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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, August 6, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 151

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: BIds to Dismiss Summerville Ratepayers Suits Pending
3M COMPANY: Discovery Ongoing in "King" Putative Class Suit
3M COMPANY: Discovery Ongoing in Defective Earplugs Suit
3M COMPANY: Mediation in Billings Case Ongoing
3M COMPANY: Oral Argument in Putative Class Suit Set for September

ALDI INC: Court Enters Judgment Binding Gant Parties to FLSA Deal
AMAZON.COM INC: Certified Questions in Unpaid Wages Suit Answered
CINTAS CORP: ERISA-Related Class Action Ongoing in Ohio
DASMEN RESIDENTIAL: Akeem's Claims vs. Triangle Defendants Narrowed
DEL GATTO INC: S.D. New York Narrows Claims in Polk Class Suit

DIRECTV: Seventh Cir. Affirms Remand Order in Indiana Cities Suit
ENERGEN RESOURCES: Final OK of $5.6M Anderson Settlement Endorsed
ENJOY TECHNOLOGIES: Does Not Pay Proper Wages, Shepherd Suit Says
ENSIGN UNITED: Newell Parties to Brief on Impact of Mauia & Newton
FLORIDA: Boatman Class Suit Against FCCC Dismissed W/o Prejudice

FRESENIUS USA: Fenske Suit Moved to San Bernardino Superior Court
GEICO GENERAL: Court Narrows Claims in McNichols CUTPA-CUIPA Suit
GT MARKETING: Pastore Slams Illegal Telemarketing Calls
IMPINJ INC: Plymouth County Retirement System Suit Concluded
INDEPENDENT BANK: Summary Judgment Bid in BOH Merger Suit Pending

JACKSON NATIONAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Nofsinger Suit Granted
KANSAS CITY ROYALS: Senne's Bid to Certify Class Partly Granted
KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS: 2nd Amended Securities Class Suit Tossed
LINDENWOOD UNIVERSITY: Claim for Conversion in Martin Suit Tossed
LIVANOVA PLC: 2nd Settlement Payment Made in 3T Device Litigation

LVNV FUNDING: Class Settlement in Norton Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
MARRIOTT INTL: Bid to Quash in Hall Suit Moved to S.D. California
MDL 2543: Co-Lead Counsel Ordered to Fix Concerns in GM Switch Suit
MDL 2795: $55M Centurylink Securities Class Suit Deal Has Final Nod
MEDICAL CITY: N.D. Texas Grants Bid to Dismiss De Leon Class Suit

MICHIGAN: District Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Pearson v. MDOC
MINDBODY INC: Court Allows Filing of 2nd Amended Stockholder Suit
MOWI ASA: Florida Court Resolves Noticed Dispute in Antitrust Suit
NAVIENT CORP: Bid for Summary Judgment in Lord Abbett Suit Pending
NAVIENT CORP: New Jersey Consolidated Securities Suit Underway

NORFOLK SOUTHERN: Continues to Defend Fuel Surcharge-Related Suit
NORTH AMERICAN TITLE: Cal. App. OKs Cortina's Bid to Dismiss Appeal
NORTH EDISTO: Dismissal of Counterclaims in Flint Suit Reversed
OLIN CORP: Suits Against Unit Over Sale of Caustic Soda Underway
OLIN CORP: Unit Defends Suits Over Sale of Caustic Soda in Canada

ONE LIFE: Bid to Revisit Discovery Order in Van Connor Suit Granted
OTIS WORLDWIDE: Darnis Putative Class Suit Underway
PANGAEA HOLDINGS: Davis Says Not Website Blind-accessible
PARETEUM CORP: Loskot Putative Class Suit Underway
PARETEUM CORP: Putative Securities Class Suit in New York Underway

PDS BIOTECHNOLOGY: Rosener Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
PHILIP MORRIS: Blais Class Action Ongoing in Canada
PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Adams Class Suit in Canada
PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Bourassa Class Suit
PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Class Suit in New York

PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Letourneau Class Suit
PONZIOS RD: Bid to Revisit Summary Judgment in Casco Suit Denied
PORTNOY SCHNECK: Posen Disputes Debt Collection Letter
PPG EMPLOYEE: Bellon Appeals Summary Judgment in ERISA Suit
QUALCOMM INC: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Remains Pending

REAL ADVISORS: Peng Sues Over Illegal SMS Ad Blasts
SIX FLAGS: Bid to Amend Complaint in OFPRS Suit Tossed
SIX FLAGS: Settlement in BIPA Related Suit Granted Initial OK
SIX FLAGS: Settlement in Credit Card Info Suits Gets Final Nod
SIX FLAGS: Settlement Reached in Magic Mountain Employees' Suit

SIX FLAGS: Settlement Reached in Members & Passholders Suits
SIX FLAGS: Settlement Reached in Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
ST. LOUIS, MO: Fant Can't Compel Compliance With July 22 Order
STARR RESTAURANT: Other Starr Restaurants Dismissed From Weiss Suit
TILRAY INC: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Braun Suit Junked

TILRAY INC: Bid to Dismiss Kasilingam Putative Class Suit Pending
TILRAY INC: Langevin Putative Class Suit in Canada Underway
UNITED STATES: Class Claims in Thomas Suit Against Trump Dismissed
WALGREEN CO: C.D. California Enters Final Judgment in Le Class Suit
WEINGARTEN REALTY: Ryan Files Suit Over Kimco Realty Merger Deal

WELLS FARGO: $12MM Settlement Entered in Ryder Putative Class Suit
WELLS FARGO: $20.8MM Settlement in ATM Access Fee Suit Reached
ZYNGA INC: California Court Grants I.C. Leave to File Surreply

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Defends 2,929 Claims as of June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Carlisle Cos. Still Faces Exposure and PI Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corning Has $96MM Estimated Reserve at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crown Holdings Still Faces Exposure Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Int'l Faces Personal Injury Claims

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lennox Int'l Faces Personal Injury Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lincoln Electric Still Defends 2,751 Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rockwell Automation Still Defends PI Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Travelers Cos. Still Defends Asbestos Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Has $1.06BB Est. Claims at June 30



                            *********

3M COMPANY: BIds to Dismiss Summerville Ratepayers Suits Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that the company has filed motions to dismiss
the putative class action suits initiated by Ratepayers of City
Summerville.

In Alabama and Georgia, 3M, together with multiple co-defendants,
is defending three state court cases brought by municipal water
utilities, relating to 3M's sale of PFAS-containing products to
carpet manufacturers in Georgia.

The plaintiffs in these cases allege that the carpet manufacturers
improperly discharged Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)
into the surface water and groundwater, contaminating drinking
water supplies of cities located downstream along the Coosa River,
including Rome, Georgia and Centre and Gadsden, Alabama.

The three water utility cases remain in the early stages of
litigation. Another case originally filed in Georgia state court
was brought by individuals asserting PFAS contamination by the
Georgia carpet manufacturers and seeking economic damages and
injunctive relief on behalf of a putative class of Rome and Floyd
County water subscribers.

This case has been removed to federal court, where 3M has filed a
motion to dismiss a series of amended complaints.

3M, together with co-defendants, is also defending two putative
class actions in federal court, where the plaintiffs seek relief on
behalf of a class of individual ratepayers in Summerville, Georgia
who allege their water supply was contaminated by PFAS discharged
from a textile mill.

In May 2021, the City of Summerville filed a motion to intervene in
the lawsuit, which remains pending.

3M has filed motions to dismiss these putative class actions and
plaintiffs' amended complaint.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M COMPANY: Discovery Ongoing in "King" Putative Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that  discovery is ongoing in the "King"
suit.

In November 2017, a putative class action (the "King" case) was
filed against 3M, Dyneon, Daikin America and the West Morgan-East
Lawrence Water and Sewer Authority (Water Authority) in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

The plaintiffs are residents of Lawrence and Morgan County, Alabama
who receive their water from the Water Authority and seek
injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, compensatory and punitive
damages for their alleged personal injuries.

The plaintiffs contend that the defendants own and operate
manufacturing and disposal facilities in Decatur, Alabama that have
released and continue to release PFOA, PFOS and related chemicals
into the groundwater and surface water of their sites, resulting in
discharges into the Tennessee River.

The plaintiffs contend that, as a result of the alleged discharges,
the water supplied by the Water Authority to the plaintiffs was,
and is, contaminated with Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA),
Perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and related chemicals at a
level dangerous to humans.

In November 2019, the King plaintiffs amended their complaint to
withdraw all class allegations.

Since then, the plaintiffs have added 37 new individual plaintiffs
and voluntarily dismissed five plaintiffs (for a total of 55
plaintiffs). The case is scheduled for trial in July 2023.

Discovery in this case is proceeding.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M COMPANY: Discovery Ongoing in Defective Earplugs Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that discovery in the next 20 bellwether cases
in the Defective Earplugs Suit in the MDL court is ongoing and is
scheduled to be complete by the end of 2022.

Aearo Technologies sold Dual-Ended Combat Arms – Version 2
earplugs starting in about 2003. 3M acquired Aearo Technologies in
2008 and sold these earplugs from 2008 through 2015, when the
product was discontinued.

In December 2018, a military veteran filed an individual lawsuit
against 3M in the San Bernardino Superior Court in California
alleging that he sustained personal injuries while serving in the
military caused by 3M's Dual-Ended Combat Arms earplugs – Version
2.

The plaintiff asserts claims of product liability and fraudulent
misrepresentation and concealment. The plaintiff seeks various
damages, including medical and related expenses, loss of income,
and punitive damages.

As of June 30, 2021, the Company is a named defendant in
approximately 3,494 lawsuits (including 14 putative class actions)
in various state and federal courts that purport to represent
approximately 13,026 individual claimants making similar
allegations.

In April 2019, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
granted motions to transfer and consolidate all cases pending in
federal courts to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Florida to be managed in a multi-district litigation (MDL)
proceeding to centralize pre-trial proceedings. Discovery is
underway. There is an administrative docket of approximately
236,000 unfiled and unverified claims at the MDL court.

The plaintiffs and 3M filed preliminary summary judgment motions on
the government contractor defense. In July 2020, the court granted
the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and denied the defendants'
summary judgment motion, ruling that plaintiffs' claims are not
barred by the government contractor defense. The court denied the
Company's request to immediately certify the summary judgment
ruling for appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. In December 2020, the MDL court granted the plaintiffs'
motion to consolidate three plaintiffs for the first bellwether
trial, which began in March 2021.

In April 2021, 3M received an adverse jury verdict in the first
bellwether trial. The jury awarded the three plaintiffs less than
$1 million in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive
damages for a total of $7 million. 3M plans to appeal the verdicts.


The appeal is expected to challenge, among other rulings, the
district court's denial of 3M's motion to assert the government
contractor defense. The next two bellwether trials occurred in May
and June of 2021.

In May 2021, 3M received a verdict in its favor, in the second
bellwether trial, where the jury rejected claims that 3M knowingly
sold earplugs with design defects.

In June 2021, 3M received an adverse verdict in the third
bellwether trial. The jury found 3M liable for strict liability
failure to warn, but found 3M not liable for design defect or
fraud. The jury apportioned fault 62 percent to 3M and 38 percent
to the plaintiff for a total damage award of approximately $1
million.

3M plans to appeal the verdict. The trials for the next five
bellwether plaintiffs are scheduled for September and October 2021
and January 2022.

Discovery in the remaining 15 bellwether cases is scheduled to be
complete by the first quarter of 2022.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.



3M COMPANY: Mediation in Billings Case Ongoing
----------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that mediation in the Billings case is
ongoing.

In August 2016, a group of over 200 plaintiffs filed a putative
class action against West Morgan-East Lawrence Water and Sewer
Authority (Water Authority), 3M, Dyneon, Daikin America, Inc., BFI
Waste Management Systems of Alabama, and the City of Decatur in
state court in Lawrence County, Alabama (the "Billings" case).

Plaintiffs are residents of Lawrence, Morgan and other counties who
are or have been customers of the Water Authority.

They contend defendants have released PFAS that contaminate the
Tennessee River and, in turn, their drinking water, causing damage
to their health and properties.

In January 2017, the court in the St. John case stayed this
litigation pending resolution of the case.

Plaintiffs in the Billings case have amended their complaint
numerous times to add additional plaintiffs.

There are now approximately 4,000 named plaintiffs.

Mediation in the Billings case is ongoing.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M COMPANY: Oral Argument in Putative Class Suit Set for September
------------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that an oral argument has been set for
September 2021, in the putative class action suit pending in
Delaware court.

In Delaware, 3M, together with several co-defendants, is defending
one putative class action brought by individuals alleging Per- and
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contamination of their water
supply resulting from the operations of local metal plating
facilities.

Plaintiffs allege that 3M supplied PFAS to the metal plating
facilities. DuPont, Chemours, and the metal platers have also been
named as defendants. This case has been removed from state court to
federal court, and plaintiffs have withdrawn its motion to remand
to state court and filed an amended complaint.

3M has filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

In February 2021, the court raised the question whether subject
matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act was proper,
issued an order requiring the parties to brief the issue and denied
defendants' motions to dismiss with leave to renew pending the
court's ruling on jurisdiction.

Briefing on the jurisdictional question is complete, and an oral
argument has been set for September 2021.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


ALDI INC: Court Enters Judgment Binding Gant Parties to FLSA Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Kronstadt of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California enters Judgment in the cases, JEREE GANT,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALDI, INC., a California
corporation; AI CALIFORNIA LLC, an unknown business entity; and
DOES 1 through Time: 100, inclusive, Defendants. JENNIFER
LACEY-SALAS, an individual, on behalf of herself and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALDI, INC., a
California corporation; AI CALIFORNIA LLC, a Limited Liability
Company; and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, Defendants, Lead Case
No. 2:19-cv-03109-JAK (PLAx), Consolidated Case No.
2:19-cv-06741-JAK (PLAx) (C.D. Cal.).

The Court enters Judgment by which all Participating FLSA Members
will be bound by the FLSA Settlement and part of the FLSA
Collective, and all Participating FLSA Members will be deemed to
have given a release of any and all Released FLSA Claims against
the Released Parties, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

Jeree Gant and Jennifer Lacey-Salas and Defendants ALDI Inc. and AI
California, LLC have settled the Action.

Judge Kronstadt, having entered an order granting the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Final Approval of Class and Collective Action Settlement
on July 19, 2021, and good cause appearing, enters Judgment in the
case.

Except as set forth in the Class and Collective Action Settlement
Agreement and Release and the Final Approval Order, Plaintiffs,
Participating Class Members, and Participating FLSA Members, will
take nothing by the Consolidated Class/Collective Action.

Each party will bear its own attorneys' fees and costs, except as
otherwise provided in the Settlement Agreement and Final Approval
Order.

The following individuals timely and validly requested exclusion
from the Class Settlement, and thereby, are not bound by the Class
Settlement: Samuel Rotter and Javier Mendez.

Judge Kronstadt enters Judgment by which all Participating Class
Members are bound by the Class Settlement, and Participating Class
Members will be deemed to have given a release of any and all
Released Class Claims against the Released Parties, as set forth in
the Settlement Agreement.

As used therein, the quoted terms have the meanings set forth
below:

      a. "Class" or "Class Members" means all current and former
hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for any of the
Defendants within the State of California at any time during the
period from Feb. 14, 2015, through June 29, 2020.

      b. "Class Period" means the period from Feb. 14, 2015 through
June 29, 2020.

      c. "Class Settlement" means the settlement and resolution of
Released Class Claims, which will be binding on all Participating
Class Members.

      d. "Consolidated Class/Collective Action" means the
consolidated action that includes Jeree Gant v. ALD1, Inc., et al.,
United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Case No. 2:19-cv-03109-JAK-PLA ("Gant Class Action")
and Jennifer Lacey-Salas v. ALDI Inc., et al., United States
District Court for the Central District of California, Case No.
2:19-cv-06741-JAK-PLA ("Lacey-Salas Action").

      e. "FLSA Members" means all current and former hourly-paid or
non-exempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants within
the State of California at any time during the period from Feb. 14,
2016 through June 29, 2020.

      f. "FLSA Period" means the period from Feb. 14, 2016 through
June 29, 2020.

      g. "FLSA Settlement" means the settlement and resolution of
Released FLSA Claims, which will be binding on all Participating
FLSA Members.

      h. "Participating Class Members" means all Class Members who
did not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion to the
Settlement Administrator.

      i. "Participating FLSA Members" means all FLSA Members who
endorse and negotiate their FLSA Payment, and who are thereby
deemed to have opted into and are bound by the FLSA Settlement.

      j. "Released Class Claims" means any and all claims, rights,
demands, liabilities and causes of action, whether known or
unknown, that were asserted or that could have been asserted and
arise from the same set of operative facts alleged in the operative
complaints of the Consolidated Class/Collective Action during the
Class Period.

      k. "Released FLSA Claims" means any and all claims, rights,
demands, liabilities and causes of action, whether known or
unknown, that were asserted or reasonably could have been asserted
based on the facts already alleged in the operative complaints of
the Consolidated Class/Collective Action during the FLSA Period,
for any alleged violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. SectionSection 201, et seq. (FLSA), including, but not
limited to, failure to pay minimum wage or failure to pay overtime
under the FLSA. The Released FLSA Claims covers only claims
provided for under FLSA.

      l. "Released Parties" means Defendants, their former, present
and future owners, parents, subsidiaries and affiliates, and all of
their current, former and future officers, directors, members,
shareholders, managers, human resources representatives, employees,
agents, principals, heirs, representatives, accountants, auditors,
consultants, insurers and reinsurers, and attorneys of the entities
listed in this paragraph.

After entry of the Judgment, the Court will retain jurisdiction to
construe, interpret, implement, and enforce the Settlement
Agreement and this Judgment, to hear and resolve any contested
challenge to a claim for settlement benefits, and to supervise and
adjudicate any dispute arising from or in connection with the
distribution of settlement benefits.

The Judgment is intended to be a final disposition of the Action in
its entirety and is intended to be immediately appealable.

Notice of entry of this Judgment will be given to the Participating
Class Members and Participating FLSA Members by posting a copy of
this Judgment on Simpluris, Inc.'s website for a period of at least
60 calendar days after the date of entry of the Judgment.
Individualized notice is not required.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Judgment is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ypwjyrw9 from Leagle.com.


AMAZON.COM INC: Certified Questions in Unpaid Wages Suit Answered
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: AMAZON.COM, INC., FULFILLMENT CENTER FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) AND WAGE AND HOUR LITIGATION. NEAL HEIMBACH;
KAREN SALASKY, Appellants v. AMAZON.COM, INC.; AMAZON.COM.DEDC,
LLC; INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellees, Case No. 43 EAP
2019 (Pa.), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Eastern District,
issues an Opinion answering two certified questions from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:

   (1) Whether time spent on an employer's premises waiting to
       undergo, and undergoing, mandatory security screening is
       compensable as "hours worked" within the meaning of the
       Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA")? and

   (2) whether the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, as
       described in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S.
       680 (1946), applies to bar claims brought under the PMWA?

The case arises out of a class action suit for unpaid wages brought
by Appellants Neil Heimbach and Karen Salasky ("Employees") who
worked for the Appellees at Amazon's warehouse facility in
Pennsylvania.  The Employees worked at Amazon's logistics
facility/fulfillment center located in a large warehouse in
Breinigsville, Pennsylvania.  Appellant Heimbach worked for Amazon
while Appellant Salasky worked for Integrity Staffing Solutions.
Amazon and Integrity separately employed hundreds of hourly workers
at the Facility.

The workers' duties included receiving deliveries of merchandise,
transporting merchandise to its appropriate location within the
Facility, 'picking' merchandise from storage locations, and
processing merchandise for shipping.  Hourly employees clocked in
and out on time clocks at the beginning and end of their shifts,
respectively. After clocking out at the end of their shifts,
employees were required to undergo antitheft security screening,
which included metal detectors, searches of bags and other personal
items, and a secondary screening process if the metal detector's
alarm sounded.  While the Employees and Amazon disagree as to the
amount of time this screening took on average, no party disputes
that Amazon did not compensate their employees for the time it took
to wait in line for and undergo these security screenings.

On Oct. 30, 2013, the Employees commenced their class action
lawsuit against Amazon in the Philadelphia County Court of Common
Pleas, asserting that they were entitled to compensation for their
unpaid time spent in the security screening process under the
PMWA.

On Nov. 1, 2013, Amazon successfully had the action removed to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.  Thereafter, the suit was consolidated by the U.S.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in the Western District
of Kentucky with other similar class actions brought in other
states, such as Kentucky, California, Arizona, and Nevada, under
those states' minimum wage laws, as well as combined with actions
brought under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Sections 201, et seq., as amended by the
federal Portal to Portal Act of 1947 ("PTPA").  The federal FLSA
requires, subject to certain exceptions not relevant in the matter,
that an employer "pay to each of his employees who in any workweek
is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce," a statutorily specified hourly
wage.

Once transferred to the District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky, the case proceeded through the discovery phase, and, upon
completion of this process, Amazon filed a motion for summary
judgment. During the pendency of these proceedings, on Dec. 9,
2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Integrity
Staffing Solutions v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014).  In Busk, the high
Court ruled that time spent by Amazon warehouse workers in Nevada
going through the same security screenings the employees in the
present case were subjected to was not compensable under the
federal FLSA.  Because of the Busk decision, the district court
dismissed the cases before it which were founded on the federal
FLSA.

Because the PMWA contained no such affirmative language excluding
the application of the federal PTPA to its interpretation, the
district court viewed it proper to consider United States Supreme
Court precedent interpreting the PTPA, such as Busk, when
interpreting the PMWA. Consequently, the district court ruled that
Busk was controlling of the employees' right to compensation under
the PMWA for the time spent undergoing security screenings and
that, in the aftermath of that decision, Employees "no longer have
a viable claim under Pennsylvania law." Id.

The Employees appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and, thereafter, petitioned that court to certify to the
Supreme Court two controlling questions of Pennsylvania law:
Whether the security screenings at issue were compensable as "hours
worked" under the PMWA, and whether Pennsylvania law recognized a
de minimis exception to the PMWA?  The court of appeals granted the
petition, noting that the Supreme Court "has never squarely
addressed" the issue of whether the PMWA incorporated the federal
PTPA.  Likewise, the court observed that, with respect to the de
minimis question, apart from a non-precedential dissenting opinion
written by former Justice McCaffery and joined by Judge Debra Todd,
there was no Pennsylvania case which addressed whether the de
minimis doctrine has any application in interpreting the PMWA.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certification to consider
the following two questions, as phrased by the court of appeals:

     (1) Is time spent on an employer's premises waiting to undergo
and undergoing mandatory security screening compensable as hours
worked within the meaning of the PWMA?

     (2) Does the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, as
described in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66
S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946) and Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
571 U.S. 220, 134 S.Ct. 870, 187 L.Ed.2d 729 (2014), apply to bar
claims brought under the PWMA?

Analysis

I. Meaning of "hours worked" under the PMWA

Judge Todd turns to the first certified question before the Court:
Whether time spent on an employer's premises waiting to undergo,
and undergoing, mandatory security screening is compensable as
"hours worked" under the PMWA.

The Employees contend that the time they are required to undergo
these security screenings by Amazon, which is a mandatory condition
of employment, constitutes time they are "required by the employer
to be on the premises."  They assert that they simply have no
option to avoid the screenings before they leave the premises which
constitutes their workplace -- the warehouse facility.

Amazon responds by asserting that the definition of "hours worked"
in Section 231.1 is not controlling; rather, Amazon focuses on the
PMWA's overtime provisions, found at 43 P.S. Section 333.104(c),
which require payment of one and one-half time the employee's
regular rate of compensation for all hours in excess of 40 worked
during a "workweek."  Amazon contends that, in order to determine
the obligation of an employer such as itself to pay overtime, it is
essential to calculate each employee's 'hours in a workweek.'  With
respect to definition of hours worked contained in 34 Pa. Code
Section 231.1, Amazon asks the Court to disregard it as, in its
view, it does not define the overtime obligations of the PMWA.  In
Amazon's view, Section 231.1, must be read as governing only the
meaning of "hours worked" within the regulations, not the PMWA.

Judge Todd opines that the plain language of Section 231.1 provides
that "hours worked" includes four separate categories of an
employee's time: (i) time during which an employee is required by
the employer to be on the premises of the employer, (ii) time
during which an employee is required by the employer] to be on duty
or to be at the prescribed work place, (iii) time spent in
traveling as part of the duties of the employee during normal
working hours, and (iv) time during which an employee is employed
or permitted to work.  Thus, she says, all time which an employee
spends performing any one of these four types of activity
constitutes hours worked for purposes of this regulation.

Applying this provision, and accepting the Sixth Circuit's finding
of fact as true that Amazon "requires" employees to remain on their
premises -- the warehouse -- until the security screenings are
complete, all time spent by the employees waiting to undergo, and
undergoing, the security screenings constitutes "hours worked"
within the meaning of Section 231.1 and, thus, within the meaning
of the PMWA.

Given her conclusion in this regard, Judge Todd need not determine
whether Employees were "on duty" or "at their prescribed work
place," or "employed or permitted to work," as those terms are used
in Section 231.1.  However, she rejects Amazon's broad contention
that only time in which employees are required to be on their
premises "working" -- i.e., engaged in duties or tasks directly
related to the specific requirements of their job or occupation --
can constitute "hours worked" for purposes of the PMWA.  Section
231.1 establishes that this suggested interpretation is unfounded
and unreasonably constrained, as this regulation specifically
designates all "time during which an employee is required by the
employer to be on the premises of the employer" as compensable
hours worked, regardless of whether the employee is actually
performing job-related duties while on the premises.  The Judge
therefore answers the first certified question in the affirmative.

II. De minimis exception under the PMWA

Judge Todd next addresses whether Pennsylvania recognizes a "de
minimis" exception to claims under the PMWA.  The Employees argue
that there is nothing in either the text or interpretative
regulations of the PMWA which establishes a de minimis exception of
the type articulated by the high Court in Anderson, an observation
made by the dissent in Caierelli.  Further, they assert that the
plain language of both the text of the PMWA and 32 Pa. Code Section
231.1(a) requires payment for "all hours worked."  In their view,
this repudiates the suggestion that any portion of the time an
employee works can be disregarded under the PMWA for purposes of
establishing the employer's obligation to pay wages.

In response, Amazon argues that a de minimis exception should be
applied to the PMWA, just as the U.S. Supreme Court crafted for the
federal FLSA in Anderson.  Amazon proffers that the high Court's
rationale in that case should be adopted by the Court, as it
recognizes that there are some periods of time an employee spends
on the employer's premises that are too insubstantial to warrant
compensation.  ItA contends that rejecting the exception would
contravene public policy by harming small businesses who cannot
bear the costs of a multiplicity of small wage and hour claims as
readily as can a large corporation like itself.

Judge Todd opines that when the text of the PMWA is read consistent
with its legislatively articulated purpose which she has discussed
at length -- to maintain the economic well-being of our
Commonwealth's workforce by ensuring that each and every
Pennsylvania worker is paid for all time he or she is required to
expend by an employer for its own purposes -- she discerns no
intent on the part of the General Assembly to allow a de minimis
exception to the PMWA's irreducible requirements.  She holds that
the PMWA plainly and unambiguously requires payment for "all hours
worked," 43 P.S. Section 333.104, signifying the legislature's
intent that any portion of the hours worked by an employee does not
constitute a mere trifle.  She, therefore, answers this question in
the negative.

Conclusion

In sum, for all of these reasons, Judge Todd answers the two
questions certified to the Court from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit by concluding that time spent on an employer's
premises waiting to undergo, and undergoing, mandatory security
screening constitutes "hours worked" under the PMWA, and there is
no de minimis exception to the PMWA.

The matter is returned to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.

Chief Justice Baer and Justices Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join
the opinion.

Justice Saylor files a dissenting opinion.

Justice Mundy files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Saylor
joins.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/u43sc9k3 from Leagle.com.


CINTAS CORP: ERISA-Related Class Action Ongoing in Ohio
-------------------------------------------------------
Cintas Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the fiscal
year ended May 31, 2021, that the company continues to defend a
class action suit alleging violations of The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

The Company, the Board of Directors, Scott Farmer (Executive
Chairman) and the Investment Policy Committee are defendants in a
purported class action, filed on December 13, 2019, pending in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging
violations of ERISA.

The lawsuit asserts that the defendants improperly managed the
costs of the employee retirement plan, breached their fiduciary
duties in failing to investigate and select lower cost alternative
funds and failed to monitor and control the employee retirement
plan’s recordkeeping costs.

The defendants deny liability.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Cintas Corporation designs, manufactures, and implements corporate
identity uniform programs. The Company also provides entrance mats,
restroom supplies, promotional products, document management, fire
protection, and first aid and safety services. The company is based
in Cincinnati, Ohio.


DASMEN RESIDENTIAL: Akeem's Claims vs. Triangle Defendants Narrowed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSHUA AKEEM, ET AL. v. DASMEN RESIDENTIAL, LLC, ET
AL., SECTION M (3), Pertains to all cases, Civil Action No.
19-13650, No. 19-13636., 19-13673, 19-14634, 19-13705, 20-187 (E.D.
La.), Judge Barry W. Ashe of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana:

    (i) granted in part and denied in part the Triangle
        Defendants' motion to dismiss; and

   (ii) granted Latter & Blum Management, Inc.'s motion to
        dismiss.

Before the Court is a motion by Defendants Triangle Real Estate of
Gastonia, Inc., Southwood Realty Co., and Lakewind East Apartments,
LLC ("Triangle Defendants") to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also before the Court is a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Latter & Blum.

The consolidated matters involve a putative class action brought by
current and former tenants and maintenance workers of five
apartment complexes ("Plaintiffs") against the current and former
owners and property managers ("Defendants") for damages allegedly
caused by hazardous conditions.  In their master amended complaint,
which combines the allegations of the six consolidated actions, the
Plaintiffs allege that the apartment complexes' current and former
owners and property managers "allowed deteriorating structural
components of buildings such as roofs, plumbing, gutters, slabs,
siding, stairwells, etc. to cause persistent water-intrusion
spurring widespread mold-infestation."  The Plaintiffs also allege
that the Defendants provided inadequate security, failed to
properly dispose of trash, failed to address insect, rodent, and
reptile infestations, and failed to adhere to fire and safety
codes, all of which created hazardous conditions.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class defined as follows: All
persons who sustained damage through hazardous conditions,
including, but not limited to, exposure to water intrusion and/or
exposure to fungal substances such as mold and mold spores which
were growing on building materials and were released into the air
of the following apartment complexes in New Orleans: Hidden
Lakes/Laguna Run, Lakewind East/Laguna Reserve, Copper Creek/Laguna
Creek, Chenault Creek/Carmel Brooks and Wind Run/Carmel Springs,
and who meet any one of the following criteria:

     1. You currently and/or formerly resided and/or had an
employment relationship with (meaning reported to work at) the
apartment complexes known as Hidden Lakes/Laguna Run, Lakewind
East/Laguna Reserve, Copper Creek/Laguna Creek, Chenault
Creek/Carmel Brooks; and Wind Run/Carmel Springs, before Dec. 13,
2017, and you allege damages from hazardous conditions, including,
but not limited to, water intrusion and/or exposure to fungal
substances such as mold and mold spores which were growing on
building materials and were released into the air.

     2. You currently and/or formerly resided and/or had an
employment relationship with (meaning reported to work at) the
apartment complexes known as Hidden Lakes/Laguna Run, Lakewind
East/Laguna Reserve, Copper Creek/Laguna Creek, Chenault
Creek/Carmel Brooks, and Wind Run/Carmel Springs, after Dec. 13,
2017 to the present, and you allege damages from hazardous
conditions including, but not limited to, water intrusion and/or
exposure to fungal substances such as mold and mold spores which
were growing on building materials and were released into the air.

The ownership of the buildings changed on Dec. 13, 2017.  Prior to
that date, the Triangle Defendants, which are related entities,
owned four of the apartment complexes.  Specifically, Triangle
owned Carmel Brooks, Lakewind owned Laguna Reserve, and Southwood
owned Laguna Creek.  While the Triangle Defendants owned these
buildings, Southwood served as the property management company.  On
Dec. 13, 2017, the Triangle Defendants sold their respective
properties to RH Chenault Creek, LLC (Carmel Brooks), RH Lakewind
East, LLC (Laguna Reserve), and RH Copper Creek, LLC (Laguna
Creek).  Defendant Eastlake Development, LLC owned Laguna Run from
Dec. 11, 2012, until Dec. 14, 2017, when it sold the property to RH
East Lake, LLC.  Latter & Blum was Laguna Run's property manager
from April 25, 2016, through Dec. 14, 2017.  After the sales,
Defendants KFK Group, LLC, KFK Development, LLC, Dasmen
Residential, LLC, and the Lynd Company managed the various
properties.

The Plaintiffs' master amended complaint alleges that all the
owners and property managers knew about the water, mold, and
numerous other issues with the properties and failed to properly
fix them.  They further allege that the property managers did not
provide to the maintenance workers personal protective equipment or
adequate training on mold remediation, but rather simply instructed
them to spray the affected areas with Kilz or bleach and paint over
them.  The Plaintiffs also allege that Eastlake and the Triangle
Defendants misrepresented that the properties were in good
condition and free of vices, ruin, and defects when the properties
were sold in December 2017.  Moreover, they allege that the
Defendants breached the lease agreements in various ways, including
failing to tender apartment units that were clean, safe, and in
good working condition.

The Plaintiffs assert several theories of liability including
strict liability, negligence, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and breach of contract as to all the Plaintiffs, and intentional
tort as to the employees.

The Triangle Defendants argue that all of the Plaintiffs' claims
against them sound in tort and are prescribed on the face of the
complaint under Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period for
delictual obligations.  In these consolidated actions, the
Plaintiffs first brought claims against the Triangle Defendants in
November 2019, which was more than one year after the Triangle
Defendants sold the properties in December 2017.  The Triangle
Defendants further argue that neither the continuing tort doctrine
nor contra non valentem applies to save the Plaintiffs' tort claims
from prescription.  Moreover, the Triangle Defendants contend that
the Plaintiffs did not allege a breach-of-contract claim, which has
a ten-year prescriptive period, because the Plaintiffs have not
pointed to a contractual duty that the Triangle Defendants
allegedly breached.

Latter & Blum also argues that the Plaintiffs' claims against it
sound in tort and are prescribed on the face of the complaint.  Its
management of Laguna Run ceased on Dec. 14, 2017, and the first
complaint implicating it in these consolidated actions was filed
more than a year later on April 1, 2019.  It argues that all of the
named Plaintiffs making claims against it specifically allege that
they knew about the mold more than a year before they filed suit
and neither the continuing tort doctrine nor contra non valentem
interrupted or suspended the running of prescription.  Further,
Latter & Blum argues that the tenant Plaintiffs have not stated a
breach-of-contract claim against it because it was not a party to
any contract with any tenant Plaintiff.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that the doctrines of
continuing tort and contra non valentem apply to interrupt or
suspend prescription of their tort claims against the Triangle
Defendants and Latter & Blum.  They also argue that they have
stated breach-of-contract claims against the Triangle Defendants
because they allege that the Triangle Defendants breached the lease
agreements by failing to provide a premises that was free of vices
and defects.30 With respect to Latter & Blum, Pthe laintiffs argue
that the property owner's obligations as lessor were transferred to
Latter & Blum as property manager who thereafter breached those
obligations intended to benefit the Plaintiffs as lessees.

Law & Analysis

A. Prescription of Plaintiffs' Tort Claims

The Plaintiffs' tort claims against the Triangle Defendants and
Latter & Blum are prescribed on the face of the complaint.  The
Plaintiffs allege that, during the Triangle Defendants' and Latter
& Blum's tenure as owners and property manager, respectively, the
Plaintiffs observed mold growth, water stains on walls and
ceilings, standing water or condensation on floors, walls, or
windowsills, and musty odors, and that they had medical issues they
believed were caused by mold.  Thus, the Plaintiffs' alleged
injuries related to any actions of the Triangle Defendants or
Latter & Blum had to have occurred prior to the sale of the
properties in December 2017.  The Plaintiffs filed their claims
against the Triangle Defendants and Latter & Blum more than a year
later, in 2019.  Although their tort claims against these
defendants are prescribed on the face of the complaint, the
Plaintiffs argue that the continuing tort doctrine and contra non
valentem operate to interrupt or suspend the prescriptive period.

1. Continuing tort doctrine

The continuing tort doctrine "applies when continuous conduct
causes continuing damages."  Citing toxic exposure cases, the
Plaintiffs argue that they allege continuing torts against the
Triangle Defendants and Latter & Blum because the hazardous
conditions of the buildings persist and continue to cause them
damage.

The Plaintiffs' argument is flawed, however, because neither the
Triangle Defendants nor Latter & Blum owes a continuing duty to
Plaintiffs with respect to the condition of the buildings, Judge
Ashe holds.  Any duty these Defendants had terminated when their
association with the buildings ended in December 2017.  As former
owners and property managers, the Triangle Defendants and Latter &
Blum have no duty with respect to the ongoing condition of the
buildings.  Their duty ended more than a year before the Plaintiffs
filed suit, and thus, the continuing tort doctrine does not save
the Plaintiffs' tort claims against the Triangle Defendants and
Latter & Blum from prescription.

2. Contra non valentem

Contra non valentem is a Louisiana jurisprudential doctrine under
which prescription is suspended when a person could not bring his
or her suit.  The Plaintiffs argue that they did not know and could
not have known that mold in the apartment complexes was causing or
exacerbating their symptoms until 2019 when their counsel performed
mold tests and the issue was reported in the media.  They contend
that when they complained to the property managers about the black
substance that they assumed was mold, the property managers said it
was dirt, and as a result, the Plaintiffs did not know that it was
actually mold until 2019 when the mold tests were done.

Judge Ashe holds that the Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that
they saw the mold.  Even if the Defendants did not confirm that the
substance was indeed mold, he says the Plaintiffs saw it with their
own eyes and suspected that it was mold.  Nothing prevented them
from verifying their suspicions within the prescriptive period.
Therefore, contra non valentem does not apply and the Plaintiffs'
tort claims against the Triangle Defendants and Latter & Blum are
prescribed.

B. Plaintiffs' Breach-of-Contract Claims

1. Triangle Defendants as owners

The Triangle Defendants argue that, although they had lease
contracts with the tenant Plaintiffs, all of the tenant Plaintiffs'
claims against them sound in tort because the Plaintiffs do not
identify any specific contract provision that was allegedly
breached.  And, as such, the Triangle Defendants argue, all of the
Plaintiffs' claims against them are prescribed.  In opposition, the
Plaintiffs point out that the lease contracts required the
landlords to provide premises that were habitable and free from
vices and defects, and these are the contractual provisions that
were allegedly breached.

Viewing the complaint as a whole, Judge Ashe holds that the
Plaintiffs have alleged enough, for the purposes of a motion to
dismiss, to state breach-of-contract claims against the Triangle
Defendants as building owners.  Contract claims have a liberative
prescriptive period of ten years.   Suit was filed well within this
period.  Thus, the Triangle Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied
as to the tenant Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claims against
them.

2. Latter & Blum as property manager

Latter & Blum argues that all of the tenant Plaintiffs' claims
against it sound in tort because it was not a party to any contract
with the tenant Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs argue that, although
they did not have a contract with Latter & Blum, they were direct
and intended beneficiaries of Latter & Blum's property management
agreement with Eastlake, and thus, the Plaintiffs contend, they can
sue Latter & Blum for breaching the property management contract.

The Plaintiffs baldly state that the property management contract
between Latter & Blum and Eastlake constitutes a stipulation pour
autrui as to which they were the intended beneficiaries.  But they
cite no provision in the contract that manifests Latter & Blum's
clear intention to extend any benefit to them.  The Plaintiffs
point to a contractual provision authorizing Latter & Blum to make
or cause to be made "all alterations required to comply with rental
agreement requirements."  This provision does not obligate Latter &
Blum as property manager directly to the tenant Plaintiffs, but
instead, merely authorizes Latter & Blum to make the alterations
for which the landlord was obligated to its tenants.

Any failure on the part of Latter & Blum under the property
management contract is a matter between it and the landlord (the
contracting parties), just as any failure on the part of the
landlord under the rental agreements is a matter between it and the
tenants.  Any benefit the Plaintiffs received as a result of the
property management agreement was a mere incident of that contract.
There is no provision in the contract evincing that the parties
intended a direct benefit to the Plaintiffs.  Without a clear
expression of any intention to provide a benefit to the Plaintiffs,
the contract does not amount to a stipulation pour autrui.
Consequently, the tenant Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claims
against Latter & Blum are dismissed with prejudice.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Judge Ashe granted the
Triangle Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Plaintiffs' tort
claims, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice.  The motion
is denied as to the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claims.  Latter
& Blum's motion to dismiss is granted, and the tenant Plaintiffs'
claims against it are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/38xrt5st from Leagle.com.


DEL GATTO INC: S.D. New York Narrows Claims in Polk Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER POLK, et al., Plaintiffs v. DEL GATTO,
INC., Defendant (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York grants in part
and denies in part Del Gatto's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff Christopher Polk brings the putative class action against
Del Gatto, an online jewelry reseller, alleging that Del Gatto
failed to pay him and other jewelry sellers for months after the
payment date specified in the parties' contract. Polk brings claims
for (1) breach of contract; (2) deceptive and unfair trade
practices in violation of New York General Business Law ("GBL")
Section 349; and (3) common law unjust enrichment.

Del Gatto, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in New York City, owns a "consumer-to-consumer jewelry
marketplace," "I Do Now T Don't" (IDNID), through which individuals
can buy and sell jewelry, including engagement rings. Del Gatto
itself acts as a clearinghouse, verifying the quality and
authenticity of the goods sold through its platform and taking a
cut of the proceeds of each sale. Sellers list their pieces on Del
Gatto's website and set prices; buyers pay Del Gatto; Del Gatto
takes a commission (depending on the price) of between 10% and 25%
of the sales price and instructs the seller to send his or her
jewelry to Del Gatto's headquarters to be examined and shipped to
the buyer. Finally, Del Gatto pays the seller.

Del Gatto requires its site's users (buyers and sellers of jewelry)
to agree to its TOU. It "expressly advertises and promises in" the
TOU that it will pay the seller on the 15th day of the month
following his or her sale.

Mr. Polk, a Florida resident and citizen, became engaged but, in
late 2018, separated from his erstwhile fiancee. He decided to sell
the engagement ring. After "thoroughly researching" Del Gatto by
reading through its website and marketing materials, he decided to
list his ring on its site in January of 2020 for $4,000. Del Gatto
approved Polk's listing almost immediately.

On June 11, 2020, a buyer paid Del Gatto $4,000 for Polk's
engagement ring. On June 16, 2020, Polk shipped the ring to Del
Gatto's New York address; on June 22, 2020, Del Gatto received the
ring.  After Del Gatto's gemologist reviewed and approved the ring,
Del Gatto sent it to the buyer. On July 31, 2020, the buyer
received the ring. Based on the 20% commission set out in the TOU
for jewelry in that price range, Del Gatto would have been entitled
to $800, and Polk to $3,200.

Mr. Polk expected payment by Aug. 15, 2020, because the TOU states
that "payments for all sales are issued on the 15th of every month
for any items that have sold" in "the month prior." By Aug. 18,
2020, Polk still had not received payment, and sent the first of
many emails to Del Gatto asking why he had not yet been paid. In an
email response sent the same day, Del Gatto told him that Del
Gatto's payment department would contact him; but it never did.
Polk emailed Del Gatto again on Aug. 26, 2020; that same day, Del
Gatto sent a boilerplate email in response, stating that its New
York office had been closed since March 2020 due to the COVID-19
pandemic and that it would "resolve any issues as quickly as
possible." Polk sent a third email on Sept. 1, 2020, again
requesting a payment status update, and received a reply identical
to the August 26, 2020 response, but also acknowledging Del Gatto's
"payment commitment" to Polk. Polk sent a fourth email on Sept. 26,
2020, and a fifth on Oct. 12, 2020; to each, he received a response
identical to Del Gatto's boilerplate August 26 email. On Oct. 12,
2020, Del Gatto, in addition to sending its August 26 boilerplate
response, emailed Polk to say that the company was "working to get
caught up" on "payment distribution," and that it would contact
Polk when his check was issued. On Nov. 8, 2020, still
empty-handed, Polk sent a sixth email update request, and once
again received a copy of the August 26 boilerplate.

Having received no further information from Del Gatto, Polk
reviewed complaints filed by Del Gatto's customers with the Better
Business Bureau. He found many which "echoed his own experience.
Del Gatto has held onto jewelry and/or payments without paying
sellers as obligated under its own contractual requirements."

On Jan. 7, 2021, Polk filed the lawsuit. On Feb. 4, 2021, about a
month later, according to Del Gatto, the company finally sent Polk
a check.

The Complaint brings claims for breach of contract, deceptive acts
and practices in violation of GBL Section 349, and unjust
enrichment. On Feb. 24, 2021, Del Gatto moved to dismiss, and filed
a supporting memorandum of law, arguing for dismissal under Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On March 17, 2021, Polk filed a memorandum
of law in opposition. On March 31, 2021, Del Gatto filed a reply
brief, Reply.

Discussion

At the threshold, Judge Engelmayer must determine whether it has
subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Finding that there is
such jurisdiction, he reaches Del Gatto's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and
sustains Polk's breach of contract claim, but dismisses the
others.

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Del
Gatto relies on its post-Complaint act of sending Polk a $3,400
check. It argues that there is no longer a justiciable dispute, as
this sum represents the "full amount due and owing" to Polk. Polk
counters that, because he did not view the $3,400 check as fully
compensatory, he declined to cash the check or drop this claim.

Judge Engelmayer opines that Del Gatto's motion lacks merit.  That
is because, even assuming that Del Gatto's cash offer was
sufficient to fully compensate Polk, it would not have mooted
Polk's case absent an offer of judgment along with the money.  The
Court therefore retains subject-matter jurisdiction.

B. Breach of Contract Claim

Mr. Polk's breach of contract claim is based on Del Gatto's TOU,
which is governed by New York law. His Complaint alleges that Del
Gatto breached its contract by failing to pay Polk by the 15th of
the month following the sale of his jewelry, as the TOU required.
In pursuing dismissal, Del Gatto relics on two provisions in its
TOU, the "Disclaimer of Warranties" and the "Release," which it
contends broadly shelter it from "any damages or liability arising
from delays or inoperability of the IDNID service." In the
alternative, Del Gatto argues that it has a viable affirmative
defense: It could not pay Polk in a timely manner due to
pandemic-induced shutdowns, and should he excused from contractual
obligations that were impractical to meet.

Judge Engelmayer holds that these arguments all fail to justify
dismissal. First, because the TOU does not define "interruption,"
there is no basis to imagine that that term reached beyond
temporary website crashes and the like to cover a durable failure
on Del Gatto's part to perform.  Second, even if Del Gatto's broad
construction of the disclaimer term "interruption" were accepted,
there would he a factual question as to whether the delay alleged
so qualified. Third, far from being plausible, Del Gatto's
construction of the Release language to allow it, with impunity, to
keep the money it received that was earmarked for seller Polk is
implausible and frivolous. Lastly, whether Del Gatto was truly
incapacitated by the pandemic to the degree that it could not pay
Polk his $3,400 until seven months had passed and Polk had brought
the lawsuit cannot be resolved without fact discovery.

C. GBL Section 349 Claim

The Complaint next alleges that Del Gatto committed deceptive and
unfair trade practices in violation of GBL Seciton 349, which
prohibits "deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in
this state." Del Gatto moves to dismiss the GBL claim for three
reasons: (1) Polk, a Florida resident, lacks standing to bring a
claim under GBL Section 349; (2) Polk's Complaint does not plead
this claim with specificity; and (3) the claim is duplicative of
his breach of contract claim.

Judge Engelmayer holds the motion is meritorious: Although Polk has
standing to pursue such a claim, it is duplicative. Again, Polk
therefore has standing to bring the claim.  The breach of contract
and GBL claims are effectively identical. And, because the
Complaint does not adequately differentiate between the breach of
contract and GBL Section 349 claims, the Judge dismisses the latter
as duplicative.

D. Unjust Enrichment Claim

For similar reasons, Del Gatto moves to dismiss the Complaint's
final claim, for unjust enrichment.

Del Gatto is correct, Judge Engelmayer finds. Polk's unjust
enrichment claim is based on the same allegations as his claim for
breach of contract: Del Gatto's failure to pay him. The Judge
therefore dismisses the unjust enrichment claim as duplicative.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Engelmayer denies the motion to
dismiss the Complaint's breach of contract claim, but grants the
motion to dismiss Polk's GBL, and unjust enrichment claims. The
Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion
pending at docket 16.

The Court schedules an initial pretrial conference. The conference
will be held telephonically. The counsel are directed to review the
Court's Emergency Individual Rules and Practices in Light of
COVID-19, found at https://nysd.uscourts.gov/honpaul-engelmayer,
for the Court's procedures for telephonic conferences.

The counsel are further directed to prepare a Civil Case Management
Plan and joint letter in accordance with the Court's Individual
Rules, to be submitted to the Court. The plan should provide the
completion of fact discovery by the end of October 2021. In
formulating the case management plan, the counsel should discuss
whether there are terms on which the matter can be resolved.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bzz43twa from Leagle.com.


DIRECTV: Seventh Cir. Affirms Remand Order in Indiana Cities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF FISHERS, INDIANA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees
v. DIRECTV, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 20-3478 (7th
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirms
the district court's order declining to exercise federal
jurisdiction.

In the lawsuit underlying the appeal, a group of Indiana cities
seeks a declaration that Netflix and other video streaming
platforms owe them past and future franchise fees under an Indiana
statute.  The cities filed the action in state court, but the
Defendant streaming platforms removed the case to federal court.
Relying on the doctrine of comity abstention, the district court
declined to exercise federal jurisdiction and remanded the case.

The Indiana Video Service Franchises Act of 2006 regulates the way
cable television companies do business within the Hoosier state.
By the Act's terms, anyone offering "video service" must enter into
a franchise agreement with the Indiana Utility Regulatory
Commission in exchange for use of a public right-of-way.  For
years, traditional cable and communications companies like Comcast
and AT&T have signed the franchise agreements and paid the required
fees.

The direct beneficiaries of this arrangement are local governments.
Video service providers must pay quarterly franchise fees to
government "units," including counties, municipalities, or
townships within the provider's service area.  Indiana law requires
that the Commission survey the participating units on an annual
basis about revenue from the franchise agreements.  According to
the Commission's most recent annual report, the units that
responded to the survey earned franchise fees totaling $19.4
million in 2019.  The Commission also reported that most units
deposit the franchise fees into general operating accounts, to be
spent on public safety, road maintenance, infrastructure, and the
like.

Although enacted in 2006, the Act is arguably behind the times.
Most people do not consume media today in the same way they did 15
years ago.  Traditional cable television, for example, has been
supplanted in many ways by on-demand streaming platforms like
Netflix or Hulu.  This modernization has left municipalities
questioning whether streaming platforms, too, should be paying a
fair share of franchise fees before enjoying the financial benefit
of Hoosiers' business.  Many cities seem to have concluded that
these streaming platforms offer "video service" within the meaning
of the Act and should have applied for franchise agreements with
the Commission some time ago.  To date, though, the streaming
platforms have not applied for franchise agreements, and thus have
avoided the Act's fee obligations.

In August 2020, the cities of Fishers, Indianapolis, Evansville,
and Valparaiso challenged that status quo by filing a putative
class action lawsuit in Marion Superior Court against Netflix,
Disney, Hulu, DIRECTV, and DISH Network.  The cities sought a
declaration that the streaming platforms provide "video service" as
defined by the Act and therefore must pay past and future franchise
fees.

For their part, the defendant streaming platforms responded by
removing the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1441
and 1453.  The platforms explained that the district court had
jurisdiction over the lawsuit under both the traditional diversity
jurisdiction statute, and under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).

The cities did not dispute the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, but instead filed a motion to remand to
state court on abstention grounds.  Invoking the comity abstention
doctrine articulated most recently in Levin v. Commerce Energy,
Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010), the cities argued that federal courts
have long declined to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving
local revenue collection and taxation.  The district court, the
cities pressed, should chart that same course here and return the
case to Indiana state court.

The district court agreed with the cities and remanded, relying on
the Levin comity abstention doctrine.  The streaming services now
appeal from that determination.

Discussion

The parties dispute the threshold question whether the case
qualifies for a Levin-based comity abstention analysis.
Determining whether an abstention doctrine applies in the first
instance is a question of law that the Seventh Circuit reviews de
novo.  Its analysis requires considering at least two factual
differences between this dispute and the one at issue in Levin.

First, the state law in question, the Indiana Video Service
Franchises Act, does not impose a direct tax.  The Act instead
allows local governments to levy franchise fees upon video service
providers conducting business within the state.  The comity
doctrine is implicated by the cities' demand for fees in the case.
Second, unlike in Levin, where an aggrieved third-party taxpayer
sought to chip away at another entity's tax benefit, the cities
themselves initiated this collection lawsuit.  But, regardless of
who brought the underlying suit, the district court's resolution of
the merits issues will risk or result in federal court interference
with the fiscal affairs of local government—the principal concern
of Levin.

On balance, the Seventh Circuit conclude that the comity doctrine
has something to say about the propriety of a federal court
adjudicating this dispute, and the district court did not err by
applying the Levin abstention factors.

Confident that the case calls for a Levin abstention analysis, the
question becomes whether the district court abused its discretion
by concluding that the factors identified in Levin support
abstention.  Levin and the Tax Injunction Act counsel that state
court is the appropriate forum for review of federal challenges to
state taxes.

Likewise in the case, the Seventh Circuit holds.  The Indiana
courts are well positioned to interpret (for the first time) the
state's Video Service Franchises Act and, in turn, to resolve any
federal defenses raised by the streaming platforms along the way.
Because it agrees with the district court that all signs point to
the need for comity-based abstention, it finds no abuse of
discretion in that determination.

The streaming platforms advance several counterpoints opposing
abstention.  But none strikes the Seventh Circuit as persuasive,
and, in any event, the companies failed to preserve these arguments
in the district court.

The platforms' primary contention on appeal is that the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 had the effect of eliminating federal
courts' ability to apply preexisting abstention doctrines to class
actions otherwise authorized for removal under the statute.  All
told, the Seventh Circuit has no argument -- preserved or otherwise
-- that convinces it to depart from its earlier conclusions.  Levin
comity applies to the dispute and the district court did not abuse
its discretion by returning the case to state court.

Disposition

In closing, the Seventh Circuit reiterates that federal courts are
duty-bound to exercise the jurisdiction granted by Congress.  But
it must remember, too, that the Supreme Court placed the comity
abstention doctrine -- first recognized more than a century ago --
on a firm foundation in Levin.  By clarifying that Hibbs v. Wynn
"has a more modest reach," the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed that
federal courts should exercise substantial caution before
adjudicating disputes with meaningful impacts on matters of state
taxation and revenue collection.

The Supreme Court is sure to say more about the limits of comity
abstention in years to come.  Today, though, informed in part by
substantial issues of waiver, the Seventh Circuit is satisfied that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the
cities' motion to remand to Indiana state court.

The Supreme Court, therefore, affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2rndazaj from Leagle.com.


ENERGEN RESOURCES: Final OK of $5.6M Anderson Settlement Endorsed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THE ANDERSON LIVING TRUST f/k/a THE JAMES H. ANDERSON
LIVING TRUST, et al., Plaintiffs v. ENERGEN RESOURCES CORPORATION,
Defendant, CV No. 13-909 WJ/CG (D.N.M.), Chief Judge Carmen E.
Garza of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico
recommends that:

    (i) the parties' Joint Motion and Brief in Support of Final
        Approval of Class Settlement, Notice and Plan of
        Allocation, filed June 28, 2021;

   (ii) the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees, Litigation
        Costs, Class Representative Service Fees, and Anticipated
        Administrative Costs from the Settlement Fund and
        Memorandum in Support Thereof, filed June 28, 2021; and

  (iii) the Plaintiff's Supplement to Motion for Attorney Fees
        and Litigation Costs - Hearing July 19, 2021, at 10:00
        a.m. via Zoom Before Chief Magistrate Judge Garza, filed
        July 14, 2021, be granted.

The case stems from the alleged systematic underpayment of
royalties on oil and gas wells in the San Juan Basin.  In September
2013, the Plaintiffs, then comprised of four separate trusts owning
royalty interests in these wells, filed the class action against
Defendant Energen Resources, the owner and operator of the wells.
Over the ensuing years of the litigation, three of the four trusts
were dismissed from the case, leaving only the Tatum Living Trust.
Further, the only claim to survive to date is the Tatum Living
Trust's claim of underpaid royalties on gas used as fuel ("Colorado
fuel gas claim"), which the Honorable Chief Judge Johnson certified
as a class claim.

On March 9, 2021, the parties informed the Court that they had
reached a settlement in the matter, and on April 5, 2021, they
filed a Joint Motion for Order (1) Preliminarily Approving Class
Settlement, (2) Approving Notice to Class Members, (3) Establishing
Opt Out and Objection Procedures, (4) Appointing a Class
Administrator, and (5) Setting a Final Hearing Date to Consider
Final Approval of the Class Settlement, Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses.  The proposed Settlement Agreement, provided, in relevant
part, that the Class would receive $5.6 million.  The Notice of
Class Action and Proposed Settlement set forth procedures for
notifying the Class members of the Agreement, including the payment
of attorney fees, costs, and reimbursement for expenses, and for
distributing the funds to the Class members.

On April 29, 2021, following a hearing on the motion, Judge Garza
entered a Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition ("PFRD"),
recommending the Court preliminarily approves the parties'
settlement of the Colorado fuel gas claim, appoints a class
administrator, and establishes procedures for providing the class
members with notice of the Agreement, for opting out of the
Agreement, and for objecting to the Agreement.

That same day, Chief Judge Johnson entered an Order Adopting Chief
Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition,
in which he preliminarily approved the Agreement, approved the
Notice as to form and content, directed Defendant Energen to
deposit the settlement payment of $5.61 million into an escrow
account, appointed a Class Administrator, and set forth various
deadlines concerning notice and due process for the Class.  The
matter was then set for a final approval hearing.

On June 28, 2021, the parties filed the instant Motion for Final
Approval, requesting the Court "(1) grants final approval of the
proposed Settlement; (2) approves the form, content, and manner of
the Settlement Class Notice; (3) approves the Plan of Allocation as
fair, adequate, and reasonable; (4) approves attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and incentive award; and (5) finds there are no
objections for the proposed Settlement."  The parties indicate that
no objections were lodged by any of the Class members, and one
class member (via her heir) elected to opt out.  The parties also
filed the instant Motion for Fees and Supplemental Motion for Fees,
asking the Court to award from the Settlement Fund "(1) attorney
fees, (2) litigation costs, (3) class representative services fees,
and (4) anticipated administrative costs." On July 19, 2021, the
Court held a hearing on the motions.

I. Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement

In their Motion, the parties contend that the Agreement is "fair,
adequate, and reasonable," that the Notice "constituted fair and
adequate notice and was the best practicable Notice under the
circumstances, satisfying all the requirements of due process" and
Rule 23, and that "the proposed Plan of Allocation is fair,
adequate, and reasonable

Judge Garza finds that (i) the Class Counsel and the Tatum Living
Trust adequately represented the Class; (ii) the Agreement was
fairly and honestly negotiated at arm's-length; (iii) the plan of
allocation treats each Class member equitably relative to each
other Class member; (iv) the relief provided for the Class members
is adequate, taking into account the costs, risks, and delay of
trial and appeal; (v) the relief provided for the Class is adequate
taking into account the effectiveness of any proposed method of
distributing relief to the class; (vi) the relief provided for the
Class is adequate taking into account the terms of any proposed
award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment; and (vii)
the relief provided to the Class is adequate.  The Judge further
finds, in conclusion that the parties have satisfied the four
prongs set forth under Rule 26(e)(2)(A)-(F).

Judge Garza further finds that (i0 the settlement was fairly and
honestly negotiated, (ii) the parties contend serious questions of
law and fact exist, which place the ultimate outcome of this
litigation in doubt; (iii) the immediate recovery is more valuable
than continued litigation; (iv) the parties agree that the
settlement is fair and reasonable; and (vi) the counsel's unanimous
support of the settlement favors approval.

Given the foregoing findings, Judge Garza thus recommends that the
settlement be approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate, and that
the Motion for Final Approval be granted in its entirety.

II. Attorney Fees and Costs

In the Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees, the Class Counsel requests
attorney fees in the amount of $2.244 million, constituting 40% of
the settlement fund, out-of-pocket litigation expenses in the
amount of $102,661.43, class representative services fees in the
amount of $5,000 to be paid to the Tatum Living Trust, and current
and anticipated administrative costs in the estimated amount of
$150,000 to be paid to the Class Administrator.

Judge Garza finds that the Class Counsel has represented the Tatum
Living Trust for over eight years in the case, and the lead counsel
for the Class "has represented Jack Anderson and various trusts
from the Bank of Oklahoma for decades in numerous royalty owner
actions."  Each of the 12 Johnson factors weighs in the Class
Counsel's favor, supporting a finding that the Class Counsel's fee
request is reasonable.  The Judge therefore finds that the attorney
fees and other fees requested are reasonable, and she recommends
that Chief Judge Johnson grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Fees.

Conclusion

Judge Garza therefore recommends the Court orders as follows:

     1. The Settlement Agreement is finally approved as fair,
reasonable, and adequate;

     2. Barbara A. Ley, P.C., is appointed as the Class
Administrator for all purposes necessary to implement the
Settlement Agreement;

     3. The parties will take any and all necessary steps to
implement the Settlement Agreement according to its terms;

     4. The Class' Released Claims (as defined in paragraph 7 of
the Settlement Agreement) are fully and completely settled,
discharged, and released.  Distribution of the Settlement Amount
will be conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Settlement
Agreement, and Class Members are deemed conclusively to have
released and settled the Class' Released Claims.  All such members
of the Plaintiff Class are barred and permanently enjoined from
commencing or prosecuting, either directly, representatively,
derivatively, or in any capacity, any of the Settled Claims,
against the Energen Released Parties (as that term is defined in
paragraph 7 of the Settlement Agreement);

     5. The following fees and expenses will be paid to the Class
Representative, the Class Administrator, and Class Counsel from the
Settlement Amount defined in paragraph 2 of the Settlement
Agreement: (i) Class Representative the Tatum Trust will be awarded
a service fee award of $5,000; (ii) Class Administrator Barbara A.
Ley, P.C. will be AWARDED current and anticipated administrative
costs in the amount of $150,000; and (iii) the Class Counsel will
be awarded reasonable attorney fees in the amount of 40% of the
gross Settlement Fund ($2.244 million), and litigation expenses in
the amount of $102,661.43.

The Class Counsel will provide to the Court by no later than Oct.
25, 2021, a Joint Status Report, including a final accounting of
the actual administrative costs to be awarded to Class
Administrator Barbara A. Ley, P.C., or an update on the status of
such a final accounting.

Generally, a party may file written objections with the Clerk of
the District Court within 14 days after that party is served with a
copy of a proposed findings and recommended disposition.  However,
at the July 19, 2021 motion hearing, the parties waived the
objections period set forth in Section 636(b)(1), so that the case
may be finalized expeditiously.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Garza recommends that the parties'
Motion for Final Approval, the Plaintiff's Motion for Fees, the
Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Fees be granted, and the
settlement be finally approved.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Findings &
Recommendations is available at https://tinyurl.com/3fddz6x6 from
Leagle.com.


ENJOY TECHNOLOGIES: Does Not Pay Proper Wages, Shepherd Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVEETTA SHEPHERD, individually, and On behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated v. ENJOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
an unknown business entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case
No. 21 CV384675 (Cal. Superior Ct., July 23, 2021)  seeks
restitution for unpaid regular and overtime wages to Plaintiff and
all the other class members.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff and the other class members
worked over eight hours in a day, and/or 40 hours in a week during
their employment with Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
engaged in a pattern and practice of wage abuse against their
hourly-paid or non-exempt employees within the State of California.
This pattern and practice involved, inter alia, failing to pay them
for all regular and/or overtime wages earned and for missed meal
periods and rest breaks in Violation of California law. Defendants
knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other class
members were entitled to receive certain wages for overtime
compensation and that they were not receiving accurate overtime
compensation for all overtime hours worked, the complaint states.

Plaintiff worked from September 2019 to November 2019 for Defendant
Enjoy Technologies, which is a platform that offers same-day
delivery services and operates mobile retail stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          Lawyers for Justice, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Tel: (818) 265-1020
          Fax: (818) 265-1021

ENSIGN UNITED: Newell Parties to Brief on Impact of Mauia & Newton
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LOUIS NEWELL, an individual, for himself and those
similarly situated; MIGUEL CALDERON, an individual for himself and
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ENSIGN UNITED STATES
DRILLING (CALIFORNIA) INC., a California corporation, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01314-NONE-JLT (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing the
impact of the recent Ninth Circuit decisions in Mauia v. Petrochem
Insulation, Inc., _ F.4th _, 2021 WL 3045400 (9th Cir. July 20,
2021), and Newton v. Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd., _
F. App'x _, 2021 WL 3011989 (9th Cir. July 15, 2021), on the
pending motion to approve the parties' proposed class action
settlement, within 14 days from the date of the Order.

The parties may also provide any input they have as to how to now
proceed in the case in light of those recent decisions.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/pzrz25as from Leagle.com.


FLORIDA: Boatman Class Suit Against FCCC Dismissed W/o Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAYVON L. BOATMAN, Plaintiff v. DONALD SAWYER, EMILY
SALEMA, BRIAN LIBEL, J.P. CARNER, DCF WELLPATH RECOVERY SOLUTIONS
GEO GROUP, SVPPD, CORRECT CARE RECOVERY, M. MASTERS, and JOHN DOE
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE/CLERK OFFICE, Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-176-JES-MRM (M.D. Fla.), Judge John E. Steele of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers
Division, dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's class action
complaint.

The cause is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff
Boatman's pro se civil rights complaint filed against 13 employees
of the Florida Civil Commitment Center ("FCCC") in Arcadia,
Florida.  The Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
on the same day.  He seeks to bring the complaint as a class action
on behalf of himself and other FCCC residents, and has accordingly
filed a "Motion for Certification of Class" and a "Motion for
Appointment of Counsel."

The Plaintiff initiated the action on Feb. 26, 2021, by filing a
21-page, 8-point-font, complaint along with 63 pages of exhibits
related to COVID-19 infections within the FCCC.  He purports to
bring the complaint as a class action on behalf of "all present and
future residents and COVID-19 positive residents and non-positive
residents of the Florida Civil Commitment Center."

The Plaintiff generally asserts that it is impossible for the
residents to stay sanitary or socially distant at the facility, and
as a result, the Defendants are not keeping the residents safe. He
seeks compensatory and punitive damages of $198,000 per day per
resident for each day they have been held at the FCCC.  He also
seeks the release of all vulnerable FCCC residents.

Analysis

A. Plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action on behalf of his
fellow detainees.

The Plaintiff filed the complaint on behalf of all present and
future FCCC residents.  He attached numerous affidavits from
residents detailing their experiences with the facility's COVID-19
response, and he also provided the COVID-related medical records of
several residents who tested positive for the virus.

Judge Steele explains that a prerequisite for class-action
certification is a finding by the Court that the representative
party or parties can "fairly and adequately protect the interest of
the class."  He cannot make this finding.  The Eleventh Circuit has
been clear that a non-lawyer proceeding pro se may not represent
the interests of others.  Accordingly, the "class-action" complaint
will be dismissed without prejudice -- and all pending motions
denied without prejudice -- to each resident filing his own 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 complaint and any appropriate motions.

B. Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

Even if he construes the complaint as filed solely on behalf of
himself, the Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted, Judge Steele holds.  Although he repeatedly asserts
that the FCCC's response to the COVID-19 has been a "train wreck,"
the Plaintiff's alleged harm is based solely on generalized
COVID-19 fears and speculation.  While he generally asserts that
the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference and gross
negligence, and expresses displeasure with the residents' housing
assignments (believing that the housing assignments contributed to
the spread of COVID-19), he does not provide a single additional
fact to support the claim.  Nor does he explain how each
Defendant's actions were unconstitutional or why he believes he is
entitled to $198,000 in damages per day since the beginning of the
pandemic.

In other words, the complaint does not "contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face."  Therefore, the Plaintiff's complaint
neither complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor
states a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the complaint
must be dismissed.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Steele dismissed without prejudice the
Plaintiff's class action complaint to any individual plaintiff
filing his or her own 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 complaint along with a
filing fee or motion to proceed as a pauper.  He denied as moot the
Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and the Plaintiff
is not assessed a filing fee.  He denied the Plaintiff's motions
for class certification and for appointment of counsel.  The Clerk
of Court is directed to deny any additional pending motions as
moot, close the case, and enter judgment accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ystxastn from Leagle.com.


FRESENIUS USA: Fenske Suit Moved to San Bernardino Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL FENSKE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FRESENIUS USA
MANUFACTURING, INC.; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 5:21-cv-00811-JWH-SPx (C.D. Cal.), Judge John W. Holcomb
of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
grants the Plaintiff's motion to remand.

Plaintiff Fenske filed the putative class action in San Bernardino
Superior Court on Feb. 9, 2021.  In his Complaint, Fenske alleges
that he was employed by Defendant Fresenius, which is "in the
kidney dialysis centers and medical supply industry."

Mr. Fenske individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, alleges that Fresenius violated various provisions of the
California Labor Code.  The Complaint includes claims for relief
for: (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (2) Failure to Pay Overtime
Wages; (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods; (4) Failure to Provide
Rest Breaks; (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage
Statements; (6) Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Separation of
Employment; and (7) Violation of Business and Professions Code
Sections 17200, et seq.

On May 7, 2021, Fresenius removed the action to the Court,
asserting jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA").  On May 28, 2021, Fenske filed the instant Motion.
Fresenius filed its opposition on June 4,7 and Fenske filed his
reply on June 11.

In his Motion, Fenske argues that Fresenius has failed to establish
that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because the amount
in controversy requirement of $5 million under CAFA has not been
met.  In its Notice of Removal, Fresenius calculated the amount in
controversy as $5,337,748.  Fenske, however, argues that the actual
amount in controversy is only $4,367,337.

Fresenius avers that the amount in controversy for Fenske's first
through sixth claims for relief "alone total $4,270,199."  To this
sum, Fresenius adds potential attorneys' fees of 25% to arrive at
its total amount in controversy of $5,337,748.

Judge Holcomb holds that while the removing party is entitled to
include attorneys' fees in its calculation of the amount in
controversy, it is entitled to do so only if such fees are included
in the "relief to which the plaintiff is entitled if the action
succeeds."  To support its amount in controversy calculation,
Fresenius relies upon an assumption that an across-the-board
estimate of 25% of the total recovery is appropriate.  As Fenske
notes, however, the Ninth Circuit has rejected such a per se rule.
Rather, "the defendant must prove the amount of attorneys' fees at
stake by a preponderance of the evidence."  There is no per se rule
that relieves the removing party of this "evidentiary burden."

Importantly, "the attorneys' fees shifting provisions in California
Labor Code Sections 218.5 and 1194 do not apply to legal work
relating to meal and rest period claims."  But in the case, Judge
Holcomb finds that Fresenius arrives at an amount in controversy in
excess of $5 million by multiplying by 25% the total amount it
estimates that Fenske seeks for all of his claims, including "meal
and rest period violations."13 When these fees are removed from the
calculation, the amount in controversy falls below $5 million, and
the Court does not have jurisdiction under CAFA.  He, therefore,
concludes that Fresenius has not met its burden to establish that
the amount-in-controversy requirement has been met.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Holcomb grants the Motion and
remands the action to the San Bernardino County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ev7rarja from Leagle.com.


GEICO GENERAL: Court Narrows Claims in McNichols CUTPA-CUIPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Alan McNICHOLS, Plaintiff v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:20-CV-01497 (KAD) (D. Conn.), Judge
Kari A. Dooley of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut granted in part and denied in part GEICO's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and
lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

The putative class action asks whether Defendant GEICO, an
automobile insurer, must pay the regulatory fees necessary for its
insured drivers to get back on the road following a total-loss
claim.  Plaintiff McNichols claims that GEICO must pay these types
of regulatory or administrative fees under the terms of his
insurance policy.  He further asserts that, in failing to pay these
fees, GEICO has run afoul of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act (CUTPA) by violating the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices
Act (CUIPA).

The Plaintiff and the putative class are drivers insured by GEICO
under the terms of a certain insurance policy.  He owned a 2005
Toyota RAV 4.  He insured the Vehicle under the Policy, as issued
by GEICO, and paid the premiums due.  On Aug. 22, 2017, the
Plaintiff got into an accident while driving the Vehicle.  He
subsequently filed an insurance claim on the vehicle arising out of
the accident.

GEICO, finding that the cost to repair the Vehicle exceeded the
value of the Vehicle, decided to pay McNichols the adjusted value
of the Vehicle, less the deductible that applied to the Policy.
GEICO hired a vendor to determine how much the Vehicle was worth,
and on Aug. 24, 2017, GEICO provided the Plaintiff $7,189.11 as
settlement for his insurance claim.

However, the Plaintiff alleges that, to replace the Vehicle, he
will need to pay reasonably necessary "Regulatory Fees," which
include Title, Registration, and Inspection Fees, before taking any
new vehicle on the road.  Title Fees could run up to $46, depending
on whether there was a lien on the vehicle.  Registration Fees,
meanwhile, could include a $132 Registration Fee, a $5 Plate Fee, a
$15 Clean Air Act Fee, a $10 Lien Fee, and a $15 Passport to the
Parks Fee.  As for Inspection Fees, those could include a $40
Emissions Exemption Fee, a $20 Emissions Testing Fee, and a $10
Greenhouse Gas Fee.

While listing these various fees, the Plaintiff specifically
alleges that he is still owed either $91 or $106 for reasonably
necessary Regulatory Fees and that the Policy entitles him to
recover those fees.

The Plaintiff first brought the putative class action in
Connecticut Superior Court on Sept. 3, 2020.  GEICO, invoking the
Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
U.S.C. Sections 1332(d), filed a timely notice of removal on Oct.
1, 2020.  On Oct. 30, 2020, GEICO filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's Complaint, and that motion was withdrawn after the
Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint on Nov. 20, 2020.

GEICO then moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on Dec. 11, 2020.
The motion was fully briefed on Jan. 28, 2021.

Discussion

GEICO seeks to dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for (1)
failure to state a claim and (2) lack of standing.  In the
alternative, GEICO asks for enforcement of the Policy's Appraisal
Clause. The main thrust of GEICO's argument across these three
issues is that the Policy is unambiguous and it simply does not
provide for the payment of Regulatory Fees.  Accordingly, GEICO
asserts that it has met its obligations and the Plaintiff cannot
state a claim for relief under the terms of the Policy.  The
Plaintiff responds that the Policy is ambiguous on this issue and
that, therefore, his claims should not be dismissed.

Standing

Judge Dooley begins, as it must, with the jurisdictional issue of
whether the Plaintiff has established, through his allegations,
standing to bring his claims.  GEICO summarily argues that the
Plaintiff "cannot seek recovery of damages that he did not incur"
insofar as he pleaded facts that described several Regulatory Fees
that he did not actually pay.  Consequently, the Plaintiff should
be barred from bringing any claims connected to these fees.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiff has alleged that he suffered an
injury in fact, to wit, underpayment of what he was owed under the
Policy.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff has standing to bring his
breach of contract claim and his CUTPA claim because he has
sufficiently plead an interest in an allegedly breached contract
and because he has sufficiently plead an injury under CUTPA that
this Court can redress.

Failure to State a Claim

GEICO seeks dismissal of both the breach of contract claim and the
CUTPA claim.  As to the breach of contract claim, GEICO asserts
that because the Policy is unambiguous and does not require the
payment of Regulatory Fees, the Plaintiff cannot state a claim for
breach of contract for failing to pay such fees.  As to the
Plaintiff's CUTPA claim, GEICO asserts that this claim is nothing
more than a reiteration of the breach of contract claim, and, in
any event, the Plaintiff has not alleged a CUIPA violation with the
specificity necessary to avoid a motion to dismiss.

Breach of Contract

The parties do not dispute the existence of a contract or whether
the Plaintiff performed under that contract, and both of these
elements are well-pleaded in the Amended Complaint.  And although
the parties disagree about whether the Plaintiff suffered any
damages, this disagreement derives from the parties' respective
positions on the issue of breach.

GEICO argues that the automobile insurance policy at issue is
unambiguous and that the Policy does not provide coverage for
Regulatory Fees.  The Plaintiff dispute turns on whether the phrase
"replacement cost" includes Regulatory Fees.  If "replacement cost"
does include Regulatory Fees, then so too would the vehicle's
actual cash value, thereby increasing GEICO's limit of liability,
and as the Plaintiff asserts, the amount owed in a total-loss
situation.

Judge Dooley concludes that the Policy is ambiguous on the question
of whether the Regulatory Fees sought by the Plaintiff are included
within the term actual cash value principally because the term used
to define actual cash value, "replacement cost," is itself,
ambiguous.  "Replacement cost" is not defined in the Policy, and,
despite GEICO's contention to the contrary, the context in which it
is used does not render it unambiguous.  The motion to dismiss the
breach of contract claim is denied.

CUTPA Claim

The Plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA) is based on an alleged violation of the
Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA).  He alleges
that GEICO misrepresents the effect of its policy provisions
through advertising on GEICO's website and that he and the putative
class relied on these types of representations in selecting an
insurance policy.  The Plaintiff also alleges that he and the
putative class suffered pecuniary harm as a result of these
misrepresentations.

These allegations, even accepted as true, do not constitute a
violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 38a-816(6)(A) because none of
the allegations occurred in the context of claims settlement, Judge
Dooley finds.  The Plaintiff has therefore failed to establish a
plausible violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 38a-816(6)(A).  His
claims of a Section 38a-816(6)(H) violation also fair no better.

For these reasons, Judge Dooley holds the parties have a dispute
about the Policy's terms, and the Appraisal Clause is not an
agreement to arbitrate disputes about the meaning of the Policy
itself.  Indeed, the questions about the meaning of loss or actual
cash value, which involve the definition of contractual terms, are
legal questions that must be resolved by the Court rather than an
appraiser.  For all of these reasons, the Judge declines to enforce
the Policy's appraisal provision as requested.

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, Judge Dooley denied GEICO's motion to
dismiss as to Count One and granted as to Count Two.  Further, the
Appraisal Clause will not be enforced as a means to resolve the
dispute.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Memorandum of
Decision is available at https://tinyurl.com/r97f2ycx from
Leagle.com.


GT MARKETING: Pastore Slams Illegal Telemarketing Calls
-------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan A. Pastore, individually and on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GT Marketing Group
USA Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-81264 (S.D. Fla., July 20,
2021), seeks statutory damages and any other available legal or
equitable remedies for violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

GT Marketing, operating as "Eccentry Holidays," is a travel service
company that sells vacations through memberships. It promotes and
markets its services by calling wireless phone users. At no point
in time did Pastore provide them with his express written consent
to be contacted in this manner, asserts the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
      EDWARDS POTTINGER, LLC
      425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Tel: (954) 524-2820
      Facsimile: (954) 524-2822
      Email: Seth@epllc.com

             - and -

      Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
      Michael J. Pascucci, Esq.
      EGGNATZ PASCUCCI
      7450 Griffin Road
      Davie, FL 33314
      Tel: (954) 889-3359
      Fax: (954) 889-5913
      Email: Mpascucci@JusticeEarned.com
             JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com


IMPINJ INC: Plymouth County Retirement System Suit Concluded
------------------------------------------------------------
Impinj, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that the class action suit entitled, Plymouth
County Retirement System v. Impinj, Inc., et al., has been
concluded.

As previously disclosed, a consolidated federal securities class
action was filed in 2018 and was settled and dismissed in 2020.

On January 31, 2019, a related class-action complaint for violation
of the federal securities laws was filed in the Supreme Court of
the State of New York for the County of New York against the
company, its chief executive officer, former chief operating
officer, former chief financial officer, members of the company's
board of directors and the underwriters of our July 2016 initial
public stock offering, or IPO, and December 2016 secondary public
offering, or SPO.

Captioned Plymouth County Retirement System v. Impinj, Inc., et
al., the complaint, purportedly brought on behalf of purchasers of
the company's stock pursuant to or traceable to the company's IPO
and SPO, alleged that the company made false or misleading
statements in the registration statements and prospectuses in those
offerings concerning demand for its products and inventory in
violation of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.

On April 9, 2019, the New York Supreme Court entered an order
staying the action and requiring the parties to update the court
every 90 days as to the status of the pending consolidated federal
securities class actions.

On July 9, 2020, the parties in both this action and the federal
securities class actions executed a stipulation of settlement that
resolved the claims in both actions.

On November 20, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington entered an order finally approving the
settlement, and the action pending in Washington federal court has
been dismissed with prejudice.

Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, the parties in this action
filed stipulation discontinuing this action with prejudice.

On April 28, 2021, after a long delay due to the impact of Covid-19
on the New York State court, the court signed and entered the
stipulation discontinuing the action with prejudice. The matter is
now closed.

Impinj, Inc. operates a platform that enables wireless connectivity
for everyday items by delivering each items unique identity,
location, and authenticity to business and consumer applications.
Impinj, Inc. was founded in 2000 and is headquartered in Seattle,
Washington.


INDEPENDENT BANK: Summary Judgment Bid in BOH Merger Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Independent Bank Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motion for
summary judgment filed in the BOH Holdings, Inc.'s merger-related
suit, is pending.

Independent Bank is a party to a legal proceeding inherited in
connection with the Company's acquisition of BOH Holdings, Inc. and
its subsidiary, Bank of Houston, or BOH, that was completed on
April 15, 2014.

Several entities related to R. A. Stanford, or the Stanford
Entities, including Stanford International Bank, Ltd., or SIBL, had
deposit accounts at BOH.

Certain individuals who had purchased certificates of deposit from
SIBL filed a class action lawsuit against several banks, including
BOH, on November 11, 2009 in the U.S. District Court Northern
District of Texas, Dallas Division, in a case styled Peggy Roif
Rotstain, et al. on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. Trustmark National Bank, et al., Civil Action No.
3:09-CV-02384-N-BG.

The suit alleges, among other things, that the plaintiffs were
victims of fraud by SIBL and other Stanford Entities and seeks to
recover damages and alleged fraudulent transfers by the defendant
banks.

On May 1, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting permission
to file a Second Amended Class Action Complaint in this case, which
motion was subsequently granted. The Second Amended Class Action
Complaint presents previously unasserted claims, including aiding
and abetting or participation in a fraudulent scheme based upon the
large amount of deposits that the Stanford Entities held at BOH and
the alleged knowledge of certain BOH officers.

The plaintiffs seek recovery from the Bank and other defendants for
their losses.

The case was inactive due to a court-ordered discovery stay issued
March 2, 2015 pending the Court's ruling on plaintiff's motion for
class certification and designation of class representatives and
counsel. On November 7, 2017, the Court issued an order denying the
plaintiff's motion. In addition, the Court lifted the previously
ordered discovery stay.

On January 11, 2018, the Court entered a scheduling order providing
that the case be ready for trial on January 27, 2020. Due to agreed
upon extensions of discovery on July 25, 2019, the Court amended
the scheduling order to provide that the case be ready for trial on
January 11, 2021.

In light of additional agreed upon extensions of discovery
deadlines, the Court entered a new scheduling order on March 9,
2020, which now provides that the case be ready for trial March 15,
2021.

In light of delays in discovery associated with the COVID-19
pandemic, the parties agreed to amend the scheduling order with new
ready for trial date of May 6, 2021.

On September 10, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for suggestion of
remand in order to remand the case to the Southern District of
Texas.

On March 11, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to amend the
scheduling order, which was granted, effectively vacating the May
6, 2021 trial date, with a new trial date to be determined upon
remand.

On April 5, 2021, Defendants re-urged the motion for suggestion of
remand, the outcome of which is still pending. In February 2021,
the Bank filed its motion for summary judgment and also joined in
on an omnibus motion for summary judgment on procedural issues
common to all Defendants.

In their reply brief, plaintiffs appear to have abandoned five of
the seven causes of action against BOH. Parties are awaiting a
ruling on the summary judgment briefing to determine the final
causes of action to be addressed at trial. The Company has
experienced an increase in legal fees associated with the defense
of this claim and anticipates further increases in legal fees as
the case proceeds to trial.

The Bank notified its insurance carriers of the claims made in the
Second Amended Complaint. The insurance carriers have initially
indicated that the claims are not covered by the policies or that a
"loss" has not yet occurred.

The Bank pursued insurance coverage as well as reimbursement of
defense costs through the initiation of litigation and other means.
On November 6, 2018, the Company settled claims under its Financial
Institutions Select Policy pursuant to which the Company received
payment of an amount which is not material to the operations of the
Company. The Company did not settle any claims under its Financial
Institution Bond Policy.

The Company believes that the claims made in this lawsuit are
without merit and is vigorously defending this lawsuit. This is
complex litigation involving a number of procedural matters and
issues. As such, the Company is unable to predict when this matter
may be resolved and, given the uncertainty of litigation, the
ultimate outcome of, or potential costs or damages arising from,
this case.

Independent Bank Group, Inc. operates as a national commercial
bank. The Bank offers personal and business banking services.
Independent Bank provides personal checking accounts, loans, debit
and credit cards, mobile banking, and investment services.
Independent Bank Group serves customers in the State of Texas. The
company is based in McKinney, Texas.


JACKSON NATIONAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Nofsinger Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BONNIE NOFSINGER, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Michigan corporation, Defendant, Case No.
17-cv-03367 (N.D. Ill.), Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, granted Jackson's motion for partial summary judgment and
denied Nofsinger's motion for class certification.

Plaintiff Nofsinger sued Jackson, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, for sending her an allegedly deceptive
Surrender Letter regarding her dual fund annuity contract.
Nofsinger alleges that Jackson's conduct, in both impermissibly
changing her contract's maturity date and sending the Surrender
Letter, constituted a breach of contract, conversion, and violation
of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA") and the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA").

On May 1, 1991, Nofsinger entered a dual fund annuity ("DFA")
contract with Jackson, which was billed as a "supplemental
retirement plan for teachers and employees of school districts."
In a typical annuity contract, the insured pays a series of
premiums that accumulate value until the contract's maturity date.
A dual fund annuity differs from a traditional annuity contract
because it accrues at two different values: the cash surrender
value and the accumulated value.  A DFA policyholder may withdraw
either the partial or full amount of the cash surrender value at
any time before the maturity date.  To collect the accumulated
value, however, the DFA policyholder must wait until the maturity
date and then opt for it to be disbursed over a minimum period of
60 months.  At the time Nofsinger entered into the DFA, she was 43
years old and worked as an Illinois public high school teacher.
Originally, Nofsinger set the DFA's maturity date for May 1, 2008.
At some point in 1993, however, Jackson changed the maturity date
on Nofsinger's annuity contract from May 1, 2008 to March 2017.

In January 2017, Jackson sent Nofsinger a letter ("Surrender
Letter"), informing her that her maturity date was soon approaching
and requesting that she select an option as to how she would like
to receive the contract's income.  The Surrender Letter proposed
four different options, including an option to receive a lump sum
payout, defined as a partial or full liquidation (Option #3).
Believing that by selecting the lump sum payout she would receive
the full value of her contract, Nofsinger settled on this option.

Before finalizing her choice, however, she briefly met with her
Edward Jones financial advisor, Jim Crowe, and his assistant, Julie
Ludeman, on Jan. 12, 2017.  After discussing the Surrender Letter,
Ludeman called Jackson and relayed Nofsinger's decision to elect
the lump sum payout for the full amount of her DFA.  Nofsinger then
signed a document that allowed for the transfer of the DFA funds to
her Edward Jones account.  Nofsinger did not consult her DFA
contract prior to opting for its liquidation.

On Jan. 18, 2017, Jackson sent Nofsinger a disbursement letter,
confirming her request to liquidate her DFA.  As of the date that
Jackson processed the liquidation request, the accumulated value of
Nofsinger's DFA was $103,962.96 and the cash surrender value was
$86,075.28.  In response to Nofsinger's liquidation request,
Jackson paid her $86,055.28  -- the cash surrender value less a $20
wire fee.

Ms. Nofsinger brings the suit against Jackson on behalf of herself
and all individuals who entered into an annuity contract or DFA
with Jackson who were sent a Surrender Letter and subsequently
assessed a "surrender charge" between 2012 and the present.
Jurisdiction is proper under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
U.S.C. Section 1332(d), because at least one member of the putative
class is a citizen of a different state than Jackson and the amount
in controversy exceeds $5 million.  Nofsinger is an Illinois
resident, while Jackson is incorporated and maintains its principal
place of business in Michigan.

After filing an amended complaint, Nofsinger moved for class
certification.  Jackson then moved for partial summary judgment as
to all counts related to the Surrender Letter.

Discussion

To support her claims against Jackson for impermissibly changing
her contract's maturity date and sending a deceptive Surrender
Letter, Nofsinger has identified multiple theories of liability:
(1) breach of contract regarding the maturity date change and
surrender charge, respectively (Counts I and II); (2) conversion
regarding the maturity date (Count III); (3) violation of the
Michigan Consumer Protection Act regarding the Surrender Letter and
surrender charge (Counts IV and V); and (4) violation of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
regarding the Surrender Letter and surrender charge (Counts VI and
VII).  Jackson has moved to dismiss Counts II, IV, V, VI, and
VII--the breach of contract and consumer fraud counts related to
the Surrender Letter and surrender charge.

I. Choice of Law

The parties apply both Illinois and Michigan law to Nofsinger's
claims, without any discussion of which state's law controls.
Choice of law is a threshold issue, and therefore Judge Tharp must
address whether Illinois or Michigan law applies before delving
into the substance of the issues presented by the pending motions.

Judge Tharp opines that to determine choice of law, the Second
Restatement urges consideration of several factors, including the
place where the plaintiff acted in reliance on the defendant's
representations, the place where she received the representations,
the residences of both parties, and the place where the plaintiff
was obligated to render performance under the contract.  These
factors overwhelmingly favor Illinois -- it is the state where
Nofsinger entered the DFA, acted in reliance on it as well as
rendered her performance by paying premiums towards it, and where
she resides.  As a result, Illinois law governs Nofsinger's
consumer fraud theory of liability.  Summary judgment is therefore
granted to Jackson as to Counts IV and V, as both are premised on
Michigan law.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

With the choice of law confusion cleared up, that leaves
Nofsinger's surrender charge claim based on theories of breach of
contract and violations of the ICFA.

A. Breach of contract

Ms. Nofsinger argues that Jackson breached their contract because
the original contract does not mention or allow for the imposition
of a surrender charge.  Jackson counters that referring to the
difference between Jackson's accumulated annuity value and
surrender value as a "surrender charge" in a later document does
not constitute a contractual breach.

Judge Tharp agrees with Jackson.  As Ms. Cynthia Campbell,
Jackson's Rule 30(b)(6) witness, testified: "The surrender charge
on CyberLife is not truly a surrender charge, it is the two values
that have been portrayed to the client throughout the life of their
contract on statements and conforms and is based on the contract
itself."  While it might sow some confusion (and therefore spawn
litigation), a change in the terminology Jackson uses to refer to
the difference between the annuity and surrender values does not
alter the contract, let alone breach it.  Jackson performed
properly under the terms of the contract and Surrender Letter by
fulfilling Nofsinger's demand to take the lump sum payout and
thereby liquidate it.  Nofsinger does not argue that the amount she
received upon termination was incorrect or that she was subject to
two deductions -- one to reflect the difference in annuity values
based on the withdrawal methodology and one to reflect a "surrender
charge." Accordingly, Nofsinger's breach of contract theory of
liability related to the surrender charge fails and Count II is
dismissed.

B. Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

A successful claim under the ICFA requires that the plaintiff
"plead and prove that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair
act with the intent that others rely on the deception, that the act
occurred in the course of trade or commerce, and that it caused
actual damages."

Ms. Nofsinger offers three reasons why the Surrender Letter
qualifies as deceptive under the ICFA.  First, she argues that
Jackson used the Surrender Letter to induce annuity holders to
choose to receive their income before their maturity date.  Second,
she asserts that the Surrender Letter was deceptive and unfair
because it contained undefined terms.  And finally, Nofsinger
argues that the Surrender Letter failed to disclose that selecting
certain options would force the consumer to inadvertently
relinquish thousands of dollars in surrender charges.

The problem with Nofsinger's first argument, Judge Tharp finds, is
that she has not identified any potentially deceptive language or
language of requirement in the Surrender Letter.  Turning to
Nofsinger's second argument, the Judge holds that reading both
options together, "lump sum payout" unambiguously appears to be an
alternative to an annuity payment, not the same form of payment, as
Nofsinger argues.  Nofsinger's final argument fares no better.
Nofsinger's argument that Jackson acted deceptively by not
disclosing a surrender charge fails because it is based on the
false premise that Jackson imposed a surrender charge.  Because
Nofsinger has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the Surrender Letter was deceptive or unfair, her ICFA
theory of liability fails.  Jackson is granted summary judgment as
to Count VII.

III. Motion for Class Certification

Ms. Nofsinger seeks certification of the following class and
subclass under Federal Rule of Procedure 23:

      a. Class: All individuals who entered into an annuity
contract with the Defendant, and who from 2012 through the present
were sent the Surrender Letter and subsequently assessed a charge
by the Defendant identified as a Surrender Charge against the value
of their annuity according to the Defendant's records.

     b. Dual Fund Subclass: All individuals who entered into a Dual
Fund Annuity contract with the Defendant and who from September
2012 through the present were sent the Surrender Letter and
subsequently assessed a charge by the Defendant identified as a
Surrender Charge against the value of their Dual Fund Annuity
according to the Defendant's records.

Judge Tharp finds that both the class and subclass rest on the
surrender charge claim, which fails as a matter of law.  If a named
plaintiff's claim lacks merit, "the effect is to moot the question
whether to certify the suit as a class action" if the basis for
which the claim fails "would apply equally to any other member of
the class."  That is the case in the instant: No class member could
sustain a cognizable surrender charge claim based on the legal
theories put forward. Nofsinger's motion for class certification is
accordingly denied.

Order

For the reasons he stated, Judge Tharp granted Jackson's motion for
partial summary judgment and denied Nofsinger's motion for class
certification.  Nofsinger's breach of contract, related to the
maturity date, and conversion claim may proceed to trial.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4th4w2c9 from
Leagle.com.


KANSAS CITY ROYALS: Senne's Bid to Certify Class Partly Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AARON SENNE, et al., Plaintiffs v. KANSAS CITY ROYALS
BASEBALL CORP., et al., Defendants, Case No. 14-cv-00608-JCS (N.D.
Cal.), Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted in part and
denied in part Plaintiff Cody Sedlock's Motion for Rule 23(b)(2)
Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs are minor league baseball players who assert claims
under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the
wage-and-hour laws of California, Arizona, and Florida against
Major League Baseball ("MLB"), MLB Commissioner Bud Selig, and 22
MLB franchises ("Franchise Defendants").  Plaintiff Sedlock is a
current minor league baseball player; the remaining plaintiffs are
former minor league baseball players.

Early on in the case, the Franchise Defendants brought a Motion to
Dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint in Part for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim.
In that motion, the Franchise Defendants asked the Court to dismiss
certain state law causes of action under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that
Plaintiffs lacked standing as to these claim and/or that they
failed to state a claim.  The Court disagreed, concluding that it
was appropriate to defer ruling on standing until the class
certification stage of the case. Dkt. No. 420 ("Article III
Standing Order").

In March 2016, the Plaintiffs moved the Court to certify Rule
23(b)(3) and Rule 23(b)(2) classes under the laws of eight states'
laws to pursue minimum wage and overtime violation claims for
baseball activities performed throughout the year.  The Court
denied the motion in full.  It found, inter alia, that because
Plaintiffs sought compensation for work players performed during
the off season, it would be difficult to determine class
membership.  It denied certification of the Rule 23(b)(2) classes
for the additional reason that all of the named Plaintiffs at that
time were former minor league players and therefore, they did not
have standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief.

The Plaintiffs subsequently brought a motion for reconsideration,
asking the Court to certify narrower classes under Rule 23(b)(2)
and (b)(3).  In particular, they asked the Court to certify under
Rule 23(b)(3) an Arizona class and a Florida class for work
performed in those states during spring training, extended spring
training, and the instructional leagues.  They also asked the Court
to certify under Rule 23(b)(3) a California class that included
players who participated in the California League during the
championship season.  In addition, the Plaintiffs requested
certification of Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief classes consisting
of current minor league players who participate in spring training,
extended spring training, or the instructional leagues in Florida
and Arizona.

In its March 17, 2017 Order, the Court found that the Main Survey
was admissible under Daubert, denying the Defendants' motion to
exclude it, and concluded that in combination with other evidence,
it was sufficient to show that Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement was met as to the proposed California class.  The Court
found, however, that with respect to the Florida and Arizona
classes, the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a) and the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) were defeated by choice
of law concerns.  Similarly, it concluded that certification of the
Plaintiffs' proposed Rule 23(b)(2) classes was inappropriate
because the Court "could not necessarily adjudicate the claims of
the Rule 23(b)(2) classes or fashion a remedy based on the law of
only one or two states" but instead "could potentially be required
to apply the law of numerous states to Plaintiffs' claims, which
undermined the cohesiveness of the class."

At the Defendants' request, the district court certified the Second
Class Certification Order for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1292.  The Ninth Circuit granted both the Defendants'
petition for permission to appeal the certification of the
California class and the Plaintiffs' petition for permission to
appeal the denial of certification for the Arizona, Florida, and
Rule 23(b)(2) classes and the appeals were consolidated.  It
affirmed the District Court's certification of the California class
but reversed as to its denial of certification of the Arizona,
Florida and (b)(2) classes, concluding that the Court's choice of
law analysis was incorrect.  The Ninth Circuit reversed the Court's
denial of certification of the Rule 23(b)(2) classes and remanded
for further consideration of whether they should be certified.

In the Motion, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the
following (b)(2) class: Any person who is or will in the future be
signed to a Minor League Uniform Player Contract and performs
services pursuant to that contract in Florida, Arizona, or
California.  They contend the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) and all
the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied.  They further contend
the proposed class representative, Cody Sedlock, has standing to
represent the (b)(2) class.  The Motion also asks to appoint Korein
Tillery LLC and Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP as the Co-Lead Class
Counsel for the proposed (b)(2) class as well as the (b)(3) classes
that have already been certified.

A hearing on the Motion was held via Zoom webinar on June 25, 2021
at 9:30 a.m.

Analysis

A. Whether Sedlock Has Standing to Represent the Proposed Class

The Defendants' standing challenges are asserted on two main
grounds.  First, they object that Sedlock does not have standing to
assert the claims of the putative class because although he is
playing under a contract with MLB, he does not play for any of the
Clubs that are defendants in the case.  Second, they contend
Sedlock may not assert the claims of the (b)(2) class members that
arise under California and Arizona law because he has never worked
as a minor league player in either state.

Judge Spero concludes that as to the first question, although
Sedlock has standing to assert his claims against MLB, he does not
have standing to assert any claims against the Franchise
Defendants.  The Judge concludes that the second question is
governed by Rule 23 rather than Article III but that even if this
question is addressed as a matter of standing, Sedlock has standing
to represent class members' claims under the laws of Arizona and
California (as well as Florida, where he performs services under
the UPC).  Nonetheless, the Judge concludes the scope of the (b)(2)
class must be narrowed in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule
23.

B. Whether the Proposed Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule
23(b)(2)

The Plaintiffs' proposed (b)(2) class may be certified if it
satisfies all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) (numerosity,
commonality, typicality and adequacy) as well as the requirements
if subsection (b)(2).

Judge Spero finds that it is undisputed that Rule 23(a)(1)'s
numerosity requirement is satisfied.  Likewise, he finds that the
proposed class satisfies the commonality requirement.  While the
breadth of the proposed class definition raises questions as to
typicality and adequacy, it does not defeat commonality.

The Judge also finds that while Sedlock does not meet the
typicality requirement as to claims based on services performed
under the UPC during the off-season or in California, he meets the
typicality requirement as to a narrowed (b)(2) class that limits
membership to individuals who perform services under the UPC during
spring training, the championship season and the instructional
leagues in Florida and Arizona.  And, to the extent Sedlock meets
the typicality requirement, he is also an adequate class
representative.

The Defendants contend the proposed class should not be certified
under subsection (b)(2) because the relief it seeks is: 1)
"antithetical" to the indivisibility requirement of Rule 23(b)(2);
2) vague and nothing more than a bare injunction to follow the law;
and 3) a "thinly-veiled request for monetary damages."

Judge Spero rejects all three arguments.  He says, the proposed
(b)(2) classes do not seek any damages.  Nor have the Defendants
cited any authority for the proposition that an injunction
requiring them to pay minimum wage and overtime amounts to an award
of damages simply because it requires the payment of money.

Finally, the Judge holds that the proposed (b)(2) classes do not
seek any damages.  Nor have the Defendants cited any authority for
the proposition that an injunction requiring them to pay minimum
wage and overtime amounts to an award of damages simply because it
requires the payment of money.

Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Spero granted in part and denied
in part.  The parties will meet and confer to address the specific
wording of the Rule 23(b)(2) class definition that the Court has
approved, incorporating the limitations.  If the parties can agree,
a stipulation will be filed with the Court by Aug. 27, 2021
containing the revised class definition.  If they are unable to
agree, they should jointly file by the same date a statement, not
to exceed five pages, setting forth the competing proposed class
definitions and explaining the basis for any disagreements.

In addition, the Court Judge the appointment of Korein Tillery, LLC
and Pearson, Simon & Warshaw LLP as the class counsel for all of
the classes certified in the action. The parties are requested to
supply an agreed-upon proposed order appointing those firms as
class counsel by Aug. 27, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ese9ktsh from Leagle.com.


KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS: 2nd Amended Securities Class Suit Tossed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: Karyopharm Therapeutics Inc., Securities
Litigation, Civil Action No. 19-11972-NMG (D. Mass.), Judge
Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts allowed the Defendants' motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint for failure to state a claim and dismissed the
SAC without prejudice.

The case is a putative securities fraud class action brought by
lead plaintiff Dr. Myo Thant, on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated investors, against Karyopharm and several
Karyopharm directors and executive officers.  Dr. Thant alleges
that Karyopharm investors have been harmed because they purchased
the company's common stock at prices that were artificially
inflated by the Defendants materially misleading statements and
omissions about selinexor, its leading drug candidate for the
treatment of certain advanced cancers.

Karyopharm is a Massachusetts-based, commercial-stage
biopharmaceutical company that develops and commercializes
treatments for cancer and other serious diseases.  The Plaintiff is
a Maryland resident who supposedly purchased and retained
Karyopharm securities in or traceable to the public offerings of
the company's common stock conducted in or about April, 2017, and
May, 2018.  He contends that the purchase price of those securities
was artificially inflated because Karyopharm executives made
several misrepresentations and omissions with respect to the safety
and efficacy of selinexor between March 2, 2017, and Feb. 22,
2019.

On July 23, 2019, the Allegheny County Employees' Retirement System
initiated a lawsuit in the Court against Karyopharm, its officers
and directors and certain underwriters that participated in
Karyopharm offerings.  That same day, notice of the putative
securities fraud class action was published pursuant to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") on PR Newswire,
a national business-oriented press release distribution service.

In September, 2019, Heather Mehdi filed this nearly identical
putative class action against Karyopharm and certain of its
officers and directors in the Court.  A week later, Dr. Thant moved
for appointment as lead plaintiff in the Allegheny action but that
case was voluntarily dismissed in March, 2020.  Shortly thereafter,
he filed a motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of
counsel in the instant case which this Court allowed in April,
2020.  In June, 2020, the Plaintiff filed his first amended
complaint and, after a motion to dismiss was fully briefed, the
Plaintiff filed the SAC with leave of Court in October 2020.

The SAC alleges that, during the class period, the Defendants made
materially misleading statements about the efficacy and safety of
selinexor in violation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Sections 77k & 77o (Counts I and II), Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
Sections 78j(b) & 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 (Counts III and IV).  It
adds that, as a result of that decline in market value, investors
who purchased Karyopharm stock in reliance on those false and/or
misleading statements suffered significant losses.

The Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim in November 2020.

At the crux of the Plaintiff's complaint is the contention that the
Defendants knew selinexor is and has always been severely toxic and
extremely limited in terms of efficacy but they, nevertheless, told
investors that the drug resulted in better overall survival for
refractory multiple myeloma patients than those who were not
treating with it.  As a result of the representations, the
Plaintiff contends that he and other class members purchased the
company's stock at an artificially inflated price and consequently
suffered losses.

The SAC identifies more than 10 statements made by Karyopharm
executives in which material facts were allegedly either omitted or
misrepresented.  Because the challenged statements are numerous and
largely duplicative, Judge Groton refers to them cumulatively or by
general groupings.  Broadly, the challenged statements fall into
categories regarding 1) the safety and efficacy of selinexor in the
context of the SOPRA trial 2) the same in the context of the STORM
trial and 3) the inclusion of the RWD study in the NDA and the
conclusions drawn therefrom.  The Plaintiff avers that the
challenged statements were misleading and made with the requisite
scienter.

The Defendants counter that the complaint fails to state a claim on
multiple, independent and dispositive grounds.  They assert that
the Plaintiff has not pled any particularized facts which
demonstrate that Karyopharm or the individual Defendants made
actionable, false or misleading statements or omissions because all
material information was disclosed to investors.  The Defendants
further contend that 1) their factual statements were accurate, 2)
their statements interpreting clinical trial results were
non-actionable opinions and 3) the Plaintiff's allegations do not
give rise to the strong inference of scienter necessary to state a
claim for securities fraud under the PSLRA.

Discussion

A. The Safety and Efficacy of Selinexor

1. The SOPRA Trial

The Plaintiff's contention that Karyopharm made materially
misleading statements with respect to the SOPRA trial is
contradicted by the timely disclosures that the company did make.
With respect to the SOPRA press release, for instance, the
Defendants expressly stated that Karyopharm was canceling that
clinical trial because the results showed it would "not reach
statistical significance for overall survival (OS), the study's
primary endpoint."

Judge Gorton holds that Karyopharm has no affirmative duty to
disclose every piece of information in its possession in which an
investor may have an interest.  He further holds that the
information the company shared adequately provided its investors
with an overall picture of the safety and efficacy of selinexor in
the context of the SOPRA trial.  Thus, selinexor was able to meet
the requisite safety and efficacy standards, validating
Karyopharm's proclaimed views of it.

2. The STORM Trial

The Plaintiff further maintains that Karyopharm misrepresented the
safety and efficacy data from the STORM trial by stating that
"selinexor demonstrated a predictable and manageable tolerability
profile" yet omitting that 100% of the enrolled patients
experienced AEs, nearly 60% experienced a severe AE, more than 25%
of patients permanently discontinued the drug due to its side
effects and approximately 18 on-study deaths were attributed to
it.

Given the circumstances of the STORM-related disclosures, Judge
Gorton finds that position well-taken.  He explains that
Karyopharm's disclosure of the most common AEs, namely, nausea,
vomiting, fatigue and reduced appetite, plausibly falls short of
rendering its representation of STORM not misleading.  Noteworthy,
the FDA apparently found STORM's toxicity data significant in that
the agency suggested as much in the February briefing document and
delayed its decision with respect to the approval of selinexor
until the STORM data could be supplemented by Karyopharm's ongoing
BOSTON trial.  Accordingly, at this stage, the Judge concludes that
the Defendants' STORM-related disclosures were arguably incomplete
for failing fully to reveal the drug's toxicity.

B. The Real World Data

The Plaintiff finally proclaims that Karyopharm's disclosures
relating to the real-world data were misleading, in violation of
federal securities law. First, the Plaintiff challenges as false
and/or materially misleading the Defendants' statement that the
company was following FDA guidance as to the safety information it
included in its NDA because Karyopharm included a RWD study that
was not pre-specified and purportedly had methodological errors.
One major fallacy of that challenge, however, is that the FDA and
Karyopharm agreed at a pre-NDA meeting that the company could
submit RWD for supportive analysis and the Plaintiff fails to
allege any other purpose for which Karyopharm included the RWD
study in its NDA.

Judge Gorton finds that nowhere in the SAC does the Plaintiff
allege plausibly that the Defendants knew the conclusions they
reported from the RWD were false.  Nor does the Plaintiff proffer
factual allegations to support its position that, when the
Defendants submitted the NDA, they knew the real-world data on
which they relied contained methodological errors.  Accordingly,
the Plaintiff has failed to plead any actionable statement
regarding the RWD study.

C. Scienter

To the extent the Plaintiff plausibly alleges an actionable
statement or omission, Judge Gorton holds that he fails adequately
to plead scienter.  Scienter is "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud."  The Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the Defendants' omission of the STORM toxicity
data was highly unreasonable.  The Defendants also made several
informative disclosures to investors which point against scienter.
Moreover, in its 2016 and 2017 Annual Reports, the company cautions
investors that "drug development such as with selinexor entails a
high risk of failure" because 1) it is hard to predict when or if a
drug candidate will prove effective and 2) results of its trials
"could reveal an unacceptably high severity and prevalence of
selinexor-related side effects" that may cause the FDA to reject
its NDA.

D. Section 20(a)

The SAC also asserts a claim for control person liability pursuant
to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the individual
defendants. Section 20(a) imposes joint and several liability on
any person who, "directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable" under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 15 U.S.C. Section
78t(a).  Because the SAC fails to allege an underlying violation of
the federal securities laws, Judge Gorton finds that the amendment
with respect to the Plaintiff's Section 20(a) claim is also
futile.

E. The Securities Act

Finally, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiff has failed to
state claims under the Securities Act because those allegations
also fall short of Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard and,
with respect to Section 11 in particular, the Plaintiff has not
established that he has standing to sue.  The Plaintiff rejoins
that no heightened pleading standard applies to Sections 11 and 15
of the Securities Act.  As to standing, the Plaintiff asserts that
he has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that the
shares of Karyopharm stock he purchased are traceable to the public
offerings.

Judge Gorton finds that the SAC fails to set forth sufficient facts
to permit the reasonable inference that the shares purchased by the
Plaintiff were issued as part of or traceable to the April, 2017,
and May, 2018, public offerings.  Furthermore, none of the
Plaintiff's purchases of Karyopharm stock took place on the day of
either secondary offering and the price per share paid by him never
matched the offering prices.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring claims under the Securities Act and, for that
reason, Counts I and II will be dismissed.

Order

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gorton allowed the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the SAC.  The Plaintiff's SAC is dismissed
without prejudice.  So ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ssbzu2e8 from Leagle.com.


LINDENWOOD UNIVERSITY: Claim for Conversion in Martin Suit Tossed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DYLAN MARTIN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LINDENWOOD UNIVERSITY, Defendant,
Case No. 4:20-CV-1128 RLW (E.D. Mo.), Judge Ronnie L. White of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, granted the Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
with respect to Martin's claim for conversion.

Mr. Martin purports to allege a class action lawsuit against
Lindenwood "on behalf of all people who paid tuition and fees for
the Spring 2020 academic semester at Lindenwood, and who, because
of Defendant's response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019
pandemic, lost the benefit of the education for which they paid,
and/or the services or facilities for which their fees were paid,
without having their tuition and fees refunded to them."

Mr. Martin alleges that, during periods of normal operations,
Lindenwood charges less for online course than for in-person
courses.  Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Lindenwood provided only
online coursework for the Spring 2020 semester after March 11,
2020.

The Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the closure of the
Defendant's facilities, the Defendant has not delivered the
educational services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that
he and the putative class contracted and paid for.  The online
learning options being offered to Lindenwood students are subpar in
practically every aspect, from the lack of facilities, materials,
and access to faculty. Students have been deprived of the
opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue,
feedback, and critique, including but not limited to the
discontinuance of internships and clinical placements.

Mr. Martin contends the online coursework is "in no way the
equivalent of the inperson education that the Plaintiff and the
putative class members contracted and paid for."  Based upon the
decision to mandate remote learning for the balance of the Spring
2020 semester, Martin alleges the "Defendant's educational services
have diminished in value significantly compared to the in-person
education services that it was providing prior to canceling
in-person classes."

The Plaintiff brings a putative class action for "a refund of
tuition and fees for in-person educational services, facilities,
access and/or opportunities that Defendant has not provided."  He
contends that, despite Lindenwood not having a choice to
discontinue in-person classes, Lindenwood "has improperly retained
funds for services that have diminished in value or are not being
provided at all."  Martin's Complaint alleges causes of action for
Breach of Contract (Count I), Unjust Enrichment (Count II), and
Conversion (Count III).

Discussion

I. Educational Malpractice Doctrine

Martin frames his claims as that Lindenwood promised one thing --
an in-person experience for the entire spring 2020 semester -- but
delivered another. He alleges that Lindenwood charged more for
in-person classes than for online tuition.  Martin claims that his
causes of action relate to only these different forms and prices of
education and do "not request any analysis where 'the trier of fact
would have to inquire into the nuances of educational processes and
theories in order to determine whether the alleged representations
were false.'"  He maintains that Lindenwood charges one amount for
online education and another amount for "full-time undergraduate
in-person tuition."

In response, Lindenwood argues that Martin's causes of action must
be dismissed because its website does not differentiate between the
cost of in-person and online learning.  It states that its website
provides pricing for "full-time undergraduate semester tuition" and
"part-time undergraduate tuition."

Judge White finds that Lindenwood's website appears to offer online
programs that are at a different price point than the full-time and
part-time semester tuition programs.  Based upon the website and
Martin's allegations, Lindenwood appears to place a cost difference
between in-person and online learning.  Thus, he finds that Martin
has alleged a cost difference between in-person and online
learning, which would not necessarily invoke the educational
malpractice doctrine.

The Judge also holds that that Martin's Complaint is not barred by
the educational malpractice doctrine.  He finds that Martin's
allegations that the education he received was "substandard" does
not necessarily require the Court's to examine Lindenwood's
pedagogical practices and instruction during the Spring 2020
semester.  Instead, at this early stage, the Judge holds Martin's
allegations that he received an entirely different educational
experience are sufficient.

Thus, the Judge recognizes, as several other courts have, that
Martin's damages may be intertwined with the determination of
whether the remote education provided to Martin and the putative
class was equivalent to the in-person instruction allegedly
promised.  At this early stage of the litigation, however, that
issue is not before the Court.  The Judge finds that Martin's
current allegations thread the needle and state a claim for relief
for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, even under Missouri's
educational malpractice jurisprudence.  As a result, he denies
Lindenwood's Motion to Dismiss the action for failure to state a
claim based upon the educational malpractice doctrine.

II. Count I Breach of Contract

Lindenwood contends that Martin has failed to identify a specific
promise for in-person instruction.  It further notes that "Missouri
courts have not recognized any implied contract between students
and universities."  Lindenwood argues that the promises related to
in-person education outlined by Martin do not constitute
contractual obligations, but are merely "aspirational in nature."

Judge White holds, however, that Lindenwood's promise of in-person
learning alleged by Martin sufficiently states a claim for breach
of contract.  He finds that Martin sufficiently alleges a breach of
contract claim, identifying specific contractual promises made to
in-person students such as Martin.  At this early stage of the
litigation, the Judge holds that Martin alleges that Lindenwood's
publications, "marketing, pricing, agreements, policies, and
established course of conduct" created an expectation that he was
paying for an in-person college experience.  Notably, Martin
alleges he signed up for and paid for a full-semester tuition, not
the on-line pricing option.  Based upon the foregoing, the Judge
holds that Martin alleges Lindenwood promised an in-person
education.  Therefore, he denies Lindenwood's Motion to Dismiss
Martin's breach of contract claim.

III. Count II Unjust Enrichment

Mr. Martin contends that Lindenwood's retention of his tuition
funds was unjust because Lindenwood failed to provide an in-person
educational experience.  He alleges that the retention of his
tuition was unjust, "especially in light of the Defendant's higher
prices for in-person coursework."  Martin further contends that
Lindenwood's retention of the funds was inequitable considering
Lindenwood's "reduced utility costs, reduced maintenance and
staffing requirements, reduced or eliminated hours for hourly
employees, etc."  Finally, Martin notes that Lindenwood received "a
significant bailout from the Federal Government under the CARES
Act" while students continued incurring debt to pay for college.

In response, Lindenwood contends that Martin has not alleged "more
than passive acquiescence, such as fault or undue advantage on the
part of the Defendant" that would make Lindenwood's "retention of
the benefit" unjust.  It notes that Martin has not pleaded an
unjust retention of funds in the Complaint, nor has he identified
"any fault or undue advantage on Lindenwood's part, particularly
when Plaintiff has not alleged that the tuition and fees Lindenwood
collected were used for any other reason than to continue providing
Plaintiff educational services."

Judge White concludes that Martin states a claim for unjust
enrichment based upon his pleading.  He finds that Martin's
allegation that Lindenwood's "retention of his tuition payment and
fees was unjust under the circumstances" is sufficient to withstand
the Motion to Dismiss because "a motion to dismiss tests the
sufficiency of the pleading, not the merits of the case."
Therefore, he denies Lindenwood's Motion to Dismiss Martin's unjust
enrichment claim.

IV. Count III Conversion

Mr. Martin contends he has identified a specific chattel: "the
tuition and fee monies he paid the Defendant in exchange for
in-person educational servicers."  He maintains that his conversion
claim falls within the exception to the rule that money cannot be
described or identified as a specific chattel.  Martin asserts he
"identified the specific sums of money that were converted, namely
the tuition and fees he paid for the Spring 2020 semester, and the
specific purpose for which they were delivered: the provision of an
in-person educational experience."  He contends Lindenwood
improperly diverted his tuition and fees away from his in-person
educational experience and instead utilized the monies for online
education.

Judge White finds that Martin alleges he paid tuition but nowhere
in his Complaint does he allege that his tuition funds were "a
specific fund to be held for a specific purpose."  Rather, he
merely "demands the return of the pro-rated portion of any Spring
Semester 2020 tuition and fees for education services not provided
or diminished in value since Lindenwood shut down."  Martin has not
sufficiently pleaded the elements of conversion, and this claim is
dismissed.

Conclusion

Defendant Lindenwood's Rule 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss is granted
in part and denied in part.  Its Motion to Dismiss is granted as to
Count III for Conversion.  Its Motion to Dismiss is denied in all
other respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/zt2ndk5d from Leagle.com.


LIVANOVA PLC: 2nd Settlement Payment Made in 3T Device Litigation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LivaNova PLC said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2021, that the second settlement payment has been
made in the class action suit related to the company's 3T device.

The Company is currently involved in litigation involving its 3T
device. The litigation includes federal multi-district litigation
in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
various U.S. state court cases and cases in jurisdictions outside
the U.S. A class action, filed in February 2016 in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, consisting
of all Pennsylvania residents who underwent open heart surgery at
WellSpan York Hospital and Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical
Center between 2011 and 2015 and who currently are asymptomatic for
NTM infection, was dismissed on July 16, 2021.

On March 29, 2019, the company announced a settlement framework
that provides for a comprehensive resolution of the personal injury
cases pending in the multi-district litigation in U.S. federal
court, the related class action in federal court, as well as
certain cases in state courts across the United States.

The agreement, which makes no admission of liability, is subject to
certain conditions, including acceptance of the settlement by
individual claimants and provides for a total payment of up to $225
million to resolve the claims covered by the settlement.

Per the agreed-upon terms, the first payment of $135 million was
paid into a qualified settlement fund in July 2019 and the second
payment of $90 million was paid in January 2020.

Cases covered by the settlement are being dismissed as amounts are
disbursed to individual plaintiffs from the qualified settlement
fund.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

LivaNova PLC, a medical device company, designs, develops,
manufactures, and sells therapeutic solutions worldwide. It
operates in two segments, Cardiovascular (CV) and Neuromodulation
(NM). The company was founded in 1987 and is headquartered in
London, the United Kingdom.


LVNV FUNDING: Class Settlement in Norton Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SONYA NORTON, Plaintiff v. LVNV FUNDING, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-05051-DMR (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Donna M. Ryu of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary
approval of a class action settlement.

Plaintiff Sonya Norton filed the putative class action against
Defendants LVNV and Law Office of Harris & Zide ("H&Z") alleging
violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 1692, et seq., and California's Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("Rosenthal Act"), California Civil
Code Section 1788 et seq.  Norton also seeks injunctive relief
under California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), California
Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq.

On Oct. 21, 2008, non-party Arrow Financial Services, LLC filed a
collections action against Norton in San Mateo County Superior
Court, alleging that Norton failed to tender owed amounts to Arrow.
On Dec. 26, 2008, the state court entered a default judgment
against Norton in the amount of $3,986.60.  On Feb. 24, 2012, H&Z
filed a substitution of counsel to appear on behalf of Arrow in the
state court action.  On May 17, 2012, H&Z caused a writ of
execution to issue from a state court in the amount of $5,853.07.

Ms. Norton's wages were garnished in the amount of $323.55 in
August and September 2012.  The Defendants sought and obtained five
more writs of execution between Dec. 27, 2013 and Sept. 1, 2017.
On Nov. 29, 2017, Norton filed a claim of exemption in response to
the garnishment of her wages.  Through December 2017, the
Defendants allegedly garnished over $1,000 from Norton's paycheck.
On Dec. 15, 2017, an attorney at Housing and Economic Rights
Advocates ("HERA") wrote a letter to H&Z on Norton's behalf stating
that the wage garnishment appeared to be improper because, unknown
to Norton, Arrow had filed a Certificate of Cancellation with the
California Secretary of State in Oct. 10, 2012.  No other party had
established itself as Arrow's assignee of record.  H&Z subsequently
filed a notice terminating the garnishment of Norton's wages.
Norton was "reimbursed some, but not all" of her garnished wages.

On Feb. 13, 2018, an H&Z attorney informed Norton's attorney at
HERA that H&Z represented LVNV rather than Arrow.  According to
Norton, LVNV had acquired the judgment against her from Arrow in
2012 but did not disclose this fact to the state court or to Norton
until 2018.  On May 11, 2018, Norton filed a motion in the state
court action to quash the prior writs of execution.  On June 29,
2018, the court granted the unopposed motion on the grounds that
"no acknowledgment of assignment of judgment has been filed as
required by Code of Civil Procedure Section 673."  On Sept. 7,
2018, H&Z filed an Acknowledgment of Assignment of Judgment in the
state court action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
Sectio 673; it acknowledges the assignment of the judgment against
Norton from Arrow to LVNV.

In the instant lawsuit, Norton contends that the Defendants were
prohibited from taking judicial action to enforce the judgment
without first complying with section 673.  She asserts individual
and class claims under the FDCPA, the Rosenthal Act, and the UCL.

Ms. Norton filed a first amended complaint as of right on Aug. 27,
2018.  On Oct. 12, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss the first
amended complaint.  The Court granted in part and denied in part
the motion.  Norton filed a second amended complaint on March 18,
2019, which the Defendants again moved to dismiss.  The Court
granted in part and denied in part the second motion to dismiss.
Norton filed the operative complaint on Sept. 10, 2019.  On March
4, 2020, LVNV filed a motion to amend its answer to the TAC to add
setoff as an affirmative defense.  On May 19, 2020, the court
granted the motion.  LVNV filed an amended answer to the TAC on
June 10, 2020.

On Oct. 6, 2020, the Court certified a class encompassing all
California residents who meet the following conditions:

      a. LVNV Funding, LLC, represented by Law Office of Harris &
Zide, took judicial action (including obtaining Writs of Execution,
wage garnishment, and bank levy) after Aug. 17, 2014 (four years
prior to the filing of the action) to collect a judgment based on a
consumer debt obtained in a California court;

      b. Arrow Financial Services, LLC was the plaintiff of record
at the time the judgment was entered; and

      c. LVNV Funding, LLC did not file an Assignment of Judgment
in conformity with California Code of Civil Procedure Section 673
or otherwise become the assignee of record.

The four-year class period corresponds to the four-year statute of
limitations for UCL claims.  The Court also certified a subclass
defined identically to the Class except the class period is limited
to Aug. 17, 2017 to the present, corresponding to the one-year
statute of limitations applicable to the Rosenthal Act and the
FDCPA.  On Dec. 15, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
the Defendants' petition for permission to appeal the class
certification order.

The parties participated in two mediation sessions.  The first was
held on Feb. 12, 2020, with mediator Peter Borkon and the second
took place on Nov. 13, 2020, with mediator Celia McGuinness.  The
parties reached a settlement in principle on Dec. 17, 2020.

Ms. Norton filed a first motion for preliminary approval on March
11, 2021.  The Court held a hearing on the motion on April 22,
2021.  During the hearing, the Court raised several concerns about
the settlement.  The parties agreed to withdraw the motion and
renegotiate certain terms.  Norton submitted the finalized
agreement with the current motion.  The Court held a hearing on the
new motion for preliminary approval on July 8, 2021.

The Agreement contains the following material terms.  The
Defendants estimate that there are 481 Class Members and 276
Subclass Members.  They have collected a total of $653,143.19 from
Class Members through judicial action, including by obtaining writs
of execution, wage garnishment, and bank levy.  Each Class Member,
upon submitting a valid claim, will receive "the total amount
collected from them by or on behalf of Defendants through judicial
action to enforce the judgment entered against them and in favor of
Arrow, including all costs collected, plus 7% interest on all
amounts collected to be calculated from the date of collection by
Defendants."  In addition, Subclass Members who submit a valid
claim will receive a pro rata share of $50,000.

The Agreement also provides for relief that does not require the
submission of a claim form.  The Defendants have incurred a total
of $169,904 in court costs in connection with their debt collection
actions.  For judgments against Class Members with "open" accounts,
the Agreement provides that Defendants will delete all court costs
and interest accrued on those costs from their system.  The
Defendants will not attempt to collect on those amounts or sell the
right to collect on them.  They represent that 112 Class Members
have open accounts.  For judgments against Class Members with
"closed" accounts, the Defendants "will make no further efforts to
collect the balances owed pursuant to those judgments, and LVNV
(the owner of the judgments), will not sell or transfer those
judgments."  The Defendants represent that 342 Class Members have
closed accounts.

The Class Members will receive the Class Notice by mail.  The
Notice explains the recipient's various legal options with respect
to this case, including submitting a Claim Form, requesting
exclusion, objecting, attending the court hearing, or doing
nothing.  It also informs the Class Members that they have 75 days
to fill out and return the Claim Form to receive any cash benefits
from the settlement.

In order to receive the monetary benefits described, Class Members
must submit a Claim Form.  The Claim Form explains what "consumer
debt" means and provides examples.  The form asks, "Was the
financial obligation you were sued for by Arrow a 'consumer debt?'"
and provides three answer options: "Yes," "No," and "I don't know."
It then explains that checking "Yes" will entitle the Class Member
to the return of the money that was collected from them, plus
interest.  The Claim Form also advises the recipient whether they
are a member of the Subclass, and if so, that checking "Yes" will
entitle them to a share of $50,000.  It also requests the
claimant's name, address, and last four digits of their Social
Security Number and provides contact information for Class counsel
and the Class Administrator.

CPT Group, Inc. will be the settlement administrator.  The
Administrator is responsible for (1) providing any notice required
by the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"); (2) mailing the Class
Notice; and (3) administering the settlement website, Claim Forms,
and all payments required under the Agreement.  The Defendants will
be jointly responsible for paying all notice and administrative
costs, and all funds necessary for the Administrator to make
payments to valid claimants.

The Defendants will provide a list of all potential Class Members
to the Administrator within 15 days of the court issuing an order
of preliminary approval.  By the deadline to send the Notice, the
Administrator will create a settlement website that will provide
information about the settlement and the process for submitting
Claim Forms.  The Administrator will also maintain a telephone
number that Class Members can call for further information.

The Administrator will review the received Claim Forms and confirm
that each is timely submitted and in the correct form.  The
Administrator will explain why it accepted or rejected each Claim
Form and will make available to counsel for both sides any
documentation that supports the determination.  If either side
disagrees with the determination, counsel for both sides will meet
and confer to attempt to reach a resolution.  If they cannot reach
an agreement on how to treat a disputed Claim Form, they will
jointly raise the issue with the court in the motion for final
approval.

The counsel for both sides will confer with respect to the
appropriate payment to each claimant.  The check payments will only
be negotiable for 90 days, which will be noted on the checks.
Within 45 days after final settlement is entered, the Administrator
will issue checks for the appropriate amount to claimants.  The
Class Members who do not cash their checks within 90 days will be
ineligible to receive any payment under the Agreement but will
still be bound by the release of claims.  The aggregate amount of
any uncashed checks will be distributed to the cy pres recipient,
the Katharine & George Alexander Community Law Center in San Jose,
California.

Potential Class Members may choose to exclude themselves from the
Class by sending the Administrator a written statement.  The
Administrator will provide copies of all valid opt-out forms to
counsel for both sides within 10 days after the deadline to respond
to the Class Notice.

Potential Class Members may also choose to object to the Agreement
without excluding themselves from the Class.  The Class Members who
do not file and serve timely written objections will be deemed to
have waived any objections and will be foreclosed from making any
objections (by appeal or otherwise) to the Agreement.

Ms. Norton intends to make an application to the court for an
incentive award of up to $7,000.  The Defendants agree to not
oppose the application as long as it does not exceed $2,000 but
reserve their right to oppose any application for a greater amount.
  They will be jointly liable for any incentive award approved by
the court. Id. While Norton is entitled to the other benefits
provided by the Agreement, she will not receive any of the $50,000
that is to be distributed to Subclass Members.

The Class counsel intend to file a motion for attorneys' fees and
costs for an amount not to exceed $241,426.58, representing
$239,373 in attorneys' fees and $2,053.58 in costs.  The Defendants
will not oppose the application as long as it does not request a
greater amount.  The attorneys' fees award will be paid separate
and apart from payments to the Class and will not reduce the total
amount awarded under the Agreement.

Judge Ryu granted the motion for preliminary approval.  The
Agreement is preliminarily approved as fair, adequate, and
reasonable pursuant to Rule 23(e).  Plaintiff Sonya Norton was
previously appointed to serve as Class Representative for the
Class.  The Counsel at the Consumer Law Office of William E.
Kennedy and Housing Economic Rights Advocates was previously
appointed to serve as Class Counsel.  CPT Group, Inc. is appointed
as the Claim Administrator.

The proposed Claim Forms and forms of notice are approved as to
form and content.  The parties will have discretion to jointly make
non-material minor revisions to the Claim Forms or the class
notices.  Responsibility regarding settlement administration,
including, but not limited to, notice and related procedures, will
be performed by the Claim Administrator, subject to the oversight
of the parties and this court as described in the Agreement.  All
Class Members who wish to submit a claim must do so in the manner
specified in the Agreement by 75 days after the date of the mailing
of the Notice.

The procedures for Class Members to exclude themselves from or
object to the Agreement are approved.  Any request for exclusion by
a Class Member must be postmarked or submitted electronically on
the settlement website by the Notice Response deadline, and in
compliance with the terms of the Agreement.  Any objection by a
Class Member must be filed with the court by the same date, and in
compliance with the terms of the Agreement.  Currently, the Class
Notice states that objections are due 14 days before the final
approval hearing. The parties will update the Class Notice to
provide that the deadline to file objections is the same as the
Notice Response Deadline.

The Judge directed the Class Counsel to file a list of Class
Members who have requested exclusion from the Settlement in a valid
and timely manner by 7 days after the Notice Response deadline.

The parties will file any memoranda or other materials in support
of final approval of the Agreement, including in response to any
timely and valid objection to the Agreement, no later than 21 days
after the Notice Response deadline. Such materials will be served
on the Class counsel, the Defendants' counsel, and on any member of
the Class (or their counsel, if represented by counsel) to whose
objection to the Agreement the memoranda or other materials
respond.

Ms. Norton's claims against the Defendants are stayed.

Pending final determination of whether the Settlement should be
approved, Norton and each Class Member, and any person purportedly
acting on behalf of any Class Member(s), are enjoined from
commencing, pursuing, maintaining, enforcing, or proceeding, either
directly or indirectly, any Released Claims in any judicial,
administrative, arbitral, or other forum, against any of the
Released Parties, provided that this injunction will not apply to
the claims of Class members who have timely and validly requested
to be excluded from the Class.  This injunction will remain in
force until the Effective Date or until such time as the parties
notify the court that the Agreement has been terminated.

In the event that the proposed Agreement is not finally approved by
the court, or in the event that the Agreement becomes null and void
or terminates pursuant to its terms, the order and all orders
entered in connection herewith will become null and void, will be
of no further force and effect, and will not be used or referred to
for any purposes whatsoever in this litigation or in any other case
or controversy, in such event the Agreement and all negotiations
and proceedings directly related thereto will be deemed to be
without prejudice to the rights of any and all of the parties, who
will be restored to their respective positions as of the date and
time immediately preceding the execution of the Agreement

The Counsel for the parties are authorized to utilize all
reasonable procedures in connection with the administration of the
Agreement which are not materially inconsistent with either the
order or the terms of the Agreement.

The following deadlines will apply:

      a. Deadline for Defendants to provide Class list to - 15 days
after Preliminary Administrator Approval entered

      b. Deadline for Administrator to mail Notice to Class Members
- 60 days after Preliminary Approval entered

      c. Deadline for Class Members to submit objections/requests -
75 days after Notice mailing for exclusion date

      d. Deadline for Class Members to submit Claim Forms - 75 days
after Notice mailing date

      e. Deadline for Class counsel to file a list of exclusions -
7 days after Notice Response deadline

      f. Deadline for Class counsel to file motion for final
approval - Within 21 days after Notice Response deadline

      g. Final approval hearing - Jan. 13, 2022, at 1:00 p.m.  The
final approval hearing will take place via Zoom videoconference.

In the Class Notice and any other settlement documents reflecting
the time and date of the final approval hearing, the parties will
list the following hearing information:

      Webinar Access: All counsel, members of the public, and media
may access the webinar information at
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/dmr.

      General Order 58: Persons granted access to court proceedings
held by telephone or videoconference are reminded that
photographing, recording, and rebroadcasting of court proceedings,
including screenshots or other visual copying of a hearing, is
absolutely prohibited.

      Zoom Guidance and Setup:
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/zoom/.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/9kdxkjv2 from Leagle.com.


MARRIOTT INTL: Bid to Quash in Hall Suit Moved to S.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD HALL, Plaintiff v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-mc-80165-TSH (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Thomas S. Hixon of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants non-party Julie Drassinower's request
to transfer her motion to quash to the Southern District of
California.

The dispute arises out of a Rule 45 subpoena the Defendant issued
to non-party Julie Drassinower in a putative class action pending
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
captioned Todd Hall et al. v. Marriott International, Inc., Case
No. 3:19-cv-01715-JLS-AHG.

The Hall Action is brought on behalf of a putative class of
consumers who allege Marriott engages in false and deceptive
advertising in the way that it represents the prices for its hotel
rooms, services, and amenities. Drassinower served as a named
plaintiff in the Hall Action before she withdrew on May 27, 2021,
when the plaintiffs filed their operative Consolidated Third
Amended Class Action Complaint. Marriott issued a deposition
subpoena to Drassinower on June 10, 2021, with the deposition
noticed for July 19, 2021 in San Francisco, California.

Ms. Drassinower argues that permitting the requested discovery
would (1) require her to devote significant time and effort to
testifying at a deposition, (2) constitute an undue burden on her
as an absent class member, and (3) elicit irrelevant testimony that
bears on no issues in the underlying Hall Action. She argues the
circumstances surrounding the booking of Marriott hotel rooms by
absent class members—and particularly those of a single absent
Class member -- are not discoverable, and that Marriott's subpoena
"appears to be nothing more than a seriously belated tactic to
explore the reasons underlying Ms. Drassinower's withdrawal as a
named plaintiff, facts that have no bearing on this litigation or
the Hall Plaintiffs' forthcoming motion for class certification."

In the alternative to the Court resolving her motion to quash,
Drassinower consents to having her motion transferred to the
Southern District of California under Rule 45(f).

Discussion

Judge Hixon explains that Drassinower is the "person subject to the
subpoena" and not only does she consent to the transfer, she
actually requests it. Further, "Rule 45(f) nowhere contemplates
that parties seeking a subpoena can or would object to transfer
back to the court where they originally filed suit, since they had
presumably chosen their preferred jurisdiction in the first
instance."

Thus, under Rule 45's plain language, the Court (the compliance
court) may transfer Marriott's motion to the court hearing the
underlying case. Under these circumstances, Rule 45(f) presents no
bar to transfer the motion to enforce compliance back to the
issuing court, and Drassinower's proactive consent to the transfer
provides sufficient grounds for this Court to grant her motion to
transfer.

Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Hixon grants Drassinower's request
to transfer her motion to quash. The Clerk of Court is directed to
transfer the case to the Southern District of California for
consideration of Drassinower's motion to quash in the pending Hall
Action. The Clerk will close the file in the matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ydcnbjdy from Leagle.com.


MDL 2543: Co-Lead Counsel Ordered to Fix Concerns in GM Switch Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION,
Case No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Jesse M. Furman of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issues an
order regarding Christopher Jones' concerns about the class action
settlement administrator.

The Court has received an email, as well as a voicemail, from an
alleged member of the settlement class, Jones, raising concerns
about the class action settlement administrator.  It will provide
copies of the same to Co-Lead Counsel.  The Co-Lead Counsel will
promptly take steps to address the class member's concerns and will
file a letter updating the Court on such efforts within 30 days.
The Co-Lead Counsel will serve a copy of the Order on the class
member at the email address provided.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4kbav8p8 from Leagle.com.


MDL 2795: $55M Centurylink Securities Class Suit Deal Has Final Nod
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: CENTURYLINK SALES PRACTICES AND SECURITIES
LITIGATION. This Document Relates to MDL No. 17-2795 (MJD/KMM),
Civil File No. 18-296 (MJD/KMM), Judge Michael J. Davis of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota granted:

    (i) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
        Settlement and Plan of Allocation; and

   (ii) the Lead Counsel's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees
        and Litigation Expenses.

CenturyLink is the country's third-largest telecommunications
company with millions of customers.  Lead Plaintiff and Class
Representative the State of Oregon by and through the Oregon State
Treasurer and the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Board
("Oregon") operates and oversees public funds for the benefit of
retired public employees.  The Oregon Public Employee Retirement
Fund is a state pension fund for retired public employees.  Oregon
purchased CenturyLink securities during the Class Period.  
Plaintiff and Class Representative Fernando Alberto Vildosola, is
trustee for the AUFV Trust U/A/D 02/19/2009.  AUFV Trust U/A/D
02/19/2009 purchased CenturyLink's 7.60% Senior Notes due Sept. 15,
2039 ("7.60% Notes") during the Class Period.

According to Vildosola and Oregon, for a number of years,
CenturyLink engaged in systemic "cramming" of customer accounts, by
adding services to customers' accounts without authorization,
deceiving customers about the prices they would be charged, and
misquoting prices by failing to disclose that "bundles" included
fees for optional services that the customers did not need or
authorize.  CenturyLink potentially overbilled 3.5 million
customers, representing over half of its broadband subscribers and
one-third of its 12 million wireline subscribers.

Overall, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants made false and
misleading statements concerning CenturyLink's allegedly fraudulent
billing practices and its financial condition on dozens of
different dates from March 1, 2013 through July 12, 2017.  As a
result, the prices of publicly traded CenturyLink common stock and
7.60% Notes were artificially inflated and then, the prices of
those securities declined when the truth was revealed in a series
of disclosures on June 16, 2017, June 19, 2017, and July 12, 2017.

In February 2018, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred four federal securities actions to the Court for
inclusion in MDL No. 2795: Craig v. CenturyLink, Inc., Civil File
No. 18-296 (MJD/KMM); Scott v. CenturyLink Inc., Civil File No.
18-297 (MJD/KMM); Thummeti v. CenturyLink, Inc., Civil File No.
18-298 (MJD/KMM); and Inter-Marketing Group USA Inc. v.
CenturyLink, Inc., Civil File No. 18-299 (MJD/KMM).  Before
transfer to the Court, on Oct. 19, 2017, the District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana granted the four potential lead
plaintiffs' motions to consolidate the Craig, Scott, and Thummeti
cases.  On Oct. 20, the Western District of Louisiana court issued
an Order appointing Oregon as Lead Plaintiff in the consolidated
cases and appointing Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP and
Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C. as Lead Counsel.  On April 20,
2018, the Court consolidated IMG with the previously consolidated
securities actions.

On June 25, 2018, Lead Plaintiff Oregon and Plaintiff Vildosola
filed a Consolidated Securities Class Action Complaint against
Defendants CenturyLink and the Executive Defendants.  The Complaint
alleges: Count 1: Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder (against Defendants
CenturyLink, Post, Ewing, Cole, Puckett, and Douglas); and Count 2:
Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act (against Defendants
Post, Ewing, Cole, Puckett, Douglas, and Bailey).

On July 30, 2019, the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in
its entirety.

On Sept. 14, 2020, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification and certified a class consisting of: All
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired publicly
traded CenturyLink, Inc. common stock or 7.60% Senior Notes due
September 15, 2039, during the period between March 1, 2013 to July
12, 2017, inclusive and who were damaged thereby.  The Court also
appointed Oregon and Vildosola as Class Representatives and
appointed Bernstein Litowitz and Stoll Berne as Class Counsel.

On Sept. 28, 2020, the Defendants filed a petition with the Eighth
Circuit seeking interlocutory appeal of the Court's class
certification order and, on Sept. 29, they filed a motion to stay
discovery with the Court.  The Plaintiffs filed oppositions to the
petition and motion to stay, and, on Oct. 27, 2020, the Eighth
Circuit denied the Defendants' petition.

In February 2020, the parties participated in a full-day, in-person
mediation before former Judge Layn R. Phillips, which did not
result in a settlement.   In early November 2020, the parties again
participated in mediation with Judge Phillips.  Judge Phillips
issued a Mediator's recommendation that the action be settled for
$55 million in cash, which led to compromise by the parties.  On
Nov. 4, 2020, the parties reached an agreement on the amount of the
settlement.  They continued to negotiate on the other terms of the
settlement and executed a Term Sheet on Nov. 19, 2020.  They signed
the formal Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement on Jan. 29,
2021.

The Settlement applies to the same Class that was previously
certified by the Court: All persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired publicly traded CenturyLink, Inc. common stock
or 7.60% Senior Notes due Sept. 15, 2039, during the period between
March 1, 2013 to July 12, 2017, inclusive, and who were damaged
thereby.

The Settlement requires a $55 million Settlement Amount that will
be paid into an escrow account.  The "Settlement Fund" means the
Settlement Amount plus any interest earned thereon after being paid
into the Escrow Account.

The Settlement Fund will be used to pay: (a) any Taxes; (b) any
Notice and Administration Costs; (c) any Litigation Expenses
awarded by the Court; (d) any attorneys' fees awarded by the Court;
and (e) any other costs and fees approved by the Court.  The
balance remaining in the Settlement Fund, that is, the Net
Settlement Fund, will be distributed to Authorized Claimants.

The Settlement is not a claims-made settlement.  If there are funds
remaining after the Claims Administrator has attempted to
redistribute remaining funds to Authorized Claimants, those funds
will be contributed to a non-sectarian, not-for-profit, 501(c)(3)
organization recommended by Lead Counsel and approved by the
Court.

The Plaintiffs' damages expert developed the Plan of Allocation
with Lead Counsel.  The expert calculated the estimated amount of
artificial inflation in the closing prices of the publicly traded
CenturyLink common stock and 7.60% Notes during the Class Period
which allegedly was proximately caused by Defendants' allegedly
materially false and misleading statements and omissions.
Recognized Loss Amounts are based primarily on the difference in
the amount of alleged artificial inflation in the respective prices
of CenturyLink Securities at the time of purchase or acquisition
and at the time of sale or the difference between the actual
purchase price and sale price.

In order to have a Recognized Loss Amount under the Plan of
Allocation, a Class Member who acquired CenturyLink common stock or
7.60% Notes during the Class Period must have held the respective
CenturyLink Security over a date on which corrective information
was released to the market (June 16, 2017; June 19, 2017; and July
12, 2017) and partially removed the artificial inflation from the
price of the security.  The specific formula is set forth in
Paragraphs 54-65 of the Proposed Class Notice and Table A to the
Proposed Class Notice.

If the total of Recognized Claims of all Authorized Claimants is
greater than the Net Settlement Fund, each Authorized Claimant will
receive their pro rata share of the Net Settlement Fund.  If the
total of Recognized Claims of all Authorized Claimants is less than
the Net Settlement Fund, the excess amount of the Net Settlement
Fund will be distributed pro rata to all Authorized Claimants
entitled to receive payment.  If an Authorized Claimant's
Distribution Amount is less than $10.00, no distribution will be
made to that Authorized Claimant.

The Plaintiffs' Counsel's attorneys' fees and litigation expenses
will be paid out of the Settlement Fund.  Lead Counsel will apply
to the Court for an award of attorneys' fees to be distributed
among all Plaintiffs' Counsel in an amount not to exceed 25% of the
Settlement Fund.  Lead Counsel will also apply for payment of
Litigation Expenses incurred not to exceed $2 million.

On March 18, 2021, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement.  Pursuant to the
Preliminary Approval Order, objections to the settlement were
required to be filed 21 days before the hearing.

No objections have been filed.  Forty-nine potential Class Members
have asked to opt out.  Proof of CAFA notice was filed on July 13.
The deadline to mail a claim for payment under the Settlement is
Aug. 13, 2021.

The Plaintiffs now move for final approval of the Settlement, and
Lead Counsel moves for an award of attorneys' fees of 25% of the
Settlement Fund to the Plaintiffs' Counsel; $888,775.83 for
litigation expenses; and costs and expenses incurred by the Class
Representatives ($40,763.69 for Oregon and $21,375.00 for
Vildosola).  Epiq received 49 requests for exclusion representing
500,608.437 eligible shares of CenturyLink common stock purchased
during the Class Period.  No objections to the Settlement or
attorneys' fee request were received.

Judge Davis heard oral argument on July 20, 2021.  Based upon the
files, records, and proceedings therein, the Judge granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
and Plan of Allocation and the Lead Counsel's Motion for an Award
of Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses.

Judge Davis finds and concludes that the Plan of Allocation is, in
all respects, fair and reasonable to the Class.  Accordingly, he
approves the Plan of Allocation proposed by the Plaintiffs.  Any
appeal or any challenge affecting the Court's approval of the Plan
of Allocation will in no way disturb or affect the finality of the
Judgment.

The Plaintiffs' Counsel are awarded attorneys' fees in the amount
of 25% of the Settlement Fund, which sum the Judge finds to be fair
and reasonable.  The Plaintiffs' Counsel are also awarded
$888,775.83 in payment of litigation expenses to be paid from the
Settlement Fund, which sum the Judge finds to be fair and
reasonable.  The Lead Counsel will allocate the attorneys' fees
awarded amongst the Plaintiffs' Counsel in a manner which they, in
good faith, believe reflects the contributions of such counsel to
the institution, prosecution, and settlement of the Action.

The Lead Plaintiff and Class Representative the State of Oregon by
and through the Oregon State Treasurer and the Oregon Public
Employee Retirement Board, on behalf of the Oregon Public Employee
Retirement Fund, is hereby awarded $40,763.69 from the Settlement
Fund as reimbursement for its reasonable costs and expenses
directly related to its representation of the Class.

Named Plaintiff and Class Representative Fernando Alberto
Vildosola, as trustee for the AUFV Trust U/A/D 02/19/2009, is
awarded $21,375 from the Settlement Fund as reimbursement for his
reasonable costs and expenses directly related to his
representation of the Class.

Any appeal or any challenge affecting the Court's approval
regarding any attorneys' fees and expenses application will in no
way disturb or affect the finality of the Judgment.

In the event that the Settlement is terminated or the Effective
Date of the Settlement otherwise fails to occur, the Order will be
rendered null and void to the extent provided by the Stipulation.

Exclusive jurisdiction is retained over the parties and the Class
Members for all matters relating to the Action, including the
administration, interpretation, effectuation, or enforcement of the
Stipulation and the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Memorandum of Law &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/wct55s8u from
Leagle.com.

Michael D. Blatchley -- michaelb@blbglaw.com -- John C. Browne --
johnb@blbglaw.com -- and Michael Mathai --
michael.mathai@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
LLP; Keith S. Dubanevich, Timothy S. DeJong, Keil M. Mueller, and
Lydia Anderson-Dana, Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C.; Special
Assistant Attorneys General and Counsel for Lead Plaintiff the
State of Oregon by and through the Oregon State Treasurer and the
Oregon Public Employee Retirement Board, on behalf of the Oregon
Public Employee Retirement Fund, Counsel for Plaintiff Fernando
Vildosola, and Lead Counsel for the Class; and Richard A.
Lockridge, Gregg M. Fishbein, and Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, Lockridge
Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Liaison Counsel for Plaintiffs.

Patrick E. Gibbs -- pgibbs@cooley.com -- Douglas P. Lobel --
dlobel@cooley.com -- David A. Vogel -- dvogel@cooley.com --, Sarah
M. Lightdale -- slightdale@cooley.com -- Ryan Blair --
rblair@cooley.com -- and Dana A. Moss, Cooley LLP; William A.
McNab, Thomas H. Boyd, and David M. Aafedt, Winthrop & Weinstine,
P.A.; and Jerry W. Blackwell, Blackwell Burke P.A.; Counsel for
Defendants CenturyLink, Inc., Glen F. Post, III, R. Stewart Ewing,
Jr., David D. Cole, Karen Puckett, Dean J. Douglas, and G. Clay
Bailey.


MEDICAL CITY: N.D. Texas Grants Bid to Dismiss De Leon Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PEARL DE LEON, on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MEDICAL CITY HEALTHCARE; and
MEDICAL CITY LAS COLINAS, Defendants, Civil Action No.
3:19-CV-01574-X (N.D. Tex.), Judge Brantley Starr of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas
Division:

    (i) denies De Leon filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
        Jurisdiction;

   (ii) grants Medical City Las Colinas' 12(b)(1) Motion to
        Dismiss;

  (iii) grants Medical City Healthcare's  12(b)(1) Motion to
        Dismiss; and

   (iv) denies without prejudice the Defendants' 12(c) Motion for
        Judgment on the Pleadings.

Ms. De Leon sued Medical City Healthcare and Medical City Las
Colinas alleging that the Defendants charged her an undisclosed
surcharge for being treated at their facility. The Defendants
removed the lawsuit to federal court via the Class Action Fairness
Act.

Medical City Las Colinas operates a hospital with an emergency
room. The hospital charges emergency room patients a surcharge,
also referred to as the facility fee, for receiving treatment at
the emergency room. The fee is calculated at one of five levels
according to the seriousness and complexity of the patient's
condition and is charged in addition to the itemized charges for
individual items of treatment or service the hospital provides to
the patient. Patients sign a financial agreement before receiving
treatment. The parties dispute whether the financial agreement
sufficiently discloses the facility fee surcharge.

Ms. De Leon received treatment at the hospital's emergency room in
fall 2017. She signed the hospital's form financial agreement, but
she alleges that neither the agreement nor any signage or staff
notified her about the facility fee. After treatment, De Leon
received a medical bill that included a $1,858.25 surcharge.

Ms. De Leon then filed the lawsuit asserting claims under the
Declaratory Judgment Act and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
She requests the Court grants her declaratory relief and several
injunctions preventing the Defendants from billing the facility fee
without sufficient disclosure ahead of treatment or collecting
facility fees charged without proper disclosure.

Ms. De Leon filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
arguing that an exception to Class Action Fairness Act jurisdiction
applies. Medical City Las Colinas filed a 12(b)(1) Motion to
Dismiss and 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, as did
Medical City Healthcare.

Discussion

A. De Leon's Motion to Dismiss

Ms. De Leon's motion asks the Court to dismiss the case without
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the case falls
into the local controversy exception to the Class Action Fairness
Act. In her Reply brief, however, De Leon walks back the assertion,
stating that she "agrees the case should remain in federal court as
a practical matter" and explaining that she filed the motion due to
"her concern about the potential exceptions to diversity
jurisdiction found in the Class Action Fairness Act that might be
raised at a later time." And, as the Defendants point out, the
Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that an exception to
the Class Action Fairness Act jurisdiction applies, and they must
raise the exception within a reasonable time.

In the case, De Leon waited over a year to raise the potential
applicability of the exception and did not present any evidence
demonstrating that the exception actually applies.  Therefore,
Judge Starr determines that De Leon failed her burden to establish
the applicability of an exception to jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act and DENIES De Leon's motion to dismiss.

B. The Defendants' Motions to Dismiss

The Defendants argue that De Leon lacks standing to sue, and
therefore the case does not present a justiciable "case or
controversy" for which the Court's Article III jurisdiction could
attach. Specifically, they contend that De Leon did not suffer an
injury in fact that the Court can redress. De Leon argues that her
injuries in fact are (1) the invasion of her right to be free from
financial injury (i.e., the cost of the allegedly
less-than-sufficiently disclosed surcharge) and (2) her right to be
free from undisclosed charges.

Judge Starr holds that the potential future controversy is merely
"conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent" on other events, and
therefore insufficient to create standing to seek prospective
relief.  He also holds that he cannot redress an injury when the
plaintiff does not seek a remedy that can redress that harm.
Without more clarity from De Leon's complaint, he cannot determine
that it has Article III jurisdiction over the case.

Therefore, the Judge grants the Defendants' motions to dismiss. But
he is dismissing De Leon's complaint without prejudice and allowing
repleading. If De Leon wishes to use the $4.05 postage expense as
her basis for standing, she may file an amended complaint within 28
days that identifies this injury and requests a correlating
remedy.

C. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings

The Defendants also filed motions for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c). Because De Leon has not yet established the
Court's Article III jurisdiction over this case, the Court cannot
reach the merits of motions. Therefore, Judge Starr denies without
prejudice the Rule 12(c) motions.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Starr denies De Leon's motion to
dismiss, grants Medical City Healthcare and Medical City Las
Colinas's motions to dismiss, and denies without prejudice Medical
City Healthcare and Medical City Las Colinas's motions for judgment
on the pleadings. He dismissed without prejudice De Leon's
complaint but allows De Leon to file an amended complaint within 28
days with changes limited to addressing the jurisdictional issues
identified in the order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3dac9r8j from
Leagle.com.


MICHIGAN: District Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Pearson v. MDOC
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, MACHELLE PEARSON, MARIA SHELDON, and RACHELL GARWOOD,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants, and
REBECCA SMITH, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. CORIZON HEALTH, INC., et al., Defendants, Case Nos.
19-10707, 19-10771 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Victoria A. Roberts of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division, denies the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.

Machelle Pearson, Maria Sheldon, Rachel Garwood, Rebecca Smith, and
other similarly situated women, are either current or former
inmates at the Women's Huron Valley Correctional Facility ("WHV").
They filed the civil rights class action under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983.

The Plaintiffs and the putative classes are current and former
inmates of WHV located in Washtenaw County, Michigan.  The facility
is the only women's prison in the State of Michigan and houses more
than 2,000 women at any given time.  The Plaintiffs describe WHV as
overcrowded, filthy and a breeding ground for communicable diseases
and pests.

The Plaintiffs challenge what they describe as inhumane, dangerous,
and unconstitutional conditions endured by female inmates at WHV.
These conditions, they allege, led to an outbreak of Sarcoptes
scabiei ("scabies"); where several women became infected; many
others were exposed.  The Plaintiffs say that despite their
grievances, the Defendants failed to provide access to adequate
medical care and resources to properly examine, test, and treat the
women, which allowed the infestation to spread.  Their claimed
damages include unbearable itching, pain, scarring, infections and
mental anguish.

The Plaintiffs allege that from 2016-2019 multiple women complained
about the symptoms, but their requests for treatment largely were
ignored by prison staff.  They say that testing in the spring of
2018 which did not disclose Scabies resulted from the Defendants'
failure to train their health officials on or properly execute
Michigan's Department of Community Health, Scabies Prevention and
Control Manual or other applicable scabies protocols. They say they
were denied appropriate medical attention and Corizon and MDOC
staff failed to adequately address the infestation.

On March 31, 2021, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Nunc Pro Tunc Order, giving them leave to reopen the case and to
file Plaintiffs' Amended Consolidated Master Class Action
Complaint.  In three separate filings, Defendants Jeffrey Bomber,
Rickey Coleman, Craig Hutchinson, Robert Lacy, Keith Papendick,
James Blessman, and Carmen McIntyre filed motions to dismiss
challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).

Broadly, the Defendants request that the Court dismisses the claims
against them in their official capacities because they are
duplicative of claims brought against the MDOC and Corizon Health,
Inc.  Secondly, they argue that the Plaintiffs failed to state a
viable Monell claim.  Finally, Defendants McIntrye and Blessman
claim that the Plaintiffs' Amended Consolidated Master Class Action
Complaint alleges a deficient medical claim.

Discussion

A. Jeffrey Bomber's Motion to Dismiss.

Jeffrey Bomber served as Corizon State Medical's acting director.
In this capacity, Bomber oversaw all of Corizon's health care
professionals in the MDOC.

The Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges Bomber violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by acting with deliberate
indifference towards their medical concerns.  They sue Bomber in
both his individual and official capacities.

Bomber says the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against
him in his individual capacity because there are no allegations
that Bomber did anything outside the scope of his official duties.
Bomber says the Plaintiffs' official capacity claims against him
are duplicative of their claims against Corizon and should be
dismissed as well.

The Plaintiffs respond with two arguments.  They argue first that
the Court, in its March 31, 2021 order, already ruled that
Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims against Bomber in his
individual capacity -- and it should not reconsider this issue.
Secondly, they say Rule 8, permits parties to set out two or more
statements of a claim or defense -- alternatively or hypothetically
-- either in a single count or defense or in separate ones.  They
add that Bomber should be held publicly accountable and that
Plaintiffs' claims against him in his official capacity do not
prejudice Bomber.

Judge Roberts assesses whether the Plaintiffs' claims are plausible
on their face.  He finds that while Bomber asks the Court to
dismiss the official capacity claims against him, the allegations
against Bomber -- in fact -- support this Section 1983 action
against Corizon.  Corizon performs a traditional state function.
As the Sixth Circuit explains in Winkler v. Madison Cty., private
medical professionals who provide health care services to inmates
at county jails qualify as government officials acting under the
color of state law for the purposes of Section 1983.

However, dismissal of redundant claims is not required.  Although
redundant, the Judge allows the claims against Bomber to proceed in
both his individual and official capacities.  While Bomber was not
an elected official like the defendants in Portsmouth, he was the
director of the largest medical service provider to incarcerated
women in the state of Michigan.  Where "alleged violations of a
plaintiffs' rights occurred because of specific individuals,"
permitting suit against individuals in their official capacities
provides "a certain level of public accountability."  The Judge
denies Bomber's motion to dismiss.

B. Papendick, Coleman, Lacy and Hutchinson's Motion to Dismiss

Papendick, Coleman, Lacy and Hutchinson's motion contains, almost
word for word, the same statement of facts, legal standard,
question presented and legal argument as Bomber's Motion to
Dismiss.  Papendick was the Outpatient Utilization Manager for
Corizon.  Coleman was Acting Chief Medical Officer as well as the
Inpatient Utilization Manager for Corizon.  Lacy acted as Regional
Medical Director at WHV and Hutchinson was the Infectious Disease
Coordinator/Director for the MDOC.

Applying the analysis he used to deny Bomber's motion, Judge
Roberts finds that the Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to
survive these Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion.

C. McIntyre and Blessman's Motion to Dismiss

McIntyre and Blessman's ask the Court to dismiss the claims against
them in their official capacities.  Blessman is the Assistant Chief
Medical Officer for MDOC; McIntyre is its Chief Medical Officer.  
McIntyre and Blessman say the allegations against them arise from
actions they engaged in in their official capacities as Chief
Medical Officer and Assistant Chief Medical Officer for the MDOC.
They say that these allegations are redundant and duplicative of
claims against the MDOC.

But, on Sept. 4, 2020, the Court granted MDOC's motion to dismiss
based on eleventh amendment immunity.  There are no claims against
the MDOC and the Plaintiffs do not allege official capacity claims
against McIntyre and Blessman that are "redundant and duplicative."
Plaintiffs are permitted to proceed with these official capacity
claims.

Finally, McIntyre and Blessman argue that Plaintiffs' claims
against them implicate medical decision making.  They say, these
claims are functionally medical malpractice claims and the
Plaintiffs fail to meet the procedural and statutory requirements
for medical malpractice claims.

To the contrary, Judge Roberts holds that the Plaintiffs make
allegations of deliberate indifference against these Defendants.
The Plaintiffs do allege a plausible set of facts which, if proven
true, could entitle them to relief.  They allege for example, that
"Blessman failed to implement any adequate policies to assist in
the diagnosis and treatment of the rash despite his knowledge of
its widespread nature and severity."  They allege that McIntyre was
"deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of WHV inmates"
by "failing to give standing orders authorizing nurses to
administer and/or provide treatment, labs, or medications for the
rashes and scabies, thereby preventing nurses from providing timely
access to medication and treatment."  These two quotes exemplify
the level of specificity of the Plaintiffs' deliberate indifference
claims.

There is no basis to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against
McIntyre and Blessman.  The Judge denies their Motion to Dismiss.

Conclusion

Judge Roberts denies the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.  The
Plaintiffs are permitted to engage in discovery.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/8wnew52c from Leagle.com.


MINDBODY INC: Court Allows Filing of 2nd Amended Stockholder Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Re: In re Mindbody, Inc., Stockholder Litigation,
Cons. C.A. No. 2019-0442-KSJM (Del. Ch.), Judge Kathaleen St. Jude
McCormick of the Court of Chancery of Delaware granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file the proposed Second Amended
Verified Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

Judge McCormick sends a letter decision to Joel Friedlander, Esq.,
Gregory V. Varallo, Esq., Jeffrey M. Gorris, Esq., Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Christopher M. Foulds, Esq.,
Friedlander & Gorris, P.A., Ryan D. Stottmann, Esq., Alexandra M.
Cumings, Esq., Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP.  The letter
decision resolves Defendants Liaw and IVP's opposition to the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file Second Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs filed the original Consolidated Complaint in October
2019, claiming in relevant part that Liaw was conflicted because
IVP sought to exit its investment in the Company. The Defendants
moved to dismiss the Complaint on Oct. 31, 2019, and the Plaintiffs
amended the Complaint in response on Feb. 20, 2020 ("First Amended
Complaint"). On Jan. 13, 2020, the Plaintiffs agreed to amend the
Complaint only once more before the court decided the Defendants'
then-pending motion to dismiss The First Amended Complaint is the
current operative complaint.

The Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss on March 12, 2020.
In response, as promised, the Plaintiffs elected to stand on the
First Amended Complaint for purposes of Court of Chancery Rule
15(aaa) and filed their answering brief on April 22, 2020.

Judge McCormick granted Liaw's motion to dismiss the claims against
him in the Oct. 2, 2020 Memorandum Opinion but observed that her
decision was a pre-judgment ruling that could be revisited "should
future developments provide a compelling reason for doing so."

Fact discovery closed on May 28, 2021, and on June 4, 2021, the
Plaintiffs moved to amend the First Amended Complaint to reassert
claims against Liaw and to bring new claims against IVP and Vista.
Liaw and IVP oppose the amendment as to Liaw under Court of
Chancery Rule 15(aaa) and as to both Liaw and IVP on the ground
that the timing of the motion is prejudicial.

Under Court of Chancery Rule 15(aaa), if "a party fails to timely
file an amended complaint and the Court thereafter concludes that
the complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), such
dismissal will be with prejudice." Rule 15(aaa) permits exceptions,
providing that a case will not be dismissed with prejudice if "the
Court, for good cause shown, finds that dismissal with prejudice
would not be just under all the circumstances."

In re Dell Techs. Inc. Class V S'holders Litig., 2020 WL 3096748,
at *43 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020) recognized an exception to Rule
15(aaa). There, the court denied motion to dismiss claims against
all but one of the defendants, rendering the decision an
interlocutory ruling. Recognizing that the case would proceed to
discovery, the court held that "if discovery shows that a dismissed
defendant had a more significant and compromising role, then
subject to the law of the case doctrine, the plaintiffs can seek to
revisit that defendant's dismissal, should future developments
provide a compelling reason for doing so."

The Memorandum Opinion followed the Dell approach, dismissing Liaw
but noting that the decision was interlocutory and providing that
claims against him could be reasserted if developments in discovery
provided a compelling reason. The question is thus whether
developments in discovery provided a compelling reason to permit
the Plaintiffs to reassert claims against Liaw and, in turn, IVP.
To align the inquiry called for by Dell with the policy underlying
Rule 15(aaa), typically the analysis should focus on developments
after the date a plaintiff elected to stand on a complaint. In the
case, that date is April 22, 2020.

Circumstances unique to the case, however, render the relevant date
a bit earlier, as the Plaintiffs agreed to stand on the First
Amended Complaint on Jan. 27, 2020, during oral argument on the
Defendants' motion to stay pending resolution of their motion to
dismiss. After Jan. 27, 2020, the Plaintiffs received evidence,
which it relied on in the Second Amended Complaint.

On their face, Judge McCormick finds that the produced text
messages and additional depositions support the Plaintiffs' theory
that Liaw formed an alliance with Stollmeyer to bring about a
near-term sale within IVP's desired timeframe. The texts and
deposition testimony provide support for the contention that Liaw
worked to lower the Company's guidance to boost Q4 numbers in
preparation of a quick private equity sale and communicated with
Stollmeyer in the process.

The Judge does not intend to suggest that the text messages or
depositions offer definitive proof of the Plaintiffs' theories.
They do, however, provide a reason to permit the amendment.

Liaw and IVP argue that the timing of the amendment is
prejudicial--fact discovery closed in May and trial was scheduled
for November. But the Plaintiffs sought leave to file the Second
Amended Complaint only one week after the close of fact discovery.
And Liaw and IVP participated in fact discovery. In any event, to
mitigate any prejudice to them resulting from the timing of the
amendment, Jdge McCormick has allowed the parties to select a later
trial date.

For these reasons, the Judge granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/wa9p5h7s from Leagle.com.


MOWI ASA: Florida Court Resolves Noticed Dispute in Antitrust Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: FARM-RAISED SALMON AND SALMON PRODUCTS
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Case No. 1:19-21551-CIV-ALTONAGA/LOUIS (S.D.
Fla.), Magistrate Judge Lauren F. Louis of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida issues an order memorializing
her rulings with respect to only one of the noticed disputes:
Whether the Defendants' objections to the time period for documents
and data should be overruled.

The cause comes before the Court upon the Plaintiffs' Notice of
Hearing, which noticed three discovery disputes pursuant to the
Court's General Order on Discovery Objections and Procedures. The
matter was referred to Judge Louis by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga,
Chief Judge for the Southern District of Florida, for disposition
of all discovery matters. A hearing was conducted on July 15,
2021.

The class action is brought on behalf of direct purchasers of
farm-raised Atlantic salmon and salmon products, who assert claims
against Defendants for violations of sections 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in
the unlawful coordination of price charged to direct purchasers of
salmon from April 10, 2013, through the present. These allegations
parallel those of the European Commission and the Department of
Justice, both of which are investigating illegal anticompetitive
behavior in the farmed salmon market.

The Plaintiffs' Requests for Production defines the "Relevant Time
Period" as Jan. 1, 2010, to the present. All the Defendants
objected to the period as unduly burdensome, not relevant to any
claim or defense, and overly broad and disproportionate to the
needs of the case. Upon conferral, the Plaintiffs have narrowed the
time frame to Jan. 1, 2010, through April 23, 2021, for requests
for data and from to Jan. 1, 2010, through Oct. 23, 2020, for
documents. The Defendants maintain their objection to producing
data for any time earlier than Jan. 1, 2011, or later than April
23, 2020; or to producing documents beyond the period of Jan. 1,
2012, to April 23, 2019.

The Defendants' position on timeframe concedes the relevance of
documents created sometime before the alleged class period began
but contends that the limit on that period is Jan. 1, 2011. The
Plaintiffs, by contrast, contend that they need three full years of
data predating the alleged conduct and documents dating back at
least to Jan. 1, 2010. Other than generally observing the
preference for more data to be used by their experts in a
regression analysis, the Plaintiffs offered no specific relevance
for the data or documents sought from the contested time period.

Indeed, the counsel for the Plaintiffs acknowledged that the
defined Relevant Time Period may have been too bluntly applied and
recognized that for some requests, the relevant time period should
be narrowed. Similarly, the Defendants' proposed cutoff time was
untethered to any factual event that has occurred (other than the
filing of the Complaint), and with respect to many categories of
documents sought the proposed cutoff would be arbitrary. Nor have
the Defendants substantiated their general assertion of burden by
arguing that the burden to produce is directly proportional to the
length of time over which they may be required to search. No facts
were advanced to support the assumption that it would be
disproportionate to the needs of the case for any Defendant to
collect another year's worth of data or documents.

Accordingly, Judge Louis overruled the Defendants' blanket
objections to producing data or documents beyond their proposed
timeframe.  Notwithstanding, and consistent with the observation
that with respect to some requests the time period defined may
indeed exceed that which is relevant and proportional to the needs
of the case, the Defendants were afforded leave to serve amended
responses and objections to the Plaintiffs' Requests for Production
within 14 days of the hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3yt9jw3m from Leagle.com.


NAVIENT CORP: Bid for Summary Judgment in Lord Abbett Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Navient Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company's motion for
summary judgment filed in Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc., et al.
v. Navient Corporation, et al., is pending.

During the first quarter of 2016, Navient Corporation, certain
Navient officers and directors, and the underwriters of certain
Navient securities offerings were sued in three putative securities
class action lawsuits filed on behalf of certain investors in
Navient stock or Navient unsecured debt.

These three cases, which were filed in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Delaware, were consolidated by the District Court,
with Lord Abbett Funds appointed as Lead Plaintiff. The caption of
the consolidated case is Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc., et al.
v. Navient Corporation, et al.

The plaintiffs filed their amended and consolidated complaint in
September 2016. In September 2017, the Court granted the Navient
defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety with
leave to amend.

The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint with the court in
November 2017 and the Navient defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the second amended complaint in January 2018.

In January 2019, the Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part the
Navient defendants' motion to dismiss.

In July 2021, the company filed a Motion for Summary judgment in
the case.

The Navient defendants deny the allegations and intend to
vigorously defend against the allegation in this lawsuit.

Navient Corporation, incorporated on November 7, 2013, provides
asset management and business processing services to education,
healthcare and government clients at the federal, state and local
levels. The Company holds the portfolio of education loans insured
or federally guaranteed under the Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFELP). The Company operates through four segments: FFELP
Loans, Private Education Loans, Business Services and Other. It
also holds the portfolio of Private Education Loans. The company is
based in Wilmington, Delaware.


NAVIENT CORP: New Jersey Consolidated Securities Suit Underway
--------------------------------------------------------------
Navient Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated putative class action suit entitled, In Re
Navient Corporation Securities Litigation

Two putative class actions have been filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey captioned Eli Pope v. Navient
Corporation, John F. Remondi, Somsak Chivavibul and Christian Lown,
and Melvin Gross v. Navient Corporation, John F. Remondi, Somsak
Chivavibul and Christian M. Lown, both of which allege violations
of the federal securities laws under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

After the cases were consolidated by the Court in February 2018
under the caption In Re Navient Corporation Securities Litigation,
the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint in April 2018
and the Company filed a motion to dismiss in June 2018.

In December 2019, the Court denied the Company's motion to dismiss.


The Company continues to deny the allegations and intends to
vigorously defend itself.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Navient Corporation, incorporated on November 7, 2013, provides
asset management and business processing services to education,
healthcare and government clients at the federal, state and local
levels. The Company holds the portfolio of education loans insured
or federally guaranteed under the Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFELP). The Company operates through four segments: FFELP
Loans, Private Education Loans, Business Services and Other. It
also holds the portfolio of Private Education Loans. The company is
based in Wilmington, Delaware.


NORFOLK SOUTHERN: Continues to Defend Fuel Surcharge-Related Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Norfolk Southern Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company
continues to defend multiple lawsuits, including consolidated cases
in the District of Columbia, related to fuel surcharges.

In 2007, various antitrust class actions filed against us and other
Class I railroads in various Federal district courts regarding fuel
surcharges were consolidated in the District of Columbia by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

In 2012, the court certified the case as a class action.

The defendant railroads appealed this certification, and the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the District
Court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration.

On October 10, 2017, the District Court denied class certification.
The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals on August 16, 2019.


Since that decision, various individual cases have been filed in
multiple jurisdictions and also consolidated in the District of
Columbia.

Norfolk said, "We believe the allegations in the complaints are
without merit and intend to vigorously defend the cases. We do not
believe the outcome of these proceedings will have a material
effect on our financial position, results of operations, or
liquidity."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Norfolk Southern Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
engages in the rail transportation of raw materials, intermediate
products, and finished goods. Norfolk Southern Corporation was
founded in 1883 and is based in Norfolk, Virginia.


NORTH AMERICAN TITLE: Cal. App. OKs Cortina's Bid to Dismiss Appeal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAROLYN CORTINA, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents v.
NORTH AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant, Case No.
F079128 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
Fifth District granted the Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal
and the Defendants' Motion to Withdraw Counsel, filed July 21,
2021.

The case began 14 years ago with the filing of a putative class
action complaint against North American Title Company (NATC)
alleging it violated the Labor Code and engaged in unfair business
practices when it failed to pay overtime, and provide meal and rest
breaks, to escrow officers employed in California. The trial court
certified two classes of Plaintiffs -- "exempt" and "non-exempt."
The matter proceeded to a bench trial on a single cause of action
under the UCL.

Following a bench trial on a claim for violation of the unfair
competition law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 17200, et seq.),
the trial court issued a detailed statement of decision in which it
found NATC liable to the exempt class and ordered a referee to
determine the amount of restitution for the exempt class members'
unpaid overtime, with NATC to bear the cost of the reference.

NATC purported to appeal from, among other things, the order
requiring it to pay the cost of the reference. The named plaintiffs
moved to dismiss the appeal as being taken from nonappealable
orders. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals granted the
motion to dismiss the appeal from the cost order -- Cortina v.
North American Title Company (Nov. 7, 2017, F074938) (Cortina I).

The trial court subsequently issued an order stating a court
reporter may record the reference proceedings and witness testimony
may be taken by teleconference. It ordered NATC to pay, in addition
to the referee's fees, the cost of court reporting services or
facilities, the cost of any conference or meeting rooms needed to
conduct the reference proceedings, and the referee's travel fees,
if any. When a dispute arose over whether out-of-state exempt class
members' testimony could be taken remotely, the referee ordered the
witnesses to travel to California for their testimony, with NATC
reimbursing them for their airfare, hotel, and ground expenses. The
trial court adopted the referee's findings and confirmed the order
requiring NATC to pay the out-of-state exempt class members' travel
costs.

NATC purports to appeal from the order requiring it to pay the
exempt class members' travel costs. The named Plaintiffs have moved
to dismiss the appeal as being taken from a nonappealable order,
and they seek sanctions and costs against NATC for filing a
frivolous appeal.

Discussion

I. The Motion to Dismiss

NATC purports to appeal from the trial court's order requiring it
to pay the travel costs of exempt class members who wish to testify
but either live outside California or live in California but are
unable to travel (the travel cost order). The Plaintiffs have moved
to dismiss the appeal as being taken from a nonappealable order and
seek sanctions and costs against NATC pursuant to California Rules
of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1), for filing a frivolous appeal.

The Court of Appeals opines that the travel cost order is not
appealable as either a collateral order, an injunction, or a
sanctions order. Whether an order constitutes an appealable
injunction does not depend on its title or form, but rather "on the
substance and effect of the adjudication." While the travel cost
order required NATC to pay money, it was not a grant of an
injunction but rather an order controlling litigation conduct. It
is "well established that courts have fundamental inherent equity,
supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power
to control litigation before them." "In the context of a class
action, it is the court's authority and duty to exercise control
over the class action to protect the rights of all parties, and to
prevent abuses which might undermine the proper administration of
justice." And although the travel cost order directs NATC to pay
the out-of-state class members' travel costs, it is not a sanctions
order, but rather an order that enables the affected class members
to testify in person.

II. Sanctions

The Plaintiffs seek attorney fees and costs as sanctions against
NATC for filing a frivolous appeal. They contend NATC's "entire
appeal argues that the trial court lacked discretion to order it to
pay the costs of a non-consensual reference, and that the cost
order is immediately appealable pursuant to the 'collateral order'
exception to the one final judgment rule," but in NATC's prior
appeal, made on the same grounds, the cost order was held to be
noncollateral and the appeal was dismissed. The Plaintiffs argue
NATC's appeal indisputably has no merit and was taken solely for
the purpose of delaying and harassing them.

While the Court of Appeals has dismissed the appeal, it cannot say
the purported appeal was necessarily frivolous. NATC presented
arguable issues as to the travel cost order's appealability, and it
was not clear that our prior opinion in Cortina I precluded appeal
of the travel cost order. Moreover, as NATC argues, it complied
with the travel cost order, so this appeal has not impeded the
continuation of the referral proceedings or delayed the entry of an
adverse judgment. Moreover, as we acknowledged in Cortina I, "if a
judgment or order is appealable, aggrieved parties must file an
appeal or forever lose the opportunity to obtain review." The Court
of Appeals agrees with NATC that it could not risk forfeiting
review of the travel cost order if it were actually appealable. It
therefore decline to award sanctions to the Plaintiffs.

Disposition

The Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. They will
recover their costs on appeal.  The Defendants' Motion to Withdraw
Counsel is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3zfp4c73 from Leagle.com.

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and Deborah E. Quick for Defendant and
Appellant.

Wagner Jones Kopfman & Artenian and Laura E. Brown --
laura@lauraebrown.com -- for Plaintiffs and Respondents.


NORTH EDISTO: Dismissal of Counterclaims in Flint Suit Reversed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Flint Equipment Company, Respondent v. North Edisto
Logging, Inc. and Paul Gunter, Appellants, Unpublished Opinion No.
2021-UP-282 (S.C. App.), the Court of Appeals of South Carolina
reverses the trial court's dismissal of North Edisto's
counterclaims.

Flint and North Edisto executed and entered into an agreement
whereby Flint agreed to provide North Edisto with goods and
services relating to North Edisto's logging business and equipment.
In April 2017, North Edisto asked Flint to repair a large piece of
tree cutting equipment, and Flint made the requested repairs.
Flint sent North Edisto an invoice in the amount of $10,483.53, but
North Edisto failed to pay.

Flint filed suit against North Edisto for breach of contract in an
effort to recoup payment for its services and repairs.  North
Edisto filed an unverified answer and three counterclaims.  The
first counterclaim was titled "Class Action, Rule 23, SCRCP," and
the second and third counterclaims were nearly identical, asserting
a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Flint
filed a motion to dismiss North Edisto's counterclaims pursuant to
Rules 12(b) and (f), SCRCP.

On May 8, 2018, the trial court heard arguments regarding Flint's
motion and later, on July 2, 2018, issued an order dismissing North
Edisto's counterclaims with prejudice.  The appeal followed.

The Court of Appeals finds the trial court erred in dismissing
North Edisto's counterclaims with prejudice without affording North
Edisto an opportunity to amend its pleadings.  It opines that when
a trial court finds a complaint fails 'to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action' under Rule 12(b)(6), the court should
give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint pursuant
to Rule 15(a), SCRCP, before filing the final order of dismissal."

Further, under Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR, the Court of Appeals holds
that the "notice of appeal will be served on all respondents within
30 days after receipt of written notice of entry of the order or
judgment."  The 30-day notice requirement is only stayed if a Rule
59(e) motion is filed, an option only available to parties that
have a "legitimate argument the trial court erred in finding the
complaint deficient."  When a party has no legitimate argument as
to the merits of a 12(b)(6) dismissal, that party has no way of
tolling the thirty-day deadline for filing an appeal while a motion
to amend is litigated.  Therefore, a party that chooses to replead
is prevented from doing so by an order that dismisses a claim under
12(b)(6) "with prejudice."

In the case, the trial court dismissed North Edisto's counterclaims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice.  The record is void of
evidence showing the trial court considered allowing North Edisto
to amend its pleadings before filing the final order of dismissal.
This was an error.  Further, the trial court erred in granting
Flint's motion to dismiss "with prejudice" because it effectively
precluded North Edisto from filing and litigating a post-ruling
motion to amend under Rule 15(a).

Based on the foregoing, the trial court's order is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court of
Appeals' Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/37v9uwzy from Leagle.com.

David Randolph Whitt, of Fleming & Whitt, PA, of West Columbia, for
Appellants.

Matthew Drew DeMott, of Moore Clarke DuVall & Rodgers, of Savannah,
Georgia, for Respondent.


OLIN CORP: Suits Against Unit Over Sale of Caustic Soda Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Olin Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that Olin, K.A. Steel
Chemicals continues to defend several class action suits related to
the sale of caustic soda.

Olin, K.A. Steel Chemicals (a wholly owned subsidiary of Olin) and
other caustic soda producers were named as defendants in six
purported class action civil lawsuits filed March 22, 25 and 26,
2019 and April 12, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of New York on behalf of the respective named plaintiffs
and a putative class comprised of all persons and entities who
purchased caustic soda in the U.S. directly from one or more of the
defendants, their parents, predecessors, subsidiaries or affiliates
at any time on or after October 1, 2015.  

Olin, K.A. Steel Chemicals and other caustic soda producers were
also named as defendants in two purported class action civil
lawsuits filed July 25 and 29, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of New York on behalf of the respective named
plaintiffs and a putative class comprised of all persons and
entities who purchased caustic soda in the U.S. indirectly from
distributors at any time on or after October 1, 2015.  

The other current defendants in the lawsuits are Occidental
Chemical Corporation d/b/a OxyChem, Westlake Chemical Corporation,
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd., and Formosa Plastics Corporation,
U.S.A. The lawsuits allege the defendants conspired to fix, raise,
maintain and stabilize the price of caustic soda, restrict domestic
(U.S.) supply of caustic soda and allocate caustic soda customers.


Plaintiffs seek an unspecified amount of damages and injunctive
relief.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Olin Corporation, incorporated on August 13, 1892, is a
manufacturer and distributor of chemical products, and ammunition.
The Company operates through three segments: Chlor Alkali Products
and Vinyls, Epoxy and Winchester. The company is based in Clayton.


OLIN CORP: Unit Defends Suits Over Sale of Caustic Soda in Canada
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Olin Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that Olin, K.A. Steel
Chemicals continues to defend several class action suits related to
the sale of caustic soda in Canada.

Olin, K.A. Steel Chemical, Olin Canada ULC, 3229897 Nova Scotia Co.
(wholly-owned subsidiaries of Olin) and other alleged caustic soda
producers were named as defendants in a proposed class action civil
lawsuit filed on October 7, 2020 in the Quebec Superior Court
(Province of Quebec) on behalf of the respective named plaintiff
and a putative class comprised of all Canadian persons and entities
who, between October 1, 2015 and the date of the eventual class
action certification, directly or indirectly purchased caustic soda
or products containing caustic soda, produced by one or more of the
defendants. Olin, K.A. Steel Chemical, Olin Canada ULC, 3229897
Nova Scotia Co. and other alleged caustic soda producers were also
named as defendants in a proposed class action civil lawsuit filed
November 13, 2020 in the Federal Court of Canada on behalf of the
respective named plaintiff and a putative class comprised of all
legal persons in Canada who, at any time on or after October 1,
2015 to the present, directly or indirectly purchased caustic soda.


The other defendants named in the two Canadian lawsuits are
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Chemical Corporation,
Oxy Canada Sales, Inc., Westlake Chemical Corporation, Axiall
Canada, Inc., Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd., Shintech Incorporated,
Formosa Plastics Corporation, and Formosa Plastics Corporation,
U.S.A.

The lawsuits allege the defendants conspired to fix, raise,
maintain control, and stabilize the price of caustic soda, divide
and allocate markets, sales, customers and territories, fix,
maintain, control, prevent, restrict, lessen or eliminate
production and supply of caustic soda, and agree to idle capacity
of production and/or refrain from increasing their production
capacity.

Plaintiffs seek an unspecified amount of damages, including
punitive damages.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Olin Corporation, incorporated on August 13, 1892, is a
manufacturer and distributor of chemical products, and ammunition.
The Company operates through three segments: Chlor Alkali Products
and Vinyls, Epoxy and Winchester. The company is based in Clayton.


ONE LIFE: Bid to Revisit Discovery Order in Van Connor Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, James Van Connor, individually and on behalf of a
class of all persons and entities similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
One Life America, Inc.; Independent Order of Foresters; Mark Adams;
and Niche Market Insurers Agency, Inc., Defendants, C/A No.
6:19-cv-03283-DCC (D.S.C.), Judge Donald C. Coggins, Jr., of the
U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Greenville
Division, granted in part and denied in part Defendant Mark Adams'
motion for reconsideration.

Defendant Mark Adams filed a Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration
of Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery and
Application to Stay Enforcement of That Order.

The Plaintiff brings the putative class action pursuant to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. Section 227,
which makes it unlawful for any person to make automated,
artificial, or prerecorded calls ("robocalls") to cell phones or
residential phone lines. He alleges, inter alia, that on July 23,
2019, Defendant Mark Adams called his cell phone with a
pre-recorded message regarding Defendant Independent Order of
Foresters' insurance services.

The present discovery dispute arises out of a set of discovery
requests sent from the Plaintiff to Defendant Adams. These
requests, comprising 16 interrogatories and 18 requests for
production, seek to elicit information about Defendant Adams'
telemarketing business practices, relationships and agreements with
other Defendants and sub-vendors, telemarketing calls made to other
individuals, and compliance with federal law. In response to each
request except for the first, ninth, and sixteenth interrogatories,
Defendant Adams asserted his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.

On Oct. 2, 2020, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel, finding that Defendant Adams had not established "a
reasonable fear of a substantial and real threat of prosecution."
Defendant Adams now requests reconsideration on the basis that the
Court made an error of law that would result in manifest
injustice.

Discussion

I. Threat of Prosecution

Defendant Adams argues that reconsideration is warranted because
the correct inquiry does not involve the likelihood of prosecution
but merely its possibility. Although the text of the TCPA imposes
no criminal liability, Section 501 of the same chapter provides
that any person who commits an act "in this chapter prohibited or
declared to be unlawful" faces a fine of not more than $10,000
and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Therefore,
Defendant Adams may be subject to criminal prosecution for the
conduct alleged in the Complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that Defendant Adams' motion should be
denied because prosecution under Section 501 for violations of the
TCPA is, as a practical matter, exceedingly unlikely. But the
practical likelihood of criminal prosecution is not the applicable
standard. Rather, the Fourth Circuit has instructed that once
incriminating potential is found to exist, courts should not engage
in raw speculation as to whether the government will actually
prosecute, and should only pursue that inquiry when there are real
questions concerning the government's ability to do so because of
legal constraints such as statutes of limitation, double jeopardy,
or immunity.

Judge Coggins opines that to the extent that Defendant Adams'
discovery responses might incriminate him in a future criminal
action -- even if the statutory provision imposing criminal
liability is rarely enforced -- he cannot be compelled to respond.
The prior decision, insofar as it abridged that constitutional
privilege, was an error of law resulting in manifest injustice, and
the Judge reconsiders the reasonableness of Defendant Adams'
assertion of privilege with respect to individual discovery
requests.

II. Interrogatories

First, Defendant Adams asserted his privilege against
self-incrimination with respect to all but three of the Plaintiff's
First Set of Interrogatories.

Judge Coggins has no difficulty determining that Defendant Adams'
interrogatory responses would be testimonial in nature.  Therefore,
application of the privilege turns on whether his responses would
be incriminating.  The Judge says telemarketing is a legitimate
business in the United States. The TCPA does not make telemarketing
itself illegal, much less criminal, but rather only imposes
liability, civil or criminal, for certain specific conduct.
Accordingly, discovery requests targeted at general information
regarding Defendant Adams' involvement in the telemarketing
business and his business partners should not implicate his Fifth
Amendment privilege.

Applying this analysis to the interrogatories at issue, the Judge
finds that the privilege does not appear to apply as to
Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. However, inquiries
as to the particular contact with the Plaintiff as well as the
manner and means of such contacts appear on their face to implicate
the privilege. Consequently, Interrogatory Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and
10 are properly subject to the privilege.

III. Requests for Production

Defendant Adams also asserted his privilege against
self-incrimination with respect to each of the Plaintiff's First
Set of Requests for Production. In determining whether production
of a document would violate the Fifth Amendment privilege, courts
distinguish between the contents of the document and the act of
production.

Judge Coggins finds that the documents requested by the Plaintiff's
First Set of Requests for Production appear to be in the nature of
business records and there is no contention that their creation was
compelled or involuntary. He therefore finds that their contents
are not privileged.

The Judge also finds that Defendant Adams' response to any of the
Plaintiff's subject Requests for Production requires a testimonial
act which implicates his privilege against self-incrimination.
Accordingly, the privilege applies to all of the Requests. That
said, the Judge notes that much of the information requested
appears to be jointly held by one or more of the corporate
co-Defendants from whom it could just as easily be discovered. He
is confident that the extremely capable lawyers in the case can
effect the discovery of necessary relevant documents to move the
case forward without infringing upon Defendant Adams'
constitutional rights.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Coggins granted in part and
denied in part Defendant Adams' Motion for Reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/c4ckh79z from Leagle.com.


OTIS WORLDWIDE: Darnis Putative Class Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------------
Otis Worldwide Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a putative class action suit entitled, Geraud Darnis et al.
v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation et al.

On August 12, 2020, a putative class action lawsuit, (Geraud Darnis
et al. v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation et al.), was filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
against Otis, Raytheon Technologies Corporation ("RTX"), Carrier,
each of their directors, and various incentive and deferred
compensation plans.

The named plaintiffs are former employees of United Technologies
Corporation (UTC) and its current and former subsidiaries,
including Otis and Carrier.

They seek to recover monetary damages, as well as related
declaratory and equitable relief, based on claimed decreases in the
value of long-term incentive awards and deferred compensation under
nonqualified deferred compensation plans allegedly caused by the
formula used to calculate the adjustments to such awards and
deferred compensation from RTX, Carrier, and Otis following the
spin-offs of Carrier and Otis and the subsequent combination of UTC
and Raytheon Company.

Otis believes that the claims against the Company are without
merit.

Otis said, "At this time, Otis is unable to predict the outcome, or
reasonably estimate the possible loss or range of loss, if any,
which could result from this action."

Otis Worldwide Corporation is the world's largest elevator and
escalator manufacturing, installation and service company. The
Company is organized into two segments - New Equipment and Service.
Through the company's New Equipment segment, the company design,
manufacture, sell and install a wide range of passenger and freight
elevators, as well as escalators and moving walkways for
residential and commercial buildings and infrastructure projects.
The company is based in Farmington, Connecticut.


PANGAEA HOLDINGS: Davis Says Not Website Blind-accessible
---------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Davis, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated visually-impaired individuals, Plaintiff, v. Pangaea
Holdings Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-06189 (S.D. N.Y., July 20,
2021), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction, compensatory,
statutory and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this action together
with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other and
further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, New York
State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law.

Defendant is a men's grooming products company that owns and
operates the website, www.meridiangrooming.com, offering features
which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services
through delivery throughout the United States, including New York.
Davis is legally blind and claims that said website cannot be
accessed by the visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
      MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
      701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
      Asbury Park, NJ 07712
      Tel: (732) 695-3282
      Fax: (732) 298-6256
      Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


PARETEUM CORP: Loskot Putative Class Suit Underway
--------------------------------------------------
Pareteum Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a putative class action suit initiated by Douglas Loskot.

Douglas Loskot v. Pareteum Corporation, et al., is a putative class
action pending in the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo.

It was filed on May 29, 2020 on behalf of all former stockholders
of iPass Inc. who received shares of the Company's common stock
pursuant to a February 12, 2019 Offer to Exchange.

The defendants are the Company, Robert H. Turner, Edward O'Donnell,
Victor Bozzo, Yves van Sante, Robert Lippert and Luis
Jimenez-Tunon.

The complaint alleges that the defendants caused the Company to
issue materially false or misleading statements in SEC filings
submitted in connection with the Offer to Exchange in violation of
Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act.

Pareteum Corporation formerly known as Elephant Talk
Communications, Inc., is an international provider of business
software and services to the telecommunications and financial
services industry. Pareteum Corporation is based in New York, New
York.


PARETEUM CORP: Putative Securities Class Suit in New York Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
Pareteum Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a putative securities class action suit entitled, In re
Pareteum Securities Litigation.

In re Pareteum Securities Litigation is the consolidation of
various putative class actions that were filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The cases
were assigned to Judge Alvin Hellerstein, who consolidated the
actions on January 10, 2020 and named the Pareteum Shareholder
Investor Group as the Lead Plaintiff.

The Lead Plaintiff is asserting claims on behalf of purported
purchasers and/or acquirers of Company securities between December
14, 2017 and October 21, 2019.

The defendants are the Company, Robert H. Turner, Edward O'Donnell,
Victor Bozzo, Denis McCarthy, Dawson James Securities Inc., and
Squar Milner LLP.

The Lead Plaintiff alleges that Defendants caused the Company to
issue certain materially false or misleading statements in SEC
filings and other public pronouncements in violation of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and Sections 11, 12 and 15 of
the Securities Act.

The Lead Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages with
interest for itself and the other class members for all damages
sustained as a result of Defendants' alleged wrongdoing and
reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in the case.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pareteum Corporation formerly known as Elephant Talk
Communications, Inc., is an international provider of business
software and services to the telecommunications and financial
services industry. Pareteum Corporation is based in New York, New
York.


PDS BIOTECHNOLOGY: Rosener Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID R. ROSENER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated and derivatively on behalf of Nominal Defendant
PDS BIOTECHNOLOGY CORPORATION v. KAMIL ALI-JACKSON, FRANK
BEDU-ADDO, OTIS BRAWLEY, GREGORY CONN, GREGORY FREITAG, STEVE
GLOVER, ILIAN ILIEV, RICHARD SYKES and LAUREN WOOD, and PDS
BIOTECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Case No. 2021-0644 (Del. Ch., July 23,
2021) is an action seeking to void the purported approval of a
proposal (Proposal 3) to amend and restate PDS Biotechnology
Corporation 2014 Equity Incentive Plan (Plan), rescind ultra vires
awards, and recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, corporate
waste and unjust enrichment.

According to the complaint, on December 8, 2020, the Company's
Board of Directors issued option awards to certain of the
defendants. The awards were purportedly issued pursuant to a
prospective amendment and restatement to the Company's Plan, which
amendment and restatement was expressly subject to stockholder
approval which had not yet been secured. On April 29, 2021, PDS
filed a proxy statement on Schedule 14A through which the Board
solicited stockholder approval of, inter alia, Proposal 3 to amend
and restate the Plan. On June 21, 2021, the Board caused the
Company to file a Form 8-K asserting that stockholders approved
Proposal 3 at the Company's June 17, 2021 annual stockholder
meeting. But in tabulating the stockholder vote, the Board failed
to properly count broker non-votes as votes against Proposal 3 as
required by the Company's bylaws. Properly counting broker
non-votes as votes against Proposal 3 results in the proposal being
rejected by the stockholders. The awards issued on December 8, 2020
are therefore ultra vires, the complaint adds.

Plaintiff Rosener is an owner and holder of PDS common stock.

Individual Defendants has served on the Board of Nominal Defendant
PDS, which describes itself on its website as "a clinical stage
biopharmaceutical company with a growing pipeline of cancer
immunotherapies and infectious disease vaccines." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen E. Jenkins, Esq.
          F. Troupe Mickler IV, Esq.
          ASHBY & GEDDES, P.A.
          500 Delaware Avenue, 8th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Tel: (302) 654-1888

                    - and -

          Gregory M. Nespole
          Daniel Tepper
          Correy A. Kamin
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          55 Broadway, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10006
          Tel: (212) 363-7500


PHILIP MORRIS: Blais Class Action Ongoing in Canada
---------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Conseil Quebecois
Sur Le Tabac Et La Sante and Jean-Yves Blais v. Imperial Tobacco
Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. and JTI-Macdonald Corp.

In a class action pending in Canada, Conseil Quebecois Sur Le Tabac
Et La Sante and Jean-Yves Blais v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans,
Benson & Hedges Inc. (RBH) and JTI-Macdonald Corp., Quebec Superior
Court, Canada, filed in November 1998, RBH and other Canadian
cigarette manufacturers (Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. and
JTI-Macdonald Corp.) are defendants.

The plaintiffs, an anti-smoking organization and an individual
smoker, sought compensatory and punitive damages for each member of
the class who suffers allegedly from certain smoking-related
diseases. The class was certified in 2005.

The trial court issued its judgment on May 27, 2015. The trial
court found RBH and two other Canadian manufacturers liable and
found that the class members' compensatory damages totaled
approximately CAD 15.5 billion, including pre-judgment interest
(approximately $12.3 billion).

The trial court awarded compensatory damages on a joint and several
liability basis, allocating 20% to the company's subsidiary
(approximately CAD 3.1 billion, including pre-judgment interest
(approximately $2.5 billion)).

In addition, the trial court awarded CAD 90,000 (approximately
$71,600) in punitive damages, allocating CAD 30,000 (approximately
$23,900) to RBH. The trial court estimated the disease class at
99,957 members. RBH appealed to the Court of Appeal of Quebec.

In October 2015, the Court of Appeal ordered RBH to furnish
security totaling CAD 226 million (approximately $180 million) to
cover both the Letourneau and Blais cases, which RBH has paid in
installments through March 2017. The Court of Appeal ordered
Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. to furnish security totaling CAD 758
million (approximately $603 million) in installments through June
2017. JTI Macdonald Corp. was not required to furnish security in
accordance with plaintiffs' motion.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the security is payable upon a
final judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the trial court's
judgment or upon further order of the Court of Appeal.

On March 1, 2019, the Court of Appeal issued a decision largely
affirming the trial court's findings of liability and the
compensatory and punitive damages award while reducing the total
amount of compensatory damages to approximately CAD 13.5 billion
including interest (approximately $10.7 billion) due to the trial
court's error in the calculation of interest.

The compensatory damages award is on a joint and several basis with
an allocation of 20% to RBH (approximately CAD 2.7 billion,
including pre-judgment interest (approximately $2.1 billion)).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's findings that
defendants violated the Civil Code of Quebec, the Quebec Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Quebec Consumer Protection Act
by failing to warn adequately of the dangers of smoking and by
conspiring to prevent consumers from learning of the dangers of
smoking.

The Court of Appeal further held that the plaintiffs either need
not prove, or had adequately proven, that these faults were a cause
of the class members' injuries.

In accordance with the judgment, defendants were required to
deposit their respective portions of the damages awarded in both
the Letourneau case and the Blais case, approximately CAD 1.1
billion (approximately $875 million), into trust accounts within 60
days. RBH's share of the deposit was approximately CAD 257 million
(approximately $194 million).

PMI recorded a pre-tax charge of $194 million in its consolidated
results, representing $142 million net of tax, as tobacco
litigation-related expense, in the first quarter of 2019.

The charge reflects PMI's assessment of the portion of the judgment
that represents probable and estimable loss prior to the
deconsolidation of RBH and corresponds to the trust account deposit
required by the judgment.

RBH and PMI believe the findings of liability and damages in both
Letourneau and the Blais cases were incorrect and in contravention
of applicable law on several grounds including the following: (i)
defendants had no obligation to warn class members who knew, or
should have known, of the risks of smoking; (ii) defendants cannot
be liable to class members who would have smoked regardless of what
warnings were given; and (iii) defendants cannot be liable to all
class members given the individual differences between class
members.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Adams Class Suit in Canada
-------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Adams v. Canadian
Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, et al.

In a class action pending in Canada, Adams v. Canadian Tobacco
Manufacturers' Council, et al., The Queen's Bench, Saskatchewan,
Canada, filed July 10, 2009, the company, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges
Inc. (RBH), and the company's indemnitees (PM USA and Altria), and
other members of the industry are defendants.

The plaintiff, an individual smoker, alleges her own addiction to
tobacco products and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD")
resulting from the use of tobacco products.

She is seeking compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of a
proposed class comprised of all smokers who have smoked a minimum
of 25,000 cigarettes and have allegedly suffered, or suffer, from
COPD, emphysema, heart disease, or cancer, as well as restitution
of profits.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Bourassa Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Bourassa v.
Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, et al.

In a class action pending in Canada, Bourassa v. Imperial Tobacco
Canada Limited, et al., Supreme Court, British Columbia, Canada,
filed June 25, 2010, the company, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.
("RBH"), and the company's indemnitees (PM USA and Altria), and
other members of the industry are defendants.

The plaintiff, the heir to a deceased smoker, alleges that the
decedent was addicted to tobacco products and suffered from
emphysema resulting from the use of tobacco products.

She is seeking compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of a
proposed class comprised of all smokers who were alive on June 12,
2007, and who suffered from chronic respiratory diseases allegedly
caused by smoking, their estates, dependents and family members,
plus disgorgement of revenues earned by the defendants from January
1, 1954, to the date the claim was filed.

In December 2014, plaintiff filed an amended statement of claim.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Class Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a putative shareholder class action suit
entitled, In re Philip Morris International Inc. Securities
Litigation.

A putative shareholder class action lawsuit, In re Philip Morris
International Inc. Securities Litigation, is pending in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
purportedly on behalf of purchasers of Philip Morris International
Inc. stock between July 26, 2016 and April 18, 2018.  

The lawsuit names Philip Morris International Inc. and certain
officers and employees as defendants and includes allegations that
the defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose information about PMI's business, operations,
financial condition, and prospects, related to product sales of,
and alleged irregularities in clinical studies of, PMI's Platform 1
product.  The lawsuit seeks various forms of relief, including
damages.

In November 2018, the court consolidated three putative shareholder
class action lawsuits with similar allegations previously filed in
the Southern District of New York (namely, City of Westland Police
and Fire Retirement System v. Philip Morris International Inc., et
al, Greater Pennsylvania Carpenters' Pension Fund v. Philip Morris
International Inc., et al., and Gilchrist v. Philip Morris
International Inc., et al.) into these proceedings.

A putative shareholder class action lawsuit, Rubenstahl v. Philip
Morris International Inc., et al., that had been previously filed
in December 2017 in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff
due to similar allegations in these proceedings.

On February 4, 2020, the court granted defendants' motion in its
entirety, dismissing all but one of the plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice.  

The court noted that one of plaintiffs' claims (allegations
relating to four non-clinical studies of PMI's Platform 1 product)
did not state a viable claim but allowed plaintiffs to replead that
claim by March 3, 2020. On February 18, 2020, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for reconsideration of the court's February 4th decision;
this motion was denied on September 21, 2020.

On September 28, 2020, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
seeking to replead allegations relating to four non-clinical
studies of PMI's Platform 1 product.

Philip Morris said, "We believe that this lawsuit is without merit
and will continue to defend it vigorously."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Letourneau Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Cecilia
Letourneau v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.
(RBH) and JTI-Macdonald Corp.

In a class action pending in Canada, Cecilia Letourneau v. Imperial
Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. and JTI-Macdonald
Corp., Quebec Superior Court, Canada, filed in September 1998, RBH
and other Canadian cigarette manufacturers (Imperial Tobacco Canada
Ltd. and JTI-Macdonald Corp.) are defendants.  

The plaintiff, an individual smoker, sought compensatory and
punitive damages for each member of the class who is deemed
addicted to smoking.

The class was certified in 2005. The trial court issued its
judgment on May 27, 2015.

The trial court found RBH and two other Canadian manufacturers
liable and awarded a total of CAD 131 million (approximately $104
million) in punitive damages, allocating CAD 46 million
(approximately $37 million) to RBH. The trial court estimated the
size of the addiction class at 918,000 members but declined to
award compensatory damages to the addiction class because the
evidence did not establish the claims with sufficient accuracy.

The trial court found that a claims process to allocate the awarded
punitive damages to individual class members would be too expensive
and difficult to administer. On March 1, 2019, the Court of Appeal
issued a decision largely affirming the trial court’s findings of
liability and the total amount of punitive damages awarded
allocating CAD 57 million including interest (approximately $45
million) to RBH. Deconsolidation of RBH in PMI's Annual Report on
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2020 for further detail
concerning the security order pertaining to both Létourneau and
Blais cases and the impact of the decision on PMI’s financial
statements.

RBH and PMI believe the findings of liability and damages in both
Létourneau and the Blais cases were incorrect and in contravention
of applicable law on several grounds including the following: (i)
defendants had no obligation to warn class members who knew, or
should have known, of the risks of smoking; (ii) defendants cannot
be liable to class members who would have smoked regardless of what
warnings were given; and (iii) defendants cannot be liable to all
class members given the individual differences between class
members.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PONZIOS RD: Bid to Revisit Summary Judgment in Casco Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CASCO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PONZIOS RD, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Civil No. 16-2084 (RBK/MJS) (D.N.J.), Judge Robert B.
Kugler of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Camden Vicinage, denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration.

The Plaintiffs are requesting the Court reconsider its decision
limiting summary judgment to the narrow circumstance where zero
cash tips were reported by the Defendants' tipped employees. They

The action arises out of an employment dispute concerning whether
Defendant Ponzios RD, doing business as Metro Diner, could pay its
"tipped employees," like bussers and servers, less than the minimum
wage by using a "tip credit" under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law
("NJWHL").

Defendant Metro Diner employed Lead Plaintiff Oscar Casco as a
busser and Opt-In Plaintiff Tina Blemings as a server in its New
Jersey location in Brooklawn, New Jersey. Casco worked for the
Defendants for approximately six months beginning in May 2014 and
earned $3.50 per hour plus tips. Blemings, by contrast, worked for
the Defendants for about four years beginning in May 2011 and
earned $2.15 per hour plus tips. Metro Diner considered waitresses,
waiters, and bussers as tipped employees and would credit as wages
to these employees the difference between the minimum wage and
their hourly wage.

On April 14, 2016, Casco brought the action (which Blemings
subsequently joined) on behalf of a nationwide collective class
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Casco also
brought a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on
behalf of himself and a New Jersey class of tipped employees.

The Complaint contains five counts: (1) FLSA minimum wage
violations (Count One); (2) FLSA overtime wage violations (Count
Two); (3) New Jersey minimum wage violations (Count Three); (4) New
Jersey overtime violations (Count Four); and (5) a New Jersey
common law unjust enrichment claim (Count Five). In answering the
Complaint, Defendants denied, among other things, that they failed
to pay their tipped employees less than the minimum wage.

The Plaintiffs sought summary judgment under the FLSA and NJWHL as
to the defense that the Defendants complied with the legal
notification requirements to pay their tipped employees less than
the minimum wage by claiming a tip credit. In the Court's prior
opinion, it held that the Defendants failed to meet the
notification requirement to take a tip credit under the FLSA and
therefore found them liable for the full minimum wage. The Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs solely on that
issue. It denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the
NJWHL claim because it was unclear, given the lack of briefing,
whether the FLSA and NJWHL paralleled each other to such an extent
that a ruling under one was dispositive of a ruling under the
other.

The Plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment on the NJWHL
claim. They also filed a motion for final collective action
pursuant to 216(b) of the FLSA and a motion to strike the
Defendants' response to their statement of material facts.

On March 9, 2021, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting
the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. In its
Opinion, it held that there was no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the Defendants illegally adjusted employees' tips to
meet the minimum wage requirement when tipped employees reported
zero cash tips. Therefore, it granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment on the narrow point that the Defendants failed to
comply with the requirements set forth in N.J.A.C. 12:56-14.4 when
waiters and waitresses reported cash tips as zero.

Additionally, the Court concluded that the Defendants took an
impermissible meal credit because the meal credit that was applied
toward employees' wages was priced at a higher rate than what it
actually cost Defendants. Accordingly, it held that the Plaintiffs
are entitled to summary judgment on this issue as well. The Court
also granted the Plaintiffs' motion for final collective action
because we found that Casco and the opt-in plaintiffs are
"similarly situated" for FLSA purposes. Lastly, it denied the
Plaintiffs' motion to strike because there was no indication of bad
faith on the part of the Defendants. Then on March 23, 2021, the
Plaintiffs filed the present motion, seeking reconsideration of the
Court's order and opinion.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs are requesting the Court reconsider its decision
limiting summary judgment to the narrow circumstance where zero
cash tips were reported by the Defendants' tipped employees. They
argue the Court overlooked facts in the record showing that the
Defendants' improper adjustment of reported cash tips was not
limited to only those instances where employees reported zero cash
tips. The Plaintiffs further insist that this limitation will
result in manifest injustice to those employees who did not report
their own tips but were still underpaid as a result of Defendants'
illegal conduct.

a. The Court's Consideration of Cash Tips Reported by Waitresses
and Waiters

In an attempt to fit this motion into these required parameters,
the Plaintiffs claim that the Court failed to consider their
assertion that the Defendants had impermissibly altered the cash
tips reported by its tipped employees "when any servers reported
that they had received little to no cash tips."

Judge Kugler disagrees. He opines that while Mr. Kolovos clearly
admits to changing the gratuities received by the Defendants'
employees when those employees recorded zero tips, the italicized
quote, "he utilizes what they've — what tips they report here,"
suggests that the Defendants relied on waitresses and waiters'
reports when they reported an amount other than zero. As he further
explained -- although the sentence is ambiguous -- drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the Judge
construe sit as referring to cash tips. Accordingly, he rejects the
Plaintiffs' argument that the Court failed to consider their
assertion that Defendants had impermissibly altered the cash tips
even when the Defendants' tipped employees reported an amount other
than zero.

b. Tipped Employees Who Do Not Report Their Own Tips

Judge Kugler recognizes that the Court's decision to limit the
grant of summary judgment to instances in which waiters and
waitresses reported zero cash tips consequently excludes bussers
who did not report their own cash tips. And it is this limitation
of the Defendants' liability under the NJWHL upon which the
Plaintiffs base their motion for reconsideration. Yet, absent from
the Plaintiffs' Opening Memorandum supporting their Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment  was any argument pertaining to Casco's
"incredibly" consistent hourly rate -- evidence that the Plaintiffs
heavily rely on to support the conclusion that the Defendants'
illegal adjustment of cash tips was not limited to only those
instances where zero cash tips were reported by waiters and
waitresses.

Because the Plaintiffs' argument alluding to Casco's identical tip
amounts despite the variation in the Defendants' gross sales was
only reestablished in the Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum and, at
best, vaguely referenced in a footnote in the Plaintiffs' Opening
Memorandum, this issue was waived.

c. The Manifest Injustice Standard

For the Court to reconsider a decision due to manifest injustice,
the record presented must be "so patently unfair and tainted that
the error is manifestly clear to all who view it." Furthermore, "it
is not the job of courts deciding a motion for reconsideration to
rescue parties from their strategic litigation choices (nor) rescue
parties from their own errors."

As established, the Court did not overlook evidence in the record.
Rather, it was the Plaintiffs' own mistake of omitting arguments in
their Opening Memorandum that could have possibly justified a
broader grant of summary judgment. Consequently, Judge Kugler
rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that the Court's limited grant of
summary judgment would result in manifest injustice.

Conclusion

For the reasons he expressed, Judge Kugler denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.  An accompanying Order will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ex5mj4vu from Leagle.com.


PORTNOY SCHNECK: Posen Disputes Debt Collection Letter
-------------------------------------------------------
Aaron Posen, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Portnoy Schneck, LLC and Cavalry SPV I,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-04071 (E.D. N.Y., July 20, 2021),
seeks to recover compensable damages caused by violations of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Portnoy is a debt collector with business address at 500 Summit
Lake Drive, Suite 4A, Valhalla, NY 10595. It attempted to collect a
credit card debt allegedly owed by Posen to Citibank, N.A.
vis-a-vis a collection letter (in behalf of Cavalry SPV) which
included a final billing statement which lists Posen's balance as
$4,652.60. Said letter, however, discounted the total amount owed
by $102.88. It was not indicated why such amount was credited to
his account. Posen alleges that Portnoy failed to validate the debt
in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Tamir Saland, Esq.
      STEIN SAKS, PLLC
      One University Plaza, Ste. 620
      Hackensack, NJ 07601
      Tel: (201) 282-6500 ext. 122
      Fax: (201) 282-6501
      Email: TSaland@steinsakslegal.com


PPG EMPLOYEE: Bellon Appeals Summary Judgment in ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Charles W. Bellon, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled CHARLES W. BELLON, ROBERT E.
EAKIN, JUDY GAY BURKE, LOUISE NICHOLS, WILTON G. WALLACE, BERNADOT
F. VEILLON, BARBARA BROWN, and ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE PPG
EMPLOYEE LIFE AND OTHER BENEFITS PLAN, PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., and
THE PPG PLAN ADMINISTRATOR, Defendants, Case No.
5:18-cv-00114-GMG-RWT, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia at Wheeling.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks to restore and recover contractually vested retiree life
insurance coverage and associated benefits under the PPG Employee
Life and Other Benefits Plan, including its predecessor plans.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were retired former
salaried employees of the Defendants, and the surviving spouses and
beneficiaries of the retired former employees who had worked in the
Defendants' commodity chemicals business and who were, at
retirement, eligible for and began receiving healthcare and life
insurance as participants of the PPG Plan.

On January 28, 2013, PPG Industries, Inc. merged its commodity
chemicals business to form Axiall Corporation. As part of the
merger, the Defendants unilaterally removed the Plaintiffs from the
Plan in violation of the Plan terms, and transferred to Axiall the
obligation to provide the Plaintiffs with retiree healthcare and
life insurance coverage under the Plan.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act when the Defendants unilaterally
removed the Plaintiffs as plan participants on January 28, 2013 and
transferring them to Axiall's Plan.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the Court's Memorandum Opinion
and Order dated June 28, 2021, denying their Motion for Relief
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) and granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The appellate case is captioned as Charles Bellon v. The PPG
Employee Life and Other Befefits Plan, Case No. 21-1812, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed on
July 27, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants CHARLES W. BELLON, ROBERT E. EAKIN, JUDY GAY
BURKE, LOUISE NICHOLS, WILTON G. WALLACE, BERNADOT F. VEILLON,
BERNADOT F. BROWN, and ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Michael A. Adams, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
          3054 Pennsylvania Avenue
          Weirton, WV 26062
          Telephone: (304) 491-4728

               - and -

          James Theodore Carney, II, Esq.
          USX CORPORATION
          600 Grant Street
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219-4776
          Telephone: (412) 433-2968

               - and -

          Maureen Davidson-Welling, Esq.
          John Edward Stember, Esq.
          STEMBER COHN & DAVIDSON-WELLING, LLC
          425 1st Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 338-1445
          E-mail: mdw@stembercohn.com
                  jstember@stembercohn.com                   

Defendants-Appellees THE PPG EMPLOYEE LIFE AND OTHER BEFEFITS PLAN;
PPG INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; and THE PPG PLAN ADMINISTRATOR are
represented by:

          Alexis E. Bates, Esq.
          Emma J. O'Connor, Esq.
          Ashley M. Schumacher, Esq.
          Joseph J. Torres, Esq.  
          JENNER & BLOCK, LLP
          353 North Clark Street
          Chicago, IL 60654-3456
          Telephone: (312) 840-7577
          E-mail: jtorres@winston.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Todd Bergstrom, Esq.
          Brittany A. Fink, Esq.
          Lindsay M. Gainer, Esq.  
          LITTLER MENDELSON PC
          707 Virginia Street East
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Telephone: (304) 599-4626
          E-mail: bfink@littler.com  

               - and -

          Jasmine A.D. Fannell, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP
          35 West Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60601-0000
          Telephone: (312) 558-5600
          E-mail: jfannell@winston.com    

               - and -

          Theodore A. Schroeder, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON PC
          625 Liberty Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 201-7624
          E-mail: tschroeder@littler.com

QUALCOMM INC: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Remains Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 27, 2021, that the company's motion for
judgment on the pleadings in the consolidated class action suit
filed by purported stockholders remains pending in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California.

On January 23, 2017 and January 26, 2017, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of the company in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California against the company and certain of its current and
former officers and directors.

The complaints alleged, among other things, that the company
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by making false and
misleading statements and omissions of material fact in connection
with certain allegations that the company is or was engaged in
anticompetitive conduct.

The complaints sought unspecified damages, interest, fees and
costs.

On May 4, 2017, the court consolidated the two actions and
appointed lead plaintiffs. On July 3, 2017, the lead plaintiffs
filed a consolidated amended complaint asserting the same basic
theories of liability and requesting the same basic relief.

On September 1, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint.

On March 18, 2019, the court denied the company's motion to
dismiss. On January 15, 2020, the company filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.

QUALCOMM  said, "The court has not yet ruled on our motion. We
believe the plaintiffs' claims are without merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


REAL ADVISORS: Peng Sues Over Illegal SMS Ad Blasts
---------------------------------------------------
Kenneth Peng, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Real Advisors, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-04063 (E.D. N.Y., July 20, 2021), seeks injunctive relief and
seeks statutory damages for violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Real Advisors is a financial education company that specializes in
real estate investing and internet marketing. To promote its
services, it engages in unsolicited SMS blasts. Peng claims that he
has received such text messages in his cellular telephone number
without his permission. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 705
      Miami, FL 33132
      Telephone: (305) 479-2299
      Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


SIX FLAGS: Bid to Amend Complaint in OFPRS Suit Tossed
------------------------------------------------------
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended July 4, 2021, that plaintiffs motion
to amend or set aside judgment in the consolidated putative
securities class action suit headed by Oklahoma Firefighters
Pension and Retirement System and Electrical Workers Pension Fund
Local 103 I.B.E.W., has been denied.

In February 2020, two putative securities class action complaints
were filed against the company and certain of its former executive
officers in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas.

On March 2, 2020, the two cases were consolidated in an action
captioned Electrical Workers Pension Fund Local 103 I.B.E.W. v. Six
Flags Entertainment Corp., et al., Case No. 4:20-cv-00201-P (N.D.
Tex.) (the "Electrical Workers litigation"), and an amended
complaint was filed on March 20, 2020.

On May 8, 2020, Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System
and Electrical Workers Pension Fund Local 103 I.B.E.W. were
appointed as lead plaintiffs, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman
LLP was appointed as lead counsel, and McKool Smith PC was
appointed as liaison counsel. On July 2, 2020, lead plaintiffs
filed a consolidated complaint.

The consolidated complaint alleges, among other things, that the
defendants made materially false or misleading statements or
omissions regarding the Company's business, operations and growth
prospects, specifically with respect to the development of its Six
Flags branded parks in China and the financial health of its
partner, Riverside Investment Group Co. Ltd., in violation of the
federal securities laws.

The consolidated complaint seeks compensatory damages and other
relief on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of Holdings'
publicly traded common stock during the period between April 24,
2018 and February 19, 2020.

On August 3, 2020, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint. On March 3, 2021, the court granted
defendants' motion, dismissing the complaint in its entirety and
with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend or set aside
judgment on March 31, 2021, which the court denied on July 26,
2021.

Six Flags said, "We believe that these lawsuits are without merit
and intend to defend this litigation vigorously. However, there can
be no assurance regarding the ultimate outcome of the lawsuit."

Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, incorporated on December 9,
1997, is a regional theme park operator. The Company operates in
the theme parks segment. The Company operates approximately 19
regional theme and water parks. Its parks occupy approximately
4,500 acres of land. Its parks are located in geographically
diverse markets across North America. The company is based in Grand
Prairie, Texas.


SIX FLAGS: Settlement in BIPA Related Suit Granted Initial OK
-------------------------------------------------------------
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended July 4, 2021, that the court granted
preliminary approval of the settlement in the putative class action
suit related to the collection of biometric data.

On January 7, 2016, a putative class action complaint was filed
against the company in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois.


On April 22, 2016, Great America, LLC was added as a defendant. The
complaint asserts that the company violated the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act ("BIPA") in connection with the admission
of season pass holders and members through the finger scan program
that commenced in the 2014 operating season at Six Flags Great
America in Gurnee, Illinois, and seeks statutory damages,
attorneys' fees and an injunction.

An aggrieved party under BIPA may recover (i) $1,000 if a company
is found to have negligently violated BIPA or (ii) $5,000 if found
to have intentionally or recklessly violated BIPA, plus reasonable
attorneys' fees in each case.

The complaint does not allege that any information was misused or
disseminated.

On April 7, 2017, the trial court certified two questions for
consideration by the Illinois Appellate Court of the Second
District. On June 7, 2017, the Illinois Appellate Court granted our
motion to appeal. Accordingly, two questions regarding the
interpretation of BIPA were certified for consideration by the
Illinois Appellate Court.

On December 21, 2017, the Illinois Appellate Court found in our
favor, holding that the plaintiff had to allege more than a
technical violation of BIPA and had to be injured in some way in
order to have a right of action. On March 1, 2018, the plaintiff
filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.


On May 30, 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's
leave to appeal and oral arguments were heard on November 20, 2018.
On January 25, 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court found in favor of
the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff does not need to allege
an actual injury beyond the violation of his rights under BIPA in
order to proceed with a complaint.

On May 7, 2021, the parties entered into a settlement agreement to
resolve the lawsuit, and preliminary approval was granted by the
court on May 14, 2021.

Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, incorporated on December 9,
1997, is a regional theme park operator. The Company operates in
the theme parks segment. The Company operates approximately 19
regional theme and water parks. Its parks occupy approximately
4,500 acres of land. Its parks are located in geographically
diverse markets across North America. The company is based in Grand
Prairie, Texas.


SIX FLAGS: Settlement in Credit Card Info Suits Gets Final Nod
--------------------------------------------------------------
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended July 4, 2021, that the court granted
final approval of the settlement in the putative class action suits
related to the printing of more than the last five digits of a
credit or debit card number entered.

During 2017, four putative class action complaints were filed
against Holdings or one of its subsidiaries. Complaints were filed
on August 11, 2017, in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois;
on September 1, 2017, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia; on September 11, 2017, in the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California; and on November
30, 2017, in the Superior Court of Ocean County, New Jersey.

The complaints allege that the company, in violation of federal
law, printed more than the last five digits of a credit or debit
card number on customers' receipts and/or the expiration dates of
those cards.

A willful violation may subject a company to liability for actual
damages or statutory damages between $100 and $1,000 per person,
punitive damages in an amount determined by a court and reasonable
attorneys' fees, all of which are sought by the plaintiffs.

The complaints do not allege that any information was misused.

On October 20, 2020, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement to resolve the lawsuits, for an immaterial amount, and
final approval was granted by the court on June 18, 2021.

Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, incorporated on December 9,
1997, is a regional theme park operator. The Company operates in
the theme parks segment. The Company operates approximately 19
regional theme and water parks. Its parks occupy approximately
4,500 acres of land. Its parks are located in geographically
diverse markets across North America. The company is based in Grand
Prairie, Texas.


SIX FLAGS: Settlement Reached in Magic Mountain Employees' Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended July 4, 2021, that a settlement has
been reached in the purported class action suit initiated by
current and former employees of Six Flags Magic Mountain.

On February 14, 2020, a complaint was filed against Magic Mountain,
LLC in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, on
behalf of a purported class of current and former employees of Six
Flags Magic Mountain.

The complaint alleges one cause of action for failure to furnish
accurate, itemized wage statements in violation of California labor
law, and seeks statutory damages under California law as well as
under the Private Attorneys General Act, and attorneys' fees and
costs.

Following mediation on January 13, 2021, the parties agreed to a
settlement in principle to resolve the lawsuit, for an immaterial
amount.

The settlement is subject to preliminary and final approval by the
court.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, incorporated on December 9,
1997, is a regional theme park operator. The Company operates in
the theme parks segment. The Company operates approximately 19
regional theme and water parks. Its parks occupy approximately
4,500 acres of land. Its parks are located in geographically
diverse markets across North America. The company is based in Grand
Prairie, Texas.


SIX FLAGS: Settlement Reached in Members & Passholders Suits
------------------------------------------------------------
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended July 4, 2021, that a settlement
agreement has been reached in the purported class action suits that
allege that the company, in violation of California law, charged
members and season passholders while the parks were closed and did
not provide refunds for the amounts charged.

Since COVID-19 began affecting the operations of the company's
parks in mid-March 2020, three similar purported class action
complaints were filed against Holdings or one of its subsidiaries
in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California on April 10, 2020, April 13, 2020, and April 21, 2020.

These complaints allege that the company, in violation of
California law, charged members and season passholders while the
parks were closed and did not provide refunds for the amounts
charged.

The complaints seek compensatory damages, punitive damages,
restitution, and unspecified injunctive relief.

On April 22, 2021, the parties entered into a settlement agreement
to resolve the lawsuits, for an immaterial amount, which is subject
to preliminary and final approval by the court.

Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, incorporated on December 9,
1997, is a regional theme park operator. The Company operates in
the theme parks segment. The Company operates approximately 19
regional theme and water parks. Its parks occupy approximately
4,500 acres of land. Its parks are located in geographically
diverse markets across North America. The company is based in Grand
Prairie, Texas.


SIX FLAGS: Settlement Reached in Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
----------------------------------------------------------
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended July 4, 2021, that a settlement has
been reached in the purported class action suit initiated by
current and former employees of Six Flags Discovery Kingdom.

On April 20, 2018, a complaint was filed against Holdings and Six
Flags Concord, LLC in the Superior Court of Solano County,
California, on behalf of a purported class of current and former
employees of Six Flags Discovery Kingdom.

On June 15, 2018, an amended complaint was filed adding Park
Management Corp. as a defendant.

The amended complaint alleges violations of California law
governing, among other things, employee overtime, meal and rest
breaks, wage statements, and seeks damages in the form of unpaid
wages and related penalties, and attorneys' fees and costs.

Following mediation on November 30, 2020, the parties agreed to a
settlement in principle to resolve the lawsuit, for an immaterial
amount.

The settlement is subject to preliminary and final approval by the
court.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, incorporated on December 9,
1997, is a regional theme park operator. The Company operates in
the theme parks segment. The Company operates approximately 19
regional theme and water parks. Its parks occupy approximately
4,500 acres of land. Its parks are located in geographically
diverse markets across North America. The company is based in Grand
Prairie, Texas.


ST. LOUIS, MO: Fant Can't Compel Compliance With July 22 Order
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS,
Defendant, Case No. 4:17-CV-2707 AGF (E.D. Mo.), Judge Audrey G.
Fleissig of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
Defendant to Comply with the Court's July 22, 2020 Order.

The Plaintiffs in the putative class action claim that they have
been jailed by the Defendant, the City of Ferguson, on numerous
occasions because they were unable to pay cash bonds or other debts
resulting from their traffic and other minor offenses. The
Plaintiffs allege that, in violation of the United States
Constitution and as a matter of the City's policies and practices,
they were not afforded counsel, any inquiry into their ability to
pay, or a neutral finding of probable cause in a prompt manner; and
they were held in jail indefinitely, in overcrowded and unsanitary
conditions, until they or their friends or family members could
make a monetary payment sufficient to satisfy the City, as part of
a broad, revenue-generating scheme.

The Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserts seven claims pursuant to
42 U.S.C. Section 1983, under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. They seek compensatory damages as well as declaratory
and injunctive relief.

The matter is now before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel. The Court issued the July 22, 2020 Order following a
hearing on Plaintiffs' prior motion to compel the production of
documents from the City. For the reasons discussed during that
hearing, the Court held that the parties should promptly meet and
confer regarding the extent to which certain categories of
documents had already been produced and, to the extent not
produced, the City should produce those documents within 30 days of
the Court's Order.

The Plaintiffs now claim that, although the City produced many
documents of the type referenced in the Court's Order, there were
gaps in that production. Plaintiffs' motion outlines those gaps. In
response, the City argues that City staff, under the supervision of
counsel, has searched for and produced all responsive documents in
its custody and that, if documents were not produced it is because
they either never existed or no longer exist because they were not
retained. The Plaintiffs argue that they have reason to believe
that the missing documents do exist and would likely have been
found if the City performed a reasonable search.

As a result of these alleged production deficiencies and others
described in the Plaintiffs' motion, the Plaintiffs request that
the Court orders the City to (1) identify the employee email
inboxes, electronic folders (including file path locations), and
hard copy locations that may store the missing document; (2)
identify which of those locations the City searched, and whether
the City used any search terms for electronic documents and, if so,
which search terms were used for each category; and (3) have the
City's counsel review all documents in the locations that may
contain documents that fall within the identified categories and
produce any responsive documents. The City argues that it has
provided sufficient information regarding its search efforts and
that further disclosure is unnecessary and would intrude on
privileged communications and work product.

Upon careful consideration of the parties' arguments, in light of
the proportionality concerns set forth in Rule 26 and the standards
for compelling disclosure under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Judge Fleissig denies the Plaintiffs' motion. The
Plaintiffs have offered insufficient argument or evidence
supporting their belief that relevant documents exist that the City
has withheld or otherwise not produced.

For most categories of documents, the Plaintiffs simply assert that
because the City produced similar types of documents for certain
years or months, such documents must exist for every year or month.
Likewise, the Plaintiffs assert that references to certain types of
documents in the DOJ's report, such as "self-initiated activity
reports," means that such documents must exist and be in the City's
custody. But the City has repeatedly informed Plaintiffs that this
is not the case. Based on the City's detailed responses, contained
in the correspondence exchanged with the Plaintiffs and in the
City's opposition brief, the Judge concludes that no further
explanation of the City's search efforts is warranted.

Although the parties have requested oral argument, based on the
extensive briefing submitted on these issues, Judge Fleissig does
not believe that oral argument is necessary. Finally, in light of
the particularly contentious and lengthy history of discovery in
the case, the Judge wishes to remind the parties of both the letter
and spirit of Local Rule 3.04 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26, which together urge the parties and their counsel to work
cooperatively and in good faith to tailor discovery to the needs of
the case and to save their most zealous advocacy for those issues
necessary to resolve the merits of the legal claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/reav7x96 from Leagle.com.


STARR RESTAURANT: Other Starr Restaurants Dismissed From Weiss Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GREGORY WEISS, Plaintiff v. STARR RESTAURANT
ORGANIZATION, LP D/B/A STARR RESTAURANTS, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 20-CV-8090 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y., Judge Jesse M. Furman of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Other Starr
Restaurants and denied as to Stephen Starr.

Plaintiff Weiss brings the putative class action raising
wage-and-hour claims under the New York Labor Law ("NYLL") against
the restaurant Buddakan (formally known as Buddakan NY, L.P.),
where Weiss previously worked as a server; Buddakan's parent
company, Starr Restaurant Organization, L.P., more commonly known
as Starr Restaurants ("Starr Restaurants"); the principal of Starr
Restaurants, Stephen Starr; and a variety of other restaurants
associated with Starr ("Other Starr Restaurants").  Buddakan and
Starr Restaurants have answered Weiss' claims.

Mr. Weiss worked as a server at Buddakan, located in Manhattan,
between February and October 2014.  Throughout his employment,
Weiss' schedule varied week to week, but he typically worked five
shifts of approximately seven hours, for an average of 35 hours per
week.  He received the prevailing tip-credit minimum wage of $5 per
hour, but for at least the first and last hours of his shift he was
required to do non-tipped work, including polishing glass and
silverware, moving furniture, cleaning, and helping with food
preparations.  Weiss was further "required to clock out and do side
work such as cleaning and organizing" while "waiting for the
manager to count and distribute the tips made," sometimes for up to
an hour -- time for which he was not compensated.  Weiss also never
received "spread of hours" pay for workdays exceeding ten hours.

Buddakan is "commonly owned by Starr Restaurants (which is in turn
owned by Stephen Starr)."  Starr Restaurants also "commonly owns"
and operates many other restaurants around the world, including the
Other Starr Restaurants, all of which are located in New York City.
Weiss alleges, "based on his direct observations and conversations
with his coworkers," that "all non-exempt employees of Defendants
worked similar hours and were paid similarly."

Indeed, Weiss avers that "employees are interchanged among and
transferred between the Defendants' restaurants, as well as
supplies"; that the "Defendants maintain a centralized
organizational structure, control, and human resources"; and that
the Defendants "implement consistent wage and hour policies,
procedures, and employment practices across all of their
restaurants."  He contends that this centralized structure is
evidenced by, among other things, the fact that the contact
information on each restaurant's website lists an email address
ending in "@starr-retaurants.com" and that each website links to
shared Twitter and LinkedIn pages; that Starr Restaurants sells
gift cards that may be used at any of the restaurants; that job
advertisements for line cooks and hosts posted online "identify
Starr Restaurants, not any of the individual restaurant locations,
as the employer" and "do not even disclose at which restaurant the
applicant would be working"; and that a server at a restaurant
affiliated with Starr Restaurants recounted on the website
glassdoor.com that his hiring process had involved an interview at
"Starr headquarters."

Stephen Starr "is the owner, founder, and CEO of" Defendants,
including Starr Restaurants, and, according to Weiss, "has
operational control of the Restaurants."  The Complaint alleges
that Starr "had and exercised control over the employment terms and
conditions of" Weiss and those similarly situated to him, including
"the power and authority to (and could also delegate to managers
and supervisors the power to) (i) hire and fire employees, (ii)
determine their work schedules, (iii) determine their rates and
methods of pay, (iv) maintain employment records, and (v) otherwise
affect the quality, terms, and conditions of their employment."

The Complaint further alleges that, "at all times, employees could
complain to Starr directly regarding any of the terms of their
employment, and Starr would have the authority to effect any
changes to the quality and terms of their employment"; that Starr
"ensured the business was operating efficiently and profitably";
and that he "possesses the power and authority to supervise and
control supervisors and can reprimand employees."  Weiss contends
that Starr's control is evidenced by public statements he has made
in interviews and online videos.

Mr. Weiss commenced suit in New York Supreme Court, New York
County, on Aug. 28, 2020.  The following month, the Defendants
removed the case to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections
1332(d) and 1453.  The Moving Defendants now move to dismiss.

Discussion

To be held liable under the NYLL, "an entity or an individual must
be an 'employer'" within the meaning of the statute.  Buddakan and
Starr Restaurants do not dispute that they were Weiss' "employers"
for purposes of the NYLL.  The question presented by the motion is
whether the Moving Defendants were as well.  Weiss contends that
Starr is liable as an "employer" based on an "operational control"
theory, and that the Other Starr Restaurants are liable as
"employers" based on a "single integrated enterprise" theory.
Judge Furman begins with a description of the applicable legal
principles and then addresses each of these contentions in turn.

A. The Meaning of "Employer" Under the NYLL

The NYLL defines 'employer' as 'any person employing any individual
in any occupation, industry, trade, business or service' or 'any
individual acting as employer.'  The definition of 'employed' under
the NYLL is that a person is 'permitted or suffered to work.'"  In
evaluating whether an individual official may be liable as an
"employer," courts consider "two other factors" on top of these
four: "the scope of the individual's 'operational control' over
'employment-related factors such as workplace conditions and
operations, personnel, or compensation' and the individual's
'potential power,' i.e., the extent to which he has authority to
control employees, even if he does not exercise it."

B. Whether Stephen Starr Was Weiss' Employer

Whether the Complaint plausibly alleges that Starr was Weiss'
"employer" within the meaning of the NYLL is a close call, but
Judge Furman concludes that it does.  He says, the Complaint
alleges that Starr "is the owner, founder, and CEO of Corporate
Defendants" and that he "had and exercised control over the
employment terms and conditions of" Weiss and others similarly
situated to him, including "the power and authority to (and could
also delegate to managers and supervisors the power to) (i) hire
and fire employees, (ii) determine their work schedules, (iii)
determine their rates and methods of pay, (iv) maintain employment
records, and (v) otherwise affect the quality, terms, and
conditions of their employment."  These allegations are somewhat
conclusory and arguably would not suffice on their own, but Weiss
backs them up with public statements that Starr himself has made in
interviews and company videos.  Thus, at this early stage of the
litigation, Weiss has sufficiently alleged that Starr was his
"employer" within the meaning of the NYLL.

C. Whether the Other Starr Restaurants Were Weiss' Employers

That leaves whether the Complaint plausibly alleges that the Other
Starr Restaurants also qualified as Weiss's "employers" for
purposes of the NYLL.  Weiss contends that it does, arguing that
they constituted a single integrated enterprise such that each can
be held liable as his "employer" under the NYLL.  The Other Starr
Restaurants counter that Weiss "has not plausibly demonstrated how
each -- let alone all -- of the nine Other Starr Restaurants had
any control over the terms and conditions of his employment at
Buddakan."

Judge Furman opines that even drawing all inferences in favor of
Weiss, the allegations and exhibits do not provide adequate support
for a single-enterprise theory of liability.  At bottom, missing
from the Complaint is any allegation permitting "the inference
that" the Other Starr Restaurants "possessed the power to control"
Weiss.  In short, his "complaint is devoid of facts suggesting any
connection between him and the Other Starr Restaurants.  It
supplies no basis for bringing them into the lawsuit which, at
present, contains allegations of violations of law solely as to
him.  Accordingly, Weiss' claims against the Other Starr
Restaurants must be and are dismissed.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Furman granted the Moving
Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Other Starr Restaurants and
denied as to Starr.  Moreover, he declined to grant Weiss leave to
amend his Amended Complaint sua sponte.

Although leave to amend a complaint should be freely given "when
justice so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), Judge Furman holds
that it is "within the sound discretion of the district court to
grant or deny leave to amend," citing Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v.
Benomar, 944 F.3d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  In the case, Weiss does not request leave to amend or
suggest that he is in possession of facts that would cure the
problems with his claims.  Moreover, the Court granted Weiss leave
to amend his original complaint in response to the Moving
Defendants' first motion to dismiss and explicitly warned that he
would "not be given any further opportunity to amend the complaint
to address issues raised by the motion to dismiss."

Starr will file his Answer no later than two weeks from the date of
the Opinion and Order.  Additionally, the initial pretrial
conference is reinstated for Aug. 12, 2021, at 2:30 p.m.  The
conference will be governed by the Court's Order of Oct. 2, 2020,
and the parties should prepare accordingly, including by submitting
a joint status letter and proposed Case Management Plan no later
than the Thursday prior to the conference.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all the Defendants
other than Buddakan, Starr Restaurants, and Starr (that is,
Havatequila Restaurant Partners, LLC; Ery North Tower RHC Tenant
LLC; Dr. Howard Dr. Fine, LLC; Moe Larry Cheese, LLC; Morimoto NY
Venture, L.P.; Train Design, LLC; Sur Organization, LLC; 26th
Street Restaurant, LLC; and SRHG West, LLC) as parties and to
terminate ECF No. 23.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/vsf7t8az from Leagle.com.


TILRAY INC: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Braun Suit Junked
---------------------------------------------------------
Tilray, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the fiscal
year ended May 31, 2021, that the motion to dismiss the
consolidated class action suit entitled, Braun v. Kennedy, C.A. No.
2020-0137-KSJM, has been denied.

On February 27, 2020, Tilray stockholders Deborah Braun and Nader
Noorian filed a class action and derivative complaint in the
Delaware Court of Chancery styled Braun v. Kennedy, C.A. No.
2020-0137-KSJM. On March 2, 2020, Tilray stockholders Catherine
Bouvier, James Hawkins, and Stephanie Hawkins filed a class action
and derivative complaint in the Delaware Court of Chancery styled
Bouvier v. Kennedy, C.A. No. 2020-0154-KSJM.

On March 4, 2020, the Delaware Court of Chancery entered an order
consolidating the two cases and designating the complaint in the
Braun/Noorian action as the operative complaint. The operative
complaint asserts claims for breach of fiduciary duty against
Brendan Kennedy, Christian Groh, Michael Blue, and Privateer
Evolution, LLC (the "Privateer Defendants") for alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty in their alleged capacities as Tilray's controlling
stockholders and against Kennedy, Maryscott Greenwood, and Michael
Auerbach for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties in their
capacities as directors and/or officers of Tilray in connection
with the prior merger of Privateer Holdings, Inc. with and into a
wholly-owned subsidiary (the "Downstream Merger").

The complaint alleges that the Privateer Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by causing Tilray to enter into the Downstream
Merger and Tilray's Board to approve that Downstream Merger, and
that Defendants Kennedy, Greenwood, and Auerbach breached their
fiduciary duties as directors by approving the Downstream Merger.

Plaintiffs allege that the Downstream Merger gave the Privateer
Defendants hundreds of millions of dollars of tax savings without
providing a corresponding benefit to Tilray and its minority
stockholders and that the Downstream Merger unfairly transferred
and extended Kennedy, Blue, and Groh's control over Tilray.

On July 17, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
asserting substantially similar claims. On August 14, 2020, Tilray
and the Privateer Defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint. At the February 5, 2021 hearing on Defendants' Motions
to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs agreed that their perpetuation of
control claims are moot and stated that they intend to move for a
fee award in connection with those claims.

On June 1, 2021, the Court denied Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint.

Tilray, Inc. engages in the research, cultivation, production, and
distribution of medical cannabis and cannabinoids. The Company is
focused on medical cannabis research, cultivation, processing and
distribution of cannabis products worldwide. The company is based
in Nanaimo, British Columbia.


TILRAY INC: Bid to Dismiss Kasilingam Putative Class Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tilray, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the fiscal
year ended May 31, 2021, that the motion to dismiss filed in the
putative class action suit initiated by Ganesh Kasilingam, is
pending.

On May 4, 2020, Ganesh Kasilingam filed a lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
against Tilray, Inc., Brendan Kennedy and Mark Castaneda, on behalf
of himself and a putative class, seeking to recover damages for
alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint alleges that Tilray and the individual defendants
overstated the anticipated advantages of the Company's revenue
sharing agreement with Authentic Brands Group ("ABG"), announced on
January 15, 2019, and that the plaintiff suffered losses when
Tilray's stock price dropped after Tilray recognized an impairment
with respect to the ABG deal on March 2, 2020.

On August 6, 2020, SDNY entered an order appointing Saul Kassin as
Lead Plaintiff and The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. as Lead Counsel. Lead
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 5, 2020, which
asserts the same Sections 10(b) and 20(a) claims against the same
defendants on largely the same theory, and includes new allegations
that Tilray's reported inventory, cost of sales, and gross margins
in its financial reports during the class period were false and
misleading because Tilray improperly recorded unsellable "trim" as
inventory and understated the cost of sales for its products.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in
its entirety on December 4, 2020. Plaintiff's opposition to the
defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed on January 25, 2021, and
the defendants' reply was filed on February 24, 2021. The Motion to
Dismiss is now fully briefed and pending before the court.

Tilray, Inc. engages in the research, cultivation, production, and
distribution of medical cannabis and cannabinoids. The Company is
focused on medical cannabis research, cultivation, processing and
distribution of cannabis products worldwide. The company is based
in Nanaimo, British Columbia.


TILRAY INC: Langevin Putative Class Suit in Canada Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tilray, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the fiscal
year ended May 31, 2021, that the company continues to defend a
purported class action suit initiated by Lisa Langevin.

On June 16, 2020, Lisa Langevin commenced a purported class action
against Tilray, Aphria, Inc., and Broken Coast Cannabis Ltd. (a
subsidiary of Aphria) in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, on her
behalf and on behalf of a proposed class of all medicinal and
recreational users in Canada of the defendants' cannabis products
who consumed the products before their expiry date.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants marketed medicinal and
recreational cannabis products in circumstances where the
defendants misrepresented the amount of Tetrahydrocannabinol or
Cannabidiol in certain of their respective products.

The plaintiff claims that as a result of the alleged mislabeling,
the plaintiff and proposed class members did not receive and
consume the product that they believed they had purchased causing
them loss, risk of injury and actual injury.

The plaintiff seeks $500,000,000 in damages and restitution and
$5,000,000 in punitive damages plus interest and costs collectively
from the defendants.

On July 20, 2020, plaintiff filed an Amended Statement of Claim,
and on December 4, 2020 filed a Third Amended Statement of Claim.

The application by the defendants to be relieved from the
obligation to file a Statement of Defense was argued before the
case management justice on June 1, 2021, and a decision is under
reserve.  

Tilray said, "We plan to vigorously defend against this action, but
there can be no assurance as to the outcome."

Tilray, Inc. engages in the research, cultivation, production, and
distribution of medical cannabis and cannabinoids. The Company is
focused on medical cannabis research, cultivation, processing and
distribution of cannabis products worldwide. The company is based
in Nanaimo, British Columbia.


UNITED STATES: Class Claims in Thomas Suit Against Trump Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARNETT L. THOMAS, et al., Plaintiffs v. DONALD JOHN
TRUMP, Defendant, Civil Action No. 21-3111 (D.N.J.), Judge John
Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey grants Plaintiff Thomas' application to proceed in forma
pauperis to assert individual claims but dismisses the complaint
without prejudice.

Plaintiff Thomas seeks to bring the putative class action in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915.

Under Section 1915, the Court may excuse a litigant from prepayment
of fees when the litigant "establishes that he is unable to pay the
costs of his suit."  In the case, the Plaintiff sufficiently
establishes his inability to pay, and Judge Vazquez grants his
application to proceed in forma pauperis without prepayment of fees
and costs.

The Plaintiff explains that the matter involves three classes of
people and he seeks to bring the matter on behalf of each class.

A plaintiff who wishes to serve as the representative of a putative
class of individuals must receive class certification.   There are
four prerequisites to obtaining class certification: "(1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
defenses or claims of the class; and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." The
party seeking class certification has "the burden of establishing
that all four requisites of Rule 23(a) are met." Baby Neal v.
Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 55 (3d Cir. 1994). Courts are required to engage
in a "rigorous analysis" to ensure that the prerequisites to class
certification are satisfied. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
161 (1982).

As a threshold matter, Judge Vazquez only assesses whether the
Plaintiff can adequately represent and protect the interests of the
class pursuant to Rule 23(a)(4) because he determines the issue to
be dispositive.  He finds that the Plaintiff seeks to represent the
putative class.  The Plaintiff, however, provides no explanation as
to why he is qualified to represent the proposed class action.  The
Plaintiff does not indicate that he has any legal training or even
experience with the federal courts generally.  Moreover, while his
interests are likely aligned with those of the rest of the putative
class insofar as they have allegedly suffered similar injuries,
that factor alone is insufficient to support a finding of adequate
representation.  As a result, the Judge concludes that the
Plaintiff is not qualified to fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the putative class.

Furthermore, a class representative's adequacy is inextricably
linked with the adequacy of the counsel he or she has retained to
represent the class.  The Judge opines that the Plaintiff is not
able to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement of adequate
representation and, therefore, has not established that class
certification is warranted.  For the foregoing reasons, the
Plaintiff's class claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Although the Plaintiff's class claims are dismissed, the Judge
still considers whether the Plaintiff can proceed with his claims
individually.  The Plaintiff asserts Section 1983 claims against
Trump for his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic as president.  The
Plaintiff notes that President Trump is now a private citizen but
states that "for purposes of this complaint, the Defendant in his
official capacity as the Commander in Chief" violated his oath of
office, and abused his power as President.  Moreover, the Plaintiff
seeks monetary relief for President Trump's alleged constitutional
violations.

As a former President of the United States, the Judge explains that
Trump "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability
predicated on his official acts."  This absolute immunity is "a
functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office,
rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and
supported by our history."  Accordingly, the Plaintiff is
attempting to obtain monetary relief from a defendant that is
absolutely immune from suit.  The Plaintiff's Complaint, therefore,
is dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B).

When dismissing a case brought by a pro se plaintiff, a court must
decide whether the dismissal will be with prejudice or without
prejudice, the latter of which affords a plaintiff with leave to
amend.  Because the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and it is the
Court's initial screening, Judge Vazquez provides the Plaintiff
with an opportunity to file an amended complaint.  Yet, he notes
that he has serious concerns that the Plaintiff will be able to
state a viable claim or claims in light the immunity mentioned.

The Judge provides the Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended
complaint that cures the deficiencies set forth.  He must set forth
the basis for his claims and provide plausible factual allegations
demonstrating that he is not asserting claims against a party that
is immune from suit.  If Plaintiff does not submit an amended
complaint curing these deficiencies within 30 days, the matter will
be dismissed and closed.

Accordingly, and for good cause shown, Judge Vazquez, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a), granted Plaintiff Thomas' application to
proceed in forma pauperis.  The Clerk of the Court is directed to
file the Complaint without prepayment of the filing fee.  The
Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further

The Plaintiff is afforded 30 days to file an amended complaint that
cures the deficiencies as set forth.  Failure to file an amended
complaint within this time will result in the entire case being
dismissed and closed.

The Clerk of the Court will mail a copy of the Opinion and Order to
the Plaintiff by regular mail.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/6kfmaeww from Leagle.com.


WALGREEN CO: C.D. California Enters Final Judgment in Le Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Marcie Le and Karen Dao, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Walgreen Co., an
Illinois corporation; Walgreen Pharmacy Services Midwest, LLC, an
Illinois limited liability company; and Walgreens Boots Alliance, a
Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-01548-DOC (ADSx)
(C.D. Cal.), Judge David O. Carter of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California grants the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and their Motion for
Attorneys' Fees, Expenses, and Service Awards.

On Aug. 2, 2021, the Plaintiffs' Motions were heard by the Court.
Having Received and considered the Motions, Judge Carter grants
final approval of the Settlement, enters the Order and Judgment.

The Court previously preliminarily approved the Settlement in its
April 1, 2021 Order Directing Notice.  In accordance with the Order
Directing Notice, Class Counsel and CPT Group, Inc., provided
notice of the terms of the Settlement to the Class Members pursuant
to the terms of the Settlement and Order Directing Notice.  As part
of that notice process, the Class Members have had the opportunity
to comment on, object to, or exclude themselves from the
Settlement.

Judge Carter finds that the Notice provided to the Class comports
with and satisfied all requirements of the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 1711, et seq.  For settlement
purposes only, heconfirms and finally approves the certification of
the Class as set forth in its Order Directing Notice.

For purposes of the Order, the Class is defined as "All persons who
are and/or were employed by Defendants in California at any time
during the Class Period as hourly, non-exempt pharmacy interns,
pharmacy intern graduates, pharmacists, staff pharmacists,
multi-location pharmacists (both assigned and unassigned), and/or
pharmacy managers (classified under job code RXH; RXMHC; RXHSF;
RXHCA; RXHLS; PHI5; PHIG; PHI3; PHI6; PHI4; SPHI4; or SPHI5)."  The
following Class Members served timely and valid requests for
exclusion and are not Class Members: Ioffe, Viktoriya; Iladjian,
Payvand; Buttolph, Judith; Valdez Jr., Leonard; Do, Loanne.

No Class Members filed written objections the Settlement.

Judge Carter finds that the Settlement Agreement has been reached
as a result of informed and non-collusive arm's-length
negotiations.  He further finds that the Parties have conducted
extensive investigation and research, and their attorneys were able
to reasonably evaluate their respective positions.  He also finds
that the Settlement now will avoid additional and potentially
substantial litigation costs, as well as delay and risks if the
Parties were to continue to litigate the case.  Additionally, after
considering the monetary recovery provided as part of the
Settlement in light of the challenges posed by continued
litigation, the Judge concludes that the Class Counsel secured
significant relief for the Class Members.

The Judge also finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate in all respects to the participating Class Members.  He
orders the Parties to comply with and carry out all terms and
provisions of the Settlement to the extent that the Settlement does
not conflict with this Order and Judgment, in which case the
provisions of this Order and Judgment will take precedence.

The Judge approves the Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees
in the amount of $2,266,666.67, which will be paid from the Gross
Settlement Fund.  He also approves the Class Counsel's request for
reimbursement of litigation expenses and costs of suit in the
amount of $254,810.92, which will be paid from the Gross Settlement
Fund.

The Judge approves (i) a payment in the amount of $375,000 to the
California Labor & Workforce Development Agency, representing the
State of California's portion of civil penalties under PAGA, (ii)
an incentive payment to the Named Plaintiffs and Class
Representatives in this action, Marcie Le and Karen Dao, in the
amount of $10,000 each, and (iii) the payment of reasonable
settlement administration costs to the Settlement Administrator,
CPT Group, Inc., in the amount of $30,000, which will all be paid
from the Gross Settlement Fund.

By operation of the Order and Judgment, the claims in the Action of
each Class Member against the Defendants are released as set forth
in the Stipulation, except for those Class Members that have
validly requested exclusion.  The claims of Named Plaintiffs are
released as set forth in the Stipulation.  Nothing in the Order
will prevent any action to enforce the Parties' obligations under
the Settlement or the Order, including as to payment of the Gross
Settlement Fund.

Without affecting the finality of the Order and Judgment, the Court
reserves exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the Action;
Named Plaintiffs; the Class; and the Defendants for the purposes of
supervising the administration, implementation, enforcement,
construction, and interpretation of the Settlement and this Order
and Judgment.

Judge Carter finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry
of the Order and Judgment and hereby directs its entry.  Each Party
is to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees except as provided in
the Settlement and this Order.

By means of the Order, the Judge enters final judgment pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(1).

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ceva7ca from Leagle.com.


WEINGARTEN REALTY: Ryan Files Suit Over Kimco Realty Merger Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Ryan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Weingarten Realty Investors, Andrew M.
Alexander, Stanford J. Alexander, Shelaghmichael C. Brown, Stephen
A. Lasher, Thomas L. Ryan, Douglas W. Schnitzer, C. Park Shaper and
Marc J. Shapiro, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-05547 (N.D. Cal., July
20, 2021), seeks to enjoin defendants and all persons acting in
concert with them from proceeding with, consummating or closing the
acquisition of Weingarten by Kimco Realty Corporation, rescissory
damages, costs of this action, including reasonable allowance for
plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and further
relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, each Weingarten
stockholder will receive 1.408 newly issued shares of Kimco common
stock and $2.89 in cash for each share of Weingarten common stock
they own. On a pro forma basis, Kimco shareholders are expected to
own approximately 71% of the combined company's equity, and
Weingarten shareholders are expected to own approximately 29%.

The complaint alleges that the proxy statement filed in line with
the merger fails to provide Weingarten stockholders with material
information or provides them with materially misleading information
concerning Weingarten's and Kimco's financial projections and the
data and inputs underlying the financial valuation analyses that
support the fairness opinion provided by Weingarten's financial
advisor, J.P. Morgan & Co. LLC, and the background of the
transaction.

Weingarten is a real estate investment trust and is a shopping
center owner, manager and developer. Its common stock trades on the
New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol "WRI." [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
      Beverly Hills, CA 90210
      Telephone: (310) 208-2800
      Facsimile: (310) 209-2348.
      Email: jelkins@weisslawllp.com

             - and -

      Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
      1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
      New York, NY 10036
      Telephone: (212) 682-3025
      Facsimile: (212) 682-3010

             - and -

      Alexandra B. Raymond, Esq.
      BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
      810 Seventh Avenue, Suite 620
      New York, NY 10019
      Tel: (646) 860-9158
      Fax: (212) 214-0506
      Email: raymond@bespc.com


WELLS FARGO: $12MM Settlement Entered in Ryder Putative Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Wells Fargo & Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the Company entered into
an agreement in the Ryder v. Wells Fargo case pursuant to which the
Company will pay $12 million to cover other impacted borrowers who
were not included in the Hernandez v. Wells Fargo, et al. case.

Plaintiffs representing a class of mortgage borrowers have filed
separate putative class actions, Hernandez v. Wells Fargo, et al.,
Coordes v. Wells Fargo, et al., Ryder v. Wells Fargo, Liguori v.
Wells Fargo, and Dore v. Wells Fargo, against Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, the United States District Court for the District of
Washington, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, and the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, respectively.

Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo improperly denied mortgage loan
modifications or repayment plans to customers in the foreclosure
process due to the overstatement of foreclosure attorneys' fees
that were included for purposes of determining whether a customer
in the foreclosure process qualified for a mortgage loan
modification or repayment plan.

In March 2020, the Company entered into an agreement pursuant to
which the Company paid $18.5 million to resolve the claims of the
initial certified class in the Hernandez case, which was approved
by the district court in October 2020. The Hernandez settlement has
been reopened to include additional borrowers who the Company
determined should have been included in the settlement class
because the Company identified a population of additional borrowers
during the relevant class period whose loans had not previously
been reviewed for inclusion in the original population of impacted
customers.

In June 2021, the Company entered into an agreement pursuant to
which the Company will pay an additional approximately $22 million
to resolve the Hernandez case.

In July 2021, the Company entered into an agreement in the Ryder
case pursuant to which the Company will pay $12 million to cover
other impacted borrowers who were not included in the Hernandez
case.

The Dore and Coordes cases have been voluntarily dismissed.

In addition, federal banking regulators and other government
agencies have undertaken formal or informal inquiries or
investigations regarding these and other mortgage servicing
matters.

Wells Fargo & Company, a diversified financial services company,
provides retail, commercial, and corporate banking services to
individuals, businesses, and institutions. The company's Community
Banking segment offers checking and savings accounts; credit and
debit cards; and automobile, student, mortgage, home equity, and
small business loans. Wells Fargo & Company was founded in 1852 and
is headquartered in San Francisco, California.


WELLS FARGO: $20.8MM Settlement in ATM Access Fee Suit Reached
--------------------------------------------------------------
Wells Fargo & Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the Company has reached
a settlement in principle pursuant to which the Company will pay
$20.8 million to resolve the ATM Access Fee-related suit, subject
to final documentation of the settlement agreement.

In October 2011, plaintiffs filed a putative class action, Mackmin,
et al. v. Visa, Inc. et al., against Wells Fargo & Company, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., Visa, MasterCard, and several other banks in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Plaintiffs allege that the Visa and MasterCard requirement that if
an ATM operator charges an access fee on Visa and MasterCard
transactions, then that fee cannot be greater than the access fee
charged for transactions on other networks, violates antitrust
rules.

Plaintiffs seek treble damages, restitution, injunctive relief, and
attorneys' fees where available under federal and state law.

Two other antitrust cases that make similar allegations were filed
in the same court, but these cases did not name Wells Fargo as a
defendant.

On February 13, 2013, the district court granted defendants'
motions to dismiss the three actions. Plaintiffs appealed the
dismissals and, on August 4, 2015, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the district
court's decisions and remanded the three cases to the district
court for further proceedings.

On June 28, 2016, the United States Supreme Court granted
defendants' petitions for writ of certiorari to review the
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.

On November 17, 2016, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the
petitions as improvidently granted, and the three cases returned to
the district court for further proceedings.

The Company has entered into an agreement pursuant to which the
Company will pay $20.8 million to resolve the cases, subject to
court approval.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Wells Fargo & Company, a diversified financial services company,
provides retail, commercial, and corporate banking services to
individuals, businesses, and institutions. The company's Community
Banking segment offers checking and savings accounts; credit and
debit cards; and automobile, student, mortgage, home equity, and
small business loans. Wells Fargo & Company was founded in 1852 and
is headquartered in San Francisco, California.


ZYNGA INC: California Court Grants I.C. Leave to File Surreply
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, I.C., ET AL., Plaintiffs v. ZYNGA INC., Defendant,
Case No. 20-CV-01539-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
grants the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a surreply and
denies Zynga's request to respond thereto.

Currently pending in the putative class action are Defendant
Zynga's renewed motion to compel arbitration and motion to dismiss,
both of which were scheduled for July 27, 2021. Also pending is
Plaintiffs' administrative motion for leave to file a surreply in
order to address the Supreme Court's recent decision in TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190 (2021), which was issued after the
filing of the Plaintiffs' opposition and addressed by Zynga in its
reply.  Zynga opposes the Plaintiffs' motion for leave or, in the
alternative, requests leave to file a response to the Plaintiffs'
surreply.

Judge Rogers grants the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a
surreply and denies Zynga's request to respond thereto.  The
parties will have an opportunity to address the issue at the
hearing.  Indeed, they are advised that the hearing on the motion
to dismiss will focus on standing only. The Court will address the
merits (if necessary) upon resolution of the standing issue.

The Order terminates Docket Number 86.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 23, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3wvb539r from Leagle.com.


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Defends 2,929 Claims as of June 30
----------------------------------------------------------
3M Company, as of June 30, 2021, is a named defendant, with
multiple co-defendants, in numerous lawsuits in various courts that
purport to represent approximately 2,929 individual claimants,
compared to approximately 2,075 individual claimants with actions
pending December 31, 2020, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

3M Company states, "The vast majority of the lawsuits and claims
resolved by and currently pending against the Company allege use of
some of the Company's mask and respirator products and seek damages
from the Company and other defendants for alleged personal injury
from workplace exposures to asbestos, silica, coal mine dust or
other occupational dusts found in products manufactured by other
defendants or generally in the workplace. A minority of the
lawsuits and claims resolved by and currently pending against the
Company generally allege personal injury from occupational exposure
to asbestos from products previously manufactured by the Company,
which are often unspecified, as well as products manufactured by
other defendants, or occasionally at Company premises.

"The Company's current volume of new and pending matters is
substantially lower than it experienced at the peak of filings in
2003. The Company expects that filing of claims by unimpaired
claimants in the future will continue to be at much lower levels
than in the past. Accordingly, the number of claims alleging more
serious injuries, including mesothelioma, other malignancies, and
black lung disease, will represent a greater percentage of total
claims than in the past. Over the past twenty plus years, the
Company has prevailed in fifteen of the sixteen cases tried to a
jury. In 2018, 3M received a jury verdict in its favor in two
lawsuits – one in California state court in February and the
other in Massachusetts state court in December – both involving
allegations that 3M respirators were defective and failed to
protect the plaintiffs against asbestos fibers. In April 2018, a
jury in state court in Kentucky found 3M’s 8710 respirators
failed to protect two coal miners from coal mine dust and awarded
compensatory damages of approximately $2 million and punitive
damages totaling $63 million. In August 2018, the trial court
entered judgment and the Company appealed. During March and April
2019, the Company agreed in principle to settle a substantial
majority of the then-pending coal mine dust lawsuits in Kentucky
and West Virginia for $340 million, including the jury verdict in
April 2018 in the Kentucky case. That settlement was completed in
2019, and the appeal has been dismissed. In October 2020, 3M
defended a respirator case before a jury in King County,
Washington, involving a former shipyard worker who alleged 3M's
8710 respirator was defective and that 3M acted negligently in
failing to protect him against asbestos fibers. The jury delivered
a complete defense verdict in favor of 3M, concluding that the 8710
respirator was not defective in design or warnings and any conduct
by 3M was not a cause of plaintiff’s mesothelioma. The
plaintiff’s appeal is pending.

"The Company has demonstrated in these past trial proceedings that
its respiratory protection products are effective as claimed when
used in the intended manner and in the intended circumstances.
Consequently, the Company believes that claimants are unable to
establish that their medical conditions, even if significant, are
attributable to the Company's respiratory protection products.
Nonetheless, the Company's litigation experience indicates that
claims of persons alleging more serious injuries, including
mesothelioma, other malignancies, and black lung disease, are
costlier to resolve than the claims of unimpaired persons, and it
therefore believes the average cost of resolving pending and future
claims on a per-claim basis will continue to be higher than it
experienced in prior periods when the vast majority of claims were
asserted by medically unimpaired claimants. In addition, during the
second half of 2020 and as of June 30, 2021, the Company has
experienced an increase in the number of cases filed that allege
injuries from exposures to coal mine dust.

"As previously reported, the State of West Virginia, through its
Attorney General, filed a complaint in 2003 against the Company and
two other manufacturers of respiratory protection products in the
Circuit Court of Lincoln County, West Virginia, and amended its
complaint in 2005. The amended complaint seeks substantial, but
unspecified, compensatory damages primarily for reimbursement of
the costs allegedly incurred by the State for worker's compensation
and healthcare benefits provided to all workers with occupational
pneumoconiosis and unspecified punitive damages. In October 2019,
the court granted the State's motion to sever its unfair trade
practices claim. In January 2020, the manufacturers filed a
petition with the West Virginia Supreme Court, challenging the
trial court's rulings; that petition was denied in November 2020.
No liability has been recorded for this matter because the Company
believes that liability is not probable and reasonably estimable at
this time. In addition, the Company is not able to estimate a
possible loss or range of loss given the lack of any meaningful
discovery responses by the State of West Virginia, the otherwise
minimal activity in this case, and the assertions of claims against
two other manufacturers where a defendant’s share of liability
may turn on the law of joint and several liability and by the
amount of fault, if any, a jury may allocate to each defendant if
the case were ultimately tried."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3ilvhgj


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Carlisle Cos. Still Faces Exposure and PI Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Carlisle Companies Incorporated, over the years, has been named as
a defendant, along with numerous other defendants, in lawsuits in
various courts in which plaintiffs have alleged injury due to
exposure to asbestos-containing friction products produced and sold
predominantly by the its discontinued Motion Control business
between the late-1940s and the mid-1980s, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company has been subject to liabilities for indemnity and
defense costs associated with these lawsuits.

The Company has recorded a liability for estimated indemnity costs
associated with pending and future asbestos claims. As of June 30,
2021, the Company believes that its accrual for these costs is not
material to the Company's financial position, results of
operations, or operating cash flows.

The Company recognizes expenses for defense costs associated with
asbestos claims during the periods in which they are incurred.

The Company currently maintains insurance coverage with respect to
asbestos-related claims and associated defense costs. The Company
records the insurance coverage as a long-term receivable in an
amount it reasonably estimates is probable of recovery for pending
and future asbestos-related indemnity claims. Since the Company's
insurance policies contain various coverage exclusions, limits of
coverage and self-insured retentions and may be subject to
insurance coverage disputes, the Company may recognize expenses for
indemnity and defense costs in particular periods if and when it
becomes probable that such costs will not be covered by insurance.

The Company is also involved in various other legal actions and
proceedings arising in the ordinary course of business. In the
opinion of management, the ultimate outcomes of such actions and
proceedings, either individually or in the aggregate, are not
expected to have a material adverse effect on the Company's
financial position, results of operations, or operating cash
flows.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3rRk9L6


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corning Has $96MM Estimated Reserve at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Corning Incorporated is a defendant in certain cases alleging
injuries from asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "At June 30, 2021 and December 31, 2020, the
amount of the reserve for these asbestos claims was estimated to be
$96 million and represented the undiscounted projection of claims
and related legal fees for the estimated life of the litigation."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2VqCKSe


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crown Holdings Still Faces Exposure Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Crown Holdings, Inc., formerly Crown Cork & Seal Company, is one of
many defendants in a substantial number of lawsuits filed
throughout the U.S. by persons alleging bodily injury as a result
of exposure to asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These claims arose from the insulation
operations of a U.S. company, the majority of whose stock Crown
Cork purchased in 1963. Approximately ninety days after the stock
purchase, this U.S. company sold its insulation assets and was
later merged into Crown Cork.

"Prior to 1998, amounts paid to asbestos claimants were covered by
a fund made available to Crown Cork under a 1985 settlement with
carriers insuring Crown Cork through 1976, when Crown Cork became
self-insured. The fund was depleted in 1998 and the Company has no
remaining coverage for asbestos-related costs.

"In December 2001, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted
legislation that limits the asbestos-related liabilities of
Pennsylvania corporations that are successors by corporate merger
to companies involved with asbestos. The legislation limits the
successor's liability for asbestos to the acquired company's asset
value adjusted for inflation.

"Crown Cork has paid significantly more for asbestos-related claims
than the acquired company's adjusted asset value. In November 2004,
the legislation was amended to address a Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision (Ieropoli v. AC&S Corporation, et. al., No. 117 EM 2002)
which held that the statute violated the Pennsylvania Constitution
due to retroactive application. The Company cautions that the
limitations of the statute, as amended, are subject to litigation
and may not be upheld.

"In June 2003, the state of Texas enacted legislation that limits
the asbestos-related liabilities in Texas courts of companies such
as Crown Cork that allegedly incurred these liabilities because
they are successors by corporate merger to companies that had been
involved with asbestos. The Texas legislation, which applies to
future claims and pending claims, caps asbestos-related liabilities
at the total gross value of the predecessor’s assets adjusted for
inflation. Crown Cork has paid significantly more for
asbestos-related claims than the total adjusted value of its
predecessor’s assets.

"In October 2010, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas
legislation was unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution when
applied to asbestos-related claims pending against Crown Cork when
the legislation was enacted in June 2003. The Company believes that
the decision of the Texas Supreme Court is limited to retroactive
application of the Texas legislation to asbestos-related cases that
were pending against Crown Cork in Texas on June 11, 2003 and
therefore, in its accrual, continues to assign no value to claims
filed after June 11, 2003.

"In recent years, the states of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming enacted legislation that limits
asbestos-related liabilities under state law of companies such as
Crown Cork that allegedly incurred these liabilities because they
are successors by corporate merger to companies that had been
involved with asbestos. The legislation, which applies to future
and, with the exception of Arkansas, Georgia, South Carolina, South
Dakota, West Virginia and Wyoming, pending claims, caps
asbestos-related liabilities at the fair market value of the
predecessor's total gross assets adjusted for inflation. Crown Cork
has paid significantly more for asbestos-related claims than the
total value of its predecessor's assets adjusted for inflation.
Crown Cork has integrated the legislation into its claims defense
strategy.

"The outstanding claims in each period exclude approximately 19,000
inactive claims. Due to the passage of time, the Company considers
it unlikely that the plaintiffs in these cases will pursue further
action against the Company. The exclusion of these inactive claims
had no effect on the calculation of the Company's accrual as the
claims were filed in states, as described above, where the
Company's liability is limited by statute.

"With respect to claimants alleging first exposure to asbestos
before or during 1964, the Company does not include in its accrual
any amounts for settlements in states where the Company's liability
is limited by statute except for certain pending claims in Texas as
described earlier.

"With respect to post-1964 claims, regardless of the existence of
asbestos legislation, the Company does not include in its accrual
any amounts for settlement of these claims because of increased
difficulty of establishing identification of relevant insulation
products as the cause of injury. Given the Company's settlement
experience with post-1964 claims, it does not believe that an
adverse ruling in the Texas or Pennsylvania asbestos litigation
cases, or in any other state that has enacted asbestos legislation,
would have a material impact on the Company with respect to such
claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3xmloTW



ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Int'l Faces Personal Injury Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Honeywell International Inc. is named in asbestos-related personal
injury claims related to North American Refractories Company
(NARCO), which was sold in 1986, and the Bendix Friction Materials
(Bendix) business, which was sold in 2014, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "NARCO manufactured high-grade, heat-resistant,
refractory products for various industries. Honeywell's
predecessor, Allied Corporation, owned NARCO from 1979 to 1986.
Allied Corporation sold the NARCO business in 1986 and entered into
a cross-indemnity agreement which included an obligation to
indemnify the purchaser for asbestos claims. Such claims arise
primarily from alleged occupational exposure to asbestos-containing
refractory brick and mortar for high-temperature applications.
NARCO ceased manufacturing these products in 1980 and ultimately
filed for bankruptcy in January 2002, at which point in time all
then current and future NARCO asbestos claims were stayed against
both NARCO and Honeywell pending the reorganization of NARCO. The
Company established its initial liability for NARCO asbestos claims
in 2002.

"NARCO emerged from bankruptcy in April 2013, at which time a
federally authorized 524(g) trust was established to evaluate and
resolve all existing NARCO asbestos claims (the Trust). Both
Honeywell and NARCO are protected by a permanent channeling
injunction barring all present and future individual actions in
state or federal courts and requiring all asbestos-related claims
based on exposure to NARCO asbestos-containing products to be made
against the Trust. The NARCO Trust Agreement (TA) and the NARCO
Trust Distribution Procedures (TDP) are the principal documents
setting forth the structure of the Trust, establishing Honeywell's
evergreen funding obligations and the material operating rules for
the Trust.

"Per the TA, the Trust is eligible to receive cash dividends from
Harbison-Walker International Inc. (HWI), the reorganized and
renamed entity that emerged, fully operational, from the NARCO
bankruptcy. The cash dividends are required to be used to pay
claims which qualify for payment under the TDP (Annual Contribution
Claims) until those funds are exhausted, at which point
Honeywell’s funding obligation is triggered. Honeywell's funding
obligation, together with any HWI dividends used to pay claims, is
subject to an annual cap of $145 million. In July 2021, HWI paid a
dividend of $47 million to the NARCO Trust. The Company is also
required to fund amounts owed pursuant to settlement agreements
reached during the pendency of the NARCO bankruptcy proceedings
that provide for the right to submit claims to the Trust subject to
qualification under the terms of the settlement agreements and TDP
(Pre-Established Unliquidated Claims), as well as fund the annual
operating costs of the Trust.

"The operating rules per the TDP include Honeywell's audit rights
and the criteria claimants must meet for a claim to be considered
valid and paid, which include adequate medical evidence of the
claimant's asbestos-related condition and credible evidence of
exposure to a specific NARCO asbestos-containing product. Once
operational in 2014, the Trust began to receive, process and pay
claims, at which point the Company began to assert its audit rights
to review and monitor the claims processor's adherence to the
established requirements of the TDP. While doing so, the Company
identified several issues with the way the Trust was adhering to
the TDP and the Company continues to identify and dispute these
matters as further claims are processed. Although the Company is
attempting to resolve instances where it believes the Trust is not
processing claims in accordance with the established TDP, the
Company reserves the right to seek judicial intervention should it
fail to resolve the disputed issues.

"Due to the bankruptcy filing in 2002, claimants were not permitted
to file additional claims until the Trust became operative in 2014.
As a consequence, there was a large backlog of claims that were
filed with the Trust upon becoming operative through December 31,
2017, the date by which these claims had to be filed or else be
barred by the statute of limitations (subject to tolling exceptions
in the TDP). Therefore, the claims filing rate did not start to
normalize until 2018 and thereafter. As a result, between 2002 and
2018, the Company lacked a history of sufficiently reliable claims
data to derive a reasonable estimate of its NARCO asbestos-related
liability, and the Company continued to update its original
estimate, as appropriate, using all available information.
23 Honeywell International Inc.

"In 2020, with three years of sufficiently reliable claims data,
the Company updated its estimate of the NARCO asbestos-related
liability utilizing claims data from January 1, 2018 through
December 31, 2020. The Company utilized an asbestos liability
valuation specialist to support our preparation of the NARCO
asbestos-related liability estimates. Our estimates, which involve
significant management judgment, include consideration of multiple
scenarios, including a scenario adjusting for the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on the Trust's ability to process claims during
2020. The estimate for the resolution of asserted Annual
Contribution Claims and Pre-Established Unliquidated Claims uses
average payment values for the relevant historical period. For
unasserted claims, the estimate is based on historic and
anticipated claims filing experience and payment rates, disease
classifications and type of claim, and average payment values by
the Trust for the relevant historical period. The Company's
estimate also includes all years of epidemiological disease
projection through 2059.

"The NARCO asbestos-related liability reflects an estimate for the
resolution of Annual Contribution Claims and Pre-Established
Unliquidated Claims filed with the Trust, as well as for unasserted
Annual Contribution Claims and Pre-Established Unliquidated Claims.
The NARCO asbestos liability excludes the annual operating expenses
of the Trust which are expensed as they are incurred.

"The Company's NARCO-related insurance receivable reflects coverage
which reimburses Honeywell for portions of NARCO-related claims and
defense costs. This coverage is provided by a large number of
insurance policies written by dozens of insurance companies in both
the domestic insurance market and the London excess market.
Honeywell's NARCO-related insurance receivable is an estimate of
the probable amount of insurance that is recoverable for asbestos
claims. Most of our insurance carriers remain solvent. However,
select individual insurance carriers are now insolvent, which we
have considered in our analysis of probable recoveries. Our
judgments related to our insurance carriers and insurance coverages
are reasonable and consistent with Honeywell's historical dealings
and Honeywell's knowledge of any pertinent solvency issues
surrounding insurers.

"Bendix manufactured automotive brake linings that contained
chrysotile asbestos in an encapsulated form. Claimants consist
largely of individuals who allege exposure to asbestos from brakes
from either performing or being in the vicinity of individuals who
performed brake replacements.

"The Company reflects the inclusion of all years of epidemiological
disease projection through 2059 when estimating the liability for
unasserted Bendix-related asbestos claims. Such liability for
unasserted Bendix-related asbestos claims is based on historic and
anticipated claims filing experience and dismissal rates, disease
classifications, and resolution values in the tort system for the
previous five years. The Company has valued Bendix asserted and
unasserted claims using average resolution values for the previous
five years. The Company updates the resolution values used to
estimate the cost of Bendix asserted and unasserted claims during
the fourth quarter each year.

"The Company's insurance receivable corresponding to the liability
for settlement of asserted and unasserted Bendix asbestos claims
reflects coverage which is provided by a large number of insurance
policies written by dozens of insurance companies in both the
domestic insurance market and the London excess market. Based on
our ongoing analysis of the probable insurance recovery, insurance
receivables are recorded in the financial statements simultaneous
with the recording of the estimated liability for the underlying
asbestos claims. This determination is based on our analysis of the
underlying insurance policies, our historical experience with our
insurers, our ongoing review of the solvency of our insurers,
judicial determinations relevant to our insurance programs, and our
consideration of the impacts of any settlements reached with our
insurers."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2WWdnZh


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lennox Int'l Faces Personal Injury Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Lennox International Inc. is involved in a number of claims and
lawsuits alleging personal injury or health problems resulting from
exposure to asbestos that was integrated into certain of its
products, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "We have never manufactured asbestos and have
not incorporated asbestos-containing components into our products
for several decades. A substantial majority of these
asbestos-related claims have been covered by insurance or other
forms of indemnity or have been dismissed without payment. The
remainder of our closed cases have been resolved for amounts that
are not material, individually or in the aggregate. Our defense
costs for asbestos-related claims are generally covered by
insurance. However, our insurance coverage for settlements and
judgments for asbestos-related claims varies depending on several
factors and are subject to policy limits. We may have greater
financial exposure for future settlements and judgments."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/37jHP1n


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lincoln Electric Still Defends 2,751 Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Lincoln Electric Holdings, Inc., as of June 30, 2021, is a
co-defendant in cases alleging asbestos induced illness involving
claims by approximately 2,751 plaintiffs, which is a net decrease
of 24 claims from those previously reported, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Lincoln Electric states, "In each instance, the Company is one of a
large number of defendants. The asbestos claimants seek
compensatory and punitive damages, in most cases for unspecified
sums. Since January 1, 1995, the Company has been a co-defendant in
other similar cases that have been resolved as follows: 55,528 of
those claims were dismissed, 23 were tried to defense verdicts, 7
were tried to plaintiff verdicts (which were reversed or resolved
after appeal), 1 was resolved by agreement for an immaterial amount
and 1,008 were decided in favor of the Company following summary
judgment motions."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3Adai5c


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rockwell Automation Still Defends PI Lawsuits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rockwell Automation, Inc., including its subsidiaries, have been
named as a defendant in lawsuits alleging personal injury as a
result of exposure to asbestos that was used in certain components
of its products many years ago, including products from divested
businesses for which they have agreed to defend and indemnify
claims, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Currently there are a few thousand claimants
in lawsuits that name us as defendants, together with hundreds of
other companies. But in all cases, for those claimants who do show
that they worked with our products or products of divested
businesses for which we are responsible, we nevertheless believe we
have meritorious defenses, in substantial part due to the integrity
of the products, the encapsulated nature of any asbestos-containing
components, and the lack of any impairing medical condition on the
part of many claimants. We defend those cases vigorously.
Historically, we have been dismissed from the vast majority of
these claims with no payment to claimants.

"Additionally, we have maintained insurance coverage that includes
indemnity and defense costs, over and above self-insured
retentions, for many of these claims. We believe these arrangements
will provide substantial coverage for future defense and indemnity
costs for these asbestos claims throughout the remaining life of
asbestos liability. The uncertainties of asbestos claim litigation
make it difficult to predict accurately the ultimate outcome of
asbestos claims. That uncertainty is increased by the possibility
of adverse rulings or new legislation affecting asbestos claim
litigation or the settlement process. Subject to these
uncertainties and based on our experience defending asbestos
claims, we do not believe these lawsuits will have a material
effect on our business, financial condition or results of
operations.

"We have, from time to time, divested certain of our businesses. In
connection with these divestitures, certain lawsuits, claims and
proceedings may be instituted or asserted against us related to the
period that we owned the businesses, either because we agreed to
retain certain liabilities related to these periods or because such
liabilities fall upon us by operation of law. In some instances the
divested business has assumed the liabilities; however, it is
possible that we might be responsible to satisfy those liabilities
if the divested business is unable to do so. We do not believe
these liabilities will have a material effect on our business,
financial condition or results of operations.

"In many countries we provide a limited intellectual property
indemnity as part of our terms and conditions of sale and at times
in other contracts with third parties. As of June 30, 2021, we were
not aware of any material indemnification claims that were probable
or reasonably possible of an unfavorable outcome. Historically,
claims that have been made under the indemnification agreements
have not had a material impact on our business, financial condition
or results of operations; however, to the extent that valid
indemnification claims arise in the future, future payments by us
could be significant and could have a material adverse effect on
our business, financial condition or results of operations in a
particular period. During the first quarter of fiscal 2021, we
reached a favorable settlement agreement regarding ongoing
litigation of a trademark infringement and false advertising matter
and received $70 million. The settlement gain is recorded in other
(expense) income in the Consolidated Statement of Operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3yq0PY0


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Travelers Cos. Still Defends Asbestos Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Travelers Companies, Inc., has received and continues to
receive a significant number of asbestos claims, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company believes that the property and casualty insurance
industry has suffered from court decisions and other trends that
have expanded insurance coverage for asbestos claims far beyond the
original intent of insurers and policyholders. Factors underlying
these claim filings include continued intensive advertising by
lawyers seeking asbestos claimants and the focus by plaintiffs on
defendants, such as manufacturers of talcum powder, who were not
traditionally primary targets of asbestos litigation. The focus on
these defendants is primarily the result of the number of
traditional asbestos defendants who have sought bankruptcy
protection in previous years.  The bankruptcy of many traditional
defendants has also caused increased settlement demands against
those policyholders who are not in bankruptcy but remain in the
tort system. Currently, in many jurisdictions, those who allege
very serious injury and who can present credible medical evidence
of their injuries are receiving priority trial settings in the
courts, while those who have not shown any credible disease
manifestation are having their hearing dates delayed or placed on
an inactive docket. Prioritizing claims involving credible evidence
of injuries, along with the focus on defendants who were not
traditionally primary targets of asbestos litigation, contributes
to the claims and claim adjustment expense payment patterns
experienced by the Company. The Company's asbestos-related claims
and claim adjustment expense experience also has been impacted by
the unavailability of other insurance sources potentially available
to policyholders, whether through exhaustion of policy limits or
through the insolvency of other participating insurers.

The Company continues to be involved in disputes, including
litigation, with a number of policyholders, some of whom are in
bankruptcy, over coverage for asbestos-related claims. Many
coverage disputes with policyholders are only resolved through
settlement agreements. Because many policyholders make exaggerated
demands, it is difficult to predict the outcome of settlement
negotiations. Settlements involving bankrupt policyholders may
include extensive releases which are favorable to the Company, but
which could result in settlements for larger amounts than
originally anticipated. Although the Company has seen a reduction
in the overall risk associated with these disputes, it remains
difficult to predict the ultimate cost of these claims. As in the
past, the Company will continue to pursue settlement
opportunities.

In addition to claims against policyholders, proceedings have been
launched directly against insurers, including the Company, by
individuals challenging insurers' conduct with respect to the
handling of past asbestos claims and by individuals seeking damages
arising from alleged asbestos-related bodily injuries. It is
possible that other direct actions against insurers, including the
Company, could be filed in the future. It is difficult to predict
the outcome of these proceedings, including whether the plaintiffs
would be able to sustain these actions against insurers based on
novel legal theories of liability. The Company believes it has
meritorious defenses to any such claims and has received favorable
rulings in certain jurisdictions.

Because each policyholder presents different liability and coverage
issues, the Company generally reviews the exposure presented by
each policyholder with open claims at least annually.  Among the
factors the Company may consider in the course of this review are:
available insurance coverage, including the role of any umbrella or
excess insurance the Company has issued to the policyholder; limits
and deductibles; an analysis of the policyholder’s potential
liability; the jurisdictions involved; past and anticipated future
claim activity and loss development on pending claims; past
settlement values of similar claims; allocated claim adjustment
expense; the potential role of other insurance; the role, if any,
of non-asbestos claims or potential non-asbestos claims in any
resolution process; and applicable coverage defenses or
determinations, if any, including the determination as to whether
or not an asbestos claim is a products/completed operation claim
subject to an aggregate limit and the available coverage, if any,
for that claim.

The Company's quarterly asbestos reserve reviews include an
analysis of exposure and claim payment patterns by policyholder, as
well as recent settlements, policyholder bankruptcies, judicial
rulings and legislative actions. The Company also analyzes
developing payment patterns among policyholders and the assumed
reinsurance component of reserves, as well as projected reinsurance
billings and recoveries. In addition, the Company reviews its
historical gross and net loss and expense paid experience,
year-by-year, to assess any emerging trends, fluctuations, or
characteristics suggested by the aggregate paid activity.
Conventional actuarial methods are not utilized to establish
asbestos reserves, and the Company's evaluations have not resulted
in a reliable method to determine a meaningful average asbestos
defense or indemnity payment. Over the past decade, the property
and casualty insurance industry, including the Company, has
experienced net unfavorable prior year reserve development with
regard to asbestos reserves, but the Company believes that over
that period there has been a reduction in the volatility associated
with the Company's overall asbestos exposure as the overall
asbestos environment has evolved from one dominated by exposure to
significant litigation risks, particularly coverage disputes
relating to policyholders in bankruptcy who were asserting that
their claims were not subject to the aggregate limits contained in
their policies, to an environment primarily driven by a frequency
of litigation related to individuals with mesothelioma. The
Company's overall view of the current underlying asbestos
environment is essentially unchanged from recent periods, and there
remains a high degree of uncertainty with respect to future
exposure to asbestos claims.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2WulADP

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Has $1.06BB Est. Claims at June 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Union Carbide Corporation has reported a total asbestos-related
liability for pending and future claims and defense and processing
costs of $1,060 million at June 30, 2021, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Union Carbide states, "The Corporation is and has been involved in
a large number of asbestos-related suits filed primarily in state
courts during the past four decades. These suits principally allege
personal injury resulting from exposure to asbestos‑containing
products and frequently seek both actual and punitive damages. The
alleged claims primarily relate to products that UCC sold in the
past, alleged exposure to asbestos-containing products located on
UCC's premises, and UCC's responsibility for asbestos suits filed
against a former UCC subsidiary, Amchem Products, Inc. ("Amchem").
In many cases, plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that they have
suffered any compensable loss as a result of such exposure, or that
injuries incurred in fact resulted from exposure to UCC's
products.

"Plaintiffs' lawyers often sue numerous defendants in individual
lawsuits or on behalf of numerous claimants. As a result, the
damages alleged are not expressly identified as to UCC, Amchem or
any other particular defendant, even when specific damages are
alleged with respect to a specific disease or injury. In fact,
there are no personal injury cases in which only the Corporation
and/or Amchem are the sole named defendants. For these reasons and
based upon the Corporation's litigation and settlement experience,
the Corporation does not consider the damages alleged against it
and Amchem to be a meaningful factor in its determination of any
potential asbestos-related liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3xrWWQW



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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