claim.

As the Pennsylvania Plaintiff does not sufficiently assert that she
justifiably relied on Blackbaud's alleged misrepresentations and
omissions and a presumption of reliance does not apply to the facts
of this case, the Pennsylvania Plaintiff has failed to establish
the justifiable reliance requirement of a UTPCPL claim.
Accordingly, the Court grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss
Pennsylvania the Plaintiff's UTPCPL claim.

G. South Carolina Data Breach Security Act Claims

South Carolina Plaintiffs Latricia Ford and Clifford Scott advance
SCDBA claims under S.C. Code Ann. Section 39-1-90(a). Blackbaud
maintains that it is not liable under the SCDBA because it does not
own or license data. The Court agrees.

The South Carolina Plaintiffs assert, among other things, that they
state a claim under the SCDBA because they fulfill the pleading
requirements for a SCDBA claim under S.C. Code Ann. Section
39-1-90(B). Judge Childs finds that this argument is unavailing.

As South Carolina Plaintiffs only assert a SCDBA claim under S.C.
Code Ann. Section 39-1-90(A) and do not plausibly allege that
Blackbaud is a business "owning or licensing" data, the Court
grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss the South Carolina Plaintiffs'
SCDBA claims.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part
Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the Court:

   * denies Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss California Plaintiffs'
     CCPA claims;

   * grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss California Plaintiffs
     Eisen's, Estes', and Regan's CMIA claims;

   * denies Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss California Plaintiff
     Clayton's CMIA claim;

   * grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss Florida Plaintiffs'
     FDUTPA claims seeking damages;

   * denies Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss Florida Plaintiffs'
     FDUTPA declaratory and injunctive relief claims;

   * grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss New Jersey Plaintiffs'
     NJCFA claims;

   * denies Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss New York Plaintiffs'
     GBL Section 349 claims;

   * grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss Pennsylvania
     Plaintiff's UTPCPL claim; and

   * grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss South Carolina
     Plaintiffs' SCDBA claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Opinion dated Aug. 12,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/tstd83mf from
Leagle.com.


MED-TRANS CORP: Black Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
---------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALPHINE BRADLEY and
WILLIAM DANIEL BLACK, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, v. MED-TRANS CORPORATION, Case No.
3:20-cv-02679-SAL (D.S.C.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter
an order certifying the following classes:

   "All persons who have been charged or to whom charges have
   been submitted for air medical transportation by Defendant
   from a location in South Carolina from July 20, 2017 to the
   present where the person transported or the person's legal
   representative did not sign the Ambulance Billing
   Authorization Form; and

   "All persons who have been charged or to whom charges have
   been submitted by Defendant for air medical transportation by
   the Defendant from a location in South Carolina from July 20,
   2017 to the present where the person transported signed an
   Ambulance Billing Authorization Form or someone with legal
   authority signed the Ambulance Billing Authorization Form on
   his or her behalf."

Med-Trans Corporation specializes in custom air transport solutions
for the medical industry.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Aug. 27,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mF5L8b
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mario Pacella, Esq.
          J. Preston Strom, Jr., Esq.
          Amy E. Willbanks, Esq.
          STROM LAW FIRM, LLC
          6923 N. Trenholm Road, Suite 200
          Columbia, SC 29206
          Telephone: (803) 252-4800
          Facsimile: (803) 252-4801
          E-mail: petestrom@stromlaw.com
                  mpacella@stromlaw.com
                  awillbanks@stromlaw.com

               - and -

          J. Clay Hopkins, Esq.
          HOPKINS LAW FIRM, LLC
          12019 Ocean Highway
          Pawleys Island, SC 29585
          Telephone: (843) 314-4202
          Facsimile: (843) 314-9365
          E-mail: clay@hopkinsfirm.com

MELINDA COONROD: Seeks Approval of Revised Class Status Deadlines
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT EARL HOWARD, et
al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v.
MELINDA N. COONROD et al., Case No. 6:21-cv-00062-PGB-EJK (M.D.
Fla.), the Parties ask the Court to enter an order granting
following revised dates:

                                    Deadline        Revised
                                                    Deadline

-- Discovery - Class Action     Sept. 6, 2021    Oct. 21, 2021

-- Motion for Class             Oct. 4, 2021     Nov. 18, 2021
   Certification

-- Response to Motion           Oct. 25, 2021    Dec. 9, 2021
   for Class Certification

-- Reply to Response to         Nov. 9, 2021     Dec. 24, 2021
   Motion for Class
   Certification

A copy of the Parties motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jqcZLh at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Tracy Nichols, Esq.
          Stephen P. Warren, Esq.
          Laura B. Renstrom, Esq.
          HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
          701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3000
          Miami, Florida 33131
          Telephone: (305) 374-8500
          Facsimile: (305) 789-7799
          E-mail: tracy.nichols@hklaw.com
                  stephen.warren@hklaw.com
                  laura.renstrom@hklaw.com

               - and -

          Marsha Levick, Esq.
          Andrew Keats, Esq.
          Katrina Goodjoint, Esq.
          JUVENILE LAW CENTER
          1800 John F. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1900B
          Philadelphia PA 19103-7412
          Telephone: (215) 625-0551
          E-mail: mlevick@jlc.org
                  akeats@jlc.org
                  kgoodjoint@jlc.org

The Defendants are represented by:

          Glen A. Bassett, Esq.
          Blaine H. Winship, Esq.
          ASHLEY MOODY
          ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA
          Complex Litigation Bureau
          Office of the Attorney General of Florida
          The Capitol, Suite PL-01
          Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
          Telephone: (850) 414-3300
          Facsimile: (850) 488-4872
          E-maiL: blaine.winship@myfloridalegal.com
                  glen.bassett@myfloridalegal.com

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summ. Judgment Ruling in Pleasant Beach Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND
ENERGY, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit styled PLEASANT BEACH MOBILE HOME RESORT LLC v. DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 20-000156-MM, in
the Michigan Court of Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were victims of the
state's failed oversight and regulatory actions to the catastrophic
damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam that flooded Midland
and surrounding areas. The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss
of property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other
losses.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying their summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as PLEASANT BEACH MOBILE HOME
RESORT LLC v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY,
Case No. 358108, in the Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August
6, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES are
represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiffs-Appellees PLEASANT BEACH MOBILE HOME RESORT LLC, CAROL
CLARKSON, DAVE CLARKSON, BRIAN MATTHIAS, PATRICK PANGLE, PATRICIA
PANGLE, JARED NICKEL, MID MICHIGAN PRESSURE CLEANING LLC, MID
MICHIGAN WINDOW CLEANING & POWER WASHING LLC, JULIE VAN AMEYDE,
JOHN SMILNAK, RANDALL MIER, and KIM MIER, on behalf of all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Emily M. Peacock, Esq.
          OLSMAN MACKENZIE PEACOCK & WALLACE
          2684 West Eleven Mile Road
          Berkley, MI 48072

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Bruneu Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND
ENERGY, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit styled JOE BRUNEAU v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES
AND ENERGY, Case No. 20-000118-MM, in the Michigan Court of
Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was a victim of the
state's failed oversight and regulatory actions to the catastrophic
damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam that flooded Midland
and surrounding areas. The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss
of property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other
losses.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying their summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as JOE BRUNEAU v. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 358101, in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August 6, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES are
represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiffs-Appellees JOE BRUNEAU, DAVID PHILLIPS, DANA RALKO, ORSO
RANDALL, JAMES MRDUTT, and ALICIA MRDUTT, on behalf of all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Mark L. McAlpine, Esq.
          MCALPINE PC
          3201 University Drive, Suite 200
          Auburn Hills, MI 48326
          Telephone: (248) 373-3700
          E-mail: mlmcalpine@mcalpinepc.com

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Fagan Case
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY
filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled
PAMELA FAGAN v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY,
Case No. 20-000111-MM, in the Michigan Court of Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was a victim of the
state's failed oversight and regulatory actions to the catastrophic
damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam that flooded Midland
and surrounding areas. The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss
of property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other
losses.

The Defendant now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying its summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as PAMELA FAGAN v. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 358098, in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August 6, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES
AND ENERGY is represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiff-Appellee FAGAN PAMELA is represented by:

          E. Powell Miller, Esq.
          THE MILLER LAW FIRM
          950 West University Dr. Suite 300
          Rochester, MI 48307
          Telephone: (248) 845-1350
          E-mail: epm@miller.law

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Forbes Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY
filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled
CHRISTOPHER FORBES v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND
ENERGY, Case No. 20-000103-MM, in the Michigan Court of Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was a victim of the
state's failed oversight and regulatory actions to the catastrophic
damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam that flooded Midland
and surrounding areas. The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss
of property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other
losses.

The Defendant now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying its summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as CHRISTOPHER FORBES v. DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 358097, in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August 6, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES
AND ENERGY is represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiff-Appellee CHRISTOPHER FORBES is represented by:

          Jason J. Thompson, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ PC
          One Towne Square, Suite 1700
          Southfield, MI 48076
          Telephone: (248) 415-3206
          E-mail: jthompson@sommerspc.com

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Holley Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND
ENERGY, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit styled THOMAS HOLLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 20-000102-MM, in the Michigan Court of
Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was a victim of the
state's failed oversight and regulatory actions to the catastrophic
damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam that flooded Midland
and surrounding areas. The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss
of property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other
losses.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying their summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as THOMAS HOLLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 358096, in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August 6, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES are
represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiffs-Appellees THOMAS HOLLEY, KATHERINE HOLLEY, MONTY
WISEMAN, JILL WISEMAN, THOMAS DECOE, MICHELLE DECOE, ROBERT
MISHLER, JR., AND SUSAN MISHLER, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Geoffrey N. Fieger, Esq.
          FIEGER LAW
          19390 W 10 Mile Rd.
          Southfield, MI 48075
          Telephone: (800) 294-6637

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Krieger Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND
ENERGY, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit styled DAVID KRIEGER v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 20-000094-MM, in the Michigan Court of
Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was a victim of the
state's failed oversight and regulatory actions to the catastrophic
damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam that flooded Midland
and surrounding areas. The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss
of property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other
losses.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying their summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as DAVID KRIEGER v. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 358076, in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August 6, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES are
represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiffs-Appellees DAVID KRIEGER, ANDREW KRIEGER, JAMES SPERLING,
and MARGARET SPERLING, on behalf of all others similarly situated,
are represented by:

          Michael L. Pitt, Esq.
          PITT, MCGEHEE, PALMER, BONANNI & RIVERS, P.C.
          117 West 4th Street, Suite 200
          Royal Oak, MI 48067
          Telephone: (248) 398-9800

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Swarthout Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND
ENERGY, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit styled CARL SWARTHOUT v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 20-000112-MZ, in the Michigan Court of
Claims.

According to the complaint, Carl Swarthout, of Midland, Michigan,
was a victim of the state's failed oversight and regulatory actions
to the catastrophic damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam
that flooded Midland and surrounding areas. Swarthout's property
was allegedly "washed away as a result of the Edenville and Sanford
Dam failures." The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss of
property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other losses.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying their summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as CARL SWARTHOUT v. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 358099, in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August 6, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES are
represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiff-Appellee CARL SWARTHOUT, on behalf of all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Michael Bonvolanta, Esq.
          BUCKFIRE LAW FIRM
          29000 Inkster Road, Suite 150
          Southfield, MI 48034
          Telephone: (248) 569-4646
          Facsimile: (248) 569-6737
          E-mail: michael@buckfirelaw.com

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Woods Case
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND
ENERGY, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit styled ROBERT WOODS v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 20-000116-MM, in the Michigan Court of
Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was a victim of the
state's failed oversight and regulatory actions to the catastrophic
damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam that flooded Midland
and surrounding areas. The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss
of property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other
losses.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying their summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as ROBERT WOODS v. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 358100, in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August 6, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES are
represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiffs-Appellees ROBERT WOODS and HOLLY JOHNSON, on behalf of
all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          David R. Dubin, Esq.
          LIDDLE & DUBIN, PC
          975 East Jefferson Ave.
          Detroit, MI 48207
          Telephone: (313) 392-0015

MICHIGAN: EGLE Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling in Zelenak Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND
ENERGY, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit styled DARYL ZELENAK v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 20-000151-MM, in the Michigan Court of
Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were victims of the
state's failed oversight and regulatory actions to the catastrophic
damage from the Edenville Dam and Sanford Dam that flooded Midland
and surrounding areas. The lawsuit seeks compensation for the loss
of property, business losses, relocation expenses, and other
losses.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's Order dated May 21,
2021, denying their summary judgment motion on qualified immunity
grounds.

The appellate case is captioned as DARYL ZELENAK v. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT GREAT LAKES AND ENERGY, Case No. 358106, in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, filed on August 6, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT GREAT
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES are
represented by:

          Nathan A. Gambill, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          525 W Ottawa St.
          PO Box 30755
          Lansing, MI 48933-1067  
          Telephone: (517) 335-7664
          E-mail: gambilln@michigan.gov

Plaintiffs-Appellees DARYL ZELENAK, SUZETTE GAY-ZELENAK, MIKE
CALLAN, and REGAN WEILAND, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Thomas W. Waun, Esq.
          140 E 2nd St, 201
          Flint, MI  48502
          Telephone: (810) 695-6100

MIDLAND CREDIT: Arbitration Bid in Branum Suit Held in Abeyance
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, REBECCA BRANUM, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MIDLAND CREDIT MGMT., INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:20CV216 SNLJ (E.D. Mo.), Judge Stephen N.
Limbaugh, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, Southeastern Division, held in abeyance the
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration pending the Plaintiff's
filing of a surreply within 14 days.

Ms. Branum filed the putative class action against Defendant
Midland Credit Management, Inc. ("MCM") alleging that MCM violated
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C.
Sections 1692, et seq., when it sent a letter to her in an attempt
to collect a debt that the Plaintiff owed on her Lowes credit card,
which was issued by Synchrony Bank.

The Plaintiff opened a Lowes credit card account in 2018. The
credit card agreement that governed the account was mailed to the
Plaintiff on Jan. 8, 2018. The Agreement stated that "By opening or
using your account, you agree to the terms of the entire
Agreement." The Plaintiff agreed to the Lowes Account Agreement by
opening and using the Lowes Account to make purchases and payments
as evidenced by the billing statements and balance maintained on
the Lowes Account. Her last purchase posted to the Lowes Account
was on or about March 17, 2018 and the last payment to the Lowes
Account was on March 14, 2018. The balance of the Lowes Account was
subsequently charged-off on Nov. 11, 2018.

The credit card Agreement contains an arbitration provision. The
Arbitration Provision requires the parties to arbitrate the dispute
before the Court. The Arbitration Provision is expressly governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. Section 1, et
seq.

Synchrony sold all rights, title, and interest in the Plaintiff's
credit card account to Midland Funding, LLC ("Midland"), including
the right to compel arbitration. Thereafter, Midland assigned,
transferred, and conveyed all rights in the Lowes Account to
defendant MCM.

The Plaintiff filed the putative class action claiming that MCM
sent a "dunning letter" containing false, deceptive, and misleading
statements in violation of the FDCPA. The Defendant moved to compel
arbitration and to dismiss in light of the language of the parties'
agreement. The Plaintiff opposes the motion.

The Plaintiff also filed a motion to strike/disregard portions of
defendant's reply memorandum in support of the motion to compel
arbitration because, the Plaintiff says, the reply and its exhibits
contain new evidence/arguments to which she cannot respond.

Judge Limbaugh finds that the Plaintiff's complaint appears to fall
squarely within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement.
She accepted the terms of the Agreement by requesting, receiving,
signing, and using her credit card. The Agreement broadly permits
either party to compel arbitration of a dispute "if it relates to
your account." It appears clear, then, that the Agreement allows
defendant to compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's claim, which
clearly relates to her account, and that the Agreement also
prohibits the Plaintiff from proceeding with her putative class
action.

The Plaintiff's sole argument is that the Defendant has not
established that it succeeded to the right to arbitrate. Judge
Limbaugh disagrees that the Defendant has not established its right
to arbitrate. He says, although it appears a scrivener's error
mistakenly caused the Defendant's declarant to state that Midland
had most-recently purchased the Lowes Account at issue, the
Defendant's declarant explained and corrected the mistake in a
supplemental declaration. The declarant also added as an exhibit
the "Assignment Agreement" which shows that Midland Funding
assigned all rights in the Purchase Agreement to MCM.

Although the Plaintiff takes issue with this "additional evidence"
(and also with the declarant's use of a typed instead of
handwritten signature), the Judge says the Plaintiff could have
easily sought leave to file a surreply if she has genuine
evidentiary concerns regarding the evidence she herself said was
necessary to the Court's determination. She did not do so, although
she says in her reply that she should now be permitted to file a
surreply to establish why the "new evidence" does not help the
Defendant's argument. There is no reason to believe that MCM did
not purchase the Plaintiff's Lowes Account or that MCM does not now
stand in Synchrony's shoes as a party to the Agreement and its
Arbitration Provision. That said, out of an abundance of caution,
the Jude will grant leave to the Plaintiff to file a surreply
within 14 days.

Accordingly, Judge Limbaugh held in abeyance the Defendant's motion
to compel arbitration pending the Plaintiff's filing of a surreply
within 14 days. He granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiff's motion to strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/a96ewetm from Leagle.com.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Johnson Seeks Extension to File Class Cert. Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHIANNA JOHNSON and TERRI
M. HAYES, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC, a Kansas corporation,
Case No. 1:21-CV-00451-UA-JLW (M.D.N.C.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court to enter an order extending their deadline for them to move
for class certification.

The Plaintiffs request relief from the 90 day deadline for filing
motion for class certification and the Court set deadline at a
later date.

The Plaintiffs commenced action June 3, 2021 against Defendant
Midland Credit for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA) and North Carolina Debt Collection Act (NCDCA).

On July 1, 2021, the Plaintiffs consented to Defendant's request
for 30 day extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint up
through and including August 2, 2021, granted by Text Order.

Midland is a specialty finance company.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Aug. 25, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3kmFE32 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Attorney for the Plaintiffs and putative classes, are:

          Scott C. Harris, Esq.
          Patrick M. Wallace, Esq.
          S. Michael Dunn, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: sharris@milberg.com
                  pwallace@milberg.com
                  michael.dunn@milberg.com

NATURAL POWER: Court Dismisses Landy TCPA Suit Without Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRENNAN LANDY, Plaintiff v. NATURAL POWER SOURCES, LLC
d/b/a SUNTUITY, Defendant, Case No. 3:21-cv-00425 (D.N.J.), Judge
Peter G. Sheridan of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss without
prejudice.

Plaintiff Landy's class action complaint is brought under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 42 U.S.C. Section 227.

Overview

On October 29, 2020, Landy received a call on his cell phone from
an unknown caller who solicited him to purchase green energy
products. He heard a pause and click before an operator came on the
line, which allegedly indicates the use of an automatic telephone
dialing system ("ATDS").

Then, Landy was transferred to an operator named Steve who
identified himself as working for US Home Solar. Landy alleges he
heard a beep -- but not a pause or click -- before being connected
with Steve. Steve also solicited Landy to purchase green energy
products.

After speaking with Steve, Landy alleged he was transferred via a
"warm transfer" to a third operator named Evelyn, from Suntuity,
who solicited Landy to purchase Suntuity's solar energy products.
He does not allege that he heard a pause and click before being
connected to Evelyn. After the call with Evelyn concluded, Landy
received a follow-up email from Brendan McGrane, another Suntuity
representative, who solicited Suntuity's products.

Mr. Landy claims he never consented to the initial call and,
therefore, it was made in violation of the TCPA. He alleges
Suntuity is vicariously liable for that violation because it "knew
about the calls, received the benefits of the calls, directed the
calls to be placed, and ratified the calls."

Mr. Landy asserts that he and the proposed class members sustained
injuries in the form of aggravation, nuisance, invasion of privacy,
monies paid to the wireless caller for the receipt of unwanted
calls, interference with the use and enjoyment of their phones,
depletion of battery life, and wear and tear on their phones.

Mr. Landy defines the proposed class No Consent Class as "All
persons in the United States who (1) from the date four years prior
to the filing of this Complaint through the date notice is sent to
the Class; (2) received at least one call from Defendant, or a
third person acting on behalf of Defendant; (3) on the person's
cellular telephone; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant's
solar products and services; (5) using the same equipment that was
used to call the Plaintiffs; and (6) for whom Defendant claims it
obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as
Defendant claims it obtained prior express written consent to call
the Plaintiffs."

Mr. Landy alleges that his claims are typical of the class members,
he can adequately represent the class, there are common questions
of law and fact, the Defendant's conduct is common to all class
members, and the class members are too numerous to be individually
joined.

Mr. Landy timely filed his complaint on January 8, 2021. He seeks
an injunction against further unauthorized calls, as well as
statutory damages and attorneys' fees for class members under the
TCPA's private right of action provision, 47 U.S.C. Section
227(b)(3)(B).

Discussion

A. TCPA Claim

Mr. Landy alleges that he was called on his cell phone without his
consent. The identity of the initial caller is unknown. However,
Landy alleges that because he was eventually transferred to
Suntuity, the previous callers acted on Suntuity's behalf and at
its direction, thereby establishing vicarious liability.

1. Direct Liability

Courts have held that under the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. Section
277(b)(1)(A)(iii), liability is imposed on the party that places
the call or text. In the case, Landy does not allege that Suntuity
placed the initial call to Landy; he only alleges the initial
caller used an ATDS to call him without his consent. Once that call
was initiated, he was transferred to US Home Solar and Suntuity.
Therefore, Judge Sheridan holds that Landy can only pursue a TCPA
claim against Suntuity on a vicarious liability theory.

2. Vicarious Liability

An entity cannot be held liable under the TCPA "merely because they
stand to benefit from the call." Instead, a defendant that is not
the initial caller can be held vicariously liable under the TCPA
based on common law agency principles. Vicarious liability can be
established through actual authority, apparent authority, or
ratification.

Judge Sheridan finds that (i) the complaint does not sufficiently
allege an actual authority relationship between Suntuity and the
initial caller; (ii) Landy does not plead any facts that indicate
Suntuity's conduct led him to reasonably believe the initial caller
had authority to act on Suntuity's behalf; (iii) Landy's complaint
does not include facts that show Suntuity manifested assent to the
initial caller calling on its behalf.

In sum, Landy's complaint does not allege enough facts to indicate
that there was an agency relationship between the initial caller
and Suntuity. As such, he has failed to allege that Suntuity can be
held vicariously liable for the initial caller's TCPA violations.

B. ATDS

To support a claim under the TCPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate
the nonconsensual call was made using an ATDS. The TCPA defines an
ATDS as "equipment which has the capacity -- (A) to store or
produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers." In the
Third Circuit, pleading that there was a brief pause or silence
before the operator speaks is sufficient to allege the use of an
ATDS, citing Hazan v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. CV1810228
(MAS/TJB), 2020 WL 919183, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2020). Thus,
Landy's allegation that he heard a pause before the operator of the
initial call came on the line is sufficient to allege that an ATDS
was used.

C. Consent

To allege a violation under the TCPA, the call must be made without
the called party's prior express consent. Suntuity argues that,
because Landy admitted he was transferred to Evelyn via a "warm
transfer," he consented to speak to Suntuity. However, neither
party defines the term "warm transfer." A warm transfer occurs when
the first operator stays on the line with the called party during a
transfer until the second operator answers. That definition does
not imply that the called party consented to speak to either
operator.

Conclusion

Because Landy does not provide enough facts to plausibly allege a
claim against Suntuity under the TCPA, Judge Sheridan holds that
the Defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted without
prejudice. Landy will have 30 days to file an amended complaint if
he wishes to do so. The Defendant may move to dismiss the amended
complaint in accordance with the timeframes set forth in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Order

The Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice.
Landy will have 30 days to file an amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/hyevvsb6 from Leagle.com.


NCAA: Morrison Files Suit in S.D. Indiana
-----------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Mary Elizabeth
Morrison, as attorney-in-fact of Richard Morrison, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, Case No. 3:21-cv-00635 (S.D. Ind., Aug. 25,
2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Personal Injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association --
https://www.ncaa.org/ -- is a non-profit organization which
regulates athletes of 1,268 North American institutions and
conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA, LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: (713) 554-9099
          Fax: (713) 554-9098
          Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


NESTLE CORP: Court Tosses Stuckey Bid to Certify Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANDRE KENNETH STUCKEY v.
NESTLE CORPORATION, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-00511-SKO (E.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Sheila K. Oberto entered an order:

   -- denying  the Plaintiff's motions to certify the case as
      class action and for leave to file a class action
      complaint; and

   -- denying as moot the Plaintiff's motion for an extension of
      time to file a class action complaint.

Nestle is a Swiss multinational food and drink processing
conglomerate corporation headquartered in Vevey, Vaud,
Switzerland.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 25, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2WytUCG at no extra charge.[CC]


NIO INC: New York Court Refuses to Dismiss Securities Litigation
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denies
the Defendants' motion to dismiss in the lawsuit titled IN RE NIO,
INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 19-CV-1424 (NGG) (JRC)
(E.D.N.Y.).

Lead plaintiff Mark Mundy and named plaintiff Eva Huang bring the
putative class action on behalf of themselves and all purchasers of
NIO's American Depositary Shares from its initial public offering
("IPO") on Sept. 12, 2018, through March 5, 2019. The Plaintiffs
allege that NIO filed a false and misleading Registration Statement
in connection with its IPO, for which the Defendants are liable
under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as
Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to Section 10(b).

The Defendants are NIO, certain of its senior executives and board
members ("Individual Defendants"), and the underwriters of NIO's
IPO. The Defendants moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Background

NIO is a Chinese company founded in 2014 that develops electric
vehicles ("EVs") and is often referred to as the "Tesla of China."
Headquartered in Shanghai, NIO pitched itself as a pioneer in
China's premium EV market that was higher quality than other
domestic manufacturers and less expensive than foreign
manufacturers. Compared to American and European EV makers, like
Tesla, Audi, and Mercedes-Benz, NIO sells its vehicles at lower
prices because it manufactures them in China. NIO's domestic
production lowers manufacturing costs, allows it to capture EV
subsidies from the Chinese government, and lets it avoid the import
duties levied on foreign manufacturers.

But unlike its foreign competitors, NIO does not manufacture its
own EVs. Instead, in May 2016, NIO partnered with Jianghuai
Automobile Group Co. Ltd. ("JAC Motors"), a state-owned Chinese
truck manufacturer. Under their five-year agreement, JAC Motors
would manufacture NIO's EVs and NIO would pay JAC Motors a
per-vehicle fee, as well as cover any operating losses for the
first 36 months of production.

On Sept. 11, 2018, NIO filed its final Registration Statement with
the SEC in advance of its IPO and, on the following day, filed its
Prospectus. On Sept. 12, NIO's shares began trading on the New York
Stock Exchange. NIO's IPO raised approximately $1.095 billion in
net proceeds from the sale of 184 million shares at a price of
$6.26 per share.

In its Registration Statement, NIO warned of risks related to its
current manufacturing agreement with JAC Motors, noting that its
brand could be "adversely affected by perceptions about the quality
of our partners' vehicles." Equity research analysts also noted
that risk, describing JAC Motors as "third tier," and described the
"unusual business model" as a "source of concern for investors."

NIO also announced in its Registration Statement that it was
developing its own manufacturing facility in Shanghai which it
expected to be ready by the end of 2020. The Shanghai Facility site
was approximately 15 miles from NIO's headquarters, an estimated
20-minute drive. Pursuant to an agreement with Shanghai municipal
authorities, the government would construct the facility and NIO
would lease it from them and outfit it into its own factory. NIO
planned to pay $650 million to complete the facility, at least $276
million of which would come from the proceeds of the IPO.

NIO made several statements related to the Shanghai Facility in its
Registration Statement, including that the construction and
operation of its own manufacturing plant in Shanghai or other
manufacturing facilities are subject to regulatory approvals and
may be subject to delays, cost overruns or may not produce expected
benefits. NIO added that construction has started on its own
manufacturing facility in Shanghai and that the facility is
currently under construction by certain Shanghai government
entities.

Before markets opened on March 6, 2019, NIO released its financial
results for the fourth quarter, as well as for the entirety of
Fiscal Year 2018 on Form 6-K. NIO reported net losses of $1.4
billion, and a significant slowdown in EV deliveries. NIO also
announced that it was abandoning its plans for the Shanghai
Facility and instead would continue to partner with JAC Motors to
produce EVs.

Following the announcement, NIO's stock fell from its dosing price
of $10.16 on March 5, 2019, to $7.09 on March 7, 2019--a 30 percent
drop.

Plaintiffs' Allegations

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants misrepresented the
progress of construction on the Shanghai Facility and failed to
warn investors about risks to construction related to future cash
flow and sales performance. The Plaintiffs rely primarily on NIO's
failure to obtain the necessary regulatory approvals, without which
NIO could not have started construction, and accounts from three
former employees, who stated that construction had never begun on
the Shanghai Facility, despite what NIO published in its
Registration Statement.

According to the Plaintiffs, construction on the Shanghai Facility
could never have begun because the Shanghai Municipal Planning and
Natural Resources Bureau website shows no construction planning
permit was ever issued for NIO's Shanghai Facility. Because the
website catalogs all permits, and no permit is available for NIO's
project, the Plaintiffs aver that NIO misrepresented the status of
the Shanghai Facility by telling investors that it was "currently
under construction" when it was not and could not have been under
the applicable laws.

The Plaintiffs also base their allegations on NIO's failure to
obtain an environmental approval. The Plaintiffs cite the lack of
environmental approval to support their allegation that
construction never began on the Shanghai Facility. The Plaintiffs
also rely on accounts from three former NIO employees, ("FE1",
"FE2", and "FE3",) to allege that construction on the Shanghai
Facility never began.

Between March and May 2019, multiple plaintiffs filed putative
class actions against NIO in the Eastern District of New York and
in the Northern District of California. The cases were transferred
to this District where the Court consolidated them, appointing Mark
Mundy as lead plaintiff and The Rosen Law Firm as class counsel.

Pleading Standard

District Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis notes that the Plaintiffs'
claims under the Exchange Act must satisfy the heightened pleading
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15
U.S.C. Section 78u-4(b), citing Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., 690 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2012).

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' Securities Act claims
are also subject to the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b)
because they are based on the same securities fraud allegations
pled under the Exchange Act.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' Securities Act claims are not
subject to the heightened pleading standards under Rule 9 (b)
because they sound in negligence, not in fraud. Judge Garaufis
notes that the Plaintiffs' claims under Section 11 of the
Securities Act and under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act are
analytically distinct, even if overlapping conduct forms the basis
for both.

The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs' Section 11 and Section
10(b) claims are separate because alternative grounds of liability,
requiring different proof, are distinctly asserted, citing In re
Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F.Supp.2d 611, 631-32 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Securities Act claims are not subject
to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleadings standards for fraud.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs assert claims against all Defendants under Section
11 of the Securities Act and against NIO and the Individual
Defendants under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.
In addition, the Plaintiffs allege "control person" liability
against the Individual Defendants under Section 15 of the
Securities Act and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The Defendants move to dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims.

Claims Under Section 11 of the Securities Act

The Plaintiffs assert Section 11 claims against all Defendants. The
Plaintiffs assert two theories of liability under Section 11: (1)
that the Defendants misrepresented the progress of construction on
the Shanghai Facility; and (2) that the Defendants omitted warnings
that the construction depended on sufficient cash flow and meeting
sales expectations.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Section 11 claims on
the grounds that the Plaintiffs fail to allege any material
misrepresentation about the status of construction of the Shanghai
Facility. The Defendants argue (1) that construction permits and
environmental approvals were not necessary for construction to have
begun, (2) that the anonymous employees' testimony should not be
credited because the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts
to establish the foundation for the former employees' knowledge,
and, (3) that even if there were a misrepresentation, the
Plaintiffs have failed to show that it was material to investors.

Judge Garaufis opines that at bottom, the two sides present
competing theories to be developed as the case continues, but at
this stage, the Plaintiffs have met their initial pleading burden.

The Court disagrees with the Defendants' argument that (i) the
absence of construction permits and environmental approvals on
which the Plaintiffs rely is meaningless because such
authorizations were neither sufficient nor necessary for
construction to begin, and (ii) the anonymous former NIO employees
on whom the Plaintiffs rely lack the requisite knowledge for their
claims that construction on the Shanghai Facility had never
started.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts
from which the Court may infer that the former employees would have
knowledge of the status of construction on the Shanghai Facility.
The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfactorily
alleged materiality.

Claims Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5

The Plaintiffs also bring claims under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 against NIO and the Individual
Defendants. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs have (1)
failed to allege a material misrepresentation or omission, (2)
failed to plead scienter, and (3) failed to plead loss causation.

As discussed, the Plaintiffs rely on three anonymous sources whose
testimony is corroborated independently and by each other.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs have pleaded the factual basis with
particularity, Judge Garaufis holds. He adds that the Plaintiffs'
allegations that the Defendants represented that the Shanghai
Facility was under construction when it was not are enough to plead
recklessness.

Even though NIO released financial results that could have impacted
the stock price at the same time as the news about the Shanghai
Facility, the Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient here, Judge
Garaufis holds, citing Gould v. Winstar Commc'ns, Inc., 692 F.3d
148, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have
satisfactorily pleaded loss causation.

Control Person Liability

In addition to their claims under Section 11 and Section 10(b), the
Plaintiffs allege violations of Section 15 of the Securities Act
and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the Individual
Defendants in their capacities as "control persons" of NIO.

The Defendants move to dismiss the control person claims on three
separate grounds: (1) the Plaintiffs have failed to plead a primary
violation under either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act,
which is necessary to sustain a control person liability claim; (2)
it is improper for the Plaintiffs to plead both primary and control
person liability for the same underlying conduct by the same
defendants and, therefore, the claims are redundant; and (3) the
Plaintiffs have failed to plead the requisite elements for either
of the control person liability claims.

The Court agrees and holds that the Plaintiffs need not allege
culpable participation for a Section 15 claim.

As discussed in the section on scienter, viewing the evidence in
the most favorable light for the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that
they have adequately alleged that NIO and its senior executives and
directors--the Individual Defendants--knew or should have known of
the status of the Shanghai Facility when they signed the
Registration Statement. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have met their
burden to plead liability under Section 20(a).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is
denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum & Order dated Aug. 12,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3phfvawf from
Leagle.com.


NOOM INC: Court Dismisses Graham's Wiretapping Suit With Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, grants
Defendants Noom's and FullStory's motions to dismiss the case,
AUDRA GRAHAM, et al., Plaintiffs v. NOOM, INC., et al., Defendants,
Case No. 20-cv-06903-LB (N.D. Cal.).

Introduction

Noom is a web application that helps its users lose weight and lead
healthy lifestyles. It uses FullStory's software to see what
visitors to its website are doing. The Plaintiffs -- on behalf of a
putative California class -- claim that this is an illegal wiretap
and a violation of their right to privacy under state law. The
Court previously dismissed the case primarily because the
Plaintiffs did not plausibly plead wiretapping.

The previous dismissal order summarized the allegations about the
alleged wiretapping. The main allegations in the current complaint
have not changed. In short, Noom uses FullStory's "session replay"
software to watch what its users are doing. The current complaint
adds allegations about how FullStory accesses and analyzes data for
its clients (such as indexing it for the client's use and showing a
user's purchase history).

The previous order found no specific jurisdiction over FullStory, a
Georgia-based company incorporated in Delaware. The current
complaint adds jurisdictional allegations: Noom advertises its
services in California, and FullStory "wiretaps geolocation
information."

The Court held a hearing on Aug. 12, 2021.

Analysis

Judge Beeler finds that the parties' arguments are unchanged. The
Defendants contend that there is no wiretapping. The Plaintiffs
counter that there is wiretapping and that the court erred
previously by concluding that as a vendor, FullStory was not a
third-party wiretapper.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiffs misunderstand the order.
FullStory is not a third-party wiretapper because it is not an
outsider and instead is a software vendor that provides a service
that allows Noom to analyze its own data. The Plaintiffs do not
state a claim for wiretapping (or invasion of privacy based on the
wiretapping) for the reasons in the Court's earlier order. The new
allegations -- illuminating the functionalities of the software --
do not change this conclusion.

The Judge further holds that the Plaintiffs also lack standing for
the claim under California's Invasion of Privacy Act for the
reasons in the Court's earlier order: There is no wiretapping,
there thus is no injury that creates a private right of action
under the statute, and there is no injury in fact that conveys
Article III standing.

There is no personal jurisdiction over FullStory either for the
reasons in the court's previous order. FullStory is a Georgia-based
vendor incorporated in Delaware that sold a product to Noom. The
basis for specific personal jurisdiction remains wiretapping. If
there were wiretapping, then there would be personal jurisdiction.
But there is no wiretapping.

Conclusion

Judge Beeler dismisses the complaint with prejudice because the
Plaintiffs did not cure the earlier complaint's deficiencies. Her
Order disposes of ECF Nos. 63 and 64.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yuymkbam from Leagle.com.


NORTON HEALTHCARE: Settlement Class Certified in Disselkamp Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DONNA DISSELKAMP, et al.,
v. NORTON HEALTHCARE, INC., et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-00048-GNS-CHL
(W.D. Ky.), the Hon. Judge Greg N. Stivers entered an order:

   1. certifying non-opt out Settlement Class for settlement
      purposes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1):

      "All persons, other than Defendants, who were participants
      as of January 22, 2012, in the Norton Healthcare 403(b)
      Retirement Savings Plan, including: (a) (i) beneficiaries
      of deceased participants who, as of January 22, 2012, were
      receiving benefit payments or will be entitled to receive
      benefit payments in the future, and (ii) alternate payees
      under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order who, as of
      January 22, 2012, were receiving benefit payments or will
      be entitled to receive benefit payments in the future; and
      (b) all persons, other than Defendants, who have been
      participants or beneficiaries in the Plan and had account
      balances in the Plan at any time between January 22, 2012,
      through the date of preliminary approval;"

      The "Class Period" is defined as January 22, 2012, through
      the date of Preliminary Approval;

   2. finally designating John S. Friend, Robert W. "Joe"
      Bishop, and Lauren E. Freeman, of Bishop Friend, PSC,
      Frank H. Tomlinson of Tomlinson Law, LLC, and James H.
      White, IV of James White Firm, LLC, as Class Counsel with
      respect to the Settlement Class in this Action;

   3. appointing Plaintiffs, Donna Disselkamp, Erica Hunter, Sey
      Momodou Bah, Kathy Reed, and Curtis Cornett as the
      representatives of the Settlement Classp; and

   4. awarding Attorneys fees, costs, and expenses, and amounts
      to Plaintiffs for their participation in this Action

Norton Healthcare is one of Kentucky's health care systems with
more than 40 clinics and hospitals in and around Louisville,
Kentucky.

The Court finds that the Settlement Class is sufficiently
well-defined and cohesive to warrant certification as a non-opt-out
class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and is hereby
finally certified as such.

Norton Healthcare is one of Kentucky's health care systems with
more than 40 clinics and hospitals in and around Louisville,
Kentucky.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zn2cHk at no extra charge.[CC]

NUTANIX INC: Proposed Case Schedule in Securities Suit OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RE NUTANIX, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION,
Case No. 3:19-cv-01651-WHO (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge William H.
Orrick entered an order approving the joint proposed case
schedule:

                 Event                          Deadline

-- Lead Plaintiff's Initial Disclosures     September 3, 2021

-- Lead Plaintiff and Plaintiff             January 21, 2022
   City of Miami Fire Fighters'
   and Police Officers' Retirement
   Trust's (City of Miami)
   Substantial Completion of
   Document Production

-- Lead Plaintiff's Motion for              January 21, 2022
   Class Certification

-- Deadline to Amend Without                January 21, 2022
   Leave of Court

-- Deposition Period for Lead               January 21, 2022 to
   Plaintiff and City of                    March 23, 2022
   Miami's Representatives

-- Defendants' Response to Lead             April 1, 2022
   Plaintiff's Motion for Class
   Certification

-- Defendants' Substantial                  April 8, 2022
   Completion of Document
   Production

-- Lead Plaintiff's Reply in Support        May 4, 2022
   of Class Certification

-- Hearing on Class Certification           May 25, 2022

-- Fact Discovery Cutoff                    August 26, 2022

-- Affirmative Expert Reports               September 30, 2022

-- Rebuttal Expert Reports                  November 2, 2022

-- Reply Expert Reports                     December 2, 2022

-- Expert Discovery Cutoff                  January 31, 2023

-- Deadline to File Dispositive Motions     February 24, 2023

-- Oppositions to Dispositive Motions       April 26, 2023

-- Replies in Support of Dispositive        May 26, 2023
   Motions

-- Dispositive Motions Heard by Court       June 21, 2023

-- Pretrial Conference                      September 11, 2023
                                            at 2 p.m.TBD

-- Trial                                    October 9, 2023
                                            at 8:30 a.m.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zsmGhY at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for Lead Plaintiff California Ironworkers Field
Pension Trust, are:

          Kenneth J. Black, Esq.
          Shawn A. Williams, Esq.
          Kenneth J. Black, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          Post Montgomery Center
          One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 288-4545
          Facsimile: (415) 288-4534
          E-mail: shawnw@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          James E. Barz, Esq.
          Frank A. Richter, Esq.
          200 South Wacker Drive, 31st Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 674-4674
          Facsimile: (312) 674-4676
          E-mail: jbarz@rgrdlaw.com
                  frichter@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Danielle S. Myers, Esq.
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: dmyers@rgrdlaw.com

The Attorneys for Named Plaintiff City of Miami Fire Fighters' and
Police Officers' Retirement Trust, are:

          Shannon L. Hopkins, Esq.
          Gregory Potrepka, Esq.
          Andrew Rocco, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          1111 Summer Street, Suite 403
          Stamford, CT 06905
          Telephone: (203) 992-4523
          E-mail: shopkins@zlk.com
                  gpotrepka@zlk.com
                  arocco@zlk.com

The Attorneys for the Defendants Nutanix, Inc., Dheeraj Pandey, and
Duston M. Williams, are:

          Nina F. Locker, Esq.
          Ignacio E. Salceda, Esq.
          Evan L. Seite, Esq.
          Laura G. Amadon, Esq.
          WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
          Professional Corporation
          650 Page Mill Road
          Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
          Telephone: (650) 493-9300
          Facsimile: (650) 565-5100
          E-mail: nlocker@wsgr.com
                  isalceda@wsgr.com
                  eseite@wsgr.com
                  lamadon@wsgr.com

NUVE MIGUEL: Santos Seeks Conditional Collective Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARGARITO HERNANDEZ SANTOS
on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiff, and the class, v.
NUVE MIGUEL CORP. d/b/a KEY FOODS and LUIS H. URGILES, Case No.
1:21-cv-01335-JPO-RWL (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order granting his motion for conditional collective
certification and for court facilitation of notice pursuant to 29
u.s.c. section 216(b).

A copy of the the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Aug.
27, 2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3krVedW at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorney for Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the
Class, are:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

OREGON: Maney's Bid to Release Decedents' Medical Records Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL MANEY; GARY CLIFT; GEORGE NULPH; THERON HALL;
DAVID HART; MICAH RHODES; SHERYL LYNN SUBLET; and FELISHIA RAMIREZ,
personal representative for the ESTATE OF JUAN TRISTAN,
individually, on behalf of a class of other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. KATE BROWN; COLETTE PETERS; HEIDI STEWARD; MIKE
GOWER; MARK NOOTH; ROB PERSSON; KEN JESKE; PATRICK ALLEN; JOE
BUGHER; GARRY RUSSELL; and STATE OF OREGON, Defendants, Case No.
6:20-cv-00570-SB (D. Or.), Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon grants in part
and denies in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Provide Notice and
Obtain Release of Medical Records of Decedents in Plaintiffs'
Proposed Wrongful Death Class.

Background

Plaintiffs Paul Maney, Gary Clift, George Nulph, Theron Hall, David
Hart, Micah Rhodes, and Sheryl Lynn Sublet, adults in custody
("AIC") at four Oregon Department of Corrections ("ODOC")
institutions, and Felishia Ramirez, the personal representative for
the Estate of Juan Tristan, filed a fourth amended complaint
alleging constitutional and state law violations against Defendants
Governor Kate Brown, Patrick Allen, several ODOC officials, and the
State of Oregon.

On April 6, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a civil rights action
against Governor Brown and several ODOC officials, alleging that
the Defendants (1) violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with
deliberate indifference to their health and safety by failing
adequately to protect them from COVID-19 through social distancing,
testing, sanitizing, medical treatment, masking, and vaccines, and
(2) were negligent in failing to carry out proper preventative
measures.

The Plaintiffs assert allegations on behalf of classes of similarly
situated AICs, and propose three classes: (1) the "Damages Class";
(2) the "Vaccine Class"; and (3) the "Wrongful Death Class."

On May 3, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the
Damages and Wrongful Death Classes. With respect to the latter, the
proposed Wrongful Death Class consists of: "the estates of those
adults incarcerated at ODOC facilities continuously since February
1, 2020, who died during the Wrongful Death Class period, and for
whom COVID-19 caused or contributed to their death." To date, 42
AICs who tested positive for COVID-19 have died.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to provide notice and
obtain release of the medical records of the decedents in their
proposed Wrongful Death Class.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs move the Court for an Order: (1) approving notice to
"emergency contact person(s), known family member(s), and/or other
person(s) to whom notice may be mailed for the purpose of
authorizing or denying the release of medical records of the 42
individual adults in custody whom the ODOC previously reported
suffered a COVID-19-related death since March 8, 2020, and who are
decedents in Plaintiffs' proposed Wrongful Death Class" and (2)
"allowing production of medical records for the 42 individual
adults in custody who suffered a COVID-19-death whose emergency
contact person(s), known family member(s), or other person(s) to
whom notice is mailed does not timely object to such disclosure."

The Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs' motion on the following
grounds: (1) the Court does not have authority to order
pre-certification notice to putative class members; (2) it is
unclear whether the emergency contact person listed in ODOC's
records is authorized to consent to disclosure of the decedent
AICs' medical records; and (3) the decedent AICs' medical records
should not be released without affirmative written consent.

1. Pre-Certification Notice

As a threshold matter, the Defendants dispute whether this Court
has authority to order pre-certification notice to putative class
members in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Central
District of California, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).  In Pan
American, the Ninth Circuit held that when "the admitted purpose of
the notice is to bring the claims of unnamed members of the
plaintiff class before the court," pre-certification notice is "not
permitted by any ascertainable source of judicial authority."
However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that, in certain
circumstances, Rule 23(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"approves discretionary notice to potential class members prior to
the district court's determination whether the action should
proceed as a class action."

Judge Beckerman holds that access to the decedent AICs' medical
records to determine whether COVID-19 caused or contributed to each
death is necessary for the Plaintiffs to establish that class
certification is appropriate here and that class members are
entitled to relief. Therefore, the Judge exercises discretion and
authorizes the Plaintiffs to send pre-certification notice for the
purpose of obtaining authorization for the release of the decedent
AICs' medical records.

Having determined that the Court has the authority to order
pre-certification notice, and that pre-certification notice is
warranted, the Judge turns to the Defendants' arguments challenging
the Plaintiffs' proposed notice.

2. Release of Medical Records

The Plaintiffs request that the Court: (1) approves notice to the
decedent AICs' emergency contact persons or known family members
for the purpose of authorizing or denying the release of the
decedent AICs' medical records, and (2) allows production of the
AICs' medical records if the recipient of the notice does not
timely object to disclosure. In response, the Defendants ask the
Court to require that the Plaintiffs: (1) identify a single person
who is qualified under Oregon law to authorize the disclosure of
the medical records, and (2) obtain affirmative written
authorization for any such disclosure.

Judge Beckerman concludes that under the circumstances present in
the case, the person(s) whom the decedent AIC listed as an
emergency contact, or the decedent AIC's known family members, may
authorize the release of the decedent AICs' medical records for the
purpose of this litigation. Although she is mindful of the decedent
AICs' privacy rights, the Judge holds that the medical records the
Plaintiffs seek are limited in scope and subject to a strict
protective order.

The Defendants also ask the Court to require the Plaintiffs to
obtain affirmative written authorization for the disclosure of the
medical records, rather than authorizing disclosure if the notice
recipient does not timely object. Under Oregon law, an AIC's
medical records may be disclosed only if (1) the AIC or a personal
representative of the AIC provides written authorization, or (2) a
court orders disclosure of the medical records.

The Plaintiffs do not offer a compelling reason why the Court
should allow the disclosure of the decedents' medical records
without the affirmative written consent of the notice recipient.
Thus, the Judge will require the Plaintiffs to obtain written
authorization (signed and dated) from the decedent AIC's emergency
contact, or from another known family member, prior to obtaining
the decedent AIC's medical records.

Conclusion

For the reasons she stated, Judge Beckerman grants in part and
denies in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Provide Notice and Obtain
Release of Medical Records of Decedents in Plaintiffs' Proposed
Wrongful Death Class). Specifically, she (i) authorizes the
Plaintiffs to send a Court-approved notice to any person(s) whom
the decedent AIC listed as an emergency contact, and/or to known
family members, and (ii) authorizes and orders the disclosure of
the requested medical records to the Plaintiffs' counsel upon
production of the written authorizations discussed.

The Judge directs the Plaintiffs to amend their Proposed Notice
Regarding Wrongful Death Class Medical Records consistent with her
Order, confer with the counsel for the Defendants regarding the
amended Proposed Notice, and submit the amended Proposed Notice to
the Court for final approval.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/59ypxxhw from Leagle.com.


PAPA MURPHY'S: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Ruling in Brown Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Papa Murphy's Holdings, Inc. and Weldon Spangler filed
an appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled EVAN
BROWN, Plaintiff v. PAPA MURPHY'S HOLDINGS INCORPORATED, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-05514-BHS-JRC, in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on May 13, 2021, District
Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the Western District of Washington,
Tacoma, issued an order adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation for the denial of the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

The matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
("R&R") of the Honorable J. Richard Creatura, United States
Magistrate Judge, and Defendants Papa Murphy's Holdings, Inc. and
Weldon Spangler's objections to the R&R.

Plaintiff Evan Brown, a former Papa Murphy's shareholder, initiated
this putative class action in June 2019. Following the Court's
adoption of Judge Creatura's Report and Recommendation dismissing
his complaint, Brown filed a second amended complaint ("SAC"). In
the SAC, Brown alleges that the Defendants violated Sections 14(e)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by allegedly
making materially false and misleading statements contained in a
Recommendation Statement made in connection with a tender offer to
acquire shares of Papa Murphy's. He alleges that the Recommendation
Statement was materially false and misleading as to Papa Murphy's
financial projections, the value of the company's shares, and the
fairness of the tender offer consideration.

Specifically, Brown asserts that the Defendants engaged a financial
advisor in connection with the merger and that the financial
advisor created a downwardly revised set of projections ("Base Case
Projections"), which were unreasonably lower than Papa Murphy's
management's significantly higher projections ("Management Case
Projections").

The Defendants now seek a review of the order entered by Judge
Settle adopting the Magistrate Judge Creatura's Report and
Recommendation for the denial of the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

The appellate case is captioned as Evan Brown v. Papa Murphy's
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 21-80092, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on August 16,
2021.[BN]

Defendants-Petitioners PAPA MURPHY'S HOLDINGS, INC. and WELDON
SPANGLER are represented by:

          Ronald L. Berenstain, Esq.
          Joseph E. Bringman, Esq.
          Sean C. Knowles, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE, LLP
          1201 3rd Avenue, Suite 4900
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 359-8477
          E-mail: rberenstain@perkinscoie.com
                  jbringman@perkinscoie.com
                  sknowles@perkinscoie.com

Plaintiff-Respondent EVAN BROWN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Juan Monteverde, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          350 Fifth Avenue, 59th Floor
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 971-1341

               - and -

          Roger Mulford Townsend, Esq.
          BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC
          1000 Second Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 652-8660
          E-mail: rtownsend@bjtlegal.com

PARAMEDICS LOGISTICS: Faces Nettles Suit Over Unpaid Wages & OT
---------------------------------------------------------------
SIMONE NETTLES, individually  and behalf of other similarly
situated and general public v. PARAMEDICS LOGISTICS OPERATING
COMPANY, LLC, a Texas limited liability company; PARAMEDICS
LOGISTICS CALIFORNIA, LLC, a Delaware limitedv liability company;
and 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No. RG21108566 (Cal. Super.,
Alameda Cty., Aug. 10, 2021) alleges that the Defendants failed to
pay minimum and overtime wages under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the other members
were required to work more than eight hours per day and/or 40 hours
per week Without overtime compensation for all overtime hours
worked.

Paramedics Logistics is located in Tyler, Texas, and is part of the
other ambulatory health care services industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          County of Santa Clara
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 265-1020
          Facsimile: (818) 265-1021

PATRICIA COGNE-FAQUE: Debritto Loses Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Timothy Debritto, et al.,
v. Patricia Cogne-Faque, et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-00203-MSM-PAS
(D.R.I.), the Hon. Judge Mary S. McElroy entered an order denying
Debritto's motion for class certification pursuant to the Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rule 23(c)(1)(4).

The motion is denied without prejudice to refiling after service to
the defendants is complete, says Judge McElroy.

The nature of suit states Prisoner Petitions -- Habeas Corpus --
Civil Rights.[CC]


PEI WEI: Class Cert. Discovery Deadline Extended to November 1
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Clarke v. Pei Wei Asian
Diner LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-00800 (N.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge David
C. Godbey entered an order granting motion to extend time for class
certification motions.

The deadline for the parties to complete class certification
discovery is extended to November 1, 2021, and the deadline for
Defendant to file a motion for decertification to December 1, 2021,
says Judge Godbey.

The suit alleges violation of the  Fair Labor Standards Act
involving denial of overtime compensation.

Pei Wei is an American restaurant chain serving Pan Asian fare,
operating in at 119 locations in the U.S.. Pei Wei's dishes are
made to order in an open concept kitchen using cooking methods like
wok firing.[CC]



PENN CREDIT: Landazuri Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Penn Credit
Corporation, et al. The case is styled as Patricia Landazuri,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Penn
Credit Corporation, John Does 1-25, Case No. 0:21-cv-61792-XXXX
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 25, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Penn Credit -- https://penncredit.com/ -- is a nationwide accounts
receivables management firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin E. Zeig, Esq.
          ZEIG LAW FIRM, LLC
          3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 310
          Hollywood, FL 33024
          Phone: (754) 217-3084
          Email: justin@zeiglawfirm.com


PHH MORTGAGE: 4632 CWELT-2008 Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as 4632 CWELT-2008, LLC, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated v. PHH Mortgage Corporation, was
removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on Aug. 25, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 0:21-cv-61793-XXXX to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

PHH Mortgage Corporation -- https://www.phhmortgage.com/ --
provides mortgage financing solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendant is represented by:

          Steven Joseph Brotman, Esq.
          LOCKE LORD
          777 South Flagler Drive, Suite 215 East Tower 6
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401
          Phone: (561) 833-7700
          Fax: (561) 655-8719
          Email: steven.brotman@lockelord.com



PHIA GROUP: Cross Bids for Summary Judgment in Weyant Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSICA WEYANT, Plaintiff v. THE PHIA GROUP LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 17 Civ. 8230 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Lorna G. Schofield of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied the parties' motions for summary
judgment.

Overview

Plaintiff Weyant brings the putative class action against
Defendants Phia and INDECS Corp., on behalf of herself and those
similarly situated. During the relevant period, the Plaintiff was a
participant in the Orange-Ulster School Districts Health Plan.
Defendant INDECS is the claims administrator for the Plan.
Defendant Phia is the authorized agent of INDECs for the purposes
of subrogation and reimbursement efforts on behalf of the Plan.

On April 10, 2012, the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle
accident in Maryland. As a result of the Plaintiff's injuries from
the Accident, the Plan provided $16,057.19 in medical benefits to
the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff returned the Plan Benefits under
protest, after the Defendants asserted a lien on certain settlement
funds she had recouped in a separate action related to the Accident
("Maryland Action").

The Plaintiff brought the action seeking entitlement to the Plan
Benefits against INDECS and Phia, but not against the Plan -- the
party that ultimately received the Plaintiff's repayment of Plan
Benefits minus a service fee.

The Plaintiff contested the validity of the lien and objected to
repayment of the Plan Benefits.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants
submitted a sworn declaration from Ms. Burkhalter. Ms. Burkhalter
asserts that she spoke with Mr. Marshall on Oct. 4, 2016, and
"instead of holding the funds in escrow until any dispute could be
resolved, it was his proposal that his firm send Phia a check for
the full amount 'right away.'"

The parties dispute the reasons for, and extent of, the Plaintiff's
objections to repayment. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff
objected to repayment on the ground that some of the Plan Benefits
may have been for treatment that was not related to the Accident
and, as a result, should not be subject to repayment on account of
the Plaintiff's receipt of the Maryland Action settlement funds.

In support of this contention, the Defendants assert that on Oct.
13, 2016, Charles Kannebecker, another lawyer for the Plaintiff,
informed Ms. Burkhalter that "he wanted Phia to sign an agreement
that Phia would accept the funds but that if Ms. Weyant felt that
the Plan had paid claims for treatment that was not related to this
accident, she could appeal those payments."

The Plaintiff denies that she or her counsel stated that her
dispute "was only regarding claims purportedly not related to the
accident," and contends that she communicated that she contested
the entire lien. In an email dated Oct. 11, 2016, Ms. Burkhalter
asked Mr. Marshall to provide a "reason patient feels the plan is
not entitled to reimbursement," and stated that the Plan will
"accept $10,000 in satisfaction of its subrogation claim in the
amount of $16,057.19." The record does not include a response from
Mr. Marshall to Ms. Burkhalter's question regarding the reasons for
Plaintiff's objection to the repayment or to the Plan's proposed
reduction of the repayment.

On Nov. 16, 2016, Ms. Burkhalter emailed Mr. Marshall, stating:
"Our office agrees to accept payment in full in the amount of
$16,057.19 with the understanding that if said amount reimbursed
represents payment for the claims not related to the above
incident, the patient has the right to dispute said
reimbursement."

On Nov. 18, 2016, Ms. Burkhalter again emailed Mr. Marshall,
stating that "the Plan will accept the payment in full and if the
patient wishes to contest the payment, the patient may do so."

The Plaintiff testified that she submitted a payment because she
was afraid of the consequences of not doing so -- specifically,
losing her health insurance while she was pregnant and still
recovering from the Accident.

Phia retained $3,532.58 of the Plaintiff's payment as a "service
fee" and sent the balance to INDECS. Per the sworn declaration of
Bruce Buchanan, Sr., President of INDECS, "INDECS forwarded 100% of
the recovery to the Plan and has not retained any of the funds paid
by the Plaintiff nor was it paid a fee for its service."

Discussion

A. Conversion Claim

The parties dispute whether the Plaintiff's conversion claim arises
under the New York Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), under New York
common law or both. A UCC conversion claim has a demand
requirement, while common law conversion does not.

Judge Schofield opines that UCC Section 3-419 on conversion
applies, and material issues of fact preclude summary judgment on
that claim. Summary judgment on any common law conversion claim,
which may be precluded upon adjudication of the UCC claim, is also
denied.

First, the Judge holds that the Plaintiff's argument that the check
is cash and thus not subject to UCC Article 3 is untenable based on
the plain language of UCC Article 3, which encompasses checks that
meet the requirements of UCC Section 3-104(1). Second, the face of
the check has the Plaintiff's name in the "Memo" field, but
otherwise contains no notation or limitation on the unconditional
promise to pay. Consequently, the check is a negotiable instrument
subject to Article 3. Third, a common law conversion claim cannot
succeed where a UCC Section 3-419 claim would otherwise fail.
Fourth, there is a material dispute of fact regarding whether a
demand for return was implied under the circumstances and whether
the payment was voluntary.

B. Defendants' Affirmative Defense - Holders in Due Course

The Defendants assert as a defense to liability that they are
"holders in due course." "To the extent that a holder is a holder
in due course, he takes the instrument free from all claims to it
on the part of any person." "A holder in due course is a holder who
takes the instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c)
without notice of any defense against or claim to it on the part of
any person."

holds that there is a material dispute of fact as to whether Phia
took the Plaintiff's check in good faith and without notice of her
claim. Accordingly, the holder in due course defense is not a basis
to grant summary judgment. The Judge finds that the Plaintiff
incorrectly argues that the Defendants are not holders in due
course because they did not take the check "for value." The record
does not clearly show what the Defendants knew of the transaction
because there are disputes of fact as to the degree to which, and
the reason(s) why, the Plaintiff objected to the repayment at the
time she remitted the check. Drawing all inferences in favor of the
Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants were
not holders in due course.

Conclusion

For the reasons she stated, Judge Schofield denied the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties will file a joint
status letter with proposed next steps.

On Aug. 26, 2021, at 10:40 a.m., a conference was to be held. The
conference will be telephonic and will occur on the following
conference line: 888-363-4749, 5583333.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y3h8svmy from Leagle.com.


PING IDENTITY: Faces New York Class Suit Over Common Stock Drop
---------------------------------------------------------------
COUNTY OF NEW YORK RETIREMENT BOARD OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. PING
IDENTITY HOLDING CORPORATION, et al., Case No. 654912/2021 (N.Y.
Sup., New York, Aug. 11, 2021) asserts claims for violations the
Securities Act of 1933 relating to Ping's secondary offering
commenced on or about July 13, 2020 of 10,324,663 shares of common
stock, including an underwriters' overallotment of 1,875,000
shares, at a price of $32.00 per share.

This securities class action is brought on behalf of a Class of all
persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Ping common
stock pursuant and/or traceable to the Offering Documents issued in
connection with the SPO, and who were damaged thereby.

Contrary to being a recent COVID-19 related event in the second
quarter of 2019, the offering documents allegedly misstated and
failed to disclose that Ping had actually been experiencing a
company-wide slowdown in sales as early as mid-2019, leading to
mass layoffs in the months leading up to the SPO. In fact, this
slowdown prompted Ping to hire an outside consultant in January
2020 -- well before the height of the Pandemic and seven months
prior to the SPO -- to evaluate the compatibility of potential new
enterprise accounts and Ping's product offerings to obtain new
customers and improve overall sales. What is more, Ping was not
meeting its internal goals in bringing on new enterprise accounts
Company-wide and the Vice President of Sales for the eastern U.S.
was concerned about Ping's long-term outlook, advising sales teams
to try to "lock-in" existing customers to three-year deals, says
the suit.

As a result of these alleged misstatements and undisclosed adverse
facts that existed at the time of the SPO as discussed in detail
below, Ping's common stock plummeted, falling from its SPO price of
$32 per share to a low of $20.22 on November 18, 2020.

Defendant Ping describes itself as a pioneer of "Intelligent
Identity." According to the Company, Ping's products enable secure
access to any service, application or application programming
interface ("API") from any device, and its primary product -- its
Intelligent Identity Platform -- can leverage artificial
intelligence and machine learning to analyze device, network,
application and user behavior data to make real-time authentication
and security control decisions, enhancing the user experience.
Ping's products are aimed at improving workflows, efficiency, and
security for their enterprise customers. According to the Company,
at the time of the SPO, Ping was experiencing a shift in
subscription revenue from its term-based licenses to
Software-as-a-Service ("SaaS") subscriptions.

The Defendants include VISTA EQUITY PARTNERS, VISTA EQUITY PARTNERS
FUND VI, L.P., VISTA EQUITY PARTNERS FUND VI-A, L.P., VEPF VI FAF,
L.P., ANDRE DURAND, RAJ DANI, ADRIANA CARPENTER, ROD ALIABADI,
DAVID A. BREACH, CLIFFORD K. CHIU, MICHAEL FOSNAUGH, LISA HOOK,
JOHN MCCORMACK, BRIAN N. SHETH, YANCEY L. SPRUILL, GOLDMAN SACHS &
CO. LLC, BOFA SECURITIES, INC., RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, CITIGROUP
GLOBAL MARKETS, LLC, BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC., CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (USA) LLC, WELLS FARGO SECURITIES LLC, DEUTSCHE BANK
SECURITIES INC., PIPER SANDLER & CO., RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES,
INC., STIFEL, NICOLAUS & COMPANY, LLC, WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY,
L.L.C., BTIG, LLC, and MIZUHO SECURITIES USA LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Gardner, Esq.
          Alfred L. Fatale III, Esq.
          Jeffrey Dubbin, Esq.
          Lisa Strejlau, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          Facsimile: (212) 818-0477
          E-mail: jgardner@labaton.com
                  afatale@labaton.com
                  jdubbin@labaton.com
                  lstrejlau@labaton.com

PORCH.COM INC: Bid for Settlement Approval in Preston Due Nov. 12
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARIANA PRESTON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PORCH.COM, INC., HIRE A
HELPER LLC, KERI MILLER, AND DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No.
21CV168-JLS (BLM) (S.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
ordered the parties to file a joint motion to amend the complaint
and joint motion for approval of the class action settlement by
Nov. 12, 2021, in accordance with the parties' agreement.

The Court held a telephonic Case Management Conference ("CMC") on
Aug. 16, 2021. During the CMC, the parties reported that they have
reached a tentative settlement on a class-wide basis.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3mhhd9rh from Leagle.com.


PRETIUM PACKAGING: California Court Enters Judgment in Moreno Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Central Division, enters Judgment
in the case, CARLOS MORENO, Plaintiff v. PRETIUM PACKAGING, L.L.C
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
8:19-cv-02500-SB-DFM (C.D. Cal.), pursuant to the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

On Aug. 6, 2021, the Court granted final approval of the class
action settlement in the matter. The class action settlement
agreement the Court approved provides for a judgment to be entered
along with the final approval order, a judgment which Judge
Blumenfeld now enters.

The Parties, their Counsel, and the Settlement Administrator will
take all steps necessary to implement and consummate the Settlement
according to its terms and provisions.

Without affecting the finality of the Judgment or the Settlement,
the Court will retain continuing jurisdiction over the Parties to
this action to ensure effectuation of the Settlement in accordance
with the terms of the Settlement and this Judgment.

Judgment is entered pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Judgment is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4kmzkn3t from Leagle.com.


PROBUILD COMPANY: Sengvong Seeks Final Approval of Settlement Deal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as OTINA SENGVONG, on behalf
of himself, and all others similarly situated, v. PROBUILD COMPANY
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company dba DIXIELINE LUMBER &
HOME CENTERS, DIXIELINE TRUSS YARD, DIXIELINE CLASSIC COLLECTIONS,
DIXIELINE HOME CENTERS; BUILDERS FIRSTSOURCE-DALLAS, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; BUILDERS FIRSTSOURCE, INC., a
Delaware corporation; AND DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
3:19-cv-02231-MMA-JLB (S.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order:

   1. finally approving the joint Stipulation of Class
      Settlement and Release Between Plaintiff and Defendants
      agreed to by Plaintiff and Defendants;

   2. confirming the certification of the Class solely for
      settlement purposes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
      Procedure 23;

   3. confirming the appointment of David Spivak of The Spivak
      Law Firm and Walter Haines of United Employees Law Group
      as Class Counsel;

   4. confirming her appointment as class representative; and

   5. granting final approval to an allocation of $40,000 for
      claims for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private
      Attorneys General act of 2004, Labor Code ("PAGA
      Payment"), of which $30,000 will be paid to the Labor and
      Workforce Development agency ("LWDA") and $10,000 of which
      will be included within the Net Settlement Amount to be
      made available for distribution to Settlement Class
      Members; and

   6. directing that [Proposed] Final Approval Order and Final
      Judgment submitted herewith be entered as called for under
      the Settlement.

The "Settlement Class" consists of all persons employed by
Defendants in California as non-exempt employees at any time during
the Settlement Class Period. The "Settlement Class Period" is from
October 15, 2015 through October 3, 2020.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Aug. 27,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3sXa4Np
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David G. Spivak, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Blvd., Ste 203
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone (213) 725-9094
          Facsimile (213) 634-2485
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Walter Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
          4276 Katella Ave., #301
          Los Alamitos, CA 90720
          Telephone: (562) 256-1047
          Facsimile: (562) 256-1006
          E-mail: walter@uelglaw.com

PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Buffington Suit Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVEN BUFFINGTON, on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated, v. PROGRESSIVE
ADVANCED INSURANCE CO., Case No. 7:20-cv-07408-PMH (S.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the Class;

      "All persons: (a) who insured a vehicle for physical
      damage coverage under a New York automobile insurance
      policy issued by Progressive Advanced Insurance Company,
      (b) who made a claim under the policy for physical damage
      to the vehicle, (c) whose claim was adjusted as a total
      loss between September 10, 2014, and the date of
      certification of the Class, and (d) who were not paid full
      sales tax for their total-loss claim;"

      Excluded from the Class are: (a) employees, officers, and
      directors of Defendant and its subsidiaries and
      affiliates; (b) the judicial officers and their immediate
      family members and associated court staff assigned to this
      action; and (c) all persons who file a timely and proper
      request for exclusion from the Class;

   2. appointing him as Class representative;

   3. appointing his counsel as Class counsel; and

   4. directing the Parties to submit a proposed Notice Plan,
      or, if the Parties are unable to agree, for Plaintiff to
      submit a Notice Plan to which Defendant may object.

Plaintiff Buffington alleges that Defendant Progressive
systematically underpaid him and thousands of other holders of
Defendant's New York automobile insurance policies by refusing to
pay full sales tax for their total-loss claims.

Under Progressive's form insurance policy issued throughout New
York (the "Policy"), Progressive is entitled to invoke its
limitation of liability when it determines that the cost to repair
a vehicle exceeds the value of the vehicle (known in the insurance
industry as a "total loss"). In such circumstances, Progressive
opts to pay insureds the ACV of their vehicle. New York Insurance
Regulations define ACV as the lesser of the cost to "(1) repair the
property to its condition immediately prior to the loss; or (2)
replace it with an item substantially identical to the item
damaged," specifying that "[s]uch amount shall include all monies
paid or payable as sales taxes on the item repaired or replaced."

However, Progressive failed to pay Plaintiff or class members sales
tax as required under Regulation 64. Plaintiff alleges that this
failure amounts to a breach of contract (Count I) and a violation
of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law section 349 (Count II), the Plaintiff
alleges.

Progressive Advanced operates as an insurance firm. The Company
underwrites motor vehicle insurance policies.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated August 25,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gEk1Ky
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for Plaintiff and Proposed Class Counsel, are:

          Edmund A. Normand, Esq.
          Amy L. Judkins, Esq.
          Jacob L. Phillips, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: ed@ednormand.com
                  amy.judkins@normandpllc.com
                  jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com
                  service@normandpllc.com

               - and -

          Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC,
          LLC
          Broadway, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10006-3205
          Telephone: (212) 952-0014
          E-mail: jkravec@fdpklaw.com

               - and -

          Antonio Vozzolo, Esq.
          VOZZOLO LLC
          345 Route 17 South
          Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458
          Telephone: (201) 630-8820
          E-mail: avozzolo@vozzolo.com

PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Buffington Suit Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVEN BUFFINGTON, on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated, v. PROGRESSIVE
ADVANCED INSURANCE CO., Case No. 7:20-cv-07408-PMH (S.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying the following
class of individuals:

   "All persons: (a) who insured a vehicle for physical damage
    coverage under a New York automobile insurance policy issued
    by Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, (b) who made a
    claim under the policy for physical damage to the vehicle,
    (c) whose claim was adjusted as a total loss between
    September 10, 2014, and the date of certification of the
    Class, and (d) who were not paid full sales tax for their
    total-loss claim."

Excluded from the Class are: (a) employees, officers, and directors
of Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; (b) the judicial
officers and their immediate family members and associated court
staff assigned to this action; and (c) all persons who file a
timely and proper request for exclusion from the Class.

The Plaintiff contends that all preconditions for class
certification set forth in Rule 23(a) are satisfied, and class
treatment is proper under Rule 23(b)(3), .

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Aug. 27,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DBpOuz
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for the Plaintiff and Proposed Class, are:

          Edmund A. Normand, Esq.
          Amy L. Judkins, Esq.
          Jacob L. Phillips, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          3165 McCrory Place, Ste. 175
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: ed@ednormand.com
                  amy.judkins@normandpllc.com
                  jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com
                  service@normandpllc.com

               - and -

          Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
          Broadway, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10006-3205
          Telephone: (212) 952-0014
          E-mail: jkravec@fdpklaw.com

               - and -

          Antonio Vozzolo, Esq.
          VOZZOLO LLC
          345 Route 17 South
          Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458
          Telephone: (201) 630-8820
          E-mail: avozzolo@vozzolo.com

RENTGROW INC: Mcintyre Appeals Class Certification Bid Denial
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff PATRICIA MCINTYRE filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled PATRICIA MCINTYRE, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated, v. RENTGROW, INC., d/b/a
YARDI RESIDENT SCREENING, Case No. 1:18-cv-12141-ADB, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Boston.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 2, 2021, the Hon.
Judge Allison D. Burroughs entered an order granting the
Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and denying the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The Court said, "In sum, although Plaintiff has raised a genuine
issue of fact as to the accuracy of the July 2017 Report and the
reasonableness of Defendant's procedures, her claim cannot survive
summary judgment because a reasonable jury could not find that
Plaintiff suffered any actual damages related to a FCRA violation
or that, for purposes of statutory and punitive damages, the
Defendant acted willfully."

Patricia McIntyre initiated this consumer class action brought
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), in which she alleged
that RentGrow, Inc. d/b/a Yardi Resident Screening published
misleading and inaccurate tenant screening reports to landlords and
property managers in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681e(b). 15
U.S.C. Section 1681e(b) requires consumer reporting agencies to
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
the information they report.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the said order entered by Judge
Burroughs.

The appellate case is captioned as Mcintyre v. RentGrow Inc., Case
No. 21-1637, in the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, filed on August 17, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that appearance
form, docketing statement and transcript report/order form are due
on August 31, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant PATRICIA MCINTYRE, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          James A. Francis, Esq.
          FRANCIS MAILMAN SOUMILAS PC
          1600 Market St., Suite 2510
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 735-8600
          E-mail: jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com  

               - and -

          Christopher M. Lefebvre, Esq.
          CLAUDE LEFEBVRE & CHRISTOPHER LEFEBVRE, PC
          Two Dexter St., PO Box 479
          Pawtucket, RI 02862-0000
          Telephone: (401) 728-6060
          E-mail: court@lefebvrelaw.com  

               - and -

          Jordan M. Sartell, Esq.
          John Soumilas, Esq.  
          FRANCIS MAILMAN SOUMILAS PC
          1600 Market St., Suite 2510
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 735-8600
          E-mail: jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com  

Defendant-Appellee RENTGROW INC., d/b/a Yardi Resident Screening,
is represented by:

          Courtney Lynn Hayden, Esq.
          James W. McGarry, Esq.
          GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
          100 Northern Ave
          Boston, MA 02210-1980
          Telephone: (617) 570-1853
          E-mail: chayden@goodwinlaw.com
                  jmcgarry@goodwinlaw.com   

               - and -

          Keith E. Levenberg, Esq.
          Joseph F. Yenouskas, Esq.
          GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
          1900 N St, NW
          Washington, DC 20036-1612
          Telephone: (202) 346-4000
          E-mail: klevenberg@goodwinlaw.com
                  jyenouskas@goodwinlaw.com   

Interested Party TRANSUNION RENTAL SCREENING SOLUTIONS, INC. is
represented by:

          David Alan Casale, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          Global Customer Centre
          20 Stanwix St.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 288-5937
          E-mail: dcasale@reedsmith.com

               - and -

          Albert E. Hartmann, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          10 S Wacker Dr., 40th Flr.
          Chicago, IL 60606-7507
          Telephone: (312) 207-1000
          E-mail: ahartmann@reedsmith.com

RICHMOND POLICE: Briefing Schedule for Class Cert. Bid Vacated
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LUIS PADILLA, v. CITY OF
RICHMOND POLICE DEPARTMENT, Case No. 4:20-cv-04597-PJH (N.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton entered an order vacating
briefing schedule for class certification motion.

The court does not vacate all dates based upon a tentative
settlement; however, the court will vacate the briefing schedule
and hearing date for the class certification motion.

The remaining pretrial dates will be vacated only upon the actual
settlement of the case, or upon entry of a conditional 120-day
dismissal, with the parties' consent.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3sSYYsM at no extra charge.[CC]



RIVINGTON LAUNDROMAT: Cordoba Seeks Overtime Pay, Missing Paystubs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Elena Andrades Cordoba, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Rivington Laundromat & Dry
Cleaning, Inc. and Michael Zetts, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-06878
(S.D. N.Y., August 16, 2021), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and
overtime wages and spread-of-hours pay pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and New York Labor Law, including applicable
liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a laundromat in New York, NY
under the name "Rivington Laundromat" where Cordoba was employed as
a laundry worker. She claims to have generally worked in excess of
40 hours a week without overtime for hours in excess of 40 hours
per workweek and denied spread-of-hours premium for workdays
exceeding 10 hours. She also claims to have never received wage
statements and appropriate minimum wage. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
      Email: michael@faillacelaw.com


RUANE CUNIFF: Court Allows Ferguson to File 3rd Amended Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL L. FERGUSON, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. RUANE
CUNIFF & GOLDFARB INC., Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-6685 (ALC)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr., of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York issued a Memorandum and
Order:

   a. granting the Plaintiffs' motions to file a third amended
      complaint and for class certification; and

   b. denying the Plaintiffs' motions for preliminary approval of
      the class action settlements.

Michael L. Ferguson, Myrl C. Jeffcoat and Deborah Smith,
individually and on behalf of the DST Systems, Inc. 401(k) Profit
Sharing Plan, bring the action under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132 against
Ruane Cuniff & Goldfarb Inc. ("RCG"); DST Systems, Inc.; The Plan's
Advisory Committee; and the Compensation Committee of the Board of
Directors of DST Systems, Inc.; for breach of fiduciary duties and
other violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 1001, et seq.

DST is a global provider of technology-based information processing
and servicing solutions who offered its employees the opportunity
to participate in the Plan -- a vehicle for retirement savings
designated to produce retirement income for its participants. The
Plaintiffs are Plan Participants.

The Plan is a defined-contribution retirement plan, funded through
employee-directed contributions, DST matching contributions, and
DST's voluntary profit-sharing contributions. DST is the Plan's
sponsor, administrator, and a designated fiduciary. The Advisory
Committee and Compensation Committee are named fiduciaries under
the Plan, and DST administered the Plan through the Compensation
and Advisory Committee.

With respect to the PSA portion of the Plan, the Plaintiffs allege,
inter alia, that RCG breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA by
concentrating an enormous and imprudent amount of the Plan assets
in the Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. stock ("VRX"),
which caused the Plan to suffer over $100 million in losses when
VRX's share price declined in 2015. As Plan fiduciaries, the DST
Defendants had a duty to monitor RCG, and thus breached that duty
by both failing to protect the Plan from RCG's imprudent investment
strategy and even supporting RCG when its strategy imploded.
According to the Plaintiff, the DST Defendants engaged in such
nonfeasance and malfeasance to preserve its longstanding financial
relationship with RCG.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify and be appointed as representatives
of the Class that includes: All participants and beneficiaries of
the DST Systems, Inc. 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan from March 14,
2010 through July 31, 2016.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Class includes more than 9,000
members and joinder is impracticable; there are questions of law
and fact common to the Class regarding Defendants' fiduciary duties
to the Plan and the participants and beneficiaries; Plaintiffs'
claims are typical of the class because they were all participants
in the plan during the period and all Participants in the Plan were
harmed by Defendants' misconduct; and the Plaintiffs are adequate
representatives of the Class because they were Participants in the
Plan during the Class Period and have no conflicts with the Class.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs allege that prosecution of separate
actions by individual participants and beneficiaries would create
the risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, and
adjudications by individual participants and beneficiaries would be
dispositive of the interests of the participants and beneficiaries
not parties to the adjudications, or would impede those
participants' and beneficiaries' ability to protect their
interests. Therefore, the Plaintiffs allege the action should be
certified as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1).

The Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint on Sept. 1, 2017, an
Amended Complaint on Nov. 20, 2017, the Second Amended Complaint on
Nov. 5, 2018, and leave to file the Third Amended Complaint on
April 10, 2020. The Plaintiffs moved to certify the class on April
10, 2020, and on Jan. 12, 2021, the Plaintiffs moved for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement agreements with
the RCG and DST Defendants.

The RCG Defendants opposed both the motion to file a third amended
complaint and the motion for class certification. Similarly, the
arbitration claimants opposed the motion for class certification
and the motions for preliminary approval of the class action
settlement agreements. The Secretary of Labor opposed the
injunctive provisions in the Plaintiffs' class action settlement
agreement.

On March 4, 2021, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that a
similar plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim brought on
behalf of the plan did not relate to his employment and thus did
not require arbitration under the terms of the arbitration
agreement, citing Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc., 990 F.3d
173, 175 (2d Cir. 2021).

The Court then denied the Plaintiffs' motions for class
certification and to file a third amended complaint without
prejudice. The Court gave the Plaintiffs an opportunity to refile
their motions, and directed the parties to address what, if any,
effect the Copper opinion has on the motion for class certification
and motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs then refiled their motions on April 5, 2021. The
arbitration Claimants opposed the motions, and the DST Defendants
filed a motion in support of class certification on May 3, 2021.
The Plaintiffs replied on May 10, 2021.

Discussion

I. Rule 23(A)

The Plaintiffs seek to certify and be appointed as representatives
of the Class that includes: "All participants and beneficiaries of
the DST Systems, Inc. 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan from March 14,
2010 through July 31, 2016 (the Class Period), excluding the
Defendants and all other individuals who are or have ever been a
member of the Advisory Committee of the DST Plan, the Compensation
Committee of the Board of Directors of DST or otherwise served as
fiduciaries of the DST Plan during the Class Period."

As to numerosity, Judge Carter finds that the Plaintiffs allege
that the class consists of over 9,000 members. Therefore, because
the class here consists of potentially thousands of members, the
numerosity requirement is plainly met.

With respect to commonality, the Judge the questions of law and
fact -- including "(1) whether the Defendants were fiduciaries of
the Plan; (2) whether the Defendants breached their fiduciary
duties; (3) whether the Plan and its participants and beneficiaries
were injured by the Defendants' breaches; and (4) whether the Class
is entitled to damages and, if so, the proper measure of damages"
-- are "common questions that satisfy the Plaintiffs' burden under
Rule 23(a)(2)."

As to typicality, for the reasons discussed in reviewing the
Plaintiffs' commonality arguments, the Plaintiffs have satisfied
the typicality requirement. The commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.

As to adequacy, the Judge holds that all members of the proposed
Class allege claims arising from the same conduct, that is that RCG
breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA by concentrating an
enormous and imprudent amount of the Plan assets in the VRX, and as
Plan fiduciaries, the DST Defendants had a duty to monitor RCG, and
thus breached that duty by both failing to protect the Plan from
RCG's investment strategy. These claims would potentially vindicate
the interests of the entire Class. The Adequacy of Representation
requirement is plainly met.

II. Rule 23(b)(1)

As the Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a),
the Court is required to assess the class under Rule 23(b)(1) for
"adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the individual adjudications.

Judge Carter holds that as the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met,
the class is properly certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). The
Plaintiffs purport to bring the action as a breach of fiduciary
duty brought under Section 1132(a)(2) on behalf of the Plan. The
allegations in the Complaint intend to remedy fiduciary breaches
and other misconduct on behalf of the Plan.

Allowing multiple actions, each of which would seek similar or the
same relief from the Defendants on behalf of the Plan, would
potentially prejudice individual class members and would threaten
to create "incompatible standards of conduct" for the Defendants.
These are issues that Rule 23(b)(1) seeks to avoid. Because the
Plaintiffs' allegations are brought with respect to breaches of
fiduciary duties to the Plans as a whole, the Defendants' duties
rise and fall with all the Plaintiffs. In sum, because the
management of the Plans has an effect on all Plan-participants, the
class is properly certified under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
or 23(b)(1)(B).

III. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend

The Plaintiffs seek leave to file a third amended complaint to add
class allegations.

As het granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification,
Judge Carter grants the Plaintiffs leave to file a third amended
complaint only to the extent of adding class allegations. Under
Rule 15(a)(2), the Court should "freely give" leave to amend "when
justice so requires."

IV. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of their Class
Action Settlement with the RCG and DST Defendants

The Plaintiffs move for preliminary approval of their Class Action
Settlement with the RCG and DST Defendants.

Judge Carter does not approve the agreements. He holds that the
Plaintiffs' injunctive provision seeks to enjoin non-parties,
including the Secretary of Labor, from bringing or prosecuting
their claims. While the Plaintiffs attempt to characterize this as
a traditional bar order, it is plainly not.

The Judge explains that Section 502(a)(2) authorizes "the Secretary
of Labor, a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" to bring a
"civil action" for breach of fiduciary duty, and the Plaintiffs
have failed to cite any case law in the circuit or otherwise that
have approved such an overbroad provision in an ERISA Section
502(a)(2) case. Thus, approving the settlement's injunction
provision would circumvent the Secretary's independent and
unqualified right to sue and seek redress for ERISA violations on
the basis that ERISA plans significantly affect the "national
public interest." Accordingly, the Judge denies the Plaintiffs'
motions for preliminary approval of the class action settlements.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Carter granted the Plaintiff's
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. The Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 is granted.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs' motions for preliminary approval of
the class action settlements are denied. Likewise, the identical
motion for preliminary approval of the class settlement in 20 CV
7092 is denied for the reasons described.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2xawkxw3 from Leagle.com.


SCHWAB CHARITABLE: Pinkert Appeals Fiduciary Breach Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Philip Pinkert filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled Philip Pinkert, individually and on
behalf of a Class of similarly situated individuals, and on behalf
of the general public v. Schwab Charitable Fund, Charles Schwab
Corporation, Schwab Charitable Board of Directors, and Schwab
Charitable Investment Oversight Committee, Case No.
3:20-cv-07657-LB, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Nov. 13, 2020, this
case is a class action suit under California common law and
California Business and Professions Code section asserting claims
against Schwab Charitable Fund, the Schwab Charitable Board of
Directors, and the Schwab Charitable Investment Oversight
Committee, who collectively failed to manage the Schwab Charitable
donor-advised fund ("Schwab DAF") in a prudent manner, and against
Charles Schwab Corporation, who facilitated and knowingly profited
from fiduciary breaches and statutory violations.

Private charitable giving is critically important to funding public
and social goods in the United States. Since as early as the Great
Depression with the creation of the New York Philanthropic Trust,
the donor-advised fund ("DAF") has served as an important
philanthropic vehicle and a staple of community foundations.

DAFs are non-profit entities. When donors contribute assets to
their DAF account, the nonprofit organization takes legal title to
the assets, but donors typically direct how funds are invested
(from among several investment options offered by the DAF) and
ultimately distributed to charitable organizations.

The Plaintiff contends that Schwab Charitable, the Board, and the
Committee have breached their fiduciary duties with respect to
their management of the Schwab DAF under the common law and
California's Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act,
to the detriment of donors to the Schwab DAF and the charitable
organizations that are the ultimate recipients of its assets and
who suffer when excessive fees are deducted from those assets.

As a result of these breaches and violations, the Defendants have
in turn violated Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200. The
Plaintiff brought the action to remedy the unlawful conduct,
prevent further mismanagement of the Schwab DAF, recover the losses
caused by the Defendants' violations and fiduciary breaches, and
obtain equitable and other relief as provided by California law.

The Plaintiff seeks a review of the Court's Order dated June 17,
2021, granting Defendants' motions to dismiss with leave to amend;
and Judgment dated July 12, 2021 in favor of the Defendants.

The appellate case is captioned as Philip Pinkert v. Schwab
Charitable Fund, et al., Case No. 21-16299, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on August 9, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Philip Pinkert Mediation Questionnaire was due
August 16, 2021;

   -- Appellant Philip Pinkert opening brief is due on October 12,
2021;

   -- Appellees Charles Schwab & Co., Schwab Charitable Board of
Directors, Schwab Charitable Fund and Schwab Charitable Investment
Oversight Committee answering brief is due on November 12, 2021;
and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant PHILIP PINKERT, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals, and on behalf of the
general public, is represented by:

          Matthew C. Helland, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, LLP
          235 Montgomery Street, Suite 810
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 277-7235
          E-mail: helland@nka.com

               - and -

          Jennifer K. Lee, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4600 IDS Center
          80 South Eighth Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          E-mail: jlee@nka.com  

               - and -

          Paul Lukas, Esq.
          Kai Heinrich Richter, Esq.
          Brock Specht, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4700 IDS Center
          80 S 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          E-mail: lukas@nka.com
                  krichter@nka.com
                  bspecht@nka.com   

Defendants-Appellees SCHWAB CHARITABLE FUND, CHARLES SCHWAB & CO.,
SCHWAB CHARITABLE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, and SCHWAB CHARITABLE
INVESTMENT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE are represented by:

          Christopher Thomas Casamassima, Esq.
          David Charles Marcus, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
          350 S Grand Avenue, Suite 2400
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 443-5374
          E-mail: chris.casamassima@wilmerhale.com
                  david.marcus@wilmerhale.com

               - and -

          Alan E. Schoenfeld, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
          7 World Trade Center
          250 Greenwich Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 937-7294
          E-mail: alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com

SELECT EMPLOYMENT: Romero Suit Seeks to Certify Class, Subclasses
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ELSIE ROMERO, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. SELECT
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation; CALIFORNIA
REHABILITATION INSTITUTE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; SELECT MEDICAL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. e 2:19-cv-06369-TJH-AGR
(C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs Elsie Romero, Ricardo Ibarra, Lauren
Lindsay and Charity Alicaya ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following class pursuant to Federal Rules
      of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, subdivisions (a) and (b)(3):

      "all persons who worked for defendant California
      Rehabilitation Institute, LLC as non-exempt
      employees at California Rehabilitation Institute at any
      time from May 31, 2016 through the date of certification;"

   2. certifying the following subclasses:

       -- On-Duty Meal Break Subclass

          "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt
          employees at California Rehabilitation Institute at
          any time from May 31, 2016 through the date of
          certification who were required to carry a
          communication device and be available to respond
          during one or more meal breaks;"

       -- On-Duty Rest Break Subclass

          "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt
          employees at California Rehabilitation Institute at
          any time from May 31, 2016 through the date of
          certification who were required to carry a
          communication device and be available to respond
          during one or more rest breaks;"

       -- Missed Rest Break Subclass

          "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt
          employees at California Rehabilitation Institute at
          any time from May 31, 2016 through the date of
          certification who (i) worked a shift of 3.5 hours or
          more and received no rest breaks; (ii) worked a shift
          of more than 6 hours and received fewer than two rest
          breaks; or (iii) worked a shift more than 10 hours and
          25 received fewer than three paid rest breaks;"

       -- Second Meal Period Subclass:

          "all persons who worked for the Defendant as non-
          exempt employees at California Rehabilitation
          Institute at any time from May 31, 2016 through the
          date of certification who worked a shift over 12 hours
          for which Defendant’s time records do not show a
          second 30-minute meal period;"

       -- Meal and Rest Break Premium Subclass

          "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt
          employees at California Rehabilitation Institute at
          any time from May 31, 2016 through the date of
          certification who received at least one meal or rest
          break premium;"

       -- Overtime Subclass

          "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt
          employees at California Rehabilitation Institute at
          any time from May 31, 2016 through the date of
          certification who worked a shift that began one
          calendar day and ended the next calendar day (an
          "overnight shift") followed by a shift that began the
          same calendar day as the overnight shift ended, who
          were not paid all overtime for all time worked in
          of eight hours or, for employees working an
          alternative workweek schedule, 12 hours in a set 24-
          hour period;"

       -- Cell Phone Reimbursement Subclass

          "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt
          employees at California Rehabilitation Institute at
          any time from May 31, 2016 through the date of
          certification who used their personal cell phones for
          work purposes and were not compensated for this
          expense;"

       -- Uniform Maintenance Subclass

          "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt
          employees in the nursing department at California
          Rehabilitation Institute at any time from May 31, 2016
          through the date of certification who dry cleaned or
          separately laundered their uniforms and were not
          compensated for these expenses;" and

       -- Wage Statement Subclass

          "all persons who worked for Defendant as non-exempt
          employees California Rehabilitation Institute at any
          time from May 31, 2016 through the date of
          certification who received a wage statement from
          Defendant;"

   3. certifying the derivative claims for failure to failure to
      timely pay all wages due upon separation, failure to
      furnish accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair
      business practices;

   4. appointing them as class representative; and

   5. appointing Matthew J. Matern and Launa Adolph of Matern
      Law Group, PC, as class counsel.

The Plaintiffs Elsie Romero, Ricardo Ibarra, Lauren Lindsay, and
Charity Alicaya seek to represent all persons who worked for
defendant California Rehabilitation Institute, LLC as non-exempt
employees at California Rehabilitation Institute ("Cal Rehab") at
any time from May 31, 2016 through the date of certification.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendant allegedly failed to provide
employees lawful meal and rest breaks. Employees were not relieved
of all duty and employer control during their breaks because they
were required to carry communication devices and be available to
respond to calls at all times during their shifts, including during
their meal and rest breaks, and employees' breaks frequently were
interrupted by calls from their supervisors and other hospital
employees.

Employees also were unable to take rest breaks due to the demands
of the job and because no one was available to relieve them for
their breaks. In fact, Defendant’s employee handbook expressly
advised employees that rest breaks may not be permitted "due to
disruption of staffing, patient care needs, or operational needs."
In addition, Defendant did not provide employees second meal breaks
on shifts over 12 hours, despite the fact Defendant's meal break
waivers did not apply to such shifts, the lawsuit says.

Defendant operates Cal Rehab, a 138-bed rehabilitation hospital in
Los Angeles, California. The hospital opened on July 24, 2016. The
Defendant has employed over 1,000 non-exempt employees during the
Class Period.

Romero worked for Defendant as a non-exempt Nursing Supervisor in
the nursing department from June 2016 to February 2017. Ibarra
worked for the Defendant as a non-exempt Maintenance Mechanic in
the plant operations department from December 2017 to September
2018.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zmVrFs at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for the Plaintiffs Elsie Romero, Ricardo Ibarra,
Lauren Lindsay, and Charity Alicaya, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, are:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Launa Adolph, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531-1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
          E-mail: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
                  ladolph@maternlawgroup.com

SENEX LAW: Virginia Court Narrows Claims in Lord FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia,
Roanoke Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit styled JENNIFER LORD, et
al., Plaintiffs v. SENEX LAW, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 7:20CV00541
(W.D. Va.).

Plaintiffs Jennifer Lord, Ebony Reddicks, and Toniraye Moss have
filed a class action lawsuit against Senex Law, P.C., alleging
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").
Senex has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion has been
fully briefed and argued and is ripe for review.

Background

Senex is a law firm that serves multifamily housing owners and
property managers and helps send tenants Notices related to debt
collection and eviction proceedings. Multifamily rental properties
hire Senex to collect on residents' past due rent payments.

The Plaintiffs describe Senex's business model as follows. First, a
landlord sends Senex a list of accounts for which a debt is
allegedly past due. Next, Senex prepares a noncompliance dunning
letter ("Notices") on landlord letterhead before printing and
sending the Notice directly to the tenant. Senex saves each
tenant's information in its proprietary debt collection software so
that it can quickly generate unlawful detainer pleadings. The
initial Notice Senex sends "is thus the first step in Senex's
seamless, integrated debt collection machine."

The Plaintiffs maintain that Senex attempts to collect tenants'
past-due rent by sending the tenants the Notices and other
correspondence. While each Notice that the Plaintiffs received was
issued on landlord letterhead and was "purportedly signed by" a
landlord's staff member, each signature was in reality "affixed at
Senex's office using Senex equipment." The Plaintiffs allege that
Senex mailed each Notice "in an envelope bearing date-stamped
postage from NEOPOST account, zip code 23663, the same account used
for notices mailed by Senex, as opposed to the zip codes where the
various Landlords are located."

Per the complaint, the Notices indicate that the landlord has
retained Senex, who already drafted this notice and provided legal
advice due to the Plaintiff's noncompliance. The Notices also still
purport to come from the Landlord, despite the fact that they were
prepared and sent by Senex. Moreover, in each Notice at issue,
under the guise of Landlord, the Plaintiffs were charged attorneys'
fees, typically $30.

The Plaintiffs contend, however, that Senex's work is not legal in
nature, but rather standard debt collection tasks routinely
performed by non-attorney debt collectors. The Plaintiffs add,
among other things, that Senex inappropriately misleads and
intimidates debtors by invoking the specter of meaningful attorney
involvement.

The Complaint raises both class action allegations against Senex
and individual claims on behalf of Plaintiffs Jennifer Lord, Ebony
Reddicks, and Toniraye Moss. The Plaintiffs maintain apartment
leases in Roanoke and Hopewell, Virginia. The Complaint also
raises, among other things, class action allegations pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).

The Complaint asserts the following questions of law and fact
common to the class:

   a. Whether class members received Notices which threatened
      eviction upon nonpayment of fees and alleged past due rent,
      and which purported to come from Landlords but in fact were
      drafted and sent by Senex misleadingly to convey meaningful
      attorney involvement;

   b. Whether these Notices were required by the FDCPA to contain
      certain notices and information and to refrain from using
      certain means and methods of debt collections and violated
      these requirements;

   c. Whether Defendant filed unlawful detainers against class
      members without meaningful attorney involvement;

   d. [T]he actual damages of the members of the class, including
      the payment of attorneys' fees not properly owed to the
      Landlord; and

   e. Whether Senex failed to promulgate processes and procedures
      sufficient to ensure the Notices were accurate and legal.

Procedural History

The Plaintiffs filed the action on Sept. 9, 2020. On Oct. 28, 2020,
Senex moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Honorable
Glen E. Conrad, Senior United States District Judge, held a
telephonic hearing on the motion on Feb. 19, 2021. On March 5,
2021, Senex filed a supplemental brief in support of its motion to
dismiss. The Plaintiffs filed a response thereto on March 10, 2021.
On May 11, 2021, the case was transferred to this Court.

Discussion

Chief District Judge Michael F. Urbanski notes that the FDCPA
protects consumers from abusive and deceptive practices by debt
collectors, and protects non-abusive debt collectors from
competitive disadvantage, citing Crawford v. Senex Law, P.C., 259
F.Supp.3d 464, 468 (W.D. Va. 2017) (quoting Yarney v. Ocwen Loan
Serv., LLC, 929 F.Supp.2d 569, 575 (W.D. Va. 2013)).

A plaintiff must plead the following to establish a violation of
the FDCPA: (1) that the plaintiff is a "consumer" as defined by the
FDCPA; (2) that the defendant is a "debt collector" as defined by
the FDCPA; and (3) that the defendant engaged in any act or
omission in violation of the FDCPA.

A. Debt Collector

As a preliminary matter, Senex argues that the Complaint fails in
its entirety because it is not a debt collector and, therefore, not
subject to the FDCPA. Senex offers two key arguments for why it is
not a debt collector under the FDCPA.

First, Senex contends that the Notices it sends on behalf of its
landlord clients are, as a matter of law, the landlords' Notices
and not Senex's. Second, Senex contends that in sending the
Notices, it performs only ministerial tasks on behalf of the
landlords that do not rise to debt collection under the FDCPA.

The Court disagrees, and finds that the Plaintiffs have pleaded
sufficient facts alleging that Senex operates as a debt collector
subject to the FDCPA. Judge Urbanski holds that the complaint
sufficiently alleges that Senex acts as a debt collector and, is
therefore, subject to the FDCPA.
B. Individual Claims

Senex next argues that even if the Court does find that it acts as
a debt collector, each claim asserted in the complaint is still
unable to withstand scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6).

The complaint alleges Senex violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(11) by
failing to notify the Plaintiffs in the Notices that it was
attempting to collect a debt and would use any information it
obtained for that purpose. In moving to dismiss, Senex argues only
that the claims fail because the Notices come from the landlords,
and not Senex. Having already rejected this argument, the Court
will deny the motion to dismiss on these claims.

The complaint also alleges that Senex violated Sections 1692e(10)
and (14). In moving to dismiss, Senex argues that the complaint
fails to state a claim for violation of Sections 1692e(10) and (14)
because even if Senex's use of landlord letterhead and landlord
signatures was false or misleading, it was not material.

In support, Senex points out that (1) Plaintiffs Lord and Reddick
do not allege that they took any action after receiving the
Notices, and (2) Plaintiff Moss does not allege that had she known
the Notices were from Senex she would not have chosen to pay her
landlord. The Court does not agree.

The complaint alleges Senex violated Section 1692e(10) by (1)
making deceptive "misrepresentations about an attorney having been
retained and having performed meaningful attorney work in
connection with that specific case," and (2) misrepresenting its
"true role in drafting, sending, and administering the Notices."

Judge Urbanski finds, among other things, that the Plaintiffs
persuasively argue, had Senex made clear that the Notices came from
a debt collector, it would have been obligated to inform the
tenants of their dispute and validation rights under Section
1692g.

The complaint also asserts, among other things, that Senex acted in
contravention of Section 1692e(3) and (9), again by making
deceptive "misrepresentations about an attorney having been
retained and having performed meaningful attorney work in
connection with that specific case." Senex asserts that the
Complaint fails to state a claim for violation of either
provision.

The Court agrees, and will dismiss the alleged violations. The
Court will also dismiss the complaint's claims for violation of
Section 1692f(1) and Section 1692e(5)

Pleading Standard

Senex lastly asserts that because all but one of the Plaintiffs'
claims arises under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e, (1) Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard applies, and
(2) the complaint is not pled with the sufficient particularity to
withstand the motion to dismiss.

Judge Urbanski states that the Court will refrain from deciding
whether Rule 9(b) or 8(a) governs claims alleging FDCPA violations,
as the complaint satisfies Rule 9(b)'s heightened requirement. In
sum, even under Rule 9(b)'s heightened requirements, the complaint
is pled with sufficient particularity, and dismissal is not
warranted on this basis.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, Senex's motion to dismiss is granted in
part and denied in part. The Court will dismiss the complaint's
claims for violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(3), (5), and (9),
and Section 1692f(1). All other claims survive the motion to
dismiss.

The clerk is directed to send copies of this memorandum opinion and
accompanying order to all counsel of record. An appropriate order
will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Aug. 12,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ea7r5uee from
Leagle.com.


SERVICEMASTER CO: Can Compel Arbitration in Cooley Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TYRON COOLEY, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE SERVICEMASTER COMPANY, LLC,
TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL, INC., THE TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:20-cv-01382-MCE-DB (E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C.
England, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of California:

    (i) denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand; and

   (ii) granted the Defendants' Motion to Compel Dismiss,
        Arbitration, and Stay Proceedings.

Plaintiff Cooley, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, seeks relief from the Defendants, inclusive, for
violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sections 201-204; Cal. Lab. Code
Sections 201-203, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1194, 2699 et seq., 2751,
and 2802; applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders;
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200, et seq.; and Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA").

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a field
representative or "outside sales representative" from approximately
November 2014 to April 2019. During the relevant period, the
Plaintiff alleges he was subject to violations of the California
Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code and that
civil penalties are warranted under PAGA.

According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff's employment with them
was subject to their mandatory arbitration policy, the We Listen
Plan ("Agreement"), which they purportedly provided to employees at
least three separate times. First, during the onboarding process,
Defendants purportedly provided their employees with the Associate
Handbook, which contained a summary of the Agreement on pages 11
through 13 in the same formatting and font style as the rest of the
Associate Handbook. Second, the Defendants contend they provide
their employees with a hard copy of the Agreement itself. Employees
were not required to acknowledge or sign that Agreement, and the
Plaintiff contends that it, in fact, was never provided to him.

Third, the Defendants aver that they had employees electronically
review and acknowledge receipt of several documents, including the
Agreement, in its then-HRIS system known as "myHR." Once logged
into the portal, the Defendants' employees were instructed to "Read
the Agreement, and then select 'Done' to move to the next page."
Once the employee selected the link to the Agreement, a copy of the
Agreement was displayed in PDF format, which the employee could
save electronically to his/her computer or print in hard copy. The
Agreement contains that arbitration provision.

After acknowledging receipt of the Agreement on November 18, 2014,
the Plaintiff continued to work for Defendants until April 3,
2019.

In November 2018, the Defendants rolled out the 2018 version of the
Agreement in conjunction with the prior version of the Agreement.
On December 21, 2018, the Defendants emailed the 2018 Agreement to
employees via email and posted the 2018 Agreement to the company
intranet as well as Defendants' online forum. Moreover, these
corporate communications stated that "continued employment
'constitutes an implied agreement to use this process.'"
Additionally, the Defendants' branch managers distributed copies of
the 2018 Agreement to all branch employees. The 2018 Agreement
became effective on January 1, 2019.

The Plaintiff maintains, however, that he never received the
Handbook or the communications regarding the 2018 Agreement roll
out from the Defendants. They further asserts that he never
received the document from his branch manager. Furthermore, the
Plaintiff alleges that he did not see any postings of the 2018
Agreement on the company's intranet. He further contends that all
employees had the same intranet login information. Finally,
according to the Plaintiff, all documents that were acknowledged
through the intranet, had to be acknowledged simultaneously upon
clicking "Done reading," even though it was impossible to read all
the documents at once.

On May 8, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a class and representative
action Complaint in Sacramento Superior Court against the
Defendants for alleged employment law violations arising from his
employment with Terminix. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff asserted
claims for: (1) failure to provide wages due upon termination; (2)
failure to provide meal periods; (3) failure to provide rest
periods; (4) failure to pay overtime; (5) failure to provide
accurate wage statements; (6) failure to indemnify necessary
business expenses; (7) violations of the California Business and
Professions Code sections 17200 et seq.; and (8) civil penalties
under PAGA."

On July 8, 2020, the Defendants timely removed the case to the
Court. Presently before the Court are the Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand, and the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Compel Arbitration,
and Stay Proceedings.

Discussion

A. Motion to Remand

According to the Plaintiff, the inferences Defendants make from the
Complaint are flawed. Specifically, he argues that the Defendants
improperly rely on "several broad assumptions to support
amount-in-controversy calculations: The estimated number of
residential outside sales professionals ("OSPs") employed by
Defendant Terminix LP in California during the class period; the
estimated total number of weeks they worked; the estimated number
of OSPs terminated since May 8, 2017, and the OPSs' average hourly
rates of pay." Finally, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendants'
reliance on the declaration of paralegal Lisa Glass is improper
because the Defendants "fail to provide any explanation of how [Ms.
Glass] arrived at [these assumptions] or why she was unable to
provide more accurate and concrete numbers."

Judge England disagrees. He holds that the Defendants allege in
their Notice of Removal that the Plaintiff's claims "unquestionably
exceed" the $5 million amount in controversy threshold, as the
Plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class for the relevant
class period spanning approximately four years. Moreover, the
Notice of Removal provides calculations for all the relevant causes
of action pled by the Plaintiff along with the basis on which they
rest.

Aggregated together, the Judge finds that the damages and
attorneys' fees for the first six causes of action could plausibly
exceed $48 million. This figure is supported by competent evidence
and is properly based on reasonable assumptions deriving from the
Plaintiff's allegations that (1) the Defendants engaged in a
"pattern and practice" to commit each asserted Labor Code
violation; and (2) each proposed putative class member "all
similarly suffered irreparable harm and damages" as a result of
said violations, which are "common to all proposed class members."
Those assumptions are that each proposed class member suffered
consistent Labor Code violations throughout the class period.

The Judge finds the assumptions on which the Defendants base their
damages calculations to be reasonable and certain. Therefore,
because the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum of
$5 million, the Plaintiff's Motion for Remand is denied.

B. Motion to Compel Arbitration, and Stay Proceedings

The Defendants next contend that the bulk of the Plaintiff's claims
should proceed on an individual basis before an arbitrator. The
Plaintiff disagrees, of course, arguing primarily that he never
entered into an arbitration agreement with the Defendants.

Judge Morrison finds that the Plaintiff asserts that he never
received either Agreement and, therefore, could not have impliedly
consented to its terms through his employment. On the other hand,
the Defendants provide ample evidence that the Plaintiff was
informed of the 2014 Agreement when he onboarded and was informed
of the 2018 Agreement. This evidence is persuasive, the Judge
holds.  Given that, the Agreement is enforceable, and the
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Case is
granted.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Morrison denied the Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand and granted the Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay the Case. The case is stayed pending
resolution of the Plaintiff's individual claims before the
arbitrator. Not later than 60 days following the date this
Memorandum and Order is electronically filed, and every 60 days
thereafter, the parties are directed to file a Joint Status Report,
advising the Court as to the status of those arbitration
proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3d7sswzn from Leagle.com.


SHUN LEE PALACE: Nov. 17 Deadline to File Class Cert. Bid Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Wang v. Shun Lee Palace
Restaurant, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-00840-VSB (S.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to extend their time to move for class
certification from August 26, 2021 to November 17, 2021.

On March 1, 2021, the Court refused to deny Plaintiffs to leave to
move for class certification. The Court also set a deadline of
August 26, 2021 to move for class certification -- 30 days after
the then-obtaining deadline to complete fact discovery and
depositions.

The Plaintiffs include Guoyi Wang, Tong Wei Wu, Zhi Qiang Lu,
Haiping Wu, Guoliang Xu, Steven Chung, Quek Yeow Yap, Shude Zhang,
Keeyew Foo, Tsunming Fong, Mingsung Chan, Leungtack Choi, Fong Yue,
Billy Qin, Monaliza Wong, and Weijun Zhen

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Aug. 25, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gyAnUX at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          TROY LAW, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Boulevard, Suite 103
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762-1324
          Facsimile: (718) 762-1342
          E-mail: troylaw@troypllc.com

SIMMONS FIRST: Faces Pace Second Putative Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Simmons First National Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6,
2021, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that Susanne
Pace filed a second putative class action complaint against
Landmark Bank to which Simmons Bank is a successor by merger.

On June 4, 2021, the Company and the Bank entered into an Agreement
and Plan of Merger with Landmark Community Bank, headquartered in
Collierville, Tennessee, pursuant to which, upon the terms and
subject to the conditions of the Landmark Agreement, Landmark will
merge with and into the Bank, with the Bank continuing as the
surviving entity.

On May 13, 2021, Susanne Pace filed a second putative class action
complaint against Landmark Bank, to which Simmons Bank is a
successor by merger, in the circuit court of Boone County,
Missouri, which has been removed to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri, Central Division.

The complaint alleges that Landmark Bank improperly charged
multiple insufficient funds or overdraft fees when a merchant or
other originator resubmits a rejected payment request.

The complaint asserts claims for breach of contract, including
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff
seeks to represent a proposed class of all Landmark Bank checking
account customers who were charged multiple insufficient funds or
overdraft fees on resubmitted payment requests.

Plaintiff seeks unspecified damages, costs, attorney's fees, pre-
and post-judgment interest, an injunction, and other relief as the
Court deems proper for herself and the purported class.

Simmons Bank denies the allegations and is vigorously defending the
matter.

Simmons First National Corporation, an Arkansas corporation
organized in 1968, is a financial holding company registered under
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended.


SPECTRUM HEALTH: Abernathy's Bid to Certify Class Action Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANKLIN B. ABERNATHY, et al., Plaintiff v. SPECTRUM
HEALTH SYSTEMS, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 21-11290-LTS (D.
Mass.), Judge Leo T. Sorokin of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts denied without prejudice Plaintiff
Abernathy's motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and to
certify class action.

Plaintiff Abernathy, an inmate now in custody at the Pondville
Correctional Center, filed a complaint in the case purportedly on
behalf of five co-Plaintiffs and a class of inmates alleging that
they are being treated for opioid use disorder and are being denied
medical treatment that includes alternative opioid treatment
medications such as buprenorphine.

The complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. Section
12101, alleging that the denial of alternative medications violates
the ADA and the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The complaint identifies 6 Plaintiffs, but only Franklin Abernathy
signed the complaint. The complaint names the following Defendants:
(1) Spectrum Health Systems, Inc; (2) Larissa Dias, LMHU Director;
(3) Jane Doe #1, MOUD Program Clinician; (4) Carol Mici,
Commissioner of Correction; and (5) Michael Rodrigues,
Superintendent MCI Shirley.  The Plaintiff seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief and an unspecified amount of monetary damages.

With the complaint, Abernathy filed a motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, a motion to certify class action, and an
emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.

Discussion

I. Signatures

Abernathy signed the complaint, but Curtis Holloway, Michael
Jordan, Thomas Curtin-Hiltz, Keith Niemic and Gildo Cardoso did
not. Abernathy states that he "allowed each of the co-plaintiffs to
read the complaint.

Judge Sorokin explains that without signatures, he cannot discern
whether all of the named Plaintiffs wish to proceed as parties to
the action.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly provides "every pleading, written motion, and other paper
must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's
name -- or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented."
Without signatures, Curtis Holloway, Michael Jordan, Thomas
Curtin-Hiltz, Keith Niemic and Gildo Cardoso cannot proceed as
plaintiffs in the action as filed and they will be dismissed
without prejudice.

II. Legal Representation

An individual may appear in federal court, either "pro se or
through legal counsel." An individual appearing pro se may not
represent any other party and may not authorize any other
individual who is not a member of the bar of the district to appear
on his or her behalf. Pro se plaintiffs cannot act as class
representatives.

In the case, Abernathy is appearing pro se, and he is not alleged
to be an attorney admitted to the bar. Without counsel, Abernathy
cannot act as a class representative nor can he represent any other
individually named plaintiff. Because Abernathy cannot adequately
represent the interests of the class he has identified, the motion
to certify a class is denied.

III. Abernathy's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

No filing fee has been paid in connection with the filing of the
complaint. Abernathy has filed a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. None of the other purported plaintiffs has done so.
Having reviewed Abernathy's filing, his motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis is denied without prejudice. If Abernathy wishes
to proceed with this action, he will be granted additional time to
file a new motion accompanied by a certified copy of his prison
account statement.

IV. Other Parties

Citing Cuevas v. DiPaulo, No. 11-10884-WGY, 2011 WL 2110759, at *2
(D. Mass. May 23, 2011) (collecting cases), Judge Sorokin states
that where there are multiple plaintiffs in a civil action, it has
been the practice of the Court to apportion equally the filing fee
between or among all plaintiffs (both in prisoner and nonprisoner
cases). If one or more of the plaintiffs (including Abernathy)
elect to re-file claims on a self-represented basis, they may do so
by (1) seeking leave to file an amended complaint accompanied by a
proposed amended complaint signed by each plaintiff; and (2) each
plaintiff filing Application to Proceed in District Court Without
Prepaying Costs or Fees accompanied by a certified copy of their
prison account statement. The filing fee would be apportioned among
the number of plaintiffs actually proceeding in the action.

V. Emergency Motion

In his emergency motion, Abernathy seeks to have the Court enjoin
the Defendants from denying the use of alternative drugs (i.e.
Buprenorphine) that are commonly used in the treatment of opiate
addiction. Although Abernathy alleges that a "physician gave him
three options of available treatment through the MOUD Program," he
complains that his request for medication other than methadone was
denied. He alleges that he had "an allergic reaction to the
methadone medication," and that he will not be considered for a
non-methadone medication such as Suboxone until he is "within 120
days before his release and discharge date." Abernathy contends
that if he is denied an alternate treatment, he is likely to
experience "a potentially fatal opioid overdose."

Judge Sorokin finds that to the extent Abernathy seeks a
preliminary injunction, preliminary injunctions may not be issued
without notice to the adverse party, and the complaint has not been
served on the Defendants. To the extent Abernathy seeks an ex-parte
temporary restraining order, the Judge notes that there is no
certification in writing of any effort the Plaintiff has made to
provide at least informal notice and no details as to the reasons
why such notice should not be required in view of an immediate and
irreparable need for injunctive relief.

Even assuming arguendo that such a showing had been made, the Judge
finds that Abernathy has not shown a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits. Abernathy is currently receiving treatment,
and while he may not be getting the best possible treatment or his
preferred treatment, he has not carried his burden of showing that
he would suffer irreparable harm should an injunction not issue.
The Court will not, in the form of a mandatory injunction, grant
Abernathy the ultimate relief he seeks without a trial.

Order

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Sorokin dismissed Curtis
Holloway, Michael Jordan, Thomas Curtin-Hiltz, Keith Niemic and
Gildo Cardoso from the action without prejudice because a
self-represented party cannot represent another individual
plaintiff or a purported class of plaintiffs. Abernathy's motions
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction and to certify class action are
denied without prejudice.

If Abernathy wishes to proceed with the action, within 35 days of
the date of the Order, he must file an Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Costs or Fees with a certified
copy of his prison account statement for the 6-month period
preceding Aug. 5, 2021. Failure of Abernathy to comply with these
directives may result in the dismissal of the action without
prejudice. The Clerk will provide Abernathy with standard
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or
Costs and will send a copy of this Order to the Treasurer's Office
at the Pondville Correctional Center in order to facilitate any
request by Abernathy for a copy of his certified prison account
statement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2d6kjn3n from Leagle.com.


SPIRIT AIRLINES: Court Grants Voluntary Dismissal of Garcia Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Jesus G. Bernal of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California grants voluntary dismissal of all
claims in the lawsuit titled MARIO GARCIA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SPIRIT
AIRLINES, INC. a Delaware limited liability company; and DOES 1 to
10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 5:21-cv-01065-JGB-SHK (C.D.
Cal.).

On Aug. 11, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal of the
action without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

Upon due consideration, good cause appearing, the Court grants
voluntary dismissal of all claims and causes of action asserted
individually without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Parties will bear their own fees and
costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/pp4vxd36 from Leagle.com.


ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL: Fails to Properly Pay OT, Hudson Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
TERISA HUDSON, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated employees, Plaintiff vs. ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL
HEALTH CENTER; TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION and/or TRINITY HEALTH,
and any related entities, Defendants, Case No.
5:21-cv-00935-GLS-TWD (N.D.N.Y., August 18, 2021) brings this
complaint as a collective and class action against the Defendants
to recover unpaid wages and related damages as a result of its
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York
Labor Law.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants from October 2015
through January 2021 as a licensed practical nurse.

The Plaintiff alleges the Defendants of failing to pay her and
other similarly situated employees' proper minimum wages and their
lawfully earned overtime compensation at the rate of one and
one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 per workweek. Instead, they were paid straight-time
compensation for overtime hours worked past 40 if the hours for the
biweekly period did not exceed 80. Purportedly, the Defendant
consistently and repeatedly used this method of paying straight
time wages for overtime hours.

The Corporate Defendants operate as a regional non-profit health
care system based in Syracuse, NY. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Frank S. Gattuso, Esq.
          GATTUSO & CIOTOLI, PLLC
          The White House
          7030 E. Genesee St.
          Fayetteville, NY
          Tel: (315) 314-8000
          Fax: (315) 446-7521
          E-mail: fgattuso@gclawoffice.com

                - and –

          James Emmet Murphy, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Tel: (212) 943-9080
          Fax: (212) 943-9082
          E-mail: jmurphy@vandallp.com

STATE AUTOMOBILE: Bluegrass Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Bluegrass, LLC filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled BLUEGRASS, LLC, Plaintiff v. STATE
AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-00414, in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia at Charleston.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Joseph R. Goodwin
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Charleston Division, granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint.

Plaintiff Bluegrass operates the Tricky Fish restaurant, Starlings
restaurant, and the Bluegrass Kitchen in Charleston, West Virginia.
It purchased a commercial property insurance policy from Defendant
State Auto. The Policy, attached to the First Amended Complaint as
Exhibit A, was in effect at all relevant times and covered the
three Bluegrass properties.

Generally, the Policy insured the Plaintiff in the event of a
"direct physical loss of or damage" to a covered property, unless
limited by an enumerated exclusion. It also provides that it will
cover lost business income sustained by the insured when a civil
authority prohibits access to the property following a covered
loss.

On March 16, 2020, the Governor of West Virginia declared a state
of emergency related to the novel coronavirus, or COVID-19,
pandemic. On March 23, 2020, the Governor issued an Executive Order
requiring all non-essential businesses to cease all activities
beyond minimum basic operations to maintain inventory, process
payroll, etc. effective at 8:00 p.m. on March 24, 2020.

As a result of the orders governing Bluegrass, the covered property
of Tricky Fish closed to the public on March 16, 2020, and reopened
on May 28, 2020. The covered property of Bluegrass Kitchen went on
a modified schedule ("take out only") on March 16, 2020, and then
ceased all operations on May 16, 2020. The covered property of
Starlings went on a modified schedule ("take out only") to the
public on March 16, 2020, and then resumed normal operations on May
28, 2020.

Bluegrass timely submitted a claim for the loss of business income
during the period of modified operations at each covered property.
State Auto denied the claim.  State Auto's position in its denial
letter is that the health and safety restrictions that closed
non-essential businesses do not constitute a direct physical loss
or damage and that certain exclusions for governmental ordered loss
of use and viral outbreaks bar coverage.

Bluegrass filed an Amended Complaint on its own behalf and on
behalf of a putative class of similarly situated business owners.
It sought a declaration that the policy covers the business losses
sustained and damages for breach of contract.

State Auto moved to dismiss. In addition to its argument that the
sustained losses are not "direct physical loss or damage," State
Auto maintained that business income coverage under Policy section
5.f does not apply when suspended operations "precede the claimed
property loss and when no direct physical loss at the described
premises is alleged;" and that the civil authority provisions do
not work to provide coverage in the absence of a "prohibition of
access" or direct physical loss or damage to the property.

Bluegrass responded that a direct physical loss does not require
any physical alteration, destruction, or damage to the covered
property and that the deprivation of use can constitute a physical
loss. It also argued that State Auto has not met its burden of
demonstrating that the policy exclusions apply in these
circumstances. In the alternative, Bluegrass argued that the
pervasive and dangerous presence of COVID-19 at its business
properties caused a dangerous condition that created a physical
loss by rendering the covered properties unusable.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the order entered by Judge
Goodwin dismissing the case. Additionally, the Plaintiff asks the
Court to review the Order dated July 21, 2021, denying its motion
to amend the judgment of dismissal or, alternatively, to certify
dispositive issues of West Virginia law to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia.

The appellate case is captioned as Bluegrass, LLC v. State
Automobile Mutual Insurance Company, Case No. 21-1900, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed on
August 18, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant BLUEGRASS, LLC, d/b/a Bluegrass Kitchen, d/b/a
Tricky Fish, d/b/a Starlings, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          David R. Barney, Jr., Esq.
          Kevin W. Thompson, Esq.
          THOMPSON BARNEY
          2030 Kanawha Boulevard, East
          Charleston, WV 25311-2204
          Telephone: (304) 343-4401
          E-mail: drbarneywv@gmail.com
                  kwthompsonwv@gmail.com  

               - and -

          Kelly Kathleen Iverson, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPEA & CARPENTER, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          E-mail: kiverson@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          36 North Jefferson Street
          P. O. Box 7635
          New Castle, PA 16107
          Telephone: (724) 656-1555
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          James Christopher Martin, Esq.
          REED SMITH, LLP
          225 5th Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 288-3546

Defendant-Appellee STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a
State Auto Insurance Companies, is represented by:

          Elise D. Allen, Esq.
          David Buishas, Esq.
          Adam Fleischer, Esq.
          BATESCAREY, LLP
          191 North Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 762-3244
          E-mail: eallen@batescarey.com
                  dbuishas@batescarey.com
                  afleischer@batescarey.com

               - and -

          Lee Murray Hall, Esq.
          Sarah A. Walling, Esq.
          JENKINS FENSTERMAKER, PLLC
          P. O. Box 2688
          Huntington, WV 25726-2688     
          Telephone: (304) 523-2100
          E-mail: lmh@jenkinsfenstermaker.com
                  saw@jenkinsfenstermaker.com

STATE FARM: Seeks to Stay Activity Pending 4th Cir. Resolution
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ELEGANT MASSAGE, LLC d/b/a
LIGHT STREAM SPA, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Case No.
2:20-cv-00265-RAJ-LRL (E.D. Va.), the Defendants filed a motion to
stay all notice-related obligations and class notice activity
pending resolution by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit of State Farm's forthcoming Petition for Permission to
Appeal Pursuant to Rule 23(f), due to be filed no later than
September 2, 2021.

Given the upcoming deadline imposed under the Court's Class
Certification Order that State Farm provide the names, addresses,
phone numbers, and email addresses of all potential class members
to Plaintiff's counsel by September 3, 2021, State Farm
respectfully requests expedited consideration of this Motion. State
Farm is obligated to protect the personal and private information
of its policyholders and respectfully submits that this provides a
basis for accelerated briefing and resolution by the Court at its
earliest possible convenience. The Plaintiff does not consent to
State Farm's Motion, the Defendants say.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Aug. 25, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DvJFv9 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Theodore I. Brenner, Esq.
          Alexander S. de Witt, Esq.
          FREEBORN & PETERS LLP
          901 East Byrd Street, Suite 950
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 644-1300
          Facsimile: (804) 644-1354
          E-mail: tbrenner@freeborn.com
                  adewitt@freeborn.com

          - and -

          Christina Guerola Sarchio, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          1900 K Street, NW
          Washington, D.C. 20006
          Telephone: (202) 261-3300
          Facsimile: (202) 261-3333
          E-mail: christina.sarchio@dechert.com

               - and -

          Douglas W. Dunham, Esq.
          Bert L. Wolff, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          Three Bryant Park
          1095 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 698-3500
          Facsimile: (212) 698-3599
          E-mail: douglas.dunham@dechert.com
                  bert.wolff@dechert.com

               - and -

          Joseph A. Cancila, Jr., Esq.
          James P. Gaughan, Esq.
          Rodney Perry, Esq.
          RILEY, SAFER, HOLMES & CANCILA LLP
          70 W. Madison St., Suite 2900
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 471-8700
          E-mail: jcancila@rshc-law.com
                  jgaughan@rshc-law.com
                  rperrry@rshc-law.com

STATE TEACHERS: Southern District of Ohio Dismisses Dennis Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEAN DENNIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. STATE TEACHERS
RETIREMENT BOARD, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-386 (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Timothy S. Black of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, granted the
Defendants' motions to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Dean Dennis and Bob Buerkle are retired public school
teachers, seeking to bring a class action on behalf of themselves
and all similarly situated individuals benefiting from the State
Teachers Retirement System ("STRS")'s defined benefit plan. The
Defendants are the State Teachers Retirement Board ("STRB") and the
STRB's individual board members ("Individual Defendants").

The STRB administers the STRS. The STRS' defined benefit plan is
funded by three sources: (1) employee contributions, currently 14%
of the employee's annual salary; (2) employer contributions; and
(3) investment earnings from the foregoing contributions.

The lawsuit concerns a retiree's cost of living allowance ("COLA")
under the plan. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Section 3307.67(A):
"Except as provided in divisions (D) and (E) of this section, the
state teachers retirement board will annually increase each
allowance or benefit payable under the STRS defined benefit plan.
Through July 13, 2013 the increase will be three per cent. On and
after August 1, 2013, the increase will be two percent." Subsection
(E) of this section provides that the STRB "may adjust the increase
payable" for the COLA if the STRB's actuary, when evaluating the
STRS, "determines that an adjustment does not materially impair the
fiscal integrity of the retirement system or is necessary to
preserve the fiscal integrity of the system."

On April 20, 2017, the STRB eliminated the COLA increases. The
Plaintiffs state this was in error for three reasons.

First, the Plaintiffs contend the STRB "relinquished any right" to
reduce the COLA when, in 2013, the STRB adopted Ohio Admin. Code
3307:1-10-01. This administrative code states that the STRB "shall
annually increase each allowance or benefit payable under the
defined benefit plan by two percent," and the code does not reserve
the right to adjust allowances based on an actuary determination.

Second, the Plaintiffs also contend that they have a "vested right"
to annual COLA increases, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code. Section
3307.42(A), which provides: The granting to any person of an
allowance, annuity, pension or other benefit under the STRS defined
benefit pla pursuant to an action of the state teachers' retirement
board vests a right in such person, so long as the person remains
the beneficiary of any of the funds established by section 3307.14
of the Revised Code, to receive the allowance, annuity, pension, or
benefit at the rate fixed at the time of granting the allowance,
annuity, pension, or benefit.

Third, even if the STRB could adjust the COLA, the STRB failed to
follow the requirements when adjusting the COLA because no actuary
provided a report or determined a change was necessary to preserve
the fiscal integrity of the system.

Thus, because of the STRB's decision to eliminate the COLA, the
Plaintiffs brought the suit, alleging violations of federal and
state constitutions, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
and unjust enrichment. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief,
monetary damages and/or restitution, interest, and fees and costs.

The civil case is before the Court on the Order of Referral to
Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman. Pursuant to that Order, the
Magistrate Judge submitted a Report and Recommendations on July 28,
2020. The Report discusses the two pending motions to dismiss, and
the parties' responsive memoranda. THe Plaintiffs submitted
objections to the Report. The Defendants responded to those
objections.

Discussion

A. Individual Defendants

The Individual Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims
against them. The Plaintiffs allege only individual capacity claims
against the Individual Defendants. The Magistrate Judge recommends
dismissing all claims against the Individual Defendants based on
qualified immunity. The Plaintiffs do not object to the Magistrate
Judge's Report as to the Individual Defendants.

Judge Black is satisfied that there are no clear errors in the
Magistrate Judge's Report when discussing the application of
qualified immunity to the claims against the Individual Defendants.
Accordingly, the Report as to the Individual Defendants is adopted,
the motion to dismiss granted, and the claims against the
Individual Defendants dismissed with prejudice.

B. The STRB

The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims
against the STRB based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The STRB is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity if it operates as an arm of
the State. The STRB bears the burden of showing that it operates in
this capacity.

In assessing whether a public entity is an "arm of the State"
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity or a "political
subdivision" not entitled to that immunity, the Court, citing Ernst
v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005), considers four
factors: (1) the State's potential liability for a judgment against
the entity; (2) the language by which state statutes and state
courts refer to the entity and the degree of state control and veto
power over the entity's actions; (3) whether state or local
officials appoint the board members of the entity; and (4) whether
the entity's functions fall within the traditional purview of state
or local government.

Judge Black finds that the entirety of the Plaintiffs' objections
attacks the Magistrate Judge's analysis of each of the four
factors; thus, the Magistrate Judge's ultimate recommendation that
the STRB is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and its motion
to dismiss should be granted.

In sum, the Judge holds that the Ernst factors, when balanced and
weighed, favor the STRB and the ultimate determination that the
STRB has carried its burden of demonstrating that it is an arm of
the state and entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in the case.
Like the other courts holding that a state employee retirement
system is an arm of the State, the Court does the name.

The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the case in full, with
which recommendation Judge Black agrees. The Judge clarifies that
the dismissal of the Plaintiffs claims against the STRB for lack of
jurisdiction due to Eleventh Amendment immunity is a dismissal
without prejudice, and such dismissal does not prevent the
Plaintiffs from pursuing the proper forum.

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, Judge Black adopted the Report and
Recommendation, as expanded in the Order. He granted the
Defendants' motions to dismiss and dismissed without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' claims against the STRB. The Judge dismissed with
prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims against the Individual Defendants
in their individual capacities. The Clerk will enter judgment
accordingly, whereupon the action is terminated upon the docket of
the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Decision & is
available at https://tinyurl.com/fsh4pymw from Leagle.com.


SUBIRANA TRANSPORT: Flores Class Suit Seeks Drivers' Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
YURI ERNESTO VALVERED FLORES, and those similarly situated, v.
SUBIRANA TRANSPORT INC., a Florida Profit Corporation, Case No.
132423973 (Fla. Cir., Miami-Dade Cty., Aug. 10, 2021) seeks to
recover unpaid wages and minimum wage compensation, and an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff was working based on a written contract which called
for payment from the Defendant based on driving as well as
reimbursement for tolls and other expenses. The Plaintiff was to be
paid a base of $1,500.00 per week but the Defendant failed to pay
plaintiff as agreed, the suit says.

The Plaintiff performed work for Defendants as truck driver from
October 26, 2019 through January 14, 2020.

Subirana Transport, Inc. is a licensed and bonded freight shipping
and trucking company running freight hauling business from Doral,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason S. Remer, Esq.
          Daniel H. Hunt, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416-5000
          E-mail: jremer@rgpattorneys.com
                  dhunt@rgpattorneys.com

SVD CORP: Almedarez Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------
Javier Almendarez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SVD Corp. and Santos Bonilla
Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-04593, (E.D. N.Y., August 16, 2021),
seeks to recover damages for violations of New York State labor
laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act, compensatory and liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees, costs and all other legal and
equitable remedies.

Defendants operate a restaurant under the name "Campus Pizza and
Gyro" where Almendarez was employed as all-around restaurant staff.
He claims to have worked in excess of 40 hours per day without
overtime premium, spread-of-hours premium and denied accurate wage
statements. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
      HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, PC
      80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
      Kew Gardens, NY 11415
      Telephone: (718) 263-9591
      Email: HFDalton6912@Gmail.com


SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES: ERS Hawaii Class Cert. Bid Pending
------------------------------------------------------------
Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motion for class
certification filed in the consolidated putative class action suit
headed by the Employees' Retirement System of the State of Hawaii,
is pending.

On May 1, 2017, May 2, 2017, June 8, 2017 and June 14, 2017, four
putative class actions were filed against the Company and certain
of its current and former officers and directors in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

After these cases were consolidated, the court appointed as lead
plaintiff Employees' Retirement System of the State of Hawaii,
which filed, on November 20, 2017, a consolidated complaint
purportedly on behalf of purchasers of the Company's common stock
between February 3, 2016 and June 13, 2017.

On February 2, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the
consolidated complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.

Before that motion was decided, on August 24, 2018, lead plaintiff
filed a consolidated amended complaint purportedly on behalf of
purchasers of the Company's common stock between October 28, 2014
and June 13, 2017.

On June 28, 2019, the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
the consolidated amended complaint in its entirety, without
prejudice, allowing lead plaintiff to leave to amend its complaint.
On August 14, 2019, lead plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint.

The second amended complaint asserts claims under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
it alleges, among other things, that the defendants made false and
misleading statements of material information concerning the
Company's financial results, business operations, and prospects.

The plaintiff seeks unspecified damages, fees, interest, and costs.


On October 4, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss the second
amended complaint in its entirety. On May 29, 2020, the court
granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss
the second amended complaint, without prejudice.

Plaintiff filed its motion for class certification on October 30,
2020, which motion remains pending.

The Company believes that the asserted claims lack merit and
intends to defend against all of the claims vigorously.

Synchronoss said, "Due to the inherent uncertainties of litigation,
the Company cannot predict the outcome of the action at this time
and can give no assurance that the asserted claims will not have a
material adverse effect on its financial position or results of
operations."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. provides cloud, digital, messaging,
and Internet of Things (IoT) platforms, products, and solutions in
North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and
the Asia Pacific. Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. was founded in
2000 and is headquartered in Bridgewater, New Jersey.


T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customers' Data, Carp Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LEON CARP, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. T-MOBILE USA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01130
(W.D. Wash., August 20, 2021) is a class action against the
Defendant for negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence,
breach of express contracts, breach of implied contracts, breach of
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment,
declaratory judgment, and violation of Washington Data Breach
Notice Act and the Washington Consumer Protection Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' failure to safeguard the
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of their customers,
including the Plaintiff, from data breach. On or about August 15,
2021, an anonymous individual posted for sale a collection of data
containing 30 million social security numbers and driver licenses,
pulled from T-Mobile servers. T-Mobile investigated further and
discovered that a subset of T-Mobile data had been accessed by
unauthorized individuals. The Plaintiff and the other Class Members
have suffered concrete damages and are now exposed to a heightened
and imminent risk of fraud and identity theft, for a period of
years, if not decades, says the suit.

T-Mobile USA, Inc. is a wireless network operator with its
principal place of business in Bellevue, Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
                  
         Cari Campen Laufenberg, Esq.
         Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
         Derek Loeser, Esq.
         Juli Farris, Esq.
         Emma M. Wright, Esq.
         KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
         1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
         Seattle, WA 98101
         Telephone: (206) 623-1900
         Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
         E-mail: claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com
                 gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                 dloeser@kellerrohrback.com
                 jfarris@kellerrohrback.com
                 ewright@kellerrohrback.com

                 - and –

         Christopher Springer, Esq.
         KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
         801 Garden Street, Suite 301
         Santa Barbara, CA 93101
         Telephone: (805) 456-1496
         Facsimile: (805) 456-1497
         E-mail: cspringer@kellerrohrback.com

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS: Court Modifies Schedule Order in Keuch Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RANDOLPH KEUCH v. TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. and TEVA PARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, Ltd.,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05488-TR (E.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge Timothy R.
Rice entered a modified schedule order as follows:

   1. By October 28, 2021, all class discovery shall be
      completed.

   2. By November 16, 2021, Plaintiff shall file a Motion for
      Class Certification.

   3. By November 16, 2021, all written discovering regarding
      Plaintiff Keuch shall be completed.

   4. By December 14, 2021, Defendants shall file a Response to
      the Motion for Class Certification.

   5. By December 28, 2021, Plaintiff may file a Reply in
      Further Support of Motion for Class Certification.

   6. By January 14, 2022, all deposition discovery regarding
      Plaintiff Keuch shall be completed.

   7. Motions for Summary Judgment shall be filed by March 4,
      2022.

   8. Responses in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment
      shall be filed by April 5, 2022.

Teva manufactures and markets generic pharmaceutical products.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/38ksGgK at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for Defendants Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd, are:

          Alan B. Epstein, Esq.
          Jennifer Myers Chalal, Esq.
          SPECTOR GADON ROSEN VINCI, P.C.
          1635 Market Street, Seventh Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 241-8832
          E-mail: aepstein@sgrvlaw.com

               - and -

          Larry J. Rappoport,  Esq.
          Brandon Shemtob,  Esq.
          STEVENS & LEE, P.C.
          1500 Market Street, Suite 1800
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (610) 205-6039
          E-mail: ljr@stevenslee.com

TFORCE LOGISTICS: Ninth Cir. Affirms Arbitration Denial in Lim Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms
the denial of a motion to compel arbitration in the lawsuit titled
SANTIAGO LIM, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TFORCE LOGISTICS, LLC; TFORCE
FINAL MILE WEST, LLC, Defendants-Appellants, and TRANSFORCE, INC.;
DOES, 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 20-55564 (9th Cir.).

Defendants-Appellants Transforce, TForce Logistics, and TForce
Final Mile appeal the district court's denial of a motion to compel
arbitration of employment-related claims brought by
Plaintiff-Appellee Santiago Lim.

Background

Mr. Lim worked as a delivery driver for TForce in California. He
alleges that TForce employs delivery drivers as part of its
business and misclassifies them as independent contractors rather
than employees. While he and other drivers signed agreements
purporting to classify them as independent contractors, Lim alleges
that TForce treated and managed them as employees. That employment,
Lim contends, violated California labor laws.

The Independent Contractor Operating Agreement between Dynamex
Operations West, Inc., and Lim (contract) provides that the
agreement will be governed by the Laws of the State of Texas, as
the principal place of business of TForce. The contract also
provides that the parties agree that any legal proceedings between
the parties arising under, arising out of, or relating to the
relationship created by the Agreement, including arbitration
proceedings, will be filed and/or maintained in Dallas, Texas, or
the nearest location in Texas where such proceedings can be
maintained.

As to "dispute resolution," the contract provides that all disputes
and claims arising under, out of, or relating to the Agreement,
including an allegation of breach thereof, will be fully resolved
by arbitration in accordance with Texas' Arbitration Act and/or the
Federal Arbitration Act.

Motion to Compel

The parties submitted several competing declarations in the
district court concerning contract formation and execution in the
motion to compel arbitration proceedings. David Brooks, Elijah
Naylor and Jesus Ramos filed declarations supporting the Motion to
Compel.

Mr. Lim filed a declaration opposing the Motion to Compel. He
states that he began working for TForce in 2011. During his
employment, Lim delivered "blood and blood products" to hospitals
and facilities in Southern California for TForce's client, the Red
Cross. Lim worked from the Red Cross hub in Pomona, California.
Before working for TForce, Lim delivered blood for the Red Cross
from Pomona through a different company.

In May 2011, TForce held a meeting of drivers making deliveries for
the Red Cross. At that meeting, TForce presented Lim with the
contract that had his name and other information "preprinted on
it." Lim states that he and other employees were told to sign the
contract if they wanted to continue making deliveries for the Red
Cross. He states that he was not given an opportunity to negotiate
the terms of the contract and that the contract was "largely
preprinted." He declares, among other things, that there was no
option to sign another document or to negotiate different terms.

A different class-action proceeding alleges similar claims against
the same defendants and reached the California Supreme Court on the
issue of class certification. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v.
Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018). In that case, the California
Supreme Court adopted the test for determining when independent
contractors qualify as employees. The Dynamex class includes only
individuals who returned timely and complete questionnaires as part
of the discovery process. Lim is not a member of that class, and
this action excludes any individuals, who are class members in that
case.

In this case, TForce filed a motion to compel arbitration of Lim's
employment-related claims based on the arbitration provision in his
contract. The district court denied the motion, holding that the
delegation clause and arbitration provision were procedurally and
substantively unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable as to
Lim.

TForce appealed and the district court stayed class proceedings
pending resolution of the appeal.

Analysis

Mr. Lim's contract contains a delegation clause that requires the
arbitrator to determine the gateway issue of arbitrability. The
district court held that the delegation clause was unenforceable as
to Lim because it was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. The Court of Appeals agrees.

Circuit Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr., writing for the Panel, notes
that Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that
an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract."

Viewing the evidence as a whole, the district court found that Lim
was presented with a contract of adhesion, i.e., a
take-it-or-leave-it offer. As the district court found, Lim
received the contract on the day it was to be executed, material
terms--including the delegation clause--were pre-printed, and there
were no negotiations as to any of the contract terms.

Importantly, the district court found that Lim believed that, if he
wanted to continue delivering for the Red Cross, he needed to sign
the contract. Despite the general descriptions of the onboarding
process provided in the TForce declarations, Lim's declaration
establishes that the only choice TForce provided to him was to
agree to the delegation clause and the rest of the contract or stop
delivering for the Red Cross. These circumstances, especially in
the employment context, indicate some degree of procedural
unconscionability, Judge Smith notes citing Saravia v. Dynamex,
Inc., 310 F.R.D. 412, 420 (N.D. Cal. 2015), et al.

With respect to unfair surprise, TForce presented the delegation
clause in the middle of 31 numbered paragraphs, within more than
nine pages of single-spaced, 10-point font. Nothing in the text of
the agreement called Lim's attention to the delegation clause, and
Lim was not required to sign or initial that specific provision.
This further supports some degree of procedural unconscionability,
Judge Smith states.

As noted, another district court denied a motion to compel
arbitration by TForce against another plaintiff based on similar
unconscionability findings regarding the same contract at issue
here (see Saravia, 310 F.R.D. at 416). While the district court in
this case correctly noted the procedural unconscionability was not
as severe as that found in Saravia, where a language barrier
existed, the facts presented here show a situation where TForce had
overwhelming bargaining power and presented the delegation clause
to Lim on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, Judge Smith opines.

Accordingly, the district court correctly determined procedural
unconscionability existed with respect to the delegation clause
because the circumstances show a degree of unfair surprise and
oppression that left Lim without an ability to negotiate and to
make only a take-it-or-leave-it decision, Judge Smith holds.

Viewed collectively, the district court concluded that the
cost-splitting, fee-shifting, and Texas venue provisions rendered
the delegation clause substantively unconscionable as to Lim. The
district court evaluated Lim's financial circumstances and found
that the delegation clause was so "prohibitively costly" that it
deprived Lim of any proceeding to vindicate his rights. These
findings are supported by the record and demonstrate substantive
unconscionability.

The contract requires that Lim arbitrate his claims in Dallas,
Texas, and that the arbitration fees be "split between the
parties," unless Lim "shows that the arbitration fees will impose a
substantial financial hardship" on him "as determined by the
Arbitrator." As the district court found, Lim resides in Southern
California, "takes home about $600 a week," and has joint custody
of his minor daughter who spends half of her time with him.

As the district court correctly concluded, these financial
circumstances were more than mere inconvenience, and when viewed
collectively with the Texas venue provision, rendered the
delegation clause so "prohibitively costly" so as to deprive Lim of
any proceeding to vindicate his rights or accomplish substantial
justice. In addition, the requirement that Lim pay half of the
arbitration fees, including with respect to the gateway issue of
arbitrability, impermissibly imposes a type of expense that Lim
would not be required to bear if he were free to bring the action
in court, Judge Smith notes. Therefore, the district court
correctly concluded that the cost-splitting provision, as applied
to the delegation clause, was unconscionable under California law.

Judge Smith also finds, among other things, that the district court
also correctly concluded that the provision permitting an award of
attorney's fees to the prevailing party was substantively
unconscionable under California law.

TForce contends that the district court abused its discretion by
not severing the unconscionable provisions and enforcing what
remained of the delegation clause. The Court of Appeals disagrees.

As the district court correctly recognized, an unconscionable
arbitration term should also not be severed if drafted in bad faith
because severing such a term and enforcing the arbitration
provision would encourage drafters to overreach, Judge Smith
explains. Therefore, given the pervasive unconscionability of the
delegation clause based on multiple unconscionable provisions--the
cost-splitting, fee-shifting, and Texas venue provisions--the
district court did not abuse its discretion by not severing those
unconscionable terms, Judge Smith holds.

Because the district court correctly held that the delegation
clause was unenforceable as procedurally and substantively
unconscionable, the district court properly proceeded to determine
the gateway issue of arbitrability, Judge Smith says. In doing so,
the district court correctly concluded that the same bases for
concluding that the delegation clause was procedurally and
substantively unconscionable--the take-it-or-leave-it circumstances
and the cost-splitting, fee-shifting, and Texas venue
provisions--also rendered the arbitration provision unconscionable.
And for the same reasons it did not err by declining to sever the
unconscionable terms with respect to the delegation clause, the
district court did not err by not severing those same terms and
declining to enforce the arbitration provision.

Conclusion

The district court correctly determined that the delegation clause
was unenforceable because it was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. Because the delegation clause was unenforceable,
the district court properly proceeded to determine the gateway
issue of arbitrability, and correctly concluded that the same bases
for concluding that the delegation clause was procedurally and
substantively unconscionable--the take-it-or-leave-it circumstances
and the cost-splitting, fee-shifting, and Texas venue
provisions--also applied to render the broader arbitration clause
unconscionable.

In light of the multiple unconscionable provisions and resulting
pervasive unconscionability, Judge Smith rules that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by declining to sever the
unconscionable provisions from the delegation clause and
arbitration provision.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4dcu6cv2 from Leagle.com.

Joshua Konecky -- jkonecky@schneiderwallace.com -- and Nathan B.
Piller -- npiller@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace
Cottrell Konecky LLP, in Emeryville, California, for the
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Steven C. Rice -- srice@marronlaw.com -- and Paul Marron --
pmarron@marronlaw.com -- Marron Lawyers APC, in Long Beach,
California, for the Defendants-Appellants.


THOMSON REUTERS: Seeks Approval of Stipulation on Case Schedule
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CAT BROOKS and RASHEED
SHABAZZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION, Case No.
3:21-cv-01418-EMC (N.D. Cal.), the Parties ask the Court to enter
an order granting their stipulation to the following case schedule:


                     Event                        Deadline

   Exchange of Initial Disclosures:           September 3, 2021

   Disclosure of Primary Class                March 1, 2022
   Certification Experts:

   Disclosure of Class Certification          May 17, 2022
   Rebuttal Experts:

   Close of Class Certification               June 17, 2022
   Expert Discovery:

   Deadline to Amend Pleadings:               July 18, 2022

   Motion for Class Certification             July 18, 2022

   Opposition to Class Certification:         September 12, 2022

   Reply Supporting Class                     October 24, 2022
   Certification:

   Hearing on Motion for                      December 8, 2022
   Class Certification:

  Close of Fact Discovery:                    February 8, 2023

Thomson Reuters Corporation is a Canada-based multinational media
conglomerate. The company was founded in Toronto, Ontario, Canada,
where it is headquartered at the Bay Adelaide Center.

A copy of the Parties' motion  dated Aug. 26, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3gHIw9I at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class, are:

          Eric H. Gibbs, Esq.
          Andre M. Mura, Esq.
          Amanda M. Karl, Esq.
          Jeffrey B. Kosbie, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street, Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
          E-mail: ehg@classlawgroup.com
                  amm@classlawgroup.com
                  amk@classlawgroup.com
                  jbk@classlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Jennifer D. Bennett, Esq.
          Neil K. Sawhney, Esq.
          GUPTA WESSLER PLLC
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 573-0336
          E-mail: jennifer@guptawessler.com
                  neil@guptawessler.com

               - and -

          Albert Fox Cahn, Esq.
          SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
          OVERSIGHT PROJECT
          40 Rector Street, 9th Floor
          New York, NY 10006
          E-mail: albert@stopspying.org

               - and -

          Benjamin Elga, Esq.
          Alice Buttrick, Esq.
          JUSTICE CATALYST LAW INC.
          123 William Street, 16th floor
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (518) 732-6703
          E-mail: belga@justicecatalyst.org
                  abuttrick@justicecatalyst.org

The Attorneys for Defendant are:

          Susan D. Fahringer, Esq.
          Nicola C. Menaldo, Esq.
          Anna M. Thompson, Esq.
          Gabriella Gallego, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
          Seattle, WA 98101-3099
          Telephone: (206) 359-8000
          Facsimile: (206) 359-9000
          E-mail: SFahringer@perkinscoie.com
                  NMenaldo@perkinscoie.com
                  AnnaThompson@perkinscoie.com
                  GGallego@perkinscoie.com

TINDER INC: Ninth Cir. Flips Class Settlement Approval in Kim Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LISA KIM, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee v. RICH ALLISON; STEVE FRYE,
Objectors-Appellants v. TINDER, INC., a Delaware corporation; MATCH
GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; MATCH GROUP,
INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
19-55807 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued an Opinion:

   a. reversing the district court's approval of the
      pre-certification class settlement; and

   b. vacating the judgment and attorneys' fees award and
      remanding the case to the district court for further
      proceedings consistent with the Opinion.

Beginning in 2015, the dating app Tinder began offering reduced
pricing for those under 30, later changed to those under 29. In
2017, plaintiff Lisa Kim purchased a premium version of the Tinder
app, but because she was already in her thirties, she paid more for
her monthly subscription than those in their twenties. Kim brought
suit against Tinder in federal district court pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") for violations of California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act and its unfair competition statute. Over
Kim's opposition, Tinder successfully compelled arbitration. After
a daylong mediation session with a retired judge, Kim and Tinder
reached a settlement, before class certification, that applied to a
putative class.

Specifically, the settlement class included all California-based
Tinder users who were at least 29 years old when they subscribed to
Tinder's premium services and were charged a higher price than
younger subscribers. As part of the settlement, Tinder agreed to
eliminate age-based pricing in California for new subscribers.
Class members who maintained or reactivated their Tinder accounts
would automatically receive 50 "Super Likes" for which Tinder would
ordinarily have charged $50. Finally, class members who submitted a
valid claim form would also receive their choice of $25 in cash, 25
Super Likes, or a one-month free subscription to the premium Tinder
service previously purchased.

Class members Rich Allison and Steve Frye, whose attorneys
represent the lead plaintiff in a competing age-discrimination
class action against Tinder in California state court, were among
six class members who objected to the proposed settlement. These
two objectors, in particular, argued that Tinder offered too paltry
a cash payout, as well as Super Likes that premium subscribers did
not need and subscriptions that former subscribers did not want,
all in exchange for releasing valuable claims that had only been
strengthened by recent victories in related California actions.
Rejecting these objections, the district court certified the class
for settlement purposes, granted final approval of the proposed
settlement, and awarded Kim a $5,000 incentive payment and her
counsel $1.2 million in attorneys' fees. Allison and Frye now
appeal.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that the district court did not subject
the settlement agreement to a "a higher standard of fairness and a
more probing inquiry than may normally be required under Rule
23(e)." Further, the district court abused its discretion by
awarding attorneys' fees with reference to an unsupported
estimation of the value of injunctive relief and a wholly inflated
assessment of benefit to the class. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
reverses the district court's approval of the settlement, vacates
the judgment and attorneys' fees award, and remands for the
district court to conduct the "more probing inquiry" that a
pre-certification class settlement demands.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/msf4w9td from Leagle.com.

Danielle Leonard (argued) -- dleonard@altshulerberzon.com -- and
Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP, in San Francisco, California;
Kimberly A. Kralowec -- kkralowec@kraloweclaw.com -- Kralowec Law
P.C., in San Francisco, California; Alfred G. Rava, Rava Law Firm,
in San Diego, California; for the Objectors-Appellants.

Adrian R. Bacon (argued) -- abacon@attorneysforconsumers.com -- and
Todd M. Friedman -- tfriedman@attorneysforconsumers.com -- Law
Offices of Todd M. Friedman P.C., in Woodland Hills, California;
John P. Kristensen -- john@kristensenlaw.com -- Kristensen LLP, in
Los Angeles, California; for the Plaintiff-Appellee.

Donald R. Brown (argued) -- dbrown@manatt.com -- Robert H. Platt --
rplatt@manatt.com -- and Benjamin G. Shatz, Manatt Phelps &
Phillips LLP, in Los Angeles, California, for the
Defendants-Appellees.


TOEZPECUNIA INC: Amador Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Exotic Dancers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHANTELLE AMADOR, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TOEZPECUNIA, INC. dba SWEET
ILLUSIONS; WAYNE M. VAJGERT; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 6:21-cv-01242-AA (D. Ore., August 20, 2021) is
a class action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act including failure to pay minimum wages, illegal
kickbacks, unlawful taking of tips, and forced tip sharing.

The Plaintiff worked as an exotic dancer at the Defendants' adult
entertainment facility, Sweet Illusions, located at 1836 South A
Street, Springfield, Oregon at various points from at least 2015 to
June 2021.

Toezpecunia, Inc. is an operator of an adult entertainment facility
under the name Sweet Illusions, located at 1836 South A Street,
Springfield, Oregon. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
                  
         S. Amanda Marshall, Esq.
         S. AMANDA MARSHALL LLC
         1318 NW Northrup Street
         Portland, OR 97209
         Telephone: (503) 472-7190
         E-mail: amanda@maclaw.law

                 - and –

         Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
         ELLZEY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
         1105 Milford Street
         Houston, TX 77006
         Telephone: (713) 554-2377
         Facsimile: (888) 995-3335
         E-mail: jarrett@ellzeylaw.com

TOTAL MERCHANT: California Court Seeks Information in Abante Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ABANTE ROOTER AND PLUMBING, INC., Plaintiff v. TOTAL
MERCHANT SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-05711-EMC (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California issued an Order requesting the
parties to file a description of the scope of publicity and nature
of the information shared with the public and the putative class
members about the case.

Before the Court will approve the parties' Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal of Action With Prejudice as to Plaintiff and Without
Prejudice as to the Putative Class, the Court requests information
from the parties about the scope and nature of the publicity
associated with the putative class action.

As Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) compels: "A class action
will not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise will be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs." This requirement "is to protect the interests of absent
plaintiffs before permitting dismissal." Although "the class has
not been certified, this requirement to act as the guardian of the
rights of class members still applies."

Thus, in order to ensure that the interests of the absent
Plaintiffs are appropriately safeguarded, and to safeguard against
any misplaced reliance on the suit and any consequential tolling of
the statute of limitations, the parties will file a description of
the scope of publicity and nature of the information shared with
the public and putative class members about the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/42yx49nu from Leagle.com.


TREATMENT ASSESSMENT: Court Amends Scheduling Order in Briggs Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Deshawn Briggs, et al., v.
Treatment Assessment Screening Center Incorporated, Case No.
2:18-cv-02684-EJM (D. Ariz.), the Hon. Judge Eric J. Markovich
entered an order granting the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to amend
the scheduling order as follows:

   a. The dates and deadlines set forth in the Court's Order at
      Doc. 318 are vacated; and

   b. The new deadlines are set as follows:

      -- Affirmative expert reports: July 26, 2021

      -- Rebuttal expert reports: September 13th, 2021

      -- Expert depositions: October 1, 2021

      -- Motion for class certification: October 15, 2021

      -- Response to Motion for class certification: November
         12, 2021

      -- Reply in support of motion for class certification:
         November 30, 2021

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3sXpJw5 at no extra charge.[CC]

TTE TECHNOLOGY: Pacana Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARK PACANA, PAUL
FISKRATTI, and WAYNE LEWALD, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others
Similarly Situated, v. TTE TECHNOLOGY, INC., dba TTE NORTH AMERICA,
Case No. 3:20-cv-02857-EMC (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following Classes pursuant to Federal Rule
      of Civil Procedure 23:

      -- California Class

         "All individuals who, during the class period,
         purchased a TCL television labeled as having a "Hz"
         rating twice as high as its actual refresh rate (Hz) in
         the state of California" (the "California Class"); and

      -- New Jersey Class

         "All individuals who, during the class period,
         purchased a TCL television labeled as having a "Hz"
         rating twice as high as its actual refresh rate (Hz) in
         the state of New Jersey" (the "New Jersey Class");

   2. designating them as Class representatives; and

   3. appointing Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC;
      Crueger Dickinson LLC; and Hudock Law Group, S.C. as Class
      Counsel;

   4. directing the parties to confer and present this Court
      with a proposed plan for giving notice to the classes
      within 15 days of an order granting class certification.

TCL sold millions of televisions in California and New Jersey that
it falsely and misleadingly advertised as having a refresh rate
twice as high as the actual refresh rate. TCL did so because, in
its words, LCD televisions present a series of still images in
rapid succession. create an image, the millions of pixels that make
up an LCD display receive an electrical charge at a given and
defined frequency and the liquid crystals within each pixel
orientate according to the charge received.

An LCD's television's refresh rate specification refers to the
frequency of this electrical process to successively draw, or
"refresh," images on the LCD display and is measured in hertz
("Hz").

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Aug. 27, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3yByFZv at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the proposed Class, are:

          Alex R. Straus, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          280 S. Beverly Drive, Suite PH
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (865) 247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: astraus@milberg.com

               - and -

          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON, Esq.
          Greg Coleman, Esq.
          Adam Edwards, Esq.
          William Ladnier, Esq.
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          First Horizon Plaza
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: (865) 247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: gcoleman@milberg.com
                  aedwards@milberg.com
                  wladnier@milberg.com

               - and -

          Charles J. Crueger, Esq.
          Erin K. Dickinson, Esq.
          Ben Kaplan, Esq.
          CRUEGER DICKINSON LLC
          4532 North Oakland Avenue
          Whitefish Bay, WI 53211
          Telephone.: (414) 210-3868
          E-mail: cjc@cruegerdickinson.com
                  ekd@cruegerdickinson.com
                  bak@cruegerdickinson.com

               - and -

          Luke P. Hudock, Esq.
          HUDOCK LAW GROUP, S.C.
          P.O. Box 83
          Muskego, WI 53150
          Telephone: (414) 526-490
          E-mail: lphudock@law-hlg.com

TYSON FOODS: $21MM Settlement Reached in Chicken Grower Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Tyson Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 3, 2021, that the company reached an
agreement to settle with the putative class of broiler chicken
farmers all claims raised in this consolidated action for $21
million.

On January 27, 2017, Haff Poultry, Inc., Craig Watts, Johnny
Upchurch, Jonathan Walters and Brad Carr, acting on behalf of
themselves and a putative class of broiler chicken farmers, filed a
class action complaint against the company and certain of its
poultry subsidiaries, as well as several other
vertically-integrated poultry processing companies, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

On March 27, 2017, a second class action complaint making similar
claims on behalf of a similarly defined putative class was filed in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma.

Plaintiffs in the two cases sought to have the matters
consolidated, and, on July 10, 2017, filed a consolidated amended
complaint styled In re Broiler Chicken Grower Litigation.

The plaintiffs allege, among other things, that the defendants
colluded not to compete for broiler raising services "with the
purpose and effect of fixing, maintaining, and/or stabilizing
grower compensation below competitive levels."

The plaintiffs also allege that the defendants "agreed to share
detailed data on grower compensation with one another, with the
purpose and effect of artificially depressing grower compensation
below competitive levels."

The plaintiffs contend these alleged acts constitute violations of
the Sherman Antitrust Act and Section 202 of the Grain Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.

The plaintiffs are seeking treble damages, pre- and post-judgment
interest, costs, and attorneys' fees on behalf of the putative
class.

The company and the other defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
September 8, 2017, and that motion was denied on January 6, 2020.

Additional named plaintiffs filed similar class action complaints
in federal district courts in North Carolina, Colorado, Kansas and
California.

On October 6, 2020, the named plaintiffs in the Oklahoma action
filed a motion with the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (the "JPML") to transfer and consolidate
all actions in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

On December 15, 2020, the JPML granted the plaintiffs' motion and
consolidated all actions in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

In June 2021, the company reached an agreement to settle with the
putative class of broiler chicken farmers all claims raised in this
consolidated action for $21 million.

The settlement is subject to court approval.

Tyson Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company worldwide. It operates through four segments: Beef,
Pork, Chicken, and Prepared Foods. Tyson Foods, Inc. was founded in
1935 and is headquartered in Springdale, Arkansas.


TYSON FOODS: Bid to Dismiss Cattle Antitrust Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------
Tyson Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 3, 2021, that the company's motion to
dismiss the consolidated putative class action suit entitled, In Re
Cattle Antitrust Litigation, is still pending.

On April 23, 2019, a group of plaintiffs, acting on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of a putative class of all persons and
entities who directly sold to the named defendants any fed cattle
for slaughter and all persons who transacted in live cattle futures
and/or options traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange or another
U.S. exchange, filed a class action complaint against the company
and its beef and pork subsidiary, Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., as well
as other beef packer defendants, in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy
from January 2015 to the present to reduce fed cattle prices in
violation of federal antitrust laws, the Grain Inspection, Packers
and Stockyards Act of 1921, and the Commodities Exchange Act by
periodically reducing their slaughter volumes so as to reduce
demand for fed cattle, curtailing their purchases and slaughters of
cash-purchased cattle during those same periods, coordinating their
procurement practices for fed cattle settled on a cash basis,
importing foreign cattle at a loss so as to reduce domestic demand,
and closing and idling plants.

In addition, the plaintiffs also allege the defendants colluded to
manipulate live cattle futures and options traded on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange.

The plaintiffs seek, among other things, treble monetary damages,
punitive damages, restitution, and pre- and post-judgment interest,
as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

This complaint was subsequently voluntarily dismissed and re-filed
in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.
Other similar lawsuits were filed by ranchers in other district
courts.

All actions seeking relief by ranchers and futures traders have now
been transferred to the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota action and are consolidated for pre-trial
proceedings as In Re Cattle Antitrust Litigation.

Following the filing of defendants' motion to dismiss this matter,
the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on October 4, 2019.
The company moved to dismiss the second amended complaint, which
the court granted on September 28, 2020.

On December 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On
February 18, 2021, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' amended complaints.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Tyson Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company worldwide. It operates through four segments: Beef,
Pork, Chicken, and Prepared Foods. Tyson Foods, Inc. was founded in
1935 and is headquartered in Springdale, Arkansas.


TYSON FOODS: Bid to Dismiss Peterson Suit Still Pending
-------------------------------------------------------
Tyson Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 3, 2021, that the motion to dismiss the
putative class action suit entitled, Peterson v. JBS USA Food
Company Holdings, et al., remains pending.

On April 26, 2019, a group of plaintiffs, acting on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of a putative class of indirect purchasers
of beef for personal use filed a class action complaint against the
company, other beef packers, and Agri Stats in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota.

The plaintiffs allege that the packer defendants conspired to
reduce slaughter capacity by closing or idling plants, limiting
their purchases of cash cattle, coordinating their procurement of
cash cattle, and reducing their slaughter numbers so as to reduce
beef output, all in order to artificially raise prices of beef. The
plaintiffs seek, among other things, damages under state antitrust
and consumer protection statutes and the common law of
approximately 30 states, as well as injunctive relief.

The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint in which the claims
against Agri Stats were dismissed and subsequently filed a second
amended complaint on November 22, 2019.

The company moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. The
indirect consumer purchaser litigation is styled Peterson v. JBS
USA Food Company Holdings, et al.

Additional complaints have been filed on behalf of a putative class
of direct purchasers of beef alleging violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act based on an alleged conspiracy to artificially fix,
raise, and stabilize the wholesale price for beef, as well as on
behalf of a putative class of commercial and institutional indirect
purchasers of beef alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, various state antitrust laws and unjust enrichment based on an
alleged conspiracy to artificially inflate the price for beef.

On September 28, 2020, the court granted the company's motion to
dismiss the complaint.

On December 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed amended complaints. On
February 18, 2021, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' amended complaints.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Tyson Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company worldwide. It operates through four segments: Beef,
Pork, Chicken, and Prepared Foods. Tyson Foods, Inc. was founded in
1935 and is headquartered in Springdale, Arkansas.


TYSON FOODS: Direct Purchaser Class Settlement Gets Final Nod
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tyson Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 3, 2021, that the Court in the
consolidated action entitled, In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust
Litigation, granted final approval to the settlement with the
Direct Purchaser Plaintiff Class but the settlement with the
putative Commercial and Institutional Indirect Purchaser Plaintiff
Class remains subject to court approval.

On September 2, 2016, Maplevale Farms, Inc., acting on its own
behalf and on behalf of a putative class of direct purchasers of
poultry products, filed a class action complaint against the
company and certain of its poultry subsidiaries, as well as several
other poultry processing companies, in the Northern District of
Illinois.

Subsequent to the filing of this initial complaint, additional
lawsuits making similar claims on behalf of putative classes of
direct and indirect purchasers were filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The court consolidated the complaints, for pre-trial purposes, into
actions on behalf of three different putative classes: direct
purchasers, indirect purchasers/consumers and
commercial/institutional indirect purchasers.

The consolidated actions are styled In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust
Litigation.

Since the original filing, certain putative class members have
opted out of the matter and are proceeding with individual direct
actions making similar claims, and others may do so in the future.


All opt out complaints have been filed in, or transferred to, the
Northern District of Illinois and are proceeding on a coordinated
pre-trial basis with the consolidated actions.

The operative complaints, which have been amended throughout the
litigation, allege, among other things, that beginning in January
2008 the defendants conspired and combined to fix, raise, maintain,
and stabilize the price of broiler chickens in violation of United
States antitrust laws.

The complaints on behalf of the putative classes of indirect
purchasers also include causes of action under various state unfair
competition laws, consumer protection laws, and unjust enrichment
common laws.

The plaintiffs also allege that defendants "manipulated and
artificially inflated a widely used Broiler price index, the
Georgia Dock." The plaintiffs further allege that the defendants
concealed this conduct from the plaintiffs and the members of the
putative classes.

The plaintiffs seek treble damages, injunctive relief, pre- and
post-judgment interest, costs, and attorneys' fees on behalf of the
putative classes.

The parties have briefed the issue of class certification, and if
necessary, trial is expected to occur in calendar 2023 after
rulings on class certification and summary judgment motions.

On April 26, 2019, the plaintiffs notified the company that the
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") Antitrust Division issued a
grand jury subpoena to them requesting discovery produced by all
parties in the civil case. On June 21, 2019, the DOJ filed a motion
to intervene and sought a limited stay of discovery in the civil
action, which the court granted in part.

Subsequently, the company received a grand jury subpoena from the
DOJ seeking additional documents and information related to the
chicken industry.

On June 2, 2020 a grand jury for the District of Colorado returned
an indictment charging four individual executives employed by two
other poultry processing companies with conspiracy to engage in
bid-rigging in violation of federal antitrust laws.

On June 10, 2020, the company announced that the company uncovered
information in connection with the grand jury subpoena that we had
previously self-reported to the DOJ and have been fully cooperating
with the DOJ as part of its application for leniency under the
DOJ's Corporate Leniency Program.

Subsequently, the DOJ has announced additional indictments,
bringing charges against additional individuals, as well as poultry
processing companies, and alleging a conspiracy to fix prices and
rig bids for broiler chicken products from at least 2012 until at
least early 2019.

Plaintiffs in the civil action filed complaints or motions that
expressly referenced the conduct in the DOJ's indictments and
argued that bid-rigging conduct was encompassed by prior
complaints.

On September 22, 2020, the court ruled that bid-rigging claims
would be consolidated into the existing action but bifurcated from
the original supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims. The original
claims will proceed on their current schedule and the bid-rigging
claims, including any related discovery, are stayed until the
supply reduction and Georgia Dock claims are resolved.

On January 19, 2021, the company announced that it had reached
agreement to settle all class claims related to the Broiler
Antitrust Civil Litigation. Settlement terms were reached with the
putative Direct Purchaser Plaintiff Class, the putative Commercial
and Institutional Indirect Purchaser Plaintiff Class and the
putative End-User Plaintiff Class (collectively, the "Classes").

Under the terms of the settlements, the company had agreed to pay
the Classes an aggregate amount of $221.5 million in settlement of
all outstanding claims brought by the Classes.

On February 23, 2021 and March 22, 2021, the Court granted
preliminary approval of the settlements with the putative Direct
Purchaser Plaintiff Class and the putative End-User Plaintiff
Class, respectively.

On June 29, 2021, the Court granted final approval to the
settlement with the Direct Purchaser Plaintiff Class.

The settlement with the putative Commercial and Institutional
Indirect Purchaser Plaintiff Class remains subject to court
approval.

The foregoing settlements do not settle claims made by plaintiffs
who opt out of the Classes in the Broiler Antitrust Civil
Litigation.

In the first quarter of fiscal 2021, the Company recorded an
aggregate legal contingency accrual of $320 million for the
above-referenced settlements and to resolve the remaining claims
brought by opt-out plaintiffs.

For the third quarter of fiscal 2021, the Company accrued an
additional $225 million for the estimated costs to resolve the
remaining claims brought by opt-out plaintiffs, bringing the total
recorded legal contingency accrual for claims related to this
matter to $545 million, which amount includes our existing
settlements.

This amount reflects an adjustment to our estimate of the probable
losses with respect to claims in the Broiler Antitrust Civil
Litigation and bid-rigging claims of potentially affected parties
identified by the DOJ in the indictments noted above.

Tyson said, "We are currently pursuing settlement discussions with
the remaining opt-out plaintiffs with respect to the remaining
claims. While we do not admit any liability as part of the
settlements, we believe that the settlements were in the best
interests of the Company and its shareholders in order to avoid the
uncertainty, risk, expense and distraction of protracted
litigation."

Tyson Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company worldwide. It operates through four segments: Beef,
Pork, Chicken, and Prepared Foods. Tyson Foods, Inc. was founded in
1935 and is headquartered in Springdale, Arkansas.


TYSON FOODS: Discovery in Pork Antitrust Litigation Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tyson Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended July 3, 2021, that discovery is ongoing in
the consolidated class action suit entitled, In re Pork Antitrust
Litigation.

On June 18, 2018, a group of plaintiffs acting on their own behalf
and on behalf of a putative class of all persons and entities who
indirectly purchased pork filed a class action complaint against
the company and certain of its pork subsidiaries, as well as
several other pork processing companies, in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota.

Subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint, additional
lawsuits making similar claims on behalf of putative classes of
direct and indirect purchasers were also filed in the same court.

The court consolidated the complaints, for pre-trial purposes, into
actions on behalf of three different putative classes: direct
purchasers, indirect purchasers/consumers and
commercial/institutional indirect purchasers.

The consolidated actions are styled In re Pork Antitrust
Litigation.

Since the original filing, putative class members have filed
individual direct actions making similar claims, and others may do
so in the future.

The complaints allege, among other things, that beginning in
January 2009 the defendants conspired and combined to fix, raise,
maintain, and stabilize the price of pork and pork products in
violation of United States antitrust laws.

The complaints on behalf of the putative classes of indirect
purchasers also include causes of action under various state unfair
competition laws, consumer protection laws, and unjust enrichment
common laws.

The plaintiffs seek treble damages, injunctive relief, pre- and
post-judgment interest, costs, and attorneys' fees on behalf of the
putative classes. On August 8, 2019, this matter was dismissed
without prejudice.

The plaintiffs filed amended complaints on November 6, 2019, in
which the plaintiffs again have alleged that the defendants
conspired and combined to fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the
price of pork and pork products in violation of state and federal
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment common laws,
and the plaintiffs again are seeking treble damages, injunctive
relief, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, and attorneys' fees
on behalf of the putative classes.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, on behalf of its citizens, has
also initiated a civil lawsuit against the company, certain of its
subsidiaries, and several other pork processing companies alleging
activities in violation of the Puerto Rican antitrust laws. This
lawsuit was transferred to the District of Minnesota and an amended
complaint was filed on December 6, 2019.

The company moved to dismiss the amended complaints, and on October
16, 2020, the court granted the motion with respect to certain
state law claims but denied the motion with respect to the
plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims.

The parties are now conducting discovery.

Tyson Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company worldwide. It operates through four segments: Beef,
Pork, Chicken, and Prepared Foods. Tyson Foods, Inc. was founded in
1935 and is headquartered in Springdale, Arkansas.


U.S. FINANCIAL: Bumpus Suit Stayed Pending Ruling in McHugh Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
grants the Defendant's Motion to Stay the lawsuit entitled PATRICK
S. BUMPUS, individually, and on behalf of the class, Plaintiff v.
U.S. FINANCIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Ohio Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-00926-MCE-AC (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Patrick S. Bumpus  alleges, both on his own behalf and on
behalf of other similarly situated California residents, a
collective action claim against Defendant U.S. Financial Life
Insurance Company on grounds that the Defendant has failed to
comply with the provisions of California Insurance Code Sections
10113.71 and/or 10113.72, which pertain to the lapse or termination
of life insurance policies.

The Plaintiff claims that although the provisions of those statutes
were enacted effective Jan. 1, 2013, they should apply
retroactively and, in any event, should be extended to life
insurance policies remaining in effect on or after that time (for
example by way of renewal). This Court's jurisdiction is premised
on the Class Action Fairness Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d).

Presently before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Stay the
matter on grounds that the applicability of the statutory theories
advanced by the Plaintiff is currently being considered both by the
California Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

Because the Court concludes that a stay is indeed appropriate under
the circumstances of this matter, the Defendant's Motion is granted
and this litigation is stayed pending what appears to be an
imminently forthcoming decision from the California Supreme Court
in McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 5th 1166 (2019)
petition for review granted, 456 P.3d 933 (Cal. Jan. 29, 2020).

The Defendant argues that holding these proceedings in abeyance
would avoid the needless expenditure of energy and resources in
litigating matters that may ultimately need to be revisited in any
event upon the issuance of potentially binding authority from
McHugh.

As Defendant points out, awaiting appellate guidance on these
issues will, at the very least, provide certainty and clarity to
issues that will, in turn, simplify and streamline the case, if not
dispose of the litigation altogether. Proceeding with the case in
the absence of direction from the Supreme Court could result in
completely unnecessary proceedings depending on how McHugh is
decided.

Not only do considerations of judicial economy weigh in favor of
granting a stay, but the prejudice to the Plaintiff appears
minimal, Judge England holds. The case remains in its infancy and
no discovery has commenced. In addition, since the Plaintiff (the
life insurance policyholder) is still alive, no death benefit is
due. Finally, while indefinite stays of proceedings are generally
disfavored, there appears to be no protracted delay anticipated in
the issuance of a decision from the California Supreme Court in
McHugh. The Supreme Court's docket shows that oral argument was
heard on June 2, 2021, and the Supreme Court's internal guidelines
provide for a disposition within ninety (90) days thereafter, or by
Sept. 2, 2021.

The Court sides with the majority position and finds that a stay of
proceedings is warranted until the California Supreme Court issues
its decision in McHugh. Continuing with discovery and other
proceedings in the face of what could well either substantially
narrow the parameters of this case or eliminate it altogether would
potentially waste the time and resources of all concerned,
particularly since a decision in McHugh appears likely within the
next few months.

Consequently, for all these reasons, the Defendant's Motion to Stay
is granted. All proceedings in the matter are stayed pending
issuance of a decision, by the California Supreme Court, in McHugh
v. Protective Life Insurance Co., supra.

The Defendant's unopposed request that it's time to answer the
Plaintiff's complaint be extended until such time as the Court
orders in a revised Pretrial Scheduling Order, to be issued should
the present stay be lifted, is also granted. The parties are
directed to submit a Joint Status Report to the Court not later
than 14 days after the date that McHugh is decided.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 12, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/hrj45ark from Leagle.com.


UMAR SERVICES: Court Extends Case Deadlines in Staley Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANGELA STALEY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
UMAR SERVICES, INC., Case No. 1:21-cv-00042-LCB-JEP (M.D.N.C.), the
Hon. Judge Joi Elizabeth Peake entered an order granting the
Parties' joint motion for extension of case deadlines.

The Phase I discovery deadline is extended up to and including
September 30, 2021. The Plaintiff's deadline to file her motion for
conditional and/or class certification is extended 30 days, up to
and including October 30, 2021.

Umar Services, Inc. operates as a non-profit organization. The
Organization offers promote community inclusion, independence and
growth for people with intellectual, developmental disabilities
through residential, employment, and cultural enrichment
opportunities. Umar Services serves communities in the State of
North Carolina.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 26, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mFVusA at no extra charge.[CC]



UNITED PARCEL: Rizvanovic Labor Code Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled MICHELLE RIZVANOVIC, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. and
DOES 1 to 10, Case No. BCV-21-101599, was removed from the Superior
Court of California for the County of Kern to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California on August 20, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 1:21-cv-01278-NONE-JLT to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code including unpaid overtime, unpaid meal period premiums, unpaid
rest period premiums, failure to pay minimum wage, failure to
furnish timely and accurate wage statements, failure to pay wages
upon termination, and unfair competition.

United Parcel Service, Inc. is an American multinational shipping
and receiving and supply chain management company, headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Tritia M. Murata, Esq.
         Maya Harel, Esq.
         Monica A. Rodriguez, Esq.
         Lauren R. Leibovitch, Esq.
         MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
         707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 6000
         Los Angeles, CA 90017-3543
         Telephone: (213) 892-5200
         Facsimile: (213) 892-5454
         E-mail: TMurata@mofo.com
                 MHarel@mofo.com
                 MRodriguez@mofo.com
                 LLeibovitch@mofo.com

UNITED STATES: Court Grants Bids to Dismiss Mattwaoshshe Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEREMY MATTWAOSHSHE, et al., Plaintiffs v. UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Federal Defendants, and NEXTERA ENERGY,
INC., et al., Case No. 20-cv-1317 (TSC) (D.D.C.), Judge Tanya S.
Chutkan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
issued a Memorandum Opinion:

   a. granting the motions to dismiss for lack of personal
      jurisdiction submitted by Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.
      ("Evergy") and NextEra; and

  b. granting the motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
      jurisdiction submitted by Solider Creek and the Federal
      Defendants.

Plaintiffs Justin Stallbaumer and Jeremy Mattwaoshshe have sued to
stop the construction of a wind generation project in Nemaha
County, Kansas. The Plaintiffs claim that Corporate Defendants
Soldier Creek Wind LLC, NextEra Energy Inc. and its subsidiaries
("NextEra Defendants"), and Evergy Kansas, were negligent in
constructing the project and that the project is a private nuisance
under Kansas law. The Plaintiffs also seek miscellaneous relief
against a number of federal entities, including Federal Defendants
the Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA"), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC"), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Department of
Justice, and the heads of each of those agencies in their official
capacities.

On May 18, 2020, Stallbaumer, a Kansas resident, and Mattwaoshshe,
a citizen of the Kickapoo Nation and Indian Tribe, filed a class
action complaint, seeking to enjoin the construction of the Soldier
Creek Wind Project in southern Nemaha County, Kansas. In short, the
Plaintiffs, who live near the project site, allege that the wind
towers erected as part of the project will damage their health,
kill local endangered species, and interfere with their quiet and
peaceful enjoyment of their properties.

The Plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order on the
same date they filed their initial complaint. On June 16, 2020, the
court denied the motion, finding it unlikely that Plaintiffs could
establish personal jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants. The
Court also ordered the parties to show cause as to why this case
should not be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas, although it ultimately declined to transfer the
action. The Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaint
on July 2, 2020. On Jan. 1, 2021, they informed the court that the
Soldier Creek Project had become fully operational sometime in late
2020. Although the Plaintiffs had sought an injunction to prevent
the project's construction, their claims are not moot, because they
also seek damages related to the way the project was built and
operates.

The Plaintiffs allege that FERC violated the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. Sections 796 et seq., and the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. Sections 1531 et seq., in
allowing NextEra to connect the wind energy project to the national
electric grid. The Plaintiffs next contend that the FAA (and, by
extension, the Department of Transportation) violated NEPA in
failing to perform an Environmental Assessment or to prepare a full
Environmental Impact Statement, and violated the ESA in issuing a
series of "no hazard" determinations under 14 C.F.R. Section 77.9.

The Plaintiffs also claim the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers violated
the ESA by granting permits to NextEra to transport heavy
construction equipment over controlled waterways. Lastly, invoking
various provisions of Title 25 and the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1996, the Plaintiffs seek a mandamus
order directing the Department of Justice to represent Plaintiff
Jeremy Mattwaoshshe and his tribe in the matter.

The Plaintiffs also bring Kansas state law nuisance and negligence
claims against Evergy, the NextEra Defendants, and Soldier Creek,
alleging that the Soldier Creek Project unreasonably interferes
with the use and enjoyment of their property and that these
Defendants violated a duty of care owed to Plaintiffs in the
planning and construction of the project.

The Federal Defendants have moved for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They
argue that the appellate courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
the claims against FERC and the FAA (and, by extension, the
Department of Transportation). They also contend that Plaintiffs
have failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites to maintain
their claims against the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department
of Justice.

Defendants Evergy and NextEra have moved to dismiss pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(2). ECF Nos. 39, 40, arguing that the
Plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficient nexus between their
claims and these companies' contacts with the District of Columbia
for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

While Defendant Soldier Creek has consented to personal
jurisdiction, it asks the Court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Discussion

A. Federal Defendants

Jurisdiction to review both FERC and FAA orders is vested
exclusively in the courts of appeals, not with the Court. The
Plaintiffs also failed to provide the required 60-day notice of
their intent to sue the Army Corps of Engineers under the ESA.
Finally, the Plaintiffs' request for an order of mandamus will be
denied because neither Title 25 nor AIRFA require the Department of
Justice to litigate on the Plaintiffs' behalf.

1. Standard for Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction

When a defendant files a motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. A
court must "assume the truth of all material factual allegations in
the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting
plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged." However, Judge Chutkan need not accept factual
inferences drawn by the Plaintiffs if those inferences are not
supported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must she accept
the Plaintiff's legal conclusions.

2. FERC and the FAA

Judge Chutkan opines that the Plaintiffs' NEPA and ESA claims fall
squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction reserved for courts of
appeals. The Plaintiffs argue that because there is no FERC order
to contest, the court has jurisdiction to fashion relief under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. Sections 551 et seq.
But the fact that the Plaintiffs challenge inaction -- i.e., the
failure to act in accordance with the agency's obligations under
NEPA and the ESA -- does not compel a different conclusion. The
Plaintiffs cite no case law in support of their novel position that
the court of appeals has "no jurisdiction at all outside the
confines of a substantive order or decision within FERC's Federal
Power Act jurisdiction." To the extent the Plaintiffs allege that
the FAA failed to conduct required environmental analysis outside
the scope of the no-hazard determinations (which is unclear from
the text of their complaint), such claims would similarly fail for
want of jurisdiction.

For these reasons, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs' claims
against FERC and the FAA fall within the court of appeals'
exclusive jurisdiction and must be dismissed.

3. Army Corps of Engineers

The Plaintiffs claim the Army Corps of Engineers violated the ESA
in issuing permits which allowed NextEra to transport heavy
construction equipment over controlled waterways. Specifically,
they contend that the Army Corps of Engineers failed to adequately
consult with the Department of the Interior pursuant to 16 U.S.C.
Section 1536(a)(2) prior to issuing the permits.

Although the Plaintiffs bring the challenge under the ESA's
citizen-suit provision at 16 U.S.C. Section 1540(g), in order to
maintain such a suit, Plaintiffs must comply with Section
1540(g)(2)(A), which prohibits the filing of a citizen-suit "(i)
prior to 60 days after written notice of the violation has been
given to the Secretary of the Interior, and to any alleged violator
of any such provision or regulation." The Plaintiffs provided two
letters to show they had complied with the ESA's sixty-day notice
requirement. And while both letters are addressed to Secretary of
the Interior, neither give notice to the Army Corps of Engineers as
the statute requires.

Acknowledging this procedural deficiency, the Plaintiffs argue that
the 60-day requirement should be waived under 16 U.S.C. Section
1536(m), which states that the requirement "shall not apply with
respect to review of any final determination of the Committee under
subsection (h) of this section granting an exemption from the
requirements of subsection (a)(2) of this section."

Judge Chutkan holds that the waiver applies in the limited
situation in which a plaintiff challenges a decision by the
Endangered Species Committee granting an exemption from the Section
7 consultation requirements. It does not apply in the case, as the
Endangered Species Committee did not convene nor did it grant the
Army Corps of Engineers an exemption from their Section 7
consultation requirements. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' claims
against the Army Corps of Engineers fail for lack of jurisdiction.

4. Mandamus Claims

Lastly, the Plaintiffs seek an order of mandamus directing the
Department of Justice to represent Plaintiff Mattwaoshshe and his
tribe in this matter under Sections 174, 175, and 185 of Title 25
and under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act ("AIRFA"). But
neither Title 25 nor AIRFA impose a non-discretionary duty on the
Department of Justice to litigate on the Plaintiffs' behalf, and
therefore the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the mandamus
statute's jurisdictional requirements.

Judge Chutkan holds that nothing in AIRFA requires the Department
of Justice to litigate the Plaintiffs' claims. among other things,
he finds that there is nothing in the provisions the Plaintiffs
cite -- 25 U.S.C. Sections 174, 175, 185, or AIRFA -- that requires
the United States to represent the Plaintiffs in the case. Thus,
the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Department of
Justice "has a clear duty to act."

B. NextEra and Evergy

Defendants NextEra and Evergy seek dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Judge Chutkan
agrees that dismissal of these claims is appropriate.

The Plaintiffs claim the Court has specific jurisdiction over
NextEra because the Plaintiffs' claims arise out of business
transacted in the District of Columbia -- specifically, lobbying
efforts and energy sales. As for Evergy, the Plaintiffs appear to
argue that their claims arise out of Evergy's transportation of
energy from the Soldier Creek Project into the District of
Columbia, or in the alternative, that there is personal
jurisdiction over NextEra, and that Evergy and NextEra are
co-conspirators.

Judge Chutkan disagrees and concludes it lacks specific personal
jurisdiction over either Defendant. First, the Plaintiffs' theory
of discovery is based on speculation that discovery would reveal
acts falling within the government contacts exemption. This is an
insufficient basis for jurisdictional discovery. Second, the Judge
is unable to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Evergy
and its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) must be
granted. He finds that the Plaintiffs' argument amounts to little
more than "bald speculation" that Evergy and NextEra are engaged in
a conspiracy, and is "insufficient to establish jurisdiction under
a conspiracy theory."

C. Soldier Creek

Defendant Soldier Creek, which has consented to personal
jurisdiction, seeks dismissal of the Plaintiffs' negligence and
nuisance claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the basis
that the claims fail to meet Article III's standing and ripeness
requirements. Specifically, they argue that the Plaintiffs have not
suffered an injury in fact.

Judge Churkan disagrees. Nevertheless, having already determined
that the claims against the Federal Defendants ought to be
dismissed, the Judge declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the Plaintiffs' Kansas-state law claims against Soldier Creek.
As the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the claims before it,
there is no reason to address Soldier Creek's 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chutkan granted the Federal
Defendants' motion to dismiss and all the claims against the
Federal Defendants are dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Likewise, Defendants NextEra and Evergy's motions to
dismiss are granted and the claims against those Defendants are
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. As there are no longer
any claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the
Judge declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims against Defendant Soldier Creek.
Accordingly, the claims against Defendant Soldier Creek is
dismissed without prejudice. The Court will issue an accompanying
order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2pxat7ut from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Elbert, et al., File Renewed Bid for Class Status
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RICH ELBERT; JEFF A.
KOSEK; REICHMANN LAND & CATTLE LLP; LUDOWESE A.E. INC.; MICHAEL
STAMER; individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
persons, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RISK
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, et al., Case No. 0:18-cv-01574-JRT-TNL (D.
Minn.), the Plaintiffs file a renewed motion for class
certification of:

   "all policyholders of 2015 Dry Bean Revenue Endorsement
   (DBRE) policies insuring dark red kidney beans in Minnesota,
   and who farmed in the District of Minnesota in 2015."

As class relief, the Plaintiffs seek an order declaring that
Defendants must take the necessary steps to ensure that Plaintiffs'
DBRE are reformed to reflect the terms of the policy as approved by
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) Board in 2012; that
Defendants must set a 2015 harvest price for dark red kidney beans
that reflects the actual market price of the crops in question for
the time period from September 2015 through November 2015; and
instituting such other relief as may be necessary to ensure that
the proper amount of indemnity is paid to Plaintiffs, the suit
says.

The Plaintiffs' original motion for class certification was filed
on April 15, 2019. The Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint was
filed February 26, 2019. TAC sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, alleging that Defendants Risk Management Agency (RMA),
FCIC, and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) acted in a
way that was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion,
contrary to statutes and other law, not observant of procedure
required by law, and unwarranted by the facts.

The Plaintiffs moved to certify a class on April 15, 2019. That
motion was withdrawn without prejudice, as documented in the
Pretrial Scheduling Order filed June 27, 2019. The Plaintiffs moved
for summary judgment on September 6, 2019. On June 29, 2021, the
Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

RMA is an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which
manages the FCIC.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Aug. 25,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3kzaw0G
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Tallman, Esq.
          JOHN D. TALLMAN, PLC
          4020 East Beltline Avenue N.E. -- Suite 101
          Grand Rapids, MI 49525
          Telephone: (616) 361-8850
          Facsimile: (616) 361-8945
          E-mail: jtallmanlaw@gmail.com

UNITED STATES: Snitko Suit Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PAUL SNITKO, JENNIFER
SNITKO, JOSEPH RUIZ, TYLER GOTHIER, JENI VERDON-PEARSONS, MICHAEL
STORC, and TRAVIS MAY, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TRACY L.
WILKISON, in her official capacity as Acting United States Attorney
for the Central District of California, and KRISTI KOONS JOHNSON,
in her official capacity as an Assistant Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Case No. 2:21-cv-04405-RGK-MAR (C.D.
Cal.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following class under Federal Rule of Civil
      Procedure 23(b)(2) with respect to the claim raised in
      Count I of the Amended8 Complaint, designating them as
      class representatives, and appointing their counsel as
      class counsel:

      "All renters of U.S. Private Vaults safe deposit boxes who
      (a) had property within their safe-deposit box seized by
      the federal government on or around March 22, 2021; and
      (b) have identified themselves to the FBI since the
      seizure;"

   2. certifying the following subclass under Federal Rule of 14
      Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) with respect to the claims raised
      in Counts II, IV, and VI of the Amended Complaint,
      designating Plaintiffs Paul Snitko, Jennifer Snitko,
      Joseph Ruiz, and Tyler Gothier as class representatives,
      and appointing their' counsel as class counsel:

      "All renters of U.S. Private Vaults safe deposit boxes who
      (a) had property within their safe-deposit box seized by
      the federal government on or around March 22, 2021; (b)
      have identified themselves to the FBI since the seizure;
      (c) have not been notified that their safe deposit boxes
      are the subject of a currently ongoing administrative or
      judicial forfeiture proceeding; and (d) whose property is
      still in the possession of the federal government;"

   3. certifying the following subclass under Federal Rule of 24
      Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) with respect to claims raised in
      Counts III, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint,
      designating Plaintiffs Joseph Ruiz, Jeni Verdon-Pearsons,
      Michael Storc, and Travis May as class representatives,
      and appointing their counsel as class counsel:

      "All renters of U.S. Private Vaults safe deposit boxes who
      (a) had property within their safe-deposit box seized by
      the federal government on or around March 22, 2021; (b)
      have identified themselves to the FBI since the seizure;
      (c) whose property is now the subject of a purported
      administrative forfeiture proceeding; and (d) whose
      property is still in the possession of the federal
      government;" and

   4. appointing their counsel as class counsel for the proposed
      class and subclasses.

A copy of the the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Aug.
26, 2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/2XT2ibN at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert Frommer, Esq.
          Robert E. Johnson, Esq.
          THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE
          901 N. Glebe Rd. Suite 900
          Arlington, VA 22203
          Telephone: (703) 682-9320
          16781 Chagrin Blvd. Suite 256
          Shaker Heights, OH 44120
          E-mail: rfrommer@ij.org
                  rjohnson@ij.org

               - and -

          Nilay U. Vora, Esq.
          Jeffrey Atteberry, Esq.
          THE VORA LAW FIRM, P.C.
          201 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 300
          Santa Monica, CA 90401
          Telephone: (424) 258-5190
          E-mail: nvora@voralaw.com
                  jatteberry@voralaw.com

VELODYNE LIDAR: Amended Complaint Scheduled to be Filed by Sept. 1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Velodyne Lidar, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that an amended consolidated
complaint is scheduled to be filed by September 1, 2021.

On March 3, 2021, a purported shareholder of Velodyne filed a
complaint for a putative class action against Velodyne, Anand
Gopalan and Andrew Hamer in the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, entitled Moradpour v. Velodyne
Lidar, Inc., et al., No. 3:21-cv-01486-SI.

The complaint alleges purported violations of the federal
securities laws and that, among other things, the defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and failed to
disclose material facts about the Company's business, operations
and prospects.

The complaint alleges that purported class members have suffered
losses.

The complaint seeks, among other things, an award of compensatory
damages on behalf of a putative class of persons who purchased or
otherwise acquired the Company's securities between November 9,
2020 and February 19, 2021.

On March 12, 2021, a putative class action entitled Reese v.
Velodyne Lidar, Inc., et al., No. 3:21-cv-01736-VC, was filed
against the Company, Mr. Gopalan and Mr. Hamer in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, based on
allegations similar to those in the earlier class action and
seeking recovery on behalf of the same putative class.

On March 19, 2021, another putative class action entitled Nick v.
Velodyne Lidar, Inc., et al., No. 4:21-cv-01950-JST, was filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, against the Company, Mr. Gopalan, Mr. Hamer, two
current or former directors, and three other entities.

The complaint alleges purported violations of the federal
securities laws and that, among other things, the defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and failed to
disclose material facts about the Company's business, operations,
controls and prospects and seeks, among other things, an award of
compensatory damages on behalf of a putative class of persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's securities between
July 2, 2020 and March 17, 2021.

The class actions have been consolidated, lead plaintiffs have been
appointed and an amended consolidated complaint is scheduled to be
filed by September 1, 2021.

The Company believes the allegations in the actions are without
merit, and intends to defend the actions vigorously.

Velodyne Lidar, Inc. operates as an automotive technology company.
The Company develops silicon valley-based lidar technology company
spun off from Velodyne acoustics. Velodyne Lidar serves customers
worldwide. The company is based in San Jose, California.


WALMART STORES: Lisowski Appeals Sales Tax Case Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Christopher Lisowski filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled CHRISTOPHER LISOWSKI, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WALMART
STORES, INC., t/d/b/a WALMART, Defendant, Case No. 2-20-cv-01729,
in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 20, 2021, Judge J.
Nicholas Ranjan of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania granted Walmart's motion to dismiss Mr. Lisowski's
claims, and dismissed his complaint with prejudice.

Twice in the past two years, Plaintiff Lisowski went to Walmart to
buy a six-pack of "5-Hour Energy" drinks. With each of these
purchases, on top of the base price, Walmart charged Mr. Lisowski
94 cents in sales tax. Mr. Lisowski paid the tax, but later came to
believe those charges were improper, because 5-Hour Energy is
purportedly a "dietary supplement" not subject to sales tax in
Pennsylvania. So he filed the class action, alleging that Walmart's
incorrect assessment of sales tax violates the Pennsylvania Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), and also
amounts to conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of a
constructive trust.

Walmart is a multi-billion-dollar corporation that operates around
8,500 retail stores in 15 countries, including at least 131 Walmart
and Sam's Club stores in Pennsylvania alone. Among many other
things, Walmart sells "5-Hour Energy" to customers in Pennsylvania
and elsewhere. 5-Hour Energy is an energy drink, marketed as a
"dietary supplement," that provides caffeine comparable to a cup of
coffee, delivered in the form of an easily consumed "shot." Bottles
of 5-Hour Energy are labeled as "DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS," and Walmart
sells them in the medicine, drug, and medical-supply section of its
stores.

In Pennsylvania, retailers are required to collect sales tax, equal
to 6-8% of the purchase price, on all sales of tangible, personal
property. But there are exceptions. Both the statute and the
related regulations promulgated by Pennsylvania's Department of
Revenue exempt certain items from imposition of the tax. Of
relevance here, the Department of Revenue has publicly notified all
retailers that "Dietary Supplements and Substitutes" are not
subject to sales tax. The Department also issued a "Retailer's
Information" booklet that identifies "dietary supplements and
substitutes, in any form" as exempt from sales tax in
Pennsylvania.

Despite these directives regarding "dietary supplements," Walmart
charged sales tax to Mr. Lisowski, and other similarly situated
individuals, on purchases of 5-Hour Energy. This conduct forms the
basis for all of Mr. Lisowski's statutory and common-law claims in
the complaint.

Mr. Lisowski now seeks a review of the case dismissal order entered
by Judge Ranjan.

The appellate case is captioned as Christopher Lisowski v. WalMart
Stores Inc., Case No. 21-2501, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on August 13, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CHRISTOPHER LISOWSKI, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Frank G. Salpietro, Esq.
          ROTHMAN GORDON
          310 Grant Street, 3rd Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 338-1185
          E-mail: fgsalpietro@rothmangordon.com

Defendant-Appellee WALMART STORES INC., DBA WalMart, is represented
by:

          Suyash Agrawal, Esq.
          Paul Berks, Esq.
          MASSEY & GAIL
          50 East Washington Street, Suite 400
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 379-0949
          E-mail: sagrawal@masseygail.com
                  pberks@masseygail.com  

               - and -

          Michael P. Pest, Esq.
          Thomas E. Sanchez, Esq.
          ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT
          600 Grant Street
          44th Floor, US Steel Tower
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 566-1930
          E-mail: mpest@eckertseamans.com
                  tsanchez@eckertseamans.com  

               - and -

          Kathryn A. Robinette, Esq.
          MASSEY & GAIL
          1000 Maine Avenue, S.W., Suite 450
          Washington, DC 20024
          Telephone: (202) 539-1583
          E-mail: krobinette@masseygail.com

WELLS FARGO: Aided MJ Companies' Ponzi Scheme, Bautista Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GILMER BAUTISTA, JUAN MENDOZA, HILDA MENDOZA, and ALEJANDRO DIAZ,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Case No. 0:21-cv-61749-RAR
(S.D. Fla., August 20, 2021) is a class action against the
Defendant for aiding and abetting fraud, aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged aiding and abetting a
massive Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Johanna Garcia through her
companies, MJ Capital Funding, LLC and MJ Taxes and More Inc. The
MJ Companies misrepresented to investors through a set of uniform
agreements that the MJ Companies would use investor funds to make
merchant cash advances (MCAs) to small businesses. Garcia and the
MJ Companies told investors they would receive high monthly returns
from merchant loan repayments and interest received, with
investors' principal investments guaranteed by the MJ Companies. In
reality, Garcia used accounts at Wells Fargo to operate a classic
Ponzi scheme. Wells Fargo monitored the MJ Companies' accounts and
knew that millions of the monies went to Garcia's personal account
at Wells Fargo, to MJ Companies' sales agents or back to other
investors. Despite this knowledge, Wells Fargo substantially
assisted the MJ Companies by allowing them to continue operating
with Wells Fargo accounts, commingle investor funds and make
payments via wire, transfer and check, the suit says.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is a nationally chartered bank headquartered
in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:          
                  
         Scott L. Silver, Esq.
         Ryan A. Schwamm, Esq.
         SILVER LAW GROUP
         11780 W. Sample Road
         Coral Springs, FL 33065
         Telephone: (954) 755-4799
         Facsimile: (954) 755-4684
         E-mail: ssilver@silverlaw.com
                 rschwamm@silverlaw.com

                - and –

         James D. Sallah, Esq.
         Jeffrey L. Cox, Esq.
         SALLAH ASTARITA & COX, LLC
         3010 N. Military Trail, Ste. 210
         Boca Raton, FL 33431
         Telephone: (561) 989-9080
         Facsimile: (561) 989-9020
         E-mail: jds@sallahlaw.com
                 jlc@sallahlaw.com

                - and –

         Jeffrey C. Schneider, Esq.
         Jason K. Kellogg, Esq.
         Victoria J. Wilson, Esq.
         LEVINE KELLOGG LEHMAN SCHNEIDER + GROSSMAN LLP
         201 South Biscayne Boulevard
         Citigroup Center, 22nd Floor
         Miami, FL 33131
         Telephone: (305) 403-8788
         Facsimile: (305) 403-8789
         E-mail: jcs@lklsg.com
                 jk@lklsg.com
                 vjw@lklsg.com

WYNN RESORTS: Ferris Putative Class Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------
Wynn Resorts Limited said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a putative class action suit initiated by John V. Ferris and
Joann M. Ferris.

On February 20, 2018, a putative securities class action was filed
against the Company and certain current and former officers of the
Company in the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York (which was subsequently transferred to the United States
District Court, District of Nevada) by John V. Ferris and Joann M.
Ferris on behalf of all persons who purchased the Company's common
stock between February 28, 2014 and January 25, 2018.

The complaint alleges, among other things, certain violations of
federal securities laws and seeks to recover unspecified damages as
well as attorneys' fees, costs and related expenses for the
plaintiffs.

On April 15, 2019, the Company filed a motion to dismiss, which the
court granted on May 27, 2020, with leave to amend. On July 1,
2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.

On August 14, 2020, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint. On July 28, 2021, the court granted in part, and
denied in part, the Company's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, dismissing certain of plaintiffs' claims, including all
claims against Mr. Craig S.Billings and the individual directors,
and allowing other claims to proceed against the Company and
several of the Company's current and former executive officers,
including Mr. Maddox, Stephen A. Wynn, Kimmarie Sinatra, and Steven
Cootey.

The defendants in these actions will vigorously defend against the
claims pleaded against them.

Wynn Resorts said, "These actions are in preliminary stages and
management has determined that based on proceedings to date, it is
currently unable to determine the probability of the outcome of
these actions or the range of reasonably possible loss, if any."

Wynn Resorts Limited owns and operates destination casino resorts.
The company was founded in 2002 and is based in Las Vegas, Nevada.


ZIRTUAL STARTUPS: Macaluso's $150K Class Settlement Wins Final OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KRISTI MACALUSO, et al., Plaintiffs v. ZIRTUAL
STARTUPS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-CV-3616 (S.D. Ohio), Judge
Algenon L. Marbley of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, grants the parties' Joint
Motion for Settlement Approval.

The action for unpaid overtime wages was brought pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") by Plaintiff Macaluso against
Zirtual, a company that provides virtual assistants to both
companies and individuals. Ms. Macaluso was employed by Zirtual as
a virtual assistant between June 2017 and through at least August
2019, when this litigation began.

Zirtual recruits virtual assistants via job advertisements on major
employment websites, seeking candidates with experience in project
management, personal and business calendar management, research,
purchasing, and other administrative tasks typically performed by
personal assistants. Potential candidates are subject to "intense
vetting procedures." The advertisements informed candidates that
they would be compensated as 1099 independent contractors and could
expect average hourly rates from $13 to $18 per hour.

Ms. Macaluso contends that Zirtual set the working hours for
virtual assistants and set forth expectations for virtual
assistants in a "Comprehensive Virtual Assistant Handbook." Virtual
assistants also sign "Independent Contractor Agreements."

Ms. Macaluso challenged Zirtual's practice of classifying most of
its virtual assistants as "independent contractors," alleging it
was a misclassification that resulted in a failure to pay overtime
compensation. She alleged that the Defendant exercised control over
"all aspects" of the working relationship with virtual assistants.
This control extended to virtual assistants' opportunities for
profit or loss. Virtual assistants were not to perform or accept
services on a per-job or project-to-project basis or otherwise
negotiates prices with Zirtual or Zirtual's customers.

The Plaintiff also alleged that virtual assistants frequently
worked in excess of forty hours per week without overtime
compensation. Because Zirtual sets the working hours for virtual
assistants, virtual assistants are limited in their ability to work
for other companies or operate independent businesses. Zirtual also
maintains an on-call policy for its virtual assistants. Ms.
Macaluso argued that virtual assistants must perform uncompensated
standardized tasks that are required by Defendant, in addition to
their compensated tasks.

Ms. Macaluso brought the action on behalf of herself and similarly
situated current and former virtual assistants who elected to opt
in, pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA. In April 2020, the
Court conditionally certified the collective action and approved
for notice to be sent to similarly situated employees.

After the 60-day opt-in period, 28 individuals opted into the
matter pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). One individual later
withdrew her opt-in consent form. The parties proceeded to
mediation in October 2020, at which time they reached a settlement
agreement.

Under the proposed settlement, the Defendant will pay $150,000 to
resolve the claims of the opt-in Plaintiffs. The Opt-In Plaintiffs
will receive settlement payments and liquidated damages. Proposed
payouts were calculated proportionally based on an individual
assessment of the workweeks worked by Opt-In Plaintiffs. The
average payout under the settlement agreement is $3,410.41.

The settlement also provides $200 payments to several virtual
assistants who had no damages or who could not recall working
overtime hours during the period of three years prior to the
settlement. The proposed settlement would fully resolve the Opt-In
Plaintiffs' claims for overtime compensation against Zirtual. The
settlement agreement also provides for a service award of $3,000 to
Ms. Macaluso, attorneys' fees in the amount of $50,000, and
litigations costs in the amount of $1,508.65.

Analaysis

To determine whether a settlement is "fair, reasonable, and
adequate," the Court balances the following factors: "(1) the risk
of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely
duration of the litigation; (3) the amount of discovery completed;
(4) the likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the opinion of
class counsel and representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class
members; and (7) public interest in the settlement."

On balance, Judge Marbley holds that these factors weigh in favor
of approving the proposed settlement agreement. He finds that (i)
the negotiations were conducted at arm's length and there is no
reason to believe the settlement involves collusion; (ii) given the
unresolved factual and legal issues in the case, the complexity,
expense, and duration of continued litigation weighs in favor of
settlement; (iii) the extensive discovery completed in this case
has allowed the parties to prosecute the case vigorously and
strategically, as well as to engage in well-informed settlement
negotiations; (iv) the Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the
merits is outweighed by the benefits of the proposed settlement;
(v) the counsel for both sides are experienced FLSA litigators;
(vi) of the 28 Plaintiffs who have filed consent motions to join
the action, only one has decided to withdraw her consent form; the
remainder are in favor of settling the case and no class members
have objected; and (vii) the public interest is served where a
settlement "provides relief to the class members, avoids further
litigation, and frees the Court's judicial resources.

As to attorneys' fees, the Plaintiffs seek approval of attorneys'
fees of $50,000, which is one-third of the total settlement amount.
Judge Marbley finds that the percentage-of-the-fund approach is the
appropriate method in the case, given the particular circumstances.
To evaluate whether the amount of an award is reasonable, courts
consider: (1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff
class; (2) the value of the services on an hourly basis; (3)
whether the services were undertaken on a contingent-fee basis; (4)
society's stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in
order to maintain an incentive to others; (5) the complexity of the
litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel
involved on both sides. In light of these factors, the Judge finds
that awarding the Plaintiff's counsel one-third of the settlement
fund, or $50,000, is appropriate under the percentage-of-the-fund
approach.

With respect to the reimbursement of expenses, the class counsel
also seeks an award of $1,580.65 for expenses from the filing fee,
service of process fees, and printing costs.

Under the common fund doctrine, Judge Marbley states that the
Plaintiff's counsel will be entitled to reimbursement of expenses
that were reasonable and necessary in resolving a case. The
expenses incurred in the case were reasonable and necessary to the
resolution of the matter and reimbursement is therefore approved.

Finally, the settlement agreement allocates $3,000 to named
Plaintiff Macaluso. Judge Marbley finds that the Plaintiff's
involvement in the case was substantial and integral to achieving
the award for the Opt-In Plaintiffs. Her assistance also "furthered
the important public policies underlying the Fair Labor Standards
Act." Accordingly, the Juduge approves the service award of $3,000
to Ms. Macaluso as appropriate compensation for her significant
participation in the litigation in the face of risk to her own
interests.

Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Marbley grants the Motion for
Settlement Approval, including the request for expenses in the
amount of $1,508.65 and the request for a service award in the
amount of $3,000 each to Ms. Macaluso, and orders that the case be
dismissed without prejudice. The Judge awards the Plaintiff's
counsel $50,000 in attorney's fees.

The parties are directed by the Court to file a Dismissal Order
dismissing the case with prejudice not later than 30 days after the
entry of the Order. The Court will retain jurisdiction over the
action only for the purposes of supervising the implementation,
enforcement, construction, administration, and interpretation of
the Settlement Agreement, including for overseeing the distribution
of settlement funds. The parties will abide by all terms of the
Settlement Agreement and the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 17, 2021 Final Approval Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ux64zy8 from Leagle.com.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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